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Assessment and Appeals under the Income Tax Act, 2025

The Income Tax Act 2025 was enacted following demands to modernize and simplify the bulky 1961 Act. Despite high expectations for structural change, the New Act is considered a disappointment because it makes very little change in substance. The stated objective was merely language simplification, which involved converting hundreds of explanations and provisos into sub-sections, and changing established terms like “notwithstanding” to “irrespective”. This linguistic revision creates an apprehension of increased litigation by disrupting settled judicial interpretation.

Procedurally, the New Act replaces the concept of “assessment year” with “tax year”. A critical transitional issue is that the Old Act (1961) will continue to apply to proceedings pending as of April 1, 2026, for previous tax years. This means taxpayers and practitioners must remain proficient in the provisions of both the 1961 and 2025 Acts for at least the next decade. Ultimately, stakeholders question whether the substantial effort was worthwhile given the minimal changes and the risk of new legal controversies.

BACKGROUND

The Income Tax Act 1961 has been around for more than six decades. The said Act had undergone innumerable changes, some on account of changes in the economic environment, some due to judicial interpretation being not in consonance with legislative intent, and some for other reasons. Consequently, the Act had indeed become bulky, and many new users found it to be cumbersome. The need for a new Income Tax legislation had been doing the rounds for more than a decade and a half. A direct tax code was put in the public domain in around 2010. Professionals spent huge amounts of time trying to analyse and dissect the provisions thereof and make representations to the government. For reasons best known to the lawmakers the direct tax code got a quick burial and is now lying only in the archives.

When a New Act was mooted, the profession and probably the taxpayer had great expectations. This was an era of massive technological development, all-round economic growth and the liberalisation of 1991, had resulted in a sea change in business environment. The government always mentioned its object of ushering in “ease of doing business.” It was hoped that the new legislation would make structural changes, conduct a complete overhaul of the cumbersome procedural issues and the New Income Tax Act, would be a forward-looking model legislation. Sadly, these expectations have not been met and to that extent the new legislation is a disappointment. The feeling is that a great opportunity has been lost.

The announcement of the new legislation was made in July 2024; the bill was tabled on 13th February 2025. referred to the Select Committee immediately thereafter. After the report of the Select Committee, which suggested a large number of changes, many of which were accepted by the Finance Ministry, the old bill was withdrawn on 8th August 2025. The redrafted legislation was placed before Parliament on 11th August 2025, passed by both houses on 11/12th August 2025 and received presidential assent on 21st August 2025. The Income Tax Act 2025 (hereafter referred to as the New Act), does not make any change in substance in the Income Tax Act 1961 (hereafter referred to as the Old Act). In its responses to the Select Committee, the Finance Ministry has made it abundantly clear that it does not intend to make any policy change and the objective was merely to ensure that the new law had language which the stakeholders could easily comprehend, was dynamic and forward-looking. Unfortunately, the objects do not seem to have been achieved. There is apprehension that, on account of the changes in language, there may be increase in litigation, unless the lawmakers take appropriate steps.

SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE

As has been narrated in the earlier paragraphs, there is very little change in substance between the Old Act and the New Act. The tabulations comparing/ matching old sections with the new sections are already in the public domain, and in this era of complete information access, bear no repetition. Therefore the object is to point out the limited changes that have been made in the provisions relating to assessment and appeals, analyse the thought process of the Finance Ministry which has been recorded by way of responses to the suggestions of the Select Committee and put forth some suggestions wherever appropriate.

IMPACT OF CHANGE IN LANGUAGE

As an endeavour towards simplifying language, all the explanations in the Old Act {900 in number) and provisos (1200 in number) have been given a go by, and the text of the said explanations and provisos find place in the New Act by way of sub-sections. The role and ambit of explanations and provisos had been judicially interpreted for more than six decades and the law on that aspect was now well settled. Judicial fora were clear, that an explanation could not exceed the ambit of the main provision and a proviso was only an exception or carve out.

