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Shareholder Agreements — Bombay High Court Decides

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Shareholder groups of listed companies and even public companies often face a nagging problem. Many of them enter into agreements giving rights to each other of different kinds over the shares held by them. These may be in the form of restrictive or pre-emptive rights or rights to purchase the shares under certain terms and conditions. The concern that keeps bothering them is whether such rights and terms are valid under law or void or, even worse, whether these are illegal.

A recent decision of the Bombay High Court (MCX Stock Exchange Limited v. SEBI and Others, WP No. 213 of 2011, dated March 14, 2012) partially sets at rest — at least to the extent a High Court decision can — the concern whether an agreement giving certain options to purchase/sell shares is void and illegal being agreements for futures under the provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA). This should help shareholders and investors of various hues who have entered into such contracts with other shareholders and faced the possibility that they may be held illegal/ void. As will be seen later though, a related issue has been kept open and so the question is not yet fully answered. Also, needless to emphasise, the decision is on facts of the case and one would have to see whether the agreements and surrounding circumstances in each case are such that the ratio of the decision may apply.

 To elaborate the issue further, before we go into the facts of the case, the SCRA, to simplify a little, was enacted mainly to regulate stock exchanges and trading on it. For this purpose, it was desired that trading in securities should take place only in regulated stock exchanges. Options, futures, etc. being securities were also required to be traded on stock exchanges. To ensure that parties do not carry out private transactions in such securities including by way of options and futures, such private transactions, subject to specified exceptions, were declared illegal and void. Stock exchanges provide a transparent mechanism for carrying out such transactions in securities also giving safety to counter parties and at the same time, other objectives such as control of undue speculation could be achieved. Hence, transactions through such exchanges were intended to be encouraged.

However, the manner in which the relevant provisions were worded resulted even in a very common set of private agreements being put to question. For example, major shareholders — particularly strategic investors — often enter into agreements whereby one or both are given an option to buy or sell the shares under certain circumstances. Such agreements are rarely assignable to third parties, are not standardised and have unique terms and conditions attached, are not generally severable into small units, etc. In other words, they do not resemble the typical options or futures that are traded on stock markets. However, the conservative view — and often endorsed by SEBI — was that such agreements amount to options/futures and hence may be held to be void and illegal.

The other provision that such private agreements fell foul of was the provisions relating to free transferability of shares. While the essence of private limited companies was restricted transferability of shares, public companies (including listed companies) required free transferability of shares. This, inter alia, enabled buyers of shares being freely able to buy shares — on and off the stock exchanges — without worrying about any restrictions the transferor may be facing. It also ensured that even the company was bound to register the transfer of the shares. Such private agreements providing for options, in a sense, created a restriction on the transfer of the shares. The question once again was whether such agreements fell foul of the law providing for free transferability of shares.

Arguably, the regulator and the law-makers had other reasons too to restrict agreements. These reasons went beyond the above purposes of ensuring trading in securities took place on stock exchanges only or to ensure that there is free transferability of shares for benefit of parties. Restrictions helped achieve other objectives such as limits on foreign holding, avoidance of benami holding of shares, etc. The problem was these provisions of SCRA which had other objectives to serve were also used and applied for such purposes. Thus, instead of making specific provisions to deal with specific concerns, they used the widely framed provisions of the SCRA. This thus resulted in bona fide and fairly common private agreements being subjected to the risk of being held illegal and void.

Coming to the Bombay High Court decision, a Company was formed by a Promoter Group for enabling trading in securities, etc. and thus required registration with the Securities and Exchange Board of India. Since a recognised stock exchange serves certain public purposes and it is not in the pubic interest that the ownership of such stock exchange is concentrated, the law provides that a group of persons acting in concert should not hold more than 5% of the share capital of such company. The relevant Regulations are in fair detail and various issues concerning it were the subject-matter of the Court decision. However, since the focus here is on the issue of validity of certain agreements relating to shares between shareholder groups, the other matters dealt with by the Court are not considered here.

 It appears that the Promoter Group originally held significantly more than 5% of the share capital of the Company. To ensure that it is in compliance with the law, a complex restructuring scheme was carried out. To simplify the matter to help focus on the issue of law, the restructuring can be explained as follows. The share capital of the Company was reduced under a court-approved scheme and further shares were issued to persons other than the Promoter Group. Further, certain shares held by the Promoter Group were transferred to other parties. The Promoter Group had entered into an agreement with certain parties holding shares in the Company whereby certain shareholders had an option to sell their shares to the Promoter Group under certain terms and conditions.

The issue was whether such an agreement amounted to options/futures and thus illegal and void. The Court analysed the nature and essence of the agreements and also the law on the subject matter. Firstly, it held that the agreements did not amount to contract of futures. Contract of futures necessarily involved agreements where the agreement to purchase/sale was concluded but only the payment and delivery was postponed. In the present case, since there was an option to sell, there was no current concluded transaction of purchase/sale. In fact, the transaction of purchase/ sale may not even arise in the future if the party did not exercise its option. Thus, the Court held there was no agreement of futures. The Court, however, did not deal with the issue whether the agreement amounted to an option, because this was not part of the allegations under the Notice issued to the aggrieved party. The Court asked SEBI, if it desired to raise that issue, to give an opportunity to the aggrieved party first.

Let us consider some extracts from the decision of the Court to consider the matter in context.

The Court described the nature of the agreements between FTIL (the Promoter) and PNB/ILFS (the counter parties) in the following words:

“The buy -back agreements furnish to PNB and IL&FS an option. The option constitutes a privilege, the exercise of which depends upon their unilateral volition. In the case of PNB, the buy-back agreements contemplated a buy-back by FTIL after the expiry of a stipulated period. But, in the event that PNB still asserted that it would continue to hold the shares, despite the buy-back offer, FTIL or its nominees would have no liability for buying back the shares in future. In the case of IL&FS, La -Fin assumed an obligation to offer to purchase either through itself or its nominee the shares which were sold to IL&FS after the expiry of a stipulated period. In both cases, the option to sell rested in the unilateral decision of PNB and IL&FS, as the case may be.”

Does the agreement amount to a contract of future so as to be violative of the law and hence illegal and void? The Court further analysed and observed as follows:

“In a buy-back agreement of the nature involved in the present case, the promisor who makes an offer to buy back shares cannot compel the exercise of the option by the promisee to sell the shares at a future point in time. If the promisee declines to exercise the option, the promissor cannot compel performance. A concluded contract for the sale and purchase of shares comes into existence only when the promisee upon whom an option is conferred, exercises the option to sell the shares. Hence, an option to purchase or repurchase is regarded as being in the nature of a privilege.

