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October 2021

EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

By Nilanjan Paul | Chartered Accountant
Reading Time 19 mins
BACKGROUND
The concept of Independent Directors (IDs) had emerged from the need to have a certain number of Directors on the Board who would think and act independently and to bring a healthy balance between the interests of the promoters and those of other stakeholders, including minority and small shareholders. IDs are an important component in the overall framework of corporate governance.

SEBI has, over the years, strengthened the institution of IDs through the recommendations of various committees. But despite several measures, concerns about the efficacy of IDs have continued. To further strengthen the overall framework of IDs for equity listed entities, the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘Listing Regulations’) have been amended with effect from 1st January, 2022. The Listing Regulations have further been amended to specifically empower the IDs of ‘high value debt listed entity1’ which would apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis until 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis thereafter. This article seeks to provide an overview of the key aspects emanating from these amendments and the key considerations for the companies and the governance professionals.

DEFINITION OF AN ID

Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations sets out certain objective conditions for determination of the independence of an ID. These conditions include areas of pecuniary relationship of self and of relatives with the listed entity, its promoter, or directors, etc. SEBI observed that scope exits to further strengthen the criteria for independence of IDs and harmonisation of certain requirements under the Listing Regulations, e.g., a cooling-off period while assessing the eligibility conditions for an ID. Further, an ID is also defined u/s 149 of the 2013 Act which provides that relatives of a proposed ID cannot have any pecuniary relationship including the pecuniary relationships as prescribed therein. The existing Listing Regulations do not provide a list of such pecuniary relationships. Hence, the definition of an ID under the 2013 Act and under the Listing Regulations is different.

To address the above concerns, especially harmonisation of requirements, SEBI has amended the Listing Regulations and has also inserted additional criteria as follows:

  •  Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID, apart from receiving Director’s remuneration, should not have / had any material pecuniary relationship with the prescribed entities, including the listed entity, its holding and subsidiaries during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations has been amended to extend the cooling-off period to three immediately preceding financial years. Let us consider the following example to better understand the amendment:

Ms Z is proposed to be appointed as an ID in Company XYZ in F.Y. 2021-2022. She noticed that in January, 2019 she had had a material pecuniary relationship (other than remuneration) with Company XYZ. As per the existing provisions, Ms Z could have been appointed as an ID as the relationship existed prior to the cooling-off period of two years. However, since the cooling-off has been extended to three years, she cannot be appointed as an ID.

  • Section 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act provides that a person cannot be appointed as an ID whose relatives have pecuniary relationships / transactions with the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or their promoters, or directors including holding any security of or interest and being indebted (in excess of the prescribed amount) during the immediately preceding two financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations does not prescribe a list of the pecuniary relationships similar to that provided under the 2013 Act but simply states that the relatives of such proposed ID should not have / had pecuniary relationship during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year in excess of the prescribed amount.

The list of pecuniary relationships as provided u/s 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act has been incorporated in Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations – with certain modifications; e.g., the period for determining pecuniary relationship is stated as three immediately preceding financial years (under the 2013 Act – two immediately preceding financial years), and the lower threshold (as per existing norms) for determining pecuniary relationship of relatives has been retained. Let’s understand these key differences with the help of the following examples:

– While assessing his eligibility conditions, Mr. Y noticed that one of his relative owes Rs. 60 lakhs to the Holding Company of the Company ABC. Company ABC is proposing to appoint Mr. Y as an ID in F.Y. 2021-2022. Mr. Y considered that the pecuniary relationships are permitted to the extent of the following:

Under the 2013 Act

Rs.

 

Under the Listing
Regulations (lower of following)

Rs.

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

Another threshold

50 lakhs

In the above situation the balance outstanding from the relatives is within the permissible limits under the 2013 Act. However, the outstanding is in excess of the limit prescribed under the Listing Regulations. Hence, Mr. Y cannot be appointed as an ID.