Income Tax Act 2025 A Missed Opportunity

When an explanation or a proviso is enacted as an independent provision by way of a sub-section, it would stand on the same footing as the other sub-sections in the section. As a consequence, if the two sub-sections are in conflict with each other or there is an element of difference in interpretation, it would require judicial intervention to make a rational interpretation. The most significant difference in language is the use of the word “irrespective of” instead of the word “notwithstanding”. In my humble understanding, these two words do not mean the same thing. It is also important to note that the word “notwithstanding” was a non-obstantate clause, and if it appeared at two places, the impact was judicially interpreted. Using the word “irrespective of”, may result in interpretation issues. The Finance Ministry has clarified that the change in language is only to make it simple and not to disagree with established propositions. It may be appropriate for the Finance Ministry to clearly mention that despite the use of a different word, the intent is to accept the interpretation that was placed on the word “notwithstanding”.

REPEAL AND SAVINGS – SECTION 536

While section 536(2) of the New Act has clauses (a) to (s), clauses (c), (d), (e) and (g) are of importance for the scope of this article. Clauses (c), (d) and (e) provide that in respect of any proceeding pending as at the date of the commencement of the New Act, pertaining to tax year beginning before 1st April 2026, the provisions of the Old Act would continue to apply. This will mean that in regard to any proceeding which is pending as on 1st April 2026, in regard to assessment year 2026-27(previous year 2025-26), or any year prior thereto, the Old Act will apply. Further if any proceeding is initiated after 1st April 2026 pertaining to these years, the Old Act will continue to apply. This will mean that at least for the next decade or so, tax practitioners will have to keep abreast of the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1961, as well as the Income Tax Act 2025. Of course, this was the position also at the time that the Income Tax Act 1922, gave way to the Income Tax Act 1961. The difference is that the tax compliance landscape at that point of time was far simpler than it is today. Considering the current complexities, taxpayers, tax practitioners as well as tax administrators have a daunting task ahead.

The procedures, obligations limitations provided for/prescribed under the Old Act would continue for all years commencing on before 1st April 2026. Clause (g), provides that in regard to any refund pertaining to an year prior to the commencement of the New Act or any sum due by the assessee pertaining to that year, the provisions relating to interest either payable by the Central Government or by the assessee, the provisions of the New Act will apply for the period after the commencement of the act.

DEFINITIONS / CONCEPTS PRIOR TO ASSESSMENT

The definitions pertaining to assessment, person, regular assessment, tax in the New Act are virtually identical to that of the Old Act. In the term “assessment”, the term recomputation has been included. This is only a semantic change as computation of tax was always a part of the assessment process.

In keeping with the change of replacing the concept of assessment year by a tax year, the New Act does not have a definition of assessment year, but a tax year is defined in section 3, in place of a previous year. Therefore 2026-27 will be the assessment year for previous year 2025-26 and tax year for financial year 2026-27.

The provisions of section 263 in regard to furnishing of a return of income, and section 267 pertaining to an updated return are similar to the corresponding provisions in the Old Act.

ASSESSMENT

The provisions in regard to inquiry before assessment are similar to that under the Old Act. Section 270(1) which deals with processing of a return of income corresponds to section 143(1) of the Old Act. Before the Select Committee, the stake holders had represented that after processing the return by the Centralized Processing Centre (CPC), which is a mechanical process now facilitated by artificial intelligence, the responsibility of grant of refund, rectification etc should vest with the jurisdictional assessing officer (JAO). This would solve a large number of problems, which arise on account of the absence of a human interface. To illustrate, in the case of a developer following the percentage completion method, the withholding of tax by the flat purchaser, the determination of income results in a mismatch, requiring reconciliation. In situations like this, a human interface becomes inevitable.

The Finance Ministry response to the stakeholders suggestion was that the duties of the CPC and the JAO are properly delineated. According to the Ministry, the CPC processes returns according to Taxpayer’s Charter. It also transfers the rectification rights on request. The speed of such actions and the actual situation in the field is well known to taxpayers and tax practitioners.

Section 273 of the New Act corresponds to section 144B of the Old Act. However, there is a significant difference between the New Act and Old Act. Section 144B provided for the entire process of a faceless assessment. Despite the deletion of section 144B (9), which expressly provided that the non-adherence to the procedure would result in the assessment as non-est, statutory recognition of the process resulted in protection of the assesee’s rights. Section 273 delegates the duty of prescription to the CBDT. Before the Select Committee, the stakeholders urged that the assessment process should have statutory recognition. The Finance Ministry response was that even delegated legislation has parliamentary oversight, as the rules framed have to be placed before the Parliament. One wonders whether such oversight is sufficient protection for the taxpayer. The infringement of a statute would give different rights to an assessee. The same may not be true of a violation of a rule. While delegated legislation gives the administrators flexibility, one wonders whether the powers of prescription would be fairly used.

