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S. 54B : Exemption from capital gains tax cannot be denied where land was purchased in the joint name of the son

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37 Capital gains : Exemption u/s.54B of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : B. P. 1-4-1988 to 15-7-1998 : Sale of agricultural land
and out of sale proceeds, purchase of agricultural land in his name and in the
name of his only son : Exemption u/s.54B allowable.


[CIT v. Gurnam Singh, 170 Taxman 160 (P&H)]

In the relevant period, the assessee had sold agricultural
land and out of the sale proceeds, the assessee, along with his son, had
purchased another agricultural land and claimed deduction u/s.54B of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that exemption from capital gains was available only in case the sale proceed
was invested by the assessee for purchasing another agricultural land and not in
respect of the land purchased by any other person. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Undisputedly, the assessee had sold the agricultural land
which was being used by him for agricultural purposes. Out of its sale
proceeds, the assessee had purchased another piece of land in his name and in
the name of his only son, who was a bachelor and was dependent upon him, for
being used for agricultural purposes within the stipulated time. Undisputedly,
the purchased land was being used by the assessee only for agricultural
purposes and merely because in the sale deed his only son was also shown as
co-owner, it did not make any difference, because the purchased land was still
being used by the assessee for agricultural purposes. It was not the case of
the Revenue that the said land was being used exclusively by his son.”


 

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S. 80-IA : Twisting and texturising of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) amounts to manufacturing or production

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38 Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Twisting and texturis-ing of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY)
amounts to manufacturing or production: Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IA.


[CIT v. Emptee Poly-Yarn (P) Ltd., 170 Taxman 332 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee-company’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IA was disallowed on the ground that the activity of processing
of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) was not an industrial activity. The Tribunal
allowed the claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“From the material considered it would be clear that POY
has different physical and chemical properties and when POY chips undergo the
process of texturising and/or twisting the yarn, i.e., twisted and/or
texturised or both, result in a product having different physical and chemical
properties. In other words, the process applied to POY, either for the purpose
of texturising or twisting, constitutes manufacture as the article produced is
recognised in the trade as distinct commodity pursuant to the process it
undergoes and which amounts to manufacture. Under the Central Excise Act, the
Union of India itself treats POY as distinct from POY drawn twisted or
texturised or both. The process amounts to manufacture as the original
commodity loses its identity. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal would
have to be upheld.


 

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Travel business : Expenditure on development of website is revenue expenditure allowable u/s.37(1).

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57 Business expenditure : Revenue/Capital :
S. 37(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Assessee in travel business :
Expenditure on development of its website : Is revenue expenditure allowable
u/s.37(1).


[CIT v. Indian Visit.com (P) Ltd., 176 Taxman 164 (Del.)]

The assessee was engaged in travel business. The assessee
made all kinds of arrangements for its clients such as booking of hotel rooms,
providing taxi services, booking of air tickets and railway tickets, etc. During
the relevant year the assessee had incurred an expenditure of Rs.20,23,317 on
development of its website. The assesse’s clients could use the said website for
the purpose of availing of the services provided by it. The assessee had claimed
the deduction of the said expenditure as business expenditure u/s.37(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that
the expenditure was of capital nature inasmuch as the assessee had acquired an
asset, which would provide it with an enduring benefit. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) Considered in the light of the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court, it is clear that just because a particular expenditure
may result in an enduring benefit it would not make such an expenditure
capital in nature. What is to be seen is what is the real intent and purpose
of the expenditure and as to whether there is any accretion to the fixed
capital of the assessee. In the case of expenditure on website, there is no
change in the fixed capital of the assessee. Although the website may provide
an enduring benefit to an assessee, the intent and purpose behind a website is
not to create an asset, but only to provide a means for disseminating the
information about the assessee. The same could very well have been achieved
and, indeed, in the past, it was achieved by printing travel brouchers and
other published material and pamphlets. The advance of technology and the
wide-spread use of the Internet has provided a very powerful medium to
companies to publicise their activities to a larger spectrum of people at a
much lower cost. Websites enable companies to do what the printed brouchers
did, but in a much more efficient manner as well as in a much shorter period
of time and covering a much larger set of people worldwide.

(ii) The Tribunal has correctly appreciated the facts as
well as the law on the subject and has come to the conclusion that the
expenditure on the website was of a revenue nature and not a capital nature.”


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Appellate : Powers in matters remitted by High Court restricted to directions by High Court.

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56 Appellate Tribunal : Powers in matters
remitted by High Court : Powers restricted to directions by the High Court.


[Harsingar Gutkha (P) Ltd. v. ITAT, 176 Taxman 137
(All.)]

In an appeal filed by the assessee against the order of the
Tribunal the Allahabad High Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal to
redecide the case on the basis of the material on record. Thereafter, by its
order dated 25-7-2008 the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to record the
statements of D and G to ascertain certain facts.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the said
order of the Tribunal, the Allahabad High Court held as under :

“(i) We are of the view that it was not open for the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to take fresh material on record by the impugned
order dated 25-7-2008. The Tribunal has directed the Assessing Authority to
record the statements of Shri Dinesh Singh, ACA and Shri G. L. Lath,
chartered accountant, which will amount to additional evidence/material in
the case. By the judgment and order passed by this Court, the Tribunal was
directed to adjudicate the matter afresh on the basis of the material on
record.

(ii) When a direction is issued to an Authority or Tribunal
to do a thing in certain manner, the thing must be done in that manner and no
other manner. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

(iii) In the instant case, the matter was remitted to the
Tribunal by this Court with certain directions and it was not open for the
Tribunal to take fresh evidence in the matter, as no such direction was issued
by this Court. The impugned order by which a fresh direction has been issued
by the Tribunal to the Assessing Officer is legally not sustainable.”


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Question of Law — Investment allowance — Whether allowable in one year or in several years is a question of law — Decision of Madras High Court not applicable.

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14 Question of Law — Investment allowance — Whether allowable
in one year or in several years is a question of law — Decision of Madras High
Court not applicable.


[CIT v. Lucas TVS Ltd., (2008) 297 ITR 429 (SC)]

The Assessing Officer was of the view that investment
allowance u/s.32A is only to be allowed in one assessment year and not in
several assessment years. The appeal related to the A.Ys. 1989-90, 1991-92 and
1992-93. The Tribunal held otherwise. The High Court dismissed the appeal in
view of its decision in Southern Asbestos Cement Ltd v. CIT, (2003) 259
ITR 631 (Mad.) in which it was held that the investment allowance in respect of
the incremental cost of the machinery, necessitated by the fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates is allowable to the assessee in the respective years in
which cost arose in view of S. 43A(1) of the Act.

On an appeal, the parties conceded before the Supreme Court
that S. 43A(1) relates to fluctuations of foreign exchange and its effect on the
valuation of the assets and that it had nothing to do with the question as to
whether it is allowable in one year and therefore the decision of the High Court
had no application. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the
order of the High Court and remitted the matter for fresh adjudication after
formulating the question of law involved.


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Appeal to Tribunal : Powers of Single member : S. 255(3) : Income computed by AO less than Rs.5 lakhs : CIT(A) enhanced it to more than Rs.5 lakhs : Single member can decide appeal.

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21 Appeal to Tribunal : Powers of Single
member : S. 255(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Income computed by
AO less than Rs.5 lakhs : CIT(A) enhanced it to more than Rs.5 lakhs : Single
member can decide the appeal.


[CIT v. Mahakuteshwar Oil Industries, 298 ITR 390
(Kar.)]

The assessee was a manufacturer of edible oil. For the A.Y.
1996-97, it had declared the total income of Rs.8,660 in the return of income.
The Assessing Officer computed the total income at Rs.2,27,614. The Commissioner
enhanced the income to Rs.13,89,795. In appeal before the Tribunal, the Single
Member of the Tribunal decided the appeal and granted relief to the assessee.

 

In the appeal preferred by the Revenue, the following
questions were raised :

“(i) Whether the single member of the Tribunal had
jurisdiction to decide the appeal when the subject matter of appeal was
exceeding Rs.5,00,000 ?

(ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in reversing the
findings of the Appellate Commissioner, when the assessee failed to discharge
the burden of proof as required u/s.68 of the Income-tax Act ?

 


The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“(i) A single member of the Tribunal can exercise powers if
the income computed by the Assessing Officer is less than Rs.5 lakhs, even
though the same has been enhanced by the Commissioner (Appeals) in excess of
Rs.5 lakhs.

(ii) The Tribunal had given a categorical finding that the
assessee was willing to examine the creditors as its witnesses to prove that
it had availed of loans from them. No records were produced to show that the
assessee had not made such a statement either before the Assessing Officer or
before the Commissioner (Appeals). When the Revenue had got the records to
show whether the assessee was willing to examine any of the witnesses or not,
when such documents were not placed before the Court, one would have to draw
an adverse inference against the Revenue.”

 


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Scientific Research and Development Expenditure : S. 35 : Whether machine being used for R&D purpose or for manufacturing, AO not authority to decide but prescribed authority u/s.35(3)

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10 Scientific Research and Development Expenditure :
Deduction u/s.35 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1999-00 : Axial machine and
computers : Whether machine being used for research and development purposes or
for manufacturing activity : Assessing Officer not an authority to decide :
Matter to be referred to prescribed authority u/s.35(3)


[CIT v. Deltron Ltd., 297 ITR 426 (Del.)]

The assessee incurred an expenditure of Rs.87,22,447 on
purchasing an axial machine along with machinery spares and computers. For the
A.Y. 1999-2000, it claimed the expenditure as a research and development
expenditure u/s.35(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer looked
at the brochure of the machine and came to the conclusion that the machine was
not used for research and development work and disallowed the claim. The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the AO could not have disallowed the
expenditure without following the procedure prescribed u/s.35(3). Thereafter,
the Revenue could have made an attempt to find out the actual use of the
machine, but it did not do so. The Tribunal confirmed the view taken by the
Commissioner (Appeals).

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“(i) The prescribed authority in this case was not the
Assessing Officer and he could not determine whether the machinery was used by
the assessee for research and development purposes or not.

(ii) Even assuming that the Assessing Officer had the
authority, the least that would have been expected from him was to confirm
physically whether or not the machine was being used for research and
development purposes. No conclusion could be arrived at by the Assessing
Officer by merely looking at the brochure. Therefore, there was no error in
the order passed by the Tribunal.

(iii) Moreover, since there was a gap of so many years, it
would not be appropriate to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer to
refer the matter to the prescribed authority to decide the question whether
the machinery was used for research and development purposes or not.”




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Penalty : S. 271B r/w. ss. 44AB and 80P of I. T. Act, 1961 : Failure to get accounts audited within prescribed time : No tax payable by assessee society in view of s. 80P : Penalty u/s. 271B not to be imposed

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  1. Penalty : S. 271B r/w. ss. 44AB and 80P of I. T. Act,
    1961 : Failure to get accounts audited within prescribed time : No tax payable
    by assessee society in view of s. 80P : Penalty u/s. 271B not to be imposed.



 


[CIT vs. Iqbalpur Co-operative Cane Development Union
Ltd.
; 179 Taxman 27 (Uttarakhand)].

The income of the assessee co-operative society was
exempted u/s. 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee society failed to
get its accounts audited u/s. 44AB of the Act within the prescribed time.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 271B of the Act. The
Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Uttarakhand High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“i) There appeared no intention on the part of the
assessee to conceal the income or to deprive the Government of revenue as
there was no tax payable on the income of the assessee, in view of the
provisions of section 80P. Thus, it was not necessary for the Assessing
Officer to impose penalty u/s. 271B.

ii) On going through the impugned order passed by the
Tribunal, no sufficient reason was found to interfere with the satisfaction
recorded by the Tribunal as to the finding of fact that the assessee had no
intention to cause any loss to the revenue and as such, the penalty was not
necessarily required to be imposed by the Assessing Officer.

iii) Agreeing with the view of the Tribunal, it was to be
held that though an assessee is liable to penalty u/s. 271B for failure to
comply with the provisions of section 44AB but since in the instant case, no
tax was payable by the assessee in view of the provisions contained in
section 80P, the Tribunal had commited no error of law in setting aside the
penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer”.

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Writ petition — Dispute between Government Undertaking and Union of India could be ordinarily proceeded with only after receipt of permission of COD — As the matter was covered by decision of Supreme Court, as an exception, High Court was directed to deci

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  1. Writ petition — Dispute between Government Undertaking and
    Union of India could be ordinarily proceeded with only after receipt of
    permission of COD — As the matter was covered by decision of Supreme Court, as
    an exception, High Court was directed to decide the matter on merits.

[Delhi Development Authority and Anr. v. UOI & Ors.,
(2009) 314 ITR 342 (SC)]

By a writ petition the Delhi Development Authority (DDA)
sought to challenge an order dated 9-9-2005 of the Addl. CIT, Rg. 32, New
Delhi requiring the petitioner to get the accounts of DDA audited u/s.142(2A)
of the Act. According to the petitioner, it had not applied for the COD
clearance as it was not required since the dispute was frivolous and in
support of its contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Canara Bank v. National Thermal Power Corporation, (2001) 1
SCC 43, (2001) 104 Comp. Cas. 97.

The Delhi High Court however held that it was not possible
at the admission stage to arrive at the conclusion that the dispute raised was
a frivolous one as was sought to be contended. According to the High Court the
decision in the Canara Bank’s case turned on its own facts and was
distinguishable. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition since the
petitioner had not within one month of the filing of the writ petition,
applied to the COD for permission to litigate. It was however clarified that
the time spent in the litigation would not be counted towards the period of
completion of the assessment and also that the petitioner was not precluded
from approaching the COD for resolution of the dispute.

On appeal the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily it
would not have differed with the view taken by the High Court, but as the
matter was covered by the decision in Rajesh Kumar v. Dy. CIT, (2006)
287 ITR 91 (SC), it directed the High Court to consider the writ petition
filed by the petitioner on merits.

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Refund : Interest u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee : S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

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Reported :


27. Refund : Interest
u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted
during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee :
S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

[CIT v. Larsen & Toubro
Ltd.,
235 CTR 108 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the
assessment was completed by an order dated 31-3-2003 passed u/s. 143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. TDS certificates were filed in the course of the
assessment proceedings. Interest u/s.244A was denied on the ground that the TDS
certificates were not furnished with the return of income. The Tribunal found
that tax was deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time and that the
proceedings resulting in refund, has not been delayed for reasons attributable
to assessee. The Tribunal accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to pay
interest u/s. 244A for the period from
1-4-2001 to the date of refund.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under :

“(i) S. 244A(2) provides
that in the event the proceedings resulting in refund has been delayed for
reasons attributable to the assessee, the period of delay so attributable
shall be exclude from the period for which the interest is payable. In the
present case, S. 244A(2) is clearly not attracted. The proceedings resulting
in the refund was not delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

(ii) Though the TDS
certificates were not submitted with the return and were filed during the
course of the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal has noted that tax was in
fact deducted at source at the right time. In the circumstances, the Tribunal
was correct in holding that since the benefit of TDS has been allowed to the
assessee, interest u/s. 244A could not be denied only on the ground that the
TDS certificates were not furnished with the return of income. Tax was
deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time.

(iii) S. 244A(2) is not
attracted. The appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of
law and is dismissed.”

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Tax Deduction at Source u/s.195

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 195 of the Income-tax Act provides for tax deduction
at source from payment of interest or any other sum chargeable under the
provisions of the Income-tax Act (other than salaries or dividend specified in
S190) to a non-resident or a foreign company at the prescribed time at the rates
in force.

1.2 U/s.195(2), where the payer considers that the whole of
such sum so payable to a non-resident would not be income chargeable of the
recipient, he can make an application to the Assessing Officer to determine the
appropriate proportion of such sum chargeable to tax, and thereupon shall deduct
tax u/s.195(1) only on that proportion of the sum chargeable to tax. Similarly,
sections 195(3) and 197 provide for the payee making an application to the
Assessing Officer for issue of a certificate that income-tax may be deducted at
lower rates of tax or not deducted on payment to be received by him, where such
lower rate or non-deduction is justified.

1.3 The issue has arisen before the courts as to whether, in
a case where the payment to the non-resident or a foreign company does not
comprise any income chargeable to tax in India at all (for example, in case of
payment for purchase of goods imported from the non-resident), whether the payer
has necessarily to apply to the tax authorities for a certificate u/s.195(2) or
whether the payment can be made to such non-resident or foreign company without
any deduction of tax at source, and without obtaining any such certificate
u/s.195(2) or u/s.195(3) or u/s.197.

1.4 While the Karnataka High Court has taken the view that it
is mandatory to obtain such a certificate from the tax authorities, the Delhi
High Court has taken a contrary view that in such cases, the payer can make the
payment without the need for such certificate.

2. Samsung Electronics’ case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Karnataka High Court in the
case of CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 320 ITR 209. Various other appeals
of different resident payers were also decided vide this judgment.

2.2 In this case, the assessee payer was a branch of a Korean
company engaged in the development, manufacture and export of software for use
by its parent company. The software developed by it was for in-house use by the
parent company. During the relevant years, the assessee imported ready-made
software products from US and French companies for its own use. It did not
deduct tax at source from payments made to the US and French companies on the
ground that the payment to the foreign companies was for purchase of products,
and was not in the nature of royalty, and was not chargeable to tax in India.

2.3 The Assessing Officer held that the payment was in the
nature of royalty, that the assessee was bound to deduct tax at source on the
payments, and accordingly treated the assessee as an assessee in default
u/s.201(1), and also levied interest u/s.201(1A). The Commissioner (Appeals)
dismissed the assessee’s appeals against this order.

2.4 The Tribunal held that the payment was not in the nature
of royalty in terms of the relevant provisions of the Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreements. It also held that it was not incumbent on the assessee to deduct any
amount u/s.195.

2.5 Before the Karnataka High Court, it was argued on behalf
of the Department that the payment was in the nature of royalty on which tax was
required to be deducted at source u/s.195. It was argued that the transaction
was a licence and was therefore in the nature of royalty. It was further claimed
that the assessee was bound to deduct tax u/s.195 and that it could not contend
that it was not the income of the recipient. Reliance was placed on the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. v.
CIT, 239 ITR 587.

2.6 It was argued by the assessee that the nature of payment
was not royalty even u/s.9(1)(vi), on account of the fact that the non-resident
supplier had merely sold a copyrighted article and not the copyright itself,
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy
Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 271 ITR 401. It was therefore claimed that
the payment was for purchase of articles/goods in connection with the business
carried on by the assessee. It was further claimed that under the Double
Taxation Avoidance Agreements, since the non-resident recipients had no
permanent establishments in India, the entire income of the non-residents
attributable to the payments was not taxable in India. It was therefore claimed
that there was no obligation on the part of the payer to deduct any amount.

2.7 It was also contended by the other assessees that there
was no obligation on their part to deduct any amount from the payments, as they
were fully and bona fide satisfied that the amount was not taxable in the hands
of the non-resident in India. They had therefore not chosen to apply for any
relief or concession in terms of S. 195(2) and (3). It was further argued that
the words used in S. 195 are ‘chargeable to tax’ and hence a person deducting
tax u/s.195 would have to necessarily first see whether the same was chargeable
to tax and then only, if it was so chargeable, he was to deduct tax. It was
contended that if a person was not liable to be charged to tax, then the payer
could not be held to be a person in default u/s.201.

2.8 The Karnataka High Court considered the decision of the
Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP’s case (supra) and of the
Calcutta High Court in P. C. Ray & Co. (India) Private Limited v. ITO, 36 ITR
365, wherein the Calcutta High Court had held that if the term ‘chargeable under
the provisions of this Act’ means actually liable to be assessed to tax, in
other words, if the sum contemplated was taxable income, a difficulty is
undoubtedly created as to complying with the provisions of the Section.’ The
High Court in that case had held that what was contemplated was not merely
amounts, the whole of which were taxable without deduction, but amounts of a
mixed composition, a part of which only might turn out to be taxable income as
well; and the disbursements, which were of the nature of gross revenue receipts,
were yet sums chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and came
within the ambit of the Section.

2.9 The Karnataka High Court therefore rejected the arguments
of the assessees that the expression ‘any other sum chargeable under the
provisions of this Act’ would not include cases where any sum payable to
non-resident was trading receipts, which may or may not include ‘pure income’.
According to the Karnataka High Court, the language of S. 195(1) was clear and
unambiguous and cast an obligation to deduct appropriate tax at the rates in
force.

2.10 The Karnataka High Court observed that S. 195 was not a charging Section, nor a Section providing for determination of the tax liability of the non-resident receiving the payments from the resident. The amount deducted by the resident was only a provisional tentative amount, which was kept as a buffer for adjusting this amount against the possible tax liability of the non-resident. Deduction of the amount u/s.195 was not the same as determination of the liability of the non-resident, who may be or may not be liable to pay any tax. Determination of tax liability could only be on the basis of the return of income filed by the non-resident. According to the Karnataka High Court, the only scope and manner of reducing the obligation for deduction imposed on a resident payer in terms of S. 195(1) was by the method of invoking the procedure u/s.195(2) of making an application to the Assessing Officer to determine by general or special order the appropriate proportion of such sum so chargeable, and upon such determination alone, being allowed the liberty of deducting the proportionate sum so chargeable to tax to fulfil the obligations u/s.195(1).

2.11 The Karnataka High Court therefore held that in the absence of an application u/s.195(2), the payer was obliged to deduct tax at source u/s. 195(1), even though the payment did not contain any element of income of the non-resident chargeable to tax in India.

    Van Oord’s case :

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Van Oord ACZ India (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (unreported — ITA No. 439 of 2008 dated 15th March 2010, available on www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was an Indian subsidiary of a Netherlands company, and was engaged in the business of dredging, contracting, reclamation and marine activities. During the relevant year, the assessee reimbursed mobilisation and demo-bilisation cost to its parent company. This cost related essentially to transportation of dredger, survey equipment and other plant and machinery from countries outside India to the site in India and the transportation of such plant and machinery on com-pletion of the contract, including fuel cost incurred on transportation. These services were contacted by the parent company and were provided by vari-ous non-resident entities. The assessee reimbursed such cost to the parent company on the basis of invoices received by the parent company from the non-resident entities.

3.3 The assessee filed an application to the As-sessing Officer for issue of nil tax withholding certificate in respect of reimbursement of various costs to the parent company. The Assessing Officer issued a certificate of deduction of tax at source at 11%, and the assessee deducted tax at source accordingly on Rs.6.98 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer disallowed payments of Rs.8.66 crore made to the parent company u/s.40(a) (i), on the ground that the assessee had defaulted in deducting tax at source u/s.195.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disal-lowance made by the Assessing Officer. The Tribu-nal confirmed the addition, stating that the asses-see was mandatorily liable to deduct tax at source u/s.195, and that it was not necessary to determine whether such payment was chargeable to tax in In-dia in the hands of the non-resident. The Tribunal further held that the assessee was a dependent agent permanent establishment of the parent foreign company and therefore the reimbursement of expenses to the foreign parent company was to be subjected to tax.

3.5 Before the Delhi High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the amount reimbursed to the parent company was not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the parent company, and that the assessee was consequently not liable to deduct tax at source u/s.195. It was argued that the obligation to deduct tax at source u/s.195 was predicated on the condition that tax was payable by the non-resident on the payments received by it, and once it was established that no such tax was payable by the non-resident, the assessee could not be treated to be in breach of its obligations.

3.6 It was pointed out that the reason for fastening the obligation to deduct tax at source of the payment to non-resident only in a situation where such payment was chargeable to tax in India was that it was not the intention of the law to fasten an absolute liability on the remitter to deduct tax at source from the payment to the non-resident, and then subject the non-resident to the rigorous process of filing return and seeking refund and assessment on the basis of such return. Where the remitter was of the opinion that some part of the income may be chargeable to tax in India, the remitter could approach the Assessing Officer to determine the ap-propriate portion of the income that would be sub-ject to tax in India and the rate on which tax was to be deducted at source. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. (supra) and various other cases for the proposition that the obligation to deduct tax at source is triggered only when the payment to be made to the non-resident is chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-resident recipient.

3.7 On behalf of the Department, it was argued that S. 195 only determines the proportion of liability and presupposes the existence of liability. It was pointed out that the assessee itself had applied for determination of extent of liability. The statutory obligation of the assessee with regard to deduct tax at source was fully crystallised, and therefore there was no justification on the part of the assessee not to deduct tax at source, particularly when the order passed u/s.195(2) had attained finality.

3.8 The Delhi High Court noted that the issue before the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP (supra) was whether tax at source was to be deducted by the payee on the entire amount paid by it to the recipient or whether it was to be deducted only on the component of pure income profits. It was therefore in the context of whether tax deductible was to be on the gross sum of trading receipts paid to non-residents or whether only on the income component. It was in that context that the Supreme Court held that “any other sum chargeable under the provision of this Act” would include the entire amount paid by the assessee to non-residents. The observations of the Supreme Court therefore needed to be read in that context. The Delhi High Court noted that the Su-preme Court was not concerned in that case with a situation where no tax in the hands of the recipient was payable at all. The Delhi High Court noted that certain observations in the judgment clearly depicted the mind of the Supreme Court that liability to deduct tax at source arose only when the sum paid to the non-resident was chargeable to tax. Once that is chargeable to tax, it was not for the assessee to find out how much of the amount of the receipts was chargeable to tax, but it was its obligation to deduct tax at source on the entire sum paid by the assessee to the recipient.

3.9 The Delhi High Court relied on certain other decisions of the High Courts, including that of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Estel Communications (P) Ltd., 217 CTR 102 and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Jindal Thermal Power Company Limited v. Dy. CIT, 182 Taxman 252, where Courts had taken the view that there was no obligation to deduct tax at source since there was no tax liabil-ity of the non-resident in India. The Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Samsung Electronic Co. Ltd. (supra), and observed that the context in that case was different. The Delhi High Court expressed its disagreement with some of the observations made in that judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

3.10 The Delhi High Court therefore held that the obligation to deduct tax at source arises only when the payment was chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The Delhi High Court noted that in the case before it, the income-tax authorities had accepted that the foreign company was not liable to pay any tax in India by accepting the foreign company’s tax return u/s.143(1) and refunding the tax deducted at source. Therefore, the assessee could not be regarded as having defaulted in deduction of TDS u/s.195.

    Observations :

4.1 This issue was also again very recently considered by the Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at Chennai, in the case of ITO v. Prasad Production Ltd., (ITA No. 663/Mds/2003, dated 9th April 2010 — unreported, available on www.itatonline.org).

4.2 The Tribunal in this case considered the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case (supra) as well as that of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP (supra). The Tribunal noted that both the Department as well as the assessee were relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP. It therefore focussed on the observations in that judgment. It noted the provisions of the follow-ing paragraph on page 588 :

“The consideration would be — whether payment of the sum to the non-resident is chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act or not ? That sum may be income or income hidden or otherwise embedded therein. If so, tax is required to be deducted on the said sum, what would be the income is to be computed on the basis of various provisions of the Act including provisions for computation of the business income, if the payment is a trade receipt. However, what is to be deducted is income-tax pay-able thereon at the rates in force. Under the Act, total income for the previous year would become chargeable to tax u/s.4. Ss.(2) of S. 4, inter alia, provides that in respect of income chargeable U/ss.(1), income-tax shall be deducted at source where it is so deductible under any provision of the Act. If the sum that is to be paid to the non-resident is charge-able to tax, tax is required to be deducted.”

4.3 The Tribunal also noted the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Eli Lilly & Co., 312 ITR 225, as under :

“To answer the contention herein we need to examine briefly the scheme of the 1961 Act. S. 4 is the charging Section. U/s.4(1), total income for the previous year is chargeable to tax. S. 4(2), inter alia, provides that in respect of income chargeable U/ss.(1), income-tax shall be deducted at source whether it is so deductible under any provision of the 1961 Act which, inter alia, brings in the TDS provisions contained in Chapter XVII-B. In fact, if a particular income falls outside S. 4(1), then the TDS provisions cannot come in.”

4.4 From these two decisions of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal concluded that it was abundantly clear that the charging provisions could not be divorced from the TDS provisions, and that S. 195 would be applicable only if the payment made to the non-resident was chargeable to tax.

4.5 The Tribunal also noted the material difference between the provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 195. U/ss.(2), the payer made the application for deduction of tax at lower rates. U/ss.(3), the payee could make an application for deduction of tax at lower rate or without deduction of tax. According to the Tribunal, the reason for such difference was that where the payer had a bona fide belief that no part of the payment bore income character, S. 195(1) itself would be inapplicable and hence there would be no question of going into the procedure prescribed in S. 195(2). Ss.(3) deals with a situation where the payer wants to deduct tax from the payment, but the payee believed that he was not chargeable to tax in respect of that payment. Hence the payee was given an opportunity to seek approv-al of the Assessing Officer to receive the payment without deduction of tax.

4.6 The Tribunal interestingly observed that by deciding whether the payment bore any income character or not, the payer was not determining the tax liability of the total income of the payee, but merely considering the chargeability in respect of the payment that he was making to the payee.

4.7 The tribunal also considered the fact that for the purposes of remittances to non-residents, a chartered accountant’s certificate was prescribed as an alternative to the procedure u/s.195(2). This was evident from the CBDT Circular 767, dated 22-5-1998. It noted that the certification covered all types of payment, whether purely capital or revenue in nature, but exempt either under the act or the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement or payments bearing pure income character. The Tribunal held that the new format of the CA certificate clearly established the legal position of S. 195 that the payer need not undergo the procedure of S. 195 at all if he was of the bona fide belief that no part of the payment was chargeable to tax in India.

4.8 The Tribunal therefore held that if the asses-see had not applied to the Assessing Officer u/s. 195(2) for deduction of tax at a lower or nil rate of tax under a bona fide belief that no part of the payment made to the non-resident was chargeable to tax, then he was not under any statutory obligation to deduct tax at source on any part of the payment.

4.9 When one looks at the provisions of S. 195(1), the language is clear that it applies only to income chargeable to tax, and not to other items at all. As analysed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal, the Karnataka High Court seems to have misapplied the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP. The better view seems to be that of the Delhi High Court and that of the Special Bench of the Tribunal that if the income is not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-resident recipient, the payer need not obtain a certificate u/s.195(2) for not deducting tax at source.

4.10 In any case, an appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Karnataka High Court has been admitted by the Supreme Court and has been fixed for hearing on 18th August 2010, on which date one hopes that this controversy will ultimately be laid to rest.

Reopening of a completed assessment

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits reassessment of income, where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year so however no reassessment will ensue where there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for assessment. No reopening is possible once it is shown that a mind is applied by the AO to the facts of the case unless the reopening is sought to be made in consequence of the possession of information obtained subsequent to an assessment.

    1.2 Very often substantial details are collected and inquiries are made by the AO but assessment orders are passed without reference to such details and inquiries, allowing a deduction or exemption. The factual question that arises in such cases is whether there has been an application of mind by the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings to the issue involved, and whether the deduction, exemption or non-taxation was after due deliberation, in which case reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated. The issue gets added dimensions where the assessee is able to show that he has filed details in response to the AO’s inquiry but the AO claims that he had not noticed the same in the myriad of details furnished with him.

    1.3 The issues that have arisen before the courts in such cases are whether, in a case where a regular order of assessment is passed u/s.143(3) without much discussion on a particular issue, there was an application of mind by the Assessing Officer; whether there was disclosure of material facts by the assessee and whether permitting reopening in such cases would amount to giving premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong. While the full bench of the Delhi High Court has taken the view that no reassessment proceedings are permissible in such cases, the division bench of the Allahabad High Court, recently, has taken a contrary view.

2. Kelvinator’s case :

    2.1 The issue came up before the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., 256 ITR 1.

    2.2 In this case, the assessment of the assessee was completed u/s.143(3). Subsequently, it was noticed by the Assessing Officer that as indicated in the accounts and tax audit report, certain prior period expenditure and certain disallowable expenditure had been wrongly allowed as deductions. He therefore issued a notice for reassessment u/s.147.

    2.3 The assessee challenged the reassessment proceedings in appeal. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that the assessee had disclosed all the facts, that no new fact or material was available with the Assessing Officer, and that it was a mere change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

    2.4 Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the department, it was argued that the change of opinion was relevant only for the purposes of clause (b) of S. 147, and that initiation of reassessment proceedings was permissible when it was found that the Assessing Officer had passed an order of assessment without any application of mind. According to the department, such application of mind could be found out from the order of assessment itself inasmuch as, if the order of assessment did not contain any discussion on the particular issue, the same may be held to have been rendered without any application of mind.

    2.5 On behalf of the assessee, it was argued before the Delhi High Court that the expression ‘reason to believe’ contained in S. 147 denoted that the reassessment must be based on a change of fact or subsequent information or new law. According to the assessee, income escaping assessment must be founded upon or in consequence of any information which must come into the possession of the Assessing Officer after completion of the original assessment.

    2.6 The Delhi High Court, after considering the various decisions cited before it, observed that it was not in dispute that the Assessing Officer did not have the jurisdiction to review his own order. His jurisdiction was confined only to rectification of mistakes as contained in S. 154. The power of rectification of mistakes could be exercised only when the mistake was apparent, and a mistake could not be rectified where it was a mere possible view or where the issues were debatable. Thus, where the Assessing Officer had considered the matter in detail and the view taken was a possible view, the order could not be changed by way of exercising the jurisdiction of rectification of mistake.

    2.7 The Delhi High Court further noted that it was a well settled principle of law that what could not be done directly could not be done indirectly. If the Assessing Officer did not have the power of review, he could not be permitted to achieve the object by taking recourse to initiating a proceeding of reassessment.

    2.8 According to the Delhi High Court, when a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of S. 143(3), a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. In terms of S. 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, judicial and official acts are presumed to have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purportedly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to reopen the proceeding without anything further, this would amount to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong.

    2.9 The Delhi High Court therefore held that since the material was before the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment, the reassessment proceedings were invalid.

3. EMA India’s case :

    3.1 The issue again recently came up before the full bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of EMA India Ltd. v. ACIT, (unreported — copy of order available on www.itatonline.org).

    3.2 In this case also, the assessment proceedings were completed u/s.143(3), and reassessment proceedings were initiated u/s.147 to disallow prior period expenditure and to tax certain interest which were disclosed in the balance sheet, profit and loss account, tax audit report, and other documents submitted before the Assessing Officer in the earlier proceedings.

3.3 The assessee challenged the reassessment proceedings in a writ petition before the High Court. Before the Allahabad High Court, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the initiation of proceedings and issue of notice were based on mere change of opinion and were totally without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the action of the Assessing Officer amounted to review of the earlier assessment order, and that even though the Assessing Officer had noticed such items, he did not assess these items nor add the same to the income during the assessment proceedings. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the full bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Kelvinator’s case (supra).

3.4 On behalf of the department, it was submitted that the initiation of reassessment proceedings was permissible when it was found that certain items of income, though chargeable to tax, had escaped the notice of the Assessing Officer, and no discussion of chargeability to tax of such items of income was made in the assessment order.

3.5 According to the Allahabad High Court, where the assessment order had been passed and certain items of income are not at all discussed and it escaped the notice of the assessing Officer as a result of which the reassessment proceedings were initiated in respect of those items of income, in the circumstances it could not be said that it would amount to review. Since the Assessing Officer did not form any view or any opinion with regard to the items of income which escaped its notice in the original assessment order, it would not amount to review of the order or change of opinion. According to the Allahabad High Court, there could be no change of opinion when no opinion was formed by the Assessing Officer.

3.6 The Allahabad High Court was of review that initiation of reassessment proceedings was permissible where it was found that the Assessing Officer had passed an order of assessment without any application of mind and such application of mind could be found out from the order of assessment itself, inasmuch as, in the event the order of assessment did not contain any discussion on a particular issue, the same may be held to have been rendered without any application of mind. According to the Allahabad High Court, in view of Explanation 1 to S. 147, mere production of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could, with due diligence have been discovered by the assessing authority would not necessarily amount to disclosure. This aspect, according to the Allahabad High Court, had not been considered by the Delhi High Court in Kelvinator’s case.

3.7 The Allahabad High Court therefore held that the reassessment proceedings were valid.

Observations:

4.1 Some controversies do not lead to ‘closements’ soon. The issue being discussed here is an example of one such controversy. Even the attempt in the proposed Direct Tax Code for resolving the controversy in favour of smooth reopening will surely raise new controversies. The issue is fiercely con-tested by the tax payers, in spite of amendments, as they perceive the whole exercise of reassessment as unjust weilding of power by those in the power. One finds a lot of merit in this when one notices the ease with which completed cases are sought to be reopened in large numbers.

4.2 The sting is acutely painful in cases where the reopening is made after expiry of four years, in spite of the fact that there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for assessment. Even in such cases the reopening is sought to be justified on the pretext that the AO had not applied his mind to the material disclosed, though it was produced. The action is sought to be explained by resorting to Explanation 1 to S. 147 and in many cases by relying on Explanation 2 to the said section.

4.3 Fortunately for the tax payers the courts have, by and large, frustrated such attempts of the Revenue in cases where disclosure is found to be evident and also in cases where the material has been furnished in response to an inquiry by the AO. The courts have not given great credence to the Revenue’s contention, often made, that the assessment order is silent on the relevant aspect under contest. The courts have advanced the cause of the tax payers even in cases involving reopening within four years on being convinced that material facts necessary for assessment were disclosed. The courts have also taken a unanimous view that the amendments of 1989 have not materially altered the available law on the subject and that a change of opinion can not lead to a valid reopening even post 1989.

4.4 The Courts have been consistent in holding that the law does not permit a review of an order, not even in the name of reassessment. A thing which can not be done directly can certainly not be done indirectly by resorting to the provisions of re-assessment. It is this principle that has been reiterated by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court by stating that permitting an AO to reopen a completed case in given circumstances amounted to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong.

4.5 Whether this position stated in paragraph 4.4 has been changed by insertion of Explanation 1 and 2. The Courts do not think so. Even after the said insertion the courts are more or less consistent, in holding that a change of opinion can not lead to reopening of a completed assessment and further that in cases where the assessee has not failed in disclosing truly and fully the material facts necessary for assessment, reopening is not possible irrespective of the time of reopening.

4.6 The Punjab & Haryana High Court, in the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT, 263 ITR 437, observed that the taxpayer had no control over the actions of an AO and that he was not in a position to direct the framing of an order in a manner that would record fully and truly all that had actually transpired during the course of assessment and in such circumstances it was appropriate to assume that the order had been passed with due diligence unless it was otherwise proved by the AO. It is normally seen that an assessment order rarely records the findings of the inquiry by AO where he is satisfied with the assessee’s explanation furnished in response to his inquiry.

4.7 The Bombay High Court, consistently follow-ing the full bench decision of the Delhi High Court, has held that once an assessment order is passed u/s.143(3) and the assessee has not been found to have failed in disclosing material facts, no reopening was sustainable. Asian Paints Ltd. v. DCIT & Ors., 308 ITR 195, Idea Cellular Ltd. v. DCIT, 301 ITR 407 and GT v. Eicher Ltd., 294 ITR 310. The same is the ratio of the decisions of several High Courts and Tribunals including the latest one by the Tribunal in the case of Vardhman Industries, ITA No. 501/ Jd/2008 dated 14-9-2009 wherein the jodhpur Bench held that even within four years it was not possible to reopen an assessment where the material facts were found to have been disclosed by the assessee. It appears that in all cases of assessments completed after scrutiny, a reopening can follow only on the basis of an information received subsequent to assessment.

4.8 Even the Allahabad High Court in the case of Foramer v. CIT & Ors., 247 ITR 436 had held that no reopening was possible on a mere change of opinion in cases where there was no failure to disclose material facts by an assessee, a decision which was later on approved by the Supreme Court. Had this decision been noted by the court in EVA’s case, the outcome could have been different. It is interesting to note that the full bench of the Delhi High Court in coming to the conclusion in assessee’s favour had concurred with the abovementioned decision of the Allahabad High Court in Foramer’s case.

4.9 The twin decisions of the Gujarat High Court in the cases of Praful Chunilal Patel, 236 ITR 732 and Garden Silk Mills, 237 ITR 668, heavily relied upon by the Allahabad High Court in EVA’s case, were not even followed by the same Gujarat high court and importantly the full bench in Kelvinator’s case had specifically dissented from these decisions of the Gujarat High Court. Like Delhi, the Bombay High Court has refused to follow the said decisions of the Gujarat High Court.

4.10 CBDT Circular No. 549 dated 31-10-1989, while explaining the implication of the scheme of reassessment, specifically clarified vide para 7.2, that the new scheme does not bring about a material change in the existing law providing that no reopening would sustain in cases of change of opinion not involving any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. It is this circular which has helped information of a definitive judicial consen-sus in the era after amendment of 1989. It is need-less to note that the circulars of the Board are binding on its officers in administering the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

4.11 S. 114 of the Indian  Evidence  Act vide clause provides that due care has been taken by a public officer in performing his duty. Therefore on completion of assessment, it can be presumed that the AO has examined the material produced before him. Frankly, Explanation 1 is an unintended but serious reflection on the state of affairs in the Revenue department, indicating that orders as a rule are passed without due diligence, unless otherwise proved.

4.12 Article 14 has been favourably relied upon by the courts to support the contention that permitting an AO to review his order results in violation of the Constitution which guarantees protection against such administrative actions of the executive.

4.13 A point which emerges from the controversy is that the issue is debatable, and the language adopted by the law is capable of two interpretations. If that is so, a view that is favourable to the assessee should be accepted.

4.14 The decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Indian Newspaper, relied upon by the Allahabad high court in EVA’s case, clearly supported the view that the reopening of an assessment was not possible for reviewing an order.

4.15 The decision in Kelvinator’s case was delivered by the full bench of the high court. The law of precedent required that the division bench of the high court, of two judges, in EVA’s case should have followed the decision of a larger bench instead of following decisions which were specifically dissented by the full bench. The decision in the case of Shyam Bansal, 296 ITR 95 (All.), again relied upon in EVA’s case did not consider the decision of the full bench and in any case the Revenue in that case was in possession of some information obtained post assessment. The binding force of the decision of the full bench in Kelvinator’s case was specifically considered in the case of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 292 ITR 49 (Delhi) wherein the Court, in the context of the very same issue, had considered the validity of a decision delivered by the division bench in the case of Consolidated Photo and Finvest Ltd. 281 ITR 394 (Del.) wherein the division bench had failed to follow the decision of the full bench in Kelvinator’s case. The Court in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines’ case held that the decision of the full bench in Kelvinator’s case had to be followed by the division bench of the Court. This position in law of precedent has been reiterated by the Bombay High Court in the case of Eicher Ltd., 294 ITR 310.

PF Payments u/s.43B —Retrospectivity of Amendment

1. Issue for Consideration :

    1.1 S.43B of the Income-tax Act provides that certain expenditures, which would otherwise have been allowable as deductions in computing the total income under the Income-tax Act, shall be allowed as deduction only in the year of actual payment of such items by the assessee notwithstanding the method of accounting followed by the assessee. These expenditures are listed in clauses (a) to (f) of the said Section Clause (b) of the said Section refers to the sums payable by an employer by way of contribution to any Provident Fund, Superannuation Fund, Gratuity Fund, or any other fund for the welfare of employees (‘welfare dues’). Accordingly, the deduction of welfare dues is allowed only where payment of such expenditure is actually made.

    1.2 Till assessment year 2003-04, the second proviso to S.43B provided that no deduction of welfare dues covered by the said clause (b) would be allowed unless such sum had actually been paid on or before the due date as defined in the Explanation to S.36(1)(va), i.e., the due date for payment of such welfare dues under the relevant applicable law. From assessment year 2004-05, the second proviso to S.43B has been omitted, and welfare dues covered by clause (b) were brought into the purview of the first proviso, which provides that the disallowance would not operate if the sums are paid on or before the due date of filing of the Income-tax return of the year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred, and proof of such payment was furnished along with the return.

    1.3 A dispute has arisen as to whether this amendment was applicable to all pending matters, and therefore applied retrospectively, or whether it applied prospectively from assessment year 2004-05 onwards. While the Bombay High Court has held that the amendment would apply prospectively, the Delhi and Madras High Courts have taken the view that the amendment applied retrospectively.

2. Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case :

    2.1 The issue came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. 298 ITR 149.

    2.2 In this case, pertaining to assessment years 1991-92 and 1994-95, the assessee had made payments of provident fund dues before the due date of filing of its return of income, but beyond the due date stipulated under the Provident Fund Act. The amounts had been disallowed by the Assessing Officer, but the assessee’s appeal against such disallowance had been allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal had also upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

    2.3 Before the Bombay High Court, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that the deletion of the second proviso to S.43B with effect from 1st April 2004 only meant that the relaxation in S.43B, insofar as employer’s contribution was concerned, would be governed by the first proviso to S.43B from 1st April 2004 only.

    2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that the amendment was curative and was resorted to for the purpose of removing the hardship caused by the second proviso. A similar amendment had been made in relation to clause (a) relating to tax, duty, cess and fees earlier, and in relation to such amendment, the Supreme Court, in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. vs. CIT 224 ITR 677, had held the amendment to be curative and retrospective. It was argued that the proviso which was inserted to remedy the unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, the proviso which supplied an obvious omission in the Section and was required to be read into the Section to give the Section a reasonable interpretation, was required to be treated as retrospective in operation, so that a reasonable interpretation could be given to the Section as a whole.

    2.5 The Bombay High Court went through the history of S.43B and the amendments carried out to it from time to time. It analysed the decision of the Supreme Court in Allied Motors case. It noted that when the two provisos to S.43 B were added, payments under clause (b) and payments under other clauses of S.43B were treated as two different classes. The Finance Act, 1989 substituted the second proviso, noting certain hardships that were being occasioned by the operation of that proviso. The Bombay High Court noted that, in its wisdom, the Parliament chose not to delete the second proviso but substituted it, and therefore intended that S.43B(b) should be treated as a class by itself distinct from the other sub-Sections. The second proviso was omitted based on the recommendations of the Kelkar Committee Report, which responded to representation by trade and industry that the delayed payment of statutory liability related to labour should be accorded the same treatment as the delayed payment of taxes and interest.

    2.6 The Bombay High Court noted the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Synergy Financial Exchange Ltd., 288 ITR 366, where the Madras High Court held that the amendment was not retrospective, on the basis that fiscal legislation imposing liability is generally governed by normal presumption that it is not retrospective and that in interpreting the statute, the Courts, in the first instance, have to consider the plain written language of the statute. If on so reading, it is not possible to give effect to the intent of the Parliament, then the Courts resort to purposeful interpretation to give effect to that intent. The Bombay High Court also (inadvertently) noted the decision of the Assam High Court in George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. vs. CIT, 284 ITR 619 as rejecting the contention that the amendment should be read as retrospective, though the Assam High Court in that case upheld the contention of the assessee for allowing deduction for the payments on or before the due date of filing of the return of income.

2.7 The Bombay High Court noted that the amendment was made applicable from the assessment year 2004-05. It observed that in interpreting statutory provisions, the Court also considered the mischief rule, namely, what was the state of law before the act or the amendment, and what was the mischief that the Act or the amendment sought to avoid. From the normal aids to construction, the Court observed that the only mischief that the amendment if at all sought to obviate was the need to eliminate the procedural complexities, reduce paperwork, simplify tax administration and to enhance efficiency and also integrate such tax proposals as the system could at present absorb, and acceptance of the representations made by trade and industry that they should not be denied the benefit of deductions on account of delayed payment of taxes and interest.

2.8 According to the Bombay High Court, the law as it stood earlier was that in relation to the employer’s contribution to provident fund, if it was not paid within the due date, was not eligible for deduction. According to the High Court, this position had been remedied, and the remedial measure had been made applicable from assessment year 2004-05. The Bombay High Court therefore took the view that it could not be said that the amendment was retrospective.

2.9 Subsequent to this decision of the Bombay High Court, the decision of the Assam High Court in George Williamson’s case went up to the Supreme Court in a special leave petition as CIT vs. Vinay Cement Ltd. 213 CTR 268. In a short five-line order, the Supreme Court noted that they were concerned with the law as it stood prior to the amendment of Section 43 B, that in the circumstances the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit under Section 43 B for that period, particularly in view of the fact that he had contributed to Provident Fund before filing of the return, and dismissed the special leave petition.

2.10 Subsequent to this decision of the Supreme Court, the matter again came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Pamwi Tissues Ltd. 215 CTR 150, relating to assessment year 1990-91.In this case, when the attention of the Bombay High Court was drawn to the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case, it observed that the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court cannot be said to be the law decided. According to the Bombay High Court, for a judgment to be a precedent, it must contain the three basic postulates – a finding of material facts, direct and inferential, statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts, and judgment based on the individual effect of the above. The Bombay High Court therefore followed its earlier decision in the case of Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, holding that Provident Fund payment made after the due date under the PF Act but before the due date of filing of the return of income, were not allowable.

3. Nexus Computer’s    case:

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nexus Computer (P) Ltd., 177 Taxman 202.

3.2 In this case pertaining to assessment year 2000-01, the attention of the Madras High Court was drawn by the Revenue to its earlier decision in the case of Synergy Financial Exchange (Supra), wherein it had held that the amendment was not retrospective, and by the assessee, to the decision of the Assam High Court in George Williamson’s case and the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case.

3.3 The Madras High  Court in that  case (Nexus Computers)noted that the order of the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case was a speaking order, which gave reasons for rejecting the special leave petition, and that the reasoning given in the dismissal of the special leave petition in that case would be binding on it as the law declared by the Apex Court under article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Madras High Court held that the Provident Fund payments would be allowable under Section 43 B.

3.4 The issue also came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Dharmendra Sharma, 297 ITR 320, in relation to assessment year 2001-02, and in CIT vs. P.M. Electronics Ltd., 177 Taxman 1. The Delhi High Court took note of the decisions of the Madras High Court in Synergy Financial Exchange, the Bombay High Court in Pamwi Tissues, the Supreme Court in dismissing the special leave petition in Vinay Cement’s case, and the Madras High Court in Nexus Computer’s case. The Delhi High Court also observed that judicial discipline required it to follow the view of the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case, and hold the amendment to be retrospective. The Delhi High Court therefore disagreed with the approach adopted by the Bombay High Court in Pamwi Tissues case.

4. Observations:

4.1 The issue of whether the amendment is retrospective in operation or not can be for the time being concluded on examination of the true effect of the Supreme Court order in Vinay Cement’s case, delivered while dismissing the special leave petition. As observed by the Bombay High Court, the question is whether it was a dismissal on merits, laying down a binding precedent. If the decision of the Supreme Court is held to have been delivered on merits, it would be the law of the land and be binding on the Courts; if not, the Courts would be empowered to examine the issue independently.

4.2 As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, 119 STC 505 :

“If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than a declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, Tribunal or authority in any proceeding subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, Tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.”

4.3 Reading the order of the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case certainly gives the impression that though the order is short, the Supreme Court has applied its mind to the issue at stake while dismissing the petition, and dismissed it on merits, and not merely on technical grounds or as not maintainable. The order therefore seems to set a binding precedent, which all High Courts ought to have followed.

4.4 Further, it is no doubt true that the operation of the proviso gave rise to absurd situations where large amounts were disallowed on account of trivial delays of a few days, even when there was reasonable cause for making delayed payments of labour welfare dues. It does seem rather harsh to take the view that such disallowance was always intended by the Legislature.

4.5 The better view of the matter is therefore the view of the Delhi and Madras High Courts that the omission of the second proviso to S.43Bis retrospective in operation, and applied to all pending matters as on the date of the amendment.

Capital Gains Account Scheme — Due Date for Deposit

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 An assessee is entitled to exemption for long-term
capital gains arising on transfer of any asset u/s.54F, if he purchases or
constructs a residential house within the stipulated period (one year before or
two years after the date of transfer for purchase, and three years after the
date of transfer for construction). The exemption available is of such amount of
capital gain in the ratio of the cost of the new house to the net sale
consideration on transfer of the assets.

1.2 Ss.(4) of S. 54F provides that the amount of net
consideration, which is not appropriated by the assessee towards the purchase of
the new asset within one year before the date of transfer of the original asset,
or which is not utilised by him for the purchase or construction of the new
asset before the date of furnishing the return of income u/s.139, shall be
deposited by him before furnishing such return into an account with a bank under
the Capital Gains Account Scheme, and utilised in accordance with such scheme.
If this is done, the amount actually utilised by the assessee for the purchase
or construction of the new asset together with the amount so deposited is deemed
to be the cost of the new asset for computing the exemption u/s.54F. In other
words, pending actual utilisation for purchase or construction of the new house,
the amount has to be deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme. The amount
deposited under the scheme can be utilised only for the purpose of making
payment for purchase or construction of the new house.

1.3 At times, it may so happen that the assessee fails to
deposit the amount under the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date
for filing the return of income u/s.139(1), but actually purchases or constructs
a new residential house before the due date for filing belated return of income
u/s.139(4), i.e., within the stipulated time period of two/three years.
The question that arises in such a case is whether the benefit of the exemption
u/s.54F can yet be availed of by the assessee in spite of such failure.

1.4 While the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal has held that the
assessee is not entitled to the exemption in such a case, the Bangalore Bench of
the Tribunal has held that the assessee can still avail of the benefit of the
exemption if such utilisation is before the due date for filing belated return
of income u/s.139(4).

2. Taranbir Singh Sawhney’s case :


2.1 The issue first came up before the Delhi Bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Taranbir Singh Sawhney v. Dy. CIT, 5 SOT 417.

2.2 In this case, the assessee sold certain shares on 25th
June 1996, and deposited the sale proceeds in his bank account on 3rd August
1996. He purchased a residential house on 1st December 1997, without depositing
any amount under the Capital Gains Account Scheme. Thereafter, the assessee
filed his return of income on 13th November 1998, claiming exemption u/s.54F of
the capital gains on sale of shares on account of property purchased on 1st
December 1997.

2.3 The Assessing Officer denied the claim for exemption
u/s.54F, on the ground that the conditions specified in that Section were not
fulfilled by the assessee, since the assessee did not deposit such consideration
in an account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme pending purchase of a
residential house. According to the Assessing Officer, the date of acquisition
of the new residential property was 1st December 1997, which was after the due
date applicable to the assessee of furnishing his return of income u/s.139(1),
i.e., 30th June 1997. According to the Assessing Officer, the net
consideration was neither appropriated towards the purchase of residential
property before the due date, nor was it deposited in the account under the
Capital Gains Account Scheme before that date, resulting in non-fulfilment of
the conditions prescribed u/s.54F. The AO therefore denied the exemption
u/s.54F.

2.4 Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee submitted
that he had opened an independent bank account for depositing the sale proceeds
for onward investment in a residential property, that the entire sale proceeds
so deposited in his bank ac-count were ultimately used for acquiring residential
property, that this account was only used for the purchase of property, and
therefore, in sum and in substance, he had complied with the provisions of S.
54F. the assessee claimed that not maintaining a bank account under the Capital
Gains Account Scheme was a technical breach, the conditions specified in S. 54 F
having been substantially complied with. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the
assessee’s contentions and dismissed the appeal.

2.5 Before the Tribunal, it was argued that the denial of
exemption was done on a mere technical lapse. It was claimed that the sale
proceeds of shares were utilised only for the purpose of investment in the new
house property and not for any other purpose. Though the sale proceeds were not
deposited in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme 1988, they
were kept in a separate bank account and utilised only for the purpose of
investment in the house property. Accordingly, the assessee had substantially
complied with the conditions specified in S. 54F. It was submitted that the
exemption provisions should be construed liberally, as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, 196 ITR 188, and that the
provisions of S. 54F should be construed in the manner to further its objectives
and not to restrain it.

2.6 The Tribunal noted the fact that the appropriation of net
consideration in the house property was not made before the due date of filing
of the return as specified u/s.139(1), and that therefore the net consideration
ought to have been deposited in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account
Scheme, 1988. Since this had not been done, according to the Tribunal, it
disentitled the assessee from exemption. According to the Tribunal, the plea of
the assessee that it was a mere technical breach was not a relevant criterion to
decide the eligibility of the assessee for exemption. The Tribunal also held
that the plea of the assessee that the provisions be construed liberally so as
to further its objectives was not tenable having regard to the clear provisions
of law. The Tribunal therefore rejected the assessee’s claim for exemption
u/s.54F.

3. Nipun Mehrotra’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Bangalore
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Nipun Mehrotra v. ACIT, 110 ITD 520.

3.2 In this case, the assessee sold shares for a total net sale consideration of Rs.11,10,833, out of which Rs.9,00,000 was paid as part consideration for acquisition of a new flat between February 2000 and June 2000. The assessee had earlier paid an amount of Rs.22lakhs to the builder for purchase of the flat between February 1999 and October 1999.A further sum of Rs.4 lakhs was paid on 4th September 2000 and Rs.3,98,000 was paid after September 2000 till March 2001. The assessee accordingly claimed exemption u/ s.54F of the entire capital gains.

3.3 The Assessing Officer considered only the payments made after the sale of shares, and since the assessee had made payments of only Rs.9 lakhs before the due date of filing of the return of income, denied exemption u/ s.54F in respect of net sale consideration of Rs.2,10,833, on the ground that the assessee should have invested this amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date of filing the return of income for assessment year 2000-01, i.e., before 31st July 2000.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, holding that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous and that, in the name of liberal interpretation, the provisions could not be circumvented.

3.5 Before the Tribunal, the Department argued that the assessee had not placed any evidence on record to suggest that the sale consideration received from the sale of shares were utilised for the purchase of the new asset, as a sum of Rs.22 lakhs was paid before the shares were sold. According to the Department, the investment of Rs.22 lakhs could not be considered for the purpose of allowing exemption u/ s.54F.

3.6 The tribunal considered the provisions of S. 54F(4). It noted that the assessee had to utilise the amount for the purchase or construction of the new asset before the date of furnishing the return of income u/s.139. Since there was no mention of any sub-section of S. 139, according to the Tribunal, one could not interpret that S. 139 mentioned therein should be read as S. 139(1). Following the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajesh Kumar [alan, 286 ITR 274 in the context of S. 54(2), the Tribunal was of the view that S. 139 mentioned in S. 54F included not only S. 139(1),but all sub-sections of S. 139.

3.7 According to the Tribunal, the intention behind the insertion of Ss.(4) in S. 54F was to dispense with the rectification of assessments in case the taxpayer failed to acquire the corresponding new asset. Therefore, if the new asset was acquired before the date of filing of the return u/s.139, then the assessee could file such return and there would be no need of rectification. The Tribunal noted that the decision of the Gauhati High Court was not available to the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Taranbir Singh Sawhney (supra).

3.8 The Tribunal therefore held that the assessee was entitled to the exemption of the entire amount of Rs.11,10,833 u/s.54F.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is true that the Bangalore Bench has not noted the fact that the subsequent part of S. 54F(4) expressly refers to S. 139(4) – “Such deposit being made in any case not later than the due date applicable in the case of the assesee for furnishing the return of income under Ss.(l) of S. 139 in an account….. “

4.2 However, it is essential to understand the background behind the introduction of the requirement of depositing the amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme. Prior to introduction of this requirement, it was noticed that assessees would claim the exemption u/ s.54F, by stating their intention to invest in a residential house within the prescribed time period. There was no mechanism for the Assessing Officer to verify whether such investment was made within the prescribed time, and it was felt that many assessees obtained the exemption without any actual investment in a residential house. Hence, this requirement was introduced to ensure that the exemption was not obtained under a false statement that the investment would be made within the prescribed period.

4.3 From that perspective, so long as the investment is made before the date of filing of the income tax return, whether u/s.139(1) or u/s.139(4), the purpose of introduction of the Capital Gains Account Scheme is achieved, namely, ensuring that the investment has actually been made before the return is filed.

4.4 As held by the Gauhati  High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar [alan (supra), in construing a beneficial enactment, the view that advances the object of the enactment and serves the purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the beneficial enactment. Therefore, even if the investment in the house property has been made before the date of filing of the belated return, the purpose of the legislature is achieved, and it is not appropriate to deny the exemption on the ground that there has been a delay in investment, and accordingly a failure to invest in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme.

4.5 The requirement to invest in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme is therefore really a procedural requirement to ensure that investment is made in a residential house as claimed in the return of income, where such investment has already not been made. To deny the exemption when there has been substantial compliance by actual investment in a house, on the ground that investment has not been made in the Capital Gains Account Scheme within the prescribed time limit, appears to be unjustified. The time limit therefore needs to be read down as including the time limit for filing of a belated return of income, as held by the Gauhati High Court.

4.6 Therefore,  the view  taken  by the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal  appears  to be a better view of the matter, as compared  to the view taken by the Delhi Bench.

Restriction on Deduction due to section 80-IA(9)

Controversies

Issue for consideration :

Chapter VIA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deals with various
deductions. Part A of this Chapter details the scheme of deductions, while part
C contains the provisions for allowing certain deductions in respect to profits
and gains from a business. Section 80A, falling in part A, provides that
deductions are to be made from the gross total income, and that the aggregate
amount of the deductions shall not exceed the gross total income.

Section 80AB, also falling in part A of Chapter VIA, provides
that where any deduction is required to be made or allowed under any section
falling in part C of that Chapter, in respect of any income of the nature
specified in any of the relevant sections which is included in the gross total
income, the amount of income of that nature as computed in accordance with the
provisions of the Income-tax Act shall be deemed to be the amount of income of
that nature derived or received by the assessee and included in his gross total
income.

Section 80IA(9), which falls in part C of Chapter VIA,
provides as under :

“Where any amount of profits and gains of an undertaking or
an enterprise is claimed and allowed under this section for any assessment
year, deduction to the extent of such profits and gains shall not be allowed
under any other provision of this Chapter under the heading
‘C — Deductions in Respect of Certain Incomes’, and shall in no case exceed
the profits and gains of such eligible business of undertaking or enterprise,
as the case may be.”

The question that repetitively arises for the consideration
of the courts is about the quantum of deduction in cases where an assessee is
eligible to claim deduction under more than one section of part C of Chapter VIA
based on different criteria, for instance, u/s.80HHC for export profits and
section 80IA for new industrial undertaking, and the manner of computation of
deductions under both the sections. While the Delhi and Kerala High Courts have
held that for the purpose of computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the deduction
already allowed u/s.80IA has to be reduced from the eligible business profits,
the Bombay and Madras High Courts have taken a contrary view that the amount of
such deduction u/s.80IA is not to be reduced in computing the export profits for
the purpose of deduction u/s.80HHC, so however the aggregate of the deductions
under both the provisions is restricted to the business profits derived from the
eligible business.

To illustrate, if the profits of an eligible business are 100
and the deduction u/s.80IA is 20, the issue is whether, for the purpose of
computation of the deduction u/s.80HHC, the profits of the business are to be
considered as 80 (as held by the Delhi High Court) or as 100 (as considered by
the Bombay High Court). There is no dispute that the total deduction cannot
exceed 100. The issue, therefore, really is whether the profits eligible for
computation of the deduction u/s.80HHC is impacted by the provision of section
80IA(9), or whether the said provision restricts the quantum of deduction
u/s.80HHC after it is computed.

Though the decisions covered in this column pertain to
deductions u/s.80IA and u/s.80HHC, and deduction u/s.80HHC is no longer
available, the principle laid down by these decisions would still be applicable
in the context of section 80IA and other deductions under part C of Chapter VIA.

Great Eastern Exports case :

The issue arose recently before the Delhi High Court in the
case of Great Eastern Exports v. CIT, 237 CTR (Del.) 264, and four other
cases disposed of through a common order.

In all these cases, the assessees had claimed deductions
under both section 80HHC and section 80IA. The Assessing Officer reduced the
amount of business profits by the deduction allowed u/s.80IA for computing the
deduction u/s.80HHC, negating the stand of the assessees that for computing
deduction u/s.80HHC, the eligible profits were to be taken, irrespective of the
deduction allowed u/s.80IA i.e., without reducing such profits by the
amount of deduction claimed u/s.80IA.

The Delhi High Court examined the provisions and the history
of Chapter VIA, and noted that prior to the amendment made by insertion of
section 80IA(9) in 1999, it had been held by the courts that each relief under
Chapter VIA was a separate one and had to be independently determined, and would
not be abridged or diluted by any of the other reliefs.

The argument on behalf of the assessees was that this
amendment had not made any change as to the manner of computation and deduction
of various provisions under part C of Chapter VIA, but only restricted the total
deduction under all those sections to the profits and gains. It was argued that
section 80AB, the controlling and governing section for all deductions under
part C of Chapter VIA, was a non obstante clause and would therefore
prevail over section 80IA(9); it referred to ‘gross total income’, and not ‘net
income’. It was also argued that a harmonious construction should be given
rather than a literal interpretation, considering the object of section 80IA(9)
of preventing deduction of more than 100% of profits and gains of the
undertaking by claiming multiple deductions under different sections.

The Delhi High Court, analysing the provisions of section
80IA(9), observed that by reading the plain language, once an assessee was
allowed deduction u/s.80IA to the extent of such profits and gains, he was not
to be allowed further deductions under part C of Chapter VIA in respect of such
profits and gains, and that in no case the deduction would exceed the profits
and gains of such eligible business. According to the Delhi High Court, the
expressions used ‘deduction to the extent of such profits’ and the word ‘and’ in
this section were very crucial. According to the Court, while the first
expression signified that if an assessee was claiming benefit of deduction of a
particular amount of profits and gains u/s.80IA, to that extent profits and
gains were to be reduced while calculating the deductions under part C of
Chapter VIA. The use of the word ‘and’, signified that the said provision was
independent — namely, the total deduction should not exceed the profits and
gains in a particular year.

The Delhi High Court observed that even a layman who had some proficiency in English would understand the meaning of that provision in the manner that they had explained, and that the provision aimed at achieving two independent objectives. According to the Delhi High Court, if the language of the statute was plain and capable of one and only one meaning, that obvious meaning had to be given to the provision. The Delhi High Court rejected the argument that section 80AB would be rendered otiose by such interpretation, by holding that there was no conflict within the two provisions, as section 80AB dealt with computation of deductions on gross total income, whose purpose was achieved, even otherwise, on reading these provisions and interpreting them in the manner they had done. The Delhi High Court refused to consider the clarification given by CBDT Circular number 772, on the ground that the notice and objects of accompanying reasons were only an aid to construction, which was needed only when literal reading of the provisions led to an ambiguous result or absurdity.

The Delhi High Court therefore held that for the purpose of computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the deduction already allowed u/s.80IA had to be reduced from the profits of the business.

Associated Capsules’ case:

The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT & Anr., 237 CTR (Bom.) 408.

In this case, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80IA at 30% of the profits and gains from the eligible business undertakings and deductions u/s.80HHC at 50% of the profits from the export of goods. The Assessing Officer computed the deduction u/s.80HHC on the business profits computed after deducting 30% of such profits which was allowed u/s.80IA.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that section 80IA(9) did not authorise the Assessing Officer to reduce the amount of profits of business allowed as deduction u/s.80IA from the total profits of business while computing deduction u/s.80HHC, that both deductions have to be computed independently, and thereafter the deduction computed u/s.80IA has to be allowed in full and the deduction computed u/s.80HHC was to be restricted to the balance profits of the business duly reduced by the deduction allowed u/s.80IA, so that the aggregate of the deductions did not exceed the profits of the business of the undertaking.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), following the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Asst. CIT v. Hindustan Mint & Agro Products (P) Ltd., 119 ITD 107 (Del). The Tribunal held that section 80IA(9) had the effect of reducing the eligible profits available for deduction u/s.80HHC.

Before the Bombay High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that the restriction imposed by section 80IA(9) was not applicable at the state of computation of deduction u/s.80HHC(3), but was applicable at the stage of allowing deduction u/s.80HHC(1). It was argued that the plain reading of section 80IA(9) did not suggest that the deduction allowable u/s.80HHC had to be computed by reducing the amount of profits allowed u/s.80IA. It was argued that wherever the Legislature intended that the deduction allowed under one section shall affect the computation of deduction allowable under another section, the Legislature had specifically stated so by using the term ‘such part of profits shall not qualify’, which term was not used in section 80IA(9). It was further argued that the expression ‘profits of the business’ for the purpose of deduction u/s.80HHC had been defined in that section, and that section 80IA(9) did not use a non obstante provision to override that definition.

It was further argued on behalf of the assessee that the basis for deduction u/s.80IA and u/s.80HHC were totally different, and that therefore the restriction imposed u/s.80IA(9) had no relation to the computation of deduction u/s.80HHC. It was further urged that the two restrictions contained in section 80IA(9) have to be read together and on such a reading, it was clear that the restrictions were with reference to allowability and not computability of deductions under other provisions of part C of Chapter VIA. Reliance was placed on the explanatory memorandum to the Finance Bill, 1998 explaining the reasons for inserting section 80IA(9), and to the CBDT Circular number 772, dated 23rd December 1998 for this proposition. Lastly, it was argued that deduction u/s.80IA was on one part of the profits (profits of an industrial undertaking), while deduction u/s.80HHC was on a different part of the profits (profits derived from exports), and that both deductions were not allowed on the same profit.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that a plain reading of section 80IA(9) showed that the deduction to the extent of profits claimed and allowed u/s.80IA could not be taken into account while computing deduction u/s.80HHC. It was claimed that in order to check the misuse of double deduction, it was necessary to exclude the deduction allowed u/s.80IA from profits available for deduction u/s.80HHC. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Great Eastern Exports (supra) and on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Olam Exports (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 229 CTR (Ker.) 206, where a similar view had been taken by the courts. Lastly, it was argued that the restrictions u/s.80IA(9) affected the whole of section 80HHC, and not just the allowability.

The Bombay High Court analysed the background and object behind insertion of section 80IA(9), as explained in the explanatory memorandum to the Finance Bill, 1998, 231 ITR (St) 252. The Bombay High Court also examined the language of section 80IA(9) which provided that the deduction to the extent of profits allowed u/s.80IA shall not be allowed under any other provisions, which, according to the Bombay High Court, did not even remotely refer to the method of computing deduction under other provisions, but merely sought to curtail allowance of deduction and not computability of deduction under any other provision of part C of Chapter VIA. According to the Bombay High Court, the words ‘shall not be allowed’, could not be interpreted as ‘shall not qualify’.

The Bombay High Court considered the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Great Eastern Exports (supra), and noted that the Delhi High Court had failed to consider one of the arguments of the counsel for the Revenue in that case. The counsel had argued that in the matter of grant of deduction, the first stage was computation of deduction and the second stage was the allowance of deduction, and that computation of deduction had to be made as provided in the respective sections and it was only at the stage of allowing deduction u/s.80IA(1) and also under other provisions of part C of Chapter VIA, that the provisions of section 80IA(9) came into operation. The Bombay High Court noted that the Delhi High Court had not rejected this argument and therefore could not have arrived at the conclusion that it did without rejecting that argument. The Bombay High Court expressed its dissent with the views of the Kerala High Court for the same reasons.

The Bombay High Court noted that the object of section 80IA(9) was to prevent taxpayers from claiming repeated deductions in respect of the same amount of eligible income and in excess of the eligible profits, and not to curtail the deductions allowable under various provisions of part C of Chapter VIA. The Bombay High Court therefore held that section 80IA(9) did not affect the computability of deduction under various provisions of part C of Chapter VIA, but affected the allowability of such deductions, so that the aggregate deduction u/s.80IA and other provisions under part C of Chapter VIA did not exceed 100% of the profits of the business of the assessee.

A similar view had been taken by the Madras High Court in the case of SCM Creations v. Asst. CIT, 304 ITR 319.

Observations:

The purpose behind insertion of section 80IA(9) has been set out in CBDT Circular No. 772, dated 23rd December, 1998 as under:
“It was noticed that certain assessees claimed more than 100% deduction on such profits and gains of the same undertaking, when they were entitled to deductions under more than one Section of Chapter VIA. With a view to providing suitable statutory safeguard in the Income-tax Act to prevent the taxpayer from taking undue advantage of the existing provisions of the Act by claiming repeated deductions in respect of the same amount of eligible income, even in cases where it exceeds such eligible profits of an undertaking or a hotel, inbuilt restrictions in section 80HHD and section 80IA have been provided by amending the Section, so that such unintended benefits are not passed on to the appellant.”

The purpose of the amendment gathered from the understanding of the Board clearly seems to be to restrict the total of the deductions to 100% of the eligible profits. Had the Delhi High Court appreciated this part of the contention of the assessee that even the Board, the administrative body, was of the view that the scope of the provision contained in section 80IA(9) was to restrict the aggregate of the deductions under the two provisions of the Chapter C to the overall profits and gains, its conclusion may have been different. The Court instead rejected any need to apply its mind to such an analogy on the ground that adopting such an insidious approach was not called for where the language of the provision was clear. The stand of the Board is clearly derived from the memorandum explaining the provisions of section 80IA(9). In any case, the stand taken by the Board could have been taken as a concession conferred on the taxpayer by the Government.

The Chapter is replete with the provisions introduced for curtailing the base for deduction like section 80HHB(5), section 80HHBA(4), section 80HHD(7), section 80IE(4), section 80P, etc. These provisions use a language materially different to the language employed by section 80IA(9) for restricting the scope of the computation of deduction itself. The Parliament where desired had adopted a clear and different language to convey its aim of diluting the basis of deduction and restricting the scope of the computable income.

Section 80IA(9) as explained by the Memorandum and the Circular merely provides that when a deduction u/s.80IA has been allowed, deduction to the extent of such profits and gains shall not be allowed under any other provision, and does not state that such profits and gains shall not be taken into account for computing such other deductions. The Bombay High Court has appreciated in the proper perspective the difference between inclusion of such profits in a computation and inclusion of such profits in the actual deduction as explained by the Memorandum and the Circular.

G. P. Singh in ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ suggests a departure from the rule of literal interpretation as under:
“It has already been seen that a statute has to be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a ‘head on clash’ between two sections of the same Act and whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.”

The Bombay High Court’s interpretation in Associated Capsule’s case is a step towards harmonising the provisions of section 80AB, section 80HHC and section 80IA(9).

It is significant to note, specially in the context of section 80HHC, that the deduction under that section is required to be computed w.r.t. the profits of the business which is artificially defined under Explanation (baa) of the said section and such artificial profits are far detached form the profit that is eligible for deduction u/s.80IA and therefore it is difficult to hold that the double deduction is claimed on the same profit. In any case, as noted, the basis on which the amount of deduction is computed under the two different provisions is significantly different.

A provision introduced for restricting the scope of a benefit under another provision has to contain a non obstante clause which is found missing in section 80HHC and on this count alone, any attempt to curtail the basis of the profit eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC should be avoided. Section 80IA(9) should at the most be seen to be achieving the same thing as is achieved by section 80AB and may be taken as a provision introduced to achieve greater clarity on the subject.

The decision of the Bombay High Court has the effect of overruling the two decisions of the Special Bench in the case of Rogini Garments & Others, 111 TTJ 274 (Chennai) and Hindustan Mint & Agro Products (P) Ltd., 123 TTJ 577 (Del.) and dissenting with the two decisions of the High Courts of Delhi and Kerala. In view of the sharp division of views of the Courts and considering the fact that the issue has the large tax effect, it is desired that the issue be settled at the earliest by the Apex Court.

Netting of interest and S. 80HHC

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 80HHC, inserted by the Finance Act, 1983 w.e.f. 1st
April, 1983 for grant of deduction in respect of the profits derived from
exports of goods and merchandise, has since undergone several changes. The
relevant part of the provision, at present, relevant to this discussion, reads
as under :

Explanation : For the purposes of this Section, :


(baa) ‘profits of the business’ means the profits of the
business as computed under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’ as reduced by :

(1) ninety per cent of any sum referred to in clauses (iiia),
(iiib), (iiic), (iiid) and (iiie) of S. 28 or of any receipts by way of
brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar
nature included in such profits; and

1.2 ‘Profits of the business’ as defined in clause (baa) of
the Explanation requires that the profits derived from exports is computed under
the head ‘Profits and gains of business and profession’ and such profits
determined in accordance with S. 28 to S. 44D is to be further adjusted on
account of clause (baa), namely, ninety percent of any receipts by way of
brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar
nature included in such profits
.

1.3 The issue that is being fiercely debated, is concerning
the true meaning of the terms ‘interest, etc.’ and ‘receipts’ used in Expln.
(baa). Whether the terms individually or collectively connote net interest, etc.
i.e., the gross interest income less the expenditure incurred for earning
such income ? A related question, in the event it is held that the terms connote
netting of interest, is should netting be allowed where the interest income is
computed as business income ?

1.4 The issue believed to be settled by the decision of the
Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of Lalsons, 89 ITD 25 (Delhi) became
controversial due to the decisions of the Madras and Punjab and Haryana High
Courts. Again, these decisions of the High Court were not followed by the
decision of the Delhi High Court, upholding the ratio of the Lalsons’ decision.
The peace prevailing thereafter has been short-lived in view of the recent
decision of the Bombay High Court, dissenting form the decision of the Delhi
High Court.

2. Shri Ram Honda Equip’s case :


2.1 The issue arose for consideration of the Delhi High Court
in Shri Ram Honda Power Equip, 289 ITR 475 wherein substantial questions of law
concerning the interpretation of S. 80HHC, Ss. (1) and (3) and clause (baa) of
the Explanation, were raised before the High Court as under :

(a) Does the expression ‘profits derived from such export’
occurring in Ss.(3) r/w Expln. (baa) restrict the profits available for
deduction in terms of Ss.(1) to only those items of income directly relatable to
the business of export ?

(b) Does the expression ‘interest’ in Expln. (baa) connote
net interest, i.e., the gross interest income less the expenditure
incurred by the assessee for earning such income ?

(c) If the expression ‘interest’ implies net interest, then
should netting be allowed where the interest income is computed to be business
income ?

2.2 The two broad issues identified by the Court from the
three questions referred to it were the determination of the nature of interest
income and the issue of netting of interest. The Court noted that the first step
was to determine whether in a given case the income from interest was assessable
as a ‘business income’, computed in terms of S. 28 to S. 44, or as an ‘income
from other sources’ determined u/s.56 and u/s.57 and to ascertain thereafter,
whether while deducting ninety percent of interest therefrom in terms of Expln.
(baa), gross or net interest should be taken in to account.

2.3 It was contended on behalf of the assessee that profits cannot be arrived at by any businessman without accounting
for the expenditure incurred in earning such interest; that the entire clause
(baa) had to be read along with the scheme of S. 80HHC(1) and (3) and given a
meaning that did not produce absurd results; that the interpretation should
reflect a liberal construction conforming to the object of encouraging exports;
that use of the term ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘brokerage,
commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipts of a similar nature’
was indicative that such amounts were the ‘net’ amounts and only net interest
was includible in the profits; hence once interest income had been computed as
business income, then netting had to be allowed.

2.4 It was further urged that as per the mandate of clause
(baa) the profits and gains of business or profession had to be first computed
as per S. 28 to S. 44, including S. 37, which envisaged accounting for the
expenditure incurred by an assessee for earning the income. The assessees also
relied on paragraph 30.11 of Circular No. 621, dated. 19-12-1991 which provided
for ad hoc 10 percent deduction to account for the expenses. It was
further urged that the Legislature wherever desired had used the expression
‘gross’ as in S. 80M, S. 40(b), S. 44AB, S. 44AD and S. 115JB, making it clear
that the Legislature in terms of S. 80HHC intended that the interest to be
accounted for in computing the profits should be net interest; that the language
of the Section was unambiguous and therefore there was no need to supply the
word ‘gross’ as qualifying the word ‘interest’. Therefore, applying the same
rule of causus omissus, such word could not be read into the Section.
Reliance was placed on the decision in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd., 155 ITR
120 (SC).

2.5 On the issue of netting, it was submitted on behalf of
the Revenue that even where the interest income was determined to be business
income, netting should not be permitted; that there could be no casus omissus,
in other words, the Court ought not to supply words when none exist; that just
as the assessees argued the Legislature if intended would have used the term
‘net’ and would have said so and in the absence of such a clear enunciation, the
word ‘interest’ has to be interpreted to mean ‘gross interest’; that applying
the strict rule of construction in interpreting the statutes, the expression
‘interest’ occurring in clause (baa) could only mean gross interest and that the
treatment in either case should be uniform.

2.6 On behalf of the Revenue it was further urged that the Legislature had permitted the retention of 10% of interest income to compensate for expenses laid out for earning such income, therefore any further deduction of the expenditure incurred for earning such interest, if permit-ted, would amount to a double deduction which clearly was not envisaged; that clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC envisaged a two-step process in computing profits derived from exports, first, the AO was required to apply S. 28 to S. 44 to compute the profits and gains of business or profession. In doing so, the AO might find that certain incomes, which had no nexus to the ex-port business of the assessee, were not eligible for deduction and therefore ought to be treated as income from other sources. Once that was done, then 90% of the receipts referred in clause (baa) had to be deducted in order to arrive at the profits derived from profits. Reliance was placed on the decision of K. Venkata Reddy v. CIT, 250 ITR 147 (AP) in support of this submission. Even if the interest earned was to be construed as part of the business income, the netting should not be permitted since the statute did not specifically say so relying on the judgments in IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 266 ITR 521 (SC), CIT v. V. Chinnapandi, 282 ITR 389 (Mad.) and Rani Paliwal v. CIT, 268 ITR 220 (P & H).

2.7 The Delhi High Court found merit in the contention of the assessee that not accepting that interest in the context referred to net interest, might produce unintended or absurd results. The Court referring to the decision of Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. CIT, 183 ITR 1 (SC) highlighted that the underlying principle of netting appeared to be logical as no prudent businessman would allow taxation of the interest income de hors the expenditure incurred for earning such income. The words ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘receipts by way of interest, commission, brokerage, etc.’, was a clear pointer to the fact that only net interest would be includible in arriving at the business profit; once business income had been determined by applying accounting standards as well as the provisions contained in the Act, the assessee would be permitted to, in terms of S. 37, claim as deduction, expenditure laid out for the purposes of earning such business income. The Court noted with approval the proposition for netting of income found from Circular No. 621, dated 19-12-1991 of the CBDT.