– Mr. X is assessing the eligibility conditions for his proposed appointment as an ID in Company DEF in March, 2022. He noticed that during F.Y. 2018-2019 one of his relatives held equity shares of the Company whose face value exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. A cooling-off period of two years and three years, respectively, has been prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. Accordingly, in this case even though the requirement of the two-year cooling period under the 2013 Act is met, Mr. X cannot be appointed as an ID because his relative had held securities during the three-year cooling period prescribed under the Listing Regulations.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID is a person who (neither himself nor whose relatives) holds or has held the position of a key managerial personnel or is or has been an employee of the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial year in which he is proposed to be appointed. The amended Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations extends the restriction to employment in any promoter group company. However, the proviso to the Regulation further provides that the cooling-off period will not apply to relatives in employment of the stated entities, provided that they do not hold the position of a key managerial personnel. Accordingly, where relatives of a person holds employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) in the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary, or associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group of the listed entity in the preceding three financial years, such person can be appointed as an ID. The following example illustrates the amendment for better understanding:

While assessing her eligibility conditions, Ms Q noticed that her spouse is the Managing Director in a promoter group company of Company LMQ which is proposing her appointment as an ID in February, 2022. Since a relative of the proposed ID holds the position of a key managerial personnel in a promoter group company, Ms Q cannot be appointed as an ID in Company LMQ. If her spouse held an employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) such as Sales Executive, she can be appointed as an ID pursuant to the relaxation as per the proviso to Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) stated above.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(viii) of the Listing Regulations provides that ID is a person who is not a non-independent director of another company on the Board of which any non-independent director of the listed entity is an ID. An explanation has now been inserted to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a body corporate that has been mandated to constitute its board of directors in a specific manner as per the law under which it is established, the non-executive directors on its Board would be treated as IDs. Similar requirement has also been prescribed for ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a Trust.

• Pursuant to the amendment, the
Listing Regulation now provides a uniform cooling period of three years
across all eligibility conditions. Such a uniform cooling-off period strikes
a healthy balance of having a reasonable cooling-off period while also
upholding the independence of the proposed ID.

 

• It might be also noted that the
above amendments would require the listed entity to obtain revised
declaration of independence from the IDs since Regulation 25(8) of the
Listing Regulations requires IDs to provide such declaration whenever there
is any change in the circumstances which may affect the status as an ID.
Consequently, as required by Regulation 25(9), the Board of Directors would
be required to take on record such a declaration after undertaking due
assessment.

ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE ROLE OF THE NRC

At present, Regulation 19(1)(c) of the Listing Regulations provides that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) should comprise of at least 50% of IDs and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares 2/3rd of the NRC should comprise of IDs. SEBI felt that there is a need to strengthen the composition of IDs in the NRC in order to reduce dependence on the promoters. Accordingly, Regulation 19(1)(c) was amended to provide that ‘at least 2/3rd’ of the Directors in the NRC of all listed companies (including listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise of IDs. Let’s understand this amendment though the following example:

The NRC of Company DEF comprises six members – with equal representation by IDs and other Directors. Company DEF does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. Hence the representation of IDs should be increased from the existing three to four IDs – so that 2/3rd of the NRC comprises IDs pursuant to the revised norms as stated above.

Clause A to Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations provides that the role of the NRC includes formulation of the criteria for determining qualifications and positive attributes of a Director. Notwithstanding such requirements, SEBI was of the view that there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRCs. Therefore, a need exists to prescribe disclosures for selection of candidates for the post of an ID. These disclosures are expected to increase the transparency in the functioning of NRCs and would also be good from the governance perspective. SEBI accordingly introduced Clause 1A in Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations to provide that:

  •     For every appointment of an ID, the NRC should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the Board of Directors;
  •     On the basis of such evaluation, the NRC should prepare a description of the role and capabilities of an ID. The person recommended to the Board for appointment should have the capabilities identified in such description;
  •     The NRC has the option of using the services of external agencies to consider candidates from a wide range of backgrounds (having due regard to diversity) and consider the time commitments of the candidates.

SEBI also introduced Regulation 36(f) in the Listing Regulations to provide that the shareholders’ notice should include the disclosures regarding the skills and capabilities required for the role and the manner in which the proposed person meets such requirements.

Further, amendments were made to Regulation 36(d) to provide that the shareholders’ notice for appointment of a new Director or reappointment of a Director should include the names of listed entities from which the person has resigned in the past three years.