77.    The distinction between an option to purchase or (repurchase and an agreement for sale and purchase simpliciter lies in the fact that the former is by its nature dependent on the discretion of the person who is granted the option, whereas the latter is a reciprocal arrangement imposing obligations and benefits on the promisor and the promisee. The performance of an option cannot be compelled by the person who has granted the option. Contrariwise in the case of an agreement, performance can be elicited at the behest of either of the parties. In the case of an option, a concluded contract for purchase or repurchase arises only if the option is exercised and upon the exercise of the option. Under the notification that has been issued under the SCRA, a contract for the sale or purchase of securities has to be a spot delivery contract or a contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery. In the present case, the contract for sale or purchase of the securities would fructify only upon the exercise of the option by PNB or, as the case may be, IL&FS in future. If the option were not to be exercised by them, no contract for sale or purchase of securities would come into existence. Moreover, if the option were to be exercised, there is nothing to indicate that the performance of the contract would be by anything other than by a spot delivery, cash or special delivery. Where securities are dealt with by a depository, the transfer of securities by a depository from the account of a beneficial owner to another beneficial owner is within the ambit of spot delivery.”

Finally, it concluded, with the following words, that the agreement was not in the nature of a futures contract:

“80. In the present case, there is no contract for the sale and purchase of shares. A contract for the purchase or sale of the shares would come into being only at a future point of time in the eventuality of the party which is granted an option exercising the option in future. Once such an option is exercised, the contract would be completed only by means of spot delivery or by a mode which is considered lawful. Hence, the basis and foundation of the order which is that there was a forward contract which is unlawful at its inception is lacking in substance.”

The next issue whether the agreements “would amount to an option in securities and, therefore, derivatives which were neither traded nor settled at any recognised stock exchange, nor with the permission of Securities and Exchange Board of India and therefore in violation of SCRA”. The Court noted that this allegation did not form part of the original notice and thus parties were not given an opportunity to reply to SEBI. Thus, SEBI was required to first give such an opportunity and then give its decision and then the question of appeal may arise.

The decision gives relief to parties who have entered into or propose to enter into such agreement at least from the concern that such agreement may amount to a futures agreement. Needless to emphasise, the decision was on facts. The other concern, though, remains open and that is whether such an agreement may amount to an option which is prohibited under law. It will have to be seen what course of action SEBI takes and whether the matter goes back to the Court.

However, it is time that the law-makers and even SEBI take the initiative and resolve the controversy. It does not seem that there can be any objection to such private agreements between two groups of shareholders where most of the elements of standardised over the counter futures/options contracts are absent. Such private agreements should be explicitly exempted and if desired, the specific areas where the law-makers have concern can be duly regulated.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 97, dated 28-3- 2012 — Overseas Investments by Resident Individuals — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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This Circular has proposed the following three changes:

(1) Acquiring qualification shares of an overseas company for holding the post of a Director A resident individual can now remit funds, within the overall ceiling prescribed from time to time under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme, for acquiring qualification shares for holding the post of a Director in the overseas company up to the extent required by the laws of the host country where the company is located.

(2) Acquiring shares of a foreign company towards professional services rendered or in lieu of Director’s remuneration General permission is granted to resident individuals to acquire shares of a foreign entity in part/ full consideration of professional services rendered to the foreign company or in lieu of Director’s remuneration. However, the value of such shares must be within the overall ceiling prescribed from time to time under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme.

(3) Acquiring shares in a foreign company through ESOP Scheme Permission has been granted to resident employees or Directors of an Indian company to accept shares offered under an ESOP Scheme in a foreign company, irrespective of the percentage of the direct or indirect equity stake of the foreign company in the Indian company, provided:

(i) The shares under the ESOP Scheme are offered by the issuing company globally on a uniform basis,

(ii) Annual Return is submitted by the Indian company to the Reserve Bank through the AD Category-I bank giving details of remittances/ beneficiaries, etc.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 96, dated 28- 3-2012 — Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party — Rationalisation.

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This Circular has proposed the following six changes:

1. Creation of charge on immovable/movable property and other financial assets

A charge can be created, under the Approval Route within the overall limit fixed (presently 400%) for financial commitment, on the immovable/movable property and other financial assets of the Indian Party and their group companies by way of pledge/ mortgage/hypothecation. However, a ‘No objection’ letter needs to be obtained from lenders to the entities on whose assets the charge is being created.

2. Reckoning bank guarantee issued on behalf of JV/WOS for computation of financial commitment

For calculating the financial commitment of the Indian Party to its overseas JV/WOS, henceforth, bank guarantee issued by a resident bank on behalf of the overseas JV/WOS of the Indian party will also be considered if the same is backed by a counter guarantee/collateral from the Indian Party.

3. Issuance of personal guarantee by the direct/ indirect individual promoters of the Indian

Party General permission is now granted to indirect resident individual promoters of the Indian Party to also give a Personal Guarantee on behalf of the overseas JV/WOS of the Indian Party.

4. Financial commitment without equity contribution to JV/WOS

An Indian Party can undertake, under the Approval Route, financial commitment by way of guarantee/ loan, without equity contribution, in the overseas JV/WOS if the laws of the host country permit incorporation of a company without equity participation by the Indian Party.

5. Submission of Annual Performance Report
In cases where laws of the host country do not prescribe mandatory audit of the books of account of the overseas JV/WOS, the Indian Party can submit the Annual Performance Report on the basis of unaudited annual accounts of the overseas JV/ WOS, if:

(a) The Statutory Auditors of the Indian Party certify that the unaudited annual accounts of the JV/WOS reflect the true and fair picture of the affairs of the overseas JV/WOS.

 (b) The un-audited annual accounts of the overseas JV/WOS have been adopted and ratified by the Board of the Indian Party.

6. Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS)

Henceforth, Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS) will be treated on par with equity shares (and not as loans) and the Indian Party will be allowed to undertake financial commitment based on the exposure to overseas JV/WOS by way of CCPS.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 24th June 24, 2013 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for low cost affordable housing projects

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Presently, Developers/Builders, Housing Finance Companies (HFC) & National Housing Bank (NHB) can avail of ECB for financing low cost affordable housing under the Approval Route.

This circular has modified the guidelines as under: –

General

The aggregate limit for ECB under the low cost affordable housing scheme for the financial years 2013-14 and 2014-15 has been fixed at $1 billion per year. This limit will be reviewed thereafter.

Developers/Builders
i. Developers/builders must have at least 3 years’ experience in undertaking residential projects (as against the earlier requirement of 5 years’ experience) and must also have a good track record in terms of quality and delivery.

ii. The ECB availed of must be swapped into Rupees for the entire maturity on fully hedged basis.

National Housing Bank (NHB)

NHB must decide the interest rate spread after taking into account cost and other relevant factors. However, NHB has to ensure that interest rate spread for HFC for on-lending to prospective owners’ of individual units under the scheme is reasonable.

Housing Finance Companies (HFC)

Henceforth, HFC are required to have minimum Net Owned Funds (NoF) of Rs. 300 crore for the past three financial years only, as the condition requiring a minimum paid-up capital of not less than Rs. 50 crore, as per the latest audited balance sheet has been withdrawn by this circular. HFC while making the application for ECB must:

i. Submit a certificate from NHB that ECB is being availed for financing prospective owners of individual units for the low cost affordable housing.

ii. Ensure that the cost of such individual units does not exceed Rs. 30 lakh and loan amount does not exceed Rs. 25 lakh.

iii. Ensure that the units financed have a maximum carpet area of 60 square metres.

