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NSE’S HIGH-TECH STOCK MARKET SCANDAL: WILL THE MASTERMINDS GO SCOT FREE?

NSE was hit by a co-location trading scandal sometime in 2015 when a whistle-blower first complained to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Author and Journalist Palak Shah has done a deep dive investigation into the NSE co-location scam. His book The Market Mafia, published in November 2020, is a full-scale exposé of the deep rot in India’s financial market ecosystem. As a journalist working with some of the leading Business newspapers in Mumbai, Palak has much insight into the working of markets, exchanges, SEBI and regulations. Considering certain constraints, BCAJ sent him questions and carried this e-interview to throw light on how the NSE scam has unfolded and the delay in investigating it. Hope you enjoy reading it!

Q.1. Can you briefly explain the matter relating to the Colo scam and corporate governance issues at NSE?
Co-location (Colo) is nothing but proximity hosting of broker servers with NSE’s master order matching engine in the exchange premises at Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC). It gives a superior trading speed and advanced information on price moves and order books. As I have detailed in my book, The Market Mafia, the Colo scandal goes back to 2010. When NSE started co-location trading, it lacked the necessary study from the market regulator SEBI and hence safeguards. There were flaws in the system, which investigations post 2015 revealed were deliberate. The flaws gave a few an advantage in connecting first and hence faster data and so on. Had SEBI made a proper study of NSE trading systems in 2010 or carried out a thorough audit and then given its go-ahead after a public consultation, the scenario would have been different. The deliberate flaws in the system were a result of corporate governance lapses at NSE, for which the accountability has to be fixed.   

Q.2. How was the matter unearthed?

In January 2015, an unknown whistle-blower first informed SEBI about the co-location scandal and certain flaws in the system. The then SEBI whole time-member Rajeev Agarwal pushed his officials into action, and the probe started in the weeks following the whistle-blower complaints. But even after Agarwal set the ball rolling, SEBI was slow in its approach and investigations since NSE’s top bosses enjoyed high patronage in New Delhi, and the regulators were scared to take them head-on. Multiple forensic and system audits by IIT Mumbai were carried out under SEBI’s instructions. NSE’s top management was hostile towards these investigations since they would not share the data and other inputs with the investigators. Yet certain facts on governance lapses and flaws in the system emerged. CBI registered an FIR in 2018 on the basis of a complaint but for four years the Co-location file kept gathering dust since no major investigation was done by the agency. It was believed by many that key players in the scam were difficult to identify. In November 2020, I published my book The Market Mafia – Chronicle of India’s High Tech Stock Market Scandal & The Cabal That Went Scot Free. The book detailed the nuts and bolts of NSE’s trading system and, for the first time, gave an inside into the working of a Co-location scam and other aspects that most of the market investors were unaware about. The book also gave vital details of the key characters in the co-location scam and brought into the public domain several hidden communication between NSE officials and SEBI with regard to the ongoing probe. The book laid bare how NSE flouted norms with relative ease and impunity, and even senior SEBI officials looked the other way. The Market Mafia carries a detailed account of brokers, NSE officials, financial market experts and policymakers who benefited from the Co-location scam and the happening within NSE. For the first time in 30 years after the Harshad Mehta scam, a book has revealed true events to show how India’s stock markets are rigged by those very people who are supposed to protect the system.

In February 2022, SEBI released an order against former NSE MD and CEO Chitra Ramkrishna, who was among the key managerial persons when the co-location scam was taking place and was later in charge of NSE between 2013 and 2016. The SEBI order stated that Ramkrishna was taking instructions from an unknown person to run the exchange, whom she called a Yogi dwelling in the Himalayas. All this attracted public attention to the NSE scandal, which I say is several times bigger than the Harshad Mehta scam.

Q.3. As the first line of oversight, has NSE performed its obligation when the matter came to light?


From the beginning, NSE has been lax in diving deep into the scandal, which came to light in 2015. It has shielded and protected its officials who could have turned a blind eye to the various lapse or who could have engineered the flaws in the trading system. Simple instance of NSE shielding its officials can be gauged from the fact that Ramkrishna was allowed to exit NSE with dignity and was also paid Rs 44 crore in dues in 2016. Instead, the exchange was required to conduct investigations into her bad governance practices and slap some serious charges. Several other instances, like sharing data illegally with Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, the two well-known market researchers by NSE, show that the officials within the exchange were complacent with the scamsters.

Q.4. Was SEBI aware of the irregularities at NSE, and for how long?

SEBI officials can be charged with ‘Omission and Commission of Duty’ which implies complacency in the scandal. It is one of the directions in which the CBI is now probing SEBI officials. The regulator is alleged to have hidden facts from the public, investigators and government about the scam. This is clear from the various arguments of CBI in the court.

Q.5. As a regulator, has SEBI been fair in investigating the matter and discharging its obligation in terms of timeliness of action, quality of investigation, quantum of punitive action taken and taking corrective action?

SEBI failed to conduct due diligence of NSE co-location trading systems from the day it started in January 2010. SEBI has been very slow in ordering proper investigations and even conducting its own probe. It left the probe to NSE to investigate itself. SEBI’s orders are childish and loosely knit. It has broken down the scam into various instances of small violations and not imposed charges of fraud and other stringent provisions laid down in the SEBI Act. The regulator has wide-ranging powers to probe such scandals, which it has not used at all. The list of SEBI’s inaction is long. All this points to SEBI’s lack of willingness in bringing the real culprits to book.

Q.6. Was a similar matter also detected at any other exchanges, and has SEBI dealt with other exchanges differently?

Yes, a forensic audit by TR Chaddha and Co. points out a scandal in sharing data by MCX with Susan Thomas and one New Delhi based algo trading Chirag Anand in an unauthorised manner. But SEBI and MCX have buried this scandal. NSE data, which was illegally obtained by Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas was going into algo trading work. Similarly, data obtained from MCX without following proper checks and balances were also going into algo trading work. SEBI has failed to take the MCX probe further and bring the actual culprits to book.

Q.7. How, in your view, will these irregularities impact the credibility of the Indian securities market, especially when one out of two exchanges and its regulator is found inactive or even complicit?

Both foreign investors and domestic institutions strongly believe that India follows the rule of law. Retail investors believe that Indian markets are most efficient and scam free. All the investors have placed their faith in SEBI and exchanges like NSE, BSE and MCX who are the larger players. They invest and trade billions of dollars at the blink of an eye. But the scandal at NSE and data sharing at MCX in a dubious manner, both of which show SEBI in poor light, can erode the trust of these investors. The credibility of the market has already been impacted but would be in ruins till the time the culprits are not found and brought to book by the government.

Q.8. You have been covering the colo and corporate governance matter at NSE in detail at various forums for quite a long time and have also covered these irregularities in detail in your book – ‘The Market Mafia’ – What is the whole idea behind this book?

You will find that The Market Mafia is a unique book since it gives all the real names of those behind the scandal at NSE and dubious happenings at MCX. The book exposes SEBI and the government’s lack of will for the past few years to investigate the scandal. It also reveals the conflict of interest that prevails in the governing structures of the stock markets and, above all, the bureaucratic rut that has exposed SEBI as a lame paper tiger.

JURISDICTION OF SEBI IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST PRACTISING CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

BACKGROUND
With the onset of the infamous Satyam scam of 2008-2009, where major accounting frauds were exposed, SEBI initiated a detailed investigation in the books of accounts of Satyam. Post investigation, SEBI issued a Show Cause Notice to the statutory auditor of Satyam, namely Price Waterhouse Co. (PWC). The power of SEBI to issue such a Show Cause Notice to a Chartered Accountant (firm) was challenged by PWC before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court (Writ Petition No. 5249 of 2010) under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (vide its order of 13th August, 2010) put the controversy to rest by allowing SEBI to initiate action and bring Chartered Accountants within its fold – subject to not encroaching on the ICAI’s powers under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (CA Act).

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court emphasized the fact that only if the Chartered Accountant was involved in falsification and fabrication of books of a listed company, then SEBI could invoke its powers under Section 11(4) r.w.s. 11B of the SEBI Act, which reads as under:

Section 11B.

(1)    Save as otherwise provided in section 11, if after making or causing to be made an enquiry, the Board is satisfied that it is necessary:

(i)    in the interest of investors, or orderly development of securities market; or

(ii)    to prevent the affairs of any intermediary or other persons referred to in section 12 being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of investors or securities market; or to secure the proper management of any such intermediary or person

it may issue such directions:

(a)    to any person or class of persons referred to in section, or associated with the securities market; or

(b)    to any company in respect of matters specified in section 11A, as may be appropriate in the interests of investors in securities and the securities market.

An important facet of the aforesaid definition is whether an auditor of listed companies (and registered intermediaries) can be considered to be a ‘person associated with the securities market’ and thereby under the jurisdiction of SEBI. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court clarified that if SEBI concludes that there was no ‘mens rea or connivance’ to fabricate and fudge the books of accounts, then SEBI ought not to issue any direction(s) against the auditor.

Within the aforesaid contours, the proceedings (qua PWC) continued at the SEBI level and finally concluded with an Order against PWC (on 10th January, 2018), inter-alia, imposing a restraint on PWC on issuing a certificate to a listed company for two years, amongst other directions. PWC challenged the SEBI Order before the Hon’ble Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). In the said case (decided on 9th September, 2019), the Hon’ble SAT went into the question as to whether SEBI could have proceeded against an auditor in connection with the work which they have undertaken for a listed company in respect of maintaining its books of accounts. After deliberation, the Hon’ble SAT ruled that SEBI’s enquiry ought to be only restricted to the charge of conspiracy and involvement in ‘fraud’. SEBI cannot take action against the auditing firm on the charge of professional negligence – since the CA firm was under the jurisdiction of ICAI. The said SAT Order has been challenged by SEBI before the Hon’ble Supreme Court – in which the regulator obtained a limited stay in its favour (Supreme Court Order dated 18th November, 2019 in Civil Appeal No(s). 8567-8570/ 2019). Until the Hon’ble Supreme Court finally adjudicates the matter – the question of SEBI’s jurisdiction of taking action against the Chartered Accountant(s) remains an open-ended one.

However, in the recent past, SEBI has been penalizing auditors of listed companies and registered intermediaries in respect of their auditing functions by alleging that the concerned auditor had violated Sections 12A(a), 12A(b) and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act, which reads as under:

12A. No person shall directly or indirectly:

(a)    use or employ, in connection with the issue, purchase or sale of any securities listed or proposed to be listed on a recognized stock exchange, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder;

(b)    employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with issue or dealing in securities which are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognised stock exchange;

(c)    engage in any act, practice, course of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the issue, dealing in securities which are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognised stock exchange, in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder.

RECENT RULING BY HON’BLE SAT

Through recent decisions in the M. V. Damania case (Appeal No. 335 of 2020 decided on 17th January, 2022) and Mani Oommen case (Appeal No. 183 of 2020 decided on 18th February, 2022); the Hon’ble SAT has set aside the SEBI orders penalising the auditors:

I.    In the M. V. Damania case, the concerned auditor had certified the expenditure incurred by Paramount Printpackaging Ltd (PPL) towards Initial Public Offering (IPO) expenses out of the IPO proceeds. The crux of SEBI’s allegation was that auditor negligently certified that an amount of Rs. 36.60 crores was utilized towards objects of the IPO. SEBI had alleged that:

(i)    PPL made payment to the various vendors in crore of rupees without having any invoices;

(ii)    in some cases, bills from the vendors were issued at a later date, post remittance by PPL; and

(iii)    the auditor did not raise any red flag against doubtful payments made by PPL.

In view of the aforesaid, SEBI imposed a monetary penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs on the auditor firm (and its partner), jointly and severally, for alleged violation of provisions of Section 12A(a), 12A(b) and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act r.w. Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations).

In Appeal, the concerned auditor contended the following, amongst other arguments:

(i)    audit of the financial statements of PPL was based on the information provided by the management;

(ii)    in the process of the audit, the endeavour was to obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for forming an independent opinion;

(iii)    all the payments made by PPL were supported by bank statements; and

(iv)    in any case, SEBI had no jurisdiction to proceed against Chartered Accountants, who are members of the ICAI.

The Hon’ble SAT ruled that the provisions of Section 12A(a) and 12A(b) of the SEBI Act do not apply to Chartered Accountants since ‘they are not dealing in the securities’. Similarly, the provisions of Section 12A(c) cannot be made applicable because the concerned auditor has carried out no ‘fraud’. Most importantly, the Hon’ble SAT ruled that in the absence of connivance, deceit, or manipulation by the auditor, the provisions of Regulation 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations cannot be made applicable. Consequently, the SEBI Order was set aside.

II.    In the Mani Oommen case, SEBI alleged that DCHL (a listed company) had understated its outstanding loans to the tune of Rs. 1,339.17 crores in 2008-09 and wrongly disclosed the difference between the actual and reported outstanding loans for 2009-10 and 2010-11. Also, its promoters, the owner of the Deccan Chronicle Marketers (DCM) had wrongly transferred loans on the last day of the financial year and reversed on the first day of the next financial year. SEBI had alleged that:

(i)    As per Sections 224 and 227 of the Companies Act, 1956, an auditor owes an obligation to the shareholders to report true and correct facts about the company’s financials, and the auditor was duty bound to report correct facts under Section 227 of the Companies Act.

(ii)    SEBI opined that the concerned auditor overlooked the reporting of the outstanding loans, and he was not diligent in his obligation to check outstanding loans details from the bank and other independent sources.

In view of the aforesaid, SEBI held that the auditor did not adhere to the Auditing and Assurance Standard – 5 (AAS) prescribed by ICAI. SEBI alleged that the concerned auditor had violated the provisions of Section 12A(a) and 12A(b) of the SEBI Act r.w. Regulations 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations. Consequently, SEBI penalized the said auditor and prohibited him from issuing any certificate of audit and rendering any auditing services to any listed companies and registered intermediaries for one year. Additionally, SEBI directed listed companies and intermediaries registered with SEBI not to engage any audit firm associated with the said auditor in any capacity for issuing any certificate w.r.t compliance of statutory obligations, which SEBI is competent to administer and enforce.

In Appeal, the concerned auditor contended the following, amongst other arguments:

(i)    as a statutory auditor, the responsibility was to express an opinion on the financial statement based on the internal audit;

(ii)    the auditor was not involved in the preparation of the books of accounts of the company; and

(iii)    the accounting adjustment, namely non-disclosure of the loans by transferring the same to the another entity was brought to his notice for the first time during audit of the books of accounts of DCHL in October-2012 (at a later point in time).

The Hon’ble SAT ruled that,
in the entire SEBI Order, there is no finding that the concerned auditor was instrumental in preparing false and fabricated accounts or has connived in the falsification of the books of account. The only finding by SEBI was that due diligence was not carried out by the said auditor. There was no finding (by SEBI) that the auditor had manipulated the books of accounts with knowledge and intention, in the absence of which, there is no deceit or inducement by the auditor. In the absence of any inducement, the question of fraud committed by the auditor does not arise. Consequently, the SEBI Order was set aside.

FRAUD VIS-À-VIS NEGLIGENCE

It is clear from the aforesaid rulings of the Hon’ble SAT that lack of due diligence can only lead to professional negligence, which would amount to misconduct – which could be under the purview of other regulators (like ICAI / NFRA). While the much-needed clarity on the jurisdiction of the SEBI vis-à-vis auditors is being awaited from the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Chartered Accountant(s) must bear in mind that presently SEBI can act against them – if found that there was an element of ‘fraud’ while auditing listed companies and regulated intermediaries.

The Regulation 2 (c) of PFUTP Regulations define the term ‘fraud’ in two parts:

(i)    First part includes any act, expression, omission, or concealment committed whether in a deceitful manner or not by a person or by any other person with his connivance or by his agent while dealing in securities in order to induce another person or his agent to deal in securities, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or avoidance of any loss; and

(ii)    The second part includes specific instances which may tantamount to be fraudulent.

In the Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel case (2017 15 SCC 1 – decided on 20th September, 2017), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that the term ‘fraud’ under the PFUTP Regulations is an act or an omission (even without deceit) if such an act or omission had the effect of ‘inducing’ another person to ‘deal in securities’.

The term ‘negligence’ as quoted in the PWC Order (SAT Appeal No. 6 of 2018) means the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances or failure to do of a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition).

RISK OF REGULATORY OVERREACH

The regulatory overlaps between SEBI and other regulators in the financial service space has been an ongoing issue. With SEBI having powers under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act), there arises a situation where SEBI exercises jurisdiction against all persons on the ground that they are ‘associated with the securities market’. Consequently, the casualty is usually the regulated entities and professionals who advise them on lawfully navigating this complex regulatory space. In the past, there have been instances of such regulatory overlaps of SEBI with Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), Competition Commission of India (CCI), Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), etc.

One cannot deny that the SEBI is an apex regulator when it comes to protecting the sanctity of the securities market and, in fact, has been armed with powers to protect the interest of investors. If the regulator demonstrates that an auditor was involved in fabricating and fudging the financial statements or had ‘colluded’ with the listed company / promoters, a charge of fraud can be fastened. However, the question is whether SEBI ought to adjudicate on issues pertaining to professional conduct of practising Chartered Accountant(s). At the end of the day, the bible for Chartered Accountants is the auditing standards – which are prepared and deliberated upon by the ICAI. The hazard of over-regulation may result in moving away from a solution-oriented regime and create a situation where every audit report will carry more caveats than it already carries. There being a thin line between a ‘fraudulent’ and ‘negligent’ act, to avoid anomaly, inter-agency coordination is desirable.

THE WAY FORWARD

In October 2010, the central government constituted Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) – an apex regulatory Council to resolve regulatory overlaps. FSDC’s role is to enhance inter-regulatory coordination and promote financial sector development. The Chairman of the Council is the Finance Minister, and its members include the heads of financial sector Regulators (RBI, SEBI, PFRDA, IRDA, etc.), Finance Secretary and/or Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Secretary, Department of Financial Services, and Chief Economic Adviser. The Council is empowered to invite experts to its meetings as and when required. FSDC may consider inviting representatives from the ICAI and NFRA for inter-regulatory coordination to resolve the regulatory overlap.

IPO FINANCING – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Initial Public Offers (IPO), as public issues of shares/securities are commonly known, have been in the news for several reasons. One is the handsome profits made by allottees in many cases due to the shares listing at a price far higher than the issue price (though some showed losses too). Then expectedly linked to this is that many IPOs have been oversubscribed many times. The other factor is the rapid rise of IPO financing, which also incidentally came to attention recently due to an alleged abusive call made by a prospective borrower to a bank officer who allegedly failed to provide the promised IPO finance. What became widely known was the enormous leverage being available through IPO financing to subscribers. SEBI has also decided to amend some IPO related provisions in the SEBI ICDR Regulations. Finally, the Reserve Bank of India has recently decided to place some very stringent restrictions on IPO financing by NBFCs, so much so that it is very likely that IPO financing could drop down to a miniscule level of what exists today. Further, the question repeatedly raised is whether there is an IPO bubble, that IPOs are priced too high and that the market boom is being taken advantage of by making IPOs. This subject generally also has a colourful history, and it is worth seeing some aspects of the past and the most recent developments.

EARLIER BOOMS IN IPOs
Many may remember the massive rise in IPOs during the Harshad Mehta times. The boom in the stock market also made new issues by companies attractive. Numerous IPOs were oversubscribed. There was actually a grey market for IPOs functioning, albeit with no legal backing, and the grey market quotes were often published in pamphlets and quoted elsewhere. To increase the odds of getting allotment in shares, it was commonly known that people resorted to multiple applications by using names of their family members and even staff and making applications in different combinations of names of such persons. The technology at that time was not advanced enough to weed out such multiple applications. Of course, those were also the times when many companies with dubious backgrounds made IPOs and then ‘vanished’.

DEMATERIALISATION OF SHARES
Dematerialisation of shares and other changes eliminated the earlier practice of multiple applications by the same person. However, a new abuse came to light, particularly surrounding the SEBI rules mandating allocation for retail investors. It was found that lakhs of Demat accounts were opened in Benami or even fake names. Amusingly, for this purpose, some names with photographs were reported to have been picked up from matrimonial sites! Applications were made in such names, financed by others. When shares were allotted, they were sold, and the sale proceeds with the profits paid to the financier. These cases became famous by one of the allegedly involved – Roopalben Panchal. Such persons whose name is ‘borrowed’ for carrying out transactions in shares by others now even have a term – ‘mules’. SEBI’s action in such cases, which saw prolonged litigation though, supplemented with other efforts such as know-your-client verification, stronger penal provisions for using fake names, etc., dealt with this abuse.

CURRENT BOOM IN IPOS AND RESPONSE OF SEBI
Very large amount of money is being raised through IPOs of several companies in recent times. New age web-based companies have finally come to roost, and some of them have offered shares to the public at a significant premium. Apart from this, several other companies have joined the party. What has been particularly notable has been the generally massive response to such issues from the public. Several public issues have seen applications that are many times the issue size.

SEBI has long moved from having a say in determining the pricing of issues. The emphasis is on due disclosure of information sufficient for the investor to make an informed decision, supported by due diligence by merchant bankers and others. Other safeguards include eligibility requirements, minimum holding and lock-in requirements, etc. But other than that, the issue price is generally not controlled.

However, this time, considering factors such as there being offers for sale by existing holders too and for other reasons, SEBI has decided to make certain amendments to the SEBI ICDR Regulations at its Board Meeting held on 28th December, 2021, followed up by formal amendments to the Regulations. The following are some of the important amendments:

a. If an object of the issue is for future inorganic growth, but specific acquisition or investment targets are not identified, in that case, the amount raised for such objects, including for ‘general corporate purposes’ shall not exceed 35% of the total amount being raised. Of this, the amount earmarked for such use for inorganic growth shall not exceed 25% of the issue size.

b. In the case of an offer for sale by companies without a track record, certain limits have been laid down for specific categories of existing shareholders. A shareholder (along with persons acting in concert) who holds more than 20% of the pre-issue shareholding (on a fully diluted basis) shall not offer more than 50% of his pre-issue shareholding. Other shareholders cannot offer more than 10% of their pre-issue shareholding.

c. Credit Rating Agencies will now act as Monitoring Agencies in place of presently recognized monitoring agencies. They will monitor the use of issue proceeds until 100% is utilized, compared to the present 95%.

d. For Anchor Investors, the lock-in now will be 30 days for 50% of shares allocated to them and 90 days for balance shares. This will apply for issues opening on or after 1st April 2022.

e. Modifications have been made to the allocations made regarding Non-Institutional Investors with effect from 1st April 2022.

The amendments thus appear to be intended to ensure only partial exit for existing shareholders in some instances or to anchor investors and generally make other fine-tuning.

HIGHLY LEVERAGED IPO FINANCING AND RESERVE BANK OF INDIA’S RECENT RESTRICTION
Earlier, we referred to financing persons who acted merely as front or were even fake to subscribe for IPOs, which is an abuse of the law. However, what is widely prevalent is also financing by lenders to subscribers to IPOs. The objective of obtaining such finance can be many. One is to acquire a higher quantity of shares of a company whose issue price is perceived by the subscriber/borrower as low, leaving scope for quick profits. However, considering that many issues are heavily oversubscribed, applying for a larger quantity of shares boosts the chances of getting a higher quantity of shares than otherwise. IPO financing thus has become quite common. Thanks to the ever-shortening gap between the date of application for shares and payment and allotment/refund, IPO financing is thus for a very short period – about a week or so. This increases the attractiveness of the finance since the attendant costs are also lower. Further, lenders have shown willingness to lend an amount that is many times the amount contributed by the borrower. Thus, there is enormous leverage. The consequence is that the profits would also be magnified, and so would the losses. The risk of losses is as much to the borrower as is to the lender since if there are huge losses (owing to, say, the price of the allotted shares being quoted far below the issue price), there could be concerns of recovery if there is not adequate other collateral.

The matter of borrowing and lending is under the purview of the Reserve Bank of India, which has taken a strong – and possibly drastic – action. It has issued guidelines dated 22nd October, 2021, stating that, from 1st April 2022, “There shall be a ceiling of Rs. 1 crore per borrower for financing subscription to Initial Public Offer (IPO). NBFCs can fix more conservative limits.”. Thus, non-banking financial companies (‘NBFCs’) shall lend a maximum of Rs. 1 crore per borrower for IPO. While Rs. 1 crore by itself does sound to be a significant sum, considering that IPO financing has been of massive amounts, this would significantly affect IPO financing. To take just one example, in the recent case referred to earlier, which came widely in the news because of an abusive call allegedly made, the amount of IPO financing said to be involved in just this one case was Rs. 500 crores that too for one single IPO. The absolute limit of Rs. 1 crore stated by the Reserve Bank of India thus sounds relatively puny in comparison. Of course, questions are raised about the interpretation of the guidelines. Whether the limit is per IPO and hence a borrower can raise Rs. 1 crore separately for each IPO? Whether the IPO is per NBFC and hence the borrower can borrow Rs. 1 crore each from different NBFCs? And so on. While clarity on this may hopefully come from RBI before the date when it will come into effect, the fact remains that the amount of IPO financing may go down substantially. The concerns of RBI are, of course, valid – that giving of huge financing may be risky for the sector itself, apart from allowing borrowers to take huge unhealthy risks. But whether the answer to this was to place such an absolute limit or whether other solutions were possible? For example, the limit could have been placed in the form of margin – say, 50% whereby the borrower would have to put in as much amount himself as he borrows. Alternatively, the borrower could provide adequate collateral of such nature that may not present difficulties in realizing if recovery has to be made. One will have to see whether RBI makes any changes before the rule comes into effect.

CONCLUSION
There are views that, retail investors are more involved in the stock market, particularly due to the pandemic with numerous people working from home. Apart from acquiring shares in the secondary market, acquisition through IPOs has also seen a rapid rise. Time only will tell us whether this is a bubble or not. But if the restriction on IPO finance comes into effect, that would also contribute to a reduction in amounts subscribed through IPOs.

IBC AND LIMITATION

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors and connected persons, such as guarantors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in paying a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the crucial aspects of the Code is whether a period of limitation applies for initiating proceedings against the corporate debtor that is very relevant since a time bar would scuttle claims against the company. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this provision in greater detail.

THE LIMITATION ACT

Before we delve into whether a period of limitation applies to claims under the Code, it is essential to get an understanding of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the Act”). This is a Central statute that provides for the law of the limitation for initiating suits and other proceedings.

The phrase ‘period of limitation’ is defined under the Act to mean the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule. The phrase ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed under the provisions of this Act.

S.3 of the Act states that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and the application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

APPLICABILITY TO THE CODE

A question that arises is whether the provisions of the Limitation Act can apply to the Code? An answer to this question is given under s.238A of the Code which was incorporated in the Code by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 with effect from 6th June, 2018. It states that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals under the Code filed before the National Company Law Tribunal / National Company Law Appellate Tribunal / the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. Thus, it is very clear that the Act’s provisions apply to claims filed under the Code.

The decision of the Apex Court in Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. [LSI-179-SC-2021(NDEL)] has held that there is no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963 for an application under the Code before the NCLT. Accordingly, an application for which no period of limitation is expressly provided under the Act, is governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for such an application is three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. It held that the provisions of the Limitation Act applied mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IBC in the NCLT/NCLAT. It also held that the words ‘as far as may be’ found in s.238A were to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonised with the subject matter of the legislation and the object which the Legislature had in view. The Courts would not give an interpretation to those words, which would frustrate the purposes of making the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings in the NCLT / NCLAT.

In Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave vs. Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 395 (SC), it was held:—

‘6. ……The present case being “an application” which is filed under Section 7, would fall only within the residuary Article 137.’

In Jignesh Shah vs. Union of India [2019] 156 SCL 542 (SC) the Court established the proposition that the period of limitation for making an application under Section 7 or 9 of the Code was three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, i.e., the date of default.

In B.K. Educational Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Parag Gupta [2018] 98 taxmann.com 213 (SC), the Supreme Court held:—

‘……“The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.’

Again in Sesh Nath Singh (supra), it was held that it was well settled that the NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation. The condition precedent for exercise of such discretion was the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables this extension. That section enables a Court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application and/or preferring the appeal within the time prescribed.

EXCLUDE TIME BEFORE WRONG FORUM
Part III of the Limitation Act lays down the manner of computation of the period of limitation. An important provision in this respect is laid down in s.14 of the Act. It states that in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has launched civil proceedings in another Court, then such time shall be excluded provided that those proceedings relate to the same matter have been launched in good faith in a Court which cannot entertain it since it has no jurisdiction to do so. In other words, if the first Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plea and if such plea was filed by the plaintiff in good faith, then the time taken for such plea would be excluded in computing the period of limitation. In Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board vs. Mohanlal & Co. [2016] 14 SCC 199, it was held that s.14 of the Limitation Act had to be interpreted liberally to advance the cause of justice. S.14 would be applicable in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. The Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh (supra) has held that:

‘There can be little doubt that Section 14 applies to an application under Section 7 of the IBC. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the IBC does not exclude the operation of Section 14 ….’

Again in Dena Bank vs. C Shivakumar Reddy [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC) it was held that that default in payment of a debt triggered the right to initiate the Corporate Resolution Process. A Petition under Section 7 or 9 of the Code was required to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed by law, which would be three years from the date of default by virtue of Section 238A of the Code read with Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

EXCLUSION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SARFAESI ACT
Another legislation with similar objectives as the Code is the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”). The SARFAESI Act also provides mechanisms for the recovery of debts by banks and financial institutions. This Act enables secured creditors to take possession of secured assets without going to Court.

In the case of Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the bank had resorted to action under the SARFAESI Act in respect of a loan default by a debtor. This debtor challenged this action by filing a Writ Petition before the Court and the Court granted an interim stay. While the Writ was pending, the bank filed a claim under the Code against the corporate debtor. This action was challenged by the corporate debtor contending that the NCLT should not have entertained the application filed by the financial creditor as the same was barred by the period of limitation. This issue reached the Supreme Court. Hence, the moot point before the Supreme Court was whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act qualified for the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act since they were not civil proceedings before a Court?

Upholding the exclusion of time spent under SARFAESI, the Supreme Court held that it was wrong to say that s.14 could never be invoked until and unless the earlier proceedings had actually been terminated for want of jurisdiction or other cause of such nature. It held that s.14 excluded the time spent in proceeding in a wrong forum, which was unable to entertain the proceedings for want of jurisdiction or other such cause. Where such proceedings had ended, the outer limit to claim exclusion under Section 14 would be the date on which the proceedings ended. The Court observed that in the case on hand, the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had not been formally terminated. The High Court stayed the proceedings by an interim order. The writ petition was not disposed of even after almost four years. The carriage of proceedings was with the Corporate Debtor. The interim order was still in force, when proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC were initiated, as a result of which the Financial Creditor was unable to proceed further under the SARFAESI Act.

Accordingly, it concluded that since the proceedings in the High Court were still pending on the date of filing of the application under s.7 of the Code in the NCLT, the entire period after the initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act could be excluded. If the period from the date of institution of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act till the date of filing of the application under s.7 of the Code in the NCLT was excluded, the application in the NCLT was well within the limitation of three years. Even if the period between the date of the notice under SARFAESI and the date of the interim order of the High Court staying the proceedings was excluded, the proceedings under Section 7 of IBC were still within limitation of three years.

It also held that the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 were undoubtedly civil proceedings. There was no rationale for the view that the proceedings initiated by a secured creditor against a borrower under the SARFAESI Act for taking possession of its secured assets were intended to be excluded from the category of civil proceedings. Even though the SARFAESI Act enabled a secured creditor to enforce the security interest created in its favour, without the intervention of the Court, it did not exclude the intervention of Courts and/or Tribunals altogether. Hence, the Court held that keeping in mind the scope and ambit of proceedings under the Code before the NCLT / NCLAT, the expression ‘Court’ in s. 14 of the Limitation Act would be deemed to include any forum for a civil proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act.

EXCLUSION OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY DEBTOR
Another important provision while computing the limitation period is s.18 of the Limitation Act. This states that if an acknowledgement of liability has been made in writing signed by the debtor against whom such property or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed.

In Dena Bank vs. C Shivakumar Reddy [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC), the Apex Court, while explaining the essence of this provision held that as per s.18 of Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of a present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, had the effect of commencing a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. Such an acknowledgement need not be accompanied by a promise to pay expressly or even by implication. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired. It further held that even if the writing containing the acknowledgement was undated, evidence might be given of the time when it was signed. An acknowledgement may be sufficient even though it was accompanied by refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy or was coupled with claim to set off, or was addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right. The term ‘signed’ was to be construed to mean signed personally or by an authorised agent.

In Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the Court held that the Code did not exclude the application of s.18 or any other provision of the Limitation Act. Again, in Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India & Anr. [LSI-176-SC-2021(NDEL)], the Supreme Court held that there was no reason to exclude the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act to proceedings initiated under the IBC.

The issue before the Apex Court in Dena Bank (supra) was whether an offer for one-time settlement signed by the debtor would lead to an exclusion of time under s.18? The Court held that it saw no reason why an Offer of One-Time Settlement of a live claim, made within the period of limitation, should not also be construed as an acknowledgement to attract Section 18 of the Limitation Act. To sum up, an application under s.7 of the IBC would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of 3 years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as a Non Performing Asset, if there was an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of 3 years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of 3 years.

CONCLUSION
Thus, it is clear that the Limitation Act applies with all its exclusions, even to the Code. Courts are very quick to support this principle and would be wary in holding otherwise.  

THE ESG AGENDA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR C-SUITE AND CORPORATE INDIA

INTRODUCTION
The topic of Environmental, Social and Governance (‘ESG’) aspects of a business has been extensively covered across the global media in the past couple of years. The focus on ESG has been particularly expedited by the Covid-19 pandemic. There is mounting pressure on businesses from all stakeholders – shareholders, investors, regulators, suppliers, customers and communities – to start thinking about their sustainability and wider ESG journey.

ESG – DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA

The business landscape in India is catching up on the ESG agenda. There is a significant growth in ESG-linked capital markets in India, with assets under management of the top 10 ESG mutual funds growing to INR 12,000 crore during 2019-2021 – representing almost a 5x increase in just two years1. From F.Y. 2022-23, SEBI has mandated the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalisation to disclose ESG data through Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR). At the COP26 summit in November 2021, India announced its goal to be net-zero by 2070. It will be businesses – large and small – which will eventually have to work towards achieving the net-zero goal and key targets around the country’s energy mix and carbon emissions intensity.     

In addition to this business and regulatory imperative, environmental factors are also at play. According to Germanwatch, India is one of the top countries which will be impacted by climate change2. Chennai almost ran out of water in 2019. The year 2021 saw droughts, floods, and landslides in various states in India. The start of the year 2022 was one of the coldest winters in India. The frequency and scale of such events are predicted to only increase in the future. Combining the impacts of such natural disasters with India’s goal to be net-zero by 2070 means that businesses across industry sectors will have to start considering sustainability and ESG parameters to make their operations more resilient for a climate-informed landscape of the future.

 

1   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/mf/mf-news/esg-fund-assets-jump-4-7-times-in-2-years-may-grow-further/articleshow/88380627.cms

2   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-among-top-10-countries-most-affected-by-climate-change-germanwatch-121012500313_1.html

So, what does this ESG agenda mean for Indian companies?

I have identified three key themes and focus areas for the C-suite to consider while trying to embed ESG parameters into business operations: a) Sustainable/ESG financing, b) Operating model, and c) Stakeholder engagement.

SUSTAINABLE/ESG FINANCING

Sustainability is not an overnight success. Embarking on a sustainability journey involves potential changes to how businesses have operated historically. This requires long-term planning and resources, with capital often being the most important. Organisations that lack enough capital or need additional funds can look at Sustainable/ESG financing. There are growing sustainability-focused capital markets – in India and overseas – that Indian companies can tap into to finance their sustainable business transformations. Depending on the business needs, the funding can take the form of either of the following two mechanisms: 1) ‘Use of proceeds’ instruments (e.g., Green/sustainability bonds/loans), where funds are used to finance specific projects/initiatives with environmental or social benefits. The 2022 Finance Budget has laid out various policies, including launching Sovereign Green Bonds and other initiatives on a private-public partnership model, in order to boost the climate finance ecosystem in India. In September 2021, Adani Green Energy Limited issued green bonds worth $750 million to fund the Capex of its ongoing renewable projects3. 2) ‘ESG-linked’ instruments (e.g., ESG/sustainability-linked loans), where repayment terms are pegged to certain environmental or social performance indicators. Ultratech Cement is already linking its financial commitments with sustainable targets4.

 

3   https://www.adanigreenenergy.com/newsroom/media-releases/Adani-Green-Energy-Continues-to-Ramp-Up-Focus-On-ESG

4   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/glasgow-cop26-how-india-inc-plans-to-meet-net-zero-targets-by-2070-121110300058_1.html

Financial institutions are increasingly moving away from funding traditional environmentally damaging assets and industry sectors. Sustainable/ESG financing can help CFOs access necessary capital as well as a greater capital pool. Additionally, such funding can potentially be at a lower cost, in turn positively impacting the bottom line. ESG/sustainability-linked loans usually involve a reduced interest rate when underlying ESG goals are met. Similarly, organisations can issue Green/sustainability bonds at lower coupon rates to investors who are willing to accept lower returns alongside achieving positive environmental and social outcomes. For organisations, sourcing cheaper Sustainable/ESG financing can help reduce the cost of capital and improve margins whilst advancing their sustainability/ESG agenda. Additionally, through embedding ESG metrics within their strategic decision-making process, an organisation can ensure that funds are utilised in activities/initiatives which can generate maximum environmental and social impact.

OPERATING MODEL – VALUE CREATION FROM ESG
Secondly, from an operating model perspective, there are opportunities for value creation as well as risk mitigation from incorporating ESG parameters into business operations. Organisations can look at value creation by assessing their product/service mix. Companies can consider launching new sustainable products to take advantage of shifting consumer trends and preferences. E.g., the plant-based protein market in India is expected to grow to $650-700 million by 20255. Similarly, the market for vegan food, recycled raw materials, electric vehicles, alternative raw materials to single-use plastics, etc., is on the rise. A global BCG research suggests that within the consumer goods sector, 70% of consumers are willing to pay a 5% price premium for more sustainably manufactured products6. India’s net-zero goals and transition to zero-carbon economy present multiple business opportunities in the areas of green hydrogen, biofuels, electric vehicles and related infrastructure, waste management, etc. Organisations can therefore achieve top-line growth through a combination of ESG/sustainability-focused new product and service launches, entering into new markets, and premium pricing. For SMEs and start-ups, it is a great opportunity to be disruptors in the sustainability domain. Through sustainable products and services, SMEs/start-ups can achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis large corporates which lack ESG credentials.

 

5   https://www.cnbctv18.com/environment/global-surge-in-plant-based-cultivated-meat-indian-market-sees-substantial-growth-11012762.htm

6   https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/supply-chain-needs-sustainability-strategy

A strong focus on environmental parameters can help organisations achieve significant resource efficiencies. Through embedding circular economy principles, companies can look at reducing the usage of raw materials and resources, including reusing and recycling them, in turn driving cost savings. A global paper company managed to achieve a 10% increase in EBITDA margins through a combination of emissions costs reductions, resource efficiencies and revenue growth7. By 2030, Ambuja Cement is targeting to save 77 litres of water/tonne of cement produced8. While these ESG-focused efforts require initial investments and often involve a longer payback period, it is not always the case. A private Indian mining company that invested in a water treatment facility on their site was able to recover the investment in just under three years. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by shifting to renewable sources of energy and less carbon-intensive methods can also drive energy savings. Ultimately, such cost savings translate to higher business valuations. The BCG research cited earlier9 also suggests that by being leaders in the ESG domain, companies across industry sectors are able to achieve significant valuation premiums (between 11-14% across consumer goods, steel and chemical sectors) over peers. Businesses can therefore look at significant value creation through a combination of multiple ESG-focused initiatives across their end-to-end value chains.

OPERATING MODEL – RISK MITIGATION BY FOCUSING ON ESG

From a risk mitigation perspective, companies need to start assessing and adapting their supply chains to account for negative impacts from climate change. Almost 5 million hectares of crop in India was affected in 2021 due to climate crisis10.  A negative impact on the agricultural sector can have a knock-on implication on multiple other industry sectors that directly or indirectly rely on agricultural produce for their raw material needs. WWF research predicts that almost 30 cities in India will face acute water crises by 205011. In addition to traditional industry sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, mining, chemicals, this can be a cause of concern for the growing technology sector in India, whose demand for water to cool their data centres will continue to rise. There is a growing sense of urgency for businesses across industry sectors to look at sustainable options and plan for raw material shortages (in India and globally) to avoid potential supply chain disruptions.

Indian companies might also face risks from regulatory changes and/or increased scrutiny. While an earlier blanket ban imposed in 2019 on single-use plastics was held off by the central government, it is now going to come into force from 1st July, 2022. New EPR rules in relation to plastic recycling and use are also coming into effect from 1st July, 202212. Corporates will have to reassess their supply chains to comply with these upcoming regulations. In November 2021, a local municipal corporation in western India, imposed a crackdown on major textile companies discharging trade effluents into the city sewage network citing environmental concerns, leading to factory closures. Proactively implementing sustainable supply chain measures can help organisations mitigate any potential disruptions (and consequential financial loss) from such regulatory changes and/or scrutiny.

 

7   https://www.bain.com/client-results/a-paper-company-takes-bold-steps-to-become-a-sustainability-leader/

8   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/glasgow-cop26-how-india-inc-plans-to-meet-net-zero-targets-by-2070-121110300058_1.html

9   https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/supply-chain-needs-sustainability-strategy

10 https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/climate-change/climate-crisis-has-cost-india-5-million-hectares-of-crop-in-2021-80809

Focusing on social aspects like health and safety, employee wellbeing, impact on communities and indigenous populations is also becoming increasing important. Any instances of corruption, bribery, child-labour, human rights abuses, etc. can lead to a negative impact on brand reputation. This might also entail financial risk in the form of a decline in stock prices or reduced valuations, regulatory penalties and fines. Ensuring the right social and governance policies for increased transparency and accountability is becoming critical.

Leading Indian multinationals have already committed to various climate change and sustainability and ESG goals. The likes of the Tata group have put compliance with ESG standards as a top business priority, and more business will follow. For SMEs as well, it will be a business imperative to consider the ESG agenda – particularly where they are suppliers or customers of large Indian and global multinationals which have their own sustainability goals and targets to achieve.

 

11 https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/water/wwf-identifies-100-cities-including-30-in-india-facing-severe-water-risk-by-2050-74058

12           https://indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-notifies-epr-norms-for-plastic-packaging-waste-7780632/

ESG AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Lastly, from a stakeholder engagement perspective, the C-suite can place high importance on ESG reporting and sustainability-related disclosures. For listed companies not within the remit of the current SEBI mandate, as well as for private companies, a voluntary disclosure can help achieve a competitive advantage through improved brand credentials. Such a voluntary disclosure can be based on existing domestic requirements in India (SEBI’s BRSR) or any global frameworks (like GRI, UN SDGs, etc.) or a customised basis depending on the commercial priorities. Voluntary disclosures can also help C-suite pre-empt any potential disclosure requests and/or pressure from customers, communities, activists and investors and build more transparent and better working relationship with these stakeholders. Mandatory or voluntary disclosures that show improved performance and results on ESG metrics can help enhance ESG ratings for organisations, which can in-turn enable them to access a larger capital pool and at more favourable terms. The government of India is also looking at obtaining an ESG ranking for the upcoming Initial Public Offering of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, with the aim of attracting a larger and responsible pool of capital13.

Impact investment has gained a lot of traction in India in the past couple of years. According to data from Impact Investors Council, almost $1.2 billion were invested just in the first five months of 202114. Private equity and venture capital groups in India are also increasingly focusing on ESG parameters as part of their investments as well as launching dedicated ESG funds15. Consequently, for SMEs and start-ups, focusing on ESG can be a great catalyst for raising funds to fuel their expansion and growth journey.

CONCLUSION

All of the above three themes – Sustainable/ESG financing, Value Creation and Risk Mitigation from ESG from an Operating Model perspective and Stakeholder Engagement – are in a way interrelated. In practice, it will be difficult to isolate one theme from the other. Progress in one aspect will have a compounding impact on others. Similarly, a negative outcome in one will also mean potential revisions across other ESG initiatives. Therefore, organisations will have to undertake a robust scenario-planning analysis in choosing ESG initiatives to be implemented and engage in continuous monitoring to maximise their ESG impact.

Irrespective of the industry sector, ownership status (public vs. private), the scale of operations (start-up vs. large multinational), it is becoming clear that there are multiple business reasons for organisations to look at ESG.

Climate change is already here (the latest evidence is the unseasonal rain on 6th January, 2022 in my home city of Ahmedabad – for a minute not considering its unintended consequences for the agricultural sector). The time for the C-suite of Indian organisations to act is now. The more proactive they are, the bigger will be the benefits and opportunities for future generations in India.

 

13             https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/ipos/fpos/govt-working-on-esg-ranking-for-lic-ahead-of-public-offer/articleshow/88744950.cms

14 https://www.freepressjournal.in/business/impact-investors-infused-around-12-bn-in-india-amid-the-second-wave-of-covid

15           https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/aavishkaar-capital-launches-250-mn-esg-first-fund-11643022266115.html

BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS – A RULING RELEVANT TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

BACKGROUND
A recent decision of the Bombay High Court not only lays down and confirms important principles of law but also has implications for corporate governance and rights of shareholders (‘activists’ or otherwise). The decision has seen differing views and reactions. Some support it as laying down correctly the law. Others hold that a more purposeful view of the provisions could have been taken as they believe the conclusions drawn impact the spirit of good corporate governance. Be as it may be, these important legal conclusions of the court are valuable to review. This decision is in the matter of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. vs. Invesco Developing Markets Fund ((2021) 131 Taxmann.com 321 (Bom.)).

This ruling is under appeal before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Interestingly, parallel proceedings are also pending before the National Company Law Tribunal/National Company Law Appellate Tribunal for the same matter. Indeed, the core question of whether the NCLT has sole jurisdiction over such matters to the exclusion of the High Court is itself being pursued. Thus, we are likely to see further developments, including possibly a different view of the facts and/or law, in the matter.

SUMMARY OF CORE FACTS AND ISSUES
The core issue is whether shareholders have the unfettered right to call a general meeting and place resolutions for consideration by shareholders? Does the Board of Directors have any discretion or power to review and reject any of such resolutions or they are bound to call (or, in default, the shareholder group would itself call) such general meeting? Is the only thing the Board is expected to check is whether the procedural requirements of calling such general meetings are complied with? Or can the Board consider the merits of such resolutions in terms of their legality, whether such resolutions could result in violations of law by the company, etc.?

The matter concerned Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. (ZEEL), a listed company. Two shareholders (‘the Shareholders’), holding, in the aggregate, 17.88% of the equity share capital of ZEEL, served a requisition under section 100 of the Companies Act, 2013 on ZEEL to convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to consider primarily two categories of resolutions (aggregating to nine resolutions in all). The first three resolutions proposed the removal of three existing directors. The remaining six resolutions proposed the appointment of six specified individuals as independent directors. Two of the first three resolutions became redundant since two of the specified directors resigned voluntarily. Interestingly, the promoters of the company held only 3.99%.

The independent directors of ZEEL met and considered the matter. The Board of ZEEL considered various legal opinions and concluded that the notice of EGM was invalid and hence decided not to call the EGM. The reasons for holding that the notice was invalid were several and which were considered by the High Court. Since, under section 100, if the Board does not call the EGM, the Shareholders themselves could call it, ZEEL approached the High Court with three prayers. The first was to declare that the notice was illegal, ultra vires, invalid, bad in law and incapable of implementation. The second sought a declaration that the rejection by ZEEL to convene the EGM was valid in law. The third prayer sought an injunction against the Shareholders from holding the EGM themselves.

These prayers, including the grounds for rejection of such requisition, became the issues for consideration by the Court.

DOES THE HIGH COURT HAVE ANY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN SUCH PETITIONS OR DOES THE NCLT HAVE SOLE JURISDICTION?
The Shareholders claimed that, in view of Section 430 of the Act, the High Court had no jurisdiction and the NCLT/NCLAT had sole jurisdiction over this matter. The Court rejected this contention stating that the relevant Rules that set out the provisions which NCLT has sole jurisdiction on does not include Section 100 and other relevant provisions. Thus, the Court concluded that it did have jurisdiction over such matters.

CAN SHAREHOLDERS PASS RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAVE LEGAL INFIRMITIES? CAN THE BOARD REJECT A REQUISITION ON SUCH GROUNDS?
This was the core and substantive issue before the Court. The Shareholders claimed that so long as the requirements of Section 100 are complied with, the Board was bound to call the EGM. Indeed, it was argued that Section 100 mandated the Board to do this by use of the word ‘shall’. The only principal substantive requirement the Board of Directors are required to check is whether the procedural requirements of Section 100 are complied with (e.g., the minimum percentage of shareholders specified (10%) have sought the holding of such EGM). This is the sole test that is relevant to decide whether the requisition is ‘valid’ (as specified in section 100(4)) or not. Effectively, the argument, as the Court highlighted, was that even if the resolutions could have resulted in ZEEL committing illegalities, the Board had no say and was bound to call the EGM.

ZEEL countered this by pointing several issues in the resolutions which made them illegal to be proceeded with and would also mean committing illegalities by ZEEL if such resolutions were passed. The appointment of six independent directors could possibly exceed the limit of 12 directors on the Board. ZEEL operated in areas that were regulated by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (‘MIB’). Any change in the Board required prior approval of the MIB. The resolutions, however, proposed the appointment first and made it subject to approval, meaning the approval, if received, would be a post-facto approval. Thus, the removal or appointment of directors would mean violation of the MIB rules for which the company would suffer.

Appointment of independent directors could be made, in law, only by following a specified procedure. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee is required to review the merits of the proposed independent directors and recommend them to the Board. The Board thereafter, at their discretion, appoints such directors and this appointment has to be then approved by the shareholders. Thus, it was a three-step process mandated by law. ZEEL contended that the requisition sought to bypass the first two steps and, thus, again, the company would be held to commit violation if it allowed the resolutions. Indeed, it was contended, the shareholders could only ‘approve’ an appointment already made and not directly appoint an independent director itself.

ZEEL even questioned whether the directors proposed for appointment by certain substantial shareholders could be held to be ‘independent’, despite their respective merits and qualifications. In the ordinary course, nominee directors are by definition, not independent directors.

Thus, ZEEL contended on these and other grounds that if the EGM was allowed to be proceeded with and the resolutions passed, ZEEL would be committing several violations of law.

The High Court, in the very eloquently written judgment, held that the Board could not proceed with a requisition that would, if implemented, result in the company committing violations of law. Citing early precedents from the UK (where the law had thereafter changed, but the rulings still had merit) and also elsewhere, as well as decisions of Indian courts, the Court held that the Board was not bound to convene an EGM if the resolutions resulted in the company committing illegalities. Particularly for listed companies (and ZEEL was a listed company), there were certain specified requirements to be followed for the appointment of independent directors, and these could not be bypassed. The prior approval of the MIB for changes in the Board was required while the resolutions proposed that it could be obtained later on.

An issue arose whether the Board of Directors could consider extreme situations and possibilities to decide whether the resolutions may end up in the company committing illegalities. The Court held that the Board could and cited the philosopher Karl Popper and held that the test of illegality was to be checked from every angle, even extreme ones. It observed, ‘Any hypothesis has to be tested, repeatedly, for failure; including testing at the margins or extremities. It is no use saying that a hypothesis fits a median situation. The question is whether the hypothesis survives a test or collision against a polarity? If it does, then it is sound; if not, it must fail throughout and considered unsound’. To demonstrate this, the Court asked the counsel for the Shareholders whether a resolution proposing that the company engage in gambling business (illegal in India) could be allowed? The counsel replied that this was an extreme or outlandish proposition. The Hon’ble Court held that even such extreme tests were necessary to test the proposition raised. If the argument of the Shareholders was accepted, even a ‘madcap resolution’ would end up being allowed.

The Court also made another important point. It observed that even the Board of Directors itself could not propose such resolutions in the manner in which they were proposed as there would be violations of law. The shareholders are not on any higher pedestal, and the same criteria are applied. Had the Board proposed such resolution, could a shareholder object before a court against such proposals and seek injunctions? The Court answered in the affirmative.

Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of ZEEL to reject the requisition and granted the injunctions prayed. The EGM was directed not to be held by the Board or by the requisitioning shareholders.

IMPLICATIONS ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY
With due respect, some aspects are worthy of consideration and debate. Concerns have been raised whether the court ruling would disempower shareholders and put brakes on even healthy shareholder activism. It could, it is argued, excessively empower an existing board having support of a small minority of shareholders and exclude the majority shareholders from exercising their rights. In particular, the issue raised was whether the process of screening prospective directors through the Nomination and Remuneration Committee was for the benefit of shareholders or could be used to supplant and exclude them? Indeed, this would mean that the shareholders could not even appoint directly those board members who would form this Committee. These, it is respectfully submitted, are valid points but it is also respectfully submitted that the answer lies in an amendment of the law, which, perhaps in hindsight, does seem to have lacuna which the present decision has thrown up.

In any case, it is respectfully submitted, that the Hon’ble Court is right in holding that the Board could not allow resolutions to be passed and implemented resulting in the company violating legal requirements. As the Court pithily observed, ‘Sometimes, it happens that a company must be saved from its own shareholders, however well-intentioned’.

IBC AND MORATORIUMS

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) has become one of the most dynamic and fast-changing legislations. Not only has the Government been modifying it from time to time, but the Judiciary is also playing a very active role in ironing out creases and resolving controversies. The Code provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in payment of a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the important facets of this resolution process is a moratorium on legal proceedings against the corporate debtor contained u/s 14 of the Code. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this crucial section in greater detail.

MORATORIUM
Once the insolvency resolution petition against the corporate debtor is admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), and after the corporate insolvency resolution process commences, the NCLT declares a moratorium prohibiting institution or continuation of any suits against the debtor; execution of any judgment of a Court / authority; any transfer of assets by the debtor; and recovery of any property against the debtor. The moratorium continues till the resolution process is completed. Thus, total protection is offered to the debtor against any suits / proceedings. In Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. vs. Hotel Gaudavan (P.) Ltd. [2018] 145 SCL 428 (SC), it was held that even arbitration proceedings are stayed during this period.

An extract of the relevant provisions is given below:

Moratorium.
14. (1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:—
(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority;
(b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein;
(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor.
…………………….
(2) The supply of essential goods or services3 to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during the moratorium period.
…………………….
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to:—
(a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangements as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator or any other authority.
(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.’

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process:
Provided that where at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of the corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as the case may be.”

The Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj vs. Shah Brothers Ispat P Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 39 (SC) has explained that the object of a moratorium provision such as s.14 of the Code was to see that there was no depletion of a corporate debtor’s assets during the insolvency resolution process so that it could be kept running as a going concern during this time, thus maximising value for all stakeholders. The idea was that it facilitated the continued operation of the business of the corporate debtor to allow it breathing space to organise its affairs so that new management may ultimately take over and bring the corporate debtor out of financial sickness, thus benefitting all stakeholders, which would include workmen of the corporate debtor. The Apex Court further explained that while s.14(1)(a) referred to monetary liabilities of the corporate debtor, s.14(1)(b) referred to the corporate debtor’s assets. Together, these two clauses formed a scheme that shielded the corporate debtor from pecuniary attacks against it in the moratorium period so that the corporate debtor got breathing space to continue as a going concern in order to rehabilitate itself ultimately. Relying on this explanation, the Supreme Court did not allow cheque bouncing proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It held that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act would, given the object and context of s.14 of IBC, amount to a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of s.14(1)(a) of the Code. Hence, the moratorium would attach to such a proceeding.

In the case of Sandeep Khaitan vs. JSVM Plywood Industries Ltd. [2021] 166 SCL 494 (SC) the Apex Court dealt with an issue of whether the High Court has inherent powers under s.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to make such orders against the corporate debtor to give effect to any order under that Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice? The Court held that the power under s.482 of the CrPC may not be available to the Court to allow the breach of a statutory provision. The words ‘to secure the ends of justice’ in s.482 cannot mean to overlook the undermining of a Statute, i.e., the provisions of s.14 of the Code.

Similarly, in Anand Rao Korada v Varsha Fabrics P Ltd. [2019] 111 taxmann.com 474 (SC), in order to recover labour dues, the High Court ordered the auction of the assets of the corporate debtor after issuance of the moratorium. The Supreme Court set aside this Order and held that if the assets of the company were alienated during the pendency of the proceedings under the IBC, it would seriously jeopardise the interest of all the stakeholders. The sale or liquidation of assets had to be in accordance with the IBC only.

RECOVERY OF PROPERTY
In Rajendra K Bhutta vs. MHADA [2020] 160 SCL 95 (SC), a society redevelopment project was blessed by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA). The developer went into insolvency, MHADA wanted to take over possession of the land given to the developer for demolition and redevelopment. The Supreme Court disallowed this owing to the moratorium u/s. 14(1)(d). It held that under s.14(1)(d) what was referred to was the ‘recovery of any property’ of the corporate debtor. It was clear that when recovery of property was to be made by an owner under s.14(1)(d), such recovery would be of property that was ‘occupied by’ a corporate debtor. The expression ‘occupied by’ would mean or be synonymous with being in actual physical possession of or being actually used by, in contra-distinction to the expression ‘possession’, which would connote possession being either constructive or actual and which, in turn, would include legally being in possession, though factually not being in physical possession. Since it was clear that the Joint Development Agreement had granted a license to the developer (i.e., the corporate debtor) to enter upon the property, with a view to do all the things that were mentioned in it, it is obvious that after such entry, the property would be ‘occupied by’ the developer. Section 14(1)(d) of the Code, when it speaks about recovery of property ‘occupied’ refers to actual physical occupation of the property. Hence, MHADA’s plea for repossession of the land was turned down.

NATURAL PERSONS NOT PROTECTED
In the above referred decision of P.Mohanraj (supra), the Supreme Court also held that it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in s.14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons, i.e., its Directors in charge of its affairs continued to be statutorily liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Accordingly, criminal proceedings could continue unabated against the Managing Director / Other Directors who have drawn the bounced cheque.

Similarly, in Anjali Rathi vs. Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 130 taxmann.com 253 (SC), the Supreme Court allowed proceedings to be carried out against the promoters of a corporate debtor which was a developer for failing to honour the terms of settlement entered into with home buyers.

PERSONAL GUARANTOR NOT SHIELDED
Another novel issue arose in SBI vs. V. Ramakrishnan [2018] 96 taxmann.com 271 (SC) of whether the moratorium extended to the personal guarantor of a corporate debtor also? The Court held that the moratorium under s.14 cannot possibly apply to a personal guarantor. This decision has since been given the shape of law by inserting sub-section (3) in s.14 which expressly provides that the moratorium under s.14 will not apply to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

WILFUL DEFAULTER PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE
An interesting question arose before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gouri Prasad Goenka vs. State Bank of India, LSI-473-HC-2021(CAL). Here the corporate debtor had gone into insolvency resolution. However, the question was whether wilful defaulter proceedings could be initiated against the promoter, in view of the moratorium imposed u/s 14? The Court held that whole-time directors and promoters who were in charge of the affairs of the defaulting company during the relevant period, when the default was committed, could not be said to be absolved of their act of wilful default committed prior to final approval and acceptance of a resolution plan. The moratorium in no way prevented this. The wilful defaulter declaration proceeding were to disseminate credit information for cautioning banks and financial institutions so as to ensure that further bank finance was not made available to them and not for recovery of debts or assets of the corporate debtor, which could hamper the corporate resolution process.

PMLA ATTACHMENT OF ASSETS
In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Manoj Kumar Agarwal [2021] 126 taxmann.com 210 (NCL-AT), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was determining whether an attachment order passed by the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 before the start of the resolution process of the corporate debtor could survive in view of s.14?

The NCL-AT held that the aim and object of the PMLA for attaching the property alleged to be involved in money laundering was to avoid concealment, transfer or dealing in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to the confiscation of such proceeds of crime under PMLA. Thus, Provisional Attachment Order was issued for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of Order. Now if s.14(1)(b) of IBC relating to the moratorium was seen, the NCLT was required to pass an order declaring a moratorium, inter alia prohibiting ‘transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the Corporate Debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein? thus the moment an insolvency was initiated, the property of the corporate debtor was protected by such a moratorium. Thus, both the provisions sought to protect the property of corporate debtor from transfer etc. till further actions take place. It further held s.14 would be attracted in all such cases. Once the moratorium was ordered, even if the Enforcement Directorate moved the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA, further action before the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA must be said to have been prohibited. Section 14 of IBC will hit the institution and continuation of proceedings before Adjudicating Authority under PMLA.

CONCLUSION
The provisions relating to the moratorium are very important to protect the assets and going concern of the corporate debtor. However, Courts are quick to ensure that while it is a shield for the debtor it cannot be used as a shield by its promoters / directors.

AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

The Securities and Exchange Board of India has amended, vide Notification dated 9th November, 2021, certain provisions concerning related party transactions as contained in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (the LODR Regulations). These amendments will come into force from 1st April, 2022, except for certain specific provisions which shall come into effect from 1st April 2023. These amendments are a follow-up to the decisions taken at SEBI’s Board Meeting held on 28th September, 2021. Those decisions, in turn, are partial / modified implementation of the recommendations made by the Working Group constituted by SEBI on related party transactions vide its report dated 22nd January, 2020 (released by SEBI on 27th January, 2020). Let us take a look at these amendments.

BACKGROUND
Related party transactions, generally stated, are specified transactions between a company and certain parties related to it in a manner defined under the relevant law. Related party transactions are a sensitive issue where there is scope of benefit to the company but which also carry serious potential of abuse. Hence, not just company law and securities laws, but even tax and other laws provide for safeguards against abuse in such transactions.

In the case of companies, the concerns are special. The scheme of management of a company is that shareholders appoint a Board of Directors to run the company. While the Board oversees the running of the company and meets regularly to review the progress, lays down strategy, etc., the actual day-to-day running is carried out by full-time employees. Hence, there are layers between the actual owners – the shareholders – and those who run the company. If transactions are carried out between the company and directors / senior management (or entities connected to them), there is obviously a conflict of interest. Steps and controls would have to be laid down in law to ensure that this conflict of interest does not prejudice the company / its shareholders. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, usually, in Indian companies, there is a dominant group of shareholders, referred to as the promoters, who have ownership and management control over the company. Transactions with such promoters (or entities connected to them) would also have a similar conflict of interest which needs to be resolved.

At the same time, considering the manner in which businesses are generally run, related party transactions are unavoidable. Arguably, related party transactions could actually result in more efficiency and other benefits. Hence, related party transactions do not deserve a total ban. Both the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) and the LODR Regulations have elaborate provisions to regulate related party transactions. As often pointed out earlier in this column, it is unfortunate that both the Act and the LODR Regulations regulate related party transactions in differently worded provisions. Thus, questions such as who are related parties, what is a related party transaction, how should they be regulated, etc., are answered differently by the Act and by the LODR Regulations.

What makes it worse is that SEBI keeps amending and reforming the LODR Regulations at a rapid pace – and thus the gap widens further. While there have been attempts earlier to narrow these differences, these are far from adequate. SEBI has now made some further amendments which we will discuss here. Note that the LODR Regulations apply to companies whose shares (and, in certain cases, debt securities) are listed on stock exchanges.

AMENDMENT TO THE DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTIES
The present definition, inter alia, deems only those members of the promoter group who hold 20% or more of the shares of the company as related parties. This part has been amended and now all members of the group shall be deemed to be related parties. The definition of promoter group itself is quite widely framed. Each of the members of the group, whether holding shares or not, will now be deemed to be a related party (as discussed earlier, with effect from 1st April, 2022).

The definition is amended even further whereby any person holding 20% or more of the equity share capital at any time during the immediately preceding financial year shall be deemed to be a related party. And with effect from 1st April, 2023 this limit will be lowered to 10% for a person to be deemed to be a related party. It appears that SEBI considers a higher, even if non-majority, shareholding a source of influence sufficient enough to consider a person as a related party and thus transactions with such persons requiring to be regulated!

The shareholding of 20% / 10% should be by a person and the concept of ‘group’ or ‘persons acting in concert’ is not made applicable. That said, it is also provided that the 20% equity shareholding (or 10% with effect from 1st April, 2023) may be held by such person directly or on a beneficial interest basis as provided in section 89 of the Act. Section 89, as amended a few years back, now has a more elaborate definition of what constitutes beneficial interest. A concern may arise here. It is stated that the holding may be direct or on a beneficial interest basis. While this results in clarity that transactions with such an entity shall be related party transactions, the question is whether the transactions should be with such beneficial owner or the company. Let’s take an example. In listed company L, a company A holds 25% shares. The beneficial owner in company A, as per section 89, is one Mr. P. Thus, Mr. P would be deemed to be a related party. The question is whether transactions with only Mr. P would be deemed to be a related party transaction and not transactions with the company A?

AMENDMENTS TO DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The present definition considers any transaction involving transfer of resources, services or obligations between a company and a related party as a related party transaction. It is now provided, to simplify things a little, that transactions between the holding company and related parties of its subsidiaries will be related party transactions for the holding company. Similarly, transactions between a subsidiary and the related party of the holding company would also be deemed to be related party transactions.

However, with effect from 1st April, 2023 a further twist is given to this to widen the scope even further. If the effect of any transaction is such that it is for the benefit of any related party as now defined (i.e., related parties of the holding company / subsidiaries), even then it will be deemed to be a related party transaction. While the intention seems to be clear, that is, to cover structuring whereby related parties get the benefits indirectly, the amendment does not give any further guidance as to how does one ascertain that a particular transaction is for the benefit of such newly-deemed related parties? This may create challenges for the Audit Committee and the Board.

The definition is further amended whereby certain transactions are now explicitly excluded. An issue of specified securities on a preferential basis that is in compliance with the SEBI ICDR Regulations will not be a related party transaction. Payment of dividends, bonus or rights issues, buybacks, etc., will not be related
party transactions if they are uniform across all shareholders in proportion to their shareholding. Acceptance of fixed deposits by banks or non-banking financial companies will not be related party transactions if the terms offered are the same as offered to all shareholders / public, provided that disclosure of such transactions is made to the exchanges every six months in the prescribed format.

AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO MATERIAL RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The scheme of the LODR Regulations is that related party transactions above the specified threshold are deemed to be material transactions requiring approval of shareholders. While such thresholds are laid down, the Board of Directors is also required to lay down a policy on materiality of related party transactions and how they should be dealt with, including clear thresholds. At present, a transaction with a related party would be considered as material if it, taken together with previous transactions in the financial year, exceeds 10% of the annual consolidated turnover as per the audited financial statements of the preceding financial year. It is now provided that if the transaction (taken along with earlier transactions in that financial year) exceeds Rs. 1,000 crores, then, too, the transaction will be deemed to be a material transaction. Thus, if the amount crosses 10% of such annual consolidated turnover or Rs. 1,000 crores, whichever is lower, it would be treated as material. This amendment will affect relatively large companies.

The present Regulations provide that related party transactions shall require prior approval of the Audit Committee. An amendment now requires that even ‘subsequent material modifications’ to related party transactions shall require such approval. The Regulations, however, do not define what constitute ‘material modifications’. Instead, the Regulations require the Audit Committee to define this term and make it a part of the policy on materiality of related party transactions.

It is now also provided that a related party transaction to which the subsidiary, and not the holding listed company, is a party and which transaction exceeds 10% of the consolidated turnover as per the preceding financial year’s audited financial statements, then the prior approval of the Audit Committee of the listed company would be required. With effect from 1st April, 2023, this clause will have effect if the value of such transaction exceeds 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary.

The purpose of making a separate category of material related party transactions is to make them subject to approval by shareholders. It is now provided that even material modifications to related party transactions shall require approval of shareholders. Moreover, all approvals of shareholders of related party transactions will now have to be prior approvals.

CONCLUSION
This latest series of amendments to related party transactions seems aimed more towards expanding the scope to ensure that transactions are not structured in a manner that in substance they benefit related parties but in form they do not get caught in the net. The broad structure and scheme, however, remains the same. That is to say, non-material transactions may be approved at the level of the company and material transactions would require approval of the shareholders. Thus, there continues to be no outright ban on related party transactions. Also, no approval of any authority such as the Government or SEBI is required. The approvals remain internal and there are also elaborate disclosure requirements. Thus, stakeholders have a say in and have knowledge of such transactions.  (Also refer detailed analysis on Page 26)

SALE DEED SANS CONSIDERATION IS VOID

INTRODUCTION
One of the first lessons learnt in Contract Law is that agreements without consideration are void ab initio. The Latin Maxim for the same is ‘ex nudo pacto non oritio action’. Of course, there are some statutory exceptions to the above under the Indian Contract Act, 1872; for example, one of the exceptions is a gift made for natural love and affection. However, by and large one cannot have an agreement for which there is no consideration. Recently, this issue was examined once again by the Supreme Court of India in the context of a sale deed without consideration. Let us examine this important proposition in the light of this recent decision.

WHAT IS CONSIDERATION?

Under the Indian Contract Act, consideration has been defined to mean any act or abstinence on the part of one party to the contract at the desire of the other. Such act or abstinence may be past, present or future. Thus, it is a valuable consideration, in the sense of the law and it may be in the form of some right, interest, profit, benefit, etc., which accrues to one of the parties to the contract or it may also be some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other party.

It is important to note that unlike in many other countries, e.g., the USA, adequacy of consideration is immaterial in India. If there exists a consideration for a contract and the parties to the contract have consented to the same, then the Courts would not examine whether the consideration is adequate for the contract or not. The Act does not require that the value of the consideration by one party must be equivalent to the value of the goods / services provided or promises made by the other party. Thus, if two parties contract to sell a horse for Rs. 1,000 and the seller has freely consented to the same, then there exists a valid consideration for the horse. Under the Contract Act, consideration must be something which the law can consider of value but it need not necessarily be money or money’s worth. Sir Pollock in his famous book on Contracts has opined that ‘It does not matter whether the party accepting the consideration has any apparent benefit thereby or not; it is enough that he accepts it and the party giving it does thereby undertake some burden, or lose something which in contemplation of law must be of some value’. Section 25 of the Act provides that an agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining whether the consent was freely given. Of course, this position of adequacy of consideration has been altered to some extent by the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the introduction of deeming provisions such as sections 50C, 50CA, 56(2)(x), etc.

Under the Act, consideration may move from the party to the contract or even any other person who is a stranger to the contract. Based on this, the Madras High Court has held in the case of Chinnaya vs. Ramayya (1881) 4 Mad 137 that consideration in India can move from a person who need not be a party to the contract. In this case, a mother agreed to gift certain properties to her daughter in consideration for her daughter agreeing to maintain her uncle (mother’s brother). After the death of the mother, the daughter refused to maintain her uncle and in response to a suit filed by the uncle, she stated that the uncle was not privy to the contract as no consideration had flown from him to her. The Court upheld the maintenance suit of the uncle and held that under the Act consideration could flow from a third party, i.e., in this case the mother, and hence there was a valid consideration to the contract between the daughter and her uncle.

Similarly, under the Act the consideration need not flow directly to a party to the contract, it can also flow to a third party and that would be treated as a valid consideration. An important case in this respect is that of Keshub Mahindra & Other, 70 ITR 1 (Bom). In this case, three brothers were substantial shareholders and in the employment of a company. The brothers agreed to transfer some of their shares in the company to certain foreign entities in return for a good business relationship of the company with these foreign entities on favourable payment terms. The Gift Tax Officer held that since the brothers had not directly received any consideration for the sale of their shares, there was a gift by them to the foreign entities. Negating this argument, the Bombay High Court held that under the Indian Contract Act, consideration can not only flow from a third party but it can also flow to a third party. The Court held that the term consideration was defined in the Contract Act. Although the shareholders of the company were distinct from the company, as per the definition of the term consideration there was nothing to show that the benefit of the act or abstinence of the promisee must go directly to the other party only, i.e., the promisor. A contract can arise even though the promisee does an act or abstains from doing something for the benefit of a third party, i.e., the company in this case, and that was a good consideration for the three brothers to transfer their shares.

In this backdrop of consideration let us examine the ratio of the Supreme Court decision.

APEX COURT’S VERDICT
The Supreme Court’s verdict in Kewal Krishan vs. Rajesh Kumar & Ors., CA No. 6989-6992/2021, Order dated 22nd November, 2021 is relevant on the subject of consideration. In this case, the appellant had executed a power of attorney in favour of his brother. The Power of Attorney holder executed two sale deeds for selling immovable properties of the appellant. One was for selling to his wife and the other to his son. The appellant objected to these sales on various grounds. One of them was that the entire sale consideration for acquiring suit properties was not paid by the purchasers. Accordingly, it was prayed that the sale deeds should be set aside.

The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence adduced to show that the purchasers had indeed paid the consideration as shown in the sale deeds. It examined section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in this respect. This section deals with the definition of sale of immovable property. It defines a sale (in respect of immovable property) to mean a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. In Samaratmal vs. Govind, (1901) ILB 25 Bom 696, the word ‘price’ as used in the sections relating to sales in the Transfer of Property Act was held to be in the sense of money.

The Apex Court in Kewal’s case (Supra) went on to hold that a sale of an immovable property had to be for a price. The price may be payable in future. It may be partly paid and the remaining part can be made payable in future. The payment of price was an essential part of a sale covered by section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property was executed without payment of price and if it did not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it was not a sale at all in the eyes of law. It was of no legal effect. Therefore, such a sale would be void. It would not impact the transfer of an immovable property.

The Court deduced that since no evidence was provided to show payment of sale consideration, the sale deeds would have to be held as void being executed without consideration. Hence, the sale deeds did not affect in any manner the share of the appellant in the suit properties. In fact, such a transaction made by the Power of Attorney holder of selling the suit properties on the basis of the power of attorney of the appellant to his own wife and minor sons was nothing but a sham transaction! Thus, the sale deeds did not confer any right, title and interest on his wife and children as the sale deeds were to be ignored being void. It further held that a document which was void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea could be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings. As no title was transferred under the said sale deeds, the appellant continued to have undivided share in the suit properties.

Thus, it is clear that for a sale transaction presence of consideration in the form of money would be a must. If the consideration is anything other than money, i.e., in kind, then it would be an exchange and not a sale. However, a sale can also take place where instead of the buyer paying the seller, some debt owed by the seller to the buyer is set off. For instance, in Panchanan Mondal vs. Tarapada Mondal, 1961 (1) I.L.R. (Cal) 619, the seller agreed to sell a property to the buyer for a certain price by one document and by a second document he also agreed to buy another property of the buyer for the same amount. Instead of the buyer paying the seller and vice versa, they agreed to set-off the two amounts. It was held that the transactions were for execution of two sale agreements.

INCOME-TAX CONSEQUENCES
One related issue would be could section 56(2)(x) of the IT Act be invoked by the Department against the purchaser? Since the agreements were without consideration could it be held that the buyer received the immovable property without payment of adequate consideration, and conversely could section 50C be invoked on the seller as being a transfer less than the stamp duty ready reckoner value? One would have to go back to the decision of the Supreme Court for the answer.

The Court has clearly held that the sale deeds did not affect in any manner the share of the appellant in the properties. It was nothing but a sham transaction. The sale deeds did not confer any right, title and interest on the buyers and the seller’s share remained intact. Hence, in such a scenario there is no receipt of immovable property by the buyer and there is no transfer by the seller. Accordingly, it stands to reason that neither section 50C could be invoked on the seller nor could section 56(2)(x) be invoked on the buyer.

STAMP DUTY CONSEQUENCES
A sale deed is liable to be stamped with duty as on a conveyance. However, what happens when the sale deed is held to be a sham as in the above case? The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 provides for the refund of stamp duty paid in case it has been used on an instrument which is afterwards found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning. An application for refund must be made to the Collector, normally within a period of six months from the date of the sale deed. Some amount is deducted while making refund of Stamp Duty, which is as follows – for stamps falling in the category of e-payment (simple receipt / e-challan and e-SBTR), 1% of the duty amount is deducted with a minimum of Rs. 200- and a maximum of Rs. 1,000. For stamp categories other than mentioned above a deduction of 10% of the duty is made.

CONCLUSION
This Supreme Court decision has once again highlighted the importance of consideration in the context of any agreement. Due care and caution should be exercised as to the manner and mode of consideration. Failure to do so could invalidate the entire transaction as seen above.  

SAT SETS ASIDE INSIDER TRADING ORDERS

As discussed several times earlier in this column, SEBI has been investigating stock market frauds, insider trading, etc., by tracking the use of social media / messaging applications. About a year back, we also discussed certain SEBI orders where it was held that some persons shared unpublished price-sensitive information through the popular chat application WhatsApp. Stiff penalties were levied on such persons under the Insider Trading Regulations. Those who were penalised appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) which has now reversed those orders. SAT has held that, on the facts, there was no violation of the SEBI Regulations on insider trading.

This decision of SAT has several interesting aspects. Has SAT made any significant interpretation of the law that has far-reaching implications as suggested by some reports? When can a person, who shares unpublished price-sensitive information (‘UPSI’), be held to have violated the Regulations? Is it necessary that a link be established between the person having the UPSI and the source within a company who had leaked such information? There are also lessons generally for persons using social media applications. Let us consider this decision (Shruti Vora vs. SEBI, dated 22nd March, 2021) in greater detail.

BROAD SCHEME OF SEBI (PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING) REGULATIONS, 2015 AS RELEVANT HERE
The Regulations seek to prohibit and punish insider trading. They prohibit what is commonly understood as insider trading – that is, trading by an insider who is in possession of, or has access to, UPSI. However, they also prohibit several other things like communication of UPSI except where permitted under the Regulations. The Regulations also have further requirements of disclosure of holdings and dealings by certain insiders, prohibition of trading during periods when the trading window is required to be closed, etc.

In the present case, the relevant provision is related to the sharing of UPSI. Insiders are prohibited from sharing UPSI. The reason for this prohibition is obvious. Sharing such information may result in the recipient dealing and profiting out of it. However, such recipient may also further pass on such information to others. Such sharing is also covered by the offence of ‘insider trading’.

However, as this case shows, three interesting questions arise: Is it required to show that a person who shared UPSI had received it from a particular person within the company? Is it required that he should know that such information was UPSI? Would the offence of insider trading also cover sharing of UPSI by a person who is not aware that it is UPSI?

The first question has been answered by a deeming provision in the Regulations itself. It is provided that a person would be deemed to be an insider even if he is in mere possession of UPSI. Thus, it is not required that his source of such information be traced within the company (a little more on this later). He is deemed to be an insider. If he then deals in the securities, or shares such UPSI, he would be deemed to have committed the offence of insider trading.

The second question is interesting and indeed became, as we will see, the core issue in this case. Should a person know that the information in his possession is UPSI? The Regulations have not made an express provision on this. SAT has held that a person should be aware that such information is UPSI and it is only in such a case that the person would be deemed to be an insider. However, the equally critical question is how does one establish whether a person knows that the information he possesses is UPSI? This can be tricky as this would be something in the person’s mind. This aspect will be discussed further while analysing the decision.

The third question would be answered by implication from the answer to the second question although, again, the Regulations have no express provision about it. If a person does not know that the information he possesses is UPSI, then sharing of such information would not make him guilty of the offence of insider trading.

With this brief background, let us consider the case and then discuss what SAT has held.

FACTS OF THE CASE AND SEBI’S ORDER
It appears that SEBI was alerted especially by media reports that financial results of reputed companies were being leaked and shared in advance on social media through chat applications like WhatsApp. It conducted investigations and amongst its findings was some data relating to two appellants in the present case. It was found that they worked in the industry and had forwarded financial results through WhatsApp to many persons, including clients. The financial results forwarded were eerily accurate and very closely matched the actual results published soon after. However, SEBI could not trace who had sent this information to such persons. Even the companies concerned could not find any leak that could have happened internally from within the companies themselves.

SEBI, however, held that the law was clear. Possession of UPSI made the person an insider. The law also prohibited insiders from sharing UPSI with others. Since these persons did share the UPSI, they committed the offence of insider trading. It levied stiff penalties on such persons. Since similar orders were passed separately for sharing of results for each company, the penalties cumulatively rose to an even larger amount.

The parties had argued that not only these messages but several others were also forwarded in the same manner. And these messages were forwarded to groups of numerous persons. The messages were sent almost as soon as they were received. The other messages had information which was not UPSI and in any case often did not even match with the actual financial results in those other cases. However, SEBI stuck to its position and held that they had indulged in insider trading and levied penalties.

APPEAL BEFORE SAT
In the appeal before SAT, the appellants made several arguments. It was pointed out that they were not aware that what they had was UPSI. They had received numerous such messages and those were also forwarded along with the ones under question. They had no means to verify the authenticity of any of the information. The messages / information so received could be compared to ‘heard in the street’ columns common in media and while such pieces are read by many, it was accepted that their authenticity was not assured. Indeed, some could be just rumours or informed guesses. The appellants also pointed out that the specific messages that were of concern were not differently coded while being forwarded. So the recipients could not distinguish those messages from the others.

DECISION OF SAT
SAT accepted the arguments of the appellants and set aside the orders of SEBI levying penalties. It also made some important points about the interpretation of the law.

At the outset, SAT confirmed that possession of UPSI did make a person an insider under law and sharing of such UPSI by such person would be an offence under the Regulations. SEBI did show that the person was in possession of the UPSI and hence it may appear that one part was fulfilled. The information was shared, too.

However, and this was the crucial point, did such person know the information received and shared was UPSI? And, if not, would the information still be UPSI qua such person? The law is silent on this point. However, this did matter because it is from the perspective of the person accused of insider trading. If such person did not know it was UPSI, then that person cannot be held to be in possession of UPSI and hence is not an insider. And if this was so, his sharing of the information was not insider trading.

It was apparent from the record itself that the persons had received numerous bits of information and had forwarded the same to many other persons. Neither the persons sending them nor the persons receiving them could have had any way of knowing that the information was authentic and hence UPSI. SAT observed, ‘The above definitions of the “unpublished price sensitive information” and “insider” would show that a generally available information would not be an unpublished price sensitive information… The information can be branded as an unpublished price sensitive information only when the person getting the information had a knowledge that it was unpublished price sensitive information’. Thus, the information was not UPSI. One could take the example of the numerous WhatsApp forwards many of us receive. We have become used to examine them with so much scepticism that we generally have stopped even reading most of them.

While it is true that possession of UPSI was sufficient to make a person an insider, there were sufficient circumstances to doubt that it was UPSI and thus the onus shifted back to SEBI. It was now up to SEBI to prove, even with a reasonably low benchmark of proof or of the preponderance of probability, that the persons knew it was UPSI. SEBI could not and it did not so prove.

SAT also noted that SEBI has not connected the information to any source within the companies and even the companies did not have any such findings of leakage.

The order was thus set aside.

CONCLUSION
The important legal point thus is that UPSI is from the perspective of the person who is in possession of the same. If I have a pile of stones with me and I do not know that a couple of the ‘stones’ are really diamonds, I may give the same to someone else for a low value. And even he may do the same with them.

That said, this does not mean one should be lax with the law. The law provides for serious consequences for insider traders and the benchmark of proof remains relatively low. In this particular case, the facts were peculiar and hence did not allow any wider generalisation. One should remain ever vigilant while forwarding information. The law has sufficient deeming provisions. Chartered Accountants are typically and even otherwise deemed to be insiders as auditors, advisers, CFOs, etc. They are also expected to know the importance of figures and it is even possible that information shared by them may be given more weightage by the recipient, and thereby also by SEBI while deciding guilt. Thus, this case should induce even more caution.

OCI: A FEW CHANGES, BUT LOTS OF CONFUSION

INTRODUCTION
The Overseas Citizen of India or OCI was a modified form of dual citizenship introduced by the Indian Government in 2005 for the benefit of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origins (PIOs) resident abroad. India currently does not permit dual citizenship, i.e., a person cannot be the citizen of both India and a foreign country, say the USA. He must select any one. An OCI cardholder is not a full-fledged citizen but he has certain benefits at par with a citizen. As of 2020, there were over six million OCIs abroad.

This scheme has seen certain regulatory and legal developments which have caused a great deal of confusion and anxiety amongst the OCI cardholders resident abroad. The University of WhatsApp (sic!) has played a stellar role in fuelling this fire. The intent of this article is to discuss those forwards and dispel some myths.

WHAT IS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK?
An OCI card is granted by the Government of India to a person under the aegis of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Section 7A of this Act provides for the registration of OCIs. At the cost of repetition, an OCI is not a full-fledged Indian citizen under the Citizenship Act but he is only registered as an OCI. Section 7A allows the Government to register the following individuals as OCIs on an application made by them:

(a) Any person who currently is a foreign citizen but was an Indian citizen at the time of commencement of the Constitution of India, i.e., in 1950;
(b) Any person who currently is a foreign citizen but was eligible to be an Indian citizen at the time of commencement of the Constitution of India, i.e., in 1950;
(c) Any person who currently is a foreign citizen but belonged to a territory that became part of India after Independence;
(d) Any person who is a child or a grandchild of the above persons;
(e) A minor child of a person mentioned in the clause above;
(f) A minor child both of whose parents are citizens of India or one of whose parents is a citizen of India;
(g) Spouse of a citizen of India or spouse of an Overseas Citizen of India cardholder;
(h) Spouse of a person of Indian origin who is a citizen of another country and whose marriage has been registered and subsisted for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the application under this section.

Thus, all of the above persons are eligible to be registered as OCIs. Interestingly, even a person of non-Indian origin can be registered as an OCI if he marries a citizen / an OCI cardholder. For example, a Caucasian American man marries an Indian OCI woman residing in the USA. He, too, would be eligible to be registered as an OCI along with their children. The Act further provides that the OCI card granted u/s 7A to a spouse is liable to be cancelled upon dissolution of marriage by the competent court. The special privileges can then be withdrawn.

The Bombay High Court in Lee Anne Arunoday Singh vs. Ministry of Home Affairs, WP 3443/2020 has held that the provisions of section 7 of the Act cast a duty on the Government to take necessary steps regarding cancellation of the OCI card issued on spouse basis, if the marriage is dissolved by a competent court of law.

The Government of India has recently made a submission in a similar case before the Delhi High Court that a foreigner registered as an OCI on the strength of marriage to an Indian citizen loses that status when the marriage is dissolved. Such foreigners are no longer eligible to be registered as OCIs under the Citizenship Act. Such a person could, however, continue to visit India by applying for an ordinary / long-term visa. A PIL (public interest litigation) has also been filed before the Delhi High Court in Jerome Nicholas Georges Cousin vs. Union of India, W.P. (C) 8398/2018 by a French national against this provision. In his plea he states that he would have to close down his business and go back to France since he would now not have permission to run a business in India.

WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO AN OCI?
The OCI card is a life-long visa granted to these foreign citizens. While their passport is the primary document to enter India, the OCI card is an additional document that they receive. They can visit India as many times as they want and stay as long as they wish. They can even permanently reside in India and work and study here. Non-OCI cardholders need to get registered with the Foreigners Regional Registration Office if they want to stay for more than six months in India. These procedures are not applicable to OCIs.

Earlier, there was a concept of a Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card which was also a long-term visa. However, issuance of new PIO cards has been discontinued and all PIO cardholders are being encouraged to migrate to the OCI card.

The Government has made some changes in the benefits available to OCIs by a Notification issued in March, 2021. This Notification has caused a lot of confusion amongst the Indian diaspora. The revised list of benefits available to OCIs is as follows:

(1) It grants a multiple entry life-long visa for visiting India for any purpose. The revised Notification has added that for undertaking the following activities, the OCI cardholder shall be required to obtain a special permission or a Special Permit, as the case may be, from the competent authority or the Foreigners Regional Registration Officer or the Indian Mission concerned, namely:
(i)  to undertake research;
(ii) to undertake any missionary or tabligh or mountaineering or journalistic activities. This amendment is to overrule the Delhi High Court’s decision in the case of Dr. Christo Thomas Philip vs. Union of India, W.P. (C) 1775/2018 where an OCI card was cancelled on the ground that the person was involved in missionary activities in India. The Court held that there is no law which prevents missionary activities by an OCI and hence the cancellation was invalid. The Court had held that prima facie the rights under Article 14 (equality before law) and 19 (freedom of speech and expression) of the Constitution of India which are guaranteed to the citizen of India, also appear to be extended to an OCI card-holder;
(iii) to undertake internship in any foreign Diplomatic Missions or foreign Government organisations in India or to take up employment in any foreign Diplomatic Missions in India;
(iv) to visit any place which falls within the Protected or Restricted or prohibited areas as notified by the Central Government or competent authority.
    
(2) Exemption from registration with the Foreigners Regional Registration Officer or Foreigners Registration Officer for any length of stay in India. The revised Notification has added that the OCI cardholders who are normally resident in India shall intimate the jurisdictional Foreigners Regional Registration Officer or the Foreigners Registration Officer by email whenever there is a change in permanent residential address and in their occupation.

(3) It provides parity with NRIs in the matter of
(i)  inter-country adoption of Indian;
(ii) appearing for the all-India entrance tests to make them eligible for admission against any NRI seat. However, the OCI cardholder shall not be eligible for admission against any seat reserved exclusively for Indian citizens. This overrules the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Pranav Bajpe vs. The State of Karnataka, WP 27761/2019 which held that when the parity between the OCI cardholder and Non-Resident Indians is removed, the concept of OCI cardholder cannot be given a restricted meaning as Non-Resident Indian so as to restrict such admission only to Non-Resident Indian quota in the State quota of seats and not in the institutional quota or Government quota of seats under the NEET Scheme. It had concluded that the minor children of Indian citizens born overseas must have the same status, rights and duties as Indian citizens, who are minors;
(iii) purchase or sale of immovable properties other than agricultural land or farmhouse or plantation property; and
(iv) pursuing the following professions in India as per the provisions contained in the applicable relevant statutes or Acts as the case may be, namely, doctors, dentists, nurses and pharmacists; advocates; architects; chartered accountants.

(4) In respect of all other economic, financial and educational fields not specified in this Notification or the rights and privileges not covered by the Notifications made by the Reserve Bank of India under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the OCI cardholder shall have the same rights and privileges as a foreigner. This is a new addition by the March, 2021 Notification. Thus, if any benefit is not specifically conferred either under the Citizenship Act or under the FEMA, 1999, then the OCI would only be entitled to such privileges as are available to a foreigner.

An OCI is not entitled to vote in India, whether for a Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council, or for Parliament, and cannot hold Constitutional posts such as those of President, Vice-President, Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, etc., and he / she cannot normally hold employment in the Government.

CAN AN OCI BUY PROPERTY IN INDIA?
One of the benefits of being an OCI is that such a person can buy immovable property in India other than agricultural land. The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 deal with this aspect. Rule 21 permits an OCI to purchase any immovable property in India other than agricultural land or farmhouse or plantation property. An OCI is also allowed to get a gift of such a property from an Indian resident / NRI / OCI who is a relative as per the definition under the Companies Act, 2013. Citizens of certain countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Nepal, Bhutan, Hong Kong or Macau, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), cannot purchase immovable property in India without permission from the RBI but even this prohibition is not applicable to OCI cardholders. It may be noted that the above relaxations under the FEMA Rules are only for OCI cardholders and not for all persons of Indian origin. If a foreign citizen of Indian origin does not have an OCI card, then he cannot buy immovable property in India without prior permission of the RBI. This is one of the biggest benefits of having an OCI card.

In this respect, misunderstanding of a Supreme Court decision in Asha John Divianathan vs. Vikram Malhotra, CA 9546/2010 Order dated 26th February, 2021 has created great heartburn amongst the OCI community. This was a decision rendered under the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (which has been superseded by the FEMA in 1999). Section 31 of the erstwhile law provided that any foreign citizen desirous of buying immovable property in India required the prior approval of the RBI. The Court held that entering into any such transaction without RBI approval was treated as an unenforceable act and prohibited by law. It further held that when penalty was imposed by law for the purpose of preventing something on the ground of public policy, the thing prohibited, if done, would be treated as void, even though the penalty if imposed was not enforceable. It is important to note that this decision is not applicable in the light of the current provisions of the FEMA Regulations. As explained above, the law now, by virtue of Rule 21 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 expressly provides that an OCI can purchase any immovable property in India other than agricultural land or farmhouse or plantation property.

WHAT DOES FEMA PROVIDE IN RESPECT OF OCIs?
The provisions relating to OCIs have been dealt with in great detail under the FEMA Regulations and it would be difficult to elaborate on all of them here. However, a few examples are explained here. At most places under the FEMA Regulations, the provisions available to persons of Indian origin have been replaced with OCIs. Thus, it is mandatory for the PIOs to have an OCI card. For instance, the facility of investment on a non-repatriable basis under Schedule IV of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 is allowed only to Non-Resident Indians and OCI cardholders. Persons of Indian origin who do not have OCI cards cannot avail of this facility.

Similarly, under the Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and Lending) Regulations, 2018 an Indian bank is allowed to lend in Indian rupees only to an NRI or an OCI cardholder.

However, in a few Regulations under FEMA, it is not mandatory to have an OCI card. For example, a Non-Resident External (NRE) Bank Account or a Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Bank Account can be opened by any Person of Indian origin. It is not necessary that such a person has an OCI card. Similarly, the Foreign Exchange Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2016 allows a PIO to remit up to US $1 million every year out of balances held in the NRO account and from the sales proceeds of assets.

IS THE DEEMED RESIDENCY PROVISION APPLICABLE?
Under section 6 of the Income-tax Act, any Indian citizen having total Indian income exceeding Rs. 15 lakhs during the previous year is deemed to be an Indian tax resident in that year, if he is not liable to tax in any other country or territory by reason of his domicile or residence or any other criteria of similar nature. This provision is applicable only to an Indian citizen, i.e., a person holding an Indian passport. An OCI does not have an Indian passport and so he would be out of the deemed taxation net.

CONCLUSION
The law relating to OCIs is dynamic in nature. In respect of all other economic fields not expressly specified or not covered by the Notifications under the FEMA, 1999, the OCI cardholder is equated with the same rights and privileges as a foreigner. Thus, it becomes very important to understand what are the benefits and provisions for an OCI cardholder.

A LEG-UP FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS – WILL SEBI’S PROPOSALS IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

SEBI has proposed several changes to the rules relating to corporate governance, mainly to strengthen the status of Independent Directors. The major changes include giving a bigger role to minority shareholders in the appointment / removal of such directors, proposing higher remuneration to them, strengthening the Audit Committee / Nomination and Remuneration Committee (‘NRC’) even further, etc. Views have been sought from the public at large through the release of a Consultation Paper.

The Consultation Paper notes how the requirements relating to corporate governance, introduced formally for the first time in 1999, have, over the years, seen several expert reviews and amendments in law to successively upgrade the requirements. As the paper notes, the Companies Act, 2013 / Rules made thereunder too have corporate governance requirements generally for specified listed and unlisted companies, many of them overlapping with the SEBI requirements. Hence, the fresh proposals are yet another step in that direction, though this time more focused on Independent Directors.

Independent Directors are seen as a pillar that balances the interests of all stakeholders with the primary focus on those of the minority shareholders vis-à-vis promoters. The worry is that promoters with their controlling stake should not be able to usurp the interests of others. This requires that they should not be able to influence the watchdog group – the Independent Directors.

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
The first of these important proposals looks at how Independent Directors are appointed and removed. At present, they are usually recommended by the NRC. The next step is appointment by the Board and the validity of their tenure is till the next annual general meeting. At such annual general meeting, the appointment is placed and confirmed by approval of the majority of shareholders who vote. Their removal is also by majority shareholder approval.

It is seen that the promoters who usually have a controlling stake can influence – perhaps decisively – the process at every step. This would mean that at every step they have a direct say and even decision-making ability. Thus, there are fair concerns that their independence may be influenced by the promoters. Hence, adopting the UK model almost wholly, it is proposed that this be corrected and that the appointment at shareholder level should pass two tests; first, approval by a majority of all shareholders including the promoters, and second, approval by the majority of the minority shareholders. Minority shareholders for this purpose would mean shareholders other than the promoters.

Let us understand this better through an example. Say, the promoters of a company hold 60% equity shares. The first test would be achieved when 50.01% of all shareholders approve (the percentage in each case is of shareholders who actually vote). Since promoters hold 60%, they would control this outcome. The second test is majority of the public (40%) shareholding and thus more than half of these – say 20.01% of the total – would also have to approve. If either of these tests fails, the appointment is rejected. There are then two ways out for the management. The first is that it can propose a new person as Independent Director and put him through these tests. Or, it can put the same candidate through a slightly different agni pariksha of sorts after a cooling period of 90 days, but before 120 days. If at least 75% of shareholders (including the promoters) approve, the appointment would be through. A similar process is proposed for the removal of Independent Directors. This ensures a significant role for the public shareholders and the strong influence of the promoters is mitigated to an extent.

SHORTLISTING OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS TO BE MORE TRANSPARENT
Even the shortlisting of Independent Directors is given a fillip by requiring more disclosures on how they came to be shortlisted. The process and requirements have to be laid down first and thereafter it is to be seen how each candidate fits these requirements. There have to be extensive disclosures to the shareholders, too.

Higher proportion of Independent Directors in the NRC
Moreover, the NRC that recommends Independent Directors will now have a higher proportion (two-thirds) of Independent Directors instead of just a majority as at present. A higher 67% ratio of Independent Directors would mean even more say to them in the NRC.

Appointment of new Independent Directors only by shareholders
At present the appointment of Independent Directors is made first by the Board and it is only at the later annual general meeting that shareholders get a chance to approve. During this period – which could be as long as a year – the Independent Director functions in office. To avoid this even interim say of the promoters on such appointments, it is now proposed that the appointment of Independent Directors shall only be by shareholders. If an Independent Director resigns / dies, his replacement too has to be made by shareholders, now within three months.

Resignation of Independent Directors to be more transparent and subject to restrictions
Concerns are often expressed that some Independent Directors having issues with the company may prefer to exit quietly without creating a fuss. To tackle this, several proposals have been made. Firstly, the complete resignation letter is required to be published by the company.

Further, if an Independent Director resigns stating ‘personal reasons’, ‘other commitments’ or ‘preoccupation’, he won’t be able to join any other Board for a year. This obviously makes sense since one cannot claim being busy, resign and then promptly join elsewhere. This may encourage them to be more forthright, if that was the real issue.

There is another concern. The management may have offered full-time employment to an Independent Director. This may be for bona fide reasons such as the management being impressed with his work. But obviously there are also concerns that this would affect his independence. A new proposal now states that if an Independent Director desires to join the company as a Wholetime Director, he will have to wait for one year after his resignation. Interestingly, as we will see later, the cooling period to become an Independent Director after having been an employee or KMP is three years, while in this case only one year’s cooling period is given.

Audit Committee to have no promoter / nominee directors or executive directors
The Audit Committee has an important role in approving related party transactions, accounts, etc. At present it is required that two-thirds of the committee should be Independent Directors and the rest can be any director, including promoter directors. Now, several categories are excluded even for the balance one-third of the committee. These may be non-independent directors but cannot be executive directors, nominee directors or those related to the promoters. The influence of both promoters and management is thus sought to be removed.

Excluding further categories of Key Managerial Persons
Persons who may have, in the immediate past, been employees / Key Managerial Persons (or their relatives) of the company and its holding / associate / subsidiary companies, or having material pecuniary relationships with them, may still have loose ties and may be subject to influence, and hence there may be concerns about their independence. Therefore, cooling periods are prescribed whereby they can join as Independent Directors only after specified periods. Two changes are now proposed. Firstly, now, past employees / KMPs of even promoter group companies will have to be subject to the cooling period. Secondly, the cooling period for all categories would now be uniform at three years.

ENHANCED REMUNERATION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Finally, there is the proposal to enhance the remuneration of Independent Directors. The dilemma here is that if you pay too little, the Independent Director does not have the incentive to devote sufficient time to the affairs of the company. And if you pay too much, the concern is about him being influenced by the remuneration which may affect his independence. At present, a maximum Rs. 1 lakh per meeting is permitted as sitting fees. Commission based on profits is allowed but this has issues for loss-making companies. Besides, commission linked to profits has obvious concerns of conflict in approving accounts since there is a link between higher profits and higher commission.

A compromise of sorts is now proposed in two ways. One is by increasing the sitting fees, but this would have to be decided by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Hence, this proposal would be forwarded to them for their consideration.

The second is by permitting grant of employees stock options (‘ESOPs’) with at least five years vesting period. Thus, those who stay on for five years can possibly be rewarded through appreciation in the value of shares. However, this solution may not resolve the issue well. ESOPs are generally not very common in companies. Apart from this, a waiting period of five years could be too long and many may not benefit.

CONCLUSION
All in all, the changes are positive. However, much more is needed to be done. The powers and liabilities of Independent Directors have not been touched upon. Individually, Independent Directors have very little power. But the liability, on the other hand, is significant and the enhanced status may raise it even more. The remuneration of Independent Directors is still not resolved satisfactorily on at least two counts. First, the amount would still be decided by the Board and thus the promoters would still have a significant, often decisive, say. Second, the amount and manner may still be found to be insufficient to attract the best of talent. The proposal of dual approval tests giving minority shareholders a bigger role could also be applied for appointment of auditors who represent another pillar of safeguards.

It will also have to be seen how companies are required to transition to the new requirements. Will the provisions be effective immediately? Whether only large companies will be required first to change, with later dates being given for successive categories of smaller companies? Will the existing directors be allowed to complete their terms or will they have to be subject to this test immediately?

It is also seen that two laws – the SEBI LODR Regulations and the Companies Act, 2013 – have simultaneous requirements of corporate governance which overlap and even conflict. Perhaps the first step could be to require that listed companies would be regulated in this regard only by SEBI.

There is also another thought. Many principles of corporate governance are borrowed from the West, including a few significant ones from the UK, even in these proposals. India is different in a very vital way. Promoters typically hold a very significant stake, often more than 50%. Investors traditionally invest on the faith of the reputation and entrepreneurship of the promoters, though there would be cases where this trust is broken. While a check on them is always advisable, it should not happen that adopting a relatively alien concept tilts the balance so much that it actually becomes a hindrance.

GIFTS FROM ‘GIFT CITY’

INTRODUCTION

The Gujarat International Financial Tec-City (‘GIFT City’) in Gujarat is India’s first International Financial Service Centre (‘IFSC’). Many nations such as Singapore, the UAE, etc., have successfully developed IFSCs which have become financial service hubs and have attracted foreign investments. India aims to do so through the GIFT City. Several sops have been provided for setting up financial service intermediaries in the GIFT City both by the RBI and by SEBI. While GIFT City is a subject which merits a publication to itself, this article only looks at some of the key features and benefits available to financial service intermediaries for setting up an entity in the GIFT City.

REGULATORY REGIME
Instead of multiple financial services regulators such as SEBI, RBI and IRDA, the GIFT City is regulated by only one body – the International Financial Services Centres Authority set up under the Finance Ministry. The IFSC Authority is based in Gujarat. The unified IFSC Authority aims to ease the business environment for the intermediaries. However, multiple legislations continue to impact the GIFT City.

Units set up in the IFSC are treated as SEZ Units set up under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005. Accordingly, units set up in an IFSC must conform to the provisions of the SEZ Act and its regulations.

Some of the key regulations pertaining to the setting up of financial institutions in the GIFT City are:

  •  Special Economic Zones Act, 2005
  •  Foreign Exchange Management (International Financial Services Centre) Regulations, 2015
  •  International Financial Services Centres Authority Act, 2019
  •  International Financial Services Centres Authority (Banking) Regulations, 2020
  •  Securities and Exchange Board of India (International Financial Services Centre) Guidelines, 2015
  •  SEBI’s Operating Guidelines for Alternative Investment Funds in International Financial Services Centres of 2018
  •  IFSCA’s Guidelines of 2020 for AIFs in IFSCs.

PERSON RESIDENT OUTSIDE INDIA
One of the most salient features of the GIFT City is that any entity set up here would be treated as a Person Resident Outside India under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Thus, even though the unit is physically incorporated in India, it would be treated as if it is a non-resident under the FEMA. A financial institution is an entity engaged in rendering financial services or carrying out financial transactions and includes banks, NBFCs, insurance companies, brokerages, merchant bankers, securities exchanges, mutual funds, etc. On the other hand, a financial service is defined to mean any activity allowed to be carried out by SEBI / RBI / IRDA or any authority empowered to regulate the financial institution.

Consequently, a financial institution set up in the GIFT City must conduct business only in foreign currency and not in Indian Rupees. This feature has certain unique consequences which are explained below.

Any SEBI-registered intermediary may provide financial services relating to the securities market in the IFSC without forming a separate company.

FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTORS
SEBI has liberalised the regime for foreign investors operating in the GIFT City as well as for FPIs to operate in it. Any applicant incorporated in the GIFT City shall be deemed to be appropriately regulated for the purposes of being registered as an FPI with SEBI. Hence, such an entity can apply for registration as a Category-I FPI.

Eligible Foreign Investors (EFIs) operating in IFSCs / GIFT City shall not be treated as entities regulated by SEBI. Further, SEBI-registered FPIs shall be permitted, without undergoing any additional documentation and / or prior approval process, to operate in the IFSC. The following are eligibility and KYC norms for EFIs:

Eligibility norms: EFIs are those foreign investors who are eligible to invest in IFSCs by satisfying the following conditions:
a) the investor is not resident in India,
b) the investor is not resident in a country identified in the public statement of the Financial Action Task Force as a deficient jurisdiction, and
c) the investor is not prohibited from dealing in the securities market in India.

KYC norms: An intermediary operating in an IFSC needs to ensure that the records of its clients are maintained as per the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and the rules made thereunder. The following KYC norms may be made applicable to EFIs:

  •  In case of participation of an EFI, not registered with SEBI as an FPI but desirous of operating in the IFSC, a trading member of the recognised stock exchange in the IFSC may rely upon the due diligence carried out by a bank which is permitted by RBI to operate in the IFSC during the account opening process of the EFI.
  •  In case of EFIs that are not registered with SEBI as FPIs and also not having bank accounts in the IFSC, KYC as applicable to Category-II FPI as per the new FPI categorisation shall be made applicable. However, PAN shall not be applicable for KYC of EFIs in the IFSC.
  •  In case of participation of FPIs in the IFSC, due diligence carried out by a SEBI-registered intermediary during the time of account opening and registration shall be considered.

Segregation of accounts: FPIs who operate in the Indian securities market and also propose to operate in the IFSC shall be required to ensure clear segregation of funds and securities. The custodians shall, in turn, monitor compliance of this provision for their respective FPI clients. Such FPIs shall keep their respective custodians informed about their participation in the IFSC.

AIFs IN THE GIFT CITY
Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) are investment vehicles set up in India which privately pool funds / monies from domestic as well as foreign investors and invest such funds / monies in securities as per a defined investment policy. In India, an AIF along with its constituents is regulated by SEBI under the SEBI (AIF) Regulations, 2012 (SEBI AIF Regulations). SEBI has provided several incentives for setting up an AIF in the GIFT City / IFSCs. The IFSC Authority has further liberalised the framework for setting up AIFs in the GIFT City. The combined regulations for setting up an AIF are explained below.

Incorporation of the AIF
Any trust / LLP / company set up in the IFSC can be registered with SEBI as an AIF. If the sponsor / manager of an Indian AIF wishes to set up an AIF in the IFSC, it must first set up a branch / company in the IFSC which will act as the sponsor / manager of the AIF. Thus, the Indian sponsor cannot directly sponsor the IFSC AIF. It must first set up a foreign branch / foreign company in the IFSC. The investment in the IFSC sponsor would be treated as an overseas direct investment in a Joint Venture / Wholly-Owned Subsidiary under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 (FEMA No. 120/RB-2004). Since this would be an investment in the Financial Services Sector, the provisions of Regulations 6 and 7 of these Regulations would need to be adhered to.

The SEBI IFSC guidelines along with the SEBI AIF Regulations recognise the following types of AIFs:
(a) Category-I AIF: Funds which invest in startups, early-stage ventures, social ventures, small and medium enterprises, infrastructure sector, etc. These include Venture Capital Funds.
(b) Category-II AIF: Residual category, i.e., other than Category I and III AIFs and which do not undertake leverage other than to meet day-to-day operational requirements as per SEBI AIF Regulations. These include Private Equity Funds / Debt Funds.
(c) Category-III AIF: Funds which employ diverse or complex trading strategies and leverage including through investments in listed or unlisted securities / derivatives. These would include Hedge Funds.

Each scheme of the AIF shall have a corpus of at least US $3 million. The manager or sponsor shall have a continuing interest in the AIF of not less than 2.5% of the corpus or US $750,000, whichever is lower, in the form of investment in the AIF and such interest shall not be through the waiver of management fees. Further, for Category-III AIFs the continuing interest shall be not less than 5% of the corpus or US $1.5 million, whichever is lower. The AIF must raise money only in foreign currency and not in Indian Rupees.

Investments permissible by the AIF
SEBI has harmonised the provisions governing investments by AIFs incorporated in IFSCs with the provisions regarding investments applicable for domestic AIFs. Accordingly, AIFs set up in the IFSC can invest in

  •  Securities which are listed in the IFSC
  •  Securities issued by companies incorporated in the IFSC
  •  Securities issued by companies in India or belonging to foreign jurisdictions
  •  Units of other AIFs located in India as well as in the IFSC
  •  Any company, Special Purpose Vehicle or Limited Liability Partnership or body corporate or Real Estate Investment Trust or Infrastructure Investment Trust in which a domestic AIF can make an investment
  •  It can also co-invest in a portfolio company through a segregated portfolio by issuing a separate class of units. However, the investments by such segregated portfolios shall, in no circumstances, be on terms more favourable than those offered to the common portfolio of the AIF and appropriate disclosures must be made in the placement memorandum regarding creation of the segregated portfolio.

AIFs operating in India are subject to leverage restrictions under the SEBI Regulations. Accordingly, AIF Category-I cannot borrow, while Category-II can only borrow for meeting daily expenses. However, these restrictions have been removed for AIFs set up in the GIFT City. An AIF in an IFSC may borrow funds or engage in leveraging activities without any regulatory limit, subject only to the following conditions:
(a) The maximum leverage by the AIF, along with the methodology for calculation of leverage, shall be disclosed in the placement memorandum;
(b) The leverage shall be exercised subject to consent of the investors;
(c) The AIF employing leverage shall have a comprehensive risk management framework appropriate to the size, complexity and risk profile of the fund.

Further, AIFs operating in India have a maximum investment diversification rule. Thus, under the SEBI Regulations a Category-I AIF can invest a maximum of  25% of its investible funds in one investee company. Similarly, a Category-II AIF can invest a maximum of 10% of its investible funds in one investee company. The guidelines for AIFs in the IFSC have removed these diversification rules. Accordingly, they shall not apply to AIFs in IFSCs, subject to the conditions that appropriate disclosures have been made in the placement memorandum and the investments by the AIFs are in line with the risk appetite of the investors.

Most offshore financial centres do not have restrictions on leveraging or diversification guidelines. This is a very welcome move since now AIFs in IFSCs can set up tailor-made schemes for investing in a very select pool of companies. These guidelines should encourage more foreign institutions to set up AIFs in India.

Lastly, Indian AIFs are subject to a monetary limit when they want to invest abroad. AIFs set up in the IFSC are exempt from this limit since they are treated as set up in an offshore jurisdiction.

Nature of Indian investments by the AIF
Under the FEM (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 an AIF is treated as an Investment Vehicle. If the control and management of the sponsor and manager of the AIF are ultimately with resident Indian citizens, then the entire investment made in India by such an AIF is treated as a domestic investment. It does not then matter whether the corpus of the scheme is foreign or Indian. Thus, if the AIF in the GIFT City is set up by and managed by another Indian entity which in turn is ultimately controlled and managed by resident Indian citizens, then the downstream investment by such an AIF in Indian entities would be treated as domestic investment. Such investment would then be outside the purview of the FEMA Regulations and would not be subject to pricing / sectoral conditions / sectoral caps under the FEM (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 even if the entire corpus is raised from non-residents.

Eligible investors in the AIF
The following persons can make investments in an AIF operating in the IFSC:

  •  A person resident outside India;
  •  A non-resident Indian;
  •  Institutional investor resident in India who is eligible under FEMA to invest funds offshore, to the extent of outward investment permitted;
  •  A person resident in India having a net worth of at least US $1 million during the preceding financial year who is eligible under FEMA to invest funds offshore, to the extent  allowed in the LRS (US $250,000) of RBI. The minimum investment by an investor in an AIF is US $40,000 for employees or directors of the AIF or its manager and US $150,000 for all other investors.

The RBI has recently expressly allowed resident individuals to make remittances under LRS to IFSCs set up in India. Resident individuals may also open non-interest-bearing Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs) in IFSCs for making the above permissible investments under LRS. Any funds lying idle in the account for a period up to 15 days from the date of receipt into the account shall be immediately repatriated to the domestic Rupee account of the investor in India. This is an example of express round-tripping being permissible by the RBI ~ Indian money under LRS would go abroad to an offshore AIF (although physically the AIF is in India) and could be routed back into India since such an AIF can invest in Indian companies!

Under the International Financial Services Centres Authority (Banking) Regulations, 2020 Qualified Resident Individuals (meaning an individual who is a person resident in India having net worth not less than US $1 million or equivalent in the preceding financial year) are permitted to open, hold and maintain accounts in a freely convertible foreign currency, with a banking unit, for undertaking transactions connected with or arising from any permissible transaction specified in the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of the Reserve Bank of India. The IFSCA has clarified that the net worth criteria shall not be applicable for an individual, being a person resident in India who opens an account with the bank for the purpose of investing in securities under the LRS. This is because of the fact that the purpose of such remittance under the LRS is investment in securities and the opening of a bank account with a banking unit is incidental to the same.

Triple role of the AIF
The AIF set up in the IFSC can also invest in India under the FDI Route, the FPI Route or the Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) Route. If it desires to come under the FPI or the FVCI Route, then it must get a separate registration for the same with SEBI. All such investments would be subject to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 administered by the RBI and the relevant SEBI Regulations.

CONCLUSION
The GIFT City at Gujarat is an excellent idea to attract foreign investment and foreign financial institutions to set up shop in India. Along with the regulatory concessions provided to AIFs, there are several income-tax benefits which are also afforded to AIFs established in the IFSC. While the Government has given a strong impetus to the GIFT City, it remains to be seen whether financial institutions actually set up shop.

 

UNDERSTANDING PREPACK RESOLUTION

BACKGROUND OF IBC AND NECESSITY OF PREPACKING THE RESOLUTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was passed four years ago with the objective ‘to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution in a time-bound manner for maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests of all the stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of Government dues and to establish an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.’ The NCLAT in Binani Industries Limited vs. Bank of Baroda & Anr. laid down the objective of the code as ‘reorganisation and insolvency resolution of Corporate Debtor (CD), maximising value of assets of the company and promoting entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balancing the interests of all stakeholders’.

Since then, the IBC has moved on and benefited with the help of the rich source of knowledge as provided by jurisprudence. After all, it was time for Government to take steps that would further improve the ease of doing business. Especially with the impact of the pandemic, there is every possibility that businesses will suffer from greater stress due to external reasons beyond their control. This could also put many businesses into greater trouble, making them go through the stress of insolvency through the Courts.

The IMF, through its ‘Special Series on Covid’, identifies three potential phases of the crisis, viz., a first phase where there is a need for interim measures to halt insolvency and debt enforcement activity; a second phase, in cases of severe crisis, where transitional measures may be required to respond to the wave of insolvency cases, including special out-of-court restructuring mechanisms; and a third phase in which countries strengthen their regular debt resolution tools to address the remaining debt overhang and support economic growth.

While the harsh truth of such turmoil is flailing and failing businesses, the pressing need is to allow genuine businesses to sustain themselves and provide options for them to recoup and bounce back. Legislative options may create a lucrative, conducive environment to rescue those affected in these challenging times. ‘Prepack’ emerges in the midst of all this as a decoction which combines the formal and informal option to lessen the burden. Addressing this necessity, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted a sub-committee on 24th June, 2020 to propose a detailed scheme for implementation of prepacked and prearranged resolution processes.

As of today a company in stress in India has four options: the Compromise and Arrangement scheme under the Companies Act, 2013; the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the IBC; RBI’s prudential framework for early recognition, reporting and time-bound resolution of stressed assets; and fourth, the out-of-court settlement framework. The then Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister, the Late Mr. Arun Jaitley, once said, ‘I think today may not be the right time to go in for this discussion (informal option) because of the huge rush of companies coming to the insolvency process, but once this rush is over over the next couple of years, and business comes back to usual, honest creditor-debtor relationship is restored on account of IBC, a situation may arise when we may then have to consider a need to marry the two processes together so they may well exist simultaneously’. Thus, the necessity to introduce an ecosystem of informal options was foreseen at the time of legislation of the IBC and prepack has emerged as an innovative corporate rescue method that incorporates the virtues of both informal (out-of-court) and formal (judicial) insolvency proceedings1.

GETTING TO KNOW ABOUT PREPACK
Prepack is a process to conclude in advance an agreement by a company which is stressed before moving for statutory administration of the same. This provides it an opportunity to continue its business as a going concern and enables the promoter to rationally decide the options, and to save the time and money cost, along with erosion of goodwill, had this been routed through the CIRP channel.

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in its ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency’ uses the word ‘Expedited reorganisation proceedings’ and Paragraph 76 defines prepack as ‘to involve all creditors of the debtor and a reorganisation plan formulated and approved by creditors and other parties in interest after commencement of the proceedings. Reorganisation may also include, however, proceedings commenced to give effect to a plan negotiated and agreed by affected creditors in voluntary restructuring negotiations that take place prior to commencement, where the insolvency law permits the court to expedite the conduct of those proceedings’.

The USA was the first to introduce prepack in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. It soon gained momentum with more than 20% of the bankruptcies going through prepack2.The plan ‘is negotiated, circulated to creditors and voted on before the case is filed’3.

With a slight variation, the United Kingdom requires an administrator to conclude the sale. The Insolvency Practitioners Association issued a Statement of Insolvency Practice which defines prepack sale as ‘an arrangement under which the sale of all or part of a company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an Administrator and the Administrator effects the sale immediately on, or shortly after, appointment.’

In Singapore, the Insolvency, Restructuring, and Dissolution (Amendment) Bill, 2020 proposes to introduce a new prepack scheme for micro and small companies in the Covid-19 environment. An automatic moratorium would come into play when a company is accepted into the scheme. There would be no requirement to convene a meeting of the company’s creditors. Instead, the Court can approve the scheme, provided that the company can satisfy it that if a meeting had been called a majority representing at least two-thirds in value of the creditors would have approved the proposed scheme.

BENEFITS OF PREPACK

Faster resolution and cost effective: The greatest advantage of prepack lies in early disposal of the case. A majority of the terms are negotiated at the stage before the same are administered by the courts, which allows sufficient time for the debtor to fructify the negotiations. The time taken in courts reduces substantially, together with an increase in the possibility of a resolution. This eventually reduces the cost of administrator / Insolvent Professional (IP) consultant. On the other hand, increase in the time involved in the process of resolution would mean that the CD may have to sustain the stress until the resolution, which in turn reduces the value of the business and also the overall chances of resolution. After introduction of the IBC, the time for resolving insolvency also came down significantly from 4.3 years to 1.6 years. Now, prepack intends to bring it down even further. In countries which are in advanced stages of implementation of the insolvency law, such as the UK and the USA, the time of resolution in prepack can be as low as a few hours!

Goodwill retention and value maximisation: The threat to any business during the resolution process is the disruption that it causes on its normal business, which eventually threatens and hampers its goodwill. Even the Act tries to resolve this concern by introducing a moratorium on admission of CIRP, but the concern is that of loss of goodwill which would otherwise impact the right resolution options. Prepack as an option would enable the CD to safeguard the goodwill which otherwise would be impacted in the formal process.

Increases the possibility of resolution: Once a debtor opts for CIRP, he loses control of the decision-making process which goes to the creditors. It is believed that the defaulting debtor must not be in control of the decision-making process, but then this reduces the possibility of resolution and leads to liquidation. The incidental option for a defaulting debtor in CIRP is that of liquidation, but the statistics reveal that debtors that stay long at CIRP are more prone to end in liquidation. Liquidation is a consequence of failed resolution and a non-desirable situation for the debtor, the creditors, the employees, etc. With prepack invoking informal methods, the chances of resolution increase with intent to move with commercial wisdom, which the debtor can assist and resolve.

Less reliance on courts: The report of the sub-committee of the Insolvency Law Committee on prepacked Insolvency Resolution process mentions withdrawal of applications filed for initiation of CIRP in respect of 14,510 Corporate Debtors at pre-admission stage, closure of CIRPs of 218 CDs u/s 12A of the Code, 27 terminations of CIRPs by the Adjudicating Authority (AA), closure of CIRPs on taking note of settlement recorded by the mediator, and even settlements at the level of the Apex Court. The volume of cases is testimony to the success of out-of-court settlements which if nurtured and guided can enable courts to decide and resolve.

CONCERNS IN PREPACK
Transparency: In the existing CIRP, section 29A of the IBC, 2016 imbibes the importance of transparency and concern of involvement of the related party in the process. Over the concerns of serial prepacking or phoenix companies hangs the fear of failure of prepack. This may also necessitate the Government to work the whole process in a controlled environment to ensure that any unscrupulous elements do not fail the process.

Defaulting debtor in decision-making: The process of CIRP shifts the decision-making power from the CD to professionals who are independent and work for the common commercial good of all. This ensures that the CD is not in control of but only a part of the decision-making process. The RP and the COC decide the course of action which is further supervised by the Courts. Prepack in contract empowers the defaulting corporate to decide on the course of resolution, whereas administrator / RP / IP have a limited role in the resolution process, that of overseeing and approval. This ensures that the CD does not hijack the resolution in his favour if left unchecked.

Framework on prepackaged Insolvency Resolution Process as suggested by the sub-committee
Different jurisdictions have legislated prepack under insolvency with various options; but it is necessary to make a law which is country-specific because one size may not fit all. The three principles that the sub-committee suggested to guide the design of the prepack framework are,
(i)    the basic structure of the Code should be retained;
(ii)  there should be no compromise of the rights of any party; and
(iii) the framework should have adequate checks and balances to prevent any abuse.

The report mentions the following as the main features of prepack:

  •  Prepack as an option must be part of the same law which governs IBC and also part of the same legislation.
  •  Prepack as an option must be available to all CDs for any stress, pre-default and post-default.
  •  The CD shall initiate prepack with consent of simple majority of (a) unrelated FCs and (b) its shareholders. No two proceedings – prepack and CIRP – shall run in parallel.
  •  Promoters and management of the CD to be in control of the decision-making process, except for decisions on matters enumerated u/s 28 of the Code, including interim finance, which shall be taken by the CD with the approval of the CoC.
  •  List of documents and reports like outstanding claims, including contingent and future claims, and a draft Information Memorandum, etc., shall be prepared by the CD and certified by the MD.
  •  The moratorium u/s 14 shall be available from the Prepack Commencement Date (PCD) till closure or termination of the process.
  •  IP shall be appointed by unrelated FC’s who shall not run the business like in CIRP but only administer / conduct the process of prepack.
  •  Similar to CIRP, RP shall make public announcements but on electronic platform, he shall verify the claim, constitute CoC (Committee of Creditors), get valuation report, conduct due diligence, make application to AA (Adjudication Authority) in case of avoidance transaction, etc.
  •  As in CIRP, the CoC shall take decisions with regard to approval by majority of votes except that of liquidation which requires 75% vote.
  • ? Section 29A related to persons not eligible to be resolution applicants to remain sacrosanct even in the prepack process.
  •  Prepack to have the Swiss challenge method to counter the first offer to ensure better proposals. Two-option approach: (i) without Swiss challenge but no impairment to Operational Creditors (OCs), and (ii) with Swiss challenge with rights of OCs and dissenting FCs subject to minimum provided u/s 30(2)(b). Prepack should allow 90 days for market participants to submit the resolution plan to the AA and 30 days thereafter for the AA to approve or reject it.

BRIEF ABOUT THE PREPACK INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS (PIRP) PASSED BY ORDINANCE DATED 4TH APRIL, 2021


The Government, aware of the urgent need for prepack, has inserted a Prepackaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) under Chapter III-A in Part II of the IBC through the ordinance route. The following is a brief, along with some highlights, about the process:

  •  An application for initiating a PIRP may be made in respect of a CD classified as a micro, small or medium enterprise under sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.
  •  Restrictions have been placed on the CDs who have recently concluded CIRP / PIRP within three years or are undergoing CIRP, or those against whom liquidation order is passed u/s 33.
  •  An FC, not being a related party of more than 66% in value, has to propose an IP to be appointed as the Resolution Professional (RP). The CD shall also obtain approval for filing the PIRP from its FC not being its related parties representing not less than 66% in value of the financial debt due to such creditors.
  •  The majority of directors / partners have to declare that the CD shall file an application for PIRP within the timeframe not exceeding 90 days along with other declarations as required u/s 54A(2)(f).
  •   The special resolution in case of companies should have three-fourths of the total number of partners approving for filing the PIRP.
  •  The IP to be appointed as RP in PIRP is duty-bound to confirm whether the CD confirms the eligibility requirement for application under PIRP.
  •  Fees paid to the IP to perform his duties shall form part of the PIRP costs.
  •  The AA shall, within a period of 14 days of the receipt of the application under PIRP, either accept or reject it after providing seven days’ time to rectify the defects, if any.
  •  The PIRP shall commence from the date of admission of the application by the AA. The PIRP shall be completed within 120 days from its commencement and the RP shall submit the resolution plan within 90 days from the prepackaged insolvency commencement date. If the resolution plan is not approved by the CoC within the stipulated time, then the RP shall file for termination of the PIRP.
  •  Moratorium as provided in sub-section (1) read with sub-section (3) of section 14 shall be applicable and shall cease to exist upon termination of PIRP.
  •  CD shall submit within two days of commencement of PIRP a list of claims and preliminary information memorandum relevant to formulate the Resolution Plan.
  •  Unlike in CIRP, the management of affairs shall vest with the Board of Directors. However, the management may be handed over to the RP if the Committee by a vote of not less than 66% of the voting share in value decides to do so, or the AA is of the opinion that the affairs had been conducted in a fraudulent manner or there has been gross mismanagement.
  •  The CoC shall be constituted within seven days of the prepackaged insolvency commencement date and its first meeting shall be held within seven days of its constitution.
  •  The CD shall submit the base resolution plan, referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 54A, to the RP within two days of the prepackaged insolvency commencement date and the RP shall present it to the CoC.
  •  The CoC may approve the base resolution plan for submission to the AA if it does not impair any claims owed by the CD to the operational creditors.
  •  The RP shall invite prospective resolution applicants to submit a resolution plan or plans, to compete with the base resolution plan, in such manner as may be specified.
  •  Sub-section (2) section 14, sub-section 2A of 14, section 14(3(c), section 17, section 19(3), section 18 clause g to e, section 19(2), section 21, section 25(1), clauses (a) to (c) and clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 25, section 28, section 29, sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) of section 30, sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of section 31, sections 24, 25A, 26, 27, 28, 29A, 32A, 43 to 51, provisions of Chapters VI and VII of Part II have been applied mutatis mutandis to the PIRP.
  •  If the AA is satisfied that the resolution plan as approved by the CoC under sub-section (4) or sub-section (12) of section 54K, as the case may be, subject to the conditions provided therein, meets the requirements as referred to in sub-section (2) of section 30, it shall, within 30 days of the receipt of such resolution plan, by order approve the resolution plan.

Prepack is a great way if India can take a leaf out of the book of countries which have legislated, administered and have learnt from experience. It may also be necessary to implement the law in a controlled environment but with the caution of not excessively restricting the eco-system which the law would promulgate. This law would stretch to the fullest strength when it is allowed to resolve the stress, provided that it is allowed to be experimented with within the framework, with little interference from courts. Excess legislation and restrictions may dilute the intent of faster resolution; this requires that those involved in the process of prepack are sensitive to the consensus-building mechanism of debtors and creditors. This also means that creditor-debtor must also act maturely during this process as they must realise that the success of this process depends on its negotiation and approval of the same. On the point of restriction, such as the one in section 29A, views are divided on transparency and genuine related-party buyer.

References
1 Bo Xie (2016), Comparative Insolvency Law: The Prepack Approach in Corporate Rescue, Edward Elgar Publishing
2 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009) 454
3 John D. Ayer et al, ‘Out-of-court Workouts Prepacks and Pre-arranged Cases, a Primer’, (April, 2005), ABI Journal <https://www.abi.org/abijournal/out-of-court-workouts-prepacks-and-pre-arranged-cases-a-primer> [2] (2020) 8 Supreme Court Cases 531

COGNIZANCE OF THE OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING

INTRODUCTION
.
Newspaper reports show that, on an average, every week in two to three cases a businessman, politician, banker or bureaucrat is booked under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act (PMLA). Apart from attachment of property and freezing of bank accounts, another action started simultaneously against such a person is initiation of criminal proceedings. On a complaint made u/s 44 of the PMLA, investigation commences and the Special Court may take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering.

However, the terms ‘cognizance of offence’ and ‘cognizable offence’ are not defined in the PMLA. Indeed, section 65 provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA for arrest, search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under the PMLA.

Accordingly, in the absence of any provision in the PMLA, one may refer to the provisions of the CrPC on a given aspect such as the definition of ‘cognizable offence’. This
term is defined in section 2(c) of the CrPC as follows:

‘Cognizable offence’ means an offence for which, and ‘cognizable case’ means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.

From a review of the above-mentioned definition one can see that where the offence is covered under the First Schedule of the CrPC or under any other law for the time being in force, the police officer may arrest without a warrant.

A reference to the First Schedule shows that it provides the following classification of offences:
• cognizable or non-cognizable,
• bailable or non-bailable, and
• the court which will try the offence.

Part II of the First Schedule refers to ‘classification of offences under other laws’. It provides that offences punishable with imprisonment for more than three years would be cognizable and non-bailable.

A reference to section 4 of the PMLA shows that the offence of money-laundering is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for more than three years which may extend up to seven years (ten years in the case of NDPS offences).

Accordingly, on the basis of the criteria specified in the First Schedule of the CrPC, the offence of money-laundering is cognizable.

WHETHER THE OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING IS COGNIZABLE?
The issue whether the offence of money-laundering is cognizable had come up for consideration before the Courts in the following cases:
•  Jignesh Kishorebhai Bhajiawala vs. State of Gujarat [2018] 90 taxmann.com 320 (Guj);
• Rakesh Manekchand Kothari vs. UoI (Manu/Guj/0008/2015);

Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. UoI [2017] 78 taxmann.com 143 (Bom);
• Vakamulla Chandrashekhar vs. ED [2019] 356 ELT 395 (Del);
• Virbhadra Singh vs. ED (Manu/Del/1813/2015);
• Moin Akhtar Qureshi vs. Union of India [2017] 88 taxmann.com 66 (Del);
• Rajbhushan Omprakash Dixit vs. Union of India [2018] 91 taxmann.com 324 (Del).

The Courts gave views which were divergent and in many cases the matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of SLPs which are pending.

However, an Explanation to section 45 has now settled the issue. The Explanation was added to section 45 w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to clarify the meaning of ‘offence to be cognizable and non-bailable’. It reads as follows:

‘Explanation. – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the expression “Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable” shall mean and shall be deemed to have always meant that all offences under this Act shall be cognizable offences and non-bailable offences notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and accordingly the officers authorised under this Act are empowered to arrest an accused without warrant, subject to the fulfilment of conditions under section 19 and subject to the conditions enshrined under this section’.

Thanks to this clarification, the controversies faced by the Courts in the above-mentioned decisions have been put to rest.

COGNIZANCE OF THE OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING – PRECONDITION

There are two provisions which refer to the precondition to take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering.

Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC, a Special Court may take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering upon a complaint made by an authority authorised in this behalf under the Act, without the accused being committed to it for trial.

The second Proviso to section 45(1) lays down the basic precondition for taking cognizance of an offence punishable u/s 4. It categorically provides that the Special Court cannot take such cognizance except upon a written complaint by the Director or any officer of the Central or State Government authorised by a general or special order.

‘Taking cognizance of’ – connotation of
The expression ‘taking cognizance of’ is not defined or explained in the PMLA. In section 44, too, there is no clarification as regards the meaning of this expression. However, its meaning has been examined by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in various decisions. The propositions laid down by the Courts may be reviewed as follows:

• Whether a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down on this issue1.
• Taking cognizance means cognizance of an offence and not of an offender. ‘Cognizance’ indicates the point of time when a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence. It is different from initiating a proceeding. Rather, it is a condition for initiating a proceeding2.
• Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence and takes first judicial notice of an offence on a complaint or police report or on his own information.3
• The Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegation4.
• At the stage of taking cognizance, only the prima facie case is to be seen. It is not open to the Court to appreciate the evidence at this stage with reference to the material5.
• For taking cognizance of an offence, the Court has to merely see whether prima facie there are reasons for issuing process and whether the ingredients of an offence are on record6.
• ‘Taking cognizance of offence’ means taking notice of an offence which would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings. It is not the same thing as issuance of process. It is entirely different from initiation of judicial proceedings; rather, it is a condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate7.

Private complainant has no locus standi
Having regard to the provisions of section 44(1)(b) and section 45 of the PMLA dealing with a complaint to the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence punishable under the PMLA, an important question that frequently arises is whether a complaint filed by a private complainant can be entertained by the Special Court.

This question was addressed by the Delhi High Court in the Raman Sharma case8. While answering it in the negative, the High Court made the following observations:

‘The question before the learned Trial Court was whether the Trial Court can entertain a complaint filed by a private party for the offence committed under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act. On this issue, section 44(b) of the Act clearly stipulates that the Special Court may, upon a complaint made by an authorised person in this behalf under this Act, take cognizance of an offence under section 3. Further, the second Proviso to section 45 makes it clear that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of offence except upon a complaint in writing made by the Director, or any officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government.

_________________________________________________________________________________

1   Nupur Talwar vs. CBI [2012] 1 SCC (Cr) 711

2   Ajit Kumar vs. State of WB; AIR 1963 SC 765

3   Anil Sawant vs. State of Bihar (1995) 6 SCC 142; R.R. Chari vs.
State of
UP 1951 CrLJ 775(SC); Darshan Singh Ram Kishan vs. State of Maharashtra 1971
CrLJ 1697 (SC)

4   Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas vs. State of WB; 1959 CrLJ
1368(SC)

5   Kishan Singh vs. State of Bihar 1993 CrLJ 1700 SC

6   Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd.
[2008] 2 SCC 492

7   State of Karnataka vs. Pastor P. Raju: AIR 2006 SC 2825; State
of WB vs. Mohd Khalid AIR 1995 SC 785

8   Raman Sharma vs. Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2020)
113
taxmann.com 114 (Del)

Accordingly, the learned Trial Court opined that the aforesaid two provisions make it clear that the Court cannot entertain a complaint filed by a private complainant for the offence committed under the Act’.