2.8 The Court observed that object of S. 80HHC was to ensure that the exporter got the benefit of the profits derived from export and was not to depress the profit further; if the deduction of 90% was of the gross interest itself, the amount spent in earning such interest would depress the profit to that extent by remaining on the debit side of the P&L Account; therefore, it could only be the net interest which could be included in the profits; if netting were not to be permitted, the result would be that the profits of the exporter would be depressed by an item that was expenditure incurred on earning interest, which did not form part of the profit at all; such could not have been the intention of the Legislature.

2.9 The Court did not approve of the contention that the treatment of clause (a) of S. 80HHC(3) should be no different from clause (b) of the same sub-section as the said clause (baa) was relatable only to clause (a) of S. 80HHC(3) and not to clause thereof; the provisions operated in distinct areas and no inter-mixing was contemplated.

2.10 For all these reasons, the Court held that the word ‘interest’ in clause (baa) to the Explanation in S. 80HHC was indicative of ‘net interest’, i.e., gross interest less the expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning such interest. The Court affirmed the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in Lalsons Enterprises (supra) holding that the expression ‘interest’ in clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC connoted ‘net interest’ and not ‘gross interest’.

2.11 The Court noted that in deciding the issue in Rani Paliwal’s case (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court, without any detailed discussion simply upheld the Tribunal’s order and therefore did not follow the ratio of the said decision in these words: “We are afraid that there is no reasoning expressed by the High Court for arriving at such a conclusion. For instance, there is no discussion of the CBDT Circular and in particular para 32.11 thereof which indicates that netting is contemplated in Expln. (baa). Also, it does not notice the effect of the words ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘receipts by way of interest….’ in the said Explanation. We are therefore unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rani Paliwal (supra).” The Court accordingly differed with the views of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rani Paliwal’s case.

2.12 While differing with the decision of the Madras High Court in Chinnapandi’s case, the Court observed as under: “The Madras High Court in CIT v. V. Chinnapandi (supra) held that even where the interest receipt is treated as business income, the deduction within the meaning of Expln. (baa) is permissible only of the gross interest and not net interest. The High Court appears to have followed the earlier judgment in K. S. Subbiah Pillai & Co. (supra) without noticing that in K. S. Subbiah Pillai (supra), the interest receipt was treated as income from other sources and not as business income. Also, the High Court in V. Chinnapandi (supra) chose to follow Rani Paliwal (supra), which, as explained earlier, gives no reasoning for the conclusion therein. Also, V. Chinnapandi (supra) does not advert to either the CBDT Circular or the judgment of the Special Bench in Lalsons (supra), with which we entirely concur on this aspect.”

2.13 The Court accordingly held that the net interest i.e., the gross interest less the expenditure incurred for the purposes of earning such interest, in terms of Expln. (baa), only be reduced from the profits of the business in cases where the AO treated the interest receipt as business income.

    Asian Star Co. Ltd.’s case:

3.1 Recently the issue again arose before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Asian Star Ltd. in appeal No. 200 of 2009. In a decision delivered on March 18/19, 2010 the Court was asked to consider the following question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was correct in holding that net interest on fixed deposits in banks received by the assessee-company should be considered for the purpose of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC and not the gross interest?”

3.2 The assessee carried on the business of the export of cut and polished diamonds. A return of income for A.Y. 2003-04 was filed, declaring a total income of Rs. 13.91 crores, after claiming a deduction of Rs.13.22 crores u/s.80HHC. The assessee had debited an amount of Rs. 21.46 crores as interest paid/payable to the Profit and Loss Account net of interest received of Rs. 3.25 crores. The assessee was called upon to explain as to why the deduction u/s.80HHC should not be recomputed by excluding ninety percent of the interest received in the amount of Rs.3.25 crores. By its explanation, the assessee submitted that during the year, it received interest on fixed deposits. The assessee stated that it had borrowed monies in order to fulfil its working capital requirements and the Bank had called upon it to maintain a fixed deposit as margin money against the loans. The assessee consequently contended that there was a direct nexus between the deposits kept in the Bank and the amounts borrowed.

3.3 The Assessing Officer, found that the explanation of the assessee could not be accepted since a plain reading of Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHE suggested that ninety percent of the receipts on account of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or receipts of a similar nature were liable to be excluded while computing the profits of the business. In appeal, the CIT (Appeals) held that the assessee had established a direct nexus between interest-bearing fixed deposits and the ‘interest charging’ borrowed funds and he directed the Assessing Officer to allow the netting of interest income and interest expenses. The view of the CIT (Appeals) was confirmed in appeal by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the finding of the Appellate Authority was based on the existence of a nexus between borrowed funds and fixed deposits. The Tribunal followed its decision in the case of Lalsons Enterprises, 89 ITD 25 (Delhi).

3.4 The Revenue contended that for computing the profits and gains of the business for S. 80HHC, ninety percent of the receipts by way of interest had to be reduced from the profits and gains of business or profession and the ‘receipts’ to be so reduced were the gross receipts; consequently, the gross receipts by way of interest could not be netted against expenditure which was laid out for the earning of those receipts; the reduction provided by the law was independent of any expenditure that was incurred in the earning of the receipts; that non -operational income should be excluded as it had no nexus with the export turnover, while on the other hand, it depressed profits by including expenditure which had been incurred for those very items which led to a consequence which could not have been intended by the Parliament having regard to the beneficial object underlying the provision.

3.5 The summary of the assessee’s contentions was that (i) The words ‘any receipts’ denoted the nature and not the quantum of the receipt;
    The expression, therefore, required the nature of the receipts to be examined; (iii) Explanation (baa) referred to any receipts of a similar nature ‘included in such profits’. The words ‘such profits’ meant profits and gains of business or profession computed u/s.28 to u/s.44D; (iv) Profits could only be arrived at after the deduction of expenditure from income and the net effect thereof constituted profits; (v) Explanation (baa) did not use the expression ‘gross or net’. However, having regard to the purpose and object of the provision and the nature of the language used in the Explanation, ninety percent of the receipts that was required to be excluded had to be computed with reference to inclusion of such receipts in profits and gains of business which in turn involved both credit and debit sides of the profit and loss account; (vi) For purposes of Explanation (baa), income from other sources would not come within the purview of the Explanation; Only business income had to be considered and interest in the nature of business income had to be taken into consideration; (vii)Receipts by way of interest in Explanation (baa) denoted the nature of the receipts and inclusion in ‘such profits’ would denote the quantum of the receipts; (viii) The words used by the Legislature suggested what was included in the total income or had gone into the computation of total income. Consequently, both debit and credit sides of the profit and loss account would have to be consid-ered; (ix) The words ‘such profits’ could only mean such profits as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act; (x) The words ‘receipt’ and ‘income’ in Explanation (baa) were interchangeably used and consequently, receipts would have to be read as income; (xi) The correct interpretation was to take into consideration netting and exclude all expenses which had a direct nexus with the earning of the income; (xii) The provision being an incentive provision under Chapter VIA, must be beneficially construed in order to encourage exports; (xiii)

The word ‘profits’ denoted profits in a commercial sense; (xiv) the object of the exclusion contained in Explanation (baa) was to sequester certain non-operational income which did not bear a direct nexus with export income and as a consequence, the exclusion could not be confined only to credit side of the profit and loss account, but must extend equally to the debit side, subject to the rider that a clear nexus has to be established.

3.6 The Bombay High Court explaining the rationale underlying the exclusion noted that : Ss.(3) of S. 80HHC was inserted by the Finance Act of 1991, with effect from 1st April 1992; the adoption of the formula in Ss.(3) was to disallow a part of the concession when the entire deduction claimed could not be regarded as being derived from export; S. 80HHC had to be amended several times since the formula had resulted in a distorted figure of export profits where receipts such as interest, rent, commission and brokerage which did not have a direct nexus with export turnover were included in the profit and loss account and resultantly became a subject of deduction; by the amendment, the position that emerged was that receipts which did not have any element of or nexus with export turnover would not become eligible for deduction merely because they formed part of the profit and loss account; this aspect of the history underlying S. 80HHC, had been elaborated upon in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Lakshmi Machine Works, 290 ITR 667.

3.7 The Court further noted that; the Explanation (baa) had to be read in the context of the background underlying the exclusion of certain constituent elements of the profit and loss account from the eligibility for deduction; what Explanation (baa) postulated was that, in computing the profits of business for S. 80HHC, the profits of business had to be first computed under the head profits and gains of business or profession, in accordance with S. 28 to S. 44D; once that exercise was complete, those profits had to be reduced to the extent provided by clauses (1) and (2) of Explanation (baa); that such receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or other receipts of a similar nature, though included in the profits and gains of business or profession, did not bear a nexus with the export turnover and consequently, though included in the computation of profits and gains of business or profession, ninety percent of such receipts had to be excluded in computing the profits of business for S. 80HHC; the reason for the exclusion was borne out by the Circular issued by the CBDT on 19-12-1991 which noted that the formula then existing often presented a distorted figure of export profits when receipts like interest, commission, etc. which did not have an element of turnover were included in the profit and loss account; the Court was required to give a meaning to the provision consistent with the underlying scheme, object and purpose of the statutory provision; the Parliament considered it appropriate to exclude from the purview of the deduction u/s.80HHC, certain receipts or income which did not have a proximate nexus with export turnover though such items formed part of the profit and loss account and form a constituent element in the computation of the profits or gains of business or profession u/s.28 to u/s.44D. The interpretation which Court placed on the provisions of S. 80HHC and on Explanation (baa) must be consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair, 295 ITR 228 295 ITR 228 where the Supreme Court held that processing charges, though a part of gross total income constituted an item of independent income like rent, commission and brokerage and consequently, ninety percent of the processing charges had to be reduced from gross total income to arrive at business profits, and Lakshmi Machine Works (supra) where the issue before the Supreme Court was whether excise duty and sales tax were included in the total turnover for the purpose of working out the formula contained in S. 80HHC(3) and the Supreme Court held that the object of the Legislature in enacting S. 80HHC was to confer benefit on profits accruing with reference to export turnover and the Supreme Court in that case had observed that ‘commission, rent, interest, etc. did not involve any turnover’ and ‘therefore, ninety percent of such commission, interest, etc. was excluded from the profits derived from?the?export,’?just?as?interest, commission, etc. did not emanate from export turnover, so also excise duty and sales tax had to be excluded.

3.8 The Court explained the resultant position in law as that while prescribing the exclusion of the specified receipts the Parliament was, however, conscious of the fact that the expenditure incurred in earning the items which were liable to be excluded had already gone into the computation of business profits as the computation of business profits under Chapter IV is made by amalgamating the receipts as well as the expenditure incurred in carrying on the business; since the expenditure incurred in earning the income by way of interest, brokerage, commission, rent, charges or other similar receipts had also gone into the computation of business profits, the Parliament thought it fit to exclude only ninety percent of the receipts received by the assessee in order to ensure that the expenditure which was incurred by the assessee in earning the receipts which had gone into the computation of the business profits is taken care of; the reason why the Parliament confined the reduction factor to ninety percent of the receipts was stated in the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill of 1991; the Parliament, therefore, confined the reduction to the extent of ninety percent of the income earned through such receipts since it was cognizant of the fact that the assessee would have incurred some expenditure in earning those incomes and therefore it provided an ad hoc deduction of ten percent from such incomes to account for the expenses incurred in earning the receipts; the distortion of the profits that would take place by excluding the receipts received by the assessee which were unrelated to export turnover and not the expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning those receipts was factored in by the Parliament by excluding only ninety percent of the receipts received by the assessee; the Parliament thought it fit to adopt a uniform formula envisaging a reduc-tion of ninety percent to make due allowance for the expenditure which would have been incurred by the assessee in earning the receipts, though in a given case it might be more or less as it was considered to be reasonable parameter of what would have been expended by the assessee; in order to simplify the application of the law, the Parliament treated a uniform expenditure computed at ten percent to be applicable in order to ensure that there is no distortion of profits by exclusion of income not relatable to export profits.

3.9 In view of the objective of the Parliament behind the introduction of the Explanation (baa) and its desire to provide uniformity of the treatment and the fact that the deduction of S. 80HHC was related to export turnover, the Bombay High Court held that the ratio and the findings of the Supreme Court in the case of the Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. v. Union of India, 155 ITR 120 were not relevant in the context of the issue under consideration by the Court; it was in order to obviate a distortion that the Parliament mandated that ninety percent of the receipts would be excluded; consequently, while the principle which had been laid down by the Supreme Court in Distributors (Baroda)’s case must illuminate the interpretation of the words ‘included in such profits’, the Court could not, at the same time, be unmindful of the reduction which was postulated by Explanation (baa), the extent of the reduction and the rationale for effecting the reduction.

3.10 The Bombay High Court noted with approval the decisions of the High Courts in the cases of K. S. Subbiah Pillai & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, CIT v. V. Chinnapandi, Rani Paliwal v. CIT and CIT v. Liberty Footwears. In view of number of reasons advanced and after a careful consideration the Bombay High Court was not inclined to follow the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipments as the simi-larity between the provisions of S. 80HHC and S. 80M which was relied upon in the judgment of the Delhi High Court missed the comprehensive position as it obtained u/s.80HHC.Such similarity of the provisions should not result into an assumption that the provisions were identical, when they were not as the Parliament had adopted a fair and reasonable statutory basis of what may be regarded as expenditure incurred for the earning of the receipts. Once the Parliament had legislated both in regard to the nature of the exclusion and the extent of the exclusion, it would not be open to the Court to order otherwise by rewriting the legislative provision. The Court observed with respect that the Delhi High Court had not adequately emphasised the entire rationale for confining the deduction only to the extent of ninety percent of the excludible receipts.

3.11 The displeasure of the Bombay High Court with the decision of the Special Bench in Lalsons Enterprises’s case, can best be explained in the Court’s own words “We are affirmatively of the view that in its discussion on the issue of netting, the Tribunal in its Special Bench decision in Lalsons has transgressed the limitations on the exercise of judicial power. The Tribunal has in effect, legislated by providing a deduction on the ground of expenses other than in the terms which have been allowed by the Parliament. That is impermissible. In the present case, it is necessary to emphasise that the question before the Court relates to the deduction u/s.80HHC. An assessee may well be entitled to a deduction in respect of the expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business in the computation of the profits and gains of business or profession. However, for the purposes of computing the deduction u/s.80HHC, the provisions which have been enacted by the Parliament would have to be complied. A deduction in excess of what is mandated by the Parliament cannot be allowed on the theory that it is an incentive provision intended to encourage export. The extent of the deduction and the conditions subject to which the deduction should be granted, are matters for the Parliament to legislate upon. The Parliament having legislated, it would not be open to the Court to deviate from the provisions which have been enacted in S. 80HHC.”

3.13 The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal of the Revenue by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the net interest on fixed deposits in the bank received by the assessee should be considered for the purposes of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC and not the gross interest.

4.Observations:

4.1 The issue has been clearly identified and argued and is further highlighted by sharply contrasting views of the High Courts on the subject. The Apex Court alone can bring finality to this fiercely contested issue.

4.2 As we understand from the reading of the Bombay High Court decision, the case of an exporter for netting of interest, etc. having nexus with the export activity is fortified. It is in cases where such receipts have no nexus with the export activity that a shadow of serious doubt has been cast by the recent decision of the Bombay High Court.

4.3 In bringing a finality to the issue, in addition to the issues which are very succinctly brought to the notice of the Courts by the contesting parties, the following aspects will have to be conclusively adjudicated upon;

4.3.1 While in a good number of cases, it maybe true that the ends of the justice will be met by allowing a deduction of 10% of the income, such a benchmark will be found to be woefully inad-equate in cases where the activity is conducted in an orderly manner, as a business. For example, a broker or a commission agent paying a sizeable amount to a sub-broker or sub-agent or lender of funds advancing loans out of borrowed funds bearing interest. In the examples given, the expenditure surely would exceed the benchmark of 10% of income. The allowance of 10% of income, in such cases, cannot be considered to be reasonable by any standard. In such cases, at least, it will be fair to read that the receipt in question is the net receipt, more so as in the cases of person who had accounted only net receipt in the books.

4.3.2 The allowance of any direct expenditure may have always been presumed and it is for avoiding any controversy in relation to an indirect expenditure that the 10% allowance is granted by the Legislature.

4.3.3 The direct expenditure, if not allowed, will give absurd results inasmuch as the same has the effect of depressing the export profit, otherwise eligible for deduction. If such receipts were to be taken out of the business profits on the footing that they had no connection with the business profits or turnover, it would only be reasonable to hold that expenditure having nexus with such receipts should also be taken out of the business profits on the same footing.

4.3.4 The result surely will be different in case where the assesssee is found to have maintained separate books of account or where the accounting is net of direct cost.

4.3.5 The result will also be different in cases where the assessee on his own had treated the receipt as also the income under a separate head of income.

4.3.6 It is an accepted principle of interpretation that the law has to be read in the context in which has placed. RBI v. Peerless General Finance Investment Co. Ltd., 61 Comp Case 663. The Delhi High Court clarified that it was inclined to adopt this contextual approach further enunciated by the Madras High Court in CIT v. P. Manonmani, 245 ITR 48 (Mad.) (FB). The context in which the word ‘receipt’ is used in Expln. (baa) may mean such receipts as reduced by the expenditure laid out for earning such income. The possible way to reconcile this is as was done by the Delhi High Court by reading the expression ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest….’ as referring to the nature of receipt, which in the context of S. 80HHC connotes ‘income’.

4.3.7 Paragraph 32.10 of Circular No. 681, dated 19-12- 1991 reads as under: “The existing formula often gives a distorted figure of export profits when receipts like interest, commission, etc., which do not have element of turnover are included in the P&L Account. It has, therefore, been clarified that ‘profits of the business’ for the purpose of S. 80HHC will not include receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar nature. As some expenditure might be incurred in earning these incomes, which in the generality of cases is part of common expenses, ad hoc 10% deduction from such incomes is provided to account for these expenses.”

4.3.8 Circular No. 621 explained the provisions of the amendment and in so explaining has favoured netting, as has been highlighted by the Delhi High Court. If that is so, the full effect, though benefi-cial, shall be given to such interpretation advanced by the Circular of the CBDT in preference to the Notes and the Memorandum. Full effect may be given to the above-referred CBDT Circular which acknowledges that ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest’, etc., are ‘incomes’ and in order to give effect to this expression, the principle of netting will have to be applied.

4.3.9 Due weightage will have to be given to the true meaning of the words ‘included in such profits’ which precede the words ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission and interest’.

4.3.10 The ratio of the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd., though considered by the Courts, will have to be revisited in order to conclusively appreciate the meaning of the words and the expressions ‘receipts by way of’ ‘included in such profits,’ ‘such profits’ and ‘computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act’.

4.3.11 The three different expressions, namely, ‘any sums’, ‘receipts’ and ‘profits’, used by the Parliament will have to be reconciled.

4.4 This controversy has plagued a good number of cases and it will be in the fitness of the things that the Government adopts a reconciliatory approach and issues a dispensation or a directive for addressing the issue that does not clog the wheels of justice.

Interest u/s.234A — Taxes paid but return delayed

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 234A(1) of the Income-tax Act provides for levy of
simple interest at the rate of one percent, for every month or part of the
month, for the default of non-furnishing the return of income u/s.139 or S. 142,
on the amount of the tax on total income as determined u/s.143(1) or on regular
assessment as reduced by the advance tax and the tax deducted or collected at
source and such other taxes as are specified in clauses (i) to (vi) of the said
Section.

1.2 The taxes to be reduced from the tax determined on
regular assessment are :

(i) advance tax, if any, paid;

(ii) any tax deducted or collected at source;

(iii) any relief of tax allowed u/s.90 on account of tax
paid in a country outside India;

(iv) any relief of tax allowed u/s.90A on account of tax
paid in a specified territory outside India referred to in that Section;

(v) any deduction, from the Indian income-tax payable,
allowed u/s.91 on account of tax paid in a country outside India; and

(vi) any tax credit allowed to be set off in accordance
with the provisions of S. 115JAA.


1.3 The interest is payable for the period commencing on the
date immediately following the due date for filing return of income defined
under Explanation 1 to mean the date specified in S. 139(1) and ending on the
date of furnishing the return or where no return is furnished, on the date of
completion of assessment u/s.144. Vide Ss.(2) the interest payable U/ss.(1) is
reduced by the interest, if any, paid u/s.140A towards the interest chargeable
u/s.234A.

1.4 A separate levy for default in payment of advance tax is
provided by S. 234B for levy of simple interest at the rate of one percent, for
every month or part of the month, on the amount of the tax on total income as
determined u/s.143(1) or on regular assessment as reduced by such taxes as are
specified in clauses (i) to (v) of Explanation 1 to the said
Section. Such interest is payable by an assessee liable to pay advance tax
u/s.208 where advance tax paid u/s.210 is less than ninety percent of the
assessed tax for the period commencing on 1st April next following the financial
year and ending on the date of determination of total income u/s.143(1) or
regular assessment. Vide Ss.(2)(i) the interest payable U/ss.(1) is reduced by
the interest, if any, paid u/s.140A towards the interest chargeable u/s.234B.

1.5 In cases involving twin defaults of delayed filing return
of income and short payment of advance tax, the person is made liable for
interest for the same period and in some cases on the same amount under two
different provisions of the Act, namely, u/s.234A and 234B. These simultaneous
levies have prompted assessees to challenge the double whammy without success;
however, some success was achieved in cases involving default of delayed return
of income where taxes were paid after the financial year end but before the due
date of filing return of income. The decision of the Delhi High Court upholding
the plea of the assessee that interest was not chargeable u/s.234A for the
period following the due date and ending on the date of filing of return has
recently been dissented by the Gujarat High Court holding that such simultaneous
levies were possible in law.

2. Pronnoy Roy’s case :


2.1 The issue was first considered by the Delhi High Court in
the case of Dr. Pronnoy Roy & Anr. v. CIT, 254 ITR 755. In that case, the
assessee had earned substantial capital gains for the assessment year 1995-96
for which the return was due to be filed on October 31, 1995. Though taxes due
were paid on September 25, 1995, i.e., before the due date of filing of
the return, the return was filed on September 29, 1996, i.e., after a
delay of about 11 months. While the returned income was accepted in assessment
of income, interest was charged u/s.234A on the ground that tax paid on
September, 25, 1995, could not be reduced from the tax due on assessment. A
revision petition u/s.264 of the Act was filed before the Commissioner
requesting for deletion of interest charged u/s.234A of the Act. The
Commissioner in his order, upheld the action of the Assessing Officer stating
that deduction of tax paid on September 25, 1995, was not provided in S. 234A of
the Act, as it compensated for delay/default in filing of return of income and
not the payment of tax. Against the order of the Commissioner, the assessee
filed a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, before
the High Court seeking for a writ of certiorari/mandamus in respect of
the said order passed u/s.264 of the Act upholding the levy of interest u/s.234A
of the Act.

2.2 The following contentions were advanced by the assessee,
before the High Court, in support of the case that no interest be levied
u/s.234A for the period commencing with 25th September 1995, i.e., the
date on which the payment of taxes was made.


* The taxes were paid voluntarily before the due date of filing return of income and once the taxes were found to have been paid no interest u/s. 234A could be levied for the period thereafter in-asmuch as there did not remain any basis for such levy.

  •  Levy of interest u/s.234A was compensatory in character and was introduced for compensating the Government for the loss of revenue and as in the assessee’s case there was no loss of revenue, on payment by the assessee, no compensation was due to the Government.

  • There was no deprival of resources for the State and in the absence of that it was not possible for it to seek damages for the same.

  • The taxes paid by him on 25th September, 1995 should be treated as payment of advance tax.

  • A separate provision, namely, S. 271F provided for the levy of penalty for the default of not filing the return of income by due date w.e.f. 1-4-1999.

  • Simultaneous levies for the same period were unjust and resulted in double jeopardy.

  • The provisions  must  be construed  liberally.

  • In case of doubt, the benefit of doubt should be given to the assessee.

2.3 On behalf of the Revenue it was contended that by reason of S. 234A, interest was charged for default in filing return which did not cease or stop with payment of taxes. That not charging interest would defeat the very objective behind introduction of S. 234A.

2.4 The Delhi High Court upheld the contention of the assessee that no interest was to be charged u/ s.234A for the period commencing from 25th September 1995 for the following reasons:

  • Penalty and interest both could not be charged for failure to perform a statutory obligation.

  • Interest, was payable either by way of compensation or damages and penal interest could be levied only in the case of a chronic defaulter.

  • The common sense meaning of ‘interest’ must be applied in interpretation of S. 234A of the Act and even if the dictionary meaning was to be taken recourse to, the Court was supported by the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictio-nary reprinted in 1991, which defined it as; “Interest is a sum of money that is paid as percentage of a larger sum of money, which has been borrowed or invested. You receive interest on money that you invest and pay interest on money that you borrow.”

  • The question raised when considered from an-other angle was that interest was payable when a sum was due and not otherwise.

  • The object of the amendment was to levy mandatory interest where the return was filed late and tax was also not paid. The provisions made an exception for deduction of the amount of the interest if the same had otherwise been paid or deposited. A statute must be construed having regard to its object in view.

  • The Court noted that in Shashikant Laxman Kale v. UOI, 185 ITR 105, the Apex Court held that interest could not be charged when no tax was outstanding. It further noted that in Ganesh Dass Sreeram v. ITa, 159 ITR 221, it had been held that “Where the advance tax duly paid covers the entire amount of tax assessed, there is no ques-tion of charging the registered firm with inter-est even though the return is filed by it beyond the time allowed, regard being had to the fact that payment of interest is only compensatory in nature. As the entire amount of tax is paid by way of advance tax, the question of payment of any compensation does not arise.”

  • Penalty could not be imposed in the absence of a clear provision. Imposition of penalty would ordinarily attract compliance with the principles of natural justice.

  • Levy of penalty in certain situations would attract the principles of existence of mens rea. While a penalty was to be levied, discretionary power was ordinarily conferred on the authority. Unless such discretion was granted, the provisions  might be held to be unconstitutional.

  • In situation of the nature involved in the case, the doctrine of purposive construction must be taken recourse to.

  • The submission of the Revenue to the effect that payment of tax although the same could be made along with the return, could not be a ground for not charging interest in terms of S. 234A; if given effect to, the object and purpose of S. 234A would be defeated and, thus, the same could not be accepted. The object of S. 234A was to receive interest by way of compensation. If such was the intention of the Legislature, it could have said so in explicit terms.

  • Judicial notice was required to be taken of the fact that the Legislature had enacted S. 271F with effect from April I, 1999, by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1998, providing for penalty, in the case of a person who was required to furnish a return of his income as required U/ss.(I) of S. 139 of the Act who did not do so.

  • When the statute provided that an interest, which would be compensatory in nature would be levied upon the happening of a particular event or inaction, the same by necessary implication would mean that the same could be levied on an ascertained sum.

  • The definition of ‘Advance tax’ was not an exhaustive one. If the word ‘advance tax’ was given a literal meaning, the same apart from being used only for the purpose of Chapter XVII-C might be held to be tax paid in advance before its due date, i.e., tax paid before the due date. A person, who did not pay the entire tax by way of advance tax, might deposit the balance amount of tax along with his return.

2.5 The Court accordingly held that interest would be payable only in a case, where tax had not been deposited prior to the due date of filing of the income-tax return.

3.  Roshanlal Jain’s case:

3.1 The assesseein Roshanlal S. lain (AOP) v. DCIT, 220 CTR 38 (Guj.), had defaulted in payment of advance tax before the year end, but had paid the shortfall after the year end, and before the due date of filing return of income. The return was filed beyond the due date prescribed u/s.139(1) and the Assessing Officer had charged interest u/ s.234A and u/ s.234B including for the period commencing on the day when the shortfall was made up and ending with the due date prescribed for filing the return of income.

3.2 The assessee challenged the validity of interest charged u/ s.234A and u/ s.234B,besides the constitutional validity of the provisions to submit that S. 234A be held to be ultra vires the Constitution to the extent it required an assessee to pay interest even after the tax has been paid before filing of the return. In relation to S. 234B, it was submitted that when the said provision charged interest for the same period for which interest had already been charged u/ s.234A, the said provision should be held to be unreasonable and should be struck down. The assessee strongly relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. Pronnoy Roy, 254 ITR 755 in support of his contentions.

3.3 The Gujarat High Court negatived the contentions of the assessee to hold as under:

  • On a plain reading of the provisions of S. 234A and S. 234B, it was apparent that S. 234A provides for the liability to pay interest for default in late furnishing of return or non-furnishing of return, while S. 234B levied interest for default in payment of advance tax.

  • Both the provisions, i.e., S. 234A and S. 234Bpro-vided for payment of interest on the amount representing the difference between the amount of tax payable on the total income as determined u/s.143(1) or on regular assessment as reduced by the specified taxes.

  • The scheme that emerged on a conjoint reading of S. 4, S. 2(1), S. 190 and S. 207, was that even though assessment of the total income might be made later in point of time, yet the liability to pay income-tax was relatable to the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year in question and such liability had to be dis-charged either by way of having tax deducted at source or collected at source, or by making payment by way of advance tax in accordance with the provisions of S. 208 to S. 219.

  • S. 208 stipulated that advance tax should be paid during a financial year in every case where the amount of such tax payable by the assessee during that financial year, as computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVIIof the Act, exceeded the prescribed limit.

  • A statutory liability was cast on the assessee to pay advance tax during the financial year as provided by the legislative    scheme.

  • In the instant case, the assessee did not dispute that there was default in payment of advance tax.

  • Payment of tax on which the assessee was resting its case was admittedly made beyond the financial year and therefore, contrary to the legislative scheme. In the circumstances, the question that was to be posed and answered was whether an assessee who had acted contrary to the legislative scheme could seek an equity.

  • For computing interest u/ s.234A, the difference of the amount on which interest became payable had to be worked out by deducting the advance tax paid, including any tax deducted or collected at source from the tax on the total income determined at the time of an assessment.

  • In the instant case, the default in filing of return of income beyond the prescribed date was also admitted. Therefore, it was not possible to accept the contention of the assessee that the amount paid beyond the financial year should be deducted from the tax on the total income as determined on regular assessment. This has to be so, considering the definition of the term ‘advance tax’ as appearing in S. 2, which categorically stipulates that ‘advance tax’ means the advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-CoEven if contextual interpretation is adopted considering the opening portion of 5.2 which states ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, the contention raised by the assessee did not merit acceptance; the context and setting of the aforesaid provisions do not even, prima facie indicate that any other law, like the one canvassed by the assessee, was possible.

  • S. 140A stipulated that where any tax was payable on the basis of any return required to be furnished, such tax together with interest payable under any provision of the Act for any delay in furnishing return, or any default or delay in payment of advance tax before furnishing the return shall be paid. In other words, the Legislature had specifically provided that once there was default in either furnishing of return or in payment of advance tax or both, as regards the amount and the period, interest had to be worked out by the assessee himself. Thus, there is an inherent indication in the statutory scheme that any payment made beyond the financial year had to be considered, but such payment had to be accompanied by the interest payable for the default committed in filing of the return of income or default in payments of advance tax during the financial year. For this purpose, the Legislature had not equated both defaults, but had instead provided for computing interest separately for both the defaults. Therefore, merely because some amount was paid beyond the financial year but before the return was filed, the assessee could not plead that it was not liable to pay interest u/ s.234A; nor could it be given credit for such payment made beyond the financial year for the purpose of computing interest u/ s.234B for the default in payments of advance tax.

  • There was no merit in the contention of the assessee that it had not incurred any liability to pay interest either u/ s.234A or u/ s.234B. It also could not contend that there was any overlapping of the period for which it could not be made liable for paying interest under both the provisions, considering the fact that both the defaults were independent of each other.

  • The doctrine of double jeopardy envisaged by Article 20(2) of the Constitution or S. 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could have no application in these proceedings. The defaults, and not offences, were not one; non-filing or late filing of return and non-payment or short-payment of advance tax could not be equated.

  • The period for which the liability to pay interest arose, had to be computed in accordance with the term fixed by each of the provisions, viz., S. 234A and S. 234B.

  • The contention, that if the statutory provision re-sulted in an absurdity or mischief not intended by the Legislature, the Court should import words so as to make sense out of the provisions, also did not merit acceptance, considering the fact that on a plain reading of the provisions, the discernible legislative intent could not be said to result in an absurdity.

  • If the plea raised by the assessee was accepted, not only would it require the Court to give a go-bye to the entire statutory scheme, but it would also result in discrimination against majority of the assessees who complied with requirements of the statutory provisions. No person was entitled to seek any relief on the basis of inverse discrimination.

  • There was also no merit in the contention  of the assessee that the provisions contained in S. 234A and S. 234B were ultra vires to the constitution. It was true that the nature of the levy of interest u/ s.234A and u/ s.234Bwas compensatory in character, but from that it was not possible to come to the conclusion that there was any arbitrariness or unreasonableness which would warrant striking down the provision.

3.4 The Gujarat High Court specifically dissented from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Dr. Pronnoy Roy’s case, 254 ITR 755 cited before the Court by the assessee and proceeded to dismiss the writ petition filed by the assessee. The submission of the assessee as to the binding nature of the precedent based on uniformity of expression of opinion on the ground of wise judicial policy also did not deserve acceptance. The Court agreed that there was no dispute about the proposition that in income-tax matters, which were governed by an all India statute, when there was a decision of a High Court interpreting a statutory provision, it would be a wise judicial policy and practice not to take a different view. However, this in the opinion of the Court was not an absolute proposition and there were certain well-known exceptions to it. In cases where a decision was sub silentio, per incuriam, obiter dicta or based on a concession or where a view taken was impossible to arrive at or there was another view in the field or there was a subsequent amendment to the statute or reversal or implied overruling of the decision by a High Court or some such or similar infirmity was manifestly perceivable in the decision, a different view could be taken by the High Court.

4. Observations:

4.1 There are several angles to the issue under consideration, prominent being:

  • the true nature of interest charged u/ s.234A; whether the same is compensatory or penal or both,
  • whether any interest can be charged where the State does not lose any revenue,
  • whether interest can be charged without there being any basis. The base, normally, is the amount unpaid or delayed,
  • the true meaning of the term ‘advance tax’, the true meaning of the term ‘interest’,
  • whether the introduction of S. 271F for levy of penalty has made any difference,
  • whether interest can be levied simultaneously under two different provisions for the same period,
  • whether such simultaneous levies resulted in a case of double jeopardy,
  • whether the levy was in violation of the Indian Contract Act, and
  • whether the levy was in violation of the Constitution of India.

4.2 All these issues, including the issue of the binding nature of an available decision of the High Court, were considered in the above discussed judgments by the Courts in delivering the conflicting verdicts. The Courts have touched upon most of these aspects and have provided their views on the same. As these views so provided are conflicting, an attempt is made to express some views on the subject and reconcile some of them.

4.3 The provisions of S. 234A, S. 234Band S. 243C, replaced the provisions of S. 139(8),S. 215 and S. 216 which provisions in the past postulated for payment of interest. The new provisions are in pari materia with the said provisions. The old provisions were held to be compensatory and not penal in nature. The Courts time and again confirmed that the old provisions could not be anything except compensatory in character. The only material difference in the two situations is that while the old provisions conferred power to waive or reduce the levy of interest, the new provisions make the levy automatic.

4.4 The rationale of levy of interest and penalty has been succinctly stated by the Apex Court in crr v. M. Chandra Sekhar, 151 ITR 433, while considering S. 139(8) of the Act, which is in pari materia with S. 234A in the following terms:

“Now, it will be apparent that delay in filing a return of income results in the postponement of payment of tax by the assessee, resulting in the State being deprived of a corresponding amount of revenue for the period of the delay. It seems that in order to compensate for the loss so occasioned, Parliament enacted the provision for payment of interest.”

4.5 Considering the basis for calculation, the period of calculation and nature thereof implies that interest levy is compensatory in nature. The amount on which the interest is calculated is the amount payable by the assessee towards tax, less the amount already paid by him. The amount of tax which ought to have been paid by the assessee but was not paid because of the non-filing or the delayed filing only can attract interest.

4.6 The golden rule of interpretation of a statute is that it should be read liberally where a statute is capable of two interpretations, the principles of just construction should be taken recourse to. The issue surely admits of two meanings as is clear from the different meanings that the Courts have placed upon it. There is a room here for diverse construction and the provision can be construed to be ambiguous and in the circumstances a construction that leads to a result that is more just can be adopted.

4.7 No loss of revenue is suffered inasmuch as tax has already been paid. Interest is payable either by way of compensation or damages.

4.8 The insertion of S. 271F providing for levy of penalty for delay in filing the return of income abundantly clarifies that the levy of interest u/ s.234 A is compensatory in nature as the penalty, if any, for the default in filing the return of income has been provided by S. 271F. Once this is established, it is easier to accept the view that no compensation can be demanded in the absence of loss of revenue where the taxes are paid leaving no basis for calculation of interest. Two different provisions operating in the same field in the same statute is a proposition difficult to comprehend. If the Government itself has thought of introducing a provision of law levying penalty, having regard to the fact that no such provision existed earlier it cannot be interpreted differently by the Department as it is bound by interpretation supplied by the memorandum reproduced hereafter.

4.9 The memorandum explaining the insertion of S. 271F explains the objective behind its introduction; 231 ITR 228 (St) :

“Providing for penalty for non-filing of returns of income – Under the existing provisions, no penalty is provided for failure to file return of income. The interest chargeable u/ s.234A of the Income-tax Act for not furnishing the return or furnishing the same after the due date is calculated on the basis of tax payable.”

4.10 On a bare reading of the provisions of S. 234A it will be clear that in determining the amount on which interest is leviable, the amount paid by way of advance tax is to be reduced. On a careful reading, it will be clear that the term advance tax for the purposes of S. 234A has not been defined. This is clear from a simple comparison with the provisions of S. 234B which also provides for a similar reduction for the advance tax paid which clarifies that such tax is the one that is referred to in S. 208 and S. 210. In the circumstances, it is possible to take a view that any tax which is paid before the due date of filing the return of income is paid in advance and therefore represented ‘advance tax’. At the same time a note requires to be taken of S. 2(1) which defines the advance tax to mean the tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-C. This conflict clearly establishes one thing and that is that the issue under consideration is debatable and in that view of the matter a view beneficial to the taxpayer requires to be adopted.

4.11 There also is a constitutionality angle to the issue that was examined by the Gujarat High Court specifically in Roshanlal [ain’s case. Whether Article 14 of the Constitution is violated in any manner, more so if it is found that the provisions of S. 234A provide for discriminatory treatment between persons of the same class placed in similar situations. In this connection the Court observed that a taxing statute enjoys a greater latitude and therefore it was difficult to uphold the proposition that the relevant part of S. 234A was unconstitutional. An inference in regard to contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution would, however, ordinarily be drawn if the provision sought to impose on the same class of persons similarly situated, a burden which led to inequality and the Court found that it was not so in the instant case. The assessee also in that case could not successfully contend that there was any unreasonable classification, considering the majority of assessees who comply with the statutory requirements.

4.12 Similarly the contention of the assessee, in Roshanlal [ain’s case, based on the provisions of S. 59 to S. 61 of the Indian Contract Act also could not carry the case of the assessee any further. The statutory scheme u/s.140A provides to make payment of tax and interest for the stated defaults before the return is filed and, therefore, to contend that the Assessing Officer could not have appropriated the amount paid towards interest did not merit acceptance. The Explanation U /ss.(l) of S. 140A specifically provides that where the amount paid by the assessee under the said sub-section falls short of the aggregate of the tax and interest payable U/ss.(l), the amount so paid shall first be adjusted towards the interest payable as aforesaid and the balance, if any, shall be adjusted towards the tax payable. In light of this specific provision under the Act, the general law under the Contract Act cannot be pressed into service by the assessee.

4.13 The views on the issue under consideration have been sharply divided and the conflict is strongly agitated by both the sides as is clear from the wide cleavage arising on account of the diametrically opposite views of the two High Courts. One must concede that both the views are tenable in law and the issue will continue to haunt the Courts unless the law is amended or the finality to the law is provided by a decision of the Apex Court. Sooner the better as the issue has an application to a very wide spectrum of taxpayers.

Authors’ note:

As we go to press, the Supreme Court in 309 ITR 231, has upheld the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Pronnoy Roy, on the ground that interest levied u/s.234A is compensatory in nature. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, since the tax due had already been paid, which was not less than the tax payable on the returned income which was accepted, the question of levy of interest did not arise.

Revision u/s.264 — Additional Evidence

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 U/s.264 of the Income-tax Act, the Commissioner is
empowered to revise any order passed by an authority subordinate to him, either
of his own motion or on an application by the assessee for revision. Such
revision order is to be passed after calling for the record of the proceeding in
which the order has been passed, and making inquiry or causing inquiries to be
made.

1.2 The issue has come up before the Courts as to whether,
while considering an application for revision, the Commissioner can take into
account any material or evidence which was not placed before the Assessing
Officer or lower authority passing the order, or events subsequent to the order
sought to be revised.

1.3 While the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts have taken the
view that the Commissioner can take into account such evidence, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view that the Commissioner can consider
only such evidence as was before the subordinate authority who has passed the
order sought to be revised.

2. Phool Lata Somani’s case :


2.1 The issue had arisen before the Calcutta High Court in
the case of Smt. Phool Lata Somani v. CIT, 276 ITR 216.

2.2 In this case, the assessee had made certain investments
in respect of which proof of investment had not been filed before the Assessing
Officer, not even during assessment proceedings. No deduction had therefore been
allowed by the Assessing Officer in respect of such investments.

2.3 The assessee filed a revision application to the
Commissioner u/s.264, claiming deduction in respect of such investment, and
furnished the particulars of investment along with the application for revision.
The Commissioner declined to entertain the revision application on the ground
that the assessee failed to produce the evidence relating to the investment made
by her before the Assessing Officer, despite an opportunity being given to do
so.

2.4 The assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court
challenging such rejection of her revision application. Before the High Court,
on behalf of the assessee it was claimed that the order of the Commissioner was
bad in law as the Commissioner failed to consider the scope and purview of S.
264, which is wider than the power vested u/s.263. It was claimed that the
Commissioner ought to have inquired into the matter as to whether the assessee
failed to produce evidence or furnish particulars. It was further pointed out
that the assessee produced copies of the document showing investments which are
required to be exempted and therefore all required particulars were furnished
with the application for revision. Though it was true that at the time of
assessment the assessee could not produce the document for a variety of reasons,
it was urged that in exercise of his plenary jurisdiction, the Commissioner
should have done justice by allowing the assessee to furnish the document so as
to get the exemption. According to the assessee, the term ‘records’ meant such
records as are available at the time of the decision of the Commissioner, not
limited to the records at the time of passing order by the Assessing Officer.

2.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued before the Court
that the power u/s.264 was absolutely a discretionary power, and the
Commissioner, after having perused records and report furnished by the Assessing
Officer, thought it fit not to interfere with the order passed by the Assessing
Officer. According to the Revenue, the Commissioner in lawful exercise of
jurisdiction had found that the assessee was always a defaulter, and in spite of
opportunity being given, the documents of investment and particulars thereof
were not shown. As such, the Commissioner did not give a premium to the lapses
or laches of the assessee.

2.6 The Court noted the difference between the powers u/s.263
and those u/s.264, particularly the fact that while the power u/s.263 could not
be applied at the instance of the assessee or even at the instance of the
Revenue, but only by the Commissioner himself, the power u/s.264 could be
exercised by the Commissioner, either of his own motion or on an application by
the assessee. It noted that in the case before it, the assessee had made the
application. It was the duty coupled with the power of the Commissioner to make
an inquiry or call for records for inquiry.

2.7 According to the Calcutta High Court, this provision
could be invoked on the application of the assessee for his benefit or for
prejudice. Upon inquiry if it was found that the assessee had been prejudiced by
any order of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner could undo such wrong with
this power by adopting appropriate, just and lawful measure. The Calcutta High
Court noted that the Kerala High Court had examined the scope of the power
u/s.264 in the case of Parekh Brothers v. CIT, 150 ITR 105. It had taken
the view that the regional power conferred on the Commissioner u/s.264 was very
wide, and that he had the discretion to grant or refuse relief and the power to
pass such order in revision as he thought fit. The discretion, which the
Commissioner had to exercise, was undoubtedly to be exercised judicially, not
arbitrarily according to his fancy.

2.8 Therefore, according to the Calcutta High Court, there
was nothing in S. 264 which placed a restriction on the Commissioner’s
revisional power to give relief to the assessee in a case where the assessee
detected mistakes after the assessment was completed, on account of which he was
over assessed. According to the Court, it was open to the Commissioner to
entertain even a new ground not urged before the lower authorities while
exercising revisional powers.

2.9 According to the Court, the Commissioner, instead of relying solely on the reports of the records of the case, should have made inquiry considering the documents placed before him by the assessee. At least this should have been reflected in the order that he had taken note on the date of making application of the revision, of the tax exempt investment. The Court was of the view that there could have been a variety of reasons for not producing evidence at the time of the assessment; this did not mean that the assessee was precluded from produc-ing evidence of contemporaneous nature at a later stage by filing an application for revision.

2.10 According to the Calcutta High Court, the power of the Commissioner u/ s.264 was to do justice, to prevent miscarriage of justice being rendered. From the records, it appeared that the assessee produced unimpeachable documents showing investment which was otherwise eligible to be taken note of for grant of deduction, and if it had been allowed by the Commissioner, then the assessee would not have suffered over-assessment.

2.11 The Calcutta High Court was therefore of the view that the Commissioner had unjustly refused to entertain the assessee’s application, and therefore the Court set aside the order of the Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for deciding the matter afresh on merits.

2.12 A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramdev Exports v. CIT, 251 ITR 873. In this case, the assessee had not claimed deduction u/s.80HHC at the time when the returns were filed. The income returned by the assessee had been accepted by the Assessing Officer u/s.143(3), and therefore the Commissioner rejected the revision application without going into the merits of the deduction claimed. The Gujarat High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner, directing the Commissioner to reconsider the application on merits.

3. M. S. Raju’s  case:

3.1 The issue again came up recently for consideration before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. S. Raju v. Dy. CIT, 216 CTR (AP) 203.

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a film producer, and certain damages of Rs 30 lakhs were claimed from him for late release of the film. These damages pertained to incomes which were offered to tax in AY. 2001-02, though the dispute arose after the end of the previous year and the amount was ultimately settled and paid after the end of the previous year.

3.3 The liability was not recorded in the accounts relating to AY. 2001-02, nor was there any reference to such amount in the audit report. The assessee however claimed deduction of such amount from its taxable income, which claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the dis-allowance on the ground that the dispute continued till October 2001. The Tribunal held that the liability did not accrue during the relevant previous year, and therefore could not be allowed as a deduction.

3.5 For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee filed its return of income without claiming deduction of such damages. The assessment order was completed u/s.143(3) without any claim for such deduction. The assessee filed a revision application u/ s.264 before the Commissioner, requesting him to direct the Assessing Officer to allow deduction of Rs.30 lakhs paid as damages.

3.6 The Commissioner rejected the assessee’s revision application holding that the assessment order for A.Y. 2002-03 made no reference to any claim for deduction of Rs.30 lakhs having been made by the assessee, and that since no such issue arose in the assessment proceedings, the subject matter of the petition had no bearing on the assessment made for A.Y. 2002-03.

3.7 Before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the Commis-sioner had refused to exercise jurisdiction merely on a technical ground, which had resulted in denial of a genuine deduction available to the assessee. It was further argued that the Assessing Officer, in his assessment order for A.Y. 2001-02, had accepted that the liability for compensation had arisen during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2002-03, and that the Revenue could not now be permitted to totally deny the relief.

3.8 The Andhra  Pradesh High Court examined the provisions of S. 264 for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Commissioner was entitled to examine the question raised for the  first  time  before  him which did not form part of the record before the Assessing Officer or even part of the order of assessment. The Court noted the explanation to S. 263(1) substituted by the. Finance Act, 1988 with effect from 1st June 1988, which defined the word ‘record’ to include all records relating to any proceedings under the Act available at the time of examination by the Commissioner, and the absence of similar provision u/ s.264.

3.9 According to the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the omission to insert a similar definition of the word ‘record’ in S. 264, while inserting this defini-tion in S. 263, was significant. The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressed its inability to agree with the opinion of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramdev Exports (supra), since the conscious omis-sion by Parliament to insert a provision in S. 264 similar to explanation (b) of S. 263(1) was not
noticed by the Gujarat High Court. It also did not agree with the opinion of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Phool Lata Somani’s case.

3.10 The Andhra Pradesh High Court therefore held that the term ‘record’ u/s.264 was only the record of proceedings before the assessing authority, and as the assessee had not claimed any such deduction in the return filed before the assessing authority, he was held not to be entitled to raise this question for the first time in revision proceedings u/ s.264. The Andhra Pradesh High Court therefore dismissed the assessee’s writ petition.

4. Observations:

4.1 In the case of CRT v. Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products & Camphor Works, 231 ITR 53, in the context of S. 263, the Supreme Court held as under:

“It, therefore, cannot be said, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent, that the correct and settled legal position, with respect to the meaning of the word ‘record’ till 1st June 1988 was that it meant the record which was available to the ITO at the time of passing of the assessment order. Further, we did not think that such a narrow interpretation of the word ‘record’ was justified in view of the object of the provision and the nature and scope of the powers conferred upon the CIT. The revisional power conferred on the CIT u/ s.263 is of wide amplitude. It enables the CIT to call for and examine the record of any proceeding under the Act. It empowers the CIT to make or cause to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary in order to find out if any order passed by the AO is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. After examining the record and after making or causing to be made an inquiry if he considers the order to be erroneous, then he can pass the order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify. Obviously, as a result of the inquiry, he may come in possession of new material and he would be entitled to take the new material into account. If the material, which was not available to the ITO at the time he made the assessment, could thus be taken into consideration by the CIT after holding an enquiry, there is no reason why the material which has already come on record, though subsequent to the making of the assessment, cannot be taken into consideration by him. Moreover, in view of the clear words used in clause (b) of the explanation to S. 263(1), it has to be held that while calling for and examining the record of any proceeding u/s.263(1), it is and it was open to the CIT, not only to consider the record of that proceeding but also the record relating to that proceeding available to him at the time  of examination…….”

4.2 From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the term ‘record’ has been held to include subsequent records as well, not only on account of the explanation, but on account of the scheme and purpose of S. 263.

4.3 The reason for insertion of the explanation to S. 263(1) was to overcome the issue of different Court decisions. The mere fact that no similar amendment was carried out to S. 264 does not mean that the term ‘record’ for that-Section has a totally different meaning. In the context of S. 264, there was no such controversy till the amendment to S. 263, and therefore no reason for any such amendment.

4.4 As  rightly observed by  the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts, the purpose of S. 264 is to do justice to the assessee. If a technical and narrow view is taken of the record permitted to be considered by the Commissioner, it will result in a mis-carriage of justice, and defeat the very purpose of that Section.

4.5 As noted by the Supreme Court in the context . of S. 263, the very fact that even u/ s.264, the Commissioner is permitted not only to examine the record, but also to make enquiries, which could throw up additional facts, clearly indicates that he can consider all facts which are before him, and not merely the facts which were before the Assessing Officer. No purpose would be served by the Commissioner making enquiries if he is not allowed to consider the facts arising out of the enquiries.

4.6 Therefore, the ratio of the decisions of the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts seem to represent the better view of the matter, that the Commissioner can  examine all the  facts  and  record before  him while  passing an order u/ s.264.

Power to examine the validity of search

1. Issue for consideration :1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 S. 132 provides for the conduct of a search and seizure operation, by the specified person, under a warrant issued in consequence of information in his possession where he has a reason to believe, that the circumstances specified in S. 132 for conduct of search exist.

    1.2 An assessment of the person being searched is made u/s.153A to S. 153C of the Act in cases of search conducted on or after 1-6-2003, which in the past was completed under Chapter XIVB in consequence of search up to 31-5-2003.

    1.3 S. 246A provides for an appeal, before the CIT(A), against such an assessment made in consequence of a search and S. 253 provides for second appeal before the ITAT.

    1.4 It is often that the person being searched challenges, in appeal, the validity of the search action, by contesting the adequacy of reasons, or, at times the very existence thereof. In such cases, the issue that often arises for consideration is about the power of the ITAT to examine the validity of a search action.

    1.5 One school of thought holds that the ITAT being a quasi-judicial authority is not empowered to sit in judgment on the validity of the action of an Income-tax authority issuing the warrant, against whose action no specific appeal is provided in the Act. The other school upholds the power of the ITAT to question the validity of a search action.

    1.6 The issue has been examined recently by two courts delivering conflicting decisions requiring us to take a note of the same.

2. Chitra Devi Soni’s case, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.) :

    2.1 In Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.), the assessee, Chitra Devi, filed an appeal before the Tribunal challenging the validity of the assessment order on the ground that the said order was violative of the principles of natural justice. The assessee contended that the assessment order was bad in law for the reason that the same was passed merely on the surmises and beliefs of the authority without being in possession of any material as was required u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act. According to the assessee, there was no material with the Director to form the belief as was required under the provisions of S. 132(1) and in the absence of any material to this effect, the assessment order passed was not maintainable and, therefore, the assessment order deserved to be set aside.

    2.2 The Tribunal in appeal had adjudicated the said issue, after referring to the various judgments on the subject concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to examine the validity of the authorisation when the same was challenged before the Tribunal.

    2.3 The Tribunal noting the failure of the Revenue authorities to produce the records, held that the search action was invalid in the absence of an authorisation. It held that an authorisation for search was sine qua non for the purpose of passing the order of assessment by the assessing authority and in the case before it, even the factum of authorisation based on reasons had not come on record. In those circumstances, the Tribunal passed the order to the effect that search was not valid and consequentially, the block assessment was held to be illegal.

    2.4 In the above background, the Revenue raised the following question in appeal before the High Court. “Whether for having recourse to assessment for the block period under Chapter XIV-B, a valid search u/s.132 is a condition precedent and mere fact of search is not enough to give jurisdiction to the Assessing Officer to have recourse to the provisions under Chapter XIV-B ? If so, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Tribunal was right to hold that the search conducted in the present case was invalid ?”

    2.5 The Revenue contended before the Rajasthan High Court that the Tribunal could not look into the validity of the search, conducted under the provisions of S. 132 of the Income-tax Act. It was urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction or competence to look into this aspect, and therefore, the judgment rendered by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction and went beyond its competence and the Tribunal had no power to declare a search to be illegal or to be invalid.

    2.6 In reply, the assessee submitted that when the basic foundation, i.e., the authorisation for search issued on the basis of the reasons was not in existence, then the Tribunal had no option but to hold that assessment of the block period was illegal and that the search was without valid authorisaton.

    2.7 It was explained to the Court that for a valid block assessment, it was necessary that a search was conducted u/s.132 and for conducting such search, authorisation was required to be given only where the concerned authority had reasons to believe that there existed circumstances enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of S. 132(1), and in the absence of authorisation based on such reasons, the block assessment itself could not be made.

2.8 The Court took note of the provisions of Chapter XIB and of S. 132 and observed that a bare reading thereof left the Court in no manner of doubt, in view of the use of word ‘then’, that the act of authorising a search had of necessity to be preceded by the existence of reason based on material in possession of the authority. In other words, existence of reason to believe, in consequence of information in possession of the officer was the sine qua non to entitle the authority to issue an authorisation as required by S. 132. It was obvious to the Court that on dissatisfaction of the abovementioned requirements of law, there could possibly be no authorisation, irrespective of the fact that it might have been made and issued and in turn if any search was conducted in pursuance of such an authorisation issued in the absence of requisite sine qua non, the search could not be said to be a ‘search’ u/s.132 of the Act, as contemplated by the provisions of S. 158B of the Act.

2.9 The Court held that the issue of an authorisation based on the reasons recorded in turn on the basis of the material available went to the root of the matter concerning the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to proceed under Chapter XIV-B and in that view of the matter, the Tribunal was very much justified, and had jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the search was conducted consequent upon the authorisation having been issued in the background of the existence of eventualities and material mentioned in S. 132(1). In the end the Court observed that it was conscious of the fact that it was not open for the Court to go into the question of sufficiency of the reasons on the basis of which the competent authority might have had entertained the reason to believe the existence of one or more of the eventualities under clauses (a) to (c) but then the question as to whether there at all existed any material to entertain the reason to believe, even purportedly, consequent upon information in his possession, with the competent authority was the matter which could definitely be looked into by the Tribunal so also by the Court as the absence thereof would vitiate the entire action.

3. Paras Rice Mills’ case:

3.1 In the case of Paras Rice Mills, 313 ITR 182 (P &H), a search and seizure action u/s.132(1) of the Act was carried out on September 26, 1995, at the business premises of the assessee and the assessment u/s.158BC was completed in consequence of the said search. The assessee preferred an appeal and also raised grounds contesting the validity of search. The Tribunal held that the search and seizure was illegal as no material was produced before the Tribunal to show that the requirements of S. 132(1) of the Act were complied with.

3.2 The Revenue in an appeal before the High Court raised the following question for consideration of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in deciding to go into the validity of the action taken u/s.132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

3.3 The Revenue contended that the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in deciding the issue of validity of the action by relying upon the judgments of the Delhi Tribunal in Virinder Bhatia, 79 ITD 340 and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gaya Prasad Pathak, 290 ITR 128.

3.4 In reply, the assessee claimed that the Tribunal had the power to examine the validity of the search and in support of their claim relied on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 and also a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Raj Kumar Gupta (ITA No. 50 of 2002 passed on August 21, 2003).

3.5 The Delhi High Court expressed their agreement with the view taken by the Delhi Tribunal in Virinder Bhatia, 79 ITD 340 and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gaya Prasad Pathak, 290 ITR 128 and for the same reason, respectfully disagreed with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 and observed that the judgment of the Court  in Raj Kumar  Gupta’s case (supra) did  not deal with the issue of scope of the assessing authority and power of the Tribunal to go into the question of validity of search.

3.6 The Court held that the Tribunal when hearing an appeal against the order of assessment could not go into the question of validity or otherwise of any administrative decision for conducting the search and seizure which might be the subject matter of challenge in independent proceedings where the question of validity or otherwise of administrative order could be gone into. The appellate authority in the opinion of the court was concerned with correctness or otherwise of the assessment, only.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is puzzling for an ordinary mind to question the power of the Tribunal to examine the validity of a search action u/s.132, where the Tribunal’s power to otherwise deal with the validity of an assessment, reassessment or revision under the Income-tax Act is accepted without batting an eyelid. Like reassessment or revision, a search also is authorised by one of specified authorities and it becomes difficult to conceive as to how these acts are different in nature so that one is capable of being tried by the ITAT and the other is not.

4.2 On the first blush, it may appear to be obvious to side with the view of the Rajasthan High Court holding that the Tribunal is vested with the power to examine the validity or otherwise of the search action but on deeper examination of the fact one needs to concede that the case of the revenue also deserves due consideration as the same is also found on the edifice of sound reasoning.

4.3 A right of an appeal is not an inherent right but is derived form statute which in the present case is under S. 246A and S. 253. An appeal lies only in cases where the circumstances listed in these sections exist failing which no appeal can lie. On a reading of these provisions, one would agree that they do not specifically provide for an appeal against the action of the authority issuing a search warrant. There is no provision permitting a person being searched to challenge the act of the authority issuing the search warrant before any other Income-tax authority like CIT(A) or the quasi-judicial authority like Tribunal. The only remedy is to approach the Courts, under the writ jurisdiction, vested under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, for challenging the validity of the search action. Relying on this understanding the Revenue authorities including the Courts have taken a view that it is not possible for the Tribunal to examine the validity of the search action.

4.4 It is in the context of what is stated above that the MP High Court in Gaya Prasad Pathak, CIT, 290 ITR 128, in an appeal against the third member order of the Tribunal concerning itself with S. 132A, observed that the jurisdiction exercised by the statutory authority while hearing the appeal could not extend to the examination of the justifiability of an action u/s.132A of the Act. That a search warrant issued by the Commissioner was without jurisdiction or not could not be the subject ma tter of assessment as the same did not arise in the course of assessment and therefore, neither the Assessing Officer nor the Appellate authority could dwell upon the said facet as the same was not a jurisdictional fact within the parameters of assessment proceeding or of an appeal arising therefrom where the scope was restricted to adjudication of the fact to the limited extent as to whether such search and seizure had taken place and what had been found during the search and seizure. The validity of search and seizure, in the considered opinion of the Court, was neither jurisdictional fact nor adjudicatory fact and therefore, the same could not be dwelt upon or delved into in an appeal.

4.5 A note also deserves to be taken of the decision of the Special Bench of the Delhi ITAT in the case of Promain Ltd. 95 ITD 489 wherein it has been held that the Tribunal appointed under the Income-tax Act does not have the power to examine the validity of a search action conducted u/s.132 or u/ s.132A while disposing of appeal against the order of block assessment.

4.6 Having noted the case of the Revenue, let us also appreciate the case of the taxpayer which also is founded on the strong base if not stronger than the Revenue’s base. On a careful observation of the provisions of Chapter XIVB as also S. 153A to S. 153C, it is noticed that a search assessment for the block period is made possible in cases where a search action u/s.132 or u/s.132A has taken place. It is only when the AO is satisfied about the fact of the search that he derives a jurisdiction to make a search assessment and it is at this stage that the authority vested with the power to make a search assessment has to satisfy himself about the validity of the search howsoever limited its scope is. Any failure by this authority to satisfy himself can be a subject matter of appeal before the CIT(A) and the tribunal and it is for this reason that the Appellate authority and with respect, an assessing authority has the power to examine whether the prima facie requirements for issue of a search authorisation were present or not.

4.7 An act of issuing a search warrant is an act carried out by the authority appointed under the Act which provides the very source on the basis of which a search assessment for the block period is carried out and it will be fair to subject such an act to examination by an appellate authority in cases where an appeal is filed against the order made on the basis of the presumption of a valid search. The power of a search assessment is derived only form an action u/s.132 or u/s.132A and in that view of the matter it is just to subject the same to the scrutiny of the appellate authorities otherwise empowered to examine the whole canvass of assessment that is springing form the search.

4.8 Article 323 of the Constitution of India lends the source for setting up of a Tribunal including ITAT. The said Article, vide clause 2(i) provides for power to examine material incidental to assessment by the Tribunal. It is this power that should empower the ITAT to examine the reasons and the validity of search.
 
4.9 It is true that the ITAT, being the creature of the Income-tax Act, derives its power under the statute and therefore its powers should be circum-scribed to those which are specifically vested in it by the Act. In our opinion, there is no reason to restrict the power of the ITAT where it is otherwise empowered to examine the validity of assessment.

Needless to say that when an Appellate authority is required to look into the validity of an assessment whose foundation is based on a single act, in this case a search action, it per force is required to examine the source material leading to such an assessment.

4.10 Initiating a search is an administrative action with dire consequences and therefore attracts principles of natural justice not only requiring but empowering the ITAT to examine the source material for search and its validity. Please see Rajesh Kumar, 287 ITR 91 (SC).

4.11 To contest such a scrutiny power of an Appellate authority only on the ground that as the AO does not have power to do so, the same cannot be done by the Appellate authorities as well is not in keeping with the prevailing times.

4.12 While two diametrically opposite views, genuinely possible, on the subject are considered, it will be fair and just and also equitable to read the power of examining validity of the Tribunal while interpreting its power u/s.253 and such reading will support the principles of natural justice instead of , frustrating it. Till such time a consensus of judicial opinion is achieved, an aggrieved person is advised to explore the possibility of approaching the High Court under Article 226 for suitable remedy which though costly may be expeditious.

S. 14A WHERE NO EXPENDITURE INCURRED

1.  Issue for consideration:
  S. 14A
provides for disallowance of an expenditure incurred in relation to an
income which does not form part of the total income under the Act.
Ss.(1) of the said Section reads as under:
  “For the purposes of
computing the total income under this Chapter, no deduction shall be
allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation
to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.”

 
Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) inserted by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. 1-4-2007,
are held to be prospectively applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2007-08 by the
Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., 328 ITR
81. These provisions provide for the manner of determination of the
amount of expenditure liable for disallowance in accordance with the
prescribed method and vests the government with the power to prescribe
the rules for computation. In pursuance of this power, Rule 8D has been
introduced by Notification dated 24-3-2008 which is held to be
prospectively applicable from A.Y. 2008-09 onwards, by the said decision
in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra).

  Ss.(3)
of the said Section provides that the provisions of Ss.(2) shall apply
even in cases where an assessee claims that no expenditure has been
incurred by him in relation to an exempt income.

 The Punjab and
Haryana High Court in some of the cases has held that no disallowance
u/s.14A was possible where the nexus between the expenditure claimed and
the exempt income was not established and where there was no finding by
the AO, of the assessee having incurred expenditure for earning an
exempt income. This finding of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
requires to be tested and considered afresh in view of the observations
of the Bombay High Court in its recent decision.

2.  Hero Cycles Ltd.’s case:

 
In CIT v. Hero Cycles Ltd., 323 ITR 518 (P & H), the Revenue for
the A.Y. 2004-05 raised the following substantial question of law:
 
“Whether on the facts and in law, the Tribunal was legally justified in
deleting the disallowance of Rs.3,48,04,375 u/s.14A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 by ignoring the evidence relied on by the AO and holding that a
clear nexus has not been established that the interest-bearing funds
have been vested for investments generating tax-free dividend income?”

 
In that case, the assessee was engaged in manufacturing of cycles and
parts of two-wheelers in multiple units. It earned dividend income,
which was exempted u/s.10(34) and u/s.(35). The AO made an inquiry
whether any expenditure was incurred for earning this income and as a
result of the said inquiry addition was made by way of disallowance
u/s.14A(3), which was partly upheld by the CIT(A). The Tribunal held
that there was no nexus with the expenditure incurred and the income
generated and recorded as under:

“We have perused the same and
find that the plea of the assessee that the entire investments have been
made out of the dividend proceeds, sale proceeds, debenture redemption,
etc., is borne out of record. In fact the CIT(A) has also come to a
categorical finding that insofar as other units are concerned, none of
their funds have been utilised to make the investments in question. One
aspect which is evident that the interest income earned by the main
unit, Ludhiana, exceeds the expenditure by way of interest incurred by
it, thus obviating the application of S. 14A of the Act. Even with
regard to the funds of the main unit, Ludhiana the funds flow position
explained shows that only the non-interest bearing funds have been
utilised for making the investments. At pp. 3 to 6 of the paper book are
placed the details of the bank accounts, wherein the amount of
dividend, sale proceeds of shares, debenture redemption, etc. have been
received and later on invested in the investments in question. Such
funds are ostensibly without any burden of interest expenditure. Thus,
on facts we do not find any evidence to show that the assessee has
incurred interest expenditure in relation to earning the tax-exempt
income in question. We find that all the details in question were
produced before the AO and the CIT(A) also. The entire evidence in this
regard, which is submitted before the lower authorities have been
compiled in the paper book, to which we have already adverted to in the
earlier part of the order. Therefore, merely because the assessee has
incurred interest expenditure on funds borrowed in the main unit,
Ludhiana, it would not ipso facto invite the disallowance u/s.14A,
unless there is evidence to show that such interest-bearing funds have
been invested in the investments which have generated the ‘tax-exempt
dividend income’. As noted earlier, there is no nexus established by the
Revenue in this regard and therefore, on a mere presumption, the
provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied. Thus, we find that the CIT(A)
erred in partly sustaining the addition. In fact, in the absence of such
nexus, the entire addition made was required to be deleted. We
accordingly hold so.”

  The counsel for the Revenue relied upon
S. 14A(3) and Rule 8D(1)(b) to submit that even where the assessee
claimed that no expenditure had been incurred, the correctness of such
claim could be gone into by the AO and in the present case, the claim of
the assessee that no expenditure was incurred was found to be not
acceptable by the AO and thus disallowance was justified.  

The
Court was unable to accept the submission in view of finding that the
expenditure on interest was set off against the income from interest and
the investments in the shares and mutual funds were out of the dividend
proceeds. In view of this finding of fact, the High Court held that
disallowance u/s.14A was not sustainable. It observed that whether, in a
given situation, any expenditure was incurred which was to be
disallowed, was a question of fact. The Court rejected the contention of
the Revenue that directly or indirectly some expenditure was always
incurred which must be disallowed u/s.14A, and the expenditure so
incurred could not be allowed to be set off against the business income
which may nullify the mandate of S. 14A. It held that the disallowance
u/s.14A required finding of incurring of expenditure; where it was found
that, for earning exempted income, no expenditure had been incurred,
disallowance u/s.14A could not stand. In the case before the Court, the
finding on this aspect, against the Revenue, was not shown to be
perverse. Consequently, disallowance was held to be not permissible. The
Court relied upon the view earlier taken by the Court in IT Appeal No.
504 of 2008, CIT v. Winsome Textile Industries Ltd., decided on 25th
August, 2009, wherein it was observed as under :

  “Contention
raised on behalf of the Revenue is that even if the assessee had made
investment in shares out of its own funds, the assessee had taken loans
on which interest was paid and all the money available with the assessee
was in common kitty, as held by this Court in CIT v. Abhishek
Industries Ltd., (2006) 205 CTR (P&H) 304; (2006) 286 ITR 1
(P&H) and therefore, disallowance u/s.14A was justified. We do not
find any merit in this submission. Judgment of this Court in Abhishek
Industries (supra) was on the issue of allowability of interest paid on
loans given to sister concerns, without interest. It was held that
deduction for interest was permissible when loan was taken for business
purpose and not for diverting the same to sister concern without having
nexus with the business. Observations made therein have to be read in
that context. In the present case, admittedly, the assessee did not make
any claim for exemption. In such a situation, S. 14A could have no
application.”

  The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that no
substantial question of law arose for consideration in the appeal filed
by the Revenue.

  3.  Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.’s case:
 
The issue of disallowance u/s.14A was recently examined in detail by
the Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v.
CIT, 328 ITR 81. In that case the assessee had claimed a dividend of
Rs.34.34 crore as exempt from the total taxable income u/s.10(33) for
A.Y. 2002-03 by claiming that no expenditure was incurred in relation to
the said dividend income. The AO was of the view that if the assessee
had not made investments in these securities, it would not have been
required to borrow funds to that extent and consequently, the interest
burden could have been reduced. On this basis, the AO concluded that a
part of the interest payment of Rs.51.71 crore, claimed as deduction,
pertained to funds utilised for the purpose of investment in shares to
the extent of Rs.6.92 crore and disallowed the said amount by resorting
to the provisions of S. 14A. The CIT(A) relying on the decisions for the
earlier years held that no expenditure was incurred for earning the
dividend income. The Tribunal however restored the matter to the file of
the Assessing Officer to verify whether any expenditure besides
interest was incurred for the year in relation to the said dividend
income.

  On the above facts, several questions were raised for
consideration of the High Court by the company, which inter alia
required the Court to examine the need for establishing the nexus of an
expenditure claimed with that of the exempt income.

  It was
contented by the company in the context that no expenditure was incurred
by it in relation to the said dividend income and the interest claimed
by it pertained to earning of the taxable income and that the investment
in shares on which dividend was received was made out of own funds and
therefore no disallowance was possible u/s.14A read with or without Rule
8D. It was further contended that the Tribunal was in error in
restoring the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer for
examining the facts afresh, as the facts during the year were the same
as were prevailing in the earlier years for which the disallowance was
deleted.

  The Revenue countered the contentions of the company
by stating that the provisions of S. 14A, in particular of Ss.(3), were
applicable to the case of a company where a claim was made by the
company that no expenditure was incurred by the company in relation to
the said dividend income.  The Bombay High Court, in the context,
observed in paragraphs 25 and 69 to 73 of the judgment that once the
Assessing Officer was satisfied about the fact that some expenditure was
incurred in relation to the income not included in the total income, it
was mandatory for him to disallow an appropriate amount computed under
Rule 8D. It noted that Ss.(3) covered a case where the assessee claimed
that no expenditure was made in relation to the concerned income. The
Court held that the claim of the assessee that no expenditure was
incurred was required to be examined by the Assessing Officer,
irrespective of the finding of fact in earlier year that investment in
the shares was made out of the company’s own funds, inasmuch as some
expenditure besides interest could have been incurred and such a
possibility was not examined by the Assessing Officer. Lastly, the Court
held that irrespective of Rule 8D, the Assessing Officer was entitled
to apportion an indirect expenditure by virtue of S. 14A (1) itself and
once a proximate nexus was established, a disallowance by resorting to
apportionment of an expenditure claimed was permissible in law.

  4.  Observations:
 
The decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court was for A.Y.
2004-05, while that of the Bombay High Court was for A.Y. 2002-03.
Admittedly, the benefit of the provisions of S. 14A(2) and (3) and Rule
8D was not available to the Courts, where those provisions are accepted
to be prospective in their application. Under the circumstances,
irrespective of the relevance of the issue being examined for and from
A.Y. 2008-09, the same would continue to be relevant for assessment
years up to A.Y. 2007-08. Accordingly, for a valid disallowance for
those years, the Assessing Officer should have established that an
expenditure was incurred for earning the income not included in the
total income and should have further established nexus of such
expenditure to the income not included in the total income. The issue,
in our opinion, however continues to be relevant even for A.Y. 2008-09
and onwards.

  It is true that Ss.(3) provides expressly for
applicability of S. 14A even in cases where an assessee claims that no
expenditure has been incurred. But then, it is equally true that Ss.(2)
specifically provides that an AO shall proceed to determine the amount
of disallowance only if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the
claim of the assessee that no expenditure was incurred by him in
relation to an exempt income. In doing so, the Assessing Officer shall
be required to establish the nexus of the expenditure sought to be
disallowed with the income not included in total income before
quantifying the disallowance as per Rule 8D.

  Even the Bombay
High Court in Godrej & Boyce’s case (supra) has confirmed that
satisfaction of the AO is an essential pre-condition for applicability
of S. 14A and of Rule 8D and it is for achieving this satisfaction that
the Court restored the case to the file of the Assessing Officer. In
fact, even Rule 8D requires such satisfaction by the AO before
permitting him to compute the amount of disallowance.

  The stand
of the Income-tax Department that applicability of the formula under
Rule 8D is irrespective of absence of expenditure and that a
disallowance of an amount computed as per Rule 8D is mandatory, appears
to be incorrect. Irrespective of the assessment year involved, the
finding by the AO that some expenditure in relation to an exempt income
was incurred by the assessee would be essential for invoking the
provisions of S. 14A, more so, in cases where an assessee has claimed
that he has not incurred any expenditure. It is in the context of the
continued validity of this proposition, that the case for reading down
clause (iii) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8D continues to be meritorious, as
the said clause (iii) provides for an ad-hoc disallowance independent of
nexus of an expenditure sought to be disallowed to an income not
included in the total income.

  It will be equally incorrect for
the Income-tax Department to solely rely on the provisions of Clause
(iii) of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 8D to advance the case of disallowance by
stating that the amount computed thereunder is deemed to be an
expenditure incurred in relation to an exempt income. The need for nexus
continues to be of relevance. Further, it is well settled that a rule
cannot travel beyond the provisions of the Section under which it falls.

 
The decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, to the effect
that S. 14A requires a finding by the AO of having incurred some
expenditure before the disallowance can be made, continues to be of
significant relevance.

Reopening of a block assessment

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 Chapter XIV-B, inserted in the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1995 w.e.f. 1-7-1995, provides for a special assessment procedure for taxing an undisclosed income detected as a result of a search action u/s.132 that took place on or after 1st July, 1995 but before 31st May, 2003.

    1.2 The chapter contains complete mechanism for computation and assessment of the total undisclosed income of the block period and includes mechanisms for filing of a return of income, issue of a notice, payment of taxes, interest and penalty. The chapter, as considered by the Courts, is a code by itself.

    1.3 The regular income, i.e., the disclosed income of the block period continues to be governed by the general provisions of the Income-tax Act including those providing for regular assessment of such income.

    1.4 The provisions for special assessment, under Chapter XIV-B, of undisclosed income and that for regular assessment u/s.143(3), operate in different fields and run parallel to each other for assessment of income of an year; one for taxing an undisclosed income, while the other for bringing to tax a disclosed income.

    1.5 Chapter XIV-B also provides for an application of all those provisions of the Act other than those that are specifically differentiated under Chapter XIV-B. In other words, unless otherwise provided in Chapter XIVB, the provisions contained in general law of the Act will apply to the assessment of an undisclosed income even for a block period, except in cases where the chapter provides for any specific departure from the general provisions of the Act by specially providing a different course.

    1.6 An interesting issue that arises, in the context, is about the possibility of reopening a block assessment made under Chapter XIVB and the consequent reassessment of the undisclosed income of the block period. The Courts have been asked to examine the possibility of application of provisions of S. 147 and S. 148 for reopening of a completed block assessment. While the Gujarat High Court finds it to be not possible, the Gauhati High Court has held that it is possible to reopen a completed block assessment.

2. Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat)’s case, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.) :

    2.1 In the case of CIT v. Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat), 307 ITR 1, certain loose papers were found and seized during the search proceedings u/s.132 of the Act from the residential premises of one of the erstwhile partners of the petitioner-firm and his statement was recorded. An order u/s.158BD of the Act was made on a total income of Rs.40,50,900 after taking approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajkot for the block period in the status of AOP pursuant to the return of income for the block period filed showing a total undisclosed income at Rs.30,00,000. The assessment was made after various details and explanation were called for, vide notice issued under Chapter XIVB.

    2.2 Subsequently a notice u/s.148 of the Act was issued seeking to reassess the income for the block period by stating that there was a reason to believe that the income for the block period had escaped assessment within the meaning of S. 147 of the Act and that the notice was issued after obtaining the necessary satisfaction of the Commissioner. In spite of repeated letters asking for the reasons recorded u/s.148(2) of the Act, the same were not supplied. In a correspondence addressed to one of the ex-partners it was stated that it was not obligatory to supply reasons recorded and the addressee was directed to file return immediately. It is at this stage that the petitioner had approached the Court challenging the impugned notice issued u/s.148 of the Act.

    2.3 The principal issue raised in the petition was whether it was open to the assessing authority to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act in respect of an assessment framed for a block period under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

    2.4 On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that S. 147 of the Act permitted an Assessing Officer to reassess an income which had escaped assessment for any assessment year. Emphasising the language of the provision, it was contended that an assessment Chapter XIB was not in respect of any assessment year but was for the block of years and as such it was impossible for the Assessing Officer to form a belief that any income chargeable to tax for any assessment year had escaped assessment.

    2.5 Based on the provisions of S. 147 of the Act and the proviso therein it was submitted that the scheme would fail in the case of assessment for the block period as the limitation u/s.147 that has been prescribed for issuance of notice has been reckoned from the end of a particular assessment year and as such it was not possible to specify the assessment year, in the case of a block assessment, from the end of which the time limit could be computed.

    2.6 The provisions of S. 151 and S. 153 of the Act were also relied upon by the petitioners to point out that the condition for obtaining the sanction of the higher authority as provided by S. 151 of the Act in cases where four years had expired from the relevant assessment year could not be complied with and fulfilled, as in respect of the block period there was no relevant assessment year w.r.t which the time limit could be observed. Similarly, S. 153 of the Act also provided different period of limitation as against the provisions of S. 158BE of the Act which provides for time limit for completion of block assessment.

    2.7 It was also contended that the order of block assessment was passed after the approval of the Commissioner and therefore a reopening with the sanction of the subordinate authority was bad in law.

    2.8 On behalf of the Revenue, it was submitted that S. 158BH of the Act specifically provided that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XIVB, all other provisions of the Act shall apply to assessment made under Chapter XIVB. It was, therefore, contended that when one considered the definition of ‘block period’ as provided in S. 158B(a) of the Act, it was clear that the said term covered the period comprising previous years relevant to 10/6 assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search was conducted u/s.132 of the Act and therefore, wherever the words ‘assessment year’ appeared in Chapter XIV of the Act relating to procedure for assessment, the term ’block period’ had to be read in the place of ‘assessment year’ to make the scheme workable.

2.9 Referring to Ss.(2) of S. 158BA of the Act, it was submitted for the Revenue that for the purpose of charging tax not only S. 113 of the Act was mate-rial, but even S. 4 had to be considered as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, 297 ITR 322. It was submitted that the Apex Court has considered the entire scheme of Chapter XIVB of the Act and had come to the conclusion that computation of undisclosed income had to be made u/s. 158BB in the manner provided in Chapter IV of the Act and therefore, the application of the said Chapter was not ruled out by the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act; that non obstante clause appearing in S. 158BA of the Act had to be read in juxtaposition with S. 158BH of the Act; that the concepts of ‘previous year’ and ‘total income’ were retained in Chapter XIVB of the Act and, therefore, ap-plication of Chapter XIV of the Act could not be ruled out from the block assessment procedure.

2.10 To begin with, the Gujarat High Court observed that in the aforesaid circumstances, when one considered the entire scheme relating to procedure for assessment/reassessment as laid down in the group of Sections from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act and compared the same with special procedure for assessment of search cases under Chapter XIVB of the Act, it became apparent that the normal procedure laid down in Chapter XIV of the Act had been given a go by when Chapter XIVB of the Act itself laid down that the said Chapter provided for a special procedure for assessment of search cases and the stand of the Revenue that S. 158BH of the Act permitted all other provisions of the Act to apply to assessment made under Chapter XIVB of the Act did not merit acceptance.

2.11 The Apex Court decision, the Court proceeded further, on which great emphasis has been placed on behalf of the Revenue in fact went on to support the view adopted by the petitioner. The Court noted that the controversy before the Apex Court was in relation to the rate of tax which was to be applied to the undisclosed income assessed in terms of Chapter XIVB of the Act and the Apex Court in that case was concerned mainly with computation of undisclosed income u/s.158BB(1) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court pointed out that it had already noticed that S. 158BH of the Act provided for invoking other machinery provisions to an assessment made under Chapter XIVB of the Act which did not require other provisions of the Act to be applied to a block assessment to be made under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

2.12 The Apex Court decision, the Court further noted, also provided for a harmonious construction on the basis of reading of the mode of computation provided in Chapter IV of the Act and provided under Chapter XIVB of the Act by stating that S. 158BH inter alia, provided that other provisions of the Act should apply if there was no conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act and other provisions of the Act. The Court further noted that in a situation where there was a conflict between the provisions of block assessment procedure prescribed under Chapter XIVB of the Act and other provisions of the Act, it would be the special procedure prescribed under Chapter XIVB of the Act which had to prevail.