• The Listing Regulations has
increased the number of IDs required in the NRC. Therefore, in case the NRC
of a listed entity does not meet the revised requirement, the NRC should be
reconstituted.

 

• The revised role of the NRC establishes
additional processes for appointment of an ID. As per the amended Schedule II
the NRC will be required to consider candidates from a wide range of
backgrounds. The databank of IDs as established under the 2013 Act might act
as a good reference point for selecting potential candidates.

COMPOSITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

The Listing Regulations cast specific responsibilities on the Audit Committee to review financial information, scrutinise inter-corporate loans and investments and the valuation of undertakings and assets of the listed entity, etc. At present, Regulation 18(1)(b) of the Listing Regulations provides that 2/3rd of the members of the Audit Committee should comprise of IDs, and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares the Audit Committee should comprise only of IDs. SEBI has amended this Regulation to provide that the Audit Committee of listed companies (which do not have outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise ‘at least 2/3rd of IDs’ instead of the existing composition of ‘2/3rd of IDs’. The amendment in the provision
relating to the constitution of the Audit Committee prescribes for a ‘minimum requirement’ of 2/3rd of the Committee to be comprised of IDs, thus allowing companies to appoint more IDs as members of the Committee. This amendment may not necessitate reconstitution of the Audit Committee.

For example, the Audit Committee of Company PQR comprises six members – four IDs and two other Directors. Company PQR does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. So it can continue with the present composition of the Audit Committee as it has the minimum number of IDs in the Audit Committee as per the revised Regulations. Since the revised Regulations prescribe the minimum composition, Company PQR may choose to appoint a higher number of IDs on the Audit Committee.

Regulation 23(2) of the Listing Regulations provides that all related party transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. SEBI felt a need to further enhance the scrutiny around related party transactions. Accordingly, a proviso was added to Regulation 23(2) which provides that only those members of the Audit Committee who are IDs should approve related party transactions.

As per the revised norms, only those
members of the Audit Committee who are IDs can approve related party
transactions. There may be transactions which have either been approved prior
to the effective date of the amendment, or there might be modifications to
the terms and conditions of existing related party transactions, thereby
requiring approval of the Audit Committee. Listed entities would need to
assess whether these transactions would require
approval of the Audit Committee as per the
amended provisions.

APPOINTMENT, REAPPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF IDS

Appointment of an ID is made through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting of a company as provided u/s 152(2) of the 2013 Act. However, reappointment of an ID requires the passing of a special resolution by the company. SEBI felt that the present framework of appointment of IDs may be influenced by the promoters – in recommending the name of IDs and in the approval process by virtue of their shareholding. This may hinder the independence of IDs and undermine their ability to differ from the promoter, especially in cases where the interests of the promoter and of the minority shareholders are not aligned. Additionally, considering that the role of IDs includes protecting the interests of minority shareholders, there is a need for minority shareholders to have a greater say in the appointment / reappointment process of IDs.

Accordingly, to give more say to the minority shareholders in the simplest manner possible, SEBI introduced Regulation 25(2A) in the Listing Regulations to extend the requirement to obtain shareholders’ approval through a special resolution for appointment and removal of an ID. Thus, as per the revised requirements, the appointment, reappointment or removal of an ID should be subject to the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution.

APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS WITHIN A STIPULATED TIMEFRAME

As per the current practice, companies appoint IDs as additional directors, subject to approval of the shareholders at the next general meeting. It is, therefore, possible that a person gets appointed as an additional ID just after an Annual General Meeting and then serves on the Board of Directors, without shareholder approval, till the next Annual General Meeting. SEBI also observed that there have been cases in the past where the shareholders have rejected the appointment of IDs even while these IDs had served on the Board for a few months. Hence, SEBI felt that reduction / elimination of the time gap may give more say to the shareholders in the appointment process. Further, in order to bring consistency and ease of compliance, SEBI felt that such a time frame may also be applied to approval of appointment of all Directors including IDs, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, etc.

Accordingly, Regulation 17(1C) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that approval of shareholders for appointment of any person (including that arising due to casual vacancy) on the Board of Directors should be taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment, whichever is earlier.