Cognizance of supplementary complaint
In the context of a supplementary complaint, a question arises whether cognizance is required to be taken again on the filing of a supplementary complaint? This question has been addressed by the Delhi High Court in Yogesh Mittal vs. Enforcement Directorate (2019) 105 taxmann.com 336 (Del). While answering it in the negative, the Delhi High Court made the following observations:

‘It is thus trite law that cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. It is also well settled that cognizance of an offence / offences once taken cannot be taken again for the second time. Since this Court has already taken a view that a supplementary complaint on additional evidence qua the same accused or additional accused who are part of same larger transactions / conspiracy is maintainable, however, with the leave of the Court and cognizance is taken of the offence / offences, not the offender and in case no new offence is made out from the additional material collected during further investigation, supporting an earlier offence on which cognizance has already been taken or additional accused are arrayed, no further cognizance is required to be taken’.

Procedural aspect of the cognizance of the offence of money-laundering
Apart from the above-mentioned substantive aspects of cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, it is equally necessary to be aware of procedural aspects relating to the same. Such procedural aspects are not specified in the PMLA.

Section 65 of the PMLA provides that the provisions of the CrPC shall apply, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA, for search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under the PMLA.

Hence, a reference may be made to Chapter XII of the CrPC [Information to the Police and their Powers to Investigate]. This Chapter lays down the procedure to be followed for investigation of cognizable or non-cognizable offences.

A reference may be made to the following provisions relating to a cognizable offence:
• Section 154 – Information in case of cognizable offence,
• Section 157 – Procedure for investigation of cognizable offence,
• Section 158 – Report to Magistrate, how submitted,
• Section 159 – Power to hold investigation or preliminary inquiry,
• Section 160 – Police officer’s power to require attendance of witnesses,
• Section 161 – Examination of witnesses by Police,
• Section 167 – Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours,
• Section 172 – Diary of proceedings in investigation,
• Section 173 – Report of police officer on completion of investigation.

A review of the above-mentioned provisions of the CrPC in the context of certain provisions of the PMLA would show that the PMLA does contain the following provisions which are analogous to corresponding provisions of the CrPC:
• Section 19 of the PMLA empowers the ED to arrest a person u/s 19 if, on the basis of material in its possession, it has reason to believe that a person is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA.
• Proviso to section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA (inserted w.e.f. 1st August, 2019) requires that upon completion of investigation where it is found that no offence of money-laundering was committed, just like section 173 of the CrPC, the ED is required to submit a closure report to the Special Court.
• However, in respect of the other provisions of Chapter XII of the CrPC, such as filing of FIR, maintaining a case diary, etc., the PMLA does not contain analogous provisions.

CONCLUSION

Often, clients approach their chartered accountants with the show cause notice received by them from an Enforcement Officer alleging that an offence under the PMLA has been committed. The clients seek advice on the manner of giving a reply. That apart, a number of questions are raised by clients in respect of the consequences of various actions under the PMLA, such as provisional attachment of property, arrest, search and seizure, etc.

To advise clients on the proper course of action it is necessary for us to familiarise ourselves with basic knowledge of the main provisions of the PMLA. This will facilitate proper steps to be taken by the client during adjudication and other proceedings under the PMLA and briefing the arguing Counsel engaged by the client for representation before the Special Court.

CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN COMPANIES ACT AND SECURITIES LAWS: COMPOUNDED BY ERRANT DRAFTING

BACKGROUND
A listed company is subject to dual regulation. First, by the Companies Act, 2013 which is the parent act under which it is incorporated and which lays down the basic rules about how companies should be governed. And second, the multiple regulations notified under the SEBI Act. The regulator under each of these sets of laws is also different.

It is not as if the objectives of the two laws are clearly distinct and non-overlapping. Unfortunately, however, neither regulator would like to cede to the other and agree that some areas are best regulated exclusively by the other. Thus, several areas are regulated by both the regulators. And these areas actually keep increasing. Whether the concept and requirements relating to Independent Directors, whether the issue of shares and debentures, whether the setting up of various committees, their constitution and scope, etc., each regulator makes its own set of provisions.

This article attempts to look at this overlap and the resultant consequences. It also highlights the attempts made periodically to harmonise and even cede control. It also differentiates the nature of enforcement by the two regulators.

But this article arises primarily out of a recent informal guidance issued by SEBI. In this case, not only is there dual regulation, but owing to what appears to be poor drafting, certain harsh consequences have arisen which SEBI has merely reinforced without accepting.

AREAS OF DUAL GOVERNANCE

The objectives of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) / Rules notified therein and the Securities Laws (consisting of the SEBI Act and several regulations notified by it) do have common areas. Both have as one of their objectives the governance of companies, even if SEBI primarily regulates companies that have listed, or propose to list, their securities. Both regulate the issue of securities, even if SEBI basically regulates the issue of securities to the public.

Thus, for example, the whole area of corporate governance is regulated minutely by both the laws. The definition of ‘Independent Directors’ is enunciated elaborately and separately by each of the two regulators. The constitution of committees such as the Audit Committee and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee is similarly laid down independently by the two laws. And the manner of issue of securities is also regulated independently by each of the two sets of laws.

Both sets of laws also regulate related party transactions. However, the definition of related parties, the nature of related party transactions governed, the manner of their approval, the quantum limits beyond which special approvals are required, etc., are all framed with differences, some major and some minor.

The result obviously is many differences, big and small, which companies have to carefully navigate through.

CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT PROVISIONS

What happens when the same issue has differently-worded provisions under the Act / Rules and the Securities Laws? For example, the minimum number of Independent Directors required. The Act has made a simple rule which may result in a lower number of minimum Independent Directors, while the Securities Laws (the LODR Regulations) would require more. Or, say, the definition of related party transactions. The definition of related parties under the SEBI LODR Regulations is wider and covers groups of persons who are not covered as related parties under the Act. Similarly, the definition of related party transactions under the SEBI LODR Regulations is wider. So, again, the question is how will the differences be reconciled?

Primarily, the answer is that (i) both the sets of provisions have to be complied with, and (ii) in case of overlap / difference, the narrower or stricter provision will apply. If the LODR Regulations require more Independent Directors while the Act prescribes a lower number, the LODR Regulations will apply. Similarly, the wider definition of related party transactions under the SEBI LODR Regulations will apply.

But while this may be a good basic principle, the provisions of each set of laws should be carefully examined.

ATTEMPTS TO HARMONISE AND CEDE CONTROL

It is not as if the two regulators are always deliberately confrontational and engaged in a turf war. There is actually a tendency to carefully review what the other regulator has already provided in its corresponding provisions. Indeed, from time to time reviews are carried out and attempts are made to harmonise wherever possible. However, often a fresh set of amendments is made which widens the gap further. Since the provisions governed by SEBI are generally in the Regulations which can be easily amended, SEBI is able to update the provisions to current requirements and also take care of the difficulties faced. The amendments to the Act require approval of Parliament, although, interestingly, we have also seen a series of amending acts over the years.

DUAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Each of the two sets of laws has differing consequences in case of violation. Even the process of enforcement can be different. A violation of the provisions in the Act may result in fine and / or prosecution and, at times, other action. SEBI, however, generally has a wider arsenal of actions. It may be in the form of levying a penalty, directing persons not to deal in securities, barring persons from accessing securities markets, disgorgement, etc.

Companies and other persons in default alleged to have violated the provisions may face dual proceedings, one by each regulator, even for substantially the same violation!

Interestingly, under section 24 of the Act, certain specified provisions of the Act relating to listed / to be listed companies are to be ‘administered’ by SEBI. Ideally, such a provision would have ensured not only that dual provisions are either eliminated or harmonised, but even the action is by a single regulator. However, the provisions of this section have a narrow scope.

MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION – DUAL PROVISIONS AND CONSEQUENCE OF POOR DRAFTING

Let us take up a specific case that provides a good example of overlapping provisions with certain anomalous results owing to poor drafting. This case relates to payment of ‘managerial remuneration’, i.e., remuneration paid to directors. Traditionally, the Act has regulated payment of managerial remuneration in fair detail. The persons who can be appointed as Managing / Wholetime Directors, the manner of their appointment, the upper limits of their remuneration, etc., are all regulated in detail. Earlier, payment of remuneration beyond the specified limits required approval of the Central Government. However, now the Act requires approval of the shareholders instead. But even the shareholders cannot grant approval for remuneration that exceeds certain limits. The Act places limits on managerial remuneration in terms of percentage of net profits (as calculated in a prescribed manner) and, in case where profits are inadequate, or there are losses, in absolute terms.

SEBI had, till recently, not provided for limits on managerial remuneration but dealt with the subject by requiring the Nomination and Remuneration Committee to recommend managerial remuneration. However, with effect from 1st April, 2019 it made several requirements relating to certain managerial remuneration. One such requirement related to Promoter Executive Directors and became an area of confusion and a company approached SEBI for an ‘informal guidance’. It may be recalled that SEBI grants ‘informal guidance’ on provisions (for a relatively small charge) which, although it has limited binding effect, often helps know the view that SEBI may generally take.

The relevant provision is Regulation 17(6)(e) of the SEBI LODR Regulations which reads as under:

(e) The fees or compensation payable to executive directors who are promoters or members of the promoter group, shall be subject to the approval of the shareholders by special resolution in general meeting, if –
(i)    the annual remuneration payable to such executive director exceeds rupees 5 crore or 2.5 per cent of the net profits of the listed entity, whichever is higher; or
(ii)    where there is more than one such director, the aggregate annual remuneration to such directors exceeds 5 per cent of the net profits of the listed entity:

Provided that the approval of the shareholders under this provision shall be valid only till the expiry of the term of such director.

Explanation. – For the purposes of this clause, net profits shall be calculated as per section 198 of the Companies Act, 2013.

As can be seen, the provision states that the upper limit on annual remuneration in case of one such Promoter Executive Director is Rs. 5 crores or 2.50% of the net profits, whichever is higher. In case there is more than one such director, the corresponding limit on the aggregate remuneration to all such directors is 5% of the net profits.

The anomaly is apparent. The limit on remuneration in case of one director is given in an absolute amount as well as in a percentage. However, in case of more than one such director, the limit is given only in percentage terms. To take an example, if the net profit is Rs. 50 crores, then the company may pay Rs. 5 crores as managerial remuneration to one such director, being the higher of Rs. 5 crores and Rs. 1.25 crores (2.50% of Rs. 50 crores). If there are two or more such directors, however, the company can pay only Rs. 2.50 crores, since in such a case the company cannot pay more than 5% of its net profits as aggregate remuneration to all such directors. Thus, even the single director, who could have otherwise received up to Rs. 5 crores, would now get a far lesser remuneration since the aggregate limit for all the directors put together is Rs. 2.50 crores! Of course, if the net profits are very large (say, beyond Rs. 100 crores), the difficulty arising out of such an anomaly would be diluted. But if the profits are less, the anomaly becomes even more glaring.

For a company that needs more than one such director, the provision creates difficulties. When SEBI was approached for an informal guidance on this, it confirmed the above view and said that the remuneration would be limited to 5% of net profits (see informal guidance dated 18th November, 2020 to Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited). Thus, the company would be required to approach the shareholders for a special resolution.

To be fair, SEBI could not have resolved a drafting anomaly through an informal guidance since this would generally require an amendment.

CONCLUSION


A careful consideration is needed whether at all there is a need for dual sets of provisions on the same subject which result in overlap, conflict and even confusion, apart from double proceedings and double punishment. A fleet-footed SEBI could be given exclusive jurisdiction over listed / to be listed companies in several areas. This will ensure that companies have a single set of provisions to apply and that there is a single regulator who will take action in case of violation and the regulator is one who has several different enforcement actions that it can take that are suited to the violation/s.

HINDU LAW: THE RIGHTS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

INTRODUCTION
The codified and uncodified aspects of Hindu Law deal with several personal issues pertaining to a Hindu. One such issue is the rights of an illegitimate child in relation to inheritance of ancestral property, self-acquired property of his parents, right to claim maintenance, etc.

 

VOID / VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 applies to and codifies the law relating to marriages between Hindus. It states that an illegitimate child is one who is born out of a marriage which is not valid. A valid marriage is one which does not suffer from the disabilities mentioned in this Act, viz., neither partner has another spouse living at the time of the marriage; neither of them is of unsound mind / has a mental disorder / is insane; they are not under the marriageable age; the parties are not within prohibited degrees of relationship as laid down in Hindu law; the parties are not sapindas (defined common relationships) of each other. For all void marriages, the Act provides that a decree of nullity can be obtained from a court of law. Hence, the marriage is treated as null and void. Thus, if there is a marriage which suffered from any of these defects then the same would be void. Certain marriages under the Act are voidable at the option of the party who is aggrieved.

 

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD – MEANING

A child born out of such a void or voidable wedlock would have been treated as an illegitimate child prior to the amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act in 1976. From 1976, the Hindu Marriage Act has been amended to expressly deal with an illegitimate child. Section 16(1) provides that even if a marriage is null and void, any child born out of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be considered to be a legitimate child. This is true whether or not such child is born before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. This would also be the case whether or not a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that void marriage under this Act.

 

It also provides that if a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable marriage, any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made, who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity.

 

Hence, now all children of void / voidable marriages under the Act are treated as legitimate. The Act also provides that such children would be entitled to rights in the property of their parents.

 

The Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha & Anr. vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, AIR 2010 SC 2685 has held that ‘it is evident that Section 16 of the Act intends to bring about social reforms, conferment of social status of legitimacy on a group of children, otherwise treated as illegitimate, as its prime object.’

 

In Jinia Keotin & Ors. vs. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730, the Apex Court explained the meaning behind the Amendment as follows:

‘4 … Under the ordinary law, a child for being treated as legitimate must be born in lawful wedlock. … The legitimate status of the children which depended very much upon the marriage between their parents being valid or void, thus turned on the act of parents over which the innocent child had no hold or control. But for no fault of it, the innocent baby had to suffer a permanent setback in life and in the eyes of society by being treated as illegitimate. A laudable and noble act of the legislature indeed in enacting section 16 to put an end to a great social evil.’

 

In S.P.S. Balasubramanyam vs. Suruttayan @ Andali Padayachi & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 756 the Supreme Court held that if man and woman are living under the same roof and cohabiting for a number of years, there will be a presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act that they live as husband and wife and the children born to them will not be illegitimate. Thus, even children born out of a live-in relationship were accorded legitimacy.

 

In Rameshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 735 the Supreme Court dealt with a case wherein after the death of a government employee, the children born illegitimately to the woman who had been living with the said employee, claimed a share in the pension / gratuity and other death-cum-retirement benefits along with children born out of a legal wedlock. The Court held that u/s 16 of the Act, children of a void marriage are legitimate. As the employee, a Hindu, died intestate, the children of the deceased employee born out of the void marriage were entitled to a share in the family pension, death-cum-retirement benefits and gratuity.

 

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTIES OF OTHER RELATIVES

However, the Amendment Act has also introduced an interesting caveat, that while such a child born out a void or voidable wedlock would be deemed to be legitimate, the Amendment would not be treated as conferring any rights in the property of any person other than its parents.

 

In Smt. P.E.K. Kalliani Amma & Ors. vs. K. Devi & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1963 the Apex Court held that section 16 of the Act was not ultra vires of the Constitution of India. In view of the legal fiction contained in section 16, the illegitimate children, for all practical purposes, including succession to the properties of their parents, had to be treated as legitimate. They could not, however, succeed to the properties of any other relation on the basis of this rule which in its operation was limited to the properties of the parents.

 

Again, in Jinia Keotin & Ors. vs. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730 the Supreme Court held that section 16 of the Act, while engrafting a rule of fiction in ordaining the children, though illegitimate, to be treated as legitimate, notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable, chose also to confine its application, so far as succession or inheritance by such children is concerned, to the properties of the parents only. It held that conferring any further rights upon such children would be going against the express mandate of the Legislature.

 

This view was once again endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha (Supra) where it held that a child born of a void or voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenary property but is entitled only to claim share in self-acquired properties, if any.

 

CONTROVERSY IN THE ISSUE

The above issue of whether illegitimate children can succeed to ancestral properties or claim a share in the HUF was given a new twist by the Supreme Court in 2011 in the case of Revanasiddappa and Anr. vs. Mallikarjun and Ors. (2011) 11 SCC 1. The question which was dealt with in that case was whether illegitimate children were entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether their share was limited only to the self-acquired property of their parents u/s 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act? It disagreed with the earlier views taken by the Supreme Court in Jinia Keotin (Supra), Bharatha Matha (Supra) and in Neelamma & Ors. vs. Sarojamma & Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 612, wherein the Court had held that illegitimate children would only be entitled to a share of the self-acquired property of the parents and not to the joint Hindu family property.

 

The Court observed that the Amendment had used the word ‘property’ and had not qualified it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad and general. It explained that if they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in section 16(3) will apply to such children only with respect to property of any person other than their parents. Qua their parents, they can succeed to all properties. The Court held that there was a need for a progressive and dynamic interpretation of Hindu Law since the society was changing. It stressed the need to recognise the status of such children who had been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously recognise the rights of such children in the property of their parents. This was a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who were as innocent as any other children.

 

The Supreme Court also explained the modus operandi of succession to ancestral property. Such children will be entitled only to a share in their parents’ property, but they could not claim it in their own right. Logically, on the partition of an ancestral property the property falling in the share of the parents of such children would be regarded as their self-acquired and absolute property. In view of the Amendment, such illegitimate children will have a share in such property since such children were equated under the amended law with the legitimate offspring of a valid marriage. The only limitation even after the Amendment was that during the lifetime of their parents such children could not ask for partition, but they could exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

 

Hence, the Court in Revanasiddappa (Supra) concluded that it was constrained to take a view different from the one taken earlier by it in Jinia Keotin (Supra), Neelamma (Supra) and Bharatha Matha (Supra) on section 16(3) of the Act. Nevertheless, since all these decisions were of two-member Benches, it requested the Chief Justice of India that the matter should be reconsidered by a larger Bench.

 

CURRENT STATUS

It has been close to ten years since the above request for a larger Bench, but the matter has not yet been resolved. This issue once again cropped up in the Supreme Court in the case of Jitender Kumar vs. Jasbir Singh CA 18858/2019 order dated 21st October, 2019. The Supreme Court observed that since this issue has been referred to a larger Bench, the current case would be decided only after its hearing.

 

MAINTENANCE

Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 also needs to be noted; it provides for maintenance of children by a Hindu. A Hindu is bound, during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children during their minority. In addition, an unmarried Hindu daughter (even if illegitimate) can claim maintenance from her father till she is married relying on section 20(3) of this Act, provided that she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself from her own earnings. This is also the view expressed by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Abhilasha vs. Parkash, Cr. Appeal No. 615/2020, order dated 15th September, 2020.

 

GUARDIANSHIP

Who would be the natural guardian of such an illegitimate child is another interesting question. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 states that a natural guardian of a Hindu minor (if he is a boy or an unmarried girl) and / or his property, is the father and after him the mother. In case the minor is below the age of five years, the child’s custody ordinarily vests with the mother. However, the Act provides an exception to this Rule that in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl, the mother would be the natural guardian and only after her can the father be the natural guardian. Recently, the Bombay High Court in Dharmesh Vasantrai Shah vs. Renuka Prakash Tiwari, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 697, reiterated that in case of an illegitimate child it is only the mother who can be the natural guardian under Hindu Law. The only exception is if the mother has renounced the world by becoming a hermit or has ceased to be a Hindu. The Court held that since it was the father’s own case that the child was an illegitimate child, it was difficult to see how he could claim the custody of the child over the biological mother. The Supreme Court has taken a similar view in the case of the guardianship of an illegitimate Christian child in the case of ABC vs. State of Delhi (NCT) (2015) 10 SCC 1.

 

CONCLUSION

The issue relating to various rights of illegitimate children has been quite contentious and litigation prone. One eagerly awaits the constitution of the larger Supreme Court Bench. Clearly, it is high time for a comprehensive legislation dealing with all issues pertaining to such children. In the words of the Apex Court, ‘they are as innocent as any other children!’  

 

FIT AND PROPER PERSON (A widely worded test to refuse entry in the securities market)

BACKGROUND
Persons desiring to do business in the securities markets are usually required to obtain a license of sorts – a registration – from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’). This is especially so for those who are known as ‘intermediaries’ and who render various forms of services. They may be stock-brokers, portfolio managers, those handling mutual funds, etc. Each category has a different set of requirements for being eligible to be registered which may include qualifications, net worth requirements, etc. Once registered, they also have to follow prescribed rules and usually a Code of Conduct. Failure to follow such rules / Code may result in action which may include penalties, suspension or even cancellation of certificates.

However, there is one overriding requirement and test common across almost all intermediaries. And that is the ‘Fit and Proper Person’ test. A person needs to be ‘fit and proper’ to obtain registration. Unlike other requirements which are well defined and strictly applied, the ‘fit and proper’ requirement may appear at first glance as vague, broadly defined and subjectively applied. In several cases, entities have been debarred or refused entry in the securities market on the ground that they failed this ‘fit and proper’ test.

So what is this test and requirement? Is it as arbitrary as it appears to be? There have been several rulings of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) and orders of SEBI over the years in this regard. This article describes the legal provisions and discusses, in the light of several precedents, how this test has been applied. While some areas of doubt and concern still remain, the rulings have been generally on similar lines applied consistently.

THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF ‘FIT AND PROPER’ UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

This term has different connotations and definitions under different laws. The Reserve Bank of India, for example, has a different connotation of this test for appointment of directors in public sector banks. Further, without using this term, other laws, too, apply similar principles while granting or rejecting licenses / registration. However, we shall focus here on the definition under Securities Laws.

The definition has seen significant change over the years and the current definition and criteria are given in Schedule II to the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008 (‘the Regulations’) which reads as under:

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING A ‘FIT AND PROPER PERSON’

For the purpose of determining as to whether an applicant or the intermediary is a ‘fit and proper person’ the Board may take account of any consideration as it deems fit, including but not limited to the following criteria in relation to the applicant or the intermediary, the principal officer, the director, the promoter and the key management persons by whatever name called –

(a) integrity, reputation and character;
(b) absence of convictions and restraint orders;
(c) competence, including financial solvency and net
        worth;
(d) absence of categorisation as a wilful defaulter.

Earlier, there were full-fledged and separate Regulations focused on this aspect – the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Criteria for Fit and Proper Person) Regulations, 2004. The wordings in the earlier Regulations were similar but lengthier. The general pattern and essence remain the same in the new criteria and, hence, the rulings thereon can be generally relied on and are indeed followed for the Intermediaries Regulations.

BROAD AND VAGUE WORDING OF THE CRITERIA

The test applies not just to the applicant / intermediary but also to its director, promoter, key managerial person, etc. The criteria are striking in their wideness and even vagueness in wording. The ‘integrity, reputation and character’ of the person is examined, but no specific benchmark has been provided as to how it would be measured or judged. And whether it would be limited to the person’s work or even his personal life can be considered.

‘Absence of convictions and restraint orders’ may sound clear at first glance but becomes complicated when looked at closely. If there is a conviction for which punishment or a restraint order is continuing, it would be obvious that he cannot be registered in violation of such orders. However, does the conviction / restraint have to be on acting as such intermediary? Or is it, and which is more likely, that the conviction / restraint may be on any area that may reflect adversely on the character of the person? In any case, it is not clear whether the conviction or restraint needs to be subsisting in the sense that it is being undergone or is a past one. If a past one, whether even a conviction / restraint from the distant past is also to be considered?

Competence, including financial solvency and net worth, is to be considered. But, again, no benchmarks are given – whether any specific qualification or area of experience would be considered. The term ‘financial solvency’ is easy to understand in a negative way as not being insolvent. But considering that it is used with the term ‘net worth’, perhaps the intention, to judge from context, may be that the net worth may be commensurate with the nature of registration sought.

As we will see later, there is a reason why the criteria are broadly worded with lack of specific, measurable parameters. The intention seems to be to judge the person in a subjective manner on such parameters. However, subjectivity is compensated in a different manner by ensuring that only those adverse aspects that are serious are considered.

PRECEDENTS

This subject has again come to the fore due to a recent Supreme Court ruling (reported in the media) on certain on-going appeals before SAT on decisions of SEBI on brokers in the NSEL matter. However, there is a longer history of precedents and generally there has been consistency in them following the principles laid down in an early SAT ruling of 2006.

Jermyn LLC vs. SEBI [2007] 74 SCL 246 (SAT – Mum.)
This was one of the earliest rulings (affirmed by the Supreme Court in the second appeal) that laid down the basic principles for application of the criteria. The matter related to the alleged Ketan Parekh scams. Simplified a little bit, the broad issue was whether persons who have been subjected to bans and investigations of serious violations could re-enter the market through a different name. The question was about determining whether a non-resident entity registered with SEBI was indeed associated with the KP group that faced serious allegations. It was alleged that there was commonality / association with persons allegedly connected with the KP group and several factors were placed on record. The entity contended that the allegations against the KP group were not finally proved, that many investigations were still going on, and so on. SAT took a broader view of the requirements relating to ‘fit and proper person’. It held that it was fair to consider serious allegations as relevant even if the proceedings do not yet have a final outcome. It also held that subjective judgment was acceptable. The following words can be usefully referred to since they have been applied in later cases (emphasis supplied):

‘9. A reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Regulations makes it abundantly clear that the concept of a fit and proper person has a very wide amplitude as the name “fit and proper person” itself suggests. The Board can take into account “any consideration as it deems fit” for the purpose of determining whether an applicant or an intermediary seeking registration is a fit and proper person or not. The framers of the Regulations have consciously given such wide powers because of their concern to keep the market clean and free from undesirable elements… In other words, it is the subjective opinion or impression of others about a person and that, according to the Regulations, has to be good. This impression or opinion is generally formed on the basis of the association he has with others and / or on the basis of his past conduct. A person is known by the company he keeps. In the very nature of things, there cannot be any direct evidence in regard to the reputation of a person whether he be an individual or a body corporate. In the case of a body corporate or a firm, the reputation of its whole-time director(s) or managing partner(s) would come into focus.

The Board as a regulator has been assigned a statutory duty to protect the integrity of the securities market and also interest of investors in securities apart from promoting the development of and regulating the market by such measures as it may think fit. It is in the discharge of this statutory obligation that the Board has framed the Regulations with a view to keep the marketplace safe for the investors to invest by keeping the undesirable elements out… One bad element can not only pollute the market but can play havoc with it which could be detrimental to the interests of the innocent investors. In this background, the Board may, in a given case, be justified in keeping a doubtful character or an undesirable element out from the market rather than running the risk of allowing the market to be polluted.

We may hasten to add here that when the Board decides to debar an entity from accessing the capital market on the ground that he / it is not a fit and proper person it must have some reasonable basis for saying so. The Board cannot give the entity a bad name and debar it. When such an action of the Board is brought to challenge, it (the Board) will have to show the material on the basis of which it concluded that the entity concerned was not a fit and proper person or that it did not enjoy a good reputation in the securities market. The basis of the action will have to be judged from the point of view of a reasonable and prudent man. In other words, the test would be what a prudent man concerned with the securities market thinks of the entity.’

This ruling and the principles it laid down were followed in many later cases such as:
1. Mukesh Babu Securities Limited vs. SEBI (Appeal No. 53 of 2007, dated 10th December, 2007, SAT);
2. SEBI’s order in case of Motilal Oswal Commodities Broker Private Limited dated 22nd February, 2019;
3. SEBI’s order in case of Anand Rathi Commodities Limited dated 25th February, 2019;
4. SEBI’s order in case of Phillip Commodities India Pvt. Ltd. dated 27th February. 2019.

ISSUES AND CONCLUSION


The series of decisions shows that the application of the criteria to determine whether a person is a fit and proper person is seen from a different perspective. The core objective is that persons with dubious reputation and image should not be allowed entry in the capital market. A person may have several cases against him about alleged scams, serious wrongdoing, etc. The final outcome of these cases may take years, even decades. Can such person enter or continue in the securities markets? Would it be sufficient that he discloses on-going cases? The governing principles as laid down suggest that SEBI can take into account such allegations even if there is no final outcome. In its subjective view, it can refuse entry to such persons. For this purpose, SEBI may take into account developments which may occur at various intermediary stages – observations of courts, reports of investigative agencies, etc. Many of the principles of natural justice such as right of cross-examination, providing of all underlying information / documents, etc., may not be strictly applied. The material SEBI has relied on is seen in a more substantive manner.

That said, this does not mean that SEBI has indiscriminate and unquestionable powers. Each of the cases has shown that the allegations on record have been fairly serious and multifarious. Such serious allegations are enough to put a person in a bad enough light to be refused entry in securities markets at least in the interim. SEBI as a gatekeeper thus has broader powers.

The test of ‘fit and proper person’ at present has application to intermediaries under the Regulations. However, it may not be surprising if such test, or at least the principles thereof, may get wider application to other persons associated with the capital markets and who play a key role. One example that can be thought of is Independent Directors.

FAMILY SETTLEMENTS: OPENING UP NEW VISTAS

INTRODUCTION
As families grow, new generations join the business, new lines of thinking emerge and disputes originate between family members regarding assets, properties, businesses, etc. Finally, these lead to a family settlement. Such a family arrangement is one of the oldest alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The scope of a family arrangement is extremely wide and is recognised even in ancient English Law. This is because the world over, courts lean in favour of peace and amity within the family rather than on disputes. In the last 60 years or so, a good part of the law in India relating to family settlements is well settled through numerous court decisions. In recent years, both the Supreme Court and the High Courts have delivered some important judgments on this very vital issue. The key tenets from these decisions have been culled out and analysed in this month’s feature.

PRINCIPLES SETTLED SO FAR

From an analysis of the earlier judgments, such as Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836; Sahu Madho Das vs. Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481; Kale vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) AIR SC 807; Hiran Bibi vs. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44; Hari Shankar Singhania vs. Gaur Hari Singhania, (2006) 4 SCC 658, etc., the settled principles that have emerged are summarised below:

(a) A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights, or by preserving the family property, or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation and saving its honour.

(b) An oral family settlement involving immovable property needs no registration. Registration (where immovable property is involved) is necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced to writing. Here, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement has already been made either for the purpose of the record, or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and it is, therefore, not compulsory to register it.

(c) A compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.

(d) By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, the members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family.

(e) A family settlement is different from an HUF partition. While an HUF partition must involve a joint Hindu family which has been partitioned in accordance with the Hindu Law, a family arrangement is a dispute resolution mechanism involving personal property of the members of a family who are parties to the arrangement. A partition does not require the existence of disputes which is the substratum for a valid family arrangement. An HUF partition must always be a full partition unlike in a family settlement.
    
DOCUMENT WHICH BRINGS ABOUT A FAMILY SETTLEMENT MUST BE REGISTERED AND STAMPED

The decision in the case of Sita Ram Bhama vs. Ramvatar Bhama, (2018) 15 SCC 130 is different from the scores of decisions which have held that family settlements do not require registration. However, this difference is on account of the facts of this case. Here, a father agreed to divide his self-acquired properties between his two sons. He died without doing so and also did not make a Will. Consequently, the two brothers, their two sisters and mother all became entitled to the properties under the Hindu Succession Act. The brothers executed a document titled ‘Memorandum of Family Settlement’ dividing the properties between the two of them as per their late father’s wishes. This document was also signed by their sisters and mother. The question was whether the instrument was to be registered or whether stamp duty was to be paid on the same? Distinguishing (on facts), the catena of decisions on the issue, the Supreme Court held that the document was to be registered and duly stamped. This was because it was not a memorandum of family settlement. The properties in question were the self-acquired properties of the father in which all his legal heirs had a right. The instrument took away the rights of the sisters and the mothers. It was a relinquishment of rights by them in favour of the brothers. It did not merely record the pre-existing rights of the brothers. Hence, it was held that the properties could not be transferred on the basis of such an instrument.

When on this subject, one must also consider the three-judge bench decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, CA 32601/2018, order dated 11th August, 2020. Though not directly on the issue, it is equally relevant. It held that a daughter would not have a coparcenary right in her father’s HUF which was partitioned before 20th December, 2004. For this purpose, the partition should be by way of a registered partition deed / a partition brought about by a Court Decree. The Supreme Court held that the requirement of a registered deed was mandatory. The intent of the provisions was not to jeopardise the interest of the daughter but to take care of sham or frivolous transactions set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her right as coparcener. In view of the clear provisions of section 6(5), the intent of the Legislature was clear and a plea of oral partition was not to be readily accepted. However, in exceptional cases where the plea of oral partition was supported by public documents and partition was finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been effected by a decree of a Court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone could not be accepted and had to be rejected outright.

Another relevant decision is that of the Delhi High Court in the case of Tripta Kaushik vs. Sub-Registrar, Delhi, WP(C) 9139/2019, order dated 20th May, 2020. In that case, a Hindu male died intestate and his wife and son inherited his property. The son renounced his share in favour of his mother by executing an instrument. The issue was one of stamp duty on such instrument. It was contended that the son had inherited half share in the property on the death of his father under the Will left by his father and, therefore, the Relinquishment Deed be considered as a family settlement not chargeable to Stamp Duty. It was held that the Relinquishment Deed did not make any reference to the Will of the late father of the petitioner, or to any purported family settlement. Accordingly, it was held that the instrument was a Release Deed liable to stamp duty and registration.

MEMORANDUM OF FAMILY SETTLEMENT NEEDS NO REGISTRATION

As opposed to the above case, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal vs. Manjit Kaur, CA 7764/2014, order dated 31st July, 2020 is diametrically opposite. In this case, a family settlement was executed in relation to a dispute between three brothers and their families. There was a specific recital in the memorandum that the appellant was accepted as the owner in possession of the suit property. He had constructed 16 shops and service stations on the same. In other words, it proved that he was being considered as the owner in possession of the suit property. Prior to execution of the memorandum on that day the family compromised not to raise any dispute regarding his ownership. Accordingly, the Court held that the document in question was a writing with regard to a fact which was already being considered and admitted by the parties. Hence, it could not be said that the document itself created rights in immovable property for the first time. Further, the parties to the document were closely related and hence the instrument did not require any registration. It was only a memorandum of family settlement and not a document containing the terms and recitals of a family settlement. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the document was valid and all parties were bound to act in accordance with the same. This decision reiterates the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kale’s case (Supra). Further, the case held that once the memorandum is acted upon, the same is binding upon the parties even though it is unregistered.

VALIDITY OF UNSTAMPED, UNREGISTERED DOCUMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

In the above case of Sita Ram (Supra), the Supreme Court also examined whether such an instrument which was required to be registered and stamped could be used for any collateral purpose. It held that it was not possible to admit such an instrument even for any collateral purpose till such time as the defect in the instrument was cured. It relied on Yellapu Uma Maheswari and another vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao and others, (2015) 16 SCC 787 for this purpose. The documents could be looked into for collateral purpose provided the parties paid the stamp duty together with penalty and got the document impounded.

However, the Supreme Court in the recent case of Thulasidhara vs. Narayanappa, (2019) 6 SCC 409 and also in the earlier case of Subraya M.N. vs. Vittala M.N. and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 705 has held that even without registration, a written document of family settlement / family arrangement can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and the conduct of the parties.

PARTIES WITH WHOM A HINDU WOMAN CAN ENTER INTO A FAMILY SETTLEMENT

The decision in Khushi Ram vs. Nawal Singh, CA 5167/2010, order dated 22nd February, 2021 is a landmark decision. It has examined the scope of the term family when it comes to a Hindu woman. The issue here was whether a married woman could execute a valid family settlement with the heirs from her father’s side. The woman had executed a memorandum of family settlement with the sons of her late brother, i.e., her nephews. The Court referred to an old three-judge bench decision in Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi, 1965 (3) SCR 841 which had analysed the concept of family with regard to which a family settlement could be entered. It was held that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property, or a claim, or even a semblance of a claim. In Kale’s case (Supra) it was held that ‘family’ has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs, but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title. In the Kale case, a settlement between a person and the two sisters of his mother was upheld.

The Court looked at the heirs who could succeed to Hindu women. It held that the heirs of the father are covered in the heirs who could succeed. When the heirs of the father of a woman were included as persons who can possibly succeed, it could not be held that they were strangers and not members of the family qua the woman. Hence, the settlement between the aunt and her nephews was upheld.

This decision, along with the vital three-judge bench decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, CA 32601/2018, order dated 11th August, 2020, has upheld the rights of Hindu daughters in their father’s family. While this case reiterates her right to enter into settlements with the heirs from her father’s side, the latter decision has explicitly laid down that a Hindu daughter, whenever born, has a right as a coparcener in her father’s HUF.

As an aside, a settlement from an aunt in favour of her nephews is covered by the exemption for relatives u/s 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act but a reverse case is not covered since a nephew is not a relative for an aunt. In such a case, reliance would have to be placed on the family settlement itself to show that the receipt of property is not without adequate consideration.

BENAMI LAW AND FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS

In the case of Narendra Prasad Singh vs. Ram Ashish Singh, SA No. 229/2002, order dated 4th July, 2018, the Patna High Court was faced with the question whether a property purchased in the name of one family member out of joint family funds would be hit by the provisions of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The Court held that this proposition could not at all be accepted since acquisition of the land in the name of a member of a family from the joint family property was not regarded as a benami transaction within the meaning of section 2 of that Act. A benami transaction had been defined u/s 2(a) of the Act as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person and a consideration is paid or provided by another person. In the present case, the consideration had been found to have been provided by the joint family fund which could not be treated as the fund of another person. In any event, the owner claimed his title purely on the basis of a family arrangement and not as a benamidar and, therefore, the case was not said to be hit by the Act.

In this respect it should be noted that the Act requires that the property should be purchased out of ‘known sources of funds’. Earlier, the Bill contained the words ‘known sources of income’ which were replaced with the present wordings. The Finance Minister explained the reason for this change as follows:

‘…. The earlier phrase was that you have purchased this property so you must show money out of your known sources of income. So, the income had to be personal. Members of the Standing Committee felt that the family can contribute to it, ……which is not your income. Therefore, the word “income” has been deleted and now the word is only “known sources”. So, if a brother or sister or a son contributed to this, this itself would not make it benami, because we know that is how the structure of the family itself is….’

CAN MUSLIMS ENTER INTO A FAMILY SETTLEMENT?


This issue was dealt with by the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Chamanbi and Others vs. Batulabi and Others, RSA No. 100004/2015, order dated 15th March, 2018. An oral family settlement was executed between a Muslim family and pursuant to the same a Memorandum of Family Settlement was executed for mutation of rights in the land records. The plea was that the document was unenforceable since Muslims could not execute a family settlement. The Court held that it was true that there was no joint family under Mohammedan Law but family arrangement was not prohibited. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shehammal vs. Hasan Khani Rawther, (2011) 9 SCC 223 which had held that a family arrangement would necessarily mean a decision arrived at jointly by the members of a family. Accordingly, the memorandum was upheld.

CONCLUSION


From the above discussion it would be obvious that our present laws relating to family settlement, be it stamp duty, registration, income-tax, etc., are woefully inadequate. Rather than making possible a family settlement, they do all they can to hamper it! India is a land of joint families and family-owned assets and yet we have to run to the courts every time a family settlement is to be acted upon. Consider the precious time and money lost in litigations on this count. It is high time amendments are made to various laws to facilitate family settlements.

SEBI TIGHTENS REGULATIONS FOR RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS – KEY AMENDMENTS AND AUDITOR’s RESPONSIBILITIES

Corporate Governance standards are being continuously strengthened with the focus on improving the quality of governance norms and disclosures by listed entities. Related party transactions have always been a key focus area for the regulators. Significant amendments have been made in the Companies Act, 2013 (2013 Act) as well as in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (Listing Regulations) to regulate such transactions and their disclosure in financial statements. The regulators made various amendments in the 2013 Act and Listing Regulations to align the requirements prescribed under the two, for example, omnibus approval by Audit Committee for repetitive related party transactions; however, SEBI regulations continue to be more stringent, for instance, the definition of related party under the Listing Regulations will result in the identification of significantly higher number of related parties vis-à-vis those under the 2013 Act.

The three important aspects of related party transactions which merit consideration are (a) Identification [who are considered related parties (RP) and when], thresholds (values or %), approvals (depending on the former who will approve – Audit Committee / Shareholders / Government) and disclosure (and their timelines) in financial statements and to be filed with the regulators. For minority shareholders such steps are of great importance to protect their interests and allow them to take decisions…Information on RPs also give better insight into performance and monitoring of movement of funds.

Section 188 of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with ‘related party transactions’, i.e., transactions specified in the section with any person who falls within the definition of ‘related party’ as per section 2(76) of the Act. Apart from section 188, there are several other provisions in the 2013 Act that deal with specific types of transactions with specific types of parties which may be covered within the definition of ‘related party’, for example, section 185 deals with loans to Directors and to certain other parties in which the Directors are interested; section 192 places restrictions in respect of non-cash transactions with Directors and certain other specified persons; and a number of sections that deal with managerial remuneration.

Further, the Listing Regulations also prescribe specific regulations which govern RPTs for the listed entities. While some provisions are common, however, with the recent amendment to the regulations, the Listing Regulations have been made much more stringent as discussed in this article.

With the aim to review and strengthen the regulatory norms pertaining to RPTs, undertaken by listed entities in India, SEBI constituted a Working Group in November, 2019 comprising members from the Primary Market Advisory Committee (PMAC)1, including persons from the industry, intermediaries, proxy advisers, stock exchanges, lawyers, professional bodies, etc.

On the basis of the recommendations of the working group, SEBI as per Notification dated 9th November, 2021 has further amended provisions relating to RPTs under the SEBI Listing Regulations.

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1 Reference may be made to SEBI Meeting – Review of Regulatory Provisions
 
 
EFFECTIVE DATE
The SEBI LODR Amendment Regulations are applicable in a phased manner; certain amendments will be effective from 1st April, 2022, while the remaining amendments will be effective from 1st April, 2023 (as specified in the regulations).SEBI LODR has been amended, inter alia, in respect of the following:
* Definition of ‘related party’ (RP) and ‘related party transactions’ (RPT),
* Change in monetary limits for classification of material RPTs,
* Disclosure requirements for RPTs,
* Process to be followed by Audit Committee for approval of RPTs.

The objective of this article is to provide an overview of the recent amendments made by SEBI and the auditor’s role in the audit of RPTs.

OVERVIEW OF THE AMENDMENTS
Definition of related party
The working group constituted by SEBI felt that the promoter or the promoter group may exercise control over and influence the decision-making of the listed entity. Accordingly, the recommendation was made to consider every person or entity forming part of the promoter or promoter group, irrespective of their shareholding in the listed entity, as a related party.

Existing regulations consider any person or entity to be a related party if he / she or it belongs to the promoter or promoter group of the listed entity holding 20% or more of shareholding in the listed entity.

The amended regulations consider any person or entity to be a related party if
* he / she / it is belonging to the promoter or promoter group of the listed entity (i.e., irrespective of shareholding) or
* if any person or entity is holding 20% or more equity shares either directly or on a beneficial interest basis as per section 89 of the 2013 Act at any time during the preceding financial year and effective from 1st April, 2023 if any person or entity is holding 10% or more of equity shares at any time during the immediately preceding financial year. This amendment will cover persons or entities holding shares as above even if he / it does not form part of the promoter or promoter group of the listed entity.

The rationale behind lowering of these amendments has been explained in the SEBI agenda2 which states that a significant percentage of Indian businesses are structured as intrinsically linked group entities that operate as a single economic unit, with the promoters exercising influence over the entire group. Thus, the promoter or promoter group may exercise control over a company irrespective of the extent of shareholding. There is also the possibility of a shareholder not being classified as a promoter but who may be exercising influence over the decisions of the listed entity by virtue of shareholding.

With the revised definition of related party and the changes in threshold to 10% w.e.f. from 1st April, 2023 it may pose a practical challenge for companies in identification of related parties, in conducting their day-to-day business since companies will need to keep track of such entities at any time during the past financial year, and transactions with such entities will require Audit Committee approval. Companies need to evaluate whether such a shareholder may have ceased to hold any shares in the listed entity in the year of applicability of the amended regulations or in a subsequent year.

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2 Reference may be made to the SEBI meeting – Review of Regulatory Provisions
DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The scope of the term has been made significantly wider, principally with a view to bring transactions with subsidiaries (listed or unlisted, Indian or foreign) within its ambit.As per existing regulations, the definition covers transfer of resources, services or obligations between a listed entity and an RP, regardless of whether a price is charged, whether there is a single or a group of transactions.

Some of the corporate actions such as issue of securities on preferential basis, rights issue, buy-backs, payment of dividend, sub-division or consolidation, etc., where these provisions are uniformly applicable / offered to all shareholders in proportion to their shareholding, have been excluded from the ambit of the definition.

SEBI has also revised thresholds for determining ‘materiality’ of an RPT. A transaction with a related party shall be considered material if the transaction(s) to be entered into individually or taken together with previous transactions during a financial year, exceed Rs. 1,000 crores or 10% of the annual consolidated turnover of the listed entity as per its last audited financial statements, whichever is lower (as per existing regulations, the threshold was only 10% of the annual consolidated annual turnover of the listed entity).

It is noteworthy that the scope of RPTs has been extended to include transactions that not only have a direct nexus with an RP but eventually also those which would indirectly benefit the RP. This will entail significant efforts from companies, and they will be required to scrutinise individual transactions with a third party and may also require listed entities to demonstrate that the RP is not benefited from a third-party transaction.

The meaning of purpose and effect’ has not been defined in the SEBI Regulations. In common parlance, purpose would mean to have an intent to benefit the RP and effect is that it actually happens indirectly; it is more of substance-based assessment and management will require to undertake critical evaluation of documentation and the commercial intention of the transaction.

PRIOR APPROVAL FROM AUDIT COMMITTEE AND SHAREHOLDERS
The amended regulations require prior approval of the Audit Committee and shareholders of the listed entity for all related party transactions and subsequent material modifications thereto… Provided that only those members of the Audit Committee, who are Independent Directors, shall approve related party transactions.

There is no need to have prior approval of the Audit Committee and shareholders of a listed entity for a related party transaction where the listed entity is not a party and its listed subsidiary is a party if Regulations 23 and 15(2) of SEBI Listing Regulations are applicable to such listed subsidiary.

1. The definition of the term ‘material modifications’
will be required to be defined by the Audit Committee and disclosed as part
of the policy on materiality.

An RPT to which a subsidiary of a listed entity
is a party (even if the listed entity by itself is not a party) shall require
prior approval from the Audit Committee of the listed entity, if the value of
such transaction (individually or together with previous transaction during
the F.Y.) exceeds

I. 10% of the annual consolidated turnover, as
per the last audited financials of the listed entity (with effect from 1st
April, 2022)

II. 10% of the annual consolidated turnover, as
per the last audited financials of the subsidiary (with effect from 1st
April, 2023)

The scope of an RPT which requires prior shareholders’ and Audit Committee approval has been expanded. Depending on the type of approval, prior approval may be taken, for example, for omnibus approval it may be before the next financial year, while for contract or transaction-based approval, it may be immediately before entering into an RPT. It is not clear whether the regulations will apply to RPTs which were entered into before 1st April 2022. While SEBI may issue a clarification in this regard, one may take a view that the regulations will be applicable prospectively considering there are no specific transitional provisions specified in the amended regulations.

DISCLOSURES
Schedule V to the Listing Regulations specifies the additional disclosures required to be provided by listed entities in their annual report. This, inter alia, includes related party disclosures and disclosures pertaining to the corporate governance report.

Existing timeline is as under:

For equity listed entities – disclosure for the
half year to be submitted within 30 days from the date of publication of its
standalone and consolidated financial results for the half year.

For high value debt listed entities – disclosures
for the half year at the time of submission of their standalone financial
results (on a comply or explain basis up to 31st March, 2023) and
on a mandatory basis from 1st April, 2023.

Revised timeline is as under:

For equity listed entities – within 15 days from
the date of publication of standalone and consolidated financial results for
the half year.

With effect from 1st April, 2023 – on
the date of publication of its standalone and consolidated financial results.

For high value debt listed entities – along with
its standalone results for the half year.

SEBI has issued another Circular dated 22nd November, 2021 which provides detailed disclosure formats of RPTs and information to be placed before the Audit Committee and the shareholders for consideration of the same.

AUDITORS’ ROLE IN AUDIT OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The corporate scandals over a period of time have indicated that related parties are often involved in cases of fraudulent financial reporting. The RPTs may provide scope for distorting financial information in financial statements and not presenting accurate information to the decision-makers and stakeholders. The audit of RPTs and transactions presents a particular challenge to auditors due to many reasons, including the following:
(1) Related party relationships and transactions are not always easy to identify due to complex structures
and arrangements;
(2) Management is responsible for identifying all related parties yet may not fully understand the definition of a related party under various regulations or may not want to provide information on the grounds of sensitivity;
(3) Many companies may not have effective internal controls in place for authorising, recording and tracking related party transactions.
(4) Auditors of smaller companies may find it difficult to identify related party relationships and transactions because management may not understand the related party disclosure requirements or their significance. It is therefore important for auditors to be clear about what needs to be disclosed so that they can advise management on the responsibility to prepare financial statements that comply with the relevant accounting framework.

ICAI issued SA 550 Related Parties which deals with the auditor’s responsibilities regarding related party relationships and transactions. Under the current auditing framework, auditors are required to focus on three areas:
1) identification of previously unidentified or undisclosed related parties or transactions.
2) significant related party transactions outside the normal course of business. Related parties may operate through an extensive and complex range of relationships and structures, with a corresponding increase in the complexity of related party transactions.
3) assertions that related party transactions are at arm’s length.

Auditors are required to evaluate whether the effects of RPTs are such that they prevent the financial statements from achieving a true and fair presentation.

With the given plethora of amendments in SEBI regulations, the responsibilities of auditors have been enhanced even further. The auditors need to understand the implications of the amendments on the company’s systems and processes of identification and disclosure of RPTs. The auditor may consider the following illustrative work-steps while conducting an audit of related party relationships and transactions to enhance the quality of the audit.

(i) Plan the audit of related party relationships and transactions by updating existing information, and by obtaining a list of related parties from clients, or compile a list based on discussions with clients. Needless to say, the auditor should consider the amendments to related party regulations for listed entities and their subsidiaries while obtaining such information.

(ii) Make inquiries from the management about changes from the prior period, the nature of the relationships, whether any transactions have been entered into and the type and purpose of the transactions.

(iii) Understand the nature, size and complexity of the businesses and use family trees or document group structures under various laws / statutes and regulations (e.g., income-tax – transfer pricing and indirect tax – GST) to help identify related parties and relationships between the client and related parties.

(iv) Consider the impact of undisclosed related party relationships and transactions as a potential fraud risk.

(v) Understand the controls, if any, that management has put in place to identify, account for, and disclose related party transactions and to approve significant transactions with related parties, and significant transactions outside the normal course of business. Also understand management’s plan to update such controls for change in related party regulations.

(vi) Perform procedures to confirm identified related party relationships and transactions and identify others including:
a. inspecting bank and legal confirmations obtained as part of other audit procedures.
b. inspecting minutes of shareholder and management meetings and any other records or documents considered necessary, such as:
*    Other third-party confirmations (i.e., in addition to bank and legal confirmations)
*    Entity income-tax returns, tax filings and related correspondence
*    Information supplied by the entity to regulatory authorities
*    Records of the entity’s investments and those of its pension plans
*    Contracts or other agreements (including, for example, partnership agreements and side agreements or other arrangements) with key management or those charged with governance
*    Significant contracts renegotiated by the entity during the period
c. Ensure compliance with all the requirements of sections 179, 180, 185, 186, 187 of the Companies Act, 2013 and rules thereunder.
d. When there are other components of the company that are not audited by the parent auditor, coordinate audit procedures with the component auditors to obtain necessary information relating to intercompany transactions and balances.
e. Review minutes and other agreements for support for loans or advances and for evidence of liens, pledges or security interests related to receivables from, or loans and advances to, subsidiaries.
f. Examine the agreements entered between the company and the related parties.

(vii) Consider any fraud risk factors in the context of the requirements of SA 240 Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements.
(viii) Establish the nature of significant transactions outside the company’s normal course of business and whether related parties could be involved, by inquiring of management.
(ix) Consider any arm’s length assertions and obtain supporting evidence from third parties.
(x) Document the identity of related parties and the nature of related party relationships.
(xi) Obtain a representation that management has disclosed the identity of related parties, relationships and transactions of which they are aware, and that related parties and transactions have been appropriately accounted for and disclosed.
(xii) Communicate significant related party matters arising during the audit to those charged with governance unless all of those charged with governance are involved in its management.
(xiii) Ensure that the accounting for and disclosure of related parties and related party transactions are appropriate and in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework.
(xiv) Reporting of Key Audit Matter (KAM) and determining whether identification of related parties and transactions with related parties is a KAM. SA 701 states that events or transactions that had a significant effect on the financial statements or the audit, may include significant transactions with related parties, significant transactions outside the normal course of business, unusual transactions. The auditor should assess whether a KAM on RPT is required and which require significant auditors’ attention.

Amendments in Corporate Governance Report
The companies as well as auditors should take note of additional disclosures in the corporate governance report by the listed entity and its subsidiaries of ‘Loans and advances’ in the nature of loans to firms / companies in which the Directors are interested by name and amount. A compliance certificate from either the auditors or practising company secretaries regarding compliance of conditions of corporate governance is required to be annexed with the Directors’ report.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The SEBI LODR Amendment Regulations on RPTs will ensure greater transparency and better corporate governance which will safeguard the interests of all stakeholders and strengthen the regulatory framework. These amendments also enhance the responsibilities of the Audit Committees and the Independent Directors with respect to RPT approvals; Audit Committees will need to define ‘material modifications’ to RPTs, require amendment to the RPT policy, revise data base of RPTs with RPTs of subsidiaries and their value. In the light of the amended provisions, listed entities would need to revisit their list of related parties, RPTs, identify material RPTs which need Audit Committee / shareholder approval and comply with the additional disclosure and documentation requirements. The listed entities will be required to identify new related party transactions based on a review of the present arrangements, update the related party policy to capture amendments and recommend updating of processes, controls for capturing additional data requirement.

The auditors have an important role to play in reporting on related party transactions given the existing responsibilities under Standards on Auditing and amendments made in the Companies (Audit and Auditor’s Reporting) Rules applicable for the financial year ending March, 2022 onwards which requires auditors to obtain representations from management that (other than those disclosed in the financial statements) no funds have been provided to intermediaries with an understanding that the intermediaries would lend or invest or provide guarantee, etc., on behalf of the ultimate beneficiaries. A similar reporting requirement has also been prescribed for receipt of funds from funding parties.

DO CONGLOMERATE STRUCTURES FACILITATE BUSINESS EFFICIENCY?

A very common business structure used across the world for business control and management is that of Holding Companies. Business Promoter Groups hold shareholding interest in entities through the process of intercompany shareholding, everything finally rising to the top into a company which is called the ultimate Holding Company of that Business Group.

The purpose of this article is not financial analysis but to attempt to understand the reasons for variations and what could be the takeaways for corporate businesses.

These Holding Companies could have reporting entities (mainly subsidiaries) on a geographical basis (subsidiaries overseas) or on different business basis (national or international).

The writer analysed ten entities which have standalone businesses and investments in subsidiaries / joint ventures / associates. For the purpose of further discussion, two entities were dropped – one had losses and the other had negative working capital. The remaining eight entities are:

1. Infosys Ltd.;
2. Hindustan Unilever Ltd.;
3. Tata Chemicals Ltd.;
4. WIPRO Ltd.;
5. Tata Consumer Products Ltd.;
6. Maruti Suzuki Ltd.;
7. Godrej Consumer Products Ltd.;
8. Dr. Reddy’s Labs Ltd.

These entities were analysed for six Key High-Level Ratios at Standalone Business and Consolidated Financials basis:
a) Net Profit Before Tax to Total Revenue – as %;
b) Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) to Total Revenue – as %;
c) Earnings before Interest, Depreciation, Amortisation and Tax (EBITDA) to Total Revenue – as %;
d) Return on Capital Employed – as % of EBIT divided by Capital Employed;
e) Turnover of Capital Employed – Number of Times Capital Employed is turned to get Total Revenue on annualised basis;
f) Working Capital Turnover – Number of times Working Capital is turned to get Total Revenue on annualised basis.

In ratios (a) to (d) above, the higher percentage is better and in the last two turnover ratios, a higher number of times indicates improved efficiency. For all eight companies, a comparison of the ratios at standalone and consolidated entity were done and the following were the results.

Findings from the ratios:
1) In two specific companies all six ratios at the Consolidated Financials stage were lower than at standalone stage;
2) In four companies, five ratios at CFS were lower than standalone entities;
3) In one company, four ratios at CFS were lower than standalone entity;
4) In one company, two ratios at CFS were lower than standalone entity – it was the only case where consolidated financials could be said to be stronger than standalone financials.

Clearly, the performance of the satellite units is NOT adding value to the standalone Holding Company.

The questions that one needs to ask are:
(a) Through the process of creating multiple subsidiaries, are we losing supervision of performance and management control on the business? This is a serious issue at the stage that India is – since inefficiency of Financial / HR / Management resources results in less than optimum performance;
(b) The Holding Company for whatever reasons – emotional on retaining / nurturing businesses or improper analysis of business study – thereby holding on to companies / businesses that it should legitimately divest;
(c) Is the financial reporting of business performance of a good quality so the right red flags are raised, or do matters suddenly blow up and management is left wondering what could have gone amiss;
(d) Are subsidiaries allowed a free run, with inadequate supervision or manned by a management cadre which is not up to the task? Are there no demands of performance on them since the subsidiaries are small businesses, not paid much attention to;
(e) Is there excessive management focus on holding company standalone businesses and the focus on other related entities is much less, resulting in great surprises when things go wrong.

Whatever may be the reasons, the recent IL&FS and DHFL cases have shown the need for much superior monitoring of conglomerate structures. Often, many skeletons start coming out of the closet on a trigger event occurring and they impact the ultimate Holding Company. There is no doubt that Boards of Directors, Auditors, Rating agencies, Capital markets (mainly minority shareholders) have been stung by these two cases. The need to focus on Consolidated Financials Statements is being felt stronger than ever before. CFS is no longer an accounting exercise devoid of practical applications.

One way of improving Indian corporate efficiency is ensuring that the variation in performance parameters in standalone and consolidated financials is not too significant to create cause for concern. In the eight companies forming part of this study, the variations were quite significant, reflecting the need for tighter management review and control.

It is my opinion that all companies which are listed Holding Companies and entities which are not listed but have a certain large size on Total Revenues and / or Net Worth, must have the following done for their fulfilment of legal requirements:

1) Look at the possibility of Holding Company dividends being considered not at standalone entity level but at consolidated financials level so that there is proper emphasis on performance and linking the same with dividends payouts;
2) Managerial remuneration under the Companies Act MUST BE guided not by standalone entity performance but by Holding Company (CFS) level performance.

There is reason to believe that both the above actions will force Promoter Groups to focus on overall performance rather than on standalone performance.

Note – The author wishes to thank the professionals that he has connected with for the purpose of clarifications on the subject of this Article.

TRADING ON SELF-GENERATED RESEARCH – SEBI’S ORDERS MAKE IT ILLEGAL UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

BACKGROUND
One would think that trading in shares based on one’s own research based on publicly available information is the commonest and the most logical thing to do and cannot imaginably be held to be illegal. Of course, many also trade on the advice of others such as professionals or even friends; equally obvious now is that trading on the basis of inside information is self-evidently illegal. And so is front-running illegal. But it would seem absurd to say that if one does meticulous research from publicly available information and then trades on it, it could be held to be illegal – and invite serious consequences! But, curiously, that is precisely one of the legal conclusions that the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has drawn in at least two recent orders. To be clear, the facts as found by SEBI are peculiar. But, as a ruling in law, it does sound to be flawed. There are a couple of other similar issues in these orders which are also of concern.

The cases relate to recommendations for trading in scrips by persons (‘Hosts’) on a financial news channel and dealings by persons alleged to be closely associated with such hosts. The primary questions are three: Whether dealing by such persons (the host / persons closely associated with such host) themselves with advance knowledge of such recommendations is illegal under securities laws and hence punishable? Whether creation of momentum in the market by dealing in advance of such recommendations is illegal? The third question, which partly overlaps with the earlier two, is whether such dealings and practices are so unethical and unfair that they amount to violation of securities laws?

THE SEBI ORDERS
There are primarily two orders that SEBI has issued in this matter. The first order, an interim one, is in the case of Hemant Ghai (the host) and his relatives (order dated 13th January, 2021). This interim order and directions issued thereunder were confirmed by an order dated 2nd September, 2021.

The second order (dated 4th October, 2021), also an interim one, is in the case of Pradeep Pandya and certain members / HUFs of the Furiya family.

It may be added that these orders are / may be further contested and in any case be under further investigation / response from parties, being interim orders. Hence, the alleged findings of SEBI as discussed here are as per the SEBI orders. The focus here is to highlight the important and interesting legal issues involved and the possible ramifications of such cases.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND ORDER PASSED
Television channels (and even social media / streaming services) commonly have programmes where a host discusses and often makes recommendations to buy / sell a particular security. The recommendation is usually accompanied by a detailed presentation / graphics, etc., giving the justification for such recommendations. This recommendation may be made in an exclusive show by such a host who is associated with such channel or in general news where an ‘external expert’ is interviewed and who gives his recommendation.

As stated, there were two orders. In the first case, Hemant Ghai hosted / co-hosted various shows on news channel CNBC Awaaz. Recommendations about buying or selling a particular scrip were made on one such show. It was observed that as soon as the recommendation was made, the price of the scrip moved sharply in the direction recommended. That is to say, for example, if the recommendation was to buy a particular scrip, the price of that scrip immediately rose sharply in the market, obviously, as SEBI pointed out, because of such recommendation. Even the volumes rose very significantly on that day. The rise in price was far higher than the comparative movement in the stock index and there was no specific news from the company whose shares were recommended justifying such a rise. SEBI compared the price before and after the recommendation and noted that the rise in price (and volumes, too) was highest on the day of such recommendation. Similar findings were made by SEBI in the second order in the case of Pradeep Pandya’s show.

What was, however, found was that certain persons alleged to be associated with such hosts (‘associates’) repeatedly carried out trading to profit from such recommendation. Such persons bought (in the case of a buy recommendation) on the day before (or earlier on the same day) of the recommendation. When the price of the shares rose sharply after the recommendations, the associates sold the shares and made handsome profits.

Furthermore, such trades were carried out under the Buy-Today-Sell-Tomorrow (BTST) mechanism. This ensured that there was no need to even make payment for the purchase and take delivery.

SEBI made detailed inquiries on how the hosts and the respective associates were linked by taking into account family relations, call data records, addresses, etc. Accordingly, it held that the associates were aware in advance what recommendation was going to be made and hence traded in advance of such recommendation. When the price moved in the desired direction after the recommendations were released, the trades were reversed and profits made.

In the order in the matter of Hemant Ghai, calculations were made alleging that aggregate profits of about Rs. 2.95 crores were generated. In the case of Pradeep Pandya, similar calculations were made alleging profits of Rs. 8.39 crores.

The parties concerned were directed to impound these profits and deposit them in an escrow account. The hosts were also debarred from continuing to make any such recommendations till further orders. The parties were also debarred from dealing in securities till further orders. As stated earlier, the interim order in the matter of Hemant Ghai was confirmed after giving the parties a hearing.

INTERESTING POINTS ARISING OUT OF THE ORDERS
SEBI held, under the interim order, the parties (the hosts / associates) prima facie guilty of violation of multiple provisions of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (‘the Regulations’). It was held that they traded on the basis of advance information that was not public. It was further held that trading in such manner, particularly without intimating the public that they have carried out such trades, was an unethical / unfair practice which in the light of several rulings amounted to violation of the Regulations. It was also held, in the Pradeep Pandya case, that by trading in advance, a momentum was created which contributed to price movement which, too, was in violation of the Regulations.

SEBI held, on the basis of the preponderance of probability, that the parties were guilty. For this purpose it relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following cases: SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. [(2018) 143 CLA 15 (SC)]; and SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera [134 SCL 481 (SC)].

SEBI also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel [(2017) 141 CLA 254 (SC)] for taking a broader and contextual view of what constitute unfair trade practices under the Regulations. Accordingly, it held that the practices alleged to have been carried out by the parties were in violation of the Regulations.

A few interesting points arise. The primary issue is whether trading on material self-generated information / analysis can be a violation of the Regulations? Can it be said that to have such advance information and trading on it amounts to such violation?

It is respectfully submitted that such ruling is absurd. Persons trading in markets, particularly informed and expert persons, often collate information of a wide nature and arrive at their own conclusion. There is no duty in law to publish such self-generated analysis and conclusions in advance to the public before carrying out trading on their own account. Investing and speculation in the market would, it is submitted, come to a standstill if this was held to be a requirement. Let us compare this aspect with two other types of dealings which are now well settled to be violations – insider dealing and front-running. In case of insider dealing, a person has access to unpublished price-sensitive information about a company and he deals on the basis of such information. It does not need elaborate explanation as to why this is illegal and indeed specific regulations make such dealings illegal. In the case of front-running, persons entrusted with price-sensitive information carry out trades on their own account first and then carry out the trades of the persons who have entrusted them with such information. They, too, thus profit and now such dealings are well settled to be violations of the Regulations.

In the case of self-generated information, there can hardly be a case of having advance information illegitimately obtained on the basis of which trades were carried out and that this is violation of the Regulations. It is submitted that this finding of SEBI has no basis in law or logic and the order needs to be reconsidered on this point.

Let us take the next issue which is a bit more contentious. The parties did not disclose to the public that they had already carried out the trades in advance of the time when they made the recommendations. To begin with, SEBI has not pointed out any specific provision in law which requires them to make such declaration. Interestingly, in most of the transactions, it was not even as if the parties made trades opposite to what they recommended. In other words, it was not as if the parties were, for example, selling while recommending to the public to buy. They did sell but after having bought first and after the price rose.

It was not even the case of SEBI that the price fell sharply after the parties sold the shares. Indeed, SEBI gave data in several cases which did not show any fall and the only point which was made was that the price did not rise as much in the days after the day of the recommendations. So it was not even a case of what is commonly known as ‘pump-and-dump’, which is a well-known fraudulent practice where unscrupulous persons by various means make the price rise to artificially high levels and then offload the shares, leaving the buyers in the lurch as the price falls soon thereafter.

Moreover, SEBI has not even claimed that the recommendation was deliberately manipulative and there was no informed basis for the recommendation. Indeed, as the SEBI orders point out, often the scrips recommended were large, well-known companies.

The allegation that in the Pradeep Pandya order the parties carried out heavy trades with an intention to thereby (even without the recommendation) result in an artificial momentum in one direction and this is thus a violation of the Regulations, of course does make sense. It would indeed be a case of pump-and-dump.

CONCLUSION
It would indeed be disturbing for the public to know that hosts of TV shows buy (or sell, as the case may be) first for themselves the scrips they recommend and sell when the price rises when there is a heavy rush to buy following the recommendation. Cynics would, of course, argue that there is no free lunch and indeed their own buying the very scrips they recommend to buy is actually having faith in their own recommendations. But holding that this is illegal and hence punishable is, it is submitted, a flawed view.

The matters are under further investigation. There could be prolonged proceedings resulting in a final order which could then be appealed against at various levels. It would be interesting to see how SEBI and appellate authorities deal with the issues. A wide range of persons, formally and informally, make recommendations about scrips. The final ruling could make such persons change the manner in which they make recommendations, what disclosures they make and perhaps debar certain types of trades.

LIABILITY OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR BOUNCED CHEQUES

INTRODUCTION
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act’) is one of the few provisions which is equally well known both by lawmen and laymen. The section imposes a criminal liability in case of a dishonoured or bounced cheque. In cases where the defendant is a company, there is a tendency on the part of the plaintiff to implicate all the Directors of the company, irrespective of whether they are professional Directors / Independent / Non-Executive Directors. There have been numerous representations from chambers of commerce and professional / trade bodies to the Government that this section should be amended to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors who are not connected with the day-to-day management of the company. However, there has been no action on this front. Interestingly, the Act was amended in 2002 to provide that the provisions of section 138 would not apply to a Nominee Director appointed by the Central / State Government or by a financial corporation owned / controlled by the Central / State Government. One wonders why a similar exemption was not provided to other professional Directors.

SECTION 138 OF THE ACT
Let us pause for a moment and examine the impugned section. Section 138 provides that if any cheque is drawn by a person to another person and if the cheque is dishonoured because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s bank account, then such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and / or with a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque. Earlier, the maximum imprisonment was for one year; however, it was extended to two years by the Amendment Act of 2002.
    
In order to invoke the provisions of section 138, the following three steps are necessary:
(i) the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(ii) once the payee is informed by the bank about the dishonour of the cheque, he (the payee) must, within 30 days of such information, make a demand for the payment of the amount of the cheque by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque; and
(iii) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the said notice. Earlier, the time given to the drawer for responding to the notice was 15 days; but this was extended to 30 days by the Amendment Act of 2002.

A fourth step is specified under section 142 which provides that a complaint must be made to the Court within one month of the date from which the cause of action arises (i.e., the notice period). A rebuttable presumption is drawn by the Act that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
    
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PERSONS IN CHARGE
Section 141 provides that in case the drawer of the cheque is a company then every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible for the company’s conduct of business, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished. However, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, then he would not be liable to the punishment. The section also exempts Government Nominee Directors. Although the section speaks about a company, the explanation to the section extends the same position to a firm, any other body corporate or association of individuals.
    
In almost all cases of cheque-bouncing involving companies, firms, etc., the complainant files a case and implicates all the Directors of the company, including the Independent and Non-Executive Directors. Thus, professionals such as Chartered Accountants, lawyers, etc., who are only involved in broader policy and strategic decisions of the company, or with the Audit Committee or Shareholders’ Grievance Committee and are in no way connected with the day-to-day management of the company, are also made a party to the criminal proceedings.
    
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS
The Supreme Court has passed a landmark decision in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89. This decision is by a three-Member Larger Bench in response to a reference application made to it by a two-Member Bench of the Supreme Court. Three very important issues were placed before the Court for its consideration:
(a)  Whether while making a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act must the complaint specifically state that the persons accused were in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company?
(b) Whether merely because a person is a Director of a company would he be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary?
(c) Would the signatory of the cheque and / or the Managing Directors / Joint Managing Director always be responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and hence could be proceeded against?
    
The Court held that since the provision fastens criminal liability, the conditions have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the company, had a role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable. Persons who had nothing to do with the matter need not be roped in. A complaint must contain material to enable the Magistrate to make up his mind for issuing the process. A ground should be made out in the complaint for proceeding against the respondent. At the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the complaint, and where the allegations in the complaint or the chargesheet do not constitute an offence against a person, the complaint is liable to be dismissed.

The Supreme Court observed that there is nothing in the Act to suggest that simply by being a Director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on its behalf. It may happen that a Director may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company. He may only attend Board meetings, decide policy matters and guide the course of business of a company. The role of a Director in a company is a question of fact depending on the peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal rule that a Director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs.

A very fitting comment made by the Court was that ‘…there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it Director, Manager or Secretary.’ What is relevant is the roles assigned to the officers in a company and not the mere use of a particular designation of an officer. Thus, merely mentioning all Directors in a compliant without anything more may not be enough. The accused should be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and a person cannot be subjected to liability of criminal prosecution without it being averred in the complaint that he satisfies those requirements. It is not that all and sundry connected with a company are made liable u/s 141. A person who is in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company would naturally know why the cheque in question was issued and why it was dishonoured. Specific allegations in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case that is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.

When it came to the position of a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, the Court took a different view since these are persons in charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of its business. In respect of such persons, the onus is on them to prove their innocence, i.e., when the offence was committed they had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

The Supreme Court laid down another important principle, that the liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a company may also be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company at the relevant time. It once again reiterates that liability depends on the role he plays in the affairs of a company and not on the designation or status. If being a Director or Manager or Secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section would have said so. Instead of ‘every person’ the section would have said ‘every Director, Manager or Secretary in a Company is liable’ …etc. The Court held that the Legislature was aware that a case of criminal liability has serious consequences for the accused. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action. Thus, even a non-Director can be liable u/s 141.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court answered the queries posed to it as under:

(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint u/s 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of section 141 and has to be made in the complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) Merely being a Director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141. A Director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.
(c) The Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Holders of such positions in a company become liable u/s 141. Merely by virtue of being a Managing Director or Joint Managing Director these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, they get covered u/s 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the dishonour and will be covered u/s 141.

This very vital decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in cases such as S.K. Alagh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 (5) SCC 662; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. vs. Datar Switchgear Ltd., 2010 (10) SCC 479; GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust vs. India Infoline Limited, 2013 (4) SCC 505, etc.
    
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION
This issue was again examined recently by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya vs. M/s Gharrkul Industries Pvt. Ltd., Cr. A, No. 1206/2021, order dated 27th September, 2021. In this case, the respondent filed a complaint u/s 138 with specific averments in the complaint that all the Directors (including those who were not signatories to the bounced cheque) were involved in the day-to-day management / business affairs of the company whose cheque had bounced.

Accordingly, the trial court issued summonses against all the Directors. The Directors contended that they were only Non-Executive Directors and, hence, no complaint could lie against them. Against this argument, the respondent proved that the Form filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs showed the Directors as Executive Directors. Hence, the matter was a fit case for a trial which needed to be decided by the Court and the entire process needed to be gone through without quashing the summons at source.

The Court held that the settled principle was that for Directors who were not signatories / not MDs, it was clear that it was necessary to aver in the complaint filed u/s 138 that at the relevant time when the offence was committed the Directors were in charge and were actually responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

The Court further held that this averment assumed more importance because it was the basic and essential averment which persuaded the Magistrate to issue a process against the Director. If this basic averment was missing, the Magistrate was legally justified in not issuing a process. In the case on hand, the Court observed that the complainant had specifically averred that all the Directors were in charge. Further, the MCA Forms also demonstrated the same. Hence, this was an issue on which a trial is appropriate and the complaint cannot be quashed at source.

EPILOGUE
Although this is a judgment under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has several far-reaching consequences and its ratio descendi can be applied under various other statutes which affix a vicarious criminal liability on Directors in respect of offences committed by a company.
    
One can only hope that taking a cue from this epoch-making Supreme Court judgment, the Government would amend the Negotiable Instruments Act to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors. In fact, such an amendment is also welcome in other similar statutes prescribing a criminal liability on the Directors.

FEMA FOCUS

(A) Amendment in Foreign Direct Investment Limits
The Government of India has liberalised its extant FDI policy and made a few changes in the sectoral caps for FDI in the insurance, petroleum and telecom sectors. These changes are explained as under:

Sr. No.

Sector / Activity

% of Equity / FDI Cap

Entry route

Erstwhile limit

New limit

1

Insurance1 (Refer Note 1)

49%

74%

Automatic

2

Petroleum
refining by the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), without any disinvestment
or dilution of domestic equity in the existing PSUs2

49%

49%
(100% allowed under automatic route where in-principle approval for strategic
disinvestment of a PSU has been granted by the Government)

Automatic

3

Telecom3

Automatic route up to 49% and beyond that under approval route

100% under Automatic route

Automatic

Note 1: The increase in the sectoral cap for insurance companies from 49% to 74% under the automatic route is subject to several conditions mentioned in the Press Note No. 2 (2021 Series) dated 14th June, 2021. Most of the conditions are the same as mentioned in the FDI Policy, 2020; one major change is with respect to constitution of the Board of Directors for insurance companies due to increase in their limit to 74%. Under the new condition, the Indian insurance company that has received foreign direct investment would need to ensure that the following persons are resident Indian citizens:
• Majority of Directors of such insurance companies;
• Majority of its Key Management Persons; and
• at least one among the Chairperson of the Board, the Managing Director and the Chief Executive Officer

______________________________________________________________________________________________

1   Press Note No. 2 (2021
Series), dated 14-6-2021

2   Press Note No. 3 (2021
Series), dated 29-7-2021

3   Press Note No. 4 (2021
Series), dated 06-10-2021

Further, the definition of Key Management Persons is the same as that defined in the guidelines issued by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (‘IRDAI’) on corporate governance for insurers in India.

(B) Amendment in Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations4
Under the existing Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2015 (‘Export Regulations’), the rate of interest payable on advance payment received by the exporter from the buyer was capped at 100 basis points over the LIBOR rate. However, due to impending cessation of LIBOR as a benchmark rate, RBI has now permitted the use of any other applicable benchmark as directed by the RBI instead of the earlier specified only LIBOR rate.

(C) Review of FDI policy on downstream investment made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis5
The Government has now clarified that investments made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis would be deemed to be domestic investments at par with investments made by residents. Accordingly, investments made by an Indian entity which is owned and controlled by an NRI on non-repatriation basis shall not be considered for calculation of indirect foreign investment.

(D) ECB – Relaxation in period for parking of unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits6
Under the existing ECB Regulations, ECB borrowers are permitted to park unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits with AD Banks for a maximum period of 12 months cumulatively. However, in view of the Covid situation, RBI has now relaxed this provision and accordingly unutilised ECB proceeds drawn on or before 1st March, 2020 can be parked in term deposits with AD Banks prospectively for an additional period up to 1st March, 2022.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

4   A.P. (Dir. Series 2021-22)
Circular No.13, Dated 28-9-2021

5   Press Note No. 1 (2021
Series), Dated 19-03-2021

6   A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.
01, Dated 17-6-2021

(E) Appointment of Special Director (Appeals) and his jurisdiction7
The Central Government has changed the jurisdiction of the Regional Special Director (Appeals) for hearing appeals filed against the order passed by the adjudicating authority under FEMA. The Table below prescribes the authority and its jurisdiction for hearing appeals:

Sr. No.

Special Director
(Appeals)

Station

Zone

Sub-zone

Jurisdiction

1.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-23, Delhi

Delhi

Delhi, Chandigarh Jaipur, Jalandhar and Srinagar

Dehradun and Shimla

States of Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal
Pradesh and Union Territory of Chandigarh, Union Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh, National Capital Territory of Delhi

2.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-20, Kolkata

Kolkata

Kolkata, Guwahati Lucknow and Patna

Bhubaneswar, Allahabad and Ranchi

States of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh,
Sikkim, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar
Pradesh and Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar

3.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-47, Mumbai

Mumbai

Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Panaji

Surat, Nagpur, Indore and Raipur

States of Maharashtra, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu

4.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-18, Chennai

Chennai

Chennai, Kochi Bengaluru and Hyderabad

Madurai and Kozhikode

States of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana, Union Territory of Puducherry and Union Territory of Lakshadweep

    
(F) Amendment in Master Direction on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly-Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad8
RBI has clarified that sponsor contribution by an Indian Party (‘IP’) to an Alternative Investment Fund (‘AIF’) set up in Overseas Jurisdictions, including International Financial Services Centres (‘IFSCs’) as per the laws of the host jurisdiction, will be treated as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI). Accordingly, an IP can set up an AIF in overseas jurisdictions, including IFSCs, under the automatic route, provided it complies with relevant regulations of FEMA 120/2004-RB (‘FEMA 120’).

Further, RBI, in consultation with SEBI, has enhanced the limit of overseas investment by Domestic Venture Capital Funds / Alternative Investment Funds registered with SEBI in equity and equity-linked instruments of off-shore Venture Capital Undertakings from the existing USD 750 million to USD 1,500 million.

Also, for investment by way of swap of shares, it is clarified that an Indian company can issue capital instruments to a person resident outside India under the automatic route if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector which is under automatic route or with prior Government approval, if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector under Government route as per Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 dated 17th October, 2019, as amended from time to time.

Additionally, RBI has also issued a clarification in para B.22 of the Master Direction on ODI which pertains to opening of a foreign currency account abroad by an Indian Party. RBI has now clarified that in addition to existing conditions, such account can be opened only if the Indian Party is eligible to make ODI under the provisions of FEMA, 120.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
7    Notification S.O. 3958(E) [F. No. K-11022/15/2021-AD.ED], Dated 24-9-2021
8    A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 04 dated 12th May, 2021 and SEBI/HO/IMD/DF6

(G) Clarification for the purpose of computation of late submission fee (‘LSF’)
Under the existing FDI provisions, if there is any delay in filing of any specified reports, such delay can be regularised by payment of LSF instead of going through the compounding process. For the purpose of computing LSF, the earlier Master Direction on Reporting specified that the period of delay would be counted from the day after the 30th day from receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. RBI has now made an amendment in the Master Direction on Reporting and clarified that
the period of delay will now be counted beginning from the day after completion of the prescribed time period and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. The prescribed time period means the time period mentioned in the relevant regulations from the date of receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares, as the case may be.

Accordingly, where FDI regulations provide for a period of 60 days for filing of specified forms, such as filing of Form FC-TRS and Form FDI-LLP(II), the delay period for computing LSF will now start from the end of the stipulated time period, i.e., the 60th day.

(H) Liberalised remittance scheme (‘LRS’) for resident individuals – Change in reporting requirement for AD Banks9
AD Banks are required to submit yearly details of applications received and remittances made by resident individual account holders under the LRS route to RBI. This reporting was required to be made on the Online Return Filing System (ORFS) but now the same is required to be made through the XBRL system by accessing the URL https://xbrl.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl. Further, in case no data is required to be furnished, AD Banks are required to file Nil figures.

(I) Introduction of Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting System (FETERS)10
RBI, in order to collect more information on international transactions using credit card / debit card / unified payment interface (UPI), has introduced FETERS with effect from 1st April, 2021. AD Banks are required to submit details of transactions through credit card / debit card / UPI (including sale and purchase of Forex towards international transactions) along with their economic classification (merchant category code – MCC). The reporting needs to be done through a new
return, namely, ‘FETERS-Cards’ on https://bop.rbi.org.in. The frequency of submission is monthly and the same needs to be done within seven working days from the last date of the month for which reporting is to be made.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
9    A.P. (Dir Series 2021-22) Circular No. 7, Dated 7-4-2021
10    A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.13, dated 25-3-2021

 

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND QUALIFYING TEST

BACKGROUND
Independent Directors are meant to be the pillar of corporate governance many of whose tenets are now mandatory in specified large / listed companies. In principle, every Director is expected to exercise a level of independence and even act akin to a trustee while discharging his duties. This is expected even from a Promoter or a Working Director. However, there are conflicts of interest, the reality of which cannot be denied. A Promoter Director or a Working Director cannot, in all fairness, be expected to be able to exercise the level of independence than one who is not so. Hence, a category of Directors was needed who had no connection or conflict that could impinge on their independence. Independent Directors, thus, have to pass through a series of negative conditions to ensure that there is no conflict of interest.

However, merely being independent is not sufficient for a person to discharge the onerous responsibility of acting as a Director when the Board of which he is a member has to oversee at a very senior level. Hence, apart from prescribing a series of disqualifications, the law also lays down that he should have certain knowledge that would enable him to discharge his responsibilities. To be precise, it is passing a certain online self-assessment Test in certain areas that are relevant to his functioning as an Independent Director. He is also required to register his details with a databank in a prescribed manner. The provisions relating to such a Test and for the databank have undergone amendments, including one most recently on 19th August, 2021 which gives exemption from the Test for professionals, including Chartered Accountants of certain standing. We discuss this subject in detail in this article.

OVERVIEW OF QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
There are more disqualifications that make a person ineligible to become an Independent Director than there are qualifications that make him eligible! Being connected with the company or the Promoters in a variety of specified ways makes a person disqualified to be an Independent Director. However, the qualifications / qualities laid down are largely generic and even vague, thus making most people eligible and qualified. Rule 5 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014 (‘the Rules’) provide that an Independent Director ‘shall possess appropriate skills, experience and knowledge in one or more fields of finance, law, management, sales, marketing, administration, research, corporate governance, technical operations or other disciplines related to the company’s business.’ However, it is up to the Board to assess whether the proposed Independent Director has the required expertise / knowledge. Section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires that the Board should assess whether in its opinion he ‘is a person of integrity and possesses relevant expertise and experience.’

However, there is also a specific requirement whereby the Independent Director has to pass an online Test which tests his knowledge on a variety of regulatory and related areas which are relevant for him to perform his functions as a Director.

BROAD SCHEME OF THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO MAINTENANCE OF DATABANK AND PASSING OF ONLINE TEST
There are two sets of requirements linked to each other that an Independent Director has to comply with. Firstly, he has to ensure that his name is entered into a databank maintained in the prescribed manner by the specified Institute. Secondly, he has to pass the specified online self-assessment Test.

Some of these requirements came into force when the provisions relating to Independent Directors were already on the statute. Hence, these provisions had to be introduced giving a transition period for Independent Directors already existing in office. Those aside, the broad scheme is as follows: A person desiring to be appointed as an Independent Director shall, before such appointment, apply to the Institute for inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by it. He may apply even if there is no immediate proposal of his being appointed as such. He also needs to pass the specified online Test within two years of inclusion of his name in such databank. If he does not pass, his name would be removed from the databank. There are categories of persons who are exempted from passing such a Test. Recently, by an amendment made to the Rules on 19th August, 2021, more categories of exempted persons have been added. The overall scheme for this purpose, partly by non-application of mind and partly by a series of amendments, is a little clumsy and also leaves several ambiguous areas.

Note that the requirement of appointment of an Independent Director under the Act applies not only to listed companies but also other categories of public companies, such as those with paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, turnover of at least Rs. 100 crores, etc.

Requirement of passing Test for being eligible to be appointed as an Independent Director
Rule 6(4) of the Rules requires an Independent Director to pass the specified ‘online proficiency self-assessment Test’ (‘the Test’). This Test has to be passed within two years of inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by the specified Institute. If he does not pass, his name will be removed from the databank.

The Institute in this case is the ‘Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs at Manesar’ as notified under section 150 of the Act.

He has to obtain a score of at least 50% in the aggregate in the Test. He can appear as many times as he wants for the Test, though he should pass it within the time limit of two years from the date on which his name is included in the databank.

Requirement of passing the Test applicable only to Independent Directors
Curiously, the requirement of passing such a Test and even of entering the name in the databank is required only for an Independent Director. Other Directors, who may form half or more of the Board, are not required to pass such Test.

Categories of Independent Directors who are exempt from passing the online Test
While the Test is not exceptionally difficult to pass, it still means that many otherwise highly qualified and / or experienced people would need to take this Test. There may be persons who may be specialists for years or even decades in their respective fields and yet would have to pass the Test. Recognising this, the Rules have been progressively amended and several categories of persons are now exempt from passing it. However, no exemption has been provided from the requirement of entering the name and details in the databank.

The categories that are exempt from passing the Test are described below.

Persons who have been Directors or key managerial personnel of certain types of entities for at least three years are exempted. These entities include listed companies, unlisted public companies with a paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, bodies corporate incorporated outside India with a paid-up capital of at least US$ 2 million, etc. This exemption will be particularly helpful for Promoters, Working Directors and even key managerial personnel, etc., who have already been associated with listed companies and who would otherwise have been required to take the Test.

Then there are persons who have worked at a senior level with the Government. Those persons who have acted at such a senior level for a period of three years in the pay scale of Director or equivalent or above in any Ministry or Department of the Central or State Government and having experience in specified areas such as commerce, corporate affairs, etc., are exempted from passing the Test.

Similarly exempted are persons who have acted for three years in the payscale of Chief General Manager or above with regulators like SEBI, Reserve Bank of India, the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority, etc., and having experience in handling matters relating to corporate laws, securities laws or economic laws.

Further, persons who have been, for at least ten years, advocates of a high court or in practice as a Chartered Accountant / Company Secretary / Cost Accountant, do not need to pass the Test. This will be helpful to professionals who by virtue of their long standing have adequate knowledge and experience in fields that would be relevant entities requiring the appointment of Independent Directors.

WHAT IF THE DIRECTOR DOES NOT PASS SUCH TEST WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME?
The law requires a person to appear for and pass the Test within the specified time. However, what would happen if he does not bother to appear or he appears and does not pass within the prescribed time? Rule 4 says that ‘his name shall stand removed from the databank of the institute’. The intention of the law seems to be that only those persons who have passed such Test or who pass the Test in the specified time should be appointed as Independent Directors.

However, the clauses are not happily worded. There are no clear answers to questions such as (i) Will it make such person ineligible to be appointed as an Independent Director? (ii) Will he immediately vacate his office as Independent Director? (iii) Will he have to pay any penalty for continuing to act as an Independent Director despite not passing the Test? (iv) What is the role of the company in this regard and whether it is required to remove such Director?

CONCLUSION
By these recent amendments, the law now rightly exempts more categories of persons who have long experience and good knowledge of their respective fields but would still be required to pass the online Test. However, it must be said that the governance of the Board and the regulatory requirements relating to them have over the years become quite complex and elaborate. The exempted categories are generally those having experience / knowledge of specialised areas while governance of the Board can require different skills, knowledge and exposure. Thus, knowledge of various laws and procedures would be helpful and it would be advisable to study the relevant laws. Further, it is necessary to appear for the Test and to pass it to confirm his knowledge. Clearly, the Test is one-time and at present there is no requirement to periodically re-appear for it or undergo some refresher course. But here, too, it may be advisable that even those who have passed the Test earlier may keep updating themselves and even voluntarily appear for it again.

    

PARTNERSHIP FIRM – STAMP DUTY ISSUES

INTRODUCTION
Partnerships are probably one of the oldest forms of doing business. Even today, a majority of the businesses in India are organised as ‘partnerships’. And stamp duty is an important source of revenue for the Maharashtra Government. This article deals with some issues relating to stamp duty which are peculiar to partnerships.

CHARGE OF STAMP DUTY

The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (‘the Act’), which is applicable to the State of Maharashtra, levies stamp duty u/s 3 of the Act which reads as follows:

‘3. Instrument chargeable with duty
Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefor respectively, that is to say –
(a) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed in the State … …
(b) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed out of the State, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in this State and is received in this State:’

From an analysis of section 3, the following points emerge:
(a) The stamp duty is leviable on an instrument and not on a transaction;
(b) The stamp duty is leviable only on those instruments which are mentioned in Schedule I to the Act;
(c) The stamp duty is leviable on the instrument if it is executed in the State of Maharashtra or on the instrument which, though executed outside the State of Maharashtra, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in the State and is received in the State. Hence, for example, even if the instrument of partnership is executed outside the State of Maharashtra but if the partnership is located in Maharashtra, and the instrument of partnership is received in Maharashtra, then it would be subject to stamp duty under the Act.
(d) The charge of stamp duty is subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I.

INSTRUMENT
The term ‘instrument’ is defined in section 2(1) of the Act to include every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. However, it does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. Stamp duty is leviable only on a written document which falls within the definition of instrument. If there is no instrument, then there is no duty.

Schedule I
Since stamp duty is levied only on the instruments specified in Schedule I, let us look at Schedule I. Only Article 47 of Schedule I specifically provides for levy of stamp duty on a partnership.

The term ‘instrument of partnership’ and the term ‘partnership’ have not been defined in the Act. Hence, the term ‘partnership’ would have to be understood as defined in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Stamp duty on formation of partnership
Stamp duty on formation of partnership is levied under Article 47(1). According to this Article, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership or the deed of partnership depends upon the capital contribution made by the partners as explained below:
(a) If the capital contribution is made only by way of cash, then the minimum amount of stamp duty is Rs. 500. Where the contribution brought in in cash is in excess of Rs. 50,000, the stamp duty is Rs. 500 for every Rs. 50,000 or part thereof. However, the maximum amount of stamp duty payable is Rs. 5,000. In other words, if the capital ranges from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 5,00,000, the stamp duty would range from Rs. 500 to Rs. 5,000. If the capital contributed in cash is in excess of Rs. 5,00,000, then the stamp duty payable would be the maximum amount of Rs. 5,000.
(b) Where capital contributed by the partners is by way of property other than cash, then the stamp duty payable is that leviable on a conveyance under Article 25.

Article 25 on Conveyance
Since Article 25 is made applicable to an instrument of partnership, the relevant provisions of Article 25 are summarised below:
* It levies a stamp duty on movable property @ 3% of the value of the property;
* It levies a stamp duty on immovable property. The stamp duty depends upon the location of the property, that is, whether it is in a rural area or in an urban area and also upon the class of municipality. The stamp duty for the city of Mumbai is 5%. Further, this duty is based on the stamp duty ready reckoner value of the property.

ADMISSION OF PARTNER OR ADDITIONAL CAPITAL BY PARTNERS
Since admission of a partner requires a fresh instrument of partnership, the question of payment of stamp duty under Article 47 would arise. However, it would be restricted only to the share of contribution brought in by the incoming partner or additional contribution brought in by the existing partners. If the incoming partner does not bring in any capital, stamp duty payable would be the minimum sum of Rs. 500.

If in an existing partnership additional capital is brought in by one or more partners, would it attract stamp duty under Article 47(1)? It is submitted that if a fresh partnership deed is not executed, then stamp duty is not payable, otherwise it would be payable only on the additional capital. The following decisions under the Income-tax Act have held that a registered document is not required when a partner introduces his immovable property into a partnership firm as his capital contribution but a registered document is required when a partner wants to withdraw an immovable property from the firm:

(a)    Abdul Kareemia & Bros. vs. CIT [1984] 145 ITR 442
    (AP)
(b)    CIT vs. S.R. Uppal [1989] 180 ITR 285 (Punj & Har)
(c)    Ram Narain & Bros. vs. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 423 (All)
(d)    Janson vs. CIT [1985] 154 ITR 432 (Kar)
(e)    CIT vs. Palaniappa Enterprises [1984] 150 ITR 237
    (Mad)

RETIREMENT OF A PARTNER OR DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
Earlier, there was no express provision for levy of stamp duty in the case of retirement of a partner. Now, it is expressly provided for and the stamp duty payable is the same as in the case of dissolution as discussed below.

Where on dissolution of a partnership (or on retirement of a partner), any property is taken as his share by a partner other than a partner who brought in that property as his share of contribution in the partnership, stamp duty is payable as on a conveyance under Article 25, clauses (a) to (d), on the market value of the property so taken by a partner. In any other case, stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

The implications of these provisions are as follows:
(a) If a partner has introduced certain property in a partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on his retirement from that partnership he takes that property, then the stamp duty of only Rs. 500 would be payable.
(b) If a partner has introduced certain property in partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on retirement of another partner from that partnership that partner takes the property, then the stamp duty as is leviable on a conveyance under Article 25 would be payable. Hence, if the property is an immovable property, then the stamp duty would be 5% as explained above. If the property is a movable property, then stamp duty would be payable at the rate of 3%.
(c) If the property acquired by the firm itself has been given to a partner on retirement or dissolution, then stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

An issue arises in the case of simultaneous admission-cum-retirement of partners done by the same deed: would the stamp duty be payable on the amount brought in by the incoming partner (gross amount) or this amount should be net of the withdrawals? Section 5 of the Act states that if an instrument relates to several distinct matters, it shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of duties with which separate instruments each relating to separate matters would have been chargeable under the Act. Hence, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership should be payable with reference to the gross amount brought in by the incoming partner and should not be with reference to the net amount. In addition, the stamp duty would be payable also as on a deed of retirement, under Article 47(2).

ARRANGEMENTS RESEMBLING
A PARTNERSHIP
In several cases, the owner and the builder enter into a profit-sharing arrangement, which is quite similar to that under a partnership. An issue in such a case would be whether the arrangement is one of a Development Rights Agreement or a partnership. The stamp duty consequences on the owner and the developer would vary depending on the nature of the arrangement.
    
Section 4 of the Partnership Act defines a partnership as ‘the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all’. Thus, a partnership must contain three elements:
(a) there must be an agreement entered into by all the persons concerned;
(b) the agreement must be to share the profits of a business; and
(c) the business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned acting for all.

ELEMENT OF PROFIT-SHARING
Sharing of profits is an essential element of a partnership. The instrument must demonstrate that what is happening in effect is that it is the net profits that are being shared and not the gross returns. Various English decisions such as Lyons vs. Knowles, 1863 3 B&S, 556 have held that a mere agreement to share gross returns of any property would be very little evidence of a partnership between them and there is much less possibility of there being a partnership between them. In certain English cases such as Cox vs. Coulson (1916) 2 KB 177 (lessee of a theatre and manager of a theatrical company), French vs. Styring [1857] Eng R 509 (joint owners of a race horse – expenses jointly borne), it was held that the mere circumstance of their sharing gross returns would be very little evidence of the existence of a partnership.

In Sutton & Co. vs. Gray (1894) 1 QB 285, S, a share broker, entered into an agreement with G, a sub-broker, that G should introduce his clients to S, receive half the brokerage in respect of the transactions of such clients put through on the Exchange by S and should bear the losses in respect thereof; it was held that this did not create a partnership between S and G as no partnership was intended and that the agreement was merely to divide gross returns and not the profits of a common business.

Further, section 6 of the Partnership Act is also relevant. It provides that the sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in the property does not of itself make such persons partners.

The relevant extracts are given below :

‘6. Mode of determining existence of partnership – In determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties, as shown by all relevant facts taken together.
Explanation I – The sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in that property does not of itself make such persons partners.
Explanation II – the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business, or of a payment contingent upon the earning of profits or varying with the profits earned by a business, does not of itself make him a partner with the persons carrying on the business; and, in particular, the receipt of such share or payment
(a) by lender or money to person engaged or about to engage in any business,
(b) by a servant or agent as remuneration,
(c) by the widow or child of a deceased partner, as annuity, or
(d) by a previous owner or part-owner of the business, as consideration for the sale of the goodwill or share thereof,
does not of itself make the receiver a partner with the persons carrying on the business.’

A relevant case in this respect is the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Vijaya Traders, 218 ITR 83 (Mad). In this case, a construction partnership was entered into between two persons, wherein one partner S contributed land while the other was solely responsible for construction and finance. S was immune to all losses and was given a guaranteed return as her share of profits. The other partner who was the managing partner was to bear all losses. The Court held that the relationship is similar to the Explanation 1 to section 6 and there were good reasons to think that the property assigned to the firm was accepted on the terms of the guaranteed return out of the profits of the firm and she was immune to all losses. The relationship between them was close to that of lessee and lessor and almost constituted a relationship of licensee and licensor and was not a valid partnership.

MUTUAL AGENCY CONCEPT
Mutual agency is also a key condition of a partnership. Each partner is an agent of the firm and of the other partners. The business must be carried on by all or any partner on behalf of all.

What would constitute a mutual agency is a question of fact. For instance, in the case of K.D. Kamath & Co., 82 ITR 680 (SC), the Court held that control and management of the business of the firm can be left by agreement between the parties in the hands of one partner to be exercised on behalf of all the partners.

Consequently, in the case of M.P. Davis, 35 ITR 803 (SC), it was held that the provisions of the deed taken along with the conduct of the parties clearly indicated that it was not the intention of the parties to bring about the relationship of partners but they only intended to continue under the cloak of a partnership the pre-existing and real relationship of master and servant. The sharing of profits or the provision for payment of remuneration contingent upon the making of profits or varying with the profits did not itself create a partnership.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay Kanubhai Patel, 2004 (6) Bom C.R. 94 had an occasion to directly deal with this issue. The Court after reviewing the Development Rights Agreement held that it is settled law that in order to constitute a valid partnership, three ingredients are essential. There must be a valid agreement between the parties, it must be to share profits of the business and the business must be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The third ingredient relates to the existence of mutual agency between the parties concerned inter se. The Court held that merely because an agreement provided for profit-sharing it would not constitute a partnership in the absence of mutual agency.

LLP
To incorporate a Limited Liability Partnership, the partners need to execute an LLP agreement. This agreement would lay down the respective capital contributions, whether they would be in the form of cash or property, etc. This Act has now been amended for an express provision of levying stamp duty on an LLP agreement. Article 47 of Schedule I to the Act now even applies to an instrument of an LLP.

AOP Deed
If, instead of a partnership, an association of persons is selected as an entity for the development business, then the above discussion would apply to the same. The law now contains an express provision that stamp duty on joint venture agreements would be also governed by Article 47.

Conversion of firm into company
The conversion of a firm into a company under Chapter XXI of the Companies Act, 2013 / Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 should not attract any incidence of stamp duty, as there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. This view is supported by the decision in the cases of Vali Pattabhirama Rao 60 Comp Cases 568 (AP) and Rama Sundari Ray vs. Syamendra Lal Ray, ILR (1947) 2 Cal 1 which state that under Part IX of the Companies Act there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. Therefore, there is no conveyance and hence there should not be any incidence of stamp duty.

CONCLUSION
From the above discussions it would be clear that a proper structuring of the transaction and a proper drafting of the relevant documents is essential to achieve the desired results.


 

PERSON IN CONTROL (PIC): NEW MODIFICATION IN THE ENTITY

Cementing the path for a notable modification in the manner that the promoters and more than 5,000 publicly-listed corporate entities operate in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), in a consultation paper has suggested doing away with the concept of promoters and shifting to ‘person in control.’ It has proposed the change to put an end to the present definition of promoter group with an idea to streamline the disclosure encumbrance. Apart from this, SEBI has announced a few other proposals that include (a) decreasing the minimum lock-in period (tenure an investor can hold on to the securities) after an initial public offer (IPO) for promoters’ portion of a minimum 20% from the current three years to one year, and the lock-in period for holding more than 20% from one year to six months; and (b) decreasing the lock-in period for pre-IPO shareholders (those who invest in the entity even before the public issue) from the current one year to six months.

The notion of the promoter is a heritage from history when a corporate body or a group of companies (say, a business house like Tata, Birla and so on) would establish a business unit; for example, a power or steel or fertilizer plant, by pledging some funds of their own and financing the remainder of the project cost by borrowings from banks or financial institutions, on top of raising funds from the capital market. This business unit would remain linked with the establishment – virtually all through the life-span of the project – having a fundamental interest in safeguarding its constant profitability and progress and consistently work for achieving this goal, thereby obtaining the position of what one may label as ‘once a promoter, always a promoter’.

FIRST LESSONS IN INTERPRETATION OF CONTROL
In order to move with the times, SEBI in its Board meeting on 6th August, 2021 gave in-principle assent to move from the concept of promoter to ‘controlling shareholders’ as was recommended in the Consultation Paper dated 11th May, 2021 which dealt with the evaluation of the structure relating to promoters and the promoter group. Although the Consultation Paper has mentioned many other viewpoints and aspects, restructuring the definition of the promoter group rationalising the disclosure needs for group entities is one of the key changes proposed. This seems to be a branding modification in the configuration of the company law.

The Companies Act, 2013 along with the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 has defined the term promoter ‘as a person who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual return in section 92; or a person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly, as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or a person with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act.’ A person or group of people to be categorised as a ‘promoter group’ should have at least 20% equity share capital.

As per the Consultation Paper issued by SEBI, a controlling shareholder is to be defined as ‘A person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, Director or otherwise.’ The concept of controlling shareholders would restructure the tactic followed by controllers while levying any compulsions and transferring the responsibility of obeying statutory compulsions over to the controlling shareholders.

According to Regulation 2(1)(e) of the Takeover Regulations, 2011, the term ‘control’ has been defined as the right to appoint the majority of the Directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner. In an identical manner, the term control has been defined u/s 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 as well.

Though the clarification of the term control given by the SEBI has been swinging, in the case of Subhkam Ventures vs. SEBI, the SEBI pronounced that defensive agreements, namely, positive votes extended to the nominee Director of the investor on issues such as amendment of the articles of association, alterations in share capital, consent of the annual business plan, reorganisation of the investee entity, the nomination of significant officers of the entity, etc., all these qualify as gaining of control by the investor.

However, on appeal the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) opined that control is a power by which, on the one hand, an investor can instruct an entity to do what it wants to do. It was also explained by the SAT that the power by which an investor can prohibit an entity from doing what the latter wants to do cannot by itself qualify as ‘control’. SEBI appealed against the SAT order before the Supreme Court. However, the Court could not pronounce its verdict due to the removal of the case owing to the departure of the investor.

The interpretation of the term ‘control’ came up before the Whole-Time Member (WTM) of SEBI for judgment in the case of Kamat Hotels vs. SEBI. The WTM had to resolve, inter alia, whether there had been a takeover of control by the Noticees just by virtue of entering into a contract under which they were allowed a number of privileges that would activate an open offer under the Takeover Code, 1997. The WTM judged that the determination of ‘control’ because of the existence of positive voting rights in light of the realities of the case was inappropriate. The WTM, with regard to the privileges accessible to the Noticees as per the contract specified as above, made an obiter pronouncement in its order: ‘It is apparent that the scope of the covenants, in general, is to enable the Noticees to exercise certain checks and controls on the existing management for the purpose of protecting their interest as investors rather than formulating policies to run the target company.’

However, since the contract ended on 31st July, 2014 and the terms and clauses that allegedly bestowed ‘control’ on the Noticees under the contract were no longer compulsory on the promoters of Kamat Hotels, therefore, the WTM opted that the determination of ‘control’ was no longer appropriate.

On the basis of earlier precedents, it looks like determination of ‘control’ shoots from several ideologies which when applied to a given group of particulars and situations offers scope for various interpretations. In this background, SEBI had proposed a Consultation Paper in March, 2016 in which the definition of ‘control’ under the Takeover Regulations was considered to be
amended as: ‘(a) the right or entitlement to exercise at least 25% of voting rights of a company irrespective of whether such holdings give de facto control, and / or (b) the right to appoint the majority of the non-Independent Directors of a company’. However, the same has not yet been executed.

IS IT THE RIGHT TIME TO MOVE FROM THE WORD ‘PROMOTER’?
Many will give a quick answer to the above question by saying ‘yes’ since the concept of ‘promoter’ has become stagnant. The concept of promoter embraces all types of casual people, blood relatives who have been suing are also treated as promoters. In short, persons who have no control whatsoever of the organisation are treated as promoters. This gives an incorrect feeling to the investors of the organisation.

SEBI should make the concept smarter, fluid and accurate rather than completely abolishing the responsibility of the leading shareholder. This can be done by employing global yardsticks. Expressions like a person acting in concert or persons in control are understood throughout the world and these will surely describe who is overseeing the entity. The minority shareholder will be better off if this modification is implemented. But it is clear that the concept of promoter has not gone away and the only change is in the terminology which has moved on from ‘promoter’ to ‘person in control’. This is a step forward because once a Promoter need not always be a Promoter.

SEBI CHASING CHANGING SCENARIO
During the previous decade, the investor scene in India experienced a radical deviation whereby a new class of shareholders has arisen as leading investors, namely, private equity funds (PEF), alternate investment funds (AIFs), mutual funds, etc. Due to this the shareholding of the promoters has come down and total promoters’ holdings in the prominent 500 listed entities by market value is on a downhill journey since 2009 when it had topped at 58%.

The new class of shareholders invests in new-age and tech businesses (although unlisted) by means of what is termed as ‘control deals’ even prior to these going in for an initial public offer (IPO) and continue to retain shares post-listing, many times being the biggest public shareholders, holding special privileges such as the right to appoint Directors.

Although the actual ‘ownership’ and ‘controlling rights’ of a company have transferred to PEFs or AIFs, the establishment that introduced the business firm continues to possess power (notwithstanding its shareholding having been reduced to a minority) as the current regulation lists it as a promoter. The market watchdog needs to fix this glitch by changing the emphasis from promoters to controlling shareholders, or the so-called ‘person in control’ (PIC). Nonetheless, it also needs to be asked whether the new class is indeed keen to take control?

These organisations signify a collection of tens of thousands of investors. However, in the case of mutual funds these run into lakhs of investors. They gather money from individual investors and many of them are high net-worth individuals and invest in companies with the prime aim of producing handsome returns. In a basic way they are financial investors, would stay invested in an entity as long as the target is achieved, otherwise they will depart; on the other hand, the role of a PIC necessitates that he stay invested over the long term. The question is, does SEBI really expect promoters to play the role of PICs.

From its suggestions on minimum lock-in period, it does not seem to be so. Post an IPO, the SEBI allows the promoter to discard his or her portion of a minimum of 20% within one year against the existing three years. Besides, holding of more than 20% can be discarded in six months instead of one year.

It is even contemplating to entirely get rid of the condition of minimum shareholding for a person to qualify as a promoter. If a unit, for instance, PEF, can dispose of its shareholding obtained before its IPO (even though big enough to give it the position of a promoter) within one year of the public issue or the condition of minimum shareholding itself is relinquished, how can it be imagined to be fair to the role of a ‘person in control’?

Irrationally, the watchdog does not even want the public to recognise the individuality of investors behind the issuer. As per the relaxed disclosure obligations, the issuer need not furnish financial statements of group entities associated with the one being listed; it need not name financial investors as promoters in IPOs; and it need not specify precise corporate entities which are part and parcel of the promoter group. How can an entity whose basis of funding is masked in privacy infuse confidence?

Today, many of the listed companies are professionally administered and much of the activity is positioned around the Board of Directors, including several Independent Directors. It also includes the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) supported by numerous teams, including the audit committee, remuneration committee, etc., for crystal-clear operations. Could the PIC role be delegated to the CEO or the BoD? The answer to this is not in the affirmative.

The members of the Board, including the CEO, are professionals. They are nominated and obtain their power from the shareholders even though by majority vote or any other method approved by them. If the majority shareholders vacate, then it is doubtful that the current CEO or BoD will continue. Further, if the former leaves within a short period, which is highly possible as per the new regulations suggested by the market regulator, then the case for the CEO or BoD serving as PIC becomes less likely. When the person who established the entity is reduced to a minority and the new group of shareholders who have majority share are reluctant to sneak into the former’s shoes, it will be tantamount to impelling the listed entity into a position of a ‘ship without a commander’.

The market watchdog should re-look at its suggestions keeping two essential principles in mind. These are, (i) the voting or controlling power of an investor must be proportional to his investment or the shares held by him, and (ii) solidity of the management. In the present situation, where the majority of shareholding is entrusted in PEFs or AIFs, they should be made accountable to accept the role of a PIC and remain invested in the entity over a reasonably long period. The market regulator must not decrease the lock-in period. It should also not abandon the prerequisite of minimum shareholding for an entity to remain in control of the firm and demand complete clarity on funding bases. Amazingly, the complete workout of the transition from promoters to controlling shareholders will prove to be pointless unless the SEBI effectively tackles the elephant in the room, viz., the definition of ‘control’.

NEW MODIFICATION IN A NUTSHELL

SEBI has recommended decreasing the minimum lock-in periods post a public issue for promoters and pre-IPO shareholders.

The consultation paper suggested a three-year transition period for moving from the promoter to the person in control concept.

If the object of the issue involves an offer for sale or financing other than for capital expenditure for a project, then the minimum promoters’ contribution of 20% should be locked in for one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

The promoters’ holding in excess of minimum promoters’ contribution shall be locked in for a period of six months as opposed to the existing requirement of one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

Control Person means any person that holds a sufficient number of any of the securities of an issuer so as to affect materially the control of that issuer, or that holds more than 20% of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer.

Control Person means any individual who has a Control relationship with the Fund or is an investment adviser of the Fund.

Control Person means a Director or executive officer of a licensee or a person who has the authority to participate in the direction, directly or indirectly, through one or more other persons, of the management or policies of a licensee.

The changes in the nature of ownership could lead to situations where the persons with no controlling rights and minority shareholding continue to be classified as promoters.

It will lighten the disclosure burden for firms.

The regulator has proposed to eliminate the present definition of promoter group because it would rationalise the disclosure burden.

It is necessitated by the changing investor landscape in India where concentration of ownership and controlling rights do not vest completely in the hands of the promoters or the promoter group.

This is because of the emergence of new shareholders such as private equity and institutional investors.

The investor focus on the quality of board and management has increased, thereby reducing the relevance of the concept of promoter.

It also suggested doing away with the current definition of promoter group since it focuses on capturing holdings by a common group of individuals.

It often results in capturing unrelated companies with common financial investors.

SUPREME COURT FORMULATES GUIDELINES FOR COMPOUNDING; HOLDS THAT CONSENT OF SEBI NOT REQUIRED

BACKGROUND
An interesting feature of the SEBI Act, 1992 is that one can potentially be prosecuted u/s 24 for violating any provision of the Act and even any of the rules and regulations made thereunder. Further, the punishment can be in the form of imprisonment for as long as ten years, or a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores. Non-payment of the penalty imposed is also punished stringently, with a minimum prison term of one month and a maximum of ten years; or with a fine of Rs. 25 crores. This is quite unlike other laws under which only specified serious violations can be prosecuted as offences. In a sense, the provisions of the SEBI Act, at least on paper, sound more stringent than even the Indian Penal Code that has varying punishments for different offences.

Fortunately, prosecution is not generally initiated indiscriminately under the SEBI Act. However, the fear of being prosecuted remains. The question that arises is how does a person, who is willing to make amends for the wrong he has committed get relief from prosecution? For this purpose, the SEBI Act has enabling provisions for compounding of offences. Section 24A provides that offences, other than those punishable with imprisonment only or with both imprisonment and fine, can be compounded by the Securities Appellate Tribunal or the court before which the proceedings are pending.

Considering that there is no violation in the Act that is punishable by imprisonment only or by both imprisonment and fine, the conclusion is that all offences are compoundable and thus any prosecution proceeding can be compounded (see later herein for certain remarks of the Supreme Court). This is because there is a common provision for prosecution u/s 24, unlike other laws that have separate punishments prescribed for different violations.

The question that came up before the Supreme Court in Prakash Gupta vs. SEBI (order dated 23rd July, 2021, [2021] 128 taxmann.com 362 [SC]) was whether, for compounding an offence by a Court / SAT, the consent of SEBI is a prerequisite? In other words, if SEBI vetoes the application for compounding and does not grant consent, can the offence still be compounded? The Supreme Court, while dealing with this question, ruled on several aspects and thereafter even laid down guidelines for compounding. These were made, the Court said, in the absence of explicit provisions in the law which gap it attempted to fill. Thus, the ruling has relevance on several aspects of the subject.

PROVISIONS OF LAW
As stated earlier, section 24A of the SEBI Act enables compounding of offences and the authority for this purpose is the SAT or the court before which the proceedings are pending. SEBI has notified settlement regulations which deal with settlement of civil proceedings and compounding of offences. The Regulations provide that the principles as applicable for settlement of civil proceedings would also apply for compounding. General principles have been laid down for three categories of proceedings. In respect of the offence of non-payment of penalty, such amount of penalty with interest and legal charges as deemed appropriate by SEBI would be proposed before the court. Generally, the amount for compounding the offence would be as per the guidelines laid down in the Schedule to the Regulations. If the application for compounding is made after framing of charges by the court, then this amount would be increased by 25%, apart from legal charges and other terms as approved by the whole-time panel of SEBI as set up under the Regulations.

However, there are many areas where there is silence or lack of clarity. Is there an inherent right to compounding? Can all offences be compounded as a matter of right? If there are some offences which cannot be compounded, which are those and who decides this? Whether such a decision can be questioned and, if so, on what grounds?

If the person rights the wrong, compensates the party that is wronged, etc., does compounding become a matter of right? In this context, is compounding of offences under the SEBI Act at par with compounding with, say, under the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonouring of cheques?

Finally, is the consent of SEBI necessary for compounding or is it solely at the discretion of the court to compound the offence? What is the relevance and weight of the views of SEBI in the matter?

These are some of the issues discussed in the decision.

IS THE OFFENCE OF NON-PAYMENT OF PENALTY COMPOUNDABLE?
Section 24(2) treats non-payment of penalty levied under the Act as an offence over and above the violation in respect of which the penalty is levied. The question is whether this offence is compoundable. In principle, considering that the offences of violation of the provisions of the Act / Regulations / Rules are compoundable, the answer should have been yes. However, the Court dwelt on what seem to be ambiguous words used in the provision. It appeared to the Court that since there was a minimum prison term of one month provided, one view could be that imprisonment is mandatory. Section 24 says that an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine cannot be compounded. In which case, as per this view, the offence of non-payment of penalty cannot be compounded. However, since this specific issue was not before the Court, it did not give a final ruling on it and kept it for consideration at a future date. In the author’s opinion, considering the framework not only of the section but also of the settlement regulations, the better view should be that non-payment of penalty should also be compoundable.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES
In passing, and as a matter of academic interest, it is interesting to note that originally compounding itself was an offence and continues to be so to a certain extent. Compounding generally meant a person accepts consideration for not prosecuting an offence. This could be even by a police officer, or others in authority, and could thus be a bribe. However, the position has changed over time. There were less grave situations where it may not be worth the effort to prosecute a person. For offences such as under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the intention may be to make dishonouring of cheque an offence a means to make such a person honour the cheque. Hence, if the party is willing to pay off its dues, the court may generally be inclined to allow compounding. There may also be situations where the offence is not very grave, the offender may have realised his wrong and regretted it, and even the injured person may be willing to let the matter go (perhaps also on receipt of some compensation). Hence, compounding of offences could be lawfully done if the law provided for it. Different laws have provided for compounding in different ways and hence the question was how should the provisions of the SEBI Act be interpreted.

Serious wrongs that cannot be compounded
The Court noted that there may be offences that are not cured merely by compensating the injured person or even if the injured person is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. There are wrongs that are public in nature and have wider implications. The yardstick applied cannot be a single and uniform one.

WHETHER CONSENT OF SEBI IS NECESSARY FOR COMPOUNDING
In the matter before the Court, the appellant had applied for compounding before a lower court. When the views of SEBI were sought, SEBI refused to grant consent to such compounding and the Additional Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings were initiated thus rejected the application. The appellant approached the High Court which, citing earlier precedents, affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court held that the wording of section 24A is clear. There is no mandatory requirement of consent of SEBI for the Court to allow compounding. The Court would consider the views of SEBI but the decision of whether or not to compound the offence would rest with the Court. The important question, however, is what weight should the Court assign to the views of SEBI.

VIEWS OF SEBI ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW COMPOUNDING
The Court elaborately discussed the object of the SEBI Act and the role of SEBI as an expert body in the securities markets. It noted that SEBI has a duty to protect the interests of investors and generally the capital market. It also reviewed the mechanism laid down by SEBI for consideration of applications for compounding and also the independent High-Powered Advisory Committee (‘HPAC’) set up to provide advice on the matter. The Court held that the views of SEBI on whether or not compounding should be allowed should be respected and followed unless the view taken can be shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

The Court also considered the aspects that SEBI takes into account and as laid down in the guidelines issued by SEBI. In particular, the matters in respect of which compounding / settlement would ordinarily not be allowed were noted.
All in all, the Court held that while the consent of SEBI is not a prerequisite, the views / recommendations of SEBI would ordinarily be followed.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE COURT FOR CONSIDERING COMPOUNDING APPLICATIONS
As if to not only give the last word but provide a comprehensive framework for compounding, the Court laid down specific guidelines that would effectively fill the gap existing today. The Supreme Court laid down four guidelines that the Court / SAT should consider while disposing of applications for compounding:
a. The factors enumerated by SEBI in its Circular of 20th April, 2007 and accompanying FAQs should be considered, though not as exhaustive.
b. The application for compounding has to be made to SEBI which places the same before the HPAC. The recommendation of HPAC should be placed before the Court / SAT which should give due deference to such opinion. It should differ if it has cogent reasons and only if the reasons provided by SEBI / HPAC are mala fide or manifestly arbitrary.
c. The offences under the SEBI Act are not comparable with other laws where restitution of the injured party is a strong ground for allowing compounding. Most offences under the SEBI Act are of a public character and restitution may not always be enough. In any case, for this purpose the opinion of SEBI should be relied upon.
d. Finally, and this point is an extension of the third one, the Court / SAT should consider whether the offence is private or public in nature. If of a public nature, it would affect the public at large. Such offences should not be compounded even if restitution has taken place.
CONCLUSION

Not only has the Supreme Court given a categorical ruling on the role of SEBI and its views on compounding, it has also given a detailed framework on how compounding applications should be considered and what principles and considerations ought to be followed in the matter. The Court applied these principles also to the case before it and held that the matter did not deserve to be compounded, considering the facts and also the views of SEBI. With a fairly comprehensive framework laid down including the weight to be assigned to the opinion of SEBI, one can trust now that applications for compounding will be more transparent and reason-based.

GAMING NOT GAMBLING

INTRODUCTION
While the difference in the spelling of gaming and gambling is only of two letters, there is a world of difference between the two in reality. India’s online gaming market is growing by leaps and bounds and there is keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in / acquiring Indian gaming companies. In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. Some recent court decisions have helped clear the regulatory shroud covering gaming activities.

LEGAL ECOSYSTEM


Let us first understand the various laws which deal with this subject:
(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.
(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising / conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.
(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and seven Union Territories regarding gambling / gaming.
(d) The following are the various laws which regulate / restrict / prohibit gambling in India:

Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central Legislation provides for the punishment of public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887: It applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.
Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, the Madras Gambling Act, etc., are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as the object of these Acts is to ban / restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.

* Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section provides for punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government. Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’
* The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central Legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions on conducting lotteries.

* The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: It requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling.

Some States which expressly permit gambling are

* Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax Rules), 2002 permits setting up of casinos in Sikkim.

* The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008, along with the Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provides for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.

* Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 provides for casinos to be set up only at five star hotels or offshore vessels with permission. This is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos in five star hotels.

* West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in West Bengal a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.

* Nagaland: The Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 regulates online games of skill in the State of Nagaland.

PUBLIC GAMBLING ACT
Since this is a Central Act on which several State Acts have been based, we may examine this Act. Section 1 of this Act has laid down three conditions all of which must be fulfilled in order that a place is treated as a common gaming house:
(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.

It is a moot point whether these definitions can even be extended to online gaming ventures.

Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs. 200 or imprisonment for any term up to three months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.

Exception u/s 12: Even if all the above-mentioned three conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla vs. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.

In State of AP vs. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill and held as follows:
• Rummy is not a game of mere chance like three cards;
• It requires considerable skill as fall of cards (is) to be memorised;
• The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;
• It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill;
• Chance is a factor but not the major factor.

The Court held that rummy is not a game of chance but a game of skill.

In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN, 1996 2 SCC 226, the Court analysed whether betting on horses is a game of chance or mere skill:
• Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or both skill and chance;
• In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated but it depends upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the players;
• A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element;
• It is the dominant element which determines the game’s character;
• In horse-racing, the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of the horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.;
• Horses are given specialised training;
• Books are printed giving details of the above, which are studied.

Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance.

In Bimalendu De vs. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal 30, it was held that Kaun Banega Carodpati, which was aired on TV channels, was not a game of chance but a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting, were missing from this game. Only a player’s skill was tested. He did not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.

In M.J. Sivani vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or of mixed skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not a game of mere skill.

In this respect, the Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 defines games of skill to include all such games where there is preponderance of skill over chance, including where the skill relates to strategising the manner of placing wagers or placing bets or where the skill lies in team selection or selection of virtual stocks based on analyses or where the skill relates to the manner in which the moves are made, whether through deployment of physical or mental skill and acumen. It further states that games of skill may be (a) card-based, (b) action / virtual sports / adventure / mystery, and (c) calculation / strategy / quiz-based. This is one of the first examples of a statutory definition of what constitutes a game of skill. ‘Gambling’, on the other hand, has been defined by this Act to mean and include wagering or betting on games of chance (meaning all such games where there is a preponderance of chance over skill) but does not include betting or wagering on games of skill.

Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence is a game, or is it more a game of chance and hence gambling.

MAHARASHTRA PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT, 1887
This Act is similar in operation to the Public Gambling Act but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse races and dog races in certain cases.

‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming / proceeds of gaming / winnings or prizes of gaming.

The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:
• Betting on rainfall;
• Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities;
• Betting on stock market prices;
• Betting on cards.

The imprisonment under this Act extends up to two years and the fine is also higher. Police officers have been given substantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine of up to Rs. 1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to finish 1st, 2nd or 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill since filling up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill – Stoddart vs. Sagar (1895) 2 QB 474.

Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients / customers.

RECENT MADRAS HIGH COURT DECISION ON ONLINE RUMMY / POKER
In the recent case of Junglee Games India vs. State of Tamil Nadu, WP No. 18022/2020, the Madras High Court had occasion to consider whether an amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 which ended up banning online rummy / poker was unconstitutional. The amended statute prohibited all forms of games being conducted in cyberspace, irrespective of whether the game involved being a game of mere skill, whether such game was played for a wager, bet, money or other stakes. The High Court held that gambling is often equated with gaming and the activity involved chance to such a predominant extent that the element of skill that may also have been involved could not control the outcome. A game of skill, on the other hand, might not necessarily be such an activity where skill must always prevail; however, it would suffice for an activity to be regarded as a game of skill if, ordinarily, the exercise of skill could control the chance element involved in the activity such that the better skilled would prevail more often than not. It held that the wording of the amending Act was so crass and overbearing that it smacked of unreasonableness in its every clause and could be seen to be manifestly arbitrary.

Whatever may have been the pious intention of the Legislature, the reading of the impugned statute and how it might operate amounted to the baby being thrown out with the bath. It even held that broadly speaking, games and sporting activities in the physical form could not be equated with games conducted in virtual mode or in cyberspace. However, when it came to card games or board games such as chess or scrabble, there was no distinction between the skill involved in the physical form of the activity or in the virtual form. The Court held that such distinction was completely lost in the amending Act as all games were outlawed if played for a stake or for any prize.

It came out with a very interesting take on the difference – ‘Seen from the betting perspective, if the odds favouring an outcome are guided more by skill than by chance, it would be a game of skill. The chance element can never be completely eliminated for it is the chance component that makes gambling exciting and it is the possibility of the perchance result that fuels gambling.’

The Bench categorically held that there appeared to be a little doubt that both rummy and poker were games of skill as they involved considerable memory, working out of percentages, the ability to follow the cards on the table and constantly adjust to the changing possibilities of the unseen cards. The Madras High Court laid down the principle that the betting that a State can legislate on has to be the betting pertaining to gambling; ergo, betting only on games of chance. At any rate, even otherwise, the judgments in the cases of Chamarbaugwalla (Supra) and K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra) also instruct that the concept of betting in the Constitution cannot cover games of skill. It concluded that the amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 was capricious, irrational and without an adequate determining principle such that it was excessive and disproportionate.

RECENT DECISION ON FANTASY SPORTS LEAGUES
One of the biggest revolutions in the gaming industry has been that of Online Fantasy Sports Leagues, be it in cricket, football, hockey, etc. Time and again there have been writs filed before the High Courts to decree these as games of chance.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Varun Gumber vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2017 Cri LJ 3827 and the Order dated 15th September, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid judgment, have held that the fantasy games of Dream 11 were games of mere skill and their business has protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, i.e., freedom to carry out trade / vocation / business of one’s choice.

In Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. Union of India, Cr. PIL Stamp No. 22/2019, the Bombay High Court held that success in Dream 11’s fantasy sports depended upon a user’s exercise of skill based on superior knowledge, judgement and attention, and the result thereof was not dependent on the winning or losing of a particular team in the real world game on any particular day. It was undoubtedly a game of skill and not a game of chance. The attempt to reopen the issues decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of the same online gaming activities, which are backed by a judgment of the three-judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), that, too, after dismissal of the SLP by the Apex Court, was wholly misconceived. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 43346 of 2019] against this decision inasmuch as it related to whether or not it involved gambling. Again, on 31st January, 2020, the Supreme Court reiterated on an application seeking clarification of its earlier Order, that it does not want to revisit the issue as to whether gambling is or is not involved.

In the cases of Ravindra Singh Chaudhary vs. Union of India, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20779/2019 and Chandresh Sankhla vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2020 SCC Online Raj 264, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed a petition against Dream11. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in D. Siluvai Venance vs. State, Criminal O.P. (MD) No.6568/2020 has passed a similar order. Recently, the Supreme Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 18478/2020, dismissed an SLP against the Rajasthan High Court Order in the Ravindra Singh case (Supra). It held that the matter was no longer res integra as SLPs have come up from the Punjab & Haryana and the Bombay High Courts and have been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

All of the above judgments analysed what was a fantasy league. They held that any fantasy sports game was a game which occurred over a pre-determined number of rounds (which may extend from a single match / sporting event to an entire league or series) in which participating users selected, built and acted as managers / selectors of their virtual team. The drafting of a virtual team involved the exercise of considerable skill as the user had to first assess the relative worth of each athlete / sportsperson as against all athletes / sportspersons available for selection. The user had to study the rules and make evaluations of the athlete’s strengths and weaknesses based on these rules. Users engaged in participating in fantasy sports read and understood the rules of the game and made their assessment of athletes and the selection of athletes in their virtual team on the basis of the anticipated statistics of their selection.

It was held that the element of skill and the predominant influence on the outcome of the fantasy league was more than any other incidents and, therefore, they were games of ‘mere skill’ and not falling within the activity of gambling. It did not involve risking money or playing stakes on the result of a game or an event, hence, the same did not amount to gambling / betting. It was even held that the fantasy sports formats were globally recognised as a great tool for fan engagement as they provided a platform to sports lovers to engage in their favourite sport along with their friends and family. This legitimate business activity having protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution contributed to Government Revenue not only vide GST and income tax payments, but also by contributing to increased viewership and higher sports fan engagement, thereby simultaneously promoting even the real world games.

FEMA
The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 and the Consolidated FDI Policy state that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting, including casinos. Thus, no FDI is allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. And, 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million-dollar question – is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.

Similar tests may also be used under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 for overseas direct investments in a foreign company. If it is an online gaming company, then it would constitute a bona fide business activity and foreign investment should be permissible.

CONCLUSION
Recent judicial thinking seems to be changing along with the times. When one looks at the Court decisions delivered on new topics such as cryptocurrencies, fantasy sports, online poker, etc., it is clear that the trend is to allow businesses in these sunrise areas. If the Legislature also moves at the same speed and in the same direction, we would have a wonderful environment which could spawn exciting businesses!

 

TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PROMOTER

BACKGROUND
As the securities laws increasingly seek to lay down sound principles of corporate governance and also push towards greater professionalisation of company management, a question has arisen whether the unique concept of promoters in securities and corporate laws needs a close relook. So much so, that even SEBI has realised this and is considering whether this concept should be dropped or re-conceptualised.

In India, promoters have been given a central role, focus and obligations in listed companies owing to historical and other reasons. While on their own they have hardly any special rights, they have multiple and even onerous responsibilities and it is increasingly felt that they need to be reconsidered considering the changing reality. The present law is so stringent that even reclassification of a person from promoter to non-promoter is a lengthy, difficult and complicated affair. It is almost as if being a promoter is a one-way street, i.e., till death do you part!

In a recent major proposed public issue, the question came up yet again about who should be classified as a promoter and why would this status be so keenly shunned. It was reported that certain top investors / management did not desire to be termed as ‘promoters’. The question is when and how is a person deemed to be a promoter and when can he claim that he is no longer a promoter.

HOW DID THE CONCEPT OF PROMOTER COME INTO BEING?

To appreciate this, we need to understand the term and then consider how various laws define and treat promoters. Promoters, traditionally, are those enterprising persons who conceive a business idea, set up a company and seek investors to finance the business. They would run the business and later even hand it over to another management. The investors would participate in the ownership / profits / appreciation. Thus, they could be seen as persons with ideas but without the financial means to implement them. They need investors who are willing to share the risk for what they expect to be substantial rewards, without usually participating in the day-to-day management of the company.

In western countries, promoters / management typically hold a small share in the capital. Their returns would come as appreciation of such holding and remuneration for running the company. In India, traditionally, promoters are families who typically own a substantial part, usually 50% or more, of the equity. Thus, they have very substantial control in the company by virtue of their own investment. As we will see, even the law expects them to have a significant own stake, or what is termed nowadays as ‘skin in the game’. Their control over the company would usually continue through succeeding generations. Since the promoter family would have dominant control, the challenge for the regulator is more of balancing the interests of these family promoters with those of the public / minority shareholders.

Thus, a multitude of provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 and various SEBI regulations have focused on identifying these promoters and placing various responsibilities and liabilities on them.

THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF PROMOTERS AND OBLIGATIONS ON THEM

To begin with, the term is defined very widely. Persons who are in ‘control’ of the company are deemed to be promoters. The term ‘control’ is also given a very wide definition. While majority shareholding is usually enough to give them ‘control’, even certain special rights under agreements are deemed to be ‘control’. Once such promoters are identified by these criteria, specified relatives and entities connected with them in the specified manner are also deemed by law to be part of the promoter group. The list of such persons is usually quite long.

The promoters are required to have a minimum significant percentage of capital after a public issue. Thus, the public issue cannot be a means of their exit. Further, their shareholding is subject to a lock-in for one to three years. Extensive disclosures are required about the history and background of each of the promoters. They have to make regular disclosures of their shareholding and changes or charges (such as pledge, etc.) made thereon.

Interestingly, they are also the fulcrum around which the independence of directors is tested. Any person who is connected with them in any of the specified ways is deemed to be not independent. This is again an extension of the presumption that the promoters are in control and hence if one is connected with them, one loses one’s independence.

Importantly, if anything goes wrong in the company, they could be very likely seen as the primary suspects for blame and punishment. This, again, is linked with their being presumed to be in control. Of course, in many situations those who are not directly involved in the day-to-day management may not be presumed to be liable.

Deeming as promoters starts with a public issue
One facet of this subject, the complications of which we will discuss later, is that the deeming of persons / group(s) as promoters begins with a public issue under securities laws. This category becomes defined and even frozen at this stage and the persons who form part of this group are identified. Unlike being in active management, being a promoter is not necessarily a choice. Being a relative or connected in one of the many specified ways is sufficient for a person to be deemed a promoter.

EXITING FROM THE PROMOTER GROUP

While it is easy to become a promoter, often even without a choice, the difficulty is in exiting. One cannot just ‘resign’ as a promoter or exit the group through a mere declaration. Even severing of financial or other ties may not always help one to get out of the category.

It is not as if a promoter is trying to escape responsibility. There may be members of the family who have no connection with the company. There may even be separations / divisions in the family. The promoters themselves could have so low a shareholding that they have literally no say, whether as directors or shareholders. Yet they continue to be promoters and remain subject to multiple restrictions, obligations and liabilities.

Regulation 31A of the SEBI LODR Regulations lays down the procedure for declassification from promoter to non-promoter. It requires, to begin with, the fulfilling of several conditions demonstrating that the person is no more connected with the promoter or even the company. The next step is obtaining the approval of the Board of Directors of the company. Then the approval of the shareholders is required. Finally, the stock exchange has to approve the reclassification. This process may easily take months and its outcome is quite uncertain. The process becomes even more difficult if the promoters seeking exit have disputes with the other promoters, which is something that is often seen in families.

Of course, it can be argued that in cases where some of the qualifications or connections that made a person a promoter no longer exist and so the person ought to thereby become a non-promoter. However, one wished there were specific and clear provisions regarding this.