2.13 The Court further noted that the entire scheme under Chapter XIV of the Act, more particularly from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act pertaining to reassessment and the special procedure for assessing the undisclosed income of the block period under Chapter XIVB of the Act, were separate and distinct from each other and in the circumstances, as per the established rules of interpretation, unless and until a plain reading of the two streams of assessment procedure did not result in the procedures being independently workable, only then the question of resolving the conflict would arise; to the contrary, in the present case, in the light of the provisions of S. 158BH of the Act, once there was a conflict between the two streams of procedure, as laid down by the Apex Court, the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act shall prevail and have primacy.

2.14 Thus, viewed from any angle, the Court held, the stand of the Revenue did not merit acceptance. Once assessment had been framed u/s.158BA of the Act in relation to undisclosed income from the block period as a result of search there was no question of the Assessing Officer issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act for reopening such assessment as the said concept was abhorrent to the special scheme of assessment of undisclosed income for block period. At the cost of repetition it was required to be stated and emphasised that the first proviso u/d 158BC(a) of the Act specifically provided that no notice u/s.148 of the Act was required to be issued for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XIVB of the Act.
 
Peerchand Ratanlal Baid (HUF)’s case :

3.1 The brief facts in the case of CIT v. Peerchand Ratanlal Baid (HUF), 226 CTR 189 (Gau.) were that a search in the Baid Group of Companies had taken place u/s.132 in the year 1995 . The assessee, a HUF, as the proprietor of one of the group companies, filed the return for the block period 1986-87 to 1996-97 showing undisclosed income of Rs.60 lakhs. The assessment was completed u/s.158BC of the Act, determining an undisclosed income of Rs.1,17,25,416. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the aforesaid order of assessment which was partly allowed and the undisclosed income for the block period was revised to Rs.24,37,850. Subsequently it was found that some of the documents seized in the case of another group company i.e., M/s. Baid Commercial Enterprises, for the same block period i.e., 1986-87 to 1996-97, pertained to the assessee. Accordingly, the AO initiated the proceedings for reopening asking the assessee to explain why the amount of Rs.59,18,246 covered by the aforesaid seized documents or any part thereof should not be added to the total undisclosed income of the assessee for the block period. The explanation given by the assessee having been found to be unsatisfactory the AO added a sum of Rs.13,66,715 to the undisclosed income of the assessee for the block period revising the assessed income to Rs.38,04,570.

3.2 The Gauhati High Court while upholding the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeal of the assessee on merits and other facets of the case, the Court at the request of the counsel appearing for the assessee, adjudicated a question raised by him to the effect that it was not within the power and jurisdiction of the assessing authority to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act in respect of an assessment for a block period made under Chapter XIV-B of the Act by placing reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) v. JCIT, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.).

3.3 The Gauhati High Court expressed its inabil-ity to subscribe to the views recorded by the Gujarat High Court and the reasons contained in support thereof. In reaching the aforesaid conclusion the Court relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, 297 ITR 322 (SC) which in the respectful opinion of the Court succinctly summed up the situation and provided adequate justification for the Court’s respectful disagreement with the views of the Gujarat High Court expressed in Cargo Clearing Agency’s case (supra).

3.4 Culling from the decision on the said case of Suresh N. Gupta (supra), the Court observed that each ‘previous year’ under the Act was a distinct unit of time for the purpose of assessment and the block period under the scheme of Chapter XIVB; it was an expanded unit of time comprising of 10/6 assessment years preceding the previous years; that the unit of time in both situations above remains constant; that it was open for Parliament to treat 10/ 6 previous years as one unit of time for the purposes of assessment for the block period; that the concept of previous year was retained in Chapter XIVB of the Act; that the non obstante clause in S. 158BA had to be read in juxtaposition with S. 158BH and if so read, other provisions of the Act would be applicable to the scheme under Chapter XIVB, if no conflict arose upon such application.

3.5 The principles noted above, the Court observed, took adequate care of the contrary view of the Gujarat High Court holding that S. 147 could not have any application to a block assessment which was made for 10/6 years without reference to any particular assessment year, as S. 147 of the Act provided only for reassessment of escaped income of any assessment year specified therein.

3.6 As regards the observation of the Gujarat High Court to the effect that all material, in course of block assessment following a search, was available with the AO and therefore the conditions precedent for the exercise of power u/s.147/148 were not satisfied, the Gauhati High Court stated that “we may straightway point out that the aforesaid view does not take care of the situation that has arisen in the present case, details of which have been set out hereinabove. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to understand that the view expressed in Cargo Clearing Agency (supra) cannot be considered to be comprehensive covering all situations to justify exclusion of the power u/s.147/u/s.148 from the provision of the special procedure for block assessments contemplated by Chapter XIVB of the Act”.

3.7 The question of limitation dealt with by the Gujarat High Court, in the considered view of the Court, had to be understood in the context of the separate period of limitation provided by S. 158BE of the Act for completion of block assessments and not for reopening such assessment for the block period; that in the absence of any separate and specific period of limitation for reopening of block assessments in Chapter XIVB, on the ratio of the judgment in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta (supra), the provisions contained in Chapter XIV prescribing the period of limitation for reopening of assessment must be understood to be applicable to assessments under Chapter XIVB of the Act inasmuch as such application would not bring in any conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIVB and those contained in Chapter XIV.

3.8 The exclusion of S. 148 by the first proviso to S. 158BC(a) of the Act was understood by the Court to be in the context of the notice that was required to be issued by the AO following action taken u/ s.132 and/or S. 132A of the Act; that such notice, in the fact of a concluded assessment for any of the assessment years included in the block period, might partake the character of reopening such an assessment, to clarify which the first proviso to S. 158BC(a) had been inserted; that the question that confronted the Court in the case under consideration was in relation to a stage after conclusion of the assessment for the block period, whereas the afore-said proviso dealt with the stage of initiation of the block assessment proceeding. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions while dismissing the appeal of the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court deemed it proper and appropriate to record their conclusion that the provisions of S. 147 and S. 148 would apply to an assessment for a block pe-riod made under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

Observations :

4.1 The controversy surrounds one of the important clauses that saves the application of the other provisions of Income-tax Act, contained in Chapter XIVB. It reads as under :

“Save as otherwise provided in this chapter, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to assessment made under this chapter.”

4.2 On a bare reading of the provisions of Chapter XIVB, it is confirmed that there are no express or apparently implied provisions in the chapter which provides for reopening of a completed block assessment. It is therefore to be examined whether the general provisions for reopening and reassessment as applicable to a regular assessment con-tained in Chapter XIV, particularly u/s.147 to u/s. 153 can be applied to the case of the block assessment under Chapter XIVB for its successful reopen-ing and succeeding reassessment.

4.3 Again on a bare reading of the abovementioned clause, it is apparent that it is possible to apply all those provisions of the Act in situations and circumstances not dealt with by Chapter XIVB. In other words, the general provisions of the Act would not apply where express provision is made in Chapter XIVB, so however, they will apply with equal force where the chapter does not contain any express provision to deal with an unspecified situation. Reopening of a completed block assessment, as noted above, is one such situation which has not been expressly dealt with by Chapter XIVB.

4.4 In the above stated analysis, on a primary reading of the provisions, one is likely to concur with the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Peerchand Ratilal Baid (HUF) which has for the reasons noted has held that subject to compliance of other conditions it is possible to reopen a completed block assessment.

4.5 Having observed that it is possible to reopen a block assessment, it remains to be seen that whether the ratio of the decision in the case of Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) would nonetheless hold water. The Gujarat High Court decision is a very well reasoned and detailed decision has ruled out the possibility of reopening of a completed block assessment and has supported the conclusion with various findings in law.

4.6 The Gujarat High Court in Cargo Clearing Agency’s case in particular held that; (1) while S. 147 of the Act permits reassessment of income that has escaped assessment for any assessment year, assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act is for a block period of 10/6 years without reference to any particular assessment year, (2) reassessment of escaped income u/s.147 of the Act is made where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment either due to the failure of the assessee to file return or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts for the purposes of assessment or where material already on record had not been processed. In a case of block assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act escapement of undisclosed income, following a search, cannot be envisaged, as all the materials recovered in the course of the search are available with the AO and there can be no case of non-disclosure of ma-terial facts by the assessee, (3) S. 158BA and S. 158BH, read in juxtaposition, leads to the conclusion that in the absence of any provision for reassessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act the provisions contained in S. 147 under Chapter XIV will not apply to assessments made for the block period, (4) the period of limitation for completion of block assessment provided for by S. 158BE of the Act is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by S. 153 of the Act. It, therefore, cannot be envisaged that the period of limitation u/s.153 of the Act would apply to block assessment. Any such application of the provisions contained in S. 153 will make the scheme visualised u/s.158BE unworkable, and (5) under Chapter XIVB of the Act certain provisions contained in Chapter XIV have been specifically incorporated, whereas certain other provisions have been specifically excluded. S. 148 has been excluded by the first proviso to S. 158BC(a), whereas S. 142, S. 143, S. 144 and S. 145 have been specifically incorporated by sub-clause (b) of S. 158BC.

4.7 Amongst several reasons advanced by the Gujarat High Court for coming to the conclusion, the two that stand apart for our consideration are :

  •  the Supreme Court’s decision in Suresh Gupta’s case was noted and its implications were considered by the Court while holding that it was not possible to read the provisions of reopening into the chapter of block assessment by suitably modifying the provisions of S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act.

  •  the scheme of block assessment per se ruled out any possibility of a reopening of a block assessment altogether.

4.8 The entire present controversy can be considered and appreciated in light of the legislative intent expressed at the time when Chapter XIVB was introduced vide the Memorandum Explaining the Provisions in the Finance Bill, 1995. The purpose and the object for introducing the said Chapter was explained in the following terms :

“Special procedure for assessment of search cases. Searches conducted by the IT Department are important means of unearthing black money. How-ever, under the present scheme, valuable time is lost in trying to relate the undisclosed incomes to the different years. Tax evaders generally manage to divert the focus to procedural and legal issues and often invent new evidence to explain undisclosed income. By the time search-related assessments are completed, the effect of the search is considerably diluted. Legal battles continue for many years to decide which income is assessable in which assessment year. No finality is reached and the seized assets remain with the Department for a long time. In order to make the procedure of assessment of search cases cost effective, efficient and meaningful, it is proposed to introduce a new scheme of assessment of undisclosed income determined as a result of search u/s.132 or requisition u/s.132A. Under this scheme, the undisclosed income detected as a result of any search initiated, or requisition made, after 30th June, 1995, shall be assessed separately as income of a block of years. Where the previous year has not ended or the due date for filing a return of income for any previous year has not expired, the income recorded on or before the date of the search or requisition in the books of account or other documents, maintained in the normal course, relating to such previous years shall not be included in the block.”

4.9 The memorandum referred to above, is a pointer to the fact that undisclosed income, in other words, the income which has not been disclosed and which has not been taxed, has to be assessed by adopting a special procedure. The special procedure has been evolved to save valuable time which is otherwise lost in the process of co-relating the un-disclosed income to different assessment years by obviating the legal battles involving issues of procedure and interpretation of law. The Legislature found it necessary to arrive at a cost effective, efficient and meaningful procedure to avoid litigations which continue for many years to decide which income, or part of income, is assessable in which assessment year.

4.10 Looking from several angles, to us the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court is a better view inasmuch as the reassessment of escaped income u/ s.147 of the Act is made in cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment either due to the failure of the assessee to file return or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts for the purposes of assessment or where material already on record had not been processed. It therefore pre-supposes a failure on the part of the assessee to comply with the requirements of the law. In a case of block assessment, on the contrary, under Chapter XIVB of the Act, the escapement of undisclosed income, following a search, cannot be envisaged at all, as all the material recovered in the course of the search is available with the AO and there can be no case of non-disclosure of material facts by the assessee. Not using such material indicates a possible failure on the part of the AO for which no power can not be vested in him to confer benefit for inaction. Moreover, the Gujarat High Court did examine the implications of Suresh N. Gupta’s decision in coming to the conclusion advanced by the Court.

The CBDT has made the following amendments vide the Income-tax (Eighth Amendment) Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st November 2011

Changes in the due date of filing TDS returns and other amendments — Notification No. 57/2011/F. No.142/23/2011-SO(TPL), dated 24-10-2011.

The CBDT has made the following amendments vide the Income-tax (Eighth Amendment) Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st November 2011:

  •   The due date for filing TDS returns for Government deductees’ has been prescribed as 31st July, 31st October, 31st January and 15th May for the quarters ended 30th June, 30th September, 31st December and 31st March as mentioned in the Table in Rule 31A.

  •    Additional details to be furnished in the TDS returns of the payees who have furnished pre-scribed forms for non-deduction of TDS due to their taxable income being below the maximum prescribed limits.

  •  In cases where income is assessable in the hands of person other than the deductee, credit for TDS on such income would be given to the other person in cases where the deductee furnishes a declaration to that effect and deductor reports such tax deduction in the name of that other person.

Sale of scrap — Whether income derived from industrial undertaking ?

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Income-tax Act, 1961 has provided tax holidays from
time to time in respect of profits derived from certain types of industrial
undertakings, whereby a certain proportion of such profits is allowed as a
deduction under chapter VIA for certain number of years from the date of
commencement of the undertaking. S. 80HH, S. 80HHA, S. 80I, S. 80J and now S.
80IB have all contained such provisions allowing deduction of a certain
percentage of profits derived from such eligible undertakings.

1.2 The common requirement for all such incentive provisions
has been that the gross total income should include profits derived from such
eligible undertakings. Further, the deduction has always been a percentage of
the profits derived from such eligible undertakings. The quantum of the
deduction has therefore been linked to the profits of the eligible undertakings.

1.3 A question has arisen before the Courts as to whether
income from sale of scrap of the eligible undertaking can be regarded as profits
derived from such eligible undertaking, for the purpose of computing the
deduction under the incentive provisions. While the Madras High Court has
consistently taken the view that such income from sale of scrap would form part
of the profits derived from such eligible undertaking, the Madhya Pradesh High
Court has recently taken a contrary view that the income from such sale would
not form part of the profits derived from the eligible undertaking.

2. Fenner India’s case :


2.1 This issue had arisen before the Madras High Court in the
case of Fenner (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 241 ITR 803.

2.2 In this case the assessee was an industrial undertaking
in a backward area manufacturing V-belts, oil seals, O-rings, rubber moulded
products, etc. It was eligible for deduction u/s.80HH in respect of the profits
derived from such industrial undertaking. It claimed a deduction of 20% of the
net profits of such undertaking, including profit on sale of scrap.

2.3 The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction in respect
of profit on sale of scrap. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the assessee’s
claim for deduction in regard to the profit on sale of scrap. The Tribunal
however allowed the Revenue’s appeal on further appeal by the Revenue.

2.4 The Madras High Court noted that there was no dispute
that the new industrial undertaking was set up to manufacture V-belts, oil
seals, O-rings, rubber moulded products, etc. and that in the process of
manufacture of the V-belts, oil seals, O-rings, rubber moulded products, certain
scrap resulted. The resulting product of scrap also had a market and was also
sold, such sale being reflected in the turnover of the industrial undertaking.

2.5 Before the Madras High Court, on behalf of the Revenue,
it was argued that profit on the sale of scrap materials could, by no stretch of
imagination, be stated to have been derived from the industrial undertaking, and
if at all, such profits were at best attributable to the industrial undertaking.
It was argued that profits on sale of the manufactured products of the
industrial undertaking alone could be stated to be profits or gains derived from
the industrial undertaking, in respect of which a deduction of 20% was
permissible.

2.6 The Madras High Court noted that an assessee must
establish that his profits and gains were derived from his industrial
undertaking. It was not sufficient if a commercial connection was established
between the profits earned and the industrial undertaking, and the law required
that such profits must have been derived from the industrial undertaking. The
industrial undertaking itself must be the source of that profit and the business
of the industrial undertaking must strictly yield that profit. It must be the
direct source of profit and not a means to earn any other profit.

2.7 The Madras High Court observed that to say that the scrap
materials had no direct link or nexus with the industrial undertaking could not
at all be expected to commend acceptance. The scrap materials came within the
manufacturing process of the industrial undertaking in the manufacture of its
products such as V-belts, oil seals, etc. Therefore, the Madras High Court was
of the view that the profits and gains from the sale of scrap materials were
eligible for deduction of an amount equal to 20% u/s.80 HH, inasmuch as such
gains or profits were derived from the industrial undertaking and includable in
the gross total income of the assessee.

2.8 A similar view had been taken by the Madras High Court in
the cases of CIT v. Wheels India Ltd., 141 ITR 745, CIT v. Sundaram
Clayton Ltd.,
133 ITR 34 and CIT v. Sundaram Industries Ltd., 253 ITR
396.

3. Alpine Solvex‘s case :


3.1 The issue again came up for consideration before the
Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Alpine
Solvex Ltd.,
219 CTR (MP) 499.

3.2 In this case the assessee was a company which had a
solvent extraction plant where soya bean oil was manufactured from soya bean
seeds. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80I on the amount
realised by it by sale proceeds of old gunny bags which were used as packing
material. The sale proceeds of such gunny bags were included in the total
turnover of the undertaking.

3.3 The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim,
holding that it was not an income derived by the assessee from an industrial
undertaking and that it was therefore not eligible for deduction u/s.80HH and
u/s.80I. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal
dismissed the Revenue’s appeal and upheld the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals).

3.4 Before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on behalf of the Revenue it was contended that the amount earned by the assessee from sale of certain gunny bags lying in the factory could not be said to be the business, much less regular business activity and hence the income derived from sale of such gunny bags could not be said to be an income derived from the industrial undertaking eligible for the benefit of special deduction u/s.80HH/80I. It was argued that the expression ‘income derived from industrial undertaking’ has to be interpreted in a restricted/narrower sense, and hence only income earned directly from the business carried on by the industrial undertaking can be taken into consideration for calculating total income and deduction available under these Sections. Nobody appeared on behalf of the assessee before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

3.5 The Madhya Pradesh High Court, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 113 ITR 84, noted that the expression’ derived from’ was more restricted than the term ‘attributable to’, which was a comparatively broader expression. It further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, 262 ITR 278, to the effect that the words ‘derived from’ used in S. 80HH must be understood as something which had direct or immediate nexus with the appellant’s industrial undertaking.

3.6 According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the main business of the assessee was to manufacture and sell soya oil by extracting it from soya bean seeds in their extraction plant. Therefore, according to the High Court, all income is derived from sale of soya oil has to be held as income derived from industrial undertaking, and so far as income earned out of sale of gunny bags was concerned, it could not be kept at par with the income derived from sale of soya oil. The High Court was of the view that sale of gunny bags was not the main or even ancillary business activity of the assessee, was not even regular or continuous business activity of the assessee, and that no investment was made by the assessee for sale of gunny bags, inasmuch as no industrial undertaking was established for manufacture and sale of gunny bags. Further, according to the Court the gunny bags were not manufactured by the assessee in its plant, which was established only for production of soya oil. According to the High Court, merely because some gunny bags were lying in the factory as surplus or unused or as waste material and were sold to earn some income, it could not be regarded as an income directly derived from the industrial undertaking.

3.7 The Madhya Pradesh High Court expressed the view that in order to derive income from the industrial undertaking, it must be shown that it was so earned by sale of those goods which were manufactured in the industrial undertaking as a part of the main and day-to-day business activity. The Madhya Pradesh High Court therefore held that the sale of gunny bags did not have a direct or immediate nexus with the industrial undertaking. While placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Sterling Foods, 237 ITR 579, the Madhya Pradesh High Court expressed its disagreement with the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Fenner (India) Ltd., noting that the Madras High Court decision did not take into consideration any decision of the Supreme Court.

3.8 The Madhya Pradesh High Court therefore held that the profit on sale of gunny bags was not part of the profits derived from the industrial undertaking eligible for deduction u/s.80HH/80I.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is significant to note that the nature of scrap dealt with by the Madras High Court was quite different from the scrap dealt with by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The Madras High Court was dealing with a situation where the scrap arose directly out of the manufacturing process, and was an incidental part (though insignificant in value) of the very manufacturing process itself. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, on the other hand, was dealing with a case where the scrap was incidental to the acquisition of raw materials (being packed in gunny bags) or to the packing of manufactured goods. The scrap was therefore not a direct outcome of the manufacturing process, but was incidental to activities associated with the manufacture of the goods. Therefore, on facts, it is possible to distinguish between the nature of the scrap resulting in two different views being taken by the High Courts.

4.2 On a broader level, however, the question that arises is whether the business of an industrial undertaking encompasses only the manufacturing process simpliciter or covers the entire business of manufacture. Can the business of manufacture be said to commence only when the raw material is subjected to the physical process of manufacture, or does it also cover the incidental processes of preparation for manufacture, finishing and ‘Packing? If one takes a view that the business of manufacture involves all these steps as well, then the waste gunny bags clearly arise directly out of the business of manufacture, and should be regarded as the profits of the industrial undertaking.

4.3 The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandian Chemicals (supra) is clearly distinguishable, as it related to interest on electricity deposit, which as the Supreme Court noted:

“Although electricity may be required for the purposes of the industrial undertaking, the deposit required for its supply is a step removed from the business of the industrial undertaking.”

Similarly, the case of Sterling Foods (supra) involved sale of import entitlements, which process was not part of the manufacturing business at all.

4.4 Viewed in this manner, it appears that the Madhya Pradesh High Court took too technical a view of the matter in holding that the waste gunny bags did not arise out of the manufacturing process. It ought to have considered that any income arising from a process which was directly associated with the business of manufacture, and not only the sale of the finished products, was profits derived from the industrial undertaking. Therefore, the view taken by the Madras High Court that sale of scrap forms part of the profits derived from the industrial undertaking, seems to be the better view of the matter.

Transfer pricing: A. Y. 2006-07: The Assessing officer cannot substitute the method of ‘cost plus mark up’ with the method of ‘cost plus mark up on FOB’ value of exports without establishing that assessee bear significant risks or AEs would enjoy geographical benefits

46. Transfer pricing: A. Y. 2006-07: The Assessing officer cannot substitute the method of ‘cost plus mark up’ with the method of ‘cost plus mark up on FOB’ value of exports without establishing that assessee bear significant risks or AEs would enjoy geographical benefits:

Li and Fung India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2013] 40 taxmann.com 300 (Delhi):

The assessee, ‘LFIL’, entered into an agreement with its associate enterprise (‘AE’) for rendering sourcing support services for the supply of high volume, time sensitive consumer goods, for which it was remunerated at cost plus mark-up of 5 %.; During the course of Transfer Pricing assessment, the assessee contended that such a transaction was at Arm’s Length Price (‘ALP’) on an application of the TNM method. The Transfer Pricing Officer (‘TPO’) observed that assessee was performing all critical functions, had assumed significant risks and it had used both tangible and unique intangibles developed by it over a period of time, which had given an advantage to the AE in form of low cost of product, quality and had enhanced the profitability of AE. Thus, it held that the compensation of cost plus mark up of 5 % was not at ALP and applied a mark-up of 5 % on the FOB value of exports made by the Indian manufacturer to overseas third party customers. Therefore, the Assessing Officer made addition on the basis of order passed by TPO, which was further affirmed by the Tribunal

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The impugned order had not shown how and to what extent assessee bore significant risks, or that the AE enjoyed such location advantages, so as to justify rejection of the Transfer pricing exercise undertaken by assessee.

ii)    Tax authorities should base their conclusions on specific facts, and not on vague generalities, such as ‘significant risk’, ‘functional risk’, ‘enterprise risk’, etc., without any material on record to establish such findings. If such findings are warranted, they should be supported by demonstrable reasons, based on facts and the relative evaluation of their weight and significance.

iii)    Where all elements of a proper TNMM are detailed and disclosed in the assessee’s reports, care should be taken by the tax administrators and authorities to analyse them in details and then proceed to record reasons why some or all of them are unacceptable;?

iv)    The impugned order, upholding the determination of certain margin over the FOB value of the AE’s contract, was an error in law. Therefore, the TPO’s addition of the cost plus 5 % markup on the FOB value of exports was without foundation and was to be deleted.”

Educational Institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad): A. Ys. 2000-01 to 2005-06: The assessee society running 25 educational institutions claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) in respect of institutions satisfying the conditions: Denial of exemption on the ground that the aggregate receipts of all institutions exceeded limit of Rs. 1 crore: Denial of exemption not proper: Assessee entitled to exemption:

35. Educational Institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad): A. Ys. 2000-01 to 2005-06: The assessee society running 25 educational institutions claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) in respect of institutions satisfying the conditions: Denial of exemption on the ground that the aggregate receipts of all institutions exceeded limit of Rs. 1 crore: Denial of exemption not proper: Assessee entitled to exemption:

CIT vs. Childrens Education Society; 358 ITR 373 (Karn):

The assessee society was running around 25 educational institutions. In the relevant assessment years the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the educational institutions which satisfied the relevant conditions. The Assessing Officer denied exemption on the ground that the aggregate of the receipts of all the institutions run by the assessee was more than Rs. 1 crore which is the condition prescribed u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the assessee was entitled to exemption us. 10(23C)(iiiad) for each of the institutions the annual receipts of which were less than Rs. 1 crore.  

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was correct in holding that the exemption in terms of the provisions of section 10(23C)(iiiad) was available to the assessee as annual receipt of each of the institutions of the assessee was less than the prescribed limit under the provision.”

Turnover and value of stock adopted by Sales Tax Authorities is binding on Income-tax Authorities: Addition merely on basis of statement of third parties is not proper:

20. Assessment:  A.  Y.  1998-99  to  2002-03:

Turnover and value of stock adopted by Sales Tax Authorities is binding on Income-tax Authorities: Addition merely on basis of statement of third parties is not proper:

CIT vs. Smt. Sakuntala Devi Khetan: 352 ITR 484 (Mad):

The assessee was a trader in turmeric. For the relevant assessment years the Assessing Officer made additions on the basis statement of third parties. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the figures of turnover finally assessed by the Sales Tax Authorities and apply the GP rate accordingly.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised before the Madras High Court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the turnover and profit of the assessee for the assessment year under consideration could not be computed in the reassessment on the basis of information received in the course of search conducted in certain cases on the sole ground that the Sales Tax Authorities have accepted the assessee’s purchases, sales and closing stock?”

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Unless and until the competent authority under the Sales Tax Act differs or varies with the closing stock of the assessee, the return accepted by the Commercial Tax Department is binding on the Income -tax Authorities and the Assessing Officer has no power to scrutinise the return submitted by the assessee to the Commercial Tax Department and accepted by the Authorities. The Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to go beyond the value of the closing stock declared by the assessee and accepted by the Commercial Tax Department.

ii)    The assessee had placed the sales tax returns before the Assessing Officer in respect of the A. Ys. 1998-99 to 2001-02. Therefore, sufficient materials were placed before the Assessing Officer in respect of those assessment years and accepted by the Authorities.

iii)    The Tribunal rightly found that the Department could not have made the addition merely on the basis of the statement of third parties and, consequently, set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the figures of turnover finally assessed by the sales tax authorities and apply the gross profit rate accordingly.”

Sum Payable — s. 43B

Controversies

Issue for consideration :


S. 43B of the Income-tax Act
provides that deductions otherwise allowable in respect of certain sums payable
shall be allowed only in the previous year in which such sums are actually paid,
irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was
incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly
employed by him.

All the clauses of S. 43B
(other than clause c) start with the term ‘any sum payable’. The meaning of the
term ‘any sum payable’ has been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. Some Courts held that no disallowance could take place u/s.43B
where the liability towards the expenditure had arisen but time for payment was
not due. As against this few Courts had held that the deduction for an
expenditure of the specified nature would be allowed only on actual payment of
dues. In order to avoid any further conflict, an amendment has been made vide
the Finance Act, 1989 with retrospective effect form 1-4-1984 by insertion of an
Explanation 2 to provide for the meaning of the said term ‘any sum payable. The
scope of the Explanation however is restricted to clause (a) of S. 43B. Clause
(a) of S. 43B deals with tax, duty, cess or fee and this clause when read with
the Explanation 2 means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the
previous year even though such sum might not have been payable within that year
under the relevant law.

The meaning of the term ‘any
sum payable’ has as noted been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. The issue which has arisen has been whether such term includes
amounts in respect of liability which has accrued but is not due for payment.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the context of clause (a) prior to the
insertion of Explanation 2, held that the term means only such items which have
become due for payment, and not items which have accrued but not become due for
payment and therefore no disallowance prior to the insertion of the Explanation
2 was possible for claims of expenditure which were due but not payable. On the
other hand, the Delhi High Court, in the context of clause (d) relating to
interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions, has recently held
that the term includes all amounts in respect of which liability has been
incurred, irrespective of whether such amounts are due for payment or not and
accordingly, the claim for allowance of an expenditure would not be allowed
unless it was actually paid.

Srikakollu Subba Rao’s
case :


The issue first came up
before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Rao & Co. v.
Union of India,
173 ITR 708.

In this case, the assessee
had challenged the provisions of S. 43B, which had been then recently introduced
with effect from A.Y. 1984-85. Besides challenging the Constitutional validity
of the provisions, the assessee contended that the provisions did not apply to
sales tax. It was further argued that the liability to pay sales tax for the
month of March 1984, which had been disallowed u/s.43B, could not have been so
disallowed.

On behalf of the assessee,
it was pointed out that under the Andhra Pradesh sales tax rules, such tax was
to be paid by the 25th day of the succeeding month. It was urged that where the
statute itself prescribes the date of payment, no exception could be taken,
acting u/s.43B, that the amount was not paid, rendering a justification for its
disallowance. It was urged that S. 43B can have no application to cases where
the statutory liability which was incurred in the accounting year is also not
payable, according to the statute, in the same accounting year.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court, while accepting these contentions observed that according to it, not only
should the liability to pay the tax be incurred in the accounting year, but the
amount should also be statutory ‘payable’ in the accounting year. According to
the High Court,
S. 43B itself was clear to that extent — it referred to the ‘sum payable’. The
Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that if the Legislature intended, it should
have so provided that any sum for the payment of which liability was incurred by
the assessee would not be allowed unless such sum was actually paid.

Further, keeping in mind the
object for which S. 43B was enacted, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that it
was difficult to subscribe to the view that a routine application of that
provision was called for in cases where the taxes and duties for the payment of
which liability was incurred in the accounting year were not statutorily payable
in that accounting year. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court noted the
subsequent amendment permitting the deduction of taxes and duties paid before
the due date of filing of the income tax return as evidence that taxes and
duties not statutorily payable during the accounting year did not fall to be
disallowed u/s.43B.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court therefore held that the term ‘sum payable’ meant not only cases where the
liability was incurred, but which were also actually payable within the year.
Accordingly, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that S. 43B did not apply to the
amounts not due for payment within the year.

Triveni Engineering’s case :


The issue again recently
came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Triveni Engineering &
Industries Ltd. v. CIT,
320 ITR 430.

In this case pertaining to
A.Y. 1991-92, the assessee had taken a loan from Industrial Finance Corporation
of India (‘IFCI’). As per the terms of the loan, the repayment of the loan along
with interest thereon was to be made in five yearly instalments payable from
November 1996 to November 2000. The assessee provided for the interest accrued
on the loan till the end of the previous year ended 31st March 1991. The
assessing officer disallowed such interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the disallowance of interest and further held that the claim of
interest was not allowable in terms of S. 43B(d).

Before the Delhi High Court, the assessee claimed that it was entitled to claim interest because interest accrues daily and it accrued as per the mercantile system of accounting adopted by the assessee with respect to the loan obtained by it from IFCI.

The Delhi High Court observed that merely because the interest was debited in the books of account maintained on a Mercantile basis could not mean that the interest had become due and accrued, because admittedly the interest liability would not become due during the relevant previous year but only in November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, interest could not be said to have ac-crued to become due and payable in the relevant previous year. The Delhi High Court observed that the stand of the assessee was incongruous because on the one hand it claimed that interest became due and accrued in the relevant previous year, however, in the same breath it admitted that the same would be due and payable only with effect from November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, the concept of debiting the books maintained on the mercantile basis was on the principle that the payment had become due and payable and, since it had become payable, it was therefore debited in the books of account. According to the Court, admittedly the interest was not due and payable from the relevant previous year.

The Delhi High Court observed that S. 43B directly and categorically disentitled the assessee from claiming benefit of interest deduction with respect to interest due and payable to financial institution till the interest was actually paid. According to the Delhi High Court, S. 43B made it abundantly clear that interest can only be allowed when it was actually paid and not merely because it was due as per the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. The Delhi High Court was of the view that any other interpretation that the interest should be allowed even when not actually paid would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court felt that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that where the amount was not due for payment before the end of the relevant previous year such amount, though having accrued, could not be disallowed u/s.43B, could not be accepted by it, as it would negate the intention of existence of S. 43B and would render otiose the expression ‘actually paid’ occurring in S. 43B. In view of the categorical language used in S. 43B(d), the Delhi High Court was of the view that it need not refer to the other subsections and exceptions of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court therefore upheld the disallowance of interest accrued but not due under the provisions of S. 43B.

Observations:

Subsequent to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Subba Rao, Explanation 2 to S. 43B was inserted by the Finance Act 1989 with retrospective effect from 1 April 1984. This explanation, clarifies that ‘any sum payable’ would include sums which were not payable within the year under the relevant law, and therefore to that extent nullifies the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is however relevant to note that the scope of the said explanation, is restricted in it’s application only to clause (a) of S. 43B, i.e., to any sum payable by way of tax, duty, cess or fee. It is consciously not extended to other clauses of S. 43B, though the language used in those clauses is also identical. At the time when Explanation 2 was inserted, S. 43B already contained clauses(b)    and (d) as well, which also used the term ‘any sum payable’. It therefore appears that the conscious intention was to make the expression applicable specifically and only to clause (a) and not to any other clauses of S. 43B. Even when clauses (e) and (f) were inserted in S. 43B, Explanation 2 was not amended to cover these clauses.

The view taken by the Delhi High Court, that allowing the claim for expenditure without actual payment of interest accrued but not due would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B and render it otiose, also does not seem to be justified. When S. 43B was inserted, the purpose for insertion of S. 43B was explained by the Honourable Finance Minister in his budget speech of 1983-84 as under:

“Several cases have come to notice where tax-payers do not discharge their statutory liability such as in respect of excise duty, employer’s contribution to provident fund, Employees State Insurance Scheme, for long periods of time. For the purposes of their income-tax assessments, they nonetheless claim the liability as deduction even as they take resort to legal action, thus depriving the Government of its dues while enjoying the benefit of non-payment. To curb such practices, I propose to provide that irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the taxpayer, a statutory liability will be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable profits only in the year and to the extent it is actually paid.”

A similar reasoning has been given in the explanatory memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 1983. The intention therefore seems to have been to cover cases of non-payment over long periods of time, and not amounts which are not due for payment. S. 43B would continue to apply to such sums which have become due for payment, but have not yet been paid.

Further support for the fact that amounts not due for payment were not intended to be covered by S. 43B can be gauged from the first proviso to S. 43B, which excludes amounts paid before the due date of the filing of the return of income from the applicability of S. 43B.

The better view of the matter therefore seems to be the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that the meaning of the term ‘any sum payable’ does not include amounts not due for payment, other than taxes, duties, cesses or fees covered by clause (a).

Waiver of interest

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration


1.1 Any amount of tax, specified as payable in a notice of
demand u/s.156, is required to be paid within 30 days of the service of notice
as mandated by S. 220(1) of the Income-tax Act.

1.2 The assessee is liable to pay simple interest @ 1% for
every month or part thereof, for default in payment of the amount of tax
referred to in para 1.1 above, as per S. 220(2) of the Act. The interest levied
u/s.220(2) is to be reduced and the excess interest paid is to be refunded in
cases where the unpaid tax on which interest was levied itself is reduced on
account of orders u/s.154, u/s.155, u/s.245D, u/s. 250, u/s.254, u/s.260A,
u/s.262 and u/s.264.

1.3 A provision has been made for reduction or waiver of the
interest levied or leviable u/s.220(2) by insertion of S. 220(2A) w.e.f.
1-10-1994 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment ) Act, 1984 where-under the CBDT and
now the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is empowered to reduce or waive the
interest u/s.220(2) on satisfaction of the conditions specified therein.

1.4 The said S. 220(2A) reads as under :

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss.(2), the Chief
Commissioner or Commissioner may reduce or waive the amount of interest paid
or payable by the assessee under the said sub-section if he is satisfied
that :

(i) payment of such amount has caused or would cause
genuine hardship to the assessee;

(ii) default in the payment of the amount on which
interest has been paid or was payable under the said sub-section was due to
the circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and

(iii) the assessee has co-operated in any inquiry
relating to the assessment or any proceeding for the recovery of any amount
due from him.”


1.5 In the context of S. 220(2A), the issue that has come up
for consideration of the Courts, repetitively, is, whether an assessee is
obliged to satisfy all the three conditions laid down in S. 220(2A) for
reduction or waiver of interest or that compliance of any one or two of them
will enable the assessee to seek reduction or waiver of interest. In short, the
issue that is for consideration is whether the compliance of three conditions
specified in S. 220(2A) is cumulative or alternative. Recently, the Karnataka
High Court dissenting from the view of the Kerala, Allahabad and Madras High
Courts held that cumulative compliance of the three conditions is not required
for being eligible for reduction or waiver of interest u/s.220(2A) of the Act.

2. Ramapati Singhania’s case :


2.1 In the case of Ramapati Singhania, 234 ITR 655 (All), the
assessee’s application, made u/s.220(2A), for waiver of interest was rejected
for non-compliance of some of the conditions of the said Section. In the writ
petition filed by the assessee, he inter alia pleaded before the High
Court that for the purposes of seeking a waiver u/s.220(2A) it was not necessary
for him to have complied with all the conditions of the said Section and that he
was eligible for the requested waiver even in circumstances where some of the
conditions of the said Section stood complied with. It was emphasised that
payment of tax on capital gains without permitting the set-off of the amount to
which the petitioner was entitled u/s.50B of the Estate Duty Act, caused genuine
hardship to the assessee and thus the petitioner was justified in not making the
payment of taxes in time.

2.2 The Allahabad High Court observed that to avail of the
benefit, it was for the person seeking the relief to make out a case that the
requirements of those provisions were fulfilled and that on a plain reading of
that provision, it was evident that all the three conditions set out therein
must be satisfied cumulatively and if any of these requirements were wanting in
a given case, the discretion to reduce or waive, might be legitimately refused.

2.3 The Court accordingly upheld the action of the
authorities in denying the waiver of interest charged for delayed payment of
taxes.

3. M. V. Amar Shetty’s case :


3.1 In M. V. Amar Shetty v. CCIT & Anr., 219 CTR 141 (Karn.),
the assessee filed a writ petition being aggrieved by an order dated 21st August
2007 passed by the Chief CIT rejecting his request u/s. 220(2A) of the
Income-tax Act seeking reduction on waiver of the interest payable on the
delayed payment of tax demanded pursuant to a notice issued u/s.156 of the Act
and for defaulting in payment of tax. The petition was rejected by the Single
Judge of the Court, against which an appeal was filed by the assessee before the
Division Bench of the Court.

3.2 It was pleaded for the assessee that the impugned order
passed by the CCIT had been passed in violation of the provisions of S. 220(2A)
of the Act and was passed without an application of mind to the conditions
mentioned under the sub-section and that the request made by the petitioner had
been rejected in an arbitrary manner. It was inter alia submitted that
the finding that the petitioner had not satisfied condition (c) for waiver of
interest charged u/s.220(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by not co-operating
with the Department by filing returns or in the assessment proceedings/payment
of tax demand was not correct and it was also submitted that the CCIT had taken
into consideration the report of the AO, which was not made known to the
assessee and therefore, the order impugned was bad on that ground also.

3.3 For the CCIT, it was submitted that the order passed was
just and proper and did not call for any interference by the Court in the appeal
and that the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition.
Reliance was placed upon two judgments in the cases of G.T.N. Textiles Ltd.
v. DCIT & Anr.,
217 ITR 653 (Ker.) and Ramapati Singhania v. CIT & Ors.,
234 ITR 655 (All.) to submit that all the three conditions laid down in S.
220(2A) should have been satisfied before interest could be waived under the
said provision and that in the instant case the CCIT had categorically held that
condition (iii) of S. 220(2A) had not been fulfilled and therefore, the assessee
was not entitled to relief under the said provisions.

3.4 The Court on consideration of the submissions made by both the sides, was not persuaded to accept the submission made on behalf of the CCIT that, all the three conditions laid down in Ss.(2A) of S. 220 should be satisfied before relief could be given to an assessee under the said provision, as was enunciated in the two judgments referred to above and cited before the Court. The Karnataka High Court accordingly directed for due consideration of the assessee’s request for waiver of interest.

4.  Observations:

4.1 S. 220(2A), begins with a non obstante clause and is a self-contained provision. It overrides the charging provision as contained in S. 220(2). At the same time the said provision restricts the power of the authority concerned to reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable by an assessee only on satisfaction of the conditions set out in the three causes of S. 220(2A). For claiming relief u/ s. 220(2A), the assessee has to satisfy the three conditions, namely, (i) he has to show that the payment of the amount has caused or would cause genuine hardship to him, (ii) that the default in payment of the amount of tax on which interest has been paid or was payable was due to circumstances beyond his control, and (iii) further that he had co-operated in the enquiry relating to the assessment or any proceeding for recovery of any amount due from him.

4.2 In G.T.N. Textiles Ltd., 217 ITR 653 (Ker.), the assessee had filed an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge, 199 ITR 347, who had dismissed the original petition challenging the rejection of the application for waiver of interest levied u/ s. 220(2) of the Act. The Court in that case held that the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A) of the Act. The Commissioner in the said case had found that one of the necessary conditions for exercising the power u/ s. 220(2A) that the payment of interest has caused or would cause genuine hardship to the assessee was not satisfied in the case of the petitioner who was earning very good income from its business. On the facts of the case, the Kerala High Court upheld the order of the Single Judge.

4.3 In the case of Eminent Enterprises v. CIT, 236 ITR 883 (Ker.), the Kerala High Court again held that even where the first condition was most satisfied, the assessee could not avail waiver of interest.

4.4 Again in the case of Metallurgical & Engineering Consultants (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 243 ITR 547, (Pat.) the Court held that all the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A). Where the Commissioner had found that the first condition was not satisfied on the basis of certain facts, and had refused to waive interest u/ s.220(2), there was no scope for the High Court to interfere with such a discretionary order.

4.5 Lately, the Madras High Court in the case of Auro Foods Ltd., 239 ITR 548, held that an assessee for the purposes of waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A) has to satisfy all the three conditions and that non-compliance of anyone of them may expose his petition to rejection by the authorities.

4.6 On a plain reading of S. 220(2A), it is evident that all the three conditions set out therein are to be satisfied cumulatively for seeking a valid relief. Where any of the requirements has not been fulfilled the discretion to reduce or waive may be legitimately refused. Thus satisfaction of one or more but not all conditions may not make an assessee eligible for reduction or the waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A). This is the way the Courts have interpreted the law with the exception of the Karnataka High Court.

4.7 The order of the Karnataka High Court provides for fresh thinking on an almost settled position in law. The Court perhaps has been impressed by the important fact that the provision of S. 220(2A) has been inserted for granting relief to an assessee in circumstances which are found to be judicious by the Court and in a case where the Court finds the case of the assessee to be so judicious, the relief should not be denied on the ground of numerical non-compliance, but instead be granted in a deserving case.

Interest income and mutuality

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 Income of certain associations of persons is exempt on the doctrine of mutuality. The common examples of these associations are clubs, societies, trade professional and mutual benefit associations, where the contributors to the fund and the recipients or beneficiaries of the fund are the same persons or class of persons. In other words, such persons are contributing to the common fund for their common good.

    1.2 Receipt of subscription from members to the common fund is exempt on the grounds of mutuality, as in such cases, the contributors and the beneficiaries are the same persons or the same class of persons, and on the same principles, the receipt by the members on distribution is exempt from tax. The difficulty however arises often in cases where the funds are invested for earning interest income; whether such income also qualifies for exemption, on the grounds of mutuality in the hands of the association. The issue gets further complicated if the interest income is earned from investments made with members.

    1.3 For quite some time it was believed that the issue has been settled in favour of non-taxation, as was discussed in the BCAJ in the past. The issue however has reemerged and it appears that the courts presently are divided on this issue under consideration, which fact has made us take note of the same and examine the aspect afresh to ascertain whether the view canvassed in the past requires a reconsideration. While the Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Delhi High Courts have taken the view in a few cases that such interest income is exempt on the grounds of mutuality, the Karnataka, Madras and Gujarat High Courts seem to have taken a contrary view in other cases.

2. Canara Bank Golden Jubilee Staff Welfare Fund’s case :

    2.1 The issue recently came up before the Karnataka High Court in the case of Canara Bank Golden Jubilee Staff Welfare Fund v. Dy. CIT, 308 ITR 202 (Kar.).

    2.2 In this case, the assessee was a society consisting of employees of Canara Bank, established with the object of promoting welfare amongst members who contributed towards the corpus fund. The welfare fund was utilised for advancing loans to members, on which it received interest, which constituted the major portion of its revenue. Surplus funds were kept with the bank, on which interest also was earned. The assessee also earned dividend income on shares.

    2.3 The assessee filed the return of income claiming exemption on the principle of mutuality. The assessment was completed u/s.143(1)(a). Subsequently the income was reassessed, bringing to tax the interest income on investments and dividend income on shares. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeals of the assessee. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee’s appeals.

    2.4 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee it was argued that the Society was established for mutual benefit of its members, and funds of the Society, consisting of contribution from the members, were used for advancing loans to members and collecting interest from the members. As such, it was claimed that the income was exempt from tax on the principle of mutuality. It was further claimed that the funds collected by the appellant were used to provide monetary assistance to members, and, as a matter of precaution, the surplus funds were kept in the bank, not with the primary object of earning interest, but to keep such funds in safe custody. Further, such interest earned had been used only for the ultimate benefit of members. It was claimed that while applying the principle of mutuality, it was the source of the deposit that had to be taken into consideration and not the manner in which the funds were applied. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Chelmsford Club v. CIT, 243 ITR 89 and the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in the case of CIT v. Natraj Finance Corporation, 169 ITR 732.

    2.5 On behalf of the Department, reliance was placed on the earlier Karnataka High Court decision in the case of CIT v. ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund, 234 ITR 308, in which case the High Court had taken the view that such interest income was taxable, to contend that the income in question was taxable.

    2.6 The Karnataka High Court, while discussing the principle of mutuality, observed that the following three conditions should exist before an activity could be brought under the concept of mutuality; that no person can earn from himself, that there is no profit motivation, and that there is no sharing of profits. It noted that the source of funds in the case before it was only from the members of the assessee and that the assessee had not received any donations or other monetary grants from any outside source, apart from the members during the relevant years. It was therefore the member’s contribution which had become the corpus fund which was utilised to advance loans to members and invested, from which the interest and dividend has arisen.

    2.7 The Karnataka High Court noted that the funds of the assessee had been invested in the term deposit with the bank which was not a member of the assessee’s welfare fund, and interest had been earned on such investment. Though the bank formed a third-party vis-à-vis the assessee, it could not be said that the identity between the contributors and the recipients was lost in such a case. The High Court observed that in ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund’s case (supra), the ingredients of mutuality were missing as, apart from contributions made by members, there were other sources of funding of the trust fund, including contributions made by the ITI management and donations. Further, in that case, the object of the trust was to invest the funds of the trust in banks and securities for earning interest to discharge the liabilities and obligations created under the trust.

    2.8 Taking into consideration the objects of the assessee, the source of funds during the relevant years and the applicability of the funds for the benefit of its members, and keeping in mind the interest on investments and dividend earned on shares was only a small portion of the total earned by investment of the surplus funds wholly contributed by the members of the assessee, the Karnataka High Court held that the interest earned on investment and dividend received on shares was deemed income from the property of the assessee contributed by its members, and was governed by the principle of mutuality and was therefore exempt.

2.9 The Court noted with approval a similar view which had been taken earlier by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Natraj Finance Corporation, 169 ITR 733. In that case, the assessee was a firm which lent money to its partners, and during the relevant years, received income on out-standing dues from a former partner and on amounts deposited in a savings account with a bank. The Court held that such interest, considering the quantum of such interest in relation to the total income, was also exempt on the grounds of mutuality, as it could not be said that the assessee was carrying on business in order to derive such a small amount of income.

2.10 The Court also noted that the Delhi High Court also, in the case of DIT(E) v. All India Oriental Bank of Commerce Welfare Society, 130 Taxman 575, has held that the principle of mutuality applies to interest income derived by a co-operative society from deposits made out of contributions made by members of the society. In taking this view, the Delhi High Court took a cue from the decision of the Supreme Court in Chelmsford Club v. CIT, 243 ITR 89, where the Supreme Court had laid down the principle that where a number of persons combine together to a common fund for financing of some venture or object and in this respect have no dealings or relations with any outside body, then any surplus generated cannot in any sense be regarded as profits chargeable to tax.

3. Madras  Gymkhana Club’s  case:

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Madras High Court in the case of Madras Gymkhana Club v. Dy. CIT, 183 Taxman 333.

3.2 The assessee in this case was a sports club providing various facilities to its members, such as restaurant, gymnasium, library, bar, coffee shop and swimming pool. Apart from the surplus funds derived from such activities, it also received interest income from its corporate members on the investment of surplus funds as fixed deposits with them. It claimed that such interest income was covered by the concept of mutuality and was therefore exempt from tax.

3.3 In the course of reassessment proceedings, the income from investment was subjected to tax along with certain other interest income. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rejected the appeals of the assessee.

3.4 Before the Madras High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the interest earned by the club out of fixed deposits and other investments made with its own institutional members was covered by the principle of mutuality. On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the interest on such investments could not be brought within the concept of mutuality as such investments were in the regular course of business of such club and had no nexus with either membership or regular activities of the club.

3.5 The Madras High Court noted that it had held in an earlier case in Wankaner fain Social Welfare Society v. CIT, 260 ITR 241, that to satisfy the concept of mutuality, the identity was required to be established in relation to the relevant income as regards those contributing to the income and those participating in the distribution of that income. According to the Madras High Court, surplus funds deposited with a member bank enured to the benefit of that member alone, who was in a position to utilise the deposit in any manner it liked, thereby depriving other members of enjoyment of such benefit, which did not satisfy the test of identity of the contributors and the participants. Though the distribution of interest was to all members, there was no identity between the contributors and the participants, inasmuch as the distribution of interest was made both to members with whom funds were deposited and to those with whom funds were not deposited, while the interest was earned only from members with whom funds were deposited.

3.6 The Madras High Court also noted that the club had received donations and gifts as well as sponsorship for programmes and activities, and advertisements. According to the Madras High Court, on a reading of the objects of the club and the provisions for making the investments, the position which emerged was that the investment of surplus funds had nothing to do with the objects of the club. It also noted that substantial amounts had been earned by way of interest from such investment of surplus funds, and that there were no plans for immediate utilisation of such funds.

3.7 The Madras High Court, following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Bangalore Club, 287 ITR 263, held that the interest earned on investment of surplus funds, being substantial, could not be held to satisfy the mutuality concept and was therefore taxable.

3.8 A similar view had been taken earlier by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Bangalore Club (supra), where the Karnataka High Court had held that interest on surplus funds placed by the club in fixed deposits with member banks was not exempt on the ground of mutuality. The Court noted that the Karnataka High Court had also earlier in the case of ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund (supra) held that interest on investments earned by the fund was not exempt on the grounds of mutuality and so also the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. v. CIT, 171 ITR 504, has held that in the case of a club whose object was to promote the game of cricket and other games and sports, which derived income from investments of surplus funds, the income from interest was not from mutual activity and was therefore liable to tax.

4. Observations:

4.1 When one analyses the decisions on the subject, one notices that the difference of opinion between the Courts hinges on the answers to the following questions:

Firstly, for application of the doctrine of mutuality, in order to claim exemption on the ground of mutuality, is it sufficient that an income arise out of an investment of surplus generated from members, or is it necessary that such income should also arise from members only?

Secondly, does the activity of investment with non-members amount to a separate activity, distinct from the main activity of the entity and therefore not covered by mutuality? Is it not sufficient that the funds invested are out of the surplus of the members and the income received on investment is also for the benefit of the members?

Thirdly, is the object for which funds are invested relevant, is it necessary that the investment income should arise out of the main activity in order for the income to qualify for mutuality?

4.2 The Supreme Court in CIT v. Bankipur Club Ltd., 226 ITR 97, held that a host of factors, not one single factor, have to be considered to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the principle of mutuality applies in a given case or not, and further observed that whether or not the persons dealing with each other are a mutual club or not and whether such persons are carrying on a trading activity or an adventure in the nature of trade is largely a question of fact.

4.3 In the case of Chelmsford Club (supra), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the annual letting value. of the clubhouse of the Chelmsford Club, which provided recreational and refreshment facilities exclusively to its members and their guests, was liable to income-tax. In that case, certain observations of the Supreme Court indicate that the principle of mutuality has to be considered qua the business or the object thereof. However, one must keep in mind the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, where there was no actual income arising other than out of the activity of the club, and therefore the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider whether the principle of mutuality should be applied to certain incomes separately.

4.4 In the case of Bankipur Club (supra), the Su-preme Court cited from the Halsbury’s Laws of England as under:

“Where a number of persons combine together and contribute to a common fund for the financing of some venture or object and will in this respect have no dealings or relations with any outside body, then any surplus returned to those persons cannot be regarded in any sense as profit. There must be complete identity between the contributors and the participators. If these requirements are fulfilled, it is immaterial what particular form the association takes. Trading between persons associating together in this way does not give rise to profits which are chargeable to tax.

Where the trade or activity is mutual, the fact that, as regards certain activities, only certain members of the association take advantage of the facilities which it offers does not affect the mutuality of the enterprise.

Members’ clubs are an example of a mutual undertaking; but, where a club extends facilities to non-members, to that extent the element of mutuality is wanting …. “.

The Supreme Court in that case  also cited from Simon’s Taxes as under:

…. it is settled law that if the persons carrying on a trade do so in such a way that they and the customers are the same persons, no profits or gains are yielded by the trade for tax purposes and therefore, no assessment in respect of the trade can be made. Any surplus resulting from this form of trading represents only the extent to
which the contributions of the participators have proved to be in excess of requirements. Such a surplus is regarded as their own money and returnable to them. In order that this exempting element of mutuality should exist, it is essential that the profits should be capable of coming back at some time and in some form to the persons to whom the goods were sold or the services rendered …. “

4.5 In the above referred Bankipur Club’s case, the Court was concerned with the clubs’ entitlement to exemption for (i) the receipts or surplus arising from the sales of drinks, refreshments, etc., (ii) amounts received by way of rent for letting out the buildings, and (iii) amounts received by way of admission fees, periodical subscriptions and receipts of similar nature, from its members and guests. The Supreme Court noted that the amounts received by the clubs for supply of drinks, refreshments or other goods as also the letting out of building for rent or the amounts received by way of admission fees, periodical subscription, etc. from the members of the clubs were only for/towards charges for the privileges, conveniences and amenities provided to the members, which they were entitled to as per the rules and regulations of the respective clubs. It also noted that different clubs realised various sums on the above counts only to afford to their members the usual privileges, advantages, conveniences and accommodation. In other words, the services offered on the above counts were not with any profit motive, and were not tainted with commerciality. The facilities were offered only as a matter of convenience for the use of members (and their friends, if any, availing of the facilities occasionally). On that reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the excess-surplus arising from the mutual arrangement, including amounts received from guests (though third parties), was exempt on the grounds of mutuality. Incidentally, one of the assessees in this case was Cawnpore Club, where the income that was sought to be assessed was derived from property let out and also interest received from ED.R., N.s.C., etc. The Supreme Court delinked that case and did not decide it, directing it to be put up for a separate hearing.

4.6 In the case of Chelmsford Club (supra), the Supreme Court observed :

“It is clear that it is not only the surplus from the activities of the business of the club that is excluded from the levy of income-tax, even the annual value of the club-house, as contemplated in S. 22 of the Act, will be outside the purview of the levy of income-tax.”

” …. we are of the view that the business of the appellant is governed by the principle of mutuality – even the deemed income from its property is governed by the said principle of mutuality.”

4.7 From the foregoing, relying on the views of the the Courts and the commentaries on taxation, the emerging view is that the surplus from the activity of mutual benefit association of any form is exempt from taxation and such exemption is not restricted to some specific incomes.

4.8 An incidental  question  that may as well be addressed is whether the activity of investment is an integral part of the object of the mutual benefit association or is an independent activity which aspect would depend upon the facts of each case. Various factors as follows may be helpful in examining this aspect: (i) Whether the investment is a mere temporary deployment of surplus funds, or of a long-term nature? (ii) Whether the intention behind making the investment is merely to see that the funds are not kept idle, but deployed till such time as required? (iii) Is the quantum of investment income small as compared to members’ contributions ? (iv) Whether the surplus has been built up only out of member contributions? Generally, if the investment income is small in relation to member contributions and the investment is primarily with a view to deploy unutilised funds, the investment activity cannot be regarded as an activity independent of the object of the association, and would be part of the surplus qualifying for exemption.

4.9 The rigours surely will be easy when investment is made with the members of the association. However here also, difference might be carved out between an investment made as an investor and the one made in the normal course.

4.10 The rigours will also be eased in cases where an investment of the association’s funds has been made pending the use of surplus funds on activi-ties of the association.

4.11 With utmost respect for the Madras High Court, the insistence on commonality between the contributors and the beneficiaries in case of investments, seems to be misplaced. The test of commonality is required to be satisfied w.r.t. the members’ contributions, and not w.r.t. the interest income arisng out of deployment of such members’ contributions. It is also helpful that the interest income that arises out of the deployment of surplus funds of members is earned for the members’ benefit, who surely are the participants on distribution of such an income.

4.12 An important principle of mutuality is that the members receive back that which was their own. The fact that in the meanwhile the funds belonging to them were deployed would not materially alter the applicability of the principle where the income remains, in reality, the income of the members.

4.13 The issue however continues to be contentious as is evident from the conflicting decisions of the Courts including the decision in the case of Rajpath Club Ltd., 211 ITR 379 (Guj.), Gulmarg Association & Anr., 90 TTJ 184 (Ahd.) and Sagar Sanjog CHS Ltd. ITA No. 1972, 1973 and 1974/Mum./2005.

4.14 The better view in the meanwhile seems to be that interest income of a mutual benefit association earned on its investments is exempt from tax under the doctrine of mutuality and the case for its exemption is stronger where the deployment of funds is merely a part of and incidental to the object of the association.

Quantum of Exclusion of Export Profit From Book Profit— MAT

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 U/s.115JB, Minimum
Alternative Tax (MAT) is payable by a company, if the Income-tax payable on the
total income as computed under the Income-tax Act (the Act) in respect of any
assessment year is less than the specified percentage of its book profit. In
such an event, the book profit is deemed to be the total income of the company,
on which the tax is payable at the rate of specified percentage. S. 115JB was
introduced by the Finance Act, 2000 with effect from 1-4-2001 to replace the
earlier version of MAT contained in S. 115JA. Initially, the specified
percentage was 7.5%, which is gradually increased and presently the same is 18%
as per the last amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from
1-4-2010.

1.2 For the purpose of
determining the MAT liability, every company is required to prepare its profit &
loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of
Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies’ Act, 1956. There are some
other provisions also in this respect with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.3 Explanation 1 to S.
115JB defines the book profit (hereinafter referred to as the said Explanation).
Under the said Explanation, the book profit means the net profit as shown in the
profit & loss account for the relevant previous year, which is to be increased
by certain specified items (upward adjustments) and the profit so increased is
required to be reduced by certain specified items (downward adjustments), if
such items are debited to profit & loss account.

1.4 One of the downward
adjustments is contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation which deals with
the exclusion of export profit eligible for
deduction u/s.80HHC(3)/(3A). The said Clause reads as under :

“the amount of profits
eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC, computed under clause (a) or clause (b) or
clause (c) of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A), as the case may be of that Section, and
subject to the conditions specified in that Section;”

1.5 S. 80HHC provides for
deduction of export profit while computing the total income as provided in the
Section. Earlier, quantum of such deduction was 100% of the export profit.
However, the Government decided to phase out this deduction with a view to
provide a sunset clause for this incentive available to exporters. For this
purpose, the Finance Bill, 2000 introduced Ss.(1B) with effect from 1-4-2000,
which provided restriction on the extent of deduction available u/s.80HHC(1).
Accordingly, the quantum of deduction u/s.80HHC in respect of export profit
available u/s.80HHC(1) was to be reduced to specified percentage every year,
with effect from A.Y. 2001-02 and was to be completely phased out by the A.Y.
2004-05. In the A.Y. 2001-02, such deduction was to be restricted to 80% of the
deduction of export profit determined u/s.80HHC(1) and for the A.Y. 2002-03 the
same was to be restricted to 70% and so on (this restricted amount of deduction
hereinafter referred to as the reduced export profit). Ss.(1B) also provided
that no deduction shall be allowed u/s.80HHC from the A.Y. 2005-06.

1.6 The Circular No. 794,
dated 9-8-2000 [162 CTR (St.) 9], while explaining the provisions of the Finance
Bill 2000, in para 43.5, clarifying the impact of new MAT provisions, pointed
out that the export profit u/s.10A/10B/80HHC/80HHD, etc. are kept outside the
purview of these provisions, as these are being phased out. In the context of S.
115JB similar clarification was also found in the Memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 2000, as well as in the speech of the Finance
Minister.

1.7 In view of the
provisions for phasing out deduction available u/s.80HHC and the provision for
excluding export profit from the book profit made in Clause (iv) of the said
Explanation for the purpose of levy of MAT, the issue was under debate as to
whether the entire amount of export profit should be excluded from the book
profit or only reduced export profit should be excluded in view of the
provisions contained in S. 80HHC(1B). To clarify the issue, if the export profit
determined u/s.80HHC(3) is Rs.100, then for the purpose of computation of book
profit for the A.Y. 2001-02, the amount to be excluded by way of export profit
should be Rs.100 (i.e., entire export profit) or Rs.80 (i.e.,
reduced export profit). This issue was decided against the assessee by the
Bombay High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd.

1.8 Recently, the Apex Court
had on an occasion to consider the issue referred to in para 1.7 above in the
same case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. and the issue is now finally settled. Though, S.
80HHC is effectively no more operative from A.Y. 2005-06, in a large number of
pending cases, this issue is relevant and therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column.


CIT
v.
Ajanta Pharma Ltd., 318 ITR 252 (Bom)


2.1 The issue referred to in para 1.7 above, came up before the Bombay High Court in the above case in the context of A.Y. 2001-02. The brief facts in the above case were that the assessee company was assessed u/s.115JB for the A.Y. 2001-02. While computing the book profit, the assessee claimed that the entire export profit computed u/s.80HHC(3) should be deducted and not the reduced export profit as provided u/s.80HHC(1B). The Assessing Officer restricted the deduction to 80%, being the amount of reduced export profit. The First Appellant Authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and took the view that for such purposes, the entire export profit is eligible for deduction. Accordingly, at the instance of Revenue, the issue referred to in para 1.7 above came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court.

2.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that while computing book profit u/s. 115JB,?only reduced export profit as provided u/s. 80HHC(1B) should be excluded from the book profit and not the amount of entire export profit. As per the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2000, the reason to introduce S. 115JB was to simplify the MAT provisions. Considering the language of Clause (iv) of the said Explanation, the export profit eligible for deduction should be equal to the amount of actual deduction allowed u/s.80HHC while computing the total income of the assessee under the normal provisions of the Act. If this is not done, an absurdity will be created to the extent that while full deduction is not allowed in respect of export profit u/s.80HHC, for the purpose of S. 115JB, the full amount of export profit will be excluded. This was never the intention of the Legislature while interpreting the provisions of law. An interpretation that results in an absurd situation is to be avoided. It was alternatively contended that even if one takes a view that eligible export profit is referable to only S. 80HHC(3) without applying the restriction contained in Ss.(1B), one has to bear in mind the expression ‘subject to the conditions specified in that Section’ contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation (hereinafter referred to as the said conditions). Accordingly, the restriction contained in Ss.(1B), being a condition for allowing deduction u/s.80HHC, has to be considered while determining the quantum of export profit to be excluded from the book profit u/s.115JB. It was also contended that the Finance Minister’s speech and the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill cannot by itself be used to interpret literal meaning of Act.

2.3 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee-company, various contentions were raised, which, inter alia, include : Considering the expression, ‘eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC’ used in the said Clause (iv), the entire export profit requires to be excluded from the book profit that being the amount eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC. The provision for exclusion of export profit contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation is to ensure that the export profits are not subjected to MAT. In the past also, in different provisions made in the Act for the levy of MAT, the export profits have been kept outside the purview of MAT. Therefore, the policy adopted by the Legislature of encouraging/boosting export was considered to be of such importance that the Legislature wished to forego taxes thereon, including MAT. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the expression ‘eligible’, it was contended that it would be beyond any doubt that the word ‘eligible’ has to be read to mean type or class or nature of profit (i.e., qualitative description of profits) and can never take within its ambit, a particular proportion or quantum thereof. The amount quantified for deduction u/s.80HHC(1B) is only a subclass or part of the type/class or nature of profit eligible and hence, the same cannot be considered for this purpose. In short, it was pointed out that Clause of the said Explanation refers to entire export profit and not reduced export profit. It was submitted that the quantum set out u/s.80HHC(1B), is not a condition and the same only provides the extent of deduction available u/s.80HHC(1). This is also supported by the language of S. 80HHC(1), which specifically allows ‘a deduction to the extent of profits referred to in Ss.(1B)’. It was also contended that if two views are possible of interpretation of the said Clause (iv), then the view in favour of the taxpayer ought to be adopted.

2.4 To decide the issue on hand, at the outset, the Court first noted the following settled position with regard to interpretation of a taxing statute [pages 258/259]:

“With the above background, let us now consider the provisions. What the Legislature ought to have done or what language or words or expression ought to have been used, is not for the Courts to consider.?The duty of the Court, in the event, where literal interpretation would defeat the intent of the Legislature or lead to an absurdity or the like would be to ascertain the Parliamentary intent, by applying the rules of statutory interpretation as followed in our jurisdiction. A word of caution, it is only in the event when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity or defeat the object or intent of the legislation and not otherwise. The principle of all fiscal legislation is that if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however, great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the State, seeking to recover tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law the case might?otherwise?appear?to?be.?The?taxing?statutes cannot be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The Court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency [CST v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1047; (1961) 12 STC 182].”

2.5 The Court, then, proceeded to decide the issue and referred to the provisions of S. 80HHC, as well as S. 115JB, as applicable to the case under consideration. The Court also referred to the earlier version of MAT contained u/s.115J as well as u/s.115JA. After tracing the history of the provisions relating to MAT, the Court stated as under (page 261)?:

“Insofar as MAT companies are concerned, that reduction of export profit while computing the book profits was not available when S. 115J was introduced from April 1, 1988. The benefit was given subsequently from April 1, 1989. Similarly the reduction was not available in the case of S. 115JA which was introduced with effect from April 1, 1997. The benefit was extended only from April 1, 1998. This intent of the Legislature must be considered while interpreting the provisions. The other aspect would be that if Ss.(1B) is not read while computing the book profits and which contains the sunset clause it would mean that even after April 1, 2005, MAT companies could claim deduction of export profits, while computing book profits which would be an absurdity.”

2.6 Proceeding further, referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. P. Varghese (131 ITR 597), the Court noted that in that judgment it was observed that it is well-recognised rule of construction that the statutory provisions must be so construed if possible that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. If the situation arises where the construction suggested by the Revenue would lead to wholly unreasonable and unjust result, which could never have been intended by the Legislature, then it must be avoided. The Court also noted that this judgment also supports the rule of interpretation that the speech made by the mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and the purposes for which the legislation was enacted. Therefore, the Finance Minister’s speech can be relied upon by the Court for the purposes of ascertaining what was the reason for introducing that clause. The Court also referred to various judgments of the Apex Court dealing with principles of statutory interpretation and in particular, dealing with principles of interpretation of taxing statute.

2.7 After referring to the judicial pronouncements with regard to principles of statutory interpretation, the Court stated as under (Page 266):

“The principles elucidated earlier of statutory construction can now be considered for interpreting the provisions of S. 115JB vis-à-vis S. 80HHC. Does a literal reading of S. 80HHC read with S. 115JB(2), Explanation 1(iv), lead to an absurdity and/or does not make clear Parliamentary intent considering the law as it stood before S. 115JB was introduced. In S. 115J and S. 115JA the expression used were ‘profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC.’ S. 115JB also uses the expression ‘profits eligible for deduction.’ There really can be no difficulty in understanding what this means. Only those profits which are eligible and computed in terms of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) and quantified in terms of Ss.(1B). The computation whether under Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) are for the purpose of Ss.(1) or Ss.(1A). S. 80HHC(1) permits a deduction to the extent of profits referred to in Ss.(1B). The only question is whether the expression in clause(a), (b) or (c) of Ss.(3) consequent on introduction of Ss.(1B) to S. 80HHC will have a meaning different from the meaning than what was originally understood, considering clause (iv) to Explanation 1 of S. 115JB.”

2.8 Referring to the argument made on behalf of the assessee that for the above purposes, provisions contained in Ss.(1B) should be ignored, the Court stated as under (Page 267):

“…….If the construction sought to be given by the counsel for the assessee is accepted it would make Ss.(1B) irrelevant for the purpose of S. 115JB. Ss.(1B) provides for deduction in terms set out therein. Ss.(3) sets out the method of computation of profits. The computation of profits is, therefore, for the purpose of working out the deduction of profits available u/s. 80HHC(1B). Earlier it was in terms of Ss.(1). Now, S. 80HHC(1) in term refers to Ss.(1B) . All the provisions are interrelated and cannot be read de hors one another. If Ss.(1B) is not read in Ss.(1), then the expression ‘no deduction shall be allowed in respect of the assessment beginning on the first day of April, 2005, and any subsequent year’, shall be rendered otiose.”

2.9 The Court also considered the argument made on behalf of the assessee that the provisions of Ss.(1B) is not a condition, but in the nature of computation and stated that even if we accept this proposition and proceed on that finding, nevertheless it is impossible of reading S. 80HHC(3) or (3A) independent of S. 80HHC(1B). The Court also noted that basically the argument of the assessee is based on the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2000. However, at the same time, in the Notes on Clauses, it is clearly stated that the profits will be reduced by certain adjustments which are eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC. The profits eligible for deduction are Reduced export profits in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). According to the Court, there is nothing in the Finance Minister’s speech of February 29, 2000 to hold otherwise. Noting the argument made on behalf of the assessee that if two views are possible, the view favourable to the taxpayer should be adopted, the Court stated that the question is whether there are two views possible in this case. According to the Court, no two views are possible, but the only view is that the MAT companies are entitled to the same deduction of export profits u/s.80HHC, as any other company involved in export in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). Once that be the case, this argument is also devoid to merit.

2.10 The Court finally concluded as under (page 268):

“……To our mind, the language is clear. The literal meaning does not in any way defeat the object of the Section and/or lead to any absurdity. The object of S. 115JB is to allow even MAT companies to avail of the benefit of deduction. If we consider the assessee’s arguments that MAT companies are entitled to full deduction of export profits, it will lead to anomaly, whereby the companies which are paying tax on total income under the normal rules, for them the deduction of export profits will be lesser than what MAT companies are entitled to. Is this a possible view? When S. 115J was originally introduced, MAT companies were not entitled to deduction of profits u/s.80HHC while working out the book profits…….”

“……Can it now be argued that MAT compa-nies considering S. 115JB(2), Explanation 1(iv) are entitled to be placed in a better position than the other companies entitled to the export deduction under 80HHC, though earlier they constituted one class? No rule of construction nor the language of the S. 80HHC read with S. 115JB, in our opinion, will permit such construction. If such construction is not possible, then both the classes of companies will be entitled to the same deduction. This would contemplate that both would be entitled to deductions of profits in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). So read, it would be a harmonious construction…..”

Ajanta Pharma Limited v. CIT, 327 ITR 305 (SC):

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Bombay High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of the assessee. To consider the issue, the Court referred to the facts of the case and noted that the following question of law is raised in the Civil Appeal:

“whether for determining the ‘book profits’ in terms of S. 115JB, the net profits as shown in the profit and loss account have to be reduced by the amount of profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC or by the amount of deduction u/s. 80HHC?”

3.2 To decide the question, the Court noted the provisions of S. 115JB and S. 80HHC as applicable to the case of the assessee. After referring to relevant provisions, the Court also noted and analysed in brief, the earlier provisions relating to MAT contained in S. 115JA. The Court, then, stated that from these provisions it is clear that S. 115JA is a self-contained code and will apply not-withstanding any other provisions in the Act. The Court then stated that S. 115JB, though structured differently, stood inserted to provide for payment of advance tax by MAT Companies. S. 115JB is the successor to S. 115JA. In essence, it is the same as S. 115JA with certain differences. Accordingly, S. 115JB continues to remain a self-contained code.

3.3 Referring to the object for which S. 80HHC was enacted, the Court noted that the Section provides for tax incentive to exporters. At one point of time, S. 80HHC(1) laid down that an amount equal to an amount of deduction claimed should be debited to profit & loss ac-count and credited to reserve account to be utilised for business purposes. Ss.(1) of 80HHC is concerned with eligibility, whereas Ss.(3) is concerned5 with computation of quantum of deduction. Prior to amendment made by the Finance Act, 2000, the exporters were allowed 100% deduction in respect of the export profit. Thereafter, the same has been reduced in a phasewise manner, as provided in Ss.(1B). The Court also noted that the deduction is available in respect of eligible goods and the same is not available to all assessable entities. Referring to S. 80AB, the Court noted that computation of deduction is geared to an amount of income, whereas the quantification of deduction u/s.80HHC(3) is geared to export turnover and not to the income. On the other hand, S. 115JB refers to levy of MAT on deemed income. This shows that the S. 80HHC and S. 115JB operate in different spheres.

3.4 Dealing with S. 80HHC, the Court further stated that S. 80HHC(1) refers to ‘eligibility’, whereas S. 80HHC(3) refers to computation of tax incentive. According to the Court, S. 80HHC(1B) deals with ‘extent of deduction’ and not with the eligibility.

3.5 The Court then referred to the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue, with regard to applicability of other conditions of S. 80HHC incorporated in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation and noted that based on this, the Revenue contends that the quantum of export profit for this purpose should be subject to Ss.(1B) of 80HHC. The Court then pointed out that according to the Revenue, both ‘eligibility’ as well as ‘deductibility’ of the profit have got to be considered together while applying the said Clause (iv). Rejecting this contention, the Court stated that if the dichotomy between ‘eligibility’ of profit and ‘deductibility’ of profit is not kept in mind, S. 115JB will cease to be a self-contained code. According to the Court, for the purposes of S. 80HHC(3)/(3A), the conditions are only that the relief should be certified by a chartered accountant. Such condition is not a qualifying condition, but it is a compliance condition. Therefore, one cannot rely upon the last sentence of the said Clause (iv) to obliterate the difference between ‘eligibility’ and ‘deductibility’ of profits as contended on behalf of the Revenue.

3.6 Comparing the relevant provisions of S. 115JB and S. 80HHC, the Court concluded as under (page 310):

“As earlier stated, S. 115JB is a self-contained code. It taxes deemed income. It begins with a non obstante clause. S. 115JB refers to computation of ‘book profits’ which have to be computed by making upward and downward adjustments. In the downward adjustment, vide clause (iv) it seeks to exclude ‘eligible’ profits derived from exports. On the other hand, u/s. 80HHC(1B) it is extent of deduction which matters. The word ‘thereof’ in each of the items u/s.80HHC(1B) is important. Thus, an assessee earns Rs.100 crores then for the A.Y. 2001-02, the extent of deduction is 80% thereof and so on which means that the principle of proportionality is brought in to scale down the tax incentive in phased manner. However, for the purposes of computation of book profits which computation is different from normal computation under the 1961 Act/computation under Chapter VI -A. We need to keep in mind the upward and downward adjustments and if so read, it becomes clear that clause (iv) covers full export profits of 100% as ‘eligible profits’ and that the same cannot be reduced to 80% by relying on S. 80HHC(1B). Thus, for computing ‘book profits’ the downward adjustment, in the above example, would be Rs.100 crores and not Rs. *90 crores. The idea being to exclude ‘export profits’ from computation of book profits u/s.115JB which imposes MAT on deemed income. The above reasoning also gets support from the Memorandum of the Explanation to the Finance Bill, 2000.”

* In the given example, this should be Rs.80 crores.

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is settled that for the purpose of excluding the export profit from the book profit while applying the MAT provisions, the entire export profit will be excluded and not the reduced export profit. Primarily, the decision of the Court seems to have been rested on the finding that both provisions (S. 80HHC & S. 115JB) operate in different spheres, S. 115JB is a self-contained code, S. 80HHC(1) deals with the ‘eligibility’, whereas S. 80HHC(3) deals with computation of quantum of deduction, S. 80HHC(1B) deals with the extent of deduction and not with the eligibility, there is dif-ference between the ‘eligibility’ and ‘deductibility’ of profits and the view also gets support from the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2000.

4.2 Interestingly, in the above judgment, the arguments raised on behalf of the assessee, as well as the view expressed by the Bombay High Court on such argument and the reasons given by the High Court for reaching the conclusion are neither referred to nor dealt with. It appears that perhaps the same arguments must have been raised by the assessee before the Apex Court, which were raised before the High Court.

4.3 On a careful reading of both the judgments, one may notice that the Apex Court has taken a view that while determining the amount of export profit for exclusion from the book profit, provisions of S. 80HHC(1B) are not to be taken in the account, whereas the Bombay High Court had taken exactly contrary view. One of the reasons given by the High Court for taking such a view was that if, while computing the book profit, Ss.1(B) is not to be read with Ss.(1) of S. 80HHC, then there would an absurdity as in such an event, MAT companies would claim deduction of export profit even after 1-4-2005 (refer para 2.5 and para 2.8 above). This reason is also to be treated as impliedly overruled as otherwise, an interesting academic issue may arise as to whether on account of the view taken by the Apex Court, whether MAT companies can attempt to claim the benefit of Clause (iv) of the said Explanation even after A.Y. 2004-05.

4.4 After giving judgment in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd., the Bombay High Court in the case of Al-Kabeer Exports Ltd. (233 CTR 443) has also taken a view that the export profit for exclusion from the book profit under the said Clause (iv) has to be computed strictly in accordance with the provisions of S. 80HHC and not on the basis of adjusted Book Profit. For this, the High Court had also placed reliance on it’s judgment in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. referred to in para 2 above. Prior to this, the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Syncom Formulations (I). Ltd. [106 ITD 193 (Mum.)] had taken a view that for such purpose, the determination of export profit should be based on the adjusted book profit and not on the basis of regular provision of the Act as applicable to the computation of profits and gains of business. The judgment of the High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. also gave an impression that it has overruled the decision of Special Bench in the case of Syncom Formulations (I) Ltd. (supra). Now, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court reversing the judg-ment of the Bombay High Court, even the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Al-Kabeer Exports Ltd. may not be regarded as good law and in that context, the view taken by the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of Syncom Farmulations (I) Ltd. (supra) gets support from the judgment of the Apex Court.

Cryptic order of the AO dropping penalty proceedings Revision u/s.263

closements

Introduction :


1.1 Various orders are passed by the Assessing Officer (AO)
under different provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). Since the
Department has no right of appeal against such orders passed before the first
appellate authority, there is an inbuilt mechanism in the Act to supervise and
monitor the correctness of such orders to safeguard the interest of the Revenue.
Accordingly, a power of revision is vested with the Commissioner of Income-tax
(CIT) to revise, etc. such orders passed by the AO as provided in that Section.

1.2 U/s.263, if the CIT considers that the order passed by
the AO is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue, he may pass such orders thereon as the circumstances of the case
justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling
the assessment and directing a fresh assessment, of course, after providing
opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Such order, under this Section, can
be passed within a time limit provided in the Section. Certain other relevant
terms are also defined in the Section, with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.3 For the purpose of exercising jurisdiction u/s. 263, two
cumulative conditions are required to be satisfied, namely, (i) that the order
of the AO is erroneous, and (ii) that it is prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue as held by the Apex Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Company
Limited (243 ITR 83). It is further held that the phrase ‘prejudicial to the
interest of the Revenue’ is of wide import and is not confined to loss of tax.
At the same time, the phrase has to be read in conjunction with erroneous order
passed by the AO. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO
cannot be termed as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, e.g.,
when the AO has adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has
resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the AO has
adopted one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an
erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue unless the view taken
by the AO is unsustainable in law.

1.4 Once penalty proceedings are initiated against the
assessee under the provisions of Act, in response to the same, various
explanations, etc. are filed by the assessee to show that the case is not fit
for imposing such penalty. After considering the same, the AO decides as to
whether penalty should be levied or not. When the AO decides not to levy the
penalty and passes an order dropping the penalty proceedings without mentioning
reasons for the same in the order, it was under consideration as to whether the
order passed by the AO dropping the penalty proceedings attracts and justifies
the revision by the CIT u/s.263 merely because reasons for dropping the penalty
proceedings are not mentioned in such order.

1.5 Recently the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
issue referred to in Para 1.4 above in the case of Toyota Motor Corporation.
Though the judgment of the Court is very short, it is felt that it has
far-reaching consequences in the actual day-to-day practice and therefore, it is
thought fit to consider the same in this column.


CIT v. Toyota Motor Corporation, 218 CTR 628 (Del.) :


2.1 In the above case, the financial years involved were
1988-89 to 1997-98. The facts are not available in the judgment. It seems that
the penalty proceedings u/s.271C for non-deduction of tax were initiated. It
also seems that the matter of liability to deduct tax and the fact of
non-deduction of tax were not in dispute at that stage. It also seems that the
assessee had explained his case and had shown his bona fides for the same
and after considering the same, the AO had decided not to levy the penalty and
the following order dated 9-7-1999 was passed :

“The penalty proceedings initiated in this case u/s.271C
r/w S. 274 of the IT Act, 1961 are hereby dropped.”