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 – Cross Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme

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Authorised persons engaged in Money transfer services and their agents & sub-agents can accept, where the address on the document submitted for identity proof by the prospective customer is same as that declared by him/her current address, the same document can be accepted as a valid proof of both identity and address. However, in cases where the address indicated on the document submitted for identity proof differs from the current address declared by the customer, a separate proof of address should be obtained.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50 dated 20th September, 2013

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Opening of Trading Office/Non-Trading Office/ Branch Office/Representative Office abroad

Presently, banks are required to submit, on halfyearly basis, a statement in Form ORA with the Regional Offices of RBI containing particulars of approvals granted for opening of Trading Office/ Non-Trading Office/Branch Office/Representative Office overseas.

This circular has done away with the requirement of filing Form ORA with the Regional Offices of RBI. However, Banks are required to maintain records of approvals granted by them for opening of Trading Office/Non-Trading Office/Branch Office/Representative Office overseas.

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US Decision Giving Relief to Satyam Directors – Implications for Independent Directors in India

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The recent US Court decision to give relief to Satyam independent directors/audit committee members has raised both – concerns and hopes. Concerns on corporate governance are indeed ineffective in practice and impossible to enforce, as has long been the suspicion. Hopes are that SEBI’s actions against independent directors and others in several recent cases, are perhaps unwarranted or probably even without legislative sanction.

Recently, the independent directors/audit committee members of Satyam Computers Limited were given relief in a class action suit filed against them in USA, for their alleged recklessness (it may be recollected that, as widely reported, in 2009, in settlement of class action claims, Satyam had paid INR7,797 million and the Auditors had paid INR1,591 million). Would the latest decision change SEBI’s approach ? Will independent directors in India be also treated with the same standards by SEBI or will they continue to be punished, as they have been punished in several recent cases, for alleged negligence, connivance, etc.?

First of all, what does the US decision say? It will be beyond the competence of this author to comment on what the scheme of provisions is in the US in this regard nor is it relevant significantly here. But a summary of some aspects apparent on the face of the decision can be made.

The decision is related to many issues, apart from the role of independent directors, such as whether the US courts had jurisdiction if shares of an Indian company was acquired on Indian stock exchanges. However, the relevant issue for discussion here is whether the independent directors (including audit committee members) could be held liable for loss caused to the investors.

The allegations in Satyam may be recollected. The company falsified its records and showed fictitious revenues, profits and assets. Further, it showed fictitious expenditure through which monies were channeled out in group companies. Loans from related parties were shown to have been taken in Satyam to compensate for the cash shortage. Such funds diverted were used in a related party – Maytas – to acquire huge amounts of immovable properties. Such fictitious amounts rose over the years and in a last ditch effort to cure the fraud, it sought to merge the related party into Satyam and show that the fictitious assets were used to acquire immovable properties and that too at an inflated price. Though this alleged fraud was carried out over several years, neither the independent directors, the Audit Committee members, nor the auditors detected or reported it. The question in the US decision was whether independent directors (including audit committee members) could be held liable for the fraud?

It needs to be noted that the US decision was not given on merits – that is — where the facts of the case were examined in great detail and decision given. The decision was on whether the class action could be dismissed on preliminary grounds that the facts, as alleged, were insufficient to determine reasonable scienter or state of mind/knowledge. The standards for this decision were simple. Are the facts – as merely alleged and not even proved – sufficient to reach the standards of scienter or a guilty state of mind, in terms of recklessness, connivance, etc.?

Thus, the plaintiffs were required to have alleged a certain level of facts which, assumed to be wholly true, should show a level of scienter/recklessness on the part of the independent directors. Several facts were alleged. That the fraud was so huge that it could not have escaped scrutiny of such competent people. That the auditors raised certain red flags in the form of certain internal control systems not being followed. That the independent directors approved the Maytas purchase without sufficient scrutiny. That though the auditors were paid huge amount for “other services”, the independent directors did not question this properly and grasp why the auditors were engaged for ‘other services’. That the norms of corporate governance in India required several things to be done by the independent directors/audit committee members who failed in performing. And so on.

The Court found that these alleged facts were not sufficient to establish scienter/recklessness. Hence, the class action was dismissed. More specifically, it was even observed that the independent directors were more likely the victims of a sophisticated fraud themselves rather than its perpetrators. The Court observed, “The majority of the allegations in the FACC concern an intricate and well-concealed fraud perpetrated by a very small group of insiders and only reinforce the inference that the AC Defendants were themselves victims of the fraud. The strength of this competing inference outweighs the inference of scienter asserted by lead plaintiffs.”

The Court dismissed the case, stating as follows:-

“Having considered the FACC in its entirety, the Court finds that lead plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to raise a strong inference of recklessness on the part of the AC Defendants that is at least as compelling as the non-fraudulent inference reasonably drawn from the allegations.”

There are some important points to note here. Firstly, this was a private action for damages, and not an action by a regulator against persons having certain statutory obligations. Secondly, certain actions were already taken against the company and its auditors and settlement for compensation was made. Arguably, the provisions of law and standards of proof required for fraud/negligence/recklessness, etc. are different in the US as compared to India, even though some of the obligations of the independent directors in the Satyam case were traced to Indian laws. Further, what are the obligations of persons under US law and how are they deemed to be contravened are also different. The specific allegations made in the class action is also to be seen in this context.

Nevertheless, it makes a difference that the actions/ omissions of the independent directors were held as not to constitute recklessness/scienter and it has some relevance in general times in India too. This is because, unless it is alleged and found that the independent directors did not comply with specific obligations under law, the issue before the Indian regulator would be similar – and that is, did the independent directors do their duties correctly? Interestingly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no findings made as of today for any of such independent directors in the Satyam case. And it would be interesting to see whether what finding SEBI makes against the same independent directors who are given relief by the US Court.

However, it is also noteworthy for comparable or even lesser levels of manipulations in several cases, SEBI has taken stringent actions against independent directors, members of audit committee, CFOs, etc. For example, in several cases (Bharatiya Global Infomedia Limited, Pyramid Saimira, Tijaria Polypipes Limited, etc. as also discussed earlier in this column), independent directors and audit committee members (and even CFOs/CSs) have been strongly acted against by SEBI. The question that will be relevant is whether such actions were correct in context of the US decision. Or whether, in India, even the Satyam independent directors would be held liable.

On balance, this author submits that the US decision should be taken in its context and will result in change in India’s approach

Having said that, there are some basic wrong things that exist in the Indian framework for corporate governance. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, they are contained in Clause 49 of the listing agreement, which is not a law, but an agreement. Moreover, it is an agreement between the stock exchange and the company. Of course, recently, violation of the listing agreement has been made punishable. However, still, it is a legally bad place to be for a provision that is meant to have such significance.

Secondly, while a significant level of obligations are laid down on independent directors in Clause 49, their rights are fairly marginal and difficult to enforce, particularly when one compares the powers of auditors under the Companies Act, 1956. Often, the only recourse left for an independent directors is to resign or otherwise report what he has already found to be objectionable.