COMPANIES WITHOUT PROMOTERS

Fortunately, there are provisions in the SEBI Regulations for companies with ‘no identifiable promoters’. This is particularly so in case of companies with professional managements. However, to qualify for this one would have to escape the wide net cast by the very broad definition of ‘promoter’ and ‘promoter group’.

SEBI’S ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE LAW


SEBI has been making attempts to address some of these issues. Indeed, two consultation papers have been recently issued by SEBI to discuss how to simplify the reclassification and how to narrow down the definition. These, however, at best scratch the surface. So the only way out is to squarely avoid becoming a promoter. And the best way is to do this, as stated earlier, at the time of the public issue.

But even that is not easy! The definition of promoters is very wide and even persons having a significant say in management, whether by way of shareholding or by agreements or otherwise, could be classified as promoters. Litigation on this issue (e.g., the decision of SAT in the Subhkam Ventures case, dated 15th January, 2010, read with the ruling of the Supreme Court on appeal) has been inconclusive. SEBI had attempted to specify some bright line tests in this regard to lay down specific criteria / clauses in an agreement which could make a person a promoter. But nothing real came out of this either.

The problem is further complicated because multiple laws have placed requirements on promoters. These include the Companies Act, SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, SEBI Takeover Regulations, SEBI Listing Regulations, the SEBI ICDR Regulations, certain laws made by the RBI, etc. Thus, there are multiple regulators involved. All this makes a change difficult and complex.

However, such changes are now the need of the hour. As SEBI has rightly pointed out in its recent consultation paper dated 11th May, 2021 on redefining the term ‘promoter’, the holding of promoters has decreased steadily from 58% in 2009 to 50% in 2018 in the top 500 companies. More importantly, the holding of institutional investors has substantially increased from 25% in 2009 to 34% in 2018. Many companies capitalising on new technology are professionally managed companies with no identifiable promoters. Hence, now the responsibilities and obligations are increasingly sought to be placed on the Board of a company rather than on the promoters.

Robust corporate governance with active involvement of institutional investors would be a better long-term objective rather than focusing on family-centred promoters. However, considering that these consultation papers propose small changes rather than a proper overhaul, the concerns remain. Hence, for now, even if not easy, prevention would be a better strategy for management / investors of new companies than the very difficult cure.  

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN A LEGAL LABYRINTH (Part – 2)

In the last issue, BCAJ, July, 2021, we looked at the legal background of cryptocurrencies and various issues relating to them. We continue examining the legal problems associated with Virtual Currencies (VCs) in India.
This month, we take up the FEMA provisions in relation to VCs

RBI PUTS TO REST 2018 CIRCULAR

In May, 2021, the RBI issued a Circular to all banks asking them not to refer to its own Circular of April, 2018 cautioning customers against VCs. This was in light of the fact that the Supreme Court in Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC) had held that the RBI Circular of April, 2018 was liable to be set aside on the ground of being ultra vires the Constitution (explained in detail in last month’s feature). Therefore, the RBI directed banks that in view of the order of the Supreme Court, the April, 2018 Circular was no longer valid and hence could not be cited or quoted from. It, however, added that banks may continue to carry out customer due diligence processes in line with regulations governing standards for Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and obligations of regulated entities under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, in addition to ensuring compliance with relevant provisions under the Foreign Exchange Management Act.

CAN LRS BE USED FOR INVESTING IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES?

The Liberalised Remittance Scheme or LRS is a Scheme of the RBI under which any individual resident in India can remit abroad up to US $250,000 per financial year for permissible capital and current account transactions.

The million-dollar question is can the LRS be used for buying foreign crypto assets such as Bitcoins, Dogecoins? Alternatively, can a resident carry out a crypto arbitrage, i.e., buy cryptocurrencies from abroad and sell them in India? This is an issue on which there is no express prohibition under the LRS and there is more confusion than clarity.

When the LRS was introduced in February, 2004, the RBI stated that it could be used for any current or capital account transactions, or a combination of both. In May, 2007, the RBI clarified that remittances under the LRS were allowed only in respect of permissible current or capital account transactions. However, in June, 2015 the RBI introduced a novel concept of defining the permissible capital account transactions for an individual under the LRS. It defined them as follows:

(i) Opening of foreign currency account abroad with a bank;
(ii)    Purchase of property abroad;
(iii)    Making investments abroad;
(iv)    Setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures abroad;
(v)    Extending loans, including loans in Indian Rupees, to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in the Companies Act, 2013.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India (Supra) examined various facets of cryptocurrencies. The ratio of this decision is relevant even for determining the issue under LRS. Various important issues were examined in this case and one of the most important of these was ‘Are Virtual Currencies (VCs) “currency” under Indian laws?’ After examining various provisions of law, the Apex Court concluded that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money! This decision has been analysed in great detail in last month’s feature.

One may consider whether VCs can be considered to be securities and, hence, permissible under the LRS as an investment in securities. FEMA defines a security to mean shares, stocks, bonds and debentures, Government securities as defined in the Public Debt Act, 1944, savings certificates to which the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 applies, deposit receipts in respect of deposits of securities and units of the Unit Trust of India established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 or of any mutual fund, and includes certificates of title to securities, but does not include bills of exchange or promissory notes other than Government promissory notes or any other instruments which may be notified by the Reserve Bank as security for the purposes of this Act. VCs are not shares, stocks, bonds, debentures, Government securities, savings certificates, deposit receipts in respect of deposits of securities or units of any mutual fund. Hence, it is not possible to contend that purchase of VCs from abroad tantamounts to an investment in securities.

The truth of the matter is that the RBI is not comfortable with the LRS being used to buy VCs. RBI’s view is that VCs are not currencies. Hence, bankers are shy to allow the LRS to buy VCs. However, what would be the position if a resident were to use the balance standing in his foreign bank account to buy VCs? How would the bankers then restrict the usage? The moot point is can the RBI have jurisdiction in such a case? Can one use credit cards and buy VCs on the ground that they are goods / intangibles and hence the transaction is a current account transaction and credit cards can be used on the internet for any permissible current account transaction? Some Indian banks have started asking their customers remitting money abroad for investment purposes to provide a declaration that such funds will not be used for buying cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins.

In fact, some private banks have gone a step forward and added a clause in the LRS declaration which doesn’t stop at cryptocurrencies but also wants customers to declare that funds would not be used to buy units of mutual funds or any other capital instrument of a company dealing in Bitcoins / cryptocurrencies / virtual currencies. Further, the LRS declaration even stipulates that the source of funds for LRS remittances should not come from investments in Bitcoins or cryptocurrencies. Clearly, a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater!

One point to be considered when dealing with this issue is that under FEMA one cannot do indirectly what one cannot do directly. Thus, if the RBI considers that VCs cannot be bought under the LRS, then one cannot buy them indirectly.

Another issue to be considered is that when remitting money under the LRS one needs to file Form A2 and fill in the Purpose Code. What Purpose Code would the bank show for cryptocurrencies – would it be Capital Account / Foreign Portfolio Investment? Without this clarity, a bank would not allow remittance for buying VCs.

ARE VCs GOODS?

In the aforesaid case of Internet and Mobile Association of India (Supra), the RBI contended that Virtual Currencies are not legal tender but tradable commodities / digital goods. If this proposition is upheld then the question which arises is whether the buying and selling of VCs would attract the provisions under FEMA relating to export and import of goods?

The Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 defines ‘software’ to mean any computer programme, database, drawing, design, audio / video signals, any information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than in or on any physical medium. VCs are also computer programmes stored in a virtual medium and, hence, the question arises whether they can be considered goods.

If a resident buys VCs from abroad would it be treated as import of goods? In this case, the provisions of the Master Direction on Import of Goods and Services amended up to 1st April, 2019 would be applicable.

Similarly, if a resident pays for foreign services / goods availed of by him by way of VCs, then would the payment by VCs be treated as an export of goods and the receipt of the foreign services / goods as an import? In this case, the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 read with the Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services amended up to 12th January, 2018 would be applicable. If one considers the payment by VCs to be an export and the receipt of goods from abroad to be an import, then this would constitute a set-off of export receivables against import payables. The FEMA Regulations permit a set-off of exports against imports only if it is in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. A payment by VCs is not prescribed under the FEMA Regulations, and hence it is a moot point whether the same would be permissible.

(To be
concluded)
 

CSR RULES AMENDMENT – AN ANALYSIS

1. BACKGROUND
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be defined as a company’s sense of responsibility towards the community and environment (both ecological and social) in which it operates. Companies can fulfil this responsibility through waste and pollution reduction processes, by contributing educational and social programmes, by being environmentally friendly and by undertaking activities of similar nature. CSR is not charity or mere donations. CSR is a way of conducting business by which corporate entities visibly contribute to the social good.

The Companies Act, 2013 has formulated section 135, Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility) Rules, 2014 and Schedule VII which prescribe mandatory provisions for companies to fulfil their CSR. This article aims to analyse these provisions (including all the amendments therein).

Applicability of CSR provisions
o On every company including its holding or subsidiary having:
* Net worth of Rs. 500 crores or more, or
* Turnover of Rs. 1,000 crores or more, or
* Net profit of Rs. 5 crores or more
o during the immediately preceding financial year, and
* A foreign company having its branch office or project office in India, which fulfils the criteria specified above.

However, if a company ceases to meet the above criteria for three consecutive financial years then it is not required to comply with CSR provisions till such time as it meets the specified criteria.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, vide Notification dated 22nd January, 2021 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 135 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 469 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), notified rules to further amend the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014. These rules are to be called the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021.

They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. As per the Notification, section 21 of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 has come into force with effect from 22nd January, 2021.

2. The top ten points relating to changes in CSR rules are as follows
CSR expenditure
(i) Surplus from CSR activities to be ploughed back in same project or transferred to Unspent CSR Account and spent as per policy and annual action plan, or transferred to Fund within 6 months of the end of the financial year.
(ii) Excess amount spent shall be set off within three succeeding financial years subject to conditions (i.e., surplus arising out of CSR activities shall not be considered and the Board of the company shall pass a resolution to that effect).
(iii) CSR amount may be spent for creation / acquisition of capital asset to be held in the manner prescribed.
(iv) Specific exclusion of sponsorship activities for deriving market benefits from the scope of CSR activities.

Governance
(v) Eligible implementing entities through which a company shall undertake CSR activities will be required to register themselves with the Central Government w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.
(vi) Responsibility of the Board to ensure that the funds so disbursed have been utilised for the purposes and in the manner as approved by it and the CFO or the person responsible for financial management shall certify to the effect.
(vii) CSR Committee to formulate Annual Action Plan for CSR activities.
(viii) Companies with average CSR obligation of Rs. 10 crores or more in three preceding years to undertake impact assessment through an independent agency for projects of Rs. 1 crore or more which have been completed not less than one year before the impact study and the report to be placed before the Board and in the Annual Report of CSR.

Reporting
(ix) Earlier, only the contents of the CSR policy were required to be disclosed on the company’s website. Now, composition of CSR Committee, CSR Policy and projects approved by the Board are required to be disclosed.
(x) New format inserted for disclosure to be included in the Board’s Report.

3. The provisions relating to amendment of the Companies Act are tabulated below:

Section

Description

Amendment

Earlier
provision

Implication

135(5)

CSR spending

If the company has not completed 3
years
since incorporation, then 2% of average net profit during such
immediately preceding financial year

The Board to ensure that the company
spends at least 2% of the average net profit made during 3 immediately
preceding financial years

This provision is to rationalise the
method of computation of net profit for the purpose of CSR

In case of newly-incorporated entities,
the amount of CSR expenditure will be increased

135(5)

2nd proviso

Unspent amount not relating to an
ongoing project

The unspent amount not relating to an
ongoing project shall be transferred to a Fund specified in Schedule
VII within 6 months of the end of the financial year

If the company fails to spend the
amount, the Board is required to specify the reasons for not spending

This is a welcome step and the
corporates will be benefited

In case the amount cannot be spent, it
can be transferred to a Fund, avoiding non-compliance

135(6)

Unspent amount relating to an ongoing
project

The company is required to transfer the
amount to a special ‘Unspent CSR Account’ within 30 days from
end of financial year and spend it within 3 financial years from date
of such transfer

No corresponding provision

This is a welcome step and the corporates
will be benefited

This will enable corporates to plan
their cash flows and park the excess amount in ‘Unspent CSR Account’ to be
utilised within next 3 F.Y.s

135(7)

Contravention w.r.t. sections 135(5) and
135(6)

Fine equal to:

In case of company – 2X of the amount required to be
transferred, or Rs. 1 crore, whichever is less

In case of officers – 1/10th of the amount
required to be transferred, or Rs. 2 lakhs, whichever is less

No corresponding provision

Provision for fine introduced

4. The provisions relating to amended CSR Rules as per the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021 are tabulated below:

Rule

Description

Amendment

Earlier
provision

Implication

4

CSR implementation

Eligible implementing entities through
which a company shall undertake CSR will require to register themselves
with Central Government w.e.f. 1st April, 2021

No corresponding provision

Welcome step from the point of view of
governance

Responsibility of the Board to ensure that the funds so disbursed
have been utilised for the purposes and in the manner as approved by
it and the CFO or the person responsible for financial management shall certify
to the effect

5(2)

CSR Committee

Committee to formulate annual action
plan
for CSR activities

Institute transparent monitoring
mechanism for implementation of projects

This is a new provision

Shall help in formulation of
Board-governed annual plan. This would lead to good governance

Board may alter such plan based
on recommendation of CSR Committee

7

CSR expenditure

Board to ensure administrative overheads
not to exceed 5% of total CSR expenditure for financial year

Contribution to corpus, expenditure on
CSR projects approved by Board on recommendation of CSR Committee, excluding
items not falling under Schedule VII

New provisions and welcome ones

This was required as corporates
necessarily need to incur some administrative expenses

Surplus from CSR activities not to be treated as business profit and
be ploughed back in same project or transferred to Unspent CSR
Account
and spent as per policy and annual action plan or transfer to
Fund
within 6 months from the end of financial year

New provision

Shall benefit the corporates in
smoothening their cash flow and also compliance of the CSR provision

Excess amount spent shall be set off within 3
succeeding financial years subject to conditions (i.e., surplus
arising out of CSR activities shall not be considered and Board of the
company shall pass a resolution to that effect)

New provision

Shall benefit the corporates in
smoothening their cash flow and also compliance of the CSR provision

CSR amount may be spent for creation
/ acquisition of capital asset to be held in the manner prescribed

 

8

CSR reporting

Companies with average CSR
obligation of Rs. 10 crores or more in 3 preceding years to undertake impact
assessment
through an independent agency for projects of Rs. 1 crore or
more which have been completed not less than 1 year before the impact study

No corresponding provision

New provision

Will lead to good governance

The report to be placed before the
Board
and in the Annual Report of CSR

Company may book the expenditure
towards CSR which shall not exceed 5% of total CSR expenditure or Rs. 50
lakhs, whichever is less

9

Display of CSR activities on website

Company to disclose composition of CSR Committee,
CSR Policy and projects approved by the Board

Company to disclose the contents of the
CSR policy

 

10

Format for Annual Report on CSR

New format inserted for disclosure to be included in the Board’s
Report

No corresponding provision

Procedural, to clarify the definitions
and meanings

2(b)

Meaning of administrative overheads

General management and administrative
expenditure, excluding direct expenses towards a particular project

No corresponding provision

2(d)

Meaning of CSR activities

Excludes sponsorship activities for deriving market benefits for its
products

As per Schedule VII

2(f)

Meaning of CSR Policy

Definition amended to widen the scope
of Committee to recommend formulation of annual action plan

2(g)

Meaning of international Org.

As defined u/s 3 of UN (Privileges and
Immunities) Act

No corresponding provision

2(i)

Meaning of ongoing project

Project already commenced, multi-year
project, i.e., not less than 1 year but not exceeding 3 years

No corresponding provision

2(j)

Meaning of public authority

As defined under the RTI Act

No corresponding provision

6

CSR Policy

Omitted

List of CSR projects which a company
plans to undertake and monitoring process

This provision was omitted as the
provision relating to annual plan has been introduced

5. Impact Analysis
(I) The new rules will give the corporates thenecessary flexibility in spending in case of ongoing projects.
(II) Those corporates that are unable to spend for any reason will be able to comply with the rules if they transfer the amount to a special Fund
(III) The new rules will bring in more transparency and will involve experts in impact analysis.
(IV) The quality of governance through the Board will be a notch higher
(V) The reporting and disclosure will improve.

ERRATA
We regret that in the BCAJ issue dated January, 2021 (Vol. 52-B, Part 4), certain inadvertent errors have crept in on three different pages. In all cases, lines / cross-headings that should have been deleted have appeared with a ruling line across them. On Page 5, the lines ‘Since we all try to avoid… feel negative emotions’, have a ruling line across them. Similarly, one line on Page 30 and six lines on Page 31 also have ruling lines across them.
The errors are sincerely regretted

DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY – PART VI

I am overwhelmed that my articles on the subject have evinced considerable interest. The amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 (‘the Amendment Act’) and the issue of daughters’ right in coparcenary property have now been the subject matter of substantial litigation all over the country. Through my articles published in the BCAJ in January, 2009; May, 2010; November, 2011; February, 2016; and May, 2018, I made an attempt to analyse and explain the legal position as per the various cases decided by several High Courts and by the Supreme Court of India.

It cannot be disputed that the amendments were beneficial to society and a step towards ensuring equality between males and females in an HUF. However, in view of the imprecise language of the Amendment Act and lack of clarity about what exactly was intended by the Legislature, the amendment was the subject matter of a plethora of court cases all over the country and ultimately some cases went up to the Supreme Court.

In view of the cases decided by the Supreme Court till then, my article published in February, 2016 expressed a hope that the legal position then explained was final. Unfortunately, further decisions came from the Supreme Court. I say unfortunately because as explained in my last article published in May, 2018, confusion was created by two different decisions of the Supreme Court and I had to end the article with the fervent hope that the Apex Court would review its decisions to resolve the conflict.

I am glad to note that the Supreme Court has now tried to resolve the conflict in its recent decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma and others, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 1.

The confusion created by the Supreme Court can be explained in brief as under:

‘The Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi vs. Lal Chand [(2006), 8 SCC 581] held that the Amendment Act would have no application in a case where succession was opened in 1989, when the father had passed away. In the case of Eramma vs. Veerupana (AIR 1966 SC 1880), the Supreme Court held that the succession is considered to have opened on the death of a person. Following that principle in the case of Sheela Devi (Supra), the father passed away in 1989 and it was held that the Amendment Act which came into force in September, 2005 would have no application’.

Based on this, the Madras High Court applied the decision to other cases.

Even in the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36 which was decided in 2016, the Supreme Court held that ‘the rights under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born’.

Thus, there is a plethora of cases deciding that the father of the claiming daughter should be alive if the daughter makes a claim in the coparcenary property. Moreover, it is necessary that the male Hindu should have been alive on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act. Thus, at that stage the legal position was that the rights of a daughter under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Consequently, I closed my February, 2016 article with the hope that this final legal position would prevail without any further complications.

Unfortunately, this did not happen and in the case of Danamma vs. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 342 the Supreme Court held differently. The principle laid down in earlier cases was not followed and (without considering its own decision in the case of Sheela Devi) it was held that a daughter would have a share even if her father was not alive on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act. This decision caused confusion. In my June, 2018 article I could end only by expressing the fervent hope that the Apex Court would review its decision in the Danamma case so that the apparent conflict is resolved without resulting in further litigation. Both these decisions were re-ordered by a Bench of two judges. Later, it was decided to refer the issue to a larger Bench.

Therefore, it is heartening to note that the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, after considering all previous decisions, including some High Court cases, has now taken a view which possibly settles all the confusion created earlier and lays down the law which is now final and binding on all. In the recent case of Vineeta Sharma (Supra), the Supreme Court has overruled its earlier decision in the cases of Prakash vs. Phulavati and partly overruled the Danamma decision of interpretation of the Amendment Act.

The final legal position as emerging from this decision can be summarised as follows:
(i) A daughter of a coparcener who is living as on9th September, 2005 shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she would have been a son;
(ii) This position applies regardless of when such daughter is born;
(iii) It is not necessary that the father on account of whom a daughter gets a right should be alive.

Hopefully, this closes the chapter of controversies regarding the interpretation of the Amendment Act. I can only express the wish that the legal ingenuity of lawyers does not extend to raising any new issues and allows the final legal position to stand.

VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

The billion-dollar acquisitions that we read about, especially of early-stage companies, raise the question, how do deal makers arrive at the deal price? There is seldom a transaction wherein the buyer and the seller would agree on the future outcome of certain critical parameters which could be a point of negotiation, or even the cause of some potential deals falling through with the two parties unable to reconcile on the deal price. It is contingent consideration that helps in breaking this deadlock between two parties because it enables the buyer to pay a part of the deal price to the seller only on the achievement of certain pre-agreed critical milestones. While such contingent consideration is commonly observed in M&A deals, there are several complexities when it comes to the valuation aspects of such consideration.

1. INTRODUCTION TO CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

Ind AS 103, Para 37 requires the consideration transferred in a business combination to be measured at fair value which is to be calculated as the sum of the acquisition-date fair value of assets transferred by the acquirer, the liabilities incurred by the acquirer to the former owners of the said business, and the equity interests issued by the acquirer. In fact, contingent consideration is one of the forms of consideration as described in Ind AS 103 and it has to be recorded at the acquisition-date fair value as a part of the total consideration. Contingent considerations are typically employed in transactions to bridge the valuation gap between the buyers’ and the sellers’ differences of opinion regarding the target entity’s future economic prospects. It helps to get the buyer and the seller on the same page when it comes to the valuation of the target entity. Let us examine this basic concept by way of an example:

Company A intends to acquire Company B. Company B has just introduced a new product line that is expected to generate significant sales. Company B’s owners have projected a significant amount of sales from the proposed product line and are considering the same to influence the deal size. Company A, on the other hand, believes that there is a risk of uncertainty in the achievement of targets contemplated by the seller and hence there is a disagreement on the deal valuation. By incorporating a contingent consideration clause in the purchase agreement, the seller accepts part of the business risk along with the buyer and also participates in any upside post-transaction.

Contingent consideration may be contingent on different events, for example, on the launch of a product, on receiving regulatory approval, or reaching a certain revenue or income milestone. The achievement of such events often spans over more than a year. Thus, it is necessary to understand the acquisition date as well as the post-acquisition treatment of such contingent consideration.

2. CLASSIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

2.1 Liability vs. equity classification
The classification of consideration is essentially driven by the mode of settlement of such consideration. Consideration settled in cash is always classified as a liability. In a scenario where the consideration is to be settled by issue of certain instruments of the buyer, one needs to determine whether the number of instruments to be issued are fixed and determined at the acquisition date. In a scenario where the number of instruments is fixed, then such consideration is classified as equity, and where the number of instruments to be issued is not fixed, then such consideration is to be recognised as a liability. Refer to Figure 2.1.1 for a simplified approach to determining equity vs. liability.

Figure 2.1.1: Classification of contingent consideration

Example: A fixed monetary amount to be settled in a variable number of shares would be classified as a liability.

Contingent consideration classified as a liability is required to be re-measured at its fair value at each reporting period. For example, a consideration depending on revenue achieved over the next three years from acquisition will need to be fair-valued at the end of each year / quarter. Whereas, a consideration classified as equity is not required to be fair-valued post the initial recognition since the consideration has already been determined and locked as at the acquisition date.

3. VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION / EARN-OUTS

The methods to be followed and the approach will be driven by the way the payment of such contingent consideration or earn-outs is structured. The pay-outs are structured based on a single or more than one metric. The Table below illustrates the various metrics which are commonly observed for contingent consideration:

Financial matrices

Non-financial matrices

Revenue

Gross profits

EBITDA

Profit before tax

Cash flows targets

Stock price

Result of clinical trials

Software development / R&D milestones

Employee retention targets

Customer retention targets

Closing of a future transaction

Number of units sold

Mostly, contingent consideration is paid on achievement of certain revenue or profit targets. Additionally, such payments may be spread over more than just one year. The pay-outs can either be linear pay-outs or non-linear pay-outs.

3.1 Linear pay-outs
Pay-outs which are dependent on a single metric and are expressed in terms of a fixed percentage or the product of a financial or some non-financial parameters, are referred to as linear pay-outs. Considerations that vary based on different levels of revenue or other parameters are non-linear pay-outs. For example:

Target will receive a payment at some future date as follows:

  •  If EBIT < $1 million, the payoff is zero;
  •  If EBIT = $1 million, the payoff is a 10x multiple of EBIT.

The valuation method will be driven by the structure of the contingent consideration pay-outs. There are two broad valuation approaches used to value a contingent consideration.
i) Probably weighted expected return method, more commonly referred to as ‘PWERM’, or scenario-based method (‘SBM’); and
ii) Option pricing method, also referred to as the ‘OPM’.

3.1.1 Probably weighted expected return method (PWERM)
The PWERM assesses the distribution of the underlying matrices based on estimates of the forecasts, scenarios and probabilities. The pay-out computed is then discounted to present value using a discount rate corresponding to the risk inherent in the inputs considered while computing the compensation. The following are the steps followed:
i) Estimate scenarios of outcomes and associated probabilities.
ii) Compute the expected payoffs using the scenario probabilities.
iii) Discount expected payoffs to present value using risk-adjusted discount rates.

Illustration 3.1.1.1

• INR 100 crores payment contingent upon obtaining FDA approval.
• Approval expected in one year.

Solution:

Particulars

Payment

Probability

Prob.-weighted payment

Approval
obtained

Approval
obtained

INR
100

INR
0

75%

25%

INR
75

INR
0

Total

Discount
rate

Present
value factor

 

100%

10%

INR
75 crores

 

0.91

Fair
value of contingent consideration

INR
68 crores

Advantages:
i)    Management controls scenarios and probabilities: The scenarios and probabilities are generally prepared by the management because they would be the best source for such data points.
ii)    Understandable: The computation and the flow are understandable to a reader with basic financial knowledge.
iii)    Flexible: The model can be structured to fit most pay-out scenarios.

Disadvantages:
i)    Management controls scenarios and probabilities: While this has been discussed under advantages, management control over these inputs is also counter-intuitive since management tends to be overly optimistic or pessimistic in its assumptions.
ii)    Lots of subjective assumptions: Most of the methods / inputs are subjective and involve judgement, which at times is not the most ideal approach to value such pay-outs.
iii)    Discount rate: Since the methods involve multiple scenarios, it is challenging to estimate the appropriate discount rate.
iv)    Path dependencies: Pay-out scenarios which are path dependent, i.e., the result of one scenario is related to one or more dependent scenarios, are difficult to model in the PWERM. It can lead to multiple nodes and is prone to errors.

3.2 Non-linear pay-outs
Non-linear contingent considerations are either not strictly linear, or they pay a fixed amount based on a milestone correlated with the broader economy; thus, they require an OPM as their complexity and discounting cannot be adequately captured in a PWERM; for example, if the buyer pays INR 50 crores if EBITDA is at least INR 75 crores in the first three years, or if the buyer pays 40% of revenues above INR 50 crores in year two, subject to a maximum of INR 40 crores. Another, more complicated, example: The buyer pays 40% of revenues in years one to three, subject to a minimum of INR 10 crores and a cap of INR 40 crores. In such an arrangement, a PWERM will not work since it’s impossible to adjust the discount rate to align with the risk of such a complex pay-out structure. An option-pricing model is generally used to value such arrangements.

3.2.1 Option-pricing methods
The payoff structures for contingent consideration arrangements that have a non-linear structure are similar to those of options in that payments are triggered when certain thresholds are met. Accordingly, some option-pricing methods may be appropriate for valuing contingent consideration that have a non-linear payoff structure and are based on metrics that are financial in nature (or, more generally, for which the underlying risk is systematic or non-diversifiable). The OPM is implemented by modelling the underlying metrics based on a log-normal distribution that requires two parameters:

* The expected value: The management expectation of the matrices over the term of the arrangement. This is generally provided by the management.

* The volatility (standard deviation) of the metric: The volatility of the metric measures the potential variability from the expected value. This is generally determined by using market-based data. However, volatility for financial metrics like revenue and EBITDA cannot simply be computed using the movement in stock prices of the comparable companies. It needs to be appropriately levered and unlevered to capture the variability in achievement of the metrics.

There are two widely used option-pricing methods, viz., the Black-Scholes Model (‘BSM’) and the Monte Carlo simulation model.

3.2.1.1 Option-pricing method – Black-Scholes Model
BSM treats a pay-out arrangement just like an ordinary option which enables use of the standardised Black Scholes – Merton formula. This approach can work for simpler pay-out structures, for example, if the selling shareholder earns the pay-out only if the target metric hits a threshold, or for linear pay-outs with caps or floors. The consideration is assumed to represent a call option on the future performance of the seller.

Illustration for BSM
Earn-outs are contingent upon the target of achieving a benchmark EBIT of INR 11,25,000 within three years. The EBIT is currently INR 10,00,000. At the end, the acquirer will pay additional consideration equal to the excess EBIT over the benchmark.

The discount rate is 10% and the risk-free rate is 3%. Volatility of earnings is 14% based on historical EBIT.

The inputs to the Black-Scholes Model for this example are:

i)    The current INR 10,00,000 level of earnings is the value of the underlying,
ii)    the benchmark of INR 11,25,000 serves as the exercise price,
iii)    the term is three years,
iv)    the volatility is 14%,
v)    the risk-free rate is 3%, and
vi)    the dividend rate is 0%.

Based on the above inputs, calculations for the Black-Scholes Model can be incorporated into an Excel spreadsheet. The resulting call option value of INR 84,413 will be the value of the contingent consideration.

3.2.1.2 Option-pricing method – Monte Carlo Simulation Model
For more complex structures, a Monte Carlo simulation is preferred. Arrangements that pay over multiple periods or multiple metrics are subject to combined caps or a floor. A Monte Carlo simulation considers the correlation between matrices and pay-outs over multiple periods. The Monte Carlo simulation repeats a process many times attempting to predict all the possible future outcomes. At the end of the simulation, several random trials produce a distribution of outcomes that can be analysed. Random numbers are used to measure possible outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence. Generally, simulation software are used to generate random numbers. These random numbers are generated based on the applicable distribution driven by the metric triggering the pay-outs.

The following are the important considerations of key inputs for valuing contingent considerations using an option-pricing model:

Discount rate applied based on risk of target metric
For earn-outs that require this kind of discount rate, either the top-down or bottom-up approach may be used to develop the rate. These approaches are well known in the valuation field. They rely on the concept of beta (ß), which reflects the level of market risk reflected in an instrument.

In the top-down approach, ß is based on the deal’s rate of return adjusted for the difference in market risk between the target metric and the overall enterprise value. Adjustments can reflect many relevant factors, such as the general risk in the target metric, leverage, term, size premium and entity-specific risk. In the bottom-up approach, ß is the target metric adjusted for term, size, entity-specific risk and other relevant valuation factors. The bottom-up approach may rely on statistical analysis of the target metric from the entity or its peers.

Volatility
Valuation techniques that rely on options modelling or Monte Carlo simulation require a volatility of the target metric. There are four ways in which such volatility can be computed:

i)    Historical changes in the target metric for the acquired entity and public comparable companies,
ii)    Entity volatility based on the relationship between the target metric and the enterprise value,
iii)    The difference between analyst forecasts and actual results for peer companies, and
iv)    Fitting a distribution to management’s estimates.

With any of these methods, a discussion with management is recommended since a derived volatility may fail to accurately incorporate the economics of the entity’s situation.

Both option-pricing models can get complex and difficult to comprehend for a lot of professionals and they have their share of advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages:
i)    Manage complex payoff structures: Can accommodate a wide range of complex payoff structures.
ii)    Objective assumptions: Most inputs are governed by market-related inputs making it less subjective than the PWERM.
iii)    Discount rate: Since the computations are made using random numbers and volatility, generally risk-adjusted discount rates are used, reducing the need of subjectivity inherent in building discount rates for financial matrices.

Disadvantages:


i)    Perceived to be complex and time-consuming.
ii)    Rigid: OPMs are based on a prescribed formula and are perceived as rigid relative to the PWERM.
iii)    Difficulty in converting real-world cash flows into risk-free cash flows: It is challenging at times to convert the pay-out structure into models to be used with the OPMs.

Valuation of contingent consideration and selection of the appropriate methods for doing so can be quite challenging. Such valuations are continuously evolving as new literature on methods and approaches is published around the world. The selection of methods to value these arrangements is driven by the complexity of the pay-outs and the experience and the qualifications of the valuer to be able to appropriately apply these methods.

The complexity of contingent consideration is not limited to its valuation but has several accounting and taxation implications which need to be considered and analysed. The accounting and tax aspects vary, based on the accounting standard being followed as well as the structure of the transactions. A discussion on these aspects would warrant an independent article, which we intend to cover over the next few issues.

INTRODUCTION TO ACCREDITED INVESTORS – THE NEW INVESTOR DIASPORA

Investors and investments have, over the decades, evolved with respect to form, structure, taxation and compliances involved. The constant need to test and re-invent has led to newer market participants exploring the investment universe.

However, one of the foremost principles of investment and investing, that is, investors should invest in financial products after knowing the risks and returns associated with them, and therefore take an informed decision regarding their investments in line with their risk-return profile, continues to prevail.

SEBI Consultation Paper: On 24th February, 2021, SEBI introduced a ‘Consultation Paper on the Introduction of the Concept of Accredited Investors’ (‘Consultation Paper’) in the Indian securities market.

The Consultation Paper made a case for introduction of the concept of Accredited Investors (AI) in the Indian securities market and covered the following aspects:

  •  Benefits to the Indian Securities Market
  •  Proposed AI eligibility criteria for various categories of investors, namely, Individuals, HUFs, Family Trusts, Bodies Corporate and Non-Resident Investors
  •  Process and validity of accreditation
  •  Procedure for implementation

SEBI Press Release (SEBI PR): Subsequently, on 29th June, 2021, SEBI via PR No. 22/2021, inter alia proposed a formal introduction of the framework for AI in the Indian securities markets.

This article covers the following aspects:

(A) CONCEPT OF AI

The AI framework as proposed by SEBI in India and prevalent framework across different economies; impact on the Indian securities markets vis-à-vis Private Equity, Venture Capital, Portfolio Management Services (PMS) and the Startup ecosystem.

AI, or as they are colloquially called Professional or Qualified Investors, amongst others are a class of investors who possess expert understanding of various financial products, the risks and returns associated with them, coupled with the financial capacity to absorb losses, enabling them to take relatively higher risk in their investing endeavours.

Hence, they are classified as a distinct group to recognise their ability to take informed decisions regarding investments and to selectively eliminate the need for extensive regulatory protection. Such investors may also enjoy relaxations with respect to disclosure requirements, filings of offer documents / prospectus, etc., and enhanced flexibility in respect of investor reporting.

Across the globe, other jurisdictions have also similarly demarcated this investor class considering their distinct knowledge and investment experience, alongside financial capacity.

(B) WHY HAVE ACCREDITED INVESTORS

The investment ecosystem in India today restricts investments in various asset classes based on the capacity of the investor to digest risks associated with that investment. This ability to digest risks is determined by minimum investment thresholds and high net worth requirements.

However, over time, investors have gained requisite knowledge to demonstrate an understanding of the asset class along with the ability to take on the risks associated with such investments.

Therefore, identifying this new investor diaspora as an ‘Accredited Investor’ enables achieving the premise of risk-reward balance coupled with the opportunity to allow investors to invest in asset classes that they understand and follow which would fill in the gap in the current investment and securities regulations. This model has also been successfully implemented globally (see ‘Accredited Investor Ecosystem Globally’ below) and has resulted in the creation of this new investor diaspora.

Overall economic boost in the investment universe and promotion of asset classes which hitherto were inaccessible to a large set of investors would be visible.

(C) THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR FRAMEWORK AS PROPOSED BY SEBI IN INDIA1 AND ACROSS DIFFERENT ECONOMIES:

(I) The eligibility criteria for Resident Investors, Non-Resident Indians and Foreign Entities as proposed by SEBI are as detailed below:

Category of investor

Eligibility criteria for Indian
investor to be an Accredited Investor

Eligibility Criteria for Non-Resident
Indians and Foreign Entities to be Accredited Investors

Individuals, HUFs and Family Trusts

Annual income >= INR 2 crores; or

Net worth >= INR 7.5 crores with not
less than INR 3.75 crores of financial assets; or

Annual Income >= INR 1 crore + Net
worth >= INR 5 crores; with not less than INR 2.5 crores of financial
assets;

Annual income >= USD 300,000; or

Net worth >= USD 1,000,000; with not
less than USD 500,000 of financial assets; or

Annual income >= USD 150,000 + Net
worth >= USD 750,000; with not less than USD 375,000 of financial assets

Trusts (other than Family Trusts)

Assets Under Management >= INR 50
crores

Assets Under Management >= USD 7.5
million

Bodies Corporate

Net worth >= INR 50 crores

Net worth >= USD 7,500,000

Others

Central and State Governments,
Developmental agencies such as SIDBI, NABARD, etc., set up under the aegis of
Government(s), funds set up by Government(s) and QIB’s as defined under SEBI
(ICDR) Regulations, 2018

Multilateral agencies, Sovereign Wealth
Funds, International Financial Institutions and Category – I FPIs

 

1   SEBI Consultation Paper dated 24th
February, 2021

Manner of determination of annual income, net worth and value of real estate assets
(i) The income and asset details which need to be considered for assessment of eligibility criteria shall be as per the data furnished in the Income-tax Returns filed for the immediately preceding financial year and the financial year in which assessment is being made.

(ii) For calculation of net worth, the value of the primary residence of the investor shall not be included.

(iii) In case the assets of the investor accounted for the assessment of eligibility criteria are in the form of real estate, a ‘ready reckoner rate’ as published by the respective local bodies shall be considered.

Manner of determination of annual income and net worth in case of joint accounts

In case of joint accounts held by individuals, the account shall be considered as an AI account only in the following scenarios:

(i) The First holder of the account is an AI;

(ii) The Joint holders are parent(s) and child(ren), where at least one person is independently an AI;

(iii) The Joint holders are spouses and their combined income / net worth meets eligibility criteria.

Manner of determination of financial capacity in case of bodies corporate

For bodies corporate, the latest statutorily audited information as on the date of application shall be considered for assessment of eligibility.

For trusts, the calculation of Assets Under Management shall be based on the valuation data as included in the Statutory Audit Report of the preceding financial year or as on the date of application.

(II) Accredited Investor Ecosystem Globally

Country

Accredited Investor criteria

Regulation

United States of America

Earned income exceeding USD 200,000 (or
USD 300,000 together with a spouse) in each of the prior two years and
reasonable expectation of a similar earning for the current year, or

SEC Reg 501(d)

United States of America




(continued)

has a net worth over USD 1,000,000,
either alone or together with a spouse (excluding the value of the primary
residence

SEC Reg 501(d)

Singapore

Net personal assets exceeding SGD 2
million (or equivalent in foreign currency), or in case of Corporates – Net
Assets exceeding SGD 10 million (or equivalent foreign currency) or

Income in preceding 12 months should be
not less than SGD 300,000 (or equivalent in foreign currency)

Section

4A(1)(a) of the Securities and Futures
Act (SFA)

Australia

Net assets of at least AUD 2.5 million, or

A gross income for each of the last 2
financial years of at least AUD 250,000

Section 708(8) of the Corporations Act,
2001

United Kingdom

‘Experienced Investor’ definition in the
UK:

A body corporate which has net assets in
excess of
€ 1,000,000 or which is part of a group which has net assets in excess of €
1,000,000;

Trustee of a trust where the aggregate
value of the cash and investments which form part of the trust’s assets is in
excess of € 1,000,000;

An individual whose net worth, or joint
net worth with that person’s spouse, is greater than € 1,000,000, excluding
that person’s principal place of residence

Section 3 of Financial Services
(Experienced Investor Funds) Regulations, 2012

When compared to global benchmarks, the financial parameters (vis-à-vis income and net worth) laid down by SEBI are on the higher side and may indicate a sense of conservative caution which is understandably needed in the advent of the sensitivity and adaptability concerns that surround this critical regulation. However, over time SEBI may consider re-evaluating these parameters as soon as AI investment becomes mainstream and with the imminent need to reduce entry barriers (income and net worth) for a seamless functioning of these crucial market participants.

(D) IMPACT ON THE INDIAN SECURITIES MARKETS VIS-À-VIS PRIVATE EQUITY, VENTURE CAPITAL, PMS AND STARTUP ECOSYSTEM

The Indian financial and securities market ecosystem is evolving with the Startups and the alternative investment space is fast maturing.

The proposed regulations as detailed below create a base for a thriving market and a soft regulatory regime. While the market for customised products for elite investors may not be readily available in the Indian securities market at this juncture, putting in place the required enabling framework will propel innovation in and development of the securities market in time to come.

Category of market participant

Associated effects under proposed
regulations2

Impact (Author’s view) and SEBI PR

Investors

Recognition as AI will help in availing
intended benefits

Portfolio diversification through access
to customised investment products or structured products;

more investment products due to lower
entry barriers such as minimum investment size

Alternative Investment Funds (AIF)

(Venture Capital, Private Equity and
Startups)

 

and

 

PMS players

Flexible participation for AI under the
AIF and PMS regulations

This is a welcome step and a much-needed
initiative opening up the investment ecosystem to AIs who were hitherto
restricted from such investments owing to prevalent minimum investment norms

 

AIFs3 and PMS4
would be able to attract capital from AIs for this fast-growing asset class
helping Startup and Venture Capital investments get the much-needed push
without the minimum investment norm requirements.

Alternative
Investment Funds

 

and

 

Portfolio
Management Services players

Beneficial interrelationship of AI with
AIF and PMS

for AI’s with minimum investment of INR
10 crores (PMS) or INR 70 crores (AIF)

Accredited Investors with minimum
investment of

INR 70 crores with AIF may avail
relaxation from regulatory requirements such as portfolio diversification
norms, conditions for launch of schemes and extension of tenure of the AIF

OR
INR 10 crores with registered

Alternative
Investment Funds

 

and

 

Portfolio
Management Services players

 

 

 





 

(continued)

PMS provider may avail relaxation from
regulatory requirements with respect to investments in unlisted securities
and shall be able to enter into bilaterally negotiated agreements with the
PMS provider

 

The above benefits shall be instrumental
for availing better means for investment structuring, pooling of capital,
co-investments, etc.

 

However, the threshold of INR 70 / 10
crores seems to be on the higher side and may merit reconsideration

Investment Advisers (IA)

Optimal engagement with IA

The terms of the agreement may be determined
mutually between the IA and the AI client, without diluting the fiduciary
responsibility cast on IAs under the SEBI Investment Advisors Regulations.

AI shall be in a better
position to bargain since the limits and modes of fees
can be governed through bilaterally negotiated contractual terms

 

2   SEBI PR
dated 29th June, 2021

3   As an illustration, the minimum capital
commitment required to participate in AIFs is INR 1 crore. In case of an
Accredited Investor, the manager may accept a capital commitment less than INR
1 crore

4   As an illustration, any entity may enter into
an agreement with a Portfolio Manager to avail customised asset management,
i.e., portfolio management service with a minimum capital of INR 50 lakhs. Such
capital may be made available to the Portfolio Manager in the form of cash or securities.
In case of a client who is an Accredited Investor, the Portfolio Manager may
accept capital and manage a portfolio of less than INR 50 lakhs

Accreditation Agencies
Accreditation Agencies (AA) can be Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs), i.e., Stock Exchanges, Depositories and / or subsidiaries of such MIIs. The modalities of accreditation, including documentation, fees, etc., will be specified by the AA separately.

Accreditation, once granted, shall be valid for a maximum period of one year from the date of accreditation.

The investor shall submit the necessary data and documents to the AA for ascertaining its eligibility to be an Accredited Investor. If eligible as per the approved criteria, the Accreditation Agency shall provide a certificate to this effect, clearly indicating the period of validity. Each certificate of accreditation shall have a unique certificate number.

The AI shall provide a copy of the Accreditation Certificate to the financial product / service provider along with a declaration to the effect that:

(i) The Investor is aware that being an AI, it is expected to have the necessary knowledge or means to understand the features of the investment product / service, including the risks associated with the investment and also has the ability to bear the financial risk associated with the investment.

(ii) The Investor is aware that the investment product / service in which it is proposing to participate may have a relaxed and flexible regulatory framework and may not be subject to the same regulatory oversight as retail products / services.

(E) WELCOME TO THE AI IN INVESTING AND ITS BALANCE
SEBI continues to pursue its ambitious attempts to harmonise the Indian securities market with the staggered introduction of global best practices in investments while giving due recognition to sophisticated market participants for better regulation.

While from a risk minimisation and mitigation perspective for market participants SEBI will need to ensure a robust recognition process and monitor the impact on the asset classes, short-term liquidity boost and transparency of information by parties looking to on-board AI’s with investor protection and interest would remain the paramount factor.

We hope that the accreditation, and acceptance, of specialist investors further propels the quantum of investments into new asset classes and helps drive the Indian economy to greater heights.

NEW FAQs ON INSIDER TRADING

SEBI has released in April, 2021 a comprehensive set of Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’) on the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘the Insider Trading Regulations’). Several aspects of the subject have been clarified. A few important ones are discussed here.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS

Insider trading is an evil of stock markets that is unacceptable across the globe and stringent laws are made against such acts. The concept of insider trading is simple enough. A person close to a company is entrusted with material information about the company and he is duty-bound not to abuse it for profit. It may be information about, say, substantial growth in profits of the company. Yet he goes ahead and buys shares of the company while the information is not yet public. When the information is released, the share price expectedly rises and he thus profits. Insider trading is condemned on several grounds. It reduces faith in the markets as there arises a feeling that the market is rigged against ‘outsiders’. It also amounts to a moral wrong by such a person against the company itself which also loses. The persons who actually invest in the company and thus put their money at risk may be at a loss. Therefore, there are comprehensive regulations against insider trading.

This evil is tackled in various ways under the law. The primary policy of course is to ban trading on the basis of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (‘UPSI’). Communication of UPSI is also prohibited. Detailed rules are laid down for control over it. A comprehensive and very wide definition of an ‘insider’ is laid down. Several categories of persons who are connected with the company or even connected with connected persons are deemed to be insiders. Further, apart from the ban in law, the company itself is required to self-regulate trading by certain insiders by a code of conduct.

It is not surprising that many areas exist where the law does not appear to be clear. SEBI has now released a comprehensive set of FAQs on the Regulations.

MULTIPLE SOURCES OF GUIDANCE – NOTES, INFORMAL GUIDANCE AND FAQs

Before we proceed to some specific and important FAQs, it is interesting to note the several attempts made to give guidance in various forms to the admittedly complex set of Regulations. The Regulations have this fairly interesting feature of ‘Notes’ to some of them. The notes attempt to explain the nature of that particular regulation. The legal status of such notes is not wholly clear.

Then we have Informal Guidance issued by SEBI in reply to specific queries raised by market participants from time to time. Coincidentally, SEBI has compiled important Informal Guidances on insider trading and released them almost simultaneously with the FAQs. But the legal status of Informal Guidances, too, is ambiguous at best.

And now we have the FAQs which again are specifically stated to be not law and not binding!

Yet, the Notes, Informal Guidances and FAQs do throw light on the complex and loosely worded Regulations and also show the mind of SEBI on how it views the Regulations. The Regulations will, of course, always rule as law but in the field of Securities Laws such supporting material has always been relevant and indeed they enrich the law.

Let us now consider some important FAQs.

DO THE REGULATIONS APPLY ALSO TO DEALINGS IN DERIVATIVES, DEBENTURES, ETC.?

The common understanding of insider trading may be that the Regulations cover dealings in equity shares. This also makes general sense since it is typically equity shares that are affected by release of material information. For example, a jump in the performance of the company affects the price of its equity shares.

However, the Regulations refer to ‘securities’ and not merely to ‘equity shares’. The term ‘securities’ is very widely defined and includes shares of all types, derivatives, debt securities, etc. Thus, the FAQs clarify that such other types of securities (except units of mutual funds) are also covered by the Regulations. Dealings in ADRs / GDRs are also clarified to be covered.

CREATION / INVOCATION / REVOCATION OF PLEDGE AND OTHER FORM OF CHARGE ON SECURITIES

It is common for shareholders to raise loans against their securities or otherwise offer such securities as security for various obligations. The securities are thus subjected to a charge which may be a pledge, a hypothecation, etc. The question is whether the creation (as also the invocation / revocation) of such a charge would amount to ‘dealing’ which is regulated?

On first impression, it would appear counter-intuitive that such acts should be regulated. Pledging of the shares does not result in transfer of risk and reward. If the price of the shares rises or falls, it would be on account of the shareholder; unlike a sale where the risks and rewards get transferred. However, an insider in possession of UPSI may, for example, pledge his shares and obtain a loan. Once the UPSI is released, which, say, is seriously negative news, the price of the shares may fall sharply. The lender thus may suffer as he will not be able to recover his loan even if he had kept a margin.

A ‘Note’ to the definition of ‘trading’ clarifies that this would include pledging, etc., while in possession of UPSI. The FAQs make this clear even further. Thus, creation, etc., of such a charge while in possession of UPSI would amount to dealing that is prohibited. However, the FAQs clarify that under certain specified circumstances such acts are permitted but it would be up to the pledger / pledgee to demonstrate that they were bona fide and prove their innocence.

CONTRA TRADES

As explained earlier, the Regulations attack the evil on several fronts. One of them is by way of ban on short-term trading by insiders which is also known as entering into contra trades within a specified period.

The basic rule is that an insider should not deal in the securities of the company on the basis of UPSI. However, to find him guilty of such an act, SEBI would have to prove several aspects. To avoid this, certain designated insiders have been banned from entering into contra trades within six months. To put this a little simply, if he purchases shares today, he cannot sell shares for six months. And vice versa. This places a brake on insiders doing quick trading which can expectedly be on the basis of UPSI.

However, some aspects are not clear and the FAQs have been released to clarify them.

Can such an insider buy a derivative and then reverse it within six months? The FAQs say he cannot, unless the closure of the derivative is by physical delivery. In other words, if he buys a future for, say, X number of shares, he can close the future by taking delivery and making the payment. However, he cannot close the future by selling it. This again makes sense because buying and selling futures / options may expectedly be on the basis of UPSI.

Can such an insider acquire shares by exercise of ESOPs and then sell them within six months? The FAQs says he can. The FAQs make some further clarifications. If he buys equity shares from the market on, say, 1st January and then acquires further equity shares by exercise of ESOPs, he can sell the shares acquired through ESOPs any time but he cannot sell the shares acquired from the market till 1st July. This would appear a little strange since usually both the categories of shares may be in the same demat account and hence not capable of being distinguished.

Then, the question is would the acquisition of shares through rights issues or public issue also amount to acquisition whereby one cannot sell the shares for the following six months? The FAQs clarify that you cannot sell the shares for such period.

Further, it is clarified that the ban on contra trades would apply not just to the designated insiders but also to their immediate relatives collectively.

IMMEDIATE RELATIVES

It is common, particularly in India, that family investment decisions are made by one person or at least jointly. One person may thus take decisions for himself / herself and other family members such as spouse, parents, children and even further. It would also be very easy for an insider to avoid the ban on trading on himself by trading in the name of a family member. Thus, the definition of insider for specified categories includes trading by ‘immediate relatives’ and they, too, are subject to certain similar regulations.
The question then is, who is an ‘immediate relative’? The definition under the Regulations creates two categories. One is the spouse, the other category is of the parent, sibling and child of such person or his / her spouse who is financially dependent on such person or consults such person while making an investment decision. The ‘Note’ to this definition clarifies this is a deeming fiction and hence rebuttable. The FAQs further emphasise this.
This clarification is important because often, being a mere relative does not necessarily mean that their dealings are in consultation with or even known to other members. A parent may not even know what are the dealings in securities of the child, particularly when the child is an adult, maybe with his own family. The same principle extends to siblings. Even spouses may want to carry out their own dealings. Hence, it would not be fair to extend an inflexible rule covering dealings of all relatives. Nevertheless, it would be more reasonable to expect, particularly in circumstances in India, that dealings of relatives are more likely based on information accessed by the insider. However, the insider can rebut this deeming fiction and establish that such persons do not consult him for their investment decisions and are not financially dependent on him.
CONCLUSION

Insider trading is not only an evil in the securities markets, but being held guilty of insider trading carries its own stigma. A person with such a track record may not get a job again in a reputed company. Investors, particularly those who are close to listed companies, would have to be familiar with the intricacies of these widely-framed Regulations so that they are not held liable under them. A Chartered Accountant in his professional dealings is very often an insider or deemed to be so by legal fiction. He may be a statutory or internal auditor, Independent Director, Adviser, Chief Financial Officer, financial adviser, merchant banker, etc., of listed companies. With his financial expertise, he would also typically deal in securities. Or he may simply park his savings in securities for his retirement. He would have to be even more careful in his dealings. The FAQs issued by SEBI thus help particularly the conservative investor who would educate himself and wade through the minefield of these Regulations safely.
 

EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

BACKGROUND
The concept of Independent Directors (IDs) had emerged from the need to have a certain number of Directors on the Board who would think and act independently and to bring a healthy balance between the interests of the promoters and those of other stakeholders, including minority and small shareholders. IDs are an important component in the overall framework of corporate governance.

SEBI has, over the years, strengthened the institution of IDs through the recommendations of various committees. But despite several measures, concerns about the efficacy of IDs have continued. To further strengthen the overall framework of IDs for equity listed entities, the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘Listing Regulations’) have been amended with effect from 1st January, 2022. The Listing Regulations have further been amended to specifically empower the IDs of ‘high value debt listed entity1’ which would apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis until 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis thereafter. This article seeks to provide an overview of the key aspects emanating from these amendments and the key considerations for the companies and the governance professionals.

DEFINITION OF AN ID

Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations sets out certain objective conditions for determination of the independence of an ID. These conditions include areas of pecuniary relationship of self and of relatives with the listed entity, its promoter, or directors, etc. SEBI observed that scope exits to further strengthen the criteria for independence of IDs and harmonisation of certain requirements under the Listing Regulations, e.g., a cooling-off period while assessing the eligibility conditions for an ID. Further, an ID is also defined u/s 149 of the 2013 Act which provides that relatives of a proposed ID cannot have any pecuniary relationship including the pecuniary relationships as prescribed therein. The existing Listing Regulations do not provide a list of such pecuniary relationships. Hence, the definition of an ID under the 2013 Act and under the Listing Regulations is different.

To address the above concerns, especially harmonisation of requirements, SEBI has amended the Listing Regulations and has also inserted additional criteria as follows:

  •  Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID, apart from receiving Director’s remuneration, should not have / had any material pecuniary relationship with the prescribed entities, including the listed entity, its holding and subsidiaries during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations has been amended to extend the cooling-off period to three immediately preceding financial years. Let us consider the following example to better understand the amendment:

Ms Z is proposed to be appointed as an ID in Company XYZ in F.Y. 2021-2022. She noticed that in January, 2019 she had had a material pecuniary relationship (other than remuneration) with Company XYZ. As per the existing provisions, Ms Z could have been appointed as an ID as the relationship existed prior to the cooling-off period of two years. However, since the cooling-off has been extended to three years, she cannot be appointed as an ID.

  • Section 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act provides that a person cannot be appointed as an ID whose relatives have pecuniary relationships / transactions with the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or their promoters, or directors including holding any security of or interest and being indebted (in excess of the prescribed amount) during the immediately preceding two financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations does not prescribe a list of the pecuniary relationships similar to that provided under the 2013 Act but simply states that the relatives of such proposed ID should not have / had pecuniary relationship during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year in excess of the prescribed amount.

The list of pecuniary relationships as provided u/s 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act has been incorporated in Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations – with certain modifications; e.g., the period for determining pecuniary relationship is stated as three immediately preceding financial years (under the 2013 Act – two immediately preceding financial years), and the lower threshold (as per existing norms) for determining pecuniary relationship of relatives has been retained. Let’s understand these key differences with the help of the following examples:

– While assessing his eligibility conditions, Mr. Y noticed that one of his relative owes Rs. 60 lakhs to the Holding Company of the Company ABC. Company ABC is proposing to appoint Mr. Y as an ID in F.Y. 2021-2022. Mr. Y considered that the pecuniary relationships are permitted to the extent of the following:

Under the 2013 Act

Rs.

 

Under the Listing
Regulations (lower of following)

Rs.

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

Another threshold

50 lakhs

In the above situation the balance outstanding from the relatives is within the permissible limits under the 2013 Act. However, the outstanding is in excess of the limit prescribed under the Listing Regulations. Hence, Mr. Y cannot be appointed as an ID.

– Mr. X is assessing the eligibility conditions for his proposed appointment as an ID in Company DEF in March, 2022. He noticed that during F.Y. 2018-2019 one of his relatives held equity shares of the Company whose face value exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. A cooling-off period of two years and three years, respectively, has been prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. Accordingly, in this case even though the requirement of the two-year cooling period under the 2013 Act is met, Mr. X cannot be appointed as an ID because his relative had held securities during the three-year cooling period prescribed under the Listing Regulations.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID is a person who (neither himself nor whose relatives) holds or has held the position of a key managerial personnel or is or has been an employee of the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial year in which he is proposed to be appointed. The amended Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations extends the restriction to employment in any promoter group company. However, the proviso to the Regulation further provides that the cooling-off period will not apply to relatives in employment of the stated entities, provided that they do not hold the position of a key managerial personnel. Accordingly, where relatives of a person holds employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) in the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary, or associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group of the listed entity in the preceding three financial years, such person can be appointed as an ID. The following example illustrates the amendment for better understanding:

While assessing her eligibility conditions, Ms Q noticed that her spouse is the Managing Director in a promoter group company of Company LMQ which is proposing her appointment as an ID in February, 2022. Since a relative of the proposed ID holds the position of a key managerial personnel in a promoter group company, Ms Q cannot be appointed as an ID in Company LMQ. If her spouse held an employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) such as Sales Executive, she can be appointed as an ID pursuant to the relaxation as per the proviso to Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) stated above.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(viii) of the Listing Regulations provides that ID is a person who is not a non-independent director of another company on the Board of which any non-independent director of the listed entity is an ID. An explanation has now been inserted to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a body corporate that has been mandated to constitute its board of directors in a specific manner as per the law under which it is established, the non-executive directors on its Board would be treated as IDs. Similar requirement has also been prescribed for ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a Trust.

• Pursuant to the amendment, the
Listing Regulation now provides a uniform cooling period of three years
across all eligibility conditions. Such a uniform cooling-off period strikes
a healthy balance of having a reasonable cooling-off period while also
upholding the independence of the proposed ID.

 

• It might be also noted that the
above amendments would require the listed entity to obtain revised
declaration of independence from the IDs since Regulation 25(8) of the
Listing Regulations requires IDs to provide such declaration whenever there
is any change in the circumstances which may affect the status as an ID.
Consequently, as required by Regulation 25(9), the Board of Directors would
be required to take on record such a declaration after undertaking due
assessment.

ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE ROLE OF THE NRC

At present, Regulation 19(1)(c) of the Listing Regulations provides that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) should comprise of at least 50% of IDs and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares 2/3rd of the NRC should comprise of IDs. SEBI felt that there is a need to strengthen the composition of IDs in the NRC in order to reduce dependence on the promoters. Accordingly, Regulation 19(1)(c) was amended to provide that ‘at least 2/3rd’ of the Directors in the NRC of all listed companies (including listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise of IDs. Let’s understand this amendment though the following example:

The NRC of Company DEF comprises six members – with equal representation by IDs and other Directors. Company DEF does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. Hence the representation of IDs should be increased from the existing three to four IDs – so that 2/3rd of the NRC comprises IDs pursuant to the revised norms as stated above.

Clause A to Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations provides that the role of the NRC includes formulation of the criteria for determining qualifications and positive attributes of a Director. Notwithstanding such requirements, SEBI was of the view that there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRCs. Therefore, a need exists to prescribe disclosures for selection of candidates for the post of an ID. These disclosures are expected to increase the transparency in the functioning of NRCs and would also be good from the governance perspective. SEBI accordingly introduced Clause 1A in Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations to provide that:

  •     For every appointment of an ID, the NRC should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the Board of Directors;
  •     On the basis of such evaluation, the NRC should prepare a description of the role and capabilities of an ID. The person recommended to the Board for appointment should have the capabilities identified in such description;
  •     The NRC has the option of using the services of external agencies to consider candidates from a wide range of backgrounds (having due regard to diversity) and consider the time commitments of the candidates.

SEBI also introduced Regulation 36(f) in the Listing Regulations to provide that the shareholders’ notice should include the disclosures regarding the skills and capabilities required for the role and the manner in which the proposed person meets such requirements.

Further, amendments were made to Regulation 36(d) to provide that the shareholders’ notice for appointment of a new Director or reappointment of a Director should include the names of listed entities from which the person has resigned in the past three years.

• The Listing Regulations has
increased the number of IDs required in the NRC. Therefore, in case the NRC
of a listed entity does not meet the revised requirement, the NRC should be
reconstituted.

 

• The revised role of the NRC establishes
additional processes for appointment of an ID. As per the amended Schedule II
the NRC will be required to consider candidates from a wide range of
backgrounds. The databank of IDs as established under the 2013 Act might act
as a good reference point for selecting potential candidates.

COMPOSITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

The Listing Regulations cast specific responsibilities on the Audit Committee to review financial information, scrutinise inter-corporate loans and investments and the valuation of undertakings and assets of the listed entity, etc. At present, Regulation 18(1)(b) of the Listing Regulations provides that 2/3rd of the members of the Audit Committee should comprise of IDs, and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares the Audit Committee should comprise only of IDs. SEBI has amended this Regulation to provide that the Audit Committee of listed companies (which do not have outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise ‘at least 2/3rd of IDs’ instead of the existing composition of ‘2/3rd of IDs’. The amendment in the provision
relating to the constitution of the Audit Committee prescribes for a ‘minimum requirement’ of 2/3rd of the Committee to be comprised of IDs, thus allowing companies to appoint more IDs as members of the Committee. This amendment may not necessitate reconstitution of the Audit Committee.

For example, the Audit Committee of Company PQR comprises six members – four IDs and two other Directors. Company PQR does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. So it can continue with the present composition of the Audit Committee as it has the minimum number of IDs in the Audit Committee as per the revised Regulations. Since the revised Regulations prescribe the minimum composition, Company PQR may choose to appoint a higher number of IDs on the Audit Committee.

Regulation 23(2) of the Listing Regulations provides that all related party transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. SEBI felt a need to further enhance the scrutiny around related party transactions. Accordingly, a proviso was added to Regulation 23(2) which provides that only those members of the Audit Committee who are IDs should approve related party transactions.

As per the revised norms, only those
members of the Audit Committee who are IDs can approve related party
transactions. There may be transactions which have either been approved prior
to the effective date of the amendment, or there might be modifications to
the terms and conditions of existing related party transactions, thereby
requiring approval of the Audit Committee. Listed entities would need to
assess whether these transactions would require
approval of the Audit Committee as per the
amended provisions.

APPOINTMENT, REAPPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF IDS

Appointment of an ID is made through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting of a company as provided u/s 152(2) of the 2013 Act. However, reappointment of an ID requires the passing of a special resolution by the company. SEBI felt that the present framework of appointment of IDs may be influenced by the promoters – in recommending the name of IDs and in the approval process by virtue of their shareholding. This may hinder the independence of IDs and undermine their ability to differ from the promoter, especially in cases where the interests of the promoter and of the minority shareholders are not aligned. Additionally, considering that the role of IDs includes protecting the interests of minority shareholders, there is a need for minority shareholders to have a greater say in the appointment / reappointment process of IDs.

Accordingly, to give more say to the minority shareholders in the simplest manner possible, SEBI introduced Regulation 25(2A) in the Listing Regulations to extend the requirement to obtain shareholders’ approval through a special resolution for appointment and removal of an ID. Thus, as per the revised requirements, the appointment, reappointment or removal of an ID should be subject to the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution.

APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS WITHIN A STIPULATED TIMEFRAME

As per the current practice, companies appoint IDs as additional directors, subject to approval of the shareholders at the next general meeting. It is, therefore, possible that a person gets appointed as an additional ID just after an Annual General Meeting and then serves on the Board of Directors, without shareholder approval, till the next Annual General Meeting. SEBI also observed that there have been cases in the past where the shareholders have rejected the appointment of IDs even while these IDs had served on the Board for a few months. Hence, SEBI felt that reduction / elimination of the time gap may give more say to the shareholders in the appointment process. Further, in order to bring consistency and ease of compliance, SEBI felt that such a time frame may also be applied to approval of appointment of all Directors including IDs, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, etc.

Accordingly, Regulation 17(1C) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that approval of shareholders for appointment of any person (including that arising due to casual vacancy) on the Board of Directors should be taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment, whichever is earlier.

The revised norms require a listed
company to obtain shareholders’ approval at the next general meeting or
within three months from the date of appointment of the ID, whichever is
earlier. An issue arises where a person has been appointed as an ID (say in
November, 2021) but the shareholder approval is pending. The next general
meeting is expected to be held in September, 2022. One might argue that in
this case the shareholders’ approval should be obtained within three months
from the effective date of the amendments, i.e., by 31st March,
2022. However, under this approach the time gap between approval by the Board
and shareholders’ approval would exceed the time period prescribed under the
Listing Regulations. An authoritative clarification would be required from
SEBI to address these situations.

INSURANCE FOR IDS

The top 500 listed entities by market capitalisation are required under Regulation 25(10) of the Listing Regulations to undertake Directors and Officers insurance (‘D and O insurance’) for all IDs of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by their Board of Directors. SEBI considered that due to increased expectation from IDs and the heightened regulatory scrutiny, adequate protection under a proper D and O insurance policy will help IDs perform their duties more effectively. Thus, the requirement of mandatory D and O insurance should be extended to a wider group of listed entities. Accordingly, SEBI has decided that with effect from 1st January, 2022 the requirement of undertaking D and O Insurance would be extended to the top 1,000 companies by market capitalisation.

The Listing Regulations were further amended to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ should undertake D and O insurance for all its IDs for such sum assured and for such risks as may be determined by its Board of Directors.

COOLING OFF PERIOD – TRANSITION OF AN ID TO AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The current provisions as prescribed under Schedule III (Part A)(A)(7B)(i) require the resigning ID (within seven days of resignation) to disclose to the stock exchanges detailed reasons for the resignation along with a confirmation that there are no other material reasons for resignation other than those already provided. SEBI observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as preoccupation, other commitments or personal reasons, and then join the Boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the regulations around the resignation of IDs.

Hence, Schedule III was amended to provide for disclosure of the resignation letter of an ID along with the names of listed entities in which the resigning Director holds Directorships, indicating the category of Directorship and membership of Board committees, if any. It may be noted that the new requirement to disclose the entire resignation letter is only an extension of the existing requirements which require disclosure of detailed reasons for resignation along with a confirmation as aforesaid.

SEBI also observed cases where IDs have resigned and have then joined the same company as Executive Directors. While there may be valid reasons for transition from an ID to an Executive Director, such instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future may practically lead to a compromise in independence. SEBI felt that a cooling-off period should be prescribed to reduce potential impairments to an ID’s impartiality in decision-making in instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in certain companies in the near future.

Thus, Regulation 25(11) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that an ID who has resigned from a listed entity cannot be appointed as an Executive / Whole-time Director on the Board of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or on the Board of a company belonging to its promoter group, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of resignation as an ID.

The amended Regulation provides a
cooling-off period of one year in case of resignation by an ID. However, such
cooling-off period has not been prescribed where the ID is appointed as an
Executive
Director post expiry of his
term as an ID.

TIME-PERIOD FOR FILLING UP CASUAL VACANCY OF IDS

As per Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations, an ID who resigns or is removed should be replaced by a new ID at the earliest but not later than the immediate next meeting of the Board of Directors, or three months from the date of such vacancy, whichever is later. However, the time limit for filling of a casual vacancy prescribed under the 2013 Act [Schedule IV (VI)(2)] is different, i.e., three months from the date of resignation / removal. In order to avoid inconsistency, SEBI has modified Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations to align the time limits prescribed under the 2013 Act.

THE WAY FORWARD

 

• Listed companies might encounter
implementation challenges emanating from these amendments – some of them have
been highlighted above. Hence it is important that the listed companies
should engage with governance professionals, including auditors, to iron out
these challenges.

 

• Apart from the above amendments, SEBI
in its Board Meeting held on 29th June, 2021 had also decided to
make a reference to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for giving greater
flexibility to companies while deciding the remuneration for all Directors
(including IDs), which may include profit-linked commissions, sitting fees,
ESOPs, etc., within the overall prescribed limit specified under the 2013
Act. At present, ESOPs to IDs are prohibited under the Listing Regulations
and the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the implementation of the SEBI decision would
require modifications to the Listing Regulations and also to the 2013 Act.
Any positive development on this aspect would enable listed companies to
attract and / or retain talented IDs.
 

ACCREDITED INVESTORS – A NEW AVENUE FOR RAISING FINANCE

SEBI has, at its Board meeting of 29th June, 2021, taken some baby steps to introduce and recognise a new category of investors – the Accredited Investors (‘AIs’) who are persons of high net worth / income. This has been followed up by amendments to the respective SEBI regulations on 3rd August, 2021. These changes should open up a new and wide channel of raising finance from informed and capable investors, particularly in areas where the present regulations are too restrictive.

This is not a new concept internationally. Many countries such as the USA, Canada, Singapore and even China have provisions for such a category of persons who are deemed to be well aware, if not sophisticated, and also having sufficient net worth so as to be able to bear losses in risky investments. Many rules are relaxed for such persons and issuers / intermediaries are able to issue complex, high risk / high return products to such persons at terms that are mutually agreed rather than statutorily prescribed. Thus, on the one hand, entities that cannot otherwise raise finance without crossing many hurdles can now raise finance more easily from such persons, on the other hand, such persons have wider avenues of investments to aim for higher returns at risks which they understand and can even manage.

In other words, AIs are expected to be sophisticated high net worth investors who do not need elaborate hand-holding by the regulator. They can evaluate complex, high risk / high return products / services and negotiate terms flexibly to protect their interests.

COMPLEX SEBI REGULATIONS AIMED AT THE NAÏVE AND UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTOR

SEBI’s regulations generally are models of micro-management. Having seen small investors repeatedly suffering in their investments, and perhaps also considering the reality of Indian markets, the rules in capital markets tend to bend towards elaborate controls. Parties generally cannot, even by mutual agreement, waive the many requirements of law enacted for the protection of investors.

A portfolio manager, for example, cannot accept a client with less than Rs. 50 lakhs of investment even if the client is well informed / capable. He also cannot invest more than 25% of the portfolio in unlisted securities under discretionary management, even if the client is agreeable to this. Similarly, Alternative Investment Funds have restrictions which cannot be avoided. Investment Advisers, too, face a very elaborate set of rules which govern almost every aspect of their business, including even the fees that they can charge. Thus, even if an informed client is willing to pay higher fees to get expert advice, the investment adviser is limited by the regulations.

The result of all this is that needy issuers are starved of funds and well-informed investors deprived of avenues with the potential of higher returns.

CONSULTATION PAPER ISSUED IN FEBRUARY, 2021

SEBI had initiated this process in February, 2021 by issuing a consultation paper proposing a framework for AIs and seeking public comments. This has now been finalised and amendments accordingly made to the regulations relating to Alternative Investment Funds, Portfolio Managers and Investment Advisers.

Who would be recognised as Accredited Investors?
As per the new framework, a person can obtain a certificate as an AI on the basis of net worth / assets or income, or a combination of the two. For example, an individual / HUF / family trust can be an AI if its annual income is at least Rs. 2 crores or net worth is at least Rs. 7.50 crores, with at least half of it in financial assets. Or it can be a combination of at least Rs. 1 crore annual income and net worth of Rs. 5 crores (with at least half in financial assets).

For other trusts, a net asset worth of at least Rs. 50 crores can qualify them as AIs. For corporates, too, a net worth of Rs. 50 crores is necessary. A partnership firm would be eligible if each partner is individually eligible. Similar parameters are provided for non-residents such as non-resident Indians, family trusts / other trusts, corporates, etc. Government departments, development agencies and Qualified Institutional Buyers, etc., would be AIs without any such minimum requirements.

Interestingly, a further category of AIs has been specified, viz., Large Value Accredited Investors. This would apply in case of Portfolio Managers and would be persons who have agreed to invest at least Rs. 10 crores.

A strange aspect is that, unlike some countries in the West, SEBI has not permitted educated / experienced investors to qualify as AIs. Indeed, having qualification or experience is not deemed to be even relevant! Thus, for example, Chartered Accountants or even CFAs, though trained to be well-versed with finance, cannot only by virtue of the fact of being qualified and competent, be recognised as AIs. They can act as advisers to AIs, but not be AIs themselves, unless they have the minimum size of assets / income.

Further, again unlike many western countries, merely having a minimum income / net worth is not enough. A formal certification as an AI is needed from certain bodies recognised for this purpose. A fee would have to be paid to them for grant of such a certificate. Curiously, although the details have not been notified, it appears from the Consultation Paper that the certificate is likely to be valid only for one year at a time and will have to be renewed annually.

The Consultation Paper had proposed yet another strange condition. Persons who desire to provide financial products / advice to AIs would not only need to obtain a copy of such a certificate from the AIs, but will also need to additionally approach the certifying agency and reconfirm with them. This would be a needless additional hurdle. Hopefully, the process may actually end up being simpler with such confirmation being quickly provided online on an automated basis after due verification by the certifying agency. However, it would be best that this requirement is not mandated when the further details are notified.

Nature of relaxations from regulations available for transactions with AIs
While ideally, an informed and capable investor should not face any hurdles in his decision-making power for making investments, even if the provisions are meant for protection, there will not be total relaxation. Instead, perhaps with the intention of testing the waters and going in gradually, SEBI has given partial relaxation from the regulations. In fact, the relaxations as proposed are few and far between. The minimum investment required, the terms on which contracts of providing services can be made, the fees that can be charged, the extent to which investments in unlisted securities can be made, etc., are some relaxations proposed.

The amendments are primarily made in the SEBI regulations governing Alternative Investment Funds, Portfolio Managers and Investment Advisers. The Consultation Paper / SEBI Board meeting has talked of amendments to other regulations, too, and it is possible that more changes may be made in the near future.

BENEFITS OF THE NEW CONCEPT
The new scheme can be expected to benefit intermediaries, investors and indeed the market. They would have more freedom to enter into arrangements and investments with risks and complexities that they are comfortable with. It should also result in availability of far more funds, from many more persons and by many more issuers. Today, many such investments simply cannot take place because of protective legal requirements. There would also be more flexibility for the parties involved. The amendments also create a sub-category of AIs called Large Value Accredited Investors, as also a separate category of fund called Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors. These would enable further flexibility to larger investors who expectedly can undertake more informed risks.

Can an AI opt out of the scheme either generally or on a case-to-case basis?
There are a few other concerns. Even if a person is an AI, he may not always want to waive the regulatory protection. He may have more than the prescribed size of net worth, etc. However, in certain cases, he may prefer not to invest as an AI. It seems that there is no bar on him from opting out.

However, care would have to be taken in the paperwork / agreements to ensure that there is no inadvertent waiver. It is common, however, that investors end up signing on the dotted line on long documents containing fine print. This is even more important considering that the benchmark for being an AI is only financial and not knowledge / qualifications.

An interesting issue would still remain as to whether, in case of disputes, his being an AI could be used against him and he be assumed to be an informed and sophisticated investor.
Whether SEBI would be available as arbiter in case of disputes / malpractices?

The intention clearly is that parties should be able to negotiate their own terms and formulate such structures, even if complex and high risk, as they are comfortable with. The regulations that otherwise provide for mandatory detailed terms would not apply. The question then would be what would be the role of SEBI in case of disputes between AIs and issuers / intermediaries? In particular, whether SEBI would still be available as arbiter in case of malpractices? Or will the parties have to approach civil courts which are expensive and time-consuming? One hopes that at least in case of frauds, manipulations, gross negligence and the like, recourse to SEBI would still be available as SEBI continues to be an expert and generally swift-footed regulator.

CONCLUSION


Despite some concerns, the amendments are still a major reform in the capital markets. Considering that the relaxations are generally partial, the level of complexity may actually increase. One can now only wait and see how the experience turns out to be over the years and how SEBI deals with the issues that would arise.
(You can also refer to the Article on Accredited Investors on Page 31 of BCAJ,  August, 2021) 

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN A LEGAL LABYRINTH (Part – 3)

Over the last two months, this Feature has examined the legal background surrounding cryptocurrencies and FEMA provisions in relation to Virtual Currencies (VCs). In this, the concluding part, we take up the tax issues pertaining to this exciting new asset class

LEGALITY STILL IN DOUBT
The legality of VCs in India continues to be a question mark. As recently as on 10th August, 2021, the Minister of State for Finance gave a written reply in the Rajya Sabha stating that the Government does not consider cryptocurrencies legal tender or coin and will take all measures to eliminate use of these crypto-assets in financing illegitimate activities or as part of the payment system. The Government will also explore the use of blockchain technology proactively for ushering in a digital economy. He added that a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary (Economic Affairs) to study the issues related to VCs and propose specific actions to be taken, had recommended in its report that all private cryptocurrencies, except any cryptocurrency issued by the State, be prohibited in India. The Government would take a decision on the recommendations of the IMC and the legislative proposal, if any, would be introduced in the Parliament.

Coupled with this is the action taken by the Enforcement Directorate against a crypto exchange in India on the grounds of money-laundering. The accusation was that the exchange was facilitating some Chinese betting apps which converted their Indian earnings into VCs and then transferred the same to digital wallets based in the Cayman Islands.

In spite of the above regulatory heat, the popularity of VCs and crypto exchanges is growing by the day and a crypto exchange has now even entered the Unicorn club!

However, in the midst of the regulatory hullabaloo and the hype over VCs, one must not lose sight of the fact that at the end of the day tax must be paid on all earnings from VCs. The Income-tax Act is not concerned with the legality of a trade. In CIT vs. S.C. Kothari [1972] 4 SCC 402 it was observed that: ‘…If the business is illegal, neither the profits earned nor the losses incurred would be enforceable in law. But that does not take the profits out of the taxing statute.’

Again, in CIT vs. K. Thangamani [2009] 309 ITR 15 (Mad), the Madras High Court held that the income-tax authorities are not concerned about the manner or means of acquiring income. The income might have been earned illegally or by resorting to unlawful means. But any illegality associated with the earning has no bearing on its taxability. The assessee, having acquired income by unethical means or by resorting to acts forbidden by law, cannot be heard to say that the State cannot be a party to such sharing of ill-gotten wealth. Allowing such income to escape the tax net would be nothing but a premium or reward to a person for doing an illegal trade. In the event of taxing the income of only those who had acquired the same in a legal manner, the tendency of those who acquire income by illegal means would increase. It is not possible for the Income-tax authorities to act like the police to prevent the commission of unlawful acts, but it is possible for the tax machinery to tax such income.

The Finance Ministry in reply to a question raised in the Rajya Sabha has stated that irrespective of the nature of business, the extant statutory provisions on the scope of total income for taxation as per section 5 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 envisage that total income shall include all income from whatever source derived, the legality of income thus being of no consequence. The gains arising from the transfer of cryptocurrencies / assets is liable to tax under a head of income, depending upon the nature of holding of the same. It further stated that no data is maintained on cryptocurrency earnings of Indians as there is no provision in the Income-tax return to capture data on earnings arising from cryptocurrencies / assets.

Accordingly, irrespective of whether a crypto trade is legal or illegal, we need to examine its taxability. Let us briefly analyse the same. At the outset, it may be noted that since this is an evolving subject, there is no settled view and hence an attempt has been made to present all the possible views.

TAXABILITY OF TRADERS IN VCs
Whether a particular asset is a capital asset or a stock-in-trade has been one of the burning issues under the Income-tax Act. Section 2(14) defines the term ‘capital asset’ to mean property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession, but it does not include any stock-in-trade. Hence, a stock-in-trade of any nature, whether securities, land or VCs, would be outside the purview of a capital asset.

People who trade in VCs, i.e., frequently buy and sell cryptos, are as much traders in VCs as a person dealing in shares and securities. The usual tests laid down to distinguish a trader from an investor would apply even in the case of VCs. Hence, tests such as intention at the time of purchase, frequency of trades, quantum, regularity, accounting treatment, amount of stock held on hand, whether purchase and sale take place in quick succession, whether borrowed funds have been used for the purchase, etc., are all relevant tests to help determine whether a person is a dealer / trader in VCs or an investor. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Associated Industrial Development Company (P) Ltd. 82 ITR 586 (SC) in the context of securities would be equally relevant even in the case of VCs. The Court held that whether a particular holding is by way of investment or forms part of the stock-in-trade is a matter which is within the knowledge of the assessee who holds the asset and it should, in normal circumstances, be in a position to produce evidence from its records as to whether it has maintained any distinction between those shares which are its stock-in-trade and those which are held by way of investment.

The CBDT Circular No. 4/2007, dated 15th June, 2007 and Circular No. 6/2016 dated 29th February, 2016, issued in the context of taxability of gains on sale of securities would assist in determining the issue even for VCs.

If a person is a trader in VCs, then any gain made by him would be taxable as business income. The purchase price of the VCs would be allowed as a deduction even if the Government / RBI takes a stand that trading in VCs is illegal.

One school of thought also suggests that since there is no actual delivery involved in the case of VCs, transactions in VCs should be treated as a speculative transaction u/s 43(5). But it would be incorrect to say that delivery is not given in case of VCs because they are credited to a digital wallet. Delivery need not always be physical and could even be constructive or symbolic and should be seen in the context of the goods in question. However, this could become a litigious issue. For example, shares in dematerialised format are credited to a demat account and not physically delivered. Similarly, mutual fund units only appear in a statement.

Section 43(5) states that any commodity in which a contract for the purchase / sale is settled otherwise than by an actual delivery or transfer of the commodity, would be treated as a speculative transaction. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC) has held that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money! Thus, while the Court has not come to a definite conclusion, the fact that VCs are commodities has been upheld by the Apex Court. In such a scenario, could the trading in VCs be treated as a speculative business? If so, then the losses from this business can only be set off against speculative gains u/s 73 of the Act, and the losses to the extent not set off can be carried forward only for four assessment years. Yet another school of thought suggests that the profits from trading in VCs should be taxed as Income from Other Sources.

TAXABILITY OF INVESTORS IN VCs
For investors in VCs, the gains would be taxable as capital gains. Depending upon whether the VC in question has been held for a period of more than or less than three years, the VCs would be treated as long-term capital assets or short-term capital assets. Long-term capital gains would be eligible for indexation and would be taxed @ 20% + surcharge + cess. Short-term capital gains, on the other hand, would be taxed as per the regular slab rate applicable to the investor. It must be pointed out that the special concessional tax rates of 10% with grandfathering of the cost for long-term gains in case of listed shares and 15% in the case of short-term gains on listed shares, do not apply to gains on VCs. Any long-term capital gain made on the sale of VCs can be saved by an Individual / HUF by reinvesting the net sale consideration in the purchase / construction of a new house property u/s 54F.

Receiving VCs as payment for goods / services
If a business receives payment for the goods / services sold by it in the form of VCs, then it would be treated as a barter exchange and the fair market value of the VCs received would be treated as the consideration received for the sale / supply. The cost of goods sold / services rendered would be deducted from this consideration and the gains would be taxable as business income.

Payment for mining
One buzzword associated with VCs is ‘mining’. A ‘VC miner’ is like the miner in the coal / gold / ore mine who, through his arduous labour, comes up with a prized catch. A Bitcoin miner is one who solves complex, cryptic math puzzles on the Bitcoin network and makes the network secure by validating the transactions which take place on it. While it is difficult to explain this concept, suffice it to say that miners help in improving the transaction network of VCs. And a miner receives payment in the form of VCs! Now how would this transaction be taxed is the question.

A good way to look at this would be that the miner is actually providing a service by carrying out the mining. Hence, the income from the same should be taxed as his business income. The cost of power, depreciation on IT equipment, maintenance, etc., would all be deductible expenses incurred to earn this income. The fair market value of the VCs received by the miner would be treated as the consideration for the service and the difference would be taxed as his business income. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs is also considering levying GST on mining activities on the ground that these constitute a service. Alternatively, if it is not a business income, it may be taxed as Income from Other Sources.

A more aggressive view is that income from mining consists of capital gains arising from a self-generated asset. This could be used for amateurs who are into VC mining as opposed to miners who carry on the activity as an occupation. Here, applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Shetty [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC), a view is taken that since the cost of acquisition of such a self-generated capital asset cannot be determined and that since section 55(2) has not prescribed the cost of acquisition / improvement of the same to be Nil, the income cannot be taxed. It is likely that the Tax Department would contest this view.

Gift of VCs
What would be the tax treatment if a person gifts VCs to another person? A gift of specified property is taxable u/s 56(2)(x) in the hands of the recipient except in the exempt cases. However, the gift must be of property as defined in the Explanation to section 56(2)(x). Property is defined to mean any sum of money, immovable property, shares and securities, jewellery / bullion, art / sculptures and archaeological collections. The Government of India has constantly taken a stand (as explained above) that VCs are not money / legal currency in India. And that VCs are not shares and securities. Thus, VCs are not property as understood u/s 56(2)(x). Accordingly, it stands to reason that the provisions of section 56(2)(x) cannot apply in the hands of a donee who gets a gift of VCs.

Disclosure in Income-tax returns
Any individual / HUF who has annual total income exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs needs to file Schedule AL on Assets and Liabilities in his Income-tax return.

The assets required to be reported in this Schedule include immovable assets (land and building), financial assets, viz., bank deposits, shares and securities, insurance policies, loans and advances given, cash in hand, movable assets, viz., jewellery, bullion, vehicles, yachts, boats, aircraft, etc. Hence, it is an inclusive definition of the term assets. If a person owns VCs, it stands to reason that the same should also be included in the asset disclosures under Schedule AL. The cost price of the VC needs to be disclosed under this Schedule. For a resident who holds VCs credited to an overseas digital wallet / held with a foreign crypto exchange during the previous year, even if he has duly reported them in Schedule FA (foreign assets), he is required to report such foreign assets again in Schedule AL, if applicable.

However, for a non-resident or ‘resident but not ordinarily resident’, only the details of VCs located in India are to be mentioned. It would be interesting to note in the case of VCs how the situs of the asset would be determined.

Another Schedule to be considered is Schedule FA on foreign assets. A resident in India is required to furnish details of any foreign asset held by him in Schedule FA. This Schedule need not be filled up by a ‘not ordinarily resident’ or a ‘non-resident’. The details of all foreign assets or accounts in respect of which a resident is a beneficial owner, a beneficiary or the legal owner, is required to be mandatorily disclosed in the Schedule FA. Tables A1 to G of Schedule FA deal with the disclosures of various foreign assets and comprise of foreign depository accounts – foreign custodian accounts, foreign equity and debt interest, foreign cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, financial interest in any entity outside India, any immovable property outside India, any other capital assets outside India, any other account located outside India in which the resident is a signing authority, etc. The CBDT has not offered any guidance on how foreign VCs should be disclosed. However, in the absence of any clarity the same may be disclosed under either of the following two Tables of Schedule FA:

• Table D – Any other capital assets outside India
• Table E – Any other account located outside India in which the resident assessee is a signing authority (which is not reported in Tables A1 to D).

In Table D, the value of total investment at cost of any other capital asset held at any time during the accounting period and the nature and amount of income derived from the capital asset during the accounting period is required to be disclosed after converting the same into Indian currency. Further, the amount of income which is chargeable to tax in India, out of the foreign source income, should also be specified at column (9). The relevant Schedule of the ITR where income has been offered to tax should be mentioned at columns (10) and (11). The instructions state that for the purposes of disclosure in Table D, capital assets include any other financial asset which is not reported in Table B, but shall not include stock-in-trade and business assets which are included in the balance sheet. Hence, VCs held as stock-in-trade by traders would not be included in this Table.

In Table E, the value of peak balance or total investment at cost, in respect of the accounts in which the assessee has a signing authority, during the accounting period is required to be disclosed after converting the same into Indian currency. Only those foreign accounts which have not been reported in Table A1 to Table D of the Schedule should be reported in Table E.

One school of thought tends to suggest that in the absence of any specific guidance on disclosure under Schedule FA, VCs need not be disclosed. This would be playing with fire. The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) Act, 2015 levies a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs for non- / improper disclosures in Schedule FA. Hence, it would be better to err on the safe side and disclose the foreign VCs held.

It should be remembered that even though there is a question mark under FEMA over whether the Liberalised Remittance Scheme can be used for buying foreign VCs, disclosures under Schedule FA should nevertheless be made. Income-tax disclosures and taxation are not dependent upon the permissibility or otherwise of a transaction!

CONCLUSION
The world of cryptocurrencies is of high reward but carries high regulatory risk. This is due to the fact that there are a lot of uncertainties and unknown factors coupled with the apparently hostile attitude of the RBI and the Government towards VCs. People transacting in them should do so with full knowledge of the underlying issues that could arise. The famous Latin maxim ‘Caveat Emptor’ or ‘Buyer Beware’ squarely applies to all transactions involving virtual currencies!

(Concluded)  

INDIA’S MACRO-ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOME MACRO-LEVEL SOLUTIONS

India’s leadership wishes that India be recognised as an economic superpower.

But there is one catch in fulfilling this intent. Can we become an economy that comes in the first five in GDP rankings (although due to our large population, per capita we may still be very low) if we do not really ‘own’ our businesses in financial structures and do not supposedly pay our due share of taxes?

How can there be an entrepreneurial push to an economy when so much of quality time is spent not on expanding business and exploiting opportunities, but on creating ‘suitable business, financial and tax structures’?

Why are Indians considered a model minority culturally overseas when within the country we see examples of businesses defaulting on loans and interest payments with the term ‘wilful defaulter’ being specially coined for them and being accused of ‘tax evasion’?

[Please refer link (as example) – https://wap.business-standard.com/article/companies/around-rs-10-52-trn-corporate-debt-may-default-over-3-years-india-ratings-120030200388_1.html.]

‘Wilful defaulter’ is someone who has the ability to pay but is organising his business with the intent not to pay.

There are two macro-economic and financial problems that India is facing today:
(I) High debt capital gearing, and
(II) Intent of tax evasion (direct and indirect).

(I) High debt capital gearing

A classic case of high capital gearing and borrowings to fund business outcome comes from a major
telecom service provider (source – ‘moneycontrol.com’, standalone financials).

Between the years 2016-17 and 2020-21, this telecom company had these important events:
i)    Increase in equity capital – Rs. 25,130.07 crores;
ii)    Increase in tangible & intangible assets – Rs. 86,637.52 crores;
iii)    Increase in long-term borrowings – Rs. 105,777.67 crores;
iv)    Increase in short-term borrowings – Rs. 39.35 crores;
v)    Losses incurred in this period – Rs. 86,561.43 crores.

One can see that the increase in share capital to fund losses and increase in tangible and intangible assets is much lower than the increase in borrowings. The company has also used operating creditors to fund its business.

In the case of a large Indian entity whose major business is in oil and gas, between the years 2016-17 and 2020-21, the increase in reserves and surplus due to undistributed profits is Rs. 182,980 crores, while the increase in long-term and short-term borrowings is Rs. 92,447 crores. Clearly, there is a good match between increased borrowings and increased profits after tax for the period under review.

‘High Capital Gearing’ in Indian corporates is resulting in a skewed debt to equity ratio. This high debt when not serviced by payments on due dates of interest and principal instalment due, results in the corporate being ultimately called a ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (by bankers as lenders) and the process of recovery of dues starts.

NPAs pose a serious problem for the financial viability of India’s financial lending sector.

(Please see link – https://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/banks-gross-npas-may-rise-to-13-5-by-sept-financial-stability-report-121011200076_1.html.)

NPAs are unfair to the savings class of citizens because they destroy the net worth of banks – very unfairly, the insurance for the individual saving and keeping money in banks is restricted to Rs. 5 lakhs per bank. How this figure of Rs. 5 lakhs has come about is not known. Anybody who has studied Indian middle class savings patterns knows that a very large part of their savings corpus is in bank deposits. More than the borrower being impacted by action against him, the bank customer is hit hard, again very unfairly. Why has the RBI as regulator not thought of protecting the bank depositor by insisting that all deposits should be fully insured for bank default is not known. If the DICGC (Credit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation) which is a 100% subsidiary of RBI does not have the financial muscle to carry the entire risk liability, one can always bring in Indian and overseas insurers for providing the default risk cover.

The issue that needs attention is why do corporates accumulate such high debt (mainly from the banking sector)? The reality is that once the banking sector was opened to private players and long-term funding got opened in foreign exchanges, both the then Development Finance Institutions, ICICI Ltd. and IDBI Ltd., chose to become commercial / retail banks.

As the push for infrastructure came from the Government of India, commercial bankers became financiers of long-term debt (instead of just working capital funding). Bankers who were working capital funding entities started moving into long-term capital funding without truly understanding the implications. The intent of this article is not to comment on fraudulent behaviour or political intervention in sanctioning of loans. That is a different matter and proving of criminal conduct and punishment thereof is outside the scope of this article.

Corporate promoter groups in multiple business types saw an opportunity to draw large debt (facilitated by the financial markets meltdown in 2008 and 2009) and exploited the situation. The absence of the ‘skin in the game’ philosophy resulted in debt being incurred on unmerited and unviable business expansion / extension or new business proposals. In the hope of keeping the engines of growth firing, the banking sector funding went into undependable and unviable projects. Why did banks and financial institutions continue their funding despite ‘High Capital Gearing’ being visible is the question to be asked. The ease of getting borrowings has compounded the problem. Ultimately, the borrower is facilitated and the depositor is ruined!

To be fair, there is no doubt that in many over-leveraged business segments like the realty sector during Covid-19, the business entities have worked towards reducing debt by sale of business, liquidation of assets, etc.

SOLUTION
One part of the solution to avoid ‘High Capital Gearing’ and funding thereof is to have a much better overview of lending proposals and their appraisal at the lenders’ end (banks and financial institutions).

The other part which is systemic in nature is to remove the Income tax shield advantage of interest cost. Any entity has two sources of funds:
1) Shareholders capital – This funding is less popular because returns to shareholders come after corporate or business Income tax.
2) Borrowings – This funding is more popular because interest paid on debt funds is an eligible item of deductible expense, thereby reducing their cost impact for the business.

If a business wishes to give a shareholder dividend of Rs. 1,000 at a corporate income tax rate of 30%, it needs to earn Rs. 1,400+. However, Rs. 1,000 paid as interest on borrowings being eligible for income tax deduction as expense, actually costs Rs. 700 to the business (tax shield Rs. 300).

This business structuring and Income tax differential treatment of interest payment and returns to shareholders post tax, has moved the pendulum unswervingly towards debt from shareholders’ funds. Also, Indian corporate and business management is still very much dependent on family-based promoter groups who clearly would like to keep their exposure to risk at the lowest level. The principle of ‘as little skin in the game’ is followed.

Owing to this family / promoter development in Indian corporates, and maybe because the law is not facilitative enough, we do not have aggressive ‘business control’ wars and that has closed off the option of takeover by a rival if the business is languishing or going down. The IBC comes in much later at the point where insolvency is declared.

This is why in India the promoters’ exposure when business goes down is very low, thanks further to low capital invested. The high risk exposure is taken by the unsecured creditors and debt holders who are the ones taking the ‘haircut’. Hence, we are seeing the way the existing promoter is fighting to retain control of the entity in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy proceedings. Companies languish but don’t die.

(Please see link – https://m.economictimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/view-india-is-no-country-for-dying-companies/articleshow/85552085.cms.)

Our laws and our infrastructure to ensure timely implementation of laws are often not in sync with one another. This is fully exploited by a defaulting promoter. As the late Mr. Arun Jaitley said, ‘There are sick defaulting companies, but no poor promoters’!

Business Income tax should be based on profit before interest and tax, thereby removing the tax shield that is provided by interest. To compensate for this additional tax outgo, the rate on business income tax should be brought down by about 300 to 500 basis points (3 to 5%). By putting both sources of funds, at the same tax treatment level, the incentive to move towards debt and reduce equity contribution should diminish.

(II) Intent of tax evasion (direct and indirect)
There is no point in repeating ad nauseam that as per Finance Ministry Officials Indians evade both direct and indirect tax. Of course, nobody talks of the fact that agricultural income does not come under Income tax and therefore all international comparisons of percentage of direct taxpayers and percentage of total direct tax collection to total tax collected from individual assessees gets terribly vitiated.

GST has tightened indirect tax compliance to a great extent, but it could still do better on compliance matters. It is one thing to keep saying that Indians are tax-evaders and another to create an environment where tax evasion is not contemplated because it gives very marginal advantage.

SOLUTION
The solution is evident from the problem. There is a need to break the Chinese wall separating the Direct Tax Administration from the Indirect Tax Administration. GST has an issue because it is borne by the end customer who gets no credit on tax and it becomes a cost to him. That is why we have the sales without invoice, the unverified composition dealer sales, etc. Where the income tax payer can take GST credit (CGST, SGST, IGST) totally, he will be quite pleased.

The author is not aware whether fungibility between direct and indirect tax is available in other economies. All economies do have direct and indirect tax payment by the ultimate consumer. However, the Indian situation is different. We need to incentivise the ultimate taxpayer so that tax revenues are buoyant.

Amend the tax laws such that a direct tax payer is permitted GST paid on his personal purchases funded by income (taxable) as a credit. The moment this is done, the customer will insist on getting a proper ‘GST Invoice’. Of course, this GST invoice must have the assessee’s name and PAN #or Aadhaar #. Once the GST invoice is made, the details of a GST dealer will be available. A direct tax payer for the sake of taking GST credits on direct tax liability payable, will file his income tax return, thereby increasing the numbers of income tax returns filers.

Increased GST Returns filings will benefit state governments also in SGST and share of IGST.

It is preferred that agriculture income also comes within the income tax net, although this may have serious political consequences and may need to wait for implementation. Farmers buying agriculture equipment, seeds, fertilisers will be benefited.

In fact, if after full GST deduction the income tax assessee has a tax refund, 40% of that should be given / paid to him as incentive and the other 60% stand cancelled.

Our tax authorities (both direct and indirect) will need to do some original tax thinking. Just stating that Indians evade tax is insulting and does not improve tax compliance. Let them think of a solution that is not very convoluted and cumbersome.

The taxpayer must feel advantaged in filing the direct tax return, The authorities have to integrate direct and indirect tax, since the end customer is paying for the same and is the same person.

The answer to both the above serious problems lies in making the final individual taxpayer the centre of Government and regulatory authorities’ policies. The solution is available, it has to be accepted and implemented.

Of course, there will be serious resistance to the above proposals from the Revenue Ministry and from businesses, for being ‘impractical and unviable’. However, both proposals are of benefit to the individual – whether as bank depositor, shareholder of over-leveraged entities or as taxpayer (direct and indirect tax). The time has come to be different in thinking and implementing policies.

(The author is grateful for the usage of news links which have collaborated his point of view)

IMPLICATIONS OF KEY AMENDMENTS TO COMPANIES ACT, 2013 ON MANAGEMENT AND AUDITORS

The effect of laws and regulations on financial statements varies considerably. Non-compliance with the same may result in fines, litigation or other consequences for the entity that may have a material effect on the financial statements. It is the responsibility of management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, to ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of various laws and regulations, including those that determine the reported amounts and disclosures in an entity’s financial statements.

Standards on Auditing (SA) 250, Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements, deals with the auditor’s responsibility to consider laws and regulations when performing an audit of financial statements. The provisions of some laws or regulations have a direct effect on the financial statements in that they determine the reported amounts and disclosures in an entity’s financial statements, e.g., the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’). Other laws and regulations that do not have a direct effect on the determination of the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, but compliance with which may be fundamental to the operating aspects of the business, to an entity’s ability to continue its business, or to avoid material penalties (e.g., compliance with the terms of an operating license, compliance with regulatory solvency requirements, or compliance with environmental regulations), non-compliance with such laws and regulations may therefore have a material effect on the financial statements. The Code of Ethics issued by the ICAI also includes specific sections on Responding to Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR)1 for listed companies. However, the auditor is not responsible for preventing non-compliance and cannot be expected to detect non-compliance with all laws and regulations.

The MCA has issued various amendments to the Companies Act, 2013, including an amendment to Schedule III of the Companies Act, 2013 to increase transparency and to provide additional disclosures in the financial statements, and CARO 2020 to enhance the reporting requirements for auditors. The MCA has also amended the provisions of Rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 to include additional matters in the Auditor’s Report w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 (except the requirement related to audit trail which is applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2022).

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1 The ICAI issued an announcement dated 26th July, 2021 and deferred the applicability date of these provisions to 1st April, 2022

This article attempts to provide an overview of the key amendments relating to the definition of listed company, Corporate Social Responsibility and managerial remuneration and related challenges emanating from these amendments and the enhanced role of management and auditors.

I. AMENDMENT TO DEFINITION OF LISTED COMPANY
Section 2(52) of the 2013 Act provides the definition of a listed company. Listed companies under this Act are required to adhere to stricter compliance norms when it comes to filing of annual returns, maintenance of records, appointment of auditors, appointment of independent directors and woman directors, constitution of board committees, etc. This may dis-incentivise (or demotivate) private companies / unlisted public companies from seeking listing of their debt securities even though doing so might be in the interest of the company. Effective 1st April, 20212, the MCA amended section 2(52) of the 2013 Act and Companies (Specification of Definitions Details) Rules, 2014 to exclude the following class of companies from the definition of a listed company:

  •  Public companies which have not listed their equity shares on a recognised stock exchange but have listed:

– Non-convertible debt securities, or
– Non-convertible redeemable preference shares, or
– Both the above categories
issued on private placement basis in terms of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008 / SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares) Regulations, 2013, respectively.

__________________________________________________________
2 The MCA issued Notification No. G.S.R. 123(E) dated 19th February, 2021 on the
Companies (Specification of Definitions, Details) Second Amendment Rules, 2021
.
  • Private companies which have listed their non-convertible debt securities on private placement basis on a recognised stock exchange in terms of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008.

 

  • Public companies which have not listed their equity shares on a recognised stock exchange but whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange in a permissible foreign jurisdiction as specified in the sub-section of section 23(3)3 of the 2013 Act.

It may be noted that SEBI has not modified the definition of a listed company. Accordingly, the implications are limited to the provisions prescribed under the 2013 Act. Some of these considerations are discussed below:

Relaxation for companies from compliances under 2013 Act

Listed companies are required to comply with additional stringent requirements under the 2013 Act, e.g., at least 1/3rd of the total number of directors to be independent directors, appointment of one woman director on the board, appointment of an internal auditor and compliance with auditor’s rotation norms. Companies which no longer qualify as listed companies pursuant to the above amendment would not be required to comply with such stringent requirements.

Besides, it is interesting to note that though the intent of the amendment is to provide relaxations for private / public companies, there might be some unintended consequences as well. One such unintended consequence is the debenture redemption norms. Section 71(4) of the 2013 Act read with Rule 18 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 prescribes the quantum of debenture redemption reserve and the investment or deposit of sum in respect of debentures maturing during the year ending on the 31st day of March of the next year, unless specifically exempted. It may be noted that in accordance with Rule 18(7)(b)(iii)(B), debenture redemption reserve is not required to be created by listed companies having privately-placed debentures. Pursuant to the amendment, these exemptions may no longer be available; creation of the debenture redemption reserve and investment of sums in respect of debentures might become applicable for listed companies having privately-placed debentures. However, this will be subject to clarification by the MCA or the ICAI.

_____________________________________________________________
3 Such class of public companies may issue such class of securities for the purposes of listing on permitted stock exchanges in permissible foreign jurisdictions or such other jurisdictions, as may be prescribed
Preparation of financial statements under Ind AS by the company
One of the criteria for applicability of Ind AS prescribed under the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 is that companies whose ‘equity or debt securities are listed’ or are in the process of being listed on any stock exchange in India (except for listing on the SME exchange or Innovators Growth Platform), or outside India would be required to prepare financial statements as per Ind AS. Further, these Rules provide that once a company starts following Ind AS, it would be required to follow these for all the subsequent financial statements even if any of the prescribed criteria do not subsequently apply to it. Accordingly, companies which no longer qualify as listed companies but have prepared financial statements under Ind AS, would continue to prepare financial statements in accordance with Ind AS.

Private / public companies listing non-convertible debt securities and / or non-convertible redeemable preference shares on a private placement basis are excluded from the definition of ‘Listed company’ as per the amended definition. One may argue that Ind AS applies to all listed companies. Since these companies are not listed companies as defined under the 2013 Act, such companies would not be required to comply with Ind AS (unless other thresholds are met). A closer look at the aforesaid Rules indicates that Ind AS applies to companies whose ‘equity or debt securities are listed’ – instead of ‘listed company’. Hence, strictly speaking, the other possible view is that private / public companies having listed non-convertible debt securities / non-convertible redeemable preference shares on a private placement basis would need to comply with Ind AS. These companies need to consider GAAP applicable to them and their auditors, while issuing an opinion on true and fair view and compliance with accounting standards u/s 133 of the Act, will need to consider this amendment.

Auditors reporting on Key Audit Matters (KAM)
Auditors are required to report Key Audit Matters in the audit report of a listed entity which has prepared a complete set of general purpose financial statements as required by SA 701, Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report. KAMs are those matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgement, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements of the current period. The Standard on Quality Control – 1 and SA 220, Quality Control for an Audit of Financial Statements, define a listed entity as an entity whose shares, stock or debt are quoted or listed on a recognised stock exchange, or are traded under the regulations of a recognised stock exchange or other equivalent body.

Different definitions of ‘Listed company’ under the 2013 Act and SA 220 may raise an applicability issue. One may argue that auditing standards are prescribed u/s 143(10) of the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the question is whether a listed company should be understood uniformly for all purposes under the 2013 Act, including while reporting on KAMs, or the definition of SA 220 be applied while auditing and reporting on the company’s financial statements. The definitions under the 2013 Act are for compliance with the legal requirements under the 2013 Act and do not apply to accounting and auditing matters. Since auditors are responsible to conduct audit in accordance with the SA, the auditor should follow the definition of a listed entity as envisaged in the SAs while reporting on KAMs. Hence, one may argue that auditors of all listed companies (even those not considered as listed companies under the 2013 Act) would continue to report on KAMs as required by SA 701. The MCA and the ICAI may consider clarifying this aspect.

Auditor’s reporting on CARO 2020
The Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (11) of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), issued the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 on 25th February, 2020. Called CARO 2020 for short, it is applicable for the financial years commencing on or after 1st April, 2021 to a prescribed class of entities including listed companies, public companies and private companies meeting the prescribed thresholds.

One may take a view that CARO 2020 does not prescribe the listing of securities by any company (including a private company) as a criterion for applicability. Hence the change in definition of a listed company may not impact the applicability of CARO. The MCA and the ICAI may consider clarifying this issue. However, reporting on CARO 2020 would continue to apply to all public companies (listed or unlisted).

II. AMENDMENT TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) PROVISIONS
Section 135 of the 2013 Act and the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014 (‘CSR Rules’) prescribe the norms relating to CSR. The MCA has recently overhauled the norms and brought significant changes in implementation of CSR initiatives, introduced new concepts like mandatory impact assessment, and prescribed the manner of dealing with unspent CSR amounts. These amendments were notified on 22nd January, 2021. CARO 2020 has also introduced specific additional reporting requirements for the auditors related to unspent amount under sections 135(5) and 135(6) of the 2013 Act. The revised Schedule III under the 2013 Act has added specific disclosures to be made by companies in respect of CSR spend.

The requirement of audit of CSR activities has not been made mandatory under the 2013 Act. However, various provisions of the Companies (Company Social Responsibilities Policy) Rules, 2014 require the monitoring and reporting mechanism for CSR activities.

Auditor’s responsibilities
Wherever an eligible company undertakes CSR activity itself, the key responsibilities of the auditor are summarised below:
• Auditors should check compliance with section 135 of the 2013 Act and check whether the expenditure has been incurred as per the CSR policy formulated by the company;
• The auditor is also required to check whether the activity / project undertaken is within the purview of Schedule VII of the Act;
• If mere contribution / donation is given for a specified purpose, then whether it is specifically allowed as per Schedule VII of the Act;
• The auditor, while opining on the financial statements, will also be required to check whether separate
disclosure of expenditure on CSR activities has been made as per Schedule III applicable for the financial
year ending 31st March, 2021 and additional disclosures as per revised Schedule III have been made by the company for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2021;
• The auditor to check whether the company has recorded a provision as at the balance sheet date to the extent considered necessary in accordance with the provisions of AS 29 / Ind AS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, in respect of the unspent amount;
• To check compliance with relevant Standards on Auditing for audit of CSR spend including:
– SA 250 – Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements;
– SA 720 (Revised) – The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

Eligible CSR activities in the context of Covid-19
The MCA has issued a Circular dated 30th July, 2021 clarifying that spending of CSR funds for Covid-19 vaccination for persons other than the employees and their families is an eligible CSR activity under Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013. Management would need to establish necessary internal controls to track that the spend is made to benefit persons other than employees and their families.

Increased focus on impact creation
The amendments require every company with an average CSR obligation of INR 10 crores or more (in the three immediately preceding F.Y.s) to undertake an impact assessment of their CSR projects having an outlay of INR 1 crore or more and has been completed not less than one year before undertaking the impact study. The assessment should be carried out through an independent agency and the impact assessment reports should be placed before the board and should be annexed to the annual report on CSR.

Enhanced monitoring mechanism
The amendments significantly enhance the monitoring mechanism and require the CSR committee to formulate and recommend an annual action plan in pursuance of its CSR policy to the board of directors. The action plan should include the prescribed matters such as the manner of execution of such projects or programmes, modalities of utilisation of funds and implementation schedules, and the monitoring and reporting mechanism for the projects or programmes.

The board of the company is required to satisfy itself that the funds disbursed have been utilised for the CSR purposes and in the manner as approved by it. It should be certified by the Chief Financial Officer or the person responsible for the financial management of the company.

The amendments have introduced a new format for the annual report on CSR activities to be included in the board’s report of a company for the F.Y. commencing on or after 1st April, 2020. Some of the new disclosures to be made by companies in the annual report include details of impact assessment of CSR projects (if applicable) along with the report and amount spent on impact assessment, details of the amount available for set-off and details of unspent CSR amount for the preceding three F.Y.s, including amount transferred to unspent CSR account and fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act. In case of creation or acquisition of a capital asset, additional disclosures are prescribed.

The auditor will also be required to read the information included in the annual report as required by SA 720, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

Unspent CSR amount – Reporting in CARO 2020
Section 135 prescribes a mandatory spending of 2% of the average net profits made by the company during the three immediately preceding financial years on CSR activities. Earlier, section 135 followed a ‘comply or explain approach’, i.e., the board of directors was required to explain in the Board Report the reason for not spending the minimum CSR amount. Accordingly, no provision for unspent amount was required to be made before the amendment.

The MCA observed that a tenable reason does not expel or extinguish the obligation to spend the stipulated CSR amount4. With this objective in mind, section 135 and the CSR Rules were amended and the ‘comply or explain’ approach was replaced with a ‘comply or pay penalty’ approach. The amended provisions now require the following in respect of ‘unspent amounts’:

• On-going CSR projects [Section 135(6)]: In this case, the company should transfer the unspent amount to a special bank account within a period of 30 days from the end of the financial year. The company should spend such amount within a period of three F.Y.s from the date of such transfer as per its obligation towards the CSR policy. In case it fails to do so, it would be required to transfer the same to a fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act within a period of 30 days from the date of completion of the third financial year.

Other than on-going projects [Section 135(5)]: When there is no on-going project, the unspent amount should be transferred to a fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act within a period of six months from the end of the financial year.

Additional reporting requirements for CSR have been introduced in CARO 2020 which require the auditor to report on the above two aspects.

_____________________________________________________________
4 Report of the High-Level Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2018
Subsequent to the amendment, the revised Technical Guide on CSR issued by the ICAI provides that an obligation to transfer the unspent amount to a separate bank account within 30 days of the end of the financial year and eventually any unspent amount out of that to a specified fund, indicates that a provision for liability for the amount representing the extent to which the amount is to be transferred within 30 days of the end of the financial year needs to be recognised in the financial statements.

Implementation challenges
The following implementation challenges will need to be considered and evaluated by both the company and the auditor in this regard:

• The CSR amendments do not link the applicability of the amendments to any financial year. It may be noted that the applicability of this amendment is prospective and therefore provision may be required for shortfall for the F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards.

• Assessment of presentation of unspent amount in the CSR bank account in the financial statements may be critical as such amounts would not be available for any other purpose. Ind AS 7 / AS 3 on Cash Flow Statement requires companies to disclose, together with a commentary by management, the amount of significant cash and cash equivalent balances held by the entity that are not available for use by the entity. Thus, the amounts in the unspent CSR bank account should be disclosed as restricted cash with adequate commentary by the management in the financial statements.

• While preparing quarterly financial information, an issue may arise whether provision for CSR obligation for the entire year should be recognised in the first quarter or the provision for unspent amount should be made at the end of the year. In this regard, the ICAI has clarified that for the unspent amount a legal obligation arises to transfer to specified accounts depending upon the fact whether or not such unspent amount relates to on-going projects. Therefore, liability needs to be recognised for such unspent amount as at the end of the financial year. However, the amount spent during the interim period needs to be charged as expense for the same interim period. It cannot be deferred to the remaining interim periods of the financial year.

The amendments have also prescribed significant penalties, e.g., in case of non-compliance with provisions relating to unspent amount a penalty twice the default amount would be imposed on the company subject to a maximum of INR 1 crore. The auditor will need to evaluate the implications on the audit report in case of non-compliance with the mandatory and stringent CSR provisions.

III. MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION
Section 149(9) of the 2013 Act provides that an independent director may receive remuneration by way of profit-related commission as may be approved by the members. In case of no / inadequate profit, section 197 of the 2013 Act permitted payment of remuneration only to its executive directors or managers.

The MCA has extended the model followed for remuneration to executive directors to non-executive directors (including independent directors) by amending section 149 and section 197, and Schedule V to the 2013 Act. Schedule V now prescribes the following limits for payment of remuneration to each non-executive director (including independent directors):

Where the effective capital
is

Limit of yearly
remuneration payable shall not exceed (INR) in case of other director (i.e.,
other than managerial person)

Negative or less than INR 5 crores

12 lakhs

INR 5 crores and above but less than INR 100 crores

17 lakhs

INR 100 crores and above but less than INR 250 crores

24 lakhs

INR 250 crores and above

24 lakhs plus 0.01% of the
effective capital in excess of INR 250 crores

Remuneration in excess of the above limits may be paid if the resolution passed by the shareholders is a special resolution.

While Schedule V has been amended to include the limits for non-executive directors, Explanation II which provides for computation of effective capital for a managerial person has not been amended. It provides as below:
• Where the appointment of the managerial person is made in the year in which the company has been incorporated, the effective capital shall be calculated as on the date of such appointment;

• In any other case the effective capital shall be calculated as on the last date of the financial year preceding the financial year in which the appointment of the managerial person is made.

In the absence of a specific amendment, one may take the view that similar provisions should be applied for other directors also, i.e., for a non-executive director. The MCA may issue a clarification in this regard.

The above amendment is effective from 18th March, 2021. This means that companies would need to comply with the amended provisions in F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards.

Amendment to remuneration policy
The earlier remuneration policies of the company would not have the flexibility of payment of remuneration in case of no / inadequate profits as payment of remuneration to non-executive directors (including independent directors). Since the amendments now permit payment of remuneration in case of loss / inadequate profits, the remuneration policy of the company would need to be updated so as to comply with these requirements.

Auditor’s reporting
Auditor’s reporting on director’s remuneration in its audit report (under ‘Report on Other Legal and Regulatory Requirement’) will encompass remuneration paid to non-executive directors as well. Since remuneration would be paid to non-executive directors (including independent directors) in case of no / inadequate profits, the auditors would need to verify compliance in this regard.

BOTTOMLINE
The overhaul of the CSR provisions, amendments to the definition of listed company and managerial remuneration highlights the intent of the MCA aimed towards developing a robust and coherent regulatory and policy framework and underlying ecosystem. The primary responsibility of effective implementation of these amendments lies with the management by ensuring their compliance in a timely manner. However, the reporting responsibilities and issuing a true and fair view on the financial statements of the company lies with the auditor. The auditor should keep track of these fast-changing regulations and their consequential implications on the audit report, especially in case there is any non-compliance.

Love what you have. Need what you want. Accept

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES – ACCOUNTING AND TAX ISSUES

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have become a rage in the United States and some other countries over the past few months. SPACs have a number of unique features – they have a limited shelf-life as they are in business only for a few years, they have no object other than acquiring a target company and they do not have too much in common with other corporates in terms of assets, liabilities, employees, etc. SEBI is considering issuing guidelines on how SPACs should operate in India. This article summarises the accounting and tax issues that SPACs could encounter here.

INTRODUCTION
SPACs. The word does not sound very exciting but it is a phenomenon that is taking stock markets (at least in the USA) by storm. The abbreviation expands as Special Purpose Acquisition Companies but a more street-sounding name is ‘blank cheque companies’. These are companies that are set up with next to nothing and list on the stock exchanges only for the purpose of raising capital for acquisitions. In India, SEBI is planning to come out with a framework on SPACs ostensibly to facilitate Startups to list on the exchanges. SPACs are usually formed by private equity funds or financial institutions, with expertise in a particular industry or business sector, with investment for initial working capital and issue-related expenses.

Private companies would benefit from SPACs as they go on to become listed entities without going through the rigours of an Initial Public Offering (IPO). It is not that SPACs is a new phenomenon – the concept of reverse mergers resembles a SPAC in many respects. SPACs are different from normal companies in that they have only one object – to list on the exchanges with the sole intention of acquiring a target company. One of the main advantages of a SPAC is the fact that it can use forward-looking information in the prospectus – this may not be permitted in a usual IPO.

In case the SPAC is not able to identify and acquire a target company within the set time frame it winds up and the funds are returned to the investors. In case the SPAC identifies a target company and enters into a Business Combination, the shareholders of the SPAC will have the opportunity to redeem their shares and, in many cases, vote on the initial Business Combination transaction. Each SPAC shareholder can either remain a shareholder of the company after the initial Business Combination or redeem and receive its pro rata amount of the funds held in the escrow account.

Investors in a SPAC put in a small amount of money for a stake in the company (usually around 20%). They get allotted shares with a lock-in period of up to a year. They have the option of exiting once the lock-in period is over. SPACs would also have similarities with Cat-1 alternate investment funds (AIF’s) – an angel fund listing on the SME platform.

THREE STAGES
Usually, a SPAC will have three phases with different time frames:

Stage

Activity

Indicative time frame

1

IPO

3 months

2

Search for target company

18 months

3

Close transaction

3 months

Ind AS accounting standards
Since all SPACs have to list on some stock exchange, they would have to follow Ind AS accounting standards as it is mandatory for all listed entities.

Stage 1
In Stage 1, SPACs normally issue different types of financial instruments to the founders / investors such as equity shares, convertible shares or share warrants. Investors would be keen to invest in these instruments since the warrants give them an opportunity to get some more shares in case a target company has been identified. Usually, the IPO price is fixed at par (say Rs. 10) while the exercise price of the warrants is fixed about 15% higher. SPACs are forced to invest at least 85% of their IPO proceeds in an escrow account. Accounting for these instruments would be driven by Ind AS 32 / Ind AS 109. Since the SPAC would not be undertaking any commercial activities at this stage, very few Ind AS standards other than Ind AS 32/109 would need to be applied. Typically, at this stage SPACs do not own too many assets. The nature of the financial instruments issued to the investors would determine the accounting. These instruments could be equity instruments, share warrants that are exercisable, convertible shares or bonds and other instruments that are entirely equity in nature. The type of the instrument would determine whether it would be accounted for as equity share capital, under other equity, or as a separate line item ‘instruments that are entirely equity in nature’.

Stage 2
Once a target company has been identified and the acquisition is formalised, Ind AS 103 Business Combinations would have to be applied. There are seven steps in Business Combination accounting:

1.    Is it an acquisition
2.    Identify the acquirer
3.    Ascertain acquisition date
4.    Recognising and measuring assets acquired, liabilities assumed, and NCI
5.    Measuring consideration
6.    Recognising and measuring Intangible Assets
7.    Post-acquisition measurement and accounting

First step – Is it an acquisition?
An amendment to Ind AS 103 has made the distinction between an asset acquisition and a Business Combination clearer. The main pointers are:

1.    Business must include inputs and substantive processes applied to those inputs which have ability to create output / contribute to ability to create output.
2.    Change in definition of ‘output’ – it now focuses on goods and services provided to customers.
3.    Omission of ability to substitute the missing inputs and processes by the market participants.
4.    Addition of ‘Optional Concentration Test’.

Remaining steps
Once the transaction meets the definition of a Business Combination, the other six steps would need to be followed. These would invariably be: identifying the acquirer, determining the acquisition date, measuring acquisition date fair values, measuring the consideration to be paid, recognising goodwill and deciding on post-combination accounting. Business Combination Accounting permits the recognition of previously unrecognised Intangible Assets – this clause would be important for SPACs since they would invariably look at technology companies that have some Intangible Assets for an acquisition.

GOING CONCERN?
Most SPACS have a limited shelf-life of about two to three years. One of the fundamental principles on which the Framework to Ind AS Standards has been formulated is the principle of Going Concern. An interesting question that arises is whether the management will need to comment on the going concern concept since it is clear that the SPAC will not be a going concern in a few years from the date of listing. Usually, SPACs provide a disclosure on their status in the financial statements. The disclosure given below is from the Form 10K (annual report) of Churchill Capital Corp IV for the year ended 31st December, 2020:

‘Our amended and restated certificate of incorporation provides that we will have until 3rd August, 2022, the date that is 24 months from the closing of the IPO, to complete our initial business combination (the period from the closing of the IPO until 3rd August, 2022, the “completion window”). If we are unable to complete our initial business combination within such period, we will: (1) cease all operations except for the purpose of winding up; (2) as promptly as reasonably possible, but not more than ten business days thereafter, redeem the public shares at a per share price, payable in cash, equal to the aggregate amount then on deposit in the trust account, including interest (net of permitted withdrawals and up to $100,000 of interest to pay dissolution expenses), divided by the number of then outstanding public shares, which redemption will completely extinguish public stockholders’ rights as stockholders (including the right to receive further liquidating distributions, if any), subject to applicable law; and (3) as promptly as reasonably possible following such redemption, subject to the approval of our remaining stockholders and our board of directors, dissolve and liquidate, subject in each case to our obligations under Delaware law to provide for claims of creditors and the requirements of other applicable law. There will be no redemption rights or liquidating distributions with respect to our warrants, which will expire worthless if we fail to complete our initial business combination within the completion window.’

It would appear that a disclosure on the above lines would suffice to satisfy the ability of the entity to continue as a going concern during the limited period of its existence.

CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION
A SPAC merger agreement may include a provision for additional consideration to be transferred to the shareholders of the target company in the future if certain events occur or conditions arise. This additional consideration, commonly referred to as an ‘earn-out’ payment, may be in the form of additional equity interests in the combined company, cash or other assets. If the SPAC is identified as the accounting acquirer and the target company is a business, the earn-out payment may represent contingent consideration in connection with a Business Combination. While such payments may be negotiated as part of the merger, the terms of the arrangement need to be evaluated to determine whether the payment is part of or separate from the Business Combination. In making this evaluation, the SPAC should consider the nature of the arrangement, the reasons for entering into the arrangement and which party receives the primary benefits from the transaction.

If the arrangement is entered into primarily for the benefit of the SPAC or the combined company rather than primarily for the benefit of the target or its former shareholders, the arrangement is likely a separate transaction that should be accounted for separately from the Business Combination. For example, payments are sometimes made to shareholders of the target company who will remain as employees of the combined company after the merger. In this case, the SPAC must carefully evaluate whether the substance of the arrangement is to compensate the former shareholders for future services rather than to provide additional consideration in exchange for the acquired business. If the SPAC determines that an earn-out provision represents consideration transferred for the acquired business, the contingent consideration is recognised at acquisition-date fair value under Ind AS 103. However, earn-out arrangements that represent separate transactions are accounted for under other applicable Ind AS. For example, payments made to former shareholders of the target company that are determined to be compensatory are accounted for as compensation expense for services provided in the post-merger period.

TAX IMPACT
Shareholders
At the time of the Business Combination, shares are usually issued. For shareholders under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, issue of shares in any form results in a ‘transfer’ of shares held by the existing shareholders of the Indian target entity. The consideration is received in the form of SPAC shares. Capital gains tax may emerge on the sale / swap of shares of the Indian target company against the shares of SPAC. The taxable capital gains would be the excess of the fair market value over the cost of acquisition in the hands of the selling shareholders. Tax rates vary from 10% to 40% under the Indian tax laws, plus applicable surcharge and cess. Tax rates shall primarily depend upon various factors – inter alia, the mode of transfer, i.e., share swap vs. merger, residential status of shareholders, availability of treaty benefits and the period of holding of the shares.

SPAC
A SPAC is required to comply with the applicable withholding tax obligation at the time of discharge of consideration to non-residents, i.e., whether on account of a merger or swap of shares.

If an Indian target company has unabsorbed tax losses and its shareholder voting rights change by more than 49%, then the unabsorbed tax losses would lapse and it shall not be eligible to carry forward its past tax losses.

Once the shares of the SPAC are listed, it is possible that the tax implications of the indirect transfer rules outlined in section 9(1)(i) would need to be considered. However, this would apply only if the SPAC is a foreign company. [Will SPAC be an Indian or a foreign company?] If it is an Indian company, then its shares are actually located in India only. Where is the question of applying indirect transfer rules? For example, a tax liability would arise if a SPAC derives its substantial value from India (more than 50%) under the Indian indirect transfer rules. Shareholders who hold less than 5% of the voting power or the SPAC’s capital are not subject to Indian indirect transfer implications, provided certain conditions are met. For other shareholders, any transfer of SPAC shares results in Indian indirect transfer implications.

SPONSORS
Typically, a SPAC sponsor converts its Class B shares into Class A shares upon successfully acquiring a target company. Depending upon the date and timing of the Business Combination and the conversion of Class B shares into Class A shares, tax implications under the Indian indirect transfer rules need to be evaluated for the SPAC sponsor.

SPACs would also need to consider the implications of Notification No. 77/2021 dated 7th July, 2021 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes which clarifies that where the value of net goodwill removed from the block is in excess of the opening written down value as on 1st April, 2020, such excess will now be offered to tax as short-term capital gain.

WOULD SPACs BE A SUCCESS IN INDIA?
The answer to this question would obviously depend on the guidance that SEBI comes up with on SPACs. The Primary Market Advisory Committee of SEBI is deliberating on whether a framework for SPACs should be introduced. The Committee is also looking into any safeguards that should be built into the framework being proposed. From the information available now, SPACs are being set up by hedge funds and private equity investors who plan for a quick exit from their investments in a couple of years. The success of SPACs depends on the existence of companies that are available for a Business Combination. Traditional Indian companies may not be interested in the SPAC route as many would feel that it is too short-term in nature – they are in for the long term. Startups could provide a good source of companies that are SPAC-eligible. India has a large number of Startups but how many of them are worthy of listing remains to be seen. In addition, Indian companies do not have a history of issuing complicated financial instruments which is one of the basic requirements of a SPAC. As things stand today, it would be reasonable to conclude that there will be a few SPAC transactions in India but the concept of SPAC is not going to overly excite everyone at Dalal Street!

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN THE LABYRINTH OF LEGAL CORRIDORS (Part – 1)

BACKGROUND OF CRYPTOS
All of us must have been reading about Cryptocurrencies / Virtual Currencies (VCs) of late. And I am sure many of us must be wondering what exactly is this strange animal which has taken the world by storm? Every day the business newspapers devote a great deal of space to news about VCs.

A cryptocurrency is basically a virtual currency which is very secure. It is based on a cryptic algorithm / code (hence, the name cryptocurrency) which makes counterfeiting very difficult. The most important part about a VC is that no Government has issued it and hence it is not Fiat Money. It is a privately-issued currency which is entirely digital in nature. There are no paper notes or coins. Everything about it is digital. Further, it is based on blockchain technology, meaning that it is stored over a network of servers. Hence, it becomes difficult to say where exactly it is located. This also makes it very complicated for any Government to regulate VCs. This has been one of the sore points for the Indian Government. The fear that VCs would lead to money-laundering and financing of illegal activities is one of the key concerns associated with cryptocurrencies.

Many people associate cryptos (as they are colloquially known) only with Bitcoins. Yes, Bitcoins were the first cryptos launched in 2009 and remain the most popular, but now there are several other VCs such as Tethers, Litecoins, Binance Coins, Bbqcoins, Dogecoins, Ethereum, etc. At last count, there were about 200 VCs! VCs are bought and sold on crypto exchanges. Several such virtual currency exchanges operate in India, for example, WazirX, CoinDCX. Tesla, the US-based electric vehicle manufacturer, announced that it had bought US $1.5 billion worth of Bitcoins and that it would accept Bitcoins as a means of payment. It is estimated that there are over ten million crypto users in India and over 200 million users worldwide. In spite of such a huge market, it is unfortunate that neither the Indian tax nor the Indian legal system has kept pace with such an important global development.

While dealing with VCs one should also know about Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). These are units of data stored on a blockchain ledger and certify a digital asset. NFTs are useful in establishing fractional ownership over assets such as digital art, fashion, movies, songs, photos, collectibles, gaming assets, etc. Each NFT has a unique identity which helps establish ownership over the asset. NFTs have even entered the contractual space. For example, in 2019 Spencer Dinwiddie, a basketball player in the US, tokenised his player’s contract with the National Basketball Association, so that several investors could invest in the same. These NFTs could then be traded on a virtual exchange. These tokens carry an interest coupon and the amount raised from the token is given to the person creating the token, e.g., the basketball player. At the end of the maturity period, the token would be redeemed and they may or may not carry a profit-sharing in the revenues earned by the token creator. The payments for buying these tokens can also be made by using cryptocurrencies.

Recently, El Salvador became the first country in the world to legalise cryptocurrencies as legal tender. Thus, residents of El Salvador can pay for goods, services, taxes, etc., using virtual currencies like Bitcoins.

Let us try to analyse cryptocurrencies and understand the fast-changing and confusing regulatory and tax environment surrounding them in India. Since there has been a great deal of flip-flop on this issue, this Feature would cover all the key developments on the subject to clear the fog. There is a great deal of misinformation and ignorance on this front and hence all key regulatory developments have been analysed below, even if they were proposals which never got formalised.

CHEQUERED LEGAL BACKGROUND


Let us start with an examination of the highly chequered background and problematic past which cryptocurrencies have encountered in India.

FM’s 2018 speech
The Finance Minister in his Speech for Budget 2018-19 said that the Government did not consider cryptocurrencies as legal tender or coins and that all measures to eliminate the use of these currencies in financing illegitimate activities or as part of the payment system will be taken by the Government. However, he also said that the Government will explore the use of blockchain technology proactively for ushering in a digital economy.

RBI’s 2018 ban
The RBI had been cautioning people against the use of ‘Decentralised Digital Currency’ or ‘Virtual Currencies’ right since 2013. Ultimately, in April 2018, by a Circular the RBI banned dealing in virtual currencies in view of the risks which the RBI felt were associated with them:

• VCs being in digital form were stored in electronic wallets. Therefore, VC holders were prone to losses arising out of hacking, loss of password, compromise of access credentials, malware attacks, etc. Since VCs are not created by or traded through any authorised central registry or agency, the loss of the e-wallet could result in the permanent loss of the VCs held in them.
• Payments by VCs, such as Bitcoins, took place on a peer-to-peer basis without any authorised central agency which regulated such payments. As such, there was no established framework for recourse to customer problems / disputes / chargebacks, etc.
• There was no underlying or backing of any asset for VCs. As such, their value seemed to be a matter of speculation. Huge volatility in the value of VCs has been noticed in the recent past. Thus, the users are exposed to potential losses on account of such volatility in value.
• It was reported that VCs such as Bitcoins were being traded on exchange platforms set up in various jurisdictions whose legal status was also unclear. Hence, the traders of VCs on such platforms were exposed to legal as well as financial risks.
• The absence of information of counterparties in such peer-to-peer anonymous / pseudonymous systems could subject the users to unintentional breaches of anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML / CFT) laws.

In view of the potential financial, operational, legal, customer protection and security-related risks associated with dealing in VCs, the RBI’s Circular stated that entities regulated by the Reserve Bank, e.g., banks, NBFCs, payment gateways, etc., should not deal in VCs or provide services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling VCs. Such services were defined as including, maintaining accounts, registering, trading, settling, clearing, giving loans against virtual tokens, accepting them as collateral, opening accounts of exchanges dealing with them and transfer / receipt of money in accounts relating to purchase / sale of VCs. This diktat from the RBI came as a body-blow to the fast-expanding cryptocurrency industry in India.

IMC’s 2019 criminalisation sword
In 2019, an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) of the Government presented a Report to the Government recommending a ban on all VCs. It proposed that not only should VCs be banned but any activity connected with them, such as buying / selling / storing VCs should also be banned. Shockingly, the IMC proposed criminalisation of these activities and provided for a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores and / or imprisonment of up to ten years. It categorically held that a VC is not a currency. Fortunately, none of the recommendations of this IMC Report saw the light of day.

Supreme Court’s 2020 boon
This Circular of the RBI came up for challenge before the Apex Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC). The ban was challenged by the Internet and Mobile Association of India, an industry body which represented the interests of the online and digital services industry along with a few companies which ran online crypto assets exchange platforms. A three-Judge Bench in a very detailed judgment assayed the RBI Circular. The Court examined three crucial questions.

Question #1: Are VCs currency under Indian laws?
• The Court noted that the word ‘currency’ is defined in section 2(h) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 to include ‘all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts, travellers’ cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments as may be notified by the RBI.’ The expression ‘currency notes’ was also defined in FEMA to mean and include cash in the form of coins and banknotes. Again, FEMA defined ‘Indian currency’ to mean currency which was expressed or drawn in Indian rupees. It also observed that the RBI had taken a stand that VCs did not fit into the definition of the expression ‘currency’ under section 2(h) of FEMA, despite the fact that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its Report defined virtual currency to mean a ‘digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and / or (2) a unit of account; and / or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status.’ According to this Report, legal tender status is acquired only when it is accepted as a valid and legal offer of payment when tendered to a creditor.

• Neither the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 nor the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, or the Coinage Act, 2011 defined the words ‘currency’ or ‘money’.