2.2 The CIT initiated the proceedings u/s.263 to revise the
above order passed by the AO and after hearing the assessee, took the view that
the AO did not verify several issues and facts as mentioned in the order passed
by him, nor did the AO carry out necessary investigations to come to the
conclusion that penalty is not leviable. Based on this, the CIT treated the
order of the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and
set aside the same with a direction to pass fresh order after making necessary
enquiries, etc. and after giving opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

2.3 When the order of the CIT passed u/s.263 came up for
consideration before the Tribunal, it was held that the AO had carried out due
verification of relevant facts and the assessee has also shown its bona fides
and its reasonable belief in not deducting tax at the appropriate stage. The
penalty proceedings were not dropped casually by the AO, but the same was done
after verification of full facts disclosed by the assessee in reply.
Accordingly, the order passed u/s.263 was set aside.

2.4 At the instance of the Revenue, the matter came up before
the High Court, for which the following substantial question of law was framed :

“Whether AO could have passed an order u/s. 271C of the IT
Act, 1961 without giving any reasons whatsoever ?”


2.5 For deciding the above question, and after noting the
reasons given by the Tribunal for deciding the issue in favour of the assessee,
the Court observed as under (page 630) :


“We are unable to appreciate this reasoning given by the Tribunal simply because that the AO him-self did not say any such thing in his order. There is no doubt that the proceedings before the AO are quasi-judicial proceedings and a decision taken by the AO in this regard must be supported by reasons. Otherwise, every order, such as the one passed by the AO, could result in a theoretical possibility that it may be revised by the CIT u/ s.263 of the Act. Such a situation is clearly impermissible.”

2.6 The Court, then, stated that it is necessary for the parties to know the reasons for the conclusion arrived at by the authorities. The order of the AO should be self-contained order giving the relevant facts and the reasons for his conclusion. The Court finally decided the issue against the assessee and held as under (page 630) :

“We find that the order passed by the AO is cryptic, to say the least, and it cannot be sustained. The Tribunal cannot substitute its own reasoning to justify the order passed by the AO when the AO himself did not give any reason in the order passed by him.

Under the circumstances, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and remand the matter back to the file of the AO to decide the issue afresh in terms of the order passed by the CIT u/ s.263 of the Act.”

Toyota Motors Corporation v. CIT, 218 CTR 539 (SC) :

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court. Somehow, the Apex Court has not dealt with the issue in detail and dismissed the appeal.

3.2 While deciding the issue against the assessee, the Court observed as under :
“We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The High Court has held that the AO had disposed the proceedings stating the penalty proceedings initiated in this case u/s.271C r/w S. 274 of the IT Act, 1961 are hereby dropped. According to the High Court, there was no basis indicated for dropping the proceedings. The Tribunal referred to certain aspects and held that the initiation of proceedings u/ s. 263 of the IT Act, 1961 (in short, the ‘IT Act’) was impermissible when considered in the background of the materials purportedly placed by the assessee before the AO. What the High Court has done is to require the AO to pass a reasoned order. The High Court was of the view that the Tribunal could not have substituted its own reasoning which were required to be recorded by the AO. According to the assessee all relevant aspects were placed for consideration and if the officer did not record reasons, the assessee cannot be faulted.

We do not think it necessary to interfere at this stage. It goes without saying that when the matter be taken up by the AO on remand, it shall be his duty to take into account all the relevant aspects including the materials, if any, already placed by the assessee, and pass a reasoned order.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it seems that even an order passed by the AO dropping the penalty proceedings should be with reasons. The AO has to record the reasons for which penalty proceedings are dropped.

4.2 Unfortunately, the Apex Court did not appreciate the contention of the assessee that all relevant aspects were placed before the AO for consideration and if the AO did not record reasons, the assessee cannot be faulted.

4.3 In response to show-cause notice for levy of penalty, the only thing the assessee can do is to offer explanation and make out a case for non-levy of penalty. However, it is difficult to understand as to how the assessee can ensure that while dropping the penalty proceedings, the AO should incorporate reasons also in the order? It seems that it is this position which must have led the Tribunal to decide the issue in favour of the assessee after verifying the factual position that the order was passed by the AO after making necessary verifications, etc. Unfortunately, this factual position has neither been appreciated by the High Court, nor by the Apex Court. In both these judgments, there is not even a discussion on this practical as well as legal difficulty faced by the assessee.

4.4 In practice, we understand that in most cases, orders for dropping the penalty proceedings are cryptic and without reasons and the same are, more or less, on the same line as in the above case. Considering the constraints of the administration and the AO in particular, it is necessary to accept the position that if the assessee has given proper explanation and shown his bona fides to the satisfaction of the AO, penalty matters should be treated as concluded even if the reasons for such satisfactions are ‘not formally mentioned in the order passed by the AO. Therefore, the above judgment of the Apex Court, to that extent, requires reconsideration. Till this happens, perhaps, the CITs while exercising. their jurisdiction u/ s.263 should consider this in the interest of justice.

Exemption for Educational Institution

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act contains 3 clauses for
granting exemption to universities or other educational institutions — (iiiab),
(iiiad) and (vi). The common requirement for exemption under all these three
clauses is that the university or other educational institution should exist
solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

1.2 There has been a debate as to the meaning of the term
‘not for purposes of profit’. The tax authorities have sought to interpret this
requirement as meaning that an Institute which earns a surplus would not be
eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s.10(23C).

1.3 While the Uttarakhand High Court has supported this view
of the tax authorities by holding that in a case of surplus, the educational
institution is not eligible for the exemption, the Bombay High Court and the
Punjab and Haryana High Courts have taken a contrary view that the institution
cannot be regarded as existing for purposes of profit simply because it has a
surplus, and would continue to be eligible for the exemption.

2. Queens’ Educational Society’s case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Uttarakhand High Court in
the case of CIT v. Queens Educational Society, 319 ITR 160.

2.2 In this case involving various educational societies
registered under the Societies Registration Act and imparting education to
children, the assessees had claimed exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiad), on the ground
that they existed solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of
profit.

2.3 The Assessing Officer rejected the claim for exemption.
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the benefit of exemption, and the Tribunal
upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

2.4 The Uttarakhand High Court disapproved the observations
of the Tribunal as hypothetical when the Tribunal noted that there was hardly
any surplus left after investment into fixed assets, that the assessees were
engaged in imparting education and had to maintain a teaching and non-teaching
staff and to pay for the salaries and other expenses, that it became necessary
to charge fees from students for meeting all these expenses, that the charging
of fee was incidental to the prominent objective of the trust of imparting
education, that the school was initially being run in a rented building and the
surplus enabled the Society to acquire its own property, computers, library
books, sports equipment, etc. for the benefit of the students, and that the
members of the Society had not utilised any part of the surplus for their own
benefit. The High Court also noted the Tribunal’s observations that profit was
only incidental to the main object of spreading education, and that if there was
no surplus out of the difference between the receipts and outgoings, the trust
would not be able to achieve its objects.

2.5 The Uttarakhand High Court observed that the reasons
recorded by the Tribunal were hypothetical, and that the Tribunal failed to
appreciate that the profit percentage was 30% and 27% of the total receipts.
According to the Uttarakhand High Court, the law was well settled that is the
profit was proved by an educational Society, then that would be income of the
society as a surplus amount remained in the account books of the Society after
meeting all the expenses incurred towards imparting education. The Uttarakhand
High Court relied on observations of the Supreme Court in the case of
Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT,
224 ITR 310 for this
proposition.

2.6 The Uttarakhand High Court observed further that the
objects clause contained other noble and pious objects and the Society had done
nothing to achieve those objects except pushing the main object of providing
education and earning profit. According to the Uttarakhand High Court, with the
profit which it had earned, the Society had strengthened or enhanced its
capacity to earn more rather than to undertake any other activities to fulfil
other noble objects for the cause of poor and needy people or advancement of
religious purposes. The High Court observed that the investment in fixed assets
might have been connected with the imparting of education, but the same had been
constructed and/or purchased out of income from imparting education with a view
to expand the institution and to earn more income.

2.7 The Uttarakhand High Court therefore held that the
Society was not eligible for exemption, as it was existing for purposes of
profit, as evidenced by the surplus earned by the Society.

3. Vanita Vishram Trust’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Mumbai High
Court in the case of Vanita Vishram Trust v. CCIT, (unreported — Writ
Petition Nos. 366 & 367 of 2010, dated 6th May 2010 — available on
www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a public charitable trust
registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. It had been running primary
and secondary schools and colleges in Mumbai since 1929 and in Surat since 1940.
Its main object was education of women. Its memorandum provided that no portion
of the income or property of the Association would be paid directly or
indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or otherwise to the members of the
Association, and that the surplus if any, was not to be paid or distributed
amongst the members of the Association, but to be transferred to another
institution or institutions having similar objects. Till A.Y. 2004-05, the trust
was allowed exemption u/s.10(22) and u/s.10(23C)(vi).

3.3 The assessee filed applications for continuation of
approval u/s.10(23C)(vi) with the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (CCIT). The
CCIT held that the trust had other objects, such as construction of ashrams for
Gujarati Hindu women, and was therefore not existing solely for education. He
also noted that since the trust had a surplus in excess of 12% of the receipts
from its activities, which was invested in making additions to assets and
increasing bank deposits, it was not entitled to the exemption. He therefore
rejected the applications for approval.

3.4 Before the Bombay High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that for nearly 80 years, the assessee had been carrying on only the activity of conducting schools and colleges and had not carried on any other activity. It was also argued that the incidental existence of a surplus generated from the activity of conducting schools and colleges would not detract from the character of the assessee as existing solely for educational purposes and not for profit, and that the entire surplus was utilised only for the purpose of education, there being a specific provision in the Memorandum under which no part of the profits could be distributed. It was further argued that the existence of a surplus did not disentitle an institution to the grant of approval, and that the purpose of the surplus was to build up corpus for the capital enhancement of the educational institutions conducted by the trust, which was not a commercial purpose, but a purpose directly proximate to the main object of conducting educational institutions.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the threshold requirement of S. 10(23C)(vi) was the existence of an educational institution or university, and its existence solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

3.6 Noting the fact that the trust had carried on only the running of schools and colleges for the last 80 years, the Bombay High Court noted that even in the past, the tax authorities had held the trust to be existing solely for educational purposes. The Bombay High Court noted that in a reference made to a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court u/s.256(1) on the issue of whether the same assessee (as was now before it) was entitled to exemption u/s.10(22) on interest earned on surplus funds of the school run by it, the Division Bench had observed that merely because a certain surplus arose from the operations of the trust, it could not be held that the institution was run for the purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the profit and the profit was utilised for the purpose of promoting the objects of the institution.

3.7 In that case, the Division Bench had relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra), in holding that as a principle of law, if after meeting the expenditure, a surplus resulted incidentally from an activity law-fully carried on by the educational institution, the institution would not cease to be one which was existing solely for educational purposes since the object was not to make profit. The Bombay High Court noted the findings of the earlier Division Bench in the case of the same assessee holding that the assessee existed only for educational purposes which consisted of running educational institutions, and not for earning profits.

3.8 The Bombay High Court also pointed out the provisions of the third proviso to S. 10(23C), which permitted an accumulation not exceeding 15% for a period of not more than 5 years. According to the Bombay High Court, this provision established that the Parliament did not regard the accumulation of income by a university or other educational institution as a disabling factor, so long as the purpose of accumulation was the application of the income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which the institution had been established. The Parliament had however placed a limit on the amount and period of such accumulation.

3.9 Referring to the decision of the Uttarakhand High Court in Queens’ Educational Society’s case, the Bombay High Court observed that that case seemed to be distinguishable, as the assessee in that case was construed to be one which existed with the object of enhancing the income and of earning profits as opposed to the provision of education. However, with reference to the observations of the Uttarakhand High Court that though it was entitled to pursue other noble and pious objects, the assessee had done nothing to achieve them and had only pursued the main object of providing education and earning profit, the Bombay High Court observed that the requirement that the institution must exist solely for educational purposes would militate against an institution pursuing other objects. The Bombay High Court therefore disagreed with the views expressed by the Uttarakhand High Court that the benefit of the exemption should be denied on the ground that the assessee had only pursued its main object of providing education and had not pursued the other objects for which the trust was constituted.

As observed by the Bombay High Court, if the assessee were to pursue other objects, it would clearly violate the requirement of existing solely for educational purposes.

3.10 The Bombay High Court therefore directed the CCIT to grant approval to the assessee u/s. 10(23C)(vi) as an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

3.11 A similar view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 188 Taxman 402, where the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that merely because profits have resulted from activity of imparting education would not result in change of character of institution that it existed solely for educational purposes.

4.Observations:

4.1 Since all the three High Courts in the above cases have referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra ) in support of the view taken by each of them, and relied on the same observations, it is necessary to understand the ratio of that decision and those observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case.

4.2 In Aditanar’s case (supra ), the Supreme Court was considering a case of a Society which was running various schools, and had received donations. The tax authorities sought to tax the donations, on the ground that the Society was not an educational institution, but merely a financing body. While holding that the Society itself was also an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“We may state that the language of S. 10(22) of the Act is plain and clear and the availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. After meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes since the object is not one to make profit. The decisive or acid test is whether on an overall view of the matter, the object is to make profit. In evaluating or appraising the above, one should also bear in mind the distinction/difference between the corpus, the objects and the powers of the concerned entity. The following decisions are relevant in this context: Governing Body of Rangaraya Medical College v. ITO, (1979) 117 ITR 284 (AP) and Secondary Board of Education v. ITO, (1972) 86 ITR 408 (Orissa).”

4.3 The Supreme Court therefore impliedly approved the ratio of these two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Orissa High Court. In Rangaraya Medical College’s case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that merely because certain surplus arose from the society’s operations, it could not be held that the institution was run for purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the said profit and the said profit was utilised for the purpose and for the promotion of the objects of the institution.

4.4 In Secondary Board of Education’s case, the Orissa High Court held:

“One of the sources of income of the Board is profits from compilation, publication, printing and sale of textbooks. The profits so earned enter into the Board fund. The income and expenditure of the Board is controlled and the entire expenditure is to be directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. Even if there is some surplus, it remains as a part of the sinking fund to be devoted to the cause of education as and when necessary. This being the objective and there being various ways of control of the income and expenditure, the Board of Secondary Education cannot be said to be existing for purposes of profit. It exists solely for purposes of education.”

4.5 It therefore appears that so long as the main object is provision of education, surplus arising from any of the activities would not disentitle the claim for exemption, so long as the surplus can be utilised only for education. This view is also supported by the permitted accumulation.

4.6 Further, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pinegrove’s case, has rightly observed that there is a definite purpose behind allowing setting up of educational institutions by private sector, including trusts/societies. Various educational colleges could not have been established for want of funds, and the Government which lacked funds thought that the private sector could assist in this regard. The Court observed that in every educational institution, there is bound to be a profit to support growth of the educational infrastructure and activities. Interestingly, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that in computing the surplus, capital expenditure has also to be deducted, as that is also an expenditure on the objects of the trust.

4.7 As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court in Vanita Vishram’s case, where S. 10(23C) itself now permits an accumulation of income up to 15% of the income of the trust, a trust cannot be penalised by treating it as existing for purposes of profit merely because it earns and accumulates such a surplus. In any case, today it is restricted from accumulating a surplus exceeding a particular level and beyond a particular period. As observed by the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, there is a clear distinction between the objects, which is that of education, and the powers, which is to spend on objects or accumulate surplus.

4.8 The Uttarakhand High Court seems to have misinterpreted the observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, regarding the corpus, objects and powers, to mean that the assessee should pursue other objects as well. As rightly pointed out by the Bombay High Court, if this interpretation were adopted and the assessee pursued other non- educational objects, it may in fact result in total denial of the benefit meant only for educational institutions.

4.8 The better view therefore is that of the Mumbai and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, that an educational trust cannot be held to be existing for purposes of profit and not for education merely because it earns a surplus from its activities.

Deductibility of expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 The deductibility or otherwise of payments connected with a property under a lease has always been a source of protracted litigation. Some of such issues are :

  •  Whether payment of premium for acquiring a leasehold asset is a revenue or capital expenditure.

  • Whether payment of lease rent in lump sum is a revenue or capital expenditure.

  •   Whether expenditure incurred for repairs and renovation of leasehold property is allowable as a deduction or not.

  •    Whether expenses on construction of building on a leasehold property is a capital or revenue expenditure.

    1.2 One more issue, which regularly comes for consideration of Courts, is about the deductibility of an expenditure incurred on stamp duty and registration charges, in executing a lease deed, paid by a lessee.

    1.3 The issue remained controversial, in spite of several Courts holding the expenditure to be deductible, because of the decisions of the Karnataka and some other High Courts holding the expenditure in question to be not allowable. Recently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court had an occasion to examine the true purpose of the dissenting decision of the Karnataka High Court in adjudicating the issue under consideration, namely, deductibility of expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges.

2. Hotel Rajmahal’s case :

    2.1 The issue earlier came for consideration of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Hotel Rajmahal v. CIT, 152 ITR 218.

    2.2 The facts behind the legal formulation were that the assessee, a firm consisting of five partners, came into force with effect from March 2, 1974. The firm took over a running business with boarding and lodging facilities in the name and style ‘Hotel Rajmahal’ at Bangalore by executing a lease deed dated April 24, 1974, for which it incurred an expenditure of Rs.11,270 by way of stamp duty, registration fee and legal expenses. The lease was for a period of ten years with option for renewal for another period of ten years.

    2.3 The assessee filed a return disclosing an income of Rs.67,220 for the A.Y. 1975-76, the relevant previous year ending December 31, 1974 after deducting the aforesaid sum of Rs.11,270. The AO completed the assessment accepting the return allowing the said deduction, but the Commissioner revised the order u/s.263 of the Act by disallowing the expenditure of Rs.11,270 on the ground that it was of capital nature having been incurred for acquisition of a capital asset. The appeal preferred by the assessee, against the order of the Commissioner, was dismissed by the Tribunal by holding that the assessee had started the business only during the relevant year for the first time and that the lease was for a considerably long period and therefore, the benefit arising from the transaction be considered as of an enduring nature.

    2.4 At the instance of the assessee, the following question of law was referred for the opinion of the Court :

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Rs.11,270 being the expenditure incurred by the assessee by way of stamp duty, registration fee and legal expenses for the execution of registration of the lease deed dated April 24, 1974, is to be allowed in computing its income for the A.Y. 1975-76 ?”

    2.5 The assessee, urged before the Court that the period of lease was not relevant for deciding whether the sum claimed for deduction was in the nature of revenue expenditure or capital in nature; what was important to consider was whether the said amount spent was a necessary outgoing for the use of a thing from which the assessee was to earn profit.

    2.6 In support of the contention, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT, 60 ITR 52 as also on the two decisions of the Bombay High Court in the cases of CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 113 ITR 877 and CIT v. Bombay Cycle & Motor Agency Ltd., 118 ITR 42.

    2.7 The Court observed that the contention of the assessee could have been relevant, provided the assessee was engaged in a business prior to the execution of the lease deed and the expenditure incurred was incidental to such business, but the assessee in the given case, for the first time, entered into the business in respect of which he spent the amount for executing and registering the lease deed and but for the execution of the lease deed, he would not have got the apparatus of the business and the leasehold rights. The Court held that the expenditure had really brought into existence an asset of enduring nature and the expenditure in connection with the acquisition of such rights should be distinguished from the expenditure incidental to the existing business and that the former could not be allowed u/s.37 of the Act, though the latter may in certain circumstances be allowed.

    2.8 The Court further observed that the assessee could not draw support from those decisions of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court since they concerned themselves with cases where a certain sum of money was spent towards stamp duty, registration fees, lawyer’s fees, etc., for the purpose of the existing business of the assessee.

    2.9 In the instant case, as already stated by the Court, it was for the first time that the assessee entered into the business by executing the lease whereunder the assessee secured the leasehold rights for an initial period of ten years with an option to renew for another period of ten years and as such the expenditure incurred for securing this kind of asset, by way of stamp duty, registration charges and legal fees was an expenditure of capital nature.

    2.10 At this juncture, we need to take note of the decisions in the cases of United Commercial Corporation, 78 ITR 800 (All) and Govind Sugar, 152 ITR 218 (Kar.), wherein the expenses in question were held to be not allowable, irrespective of the fact that they were incurred after the business was set up.

3. Gopal Associates’ case :

3.1 Recently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Gopal Associates, 222 CTR 307 was required to consider the issue of allowability of the expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges in executing a lease deed. In that case, during the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee took on lease, a fruit processing plant from the HPMC. The lease deed was executed on 27th December, 1993 for a period of 7 years but was later terminated. The assessee had spent a sum of Rs.3,44,251 as stamp duty and registration charges on execution of the lease deed. The AO treated this expenditure as capital expenditure by relying upon the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case Hotel Rajmahal (supra). On the other hand, the assessee relying upon the judgments of the Madras, Kerala and Gujarat High Courts in Sri Krishna Tiles & Potteries Madras (P) Ltd. v. CIT, 173 ITR 311 (Mad.), Plantation Corporation of Kerala Ltd. v. Commissioner of Agri. IT, 205 ITR 364 (Ker.) and Gujarat Machinery Manufacturing Ltd. v. ClT, 211 ITR 1010 (Guj.) contended that the amount spent as stamp duty and registration charges should be treated as revenue expenditure. The CIT(A) and Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee.

3.2 The Revenue filed an appeal challenging the order of the Tribunal by raising the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the expenditure incurred on stamp duty and registration charges at the time of execution of lease agreement for taking on lease the fruit processing plant for seven years was allowable as revenue expenditure.”

3.3 The Himachal Pradesh High Court noted that the Karnataka High Court in Hotel Rajmahal’s case (supra) did not really discuss the matter in detail but held that when for the first time the assessee entered a lease deed securing leasehold rights for a long period, the expenditure incurred on stamp duty registration and legal fees, etc. should be treated as expenditure of capital nature. The Court however chose to follow the decision of the Madras High Court  in Sri Krishna  Tiles & Potteries  Madras  (P) Ltd. case (supra) which in turn followed the law laid down by the Bombay High Court in ClT v. Cinceita Ltd., 137 ITR 652 (Born.) and accordingly dis-agreed with the decision of the Karnataka High Court to hold that irrespective of whether the incidental expenditure was incurred in connection with or related to capital expenditure, the same had to be treated as revenue expenditure.

3.4 The Court also  noted that the Kerala High Court also took the same view in Plantation Corporation’s case (supra) and the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Machinery’s case (supra) dealt with the same question and held that the amount spent on registration and stamp charges was a revenue expenditure.

3.5 The Court chose to follow the reasoning given by the Bombay, Madras, Kerala and Gujarat High Courts and respectfully disagreed with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

3.6 In view of the findings, the Court decided the substantial question against the Revenue by holding that the expenditure in question was a revenue expenditure allowable as a deduction.

Observations:

4.1 The short but interesting  issue is whether  the expenditure  in question  for drawing  up a proper and effective deed of lease, namely, the expenditure in respect  of stamp  duty,  registration  charges  and professional fees paid to the. solicitors who prepared and got registered  the deed  of lease is an expenditure resulting in an enduring  benefit simply because it is in some manner  incurred  at the same time and is connected  that way to a property  acquired  under a lease. Further,  the fact that the lease is of a longer period will have any bearing in deciding the issue or not.

4.2 We need to note that there is no element of premium in the said amounts claimed as expenditure and the expenditure would have been the same even if the lease had been of a shorter duration. The expenditure in question is not for acquiring the lease-hold right which is normally acquired on payment of premium, but is incurred to meet certain expenses which have necessarily to be incurred in order to conform to the legal requirements laid down in this behalf for getting a legal deed of lease. It is incurred for drawing up and registering a valid deed of lease not suffering from legal infirmities to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the as-sessee.

4.3 The contention that the assessee obtains an en-during benefit by obtaining the lease deeds and any expenses incurred in connection therewith should be treated as capital expenditure, more so when the lease is for a longer a period should be examined in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Empire Jute Co. Ltd. CIT, 124 ITR I, CfT v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., 172 ITR 257 and Alembic Chemicals Works Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 177 ITR 377, which have laid down pragmatic and practical tests to find out whether an expenditure is revenue or capital in nature. The Supreme Court held that even in a case where expenditure is incurred for obtaining an advantage of enduring benefit, emphasis should be placed on the nature of the advantage in a commercial sense and if the advantage consists merely in facilitating the assessee’s trading operations or enabling the management and conduct of the assessee’s business to be carried on more efficiently or profitably, while leaving the fixed capital untouched, the expenditure should be held to be on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure for an indefinite future.

4.4 The test of ‘enduring benefit’ has been held to be not a decisive or conclusive test: it cannot be applied blindly and mechanically. The question must be viewed in the larger context of business necessity or expediency. If the expenditure is so related to the carrying on or the conduct of the business, it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and not for acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character. If the expenditure helps in the profit-earning process, it should not be treated as resulting in acquisition of a profit-earning machinery or apparatus.

4.5 The Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Cinceita Pvt. Ltd., 137 ITR 652, held that though the period of the lease was for 20 years with an option for renewal at a higher rent, yet the expenditure claimed by the assessee was the only expenditure required for drawing up a proper and effective lease deed, namely, the expenditure in respect of the stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees paid to the solicitors, who prepared and registered the lease deed. It noted that there was no element of premium in the amount claimed as expenditure for acquiring the leasehold premises and moreover, the expenditure would have been the same even if the lease was for a shorter duration of any period exceeding one year. Importantly, the Court held that merely because the period of the lease was longer it could not be held that the expenditure resulted in acquiring an asset or advantage of an enduring nature. Therefore, the sum spent was held to be allowable as revenue expenditure.

4.6 The Kerala High Court in the case of Plantation Corporation, 205 ITR 364, held that the Appellate Tribunal had overemphasised the fact that the assessee had acquired an enduring benefit on planting rubber trees by obtaining long-term lease arrangement. The expenditure incurred relating to stamp duty, adjudication fee, registration fee, etc. in respect of lease deeds covering the lands leased to the assessee by the Government was revenue expenditure according to the Court.

4.7 The Madras High Court in the case of Sri Krishna Tiles & Potteries Madras (P) Ltd., 173 ITR 317, held that there was a transfer of interest in the property which was the subject matter of the agreement and the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount paid as salami was a capital expenditure; however, the sum paid towards stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees to the lawyers was allowable as revenue expenditure.

4.8 The Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Machinery Mfg. Ltd. 211 ITR 1010, in a case dealing with the claim by the lessor, held that the assessee had let an immovable property in consideration of obtaining rent from the lessee and that the assessee (lessor) had not spent any money for acquisition of an asset or rights of a permanent character. On the contrary, the assessee, as a lessor, had parted with some of its rights as owner of the immovable property in favour of the lessee. The assessee was the owner of the property and by executing the lease deed in favour of the lessee, it was not acquiring any new source of income or new asset. Therefore, the expenditure for the stamp duty and the registration of the lease deed could not be said to have been laid out for acquisition of any asset or a right of a permanent nature. The expenditure was laid out for earning rent or was spent as part of the process of profit earning. The expenditure was related to the carrying on or conduct of the business or of earning income by letting out the immovable property which was already owned by the assessee. Merely because the expenditure was related to a capital asset, it did not become a capital expenditure. Therefore, the expenditure incurred by the assessee for letting out the property was revenue expenditure. The Court in arriving at the decision relied on CIT v. Khandelwal Mining and Ores Pvt. Ltd., 140 ITR 701 (Born.) and CIT v. Katihar Jute Mills (P) Ltd., 116 ITR 781 (Cal.).

4.9 In CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 113 ITR 877, it was held by the Bombay High Court that expenses incurred by way of brokerage and stamp duty for acquiring office premises on lease for a short period of five years were allowable as a deduction in computing the total income of the assessee, since the assessee could not be said to have acquired or brought into existence an advantage of an enduring character.

4.10 The Bombay High Court again in CIT v. Bombay Cycle & Motor Agency Ltd., 118 ITR 42, allowed the claim of the assesses for deduction of the expenses in question. In that case, one of the leases in question was for a period of ten years and the other for a period of five years. The Tribunal had taken the view that the fact that the amounts had been spent in connection with the opening of new branches was by itself no justification for disallowance, that no asset of an enduring nature had been brought into existence, and that the period of the lease by itself was not indicative of securing an asset of an enduring nature and that the expenditure could not be disallowed as of a capital nature.

4.11 It appears that the decisions in the cases of United Commercial Corporation, 78 ITR 800 (All.) and Govind Sugar, 152 ITR 218 (Kar.), wherein the expenses in question were held to be not allowable irrespective of the fact that they were incurred after the business was set up require reconsideration. The view that the expenditure on stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees for drafting the lease deed be allowed as a revenue expenditure is a better view.

Taxability of interest on disputed compensation

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Government under the Constitution of India is vested
with the power to compulsorily acquire the private property of its subject in
the given circumstances on payment of compensation. This compensation may in
some cases get enhanced, by the Government or by a Court, where the owner of the
property challenges the quantum of compensation. In such cases of enhancement,
the owner in addition to the compensation is granted interest on the delayed
payment which usually spreads over a period exceeding a year. It is also seen
that the Government in turn challenges the orders of enhancement and interest
thereon, passed by the Courts, before the higher forum, before whom the issue is
finally settled.

1.2 In the circumstances stated in paragraph 1.1, the issues
that arise under the law of income-tax are; whether the compensation received is
taxable or not; whether the interest received thereon is taxable or not and if
yes in which year it will be taxable and whether the interest can be taxed
pending the finalisation of the dispute surrounding the quantum of compensation.

1.3 The first issue referred to in paragraph 1.2 is sought to
be taken care of by insertion of S. 45(5) which provides for taxation of deemed
capital gains on compulsory acquisition of a property. The second issue about
the year of taxation of the interest is rested by the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of Ramabai v. CIT, 181 ITR 400 (SC), wherein it was held that
the interest received on additional compensation should not be taken to have
been accrued in the year of the order, but should be held to have accrued year
after year from the date of handing of the possession of the property till the
date of the order granting the interest and should be spread over the period for
which the same was granted and should be taxed in the respective years. The
third issue continues to emerge repeatedly before the Courts requiring the
Courts to address the issue of the taxability of interest pending its
finalisation.

1.4 A good number of decisions of the High Courts confirms
that the interest on enhanced compensation cannot be taxed till such time the
same is free of any dispute and it is only when the payment thereof is free of
any disputes that it can be brought to tax. As against this, the Revenue
regularly relies on the sole decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which
held that the interest should be taxed in the year in which the same was
received under the order of additional compensation and the fact that the
Government had filed an appeal against the order of enhancement shall not defer
the taxation.

2. M. Sarojini Devi’s case :


2.1 The issue came up for consideration of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of CIT v. M. Sarojini Devi, 250 ITR 759. In that
case, land belonging to the assessee had been acquired by the Government in the
year 1966 and compensation was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The
amount of compensation was challenged by the assessee and on reference,
compensation at a higher rate was awarded in the previous year relevant to the
A.Y. 1976-77, together with an interest of Rs.43,642 for the period 1966 to
1975. The State Government challenged the said order of enhancement in an appeal
before the Supreme Court, which was pending. The Assessing Officer held that the
entire amount of interest on enhanced compensation was liable to tax in A.Y.
1976-77.

2.2 The assessment was challenged in appeal before the
Appellate Commissioner who held that the amount of interest received by the
assessee could not be taxed, as the matter had not become final and an appeal
was pending before the Supreme Court. In deciding the issue, he relied on a
judgment of the same Court in CIT v. Smt. Sankari Manickyamma, 105 ITR
172 (AP). On further appeal before the Tribunal, the Appellate Commissioner’s
view was upheld by following the said decision of the Court.

2.3 The Revenue being aggrieved referred the following
question to the Court : “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the interest on compensation for the assessment year for which the
interest should be brought to tax is the one in which it was awarded or the year
in which issue of quantum of compensation becomes final ?”

The question raised was reframed by the Court as follows;
“Whether the AO has to wait till the final disposal by the final Court in an
acquisition matter before the interest accrued is taxed ?”

2.4 The Court on consideration of the facts noted that the
question was already answered by the Supreme Court in Rama Bai v. CIT,
181 ITR 400 (SC). The Court observed that the fact that the compensation was
enhanced by the High Court in an appeal and the interest accruing thereon was
received by the assessee made him liable to pay the tax, however, the interest
would be spread over the period for which it accrued to him, in accordance with
the Supreme Court judgment. It also noted that in case the judgment enhancing
the compensation in favour of the assessee was reversed by the Supreme Court,
the assessee, even after payment of tax on the accrued interest, would not be
remediless, as he could seek refund of the tax so paid, by making appropriate
application for rectification of the assessment. Lastly, the Court was of the
view that the judgment relied upon by the Tribunal in Smt. Sankari Manickyamma’s
case, 105 ITR 172 (AP), stood reversed in view of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Rama Bai’s case, 181 ITR 400.

2.5 The Andhra Pradesh High Court for the above reasons,
answered the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

3. Karanbir Singh’s case :


3.1 The Punjab & Haryana High Court recently was required to
deal with the issue in the case of CIT v. Karanbir Singh, 216 CTR 585. In
that case land belonging to the assessee was acquired by the Punjab State
Electricity Board in 1962. During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1986-87,
the assessee received enhanced compensation and interest to the tune of
Rs.11,87,485 and Rs.17,06,686, respectively. The State Government filed an
appeal against the said order of enhancement, which appeal was pending at the
time of assessment. The AO held that the entire amount of interest received of
Rs.17,06,686 was assessable in the assessee’s hands for the A.Y. 1986-87, as the
amount was actually received during that year.

3.2 Aggrieved by the order of assessment on this count, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) and inter alia contended that the amount of interest received by the assessee was not taxable in his hands during the year in question in terms of judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., 161 ITR 524. The CIT(A) did not accept the contention of the assessee, but directed for taxing only that amount of interest which accrued to the assessee during the assessment year in question, by relying on the decision in the case of Smt. Rama Bai v..CIT, 181 ITR 400 (SC).

3.3 The assessee, being still aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the Tribunal where the Tribunal relying upon decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd.’s case (supra) accepted the appeal of the assessee by holding that no amount of interest should be taxable, as the matter regarding compensation had not attained finality and was still fluid.

3.4 At the instance of the Revenue, the following question was referred to the Punjab & Haryana High Court; “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the amount of interest on enhanced compensation received in June, 1985 in consequence upon judgment of District Judge and the amount having been utilised/invested in discretion of the assessee was not includible in the total income of the assessee ?”

3.5 The Revenue contended that the principles of law laid down in Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd.’s case (supra) were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the right to receive compensation by the assessee was not in dispute and it was only the quantification thereof on account of which the appeals were pending at the relevant time; that merely because the quantum issue had not attained finality, the amount which had actually been received and was available at the discretion of the assessee could not be held to be non-taxable, as the same would be totally against the spirit of the taxing statute. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Smt. M. Sarojini Devi (supra).

3.6 The High Court noted that against a solitary judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. M. Sarojini Devi’s case (supra), there were many judgments of different Courts taking a view in favour of the assessee on the issue, namely, CIT v. Laxman Das & Anr., 246 ITR 622 (All), Director of IT (Exemption) v. Goyal Charitable Trust, 125 CTR (Del.) 426, 215 ITR 672 (Del.), Chief CIT & Anr. v. Smt. Shantavva, 188 CTR (Kar.) 162,267 ITR 67 (Kar.) and CIT v. Abdul Mannan Shah Mohammed, 248 ITR 614 (Bom.). It also noted that a special leave peti-tion in a similar case was dismissed by the Supreme Court reported in CIT v. [anabaiViihabai Dudhe, 268 ITR (St) 215.

3.7 The High Court agreed that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. M. Sarojini Devi’s case (supra) had taken the view that the AO need not wait till the matter regarding assessment of compensation attained finality, however, for arriving at the above conclusion, much discussion was not available in that judgment. As against that, the Court found that in a number of judgments as referred to above, different Courts had held that such interest was to be taxed in the year of settlement of dispute and that under similar circumstances, a special leave petition to appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court had also been dismissed.

3.8 Keeping in view the totality of circumstances and the ratio of judgment referred to above, the Court decided the issue’ in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, by holding that the Revenue was not entitled to tax the amount of interest received by the assessee on account of acquisition of land till such time the proceedings in reference thereto attained a finality.

Observations:

4.1 The Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., 161 ITR 524 (SC), held that when the Government had appealed against the award and the- additional amount of compensation was deposited in the Court, it was not taxable at that stage, as the additional compensation would not accrue as income when it was specifically disputed by the Government in appeal.

4.2 A position  that has emerged  and  has gained acceptance on account of the above decision of the Supreme  Court  is that  where  the disputed  additional compensation does not accrue till such time the dispute relating thereto is settled; the question of taxing interest thereon should not arise at all, as the same has also not accrued till then.

4.3 The Bombay High Court following  the above referred Supreme Court decision in the case of Abdul Mannan Shah’s case (supra) held that in view of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, there was no merit in the Revenue’s appeal and that no substantial question of law arose as the judgment of the Supreme Court, on facts, squarely applied to the facts of the case before them. In that case, the Court was required to consider the taxability of the interest on enhanced compensation pending the appeal by the Government.

4.4 Recently a similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court in Paragon Constructions (I) (P) Ltd. v. CIT & Anr., 274 ITR 413, in a matter pertaining to arbitration where the amount of arbitration award received by the assessee was not held to be taxable till the proceedings attained a finality.

4.5 The issue appears to be fairly settled in favour of the assessee, not only by the decisions of the High Courts, but also by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) and in all fairness the Revenue should accept the position law laid down under these decisions to be final where the right to receive enhanced compensation itself is disputed by the Government. This acceptance will in turn avoid any futile litigation. The interest on enhanced compensation whenever in dispute before whichever forum should not be brought to tax till such time there remains no dispute regarding the quantum of enhanced compensation payable or paid in pursuance of an order of compulsory acquisition.

4.6 It is at the same time appropriate to note that the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) held that when the right to receive enhanced compensation itself was under dispute and was not absolute that the compensation cannot be said to have accrued, however, where the right was admitted and only quantification thereof was disputed, the taxation of the admitted undisputed amount need not be deferred. In that case, the enhanced compensation awarded by the arbitrators was allowed to be withdrawn on furnishing of a security bond that the amount released would be refunded in the event of the assessee found to be disentitled to the compensation so enhanced. In Abdul Mannan Shah’s case (supra), the case before the Bombay High Court, the assessee was permitted to withdraw the amount of interest deposited in the Court on furnishing the security for refund.

Contact details of Income Tax Ombudsman, at different Centres

Status of ‘Not Ordinarily Resident’ — S. 6(6)

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 In case of Individual (also HUF), if he is ‘Resident’ as
per the provisions of S. 6(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’), he can
also be regarded as ‘Not Ordinarily Resident’ (NOR) if he satisfies the
conditions provided u/s.6 (6) of the Act. Prior to its amendment by the Finance
Act, 2003 (with effect from 1-4-2004), this provision was very useful and
beneficial, especially for Indians residing abroad for a long time and returning
to India after their long stay outside India at their retirement age. These
provisions also became a tool for arranging one’s affairs in such a manner that
one cleared the status of NOR by remaining outside India for a shorter period of
two to three years continuously. Similar provisions were also contained in S. 4B
of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (1922 Act). The status of NOR gives an advantage of
non-taxability of foreign income in most cases. In the post-amendment period
(from A.Y. 2004-05) , the conditions for acquiring the status of NOR have been
made very stringent. However, we are not concerned in this write-up with the
post-amendment provisions and therefore, in this write-up, reference is made
only to pre-amendment provisions. For the sake of convenience, the reference of
HUF is also avoided in this write-up.

1.2 Once an Individual is regarded as ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), he
can also be regarded as NOR, if, he has not been ‘Resident’ in India in nine
years out of the ten previous years preceding that year [preceding years], or
has not been in India during the seven preceding years for a period of, or
periods amounting in all to, 730 days or more. As stated earlier, similar
provisions were also contained in S. 4B of the 1922 Act. In view of this, an
Individual, who is ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), unless he is NOR, is regarded as what is
popularly known as Ordinarily Resident. Accordingly, Individual can either be
Ordinarily Resident or NOR.

1.3 The consistent judicial as well as Departmental view was,
if an Individual is ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), he is regarded as Ordinarily Resident,
if, he satisfies both the conditions contained in S. 6(6), viz. (i) he
should be ‘Resident’ in India [u/s.6(1)] for nine years out of ten preceding
years AND (ii) he should be in India for an aggregate period of 730 days or more
in the preceding seven years. In other words, he can be regarded as NOR, if he
is in India for an aggregate period of less than 730 days in the seven preceding
years. OR effectively, he is ‘Non-Resident’ (NR) for at least two years u/s.6(1)
in ten preceding years. This was the consistent view under the Act as well as
under the 1922 Act till the Gujarat High Court took a different view in the case
of Pradip J. Mehta, which ultimately resulted into amendment in S. 6(6) in 2003
to keep the provisions in line with the view expressed by the Gujarat High
Court. The High Court took the view that an Individual has to be NR u/s.6(1) for
nine years out of the ten preceding years to acquire the status of NOR in a case
where he was in India for 730 days or more in seven preceding years. Therefore,
the controversy came-up with the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and existed
for the pre-amendment period. In fact, the Department was also attempting to
take a view that the amendment of 2003 is clarificatory and will also apply to
earlier years. Therefore, the issue became very vital.

1.4 The judgment of the Gujarat High Court referred to in
para 1.3 above, came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently and the
issue has now got resolved. Therefore, though the provisions have been amended
in 2003, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column, as the same will
be useful in many pending cases of the pre-amendment period.


Pradip J. Mehta v. CIT, 256 ITR 647 (Guj.) :


2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were : the assessee
had claimed status of NOR for the A.Y. 1982-83. The assessee was in India for
196 days in the relevant previous year and was also in India for more than 730
days (1402 days) in the seven preceding years. However, out of ten preceding
years, the assessee was NR for two years and hence, he claimed that as he was
not ‘Resident’ for nine years out of ten preceding years, he should be regarded
as NOR. The Assessing Officer (AO) took the view that for an Indian to become
NOR, he should be NR for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years and
as the assessee was NR only for two years out of the ten preceding years, he
cannot be regarded as NOR and accordingly he is Ordinarily Resident and his
foreign income is taxable in India. The First Appellate Authority, as well as
ITAT confirmed the view of the AO and the issue came up before the Gujarat High
Court at the instance of the assessee.

2.2 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was,
inter alia, contended that the intention of the Legislature in enacting
the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of Act was that, if an individual was not a
‘Resident’ for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years, he should be
treated as NOR. According to the counsel, the assessee was ‘Resident’ in India
for eight years out of ten preceding years, which means he was not a ‘Resident’
in India for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years. Therefore, he
falls in the category of NOR.

2.2.1 In support of his contention, the counsel for the
assessee drew the attention of the Court on the judgment of Patna High Court in
the case of C.M. Townsend (97 ITR 185), in which the High Court, while dealing
with the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of the Act, has held that the assessee will be
regarded as NOR, if he was not a ‘Resident’ in India for a period of nine years
out of ten preceding years. In that case that was so, though the assessee was in
India for more than 730 days in seven preceding years. Similar view was also
taken by the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) reported in (223 ITR 379).
Reliance was also placed on the judgments of the Bombay High Court in Manibhai
S. Patel (23 ITR 27) of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of P.B.I.
BAVA (27 ITR 463), in which also similar view was taken under the 1922 Act. The
attention of the Court was also drawn to the observations on the commentaries of
the learned authors Kanga and Palkhivala in their book the Law and Practice of
Income Tax, 7th Edition, in which similar conditions of S. 6(6) have been
clearly explained by relying on various judgments referred to therein.

2.3 On behalf of the Revenue, the counsel supported the reasonings of the Tribunal in support of its decision. It was also contended that the condition in the first part of S. 6 (6)(a) of the Act requires an individual not to be ‘Resident’ in India for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years for being treated as NOR.
 

2.4 After referring to the provisions contained in S. 6(6)(a) and noting the fact that similar provisions were contained in S. 4B of the 1922 Act, the Court stated that the short question raised for the assessee was that he should be treated as NOR because he was ‘Resident’ in India for a period of eight years and not nine years, as the law requires out of ten preceding years. In other words, he would be NOR, even if for all the remaining eight years out of ten years he was ‘Resident’ in India.

2.5 Referring to the contentions  of the assessee, the Court  stated  as under (page  654) :

“This contention though appearing to be attractive at first blush, is not at all warranted by the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of the Act. S. 6(6)(a) does not define ‘ordinarily resident in India’, but describes ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. It resorts to the concept of ‘resident in India’, for which the criteria are laid down in S. 6(1) of the Act. On its

plain construction clause (a) of S. 6(6) would mean that if an individual has in all the nine out of ten previous years preceding the relevant previous year not been resident in India as contemplated by S. 6(1), he is a person who is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. To say that an individual who has been resident in India for eight years out of ten preceding years should be treated as ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, does not stand to reason and such contention flies in the face of the clear provision of clause (a) of S. 6(6) which contemplates the period of nine years out of ten preceding years of not being a resident in India before an individual could be said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, which position will entitle such person to claim exemption under 5(1)(c) of the Act in respect of his foreign income. An individual who has not been resident in India, within the meaning of S. 6(1), for less than nine out of ten preceding years does not satisfy that statutory criteria laid down for treating such individual as a person who can be said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, as defined by S. 6(6). A resident of India who goes abroad and is not a resident in India for two years during the preceding period of ten years will therefore, not satisfy the said condition of not being a resident of India for nine out of ten years.”

2.6 The Court, then, noted that as per one of the conditions of S. 6(6)(a), if the assessee is in India for 730 days or more in seven preceding years, he does not become NOR. The Court also noted that u/s.6(1)(c), the individual will become ‘Resident’ if his total stay in India is 365 days or more in the preceding four years. The Court then observed as under (Page 655) :

“…………It would therefore, be strange  to treat a person who has been resident in India in eight years out of ten preceding years as an individual who is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. This mis-conception that has also crept in the commentaries of some learned authors on which reliance was placed, arises, because one tries to search for a definition of ‘ordinarily resident’ in India in S. 6(6)(a), which as observed above, only lays down the condition of not being resident in India for nine out of ten preceding years for being treated as ‘not ordinarily resident of India’ besides the other condition of not being in India for seven hundred and thirty or more days in the preceding seven years………..”

2.7 The Court, then, stated that ‘ordinarily resident’ for the purpose of income tax connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences. For this, the Court referred to certain decisions given in the UK and stated that the motive of presence here is immaterial, it is a question of quality which the presence assumes.

2.8 The Court, while deciding the issue against the assessee, finally concluded as under (page 656) :

“The foreign income of every resident even when it is not brought into the country is chargeable to tax except when the resident is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. For an individual including a resident in order to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ so as to escape tax on his foreign income, it must be shown that the position is covered by clause (a) of Ss.(6) of S. 6 of the Act. When an individual has been a resident in India for nine out of ten preceding years, then in order to escape tax on his foreign income, he must not have been in India for seven hundred and thirty days or more in the aggregate during the preceding seven years. The test is one of presence and not absence from India and the length of presence will determine when an individual is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. In order that an individual is not an ordinarily resident, he should satisfy one of the two conditions laid down in S. 6(6)(a) of the Act, the first condition is that he should not be resident in India in all the nine out of ten years preceding the accounting year and the second condition is that he should not have during the seven years preceding that year, been in India for a total period of seven hundred and thirty or more days.”

2.9 In the above judgment, somehow, the Court chose to not to deal with the reasonings of the judgments on which reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee (referred to in para 2.2.1 above).

Pradip J. Mehta  v. CIT, 300 ITR 231 (SC) :

3.1 The judgment of the Gujarat High Court referred to in para 2 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court. For the purpose of dealing with the issue, the Court noted the facts of the case of the assessee in brief. It seems that the Court has believed that the assessee was NR in three years out of ten preceding years while the factual position seems to be (as is apparent form the judgment of the High Court) that the assessee was NR for two years in ten preceding years. However, this factual misleading/wrong noting does not make any dif-ference in principle and therefore, one may ignore the same.

3.2 After considering the facts and the relevant provisions and the observations of the High Court (major part referred to in para 2.5 above), the Court noted the fact that certain decisions of the High Court and AAR (referred to in para 2.2.1 above) were cited on behalf of the assessee in support of his claim. The Court, then, considered those judgments/rulings and observed as under:

“The aforesaid decisions cited by the assessee have been noted by the High Court. The High Court answered the reference in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, without either agreeing or disagreeing with the view taken by the various High Courts and the Authority for Advance Rulings, which is presided over by a retired judge of the Supreme Court.”

3.3 The Court noted that S. 6(6)(a) of the Act cor-responds to and is in pari materia with S. 4B of the 1922Act. The Court then referred to the background of introduction of S. 4B in the 1922Act and speeches made during the assembly debates on proposed Section at that time which was referred to in the judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of P.B.I. BAVA (supra). Referring to this as well as other judgments, the Court observed as under (page 240) :

“The Indian Income-tax Act of 1922was replaced by the Income-tax Act of 1961.The Law Commission of India has recommended the total abolition of the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922Act defining ‘Ordinary Residence’ of the taxable entities. The Income-tax Bill, 1961 (Bill No. 27 of 1961), did not contain any such provision. On the legislative anvil, it was felt necessary to keep the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922 Act intact and therefore,S. 6(6)had to be enacted in the 1961Act. Referred to Chaturvedi & Pithisaria’s Income Tax Law, fifth Edition, volume I 1998, page 565.”

3.4 The Court also took note of Departmental Circular (being Circular letter dated 5-12-1962)issued by Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, addressed to Secretary,Indian Chamber of Commerce, (Calcutta) in which also the effect of the provisions was explained, which supports the stand of the assessee. It was also noted that the letter was issued after having communications with the Ministry of Finance.

3.5 The Court also took note of the fact that the Law Commission of India had recommended that the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922 Act be deleted, but that suggestion was not accepted by the Legislature. The Court then stated as under (Page 242):

“………Rather, on the legislative anvil, it was felt necessary to keep S. 4B of the 1922Act intact and, accordingly, S. 6(6), which corresponds to and is in pari materia with S. 4B of the 1922act, was enacted in the 1961 Act. This shows the legislative will. It can be presumed that the Legislature was in the know of the various judgments given by the different High Courts interpreting S: 4B, but still the Legislature chose to enact S. 6(6) in the 1961Act, in its wisdom, the Legislature felt necessary to keep the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922Act intact. It shows that the Legislature accepted the interpretation put by the various High Courts prior to the enactment of the 1961Act. It is only in the year 2003that the Legislature amended S. 6(6) of the 1961Act, which came into effect from April 1, 2004”.

3.6 The Court then clearly stated that it is well settled that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably, the Court would adopt interpretation which is in favour of the taxpayer and against the Revenue. For this, the Court also drew support from other judgments of the Apex Court.

3.7 Referring to the various judgments of the Apex Court, the Court also reiterated the settled position that the Circulars issued by the Department are binding on the Department. The Court also noted that Circular letter issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal has reference to the correspondence resting with the Ministry of Finance, wherein it is stated that the Department’s view has all along been the same as contended on behalf of the assessee. While deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, the Court finally concluded as under (page 243):

“In these circumstances, a person will become an ordinarily resident only if (a) he has been residing in nine out of ten preceding years; and (b) he has been in India for at least 730 days in previous seven years.

Accordingly, this appeal is accepted. The order passed by the High Court and the authorities below are set aside. It is held that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erred in its interpretation of S. 6(6) of the Act and the view taken by the Patna High Court, Bombay High Court and Travoncore-Cochin High Court has laid down the correct law……..”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that in the pre-amended provisions, the assessee has to be ‘Resident’ for nine years out of ten preceding years as well as he should also be in India at least for 730 days in the preceding seven years to be regarded as ‘Ordinarily Resident’. If, anyone of these conditions is not satisfied, he would be regarded as NOR under the preamended provisions.

4.2 The amendment    made by the Finance Act, 2003 is prospective and will not apply to period prior to A.Y.2004-05.

4.3 The Court has emphatically reiterated its earlier position that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably the interpretation favouring the taxpayer and against the Revenue should be adopted.

4.4 One more important principle reiterated by the Apex Court is that the judgments cited before the Courts in support of the contentions should be dealt with and reasons should be recorded for taking a contrary view.

Whether amendment relating to payment of P.F., etc. by ‘due date’ of furnishing return is retrospective ? — S. 43B

Introduction :

    1.1 With a view to prevent assessees from claiming deduction in respect of statutory liabilities, etc. even when they are disputed and not paid to appropriate authority, S. 43B was introduced w.e.f. A.Y. 1984-85. The provision, effectively, provides that deduction in respect of items specified therein will be allowed only on the basis of actual payment. Though originally the provision was introduced to cover statutory liabilities within its ambit, subsequently, the scope thereof is widened from time to time to include within its net bonus and commission payment to employees as well as interest payable to financial institutions, etc. Lastly, to nullify the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (245 ITR 428), even the employers’ liability in respect of provision for leave salary has also been brought within its ambit. Unfortunately, at the initial state, the provisions are introduced in the Income-tax Act (the Act) for a specific purpose (many times justifiable) and then, the scope thereof gets widened to unrelated items even if the judiciary explains the correct effects of the provisions originally introduced. S. 43B is a classic example of this nature.

    1.2 Large number of litigations were found on the effect of provision of S. 43B and finally, an attempt was made to carry out some rationalisation in the provision by the Finance Act, 1987, which introduced the first ‘proviso’ to S.43B w.e.f. A.Y. 1988-89 (hereinafter referred to as the said ‘proviso’). This is inserted with a view to provide deduction of statutory dues, etc. at the end of the previous year if, they are actually paid by the assessee on or before the ‘due date’ applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income u/s.139(1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘due date’) in respect of previous year in which the liability to pay such dues was incurred with certain further conditions with which we are not concerned in this write-up. Accordingly, with this rationalisation, such amount of outstanding at the year end and paid by the relevant ‘due date’ became eligible for deduction under the said ‘proviso’, which was made effective from 1-4-1988. However, this ‘proviso’, at that time, did not apply to items covered (contribution to P.F., etc.) under clause (b) of S. 43B, under which the conditions for allowing deductions were most stringent. In the context of this ‘proviso’, the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. (224 ITR 677) took the view that though the ‘proviso’ is introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1-4-1988, the same will apply retrospectively and the benefit thereof will be available even in respect of the assessment year prior to A.Y. 1988-89. The effect of this judgment was considered in this column in the May, 1997 issue of the Journal.

    1.3 Presently, S. 43B covers various items listed in clauses (a) to (f). Till the amendment was made by the Finance Act, 2003 (w.e.f. 1-4-2004), the said ‘proviso’ was applicable to all the clauses of S. 43B except clause (b) of S. 43B. Contribution to employees welfare fund (such as P.F., etc.) was governed by 2nd proviso to S. 43B, under which the payment thereof was required to be made by the due date under the relevant law, rule, etc. in the manner provided in the said 2nd proviso.

    1.4 S. 43B(b) covers the employers’ contribution to any Provident Fund (P.F.) or Superannuation Fund or Gratuity Fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees (hereinafter referred to as contribution to employees welfare fund). As stated in Para 1.3 above, this was earlier not covered by the said ‘proviso’ and accordingly, payment covered by S. 43B (except the contribution to employees welfare funds) were eligible for deduction if the payment in respect thereof is made by the relevant ‘due date’. The Finance Act, 2003 omitted the said 2nd proviso to S. 43B and amended the said first ‘proviso’ w.e.f. 1-4-2004 and made the first ‘proviso’ also applicable to clause (b) dealing with contribution to employees welfare funds (hereinafter this amendment is referred to as Amendment of 2003). Accordingly, all the items covered in S. 43B [i.e., clauses (a) to (f)] are eligible for deduction if amount is paid by the relevant ‘due date’ even if the same is outstanding at end of the relevant year. We are concerned with the effect of this Amendment of 2003 in this write-up.

    1.5 The issue was under debate as to whether the amendment of 2003 will apply to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 as the amendment was expressly made effective from 1-4-2004. After this amendment, various Benches of the Tribunal started taking a view that the amendment is clarificatory in nature and is applicable retrospectively even to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05. For this, reliance was being placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. referred to in Para 1.2 above. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. (213 CTR 268) dismissed the SLP filed by the Department against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. (284 ITR 619) in a case dealing with the assessment year prior to A.Y. 2004-05, by stating that the assessee will be entitled to claim the benefit in S. 43B for that period particularly in view of the fact that he has made the contribution to P.F. before filing of the return. Many of the High Courts also took similar view that the amendment of 2003 is clarificatory in nature and is applicable to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 [Ref. : 297 ITR 320 (Del.), 313 ITR 144 (Mad.), 313 ITR 161 (Del.), 213 CTR 269 (Kar.) etc.]. However, the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues Limited (313 ITR 137) took a view that the said amendment of 2003 is applicable only from the A.Y. 2004-05. This was followed by the Bombay High Court in other cases also. Therefore, the debate continued and the assessees within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court were suffering the disallowance for the prior years in such cases.

    1.6 Recently, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the issue referred to in Para 1.5 above in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. and the issue is now finally resolved. Though the law is amended from the A.Y. 2004-05, in respect of the prior years, many matters are pending and are under litigation (especially in the State of Maharashtra). Therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

CIT v. Pawmi Tissues Limited, 313 ITR 137 (Bom.)

2.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up before the Bombay High Court in the above case at the instance of the Revenue in the context of the A.Y. 1990-91. The following question was raised before the Court (Page 138) :
 
“The substantial question of law which arises in the present appeal is regarding the correct inter-pretation of S. 43B, S. 2(24)(x) read with S. 36(1)(va) and as to the claim of deductions as claimed by the assessee in respect of the PF, EPF and ESIC contributions especially in the facts and circumstances of the case and in law.”

2.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that insofar as the provident fund dues are concerned, the amendment is made applicable from the A.Y. 2004-05. In the earlier years, the employers’ contribution to P.F. if not paid within the due date under the relevant law was not eligible for deduction. For this, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Godavari (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. (298 ITR 149).

2.3 On behalf of the assessee, attention was drawn to the judgment of Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Limited (supra) to contend that while considering the same issues for the A.Y. 1992-93, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee following the earlier judgments of the same High Court in other cases. It was further pointed out that the Revenue preferred Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court in the case reported as Vinay Cement Limited and the SLP was dismissed. Consequently, the said judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Limited got approved. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Employees Welfare Association (4 SCC 187), it was pointed out that if the Supreme Court has given reasons for dismissing the SLP, that still attracts Article 14 of the Constitution and consequently, it would be a binding precedent.

2.4 After considering the contentions of both the sides, the High Court decided the issue against the assessee and allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue with the following observations [Page 139] :

“In our opinion, the dismissal of the special leave petition as held in CIT v. Vinay Cement Ltd., (2009) 313 ITR (St.) 1 cannot be said to be the law decided. In State of Orissa v. M. D. Illyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275, the Supreme Court has held that a decision is a precedent on its own facts and that for a judgment to be a precedent it must contain the three basis postulates. A finding of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the individual effect of the above.”

2.5 In view of the above judgment of the Bombay High Court, the view also prevailed that the said Amendment of 2003 is prospective and applicable only from the A.Y. 2004-05.

CIT v. Alom Extrusions Limited, 2009 TIOL 125 SC IT:

3.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court in a batch of civil appeals with the lead matter in the case of Alom Extrusion Ltd. For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted the first and the second provisos prior to the amendment of 2003 and the said ‘proviso’ (the first proviso) after such amendment.

3.2 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court considered the scheme of the Act and the historical background and the object of introduction of the provisions of S. 43B. The Court also referred to the earlier amendments made in 1988 with introduction of the first and second provisos. The Court also noted further amendment made in 1989 in the second proviso dealing with the items covered in S. 43B(b) (i.e., contribution to employees welfare funds). After considering the same, the Court stated that it becomes clear that prior to the amendment of 2003, the employer was entitled to deduction only if the contribution stands credited on or before the due date given in the Provident Fund Act on account of second proviso to S. 43B. This created further difficulties and as a result of representations made by the industry, the amendment of 2003 was carried out which deleted the second proviso and also made first proviso applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds referred to in S. 43B(b).

3.3 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia, contended that even between 1988 and 2004, the Parliament had maintained a clear dichotomy be-tween the tax duty, etc. on one hand and contribution to employees welfare funds on the other. This dichotomy continued up to 1st April, 2004 and hence, the Parliament consciously kept that dichotomy alive up to that date by making the amendment of 2003 effective from 1-4-2004. Accordingly, the amendment of 2003 should be read as amendatory and not as curative.
 
3.4 Disagreeing with the argument of the Department, the Court stated that there is no merit in the appeals filed by the Department for various reasons such as : originally S. 43B was introduced from 1-4-1984 with certain objectives and the conditions thereof were relaxed in 1988 in the context of tax duty and other items [except for contribution to employees welfare funds covered in S. 43B(b)] to remove the hardships. This relaxation appears to have not been made applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds for the reason that the employers should not sit on the collected contributions and deprive the workmen of the rightful benefits under Social Welfare Legislations by delaying payment of contribution to welfare funds. The Court then further observed as under :

“However, as stated above, the second proviso resulted in implementation problems, which have been mentioned hereinabove, and which resulted in the enactment of Finance Act, 2003, deleting the second proviso and bringing about uniformity in the first proviso by equating tax, duty, cess and fee with contributions to welfare funds. Once this uniformity is brought about in the first proviso, then, in our view, the Finance Act, 2003, which is made applicable by the Parliament only with effect from 1st April, 2004, would become curative in nature, hence, it would apply retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988.”

3.5 The Court then referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors [P] Ltd. (supra) in which the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1-4-1988 (referred to in Para 1.2 above) was held as retrospective in nature. After considering the said judgment , the Court finally decided the issue in favour of the assessees and held as under :

“Moreover, the judgment in Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) is delivered by a Bench of three learned Judges, which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold that the Finance Act, 2003, will operate retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988 [when the first proviso stood inserted].”

3.6 To support its conclusion, the Court also drew support from another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of J. H. Gotla (156 ITR 323) with the following observations :

“Lastly, we may point out the hardship and the invidious discrimination which would be caused to the assessee(s) if the contention of the Department is to be accepted that the Finance Act, 2003, to the above extent, operated prospectively. Take an example — in the present case, the respondents have deposited the contributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March (end of accounting year) but before filing of the Returns under the Income-tax Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees’ Provident Fund Act, they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction u/ s.43-B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of ac-count in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right up to 1st April, 2004, and who pays the contribution after 1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction u/s.43-B of the Act. In our view, therefore, Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, should be read as retrospective. It would, therefore, operate from 1st April, 1988, when the first proviso was introduced. It is true that the Parliament has explicitly stated that the Finance Act, 2003, will operate with effect from 1st April, 2004. However, the matter before us involves the principle of construction to be placed on the provisions of Finance Act, 2003.”

Conclusion :

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the amendment of 2003 referred to hereinbefore is applicable to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 also and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pawmi Tissues Ltd. (supra) is no longer a good law.

4.2 In many cases, especially within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court, the assessees have suffered disallowances and the matters are pending. In such cases, the assessees will be entitled to get the benefits of such deductions.

Whether accrued interest will be nullified by subsequent modification in terms ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 In respect of transaction of borrowing and lending,
agreements are entered into between the parties, under which interest is payable
by the borrower to the lender and such interest becomes income of the lender in
the year of accrual under the Mercantile System of Accounting. Many a time,
assets are purchased by the assessee (purchaser) on deferred credit basis and in
such cases, generally, the terms of agreement provide for the liability to pay
interest by the purchaser on the amount outstanding from time to time. Such
interest also becomes income of the person granting such credit in the year of
accrual under the Mercantile System of Accounting.

1.2 After determining the terms of credit and liability to
pay interest, sometimes, for various commercial reasons, such terms are modified
and such modification may also include change in the effective date from which
the interest becomes payable by the concerned party. For this purpose,
especially in case of companies, appropriate resolution is passed at the
relevant time, generally before the end of the relevant year recording modified
terms and the revised effective date from which the interest becomes payable. In
all such cases, the issue arises with regard to the effect of such resolution on
the past period as well as for the future period in the context of taxability of
interest income in the hands of the company passing such resolution.

1.3 Recently, the issue referred to in Para 1.2 above, came
up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Sarabhai Holding P.
Ltd. This judgment throws considerable light on the issue and the same would be
a good guide for dealing with such issues. Therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column, as such issue very often arises in the
day-to-day practice.


Sarabhai Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT,


257 ITR 355 (Guj.) :

2.1 The name of the above Company had subsequently undergone
change and the Company was then known as Sarabhai Holdings P. Ltd. In the above
case, various issues with regard to liability to pay interest u/s.215, penalty
u/s.272(2) for under-estimate of income for payment of advance tax, concealment
penalty u/s.271(1)(c), etc. had come up before the Court, with which we are not
concerned in this write-up. The main issue was with regard to accrual of
interest income and taxability thereof, which is similar to the issue referred
to in Para 1.2 above and accordingly, only relevant facts in that context are
considered here. The accounting year of the assessee was July-June. The issue
related to A.Ys. 1979-80 and 1980-81. As such, the relevant previous years were
the periods from 1-7-1977 to 30-6-1978 and 1-7-1978 to 30-6-1979 as per the
provisions of the Act at the relevant time. The assessee was following the
Mercantile System of Accounting. The relevant facts were : Under an agreement
dated 28-2-1977, the assessee had transferred (effective from that date) its
industrial undertaking of Sara-bhai Chemicals & Business Activity of Sarabhai
Company Services Division as a going concern (hereinafter referred to as the
said Unit) to its wholly-owned subsidiary, namely, Elscope (P.) Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as the said Elscope) for an agreed consideration and,
in turn, after four months, the said Elscope had transferred the said Unit to
its subsidiary, namely, Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. The said agreement
dated 28-2-1977 was amended by supplementary agreement dated 4-3-1977 and the
Deed of Assignment was executed on 28-6-1977. Under the terms of the agreement,
the said Elscope was liable to pay part of the consideration when demanded by
the assessee and payment of part consideration was deferred, which was to be
paid in eight equal annual instalments on 1st October of every year beginning
from 1-10-1979 and the same was to carry simple interest @ 11% per annum on the
amount outstanding from time to time.

2.1.1 On 15th June, 1978, the said Elscope wrote to the
assessee proposing modification in terms of payment and requested, inter alia,
that the interest be charged on the deferred sale consideration from 1-7-1979
instead of from 1-3-1977. It was also proposed that certain amount will be
payable (Rs.1.84 crores) as and when the assessee demands without any interest
and part of the amount (Rs.4.70 crores) will be paid in five annual instalments
beginning from 1-3-1987, which will carry simple interest @ 11% per annum with
effect from 1-7-1979. The said Elscope also offered to secure the said amount of
Rs.4.70 crores to the satisfaction of the assessee [eventually, it seems that
Secured Debentures of the said Ambalal Sarabhai Ltd. were given as security]. On
30th June, 1978, the proposal sent by the said Elscope vide letter dated
15-6-1978 was decided to be accepted by the assessee and a resolution to that
effect was passed (hereinafter referred to as the said Resolution) in the
Meeting of the Board of Directors. The relevant portion of the said Resolution
reads as under :

“. . . the company doth hereby approve, accept and adopt
the following revised mode of payment as contained in letter No. ELSCOPE/MC
dated 15th June, 1978, received from Elscope Pvt. Ltd.”


2.1.2 The assessee company furnished Returns of Income for the A.Y. 1979-80, declaring business income of Rs.772 and for the A.Y. 1980-81, declaring loss of Rs.17,345. In these returns, the assessee had not considered the interest income from the said Elscope, on the ground that as per the revised arrangement such interest was payable by the party only from 1-7-1979. The Income-tax Officer (ITA) took a view that by the date the said Resolution [dated 30-6-1978] was passed, the interest for the whole year had already accrued to the assessee. It was further held that the assessee has relinquished the interest without any commercial consideration as the two companies were closely related and it was the case of collusion to evade tax liability. Accordingly, the ITa added the interest income of Rs.66,29,236 for the A.Y. 1979-80. Almost for similar reasons, the ITa also made an addition of Rs.55,67,750 for the A.Y. 1980-81 on account of such interest. The first Appellate Authority [CIT(A)] confirmed the action of the ITa. The CIT(A) also commented on the nature of security given by the said Elscope while revising the terms of payment of interest and pointed out that the security of bonds of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. were redeemable during the year 1991 or subject to some conditions in the year 1987. Accordingly, considering its quoted market price, the same are worth about %rd of the face value. Thus, in the process, the assessee company has accepted assets worth %rd of the market price as such security.
 
2.1.3 When the matter came up in the second appeal, the Tribunal took the view that it is pertinent to note that there is no indication in the said Resolution to suggest that the revised mode of payment was effective from any date prior to 30-6-1978. Therefore, it is not a case where the income though given up during the year could not be said to accrue, the accrual of interest commenced from the beginning of the accounting year as interest accrues from day to day. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the contention of the assessee that no interest accrued for the accounting year relevant to the A.Y. 1979-80 and confirmed the action of the ITA as well as CIT(A) for that year. However, for the A.Y. 1980-81, the Tribunal pointed out that there was a material distinction between the facts for that year and the earlier year. This difference was caused by the said Resolution (dated 30-6-1978), under which the original agreement stood modified. Accordingly, it was held that as a result of the said Resolution, no income could be said to have accrued to the assessee for this year, as the interest was to start accruing from 1-7-1979. The Tribunal also stated that as there was no accrual of income at all, no question of relinquishment of any right to receive arises. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted the addition made in respect of interest income for the A.Y. 1980-81.

2.2 When the matter came up before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that in view of the said Resolution, there was no accrual of interest to the assessee till 30-6-1979. It was further contended that it was open for the assessee to agree to modification of the terms of payment and substitute the original stipulation re-garding the payment of interest by fixing time, from which the interest would accrue and that was done before the end of the relevant accounting year. Alternatively, it was contended that if the interest is treated as accrued for the A.Y. 1979-80, it should be held that the income accrued was given up by the assessee for valid commercial expediency and for that purpose, reliance was placed on concept of real income. It was pointed out that the assessee had agreed to modify the terms with a view to get his dues secured. Reliance was placed on the judgments of various High Courts and the Apex Court in support of such propositions.

2.3 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that there was no commercial expediency for which interest that had already accrued could have been given up. The transaction between the parties was not a genuine transaction as the said Elscope was only made a conduit pipe as the said Elscope had transferred the said Unit to its subsidiary within a short period of four months. It was also contended that the said Resolution did not effectively change the mode of payment even for the A.Y. 1980-81 and the interest continued to accrue to the assessee under the existing mode of payment stipulated in the agreement and the deed of assignment. It was also pointed out that the said Resolution could not be given retrospective effect, because on the last day of the accounting year, the interest had already accrued and the same could not have been affected by such resolution. It was also contended that there was no reason for the said Elscope to make the proposal for modification as its subsidiary (Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd.) had also stepped in its shoes by that time. Reliance was also placed on the judgments of various High Courts and the Apex Court in support of such propositions.

2.4 After considering the contentions raised on behalf of both the parties and various judgments on which reliance was placed, the Court proceeded to decide the issue for the A.Y. 1979-80. For this purpose, the Court noted various terms and conditions stipulated in the original agreement, the supplementary agreement and the deed of assignment. Having referred to the same, the Court observed as under (pages 391/392) :

“It would be a trite thing to say that the terms of payment of interest which were binding on the parties were those which finally came to be incorporated in the deed of assignment. Payment of interest was treated as essence of the contract and as noted above. If the instalments were not duly paid, the rate of interest was to be higher than 11% per annum and the vendee was in the event of default of payment of instalment bound to pay interest at the rate payable by the vendor to its bankers in the ordinary course of business. These terms regarding mode of payment were never disturbed until the last date of the accounting year ending on June 30, 1978 on which date the assessee passed the resolution dated June 30, 1978, ‘by which it accepted the proposal of its subsidiary Elscope sent on June IS, 1978 and substituted the mode of payment by purporting to shift the date of charging of interest by July I, 1979.”

2.5 The Court, then, noted that from the terms of various agreements, it is seen that the transaction took place with effect from 1-3-1977 and the obligation to pay interest was incorporated in such agreement in the context of such transaction. The obligation to pay interest was not a separate debt, but the debt incurred under the contract included the obligation to pay interest. Therefore, to say that no date of accrual of interest was fixed in the contract is to misconstrue the provision thereto, despite the express stipulation about the obligation to pay interest which was to be treated as the essence of the contract. When no date is specified in the transaction which incorporated an obligation of party thereto to pay interest, it obviously would mean that the date from which the interest is to be paid would be the point of time from when the obligation to pay the outstanding amount starts and that will be the date from which the creditor’s entitlement to recover interest starts.

2.6 Having made the above-referred observations, the Court finally, while deciding the issue against the assessee with regard to accrual of interest, held as under (page 393) :

“Interest accrues in most circumstances on the time basis to be determined by the amount out-standing and the rate applicable. Recognition of the revenue requires that the revenue is measurable, and that at the time of sale, it would not be unreasonable to accept ultimate collection. In the present case, in view of the categorical stipulation that interest will be payable on the deferred consideration amount in respect of the sale which became effective from March 1, 1977, the interest started accruing on that time basis from March I, 1977 determined by the amount outstanding from time to time and the rate applicable which were stipulated in clearest possible terms in the deed of assignment dated June 28,1977, and the agreements which preceded it. That what already accrued during the accounting year from July I, 1977 to June 30,1978 could not be nullified by the resolution of June 30, 1978, said to have been passed at 2.00 p.m. on that day. As held by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Shiv Prasad Janak Raj and Co. (P.) Ltd. (1996) 222 ITR 583, the concept of real income cannot be employed so as to defeat the provisions of the Act and the Rules. In that case, it was held that waiver of interest after the expiry of the relevant accounting year only meant that the assessee was giving up the money which had accrued to it. It cannot be said that the interest amount had not accrued to the assessee.”

2.7 The Court, then, stated that now the only question remains to be examined is whether the interest that had accrued and which the assessee did not in fact receive was given up for any commercial expediency after its accrual as contended on behalf of the assessee on an alternative basis. For this, the assessee relies on the fact that the debt which was earlier unsecured became secured on such re-arrangement. After referring to the factual position in this regard, the Court stated that admittedly no security passed. The CIT(A) has admirably discussed this aspect in his order and exposed the hollowness of the assessee’s stand that it secured debt with the bonds of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. According to the Court, the last-minute arrangement was made to ward off the payment of tax on interest income that had accrued to assessee during the accounting year ending 30-6-1978 (till the moment the resolution dated 30-6-1978 was passed at 2 p.m.). For this, the ground of commercial expediency was created of getting debt secured. In fact and reality, neither was there in particular security offered in the proposal, nor was there any acceptance of security. A ghost was created to hide the real object of modification of the mode of payment, which was to ward off payment of tax on interest income that already had accrued to the assessee. Accordingly, the Court confirmed the decision of the Tribunal for the A.Y. 1979-80 and upheld the addition on account of interest income made by the ITO.

2.8 The Court then noted that there was no challenge levelled against the genuineness of the said Resolution. The law permits the contracting parties to change their stipulations by mutual agreement and, therefore, there was no impediments in changing the terms of the contract. The resolution dated 30-6-1978 accepted the proposal of the said Elscope. In view of this, under the changed mode of payment adopted in it, no interest was to accrue during the accounting period from 1-7-1978 to 30-6-1979. Therefore, no interest accrued to the assessee during that period and hence, the reasoning of Tribunal for deleting the addition of such interest income for the A.Y. 1980-81 is correct. Since no interest accrued during this period, no question of relinquishment of interest for any commercial expediency arises, as you cannot relinquish the income that has not accrued at all. Accordingly, the Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee for the A.Y. 1980-81.

CIT v. Sarabhai  Holdings  P. Ltd., 307 ITR 89 (SC) :
3.1 The above-referred   judgment  of the Gujarat High Court came up before the Apex Court at the instance of the Revenue as well as the assessee. On behalf of both the parties various contentions were raised to support their case, which were similar to the contentions raised before the High Court.

3.2 After considering the factual position with regard to both the assessment years and the contentions raised by the parties, the Court, first dealt with the contention of the Revenue that the assessee was trying to avoid payment of tax on the interest by making such arrangements and in that context observed as under (page 98) :

“We cannot understand the criticism of learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue that by resolution dated June 30, 1978, the assessee was avoiding the payment of tax on the interest which had accrued. The genuine nature of the resolution was not and could not be disputed. When we see the letter dated [une 15, 1978, and also note that the letter was complied with by Elscope in providing adequate security of the payable amount, there is nothing to dispute or suspect the genuineness of the transaction. The whole transaction would have to be viewed on that backdrop. In the commercial world, the parties are always free to vary the terms of contract. Merely because by resolution dated June 30, 1978, the assessee agreed to defer the payment of interest, that would not mean that it tried to evade the tax. What is material in tax jurisprudence is evasion of the tax, not the beneficial lawful adjustment therefor. Considering the genuine nature of the transaction based on the letter dated June 15, 1978, and the resolution dated June 30, 1978, it cannot be said that the whole transaction was in order to evade the tax.”

3.3 Having accepted the genuineness of the said Resolution and the object of the assessee, the Court confirmed the decision of the High Court for both the assessment years and held as under (page 99) :

“We agree with the High Court’s finding that the law permits the contracting parties to lawfully change their stipulations by mutual agreement and, therefore, the assessee and the vendee had no legal impediment in modifying the terms of their contract. We also agree with the further finding of the High Court that the resolution could not be given any retrospective effect so as to facilitate evasion of tax liability that had already arisen for the A.Y. 1979-80.We further agree with the High Court’s finding that it being a valid stipulation, it changed the mode of payment from the date of the resolution and, therefore, under the changed mode of payment adopted under the resolution dated June 30,1978, no interest was to accrue during the accounting period from July 1, 1978, up to June 30, 1979, and, therefore, the reasoning of the Tribunal on that count appeared to be correct as regards  the assessment  year 1980-81 is concerned. We further confirm the finding that since no interest had accrued in the accounting year July 1, 1978 to June 30,1979, there could arise no question of relinquishment of interest for any commercial expediency.”

Conclusion:

4.1 The above judgment of the Apex Court confirms the principle that generally interest accrues on day-to-day basis. The Court has also accepted the view of the High Court that the interest so accrued cannot be nullified by the resolution subsequently passed.

4.2 It seems to us that the effect of the resolution in the above case has been decided on the basis of the facts of that case. It also seems that the above principle cannot have universal application in every case dealing with the time of accrual of interest irrespective of the facts of the case. In a given case, based on the terms of agreement and/or facts and circumstances of the case, a different view may also emerge.

4.3 Though the concept of real income still holds good, the same has to be applied cautiously and in case of non-receipt of accrued interest, it may be difficult to apply when the assessee follows the Mer-cantile System of Accounting.

Withdrawal from Revaluation Reserve— Effect on ‘book profit’U/s.115jb

Closements

Introduction :

1.1 S. 115JB was introduced by the Finance Act,
2000 with effect from A.Y. 2001-02, which, in substance, provides that if the
income-tax payable on Total Income is less than 7.5% of the ‘Book Profit’ of the
Company, then the ‘Book Profit’ shall be deemed to be the Total Income of the
assessee, on which tax is payable @ 7.5% (this rate is subsequently increased
from time to time and presently the same is 18% from A.Y. 2011-12). This
position emerges on account of subsequent amendment made in S. 115JB by the
Finance Act, 2002 with retrospective effect from A.Y. 2001-02. Accordingly, in
such cases, u/s.115JB Minimum Alternative Tax (MAT) is payable by the Company.
S. 115JB is the successor of S. 115JA, which was introduced by the Finance (No.
2) Act, 1996 with effect from 1997-98 and which continued up to A.Y. 2000-01.
Originally, for the purpose of levy of MAT, S. 115J was introduced by the
Finance Act, 1987 with effect from A.Y. 1988-89, which continued up to A.Y.
1990-91.

1.2 Basically, all the abovereferred three
provisions enacted for the purpose of levy of MAT are on similar line with one
major difference that u/s.115JB MAT liability is to be worked out at 7.5% of the
‘Book Profit’ and the ‘Book Profit’ is deemed to be Total Income, whereas in the
earlier provisions, 30% of the ‘Book Profit’ was deemed to be the Total Income
in cases where the Total Income of the Company was found to be less than 30% of
its ‘Book Profit’. This and certain other differences in such provisions are not
relevant for the purpose of this write-up.

1.3 Under all the abovereferred three provisions,
one common thread is that the basis of working of ultimate tax liability is the
‘Book Profit’. In all these provisions, one common provision can be noticed that
the Company shall prepare its Profit & Loss Account for the relevant Previous
Year, in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to
the Companies Act, 1956. In this context, the provisions of S. 115JB have been
made more stringent with which also we are not concerned in this write-up. By
and large, the profit shown in such Profit & Loss Account cannot be disturbed by
the AO in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Apollo Tyres
Ltd. (255 ITR 273). This judgment we have analysed in this column in the June,
2002 issue of this Journal.

1.4 In all the abovereferred three Sections, the
‘Book Profit’ is defined in the relevant Section. In such definition, starting
point, in each of the Section, is net profit means ‘Net Profit as shown in the
Profit & Loss Account for the relevant Previous Year’ and the definition further
specifies certain items for adjustments to increase such net profit
(‘Specified Items for Upward Adjustments’)
and items for adjustments to
reduce the net profit so increased, (‘Specified Item for Downward
Adjustments’)
as provided therein. One such ‘Specified Item for Downward
Adjustment’ provided in all the three provisions relates to the amount withdrawn
from any Reserve or Provision, if any such amount is credited to the Profit &
Loss Account. In S. 115JB, ‘Book Profit’ is defined in Explanation 1 to S. 115JB
(the said Explanation). In the said definition, the ‘Specified Item for
Downward Adjustment’ relating to such withdrawal from Reserve/Provision
appearing in clause (i) reads as under :


“(i) the amount withdrawn from any reserve or
provision (excluding a reserve created before the 1st day of April, 1997
otherwise than by way of a debit to the profit and loss account), if any
such amount is credited to the profit and loss account;

Provided that where this Section is
applicable to an assessee in any previous year, the amount withdrawn from
reserves created or provisions made in a previous year relevant to the
assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 shall not
be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been
increased by those reserves or provisions (out of which the said amount was
withdrawn) under this Explanation or Explanation below second
proviso to S. 115JA, as the case may be; “

Hereinafter, the above Clause is referred as
the said Clause (i), reduction with respect to the amount of
withdrawal provided in the said Clause (i) is referred to as “Exclusion
from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’
and the restriction on such exclusion provided
in the Proviso to the said Clause (i) is referred to as “Restriction on
Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ “
.