Thirdly, this weak basis of law making causes problems even for SEBI. It really does not have any specific powers – as it has for various other ills – for taking action against errant companies, independent directors, etc. Thus, it uses its generic powers – which are meant to be used in exceptional cases – and debars them. While it is true that SEBI as an expert body needs certain wide and discretionary powers to take action in the face of newer and innovative types of market manipulations, corporate governance is fairly old now for resorting to such actions.

Finally, the scheme of law leaves the investors uncompensated. Whether it is Satyam, Pyramid or other cases, it was the investors who were left stranded with their shares devalued, as they assumed that SEBI had put in an effective system of corporate governance, where there are responsible persons to carry out the safeguards. The weak basis of law which, at best, punishes the independent directors by debarring them, does not help the investors recover their losses.

There is another dimension too. The general principles and even the concept of corporate governance are borrowed from the West where the management is with executives whose total holdings is usually in single digits. In comparison, in India, companies are promoter controlled, usually families and who often hold 35-50% and even more of the company. The concept of independent directors, etc. are relevant where shareholders holding 90% can appoint such people to safeguard their interests. While in India, if such concepts are blindly introduced for similar purposes, they would be – and indeed they are often – defeated by promoters, having full power to appoint people who are favourably disposed to them and the inherent power to remove them.

In the end, it seems that a transparent, effective, and comprehensive scheme of law governing corporate governance relevant to Indian realities, is needed. In this context, then, it is sad that neither the concept paper on corporate governance recently issued by SEBI nor the Companies Bill 2011 addresses these fundamental issues. The result then is likely to be a false sense of security, which would often be taken away by scams and which would be acted against by SEBI using its discretionary and arbitrary powers.

Attest function where the member is personally interested (Clause 4 of Part I of the Second Schedule).

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Attest function where the member is personally interested (Clause 4 of Part I of the Second Schedule). Shrikrishna (S) – Arjun, I rang your office. They told me you are not attending for the last three days. Somebody said you were at home only. Arjun
(A) – Yeah! While doing duniyabharka work, our own family’s work remains pending.

S – What was pending?

A – My brother’s all the returns are pending. Tax audit as well as VAT audit! 15th January was the last date. Now everything is done. Great relief!

S – VAT I can understand. But tax audit date has gone long back.

A – Agreed. But my experience is that while doing VAT audit, many ‘lochas’ in tax audit are revealed! That is why, in some cases, I prefer to do it together!

S – But then, you should prepone VAT audit, rather than postponing tax audit.

A – True. But who has time to do VAT audit in the September pressure! Continuously, firefighting is going on in our office. S – Anyway, I hope, your brother’s audit is done by somebody else.

A – Why? Mere bhaika audit doosre ko kyo doo?

S – Arey baba, you cannot certify the financial statements of your relatives. It is a misconduct!

A – Yes. But I make it clear in the report that the person whose audit I am signing is my relative. That’s what we learnt when we did our CA

S – That was the position long ago! Prior to 2006. But your CA Act was amended in 2006. Are you not aware?

A – We recognise only Income Tax Act. All other Acts are of no relevance to me!

S – Then remember. As I mentioned to you, you cannot sign the financial statements of any business or enterprise where you have a substantial interest.

A – Baap Re! It doesn’t talk of mere relative?

S – No. Not only that. Even if your firm or any of your partner has a substantial interest, that also you cannot attest.

A – So wide! That means I cannot sign the balance sheet of even my partner’s wife!

S – This is only to ensure your independence. If you are interested in something how can you be impartial?

A – This is strange !

S – Otherwise, people will always believe that you have ‘accommodated’ the relative. Your credibility is in doubt.

A – But I make a disclosure of interest?

S – That won’t suffice. Previously, it was permitted. But now they have deleted the words – ‘unless he discloses the interest also in his report’. Thus, that exception is a thing of the past now !

A – Oh. I never knew.

S – Your Council has issued further guidelines on 8th of August of 2008 – Date is easy to remember – 8-8-8 !

A – And what it says?

S – It says – not only your own interest – But even if one or more persons who are your relatives have a substantial interest in a concern, then that also you cannot audit.

A – Ah – But relative is a very narrow concept in Income Tax, section 2(41) only talks of parents, spouse, brother and sister !

S – Listen carefully. It is not ‘relative’ under tax act; but under the Companies Act. Section 6!

A – Oh My God! That will cover many persons. And that again I have to check in respect of my partners also!

S – Yes, my dear. Don’t take it lightly. A – And what is substantial interest?

S – For that, you need to refer to your CA Regulations. – In that, Appendix (9).

A – But it would be 20%, I believe.

S – Yes. But read it at least once! See, the Council feels that you should err on safer side; and not merely adhere to the words of law. Try to understand the spirit of it. Otherwise you may lose or compromise your independence.

A – You mean, there should not be conflict of interest and duty. Right?

S – Exactly. Therefore, as an employee of an organisation, you cannot sign as auditor. Not only that, even if you are an employee of a group concern under the same Management, then also you cannot sign.

A – What if I am a part-time lecturer in a college – and I want to sign the audit of the college? S – Even that is not allowed. For that matter, if your partner is a trustee or employee of a trust, that trust’s audit also you cannot sign.

A – Where shall I get all this to read? And who has time to read? After all who is going to see even if I sign?

S – Remember. In the Mahabharata, I supported you because you were on the right side of law. If you are casual and don’t take your rules seriously, I cannot side with you. Then you be prepared to suffer.

A – I believe, apart from our CA Act, there is some prohibition in the Company Law also.

S – Of course, yes. Section 226 of Companies Act directly states the disqualifications of auditors.

A – I will have to read it again. What other things should I see?

S – I am sure, you are not writing the accounts of any client and also signing them.

A – Ah! That I know. Therefore, I give the accounts writing invoice in my wife’s name. Sometimes in Draupadi’s name, sometimes in Subhadra’s. Advantage of having two wives!

S – But do they know what is accounting? They have learnt only classical dancing. Take care. You may invite trouble.

A – You are giving me shock after shock. Ultimately then how to practice?

S – One more thing. Just as you cannot audit the books which you have written, same way you cannot sign statutory audit where you have also done internal audit. I feel, an internal auditor should also not sign a tax audit.

A – Well, you have told me so many things. I cannot remember all this. I’d better get the literature and read it myself.

S – I can see that you have become nervous after hearing all these. But if you see the provisions of the Companies Bill, 2012, they are even more stringent and wider.

A – Oh my God!
The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 4 of Part I of the Second Schedule which reads as under:

Clause (4): expresses his opinion on financial statements of any business or enterprise in which he, his firm or a partner in his firm has a substantial interest; Further, readers may also refer to the following: – Chapter IV of Council General Guidelines, 2008 dated 8th August, 2008 (refer page nos. 313 – 323 of the Code of Ethics publication January 2009 edition or the website of ICAI). – pages 239 – 244 of ICAI’s publication on Code of Ethics, January 2009 edition (reprinted in May 2009).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14 dated 22nd July, 2013

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Export of Goods and Software – Realisation and Repatriation of export proceeds – Liberalisation

This circular clarifies that exporters are required to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported upto 30th September, 2013 within nine months from the date of export i.e. the provision will be applicable for exports undertaken between 1st April, 2013 and 30th September, 2013. However, there are no changes in the provisions with respect to period of realisation and repatriation of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to warehouses established outside India.