• The Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 defined money to include a cheque, postal order, demand draft, telegraphic transfer or money order.

• Section 65B of the Finance Act, 1994, inserted by way of the Finance Act, 2012, defined ‘money’ to mean ‘legal tender, cheque, promissory note, bill of exchange, letter of credit, draft, pay order, travellers’ cheque, money order, postal or electronic remittance or any other similar instrument, but shall not include any currency that is held for its numismatic value’. This definition was important, for it identified many instruments other than legal tender which could come within the definition of money.

• The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 did not define ‘money’ or ‘currency’ but excluded money from the definition of the word ‘goods’.

• The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 defined ‘money’ under section 2(75) to mean ‘the Indian legal tender or any foreign currency, cheque, promissory note, bill of exchange, letter of credit, draft, pay order, travellers’ cheque, money order, postal or electronic remittance or any other instrument recognised by RBI, when used as a consideration to settle an obligation or exchange with Indian legal tender of another denomination but shall not include any currency that is held for its numismatic value.’

The Supreme Court ultimately held that nothing prevented the RBI from adopting a short circuit by notifying VCs under the category of ‘other similar instruments’ indicated in section 2(h) of FEMA, 1999 which defined ‘currency’ to mean ‘all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts, travellers’ cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments as may be notified by the Reserve Bank.’ Promissory notes, cheques, bills of exchange, etc., were also not exactly currencies but operated as valid discharges (or the creation) of a debt only between two persons or peer-to-peer. Therefore, it held that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money!

Question #2: Did RBI have power to regulate VCs?
The Apex Court observed that once it was accepted that some institutions accept virtual currencies as valid payments for the purchase of goods and services, there was no escape from the conclusion that the users and traders of virtual currencies carried on an activity that fell squarely within the purview of the Reserve Bank of India. The statutory obligations that the RBI had, as a central bank, were (i) to operate the currency and credit system, (ii) to regulate the financial system, and (iii) to ensure the payment system of the country to be on track, and would compel them naturally to address all issues that are perceived as potential risks to the monetary, currency, payment, credit and financial systems of the country. If an intangible property could act under certain circumstances as money then RBI could definitely take note of it and deal with it. Hence, it was not possible to accept the contention that cryptocurrency was an activity over which RBI had no power statutorily. Hence, the Apex Court held that the RBI has the requisite power to regulate or prohibit an activity of this nature. The contention that the RBI was conferred only with the power to regulate, but not to prohibit, did not appeal to the Court.

The Supreme Court further held that the RBI’s Circular did not impose a total prohibition on the use of or the trading in VCs. It merely directed the entities regulated by the RBI not to provide banking services to those engaged in the trading or facilitating of the trading in VCs. Section 36(1)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 very clearly empowered the RBI to caution or prohibit banking companies against entering into certain types of transactions or class of transactions. The prohibition was not per se against the trading in VCs. It was against banks, with respect to a class of transactions. The fact that the functioning of VCEs automatically got paralysed or crippled because of the impugned Circular was no ground to hold that it was tantamount to a total prohibition.

It observed that so long as those trading in VCs did not wish to convert them into currency in India and so long as the VC enterprises did not seek to collect their service charges or commission in currency through banking channels, they will not be affected by this Circular. Peer-to-peer transactions were still taking place without the involvement of the banking channel. In fact, those actually buying and selling VCs without seeking to convert currency into VCs or vice versa, were not at all affected by the RBI’s Circular. It was only the online platforms which provided a space or medium for the traders to buy and sell VCs that were seriously affected by the Circular, since the commission that they earned by facilitating the trade was required to be converted into fiat currency.

Various regulatory events from 2013 to 2018 showed that RBI had been brooding over the issue for almost five years before taking the extreme step of issuing the Circular. Therefore, the RBI could not be held guilty of non-application of mind. The Apex Court held that if RBI took steps to prevent the gullible public from having an illusion as though VCs may constitute a valid legal tender, the steps so taken were actually taken in good faith. The repeated warnings through press releases from December, 2013 onwards indicated a genuine attempt on the part of the RBI to safeguard the interests of the public. Therefore, the impugned Circular was not vitiated by malice in law and was not a colourable exercise of power.

Thus, the RBI had the power to regulate and prohibit VCs.

Question #3: Was RBI’s Circular excessive and ultra vires?
The Supreme Court then held that citizens who were running online platforms and VC exchanges could certainly claim that the Circular violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution which provides a Fundamental Right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens subject to Article 19(6) which enumerated the nature of restriction that could be imposed by the State upon the above right of the citizens. It held that persons who engaged in buying and selling virtual currencies just as a matter of hobby could not take shelter under this Article since what was covered was profession / business. Even people who purchased and sold VCs as their occupation or trade had other ways such as e-Wallets to get around the Circular. It is the VC exchanges which, if disconnected from banking channels, would perish.

The Supreme Court held that the impugned Circular had almost wiped the VC exchanges out of the industrial map of the country, thereby infringing Article 19(1)(g). The position was that VCs were not banned, but the trading in VCs and the functioning of VC exchanges were rendered comatose by the impugned Circular by disconnecting their lifeline, namely, the interface with the regular banking sector. It further held that this had been done (i) despite the RBI not finding anything wrong about the way in which these exchanges functioned, and (ii) despite the fact that VCs were not banned. It was not the case of RBI that any of the entities regulated by it had suffered on account of the provision of banking services to the online platforms running VC exchanges.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the petitioners were entitled to succeed and the impugned RBI Circular was liable to be set aside on the ground of being ultra vires of the Constitution. One of the banks had frozen the account of a VC exchange. The Court gave specific directions to defreeze the account and release its funds. Accordingly, the Supreme Court came to the rescue of Indian VC exchanges.

Along with the above Supreme Court decision, another decision which merits mention is that of the Karnataka High Court in the case of B.V. Harish and Others vs. State of Karnataka (WP No. 18910/2019, order dated 8th February, 2021. In this case, based on the RBI’s Circular, the police had registered an FIR against the directors of a company for running a cryptocurrency exchange and a VC ATM. The Karnataka High Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court explained above and quashed the chargesheet and other criminal proceedings.

Recently, the RBI in a Circular to banks and NBFCs has stated that certain entities are yet cautioning their customers against dealing in virtual currencies by making a reference to the RBI Circular dated 6th April, 2018. The RBI has directed that such references to the abovementioned Circular were not in order since it had been set aside by the Supreme Court. However, the RBI has added that banks / entities may continue to carry out customer due diligence processes in line with regulations governing standards for Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and obligations of regulated entities under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, in addition to ensuring compliance with relevant provisions under FEMA for overseas remittances.

Finance Minister’s interviews
In February / March, 2021 in reply to questions raised in the Rajya Sabha as to whether the Central Government was planning to issue strict guidelines on cryptocurrency trading and whether the Government was doing anything to curb clandestine trading of VCs, the Finance Minister stated that a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC), constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary (Economic Affairs) to study the issues related to VCs and propose specific actions to be taken in the matter, had recommended in its report that all private cryptocurrencies, except any cryptocurrency issued by the State, be prohibited in India. The Government would take a decision on the recommendations of the IMC and the legislative proposal, if any, would be introduced in the Parliament following the due process.

Recently, in March, 2021, the Finance Minister has said that the Government was not closing its mind and that they were looking at ways in which experiments could happen in the digital world and cryptocurrencies. She has also stated that ‘From our side, we are very clear that we are not shutting all options. We will allow certain windows for people to do experiments on the blockchain, bitcoins or cryptocurrency… A lot of fintech companies have made a lot of progress on it. We have got several presentations. Much work at the state level is happening and we want to take it in a big way in IFSC or Gift City in Gandhinagar.’

MCA’s 2021 Rules for companies
In March, 2021 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has mandated all companies to disclose certain additional information in their accounts from 1st April, 2022. One such important information pertains to details of cryptocurrency or virtual currency.

Where the company has traded or invested in cryptocurrency or virtual currency during the financial year, the following details have to be disclosed in its Balance Sheet:
(a) profit or loss on transactions involving the cryptocurrency or virtual currency, (b) amount of currency held as at the reporting date, (c) deposits or advances from any person for the purpose of trading or investing in cryptocurrency / virtual currency.

Similarly, the Profit & Loss Statement of such a company must carry the following additional details:
(i) profit or loss on transactions involving cryptocurrency or virtual currency, (ii) amount of currency held as at the reporting date, and (iii) deposits or advances from any person for the purpose of trading or investing in cryptocurrency or virtual currency.

CRYPTOCURRENCY BILL, 2021
The Government had proposed to table ‘The Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021’ during the January to March, 2021 session of the Lok Sabha. However, it was not introduced. The purport of this Bill states that it aims to create a facilitative framework for creation of the official digital currency to be issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The Bill also seeks to prohibit all private cryptocurrencies in India; however, it allows for certain exceptions to promote the underlying technology of cryptocurrency and its uses. It would be interesting to see the contours of this Bill when it is tabled. However, it seems quite clear that the Government is considering introducing its own digital currency to be issued by the RBI. One aspect which is worrying is that it seeks to prohibit all private VCs. Does this mean that the Government would get over the Supreme Court verdict by this law?

(To be continued)

‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’ – PMLA DEFINITION UNDERGOES RETROSPECTIVE SEA CHANGE

The concept of ‘proceeds of crime’ is most vital and pervades the entire fabric of The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Previously, it was an exhaustive definition and consisted of only the following three constituents:
•    Any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence;
•    The value of any such property;
•    The property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad (where property considered proceeds of crime is taken or held outside the country).

The erstwhile definition was found narrow and inadequate to deal with the ever-growing menace of money-laundering. Therefore, the Enforcement Directorate had consistently represented to the Government that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was ambiguous. The ambiguity adversely impacted three important aspects, viz., the ability of the Directorate to investigate the money trail, the adjudication of attachments by the PMLA Adjudicating Authority and Tribunal, and also the trial of the offence of money-laundering under PMLA. Accordingly, amendment in the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was long called for.

RETROSPECTIVE AMENDMENT

The erstwhile definition was eventually amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 by adding the Explanation to the definition w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. The definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) after such amendment reads as under:

‘Proceeds of crime’ means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, or the value of any such property, or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.
Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that ‘proceeds of crime’ include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

A review of the Explanation shows that the purpose of inserting it was to expand the parameters of ‘proceeds of crime’. The Explanation seeks to widen the scope of the definition by bifurcating the same into the following two properties as stand-alone constituents of the ‘proceeds of crime’:
•    Property derived or obtained from a scheduled offence;
•    Property which is directly or indirectly derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

From the initial words in the Explanation, ‘For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that’, it is evident that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively.

The Supreme Court has held1 that an Explanation may be added in declaratory form to retrospectively clarify a doubtful point of law and to serve as proviso to the main section.

 

1   Y.P. Chawla vs. M.P. Tiwari AIR 1992 SC 1360,
1362

INGREDIENTS OF ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

A review of the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) as expanded by the new Explanation calls for a detailed examination of the following terms and expressions:
•    property [section 2(1)(v)]
•    person [section 2(1)(s)]
•    derived or obtained
•    directly or indirectly
•    as a result of criminal activity relating to
•    scheduled offence [section 2(1)(y)]
•    value (of property) [section 2(1)(zb)]

‘property’ is defined in section 2(1)(v). Its specific constituents: corporeal, incorporeal, movable, immovable, tangible and intangible are self-explanatory;
‘person’ is defined in section 2(1)(s). Its constituents are largely similar to its definition in the Income-tax Act with which all of us are familiar;
‘derived’ is a term that has been interpreted in the context of the expression ‘attributable to’ in a number or tax cases. The word ‘derived’ means ‘derived from a source’, or means ‘arise from or originate in’2.
Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) defines ‘obtain’ as ‘to get hold of by effort; to get possession of; to procure; to acquire in any way.’
‘indirect’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) as follows:
‘Not direct in relation or connection; not having an immediate bearing or application; not related in natural way. Circuitous, not leading to aim or result by plainest course or method or obvious means, roundabout, not resulting directly from an act or cause but more or less remotely connected with or growing out of it’.
The expression ‘as a result of criminal activity relatable to’ is connected with ‘scheduled offence’. The expression ‘as a result of criminal activity relatable to’ is wider in scope than the expression ‘as a result of the scheduled offence’. A property may be derived or obtained from commission of a scheduled offence. Alternatively, it may be directly / indirectly derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence. Both types of properties are now clarified to be considered ‘proceeds of crime’ on a stand-alone basis.

Accordingly, it stands to reason that property and receipts arising from any and every crime are not covered in this definition. Only the following kinds of receipt and property would be covered in the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’:
•    Property / receipts which are derived or obtained from the scheduled offence;
•    Property / receipts which are the result of criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence.

‘scheduled offence’ is defined in section 2(1)(y). This definition consists of Part A, Part B and Part C with a clear mention of the statutes and matters covered therein. These do not call for any interpretation.
‘value’ (of property) is defined in section 2(1)(zb) to mean the fair market value of any property on the date of its acquisition.

In view of the expanded definition of ‘proceeds of crime’, a few important aspects are reviewed as follows:

 

2   CIT vs. Jameel Leathers and Uppers 246 ITR 97

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF DEFINITION OF ‘PROCEEDS OF
CRIME’

The Constitutional validity of the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ has been examined by courts in several cases.

Thus, in B. Rama Raju vs. Union of India (2011) 12 taxmann.com 181 (AP), the vires of the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) was called in question on the following ground:

‘Section 2(u) of the Act defines “proceeds of crime” expansively to include property or the value thereof, derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence even if in the hands of a person who has no knowledge or nexus with such criminal activity allegedly committed by others. The expansive definition thus inflicts grossly unreasonable consequences on innocent persons and is, therefore, unconstitutional offending Articles 14, 20, 21 and 300A of the Constitution’. [Emphasis supplied.]

After examining various aspects, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that section 2(1)(u) which defines the expression ‘proceeds of crime’ is not unconstitutional.

Similarly, in Alive Hospitality & Foods vs. Union of India (MANU/GJ/1313/0013), it was contended before the Gujarat High Court that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was too broad and, therefore, arbitrary and invalid. While rejecting this contention, the High Court made the following observations:

‘The contention that the definition of “proceeds of crime” [section 2(u)] is too broad and is therefore arbitrary and invalid since it subjects even property acquired, derived or in the possession of a person not accused, connected or associated in any manner with a crime and thus places innocent persons in jeopardy, is a contention that also does not merit acceptance’. [Emphasis supplied]

Likewise, in Usha Agarwal vs. Union of India (MANU/SIK/0040/2013), the High Court of Sikkim held that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ has the object of preventing and stemming criminal activities related to money-laundering at its very inception and could not be considered arbitrary.

TAINTED PROPERTIES HELD OUTSIDE INDIA – DEEMED
‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

In several cases, it is found that properties derived or obtained by committing a scheduled offence are taken away and held outside India. In such situations, the question arises whether the Enforcement Directorate can initiate proceeding against any property of the accused which is held in India to the extent of the value of the proceeds of crime held overseas. This question was addressed by the Delhi High Court in Abdullah Ali Balsharaf vs. Directorate Enforcement (2019) 101 taxmann.com 466 (Delhi). The High Court held that the Enforcement Directorate would be entitled to initiate proceedings against any property held in India to the extent of the value of the ‘proceeds of crime’ held overseas.

It may be noted that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was amended by the Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 14th May, 2015 which inserted the words ‘or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country’. Thus, the conclusion of the Delhi High Court is consistent with the said amendment.

In Deputy Director vs. Axis Bank (2019) 104 taxmann.com 49 (Delhi), the Delhi High Court considered a similar situation and came to the same conclusion by making observations to the following effect:

‘The empowered enforcement officer has the authority of law in PMLA to attach not only a “tainted property” – that is to say a property acquired or obtained, directly or indirectly, from proceeds of criminal activity constituting a scheduled offence – but also any other asset or property of equivalent value of the offender of money-laundering, the latter not bearing any taint but being alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property) on account of its link or nexus with the offence (or offender) of money-laundering’. [Emphasis supplied.]

CLAIM OF BANK – A VICTIM OF FRAUD – CANNOT BE
DEFEATED EVEN IF PROPERTY REPRESENTS ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

In Indian Bank vs. Government of India (2012) 24 taxmann.com 217 (Madras), the question before the Madras High Court was whether the claim of a bank that was a victim of fraud committed by its borrower can be defeated on the ground that the property represented ‘proceeds of crime’?

While answering this question in the negative, the High Court explained the material facts and rationale underlying its conclusion as follows:
•    Nationalised banks are the victims of a fraud committed by the company and its officers. It is the banks’ money which has actually been made use of by the company and its directors to buy properties in their names. Where do these victims stand vis-a-vis the accused in such cases?
•    The PMLA, thus, not only seeks to punish the offenders, but also seeks to punish the victims of such offences.
•    Section 8(6) and section 9, which seek to punish the victims of crime along with the accused, appear to be a disincentive for the victims.
•    For the victims of crime, there would virtually be no difference between the accused and the Central Government, as in any case they would have to lose their property to either of the two.
•    If the order of adjudication made by the Adjudicating Authority becomes final, after the conviction of the company and its directors by the criminal Court, the Central Government would confiscate such property in terms of section 8(6). Thereafter, the property would vest in the Central Government free of all encumbrances u/s 9. In other words, the banks, who were the victims of fraud, may have to lose the property to the Central Government for no fault of theirs except that they were defrauded by the company.
•    If a property is proved to be involved in money laundering, the Adjudicating Authority has only one choice, viz., to make the attachment absolute, wait for the final adjudication by the criminal Court and either release the property to the accused if he is acquitted in the criminal Court, or confiscate the property to the Central Government if the accused is convicted by the criminal Court. Therefore, section 8 in its entirety is accused-centric and Central Government-centric. It does not take into account the plight of the victims of crime.
•    In view of the inherent lacuna in the Act, I think the banks cannot be left high and dry.
•    The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act would show that the primary object for which the Act came into existence was for prevention of laundering of proceeds of drug crimes committed by global criminals / terrorists, involved in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The more the Act is used for tackling normal offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, committed within the territories of India, the more the result would be disastrous for the victims of crime. Therefore, sections 5, 8 and 9 cannot be used by the respondents to inflict injury upon the victims of the crime.

PROPERTIES REGARDED AS NOT ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

In a number of cases, Courts and Tribunals have rejected the claim of the Enforcement Directorate that a particular property is ‘proceeds of crime’. A few illustrative cases may be reviewed as follows:

(i) Mortgaged properties acquired prior to fraud – not ‘proceeds of crime’
Often, circumstances show that mortgaged properties were acquired by owners much before the alleged fraud was committed by the accused persons. In such a situation, a question that needs to be addressed is whether such properties were purchased out of the ‘proceeds of crime’ as defined in section 2(1)(u). This question was addressed in Bank of Baroda vs. Deputy Director (2019) 103 taxmann.com 30 (PMLA-AT). In that case, it was held that mortgaged properties which were acquired by owners much before the alleged fraud was committed by the accused person cannot be considered ‘proceeds of crime’.

(ii) Amount of loan received against mortgage of property – not ‘proceeds of crime’
Obtaining loan on mortgage of property is a common business transaction. Often, the allegation is made that the property mortgaged for the loan is acquired from the ‘proceeds of crime’. However, in Branch Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Deputy Director (2019) 107 taxmann.com 102 (PMLA-AT), it was held that where property was mortgaged with the bank much prior to the date of commission of the offence of money-laundering, the property so mortgaged cannot be regarded as acquired out of the ‘proceeds of crime’.

(iii) Amount of loan obtained by misrepresentation – not ‘proceeds of crime’
In Smt. Nasreen Taj vs. Deputy Director (2017) 88 taxmann.com 287 (PMLA-AT), a loan was taken for purchase of land. It was found that the land was purchased before the grant of loan. It was also found that the loan was obtained by misrepresentation in collusion with a bank employee. It was held that the amount of such loan could not be regarded as ‘proceeds of crime’. While reaching this conclusion, the High Court explained the material facts and rationale underlying its conclusion as follows:
•    The complainant in the criminal case is the bank who is the victim. Had the bank not filed a criminal complaint, perhaps the conspiracy might not have been discovered.
•    In a case like the present one if the security of the bank is treated as ‘proceeds of crime’ and is confiscated under the Act, in future no bank in such circumstances would make a complaint to the authorities.
•    The trial in the prosecution complaint would take a number of years. The victim cannot wait for such a long period of time, although after trial and final determination the victim is entitled to recover the amount by selling immovable properties u/s 8(8).
•    The intention of the Act could not have been to affect a third person or an innocent person as is sought to be done in the instant case.
•    If the impugned order is correct, it would be a patently absurd situation that not only substantial securities of the Bank are not available for the benefit of the bank but are vested in the Central Government as ‘proceeds of crime’. Such a result does not advance the objects of the Act.

CONCLUSION

The recent amendment to the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ has expanded the list of properties considered as involved in the offence of money-laundering or in a scheduled offence. Consequent to the amendment, the area of scrutiny of substantive transactions by a Chartered Accountant while reporting compliance of statutory laws, applicable to transactions involving properties, is widened substantially.

The said amendment makes it incumbent upon a Chartered Accountant to modify his checklist of forensic audit of substantive transactions to ensure that he fully complies with his reporting obligations.

Intaxication: Euphoria at getting a refund from the IRS, which lasts until you realise it was your money to start with
– From a Washington Post word contest

SEBI: REVISING ITS OWN ORDERS AND ENHANCING PENALTIES

BACKGROUND
One of the many penal powers that SEBI has under the SEBI Act, 1992 (‘the Act’) is to levy fairly hefty penalties on those who have violated the provisions of various securities laws. The penalty is often up to three times the gains or Rs. 25 crores, whichever is higher. A person on whom a penalty has been levied can appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) and, if he does not succeed, further to the Supreme Court.

However, the question is, can SEBI review and revise its own orders?

The penalty is levied by an Adjudicating Officer (‘AO’) who, though subordinate to SEBI, is expected to act independently. It may happen that the ‘AO’ has, in the eyes of SEBI, made an error and thus the alleged wrongdoer escapes with a lower or even no penalty. Can this error be corrected? An incorrect order not only lets a wrongdoer escape but also creates a precedent for related matters in similar context and future cases.

The Act provides for a review and revision of the orders passed by the ‘AOs’. The Act was amended in 2014 with effect from 28th March, 2014 and sub-section (3) was introduced to section 15-I to permit such revision. Broadly stated, SEBI can initiate proceedings to revise an adjudication order and enhance the penalty if the order is found erroneous and not in the interests of the securities markets. The review proceedings have to be initiated within three months of the original order, or disposal of appeal by SAT against such order, whichever is earlier.

SEBI has passed several review orders under this provision. In fact, it recently enhanced the penalty on credit rating agencies in the matter of IL&FS from Rs. 25 lakhs as per the original order to Rs. 1 crore. Let us analyse the provision in more detail and consider briefly some pertinent cases.

SECTION 15-I(3) ANALYSED

Section 15-I of the SEBI Act lays down the procedure for adjudication by an ‘AO’ under various provisions that prescribe the penalty for specific wrongs. Section 15-I(3) lays down the provisions relating to revising orders passed by the ‘AO’ and reads as under (emphasis supplied):

Power to adjudicate

(3) The Board may call for and examine the record of any proceedings under this section and if it considers that the order passed by the adjudicating officer is erroneous to the extent it is not in the interests of the securities market, it may, after making or causing to be made such inquiry as it deems necessary, pass an order enhancing the quantum of penalty, if the circumstances of the case so justify:

Provided that no such order shall be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter:

Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section shall be applicable after expiry of a period of three months from the date of the order passed by the adjudicating officer or disposal of the appeal under section 15T, whichever is earlier.

Specific aspects of this provision are discussed in the following paragraphs.

ORDER SHOULD BE ‘ERRONEOUS’

This is the basic and most important prerequisite for enabling SEBI to take up revision of such orders. There has to be a manifest error in the order. The error may be of fact or of law. The error may be of not levying a penalty where the law requires it, or levying a lower penalty. An error must also be distinguished from taking a different view from amongst two or more views plausible. It is submitted that the view taken by the ‘AO’ has to be erroneous in the sense that such view could not possibly be taken. An error may not be very difficult to identify and demonstrate. However, in case of law there may be some subtleties. If two views are possible on reading the relevant provision of law, merely because the ‘AO’ took one of the plausible views does not mean that the order is erroneous. However, if the view in law is not possible to be taken, then the order is erroneous.

The other issue is, when can the amount of penalty levied be said to be erroneous? Certain provisions levy a minimum penalty and thus if the ‘AO’ levies penalty below this statutory minimum, the order is obviously erroneous. There can be other similar errors. The interesting question is that if the ‘AO’ levies penalty within a certain range permissible under law, can the order be held to be erroneous and a higher penalty be levied? As we shall see later, SEBI has levied higher penalty, albeit on facts, in certain orders.

THE ORDER IS ‘NOT IN THE INTEREST OF SECURITIES MARKETS’

The error should be of such a nature that it is not in the interests of securities markets. This provision is obviously very broad in nature and gives a wide brush for the SEBI to paint with. The securities markets consist of investors, companies, various intermediaries, exchanges, etc. There is also generally the credibility of the securities markets. Further, and more importantly (as also pointed out in orders under this provision), an error whereby a wrongdoer escapes with lower or no penalty creates an unhealthy precedent for others and indirectly serves as a disincentive for those who scrupulously follow the law.

The two conditions are simultaneous

The order should be erroneous and such error should be one that is not in the interests of the securities markets. Both these conditions have to be shown by SEBI before it can take up review of such an order and pass a revised one.

Opportunity of being heard
This is a basic principle of natural justice and is inbuilt in the provision. The party should be given a fair opportunity of being heard since the revision may result in enhancement of the penalty.

Enhancement of the quantum of penalty
The order can be revised and the amount of penalty can be increased. An interesting contention was raised in a couple of cases that enhancement means that the earlier order should have levied at least some penalty. And, therefore, if there was no penalty levied, there is no question of enhancement! SEBI has rejected this technical argument and has held that a penalty can be levied even if no penalty was levied earlier.

Interestingly, SEBI has even taken a view in some orders that the revision need not necessarily be for enhancing the penalty. It may even be for correcting a wrong interpretation of law by the ‘AO’.

Time limit
The provision shall not apply after a period of three months from the date of the original order or disposal of the appeal by SAT in relation to such order, whichever is earlier. While the wording is not wholly clear on this point, SEBI has taken a view that the time limit applies to initiation of the proceedings and the final revised order may be passed in due course even after such time.

Whether appeal to SAT against original order would bar such revision till appeal is disposed of?

SAT has refused to bar the continuation of such proceedings for revision even when the original order was under appeal before it (in the case of India Ratings and Research Private Limited vs. SEBI, order dated 1st July, 2020). However, it also ordered in that case that the revised order should not be given effect to.

Whether the provisions relating to revision under the Income-tax Act, 1961 are pari materia with the provisions under the Act?

A stand often raised by parties when faced with such revision proceedings is that the provision under the Act should be interpreted and applied in the same strict manner as the provision for revision of orders under the Income-tax Act for which there are numerous precedents laying down principles. However, SEBI has rejected this stand generally. It has taken a view that the scheme, object and even wording of the provision under the Income-tax Act are sharply different. Hence, section 15-I(3) of the (SEBI) Act has to be viewed independently and broadly.

SOME ORDERS PASSED UNDER THIS PROVISION

Over the years, SEBI has passed several orders revising the original order. Some of those orders are worth reviewing briefly.

In an order dated 13th November, 2014 in the case of Crosseas Capital Services Private Limited, no penalty was levied in a certain case of self-trades through automated trading. On facts, SEBI reviewed this order and held that a penalty was leviable and also directed the party to review its systems to ensure that such acts are not repeated. SEBI also rejected the argument that ‘enhancement’ can be only where the earlier order had levied at least some penalty. Orders of similar nature were passed against a stock-broker and his client in two other cases –

a) In the case of broker Adroit Financial Services Private Limited and its client AKG Securities and Consultancy Limited, vide order dated 13th January, 2015, and
b) In the case of broker Marwadi Shares and Finance Limited and its client Chandarana Intermediaries Brokers Private Limited, vide order dated 13th October, 2015.

Vide order dated 11th January, 2017, in the matter of Saradha Realty India Limited, SEBI passed an interesting direction. The original order of the ‘AO’ had let off certain directors of the company who had resigned although they were directors at the time when the violations took place. The penalty was thus levied, jointly and severally, only on the existing directors. SEBI passed a revised order levying such penalty on all the persons who were directors at the time when the violations took place. The amount of penalty itself was not enhanced.

In a recent order (dated 20th November, 2020 in the matter of Oxyzo Financial Services Private Limited), SEBI held that the ‘AO’ had made a wrong interpretation of the applicable provision and thus revised it as per the correct interpretation. However, since even otherwise there was no violation by the party of the applicable law, no penalty was levied even in the revised order.

In three recent orders, all dated 22nd September, 2020, SEBI enhanced the penalty levied from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore in each case. These were the cases of credit rating agencies in respect of credit rating in the matter of IL&FS. SEBI held that, especially in view of the significant amounts involved and the impact on investors, a higher penalty was deserved.

CONCLUSION


Often, adjudication proceedings are initiated many years after an alleged violation. These proceedings themselves may take a long time to conclude. The revision proceedings would then add yet another layer to the time and proceedings. Thankfully, there is a short time limit of a maximum of three months of the original order to initiate such proceedings.

However, the wordings of the provision for revision are broad and even vague at places. The scope ought to be narrow particularly considering that the original order has to be ‘erroneous’. Merely because SEBI holds another, different view should not result in invocation of this provision if the view in the original order is also an alternate and acceptable one. Further, merely because a higher penalty was leviable by itself should not result in invocation of this provision. One hopes that, in appeal, clearer principles would be laid down.

SUPREMACY OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

INTRODUCTION
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘the DV Act’) is a beneficial Act and one which asserts the rights of women who are subject to domestic violence. Various Supreme Court and High Court judgments have upheld the supremacy of this Act over other laws and asserted from time to time that this is a law which cannot be defenestrated.

In the words of the Supreme Court (in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020), domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or other or almost every day; however, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. The enactment of this Act of 2005 is a milestone for protection of women in the country. The purpose of its enactment, as explained in Kunapareddy Alias Nookala Shankar Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr. (2016) 11 SCC 774 was to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. In Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar (2017) 8 SCC 550, the Supreme Court noticed that the DV Act has been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence. Considering the importance accorded to this law, let us understand its important facets.

WHO IS COVERED?

It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.

It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, then she can approach the designated Protection Officers to protect her. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that the Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which have taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu (2014) 3 SCC 712.

Hence, it becomes essential to find out who can claim shelter under this Act. An aggrieved woman under the DV Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges having been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, or are family members living together as a joint family.

WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?

The concept of domestic violence is very important and section 3 of the DV Act defines the same as an act committed against the woman which:
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the woman and includes causing abuse of any nature, physical, verbal, economic abuse, etc.; or
(b) harasses or endangers the woman with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Thus, economic abuse is also considered to be an act of domestic violence under the DV Act. This term is defined in a wide manner and includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which a woman is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity, including household necessities, stridhan property, etc.

SHARED HOUSEHOLD

Under the Act, the concept of a ‘shared household’ is very important and means a household where the aggrieved lives, or at any stage has lived, in a domestic relationship with the accused male and includes a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. Section 17 of the DV Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Further, the Court can pass a relief order preventing her from being evicted from the shared household, against others entering / staying in it, against it being sold or alienated, etc. The Court can also pass a monetary relief order for maintenance of the aggrieved person and her children. This relief shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with her accustomed standard of living.

In S.R. Batra and Anr. vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the wife is entitled only to claim a right u/s 17(1) to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.

Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to again consider this very issue in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020 and it overruled the above two-Judge decision. The Court had to decide whether a flat belonging to the father-in-law could be restrained from alienation under a plea filed by the daughter-in-law under the DV Act. The question posed for determination was whether a shared household has to be read to mean that household which is the household of a joint family / one in which the husband of the aggrieved woman has a share. It held that shared household is the shared household of the aggrieved person where she was living at the time when the application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from its use, or she is temporarily absent. The words ‘lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship’ had to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living, including the nature of household, have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household or not. It held that the definition of shared household as noticed in section 2(s) did not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or (has been) taken on rent by the husband. If the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom the woman has lived in a domestic relationship, then the conditions mentioned in the DV Act were satisfied and the said house will become a shared household.

The Supreme Court also noted with approval the decisions of the Delhi Court in Preeti Satija vs. Raj Kumari and Anr., 2014 SCC Online Del 188, which held that the mother-in-law (or a father-in-law, or for that matter ‘a relative of the husband’) can also be a respondent in the proceedings under the DV Act and remedies available under the same Act would necessarily need to be enforced against them; and in Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur and Ors., 2014 SCC Online Del 7617, which held that the broad and inclusive definition of the term ‘shared household’ in the DV Act was in consonance with the family patterns in India where married couples continued to live with their parents in homes owned by the parents. However, the Supreme Court also sounded a note of caution. It held that there was a need to observe that the right to residence u/s 19 of the DV Act was not an indefeasible right of residence in a shared household, especially when the daughter-in-law was pitted against an aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. Senior citizens in the evening of their lives were also entitled to live peacefully and not be haunted by marital discord between their sons and daughters-in-law. While granting relief the Court had to balance the rights of both the parties.

LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

A live-in relationship is also considered as a domestic relationship. In D. Velusamy vs. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469 it was held that in the DV Act Parliament has taken notice of a new social phenomenon which has emerged in India, known as live-in relationship. According to the Court, a relationship in the nature of marriage was akin to a common law marriage and must satisfy the following conditions:
(i)   The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses;
(ii)    They must be of a legal age to marry;
(iii)   They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried;
(iv) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time; and
(v)  The parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household’.

SEPARATED COUPLES

The Supreme Court had an interesting issue to consider in the case of Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury, Cr. Appeal No. 1545/2015 ~ whether once a decree of judicial separation has been issued, could the woman claim relief under the DV Act. The Supreme Court held after considering various earlier decisions in the cases of Jeet Singh vs. State of U.P. (1993) 1 SCC 325; Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar vs. Sunanda (2001) 4 SCC 125; Bai Mani vs. Jayantilal Dahyabhai, AIR 1979 209; Soundarammal vs. Sundara Mahalinga Nadar, AIR 1980 Mad 294, that there was a distinction between a decree for divorce and a decree of judicial separation; in divorce there was a severance of the status and the parties did not remain as husband and wife, whereas in judicial separation the relationship between husband and wife continued and the legal relationship continued as it had not been snapped. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the decree of judicial separation did not act as a deterrent for the woman from claiming relief under the DV Act since the relationship of marriage was still subsisting.

SENIOR CITIZENS ACT

Just as the DV Act is a beneficial statute meant for protecting the rights of women, so also the ‘Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007’ is a Central Act enacted to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens. More often than not, there arises a divergence between the DV Act and the Senior Citizens Act and hence it is essential to understand this law also.

The Senior Citizens Act provides for the setting up of a Maintenance Tribunal in every State which shall adjudicate all matters for their maintenance, including provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment. Section 22(2) of this Act mandates that the State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of the life and property of senior citizens. To enable this, section 32 empowers it to frame Rules under the Act. Accordingly, the Maharashtra Government has notified the Maharashtra Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2010. Rule 20, which has been framed in this regard, provides that the Police Commissioner of a city shall take all necessary steps for the protection of the life and property of senior citizens.

Section 23 covers a situation where property has been transferred by a senior citizen (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transferee must provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. In such cases, if the transferee fails to provide the maintenance and physical needs, the transfer of the property is deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion or under undue influence and can be held to be voidable at the option of the transferor.

Eviction from house under Senior Citizens Act
One of the most contentious and interesting facets of the Act has been whether the senior citizen / parent can make an application to the Tribunal seeking eviction from his house of the relative who is harassing him. Can the senior citizen / parent get his son / relative evicted on the grounds that he has not been allowing him to live peacefully? Different High Courts have taken contrary views in this respect. The Kerala High Court in C.K. Vasu vs. The Circle Inspector of Police, WP(C) 20850/2011 has taken the view that the Tribunal can only pass a maintenance order and the Act does not empower the Tribunal to grant eviction reliefs. A single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Walia vs. Sneha Walia, 204 (2013) DLT 618 has held that for an eviction application the appropriate forum would be a Court and not the Maintenance Tribunal.

However, another single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Nasir vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2015 (153) DRJ 259 has held that the object of the Act had to be kept in mind and which was to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to the parents and senior citizens who were in distress by a summary procedure. The provisions had to be liberally construed as the primary object was to give social justice to parents and senior citizens. Accordingly, it upheld the eviction order by the Tribunal. It held that directions to remove the children from the property were necessary in certain cases to ensure a normal life for the senior citizens. The direction of eviction was a necessary consequential relief or a corollary to which a senior citizen would be entitled and it accordingly directed the police station to evict the son.

A similar view was taken in Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania vs. Vallabhdas Govindram Meswania, AIR 2013 Guj. 160. The Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in J. Shanti Sarup Dewan vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, LPA No. 1007/2013 held that there had to be an enforcement mechanism set in place, especially qua the protection of property as envisaged under the said Act, and that the son was thus required to move out of the premises of his parents to permit them to live in peace and civil proceedings could be only qua a claim thereafter if the son so chose to make one, but that, too, without any interim injunction.

Senior Citizens Act or D.V. Act – Which reigns supreme?
What happens when a woman claims a right under the DV Act to a shared household belonging to her in-laws in which she and her husband resided and at the same time the in-laws seek to evict her by resorting to the Senior Citizens Act? We have already seen that the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander (Supra) has categorically established that a shared household would even include a house owned by and belonging to the in-laws. In such a scenario, which Act would reign supreme? A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this very singular issue in Smt. S. Vanitha vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors., CA 3822/2020 Order dated 15th December, 2020. The facts were that the in-laws sought to evict their estranged daughter-in-law from their house by resorting to the Senior Citizens Act. The Tribunal issued an eviction order. The woman claimed that as the lawfully-wedded spouse she could not be evicted from her shared household in view of the protection offered by section 17 of the DV Act. By relying on the decision in Satish Chander (Supra) she claimed that the authorities constituted under the Senior Citizens Act had no jurisdiction to order her eviction.

J. Dr. Chandrachud, speaking on behalf of the Bench, observed that the Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words, would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy could be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute.

The Bench observed that section 36 of the DV Act contained a non-obstante clause to ensure that the remedies provided were in addition to other remedies and did not displace them. The Senior Citizens Act was undoubtedly a later Act and also stipulated that its provisions would have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. However, the Court held that the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act giving it overriding force and effect would not by themselves be conclusive of the intent to deprive a woman who claimed a right in a shared household under the DV Act. It held that the principles of statutory interpretation dictated that in the event of two special acts containing non-obstante clauses, the later law typically prevailed and here the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was the later statute. However, interestingly, the Apex Court held that in the event of a conflict between two special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would have to be analysed to ascertain which one should prevail over the other. In this case, both pieces of legislation were intended to deal with salutary aspects of public welfare and interest.

It held that a significant object of the DV Act was to provide for and recognise the rights of women to secure housing and to recognise the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or right in the shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the DV Act, 2005, would defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens was intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the DV Act could not be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations had to be harmoniously construed.

Hence, it laid down a very important principle, that the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household could not be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act! It accordingly directed that, in deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act to grant only such remedies of maintenance that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes such as the DV Act. The Senior Citizens Act could not be deployed to override and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman’s right to a shared household u/s 17 of the DV Act.

CONCLUSION


It is evident that the DV Act is a very important enactment and a step towards women’s empowerment. Courts are not hesitant to uphold its superiority over other laws and under various scenarios.  

INTERIM ORDERS – POWERS OF SEBI RESTRICTED BY SAT

BACKGROUND

Three
consecutive recent rulings of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) have
placed limitations on the powers of SEBI to pass interim / ex parte
orders which restrain parties from accessing stock markets, require them to
deposit allegedly illegal profits in escrow accounts, etc. These precedents
also lay down guidelines and specify the circumstances under which such powers
may be exercised by SEBI and hence will help other parties obtain relief when
faced with similar arbitrary orders passed based on little or no credible
evidence. One of the decisions of SAT has been affirmed by the Supreme Court on
facts.

 

SUMMARY
OF RELEVANT LAW

SEBI does have
wide powers to pass penal, remedial and other orders / directions against those
who have been found to have committed violations of securities laws. Such
violations may include fraud on markets, insider trading, front-running, etc.
SEBI may pass orders to disgorge illegally made profits. However, there may be
concerns that while the investigation and due process is ongoing, the parties
may continue the frauds or other violations. They may even transfer the assets,
illegally made profits, etc., in such a way that their recovery later may not
be possible. SEBI has powers to pass interim orders to prevent such things from
happening and thus may restrain parties from continuing such violations,
transfer assets, etc. SEBI may also pass interim orders to impound the
estimated amounts and require that such monies be deposited in an escrow
account pending final orders of disgorgement.

 

Such interim
orders may be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing, or even without
such opportunity which may instead be given after the interim order. The
interim order in the case may be confirmed, modified or reversed after the
hearing. If confirmed, it may stay in place till the investigation is
completed, show cause notices issued to parties and after giving due opportunity
to respond, including a personal hearing, and then a final order may be passed.

 

Such interim
orders may be of various types and SEBI has wide general and specific powers in
this regard. SEBI may prohibit a person from accessing the securities markets.
It may prohibit a person from dealing in securities in such markets. It may
impound the proceeds or securities in respect of transactions that are under
investigation. Usually, such orders to impound such amounts are accompanied by
orders to freeze assets of such persons till such impounded amounts are duly
deposited in escrow accounts.

 

However, orders
that stop access to or stop dealing in securities markets may be economically
fatal. The amounts directed to be impounded may be far higher than the actual amount
later found to be correct, or may be directed on the wrong persons. Depositing
of such amounts at such short notice may be difficult or even impossible.
Considering that such orders are usually accompanied by directions freezing the
assets of parties, the effects may be even more far reaching.

 

Such orders are
also indefinite in nature in the sense that there is no statutory outer time
limit by which time the final orders have to be passed. Thus, the restrictions
may continue indefinitely. It is no solace to the parties if it is found later
that they have not committed any violations, or no or a lower amount can be
disgorged. At best, the amounts in the escrow account would be returned with
the minimal bank interest paid by nationalised banks, the parties being allowed
to resume their activities.

 

As the three
case studies summarised here will show, the orders have been arbitrary with
harsh consequences which SAT had no hesitation in setting aside or modifying.
In one case where the interim order has been finally disposed of, SEBI has
actually reversed the order stating that no purpose would be served in issuing
such interim directions. The Supreme Court affirmed the view that such orders
can be passed only in urgent cases, which the facts must bear out.

 

Case 1 – Cases
relating to ‘trading in mentha oil contracts’ on a commodity exchange

A unique
concern of commodity exchanges is the cornering of the market in a commodity by
a person / group. Such dominance may result in price distortion which could
also harm other participants in the market. In this case, SEBI had concerns
that a group of parties had accumulated a substantial percentage of mentha
oilstock [North End Foods Marketing (P) Ltd. vs. SEBI (2019) 105 taxmann.com
69 (SAT)]
. It was prima facie believed that this was done to
manipulate the mentha oil market and dominate the price of mentha oil futures.
SEBI passed an interim order prohibiting the parties from dealing in or
accessing the securities markets and from being associated with it.

 

The parties
filed an appeal before SAT which recorded several findings. It noted that there
was no prima facie finding that the parties had accumulated large
quantities of mentha oil or that they had dominated the market. There was
merely suspicion to that effect. Further, no urgency was found for passing of
such orders. In any case, the order was passed at a much later stage when the
execution of trades was over and the facts did not show the alleged
manipulation. SAT thus set aside the said interim order.

 

This decision
of SAT has become a precedent for future cases and lays down guidelines,
restrictions and also circumstances under which such interim orders may be
passed.

 

At the outset,
SAT recognised that SEBI has wide powers to pass such orders. SAT also
confirmed that the opportunity to respond / of personal hearing may be given
later. That said, SAT noted that such orders can have serious consequences and
hence have to be passed only in urgent cases and sparingly. In particular,
there has to be prima facie evidence and finding of wrong-doing and its
continuance. Since none of this was present in the present case, SAT set aside
the order.

 

SAT observed, In our opinion, the respondent is empowered to
pass an
ex parte interim order only
in extreme urgent cases and that such power should be exercised sparingly.

In the instant case, we do not find that any extreme urgent situation existed
which warranted the respondent to pass an ex parte interim order. We
are, thus, of the opinion that the impugned order is not sustainable in the
eyes of law as it has been passed in gross violation of the principles of
natural justice as embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.’

 

Interestingly,
SEBI, after the interim order was set aside, re-examined the matter and
confirmed that there was no urgency or purpose served for passing the interim
directions. Hence, it desisted from passing any fresh interim order and also
vacated the interim order against those who had not gone in appeal. The
investigations, of course, continue.

 

Case 2 –
Alleged insider trading case

SEBI found that
the Managing Director of Dynamatic Technologies Limited (DTL) had sold some
shares during a time when it was alleged that there was unpublished
price-sensitive information of reduced profits. SEBI computed the reduction in
market price after such information was made public and accordingly computed
the losses allegedly avoided which amounted to Rs. 2.67 crores. SEBI added
interest thereon from such date and passed an interim order that an aggregate
amount of Rs. 3.83 crores be impounded and accordingly deposited by such person
in an escrow account. Till such time as this amount was so deposited, his
accounts were frozen.

 

The MD appealed
to SAT. SAT applied its own ruling in the North End Foods case (Supra),examined
the basic facts and noted that the sale of shares was in 2016. The
investigation commenced in 2017 and the interim order was passed in 2019. No
evidence was put forth on how the appellant had tried to divert the alleged
notional gains. SEBI in its order had expressed a mere possibility of diversion
of such gains. SAT affirmed that such orders can be passed only if there is
some evidence to show and justify the action taken. Accordingly, SAT set aside
the direction but it asked the appellant to file a reply within four weeks and
that SEBI shall give a personal hearing and thereafter pass a final order
within six months. However, SAT also required the appellant to give an
undertaking that he shall not alienate 50% of his holding in the company
[Dr. Udayant Malhoutra vs. SEBI (2020) 121 taxmann.com 326 (SAT)]
.

 

SEBI appealed
to the Supreme Court against the SAT order and the Court affirmed the decision
on facts [SEBI vs. Udayant Malhoutra (2020) 121 taxmann.com 327 (SC)].
It affirmed the view of SAT that such orders could be passed only in urgent
cases. Since the facts of this case did not demonstrate such urgency, the Court
refused to interfere with the SAT order.

 

Case 3 –Prabhat
Dairy Limited

In this case the company had sold its holding in its subsidiary and a
unit to another company. The sale proceeds were substantial and the company
had, while seeking approval of shareholders for such sale, stated that it will
use the net proceeds for distribution to its shareholders in an appropriate
form. It appears that such distribution was delayed. In the meantime, the
promoters of the company, who held about 51% shares, proposed to acquire the
shares held by the public and thereby de-list the shares of the company. This
de-listing proposal was approved by 99.13% of the shareholders and the
application was pending disposal by stock exchanges / SEBI.

 

SEBI received
complaints about this and there were media reports, too. SEBI asked stock
exchanges to examine the matter; the exchanges expressed some concerns and also
recommended appointment of a forensic auditor. The primary concern was whether
the proceeds may have been diverted.

 

SEBI appointed
a forensic auditor who inter alia reported that several matters of
information / documents were not made available to them. The company responded
that inter alia the pandemic had slowed down responses. SEBI,
considering all these factors, passed an interim order directing the company to
deposit Rs. 1,292.46 crores, being sale proceeds less certain adjustments /
expenses, in an escrow account. Since this direction was not complied with in
the time given, SEBI attached the bank / demat accounts of certain promoters.

 

The company /
promoters appealed to SAT. SAT found several issues with the SEBI order. It
noted that SEBI itself had recorded that a sum of Rs. 1,002 crores was already
lying in fixed deposits. Secondly, SEBI had ordered the whole sum of Rs.
1,292.46 crores to be deposited in an escrow account when the fact was that
more than half of it would go to the promoters who held about 51% shares. The
de-listing offer itself could have resulted in an attractive price paid to
public shareholders. Mandating deposit of such an unreasonably high sum in the
escrow account would cause severe disruption in the company and bring it to its
knees. It also found issue with the fact that SEBI had kept the de-listing
application on hold.

 

Taking all this
into account, SAT ordered the company to deposit Rs. 500 crores in an escrow
account which would not be used till the forensic audit was completed and SEBI
gave a decision regarding distribution of the amount and / or the de-listing
application. It directed the company to provide information to the forensic
auditor within ten days and he would thereafter give his report within four
weeks. SEBI was also directed to process the de-listing application within six
weeks. On deposit of the said Rs. 500 crores, the bank / demat accounts of the
promoters were directed to be defreezed (Prabhat Dairy Limited and others
vs. SEBI,
order dated 9th November, 2020).

 

CONCLUSION

The series of
fairly consistent rulings of SAT has substantially settled the law relating to
the powers of SEBI to pass directions by interim orders. SEBI will have to
balance the interests of the securities markets / investors with the
inconvenience caused to those who are given such directions and also pass
orders in exceptional cases only where at least prima facie evidence is
available. Further, as the Supreme Court also affirmed, urgency for passing
such orders would have to be demonstrated.

 

However, it continues to be seen that such interim orders are being
passed and restrictions / impounding directed. Not all such parties can afford
to quickly approach SAT for relief. One hopes that SEBI itself will exercise
self-restraint and pass orders in accordance with the guidelines laid down by
the Supreme Court and SAT in their rulings.

 

ANCESTRAL OR SELF-ACQUIRED? THE FIRE CONTINUES TO RAGE…

INTRODUCTION

One of the favourite riddles of all time is ‘Which came first – the chicken or the egg?’ There is no clear answer to this question. Similarly, one of the favourite questions under Hindu law is ‘Whether a property is ancestral or self-acquired?’ This column has on multiple occasions examined the question in the light of decisions of the Supreme Court of India. However, every time there is a new decision on this point, it becomes necessary to re-examine this very important issue and consider the earlier case law on the subject.

 

Under the Hindu Law, the term ‘ancestral property’ as generally understood means any property inherited from any of the three generations above of male lineage, i.e., from the father, grandfather, great grandfather. In fact, two views were prevalent with regard to ancestral property: View-1: Ancestral property cannot be alienated. According to this, if the person inheriting it has sons, grandsons or great-grandsons, then it automatically becomes joint family property in his hands and his lineal descendants automatically become coparceners along with him. View-2: Ancestral property can be alienated since it becomes self-acquired property in the hands of the person inheriting it. Thus, he can alienate it by Will, gift, transfer, etc., or in any other manner he pleases.

 

EARLIER IMPORTANT DECISIONS

CWT, Kanpur and Others vs. Chander Sen and Others (1986) 3 SCC 567

In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that property inherited by a Hindu by way of intestate succession from his father under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would not be HUF (or ancestral) property in the son’s hands vis-à-vis his own sons. This position was also followed in Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar (1987) AIR SC 558.

 

Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran (2008) 3 SCC 87

Here, the Supreme Court followed the Chander Sen case (Supra) and various subsequent judgments and held that having regard to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property devolving upon the sons and daughters of an intestate Hindu father ceased to be joint family property and all the heirs and legal representatives of the father would succeed to his interest as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. In a case of this nature, the joint coparcenary did not continue.

 

Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh AIR (2016) SC 1169

This was a case where a Hindu died intestate in 1973 (after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act). The Court held that on a conjoint reading of sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, once the joint family property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it and they hold the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.

 

Arshnoor Singh vs. Harpal Kaul, AIR (2019) SC (0) 3098

A two-member Bench of the Supreme Court analysed various earlier decisions on the subject and held that after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, the concept of ancestral property has undergone a change. Post-1956, if a person inherited a self-acquired property from his paternal ancestors, the said property became his self-acquired property and did not remain coparcenary property.

 

However, the Apex Court held that if the succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e., prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, then the parties would be governed by Mitakshara law. In that event, the property inherited by a male Hindu from his paternal male ancestor would be coparcenary property in his hands vis-à-vis his male descendants up to three degrees below him. Accordingly, the nature of property remained coparcenary even after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Incidentally, the comprehensive decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Surender Kumar vs. Dhani Ram, AIR (2016) Delhi 120 had taken the very same view.

 

The Supreme Court further analysed that in the case on hand, the first owner (i.e., the great-grandfather of the appellant in that case) died intestate in 1951 and hence the succession opened in 1951. This was a time when the Hindu Succession Act was not in force. Hence, the nature of property inherited by the first owner’s son was coparcenary and thereafter, everyone claiming under him inherited the same as ancestral property. The Court distinguished its earlier ruling in the case of Uttam (Supra) since that dealt with a case where the succession was opened in 1973 (after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force) whereas the present case dealt with a situation where the succession was opened in 1951. The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier decision in the case of Valliammai Achi vs. Nagappa Chettiar AIR (1967) SC 1153 that once a person obtains a share in an ancestral property, then it is well settled that such share is ancestral property for his male children. They become owners by virtue of their birth. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not allow the sale by the father to go through since it affected his son’s rights in the property. Thus, the only reason why the Supreme Court upheld the concept of ancestral property was because the succession had opened prior to 1956.

 

Doddamuniyappa (Dead) through LRsv Muniswamy (2019) (7) SCC 193

This decision of the Supreme Court also pertained to the very same issue. The Court held that it was well settled and held by in Smt. Dipo vs. Wassan Singh (1983) (3) SCC 376 that the property inherited from a father by his sons became joint family property in the hands of the sons. Based on this principle, the Court concluded that property inherited by a person from his grandfather would remain ancestral property and hence his father could not sell the same. In this case, neither did the Supreme Court refer to its earlier decisions cited above nor did it go into the issue of whether the succession had opened prior to 1956. It held as a matter of principle that all ancestral property inherited by a person would continue to be ancestral property for his heirs.

 

It is humbly submitted that in the light of the above decisions, this view would not be tenable after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, based on the facts of the present case one can ascertain that the first owner died sometime before 1950 and hence it can be concluded that the succession opened prior to 1956. If that be the case, as held in Arshnoor Singh vs. Harpal Kaul (Supra), the property continues to be ancestral in the hands of the heirs. Hence, while the principle of the decision in the Doddamuniyappa case seems untenable, the conclusion is correct!

 

LATEST DECISION

One more Supreme Court decision has been added to this roster of cases. The decision in the case of Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel vs. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai, AIR (2019) SC 4822 has given quite a definitive pronouncement. In this case, a property was purchased by the father of the Donor and it is by virtue of a Will executed by the father that the property came to be owned by the Donor in 1952-1953. Subsequently, the Donor executed a gift deed in favour of a person. Subsequent to the demise of the Donor, his sons objected to the gift on the ground that what their father received was ancestral property; moreover, since he got it by way of partition, hence it could not be gifted away. The sons relied upon an earlier Supreme Court decision in the case of Shyam Narayan Prasad vs. Krishna Prasad, (2018) 7 SCC 646 to contend that self-acquired property of a grandfather devolves upon his son as ancestral property.

 

The Supreme Court considered its earlier decision in the case of C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar, AIR (1953) SC 495 where, while examining the question as to what kind of interest a son would take in the self-acquired property of his father which he receives by gift or testamentary bequest from him, it was held that a Mitakshara father has absolute right of disposition over his self-acquired property to which no exception can be taken by his male descendants. It was held that it was not possible to hold that such property bequeathed or gifted to a son must necessarily rank as ancestral property. It was further held that a property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the Donee simply by reason of the fact that the Donee got it from his father or ancestor. It further held that a Mitakshara father is not only competent to sell his self-acquired immovable property to a stranger without the concurrence of his sons, but he can make a gift of such property to one of his own sons to the detriment of another. When the father obtained the grandfather’s property by way of gift, he received it not because he was a son or had any legal right to such property but because his father chose to bestow a favour on him which he could have bestowed on any other person as well.

 

To find out whether or not a property is ancestral in the hands of a particular person, not merely the relationship between the original and the present holder but the mode of transmission also must be looked into. The Court held that property could ordinarily be reckoned as ancestral only if the present holder had got it by virtue of his being a son or descendant of the original owner. The Court further held that on reading of the Will as a whole, the conclusion becomes clear that the testator intended the legatees to take the properties in absolute rights as their own self-acquired property without being fettered in any way by the rights of their sons and grandsons. In other words, he did not intend that the property should be taken by the sons as ancestral property. Thus, the intention arising from the document / transfer / transmission was held to be an important determining factor in that case.

 

The Court in Govindbhai’s case (Supra) also referred to its earlier decision in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao & Ors. vs. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by LRs, AIR (1967) SC 591. In that case, a life interest benefit was given by a father to his two sons. The Court concluded that the properties taken by the two sons under the Will were their separate properties and not ancestral since there was no such intention in the Will.

 

The Court in Govindbhai’s case (Supra) also examined the reliance placed on Shyam Narayan’s case (Supra) and held that in that case the Apex Court did not question the issue of whether the property was ancestral property. It only held that once ancestral property was partitioned it continued to be ancestral in the hands of the recipient sons and grandsons. Hence, that case was not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In that case, the Trial Court and the High Court had held that property received on partition of an HUF in 1987 was ancestral property. The Supreme Court found no reason to disagree with this conclusion. While the facts emerging from the Supreme Court decision are not fully clear, it is humbly submitted that the conclusion reached in the Shyam Narayan case (Supra) requires reconsideration.

 

Ultimately, in the case on hand (Govindbhai), the Supreme Court held that since the grandfather purchased the property and he was competent to execute a Will in favour of any person, including his son, the recipient (i.e., his son) would get it as his self-acquired property. The burden to prove that the property was ancestral was on the plaintiffs alone. It was for them to prove that the Will of their grandfather intended to convey the property for the benefit of the family so as to be treated as ancestral property. In the absence of any such averment or proof, the property in the hands of Donor has to be treated as self-acquired property. Once the property in the hands of the Donor is held to be self-acquired property, he was competent to deal with his property in such a manner as he considered proper, including by executing a gift deed in favour of a stranger to the family. Accordingly, the gift deed was upheld.

 

CONCLUSION

A conjoined reading of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court shows that the customs and traditions of Hindu Law have been given a decent burial by the codified Act of 1956! To reiterate, the important principles laid down by various decisions are that:

 

(a) Inheritance of ancestral property after 1956 does not create an HUF property and inheritance of ancestral property after 1956 therefore does not result in creation of an HUF property;

(b) Ancestral property can become an HUF property only if inheritance / succession is before 1956 and such HUF property which came into existence before 1956 continues as ancestral property even after 1956;

(c)  If a person dies after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and there is no HUF existing at the time of his death, inheritance of a property of such a person by his heirs is as a self-acquired property in the hands of the legal heirs. They are free to deal with it in any manner they please.

(d) After passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 if a person inherits a property from his paternal ancestors, the said property is not an HUF property in his hands and the property is to be taken as a self-acquired property of the person who inherits the same;

(e) Self-acquired property received by way of gift / Will / inheritance continues to remain self-acquired in the hands of the recipient and he is free to deal with it in any manner he pleases.

Considering that this issue regularly travels all the way to the Supreme Court time and again, is it not high time that the Parliament amends the Hindu Succession Act to deal with this burning issue? If the Income-tax Act can be amended every year, and now even the Companies Act is amended regularly, why cannot this all-important law be amended with regular frequency? This Act touches many more lives and properties as compared to several other corporate statutes but yet it was last amended in 2005 and that, too, suffered from a case of inadequate drafting! One wishes that there is a comprehensive overhaul of the Hindu Succession Law so that valuable time and money are not lost in litigation.

OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING: FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT AMENDMENT

Section 3 of The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) is
the most important provision and the pivot for many other provisions of the Act.
It deals with the crucial concept of the offence of money-laundering. This
definition was recently amended w.e.f. 1st
August, 2019 by inserting Explanation to section 3.

Section 3 after such
amendment reads as follows.

3.         Offence of
money-laundering

Whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or
is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the
1[proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession,
acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be
guilty of offence of money-laundering.

 

2[Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that

(i)         a person shall be guilty of offence of
money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly
attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is
actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities
connected with proceeds of crime, namely –

(a) concealment; or

(b) possession; or

(c) acquisition; or

(d) use; or

(e) projecting as untainted property; or

(f)  claiming as
untainted property;

(g) in any manner whatsoever.

 

(ii)        the process or
activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues
till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime
by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as
untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner
whatsoever.]

Explanation
retrospectively brings a sea change

The Explanation has
been inserted in section 3 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. It begins with the words
‘for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that’. These words
suggest that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively. The
Supreme Court has held3  that an Explanation may be
added in declaratory form to retrospectively clarify a doubtful point of law and
to serve as proviso to the main section.

 

There are two parts in the
Explanation. While the first part seems to refine and modify the concept
of money-laundering given in section 3, the second part adds a new angle by
making the offence of money-laundering a continuous offence.

 

Earlier, some ambiguity
was found to exist in section 3. It was contended by the Directorate of
Enforcement that such ambiguity handicapped investigation of the money trail,
the adjudication of attachment by the PMLA Adjudicating Authority and Tribunals,
as also the trial of the offence of money-laundering under PMLA.

 

The handicap was created
by the words ‘and projecting or claiming it as untainted property’ in the
main part of section 3. Due to this, unless it was established in every case
that there was a further act of ‘projecting or claiming’ the
proceeds of crime as untainted property, section 3 could not be invoked. This
was a compulsory pre-condition that was required to be fulfilled due to the word
‘and’ preceding the words ‘projecting or claiming’. In other
words, money-laundering was regarded merely as projection or claiming proceeds
of crime as untainted property. This infirmity in the language of section 3
created a handicap. A person would fall in the earlier part of section 3 but
would escape the rigours of section 3 merely because it could not be
further proved in every case that he ‘projected or claimed’
the proceeds of crime as untainted property.

 

Explanation
(i)
now seeks to remove this
lacuna by clarifying vide placement of (e) and (f) as merely one of the
processes or activities the existence of which alone no longer remains a
pre-condition to attract the charge of money-laundering.

 

Having regard to the said
handicap, the Government considered it necessary to widen the scope of ‘proceeds
of crime’. This was done by inserting the Explanation to section 3. The
Explanation clarified the extent to which a person is guilty of the
offence of money-laundering where he is found to have directly or indirectly
attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly was a party to or was
actually involved in any manner whatsoever in one or more of the processes or
activities specified in section 3 Explanation (i). The following two
activities have been mentioned in the list of processes or activities in
Explanation (i):

  •             projecting as untainted
    property,
  •             claiming as
    untainted property.

 

The words in
Explanation (i), viz., ‘one or more of the following’ and
‘in any manner whatsoever’ signify that Explanation (i) is
intended to widen the scope of section 3.

 

1   Substituted for ‘proceeds
of crime and projecting’ by the Prevention of  Money-Laundering (Amendment) Act,
2012, w.e.f. 15th February,
2013

2   Inserted by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2019, w.e.f. 1st August,
2019

3   Y.P. Chawla vs. M.P. Tiwari AIR 1992 SC
1360, 1362

 

INGREDIENTS OF OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING

A broad analysis of
section 3 as amended shows the following ingredients:

  •             The persons regarded as guilty of
    money-laundering – mens rea implied in the definition of
    money-laundering.
  •             Actions must be connected with
    specified processes or activities.
  •             Specified processes or
    activities.
  •             Nexus of the processes or activities
    with ‘proceeds of crime’.
  •             ‘Proceeds of crime’ – defined in
    section 2(1)(u).
  •             Projecting or claiming proceeds of
    crime as untainted property – no longer an essential ingredient of the offence
    of money-laundering.

 

The above six ingredients
of the concept of money-laundering are reviewed as follows:

 

The persons regarded
as guilty of money-laundering –
mens rea implied in the definition of
money-laundering

The following four types
of persons are covered in section 3:

 

The person who directly or
indirectly

 

 

 

A review of the four types
of persons mentioned above in relation to the specified processes and activities
gives rise to the question whether mens
rea
or a guilty mind is implied in the definition
of money-laundering.

 

Mens rea is
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) as under.

Mens rea

An
element of criminal responsibility; a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose;
a criminal intent.
Guilty knowledge and wilfulness.

 

The aspect of mens rea has been
subject of intensive debate before Courts under Income-tax law in respect of
penal provisions. The Supreme Court has held4  in a number of tax cases that a penal
provision must be strictly construed and that mens rea is a
necessary ingredient for the imposition of penalty.

 

Under the criminal law,
too, unless it is found that the accused had the guilty intention to commit
crime, he cannot be held guilty of committing the crime. Thus, mens rea is
considered an essential ingredient of criminal offence5. The nature
of mens rea
may be implied in a statute creating an offence if the object and the wordings
of the provisions of the statute so suggest.

 

The
Parliamentary debate on the Money-Laundering Bill, 1999 shows that the word
‘knowingly’ did not exist in the definition of
money-laundering.
Hence, the
Parliamentary Committee observed that without the word ‘knowingly’, the
provision creating liability for money-laundering was harsh and could result in
a situation where anyone who unintentionally commits the offence of
money-laundering will be regarded as guilty. To avoid such a situation, the
Committee recommended adding the word ‘knowingly’ to indicate that mens rea is an
essential ingredient of the definition of the offence of money-laundering. Thus,
where there is prima facie evidence of a guilty state of mind, the
accused will have the opportunity to disprove the allegation of offence by
presenting satisfactory evidence of honesty of his belief in the action that he
undertook innocently. This principle is now incorporated in section 24 (burden
of proof) that was amended w.e.f. 15th
February, 2013 to provide that in the case of a person not charged with the
offence of money-laundering, the mandatory opportunity to prove the contrary is
not available to such person. This is evident from the absence of the words
‘unless contrary is proved’ before the word ‘presume’ in section
24(b).

 

Accordingly, all four
types of persons who directly or indirectly

 

 

would be guilty
of money-laundering on the premise of their attempt, knowledge and actual
involvement. Section 24 gives such person an
opportunity to prove that he did not commit the offence of money-laundering as
defined in section 3.

 

‘Attempt – connotation
of’

The expression ‘attempt
to indulge
in’ in the main part of section 3 and the newly-inserted
Explanation is suggestive of the intention to widen the scope of the
definition of ‘offence of money-laundering’ in section 3.

 

The wording of section 3,
particularly the expression ‘directly or indirectly’ and the expression ‘attempt
to indulge in’, leaves no doubt that even where the attempt does not reach the
stage of completion of the action for which the attempt was made, the charge of
offence u/s 3 would be attracted in the same way as if the criminal act was
consummated.

 

What constitutes an
attempt is indeed a mixed question of law and fact and it depends on the
circumstances of each case to ascertain whether an attempt was made. When the
word ‘attempt’ is juxtaposed with the word ‘prepare’, it is clear that attempt
begins after the preparation is complete.

 

Actions must be
connected with specified processes or activities

To attract the guilt of
offence of money-laundering in section 3, it must be established that the
above-mentioned actions of the person were linked to the specified processes or
activities.

Specified
processes or activities

 

The following processes or
activities connected with proceeds of crime are covered by section 3

           concealment

           possession

           acquisition

           use

           projecting as untainted
property

           claiming as untainted
property.

 

The concepts underlying
the above processes and activities may be reviewed as follows:

The first process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is concealment.
Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) defines ‘concealment’ as
follows:

To
conceal
.
A withholding of something which one knows and
which one, in duty, is bound to reveal. Concealment implies intention to
withhold or secrete information so that one entitled to be informed will remain
in ignorance.

 

The second process
or activity connected with proceeds of crime is possession. The
word ‘possession’ is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth
Edition) as follows:

Possession. Having control
over a thing with the intent to have and to exercise control.

 

The term ‘possession’ has
been examined by Courts in a number of decisions. A reference may be made, in
particular, to the following decisions:

  •             Union of India vs. Hassan Ali
    Khan (2011) 14 taxmann.com 127 (SC);
  •             Radha Mohan Lakhotia vs. Dy. Director (2010) (5) Bom. Cr 625;
  •             Hari Narayan Rai vs. State of Jharkhand (2011) (6) R Cr
    1415;
  •             Vikash Kumar Sinha vs. State of Jharkhand (2011) (2) J Cr 395 (Jhr).

 

The third process
or activity connected with proceeds of crime is
acquisition.

The word ‘acquisition’ is
derived from the word ‘acquire’ which is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary
(Sixth Edition) as under:

To
gain by any means, usually by one’s own exertions; to get as one’s own; to
obtain by search, endeavour, investment; practice or purchase; receive or gain
in whatever manner; come to have, to become owner of property; to make property
one’s own; to gain ownership of.

 

The term ‘acquisition’ has
also been examined by Courts in various decisions. A reference may be made, in
particular, to the following:

  •  State of
    Maharashtra vs. Mahesh P. Mehta 1985 CrLj 453 (Bom.);
  •  Devilal Ganeshlal vs. Director
    1982 CrLj 588 (Bom.).

 

The fourth process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is use. The term
‘use’ is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition)
as under:

To make use of; to convert
to one’s service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilise; to carry out a
purpose or action by means of; to put into action or service, especially to
attain an end.

 

The fifth process
or activity connected with proceeds of crime is projecting as untainted
property.
It is self-explanatory.

 

The sixth process
or activity connected with proceeds of crime is claiming as untainted
property
. This, too, is self-explanatory.

 

It may be noted that the
fifth and sixth activities connected with proceeds of crime have been placed in
Part (i) of the Explanation inserted in section 3 w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to plug a loophole in the
language of section 3. Earlier, ‘projecting or claiming as untainted
property’
of proceeds of crime was a pre-condition to attract section
3.

 

It
was difficult to prove the existence of this fact of projecting or claiming.
This loophole has been plugged by bifurcating the projecting or claiming of
proceeds of crime as untainted property into two separate activities. The
existence of none of these two bifurcated activities is now a pre-condition to
attract the guilt of money-laundering u/s 3.

 

Nexus of the
processes or activities with ‘proceeds of crime’

To attract section 3 it is
necessary to establish that the specified processes or activities are connected
with the proceeds of crime. Without such a nexus of the processes or activities
with the proceeds of crime, section 3 cannot be invoked.

 

“Proceeds of
crime” – defined in section 2(1)(u)

The definition of
‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) needs to be dealt with in detail
to understand significant aspects of the definition on the basis of the legal
position considered by Courts in respect of significant aspects.

 

Projecting or
claiming proceeds of crime as untainted property – no longer an essential
ingredient of offence of money-laundering

All the above-mentioned
constituents of ‘proceeds of crime’ are interlinked and the presence of
any constituent in a given case will attract section 3. According to the law
prior to insertion of the Explanation to section 3
w.e.f.
1st August, 2019, even if a
single one of the above constituents was not found to exist in a given case, the
liability u/s 3 was not attracted to that case. Thus, despite the presence of
all other constituents of ‘proceeds of crime’, if there was no projection
or claiming the proceeds of crime as untainted property, the charge u/s 3 was
considered unsustainable. This position has undergone a sea change after the
insertion of the Explanation to section 3 w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 as explained in
the first paragraph.

 

Apart from the above six
ingredients, the following important aspects of the offence of money-laundering
may also be noted.

 

The offence of
money-laundering – now a ‘continuing’ offence

Explanation (ii)
adds a new dimension to the
rigours of section 3. Now, the offence of money-laundering is not to be
interpreted as a one-time offence that ceases with the processes or activities
specified in Explanation (i). The effect of Explanation (ii) is
that a person shall be considered guilty of the offence of money-laundering so
long as he continues to enjoy the proceeds of crime, thereby making the offence
of money-laundering a continuing offence.

 

The scope of the
Explanation is better understood when read with various amendments made
to the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’.

 

Definition of
“offence of money-laundering” strengthened by Explanation
– observes the
Bombay High Court

In a recent decision, the
Bombay High Court6 
has
dealt with the implications of the newly-inserted
Explanation w.e.f. 1st August, 2019.
In this connection, the High Court made the following significant
observations:

 

The offence of money laundering as defined in
section 3 of the PMLA is wide enough to cover an act of a person who directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or
is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of
crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting
or claiming it as untainted property. The Explanation appended to the said
section clarifies that a person shall be held guilty of the offence of money
laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to
indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a part or is actually involved in
one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of
crime, i.e., concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting or
claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever. The process or
activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues
till such time a person directly or indirectly enjoys the proceeds of crime by
various acts referred to in the sub-clause (i)’.

 

 

4              Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT 291 ITR 519
(SC): (2007) 6 SCC 329; Ram Commercial Enterprise Ltd. vs. CIT 246 ITR 568; CIT
vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. 322 ITR 158 (SC):

5   Nathulal vs. State of MP AIR 1966 SC
43

6   Dheeraj Wadhawan vs. Directorate
of Enforcement (Anticipation Bail Appl. No. 39 & 41 decided by Bombay High
Court on 12th May, 2020).

CONCLUSION

While making due diligence to report compliance with various
statutory laws, as a part of forensic audit or internal audit function as
regards compliance with the provisions of the Prevention of Money-Laundering
Act, 2002, the new definition of the offence of money-laundering in section 3 as
amended w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 will have
to be kept in mind. The compliance checklist will have to be modified
appropriately to cover all the limbs of section 3 and, in particular, the
newly-inserted Explanation.

 

If there is a lapse made
by a Chartered Accountant entrusted with reporting the compliance of all
statutory laws, including the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, he may
be held liable for negligence in his professional duties.

PFUTP REGULATIONS – BACKGROUND, SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF 2020 AMENDMENT

Fraud shakes investor
confidence and damages both the capital markets and capital-raising because
people develop long memories when they lose a large part of their hard-earned
savings because of fraud. The disillusionment with the markets, a consequence
of the Harshad Mehta scam in the early 1990s, lingers even today. Though the
Harshad Mehta scam was really a massive banking scandal, it was the securities
markets which took the blame for it as the tainted and stolen money was put
into the securities markets on a huge scale leading to market manipulations and
disruptions. Another scam with Ketan Parekh at its helm towards the beginning
of this century, and later India’s most (in)famous corporate scam in recent
years, at Satyam Computers Limited, have shaken investor confidence in the
capital markets and corporate India. Fraud has a system-wide impact on the
economy and society, and not just on those defrauded. Where fraud exists,
honest companies’ cost of raising capital becomes higher, whether it’s issuing
debt or equity securities.

 

1.     BACKGROUND
TO REGULATION OF FRAUD AND MANIPULATION BY SEBI

Almost invariably,
successful economic times hide many problems including fraud to take root even
more easily in times of economic bubbles. The
beta
of the market hides the negative
alpha
of frauds. As the economic waters recede, many frauds are uncovered as it is no
longer possible to skim off returns without being noticed when the markets
can’t hide your fraud. Such phases are invariably followed by reports,
committees, investigations and, finally, new regulations.

 

After periods of fraud like
the ones led by Charles Ponzi, Harshad Mehta, Enron and WorldCom, and Ramalinga
Raju of Satyam Computers Limited, a host of new regulations were brought in.
The Harshad Mehta scam helped mould the outlook of the modern regulator of
India, SEBI, on the need for a robust regulatory environment.

 

SEBI recognised that in
order to ensure confidence, trust and integrity in the securities market, there
was a need to ensure fair market conduct. Fair market conduct can be ensured by
prohibiting, preventing, detecting and punishing such market conduct that leads
to market abuse. Market abuse is generally understood to include market
manipulation and insider trading and such activity is regarded as an
unwarranted interference in the operation of ordinary market forces of supply and
demand and thus undermines the integrity and efficiency of the market1
which, in turn, erodes investor confidence and impairs economic growth2.

 

It was for this purpose,
i.e., to ensure fair market conduct, to deal with fraudulent and unfair trade
practices related to the securities market, and to provide for the means of
detection, prohibition and prevention thereof3 that SEBI framed the
Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities
Markets, Regulations, 1995. These were thereafter reviewed and replaced with
the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to
Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (
PFUTP
Regulations
) which were notified on 17th July, 2003 and thereafter
amended in 2012, 2013, 2018 and 2020, respectively4.

 

The Supreme Court has
highlighted5  that the object
and purpose of the PFUTP Regulations is to safeguard the investing public and
honest businessmen. It is established6 that the aim of the
Regulations is to prevent exploitation of the public by fraudulent schemes and
worthless securities through misrepresentations, to place adequate and true
information before the investor, to protect honest enterprises seeking capital
by accurate disclosures, to prevent exploitation against the competition
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public and to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound
securities.

The underlying aim behind
enacting the PFUTP Regulations is thus to preserve market integrity and to
prevent market abuse. The Supreme Court also asserted that in order to
effectively ensure security and protection of investors from fraud and market
abuse, SEBI, as regulator of the securities market must sternly deal with
companies and their directors indulging in manipulative and deceptive devices,
insider trading, etc., or else the regulator will be failing in its duty to
promote orderly and healthy growth of the securities market7.

 

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1   Palmer’s Company Law, 25th Edition
(2010), Volume 2 at page 11097; Gower & Davies-Principles of Modern Company
Law, 9th Edition (2012) at page 1160

2   T.K. Vishwanathan Committee, Report of
Committee on Fair Market Conduct (8th August, 2018)

3   Munmi Phukon, ‘SEBI’s expanded power to
protect investors’ interest’ < http://vinodkothari.com/2019/01/sebis-expanded-power-to-protect-investors-interest/>

4   Id

5   SEBI vs. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel,
2017 (8) SCJ 650

vinodkothari.com/2019/01/sebis-expanded-power-to-protect-investors-interest/>

6   Id

7   Id

 

2.     WHAT
CONSTITUTES FRAUD AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES?

When one speaks of fraud in
general, it could include all forms of unfair behaviour starting from the
morally improper to the legally prohibited. However, fraud when legally defined
is a term of art used to describe a wide variety of conduct which is
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative. At the same time, all conduct which may
be unfair may not be fraudulent.

 

Fraud

A subject like fraud which
attracts a lot of careful attention because of the stigma attached to it must
be read and interpreted carefully so that non-fraudulent conduct does not get
caught in its net. The definition of fraud under the PFUTP Regulations thus
requires a closer scrutiny and better understanding. It says that
‘“fraud” includes any act, expression, omission or
concealment committed whether in a deceitful manner or not by a person or by
any other person with his connivance or by his agent while dealing in
securities in order to induce another person or his agent to deal in
securities, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or avoidance of any loss…

 

However,
this definition of fraud under Regulation 2(1) of the PFUTP Regulations does
not clearly delineate the scope of fraud. What is stated therein is only part
of the expanse of the definition. If anything, the definition is not exhaustive
but only indicative by example. And the examples outlined by SEBI include,
inter alia, a knowing misrepresentation of truth, active concealment of material
facts, suggesting as a fact something known to be untrue by the person making
it, a promise made without any intention of performing it and other deceptive
behaviour with a view to induce another person to act to his detriment or to
deprive him of informed consent and full participation.
Further,
the definition includes within its ambit representations made in a reckless or
careless manner (irrespective of whether or not the same are true), acts or
omissions specifically declared to be fraudulent, false statements made without
reasonable ground for believing them to be true. Further, acts of an issuer of
securities involving misinformation affecting the market price of the
securities in a misleading manner also falls within the scope of the definition
as explicitly laid down thereunder.

 

However, general comments
made in good faith in regard to the economic policy of the government, the
economic circumstances of the country, trends in the securities market or any
other matter of like nature, whether such comments are made in public or in
private, are excluded from the definition of fraud.

 

Thus, the scope of
definition of fraud provided by SEBI is not exhaustive. Regulations 3 and 4
enlist ingredients of fraudulent and unfair trade practices. The term fraud has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court in
SEBI
vs. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel
8
to be wider than ‘fraud’ as used and understood under the Indian Contract Act.
The term ‘unfairness’ has been interpreted to be even broader than and
inclusive of the concepts of deception and fraud. Unfair trade practices, the
Supreme Court has noted, are not subject to a single definition but require
adjudication on a case-to-case basis. Conduct undermining good faith dealings
may make a trade practice unfair. The Supreme Court has defined unfair trade
practices as follows:

 

‘having
regard to the fact that the dealings in the stock exchange are governed by the
principles of fairplay and transparency, one does not have to labour much on
the meaning of unfair trade practices in securities. Contextually, and in
simple words, it means a practice which does not conform to the fair and
transparent principles of trades in the stock market.’

 

Prohibited
dealings

By
virtue of Regulation 3 of the PFUTP Regulations, certain dealings in securities
including buying, selling or otherwise dealing in securities in a fraudulent
manner are prohibited. These dealings include using or employing any
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances in contravention of the
provisions of the SEBI Act or the rules of the regulations made thereunder in
connection with the issue, purchase or sale of listed or to-be-listed
securities. Further, it includes employing any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud as well as engaging in any act, practice, course of business which
operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with
any dealing in or issue of securities which are listed or proposed to be listed
on a recognised stock exchange in contravention of the provisions of the SEBI
Act or rules or regulations made thereunder are prohibited dealings.

 

Regulation
4

Regulation 4 prohibits
manipulative, fraudulent and unfair trade practices. It provides indicative
examples of what constitutes fraud under the scope of the PFUTP Regulations.
The following are examples of instances of fraud governed under the
aforementioned provisions of the PFUTP Regulations:

 

Market
manipulation

The
regulations describe two classic forms of volume manipulation, one of which is
creation of an appearance of trading volume in the market. Regulation 4(2)(a)
deems dealings which
knowingly create a false or misleading appearance of trading to be
fraudulent. The false appearance of trading is intended to create an impression
amongst gullible investors that the securities are traded frequently and are
therefore highly liquid. The illusion of liquidity fools investors to purchase
the securities, only to be left holding illiquid securities when the artificial
trading ceases.

 

The second form of
classical volume manipulation pertains to another type of volume manipulation
where the same person is on both sides of the transaction. This is dealt with
under Regulation 4(2)(b) which provides that dealing in a security where parties
do not intend to effect transfer of beneficial ownership but intend to operate
only as a device to inflate, depress or cause fluctuations in the price of such
security for wrongful gain or avoidance of loss, is fraudulent.

 

In simple terms, the manipulator
(person), wearing the buyer’s hat, puts in successive bids of higher and higher
prices. Wearing the seller’s hat, the same person or his nominee sells at the
higher price. The false trade would give the appearance of a price higher than
is in fact the true value of the security. Similarly, a buyer can put
successively lower bids to reduce the price artificially.

 

Under-cutting
minimum subscription norms

The SEBI Act provides for
minimum subscription of shares on issue. There are people who try to undercut
these requirements by advancing money to potential subscribers so as to induce
them to subscribe to the shares for fulfilment of the minimum subscription on
issue requirement. Regulation 4(2)(c) classifies these kinds of transactions as
fraudulent and unfair trade practices. Such frauds are committed when a company
or its promoters seek to fill subscription of shares in a public offer through
fictitious trades to satisfy the minimum subscription requirements.

 

Price
manipulation

There are several forms of
fraudulent conduct leading to price manipulation of shares, some of which are
dealt with specifically in the regulations as provided below.

 

Regulation 4(2)(d) deals
with inducing someone to deal in securities with the objective of artificially
inflating, depressing, maintaining or causing fluctuation in the price of a
security by any means, including by paying, offering or agreeing to pay or
offer any money or money’s worth, directly or indirectly, to any person. This
form of fraud is a variation of classical manipulation described in Regulation
4(2)(b), with the difference being that it includes price manipulation using
another person.

 

Secondly, Regulation
4(2)(e) provides that any act, omission amounting to manipulation of the price
of a security, including influencing or manipulating the reference price or
benchmark price of any securities is fraudulent. This is also a variation of
volume manipulation described in Regulation 4(2)(b) with the significant
difference being that it does not require the person to be on both sides of the
transaction.

 

For example, a person can
inflate or depress the price of securities without being on both the buy and
the sell sides. This can be done by simply purchasing a large number of
securities for a nefarious purpose. In other words, there is a possibility of a
buyer (or a seller) putting in successively higher (or lower) prices in the
market driving up (or down) the prices artificially without the other side
knowing that such person is manipulating the market. Such actions amount to
manipulation.

 

Spreading
false information

PFUTP Regulations prohibit
spreading rumours or false information about a company and then profiting from
such information. This prohibition is dealt with by Regulation 4(2)(f) which
covers the knowing publication of false information relating to securities,
including financial results, financial statements, mergers and acquisitions,
regulatory approvals, which is not true or which the publisher does not believe
to be true, prior to or in the course of dealing in securities.

The
classic example is when a promoter talks up the prospectus of a company’s
performance and sells the shares of the company while it is in an inflated
state of informational being. However, it has more complex forms.

 

Another form of propagation
of false information has been prohibited in Regulation 4(2)(k) that pertains to
disseminating information or advice through the media, knowing such information
to be false and / or misleading and which is designed or likely to influence
the decision of investors dealing in securities.

 

Moreover, Regulation
4(2)(r) pertains to knowingly planting false or misleading news which may
induce sale or purchase of securities. This can range from false rumours about
a company to placing a wrong advertisement about an event of a company to
modify the price of its security.

 

Instances
of unauthorised trading

The following set of
regulations deal with different circumstances of unauthorised trading in the
market.

 

Regulation 4(2)(g) deems
any act of entering into a transaction in securities without the intention of
performing it or without the intention of change of ownership of such security;
this is a variation of regulation 4(2)(a) and is often described as ‘painting
the tape’. It is a form of market manipulation whereby market players attempt
to influence the price of a security by buying and / or selling it among
themselves so as to create the appearance of substantial trading activity in
it.

 

While Regulation 4(2)(h)
deals with stolen, fraudulently issued or counterfeit securities, persons
selling, dealing in such securities who are holders in due course, or
situations where such securities were previously traded on the market through a
bona fide transaction are, however,
excluded from this provision.

 

Regulation 4(2)(m) pertains
to churning. Churning means entering into repeated buy and sell transactions
merely to generate more commission income. It involves unauthorised trades that
may be made by a portfolio manager and suppressed from the client.

 

Regulation 4(2)(o) pertains
to market participants fraudulently inducing any person to deal in securities
with the objective of enhancing their brokerage or commission or income. And
Regulation 4(2)(t) pertains to illegal mobilisation of funds by carrying on or
facilitating the carrying on of any collective investment scheme by any person.

 

Circular
transaction

Circular trading is a
fraudulent scheme where sell orders are entered by a broker who knows that
offsetting buy orders for the exact same number of shares at the same time, and
at the same price, have either been or will be entered.

 

The
Regulation 4(2)(n) pertains to circular transactions in respect of a security
entered into between persons including intermediaries to artificially provide a
false appearance of trading in such security or to inflate, depress or cause
fluctuations in the price of such security.

 

Intermediary
predating

This
pertains to a broker or any other intermediary providing bogus records to
inflate the price a purchaser of security pays to such broker. Similarly, a
mutual fund may change the date of investment to give a favoured investor a
superior price (say of the previous date); these would be clearly fraudulent.
Regulation 4(2)(p) pertains to intermediary predating or otherwise falsifying
records, including contract notes, client instructions, balance of securities
statement, client account statements and so on.

 

Front-running

Front-running pertains to
any order in securities placed by a person on the basis of unpublished
price-sensitive information. It is a serious and common malpractice involving a
broker or other intermediary who knows about the client’s order and placing an
order ahead of the client.

 

Thus, a broker who knows
that his client wants to place an order of one million shares of Infosys
punches in his own order ahead of the client’s order. This front-running order
would increase the price available to his client and thus hurt his client.
Regulation 4(2)(q) prohibits front-running.

 

Misselling
of securities

Regulation 4(2)(s) pertains
to misselling of securities or services related to the securities market, which
means sale of securities or services related to the securities market by any
person directly or indirectly, by knowingly making a false or misleading
statement, or concealing or omitting material facts, or concealing the risk
associated with the securities, or by not taking reasonable care to ensure the
suitability of the securities or service, as the case may be, to the purchaser.

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

8   SEBI vs. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel,
2017 (8) SCJ 650

 

3.     POWERS
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF PFUTP REGULATIONS

In order to effectively
enforce the provisions of the PFUTP Regulations, SEBI is empowered to
inter alia restrain persons from accessing
the securities market and prohibit any person associated with the market to
buy, sell or deal in securities, and to impound and retain the proceeds or
securities in respect of any transactions which are in violation or
prima facie in violation of these
regulations. Further, SEBI is also empowered to prohibit the person concerned
from disposing of any of the securities acquired in contravention of these
regulations and to direct such person to dispose of the securities acquired in
contravention of these regulations in such manner as the Board may deem fit,
for restoring the
status quo ante.

 

Disgorgement

It is well established that
the power to disgorge is an equitable remedy and is not a penal or even
quasi-penal action. It differs from
actions like forfeiture and impounding of assets or money. Unlike damages, it
is a method of compelling a defendant to give up the amount by which he was
unjustly enriched. Disgorgement is intended not to impose on defendants any
demand not already imposed by law, but only to deprive them of the fruit of
their illegal behaviour. It is designed to undo what could have been prevented
had the defendants not outdistanced the investors in their unlawful project. In
other words, disgorgement merely discontinues an illegal arrangement and
restores the
status quo ante.
Disgorgement is a useful equitable remedy because it strips the perpetrator of
the fruits of his unlawful activity and returns him to the position he was at
before he broke the law. But merely requiring a defendant to return the ‘stolen
goods’ does not penalise him for his illegal conduct.

 

In its order dated 4th
October, 2012 in the matter of
Shailesh
S. Jhaveri vs. SEBI
, the Securities Appellate
Tribunal (‘SAT’) ruled that disgorgement proceedings do not amount to
punishment and are merely an equitable monetary remedy. In this case, SEBI had
issued orders barring the persons concerned for a period of two years from
accessing the securities market and also issued a disgorgement order for
violation of Regulations 4(2) and 4(d) of the erstwhile PFUTP Regulations9.

 

By
virtue of Regulation 11(1)(d) of the PFTUP, SEBI is now expressly empowered to
impound, retain and order disgorgement of the proceeds or securities in respect
of transactions which are in violation or
prima facie in
violation of the PFUTP Regulations. In the
Morgan Industries price rigging case10, SEBI had charged
Alka Synthetics and some other entities with having rigged the prices of the
Magan Industries scrip. SEBI had directed the stock exchange concerned to impound the
proceeds totalling Rs. 10 crores (Rs. 100 million). Alka Synthetics challenged
this decision in the Gujarat High Court. The Bench held that SEBI
was within its rights to issue directions to impound the auction proceeds and
that this did not amount to deprivation of property and hence did not violate
Article 300(A) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court remanded the ruling back
to the High Court, though the setting aside was not on the merits.

 

Debarring
from accessing capital markets

In case of manipulation of
a public issue, debarring a person from accessing and associating with the
capital markets was upheld as a preventive measure while distinguishing cases
where similar orders were passed even though manipulation was not connected to
raising of capital from the public11.

 

Further, in the matter of Polytex India Limited12,
SEBI observed violation of the provisions of Regulations 3 and 4 of the PFUTP
Regulations as a consequence of manipulation of the price of the Polytex scrip.
It barred various noticees thereunder for periods ranging from five to seven
years from accessing the securities market and from buying, selling or
otherwise dealing in securities, directly or indirectly, or being associated
with the securities market in any manner whatsoever. It also passed directions
with regard to disgorgement of an amount of Rs. 3,05,99,174 with interest
accrued at 12% per annum from 17th December, 2012 till the date of
payment. Notably, this order was issued by SEBI on 31st January,
2019.

 

In the matter of Chetan Dogra & Ors13,
SEBI passed an order barring noticees therein from accessing the securities
market for six months to one year, as well as imposing disgorgement of unlawful
gains made to the tune of Rs. 2,14,85,115 for violation of Regulations 3(a),
(b), (c), (d), 4(1), (2a), (b) and (g) of the PFUTP Regulations.

The Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Pan Asia Advisors Ltd.14 affirmed SEBI’s power to pass
orders debarring respondents for a period of ten years in dealing with
securities while considering the role played by the respondents as lead
managers relating to the GDRs issued by six companies which had issued them.

 

Moreover, section 11(2)(e)
of the SEBI Act, 1992 expressly enables SEBI to take measures to prohibit
fraudulent and unfair trade practices. Regulations 3(a), (b) and (c) mirror the
provisions u/s 12A of the SEBI Act, 1992. Section 12A prohibits the use of
‘manipulative and deceptive devices’ and section 15HA provides for a penalty
for fraudulent and unfair trade practices u/s 12A.

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

9   Shailesh S. Jhaveri vs. SEBI [2012] SAT
180

10  SEBI vs. Alka
Synthetics, [1999] 19 SCL 460

11  Manu Finlease vs.
SEBI, [2003] 48 SCL 507 (SAT)

12  SEBI Whole-Time member
order dated 31st January, 2019 in the matter of Polytex India
Limited, Gemstone Investments Limited and KGN Enterprises Limited and Ors.

13  SEBI Whole-Time member order dated 31st
August, 2020 in the matter of  Chetan
Dogra & Ors.

 

4.     SEBI
PFUTP (SECOND AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS, 2020

By way
of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices) (Second
Amendment) Regulations, 2003, an explanation has been inserted under Regulation
4(1) which clarifies that
any act
of diversion, misutilisation or siphoning off of assets or earnings of a
company whose securities are listed or any concealment of such act or any
device, scheme or artifice to manipulate the books of accounts or financial
statement of such a company that would directly or indirectly manipulate the
price of securities of that company, shall be and shall always be deemed to
have been considered as manipulative, fraudulent and an unfair trade practice
in the securities market.

 

This explanation clarifies
that SEBI has always held inherent powers to take appropriate action under the
PFUTP Regulations for violations involving fudging of books of accounts and
financial statements of listed companies where such fudging,
directly or indirectly, results
in manipulation in the price of the company’s securities. The explanation has
far-reaching effects and addresses questions pertaining to SEBI’s
jurisdictional prowess that remained unanswered for years.

 

Jurisdictional
conundrum – PwC

After
the unfolding of the large-scale accounting fraud in Satyam Computers Limited (
‘Satyam Computers’), SEBI had initiated proceedings against PriceWaterhouse Cooper (‘PwC’) since the accounting firm had conducted the audit in Satyam Computers
and their alleged failure to detect financial misdoings within the company of
momentous scale in turn resulted in severe losses to Satyam’s shareholders. The
financial wrongdoing by PwC included,
inter alia,
overstatement of cash and bank balances and misstatements in the books of
accounts.

 

When SEBI attempted to
charge the auditors involved in this massive accounting fraud by initiating
show cause proceedings against PwC under sections 11, 11B and 11(4) of the SEBI
Act and Regulation 11 of the PFUTP Regulations, it was faced with critical
uncertainty about its jurisdiction over such matters and the entities involved
therein.

 

In PricewaterhouseCoopers and Co. and Ors. vs. SEBI15, PwC challenged SEBI’s
initiation of proceedings against it and argued that SEBI did not have the
jurisdiction to initiate action against auditors who are discharging their
duties as professionals. It was also argued that the scope of SEBI’s power is
limited to entities forming part of the securities markets and that auditors
cannot be considered to be associated directly with the securities markets.

 

The Bombay High Court,
however, affirmed that SEBI has jurisdiction under provisions of the SEBI Act
and Regulations framed therein to inquire into and investigate matters in
connection with manipulation and fabrication of books of accounts and the
balance sheets of listed companies. It was further held that SEBI is empowered
to take regulatory measures under the SEBI Act for safeguarding the interest of
investors and the securities market. The Court held that in order to achieve
the same SEBI can take appropriate remedial steps which may include debarring a
Chartered Accountant from auditing the books of a listed company.

 

This resulted in the
implication that, even if indirectly, auditors owed a duty to shareholders and
investors. The High Court stated that ‘The auditors in the company are
functioning as statutory auditors. They have been appointed by the shareholders
by majority.
They owe a duty to the shareholders
and are required to give a correct picture of the financial affairs of the
company.’

 

This decision of the Bombay
High Court was appealed against and is pending before the Supreme Court of
India.

 

SEBI’s
deliberations

In its report16,
the Committee on Fair Market Conduct under the chairmanship of Dr. T.K.
Viswanathan (ex-Secretary-General Lok Sabha and ex-Law Secretary) had
inter alia noted that financial statement
frauds in a listed company has resulted in the loss of confidence by domestic
and international investors not only in the listed company in question but also
the entire industry to which that listed company belonged.

 

The committee had also
noted that there is a need for SEBI to take direct action against the
perpetrators of such financial fraud since it not only has an adverse impact on
the shareholders of the company but also impacts investor confidence in the
securities markets.

 

SEBI
felt17 that artificially inflating a company’s revenue, profits and
receivables, or hiding diversion of funds, will impact the price of its shares
and would influence the investment / disinvestment decisions of the investors.
In cases relating to diversion of funds or misstatements in disclosures of a
listed company and its management, the intention of the perpetrators has a
direct bearing on the interest of the investors as they remain invested or deal
in securities without having any information of such diversion. Therefore, such
diversion of funds or misstatements in disclosures are unfair trade practices
and the element of dealing in securities or the element of inducing others to
deal in securities need not be specifically proved in such cases.

 

SEBI felt that it was
important that gullible investors were not duped by such manipulative diversion
or misstatements and that the trust reposed in the securities markets was not
eroded by such fraudulent and manipulative activity18.

 

For the purpose of removal
of doubts, SEBI has now clarified that the existing provisions of the FUTP
Regulations always provided for effectively dealing with such fraudulent
activities of manipulating the prices of listed securities or diverting,
misutilising or siphoning off or hiding the diversion, misutilisation or
siphoning off of public issue proceeds or assets or earnings.

 

IMPLICATION

It is pertinent to note
that SEBI has acted upon the Report of the Committee on Fair Market Conduct for
issuing the clarification under the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair
Trade Practices) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2020. Notably, the Committee
had observed that SEBI had powers u/s 11B of the SEBI Act, 1992 to issue
various directions, including directions to bar persons involved in financial
statement frauds, from associating with listed companies as promoter / director
/ auditor of any listed company, impounding and disgorgement of any illegal
gain made by such person, etc.19

 

Thus, SEBI has clarified that it was and is empowered to take action against
listed companies, their promoters, directors and auditors or any person
responsible for fudging and fraudulent actions pertaining to books of accounts
and financial statements of listed companies, where such actions result in or
have potential to mislead investors.

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

 

14  SEBI vs. Pan Asia Advisors Ltd., AIR 2015
SC 2782

15  PricewaterhouseCoopers and Co. and Ors.
vs. SEBI, 2011 (2) Bom CR 173

16  Report of the Committee on Fair Market Conduct
under the Chairmanship of Dr. T.K. Viswanathan (8th August, 2018)

17  SEBI Board Meeting dated 29th
September, 2020

18  Id

19 Report of the Committee on Fair Market Conduct
under the Chairmanship of Dr. T.K. Viswanathan (8th August, 2018)

 

FINALLY, ACCOUNTING / FINANCIAL FRAUDS ARE OFFENCES UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

Finally, SEBI has
specifically recognised accounting frauds, manipulations and siphoning off of
funds in listed companies as offences. It sounds surprising that such acts were
not yet offences under Securities Laws and that the law-makers / SEBI took so
long, actually, several decades, to do this. Indeed, there have been rulings in
the past on such cases where parties have been punished. Now, however, such
acts attract specific provisions and will be punishable in several ways – by
penalty, debarment, disgorgement, even prosecution and more (vide amendment
to SEBI PFUTP Regulations dated 19th October, 2020).

 

The new provision is
broadly – albeit clumsily – worded. It is put within a strange context
in the scheme of the regulations. One would have thought that a separate and
comprehensive set of regulations would have been made to combat corporate
frauds just as, for example, in the case of insider trading cases, regulations
that would have given proper definitions, covered specific types of accounting,
financial and other corporate frauds, specified who will be held liable and
when, etc. Instead, the new provision has been introduced in the form of an Explanation
to a provision in a set of regulations which are generally intended to deal
with frauds and the like in dealings in securities markets. Interestingly, the
intention seems to be to give retrospective effect to this provision.

 

Certain
basic questions will need to be answered. What are the specific acts that are
barred? Who are the persons to whom these provisions apply? What is the meaning
of the various terms used? What are the forms of penal and other actions that
can be imposed against those who have violated these provisions? Is there a
retrospective effect to the new provision? Let us consider all these issues in
brief.

 

SUMMARY
OF PROVISION

The new provision, framed
as an Explanation, bars acts of diversion / siphoning / misutilisation of
assets / earnings and concealment of such acts. It also bars manipulation of
financial statements / accounts that would in turn manipulate the market price.

 

The principal provision is
Regulation 4(1) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade
Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP
Regulations). Regulation 4(1) prohibits fraudulent, manipulative and unfair
practices in securities markets. The newly-inserted Explanation to it says that
the acts listed therein (of diversion, siphoning off, etc.) are deemed to be such practices and thus
also prohibited.

 

What type
of acts are barred?

The following are the acts
barred by the new provision:

 

(a) ‘any act of diversion, misutilisation or
siphoning off of assets or earnings’,

(b)        any concealment
of acts as listed in (a) above,

(c) ‘any device, scheme or artifice to manipulate
the books of accounts or financial statement of such a company that would
directly or indirectly manipulate the price of securities of that company’.

 

To which
type of entities do the bars apply?

The acts should be in
relation to those companies whose securities are listed on recognised stock
exchanges. This would cover a fairly large number of companies. The securities
may be shares or even bonds / debentures. The securities may be listed on any
of the various platforms of exchanges.

 

Who can be
punished?

The Explanation makes the
act of diversion, concealment, etc. punishable. Hence, whoever commits such
acts can be punished. Thus, this may include the company itself, its directors,
the Chief Financial Officer, etc. Any person who has committed such an act
would be subject to action.

How are
such acts punishable?

The provisions of the SEBI
Act and the PFUTP Regulations give SEBI wide powers of taking penal and other
actions where such acts are carried out. There can be a penalty of up to three
times the profits made, or Rs. 25 crores, whichever is higher. SEBI can debar
the persons from being associated with the capital markets. SEBI can order
disgorgement of the profits made through such acts. The person who has
committed such acts can also be prosecuted. There are other powers too.

 

ANALYSIS
OF THE ACTS COVERED

Acts of diversion /
misutilisation / siphoning off of the assets / earnings of the company are
barred. The terms used have not been defined. If read out of context, the term
diversion and misutilisation may have a very broad meaning. But taken in the
context of the scheme of the PFUTP Regulations and also the third term
‘siphoning’, a narrower meaning would have to be applied.

 

The act of concealment
of such diversion / misutilisation / siphoning is also barred by itself. The
word ‘concealment’ may have to be interpreted broadly and hence camouflaging
such acts in various forms ought also to be covered.

 

The third category has
three parts. There has to be a device, scheme or artifice. Such
device, etc. should be to manipulate the books of accounts or financial
statement of the company. The manipulation should be such as would directly or
indirectly manipulate the price of the securities of the company. Essentially,
the intention is to cover accounting frauds / manipulation. However, since such
acts should be such as would result in manipulation of the price of securities,
the scope of this category is narrower. A classic example would be inflating
(or even deflating) the financial performance of the company which would affect
the market price. The definition of ‘unpublished price sensitive information’
in the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations could be usefully referred to for some
guidance.

 

Taken all together,
however, the three categories cast the net wide and cover several types of corporate
/ financial frauds. There is no minimum cut-off amount and hence the provisions
can be invoked for such acts of any amount.

 

RETROSPECTIVE
EFFECT?

It appears that the
intention is to give retrospective effect to the new provision. The relevant portion
of the Explanation reads:

‘Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that
any act of… shall be and shall always be
deemed
to have been considered as manipulative, fraudulent and an
unfair trade practice in the securities market’ (emphasis supplied).

 

Thus, a quadruple effort
has been made to give the provision a retrospective effect. The amendment is in
the form of an ‘Explanation’ to denote that this is merely an elaboration of
the primary provision and not an amendment. The Explanation states that it is
introduced ‘for removal of doubts’. It is also stated to be a ‘clarification’.
It is further stated that the specified acts ‘shall always’ be said to be
manipulative, etc. Finally, it is also stated that these acts are ‘deemed’ to be
manipulative, etc.

 

While the intention thus
seems more than apparent to give retrospective effect, the question is whether
acts as specified in the Explanation that have taken place before the date of
the amendment would be deemed to be covered by the Regulations and thus treated
as fraudulent, etc.? And accordingly, whether the various punitive actions
would be imposed even on offenders who may have committed such acts in the
past?

 

Giving
retrospective effect to provisions having penal consequences is fraught with
legal difficulties. While siphoning off of funds, accounting manipulation, etc.
are abhorrent, there have to be specific legal provisions existing at the time
when such acts are committed and which prohibit them and make them punishable.
It may also be remembered that the Regulations are subordinate law notified by
SEBI and not amendments made in the SEBI Act by Parliament. Of course, the
amendments are placed before Parliament for review and for amendments to them,
if desired.

 

There is another concern.
When a fresh provision is introduced, a fair question would be that this may
mean that the existing provisions did not cover such acts. Hence, if the
retrospective effect of the provision is not granted, then there can be an
argument that the existing Regulation 4(1), which otherwise bans all forms of
manipulative and other practices, be understood as not covering such acts.

 

However, it is also
arguable that if the existing provision, before the amendment, was broad enough
to cover such acts, then there is really no retrospective effect. SEBI has in
the past taken action in several cases of accounting manipulation / frauds,
etc.

 

The Supreme Court has held
in the case of N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 178 Comp Cas 390 (SC)]
that accounting manipulation can be punished by SEBI under the relevant
provisions of the SEBI Act / the PFUTP Regulations. In this case, SEBI recorded
a finding that the accounts of the company had been manipulated by inflating
the revenues, profits, etc. The promoters had pledged their shares at the
inflated price. SEBI had debarred the directors for specified periods from the
securities markets. On appeal, the Supreme Court did a holistic reading of the
SEBI Act along with the Companies Act, 2013 and held that such acts were subject
to adverse actions under law. However, it was apparent that the general objects
of the law, the generic powers of SEBI, etc. were given a purposive
interpretation and the SEBI’s penal orders upheld. Interestingly, the Court
even observed that, ‘…in SEBI Act, there is no provision for keeping proper
books of accounts by a registered company.’
Thus, while this decision is
authoritative on the matter, it was also on facts. There was thus clearly a
need for specific provisions covering financial frauds, accounting
manipulation, etc. The new provisions do seem to fill the gap to an extent, at
least going forward.

CONCLUSION

The
amendment does serve the purpose of making a specific and focused provision on
accounting and financial frauds that harm the interests of the company and its
shareholders and also of the securities markets.

However, there is also
disappointment at many levels. It took SEBI almost 30 years to bring a specific
provision. Arguably, such frauds are as much, if not more, rampant and serious
as most other frauds including insider trading. However, while insider trading
is given a comprehensive provision with important terms defined, several
deeming provisions made, etc., financial frauds have a clumsily drafted and
clumsily placed provision, almost as a footnote. Such frauds not only deserve a
separate set of regulations but also a specific enabling provision in the SEBI
Act and a provision providing for specific punishment to the wrongdoers.

Giving the provision
retrospective effect may appear to be well intended but it may backfire if
there is large-scale action by SEBI for past acts.

Nonetheless,
finally, despite the warts and all, our Securities Laws now do have a specific provision
covering financial frauds in listed companies. One can expect to see action by
SEBI on this front in the form of investigations and punitive orders against
wrongdoers.
 

 

 

 

 

 

HINDU LAW – A MIXED BAG OF ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Law has always been a
very fascinating subject. The fact that it is both codified in some respects
and uncodified in others makes it all the more interesting. The Supreme Court
in the case of M. Arumugam vs. Ammaniammal, CA No. 8642/2009 order dated
8th January, 2020
had occasion to consider a mixed bag of
issues under Hindu Law. Some of the observations made by the Court are very
interesting and have a profound impact on the interpretation of Hindu Law. Let
us understand this decision in more detail and also analyse its implications.

 

FACTUAL MATRIX

The facts of this case are
quite detailed but are relevant to better appreciate the decision. There was a
Hindu male, his wife, two sons and three daughters. He also had an HUF in which
he (the karta) and his two sons were coparceners. The HUF had certain
property. This was prior to the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 (the Act) and hence the daughters were not coparceners. The karta
died intestate. Accordingly, by virtue of the Act, his share in the HUF was to
be succeeded to by his legal heirs in accordance with the Act, i.e., equally
amongst the six surviving family members. On his death, a Release Deed was
executed in respect of the HUF amongst the two sons, the mother and the
daughters in which the mother and the daughters relinquished all their rights
in the father’s HUF to the two sons. As one of the daughters (the respondent in
this case) was a minor, her mother executed the deed as her natural guardian
for and on her behalf. Similarly, as one of the sons was a minor, the elder son
(the appellant in this case) executed this deed as his guardian.

 

After
nine years, a Deed of HUF Partition was executed between the two sons in which
the husband of the respondent (who was now a major) acted as a witness.
Thereafter, the two sons were in possession of the erstwhile HUF property in
their own individual, independent capacities. When they sought to sell this
property, the respondent objected to the sale on the grounds that when the
release deed was executed she was a minor and her mother had no authority to
sign it on her behalf. She also contended that she was, in fact, not even aware
of the release deed. Hence, the same was void ab initio and all
subsequent transactions and agreements were also void. Accordingly, she
filed a suit to set aside the transactions.

 

The trial court dismissed
the suit holding that the mother acted as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter and no steps were taken by the respondent on attaining majority to get
the release deed set aside within the period of limitation of three years. She
then filed an appeal before the Madras High Court which came to the conclusion
that the property in the hands of the legal heirs of the father after his death
was Joint HUF property and the mother could not have acted as the guardian of
the minor. It held that the eldest son on demise of the father became the karta
of the HUF and also the guardian for the share of the minors within the family.
Hence, he could not have executed such a release deed in his favour. It was,
therefore, held that the release deed was void ab initio. Consequently,
the eldest son filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

 

It is in the background of
these facts that we can understand the ratio of the Apex Court on
various issues.

 

WHO CAN BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN?

The Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the law relating to minority and guardianship
of Hindus and the powers and duties of the guardians. It overrides any
uncodified Hindu custom, tradition or usage in respect of the minority and
guardianship of Hindus. Under this Act, a guardian means a person who has the
care of the minor or of his property, or both. Further, the term also includes
a natural guardian. The term ‘Natural Guardian’ is of great significance since
most of the provisions of this Act deal with the rights and duties of a natural
guardian and hence it becomes necessary to understand the meaning of this term.
If the minor is a boy or an unmarried girl, then the father and after him the
mother automatically becomes the natural guardian. The natural guardian of a
Hindu minor has the power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and
proper for the minor’s benefit or for the realisation, protection or the
benefit of the minor’s estate. The most important restriction placed by the Act
on the natural guardian relates to his immovable property. A natural guardian
cannot without the prior permission of a Court enter into any disposal /
mortgage / lease exceeding five years of his immovable property.

 

This Act also has a caveat.
It states that a guardian cannot be appointed for the minor’s undivided
interest in a joint HUF property if the property is under the management of an
adult member of the family. Since the interest in an HUF property is not
separate or divisible from the rest of the shares, it is not possible to
segregate the interest of one member from another. The Supreme Court set aside
this provision in Arumugam’s case (Supra) stating that in that
case they were dealing with a situation where all the family members decided to
dissolve the Hindu Undivided Family assuming there was one in existence. Hence,
the exemption had no application.

 

As regards the plea that
the mother cannot act as the natural guardian and the karta of the HUF
would play both roles, the Apex Court observed that a karta is the
manager of the joint family property. He was not the guardian of the minor
members of the joint family. What the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
provided was that the natural guardian of a minor Hindu shall be his guardian
for all intents and purposes except so far as the undivided interest of the
minor in the joint family property was concerned. This meant that the natural
guardian could not dispose of the share of the minor in the joint family
property. The reason for this was that the karta of the joint family
property was the manager of the property. However, this principle would not
apply
when a family settlement was taking place between the members of the
joint family. When such a dissolution took place and some of the members
relinquished their share in favour of the karta, it was obvious that the
karta could not also act as the guardian of that minor whose share was
being relinquished in his own (i.e., the karta’s) favour. There would be
an apparent conflict of interest. In such an eventuality, it would be
the mother alone who would be the natural guardian. Accordingly, there was
nothing wrong in the mother acting as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter.

 

CHALLENGE BY MINOR ON ATTAINING MAJORITY

Section 8 of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act further provides that any disposal and / or
alienation of a minor’s immovable property by her natural guardian in
contravention of the Act is voidable at the instance of the minor. The Supreme
Court held that this meant that the release deed at best became a voidable
document which in terms of section 8 of the Act should have been challenged
within three years of the daughter attaining majority. Since she had failed to
do so, she could not now challenge the same. Thus, the period of limitation of
three years to challenge the document had expired.

 

Whether
property is joint or self-acquired

The next issue to be
decided by the Supreme Court was that in respect of the interest in the
coparcenary property which was succeeded by the legal heirs, whether it
continued to be HUF property or did it become the self-acquired property of
each heir? The Supreme Court referred to several decisions such as Guruprasad
Khandappa Magdum vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, (1978) 3 SCC 383; CWT vs.
Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567
; Appropriate Authority IT vs. M.
Arifulla (2002) 10 SCC 342
, etc. to hold that property devolving upon
legal heirs under intestate succession from a Hindu male is the individual
property of the person who inherits the same. It is not HUF property in the
recipient’s hands.

 

The Court also considered
section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act which clearly lays down that any Hindu
can dispose of his share in an HUF by means of a Will. It held that the
Explanation to section 30 clearly provided that the interest of a male Hindu in
a Mitakshara coparcenary is property capable of being disposed of by him
by a Will. This meant that the law-makers intended that for all purposes the
interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary was to be virtually
like his self-acquired property.

 

Manner of
owning the property

In this case, on the death
of the father and execution of the subsequent release deed, the two sons ended
up owning the property jointly. The Court referred to section 19 of the Act
which provides that when two or more heirs succeed together to the property of
an intestate, they shall take the property per capita and as tenants in common
and not as joint tenants.

 

It may be useful to explain
the meaning of these two terms. Although both may appear similar, but in law
there is a vast difference between the two. Succession to property would be
determined depending upon how a property has been acquired. A Joint Tenancy has
certain distinguishing features, such as unity of title, interest and
possession. Each co-owner has an undefined right and interest in property
acquired as joint tenants. Thus, no co-owner can say what is his or her share.
One other important feature of a joint tenancy is that after the death of one
of the joint tenants, the property passes by survivorship to the other joint
tenant and not by succession to the heirs of the deceased co-owner. For
example, X, Y and Z own a building as joint tenants. Z dies. His undivided
share passes on to X and Y. Tenancy in common is the opposite of joint tenancy
since the shares are specified and each co-owner in a tenancy in common can
state what share he owns in a property. On the death of a co-owner, his share
passes by succession to his heirs / beneficiaries under the Will and not to the
surviving co-owners. If a Will bequeaths a property to two beneficiaries in the
ratio of 60:40, then they are treated as tenants in common.

 

The Supreme Court concluded
that section 19 clearly indicated that the property was not to be treated as a
joint family property though it may be held jointly by the legal heirs as
tenants in common till the property is divided, apportioned or dealt with in a
family settlement.

 

Notional
partition on demise of coparcener

The Supreme Court held that
under the Act, on the death of a coparcener a notional partition of the HUF
takes place. This proposition may be elaborated for the benefit of all that
when a coparcener dies, there would be a notional partition of his HUF just
before his death to determine his share in the HUF which is bequeathed by his
Will. Accordingly, on the date prior to the coparcener’s demise, one needs to
work out the number of coparceners and determine each one’s share on that date.
Thus, if there are ten coparceners just before his death, then each would have
a notional 1/10th share.

 

CONCLUSION

The
Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Madras High Court and upheld the
validity of the release deed. It also held that a mother would be the natural
guardian of the minor. This decision has elaborated on various important issues
relating to Hindu Law. It is an extremely unfortunate situation where for every
key feature of Hindu Law the Supreme Court needs to intervene. Should not the
entire Hindu Law be overhauled and codified in greater detail till such time as
India has a Uniform Civil Code?
 

 

 

STATEMENT RECORDED UNDER PMLA AND OTHER LAWS: WHETHER ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

In a recent
decision of the Supreme Court (Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Cr.
Appeal No. 152/2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)
, the
captioned question was examined in connection with the statement recorded under
the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the
NDPS Act). The Supreme Court held that the officers who are invested with powers
u/s 53 of this Act are police officers and therefore a statement recorded u/s
67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
offence under the NDPS Act.

 

Section 53 of the
NDPS Act empowers the Central Government to invest any officer of the
Department of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any
other department of the Central Government, including para-military forces, or
armed forces, or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer-in-charge
of a police station for investigation of offences under the NDPS Act.

 

The prohibition
that a statement recorded u/s 67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional
statement has its roots in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence
Act) which provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved
against a person accused of an offence.

 

It is section 53 of
the NDPS Act which distinguishes it from the provisions in other laws perceived
as comparable as regards issue of summons, power to call for information,
enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, etc. If such
comparable provision in other laws (such as, FEMA, PMLA, Customs Act) does not
have wording similar to that of section 53 of the NDPS Act, it would not be
proper to apply the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tofan
Singh (Supra)
to say that the statement recorded by an officer under
such other laws is not admissible as evidence.

 

The purpose of
this article is to analyse the correct legal position to find the answer to the
question whether a statement recorded under PMLA is admissible as evidence.

 

The relevant
aspects of the subject-matter have been reviewed as follows.

 

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF PMLA, CrPC AND EVIDENCE ACT

Section 50(3) of
the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) specifies the
following obligations of the persons summoned:

(a)        To attend in person or through authorised
agents,

(b)        To state the truth with respect to the
subject for which they are examined or they make statements,

(c)        To produce such documents as may be
required.

 

Section 164(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) provides that before
recording any confession, the Magistrate is required to explain to the person
making the statement that he is not bound to make such confession and that if
he does so, it may be used as evidence against him. It further provides that
the Magistrate shall not record the confession unless, upon questioning the
person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

 

The ban in section 25 of the Evidence Act (i.e., no confession made to a
police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence) is
an absolute ban. However, there is no ban on the confession made to any
authority who is not a police officer except when such confession is made while the accused is in police custody.

 

WARNING U/S 164 OF CrPC – RAISON D’ETRE

Section 50(3) of
the PMLA, among others, enjoins upon the person summoned the obligation ‘to
state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined or makes
statement
’. In respect of such obligation of the person summoned, a crucial
question that needs to be addressed is whether the warning u/s 164 of the CrPC
needs to be administered to the person before he makes the statement.

This question has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in various decisions. After a detailed
review, the Supreme Court has laid down important propositions in this matter
and also explained the need and raison d’etre underlying the
administering of such a warning. These propositions may be reviewed as follows.

 

(i)   Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not
limit itself to a confession made to a Magistrate and, therefore, there is no
bar to its application to the statement so recorded. The person who makes the
statement is not excused from speaking the truth on the premise that such a
statement could be used against him. Such requirement is included in the
provision for the purpose of enabling the officer to elicit the truth from the
person being interrogated. There is no involvement of the Magistrate at that
stage1.

(ii)   Warning a person that making a false statement
is an offence cannot be construed to mean exertion of pressure to extract the
statement2.

(iii) Statements
made before the officers are not confessions recorded by the Magistrate u/s 164
of the CrPC. Such statements are not made subject to the safeguard under which
confessions are recorded by a Magistrate. Therefore, it is all the more
necessary to scrutinise such statements to ascertain whether the same were made
under threat from some authority. If such scrutiny reveals that the statements
were voluntary, the same may be received against the maker of the statement in
the same manner as a confession3.

 

PERSON MAKING A STATEMENT – NOT A COMPELLED WITNESS

During the
examination of an accused, an important issue that arises is whether an
accused person can be compelled to be a witness against himself. In this
connection, reference may be made to Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India
which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
However, to invoke such a Constitutional right
guaranteed under Article 20(3) against testimonial compulsion, the following
aspects must be examined4.

 

i)             
Whether a formal accusation has
been made against the person claiming such Constitutional guarantee. At the
stage when an authority issues notice to collect information, there is no
accusation against the person from whom the information is sought. The
information is collected to ascertain whether a formal accusation can be made
against the person. This is decided only after the information is collected and
examined. It is only when a show cause notice is issued that it can be said
that a formal accusation has been made against the person5;

_________________________________________________________________________

        
1      Asst. Coll. C. Ex.
Rajamundry vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

       
2      C. Sampath Kumar
vs. Enforcement Officer [1997] 8 SCC 358

                
3      Haroon Haji Abdulla
vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1968 SC 832


               
4      See: Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs.
Manek [1961] 1 SCR 417

ii) Whether the offence committed by such a person
would result in his prosecution;

iii)         What is the nature of the accusation and
the probable consequence of such an accusation?

iv)         To ascertain whether the statement is
covered within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person must be an accused at
the time when
he made the statement. Therefore, the fact that he became
an accused after making the statement is irrelevant6.

 

OFFICER RECORDING STATEMENT – WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER

In respect of the
statement recorded u/s 50 of the PMLA, the crucial issue which requires
consideration is whether the officer who records such a statement is a police
officer for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Section 25
provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against
a person accused of any offence. The provisions perceived as comparable to
section 50 of the PMLA are also found in the following statutes:

(1) Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999.

(2) Customs Act,
1962.

(3) Central Excise
Act, 1944.

(4) NDPS Act, 1985.

 

Accordingly, the
decisions of courts in respect of such apparently comparable sections in other
laws may provide a useful reference. The language of the relevant provisions in
the abovementioned laws must be carefully examined and compared with that of
section 50 of the PMLA before relying on the decisions based on the
corresponding provision in the other laws. In this context, some important
propositions laid down by the Courts are reviewed as follows:

 

(A)  
The crucial test to ascertain
whether an officer recording a statement under a Special Act (such as PMLA) is
a police officer is to check whether such officer is vested with all
powers exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC qua
investigation of offences under the CrPC Such powers include the power to
initiate prosecution by submitting a report or chargesheet u/s 173 of the CrPC.
It is not sufficient to show that such officer exercises some or many
powers of a police officer conducting investigation under the CrPC. If he does
not exercise all such powers, such officer would not be regarded
as a police officer7.

___________________________________________

5   Bhagwandas Goenka vs. Union of India: AIR
1963 SC 26

6   State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad [1962] 3
SCR 10

 

 

(B)  An officer under the Customs
Act, 1962
is empowered to check smuggling of goods, ascertain contravention
of provisions of the Customs Act, to adjudicate on such contravention, realise
customs duty and for non-payment of duty on confiscated smuggled goods and
impose penalty. The Customs Officer does not have power to submit a report to
the Magistrate u/s 173 of the CrPC because he cannot investigate an offence
triable by a Magistrate. He can only file a complaint before the Magistrate.

 

It is, thus,
evident that the officer recording a statement under the Customs Act does not
exercise all such powers. Accordingly, a Customs Officer is not a
police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Consequently, the statements made before a Customs Officer by a person against
whom such officer makes an inquiry are not covered by the said section and are,
therefore, admissible in evidence8.

 

(C)  While investigating offences under the PMLA,
the Director and other officers do not have all powers
exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC. For
example, they do not have the power to submit a report u/s 173 of the CrPC.
Hence, the officers recording a statement u/s 50 of the PMLA are not ‘police
officers’. Accordingly, they are not hit by the prohibition in section 25 of
the Evidence Act. Consequently, a statement recorded before such officers is
admissible as evidence9.

 

(D) On similar grounds, it has been held that an
officer functioning under FERA (having similar powers as under FEMA) cannot be
considered a police officer10.

 

(E)  In a recent decision11 concerning
the provisions of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court examined important aspects
such as fundamental rights and the NDPS Act, confessions u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act, provisions contained in the NDPS Act, the scope of section 67 of the NDPS
Act (power to call for information, etc.) and whether an officer designated u/s
53 of the NDPS Act (power to invest officers of certain departments with powers
of officer-in-charge of a police station) can be said to be a police officer.
After such examination, the Supreme Court held as follows:

____________________________________________________________

7   Balkishan vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981
SC 379

8   State of Punjab vs. Barkatram: AIR 1962 SC
276; Rameshchandra Mehta vs. State of WB: AIR 1970 SC 940; Veera Ibrahim vs.
State of Maharashtra [1976] 2 SCC 302; Percy Rustomji Basta vs. State of
Maharashtra [1971] 1 SCC 847

9   Virbhadra Singh vs. ED (MANU/DEL/1813/2015)
(Del. HC)

10  P.S. Barkathali vs. DoE AIR 1981 Ker 81; also
see Emperor vs. Nanoo [1926] 28 Bom LR 1196; 51 Bom 78 (FB)

11    Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)

 

  • the officers who are invested
    with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are ‘police officers’ within the meaning of
    section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement
    made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence
    Act and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the
    NDPS Act;
  •   a statement recorded u/s 67
    of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
    offence under the NDPS Act.

 

SUPREME
COURT SOUNDS A NOTE OF CAUTION REGARDING EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF STATEMENT
RECORDED BY THE OFFICER

The raison
d’etre
for section 25 of the Evidence Act (that the statement recorded by a
police officer is not admissible as evidence) is to avoid the risk of the
allegation that such a statement was obtained under coercion and torture.

 

In the preceding heading, the aspects, such as whether the officer
recording the statement under a particular statute is a police officer and
whether such statement is admissible as evidence as examined by Courts, have
been reviewed in detail in connection with various statutes.

 

The Supreme Court has sounded a note of
caution in respect of the statement made by a person to an officer who is not a
police officer, and which is accordingly not hit by the ban u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act. Such statement must be scrutinised by the Court to ascertain whether the
same was voluntary or whether it was obtained by inducement, threat or promise
in terms of the tests laid down in section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such
statement is impaired on the touchstone of such tests, the same would be
inadmissible12.

________________________________________________________

12  Asst. Coll. of C. Ex. Rajamundry vs. Duncan
Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

 

CORPORATE LAW IN INDIA – PROMOTING EASE OF DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT DILUTING STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

The sheer size
of corporates combined with the volatile stock markets has made corporate
performance the barometer of a country’s economic sentiment, and India is no
exception to this. In the last three decades, continuous measures to deregulate
the corporate sector were driven by the desire to attract investments to
accelerate economic growth. This was interrupted by new regulatory measures
introduced to prevent corporate scandals that erupted periodically from
recurrence. Seen through this lens, it appears that deregulation, which now
goes by the phrase promoting ‘Ease of Doing Business’ and protecting
stakeholders’ interests are contradictory as evidenced by the periodic swings
in the regulatory environment from promoting Ease of Doing Business to
protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and back.

 

This article
seeks to examine the validity of a perceived conflict between promoting Ease of
Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and explores potential
avenues to reconcile the two by taking a historical view. It is structured in
four parts:

 

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the pre-corporate era;

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era;

Indian
regulatory initiatives in the 21st century;
and

Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with Protecting Stakeholders’ interests in the corporate
world.

 

Part 1: Promoting Business and Protecting
Stakeholders’ Interests in the pre-corporate era

Despite
appearing contradictory, in the transport sector the progress in braking technology
was a key prerequisite for quicker and faster transport of goods and people.
Likewise, protecting stakeholders’ interest is a prerequisite to promote
economic activity in a society. This can be seen in the evolution of the three
key commercial concepts that boosted economic growth, namely, (i) Recognition
of private property, (ii) Use of commercial lending and borrowing, and (iii)
Advent of corporate entities for conducting business.

 

Table 1: Commercial concepts that promoted
economic activity

 

Key commercial
concept

Promoting economic activity

Protecting stakeholders’
interest

Benefit
derived

Private property as distinct
from personal property

Ownership without possession led
to rental agreements increasing the use of assets

Defining theft and robbery, with
stringent penal action for defaulters, thereby protecting the owners’
interest

Development of agriculture and
trade then, and protection of intellectual properties now to fuel economic
growth

Commercial lending and borrowing
for interest

Defined norms for recording of
loan of goods or money to enforce promises made

Penalty for defaulting borrower:
bonded labour, debtors’ prison and 
disqualification from political and 
commercial activities to protect lenders’ interest

Credit sales and asset creation
using borrowed funds to fuel accelerated economic growth

Limited liability companies with
transferable shares

Liquidity to shareholders
without disrupting the business that enabled a larger number of investors to
collaborate

Reporting transparency,
regulation of related party transactions and insider trading to ensure fair
value for shareholders who wanted to exit by selling their shares at any
point in time

Creation of large multi-national
companies and ability to undertake economic activities with long gestation
period

 

 

The first
impetus to economic growth came with private property. Recognition of private
property resulted in ownership without possession by penalising theft and
robbery which can negate the owners’ rights. This enabled individuals to
undertake economic activities on a larger scale and with a longer gestation
period by assuring them that the rewards of their labour will be secured for
their own benefits. It resulted in human societies shifting from hunting and
gathering to agriculture where there is a time lag of a few days to weeks or
months between ploughing and harvesting of crops, which promoted production in
excess of consumption required by the individuals or their families. At a later
stage, this protection against theft and robbery promoted trade by assuring
travelling merchants the safety of their goods when they moved it from place of
production to places of consumption.

 

In the digital
economy of the 21st century, as the nature of assets changed, recognition
of private property is visible in the clamour for protection of Intellectual
Property (IP) that comes from technology companies and Startups who invest
their efforts in creating it. As a result, economies that protected IPs like
the USA and Europe have had accelerated economic growth and other economies
have since emulated them by enacting enforceable IP laws to promote local IP
creation.

 

The second impetus to economic growth came
from the use of credit for commercial activities which pulled in future demand
into the present time. For long periods in human history, lending and borrowing
were in the realm of social activity, where an individual or a household in
short supply would borrow their daily necessities from their neighbours. In the
social realm, the quantity borrowed and the quantity returned were the same. As
the goods borrowed changed from items of daily necessities to seeds for farming
and goods / money for trade, the concept of interest emerged. The borrowers
induced the lenders to part with their valuables by promising them a share of
their gains. Being a voluntary act motivated by profit, the lenders wanted an
assurance that the borrowers would honour their promise.

 

Given the
substantial benefits that accrue to the society, in the early stages regulators
created deterrents like bonded labour and imprisonment for the defaulting
borrowers. In later stages it took the form of enacting insolvency and
bankruptcy laws like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that India enacted in
2016 which empowers lenders to enforce the promise made by the borrowers by
taking control of their assets.

 

Progress in enacting and enforcing the
Intellectual Property laws and enabling quick recovery of loans shows the
primary role played by private property and commercial lending in accelerating
economic activity. This rule of law is a primary prerequisite for economic
development and growth. At the next level, economic activity can be further
accelerated by ensuring good governance which has two components – political
governance and corporate governance, which is reflected in the social and moral
ethos of society even though its roots can be traced back to regulatory
enactments.

 

Part 2: Promoting business and protecting
stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era

By combining the three concepts of joint
ownership, limited liability and transferability of shares in one commercial
entity, which is the joint stock companies, the foundation was laid for rapid
and sustained economic progress. This new entity enabled collaboration among
large numbers of investors to undertake projects of longer gestation periods,
which would have been unimaginable without joint stock companies. This boon,
however, is not without reservations as it comes with significant drawbacks
that are visible in the periodic corporate scandals that have erupted across
the globe due to misuse of the limited liability provision combined with the
separation of ownership from operational controls.

 

Corporate scandals seen in the last five
centuries can be traced to one of these three elements – (a) indiscreet use of
corporate assets, (b) diversion of corporate assets for personal use, or (c)
misuse of corporate business information for personal gains. These concerns are
not new and were expressed when the first company was created. However, these
concerns were overlooked as the economic benefit from these companies was
substantial. The very first joint stock company was formed in the year 1553 in
London to find a trade route to China through the North Seas, although it ended
up finding a profitable trade opportunity with Russia. It sought to address
these concerns by prescribing three basic qualifications of ‘sad, discreet and
honest’ for their directors who held operational control of the company. While
discreet and honest are self-explanatory, the word ‘sad’ is derived from the
word ‘sated or satisfied’, to denote a satisfied individual who would take care
of the interest of minority shareholders and other stakeholders without
diluting it for his own personal interests.

 

Table
2: Major regulatory initiatives in corporate law

 

Year

Regulatory initiative

Trigger

Protection to stakeholders

1856

The
Limited Liability Companies Act, England

Need
for larger investments in manufacturing facilities due to the industrial
revolution using steam power that required collaboration by a larger number
of investors

Brought
in the concept of ‘perfect publicity’. This phrase was used for transparent
reporting at that time, to protect minority shareholders and other
stakeholders

1890s

Concept
of private limited companies introduced in England

Excessive
regulations for incorporating companies mandated due to the outrage triggered
by the Solomon vs. Solomon case where the promoter as debenture holder was
repaid ahead of unsecured creditors, who remained unpaid

A
private company had legal restrictions placed on the method of fund-raising
and free transfer of shares to prevent investors who are not connected with
promoters from participation

1932

Securities
Exchange Commission, USA

Need
for capital infusion to revive the US economy that shrank by more than a
quarter, i.e. 27%, following the 1929 stock market crash

Insider
trading was defined as illegal to encourage retail investors to invest,
thereby reviving the economy

1961

Outcome
of the case of Cady Roberts & Co., USA

Rampant
misuse of information by outsiders with inside information

Brought
‘outsiders’ with insider information under regulatory purview to protect
retail and institutional investors

1992

Cadbury
Committee, England

Corporate
scandals of BCCI, Poly Peck, Coloroll plc and Maxwell where promoters misused
their position for personal benefit

Advocated
the concept of independent directors on corporate boards and audit committees
to protect retail shareholders & institutional investors

 

The last five centuries of corporate history
have not come up with any new concepts to redress the concerns of minority
shareholders and stakeholders but has only seen refinement and fine-tuning in
implementing the three qualities of ‘sad, discreet and honest’ that were
defined in the year 1553. Thus, we have seen movement from

 

  Sad or Satisfied Directors to Independent
Directors who are entrusted with the job of protecting minority shareholders
and other stakeholders,

  Discreet to fair disclosures to prevent
benefits accruing to individuals with inside information by regulating insider
trading, and

  Honest to Related Party Transactions at arm’s
length pricing to prevent individuals with control from misusing their powers
for their personal benefit in transactions with the company.

 

While these concepts are clear in principle
to protect stakeholders’ interests, it is in their implementation that
challenges arise. Despite the refinements made in the last five centuries, the
outcome is not as desired. As a result, we see a constant battle between
promoting Ease of Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders Interest, as seen
from the regulatory developments in India over the last two decades.