1.5 In cases where the Company revalues its Fixed
Asset resulting into increase in the value of such assets in the books of the
Company, the increased amount is credited to Revaluation Reserve Account in
accordance with the accepted accounting principles. In view of such revaluation,
the Company is required to provide depreciation on fixed assets on the revalued
amount of such assets instead of on the basis of historical costs. At the same
time, the Company is permitted to withdraw from the Revaluation Reserve Account
differential amount of depreciation (i.e., the amount of depreciation
related to revalued amount of fixed assets). In such cases, effectively, the
amount of charge of depreciation to Profit & Loss Account equals to the
depreciation, which would have been otherwise charged on historical cost. This
is accepted accounting practice.

1.6 In the past, the issue was under debate as to whether in such cases, the amount withdrawn from Revaluation Reserve Account should be reduced from the net profit for the purpose of computing the ‘Book Profit’ by treating the same as item of “Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’ as provided in the said Clause (i) or the same should not be so excluded as it falls in the category of “Restriction on Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’. The Delhi High Court in the case of Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. (184 Taxman 375) has decided the issue against the assessee. However, some of the professionals still held the view that such withdrawal from the Revaluation Reserve Account should be treated as item of “Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’, mainly on the ground that at the time of creation of Revaluation Reserve, as per the accepted accounting principles and practices, the amount of revaluation was never required to be routed through Profit & Loss Account and hence, the restriction contained in the Proviso to the said Clause (i) should not apply.

1.7 It may be noted that by virtue of the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2006 with effect from A.Y. 2007-08, a specific provisions are made in the definition of ‘Book Profit’ in S. 115JB because of which, effectively, depreciation relating revalued amount is required to be ignored.

1.8 Recently, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the abovereferred judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and the issue has now got settled. Though, now there is a specific provision in S. 115JB referred to in para 1.7 above, this judgment will be relevant for pending cases as well as for general principles in the context of the computation of ‘Book Profit’. Therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. v. CIT (unreported):

2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were : during the previous year ending 31-3-2000 (A.Y. 2000-01), the Company had revalued its fixed assets resulting into increase in book value of such assets by Rs.288.58 cr. During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2001-02, in the Profit & Loss Account, a charge of depreciation was shown at Rs.127.57 cr. which was reduced by the transfer from Revaluation Reserve Account to the extent of Rs.26.12 cr. resulting in a net debit on account of depreciation at Rs.101.45 cr. The net profit as per Profit & Loss Account of the Company was Rs.18.74 cr. In the return of income, while computing ‘Book Profit’ for the purpose of MAT liability u/s.115JB, the asses-see treated the amount of Rs.26.12 cr. withdrawn from the Revaluation Reserve Account as item of “Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’ under the said Clause (i) and accordingly, reduced the amount of profit by that amount. During the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of such reduction of Rs.26.12 cr. while computing the ‘Book Profit’ on the ground that the Revaluation Reserve Account was created in the A.Y. 2000-01 and this amount was not added back to the net profit for the purpose of computing the ‘Book Profit’ as provided in the said proviso to the said Clause (i) and accordingly, this amount falls in the category of “Restriction on Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’. The assessee did not succeed in his appeals before the first Appellate Authority, ITAT as well as the High Court. Accordingly, at the instances of assessee, the issue referred to in para 1.6 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court.

2.2 Before the Apex Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the creation of Revaluation Reserve does not impact the Profit and Loss Account in the year of creation; such Revaluation Reserve is not a free reserve; the same is not available for distribution of profits; unlike revenue reserves, such reserve is not an appropriation of profits and the same is never debited by way of debit entry through Profit & Loss Account; the Revaluation Reserve is in the nature of adjustment entry to balance both the sides of balance sheet, etc. It was further contended that the treatment of Revaluation Reserve is governed by the Accounting Standards 10 and 6 (AS) and the Guidance Note on Treatment of Reserves Created on Revaluation of Fixed Assets (Guidance Note) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and on that basis the amount of such reserve is not debited to Profit & Loss account in the year of creation and the amount of revaluation is directly credited to Revaluation Reserve Account. Since in the year of creation of such reserve, the ‘Book Profit’ suffers full tax, without being affected by creation of such reserve, in the year of withdrawal, the amount withdrawn would be liable to be reduced while computing the ‘Book Profit’. It was also pointed out that by virtue of the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2006 (referred to in para 1.7) the deprecation on historical cost would only be taken into account while computing the ‘Book Profit’ and the same is applicable from A.Y. 2007-08.

2.3 After considering the arguments raised on behalf of the assessee, the Apex Court proceeded to decide the issue and for that purpose noted the provisions of S. 115JB. The Court also referred to the historical background of the provisions relating to MAT starting from S. 115J onwards referred to in paras 1.1 and 1.4 above. The Court then stated that even in the S. 115J certain adjustments were required to be made to the net profit as shown in the Profit & Loss Account which included the re-duction of the amount of net profit by the amount withdrawn from any reserve, if any such amount is credited to the Profit & Loss Account. The Court then noted that some companies have taken advantage of this provision u/s.115J by decreasing their net profit by the amount withdrawn from the reserve created in the same year itself, though the reserve when created, had not gone to increase the ‘Book Profit’. According to the Court, such adjustments led to lowering of profits resulting in the reduction of tax liability based on the net profits. In view of this, S. 115J was amended and it was provided that the ‘Book Profit’ will be allowed to be decreased by the amount withdrawn from any reserve only in the following two cases:

“*(i) if such reserve has been created in the pre-vious year relevant to the assessment year commencing w.e.f. 1-4-1998

OR

(ii)    if the reserve so created in the previous year has gone to increase the book profit in any year when S. 115J was applicable.”

*    This should be reserve created prior to the previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on 1-4-1988.

2.4 The Court further stated that under the ap-plicable provisions, the first step for determining the ‘Book Profit’ is that the net profit as shown in the Profit & Loss Account for the relevant year has to be increased by the items specified [Clauses (a) to (f)] in the definition (if the amount of such item is debited to Profit & Loss Account) which includes [in Clause (b)] the amount carried to any specified reserve by whatever name called. The second step is that the amount so increased has to be reduced by the items specified [Clauses (i) to (vii)] in the definition which includes [in clause (i)] an amount withdrawn from any reserve (with some exception), if any such amount is credited to the Profit & Loss Account. The Court also noted the “Restriction on Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ’’ as provided in the Proviso to the said Clause (i).

2.5 The Court then noted that the following question needs consideration in this case:

“Q.: Could Rs.26,11,74,000, being the differential depreciation recouped from the revaluation reserves created during the earlier A.Y. 2000-01, be said to be credited in the P & L Account during the assessment year in question in terms of clause (i) to the explanation to S. 115JB(2)?”

2.6 Explaining the effect of the definition of ‘Book Profit’, the Court stated that the said Clause (i) mandates reduction for the amount withdrawn from the reserve earlier created if the same is credited to Profit & Loss Account. The said Clause
(i)    contemplates only those reserves which actually affect the net profit as shown in the Profit & Loss Account. The object of providing “Specified Exclusion from the ‘Book Profit’ ” is to find out true working result of the Company.

2.7 Dealing with the case of the assessee, the Court noted that the adjustment made in the Profit & Loss Account by the assessee, is as per AS and the Guidance Note of the ICAI which is in conformity with the provisions of S. 211 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Court also noted that before considering the effect of withdrawal of Rs.26.12 cr. from the Revaluation Reserve, the Company had a loss of Rs.7.38 cr. Accordingly, on account of such withdrawal from the Revaluation Reserve, the said loss has got converted into profit of Rs.18.74 cr. The said adjustment primarily is in the nature of contra adjustment in the Profit & Loss Account and it is not the case of effective credit to the Profit & Loss Account as contemplated in the said Clause (i). Credit in the Profit & Loss Account under the said Clause (i), implies the effective credit and therefore, as per the accounting principles, the contra adjustment does not at all affect any particular account. According to the Court, unless an adjustment has the effect of increasing the net profit as shown in the Profit & Loss Account the amount cannot to be said to be credited to the Profit & Loss Account. Therefore, through the amount has been literally credited to the Profit & Loss Account, in substance, there is no such credit. After taking such a view and con-sidering the object for which the MAT provisions were introduced, the Court held as under:

“….In the present case, had the assessee deducted the full depreciation from the profit before depreciation during the accounting year ending 31-3-2001, it would have shown a loss and in which event it could not have paid the dividends and, therefore, the assessee credited the amount to the extent of the additional depreciation from the revaluation reserve to present a more healthy balance sheet to its shareholders enabling the assessee possibly to pay out a good dividend. It is precisely to tax these kinds of companies that MAT provisions had been introduced. The object of MAT provisions is to bring out the real profit of the companies. The thrust is to find out the real working results of the company. Thus, the reduction sought by the assessee under clause (i) to the explanation to S. 115JB(2) in respect of depreciation has been rightly rejected by the AO.”

2.8 Having taken the above view, the Court further stated that the matter can be examined from another angle under the said Clause (i). The assessee becomes entitled to reduce the amount withdrawn from such reserve only if at the time of creation, the reserve had gone to increase the ‘Book Profit’ u/s.115JB/115JA. From the factual position of the assessee, it is clear that neither the amount of Rs.288.58 cr. nor Rs.26.12 cr. had ever gone to increase the ‘Book Profit’ in the said year ending on 31-3-2000. As such amount has not gone to increase the ‘Book Profit’ at the time of creation of reserve, there is no question of reducing the amount transferred from such reserve to the Profit & Loss Account. Restriction contained in the Proviso comes in the way of such reduction. The Court also stated that by interplay of the balance sheet items with Profit & Loss Account items, the assessee has sought to project the loss of Rs.7.38 cr. as profit of Rs.18.73 cr.

Conclusion:

3.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is clear that in all such cases of withdrawal of the amounts from Revaluation Reserve, the assessee would not be entitled to reduce such amount under the said Clause (i) for the purpose of computing the ‘Book Profit’.

3.2 The said Clause (i) contemplates that the credit of the amount of such withdrawal to the Profit & Loss Account must be real (and not literal) and the same must in effect impact the net profit shown in the Profit & Loss Account. Under the said Clause (i), such reduction is permissible only in those cases where, at the time of creation of reserve, the ‘Book Profit’ is increased by the amount of the said reserve.

3.3 From the above judgment, it also appears that unless the assessee is in a position to show that at the time of creation of reserve the ‘Book Profit’ was increased by the amount of such reserve, the reduction under the said Clause (i) on account of withdrawal is not permissible and for this purpose, it is not relevant that at the time of creation of reserve the assessee was not required to route the amount of reserve through the Profit &    Loss Account in accordance with the accepted and settled accounting principles and practices.

3.4 The above judgment is delivered in the con-text of the provisions of S. 115JB as applicable to the A.Y. 2001-02. As mentioned in para 1.7 above, the definition of the ‘Book Profit’ in S.

115JB is further amended by the Finance Act, 2006 from the A.Y. 2007-08 and specific provisions are made for adjustments with regard to the amount of depreciation debited to the Profit & Loss Account because of which, effectively, depreciation relating to revalued amount of assets is required to be ignored and the amount withdrawn from the Revaluation Reserve Account relating to such depreciation is required to be separately deducted under clause (iib) of the said Explanation. Therefore, from the A.Y. 2007-08, in such cases, the issue may arise with regard to the treatment of the amount withdrawn in excess of the amount referred to in clause (iib), if any from the Revaluation Reserve Account and credited to the Profit & Loss Account while computing the ‘Book Profit’.

Note : The above judgment is now reported in 330 ITR 363.

TDS on Discount on Airline Tickets

Controversies

1. Issue for Consideration :



1.1 Airlines generally sell air tickets through travel
agents who are paid a commission on sale of such tickets which commission is
worked out on the basis of the minimum fares prescribed by the airlines. Tax
is deducted by the airlines on this commission u/s. 194H of the Act. Where the
tickets are provided to the travel agent by the airlines at a price below the
published fare, the difference, known as ‘discount’, or a part thereof is
retained by him while selling the tickets to the passengers, which is in
addition to the regular commission earned by him. No tax is deducted by the
Airlines on this amount retained by the travel agents. All airlines are
required to file a list of their standard fares with the Director General of
Commercial Aviation, which are called published fares. Usually tickets are
provided by airlines to travel agents at significant discounts to the
published fares and sold by the agents to their customers by passing over the
difference in full or part. Under IATA rules, the travel agents receive their
commission as a percentage of the published fares, in respect of which tax is
deducted at source by the airline under Section 194H.

1.2 S. 194 H defines ‘commission or brokerage’, vide
Explanation(i), as under :

” ‘Commission or brokerage’ includes any payment received
or receivable, directly or indirectly by a person acting on behalf of another
person for services rendered (not being professional services) or for any
services in the course of buying or selling of goods or in relation to any
transaction relating to any asset, valuable article or thing not being
securities.”

1.3 In recent years, tax authorities have sought to take a
stand that the discount from published fares given by airlines to travel
agents (which in turn is generally passed on by the travel agent to the
customer in full or part) amounts to an additional special commission, and
that TDS is deductible on this amount under Section 194H.

1.4 The issue has now reached Courts and the Bombay High
Court has held that such discount is not in the nature of brokerage or
commission and no tax is deductible thereon. The Delhi High Court has taken a
view that tax is deductible on such discount.


2. Qutar Airways’ case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Bombay High Court in the
case of CIT vs. Qutar Airways (Income Tax Appeal No.99 of 2009),
ITATOnline.org.

2.2 In this case, it had been claimed by the Revenue that
the difference between the published price and the minimum fixed commercial
price amounted to an additional special commission, and that TDS was therefore
deductible by the airline on this amount under Section 194H.

2.3 The Tribunal had granted relief to the airline,
following its earlier decision in the case of Korean Air vs. DCIT,
holding that TDS was not deductible in similar circumstances.

2.4 Before the Bombay High Court, the counsel for the
Revenue contended that it was not the Revenue’s case that the difference
between the principal price of the tickets (as published) and the minimum
fixed commercial price amounted to brokerage.

2.5 The Bombay High Court noted that though an appeal had
been preferred against the decision of the Tribunal in Korean Air’s case, the
appeal had been rejected by the High Court for non-removal of office
objections under rule 986. The Court noted that for Section 194 H to apply,
the income being paid out by the airline must be in the nature of commission
or brokerage, and must necessarily be ascertainable in the hands of the
recipient.

2.6 On the facts of the case before it, the Bombay High
Court noted that the airlines had no information about the exact rate at which
the tickets were ultimately sold by the agents, since the agents had been
given discretion to sell the tickets at any rate between the fixed minimum
commercial price and the published price. It was noted by the Court that it
would be impracticable and unreasonable to expect the airline to get feedback
from their numerous agents in respect of each ticket sold. The Court was of
the view that if the airlines had discretion to sell the tickets at a price
lower than the published price, then the permission granted to the agent to
sell it at a lower price could neither amount to commission or brokerage in
the hands of the agent. The Bombay High Court however clarified that any
amount which the agent earned over and above the fixed minimum commercial
price would naturally be income in his hands and would be taxable as such in
his hands.

2.7 The Bombay High Court therefore held that no TDS was
deductible under Section 194H in respect of such discount over the published
fares given by airlines to travel agents.


3. Singapore Airlines’ case :

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Singapore Airlines and 12 other airlines — CIT vs. Singapore Airlines Ltd. (ITA Nos.306/2005 and 123/2006).

3.2 In this case, a survey was conducted on the airlines. This revealed that supplementary commission was being paid to travel agents. The travel agent, after sale, would send the details every two weeks to an organisation Billing Settlement Plan (‘BSP’), which was an organisation approved by the International Air Transport Association, which would prepare an analysis of the billing and send it to each airline. In this analysis, this amount was shown as supplementary commission. The airlines either accounted for this as supplementary commission or incentives/deals. Some travel agents confirmed that such supplementary commission had not been passed on by them to customers. From April 2002, the procedure was changed and tickets were sold at the net price. The Department started proceedings against the airlines for non-deduction of TDS under Section 194H on such supplementary commission.

3.3 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the stand of the Department. The Tribunal however allowed the airline’s appeal, holding that the airline received only the net fare from the agent, that any surplus or deficit from such net fare was the profit or loss of the agent, and since such profit or loss was on account of his own efforts and on his own account, did not emanate from services rendered to the airline.

3.4 Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the Department it was argued that:

    i) the relationship between the assessee-airline and the travel agent was that of a principal and agent and not one of principal to principal.

    ii) the supplementary commission retained by the travel agent was not a discount as claimed by the assessee-airline since it was paid for services rendered by the travel agent in the course of buying and selling of tickets;

    iii) the submission of the assessee-airline that they had a dual/hybrid relationship with their agent, that is, insofar as the transaction which involved payment of standard commission was that of agency, while that which involved the retention of supplementary commission by the travel agent, that is, price obtained over and above the net fare, was a result of a principal-to-principal relationship ought to be rejected, for the reason that no evidence whatsoever was placed by the assessee-airline to establish that there was such a dual relationship between the parties. The Standard Format Agreement (as approved by lATA), that is, the Passenger Sales Agency (PSA) Agreement executed by the assessee airline was silent as regards any such dual relationship to which the assessee-airline had adverted to;

v) the main provision of Section 194-H included within its ambit payment by cash, cheque, draft or by any other mode. Thus retention of money by the travel agent was covered by the main provisions of Section 194H. It was not the case of the assessee-air line either before the Assessing Officer or the CIT(A) that the travel agent was required to only remit the net fare to the airlines, and this was not even a condition in the PSA Agreement. The net fare was actually arrived at by deducting from the gross fare, tax, standard commission and supplementary commission. While standard commission was fixed by lATA the supplementary commission was variable, as it was dependent on the policies of the airline vis-a-vis their agents. If net fare was the basis for the entire transaction, then there was no necessity of intervention of BSP to carry out a billing analysis, as then the amount payable by the travel agent to the assessee-airline could easily be calculated by taking into account the product of the number of tickets sold and the net fare; and

vi)     the amount of supplementary commission which had to be paid on each transaction was embedded in the deal code which was known only to the three concerned parties, that is, the assessee-airline, the travel agent and BSP.Since the assessee-airline was the person responsible for payment of supplementary commission to the travel agent, the tax could have been deducted as and when the billing analysis statement was handed over by the BSP to the airline. It was thus contended that the supplemen-tary commission fell within the ambit of the explanation to Section 194H.

3.5 On behalf of the assessee-airlines, it was argued before the Delhi High Court that:

    i) supplementary commission was only a nomenclature which finds mention in the billing analysis statement of BSP.The said supplementary commission denotes a notional figure which is the difference between the published fare less standard IATAcommission (9% or 7%). The net fare is the amount received by the assessee from its travel agents. In other words, the

supplementary commission is not a commission within the meaning of Section 194H;

    ii) supplementary commission can only be brought within the ambit of Section 194H, if it fulfils the following criteria as prescribed under the said provision-

    a. the sum received must be in the nature of income,

    b. such income must denote any payment received or receivable directly or indirectly by the payee from the payer, that is, the assessee, and

    c. the recipient should be a person acting on behalf of that another person, and that, the sum received or receivable whether directly or indirectly should be for services rendered in the course of buying and selling of goods, that is, tickets in the present case.

    iii) the Department had not been able to produce any evidence to show that the difference between the published fare and the net fare (i.e., the fare the assessee received from the travel agents) was realised by the travel agents. The difference as reduced by standard commission and taxes which is referred to as supplementary commission is only a notional figure and this cannot be termed as a commission within the meaning of Section 194H. What the assessee is entitled to receive is only the net fare. There is no right in the assessee-airline to receive the published fare from the travel agent on sale of tickets;

    iv) the notional figure of supplementary commission as appearing in the billing analysis statement of the BSP is neither income nor can it be construed as payment received or receivable, directly or indirectly by the travel agents in its capacity as the agent of the assessee-airline for any services rendered to the assessee-airline. The billing analysis statement of BSP is not a statement of account as contended by the Revenue;

    v) since there was no evidence to suggest that the difference between published fare and the net fare was actually received by the travel agent, there was no obligation on the part of the assessee-airline to deduct tax at source on such notional commission which had not been realised;

    vi) in these circumstances the provisions of Section 194H were unworkable;

    vii) the travel agents had paid tax on the said supplementary commission and hence the Revenue was precluded from raising demands on the assessee-airline.

3.6 Analysing the provisions of Section 194H, the Delhi High Court noted that the provisions of Section 194H would be attracted only if:

    i) there is a principal-agent relationship between the assessee-airline and the travel agent;

    ii) the payments made by assessee-airline to the travel agent, who is a resident is an income by way of commission;

    iii) the income by way of commission should be paid by the assessee-airline to the travel agent for services rendered by the travel agent or for any services in the course of buying or selling of goods;
 
    iv) the income by way of commission may be received or be receivable by the travel agent from the assessee-airline either directly or indirectly; and

    v) lastly, the point in time at ‘which obligation to deduct tax at source of the assessee-airline will arise only when credit of such income by way of commission is made to the account of the travel agent or when payment of income by way of commission is made by way of cash, cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier.

3.7 Analysing the terms of the PSA agreement and the manner in which the airlines and travel agents functioned, the Delhi High Court concluded that:

    i) the travel agent acted on behalf of the airline to establish a legal relationship between an airline and a passenger, and was therefore an agent of the airline, which was his principal;

    ii) since it was undisputed that the amount received and retained by the travel agent over and above the net fare would be assessable to tax in his hands as his income, and tax had actually been paid by agents on such income, supplementary commission was ‘income’ within the meaning of Section 194H;

    iii) the supplementary commission is not a discount, on account of the fact that the payment retained by the travel agent is inextricably linked to the sale of the traffic document/ air ticket, and the travel agent does not obtain proprietary rights to the traffic documents/air tickets;

    iv) there are no two transactions, for one of which commission is paid to the agent, and the second of which is between principal to principal, but just one transaction of sale of tickets on behalf of the airline to the passenger;

    v) the amount received by the travel agent over and above the net fare is known to the airline when it receives the billing analysis made by BSP.

The Delhi High Court therefore held that the amount received and retained by the travel agent over and above the net fare was in the nature of commission, liable to deduction of TDS under Section 194H.

4. Observations:
4.1 The conclusions of the Delhi High Court are weighed by one of the facts that the travel agent is an agent of the airline and therefore all and any receipt by him represents commission in his hands, including the difference between the published fare and the net fare.

4.2 The difference between the published fare and the net fare really consists of two components – one component is that of commission as a pre-agreed percentage of the published fare, which is undoubtedly commission covered by the provisions of Section 194H. The other component is the amount not realised by the agent from the client, and therefore not paid to the airline.

4.3 To illustrate, take a situation where the published fare is Rs.50,OOO, the agent’s commission is 7% (Rs.3,500), and the agent sells the ticket to the passenger for Rs.27,500. The agent would collect Rs.27,500 from the passenger and pay Rs.24,OOO to the airline as net fare (ignoring tax), after deducting his commission of Rs.3,500. In this case, the difference between the published fare and the net fare is Rs.26,OOO, consisting of the agent’s commission of Rs.3,500 and the discount passed on to the client of Rs.22,500. This amount of Rs.22,500 is really a discount given by the airline to the passenger through its agent, the travel agent. The travel agent is therefore holding such discount of Rs.22,500 in trust for the passenger, to whom the airline has permitted him to grant such discount.

4.4 With respect to the concerned parties, it was not impressed upon the Delhi High Court that the difference between the published fare and the net fare, in fact was a discount given to the passenger by the airline through the agent and it was the airline alone, ‘which undoubtedly had proprietary rights in the tickets, till such time it was sold to the passengers and the benefit derived by the passenger was a benefit passed on by the airline and not by the agent who received it in trust for the passenger. If the difference is viewed as a discount given to the passenger routed through the agent, as was done by the Bombay High Court, the view taken by the Delhi High Court might have been quite different. As rightly appreciated by the Bombay High Court, the factual position is that the airline has merely granted a permission to the agent to sell the tickets at a lower price, which discount granted through the agent can certainly not be regarded as commission.

4.5 The issue, if any, arises only where in the above example, the travel agent pays to the airline, Rs. 23,000 and not Rs. 24,000 and in the process retains for himself an amount of Rs. 1000. It is this Rs. 1000, whose true nature has to be examined w.r.t. the provisions of s. 194H. This difference so retained may not be a commission within the meaning of Section 194H, unless it is brought within the ambit of Section 194H by proving that the sum received was in the nature of income received or receivable directly or indirectly by the payee from the payer, (that -, IS, the airlines.) and the recipient, (that is, travel agent,) should be a person acting on behalf of that another person, and that, the sum received or reeivable, whether directly or indirectly should be for services rendered in the course of buying and selling of goods, (that is, tickets in the present case). The difference cannot be termed as a commission within the meaning of Section 194H. What the airline is entitled to receive is only the net fare. There is no right in the assessee-airline to receive the published fare from the travel agent on sale of tickets. It cannot be construed as payment received or receivable, directly or indirectly, by the travel agents in its capacity as the agent of the airline for any services rendered to the airline.

4.6 Therefore, the view taken by the Bombay High Court that such discount is not liable to deduction of TDS u/s.194H seems to be the better view of the matter, as compared to the view taken by the Delhi High Court.

Monetary limit for filing of appeal by Income-tax Department

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Income-tax Department, aggrieved by an order of the
CIT(A), has the right to appeal u/s.253 to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and
to the High Court u/s.260A when aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal. An appeal
can also be filed before the Supreme Court with the permission of the Court
against the decision of the High Court. Every year a large number of appeals are
filed by the Income-tax Department, some of which are filed in a routine manner.
Prosecuting these appeals, filed as a matter of course, results in a huge annual
expenditure, at times exceeding the benefit derived from such prosecution.

1.2 Realising the leakage of substantial revenue and with the
intent to avoid litigation, the Government of India, in all its Revenue
Departments, has evolved a policy of refraining from filing an appeal before the
higher authorities, where the monetary effect of the contentious issues causing
grievance, in terms of tax, is less than the acceptable limit. This benevolent
policy of the Government prevents the Courts from being flooded with the cases.

1.3 In pursuance of this policy, the Central Board of Direct
Taxes issues instructions to the Income-tax authorities, directing them to avoid
filing of appeals, where the tax effect of an issue causing a grievance is less
than the monetary limit prescribed under such instructions. Presently,
Instruction No. 2 of 2005, dated October 24,2005, advises the authorities to
refrain from filing appeal before the Tribunal, w.e.f. 31-10-2005, in cases
where the tax effect of the disputed issues is Rs.2,00,000 or less and before
the High Court where such tax effect is Rs.4,00,000 or less and before the
Supreme Court where such tax effect is Rs.10,00,000 or less.

1.4 The said Circular of 2005 is issued in substitution of
the Instruction No. 1979, dated 27-3-2000 which provided that no appeal be
filed, by the Income-tax Dept. before the Tribunal in cases where the tax effect
of the disputed issues is Rs.1,00,000 or less and before the High Court where
such tax effect is Rs.2,00,000 or less and before the Supreme Court where such
tax effect is Rs.5,00,000 or less. The said Circular of 2000 was in substitution
of the Instruction No. 1903, dated 28-10-1992, wherein monetary limits of
Rs.25,000 before the Tribunal, Rs.50,000 for filing reference to the High Court
and Rs.1,50,000 for filing appeal to the Supreme Court were laid down. The said
instruction was in substitution of Instruction No. 1777, dated 4-11-1987.

1.5 It is common to come across cases where the monetary
limit, prescribed by the CBDT prevailing at the time of filing an appeal, has
undergone an upward revision before the time of the hearing of such appeal. In
such cases, the issue that often arises is about the applicability of the
upwardly revised limits, relying upon which the defending assessees contend that
the appeal by the Income-tax Department is not maintainable. The issue was
believed to be settled in favour of the taxpayers by a decision of the Bombay
High Court till recently when the validity of the said decision, in the context
of Instruction of 2005, has been doubted by another Bench of the same Court.

2. Pithwa Engg. Works’ case :


2.1 The issue first came up for consideration in the case of
CIT v. Pithwa Engineering Works, 276 ITR 519 (Bom). The Court examined
whether in deciding the maintainability of an appeal by the Income-tax
Department, the monetary limit of the tax effect, upwardly revised and
prevailing at the time of adjudicating an appeal, should be applied in
preference to the limit prevailing a the time of filing an appeal. In the said
case, at the time of filing the appeal before the High Court, the Instruction
then prevailing, provided for a monetary limit of Rs.50,000. However at the
time, when the appeal came up for hearing , this limit was revised to
Rs.2,00,000 vide Circular dated 27-3-2000.

2.2 The Court took note of its own decision in the case of
CIT v. Camco Colour Co.,
254 ITR 565, where-in it was held that the
instructions issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, dated March
27,2000 were binding on the Income-tax Department. Under the said Instruction,
the monetary limit, for filing a reference to the High Court, earlier fixed at
Rs.50,000 was revised and fresh instructions were issued to file references only
in cases where the tax effect exceeded Rs.2,00,000.

2.3 The Court in the case before them observed that the said
instructions dated March 27, 2000 reflected the policy decision taken by the
Board, not to contest the orders where the tax effect was less than the amount
prescribed in the above Circular with a view to reduce litigation before the
High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Court did not find any force in the
contention of the Revenue that the said Circular was not applicable to the old
referred cases as such a contention was not taken to a logical end.

2.4 The Bombay High Court negatived the submission of the
Revenue that so far as new cases were concerned, the said Circular issued by the
Board was binding on them and in compliance with the said instructions, they did
not file references if the tax effect was less than Rs.2 lakh, however, the same
approach was not to be adopted with respect to the old referred cases where the
tax effect was less than Rs.2 lakh. The Court did not find any logic behind such
an approach. The Court held that the Circular of 2000 issued by the Board was
binding on the Revenue.

2.5 The Court further proceeded to observe that the Court
could very well take judicial notice of the fact that by passage of time money
value had gone down, the cost of litigation expenses had gone up; the assesses
on the file of the Department have increased; consequently the burden on the
Department had also increased to a tremendous extent; the corridors of the
superior Courts were choked with huge pendency of cases. The Court noted that in
the aforesaid background, the Board had rightly taken a decision not to file
references if the tax effect was less than Rs.2 lakh and the same policy needed
to be adopted by the Department even for the old matters.

2.6 Finally the Court held that the Board’s Circular dated
March 27, 2000 was very much applicable even to the old references which were
still undecided and the Income-tax Department was not justified in proceeding
with the old references, wherein the tax impact was minimal and further there
was no justification to proceed with decades old references having negligible
tax effect.

3. Chhajer Packaging’s case :


3.1 The issue recently came up for consideration, once again, before the same Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Chhajer Packaging and Plastics Pvt. Ltd., 300 ITR 180 (Born). In that case, the appeal was filed by the Income-tax Department prior to 24-10-2005, the date when Circular No.2 of 2005 was issue for an upward revision of the monetary limit from Rs.2,OO,OOO to Rs.4,OO,OOO.

3.2 The assessee company in that case, raised the preliminary objection, by relying upon Instruction/ Circular No.2 of 2005, dated October 242005 to plead that since the limit of appeal u/ s.260A of ‘the Act to be preferred was raised to Rs.4 lakh and as the tax effect in its case did not exceed Rs.4 lakh, the Department ought not to have pursued its appeal.

3.3 The above-stated submission of the company was opposed by the Revenue, by contending that the present appeal was filed by the Department in August, 2004, while instruction was issued only on October 24, 2005, which was prospective in nature and therefore, the appeal by the Income-tax Department did not fall within the ambit of the instruction dated October 24, 2005.

3.4 The assessee company in its turn relined upon – the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court at Bombay, in CIT v. Pithwa Engg. Works, 276 ITR 519, wherein the Court dealt with a similar Circular dated March 27,2000, wherein financial limit for preferring appeals u/ s.260A of the Act before the High Court, was raised to Rs.2 lakh. Reliance was placed on the following observations in the penultimate paragraph (page 521) ; ” In our view, the Board’s Circular dated March 27, 2000, is very much applicable even to the old references which are still undecided” to claim that the Circular was applicable to the appeals which were still pending.

3.5 The  Bombay High Court at the  outset observed that the views of the Court in  Pithwa Engineering’s case  pertained to Circular dated March 27, 2000. Thereafter the Court referred to Instruction  No. 2/2005,  dated  October 24, 2005, paragraph 2 “In partial modification of the above  instruction, it has now been decided by the Board that appeals will henceforth be filed only in cases where the tax effect exceeds  the revised  monetary limits given  hereunder”.

3.6 Taking  into consideration the portion underlined for the purpose of emphasis, the Court held that the Revenue was justified in contending that the Circular was applicable only prospectively and that it made no reference to pending matters. On the basis of the text and considering the applicability of the Circular dated October 24, 2005, the Court declined to follow the view taken by the Court in Pithwa Engineering’ case regarding the earlier circular.

4. Observations:

4.1 The available  statistics  reveal that the number of appeals  filed by the Income-tax  Department  far outnumber  the appeals  filed by the taxpayers.  This simple statistics convey an important  and alarming fact when read with the fact that ninety  per cent of these  appeals  are decided  against  the Income-tax Department.  The emerging  conclusion  is that most of these appeals  are filed as a matter  of course,  in a routine  manner  without  application  of mind as to the viability, efficacy and the cost involved  in prosecuting these appeals. The Government  today, is the biggest litigant.

4.2  The aforesaid  facts when examined  in the light of another  equally  disturbing  fact that  the Courts today  are flooded  with the number  of cases, which if disposed  of at the present  pace,  will be adjudicated  after a scaringly long  period.

4.3  It is realisation    of these  facts and of the enormous  costs involved    therein that  the Government of India  evolved a benevolent policy  of refraining from pursuing appeals where the  tax  effect in monetary terms  was negligible. It also decided to review the prescribed monetary limits from time to time, keeping in mind the  inflation factor. This avowed  policy has been religiously  followed  by the Government  by revising  the said limits periodically.

4.4  It is this policy background   that  was  kept  in mind  by the Bombay High Court  while deciding  in Pithwa  Engineering’s   case that  the  revised  monetary limits should  be applied  at the time of adjudicating  the appeals.  This was done to promote  the said avowed  policy of avoiding  litigation  and promote the breathing  space in the corridors  of Court and was not done to defeat  the power  of an executive to provide  guidelines  for administration   of the law that it is vested  with.  This angle  of the Court, if appreciated,  will enable  the Income-tax  Department to welcome  the said decision  with open arms.

4.5 Unfortunately, in Chaajer Packaging’s case the aspects narrated in the above paragraph were not pressed as is apparent from the reading thereof or the Court was not impressed by the same, if they were brought to the attention of the Court. We are sure that had the avowed policy of the Government and the logic of the Court in Pithwa Engineering’s case been brought to the notice of the Court, the decision in Chhajer Packaging’s case could have been different.

4.6 The Bombay High Court even in Carrico Colour Co.’s case, 254 ITR 565 (Born.), much before the Pithwa Engineering’s case had applied the Circular of 2000 in deciding a reference on 26-11-2001 which was filed in 2000 and pertained to A.y. 1990-91.

4.7 With utmost respect to the Court, attention is invited to Paragraph 7 of the said instruction of 2000 which reads as ‘ This instruction will come into effect from 1st April, 2000.’ The said Circular dated 27-3-2000 was specifically made effective from a later date i.e., 1st April, 2000 and was otherwise prospective. In spite of the said Circular being specified to be prospective in its nature, the Court in Pithwa Engineering’s case had held the same to be retrospective. This fact takes away the logic supplied in Chhajer Packaging’s case wherein relying on the use of the term ‘henceforth’ in paragraph 2 of the instructions of 2005, it was held that the said instructions of 2005 were not prospective.

4.8 The Bombay High Court in our opinion should have followed its own decision in Pithwa Engineering’s case as per the law of precedent, as the facts were the same in both the cases. In case of a disagreement, the later case should have been referred to the full Bench. The said decision needs a reconsideration.

Whether Rectification Order can be passed beyond the time limit of four years ?

Closements

1.1 Under the Income-tax Act (the Act), various provisions
are made for rectification of orders passed. S. 254(2) provides for
rectification of orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals (Tribunal).
It is provided that the Tribunal may amend its order at any time within a period
of four years from the date of the order with a view to rectifying any mistake
apparent from the report and the Tribunal shall make such amendment if the
mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or Assessing Officer.
Accordingly, S. 254(2) enables the Tribunal to rectify its own order suo moto
or when the mistake is brought to its notice by the concerned party.


1.2 The time limit for rectifying the orders u/s. 254(2) is
four years from the date of the order. In the past, the issue had come up as to
whether the Tribunal is empowered to pass rectification order even after the
expiry of the time limit of four years, in a case where the application for the
requisite rectification is made within the specified time limit of four years.
The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals
Limited (256 ITR 767) had taken a view that if the assessee has moved the
application within the specified period of four years, the Tribunal is bound to
decide the application on merit and not on the ground of limitation, and
accordingly held that the Tribunal can pass such rectification orders even after
the expiry of the specified period of four years, if the application is moved
within the specified period of four years. However, the Madras High Court had
dissented from this view.

1.3 In view of the above-referred conflicting judgments of
the High Court, the issue was under debate as to whether the Tribunal can pass
the rectification order u/s.254(2) after the specific period of four years in a
case where the application for rectification is made within the specified period
of four years.

1.4 S. 154(7) also provides for time limit of four years from
the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be amended was
passed. This enables the Income-tax authorities to rectify their orders within
the specified time limit. S. 154(8) also provides that the Income-tax
authorities shall pass such order of rectification within six months from the
end of the month in which the application is received by it. According to the
Courts, this time limit of six months is within the overall period of time limit
of four years.

1.5 Recently the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
issue referred to in para 1.3 above in the case of Sree Ayyanar Spinning &
Weaving Mills Limited, and the issue is now resolved. Hence, considering the
importance of the issue in day-to-day practice, it is thought fit to consider
the same in this column.


CIT v. Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited,
296 ITR 53 (Mad.) :

2.1 In the above case, an assessment was completed for the
A.Y. 1989-90 assessing income u/s. 115J. There was some dispute with regard to
the working of Book Profit on the issue of the adjustment of earlier years’
depreciation on account of change in the method of depreciation made by the
assessee in the relevant previous year. The order was confirmed by the First
Appellate authority and the matter came up before the Tribunal. It was remanded
back to the Assessing Officer with certain directions. Again the same order was
passed by the Assessing Officer and the same was also confirmed by the First
Appellate authority. In this second round of appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the
order of the Assessing Officer and took the view that the depreciation relating
to the earlier years should not be adjusted while computing the Book Profits. If
such an adjustment is made, the profit and loss account of the year in question
would not reflect the correct picture. It seems that this order was passed by
the Tribunal on 9-12-1996.

2.2 On 2-8-2000, the assessee moved miscellaneous application
for rectification of above order of the Tribunal u/s.254(2) and raised certain
points therein. Although at the time of making such application, a judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (255 ITR 273) was not
available, relying on the said judgment, the Tribunal finally passed the
rectification order dated 31-1-2003, recalling its earlier order and
subsequently, the consequential order was passed on 12-6-2003. In substance, it
appears that the Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee in the rectification
proceedings relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Apollo
Tyres Limited (supra).

2.3 On the above facts, the rectification order passed by the
Tribunal was questioned by the Revenue before the Madras High Court. On behalf
of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the Tribunal was not
justified in passing the rectification order u/s.254(2) after the expiry of
specified period of four years, though the application for such rectification
was moved by the assessee within the specified period of four years; S. 254(2)
specifies the time limit for passing such an order and hence such order cannot
be passed beyond that specified period. The assessee further contended that in
the case of Income-tax authorities, the rectification of mistake is governed by
S. 154 and even though S. 154(8) provides that the rectification order shall be
passed within the specified period of six months, the same shall be read into
the total period of four years provided in S. 154(7). The statute provides the
specific outer time limit and it may not be proper for the Court to go beyond
the same.

2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia,
contended that the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on merit and not
on the ground of limitation once the application is made within the specified
time limit of four years. For this, reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited
(supra). It was further contended that Circular No. 68, dated 17-11-1971
provides that a mistake arising as a result of subsequent interpretation of law
by the Supreme Court would constitute a mistake apparent from the record and
hence, the Tribunal was justified in relying on the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (supra), though the said judgment was
not available at the time of passing the original order when the application for
rectification was moved.

2.5 After considering the arguments of both the sides and after referring to the provisions dealing with rectification contained in S. 254 as well as S. 154, the Court took the view that the authority is barred from passing the order of rectification be-yond the period of four years specified in S. 154(7) and likewise the Tribunal also should pass the order of rectification u/ s.254(2) only within the specified period of four years. The Court also did not agree with the view of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (supra).

2.6 While deciding the issue in favour of the Rev-enue, the Court finally held as under (page 62) :

“…. it cannot be construed that the power of the Appellate Tribunal to rectify the mistake could be extended indefinitely beyond four years, which time is specifically spelled out by the Legislature in S. 254(2) itself for passing an order of rectification, either suo motu by the Tribunal or on application either by the assessee or by the Assess-ing Officer. The mere usage of ‘and’ between two limbs of S. 254(2) will not, in any way, enlarge the limitation prescribed for passing the order of amendment u/ s.254(2) of the Act. Consequently, any order of amendment that would be passed by the Appellate Tribunal beyond the period of four ( years would lack jurisdiction, assuming the Ap-pellate Tribunal has got a right to pass an order of rectification to rectify the mistake in the light of the subsequent interpretation of law by any Court, as per Circular No. 68, dated November 17, 1971 [see (1972) 83 ITR (ST.) 6]. Therefore, it follows that in any case of rectification, the Income-tax authorities and the Appellate Tribunal are within their power and jurisdiction to amend their respective orders u/ s.154 and u/ s.254, respectively, in the light of subsequent interpretation of law by the Courts, but such power and jurisdiction could be exercised statutorily only . within the time of four years, not beyond the period of four years.”

CIT v. Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited, 301 ITR 434 (SC) :

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Madras High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court, wherein the only issue to be considered was whether the Tribunal can pass the order of rectification u/ s.254(2) beyond the specific period of four years when the application for such rectification is moved within the specified period of four years. To consider the issue, the Court noted the relevant facts and the issues raised before the High Court and the grounds on which the Tribunal had passed the order u/s.254(2). The Court also noted that in the appeal before it, the Court is not concerned with the merits of the case, i.e., reworking of computation made by the Assessing Officer. The Court also heard both the parties, wherein on behalf of the Revenue it was contended that on the facts of the c.aseof the assessee, the judgment of the Apex Court In the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (supra) was not applicable. However, the Court stated that though we have referred to the submissions of both the sides on merits, in this case, we are only conerned with the interpretation of S. 254(2) regarding the powers of the Tribunal in the matter of rectification of mistake apparent from the record.

3.2 Having clarified the issue under  consideration the Court noted  the controversy raised  on account of the rectification order  passed by the Tribunal  in response to miscellaneous applications dated 2-8-2000 filed by the assessee  and  the order  of the Tribunal dated 31-1-2003 recalling its order dated 9-12-1996. The Court also noted the conclusion of the High Court and also the fact that the High Court did not go into the merits of the case.

3.3  The Court then referred  to the provisions of S. 254(2) and  observed as under (page  432) :

“Analysing the above provisions, we are of the view that S. 254(2) is in two parts. Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it U / ss.(l). Under the second part of S. 254(2), the reference is to the amendment of the order passed by the Tribunal U/ss.(l) when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in short, the first part of S. 254(2) refers to the suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by the Tribunal, whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the asseSSee pointing out the mistake apparent from the record. In this case, we are concerned with the second part of S. 254(2). As stated above, the application for rectification was made within four years. The application was well within four years. It is the Tribunal which took its own time to dispose of the application. Therefore, in the circumstances, the High Court had erred in holding that the application could not have been entertained by the Tribunal beyond four years.”

3.4 The Court then referred to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (supra), relied on by the counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee and noted the view of the Rajasthan High Court as appearing in the head notes of the said judgment as under (page 438) :

“Once the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of appeal, the Tribunal cannot reject that application on the ground that four years have lapsed, which includes the period of pendency of the application before the Tribunal. If the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of the order, the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on the merits and not on the ground of limitation. S. 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, lays down that the Appellate Tribunal may at any time within four years from the date of the order rectify the mistake apparent from the record, but that does not mean that if the application is moved within the period allowed, i.e., four years, and remains pending before the Tribunal, after the expiry of four years the Tribunal can reject the application on the ground of limitation.”

3.5 Having considered the above-referred view of the Rajasthan High Court, the Court decided the is-sue in favour of the assessee and held as under (page 438) :

“We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (2002) 256 ITR 767.

For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore T.e. (A) No. 2/2004 on the file of the Madras High Court for fresh decision on the merits of the matter as indicated here in above. All contentions on the merits are expressly kept open. We express no opinion on the merits of the case whether rectification application was at all maintainable or not and whether the judgment in the case of Apollo Tyres (2002) 255 ITR 273 was or was not applicable to the facts of this case. That question will have to be gone into by the High Court in the above T.e. (A) No. 2/2004.”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, now it is clear that once the application for rectification is moved within the specific period of four years, the Tribunal can pass order u/ s.254(2) even if such a period has expired.

4.2 The above position will also equally apply for passing rectification order u/s.154 by the Income-tax authorities. Therefore, once such a period is expired, it would not be correct for the Income-tax authorities to take a view that it has no power to pass the rectification order u/s.154, even if the application is made within the specified period of limitation.

4.3 So far as the powers of the Income-tax authorities to rectify their order are concerned, there is also time limit of six months provided in S. 154(8). In many cases, this time limit is not observed by the authorities. Even in such cases, it would not be correct for the Income-tax authorities to later on take a stand that since specified mandatory time limit of six months has expired, they have no power to pass the requisite rectification order. With the above judgment of the Apex Court, in our view, even this position becomes clear.

4.4 Interestingly, there is also time limit for passing order for refusing or granting registration to charitable trusts, etc. u/s.12AA, wherein it is provided that every order of granting or refusing the registration under the said provision shall be passed before the expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the relevant application is received – [Refer S. 12AA (2)]. In the context of these provisions, the Special Bench of the Tribunal (Delhi) in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust [(2007) 17 SOT 281] has taken a view that if such an order u/s.12AA(2) is not passed within the specified period of six months, registration shall be deemed to have been granted.

In case of expatriate, seconded to Indian Company, liability of TDS on ‘Home Salary’ paid by the Foreign Company outside India — Sec. 192

Introduction

1.1 A person responsible for making certain payments [Payer] to a resident or a non-resident (Payee) is required to deduct tax (TDS) as provided in various provisions contained in Chapter XVIIB of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (the Act). In the last few years, the net of TDS is substantially widened from time to time by the Government and large number of payments are now covered within those provisions. A large portion of direct tax collection is made by the Government through TDS provisions.

1.2 Out of the collections made by the Government by way of TDS, a major portion of the collection represents the TDS from salary income. Sec.192(1) provides that any person responsible for paying (Employer) any income chargeable under the head ‘Salaries’ [hereinafter referred to as Salary Income], at the time of payment, is required to deduct tax on the estimated Salary Income of the assessee (Employee) for relevant financial year as provided in the Section. Such Employee could be resident or non-resident. The only criterion is taxability of Salary Income under the Act. Such tax is required to be deducted at an average rate of Income-tax as provided in the Section. Sec.192(2) further provides that if the assessee (Employee) is employed simultaneously under more than one employer during the financial year, etc., he may furnish to the Employer referred to in Sec.192(1) such details of his Salary Income from the other employer or employers in the prescribed form (Form No.12B) and in that event, such Employer is under an obligation to take into account such details for the purpose of making deduction under Sec.192(1). The provisions contained in Sec.192(2) are regarded as optional for the assessee (Employee).

1.3 When a non-resident (say, a Foreign Company) makes payment outside India to any resident (or to non-resident in certain cases) falling within any of the provisions contained in Chapter XVIIB, then in such a case, whether such a non-resident also is required to deduct tax or not is a matter which is currently under debate on the ground as to whether such machinery provisions of the Act can be applied beyond the territories of India [i.e., on the ground of extra-territorial jurisdiction]. The Department holds the view that in such an event, even such a non-resident making payment outside India is required to deduct tax and comply with the provisions of the Act with regard to TDS. This view of the Department is also reflected in some of the Circulars issued by the CBDT [e.g., Circular No.726, dated 18.4.1995, under which certain exceptions for TDS are provided for payments made by non-residents to resident Payees, being lawyers, chartered accountants, etc.].

1.4 In many cases, a Foreign Company enters into joint venture with an Indian partner in respect of some business activities for which a company is incorporated in India jointly with the resident joint venture partner [J. V. Company or Indian Company]. Similarly, many a time, a Foreign Company incorporates a subsidiary company in India for carrying out certain business activities [Indian Company]. In such cases, many a time, such Foreign Company deputes its employees on secondment basis to such Indian Company and the expatriates so seconded remain in India for a specified period in the employment of the Indian Company (generally such expatriates also become resident in India under the Act during such a period). In such cases, the Indian Company makes payment of salary, etc. and deducts tax under Sec.192(1) in respect of such payments. At the same time, in many such cases, such expatriates seconded by the Foreign Company to the Indian Company retain their lien on their job with the Foreign Company and also continue to remain on the rolls of the Foreign Company, and, apart from the salary, etc. received from the Indian Company, they also receive the agreed remuneration outside India in foreign currency from such Foreign Company (Home Salary). In such cases, no reimbursement is made by the Indian Company in respect of such Home Salary received by the expatriates and the same is also not claimed as deduction in computing the taxable income of the Indian Company. In such cases, the issue with regard to taxability of such Home Salary in India is under debate, which has to be decided on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. In cases where such Home Salary is related to the services rendered by such expatriates in India, the same is generally treated as taxable income in India and in such an event, further issue with regard to liability of TDS in respect of such Home Salary is also under debate. In many cases, the Department has taken a stand that since such Home Salary relates to services rendered in India, the same is deemed to have accrued or arisen in India under Sec.9(1)(ii) and accordingly, the Indian Company is liable to deduct tax under Sec.192(1), as no work is performed by such expatriates for the Foreign Company during such periods.

1.5 Recently, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the issues referred to hereinbefore in the case of Eli Lilly & Co. India Pvt. Ltd. [Civil Appeal No.5114/2007] and other cases. Therefore, the judgment of the Apex Court in this batch of cases is of great importance and hence, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

Eli Lilly & Co. India Pvt. Ltd. and Others —178 Taxmann 505 (SC).

2.1 In the above cases (taken up by the Apex Court together), the Home Salary was paid by a Foreign Company to its employees seconded to the Indian Company [which was also not reimbursed by’ the Indian Companies 1, no tax was deducted on such payments. The Indian Companies had deducted tax under Sec.192 in respect of Salary Income paid by them to such seconded expatriates. In some cases, the employees had filed their returns of income in India and paid taxes on the Home Salary. In some cases, it seems, initially, a stand was taken that Home Salary is not taxable in India, but it appears that subsequently such stand was given up and taxes were paid. Since a large number of cases were involved, the detailed facts in respect of each one of those cases are not available except for one case to which reference is made hereinafter. Primarily, it seems that in all cases, the Indian Companies were treated as ‘assessee-in-default’ under Sec.201 and interest was charged under Sec.201(lA) and in some cases, penalty under Sec.271C was also levied for non-deduction of tax. It seems that in all cases, the High Court had decided these issues in favour of the Indian Companies.

2.2 In the case of Mis. Eli Lilly & Co. India Pvt. Ltd. (Indian Company), the brief facts were: The Company was engaged in manufacturing and selling pharmaceutical products during the Financial Years 1992-93 to 1999-2000. The Company was a J. V. Company between Messrs. Eli Lilly Inc., Netherlands (Foreign Company) and its Indian Partner, Mis. Ranbaxy Ltd. The Foreign Company had seconded four expatriates to the Indian Company (i.e., J. V. Company) and the appointment was routed through a J. V. Board consisting of Indian Partner and the Foreign Company. Only a part of their aggregate remuneration was paid in India by the Indian Company on which tax was deducted under Sec.192(1). These expatriates, who were seconded by the Foreign Company to the J. V. Company in India, also continued to be on the rolls of the Foreign Company and they received Home Salary outside India in foreign currency from the said Foreign Company, on which no tax was deducted. A survey under Sec.133(A) was carried out and in the course of such survey, these facts were noticed. The post-survey operations revealed that those expatriates who were employed by the Indian Company (on being seconded by the Foreign Company), no work was performed by them for the Foreign Company. Based on these facts, the Assessing Officer (A.a.) found that total remuneration paid to them was only on account of services rendered in India and therefore, the same is taxable in India in terms of Sec.9(1)(ii), and accordingly subject to tax deduction under Sec.192(1) of the Act. It was the contention of the Indian Company that the Home Salary is paid by the Foreign Company to expatriates outside India, de hors the contract of employment in India. The A.a. treated the Indian Company as ‘assessee-in-default’ under Sec.201 in respect of Home Salary paid by the Foreign Company outside India and levied interest under Sec.201(lA). In the Appellate proceedings, the Tribunal and the High Court took a view that the Indian Company was not under statutory obligation to deduct tax under Sec.192 on the Home Salary paid by the Foreign Company, as it was not paid by the Indian Company and hence it is not an ‘assessee-in-default’. At the instance of the Department, the matter came up before the Apex Court and the Apex Court decided to dispose of this case as well as other cases involving similar issues together.

2.3    On behalf of the Revenue, it was submitted that Sec.192 comprises the following four elements:

i) It imposes an obligation of ‘deducting’ tax on ‘any person’ responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head ‘salary’,

ii) Clarifies that this obligation attaches itself ‘at the time of payment’, which is the temporal time-frame,

iii) The rate is to be determined on the basis of the average rate of Income-tax for the financial year, and

iv) Most importantly, the rate is to be applied ‘on the estimated income of the assessee under this head for that financial year’, i.e., for the totality of the assessable salary income of the assessee-employee.

2.3.1 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia, further contended that the expression ‘any person’ in Sec.192 would include any person responsible for making salary payment to an employee, whether such employee is in India or outside India or whether such payment is made in india or outside India. The only requirement is that the assessee employee must be paid in respect of services rendered in India. A reference was also made in Sec.192(2) to draw a distinction between the expressions, ‘making the payment’ and ‘making the deduction’. With this distinction, it was contended that the very fact that Sec.192(2) authorises the employee to choose one of the several persons ‘making the payment’ and not ‘making the deduction’ is an indication that the obligation under Sec.192(1) attaches to ‘any’ person, who is responsible for making payment of Salary Income and is not limited to a person, who is under an obligation to deduct tax at source. It was finally contended that Sec.192 imposes a joint and several obligation on all the persons, who are responsible for paying any Salary Income to employees in India. In the alternative, it was contended that if it is held that it is only Indian Employer who is obliged to deduct tax at source and not the foreign employer (who is directly paying to the foreign account of the employee outside India), the obligation of the Indian employer has to be interpreted co-extensively and in respect of the entire Salary Income of the employees, so long as such Salary Income of the employee arises or accrues in India or is in respect of ‘services rendered in India’.

2.3.2 With regard to the issue relating to penalty under Sec.271C, on behalf of the Department it was contended that such penalty is in the nature of civil liability. The burden of bringing the case within the exception provided in Sec.273B, namely, showing ‘reasonable cause’, is squarely on the assessee. It was pointed out that in these appeals, the assessee has pleaded bona fide misunderstanding of law, which explanation does not satisfy the test of ‘reasonable cause’ and therefore, merits rejection.

2.4 The counsel appearing on behalf of Mis. Eli Lilly & Co. India Pvt. Ltd. [i.e., an Indian Company] raised various contentions. The Indian Company (which is Employer in India) was under no obligation to deduct tax under Sec.192(1) from the Home Salary, which was admittedly not paid by it. Sec.192(1) obliges the Employer to deduct tax out of the esti-mated salary income at the time of making payment thereof. Such TDS is required on estimated income for the reason that Salary Income is liable to change during the year on account of various reasons, such as increment, pay revision, payment of bonus, D.A., valua-tion of perquisites in kind, etc. Unlike most of the other provisions, TDS is required under Sec.192(1) at the time of payment of salary, the obligation of Employer is to deduct tax qua the amount actually paid by the Employer or paid on his behalf or on his account. Sec.192(2) specifically provides that when the employee is simultaneously in employment of more than one employer, the employee has an option to file with one employer (the chosen employer), a declaration of salary earned by him in Form No.12B and in that event, such chosen em-ployer is under an obligation to deduct tax on aggregate Salary Income of the employee. In the absence of exercise of option under Sec.192(2), the obligation of each employer is confined to the amount of salary actually paid by him and there is no statutory obligation on one employer to take into account the salary paid by other employer for the purpose of TDS. The TDS provisions are in the nature of machinery provisions, which enable easy col-lection and recovery of tax and the same are independent of charging provisions which are applicable to the recipients of income, whereas the IDS provisions are applicable to the Payer of income. The obligation of IDS on the Payer is independent of assessment of income in the hands of all the expatriate employees and hence the employer is obliged to deduct tax at source only from the payment made by him or payment made on his behalf or on his account. Each employer is required to comply with the TDS obligations in respect of Salary Income paid by him and the obligation does not extend to deduct tax out of Salary Income paid by other persons, when it is not on account of or on behalf of such employer, notwithstanding the fact that such salaries may have nexus with the service of the employee with the employer (Indian Company) and may be assessable to tax in India in the hands of the recipient employee. The payment of Home Salary by the Foreign Company in Netherlands was not on behalf of or on account of the Indian Company and consequently, the Indian Company was not under a statutory obligation to deduct tax from the entire Salary Income of the expatri-ate including Home Salary, particularly when the expatriates did not exercise an option under Sec.192(2) requiring the Indian Company to deduct tax from their aggregate Salary Income. It was also pointed out that each of the expatriate employees had paid directly the tax due on the Home Salary by way of advance taxi self-assessment tax from time to time and they had also filed their returns of income in India. In view of this, there is no loss to the Revenue of the alleged default of not deducting tax on the entire Salary Income as on account of short deduction of tax and hence, even if the Indian Company is regarded as ‘assessee-in-default’ in terms of Sec.201 of the Act, the tax alleged to be in default cannot be once again recovered from the Indian Company.

2.4.1 The counsel appearing on behalf of another Indian Company [M/ s. Erection Communica-tions Pvt. Ltd.] raised various contentions.

These include contentions with regard to the issue that such TDS provisions have no extra-territorial operations. In this regard it was, inter alia, submitted: there is no provision in the Act that TDS provisions shall apply to payment made abroad by a person who is located outside India, breach of such provisions results in severe penal and criminal action and therefore, penal and criminal liability imposition by a statute on foreigners in respect of their acts and omissions committed outside India should not be inferred unless there is a clear-cut provision in the Act to that effect, applicability of TDS provisions to payment made abroad has nothing to do with the taxability of such amount in India, there are various instances where the amounts paid outside India by a foreigner are taxable in India, but such payments are not subject to TDS provisions, etc. Dealing with the provisions of Sec.192(1), it was contended that the same can be divided into two distinct parts. First part creates a legal liability to deduct tax and the second part provides for computation of the amount of tax to be deducted. On a plain and correct reading of the provisions creating liability to deduct tax, the tax is deductible only from the amount paid or payable by the Payer and he is not at all required to deduct tax in respect of the amount paid by any other person. The second part of the provision also refers to only estimated Salary Income of the employee for the whole financial year on the basis of payment made by the Payer (Employer). Other contentions raised were similar to those raised by the earlier counsel.

2.4.2 Another counsel appearing on behalf of M/ s. Mitsui & Co. Ltd. also raised similar contentions. However, his main thrust was with regard to penalty imposed under Sec.271C. It was contended that the retention/continuation payment made to expatriates in Japan by Head Office (H.O.) of the Company was not taxable in India and/ or TDS provisions are not applicable to such payments. It was further stated that the Company had presented its case before the Department to this effect. However, after consultation with CBDT, it was agreed to pay the tax and accordingly the amount of tax and interest was deposited on the understanding that there will not be any penalty proceeding. Accordingly, both in law and on facts, the Department had erred in imposing penalty. To support his legal stand with regard to non-taxability of the amount also, various contentions were raised with reference to the provisions contained in Sec.9(1)(ii) as well as the Explanation introduced by the Finance Act, 1983 (w.ef 1.4.1979) and another Explanation introduced by the Finance Act, 1999 (w.ef 1.4.2000), to ultimately contend that despite the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1983, a salary paid for ‘off-period’ was not covered in the provisions and hence another amendment was made, which is prospective in nature. In effect, it seems that an attempt was made to show that taxability of such amount was debatable. The difference between the Branch (Branch Office) on the one hand and H.O. on the other hand recognised for the purpose of implementing TDS provisions was also brought out as, in this case, the expatriates were working at the Project Office in India and were getting salary for rendering services in India and at the same time, they were also getting continuation/retention payments (Home Salary) from the H.O. in Japan.

2.4.3 The Court also noted that the other counsels appearing for various other assessees have adopted the arguments taken up by the earlier counsels.   

[To be Concluded]

Concealment Penalty — Whether Disallowed Claim For Expenditure Amounts to “Furnishing Inaccurate ‘Particulars’ ”

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 Under the Income-tax Act (the Act), to safeguard the
interest of the Revenue against non-disclosure of correct income in the return
of income furnished by the assessee, various provisions are made including the
provisions for imposition of penalty for concealment of income. A penalty
u/s.271(1) c) of the Act (‘Concealment Penalty’) can be imposed in cases where
the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income (‘Concealed Income’) or
furnished inaccurate particulars of his income (‘Furnishing Inaccurate
Particulars of Income’). The action of imposition of penalty should clearly
bring out whether the penalty is imposed on account of concealed income or for
furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

1.2 Explanation 1 to S. 271(1) provides legal fiction
whereunder any addition or disallowance is deemed to represent the concealed
income for the purpose of levy of concealment penalty once the condition
provided in the Explanation are satisfied (hereinafter this Explanation 1 is
regarded to as the said Explanation). The said Explanation shifts the burden of
proof from the Department to the assessee as regards the concealed income. In
substance, the said Explanation provides for a deeming fiction whereunder any
addition or disallowance made to the total income is regarded as concealed
income for the purpose of levy of concealment penalty under the circumstances
mentioned therein. The said
Explanation has undergone change from time to time and the same was last
substituted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 and the same was
subsequently amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1986 w.e.f. 10-9-1986. It may also be noted that it is a
settled law that the issue of concealment of income for the purpose of imposing
concealment penalty is to be decided on the basis of the law in force at the
time of furnishing return of income.

1.3 In the context of the levy of concealment penalty,
various issues are under debate. By and large, in practice, once any claim of
expenditure made in the return of income is disallowed [or any addition is made
to the returned income], the assessing authority initiates proceedings for
imposition of concealment penalty. In most such cases, once such
disallowance/addition is confirmed by the First Appellate Authority, generally
the assessing authority imposes concealment penalty, though it is a settled
position in law that mere disallowance of expenditure or addition to income by
itself does not give rise to concealed income.

1.4 In the context of imposition of concealment penalty,
various issues are under debate. One such issue is : whether disallowance of
claim of expenditure treating the same as incorrect amounts to furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income, attracting provisions relating to concealment
penalty.

1.5 Earlier, the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff
(291 ITR 519), inter alia, held that the order imposing such penalty is
quasi-criminal in nature and the concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate
particulars of Income, both, referred to deliberate act on the part of the
assessee. In substance, the Court expressed the view that mens rea is essential
ingredient for invoking provisions relating to concealment penalty. The Apex
Court, in this case, also made various other important observations with regard
to provisions relating to concealment penalty.

1.6 Subsequently, another Division Bench of the Apex Court,
in the context of similar provisions relating to the levy of penalty under
Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder (the Excise Act), had to
consider some of the views expressed in the above referred judgment of Dilip N.
Shroff (Dilip N. Shroff’s case). At the instance of this Division Bench of the
Apex Court, the relevant issue was referred to a Larger Bench (consisting of
three Judges) and that is how the Larger Bench in the case of Dharmendra
Textiles Processors (306 ITR 277) considered the effect of the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). Primarily, the latter
judgment was concerned with the levy of penalty under the Excise Act. The Larger
Bench in this case (Dharmendra Textile’s case), did not agree with the view
taken in Dilip N. Shroff’s case. We have analysed this judgment in this column
in the December, 2008 issue of the Journal. In our write-up, we have expressed
the view that the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case overrules the judgment
of Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that deliberate act on the
part of the assessee will have to be proved for the levy of concealment penalty
(i.e., mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions) and the order
imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature, but the other observations
made in Dilip N. Shroff’s case in the context of concealment penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) should continue to hold good, as the Apex Court in the case of
Dharmendra Textile’s case was neither specifically concerned with those
observations, nor with the provisions of S. 271(1) (and the Explanation thereto)
of the Act.

1.6.1 Unfortunately, subsequent to the judgment in the case
of Dharmendra Textile’s case, by and large in most cases, the Department appears
to have taken a view that once the disallowance/addition is confirmed at the
Appellate level and the final total income is higher than the returned income,
provisions relating to levy of concealment penalty get attracted.

1.6.2 In various decisions of the Tribunal, the effect of the
judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case came up for consideration under different
circumstances and on different set of facts. In most such cases, by and large,
the different Benches of the Tribunal have not accepted the extreme stand taken
by the Department on the effect of the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case and
in those decisions, the effect of the said judgment is explained under different
circumstances [Ref. Gem Granite — 18 DTR 358 (Chennai), Mrs. Najma Kanchwalla —
24 DTR 369 (Mumbai), Glorious Reality (P) Ltd. — 29 SOT 292 (Mumbai), Veejay
Service Station — 22 DTR 527 (Delhi), V.I.P. Industries Ltd. — 21 DTR 153
(Mumbai), etc.]. Apart from this, the Delhi High Court in the case of Escorts
Finance Ltd. (ITA No. 1005 of 2008) also explained the effect of Dharmendra
Textile’s case. After considering the said judgment of the Apex Court, the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Haryana Warehousing Corporation
also took the view that no concealment penalty can be levied where the assessee
has made a bona fide claim of exemption by making proper and adequate disclosure
in the return of income even if the claim of such exemption is not accepted.
Even the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills considered
the judgment in the case of Dharmaneda Textile and did not agree with the
extreme view of the Department, though in the context of the provisions under
the Excise Act.

1.6.3 A very detailed and well-reasoned decision explaining the effect of the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case is found in the case of Kanbay Software India [P] Ltd. — 22 DTR 481 (Pune). In this decision, various aspects of concealment penalty have been considered in detail.

1.7 Notwithstanding the above, the controversy with regard to the effect of Dharmendra Textile’s case continued. In spite of various decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts explaining the provisions relating to concealment penalty, by and large, the Department is invoking these provisions in most cases where any disallowance of expenditure/claim of deduction or addition to income is confirmed at the Appellate level. In this scenario, the judgment of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile’s case gave a fillip to the existing practice, adding fuel to the fire, and the problem got aggravated, notwithstanding the subsequent development on the issue referred to hereinbefore. The Department continued to hold a view that the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case is no longer a good law. On the other hand, the view held in the profession, by and large, was that the Larger Bench in the Dharmendra Textile’s case overrules the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions relating to concealment penalty and the provisions are quasicriminal in na-ture and except for this, the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case is still a good law.

1.8 Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. had an occasion to consider the issue referred to in para 1.7 above and hence the judgment of the Apex Court in that case becomes relevant and important in relation to the matters concerning concealment penalty. Therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd.
— 322 ITR 158 (SC) :

2.1 The above case relates to A.Y. 2001-02. The brief facts of the said case were : The assessee had furnished return of income showing a loss of Rs.26,54,554. The assessee had claimed deduction of expenditure by way of interest (Rs.28,77,242) on borrowing for the purpose of purchase of shares of IPL by way of its business policy. The assessee did not earn any income from those shares and the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of the said interest expenditure by invoking provision of S. 14A. Accordingly, the income was assessed at Rs.2,22,688.

2.2 In response of show-cause notice regarding concealment penalty, the assessee, inter alia, contended that all the details given in the return of income were correct and it was neither a case of concealment of income, nor a case of furnishing any inaccurate particulars of such income. It was also pointed out that the disallowance is made in the as-sessment solely on account of different view taken on the same set of facts and hence, at the most, the same could be termed as difference of opinion and not a case of concealed income or a case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income as contemplated in provisions relating to concealment penalty. It was also pointed out that the assessee is an invest-ment company and in the earlier A.Y. (i.e., 2000-01) similar disallowance is deleted by the First Appellate Authority and that view has also been confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. The AO did not accept the contentions of the assessee and imposed a penalty of Rs.11,37,949. The First Appellate Authority deleted the penalty and the appeal of the Department before the Appellate Tribunal also did not succeed. The High Court also confirmed the order of Appellate Tribunal. Under these circumstances, the issue with regard to the said penalty came-up before the Apex Court at the instance of the Department.

2.3 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia contended that the claim of interest expenditure was totally without any legal basis and was made with mala fide intentions and the claim was also not accepted by the First Appellate Authority and hence it was obvious that such claim did not have any basis. It was also pointed out that the issue of deductibility of such expenditure in the earlier year is pending before the High Court. It was further contended that otherwise also, the expenditure of interest is not eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Act as under the said provision, only the amount of interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of business/profession could be claimed and the present case was not in respect of the capital borrowed for such purposes. Attention was also drawn to the provisions of S. 10(33) to show that expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income is not deductible. In short, the contention was that the assessee had made a claim, which was totally unacceptable in law and thereby had invited the provisions relating to concealment penalty and had exposed itself to such provisions.

2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the language of the provision of concealment penalty had to be strictly construed, this being part of a taxing statute and more particularly the one providing for penalty. Accordingly, unless the wording directly covered the assessee and the factual situation therein, there could not be any penalty under the Act. It was also pointed out that there was no case of concealed income or the case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income in the return furnished by the assessee.

2.5 After considering the contentions of both the sides, the Court proceeded to consider the issue further and after referring to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Court noted that the provisions suggest that for imposing concealment penalty, there has to be concealed income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Court then noted that the present case is not the case of concealed income and that is not the case of the Department either. On behalf of the Department, it was suggested that by making incorrect claim for the expenditure of interest, the assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Dealing with this contention, after referring to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘particulars’, the Court stated that the same used in S. 271(1)(c), would embrace the meaning of the de-tails of claim made. It is an admitted position that in the present case no information given in the return was found to be incorrect or inaccurate. It is not, as if, any statement made or any details supplied were found to be factually incorrect. Therefore, at least, prima facie, the assessee cannot be made guilty of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. While dealing with the interpretation of the Department that ‘submitting an incorrect claim in law for the expenditure on interest would amount to giving inaccurate particulars of such income’, the Court stated that such cannot be the interpretation of the concerned words. According to the Court, the words are plain and simple and in order to expose the assessee to concealment penalty, unless the case is strictly covered by the provision, the penalty provision cannot be invoked. According to the Court, by any stretch of imagination, making an incorrect claim in law cannot tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Court also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Atul Mohan Bindal (317 ITR 1), in which the Court considered the same provisions. After referring to judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case, as also to the judgment in the case of Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills (supra), the Court in that case reiterated on page 13 of the judgment that : ‘It goes without saying that for applicability of S. 271(1)(c), conditions stated therein must exist’.

2.6 After mentioning the above position in law, the Court referred to the Dilip N. Shroff’s case and stated as under (pages 164-165) :

“Therefore, it is obvious that it must be shown that the conditions u/s.271(1)(c) must exist before the penalty is imposed. There can be no dispute that everything would depend upon the return filed because that is the only document where the assessee can furnish the particulars of his in-come. When such particulars are found to be inaccurate, the liability would arise. In Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329, this Court explained the terms ‘concealment of income’ and ‘furnishing inaccurate particulars’. The Court went on to hold therein that in order to attract the penalty u/s.271(1) (c), mens rea was necessary, as according to the Court, the word ‘inaccurate’ signified a deliberate act or omission on behalf of the assessee. It went on to hold that clause (iii) of S. 271(1)(c) provided for a discretionary jurisdiction upon the assessing authority, inasmuch as the amount of penalty could not be less than the amount of tax sought to be evaded by reason of such concealment of particulars of income, but it may not exceed three times thereof. It was pointed out that the term ‘inaccurate particulars’ was not defined anywhere in the Act and, therefore, it was held that furnishing of an assessment of the value of the property may not by itself be furnishing inaccurate particulars. It was further held that the Assessing Officer must be found to have failed to prove that his explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the computation of his income were not disclosed by him. It was then held that the explanation must be preceded by a finding as to how and in what manner, the assessee had furnished the particulars of his income. The Court ultimately went on to hold that the element of mens rea was essential. It was only on the point of mens rea that the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT was upset”.

2.7 The Court then dealt with the judgment of Dharmendra Textile’s case and the effect thereof on Dilip N. Shroff’s case and explained as under (page

165) :

“. . . . . . The basic reason why the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT was overruled by this Court in Union of India v. Dharmendra Textiles Processors, was that according to this Court the effect and dif-ference between S. 271(1)(c) and S. 276C of the Act was lost sight of in the case of Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT. However, it must be pointed out that in Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processors, no fault was found with the reasoning in the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT, where the Court explained the meaning of the terms ‘conceal’ and ‘inaccurate’. It was only the ultimate inference in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT to the effect that mens rea was an essential ingredient for the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) that the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT was overruled.”

2.8 The Court then noted that in the present case, it is not concerned with mens rea and also stated that it has seen the meaning of the word ‘particu-lars’ earlier. The Court then stated as under (pages165-166) :

“. . . . . . Reading the words in conjunction, they must mean the details supplied in the return, which are not accurate, not exact or correct, not according to truth or erroneous. We must hasten to add here that in this case, there is no finding that any details supplied by the assessee in its return were found to be incorrect or false. Such not being the case, there would be no question of inviting the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. A mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Such claim made in the return cannot amount to the inaccurate particulars.”

2.9 The Court then referred to the argument based on S. 14A of the Act and the points raised and reiterated that such claim of excessive deductions, knowing that they are incorrect, amounted to concealed income. Further, the Court noted that it was tried to be argued that the falsehood in accounts can take either of two forms : (i) an item of receipt will be suppressed fraudulently or (ii) an item of expenditure may be falsely (or in an exaggerated amount) claimed. According to the Department, both types of items are to reduce the taxable income and therefore, amount to concealed income as well as furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. Rejecting these contentions, the Court stated as under (page 166) :

“We do not agree, as the assessee had furnished all the details of its expenditure as well as income in its return, which details, in themselves, were not found to be inaccurate, nor could be viewed as the concealment of income on its part. It was up to the authorities to accept its claim in the return or not. Merely because the assessee had claimed the expenditure, which claim was not accepted or was not acceptable to the Revenue, that by itself would not, in our opinion, attract the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). If we accept the contention of the Revenue, then in case of every return where the claim made is not accepted by the Assessing Officer for any reason, the assessee will invite penalty u/s.271(1)(c). That is clearly not the intendment of the Legislature.”

2.10 The Court then also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sree Krishna Electricals (27 VST 249) rendered under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act in connection with the penalty proceedings wherein the authorities had found that there were some incorrect statements made in the return, though the said transactions were reflected in the accounts of the assessee. The Court then quoted the following observations from the judgment in that case (page 167) :

“So far as the question of penalty is concerned, the items which were not included in the turnover were found incorporated in the appellant’s account books. Where certain items which are not included in the turnover are disclosed in the dealer’s own account books and the assessing authorities include these items in the dealer’s turnover disallowing the exemption, penalty cannot be imposed. The penalty levied stands set aside.”

2.10.1 Referring to the above-referred observations in the context of penalty proceedings under the Sales Tax Act of Tamil Nadu, the Court stated that the situation in the present case is still better as no fault has been found with the particulars submitted by the assessee in his return. Accordingly, the Court held that the First Appellate Authority, the Tribunal and the High Court have correctly reached the conclusion and accordingly, dismissed the appeal filed by the Department as without merit.

Conclusion :

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the settled position is again reiterated that mere disallowance of claim for expenditure by itself would not tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and accordingly, in such cases no concealment penalty can be levied on that basis, notwithstanding the judgment of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile’s case. We hope that this principle reiterated by the Apex Court will be followed by the Department in spirit. We also hope that the Department will not initiate proceedings for the levy of concealment penalty in such cases.

3.2 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that the judgment of the Apex Court in Dilip No. Shroff’s case is overruled by the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case only to the extent it holds that the element of mens rea is essential for levy of concealment penalty and the other observations in Dilip N. Shroff’s case will continue to hold good, except perhaps the observations with regard to nature of concealment penalty.

Whether Reassement u/s.147 is Permissible on a Mere ‘Change of Opinion’

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 S. 147 authorises and permits the Assessing Officer (AO)
to assess or re-assess the income chargeable to tax, if he has reason to believe
that income for relevant years has escaped assessment. This is popularly known
as power of reassessment.

1.2 Provisions of S. 147 have been substituted by the Direct
Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 with effect from 1-4-1989 (New Provisions).
Primarily, the New Provisions confer jurisdiction to reopen the reassessment,
when the AO, for whatever reason, has ‘reason to believe’ that the income has
escaped assessment.

1.2.1 Under the New Provisions, the above-referred power of
reassessment cannot be exercised after the end of four years from the end of the
relevant assessment year in cases where the original assessment is made
u/s.143(3) or S. 147, unless in such cases, the income chargeable to tax
has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of failure of the
assessee to make return u/s.139 or in response to notice u/s.142(1)/148 or by
reason of failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts
necessary for such assessment (‘failure to disclose material facts’). In this
write-up we are not concerned with this provision.

1.3 Prior to substitution of the provisions of S. 147 w.e.f.
1-4-1989 as aforesaid (i.e., New Provisions), S. 147 providing for
reassessment was divided into two separate clauses [(a) and (b)], which laid
down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past
assessment years could be assessed or re-assessed (Old Provisions). Under the
Old Provisions, clause (a) empowered the AO to initiate proceedings for
re-assessment in cases where he has ‘reason to believe’ that by reason of the
omission or failure of the assessee to make return u/s.139 or by reason of the
‘failure to disclose the material facts’, the income chargeable to tax has
escaped assessment. Under clause (b) of the Old Provisions, the AO was empowered
to initiate reassessment proceedings if, in consequence of information in his
possession, he has ‘reason to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment, even if there is no omission or failure on the part of the assessee
as mentioned in clause (a).

1.4 From the comparison of the Old Provisions with the New
Provisions relating to re-assessment, it would appear that to confer
jurisdiction under clause (a) of the Old Provisions, it would appear that two
conditions were required to be satisfied, namely, (i) the AO must have ‘reason
to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, and (ii) such
escapement has occurred by reason of ‘failure to disclose material facts’, etc.
on the part of the assessee. On the other hand, under the New Provisions, the
existence of only first condition (i.e., ‘reason to believe’) is
sufficient to confer the jurisdiction on the AO to initiate the reassessment
proceedings (except, of course, in cases covered by the circumstances mentioned
in Para 1.2.1 above).

1.5 Various issues are under debate with regard to powers of
the AO to make reassessment under the New Provisions. In large number of cases,
reassessment proceedings are being initiated merely on account of ‘change of
opinion’ on the issues decided at the time of original assessment. In such
cases, the issue has come up before the Courts in the past as to whether, under
the New Provisions, the AO is empowered to initiate reassessment proceedings on
a mere ‘change of opinion’. By and large, the Courts have taken a view that
reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’.
However, the issue still survives and in practice, such re-assessment
proceedings are being initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’ by giving one
reason or the other.

1.6 Recently, the issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up
for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Kelvinator of India Ltd.
and the same is finally resolved by the Apex Court. Considering the importance
of the issue in day-to-day practice, it is thought fit to consider the said
judgment in this column.


CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., 256 ITR 1
(Del.) — Full Bench :


2.1 In the above case, the issue referred in Para 1.5 above
was referred to the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In that case, the facts
were : The assessee had furnished the return of income for the A.Y. 1987-88 on
29-6-1987. The assessee had maintained guest houses at different places on which
it had incurred total expenditure of Rs.3,33,926 consisting of rent
(Rs.1,76,000), depreciation (Rs.66,441) and other expenses (Rs. 91,485). As it
did not claim deduction for these expenses, revised return was filed on
5-10-1989 along with a letter mentioning that out of the above amount of
Rs.3,33,926, the rent and depreciation should be allowed as deduction u/s.30 and
u/s.32 of the Act, relying on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case
of Chase Bright Ltd. (177 ITR 124). Accordingly, disallowance of the expenses
u/s.37(4) of the Act was restricted to only Rs.91,485 and the relevant order was
passed on 17-11-1989. Subsequently, notice u/s.148 was issued on 20-4-1990 for
reopening of the assessment u/s.147. Though as per the reasons recorded for
reopening, the assessment was reopened on the alleged ground of various
disallowable claims, but except for the above referred two items of
disallowances, neither any claim was disallowed, nor any addition was made on
completion of reassessment. In support of the reassessment, the AO had relied
upon the order of the CIT(A) for the A.Y. 1986-87, which was passed on 7-7-1990,
although the assessment was reopened on 2-4-1990. In the appeal filed against
the reassessment order, the CIT(A) quashed the reassessment proceedings on the
ground that it was a case of mere ‘change of opinion’ on the part of the AO as
no new fact or material was available with the AO The Appellate Tribunal also
upheld the decision of the CIT(A) and it was held that New Provisions of S. 147
are applicable in this case and it was also a case of mere ‘change of opinion’.