REASSESSMENT

Section 280 corresponds to section 148 of the Old Act by virtue of which a person is called upon to file a return, if, in the opinion of the department, income has escaped assessment. Sub section (5) of the section dispenses with the requirement of an opportunity in terms of section 281 in certain circumstances. The circumstances have been expanded to include , in terms of Section 280(6)(g) and (h) two situations, namely the issue of any direction by an approving panel in respect of an impermissible avoidance agreement, and any finding or direction contained in an order passed by any authority tribunal or court in any proceeding under this Act by way of appeal, reference revision, or by a court in any proceeding under any other the law. If these circumstances exist, no opportunity mandated by section 281, is necessary before issue of notice under section 280.

Before the Select Committee, the stake holders had requested that an opportunity be provided to an assessee, in terms of section 281 even if such circumstances exist. The Finance Ministry response was that, since the finding or direction was by a higher authority, it was bound to follow it and in any event an opportunity was already afforded by the authority before it recorded a finding or issued a direction. This could have significant repercussions for two reasons. Firstly, the term “authority” has not been defined in the New Act, though an income tax authority has been defined. So, the scope of the exclusion from a prior enquiry would stand substantially expanded, Secondly the finding or direction by a court under any other law, could put an assessee to substantial inconvenience. This is because each law has a different and distinct ambit. To illustrate, in a proceeding under say the PMLA or Prevention of Corruption Act, the court may record a finding. If the reopening is based on such a finding, it could have repercussions. Another example would be the statement of parties in matrimonial dispute before a family court. In such cases, statements are made in a particular context. If the court records a finding in regard to such statements, it could cause problem to assessees.

Section 282 sets out the time limit within which notice under section 280 can be issued. At first blush, one feels that the time limit has been increased from three years to four years and from five years to six years in certain circumstances, This is however not so. Section 149 of the Old Act prescribed limits with reference to an assessment year while the New Act prescribes time limits with reference to a tax year. The actual timelines therefore remain unchanged.
Section 286, corresponding to section 153 of the Old Act, sets out the time limits within which assessments, reassessments and recomputations are to be completed. Unlike section 153, which uses the term “month”, section 286 uses the word “year”. The reason for such change is not understood. Since both these terms are not defined in either the Old Act or the New Act the definition under the General Clauses Act will apply

APPEALS AND REVISION

The appeal and revision provisions remain substantially unchanged, though there are minor differences in language. Interestingly in regard to the revisionary powers of the Commissioner under section 378, the stakeholders had requested that the intimation under section 270(1) be treated as an order for the purpose of revision. This was earlier provided in section 264 in the Old Act, but after the deletion of the explanation, conflicting views had arisen. While declining to make a change in regard to the revisionary powers of the Commissioner, the Finance Ministry has explicitly stated that there is “no bar to a Commissioner exercising his jurisdiction in regard to an intimation under section 270(1). This would be clarified by way of administrative instructions.“ Thus, at least one controversy as to whether an assessee can invoke a Commissioner’s revisionary jurisdiction in regard to an intimation appears to have been settled.

CONCLUSION

If, simplification of language and reduction in volume were the only objects of the New Act, and the government was not desirous of making any structural or policy change, one wonders whether the huge effort and cost was worth it, A major part of the objects could have been achieved by a Taxation Laws Amendment Act. It will be only in mid-2027 that the provisions which are the subject matter of this article will be put to use. Even with the restriction that no policy change is to be made, it would be appropriate to make some changes in the Income Tax Act 2025. Probably the Government is conscious of this. It is borne out by the answer by the Minister of State for Finance in reply to a question in Parliament, which mentions that the forms to be used with effect from 1st April 2026, will be notified only after the Finance Bill 2026 is passed as the said bill may make certain changes to the New Act. One hopes that the lacunae which have already come to the fore are taken care of, so that litigation pertaining to the New Act can be avoided to the extent it can!