 

Part 3: Indian regulatory scene in the 21st century

The statutory endorsement of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992, the entity that was set up in 1988,
is a key element in the economic liberalisation process of the Indian economy.
Modelled on the SEC in the USA, it replaced the Controller of Capital Issues as
the regulator of new issues for raising funds from the public by companies.
Moving from a formula-based pricing to a market-based pricing mechanism, SEBI
led the movement to promote and enforce good corporate governance in India as
it seeks to protect stock market investors by preventing corporate scandals.
Following the path set by SEC, SEBI too embraced the principle of empowering
investors by providing them with the information required to make informed and
educated decisions. Hence, since its inception SEBI has mandated and nudged
companies to provide additional information or mandated more frequent
information sharing as the means to achieve better quality corporate
governance.

 

Table
3:
Key Indian regulator initiatives in the 21st
century

 

Year

Initiative

Trigger

Major recommendations

2000

Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate
Governance

To make Indian stock markets attractive as a destination
for capital inflows among the emerging markets by promoting good corporate
governance

25 practices for promoting good corporate governance,
of which 19 practices ‘are absolutely essential, clearly defined and could be
enforced by amending existing laws’ and classified as mandatory; the balance
six are listed as non-mandatory or recommended voluntary practices.
Implemented as Clause 49 of the listing agreement

2003

Narayanamurthy Committee on Corporate Governance

Stocktake of corporate governance practices in India
in the backdrop of corporate scandals in the USA

Strengthened the audit committee by defining members’
qualification roles, which included approval of related party transactions.
Also recommended real time disclosures of information important to investors
to prevent / reduce insider trading

2013

Companies Act, 2013

Satyam, Sahara and Saradha scams coming up in close
succession

Highly procedural systems outlined for companies
accepting public deposits and excluded interested shareholders from
participating in approving related party transactions. Both these measures
were significantly diluted after protests by promoters against the additional
burden placed on them

2017

Kotak Committee Report

Desire for higher quality of corporate governance to
bridge the valuation gap between performance of privately-owned companies and
publicly-owned companies, and public sector banks trading below their book
value and at a discount to private banks

Numerous practices aimed at reducing the gap between
the spirit of law and its practice in the corporate world regarding
independent directors, audit committees, related party transactions and
regulating insider trading, all with the intent of promoting higher quality
of corporate governance

2020

Covid-19 relaxations

Diluted requirements in many areas to enable
continuity of business during the country-wide lockdown period

In most cases, deferred the timeline for reporting,
reduced frequency of board meetings and permitted resolutions to be
considered in video / audio meetings that were in normal times banned

 

In the last two
decades, strengthening corporate governance or protecting stakeholder interests
has resulted in the prescription of multiple rules and procedures which
include, among others, to define an independent director, the minimum role of
the audit committee, elaborate systems for approving related party transactions
and complex processes for preventing insider trading to the detriment of other
investors. While these measures are well intended, historically they have not
served the purpose of preventing corporate scandals leading to erosion of
corporate shareholder value. Further, in the face of economic downturn or stock
market collapse, to stimulate economic activity many of the stringent controls
and systems mandated are diluted, despite knowing the adverse impact on
stakeholder interests.

 

Part 4: Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with protecting Stakeholder Interests

Ease of Doing Business is associated with
nil or reduced regulatory costs, efforts and time required to take and
implement any decision. On the other hand, protecting stakeholder interests
involves placing restraints on certain decisions or specifying some
pre-conditions for it. The key challenge in reconciling Ease of Doing Business
with protecting stakeholder interests is in designing restraints on actions
that protect stakeholder interests without translating into additional costs,
efforts or time required to complete the actions.

 

In achieving such a reconciliation,
technology, especially electronic messaging and e-voting should be liberally
used to convert representative democracy, as manifest in decision-making by the
board of directors, to participatory democracy of shareholder decision-making.
Further, in this digital era of cashless economy and compulsory
de-materialisation of shares mandated for all public companies, use of
electronic records should be prescribed for record-keeping by companies.

 

A brief analysis of the restraints that are
in place to protect stakeholder interests in the corporate law as it exists
today is listed here along with the changes proposed for protecting stakeholder
interest while at the same time promoting Ease of Doing Business.

 

Certification
of company’s reports:
Certain reports that are
prepared by the company and shared with stakeholders are required to be
certified by specified professionals or professional agencies to assure
stakeholders of their veracity and fairness. These are reports like:

 

  •    Annual Accounts by statutory
    auditors,
  •    Corporate Governance report
    by practising company secretaries,
  •    Statutory compliances
    certificates by practising company secretaries, and
  •    Mandatory credit rating for
    issuing debt instruments.

 

Despite many instances where independent
professionals have failed in providing the required assurance, third party
certification is an effective means of assurance to all stakeholders. Measures
like limiting an auditor’s tenure through rotation, preventing the auditors
from providing consulting or advisory services that can dilute their
independence seek to prevent, if not reduce, the instances of failure. In this
regard, the initiative in the UK of getting the auditors to separate their
consulting business from audit firms needs to be closely watched to determine
its effectiveness for India to adopt the same.

 

Presence of
independent directors:
The concept of independent
directors was introduced in the corporate board rooms to protect the interests
of minority shareholders and other stakeholders from misuse of executive powers
by the promoters and executive management. This was especially the case with
respect to their role in approving related party transactions and staffing the
audit committees to prevent misreporting.

 

As seen in the last few decades, the role of
independent directors in preventing corporate scandals has had mixed results.
In a few cases, independent directors were ineffective and in a few other
instances, they have resigned at the first sign of trouble when their presence
was most needed.

 

Given this ineffectiveness, it is worth
considering whether all related party transactions should be put up for
approval of the shareholders. With the exemption for small value transactions
in place, defined with reference to the size of the company or an absolute
value, whichever is lower, for all other transactions shareholder approval
through e-voting should be considered as a cost-effective and efficient system,
with the Board’s role restricted to ensuring that accurate and adequate information
is provided to the shareholders for their decision-making. Given the dominance
of promoters in the ownership of companies, on specific issues like related
party transactions voting by majority of non-promoter shareholders present and
voting should be considered.

 

Pre-approval from a designated authority –
the regulatory cost and effort increases at higher levels of the hierarchy and
diminishes as the levels decrease. Further, the cost is related to the number
of occasions where the approval is sought to be obtained or the specified
intervals within which these meetings should be held. Different levels at which
approvals are required in the descending order of hierarchy and costs involved
are listed below:

 

From MCA for unlisted companies and / or SEBI
in case of listed companies,

From shareholders in a duly convened
meeting or postal ballot,

From the Board in a duly conveyed
meeting,

From the Board through a circular
resolution.

 

In certain exceptional cases like mergers or
demergers, approval from stakeholders like creditors and lenders is mandated to
ensure their interests are protected in restructuring the entity on which they
took their exposure, as its underlying value could change.

 

In the 19th century, proxy was an
effective means introduced to permit shareholders who were unable to attend
meetings in person. Given the technological advancement in the 21st
century, e-voting could be mandated for companies of all sizes to enable larger
participation of shareholders in decision-making. Over time, as shareholders
get used to e-voting, the proxy system can be dispensed with.

 

Further, the one-time Covid-19 relaxation
provided for conducting shareholder meetings in electronic mode be converted
into a permanent provision in the Act to enable greater shareholder
participation.

 

Providing advance notice – The regulatory specification that translates to time involved in
taking a decision based on the minimum time prescribed for undertaking an
activity.

Illustrations:

Shareholder meetings – 21 days’ advance
notice, plus, based on convention, 2 days’ postal time considered for delivery,

Board meetings – 7 days’ advance notice for
convening board meeting.

 

Given the widespread use of emails for
communication, combined with the need for investors to have PAN and / or
Aadhaar cards as part of their KYC, the time for providing advance notice can
be reduced to seven days in case of both board meetings and shareholder
meetings, thereby enabling faster decision-making. The current provision for
holding shareholder meetings at shorter notice requires consent from 95% of the
members. In companies with lesser number of members, inability to contact even
one or two shareholders to get their consent will render this provision
ineffective.

 

Filing of
returns with public authorities (MCA / Stock Exchanges):
The regulatory requirements specifying filing multiple returns with
the public authorities can be classified into two broad categories:

Event-based returns – Returns that are required to be filed only on the occurrence of
certain activities / transactions such as appointment or resignation of
directors, fund-raising;

Calendar-based returns: – Returns that are to be filed at periodic intervals reporting the
activity that occurred during that period, including filing of nil return or
reiteration of the status as on a given date such as annual filing of KYC form
for directors or half-yearly filing of MSME form;

Ease of
Doing Business
– Can
be promoted by reducing the cost and time for regulatory compliance by ensuring
event-based return filings to public authorities like MCA and SEBI are only for actions that require their prior
approval.
For all other returns that only notify actions already taken,
these returns be clubbed into a quarterly or annual return to be filed, thereby
reducing the compliance burden.

 

Maintenance
of internal records as evidence:
This includes
maintenance of registers for certain activities and minutes of shareholder and
board meetings that are required as evidence for future records or use in case
of disputes.

 

Initially encourage and subsequently mandate
companies to maintain all internal minutes and registers in electronic records
that are tamperproof, with audit trails for entries made; these can be retained
for long periods of time. Provision can also be made for stakeholders concerned
to have 24/7×365 days access to these records. This concept is in line with the
requirements for all public companies to have their shares in dematerialised
form. In the medium to long run, this will ensure elimination of disputes
related to incorrect records or absence of records.

 

The Covid-19 pandemic in March, 2020 by
imposing significant restrictions on the normal way of life has provided an
opening for digital technology to change our lives forever. In the governance
and compliance field, while exemptions are being provided on a transactional
basis, can we use this opportunity to make a transformational change in protecting
stakeholder value and at the same time promote Ease of Doing Business by
embracing technology?

INFORMAL GUIDANCE – A REFRESHER USING A RECENT CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

Informal guidance has not been discussed in this column recently. A
recent informal guidance by SEBI gives an opportunity to refresh this useful
method of obtaining guidance of the regulator and in a fairly interesting
manner.

 

Informal guidance is a speedy way to know the mind of SEBI – or at least
of the relevant department – on a regulatory issue one is facing in an actual
case. One may be proposing to enter into a transaction or may be facing an
issue on interpretation of legal provisions. One then approaches SEBI with an
application giving the facts and the regulatory issues involved / queries and
SEBI gives its informal guidance. One could compare this with the advance
rulings as available under other laws, but the analogy should not be taken too
far. Informal guidance has a limited binding effect. In law, it can even be
reversed / ignored by SEBI itself, as will be seen in some detail later in this
article. Nevertheless, it has been useful in several cases.

 

WHAT IS INFORMAL GUIDANCE AND WHAT IS THE REGULATORY
BACKING?

SEBI introduced the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Informal
Guidance) Scheme, 2003 (the Scheme) in June, 2003. It is issued u/s 11(1) of
the SEBI Act and is thus a kind of measure in relation to securities markets
that SEBI has implemented. It does not have the status of a formal regulation
or rule and thus its legal status is limited. As we shall see, the Scheme
itself repeatedly mentions that the guidance given under it has limited binding
effect.

 

Nevertheless, it is a useful form of seeking guidance or ruling from
SEBI on how the relevant department of SEBI would view a particular situation
in the context of the relevant provisions of the securities laws. The person
desiring it approaches SEBI giving all relevant facts and the precise issue on
which he desires clarification. A fairly time-bound reply is generally given.

 

Who can approach SEBI for informal guidance?

Specified persons associated with capital markets can approach SEBI for
informal guidance. Those eligible include registered intermediaries (i.e.,
stock brokers, portfolio managers, etc.), listed companies (and also companies
proposing to get their securities listed and that have filed their offer
document / listing application), an acquirer / prospective acquirer under the
SEBI Takeover Regulations, etc.

 

What are the types of informal guidance that may be applied for?

There are two types of informal guidance that can be applied for. One is
a ‘no-action letter’. A person lays down the detailed proposed transaction he
desires to undertake and seeks guidance from SEBI on how it would view it. The
department concerned at SEBI may provide a ‘no-action letter’ whereby it would
not recommend any action to be taken under the applicable securities laws if
such a transaction is undertaken.

 

The second type is an ‘interpretive letter’ where again the SEBI
department concerned provides an interpretation and answer on an issue of law
under any of the securities laws in the context of the specified facts /
proposed transaction.

 

What are the fees?

A sum of Rs. 25,000 is to be paid as application fees. If the
application is rejected because it pertains to a matter where informal guidance
cannot be given, the fees are refunded after deducting Rs. 5,000 as processing
fee. If the application is rejected because the request for confidentiality
(discussed later herein) is not accepted, the fee will be refunded.

 

What is the time period for issue of informal guidance by SEBI?

The application has to be disposed of as early as possible, but not
later than 60 days of its receipt.

 

What are the situations under which informal guidance will not be
granted?

Applications have to be based on factual situations, even if proposed.
Thus, applications with hypothetical situations or in which the applicant has
no direct / proximate interests are rejected. If the matter is already covered
by an earlier informal guidance, the application may be rejected giving a
reference to the earlier one. In particular, if enforcement action is already
taken on the matter (investigation, inquiry, etc.) or any connected matter is sub
judice
, then the application would be rejected.

 

However, the grant of informal guidance is not a right and SEBI may not
respond at all and also does not have to answer why it has not responded.

 

Confidentiality of application / informal guidance

The application and response thereto is published for public viewing by
SEBI. A party may have reasons to keep the application confidential and may
make such a request in its application. SEBI may consider this request and
either accept it or reject it and refund the application fees. If it accepts
the request for confidentiality, the response of SEBI would be kept
confidential for a period of up to 90 days.

 

WHAT IS THE BINDING NATURE OF AN INFORMAL GUIDANCE?

The informal guidance, while comparable in concept, is not an advance
ruling by SEBI and hence does not have an element of finality. It is issued by
the particular department of SEBI and although SEBI may act generally in
accordance with it, the view is not binding on SEBI. It is not conclusive and
cannot be appealed against. It is also on the facts provided, and if the
proposed transaction deviates from such facts, the informal guidance may not
cover it.

 

As we shall see later, there has been a case where SEBI issued a
different guidance in a later case. SAT has also had occasion to examine the
nature of an informal guidance and the extent to which it is final, appealable,
etc.

 

These factors are surely to be noted. However, despite this, the utility
of informal guidance cannot be understated. It can be quite helpful and even
the limited assurance that the department / SEBI will generally act according
to the guidance would be helpful in most cases.

 

Case study of a recent informal guidance in the matter of Takeover
Regulations and Insider Trading

The case shows how relatively simple transactions can have several implications
under detailed and complex laws. This is in the matter of proposed transactions
by the promoters of HEG Limited (SEBI informal guidance dated 4th
June, 2020).

 

The core issues were relatively simple. Some of the promoters of a
listed company had dealt in the shares of such company in the market. Now, they
desired to transfer some shares among themselves. Such inter se transfer
would mean that the overall holding of the Promoter Group would remain the
same, even if the holdings of individual promoters could rise / fall.

 

However, this
proposal of inter se transfer raised several issues. The first related
to certain provisions in the SEBI insider trading regulations which prohibit
‘contra’ trades on specified insiders for six months. Thus, if such a person
has bought shares, he cannot sell the same for six months. And vice versa.
As stated earlier, some promoters had dealt in the shares and hence concern
arose whether there would be a bar on further transactions. The question thus
was whether such prohibition would apply to the whole Promoter Group or
only to those persons who had earlier traded in the shares. SEBI replied that
it would apply only to those who had traded in the shares and not to the whole
Promoter Group.

 

An incidental question was whether transactions inter se the
Promoters would attract the ‘trading window’ restrictions. Insiders are
prohibited from trading during the time when the ‘trading window’ is closed.
This is usually so when there is unpublished price sensitive information which
is very likely to be accessed by the insiders. SEBI replied that since the
transfer was within the Promoter Group where both parties could be said to be
aware and thus would make a conscious and informed decision, the transaction
was covered by a specific exception in the Regulations. Hence, such transfer
would not attract the prohibition.

 

The third and final question was whether the inter se transfer
would be exempt from open offer requirements? A person / group holding more
than 25% shares can acquire up to 5% shares in a financial year. If the
acquisitions are more than this limit, an open offer is required. Inter se
transfers are exempted, but subject to certain conditions. However, in the
present case it was stated that the proposed inter se transfer was less
than 5%. Subject to compliance with the other conditions, the reply was that
the proposed transfer would not attract the open offer requirements.

 

Thus, a simple proposed transaction that could have serious consequences
was resolved by clear guidance from SEBI. If the transactions are completed in
the manner described in the application, there is a reasonable, even if not
conclusive, assurance that SEBI will not take a different view and initiate
proceedings having serious repercussions.

 

SAT DECISIONS WHERE INFORMAL GUIDANCE HAS BEEN
EXAMINED

In Deepak Mehra vs. SEBI [2010] 98 SCL 126 (SAT-Mum.), a
question arose that in the context of a takeover transaction involving a
complex restructuring / issue of securities, would the requirements of open
offer be attracted? SEBI was approached for informal guidance and the relevant
department opined that, on the facts, the open offer requirement would be
attracted only at a later stage on conversion of securities. A shareholder
filed an appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) against such
informal guidance. SAT answered some basic questions on informal guidance.
Firstly, it described the nature of informal guidance and whether it can be
appealed against. It observed, ‘Clause 13 thereof also makes it clear that a
letter giving an informal guidance by way of interpretation of any provision of
law or fact should not be construed as a conclusive decision or determination
of those questions and that such an interpretation cannot be construed as an
order of the Board under section 15T of the Act… The informal guidance given by
the general manager is not an “order” which could entitle anyone to
file an appeal.’

 

Thus, the informal guidance is not a conclusive decision on the issues,
nor is it an order of SEBI.

 

There is also the case of Arbutus Consultancy LLP vs. SEBI [2017]
81 taxmann.com 30 (SAT–Mum.)
where an interesting point arose. SEBI had
given an informal guidance earlier and in the appeal before SAT, the appellant
sought to rely on it and claimed that SEBI could not depart from it. Several
questions arose. How much weightage should be given to an informal guidance by
SEBI in another case and also by SAT? Secondly, can SEBI give a different informal
guidance in another matter? And if so, can an appellant still claim that the
first informal guidance should be relied upon in his case? SAT held that an
informal guidance that is erroneous can be rejected by SEBI itself and, of
course, also by SAT. A mistake by an officer of SEBI cannot be taken advantage
of. And the fact that another informal guidance with a different view was
available should have been noted by the appellant.

 

CONCLUSION

Carefully used, and in the spirit in which the Scheme has been conceived,
informal guidance can be a useful method to resolve legal issues in a fairly
speedy manner and with a reasonable degree of assurance. Informal guidance
given in the past in other cases also provides a window to the mind of SEBI in
respect of certain issues. The possible pitfalls should, however, be noted.

 

It’s almost always possible
to be honest and positive

  
Naval Ravikant

 

Be willing to be a beginner every single morning

  Meister Eckhart

  

 

PENAL PROVISIONS OF FEMA AS ANALYSED BY COURTS

INTRODUCTION

The
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) is a law dealing with foreign
exchange in India with the objective of promoting the orderly development and
maintenance of the country’s foreign exchange market. FEMA, a civil law,
replaced the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 which provided for
criminal prosecution. While this very important law celebrated its 20th
anniversary this year, in the recent past several Court decisions have analysed
FEMA Regulations and laid down certain important propositions. Through this
article, an attempt has been made to look at some such important decisions and
the principles laid down by them when it comes to imposition of a penalty under
FEMA.

 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR LEVY OF PENALTY

Section
13(1) of FEMA levies a penalty for offences. It states that when any person
contravenes the Act or any regulation, notification, direction or order issued
in exercise of the powers under this Act, or contravenes any condition subject
to which an authorisation is issued by the RBI, he shall, upon adjudication, be
liable to a
penalty up to thrice the sum involved in such
contravention
where such amount is
quantifiable, or up to Rs. 2 lakhs where the amount is not quantifiable. Where
such contravention is a continuing one, a further penalty may be levied which
may extend to Rs. 5,000 for every day after the first day during which the
contravention continues.

 

Section
14 further provides that if any person fails to make full payment of the
penalty imposed on him u/s 13 within a period of 90 days from the date on which
the notice for payment of such penalty is served on him, he shall be liable to
civil imprisonment under this section. If the penalty is above Rs. 1 crore, the
detention period can extend up to three years and in all other cases up to six
months.

 

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT

In the
case of
Shailendra Swarup vs. ED, CA No. 2463/2014
(SC) dated 27th July, 2020
a penalty was levied on the company and its directors for import
violations under the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA).
One of the directors contested this penalty stating that he was a professional
and a non-executive director on the Board who was not in charge of day-to-day
affairs. The Supreme Court upheld his contention and held that for any action
under FERA the person charged must be responsible for the affairs of the
company. Merely because a person is a director he does not automatically become
liable. While this decision was under the FERA regime, it would be equally
useful under the FEMA. Section 42(1) of FEMA in relation to contraventions by
companies also states that every person who is in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty. Hence,
a blanket penalty notice by the Enforcement Directorate to all and sundry,
including independent directors, should be avoided.

 

Similarly,
in
M/s National Fertilisers Ltd. vs. ED, CRL.
M.C. 3003/2002 (Del.) dated 9th March 2016
, the Delhi High Court dealt with the issue (under the
erstwhile FERA) of a Government company making full advance payment for import
of certain chemicals without obtaining any prior permission of the Reserve Bank
of India. The Court held that to charge an officer for a default committed by a
company evidence must be brought on record to show that all the petitioners
were in charge and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the
time when the offence was committed. It held that the Memorandum and Articles
of Association of the company would have pinpointed as to who were the officers
in charge and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the time
of commission of the said offence. Only the Managing Director or the Executive
Director / Functional Directors are responsible for the conduct and management
of the business of the company. At best, persons having domain over funds or
those who instructed the authorised dealers could be construed to be guilty of
foreign exchange violations.

 

Again,
in
Narendra Singh vs. ED [2019] 111 taxmann.com
360 (Delhi)
it was held that while
as a broad proposition the Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution would not readily interfere with a show cause notice at the
stage of adjudication, this was not an inflexible rule, particularly in a case
where the foundational facts necessary for proceeding with such adjudication
were shown not to exist. In the case of each of the accused, it was shown that
they were only Non-Executive Directors of the accused company and, therefore,
not a person ‘in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business’.
Hence, the adjudication proceedings under FEMA were quashed.

 

However,
in
Suborno Bose vs. ED, CA No. 6267/2020 (SC)
dated 5th March, 2020
, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of penalty on an M.D. for a
continuing offence by a company. In this case, a penalty was levied on a
company and its M.D. for an offence u/s 10(6) of the FEMA, i.e., not
surrendering foreign exchange to the authorised person / bank within the time
permissible under the Act. In this case, it was alleged that the import of
goods for which the foreign exchange was procured and remitted was not
completed as the Bill of Entry remained to be submitted and the goods were kept
in the bonded warehouse and the company took no steps to clear the same. As a
result, the Court held that section 10(6) of the FEMA was clearly attracted
being a case of not using the procured foreign exchange for completing the
import procedure. Further, the company should have taken steps to surrender the
foreign exchange within the time specified in Regulation 6 of the
Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation,
Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000.
The Supreme Court concluded that an offence u/s 10(6) was
a continuing offence as long as the imported goods remained uncleared and the
obligation provided under the Regulations was not discharged. Thus, the
contravention would continue to operate until corrective steps were taken.
Accordingly, the person in charge of managing the affairs of the company would
be liable to corrective steps.

 

The
observations made by the Bombay High Court in
Shashank Vyankatesh Manohar vs. Union of India, 2014 (1)
Mh. L.J 838
are also very relevant.
Here, it was held that due caution and care must be taken before adjudicating a
penalty under FEMA, otherwise the noticee on failure to pay the penalty would
be presented with dire penal consequences of being imprisoned for six months,
apart from other liabilities and adverse consequences. Merely because the
imprisonment would be in a civil prison and not in a criminal prison would be
no consolation to the person who was not responsible for contravention of FEMA.
The Court held that since the provisions of section 42 of the Act were
in pari materia with the provisions of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla
and another (2005) 8 SCC 89,
were
required to be applied to FEMA cases also. That is why even in the case of a
person holding the position of M.D., he was not liable if he had no knowledge
of the contravention when the contravention took place, or if he had exercised
all due diligence to prevent the contravention of the Act. The liability was
thus cast on those persons who had something to do with the transactions
complained of. The conclusion was inevitable that the liability arises on
account of conduct, act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on
account of holding an office or a position in a company.

 

An
interesting penalty matter was considered by the Appellate Tribunal for SAFEMA,
FEMA, NDPS, PMLA and PBPT Act in the case of
M/s Jaipur IPL Cricket Pvt. Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED,
FPA-FE-9/Mum./2013 (AT-PMLA), dated 11th July, 2019.
In this case, the Enforcement Directorate had levied a
penalty u/s 13 of Rs. 98 crores (being thrice the sum involved of Rs. 33
crores) for violation of various FEMA Regulations in relation to Foreign Direct
Investment in the Rajasthan Royals IPL Franchisee.

 

The
Appellate Tribunal (AT) held that it was a settled principle of law that even
though proceedings initiated u/s 13 of FEMA did not result in criminal
conviction or sentence, the consequences were equally penal and disastrous.
Further, section 14 clearly provided that in case the penalty imposed was not
paid within the time period provided, it would result in civil imprisonment. It
held that a bare perusal of FEMA established that its provisions were onerous
in nature and wide in scope and statutes which imposed onerous obligations,
were wide in scope and ambit and envisaged penal consequences must be construed
strictly. It also considered section 42 of FEMA which governs the imposition of
penalty upon persons in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the company. In order to invoke the said provision,
two conditions were required to be satisfied cumulatively; firstly, it must be
established that the company has violated FEMA, and secondly, it must be
established that the person sought to be made liable to penalty was in charge
of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the
company at the time the contravention was committed and not conducted its
diligence in relation to the transaction. The burden of proof to establish and
substantiate both the above requirements for imposition of penalty u/s 42(1) of
FEMA was upon the Enforcement Directorate in the first instant. Thereafter, it
shifted to the private party who was liable to discharge the same.

 

The
proceedings under FEMA in which a penalty was sought to be imposed for
contravention of a statutory obligation were ‘
quasi criminal
proceedings’. Section 13 of FEMA was couched in discretionary terms and vested
the regulatory authorities with discretion to impose a penalty up to three
times the sum involved in the contravention. It noted that the imposition of
penalty in quasi criminal proceedings must be guided by the well-established principles of proportionality. Imposition of a penalty of Rs. 98.35 crores as against
the total value of remittances of Rs. 33.22 crores in respect of alleged
contraventions which could at best be treated as technical and venial was untenable
and unsustainable. The factors which weighed with the AT in imposition of
penalty were that ~ no loss has been caused to the exchequer; the remittances
had come into India and continued to remain in India; this was not a case where
foreign exchange has gone out of India; the remittances were utilised for the
purposes for which they were intended; no allegation of misutilisation of the
monies for extraneous purposes; entities which made the said remittances had
not gained any benefit whatsoever and instead had suffered considerable
financial detriment as shares having beneficial interest were not issued
against the inward remittances to the foreign investors for 11 years; the
country has not lost any revenue. Hence, considering all factors, the AT held
that imposition of an exorbitant penalty of Rs. 98.35 crores should be reduced
to Rs. 15 crores.

 

Conversely,
in
Tips Industries Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED
[2020] 113 taxmann.com 318 [(PMLA-AT), New Delhi]
the AT was faced with the issue of penalty on the M.D. of
a company for FEMA violations in relation to overseas direct investment in
foreign subsidiaries. It was the argument of the accused M.D. that he was not
responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company and that the adjudicating
authority had not been able to substantiate why he should be penalised. The AT
observed that Form ODA (seeking approval of the RBI for the overseas direct
investment) had been filed before the RBI along with a declaration and the same
was signed by the accused as Managing Director of the foreign company and the
Indian investing company. This was held to be evidence that he was indeed
responsible for the activities of the appellant company. Besides, neither the
company nor the MD was able to show any other document to prove that somebody
else was the person responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company.

 

The AT also dealt with the
issue of pre-deposit of the penalty amount in the case of
Google India (P) Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED [2020] 116
taxmann.com 622 (ATFFE – New Delhi).
In this
case, Google India entered into an agreement with Google Ireland and Google USA
under which, for a distributor fee, Google Ireland granted a right to it to
distribute / sell online advertisement space under the ‘Ad Words Program’ to
advertisers in India. The dues to Google Ireland and Google USA were
outstanding beyond a period of six months and hence permission of the AD Bank
was sought explaining the reasons for delay. The AD Bank, out of abundant
caution, sought permission of RBI for allowing the remittances in question. The
RBI permitted the AD Bank to allow the remittances. The said permissions were
granted from ‘the foreign exchange angle under the provisions of FEMA’.

 

The ED
held that this was tantamount to borrowing by the Indian company and it levied
a penalty of Rs. 5 crores on the Indian company and Rs. 20 lakhs on each of its
foreign directors. It opposed the delay and stated that RBI could not condone
it and the appellant would be guilty of breach of provisions of FEMA as the
same were not paid within the prescribed period of time.

 

It was
contended on behalf of the appellant that there were no FEMA violations as the
permissions were granted by the RBI only after considering the following
aspects ~ expressly requiring the AD Bank to verify the genuineness of the
reasons for delay and whether there was any pecuniary gain to the appellant; a
specific confirmation by the appellant that there was no pecuniary gain to it
and a confirmation by the appellant that the amounts to be paid were not
utilised for any other purpose and that there was no interest paid on the same.
It was further submitted that the RBI has not treated the two transactions as
ECB / deferred payment arrangements. It is also submitted that nothing contrary
has been discovered by the respondent after independent investigation. Thus,
the decision taken by the RBI was as per law and the question of violations of
any provisions does not arise.

 

The AT
relying on
LIC vs. Escorts Ltd.
[1986] 1 SCC 264
held that it
is a settled law that FEMA being a special act no authority has the
jurisdiction to reinterpret and / or restrict the permissions granted by the
RBI in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 3 read with section 11 of FEMA.
Further, the ED had no jurisdiction to reinterpret the terms of the agreement
between Google Ireland and Google India. It was settled law that the Court
should proceed on the basis that the apparent tenor of the agreement reflects
the real state of affairs –
UOI
vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
[1995] 76 ELT 481 (SC). Its prima
facie
view was that once the permission has been
granted by the RBI, the delay stood regularised and there were no violations of
the provisions of FEMA. The presumption was in favour of the appellant that RBI
must have been satisfied while condoning the delay. It held that the contention
by the ED that amounts due for more than six months automatically makes the
same a deferred payment arrangement / ECB was incorrect. A stringent law could
only be applied in the Master Circular on Imports where there was no such
condition mandated. Further, the circular expressly provided for settlement of
dues by the AD banks beyond a period of six months.

 

Hence,
it held that the appellants had
prima
facie
demonstrated that there was no violation of
the provisions of the FEMA / the Master Circular on Imports. Even if there was
a violation, then the RBI had regularised the same by granting the permissions
to settle the dues specifically from a ‘FEMA angle’. The RBI permission expressly
stated that the permission was issued from a foreign exchange angle under FEMA.
The limitation of the permission was only in respect of any other applicable
laws other than FEMA. The ED was not seeking to impose a penalty for violation
of any other laws. It concluded that in the light of the
prima facie case made out by the appellant, it would suffer hardship if asked to
deposit the penalty amount. The AT was of the opinion that the chances of
success of the appeal were more than of the failure of the appeal. Accordingly,
it stayed the payment of the penalty.

 

CONCLUSION

In
spite of being a 20-year-old law, FEMA is an evolving law since the
jurisprudence on it is taking shape only now. One reason for this is that often
cases under FEMA drag on, reaching finality after a long duration. It is
heartening to note that the judiciary has been taking a very balanced approach
towards cases under FEMA.

 

 

You may have a fresh start any moment you choose, for
this thing that we call ‘failure’ is not the falling down, but the staying down

  Mary Pickford

 

 

A man can only attain knowledge with the help of those
who possess it. This must be understood from the very beginning. One must learn
from him who knows

   George
Gurdjieff

WHETHER PRACTISING CAs CAN DEAL IN DERIVATIVES ON STOCK EXCHANGES

Chartered
Accountants who are in practice are not supposed to carry on any business
activity other than accounting professional activity. Reference must be made in
this regard to Part-I of the First Schedule of the Chartered Accountants Act,
1949 which deals with professional misconduct by CAs in practice; clause (11)
of the Act reads as follows:

 

The Chartered
Accountants Act, 1949

‘THE FIRST
SCHEDULE

[See Sections
21(3), 21A(3) and 22]

PART-I:
Professional misconduct in relation to chartered accountants in practice.

A Chartered
Accountant in practice shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct,
if he –

(1) to (10)
……………

(11) engages in
any business or occupation other than the profession of chartered accountants
unless permitted by the Council so to engage;

Provided that nothing contained herein shall disentitle a chartered
accountant from being a director of a company (not being a managing director or
a whole time director) unless he or any of his partners is interested in such
company as an auditor.’

 

Given this
background, an attempt will be made here to understand ‘Whether chartered
accountants in practice can have dealings in Derivatives listed on stock
exchanges.’

 

Let us first look
at section 43(5) of the Income Tax Act; sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the same
read as under:

‘Sec. 43(5) –

(a) to (c)
……………..

(d) an eligible transaction in respect of trading
in derivatives referred to in clause [(ac)] of section 2 of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956) carried out in a recognized stock
exchange; or

(e) an eligible transaction in respect of trading
in commodity derivatives carried out in a [recognized stock exchange] which is
chargeable to commodities transaction tax under Chapter VII of the Finance Act,
2013 (17 of 2013),

shall not be
deemed to be a speculative transaction.’

 

WHAT ARE
DERIVATIVES?

The term
‘Derivative’ indicates that it has no independent value, i.e., its value is
entirely ‘derived’ from the value of the underlying asset. The underlying asset
can be securities, commodities, bullion, currency, livestock or anything else.
In other words, Derivative means a forward, future, option or any other hybrid
contract of pre-determined fixed duration, linked for the purpose of contract
fulfilment to the value of a specified real or financial asset or to an index
of securities.

 

The definition of
Derivatives is specified u/s 2(ac) of the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956
and reads as under:

‘(ac)
“Derivative” includes –

 (A) a security derived from a debt instrument,
share, loan, whether secured or unsecured, risk instrument or contract for
difference or any other form of security;

 (B) a contract which derives its value from
the prices, or index of prices, of underlying securities.’

 

Whether
income / loss on dealings in Derivatives results in Income from Business

Since the issue of
Derivatives is laid down in section 43(5) of the Income Tax Act which falls
within the provisions of sections 28 to 44 which deal with ‘Income from
Business or Profession’, it seems implied that income / loss from dealing in
Derivatives shall form part of the ‘Income from Business’ and not any Other
Head of Income such as Income from Other Sources.

 

Reference is made to the ‘Guidance Note’ of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India on Tax Audit u/s 44AB of the Income Tax Act (Revised 2014
Edition), which contains a chapter dealing with determining the turnover or
gross receipt in respect of transactions in Derivatives / Future & Option. The
relevant paragraph 5.14 clause (b) of the said ‘Guidance Note’ u/s 44AB reads
as under:

 

‘5.14 –

(a)………….

(b) Derivatives,
futures and options: Such transactions are completed without the delivery of
shares or securities. These are also squared up by payment of differences. The
contract notes are issued for the full value of the asset purchased or sold but
entries in the books of accounts are made only for the differences. The
transactions may be squared up any time on or before the striking date. The
buyer of the option pays the premia. The turnover in such types of transactions
is to be determined as follows:

(i) The total of
favourable and unfavourable differences shall be taken as turnover.

(ii) Premium
received on sale of options is also to be included in turnover.

(iii) In respect
of any reverse trades entered, the difference thereon should also form part of
the turnover.’

 

This also added to
the understanding that income / loss from transactions of Derivatives, Futures
and Options shall likely be treated as Income from Business since the same is
considered in the ‘Guidance Note’ for the purpose of section 44AB which relates
to Income from Business or Profession only and not any other heads of income
under the Act.

 

In view of the
above, the following points emerge for consideration:

1.  Whether the income from the activity of a
chartered accountant in practice in respect of his investment dealing in
Derivatives listed on the stock exchange shall be treated as Income from
Business, in case there are multiple transactions of Derivatives undertaken by
a chartered accountant in a year.

2.  Whether a chartered accountant in practice can
otherwise invest in Derivatives listed on the stock exchange as part of his
investment activity.

3.  Although such income / loss on account of
dealings in Derivatives may be treated as Income from Business for the purpose
of Income Tax, but whether such income / loss can escape being treated as
Income from Business or Profession as per the guidelines of the Institute on
the subject, if any.

4.  Whether a chartered accountant in practice is
under obligation to seek permission of the Council of the Institute before
dealing in Derivatives.

 

To attain clarity
on the issue, the necessary clarification was sought from the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India and the Secretary, Ethical Standards Board of
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, clarified the position as
under:

 

‘In this regard,
please note that the Ethical Standards Board at its 148th Meeting
held on 13.06.2019 was of the view that “Derivative transaction on stock exchange is not any kind of
investment but it’s more likely a business prohibited under Clause (11) of Part
1 of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. Such kind of
practice is not permissible to members in practice.”’

 

In view of this, it
is submitted that the above clarification may be kept in mind by the chartered
accountants in practice in case they undertake transactions in Derivatives and
they should do so with the prior permission of the Council of the Institute so
as to protect them from any possible (charge of) professional misconduct under
the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

 

Practising chartered accountant as ‘Karta’ of Hindu Undivided Family

In case a chartered
accountant in practice undertakes dealings in Derivatives as the karta
of his HUF, such activity shall also not be permissible in view of the above
guidelines of the Ethical Board of  the
Institute.

 

In this regard
reference may be made to Part-1 of the First Schedule – Clause 11 of the Code
of Ethics
, Volume-III (Case Law Referencer) published by the Institute
which reads as under:

 

Practising CA as karta of Hindu Undivided Family

1.1.11(191) – A
member as a karta of his Hindu Undivided Family entered into a
partnership business for a short period with non-chartered accountants for
engaging in business other than the profession of chartered accountants without
prior permission of the Council.

Therefore, he was
found guilty in terms of clauses (4) and (11).

[R.D. Bhatt
vs. K.B. Parikh – Page 191 of Vol. VI (2) of Disciplinary Cases – Decided on 15th,
16th and 17th December, 1988].

 

1.1.11(192) – Where
a chartered accountant was karta of the HUF and was engaged in the
business of a firm without permission of the Council.

He was held guilty
of professional misconduct.

[V. Krishnamoorthy vs. T.T.
Krishnaswami – Page 192 of Vol. VII (2) of Disciplinary Cases – Council’s
decisions
dated 27th to 29th September, 1992].

 

1.1.11(193) – Where
a chartered accountant acted as karta of a Hindu Undivided Family
without taking prior permission of the Council.

It was held that he
was inter alia guilty of professional misconduct.

[B.L. Asawa,
Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank, Delhi vs. P.K. Garg – Page 728 of Vol. IX
– 2A – 21(4) of Disciplinary Cases – Council’s decisions dated 16th
to 18th September, 2003].

 

Clause (4) be read with Authority of the Council as contained in
Clause (11)

These guidelines of
the Ethical Board of the Institute are self-explanatory and may be kept in mind
by chartered accountants in practice who carry on dealings in Derivatives as karta
of and on behalf of their HUF.

 

Applicability to other professionals and Government servants

In case the same
analogy is extended to other professionals, such as doctors in practice or
advocates in practice, these categories of professionals may also need to be
vigilant about it. It may not be out of place to point out that even Government
servants who are not otherwise eligible to carry on any business need to be
cautious about dealings in Derivatives in view of the above clarification by
the Institute.

 

CONCLUSION

This article has
been written with the intention of bringing this issue to the notice of the
fraternity of chartered accountants so that while undertaking any transactions
/ dealings in Derivatives either in their individual capacity or as the karta of their Hindu Undivided Family, they may not be caught
on the wrong foot vis-à-vis the Ethical Rules of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India; they should seek the prior permission of the
Council of the Institute as laid down in Part-1 of the First Schedule of the
Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 before carrying out dealings in Derivatives.

 

The Idea of Dharma and Adharma

 

Dharma is both that which we hold to and that which
holds together our inner and outer activities. In its primary sense it means a
fundamental law of our nature which secretly conditions all our activities, and
in this sense each being, type, species, individual, group has its own dharma.
Secondly, there is the divine nature which has to develop and manifest in us,
and in this sense dharma is the law of the inner workings by which that grows
in our being. Thirdly, there is the law by which we govern our outgoing thought
and action and our relations with each other so as to help best both our own
growth and that of the human race towards the divine ideal.…Dharma is all that
helps us to grow into the divine purity, largeness, light, freedom, power,
strength, joy, love, good, unity, beauty, and against it stands its shadow and
denial, all that resists its growth and has not undergone its law, all that has
not yielded up and does not will to yield up its secret of divine values, but
presents a front of perversion and contradiction, of impurity, narrowness,
bondage, darkness, weakness, vileness, discord and suffering and division, and
the hideous and the crude, all that man has to leave behind in his progress.
This is the adharma, not-dharma, which strives with and seeks to overcome the
dharma, to draw backward and downward, the reactionary force which makes for
evil, ignorance and darkness

   Sri
Aurobindo

(Essays on the Gita, CWSA, Vol. 19, p.172)

 

 

FRONT-RUNNING: SEBI RUNS EVEN FASTER AFTER PERPETRATORS

BACKGROUND

A recent order
of SEBI (dated 7th August, 2020 in the matter of dealers of Reliance
Securities Limited) on front-running is noteworthy on several grounds. Firstly,
it has been rendered in less than four months after the alleged front-running
took place. The transactions in question took place from December, 2019 to
April, 2020; SEBI completed the preliminary examination which, as we shall see,
involved numerous aspects and passed its order on 7th August, 2020.

 

Secondly, as the
order shows, a lot of detailed detective work has been carried out wherein the
alleged connections between more than 25 parties have been detected and
demonstrated. The connections are in various ways. They are through
transactions in bank accounts, they are through calls made to each other, there
are social media connections and also through family relations between the
parties concerned. SEBI then passed an interim order banning from the capital
markets the parties allegedly involved in the front-running and also ordered
them to deposit the profits made until a final order has been passed.

 

Front-running
cases, like insider trading, are notoriously difficult to detect. Investigation
and demonstration of guilt is even tougher. In view of this, the meticulously
detailed order at a preliminary stage is credit-worthy.

 

This order is in
the matter of certain dealers of Reliance Securities Limited in respect of
transactions by Reliance in their capacity as stockbrokers for Tata Absolute
Return Fund, a scheme of Tata AIF, a SEBI-registered Alternate Investment Fund
(‘Tata Fund’). The interim order finds these parties, along with various
associated persons, to have been involved in front-running and allegedly making
profits by trading ahead of the large orders of Tata Fund.

 

WHAT IS FRONT-RUNNING?

There have been
several cases of front-running in the past and in respect of which SEBI has
passed orders. However, earlier what amounted to front-running and even whether
it was a violation of securities laws, was in question. Indeed, the Securities
Appellate Tribunal had even held that front–running did not amount to violation
of the securities laws then existing [e.g., Dipak Patel (2012) 116 SCL
581 (SAT)], [Sujit Karkera (2013) 118 SCL 84 (SAT)].
However, the
Supreme Court decision in the case of SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldeobhai Patel
[(2018) 207 Comp Cas 416 (SC)]
laid the matter more or less to rest and
held that it was a violation of specified provisions of the securities laws.
Further, the relevant clause in the SEBI PFUTP Regulations has also been
amended to explicitly include front-running as it is generally understood.
Hence, today, it is more or less well settled that front-running is a violation
punishable under the securities laws.

 

However, there
is no specific definition in the Securities Laws of the term ‘front-running’. There
are clauses that do describe what is understood as front-running. There are
also several other dictionary definitions and also a fairly detailed
description in the decision of the Supreme Court. For guidance, although in a
different context, there is also a definition of front-running in a SEBI
Circular (dated 25th May, 2012).

 

Front-running is
also known as trading ahead. It essentially means that, armed with valuable
information of a proposed large transaction which would result in a change in
the price of a security, a person, in breach of trust, trades before such a
transaction takes place and makes personal illicit profits. To take an example,
a stockbroker has been given an order to buy a very large quantity of shares of
a particular company by his client. The experienced stockbroker knows that this
order will result in a rise in the price of that scrip in the market. He then
proceeds to first buy for himself these shares at the then prevailing price.
After doing this, he places the order of his client at the increased price.
Simultaneously, he sells the shares that he has just acquired, at this higher
price. The result is that his client ends up paying a higher price for the
shares – and the difference is pocketed by the stockbroker.

 

This is breach
of trust of the client. This also affects faith in the markets and its
integrity because, if permitted, there would be concerns that such malpractices
can happen on a regular basis and cause losses to the public. SEBI has alleged
in this case that front-running harms not just the client but the market and
the public in general.

 

Front-running is
thus similar to insider trading. In insider trading, a person in possession of
price-sensitive information which has been given to him in trust, abuses such
trust and trades and makes a profit for himself. So also in front-running.
However, interestingly, there are comprehensive regulations for insider trading
that define various terms, have several deeming provisions, etc. This, at least
in theory, should help inside traders to be caught and punished. It is another
thing that insider trading is still notoriously rampant and yet difficult to
catch. Front-running, in comparison, has just one specific provision under the
PFUTP Regulations. There are no definitions, no deeming provisions, no
explanations of how persons may be deemed to have been connected as insiders,
etc. In this context, the SEBI order in the present case is thus a good case
study for all on how the violation has been established, albeit by an
interim order.

 

WHAT ARE THE ALLEGED FINDINGS OF THIS
CASE?

As discussed
earlier, the Tata Fund used to carry out trades through its stockbrokers,
Reliance Securities Ltd. The orders were large and expectedly would result in a
change in the price of the ordered scrip. A large purchase order would thus be
expected to result in rise in prices, and vice versa in case of an order
of sale. The Fund also dealt heavily in derivatives where, again, the impact of
the orders would be similar.

 

Front-running in
such a circumstance, as the order also explains in detail, follows two
strategies. In case of a purchase order, it is the Buy-Buy-Sell (BBS) strategy.
In case of a sale transaction, it is the Sell-Sell-Buy (SSB) strategy. If the
Fund had placed a buy order, the front-runner would buy ahead, and then place
the order of purchase for the Fund. Against such purchase order of the Fund,
the front-runner would sell the shares bought by him earlier.

 

SEBI found
through its surveillance that transactions suspiciously of the nature of
front-running were taking place. An analysis of the data followed and the
various parties who allegedly did the front-running were investigated. Their
connections with the dealers of the stockbroker who had executed the
transactions of the Fund were looked into by checking the bank transactions,
inquiry with the brokers, their phone records and even their Facebook accounts.
Personal connections and relations were also looked into. It was established
that three such dealers had connections directly or indirectly with various
parties who had actually traded ahead of the orders of the Fund. This was seen
in the equity segment as well as the derivative segment. The timing of these
orders and how they matched with the orders of the Fund were analysed. Analysis
was also done of the volume of trading of such persons, particularly in the
derivatives segment before and during the period when such alleged
front-running took place. It was alleged that a significant proportion of the
transactions of such parties matched with those of the Fund and a large amount
of profit was made in a short time by these parties.

 

In view of these
findings, SEBI passed an interim order and prohibited the parties from dealing
in or being associated with the securities market.

 

SEBI also
ordered these parties to deposit the profits allegedly made from front-running
– of nearly Rs. 4.50 crores – pending further investigation, a hearing to the
parties and a final order. The parties have been required to deposit this
amount within 15 days of the order. Their assets have also been frozen.

 

SOME ISSUES IN THE ORDER

As stated
earlier, the order is credit-worthy on several grounds. It has detected, even
in an interim way and through an ex parte order, a difficult case of
front-running. Not only this, the speed of detection and investigation is indeed
very fast. It is expected to act as a warning to those who indulge in such
activities.

 

However, there
are some concerns, too. To begin with, the connections alleged are on
relatively flimsy basis. A few phone calls between the dealer and the alleged
front-runner have been held sufficient to establish a connection. Transfers of
funds of relatively small amounts between parties have also become the basis of
the connection. What is surprising is that even being a Facebook friend is seen
as a connection. While checking the Facebook profiles of persons is surely good
use of modern technology to go behind the scenes, it is also unrealistic. It is
very common for people active on social media to have hundreds or even
thousands of so-called Facebook friends. Facebook, Twitter and even LinkedIn
are generally used for exchange of information and ideas and do not necessarily
mean that there is also an off-line connection between the parties.

 

Interestingly,
this is not the first time SEBI has used online connections to allege
‘connections’. In another case of alleged front-running, SEBI had noticed a
‘connection’ through a matrimonial site and passed an interim order (dated 4th
December, 2019). There have been other cases, too, where a Facebook connection
has been relied upon to allege ‘connections’.

 

The connection
alleged on account of the calls made between parties may also not be sufficient
to uphold such serious allegations. Unless the calls are timed with the
transactions it may be difficult to say that this meant such a connection that
parties are engaged in front-running together. In this case, of course, SEBI
has also tabulated the data of transactions and alleged that the timing also
matched.

 

Then there is
the connection alleged on account of financial transactions. Being an interim
order, it appears that no further information has been collected as to the
reason for entering into such transactions. It may be possible that such
financial transactions may be for genuine reasons having no connection with
front-running and also not establishing any connection sufficient for
front-running.

 

Nevertheless,
all these parties have been debarred even in the interim by this order. They
have been made to deposit a very large sum of money being alleged profits of
front-running. Their assets are also barred from sale, etc.

 

There is another
angle here. As stated, at least on first impression, the basis for alleging
connections is shaky. What is possible is that in the future such parties may
ensure that even such connections are not there, or not evident. After all,
these are white-collar crimes committed by educated people having a level of
sophistication. Indeed, if such flimsy connections are relied on, it may mean
that many persons perpetrating front-running would not come under the radar.

 

To conclude,
being an interim order, it may happen that the explanation given by the parties
may result in it being set aside either wholly or in part. Nevertheless, this
order is a wake-up call and a warning to persons operating the markets that
SEBI by its market surveillance collects and analyses information that may
throw up white-collar frauds. The fact that such white-collar frauds have been
tackled in a timely manner should make one hope that other less sophisticated
orders would also be caught in larger numbers.

 

 

Do not wait; the time will never
be ‘just right.’
Start where you stand and work with whatever tools you may have at your
command, and better tools will be found as you go along

 
George Herbert

 

LAW OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO WITNESSES TO A WILL

INTRODUCTION

One of the most crucial ingredients for a valid Will is the fact of it
being witnessed by two attesting witnesses. Many a Will has been found wanting
for the fact of improper attestation. However, what would be the state of a
Will where both the attesting witnesses are also dead and when it is being
proved in Court (say in a probate petition)? Would the Will suffer for want of
attestation or could it yet be considered valid? The Supreme Court was faced
with this interesting issue in the case of V. Kalyanaswamy (D) by LRs vs.
L. Bakthavatsalam (D) by LRs, Civil Appeal Nos. 1021-1026/2013, order dated 17th
July, 2020.
Let us analyse this case and other related judgments on
this issue.

 

FACTS AND THE ISSUE

In the Kalyanaswamy case (Supra) in the Supreme Court, both
the attesting witnesses to the Will were not alive. One of them was an
Income-tax practitioner and the other a doctor. The questions framed by the
Supreme Court for its consideration were as follows:

(a) When both the attesting witnesses are dead, is it required that the
attestation has to be proved by the two witnesses? Or

(b) Is it sufficient to prove that the attestation of at least one of the
attesting witnesses is in his handwriting and proving the testator’s signature?

 

Before we analyse the Court’s findings it would be worthwhile to understand
the requirements of witnessing a Will and the manner of proving the same.

 

WITNESSING A WILL

The mode of making a Will in India is provided in section 63 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925. This Act applies to Wills by all persons other than
Muslims. For a Will to be valid under this Act, its execution by a testator
must be attested by at least two witnesses. The manner of witnessing a Will is
as is provided in section 63 of the Indian Succession Act which requires that
it is attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has:

(a) seen the testator sign the Will; or

(b)   received from the testator a
personal acknowledgement of his signature.

 

It is trite that the witnesses need not know the contents of the Will. All
that they need to see is the testator and each other signing the Will ~ nothing
more and nothing less!

 

MANNER OF EVIDENCE

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the
Evidence Act’) explains how a document that is required to be attested must be
proved to be executed. In the case of a Will, if the attesting witness is alive
and capable of giving evidence, then the Will can be proved only if one of the
attesting witnesses is called for proving its execution. Thus, in the case of a
Will, the witness must be examined in Court and he must confirm that he indeed
attested the execution of that Will.

 

WHAT IF WITNESSES CANNOT BE FOUND?

However, section 69 of the Act provides that if no such attesting witness
can be found, it must be proved that the attestation by at least one of the
witnesses is in his own handwriting and that the signature of the person
executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Thus, evidence
needs to be produced which can confirm the signature of at least one of the
attesting witnesses to the Will as well as that of the testator of the Will.

 

The Madras High Court in N. Durga Bai vs. Mrs. C.S. Pandari Bai,
Testamentary Original Suit No. 22 of 2010, order dated 27th
February, 2017,
has explained that u/s 69 of the Evidence Act, two
conditions are required to be proved for valid proof of the Will, i.e., the
person who has acquaintance with the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses and also the person executing the document should identify both such
signatures before the court. In that case, a person had identified the
signature of the testator. However, his evidence clearly showed that he was not
acquainted with the signature of both the attesting witnesses. Therefore, the
High Court held there was no compliance of section 69.

 

The Supreme Court in Kalyanaswamy (Supra)
explained that the attesting witness not being found refers to a variety of
situations ~ it would cover a case of an incapacity on account of any physical
illness; a case where the attesting witnesses are dead; the attesting witness
could be mentally incapable / insane. Thus, the word ‘found’ is capable of
comprehending a situation as one where the attesting witness, though physically
available, is incapable of performing the task of proving the attestation and,
therefore, it becomes a situation where he is not found.

 

In Master Chankaya vs. State and others, Testamentary Case No.
40/1999, order dated 12th September, 2019
the Delhi High
Court explained that it was not the case of the petitioner that the attesting
witnesses could not be found. In fact, the petitioner had throughout contended
that he was aware of their whereabouts and assured the Court that he would
produce them before the Court. Later, he dropped the said witnesses on the
ground that their whereabouts were not known and he was therefore unable to
produce them. The Court held that the petitioner did not exhaust all the
remedies for producing the witnesses before it. The petitioner could have
resorted to issuance of a summons to the witnesses under Order 16 Rule 10 of
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the purpose of seeking their appearance. No
such assistance was taken from the Court and hence section 69 could not
automatically be invoked. Thus, all possible remedies must be exhausted before
resorting to this section.

 

The Calcutta High Court in Amal Sankar Sen vs. The Dacca Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. (in liquidation), AIR 1945 Cal 350,
observed:

 

‘…In order that Section 69, Evidence Act, may be applied, mere taking out
of the summons or the service of summons upon an attesting witness or the mere
taking out of warrant against him is not sufficient. It is only when the
witness does not appear even after all the processes under Order 16 Rule 10,
which the Court considered to be fit and proper had been exhausted, that the
foundation will be laid for the application of Section 69, Evidence Act………In
order that S.69, Evidence Act, may be applied ………….the plaintiff must move the
Court for process under Order 16 Rule 10 Civil P.C., when a witness summoned by
him has failed to obey the summons…’

 

Further, in Hare Krishna Panigrahi vs. Jogneswar Panda & Ors.,
AIR 1939 Cal 688,
the Calcutta High Court observed that the section
required that the witness was actually produced before the court and then if he
denied execution or his memory failed or if he refused to prove or turned
hostile, other evidence could be admitted to prove execution. If, however, the
witness was not before the court at all and the question of denying or failing
to recollect the execution of the document did at all arise… the plaintiff
simply took out a summons against the witness and nothing further was done
later on. The court held that in all such cases it was the duty of the
plaintiff to exhaust all the processes of the court in order to compel the
attendance of any one of the attesting witnesses, and when the production of
such witnesses was not possible either legally or physically, the plaintiff
could avail of the provisions of section 69 of the Evidence Act.

 

In this respect, the Supreme Court in Babu Singh and others vs. Ram
Sahai alias Ram Singh (2008) 14 SCC 754
has explained that section 69
of the Evidence Act would apply where the witness is either dead or out of the
jurisdiction of the court, or kept out of the way by the adverse party, or
cannot be traced despite diligent search. Only in that event the Will may be
proved in the manner indicated in section 69, i.e., by examining witnesses who
were able to prove the handwriting of the testator. The burden of proof then
may be shifted to others. The Court further propounded that while in ordinary
circumstances a Will must be proved keeping in view the provisions of section
63 of the Indian Succession Act and section 68 of the Evidence Act, in the
extraneous circumstances laid down in section 69 of the Evidence Act, the
strict proof of execution and attestation stands relaxed. However, in this case
the signature and handwriting, as contemplated in section 69, must be proved.

 

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court in the Kalyanaswamy
case (Supra) considered the question whether (despite the fact
that both the attesting witnesses were dead), the matter to be proved u/s 69 of
the Evidence Act was the same as a matter to be proved u/s 68 of the same Act?
In other words, section 68 of the Act mandatorily requires that in the case of
a Will at least one of the attesting witnesses must not only be examined to
prove attestation by him, but he must also prove the attestation by the other
attesting witness. The court held that while it was open to prove the Will and
the attestation by examining a single attesting witness, it was incumbent upon
him to prove attestation not only by himself but also the attestation by the
other attesting witness.

 

The Apex Court agreed with the principle that section 69 of the Evidence
Act manifests a departure from the requirement embodied in section 68. In the
case of a Will, when an attesting witness is available, the Will is to be
proved by examining him. He must not only prove that the attestation was done
by him, but he must also prove the attestation by the other attesting witness.
This is subject to the situation which is contemplated in section 71 of the Evidence
Act which allows other evidence to be adduced in proof of the Will among other
documents where the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the
execution of the Will.

 

Section 71 of the Evidence Act states that if the
attesting witness to a document denies or does not recollect the execution of
that document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. The Apex Court
held that the fate of the transferee or a legatee under a document (which is
required by law to be attested), is not placed at the mercy of the attesting
witness and the law enables corroborative evidence to be effected for the
document despite denial of the execution of the document by the attesting
witness.

 

One of the important rules laid down by the Supreme Court is that in a case
covered u/s 69 of the Evidence Act, the requirement pertinent to section 68 of
the same Act (that the attestation by both the witnesses is to be proved by
examining at least one attesting witness), is dispensed with. In a case covered
u/s 69 what was to be proved as far as the attesting witness was concerned was
that the attestation of one of the attesting witness was in his handwriting.
The language of the section was clear and unambiguous. Section 68 of the
Evidence Act contemplated attestation of both attesting witnesses to be proved
but that was not the requirement in section 69.

 

The Court also dealt with another aspect about section 69 of the Evidence
Act. Section 69 spoke about proving the Will in the manner provided therein.
The word ‘proved’ was defined in section 3 of the Evidence Act as follows:

 

‘Proved. – A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.’

 

According to the Supreme Court, the question to be asked was whether having
regard to the evidence before it, the Court could believe the fact as proved.
The Court held that in a case where there was evidence which appeared to
conform to the requirement u/s 69, the Court was not relieved of its burden to
apply its mind to the evidence and it had to find whether the requirements of
section 69 were proved. In other words, the reliability of the evidence or the
credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the Court to still ponder over.
In this case, one of the witnesses was an Income-tax practitioner and the other
was a doctor. Both of them were respectable professionals who were well known
to the testator and there was no reason to doubt their credibility. Applying
these principles, the Supreme Court found that based on external evidence
before it, the signature of one of the attesting witnesses and the testator
were proved.

 

The Court also considered the physical and mental
capacity of the testator to make a valid Will. It held that as far as his
health was concerned, it was well settled that the requirement of sound
disposing capacity was not to be confused with physical well-being. A person
who has had a physical ailment may not automatically be robbed of his sound
disposing capacity. The fact that a person was afflicted with a physical
illness or that he was in excruciating pain would not deprive him of his
capacity to make a Will. What was important was whether he was conscious of
what he was doing and whether the Will reflected what he had chosen to decide.
In this case, the testator was suffering from cancer of the throat but there
was nothing to indicate in the evidence that he was incapable of making up his
own mind in the matter of leaving a Will behind. The fact that he was being fed
by a tube could hardly have deprived him of his capacity to make a Will.

 

Accordingly, the Court opined that the requirements of section 69 were
fulfilled and, hence, the Will was a valid Will.

 

CONCLUSION

A Will is a very important, if not the most
important, document which a person may execute. Selecting an appropriate
witness to the Will is equally important. Some suggestions in this respect are
selecting a relatively younger witness. Further, one should consider having
respectable professionals, businessmen, etc., as witnesses so that their
credibility is not doubted. As far as possible, have people who know the
testator well enough. In the event that both the witnesses predecease the
testator, he must make a new Will with new witnesses. Always remember, that all
precautions should be taken to ensure that a Will should live longer than the
testator!

 

BENEFITS FOR SMPs UNDER MSME ACT & OTHER STATUTES

The
Chartered Accountants in public practice spread across India are generally
categorised as Small and Medium Practitioners (SMP). As per ICAI statistics,
almost 97% of the CA firms in India are sole proprietorships or partnership
firms with up to five partners. This category forms the backbone of the
profession in India catering to a vast number of entities.

 

The
ICAI’s Ethical Standards Board in a recent decision has clarified that ‘A CA
firm may register itself on Udyog Aadhar, a web portal of the Ministry of
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises’. Accordingly, the SMP CA firms can avail
the various benefits available to the MSME units by registering themselves
under ‘UDYAM’ (earlier Udyog Aadhar).

 

The
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act was notified in
2006 to address policy and practical issues affecting MSMEs as well as the
coverage and investment ceiling of the sector.

 

Many CAs
do not register as MSMEs due to lack of familiarity with the various benefits
and support made available by the government for the sector. The authors have
attempted to summarise in this article the key benefits available to SMPs.

 

CLASSIFICATION OF MICRO, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTERPRISES

 

The
revised classification of MSME’s applicable w.e.f. 1st July, 2020
for Manufacturing and Service Enterprises is as follows:

 

Micro

Small

Medium

Investment in Plant & Machinery (for manufacturing entities) or
Equipment (for service entities) not more than

Rs. 1
crore

Rs. 10
crores

Rs. 50
crores

 

AND

Annual turnover not more than

Rs. 5 crores

Rs. 50 crores

Rs. 250 crores

 

REGISTRATION OF MSME (UDYAM)

 

Registration
under the MSME Act, 2006 will be called  Udyam
Registration w.e.f. 1st July, 2020 and a dedicated web portal has
been made available for registration at the following web address:
https://udyamregistration.gov.in.

 

The
following are important features of the new registration process:

 

* The
MSME registration process is fully online, paperless and based on
self-declaration.

* No
documents or proofs are required to be uploaded for registering as an MSME.

* No fees
are payable for registration.

* Aadhaar
number is mandatory for obtaining Udyam Registration (Aadhaar of
proprietor / partner / karta / authorised signatory).

* PAN and
GSTIN are mandatory for Udyam Registration from 1st April, 2021.

* PAN and
GST-linked details on investment and turnover of enterprises will be taken
automatically from government data bases.

*
Registration of entities not having either PAN or GSTIN will be cancelled
w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.

* A
registration certificate will be issued which will have a dynamic QR Code from
which the details about the enterprise can be accessed.

* All
existing enterprises registered under EM–Part-II or Udyog Aadhar shall register
again
on the Udyam Registration portal on or after 1st July,
2020. All enterprises registered till 30th June, 2020 shall be
reclassified in accordance with this Notification.

* The
existing enterprises registered prior to 30th June, 2020 and not
having registered under Udyam shall continue to be valid only for the
period up to 31st March, 2021.

 

KEY BENEFITS FOR SMPs UNDER THE MSMED ACT AND OTHER STATUTES

 

1.
Protection against delayed payments to Micro & Small Enterprises (MSEs)

 

The MSMED
Act, 2006 gives protection to MSME-registered entities against delay in
payments from buyers.
Further, the MSME’s have right of interest on delayed payment through
conciliation and arbitration and settlement of disputes to be done in minimum
time.

 

  • If any micro or small
    enterprise that has MSME registration supplies any goods or services, then
    the buyer is required to make payment on or before the date agreed upon
    between the buyer and the micro or small enterprise.
  •  In case there is
    no payment date on the agreement, then the buyer is required to make
    payment within 15 days of acceptance of goods or services.
  • Further, in any case,
    a payment due to a micro or small enterprise cannot exceed 45 days from
    the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.
  • In case of failure by
    the buyer to make payment on time, the buyer is required to pay compound
    interest with monthly interest rests to the supplier on that amount from
    the agreed date of payment or 15 days of acceptance of goods or services.
  •  The penal
    interest
    chargeable for delayed payment to an MSME enterprise is three
    times the bank rate
    notified by the Reserve Bank of India. Such
    interest is also not a tax-deductible expense under the Income-tax Act.
  • Further, as mentioned
    in section 22 of the MSMED Act, 2006, where any buyer is required to get
    his annual accounts audited under any law for the time being in force,
    such buyer shall furnish additional information in his annual statement of
    accounts regarding the outstanding principal and interest payable to MSME
    enterprises.

 

MSME
units can access the MSME SAMADHAAN portal
(https://samadhaan.msme.gov.in/) for prompt settlement of any disputes relating
to delay in payment or interest.

 

2.  Credit Guarantee Scheme for Micro & Small
Enterprises (CGTMSE)

 

  • Credit guarantee for
    loans up to Rs. 2 crores, without collateral and third-party guarantee.
  • New and existing Micro
    and Small Enterprises engaged in manufacturing or service activity are
    eligible borrowers under this scheme.
  • Borrowers need to
    conduct a market analysis and prepare a business plan containing relevant
    information, such as business model, promoter profile, projected
    financials, etc. and submit the loan application which is sanctioned as
    per the bank’s policy. After the loan is sanctioned, the bank applies to
    the CGTMSE authority and obtains the guarantee cover.
  • Guarantee coverage
    ranges from 85% (Micro Enterprise up to Rs. 5 lakhs) to 75% (others).
  • 50% coverage is for
    retail activity.

Detailed
information and application
can be obtained from https://www.cgtmse.in/

 

3.
Interest Subvention Scheme for MSMEs – 2018

  • 2% interest subvention
    on fresh or incremental loans, maximum up to Rs. 1 crore, to MSMEs.
  • This interest relief
    will be calculated at two percentage points per annum (2% p.a.), on outstanding
    balance from time to time from the date of disbursal / drawl or the date
    of notification of this scheme, whichever is later, on the incremental or
    fresh amount of working capital sanctioned or incremental or new term loan
    disbursed by eligible institutions.
  • Incremental / fresh
    term loan or incremental / fresh working capital extended from 2nd
    November, 2018 by any scheduled commercial banks, NBFCs, RRBs, UCBs
    (scheduled and non-scheduled) and DCCBs would be covered under the scheme.
  • SIDBI shall act as a
    nodal agency for the purpose of channelling of interest subvention to the
    various lending institutions through their nodal office.
  • MSMEs already availing
    interest subvention under any of the schemes of the State / Central
    government are not eligible under the scheme.

 

Detailed
information about the scheme can be obtained from:
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/125ISCUR72A9B5ADE83345F9A47410967A83ED27.PDF

Detailed
information and application can be obtained from
https://sidbi.in/files/circulars/ISS-for-MSMEs,-2018—Circular-and FAQs.pdf

 

4.
Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme – Atmanirbhar Bharat Mission 2020

 

The
Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme, worth Rs. 3 lakh crores, was launched
as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Mission on 20th May, 2020. The
scheme provides credit relief to MSMEs facing hardships due to coronavirus
pandemic-triggered lockdowns.

 

In a
pragmatic mid-scheme assessment, the government on 1st August, 2020
has expanded the eligibility criteria for the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee
Scheme (ECLGS) beyond MSMEs to include ‘individuals who take loans for business
purpose’. With the eligibility expansion, Chartered Accountants, who
have taken loans for their professional needs, will be eligible for credit
under the special credit guarantee scheme which was earlier aimed to benefit
medium and small enterprises.

 

KEY FEATURES

 

  • All MSME borrower
    accounts with outstanding credit of up to Rs. 25 crores as on 29th
    February, 2020 which were less than or equal to 60 days past due as on
    that date, i.e., regular, SMA 0 and SMA 1 accounts, and with an annual
    turnover of up to Rs. 100 crores, would be eligible for Guaranteed
    Emergency Credit Line (GECL) funding under the scheme.
  • The amount of funding
    shall be either in the form of additional working capital term loans (in
    case of banks and FIs), or additional term loans (in case of NBFCs).
  • Funding would be up to
    20% of their entire outstanding credit up to Rs. 25 crores as on 29th
    February, 2020.
  • The entire funding
    shall be provided with a 100% credit guarantee.
  • Tenor of loan under
    the scheme shall be four years with moratorium period of one year on the
    principal amount.
  • No guarantee fee shall
    be charged.
  • Interest rates under
    the scheme shall be capped at 9.25% for banks and FIs, and at 14% for
    NBFCs.

 

5. Trade Receivables
Discounting System (TReDS)

 

  • TReDS is a digital
    platform for MSMEs to auction / discount their trade receivables at
    competitive rates through online bidding by financiers.
  • The system, which is
    accessible online through three exchanges, was launched to ensure that
    suppliers are credited their due receivables in a timely manner.
  • The system is
    initiated when a transaction is conducted between the supplier and buyer.
  • The receivable is
    logged into the system by the supplier.
  • Receivables are funded
    by financiers through a bidding process.
  • Only the supplier is
    able to view all the bids placed by different financiers. When the
    supplier selects the best bid, the amount is received within two to three
    business days from the financier.
  • On the regular due date,
    the due amount is debited from the buyer and transferred to the financier.
  • The objective is to
    address the critical needs of MSMEs:

(i)
Promptly finance trade receivables, and (ii) Financing trade receivables based
on buyers’ credit rating.

 

TReDS has
been licensed to three exchanges:

 

(1)
Receivables Exchange of India Ltd. (RXIL):
A joint venture between
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and National Stock Exchange
of India Limited (NSE).

https://www.rxil.in/AboutTreds/Treds

(2)       Invoicemart: Promoted by A TReDS Ltd.
(a joint venture between Axis Bank and mjunction services).

https://www.invoicemart.com

(3)       M1Xchange: Promoted by Mynd Solutions
Private Limited

M1xchange:
https://www.m1xchange.com/treds.php

 

Detailed
information available at:
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/TREDSG031214.pdf

 

6. Public
Procurement Policy from MSME

 

  • The Public Procurement
    Policy for Micro and Small Enterprises (MSME) Order, 2012 has mandated every
    Central Ministry / Department / PSU to procure minimum 25% of the annual
    value of goods or services and certain reserved items from Micro and Small
    Enterprises.
  • No fees for procuring
    tender document or furnishing earnest money; and, in certain cases, price
    adjustment also permissible for MSEs to the extent of 15% to match lowest
    bid in tender.
  • The MSME SAMBANDH is
    the Public Procurement Portal launched by the Central Government for the
    MSMEs to monitor the implementation of the public procurement from MSEs by
    Central Public Sector Enterprises (sambandh.msme.gov.in).

 

7.
Reimbursement of ISO Certification

 

  • All registered Micro
    and Small Industries can avail an exemption of all expenses incurred for
    obtaining ISO 9000, ISO 14001 and HACCP certifications.
  •  It includes 75%
    of the certification expenses up to a maximum of Rs. 75,000 to each unit
    as one-time reimbursement.
  • Scheme applicable only
    to those MSEs which have acquired Quality Management Systems (QMS) / ISO
    9001 and / or Environment Management Systems (EMS) / ISO14001 and / or
    Food Safety Systems (HACCP) Certification.

 

For more
information:

https://www.startupindia.gov.in/content/sih/en/government-schemes/reimbursement_iso_standards.html

 

  • 8. Service Exports
    from India Scheme (SEIS)

 

  • To facilitate growth
    in export of services so as to create a powerful and unique ‘Served from
    India Scheme’ brand, instantly recognised and respected the world over.
  • Under this scheme, all
    Indian Service Providers having free foreign exchange earning of at least
    US $15,000 in the preceding year can claim the Duty Credit Scrip.
  • For Individual Service
    Providers and sole proprietorships, such minimum net free foreign exchange
    earnings criterion would be US $10,000 in the preceding financial year.
  • This Duty Credit Scrip
    is equivalent to 3% – 7% of ‘NET’ free foreign exchange earned during the
    previous financial year.
  • The Duty Credit Scrips
    and goods imported against them shall be freely transferable.
  • The services of SMPs
    are covered under the category – Professional Services – Legal Services,
    Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services and Taxation Services.
  • Free foreign exchange
    earned through International Credit Cards and other instruments as
    permitted by RBI for rendering of service are also taken into account for
    computation of Duty Credit Scrip.
  • Import Export Code
    (IEC) is mandatory at the time of rendering service for claiming benefits.

 

For more
information:
https://dgft.gov.in/CP/

 

9.
Reduced IPR Filing Fee

  • The Department of
    Electronics and Information Technology (DeiTY) has launched a scheme
    entitled ‘Support for International Patent Protection in E&IT
    (SIP-EIT)’ to provide financial support to MSMEs and Technology Startup
    units for international patent filing.
  • The reimbursement
    limit has been set to the maximum of Rs. 15 lakhs per invention or 50% of
    the total charges incurred in filing and processing of a patent
    application, whichever is lesser.

 

For
details refer:
http://www.ict-ipr.in/sipeit/SIPEITForm

 

CONCLUSION

 

The
Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME) is one of the top priority sectors
for the present Government of India and it is providing all the support and
assistance needed for the development of the sector. The Small and Medium
Chartered Accountant Practitioners (SMPs) are the most popular source of advice
and support to MSMEs.

 

Among
other MSMEs, the SMPs are also in need of credit and technical support for
growth and development. The delayed recovery of outstanding dues from clients
leads to working capital issues and a major roadblock for the growth of small
CA firms. The lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic has further reduced the
inflow of client funds and resulted in a cash crunch. The various schemes as
discussed above will come as a great guidance to the practising Chartered
Accountancy firms in these difficult times.

 

 

 

COPARCENARY RIGHT OF A DAUGHTER IN FATHER’S HUF: FINAL TWIST IN THE TALE?

INTRODUCTION


The Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005 (‘2005 Amendment Act’) which was made operative from 9th
September, 2005, was a path-breaking Act which placed Hindu daughters on an
equal footing with Hindu sons in their father’s Hindu Undivided Family by
amending the age-old Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act’). However, while it
ushered in great reforms it also left several unanswered questions and
ambiguities. Key amongst them was to which class of daughters did the 2005
Amendment Act apply? The Supreme Court by two important decisions had answered
some of these questions and helped clear a great deal of confusion. However,
just when one thought that things had been settled, a larger bench of the Apex
Court has turned the decision on its head and come out with a more liberal
interpretation of the law. Let us analyse the Amendment and the old and the new
decisions to understand the situation in greater detail.

 

THE 2005 AMENDMENT ACT


First, let us understand
the Amendment to put the issue in perspective. The Hindu Succession (Amendment)
Act, 2005 amended the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which is one of the few
codified statutes under Hindu Law. It applies to all cases of intestate succession
by Hindus. The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person
who is not a Muslim, a Christian, a Parsi or a Jew. Any person who becomes a
Hindu by conversion is also covered by the Act. The Act overrides all Hindu
customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such
property and the order or preference among them. The Act also deals with some
important aspects pertaining to an HUF.

 

By the 2005 Amendment Act,
Parliament amended section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the amended
section was made operative from 9th September, 2005. Section 6 of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was totally revamped. The relevant portion of
the amended section 6 is as follows:

 

‘6. Devolution of interest
in coparcenary property.?(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), in a Joint Hindu family governed
by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,?

(a) by birth become a
coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;

(b) have the same rights
in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;

(c) be subject to the same
liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and
any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a
reference to a daughter of a coparcener:


Provided that nothing
contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or
alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property
which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.’

 

Thus, the amended section
provides that a daughter of a coparcener shall become by birth a coparcener in
her own right in the same manner as the son and, further, she shall have the
same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a
son. It also provides that she shall be subject to the same liabilities in
respect of the coparcenary property as a son. Accordingly, the amendment
equated all daughters with sons and they would now become coparceners in their
father’s HUF by virtue of being born in that family. She has all rights and
obligations in respect of the coparcenary property, including testamentary
disposition. Not only would she become a coparcener in her father’s HUF, but
she could also make a will for the same.

 

One issue which remained
unresolved was whether the application of the amended section 6 was prospective
or retrospective?

 

Section 1(2) of the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, stated that it came into force from the date
it was notified by the Government in the Gazette, i.e., 9th
September, 2005. Thus, the amended section 6 was operative from that date.
However, did this mean that the amended section applied to:

(a) daughters born after
that date,

(b) daughters married
after that date, or

(c) all daughters, married
or unmarried, but living as on that date?

 

There was no clarity under
the Act on this point.

 

PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION UPHELD


The Supreme Court, albeit
in a different context, clarified that the 2005 Amendment Act did not seek to
reopen vesting of a right where succession has already taken place. According
to the Supreme Court, ‘the operation of the Statute is no doubt prospective
in nature… the 2005 Act is not retrospective, its application is prospective” –
G. Sekar vs. Geetha (2009) 6 SCC 99.

 

The Supreme Court has held
in Sheela Devi vs. Lal Chand, (2007) 1 MLJ 797 (SC) that if the
succession was opened prior to the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the
provisions of the 2005 Amendment Act would have no application.

 

FATHER-DAUGHTER COMBINATION IS A MUST

Finally, the matter was
settled by a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Prakash
vs. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36.
The Supreme Court examined the issue in
detail and held that the amendment was prospective and not retrospective. It
further held that the rights under the Hindu Succession Act Amendment were
applicable to living daughters of living coparceners (fathers) as on 9th
September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters were born. It further held
that any disposition or alienation including a partition of the HUF which may
have taken place before 20th December, 2004 (the cut-off date
provided under the 2005 Amendment Act) as per law applicable prior to the said
date, would remain unaffected. Thus, as per the above Supreme Court decision,
in order to claim benefit what was required was that the daughter should be
alive and her father should also be alive on the date of the amendment, i.e., 9th
September, 2005. Once this condition was met, it was immaterial whether the
daughter was married or unmarried. The Court had also clarified that it was
immaterial when the daughter was born.

 

DAUGHTER BORN BEFORE THE ACT

In Danamma @ Suman
Surpur & Anr. vs. Amar & Ors., (2018) 3 SCC 343
, another
two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court took off from the Prakash case
(Supra)
and agreed with it. It held that the Amendment used the words ‘in
the same manner as the son’
. It was therefore apparent that both the sons
and the daughters of a coparcener had been conferred the right of becoming
coparceners by birth. It was the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that
created the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener
became coparceners by virtue of birth. The net effect of the amendment
according to the Court was that it applied to living daughters of living
coparceners as on 9th September, 2005. It did not matter whether the
daughters were married or unmarried. It did not matter when the daughters were
born. They might be born even prior to the enactment of the 1956 Act, i.e., 17th
June, 1956.

 

THREE-JUDGE VERDICT LAYS DOWN A NEW LAW

A three-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, CA 32601
/2018, Order dated 11th August, 2020
considered a bunch of
SLPs before it on the issue of the 2005 Amendment Act. The Court by a very
detailed verdict considered the entire genesis of the HUF Law. It held that in
the Mitakshara School of Hindu law (applicable to most parts of India), in a coparcenary
there is unobstructed heritage, i.e., right is created by birth. When right is
created by birth it is called unobstructed heritage. At the same time, the
birthright is acquired in the property of the father, grandfather, or great
grandfather. In case a coparcener dies without leaving a son, right is acquired
not by birth, but by virtue of there being no male issue and is called
obstructed heritage. It is called obstructed because the accrual of right to it
is obstructed by the owner’s existence. It is only on his death that obstructed
heritage takes place. It held that property inherited by a Hindu from his
father, father’s father, or father’s grandfather (but not from his maternal
grandfather) is unobstructed heritage as regards his own male issues, i.e., his
son, grandson, and great-grandson. His male issues acquire an interest in it
from the moment of their birth. Their right to it arises from the mere fact of
their birth in the family, and they become coparceners with their paternal
ancestor in such property immediately on their birth, and in such cases
ancestral property is unobstructed heritage.

 

Further, any property, the
right to which accrues not by birth but on the death of the last owner without
leaving a male issue, is called obstructed heritage. It is called obstructed
because the accrual of right to it is obstructed by the existence of the owner.
Consequently, property which devolves on parents, brothers, nephews, uncles,
etc. upon the death of the last owner is obstructed heritage. These relations
do not have a vested interest in the property by birth. Their right to it
arises for the first time on the death of the owner. Until then, they have a
mere spes successionis, or a bare chance of succession to the property,
contingent upon their surviving the owner. Accordingly, the Apex Court held
that unobstructed heritage took place by birth and obstructed heritage took
place after the death of the owner.

 

The Apex Court laid down a
very vital principle that coparcenary right, under section 6 (including
after Amendment), is given by birth which is called unobstructed heritage
.
It is not a case of obstructed heritage depending upon the owner’s death. Thus,
the Supreme Court concluded that a coparcener’s father need not be alive
on 9th September, 2005
, i.e., the date of the Amendment.

 

The Court observed that
the Amendment was a gender bender inasmuch as it sought to achieve removing ‘gender
discrimination to a daughter who always remains a loving daughter’
. It
further held that though the rights could be claimed, w.e.f. 9th
September, 2005, the provisions were of a retroactive application, i.e., they
conferred benefits based on the antecedent event and the Mitakshara coparcenary
law should be deemed to include a reference to a daughter as a coparcener.
Under the amended section 6, since the right was given by birth, i.e., an
antecedent event, the provisions concerning claiming rights operated on and
from the date of the Amendment Act. Thus, it is not at all necessary that the
father of the daughter should be living as on the date of the Amendment, as she
has not been conferred the rights of a coparcener by obstructed heritage. The
effect of the amendment is that a daughter is made coparcener with effect from
the date of the amendment and she can claim partition also, which is a
necessary concomitant of the coparcenary. Section 6(1) recognises a joint Hindu
family governed by Mitakshara Law. The coparcenary must exist on 9th
September, 2005 to enable the daughter of a coparcener to enjoy rights
conferred on her. As the right is by birth and not by dint of inheritance, it
is irrelevant whether a coparcener whose daughter is conferred with the rights
is alive or not. Conferral is not based on the death of a father or other
coparcener.

 

The Court also held that
the daughter should be living on 9th September, 2005. In the
substituted section 6, the expression ‘daughter of a living coparcener’ has not
been used. One corollary to this explanation would mean that if the daughter
has died before this date, then her children cannot become coparceners in their
maternal grandfather’s HUF. However, if she dies on or after this date, then
her children can become coparceners in their maternal grandfather’s HUF.

 

The Court explained one of
the implications of becoming a coparcener was that a daughter has now become
entitled to claim partition of coparcenary w.e.f. 9th September,
2005, which was a vital change brought about by the statute. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, CA 32601/2018, Order
dated 11th August, 2020
expressly overturned its earlier
verdict in Prakash vs. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36 and those
portions of Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. vs. Amar & Ors., (2018)
3 SCC 343
which approved of the decision in Prakash vs. Phulavati.

 

EXCEPTION TO THE RULE

Section 6(5) of the Act
provides that the Amendment will not apply to an HUF whose partition has been
effected before 20th December, 2004. For this purpose, the partition
should be by way of a registered partition deed / a partition brought out by a
Court Decree. In the Amendment Bill even oral partitions, supported by
documentary evidence, were allowed. However, this was dropped at the final
stage since the intention was to avoid any sham or bogus transactions in order
to defeat the rights of coparcener conferred upon daughters by the 2005
Amendment Act.

 

It was argued before the
Court that the requirement of a registered deed was only directory and not
mandatory. But the Court negated this argument. It held that the intent of the
provisions was not to jeopardise the interest of the daughter but to take care
of sham or frivolous transactions set up in defence unjustly to deprive the
daughter of her right as coparcener. In view of the clear provisions of section
6(5), the intent of the Legislature was clear and a plea of oral partition was
not to be readily accepted. However, in exceptional cases where the plea of
oral partition was supported by public documents and partition was finally
evinced in the same manner as if it had been effected by a decree of a court,
it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone could not
be accepted and had to be rejected outright.

 

CONCLUSION

The conclusion arrived at
by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma’s case (Supra) undoubtedly
appears to be correct as compared to the earlier decisions on the point. A
beneficial Amendment was sought to be made restrictive and the same has now
been set right. However, consider the turmoil and the legal complications which
this decision would now create. Several disputes in HUFs were created by the
2005 Amendment and those raging fires were settled by the decision in Prakash
vs. Phulavati (Supra)
. It has been almost five years since this
decision was rendered. Now comes a decision which overrules the settled law.
One can expect a great deal of litigation on this issue now that the
restrictive parameters set down have been removed. In respect of cases pending
before different High Courts and subordinate courts, the Supreme Court in Vineeta
Sharma’s case (Supra)
has held that daughters cannot be deprived of
their equal right and hence it requested that all the pending matters be
decided, as far as possible, within six months. However, what happens to cases
where matters are settled? Would they be reignited again?

 

One wonders
how Parliament can enact such a path-breaking enactment and not pay heed to a
simple matter of its date of applicability. Could this issue not have been
envisaged at the drafting stage? This is a classic case of a very advantageous
and laudable Amendment suffering from inadequate drafting! Is it not strange
that while the language of some of our pre-Independence Acts (such as the
Contract Act 1872, Transfer of Property Act 1882, Indian Succession Act 1925,

etc.) have stood strong for over a century, some of our recent statutes have
suffered on the drafting front. Ultimately, matters have to travel to the
Supreme Court leading to a lot of wastage of time and money. One can only hope
that this issue of the coparcenary right of a daughter in her father’s
HUF
is settled once and for all. Or are there going to be some more
twists in this tale?

 

If you disrupt yourself, you
will be able to manage and even thrive through disruption.

 
Whitney Johnson,
Executive Coach and Author

DISGORGEMENT OF ILL-GOTTEN GAINS – A US SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT AND A SEBI COMMITTEE REPORT

BACKGROUND


One of the
important enforcement tools that SEBI has against wrong-doers in capital
markets is disgorging their ill-gotten gains. This means taking away by SEBI
those gains that such persons have made from their wrong-doings. For example,
an insider may trade based on unpublished price-sensitive information and make
profits. SEBI would take away, i.e., disgorge, such profits and deposit them in
the Investors’ Protection and Education Fund. There can be numerous other
similar cases of ill-gotten gains such as through price manipulation, excessive
remuneration, fraudulent schemes of issue of securities, etc.

 

Disgorgement is
not a punitive action and thus is limited to the gains made. Penalty and other
actions may be over and above such disgorgement. The idea of disgorgement is
that a wrong-doer should not retain the profits from his wrong-doing.

 

While this power
is expressly available to SEBI under law (thanks to a curiously worded
‘Explanation’ to section 11B), there are many areas on which there is ambiguity
and lack of clarity. Recently, however, there have been two developments that
finally have highlighted these areas of concern in relation to disgorgement.
The first is a judgment of the Supreme Court of the USA (in Charles C.
Liu et al vs. SEC, Supreme Court dated 22nd June 2020, No. 18-501

– referred to here as Liu), and the second is the report of the
high-level committee under the Chairmanship of Justice A.R. Dave (Retired
Judge, Supreme Court of India) dated 16th June, 2020 (‘the Report’).

 

The US judgment
in Liu has highlighted three qualifications to the absolute power
of disgorgement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the context
of the prevailing law. The Report, on the other hand, makes recommendations for
amendments in these areas, although to some extent different from what the US
judgment in Liu has held. These developments need discussion
because disgorgement happening at present in India (and even in the US) is
often ad hoc, arbitrary and even unfair.

 

For example, the
Securities Appellate Tribunal in Karvy Stock Broking Ltd. vs. SEBI
[(2008) 84 SCL 208]
pointed out the arbitrary manner in which
disgorgement was ordered by the Securities and Exchange Board of India. Persons
who rendered services, and thus were part of the alleged scam, were required to
disgorge the entire illegal gains. Similar orders of disgorgement were,
however, not made against others in the same matter who had made the major
gains.

 

There are no
legal or judicial guidelines regarding the manner of disgorgement except some
generic remarks in SEBI orders or SAT decisions. Some of the issues raised in Liu
and the Report can be strongly raised before SEBI and appellate authorities in
the hope that they would be ruled on, thus creating clarity and precedents. In
some or all areas, the law itself could be amended, thus creating a strong, transparent
and comprehensive base that SEBI and parties can rely on.

 

PRESENT PROVISIONS RELATING TO
DISGORGEMENT IN INDIA UNDER THE SEBI ACT, 1992


SEBI has ordered
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in numerous cases over the years. While
disgorgement is accepted as an inherent power based on equity, the basis in
terms of specific legal provisions in the Act is almost a belated
after-thought. It is in the form of an ‘Explanation’ to section 11B of the SEBI
Act inserted in 2013. The Explanation declares that SEBI has the power to
disgorge any profit made / loss avoided by any transaction or activity in
contravention of the Act or Regulations made thereunder. Such ‘wrongful gain
made or loss averted’ can be disgorged. No further guidance or details are
given in the provision or in any Rules / Regulations / Circulars.

 

Thus, while
power has been granted in the law, many aspects remain unclear and thus result
in arbitrary actions in many cases that have now been highlighted, particularly
through the US judgment and the Report.

 

Who should be
made to disgorge the profits? Should every person who has contravened the law
be made to disgorge the full profits, or should each person be made to disgorge
the profits that he has made? In particular, can a wrong-doer be made to pay
even the profits earned by another wrong-doer in the same wrong but who cannot
or does not pay the amount? In short, should the liability be joint and
several? If yes, are all wrong-doers to be subject to such joint and several
liability, or only certain specific categories of such wrong-doers should be so
subject?

 

Should the gross
gains earned by a wrong-doer be fully disgorged or only his net gains
that have gone into his pocket? In other words, should any deductions be
allowed for expenses, taxes, etc. incurred while earning such profits?

 

Should any
account be taken of losses incurred by the victims or should the disgorgement
be only of the gains made?

 

Who should keep
such disgorged profits? Should they be paid to those who incurred the losses,
or can SEBI / Government keep them? Can an employer disgorge profits earned by
an employee through violations of Securities Laws?

 

THE DECISION OF THE US SUPREME COURT IN
LIU


Summarised and simplified, these were the
facts: A married couple formulated a scheme to defraud foreign nationals,
inviting them to invest in certain commercial enterprises. This, it was
promised, would enable them to obtain permanent residence in the USA. It turned
out that this was allegedly a scam and only a small part of such amounts raised
(about $27 million) were invested for such purposes. A substantial portion of
the rest was diverted to personal accounts. Such acts were found to be in
violation of the relevant laws and SEC ordered disgorgement.

 

SEC, for the
purpose of disgorgement, applied a provision that enabled grant of ‘equitable
relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors’. The
core question before the Court was whether such disgorgement satisfied this
condition of ensuring equitable relief.

 

The Court
upheld the right of SEC to disgorge the ill-gotten gains. However, three
conditions were placed: First, joint and several liability cannot be placed on
all the guilty persons, except in cases where the parties are partners in the
wrong-doing. Second, the condition that it is for the benefit of investors
should be satisfied. In the ordinary course, if the disgorged proceeds are used
to compensate the loss caused to investors, the condition would be satisfied.
In other cases, compliance of this condition would have to be demonstrated.
Third, it was held that it would not be correct to disgorge all the profits
without giving appropriate deductions. While monies that go into the pocket of
the wrong-doer cannot be allowed as deductions, fair deductions on legitimate
expenses related to the activity that was in violation of law could be allowed.

 

Indian
Securities Laws do have parallels with those in the USA and thus judicial
developments there are considered by SEBI and Courts here. The judgment is not
only on certain general legal principles but also lays down issues that have
relevance even in the Indian context. However, the language of the law in India
is specifically different in some respects and hence it cannot be directly
applied to India in all aspects. For example, there is no condition in the
Explanation to section 11B that the disgorged amount should be for the benefit
of investors. It is also specifically stated in section 11(5) that the amount
disgorged should be credited to the IPEF fund, the uses of which have been
prescribed in the regulations. Thus, the decision in Liu, while
raising interesting questions, would have to be applied after considering the
niceties of specific and different provisions in India.

 

REPORT OF JUSTICE A.R. DAVE COMMITTEE


The Report is
fairly detailed and covers suggestions for reforms in certain major areas. In
one of the sections, where suggestions have been given relating to
quantification of penalties and the like, the subject of disgorgement has been
discussed in some detail. Notably, the Report was released before the decision
in Liu was rendered. Nevertheless, the issues that came up in Liu
have also been discussed to an extent.

 

The Report notes
the language of the Explanation and its possible interpretations. A literal
view could be that a wrong-doer could be held liable to disgorge only the gains
that have gone into his pocket and he would not be made to pay what other
wrong-doers gained. However, the Report opines that the better view is that the
gains made by all wrong-doers can be recovered from each person. The Committee,
however, suggests that the language should be made more clear and specific to provide
for joint and several liability of all persons who indulged in such
wrong-doing.

 

It also opines that disgorgement should be
of net gains and not of gross gains. It suggests detailed guidance on what
deductions should be allowed from the gains, so that only the net gains are
disgorged. Interestingly, income-tax is allowed as a deduction where it has
been incurred on gains from certain insider trading but not, say, where there
are identifiable investors who have lost money.

 

The Report also
notes that SEBI has no powers of compensating investors by helping them recover
their losses from the wrong-doers. For recovering their losses, the victims
have to approach civil courts. It also notes that it is the gains made that can
be disgorged and not the losses caused to others. Such losses can, however, be
taken into account for levy of penalty.

 

The Report makes
detailed and specific amendments to the law. It has been released for public
comments after which SEBI may implement it by amending the law.

 

CONCLUSION


Wrong-doings in
securities laws usually have a motive of financial gain. If the gains are
disgorged consistently, the motive is frustrated and wrong-doers lose their
incentive. That, coupled with penalty and other enforcement and even prosecution,
should help curb the ills in our securities markets.

 

The law relating
to disgorgement, however, continues to remain vague and opaque, leading to
arbitrary actions. The absence of guidelines also leads to inconsistent
actions. Appellate authorities also face the same problem of absence of a base
in law in terms of clear provisions.

 

Even the
decision in Liu is general in nature though broad guidelines are
given. Fortunately, we have the detailed and scholarly report of Justice Dave
and one hopes that it is quickly implemented after due consideration.

 

INSOLVENCY CODE VS. PMLA – CONFLICT OR OVERLAP?

The Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(the Code) came into force on 28th May,
2016. It was enacted as a special statute to deal with important aspects of insolvency
and bankruptcy. Being a complete Code, it is to prevail over other laws so that
no person can take advantage of pendency of a proceeding under any other law to
stall insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings1. A specific provision
in the Code that confers overriding powers is section 238 which reads as under:

 

‘The provisions of
this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law
for the time being in force or any instrument
having effect by virtue of any such law’ (emphasis supplied).

 

A review of section
238 of the Code, particularly the non-obstante expression therein, shows
that provisions of the Code have overriding effect over the provisions of other
statutes which are inconsistent with the Code.

 

The Prevention
of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
(‘PMLA’) came into force on 1st
July, 2005. PMLA was enacted as a special statute to prevent money-laundering
and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. A specific
provision of the PMLA that confers overriding powers is section 71 which reads
as under:

 

‘The provisions of
this Act shall have effect notwith-standing anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law
for the time being in force’ (emphasis
supplied).

 

Thus, a review of section
71 of the PMLA, particularly the non-obstante expression therein, shows
that the provisions of the PMLA have overriding effect over provisions of other
statutes which are inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA.

 

TWO SPECIAL ENACTMENTS
– OVERLAP OR CONFLICT?

From a review of
the preamble to the Code and the PMLA which specify their respective
objectives, it is evident that both the Code and the PMLA are special Acts. The
moot issue for consideration is: when there are two Special Acts, how to resolve
overlap or conflict between the two?

This issue has been
addressed by Courts and other forums in the following manner: When there is
an overlap or conflict between any two Acts, both of which are special Acts,
then the Act which came later must prevail2.

 

Reiterating the
view that it is the subsequent legislation which will have the overriding
effect, the Supreme Court3 observed that it is possible that both
the enactments have the non-obstante clause. In that case, the proper
approach would be that one must be guided by the object and the dominant
purpose for which the special enactment was made.

 

Where the dominant
purpose of a law is covered by certain contingencies, even then the intention
can be ascertained by looking to the objects and reasons notwithstanding that
the law might have come at a later point of time.

 

OVERRIDING EFFECT OF
THE CODE

The overriding
effect of the Code has been examined in various decisions in the context of
specific legislations and proceedings thereunder. Thus, in respect of
proceedings under PMLA vis-a-vis the Code, the following important propositions
have been laid down:

 

(i)   PMLA is a statute which came into effect much
prior to the coming into force of the Code and, therefore, the Code has
overriding effect over the PMLA4.

(ii)   Where the properties of a corporate debtor
under liquidation were attached under PMLA, the question whether attached
properties were proceeds of crime or whether lenders were bona fide
lenders must be decided by the authorities under

 

PMLA. Besides, the
liquidator appointed under the Code has to approach the authorities under PMLA
for withdrawal of the attachment5.

(iii) Since the PMLA relates to a different field of
penal action regarding proceeds of crime, it can be simultaneously invoked with
the Code. Because of the absence of inconsistency, the PMLA has no overriding
effect over the Code and vice versa6.

(iv) Where prior to admission of the Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process certain properties of a corporate debtor were
attached under the PMLA, the same could not be released as section 14 of the
Code does not have overriding effect on the PMLA7.

RECENT CASES

Keeping in mind the
afore-mentioned legal position, a few recent cases are examined.

 

PMT Machines case

In this case8,
in 2011-12, the debt-laden Sterling Biotech’s subsidiary, PMT Machines (‘the
company’) defaulted on its debt repayments following which the consortium of
banks, led by UCO Bank, initiated recovery proceedings in 2013 before the Debt
Recovery Tribunal.

In 2017, the
Enforcement Directorate conducted search and seizure under the provisions of
the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the Income-tax Act at the Mumbai and
Vadodara premises of the Sterling group’s promoters and the group companies. In
2018, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) passed orders for provisional attachment
of the properties of PMT Machines.

The company was
admitted for insolvency resolution by the Mumbai Bench of the National Company
Law Tribunal in 2018.

The Resolution
Professional approached the appellate authority under PMLA with the plea that
the properties were wrongly attached by the ED. This plea was made on the
premise that the attached properties were acquired before the ‘alleged
commission of offences and charges on the properties were created prior to the
date of alleged offences’.

The Resolution
Professional submitted that because of the attachment by the ED, the Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process cannot achieve its objective of maximisation of
value of the stressed assets. He pleaded that the attachment of properties by
the ED was delaying the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the company.

 

Upholding the
prevalence of the Code over the PMLA, the appellate authority (PMLA) released
the properties of the company which had been attached by the ED. The appellate
authority (PMLA) observed that since the properties attached had no relation to
the alleged crime committed by the management of the corporate debtor, the same
must be released to the Resolution Professional to ensure quick insolvency
resolution for the company.

 

Holding that the
recovery proceeding initiated by the banks was ‘valid and legal’ and that the
same could not be ‘blocked for years without valid reasons’, the PMLA appellate
authority observed that the ED is not precluded from attaching other private
properties and all other assets of the alleged accused.

 

The appellate authority, however, clarified that the ruling will ‘have
no bearing in any proceedings initiated against the alleged accused including
extradition proceedings pending or proposed to be initiated in any part of the
world’.

 

In response to the
ED plea that banks were the victim of the alleged fraud perpetrated by the
management of the corporate debtor and that the banks were entitled to recover
their dues, the PMLA appellate authority held that the banks should approach
the special court set up for that purpose.

 

The judgment, thus,
paves the way to achieve the desired objective of the insolvency process.

 

JSW Steel case

In the case of JSW
Steel (‘the Company’), the main issue was whether PMLA has overriding effect
on the Code?

 

The National
Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) approved JSW Steel’s resolution plan for Bhushan
Power & Steel – one of the 12 big cases mandated by the Reserve Bank of
India for resolution under the Code. This should have ended the two-year-long
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process for the stressed company. Instead, an
appeal was filed by JSW seeking protection from attachment and from the
liability resulting from criminal proceedings, highlighting conflict between
two apparently overlapping laws, the PMLA and the Code.

 

The company
explained its concern to NCLT about the main issue, viz., whether the PMLA
has overriding effect on the Code
, in the following words:

 

‘What is concerning
us is that contrary judgments are coming up in some ongoing PMLA cases. Today,
no bidder is aware of criminal liabilities. Criminal liability will be on the
person who has done it and the new management in no way would be responsible
for it. But can the assets of the corporate debtor be attached, that is the
main question’.

 

The company’s offer
for Bhushan Power was Rs 19,350 crores. Certain issues about the overriding
provisions of the PMLA and the Code had caused apprehensions to the bidders and
creditors of the stressed steel assets under the Code.

 

One of the bidders
expressed concern over the attachment of assets under the PMLA. The bidder
sought to secure the bid amount and creditors were concerned about recovering
their money.

 

THE CODE AND PMLA – OPERATE IN DIFFERENT SPHERES

In Deputy
Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi vs. Axis Bank
9,
the Delhi High Court has held that both the PMLA and the Code have non-obstante
clauses but since they do not operate in the same sphere, they can co-exist.

 

It was observed
that the objective of the PMLA being distinct from that of the Recovery of
Debts Due to Banks and Finance Institutions Act
, the SARFAESI Act, and the
Code, these three legislations do not prevail over the PMLA. By virtue of
section 71 of the PMLA, PMLA has overriding effect on other existing laws in
the matter of dealing with ‘money laundering’ and ‘proceeds of crime’.

 

In two differing
judgments, however, the NCLAT in Rotomac Global10 and
the PMLA Appellate Authority in PMT Machines11 had dealt with
the issue of overlap between PMLA and the Code. In the Rotomac Global case,
it was held by the NCLAT that section 14 of the Code (moratorium) is not
applicable to proceedings under the PMLA and that neither law has an overriding
effect on the other because both the laws operate in different spheres.

 

In the case of PMT
Machines,
however, the PMLA appellate authority had upheld the prevalence
of the Code over the PMLA and set aside the order of attachment under PMLA and
released the properties on the ground that the properties were acquired much
prior to the date of the alleged offence of money laundering.

 

GROUND REALITIES

Indeed, banks will
have to establish that the security interest was created prior to the crime
period. The issue is: ‘Operationally, how would a creditor establish that
its charge on the property was created before the crime period?’

 

Bidders, too, are
awaiting clarity. In some cases, change of control had already taken place but
yet there was litigation. If the assets of the corporate debtor are allowed to
be attached, it will pose huge risk if, after paying a substantial sum, there
is no assurance about possession of the asset.

 

Sterling SEZ and Infrastructure Finance case

In this case12,
the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process had commenced. The application of
the financial creditor initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process
was admitted, the Resolution Professional was appointed and moratorium was
declared.

 

The Enforcement
Directorate attached the assets of the corporate debtor. The Resolution
Professional informed the ED about the declaration of moratorium and sought
withdrawal of the attachment. However, the ED contended that the attached
properties constituted ‘proceeds of crime’ and, therefore, moratorium would not
be applicable to the proceedings under the PMLA. The adjudicating authority
under the Code was called upon to decide whether proceedings before the PMLA
Court in respect of attachment of properties were merely civil proceedings and,
accordingly, the adjudicating authority under the PMLA had no jurisdiction to
attach properties of the corporate debtor undergoing the Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process.

 

After examining the relevant provisions of the Code and the PMLA, the
Adjudicating Authority under the Code held that the Adjudicating Authority
under the PMLA had no jurisdiction to attach properties of the corporate debtor
undergoing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

 

It also held that
the attachment order passed under the PMLA was non-est in law since it
was hit by declaration of moratorium under the Code. Accordingly, it was
finally held that the Resolution Professional could proceed to take charge of the properties as if there was no attachment order.

 

GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH

After completing
the resolution under the Code, several bidders faced demands from different
government authorities. The biggest concern, however, was the threat of
attachment under PMLA.

 

A number of
representations have been made by bidders to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
on the issues pertaining to the PMLA, especially with regard to the attachment
of property.

 

In a holistic view
of the matter, it is suggested that the PMLA should either be amended or the
bidder should be allowed to revise the bid to the extent of the liability in
respect of the alleged ‘proceeds of crime’. The amount may be put in an escrow
account.

 

Government has taken cognisance of
this issue and has sought to amend the Code in December, 2019 to ring-fence the
prospective bidder for stressed assets against the liability for prior
offences.

 

__________________________________________-

1   Neeraj Jain vs. Yes Bank Ltd. (2019) 106
taxmann.com 35 (NCLAT)

2   Solidaire India Ltd. vs. Fair Growth AIR 2001
SC 958; Raman Ispat (P) Ltd. vs. Executive Engineer (Paschimanchal Vidyut
Vitran Nigam Ltd.) (2018) 97 taxmann.com 223 (NCLT-All).

3   Bank of India vs. Ketan Parekh AIR 2008 SC
2361; (2008) 8 SCC 148

4      Siddhi Vinayak Logistic Ltd. vs. Dy.
Director, DoE, Mumbai (2019) 101 taxmann.com 491 (PMLA-AT)

5   Anil Goel, Liquidator, Rotomac Global (P)
Ltd. vs. Ms Ramanjit Kaur Sethi, Dy. Director, DoE (2019) 102 taxmann.com 152
(NCLT-All)

6   Varrsana Ispat Ltd. vs. Dy. Director, DoE
(2019) 108 taxmann.com 96 (NCL-AT) Per contra Asset Reconstruction Co. (India)
Ltd. (ARCIL) vs. Dy. Director (2019) 109 taxmann.com 192 (NCLT-Hyd.)

7   Varrsana Ispat Ltd. vs. Dy. Director, DoE
(2019) 108 taxmann.com 96 (NCL-AT)

8      PMT Machines Ltd. vs. Dy. Director, DoE
(2019) 111 taxmann.com 362 (PMLA-AT)

9 (2019] 104 taxmann.com 49 (Delhi)

10 Rotomac Global (P) Ltd. vs. Dy. Director, DoE
[2019] 108 taxmann.com 397 (NCLAT)


11 PMT Machines Ltd. vs. Dy. Director, DoE (2019) 111 taxmann.com 362
(PMLA-AT)

12 SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. vs. Sterling SEZ
& Infrastructure Finance Ltd. [2019] 105 taxmann.com 167 (NCLT – Mum.)

AMENDMENT IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT RULES

(A)   BACKGROUND

Under the erstwhile
FEMA regulations governing Foreign Direct Investment into India (‘FDI’), i.e.
FEM 20(R), Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer of Issue of Security by a
Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2017 (‘FDI Regulations’) dated 7th
November, 2017, the RBI had powers to govern FDI which included equity
investments into India.

 

However, the above
position governing FDI has been overhauled since then. The Government of India,
with effect from 15th October, 2019, assumed power from RBI to
regulate non-debt capital account transactions which would include equity
instruments, capital participation in LLP, etc. by issuing the Foreign Exchange
Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘Non-Debt Rules’) for governing
non-debt transactions.

 

Therefore, upon
issuance of the above Non-Debt Rules, the power to regulate FDI into India was
taken over by the Central Government from RBI.

 

(B)   AMENDMENTS TO NON-DEBT RULES BY NOTIFICATION
DATED 27TH APRIL, 2020

 

(I)   Acquisition of equity shares by purchasing
rights entitlement from person resident in India

The Government of
India issued the above notification for amending Rule 7 of the Non-Debt Rules
which deals with investment by a person resident outside India in equity shares
(other than share warrants) issued by an Indian company on rights issue which
are renounced by the person to whom it is offered.

 

The amendment now
inserts Rule 7A which provides that whenever a person resident outside India
purchases rights for investing in equity shares (other than warrants) from a
person resident in India who has renounced it, investment by the person
resident outside India has to follow the applicable pricing guidelines laid
down in Rule 21 of the Non-Debt Rules. The pricing guidelines are given as
under:

(i)   In case of listed companies – As per SEBI
guidelines;

(ii)   In case of unlisted companies – As per
internationally accepted pricing methodology.

 

The earlier
Non-Debt Rules did not provide for any different pricing guidelines in case of
investment by person resident outside India in rights shares by purchase of
rights renounced by person resident in India. The earlier Non-Debt Rules
provided for following conditions in case of investment by person resident
outside India through either subscription to rights shares or purchase of
rights renounced by person resident in India:

 

Sr.
No.

Rights
issued by

Pricing
guidelines for rights issue and subscription pursuant to purchase of rights
renounced

1

Listed Indian company

Price determined by Indian company

2

Unlisted Indian company

Price not less than price offered to
person resident in India

 

Implications
of above amendment to Non-Debt Rules

Under the erstwhile
Non-Debt Rules which were similar to the FEMA 20(R) provisions governing FDI,
where a person resident outside India purchased rights entitlement to equity
shares which were renounced by a person resident in India, such non-resident
could invest at the same price at which they were offered to the person
resident in India. However, there are no pricing guidelines which are
applicable on issuance of shares on rights basis under the Companies Act, 2013.

 

Hence, whether a
non-resident purchased rights entitlement which was renounced by a person
resident in India or participated in rights issue as it was holding equity
shares, there was no change in pricing guidelines related to issuance of rights
shares.

 

However, post amendment to the Non-Debt Rules, a new criterion has been
drawn for a person resident outside India who purchases rights entitlements
from a person resident in India wherein pricing guidelines will be different as
compared to a person resident outside India who invests in rights issue. The
same is summarised as under:

 

Sr.
No.

Investment
by person resident outside India

Rights
issued by

Pricing
guidelines for rights issue

1

Participation in rights issue

Listed Indian company

Price determined by Indian company

2

Unlisted Indian company

Price not less than price offered to
person resident in India

3

Participation in rights issue through
purchase of rights entitlement

Listed Indian company

As per SEBI guidelines

4

Unlisted Indian company

As per internationally accepted
valuation methodology

 

The above amendment
will result in a peculiar situation which can be explained by way of the
following example:

 

Mr. NRI is a person
resident outside India who is holding 1,000 equity shares in an existing
unlisted Indian company, X Ltd. which has undertaken rights issue wherein Mr.
NRI will be eligible for 100 equity shares on rights basis. Equity shares are
issued on rights basis at the same price of Rs. 20 per equity share to both
resident as well as non-resident shareholders. Accordingly, Mr. NRI will
purchase his entitlement, i.e. 100 rights equity shares at the rights price of
Rs. 20 per share.

 

Further, Mr. NRI
also purchases rights entitlements for 50 equity shares from a person resident
in India. In such a scenario, the investment by Mr. NRI for purchasing 50
equity shares by way of rights entitlement would be at a price based on an
internationally accepted valuation methodology which can be different from the
price at which X Ltd. has issued the rights shares.

 

Hence, in a rights issue by an Indian company to the same non-resident
investor, there would be two different prices, one price for the purchase of
rights shares and another price for the purchase of rights shares acquired
through acquiring rights entitlement from a person resident in India.

 

Further, the new
Rule 7A does not cover situations where a person resident outside India has
purchased rights entitlement from persons resident outside India. In such a
situation the amendment does not apply.

Additionally, as per section 62(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, where a
shareholder to whom rights offer is made declines to exercises his right, the
Board can dispose them in a manner which is not disadvantageous to the company.
In such a situation, if the Board allocates those rights to an existing foreign
investor, the same cannot be considered to be purchase of rights renounced by
Indian investor and hence the amendment will not apply. Thus, a foreign
investor can acquire shares in the Indian company at the rights issue price
even if it is below fair market value.

 

(II)  Amendment in sourcing
norms for single brand product retailing

Earlier regulations
provided that sourcing norms shall not be applicable up to three years from
commencement of the business, i.e., opening of the first store for entities
undertaking single brand retail trading of products having ‘state-of-art’ and
‘cutting-edge’ technology and where local sourcing is not possible.

 

The amendment now
clarifies that exemption from sourcing would be applicable for three years
starting from the opening of the first store or the start of online retail,
whichever is earlier.

 

(III) Amendment in FDI limit
for insurance intermediaries

FDI in insurance
intermediaries, including insurance brokers, re-insurance brokers, insurance
consultants, corporate agents, third-party administrators, surveyors and loss
assessors and such other entities, as may be notified by the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority of India from time to time, is now
permitted up to 100% under the Automatic Route.

 

(IV) Amendment for FPIs

The amendment has
now provided that where FPI’s investment breaches the prescribed limit,
divestment of holdings by the FPI and its reclassification into FDI shall be
subject to further conditions, if any, specified by SEBI and RBI in this
regard.

 

SUMMARY OF
RECENT COMPOUNDING ORDERS

An analysis of some
interesting compounding orders passed by RBI in the months of January and
February, 2020 and uploaded on the website1  are given below. Article refers to regulatory
provisions as existing at the time of offence. Changes in regulatory
provisions, if any, are noted in the comments section.

_________________________________________

1   https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Compoundingorders.aspx

 

 

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)

 

A. M/s Congruent Info-tech Pvt. Ltd.

Date of order:
19th December, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
20/2000-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a
Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000]

 

ISSUE

(1) Violation of pricing guidelines in issue of
shares,

(2) Delay in refund of consideration,

(3) Transfer of shares from resident to
non-resident by way of gift without RBI’s approval,

(4) Taking on record transfer of shares in the
books of the company without RBI’s approval.

 

FACTS

  •     Applicant company was
    engaged in the business of writing, modifying, testing of computer programmes
    to meet the needs of a particular client excluding web-page designing.
  •     The company received
    foreign inward remittance of Rs. 13,32,900 from Mr. Mani Krishna Murthy, USA
    towards subscription to shares which was duly reported to RBI.
  •     The applicant company
    allotted 10,000 equity shares at a face value of Rs.10 each amounting to Rs.
    1,00,000 as against their Fair Value of Rs. 92.50 to a person resident outside
    India on 9th October, 2003. The shortfall of Rs. 8,25,000 was
    brought in by way of inward remittance on 1st July, 2019 after a
    delay of approximately 15 years and 8 months.
  •     Further, the company
    refunded an amount of Rs. 10,30,900 without the permission of RBI on 5th
    April, 2011 (approximately three years from its deemed date of receipt, i.e. 29th
    November, 2007).
  •     The resident shareholder,
    Mr. V.S. Krishna Murthy, had transferred 20,000 equity shares of fair value Rs.
    92.50 each, amounting to Rs. 18,50,000, to a non-resident Mr. Mani Krishna
    Murthy on 9th October, 2003 by way of gift without RBI’s approval.
  •     The above transfer of
    shares was also taken on record by the applicant company without obtaining
    RBI’s approval.

 

Regulatory provision

  •     Paragraph 5 of Schedule I
    to Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB, ‘the price of shares issued to persons
    resident outside India shall not be less than the fair value of shares.
  •     Paragraph 8 of Schedule I
    to Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB read with A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20
    dated 14th December, 2007, ‘the shares have to be issued / amount
    refunded within 180 days from the date of receipt of the inward remittance
    .’
  •     Regulation 10A(a) of
    Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB, ‘a person resident in India who proposes
    to transfer to a person resident outside India any security by way of gift
    shall make an application to Reserve Bank
    .’
  •     Regulation 4 read with
    Regulation 10(A)(a) of Notification No. FEMA 20/ 2000-RB, ‘the company can
    take the transfer of shares by way of gift, on record, after the approval of
    Reserve Bank
    .’

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
Paragraph of FEMA 20 Regulation

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default (approximately)

Paragraph 5 of Schedule I

Violation of pricing guidelines in issue
of shares to non-resident

Rs. 8,25,000

15 years, 8 months and 22 days

Paragraph 8 of Schedule I read with A.P.
(DIR Series) Circular No. 20

Delay in refund of receipt of
consideration

Rs. 10,32,900

2 years, 10 months and 9 days

Regulation 10(A)(a)

Transfer of shares by way of gift from
resident to non-resident without prior approval from RBI

Rs. 18,50,000

15 years, 10 months and 18 days

Regulation 4 read with Regulation
10(A)(a)

Taking on record transfer of shares by
way of gift without RBI approval

Rs. 18,50,000

15 years, 10 months and 17 days

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty
of Rs. 2,15,519 was levied.

 

Comments

Under the erstwhile FEMA 20 Regulations as well as under Non-Debt
Rules, transfer of shares from resident to non-resident by way of gift requires
prior approval of RBI. Hence, unless approval from RBI is obtained, the Indian
company whose shares are being transferred should also not record the transfer
from resident to non-resident by way of gift.

 

B. Atrenta (India) Private Limited

Date of order:
30th January, 2020

Regulation: FEMA
20/2000-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a
Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000]

 

ISSUE

Transfer of shares
of the applicant from NRI to Non-Resident company without prior approval of
RBI.

 

FACTS

  •     Applicant Company had
    allotted 96,600 and 4,600 fully paid up equity shares to M/s Atrenta Inc. (NR)
    and Mr. Ajoy Kumar Bose (NRI), respectively, as part of subscription to the
    memorandum on 26th May, 2001.
  •     Further, the applicant
    company allotted 2,35,620 and 80 fully paid equity shares to M/s Atrenta Inc.
    and Mr. Ajoy Kumar Bose, respectively, on 10th October, 2001.
  •     Mr. Ajoy Kumar Bose (NRI)
    transferred 4,598 and 80 equity shares on 26th May, 2011 and 17th
    October, 2001 to M/s Atrenta Inc. (NR) without obtaining prior approval of RBI.
  •     The applicant company also
    took the transfer of shares from NRI to NR on record.

 

Regulatory
provision

    Regulation 4 of FEMA 20, ‘save as
otherwise provided in the Act or Rules or Regulations made thereunder, an
Indian entity shall not issue any security to a person resident outside India
or shall not record in its books any transfer of security from or to such
person. Provided that the Reserve Bank may, on an application made to it and
for sufficient reasons, permit an entity to issue any security to a person
resident outside India or to record in its books transfer of security from or
to such person, subject to such conditions as may be considered necessary.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
paragraph of FEMA 20 Regulation

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default (approximately)

Regulation 4

Transfer of shares of the applicant from
NRI to Non-Resident Company without prior approval of the Reserve Bank of
India

Rs. 46,780

16 years and 5 months

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty
of Rs. 79,526 was levied on the applicant company.

 

Comments

It is interesting
to note that the above penalty was levied on the applicant company for taking
on record transfer of shares from NRI to non-resident without prior approval of
RBI. Additionally, the NRI2 
was also levied penalty of similar amount for transferring its shares to
non-resident company without prior approval of RBI. Thus, penalty was levied
twice on the same transaction, one which was levied on the company, and the
second which was levied on the NRI.

 

It should also be
noted that under the earlier FEMA 20 Regulations (which were applicable till
November, 2017), an NRI could transfer equity shares by way of sale or gift to
another NRI only and not to any other non-resident. However, post November,
2017 under the erstwhile FEMA 20(R) as well as under the revised Non-Debt Rules
governing FDI from October, 2019 an NRI can transfer shares to any person
resident outside India by way of sale or gift without any approval from RBI.

 

ESTABLISHMENT
IN INDIA OF A BRANCH OFFICE OR A LIAISON OFFICE OR A PROJECT OFFICE OR ANY
OTHER PLACE OF BUSINESS

 

C. M/s Quanticate
International Limited, Branch Office

Date of order:
27th June, 2019

Regulation: RBI
approval letter dated 24th September, 2010 and Master Direction –
Establishment of Branch Office (BO) / Liaison Office (LO) / Project Office (PO)
or any other place of business in India by foreign entities, FED Master
Direction No. 10/2015-16

 

ISSUE

Payment of expenses
of the branch office directly by the parent company to the third party.

 

FACTS

  •     The applicant company was
    engaged in the business of statistical consultancy, statistical programming,
    pharmaco-vigilance, analysing and data management services to its head office.
  •     The applicant company
    established a branch office in India with the permission of RBI vide
    letter No. FE.CO.FID/7508/10.83.318/2010-11 dated 24th September,
    2010.
  •     The branch office (BO) had
    an account with RBS Bank to carry out its transactions. After the closure of
    RBS operations in India, the branch office closed this account on 19th
    August, 2016 and opened a new account with Standard Chartered Bank on 19th
    September, 2016.

______________________________________________

2   Ajoy Kumar Bose – CA. No 5047 / 2019 dated 12th
February, 2020

 

  •     Although the BO had an
    account with Standard Chartered Bank, the remittances of Rs. 5,40,42,300 were
    made directly by the parent company of the BO to a third party account for
    payment of expenses, particularly their staff, landlord and supplier in India
    during the period 21st September, 2016 to 23rd March,
    2017.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •     Paragraph 6 of the
    permission letter states that the entire expenses of the office in India will
    be met either out of the funds received from abroad through normal banking
    channels or through income generated by it in India by undertaking permitted
    activities.
  •     Paragraph 11 of the
    permission letter states that the office may approach AD Bank in India to open
    an account for its operation in India. Credits to the account should represent
    the funds received from the head office through normal banking channels for
    meeting the expenses of the office and profit made by the BO. Debits of this
    account shall be for the expenses incurred by the BO and towards remittance of
    profit / winding up proceeds.
  •     Paragraph 3(ii) of FED
    Master Direction No. 10/2015-16 dated 1st January, 2016 also
    reiterates what was stated in paragraph 11 of the permission 11.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
provision

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default

Paragraph 6 and Paragraph 11 of RBI
approval letter read with Paragraph 3(ii) and 2(i) of FED Master Direction
No. 10/2015-16

Payment of expenses of the Branch Office
directly by the parent company to third party

Rs. 5,40,42,300

2 years, 3 months and 27 days

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty
of Rs. 2,46,169 was levied.

 

Comments

The companies which
have set up branch offices in India need to closely monitor their activities
and it needs to be ensured that all payments of branch offices should be
undertaken only through the branch’s Indian bank account and not  directly from its parent company.

 

D. M/s ETF Gurgaon Project Office (MG-SE-17)

Date of order:
11th October, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
22(R)/2016-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Establishment in India of a branch
office or a liaison office or a project office or any other place of business)
Regulations, 2016]

 

ISSUE

Inter-project
transfer of funds and transfer of project assets from one project to another.

 

FACTS

  •     The applicant, M/s ETF, a
    company incorporated and registered under the laws of France, specialises in
    construction and maintenance of railway networks, urban transport networks and
    industrial siblings. It was involved in the development of railway
    infrastructure, high-speed lines, concrete slab tracks, metal and rubber
    wheeled tramway systems, etc.
  •     The applicant had
    established the following project offices in India for executing the following
    contracts:

i.    Contract MG-SE-17 with IL&FS Rail
Limited (referred to as MG-SE-17, Gurgaon);

ii.   Railway Infrastructure contract awarded by
Rail Vikas Nigam Limited (RVNL) – Construction contract with SEW-ETF-AIL JV2
(referred to as RVNL Kanpur);

iii.  Contract CT19A (referred as CT-19A Noida).

 

  •     Project expenses relating
    to a particular contract were met from the contract receipts relating to the
    said contract, or from remittances obtained from the Head Office in France
    depending upon the requirement of funds.
  •     There were, however,
    occasions where funds available in the bank account for a particular contract
    were insufficient to meet the expenses of the said contract necessitating
    inter-project transfer of funds.
  •     During the F.Y. 2016-17, ETF has obtained approval from RBI for
    inter-project transfer of funds up to Rs. 1,00,00,000 from the project office
    of MG-SE-17 to CT-19A.
  •     During the F.Ys. 2016-17
    and 2017-18, the Gurgaon project office did inter-project utilisation of funds
    and allocation of common expenditure amounting to Rs. 4,60,55,459.
  •     The above activity
    (inter-project utilisation of funds) of the Gurgaon project office did not
    relate to the contract secured by the foreign entity for which the project office
    was established.
  •     In the Annual Activity
    Certificates (AAC) for the years ended 31st March, 2017 and 31st
    March, 2018, the auditor had qualified the AACs by observing that the
    inter-project transfers were done without RBI approval.
  •     Further, transfer of
    project assets from the Gurgaon project office to another amounting to Rs.
    1,06,44,273 was also done without RBI approval.
  •     The applicant was granted post
    facto
    approval subject to compounding of the contravention.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •     Regulation 4(k) of
    Notification No. FEMA.22(R)/RB-2016 dated 31st March, 2016 states
    that a person resident outside India permitted under these Regulations to
    establish a branch office or liaison office or project office may apply to the
    Authorised Dealer Category-I bank concerned for transfer of its assets to a
    joint venture / wholly owned subsidiary or any other entity in India.
  •     Regulation 4(l) (Annex D)
    of Notification No. FEMA.22(R)/RB-2016 dated 31st March, 2016 states
    that the branch office / liaison office may submit the Annual Activity
    Certificate (Annex D) as at the end of 31st March along with the
    audited financial statements, including receipt and payment account on or
    before 30th September of that year.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
provision

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation 4(k), Regulation 4(f) read
with Annex D of Regulation 4(l) of Notification No. FEMA.22(R)/RB-2016

Inter-project utilisation of funds and
transfer of project assets from one project to another

Rs. 5,66,99,732

2 years, 9 months and 9 days

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty
of Rs. 2,56,799 was levied.

 

Comments

Where foreign companies have set up more than one project office in
India, adequate care needs to be taken to ensure that funds of these project
offices are not transferred amongst themselves without prior approval of RBI.

 

EXPORT OF GOODS AND SERVICES

E. M/s Dalmia Cement (Bharat)
Limited (Legal Successor of OCL India Ltd.)

Date of order:
28th January, 2020

Regulation: FEMA
23/2000-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services)
Regulations, 2000]

 

ISSUE

Failure to realise
the export proceeds (by the erstwhile OCL India Ltd.) within the stipulated
time period.

 

FACTS

  •     The applicant company, M/s
    Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited (the legal successor of M/s OCL India Limited,
    consequent upon a merger ordered by NCLT vide order dated 18th
    July, 2019) was engaged in the business of export of refractory materials,
    cement, etc.
  •     The erstwhile M/s OCL India
    Limited, a ‘Star Export House’ engaged in the business of export of refractory
    materials, cement, etc., had made exports under 13 different invoices between
    February, 2008 and May, 2012.
  •     M/s OCL India Limited was
    not able to realise and repatriate the export proceeds pertaining to 13
    invoices within the stipulated time.
  •     Subsequently, M/s OCL India
    Limited had written off the amount in its books.
  •     However, as the company was
    under investigation by the Directorate of Enforcement, the above bills could
    not be written-off by the applicant on its own or by its AD bank.
  •     The applicant filed a
    petition in the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi for regularising the above
    write-off.
  •     The Hon’ble Court disposed
    of the matter with directions to the applicant to apply for compounding again
    to the RBI along with fresh fee for compounding.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •     Regulation 9 of
    Notification No. FEMA.23/2000 which states that the amount representing the
    full export value of goods or software exported shall be realised and
    repatriated to India within six months (applicable up to 3rd June,
    2008) and twelve months (as applicable subsequently) from the date of export.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
Provision

Nature
of default

Amount
involved (in INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation 9 of FEMA 23/2000-RB

Failure to realise export proceeds
within stipulated time period

Rs. 39,22,447

Approximately 11 years

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty
of Rs. 79,419 was levied.

 

Comments3

In the instant
case, the applicant company had initially filed a compounding application with
RBI for write-off of export proceeds. However, the said compounding application
was returned by RBI on the ground that compounding application can be filed
only after transactions are regularised by RBI. Further, RBI advised the
applicant company to approach the Trade Division of RBI for regularising its
export transactions. However, as the applicant company was under investigation
by ED, it could not write off its export receivables and hence had initially
filed compounding application before RBI. As RBI returned its compounding
application, it filed a writ petition with the Delhi High Court for writing off
export receivables.

_________________________________________________________________________

3   Based on Delhi High Court order in case of
OCL India Limited [W.P.(C) 8265/2018 & CM Nos. 31684/2018 dated 18th
July, 2019]

 

 

During the
hearing before the Delhi High Court, counsel for RBI submitted that there is no
provision which precluded RBI from considering and processing compounding
application where investigation is pending. Accordingly, based on RBI’s
submission that the matter be remanded back to RBI for fresh consideration, the
Court dismissed the writ petition and directed RBI to consider the compounding
application of the applicant afresh and not reject it on the basis of
approaching another department of RBI. Interestingly, the Delhi High Court also
stayed proceedings initiated by ED till
the applicant’s compounding application was considered by RBI
.

CURRENT THEMES IN CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS AND M&As

This article attempts to consolidate recent key commercial and regulatory developments having a bearing on Corporate Restructurings and Mergers & Acquisitions. It could help decision-makers in preparing for the expected resurgence of corporate actions as we step into ‘Mission Begin Again’.

BACKDROP

The F.Y. 2019-20 was hampered by a global structural slowdown which got further amplified with the novel Covid-19 pandemic bearing significant impact on business models and corporate actions.

From a sustenance stand-point, raising fresh capital for organic and inorganic needs is clearly the need of the hour. We are seeing the outlier transaction of Jio Platforms’ Rs. 115,693 crores aggregate fund raise1  and then we have the flurry of announcements for rights issues, NCDs, venture debts and loan top-ups. From the startups’ perspective, pricing and dilution issues are forcing them towards debt and venture debt with unique situations around collaterals and dynamic business models with cash burn.

With Unlock 1.0 and the expectation of ‘normal’ monsoon2  serving as a confidence-booster, markets and industries are moving in a green zone, at least on a month-on-month basis, including for capital markets.

Index Current levels (1st June, 2020) % change from 1st Jan to 31st Mar % change from 31st Mar to 1st June
SENSEX 33,303 – 29% + 13%

Subject to the possibility of Covid continuing to lash out again and again in waves, Q3FY21 and Q4FY21 may provide some clarity on business feasibilities, cash runways, etc. which could act as a direct feeder for potential internal and external restructurings and M&A actions and consolidation across sectors.


1   https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/715b628f-8f44-413a-b509-2943a2dd3f22.pdf
2  http://internal.imd.gov.in/press_release/20200601_pr_827.pdf

Each corporate action, irrespective of its nature, size and scale, has its unique internal and external challenges, including:

From the preparedness point of view, the above agenda clearly needs at least two to four months of planning before actual execution of corporate action. So, the time is NOW.

With almost all the businesses exposed due to the pandemic, it is absolutely essential to take a hard look / relook at the story, rephrase it and create a platform for market participants for ease of deal-making.

On the M&A horizon, we are seeing re-negotiations of live transactions, revalidating offerings and numbers to see if strategic reasons still hold good, to re-assess deal valuations, covenants, etc. For already ‘closed’ transactions, re-negotiations are expected in the capital structure (cap tables, as they are known commonly), earn-out targets, valuation covenants, agreed business plans and covenants in the shareholder / transaction agreements. Such re-negotiations may also get extended to ESOPs and sweat equity allocations and agreed benchmarks.

For us professionals, we can add significant value on both sides of the table, especially keeping tax and regulatory requirements in mind.

RIGOROUS OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENTS COULD LEAD TO RESTRUCTURINGS AND DEALS

An assessment of costs, commitments, scenario analyses, markets and stakeholders’ concerns during the lockdown could help in identifying ‘good apples’ and ‘bad apples’.

Consolidation (mergers) and hive-offs (de-mergers or slump sale or itemised sale) can be evaluated for the following scenarios:

Indicator Possible solution
New-age business or product Hive-off to attract new-age capital
Excess capacities, facilities and assets Hive-off and sale / leases, white-labelling arrangements, joint ventures
Unviable undertakings / companies Consolidation with parent to optimise on costs going forward
Business succession issues due to shifting of talent, labour and resources Merger / consolidation with other market participants

 

Creating group or sector-level outsourcing vehicles with independent business plan

High-performing businesses Separating from common hotchpotch and value realisation

At times, segregation of businesses with distinct cash flows could help could lead the way forward for the company, investor interest and fund-raising. Such a raise also helps promoters to bring their contribution in the bank settlements which are generally in 20%-25% ratio of restructuring and thereby helping and working on an overall bailout plan.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) has fast-tracked the insolvency and resolution process requiring swift action on the part of management in the rescue attempt. It is often seen that viable assets / businesses are drawn into distress if not segregated in time.

By way of example, recently Gold’s Gym filed for bankruptcy protection in the US3. Interestingly, they have closed company-owned gyms; however, licensing (franchising) business is expected to keep the company a going concern. We have had many such examples in India in the past.

Global companies and investors are looking out for replacing China with India and other developing countries. In times like these, corporates which are placed well from the structure, clarity of business plan, readiness and compliance point of view could be the preferred choice for external investors and also help in faster ‘closing’ of deals.


3   https://www.goldsgym.com/restructure/

Even a simple decision of choice of a legal entity between Limited Liability Partnership vs. Private Limited Company could have significant impact on the IRR of the project merely due to the difference in applicable income tax rates.

In October, 2019 RIL created a structural as well as technological platform providing flexibility in deal-making4.

Structures like these provide significant flexibility in deal-making or primary listing at a multiple level, like platform company, telecom company, investees or even any combination thereof.

The current slowdown and the ability to go back to the drawing board can certainly be leveraged to prepare for M&As, restructurings and the expected resurgence in Q3FY21 onwards. Going by experience, we often find ourselves hard-pressed for availability of sufficient time to implement the most effective structure and thereby compromising on possible savings even in time value of money terms.

From the balance sheet optics point of view, historically, companies have also used the capital reduction process u/s 66 of the Companies Act to adjust negative reserves or assets which have lost value against the capital. Companies can evaluate such strategies to right-size the balance sheet, especially absorbing the Covid impact.

IMPACT OF COVID-SPECIFIC ANNOUNCEMENTS

As announced under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiatives and further ratified by the IBC (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 dated 5th June, 2020:

  • No application for IRP shall be filed for any default arising on or after 25th March, 2020 for a period of six months or such further period not exceeding one year from such date; and

4   https://www.ril.com/DownloadFiles/Jio%20Presentation_25Oct19.pdf

(ii)   there shall be a permanent ban on filing of applications for any default which may occur during the aforesaid period.

Separately, government also intends to raise the minimum threshold to initiate fresh IBC proceedings to Rs. 1 crore.

Corporates can use this for their benefit in multiple ways, including:

(a)   Design and negotiate a restructuring strategy directly with lenders and creditors;

(b) Speedy disposal of internal restructuring schemes involving merger, de-merger, capital reduction, etc. due to expected reduction in the burden of cases on NCLTs.