2.2 On the above facts, the Revenue made an application for
referring the following questions to the High Courts (para 5) :

“Whether, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in
holding that the proceedings initiated u/s.147 of the said Act were invalid on
the ground that there was a mere ‘change of opinion’ ?”

2.3 The above-referred application was rejected by the
Tribunal and hence, at the instance of the Revenue, a petition was filed
u/s.256(2) before the Delhi High Court for direction to Tribunal for referring
the above-referred question to the High Court.

2.4 Before the High Court, the counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, referred to the provisions of S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (the 1922 Act) and the Old Provisions as well as the New Provisions of S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). He also pointed out that the proviso to S. 147 under the New Provisions is in pari materia with Clause (a) of S. 147 under the Old Provisions. It was, inter alia, further contended that the ‘change of opinion’ is relevant only for the purpose of Clause (b) of S. 147 under the Old Provisions, the initiation of reassessment proceedings is permissible when it is found that the AO has passed the assessment order without any application of mind and the same can be found out from the order of assessment itself. When the order of the assessment does not contain any discussion on a particular issue, then the same may be held to have been rendered without any application of mind. It was further contended that from the reasons recorded by the AO, it is apparent that reliance has been placed upon the tax audit report which would have come within the purview of the expression ‘information’ as contemplated in 147 and hence, the re-assessment cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. For this purpose, reliance was placed on various judgments of the Courts including the judgments of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Praful Chunilal Patel (236 ITR 832) and a Delhi High Court case of Bawa Abhai Singh (253 ITR 83). It was also contended that Circular No. 549, dated 31-10-1989 issued by the CBDT (Circular No. 549) cannot be relied upon for the purpose of construction of New Provisions inasmuch as the Circular cannot override the statutory provisions.

2.5 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the expression ‘reason to believe’ contained in S. 147 denotes that the belief must be based on the change of fact or subsequent information or new law. Income escaping assessment must be founded upon or in consequence of any information which must come into the possession of the AO after completion of the original assessment. It was also pointed out that the said Circular No. 549 clearly shows that S. 147 was amended only to allay fear of all concerned that prior thereto an arbitrary power was conferred upon the AO and the CBDT, who has the authority to interpret the law, has issued the said Circular No. 549, which should govern the case. Reliance was also placed on various judgments of the Courts in support of contentions raised.

2.6 After considering the contentions raised on behalf of both the parties, the Court proceeded to consider the issue and for that purpose noted the provisions regarding reassessment under 1922 Act as well as the Old Provision and the New Provision under the Act. The Court also noted the said Circular No. 549. The Court then also referred to the various judgments of the Courts rendered under 1922 Act as well as the Old Provisions and the New Provisions of the Act dealing with the issue, wherein the view was taken that reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’. Referring to the New Provisions, the Court noted the following observations (head notes) of the Delhi High Court (234 ITR 170) in the case of Jindal Photo Films Ltd. (page 13):

“The power to reopen an assessment was conferred by the Legislature not with the intention to enable the Income-tax Officer to reopen the final decision made against the Revenue in respect of questions that directly arose for decision in earlier proceedings. If that were not the legal position, it would result in placing an unrestricted power of review in the hands of the assessing authorities depending on their changing moods.”

2.7 After considering the above, the Court stated that although the referring Bench had prima facie agreed with the decision of this Court in the case of Jindal Photo Films Ltd. (supra), but doubt was sought to be raised by the Revenue in view of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Praful Chunilal Patel (supra). Accordingly, the Court considered the said judgment of the Gujarat High Court and noted that in that case it was held that the word ‘assessment’ would mean the ascertainment of the amount of taxable income and the tax payable thereon. In other words, where there is no ascertainment of amount of taxable income and the tax payable thereon, it can never be said that such income was assessed. It was further held that merely because during the assessment proceedings the relevant material was on record, it cannot be inferred that the AO must necessarily have deliberated over it and taken in to account while ascertaining the taxable income or that he had formed an opinion in respect thereof. If looking back, it appears to the AO (albeit, within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year) that particular item even though reflected on the record was not subjected to assessment and was left out while working out the taxable income earlier, that would enable him to initiate the proceedings for reassessment. After referring to this view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in that case, the Court disagreed with the same and stated as under (page 15):

“We are, with respect, unable to subscribe to the aforementioned view. If the contention of the Revenue is accepted the same, in our opinion, would confer an arbitrary power upon the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer who had passed the order of assessment or even his successor officer only on the slightest pre-text or otherwise would be entitled to reopen the proceeding. Assessment proceedings may be furthermore reopened more than once. It is now trite that where two interpretations are possible, that which fulfils the purpose and object of the Act should be preferred.”

2.8 The Court then also considered the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bawa Abhai Singh (supra) on which reliance was placed by the Revenue to contend that reassessment proceedings can be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’. The Court then noted that in that case it was held that the Old Provisions and the New Provisions are contextually different. Under the New Provisions, the only condition for initiating the reassessment proceeding is that the AO should have ‘reason to believe’ that income has escaped assessment, which belief can be reached in any manner and is not qualified by any pre-condition of faith and true disclosure of material fact by the assessee as contemplated under the Old Provisions in clause    of S. 147. Accordingly, the power to re-open the assessment under the New Provisions is much wider and can be exercised even after the assessee has disclosed fully and truly all material facts. After noting this part of the said judgment, the Court stated that it is evident that this judgment cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that mere ‘change of opinion’ would also confer jurisdiction upon the AO to initiate reassessment proceedings as was contended on behalf of the Revenue.

2.9 Dealing with the meaning of the expression ‘reason to believe’, the Court noted the following view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the earlier referred judgment of Bawa Abhai Singh (supra), on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Revenue (page 16):

“The crucial expression is ‘reason to believe’. The expression predicates that the Assessing Officer must hold a belief?.?.?.?. by the existence of reasons for holding such a belief. In other words, it contemplates existence of reasons on which the belief is founded and not merely a belief in the existence of reasons inducing the belief. Such a belief may not be based merely on reasons but it must be founded on information. As was observed in Ganga Saran and Sons P. Ltd. v. ITO, (1981) 130 ITR 1 (SC), the expression ‘reason to believe’ is stronger than the expression ‘is satisfied’. The belief entertained by the Assessing Officer should not be irrational and arbitrary. To put it differently, it must be reasonable and must be based on reasons which are material. In S. Narayanappa v. CIT, (1967) 63 ITR 219, it was noted by the Apex Court that the expression ‘reason to believe’ in S. 147 does not mean purely a subjective satisfaction on the part of the Assessing Officer, the belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely a pretence. It is open to the Court to examine whether the reasons for the belief have a rational nexus or a relevant bearing to the information of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant for the purpose of the Section. To that limited extent, the action of the Assessing Officer in initiating proceedings u/s. 147 can be challenged in a Court of law.”

2.10 To decide the issue, the Court then further stated that it is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that the entire statute should be read as a whole and the same has to be considered thereafter chapter by chapter and then section by section and ultimately word by word. It is not in dispute that the AO does not have any jurisdiction to review his own order. His jurisdiction is confined to only rectification of apparent mistakes u/s.154 and the said powers cannot be exercised where the issues are debatable. According to the Court, what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly by taking recourse to provisions relating to reassessment. For this, the Court observed as under (page 15):

“It is a well-settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. If the Income-tax Officer does not possess the power of review, he cannot be permitted to achieve the said object by taking recourse to initiating a proceeding of reassessment or by way of rectification of mistake.

2.11 The Court then considered the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the said Circular No. 549 cannot be considered, as the Circular cannot override the statutory provisions. In this context, the Court reiterated the settled position with regard to the binding effect of the Circular issued by the CBDT for which reference was made to the judgments of Apex Court in the cases of UCO Bank (237 ITR 889) and Anjum M. H. Ghasswalla (252 ITR 1). The Court, then, felt that if the AO is permitted to reopen the completed assessment on a mere ‘change of opinion’, then the powers of the AO become arbitrary. In this context, the Court observed as under (page 19):

“Another aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. A statute conferring an arbitrary power may be held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. If two interpretations are possible, the interpretation which upholds constitutionality, it is trite, should be favoured.

In the event it is held that by reason of S. 147 if the Income-tax Officer exercises his jurisdiction for initiating a proceeding for reassessment only upon a mere change of opinion, the same may be held to be unconstitutional. We are therefore of the opinion that S. 147 of the Act does not postulate conferment of power upon the Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment proceeding upon his mere change of opinion.”

2.12 While taking a view that on a mere ‘change of opinion’ reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated, even if the detailed reasons have not been recorded in the original assessment order for accepting the claim of the assessee, finally, the Court stated as under (pages 19/20):

“We also cannot accept the submission of Mr. Jolly to the effect that only because in the assessment order, detailed reasons have not been recorded an analysis of the materials on the record by itself may justify the Assessing Officer to initiate a proceeding u/s.147 of the Act. The said submission is fallacious. An order of assessment can be passed either in terms of Ss.(1) of S. 143 or Ss.(3) of S. 143. When a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of the said Ss.(3) of S. 143, a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. It is well known that a presumption can also be raised to the effect that in terms of clause (e) of S. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purport-edly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to reopen the proceeding without anything further, the same would amount to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong.”

CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., 320 ITR 561 (SC):

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court to decide the issue referred to in para 1.5 above.

For this purpose, the Court noted the Old Provisions as well as the New Provisions of S. 147. The Court then stated that on going through the changes made under the New Provisions, we find that for the purpose of reopening, two conditions were required to be fulfilled under the Old Provisions, but under the New Provisions they are given go by and only one condition has remained, namely, that once the AO has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, that confers the jurisdiction for reopening. Therefore, under the New Provisions, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give schematic interpretation to the words, ‘reason to believe’, failing which S. 147 would give arbitrary powers to AO to reopen assessment on the basis of a mere ‘change of opinion’. One must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between the power of review and power of reassessment. The AO has no power to power to review; he has the power to reopen. Having made these observations, the Court then held as under (pages 564/565):

“But reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain pre-conditions and if the concept of ‘change of opinion’ is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of ‘change of opinion’ as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, the Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is ‘tangible material’ to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to S. 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, the Parliament not only deleted the words ‘reason to believe’, but also inserted the word ‘opinion’ in S. 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the companies against omission of the word ‘reason to believe’, the Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word ‘opinion’ on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer.”

3.2 In support of the aforesaid view, the Court also relied on the said Circular No. 549 and reproduced the following portion therefrom (page 565):

“7.2 Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression ‘reason to believe’ in S. 147. — A number of representations were received against the omission of the words ‘reason to believe’ from S. 147 and their substitution by the ‘opinion’ of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, ‘reason to believe’ had been explained in a number of Court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from S. 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended S. 147 to reintroduce the expression ‘has reason to believe’ in place of the words ‘for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion’. Other provisions of the new S. 147, however, remain the same.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that even under the New Provisions, reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’. One of the major reasons for taking such a view also appears to be the fact that if the AO is permitted to reopen the assessment on a mere ‘change of opinion’, S. 147 would give arbitrary powers to the AO to reopen reassessment. Therefore, the concept of ‘change of opinion’ is treated as inbuilt test to check the abuse of power by the AO.

4.2 If the AO is permitted to reopen concluded assessment on a mere ‘change of opinion’, his power may become arbitrary and statute confirring arbitrary power may be held unconstitutional as held by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the above case.

4.3 From the above judgment read with the Full Bench Judgment of the Delhi High Court, it seems that the completed assessment can be reopened only when there is a tangible material available with the AO to form a belief that taxable income has escaped assessment. The belief entertained by the AO should not be irrational and arbitrary. It must be reasonable and must be based on reasons which are material.

4.4 We may also state that if the return of income is processed u/s.143(1) without making any assessment u/s.143(3)/147, then such determination of income does not amount to ‘assessment’ [Ref. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Broker P. Ltd., 291 ITR 500 – SC]. Therefore, in such cases, it seems that the above-referred judgment of the Apex Court may not be of any use to contest the assessment proceedings initiated u/s.147.

Whether disputed Enhanced Compensation is taxable in the year of receipt – section 45(5)

Closements

1.1 In the case of compulsory acquisition of property, in
most cases, at the initial stage, compensation is awarded [original
compensation], which is received by the person whose property is acquired
[owner]. In most such cases, there is always a dispute with regard to the
quantum of compensation originally awarded and the disputes remain in litigation
for a long time. In a large number of such cases, by and large, the owners
succeed and secure additional compensation from the Courts [Enhanced
Compensation]. Generally, in most such cases, the State continues to litigate
the quantum of Enhanced Compensation till the Apex Court and the issues get
finally resolved after a very long time. In most cases, once the Enhanced
Compensation is determined/approved by the Courts [say, the High Court], the
amount of such Enhanced Compensation is deposited with the Courts and the owners
are permitted to withdraw the same against some security [say, bank guarantee],
or even without any security, notwithstanding the fact that the disputes remain
pending before the higher courts [say, Apex Court]. In most such cases, the
dispute was with regard to the year of taxability of the Enhanced Compensation
when such disputed compensation was received by the owner on furnishing security
as the amount received is liable to be repaid, if, the higher court decides the
issue against the owner [fully or partly].

1.2 Before the introduction of Sec. 45(5) from the A.Y.
1988-89 [Pre-1988 Law], the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Housing Land
Development Trust Limited [161 ITR 524] had taken a view that such receipt of
disputed Enhanced Compensation cannot be taxed in the year of receipt on the
grounds that the same has not accrued to the assessee as the amount awarded is
disputed by the Government in the final appeal.

1.3 To resolve the above issue, Sec. 45(5) was introduced
from the A.Y. 1988-89, which, effectively, provided that where the capital gain
arises on account of compulsory acquisition on account of transfer of such
assets for which the consideration was determined or approved by the Central
Government or the Reserve Bank of India [RBI] and the compensation or the
consideration for such transfer is enhanced or further enhanced [Enhanced
Compensation] by any court etc., the capital gain computed at the first instance
based on the original compensation [or consideration originally determined or
approved by the Central Government/RBI] is chargeable to tax in the previous
year of receipt of such Enhanced Compensation or part thereof. It is also
provided that if any such Compensation is enhanced or further enhanced by the
Court etc., then the amount of such Enhanced Compensation shall be deemed to be
income chargeable as capital gain of the previous year in which such enhanced
amount is received by the assessee [Post-1988 Law].

1.4 As mentioned earlier, in many cases, such enhanced amount
is disputed by the payer before the higher authority/court etc. and the amount
of such disputed compensation is deposited with the Court and the assessee, in
most cases, is allowed to withdraw the same on furnishing some security such as
bank guarantee etc. or even without that [Disputed Enhanced Compensation]. The
amendment of 1988 was primarily made to resolve the issue of the year of
taxability of such Disputed Enhanced Compensation. However, various Benches of
the Tribunal as well as various High Courts, even under Post-1988 Law, followed
the principle laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court in the above referred
case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Limited [hereinafter
referred to as Hindustan Housing’s case] and took the view that unless the
Enhanced Compensation is received without any embargo, leaving thereby no scope
or likelihood of returning the same, such Disputed Enhanced Compensation cannot
be taxed in the year of receipt. Some contrary views were also found on this
issue. Accordingly, by and large, in spite of the introduction of section 45(5),
the issue with regard to receipt of Disputed Enhanced Compensation continued and
was under debate.

1.5 The above issue had become very relevant from the
assessees’ point of view because if such Disputed Enhanced Compensation is taxed
in the year of receipt and subsequently, the amount of such Compensation gets
reduced on account of any order of the higher authority/court etc. and if, the
assessee is required to refund the excess amount received by him, then there was
no specific mechanism in the Income-Tax Act [the Act], whereby the effect of
such reduction in the amount of such Enhanced Compensation can be given in the
assessment of the assessee. To address this issue, the Finance Act, 2003
introduced Clause (c) in section 45(5) and section 155(16) [w.e.f. A.Y. 2004-05]
to provide that in such an event, a proper rectification will be carried out in
the assessment of relevant assessment year, in which such Disputed Enhanced
Compensation was taxed on account of the receipt thereof [Post-2003 Law].

1.6 After the amendment made in Sec.45(5) by the Finance Act, 2003, the issue referred to in Para 1.4 was considered by the Special Bench of ITAT (Delhi) in the case of Kadam Prakash – HUF [10 SOT 1] in the context of the assessment year prior to A.Y. 2004-05 under the Post-1988 Law. In this case, the Special Bench of ITAT considered the effect of amendment of 2003 and took the view that such Disputed Enhanced Compensation can be taxed in the year of receipt and the amendment of 2003 will also apply to earlier years. At that time, it was felt that perhaps the issue should now be treated as al-most settled. However, as it happens, subsequently, the Madras High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Firm [HUF] and connected appeals [289 ITR 245] had an occasion to consider the issue referred to in Para 1.4 above. In that case, even after noticing the amendment of 2003, the High Court still took the view that such Disputed Enhanced Compensation cannot be taxed in the year of receipt. On the other hand, the Kerala High Court in the case of C.P. Jacob [174 Taxman 154] took a contrary view and went a step further and held that even without the aid of amendment of 2003, the assessee is entitled to get assessment rectified, if additional compensation assessed on receipt basis is ordered to be repaid in appeal by the Court. According to the Kerala High Court, the assessee was not without remedy, if an additional compensation received through the Court would have been cancelled or reduced in further appeals by the Court and the final judgment in the matter of compensation was delivered by the Court beyond the period of limitation provided for rectification of an assessment. According to the Kerala High Court, the assessee, in such cases, is not helpless because as a last resort, the assessee can approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to redress his grievance against the judgment. Accordingly, the Kerala High Court took the view that it is clear from section 45(5) [i.e. Pre-2004 Law] that the statute provides for assessment of such capital gain in the acquisition proceedings on receipt basis and such Disputed Enhanced Compensation can be taxed in the year of receipt. Under the circumstances, the issue with regard to year of taxability of receipt of Disputed Enhanced Compensation continued.

1.7 Recently, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the issue referred to in Para 1.6 in the case of Ghanshyam [HUF] in the context of A.Y. 1999 -2000 and other appeals under the Pre-2003 Law and the issue was decided. Considering the importance of the issue which is under debate for a long time, it is thought fit to consider this judgment in this column.

CIT vs Ghanshyam (HUF) – 315 ITR 1 (SC)

2.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.6 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the above case in the context of A.Y. 1999-2000. In the above case, brief facts were: The assessee’s land was acquired by Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) and the issue with regard to Enhanced Compensation was in dispute and pending before the High Court. In terms of the Interim Order of the High Court, the assessee had received the Enhanced Compensation of Rs.87, 13,517 and the interest thereon of Rs.1, 47,575 during the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1999-2000 on furnishing the requisite security. While furnishing the return of income, the assessee took the stand that as the entire amount was in dispute before the High Court in the appeal filed by the State, the amount of Enhanced Compensation received had not accrued during the year of receipt and accordingly, the receipt of such Disputed Enhanced Compensation and interest thereon was not taxable during the Asst. Year 1999-2000. The Assessing Officer [A.O.] took the view that on account of provisions of section 45 (5), the amount so received by the assessee was taxable. The First Appellate Authority accepted the claim of the assessee, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Hindustan Housing’s case [supra] and the Appellate Tribunal also decided the issue in favour of the assessee. When the matter came up before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the Courts took the view that the case of the assessee is squarely covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in Hindustan Housing’s case [supra]. According to the High Court, when the State is in appeal against the order of the Enhanced Compensation and interest thereon, the receipt of such amounts is not taxable as income as the said two items are disputed by the Government in appeal. On these facts, the matter came up before the Apex Court at the instance of the Revenue along with other similar appeals.

2.2 After referring to the facts of the above case, the Court noted that the short question to be decided in this batch of Civil Appeals is as under:

“Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in ordering the deletion of the enhanced compensation and interest thereon from the total income of the assessee on the ground that the said two items, awarded by the reference court, were under dispute in first appeal before the High Court”.

2.3 To decide the issue, the Court referred to the definition of the term, ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47) as well as the provisions of section 45(1). The Court also referred to the provisions contained in section 45(5) under the Pre-2003 Law as well as the Post-2003 Law. The Court also noted the provisions of section 155(16) introduced by the Finance Act, 2003 referred to in para 1.5 above. After referring to these provisions and conditions for the chargeability of the amount under the head ‘Capital Gains’, the Court stated that the Capital Gain is an artificial income. From the scheme of section 45, it is clear that Capital Gain is not an income which accrues from day- to-day during the specific period, but it arises at a fixed point of time, namely, on the date of transfer. According to the Court, Sec.45 defines Capital Gains. It makes them chargeable to tax and it allots an appropriate year for such charge and section 48 lays down the mode of computation of Capital Gains and deductions therefrom.

2.4 After referring to the basic scheme with regard to the taxation of Capital Gains, the Court referred to the historical background and reasons for which section 45(5) was inserted by the Finance Act, 1987 [w.e.f. 1.4.1988]. The Court noted that Capital Gains arising on transfer of capital asset are chargeable in the year of transfer of such asset. However, it was noticed that in cases of compulsory acquisition of assets, the additional compensation stood awarded in several stages by different appellate authorities, which necessitated rectification of the original assessment at each stage as provided in section 155(7A). It was also noticed that the repeated rectification of assessment on account of Enhanced Compensation by different courts often resulted in mistakes in computation of tax. Therefore, with a view to removing these difficulties, the Finance Act, 1987 inserted section 45 (5) for taxation of such additional compensation in the year of receipt instead of in the year of transfer of the capital asset. Accordingly, such additional compensation is treated as deemed income in the hands of the recipient, even if the actual recipient happens to be a person different from the original transferor by reason of death, etc. For this purpose, the cost of acquisition in the hands of the receiver of additional compensation is deemed to be nil. The Court also noted the insertion of section 54H by the Finance Act, 1991, which effectively provides for reckoning the time limit for making requisite investments for claiming certain exemptions from the date of receipt of such compensation, instead of from the date of transfer as provided in various sections referred to in section 54H. The Court also referred to Circular No.621 dated 19.12.1991 [195 ITR (St) 154, 171] explaining the effect of such amendments.

2.5 The Court, then summarized the overriding effect of the provisions of section 45 (5) and stated that in situations covered by section 45(5), from A.Y. 1988-89, the gain is to be dealt with as under [page 11]:

“(a)    the Capital Gain computed with reference to the compensation awarded in the first instance or, as the case may be

– the consideration determined or approved in the first instance by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India is chargeable as income under the head “Capital Gains” of the previous year, in which such compensation or part thereof, or such consideration or part thereof, was first received; and the amount by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced or further enhanced by the Court, Tribunal or other authority is to be deemed to be the income chargeable under the head “Capital Gains” of the previous year in which such an amount is received by the assessee.

2.6 The Court, then, proceeded to analyse the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [L.A. Act]. The Court noted the provisions of section 23(1) and stated that the same provide for determining the amount of compensation on the basis of market value of the land on the date of publication of the relevant notification for acquisition and other matters to be considered for determining such amount. Referring to section 23(1A), which provides for payment, in addition to the market value of the land, of an additional amount @12% per annum of such market value for a period from the date of publication of notification to the date of award of compensation by the Collector or to the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is later. According to the Court, this is provided to mitigate the hardship to the owner, who is deprived of his enjoyment by taking possession from him and using it for public purposes, because of considerable delay in making the award and offering payment thereof. This additional amount payable u/s. 23(1A) of the L.A. Act is neither interest nor solatium. It is an additional compensation, which compensates the owner of the land for the rise in price during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings. It is a measure to offset the effect of inflation and continuous rise in the value of the property. This represents the additional compensation and has to be reckoned with as part of the market value of the land, which is to be paid in every case. The Court then noted Sec. 23(2) of the L.A. Act, which, in substance, provides that the Court shall in every case award, in addition to the market value of the land, a sum of 30% of such market value in consideration of the compulsory acquisition of the land. In short, it talks about the solatium. The award of solatium as well as the payment of additional amount u/s 23(1A) are mandatory.
 

2.6.1 The Court, then, noted the provisions of section 28 and section 34, which provide for interest payable under L.A. Act. The Court then explained that section 28 applies when the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when the Court awards excess amount [i.e. Enhanced Compensation]. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on excess amount awarded by it [i.e. Enhanced Compensation] over the compensation awarded by the Collector. The Court also stated that such Enhanced Compensation also includes additional amount payable u/s. 23(1A) and the solatium payable u/s. 23(2) of the L.A. Act. The interest on such Enhanced Compensation becomes payable u/s. 28 if, the Court awards interest under that section. Award of interest u/s. 28 is not mandatory, but is left to the discretion of the Court. section 28 does not apply to the cases of undue delay in making award for compensation; it only applies to the amount of Enhanced Compensation. The Court also noted that such interest is different from compensation as held by the Apex Court in the cases of Ramchand vs Union of India [(1994) 1 SCC 44 and Shri Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited (1994) 1 SCC 262]. The Court also noted the provision for interest payable u/s. 34 of the L.A. Act, which effectively provides for payment of interest at the specified rate for delay in payment of com-pensation after taking possession of the land.

2.6.2 Having analysed the above referred provisions of the L.A. Act, the Court stated as under [pages 14-15]:

“To sum up, interest is different from compensation. However, interest paid on the excess amount under section 28 of the 1894 Act depends upon a claim by the person, whose land is acquired whereas interest under section 34 is for delay in making payment. This vital difference needs to be kept in mind in deciding this matter. Interest under section 28 is part of the amount of compensation, whereas interest under section 34 is only for delay in making payment after the compensation amount is determined. Interest under section 28 is a part of the enhanced value of the land, which is not the case in the matter of payment of interest under section 34”.

2.6.3 Finally, the Court summarised the relevant provisions of the L.A. Act as under [page 15]:

“ It is clear from a reading of section 23(1A), 23(2) as also section 28 of the 1894 Act that additional benefits are available on the market value of the acquired lands under section 23(1A) and 23(2), whereas section 28 is available in respect of the entire compensation. It was held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sunder vs Union of India [2001] 7 SCC 211, that “indeed the language of section 28 does not even remotely refer to market value alone and in terms, it talks of compensation or the sum equivalent thereto. Thus, interest awardable under section 28, would include within its ambit, both the market value and the statutory solatium. It would be thus evident that even the provisions of section 28 authorise the grant of interest on solatium as well”. Thus, “solatium” means an integral part of compensation, interest would be payable on it. Section 34 postulates award of interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date of taking possession only until it is paid or deposited. It is a mandatory provision. Basically section 34 provides for payment of interest for delayed payment.”

2.7 After considering and analysing the effect of the relevant provisions of the L.A. Act, the Court proceeded to consider the taxability of amount received with reference to the provisions of section 45(5) of the Act. For this purpose, the Court then noted as under [page 15]:

“ The question before this Court is: whether additional amount under section 23(1A), solatium under section 23(2), interest paid on excess compensation under section 28 and interest under section 34 of the 1894 Act could be treated as part of the compensation under section 45(5) of the 1961 Act? ”

2.8 The Court then proceeded to consider the relevance and effect of Hindustan Housing’s case on which heavy reliance was placed by the representatives of the assessees as well as by the High Court and the appellate authorities. The Court noted that in that case, after awarding the original compensation, the Enhanced Compensation was granted with interest by an award of arbitrator, against which the State Government was in appeal. Pending the appeal, the State Government deposited in the Court an additional amount of award [including interest] and the assessee was permitted to withdraw the same on furnishing the security bond for refunding the amount in the event of the said appeal of the Government being allowed. The issue of taxability of this amount in the A.Y.
 

1956-57 had come up for consideration. On these facts, the Court had taken a view that since the entire amount was in dispute in the appeal filed by the State Government, there was no absolute right to receive the amount at that stage. If the appeal was to be allowed in its entirety, right to payment of Enhanced Compensation would have fallen altogether. Accordingly, it was held that the amount so received was not income accrued to the assessee during the previous year, relevant to the A.Y. 1956-57.

2.8.1 Explaining the effect of Hindustan Housing’s case on the issue before the Court, the Court stated that the said judgment was delivered on 29th July, 1986 under the Pre-1988 Law, i.e. before the introduction of the provisions of Sec.45(5) of the Act. The Court also stated that the said judgment was delivered in the context of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 [1922 Act], when the definition of the term ‘transfer’ in section 12B did not contain a specific reference to compulsory acquisition. According to the Court, after the insertion of section 45(5), a totally new scheme stood introduced keeping in mind the compulsory acquisition, where the compensation is payable at multiple stages and the amount has been withdrawn and used by the assessee for several years pending the litigation. Accordingly, the Court took the view that the judgment of the Apex Court in Hindustan Housing’s case is not applicable to the present case.

2.9 The Court then proceeded to consider the taxability of receipt of such amount under the Post-1988 Law, independent of the judgment of the Apex Court in Hindustan Housing’s case. For this purpose, the Court referred to the provision of section 45(5) as introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 [i.e. Post-1988 Law] and noted that under the said provisions, the Enhanced Compensation is to be deemed as income of the recipient of the previous year of receipt. The Court then explained the effect of the provisions of section 45(5) and the issue to be decided by the Court in that context as under [page 17]:

“Two aspects need to be highlighted. Firstly, sec-tion 45(5) of the 1961 Act deals with transfer(s) by way of compulsory acquisition and not by way of transfers by way of sales, etc., covered by section 45(1) of the 1961 Act. Secondly, section 45(5) of the 1961 Act talks about enhanced compensation or consideration, which in terms of L.A. Act, 1894, results in payment of additional compensation.

The issue to be decided before us – what is the meaning of the words “enhanced compensation/ consideration” in section 45(5) (b) of the 1961 Act? Will it cover “interest”? These questions also bring in the concept of the year of taxability”.

2.10 The Court then again referred to the relevant provisions of the L.A. Act and the impact thereof as explained earlier [para 2.6 above]. The Court then stated as under [page 18]:

“ ….. It is equally true that section 45(5) of the 1961

Act refers to compensation. But, as discussed hereinabove, we have to go by the provisions of the 1894 Act, which awards “interest” both as an accretion in the value of the lands acquired and interest for undue delay. Interest under section 28, unlike interest under section 34, is an accretion to the value; hence, it is a part of enhanced compensation or consideration, which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894 Act. So, also additional amount under section 23(1A) and solatium under section 23(2) of the 1894 Act forms part of enhanced compensation under section 45(5) (b) of the 1961 Act … ”

2.11 The Court then considered the argument on behalf of the assessee that section 45(5) (b) of the Act deals only with reworking and its object is not to convert the amount of Enhanced Compensation into deemed income in the year of the receipt. Rejecting this argument, the Court stated that an overriding provision in the form of section 45(5) was inserted in the Post-1988 Law to treat the receipt of such Disputed Enhanced Compensation as deemed income and tax the same on receipt basis. This position gets further support from the insertion of clause (c) in section 45(5) and section 155(16) by the Finance Act, 2003. While concluding that the receipt of such Disputed Enhanced Compensation is taxable in the year of receipt, the Court finally held as under [page 19]:

“… Hence, the year in which enhanced compensation is received is the year of taxability. Consequently, even in cases where pending appeal, the court/ Tribunal/authority before which appeal is pending, permits the claimant to withdraw against security or otherwise the enhanced compensation(which is in dispute), the same is liable to be taxed under section 45(5) of the 1961 Act. This is the scheme of section 45(5) and section 155(16) of the 1961 Act. We may clarify that even before the insertion of section 45(5)(c) and section 155(16) with effect from April 1, 2004, the receipt of enhanced compensation under section 45(5)(b) was taxable in the year of receipt, which is only reinforced by insertion of clause (c) because the right to receive payment under the 1894 Act is not in doubt…”

2.12 Since the Court has explained the nature of interest u/s. 28 and section 34 of the L.A. Act and drawn a distinction between the two [referred to in paras 2.6.2 and 2.6.3], the Court noted the practical difficulties which are likely to be faced in giving effect to its judgment in the old matters under consideration. In view of this, the Court also directed not to carry out re-computation on the basis of this judgment, particularly in the context of interest under two different provisions of the L.A. Act and stated under [page 19]:

“Having settled the controversy going on for the last two decades, we are of the view that in this batch of cases which relate back to the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93, possibly the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would have ended. In a number of cases, we find that proceedings under the 1894 Act have been concluded and taxes have been paid. Therefore, by this judgment, we have settled the law but we direct that since matters are a decade old and since we are not aware of what has happened in the Land Acquisition Act proceedings in pending appeals, the recomputation on the basis of our judgment herein, particularly in the context of type of interest under section 28 vis-à-vis interest under section 34, additional compensation under section 23(1A) and solatium under section 23(2) of the 1894 Act, would be extremely difficult after all these years, will not be done ”.

Conclusion

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, a very old controversy with regard to the year of taxability of the receipt of Disputed Enhanced Compensation is now resolved and the same is tax-able in the year of receipt, notwithstanding the fact that the dispute with regard to the ultimate right of receiving such compensation under the L.A. Act is finally not settled. The judgment of the Apex Court in the above case also makes it clear that the above position with regard to the taxability of receipt of such compensation will apply under the Post-1988 Law and such cases will not be governed by the judgment of the Apex Court in Hindustan Housing’s case. Accordingly, the view taken in the decision of the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of Kadam Prakash [referred in Para 1.6 above] gets approved in an implied manner.

3.1.1 In the above judgment, the Apex Court has also taken a view that the term ‘Enhanced Compensation’ used in section 45(5)(b) includes the additional amount received u/s. 23(1A) as well as the amount of solatium u/s. 23(2) of the L.A. Act. Accordingly, the same will also have to be dealt with as such.

3.1.2 The Court has also distinguished the nature of interest payable under two different provisions of the L.A. Act [viz. section 28 and section 34] and taken a view that interest granted u/s 28 of the L.A. Act [unlike interest granted u/s 34 of the said Act] is an accretion to the value and hence, the same also forms part of the Enhanced Compensation or consideration referred u/s 45(5)(b). Accordingly, the same may also have to be dealt with as such.

3.1.3 On the other hand, interest granted u/s 34 of the L.A. Act will not form part of the enhanced compensation [unlike interest u/s 28 as aforesaid] and will continue to be taxed as interest. For this, useful reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Shamlal Narula [53 ITR 151].

3.1.4 In the above judgment, the Court has also directed not to make re-computation based on the judgment in these cases for stated reasons [Ref. 2.12 above]

3.2 Interestingly, the issue with regard to the year of taxability [under the Mercantile System] of interest payable in such cases had come-up before the Courts in the past. The Madras High Court in the case of T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty [87 ITR 22] had an occasion to consider the year of taxability of interest included in the amount fixed as compensation by the Court in a case where the property was acquired by the Government under the Requisitioned Land [Continuance of Powers] Act, 1947 under a notification issued by the Collector of Madras dated 24.5.1949. The Court had taken a view that such interest accrues year after year. This judgment of the Madras High Court is upheld by the Apex Court [165 ITR 231].

It is worth mentioning that in the earlier judgment of the Apex Court [66 ITR 465], in the same case [it appears that in the first round of litigation], the Apex Court, while rejecting the case of the assessee with regard to non-taxability of such interest altogether had stated thus : “In the case on hand, the right to interest arose by virtue of the provisions of sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the arbitrator and the High Court merely gave effect to that right in awarding interest on the amount of compensation. Interest received by the assessee was therefore properly held taxable”.

The question regarding the period of accrual of interest payable u/s 28 and 34 of the L.A. Act had come up for consideration before the Apex Court in a batch of cases and the Apex Court, in its judgment, reported as Ramabai vs C.I.T. and other cases [181 ITR 400], has taken view that this issue is concluded by the Apex Court in the case of T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty [165 ITR 231]. The Court specifically stated thus: “The effect of the decision, we may clarify, is that the interest cannot be taken to have accrued on the date of the order of the Court granting enhanced compensation but has to be taken as having accrued year after year from the date of delivery of possession of the lands till the date of such order.” This was the position settled by the Apex Court with regard to the point of time at which such interest accrues and taxability thereof accordingly.

Now, the Apex Court in the case of Ghanshyam [HUF] has held that the interest u/s 28 of the L.A. Act forms part of the Enhanced Compensation contemplated u/s 45(5)(b). Hence such interest on Disputed Enhanced Compensation becomes taxable in the year of receipt along with such compensation. However, no reference is found to have been made in this case of the earlier above referred judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Govindarajulu Chetty (supra) or Ramabai and other cases (supra). It may also be noted that those earlier judgments of the Apex Court have been delivered by the benches of three judges, whereas the judgment in the case of Ghanshyam [HUF] has been delivered by the bench of two judges. This may throw open some interesting issues with regard to the character of interest u/s 28 of the L.A. Act as well as the year of taxability thereof. This also may have to be considered in the light of the amendments made for the Finance Act, 2009, referred to hereinafter.

3.3 In the context of the year of taxability of interest on compensation or on enhanced compensation, the Act is now specifically amended by the Finance Act, 2009 w.e.f. the A.Y. 2010-11 [Ref. sections 145A(b), 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv)]. Under the amended provisions, effectively, 50% of the interest received by the assessee on compensation or on Enhanced Compensation is taxable in the year of receipt. These provisions do not distinguish between the interest received u/s 28 or 34 of the L.A. Act. In fact, these provisions also do not make any reference to compulsory acquisition or to the L.A. Act. Therefore, some issues are likely to come up for consideration with regard to the applicable provisions for the taxability of such interest and in particular, in the context of interest awarded u/s 28 of the L.A. Act.

Payment to Non-Resident in Respect of Income Not Chargable to Tax — Obligation of TDS u/s.195

Closements

Introduction :

1.1 U/s.195(1) of the
Income-tax Act (the Act), any person responsible for paying (Payer) to a
Non-Resident or Foreign Company (Payee) any interest or ‘any other sum
chargeable under the provision of the Act’ (hereinafter referred to as taxable
income) is required to deduct tax at source (TDS/TAS). Such TDS is required to
be made either at the time of crediting the income to the account of the Payee
or at the time of payment thereof, whichever is earlier at the rates inforce.
The provision applies to all the Payers, including individual and HUF. The only
specific exclusion provided is in respect of payment of dividend which is exempt
by virtue of payment of Dividend Distribution Tax. Some relief is provided to
the Government, Public Sector Banks, etc. with regard to the timings of the TDS
with which we are not concerned in this write-up. The scope of the provision is
wide and therefore, the implications thereof have far-reaching effect in large
numbers of cases as the number of such payments has increased manifold with the
development of the economy and growth of cross border transactions in the last
decade — S. 195(1).

1.2 The provision is also
made that if the Payer considers that the whole of such a sum would not be
chargeable to tax in the hands of the Payee, he may make an application to the
Assessing Officer (AO) to determine the appropriate portion of such taxable
income by passing a general or special order and upon such determination, the
Payer is obliged to deduct tax only on the portion so determined — S. 195(2).

1.3 The provision is also
made that the specified recipient of such a sum can also make an application to
the AO in the prescribed form for grant of a certificate authorising him to
receive such sum without TDS and upon grant of such a certificate, the Payer is
required to make payment without TDS. These provisions are largely used by
foreign banks operating in India for receiving payments from their customers
without TDS. — S. 195(3)/(5) read with Rule 29B.

1.4 Provision for receiving
income without TDS or with TDS at a lower rate has also been made by following
appropriate procedure of making application to the AO and obtaining appropriate
certificate to that effect with which we are not concerned in this write-up — S.
197. We may clarify that the provisions relating to receipt of income without
TDS by furnishing appropriate declaration in the prescribed form (such as
15G/15H) contained in S. 197A are applicable only to Resident Payees. Therefore,
Non-Resident Payees cannot avail of this facility. In this write-up, we are also
not concerned with other exceptions provided from the operations of TDS
provisions.

1.5 The Apex Court in the
case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. LTD. (239 ITR 597) has held that the
expression ‘taxable income’ used in S. 195(1) applies to any sum payable to the
Non-Resident even if such a sum is a trading receipt in the hands of the payee,
if, the whole or part thereof is chargeable to tax under the Act. These
provisions are not only limited to the sums which are of ‘Pure Income’ nature.
Based on this judgment, it was rightly felt that in the profession as well by
the Payers of such income that the TDS is required to be made u/s.195(1) only
if, the income is chargeable to tax (partly or wholly) under the Act and in
cases where, the income itself is not chargeable to tax (Non-taxable income)
question of making any TDS should not arise. Other principles emerging from the
said judgment of the Apex Court are not considered as the same are not relevant
for this write-up. We have analysed this judgment of the Apex Court in this
column in the October, 1999 issue of this Journal.

1.6 In view of the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. referred
to in para 1.5 above (hereinafter referred to as Transmission Corporation’s
case), the litigation on many issues with regard to the obligation to make TDS
should have got substantially reduced. However, the Revenue interpreted the
effect of the above judgment little differently and felt that it is not for the
assessee to decide whether the income is chargeable in the hands of the Payee or
not, and hence, the litigation on the obligation to make TDS continued, even on
such aspects.

1.7 Pending the issue
referred to para 1.6 above, S. 195(6) was introduced by the Finance Act, 2008
(with effect from 1-4-2008) providing that the Payer shall furnish the
information relating to payments of such sums in the prescribed form and manner.
For this Rule 37BB was introduced and the procedure for making remittances is
provided for which the certificate of Chartered Accountant in the prescribed
Form 15CB is required to be obtained by the Payer before making remittance to
the Payee (New Procedure for Remittance). Earlier, there was a requirement for
obtaining certificate of Chartered Accountant for making remittance to the
Non-Resident, but the same was operating under the Circulars issued by CBDT.

1.8 The effect of judgment
of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case came up for consideration
before the Karnataka High Court (320 ITR 209) in the case of M/s. Samsung
Electronics Co. Ltd. and other cases (hereinafter referred to as ‘Samsung’s
case’) in the context of obligation to make TDS in respect of payments made to
Non-Resident Payees for supply of shrinkwrapped standardised software. In this
write-up, we are not concerned with the character of payment for the supply of
such software. However, various views expressed/observations made by the
Karnataka High Court in relation to the provision of S. 195 and the obligations
of the Payer to make TDS under the same, as well as the effect of the Apex
Court’s judgment in Transmission Corporation’s case, raised large number of
practical and legal issues.

1.8.1 In Samsung’s case, the High Court expressed various views in relation to S. 195 having far-reaching implications such as: S. 195(1) is neither a provision for ascertaining the tax liability of a Non-Resident, nor for determining whether u/s.9 of the Act, any income is deemed to have accrued or arisen to Non -Resident in India; the provision applies once the payment is made to a Non-Resident; it provides limited relief from such obligation if, the payer is able to demonstrate before the AO that the entire payment does not bear the character of income, but only a part of thereof bears such character, etc. According to the Court, the question of character of income being paid to Non-Resident Payee can only be decided in the regular assessment and cannot be determined in the proceedings u/s.195 and such questions are not relevant for determining the obligation to make TDS u/s.195. According to the Court, even in the proceeding u/s.195(2), the AO cannot embark upon exercise of determining the actual tax liability and entertain the plea that income is not chargeable to tax. The question of character of income and the tax liability of Payee cannot even be considered by the Appellate Authority in appeal proceedings against the order of the AO passed u/s.201 and if so, it was also not open to the Appellate Tribunal to venture on finding an answer to vary question in the further appeal to the Tribunal as it is not a proper exercise of its appellate powers. The Payers and the profession were shocked by these views as practically it was almost impossible to comply with the obligation to make TDS in terms of these views.

1.8.2 In particular, the following findings of the High Court read with other observations made in Samsung’s case created a situation referred to in para 1.8.1. (pages 245-246):

“If one is allowed the liberty of giving a rough and crude comparison to the manner in which the provisions of S. 195 of the Act operate on a resident payer who makes payment to a non-resident recipient and if the payment bears the character of semblance of an income receipt in the hands of the non -resident recipient, then the obligation on the part of the resident payer who makes such a payment to the non-resident recipient is like a guided missile which gets itself attached to the target, the moment the resident -assessee makes payment to the non-resident recipient and there is no way of the resident payer avoiding the guided missile zeroing in on the resident payer whether by way of contending that the amount does not necessarily result in the receipt of an amount taxable as income in the hands of the non-resident recipient under the Act or even by contending that the non-resident recipient could have possibly avoided any liability for payment of tax under the Act by the overall operation of different provisions of the Act or even by the combined operation of the provisions of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the Act as is sought to be contended by the respondents in the present appeals.

The only limited way of either avoiding or warding off the guided missile is by the resident payer invoking the provisions of S. 195(2) of the Act and even here to the very limited extent of correcting an incorrect identification, an incorrect computation or to call in aid the actual determination of the tax liability of the non-resident which is in fact had been determined as part of the process of assessing the income of the non-resident and by using that as the basis for claiming a proportionate reduction in the rate at which the deduction is required to be made on the payment to the non-resident. Except for this method, there is no other way of the resident payer avoiding the obligations cast on it by the provisions of S. 195(1) of the Act and as a consequence of such default when is served with a demand notice in terms of S. 201 of the Act.

This position is the clear legal position that emerges on analysing the full effect of the provisions of S. 195 of the Act in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd.’s case (1999) 239 ITR 587.”

1.8.3 Subsequently, it was expected that the CBDT will come out with some clarification to relieve the Payers from the abnormal hardship created by the above judgment but that never happened. Fortunately, the Delhi High Court in the case of Van Oord ACZ India (189 Taxman 232) and Special Bench of ITAT (Chennai) in the case of M/s. Prasad Production (125 ITD 263) took a different view on the major issue and explained the correct effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case. These gave some relief to the Payers, but the issues survived due to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case.

G. E. India Technology Centre P. Ltd. v. CIT, 327 ITR 456 (SC):

2.1 The above-referred judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case came up for consideration before the Apex Court (in a batch of appeals filed by various assessees — reported as GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd). For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted the facts of the leading case of Sonata Information Technology Ltd. In that case, the assessee was distributors of imported pre- packaged shrink-wrapped standardised software from Microsoft and other suppliers outside India. The assessee made payments for such softwares to suppliers without making TDS on the ground that such payments represent purchase price of the goods. The Income-tax Officer (TDS) (ITO), however, took the view that such payments are in the nature of royalty, as the sale of software included a licence to use the same and accordingly, the same represents income deemed to accrue or arise in India. The first Appellate Authority upheld the view of the ITO. However, the Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and held that such payment did not give rise to any taxable income in India and therefore, the assessee was not liable to deduct Tax At Source (TAS). When the matter came up before the Karnataka High Court at the instance of the Revenue, the contention was raised for the first time on behalf of the Revenue that unless the Payer makes an application to the ITO u/s.195(2) and has obtained permission to make for non-deduction of the TAS, it was not permissible for making payment without making deduction of TAS. This contention was accepted by the High Court for which a strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case.

2.2 At the outset, the Court noted that the short question which arises for determination in this batch of cases, is as follows (page 458):

“whether the High Court was right in holding that the moment there is remittance the obligation to deduct tax at source (TAS) arises? Whether merely on account of such remittance to the non-resident abroad by an Indian company per se, could it be said that income chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘I.T. Act’) arises in India”

2.3 To decide the issue on hand, the Court referred to the provisions of S. 195 and in particular, also noted the New Procedure for Remittance contained in S. 195(6). The Court, then, explained the scheme of S. 195 and other relevant provisions under which the statutory obligation is imposed on the Payer to deduct tax while making payment to non-resident and the consequences of the default, if any, committed by the Payer in that respect. The Court, then, stated that the most important expression contained in S. 195 (1) is ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act’. Therefore, a person making payment to a non-resident is not obliged to deduct tax if, such sum is not chargeable to tax under the Act. While explaining the effect of this expression, the Court further stated as under (pages 460/461):

“….It may be noted that S. 195 contemplates not merely amounts, the whole of which are pure income payments, it also covers composite payments which have an element of income embedded or incorporated in them. Thus, where an amount is payable to a non-resident, the payer is under an obligation to deduct TAS in respect of such composite payments. The obligation to deduct TAS is, however, limited to the appropriate proportion of income chargeable under the Act forming part of the gross sum of money payable to the non-resident. This obligation being limited to the appropriate proportion of income flows from the words used in S. 195(1), namely, ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act.’ It is for this reason that vide Circular No. 728, dated October 30, 1995 the Central Board of Direct Taxes has clarified that the tax deductor can take into consideration the effect of the DTAA in respect of payment of royalties and technical fees while deducting TAS….”

2.4 Proceeding further, the Court noted that S. 195(1) is in identical terms with S. 18(3B) of the 1922 Act. Under those provisions, in the case of Cooper Engg. Ltd. (68 ITR 457 — Bom.), it was pointed out that if the payment made by the resident to the non-resident does not represent taxable income in India, then no tax is required to be deducted, even if the Payer has not made any application u/s.18(3C) [similar to S. 195(2) of the Act], the Court, then, explained effect of S. 195(2) as under (page 461])?:

“….The application of S. 195(2) pre-supposes that the person responsible for making the payment to the non -resident is in no doubt that tax is payable in respect of some part of the amount to be remitted to a non-resident, but is not sure as to what should be the portion so taxable or is not sure as to the amount of tax to be deducted. In such a situation, he is required to make an application to the Income-tax Officer (TDS) for determining the amount. It is only when these conditions are satisfied and an application is made to the Income- tax Officer (TDS) that the question of making an order u/s.195(2) will arise. In fact, at one point of time, there was a provision in the Income-tax Act to obtain a NOC from the Department that no tax was due. That certificate was required to be given to the RBI for making remittance. It was held in the case of Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping International Joint Stock Company v. ITO, (1971) 81 ITR 162 (Cal.) that an application for NOC cannot be said to be an application u/s.195(2) of the Act. While deciding the scope of S. 195(2) it is important to note that the tax which is required to be deducted at source is deductible only out of the chargeable sum. This is the underlying principle of S. 195. Hence, apart from S. 9(1), S. 4, S. 5, S. 9, S. 90, S. 91 as well as the provisions of the DTAA are also relevant, while applying tax deduction at source provisions…..”

2.5 The Court, then, stated that the application to the ITO u/s.195(2) or u/s.195(3) is to avoid any further hassles for both residents as well as non-residents. The said provisions are of practical importance. Referring to the judgment in Transmission Corporation’s case, the Court pointed out that in that case the Apex Court has observed that the provisions of S. 195(2) is a safeguard. Based on this, the Court, then, further stated as under (pages 461/462):

“From this it follows that where a person responsible for deduction is fairly certain, then he can make his own determination as to whether the tax was deductible at source and, if so, what should be the amount thereof.”

2.6 Dealing with the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the moment there is remittance, the obligation to deduct TAS arises, the Court stated that if this is accepted, then we are obliterating the words ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ in S. 195(1). Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Ship Breaking Corpn. (314 ITR 309), the Court stated that the Payer is bound to deduct TAS only if, the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable, there is no question of TAS being deducted. Referring to the scheme of deduction of TAS contained in Chapter XVII-B, the Court stated that on analysis of various provisions contained therein, one finds the use of different expressions, however, the expression ‘sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ is used only in S. 195. In no other provision this expression is found. Therefore, the Court is required to give meaning and effect to the said expression. Therefore, it follows that the obligation to deduct TAS arises only when there is a sum chargeable under the Act. S. 195 is to be read in conformity with charging provision (S. 4, S. 5 and S. 9). The Court stated that we cannot treat S. 195 to mean that the moment there is remittance, the obligation to deduct TAS arises. If such a contention is accepted, it would mean that on mere remittance income would be said to arise or accrue in India. While interpreting a Section, one has to give weightage to every word used in the Section. Again, the Act is to be read as an integrated code and one cannot read the charging Section of the Act de hors the machinery provision as held by the Apex Court in the case the Eli Lilly (312 ITR 325).

2.6.1 Explaining further, the effect of the above referred contention of the Revenue, the Court stated as under (page 463):

“….If the contention of the Department that any person making payment to a non-resident is necessarily required to deduct TAS, then the consequence would be that the Department would be entitled to appropriate the monies deposited by the payer even if the sum paid is not chargeable to tax because there is no provision in the Income- tax Act by which a payer can obtain refund. S. 237 read with S. 199 implies that only the recipient of the sum, i.e., the payee could seek a refund. It must therefore follow if the Department is right, that the law requires tax to be deducted on all payments, the payer, therefore, has to deduct and pay tax, even if the so-called deduction comes out of his own pocket and he has no remedy whatsoever, even where the sum paid by him is not a sum chargeable under the Act. The interpretation of the Department, therefore, not only requires the words ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ to be omitted, it also leads to an absurd consequence. The interpretation placed by the Department would result in a situation where even when the income has no territorial nexus with India or is not chargeable in India, the Government would nonetheless collect tax….”

2.7 Dealing with another argument of the Revenue that huge seepage of the revenue can take place if the Payers are free to decide to deduct or not to deduct TAS, the Court stated that according to the Revenue, S. 195(2) is a provision requiring the Payer to give information so that the Revenue is able to keep track of the remittances made to non-residents outside India. The Court did not find any merit in this contention. For this, the Court noted that the Payer when he makes remittance, he claims a deduction or allowance of sum as an expenditure and if there is default in making TAS, such expenditure will get disallowed as provided in S. 40(a)(i). This provision ensures effective compliance of S.

195.    The Court also noted the New Procedure for Remittance introduced in the form of 195(6) with effect from 1-4-2008 and stated that it will not apply for the period under consideration. Finally, the Court took the view that there are adequate safeguards created in the Act, which would prevent the revenue leakages.

2.8 The Court, then, considered the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case and stated that the only issue raised in that case was whether TDS was applicable only to pure income payments and not to composite payments, which had an element of income embedded therein. The controversy before the Court in the present cases is, therefore, quite different. In that case, it was held by the Court that if the Payer had a doubt as to the amount to be deducted as TAS, he could approach to the ITO to compute the amount on which deduction of TAS has to be made. Explaining the effect of the said judgment, as well as the effect of S. 195(2), the Court concluded as under (pages 465/466):

“…..In our view, S. 195(2) is based on the “principle of proportionality”. The said sub-section gets attracted only in cases where the payment made is a composite payment in which a certain proportion of payment has an element of “income” chargeable to tax in India. It is in this context that the Supreme Court stated, “If no such application is filed, income-tax on such sum is to be deducted and it is the statutory obligation of the person responsible for paying such ‘sum’ to deduct tax thereon before making payment. He has to discharge the obligation to TDS”. If one reads the observation of the Supreme Court, the words ‘such sum’ clearly indicate that the observation refers to a case of composite payment where the payer has a doubt regarding the inclusion of an amount in such payment which is exigible to tax in India. In our view, the above observations of this Court in Transmission Corporation case (1999) 239 ITR 587 (SC) which are put in italics have been completely, with respect, misunderstood by the Karnataka High Court to mean that it is not open for the payer to contend that if the amount paid by him to the non-resident is not at all ‘charge-able to tax in India’, then no TAS is required to be deducted from such payment….”

2.9 On merits of the cases on hand, the Court noted that the ITO and the First Appellate Authority have taken a view that the payment for supply of software constituted royalty, whereas the Appellate Tribunal has held otherwise and accepted the contention of the Appellant(s). However, the High Court did not go into merits of the cases. Therefore, the cases are remitted to the High Court for de novo consideration on merits.

Conclusion:

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, now it is the settled that if the payment is made to a non-resident, which is not a taxable income in India, then no tax is required to be deducted u/s.195.

3.2 For the above purpose, it is open to the Payer to decide whether such payment is at all chargeable to tax in India as the income of the Payee. For this purpose, the Payer can take into account the relevant provisions of the Act as well as applicable Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). If, in the process, the Payer is fairly certain about the non-taxability, he need not deduct TAS.

3.3 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, for the purpose of determination taxability of the remittance being made to non-resident, it is also open to the Payer to determine the character of income in the hands of non-resident Payee.

3.4 There are adequate safeguard in the Act to prevent revenue leakages, notwithstanding the above view of the Apex Court on the provisions of S. 195.

3.5 In the above judgment, the Court has also relied on its judgment in the case of Eli Lilly & C0. India Pvt. Ltd. (312 ITR 225). In this case, the Court dealt with the liability for TDS u/s.192 in respect of ‘Home Salary’ paid by the foreign company outside India to expatiates, seconded to the Indian company. We have analysed this judgment in this column in the May/June, 2009 issues of this journal. For the effect of the same and other consequences of default for non-compliance of TDS provisions, reference may be made to the same.

Concealment Penalty — Whether mens rea is essential ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act (the Act) provides for
levy of penalty (Concealment Penalty) in cases where the assessee has concealed
particulars of his income (‘Concealment of Income) or furnished inaccurate
particulars of such income (Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars). Explanation 1 to
S. 271(1) provides a legal fiction whereunder any addition or disallowance is
deemed to represent Concealed Income for the purpose of levy of Concealment
Penalty, provided conditions of the Explanation are satisfied. The Explanation
provides that (i) where the assessee fails to offer an explanation in respect of
any facts, material to the computation of total income or offers an explanation
for the same, which is found to be false, or (ii) where the assessee is not able
to substantiate the explanation offered by him and fails to prove that the same
is bona fide and that all the facts relating to the same and material to
the computation of his income have been disclosed by him, then the amount added
or disallowed shall be deemed to represent Concealed Income. This Explanation
shifts the burden of proof from the Department to the assessee. In substance,
the Explanation provides for a deeming fiction whereunder any addition or
disallowance made to the total income shall be regarded as Concealed Income for
the purpose of levy of Concealment Penalty under the circumstances mentioned
therein (hereinafter this Explanation 1 is referred to as the said Explanation).
The said Explanation has undergone change from time to time and the same was
last substituted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which was
subsequently amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1986 with effect from 10-9-1986.

1.2 Various issues are under debate with regard to the
provisions relating to levy of Concealment Penalty. One such issue is with
regard to nature of this penalty and whether mens rea is essential
ingredient for invoking the provisions for imposing Concealment Penalty.

1.3 Recently in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Dilip N. Shroff (291 ITR 519), it was, inter alia, held that the order
imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and ‘Concealment of Income’
and ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’, both refer to deliberate act on the
part of the assessee. In substance, the Court expressed the view that mens
rea
is essential ingredient for invoking provisions relating to the
Concealment Penalty. Therefore, this became one of the major defences for the
assessee in the matter of levy of Concealment Penalty.

1.4 Subsequently, another Bench of the Apex Court while
dealing with similar provisions relating to the levy of penalty under the
Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder (the Excise Act),
expressed a doubt about the correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra) on the principle laid down therein that
for levy of such Concealment Penalty deliberate act of ‘Concealment of Income’
or ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’ on the part of the assessee is essential.
This Division Bench felt that correct position in law in this regard is laid
down in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, SEBI’s case
[(2006) 5 SCC 361], wherein it is held that such penalty provisions are for
breach of civil obligation and hence mens rea is not an essential
ingredient of such provisions. In short, it is held that willful concealment is
not essential for attracting such civil liabilities of penalty. Accordingly, the
issue was referred to larger Bench.

1.5 Recently, the Apex Court (larger Bench consisting of
three judges) delivered the judgment on the issue referred to paras 1.2 and 1.4
above in the case of Dharmendra Textiles Processors, disapproving the above
principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra).
This may have far-reaching consequences in the matter of levy of Concealment
Penalty in day-to-day practice and also in terms of litigation on the issues
relating to levy of Concealment Penalty. Therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column.


Dilip N. Shroff v. JCIT, 291 ITR 519 (SC) :

2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were: For the A.Y.
1998-99, the assessee had computed long-term capital loss of Rs.34.12 lakhs on
transfer of 1/4th interest in property at Mumbai and the same was computed by
taking Fair Market Value (FMV) of the property as on 1-4-1981 as the cost of
acquisition as provided in S. 55(2)(b) of the Act and, it seems, on that basis
Indexed Cost was determined. The FMV was determined (based on the Registered
Valuer’s Report) at Rs.2.52 crores. However, for the purpose of assessment, such
valuation was obtained from the District Valuation Officer (DVO), who had
determined such FMV at Rs.1.44 crores. This had resulted into a long-term
capital gain of Rs.3.09 crores as against long-term capital loss of Rs.34.12
lakhs computed and shown by the assessee. On these facts, Concealment Penalty of
Rs.68.78 lakhs was imposed, which was confirmed by the First Appellate authority
as well as the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal preferred by the assessee before
the High Court u/s.260A of the Act was dismissed in limine. Under this
circumstance, the issue relating to the levy of Concealment Penalty came up
before the Apex Court in the above case.

2.2 The Apex Court allowed the appeal of the assessee by
taking a view that ‘Concealment of Income’ as well as ‘Furnishing of Inaccurate
Particulars’, both refer to deliberate act on the part of the assessee and mere
omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act.

2.3 In the above case, the Apex Court also made the following
important observations :


(i) By reason of such concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars alone, the assessee does not ipso facto become liable for penalty. Imposition of penalty is not automatic. Levy of penalty is not only discretionary in nature, but such discretion is required to be exercised on the part of the Assessing Officer, keeping the relevant factors in mind.

(ii) While considering the scope of the Explanation, the Court stated that if the ingredients contained in the main provisions as also the Explanation appended thereto are to be given effect to, despite deletion of the word’ deliberate’, it may not ‘be of much significance. The expression ‘conceal’ is of great importance. It signifies a deliberate act or omission on the part of the assessee. Such deliberate act must be either for the purpose of ‘Concealment of Income’ or ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’.

(iii) The term ‘inaccurate  particulars’ is not defined.
 
Furnishing of an assessment of value of the property may not by itself be furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Even if the Explanations are taken recourse to, a finding has to be arrived at having regard to clause (A) of Explanation 1 that the Assessing Officer is required to arrive at a finding that the explanation offered by an assessee, in the event he offers one, was false. He must be found to have failed to prove that such explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the income were not disclosed by him. Thus, apart from his explanation being not bona fide, it should have been found as of fact that he has not disclosed all the facts which were material to the computation of his income.

iv) The order imposing penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, the burden lies on the Department to establish that the assessee had concealed his income. Since the burden of proof in penalty proceedings varies from that in the assessment proceedings, a finding in an assessment proceeding that a particular receipt is income cannot automatically be adopted, though a finding in the assessment proceeding constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceedings. In the penalty proceedings, thus, the authorities must consider the matter afresh, as the question has to be considered from a different angle.

v) Before a penalty can be imposed, the entirety of the circumstances must reasonably point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represented income, and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars thereof.

vi) ‘Concealment of Income’ and ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’ are different and both refer to deliberate act on the part of the assessee. A mere omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act of suppressioveri or suggestiofalsi. Although it may not be very accurate or apt, but suppressioveri would amount to concealment, suggestiofalsi would amount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Union of India and Others v. Dharmendra Textiles Processors and Others, 306 ITR 277 (SC) :

3.1 In the above case (as well as other cases), when it came up before another Division Bench, the question was whether the provisions of S. llAC of the Excise Act (as inserted by the Finance Act, 1996 with the intention of imposing mandatory penalty on persons who evaded payment of taxes) should be read to contain mens rea as essential ingredient, and whether there is scope of levying penalty below the prescribed minimum. The Revenue’s stand was that the said Section should be read as penalty for statutory offence and once there is a default, the authority has no discretion in the matter of imposing penalty and the authority, in such cases, was duty bound to impose penalty as prescribed. On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee reference was made to S. 271(1)(c) of the Act taking the stand that S. llAC of the Excise Act is identically worded and in a given case, it was open to the authority not to impose any penalty. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). The Division Bench was of the view that the basic scheme for the imposition of Concealment Penalty under the Act and penalty u/s.llAC of the Excise Act is common, and was of the view that the law laid down in Chairman, SEBI’S case (supra) is correct and had doubted the correctness of the above principle laid down in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). Accordingly, the matter was referred to Larger Bench, effectively to decide whether mens rea is essential ingredient of S. llAC of the Excise Act, and whether the authority has any discretion in the matter of levy of penalty u/s.llAC of the Excise Act, when there is a breach. We are not concerned with the issue relating to discretion of the authority as to levy or not to levy the penalty under the said S. llAC (as, in this context, there is a difference between the two provisions, particularly on account of the said Explanation) and other background of the said case in this write-up and therefore, the same is not referred to.

3.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that in S. 11AC of the Excise Act, no reference to any mens rea is made and this is clear from the other relevant provisions also. It was further contended that the reliance on the judgment in the case of Dilip N:Shroff (supra) is misplaced, as in that case the question relating to discretion of the authority as to levy or not to levy the penalty was not the basic issue. In fact, S. 271(1)(c) of the Act provides for some discretion and therefore, that decision has no relevance. S. nxc provides for a mandatory penalty once the breach is committed. So far as the present case is concerned, the only dispute is whether the discretion has been properly exercised, which is a question of fact. Reliance was placed on the Chairman, SEBI’s case (supra).

3.3 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the factual scenario in each case has to be examined. It was further contended that S. 271C of the Act uses the expression ‘shall be liable’, whereas S. 271B uses the expression ‘shall pay’ in support of the contention that there is a discretion to reduce the penalty. The reference, for this purpose, was also made to S. 271F and S. 272A of the Act. It was further contended that even if it is held that the Section gives the impression that the imposition of penalty is mandatory, yet there was scope for exercise of discretion as held by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, (106 STC 604). It was also contended that various degrees of culpability envisaged in S. llAC cannot be placed on the same pedestal. Certain further arguments were made with reference to S. llAC of the Excise Act and the rules made there under, with which we are not concerned in this write-up, as the same primarily may be relevant in the context of the Excise Act.

3.4 After considering the arguments of both the sides, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Excise Act and the rules made thereunder as well as the provisions of S. 271 and S. 271C of the Act. The Court then stated that in Chairman, SEBI’s case (supra), after referring to the statutory scheme, it was pointed out that there was a scheme attracting the imposition of penalty in that Act (SEBIAct) under different circumstance (i.e., penalty with reference to breach of civil obligation and penalty related to criminal proceedings). The Court further stated that in that case, after referring to certain provisions of the SEBI Act, the Court has held as under (pages 294/295) :

“The scheme of the SEBI Act of imposing penalty is very clear. Chapter VI-A nowhere deals with criminal offences. These defaults for failures are nothing but failures or default of statutory civil obligations provided under the Act and the Regulations made thereunder. It is pertinent to note that S. 24 of the SEBI Act deals with the criminal offences under the Act and its punishment. Therefore, the proceedings under Chapter VI-A are neither criminal nor quasi-criminal. The penalty leviable under the Chapter or under these Sections is penalty in cases of default or failure of statutory obligation or in other words breach of civil obligation. In the provisions and scheme of pen-alty under Chapter VI-A of the SEBI Act, there is no element of any criminal offence or punishment as contemplated under criminal proceedings. Therefore, there is no question of proof of intention or any mens rea by the appellants and it is not an essential element for imposing penalty under the SEBI Act and the Regulations …. “.

3.5 After referring to the view expressed by the Apex Court in Chairman, SEBl’s case (supra), the Court stated that the Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that mens rea is not an essential element of imposing penalty for breach of civil obligation. For this, the Court made reference to various decisions of the Apex Court under different statutes dealing with this issue and taking similar view. Amongst this, the Court also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Tranvancore Agency (171 ITR 455), in which the Court was concerned with the levy of penalty u/ s. 271(I)(a) (since omitted from A.Y. 1989-90) for failure to furnish the return of income as required u/s.139(1) of the Act. In that case, the Court compared these provisions with S. 276C of the Act dealing with prosecution in cases where the person willfully fails to furnish the return of income as required u/s. 139(1) of the Act. In that case, having referred to both these Sections, the Court has stated that “it is clear that in the former case what is intended is a civil obligation, while in the latter what is imposed is a criminal sentence”. In that case, the Court has concluded that in the proceedings u/ s.271(I)(a) of the Act, the intention of the Legislature seems to emphasis the fact of loss of revenue and to provide a remedy for such a loss, although no doubt, an element of coercion is present in the penalty. Therefore, accordingly to the Court in that case, there is nothing in S. 271(I)(a), which required that mens rea must be proved before the penalty can be levied under that provision.

3.6 Dealing with the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (supra), on which also heavy reliance was placed on behalf of the .assessee, the Court stated that the same is not of any assistance, because the same proceeded on the basis of a concession and in any event, did not indicate the correct position in law.

3.7 The Court then referred to settled position of interpretation that the Court cannot read anything into the statutory position or stipulated condition, when the language is plain and unambiguous. The Court also referred to various decisions of the Apex Court relating to the principle of construction of statutory provisions. The Court, then, dealing with the principle of interpretation of the statute, stated as under (pages 300-301) :

“Two principles of construction – one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole, appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity, and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or Section must be construed together and every clause of a Section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. ‘An intention to produce an unreasonable result’ said Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1965) 3 All ER 539 (CA) (All ER page 544 I) ‘is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available’. Where to apply words literally would ‘defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result’, we must ‘do some violence to the words’ and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRe, (1963) AC 557(HL) where at AC page 577 he also observed: (All Er page 664-1)’. This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such (that it rarely emerges)”.

3.8 Dealing with the judgment in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra), the Court stated as under (page 302) :

“It is of significance to note that the conceptual and contextual difference between S. 271(I)(c) and S. 276C of the Income-tax Act was lost sight of in Dilip N. Shroff’s case (2007) 8 Scale 304 (sc)

The Explanations appended to S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act entirely indicate the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing the return. The judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case (2007) 8 Scale 304 (SC) has not considered the effect and relevance of S. 276C of the Income-tax Act. The object behind the enactment of S. *272(1)(c) read with the Explanations indicates that the said section has been enacted to provide for remedy for loss of revenue. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. Wilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as is the case in the matter of prosecution u/ s.276C of the Income-tax Act”.

should be read as 271(1)(c)

3.9 Finally, in the context of the issue under consideration, the Court took the view (so far as it is relevant for this write-up) that Dilip N. Shroff’s case was not correctly decided. In this context, the Chairman, SEBI’s case has analysed the legal position in the correct perspective. The Court then stated that the matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench to deal with the matter in the light of this decision, only so far as cases where there is challenge to the vires of the relevant provisions and rules made under the Excise Act.

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, it is now clear that mens rea is not an essential ingredient of the provisions dealing with Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c). It is also clear that the nature of such Concealment Penalty is not quasi-criminal, but the same is for breach of civil obligation and therefore, willful concealment is not essential for levy of such penalty.

4.2 In view of the above, the cases relating to the levy of Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) will have to be decided on the basis of provisions of S. 271(1)(c) read with the Explanations (Explanation 1 in particular) to S. 271.

4.3 From the judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, it seems that the same overrules the judgment of the Apex Court in the Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that deliberate act on the part of the assessee will have to be proved for levy of Concealment Penalty (i.e., mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions) and the order imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature. It seems that the other observations made by the Apex Court in Dilip N. Shroff ‘s case in the context of Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) should continue to hold good, as the larger Bench of the Apex Court was not specifically concerned with those points as well as the language of the S. 271(1) (and the Explanations thereto) of the Income-tax Act.

Whether free/subsidised transport facility is liable to Fringe Benefit Tax — S. 115WB(3)

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 Finance Act, 2005 introduced new provisions relating to
Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) with effect from A.Y. 2006-2007 by introducing New
Chapter XII-H in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). S. 115WA provides that the
additional Income-tax (referred to in the Act as FBT) shall be charged in
respect of fringe benefits provided or deemed to have been provided by an
employer to his employees during the previous year on the value of such fringe
benefits.

1.2 S. 115WB(1) defines ‘Fringe Benefit’ as any consideration
for employment provided by way of any privilege, service, facility or amenity,
directly or indirectly, by an employer, whether by way of reimbursements or
otherwise, to his employees (including former employees). The other part of the
definition contained in this sub-section is not relevant for this write-up. The
meaning of fringe benefit provided u/s.115WB(1) referred to hereinbefore is
hereinafter referred to as ‘General Fringe Benefit’.

1.3 S. 115WB(2) provides that the fringe benefit shall be
deemed to have been provided by the employer to his employee, if the employer
has in the course of his business or profession [including any activity whether
or not such activity is carried on with the object of deriving income, profits
or gain] incurred any expense on, or made any payment for, the purposes of
certain expenses enumerated therein (hereinafter the fringe benefit considered
under this sub-section is referred to as ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ and expenses
enumerated for this purpose are referred to as Specified Expenses).

1.4 S. 115WB(3) provides that for the purpose of Ss.(1),
the privilege, services, facility or amenity (i.e., General Fringe
Benefit) does not include perquisite in respect of which the tax is paid or
payable by the employee or any benefit or amenity in the nature of free or
subsidised transport or any such allowance provided by the employer to his
employees for the journeys by the employees from their residence to the place of
work or for returning back to the residence (here in this write-up, this
facility of transport is referred to as ‘Free/Subsidised Transport Facility)’.

1.5 The FBT is payable on the value of the Fringe Benefit
which has to be valued as provided in S. 115WC. The CBDT, in its Circular No. 8,
dated 29-8-2005 (hereafter referred to as the said Circular), has also clearly
stated that if there is no provision for method of valuing any particular fringe
benefit, even if it falls in the category of ‘General Fringe Benefit’, the same
is not liable to FBT. It may be noted that u/s.115WC (which is the only
provision which provides for method of valuing the fringe benefit), there is no
provision to compute any value of ‘General Fringe Benefit’. The computation is
provided only in respect of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ and other specified fringe
benefits referred to in S. 115WB(1) with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.6 Since the provisions of S. 115WB(3) which provides for
exemption from the levy of FBT are specifically made applicable to S. 115WB(1),
the issue was under debate as to whether the exemption provided therein can be
claimed in respect of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ [referred in S. 115 WB(2)]. The
CBDT in the said Circular has stated that the ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ provided
in S. 115WB(2) expands the scope of the meaning of the term of ‘Fringe Benefit’
provided in S. 115WB(1) (i.e., ‘General Fringe Benefit’). The issue is
relevant as otherwise there is no specific provision providing method of valuing
the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ and accordingly, such fringe benefit is not subject
to FBT liability as mentioned in para 1.5 above. The Authority for Advance
Ruling (AAR) had an occasion to consider this issue in the case of R&B Falcon
(A) (P.) Ltd.

1.7 Recently, the issue referred to in para 1.6 above came up
for consideration before the Apex Court while considering the correctness of the
ruling of the AAR referred to in para 1.6 above and the issue is now settled.
This is the first judgment of the Apex Court dealing with the provisions
relating to FBT and therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this
column.


R & B Falcon (A) Pty. Ltd., in re


— 289 ITR 369 (AAR)

2.1 In the above case, the issue relating to scope of the
exemption provided in S. 115WB(3) came up for consideration before the AAR and
the issue referred to in para 1.6 also came up for consideration. In the above
case, the brief facts were: the applicant was non-resident company incorporated
under the laws of Australia. It was engaged in the business of providing Mobile
Offshore Drilling Rig (MODR) along with crew on a day-rate charter-hire basis to
drill offshore wells. The applicant entered into a contract in October, 2003
with ONGC for supplying MODR along with the equipments and offshore crew
(employees). The employees of the applicant worked on MODR on commuter basis.
Under this system, an employee works on MODR for 28 days (called ‘on days’),
which is then alternated by 28 days field brake (called ‘off days’), when he
stays at the place of his residence in his home countries like Australia, U.K.,
USA, etc. They are transported from their home country to the MODR in two laps-
the first is from a designated base city in the home country to a designated
city in India for which the applicant provides free air ticket of economy class
and second is from that city in India to MODR through helicopter, especially
hired by the applicant for this purpose. On completion of 28 days of duty on
MODR, they are transported back to their home country in the same manner. They
are not paid any conveyance/transport allowance.

2.2 On the above facts, the following question was raised
before the AAR :

“Whether transportation cost incurred by R & B Falcon (A)
Pty. Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Applicant’) in providing
transportation facility for movement of offshore employees from their
residence in home country to the place of work and back is liable to Fringe
Benefit Tax (‘FBT’) ?”


2.3 The comments of the Commissioner made to the Applicant’s application, inter alia, stated that there is no element of transportation of these employees from the place of work and back on day-to-day basis, the expenses incurred on such transportation are covered within the scope of ‘General Fringe Benefits’ u/s.115WB(1)(a) as well as within the  scope    of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefits’ u/s.115 WB(2)(F),no taxes are paid by the employees for the transportation and therefore, such expenses incurred by the employer are liable to FBT. It was also stated that the applicant has a PE in India and has been filing returns of its income u/ s.44BB of the Act.

2.4 On behalf of the applicant, it was pointed oU.t that there are three categories of employees working under the applicant (i) employees based on land who attend to the administration, etc., (ii) Indian employees working on the rig, and (iii) foreign nationals (employees) who are transported to the rig from outside India. This application relates to the third category of the employees. It was, inter alia, further contended that considering its nature, such transportation of offshore employees does not fall within the charge of FBT u/s.115WA. Further, this position is made clear by the Circular No.8 of 200 which clearly excludes such transportation of employees from the ambit of the charge of FBT. The same position is also made clear by S. 115WB(3)and the view of the Commissioner is not tenable in law. On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the employees are carried in batches to the rig and they are alternated after each period of 28 days, such employees live on the rig for 28 days while they were on work there and therefore, the place of their residence is the rig and as such no ‘Free/Subsidised Transport Facility’ as contemplated in S. 115WB(3) is involved. A reference was also made to various questions and answers contained in the said Circular  to support    its case.

2.5 After considering the contentions raised by both the sides, the AAR noted the relevant provisions contained in 115WA, 115WB and 115WC and stated that the other provisions are mainly procedural provisions which are not relevant for the question under consideration.

2.6 Considering the provisions contained in S. 115WA, the AAR noted that FBT is leviable in respect of fringe benefit provided or deemed to have been provided by an employer to his employees during the previous year. It was further noted that S. 115WB(1)refers to fringe benefit provided to the employees in consideration for the employment and S. 115WB(2)provides that if employer incurs specified expenses, the fringe benefits shall be deemed to have been provided by the employer to his employees. Then the AAR referred to relevant part of the specified expenses in clause ‘F’ (Conveyance) and ‘Q’ [tour and travel (including foreign travel)] .

The AAR further noted that the rigor of FBT leviable on the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ is to some extent mitigated by 5. 115WB(3),which is clarificatory in nature. There are two exclusions provided in this sub-section viz. (i) ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of perquisites in respect of which tax is paid or payable by the employee; and (ii) ‘Pree /Subsidised transport Facility’ provided to the employee. The AAR then stated that rationale of the first exclusion appears to be to avoid double taxation of the same ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of the perquisites.

2.7 According to the AAR, 5. 115WB(1) does not take within its fold free or concessional tickets provided by an employer to his employees for the purpose of journey outside India. A combined reading of both the sub-sections would show that the ambit of such ‘General Fringe Benefit’ would not take in its ambit’ conveyance’ , and ‘tour and travel’ (including foreign travel); otherwise the said expressions could not have been elements of the deeming provisions contained in 5s.(2). The AAR also stated that the first limb of exclusion is not applicable in this case, as it is nobody’s case that the employees have paid or are liable to pay tax on the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of perquisites, if any. According to the AAR, the transportation expenses in question being related to employees’ journeys outside India, the same is also not covered within the ambit of second limb of exclusion contained in 115WB(3). Accordingly, the AAR took the view that such transportation expenses are liable to FBT and the same are not excluded by virtue of the provisions of 5. 115WB(3). Finally, the AAR opined as under (page 238) :

“Now it may be recalled that we have held above that 5s.(1) of 5. 115WB does not take in its fold free or concessional tickets provided by an employer to his employees for the purpose of journeys outside India, therefore, it follows that the transportation costs incurred by the applicant in bringing the offshore employees from the place of their residence outside India to the rig (in India) will not fall within the second limb of 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB.”

2.8 The AAR then proceeded to consider whether such transportation expenses would fall within the meaning of ‘conveyance’, or ‘tour or travel’ (includ-ing foreign travel)’, as contemplated in S. 115WB(2). To resolve this controversy, the AAR stated that the terms ‘residence’, ‘tour or travel’, ‘conveyance’ and ‘transport’ should be understood. They are not defined as they are not technical terms. The AAR then noted the dictionary meanings of these terms as well as the concept of residence explained in Model Convention on Income and Capital issued by the OECD in the context of the tie-breaker rule for residence. The AAR took the view that the term ‘residence’ connotes a place of abode where a person intends to dwell for considerable length of time and not a place where a person is required to stay for a short duration in connection with his duties like the stay at the rig. Accordingly, the AAR did not accept the contention of the Revenue that the place of residence of the offshore employees is the rig where they stay for doing their duties. Referring to the dictionary meaning, the AAR also stated that conveyance and transport are used many a time interchangeably and the terms tour and travel are used to denote movement from one place to another, one country to another, both for pleasure, as well as for discharging of duty. One of the meanings of tour specifically refers to ‘on an oil rig’. The AAR then stated that the provision of free ticket for travelling of employees from home country to designated city in India would fall under clause (Q) ‘tour and travel’ and journey from the chopper based in India to the rig by helicopter would fall under clause (F) – ‘Conveyance’.

2.9 Finally, while deciding the issue against the as-sessee, the AAR held as under (page 242) :

“…. It is interesting to note question No. 24 and answer thereto in the said Circular. That question deals with the case of foreign company, which sends its employees on tour to India; the answer provides that the liability to pay FBT would depend upon whether or not the company is an employer in India. A foreign company is treated as an employer in India provided it has employees. based in India; if such foreign company has no employees based in India, it is not an employer in India and is not liable to pay FBT in India. It has been pointed out above that the applicant has three categories of employees – (i) employees working on land and dealing with administration; (ii) Indian employees working on the rig, and (ill) foreign employees transported to India for the purpose of working on the rig. Therefore, the employer though a foreign company will be treated as employer in India inas-much as a section of its employees are based in India. It is worthwhile to point out that the liability of the foreign company to pay Fringe Benefit Tax on sending its employees on tour and travel to India depends on whether the foreign company is an employer in India and not whether the employees are working in India. After a careful reading of the questions and answers in the Circular it has been pointed out above that Question No. 104 relating to transportation of employees whether free or on subsidised basis for journeys from their residence to the place of work and from the place of work to their residence, refers to the residences of the employees within India and that the same position will govern sub-section (3) of 5. 115WB.”