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Relief for Shareholders Agreements – SEBI Notifies Long-overdue Relaxations

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SEBI finally resolves an age-old self-created problem SEBI has finally set at rest, substantially though not fully, a controversy that affected for decades some core issues in Shareholders Agreements and related agreements/structures. An age old provision in the form of a circular existed that was meant to prevent certain ills but ended up affecting innumerable agreements between two or more groups of shareholders and others. A brief introduction of the issue is first necessary to understand what the problem was and what SEBI has now provided.

What was the problem?

Take an example of a situation where such a provision created hurdles. When two or more groups get together in a company, to control and run it together, it is common and even inevitable that they will agree that one group will not exit without the other having a say. Thus, if Group A wants to sell its shares, Group B would want certain safeguards/rights. It would require Group A to give what is known was Right of First Refusal. This means that if Group A is getting an offer to acquire its shares at say, Rs. X per share, then Group B would have right to buy the shares at the same price. In other words, it has a right of pre-emption. Of course, Group B could choose not to buy and let the shares be sold to the offering party. At times, they may agree that on completion of certain conditions, one group (or a third party, say an executive) would have a right to acquire a certain number of shares. One could go on with more such examples but, in essence, rights are given over to one person to acquire another person’s shares in the future. Similar rights could be given to a person to sell its shares.

The law makers had a certain concern on an entirely unrelated issue. Considering the evils of unregulated trading in shares (including what is known as dabba trading in common parlance) it was decided that trading in securities otherwise than on regulated and recognized stock exchanges should not be permitted. Thus, trading – or even contracting to buy/sell – securities except on a recognised stock exchange was made null and void. Thus, such a contract was not enforceable. The only real exception (apart from certain territorial exceptions) to was “spot transactions”. This covered a contract of purchase and sale of securities where the delivery/payment was spot – which was effectively defined to be that the delivery of shares and payment was to be made within one day of the contract.

The law as so framed ensured that forward/futures/ options trading in securities could not be carried out without being regulated. However, a simple transaction of private sale and purchase of shares and other securities on ready payment/delivery basis was exempted.

The wording of this law, however, had a peculiar consequence. It meant that no contract of sale/ purchase of securities could be entered into unless it fell into the very narrow exempted category. For most practical purposes, one could not enter into a valid agreement to buy/sell shares in the future. Or enter into an agreement where involving postponement of the payment of consideration and/or delivery of the securities beyond one day. As joint ventures, private equity, co-promoted companies, etc. became increasingly common, this became a serious concern. Parties entering into such agreements could not bind each other with such basic commercial safeguards. This was despite the fact that almost all of such agreements could not even remotely affect public interest, being entered into by informed parties on a negotiated basis without any intention of trading.

In practice, this problem was dealt with parties by often being in denial or half-baked structuring or even sheer ignorance. Some legal counsels even opined that, structured in a particular way, the notification did not apply to private agreements. The reality, however, was that even in the most optimistic scenario, often, there was concern that, if put to test, many of such clauses in agreements may not be held valid. Thus, what was referred to euphemistically as a “calculated risk” was taken. The fact that Supreme Court, other courts and SEBI held many of such agreements to be unenforceable worsened matters (the various decisions and their legal basis can be subject for a separate detailed article).

The matter became more complicated when this issue spilled over to other laws including laws regulating foreign exchange.

SEBI’s recent circular gives relief – with some conditions

Finally, on 3rd October 2013, SEBI issued a circular withdrawing the earlier notification and allowing parties to enter into agreements for purchase/sale of shares, though with certain conditions which are fairly reasonable. Let us consider which of such contracts are exempted and under what conditions.

The first two exemptions are as expected and continuing ones. “Spot Delivery Contracts” are exempted. Purchase or sale of securities/derivatives on stock exchanges in accordance with law and bye-laws, etc. of such exchanges are also exempted.

Next exempted category is “contracts for preemption including right of first refusal, or tag-along or drag- along rights contained in shareholders agreements or articles of association of companies or other body corporate”. Thus, all contracts of pre-emption are exempted, including the specified ones such as right of first refusal, etc. These may be contained in the agreements between shareholders and/or incorporated in the articles of association of the company.

Then come certain “options” in agreements between shareholders (or contained in the articles of association). Such options provide a right to one person to buy or sell shares. On exercise of such options, the actual purchase/sale of shares is effected. Such agreements are also exempted, subject, however, to certain conditions. Firstly, the securities underlying such options should have been held continuously for at least one year by the selling party. This is effectively a lock-in period. Secondly, the price/consideration for such purchase/sale of shares should be in compliance with prevailing laws. Finally, the contract, i.e., the purchase/sale is settled by actual delivery of the underlying securities.

The circular makes it clear that the contracts will continue to have to adhere to FEMA and Regulations/Rules issued thereunder. FEMA has other policy considerations and hence such agreements particularly with parties across the border would require such compliance.

Will the relaxations apply to existing agreements?

An interesting provision is made for agreements for purchase/sale of shares existing on the date of this circular. It is clarified that this circular shall neither affect nor validate agreements existing immediately prior to the date of the circular. In other words, all such existing agreements shall continue to be subject to the earlier law. Only those contracts having such clauses and which are entered into on or after the date of this circular would benefit from the relaxations made in it, subject of course complying with the conditions stated therein.

There have been views expressed that parties could merely re-execute such contracts as of a date after the date of such circular. This sounds like a fairly simple solution to the thousands of agreements existing as on such date, though one wonders whether it is simplistic too. The practical hurdle is whether all the parties concerned would readily agree to re-execute such past agreements. In practice, often relations may have soured between the parties who may want to re-negotiate certain terms of the agreement if it has to be re-executed. Obviously, though the party entitled to the rights may be keen, the party who is subject to the obligations may not readily agree. Then there is a commercial reality that was often observed in practice. Many parties entered into some version of such agreements knowing quite well that they are likely to be unenforceable. Hence, they considered the likelihood of being required to act upon it fairly remote and considered that if at all such transactions were to be executed, the parties could consider the offered terms and generally the reality at that time. The party entitled to the rights too may not have really believed that it would actually get them. Clearly, these parties never intended such agreements to have unqualified binding force and they may not agree to re-execute them to give them such force. Thus, the parties would want to re-negotiate the contract instead of merely printing out a copy and re-executing the same today.

Applicability to other laws for certain contracts

The circular also clarifies that as far as government securities, gold related securities, money market securities, contracts in currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and ready forward contracts in debt securities entered into on the stock exchange are concerned, they shall be in accordance with various specified laws such as securities laws, banking laws, FEMA, etc.