The Government of India has also proposed multiple schemes such as the Rs. 3 lakh crores Collateral-free Automatic Loans for Business5, including MSMEs; Rs. 20,000 crores Subordinate Debt for MSMEs; Rs. 50,000 crores equity infusion through MSME Fund of Funds. Ultimately, financing under any such scheme will be subject to the strength of the business and balance sheet. Corporates have been using mergers as a tool to demonstrate higher asset and capital base.

Other recent initiatives announced by the government giving impetus to transactions include:

(1)   Direct listing of securities by Indian public companies in foreign jurisdictions;

(2)   Sector-specific initiatives and reforms in agriculture, defence, space, coal, food processing, aircraft MRO, logistics, education, etc.;

(3)   Private companies which list NCDs on stock exchanges need not be regarded as listed companies.

OVERSEAS LISTING OF PUBLIC COMPANIES – A NEW PARADIGM

In December, 2018 SEBI published the Expert Committee Report6 suggesting a framework for listing shares of Indian companies on overseas exchanges and vice versa.

In March, 2020 the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2020 introduced in the Lok Sabha proposed to amend section 23 and provide for – such class of public companies may issue such class of securities for the purposes of listing on permitted stock exchanges in permissible foreign jurisdictions or such other jurisdictions, as may be prescribed.


5   https://www.eclgs.com/
6   Report of the Expert Committee for Listing of Equity Shares of companies incorporated in India on Foreign Stock Exchanges and of companies incorporated outside India on Indian Stock Exchanges, dated 4th December, 2020As of today, Indian companies can access the equity capital markets of foreign jurisdictions through the American Depository Receipts (‘ADR’) and Global Depository Receipts (‘GDR’) regimes. Indian companies can list their debt securities on foreign stock exchanges directly through the masala bonds and / or foreign currency convertible bond (‘FCCB’) / foreign currency exchangeable bonds (‘FCEB’) framework.

The proposed framework is expected to provide:

As stated in the Expert Committee Report, over the period 2013-2018, 91 companies with business operations primarily in China raised US $44 billion through initial public offerings on NYSE and NASDAQ in the USA. This indicated the potential for Indian companies, especially unicorns, to tap additional capital in the new structure.

The report also listed jurisdictions where listing could be allowed – USA, China, Japan, South Korea, UK, Hong Kong, France, Germany, Canada and Switzerland.

Key beneficiaries of this could be IT/ITES, unicorns, healthcare, infrastructure, companies having significant global exposure, companies having strong corporate governance and having third-party investors such as PE, VC investors.

From the process point of view, some of the critical aspects of the process include:

Key nuances of overseas listings include:

  1. Relatively higher process and adviser costs;
  2. Approximately six months of overall timelines;

iii.         Potential class action suits for significant drops in the prices, etc.;

  1. Understanding of and compliance with foreign regulations such as stock exchange regulations, regulations such as FCPA (anti-corruption regulations), FATF compliances; and
  2. Enhanced disclosures and continuous investor, market engagements.

Before this becomes a reality, substantial changes are expected across the spectrum from corporate law to securities law and tax laws.

OTHER RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

With the number of new proposals, disclosure requirements could also lead to re-assessment of group structures.

CARO 2020

Under CARO 20207, a disclosure is required whether a company is a Core Investment Company (‘CIC’) as per RBI regulations and whether the group has more than one CIC. As a fallout, if at such group level the aggregate asset of the CICs exceeds Rs. 100 crores, such CICs are required to be registered with RBI as ‘Systematically Important CICs’ (CIC-ND-SI).

Some of the legacy groups could unintentionally run into unwanted, tedious registration or compliance requirements with such new disclosures and focused assessment. It could even be reason enough to liquidate or consolidate unwanted holding / operating companies with the objective to cut costs and streamlining operations to reduce the regulatory burden.


7   Applicability extended from financial year 2019-20 to financial year 2020-21 onwards

Minority squeeze-outs

On 3rd February, 2020 sub-sections 11 and 12 were introduced in section 2308  to provide for compromise or arrangement to include takeover offers made in such manner as may be prescribed (except for listed companies where SEBI regulations are to be followed).

The MCA also notified the National Company Law (Amendment) Rules 2020 (‘NCLT Rules’) and the Companies (Compromises, Amalgamations and Arrangements) Amendment Rules, 2020 (‘Companies Rules’) to deal with the rules and procedures.

This will certainly provide an additional and specific window for companies looking to delist and provide them with a framework to eliminate the minority shareholders completely. This will help them to effectively take 100% control over operations and help in decision-making during corporate actions.

SEBI’s Press Release for Listed Companies having Stressed Assets9 and other relaxations

The timing of SEBI’s Press Release (PR No./35/2020) could not have been better. It principally deals with relaxation in the pricing of preferential issues and exemption from making an open offer for acquisitions in listed companies having ‘Stressed Assets’ (as per the eligibility criteria set out) by way of:

  1. Relaxation of pricing guidelines and limiting the pricing calculation based on past two weeks’ data only. Existing regulations also mandate considering 26 weeks’ price data which may not capture the Covid disruption;
  2. Exemption from making an open offer even if the acquisition is  beyond  the  prescribed threshold or if the open offer is warranted due to change in control.

The above proposal comes with conditions such as non-applicability for allotment to promoters, approval of majority of the minority shareholders, disclosure and monitoring of proposed use and lock-in period of three years.


8   https://tinyurl.com/ycdc3tvs
9. https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/jun-2020/relaxations-for-listed-companies-having-stressed-assets_46910.html

Further, SEBI also issued PR No./ 36 / 2020 temporarily relaxed pricing guidelines (up to 31st December, 2020) for all the corporates and provided an additional option to price the preferential allotments at the higher of 12-week or two-week prices with lock-in of three years.

The above decisions could help in faster resolution of stress and avert liquidation proceedings under IBC and large M&As and also provide an incentive to the promoters to provide liquidity to the companies at current prices.

Peculiar situations arising in deals

Declining valuations create opportunities to seek deals that create long-term value and total shareholder returns

 

In fact, the numbers of buyers could also be limited in today’s times. This could be the single most important reason for deals to return soon and chase companies that have survived the impact of Covid-19

Valuation and volatility issues around primary markets are expected to spur secondary market deals and M&As at least for the rest of F.Y. 2020.

Ex-IBC M&A activity itself has seen a lull even in F.Y. 2019. For various reasons, transactions also take too long to close. Limited partners of PE Funds have also advised the general partners and fund managers to tread with caution and focus on situations in existing portfolio companies during Covid.

Key discussions amongst the investment community are revolving around the following points:

(a) Re-negotiations are rampant;

(b) Decision-making has slowed across the globe and parties are trying to fully understand the impact of Covid-19 on businesses;

(c) M&A deal-making teams need to identify what would be the ‘new normal’;

(d) Sectors like healthcare, agri, logistics and technology would get more investments in the near future, as their inherent need has been clearer due to the Covid situation. On the other hand, discretionary spends like luxury goods, hotels, tourism, etc. might have longer downturns;

(e) The deal-making process will change to more virtual meetings, online DDs, etc., managements may not be immediately comfortable in taking such strategic decisions through virtual meetings, leading to slower deal-making processes;

(f) Companies / business models which are cash-positive will be more in demand and would attract buyers’ interest;

_____________________________________________________________

8   https://tinyurl.com/ycdc3tvs
9   https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/jun-2020/relaxations-for-listed-companies-having-stressed-assets_46910.html
10  MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Department of Economic Affairs) NOTIFICATION, New Delhi, 22ndApril, 2020

(g) Keeping a tab on regulatory changes, compliance timelines, ability to avail of fiscal benefit has been an area of concern. For example, post-22nd April, 202010 , foreign investment from neighbouring countries will require prior government approval.

Key changes in some of the deal-making aspects are dealt with as under:

Constrained due diligences with renewed focus areas:

The security of supply chains, possible crisis-related special termination rights in important contracts and other issues that were considered low-risk in times of economic growth will become more important.

Areas requiring special focus or an expert opinion during the diligences include:

(i)   Business Continuity Plan,

(ii) IT infrastructure and data security,

(iii) Insurance and Risk Mitigation policies,

(iv) Impact and scenario analysis, especially for fiscal benefits,

(v) Strength of supply chain.

One solution here could be ready with a vendor due diligence (‘VDD’) report upfront.

Pricing and instrument structuring: Pricing is generally a forward-looking exercise on the back of the latest financial performance.

Earnings / profitability-based pricing models are more relevant in case of established businesses, whereas indicators such as Daily Active Userbase (DAU), Merchandise Value or traction are used in valuing new-age businesses.

Due to changing dynamics and demand / supply chain disruptions, the problem is around sustainability of earnings of F.Y. 2020 and the estimation of earnings for F.Y. 2021.

In such situations, pricing based on a stable period which could be F.Y. 2021 or even F.Y. 2022, could be looked at whereby consideration can be back-ended or involving escrow arrangements. Such structures would also necessitate careful structuring from the income tax point of view.

Further, in case of FDI / cross-border transactions, transfer of equity instruments between an Indian resident and a non-resident, an amount not exceeding 25% of the total consideration –

(A) may be deferred or settled through escrow for a period not exceeding 18 months from the date of transfer agreement; or

(B) may be indemnified by the seller for a period not exceeding 18 months from the date of the payment of the full consideration.

While point (A) is often seen in practice, it does provide limited flexibility of 18 months. To address this, one can consider structuring staggered acquisition of shares over a period of time where performance needs to be comforted with an appropriate legal documentation or even using dilutive convertible instruments to the extent possible.

Disclosure lists, indemnities, representation and warranties:

While some of the risks are still not insurable, significant reliance and discussions could be around various disclosures since some of the standard representations may not hold good; let’s say the possibility of one of the largest customers calling off a contract, or a vendor renegotiating prices causing material adverse effect, etc.

It is imperative to provide for sufficient headroom for financial covenants typically agreed in shareholder agreements, especially for credit or quasi-credit deals.

Transaction structuring-related aspects:

Most often we see peculiar structuring needs around optimising tax costs, timelines, low compliances, etc. Table A (See below) provides a quick view of key parameters of some basic structuring ideas.

CONCLUSION

At the cost of many innocent lives, these unprecedented times are expected to bring in significant focus on sustainability and on an essentially minimalist and fundamental approach for any action or decisions. The ongoing fiscal, regulatory and geo-political changes are expected to add to the vibrancy for a living or corporal person.

Depending upon the strategy a business may adopt, defensive measures could help to protect the future and aggressive actions could actually help in transforming or even re-writing the future. On this positive note, we continue to look forward to some interesting corporate actions and decision-making.

Table A

Important Covid-19 Parameters Share Acquisition / Slump Sale Scheme of Arrangement (NCLT Route)
Consideration Cash flows or share swaps More flexible & comprehensive. Issue shares, convertible instruments, other securities or cash flow
Valuation Limited flexibility on account of certain taxation and commercial aspects and related costs Ability to structure the valuation subject to going concerns and future parameters
Tax Outflow Immediate tax liability – could put pressure on cash flows Could be structured as tax neutral combination or divestment, thereby postponing actual tax incidence to the liquidity event
Timelines 1 to 2 months

 

(Could increase in case of regulatory involvement)

4 to 8 months subject to NCLT process
Stamp Duty Costs Subject to state-specific laws

 

Could range between 0.25% to 3%, depending upon transfer of shares or transfer of business

Subject to state laws

 

Example, in Maharashtra – It is higher of 0.7% of value of shares issued and 5% of value of immoveable property situated in the state, subject to overall cap of 10% in the value of shares issued

GST Share transfers excluded. Asset sale subject to GST Transfer of business undertakings may not be subject to GST

LIMITATION ON FILING A PROBATE PETITION

INTRODUCTION

A probate means a copy of a Will
certified by the seal of a Court. A probate of a Will establishes the
authenticity and finality of that Will and validates all the acts of the
executors. It conclusively proves the validity of the Will; after a probate has
been granted, no claim can be raised about the genuineness or otherwise of the
Will.

 

One of the important questions
that often arises in relation to a probate is till when can a probate petition
be lodged? Is there a maximum time limit after the death of the testator within
which the executors must lodge the petition before the Courts? The Bombay High
Court had an occasion to consider this question in the case of Suresh
Manilal Mehta vs. Varsha Bhadresh Joshi, 2017 (1) AIR Bom R 487.
Let us
examine this issue.

 

NECESSITY
FOR A PROBATE


The Indian Succession Act,
1925
deals with the law relating to Wills. According to this Act, no
right as an executor or a legatee can be established in any Court unless a
Court has granted a probate of the Will under which the right is claimed. This
provision applies to all Christians. In the case of any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh
or Jain, it applies to:

(a) any Will made within the local limits of the ordinary original civil
jurisdiction of the High Courts of Madras or of Bombay, or within the
territories which were subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal;

(b) to all such Wills made outside those territories and limits so
far as it relates to immovable property situated within those territories or
limits.

 

Thus, for Hindus, Sikhs, Jains
and Buddhists, who are / whose immovable properties are situate outside the
territories of West Bengal or the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay, a
probate is not required. Similarly, where a Will is made outside Mumbai (say,
in Ahmedabad) and it makes no disposition of any immovable property in Mumbai
or other designated town, then such a Will would not require a probate.


An executor of such a Will may
need to do so only on the occurrence of a certain event, for instance, on a
suit being filed challenging that Will. However, a Will made in Mumbai or
pertaining to property in Mumbai needs to be compulsorily probated,
irrespective of whether or not there is an actual need for it.

 

DOES
THE LAW OF LIMITATION APPLY?

Coming back to the issue at hand,
the question which arises is whether the filing of a probate petition is barred
by any law of limitation, i.e., is there an outer time limit for filing the
petition? In this respect, one may consider the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963
which provides for periods of limitations for various suits.
Article 137 of the schedule to this Act states that in respect of any other
application for which no specific period of limitation is provided elsewhere in
that Act, the period of limitation is three years from when the right to apply
accrues. Further, Rule 382 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules
provides that in any case where an application for probate is made for the
first time after the lapse of three years from the death of the deceased, the
reason for the delay shall be explained in the petition. If the explanation is
unsatisfactory, the Prothonotary and Senior Master may require such further
proof of the alleged cause of delay as he may deem fit.

 

In Vasudev Daulatram
Sadarangani vs. Sajni Prem Lalwani, AIR 1983 Bom 268
, the Court dealt
with the issue of whether Article 137 was applicable to applications for
probate, letters of administration or succession certificate. The Court held
that there was no warrant for the assumption that this right to apply accrued
on the date of death of the deceased. It held that the right to apply
may therefore accrue not necessarily within three years from the date of the
deceased’s death but when it becomes necessary to apply, which may be any time
after the death of the deceased, be it after several years.
However,
reasons for delay must be satisfactorily explained to the Court. Further, such
an application was for the Court’s permission to perform a legal duty created
by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and was a continuous
right which could be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as
long as the right to do so survived.

 

This view of the High Court was
approved by the Supreme Court in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur vs. Kirandeep
Kaur & Ors (2008) 8 SCC 463.
However, the Supreme Court also held
that the application for grant of a probate or letters of administration was
covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In Krishna Kumar Sharma vs.
Rajesh Kumar Sharma (2009) 11 SCC 537
the Supreme Court once again reiterated
this view and also held that the right to apply for a probate was a continuous
right.

 

WHAT
IS THE MAXIMUM TIME LIMIT?

In Suresh Manilal Mehta
(Supra)
a daughter opposed her father’s probate petition. Here, the
probate petition was filed 33 years after the testator died. She argued that
such a long delay in seeking the probate was itself a sufficiently suspicious
circumstance to warrant the dismissal of the suit, especially if there was no
explanation for the delay. The explanation for this delay was that under the
husband’s Will, a majority of his estate devolved upon his wife and some
portion on his son. Further, his daughter was to take in the residuary estate
only if both her parents and her brother were no more and if her brother died
before turning 21 years of age. Since that was not the case the daughter did
not get the residuary estate. When the mother got the father’s estate under his
Will, no dispute was raised. However, when she died and her Will was sought to
be probated, her daughter argued that first the father’s Will must be probated
since the mother derived her entire estate from the father. Thus, the act of
probating the father’s Will was a good 33 years after his death.

 

The High Court held that the view
that Article 137 would have no application at all in any case to any
application for probate was incorrect. However, neither of the aforesaid two
Supreme Court decisions had held that the date of death of the deceased would
invariably provide the starting point of limitation. On the contrary, both the
decisions confirmed that the right to apply for a probate was a continuing
right so long as the right to do so survived.

 

Giving the analogy of two Wills,
one made in Mumbai and the other outside Mumbai, the High Court explained that
it could not be that the three-year limitation from the testator’s death would
apply to one of those two Wills, the one made in Mumbai, and not to the other
Will, i.e., the one made outside Mumbai. The date of death of the deceased
could not, therefore, be the starting point for the limitation in two otherwise
identical situations separated only by geographies, or else there would be
different starting points of limitation!

 

Accordingly, the Court held that
the only consistent view was that the right to apply for a probate was a
continuing right
and the application must be made within three years of
the time when the right to apply accrued. An executor named in the Will could
apply for probate at any time so long as the right to do so survived.

 

CONCLUSION

This
is an extremely essential judgment which would help ease the process of
obtaining probates. There are numerous cases where probates have not been
obtained and this has led to the properties / assets getting stuck. In all such
cases it should be verified whether a probate petition could now be launched,
even if it is many years after the testator’s death.

IS IT FAIR TO PUNISH TAXPAYERS FOR A FAULTY GSTN?

BACKGROUND

When the GST (Goods and Services
Tax) law was introduced in India in 2017, sufficient time was not given to
taxpayers, professionals, technical teams and the country as a whole to
understand it. Adapting to something new takes its own time to understand and
implement at the ground level; GST has been no exception to this thumb rule.
Every new reform will require an initial learning experience and will also face
some resistance; clearly, the government could have managed its implementation
better had it given sufficient time to build the GSTN portal.

 

Earlier, taxpayers were so
disappointed with VAT compliances and multiple State taxes that they adopted a
welcoming approach to GST and were willing to embrace it wholeheartedly. The
government had spoken so much about it and boosted it so much that there was a
hope in the taxpayers that the new law would be easy to understand and
implement and that the return-filing process would be smooth. However, the
frequent changes in the GST law has led to delays in technical implementation
at the GSTN portal which has made it cumbersome to comply with and resulted in
the wasting of thousands of person-hours of both taxpayers and professionals.

 

In this article, we have
highlighted some of the technical problems faced by taxpayers in compliance due
to bugs and errors in the GSTN portal; although it has been about 31 months
since its introduction, the GSTN portal has not been functioning very well.

 

ISSUES
AT HAND

Taxpayers cannot be expected to
have enough technical knowledge of the GSTN portal and the concept behind it.
Still, since it has now become a law, or kanoon, both taxpayers and professionals
are making valiant attempts to carry on business and adhere to the compliances
in accordance with the law.

 

Registering on the GSTN portal is
a lengthy and time-consuming process. It is a very stringent procedure and
requires too many details and specific formats for uploading documents; so is
the case with various other forms and returns. The businessman is being forced
to spend more hours fulfilling compliances, accumulating various data points,
most of which could have been avoided, rather than focusing on his business and
growth prospects. This is followed by a continuous process of filing
back-to-back returns either monthly or quarterly, as applicable, instead of a
single return having all the details. Moreover, there are no revision / amendment
facilities for the returns filed.

 

Limitless updates and
notifications
have now become the norm 
and there is no clarity; instead, things are becoming more complicated
and cumbersome, thanks to the Advance Ruling Authority. The constant updates,
notifications, etc. have become a nightmare and any single unintentional missed
update of notification results in penalty and interest. Frequent changes and
revisions
in the GST rates have led to uncertainty for both businessmen and
government. Further, the new Input Tax Credit (ITC) rule limiting ITC from 20%
to 10%, and managing all the calculations has become difficult for SMEs and
also for large corporates. Besides, there is a severe lack of natural
justice
as the burden to prove the purchase details is placed on the
purchasers instead of punishing the defaulting sellers. The increase of
government tax revenue by curbing the working capital has thereby created
unfair business practices and pressure of paying tax on honest taxpayers; and this
might have even led to an increase in the black economy because many small
businesses have started to do business in cash, not to avoid GST but to avoid
compliance because of the torturous procedures of GST.

 

The GSTN portal is faulty and
weak
and no repair has been done thanks to which both taxpayers and
professionals are facing problems. There is a lack of clarity and knowledge
with the technical support team. The helpline numbers have turned out to be
helpless. There is so much pressure on the GSTN portal that it is always down
or under maintenance. In spite of the faulty system, it is the taxpayer who has
to bear the burden of paying late fees even if payment is done within
the due date but there were system issues while filing the returns. The faulty
and delayed release of forms and utilities without proper testing has added
further to the existing problems. There are many bugs and tech issues in
various forms and returns, creating hurdles in filing the returns within the
due date. Extensions given by the government can be a temporary solution;
however, it will not help unless the system is upgraded to optimum capacity to
handle taxpayers’ logins. Despite all these facts, government continues to
levy penalty and interest for late filing
of returns, in spite of knowing
that very often the GSTN portal is out of service.

 

Separate due dates for filing of
returns and payment of tax should be taken into consideration. Further, extreme
importance is given to set-off of tax instead of considering the date of
deposit of tax as the date of payment. Very few resources are available to deal
with the plethora of problems. Solutions to problems are offered quite late and
are not effective enough to deal with those problems. Moreover, the opinions
of ground-level experts are neglected
and more trust is placed on the
bureaucracy.

 

THE QUESTION IS – IS IT FAIR?

Is it fair for the taxpayers to
shift their focus from business to adhering to innumerable compliances? The new
ITC rule which has added to the unfairness and its working has worsened things
even further. Is it right for purchasers to be burdened and punished for
defaulting sellers? Let’s understand this with an illustration.

 

Mr. A has a business selling
goods and pays GST on the same. He purchases goods from Mr. B and these goods
are eligible for claiming of ITC. But Mr. B defaults in making GST payments to
the government and filing his returns, which results in non-reflection of the
transaction on Mr. A’s  GSTR2A. Mr. A has
honestly paid his share of tax to the government but is unable to claim his
rightful share due to the default by Mr. B. Is this fair to Mr. A?

 

Similarly, with the new ITC rule
it has become practically impossible to do the workings and track the entries
of those that are reflecting in GSTR2A on a month-on-month basis. If a dealer
is filing monthly returns of GSTR3B and quarterly returns of GTSR1, the entire
working capital is curbed and the taxpayer is at times paying taxes from his
savings instead of his business because entries are not reflecting in GSTR2A.

Is it fair for professionals to
have so many continuous updates and notifications with so much ambiguity?

 

PROBLEMS (AND SOLUTIONS) WITH THE GSTN
PORTAL

(i) Rectification and revision of all GST returns to be made available,
say once a quarter;

(ii) Increasing the capacity of the portal from the existing 1.5 lakh
to 50 lakhs (in line with the Income Tax Portal) to handle the login for one
crore taxpayers;

(iii) Ensure effective functioning of the helpdesk and helpline numbers
and also provide training to the assigned staff, thus providing immediate and
effective solutions to grievances;

(iv) Immediate solutions of glitches and drawbacks on the GSTN portal
within ten days;

(v) Waiver of late fees, especially when the fees are levied due to
the faults and failures of the GSTN system;

(vi) Refund of late fees paid earlier by those whose deadlines and due
dates were later extended;

(vii) Simple procedures and format of filing GST returns; 50% of data
sought in various tables of annual returns forms are unnecessary and can be
avoided for smoother filing;

(viii) Separate due dates for payment of tax and filing of returns so that
downloading system reports like GSTR2A and reconciliation become easier;

(ix) Scrap the GSTR3B form and take the summary of sales and purchase
from both purchasers’ and sellers’ quarterly returns instead of bill-wise
summary;

(x) Provide a solution to the illogical sections of 16(4) and 36(4)
of the IGST;

(xi) Date of tax deposit to be considered as the payment date;

(xii) System testing and checking prior to the release of any new form
or process;

(xiii) Waive late fees until the GST portal turns smooth and efficient;

(xiv) Single return to be introduced consisting of all the details of receipts
and supply;

(xv) Amendments and notifications without ambiguity;

(xvi) ITC rules to be amended in an effective manner, thus making it fair
to practice business for taxpayers and shifting the burden on to defaulting
sellers;

(xvii) Furnish and publish telephone and email ids that are working and
reachable of officers concerned on the website;

(xviii) Self-adjustments of balances in cash ledger and electronic credit
ledger across multiple GSTNs of a single legal entity;

(xix) GSTR3B filing for earlier period without late fees;

(xx) E-Act – there are so many changes, there should be a mandatory
updated legal position, Act, Rules, Notifications all incorporated at one
place. We do have such daily updated laws under the Companies Act, 2013;

(xxi) Bringing out amendments only once a month (with reasonable
exceptions) like a master circular rather than uncontrolled rolling out of
changes.

 

CONCLUSION

Even today, GSTN portal is not
glitch-free; it would still be a bumpy ride for taxpayers and professionals who
are dealing with it; Infosys Chairman Nandan Nilekani has promised to solve all
technical issues by July, 2020. However, by that time the new forms are
expected to be live (by October, 2020) with new challenges.

 

The demand
from taxpayers and professionals is very simple and can be met if there is
willingness on the part of the government to act fast rather than acting only
when the problems are highlighted by professionals and taxpayers.

 

The
government would do well to work upon making the frameworks and the GSTN portal
more user-friendly; the present situation and scope of GST leads to varied
interpretations, thereby resulting in possible litigations in the GST regime in
the near future. With the new forms deadline deferred by the government, we
hope the forms are made live with proper testing and feedback from all
stakeholders.

 

IS IT FAIR?

The
question remains, is it fair to punish taxpayers for a faulty GSTN?

SEBI’S RECENT ORDER ON INSIDER TRADING – INTERESTING ISSUES

SEBI recently passed an interim
order in an alleged case of insider trading and ordered impounding of profits
running into several crores of rupees, along with interest on it. This order
was apart from other adverse directions in the form of restrictions and also
such further other action that may be initiated later in the form of penalty,
etc. While the order by itself has several points which are analysed here,
there are certain other issues arising out of this order, as also a settlement
order in a related matter of the company, which also need a look.

 

Insider trading is something that
every securities regulator across the world seeks to prevent and strictly
punish and, as an offence, stands second perhaps only to blatant market
manipulation. Insider trading is a breach of trust by insiders with
shareholders and the public generally and by itself also leads to loss of faith
in stock markets. When persons are placed in positions of power and access to
sensitive information, they are duty-bound not to profit illegitimately from
it. If, for example, a Chief Financial Officer learns something from sensitive
information relating to accounts / finance made available to him due to his
position of power and trust, he is duty-bound not to exploit it for his
personal profit. For instance, if he comes to know that his company has made
substantial profits, he is expected not to buy shares based on this information
that is not yet public and also not to share such information.

 

The
offence of insider trading – whether dealing on the basis of such unpublished
sensitive information or sharing such information – is so difficult to prove,
that the law has been drafted very widely and presumptively. Many aspects are
presumed in law even if some of these presumptions can be rebutted by persons
accused of insider trading. The tools of punishment for insider trading
available with SEBI are varied and far-reaching. The profits made can be
disgorged, penalty up to three times the profits made, or Rs. 25 crores,
whichever is higher, can be levied, the guilty persons can be debarred from
capital markets and so on.

Let us examine and analyse a recent
order which is a good test study of how the legal concepts are applied in an
actual case (Order No. WTM/GM/IVD/55/2019-20 in the matter of PC Jeweller
Limited, dated 17th December, 2019).

 

BASIC FACTS

SEBI has made certain allegations of
findings relating to this listed company, PC Jeweller Limited (‘PC Jeweller /
Company’). These allegations of findings are given below as the basic facts and
then we will see how SEBI established the guilt of insider trading, how the
alleged illegitimate profits from insider trading have been calculated and what
initial directions have been issued.

 

To
broadly summarise, the company had proposed a substantial buyback of its shares
and obtained approval of its board of directors. The announcement resulted in a
sharp rise in its share price. Later, however, when the company approached the
lead banker / lender for approval, it was rejected. The rejection was
reconfirmed when the lender was approached a second time. Consequently, the
company had no choice but to withdraw the buyback decision. In the meanwhile,
during this period certain insiders not only sold shares in the company at the
then ruling high price but even squared off certain buy futures and also
entered into fresh sell futures. Each of these resulted in the insider
allegedly avoiding significant loss and even profited. The buy / long future
was for purchase of shares and if squared off at the ruling high price, it
saved the insider from suffering loss that would have arisen when the share
price fell after the announcement of withdrawal of the buyback decision.
Similarly, the put option was for sale of shares at the ruling high price and
when squared off when the price fell, profits were made.

 

Several issues arose. Whether the
company should have initiated the buyback proposal without duly disclosing that
it was subject to approval of lenders? Whether this was a case of insider
trading and, if yes, what action should be taken?

 

The following are some specific
facts as per findings in this interim order (note that the interim order is issued
without giving parties a hearing, which is given after the order and
which may result in modification of facts / directions):

 

(i) There
were two directors who were brothers and promoters. There was another brother
who was ex-Chairman. There were certain relatives of such persons who were the
sons and wives of such sons. There was also a private limited company (QDPL) in
which a family member held 50% shares. One of the brothers passed away by the
time this order was passed;

(ii) The company initiated the buyback proposal on 25th April,
2018 after internal discussions followed by discussions with auditors and
merchant bankers. Thereafter, it convened a Board meeting on 10th
May, 2018 when the Board approved the buyback;

(iii) The buyback proposed was at a significant price and of a
significant amount. It was for 1.21 crore shares at a price up to Rs. 350 (the
ruling market price of shares just before the Board meeting was about Rs. 216).
The total buyback consideration would have been approximately Rs. 424 crores;

(iv) The company also had in the meantime initiated approval of
shareholders for the buyback through postal ballot. However, it appears that
the outcome of the voting of the ballot was not announced, although it appears
that more than 99% of votes were in favour of the buyback;

(v) However,
on 7th July, 2018, the lead banker rejected the request to allow the
buyback of shares. A request to reconsider was also rejected. Consequently, the
company convened a Board meeting on 13th July, 2018 to withdraw the
buyback proposal and duly announced the decision;

(vi) Certain relatives of the promoter-directors and QDPL (the
private company in which a relative held 50% shares) entered into certain
transactions during the time after the announcement of the buyback
proposal but before the announcement regarding the withdrawal of the
buyback. Fifteen lakh shares were sold. A long position in futures of 2.25 lakh
shares was squared off by a similar put future. A fresh short position of three
lakh shares was also entered into.

 

FINDINGS BY SEBI

SEBI made the following findings in
its interim order: The relations and transactions between the
promoter-directors and the relatives / QDPL who traded in the shares / futures
were laid down in detail. These relatives / QDPL were thus held to be insiders
/ beneficiaries of inside information. The timing of the transactions was
specified as being during the time after the buyback was announced and
information about the rejection by the lead banker, but before the time
when the announcement of withdrawal of buyback was published.

 

SEBI worked out the notional gains /
losses avoided by such transactions by taking the price when such transactions
were undertaken and the price quoted in the markets after the announcement of
withdrawal of buyback was made. This was calculated at about Rs. 7.10 crores.
To this, interest @ 12% per annum was added till the date of order which
amounted to Rs. 1.21 crores. The total came to Rs. 8.31 crores.

 

ORDERS BY SEBI

SEBI held that the
promoter-directors were insiders and they communicated the price-sensitive
information to persons connected to them who traded in the shares / futures.
Thus, there were two sets of alleged violations. One was by the
promoter-directors who were alleged to have shared the price-sensitive
information to persons connected to them. The second was by such connected
persons who dealt in the shares / futures based on such information and avoided
a large amount of losses.

 

SEBI directed the persons who traded
in the shares / futures to deposit the notional gains along with interest in an
escrow account pending final orders. Till that time, no transactions were
allowed in their bank, demat and other accounts and they were not allowed to
dispose of any of their other assets, except for complying with such directions
and till such deposit was made.

 

Further, they were asked to show
cause why such notional gains should not be formally disgorged, along with
interest, and why they should not be restrained from accessing securities
markets / dealing in securities for an appropriate period. The
promoter-director was also asked to show cause why he should also not be
restrained similarly from accessing securities markets / dealing in securities.

 

SETTLEMENT ORDER

Interestingly, a settlement order
was passed a few weeks before the interim order. Vide this, the company agreed
to pay Rs. 19,12,500 as settlement charges for certain alleged defaults in
disclosures. These mainly related to not informing in time about the objections
of the lenders to the buyback offer which was stated to be material information. SEBI had initiated
proceedings to levy a penalty. However, the company came forward for a
settlement and paid the agreed amount.

 

OBSERVATIONS

There
are several interesting issues here. Some are lessons for companies and persons
associated with such companies generally. The other is about concerns over such
interim orders and findings and their implications.

 

It
is critical that companies and managements should consider carefully the
implications of major decisions and disclose to public meticulously all
relevant information in that regard. In this case, the issue was not so much
that the buyback had to be cancelled because of lack of approval from the lead
lender, but that such condition was not disclosed beforehand. It may be that
often such approvals ordinarily do come in due course. But in this particular
case, it mattered significantly, so much so that the buyback had to be called
off and the share price seems to have crashed because of this.

 

Promoters
/ insiders need to be generally very careful in dealing in shares. There are
many safeguards provided in law. For example, prior approval of the Compliance
Officer ensures a check on whether any price-sensitive information remains
undisclosed. However, even in such cases, the promoters / management may have
as much, if not more, knowledge of what critical issues may arise.

 

There
are also concerns about such an interim order and some very general
observations can be made for academic analysis. In this case, it appears that
the promoters held more than 60% shares and even after the sale, the holding
was 57.59%. It is not as if a very significant portion of the shares was sold.
One does not know whether there was a particular reason for such sale other
than what SEBI has alleged for the sale of the shares. Interim orders, it is
well settled, have to be made sparingly. The SEBI order states that if an
interim order is not passed, it would ‘result in irreparable injury to the
interests of the securities markets and the investors’. From the facts stated
in the order itself, the promoter holding is very significant even after such
sale. It is not clear how then such an order would have prevented such
‘irreparable injury’. An interim order of such a nature is stigmatic and
restrictions placed can affect day-to-day business. One wonders whether first
issuing a show-cause notice giving all alleged facts as presented and giving
due opportunity to the parties would have been a better course.

 

Be that as it may, such orders continue to
provide and reinforce lessons for companies, promoters and insiders generally
for exercising due care.

OVERVIEW OF AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996: ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the volume and intensity of cross-border
investment, trade and commerce have become the key indicators for defining the
developmental growth index of a sovereign state. The Government of India has
implemented a myriad legislations and policies to attract investments and make
it easier to do business in India.

 

A key impediment of doing business in India has been the
difficulty of enforcing contracts and the time taken by courts and tribunals to
give determinations. An effective and efficient dispute resolution mechanism is
critical for instilling confidence in investors and to achieve the goals of a
growing economy.

 

Against this backdrop, the Government of India (GoI) after a
period of almost 20 years, in the year 2015 made much-needed amendments to the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the 1996 Act) to ensure that
arbitrations are quicker and smoother. The amendments were indeed
path-breaking, since some of the amended provisions went well beyond what the
law in even arbitration-friendly countries provided for. These included
disclosures of impartiality (adopting the International Bar Association’s
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, in the Act
itself) and providing for strict timelines within which an arbitration is to be
completed.

 

However, the GoI and the stakeholders in the arbitration
process felt that various provisions required clarifications or amendments. The
GoI, which has been closely watching the situation, was eager to provide
necessary support to the legislative framework for arbitrations in India.

 

A high-level committee under the chairmanship of Justice B.N.
Srikrishna, former judge of the Supreme Court of India, was constituted by the
Central Government to submit a report on how to achieve the goal of making
India an arbitration hub, to explore the lacunae in the effective
implementation of the 1996 Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment), 2015 (2015 Amendment) and also to provide a robust scheme of
legislation aligned with the letter and spirit of the UNCITRAL Model Law and
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the New York Convention).

 

Based partly on the report of the high-level committee, the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) 2019 Bill (the Bill) was framed and
placed before both the Houses of Parliament for approval. Both Houses swiftly
approved the Bill and the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment Act) 2019
(2019 Amendment) was passed. The 2019 Amendment received Presidential assent on
9th August, 2019 and by a Gazette Notification dated 30th
August, 2019 bearing No. S.O. 3154(E) (Gazette Notification), certain
provisions, namely, section 1, section 4-9 (both inclusive), sections 11-13
(both inclusive) and sections 15 of the 2019 Amendment were brought into force.
Some of the other provisions are yet to be notified. The speed at which such
amendments were passed and came to be implemented makes GoI’s intention to
support arbitrations clear. But has the GoI been successful? Some of the
amendments have given rise to mystifying questions which will be explored in
this article.

 

KEY
AMENDMENTS UNDER THE 2019 AMENDMENT

 

Definition of arbitral institution

Section 1(ca) inserted by the 2019 Amendment provides for the
definition of arbitral institution’ to mean ‘arbitral
institutions designated by the Supreme Court / High Court under the Act’.

This would mean that the established arbitral institutions such as the
International Court of Arbitration (ICC), the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre (SIAC), the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA), etc., would have to necessarily be designated to fall within the scope
of the definition of arbitral institution under the amended 1996 Act. This
section has been notified under the Gazette Notification. However, it is
unclear how arbitral institutions of the world will be designated and what
criteria will be required to be met to be recognised under the 1996 Act.

 

Arbitral appointments u/s 11

Sub-section 3A, inserted by the 2019 Amendment, empowers the
Supreme Court and High Court to designate arbitral institutions graded by the
Arbitration Council of India (ACI) u/s 43-I to make arbitral appointments. It
further provides that in cases where the High Court concerned does not have any
graded arbitral institutions within its jurisdiction, the Chief Justice of such
High Court is empowered to maintain a panel of arbitrators to discharge the
functions within the meaning of ‘arbitral institution’ under the amended 1996
Act. The arbitrators shall be entitled to fees as prescribed under the Fourth
Schedule of the amended 1996 Act.

 

The 2019 Amendment provides an explanation to sub-section 14
of section 11 that the rates as per the Fourth Schedule shall not be applicable
in cases of international commercial arbitration and in arbitrations (other
than international commercial arbitration) where parties have agreed for
determination of fees as per the rules of the arbitral institution. It may be
inferred from this that parties can agree to determination of fees by an
arbitral institution which is designated by the Supreme Court / High Court.
However, what happens in cases where an arbitral institution is not designated
with the Supreme Court / High Court remains unanswered.

 

The amendment also states that such panel of arbitrators as
maintained by the High Court is subject to review by the Chief Justice of the
High Court concerned. Although it may seem that the intention behind the
amendment to section 11 is to popularise institutional arbitration in India,
however, the intervention and excessive supervision may hamper party autonomy.
These provisions have not been notified as yet. There are several
representations pending with the GoI to revisit these provisions.

 

TIMELINES

The 2015 Amendment introduced a timeline of 12 months from
the date an arbitrator entered reference to complete the arbitration. This was
extendable by six months by consent of the parties. Further extensions could be
granted only by the courts.

 

The 2019 Amendment now provides that an arbitral tribunal has
to render an award within 12 months from the date of completion of pleadings
u/s 23(4) in cases of domestic arbitrations. Section 23(4) has been introduced,
providing a timeline for filing of the pleadings as six months from the date of
the arbitrator/s receiving notice of appointment. It may be noted that this
provision does not take into account the timelines for filing counterclaims and
defence thereto, rejoinders and sur-rejoinders. This provision has been
notified under the Gazette Notification. There could be challenges in some
cases, especially since there are times when parties seek additional time to
permit settlement talks, even once an arbitrator is appointed. The 12-month
timeline does not apply to international commercial arbitration. It is not
clear why international commercial arbitrations have been excluded from such
timelines and such distinction between domestic and international arbitrations
seems artificial. It is unlikely that foreign parties choosing arbitration in
India would appreciate this, since they would also desire that the arbitration
is concluded within the timeframe.

 

The Delhi High Court in its recent judgment in the matter of Shapoorji
Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Jindal India Thermal Power Limited
1
 has clarified that the new
timelines set out in the 2019 Amendment would be applicable not only to
arbitration proceedings which have commenced after the 2019 Amendment, but also
to arbitration proceedings which are pending as on the date of enactment of the
2019 Amendment. This will add to additional uncertainty, since there may be
pending arbitrations in which pleadings have not been filed within six months.

 

Amendment to section 34

The amendment to section 34 provides that the challenge to an
arbitral award could be established only on the basis of the record of the
Arbitral Tribunal.

 

The amendment was a welcome step to ensure speedy disposal of
challenges by losing parties, wherein the parties seek to produce new /
additional documents and lead evidence before the courts at the stage of
challenge to an award, thus fundamentally trying to re-open the arbitral
dispute itself. However, in September, 2019 the Supreme Court in Canara
Nidhi Limited vs. M. Shashikala
2  clarified the legal position that a challenge
u/s 34 ‘will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was
before the arbitrator and that cross-examination of persons swearing into the
affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary.
’ It will be
interesting to see how this judgment is used further as it provides for an open
field for the practitioners to adduce additional evidences, by proving that
their case falls within the exceptional circumstances contemplated under the Canara
judgment.

 

CONFIDENTIALITY

The issue of confidentiality pertaining to arbitral
proceedings has been debated extensively in international arbitrations. The
1996 Act did provide for confidentiality to be maintained in cases of
conciliation, but not in arbitration. In international arbitrations, the
parties have the option to apply the confidentiality provisions under the
International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines and Rules; however, the IBA
Rules and Guidelines can only act as a soft law. The insertion of section 42A
provides the disclosure of the arbitral award to be made only where it is
necessary for implementing or enforcing the award. It is a welcome move to
provide statutory backing to the concept of confidentiality in arbitral
proceedings and ensuring that the stand taken by the Indian legislation is akin
to the international best practices. However, the interplay between the ACI’s
power to keep a depository of arbitral awards and confidentiality provisions is
something to be seen in future.

 

Protection afforded to an arbitrator for action taken in
good faith

Under the newly-inserted section 42B of the 2019 Amendment,
immunity is now provided to the arbitrators against liabilities for acts
performed in their capacity as arbitrators, so long as they are in good faith.
This section should act as an incentive for more people to act as arbitrators.

 

Arbitration Council of India

The 2019 Amendment sought to insert an altogether new Part
‘1A’ to the 1996 Act for the establishment and incorporation of an independent
body corporate, namely, the Arbitration Council of India (ACI) for the purposes
of grading of arbitral institutions as per the qualifications and norms
contained in the Eighth Schedule (as inserted vide the 2019 Amendment) which
includes criteria relating to the infrastructure, quality and calibre of
arbitrators, performance and compliance of time limits for disposal of domestic
or international commercial arbitrations, etc., formulating policies and training
modules to adept professionals in the field of arbitration and ADR mechanisms.

 

Section 43C(1) provides that the ACI shall be composed of a
retired Supreme Court or High Court judge, appointed by the Central Government
in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, as its Chairperson; an eminent
arbitration practitioner nominated as the Central Government Member; an eminent
academician having research and teaching experience in the field of
arbitration, appointed by the Central Government in consultation with the
Chairperson, as the Chairperson-Member; Secretary to the Central Government in
the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice and Secretary to
the Central Government in the Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance,
both as ex-officio members; one representative of a recognised body of
commerce and industry, chosen on rotational basis by the Central Government, as
a part-time member; and Chief Executive Officer-Member-Secretary,
ex-officio.

 

The Ministry of Law and Justice has, in its press release
dated 12th February, 2020, enlisted the draft rules prepared to set
in motion the proposal of the ACI and has invited comments from various
stakeholders on the following:

 

(1)   The
Arbitration Council of India (the Salary, Allowances and other Terms and
Conditions of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020;

(2)   The
Arbitration Council of India (the Travelling and other Allowances payable to
Part-time Member) Rules, 2020;

(3)   The
Arbitration Council of India (the Qualifications, Appointment and other Terms
and Conditions of the service of the Chief Executive Officer) Rules, 2020;

(4)  The
Arbitration Council of India (the Number of Officers and Employees of the
Secretariat of the Council and the Qualifications, Appointment and other Terms
and Conditions of the officers and employees of the Council) Rules, 2020.

 

This provision has received vastly
differing views from the arbitration fraternity. On the one hand, it is said to
enhance the use of institutional arbitration over ad hoc, as well as an
attempt to ensure that there is some quality control over institutions and
arbitrators. On the other hand, stakeholders have taken the view that being
accredited by government officials amounts to regulation and excessive control
of arbitrators. This is all the more significant, given that the government is
one of the largest litigants in India. The provisions relating to the ACI have
not been notified yet.

 

The Eighth Schedule

One of the biggest benefits for
parties opting for arbitration rather than a court process to dispute
resolution is the right to nominate an arbitrator of their choice. This gives
flexibility in the process and often parties can nominate domain experts to
determine a particular matter, rather than someone who may be a qualified
lawyer or a retired judge but who may not be as well versed in the subject
matter of the dispute. The 2019 Amendment has introduced an Eighth Schedule
setting out the eligibility requirements for the accreditation and
qualification of an individual as an arbitrator. These provisions have not been
notified as yet.

 

RESTRICTING FOREIGN LAWYERS?

While such accreditation and
qualification of individuals acting as arbitrators may, at first glance, seem
attractive as a measure for quality control, some of the eligibility criteria
are highly restrictive and will infringe on a party’s right to appoint an
arbitrator of its choice, keeping in mind the nature of the dispute.

 

Some qualifications under the Eighth
Schedule require an arbitrator to, inter alia, have knowledge of the
laws in India such as the Constitution of India and the labour laws. Such
knowledge may not have any connection with a dispute at hand, such as, say,
whilst determining a matter relating to a contractual dispute governed entirely
by foreign law.

 

The Eighth Schedule also speaks of
appointment of advocates having ten or more years’ experience and being
registered under the Advocates Act in India. This throws open the question
whether this would potentially restrict foreign lawyers from acting as
arbitrators in India. This may prove to be an issue in a contract in disputes
having smaller value. A lawyer of ten or more years’ experience may charge an
amount that is a substantial portion or even more than the amount in dispute.
Besides, the ban on foreign qualified lawyers acting as arbitrators would be
contrary to the ethos of international arbitration and could discourage foreign
parties from seating their arbitrations in India since they would be prevented
from appointing an arbitrator of their choice. This may be more significant if the arbitration itself is
governed by foreign law (although seated in India).

 

Of the changes and standards
introduced under the 2019 Amendment, the Eighth Schedule by far contains the
most restrictive provisions which might take a toll on the promotion of
arbitrations in India. In the interest of promoting India as a hub for
arbitration, it is hoped that the government will reconsider this amendment
and, inter alia, allow foreign lawyers to act as arbitrators.

Insertion of section 87

When
the 2015 Amendment came into force, there was a huge debate as to whether the
amendments would apply retrospectively or prospectively. This was ultimately
settled by the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs.
Kochi Cricket Private Limited and Ors
3. Interestingly, the
GoI had filed an affidavit in the matter stating that its intention was to have
the 2015 Amendment apply only to arbitrations invoked after the 2015 Amendment
came into force. However, in the judgment, despite the position of the GoI stated
on affidavit, on an interpretation of a plain reading of the language used in
the 2015 Amendment it was ultimately held, inter alia, that the 2015
Amendment applied to applications which were pending in various courts
challenging an award in an arbitral proceeding which commenced before the
enactment of the 2015 Amendment. The judgment also went on to analyse and hold
exactly which section of the amendment would apply to ongoing arbitrations and
proceedings arising therefrom and which amendments would apply to arbitrations
invoked after the 2015 Amendment came into force.

 

The 2019 Amendment attempted to undo
the position held in the above judgment. The 2019 Amendment provides that,
unless otherwise agreed by parties, it shall not apply to:

(a)   the
arbitral proceedings commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment;

(b) the
Court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings
irrespective of whether such court proceedings have commenced prior to or after
the commencement of the 2015 Amendment.

 

MAKING INDIA AN ARBITRATION HUB?

It was further clarified that the
2015 Amendment shall only apply to arbitral proceedings that have commenced on
or after the introduction of the 2015 Amendment and to court proceedings
arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings.

 

However, in the matter of Hindustan
Construction Company Limited & Anr vs. Union of India
4
the Supreme Court has now held that section 87 of the 2019 Amendment is
manifestly arbitrary and unconstitutional. This judgment goes on to clarify
that the 2015 Amendment, in its original form, shall be applicable as held in
the Board of Control for Cricket in India matter.

Observing the latest arbitration
trends in India, there is not an iota of doubt that the GoI is leaving no stone
unturned to try to make India an arbitration hub. However, the continuous
change in the position of the arbitration law has left many questions
unanswered. Some well-intentioned amendments also have underlying issues that
need to be revisited.

It
is also noteworthy that the Constitutional validity of the 2019 Amendments is
under challenge before the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 76 of 2020
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. The main challenge is to the
provisions relating to the qualification required to be an arbitrator and the
mandatory requirement for the Arbitral Institutions to register themselves
before the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India. This petition is subjudice
before the Supreme Court. It would be interesting to follow the developments in this matter as they might
lead to defining the arbitration regime in India.

 

The 2019 Amendment, however well intentioned,
clearly has some challenges. We will have to wait and see whether these issues
are addressed by the GoI or interpreted by the Supreme Court so that there is
clarity on them.


__________________________________________

1   OMP (Misc) (Comm) 512/2019

2   2019 SCC OnLine SC 1244

3   (2018) 6 SCC 287

4   Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1074 of 2019

TRANSITION TO CASH FLOW-BASED FUNDING

HISTORY

The Indian
banking industry is centuries old. A peep into its recent past is replete with
milestone events of change. Notable among them, starting with social control
over banks, have been nationalisation of commercial banks; identification of
priority sector for lending; an annual credit plan; diversification of
institutions and setting up of the Exim Bank to focus on export financing;
regional rural banks to introduce the hybrid of commercial bank strength with
local government participation; the creation of local area banks; micro-finance
companies; and so on. Clearly, banks have been an important tool to facilitate
the development of the Indian economy for decades. Foreign direct investment
norms in the banking sector were relaxed and the cap raised to 74%. The
financial needs of the rapidly-growing economy were catered to by government
banks, private banks and foreign banks, with a major share taken by government
banks. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued guidelines for banks and ensured
compliance of BASEL-I norms in a phased manner between 1991 and 1999.

 

The growing economy needed more
finance and advanced banking. The ever-increasing need for strengthening of the
banking sector was further underlined as Lehman Brothers collapsed in the
Sub Prime Crisis
(it filed for bankruptcy in 2008 – the largest in US
history). Around that time, commercial banks in India were in the process of
implementing BASEL-II norms which were completed by March, 2009. With the
advent of Information Technology, the retail industry boom and modernisation of
communication and data transfer, there have been rapid changes in the way
people and corporates do banking. The most recent development in the banking
business was in 2016 when RBI approved ten entities to set up small finance
banks.

 

Reserve Bank of India is the
regulatory body of Indian banking. With the adoption of BASEL norms, the
functioning of Indian banks is more standardised and in line with international
practices.

 

PRESENT SCENARIO

There have been various business strategies
in corporate lending followed by bankers. Banks with large balance sheets have
shown an appetite for taking large exposures and have been also daring to play
long term. On the other hand, Non-Banking Financial Corporations (NBFCs) have
exercised quick entry and timely exit compromising on collateral covers but
snatching from banks the opportunity of making good profit margins. Whatever
the form of these loans, all of these are asset-backed financing models.

 

By and large, all public sector
banks in India are disbursing loans (long–term, short-term loans, working
capital loans / cash credits) on the basis of assets as security. For term
loans, the primary security are assets like property, plant, equipment (fixed
assets) owned by the company. For short-term loans and working capital loans,
normally stock and debtors (current assets) are the primary security. The
liquidation value of an asset is the primary focus and projected cash flows are
the secondary focus. Cash flows are part of project proposals; however, such
inflows are not linked directly to loan eligibility or repayment / servicing
frequency and mode. This involves a lot of documentation and mortgage of the
asset in the name of the banker till the loan remains outstanding.

 

Post-disbursal, borrowers submit
periodic performance reports and provisional financials to the bankers as per
agreed terms. This information is not real-time information and in many cases
there are delays in submission of these documents. Banks lack the advanced
analytical tools and bandwidth to assess these reports regularly on a real-time
basis. Non-performance of an asset, i.e., borrower account, gets noticed quite
late when risk exposure is already very high. Increase in non-performing assets
is worrisome not only for the banker but for the economy at large as public
funds are at stake.

 

One may find that the practice of
asset-based lending has not helped us in timely identification of likely
non-performing credit and immediate reconstruction to put them back on track. A
question therefore arises whether it is time to go for alternate methods of
credit appraisal and adopt international best practices in banking in general
and lending in particular.

 

PROPOSED CHANGE

Assets don’t help companies to
repay loans. Often, the disposal of assets, primarily immovable property, poses
great difficulty in selling. It’s their cash flow that makes a difference. The
need for mitigation of risk is inherent to the banking business – new
technologies, policies and strategies are adopted from time to time for this.
Under the new mechanism, banks would be able to prioritise their fund
deployment programme. The public sector major, State Bank of India (SBI), has
announced that it will shift to the cash flow-based lending model beginning April,
2020. Other PSUs will not lag behind in following suit; some banks are already
doing it for a portion of their products.

 

Banks in India have traditionally
lent to companies against their assets. Cash flow-based lending is widely
considered to be a more efficient and safe way of mitigating risk as it reduces
discretion on the part of the lender. The new framework for loan sanctions will
apply to large companies as well as small enterprises.

 

THE MECHANISM

Cash flow-based lending (CFL)
envisages a shift in the bank’s appraisal system from traditional balance
sheet-based funding to a more objective appraisal system of leveraging the cash
flows of the unit. In CFL, loan requirement is based on actual revenue
generation and capacity to repay. Further, the repayment schedule is based on
the timing of the entity’s cash inflows. Company’s cash conversion cycle is
calculated. Based on cash conversion cycle, the ability of the borrower to pay
back the loan is calculated. With better negotiated terms with vendors / creditors,
the cash conversion cycle will shrink; and with increase in credit period to
the customer, the cash conversion cycle will be longer. While 25% of the
working capital gap (the difference between assessed gross working capital
assets minus gross working capital liabilities) is met by the company, banks
fund the remainder. Most of the working capital finance is in the form of cash
credit, a system where companies freely draw (and service interest) within a
certain limit or drawing power fixed by the lender. Drawing power is arrived at
on the basis of inventory volume minus margin therein. Cash flow lending, then,
is essentially lending to repeated asset conversion cycles and payback is
dependent on the firm’s ability to generate (and retain in the business)
sufficient cash over a number of years of profitable operations to make
required interest and principal payments on the loan. The loan amount as well
as mode of repayment is adjusted with cash inflows based on the cash conversion
cycle. Documented cash flows and the credit rating of the borrower will play an
important role.

 

A system of determining monthly /
quarterly utilisation limits for credit drawings can be fixed. Actual drawings
should be confined to determine limits. Deviations are not allowed and, when
allowed, they are always with approval from higher levels. The quarterly
monitoring system should ensure no diversion of bank credit for purposes other
than the sanctioned purpose.

 

NATURE
OF CHANGE IN BASIS OF LENDING

India’s government-owned banks
are likely to change the way they lend. Since the 1970s, public sector banks
have given out most working capital loans and short-term loans required for the
day-to-day operations of a business. Public sector banks have a more than 55%
share of the loan market. These loans were disbursed on the basis of the net
current assets of corporate borrowers. This is considered as a flawed system
that is believed to have resulted in over-funding to some and under-funding to
others. A system which does not focus on entity cash inflows as the primary
basis of loan availment and mode of repayment, often results in delayed
repayments, thus adversely affecting the NPA ratio. The outdated practice may
soon change with the country’s largest lender State Bank of India proposing a
transition from an ‘asset-based lending’ model to ‘cash flow-based lending’, a
mechanism that, among other things, may reduce diversion of funds by borrowers
and enable banks to assess the ability of borrowers to service loans on time.
The shift will require borrowing entities to share their cash flow statements
more frequently with banks.

 

NATURE OF LOAN PORTFOLIOS

Except for
some seasonal industries such as sugar, public sector banks arrive at a
company’s working capital requirements by considering the difference between
the borrower’s current assets (receivables, raw material stock, finished goods)
and current liabilities (payables like loan interest, taxes, payment to vendors
and workers). While 25% of the working capital gap (the difference between
assessed gross working capital assets minus gross working capital liabilities)
is met by the company, banks fund the remainder, although in many cases they
end up funding more. Most of the working capital finance is in the form of cash
credit, a system where companies freely draw (and service interest) within a
certain limit or drawing power fixed by the lender. Such asset-based lending
ignores the manipulation of the actual value of the assets pledged.

In a country like India a major
portion of the short-term loan portfolios of PSU banks consists of Cash Credit
(CC) accounts. As mentioned above, these loans are disbursed on the basis of
current assets as primary security. These assets themselves are not cash but
there is always conversion time in which these assets will generate cash. On a
broader basis, there would be the cash conversion cycle of every company. These
types of loans are most suited for cash flow-based funding. This is further
suited for MSMEs (Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises). Cash flow-based lending
envisages a shift in the banks’ credit appraisal mechanism and monitoring
system from the traditional balance sheet-based funding to a more objective
appraisal system. In CFL, loan requirement is based on actual revenue
generation and capacity to repay. Furthermore, the repayment schedule is based
on the timing of the MSME’s cash inflows. The advantages of CFL are that the
loan amount and repayment are based on the MSME’s actual cash generation,
reduction in credit risk, reduced monitoring costs for banks, reduction in
turnaround time and ability to serve entities that don’t have adequate
collaterals.

 

CHANGE IN ASSESSMENT OF BORROWER
BUSINESS

The primary focus in assessment
of business will no longer be the asset base of the balance sheet. The primary
focus will be cash inflows and the cash conversion cycle. Assets will be only
secondary support. Proven past cash flow generation data and credit ratings
will play an important role. Various databases and information available on the
cloud platform will be considered for data analysis. TransUnion CIBIL data will
by and large be considered a reliable source. Nowadays this data is available
at one’s fingertips, thanks to linking of the data base of PAN, Udyog Aadhaar,
Credit Cards. This data is more reliable and available independently for
verification.

 

IMPACT

Banking disbursement is expected
to rise. As asset backing is no more a primary criterion, companies not having
a large fixed capital base or real estate but having past record of operations
and margins can now avail cash flow-based loans. Various Startups which are in
the category of service sector will be benefited as these cash flow-based
funding loans will be available to these units, thereby increasing the size of
the disbursement portfolios of banks and financial institutions.

 

IMPACT – On NPA and bank balance
sheet

As mentioned earlier, due to lack
of expertise and bandwidth to assess various financial data real time, the
monitoring was not very effective. Since there was no direct linking of the
timing of cash inflows, the cash conversion cycle and repayment mode and
frequency, there used to be delays and at times diversion of funds, too. With
the shift to cash flow-based funding, these drawbacks will no more result in
NPAs growing without any control as drawings can be stopped when cash flows are
affected. The framework is already available for analysis of data. Databanks
are ready with authenticated data linked to the borrower and access to such
information is available to bankers. Loan amount and repayment frequency when
tied up with cash inflow working and timing, loan disbursal will be more
scientific and will cover the cyclical nature of business. All these will
facilitate timely servicing of loans, thereby improving overall NPA ratio.

 

IMPACT – On borrowing cost

Since the primary security is
future cash flows based on past records and credit ratings, there is no
tangible security in many cases. The cost of borrowing will tend to be higher
than asset-backed lending. With favourable performance and consistency in
repayment, this cost will also tend to ease out for standard portfolios.

 

IMPACT – On sectors

Service-oriented businesses with
minimum fixed or tangible capital with proven business model Startups – which
do not have any past record but are in a tie-up with payment gateways for
capturing sales inflows which can be reliably assessed for funding.

 

Financial Technology Companies
which provide various financial solutions to traders and service providers for
capturing the data real time and for producing various complex reports needed
for assessment will be benefited and the impact will be positive.

 

INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

Cash flow-based financing may be
a recent development in India; however, all over the world this is a settled
method of financing, specially to small and medium enterprises, or to
organisations which do not have collateral but have a strong margin business
model, or organisations which do not have past track records and hence
appraisal risks are high; in such cases also, cash flow-based funding is in
vogue.

 

Key Features:

Lending to finance an entity’s
permanent (long-term) needs, seasonal needs;

Usually medium-term, with loan
terms of up to seven or eight years in most cases;

Covenants in the loan agreement
are often included as a ‘trigger’ to signal to the lender a deteriorating
situation so that corrective action may be taken.

 

While there are pronounced
advantages in CFL over asset-based lending, the emphasis is on the process of
the lending method. This presupposes a dedicated and purpose-oriented
policy-making personnel equally supported by an alert team of front-end staff.

 

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing paragraphs one
may conclude that the rapid growth of the Indian economy needs to be
continuously supported by an efficient system of banking dedicated to lend with
care and identify the potential risk much in advance; and also to mitigate the
risk by suitably hedging with a cash flow-based lending in place of asset-based
lending with all its limitations.

 

In
the short run, or even in the long run, cash is the only factor that repays a
loan; the cash conversion cycle is the only correct method to decide the mode
and frequency of repayments. Collateral is the buffer in case cash is not
generated to repay a loan. Cash flow control is the need of the times. In order
to be in line with government policies and also to reap the benefits of a
win-win situation for bankers and small and medium enterprises, cash flow-based
loans appear more appropriate as the supporting infrastructure framework is
already ready.

COVID-19 IMPACT ON INDIAN ECONOMY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETS

INTRODUCTION:
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

It was mid-January when we
started to hear stories about a virus in China which had locked down the entire
Wuhan city, the epicentre of the virus. Its effect had also spread to other
Asian countries and by 30th January, 20201 India reported
its first Covid-19 case. After two and a half months of the first reported
case, India is now in the second phase of lockdown. India took early calls to
go for a complete lockdown and implemented strict guidelines due to the
experience of other countries, the rate of transmission of the virus from one
person to another and also the strain which this virus could cause on the
healthcare system of the country.

 

Observers state that the lockdown
slowed the growth rate of the virus by 6th April to a rate of
doubling every six days, from a rate of doubling every three days earlier. The
metric called R-Naught or R-Zero, estimates that the infection rates in India
have fallen to 1.55 on 11th April from 1.83 on 6th April,
further indicating that lockdowns could be helping2.

 

This article seeks to explore the
consequences and impact of the current health crisis on the overall Indian
economy and the Indian financial markets.

 

Looking back to the situation
till a couple of years ago, India was going through its own economic slowdown:

(i) The primary reasons were the ‘shocks’ of demonetisation in 2016 and
the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2017.

(ii) India recorded the lowest quarterly GDP growth rate in the last
decade of 4.7% in Q3FY203 and the growth outlook (pre-Covid-19) for
FY21 was upwards of 5%.

(iii) The economy had started to show some signs of recovery when the
index of industrial production (IIP) grew by 2% on a y-o-y basis in January,
2020. The manufacturing index also improved by 1.5%.

 

(iv) To boost the economy, the Finance Minister reduced the base
corporate tax rate to 22% (effectively ~ 25%) for companies which do not seek
to take certain exemption benefits. This led to earnings recovery for many
companies and a boost to the stock markets as well.

 

What impact will the current
crisis have on the GDP growth rate?3

(a) It has been estimated by various rating agencies that the advanced
economies will contract by 0.5% to 3% in 2020 as against a global growth of
1.7% in 2019.

(b) China is estimated to grow ~ 3% in 2020, while India’s growth
forecast for FY21 has been revised downwards and is estimated to be between
1.8% and 2.5% from more than 5% estimated before the lockdown was announced.

(c) Having said that, even a 2% growth rate is still good news for
India. Due to the low base rate, the expected GDP growth in FY22 is expected to
be upwards of 7%.

 

With what is now happening across
the world (post the Covid-19 outbreak), including India, a slowdown in each and
every economy is imminent. The extent of impact in different geographies will
vary based on the severity of the virus, the stimulus packages by the
governments to revive the economy and how fast a nation is able to commence its
economic activities.

 

MEASURES
TAKEN SO FAR BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Though India has been very slow
in announcing economic packages for industry, there have been three major
announcements – two by the RBI (monetary policy) and one by the Finance
Ministry (fiscal policy).

 

(1) On 26th March, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman
announced a Rs. 1.7 lakh-crore fiscal package for the poor, including cash
transfers, free food grains and free cooking gas.

(2) On 27th March, the RBI announced a 75-basis points cut in
the policy rate and a 100-bps cut in the cash reserve ratio for banks to inject
liquidity in the system and provide moratoriums for loan repayments for three
months (March to May, 2020).

(3) On 17th April, RBI freed up more capital for banks to
lend, announced a fresh Rs. 50,000-crore targeted long-term repo operation to
address the liquidity stress of NBFCs and microfinance institutions and hinted
at the possibility of further rate cuts going forward. RBI also announced a Rs.
50,000-crore special finance facility to NABARD, SIDBI and NHB for onward
lending to NBFCs in the space. The RBI Governor also announced that India would
do ‘whatever it takes’.

 

To sum up, the government has
first prioritised the containment of the virus and providing relief to the
poorest sections of society. In the days to come, it will dole out sector- and
industry-specific packages as well.

 

IMPACT ON VARIOUS INDUSTRIES

It
goes without saying that the lockdowns will certainly have an impact on each
and every industry in
varying degrees.

S.No.

Industry

Impact

Likely nature of effect

1

Auto and auto components

High

  • Weak PV and CV demand due to
    liquidity shortage with NBFCs, economic uncertainties, weaker consumer
    purchasing power, likely NPAs in the sector
  •  Stuck with inventories of
    unsold BS-IV vehicles with the original deadline of selling
    them before 31st March, 2020

2

Aviation and tourism

High

  • Uncertainty over travel
    restrictions which can extend or remain restricted for a longer period of
    time, borders might remain closed
  • Loss of jobs and pay cuts
  • 102 of 137 airports managed
    by AAI have recorded losses to the tune of Rs. 1.6 billion
  • Estimated to render more than 50% of tourism industry workforce
    jobless in hospitality industry4

3

Agriculture

Low

  • Since agriculture is the
    backbone of the country and part of government-announced essential category,
    the impact is likely to be low on both primary agricultural production and
    usage of
    agri-inputs like seeds, pesticides and fertilisers
  • Agro-chemicals: Companies
    that depend on exports for finished goods sale and imports of raw ingredients
    will be impacted

  • Food exports: Major
    destinations like the U.S., Europe expected to grapple with Covid-19
    for the next few months and Indian export-based companies will be impacted
    due to low consumer demand and port hurdles
  • The economic packages likely
    to be announced will provide relief to farmers and the allied sectors and,
    hence, the overall impact on agriculture will be low

4

Chemicals and petrochemicals

Medium

  • Weakening in crude oil
    prices and cascading impact on petrochemicals, coupled with uncertain
    domestic and global demand; petrochemicals prices are likely to remain low
  • Uncertain demand outlook and weak prices are
    expected to lead to weak market
    sentiments and delayed investments in the sector

5

Consumer, retail & internet business

Low to medium

Essential commodities:

  • Growth seen for essential
    commodities players, with possible margin improvements, unless there is price
    control by government
  • There will be increased
    pressure on supply chain for deliveries of products amidst the lockdown

Non-essential commodities:

  • Markets likely to crash due to low discretionary
    demand. Overdependence on imports
    could pose a threat
  • Industries facing severe challenges: Apparel, durables, restaurants and other on-premise services like gyms / salons, etc.

6

Banking and NBFC’s

Medium to high

  • Banking sector to be under
    pressure due to reduced off-take of loans in expected recessionary market
    conditions and cautious lending
  • Possibility of increased delinquencies post the
    moratorium period, and may also result in depressed NIMs in a low interest
    rate regime
  • Drop in transaction fee-based income due to lower cross-border
    trade

  • Affordable housing, two-wheeler financing,
    micro-finance and gold loans
    exposures to be adversely impacted

7

Insurance

Low

  • Fresh demand for health insurance and life
    insurance witnessed a surge in the current scenario
  • Renewals may get delayed due
    to shortage of money in the hands of policyholders
  • Usage of AI / ML / technology can assist in
    reduction of operating costs, increasing customer satisfaction and policy
    management

8

MSMEs

High

  • Many MSMEs to face closure of business if the
    lockdown continues for more than eight weeks due to heavy leverage costs and
    no production output for more than eight weeks

  • More than 114 million people
    are likely to get affected, with a dent in
    their contribution to GDP (~ 30-35% of GDP)

9

Transport and logistics

Medium to high

  •  Crude price reduction is
    likely to positively impact the
    transportation costs in the short term
  • Freight traffic volume is expected to slow down

  • Post-monsoon, the demand is
    anticipated to spike on account of accrued consumer
    savings as well as onset of festive season
  •  Lower utilisation of ports
    infra, road and rail infra, storage infra due to reduced cargo traffic in
    short to medium term

10

Healthcare and pharmaceuticals

Low to medium

  • Generic drugs are most impacted – reliance is high on imports (~
    70%) from China

  • Non-availability of labour,
    transport of ingredients and supply side issues
    could impact production volume

  • High exports demand for
    certain products over the short term – as developed countries
    (U.S., EU, etc.) look to stockpile medicines
  • Probable price controls of essential drugs
  • Online pharmacies – medicine
    delivery has been affected due to non-availability of delivery staff

11

Construction and real estate

High

  • The housing sector is
    expected to see muted demand with significant reduction in new launches

  • The existing demand for
    commercial real estate may either get curtailed or
    postponed till H2 of the current year
  • One of the largest employment generators in the
    country, it will have a multiplier
    effect on around 250 allied industries
  • There is a likelihood of the
    government providing relief to the sector in terms of relaxation for project
    delays in residential housing sector, easing financial stress by extending
    loan repayment, etc.

12

Overall imports and exports

High

  •  India’s merchandise exports
    slumped by a record 34.6% in March, 2020 while imports declined 28.7% as
    countries sealed their borders to combat the Covid-19 outbreak5
  • Business Process
    Outsourcing, one of the India’s largest exports, will be severely affected as
    lockdown measures, both in origin and destination countries, have forced
    offices to close. It will be further accelerated with the cost-cutting
    measures by the destination countries
  • However, it is likely that India’s balance of
    payments position may improve. Weak domestic demand, low oil prices and
    Covid-19-related disruptions are expected to narrow the current account deficit
    to 0.2% in FY21 and to keep it low in the following years

Source: KPMG report, news articles

 

 

Some general and overarching
impacts on the overall economy could be:

(i) Unemployment – The unemployment in
India has shot up from 7% to 23% in the last two weeks of March, 20206

(ii) Poverty – As per the estimates of the Indian Labour
Organisation, more than 400 million people in India are at the risk of sinking
back below the poverty line.

 

While the current lockdown will
be ending on 3rd May and some relaxations have been offered post 20th
April, if the number of infections surges, there could be further lockdowns.
This could further affect the businesses and the economy and we should be
prepared for the same.

 

 

THE IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKET

Let us now look at how the Indian
financial markets have been impacted in the past during various crises – from
the Harshad Mehta and Ketan Parekh scams to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
and the recent China-US trade wars. Table 2 (next page) denotes the time
required for the market (Nifty) to bottom out from its peak and then the time
taken to reach back to its peak:

 

Peak

Trough (Bottom)

Peak to Trough

Recovery Month and  Value

Months to

Recovery

Month

Value

Month

Value

Months

Extent (%)

Month

Value

Mar-92

1262

Apr-93

622

13

-50.7

Feb-94

1,349

23M

Feb-94

1349

Nov-96

830

33

-38.5

Aug-99

1,412

66M

July-97

1222

Nov-98

818

16

-33.1

July-99

1,310

24M

Feb-00

1655

Sept-01

914

19

-44.8

Dec-03

1,880

46M

Dec-03

1880

May-04

1,484

5

-21.1

Nov-04

1,959

11M

Dec-07

6139

Nov-08

2,755

11

-55.1

Dec-10

6,135

36M

Dec-10

6135

Dec-11

4,624

12

-24.6

Oct-13

6,299

34M

Feb-15

8902

Feb-16

6,987

12

-21.5

Mar-17

9,174

25M

Aug-18

11681

Aug-19

10,793

6

-7.6

Apr-19

11,748

8M

Jan-20

12362

23-Mar-20

7,610

2

-38.4

??

??

??

Source: Nifty historical data

 

 

The Indian equities reached the
trough (bottom) on 23rd March, 2020. The current down-turn is still underway
and has shown the trough as on 23rd March, 2020.

 

What has happened to the Indian
financial markets since the start of the crisis?7

  • The valuations have corrected significantly
    on a trailing PE basis – from a high of 29.9 a few months back to ~ 16-17 now.
    During the GFC, the Nifty PE had touched a low of ~ 11-12 trailing PE.
  • The long-term EPS growth has been 13%
    year-on-year and in the quarter ended December, 2019 the EPS growth was ~ 15%.
    This was mainly due to the tax cuts which led to recovery in Q3 FY20.
  • The long-term average of Nifty Earnings has
    been ~ 12.5% while in the last five years the average has fallen to ~ 3-4%.
    There was a marginal recovery in the last financial year but now the recovery
    has been deferred to FY22.
  • The benchmark indices – Nifty50 and the
    Sensex – have fallen ~ 25% year-to-date (YTD), 2020.
  • Within the large-cap, mid-cap and small-cap
    space, the fall has been as under:

    small
cap has fallen ~ 33%

    followed
by mid-cap at ~ 26% and

    large
cap at ~ 19% on a YTD, 2020 basis.

  • Nifty Bank has fallen the most during this
    crisis, plunging almost 50% and certain NBFCs falling more than 50% as well.
    The markets recovered somewhat in the first two weeks of April, 2020 and today
    the Nifty Bank is sitting at a 40% discount to its peak valuation.
  • While Nifty Bank has fallen significantly,
    Nifty Pharma has been the biggest beneficiary and is the only index with a
    positive YTD return of ~ 16%. The rest of the indices (sectors) have seen
    negative returns, the least negative being Nifty FMCG at ~ (-)5%.
  • In the credit scenario the investment grade
    ratings have fallen from 40% earlier to ~ 30% now. The downgrades are much higher
    in value – ~ Rs. 1,990 billion worth papers have been downgraded.
  • On the global front, the US Dow Jones has
    fallen by ~ 20% on YTD, 2020 basis, while most of the European markets have
    fallen upwards of 20% on YTD, 2020 basis. The China market has been the most
    resilient and has fallen only ~ 8% on YTD, 2020 basis.

 

Before the Covid-19 crisis, the
banking and financial services were facing massive problems with the collapse
of IL&FS and DHFL and the Yes Bank fiasco. In the current market scenario,

  • NPAs are likely to increase as the private
    banks, NBFCs and even micro-finance institutions have aggressively built their
    retail loan book and there will likely be massive layoffs
  • Further, these loans are majorly unsecured
    and there can be a slew of defaults, especially on the MFI side, and can also
    bring the mid and smaller NBFCs to the brink of collapse
  • Some of the new-age digital financial
    startups which simply opened the liquidity tap to trap the young earners with
    huge interest rates, may be forced to shut shop
  • However, the liquidity and moratoriums
    provided by RBI will come to the rescue
  • More clarity in this regard will emerge only
    after three to six months when the economic activity resumes
  • Meanwhile, credit off-take can be low for
    the next couple of quarters as companies rework on their capex plans due to
    weak demand and the uncertain global environment.

 

ANY
SILVER LINING IN THE MIDST OF THIS CRISIS?

While all of the above sounds
quite alarming, there are many positives in India’s current state of affairs:

 

  • Forex reserves: India has forex reserves to
    the tune of USD 476.5 billion as on 10th April, 2020 and in a
    worst-case scenario this will take care of 11.8 months of India’s import bills8.

  • Crude prices: The crude prices have fallen
    to record lows, lower than $10 per barrel as on 20th April, 2020. If India can
    import and store additional crude at this level, it will save huge import bills
    once normalcy kicks in and crude prices rise. Since 80% of India’s oil
    requirement is met through imports, a fall in crude oil prices can save USD 45
    billion on crude oil imports9.
  • MSCI Index re-jig: Indian stocks are
    expected to see an inflow of more than USD 7 billion on account of a likely
    increase in their weight on the MSCI Index. FIIs have been net sellers and they
    have sold more than Rs. 30,000 crores in the last four weeks. Therefore, a
    re-jig of the MSCI index will bring in fresh FII inflows10.
  • Low inflation: The food inflation is on a
    declining trajectory and has eased ~ 160 basis points from its peak in January,
    2020. The CPI inflation as on 19th March, 2020 was 5.9% and the RBI is
    confident of bringing it below 4% by the second half of 2020.
  • Normal monsoons: The Indian Meteorological
    Department has forecast a normal monsoon in 2020. This will benefit agriculture
    which is the backbone of the Indian economy.
  • Shift from China to other geographies: Many
    countries are envisaging a shift of dependency from China and also to shift
    their manufacturing bases from China to either their home country or to find a
    suitable alternative. Japan has announced packages for its companies bringing
    back manufacturing home. India can benefit a lot if some of this shift happens
    from China to India. It will significantly improve FDI flows into India.


FOOD FOR THOUGHT

The way the economy will recover
or fall will depend on how the pandemic plays out. No doubt a vaccine is the
need of the hour, but that will take a minimum of nine months to a year to
develop and then to be distributed to every human being on the planet. While
there may be some medicinal cure which could be developed, there will be
uncertainties in the interim. During these times, the following possibilities
could emerge:

 

  • Will there be de-globalisation? Will
    countries close borders – partially or completely?
  • Will India gain a lot of market share with
    a shift in manufacturing base to India?
  • Will there be a V-shaped, U-shaped,
    W-shaped or L-shaped recovery of the Indian and global financial markets?
  • Will there be disruption in existing
    industries – Will Information Technology be the new king? Will the pharma
    sector be the best performer index in the market?

 

We are fighting with an ‘unknown
unknown’ phenomenon and only over time will we be able to get the answers to
the above questions.

 

I would like
to conclude with a quote from Joel Osteen – ‘Quit worrying about how
everything is going to turn out. Live one day at a time’
. This, too, shall
pass and we will emerge as a stronger and better economy in the end.
 

 

Disclaimer: The views, thoughts and opinions expressed
in this article belong solely to the author; the data has been gathered from
various secondary sources which the reader needs to independently verify before
relying on it. The information contained herein is not intended to be a source
of advice or credit analysis with respect to the material presented, and does
not constitute investment advice

________________________________________________________

1   Ministry of Health, https://www.mohfw.gov.in/, News Articles

2   https://theprint.in/science/r0-data-shows-indias-coronavirus-infection-rate-has-slowed-gives-lockdown-a-thumbs-up/399734/

3   IMF estimates,
Various rating agencies
4   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/indias-tourism-sector-may-lose-rs-5-lakh-cr-4-5-cr-jobs-could-be-cut-due-to-covid-19/articleshow/74968781.cms?from=mdr

5   https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-s-trade-deficit-narrows-to-9-8-bn-in-march-exports-dip-34-6-11586955282193.html

6   CMIE
database,
https://www.cmie.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=warticle&dt=2020-04-07%2008:26:04&msec=770

7   Newspaper Articles, Nifty50 Returns

9   https://www.energylivenews.com/2020/03/24/india-to-save-45bn-on-crude-oil-imports-next-financial-year/

10  https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/morgan-stanley-sees-71-
billion-inflows-into-india-on-msci-rejig

 

SOME REFLECTIONS ON COVID-19 AND THE ECONOMY: RESET TIME

I am presenting a few thoughts on
the reasons for the pandemic, how to stop future pandemics, its impact on the
economy and steps for its revival, the oil shock and its domino effect and
other related issues.

 

PANDEMIC REASON – VIRUS AND STRESS IN
ANIMALS

I have seen
a video on the reasons for pandemics published by the Nutrition Facts Organisation
of the USA in 2010. Dr. Michael Greger, M.D., FACLM, explains that (i)
this is a zoonotic disease and the virus which is present in animals infects
mankind, (ii) most viruses are completely neutralised within 30 minutes under
direct sunlight; however, in dark, damp and shaded conditions they can survive
for weeks, (iii) viruses which have existed for thousands of years innocuously
have now become deadly.

 

Why is this so? Clearly, the stress
and the pain suffered by animals results in even an innocent virus turning
into a deadly one.
When these stressed animals / birds are eaten by men,
they get infected. If we don’t stop industrial animal farming for food, then we
should be prepared for a pandemic of deadly proportions equivalent to the
Indonesian tsunami of 2004 simultaneously hitting all the major cities around
the world.
In case a pandemic hits the USA, it may be necessary to lockdown
the whole country for 90 days. This prediction was made in the year 2010. (See
the video: https://nutritionfacts.org/video/pandemics-history-prevention/)

 

In short, extreme cruelty by
mankind on animals and birds has caused this pandemic. And all nations are
responsible for this cruelty. Industrial farming of pigs and chicken, of cows
for milk, etc., several such cruel practices were started in the capitalist western
countries and this is the chief cause of this virus.

 

According to me, in the same way,
globally, half the human population lives in stress because of poverty and wars
inflicted by greedy lobbies and nations. This stress also affects world peace
and welfare. It is time we take notice of this fact.


PREVENTING FUTURE VIRAL PANDEMICS

To prevent such pandemics, one
should not only turn vegetarian, one should turn vegan. It is a simple
philosophy. Love your animals as you love your family. Love your employees as
your own family. Love is a great strength. The absence of love or callousness
has immeasurable negative power. Philosophy includes the principles of how to
live happily in society and the world. In Hindi it is called:
In English, it’s ‘The
relationship amongst: Individuals, Universe and God’.

 

A useless plastic straw that we
throw away travels a few thousand miles through the ocean and hurts a tortoise.
The tortoise is in stress. Its stress affects world peace. We do not give
cognition to the stress suffered by billions of lives around the world. It is
high time that we recognise the philosophy that the stress caused in the
tiniest of lives will one day come back to haunt us. We have ignored the
warnings of numerous environmentalists. Let us now hear this warning by Mother
Nature or
This is the time to RESET
everything and challenge all our assumptions
. The virus has proved that we
have to live as one family,
The solution to this virus and many other
problems may be found by the world in co-operation and not in competition. All
national boundaries are man-made and artificial. The ultimate truth is – We Are
All One,

 

If someone
had said before seeing the above video, ‘Don’t be cruel with animals’, the mass
commercialised industrialist as well as the consumer would not have listened to
him. The government would not interfere considering ‘philosophy and ethics as a
matter of personal choice’. But after seeing the video anyone who believes in prevention
of pandemics
and other mass tragedies may want to practice and spread the
message of Universal Love and Truth.

 

A reader may ask, ‘Okay. I have
understood that the cause of the current pandemic is human cruelty to animals
and birds. But as an individual, what can I do?’ The answer to that is,
‘One individual cannot change the world. He cannot stop industrialised animal
farming. But he can stop eating animals and consuming dairy products.’ When
many individuals stop buying any product which involves cruelty, businesses
will have to change their practices. If we do not reset our business practices
and our personal lives, nature may (or may not) give us another warning.

 

PANDEMIC’S IMPACT ON ECONOMY

Both the Indian and the global
economies have suffered a serious setback due to the current pandemic.
How serious is it? How long will it take to recover? As recently stated by Mr.
Sanjiv Mehta, CA, Chairman of Hindustan Unilever, no one can provide a proper
answer to these questions. Economics is a social subject. Unlike the laws of
physics, the results of actions in economics cannot be predicted. They depend
upon society’s psychology, culture, readiness to put in hard work and so on.

 

To explain the issue in simple
terms, one can use the analogy of a person who has suffered a heart attack.
He knows the reasons of the attack: Lack of exercise, an over-indulgent
lifestyle, and so on. ‘Can he or will he recover? How good will be the
recovery?’ The answer to these questions is, ‘Of course he will recover.’ ‘How
well he will recover depends upon whether he has learnt his lesson. Will he
change his over-indulgent lifestyle? Will he start exercises? And does he have
the will power to return to a healthy life? Is he a positive thinker? Does his
positivity translate into action?’

 

This analogy can be applied not
only to individuals hit by disease, but also to nations hit by disasters.

 

The current pandemic has already
caused serious damage to economies. And the damage will continue for some time.
Nations and the world are not going to die. We will all recover. How well do we
recover is the issue. The quality of recovery depends upon how well we reset
our businesses and our personal lives.

 

Supply chains have been broken
and damaged. The demand for many goods and capital assets has evaporated. When
both supply and demand go down, there is necessarily a contraction of the
economy. There is no alignment between reduction in supply and demand. In other
words, the supply of goods A, B and C has stopped. The demand for goods C, Y
and Z has evaporated. Hence the contraction in the economy can be even worse.

 

In agriculture, tea gardens and
mango and grape orchards, vegetables and so on are adversely affected.
Agriculture has been exempted from the lockdown. But then a lot of migrant
workers have gone back to their native places. Transport is affected. Even the
manufacture of medicines is seriously affected.

 

Where does a nation start with relief
and recovery actions?
The Government of India (GOI) and the RBI have
already announced different packages of financial relief – all together
amounting to Rs. 5 trillions. (One trillion is a short term for one lakh
crores.) Food Security is provided to 80 crores of Indians. The
GOI has started with ensuring that the poor daily wage-earners do not stay
hungry. They are being provided food and fuel in different ways. It is my
personal knowledge that, at least in Gujarat, the GOI is reaching the poor.

 

Having discussed stress and the
pain in animals, let us turn to the stress and the pain in human beings.
Let us take an example. The Covid-19 virus has spread in the Dharavi slum.
Hundreds of people are infected. This has raised fears of community spread. The
Central and the State Governments are worried. They do not see any practical
solution. They are frustrated. Imagine an invisible tiny virus frustrating the
Government of India. Why has this situation arisen?

 

In Mumbai, some flats are sold at
a price of Rs. 1,00,000 per square foot, or even more. In the same city,
several million people live in slums, on footpaths and in chawls. Many
people just do not have a roof over their heads.

 

Why is there such a wide
difference in incomes and wealth?

 

We do not ask this question.
Society in general doesn’t care. The government has excellent schemes for slum
development.
Market forces will make it practical to give decent homes to
many slum-dwellers. And instead of spending money on slum redevelopment, the
government will get revenue. And yet, the Dharavi redevelopment scheme has not
taken off for so many years. Why? Because of corruption and greed.

 

Imagine a poor person living in
Dharavi. Most people there do not have toilets and bathrooms within their tiny
homes. They use common facilities. Imagine their fear of viral infection. They
can’t leave Dharavi due to the lockdown. And they can’t live in Dharavi because
of the abysmal living conditions. What amount of fear and stress are the people
living in Dharavi suffering from right now? Won’t that stress affect us and our
governments? Nature has already provided the answer. It will affect all of us.

There are many individuals and
NGOs who question the current pitiable condition of the poor. They work on the
ground in helping the poor. Many of them have achieved good success. May their
tribe grow; may their enthusiasm to help the poor infect society and
governments. May we see a day when every family in India has a home. One
such dreamer is
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He has already planned a
scheme for this purpose. I remember saying in my presentation at the BCAS
Economics Study Circle in 2015: ‘If all the welfare schemes planned by Mr. Modi
are executed in reality (not just on paper), then India can have 12% GDP growth
for the next 20 years.’ This is the solution and the answer to the question,
’How will the economy be affected by the present pandemic?’

 

India has a huge unsatisfied
need. And India has sufficient natural resources to provide food, clothing and
homes to every individual in the country. But the market system will not permit
it. Under a capitalist market system, farmers, teachers and doctors earn less
than share market speculators and tax consultants. A producer of goods and
services earns less than a film star and a sportsman. This market system has
to be reset
.

 

GDP

GDP is a
misleading statistical figure that has become popular to such an extent that it
has become harmful. When a jungle is destroyed and factories are set up, GDP
goes up. But there is no consideration for the damage to the environment, the
loss of life of animals, the huge difficulties to tribals and so on. If the
Indian rupee rises to Rs. 36 per dollar, our GDP will jump from $2.8 trillion
to $5.6 trillion. This shows that the exchange conversion market is an
illusion. When liquor and cigarette production goes up, the GDP goes up. Share
market speculators speculate and GDP goes up with zero contribution to the real
economy. I am not worried if the GDP falls, but the people would be free from
pollution and the resultant diseases.

 

There is none and there will be
no direct relationship between welfare and GDP.

 

THE
CORONA SHOCK: NEGATIVE OIL PRICE

On Monday, 20thApril,
and also on Thursday, 23rd April, 2020, the price for a barrel of
crude oil on the New York Commodity Exchange dropped to negative $38. What is a
negative oil price? Why did it happen? And what can be the consequences?

 

This has happened because of
excess supply of crude oil and lack of storage capacity for the excess. Global
production (extraction from oil wells) is 100 million barrels per day (MBD).
With the almost global lockdown, the entire transport system and factories have
stopped. Now only domestic and agricultural consumption of power continues. As
per oil experts’ opinion, the demand has gone down by at least 25%. However,
production of crude oil continues at the same pace. Saudi Arabia, Russia and
the USA have agreed to cut down production by about 10.3 MBD. This cut will be
effective from 1st May, 2020. But the surplus of supply over
consumption will continue. Global storage tanks are almost full. In the USA,
people holding a ‘Buy’ contract have no storage space. Assume that a buyer has
already paid the full price. Now, either he has to lift the oil, or pay $38 per
barrel to cancel the contract. A negative price reflects the cost of storage
for an indefinite period. However, these negative prices will not last. It is
estimated that in the short term the price may settle around $20/barrel.

 

Crude oil is the most important
component of energy today. Hence, the USA has used it as an instrument in its currency
war.
Its government insists that all global trade must happen in US
Dollars. Some nations refused. They were ready to sell their oil in Euros.
Hence the attacks on Iraq, Lebanon and Libya and the sanctions on Venezuela and
Iran. This is a classic illustration of a currency war using commodities as
weapons. When the opponents do not succumb to sanctions, the USA starts a
weapons war. [See a clip of the news on CNN dated 23rd April, 2020:
New York (CNN Business) 22nd April, 2020.]

 

The report said, ‘The Trump
administration ordered Chevron to halt oil production in Venezuela
, dealing
another blow to the nation. The directive is part of President Donald Trump’s
effort to pressure the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by starving
it of cash. Despite having more oil reserves than any other country on earth,
Venezuela’s production has imploded because of tough sanctions imposed by the
United States and other reasons.’

 

But there are other factors to be
considered. When oil was sold at $100 per barrel, the USA started shale oil
production on such a scale that it became free from imports of crude oil. The
average cost of production of shale oil is estimated to be $40 per barrel
(estimates vary). When the oil price was high, shale gas producers took huge
loans on small capitals and did business. Now, with the oil price being less
than $40 per barrel, most of them are making losses. Because of the viral
pandemic, the global economy has slowed down. The demand for oil may remain low
in the short term. Hence prices may remain under $40 for many months. Some
shale oil producers may even go insolvent.

 

Domino Effect: When an
oil producer goes insolvent, the following people also suffer losses:
Speculators in oil prices, speculators in shares of oil companies, banks and
institutions that lent to the oil producers, speculators in bank shares;
employees of all of the above entities suffer and ultimately the government
loses tax revenues.
When these loss-making companies are bailed out, the common man, the taxpayer,
suffers. Thus, one loss has a domino effect.

 

We have seen this oil industry
projection at some length. There are many other enterprises that are also
highly leveraged. The airline industry is a capital intensive, high
revenue cost industry with widely fluctuating profit margins. The lockdown may
have caused huge losses for all airline companies. Some may go insolvent. Many
other enterprises will also go insolvent. That means huge losses for banks
and the financial system. Will it result in banks going insolvent? Will central
bankers around the world be able to save the banking system?

 

In Maharashtra, mango and
grape orchard
owners can’t export their fruits. All over the country, many
farmers cannot sell their products even within India. Most of their products
are perishable. They will suffer huge losses. Who will bear these losses? The
list can go on.

 

Suddenly, the force majeure
clause is being invoked by parties for not fulfilling their part of the
performance. Everyone looks at themselves. As if the ship is sinking! If this
happens on a very large scale, then the economy can come crashing down. The
economy is really like a giant machine with several wheels within wheels.
All these wheels are connected by bearings, gears and chains. Some wheels
stopping or slowing down may disrupt the machine. But if several wheels stop
functioning, then the bearings can break down and the machine stop. We need to
identify all the wheels, bearings, gears and chains in the economic machine.
Observe them, help them, and ensure that almost all parts function.

 

SOLUTION: ECONOMIC ACTION

Confidence at the highest level
is crucial. The US and European economies have been built over a few hundred
years. The Indian and Chinese economies and societies have been built over a
few thousand years.
How can these economies be destroyed if a pandemic
disturbs them for a few months? Only when an economy has its fundamentals
seriously wrong can it be damaged. Probably, all countries, including communist
countries, are working on Capitalist Market Economics. These need to be RESET.
In other words, extreme disparities in income, wealth and welfare have to be
reduced. Every producer of goods and services must get at least a living wage.
There should be no or minimum stress caused by unfair economics at the human
level. Poor people constitute the base of the economic pyramid. When the base
is strong, the structure will be steady. And it can come up fast. If the poor
at the base die due to starvation, the whole economy will be badly affected And
it cannot recover fast enough.

 

The Government of India has
effected a large financial relief package. And the Prime Minister has
his heart in the right place. First priority is being given to the poor, daily
wage earners, hawkers and others. Cooked and uncooked food is reaching the poor
in villages through the government machinery. There are corners where the government
may not reach. These are being reached by NGOs. Cash is reaching the poor under
‘Direct Benefit Scheme’. Tax refunds are being expedited. Banks are asked to
release more loans. Provident fund claims are being released quickly. Through
all practical measures the government is ensuring that cash flow in the nation
must continue. Cash in the society is like blood in the body. It must remain
circulating. Otherwise the body parts will get numb. And even the smallest part
going numb will affect the whole body.

 

One big relief this time is from
the tax departments. Every year, from January to March, Income-tax and
GST officers get into overdrive to collect tax revenues, whether departmental
claims were right or wrong. Big refund claims, howsoever legitimate, are
withheld for the 4th quarter. That pressure is off this year. And revenue
targets have naturally gone for a toss.

 

Will this huge expenditure of Rs.
5 trillion cause a budgetary deficit? Yes, certainly the budgetary
deficit will increase. Will it cause inflation? May be, maybe not. The
Food Corporation of India (FCI) has over 70 million tonnes of food stocks.
Every year, substantial quantities of food rot and have to be disposed of. If
this stock of food is used, the market demand-supply equations will not be
affected. There need not be any inflation in the price of food. There are some
other items whose demand has fallen. In the case of some other items, it is the
supply that has fallen. All together, as a combined figure, there may be a
minor inflation. (Any guess for the future is to be taken with a pinch of
salt.) But in times of recession, it will help the economy rather than damage
it.

 

ON TOP OF THE ECONOMIC CHAIN

Man is at the top of the food
chain
. No other animal eats man. Man eats almost every animal and plant.
Man contributes little to the nature, but he exploits nature to the maximum
extent. Similarly, there are many people within mankind who are on top of the
economic chain. They contribute little to the economy / society and yet earn
disproportionately large incomes. It is for governments to identify the
enterprises on the top of the economic chain. Do not spend a single rupee
and a single minute on these people. They will manage.

 

BAILOUT PACKAGES

All nations
have announced huge bailout packages. Most of the funds for these packages will
come simply by ‘printing money’. How long can money supply influence and when
does it become useless or even counter-productive? To understand this point,
consider an extreme hypothesis: Indian GDP is Rs. 190 trillion. Can we
say, ‘Just print Rs. 190 trillion and no one has to do any work? They can relax
and enjoy.’ We cannot do that. People have to work and produce goods and
services. A currency note that cannot buy anything has no value. Having
ruled out the extreme hypothesis, one needs to work out the right balance.
Every enterprise that breaks down due to the pandemic will be a wheel that
stops functioning. Save that wheel. Lend it sufficient cash to make it turn
again. Once it starts running, stop lending. Slowly take back the loans. On the
other hand, the daily wage earner can be given food free as long as the
lockdown runs. Probably, for one more week. Then stop all free doles. His
hunger will make him hunt for work. And those millions of wheels will start
functioning once again. Bailout packages is a huge subject by itself. But I
will not go into that right now.

 

There should be no central
command in the sense of planning from top-down. A central command will make
mistakes and commit blunders. Let everyone find their own way. Ensure
continuity of infrastructure. Those who need help should be helped. Give
priority to very small enterprises, then to small and medium, and finally to
large. Let individual spirits find individual solutions. Open up the market
with safety. Planning by every individual and every enterprise, with the
government supporting them, is the best approach.

 

Note: This
article was written on 24th April. Before it gets published in our
journal, I had the opportunity to listen to the Economic Wizard – Mr. Mohandas
Pai on BCAS Webinar on 9th May. I am adding a few more notes.

 

i)  When India works for full year, it generates
GDP of say Rs. 200 Trillions. It is clear that Indian economy will not work for
at least two months due to Covid 19 Pandemic. As simple arithmetics, GDP should
fall by 17%. There are many variables. Some things continued even during lock
down. Some things will not work even after the lock down is lifted. On the
whole, Indian GDP for the financial year 2020-21 can fall by 20%. From an
estimated growth rate of 5% if there is a fall of 20%, our GDP may fall by 15%.
This can cause massive repercussions. As discussed earlier, Government, RBI
& peoples’ job is to ensure that the wheels within wheels work with minimum
damage. Otherwise the domino effect can cause far more losses.

ii) Long term stability lies in
Indian economy being an independent economy. Neither based on exports, nor
based on imports. In still longer terms, when we all – Government to people are
sensitive to the weakest of the lives; and when we ensure welfare of all lives;
we can have a truly satisfied, peaceful India.

 

CONCLUSION

India
and the world have suffered huge personal and economic losses. All this because
of a tiny, invisible organism which probably does not even have life. This is a
warning that Mother Nature has given to Mankind. If we learn the lesson, if we
reset our lifestyle and our capitalist market economics, we can prevent future
pandemics. If we ensure that every individual and every fit enterprise survives
this pandemic, then the human spirit will ensure that in the short term the
economy will be functioning well. Ignore the share market indices and GDP
statistics. Focus on welfare of all – ‘Unto The Last’. Adopt Gandhiji’s and
Vinobaji’s concept of SARVODAYA.

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CORPORATE AND ALLIED LAWS

Prior to the manifestation of the
Covid-19 pandemic, most of us would have heard about a disaster recovery plan
or business continuity plan as part of the risk management plans. Such disaster
recovery plans would seldom have envisaged a situation of countrywide, or even
global, lockdowns which most of the world is currently experiencing. Therefore,
it is unwise to expect that such a well-thought-out disaster recovery or
continuity plan would have been prepared for a country as a whole. No doubt,
there are certain legislations like the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the
Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 which have come handy to the government in this
unprecedented calamity.

 

Coming to the specific subject of
the impact of Covid-19 on the Corporate and Allied Laws, we need to briefly
touch base with the typical limitations that all of us are suffering from. The
current situation of countrywide lockdown and social distancing norms is making
most of us feel handicapped at not being able to attend office as we would
generally do, have free access to the enabling office environment of accessing
computers, the internet, physical records, printing and scanning documents, DSCs
and all other tools that create a smooth working environment and enable the
ease of working. For most of our working lives easy availability of such basic
office infrastructure has been taken for granted and we did not pause and think
even for a minute what would happen if the easy availability of such office
infrastructure is interrupted for any length of time.

 

These aspects are highlighted to
pinpoint the limitations which business enterprises are facing today as far as
operational aspects are concerned. Apart from these operational limitations or
micro issues, there are many substantive effects or macro issues which Covid-19
has triggered globally. Therefore, in the context of Corporate and Allied Laws
we would need to dissect the Covid-19 impact from two broad perspectives, viz.,
(1) Operational or micro issues; and (2) Substantive or macro issues.

 

Various operational or micro
issues are more to do with operational difficulties currently faced by
corporates causing hindrances in timely and adequate compliances for the short
time span during the ongoing lockdown. On the other hand, the substantive or
macro issues would require a much deeper understanding of certain provisions of
the Corporate and Allied Laws in the context of the unique environment created
by Covid-19 and its possible effects, which would have a long-lasting impact on
Indian corporates in the medium to long term, say over a period of six to 18
months.

 

Many relaxations announced
address the operational or micro issues under the Companies Act, 2013, FDI
norms to check opportunistic takeovers of Indian companies and reducing the
post buyback period for raising further capital from 12 months to six months
under SEBI Regulations amongst others. Therefore, as the Indian corporates
battle the disruptions caused by Covid-19 and endeavour to revive and
streamline business operations post relaxations of the lockdown measures, there
would be a greater need to evaluate the Corporate and Allied Laws provisions
which could create hindrances or pose substantive or macro limitations to
effective recovery and announce enabling relaxations to provide a free runway
for a smooth take-off.

 

Most of us would be aware about
these relaxations by now given the quick spread of such updates on social media
platforms (even faster than coronavirus). Therefore, without getting into the
details, I would like to briefly summarise most of the relaxations as a quick
refresher for ease of reference.

 

I.   Companies Act, 2013 and related rules

 

1. Board meeting permitted through video conferencing or other
audio-visual means
in respect of certain matters for which mandatory
physical meeting is otherwise required, which includes approval of financial
statements, Board’s report, prospectus and matters relating to mergers,
amalgamations, demergers, acquisitions and takeovers – up to 30th
June, 2020
.

 

2. Maximum time gap between two consecutive Board meetings
relaxed from the existing 120 days to 180 days for the next two quarters, i.e. till
30th September, 2020.

 

3. Non-holding of at least one meeting of Independent Directors in
a financial year
without the attendance of Non-Independent Directors will
not be treated as violation for F.Y. 2019-20.

 

4. Non-compliance of residency in India for a minimum period
of 182 days by at least one director of every company will not be treated as
violation for F.Y. 2019-20
.

 

5. Implementation of reporting by auditors as per the Companies
(Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 deferred by one year to F.Y. 2020-21.

 

6. The time limit for (i) creating Deposit Repayment Reserve of
20% of deposits
maturing during F.Y. 2020-21; and (ii) making specified
investment or deposit of at least 15% of the amount of debentures maturing during
F.Y. 2020-21 extended from 30th April to 30th June,
2020.

 

7. The time limit for filing of declaration for commencement of
business
by newly-incorporated companies extended from 180 days to 360
days
.

8. Contribution to newly-formed PM CARES Fund covered
under CSR spending of corporates and FAQs released in relation to CSR
spending in view of the peculiar situation of the Covid-19 pandemic.

 

9. Conduct of Extraordinary General Meetings through video
conferencing or other audio-visual means permitted till 30th June,
2020
in unavoidable cases, subject to certain safeguards and protective
mechanisms as detailed in MCA Circular No. 14/2020 dated 8th April,
2020 as further clarified by MCA Circular No. 17/2020 dated 13th
April, 2020.

 

10. Extension of due date of AGM to 30th September, 2020
for companies whose financial year has ended on 31st December,
2019
, i.e. time limit extended from six months from the end of the
financial year to nine months.

 

11. Companies Fresh Start Scheme, 2020 (CFSS) has been announced
in order to enable certain eligible defaulting companies to regularise their
filings without payment of additional fees and granting immunity from launching
prosecution or proceedings for imposition of penalty on account of delay
associated with certain filings. The detailed guidelines and operational
procedures have been laid out in MCA Circular No. 12/2020 dated 30th March,
2020.

 

12. LLP Settlement Scheme, 2020 (LSS) which was announced through
MCA Circular No. 06/2020 dated 4th March, 2020 has been modified vide MCA
Circular No. 13/2020 dated 30th March, 2020
keeping in mind the
prevalent situation.

 

II.  Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
Regulations applicable to listed companies

 

A. SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations,
2015 (‘LODR’)

1. The following relaxations, in the form of extension of timeline
for certain compliance requirements / filings by entities whose equity
shares are listed
, have been announced (Refer Table A).

Further, vide a separate
circular1, SEBI has granted similar relaxations to issuers who have
listed their debt securities, non-convertible redeemable preference shares and
commercial papers, and to issuers of municipal debt securities.

 

2. As per Regulations 17(2) and 18(2)(a), the Board of directors and
the audit committee need to meet at least four times a year, with a maximum
time gap of 120 days between two meetings. The listed entities are exempted
from observing this maximum time gap for the meetings held / proposed to be
held between 1st December, 2019 and 30th June, 2020.
However, listed entities need to ensure that there are at least four Board and
audit committee meetings conducted in a year.

 

3. The effective date of operation of the new SEBI circular on
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
dated 22nd January, 2020 in
relation to imposition of fines and other enforcement actions for
non-compliance with provisions of the LODR, has been extended to compliance
periods ending on or after 30th June, 2020 instead of 31st
March, 2020. Thus, the existing SEBI SOP Circular dated 3rd May,
2018 would be applicable till such date.

 

4. Publication of newspaper advertisements for certain
information such as notice of Board meetings, financial results, etc. as
required under Regulations 47 and 52(8) has been exempted for all events
scheduled till 15th May, 2020
.

Table A

No.

Regulation
No.

Compliance
requirement / filings

Relaxations
w.r.t. quarter / F.Y. ending
31st March, 2020

 

 

 

Due date

Extended date

1.

7(3)

Half-yearly compliance certificate on share
transfer facility

30th April, 2020

31st May, 2020

2.

13(3)

Quarterly statement of investor complaints

21st April, 2020

15th May, 2020

3.

24A

Annual secretarial compliance report

30th May, 2020

30th June, 2020

4.

27(2)

Quarterly corporate governance report

15th April, 2020

15th May, 2020

5.

31

Quarterly shareholding pattern

21st April, 2020

15th May, 2020

6.

33

Quarterly financial results

15th May, 2020

30th June, 2020

Annual financial results

30th May, 2020

30th June, 2020

7.

40(9)

Half-yearly certificate from practicing CS on
timely issue of share certificates

30th April, 2020

31st May, 2020

8.

44(5)

Holding of AGM by top 100 listed entities by
market capitalisation

31st August, 2020

30th September, 2020

9.

19(3A), 20(3A) and 21(3A)

Nomination and Remuneration Committee, Stakeholders
Relationship Committee and Risk Management Committee need to meet at least
once in a year

31st March, 2020

30th June, 2020

10.

Circular issued in terms of Regulation 101(2)

Disclosure requirement by large corporates

 

 

Initial disclosure

30th April, 2020

30th June, 2020

Annual disclosure

15th May, 2020

30th June, 2020



5. Regulation 29(2) specifies that listed entities should give prior
intimation to stock exchanges about Board meeting
(i) at least five days
before the meeting wherein financial results are to be considered, and
(ii) two working days for all other matters. This requirement of prior
intimation has been reduced to two days in all cases for Board meetings
to be held till 31st July, 2020.

 

6. Any delay in submission of information to stock exchanges
regarding loss of share certificates and issue of duplicate share certificates
within two days of receiving such information as required under Regulation
39(3) will not attract penal provisions for intimations to be made between 1st
March, 2020 and 31st May, 2020.

 

7. In line with the relaxations announced by the MCA for allowing
companies whose financial year ended on
31st December, 2019
to hold their AGM till 30th
September, 2020, SEBI has granted similar relaxation to top 100 listed
entities, whose financial year ended on 31st December, 2019,
for holding their AGM within a period of nine months instead of within a period
of five months from the year-end.

 

8. SEBI has further clarified that authentication / certification of
any filing / submission made to the stock exchanges under LODR may be done
using digital signature certificate (DSC) until 30th June, 2020.

 

Suggested relaxations: Apart from the above
relaxations proactively given by SEBI, the following further relaxations may be
considered by it:

 

1. There were a few amendments made to the LODR based on the
recommendations of the Kotak Committee which came into effect from 1st
April, 2020, mostly relating to Board of directors and its meetings. These
include (i) requirement of having at least one Independent woman director by
the top 1,000 listed entities [Reg. 17(1)(a)]; (ii) requirement of having at
least six directors on the Board by top 2,000 listed entities [Reg. 17(1)(c)]
and (iii) a person shall not be a director in more than seven listed entities
(Reg. 17A). While most of these provisions were introduced well before time for
listed entities to be compliant beforehand, the current situation warrants
reconsideration in extending the effective date of these provisions.

2. Regulation 25(3) of LODR requires Independent directors to hold at
least one meeting in a year without the presence of Non-Independent directors
and members of management. Here, too, relaxation should be granted by extending
the due date to 30th June, 2020 as done for compliance of
Regulations 19(3A), 20(3A) and 21(3A) in respect of committee meetings. It is
worthwhile to recall that the MCA has waived the similar requirements under the
Companies Act as stated above.

 

B.  SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations,
2011 (‘SAST’)

The time limit for filing annual
disclosures under Regulations 30(1) and 30(2) by persons holding 25% or more
shares / voting rights in a listed company and by promoters (including persons
acting in concert), respectively, regarding aggregate shareholding and voting
rights held in the listed company, have been extended till 1st June,
2020 instead of seven working days from the end of the financial year. Further,
a similar time limit extension has been granted for disclosure to be made by
promoters under Regulation 31(4) regarding non-encumbrance of shares held by
them, other than those already disclosed during the financial year.

 

C.  SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations,
2018 (‘ICDR’)

1. Rights Issues: SEBI has proactively announced certain
much-needed relaxations to listed entities in order to create an enabling
environment for fund-raising through rights issues that open on or before 31st
March, 2021. SEBI, vide a Circular2 , has granted relaxations
from strict application of certain provisions relating to rights issues, which
broadly include the following:

 

a) Eligibility conditions relating to Fast Track Rights Issues:
Certain eligibility conditions have been relaxed, inter alia, in the
form of reduction of certain time periods and monetary caps so that companies
can find it easy to comply with such conditions and come out with Fast Track
Rights Issues for quick fund raising.

b) Relaxation with respect to minimum subscription amount: The
requirement of receipt of minimum subscription amount in a rights issue has
been relaxed from the existing 90% to 75%, provided that such companies
need to ensure that at least 75% of the issue size is utilised for the objects
of the issue other than general corporate purpose.

c) Relaxation with respect to minimum threshold required for
non-filing of draft offer document with SEBI for its observations:
The
listed entities with a rights issue size of up to Rs. 25 crores (instead of Rs.
10 crores as earlier applicable) need not file draft letter of offer with SEBI
and can directly proceed to issue letter of offer to shareholders.

 

2. Validity of Observations issued by SEBI: As per the
existing provisions, a public issue / rights issue may be opened within a
period of 12 months from the date of issuance of Observations by SEBI. This has
been relaxed vide a SEBI Circular3  which provides that the validity of the SEBI
Observations, where the same have expired / will expire between 1st March,
2020 and 30th September, 2020 has been extended by six months from
the date of expiry of such Observations, subject to a requisite undertaking
from the lead manager to the issue.

 

3. Relaxation from fresh filing of offer document with SEBI in
case of increase / decrease in fresh issue size:
As per the existing
provisions, fresh filing of the draft offer document along with fees is
required in case of any increase or decrease beyond 20% in the estimated fresh
issue size. This has been relaxed vide a SEBI Circular3
whereby issuers have been permitted to increase or decrease the fresh issue
size by up to 50% of the estimated fresh issue size without the requirement to
file a fresh draft offer document with SEBI subject to fulfilment of certain
conditions. This relaxation is applicable for issues (IPO / Rights Issues /
FPO) opening before 31st December, 2020.

 

D. SEBI (Buy-back of Securities) Regulations,
2018 (‘Buy-back Regulations’)

Regulation 24(i)(f) of the
Buy-back Regulations imposes a restriction that companies shall not raise
further capital for a period of one year from the expiry of the buy-back
period, except in discharge of their subsisting obligations. Vide a SEBI
Circular4, this restrictive timeframe of one year has been reduced
to six months in line with the provisions of section 68(8) of the Companies
Act, 2013. This relaxation is applicable till 31st December, 2020.
This is a welcome relaxation, much needed in the current scenario where many
companies had announced buy-back prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 and may now
need capital to survive these difficult times.

 

III. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’)

The provisions of the IBC can
play a crucial role to make or break an entity in this turbulent business
environment. It is obvious that many businesses would find it difficult to
honour their financial obligations on time due to loss of business, revenue and
profit, as well as due to lack of liquidity in the market. In this regard, the
government has already announced its intention to put in place requisite
safeguards so that business entities are not dragged to insolvency proceedings
to further worsen the ongoing business crisis. The following few key decisions
/ announcements have already been made or are at an advanced stage of
consideration:

 

1.    
The threshold limit of debt default for invoking the Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) has been increased to Rs. 1 crore from Rs.
1 lakh.

 

2. An amendment has been made to the IBBI CIRP Regulations to provide
that the period of lockdown imposed by the Central Government due to Covid-19
shall not be counted for the purposes of the time-line for any activity that
could not be completed due to such lockdown in relation to a CIRP.

 

3. As per a news article, the provisions of
sections 7, 9 and 10 relating to initiation of CIRP is proposed to be suspended
for a period of six months which can be extended up to one year through
promulgation of an ordinance.


To conclude,
we must acknowledge the proactive relief measures announced by the government
and Regulators as far as Corporate and Allied Laws compliances are concerned,
which would provide a much-needed breather to India Inc. to successfully sail
through these difficult times. It would be imperative to continuously evaluate
and announce further substantive reliefs that should be provided till business
normalcy is achieved.

 

Let
me recall the words of Swami Vivekananda, ‘To think positively and
masterfully, with faith and confidence, life becomes more secure, richer in
achievement and experience’
in the hope that all of us would imbibe this
thought in these difficult times; and once we overcome this situation, we will
cherish this novel experience for the rest of our lives.


___________________________________________________

1   SEBI Circular No. SEBI/HO/DDHS/ON/P/2020/41 dated 23rd March,
2020

2     SEBI Circular No.
SEBI/HO/CFD/CIR/CFD/DIL/67/2020 dated 21st April, 2020

3     SEBI Circular No.
SEBI/HO/CFD/DIL1/CIR/P/2020/66 dated 21st April, 2020

4     SEBI Circular No.
SEBI/HO/CFD/DCR2/CIR/P/2020/69 dated 23rd April, 2020


‘MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION’ IN CORPORATE LENDING

Mutually assured
destruction is a term normally associated with nuclear war.


Its origins go back
to the post-World War II era when the then three superpowers of the world – the
USA, the Soviet Union and China – engaged in a race to spend billions of
dollars to build nuclear weapons. Other countries including India followed
suit. But these countries quickly realised that if and when there is a nuclear
engagement between two nuclear-armed countries, it will lead to disruption and
destruction on such a large scale that perhaps it would destroy life for
generations to come. And the destruction may not be limited only to the
countries engaged in the war, but perhaps to the entire humanity. This
potential destruction caused by a nuclear war is what came to be known in the
US as ‘mutually assured destruction’. The acronym for this, ‘MAD’, is very,
very apt!

 

‘MAD’ is a term
which today can be widely applied in several areas, including the Indian
Corporate Lending scenario. Just as in nuclear war everyone destroys everyone
else, the stakeholders in this industry have acted in such a way that they have
ended up in a ‘MAD’ state.

 

WHY THE PLETHORA OF NPAs

Today in the
lending industry in India there is a plethora of NPAs. We have seen the biggest
names in the industry crumble, we have seen insolvencies like never before and
we have seen unprecedented destruction of wealth. The question to be asked is
how did we land up in this scenario? What was it that led to this? To answer
this question, we need to start by looking at corporate lending prior to the
NPAs and prior to the build-up of all those bad loans. To understand this
better, there is a need to comprehend a very simple methodology that any lender
uses while lending money to a corporate. This model is called EIC – basically,
economy, industry and company. A lender will look at not only the company, its
promoters, its business, cash flows, etc., but also look at it in reference to
the industry in which it operates. Thereafter, the industry is analysed based
on the prevalent economic scenario.

 

There is now one
more ‘E’ to this model and that is environment or the global environment /
economic state. The key point is that none of these elements, i.e., company /
industry / economy can or should be analysed in a silo. The analysis always has
to be comprehensive (or in toto, if you wish).

 

Statements such as
‘India should grow at 5% or 8% or 10%’ are very naïve, to say the least. All we
need to do is to look around and ask which countries have grown at this pace,
or have even grown at all over the last decade? And, what has growth brought?
Has it ensured equal distribution of wealth amongst all people? Has it pulled
people out of poverty? If not, what good is this growth? India, after all, is
not a bubble which floats around by itself. Its economic state is a result of
what happens around the world. This is typically what is called ‘big picture
dynamics’. Unfortunately, when we forget the big picture and try to look at the
short term and view things in a silo, it inevitably leads to trouble and
destruction.

 

So, along with the
EIC model, traditionally any lender would also looked at the all-important
three Cs – Company (promoters, business, products, etc.), Cash flow
(serviceability) and Collateral (back-up). This EIC+3 Cs pretty much worked
fine for many years.

 

Then there was a
huge change in the demand-supply dynamic that came in with licenses being
distributed to a huge number of NBFCs, small finance banks, MFIs, etc. All
these players wanted a piece of the very under-penetrated but very attractive
Indian market. The Indian market though very large, had a certain segment that
the whole industry was after. This segment was already being catered to by
banks. But now these new players also wanted to break in. The question for
these new lenders was what USP could they offer to lure these customers away? Then
began a rat race to grab the all-coveted market share of borrowers.

 

And this is what
led to the creation of a series of new, innovative, flashy, unthought-of
financial solutions under the domain of structured finance. Structured finance
typically features off-balance sheet funding, name-lending, zero coupon bonds,
etc. Some of these structures were very attractive to the borrowers because
they allowed them to raise debt without disclosing additional leverage on their
financials. While there was nothing inherently wrong with these structures,
what went wrong was that the lenders who were lending under these models
completely forgot and ignored the EIC+3 Cs model. The big picture dynamics also
seemed to have been forgotten. That is what has led us to this mess.

 

‘NAME-LENDING’ BECOMES
A PROBLEM

While there is no
dearth of examples to prove this, if we can just pick a couple of very well
written and publicised cases which went bad, we will realise how aptly the term
‘MAD’ fits in the corporate lending business. Both of these cases can
technically fall under the domain of ‘name-lending’ which is basically lending
to a reputed customer without thorough analysis and without collaterals (in
most cases).

 

The corporate
lending business has five critical elements – the borrowing entity, the
promoter, the lender, the auditors and the rating agencies. The best example of
how these five elements collaborated to ensure ‘MAD’ is the downfall of the
IL&FS group. In this particular case, the reason that it stands as one of
the largest NPAs in history is that almost all the stakeholders acted with no
vision, no big-picture dynamics and with a complete ignorance of basics. The
lack of integrity from the management and a total lack of accountability from
the auditors and rating agencies allowed IL&FS to become the mess that it
is today. The lenders, on the other hand, were guilty of showing blind faith in
the name, in the rating agencies and lending without thorough analysis and
collaterals in some cases. This all but ensured their own destruction in the
process, along with the destruction of several corporate entities within the
IL&FS group. This is a classical example of ‘MAD’.

 

The second apt
example would be Kingfisher Airlines. If we look at this case carefully through
the lens of the EIC+3 Cs model, some glaring, unfortunate decision-making on
the part of the promoter, the company and other stakeholders comes to the fore.

 

The Indian aviation
industry was booming at the time when KFA was launched. However, for years
together it has been a known fact that globally only five to ten airlines have
ever shown sustainable profitability; and there is a reason for this – this
industry, along with telecom, is completely marred by cut-throat competition.
The fact is the players in this industry cannot really control or decide a
floor price for themselves. Besides, to enter aviation you have to invest large
sums of money and you have to operate almost completely at the mercy of your
competitors who decide the price that customers are willing to pay, on the one
hand, and the ATF and other costs, on the other. There is very little an
aviation company can control on its own. Now, the important thing to note is
that any company to be sustainable has to make profits; possibly after a few years
of operations in industries where there are longer gestation periods. But in
the long run making profits is a must. The revenue model has to be robust
enough to make sustainable profits. In aviation, the only thing you can perhaps
control is a few peripheral costs. But really, without any predictability of a
top line, it is extremely difficult to run a profitable company and to make
sure that it sustains. That’s where the KFA story is very interesting.

 

At the time of its
launch, we had a reputed promoter who had run a very successful liquor
business. When he launched the airline, he seems to have had this vision that
his airline would resonate the King of Good Times slogan. With that in
mind, KFA was launched with a brand-new fleet, best in-flight entertainment,
best available crew and amazing meals; in short, a fully satisfying customer
experience. All seemed hunky dory for a while. While the airline was not making
too much money, it still seemed to be able to sustain its debt and operate
comfortably. What happened next was just naked ambition – the decision to take
over Air Deccan which was a low-cost carrier.

 

HIGH COST FOR A
LOW-COST BUY

As it turns out,
this was the starting point of all troubles for KFA. With this takeover, the
airline had a low-cost carrier under its brand and was still trying to match
its ‘best in industry’ service and the other standards that it was known for.
With the pricing of the low-cost carrier being about 30 to 40% lower than the
full-cost carrier, it was a simple case of costs outweighing revenues. It was
unabashedly a failed business model. Typically, any low-cost airline is
supposed to only fly its passengers from point A to point B. No value-added
services are provided because the cost of the tickets is not enough to cover
any other expenses. But KFA Red, which was the low-cost carrier, ignored this
and started operating in its own silo. Again, a case of losing sight of the
basics and losing sight of the big picture. While this happened, to cover the
deficit between income and costs, KFA kept leveraging its balance sheet more
and more and more. The lenders, knowingly or unknowingly, played a crucial role
in allowing this leverage to build up, eventually leading to destruction of
both the company and of themselves.

 

This was done
through the use of another common concept of corporate lending, i.e.,
‘refinancing’, which is a common end-use stated on the sanction letters of
borrowers in several industries, including real estate. What it means is that
when a Rs. 100-crore loan is up for repayment in the next two to three months,
the borrower approaches another banker and asks for a Rs. 100-crore loan to
repay the first one. And if this cycle continues to go on, it basically means
the borrower never actually repays the principal amount to any lender from his
own pocket. It is like one lender financing another through the borrower’s
balance sheet. This eventually ensures ‘mutually assured destruction’ because
the banker intentionally or unintentionally helps the borrower get
into a habit of never having to repay the principal amount.

 

MONEY LENT FOR ALL THE WRONG REASONS

Then there is
over-leveraging, another demon that has led to the downfall of most companies.
It is high time the lending industry restrains itself when it realises the
company has passed its ‘sustainable debt’. This is another concept which seems
to be lost on the industry. Lenders keep lending to the same company over and
over again even though its cash flows simply can’t keep up with the piling
debt. What makes it worse is that the money is lent for all the wrong reasons,
such as meeting quarterly targets, eating into another lender’s market share,
name-lending because the promoter is reputed and so on. None of these loans are
lent on the basis of any analysis. Once again, a case of moving away from the
basics, not thinking of the big picture and eventually mutually destructing.

 

A very important
point to note here is that bankers or lenders are not meant to be in the
business of invoking securities. It is the least productive thing a lender can
do. It basically means that your entire assessment has failed and you are now
relying totally on your back-up. A collateral is just that, a back-up. Yet
today, most lenders spend substantial amounts of time and money in trying to
invoke securities and recover their money.

 

Now, we can ask
whether all this is too idealistic. Shouldn’t we look at being practical? Who
cares which company survives and which doesn’t? But the problem with this
approach is that it has created a systemic issue of ‘bad credit’. And the
inconvenient thing about ideals is that they are difficult to chase, they
require resilience, they require courage, they require character. But we also
need to remember that if we have all these and we reach our ideals, or even
close to our ideals, very few things can topple us.

 

Therefore, a lender
needs to have the will and the vision to say ‘no’ when a borrower inches
towards over-leveraging or is struggling with a flawed revenue model.

 

No promoter who has
built his or her business from the ground up wants to see it destroyed. And
therefore, lenders and rating agencies and other stakeholders need to also
think about sustainability of the businesses they are dealing with and, in
turn, their own sustainability. The sooner this realisation of interdependence
and responsibility comes, the sooner will we start digging ourselves out of our
graves. Perhaps, then, we will automatically also see that there is enough
credit available for the people who need it.

 

COVID-19 AND THE RESHAPING OF THE GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

Geopolitics has been historically
shaped by multiple events in history. Wars, conflicts and occasionally
haphazard events have changed how nations have achieved and lost power on the
international stage. The international system after the Cold War ended has been
characteristically driven by the United States-led global order. The Western
institutions, collectively known as the Bretton Woods system, have been major
institutions shaping the global financial order. In the dying stages of the
Cold War, China’s rise was seldom seen as that of the next big global power fit
enough to challenge the US presence in Asia. The post-Cold War era also saw the
formation and development of the European Union. The diffusion of power and
geopolitics from central power to multiple regional power centres led to the
formation of the multipolar regional order.

 

Frictions between countries were
commonplace in Asia; an ascendant China was not only challenged by US presence
in the region, but also by the rise of India throughout the 2000s. However,
since the mid-2000’s, the rise of China and the debate on the uneasy decline of
US power in Asia has displayed itself in multiple events and forums across the
region, often with countries such as India and groupings like ASEAN having to
pay the price for choosing sides. The recent episode involving a trade war
between the US and China over supremacy in the technological space exposed the
limits of the structure and tipping points between both the countries in the
region. Eventually, the end of this war was followed by COVID-19, a ‘Black
Swan’ event which has had a huge impact on the global economy and geopolitics.

 

‘Black Swan’ events are an extremely
negative event or occurrence that is impossibly difficult to predict. In other
words, such events are both unexpected and unpredictable. As the world deals
with the COVID-19 pandemic which has seen 15,361 deaths till 23rd
March, 2020, reports have indicated faults at multiple levels in controlling
the issue at the right time. While China’s suppression of the information has
surfaced in recent understanding, the drop in its consumption levels has
severely impacted the global economy. Businesses have been clearly hit. Major
among them have been aviation and tourism. The drop in travel and bans on
flights have impacted the two industries, leading to a complete shutdown of
some sectors within these areas. Major global airlines have cut anywhere
between 80 to 90% of their capacity on the backs of travel bans and the lack of
passengers as a result thereof. Some economies reliant on tourism have been
badly hit.

 

Nevertheless, crisis times call for
astute diplomacy and capitalisation of the issues at hand. Several issues could
be noticed on how states handled the crisis and their response, and how global
markets and the uncertainty were taken advantage of by a few countries. While
China reached the peak of the crisis, global markets had started to respond by
closing down to the outside world systemically. Crashing markets and impacted
supply chains followed by reduced demands were indicative of the coming crisis.
One of the key impacts of the slowing economy was felt in the oil markets. The
reduced demand from China and the rest of the world has led to tumbling prices.
The OPEC, which coordinates and sets global oil prices, fell out with Russia.
This fallout between Russia and Saudi Arabia has sent oil prices crashing,
leading to historical lows, possibly benefiting bigger global consumers.

 

Japan, which had been continually
struggling to keep its economy afloat, reported one of the slowest growth rates
in many years due to domestic policies. Just staying above the line going into
recession, due to the slowdown caused by the virus, Japan may very well be
heading into an economic crisis. Recent discussions also highlight that Japan
would most likely be postponing the Summer Olympics which could have provided a
great boost to its economy.

 

Similarly, some other countries have
not failed to showcase their power through diplomacy. India, which has till now
done some of the most extensive relief operations in all affected regions by
bringing back stranded citizens, has also extended its hand to the South Asian
region which has fallen apart after the failure of the South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation (SAARC); the joint effort call was heeded by all
(except Pakistan). Similarly, India also lifted the ban on the export of all
kinds of personal protection equipment, including masks, and cleared some
consignments of medical gear placed by China, a move seen as a goodwill
gesture; such diplomatic signalling is seen positively as an extending reach in
times of crisis. India’s ability to get back its citizens from Wuhan is also a
demonstration of this extended positive reach.

 

In the global sense, as the crisis’s
epicentre moves to Europe where the death toll has now overtaken that of China,
and the United States’ healthcare system has showcased its total unpreparedness
to tackle this epidemic, China’s reviving supply lines will surely find a
future market to sell its goods. India, with its developed pharmaceutical
sector, should capitalise on this situation. However, the US lobbies which are
averse to generic substitutes have always scuttled any ideas for the lucrative
markets. China’s companies, including its retail giant Alibaba, have already
started to send across protective medical supplies to all South Asian countries
(excluding India) as well as some countries in Africa. The inability to rely on
existing Western donor systems which have been increasingly challenged by China
since the last decade, may turn out to be a silver lining for China.

 

The
future of the global order remains uncertain; the COVID-19 crisis has struck at
a time when leaderships have been challenged domestically all over the world.
While the United States is in election season, China’s vulnerability to a
crisis has put a question mark on the strengthening of the power base of
President Xi Jinping within China and that of its ruling Communist Party.
However, India’s handling of the situation has helped quell some negativity for
now about the ongoing domestic issues in the country. Nevertheless, once the
dust settles, the gravest impact would be felt in Europe. As the region was
already battling a refugee crisis, deaths relating to Coronavirus would add a
burden on the regional economies. The inability to rebuild from the economic
impact would invariably shift the burden on the emerging powers within the
grouping, forcing an already delicate line in the grouping; the region’s
economic engine Germany has already recorded no growth in the coming year. The
negative growth rate and the developing internal political crisis within the
country do not hold a positive outlook.

 

In the second half of 2020, the geopolitical
shifts will be visible through geo-economics outlays. China, which was first in
and is now first out, will continue to rebuild from the economic shocks. It is
bound to benefit most from the post-crisis scenario as the virus spread will
keep it from exhausting its options in supplying the growing needs during the
crisis and its aftermath. India’s chances to plug into this geopolitical
reordering will be crucial. The uncertain political and economic reach of the West
could well make it use a resilient India to assert itself to balance China in
Asia; nevertheless, India will have to once again resort to its delicate
balancing game between the US and China, at the same time being careful not to
tip the scales too much to still be able to plug itself into a reviving Asian
economy.

HOUSEKEEPING FOR BHUDEVI

Nandurbar is one of Maharashtra’s
smaller districts by area (5,955 sq. km.) and its forest cover, according to
the India State of Forest Report, 2019, is just over 20% of its area; which
means that about 1,196 sq. km. of Nandurbar is forest. Far away from Nandurbar
is the district of Kokrajhar in Assam, which has about 1,166 sq. km. of forest
covering a smaller total area (3,296 sq. km.).

 

For all those who prefer seeing the
wood for the trees, the more forest a district has, the happier it must be.
There are a host of reasons why this is so and many of these reasons have to do
with the idea of ‘environment’, both as the presence of and manifestation of
what in English is called ‘nature’, and also as the provision of many of the
basic materials that are central to our lives.

 

Our Indic conception transcends
‘environment’ entirely, for our tradition regards the earth as Bhudevi,
whose consort Vishnu incarnates from age to age to rid her of the
accumulation of demonic forces. He does this out of love for the earth and its
inhabitants.

 

As guardians and practitioners of
this tradition, those who live close to and within the forest tracts of
Nandurbar and Kokrajhar would be the ideal persons to inform us about the worth
and value of the forest to their lives. To even the partially observant
traveller, India’s tribal and rural societies – wondrously variegated though
their individual cultures may be – take much of their identity from the forest
and from nature.

 

The forest supplies them with
firewood and timber for construction, it is home to the animal and bird prey
they seek for their cooking pots; the forest contains the medicinal plants and
herbs that indigenous and local medicinal traditions depend upon; fruits are
plentiful, cattle are watchfully allowed into the forest to seek the remedies
they are preternaturally aware of; and the forest is home to the wild relatives
of the grasses we call cereals and to the great majority of our vegetables.

 

If we compare this list of what the
forest supplies its residents with with another list, that of what contemporary
industrial society supplies its residents with, then there is no contest about
which list is the longer one. However, the most elementary materials on both
lists are none too different from each other. What is different is that the
non-forest list supplies each and every one of its items for a fee.

 

That fee embodies several important
concepts. There is extraction or collection of the primary material (wood, for
example, in the form of whole, uncut logs), movement of the primary material to
a place where some initial transformation to it can take place (such as a saw
mill), movement of the transformed material to a consumption centre (such as a
town or city), further transformation (sections for door and window frames, for
furniture, shaping into ordinary household goods, shaping into crafts items and
curios), final purchase and use in a wholesale or retail transaction.

 

These concepts communicate with us
in today’s world not as the transformation of a material, not as a reminder of
the origin of a material, but through a number we call the cost that is
connected to either the extraction of a material, the transformation of a
material, or the marketing of a transformed material to its final consumers.

 

These costs, whether considered once
depending upon where, in this chain of transformation, you stand, or whether
considered two or three times by those tasked with analysing an industry based
on a primary material, satisfy the current frameworks we employ to describe how
value is understood, multiplied and given economic substance. But they are
utterly unable to convey other kinds of valuing, especially the kind that the
tribal societies of Nandurbar and Kokrajhar use when they regard primary
material from their forests.

 

What are these other kinds of value?
From the point of view of the holders of knowledge about the primary material
in all its aspects, values associated with the forest in their living vicinity
are cultural, social, spiritual and pertain to health and well-being. Their
knowledge relates not to the market worth of a cubic metre of wood and how much
price value can be added to that block of wood by transforming it into a
contemporarily styled cabinet, or an objet d’art. Their knowledge
relates to the numerous physical conditions that need to be maintained and
balanced so that trees in the forest, just as much as the forest’s flora and
non-human residents, continue to be nourished.

 

The manner in which our system of
national accounts is framed, there is no scope whatsoever for knowledge of this
kind to be recognised, let alone to be valued even if imperfectly. Yet it is
becoming clearer with every passing year that such a valuation is needed. The
clarity comes because several biophysical and geophysical changes are becoming
more intense.

 

There is the diminishing of
biodiversity, which means fewer species than before. There is the expansion of
the human settlement footprint, which encroaches on nature’s territory, and in
doing so alters natural rhythms (such as when a wetland is filled in to become
a city suburb). There are the effects of climate change and variation, which
affect crop cycles as much as coastal towns or snowfields.

 

The science that monitors these
changes has led to some sophisticated models being created which, in turn, lead
to estimates of risk (and the corollary, prescriptions for the mitigation of
risk) and therefore estimates of the costs of not acting to reduce risk. This
is where cost sets that can apply to the bewildering complexity of our natural
world make their appearance. A domain dedicated to this nascent art has been
named, too: it’s environmental-economic accounting.

 

India’s official statisticians have considered
how to ‘cost’ (or ‘price’) nature since the mid-1990s, when experimental
accounts which included ‘nature’s value’ were drawn up for a few states. The
activity has languished at that level since. Had they looked at our wisdom,
they may well have found inspiration, for the Shiva Purana explained to
us that during Kaliyuga, our present age, one of the many signs of
growing chaos is that the merchant class ‘have abandoned holy rites such as
digging wells and tanks, and planting trees and parks’ (II.1.24).