R & B Falcon (A) (Pty.) Ltd. v. CIT, 301 ITR 309 (5C) :

3.1 The above-referred ruling of the AAR came up for consideration before the Apex Court. After referring to the facts of the case, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of Chapter XII-H. The Court also referred to the objects of the introduction of the said provisions as stated in the said Circular and noted that an employer in India is liable to FBT in respect of the value of Fringe Benefits provided by him to his employees and deemed to have been provided by him to his employees. The Court also noted from the said Circular that if there is no provision for computing the value of any particular Fringe Benefit, such Fringe Benefit, even it may fall within the 5. 115WB(1)(a) (i.e., ‘General Fringe Benefits’) is not liable to FBT.

3.2 The Court then referred to some of the questions and answers given in the said Circular. The Court noted the answer to question No. 20, in which, it is, inter alia stated that in case of Indian Company having employees based both in India as well as outside India and incurs the Specified Expenses, the value of such Fringe Benefit is determined, as a proportion of total amount of expenses incurred for identified purposes. For this purpose, such expenses attributable to operations in India should be taken into account. The Court also noted answer to question No. 21, in which, while dealing with the FBT liability of Indian Company carrying on business outside India, where none of its employees in such business is liable to pay tax in India, it is stated that the Indian Company would be liable to FBT,if its employees are based in India. Therefore, if such Indian Company does not have any employees based in India, such Company would not be liable to FBT.The Court also noted the question No. 104 with regard to FBT liability on the expenditure incurred by the employer for the purpose of providing ‘Pree /Subsidised Transport Facility’.

3.3 Having referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and some paras of the said Circular, the Court noted that in the above case, with regard to FBT liability for providing transportation and moves. ment of offshore employees from their residence and home countries outside India to the place to rig and back, the AAR has opined as under (page 524) :

“(1) The exemption  provision  contained in 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB is restricted to 5s.(1) whereas the exemption falls under the deeming provision contained in 5s.(2).

(2) Residence within the meaning of the said provision would mean residence in India and as the employees concerned are residents of the countries outside India, 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB is not applicable”

3.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, cone tended that the distinction between 5s.(1) and (2) is highly artificial and unless both the provisions are read into 5s.(3), the same would be rendered otiose; the Parliament has not restricted the operation of that provision only to regular employees and hence no restrictive meaning can be given to the said provisions; residence of the employees being not restricted to the territory of India, the AAR are committed serious error in taking a view that the place of residence would mean residence in India in 115WB(3);the CBDT itself, in the said Circular, has expressed view that 5s.(2) is merely in expansion of 5s.(1) and overall reading of the said Circular als indicates that the FBT is not payable in respect of the expenditure incurred by the employer for an employee who is not based in India.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the FBT is a new concept in terms where of any consideration for employees provided, inter alia, for facility or amenity comes within the purview of FBT liability, the tax is payable only when employer incurs specified expenses and such exemption has to be granted only on the tax leviable U/ss.(l). The terms residence, transport, etc. must be given broad meaning, which would lead to conclusion that only when employees are provided ‘Free /Subsidised Transport Facility’ on regular basis, the exemption should be granted. The Parliament has used the words’ employees’, ‘journey’ and hence the same would only mean that it should cover only the journey undertaken by the employees for regularly attending the work on periodic basis.

3.6 After considering argument on both the sides, the Court stated that the object for imposition of FBT is evident from the said Circular, which is to bring about an equity. The intention of the Parliament to tax the employer where on the one hand he deducts the expenditure for the benefit of employees and on the other hand, on the employees getting the direct or indirect benefits from such expenditure, no tax is leviable. Indisputably, Ss.(3) refers to Ss.(l) only and ex-facie, it does not have any application to the ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’. The CBDT categorically states in answer to question No.7 that Ss.(2) provides for an expansive definition. Having noted these positions, the Court stated as under (pages ‘526/527) :

“Does it mean that Ss.(2) is merely an extension of Ss.(l) or it is an independent provision? If Ss.(2) is merely an extension of Ss.(1), Mr. Ganesh may be right, but we must notice that S. 115 WA provides for imposition of tax on expenditure incurred by the employer on providing its employees certain benefits. Those benefits which are directly provided are contained in Ss.(l). Some other benefits, however, which the employer provides to the employees by incurring any expenditure or making any payment for the purpose enumerated therein in the course of his business or profession, irrespective of the fact as to whether any such activity would be carried on a regular basis or not, e.g., entertainment would, by reason of the legal fiction created, also be deemed to have been provided by the employer for the purpose of Ss.(2). Whereas Ss.(1) envisages any amount paid to the employee by way of consideration for employment, what would be the limits thereof are only enumerated in Ss.(2). We, therefore, are of the opinion that Ss.(1) and Ss.(2), having regard to the provisions of S. 115WAas also Ss.(3) of S. 115WB must be held to be operating in different fields.”

3.7 The Court further explained the effect of the provisions of S. 115WB(3) and stated as under (page 527) :

“A statute, as is well known, must be read in its entirety. What would be the subject-matter of tax is contained in Ss.(l) and Ss.(2). 5s.(3), therefore, provides for an exemption. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the latter part of the contents of Ss.(3) must be given its logical meaning. What is sought to be excluded must be held to be included first. If the submission of the learned Solicitor General is accepted, there would not be any provision for exclusion from payment of tax on amenity in the nature of free or subsidised transport.

Thus, when the expenditure incurred by the employer so as to enable the employee to undertake a journey from his place of residence to the place of work or either reimbursement of the amount of journey or free tickets therefor are provided by him, the same, in our opinion, would come within the purview of the term by way of reimbursement or otherwise.”

3.8 Finally while upholding the view of the AAR that ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ is not covered within the scope of S. 115WB(3), the Court held as under (page 528) :

“The Parliament, in introducing the concept of fringe benefits, was clear in its mind insofar as on the one hand it avoided imposition of double taxation, i.e., tax both on the hands of the employees and employers; on the other, it intended to bring succour to the employers offering some privilege, service, facility or amenity which was otherwise thought to be necessary or expedient. If any other construction is put to Ss.(l) and Ss.(3), the purpose of grant of exemption shall be defeated. If the latter part of Ss.(3) cannot be given any meaning, it will result in an anomaly or absurdity. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that the Court shall avoid such construc-tions which would render a part of the statutory provision otiose or meaningless – Visitor v. K. S. Misra, (2007) 8 SCC 593; CST v. Shri Krishna Engg. Co., (2005) 2 SCC 692.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that AAR was right in its opinion that the matters enumerated in Ss.(2) of S. 115WB are not covered by Ss.(3) thereof, and the amenity in the nature of free or subsidised transport is covered by Ss.(l).”

3.9 The Court then proceeded to consider the view of the AAR that in S. 115WB(3), after the word ‘residence’ the words ‘in India’ should be read and stated that the AAR was not correct in taking such a view. In this context, the Court further observed as under (pages 528/529) :

” …For the purpose of obtaining  the benefit of the said exemption, however, the expenditure must be incurred on the employees directly for the purposes mentioned therein, namely, they are to be provided transport from their residence to the place of work or from such place of work to the place of residence. Any expenditure incurred for any other purpose, namely, other than for their transport from their residence to the place of work or from the place of work to the place of residence would not attract the exemption provision. The assessing authority, therefore, must, in each case, would have a right to scrutinise the claim. CBDT has the requisite jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of Income-tax Act. The interpretation of CBDT being in the realm of executive construction should ordinarily be held to be binding, save and except where it violates any provisions of law or is contrary to any judgment rendered by the courts. The reason for giving effect to such executive construction is not only the same as contemporaneous which would come within the purview of the maxim temporania caste pesto, even in certain situation a representation made by an authority like Minister presenting the Bill before the Parliament may also be found bound thereby.”

3.10 The Court then stated that there is no provision in S. 115WB(3) that the employees’ residence must be based in India and therefore, provision must be given its natural meaning. Hence, it would be difficult to accept the contention that employees’ residence must be based in India for that purposes. The Court further observed as under (page 530) :

“However, it appears that the contention that such expenditure should be paid on a regular basis or what would be the effect of the words “employees’ journey” did not fall for consideration of AAR. What, therefore, is relevant would be the nature of expenses. The question as to whether the nature of travelling expenditure incurred by the appellant would attract the benefits sought to be granted by. the statute did not and could not fall for consideration of the AAR. Its opinion was sought for only on one issue. It necessarily had to confine itself to that one and no other. No material in this behalf was brought on record by the parties. Whether the payments were made to them on a regular basis or whether the expenditures incurred, which strictly come within the purview of S. 115WB or not must, therefore, be answered having regard to the materials placed on records. If any question arises as to whether the agreement entered into by and between the appellant and the employees concerned would attract, in given cases, the liability under Fringe Benefit Tax would have, thus, to be determined by the assessing authority.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court it is now clear that the exemption contained in the S. 115WB(3)is applicable only to the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ and the same cannot be extended to ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’.

4.2 For the purpose of S. 115WB(3), the place of residence of an employee need not be in India. The provision also applies to employees having residence outside India.

4.3 This is the first judgment of the Apex Court dealing with FBT provisions and it appears that these provisions should be interpreted bearing the object for which the same are introduced, as observed by the Court. The above judgment is also useful to avoid double taxation of the same amount (i.e., in the hands of employer as well as employees).

4.4 From the above judgment it also becomes important to note that while interpreting these provisions, the views expressed in the said Circular should also be given due weightage. Likewise, the representation made by the Minister at the time of introduction of the Bill also carries a great weight.

Taxability of Fees from offshore services — post Finance Act, 2010

Article

By the time you read this Article, the Finance Bill, 2011
will be presented by the Hon’ble Finance Minister in the Parliament and probably
with minimum changes expected in the direct tax provisions in this year’s budget
on account of onset of the Direct Tax Code in the financial year 2012-2013, it
is then time to introspect on one of the most discussed and publicised amendment
of Finance Act, 2010 in section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’).

By the Finance Act, 2010; the Legislature retrospectively
amended the Explanation to section 9 of the Act (which was inserted retrospectively only vide the
Finance Act, 2007
) to reiterate the taxability of income by way of interest,
royalty and Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’), under the principle of ‘source
rule of taxation’. This was done with a view to reverse the findings of the Apex
Court in the cases of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT,
(288 ITR 408) and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Jindal Thermal
Power Company Ltd. v. DCIT (TDS),
(321 ITR 31) on the issue of taxability of
FTS in India u/s.9 of the Act. The Legislature amended the language of the
Explanation to provide that situs of rendering of services was not relevant in
determining the taxability of the aforesaid income u/s.9 of the Act. The
Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2010 specifically stated the intention
of the Legislature to tax the fees from technical services which are provided
from outside India as long as they are utilised in India (services
rendered from outside India are for brevity referred to as ‘offshore services’
).
The aforesaid intention further got judicial recognition in the decisions of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) of Ashapura Minechem Limited
v. ADIT,
(2010) (40 DTR 42) (Tri.) and Linklaters LLP v. ITO, (42 DTR
233) (Tri).

However, on a careful reading of section 9(1)(vii) along with
the aforesaid Explanation, a question that arises for consideration is whether
the plain words of the statute in their present form support the intention of
the Legislature of ‘situs of utilisation of services’ as being condition of
paramount importance to determine the tax jurisdiction of income from offshore
services u/s.9 of the Act.

The issue has been dealt only from the perspective of
provisions of the Act and not from the perspective of Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreements entered by India with other countries.

Section 4, section 5, r.w.s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act provide for
taxability of FTS in India.

Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act by deeming fiction prescribes three rules qua the
category of the payer for determination of the tax jurisdiction of FTS in India
in the form of sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). The concept of ‘source rule’ of
taxation was introduced in section 9 of the Act to address the difficulties
faced in taxing income in the nature of interest, royalty and FTS by the Finance
Act, 1976. Section 9(1)(vii)(b) which deals with taxation of FTS along with an
Explanation to Section 9, in its present form, is reproduced below for ready
reference:

    “(vii) income by way of fees for technical services payable by:

        (a)

        (b) a person who is a resident, except where the fees are payable in respect of services utilised in a business or profession carried on by such person outside India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source outside India; or

        (c)

    Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this section, income of a non-resident shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India under clause (v) or clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section(1) and shall be included in the total income of the non-resident, whether or not, :

        (i) the non-resident has a residence or place of business or business connection in India; or

        (ii) the non-resident has rendered services in India.”

From the aforesaid provision, one would appreciate that in
its present form, the condition of ‘utilisation of services in India’ as
determining the tax jurisdiction of fees from offshore services

cannot be found in the plain words of the statute. The condition of ‘utilisation
of services’ may be of relevance in order to test the exception as provided in
section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act, but cannot be read to determine the taxability
of offshore services. In other words, the ‘situs of service utilised’ can be
relevant only to fall under the exception of section 9(1)(vii)(b) and not the
main part of section 9(1)(vii)(b). Further, if the said condition was to be read even in the
main part of section 9(1)(vii)(b), then there was no requirement to separately classify the
provision in clauses (a), (b) and (c) and the language of the provision would
have been different. The condition on the touchstone of ‘source rule of
taxation’ which then determines the tax jurisdiction of fees from offshore services is discussed below.

The concept as well as the expression ‘source of income’ is
not new to the Income-tax Act, 1961. In fact, this concept even existed under
the Income-tax Act, 1922 (‘the 1922 Act’). The provisions of section 42(1) of
the 1922 Act analogous to the present provisions of section 9(1)(i) considered
‘source of income in India’ as one of the basis for determining whether income
was deemed to accrue or arise in India.

The word ‘source of income’ is not defined under the
provisions of the Act. However, the CBDT in Circular No. 3 of 2008 on
Explanatory Notes on provisions relating to Direct Taxes of the Finance Act,
2007 explained the principle of ‘source rule of taxation’ for determining tax
jurisdiction of FTS in S. 9 as to be the country where the income is earned.
The word ‘earned’, though not defined under the provisions of the Act, has
received judicial interpretation in various decisions.

The Gujarat High Court, in the case of CIT v. S. G. Pgnatale, (124 ITR 391) explained the concept of ‘income earned’ for the purpose of section 9(1)(ii) of the Act. The Court, after con-sidering the ratio of the relevant legal precedents at that point of time, explained the meaning of the word ‘earned’ in the narrower sense and in the wider sense. In the narrower sense, the word ‘earned’ refers to a place of rendering or performance of services as an ingredient to determine the ‘source of income’ and in the wider sense equated it with ‘accrued’, meaning that not only the assessee under consideration should have rendered services or otherwise, but also should have created a debt in his favour i.e., a right to receive. Thus, the wider meaning of the word ‘earned’ indicates something which is due and entitlement to a sum of money consideration for which services have been rendered or otherwise by the assessee.

Further, the principle of ‘source of income’ juxta-posed with the words ‘income earned’ has been aptly explained in the following decisions, which hold the field of taxation on ‘source of income’, even today:


    E. D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (26 ITR 27) (SC);

    CIT v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., (18 ITR 472) (SC);

    CIT v. K.R.M.T.T. Thiagaraja Chetty & Co., (24 ITR    (SC);

   CIT of Taxation v. Kirk, (1900) AC 588 (PC);

  W. S. Try Ltd. v. Johnson (Inspector of Taxes),(1946) 1 ALL ER 532 (CA); and

 Webb v. Stenton, (1883) (11 QBD 518) (CA).

A question may then arise as to where then the condition of ‘income earned’ as intended by the Legislature can be found in the plain words of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. The words ‘payable by’ in section 9(1)(vii) express the condition of ‘income earned’.

In the general sense, the word ‘payable’ means that which should be paid. However, the following decisions have held that the word ‘payable’ is somewhat indefinite in import and its meaning must be gathered from the context in which it occurs:

New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram,(1976) (3 SCC 407); and

Garden Silk Weaving Factory v. CIT, (213 ITR 10) (Guj.)

Further, the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. The Central India Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., (114 CTR 160) has explained the words ‘due’ and ‘payable’ in context of section 41(2) of the Act. The Court observed that the word ‘due’ has two meanings, and one of the meaning is equivalent to ‘payable’, thereby indicating that the word ‘payable’ can be read to include ‘due’ and expressing that debt or obligation to which applied has by contract or operation of law becomes immediately enforceable, thereby in other words, satisfying the twin condition of ‘income earned’ in the wider sense u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act. This argument gets support from the fact that Explanation to section 9 of the Act has been specifically amended to provide that situs of rendering of services shall not be relevant in determining the tax jurisdiction of the income from offshore services and thereby conveying the meaning of ‘income earned’ in a wider sense. The findings of the Apex Court in E. D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. (supra) were relied upon by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. S. G. Pgnatale, (Guj.) in order to differentiate the meaning of the word ‘earned’ in wider sense from the narrower sense.

The relevant observations of the decision of CIT v. S. G. Pgnatale, (supra) with respect to the word ‘earned’ are reproduced below, duly explaining it in the narrow sense as well as in the wider sense:

“…..17. The word ‘earned’ even though it does not appear in section 4 of the Act has been very often used in the course of the judgments…. The concept, however, cannot be divorced from that of the income accruing to the assessee.

If the income has accrued to the assessee, it is certainly earned by him, in the sense that he has contributed to its production or the parenthood of the income can be traced to him….The mere expression ‘earned’ in the sense of rendering the services, etc., by itself is of no avail.”

Thus, it is clear that according to the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon’s case (supra) the word ‘earned’ has two meanings. One meaning is the narrower meaning in the sense of rendering of services, etc., and the wider meaning in the sense of equating it with ‘accrued’ and treating only that income as earned by the assessee to which the assessee has contributed to its accruing or arising by rendering services or otherwise, but he must have created a debt in his favour…..?It may be pointed out that these two meanings indicated by the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon’s case (supra) have also been indicated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 28, p. 069 where it has been pointed out that the word ‘earned’ has been construed as meaning entitled to a sum of money under the terms of a contract, implies that wages earned are owing, and may carry the meaning of unpaid, but does not necessarily imply that they are due and payable. The term has been distinguished from ‘due’ and ‘payable’. Thus, the wider meaning of the word ‘earned’ indicates something which is due, owing and entitlement to the sum of money consideration for which services have been rendered by an assessee, is a clear concept indicated by Corpus Juris Secundum….”


So, based on the aforesaid consideration, it is possible to conclude that the word ‘payable’ in section 9(1)(vii) symbolises the condition of income ‘earned’ in the wider sense and reiterating the principle of ‘source rule of taxation’ u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act.

In all fairness, before concluding on the condition which determines the tax jurisdiction of fees from offshore services, it would be relevant to consider the finding of the decisions of the Mumbai Tribunal as referred above of Ashapura Minechem Ltd. (supra) and Linklaters LLP v. ITO (supra).

The Tribunal in the case of Ashapura Minechem Limited ( supra) relying on the provisions of section 9 of the Act (as amended vide the Finance Act, 2010) held that the technical services of bauxite testing and preparation of reports rendered from outside India by a non- resident company shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act (and also under Article of India-China tax treaty) on the ground that the impugned services were utilised in India. On a similar analogy, fees from professional services rendered by Linklaters LLP (‘the Appellant’) to residents of India in the case of Linklaters LLP v. ITO (supra) was also held to be taxable in India as FTS under the provisions of section 5(2) r.w.s. 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal further opined that ‘situs of utilisation of service’ and ‘situs of payer’ determine the tax jurisdiction of FTS under the source rule of taxation in section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, which also finds support in the respective Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2007 and Finance Bill, 2010.

In this regard, it may be relevant to consider the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd., (101 ITR 502), wherein the Court held that a debt due to a foreigner cannot be treated as an asset or source of income in India and the interest thereon cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in India, merely because the debtor is in India, thereby upholding that situs of the payer itself cannot solely determine the tax jurisdiction of income.

Thus, ‘situs of payer’ and ‘situs of utilisation of service’ may be of relevance for the purpose of determining the applicability of exception u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act or satisfaction of additional condition u/s.9(1)(vii)(c).

In addition, the following decisions by various judicial authorities have also upheld the principle of ‘the country where income is earned’ as the basis for determining the tax jurisdiction of income under source rule of taxation:

    Rajiv Malhotra, in re (284 ITR 564) (AAR);

    Rupajee Ratanchand and Anr. v. CIT, (28 ITR 282) (AP);

     Mansinghka Brothers Private Ltd. v. CIT, (147 ITR    (Raj.);

    C. G. Krishnaswami Naidu v. CIT, (62 ITR 686) (Mad.); and

    SAT Behwaric & Co. v. CIT, (30 ITR 151) (Raj.)

In light of the above, one may conclude that it is the principle condition of ‘income earned’ under the source rule of taxation, which determines tax jurisdiction of FTS u/s.9(1)(vii).

Further, the next important concept which requires simultaneous discussion is of whether India has a ‘territorial tax system’, ‘worldwide tax system’ or ‘mixed tax system’. The reference towards the concept of ‘territorial nexus’ was recently found in the judgments of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Ashapura Minechem case (supra), Linklaters LLP v. ITO (supra) and also under Memorandum explaining the provisions to Finance Bill, 2007.

There are essentially three types of tax strategies applied worldwide, which are as under?:

  •     Territorial tax system;
  •     Worldwide tax system; and
  •     Mixed tax system

Under ‘territorial tax system’ as rightly explained by the Tribunal in the aforesaid decisions, a tax-payer is responsible for paying taxes only on that part of business which he does within his home country or state. In other words, it relies only on the ‘territorial’ principle for taxing income earned inside the national borders. On the other hand, in ‘worldwide tax system’, a taxpayer is taxed by the home government on all the business that the taxpayer does worldwide. Whereas in the case of mixed tax systems, elements of both territorial and worldwide tax systems are in place.

India follows ‘mixed tax system’. Elements of worldwide tax system are found while taxing residents of India and elements of territorial tax systems are found while taxing non-residents of India. ‘Doctrine of nexus’ is considered in India for the purpose of determining tax jurisdiction of income in case of non-residents.

The ‘doctrine of nexus’ for determination of tax jurisdiction of income of non- residents in India was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (183 ITR (three-Member Bench decision) as early as in the year 1989 while rejecting the submission of extra-territorial application of the provisions of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, which are presently being considered. The principle of ‘doctrine of nexus’ was well read down in the provisions of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act by the said judgment. However, the ingredient which shall determine such nexus was referred to the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the Electronics Corporation’s case (supra), since the question was of substantial importance. It would be important to mention here that the decision of the Constitution Bench is still awaited. However, there are reports that before the matter could be placed before the Constitution Bench, the appeal was withdrawn.

Further, the law of nations generally recognises that the ‘doctrine of nexus’ involves consideration of two elements:

  •     The connection must be real and not illusory; and
  •     The liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to the connection.

Thus, based on the aforesaid principles, the customary international law that comprehends levy of taxes by a state where there is connection between the state and the taxpayer on either of the following basis:

  •     Territorial nexus, based on domicile or residence of the taxpayer in the taxing state; or

  •     Economic nexus, based on the economic activity within, or connected with, the taxing state.

If one were to define economic nexus, in common parlance, it is regarded as part of ‘territorial nexus’. A nexus between the person or income sought to be taxed on the one side and the taxing country on the other.

Similarly, one may refer to the following Indian judicial precedents wherein time and again, the judicial authorities have upheld the ‘doctrine of nexus’ between the person or income which is subject to tax and the country imposing the tax as a pre-requisite for the purposes of taxation:

    CIT v. Eli Lilly and Co. (India) P. Ltd. and Ors., (312 ITR 225) (SC);

    Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (154 ITR 64) (SC);

    Mahaveer Kumar Jain v. CIT, (277 ITR 166) (Raj.) [decision following the judgment of Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. case (supra)]; and

    Worley Parsons Services Pty Ltd., In re (312 ITR 273) (AAR);

Based on the aforesaid discussion, one may conclude that the ‘doctrine of nexus’ is well recognised and is an accepted principle for the purpose of determining tax jurisdiction of in-come, more specifically in cases of taxation of non-residents in India and ‘source of income in India’ is recognised as one of the ‘doctrine of nexus’ to establish territorial nexus in India.

India, therefore, neither follows pure ‘territorial tax system’ nor pure ‘worldwide tax system’, but follows ‘mixed tax system’. So, even after looking at the issue to determine tax jurisdiction of FTS from the point of view of the ‘doctrine of nexus’, the result under this alternative also remains the same that ‘source of income’, being the necessary nexus or connection, must have a relationship with India i.e., of ‘income earned’ in India and therefore, the observations of the Mumbai Tribunal may require reconsideration.


Conclusions:

In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussions, one may conclude as under:

  •  Plain words of the statute in section 9(1)(vii) of the Act cannot be read to state that ‘situs of service utilised’ shall be of paramount importance to determine the tax jurisdiction of fees from offshore services;
  •  The principle of ‘source rule of taxation’ recognises the country where the income is earned as the basis for determining the tax jurisdiction of fees from offshore services;
  •  ‘Situs of payer’ and ‘Situs of services utilised’ are of relevance for the purpose of falling under the exception of section 9(1)(vii)(b) and satisfying the additional condition of section 9(1)(vii)(c) of the Act;
  •  Non-relevance of ‘situs of service rendered’, supports the argument that the concept of ‘income earned’ is interpreted in wider sense to determine tax jurisdiction of income from FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act;
  •  India, neither follows pure ‘territorial tax system’ nor pure ‘worldwide tax system’, but follows ‘mixed tax system’; and
  •  ‘Source of income’ is recognised under the Act as one of the basis of territorial nexus in determination of tax jurisdiction of income.

Therefore, in light of the aforesaid considerations, the general understanding of fees from offshore services being income deemed to accrue or arise in India and taxable under the domestic provisions of the Act, may require reconsideration.

Editor’s Note: Attention of the readers is invited to the recent decision of the Supreme Court of India (five member Bench) in the case of GVK Industries Ltd vs. ITO (2011-TII-03-SC-CB-INTL) in which the Court has opined on the issue of `territorial nexus’ for taxation in India.

Whether Concealment Penalty can be levied in case of reduction in loss ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 If the assessee has concealed particulars of his income
or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, a penalty u/s.271(1)(c)
(Concealment Penalty) can be imposed under the Income-tax Act (the Act). The
amount of such Concealment Penalty shall not be less than 100% (or more than
300%) of the amount of tax sought to be evaded (‘the tax on concealed income’).

1.2 The expression, ‘the amount of tax sought to be evaded’ (i.e.,
‘the tax on concealed income’) is defined in Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)(c),
which, inter alia, effectively provided (before amendment w.e.f. A.Y.
2003-2004) that the same represents the difference between the tax on assessed
income and the tax on returned income (assuming that the difference between the
returned income and the assessed income is treated as concealed income). This
explanation, inter alia, also provided that when concealed income exceeds
the total income, then the tax that would have been chargeable on concealed
income as if such concealed income is the total income of the assessee, is
treated as ‘tax on concealed income’. This explanation was inserted w.e.f.
1-4-1976 (hereinafter, the same is referred to as the said Explanation).

1.3 As there was difference of opinion amongst the High
Courts on the issue that if the income disclosed in the return as well as the
income assessed is in negative (even after making certain
additions/disallowances), whether Concealment Penalty can be imposed or not. An
appropriate amendment was made to take care of such situation u/s.271(1)(c) as
well as in the said Explanation by the Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. A.Y. 2003-2004
(hereinafter, such amended provisions are referred to as post-amendment
provisions and the earlier provisions are referred to as pre-amended
provisions). These amendments made by the Finance Act, 2002 are referred to as
Amendment of 2002. The post-amendment provisions made the position explicitly
clear that Concealment Penalty can be imposed even if income assessed is
negative and the assessee is not liable to pay any income-tax.

1.4 In the context of pre-amended provisions, the issue
referred to in para 1.3 above was decided by the Apex Court in the case of
Virtual Soft Systems Limited (289 ITR 83), wherein the Court took the view that
Concealment Penalty cannot be imposed in a case where the assessment has
resulted into loss where the assessee is not liable to pay any tax and the
Amendment of 2002 was applicable w.e.f. 1-4-2003 (i.e., A.Y. 2003-2004)
and the same is not clarificatory/declaratory in nature and hence the same is
prospective. This judgment has been considered in this column in the April, 2007
issue of the Journal.

1.5 The correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) was doubted by another Bench
of the Apex Court and hence the issue decided therein came up for
reconsideration before a larger Bench (three Judges) of the Apex Court in the
case of Gold Coin Health Food P. Limited, wherein the earlier judgment has been
overruled. Though this judgment will affect only the cases governed by the
pre-amended provisions (i.e., up to A.Y. 2002-03), considering its
importance and the fact that there may be many pending matters involving this
issue in respect of that period, it is thought fit to consider the same in this
column.


CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food P. Ltd.,


304 ITR 308 (SC) :

2.1 In the above case, the larger Bench of the Apex Court was
constituted to consider the correctness of the judgment of the Division Bench of
the Apex Court in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) and to
decide whether Concealment Penalty can be imposed in case of reduction in loss
under the pre-amended provisions. In that case, the Department had placed
reliance on Notes of Clauses relating to the Amendment of 2002 to contend that
the said amendment was clarificatory in nature and consequently it was
applicable retrospectively. This argument was rejected by the Court. Another
Division Bench, which doubted the correctness of the said judgment, noted that
the Division Bench in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra)
had rejected this argument, but it was of the view that the true effect of the
Amendment of 2002 was not considered in that case, as it was prima facie
of the view that merely because the amendment was stated to take effect from
1-4-2003, that cannot be the ground to hold that the same did not have a
retrospective effect.

2.2 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia,
contended that the purpose behind making the provisions relating to Concealment
Penalty is to penalise the assessee for (a) concealing particulars of income;
and/or (b) furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income, and hence, whether
the assessee’s income was a profit or loss was really of no consequence. It was
further contended that the word ‘any’ used in the expression in addition to ‘any
tax payable’ found in the provision makes the position clear that the penalty
was in addition to any tax and even if no tax was payable, the penalty was
leviable. The Amendment of 2002 was made to clarify this position as some High
Courts took a contrary view. This was not a substantive amendment which created
penalty for the first time. Even Notes on Clauses make the position clear that
the amendment was clarificatory in nature and would apply to all assessments
even prior to A.Y. 2003-04.

2.3 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee, it was,
inter alia,
contended that the judgment in the case of Virtual Soft Systems
Limited (supra) lays down the correct principle in law and that position
was rightly noted by various High Courts, more particularly by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in the case of Prithipal Singh and Co. (183 ITR 69) and the
Department’s appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court (249
ITR 670). It was further contended that the Amendment of 2002 enlarged the scope
of levying Concealment Penalty and therefore, does not operate retrospectively
and is applicable only w.e.f. 1-4-2003. It was also pointed out that the
memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2002 also states that
this amendment will take effect from 1-4-2003.

2.4 After considering the arguments advanced on behalf of both the parties, the Court noted that in the judgment in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra), it was also observed that even if the statute does contain a statement to the effect that the amendment is clarificatory or declaratory, that is not the end of the matter. The Court has also to analyse the nature of the amendment to decide whether, in reality, it is clarificatory or declaratory. Hence, the date from which the amendment is made operative does not conclusively decide the issue. The Court also noted the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Reliance Jute and Industries Limited (120ITR 921) wherein, it was observed that the law to be applied in income-tax assessments is the law in force in the assessment year, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication.

2.5 The Court then stated that it will be necessary to focus on the definition of the term ‘income’, which is inclusively defined in S. 2(24) and includes losses, i.e., negative profits. Having stated so, the Court drew support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harprasad & Co. P. Ltd. (99 ITR 118) and  observed as under    (page 313) :

“…. This Court held with reference to the charging provisions of the statute that the expression ‘income’ should be understood to include losses. The expression ‘profits and gains’ refers to positive income, whereas losses represent negative profit or in other words minus income. This aspect does not appear to have been noticed by the Bench in Virtual’s case (2007) 9 SCC 665. Reference to the order by this Court dismissing the Revenue’s Civil Appeal No. 7961 of 1996 in CIT v. Prithipal Singh and Co. is also not very important because that was in relation to the A.Y. 1970-71 when Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)(c) was not in existence. The view of this Court in Harprasad’s case leads to the irresistible conclusion that income also includes losses. Explanation 4(a) as it stood during the period April 1, 1976 to April 1, 2003 has to be considered in the background.”

2.6 The Court then stated that it appears that what the Amendment of 2002 intended was to make the position explicit, which otherwise was implied. For this, the Court noted the following recommendation of Wanchoo Committee pursuant to which a relevant portion of the said explanation was inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1976 (page 313) :

“We are not unaware that linking concealment penalty to tax sought to be evaded can, at times, lead to some anomalies. We would recommend that in cases where the concealed income is to be set off against losses incurred by an assessee under other heads of income or against losses brought forward from earlier years, and the total income thus gets reduced to a figure smaller than the concealed income or even to a minus figure, the tax sought to be evaded should be calculated as if the concealed income were the total income.”

2.7 Referring to the Circular No. 204, dated 24-7-1976, issued by the CBDT explaining the provisions along with which the said Explanation was introduced, the Court noted that in the said Circular also it is stated that even if the total income is reduced to the minus figure, ‘the tax on concealed income’ still means the tax chargeable on the concealed income as if it were the total income. The Court, then, observed as under (page 314) :

“A combined reading of the Committee’s recommendation and the Circular makes the position clear that Explanation 4(a) to S. 271(I)(c) intended to levy the penalty not only in a case where after addition of concealed income, a loss returned, after assessment becomes positive income, but also in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss and finally the assessed income is also a loss or minus figure. Therefore, even during the period between April 1, 1976 and April 1, 2003, the position was that the penalty was leviable even in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss.”

2.8 Considering the relevance of the Notes on Clauses, while interpreting the provisions on such issues, the Court stated that the same are relevant and for that drew support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Yuvraj Amarinder Singh (156 ITR 525). The Court also noted the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Poddar Cement P. Ltd. (226 ITR 625), wherein it was stated that the circumstances under which the amendment was brought in existence and consequences of the amendment will have to be taken care of while deciding the issue as to whether the amendment was clarificatory or substantive in nature and, whether it will have retrospective effect or not. The Court then referred to various judgments of the Apex Court, in which the Court has considered cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. In these judgments, it was also made clear that the presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.

2.9 Having referred to the principles and tests to be applied to determine whether a particular amendment is to be regarded as clarificatory or substantive in nature or whether it will have retrospective effect or not, the Court finally overruled the view of the Division Bench in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) and held as under (page 318) :
“The above being the position, the inevitable conclusion is that Explanation 4 to S. 271(I)(c) is clarificatory and not substantive. The view expressed to the contrary in Virtual’s case (2007) 9 SCC 665 is not correct.”

Conclusion:

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, reversing the judgment of the division bench of the Apex Court in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra), the position now emerges is that, under the pre-amended provisions also, the Concealment Penalty can be imposed even in a case where the assessment has resulted into reduction in loss and there is no tax payable by the assessee.

3.2 From the above judgment, it also appears that for the purpose of determining the nature of amendment (i.e., whether the same is clarificatory or substantive in nature), the position as existed before the amendment and the purpose for which the amendment is made is very relevant.

‘Urban Land’ Under Wealth Tax Act

Controversies

1.
Issue for consideration :


1.1 Wealth tax is chargeable
on the assets specified in S. 2(ea) of the Wealth-tax Act. One of such assets is
an ‘urban land’, which has been defined in Explanation 1(b) of the said Section.
The definition reads as under :


” ‘Urban land’ means land
situate :



(i) in any area which is
comprised within the jurisdiction of a municipality (whether known as a
municipality, municipal corporation, notified area committee, town area
committee, town committee or by any other name) or a cantonment board and
which has a population of not less than ten thousand according to the last
preceding census of which relevant figures have been published before the
valuation date; or

(ii) in any area within
such distance, not being more than eight kilometres from the local limits of
the municipality or cantonment board referred to in sub-clause (i) as the
Central Government may, having regard to the extent of, and scope for,
urbanisation of that area and other relevant considerations, specify in this
behalf by Notification in the Official Gazette,

but does not include land
on which construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the
time being in force in the area in which such land is situated or the land
occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the
appropriate authority or any unused land held by the assessee for industrial
purposes for a period of two years from the date of its acquisition by him or
any land by the assessee as stock-in-trade for a period of ten years from the
date of its acquisition by him.”

1.2 One of the exceptions
contained in the said definition excludes an urban land occupied by any building
which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority or an
unused land held by the assessee for industrial purposes for a period of two
years from the sate of its acquisition.

1.3 We intend to examine
here, the liability to wealth tax in a case where the work for construction of
an industrial building has begun in pursuance of the approval by appropriate
authority, but is not completed within the period of two years or a case where
work for construction of a residential building has begun in pursuance of the
approval by appropriate authority, but is not completed. The case of the
taxpayers for exemption from levy of the wealth tax rests on the contention that
once the work of construction of a building has commenced, the structure even
though incomplete should be recognised as ‘building’ nonetheless, and in the
alternative a land on which the work of constructing a building is in progress,
ceases to be a ‘land’. It is argued that since the building is being
constructed, the same is exempt for the purpose of wealth tax in terms of the
meaning to be given to urban land more importantly on account of the objective
behind the levy of tax. The Revenue, on the other side is of the view that such
a land on which the building is under construction continues to be a land and
therefore liable to wealth tax. The conflicting decisions, available on the
subject, of the High Court highlight the importance of the issue that requires
consideration. The Karnataka and the Gujarat High Courts are of the view that
the land under discussion is liable to wealth tax, while the Kerala and Punjab &
Haryana High Courts hold that no wealth tax is chargeable once the work of
construction has begun.

2.
Giridhar G. Yadalam’s case, 325 ITR 223 (Karn.) :


2.1 Recently the Karnataka
High Court examined this issue in the case of CWT v. Girdhar G. Yadlam.
The assessee in that case was assessed in the status of a Hindu undivided family
and the assessment year in question was 2000-01. The assessee owned a plot of
land which was given to a developer for construction of residential flats in the
year 1995-96, so however the ownership of the same was retained by him as
contended by him in the income-tax proceedings. The assessee had claimed, in the
income-tax proceedings, that it had retained ownership of the land until flats
were fully constructed and possession of the assessee’s share was handed over.
It had contended that the development agreement constituted only permissive
possession for the limited purpose of construction of flats. The assessee
contended that it continued to be the owner of the land till the flats were
sold. A notice u/s.17 of the Wealth-tax Act was issued to the assessee for
bringing to tax the said land under development. On due consideration of the
facts, the Assessing Officer treated the said land as an urban land and brought
it to tax. An appeal was filed against such an order was allowed by the CWT
(Appeals) whose order was confirmed by the Tribunal following its decision in
WTA Nos. 4-5/Bang./2003, dated March 22, 2004.

2.2 Aggrieved by the order
of the Tribunal the Revenue filed an appeal before the Karnataka High Court
raising the following questions of law :


(a) Whether the Tribunal
was correct in holding that the value of properties held by the assessee at
Adugodi and Koramangala is not chargeable to wealth tax, as the same are not
urban land but land with superstructure and cannot form part of the wealth
as defined u/s.2(ea) of the Act ?

(b) Whether the
properties of the assessee cannot be brought to wealth tax assessment ?


2.3 The High Court on appreciation of the opposing contention observed that what was excluded was the land occupied by any building which had been constructed; admittedly, in the case on hand, the building was not fully constructed, but was in the process of construction and hence could not be understood as a building which had been constructed. It held that the Courts had to interpret any definition in a reasonable manner for the purpose of fulfilling the object of the Act and the Courts. It held that the term ‘constructed’ had its own meaning and would mean ‘fully constructed’ as understood in the common parlance.

2.4 The Court further observed that the Tribunal had chosen to blindly follow its earlier order, without noticing the intention of the Legislature and the specific wording in the Section and neither the owner nor the builder nor the occupant would pay any tax to the Government in terms of the Wealth-tax Act, if the order of the Tribunal was accepted. The ‘land occupied by any building which has been constructed’, should be interpreted in a manner that would fulfil the intention of the Legislature.

2.5 The Court did not approve the theory of openness of the land for the purpose of taxation accepted by the Tribunal as in its opinion the Tribunal had failed to notice the principle that each word in taxing status had its own significance for the purpose of taxation. The Court observed that the words ‘land on which the building is constructed’ had not been properly appreciated/ considered by the Tribunal.

2.6 The Court further observed that the interpretation of any word would depend upon the wording in a particular context and the object of the Act as understood in law and therefore, was not prepared to blindly accept the meaning given to the term ‘building’ in the Law Lexicon. That the use of the words ‘building constructed’ in the Act made all the difference for the purpose of interpretation.

2.7 The Court took note of its own judgment in the case of Vysya Bank Ltd. v. DCWT, 299 ITR 335 (Karn.) to buttress its findings in favour of the Revenue. It also distinguished the judgment of the Orissa High Court in CWT v. K. B. Pradhan, 130 ITR 393 (Orissa) which examined the meaning of the term ‘house’ for the propose of the Wealth-tax Act as in the said case, the Court was considering only the word ‘house’ and not ‘building constructed’ as in the case before it.

2.9 The Court further observed that it could not forget that the Parliament in its wisdom had chosen to provide an exemption only under certain circumstances which could not be extended without any legal compulsion in terms of the Act. The Court finally held that a land on which completed building stood, such land alone would qualify for exemption. The Court accordingly accepted the appeal of the Revenue.

    Apollo Tyres Ltd.’s case, 325 ITR 528 (Ker.):
3.1 The Kerala High Court was appraised of the same issue in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CWT, 325 ITR 528 (Ker.). In that case, the assessee, a public limited company was engaged in production and sale of automotive tyres. It was allotted a plot in Gurgaon on December 29, 1995 on which it commenced construction of a commercial building in November, 1997, and completed construction of a four-storeyed building with basement and started occupying it from March 29, 2000. After completion of the construction of the building, the land and building were granted exemption from wealth tax as the said assets fell under the exempted category. However, in the course of assessment for the A.Y. 1998-99, the Wealth-tax Officer assessed the value of the land treating it as urban land u/s.2(ea) rejecting the assessee’s contention that construction of building was in progress on the valuation date, that is, March 31, 1998, and as such the land could not be treated as urban land under Explanation 1(b) to S. 2(ea) of the Act. The first Appellate Authority upheld the claim of exemption of the assessee, but the Tribunal on appeal by the Department, reversed the order of the first Appellate Authority and upheld the assessment order by relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CWT v. Giridhar G. Yadalam (supra).

3.2 The appellant company submitted that the exemption ceased to be available only where, after two years of acquisition, the land was continuously kept vacant without utilising it for construction of building for industrial or commercial purposes. It was highlighted that the assessee had started construction of a commercial building as on the valuation date and in the course of two years and thereafter the assessee had completed the construction of the building and had started using the building which was no longer assessed by the Wealth-tax Officer as the building qualified for exemption. It contended that commencement of construction of the building on the urban land itself was use of the building for industrial purpose.

3.3 The Revenue on the other hand contended that the intention of the Legislature in limiting the exemption for vacant land up to two years was only to ensure that if the assessee wanted to get exemption beyond two years, the assessee should have completed construction of the building in the course of two years and used the building for industrial purposes. It further contended that unless the building was constructed and put to use for industrial purpose, before the year end, the land could not be said to have been used for industrial purpose. In other words, the value of urban land could be assessed to wealth tax until completion of construction of the building and until commencement of use of such building for commercial or industrial purpose.

3.4 The Kerala High Court held that the urban land that was subjected to tax under the definition of ‘asset’ generally covered vacant land, only. It noted the fact that under the exception clause ‘the land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority’ was exempt from the purview of tax which according to the Court clarified that when an urban land was utilised for construction of a building with the approval of the prescribed authority, then the land ceased to be identifiable as urban land; that the section contemplated for taxing such a land on which an illegal construction was made without approval by the appropriate authority and that it was only in such a case that such land would still be treated as urban land, no matter building was constructed thereon; that however, if a building was constructed with the approval of the prescribed authority, then such land went out of the meaning of ‘urban land’.

3.5 The question according to the Kerala High Court to be considered was whether during the period of construction of the building, the urban land on which such construction was made could be assessed to wealth tax. In the Court’s view, once the land was utilised for construction purposes, the land ceased to have its identity as vacant land and it could not be independently valued. The Court pertinently noted that the building under construction whose work was in progress was not brought within the definition of ‘asset’ for the purpose of levy of wealth tax. It also noted that there was no dispute that as and when construction of the building was completed, there could be no separate assessment of urban land and the assessment was thereafter only on the value of the building, if it was not exempted from tax. The commercial building constructed by the appellant assessee, the Court noted, fell within the exemption clause as commercial building was not subjected to wealth tax. The commencement of construction in the opinion of the Court amounted to the use of the land for industrial purpose as without construction of the building the land could not be used for the purpose for which it was allotted.

3.6 For removal of doubts the Court noted that part construction and abandoning further construction would not entitle the assessee for exemption, unless the assessee eventually completed construction of the building and used the building for commercial or industrial purpose. As in the case before the Court, the assessee progressively completed construction of a four-storeyed building with basement and started using it within the course of two years from the valuation date, the assessee was entitled to exemption; that the assessee could not be expected to complete the construction of

    four-storeyed massive building in the course of two years which was the period provided in Explanation 1(b) of S. 2(ea). Keeping in mind the exemption available to productive assets, the Court felt that there was no scope for levy of tax during the period of construction of the productive asset, namely, commercial building by utilising the urban land. In other words, once the non-productive asset like urban land was converted to a productive asset like a building which qualified for exemption, then the assessee could start availing of exemption even during of conversion of such non-productive asset to productive asset. The Court confirmed the eligibility of the assessee for claim of exemption for urban land on which they were constructing a commercial building on the valuation date.

    Observations:
4.1 The present scheme of the wealth tax primarily seeks to tax an unproductive asset and leaves un-taxed an asset, which is put to a productive use. This is amply clarified by the Finance Minister’ speech and the memorandum explaining the objects behind the introduction of the new scheme of wealth tax while moving the Finance Bill, 1992. Once an asset is shown to be a not non-productive asset, it ceases to be outside the ambit of the wealth tax. The activity of construction ensures that the land in question is a ‘productive asset’ and no wealth tax can be levied on an asset which is productive.

4.2 A land on being put to construction cannot be termed as an open land and even perhaps a ‘land.’ A land is a surface of the earth and once the surface is covered, it cannot be termed as the land, leave alone the urban land.

4.3 The decision in Giridhar G. Yadalam’s case under comment was discussed by the Kerala High Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT, (supra), and only thereafter the Court did not subscribe to the view that construction should have been completed within two years. The Kerala High Court found that Giridhar Yadalam’s case was inapplicable, where the assessee constructed the building in stages though the full construction took four years.

4.4 The purpose and the objective behind introduction of the provision, brought in with effect from April 1, 1995, should be kept in mind. It was for bringing to tax an unutilised open land that the provision was introduced. Once a land is admitted to be put to use for the purposes of construction, it ceased to be a chargeable land and should not be subjected to tax if the construction of the building is eventually completed and is not used a subterfuge to avoid any tax. While there is no doubt that a land that is put to use for construction within two years, is exempt for two years from tax, for the period thereafter it is no longer a virgin land, so that it is not liable to tax.

4.5 Once land is married to a superstructure, it can no longer be treated as land simpliciter. It is also not a property capable of being occupied for use and be termed as a building. A building under construction is neither vacant land, nor can it be treated as a building prior to completion as is generally understood for municipal tax. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Polychem Limited, AIR 1974 SC 1779 with regard to municipal tax had held that unfinished building would not justify any valuation, since it cannot be treated as a building. The Madras High Court in CWT v. S. Venugopala Konar, 109 ITR 52 has held that only the amount spent on construction would be the value of the property under construction. The Karnataka High Court referred to the decision in State of Bombay v. Sardar Venkat Rao Gujar, AIR 1966 SC 991, where it was held that a building in order for it to be con-sidered as a building should have walls and a room. The Supreme Court in that case had followed the decision in Moir v. Williams, (1892) 1 QB 264.

4.6 The Gujarat High Court, in CWT v. Cadmach Machinery Co. Pvt. Ltd., 295 ITR 307 (Guj.) found that the land on which construction had started would not be treated as building, so that the land value could be included under the law u/s.40(3)(vi) of the Finance Act, 1993 differing from the decision of the Delhi High Court in CWT v. Prem Nath Mo-tors P. Ltd., 238 ITR 414. Recently, in the case of CIT v. Smt. Neena Jain, WTA Nos. 17 to 20, dated 19-2-2010, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has upheld the view that a house under construction is not liable to WT and is not an urban land.

4.7 The Cochin Bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Mathew L. Chakola v. CWT, 9 SOT 617 (Cochin) and Meera Jacob v. WTO, 14 SOT 486 (Cochin), held that once construction activity started on an urban land, the land lost its character of an urban land and was outside purview of definition of the ‘urban land’. Similarly, in Federal Bank Ltd. v. JCIT, 295 ITR (AT) 212 (Cochin), it was held by the Tribunal that once the building was under construction, the land was no longer a vacant land so as to be made liable for wealth tax u/s.2(ea) of the Wealth-tax Act.

4.8 In the said case of Meera Jacob v. WTO, 14 SOT 486 (Cochin), the Tribunal has also upheld the alternative contention of the appellant that once a land was put to construction, it ceased to be an asset liable to wealth tax, as the activity of construction ensured that the land in ques-tion was a ‘productive asset’ and no wealth tax could be levied on an asset which was productive; wealth tax was chargeable only on such assets which were not productive. For supporting this proposition, the Cochin Bench followed its own decision in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. 295 ITR (AT) 212 (Cochin). The Cochin Bench in the said decision also held that once a land was subjected to construction, it ceased to be an open land; it is only an open land that could be treated as a land; a land was a surface of the earth and once the surface was covered, it ceased to be the land, leave alone the urban land.

4.9 It is exempt primarily for the reason that land on which construction is in progress is not an asset u/s.2(ea) as it has not been so listed. A land acquired for industrial use will be exempt for two years after its acquisition provided the construction starts during the third year. Once the construction has begun, as stated, the land ceases to be chargeable to wealth tax, subject to the condition that such construction eventually leads to completion of building. It needs to be appreciated that the exemption given for a land on which construction is in progress is in relaxation of levy of wealth tax on urban land.

4.10 In the case of Vysya Bank Ltd. v. DCWT 299ITR335 (Karnataka) the Bank had entered into an agreement for purchase of property on June 17, 1978 and was put in possession of the property. The Assessing Officer ruled that the assessee had become the owner of the property and was liable to wealth tax. On an appeal by the assessee to the Court, the Karnataka High Court examined the meaning of the terms ‘assets’ and ‘urban land’ and also the judgment of the Apex Court in CWT v. Bishwanath Chatterjee, (1976), 103 ITR 536 and ultimately ruled that the Assessing Authority was not justified in including the vacant land in the net wealth of the assessee for the purpose of computation of wealth as on the valuation date for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act.

4.11 It is relevant to note that there are no rules for valuation of a property under construction. Neither there is a provision which state that such a property should be valued merely as land.

4.12 As noted by the Kerala High Court, the better view is that the decisions of the Karnataka High Court and the Gujarat High Court need review.

Slump sale and S. 50B

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 50B provides for taxation of capital gains arising in
a slump sale. ‘Slump sale’ has been defined by S. 2(42C) to mean transfer of one
or more undertakings as a result of sale for a lump sum consideration without
values being assigned to individual assets and liabilities in such sales other
than for the purposes of payment of stamp duty. An ‘undertaking’ has been
defined vide S. 2(19AA) to include any part or a unit or a division thereof or a
business activity as a whole.

1.2 These provisions are introduced by the Finance Act, 1999
w.e.f. 1-4-2000 to put to rest the serious doubts prevailing for long about the
taxability or otherwise of gains in slump sale of business on a going concern
basis.

1.3 The newly introduced provisions besides providing for the
taxability of such gains provide for the detailed mechanism for determination of
the period of holding and the computation of capital gains.

1.4 The doubts about the taxability of gains in slump sale
for the period up to A.Y. 1999-2000 continue to persist with the views with
equal force persisting. While some Benches of the Tribunal have favoured the
taxability, others have exempted the gains form the ambit of taxation.

1.5 As if the above-referred controversy was in-sufficient, a
new controversy has arisen about the applicability of the newly inserted
provisions to the pending assessments. A recent decision of one of the Benches
of the Tribunal has taken a view conflicting with the prevailing view that the
said provisions were prospective in nature.

2. Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.’s case :


2.1 In the case of ACIT v. Asea Brown Boveri Ltd., 110
TTJ 502 (Mum.), the Tribunal was concerned with the issue as to whether the
transaction in question was a slump sale or an itemised sale. It was also
concerned about the taxability or otherwise of the gains arising on transfer of
a business in a slump sale. Though the Tribunal in this case had held that the
impugned transaction did not amount to slump sale, it was felt necessary to deal
with the issue of taxability of profits or gains if the impugned transaction was
held to be a slump sale without prejudice to the aforesaid finding.

2.2 The Tribunal for the reasons recorded in their order held
that profit arising on slump sale was taxable, as it was possible to compute the
capital gains including the cost of acquisition in some manner and the limited
question before them was about the mode of computation to be adopted for working
out the profits/gains from the slump sale. The Tribunal noted that there were
two provisions which were relevant in this behalf : (i) the provisions of S.
50B, which were specific to the computation of capital in case of slump sales,
and (ii) the general provisions of S. 45, which were applicable in the absence
of special procedure prescribed in S. 50B.

2.3 On applicability of S. 50B, the Revenue submitted that
once the transaction was held to be a slump sale, the taxability of the profits
and gains arising on such sale had to be brought to tax u/s.50B of the IT Act,
as the said S. 50B, being a procedural and computational provision, was
retroactive in its operation and therefore should govern all the pending
proceedings. Against the contentions of the Revenue, the assessee, on the other
hand, contended that S. 50B did not have retrospective operation and hence the
taxability of profits/gains from a slump sale could not be considered u/s.50B
which Section was operative from A.Y. 2000-01, only.

2.4 The Tribunal after taking note of the several
provisions including that of S. 2(42C) and S. 2(19AA) confirmed that S. 50B had
been inserted in the IT Act by the Finance Act, 1999 w.e.f. 1st April 2000 and
was applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2000-01, while the appeal before them related to A.Y.
1997-98 and accordingly the newly inserted provisions were not available on the
statute book for the assessment year under appeal. This fact however did not
deter the Tribunal to apply the said provisions of S. 50B, as in their opinion
the concept of slump sale which hitherto judicially recognised was now been
codified and inserted in the form of clause (42C) in S. 2 of the IT Act; that
what was earlier the judge-made law was now a codified law; the Bombay High
Court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. ITO, 264 ITR 193 held
that the concept of slump sale initially evolved under judge-made law was
subsequently recognised by the Legislature by inserting S. 2(42C); that
insertion of the new provisions was nothing but codification of what was
hitherto judicially recognised and S. 2(42C) was nothing but declaration of the
existing law of slump sale.

2.5 The Tribunal further noted that the Court in the said
case was concerned with the A.Y. 1995-96 when S. 50B was not in existence and
still the Court accepted that profits and gains arising on slump sale were
taxable, which in the opinion of the Tribunal showed that it had always been the
law that profits and gains from slump sale were taxable; the natural corollary
to the said decision was that the provisions of S. 50B(1) declaring that any
profit or gain arising from the slump sale would be chargeable to tax as capital
gains, was merely declaratory of the law as it then existed.

2.6 The Tribunal also proceeded to answer the obvious question as to what was the necessity of en-acting S. 50B when it was merely declaratory of the existing law. The Tribunal observed that the answer to that question lay in the provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 50B, which provided for the mechanism for the computation of cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement. It noted that the absence of any statutory mode of computation of cost of acquisition/improvement, difficulties were being experienced in the computation of capital gains arising from the slump sale, which were resolved by introduction of S. 50B; the heading of S. 50B which read: “Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of slump sale” clarified that S. 50B dealt with computation of capital gains in cases of slump sale; while Ss.(l) of S. 50B declared the existing law and thus put the same beyond the pale of any doubt, Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) thereof merely laid down the machinery for computation of capital gains from slump sale.

2.7 The Tribunal  proceeded to examine whether the computational provisions in S. 50B(2) and (3), enacted to provide simplicity, uniformity and certainty, the three pillars of taxation for the computation of capital gains, were retroactive or not. In order to answer this question, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in CWT v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, 210 ITR 886 (SC), wherein it had been held that machinery provisions, which provide for the machinery for the quantification of the charge, were procedural provisions and therefore would have retroactive operation and apply to all pending proceedings. Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 50B are thus procedural provisions inasmuch as they have been enacted to quantify and thereby simplify the procedure for computation of cost of acquisition/improvement in cases of slump sale. Based on the aforesaid findings, the Tribunal held that the provisions of S. 50B(2) and (3) were machinery provisions and hence would have retroactive operation and apply to all pending matters.

2.8 In deciding the issue the Tribunal also rejected the plea of the assessee that S. 50B could not have retroactive operation as it would mean, by the same logic, that the amendments made in S. 55(2)(a) deeming the cost of acquisition of certain assets to be nil would equally have retroactive operation. The assessee for this contention had relied on CIT v. D.P. Sandu Brothers Chembur (P) Ltd., 273 ITR 1, wherein it was held that the amendments to S. 55(2)(a) -(., deeming the cost of acquisition of a tenancy right to be nil had only prospective effect and not retrospective effect. The aforesaid decision was found to be rendered in the context of the provisions of S. 55(2)(a), which deemed the cost of acquisition of tenancy right to be nil and not in the context of S. 50B(2) and (3) which merely simplified and standardised the procedure for computation of cost of acquisition/improvement in cases of slump sale.

3. Sankheya Chemicals’ case:

3.1 In Sankheya Chemicals Ltd. v. ACIT, 8 SOT 50 (Mum.), the Chemical Division of the assessee-company was sold as a going concern on 1st April, 1990 for a lump sum price of Rs.20 lakhs. The said business consisted of the leasehold rights of the land, factory building, plant and machinery and electrical installation which was transferred to the subsidiary company, along with other assets and liabilities including transfer of raw material and other licences, etc.

3.2 The same Mumbai Tribunal was inter alia asked to consider whether provisions of S. 50B were retroactive in its operation so as to bring within its net the gains of transfer of a business for a slump consideration prior to introduction of S. 50B.

3.3 Taking into consideration the facts of the case in totality, the Tribunal held that no tax was exigible to the gains arising on the transfer of the business undertaking as a going concern by the assessee-company and the gains on such transfer were not includible in the hands of the assessee as income from short-term capital gains by relying on Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. v. DCIT, 90 ITD 344 (Hyd.). The Tribunal also noted that S. SOBof the IT Act was introduced w.e.f. 1st April 2000 and in the facts of the present case, the business undertaking was sold on 1st April 1990, i.e., prior to the introduction of the provisions of S. SOBof the IT Act.

3.4 The Mumbai Tribunal in this case noted with approval the decision of the Hyderabad Bench in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (supra) which held as under:  “……S. 50 and S. SOB are mutually exclusive.  In other  words,  S. 50B is attracted when  there  is a slump  sale and  S. 50 is attracted when  there is an itemised  sale. S. SOBwas not applicable  for the assessment  year  in question,  as it had no retrospective  operation.  So, the position that emerged  was that what  was transferred  by the assessee was the cement  unit as a going  concern  for a lump sum price, and so, the sale in question  was a slump  sale, and so, S. 50 was not attracted,  (para 34)…..  “

Observations:

4.1 With utmost respect for the Bench of the Tribunal delivering the decision in the case of Asea Brown Boveri’s case, it is to be noted that the Tribunal erred in not appreciating the correct ratio of the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. The Court in that case while deciding the appeal in favour of the assessee had nowhere directly or indirectly stated that the provisions of S. SOB were retrospective in its operation. The Coud was only asked to decide whether the transfer in the said case was a slump sale or an itemised sale. This is clear from p. 235 of the said report as under : “In this appeal, we were only required to consider whether the transaction was a slump sale and having come to the conclusion that there was a sale of business as a whole, we have to remand the matter back to the AO to compute the quantum of capital gains. For that purpose, the AO will have to decide the cost of the undertaking for the purposes of the computing capital gains that may arise on transfer. That, the AO will also be required to decide its value u/ s.55 of the IT Act. Further, the AO will be required to decide on what basis indexation should be allowed in computing the capital gains and the quantum thereof. Lastly, the AO,will be required to decide the quantum of depreciation on the block of assets. It may be mentioned that these parameters which we have mentioned are not exhaustive. They are some of the parameters under the Act.” In fact, the Court only directed the authorities to compute gains if that was possible and nothing beyond that. The Court in that case was not concerned with the issue as to whether there at all arose any taxable capital gains on slump sale.

4.2 The Tribunal itself noted with approval that in Premier Automobiles case (supra) the Court had left the issue of working out the cost of acquisition to the AO with the observations, which even the Tribunal found to be quite significant. It further ob-served that “the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the aforesaid case has not excluded the applicability of the parameters prescribed in S. 50B(2) and for computing the cost of acquisition/improvements in cases of slump sale”. This observation makes it clear that the Bombay High Court nowhere confirmed the applicability of the said provisions.

4.3 Thus, contrary to what has been stated by the Tribunal, we do not find that the said decision of the Tribunal was in conformity with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Premier Automobiles case in-asmuch as the issue adjudicated by the Tribunal was never before the High Court in the said case.

4.4 The Supreme Court in Sandu Bros. (supra) was asked to examine whether the provisions of S. 55 providing for adoption of Nil cost in case of tenancy was retrospective and was applicable to assessment years prior to AY. 1995-96. The Supreme Court after analysing the facts and the law held that the said provisions had only prospective application. The issue before the Tribunal in Asea Borwn Boveri’s case was largely similar and the assessee was right in relying on the said decision to support its case that provisions of S. SOBwere not to apply retroactively.

4.5 The Tribunal itself noted that the provisions of S. SO Band Ss.(l) in particular had the effect of removing existing anomaly about the taxation of gains on slump sale. This finding of the Tribunal confirmed that the new provision created a specific charge on such gains for the first time by providing the elaborate mechanism for making the said charge effective. The definitions of the terms ‘slump sale’, ‘undertaking’ and ‘net worth’ give a fresh meaning to the understanding of the said terms and therefore make it all the more difficult to support the Tribunal’s view that the newly inserted provisions are retroactive. Even the Legislature has nowhere expressed that the provisions were clarificatory, leave alone retroactive. Neither the provisions, nor the notes on clauses and the memorandum explaining the provisions as also the Circular following the insertion make such a claim.

4.6 The issue was examined by the Hyderabad Bench in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (supra), which clearly held that the provisions of S. 50Bwere not retrospective or retroactive. This decision was followed by the Mumbai Bench in the Sankheya Chemicals’ case (supra), which sadly was not taken note of.

4.7 The better view is that S. SOB should be applied prospectively and not retrospectively. The issue however calls for adjudication by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in view of the cleavage of the opinions amongst the Benches.

Allowability of Broken Period Interest

Controversies

1.
Issue for consideration :


1.1 Interest on government
securities is normally payable half-yearly. When government securities are
traded, the purchaser has to pay the seller not only the purchase price of the
securities but also the interest accrued on the government securities from the
last due date of the interest till the date of purchase of the securities. This
interest from the last due date till the date of purchase/sale is referred to as
broken period interest. While the purchaser of the government securities would
pay the broken period interest, the seller would receive the broken period
interest. For a trader in government securities, including a bank, the net
position of broken period interest for the year would either be an income or an
expenditure, depending upon the quantum of government securities bought and sold
and the dates on which such transactions were effected.

1.2 In a situation where the
net broken period interest for the year is an expenditure, the issue has arisen
before the courts as to whether such broken period interest is deductible as
business expenditure. While the Bombay High Court has held that such amount of
broken period interest is an allowable deduction, the Rajasthan High Court has
taken a contrary view and held that such broken period interest cannot be
allowed as a deduction.

2.
American Express Bank’s case :


2.1 The issue first came up
before the Bombay High Court in the case of American Express International
Banking Corporation v. CIT,
258 ITR 601.

2.2 In this case, the
assessee, which was a bank, was required to maintain statutory liquidity ratio
in relation to its business in the form of government securities. It also traded
in government securities. During the year, the assessee paid Rs.7,13,627 to
sellers towards broken period interest accrued on securities till the date of
purchase by the assessee, and received Rs.4,07,288 from buyers towards broken
period interest on securities sold by it. The assessee claimed the net amount of
Rs.3,06,399 as business expenditure u/s.37.

2.3 The Assessing Officer
taxed the amount of Rs.4,07,288 received by the assessee towards broken period
interest, but denied deduction of Rs.7,13,627 broken period interest paid by the
assessee. The denial was on the ground that the expenditure was for purchase of
income-bearing assets, and was therefore a capital expenditure, which could not
be set off as expenditure against the income from such assets. The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that the amount was allowable as a deduction u/s.28. The Tribunal
upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), holding that the broken period
interest of Rs.7,13,627 was allowable as a deduction.

2.4 On behalf of the
Revenue, it was argued that the government securities purchased were income
bearing assets, and that the amount spent on such purchase was capital outlay.
It was therefore argued that capital outlay on purchase of the assets could not
be set off as expenditure against income accruing from the assets purchased.
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Vijaya Bank v. Additional CIT,
187 ITR 541. It was also argued that a
composite price had been paid for the purchase, consisting of interest accrued
as well as the price, and that there was no provision under the Income-tax Act
which authorised bifurcation of such a price. It was also argued that the
interest income was chargeable to tax under the head ‘Interest on Securities’,
and that therefore S. 28 could not be invoked for claiming the net interest as a
deduction.

2.5 On behalf of the
assessee, it was argued that the assessee was computing its profit from trading
in securities, which had to be computed u/s.28. To compute the correct profits,
the interest income for the period that the securities were held by the assessee
had to be recorded as its income, and it was on this basis that the net broken
period interest was claimed as a deduction. It was further argued that the
interest income in respect of such trading activity had not been taxed under the
head ‘Interest on Securities’ but under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business
or Profession’. It was argued that the method of accounting followed by the
assessee was consistently followed by it, as well as by all other banks. It was
further argued that when the income of such broken period interest was taxed,
the payment of such broken period interest could not be disallowed.

2.6 The Bombay High Court
observed that Vijaya Bank’s case (supra) was a case where the interest on
government securities was taxable under the head ‘Interest on Securities’,
whereas the case before it was a case where the interest was taxed under the
head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’. The Bombay High Court noted
that there was no loss of revenue under the method of accounting followed by the
bank. The Bombay High Court therefore held that the broken period interest paid
by the bank was an allowable deduction in computing its business profits.

2.7 In CIT v. Citibank
NA,
264 ITR 18, the Bombay High Court has followed the view taken by it
earlier in American Express’ case.

3.
Bank of Rajasthan’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently
came up before the Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Bank of
Rajasthan Ltd.,
316 ITR 391.

3.2 In this case, pertaining
to a year subsequent to deletion of the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’,
an order had been passed u/s.263 making an addition to the income returned by
the assessee-bank, representing the broken period interest paid by the bank.
This order was on the basis that such interest was not allowable as a deduction
in view of the Supreme Court decision in Vijaya Bank’s case (supra). The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal, holding that Vijaya Bank’s case did not
apply after the deletion of the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’. The
Tribunal followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in American Express
International Banking Corpo-ration’s case (supra), and quashed the order
u/s. 263.

3.3 The Rajasthan High Court considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank’s case (supra), and observed that even if that decision related to deduction of interest under the head ‘Interest on Securities’, it had relied upon the English decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of CIR v. Pilcher, 31 TC 314, for the well-settled principle that outlay on the purchase of an income-bearing asset is in the nature of capital outlay and no part of the capital for laid out can be set off as expenditure against income accruing from the asset in question. It was on that reasoning that the deduction had not been allowed in that case. According to the Rajasthan High Court, the ratio of Vijaya Bank’s decision still held good even after the deletion of the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’.

3.4 The Rajasthan High Court expressed its dissent with the decision of the Bombay High Court in American Express International Banking Corporation’s case on the ground that if carried to the logical conclusion, it permitted a post-mortem of the purchase component of the asset and permitted deduction of interest element paid as business expenditure. According to the Rajasthan High Court, the Supreme Court judgment proceeded on an established legal principle deduced from previous English judgments, and could not therefore be brushed aside.

3.5 The Rajasthan High Court therefore held that the ratio of Vijaya Bank’s decision (supra) applied to the case before it, and held that the broken period interest was not deductible in computing the income of the bank.

    Observations:
4.1 The whole controversy seems to revolve around the validity and continued applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Vijaya Bank’s case (supra). It would therefore be worthwhile to consider the facts and the ratio of that decision, and the circumstances in which it was rendered.

4.2 Unfortunately, the decision of the Supreme Court is a brief one-page judgment. The decision of the Karnataka High Court from which this matter came up to the Supreme Court is however reported in Tax LR (1976) 524, from which the facts can be deduced. Also, the Bombay High Court has drawn out certain facts from the deci-sion of the Karnataka High Court as well as the Supreme Court. From the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that though the issue before it was with reference to taxation of interest under the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’ as well as deduction u/s.28 in computation of income under the head of income ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’, the Supreme Court seems to have answered the issue only from the perspective of ‘Interest on Securities’. One significant factor that needs to be understood is that under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’, all expenditure incurred for the purpose of the business or profession is allowable, unless specifically prohibited, as also all losses incurred during the course of carrying on of the business or profession, unlike in the case of ‘Interest on Securities’ where only expenditure incurred for purpose of realising the interest on securities is deductible as expenditure. It was therefore perhaps on account of the restricted allowability that the Supreme Court took the view that it did in Vijaya Bank’s case.

4.3 The other aspect of Vijaya Bank’s decision, as analysed by the Bombay High Court, is that Vijaya Bank had taken over the assets and liabilities of Jayalakshmi Bank Ltd., which included the government securities and interest accrued thereon. It was such interest which was claimed as a deduction by Vijaya Bank, which had accrued to Jayalakshmi Bank prior to takeover of assets and liabilities by Vijaya Bank. On the facts, it appears therefore that such government securities were investments of Vijaya Bank, and not its stock in trade. It may however be noted that the second question raised before the Supreme Court pertained to broken period interest in case of securities purchased from the open market. The Bombay High Court does not seem to have looked at this aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision.

4.4 Where the government securities form part of a trading business, it certainly cannot be said that the amount paid for the acquisition of stock in trade is a capital outlay, as such purchases and stock form part of the circulating capital of the business. The entire purchase is on revenue account, and is an allowable expenditure of the business. Therefore, even if a view is taken that the broken period interest forms part of the purchase cost of the government securities and cannot be broken up, it would still be allowable as a revenue expenditure.

4.5 Further, as anybody familiar with the government securities market in India would be aware, the purchase price of government securities quoted on the markets does not include the interest component for the broken period. Such interest component for the broken period has to be invariably computed separately and is payable over and above and in addition to the negotiated purchase price. Given this commercial reality, to say that the broken period interest is a part of the purchase price would be incorrect. In reality, what is being paid for over and above the purchase price is the right to receive the interest accrued up to the date of the transaction. Therefore, irrespective of whether the securities are held as stock in trade or as investments, such interest paid for would have to be reduced from the total interest received subsequently on the due date, since the interest received includes the interest for which payment is made.

4.6 It is also important to note that business profits have to be computed in accordance with the method of accounting followed by the assessee. In preparing its accounts, the assessee would have to follow accounting standards applicable to it. The accounting standards applicable to in-vestments (e.g., AS-13) require that when unpaid interest has accrued before the acquisition of an interest -bearing investment and is therefore included in the price paid for the investment, the subsequent receipt of interest is allocated between pre-acquisition and post-acquisition periods; the pre-acquisition portion is deducted from cost. This supports the view that the subsequent interest receipt on the due date has to be partly adjusted against the broken period interest paid, and it is only the net amount which is really the income.

4.7 Even under the Income-tax Act, all business losses and revenue expenditure are allowable as deduction in computing business income. The payment of broken period interest on purchase of government securities held as trading assets is certainly a business expenditure, if not a busi-ness loss, and is therefore clearly an allowable deduction.

4.8 Lastly, the CBDT had clarified vide its Circular No. 599, dated 24 April 1991 [189 ITR (St) 126], that securities held by banks must be regarded as stock in trade, and that interest payments and receipts for broken period on purchase of securities must be regarded as revenue payments/receipts, and only the net interest on securities should be brought to tax as business income. Though the Circular was issued subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank’s case, it had not considered the ratio of that decision which was rendered on 19 September 1990. This Circular was therefore withdrawn on 31 July 1991 vide CBDT Circular No. 610 [191 ITR (St) 2]. By a subsequent Circular No. 665, dated 5 October 1993 [204 ITR (St.) 39], the CBDT clarified that the Supreme Court, in Vijaya Bank’s case, was not directly concerned with the issue whether securities form part of stock in trade or capital assets. The CBDT has clarified that whether a particular item of investment in securities constitute stock in trade or capital asset is a question of fact, and that banks are generally governed by the instructions of the Reserve Bank of India from time to time with regard to the classification of assets and also the accounting standards for investments. Assessing Officers have therefore been directed to determine the facts and circumstances of each case whether a particular security constitutes stock in trade or investment after taking into account the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. In a sense, the CBDT has also therefore indirectly accepted the fact that where the government securities are held as trading assets (stock in trade), the allowability of broken period interest as a deduction should not really be an issue.

4.9 The view taken by the Rajasthan High Court therefore does not seem to be justified, given the fact that government securities are generally held as stock in trade by banks. Therefore, the view taken by the Bombay High Court is the better view of the matter, and broken period interest should be allowed as a deduction where the securities are held as stock in trade. Even if the securities are held as investments, logically the interest income actually received includes the broken period interest paid for, and to that extent the amount received on the due date does not constitute income of the recipient.

Whether interest u/s.234A can be levied in case of delayed Return of Income even if self-assessment tax is paid before the due date ?

Closements

Introduction :

1.1 S. 234A provides for interest in case of default in furnishing return of income as provided in the Income-tax Act (the Act). S. 234A(1) effectively provides that if the return of income u/s.139(1)/(4) or in response to notice u/s.142(1) is furnished after the due date (or is not furnished), the assessee is liable to pay simple interest @ 1% for every month or part of a month for the period of delay. (In case of failure in furnishing the return of income also provision is made with which we are not concerned in this write-up.) The rate of interest was originally 2% per month, which has subsequently been reduced from time to time. Such interest is payable on the amount of tax on the total income as reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid and TDS (or TCS). Considering the issue under consideration in this write-up, it is assumed that the returned income is accepted and the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2007 with regard to granting credit for relief u/s.90, etc. is not relevant. In the context of this write-up, effectively, interest u/s.234A(1) is required to be charged on the tax on such total income as reduced by advance tax, if any, paid and TDS or TCS.

1.2 In many cases, furnishing of return of income gets delayed on the part of assessee for various reasons. However, in such cases, the assessee, in many cases, decides to pay the self-assessment tax before the due date of return of income. In such cases, the issue is under debate as to whether interest u/s.234A(1) can be charged even if the assessee has paid the full amount of tax before the due date of return by way of self-assessment tax. In short, the issue is: whether for the purpose of determining the amount of interest u/s.234A(1), tax paid by way of self-assessment before the due date of return of income can be given credit or not as there is no specific provision to grant such credit for such purpose. The Courts are divided on the issue.

1.3 Recently, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the issue referred to in Para 1.2 above in the case of Dr. Prannoy Roy and Another and the issue got resolved. Considering the importance of the issue, it is thought fit to consider this judgment in this column.

Dr. Prannoy Roy and Another v. CIT and Another,

254 ITR 755 (Delhi) :

2.1 The above case was concerned with A.Y. 1995

96. The brief facts were: The assessee had made substantial capital gain and the return of income

was due to be filed on 31-10-1995, but such return was actually filed on 29-9-1996 (i.e., delay of about eleven months). However, the assessee has paid taxes due on 25-9-1995 (i.e., before the due date of furnishing the return of income). The return of income was accepted on 29-1-1998, but interest u/s. 234A was charged on the ground that the tax paid on 25-9-1995 cannot be reduced from the tax due on assessment for the purpose of determining the amount of tax on which interest is chargeable u/s. 234A(1). The assessee had filed revision petition u/s.264 before the Administrative Commissioner, requesting him to delete the interest u/s.234A charged by the Assessing Officer (AO). However, the Commissioner passed an order dated 9-3-1999 confirming the action of the AO on the ground that there is no provision in 234A to grant credit for self-assessment tax paid on 25-9-1995 and the interest u/s.234A compensates for the delay/default in filing return of income and not the tax. Against this order, the assessee filed the writ petition before the Delhi High Court. Accordingly, the issue referred in Para 1.2 above came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court.

2.2 For the purpose of determining the issue, the High Court referred to the provisions of S. 234A and also the historical background thereof as given in CBDT Circular No. 549, dated 31-10-1989 [182 ITR (St.) 37]. After referring to this, the Court noted that it is not in dispute that S. 234A of the Act is an amalgam of earlier S. 139(8), S. 271(1)(a) and S. 140A(3) of the Act. The said provisions mandate payability of the tax as the basis for calculation of the compensation or penalty due to the Department in case of violation.

2.3 The Court, then, considered various judgments of Courts [including the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. (160 ITR 961), in which the Courts have taken a view that interest is compensatory in nature. The Court also noted the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Dr. S. Reddappa (234 ITR 62), wherein after considering various case laws, the Court has taken a view that it is fairly obvious that provisions of S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C, which replace the earlier provisions postulating payment of interest and are in pari materia with the said provisions cannot be anything except compensatory in character. The only material difference in the two sets of provisions is that while the old provisions conferred power to waive or reduce the levy of interest, the impugned provisions make the same automatic.

2.4 The Court then proceeded to consider the principles of interpretation of taxing statute and stated that it is true that the Court must interpret the provisions of the statute upon ascertaining the object of the Legislature through the medium or authoritative forms in which it is expressed. It is well-settled that the Court should, in such cases, assign its ordinary meaning. Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anjum M. H. Ghaswalla (251 ITR 1), the Court stated that it is well settled that for the purpose of imposition of penal interest express provision in that regard in a statute must exist. The Court, then, further observed as under (Page 763) :

“In relation to beneficent construction, the basic rules of interpretation are not to be applied where

(i) the result would be re-legislation of a provision by addition, substitution or alteration of words and violence would be done to the spirit of the provision; (ii) where the words of a provision are capable of being given only one meaning; and (iii) where there is no ambiguity in provision — where there is a doubt, however, the Court may apply the rule of beneficent construction in order to advance the object of the Act [see Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24; AIR 2001 SC 2472].

We are not unmindful that the golden rule of interpretation of a statute is that it should be read liberally.”
 
2.5 After considering the above, the Court also stated that it is equally well settled that where the statute is capable of two interpretations, the principles of just construction should be taken recourse to.

2.6 Referring to the contentions raised on behalf of the Revenue, the Court observed as under Wage 764) :

“The contention of the Revenue is that by reason of S. 234A, interest is charged for default in filing return as regards whereto it does not cease or stop with payment of taxes, whereas on the other hand, the contention of the assessee is that in a situation of this nature, where the assessee could not file a return for reasons beyond his control, he is not liable to pay interest, as thereby the Revenue does not suffer any loss inasmuch as tax, although strictly not in terms of definition of advance tax as contained in S. 208 of the Act, has been paid, but tax therefore has already been paid.

For the purpose of determining the issue, it is necessary to consider as to whether penalty and interest both were charged for failure to perform a statutory obligation. We think not. Failure to comply with the statutory provisions may lead to penal consequences. Interest, on the other hand, is payable either by way of compensation or damages. Even penal interest can be levied only in the case of a chronic defaulter.”

2.7 Referring to the Full Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of SMS Schloemann Siemeg, A.G. (254 ITR 97), the Court stated that in this judgment, the High Court has taken a view that interest is payable if the sum is due. Where the assessee is in default in making payment of the assessed amount demanded from him, he is liable to pay interest by way of compensation, but the same would not mean that although there does not exist any demand, interest would become payable. After referring to this judgment, the Court took the view that in a situation of this nature, the commonsense meaning of ‘interest’ must be applied even in S. 234A of the Act. The Court also referred to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘interest’ to show that the same is compensatory in nature. To support the view that interest cannot be charged when no tax is outstanding, the Court also relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Shashikant Laxman Kale (185 ITR 105) and Ganesh Das Sreeram (169 ITR 221).

2.8 Dealing with the principles of imposition of penalty, the Court observed as under (Pages 766-767) :

“Penalty cannot be imposed in the absence of a clear provision. Imposition of penalty would ordinarily attract compliance with the principles of natural justice. It in certain situations would attract the principles of existence of mens rea. While a penalty is to be levied, discretionary power is ordinarily conferred on the authority. Unless such discretion is granted, the provisions may be held to be unconstitutional.”

2.9 Having referred to the above principles, the object of levying interest and the nature of interest, the Court opined that in situation of this nature, the doctrine of purposive construction must be taken recourse to. For this, the Court referred to various judgments dealing with the principle of purposive construction to support the opinion formed by the Court.

2.10 Referring to the contentions raised by the counsel on behalf of the Revenue to the effect that such payment of tax cannot be a ground for not charging interest u/s.234A and that will defeat the object and purpose u/s.234A, the Court stated that the object of S. 234A is to receive interest by way of compensation, if such was not the intention of the Legislature, it could have said so in explicit terms.

2.11 The Court then took notice of insertion of 271F w.e.f. 1-4-1999, providing for penalty for delay/default in furnishing return of income as referred to therein. The Court also noted the object of introducing this provision as explained in the memorandum explaining the insertion of the provision. Having referred to this, the Court stated that the purpose and the object of the Act is to realise the direct tax. It imposes a fiscal burden. When the statute says that an interest, which would be compensatory in nature, would be levied upon the happening of a particular event or inaction, the same by necessary implication would mean that the same can be levied on an ascertained sum. The Court then also considered the meaning of the term ‘advance tax’ in the context of this situation and observed as under (page 769):

“The interpretation clause, as is well known, is not a positive enactment. The interpretation clause also begins with the word ‘unless the context otherwise requires’. Advance tax has been defined to mean the advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-Co Such a definition is not an exhaustive one. If the word ‘advance tax’ is given a literal meaning, the same apart from being used only for the purpose of Chapter XVII-C may be held to be tax paid in advance before its due date, i.e., tax paid before the due date. The matter might have been otherwise, had there been an exhaustive definition of the said provision. The scheme of payment of advance tax is that it will have to be paid having regard to the anticipated income on September 15, December 15 and March 15. A person, who does not pay the entire tax by way of advance tax, may deposit the balance amount of tax along his return.