Anomalous provision in Companies Act, 2013

In this context, it is necessary to discuss a strange provision in the recently notified Companies Act, 2013. Section 194, which incidentally has been notified as to have come into effect, prohibits certain contracts by directors/key managerial persons of companies. The specified contracts are rights (or a right exercisable at option of such person) to call for delivery or make delivery of a specified quantity of shares/debentures, at a specified price and within a specified time. It appears that the intention is to prohibit contracts of futures/options. While this is consistent with the existing provisions under the SEBI Regulations relating to prohibition of insider trading, this provision is too widely worded. The SEBI Regulations are intended to prohibit directors/officers/designated employees from entering into derivatives transactions of their companies. However, the scope of section 194 is very broad. It is a blanket ban on all agreements giving any right or option to acquire/sell shares. Further, the section applies to all companies – listed, unlisted or even private. It does not even give exemption to employees’ stock options. Thus, despite the relaxation by the circular, this ill-advised provision in the Act can present problems. On the other hand, it applies only to directors/key managerial persons and not others including other promoters or promoter companies.

Curiously, the Explanation to this section seems to modify its scope. Firstly, it states that it would apply to those shares/debentures where the concerned person is a whole -time director and not merely a director. Secondly, the shares/debentures may be of the employer company or its holding company or its subsidiary. Even more curiously, the initial part of the section refers also to “associate” companies. Further, the ban in the section is on “buying” such rights and one thus wonders whether such rights granted to employees or otherwise forming part of contracts are also covered. The section is an example of bad drafting. To summarise, however, this provision will create hurdles in case of whole-time directors/key management persons in entering into agreements to buy/sell shares in the future or acquire options for such buy/sell of shares.

To conclude, SEBI has finally provided relaxation to genuine contracts between parties that faced the possibility of being treated as impermissible under SEBI regulations though they did not affect public interest.

Challenge to Arbitration Award issued in foreign country should be in the country where award is published

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In the present case, the parties agreed that the arbitration would be held at Geneva, Switzerland. Hence, the Swiss law could be the curial law. The parties agreed, rules framed by ICC, Paris would be the appropriate procedure. In any event, Indian law would have no role to play when the parties expressly agreed that they would have sitting of arbitration abroad where Indian law would have no force.

When there was no express designated venue, the law applicable to the seat of arbitration would be the curial law.

If a contracting party feels, his counterpart in contract committed any breach, place of committing of breach would be ordinarily place where he should ventilate his grievance. Similarly, when arbitration is held in a particular place and losing party feels, the Tribunal did not decide issue in the way it ought to have, he has to approach the Court where arbitration was held and/or award was published unless parties mutually agree to be guided by another law or law of place where contract was performed.

Coal India Ltd vs. Canadian Commercial Corporation AIR 2013 (NOC) 265 (Cal.)

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NEW BANKING LICENSES-THE WAY FORWARD

1. Objective and Evolution of Global Banking

The word “bank” was borrowed from Middle French “banque”, from Old Italian “banca”, from Old High German “banc” which means “bench, counter”. Benches were used as desks or exchange counters during the Renaissance by Florentine bankers , who used to make their transactions atop desks covered by green tablecloths. Today, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) the world’s largest bank , has about $2.43 trillion of deposits, which is almost higher than the nominal GDP of India, Italy, Russia, France and the UK.

Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 defines a bank as “a banking company which transacts the business of banking in India”. Further, section 5 (b) of the Act defines banking as “accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, or deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise.”

Typically, the provision of deposit and loan products normally distinguishes banks from other types of financial firms. The core activity of banks is to act as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. However, several banks have successfully leveraged this relationship with depositors and borrowers (channel) to provide all sort of financial services ranging from core services (ATM, Cards, project finance) to ancillary services (Bancassurance, Investment banking, Wealth Management, etc.) to complex & structured solutions (Mortgage Backed Securities, Collateralised Debt Obligation, etc.). For example, other income (non-funded revenues) of Axis Bank was at ~20% of total revenues in FY13.

Conversely, non-financial entities having eminent distribution networks have migrated to the role of providing banking services. For example, Japan Post Bank which is owned by Japan Post Holdings Co., has the largest public deposit in Japan ($1.81 trillion) garnered through a nationwide network of post offices. However, the bank primarily invests its money in government bonds and acts merely as a savings bank. In India, the Department of Posts has applied for a banking license and perhaps is pursuing a similar model.

Banks can create new money when they make a loan. New loans throughout the banking system generate new deposits elsewhere in the system. The money supply is usually increased by the act of lending, and reduced when loans are repaid faster than new ones are generated. In the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2007, there was a big increase in the money supply, largely caused by much more bank lending, which served to push up property prices and increase private debt. The amount of money in the economy in the UK went from £750 billion to £1700 billion between 1997 and 2007, much of the increase caused by bank lending. In fact in many European countries, bank assets dwarf the size of the local economy and are far in excess of other regions in the world as per Table 1.

Excessive or risky lending can cause borrowers to default, the banks then become more cautious, so there is less lending and therefore less money so that the economy can go from boom to bust as happened in the UK and many other Western economies after 2007. Consequently, European banks’ profits have plummeted from 46% to 1.58% in the Top 1000 bank profits list whereas Asia’s banks have increased their profits from 19% to 56%.

2.    Evolution of Banking in India and need for new banking licenses

While global banking has seen regional disproportional growth due to country specific economic and regulatory requirements, India has its own model for financial development and its regulations. To a great extent, the conservative approach adopted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has helped insulate the domestic banks from global crisis; on the other hand, none of the Indian banks have become global in size.

India has 168 Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) and 82 cooperative banks. Of the 168 SCBs, 82 are Regional Rural Banks and 26 are Public Sector Banks. Thus, only 60 banks are private of which, 40 are foreign banks. According to RBI’s quarterly statistics on deposits and credit of scheduled commercial banks in March 2012, PSBs accounted for approximately 75% per cent of the aggregate deposits. This lopsided structure, where all the eggs are in the same basket, increases the risks to the economy and erodes financial stability while adding a lot of stress on the public banks to increase financial Inclusion. Further, Indian banks will have to bring in additional capital of Rs. 5 lakh crore to meet Basel III norms. The government on its part has to infuse Rs. 90,000 crore into the PSBs to maintain majority shareholding under Basel III.

RBI has as a strategy, since the economic liberalisation in 1991, has followed the cycle of permitting new bank licenses once every decade—in 1993, 2003 and 2013. This permits RBI to regulate the growth and stability of the banking system as well as the new entrants.

The key economic environment under which new banking licenses will be awarded in 2013 could be summarised as below:

•    Overall economic growth

We are in a situation where economic growth has collapsed, industrial output has stagnated for two years, jobs are being shed, consumer inflation is close to 10%, the current account deficit (CAD) in the balance of payments is nearly 5% of GDP at last count, investment is fleeing abroad, external debt maturing in the current fiscal year exceeds $170 billion and the rupee is touching new lows against the dollar each week. While the RBI and the Government are intervening with short-term measures, longer term initiatives are imperative.

As per the discussion paper on the entry of new banks into the private sector (Discussion Paper): “It is generally accepted that greater financial system depth, stability and soundness contribute to economic growth. But beyond that for growth to be truly inclusive requires broadening and deepening the reach of banking. A wider distribution and access of financial services helps both consumers and producers raise their welfare and productivity.”