 

Now, however, India’s obligations to
the large number of multilateral treaties and agreements which have to do with
environment and biodiversity broadly, as well as the effects of climate change,
and moreover to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, are running
into the inherent limitations of the system of national accounts that, so far,
excludes nature and knowledge systems associated with nature.

 

The accounting fraternity in our
country possesses experience and wisdom aplenty, for they know the daily pulse
of a huge and astonishingly variegated economic web. As our companies and
industries learn to lighten the environmental footprint of all their
activities, their need to adopt methods to measure, cost, assess and plan for
the environmental consequences of those activities will only increase.

 

Yet
it is not for us to adopt, in the name of standardisation, an ‘international’
method that values nature. Rather, what is called for is an Indic
conceptualisation of nature which suits our civilisational economic trajectory
and which is rooted in our scriptures. ‘Heaven is my father; my mother is this
vast earth, my close kin,’ says the Rig Veda (1.164.33).

 

By taking up such a challenge –
conceiving and imparting a new accounting literacy that sensitively interprets
the wisdom of our rishis and sants to temper the demands of our
era – the accounting fraternity will contribute considerably to renewing our
homage to Bhudeví.

 

(The author, Rahul Goswami, lives in Goa and is
the Unesco-Asia expert on intangible cultural heritage)
 

REGULATION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS – PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF
REGULATION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS


Related party transactions are
transactions by a company with parties that are related to it or to certain
persons having some control over the company. Such transactions present a
classic case of conflict of interest where persons in control of the company
are in a position to approve such transactions where they have interest or
benefit. Related party transactions can thus be termed as a kind of corporate
nepotism. The objective of regulation is to ensure that there is oversight over
such transactions by independent persons, or that they are approved by other stakeholders,
or both. There are requirements also for extensive disclosures.

 

Thus, the Companies Act, 2013 (‘the
Act’) and the Rules made under it contain elaborate provisions for regulation
of related party transactions. SEBI, too, aims at regulating such transactions
independently through the SEBI LODR Regulations (‘the Regulations’). Since both
these sets of laws govern companies, there is obviously some concern about
conflicting provisions and even duplication / overlap which could result in
excessive compliance needs. Although attempts have been made to harmonise the
two sets of provisions,  differences
still remain.

 

SEBI has recently undertaken an exercise
to review the provisions and a report has been released containing
recommendations for change. After receiving feedback and consultation, SEBI
will notify the final changes.

 

SCHEME OF PROVISIONS


While this article concerns itself with
the proposed changes in the SEBI LODR Regulations, it is worth reviewing
briefly the scheme of provisions both under the Act and the Regulations.

 

To begin with, there is the definition
of a ‘related party’. Several persons and entities are listed specifically or
descriptively as related parties. These include relatives and also various
parties with which specified persons in management have control or association.
The Regulations, too, provide a definition which takes the definition under the
Act as the starting point and adds the definition under the relevant accounting
standard.

 

Then there is the definition of related
party transactions. The Act provides a list of transactions which, if
with a related party, would be subject to regulation. The Regulations, however,
provide a generic descriptive definition and thus are wider in nature.

 

Next, we have the manner of regulation.
This is in two forms. The first is the manner of approval required. This is
broadly at two levels. All related party transactions require approval of the
Audit Committee and generally the Board. Certain transactions also require the
approval of shareholders. Where approval of shareholders is required, related
parties cannot vote to approve such transactions. Secondly, there are
requirements for disclosures of such transactions which are extensive and also
supplement the disclosures required under the applicable accounting standard.

 

CONCERNS


The provisions have seen repeated
reviews and changes over the short period since they have been in existence.
SEBI had set up a committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Ramesh Srinivasan, MD
& CEO of Kotak Mahindra Capital Company Limited, which submitted its report
on 27th January, 2020. SEBI has invited feedback on this by 26th
February, 2020 after which one may expect SEBI to implement the changes by
suitably amending the Regulations.

 

The Committee has reviewed nearly every
major area of the provisions including the definitions of related party and
transactions, the threshold limits, the manner of approval, disclosures, etc.
Amendments, major and minor, have been suggested. The report, apart from giving
a detailed background and reasoning for proposing the changes, also gives the
exact language of the amendments. There are several advantages of these. One
will be able to know the exact language of the proposed amendments in course of
time. Concerns over ambiguities, difficulties, etc. can thus be pointed out
well in advance. Importantly, it will be easier for SEBI to notify the
amendments quickly.

 

Let us see in the following paragraphs
some of the important amendments proposed.

 

DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTY TO NOW
INCLUDE ALL PROMOTERS


Unlike many countries in the West, India
has a very large proportion of its companies promoted and controlled by family
groups. They hold a significant percentage of the total share capital, often
nearly half. Needless to add, generally they control the company for all
practical purposes on most matters.

 

At present, the Regulations define a
related party in two parts. One is the definition under the Act / or applicable
accounting standard, which itself is broad and includes many entities with
which directors / others may be associated. The second part consists of any
promoter who holds 20% or more of the share capital of the company.

 

However, there is an important lacuna
here. Even these wide definitions may still not include many entities connected
with the promoters. It is proposed that all promoters and members of the
promoter group would be now treated as related parties. Further, any entity
that directly / indirectly, along with relatives, holds 20% or more of the
share capital would also be treated as a related party.

 

Interestingly, to be considered as a
related party, the promoter will now not have to hold any shares.
Further, the person holding 20% or more may be a total outsider not connected
with the management at all.

 

There could be difficulties for the
company to compile a comprehensive list of these newly-covered entities. The
list of promoters, of course, should be readily available. However, identifying
persons who hold 20% or more may present some difficulties. Fortunately, a good
starting point would be the disclosures received from persons holding 5% or
more of the shares under the SEBI Takeover Regulations. However, the
definitions under the two laws are different in detail and hence it may still
be difficult for the company to prepare an accurate list of related parties
covered by these amendments.

 

TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN RELATED PARTIES OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARIES


Currently, transactions between the
company and its related parties are covered and to some extent between the
company and its subsidiaries. The concern is that certain sets of transactions
may get left out.

 

It is now proposed that transactions
between subsidiaries of the company and a related party either of the company
or its subsidiaries will be deemed to be related party transactions. Thus, the
following would now be related party transactions:

 

(i) Between the company and its related party;

(ii) Between the company and any related party
of any of its subsidiaries;

(iii) Between the subsidiaries of the company
and any related party of the company; and

(iv) Between the subsidiaries of the company
and any related party of any of its subsidiaries.

 

TRANSACTIONS WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO BENEFIT
RELATED PARTIES


It is now proposed to
cover transactions with any parties, ‘the purpose and effect of which is to
benefit
a related party of the listed entity or any of its subsidiaries’.

 

The intention
obviously is to cover those transactions ostensibly carried out with a
non-related party but the intention and also the effect is to benefit related
parties. In a sense, the intention seems to be to cover indirect transactions.
The requirement is that not just the actual effect, but even the purpose
of the transaction has to be benefit to a related party. Arguably, a
transaction with an unintentional benefit to a related party ought not to be
covered. However, this aspect may need clarification.

 

No guidance is given
as to how to determine or even detect such transactions. It is very likely that
the management or person who is the related party would know about the benefit
and thus the onus would be on such person to inform the company.

 

It is also not clear
whether the benefit should be for the entire amount of the transaction or part
of it. For example, a contract may be given to a non-related party X, who may
sub-contract a part of the contract to a related party. If other conditions are
met, it would appear that such a contract should also get covered.

 

MATERIAL MODIFICATIONS LATER TO RELATED
PARTY TRANSACTIONS


Related party
transactions may be approved and transactions initiated but later they may
undergo modifications. At present, unless the modification is in the form of
entering into a de novo transaction, the modification may not get
covered. To ensure that material modifications also get covered, it is provided
that they require approval in the same manner as original transactions. It is
not clear what does the word ‘material’ mean. As this term is not defined, one
will have to adopt alternative definitions and interpretations of this term.

 

In case where the
transaction is by a subsidiary with a related party, the modification will
require approval only if certain specified thresholds are exceeded.

 

PRIOR APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS


Certain material
transactions with related parties that are above the specified thresholds
require approval of shareholders at present. It is proposed that such approvals
should be taken prior to undertaking such transactions. This requirement
will also extend to material modifications to such transactions.

 

MODIFICATION IN CRITERION FOR DETERMINING
MATERIAL RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS


Transactions above a
certain threshold are deemed to be material. It is now provided that the
threshold shall be the lowest of the following:

 

(a) Rs.
1,000 crores;

(b) 5%
of consolidated revenues;

(c) 5%
of consolidated total assets;

(d)  5%
of consolidated net worth (if positive).

 

This will
particularly affect very large companies for whom, as per the present
thresholds, even Rs. 1,000 crores of transactions were not ‘material’.

 

REVIEW REQUIREMENTS BY AUDIT COMMITTEE
AND DISCLOSURES TO SHAREHOLDERS


The Audit Committee
will now be required to mandatorily review certain aspects of the related party
transactions that are placed before it for approval. This, on the one hand,
provides guidance to the Audit Committee as to what specific factors to take
into account. On the other hand, it places responsibility on the Audit
Committee to go into these details.

 

It is also proposed
that the notice to shareholders for approval of material related party
transactions should give specific items of information. This again increases
transparency and enables the shareholders to take an informed decision on the
transactions. Interestingly, whether or not the Audit Committee approval was
unanimous has to be stated.

 

CONCLUSION


There are other
amendments proposed, too. And there are some other aspects of the amendments
apart from those discussed above. The final amendments as notified would be
worth going into in detail taking into account all the amendments.

 

As mentioned earlier,
SEBI has given some time for feedback on the proposed amendments. Considering
the past track record of SEBI, it is likely that the amendments may be notified
soon thereafter. It will have to be seen whether the amendments are put into
place immediately or phased out and also whether they are made applicable to
all companies or only to some.

 

The
responsibility of the company, and particularly of the Audit Committee, will
only increase after such amendments. Related party transactions are a source of
concern and even wrongdoings such as siphoning off profits / assets of
companies. The amended provisions may result in increased accountability by all
parties concerned.

 

For the Board
generally and for the Independent Directors / Audit Committee in particular, it
is not easy to determine whether all related party transactions are covered.
Ideally, the primary onus should be on the management / promoters and
particularly those persons with respect to whom the related party connection
exists with a counter party. If they fail to disclose their interest and
connection, it is possible that others may not even come to know. However, this
is not readily accepted in law and the Board / Independent Directors / Audit
Committee and even the Auditors will have to exercise diligence and care as
expected respectively from them. Their responsibility, and hence liability,
will only increase.
 

 

TRANSMISSION OF TENANCY

INTRODUCTION


One of the biggest
questions that invariably crops up when preparing a Will is, ‘Can I bequeath my
tenanted property?’ This is especially true in a city like Mumbai where
tenanted properties are very valuable. Tenanted property could be in the form
of residential flats or commercial properties. A person can make a Will for any
and every asset that he owns. Hence, the issue which arises is, can a person
bequeath a property of which he is only a tenant? In the State of Maharashtra,
the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (the Act) are also
relevant. Let us analyse this important issue in more detail.

 

RENT ACT
PROVISIONS


Section 7(15) of the Act defines the
term ‘tenant’ as any person by whom rent is payable for any premises. Further,
when the tenant dies, the term includes:

(a) in the case of residential tenanted
premises, any member of his family who is residing with the tenant at the time
of his death; or

(b) in the case of a tenanted premises
which is used for educational, business, trade or storage purposes, any member
of his family who, at the time of the tenant’s death, is using the premises for
such purpose.

 

Moreover, in the absence of any family
member of the tenant, any heir of the tenant as may be decided by the Court in
the absence of any agreement will be the tenant. These provisions are
applicable to transmission of tenancy by the original tenant as well as by any
subsequent tenants.

 

The term family has not been defined
under the Act and, hence, the general definition of the term would have to be
taken. It is a term which is open to very wide interpretation and is quite
elastic. The Bombay High Court in Ramubai vs. Jiyaram Sharma, AIR 1964
Bom 96
, has held that the term family would mean all those who are
connected by blood relationship or marriage, married / unmarried / widowed
daughters, widows of predeceased heirs, etc. The Black’s Law Dictionary
defines the term as those who live in the same household subject to general
management and control of the head. Another definition is a group of blood
relatives and all the relations who descend from a common ancestor, or who
spring from a common root, i.e., a group of kindred persons. Hence, it is a
very generic term.

 

From the above definition of the term
tenant under the Act, it is very clear that only those family members of the
tenant who are residing with him would be entitled to his tenancy after his
demise. It is also relevant to note that the family members need not
necessarily be legal heirs of the tenant and the legal heirs would get the
tenancy only in the absence of any family members and that, too, on
determination by a competent Court. Residing with the tenant means that the
family members must stay, eat and sleep in the same house as the tenant. This
is a question of fact as to whether or not a family member can be said to be
residing with the deceased tenant.

 

However, in the case of non-residential
premises, the family members must be using the property along with the tenant.
Thus, in case of such premises it is not necessary that they reside with the
tenant but they must use the premises for the purposes for which the tenant was
using the same. In the case of Pushpa Rani and Ors. vs. Bhagwanti Devi,
AIR 1994 SC 774
, the Supreme Court held that when a tenant dies, it is
the person who continued in occupation of and carried on business in the
business premises alone with whom the landlord should deal and other heirs must
be held to have surrendered their right of tenancy.

 

The Supreme Court in the case of Vasant
Pratap Pandit vs. Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis, 1994 SCC (3) 481
has held
that the legislative prescription of this provision of the Act is first to give
protection to the members of the family of the tenant residing with him at the
time of his death. The basis for this is that when a tenant is in occupation of
premises, the tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit but also for
the benefit of the members of the family residing with him. Therefore, when the
tenant dies, protection should be extended to the members of the family who
were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose needs as well the
tenancy was originally taken by the tenant. It is for this object that the
legislature has, irrespective of the fact whether such members are ‘heirs’ in
the strict sense of the term or not, given them the first priority to be
treated as tenants. All the heirs are liable to be excluded if any other member
of the family was staying with the tenant at the time of his death.

 

The Bombay High Court was faced with an
interesting question in the case of Vasant Sadashiv Joshi vs. Yeshwant
Shankar Barve, WP 2371/1997.
Here, the tenant resided in a premises
along with his brother. The tenant and his brother were part of an HUF. After
the tenant’s death, the brother’s son contended that since the family members
were recognised as tenants, the joint family itself should also be recognised
as a tenant. The High Court negated this plea and held that the term only
included a single person as a tenant and it was not possible that every member
of the HUF would become a tenant. It held that when a landlord grants a tenancy
it is a contract of tenancy as entered into with a specific person (tenant).
The landlord expects fulfilment of legal obligations from the tenant. The law,
therefore, does not envisage that the landlord would be required to deal with
all members of the joint family.

 

Similarly, in Vimalabai Keshav
Gokhale vs. Avinash Krishnaji Binjewale, 2004 (1) Bom CR 839,
the High
Court rejected the contention that the Bombay Rent Act would enable each and
every member of the tenant’s family to claim an independent right in respect of
the tenancy and held that any member would mean ‘any one member.’

 

The Bombay High Court in Urmi
Deepak Kadia vs. State of Maharashtra, 2015(6) Bom CR 354
considered
whether the Maharashtra Rent Control Act was contrary to the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 since it provided protection only to those heirs of the deceased who
at the time of his demise were staying with him and not to others. It held that
the field covered by two laws was not the same but entirely different. The Rent
Act sought to prevent exploitation of tenants and ensured a reasonable return
for investment in properties by landlords. In some contingencies u/s 7(15) of
the Rent Act, certain heirs were unable to succeed to a statutory tenancy. To
this extent, a departure was made from the general law. In such circumstances,
the observations of the Apex Court in Vasant Pratap’s case (Supra)
were decisive. Hence, it concluded that the Rent Act did not interfere with the
Hindu Succession Act.

 

HEIRS OF
TENANT SUCCEED IN ABSENCE OF FAMILY MEMBERS


The Act further provides that in the
absence of family members, it is the heirs of the tenant who would succeed to
the tenanted premises. The term heirs has not been defined under the Act and
hence one needs to have recourse to the usually understood meaning. The Supreme
Court in the case of Vasant Pratap (Supra) has dealt with the
definition of the term heirs. It means the persons who are appointed by law to
succeed to the estate in case of intestacy. It means a person who succeeds,
under law, to an estate in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, upon the death
of his ancestor, by descent and right of relationship. The term is used to
designate a successor to property either by Will or by law. The Court further
held that a deceased person’s ‘heirs at law’ are those who succeed to his
estate by inheritance under law, in the absence of a Will.

 

The Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh
Trivedi vs. Sundar Devi (2002) 2 SCC 329
had held that the brother of a
male tenant would be his heir. However, an interesting question arose in Durga
Prasad vs. Narayan Ram Chandaani (D) Thr. Lr. CA 1305/2017 (SC)
as to
whether the brother of a married female tenant could be treated as her legal
heir and thus become the tenant after her demise? In this case before the
Supreme Court, a person had taken a residential property on rent. After his
demise his son became the tenant and after his son’s demise, his
daughter-in-law became the tenant. The question arose as to who would become
the tenant on her demise as she did not have any children. Her brother claimed
that he was a part of the deceased tenant’s family and hence he should inherit
the property. This was a property located in UP, so the Apex Court considered
the provisions of the U.P. Rent Act. Under that Act, the heirs of a tenant residing
with him succeed to the premises on the tenant’s death.

 

The Supreme Court held that the
question falling for consideration was whether the brother of the tenant was an
heir under the U.P. Rent Act. Since the term heir was not defined under the
Act, it held that heir was a person who inherited by law. Section 3(1)(f) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 defined an heir to mean any person, male or
female, who was entitled to succeed to the property of an intestate under the
Act. The word heir had to be given the same meaning as would be applicable to
the general law of succession. The deceased tenant being a Hindu female, the
devolution of tenancy would be determined u/s 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.
Sub-section (2) of section 15 carved out an exception to the general scheme and
order of succession of a Hindu female dying intestate without leaving any
children. If such a woman has inherited property from her husband /
father-in-law, then the property devolved upon her husband’s heirs. The Apex Court
held that since she did not have any children and the tenancy in question had
come from the tenant’s father-in-law to her husband and from her husband to the
tenant, the exception contained in section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act
would apply. Accordingly, since her brother was not an heir of her husband, he
was not entitled to succeed to the tenancy in question.

 

CAN THE TENANT
MAKE A WILL?


This brings us to the important
question of whether a tenant can will away his tenanted premises? In the case
of Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 683, a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the rule of heritability
(capable of being inherited) extends to statutory tenancy of commercial as well
as residential premises in States where there is no explicit provision to the
contrary under the Rent Act and tenancy rights are to devolve according to the
ordinary law of succession, unless otherwise provided in the statute. In Bhavarlal
Labhchand Shah vs. Kanaiyalal Nathalal Intawala,
referring to the
Bombay Rent Control Act, 1974, it was held that a tenant of a non-residential
premises cannot bequeath under a Will his right to such tenancy in favour of a
person who is a stranger, not being a member of the family, carrying on
business. In State of West Bengal vs. Kailash Chandra Kapur, (1997) 2 SCC
387
, it was held that in the absence of any contrary covenants in the
lease deed or the law, a Will in respect of leasehold rights in a land can be
executed by a lessee in favour of a stranger.

 

Hence, if the Rent Control laws of a
State so provide, then a tenant cannot make a Will for his tenanted premises.
In that event, the tenancy would pass on only in accordance with the Rent
Control Act. This proposition is also supported by the Supreme Court’s decision
in the case of Vasant Pratap (Supra). In that case, the tenant
made a Will of her property in favour of her nephew. This was opposed by her
sister’s grandson who was staying with the tenant at the time of her death. The
Apex Court held that normally speaking, tenancy right would be heritable but if
the right to inherit had been restricted by legislation, then the same would
apply. It held that if the word ‘heir’ in the Rent Act was to be interpreted to
include a ‘legatee under a Will’, then even a stranger may have to be inducted
as a tenant for there is no embargo upon a stranger being a legatee under a
Will. This obviously was not the intention of the legislature. Accordingly, it
was held that a bequest could not be made in respect of a tenanted property.

 

The Supreme Court’s decision in the
case of Gaiv Dinshaw Irani vs. Tehmtan Irani, (2014) 8 SCC 294
succinctly sums up the position after considering all previous decisions on
this issue:

 

‘…in general
tenancies are to be regulated by the governing legislation, which favour that
tenancy be transferred only to family members of the deceased original tenant.
However, in light of the majority decision of the Constitution Bench in
Gian
Devi vs. Jeevan Kumar (Supra)
, the position which emerges
is that in absence of any specific provisions, general laws of succession to
apply, this position is further cemented by the decision of this Court in
State
of West Bengal vs. Kailash Chandra Kapur (Supra)
which has allowed
the disposal of tenancy rights of Government owned land in favour of a stranger
by means of a Will in the absence of any specific clause or provisions.’

 

CONCLUSION


The law as it stands in the State of
Maharashtra is very clear. A tenancy cannot be bequeathed by way of a Will. It
would pass only in accordance with the Rent Act. However, the position in other
States needs to be seen under the respective Rent Acts, if any.
 

 

IS BEING A PROMOTER A ONE-WAY STREET WITH NO EXIT OR U-TURN?

BACKGROUND – CONCEPT OF FAMILY/ PROMOTER-DRIVEN COMPANIES
IN INDIA

A peculiar and important feature of Indian companies and even
businesses in general is that the ownership and management is largely
‘promoter’-driven. There is usually a ‘founder’, an individual who starts a
business which is then continued by his children / extended family for many
generations. The founder family (which may be more than one) usually holds
controlling stake, often more than 50%. The company and group entities are
usually referred to as the ‘X group’ with X representing such family. This is
unlike most companies in the West where, even if founded by an individual whose
family may continue to hold substantial shareholding, the management is often
‘professional’.

 

Securities laws in India have rightly acknowledged this
feature and there are a multitude of provisions specifically recognising them
and creating an elaborate set of obligations for them. These persons are called
promoters and the various entities (family members, investment companies held
by them, etc.) are called the ‘Promoter Group’. Thus, for example, Independent
Directors are by definition those who are not from or associated with the
Promoter Group. The promoters may be treated as insiders and their trades in
shares of the company regulated. The ‘Promoter Group’ is required to have a
minimum shareholding (at the time of a public issue) and also a maximum
shareholding. It cannot occupy more than a certain number of Board seats. It
has to make regular disclosure of its shareholding. Indeed, the ‘Promoter
Group’ would generally be deemed to be in charge of the company and the buck
for any violation of laws will usually stop at them.

 

However, there is one curious and difficult area: How can a
person / entity, once designated a promoter, cease to be a promoter? How does
he get an exit and reclassify himself as a non-promoter? As we shall see, and
as particularly highlighted by a recent ‘informal guidance’ by SEBI, it is
relatively easy to become a promoter but extremely difficult to stop being one.

 

WHO IS A PROMOTER AND WHO BELONGS TO THE PROMOTER GROUP?

There is an elaborate definition of the terms ‘Promoters’ and
‘Promoter Group’ prescribed in the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure
Requirements), 2018. The Group includes the promoter family and even many
members of the extended family. It also includes specified investment entities
/ group companies / entities. Over time, this list can turn quite long as the
family expands and various new entities are formed and which are covered by the
definition.

 

The Promoter Group usually gets defined and identified when a
public issue is made, leading to listing of the shares of the company and all
those who are in control of the company are included. Their specified relatives
and group entities are also included. However, as time passes, new relatives
and new entities would get added. But as we will see later, while inclusion is
easy and even automatic, removing even one person is extremely difficult.

 

REASONS FOR GETTING OUT OF THE PROMOTERS CATEGORY

It has been seen above how easy and automatic it is to become
a promoter. Just being born in the promoter family or otherwise being related
in any of the specified ways could be enough. However, for several reasons, a
person (or an entity with which he is associated in specified manner) may
desire not to be part of the Promoter Group and be saddled with several
obligations and liabilities. There is, of course, the liability of compliance
and even of violations that he remains subject to just by the fact that he is
on the promoter list. If he is in control of the relevant company, this cannot
be escaped.

 

But there are various reasons why a person may want to be
excluded. He or she may have left the family and may be in employment elsewhere
or carrying on a separate independent business. He may have actually had
disputes with the company and thus no more be part of the core group. He or she
may have married and now not be connected with the company. He may not be
holding any shares or holding insignificant shares and have no say in the
company. In fact, even the whole Promoter Group or a sub-group thereof may have
reason to be excluded if they are reduced to a minority with someone else
taking a higher stake. There would, of course, be the obvious case where a new
promoter acquires most or all of the existing group’s shareholding in a
transparent way (usually by an open offer) and thus takes control of the
company.

 

There can be many more situations. The question is can an
existing promoter get his name removed from the list of promoters? If yes, how
and what are the conditions?

 

CONCERNS OF SEBI IN ALLOWING PROMOTERS TO LEAVE THE
CATEGORY

Certain obligations are imposed on promoters who are in
control of the company. If a person who is otherwise in control of the company
or closely connected with persons who are, and is allowed to represent himself
as not a promoter, he would escape this liability. Shareholders, too, perceive
a particular group as the promoters and take decisions accordingly. Thus,
generally, the regulator would want sufficient assurance before allowing the
exclusion of a person from the Promoter Group. However, as we will see below,
the conditions placed are extremely stringent and it may often be difficult for
persons to exclude themselves even for bona fide reasons.

 

ONCE A PROMOTER, ALMOST ALWAYS A PROMOTER

As mentioned earlier, a person and entities related to him
are required to be declared as promoters at the time of a public issue. Many
entities / persons connected with him in specified ways would also be deemed to
be part of the Promoter Group. Death would do him apart, but then the successors
to his shares would be deemed to be promoters. Thus, the person to whom shares
are willed or even gifted during the (deceased’s) lifetime would become a
promoter.

 

REQUIREMENT FOR RECLASSIFICATION FROM PROMOTER TO PUBLIC

The requirements relating to reclassification from promoter
to public category are contained in Regulation 31A of the SEBI (Listing
Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘the LODR
Regulations’). These are the outcome of several changes over time and also the
consequence of several discussion papers / committee deliberations. The Kotak
Committee’s report of 2017 on corporate governance had also made detailed
suggestions. SEBI is in the process of proposing yet another round of revision
of the requirements.

 

There are several conditions that a promoter has to comply
with to be allowed to be reclassified into the public category. Some of these
are obvious and make sense. Such a person (and persons related to him) should
not be holding more than 10% shares in the company. He should not exercise
control, directly or indirectly, over the company. He should not be a director
or key managerial person in the company. He should also not be entitled to any
special rights with respect to the company through formal or informal arrangements.

 

However, there are further stringent conditions and
requirements if he seeks reclassification. The promoter needs to apply to the
company and needs to demonstrate that he has complied with the other conditions
(i.e., holding 10% or less, not being a director, etc.). The Board of the
company then has to consider this request and place the reclassification
request before the shareholders with its comments. The matter has to be placed
before the shareholders after three months but before six months of the date of
such Board meeting. At such meeting of shareholders, the promoter seeking
reclassification and promoters related to him cannot vote. An ordinary
resolution has to be passed by the remaining shareholders approving such
reclassification. Once so approved, the stock exchanges would then consider the
application and if the requirements are duly complied with, approval would be
granted for reclassification.

 

Thus, the primary onus and even the decision have been placed
on the Board and the shareholders. In principle, the safeguards may appear
warranted. Leaving the matter to internal decisions also ensures avoidance of
an arbitrary decision by the regulator and also smooth implementation in many
cases. However, the elaborate requirements can make ordinary cases for
exclusion difficult. A family member, for example, may move out of India and
yet he would continue to be a promoter and hence in control unless this
procedure is followed.

 

There may be disputes
within the family and thus persons seeking exclusion may find their efforts
being sabotaged, even if in principle their requests have to be processed. The
10% shareholding requirement is also too low. At 10% holding, a person / group
has practically no say in the running of the company.

 

In a recent case (in
re: Mirza International Limited, Informal Guidance dated 10th June,
2020)
it was seen that a promoter gifted shares aggregating to more
than 10% to his daughters who were married and otherwise not involved with the
company. This made them part of the Promoter Group. An informal guidance of
SEBI was sought whether such persons could be reclassified as public instead of
being included in the promoter / Promoter Group. SEBI opined that the fact that
they held more than 10% shares went against the condition prescribed and hence
they could not be reclassified as public.

 

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

There are several
businesses that have seen multiple generations. The businesses may have been
divided. Off-spring may not be interested in the family-controlled companies.
There may be disputes. There may be members of the family who have no say
or even interest in the company. The stringent requirements and procedures are
elaborate and have hurdles which seem unjustified when the primary facts may
show that a person does not have any control or even say in the company.
Indeed, they may not
even hold a single share. Thus, many persons may continue to be deemed to be
promoters and bear the burden of liability in matters in which they have no
say. Such persons may not be promoters by choice and have no easy avenue to get
out. It is high time that the requirements are changed to make them simple and
practical; it is hoped that the coming set of proposed revisions ensures this.

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION & SUCCESSION

INTRODUCTION

Inter-community / inter-faith marriages are increasing in India. It is
becoming common to see a Hindu woman marrying a person professing Islam or Christianity.
Subsequently, she converts to Islam or to Christianity.

 

In all such cases, a question often arises: whether the Hindu woman who has
converted to another religion would be entitled to succeed to the property of
her parents? Would she be a member of her father’s HUF? Further, what would be
the position of her children – would they be entitled to succeed to the
property of their maternal grandfather? Let us examine these tricky issues in
some detail.

 

SUCCESSION TO PARENTS’ PROPERTY

Let us first
consider what would be the position of a Hindu woman who has converted to Islam
/ Christianity in relation to her parents’ property. If the parent has made a
Will, then she can definitely be a beneficiary. This is because a Will can be
made in favour of any person, even a stranger. Hence, the mere fact that the
daughter is no longer a Hindu would not bar her from being a beneficiary under
the Will.

 

However,
what is the situation if the father dies intestate, i.e., without making a
Will? In such a case, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would apply. The Class I
heirs of the father would be entitled to succeed to the property of the Hindu
male dying intestate. The daughter of a Hindu male is a Class I heir under the
Hindu Succession Act. Now the question that would arise is whether the
subsequent religious conversion of such a Class I heir would disentitle her
from succeeding to her father’s estate.

 

The Gujarat
High Court had occasion to grapple with this interesting problem in the case of
Nayanaben Firozkhan Pathan vs. Patel Shantaben Bhikhabhai, Spl. Civil
Appln. 15825/2017, order dated 26th September, 2017.
In this
case, the child of a Hindu wanted to get her name entered in the Record of
Rights of an ancestral land held in the name of her deceased father. The
Collector allowed the mutation in favour of all children except one daughter
who had converted to Islam. It was held that her conversion disentitled her
from succeeding to her father’s estate. The matter reached the Gujarat High
Court. The Court observed that section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act provides
that the Act applies only to Hindus and to persons who were not Muslims,
Christians, Parsis, Jews or of any other religion. However, this section only
provides a class of persons whose properties will devolve according to the Act.
It is only the property of those persons mentioned in section 2 that will be
governed according to the provisions of the Act. Section 2 has nothing to do
with the heirs. This section does not lay down as to who are the disqualified
heirs.

 

The Court
further analysed the provisions of section 4 which envisages that any other law
in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to apply to
Hindus insofar as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in
the Act. While a number of Central Acts were repealed as a consequence of this
section, one Act which has not been repealed is the Caste Disabilities
Removal Act, 1850.
This is a pre-Independence Act which consists of one
section which states that:

 

‘So much of
any law or usage which is in force within India as inflicts on any person
forfeiture of rights or property, or may be held in any way to impair or affect
any right of inheritance, by reason of his or her renouncing, or having been
excluded from the communion of, any religion, or being deprived of caste, shall
cease to be enforced as law in any Court.’

 

The Gujarat
High Court held that a change of religion and loss of caste was at one time
considered as grounds for forfeiture of property and exclusion of inheritance.
However, this has ceased to be the case after the passing of the Caste
Disabilities Removal Act, 1850. The Caste Disabilities Removal Act provides
that if any law or (customary) usage in force in India would cause a person to
forfeit his / her rights on property or may in any way impair or affect a
person’s right to inherit any property, by reason of such person having
renounced his / her religion or having been ex-communicated from his / her
religion, or having been deprived of his / her caste, then such law or
(customary) usage would not be enforceable in any court of law. Thus, the Caste
Disabilities Removal Act intends to protect the person who renounces his / her
religion.

 

Further, the
Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of E. Ramesh vs. P.
Rajini (2002) 1 MLJ 216
has also taken the same view. It held that the
Hindu Succession Act makes it clear that if the parents are Hindus, then the
child is also governed by the Hindu Law or is a Hindu. It held that the
Legislature might have thought fit to treat the children of the Hindus as
Hindus without foregoing the right of inheritance by virtue of conversion.

 

Accordingly,
the Gujarat High Court concluded that all that needs to be seen is whether the
daughter was a Class I heir? If yes, then her religion had no locus standi
to her succession to her father’s property.

 

POSITION OF CONVERT’S CHILDREN

The position
of a person who has converted to Islam is quite clear. Section 26 of the Hindu
Succession Act clearly provides that the descendants of the convert who are born
after such conversion are disqualified from inheriting the property of any of
their Hindu relatives. Thus, the children of a Hindu daughter who converts to
Islam would be disqualified from inheriting the property of their maternal
grandfather.

 

This section
was explained by the Calcutta High Court in Asoke Naidu vs. Raymond S.
Mulu, AIR 1976 Cal 272.
It explained that this section therefore does
not disqualify a convert. The present Act discards almost all the grounds which
imposed exclusion from inheritance and lays down that no person shall be
disqualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease,
defect or deformity. It also rules out disqualification on any ground
whatsoever except those expressly recognised by any provisions of the Act. The
exceptions are very few and confined to the case of remarriage of certain
widows. Another disqualification stated in the Act relates to a murderer who is
excluded on the principles of justice and public policy. Change of religion and
loss of caste have long ceased to be grounds of forfeiture of property. The
only disqualification to inheritance is found in section 26 which disqualifies
the heirs of a converted Hindu from succeeding to the property of their Hindu
relatives. However, the disqualification does not affect the convert himself or
herself.

 

POSITION OF CONVERT IN FATHER’S HUF

On the
marriage of a Hindu who has converted to Islam or Christianity, his continuity
in an HUF needs to be considered if his marriage is solemnised under the Special
Marriage Act, 1954
. In such a case the normal succession laws get
disturbed. This would be so irrespective of whether or not the Hindu converts.
All that is required is that the marriage must be registered under this Act.
Section 19 of this Act prescribes that any member of a Hindu Undivided Family
who gets married to a non-Hindu under this Act automatically severs his ties
with the HUF. Thus, if a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain gets married to a
non-Hindu under the Special Marriage Act, he ceases to be a member of his HUF.
He need not go in for a partition since the marriage itself severs his
relationship with his family. He cannot even subsequently raise a plea for
partitioning the joint family property since by getting married under the Act
he automatically gets separated from the HUF. Taking the example of the
daughter who converted to Islam, even though she can now be a member of her
father’s HUF by virtue of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, she would cease
to be a member due to her marriage being registered under the Special Marriage
Act.

 

SUCCESSION TO THE CONVERT’S PROPERTY

The last
question to be examined is which succession law would apply to such a convert’s
own property? If she dies intestate, would her heirs succeed under the Hindu
Succession Law (since she was once a Hindu) or the Muslim Shariya Law (since
she died a Muslim)? Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act is by far the most
important provision. It changes the normal succession pattern laid down by law
in case of any person whose marriage is registered under the Act. It states
that the succession to property of any person whose marriage is solemnised
under the Act and to the property of any child of such marriage shall be
regulated by the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

 

Section 21
makes the Indian Succession Act, 1925 applicable not only for the couple
married under the Act but also for the children born out of such wedlock. Thus,
for such a convert whose marriage is registered under the Special Marriage Act,
the succession law would neither be the Hindu Succession Law nor the Muslim Law
but the Indian Succession Act. The same would be the position for her children.
Of course, if she were to make a valid Will, then the Will would prevail over
the intestate succession provisions of the Indian Succession Act.

 

CONCLUSION

Till such
time as India has a Uniform Civil Code, succession laws are bound to throw up
such challenges. It would be desirable that the succession laws are updated to
bring them up to speed with such modern developments and issues so that legal
heirs do not waste precious time and money in litigation.
 

 

 

Those who always adhere to truth do
not make false promises.

Keeping one’s promises is,
surely,  the mark of one’s  greatness.
(Valmiki
Raamaayan 6.101.52)

 

ANALYSIS OF RECENT COMPOUNDING ORDERS

Here
is an analysis of some interesting compounding orders passed by the Reserve
Bank of India in the month of December, 2019 and uploaded on the website1.
This article refers mainly to the regulatory provisions as existing at the time
of offence. Changes in regulatory provisions are noted in the comments section.

 

FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)

 

A.
Utkarsh CoreInvest Ltd.

Date
of order: 18th November, 2019

Regulation:
FEMA 20/2000-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by
a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000] and FEMA 20(R)/2017 (dated
7th November, 2017)

 

ISSUE

FDI
in Indian company engaged in business of investing in other companies and
taking on record transfer of shares of an Indian company between two
non-residents.

 

FACTS

Issue
1

(i) The applicant company was engaged in the business of micro finance.

(ii) Subsequently, it was issued license to set up a small finance bank
wherein one of the conditions stipulated that the applicant company should be
registered as an NBFC-CIC after transfer of its micro-finance business to the
bank.

(iii) Accordingly, the applicant company applied to RBI for
registering itself as an NBFC-CIC in December, 2016 and incorporated a
subsidiary company to which it transferred the micro-finance business in
January, 2017.

(iv) At the time of filing its application for license to set up a
small finance bank, the applicant company had foreign shareholding of around
84.1%. In order to bring the foreign shareholding below 50%, the applicant
company raised equity capital (by way of rights issue) which was offered to
both resident and non-resident shareholders in November, 2017. The applicant company
received FDI amounting to Rs. 28,68,95,310 at the same time which was not
permissible under the extant FEMA 20(R).

(v) Subsequently, in March, 2018, FDI up to 100% under automatic route
was allowed in investing companies registered as NBFCs with RBI.

 

Issue 2

(a) In August, 2017, International Finance Corporation (IFC), a
non-resident entity, had transferred 42,69,726 shares of the applicant company
amounting to Rs. 55,50,64,380, to another non-resident entity which was
recorded in the books of the applicant company without obtaining prior approval
of the Government.

(b) The Government of India, MoF, DEA, while according its approval for
another transaction in October, 2018 which involved share transfer between two
non-resident entities had, vide its letter dated 22nd October, 2018,
advised the applicant company to approach RBI for compounding for ‘past foreign
investments made in UMFL, including share transfers among non-residents,
without GoI approval’.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •    Regulation 16(B)(5) of FEMA 20(R) in
    November, 2017 states that ‘Foreign investment into an Indian company,
    engaged only in the activity of investing in the capital of other Indian
    company/ies, will require prior approval of the Government. A core investment
    company (CIC) will have to additionally follow the Reserve Bank’s regulatory
    framework for CICs’.
  •    The above regulation was amended in March,
    2018 which allowed foreign investment up to 100% under automatic route in
    investing companies registered as NBFCs with RBI.
  •    Regulation 4 of the erstwhile FEMA 20, which
    stated that ‘Save as otherwise provided in the Act, or rules or regulations
    made thereunder, an Indian entity shall not issue any security to a person
    resident outside India or shall not record in its books any transfer of
    security from or to such person.’

 

CONTRAVENTION

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default

Receiving
FDI in Indian company which is engaged in investing in capital of other
companies

Rs.
28,68,95,310

Seven
months approx.

Taking
on record share transfer between two non-residents when foreign investment
itself was not permitted

Rs.
55,50,64,380

Total

Rs.
84,19,59,690

 

 

 

Compounding
penalty

A compounding penalty of Rs.
43,09,797 was levied.

 

Comments

It is interesting to note that
generally transfer of shares between two non-residents is not subject to any
reporting requirement by the Indian company. Form FC-TRS regarding reporting
transfer of shares of an Indian company is required to be filed only when
either the transferor or the transferee is an Indian resident. Thus, any
transfer of shares between resident to non-resident or vice versa is required
to be reported in Form FC-TRS but not any transfer of shares between two
non-residents.

 

However, where FDI itself is not
permitted under the 100% automatic route and is subject to prior approval of
the Government, any transfer of shares between two non-residents would also be
subject to prior approval. Hence, Indian companies engaged in sectors where
prior approval of Government is required should be cautious and ensure that any
transfer of shares between two non-residents is undertaken only after obtaining
prior approval of Government.

 

B. M/s Star
Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd.

Date of order:
29th November, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
20(R)/2017 [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a
Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017]

 

ISSUE

Delay in allotment of shares
within 60 days of receipt of share capital.

 

FACTS

(i) Applicant company is engaged in the business of non-life insurance.

(ii) It received FDI from two Mauritian companies amounting to Rs.
30,50,00,079 in December, 2018.

(iii) Shares were allotted by the applicant company to the above
shareholders after a delay of three months and ten days (approximately) beyond
the stipulated time of 60 days from the date of receipt of the consideration.

 

Regulatory
provision

Paragraph 2(2) of Schedule I to
Notification No. FEMA 20(R)/2017-RB, states that capital instruments shall be
issued to the person resident outside India making such investment within 60
days from the date of receipt of the consideration.

 

Contravention

The amount of contravention is Rs
30,50,00,079 and the period of contravention three months and ten days.

 

Compounding
penalty

A compounding penalty of Rs.
15,75,000 was levied.

 

Comments

The above order highlights the
fact that RBI is taking a serious view of contraventions relating to delay in
allotment of shares to foreign investors. Hence, it is absolutely critical that
in respect of foreign investment, shares should be allotted within the
prescribed period of 60 days as per erstwhile FEMA-20(R) and even under the new
Foreign Exchange Management (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019
effective from 17th October, 2019.

 

EXPORT
OF GOODS AND SERVICES

 

C. H.F. Metal
Art Private Limited and Azoy Bansal

Date of order: 5th
November, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
23/2000-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services)
Regulations, 2000] and FEMA 23R/2015-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Export of
Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015]

 

ISSUE

(i) Failure to export goods within the prescribed
period of one year from the date of receipt of advance.

(ii) Failure to realise export proceeds within the
stipulated time period.

(iii) Contravention deemed to have been
committed by director who was in charge of the company at the time of
contravention.

 

FACTS

  •   The applicant company is engaged in the
    business of minting and supply of precious metal coins and bars, as well as
    high quality medals, gifts and promotional items in non-precious metals.
  •   The company received certain export advances
    between January, 2008 and July, 2011 amounting to Rs. 6,30,79,984 but was
    unable to make exports within the prescribed time limit. However, the company
    has adjusted the export advances against subsequent exports made during the
    period from August, 2013 to June, 2014.
  •   The company could not realise export proceeds
    against certain exports amounting to Rs 10,58,50,346 within the prescribed time
    period 2014-2018.

 

Regulatory provisions

  •   Regulation 16 of Notification No. FEMA
    23/2000- RB, where an exporter receives advance payment (with or without
    interest) from a buyer outside India, the exporter shall be under an obligation
    to ensure that the shipment of goods is made within one year from the date of
    receipt of advance payment.
  •   Regulation 9 of Notification No. FEMA 23/2000-
    RB and FEMA 23(R), the amount representing the full export value of goods or
    software exported shall be realised and repatriated to India within nine months
    from the date of export.
  •   Section 42(1) of FEMA states that, ‘Where a
    person committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of
    any rule, direction or order made thereunder is a company, every person who, at
    the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible
    to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the
    company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable
    to be proceeded against and punished accordingly’.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
Provision

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation
16 of FEMA 23/2000-RB

Failure
to export the goods within a period of one year from the date of receipt of
advance

Rs.
6,30,79,984

11
months to 4.6 years

Regulation
9 of FEMA 23/2000-RB & FEMA 23(R)

Failure
to realise export proceeds within stipulated time period

Rs.
10,58,50,346

One
day to seven months

Section
42(1) of FEMA

Being
director of company which committed above contravention of FEMA

Rs.
16,89,30,330

11
months to 4.6 years and one day to seven months

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty of Rs.
10,32,998 was levied on the company and Rs. 1,03,300 on the director
personally.

 

Comments

In the instant case, the company
had committed contravention by not exporting goods against advance received
within the prescribed time frame and also by not receiving payment for exports
within the prescribed time. However, the director who was in charge of the
company was also deemed to be guilty u/s 42(1) of FEMA and hence compounding
penalties were levied both on the company as well as the director in respect of
the contraventions. Accordingly, going forward, especially in cases of export
of goods, it is advisable that directors of companies are extremely vigilant
and ensure that their company adheres to the prescribed time lines failing
which both the company as well as the directors would be personally liable for
any contravention.

 

BORROWING
OR LENDING IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE

 

D. M/s Tulsea
Pictures Private Limited

Date of order:
28th November, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
4/2000-RB [Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing or Lending in Foreign
Exchange) Regulations, 2000]

 

ISSUE

(i) Borrowings from NRI without issuance of NCDs through public offer.

(ii) Utilising borrowed funds for other than business purposes.

 

FACTS

  •   The applicant company appointed an NRI as one
    of the directors on its board.
  •   The company raised a loan of Rs. 32,96,432
    from the NRI director to meet its day-to-day expenses and other liabilities.
  •   The loan in INR had been availed from the NRI
    without issuing non-convertible debentures (NCD) through public offer.
  •   Out of the aforesaid amount, the applicant
    company had utilised Rs. 5,98,670 for paying the lease rentals for a
    residential premise taken for the NRI director and for meeting day-to-day
    expenses.
  •   The company was granted permission to convert
    the loan amount into equity, subject to lender’s consent and adherence to FDI /
    pricing norms for such conversion and reporting requirements.
  •   The company allotted 55,056 equity shares to
    the director on 5th July, 2018 against the outstanding loan amount
    of Rs. 26,97,762.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •     Regulation 5(1)(i) of Notification No. FEMA
    4/2000-RB inter alia states as under:

‘Subject to the
provisions of sub-regulations (2) and (3), a company incorporated in India may
borrow in rupees on repatriation or non- repatriation basis, from a
non-resident Indian or a person of Indian origin resident outside India or an
overseas corporate body (OCB), by way of investment in non-convertible
debentures (NCDs) subject to the following conditions:

i.    the issue of Non-convertible Debentures
(NCDs) is made by public offer;…’

  •     Regulation 6 of
    Notification No. FEMA 4/2000-RB states that no person resident in India who
    has borrowed in rupees from a person resident outside India shall use such
    borrowed funds for any purpose except in his own business.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
Para of FEMA 4 Regulation

Nature
of default

Amount
involved

(in
INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation
5(1)(i) of Notification No. FEMA 4/2000-RB

Issue
1:

Borrowings from NRI without issuance of NCDs through public offer

Issue
1:

Rs.
32,96,432

 

Approximately
7 years

Regulation
6 of Notification No. FEMA 4/2000-RB

Issue
2:

Utilising borrowed funds for purpose other than business

Issue
2:

Rs.
5,98,670

Approximately
7 years

 

 

Compounding
penalty

A compounding penalty of Rs.
1,29,213 was levied.

 

Comments

It is important to note that
borrowings in INR by an Indian company from its NRI director, even though
permissible under the Companies Act, 2013, is not permissible under FEMA
regulations. Under FEMA, INR borrowings from NRIs are permitted only through
issuance of NCDs made by public offer under both repatriation as well as
non-repatriation route.

 

OVERSEAS
DIRECT INVESTMENT (ODI)

 

E. Ms Pratibha
Agrawal

Date of order:
11th November, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
120/2004 [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign
Security) Regulations, 2004]

 

ISSUE

Acquisition of foreign securities
by way of gift from a person resident in India.

 

FACTS

  •    The applicant was a resident individual and
    the spouse of a senior management employee of Sterlite Industries India Limited
    from 2001 to 2008.
  •    The senior employee was offered 8,000 shares
    of Vedanta Resources Plc, London, in March, 2004 to be issued in two tranches.
    The first tranche of 4,000 shares was allotted in March, 2004 and second in
    February, 2005.
  •    The consideration paid for the shares allotted
    in the second tranche was equivalent to face value, i.e., USD 400 (INR 17,532).
  •    Out of the 4,000 shares of the second
    tranche, the senior employee gifted 3,000 to the applicant (Ms. Pratibha
    Agrawal) and, accordingly, share certificates for these 3,000 shares were
    issued in the name of the applicant.

 

Regulatory
provisions

As per Regulation 22(1)(i), read
with Regulation 3, a person resident in India being an individual may acquire
foreign securities by way of gift only from a person resident outside India and
not from another Indian resident.

 

CONTRAVENTION

 

Relevant
Para of FEMA 120 Regulation

Nature
of default

Amount
involved
(in INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation
22(1)(i)

Acquisition
of foreign securities by way of gift from a person resident in India

Rs.
22,49,232

Approximately
13 years

 

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty of Rs. 66,869
was levied.

Comments

In view of the peculiar language
of FEMA 120, it is advisable that appropriate care is taken in respect of gifts
of shares of foreign companies between residents and non-residents. Under the
existing provisions, an Indian resident can acquire shares by way of gift from
only a non-resident and not from a resident.

 

F. Masibus
Automation and Instrumentation Pvt. Ltd.

Date of order:
26th November, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
120/2004 [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign
Security) Regulations, 2004]

 

ISSUES

(i) Sending remittances to overseas company without submitting Annual
Performance Report (APR);

(ii) Delay in submission of duly completed Part I of the Form ODI;

(iii) Overseas investment undertaken by a method of funding not
prescribed;

(iv) Delayed receipt of proof of investment;

(v) Delayed submission of APRs;

(vi) Disinvestment from the overseas entity without obtaining fair
valuation certificate prior to its divestment;

(vii) Disinvestment undertaken from the overseas entity when it had
outstanding loans;

(viii) Disinvestment without
prior approval of RBI when it was not eligible under the automatic route.

 

FACTS

  •    The applicant is engaged in the business of
    manufacturing of electrical equipment, wiring devices, fittings, etc.
  •    The applicant remitted SGD 990 on 4th
    July, 2008 towards 99% stake in the overseas JV, viz., Masibus Automation and
    Instrumentation (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. in Singapore.
  •    Subsequently, the applicant undertook ODI of
    SGD 5,000 on 4th July, 2008 by way of payment by the director of the
    applicant company in cash during his visit abroad.
  •    The applicant had sent seven remittances
    aggregating SGD 52,000 in 2010-11 without submitting APR.
  •    Further, the applicant submitted Part I of
    Form ODI with delay on 11th January, 2018 in respect of remittance
    of SGD 5,000 made through the director on 4th July, 2008.

 

  •    Share certificate for the aforesaid
    remittance of SGD 990 made in July, 2008 was received with delay (i.e. beyond
    the prescribed period of six months under FEMA 120) on 8th
    September, 2014.
  •    The applicant submitted APRs for the years
    ending 2009 to 2012 with delay on 12th January, 2018.
  •    Disinvestment from the overseas entity was
    undertaken on 11th April, 2012 without obtaining fair valuation
    certificate and when it had outstanding loans.
  •    Accordingly, as the applicant had outstanding
    loans, it was not eligible to undertake the disinvestment under the automatic
    route and should have sought prior approval of RBI before disinvestment.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •    Regulations 6(2)(iv), 6(2)(vi), 6(3), 15(i),
    15(iii), 16(1)(iii), 16(1)(iv), 16(3) of FEMA 120.

 

CONTRAVENTION

 

Relevant
Para of FEMA 120 Regulation

Nature
of default

Amount
involved (in INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation
6(2)(iv)

Making
overseas remittances towards share capital without submitting APR of the
overseas entity

Rs. 18,46,500

Five
years

Regulation
6(2)(vi)

Overseas
investment made through director in cash was treated as investment of Indian
company, hence Indian company ought to have filed Part I of Form ODI for
making remittance. There was delay in submission of Part I of the Form ODI in
respect of the
above investment

Rs.
1,60,600

4th
July, 2008 to
11th January, 2018

Regulation
6(3)

Overseas
investment undertaken through cash payment made by director is not a
prescribed method of funding

Rs.
1,60,600

4th
July, 2008 to
13th May, 2019

Regulation
15(i)

Proof of
investment made in overseas entity should be received and filed with RBI
within six months of making remittance. There was delay in providing share
certificate to RBI in respect of overseas remittances made

Rs.
31,799

4th
July, 2008
to 8th September, 2014

Regulation15(iii)

APR of
the overseas entity based on its audited accounts has to be filed annually on
or before 31st December. Applicant delayed submission of APR in
respect of its
overseas entity

Not
applicable

1st
July, 2013 to
21st September, 2018

Regulation
16(1)(iii)

Any
divestment of overseas entity has to be undertaken at a price which is not
less than its fair value as certified by CA / CPA based on last audited
financials of overseas entity. In the instant case, applicant divested its
overseas entity without obtaining its fair valuation certificate from CA /
CPA

Rs.
31,799

11th
April, 2012 to
13th May, 2019

Regulation
16(1)(iv)

An
Indian party can undertake divestment of its overseas entity only when the
overseas entity does not have any amount payable to Indian entity. In the
instant case, the applicant had undertaken disinvestment of the overseas
entity when it still had outstanding loans payable to it

Rs.
23,56,703

11th
April, 2012 to
13th May, 2019

Regulation
16(3)

Indian
entity wanting to divest its overseas entity which has any amount payable to
it would need prior approval of RBI before undertaking divestment. In the
instant case, the applicant undertook disinvestment without prior approval of
RBI when not eligible under automatic route

Rs.
23,91,521

11th
April, 2012 to
13th May, 2019

 

Compounding
penalty

Compounding penalty of Rs.
3,61,126 was levied.

 

Comments

In view of numerous compliances
prescribed under FEMA 120 in respect of overseas investments, it is essential
that adequate care is taken by every Indian entity in respect of its overseas
investment. Specific care should be taken to ensure that overseas investment by
any Indian entity is routed only through Indian banking channels and not made
in cash by any person visiting overseas.

 

Further, Regulation 16(1)(iv) of
FEMA 120 states that at the time of divestment, the Indian party should not
have any outstanding dues by way of dividend, technical know-how fees, royalty,
consultancy, commission or other entitlements and / or export proceeds from the
overseas JV or WOS. This includes any amount due, including loan payable by the
overseas entity to an Indian entity. Hence, appropriate care should be taken to
ensure that the overseas entity does not have any amount payable to an Indian
entity at the time of its disinvestment.

 

G. Essar Steel
India Ltd.

Date of order:
22nd November, 2019

Regulation: FEMA
120/2004 [Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security)
Regulations, 2004]

ISSUES

(i) Effecting remittance without prior approval of RBI when the Indian
party (IP) was under investigation by the Department of Revenue Intelligence
(DRI);

(ii) Delayed submission of APRs;

(iii) Disinvestment without obtaining valuation.

 

FACTS

  •    The applicant company set up a wholly-owned
    subsidiary (WOS), Essar Steel Overseas Ltd., in Mauritius by remitting USD 1
    (INR 47) on 7th August, 2010.
  •    Since the applicant company was under
    investigation by the DRI at the time of effecting the remittance, it was not
    eligible to make ODI under the automatic route.
  •    The WOS was later liquidated on 9th
    March, 2012 and no valuation was done as required. The transactions were taken
    on record on 14th August, 2019.
  •     Further, the applicant had reported Annual
    Performance Reports (APRs) for the accounting years 2011 and 2012 with a delay
    on 15th June, 2013 and 17th December, 2013.

 

Regulatory
provisions

  •     Regulation 6(2)(iii) of FEMA 120 provides
    that Overseas Direct Investment under automatic route is permitted in certain
    cases provided ‘the Indian party is not on the Reserve Bank’s exporters
    caution list / list of defaulters to the banking system circulated by the
    Reserve Bank, or under investigation by any investigation / enforcement agency
    or regulatory body.’
  •     Regulation 15(iii) of FEMA 120 states that, ‘An
    Indian Party which has acquired foreign security in terms of the Regulation in
    Part I shall submit to the Reserve Bank, through the designated Authorised
    Dealer, every year on or before a specified date, an Annual Performance Report
    (APR) in Part III of Form ODI in respect of
    each JV or WOS outside India…’. The specified date for filing APR currently
    is on or before 31st December every year.
  •     Regulation 16(1) provides that an Indian
    party may disinvest to a person resident outside India subject to the following
    conditions:

 

     (iii)
if the shares are not listed on the stock exchange and the shares are
disinvested by a private arrangement, the share price is not less than the
value certified by a Chartered Accountant / Certified Public Accountant as the
fair value of the shares based on the latest audited financial statements of
the JV / WOS.

 

CONTRAVENTION

Relevant
Para of FEMA 120 Regulation

Nature
of default

Amount
involved (in INR)

Time
period of default

Regulation

6(2)(iii)

Effecting
remittance and incorporating overseas entity under the automatic route
without obtaining prior approval of RBI when the Indian Party (IP) was under
investigation by DRI

Rs.
47

Seven
years five months, to nine years and one month, approximately

Regulation
15(iii)

Delayed
submission of APRs

Regulation
16(1)

Disinvestment
of the overseas entity without obtaining fair valuation certificate from CA /
CPA at the time of disinvestment

 

 

Compounding
penalty

A compounding penalty of Rs. 83
was levied.

 

Comments

In the instant case, as the
applicant was under investigation by DRI and the Enforcement Directorate (DoE)
in Mumbai and Ahmedabad, the RBI had sought a No-Objection Certificate from the
DoE before proceeding with the compounding application. However, as no reply
was received from the DoE, RBI proceeded for the compounding without prejudice
to any other action which may be taken by the authority under any other laws.
Thus, RBI compounded the above contravention even though it did not receive any
NOC from the DoE.

 

Besides, Indian entities wishing
to make overseas investments should understand that if there is any
investigation pending against them by any regulatory body or investigation
agency, they cannot make an overseas investment under the automatic route and
need to obtain prior approval of RBI before making such investment.
 

 

 

 

IS IT FAIR TO TREAT RCM SUPPLIES AS EXEMPT?

HISTORY OF RCM IN INDIA

Reverse
Charge Mechanism or RCM is not a new concept in the Indirect Tax arena. It was
first introduced in India in 1997 on services provided by Goods Transport
Agency and Clearing and Forwarding Agent. Even the erstwhile Sales Tax and VAT
Laws in some states had a tax similar to RCM, the purchase tax wherein the
buyer or recipient of goods had to pay tax on purchase of specified goods; for
example, Maharashtra levied a purchase tax on cotton. The current GST regime
has only taken this forward, bringing in some more categories of goods and
services under the net of RCM.

 

India
is not the only country with RCM provisions; most of the developing and developed
nations have RCM provisions including EU VAT, Australia, Singapore, etc. The
underlying reason for introducing RCM in India was to map the unorganised
sector and shift the compliance liability regarding the same to the organised
recipients. It was believed that this would lead to increase in tax revenue
and make administration of the small unorganised sector easy.

 

From
an economy’s perspective, RCM is a robust check mechanism to ensure that all
supplies are taxed and there is minimal evasion. However, the concept has
certain flaws and repercussions that need to be dealt with.

 

RCM UNDER GST

RCM
under GST is governed by sections 9(3) and 9(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 which
essentially lay down the following:

(a)  9(3): Supply of specified categories of notified
goods and / or services attract GST under RCM where the recipient is liable to
pay tax on such goods and / or services;

(b)
9(4): Supply made by an unregistered person to a registered person, wherein the
registered recipient shall be liable to pay tax.

 

Further,
Notification No. 13/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 notifies
the categories of supplies which shall attract GST under RCM u/s 9(3) of the
CGST Act, 2017. Considering that under the RCM provisions the recipient pays
tax instead of the supplier, the recipient is eligible to avail Input Tax
Credit (ITC) of the tax so paid. However, as per section 17(3) of the CGST Act,
2017 the value of exempt supply shall include reverse charge supplies and
therefore ITC on the inputs and / or input services used for making such
reverse charge supplies is not available. Accordingly, the ITC pertaining to
such supplies stands unutilised and blocked.

 

While
the recipient certainly bears the brunt of the compliance burden on RCM
supplies, he remains financially unaffected as the tax paid can be availed as
credit (subject to his taxable and exempted supplies). However, this provision
proves to be prejudicial against the supplier who is unable to avail ITC
pertaining to inputs or input services used for supplying RCM supplies and also
leads to double taxation.

 

Moreover, if such supplier is engaged only in a
single business (i.e., RCM supplies), the entire ITC paid becomes a cost to
him. Let us understand this with the help of a numeric example as given below:

 

Sr. No.

Particulars

Under normal or
forward charge mechanism

Under reverse charge
mechanism

1

Value of inputs and / or input services used by the supplier

100

100

2

GST paid on 1 above @ 18%

18

18

3

Value addition made @ 30%

30

30

4

Cost of production (COP)

130

130

5

Profit @ 30% of COP

39

39

6

Selling price

169

169

7

GST on selling price @ 18%

30.42

30.42 (paid by recipient)

8

ITC available for set-off

18

9

Net GST paid by the supplier

12.42

18

10

ITC available to recipient

30.42

30.42

 

 

In the above example, it is evident
that although the recipient in both cases is eligible to avail the same ITC, it
is the supplier who faces iniquitous treatment.

 

Under GST, there are exempt,
zero-rated, taxable and non-GST supplies. For supplies that are either taxable
or zero-rated, ITC is available to the supplier. However, for exempt and
non-GST supplies such as essential items, reverse charge supplies, petroleum,
alcohol, etc., the suppliers suffer as they pay GST on the inward side but fail
to avail the set-off of the same as their outward supplies are not taxed. When
GST was being rolled out, the GST Council had received several representations
from sectors such as pharma, poultry, education, etc. to examine the problem of
accumulated ITC on account of exempt supplies. However, the problem remains
unaddressed till now as far as RCM is concerned.

 

During the Covid-19 outbreak, the
Supreme Court dismissed various pleas which had sought exemption from GST for masks, ventilators, PPE kits and other Covid-19-related equipment
on the premise that granting exemption to these would result in blocked ITC,
thereby increasing the manufacturing cost and occasioning a higher price for
consumers.

 

The
Council has in the past taken steps to address the issue of inverted duty
structure. However, the businesses which deal in exempted supplies are still
reeling from the impact of accumulated credits. The Council needs to deliberate
on the probable solutions to the above-mentioned concerns. The immediate
actions could include:

 

(i) Taking stock of items which are
exempt supplies, including the RCM supplies;

(ii) Evaluating the inward supplies used by such suppliers;

(iii) Exempting the inward supplies for the entire
chain of suppliers if feasible, or providing a mechanism of refunds to such
suppliers;

(iv) If not feasible, then
classifying the outward supplies as zero-rated supplies so that ITC is
available to the suppliers;

(v) An
option can be provided to the RCM sellers: whether to be classified as an RCM
supplier or not. This will give an alternative to sellers to evaluate the
trade-off between the cost of compliance and credit lost. Suppliers with
substantial credit can avail the ITC and carry out the compliances themselves
as against the small suppliers who would not like to get into the compliance
hassle. Similarly, this can be indicated in the tax invoice so as to inform the
buyer about whether or not to levy GST under RCM on the basis of the option
chosen by the supplier.

 

CONCLUSION

Is it fair for the RCM
suppliers to endure the unwarranted loss of credit for the simple reason that
their products or services, viz. sponsorship services, legal services, security
services, GTA services, cashew nuts, silk yarn, raw cotton, etc. are covered by
the said mechanism?

 

As discussed above, RCM is a tax
concept meant for the small and unorganised sector. Therefore, shouldn’t the
government be extra vigilant about any financial hardships being caused to
these small traders and businesses by the tax mechanism? Every business incurs
certain non-avoidable expenses including rent, audit fees, housekeeping,
business promotion, etc. All these input services are exigible to GST and constitute a large chunk of the
expenditure in the supplier’s profit and loss account. The GST pertaining to these expenses not being allowed as ITC
gives rise to superfluous adversities.

 

One of the most prominent objectives of GST was to eliminate
cascading effect and double taxation. While the government has, to a large
extent, been able to meet this objective, it remains to be seen whether the RCM
suppliers will also experience the benevolence of the Good and Simple Tax soon
enough!

 

 


Wise men say that the root of victory is in consultation with the wise.


  (Valmiki Raamaayan 6.6.5)

SAT RULES: WHETHER PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS CAN BE RELATED PARTIES

Related parties
and transactions with them are a concern of many laws – the Companies Act,
2013, the SEBI Regulations, the Income-tax Act and so on. The core concern is
that when parties are ‘related’, there is a conflict of interest between such
related parties who are involved in taking a decision regarding these
transactions and the interests of other parties who have no say or even
knowledge about it. For example, a firm owned by the daughter of the MD of a
listed company is sought to be given a contract of services. There is obviously
concern whether the terms would be fair, whether such services were indeed
needed by the company, etc. In a sense, thus, transactions with related parties
are a form of corporate nepotism. However, the definition of related parties,
as we will see a little later, is not narrow to include merely relatives of
controlling / deciding person/s. It includes subsidiaries, parent companies,
group entities of a certain type, etc. Business realities require that certain
activities are carried on by the same group in different entities, and even
otherwise transactions between groups or related entities are inevitable. Yet,
concerns would remain about the conflict of interest and whether the
arrangement is on commercial arm’s length terms.

 

The Companies
Act, 2013 (the Act) and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure
Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (the LODR Regulations) both deal with matters
relating to related parties and transactions with them. There is a detailed
accounting standard, too, dealing with this. Generally, these provide for
certain safeguards. There are requirements of approval of shareholders beyond a
particular threshold of materiality, with related parties generally barred from
voting thereon. The Audit Committee also has to approve all related party
transactions. Besides, there are requirements of disclosure of related parties
and transactions with them in the accounts. All of this serves at least two
purposes. Firstly, parties whose interests could potentially be affected would
get a say. Secondly, there is disclosure irrespective of whether such approval
was required. Hence, readers can review the nature and extent of such transactions.

 

Considering these varied safeguards and considering that parties may
still try to avoid them, an understanding of the provisions relating to such
transactions is important. A recent decision of the Securities Appellate
Tribunal (SAT) provides such an opportunity. Essentially, it held inter alia
that a public charitable trust whose managing trustee was
father / father-in-law of the promoter directors of a listed company was
not a related party. Thus, although there were significant transactions with such
trust, the relevant provisions of law governing related parties would not
apply. The decision of SAT is in the matter of Treehouse Education and
Accessories Limited vs. SEBI [(2019) 112 taxmann.com 349 (SAT), order dated 7th
November, 2019].

 

BACKGROUND

The facts of
the case are complicated and may even appear to be sordid, involving alleged
criminal acts. The background of what had transpired, as narrated by the
decision of SAT discussed here, an earlier decision of SAT and two orders of
SEBI, is as follows.

 

Treehouse
Education and Accessories Limited, a listed company (the Company) is engaged in
the business of education that it carries out through its own schools,
franchisees and along with certain public charitable trusts. It develops the
course and curriculum for the purpose. The franchisees and the trusts had
certain commercial arrangements with the company. It appears that there were
proposals and negotiations to merge the company with a company of the Zee group
for which an exchange ratio was also determined. For certain reasons, details
of which are not relevant here, there were disputes to such an extent that the
matter went to the police and the courts and the share exchange ratio was
revised substantially downwards.

The company
suffered very large losses which had allegedly questionable issues. There were
media reports about the company as per the SEBI orders which led to SEBI
initiating a preliminary inquiry.

 

Soon
thereafter, after making certain preliminary allegations, SEBI passed an
interim order debarring the company and its directors from accessing the
capital markets and ordered a forensic audit into its affairs. The order of
SEBI was appealed against to SAT which asked SEBI to pass a final order within
a specified time after giving due opportunity to the parties to present their
case. SEBI did so and passed a confirmatory order on 16th November,
2018 imposing the same directions as did the interim order. This order was
appealed again and SAT passed the order which is now discussed here.

 

Two issues of
contention arose. One was whether SEBI was entitled to initiate such
investigations and pass such harsh orders on the facts (more so when they were
admittedly initiated on the basis of media reports). The second issue, and
which is the subject of more detailed discussion here, is whether the company
and the public charitable trust whose managing trustee is a relative of the
promoter directors, can be said to be related parties? And thus, whether the
provisions of disclosure, approval, etc. under the relevant provisions apply to
transactions with them.

 

Whether
transactions with public charitable trust where relative of promoter directors
is a managing trustee are related party transactions?

Owing to, as
the company explained to SEBI, certain peculiar circumstances / laws relating
to educational institutions / schools, the company had to enter into a tie-up
arrangement with public charitable educational trusts to run certain schools.
The company would provide its name and backing and curriculum, etc. More
importantly, it would provide funds (returnable over certain years, with
interest for a part of this time) that can be used to set up the schools.

 

One trust, to which large amounts were provided as security deposit, had
a managing trustee who was the father / father-in-law of the promoter director
couple. Owing to losses by the said trust, security deposits of large amounts
had effectively eroded and hence potentially huge losses were faced. The
question thus arose whether the law relating to related party transactions was
violated. For this purpose the moot question was whether the company and the
trust were related parties as understood in law.

The relevant
provisions for this purpose are contained in the Act and the LODR Regulations.
Section 2(76) of the Act defines the term ‘related party’ exhaustively. On a
plain and literal reading of the definition, it appears that a public
charitable trust would not be covered under the said definition. However, since
the company is a listed company, the provisions of the LODR Regulations would
also be applicable. Hence, if a party with whom the company transacts is a
related party under those Regulations, then the relevant requirements contained
therein would also have to be complied with.

 

Regulation
2(1)(zb) defines related party as follows (emphasis supplied):

 

‘”related
party” means a related party as defined under sub-section (76) of section
2 of the Companies Act, 2013 or under the applicable accounting standards:…’

 

Thus, it
includes, first, a related party as defined under the Act that we have seen
does not include a public charitable trust. However, the definition is wider
and has a second leg and includes a person defined as a related party under the
applicable accounting standards. If we apply the Indian Accounting Standards
(Ind AS 24), the definition therein is fairly wide and indeed worded
differently. It includes categories of persons not included in the definition
under the Act. Thus, for example, it includes entities that are controlled by
the persons who control the company or the ‘close relatives’ of such persons.
There are other categories, too. The relevant question would be whether on the
facts of the case a public charitable trust whose managing trustee is the
father / father-in-law of the director couple said to be in control of the
company is a related party. This would have been an interesting analysis.

 

Here is a case
where a company has commercial relations with a public charitable trust whose
objective is understood to be public welfare. There is a relative of the
promoter director who is stated to be the managing trustee.

 

SEBI had in its
interim as well as confirmatory orders made a preliminary allegation that the
said trust was a related party, the transactions with whom were carried out
without complying with the relevant provisions of law. And on this and other
grounds, ordered debarment of the parties and a forensic audit of the affairs
of the company. The appellants challenged this order and asserted that the
trust was not a related party.

SAT observed as
follows while holding that the trust was not a related party (emphasis
supplied):

 

‘18. Similarly,
we are unable to agree with the contentions of SEBI that a trustee of a public
charitable trust is a related party going by the correct reading of the
definition in the Companies Act as well as in the LODR Regulations, unless
there is evidence to show that those Trusts have been set up or (are) operating
for the benefit of the appellant
(s). Moreover, there is nothing on
record to show that Mr. Giridharilal, the trustee, has personally benefited in
any manner not only by virtue of being a trustee or in general by any other
means.’

 

Making this
legal and factual conclusion, the SAT overturned the order of SEBI insofar as
it debarred the appellants.

 

Interestingly,
neither SEBI nor SAT made any detailed analysis of the definition of related
party under the Act or under the Regulations. SAT merely says that on a
‘correct reading of the definition’ under the Act / Regulations, a trustee of a
public charitable trust is not a related party. It did not explain what this
reading was and how was it correct. Curiously, it places its own additional
condition about the trust being set up or operating for the benefit of the
appellants.

 

However, it is
respectfully submitted that such a condition is not part of the law relating to
related party transactions.

 

It is submitted
that the Order of SAT needs reconsideration. The definitions of related party
would need to be analysed, the facts of the case examined in more detail and
only the conditions specified in the law applied. It appears that the second
leg of the definition in the LODR Regulations was not even examined.

 

Reliance on media
reports by SEBI in making adverse orders against parties

Another
observation SAT made is that SEBI initiated the examination based on media
reports which resulted in passing of adverse orders against the appellants that
remained in place for a very significant time. It is submitted that taking
hasty action relying on media reports is a dangerous way of reacting. Media,
particularly social media, have a tendency to quickly build outrage which a
patient regulator may consider letting pass, focusing instead on the surer
method of meticulous examination. It was particularly noted by SAT that the
appellants have suffered debarment for quite a long period and the
investigation and even the forensic audit has not yet been completed.

 

CONCLUSION

The SAT order
is only with reference to the interim / confirmatory order. SEBI is yet to
investigate fully and also yet to receive the forensic report ordered.
Thereafter, it may make formal charges, if any, and pass a final order. This
may happen in the near future. It would be interesting to see how SEBI deals
with the issue of related party in the context of these facts since in the
earlier orders it had made preliminary allegations only. More interesting would
be to see how SEBI deals with the reasoning and ruling of SAT on related
parties, which I submit requires reconsideration.
 

 

 

FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIME: NEW RULES

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (the FEMA) governs the law relating to foreign exchange in India. The Reserve Bank of India is the nodal authority for all matters concerning foreign exchange. Under section 6(2) of the FEMA, the RBI was the authority empowered to notify Regulations pertaining to capital account transactions. Pursuant to the same, the RBI had notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Security to a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017 (TISPRO Regulations) for foreign investment in Indian securities and the Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property in India) Regulations, 2018 (Property Regulations) for foreign investment in Indian immovable property.

However, the Finance Act, 2015 amended FEMA to provide that the RBI would only be empowered to notify Regulations pertaining to Debt Instruments, whereas the Central Government would notify Rules pertaining to the limit and conditions for transactions involving Non-Debt Instruments. While moving the Finance Bill, 2015 the Finance Minister explained the rationale for the same. He stated that capital account controls were more a policy matter rather than a regulatory issue. Accordingly, the power to control capital flows on equity was transferred from the RBI to the Central Government. Hence, a distinction was drawn between Debt Instruments and Non-Debt Instruments. The power to determine what is debt and what is non-debt has also been given to the Central Government.

While this enabling amendment was made in 2015, the actual Rules for the same were only notified on 16th October, 2019 and, thus, the transfer of power took place only recently. Let us analyse some key features of these new Rules.

DISTINCTION

The Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance is the authority within the Central Government which has been given the above responsibility. The Finance Ministry has, on 16th October, 2019, determined certain instruments as Debt Instruments and certain others as Non-Debt Instruments as given in Table 1 below:

Debt Instruments Non-Debt Instruments
Government bonds Investments in equity in all types of companies
Corporate bonds Capital participation in LLPs
Securitisation structure other than equity tranches Investment instruments recognised in the Consolidated FDI Policy, i.e., compulsorily convertible preference shares, compulsorily convertible debentures, warrants, etc.
Loans taken by Indian firms Investments in units of Investment Vehicles such as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs); Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs); Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InVITs)
Depository receipts backed by underlying debt securities Investment in units of Mutual Funds which invest more than 50% in equity shares
Junior-most layer of securitisation structure
Acquisition, sale or dealing directly in immovable property
Contribution to trusts
Depository receipts backed by equity instruments, e.g., ADRs / GDRs

Table 1: Classification of Debt vs. Non-Debt Instruments

NOTIFICATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Pursuant to this determination, the Finance Ministry on 17th October, 2019 notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (the NDI Rules) and, correspondingly, the RBI has notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 (the Debt Regulations). The NDI Rules have superseded the erstwhile TISPRO Regulations and the Property Regulations which were issued by the RBI. While there are no changes in the NDI Rules as compared with the erstwhile Property Regulations, there are several changes in the NDI Rules as compared with the erstwhile TISPRO Regulations which are explained below. The RBI had also notified the Master Direction No. 11/2017-18 on Foreign Investment in India. This was issued pursuant to the TISPRO Regulations. However, section 47(3) of the FEMA states that all Regulations made by the RBI before 15th October, 2019 shall continue to be valid until rescinded by the Central Government. Now that the TISPRO Regulations have been superseded by the NDI Rules, it stands to reason that this particular Master Direction would also no longer be valid. However, unlike the TISPRO Regulations, this Master Direction has not been expressly rescinded.

The TISPRO Regulations permitted an Indian entity to receive any foreign investment which was not in accordance with the Regulations provided that the RBI gave specific permission for the same. The NDI Rules also contain a similar provision for the RBI to give specific permission but it must do so after consultation with the Central Government. The powers of the RBI to specific pricing guidelines for transfer of shares between residents and persons resident outside India continue under the NDI Rules but they must be made in consultation with the Central Government.

Debt vs. Non-Debt definition: As compared to the TISPRO Regulations, the NDI Rules contain certain changes. Some of the key features of these Rules are explained here. One of the important definitions is the term ‘Non-Debt Instruments’ which has been defined in an exhaustive manner to mean the instruments listed in Table 1 above. Consequently, the term ‘Debt Instruments’ has been defined to mean all instruments other than Non-Debt Instruments.

Equity instruments: The term ‘capital instruments’ has been replaced with the term ‘equity instruments’. It means equity shares, compulsorily convertible debentures (CCDs), compulsorily convertible preference shares (CCPS) and warrants.

FDI: The distinction between foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment has been continued from the TISPRO Regulations. Accordingly, any foreign investment through equity instruments of less than 10% of the post-issue paid-up capital of a listed company would always be foreign portfolio investment, whereas if it is 10% or more it would always be FDI. Any amount of foreign investment through equity instruments in an unlisted company would always be FDI.

Listed Indian company: The definition of the term ‘listed Indian company’ has undergone a sea change as compared to the TISPRO Regulations. Earlier, it was defined as an Indian company which had its capital instruments listed on a stock exchange in India and, thus, it was restricted only to equity shares which were listed.

The NDI Rules amended this definition to read as an Indian company which has its equity or Debt Instruments listed on a stock exchange in India. This amendment has created several unresolved issues. For example, under the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Security) Regulations, 2008 a private limited company can also list its non-convertible debentures on a recognised stock exchange in India. Now, as per the amended definition under the NDI Rules, such a private company would also have to be treated as a listed Indian company. Accordingly, any foreign investment in such a private company, through equity instruments of less than 10% of the share capital, would now be treated as foreign portfolio investment. Secondly, Rule 21 specifies the pricing guidelines and states that the price of equity instruments issued by a listed Indian company to a person resident outside India would be as per the SEBI Guidelines. Thirdly, in case of a transfer of shares in such a company from a resident to a person resident outside India would have to be as per the SEBI Guidelines. There are no SEBI Guidelines for pricing of unlisted equity shares in case of a company whose debentures are listed. Hence, the Rules require adherence to SEBI pricing Guidelines when, in fact, there are none for private companies whose debt alone is listed! It is submitted that the NDI Rules should be amended to revert to the original position.

Rule 19 of the NDI Rules provides that in case of the merger / demerger of two or more Indian companies, where any of them is a company listed on a stock exchange, the scheme shall be in compliance with the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015. Here Rule 19 does not use the defined phrase of ‘listed Indian company’. Further, while the aforesaid SEBI Regulations apply both to listed equity shares and listed debt, the provisions in Regulation 37 relating to scheme of arrangement apply only to companies which have listed their equity shares. Hence, it stands to reason that this particular provision of Rule 19 only covers companies whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange.

 

Separate schedules: Similar to the TISPRO Regulations, the NDI Rules classify the different types of foreign investment which an Indian entity can receive into different schedules. Schedule I deals with FDI in an Indian company; schedule II deals with investment by a Foreign Portfolio Investor; schedule III deals with repatriable investment by NRIs; schedule IV deals with non-repatriable investment by NRIs and other related entities; schedule V deals with investment by other non-resident investors, such as sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, etc.; schedule VI deals with investment in an LLP; schedule VII deals with investment by a Foreign Venture Capital investor; schedule VIII deals with investment in an investment vehicle; schedule IX deals with investment in Foreign Depository Receipts; and schedule X deals with investment in Indian Depository Receipts.

Mutual funds > 50% in equity: One major amendment introduced by the NDI Rules was to classify a mutual fund which invested more than 50% in equity as an investment vehicle along with an REIT, AIF and an InVIT. The implication of this seemingly small amendment is drastic. It would mean that any mutual fund which is owned and / or controlled by non-residents and if it has invested more than 50% in equity, then any investment made by such a fund would be treated as indirect FDI. Thus, any investment by such a fund (even though it is not a strategic investment but a mere portfolio investment) would have to comply with pricing guidelines, reporting, sectoral caps and conditions, etc., specified for indirect FDI. Further, several sectors would be out of bounds for such a fund which are currently off limits for FDI. This move created turmoil within the mutual fund industry since several funds are owned and / or controlled by foreign companies. It also led to a bias against such funds and in favour of purely domestic funds. The SEBI took up this issue with the Finance Ministry and, accordingly, the NDI Rules have been amended on 5th December, 2019 with retrospective effect to drop such mutual funds which invest more than 50% in equity from the definition of investment vehicle. Accordingly, any investment by such mutual funds would no longer be classified as indirect FDI.

Sectoral caps: The NDI Rules amended the definition of sectoral caps to provide the maximum repatriable investment in equity and Debt Instruments by a person resident outside India. Thus, compared to the TISPRO Regulations, Debt Instruments were also added in the definition of sectoral caps. This definition again created an ambiguity since it was not possible to consider debt investment while reckoning the sectoral caps. Accordingly, the NDI Rules have been amended on 5th December, 2019 with retrospective effect to drop Debt Instruments from the definition of sectoral caps and revert to the earlier definition.

Pricing of convertible instruments: Unlike the TISPRO Regulations, the NDI Rules did not provide flexibility in determining the issue price of CCDs and CCPS. Now, the NDI Rules have been amended on 5th December, 2019 with retrospective effect to provide that the price of such convertibles can either be determined upfront or a conversion formula should be determined at the time of their issue. The conversion price should be ≥ the fair market value as at the date of issue of the convertible instruments.

FPI: The NDI Rules have substantially amended the provisions relating to investments by SEBI Registered Foreign Portfolio Investors or FPIs:

(a) Under the TISPRO Regulations, maximum aggregate FPI investment was 24%. This limit could be increased to the sectoral caps by passing a special resolution. Thus, a company in the software sector which has no sectoral caps could increase the FPI limit to 100%.

(b) The NDI Rules now provide that with effect from 1st April, 2020 the FPI limit for all companies shall be the sectoral caps applicable to a company irrespective of whether or not it has increased the limit by passing a special resolution. The only exception is a company operating in a sector where FDI is prohibited – in which case the FPI limit would be capped @ 24%. This is a new feature which was not found in the TISPRO regime. Thus, in the case of a listed company operating in the casino / gambling sector (where FDI is taboo) the FPI limits would be 24%! This is a unique provision since FDI and FPI are and always were separate ways of investing in a company. Now, FPI would be limited in a company simply because it is ineligible to receive FDI.

(c) In case the Indian company desires to reduce the FPI limit then it can peg it to 24% or 49% or 74% provided that it passes a special resolution to this effect before 31st March, 2020. Thus, if an Indian company is wary of a hostile takeover through the FPI route, then it may reduce the FPI limit. Such a company which has reduced its FPI limit may once again increase it to 49%  or 74% or sectoral cap by passing another special resolution. However, once a company increases its FPI limit after first reducing it, then it cannot once again reduce the same.

(d) If an FPI were to inadvertently breach the limit applicable to a company, then it has five trading days to divest the excess shares, failing which its entire shareholding in that company would be classified as FDI.

(e) The Rules originally provided that FPIs could sell / gift shares only to certain non-residents. This provision has been amended with retrospective effect to provide that FPIs can sell in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by the SEBI Regulations. Thus, the original position prevalent under the TISPRO Regulations has been restored.

FVCI: Under the TISPRO Regulations, a SEBI registered Foreign Venture Capital Investor could invest in the securities of a start-up without any sectoral restrictions. As compared to the TISPRO Regulations, instead of the term ‘securities’, the NDI Rules provide a more detailed description permitting investment in the equity or equity-linked instruments or debt instruments issued by a start-up. However, if the investments are in equity instruments then the sectoral caps, entry routes and other conditions would apply.

Sectoral conditions: The NDI Rules have made certain changes in the sectoral conditions for certain sectors which are as follows:

(i)   Coal and lignite: 100% FDI through the automatic route is now allowed in sale of coal and coal mining activities, including associated processing infrastructure, subject to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. This includes coal washery, crushing, coal handling and separation (magnetic and non-magnetic).

(ii)   Manufacturing: The 100% automatic route FDI is permissible in manufacturing. The definition of the term manufacturing has been amended to include contract manufacturing in India through a legally tenable contract, whether on principal-to-principal or principal-to-agent basis. In this respect, the Commerce Ministry has clarified that the principal entity which has outsourced manufacturing to a contractor would be eligible to sell its products so manufactured through wholesale, retail or e-commerce on the same footing as a self-manufacturer. Further, the onus of compliance with the conditions for FDI would remain with the manufacturing entity.

(iii) Broadcasting: A new entry has been added permitting FDI up to 26% on the Government approval route in uploading / streaming of news and current affairs through digital media.

(iv) E-commerce: Under the TISPRO Regulations, an e-commerce entity was defined to mean an Indian company or a foreign company covered under the Companies Act, 2013 or an office, branch or agency which is owned or controlled by a person resident outside India and which is conducting e-commerce activities. The NDI Rules have truncated the definition to only cover a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 / 2013. Hence, going forward, branches of foreign companies would not be treated as an eligible e-commerce entity. Further, a new condition has been included that an e-commerce marketplace with FDI must obtain and maintain a report from its statutory auditor by the 30th day of September every year for the preceding financial year confirming compliance with the FDI Guidelines.

(v) Single Brand Product Retail Trading (SBRT): The original NDI Rules contained some variations compared to the TISPRO Regulations which have now been rectified. However, even though 100% automatic route FDI continues to be allowed in SBRT, there are yet some changes compared to the TISPRO Regulations:

(1)     SBRT FDI > 51% requires that at least 30% of the value of the goods procured shall be locally sourced from India. The entity can set off this 30% requirement by sourcing goods from India for global operations. For this purpose, the phrase ‘sourcing of goods from India for global operations’ has been defined to mean the value of goods sourced from India for global operations for that single brand (in rupee terms) in a particular financial year directly by the entity undertaking SBRT or its group companies (whether resident or non-resident), or indirectly by them through a third party under a legally tenable agreement.

(2)     As before, an SBRT entity operating through brick and mortar stores can also undertake retail trading through e-commerce. However, it is now also possible to undertake retail trading through e-commerce prior to the opening of brick and mortar stores, provided that the entity opens brick and mortar stores within two years from the date of starting the online retail.

The power to govern the mode of payment and reporting of the non-debt instruments still vests with the RBI and, thus, the RBI has also notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019. These lay down the forms to be filed on receipt of various types of foreign investment, the manner of making payment by the foreign investors and the manner of remittance of the sale / maturity proceeds on sale of these foreign investments. These Regulations contain provisions which are the same as those contained in the earlier TISPRO Regulations.

DEBT REGULATIONS

Consequent to the notification of the Debt Rules, the RBI has notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019. These regulate debt investment by a person resident outside India. For instance, the investment by FPIs in corporate bonds / non-convertible debentures is governed by these Regulations. One change in the debt regulations as compared to the TISPRO Regulations is that NRIs are no longer allowed to invest in money market mutual funds on a non-repatriation basis.

CONCLUSION

The FEMA Regulations have been totally revamped in the field of capital instruments. It remains to see whether the Government would amend more FEMA Regulations to transfer power from the RBI to itself. One only wishes that whichever authority is in charge, there is clarity and simplicity in the FEMA Regulations which would lead to a conducive investment climate.

POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF STRESSED ASSETS

The gross
Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of all Scheduled Commercial Banks shot up from Rs.
69,300 crores in 2009 to Rs. 9,33,609 crores in 2019. The stress in the industrial
sectors such as power, roads, steel, textiles, ship-building, etc. are mainly
responsible for this huge increase. RBI has time and again come up with various
guidelines to resolve the financial stress in NPAs and reclassify them to
standard assets. The Government of India also brought the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code (IBC) into force in 2016 to bring about quick resolution of
NPAs. However, the results have not been very encouraging.

 

BBBB MODEL OF INFRASTRUCTURE /
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

Infrastructure
development and financing of green field / brown field projects is generally
plagued with several issues. And it is this area that has significantly
increased the NPAs in the banking sector. Since the opening up of the economy
the nexus between the 4B’s has been at the centre of the problem. One can
term it as the ‘BBBB model’ of infrastructure development wherein the
Bureaucracy, Businessmen, Bankers and the Bench (Judiciary) have played a key
role in creating stress in the project / company and consequently leading to
non-viability of the projects and the rise in NPAs.
The role played by
these 4Bs which has led to cost escalation of the projects or delays in their
implementation can be summarised as under:

 

Bureaucracy: The number of regulatory approvals creating hurdles in doing business,
delays in getting several regulatory approvals, land acquisition delays,
greasing of the palms of bureaucrats and politicians for expediting approvals,
compliance / clearances and licenses, etc.

Businessmen: Aggressive / unrealistic projections, siphoning off of funds and fund
diversion, gold plating the cost of projects, etc.

Bankers: Financing based on aggressive / unrealistic projections, lack of
project monitoring, delays in sanctioning / disbursements, phone banking /
corruption, technical and physical incapability / inefficiency for project
appraisal / analysis, etc.

Bench: The slow process of the judiciary / arbitration / claim settlement and
justice delivery system in India.

 

The above are some of
the primary reasons for delays in implementation of projects, consequently
leading to cost escalations, increase in the overall cost of the projects and
their non-viability.

 

Understanding financial stress in the
company / project

We normally hear
about ‘signs of financial stress’ like (1) the company is making losses, (2)
the net worth of the company is negative, (3) the company is not able to meet
its present payment obligations, (4) the company’s rating is downgraded, (5) it
has a high debt-to-equity ratio, (6) there is consistent over-drawl in the cash
credit account, and (7) it has a low current asset ratio.

 

These are only
‘signs’ of the financial stress in the company. Some of these signs would be
common across sectors, industries or among various companies in distress.
However, the causes of the financial stress among them would vary and could
relate to regulatory approvals, labour, reduction in demand for products /
services, land acquisition, debtors unable to pay, litigations, reduction in
revenues or prices of products or services, increase in input costs,
non-availability of inputs / raw materials, etc.

 

In order to resolve
the financial stress in companies and for resolving the NPA issue, we can
broadly categorise the solutions adopted by the regulator / government into two
kinds:

 

(1)
  Sweep the dust under the carpet:

Under this, the regulator allowed lenders to defer their interest and principal
payments, allowed lenders to provide additional funding and required promoters
to infuse more capital and provide personal and / or corporate guarantees. The
regulator even allowed regulatory forbearance (i.e., special dispensation to
lenders for not categorising these borrowers / assets as NPAs once the
restructuring plan was implemented) so that the company and existing capital
providers are given enough time to resolve the real cause of the financial
stress and the company can be revived.

 

The
problem with this approach was that the cause of the financial stress never got
resolved but the payment to lenders got postponed and the build-up of NPAs in
the system did not get reversed. Further, the lenders failed to monitor things
once the restructuring scheme got implemented whether or not the cause of
financial stress was resolved. Lenders with their short-sighted view were only
bothered that they did not have to classify the asset as an NPA or make
additional provisions immediately, and for the time being they could sweep the
dust under the carpet. This led to lenders approving restructuring schemes that
were based on aggressive business assumptions and sometimes even unrealistic
assumptions.

 

(2)   Lift the mat, show the dust to everyone and
let someone else clean it up:
Under the second type of solution, the regulator
took away the regulatory forbearance (i.e., special dispensation for not
categorising the account by lenders as NPA on restructuring). The regulator
allowed the lenders to defer their interest and principal payments and required
promoters to infuse more capital and provide personal and / or corporate
guarantees. The lenders were required to reach an agreement for a restructuring
scheme within specified timelines. If the restructuring scheme was not approved
within the specified timelines, lenders either had to change the owner or
resolve the matter under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).

 

The timelines
specified by the regulator again resulted in lenders approving some of the
restructuring schemes that were based on aggressive business assumptions and
sometimes unrealistic assumptions.

 

Another issue was
that each and every decision of the lenders was viewed and reviewed with
suspicion and the sword of inquiry by various investigative agencies of the
government and its authorities was hanging on the lender’s decision. This led
to lenders not reaching any decision at all in some cases. In such situations,
lenders preferred to let the NCLT, NCLAT or the Supreme Court decide under the
IBC even at the cost of possible value destruction of the asset on referring to
these forums.

 

These solutions did
not lead to a reversal of the build-up of NPAs or resolving the real cause of
the financial stress in the company. Further, shareholders and depositors of
lenders continued to lose money under both the above methods due to various
reasons.

As
you may have noticed under the above two approaches, the government or the
regulator is only providing a solution for postponing payment of interest and
principal but has failed to provide a solution for resolving the cause of the
financial stress. Resolving the cause of financial stress has been left to the
existing lenders or promoters, and in some cases to new lenders and promoters
where the asset is sold to a new investor. In order to resolve the stress of
NPAs in the economy, the government and various regulators need to step in and
resolve the true cause behind the financial stress. At the same time, it is
virtually impossible for governments and regulators to have a customised
solution for each company for resolving its financial stress. Hence there is a
need to generalise the causes of financial stress in a company and then
government and regulators need to find a solution for resolving these issues
rather than merely postponing interest and principal payments.

 

The factors leading
to financial stress in a company can be broadly categorised as under:

 

Table 1

Sr.

Stress factor

Entity responsible

(A)

Revenue

Customers are interested in minimising
the price of the product and consequently revenue for the company

(B)

Variable cost

Raw material, labour costs, etc. directly linked to generating
revenue. Suppliers, labour are interested in maximising or increasing this component and consequently the
cost of production

(C)

Fixed cost

– Revenue-linked

Administration cost, legal, rentals, etc. (other bare minimum fixed
costs which are absolutely necessary)

(D)

Fixed cost

– Capital
provider-related

Depreciation and interest. Capital providers are interested in maximising or increasing this component
in order to maximise their return on capital

(E)

Profit

Capital providers are interested in maximising
or increasing this component in order to maximise their return on capital

 

Please note: Regulator / government will have a role in all or any of the above
factors directly or indirectly either for minimising or maximising the stress
factor. (Examples: Central Electricity and Regulatory Commission would be
keen on minimising revenue and tariff for customers. NHAI, if it delays in
land acquisition for a road project, it would push the cost of the project
and consequently fixed costs)

 

 

Financial stress in a
company can be reduced if the role of any of the above can be reduced or
eliminated. The factors stated in A, B and C above can be difficult to reduce
or eliminate. However, the factors stated in D and E can be reduced or
eliminated to make the operations of the company viable and resolve the
financial stress in the company.

 

‘Utility
Instruments’: A possible solution for resolving stress / NPAs

One of the solutions
for resolution of stressed assets and reducing the NPAs in the books of lenders
can be the issuing of ‘Utility Instruments’. A typical project which is an NPA,
especially in the infrastructure space, is funded by a mix of debt (from banks)
and equity infused by the promoters / investors in the company. What if an
instrument is introduced which replaces all the debt and equity in the company?

 

Two questions arise:

(1) Who will
subscribe to these ‘Utility Instruments’?

(2)
What will be the return on these ‘Utility Instruments’ – especially when the
project is not even able to service the interest, forget servicing of principal
and return on equity?

 

The answers to the
above questions will be explained in detail with the help of an example of a
stressed power-generating company that is an NPA asset in the books of the
bankers.

 

How it will work

A typical Power
Generation Company POGECO Ltd. has set up a coal-fired thermal power plant of
1,000 MW at Rs. 5 crores per MW with a debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30.  When the project is implemented and
operational, the balance sheet of such a company would broadly look as under:

 

Table 2

Liabilities

Rs. Cr.

Assets

Rs. Cr.

Equity

1,500

Fixed Assets

5,000

Debt

3,500

 

 

Total

5,000

Total

5,000

 

 

A typical Profit and
Loss account of POGECO Ltd would look as per Table 3, had it been
operating under normal circumstances based on certain assumptions.

 

These
assumptions are further detailed in Table 4 (for those interested in
understanding the details of calculations).

Table 3

Sr.

Particulars

Total for the year

(Amt. Rs. Cr.)

(A)

Per unit

(Amt. in Rs./Kwh)

(B)

% of Tariff (B)

(A)

Revenue

2,973

4.39

100%

(B)

Variable cost – fuel cost

1,929

2.85

65%

(C)

Fixed cost

 

 

 

i

O&M

150

0.22

5%

ii

Depreciation

200

0.30

7%

iii

Interest on long-term loan

420

0.62

14%

iv

Interest on working capital loan

48

0.07

2%

 

Total fixed cost

818

1.21

28%

(D)

Profit Before Tax (PBT)

226

0.33

7%

 

 

Cost components of
POGECO Ltd. and assumptions

 

Table 4

Sr.

Cost component

Assumption

(A)

Variable costs

 

1

Coal purchase cost

Rs. 4,000 per tonne (4,000 gross calorific value – GCV) (including
transportation up to the gate, taxes, etc.)

2

Secondary fuel purchase cost

Rs. 0.10 per kwh

(B)

Fixed cost

 

1

Operation & maintenance (O&M)

Rs. 15 lakhs per MW p.a. (including maintenance capex)

2

Depreciation on fixed assets

Rs. 200 crores p.a. assuming a 25-year plant life

3

Interest on long-term debt

12% p.a.

4

Interest on working capital

12% p.a.

5

Return on equity

15% – promoter / investor will expect some return on his investment
(or else he will not be interested in carrying out the operations). This is
generally even recovered from the consumers in the tariff in a typical PPA

(C)

Other assumptions

 

1

Plant load factor (PLF)

85%

2

Auxiliary consumption

9%

3

Station heat rate

2,500 kcal/kWh

4

Working capital requirement

1 month coal inventory and 1 month receivables

 

 

Let us critically
analyse the above cost components.

As you can see (refer
Table 3)
, 28% of the cost is fixed cost (in the first year). Normally, this
cost would gradually go down over the years as the debt gets paid and the
interest cost on long-term loan would gradually decrease. However, costs of
other components that are fixed will not decrease over the years and will
remain constant throughout the plant life.

 

Any investor putting
in his time, money and effort would want a normal return on his investment.
Hence, PBT of Rs. 226 crores is nothing but 15% return on Rs. 1,500 crores
equity investment. Accordingly, PBT would represent about 7% of the tariff
which will be charged to the consumers of POGECO Ltd.

 

From a consumer’s
perspective he will be paying ~ 35% (28%+7%) of the power tariff on account of
O&M, depreciation, interest and return of equity. As a consumer, he would
be interested in reducing these components to the maximum extent.

 

In India we have also
seen the issue relating to gold plating of projects or cost escalations /
overruns due to delays. In such a scenario, per MW cost of setting up the power
plant is much higher than Rs. 4 crores to Rs. 5 crores per MW (as assumed in
our example). In such an event the consumers would be paying more than 35% of
the tariff in fixed costs component.

 

To put it in a different
perspective, the stress in POGECO Ltd. will be due to the following conflicting
factors among various parties:

(1)
Consumers and regulator will want to
minimise
the tariff / revenue, i.e. component A from tariff (refer
Table 3
);

(2) Bankers or debt
providers will want to ensure their
interest and principal gets paid hence they will not be interested in reducing
component Cii, Ciii and Civ (i.e. depreciation and
interest) from the tariff and the Profit & Loss statement (refer Table 3).
The reason for including depreciation here is that although in the P&L it
is a non-cash item, but commensurate cash flows will be utilised to service the
principal portion of the debt.

(3) Investors /
promoters will want to maximise
their return, hence they will try to increase component Cii and D
(i.e. depreciation and PBT) (refer Table 3).

 

The
conflict among the above factors makes POGECO Ltd. unviable (the example
tariffs are too low or the cost of project is high which has increased the
fixed costs). What could be the solution for making POGECO Ltd. viable which
ensures principal payment to banks, return of investment / equity of promoter /
investor and tariff reduction for consumers?

 

The key is to
eliminate some of the components of the fixed costs which will benefit the
consumer while ensuring that the investments of the banks and investors are
returned.

 

How do we reduce the
fixed cost components?

Step 1 – Issue ‘Utility Instruments’ to
the end-consumers of the power

To make it easier to
understand, let us assume a town with 30 lakh consumers / families /
connections is consuming electricity from POGECO Ltd. Further, it is assumed
that distribution lines are already set up and cost related to distribution /
distribution losses is not involved. These consumers are directly purchasing
power from POGECO Ltd. These 30 lakh consumers on an average would consume
about 180-190 units per month which is about 6,776 million units of electricity
requirement.

 

The net generation of
the 1,000 MW power plant (assuming it operates at 85% PLF and 9% of auxiliary
consumption) would be roughly ~ 6,776 million units.

 

Hence, POGECO Ltd.
would issue ‘Utility Instruments’ to these 30 lakh consumers. Each instrument
issued by POGECO Ltd. would give the right to the consumer to purchase 10 units
of electricity from POGECO Ltd. at a discounted price per unit.

 

POGECO
Ltd. will issue 67.76 crore ‘Utility Instruments’ at Rs. 73.79 each to its
consumers. This will enable POGECO Ltd. to generate Rs. 5,000 crores from the
issuance. The calculation can be better explained in the table below:

 

Table 5

Sr.

Particulars

Quantity

(A)

POGECO Ltd. capacity

1,000 MW

(B)

Net generation @ 85% PLF and 9% auxiliary consumption

6,77,58,60,000 units

(C)

Number of ‘Instruments’ to be issued with right to purchase 10 units
(b/10)

67,75,86,000

(D)

Cost of project for setting up the power plant

Rs. 5,000 crores

(E)

Amount to be raised per ‘Instrument’ (d/c)

Rs. 73.79

 

 

Step 2 – Utilise the proceeds received
from these ‘Utility Instruments’ to pay the bankers and the investors

A Board of Trustees
can be appointed to oversee the entire process of getting the proceeds from
consumers and paying the bankers and investors (once the plant is made
operational). An O&M contractor should be appointed who will be managing
the plant and will be operating under the supervision / oversight of the Board
of Trustee and the regulator. With the proceeds from the ‘Utility Instruments’,
POGECO Ltd. will pay back the debt of Rs. 3,500 crores and the equity
investment of Rs. 1,500 crores.

 

RETURN ON INVESTMENT

The investor will
demand some return on investment up to the date he receives his money from the
‘Utility Instruments’. Further, there will also be a working capital
requirement to fund coal / fuel inventory and receivables. These additional
requirements can always be factored into the amount to be raised from the
consumers through the ‘Utility Instruments’.

 

Step
3 – Supply electricity to consumers at variable cost

The ‘Utility
Instruments’ will not carry any interest, nor will the amount paid by consumers
for purchase of the same (@ Rs. 73.79 per ‘Instrument’) be repaid to the consumers.
However, with the ‘Instruments’ the consumer has the right to purchase
electricity from POGECO Ltd. at a variable cost. Accordingly, each unit
consumed by the consumer will cost him only Rs. 3.07 per unit vs. Rs. 4.39 per
unit (that he would have otherwise paid to purchase power in our example –
refer Profit & Loss statement in Table 3 above). This is a saving of
about 30% in electricity cost for the consumer!

 

Let us do the math on
how he is getting the return on his investment of Rs. 73.79 per ‘Utility
Instrument’.

 

Assuming a family is
consuming 100 units of electricity every month, it consumes 1,200 units every
year. The consumer will need to buy 120 ‘Utility Instruments’. This will
require him to pay or invest Rs. 8,855. Against this investment he will be
saving Rs. 1.32 per unit of his consumption, or Rs. 1,584 in the first year of
investment on consumption of 1,200 units of electricity (i.e. Rs. 1.32 fixed
cost x 1,200 units). This works out to about 17.88% of the amount invested.

 

These savings would
gradually reduce (i.e. as discussed above due to the impact of the long-term
debt as it gets paid and the interest cost on long-term loan as part of fixed
cost would gradually decrease). The yearly saving gradually reduces to Rs. 861
in the 25th year of the power plant’s life. However, the Internal Rate of
Return for the consumer would still work out to be about ~ 15.5% over the
period of 25 years of the life of the plant.

 

With the above
analysis, the questions related to (1) Who will subscribe to these ‘Utility
Instruments’, and (2) What will be the return on these ‘Instruments’ are
answered.

 

Enumerable factors
such as costs related to distribution licensee, distribution and transmission
costs and losses, etc. will also play a role which would pose practical
challenges for implementing this concept. How to deal with these challenges and
issues can be a separate analysis or part of a study.

 

Applicability to
other sectors

A detailed analysis
of the concept has been presented here using the example of a power company.
However, this principal / concept can be applied to any company / sector that
is capital intensive or any public utility company, or any company having a
substantial component of operating and financial leverage and is catering to a
large number of consumers.

 

Examples:

(a) ‘Utility
Instruments’ can be issued to truck owners / transport companies / courier
companies wherein they will be paying toll limited to variable and O&M
costs for a road project.

(b) ‘Utility Instruments’
can be issued by Metro projects in urban areas such as Mumbai Metro or Delhi
Metro to its daily travellers / office-goers.

(c) Companies laying
the network of pipelines for the distribution of natural gas in urban areas can
issue ‘Utility Instruments’ to their consumers who would be using piped natural
gas.

(d) Financing for
setting up of infrastructure for charging stations in the city and providing
batteries for electric cars can be done through issuing ‘Utility Instruments’
to consumers using electric cars.

 

Implementation of the concept

We can always think
of variations to the above principle for implementation of this concept in the
current scenario with limited changes / amendments to the regulations. Let us
assume that Tata Power (i.e. a generation company) issues ‘Utility Instruments’
to the consumers in Mumbai. The proceeds will be utilised to reduce the debt
and / or equity component in their balance sheet.

 

As a consumer the
holder of a ‘Utility Instrument’ will be paying the normal electricity bill
every month as per the existing mechanism along with other consumers. At the
end of the year, Tata Power can reimburse various cost components (other than
O&M cost and variable cost) to the holders of these instruments. A
Chartered Accountant can play a role here for identifying companies wherein
this structure / concept can be implemented and give necessary advice to the
senior management to this effect.

 

Under
the current scenario there would be various regulatory challenges for issuance
of ‘Utility Instruments’. This will even require SEBI and RBI to come together
for necessary issuance and / or amendment of guidelines for enabling their
issuance. Several existing guidelines such as ICDR guidelines, the Companies
Act, 2013, etc. will also have to be amended in order to recognise these
‘Instruments’. A Chartered Accountant can play an important role here, too,
initially making necessary representations to various regulatory and industrial
bodies.

 

These
‘Utility Instruments’ can also be marketable / tradeable, i.e. if in a
given year the consumer shifts location, there is flexibility for him to sell
the same to another consumer. A Chartered Accountant / Merchant Banker can play
a critical role in the valuation of such ‘Instruments’.
The
Board of Trustees will also play a key role in ensuring successful
implementation of the concept. The government will have to issue necessary
regulations for the purpose of setting up, functioning and overseeing of the
Board of Trustees in the interest of the consumers and holders of ‘Utility
Instruments’. Here, too, a Chartered Accountant can play an eminent role as a
watchdog and audit the entire process on a continuous basis.

In these unprecedented times, going forward there is going to be significant
stress in the manufacturing, industrial and infrastructure sectors. Companies
which were probably viable prior to Covid-19 may turn unviable due to lack of
demand or various other factors. We need to think of out-of-the-box solutions
in order to cope with the possible crisis. Through implementation of this
concept in sectors wherein wide numbers of consumers are being catered to, we
can attempt to eliminate the fixed costs related to investments.

 

 

MAKING A WILL WHEN UNDER LOCKDOWN

INTRODUCTION

We are currently living in times
of uncertainty due to Covid-19. Hopefully, by the time this issue reaches you
India’s lockdown would have eased. However, it could also be extended or
re-enforced at any time. It is in times such as these that we realise that life
is so fragile and fleeting. This lockdown has also forced several of us to
consider making a Will. During these past 30 days, the author has drafted
several Wills for people who are concerned about what would happen if they
contracted the virus. Through this month’s feature, let us look at the unique
issues and challenges which one faces when drafting a Will during a lockdown.

 

DECODING
THE JARGON

Wills are usually associated with
a whole lot of jargon which make them appear very complex to the man on the
street. However, most of these legal words are used by legal professionals and
a person making a Will can avoid using them. However, it is beneficial to
understand the meaning of these words in order to understand various other
things. All or some of the following terms are normally involved in a Will:

 

(a) Testator / testatrix: A person who makes the Will. He
/ she is the person whose property is to be disposed of after his / her death
in accordance with the directions in the Will.

(b) Beneficiary / legatee: The person to whom the
property will pass under the Will. He is the person to whom the property of the
testator would be bequeathed under the Will.

(c) Estate: The property of the testator remaining after his
death. It consists of the sum total of such assets as are existing on the date
of the testator’s death. The estate may also increase or decrease after the
testator’s death due to the actions carried out by the executors. For example,
the executors may carry on the business previously run by the deceased in the
name of the estate.

(d) Executor / executrix: The person who would
administer the estate of the testator after his death in accordance with the
provisions of the Will. The executor is normally named in the Will itself. An
individual, limited company, partnership firm, etc., may be appointed as an
executor. In many cases, a bank is appointed as the executor of a Will. For all
legal and practical purposes, the executor acts as the legal representative of
the estate of the deceased. On the death of the testator, the property cannot
remain in a vacuum and hence the property immediately vests in the executor
till the time the directions contained in the Will are carried out and the
property is distributed to the beneficiaries.

(e) Bequest: The property / benefits which flow under the
Will from the testator’s estate to the beneficiary.

(f) Bequeath: The act of making a bequest.

(g) Witnesses: The persons who witnesses the signing
of the Will by the testator.

 

BACK
TO BASICS

First things first, making a Will
involves certain basics which one needs to remember. Any adult, owning some
sort of property or assets can and should make a Will. If a Will is not made,
then the personal succession law as applicable would take over. For instance, Hindus
would be governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Only adults of sane mind
can make a Will. Thus, anyone who is insane or is a lunatic, or has lost
control over his mental faculties cannot make a Will.

 

A Will is a document which
contains the last wishes of a person as regards the manner and mode of
disposition of his property. A person expresses his will as regards the
disposition of his property. The Indian Succession Act, 1925 (which governs the
making of Wills in India) defines a Will to mean ‘the legal declaration
of the intention of the testator with respect to his property which he desires
to be carried into effect after his death’. However, the intention manifests
only after the testator’s death, i.e., posthumous disposition of his property.
Till the testator is alive, the Will has no validity. He can dispose of all his
properties in a manner contrary to that stated in the Will and such action
would be totally valid.

For example, ‘A’ makes a lockdown
Will bequeathing all his properties to his brother. However, post the lockdown
he, during his lifetime itself, transfers all his properties to his son with
the effect that at the time of his death he is left with no assets. Such action
of the testator cannot be challenged by his brother on the ground that ‘A’ was
bound to follow the Will since the Will would take effect only after the death
of the testator. In this case, as the property bequeathed would not be in
existence, the bequest would fail. The Will can be revoked at any time by the
testator in his lifetime. Hence, it is advisable to at least make a basic Will.
It can always be revised once things improve.

 

The testamentary capacity of the
testator is paramount in case of a Will. If it is proved that he was of unsound
mind, then the Will would be treated as invalid. What is a ‘sound mind’ is a
question of fact and needs to be ascertained in each case. Hence, if a person
has been so impacted by the Covid-19 that his mental faculties are arrested,
then he cannot make a valid Will.

 

The most important element of a
Will is its date! The last Will of a deceased survives and hence the date
should be clearly mentioned on the Will.

 

LOCKDOWN
ISSUES

Let us now consider the singular
situations which arise in making a Will during a lockdown. People making a Will
may experience some or all of these in these testing times:

(a) Format: There is no particular format for making a Will.
Several persons have expressed apprehension that during the lockdown they are
unable to obtain a stamp paper, unable to print a document or unable to get
ledger paper, etc. A Will can be handwritten (provided it is legible
handwriting); it could be on a plain paper and it need not be on a stamp paper.

Thus, there should not be any problems from a format perspective.

 

(b) Witness: Section 63 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 requires that the Will should be attested by two or more
witnesses, each of whom has:

(i) seen the testator sign the Will or affix his mark; or

(ii) received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his
signature or of the signature of such other person.

 

Each of the witnesses must sign
the Will in the presence of the testator. No particular form of attestation is
prescribed. It is important to note that the attesting witnesses need not
know the contents of the Will. All that they attest is the testator’s signature
and nothing more.

 

A problem which many people could
face is getting two Witnesses to witness the Will. Neighbours may be requested
to help out. However, what if the neighbours are reluctant to do so due to
social distancing issues, or in the case of persons living in bungalows? In
such cases, one’s domestic servants, maids, watchmen may be asked to act as
witnesses. They must, as witnesses, either write their name or at least affix
their thumb impression – left thumb for males and right thumb for females.

 

However, what can people do if
there are no servants also? In such a case, the adult family members of the
testator may be approached. However, a question which arises is that if such
members are beneficiaries under the Will, can they act as witnesses, too?
Generally speaking, No. The Indian Succession Act states that any bequest
(gift) to a witness of a Will is void. Thus, he who certifies the signing of
the Will should not be getting a bequest from the testator. However, there is a
twist to the above provision. This provision does not apply to Wills made by
Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists and, hence, bequests made under their Wills
to attesting witnesses would be valid. Wills by Muslims are governed by their
Shariyat Law. Thus, the prohibition on gifts to witnesses applies only to Wills
made by Christians, Parsis, Jews, etc. Accordingly, any Will by a Hindu can
have a witness as a beneficiary.

 

A related question would be, can
an executor be a witness under the Will? Thus, if a person names his wife as
the executor, can she also be an attesting witness? The answer is, Yes. An
executor is the person who sets the Will in motion. It is the executor through
whom the deceased’s Will works. There is no bar for a person to be both an
executor of a Will and a witness of the very same Will. In fact, the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 expressly provides for the same. Accordingly, people of
all religions can have the executor as the witness.

 

To sum up, in the case of Hindus,
Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists, the witness can be a beneficiary and an executor.
However, in the case of Wills made by Christians, Parsis, Jews, etc., the
witness can be an executor but not a beneficiary.

 

Can witnesses practice social
distancing and yet witness the signing of the Will? Some English cases throw
some light on this issue. In Casson vs. Dade (1781) 28 ER 1010 a
testatrix signed her Will in her lawyer’s office and went to sit in her horse
carriage before the witnesses signed it. Since she could, through the
carriage’s window and the office’s window, see the witnesses signing, it was
held that the Will was valid.

 

This case is an example of where
the circumstances were enough to meet the witnessing requirements. This case
was followed by the UK Court of Protection in Re Clarke in
September, 2011
when a lasting power of attorney in the UK was held to
have been validly executed where the donor was in one room and the witnesses in
another, separated by a glass door. Even though the witness was sitting in the
adjacent room, there were clear glass doors with ‘Georgian bars’ between the
two rooms and it was held that the witness had a clear line of sight through
those glass doors. It was held that the donor would also have been able to see
the witness by means of the same line of sight through the glass doors.

 

As the Indian law stands today, a
witness cannot witness the execution of a will by Zoom or Skype. Scotland is
one of the places where this is possible. To deal with the witness issue, the
Law Society of Scotland has amended its guidance on witnessing the signing of a
Will. It allows the lawyer to arrange a video link with the client. If this can
be done, the solicitor can witness the client signing each page. The lawyer
should assess the capacity of the client and using his professional judgement,
consider whether any undue influence is being exerted on the client.

 

The signed Will can then be
returned to the solicitor by post. The lawyer can then sign as witness on the
receipt of the signed Will. This is a truly revolutionary step!

 

(c) Doctor’s Certificate: Quite
often, a doctor’s certificate as to the mental fitness of the deceased is
attached to a Will. This is especially so in the case of very old persons so as
to show that the Will is valid. The doctor would certify that the testator is a
person who is alert and able to understand what he is doing. A question which
now arises is how to obtain a doctor’s certificate if the testator cannot visit
the doctor? One option to consider if the doctor is being regularly consulted
is that a video conference could be arranged and if the doctor can issue the
certificate on that basis, then that would suffice. Of course, the doctor’s
certificate may not physically reach the testator but the same could be
collected once the lockdown eases and attached to the Will. It is advisable in
the case of very old / feeble persons that the certificate is obtained from a
neurophysician or a psychiatrist.

An alternative to this would be
to obtain a video recording of the Will execution process with the testator
reading out the entire Will. This helps show that he understands what he is
doing and is useful for very old persons who cannot obtain a medical
certificate.

 

(d) Enumerating all assets: It is generally preferable
that the Will be specific and enumerate all assets of the testator along with
account numbers, etc. so that it would help the beneficiaries in identifying
the assets. However, in a lockdown it may happen that such details are in the
office or in a bank locker and the testator is unable to access them and write
the details in the Will. In such a case, as many details as possible may be
given, or the Will may make a general bequest of the entire estate of the
testator as on the date of his death. On a separate note, it is always a good
idea to keep a complete inventory of assets along with details of nominations,
account numbers, addresses, etc., both at office and at home.

 

While bequests can be general or
specific, they cannot be so generic that the meaning itself is unascertainable.
For instance, a Will may state ‘I leave all my money to my wife’. This is a
generic bequest which is valid since it is possible to quantify what is
bequeathed. However, if the same Will states ‘I leave money to my wife’ then it
is not possible to ascertain how much money is bequeathed. In such an event,
the entire Will is void.

 

The Will must also create a
repertoire of digital assets which should enumerate all important passwords,
online accounts, e.g., emails, social media accounts, bank accounts, etc.

 

(e) Registration: Registration of
Wills is out of the question in a lockdown. However, registration is not
compulsory.
Again, a video Will can act as an alternative.

 

(f) Bequest to minors : In the
case of nuclear families, there is a tendency to leave everything to one’s
spouse and in case of death of the spouse before the death of the testator, to
the children. However, in the case of minor children it is not advisable to
bequeath assets directly to them. In such situations, a trust is advisable. In
times such as these setting up a trust is not possible since it would not be
feasible to obtain a PAN, open a bank account / demat account, etc. What, then,
can one do? A trust under a Will may be considered, in which case the trust
comes into effect only when the Will is executed and no trust is set up at the
time of making the Will. Thus, the act of settling the assets into the trust is
pushed till when the Will is executed. This trust could own all the assets to
be bequeathed to the minors.

 

If at all assets are to be bequeathed
directly to minors, then a guardian should be appointed under the Will. In this
case, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the
law relating to guardianship of Hindus and the powers and duties of the
guardians. A Hindu father who can act as the natural guardian of his legitimate
children can appoint a guardian by his Will. Such a guardian could be for the
minor and / or for his property. Such an appointment would be invalid if the
father dies before the mother, because in such a case the mother would take
over as the natural guardian. However, once the mother dies, and if she dies
without appointing a person as the guardian under her Will, then the father’s
testamentary guardian would be revived. The testamentary guardian is subjected to
a dual set of restrictions. Firstly, those specified in the Will appointing
him, and secondly, those contained in this Act which apply to natural
guardians. Thus, the testamentary guardian is subjected to the restrictions on
sale of immovable property just as a natural guardian would be. The rights of
the testamentary guardian would be the same as those of a natural guardian. In
case the minor is a girl, then the rights of the testamentary guardian would
end on her marriage.

 

(g) Living Will: A living Will is not recognised
in India. However, as per the Supreme Court’s decision in Common Cause
vs. UOI, WP (Civil) 215/2005 (SC),
an Advanced Medical Directive is
possible. This can state as to when medical treatment may be withdrawn, or if
specific medical treatment that will have the effect of delaying the process of
death should be given. However, one of the stringent requirements of such a
document is the requirement of two independent witnesses and the directive
should be countersigned by a Jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate, First Class
(JMFC), so designated by the district judge concerned. This requirement would
not be possible in the case of a lockdown and hence, having an Advanced Medical
Directive is not possible till such time as normalcy returns.

 

(h) Hospital bed Wills: What happens in case a
person is unfortunate to contract the virus and is placed in a hospital
quarantine? Can such a person make a Will? The above peculiar issues would
apply to him also. As always, the biggest challenge would be getting two
witnesses. He could request the doctors / nurses treating him to help out. That
is the only way out for a patient in the isolation ward.

    

CONCLUSION

It is evident that a Will under
lockdown would throw up several unique issues. However, as explained above, a
solution exists for even the strangest of problems. An overarching question is,
should one adopt a DIY (Do It Yourself) approach or consult a professional for
preparing the Will? At the risk of sounding biased, I would always suggest consulting
a professional, especially when the Will is being executed during a lockdown.

 

While
legal planning does not prevent a healthcare crisis, it can and would ensure
that you control who makes decisions. It also prevents your loved ones from
being left with a stressful legal situation to fix in a short time. Getting
one’s legal affairs in order today would give you the peace of mind that you
have taken tangible steps to truly be prepared for an uncertain future. Till
then, stay safe and don’t forgot to wash your hands!

SEBI’S BROAD ORDER ON ENCUMBERED SHARES – REPERCUSSIONS FOR PROMOTERS

In the ongoing Covid-19 crisis,
where the world is reeling and stock markets are crashing three times and then
recovering once, a recent SEBI order on disclosure of encumbered shares could
have widespread repercussions on promoters. Increasingly, over the years, the
regulatory outlook of SEBI has been one of disclosures and self-education
rather than close monitoring and micro-management. Material events relating to
a company should be disclosed at the earliest so that the public can educate
itself and take an informed decision. In this context, an order levying a
fairly stiff penalty in a complex case of encumbrance of shares held by a
promoter company makes interesting reading (Adjudication Order in respect of
two entities in the matter of Yes Bank Ltd. Ref No.: EAD-2/SS/SK/89/252-253
/2019-20, dated 31st March, 2020).

 

BRIEF
BACKGROUND

Disclosure of holding of shares
in listed companies by promoters and certain other persons (substantial
shareholders, etc.), is an important feature of the securities laws in India.
Promoters typically have large holdings of shares, they control the company and
their continued involvement in it as substantial shareholders is an aspect
considered by the public as relevant in investment decision-making. Being
insiders with control of the company, their dealings in shares are also closely
monitored. Thus, movements in shareholding of shares are required to be
disclosed by several provisions of the securities laws. These disclosures are
event-based and also periodical. Quarterly / annual disclosures are mandated.
So are disclosures based on certain types of transactions or crossing of
certain values / quantities / percentage of movement in the shares held.

 

Interestingly, and this is the
topic of this article, disclosure of encumbrance in the shares of promoters and
their release is also a requirement under the provisions of SEBI (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 (‘the Takeover
Regulations’). Regulation 31 of the Takeover Regulations requires disclosure by
the promoters of the creation, release or invocation of any encumbrance on
their shares.

 

The definition of what constitutes
‘encumbrance’ has undergone changes over the years and the present case relates
to a matter before the recent amendment made in July, 2019, though the
principle would apply even now. The earlier definition was short – ‘“encumbrance”
shall include a pledge, lien or any such transaction, by whatever name called’
.

 

It is of particular interest to
shareholders whether and to what extent the shareholding of promoters is
encumbered. The Satyam case is often referred to in this regard.

 

COMPLEXITY
OF ENCUMBRANCES

Pledging and hypothecation of
shares are the classic and most familiar of encumbrances on shares. A
shareholder may, for example, transfer his shares to a lender who would hold
them till the loan is repaid. If there is a default, the lender may simply sell
the shares in the market and realise his dues. But now that shares are held
digitally in demat accounts, a special process has been made to enable pledge /
hypothecation of shares. The shares are not transferred to the lender but a
record is made of the pledge / hypothecation in the demat account.

 

However, encumbrance, as the
definition shows, is a wider term rather than mere pledge / hypothecation. The
definition is inclusive and also has a residuary clause that says such
transactions ‘by whatever name called’ are also covered. As we will see later,
the parties in the present case, however, claimed that encumbrances should be
limited to pledge / hypothecation.

 

A question arises whether
restrictions placed on the disposal or other transactions in respect of shares
amounts to encumbrance as so envisaged. The classic case is of giving a
Non-Disposal Undertaking, popularly referred to as an NDU, in respect of the
shares. This means an undertaking is given that the shares held shall not be
disposed of till certain conditions (say, loans / interest are repaid) are met.
Even if a plain vanilla NDU is held to be an encumbrance, there are actually
many variants of an NDU or similar encumbrances as the present case shows. The
question is whether the definition should be treated as a generic catch-all
definition or whether it should be given a restrictive meaning. This has been
the core question addressed in this decision. Let us consider the specific
facts.

 

FACTS
OF THE CASE

The matter concerns two promoter
companies of Yes Bank Limited. Broadly summarised, the essential facts (though
there is some variation in details) are as follows: Both took loans by way of
differently structured non-convertible debentures from entities. The total
amount of loans taken was Rs. 1,580 crores. The shares held and which were the
subject matter of the alleged encumbrance, constituted 6.30% of the share
capital of Yes Bank. The debenture documents / terms placed certain
restrictions on the promoter entities. They were required to maintain a certain
cover ratio / borrowing cap. If such limits were violated, there were certain
consequences, principally that the promoter entity could be held to have
defaulted. There was, however, some flexibility. The promoter entities could
make certain variations after the approval of debenture holders in a specified
manner or after complying with certain conditions.

 

SEBI’S
ALLEGATION

SEBI held that the cover ratio /
borrowing cap effectively amounted to an encumbrance on the shares and thus
required disclosures under the Takeover Regulations. It alleged that the
entities would effectively face a restriction on the sale of their shares
because if they sold the shares, the ratios / caps would get exceeded and hence
the terms of the debentures could get violated. It was an admitted fact that no
disclosure of this alleged encumbrance was made as required under the
Regulations. Thus, there was a violation of the Regulations and SEBI issued a
show cause notice as to why penalty should not be levied.

 

CONTENTIONS
OF THE PROMOTER ENTITIES

The promoters gave several
detailed technical and substantive arguments to support their view that there
was no violation and hence no penalty could be levied. Technical arguments like
inordinate delay in initiating the proceedings were given. It was also argued
that since then the structure had undergone substantial changes, and
particularly on revision of terms, disclosure was required and was duly made.

 

It was argued that the definition
of encumbrance effectively limited it to things like pledge, hypothecation,
etc. The principle of ejusdem generis applied for the words used ‘by any
other name called’ considering that they were preceded by the words ‘such
transaction’.

 

Some of the other major arguments
were as follows: It was argued that the structure and terms of debentures did
not amount to encumbrance as understood in law. The caps on borrowings, etc.
were of financial prudence. There were many alternatives for the entities to
sell the shares if they wanted to do so within the terms of the debentures
themselves. References were made to FAQs and press releases where some
clarifications were given about encumbrances. It was argued that examples were
given of the type of encumbrances that were envisaged to be given and the
present facts did not fit those examples.

 

Incidentally, the parties had
earlier applied for settlement of the alleged violations but the application
was returned due to expiry of the stipulated time under the relevant settlement
regulations.

 

REPLY
AND DECISION OF SEBI

SEBI rejected all the arguments.
The debenture documents were made in late 2017 / early 2018 and thus SEBI held
that there was no inordinate delay in initiating the proceedings. The mere fact
that the structure was changed later and the disclosures duly made did not
affect the fact that no disclosure was made originally when the alleged
encumbrance was made.

 

It also rejected the core
argument that ‘encumbrance’ should be given a limited meaning more or less
restricting it to cases like pledge and hypothecation or the like. SEBI pointed
out that the definition was inclusive and even more descriptive than limiting.
The use of the words ‘by any other name called’ could not be restricted to
examples given of pledge / hypothecation. The principle of ejusdem generis
did not apply.

 

SEBI also traced the history of
the regulations and explained the dilemma that was faced regarding identifying
the many types of encumbrances. It was accepted that encumbrances on shares of
promoters needed disclosure in the interest of the securities markets.
Considering the varied and often sophisticated nature of encumbrances, the
definition was made descriptive / inclusive and not exhaustive. It was well
settled, SEBI argued, that securities laws being welfare regulations, needed
wider beneficial interpretation.

 

Although the definition was
modified recently whereby some specific instances were further added, it did
not mean that the earlier definition should be construed narrowly.

 

SEBI noted that the effect of the
conditions regarding limits was that the shares of the entities could not be
sold. This amounted to an encumbrance on shares and hence non-disclosure
amounted to violation of the Regulations.

 

SEBI thus levied a penalty of Rs.
50 lakhs on each of the two entities.

 

CONCLUSION

It goes without saying that
disclosure of encumbrances matters at any stage. Indeed, SEBI has required,
over a period, more and more information relating to encumbrances including,
most recently, the purpose for which the encumbrances were made.

 

However, their effect would be
seen particularly when the encumbrances end up being given effect to with
shares being sold in the market on invoking of the encumbrances, to take an
example. This may particularly happen when the price of the shares goes down
sharply, resulting in a vicious circle. The coverage / margin required by the
encumbrance documents gets violated and there is need to provide more shares as
encumbrance or sale of shares (and) which results in further lowering of price.
This would again affect the interests of shareholders. We are seeing now a huge
crash in share prices. It is possible that there may be many such similar
encumbrances and they may come to light because of the impact of share sale or
other transactions. There may be more cases in which SEBI may have to act.

 

This decision is relevant even
under the amended regulations. It lays down the principles and intent of the
regulations relating to encumbrances. Thus, unless reversed on appeal, it would
matter particularly (if and) for any fresh encumbrance as understood in a broad
manner in the SEBI order is undertaken. Such encumbrances then would advisably
be disclosed duly in accordance within the time limits and manner prescribed.

 

There
may be entities that have not disclosed the encumbrances till now, taking a
stand similar to that taken by the entities in the present case. They may need
to revisit their stand and documents and see whether due disclosures need to be
made, even if belatedly, but voluntarily. Better late than never.

REVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY DUE TO COVID-19 PANDEMIC

(A)   BACKGROUND – FDI Regulations pre-October, 2019

Under the erstwhile FEMA regulations
governing Foreign Direct Investment into India (‘FDI’), i.e., FEM 20(R),
Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer of Issue of Security by a Person Resident
outside India) Regulations, 2017 (‘FDI Regulations’) dated 7th November, 2017,
the RBI had powers to govern FDI which included equity investments into India.

 

The above regulations were issued
after superseding the earlier regulation dealing with FDI, i.e., the Foreign
Exchange Management (Transfer or issue of Security by a Person Resident outside
India) Regulations, 2000 which were issued by RBI on 3rd May, 2000 (‘Old FDI
Regulations’).

 

Thus, under the FDI regulations, RBI
had powers to regulate FDI into India. At the same time, the Government of
India used to issue a consolidated FDI Policy which contained a broad policy
framework governing FDI into India. The last such consolidated FDI Policy (‘FDI
Policy’) was issued on 28th August, 2017 by the Department of
Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India. However, as only the RBI
had the powers to govern FDI, Para 1.1.2 of the FDI Policy stated that any
changes in it made by the Government of India will need to be notified by the
RBI as amendments to the FDI regulations. Further, it was specifically
clarified that if there was any conflict between changes made in the FDI Policy
through issuance of Press Notes / Press Releases and FDI Regulations, the FDI
Regulations issued by RBI will prevail. Further, the FDI Policy defined FDI in
Para 2.1.14 as under:

 

‘FDI’ means investment by
non-resident entity / person resident outside India in the capital of an Indian
company under Schedule I of Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of
Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000
.

Schedule I of the Old FDI
Regulations dealt with investment by person resident outside India in the
equity / preference / convertible debentures / convertible preference shares of
an Indian company.

 

Hence, under the earlier FEMA regime
FDI was governed by the RBI through FDI Regulations and the policy framework
was given by the Government through issuance of an annual FDI Policy and
amendments by issuance of Press Notes / Press Circulars as and when required.

 

(B)   BACKGROUND – FDI Regulations post-October, 2019

However, the above position
governing FDI was completely overhauled with effect from October, 2019. From 15th
October, 2019 the Government of India assumed power from the RBI to regulate
non-debt capital account transactions. Subsequently, vide 16th
October, 2019, the Central Government notified the following list of instruments
which would qualify as non-debt instruments:

 

List of instruments notified
as non-debt instruments

(a) all
investments in equity instruments in incorporated entities: public, private,
listed and unlisted;

(b) capital
participation in LLPs;

(c) all
instruments of investment recognised in the FDI Policy notified from time to
time;

(d) investment
in units of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs) and Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvIts);

(e) investment
in units of mutual funds or Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) which invest more than
fifty per cent in equity;

(f)   junior-most
layer (i.e. equity tranche) of the securitisation structure;

(g) acquisition,
sale or dealing directly in immovable property;

(h) contribution
to trusts; and

(i)   depository
receipts issued against equity instruments.

Thus, all investments in equity
shares, preference shares and convertible debentures and preference shares were
classified as non-debt and came to be regulated by the Central Government
instead of by the RBI.

 

Thereafter, on 17th
October, 2019 the Central Government issued the Foreign Exchange Management
(Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘Non-Debt Rules’) for governing Non-Debt
transactions.

 

Hence, upon issuance of the above Non-Debt
Rules, the power to regulate FDI into India was taken over by the Central
Government from the RBI. Accordingly, the FDI Policy effectively became
redundant as it governed FDI as defined under the erstwhile FDI Regulations
which was superseded by the Non-Debt Regulations with effect from 17th
October, 2019.

 

(C) Amendments to FDI Policy by issuance of Press Note No. 3 (2020)
dated 17th April, 2020

The existing FDI Policy, vide
Para 3.1.1, provided that a non-resident entity could invest in India under the
automatic route subject to the FDI Policy. However, investments by an entity or
an individual based in Bangladesh and Pakistan was allowed only under the
Government route.

 

In view of the Covid pandemic, the
Government of India has amended the FDI Policy by issuing the above Press Note
No. 3 (2020) dated 17th April, 2020 under which the FDI Policy is
now amended to provide that if any investment is made by an entity, citizen or
beneficial owner who is a resident of a country with whom India shares its land
border, will be under the Government route. Further, any transfer of ownership
of existing or future FDI in an Indian entity to a person resident of the above
countries would also require Government approval.

 

Additionally, it has also been
provided that the above amendment in the FDI Policy will take effect from the
date of the FEMA notification.

 

Subsequently, the Government of
India has issued a notification dated 22nd April, 2020 (‘FEMA
Notification’) to amend Rule 6(a) of the Non-Debt Rules which deals with FDI
for giving effect to the above Press Note No. 3.