Allied Laws

43. K. S. Shivappa vs. K. Neelamma

AIR 2025 SC 4792

October 07, 2025

Minor’s Property – Repudiation of Voidable Transfer – Transfers held to be void ab initio. [S. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963]

FACTS

Mahadevappa owned plots in Davanagere, which were purchased in the names of the three minor sons of Rudrappa. Without obtaining the mandatory permission of the District Court under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, Rudrappa, the natural guardian, sold plot no. 56 and plot no. 57 to third parties in 1971. The purchasers further transferred the plots, including a transfer of plot no. 57 in 1993 to Smt. Neelamma (Respondent). After attaining majority, the surviving minors, along with their mother, repudiated the guardian’s unauthorised sales by executing fresh sale deeds in favour of K.S. Shivappa (Appellant). Appellant thereafter combined both plots and constructed a house. The Respondent filed a suit for declaration and possession, claiming that her vendor had a good title. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the minors had validly repudiated the earlier sale through their later conveyance to Appellant. The First Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding that in the absence of a suit for cancellation, the guardian’s sale had attained finality. The High Court affirmed this view, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that a sale of a minor’s property made by a natural guardian without obtaining prior court permission under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, is voidable, and it is not mandatory for the minor, upon attaining majority, to file a suit to set aside such a sale. The Court clarified that a voidable transaction may be avoided either through a formal suit or by unequivocal conduct, such as the minor subsequently selling the same property within the period of limitation. In this case, the surviving minors, after attaining majority, had validly repudiated their father’s unauthorised sale by executing a fresh sale deed in favour of the appellant, K.S. Shivappa. Consequently, the earlier sale to the respondent’s predecessor became void ab initio, and no valid title ever passed to the Respondent. Additionally, the Court held that Respondent failed to prove her title since she did not enter the witness box, and her power-of-attorney holder could not testify on matters within her personal knowledge.

Accordingly, the decrees of the First Appellate Court and High Court were set aside, and the Trial Court’s dismissal of Respondents suit was restored.

44. Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi & Ors vs. Syeda Arifa Parveen

2025 SCC Online SC 2155

October 07, 2025

Mohammedan Law – Oral Gift (Hiba) – Proof of Relationship – Limitation Act. [S. 50 & 73 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963]

FACTS

The dispute pertained to agricultural land situated at Village Kusnoor, Karnataka. The original owner of the land, Khadijabee, obtained a decree of title in 1971. The Plaintiff, Syeda Arifa Parveen, claimed that she was the only daughter and legal heir of Khadijabee and that her mother had orally gifted 10 acres of the land to her, which was later recorded in a Memorandum of Gift. Upon the death of Khadijabee and her husband Abdul Basit, the Plaintiff alleged that she had become the absolute owner of the entire suit property. The Defendants, however, contended that they had validly purchased the entire land through five registered sale deeds executed by Abdul Bas (claimed to be Abdul Basit), and their names had been consistently recorded in the revenue records since then. When the Defendants allegedly interfered with her possession, the Plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration of ownership, cancellation of sale deeds, and a permanent injunction.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff failed to prove her status as the daughter of Khadijabee, as the oral testimony relied upon lacked credibility and was unsupported by any documentary evidence such as birth records, school certificates, or family documents. The Court further held that the alleged oral gift (Hiba) was not proved in accordance with Mohammedan Law, as there was no proof of actual or constructive delivery of possession to the Plaintiff at the time of the gift, and the consistent mutation entries in favour of Abdul Basit and thereafter the Defendants negated the claim of transfer of possession. Additionally, the Court ruled that the High Court had exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by enhancing the relief in favour of the Plaintiff without there being a cross-appeal. It also observed that the suit filed in 2013 challenging the sale deeds of 1995 was clearly barred by limitation. Consequently, the Defendants were held to be the lawful owners under their registered sale deeds.

Accordingly, the judgments of Trial Court and the High Court were set aside and Civil Appeal was allowed.

45. Sangita Sandip Jadhav & Ans vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

2025 SCC Online Bom 880

April 2, 2025

Stamp Duty – Refund – Agreement for Sale Cancelled – No Possession Handed Over – Limitation within Section 48. [S.47(c)(5) & S. 48(1) of Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (MSA)]

FACTS

Petitioners entered into a registered Agreement for Sale to purchase a Flat in “Rukmini Heights”, Satara. They paid part consideration and stamp duty along with registration fees. Since loan applications were not sanctioned and they could not proceed with the transaction, the parties executed a registered Deed of Cancellation, wherein it was clearly stated that possession of the flat was never handed over. Petitioners applied for a refund of stamp duty under Section 47(c)(5) of MSA. The Collector of Stamps rejected the application, holding that possession was handed over based on a clause in the Agreement for Sale and invoked the Proviso to Section 48(1) of MSA, which bars refund where possession has passed. Appeal before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority was also dismissed, leading to the present petition.