There are three fundamental reasons for this cor-relation: (1) the banking system creates a more stable employment environment and provides more business opportunity, (2) it helps enlarging the per capita GDP as it brings the unaccounted sector into its fold and (3) it brings additional capital to the banking system, which has a snowball effect.

•    Financial Inclusion

As per the census of India about 59% of households had access to banking services in 2011 and the all-India average population per bank branch was 12,500 in 2012. The majority of India’s 6,50,000 villages do not have even one bank branch, and just 3.5 of every 10 Indians have access to formal banking services in the country, according to a 2011 World Bank survey. Only 37,471 branches were operational in rural India, as of March 2012, while the total banking outlets in villages (including branches, business correspondents and other modes) number just 1,81,753.

While the existing banks also function as per the same mandate (one rural branch out of every four branches), the entry of new players, with a specific and deeper financial inclusion as a license condition, should augment the overall rural presence.

•    Efficiency and Competition

While the overall efficiency of banks in India is increasing, there exists a lot of scope to improve the efficiency of the public sector banks. Net impaired assets (net NPAs + restructured assets) have increased rapidly in FY12 and FY13. Net impaired assets to net worth ratios are now at alarming levels, particularly for PSU banks. Barring BOB and SBI, for all other PSU banks, net impaired assets are almost equal to or even more than 1Q14 net worth. However, for private sector banks, stress levels are very much under control and manageable. Net impaired assets as a percentage of net worth is ~10% for private sector banks (except for Axis Bank at 14% and ICICI Bank at 12%).

Even for private banks, bringing in fresh competition from well-managed business houses, having proven track record in both profitability and setting up pan-India networks (e.g. telecom), will improve the competition and bring in innovation into the system which will only benefit the consumer. Currently, since there are only 3-4 private banks which have pan-India presence, entry of larger business houses will provide competition and much required depth to the financial system in India.

3.    New banking license guidelines

RBI granted licenses to 10 private players between 1993 and 2003. The players were ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, UTI Bank (now Axis), Global Trust Bank (GTB), IDBI Bank, Times Bank, Centurion Bank, Bank of Punjab, IndusInd Bank, and businessman CR Bhansali, who was accorded an in-principle approval but the bank never materialised. Of the 10, four were promoted by financial institutions and the remaining six by individual banking professionals. As it turned out, all those promoted by individuals either failed or merged with other banks, (viz., GTB with Oriental Bank of Commerce and Times Bank, Bank of Punjab and Centurion Bank with HDFC Bank).

The central bank become more cautious, and be-tween 2004 and 2010 granted licenses only to Kotak Mahindra Bank and Yes Bank.

The failures/mergers were essentially due to (1) weak corporate governance/frauds (CR Bhansali and GTB) and (2) lack of promoter interest or deep pockets (Times Bank, Bank of Punjab and Centurion Bank). RBI also noted that the experience of the Local Area Banks have also not been encouraging due to small size and concentration risk. Similar is the situation with RRBs.

The discussion paper thus notes: “The experience of the Reserve Bank over these 17 years has been that, only those banks that had adequate experience in broad financial sector, financial resources, trust-worthy people, strong and competent managerial support could withstand the rigorous demands of promoting and managing a bank.”

Further, Indian regulators have also learnt that during the 2008 crisis, it was the strength of the Indian JV partner which helped sustain the business, for example, an entity like Tata AIG. Further, RBI also learnt that only domestic banks (unlike foreign banks) have been able to penetrate the country and support financial inclusion.

In light of the macroeconomic situation and experiences both domestically and internationally (Lehman Brothers collapse, etc), RBI has come out with guidelines for issuance of new banking licenses. The table below attempts to summarise the key conditions of the guidelines and rationale for the same:

While the objective tests have been laid down as above, RBI has retained subjectivity in the allotment of banking license to give itself flexibility in decision making. It is expected that the RBI may consider the following and perhaps more, while evaluating each of the applications:

•    Industrial and business houses having a long history of building and nurturing new businesses in highly regulated sectors such as Telecom, Power,

Automobiles, Defence, infrastructure projects like Airports, Highways, Dams, Ports probably may be considered favourably as industrial and business houses with presence across various sectors would face a higher reputational risk compared to a pure individual promoter or financial services player.

•    Background of promoter, directors and top executives. No objection certificate of the promoter’s credentials, integrity and background will probably be taken from banks, other regulatory agencies and also from investigating agencies.

•    Corporate governance standards in the corporate entity, extent of financial activities carried out by the industrial/business house, comfort with the corporate structure within the group, whether ownership is diversified and separate from management and the source of promoters’ equity.

4.    Applicants and way forward

Unlike an NBFC License, a banking license is controlled with an occasional window which opens briefly, once in a decade. Essentially, some sort of excitement is expected over the number of applicants. In 1993, 13 applications were received out of which 10 were awarded the license. In 2003, 100+ applications were received out which license was awarded only to two. When the current guidelines of 2013 were announced, media reports expected over 100 applications to be received by RBI before the cut-off date of 1st July, 2013. To everyone’s surprise, only 26 applicants were received. Expected big names like Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd opted not to apply citing that the new rules may be too hard for businesses to implement.

Of course, each applicant would have done his cost benefit analysis before applying. The apparent benefits, amongst others, would be

(1)    Scalability and stability of business,

(2)    Better cost of capital due to access to public deposits,

(3)    Distribution network so as to improve the fee based income (eg- Bancassurance), and

(4)    Return on investments. Table 2 indicates the share price performance of new banks commenced since 1993.

The key challenges for setting up the bank would, amongst others, be

(1)    Stringent regulations, not just for the bank, but for all financial regulated entities in the Applicant group and

(2)    Cost on account of priority sector lending, branch expansion and financial inclusion.

The bigger issue arises from the fact that the conditions are expected to be complied with from day one of the commencement of the bank business. RBI has emphasised that it will not deviate from the guidelines while allotting licenses and thus, will not grant any exemptions.

The list of applicants along with a possible classification, and RBI’s potential key consideration for that bucket is tabled below.

RBI is now expected to set up a committee to screen and shortlist the applicants who will be called for interviews and discussion on the business plan. The in-principle approvals for the licenses are expected to be issued anywhere before the election next year and most probably between January to March 2014. It also needs to be seen if Mr Raghuram Rajan, the new RBI Governor (and former IMF chief economist) who was not in favour of the government giving banking licenses to industrial houses, has a decisive role to play in the grant of the banking licenses. His opinion has been that existing peers, like NBFCs and MFIs, should be given preference over corporates owing to their experience in this business. According to Mr Rajan, “If corporates are given license, the regulator needs to ensure there is no inter-company lending, proper risk management processes are followed and there is enough transparency.”5

Of the number of applicants, RBI will now be required to address several critical questions, including:

•    How many banking licenses should be issued, assuming the industry is likely to consolidate?

•    Will players with pan-India focus be given preference over regional players? Or whether both the categories of applicant will be considered?

•    Whether large industrial houses with experience in setting up pan-India networks like telecom, automobiles, etc., will get preference?