 

(D) Implication of above amendment to Non-Debt Rules

(i)   Restrictions on investment from neighbouring countries

As on date, India shares its land
boundary with the following seven countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh, China,
Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan and Afghanistan.

 

As per the pre-amended Rule 6(a) of
the Non-Debt Rules, a person resident outside India could make investment
subject to the terms and conditions specified in Schedule I which dealt with
FDI in Indian companies. However, there was a proviso which specified
that investment from the following persons / entities was under the Government
route:

 

  • An entity incorporated in Bangladesh or
    Pakistan;
  • A person who is a citizen of Bangladesh or
    Pakistan.

 

As per the amendment made on 22nd
April, 2020, the above provision has been amended to provide that investment
from the following persons / entities will be under the Government route:

  • An entity incorporated in any of seven
    neighbouring countries mentioned above;
  • If the beneficial owner is situated in any
    of the above seven neighbouring countries;
  • The beneficial owner is a citizen of any of
    the above seven neighbouring countries.

 

Further, transfer of ownership of
any existing or future FDI in an Indian entity to the above persons will also
be under the Government route.

 

Accordingly, for example, if earlier
a company based in China wanted to undertake FDI in any Indian company, the
same was allowed under the automatic route subject to sectoral caps, if any,
applicable to the industry in which the Indian company was operating. However,
post-22nd April, 2020 a Chinese company which has made investment in
an Indian company which is engaged in a sector where FDI is permissible up to
100% without any restrictions, would neither be allowed to undertake any fresh
investment in such Indian company nor acquire shares in any existing Indian
company under the FDI route without Government approval.

 

The above restriction has come in
the wake of news reports that the People’s Bank of China has acquired more than
1% stake in HDFC. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when the
valuation of Indian companies is low due to the impact of Covid-19, Indian
companies are not taken over by Chinese companies. However, the above
restriction is not directed only at China but covers investment from all the
seven countries mentioned above.

(ii) Meaning of beneficial ownership

It is interesting to note that the
term ‘beneficial owner’ has not been defined under FEMA. Rule 2(s) of the
Non-Debt Rules, 2019 while defining the term ‘foreign investment’ clarifies
that where, in respect of investment made by a person resident in India, if a
declaration is made under the Companies Act, 2013 that the beneficial interest
in the said investment is to be held outside India, such investment even though
made by a person resident in India, will be considered as foreign investment.
Thus, the Non-Debt Rules, 2019 refer to the provisions of the Companies Act,
2013 (‘Cos Act’) for determining whether a beneficial interest exists or not.

 

Section 89(10) of the Cos Act
defines beneficial interest in a share to include directly or indirectly,
through any contract, arrangement or otherwise, the right or entitlement of a
person alone or together with any other person to –

(a) exercise
or cause to be exercised any or all of the rights attached to such share;

(b) receive
or participate in any dividend or other distribution in respect of such share.

 

Hence,
based on the above provision of the Cos Act, it can be concluded that ‘beneficial
interest’ means a person who has the right to exercise all the rights attached
to the shares and also receive dividend in respect of such shares.

 

Further, section 90 of the Cos Act
read with Rule 2(e) of the Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners) Rules,
2018 specifies that if an individual, either directly or indirectly, is holding
10% or more of shares or voting rights in a company, such individual will be
considered to be a significant beneficial owner of shares and will be required
to report the same in the prescribed format.

 

Additionally, Rule 9(3) of the
Prevention of Money Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 (‘PMLA Rule
9’) defines beneficial owner as a natural person holding in excess of the
following thresholds:

 

Nature of entity

Threshold limit

Company

25% of shares or capital or profits

Partnership firm

15% of capital or profits

Unincorporated body or body of individuals

15% of property or capital or profits

Trust

15% interest in trust

 

Further, the above-referred PMLA
Rule 9 also provides that in case any controlling interest in the form of
shares or interest in an Indian company is owned by any company listed in India
or overseas or through any subsidiaries of such listed company, it is not
necessary to identify the beneficial owner. Thus, in case of shares or
interest-held listed companies, beneficial ownership is not to be determined.

 

The above PMLA Rule 9 is followed by
SEBI for the purposes of determining beneficial ownership in any listed Indian
company.

 

Hence, we have a situation where the
Cos Act determines a significant beneficial owner as a natural person holding
10% or more directly or indirectly in the share capital, whereas SEBI, for the
purposes of a listed company, considers a threshold of shareholding exceeding
25% to determine beneficial ownership.

 

Additionally, the OECD Beneficial
Ownership Implementation Toolkit, March, 2019 states that beneficial owners are
always natural persons who ultimately own or control a legal entity or
arrangement, such as a company, a trust, a foundation, etc. Accordingly, where
an individual through one or more different companies controls the investment,
all intermediate controlling companies will be ignored and the individual would
be considered to be the beneficial owner of the ultimate investment.

 

However, in the absence of any
clarity given under the FEMA notification or by the Press Note regarding the
percentage beyond which an individual would be considered to be having
beneficial interest in the investment, one may take a conservative view of
considering shareholding of 10% or more as beneficial interest for the purposes
of FEMA. The same is explained by the example below:

 

Example

An Indian company is engaged in the
IT sector in which 100% FDI is permitted under the automatic route having the
following shareholding pattern:

In the above fact pattern, where the
Chinese Co. or a Chinese individual are holding 10% or more beneficial interest
either directly or indirectly through one or more entities in an Indian
company, the same will be covered under the restriction imposed by the FEMA
notification. Accordingly, any future investment of the Mauritius Co. into the
Indian Co. will be subject to Government approval.

 

Further, any change in shareholding
at any level which will transfer beneficial interest from a non-Chinese company
/ individual to a Chinese company or Chinese individual, will also be subject
to Government approval.

 

(iii) Meaning of FDI

Rule 6(a) of the Non-Debt Rules
provides that a person resident outside India can make investment subject to
the terms and conditions specified in Schedule I which deals with FDI in Indian
companies. FDI is defined to include the following investments:

  • Investment in capital instruments of an
    unlisted Indian company; and
  • Investment amounting to 10% or more of
    fully diluted paid-up capital of a listed Indian company.

 

Capital instruments means equity
shares, fully, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures, fully,
compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares and share warrants.

 

As per the amendment made on 22nd
April, 2020 the above Rule 6(a) has been amended to provide that
investment from entities or a beneficial owner located in the above seven
neighbouring countries will be under the automatic route.

 

Any investment of less than 10% in a
listed Indian company is considered as Foreign Portfolio Investment and is
covered by Schedule II of the Non-Debt Rules.

 

Further, the following schedules of Non-Debt
Rules cover different types of investments into India:

Schedule reference

Nature of investment

Schedule II

Investment by Foreign Portfolio Investment

Schedule III

Investment by NRIs or OCIs on repatriation basis

Schedule IV

Investment by NRIs or OCIs on
non-repatriation basis

Schedule V

Investment by other non-resident investors like sovereign
wealth funds, pension funds, foreign central banks, etc.

Schedule VI

Investment in LLPs

Schedule VII

Investment by Foreign Venture Capital investors

Schedule VIII

Investment in an Indian investment vehicle

Schedule IX

Investment in depository receipts

Schedule X

Issue of Indian depository receipts

As the amendment is made only in
Rule 6(a) which deals with FDI in India covered under Schedule I, investment
covered by the above-mentioned Schedules II to X (excluding investment in LLP
covered by Schedule VI) will not be subject to the above restrictions placed on
investors from China and other neighbouring countries.

 

For example, any investment of less
than 10% in a listed Indian company will be considered to be Foreign Portfolio
Investment and, accordingly, will not be subject to the above restrictions
placed on investors from China and other neighbouring countries.

 

With regard to investment in LLPs,
the same is covered by Schedule VI of the Non-Debt Rules. Clause (a) of
Schedule VI provides that a person resident outside India, not being Foreign
Portfolio Investor (FPI) or Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI), can
contribute to the capital of an LLP which is operating in sectors wherein FDI
up to 100% is permitted under the automatic route and there are no FDI-linked
performance conditions.

 

Accordingly, post-22nd April,
2020, as FDI by person / entities based in neighbouring countries will fall
under the approval route they will not be eligible to make investment in any
LLP, irrespective of the sector in which it operates. Thus, persons / entities
based in neighbouring countries will neither be able to undertake fresh
investment in an existing LLP where they are already holding partner’s share,
or incorporate new LLPs or buy stakes in any existing LLP even under the
Government route.

 

Thus, unlike investment in companies
which will be allowed with the prior approval of the Government, investment in
LLPs will no longer be permissible either under the automatic route or the
approval route irrespective of the business of the LLP. Similarly, a company
having FDI with investors who belong to the neighbouring countries will not be
allowed to be converted into an LLP.

 

Meaning of transfer of
existing or future FDI

The amended provision says
Government approval is required before transfer of existing or future FDI in an
Indian entity to persons / entities based in the neighbouring countries. Hence,
transfer of existing FDI in an Indian entity as well as transfer of any FDI
which is made in future to persons / entities based in the neighbouring
countries will require Government approval.

 

Restriction
on issuance of shares against pre-incorporation expenses

Under the existing provisions, a WOS
set up by a non-resident entity operating in a sector where 100% FDI is
permitted under the automatic route, is permitted to issue shares against
pre-incorporation expenses incurred by its parent entity subject to certain
limits.

 

Going forward, as investment by
neighbouring countries will now fall under the Government route, a WOS set up
by a parent entity which is based in the neighbouring countries will not be
permitted to issue shares against pre-incorporation expenses incurred by the
parent entity.

 

Convertible instruments

FDI includes equity shares, fully,
compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures, fully, compulsorily and
mandatorily convertible preference shares, and share warrants. Accordingly, any
issuance or transfer of convertible instruments to persons / entities of
neighbouring countries will now be subject to Government approval irrespective
of the fact that convertible instruments have not yet been converted into equity.

 

However, determining beneficial
ownership in case of convertible instruments will be challenging. The case may
be more complicated where overseas investors in an Indian company have issued
optionally convertible instruments.

 

In this regard, one may place
reliance on the definition of FDI under Rule 2(r) which requires FDI to be
computed based on the post-issue paid-up equity capital of an Indian company on
fully diluted basis. Hence, a similar analogy could also be applied for
computing beneficial ownership of residents / entities of neighbouring
countries on the assumption that the entire convertible instruments have been
converted into equity.

 

(iv) Indirect foreign investment – Downstream
investment

Indirect foreign investment is
defined to mean downstream investment received by an Indian entity from:

(a) another
Indian entity (IE) which has received foreign investment and (i) the IE is not
owned and not controlled by resident Indian citizens or (ii) is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India; or

(b) an
investment vehicle whose sponsor or manager or investment manager (i) is not
owned and not controlled by resident Indian citizens or (ii) is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India.

 

The above amendment will also affect
downstream investment made by an existing Indian company which is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India. Hence, if persons / entities of
neighbouring countries have beneficial interest in such an Indian company which
is owned or controlled by persons resident outside India, any downstream
investment made by such a company would also be under Government route.

 

The above can be illustrated as
follows:

 

 

Thus, in the instant case, as Indian Co. is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India, any investment made by Indian Co.
will be considered to be downstream investment and will be required to comply
with the applicable sectoral caps. Hence, if persons / entities of neighbouring
countries hold beneficial interest in Indian Co., any subsequent investment
made by Indian Co. will require Government approval. Further, any downstream
investment made by WOS would also need prior Government approval.

 

Additionally, downstream investment by an LLP which is owned
or controlled by persons resident outside India and having beneficial ownership
of persons / residents of neighbouring countries will not be allowed in any
Indian company, irrespective of the sector.

 

(v) Effective date of changes made in FDI Policy

It is interesting to note that the Government had decided to
make changes in the FDI Policy by issuing a Press Note. Further, the Press Note
has itself stated that the above changes will come into effect from the date of
issuance of the relevant notification under FEMA. The relevant FEMA
Notification has been issued on 22nd April, 2020 and hence the above
changes will be effective from that date.

 

(vi) Status of FDI from Hong Kong

Hong Kong is one of the major contributors to FDI in India.
As per Government of India records, FDI from Hong Kong is almost double that
from China and hence it is essential to evaluate whether Hong Kong will be
considered separate from China to determine whether it will be covered under
the new restrictions imposed by Press Note No. 3. It is interesting to note
that Hong Kong is governed separately as Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China but it forms part of China. However, for the purpose of
reporting FDI, Hong Kong is classified as a separate country by the Government
of India. Similarly, the Indian Government has entered into a separate tax
treaty with Hong Kong in addition to China for avoidance of double taxation.
Additionally, Hong Kong has separately signed the Multilateral Convention in
addition to China as part of OECD’s BEPS Action Plans.

 

Based on the above, it appears that the Government is taking
the view that Hong Kong is separate from China; and if such is indeed the case,
then it is possible to take the view that the above restrictions imposed by Press
Note No. 3 will not affect FDI from Hong Kong and the same should be covered
under the automatic route as hitherto applicable. However, it is advisable that
the Government issue an appropriate clarification on the same.

 

SUMMARY

Based on the above discussions, the amendment in
the FDI regime by putting investment from neighbouring countries under the
Government route has given rise to several issues. It is expected that the
Government will quickly issue necessary clarifications in this regard.

SHARING INSIDE INFORMATION THROUGH WhatsApp – SEBI LEVIES PENALTY

BACKGROUND

On 29th April,
2020, SEBI passed two orders (‘the orders’) levying stiff penalties on two
persons who allegedly shared price-sensitive information. The information they
shared was the financial results of listed companies before these were
officially published.

 

About two years back, there
were reports in the media that the financial results of leading companies had
been leaked and shared on WhatsApp before they were formally released. It was
also alleged that heavy trading took place based on such leaked information.
These orders are, thus, the culmination of the investigation that SEBI
conducted in the matter. It is not clear whether these are the only cases or
whether more orders will be passed, considering that leakage was alleged in
respect of several companies. (The two orders dated 29th April, 2020
relate to the circulation of information concerning Ambuja Cements Limited and
Bajaj Auto Limited.)

 

Insider trading is an issue
of serious concern globally. Leakage of price-sensitive information to select
people results in loss of credibility of the securities markets. However, the
nature of insider trading is such that it is often difficult to prove that it
did happen. This is particularly so because such acts are often committed by
people with a level of financial and other sophistication. Hence, the
regulations relating to insider trading provide for several deeming provisions
whereby certain relations, acts, etc. are presumed to be true. As we will see,
in the present cases the order essentially was passed on the basis of some of
these deeming provisions. However, as we will also see, the application of such
deeming provisions in the context of social media apps like WhatsApp can
actually create difficulties for many persons who may be using them for
constant informal communication.

 

WHAT
ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED?

There were media reports that
the financial results of certain leading companies were leaked in some WhatsApp
groups well before they were formally approved and published by the companies.
Financial results are by definition deemed to be price-sensitive information,
meaning that their release can be expected to have a material impact on the
price of the shares of such companies in the stock market. In the two companies
considered in the present cases, it was alleged that there was a sharp rise in
the volumes of trade after the leakage.

 

It was found that two persons
– NA and SV – had shared the results through WhatsApp in respect of the two
companies. NA shared the information with SV and SV passed it on to two other
persons. SEBI carried out extensive raids and collected mobile phones and
documents. But it could not trace back how the information got leaked from the
companies to these persons in the first place and whether it was passed on to
even more people. In both the cases it was found that the information that was
leaked and shared matched with the actual results later released formally by
the companies.

 

Thus, it was alleged that NA
and SV shared UPSI in contravention with the applicable law. NA and SV were
stated to be working with entities associated with the capital markets.

 

WHAT
IS THE LAW RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING?

While the SEBI Act, 1992
contains certain broad provisions prohibiting insider trading, the detailed
provisions are contained in the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading)
Regulations, 2015 (‘the Regulations’). These elaborately define several terms
including what constitutes insider trading, who is an insider, what is
unpublished price-sensitive information (‘UPSI’), etc. For the present
purposes, it is seen that financial results are deemed to be UPSI. Further, and
even more importantly in the present context, the term insider includes a
person in possession of UPSI. The offence of insider trading includes sharing
of UPSI with any other person. Thus, if a person is in possession of UPSI and
shares it with another person, he would be deemed guilty of insider trading.

 

It is not necessary that such
person may be connected with the company to which the UPSI relates. Mere
possession of UPSI, by whatever means, makes him an insider and the law
prohibits him from sharing it with any other person. This thus casts the net
very wide. In principle, even a person who finds a piece of paper containing
financial results on the road would be deemed to be an insider and cannot share
such information with anyone!

 

WHAT
DID THE PARTIES ARGUE IN THEIR DEFENCE AND HOW DID SEBI DEAL WITH THEM?

The parties placed several
arguments to contend that they could not be held to have violated the
regulations.

 

They claimed that they were
not aware that these were confirmed financial results and pointed out that
globally there was a common practice to discuss and even share gossip, rumours,
estimates by analysts, etc. relating to companies. There were even columns like
‘Heard on the Street’ which shared such rumours. They received such information
regularly and forwarded it to people. They pointed out that there were many
other bits of information that they shared which were later found to be not
accurate / true. But SEBI had cherry-picked this particular item. As far as
they were concerned, these WhatsApp forwards were rumours / analysts’
estimates, etc. like any other and were thus expected to be given that level of
credibility.

 

SEBI, however, rejected this
claim for two major reasons. Firstly, it was shown that the information shared
was near accurate and matched with the actual results later released by the
companies. Secondly, the law was clear that being in possession of UPSI and
sharing it made it a violation. It was also pointed out that the claim that
these were analysts’ estimates was not substantiated.

 

The parties also pointed out
that they were not connected with the companies. Further, no link was
established with anyone in the companies and the information received by them.
But SEBI held that because mere possession of UPSI made a person an insider, no
link was required to be shown between the parties or the source of information
and the companies.

 

It was also pointed out that
they had not traded on the basis of such information. Here, too, SEBI said that
mere sharing of UPSI itself was an offence. Further, SEBI said that it was also
not possible to determine due to technical reasons who were the other persons
with whom the information may have been shared and whether anyone had traded on
the basis of such information.

 

There were other contentions,
too, but SEBI rejected all of them and held that the core ingredients of the
offence were established.

 

ORDER
OF SEBI

SEBI levied in each of the
orders on each of the parties a penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs. Thus, in all, a total
penalty of Rs. 60 lakhs was levied on the two. SEBI pointed out that it was not
possible to determine what were the benefits gained and other implications of
the sharing of information. However, it said that an appropriate penalty was
required to be levied to discourage such actions in the markets.

 

CRITIQUE
OF THE ORDERS

Insider trading, as mentioned
earlier, is looked at very harshly by laws globally and strong deterrent
punishment is expected on the perpetrators. However, there are certain aspects
of these orders that are of concern and there are also some general lessons.

 

The core point made in the
orders is that mere possession of UPSI is enough to make a person an insider.
There is certainly a rationale behind such a deeming provision. It is often
very difficult to prove links between a company and its officials with a person
in possession of inside information. A company is expected to take due steps to
prevent leakage of information by laying down proper systems and safeguards.
If, despite this, information is leaked, then the person in possession is
likely to have got it through some links. Further, where a person is in
possession of such information, even if accidentally, it would be expected of
him to act responsibly and not to trade on it or share it with others. In the
present case, SEBI held that the parties were having the UPSI and they should
not have shared it with others.

 

However, there are certain
points worth considering here, in the opinion of the author. The parties have
claimed that they have been sharing many other items which were not confirmed
or authentic information but merely what was ‘heard on the street’. The persons
who received it would also treat such information with the same level of
scepticism. If, say, 24 items were shared which were mere rumours and then one
such item was shared without any further tag to it, the fair question then
would be whether it should really be treated as UPSI, or even ‘information’? SEBI
has not alleged or recorded a finding that there was any special mention that
these bits of information were unique and authentic.

 

SEBI has stated that the
parties should have noted later, when the results were formally declared, that
the information was confirmed to be authentic. The question again is whether it
can be expected of a person, if, assuming this was so, he or she is sharing
hundreds of such forwards, to check whether any such item was found later to be
true?

 

SEBI has insisted that (i) it
was shown that the information was authentic, (ii) it was deemed to be
price-sensitive, (iii) it was not published, (iv) the parties were in
possession of it, and (v) they shared it. Hence, the technical requirements for
the offence were complete and thus it levied the penalty. It is also relevant
to note that the same two parties were found to have shared UPSI in two
different companies and to the same persons.

 

Be that
as it may, this is an important lesson for people associated with the capital
markets. Social media messages are proliferating. People chat endlessly on such
apps and forward / share information. We have earlier seen cases where
connections on social media were considered as a factor for establishing
connections between people. The lesson then is that, at least in the interim,
people connected with the capital market and even others would need to err on
the side of caution and not share any such items. Just as people are
increasingly advised to be careful about sharing information received on WhatsApp
and the like which could be fake news, such caution may be advised for such
items, too. The difference is that in the former case it is to safeguard
against fake news and in the latter it is to safeguard against authentic news!

 

At the same time, it is
submitted that a relook is needed at the deeming provisions and their
interpretation and exceptions may need to be made. Sharing of guesses, gossip,
estimates, etc. ought not to be wholly banned as they too have their productive
uses. Considering the proliferating nature of such apps and their productive
uses, it may not be possible or fair to expect that people will not discuss or
share gossip and things that are ‘heard on the street’. Something more should
be required to be established to hold a person as guilty than the mere ticking
off of the technical requirements of an offence.

 

 

THE DOCTRINE OF ‘FORCE MAJEURE’

INTRODUCTION

Force majeure is a French
term which, at some point or other, we have all come across when reading a
contract. It is a small, solitary clause lurking somewhere at the end which has
the effect of discharging all the parties from their obligations under the
contract! What does this clause actually mean and how does one interpret it in
the light of the present pandemic? Would a contract hit by non-performance due
to Covid-19 fall under the force majeure scenario? Let us
try and answer some of these questions.

 

MEANING

The Black’s
Law Dictionary, 6th edition, defines the term force majeure
as ‘An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.’ The
events of force majeure could be acts of God such as earthquakes,
floods, famine, other natural disasters and manmade occurrences such as wars,
bandhs, blackouts, sabotage, fire, arson, riots, strikes, theft, etc. Even
major changes in government regulations could be a part of this clause. In
short, any act that was outside the realm of contemplation at the time when the
contract was executed but which now has manifested and has had a major impact
on the contract. It is necessary that such acts should not be committed
voluntarily by either party, i.e., they are out of the control of the parties
which are rendered mere spectators to the consequences. For example, a sample force
majeure
clause found in a real estate development contract could be as
follows:

 

The
obligations undertaken by the parties hereto under this Agreement shall be
subject to the force majeure conditions, i.e., (i) non-availability of
steel, cement and other building material (which may be under Government
Control), water and electric supply, (ii) war, civil commotion, strike, civil
unrest, riots, arson, acts of God such as earthquake, tsunami, storm, floods,
cyclone, fire, etc., (iii) any notice, order, rule, notification of the
Government and / or other public or competent authority, (iv) any other
condition / reason beyond the control of the Developer.’


INDIAN CONTRACT LAW

The Indian Contract Act, 1872
governs the law relating to contracts in India. The edifice of almost all
contracts and agreements lies in this Contract Law. In the event that a
contract does not explicitly provide for a force majeure clause, then
section 56 of the Act steps in. This section deals with the frustration
of contracts
. The consequences of a force majeure event
are provided for u/s 56 of the Act which states that on the occurrence of an
event which renders the performance impossible, the contract becomes void
thereafter. A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes
impossible or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent,
becomes unlawful is treated as void when the act becomes impossible or
unlawful. Thus, if the parties or one of the parties to the contract is
prevented from carrying out his obligation under the contract, then the
contract is said to be frustrated.

 

When the act
contracted for becomes impossible, then u/s 56 the parties are exempted from
further performance and the contract becomes void. The Supreme Court in Satyabrata
Ghose vs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44
has held that a
change in event or circumstance which is so fundamental as to strike at the
very root of the contract as a whole, would be regarded as frustrating the
contract. It held:

 

‘In deciding
cases in India the only doctrine that we have to go by is that of supervening
impossibility or illegality as laid down in section 56 of the Contract Act,
taking the word “impossible” in its practical and not literal sense. It must be
borne in mind, however, that section 56 lays down a rule of positive law and
does not leave the matter to be determined according to the intention of the
parties.’

 

The Supreme
Court went on to hold that if and when there is frustration, the dissolution of
the contract occurs automatically. It does not depend on the choice or election
of either party. What happens generally in such cases is that one party claims
that the contract has been frustrated while the other party denies it. The
issue has got to be decided by the courts on the actual facts and circumstances
of the case.

 

The Supreme Court has, in South East Asia Marine Engineering and
Constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC Ltd.) vs. Oil India Ltd., CA No. 673/2012, order
dated 11th May, 2020
, clarified that the parties may instead
choose the consequences that would flow on the occurrence of an uncertain
future event u/s 32 of the Contract Act. This section provides that contingent
contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event occurs,
cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has occurred. If the
event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.

 

The English
Common Law has also dealt with several such cases. The consequence of such
frustration had fallen on the party that sustained a loss before the
frustrating event. For example, in Chandler vs. Webster, [1904] 1 KB 493,
one Mr. Chandler rented space from a Mr. Webster for viewing the coronation
procession of King Edward VII. Mr. Chandler had paid part consideration for the
same. However, due to the King falling ill, the coronation was postponed. Mr.
Webster insisted on payment of his consideration. The Court of Appeals rejected
the claims of both Mr. Chandler as well as Mr. Webster. The essence of the
ruling was that once frustration of a contract took place, there could not
be any enforcement and the loss fell on the person who sustained it before the force
majeure
event occurred.

 

The above
Common Law doctrine has been modified in India. The Supreme Court in the SEAMEC
case (Supra)
has held that in India the Contract Act had already
recognised the harsh consequences of such frustration to some extent and had
provided for a limited mechanism to improve the same u/s 65 of the Contract
Act. Section 65 provides for the obligation of any person who has received
advantage under a void agreement or a contract that becomes void. It states
that when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage
under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make
compensation for it to the person from whom he received it. Under Indian
contract law, the effect of the doctrine of frustration is that it discharges
all the parties from future obligations.

 

For example,
a convention was scheduled to be held in a banquet hall. The city goes into
lockdown due to Covid and all movement of people comes to a halt and the
convention has to be cancelled. Any advance paid to the banquet hall for this
purpose would have to be refunded by the hall owners. In this respect, the
Supreme Court in Satyabratha’s case has held that if the parties
to a contract do contemplate the possibility of an intervening circumstance
which might affect the performance of the contract but expressly stipulate that
the contract would stand despite such circumstances, then there can be no case
of frustration because the basis of the contract being to demand performance
despite the occurrence of a particular event, performance cannot disappear when
that event takes place.

 

COVID-19 AS A ‘FORCE MAJEURE’

Is Covid-19
an Act of God; is a typical force majeure clause wide enough to
include a lockdown as a result of Covid-19? These are some of the questions
which our courts would grapple with in the months to come. However, some Indian
companies have started invoking Covid and the related lockdown as a force
majeure
clause. For example, Adani Ports and SEZ Ltd., in
a notice to the trade dated 24th March, 2020, has stated that in
view of the Covid-19 pandemic the Mundra Port has notified a ‘force
majeure
event
’. Accordingly, it will not be responsible for any claims,
damages, charges, etc., whatsoever arising out of and / or connected to the
above force majeure event, either directly or indirectly. This
would include vessel demurrage due, inter alia, to pre-berthing or any
other delays of whatsoever nature and, accordingly, the discharge rate
guaranteed under the agreement shall also not be applicable for all vessels to
be handled at the port for any delay or disturbance in the port services during
the force majeure period.

 

CONCLUSION

Indian businesses would have to take a deep look at their contracts and
determine whether there is a force majeure clause and, if yes,
what are its ramifications. In cases where there is no such clause, they should
consider taking shelter u/s 56 of the Indian Contract Act. This is one area
where they could renegotiate and, if required, even litigate or go in for arbitration.
It would be very interesting to see how Indian Courts interpret the issue of
Covid acting as a force majeure clause. However, it must be
remembered that force majeure cannot be invoked at the mere drop
of a hat. The facts and circumstances must actually prove that it was
impossible to carry out the contract. What steps did the parties take to meet
this uncertain event would also carry heft with the Courts in deciding whether
or not to excuse performance of the contract.
 

CAN AGRICULTURAL LAND BE WILLED TO A NON-AGRICULTURIST?

INTRODUCTION

A person can
make a Will for any asset that he owns, subject to statutory restrictions, if
any. For instance, in the State of Maharashtra a person cannot make a Will for
any premises of which he is a tenant. A similar question that arises is, ‘Can
a person make a Will in respect of his agricultural land?
’ A
Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to decide this very
important issue in the case of Vinodchandra Sakarlal Kapadia vs. State of
Gujarat, CA No. 2573/2000, order dated 15th June, 2020.

 

APPLICABLE LAW

It may be noted that Indian
land laws are a specie in themselves. Even within land laws, laws relating to
agricultural land can be classified as a separate class. Agricultural land in
Maharashtra is governed by several Acts, the prominent amongst them being the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966; the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948; the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act,
1961;
etc.

 

The Maharashtra Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (‘the Act’), which was earlier known as the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, lays down the situations under which
agricultural land can be transferred to a non-agriculturist. The Act is
applicable to the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra. The Bombay
Reorganisation Act, 1960 divided the State of Bombay into two parts, namely,
Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Act is in force in most of Maharashtra and the
whole of Gujarat.

 

PROHIBITIONS UNDER THE ACT

Under section 63 of the Act,
any transfer, i.e., sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage, with possession of
agricultural land in favour of any non-agriculturist shall not be valid unless
it is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The terms sale, gift,
exchange and mortgage are not defined in this Act, and hence the definitions
given under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would apply.

This section could be
regarded as one of the most vital provisions of this Act since it regulates
transactions of agricultural land involving non-agriculturists. Even if a
person is an agriculturist of another state, say Punjab, and he wants to buy
agricultural land in Maharashtra, then section 63 would apply. The above
transfers can be done with the prior permission of the Collector subject to
such conditions as he deems fit.

 

If land is transferred in
violation of section 63, then u/s 84C the transfer becomes invalid on an order
so made by the Mamlatdar. If the parties give an undertaking that they
would restore the land to its original position within three months, then the
transfer does not become invalid. Once an order is so made by the Mamlatdar,
the land vests in the State Government. The amount received by the transferor
for selling the land shall be deemed to be forfeited in favour of the State.

 

Further, section 43 of the
Act states that any land or any interest therein purchased by a tenant cannot
be transferred by way of sale or assignment without the Collector’s
permission. However, such a permission is not needed if the partition of the
land is among the members of the family who have direct blood relations, or
among the legal heirs of the tenant.

 

Sections 43 and 63 may be
considered to be the most important provisions of the Act. In this background,
let us consider a case decided by the Supreme Court recently.

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The
facts in the case before the Supreme Court were very straight forward. An
agriculturist executed a Will for the agricultural land that he owned in
Gujarat in favour of a non-agriculturist. On the demise of the testator, the
beneficiary applied for transferring the land records in his favour. The
Revenue authorities, however, found that he was not an agriculturist and
accordingly proceedings u/s 84C of the Act were registered and notice was
issued to the appellant.

Ultimately, the Mamlatdar passed
an order that disposal by way of a Will in favour of the appellant was invalid
and contrary to the principles of section 63 of the Act and therefore declared
that the said land vested in the State without any encumbrances. A Single Judge
of the Gujarat High Court in Ghanshyambhai Nabheram vs. State of Gujarat
[1999 (2) GLR 1061]
took the view that section 63 of the Act cannot
deprive a non-agriculturist of his inheritance, a legatee under a Will can also
be a non-agriculturist. Accordingly, the matter reached the Division Bench of
the Gujarat High Court which upheld the order of the Mamlatdar and held:

 

‘….Act has
not authorised parting of agricultural land to a non-agriculturist without the
permission of the authorised officer, therefore, if it is permitted through a
testamentary disposition, it will be defeating the very soul of the
legislation, which cannot be permitted. We wonder when testator statutorily
debarred from transferring the agricultural lands to a non-agriculturist during
his life time, then how can he be permitted to make a declaration of his
intention to transfer agricultural land to a non-agriculturist to be operative
after his death. Such attempt of testator, in our view, is clearly against the
public policy and would defeat the object and purpose of the Tenancy Act…
Obvious purpose of Section 63 is to prevent indiscriminate conversion of
agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose and that provision strengthens
the presumption that agricultural land is not to be used as per the holders
caprice or sweet-will (sic)’
.

 

The same view was taken by
the High Court in a host of cases.

 

ISSUE IN QUESTION

The issue reached the Supreme
Court and the question to be considered by it was whether sections 63 and 43 of
the Act debarred an agriculturist from transmitting his agricultural land to a
non-agriculturist through a ‘Will’ and whether the Act restricted the transfer
/ assignment of any land by a tenant through a Will?

 

DECISION OF THE APEX COURT

The Supreme Court in the case
of Vinod (Supra) observed that a two-member Bench (of the Apex
Court) in Mahadeo (Dead through LR) vs. Shakuntalabai (2017) 13 SCC 756
had dealt with section 57 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1958 as applicable to the Vidarbha region of the State of Maharashtra. In that
case, it was held that there was no prohibition insofar as the transfer of land
by way of a Will is concerned. It held that a transfer is normally between two
living persons during their lifetime. A Will takes effect after the demise of the
testator and transfer in that perspective becomes incongruous. However, the
Court in Vinod (Supra) observed that its earlier decision in Mahadeo
(Supra)
was rendered per incuriam since other, earlier contrary
decisions of the Supreme Court were not brought to the notice of the Bench and
hence not considered.

 

It held that a tenancy
governed by a statute which prohibits assignment cannot be willed away to a
total stranger. A transfer inter vivo would normally be for
consideration where the transferor gets value for the land but the legislation
requires previous sanction of the Collector so that the transferee can step
into the shoes of the transferor. Thus, the screening whether a transferee is
eligible or not can be undertaken even before the actual transfer is effected.
The Court observed that as against this, if a Will (which does not have the
element of consideration) is permitted without permission, then the land can be
bequeathed to a total stranger and a non-agriculturist who may not cultivate
the land himself; which in turn may then lead to engagement of somebody as a
tenant on the land. The legislative intent to do away with absentee landlordism
and to protect the cultivating tenants, and to establish direct relationship
between the cultivator and the land, would then be rendered otiose.

 

Accordingly, the Court held
that the restriction on ‘assignment’ without permission in the Act must include
testamentary disposition as well. By adopting such a construction, the statute
would succeed in attaining the object sought to be achieved.

 

It also cautioned against the
repercussions of adopting a contrary view. If it was held that a Will would not
be covered by the Act, then a gullible person could be made to execute a Will
in favour of a person who may not fulfil the requirements and may not be
eligible to be a transferee under the Act. This may not only render the natural
heirs of the tenant without any support or sustenance, but may also have a
serious impact on agricultural operations. It held that agriculture was the
main source of livelihood in India and hence the restrictions under the Act
cannot be given the go-by by such a devise.

 

Another connected question
considered was whether any prohibition in State enactments which were
inconsistent with a Central legislation, such as, the Indian Succession Act,
1925 must be held to be void?
The Court held that the power of the State
Legislature to make a law with respect to transfer and alienation of
agricultural land stemmed from Entry 18 in List II of the Constitution of
India. This power carried with it the power to make a law placing restrictions
on transfers and alienations of such lands, including a prohibition thereof. It
invoked the doctrine of pith and substance to decipher the true object of the
Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court observed that the primary concern of the
Act was to grant protection to persons from disadvantaged categories and confer
the right of purchase upon them, and thereby ensure direct relationship of a
tiller with the land. The provisions of the Act, though not fully consistent
with the principles of the Indian Succession Act, were principally designed to
attain and sub-serve the purpose of protecting the holdings in the hands of
disadvantaged categories. The prohibition against transfers of holdings without
the sanction of the Collector was to be seen in that light as furthering the
cause of legislation. Hence, the Apex Court concluded that in pith and
substance, the legislation was completely within the competence of the State Legislature
and by placing the construction upon the expression ‘assignment’ to include
testamentary disposition, no transgression ensued.

 

CONCLUSION

Persons owning agricultural
land should be very careful in drafting their Wills. They must take care that
the beneficiary of such land is also an agriculturist or due permission of the
Collector has been obtained in case of a bequest to a non-agriculturist. It is
always better to exercise caution and obtain proper advice rather than leaving
behind a bitter experience for the beneficiaries.
 

 

 

PROPOSAL FOR SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGES – BOLD, INNOVATIVE AND TIMELY

Imagine a situation where a humanitarian
crisis or disaster takes place. A cyclone, floods, or, as is happening right
now, the Covid crisis. But even without a crisis there are human misery and
needs of various kinds. In the ordinary course, the government, some Indian /
international charitable organisations do take the initiative to provide
relief. However, often there is confusion and a scramble. Those in need do not
know whom to approach for help. Those who wish to donate funds or services do
not know who needs the funds / services and also which are the reliable
organisations that will really help the needy. Even the relief organisations
may be at a loss to find the needy and / or find those who can fund the relief
measures that they are ready to carry out.

 

Now, imagine if there was a smooth and
seamless system to coordinate the efforts of all such persons – the needy, the
donors / volunteers, the relief organisations, etc. – a system whereby funds
from those willing to help definitely reach the needy. The proposed model of
Social Stock Exchange (‘SSE’) as envisaged by a recent SEBI Working Group
Report, envisages just that. A whole eco-system is proposed in which, in a
variety of innovative ways, funds from those who have and also want to give,
reach those who need those funds. What’s more, there is also scope for
investors to participate in it and earn returns!

 

The objective essentially is to provide not
just information and coordination to all concerned, but also lay down a system
of checks and balances, reliable information, well-defined disclosure standards
and an audit mechanism. The system can use existing and new infrastructure and
systems to help raise funds in the form of securities and other instruments.

 

Such a report has just been released and
comments have been invited on it. However, considering the ambitious goals and
also the numerous structural changes and the set-up needed, it may be years
before they are fully implemented. However, a quick start is quite possible and
some major steps could be taken in a short time.

 

BACKGROUND

The Finance Minister had, in her Budget
Speech for financial year 2019-20, declared the decision of the Government of
India to set up a Social Stock Exchange to help raise funds for social impact
investing. She said, ‘It is time to take our capital markets closer to the
masses and meet various social welfare objectives related to inclusive growth
and financial inclusion. I propose to initiate steps towards creating an
electronic fund-raising platform – a social stock exchange – under the
regulatory ambit of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for listing
social enterprises and voluntary organisations working for the realisation of a
social welfare objective so that they can raise capital as equity, debt or as
units like a mutual fund.’

 

Shortly thereafter, a working group was set
up and, after due consultations / deliberations, its report giving
recommendations has been published for public comments.

 

It is a fairly detailed report that makes
several suggestions on how to go about implementing the proposals made by the
Finance Minister. It surveys the global scenario and consciously makes
proposals much beyond most practices in prevalence. It envisages not just the
setting up of an SSE but discusses several other aspects of the eco-system and
also various products / structures that can be developed to ensure a
sophisticated and effective system.

 

The needy

That India has numerous needy sections
requiring relief goes without saying. Rural poverty, medical relief,
educational assistance, etc. are broad needs, while disaster relief is also
often required. The relief does not have to be merely the giving away of cash,
but also assistance in kind and / or service in various forms. Often, such
needy persons inhabit the interior parts of the country and hence it is also
vital that the relief has to be structured in such a way that it reaches them.
Such needy persons are unlikely to have direct knowledge and contact with those
who are able and willing to provide relief.

 

The relief organisations

The report
suggests that in India there are more than 30,00,000 (30 lakh) NGOs and other
organisations, small and large, able and willing to provide relief to the
needy. These include small social service organisations with a tiny set-up, to
large international organisations having extensive manpower, systems and
knowhow. They, however, need information about those who are in need of relief
and also knowledge of those who may provide funds for relief. They also need
knowhow of how to present their credentials to demonstrate that they have been
doing effective work. This would include a language of standardised benchmarks
and parameters to show their effectiveness. That they meet such benchmarks also
needs to be certified by ‘social auditors’ competent in this field.

 

The donors

There are several large international
donors, small and medium-sized donors / trusts, corporate donors (particularly
those who allocate funds for CSR work) and of course the millions of individual
donors who would want to make a difference to the needy. Then there is the
government itself which allocates large amounts of monies for relief work of
various types. However, all these need either direct access to the needy if the
relief provided is simple, or to organisations carrying out relief work to whom
they can donate funds or even provide honorary services. For this purpose, they
would want to be assured that their funds and services are put to the most
effective use so as to have the best social impact.

 

SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGEA model that brings together the various parties and helps
set up an eco-system

The report recognises that there are many
scattered organisations of various types who offer relief and provide
coordination and information in this regard. The need, however, is for a
complete and common eco-system whereby the needy, the relief organisations, the
donors and various other service entities are connected with each other. At
present, some bodies do provide part of such services / eco-system. However,
the report suggests that a Social Stock Exchange could serve as a centralised
body for enabling such an eco-system. Internationally, there are many SSEs of
varying kinds. However, the report seeks to go far ahead of such SSEs and
provide not just an information system but also a wide variety of funding
structures including listed securities that are tailor-made to meet such needs.
Some of the suggestions in this regard are described here.

 

Information repository

An accessible database of various relief
organisations would be set up under the aegis of the SSE. It would have
detailed information of the governing bodies, financials, track records of
relief work in a language of benchmarks and parameters that are well
established, well defined and understood by those familiar with the system. The
repository would have other relevant information, too. Anyone, including
donors, can access the information and find the relevant information.

 

Standards / benchmarks and disclosure
standards

Just as financial statements have a language
to present financial information to financially literate users, a similar set
of languages / standards and so on would be needed so that relief organisations
can present the work they have done in objectively understood / measurable
parameters. This would demonstrate their effectiveness.

 

Social auditors

Like auditors of financial statements,
social auditors would be needed to verify that the information disclosed by
relief organisations is fairly and correctly stated. This would give
reassurance to readers of such statements.

 

SECURITIES AND INSTRUMENTS OF VARIOUS
KINDS

While stock exchanges are normally conceived
of as a place / platform for transactions in securities of various kinds, the
SSE would not be focused on equities in the traditional sense. The securities
on the SSE would enable finance to reach relief organisations. The investments
may be in the form of equity or bonds of various kinds. If the projects in
which investments are made achieve the social benefit / impact promised, the
investors would get their monies back, possibly with some returns. Donors and
similar organisations would effectively provide monies for return of the funds.
The securities could also be traded on the SSE. If the project fails wholly or
partially, the amount invested may not be wholly returned. Loans from banks /
NBFCs may also be made in a similar manner. Different structures have been
suggested depending upon whether the organisation is For-Profit or
Not-For-Profit. The varying legal structures of such organisations (e.g.,
trust, section 8 companies or even individual / firm / company) have been noted
in the report and that the funding / securities structure would be different
for each such group.

 

The report also provides a structure for
deployment of CSR funds, including even trading in CSR certificates. Thus, for
example, CSR spends in excess of the prescribed minimum could be transferred to
others who have not been able to find appropriate projects for their own
spends.

 

Alternative Mutual Funds are also expected
to carry out a significant role in helping routing of such funds in the form of
units.

 

LEGAL / TAX HURDLES

The report conceives of an eco-system for
which much would be needed in terms of amendments in securities, tax and other
laws to enable it to fructify. The SSE itself would be under primary regulation
of the SEBI subject to possibly a separate sector regulator at a later point of
time. The SSE could be a separate platform under existing stock exchanges since
they already have the infrastructure.

 

However, several changes would have to be
made in law.

 

The securities laws would have to be amended
to enable the new forms of securities suggested. The Regulations relating to
Alternative Investment Funds would also require amendments. SEBI would have to
be given powers to provide for registration for various agencies, for
supervision, for prescribing disclosure requirements, levy of penalty, etc.

The report emphasises several changes in tax
laws. Requirements relating to registration / renewal of charitable
organisations, particularly the changes made in the recent Finance Act, 2020,
are suggested to be simplified and relaxed. Further, tax benefits for CSR
spends through such SSEs, for donations / investments made through an SSE, etc.
are recommended.

 

CONCLUSION

The implementation of the proposed structure
would take place in stages. It may even otherwise take time for various
organisations and entities to understand and become part of the proposed
eco-system. However, the recommendations do make for an inspiring read. The
system could provide the most effective use of the funds given in the form of
grants, donations and even investments. Organisations that work well would get
formal recognition in a language and in the form of parameters that are
commonly understood in the industry. There would be faith in the system that
would be reinforced by the supervision and discipline of SEBI.

 

Chartered Accountants would obviously have a
major role to play. They would be closely involved in advising corporates,
relief organisations and even donors on law, tax, structuring, etc. Preparation
of financial statements and even reports to present the social impact /
performance of such entities would be a new and refreshing challenge. It is not
expected that their involvement would be purely honorary or as social work.

 

One looks forward to speedy implementation
of the recommendations of this report which could usher in substantial changes
in the present system

 

FDI IN E-COMMERCE

Background

 

Retail sector in
India is considered to be a sensitive sector especially due to factors, such as
(i) the employment it generates; (ii) unorganised clusters of traders iii)
inability to compete with large players iv) concentration of vote bank.
Accordingly, Government over the years has traded consciously and opened up FDI
in retail sector in truncated manner.

 

The Department of
Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India has issued Press Note No 2 (2018 Series) on 26th
December, 2018 (PN 2 of 2018). PN 2 of 2018 amends paragraph 5.2.15.2
(e-commerce activities) of the current ‘Consolidated FDI Policy’ of the DIPP
effective from 28th August, 2017 (FDI Policy), effective from 1st
February, 2019. Paragraph 5.2.15.2 (e-commerce activities) incorporates the
provisions of Press Note No 3 (2016 Series) dated 29th March, 2016
(PN 3 of 2016), pursuant to which foreign direct investment (FDI) up to 100%
was allowed under the automatic route in entities engaged in the marketplace
model of e-commerce, subject to compliance with certain conditions. However,
FDI in entities engaged in the inventory-based model of e-commerce was
expressly prohibited, and this continues to be the case as on date. A
marketplace-based model of e-commerce is a model of providing an information
technology platform by an e-commerce entity on a digital and electronic network
to act as a facilitator between buyer and seller. An inventory-based model of
e-commerce, on the other hand, is a model where inventory of goods and services
is owned by an e-commerce entity and is sold to the consumers directly.

 

It has been a bone
of contention of trade association that FDI component is creating an uneven
playing field to the disadvantage of millions of small business enterprises. It
is alleged that the e-retailers are engaged in predatory pricing policy and
subsidizing the prices with a view to oust brick and mortar shops from retail
trade.

 

While the
conditions contained in PN 3 of 2016 were introduced to bring some comfort to
brick and mortar retailers (small traders) and to ostensibly create a level
playing field for such retailers with their e-commerce counterparts, it was
felt in some quarters that the wording of PN 3 of 2016 was not stringent enough
and that the intended goal of such PN 3 of 2016 was not being achieved.
Complains were made to regulator that certain marketplace platforms were
violating policy by influencing the price of products and indirectly engaging
in inventory-based model. In order to ensure that rules are not circumvented
DIPP came up with PN 2 of 2018[1].

 

Some of the
important changes made by PN 2 of 2018 are highlighted in this article.

 

Scope and
applicability

PN 2 of 2018
proposes to amend para 5.2.15.2 dealing with e-commerce activities.
Accordingly, PN 2 of 2018 has no impact on following:

 

  •     Wholesale cash and carry
    trading;
  •     Single brand retail trading
    operating through brick and mortar stores;
  •     Multi brand retail trading;
  •     Indian entity with no FDI
    engaged in online e-commerce business;
  •     Indian entity with FDI
    engaged in manufacturing selling products in India through e-commerce.

 

Restrictions of PN
2 of 2018 are applicable to Indian e-commerce company having FDI. It does not
apply to home grown retail majors like Vijay Sales, Big Bazaar, Reliance Retail
etc. Thus, PN 2 of 2018 may assure level playing field against foreign capital but
does little to prevent small traders from predatory pricing and market
penetration policy adopted by Indian conglomerates.

 

PN 2 of 2018 is
applicable from 1st February, 2019. There is no express
grandfathering of existing structures. Moreover, since amendments seek to
clarify legislative intent, it is advisable that e-commerce companies comply
with new regulations. Some of the stringent conditions will require e-commerce
companies to rejig their business model.

 

 

Ownership and control over inventory

 

Policy

E-commerce entity
providing a marketplace will not exercise ownership or control over the
inventory i.e. goods purported to be sold. Such an ownership or control over
the inventory will render the business into inventory based model. Inventory of
a vendor will be deemed to be controlled by e-commerce marketplace entity if
more than 25% of purchases of such vendor are from the marketplace entity or
its group companies.

 

Comments

  •     Existing regulation i.e. PN
    3 of 2016 provides that e-commerce entity providing a market place will not
    exercise ownership over the inventory i.e. goods purported to be sold. Such an
    ownership over inventory will render the business into inventory-based model.
  •     PN 2 of 2018 imposes an
    additional condition and deems inventory of vendor to be controlled by
    e-commerce marketplace entity if more than 25% of purchases of such vendor are
    from market place entity or its group companies.
  •     Said condition seems to
    plug in loophole in existing regulatory framework. Under existing regulatory
    framework e-commerce entity can undertake B2B trading. Marketplace Entities
    used one or more of their group entities to sell goods to sellers on a B2B
    basis with such sellers in turn listing the goods on the Marketplace Entity’s
    platforms for sale to retail customers.
  •     Going forward, e-commerce
    entity will have to develop mechanism to track purchases of vendor listed on
    its portal. If 25% limit is breached by vendor it will tantamount to violation
    of FDI conditions for e-commerce entity. This is likely to be cumbersome
    compliance as vendors may be reluctant to share their financial details.
  •     Regulation is not clear on
    period for computing ‘25%’ threshold limit. Arguably, 25% of purchases should
    be calculated for each financial year and reference to 25% should be in value
    terms based on financial statement of vendor. Further, 25% of overall threshold
    can be computed only after closure of financial year. This poses challenge on
    e-commerce companies to test compliance before closure of financial year. Further,
    regulation is not clear in case of computation of 25% threshold in case of
    vendor engaged in trading of multiple goods. It is not clear whether 25%
    threshold should be computed for that segment of goods traded on e-commerce
    website or purchase on overall basis needs to be seen.
  •     Regulation stresses on
    purchase aspect of vendor from e-commerce companies or its group companies and
    has nothing to do with the aspect of vendor selling goods on market platform of
    e-commerce companies. Accordingly, on plain reading – say Vendor A purchasing
    goods in bulk[2]
    from group companies of Flipkart and selling on Amazon and offline in large
    quantities and on Flipkart in small quantities, will render Flipkart to
    violation of FDI norms.
  •     Restriction may put
    limitation on Indian vendors who are not 
    recipient of FDI to look out for alternatives sources to procure goods.
    Thus, PN 2 of 2018 indirectly regulates procurement pattern of non FDI
    companies trading on e-commerce platform.
  •     Sellers may require to
    broad base their procurement function and approach directly distributors or
    manufacturer of products. This is likely to impact margins and supply chain
    efficiency.
  •     Interestingly, PN 2 of 2018
    permits e-commerce companies to provide support services in respect of
    warehousing, logistics, order fulfilment, call centre, payment collection and
    other services. Accordingly, it may be open for e-commerce company or group
    company to provide indenting services to sellers and facilitate them to
    purchase goods from distributor or manufacturers. Said services can be validly
    provided as long as it is provided in fair and non-discriminatory manner.
  •     Regulation 2 of FEMA 20(R)
    defines group company as follows:

“Group Company
means two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are in a position
to

(a)  Exercise 26 percent, or more of voting rights
in other enterprise;  or

(b) Appoint more than 50 percent, of members of
board of directors in the other enterprise.”

  •     Definition of Group Company
    is based on 26% shareholder threshold and power to appoint more than 50%
    members of Board. This definition is in contradiction to definition of control
    under Ind AS 110[3].
    Ind AS definition of control is expansive and requires Company to give
    consideration to shareholders agreement and right flowing to investor to
    determine control. As against that, definition of group company in FEMA 20(R)
    is more legalistic. Further, analyst believes that stringent condition is
    likely to pave way to franchisee models[4].

 

Restriction on group company sellers to
participate on e-commerce platform

 

Policy

An entity having
equity participation by e-commerce marketplace entity or its group companies,
or having control on its inventory by e-commerce marketplace entity or its
group companies, will not be permitted to sell its products on the platform run
by such marketplace entity.

 

Comments

  •     Existing regulation i.e. PN
    3 of 2016 provides that e-commerce entity will not permit more than 25% of the
    sales value on financial year basis affected through its marketplace from one
    vendor or group company.
  •     PN 2 of 2018 prohibits i)
    entity having equity participation by e-commerce marketplace entity or its
    group companies or ii) vendor on which e-commerce marketplace entity or its
    group companies has control over inventory.
  •     On comparison of existing
    and new regulation following are notable changes:

    Ban on entity in which e-commerce
marketplace entity or its group companies has equity participation to sell on
e-commerce platform.

    Ban on entity on which e-commerce
marketplace entity or its group companies has control over inventory to sell on
e-commerce platform.

    Other vendors (other than mentioned above)
can sell on e-commerce platform even if its sales amount to more than 25% of
sales value.

  •     PN 2 of 2018 has used
    ambiguous term ‘equity participation’. Extant FDI Policy defines ‘capital
    instrument’ as referring to equity shares, CCPS, CCDs and warrants. It is
    therefore unclear whether the term “equity participation” refers solely to
    equity investments or whether it includes investments using other instruments
    (such as CCPS, CCDs or warrants) as well and its impact on conversion. Further
    no threshold for equity participation is prescribed. Accordingly, holding of 1%
    by specified entities will debar investee entity from trading in e-commerce platform.
  •     At times investing in
    companies providing support services are driven by business and commercial
    consideration. Since services are so interlinked, it may be a commercial
    necessity to hold stake in service company to ensure quality of service and safeguard
    reputation of e-commerce companies. Revised policy seems to give a total go-by
    to business consideration and looks involvement of service company (with equity
    participation of e-commerce company) as a sole driver.

    Many e-commerce entities operating in India
have made (or entities controlled by them have made) investments in entities
(First Level JV Entity) that are owned and controlled by an Indian resident.
The First Level JV Entities establish further subsidiaries (Second Level JV
Entity). In light of the current guidelines on downstream investments, these
Second Level JV Entities or group entities are not subjected to similar
obligations as applicable to foreign direct investment in First Level JV
Entity. Use of term ‘equity participation’ raises issue whether restriction
will apply to First Level JV entity or even Second Level JV Entity. In contrast
to other clauses in PN 2 of 2018, this clause does not use the words equity
participation ‘directly or indirectly’.

    Policy is likely to put a break on Amazon
from selling products from subsidiaries like Cloudtail and Appario, Flipkart
from selling products through its investee company WS Retail unless e-commerce
major restructures their business model. 

 

No exclusivity

 

Policy

E-commerce
marketplace entity will not mandate any seller to sell any product exclusively
on its platform only.

 

Comments

  •     Condition seems to be one
    way in terms of requiring e-commerce entity to sell product exclusively on its
    platform. Condition does not restrict seller to approach e-commerce company to
    sell its product exclusively on its platform.
  •     This condition will put
    check on practices of selling mobile phones and white goods on exclusive basis.
    Accordingly, it will no longer be open for Flipkart to have exclusive partnership
    of selling smartphones like Xiaomi and Oppo. Exclusive sale was perceived to be
    concentration of power in hands of few and detrimental to the interest of small
    traders.
  •     Said condition puts
    practice of selling private label products say Amazon kindle, Amazon Echo, MarQ
    range of electronic goods in doubt. Private label products are in-house brands
    of e-commerce company. Reason for promoting private label products is to earn
    high margin and seek repetitive customers as private label products are exclusively
    sold by e-commerce companies.  E-commerce
    entities seek to sell private label products at discounted price vis-à-vis
    compete and try to lure customers.
  •     On plain reading, there is
    no bar on sellers to sell products exclusively on e-commerce platform. DIPP in
    its press release has clarified that present policy does not impose any
    restriction on the nature of products which can be sold on the marketplace.

 

Level playing field

 

Policy

E-commerce entities
providing marketplace will not directly or indirectly influence the sale price
of goods or services and shall maintain level playing field. Services should be
provided by e-commerce marketplace entity or other entities in which e-commerce
marketplace entity has direct or indirect equity participation or common
control, to vendors on the platform at arm’s length and in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner. Such services will include but are not limited to
fulfilment, logistics, warehousing, advertisement/marketing, payments,
financing etc. Cash back provided by group companies of marketplace entity to
buyers shall be fair and non-discriminatory. For the purposes of this clause,
provision of services to any vendor on such terms which are not made available
to other vendors in similar circumstances will be deemed unfair and
discriminatory.

 

Comments

  •     PN 3 of 2016 merely
    stipulates that e-commerce entities providing marketplace will not directly or
    indirectly influence the sale price of goods or services and shall maintain
    level playing field. PN 2 of 2018 imposes additional conditions on e-commerce
    companies and its investee company to provide services to vendors on platform
    at arm’s length on fair and non-discriminatory manner. Policy deems that
    provision of services to any vendor on such terms which are not made available
    to other vendors in similar circumstances will be deemed unfair and
    discriminatory.
  •     Policy seems to plug
    practices of predatory pricing policy and subsidising the prices. Going forward
    it will be difficult to provide cash back, fast delivery, etc., to select set
    of sellers. All the service providers will have to open up such services for
    all the sellers on its platform.
  •     Use of terms ‘arm’s
    length’, ‘fair and non-discriminatory’ and ‘similar circumstance’ are
    subjective and is likely to give rise to further frictions. It is equally true
    in a market place; all sellers can’t be treated similarly. It is natural for
    business to give preferential treatment to set of customers who are top
    customers. Person selling miniscule quantity cannot be compared with customer
    selling substantial quantity. Use of the word ‘similar circumstances’ should be
    construed in right perspective.
  •     Policy requires cash back
    to be provided to buyers and services to be provided to sellers to be fair and
    non-discriminatory. Policy does not seem to restrict buyer/seller to be
    provided better services if they are paying a premium/price to avail
    preferential service. Accordingly, services like prime membership are unlikely
    to be affected by new regulation.

 

Report to RBI

 

Policy

E-commerce
marketplace entity will be required to furnish a certificate along with a
report of statutory auditor to Reserve Bank of India, confirming compliance of
above guidelines, by 30th of September of every year for the
preceding financial year.

 

Comments

  •     Regulation places
    additional obligation on statutory auditor to certify compliance with new
    guidelines. This will be an onerous task given subjectivity involved in
    guidelines.

 

Concluding Remarks

Revised regulation
seeks to provide level playing field to small traders and protect them from
foreign capital. Changes come at a time when 
investments in e-commerce are at record high. Acquisition of controlling
stake by Walmart in Flipkart at whopping USD 16 billion raised bar of
e-commerce industry in India. Research firm Crisil has estimated that nearly
35-40% of e-retail industry sales, amounting to Rs 35,000-40,000 crore, could
be impacted due to the tightened policy. It is further estimated that Brick and
Mortar business will gain 150-200 bps topline boost. Media5 has
reported that new regulations are draconian and a bigger retrograde move than
even Vodafone tax issues. It will not only impact e-commerce sector but also
FDI inflow in other sectors because regulations can change overnight. One
believes that DIPP will come out with clarification and allay all fears.

STAMP DUTY ON CHAIN OF DOCUMENTS

Introduction


Go to register a document
for a flat/office and chances are that the Sub-registrar of Assurances would
point out that the antecedent title documents have not been stamped properly
and hence, the current instrument cannot be registered. The Authority would first
ask that stamp duty with penalty be paid on all the earlier chain of documents
and only then would the current instrument get stamped and registered. This
creates several hurdles for property buyers and they are unnecessarily
penalised for past lapses in the property documents. One wonders till what
extent can the current buyer be asked to go to pay stamp duty on the past
documents?

 

In this respect, the Bombay
High Court has given a path breaking decision which would ease the property
buying process.

 

The Case


The decision was rendered
in  the case of Lajawanti G.
Godhwani vs. Shyam R. Godhwani and Vijay Jindal, Suit No. 3394/2008
,
decision rendered on 13th December, 2018.This case
pertained to a flat purchased in an auction conducted by the Court Receiver.
The last time the flat was sold was in 1979 and that document was stamped only
with a duty of Rs. 10. The old agreement was not even registered. When the
purchaser went to register the instrument of transfer, the Sub-registrar of
Assurances demanded stamp duty on the entire chain of title documents since the
same was not paid. The duty alone on the old agreement at the Stamp Duty
Reckoner Rates amounted to Rs. 2 crore. As the purchaser had bought the flat
through a Court Receiver’s auction, he approached the High Court to get
directives that the seller should bear the previous stamp duty and penalty.
While one of the original owners agreed, the other former co-owners refused.
Accordingly, the High Court was hearing their dispute.

 

Basics of Stamp Law


Before understanding what
the Court held, it would be useful to appreciate certain basics of stamp duty.
Stamp duty is both a subject of the Central and the State Government. Under the
Constitution of India, the power to levy stamp duty is divided between the
Union and the State. The Parliament has the power to levy stamp duty on the
instruments specified in Article 246 read with Schedule VII, List I, Entry 91
and the State Legislature has the power to levy stamp duty on instruments
falling under Article 246 read with Schedule VII, List II, Entry 63. Often a
question arises, which Act applies – the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 or the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. For most of the instruments, the State Act would
apply. However, for the nine instruments provided in the Union List of the
Constitution of India, the rates are mentioned in the Schedule to the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899.

 

In Hindustan Steel
Ltd. vs. Dalip Construction Company, 1969 SCR (3) 796,
the Supreme
Court held that the Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for
the State on certain classes of instruments. 

 

Stamp Duty is leviable on
an instrument (and not a transaction) mentioned in Schedule I to the Maharashtra
Stamp Act, 1958 at rates mentioned in that Schedule – LIC vs. Dinannath
Mahade Tembhekar AIR 1976 Bom 395.
An Instrument is defined under the
Maharashtra Stamp Act to include every document by which any right or liability
is created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded.  However, it does not include a bill of
exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of
insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. This is because
these nine instruments are within the purview of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
All instruments chargeable with duty and executed in Maharashtra should be
stamped before or at the time of execution or immediately thereafter or on the
next working day following the date of execution. 

 

One of the biggest myths
surrounding stamp duty is that it is levied on a transaction. It is only levied
on an instrument and that too provided the Schedule mentions rates for it. If
there is no instrument then there is no duty is the golden rule one must always
keep in mind. An English decision in the case of  The Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs.
G. Anous & Co. (1891) Vol. XXIII Queen’s Bench Division 579
has
held that held that the thing, which is made liable to stamp duty is the
“instrument”. It is the “instrument” whereby
any property upon the sale thereof is legally or equitably transferred and the
taxation is confined only to the instrument whereby the property is
transferred. If a contract of purchase or sale or a conveyance by way of purchase
and sale, can be, or is, carried out without an instrument, the case would not
fall within the section and no tax can be imposed. Taxation is confined to the
instrument by which the property is transferred legally and equitably
transferred. This decision was cited by the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan
Lever Ltd vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 438.

 

On 9th December,
1985, the Maharashtra Stamp Act was amended which mandated that stamp duty had
to be paid at the rates prescribed in the Ready Reckoner published every year.
Following this, the Stamp Office started demanding stamp duty even on resale
agreements of old properties for which a nominal duty had been paid on the
agreements when they were originally executed. Consequently, the issue arose as
to whether the amendments made in 1985 were applicable even to documents which
were registered earlier than 1985. Two Single Judge decisions of the Bombay
High Court, Padma Nair vs. The Deputy Collector, Valuation, AIR 1994 Bom
160 / ITC Limited and Anr. vs The State and a Division Bench decision in the
case of Nirmala Manherlal Shah vs State, 2005 (5) BomCR 206
are
relevant in this respect. The Courts in these cases were considering whether
stamp duty was payable on the agreement to sell entered into before 9th
December, 1985. The Courts took a view that only in respect of those Agreements
to Sell entered into with effect from 9th December, 1985 and not
earlier were to be stamped in terms of the definition ‘conveyance’ read with
Explanation under article of Schedule I. Inspite of these verdicts the Stamp
Office demands stamp duty on old agreements that had been executed prior to
1985.

 

Bombay High Court’s verdict


The verdict in the instant
case was delivered by J. Gautam Patel. The Court held that as regards the
question of stamp duty on antecedent documents there was no clear or well
considered response from the Stamp Office. Neither the Officer from the Stamp
Office nor the Assistant Government Pleader was able to show the Court as to
under what provision of the Stamp Act, old documents prior to the amendments to
the Stamp Act could be legitimately or lawfully said to be “unstamped” or even
insufficiently stamped if, according to the law as it stood at that historical point
in time, the document itself was not liable to stamp in the first place. The
Counsel for the Government agreed that any such assessment would have to be on
the basis of the Stamp Act as it stood at that time of the older transactions
and not at the current rates.

 

The High Court held that
the entire approach of seeking duty on past agreements seemed prima facie
entirely incorrect. The Court considered a very simple example to substantiate
its stand—a flat in a cooperative housing society was held by A, who was the
original allottee of the flat. In 1970, he sold the flat to B. It is not shown
that the 1970 sale attracted stamp duty. B held the flat until 2018, when he
sold it to C. Now when C submitted his transfer instrument of 2018  (from B to C) for adjudication, was it even
open to the Stamp Authorities to contend that the parent 1970 transfer from A
to B was bad or invalid or inoperative for want of stamp since, had it been
done today, it would have attracted stamp, notwithstanding that it did not attract
duty at the date of that transfer in 1970? The Court did not think so and held
that the Authority should remember that what was submitted to it was the
current instrument of 2018, not the instrument of 1970; the latter was only an
accompaniment to trace a history of the title of the property, not to
effectuate a transfer. Stamp duty was attracted by the instrument, not the
underlying transaction, and not by any historical narrative in the instrument.
If the Authority’s view of levying duty on past instruments was to be accepted,
then it had no answer to the inevitable consequences, for its view necessarily
meant that no title ever passed to B, and A would have to be held to continue
to be the owner of the flat, which was clearly absurd and was nobody’s case. It
was also unclear just how far back the Authority could travel by applying the
current taxing regime on old concluded transactions. Moreover, when such
transactions were in every sense complete and not being effectuated currently.

 

Accordingly, the Court concluded that there
was no question of either the auction purchaser or anyone else being liable to
pay stamp duty on the older documents, copies of which were tendered along with
the auction purchaser’s instrument of transfer. The Bombay High Court also laid
down very vital principle—since the auction purchaser’s instrument of transfer
had been stamped, no question could arise of reopening an issue of sufficiency
of stamps on the antecedent documents. That claim was deemed to have been given
up by the Authority by its act of accepting the stamp duty paid on the auction
purchaser’s transfer instrument.

 

CONCLUSION

Registration offices should no longer demand
payment of stamp duty on antecedent documents of title at current rates before
accepting registration of the current instrument of transfer. This decision
have very rightly held that a purchaser only seeks to register and pay duty on
the current instrument of transfer and he cannot be held responsible for
non-payment of past owners. One hopes that the offices of the Registrar would
take this decision in the right spirit and act accordingly. A circular from the
Stamp Office toeing the line of this decision would really help smoothen the
property buying process and may ultimately even act as an impetus to the house
buying process.  

PENALTY PROVISIONS UNDER SECURITIES LAWS – SUPREME COURT DECIDES

Securities Laws empower
SEBI to levy penalty in fairly large amounts, often even for technical
violations. The maximum amount can extend in some cases to upto Rs. 25 crores
or even more. It is fairly common to see penalties in lakhs or tens of lakhs
and more even for violations such as late filing of returns and making of
certain disclosures, etc.

 

The legal provisions have
seen frequent changes and even suffer from poor drafting. Even court decisions
have seen twists and turns by changes in interpretation by SEBI. SEBI
interpreted an earlier decision of Supreme Court in Shri Ram Mutual Fund
((2006) 5 SCC 361 (SC))
that the court held that penalty was mandatory in
case of violations and no mens rea had to be proved. It was arguable
that the Court did not make penalty mandatory. However, SEBI took a view that
it had no choice but to levy penalty. This had also to be seen in context of
the fact that there were provisions which provided for fairly large minimum
penalties.

 

Finally,
there were two fundamental interpretation issues of certain provisions. One
related to section 15J in the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992
provided that three factors to be taken into account by the Adjudicating
Officer (“the AO”) while levying penalty. The second question was whether these
three factors were merely illustrative, in which case other factors
could also be taken into account? Or whether they were exhaustive, meaning
that no other factors could be taken into account.

 

A related issue was whether
the AO has any discretion not to levy penalty or levy a lower penalty
than the one prescribed. These questions arose out of seemingly anomalous or
contradictory provision because some sections provided for a minimum and
mandatory penalty while another provision required the AO to consider certain
factors while deciding levy of penalty.

 

Fortunately, all of these
issues have been considered by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in Adjudicating
Officer, SEBI vs. Bhavesh Pabari ((2019) 103 taxmann.com 8 (SC)).

 

Background


The decision with several
separate cases in appeal though all of them had a common theme of penalty. The
Court thus first discussed in detail the legal background in the form of
earlier cases of the Supreme Court and also the provisions of the Act including
the various changes therein over the period.

 

The Court then arrived to
certain conclusions as to how the law should be interpreted and applied with
regard to certain matters and questions. These interpretation were then applied
to the facts of individual cases while deciding the violation.

 

It will be thus necessary
to summarise what the Court decided for each issue before it.

 

Whether
penalty is to be mandatorily levied or is there any discretion/exception
possible?

This has been a fundamental
question and the general stand taken by SEBI was that its hands were tied by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Shriram. Thus, SEBI held that once there
was a violation levy of penalty was mandatory and mens rea has no
relevance. Author submits that the Court in Shriram’s case did not held that
levy of penalty was mandatory. However, the Court in the present case has
reviewed the provisions dealing with penalty and some other issues.

 

It was seen that there were
several provisions dealing with levy of penalty – for example section 15A(a) to
15-HA) each section provided for penalty for the specific violation dealt with
in the section. Curiously, from 2002 to 2014, provisions relating to penalty
made a strange reading. Some provisions provided for a minimum penalty of Rs. 1
crore u/s. 15-A. The questions were : whether minimum penalty was to be
mandatorily levied? Did the Adjudicating Officer have the power to levy a lower
penalty or even waive the penalty? For instance section 15J provided for three
specific factors to be considered whilst levying penalty. The issue was : if
levy of a minimum penalty was mandatory, then would section 15J not become
redundant?

 

The Court pointed this
anomalous consequence and held that such a view usually cannot be taken. It
observed, “…if the penalty provisions are to be understood as not admitting of
any exception or discretion and the penalty as prescribed in Section 15-A to
Section 15-HA of the SEBI Act is to be mandatorily imposed in case of default/failure,
Section 15-J of the SEBI Act would stand obliterated and eclipsed… Sections
15-A(a) to 15-HA have to be read along with Section 15-J in a manner to avoid
any inconsistency or repugnancy. We must avoid conflict and head-on-clash and
construe the said provisions harmoniously. Provision of one section cannot be
used to nullify and obtrude another unless it is impossible to reconcile the
two provisions.”.

 

The court then pointed out
that the law had been amended in 2014 and it was clarified that discretion was
available to the Adjudicating Officer to consider the specified factors before
levying a penalty. The Court held that this clarification put beyond doubt that
discretion was always available with the Adjudicating Officer to consider
various factors and was not bound by the provisions providing for minimum and
mandatory penalty.

 

The Court observed, “The
explanation to Section 15- J of the SEBI Act added by Act No.7 of 2017, quoted
above, has clarified and vested in the Adjudicating Officer a discretion
under Section 15-J on the quantum of penalty to be imposed while adjudicating
defaults under Sections 15-A to 15-HA.
Explanation to Section 15-J was
introduced/added in 2017 for the removal of doubts created as a result of
pronouncement in M/s. Roofit Industries Ltd. case ([2016] 12 SCC 125).”
(emphasis supplied). Hence the court reaffirmed that the earlier decision in
Roofit’s case was erroneous.

 

How should
a provision specifying a minimum penalty be interpreted?

There were several
provisions in the Act that provide, even today, for a minimum penalty of Rs. 1
lakh. The Court pointed out that some of these can be even for technical
defaults involving small amounts. The Court highlighted its earlier decision in
Siddharth Chaturvedi & Ors.( [2016] 12 SCC 119), which had held,
“…that Section 15-A(a) could apply even to technical defaults of small amounts
and, therefore, prescription of minimum mandatory penalty of Rs.1 lakh per day
subject to maximum of Rs.1 crore, would make the Section completely
disproportionate and arbitrary so as to invade and violate fundamental rights.”

 

The Court also pointed out
that the law was later amended to provide for a lower minimum penalty. In
short, the court concluded that discretion was available with the AO even with
regard to levy of a minimum penalty taking into account relevant facts of the
case.

 

Whether
the factors specified in section 15J were illustrative or exhaustive?

Section
15J is the general provision that applies to the various specific penalty provisions.
It states that while levying penalty, the AO shall consider three factors. One
was the amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage made. The second
was whether loss was caused to investors. The third was whether the default was
repetitive.

 

The
issue was: whether the above three were the only factors to be
considered by an AO or whether the other relevant factors AO could consider. It
was pointed out that section 15-I did provide that the AO shall levy “such
penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of any of those
sections.”.

 

The
Court pointed out that there were several penalty provisions where none of the
three factors specified in section 15J would be relevant. Hence, taking a view
that these three factors are the only relevant factors would lead to an
anomalous result.

 

The
Court thus concluded the AO ought to consider not just the three factors
specified in section 15J but such other factors that are relevant. It observed,
“Therefore, to understand the conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of Section 15-J to be exhaustive and admitting of no exception or vesting any
discretion in the Adjudicating Officer would be virtually to admit/concede that
in adjudications involving penalties under Sections 15-A, 15-B and 15-C,
Section 15-J will have no application. Such a result could not have been
intended by the legislature.
We, therefore, hold and take the view that
conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J are not
exhaustive and in the given facts of a case, there can be circumstances
beyond those enumerated by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J which
can be taken note of by the Adjudicating Officer while determining the quantum
of penalty.

 

Application
in individual cases

The Court then applied the
aforesaid conclusions in the various individual cases before it in appeal to
decide whether the penalty levied was in accordance with law and the
conclusions reached by the Court.

 

Can
penalty be levied separately for transactions in a party’s own name and also in
the name of a firm in which he is sole proprietor?

While dealing with individual cases, the
Court was presented with an interesting question. In a particular case, it was
observed that a party carried out transactions in violation of law in two names
– one (Bhavesh Pabari) was in his own name and the other through a firm name
(Shree Radhe) where he was sole proprietor. SEBI levied penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs
each for both the names. The appellant argued only one penalty should have been
levied since the party was the same. The Court rejected this argument on the
facts of the case. It observed, “This contention superficially seems
attractive, but on an in-depth reflection should be rejected as Bhavesh Pabari
had indulged in trading in its personal name and also in the name of his firm
M/s. Shree Radhe.”.



Can the
Supreme Court consider the reasonableness of penalty levied?

This was yet another issue
worth discussing. Can a party pray to the Supreme Court for reconsidering the
amount of penalty levied and argue that it was excessive or disproportionate?
This is particularly relevant since appeals against such orders can be to the
Securities Appellate Tribunal and thereafter straight to the Supreme Court. The
Court rejected this contention, and made the following pertinent observation,
“This court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 15-Z of the SEBI
Act, cannot go into the proportionality and quantum of the penalty imposed,
unless the same is distinctly disproportionate to the nature of the violation
which makes it offensive, tyrannous or intolerable. Penalty by it’s very
nature of the is penal. We can interfere only where the quantum is wholly
arbitrary and harsh which no reasonable man would award.”

Hence, except in exceptional
case the court, would generally not go into the reasonableness of the penalty.

 

Conclusion

The
decision of the Supreme
Court is very relevant and will need to be considered by SEBI and even
SAT
while considering cases of penalty. Parties would be free to present all
relevant facts of the case and emphasise all relevant factors with
respect to
the alleged violations in penalty proceedings. The AO will have to
judicially consider the facts and is no longer bound to levy ?minimum
penalty’.
 

 

 

 

OVERHAUL OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INDIA

(A) Background

Section 6 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (‘FEMA’) deals with regulating capital account transactions. The Finance Act, 2015 amended section 6 of FEMA to provide that the Central Government will have the power to regulate non-debt instruments, whereas RBI will have the power to regulate debt instruments. However, this provision of FEMA was to be given effect from a date to be notified by the Central Government.

On 15th October, 2019, the Ministry of Finance notified the above provisions of the Finance Act, 2015 (the ‘Notified Sections’) which amended section 6 of FEMA. Accordingly, the Central Government assumed the power to regulate non-debt capital account transactions and RBI assumed the power to regulate debt capital account transactions from 15th October, 2019.

Subsequently, on 16th October 2019, the Central Government notified the following list of instruments which would qualify as debt instruments and non-debt instruments.

(1) List of instruments notified as Debt Instruments

(i)   Government bonds;

(ii)   Corporate bonds;

(iii) All tranches of securitisation structure which are not equity tranches;

(iv) Borrowings by Indian firms through loans;

(v) Depository securities where underlying securities are debt securities.

(2) List of instruments notified as Non-Debt Instruments

(a) all investments in equity instruments in incorporated entities: public, private, listed and unlisted;

(b) capital participation in LLP;

(c) all instruments of investment recognised in the FDI policy notified from time to time;

(d) investment in units of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvIts);

(e) investment in units of mutual funds or Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) which invest more than fifty per cent in equity;

(f)   junior-most layer (i.e., equity tranche) of securitisation structure;

(g) acquisition, sale or dealing directly in immovable property;

(h) contribution to trusts; and

(i)   depository receipts issued against equity instruments.

Further, it has also been specified that all other instruments which have not been included in the above lists of Debt or Non-Debt Instruments will be deemed to be Debt Instruments.

Thereafter, on 17th October, 2019 the Central Government issued the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘Non-Debt Rules’) for governing Non-Debt transactions and RBI notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instrument) Regulations, 2019 (‘Debt Regulations’) for governing Debt Instruments. Additionally, on the above date RBI also notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 (‘Payment Regulations’).

Issuance of the above Non-Debt Rules and Debt Regulations superseded FEMA regulations governing Foreign Direct Investment into India (‘FDI’), i.e., FEM 20(R), Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer of Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2017 (‘TISPRO’) and FEM 21(R), Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property in India) Regulations, 2018 (‘Immovable Property Regulations’).

Accordingly, after 17th October, 2019 the erstwhile FDI provisions governed by TISPRO regulations have now been divided into Non-Debt Rules and Debt Regulations. Subsequently, on 5th December, 2019 the Central Government has further amended the Non-Debt Rules. A snapshot of the revised FDI regime is as under:

(B) Overview of Non-Debt Instrument Rules, 2019

These can be further divided as under:

(C) Key changes in revised FDI regulations governing Non-Debt Instruments are summarised below:

(1) New definition of hybrid securities

Hybrid securities have been defined as under:

‘Hybrid securities’ means hybrid instruments such as optionally or partially convertible preference shares or debentures and other such instruments as specified by the Central Government from time to time, which can be issued by an Indian company or trust to a person resident outside India;

The expression ‘hybrid instruments’ has not been used in the Non-Debt Instruments Rules. Therefore, the intention of introducing these definitions is not clear and one would have to wait for some clarification from the Government on the same.

(2) Power to Central Government

The erstwhile FDI regime governed by TISPRO provided powers to RBI for regulating investment in India by persons resident outside India. Under the new regime of Non-Debt Rules, RBI in consultation with the Central Government will regulate Non-Debt investments in India by a person resident outside India.

(3) Mode of payment, remittance and reporting requirements

The mode of payment for Non-Debt Instruments along with remittance of sales proceeds will now be governed by the Payment Regulations, 2019. These regulations are broadly similar to those contained in TISPRO. The Payment Regulations, 2019 now specifically provide that transfer of capital contribution or profit share in an LLP between a resident and a non-resident shall be reported by resident transferor / transferee in Form LLP (II).

(4) Liberalisation for Foreign Portfolio Investors

Investment by FPIs into unlisted Indian companies

◆     Schedule 2 of the erstwhile TISPRO provided that Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) could purchase or sell capital instruments of an Indian company listed on a recognised stock exchange in India.

◆     Chapter IV of the Non-Debt Rules now provide that FPI can purchase or sell equity instruments of an Indian company which is listed or to be listed on a recognised stock exchange in India.

◆     Thus, earlier where FPIs were eligible to invest in capital instruments of only listed Indian companies, under the new framework FPIs are also allowed to invest in equity instruments which are to be listed on any recognised stock exchange in India.

Investment limit of FPIs

◆     Schedule 2 of the erstwhile TISPRO provided that the individual limit of a single FPI holding in an Indian company shall be less than 10% of the total paid-up equity capital on fully-diluted basis. Additionally, on an aggregate basis, total shareholding of all FPIs in an Indian company should not exceed 24%. However, this aggregate limit of 24% could be increased by the Indian company up to the sectoral cap with specific approval of the board of directors and a special resolution being passed at the general meeting.

◆     The Non-Debt Rules now provide that with effect from 1st April, 2020, the default aggregate FPI limits in an Indian company is the applicable sectoral cap, as laid out in Schedule I of the Non-Debt Instruments Rules and is not capped at 24% as applicable in the erstwhile TISPRO. Additionally, it has also been provided that before 31st March, 2020, the above aggregate limit of sectoral caps can be reduced to 24%, 49% or 74% as deemed fit by the company with the approval of its Board and passing of a special resolution. Further, once the Indian company has decreased its aggregate limit from sectoral cap to a lower threshold of 24%, 49% or 74%, as the case may be, the same can also be increased by the company in future. However, if an Indian company increases FPIs’ aggregate investment limit to higher limit, the same cannot be decreased in future. Thus, if any Indian company wants to reduce the aggregate FPI limits from sectoral cap to lower threshold of 24%, 49% or 74%, the same should be undertaken before 31st March, 2020.

◆     Additionally, it is also specifically clarified that in sectors where FDI is prohibited, aggregate FPI limit is capped at 24%.

◆     Further, in case the applicable FPI ceiling limit is breached, FPI would need to divest its holdings within a period of five trading days. Failure to do so would result in the entire FPI limits being classified as FDI and the relevant FPI investor will no longer be allowed to make further investments under the FPI route.

◆     Additionally, FPIs have now been specifically allowed to purchase units of domestic mutual funds or Category III alternative investment fund or offshore fund for which no-objection is issued in accordance with the SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations, 1996 and which, in turn, invests more than 50% in equity instruments on repatriation basis subject to the terms and conditions specified by SEBI and RBI.

Investment by FPIs into interest rate derivatives

◆     FPIs were earlier permitted to invest in interest rate derivatives under the erstwhile TISPRO. However, under the new Non-Debt Rules, FPIs are not permitted to invest in interest rate derivatives.

(5) Liberalisation for Non-Resident Indians (‘NRIs’) and Overseas Citizen of India (‘OCI’)

◆     OCIs can now enrol for the National Pension Scheme governed and administered by the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority of India.

◆     Further, NRIs and OCIs can now also invest in units of domestic mutual funds which invest more than 50% in equity on non-repatriation basis.

(6) Investments by other non-resident investors

◆     Eligible Foreign Entities as defined in SEBI Circular dated 9th October, 2018 and having actual exposure to the Indian physical commodity market have now been allowed to participate in the domestic commodity derivative market as per the framework specified by SEBI. Eligible Foreign Entities have been defined to mean persons resident outside India as per provisions of FEMA and who are having actual exposure to Indian physical commodity markets.

(7) General provisions

◆     A clarification has been introduced to provide that in case of transfer of equity instruments held on a non-repatriation basis to someone who wants to hold it on a repatriation basis, the transferee will have to comply with the other requirements of pricing and sectoral caps, among others, similar to any other non-resident investor holding shares on a non-repatriation basis. Further, under TISPRO, for transfers which were not under the general permission, permission was to be sought only from RBI. However, the Rules now require the permission to be sought from RBI in consultation with the Central Government.

◆     In the case of issuance of shares to non-residents pursuant to a scheme of merger or amalgamation of two or more Indian companies, or a reconstruction by way of demerger or otherwise of an Indian company, where any of the companies involved is listed on a recognised stock exchange in India, then the scheme of arrangement shall need to be in compliance with the SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirement) Regulations, 2015.

◆     In case of Downstream Investments, the meaning of ‘Ownership of an Indian Company’ has been changed; it now states:

‘ownership of an Indian company’ shall mean beneficial holding of more than fifty percent of the equity instruments of such company; and ‘ownership of an LLP’ shall mean contribution of more than fifty percent in its capital and having majority profit share;

The TISPRO regulations provided 50% of capital instruments for determining ownership of an Indian company and not equity instruments as defined above.

(8) Sectoral limits

◆     The sectoral limits for investment in different sectors under the Non-Debt Rules are similar to the erstwhile TISPRO as amended by Press Note 4 (2019 series) dated 18th September, 2019.

(9) Remaining provisions relating to investment, transfer of securities, eligibility etc.

◆     All remaining provisions of Non-Debt Rules relating to investment, transfer, eligibility are broadly similar to those under the erstwhile TISPRO.

Key changes in revised FDI regulations governing debt instruments are summarised below:

◆     Earlier, TISPRO allowed only FPIs, NRIs and OCIs to trade in exchange-traded derivatives. However, the revised Debt Regulations now permit all persons resident outside India to trade in exchange-traded derivatives subject to limits prescribed by SEBI and other conditions specified in Schedule 1.

◆     Additionally, FPIs are now allowed to invest in non-convertible debentures / bonds issued by an unlisted Indian company. Earlier TISPRO allowed FPIs to invest in non-convertible debentures / bonds of following companies:

(a) listed Indian companies; or

(b) companies engaged in infrastructure sector; or

(c) NBFCs categorised as infrastructure finance companies; or

(d) Primary issue of non-convertible debentures / bonds provided they are listed within 15 days of issuance.

◆     Further, any person resident outside India can enter into any derivative transaction subject to conditions laid down by RBI.

◆     Additionally, it is now clarified that AD Bank can allow inward as well as outward remittances for permitted derivatives transaction.

(10) Remaining provisions relating to investment, transfer of securities, eligibility, etc.

All remaining provisions of Debt Regulations relating to investment, transfer, eligibility, taxes, repatriation are broadly similar to the erstwhile TISPRO.

Applicability of ECB provisions

◆     Earlier TISPRO only governed investment by FPIs, NRIs, OCIs, foreign central banks and multilateral development banks in government securities, debt, non-convertible debentures and security receipts. The same are now covered under Debt Regulations.

◆     In respect of debt instruments, other than the above, the same will be governed by ECB Regulations. Hence, non-convertible or optionally convertible debentures or preference shares would continue to be governed by ECB Regulations.

◆     Debt Regulations only allow FPIs to invest in non-convertible debentures / bonds of an Indian company. Hence, NRIs, OCIs or any other person resident outside India if he / she wants to invest in non-convertible or optionally convertible instruments which are qualified as debt, the same would need to be in compliance with ECB Regulations.

CONCLUSION

With the onset of the above amendments, the FDI regime has now been divided into two categories, viz., Non-Debt and Debt. Further, Non-Debt would henceforth be governed by the Central Government in association with the RBI and Debt would be governed by RBI.

Going forward, it needs to be seen how this arrangement of the RBI and the Central Government works in tandem to ensure that relevant approvals under FEMA are received at the earliest.

RELATIVE IS RELATIVE TO THE ACT IN QUESTION

Introduction

Who is a relative? This question
may appear very mundane at first blush, but when viewed in the legal context it
becomes very significant. India is a land of laws and each one of them is an
island in itself. Many of the Acts have defined the term ‘relative’ and each
has done so in its own independent manner, thereby creating multiple
definitions. Hence, the term ‘relative’ is relative to the Act in question,
i.e., it depends on the Act which is being examined.

 

The generic definition of the term
‘relative’ as contained in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary is a person
connected by blood or marriage. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, 2014
(9) SCC 632,
the Supreme Court held that in Ramanatha Aiyar’s, Advance
Law Lexicon (Vol. 4, 3rd Ed.), the word ‘relative’ means any person related by
blood, marriage or adoption. Again, in the case of U. Suvetha vs. State
by Inspector of Police, (2009) 6 SCC 787
it held that in the absence of
any statutory definition, the term must be assigned a meaning as is commonly
understood. Ordinarily, it would include the father, mother, husband or wife,
son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of
an individual. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature
of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption. The expression ‘relative of the husband’ came up for consideration in
the case of Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010)11 SCC 618
where it was held that the word relative would be limited only to the blood
relations or the relations by marriage.

 

Interestingly, the succession laws
such as the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 do not use the term ‘relative’. Instead,
they use the word ‘heir’ which has a different connotation altogether. An heir
is a relative who comes into being only on the death of a person, whereas a
person would have relatives even when he is alive.

 

Let us analyse the definitions
under a few crucial Acts and try and bring out the similarities and the
dissimilarities between the different meanings.

 

Income-tax
Act, 1961

The Big Daddy of all laws has the
biggest list of relatives, no pun intended! The notorious section 56(2)(x) of
the Act taxes certain receipts of property in the hands of the recipient.
However, any receipt of property from a relative is exempt from tax. Hence, it
becomes very essential that the list of relatives is long. This section provides
an exhaustive definition under which the following persons would be treated as
a relative of the donee / recipient:

 

(i)    spouse
of the individual;

(ii)    brother or sister of the individual;

(iii)   brother or sister of the spouse of the individual;

(iv)   brother or sister of either of the parents of the individual;

(v)   any lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual;

(vi)   any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the individual;

(vii) spouse of the person referred to in clauses (ii) to (vi).

 

The term lineal ascendant or
descendant is also an often-used term but never defined in various Indian laws.
It means a straight line of relationship either upwards or downwards. For
instance, a son, his father and grandfather would constitute a lineal
ascendancy. One prevalent myth is that it only refers to male relations. A
daughter, her mother and her grandmother or a son, his mother and his
grandmother would also constitute a lineal relationship. All that is required
is that the relatives should be in a direct straight line. Parallel /
horizontal relations, such as cousins and uncles, would not constitute a lineal
line. One of the most interesting facets of the above definition is that an
uncle / aunt is a relative for a nephew / niece but the converse is not true.
So a nephew can receive a gift from his uncle but the very same uncle cannot
receive a gift from his nephew without paying tax on the same. Strange are the
ways of the taxman, but then law and logic never went hand-in-hand! In this
connection there have been conflicting decisions of the courts as to whether a
gift received by a person from his sibling but made from the bank account of
his sibling’s son would attract the rigours of this section – PCIT vs.
Gulam Farooq Ansari, ITA 230/2017, Raj HC order dated 22nd November,
2017 and Ramesh Garg vs. ACIT, [2017] 88 taxmann.com 347 (Chandigarh – Trib.)

 

Again, a cousin (e.g., the
recipient’s mother’s sister’s son) does not constitute a relative under this
section – ACIT vs. Masanam Veerakumar, [2013] 34 taxmann.com 267 (Chennai
– Trib.)
An interesting decision was delivered by the Mumbai ITAT that
a relative of a father did not become the relative of a minor recipient just
because the minor’s income was clubbed with his father. Since the minor received
the gift, the relationship of the donor should be with reference to the minor
who was to be treated as ‘the individual’ – ACIT vs. Lucky Pamnani [2011]
129 ITD 489 (Mumbai).
The Act also defines a child in relation to an
individual to include a step-child and an adopted child. Interestingly, this
Act is the only one where one’s in-laws are included in the list of relatives.

 

This section has become a hindrance
to the untangling of several jointly owned family businesses on account of
certain relatives not being included in the list of exemptions.

 

Companies
Act, 2013

The new avatar of the
Companies Act has also seen a new meaning to the term ‘relative’. Several old
relations have been severed and the new list in the Companies Act, 2013 is
quite a pruned one compared to the lengthy list contained in the Companies Act,
1956. Given below is a comparison of the definition under the two Acts:

 

HOW TWO ACTS DEFINE A ‘RELATIVE’

 

Companies Act, 2013

Companies Act, 1956

Members of an HUF

Members of an HUF

Spouse

Spouse

Father, including step-father

Father, not including step-father

Mother, including step-mother

Mother, including step-mother

Son, including step-son

Son, including step-son

Son’s wife

Son’s wife

Daughter. Notably not including a step-daughter, whereas she was
included under the 1956 Act!

Daughter including a step-daughter

Daughter’s husband

Daughter’s husband

Brother, including step-brother

Brother, including step-brother

Sister, including step-sister

Sister, including step-sister

Father’s father

Father’s mother

Mother’s mother

Mother’s father

Son’s son

Son’s son’s wife

Son’s daughter

Son’s daughter’s husband

Daughter’s son

Daughter’s son’s wife

Daughter’s daughter

Daughter’s daughter’s husband

Brother’s wife

Sister’s husband

 

 

The definition under the Companies
Act is relevant not just under that law but even under other statutes which
rely on the definition contained therein. Some of the important places where
the term relative is used in the Companies Act include the ‘related party’
definition; the ‘interested director’ definition; disqualification from being
appointed as an auditor if his relative is an interested party / employee;
disqualification from being appointed as an independent director if his
relative has a pecuniary relationship / is a key managerial personnel; loan by
a company to its director or his relative, etc.

 

Maharashtra
Stamp Act, 1958

Gifts between relatives carry a
concessional stamp duty as opposed to gifts to non-relatives. Gifts to defined
relatives carry a stamp duty @ 3% + 1% on the market value / ready reckoner
value of the property. The defined relatives for this purpose are spouse,
sibling, lineal ascendants or descendants of the donor. Thus, the list is quite
small as compared to the list u/s 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act. Hence, it is
essential to note that what may be exempt from income-tax may not also carry a
concessional stamp duty rate.

 

In addition to the above, for two
types of properties and six relatives the stamp duty is only Rs. 200 + 1% of
the market value of the property and a registration fee of just Rs. 200. This
concession is available only for residential or agricultural property and only
for the husband, wife, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter of the donor. Any
other relative not covered within the above six relations would attract the 4%
duty, provided the relation is covered within the above larger list. For
instance, a gift of property to one’s brother would attract 4% duty on the gift
deed. Similarly, even for gift to the six relations if it is a gift of
commercial property / non-agricultural land, then the duty would be 4%, e.g.,
gift of an office to one’s son would attract 4% duty. Unlike section 56(2)(x),
the relatives need to be viewed in relation to the donor and not in relation to
the recipient. Hence, if a son gifts a residential house to his father, then
the gift deed would not attract a concessional duty of Rs. 200 + 1% but would
be covered by the 4% duty!

 

SEBI
Laws

SEBI Regulations have various ways
of dealing with relatives. The SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure
Requirements) Regulations, 2009
which prescribe the requirements for
making an offer document for public issues, rights issues, etc., define who
constitutes a promoter group of a company making an issue. It includes the
promoter and his immediate relatives, i.e., any spouse or any parent, brother,
sister or child of the promoter or of the spouse. Thus, step-children have also
been covered.

 

The SEBI (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 2011
exempts any
transfer of listed shares inter se immediate relatives from the
requirements of making an open offer. The definition is the same as given
above.

 

On the other hand, the SEBI
(Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015
treats the immediate
relative of an insider as a connected person and it is defined to mean the
spouse of a person, and includes parent, sibling, and child of such person or
of the spouse, any of whom is either dependent financially on such person, or
consults such person in taking decisions relating to trading in securities.

 

The SEBI (Listing Obligations
and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015
prescribe the meaning of
an independent director for a listed company. For this purpose, a person whose
relative has a pecuniary relationship with / is a KMP of the listed company,
etc., cannot be appointed. Again, beginning 1st April, 2020, the
Chairmen of certain listed companies cannot be related to the MD / CEO. The
definition of relative for these purposes is the same as contained in the
Companies Act, 2013. Thus, different SEBI Regulations have dual definitions
with the term immediate relative being much smaller in ambit than a relative.


FEMA
Regulations

The FEMA Regulations notified by
the RBI under the FEMA Act, 1999 use the concept of relative at various places:

 

a)   A
gift of shares from a resident to a non-resident requires the RBI approval and
is allowed only for gift to relatives;


b)  Individuals
resident in India are permitted to include a non-resident Indian close relative
as a joint holder in all types of resident bank accounts on ‘either or survivor’”
basis;


c)   Resident
relatives can be added as joint account holders along with the primary holder
in Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Accounts and Non-Resident (External) / NRE
Accounts;


d)  NRIs/
PIOs can remit up to USD 1 million per financial year in respect of assets
acquired under a deed of settlement made by his / her relatives provided the
settlement takes effect on the death of the settler;


e)   An
NRI or an OCI can acquire by way of gift any immovable property (other than
agricultural land / plantation property / farm house) in India from a person
resident in India or from an NRI or an OCI who is a relative;


f)   An
NRI or an OCI may gift any immovable property (other than agricultural land or
plantation property or farm house) to an NRI or an OCI who should be a relative
of the donor;


g)  Under
the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of USD 250,000, a resident can meet the
medical expenses in respect of an NRI close relative when the NRI is on a visit
to India; maintain close relatives abroad;


h)   Under
the LRS, residents can extend interest-free loans in Indian rupees to NRI / PIO
relatives.

 

The definition of relatives under
the Companies Act, 2013 is adopted for all of the above purposes.

 

However, the FEMA Regulations have
a different definition when it comes to acquisition of immovable property
abroad. They provide that a resident can acquire immovable property abroad
jointly with a relative who is a person resident outside India, provided there
is no outflow of funds from India, and for this purpose the definition of
relative means husband, wife, brother or sister or any lineal ascendant or
descendant of that individual.

 

Agricultural
land laws

The Maharashtra Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948
seeks to govern the relationships between
tenants and landlords of agricultural lands. A person lawfully cultivating any
land belonging to another person is deemed to be a tenant if such
land is not cultivated personally by the owner. Land is said to be
cultivated personally if a (parcel of) land is cultivated on one’s own account
by labour of family members, i.e., spouse, children or siblings in case of a
joint family. A joint family is defined to mean an HUF and in case of other
communities, a group or unit the members of which are by custom joint in estate
or residence. In one case, even a married sister living with her husband has
been regarded as a part of the family – Case No. 8953 O/154 of 1954.
No land purchased by a tenant shall be transferred by him by way of sale, gift,
exchange, etc., without the previous sanction of the Collector. Rule 25A
provides the circumstances in which, and conditions subject to which, sanction
shall be given by the Collector u/s 43. One of them is for a gift in favour of
a member of the landowner’s family.

 

The Maharashtra Agricultural
Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961
imposes a ceiling on holding of
agricultural land in Maharashtra. Under section 4 of the Act, the ceiling on
the holding of agricultural lands is per ‘Family Unit’. This is a unique
and important concept introduced by the Act. It is very essential to have a
clear picture as to who is and who is not included in one’s ceiling computation
since that could make all the difference between holding and acquisition of the
land. A family unit is defined to mean the following – a person; his spouse or
more than one spouse if that be the case (thus, if a person dies leaving two or
more widows, then they would constitute one consolidated family unit for
considering the ceiling [State Of Maharashtra vs. Smt. Banabai and
Anr.(1986) 4 SCC 281];
his minor sons; his minor unmarried daughters;
and if his spouse is dead then the minor sons and minor unmarried daughters
from that spouse.

 

Thus, the married daughter of a
person, whether minor or major, would constitute a separate family unit and
hence any land held by such a daughter would not be included in computing the
ceiling of a person. This is the reason why many people transfer excess
agricultural land to their married daughters so as to exclude it from the
ceiling limits. Since a daughter is a relative u/s 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax
Act, the transaction is out of the purview of that section. Similarly, a
daughter is a relative under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 and hence a gift
of agricultural land to one’s married daughter attracts a concessional stamp
duty of Rs. 200 + 1% of the market value. Further, it is important to note that
a person’s parents are not included in his ceiling and hence, if either or both
of one’s parents are alive and holding land, then the same would not be
included in the person’s ceiling computation. Similarly, land held by one’s
major son and / or his wife is not included in a person’s ceiling computation.

 

Benami
Act

The Benami Property Transactions Act,
1988 is an Act which has gained a lot of prominence of late. Attachment orders
are being issued by the Competent Authority in respect of benami properties. In
such a situation, it becomes very important to understand what are the
exceptions to benami property. The Act provides for three situations when
property held for the benefit of relatives would not be treated as benami:

 

(i) Property held by a Karta, or a member of an HUF, as the case
may be, and the property is held for his benefit or the benefit of other
members in the family and the consideration for such property has been provided
or paid out of the known sources of the HUF;

(ii)  Property held by any individual in the name of his spouse / any
child of such individual and the consideration for such property has been
provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual; and


(iii) Property held by any person in the
name of his sibling or lineal ascendant / descendant, whose names and the
individual’s name appear as joint-owners in any document, and the consideration
for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the
individual.

 

Rent
Act

The
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 defines a tenant to include, when the tenant
dies, any member of the tenant’s family who is residing with him in case of a
residential property. However, the Act does not define the term family member.
The Supreme Court in S.N. Sudalaimuthu Chettiar vs. Palaniyandavan, AIR
1966 SC 469
has defined the term family (in the context of an
agricultural land law) to mean ‘a group of people related by blood or marriage,
relatives’. Accordingly, the son-in-law was held to be a tenant since he was
residing with the tenant.

 

Accounting
Standards

For the purposes of the related
party definition, the Accounting Standards also give a definition of the term
relative. AS-18 on Related Party Disclosures defines it as an individual’s
spouse, child, sibling, parent who may be expected to influence or be influenced
by that individual in his / her dealings with the entity. On the other hand,
Ind AS 24 on Related Party Disclosures uses the term close members of the
family of a person and defines it to include the person’s children, spouse /
domestic partner, sibling, parent; children of that person’s spouse / domestic
partner and dependants of that person or his / her spouse / domestic partner.
Thus, the definition under Ind AS is much wider than the one found under Indian
GAAP.

 

IBC,
2016

The latest law to come out with its
own definition of the term ‘relative’ is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 as amended by the 2018 Amendment Act. The Act provides that a relative of
a person or his spouse would constitute a related party in relation to that
person. The list of relatives included by the Code for this purpose is very
long:

(i)    members
of an HUF

(ii)    spouse

(iii)   parents

(iv)   children

(v)   grandchildren

(vi)   grandchild’s children

(vii)  siblings

(viii)  sibling’s children

(ix)   parents of either parent

(x)   siblings of either parent 

(xi)  wherever the relation is that of a son, daughter, sister or
brother, their spouses are also included in the definition of relative.

 

CONCLUSION

Perhaps
the time has come to subsume all these definitions into one consolidated
definition of the term ‘relative’ which could be used in all laws rather than
each legislation coming up with its own definition. However, having said that,
it is also true that what may be good for one law may not be so for another
law. Hence, a very long list of relatives may be beneficial under taxing
statutes but not so under regulatory statutes, such as the Companies Act since
it would increase the number of ineligible persons. However, an effort must be
made to strike a balance and arrive at a consolidated definition. Till that
time, the word ‘relative’ would continue to be a relative term!

DISCLOSURE OF PROMOTER AGREEMENTS: SEBI’S NDTV ORDER

SEBI recently passed an
order against some promoters of New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV). Under the
order dated 14th June, 2019, it debarred certain promoters from dealing in and
accessing the securities markets, acting as directors in listed companies, etc.
The order concerns itself with certain loan and related agreements the terms of
which were not disclosed to the public. SEBI held that such non-disclosure is
fraudulent and harmful to the interests of the public / shareholders. The order
raises wider concerns since this is a common issue. The question would be
whether there is adequate disclosure of terms of shareholders’ agreements and
similar agreements by major shareholders / promoters of listed companies. On
appeal, the Securities Appellate Tribunal on 18th June, 2019 stayed the SEBI
order for the time being.

 

The bone of contention was
the loans taken by a promoter company under certain terms from two successive
lenders. These terms fell into broadly two categories: One is the grant of
convertible warrants to the second lender such that they could effectively
become almost 100% owners of the promoter company. The second relates to
certain clauses whereby the promoters were obliged to take prior written
permission of the lender before carrying out specified acts in NDTV. This,
according to SEBI, amounted to giving powers to the lender to take decisions in
NDTV. However, these agreements were not disclosed to NDTV or the public in
general. According to SEBI, this amounted to non-disclosure of price-sensitive
information and also fraud, and thus passed the adverse directions against
three promoters.

 

As stated earlier, some of
the terms are commonly a part of agreements entered into by promoters /
companies. This order ought to be of wide concern since it may lead to charges
of non-disclosure or incomplete disclosure and thus result in serious adverse
consequences.

 

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The relevant promoters of
NDTV were RRPR Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (RRPR) and Dr. Prannoy Roy / Ms Radhika Roy
(together the Roys). The Roys owned RRPR. They held in the aggregate during the
relevant time about 61 to 63% of the equity shares of NDTV. It appears that
RRPR had taken some loans from ICICI Bank Limited. To repay those loans, it
took certain loans from Vishwapradhan Commercial Private Limited (VCPL). The
terms of the loans from ICICI Bank and VCPL and the transactions related to the
loans were the areas of concern.

 

After carrying out certain
internal sale / purchase transactions, RRPR ended up holding 30% shares in
NDTV. As a part of the loan transaction terms with VCPL, share warrants were
issued to VCPL whereby, if such share warrants were fully exercised, VCPL would
hold 99.99% shares in RRPR. Effectively, it would thus become 100% owner in
RRPR. Certain connected agreements also gave an option to associate companies
of VCPL to acquire in aggregate 26% of NDTV from RRPR.

 

Further, the loan agreements
between RRPR / the Roys and ICICI / VCPL provided for certain terms relating to
the management of NDTV. Several specified important decisions could not be
taken in NDTV without the prior written approval of VCPL. RRPR and the Roys
were required to exercise their shareholding in NDTV to ensure that decisions
in NDTV are not taken in violation of these terms.

 

THE ALLEGATIONS

SEBI stated that the
promoters did not make the required disclosures of these transactions and
terms. The information was price-sensitive and would have affected the
decisions of the investors / public. SEBI alleged that this non-disclosure was
fraudulent in nature.

 

The terms of the agreement
whereby share warrants were issued to VCPL amounted for all practical purposes
to transfer of the shares in NDTV by the promoters. Further, agreeing to terms
whereby certain important decisions in NDTV would require prior approval of
ICICI / VCPL also amounted to information that shareholders / public ought to
know. Effectively, decision-making power was transferred / shared with certain
persons of which the public did not have knowledge. They would be looking at
the Roys as the persons in charge.

 

Thus, multiple provisions
of the SEBI Act and the SEBI PFUTP Regulations were alleged to have been violated
by entering into such transactions without due disclosures.

 

THE DEFENCE OFFERED BY THE PROMOTERS

The promoters denied the
allegations. They claimed that the loan agreement was a private one and had
nothing to do with NDTV. NDTV was not bound by the terms of the agreement.
Hence, the terms agreed upon did not affect NDTV and thus the public /
shareholders.

 

Further, it was contended
that these were standard terms in loan agreements.

 

Importantly, a distinction
was made between their role as shareholders and as directors. It was stated
that they were free to do what they wanted as shareholders in respect of their
shares. They stated that their acts as private shareholders did not conflict
with their role as directors. In any case, they were in the minority on the
board as there were so many other directors.

 

SEBI’S CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

SEBI did not agree with
the defence offered by the promoters. It held the agreements were not bona
fide
loan agreements, and indeed were a sham to that extent. Such long-term
loans without interest and without any terms of repayment are not entered into
in the ordinary course of business. The loan agreement was, SEBI concluded, a
sale agreement.

 

The right of ICICI / VCPL
under the agreement to participate in certain important decisions was vital
information that the promoters should have disclosed to NDTV and the public.
SEBI also rejected the distinction made by the promoters between their role as
shareholders and as directors.

 

SEBI also rejected the
contention that as just two directors on the Board of NDTV, they could not have
influenced the decisions of NDTV. SEBI noted, ‘This contention is not tenable
in view of the fact that Noticee No. 2 is not only the Director of NDTV but is
the Chairman of the Board of the Company. Secondly, Noticee No. 2 and 3 were
not only the Chairman and Managing Director, respectively, but along with
Noticee No. 1, which is a private limited company of Noticee No. 2 and 3, were
also the promoters and majority shareholders, holding majority voting rights in
NDTV. Therefore, it is inconceivable that Noticee No. 2 and 3 were incapable of
ensuring compliance with the conditions to which they had agreed under the loan
agreements with respect to the affairs of NDTV.’

 

Further, SEBI pointed to
the code of conduct of NDTV to which the Roys were subject. As per this code,
they were not supposed to put themselves in a position of conflict with the
company. Yet, by entering into such a loan agreement, they had placed
themselves in such a position.

 

SEBI noted that the Roys
had entered into off-market transactions in the shares of NDTV. Thus, they
dealt in shares of NDTV without disclosing relevant information to the public
who dealt in shares without having such information. SEBI observed, ‘In the
absence of availability of material information relating to VCPL Loan
Agreements 1 and 2 in the public domain, investors were not in a position to
take any informed decision while dealing in the scrip of NDTV. Hence, by
concealing such material information from the public shareholders during the
relevant period when the promoters themselves were dealing in shares of the
company, Noticees have allegedly committed fraud on the minority public
shareholders of the company.’

 

The terms of the loan
agreement, SEBI noted, apart from being very liberal, were strange. The share
warrants could be converted even after the repayment of the loan. Thus, the
lender could become effectively the owner of RRPR and hence the 30% shares in
NDTV even after repayment of the loan. Thus, it noted, ‘It is not a loan
transaction simpliciter. It appears an outright transfer of 30% stake and
voting rights in NDTV by the Noticees masquerading as a loan agreement which
did not even possess the basic attributes of a normal secured loan transaction.
In my view, the VCPL Loan Agreements 1 and 2 are sham loan transactions
executed by the Noticees only with a motive to sell their substantial stake in
NDTV.’

 

Accordingly, SEBI ordered
as follows: RRPR and the Roys were debarred from accessing the securities
markets, buying / selling securities or being associated with the securities
markets for two years. Their existing securities, including mutual fund units,
were frozen during this period. The Roys were also debarred from occupying
positions as Director or Key Managerial Personnel in NDTV for two years and in
any other listed company for one year.

 

 

APPEAL TO SAT AND STAY

The promoters immediately
appealed to SAT, which has stayed the order for the time being pending final
disposal. SAT held that the conclusions drawn by SEBI need to be examined in
more detail and a company such as NDTV cannot be kept headless in the meantime.
This would be harmful to NDTV and also its shareholders.

 

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is very common for
parties to enter into shareholders’ and similar or related agreements with
investors / lenders. Certain rights are given to them that include taking their
approval for specified major matters. The SEBI LODR Regulations now do have a
requirement of making disclosures of such agreements. However, this order would
be an eye-opener for parties who would have to ensure that due disclosures are
made. The present case related to events in and around 2008-2010. There may
thus be concerns that even agreements entered into in the distant past may be
covered and SEBI may take action if these have not been disclosed.

 

Though the facts of this
case are peculiar and though the matter is under appeal, a closer look is
required by companies and promoters to their own cases. It is also suggested
that SEBI itself comes out with clearer directions on this and gives time to
promoters / companies to make specific disclosures, irrespective of what has
happened in the past.

RERA, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

RERA (or Real Estate Regularity Authority),
introduced as a remedy against the rampant malpractices of builders and to
safeguard the interests of homebuyers by ensuring the sale of plots, apartments
or buildings in an efficient, fair and transparent manner, has had more than
two years of operation and it is time to look back and assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the legislation in its present form and application. As with any
regulatory measure at the nascent stage, particularly in an area like the real
estate sector, there were inevitably certain teething problems to be addressed
and the effectiveness lies in the way such problems have been dealt with.

 

NOT OPERATIONAL IN ALL STATES

The Central legislation, applicable
throughout the country (except the then state of Jammu & Kashmir), did not
find an equally enthusiastic response from several states and Union territories
which failed to act within the prescribed time in matters of framing rules,
setting up the Authorities, creating the website and establishing the Appellate
Tribunals in their respective jurisdictions.

 

It is a matter of common knowledge that
barring Maharashtra and a few other states, the governments did not abide by
the mandate of the Act in framing the Rules in the prescribed time. As conveyed
recently by the Centre to the Supreme Court, the process to notify the Rules in
Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Sikkim is still under way. Twenty
nine states / UTs have so far set up the Authority and only 22 the Appellate
Tribunal. The inaction on the part of several states for a considerably long
period of time not only distorted the pan-India nature of the Act, but also
deprived the people of those states of the intended benefits, creating unjust
differentiation.

 

The Centre needs to be more active in
ensuring enforcement of the Act and its timely implementation in the true
spirit of the legislation by constant monitoring.

 

LACK OF HARMONY BETWEEN THE ACT AND RULES

RERA, the Central Act, is not uniformly
implemented in various states because the rule-making power is vested in the
states which have framed rules of varying nature, some even inconsistent with
the substantive provisions of the Act.

 

Section 84 of RERA provided for the state
governments to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act by
notification within a period of six months of the commencement of the Act.
Although the power to frame rules was vested in the states, it was expected
that the Rules would be within the framework of the Act and as such would not
be different in substance beyond a reasonable limit.

 

But is it fair for certain states to go
beyond the authority to suit their own understanding of how the provisions
should be? For instance, the provision of section 4(2)(l)(D) requires 70% of
the amounts realised from time to time from the allottees to be deposited in a
separate bank account to cover the cost of construction and the land cost which
can be withdrawn from the account to cover the cost of the project, in
proportion to the percentage of completion of the project. The idea in broad
terms was to have free funds equal to the profit component embedded in the
receipts (estimated at 30% of the receipts) and to keep the balance amount
separate from other funds to be used exclusively for the cost of the
construction and the land. The withdrawal, as per the Act, is restricted to the
amount proportionate to the percentage completion of the project.

 

Certain states
have prescribed rules for determining the withdrawable amount which are not
consistent with the provisions of the Act. Maharashtra, for instance, permits
withdrawal of the entire land cost and the entire cost incurred up to the date
of withdrawal, leaving, in a large number of cases, hardly any amount to be
utilised for further construction. Further damage to the concept is done by the
executive order giving artificial meaning to the land cost which is a notional
cost higher than the actual land cost envisaged in the Act. The Maha-RERA, for
instance, permits withdrawal of the notional indexed cost in line with the
computation of cost of acquisition for purposes of capital gain under the
Income-tax Act which results in withdrawal of an amount several times more than
the actual land cost (Circular No. 7/2017 dated 4th
July, 2017).

 

There are other areas where such digression
is visible. Notable among these is the area of conveyancing. Section 11(4)(f)
provides for executing a registered conveyance deed of the apartment, plot or
building in favour of the allottee and the undivided proportionate title in the
common areas to the Association of Allottees or the Competent Authority. The
Rules of several states are at variance with this provision as they have chosen
to go by the prevailing / prevalent local laws, even if they are inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act. Maharashtra, for instance, goes by the pattern
laid down in MOFA and provides for conveyance of the building not to the
allottees but to the association of allottees / society / company. In case of
buildings in layouts, the structure of the building (excluding basements and
podium) is to be conveyed to the respective societies and the undivided and the
inseparable land along with basements and podiums are to be conveyed to the
apex body or Federation of all the societies formed for the purpose [Rule
9(2)]. Tamil Nadu follows its local law, i.e., The Tamil Nadu Apartment
Ownership Act,1994 and provides for conveyance of undivided share of land,
including proportionate share in the common area, directly to the respective
allottees [Rule 9(3) of Tamil Nadu Rules]. Karnataka follows Tamil Nadu and
provides for conveyance of apartment along with proportionate share in common
areas to the respective allottees.

 

One can hold a view that such rules are more
reasonable and pragmatic, providing for consistency in the practice so far
observed, without in any way harming the cause of the allottees. The solution
in such cases appears to be a review of the Act instead of allowing such
variance to continue. Rules being subordinate legislation are to be in
conformity with the law. Another possible solution can be to make the
provisions applicable in the absence of local laws, as has been done in section
17 which lays down the time within which the conveyance is to be made.

 

UNWORKABLE
OR DIFFICULT DIRECTIONS

There is one area of concern to the
promoters. In an agreement where the landowner gets his land developed by the
builder in consideration of allotment of certain units in the developed
building free of cost, both the landowner as well as the builder are regarded
as the promoters under the Act.

 

In such a case, is it fair to insist on both
of them to open separate bank accounts for depositing 70% of the receipt from
the allottees, creating a situation where the landowner who though not required
to incur any cost of construction, is forced to keep 70% of sale proceeds of
his share of units in the bank account till the entire project is completed? If
we examine the provision closely, it requires opening of a separate account for
the project and not for individual promoters. If the project is one in which
there are two promoters, then there should be a requirement of opening one bank
account only. Is it fair in such circumstances to ask the landowner to deposit
70% of sale proceeds in a separate bank account?

 

It will take a substantially long time for
contentious issues to be settled in judicial forums. In case a high-level body
is established at the Centre with the authority to issue clarifications by way
of circulars binding on all the Authorities, much of the hardship and
litigation can be avoided.

 

INTERPRETATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT
OF LAW

RERA has been introduced to safeguard the
interests of the home-buyers. The object and the purpose of the legislation is
material in the understanding of any provision which, unless contrary to any
specific provision, is to be interpreted in a manner so as to subserve the
purpose of the Act.

 

In view of such
an accepted canon of interpretation particularly in respect of a legislation
which is remedial in nature, meant to address the problems faced by the class
of people having no accessible remedy for the harm done to them by the class of
powerful persons, is it fair for the authorities to go by the rigidity and technicality
of words and expressions disregarding the objects and purposes of the
legislation? The decision not to entertain complaints for delayed possession
after the promoter has offered to give possession; the decision exempting the
promoter from the requirement of registration if the completion certificate is
issued within three months from the commencement of the Act; the decision not
to entertain complaints if the project is not registered; the decision not to
consider a project as ongoing even if a part-occupancy certificate is issued
before 1st May, 2017; these are some of the decisions which appear
to go against the avowed purpose of the legislation depriving the affected
persons of the remedy to which they are entitled for no fault of theirs.

 

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Even though the Authority is constituted of
a Chairman and two members, the decision on complaints filed by the aggrieved
allottees is taken by a single member, resulting in the same Authority taking
different views on the same issue. This introduces subjectivity in judicial
decision-making which should ideally be avoided.

 

 

One finds instances of a differing approach
in decisions by different members of the same Authority. On the basic issue,
for instance, whether RERA has application in respect of projects which are not
registered or which are exempted from registration, different decisions have
come from different members. One member has taken a decision that registration
is one of the obligations cast on the promoter, non-performance of which visits
with penal consequences under the Act. The registration is not the essential
pre-requisite for entertaining a complaint under RERA. A different view is
taken by the other member who declines to entertain the complaint of the
aggrieved person if it relates to an unregistered project. The issue has been
considered and adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal and the jurisdictional
High Court, yet the
problem persists.

 

As a matter of sound judicial process, it is
advisable to introduce the Bench system of deciding judicial matters. Once a
different view is proposed to be taken by another Bench on the matter of
interpretation, the Chairman should constitute a larger Bench to decide the
matter.

 

PUBLICATION OF CASES DECIDED BY DIFFERENT
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES

RERA being a
Central Act, the views taken by any Tribunal / High Court on any issue should
be a source of guidance to all the Authorities in the country. For this it is
necessary to have agencies like those bringing out AIR, Taxmann, etc., for
publishing important decisions on points of law given by different Tribunals,
High Courts and the Supreme Court so that the doctrine of precedent  and Stare Decisis may be applied in relation to RERA cases also.

 

CONCLUSION

Overall, RERA has provided substantial relief to the
hitherto unprotected home-buyers. It has succeeded in instilling a sense of
confidence and providing an assurance that things will go as promised. In this regard,
certain states including Maharashtra have played a commendable role. With this
undeniable truth, the need is for the initial enthusiasm to continue unabated
in providing speedy resolution of disputes in the true spirit of the
legislation. The discussion above is meant to focus on certain aspects, a
meaningful consideration of which may go a long way in making RERA serve its
purpose even better.

 

MANDATED CSR AND IMPRISONMENT: A FIT CASE FOR RECONSIDERATION

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is in
the news with the passing of the Companies Amendment Act, 2019 because it has
made lapses in complying with CSR spends an offence subject to imprisonment for
a maximum period of three years1. The penal provision for
imprisonment replaces the earlier requirement to comply with CSR spends or
explain the reason why a company had not spent the mandated amount on CSR. This
change was brought in after witnessing five years’ track record of implementing
mandated CSR. Hence it is appropriate that we evaluate and take stock of the
idea behind Mandated CSR in the backdrop of India Inc’s track record on
implementing CSR spends in the last five years and evaluate the fairness of the
current punishment accorded for lapses in CSR spends in the overall context of
the penal provisions prescribed under the Companies Act, 2013.

 

India is the first and probably only country
till date to mandate CSR spends by large corporates. It was part of the
Companies Act, 2013 which was enacted to replace the 1956 Act and was seen as a
major measure to promote ease of doing business and corporate activity that
would accelerate the pace of India’s economic growth. Probably to balance the
inequality created by private sector-led economic growth, the new Act required
large companies, defined by their net-worth, turnover or profits beyond the
defined threshold level, to spend 2% of the average profits of the last three
years on specific activities identified in schedule VII of the Act.

__________________________________________________________________

1   135 (5)
The Board of every company referred to in sub-section (1), shall ensure
that the company spends, in every financial year, at least two per cent of the
average net profits of the company made during the three immediately preceding
financial years, or where the company has not completed the period of three
financial years since its incorporation, during such immediately preceding
financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy:

Provided that the
company shall give preference to the local area and areas around it where it
operates, for spending the amount earmarked for Corporate Social Responsibility
activities:

Provided further
that if the company fails to spend such amount, the Board shall, in its report
made under clause (o) of sub-section (3) of section 134, specify
the reasons for not spending the amount and, unless the unspent amount relates
to any ongoing project referred to in sub-section (6), transfer such
unspent amount to a Fund specified in Schedule VII, within a period of six
months of the expiry of the financial year.

Explanation—For the
purposes of this section “net profit” shall not include such sums as may be
prescribed and shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of section
198.

(6) Any amount remaining
unspent under sub-section (5), pursuant to any ongoing project,
fulfilling such conditions as may be prescribed, undertaken by a company in
pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy, shall be transferred
by the company within a period of thirty days from the end of the financial
year to a special account to be opened by the company in that behalf for that
financial year in any scheduled bank to be called the Unspent Corporate Social
Responsibility Account, and such amount shall be spent by the company in
pursuance of its obligation towards the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy
within a period of three financial years from the date of such transfer,
failing which, the company shall transfer the same to a fund specified in
schedule VII, within a period of thirty days from the date of completion of the
third financial year.

(7) If a company
contravenes the provisions of sub-section (5) or sub-section (6),
the company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than fifty
thousand rupees but which may extend to twenty-five lakh rupees and every officer of such company who is in default
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years
or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but
which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.

 

 

CSR RATIONALE – THE THREE VIEWPOINTS

The concept of CSR emerged in economies
where there was exclusive focus on corporate business responsibility. In
contrast, in social democratic societies in Northern Europe, especially the
Nordic countries, the concept of CSR is quite nascent and is focused more on
sustainability and innovations as the basic social security needs of health,
education and old-age relief are provided by the state. Even in continental
Europe, in countries like France and Germany, where some form of state
socialism prevails, CSR has limited appeal. Companies in the private sector of
these economies implement labour laws which are quite comprehensive and pay
their taxes which fund social security programmes for the rest of the society.

 

The idea of CSR has flourished only in
liberal market economies such as the United States where the private sector
dominates healthcare and education, catering only to the needs of the society
that can afford to use their service. The reason for this is not too difficult
to fathom. The primary business responsibility of a company in these economies
is restricted to earning a profit by conducting its affairs legally and the
social security system in place is not comprehensive enough to cover all the
vulnerable sections of the society. Further, some of these social concerns were
not addressed by the government despite the visible and pressing needs as it
was seen by some to infringe on the personal freedom of individuals, or seen by
some others to be discretionary for which tax-payers’ money should not be used.

 

Over time, three distinct views emerged to
justify CSR in these liberal economies. Initially, CSR spending was seen as an
optional marketing expense, essential for building a corporate brand and
goodwill among the public at large who were seen as potential customers or
employees in the long run. In the second stage, the pressure to spend on CSR
increased in companies operating in certain sectors like mining and energy that
used natural resources and caused noticeable pollution / environmental hazards.

 

But then a new rationale emerged, with CSR
being seen through the lens of the social contract theory. Using this theory,
CSR spending was justified as the fee paid by the polluting firms to society in
return for their right to carry on business. This view seems to have gained
credibility as firms with high CSR spends were found in highly polluting
sectors, or sectors with large negative externalities, such as mining, tobacco
and oil exploration.

 

Around the end of the second millennium, a
third view emerged. It was an interesting viewpoint, where CSR was seen as
businesses serving the base of the pyramid. This idea gained traction in
parallel with the idea of social enterprises gaining visibility, especially in
areas like micro-finance. Depending upon whom you talk to and which part of the
world you are in, all the three views can be heard.

 

MANDATED CSR – A
PRO-CON ANALYSIS

The idea of mandated CSR introduced by the
Companies Act, 2013 emerged in the backdrop of the prevailing concepts of CSR
expenditure seen as brand investment or as a social contract with the society
to compensate for the negative effects of business, or as catering to the needs
of the base of the pyramid, or as a variant of social enterprise. In this
context, mandated CSR was a new idea not found elsewhere in the world. Shorn of
its voluntary ‘mask’, mandated CSR is a form of taxation, where the tax,
instead of being paid to the exchequer, was now in the hands of the taxpayer to
be spent on pre-defined purposes. Instead of a legal process coercing the
company to spend with the threat of penalty for defaults in spending, the 2013
mandate used the principle of social pressure of ‘Comply or Explain’, a
technique using social standing and reputation as leverage to get companies to
spend on CSR.

 

Advocates of the mandated CSR approach
hailed it for three specific reasons:

(i) Companies would be more effective than
government in spending the money as they would bring in the speed and
efficiency of the corporate world in the selection, implementation and
monitoring of the CSR spends. Especially on the monitoring front, there was
huge expectation of corporate experience bringing in new techniques and methods
of monitoring that would help the social sector.

(ii) Absence of the bureaucracy and
discretion available in the corporate world would enable innovative projects to
be taken up in the social sector funded by the corporates. Once these projects
succeeded, they could be used by the government for scaling up and reaching
larger segments of the society.

(iii) Companies would cater to the needs of
specially deserving segments of the population and meet the specific needs of
their location that may not be visible to the larger government machinery.

 

Opponents of the mandated CSR school, in
addition to questioning the ‘corporate efficiency’ theory, also raised the
issue of intent where some corporates instead of allocating incremental budgets
for CSR spends may be reclassifying their current spends or placing a social
envelop for their business spends on marketing and pre-recruitment training
expenses to meet the mandate. Further, they also questioned the desire of
corporates to spend time and effort in building the competency required to
manage social projects.

 

While both sides had their merits, only the
track record of India Inc. in CSR spends could settle the issue one way or the
other. So what does the five-year track record of India Inc. show?

 

INDIA INC.’S CSR
PERFORMANCE – THE TRACK RECORD

In the first year of mandated CSR, if we
take Nifty 50 as representative of India Inc., the performance reflected
teething troubles as is to be expected of any new enactment, especially one
that involves discretionary spends. Against a mandated spend of Rs. 5,046
crores, reflecting 2% of the profits of the Nifty 50 companies, the actual
spend was at 79%, amounting to Rs. 3,989 crores2. Two of the Nifty
50 entities, State Bank of India and Bank of Baroda, are not regulated by the
Companies Act, 2013 and hence were not required to specify their mandated
spends on CSR.

__________________________________________-

2   CimplyFive’s India Secretarial Practice 2015,
Nifty 50 Annual Report Analysis, December 2015

 

Of the remaining 48 companies, 16 spent in
excess of the mandate, including three companies where the mandated spends on
CSR was negative due to lack of profits. The remaining 32 companies had a
shortfall in their spends, with 30 of them explaining the reason for their
inability to spend. Only two companies offered no explanation for not spending
the required amount on CSR. A further analysis revealed that 12 companies had
stated that being the first year, they were not able to spend as they were
building their capacity to spend.

 

Table 1: Comparison of CSR spends by Nifty 50
Companies in the first two years of mandate

 

Financial year

CSR amount mandated

Rs. crores

Amount spent

Rs. crores

% spent of mandated amount

Companies not spending mandated amount

2014-15

5,046

3,989

79%

32 (64%)

2015-16

5,478

5,082

93%

25 (50%)

 

In the second
year of implementation, we see a marked improvement in CSR spends compared to
the first year as depicted in Table 1. The mandated amount of CSR spends
increased by 8.5% to Rs. 5,478 crores and the amount spent on CSR activities
increased by 27% to Rs. 5,082 crores. Even the amount spent as percentage of
the mandate increased from 79% to 93%, an increase of 14%.3  Companies not spending the mandated amount
too decreased from 32 to 25 and only one company did not disclose the reason
for not spending the mandated amount.

 

The steady improvement in compliance becomes
more evident when we look at the last two years. In 2017-18, the CSR spend as a
percentage of mandate was 984 
and in the last financial year 2018-19, the spend as a percentage of
mandate was at 104. However, the number of companies with shortfall in CSR
spends in 2018-19 at ten remained at the same level as in 2017-18.

 

The performance of India Inc., as
represented by the Nifty 50 companies in the five-year period, reflects that
the objective of CSR mandate in getting companies to spend on social activities
is achieved as evidenced by Nifty 50 companies, as they spent 104% of the
mandated amount.

____________________________________________________

3   CimplyFive’s India Secretarial Practice 2016,
Nifty 50 Annual Reports Analysis, November 2016

4   CimplyFive’s India Secretarial Practice 2018,
A Study of Nifty 50 Companies, March 2019

 

 

Table 2: CSR spends of the Nifty 50 Companies
in last two years

 

Financial year

CSR amount mandated

Rs. crores

Amount spent

Rs. crores

% spent of mandated amount

Companies not spending mandated amount

2017-18

6,434

6,300

98%

10 (20%)

2018-19

6,858

7,109

104%

10 (20%)

 

 

The Indian experience of using ‘comply or
explain’ is at par with the international experience seen in Europe where it
takes three to four years for a new regulation to be widely adopted and
implemented. While the experience of Indian corporates outside the Nifty 50
companies could be different, there is no data that is analysed and presented
to show that. Given this analysis, was there a need to change the penal
provision to enforce CSR spends by Indian corporates to the extreme level of
imprisoning the officers in default for a maximum period of three years? How
does this punishment compare with penalties for other defaults in company law?

 

PENALTY IN CORPORATE
LAW

Conceptually, punishment or penalty can have
two distinct objectives:

 

(a) Compensatory, i.e., to punish the
wrongdoers by taking away from them the benefit accruing to them from their
wrongdoing. Most often this is in the form of monetary penalties; or

(b) Deterrent and preventive, i.e., act as a
disincentive to the wrongdoer and all other potential wrongdoers by imposing a cost on them that is prohibitive and dissuades them from
committing the wrong. Since the objective is to be a deterrent and preventive,
this takes the form of monetary penalties, where the amount recovered is more
than the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer and / or limiting the personal
freedom of the wrongdoer, i.e., imprisonment.

 

The Companies Act, 2013, consisting of 470
sections, has penalties both in the nature of compensatory and
deterrent-cum-preventive measures. The Act has 101 sections with monetary
penalties for non-compliance and 56 sections that have imprisonment as penalty
combined with fine, as monetary penalty.5  While monetary penalties can be levied on
either the company or the officers in default, imprisonment is a penalty
applied only to the officers in default.

__________________________________________________

5   CimplyFive’s Report on the Cost of Compliance
and Penalty for Non-compliance under the Companies Act, 2013, December 2017

 

 

Analysing the penalty provisions that
provide for imprisonment in the Companies Act, 2013 we can classify them into
six distinct categories based on their value as a deterrent, as detailed in
Table 3:

 

Table 3: Classification of penalty provisions
for imprisonment based on their value as a deterrent

 

Category

Quantum of imprisonment

Illustrative types of wrongdoing

I

Which may extend up to 6 months

If company issues shares at a discount (section 53)

II

Which may extend up to 1 year

If a company fails to comply with the orders of the Tribunal
regarding rectification of registers of members (section 59)

III

Which may extend up to 2 years

Tampering with minutes (section 118)

IV

Which may extend up to 3 years

If a company violates the provisions of buyback of securities
(section 68)

If a company violates the provisions of buyback of securities
(section 69)

Default in complying with the order of the Tribunal to redeem
debentures, pay interest, etc. (section 71)

V

Which may extend up to 7 years

If company fails to repay deposit, or interest thereof,
within the time specified (section 74)

VI

Which may extend up to 10 years

Incorporation of a company providing false or incorrect
information (section 7, attracting penalty under section 447)

 

 

Seen in this backdrop, lapses in complying
with the CSR requirements on spending / transferring the amount to specified
accounts with imprisonment up to three years equates it to a category IV
offence, which is higher than tampering with the minutes of meetings of the
company.

 

Further, an analysis of Nifty 50 companies
that have short-spent on the mandated amount reveals that in some companies,
the Profit After Tax may not be backed by Operating Cash flows providing them
the liquidity to spend. At the Nifty 50 level, Operating Cash flows at Rs. 3,13,638 crores
are 90% of Profit After Tax at Rs. 3,48,751 crores. For certain companies that
have short-spent on CSR, Operating Cash flow as a percentage of Profit After
Tax drops to 16. Given this anomaly of Operating Cash flows being lower than
Profit After Tax in many companies due to their business model of selling on
credit or having a long working capital cycle, the penal provision of
imprisonment for non-compliance which could be the result of a business reality
needs a review.

 

Given the fact that charity cannot be
mandated or legislated, this mandate to prescribe imprisonment for lapses in
CSR spends, which the world over is optional for corporates, needs to be
seriously reconsidered.
The regulators, by swiftly
amending the law to remove this aberration, would visibly signal a conducive
corporate environment to promote economic growth and employment generation.

 

 

PS: After this article was written but
before publication, the government has responded to implement the report of
high-level committee on CSR which has recommended that violations should be
treated as civil offences and made liable to monetary fines.

 

This is a welcome step and will go a long
way in the Indian companies feeling the responsive nature of the regulator to
critical feedback.