In the instant case, tax has been paid although no return has been filed. The Revenue, therefore, has not suffered any monetary loss.”

2.12 Finally, the Court took the view that in this case if the doctrine of purposive construction is not applied, the same may betray the purpose and object of the Act. Otherwise, we will have to read the penal provision in 234A, which was not and could not have been the object of the law for the reasons stated hereinbefore. The Court also stated that it is further well known that in the case of a doubt or dispute, taxation statute must be liberally construed. Therefore, we are not in a position to assign stringent meaning to the words, ‘advance tax’ as contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the Revenue.

2.13 Rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue with regard to the penal nature of the provision, the Court stated as under (Page 770) :

“If a penal provision is to be read in S. 234A, the same may border on unconstitutionality, as there-for the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with. It is also well settled that when two constructions are possible, the construction which would uphold the constitutionality of a provision, be applied. Had the Leg-islature made the amendment only for the purpose of imposition of a penalty, there was no necessity of enacting S. 271F later on.”

2.14 Finally, the Court concluded that interest would be payable only in a case where tax has not been deposited prior to the due date of filing of the income-tax return and decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

CIT v. Dr. Prannoy Roy and Another, 19 DTR 102 (SC) :

3.1 At the  instance    of the  Revenue, the  above judgment of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court along with another case, wherein the same was followed.

3.2 After referring to the facts in brief and the views expressed by the High Court, the Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held as under (Page 103) :

“Having heard counsel on both sides, we entirely agree with the finding recorded by the High Court as also the interpretation of S. 234A of the Act as it stood at the relevant time.

Since the tax due had already been paid, which was not less than the tax payable on the returned income which was accepted, the question of levy of interest does not arise. Thus, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is clear that interest u/ s.234A is compensatory in nature and the same cannot be charged if taxes are paid before the due date of furnishing return of income even if the furnishing of return gets delayed. It is also important to note that the Apex Court has agreed with the findings as well as interpretation of the High Court with regard to S. 234A.

4.2 Recently the Gujarat High Court in the case of Roshanlal S. Jain (309 ITR 174) has taken a contrary view on the issue referred to in Para 1.2 above and has dissented from the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. Prannoy Roy (supra). This has not been referred to in the above case before the Apex Court. However, in view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court will now no longer be regarded as given.

4.3 Incidentally, it may be mentioned that while filing an appeal against the levy of interest, care should be taken to deny the liability to pay such interest, so that the issue of maintainability of appeal against such interest does not create any difficulty.

Tribunal News: PART B

Bomi  S. Billimoria    v. ACIT ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai Before  D. Manmohan (VP) and J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM)
ITA No. 2120/Mum./1998 A.Y. : 1993-94. Decided on:  30-6-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue: Prakash Jotwani/ J. V. D. Langstieh

S. 48 – Amount received on transfer of shares under cashless option not liable to tax under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’ since such option does not have cost of acquisition.

Per D. Manmohan :

Facts:

The assessee was an employee of Johnson & Johnson, Bombay which was a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, USA. Under stock option plan, the USA company granted to the assessee, on 7-12-1989, a cashless option to purchase 2500 shares of Johnson & Johnson, USA at a price of USD 57.88 per share which price was the fair market value of the stock on the day of granting the option. The Reserve Bank of India had approved the stock option scheme on the condition that there should not be any payment, either in India or abroad, for acquiring the shares.

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1993-94, on 13-8-1992, the assessee exercised his option to realise the value of the options under the scheme and accordingly sold 1000 shares in USA and received a sum of Rs.4,59,405 in Indian currency. After considering the amount retained in USD in EEFC Account and also the bank charges the net gain was computed at Rs.5,44,925. The assessee regarded this amount as a capital  receipt  not chargeable    to tax.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held the profit on sale of option to be chargeable either as salary or short term capital gains or as speculation profit.

The CIT(A) held that the shares obtained under the ESOP were a capital asset and as they were held for less than 3 years, the gain was assessable as short term capital gain. He rejected the argument that as there was no ‘cost of acquisition’, ‘the capital gains were not assessable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The issue before the Tribunal was whether the amount received by the assessee was liable to tax under the head’ capital gains’ and if so whether there was any cost of acquisition so as to bring to tax the net receipts.

Held:

    1) As the CIT(A) had held that the shares acquired under ESOP amounted to acquisition of a capital asset one had to proceed on that premise;

    2) Since on the date of exercising the option there was no cost of acquisition of shares, in accordance with the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B. C. Srinivasa Shetty (128 ITR 294) the gains could not be taxed;

    3) Even if it is assumed that the market value of the shares is the benefit given to the assessee, such benefit can be said to accrue to the assessee only on the date of exercise of the option. As the date of exercise of option as well as the date of sale is the same, there was no difference between the ‘deemed cost of acquisition’ and the actual price realised by assessee and thus there is no capital gain chargeable to tax.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

2. Shree Capital Services Ltd. v. ACIT ITAT Special Bench Kolkata Before G. D. Agrawal (VP) and B. R. Mittal (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 1294 (Kol.) of 2008

AY.  : 2004-05. Decided on: 31-7-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue: Manish Sheth/ Sushil Kumar s. 43(5) – For a period prior to A. Y. 2006-07 transactions in futures and options are speculative transactions u/s.43(5) – S. 43 (5) (d) is not retrospective.

Per G. D. Agrawal :

Facts:

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2004-05 the assessee company, which was engaged in the business of financing and investment in shares and securities, suffered a loss of Rs.9,25,065 on account of futures and options. The Assessing Officer (Aa) treated the same as speculation loss as per S. 43(5) of the Act.

The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the Aa. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Special Bench (SB) of the Tribunal adjudicated two questions viz. (i) whether a transaction in derivatives falls within the meaning of ‘speculative transaction’ as provided u/s.43(5); and if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether clause (d) of S. 43(5), introduced by the Finance Act, 2005 w.e.f. 1-4-2006, is clarificatory in nature and therefore retrospective in operation.

Held:

    1. Derivative is a security which derives its value from the underlying assets. When the underlying asset of any derivative is share and stock, for all practical purposes, the treatment given to such derivative should be similar to stock and securities.

    2. S. 43(5) uses the term ‘commodity’ in a very wide sense and covers ‘derivatives’.

    3. The fact that S. 43(5)(d) exempts certain derivatives from the ambit of the definition of ‘speculative transaction’ itself shows that they would otherwise have come within the term. If ‘derivatives’ are held to be not covered by the definition of ‘speculative transaction’ the amendment would be redundant.

    4. Since clause (d) of S. 43(5) does not exempt all transactions in derivatives but only the ‘eligible transactions’ on ‘recognised stock exchanges’ this clause cannot be held to be clarificatory. Further, Rules 6DDA and 6DDB which deal with ‘recognised stock exchanges’ were inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2005. Consequently, clause (d) of S. 43(5) applies to AY. 2006-07 and onwards.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

3. Western Coalfields Ltd. v. ACIT  ITAT Nagpur Bench
Before N. L. Dash (JM) and V. K. Gupta (AM)
IT A No. 289 and  290/N ag.l2006

AYs.  : 2002-03 and  2003-04. Decided on:  30-6-2009 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Nani Daruwala/ A K. Singh

Explanation to S. 37(1) – Penalty which is not of the nature of illegal! unlawful expenditure is not covered by the Explanation to S. 37(1).

Per V. K. Gupta :

Facts:

The assessee company was a colliery which trans-ported coal to Electricity Boards in railway wagons. Freight paid to the railways depended upon the carrying capacity of the wagons. In case the wagons were overloaded as compared to their carrying capacity, the railways charged ‘overloading charges’ at a rate which was generally six times the normal freight. The assessee’ claimed these overloading charges as a deduction on the ground that they have been incurred for a commercial purpose and were not for infraction of any law. The Assessing Officer (Aa), however, held these to be penal in nature and did not allow the same.

The CIT(A)  confirmed the  action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred-an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that had the amounts been paid to a private carrier the same would have been allowable. The fact that the same are paid to Railways which is an institution owned by the Government, working under an Act of Parliament, the nature of overloading charges which are essentially of commercial nature cannot be characterised as of penal nature irrespective of the nomenclature given to such charges by the Railways. It held that:

    i. the substance of the matter has to be looked into and given preference over the form;

    ii. the amount was essentially of a commercial nature and incurred in the normal course of the business and was consequently allowable;

    iii. the object of Explanation 1 also supports the claim of the assessee as these expenses are not of the nature of any illegal/unlawful expenditure;

    iv. the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Hero Cycles Ltd. is squarely applicable.

This ground was decided in favor  of the assessee.

4. ACIT v. RPG Life Sciences Ltd. ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and V. D. Rao OM) ITA No. 1579/Mum.l2006

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Decided on:  31-8-2009
Counsel  for revenue/assessee:
Yashwant  V. Chavan/B. V. Jhaveri

S. SOB read with S. 2 (42 C) – Slump sale – Sale of one of the manufacturing divisions of the assessee
– Whether the transaction could be considered as slump sale – On the facts, Held: No.

Per P. M. Jagtap  :

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing pharmaceutical and agrochemical prod-ucts. During the year under consideration, its agro-chemical division was sold for an agreed consider-ation of Rs.72.70 crares. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to explain as to why the said sale be not treated as a slump sale and capital gain arising therefrom be not computed u/ s.50B. In reply, the assessee explained that it had sold the assets and liabilities of its agrochemical division by identifying the value of each and every item. In support, the break up of the agreed consideration of Rs.72.7 crore was given. The attention of the AO was drawn to the various schedules of the agreement where the fixed assets were valued item-wise by ascertaining the value of land, building, plant and machinery, furniture and fixtures and capital work-in-progress separately.

However, the assessee’s submissions were not found acceptable by the AO for reasons, amongst others, as under:

Assessee had transferred the entire undertaking as a going concern along with all existing employees.

The intention of the contracting parties was to sell the agrochemical undertaking and not the land, building, plant and machinery and furniture and fixtures and other intangible and current assets, all of which comprised the agro-chemical division separately.

The individual assets of agrochemical division I.were not separately valued but only group of assets were valued.

The valuation report valuing individual assets and/or schedules to the agreement listing out individual assets and value thereof have no relevance unless the consideration is determined on the basis of itemised value.

All the licences, old records of account books, vouchers pertaining to agrochemical business were also transferred by the assesses.

Accordingly, it was held that that the sale of the agrochemical division by the assessee was slump sale and the capital gain arising there from was chargeable to tax in its hand as per the provisions of S. SOB.

On appeal the CIT(A) accepted the stand of the assessee that sale of its agrochemical division was not a slump sale.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that as confirmed by the CIT(A) in his order – all the fixed assets as well as the current assets of agrochemical division were valued. The fixed assets were valued itemised by ascertaining the value of each and every asset separately and after adding non-compete fee of Rs.4 crores to the said value, the value of the fixed assets was worked out at Rs.54.33 crores. In a similar manner, net current assets were valued at Rs.58.38 crores and after deducting the value of net current liabilities therefrom, the total value was arrived at Rs.88.68 crores. As against the said value, the consideration finally agreed was Rs.72.70 crores and the reconciliation to explain the difference between the same was also furnished. The Revenue was not able to controvert or rebut the findings recorded by the CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

Tribunal News: PART A

1. (2009) 119 ITD 1 (Pune) Bhagwandas Associates v. ITO, Ward 5(4), Pune A.Y.: 1988-89. Dated:  28-9-2007

The mistake which is otherwise rectifiable u/s.154 cannot be adjusted at the time of giving effect to appellate order u/s.250/254 particularly when that mistake is absolutely out of context and purview of appellate order.

Facts:

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.32AB in his return for A.Y. 1988-89 based on audit report. The AO wrongly allowed deduction of higher amount and also made addition on account of sales tax refund. The Tribunal deleted the addition of sales tax refund. While giving effect to Tribunal’s order AO rectified deduction u/s.32AB to the correct figure. The CIT(A) also held that ‘rectification was consequential of giving effect to the Tribunal’s order’ and upheld the addition in favour of AO. On an appeal to Tribunal, it was held that:

    There are 2 types of orders of appellate authority. One is specific relief pertaining to specific ad-dition and the other is de novo assessment i.e. setting aside assessment and making a fresh assessment. In second case, AO has same powers as at the time of making fresh assessment.

    ‘When Tribunal sets aside the assessment and remands the case for making fresh assessment, the power of AO is confined to the subject matter of the appeal before Tribunal. He can not take up the questions which were not subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal even though no specific direction has been given by the Tribunal.’

    The contention of CIT(A) is not correct because thetquaritum of deduction u/s.32AB is not linked with the assessed income. Rather it is based on the quantum of investment. Giving effect to the Tribunal’s order can not be equated with the regular assessment order.

    Even though AO can make rectification of order u/s.154, he has exceeded his limits while giving effect to the order of the Tribunal.

    Hence, it was held that even though a mistake is rectifiable u/ s.154, it can not be adjusted while giving effect to the order of Tribunal particularly when that mistake is absolutely out of context and purview of appellate order.

2. (2009) 119 ITD 13 (Mumbai) Smarttalk (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, Ward 8(3)(2), Mumbai A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated: 31-3-2008

Assessee co., a joint venture, took bank loan guaranteed by co-venturers – Payment by one of the venturers to discharge his obligation credited by company to capital reserve. Repayment taxed u/s. 10(3) – CIT(A) upheld addition u/s.28(iv)/41(1) – Since assessee has not claimed deduction of the amount originally, repayment of loan not taxable u/s.28(iv)/41(1). Also can not be taxed u/s.10(3) as S. 10 deals with income which does not form part of total income – Additions, therefore to be deleted.

Facts:

The assessee company was a joint venture between ‘M’ (holding 49%) and ‘B’ (holding 51% of shareholding). The company took a loan of Rs.7 crores from Bank of America which was guaranteed by eo-venturers in proportion to their shareholding. The agreement also restricted the right of the asses-see to enter into any merger, acquisition or sale without prior permission of bank. In A.y. 2002-03~ ‘ASC’ took over 51% shareholding of ‘B’ and’ AW’ took over 49% shareholding of ‘M’. The company had repaid the loan to the extent of Rs.2 crores. 49% of the balance loan was repaid by ‘M’ (i.e. Rs.2.45 crores) along with outstanding interest which was credited by assessee to capital reserve. The AO taxed the same u/s.l0(3). On appeal to CIT (A), it upheld the addition u/s.28(iv)/41(1). On appeal to Tribu-nal, it applied the ratio laid down by the Bombay High Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. CIT, and followed by the Third Member Bench in ITO v. Ahuja Graphic Machinery Ltd., holding that waiver of loan is neither covered u/s.28(iv) nor u/s.4l(l). As the assessee has not claimed deduction of loan taken, repayment of the same by eo-venturer cannot be taxed as cessation of liability u/s.4l(l). Further, the said sum can also not be taxed u/s.lO(3) as S. 10 deals with only such incomes, which are not to be included in the total incomes of the assessee. Hence, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

3. (2009) 199 ITD 15 (Agra) (Third  Member) ITO,  Range  3(1), Gwalior  v. Laxmi Narain Ramswaroop Shivhare A.Y.: 2001-02. Dated: 26-12-2008

S. 145 – A.Y. 2001-02 was the first year of business of the assessee – Aa rejected books of accounts on the ground that there were no support-ing vouchers for sales and all sales made in cash
– Applied different G.P. ratio on comparative basis – Since due to the nature of business of the assessee it is not possible to maintain proper sales bills, it cannot be said that books of accounts were defective – Therefore, books cannot be rejected and actual G.P. ratio to be considered.

Facts:

The assessee firm was engaged in the business of trading in country liquor and IMFL. The supplies of country liquor to the assessee were made through the Government warehouse on payment of duty and purchase of IMFL was made from other private parties in accordance with the permit given by the Government. The assessee got his accounts audited and furnished audit report in Form 3CD. However, he could not produce supporting vouchers in respect of sale of country liquor as the sales were recorded on the basis of daily sales records given by employees of the shops. AO rejected books of accounts on the ground that the sales were not subject to any independent evidence and applied G.P. ratio of 5% against actual G.P. ratio of 3.11%. On an appeal to CIT(A), he reduced G.P. ratio to 4%. On appeal before Tribunal, the Third Member held that:

    The AO rejected books of accounts for want of sales bills and accepted sales value declared by the assessee. Hence, he has no reason to reject books of accounts.

    The CIT(A) has reduced  G.P. ratio and has given a finding  that there was no significant defect in the books.    

    The nature of business of the assessee is such that it is not possible to maintain proper bills.

    Hence, the books of accounts can not be rejected and actual results declared by the assessee be accepted.

4. (2009) 119 ITD 49 (Ahd.) ITO, Ward-4(2),  Ahmedabad v. Krishnonics Ltd. A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated: 19-12-2007

Held  1:

Provisions of S. 2(22)(e) are not applicable when loan is advanced in the course of normal money lending business – Further, in determining ‘sub-stantial part of business’, income criteria is not relevant but objects and deployment of funds are relevant factors.

Held  2:

Foreign travelling expenses incurred for the purpose of business are allowable expenditure especially when they are proved to be incurred for the purposes of business.

Facts 1 :

The assessee company took loan of Rs.37,77,475 from ‘I’ Ltd. which was claimed to be engaged in the business of money lending. ‘I’ Ltd. also advanced the loan of Rs.1,08,099 to G Ltd. a third party not connected with any of the above parties. It was found that one of the directors of assessee was holding more than 10% of share-capital in ‘I’ Ltd. and more than 20% capital in assessee company. The AO invoked the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) on the ground that ‘I’ Ltd. derived more income from dividend than from interest income. On appeal to CIT(A), it deleted the addition. However, Revenue preferred an appeal to Tribunal. The Tribunal held that as per S. 2(22)(e)(ii) ‘substantial income’ is not the relevant criteria for determining substantial part of business but objects and deployment of funds are relevant. As money lending business was one of the six objects of assessee company and it carried on that object in preference to others it was engaged in the business of money lending and hence provisions of S. 2(22)(e) are not attracted.

Facts 2:

The assessee company claimed expenses on account of travelling of managing director to Taiwan. It was claimed that the expenditure was incurred to find out the possibility of expanding export sales and to acquaint company regarding latest automation machinery concept. The AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that assessee did not prove it to have been incurred for the purposes of business.

The CIT(A) allowed the claim of assessee. However, department preferred an appeal to Tribunal. It was shown that as a result of the visit to Taiwan, assessee was able to make exports to Taiwan which was not contested by AO. Hence, Tribunal allowed the appeal in favour of assessee and upheld the decision of CIT(A).

5. (2009) 119 ITD 62 (Kolkata) (TM) Shanti Ram Mehta v. ACIT, Circle-3, Asansol A.Ys.: 2000-01 and 2003-04 Dated: 11-11-2008

Additions u/s.69C for unexplained expenditure cannot be made on ad hoc basis or on presumptions.

Facts:

The assessee mainly dealt in two products namely Kerosene Oil and Fertilizers. During A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2003-04, assessee made purchases from different parties. He was to bear some expenses relating to transportation charges. However, he submitted to AO that the purchases were made in bulk. Regard-ing kerosene oil it was submitted that supplying dealers redirect the Tankers to assessee’s business place hence no charges were incurred towards trans-portation. However, AO accepted the contention of assessee only in respect of Kerosene oil and added transportation charges of Rs.50,OOOon estimated basis in respect of purchase of fertilizers as they were purchased in small quantities in a day which was revealed from books of accounts. On an appeal to C!T(A), he upheld the addition. On appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that 5. 69C is applied when assessee is unable to explain the source of any expenditure however ‘the AO has to first find the evidence of incurring the expenditure. S. 69C cannot be applied on mere presumption or suspicion’. In the present case, the’ AO didn’t bring on record any evidence of incurring transportation charges. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs.50,OOOalleged to have been incurred towards transportation charges.

6. 2009 TIOL 526 ITAT Mum. Livingstones Jewellery (P) Ltd. v. DCIT ITA No. 187/Mum./2007 A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated:   12-5-2009

S. 10A –  All the profits  which  have  nexus  with the  business   of  the  undertakingqualify   for deduction u/s.10A – Interest income on FDRs given by the assessee to the Bank for obtaining credit facilities has nexus with the business of the undertaking and qualifies for deduction u/s.10A.

Facts:

The assessee having its business of manufacturing and export of studded and plain jewellery of gold and platinum filed its return of income for A.Y. 2003-04 declaring total income after claiming deduction u/s.10A. Interest of Rs.9,OO,961 received on fixed deposits was netted against the interest payment of Rs.1,04,37,835 and net interest of Rs.95,36,873 was debited to its P&L account. The AO held that interest income on FDs with bank cannot be said to be derived from export of goods and merchandise. He, denied the deduction u/s.10A of this amount of interest on FDs.

The CIT(A) did not allow any relief to the assessee.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The expression ‘profits derived from export of articles or things or computer software’ as employed in 5s.(1) or 5s.(lA) has been given a specific meaning in 5s.(4). 5s.(4) states that the ‘profits derived from export of articles or things or computer software’ shall be the amount which bears to the ‘profits of the business of the undertaking’, the same proportion as the export turnover in respect of such articles or things or computer software bears to the total turnover of the business carried on by the undertaking. By providing for considering the ‘profits of the business of the undertaking’, the position has been made clear that the restricted general meaning given to eligible profi ts as derived from the export of articles in 5s.(1) ha; been given a go by in 5s.(4) and the scope of the benefit has been expanded by extending to all the profits of the business carried on by the undertaking. The Tribunal noted that the wording of 5s.(4) as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2000 is on the pattern of 5. 80lA prior to its substitution w.e.f. 1-4-2000. It also noted that in the context of 5. 80IA the Arnritsar Bench of the Tribunal had in the case of Dy. CIT v. Chaman Lal & Sons, 3 50T 333 held that the benefit of deduction was available in respect of purchase and sale which was part and parcel of the business of the industrial undertaking. All the profits which have nexus with the business of the undertaking will qualify for deduction. The Tribunal noted since that the FDRs were given to obtain credit facility, interest income had nexus with the business of the undertaking and falls under the head ‘Income from Business’. It allowed the claim of deduction u/s.lOA in respect of interest income.

The appeal  filed by the assessee  was allowed.

7. 2009 TIOL 559 ITAT Mum. ITO v. P & R Automation Products Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 2119/Mum./2007 A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated:   25-3-2009

32 – Machinery purchased and given to sister concern for manufacturing goods for the assessee, which in turn exports them, is utilised by the assessee for business – No part of depreciation can be disallowed on such machinery on the ground that spare capacity was utilised by the sister concern for manufacturing its own goods which were sold locally.

Facts:

As per the agreement entered into between the assessee and PAL (its sister concern) a CMG machine was purchased by the assessee and was installed at the factory premises of the sister concern. The sister concern was to use the machine at its premises for manufacturing goods by utilising its power, labour and other facilities and sell the goods so manufactured to the assessee at fair market price to meet the assessee’s export obligation. PAL was authorised to develop indigenous market for said products by using spare capacity. The total sales declared by PAL were Rs.2.28 crores out of which sales to the assessee were Rs.1.50 crores. 93% of the capacity of the machine had been utilised for goods sold to the assessee and spare capacity to the tune of 7% had been utilised for others. The assessee had not charged any rent or hire charges from the sister concern.

The assessee claimed depreciation on the machine on the ground that it was utilised by it for the purposes of its business. While assessing the total income of the assessee the Aa disallowed the claim of depreciation on this machine on the ground that the sister concern had also utilised the machine for manufacturing its own goods which were sold locally.
 
The CIT(A) relying upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Express Pvt. Ltd. 255 ITR 68 held that the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.32 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that u/s.32 an assessee is entitled to deduction by way of depreciation on machinery, if it is owned by the assessee and is used for the purpose of its business. The Tribunal noted the undisputed facts viz. that the assessee had purchased the machinery and the same was provided to the sister concern essentially to manufacture goods for the assessee and supplying the same at fair market price. The Tribunal held the conditions required to be satisfied for deduction u/s.32 as having been satisfied. It stated that its view is supported by the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Express Pvt. Ltd.

The appeal  filed by the Revenue  was dismissed.

8. 2009 TIOL 550 ITAT Mum. Popatlal Fulchand v. ACIT ITA No. 358/Mum./2008 A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated:  6-5-2009

s. 22. – Property owned by individuals and used by a firm, without paying any rent, whose partners are HUFs of the individuals owning the property can be said to be used for the purposes of business by such individuals and consequently its notional income is not chargeable.

Facts:

The assessee alongwith other individuals were owners of a property which was being used by M/s. F C International, a partnership firm, whose partners were HUFs of the assessee and other individual owning the property. The HUFs were partners through the individuals owning the property. The firm did not pay any rent for the property.

The assessee was of the view that annual value of this property is not chargeable to tax since the same is being used for the purposes of his business. The Assessing Officer (Aa) was of the view that the firm is a distinct entity than its individual partners and since the property has been utilised for the purpose of the business of the firm, the benefit of S. 22 cannot be given to individual partners.

The CIT(A) upheld    the view  of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal held that the assessee was not liable to tax in respect of the notional income of the house property used by the firm for its business without paying any rent to the owners of the property. It also observed that the issue under consideration is squarely covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Cl’T v. H. S. Singhat & Sons, 253 ITR 653 (Del.). The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Is it fair to insist on e-compliance without adequate machinery

1. Computerisation is the need of the day in all walks of life. Even various government departments are gradually (in fact, in some sectors, rapidly) thrusting e-compliance on citizens. In the context of income-tax, it all started with e-filing of Quarterly TDS Statements, then e-filing of Returns, followed bye-payment of Taxes, e-filing of remittance certificate (S. 195) and now forthcoming is e-credit of Taxes (Form 26AS). This article examines certain grievances faced by tax practitioners and taxpayers at large in the context of e-compliance under Income-tax Act, 1961.

2. E-payment  of taxes:

E-payment has been made mandatory for all corporate assessees (and those non-corporate assessees who are liable for audit u/s.44AB) w.e.f. 1-4-2008. The general difficulties faced in e-payment are:

2.1 On the NSDL website, once we click the relevant link for e-payment, a web-page appears where we have to fill up the basic information like PAN I TAN, Assessment Year, Name, Address etc. After filling all these details, we have to click to the relevant link, submit to the bank and then proceed with the e-payment gateway.

If at all in this whole process, there is any interruption due to whatever problem like power failure, internet connection failure, bank password mis-match etc., then the whole process is to be restarted from filling of the Basic data. Even otherwise, when multiple payments for different sections (TDS) are to be made; for all the challans, one has to fill up the basic data like name, address, etc. over and again. There should be a facility that once PAN I TAN is entered all the Basic data should automatically appear because it is already in the database of the department.

2.2 At present, there are only 30 banks which are authorised to accept e-payment of taxes ..This creates practical difficulties for taxpayers who are not maintaining account with these Banks. Though, in practice, certain other Banks are also accepting e-payment of taxes but since they are not authorised, ultimately they also have to route it through one of the authorised Banks. This, at times, results in de-lay in credit of tax-payments, with consequential loss of interest u/s.234A, u/s.234B, u/s.234C, u/s. 201 etc. and at times may become a cause of 40a(ia) disallowance.

3. e-filing    of quarterly TDS  statements:

3.1 Once a quarterly TDS statement is uploadedl filed with NSDL, if any corrections are to be done, deductor has to upload/file a correction statement. For this, first of all he has to give the link of fvu file of original statement. Once this is done, the original statement appears on the screen, which can be corrected and new fvu file is generated. There are instances, where the deductor has lost the original fvu file due to computer problem etc. There is no procedure to get the lost fvu file back either from NSDL web site or income tax department’s website. In such a scenario, as the correction statement can never be filed, the deductee will lose the credit for taxes?

3.2 There was a suggestion from NSDL official that, if 95% PAN compliance is not possible, the deductor should submit only those deductee records where PAN is available. As and when other PANs are obtained, correction statement should be filed. This may create 3 difficulties. Firstly, the Challan Details and Deductee Details amount will not match. Secondly, it may amount to a default on the part of deductor of not submitting the details of all tax deducted. Thirdly, filing correction statements repeatedly, is a cumbersome process, as explained in para 3.1 and also it comes at a cost every time.

4.  Form 26AS :

It is proposed that in the near future, even credit for tax deducted will be based on Form 26AS which is electronically generated by NSDL, based on data submitted by deductor. If PAN is wrongly given by deductee, it will not be reflected in his Form 26AS. The deductee will, therefore, have to request the deductor to file a correction statement. In case of large deductors, especially government departments or public sector banks, the feasibility of filing such correction statement, at the instance of a large number of deductees, is really a question mark. Admittedly, there is a facility on the NSDL website to verify PAN, but it comes at a huge cost of Rs.12,OOO. Should there be such a huge charge for statutory compliance?

5. Conclusion:
It is rightly said that change is the only constant in life and generally, change is for the better. Admittedly, even if e-compliance is for the better, the transition should be pain-free and at least in the transitional period, the system should not be faceless. There has to be a sort of ombudsman for handling these technical grievances of the taxpayer.

Section 32(1) — Depreciation is allowable on pre-operative expenses which are revenue in nature, allocated to fixed assets since the expenses were incurred on setting up fixed assets and in pre-operative period the assessee was only engaged in putting up fixed assets on rented land.

(2011) TIOL 434 ITAT-Del.Cosmic Kitchen Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT ITA No. 5549/Del./2010 A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 13-5-2011

Facts:

In
pre-operative period, the assessee had incurred expenditure of
Rs.16,93,153, which was debited under 8 heads, all of which were revenue
in nature. The assessee was not able to link any expenditure with a
particular item of fixed asset. However, since during the pre-operative
period the assessee was engaged only in putting up fixed assets on
rented land, it had capitalised this sum of Rs.16,93,153 to various
items of fixed assets in the ratio of cost of the asset to total cost.
The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed Rs.2,70,744 being the amount of
depreciation on this sum of Rs.16,93,153 on the ground that the
expenditure incurred is revenue in nature and there is no link between
item of asset and the expenditure incurred. Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

In
view of the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Food
Specialities Ltd., 136 ITR 203 (Del.) and also the ratio of the
decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Lucas-TVS Ltd., 110 ITR 346
(Mad.), the expenditure was required to be capitalised. Also the
proportionate method of allocating the expenditure to various items of
fixed assets is fair and reasonable. Accordingly, the assessee is
entitled to claim depreciation on the sum of Rs.16,93,153 being
pre-operative expenses capitalised to various items of fixed assets. The
Tribunal decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.

levitra

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act— Contravention of provisions of Act — Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously — If the exoneration in the adjudication proceedings is on merits criminal prosecution on same set of facts cannot be allowed.

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act— Contravention of provisions of Act — Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously — If the exoneration in the adjudication proceedings is on merits criminal prosecution on same set of facts cannot be allowed.

[Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal and Anr., (2011) 333 ITR 58 (SC)]

On 22nd May, 1992 various premises in the occupation of the appellant Radheshyam Kejriwal besides other persons were searched by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate. The appellant was arrested on 3rd May, 1992 by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate in exercise of the power u/s.35 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and released on bail on the same day. Further the appellant was summoned by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate to give evidence in exercise of the power u/s.40 of the Act and in the light thereof his statement was recorded on various dates, viz., 22nd May, 1992, March 10, 1993, March 16, 1993, 17th March, 1993 and 22nd March, 1993. On the basis of materials collected during search and from the statement of the appellant it appeared to the Enforcement Directorate that the appellant, a person resident in India, without any general or specific exemption from the Reserve Bank of India made payments amounting to Rs.24,75,000 to one Piyush Kumar Barodia in March/April, 1992 as consideration for or in association with the receipt of payment of U.S. $ 75,000 at the rate of Rs.33 per U.S. dollar by the applicant’s nominee abroad in Yugoslavia. It further appeared to the Enforcement Directorate that the transaction involved conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency at rates of exchange other than the rates for the time being authorised by the Reserve Bank of India. In the opinion of the Enforcement Directorate the act of the appellant in making the aforesaid payment of Rs.24,75,000 in Indian currency at the rate of Rs.33 per U.S. dollar against the official rate of dollar, i.e., Rs.30 per dollar (approximately), contravened the provisions of section 8(2) of the Act. Further the said payment having been made without any general or special exemption from the Reserve Bank of India, the appellant had contravened the provisions of section 9(1)(f) of the Act and accordingly rendered himself liable to imposition of penalty u/s.50 of the Act. The Enforcement Directorate was further of the opinion that by abetting in contravening the pro-visions of sections 9(1)(f)(i) and 8(2) of the Act read with the provisions of section 64(2) of the Act, the appellant had rendered himself liable for penalty u/s.50 of the Act.

Accordingly, a show-cause notice dated 7th May, 1993 was issued by the Special Director of the Directorate of Enforcement calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why adjudication proceedings as contemplated u/s.51 of the Act be not held against him for the contraventions pointed above. Show-cause notice dated 7th May, 1993 referred to above led to institution of proceedings u/s.51 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘adjudication proceedings’). The Adjudication Officer came to the conclusion that the allegation made against the appellant of contravention of the provisions of sections 8, 9(1)(f)(i) and 8(2) of the Act read with section 64(2) of the Act could not be sustained. According to the Adjudication Officer, it had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that a sum of Rs.24,75,000 had been actually paid, since there was no documentary evidence except the statement of Shri Piyush Kumar Barodia and a retracted statement of Shri Radheshyam. Since the Enforcement Directorate had not challenged the adjudication order it had become final.

Since any person contravening the provisions of section 8 and 9 of the Act besides other provisions is liable to be prosecuted u/s.56, a notice for prosecution came to be issued on 29-12-1994. After hearing, a complaint was lodged before the Metropolitan Magistrate. The application of the appellant for dropping the prosecution inter alia on the ground that on the same allegation the adjudication proceedings have been dropped was rejected by the Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 2-9-1997. The criminal revision application before the Calcutta High Court was rejected by an order dated 10-8-2001.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the ratio of various decisions on the subject could be broadly stated as follows:

(i)    Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;

(ii)    Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution.

(iii)    Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;

(iv)    The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceeding is not binding on the proceedings for criminal prosecution;

(v)    An adjudication proceeding by the Enforcement Directorate is not a prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(vi)    The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of the finding. If the exoneration in the adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on the merits, prosecution may continue; and

(vii)    In case of exoneration, however, on the merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceeding is on the merits. In case it is found on the merits that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceeding, the trial of the person concerned shall be in abuse of the process of the Court.

Bearing in mind the principles aforesaid, the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the case of the appellant. The Supreme Court noted that in the adjudication proceedings, on the merits the adjudicating authority had categorically held that the charges against Shri Radheshyam Kejriwal for contravening the provisions of section 9(1)(f)(i) and section 8(2) r.w.s. 64(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 could not be sustained. The Supreme Court held that in the face of the aforesaid finding by the Enforecement Directorate in the adjudication proceedings that there is no contravention of any of the provisions of the Act, it would be unjust and an abuse of the process of the Court to permit the Enforcement Directorate to continue with the criminal prosecution. In the result, the Supreme Court by majority allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the order affirming the same by the High Court and the appellant’s prosecution was quashed.

However, in a dissenting judgment separately delivered by P. Sathasivam J., it was held that considering the interpretation relating to sections 50, 51 and 56 by various decisions, in a statute relating to economic offences, there was no reason to restrict the scope of any provisions of the Act. These provisions ensured that no economic loss was caused by the alleged contravention by the imposition of an appropriate penalty after adjudication u/s.51 of the Act and to ensure that the tendency to violate is guarded by imposing appropriate punishment in terms of section 56 of the Act. Section 23D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 had a proviso which indicated that the adjudication for the imposition of penalty should precede making of complaint in writing to the Court concerned for prosecuting the offender. The absence of a similar proviso to section 51 or to section 56 of the present 1973 Act was a clear indication that the Legislature intended to treat the two proceedings as independent of each other. There was nothing in the present Act to indicate that a finding in adjudication is binding on the Court in a prosecution u/s.56 of the Act or that the prosecution u/s.56 depends upon the result of adjudication u/s.51 of the Act. The two proceedings were independent and irrespective of the outcome of the decision u/s.50, there could not be any bar in initiating prosecution u/s.56. The scheme of the Act made it clear that the adjudication by the concerned authorities and the prosecution were distinct and separate. It was further held that no doubt, the conclusion of the adjudication, in the case on hand, the decision of the Special Director dated 18th November, 1996 may be a point for the appellant and it is for him to put forth the same before the Magistrate. Inasmuch as the FERA contains certain provisions and features which cannot be equated with the provisions of the Income-tax Act or the Customs Act and in the light of the mandate of section 56 of the FERA, it is the duty of the Criminal Court to discharge its functions vested with it and give effect to the legislative intention, particularly, in the context of the scope and object of the FERA which was enacted for the economic development of the country and augmentation of revenue. Though the Act has since been repealed and is not applicable at present, those provisions cannot be lightly interpreted taking note of the object of the Act.

In view of the above analysis and discussion, the dissenting Judge agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta as well as the decision of the High Court.

Deductibility of ‘set-on’ amount under Payment of Bonus Act

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 requires an employer,
running a factory or an establishment where twenty or more workers are employed,
to pay to the employees such amount or amounts by way of bonus as prescribed
under the said Act, subject to a maximum amount prescribed therein. The amount
payable is calculated with reference to the allocable surplus to be computed in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder.

1.2 The Act inter alia provides for setting aside an
amount, out of the allocable surplus, that is found to be in excess of the
maximum amount payable towards bonus for an year, subject to a maximum of twenty
per cent of the salary, wages, etc. Such a provision, prescribed u/s.15 of the
Act, is allowed for meeting the shortfall, if any, in any of the four years
including the fourth year. The amount so provided for becomes free at the expiry
of the four years, provided there was no shortfall in any of the said years. S.
28 of the said Act provides for punishment with fine and imprisonment for
non-compliance of the provisions of the Act.

1.3 The excess so set aside is known as ‘set-on’ amount for
which a provision is made in the books of account by debiting the profit & loss
account of the year. The issue has arisen about the deductibility of this
provision of set-on amount. The Gauhati High Court has held that the set-on
amount is allowable as deduction while several High Courts including the Bombay
High Court recently held that such an amount is not deductible.

2. India Carbon Ltd.’s case :


2.1 In India Carbon Ltd. v. CIT, 180 ITR 117 (Gau.),
the question in the reference arose as to whether bonus amounts set apart
(called ‘set-on’ amount) debited to the profit & loss account of the company
could be deducted from the income of the company or not for A.Y. 1976-77. The
assessee a company claimed deduction of two amounts, Rs.8,56,241 as bonus paid,
and Rs.7,36,915 the amount deposited in ‘set-on’ account. The former was claimed
u/s.36(1)(ii) and the latter u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The ITO allowed
the deduction of Rs.8,56,241 but rejected the claim for Rs.7,36,915. The
Appellate Authority allowed deduction for both the payments. The Tribunal
however overturned the decision of the Appellate Authority and rejected the
claim for deduction of the set-on amount of Rs.7,36,915. The Tribunal was not
impressed with the contention of the company that it regularly adopted the
mercantile method of accounting and the deduction in the past assessment years
was allowed to the company.

2.2 Being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the company
referred the following questions for consideration of the Gauhati High Court
under Ss.(1) of S. 256, :

(i) “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in reversing the order of the AAC and
disallowing the statutory liability of bonus set-on computed according to the
provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 ?

(ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in disregarding and rejecting the method of
accounting regularly employed by the appellant company ?

(iii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that bonus set-on cannot be
regarded as a liability of the year in which the computed amount should be
carried forward for being set-on in the manner prescribed under the Payment of
Bonus Act, 1965 ?”

2.3 The company contended that the set-on amount is not
prohibited to be deducted u/s. 40(a)(ii) and, therefore, such amounts were
expenditure for the business; the assessee could not utilise the amount
irretrievably and it was commercially expedient to provide for such set-on.

2.4 In reply the Revenue argued that the amount in question
was a reserve fund; the amount stood deposited in the account books of the
assessee and could be utilised by the assessee and, therefore, was not an
expenditure; such an amount, to be paid in future, could not be allowed either
u/s.28 or u/s.30 to u/s.36 or u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act.

2.5 The Gauhati High Court noted the following amongst other
things :

  • The
    Government of India in 1961 to obtain industrial peace, appointed a committee
    called the Tripartite Commission and on acceptance of the committee’s report
    on 6-12-1964, with modifications, the Government of India promulgated on
    29-5-1965, an Ordinance which was replaced by the Act No. 21 of 1965 called
    the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, to regulate the bonus payments in the country
    with some exceptions.
     


  • The
    Act contained 40 Sections, 4 Schedules and the Rules. They provided together
    for ascertainment of gross profits, available surplus and allocable surplus
    and set out the sums to be deducted from gross profits besides the manner of
    calculation of taxes. The Act also provided for eligibility of workmen for
    bonus and for a minimum bonus to be paid and defined the limit of maximum
    bonus. Rules were provided explaining how the number of working days was to be
    reckoned.
     


  • The
    Act inter alia vide S. 15 provided for how amounts were to be carried
    forward (referred to as ‘set-on’) and when the set-on amount was to be
    utilised with the help of the Fourth Schedule. The utilised amount was called
    the ‘set-off’ amount. Register was prescribed to show the set-on and set-off
    amounts.


2.6 The Court further noted that what constituted ‘expenditure’ was a many splendoured controversy; its meaning had gained many facets and dimensions over the years in fiscal statutes and in its trail had brought to surface many fresh controversies. It referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Molasses Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, 37 ITR 66, to notice that an ‘expenditure’ was that which was paid out and paid away; an amount which passed out irretrievably from the hands of the assessee was ‘expenditure’. Referring to CIT v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd., 53 ITR 140 (SC), the Court noted that the expenditure was wider in meaning and scope than when used to mean expenditure for earning profits; not all that was spent in a business could be construed as expenditure. ‘Commercial expediency’ and ‘reasonableness of expenditure’ were considered relevant for allowing a deduction, as was held in CIT v. Walchand & Co. (P.) Ltd., 65 ITR 381 (SC), and these aspects were to be looked at from the point of view of business. In Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. v. 156 ITR 585 (SC), the Gauhati High Court noted, that contribution to the gratuity fund created for the benefit of employees in an irrevocable trust, was allowed to be deducted.

2.7 The three cases where the issue was considered under the Payment of Bonus Act, against the assessee’s claim for deduction, were noted by the Court:

  •     In Malwa Vanaspati & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 154 ITR 655 (MP), it was held that S. 15 created a liability which was not a subsisting liability and, therefore, such amounts were held in reserve for meeting a future liability which contingent in nature, more so where the assessee did not deposit the amount with the Bonus Act authority.

  •     In Rayalaseema Mills Ltd. v. CIT, 155 ITR 19 (AP), it was held that set-on was not covered by S. 28 and S. 37 of the Income-tax Act and therefore, not an expenditure and the set-on amount was carried forward for a limited period for four years which was not the same as amounts paid to a third party, and, therefore, not loss, not a trading liability and not an expenditure.

  •     In P. K. Mohammed Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, 162 ITR 587 (Ker.) the set-on amount was construed to be deposits made under the compulsion of a statute to satisfy a contingent liability to be paid in future.

2.8 The Gauhati High Court also noted that in three other cases, the Madras High Court had examined the issue of deductibility of an amount set aside for payment of bonus to workers independent of the Payment of Bonus Act. In CIT v. Somasundaram Mills (P.) Ltd., 95 ITR 365 (Mad.), CIT v. Anamallais Bus Transports (P.) Ltd., 99 ITR 445 (Mad.) and again in 118 ITR 739 (Mad.), it was held that the amount set aside as such for payment of bonus represented a contingent liability and could not be allowed as expenditure; the workmen did not have a right in such amounts.

2.9 The Court referred to the rule that required the statutory maintenance of registers and the columns therein. It noted that the Register ‘B’ showed set-on and set-off; that the amounts shown in columns, 3, 4 and 5 of the Fourth Schedule were amounts which were to be paid or have been paid to the employees; columns 2 to 5 in Form ‘B’ showed the amounts paid or to be paid. The Court observed that these columns, coupled with the language of S. 15 of the Act, indicated that the set-on amount could not be used or utilised by the assessee for business purposes and the amount deposited was held for the benefit of workmen; the use of words ‘utilised for the purpose of payment of bonus’ in S. 15 made this clear.

2.10 The Court posed itself a question, the answer thereto was considered crucial for deciding the issue whether a set-on amount was deductible or not. “In case such amounts were used by the assessee and the amounts were lost in the business, could a businessman be heard to contend that amounts were lost in business, there was nothing left to be paid to workmen and that as such he might be absolved from paying the bonus to workmen?”

2.11 The Court answered that the assessee could not utilise the set-on amount for business; that on making the deposit the assessee was divested of the right to invest or utilise the amount for business; the columns shown in the Fourth Schedule, Form B and the language used in the Schedule and in S. 15 of the Act indicated that the set-on amount, after it was deposited, could not be utilised; the amount was to be paid in four years. The Court was not impressed by the contention that the assessee could utilise the amount in business as the amounts set on were akin to the funds in an irrevocable trust such as referred to in Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. v. CIT (supra) and the assessee was not an owner of the funds. The issue of deduction when viewed from the point of business as was done in CIT v. Walchand and Co. (P.) Ltd. (supra), would lead to an inevitable answer in favour of allowance of claim of the assessee.

2.12 The set-on amount could not be utilised by the assessee and had to be deposited perforce under the statute, and in that view of the matter such amount was an expenditure allowable for deduction. The Court observed that the company would be liable for punishment for fine and imprisonment u/s.28 of the Act for contravention where it utilised or used the amount. The set-on amount for the aforesaid reasons was an expenditure incurred by the assessee, and, therefore, had to be deducted.

    3. Ingersoll-Rand’s case:

3.1 In Ingersoll-Rand (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 320 ITR 513 (Bom.), the question that had been referred for consideration of the High Court at the instance of the assessee read as?: “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the set-on liability u/s.15 of the Payment of Bonus Act, amounting to Rs.24,73,865 was not allowable as a deduction in computing the total income of the assessee for the year under reference?”

3.2 The Court in the beginning took notice of the fact that S. 15(1) of the Payment of Bonus Act laid down that where for any accounting year the allocable surplus exceeded the amount of maximum bonus payable to the employees in the establishment u/s.11, then the excess should, subject to a limit of twenty per cent of the total salary or wage of the employees employed in the establishment in that accounting year, be carried forward for being set on in the succeeding accounting year and so on up to and inclusive of the fourth accounting year to be utilised for the purpose of payment of bonus.

3.3 The Court also noted that the issue of deduc-tion of set-on bonus was already considered by several High Courts and particularly, in favour of the Revenue by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Malwa Vanaspati & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 154 ITR 655, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rayalaseema Mills Ltd. v. CIT, 155 ITR 19 and the Kerala High Court in P. K. Mohammed (P) Ltd. v. CIT, 162 ITR 587. It also took note of the contrary view taken by the Gauhati High Court in India Carbon Ltd. v. CIT, 180 ITR 117. The Court noted that amongst the High Courts, there were two different views, though the majority of the High Courts have taken a view that the sum in question was not an allowable deduction.

3.4 The Bombay High Court observed that in India Carbon’s case (supra) the Gauhati High Court proceeded to hold that; the assessee could not utilise the amount for business; that on making deposit it was divested of the right to invest or utilise the amount for business; the amount had to be paid in future in the course of a cycle of four years; the amount if utilised would be in contravention of the Act and punishable. On this basis it held that the amount deposited under the provisions of the Act, which could not be utilised for the purposes of business, amounted to expenditure allowable.

3.5 Attention of the Court, on behalf of the company, was drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT, 245 ITR 428 (SC), to contend that considering the ratio of that judgment, the allocable surplus would be an allowable deduction. In that case, the company had floated a scheme for its employees for encashment of leave and created a fund by making a provision for meeting such liability under a leave reserve account which was maintained so as to provide for encashment and payment of leave and vacation leave was paid from the leave reserve. On the basis of facts, the Court held that the provision made by the appellant company for meeting the liability incurred by it and the leave encashment scheme was entitled to deduction.

3.6 The Court relying on the precedents in favour of the Revenue held that an amount set on u/s.15 of the Payment of Bonus Act was not an accrued liability, but only a provision to meet a future liability, if any, and therefore, being a contingent liability, it was not allowable as deduction. It observed that; what the assessee was required by statute to do was to keep a reserve with itself, of what was known as allocable surplus to meet a future shortfall, if any, for a period of four years; the shortfall could not be estimated with reasonable certainty, though statutorily the liability had to be incurred; the extent of the liability also could not be estimated with reasonable certainty as if there were profits to meet the bonus liability the reserve would not be expended; only in the event there were no sufficient profits would the allocable surplus be utilised to meet the liability; the amount was merely a reserve fund which the Payment of Bonus Act mandated; after the expiry of four succeeding accounting years if the amount was not utilised the assessee was free to make use of the amount; the amount to be adjusted for the subsequent year, depended therefore on the shortfall which could not be anticipated with reasonable certainty; the amount was not deducted in the hands of the assessee unless it was utilised; the deduction claimed was not an accrued liability, but only a provision u/s.15(1) of the Payment of Bonus Act to meet a future liability, if any; the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the set-on liability u/s.15 of the Payment of Bonus Act was not allowable as a deduction in computing the total income of the assessee for the year under reference.

3.7 The judgment in Bharat Earth Movers (supra) case was found by the Bombay High Court to be clearly distinguishable and, therefore, not applicable.

    4. Observations:

4.1 S. 15 of the Payment of Bonus Act reads as under:

    1) “Set-on and set-off of allocable surplus — (1) Where for any accounting year, the allocable surplus exceeds the amount of maximum bonus payable to the employees in the establishment u/s.11, then, the excess shall, subject to a limit of twenty per cent of the total salary or wage of the employees employed in the establishment in that accounting year, be carried forward for being set on in the succeeding accounting year and so on up to and inclusive of the fourth accounting year to be utilised for the purpose of payment of bonus in the manner illustrated in the Fourth Schedule.

    2) Where for any accounting year, there is no available surplus or the allocable surplus in respect of that year falls short of the amount of minimum bonus payable to the employees in the establishment u/s.10, and there is no amount or sufficient amount carried forward and set on U/ss.(1) which could be utilised for the purpose of payment of the minimum bonus, then, such minimum amount or the deficiency, as the case may be, shall be carried forward for being set off in the succeeding accounting year and so on up to and inclusive of the fourth accounting year in the manner illustrated in the Fourth Schedule.

    3) The principle of set-on and set-off as illustrated in the Fourth Schedule shall apply to all other cases not covered by Ss.(1) or Ss.(2) for the purpose of payment of bonus under this Act.

    4) Where in any accounting year any amount has been carried forward and set on or set off under this Section, then, in calculating bonus for the succeeding accounting year, the amount of set-on or set-off carried forward from the earliest accounting year shall first be taken into account.”

4.2 S. 28 provides for penalty for violation of any of the provisions of the Act. It reads as:

“If any person —

    a) contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder; or

    b) to whom a direction is given or a requisition is made under this Act fails to comply with the direction or requisition, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

4.3 The primary thing that emerges out of the provisions of the Act is that the setting aside of the prescribed amount of ‘set-on’ is a statutory requirement and non-compliance thereof attracts the stringent punishment. Also emerges is the fact that the Income-tax Act does not provide for any express disallowance of the amount of ‘set-on’ un-less a view is taken that it is hit by S. 43B. It is also clear that such amount is not free for utilisation at the whims and fancies of the establishment which is rather duty bound to utilise the said amount for meeting the shortfall of any of the four years. Specific formula are provided by the Act for scientifically calculating the ‘set-on’ amount with the precision. There is nothing uncertain about the quantum of the provision. There is every possibility that the liability might emerge as had that not been anticipated, the law would not make any provision for such ‘set-on’. The sum is set aside for the labour welfare under a statutory stipulation.

4.4 The establishment is made presently liable for setting aside an amount not out of the profit, but out of the allocable surplus under a provision of law and under the mercantile system of accounting, it falls for allowance u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act. The establishment is divested of the set-on amount on creating a provision as per statute and on provision ceases to be the owner of the funds and holds thereafter as trustee or a custodian of the funds. The employees have an overriding title for the pre-scribed period of four years and the set-on money cannot be frittered away at the sweet will of the employer during the said period of four years.

4.5 For allowance of a deduction, actual parting of funds is not necessary and in any case, settlement by accounts is also an expenditure. The Supreme Court in the case of Metal Box Ltd., 73 ITR 53 held that an accrued but undischarged liability is allowable and a discounted value of a contingent liability in given circumstances be sometimes an expenditure. The Calcutta High Court in case of Electric Lamp Mfg. (India) Ltd., 165 ITR 115 (Cal.) held that a provision of a statutory liability on actuarial valuation is allowable as a deduction.

4.6 It may be true that the payment as also the quantum thereof is not certain, that fact alone should not deter the allowance of the claim for deduction. In the event the amount or part thereof was found to be not payable, the same nonetheless will be liable for taxation u/s.41 of the Act. No income escapes taxation by allowing the claim. In fact the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rayalaseema Mills Ltd. v. CIT, 155 ITR 19 (AP) was pleased to hold that the obligation for setting on was statutory, but was confined only to the four succeeding accounting years, whereafter the assessee was free to make such use of the amount, if any, remaining, as it thinks fit. The Court accordingly confirmed that for the period of four years, the assessee was prevented from using the said funds at his will leading to a reasonable inference that the liability cannot at least be construed to be contingent and the funds set aside were not free. The said decision also noted the fact that the set-on amount could be utilised for payments in case of the need and only after the expiry of the four year period that the funds will be a part of the general revenue. The better view appears to be in favour of allowance of a set-on amount more importantly in view of provisions of S. 41 of the Act which ensures that no expenditure, that is not incurred finally, escapes taxation.

Is Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. [292 ITR (AT) 144 (SB)(Mum.)] Still a good law ?

Article 1

I. Introduction :

1.
The calculation of deduction u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax Act itself is a complex
issue. The complexity is further increased when one attempts to calculate the
deduction u/s.80HHC of the Act for the purpose of making adjustments u/s.115JA/JB
of the Act in order to arrive at the ‘book profit’. The Special Bench in the
case of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. [292 ITR (AT) 144 (Mum.)] held that for
the purpose of S. 115JB, the deduction u/s.80HHC of the Act has to be calculated
with reference to the adjusted book profits and not the normal gross total
income.

2.
Recently, the Bombay High Court has rendered a decision in the case of CIT v.
Ajanta Pharma Ltd.
reported at (318 ITR 252). In the said decision, the
Bombay High Court has observed at para 36, page 269 as under :

We
have had the benefit of going through the reasoning and the orders in

Deputy CIT v. Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd.,

(2007) 292 ITR (AT) 144; (2007) 106 ITD 193 (Mum.)(SB) as also in the case of
Deputy CIT v. Govind Rubber P. Ltd.,
(2004) 89 ITD 457; (2004) 82 TJT 615.
It is not possible to agree with the view taken by the Benches. Those decisions
in view of these judgments stand overruled.”

3.
An attempt has been made in this article to find out as to whether; subsequent
to the decision of Bombay High Court, the ratio laid down by the Special Bench
in the case of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. is still valid or not, and if yes,
to what extent.

4.
Before we really go into the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Ajanta Pharma Ltd., it is imperative to closely look into the decision of the
Special Bench in the case of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. and also the decision
of the Division Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd.
(21 SOT 101) which has been ultimately reversed by the Bombay High Court in the
above-referred decision. This is for the reason that according to the humble
opinion of the author, the issue involved in Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. is
totally different than the issue involved in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd.


II. Issue involved in the decision
of Special Bench — Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. :

5.
According to the provisions of S. 80HHC of the Act, the deduction provided under
that Section is to be calculated as per the formula prescribed in Ss.(3).
According to the said formula, one has to start with the ‘profit of the
business’ and make some multiplication, division, etc. in case of manufacturing
exporter to arrive at eligible amount of deduction. The Section also provides
for the formula in case of trader exporter wherein also one has to calculate the
profit of the business. The question which arose before the Special Bench is as
to what is to be taken as the ‘profit of the business’ which would further
undergo the mathematical exercise. According to the assessee, while calculating
the deduction u/s. 80HHC for the purpose of 115JA/JB, the profit of the business
should be the profit as shown in Profit and Loss Account; whereas as per the
revenue, the profit would mean profit assessable under the head ‘business
income’. Thus, the whole controversy is — What is the starting point for
calculating deduction u/s.80HHC for the purpose of S. 115JA/JB of the Act. This
issue has been resolved by the Special Bench in favour of the assessee for the
detailed reasons given in the said decision.


III. Issue involved in the decision
of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. (80 HHC) :

6.
The Bombay High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. was required to address
an issue as to whether the export profits to be excluded from the ‘book profits’
u/s.115JB of the Act is to be calculated after applying the restriction of S.
80HHC(1B) of the Act. In other words, whether the amount to be reduced from the
book profits should be the entire eligible amount of deduction or only the
percentage of the eligible deduction actually allowable under the Act as per S.
80HHC(1B) of the Act ? The questions of law raised before the High Court are as
under :


“1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the
ITAT was justified in approving the Order of the CIT(A) in allowing respondent
to exclude export profits for the purpose of S. 115JB at the figure other than
that allowed u/s.80HHC(1B) ?

2.   Whether in law for the purpose of calculating book profit u/s.115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 under Explanation 1 sub-clause (iv) the export profits to be excluded from the book profits would be the export profits allowed as a deduction u/s.80HHC after restricting the deduction as per the provisions of Ss.(1B) of S. 80HHC of the Act or the export profits calculated as per Ss.(3) and Ss.(3A) of S. 80HHC before applying the restriction contained in Ss.(1B) of S. 80HHC??”

Answering the said question, the High Court held that while computing the ‘book profits’, the quantum of deduction allowable under clause (iv) to Explanation 1 u/s.115JB of the Act will have to be restricted to actual permissible deduction as calcu-lated u/s.80HHC(1B) of the Act.

IV.    To what extent is Syncome Formulations    Ltd. still a good law??

  7.  As seen above, the question referred to the High Court was restricted to S. 80HHC(1B). The issue dealt with by the Tribunal in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. was only in respect of S. 80HHC(1B) and, therefore, the High Court could not have dealt with the controversy which was there in Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. This is further fortified by the question of law referred to before the High Court.

8.    Further, no arguments were also raised by the either parties before the Bombay High Court in respect of the controversy involved in Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. In my opinion, something which has not been considered could never have been disapproved.

   9. The reason as to why the Bombay High Court observed that Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. is overruled is because the Tribunal decision in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. (21 SOT 101) at para 10, page 109 heavily relied upon para 59 of the decision of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. The reliance was limited to the controversy which was involved in Ajanta Pharma Ltd. and not the one which was involved in Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. It is only because the Tribunal in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. in one of the paragraphs, has heavily relied upon the decision of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd., the High Court has observed that Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. is overruled.

10.    Further, controversy involved in Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. is resolved in favour of the assessee after strongly relying upon the Circular of CBDT [Circular No. 680, dated 21-2-1994 (206 ITR 297)]. The said Circular has neither been cited nor discussed by the Bombay High Court.
This also establishes that the controversy was totally different before the Bombay High Court. This view is made abundantly clear by the immediately following paragraphs (para 37 on page 269, 270), wherein the Bombay High Court has observed in respect of the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. GTN Textiles Ltd., (248 ITR 372) as under?:

“The issue before the Kerala High Court was, what is the profit that should be taken into consideration considering the accounting system that has to be followed while working out the book profits. Therefore, the judgment would be no assistance in considering the question framed for consideration. (Emphasis supplied).

 11.   From this, it is clear that the decision of the Kerala High Court which is directly on the issue dealt with Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. has been held to be not applicable. Moreover, the Bombay High Court has not dissented from the view of the Kerala High Court.

12.    The view taken by the Special Bench is correct also in view of the fact that there are direct decisions of the High Court in the following cases supporting the stand taken by the Special Bench?:

  •     CIT v. GTN Textiles Ltd., [248 ITR 372 (Ker.)]
  •     CIT v. K. G. Denim, [180 Taxman 590 (Mad.)]
  •     Rajnikant Schenelder & Associates (P) Ltd., [302 ITR 22 (Mad.)]


13.     It is also relevant to refer the decision in the case of Sun Engineering Works Ltd. (198 ITR 297) (SC), wherein the Supreme Court has observed that a decision of the Court takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision, one must carefully try to ascertain the principles laid down by the Court and not to pick out words or a sentence from the judgments delivered from the context of the question under consideration. It was categorically held that “It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete ‘law’ declared by this Court. The judgments have to be considered in the light of the question which were before this Court.” Applying the said ratio, the observations in the case of decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. cannot be construed to mean that the decision of Special Bench is completely overruled.

14. (ITA No. 4155/Mum./2007) dated 9-11-2009 has accepted that the issue decided by the Bombay High Court does not entirely overrule the issue decided by the Special Bench in the case of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. However, the Delhi Tribunal recently in the case of ACIT v. Cosmo Ferrites Ltd., [126 TTJ 666 (Del.)] has rendered a contrary view and held that the decision in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. overrules the decision of the Special Bench in Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. However, with due respect, the author disagrees with the said views of the Delhi Tribunal for the detailed discussion made above.

    15. Construed from the discussion made above, it can be assumed that the decision of Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd. cannot be said to be entirely overruled except only to the extent of quantum of deduction. In other words, the necessary conclusion of the said discussion could be that while computing the amount of deduction as per clause (iv) to Explanation I to S. 115JB(2) of the Act, the book profits should be considered as the gross total income for the purpose of determining the eligible amount of deduction u/s.80HHC of the Act as per S. 80HHC(3)/(3A) of the Act. The provision of S. 80HHC(1B) would then be applied, as held by the Bombay High Court, to determine the quantum of deduction which will be allowed to be reduced while computing the book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB of the Act.

4. CBDT notifies norms for procedure and criteria for compulsory manual selection of cases for scrutiny during Financial Year 2014-2015 – Instruction No. 6 dated 2nd September, 2014

4. CBDT notifies norms for procedure and criteria for compulsory manual selection of cases for scrutiny during Financial Year 2014-2015 – Instruction No. 6 dated 2nd September, 2014

CBDT    extends    the    due    date    for    filing    income    tax    returns    for  assessees who are liable to tax audit u/s. 44aB of the act  –    Order    u/s.    119    of    the    Act    –    File    no:    F.No.153/53/2014-TPL    (Pt.I)    dated    26th    September    2014

 The    Board    has    extended    the    due    date    for    filing    return    of income for assessees who are subject to tax audit from 30th     September     2014     to     30th     November     2014     in     line    with the extension of obtaining the tax audit report. it has been    clarified    in    the    order    that    interest    u/s.    234A    would    be leviable.  in all other cases the due date would remain   at 30-09-14

2. Extension of due date of filing of the return of income – Order F. No. 225-268-2014-ITA.II dated 16th September, 2014

2. Extension of due date of filing of the return of income – Order F. No. 225-268-2014-ITA.II dated 16th September, 2014

Considering     the     large     scale     devastation     in     the     State    of     Jammu     and    Kashmir     due     to     heavy     rains     and     floods,    CBDT     has     extended     the     due-date     of     filing     Returns     of      Income     from     30th    September,     2014     to     30th    November, 2014,     in    cases    of     Income-tax    assessees     in     the    State    of Jammu and Kashmir.

3. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income between Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan enters into force on 17th July, 2014 – Notification No. 42 dated 5th September, 2014

3. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income between Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan enters into force on 17th July, 2014 – Notification No. 42 dated 5th September, 2014

1. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income between Government of the Re-public of India and the Government of Republic of Fiji enters into force on 12th August 2014 – Notification No. 35/2014/F.No.503/11/2005/-FTD-11 dated 12th August, 2014

1. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to  taxes on income between Government of the Re-public of India and the Government of Republic of Fiji enters into force on 12th August 2014 – Notification No. 35/2014/F.No.503/11/2005/-FTD-11 dated 12th August, 2014

Ownership of a Part of the House and Exemption u/s. 54F

Synopsis

Section 54F, which allows exemption to an assessee from capital gains tax upon reinvestment of sale proceeds into a residential property, has been prone to litigation. A new area of controversy is now emerging with conflicting decisions rendered by various tribunals – whether part or joint ownership of a property at the time of transfer of the original asset could be construed as ownership of “one” residential property as intended under the proviso to section 54F(1). In this article, the authors discuss the conflicting tribunal judgments and their interpretation on this issue.

Issue for Consideration

An assessee, being an individual or a HUF, is exempted from payment of income tax on capital gains arising from the transfer of an asset, not being a residential house, u/s. 54F of the Income-tax Act on reinvestment of the net consideration in purchase or construction of a residential house, within the specified period. This exemption from tax is subject to fulfillment of the other conditions specified in section 54F, one of which is that the assessee should not own more than one residential house, other than the new house, on the date of transfer of the said asset. This condition prescribed by item (i) of Clause (a) of the Proviso to section 54F(1) reads as under; “Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply where – (a) the assessee, – (i) owns more than one residential house, other than the new asset, on the date of transfer of the original asset; or…..”. Till assessment year 2000-01, the condition was that the assessee should not own any other residential house on the date of transfer, other than the new house.

An ownership of more than one house is fatal to the claim of exemption from tax on capital gains. The term ‘more than one residential house’ and the term ‘owns’ are not defined by section 54F or the Income-tax Act. Whether the Income-tax Department, while applying these terms, is required to establish that the assessee is the sole owner of a whole house, absolutely to the exclusion of other persons or is it sufficient if it establishes the co-ownership or joint ownership of the house or a part of the house by the assessee held together with the other persons, is the question that is being debated by the different benches of the tribunal. The issue involves the interpretation of these terms on which the different benches of the tribunal have taken conflicting stands that require due consideration. The Mumbai and the Chennai benches of the tribunal have taken a stand that the co-ownership of a house at the time of transfer does not amount to ownership of a house and is not an impediment for the claim of exemption u/s. 54F, while the Hyderabad and the Chennai benches of the tribunal have denied the benefit of section 54F in cases where the assessees have been found to be holding a share in the ownership of the house as on the date of transfer of the asset.

Rasiklal N. Satra’s Case

The issue first came up for consideration of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of Rasiklal N. Satra, 98 ITD 335. In that case, the assessee had derived capital gains of Rs. 6,68,698 for A.Y. 1998-99 on sale of shares in respect of which gains, an exemption u/s. 54F was claimed on the strength of purchase of a house at Vashi, Navi Mumbai. The AO in the course of assessment noticed that the assessee was the co-owner of a house at Sion on the date of transfer of the said shares which co-ownership was held to be in violation of one of the conditions of section 54F. The AO accordingly denied the claim of exemption, on the ground that the assessee owned another house on the date of transfer of the shares.

Before the CIT (Appeals) it was contended that a shared interest in the property did not amount to ownership of the property, a contention that was accepted by the CIT (Appeals) who allowed the claim of the assessee for exemption from tax.

In the appeal by the AO to the tribunal, the Income-tax Department contended that a share in the ownership of a house amounted to the ownership of house and as such the assessee had violated the condition in section 54F and as a result was not eligible for the claim of exemption from tax. The assessee reiterated his contention that a shared interest in the property was not equivalent to the ownership of the house. He also relied on the provisions of section 26 of the Act to contend that the joint owners were to be assessed in the status of an AOP unless the shares of the owners were definite and ascertainable. He contended that he had no definite share in the house and he could not be held to be the owner of the house.

The tribunal noted that the only issue before it was as to whether the assessee could be said to be the owner of the Sion house or not. In the context, it observed that the Legislature had used the word ‘a’ before the words ‘residential house’ which must mean a complete residential house and would not include a shared interest in a residential house; where the property was owned by more than one person, it could not be said that any one of them was the owner of the property; in such a case no individual person, of his own, could sell the entire property though no doubt, he could sell his share of interest in the property but as far as the property was considered, it would continue to be owned by co-owners; joint ownership was different from absolute ownership; in the case of a residential unit, none of the co-owners could claim that he was the owner of a residential house; ownership of a residential house meant an ownership to the exclusion of all others and where a house was jointly owned by two or more persons, none of them could be said to be the owner of that house.

The tribunal fortified its views with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta vs. CIT, 166 ITR 833, wherein, it was held that a fractional ownership was not sufficient for claiming even fractional depreciation u/s. 32 of the Act. It observed that because of the said judgment, the Legislature had to amend the provisions of section 32 with effect from 01-04-1997 by using the expres-sion ‘owned wholly or partly’. It held that the word ‘own’ would not include a case where a residential house was partly owned by one person or partly owned by other person(s). It further observed that after the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta (supra), the Legislature could have also amended the provisions of section 54F so as to include part ownership and since, the Legislature had not amended the provisions of section 54F, it had to be held that the word ‘own’ in section 54F would include only the case where a residential house was fully and wholly owned by assessee and consequently would not include a residential house owned by more than one person. In the present case, admittedly the house at Sion, Mumbai, the tribunal further noted, was purchased jointly by assessee and his wife. As it was nobody’s case that wife was a benami of assessee, as such it had to be held that assessee was not the owner of a residential house on the date of transfer of original asset. Consequently, the exemption u/s. 54F could not be denied to assessee.

Holding of a share or a part ownership in the house was not considered by the tribunal to be representing the ownership of a house for the purposes of compliance of conditions contained in the Proviso to section 54F(1) of the Act. The benefit of section 54F conferred on the assessee by the CIT (Appeals) was confirmed by the tribunal.

Apsara Bhavana Sai’s Case

The issue recently came up for consideration of the Hyderabad bench of the tribunal in Apsara Bhavana Sai’s case, 40 taxmann.com 528.

In this case, the assessee had claimed an exemption u/s. 54F in respect of long term capital gains arising from sale of shares, for A.Y. 2008-09. During the course of assessment, the AO noticed that the as-sessee owned two houses, i.e. more than one house, as she had declared income from these two houses under the head ‘Income from House Property’. He was of the opinion that the assessee had violated the condition of section 54F(1) that prohibited her from owning more than one house on the date of transfer of shares. He accordingly called upon the assessee to explain her case for the exemption.

The assessee, inter alia, claimed that one of the houses at ‘My Home Navadeep’ was held jointly by her with her husband. Relying on the decision in the case of Rasiklal N. Satra (supra), she argued that a share in a house, per se, was not equated with the ownership of the house and her co-ownership of the said house, should not be a ground for denial of benefit of section 54F to her.

The AO noted that the assessee, as a joint owner, was holding the rights of ownership over the house and could not be said to be not the owner of the property, more so where the entire rental income of the house was offered for taxation in her hands. Relying on an unreported decision of the Chennai bench of the tribunal, in the case of Dr. P. K. Vasanthi Rangrajan dated 25-07-2005 in ITA No. 1753/MDS/2004, the AO denied the exemption to the assessee. He also relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Chandanben Maganlal, 245 ITR 182 to support his action.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee reiterated that a share in the joint property should be regarded as a share only and not as an ownership, relying on the decisions in the cases of Rasiklal N. Satra (supra) and Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta, 166 ITR 783 (SC) where it was held that a co-owner was a person entitled to a share in the property but could not be recognised as the single owner. The decisions in the cases of Shiv Narain Chaudhary, 108 ITR 104 (All.) and in T. N. Aravinda Reddy, 120 ITR 46 (SC) were also relied upon. The assessee further contended that the decision of the tribunal in the case of Rasikal N. Satra (supra) was not contested further, and therefore, shall be considered as final. She maintained that part ownership of the house property could not be a disqualification for claiming exemption u/s. 54F as a joint ownership in a house should not be considered in counting the numeric strength of the house property as envisaged under the provisions for claiming exemption u/s. 54F. The assessee submitted that that the share in a joint ownership in the property at ‘My Home Navadeep’ should be excluded and not considered as disqualification for claiming exemption u/s. 54F of the Act.

The CIT(A) observed that;

•    admittedly the house was jointly owned by the assessee with her husband and the question, therefore, was whether the part ownership of the assessee of the said flat could be considered as ownership of the flat.

•    in the case of Dr. P. K. Vasanthi Rangarajan (supra), wherein it had been held that if an assessee owned a part of a residential property, though not fully, it amounted to owning of a residential property as envisaged in section 54F and the assessee became disqualified for exemption u/s. 54F,

•    Mumbai bench in the case of Rasiklal N. Satra (supra) had taken a view that ownership was different from absolute ownership and that none of the co-owners could claim that he was the owner of the residential house as the ownership of a residential house meant ownership to the exclusion of all others relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta (supra), holding that fractional ownership was not sufficient for claiming even fractional depreciation u/s. 32 of the Act.

•    the said decision in the case of Rasiklal N. Satra (supra) was not contested further,

•    the Chennai bench of the tribunal, in a later decision in the case of Asstt. CIT vs. K. Surendra Kumar in ITA No. 1324/Mds/2010 dated 12-08-2011, had followed the same decision of the Mumbai bench going against the decision of their co-ordinate bench in the case of Dr. P.K. Vasanthi Rangarajan (supra), wherein the tribunal noted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta (supra) had not been considered in Dr. P.K.Vasanthi Rangrajan’s case, whereas the same was considered by the Mumbai bench in the case of Rasiklal N. Satra (supra).

•    the Chennai bench in the said K. Surendra Kumar ‘s case held that since in the said case the assessee was only a part owner of the two residential properties, he could not be said to be owning a residential house as required for the purpose of benefit u/s. 54F of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that as the assessee was only a part owner of the property at ‘My Home Navadeep’, in the light of the decisions of the Mumbai and Chennai benches, the assessee could not be considered as owning the said property, to the exclusion of the joint owner, i.e., her husband, so as to be called the ‘owner’ for the purpose of section 54F of the Act. The CIT(A) held that the assessee could be said to be owning only one property as on the date of sale of shares, and therefore, was eligible for deduction u/s. 54F and accordingly, decided the grounds raised by the assessee in her favour and directed the Assessing Officer to revise the computation of income.

Against the order of the CIT(Appeals), the Income tax Department filed an appeal before the tribunal wherein it was pleaded; that the CIT(A) wrongly granted deduction u/s. 54F of the Act, though the assessee was owning more than one residential house; that the assessee being partial owner of the property at ‘My Home Navdeep’ and absolute owner of the other house situated at Meenakshi Royal Court, was owning more than one house and was not entitled for deduction u/s. 54F of the Act; even fractional or partial ownership of the immovable property disentitled the assessee for claiming deduction u/s. 54F of the Act ; that the judgments relied on by the assessee were relating to granting of deduction u/s. 32 and the language used therein was entirely different from section 54F of the Income- tax Act and these judgments were not applicable to the facts of the case; that the assessee was to be treated as owning more than one residential house and she could not granted deduction u/s. 54F of the Act in view of the judg-ments in the cases of CIT vs. Ravinder Kumar Arora, 342 ITR 38(Delhi), Mrs. Kamlesh Bansal vs. ITO, 26 SOT 3 (Delhi) (URO), Madgul Udyog vs. CIT, 184 ITR 484 (Cal.)and Dy. CIT vs. Greenko Energies (P.) Ltd. in ITA Nos. 3-7/Hyd/13 dated 10.5.2013.

The tribunal, on due consideration of the material on record, observed that the exemption u/s. 54F had been granted to the assessee with a view to encourage construction of one residential house and the construction/purchase of a house other than one residential house was not covered by section 54F of the Act; that the concession provided u/s. 54F w.e.f. 01-04-2001 would not be available in a case where the assessee already owned, on the date of transfer of the original assets, more than one residential house; it was clear that emphasis had been given on owning more than one residential house by an assessee and the assessees who already owned more than one residential house on the date of transfer of the original asset, were not eligible for the concession provided u/s. 54F of the Act even if the other residential house might be either owned by the assessee wholly or partially. In other words, when any assessee who owned more than one residential in his/her own title exercising such dominion over the residential house as would enable other being excluded therefrom and having right to use and occupy the said house and/or to enjoy its usufruct in his/her own right should be deemed to be the owner of the residential house for the purpose of section 54F of the Act and that the proviso to section 54F of the Act clearly provided that no deduction shall be allowed if the assessee owned on the date of transfer of the residential asset more than one residential house.

For concluding the case in favour of the Income tax Department, the tribunal relied upon the decisions in cases of Smt. Bhavna Thanawala vs. ITO, 15 SOT 377 (Mum), Ravinder Kumar Arora vs. Asstt. CIT, 52 SOT 201(Delhi) and V. K. S. Bawa vs. Asstt. CIT, 56 ITD 232 (Delhi).

Observations

Section 54F on its original enactment by the Finance Act, 1982 disentitled an assessee for the claim of exemption from tax in a case where he owned any one other house as on the date of transfer, other than the new house. Realising the genuine difficulties faced by the assesses, a relaxation was made by the Finance Act, 2000 with insertion of the Proviso in s/s. (1) so as to enable an assessee to own one residential house as on the date of the transfer of the asset. The sum and the substance of the Proviso is that an assessee is not disentitled from claiming an exemption on account of his ownership of one house as on the date of transfer.

The issue is two dimensional. The Income-tax Department has to cross two hurdles, not one, before it can successfully deny the benefit of exemption to the assessee. One, it has to establish that the term ‘owns’ include an ownership of a ‘part ownership’ or a ‘joint or co-ownership’ of the house. Second, it has to establish that the term ‘one’ includes within its ambit ‘a fraction of one’. In our opinion, the tribunal has not considered the other equally important aspect of the condition stipulated and have emphasised the first aspect of the issue only, while deciding the issue either way.

On a reading of the said Proviso, it is evident that the legislature, unlike other provisions, has not expressly stated that the term ‘owns’, or for that matter the term ‘one residential house’, shall include a co-ownership of a part of the residential house. The Act, at many places, clearly provide that a part of a building is also included in the building. For example; Explanation (b) of section 194IA, 269UA(d)(i) and (ii), section 32, etc.. In the absence of an express provision, it is inappropriate to read the Proviso in a manner so as to include the ownership of a part of the house therein and circuitously hold that such an interpretation represents the legislative intent.

The decisions relied upon by the AO and by the Hyderabad tribunal in the cases of Chandanben Maganlal (Guj) and Ravindar Kumar Arora (Del) are the cases that involved the issue of eligibility of an assessee for exemption u/s. 54F on the strength of acquiring co-ownership rights in a new house on transfer of an asset other than a residential house. These cases, therefore, dealt with the interpretation of the main provision of s/s. (1) which employs a different language than the Proviso and are therefore distinguishable. The main provision requires ‘purchase’ of ‘a’ residential house while the Proviso restricts ownership to ‘one’ residential house. The terms employed are not only different, they are used in different context for different objective and should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates the objective and not frustrate the incentive provisions. While ‘a’ house may include a part of the house, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to state that ‘one’ includes a part of one, as well. Section 54F(1), in three places, has used different terminologies conveying the different objectives of the legislature. At one place in main sub-section (1), it has used ‘a residential house’; in the Proviso ‘one residential house’ is used in Items (a)(i) and (b) while in Items (a)(ii) and (iii) ‘any residential house’ has been used.

Section 13 of the General Clauses Act provide that ‘single’ includes ‘plural’ and the ‘plural’ includes ‘single’. It does not provide that ‘one’ includes a fraction of one. ‘One’ is a full and complete number; an integer; a whole number, complete in itself; single and integral in number, the lowest cardinal number; not capable of being substituted by a part i.e. an incomplete number.

The fact that the different benches have taken conflicting views and even the Chennai bench has taken conflicting views in two different cases clearly indicate that more than one view is available. It is by now a settled a proposition of taxation laws that a view beneficial to the assessee should be adopted in a case where two views are possible. Vegetable Products Ltd. 88 ITR 192 (SC). It is also a settled po-sition in law that an incentive provision should be liberally interpreted to facilitate the conferment of an incentive on the assessee. Bajaj Tempo Ltd. 196 ITR 188 (SC) and Strawboard 177 ITR 431 (SC).

It may be possible to hold that a co-owner or a part owner is also the owner of a house but the same may not be true while supplying a meaning to ‘one’ house. A part of a house cannot be treated as one house and ownership of a part of house cannot be considered as the ownership of one house.

A useful reference may also be made to the provisions of section 32 which expressly covers the cases of the whole or part ownership of an asset for grant of depreciation. The term ‘wholly or partly’ used before the term ‘owned’ in section 32(1) clearly convey the legislative intent of covering an asset that is partly owned for grant of depreciation. In its absence, it was not possible for a co-owner of an asset to claim the depreciation as was held in the case of Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta (Supra). In that case, a fractional share in an asset was not considered as coming within the ambit of single ownership. It was held that the test to determine a single owner was that “the ownership should be vested fully in one single name and not as joint owner or a fractional owner”.

The better view, in our considered opinion is to ignore the case of co-ownership for the purposes of application of restrictions contained in Proviso to section 54F(1) of the Income-tax Act so as to enable the claim of exemption.

88. CBDT has issued a letter to all the Chief Commissioners of income- tax clarifying certain issues and laying down important directives for smooth implementation of Safe Harbour Rules which were earlier prescribed – Letter dated 20-12-2013 F.No. 500/139/2012/FTD-1 copy available on www.bcasonline.org

88. CBDT has issued a letter to all the Chief Commissioners of income- tax clarifying certain issues and laying down important directives for smooth implementation of Safe Harbour Rules which were earlier prescribed – Letter dated 20-12-2013 F.No. 500/139/2012/FTD-1 copy available on www.bcasonline.org

87. CBDT issues instructions for relaxing the time frame prescribed u/s. proviso to s/s. 2 of Section 143(1) relating to the date of processing refunds. This would be applicable in cases where the return of income has been filed within the time frame prescribed. Refund is due to the assessee but due to technical reasons not attributable to the assessee, the return has not been processed – Instruction no 18/2013 dated 17th December 2013 (F.No. 225/196/2013-ITA -II) -copy available on www. bcasonline.org

87. CBDT issues instructions for relaxing the time frame prescribed u/s. proviso to s/s. 2 of Section 143(1) relating to the date of processing refunds. This would be applicable in cases where the return of income has been filed within the time frame prescribed. Refund is due to the assessee but due to technical reasons not attributable to the assessee, the return has not been processed – Instruction no 18/2013 dated 17th December 2013 (F.No. 225/196/2013-ITA -II) -copy available on www. bcasonline.org