HELD

The Bombay High Court held that there was no conclusive evidence of possession having been delivered on execution of the Agreement for Sale, especially when only 15% of the total consideration was paid. The covenant relied upon by authorities was contradictory to the clause requiring execution of a Sale Deed only after payment of full consideration. The Cancellation Deed explicitly recorded non-delivery of possession, which further negated the conclusion of conveyance-like transfer. Even assuming possession was deemed to have been handed over, the Court held that the refund application was filed within six months from execution of the Agreement for Sale, thus satisfying Section 48(1) of MSA. Since the intended transaction had completely failed, the case squarely fell under Section 47(c)(5) of MSA. Retaining stamp duty in such circumstances would amount to unjust enrichment by the State. Therefore, the impugned orders were quashed, and the Respondents were directed to refund to the Petitioner.

Accordingly, rejection orders of the Collector and Chief Controlling were set aside and a refund was directed.

46. Varinder Kaur vs. Daljit Kaur & Ors.

2025 SCC Online Del 6212

September 26, 2025

Cancellation of Gift Deed – Neglect of Senior citizen – Maintenance is an Implied Condition. [S.23, Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007]

FACTS

Respondent No. 1, Smt. Daljit Kaur executed a gift deed dated 05.05.2015 in favour of her daughter-in-law, the Appellant, transferring her residential property. Later, alleging neglect and maltreatment, she invoked Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, seeking cancellation of the gift deed on the ground that the Appellant had refused to provide basic amenities, care, medicines, and had even threatened her with confinement and harm. The Maintenance Tribunal refused cancellation on the basis that the gift was not shown to be conditional. However, on appeal under Section 16, the District Magistrate set aside the Tribunal’s decision and directed cancellation of the gift deed. The Appellant challenged said order before the High Court in a writ petition, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The Appellant then filed the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent before the Division Bench.

HELD

The Delhi High Court held that for senior citizens gifting property to children or close relatives, “love and affection” inherently implies the condition of receiving care in return. Thus, an express condition in the deed is not mandatory for invoking Section 23. The Court further noted ample material in the form of letters and complaints showing that the Appellant had denied Respondent No. 1 basic necessities, medicines, and personal belongings, and had subjected her to threats and ill-treatment soon after obtaining the transfer. In such circumstances, the deeming fiction under Section 23(1) becomes operative, rendering the transfer voidable, and justifying cancellation of the gift deed. The Court endorsed the beneficial and purposive interpretation adopted by the District Magistrate and Single Judge, consistent with the statutory objective of protecting the dignity, security, and welfare of senior citizens.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and cancellation of gift deed was upheld.

Editor’s Note: Readers may note that the subject matter of this dispute was covered in detail in the feature “Laws and Business” in the September 2025 Edition of BCAJ. Those who are interested may read the said feature for a more comprehensive view covering multiple cases.

47. Rama Bai vs. Amit Minerals through Incharge Officer & Anr.

2025 SCC Online SC 2067

September 24, 2025

Motor Accident Compensation – Driver without Valid License – Insurer Liable on ‘Pay and Recover’ Principle. [S.149(2)(a)(ii), Motor Vehicles Act, 1988]

FACTS

The Appellant is the mother of the deceased Nand Kumar, who was working as a conductor in a truck. The truck collided with a tractor-trolley, causing his death. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded ₹3,00,000/- as compensation and fastened liability on the driver and owner, as the driver’s driving licence had expired on 20.06.2010 and was only renewed from 03.11.2011 to 02.11.2014 — thus the driver did not hold valid licence on the date of the accident. In appeal, the High Court enhanced the compensation to ₹5,33,600/- with 7% interest, but absolved the Insurance Company from the liability due to breach of policy conditions. The Appellant approached the Supreme Court seeking application of the ‘pay and recover’ principle so that immediate compensation is not delayed.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that although the driver did not possess a valid driving licence on the date of accident giving the Insurance Company a valid defence under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) and justifying avoidance of liability, the beneficial object of the Motor Vehicles Act requires that victims are first compensated promptly. The Court applied the doctrine of “Pay and Recover”. The Insurance Company must first satisfy the award and thereafter recover the amount from the vehicle owner through appropriate legal proceedings.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and insurer was directed to ‘Pay and Recover’.