The revised norms require a listed
company to obtain shareholders’ approval at the next general meeting or
within three months from the date of appointment of the ID, whichever is
earlier. An issue arises where a person has been appointed as an ID (say in
November, 2021) but the shareholder approval is pending. The next general
meeting is expected to be held in September, 2022. One might argue that in
this case the shareholders’ approval should be obtained within three months
from the effective date of the amendments, i.e., by 31st March,
2022. However, under this approach the time gap between approval by the Board
and shareholders’ approval would exceed the time period prescribed under the
Listing Regulations. An authoritative clarification would be required from
SEBI to address these situations.

INSURANCE FOR IDS

The top 500 listed entities by market capitalisation are required under Regulation 25(10) of the Listing Regulations to undertake Directors and Officers insurance (‘D and O insurance’) for all IDs of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by their Board of Directors. SEBI considered that due to increased expectation from IDs and the heightened regulatory scrutiny, adequate protection under a proper D and O insurance policy will help IDs perform their duties more effectively. Thus, the requirement of mandatory D and O insurance should be extended to a wider group of listed entities. Accordingly, SEBI has decided that with effect from 1st January, 2022 the requirement of undertaking D and O Insurance would be extended to the top 1,000 companies by market capitalisation.

The Listing Regulations were further amended to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ should undertake D and O insurance for all its IDs for such sum assured and for such risks as may be determined by its Board of Directors.

COOLING OFF PERIOD – TRANSITION OF AN ID TO AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The current provisions as prescribed under Schedule III (Part A)(A)(7B)(i) require the resigning ID (within seven days of resignation) to disclose to the stock exchanges detailed reasons for the resignation along with a confirmation that there are no other material reasons for resignation other than those already provided. SEBI observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as preoccupation, other commitments or personal reasons, and then join the Boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the regulations around the resignation of IDs.

Hence, Schedule III was amended to provide for disclosure of the resignation letter of an ID along with the names of listed entities in which the resigning Director holds Directorships, indicating the category of Directorship and membership of Board committees, if any. It may be noted that the new requirement to disclose the entire resignation letter is only an extension of the existing requirements which require disclosure of detailed reasons for resignation along with a confirmation as aforesaid.

SEBI also observed cases where IDs have resigned and have then joined the same company as Executive Directors. While there may be valid reasons for transition from an ID to an Executive Director, such instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future may practically lead to a compromise in independence. SEBI felt that a cooling-off period should be prescribed to reduce potential impairments to an ID’s impartiality in decision-making in instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in certain companies in the near future.

Thus, Regulation 25(11) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that an ID who has resigned from a listed entity cannot be appointed as an Executive / Whole-time Director on the Board of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or on the Board of a company belonging to its promoter group, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of resignation as an ID.

The amended Regulation provides a
cooling-off period of one year in case of resignation by an ID. However, such
cooling-off period has not been prescribed where the ID is appointed as an
Executive
Director post expiry of his
term as an ID.

TIME-PERIOD FOR FILLING UP CASUAL VACANCY OF IDS

As per Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations, an ID who resigns or is removed should be replaced by a new ID at the earliest but not later than the immediate next meeting of the Board of Directors, or three months from the date of such vacancy, whichever is later. However, the time limit for filling of a casual vacancy prescribed under the 2013 Act [Schedule IV (VI)(2)] is different, i.e., three months from the date of resignation / removal. In order to avoid inconsistency, SEBI has modified Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations to align the time limits prescribed under the 2013 Act.

THE WAY FORWARD

 

• Listed companies might encounter
implementation challenges emanating from these amendments – some of them have
been highlighted above. Hence it is important that the listed companies
should engage with governance professionals, including auditors, to iron out
these challenges.

 

• Apart from the above amendments, SEBI
in its Board Meeting held on 29th June, 2021 had also decided to
make a reference to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for giving greater
flexibility to companies while deciding the remuneration for all Directors
(including IDs), which may include profit-linked commissions, sitting fees,
ESOPs, etc., within the overall prescribed limit specified under the 2013
Act. At present, ESOPs to IDs are prohibited under the Listing Regulations
and the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the implementation of the SEBI decision would
require modifications to the Listing Regulations and also to the 2013 Act.
Any positive development on this aspect would enable listed companies to
attract and / or retain talented IDs.
 

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