* The authors are senior officials of a well-known financial company. The views expressed in the article are their personal views.

1Medici Bank

2The Bankers Top 1000 World Banks Ranking – July 2013

5http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-02/ news/29374475_1_banking-licence-corporate-houses-raghuram-rajan

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 94 dated 1st April, 2013

21. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 94 dated 1st April, 2013

Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered FIIs in Government Securities and Corporate Debt

This circular has revised, with immediate effect, the guidelines relating to investment in Government Securities & Corporate Debts by removing/merging the sub-limit in each category into a single limit. The details of the said revision are as under: –

The above limits are not applicable to Non-Resident Indians and they can invest without any limit in Government Securities as well as corporate debt.

E-filing of tax returns goes to the next level

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Readers would be aware of the e-filing requirements with reference to income-tax returns. These were brought onto the statute long back and, by now, most of us are well versed in the process of e-filing of the ITR forms. We also have the e-filing requirements under Company Law whereby we have been filing documents electronically with the MCA. For the past few years, ever since the e-filing of returns was made mandatory, we have had a situation where the audited accounts, the tax audit report, the MAT certificate etc., have not been submitted to the tax department unless specifically called for during a scrutiny. This, in my opinion, has inadvertently led to a bit of leniency being shown by many of our members in terms of timely closure of documentation and filing.

Background:
Section 139 requires certain categories of persons to file tax returns in India. Section 139(1) states that the returns need to be in prescribed form. Rule 12 lays down the prescribed forms. Proviso to Rule 12(3) as amended vide Notification No. 37/2011/F. No. 149/68/2011-SO(TPL) dated 01-07-2011 makes it mandatory for some of these categories of return filers to e-file their returns mandatorily. For others, there is an option to e-file the returns (section 139(1B)) but only if they are assessable in specified cities. Section 139(1B) empowers the Government to formulate a scheme for e-filing. In pursuance of this power, the “Furnishing of Return of Income on Internet Scheme 2004” was notified on 30-9-2004. Then, this scheme was superseded by the “Electronic Furnishing of Return of Income Scheme 2007” vide notification No. SO 1281 (E) d. 27-70-2007.

As per Rule 12 (2), ITR-1, 2, 3, 4, 4S, 5 & 6 are not required to be accompanied by any documents. For A.Y. 2009-10, vide Circular No. 3/2009 d. 21-05-2009, the TP reports were to be filed physically before the due date. Thereafter, we have not had any such similar circulars but the practice of filing the TP reports on or before the due date for filing the returns has continued.

Recent notifications:

Now, on 1st May, 2013, the CBDT issued a Notification (No. 34/2013/F. No. 142/5/2013-TPL) which made amendments to Rule 12 whereby, the following proviso has been inserted in sub Rule (2) w.e.f. 1st April, 2013:

“Provided that where an assessee is required to furnish a report of audit under sections 44AB, 92E or 115JB of the Act, he shall furnish the same electronically.”

It is on account of this amendment that now, tax payers who are subject to a tax audit or a transfer pricing audit or who have to pay MAT, are now required to file the respective reports electronically.

Subsequent to the abovementioned notification, another notification has been issued on 11th June, 2013 (Notification No. 42/2013/ F.No.142/5/2013-TPL) which amended the proviso to Rule 12(2) which was inserted by the earlier notification dated 1st May. Now, the amended proviso reads as under:

“Provided that where an assessee is required to furnish a report of audit specified under sub-clauses (iv), (v), (vi) or (via) of clause (23C) of section 10, section 10A, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, section 44AB, section 80-IA, section 80-IB, section 80-IC, section 80-ID, section 80JJAA, section 80LA, section 92E or section 115JB of the Act, he shall furnish the same electronically.”

As a result of the above amendment, now, many more reports are required to be filed electronically.

Another interesting amendment that was made vide the notification dated 11th June is the insertion of second proviso to sub rule (3) of Rule 12. The newly inserted proviso reads as under:

“Provided further that a person who is required to furnish any report of audit referred to in proviso to sub-rule (2) electronically, other than a person to whom clause (aaa) or clause (ab) of the first proviso is applicable, shall furnish the return, in Form as applicable to him, in the manner specified in clause (ii) or clause (iii).”

The cumulative impact of all the amendments is that any taxpayer who is subject to any audit will have to file the audit report electronically and, in addition, also have to file its tax return electronically.

The new e-filing regime:
Before we look at the details of the new e-filing regime, a quick look at the changes in type of tax return forms that can be filed for A.Y. 2013-14:

 Form No.

 Change applicable from A.Y. 2013-14

 ITR-1 (Sahaj) 

 Cannot be used by an individual having:
i. A loss under IFOS
ii. A claim for foreign tax credit/relief under section 90/90A/91
iii. Exempt income exceeding Rs. 5,000

 ITR-4S (Sugam)

Cannot be used by an individual/HUF having:
i. A claim for foreign tax credit/relief under section 90/90A/91
ii. Exempt income exceeding Rs. 5,000

Similarly, the amended position regarding how the tax returns can be filed with effect from A.Y. 2013-14:

Registration of Chartered Accountant on e-filing portal:

Significantly, the onus of uploading the tax audit report, transfer pricing report, MAT certificate, trust audit report etc., has been cast on the concerned Chartered Accountant who signs such a report/certificate. As a result, the process of e-filing of such reports would begin with the concerned CA having to register himself/herself on the e-filing portal. It may be noted that many CAs would already be registered with the said portal and would have been filing their personal tax returns electronically. However, even such CAs would still need to register themselves once again on the portal. For this, one would need to visit www. incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in and register on the site under the sub-category of “Chartered Accountants” under the main category of “Tax Professional”.

While registering, the CA will have to provide his ICAI Membership Number and date of enrolment with the ICAI. We need to be careful with this data since I am informed by a Regional Council Member of ICAI that this data is cross-verified by the portal with the ICAI records. While this information is not verified by me, if it is true, then even a small mistake may lead to problems in registration. Once the CA is registered successfully, he/she would get a notification by email and on a mobile (so, both these fields are mandatory and we will have to provide a valid email ID and a valid mobile number while registering). The activation link received through email has to be activated and then the registration would be completed. The CA would then get a new login name which is based on this ICAI Membership Number as opposed to the PAN-based login ID that we are generally accustomed to.

Once the CA registers on the site, his client will then need to register the CA as the signatory to the respective report/certificate. So, for example, in case of a taxpayer XYZ Pvt. Ltd., the tax audit report will be signed by CA Mr. A, the transfer pricing report will be signed by CA Ms. B and the MAT certificate will be signed by CA Mr. C, then the said company will have to log onto the e-filing portal and register each of these CAs for the respective report/ certificate. When this is done, the concerned CA will get a mail informing that a particular taxpayer has registered the CA as its signatory. The message contains the following line:

Dear AMEET NAVINCHANDRA PATEL,

User AAXXXXXX1B has added you as the CA for FORM3CA, FORM3CB for 2013-14.

Filing of tax returns only after uploading other reports:

It may be noted that it is no longer possible for a taxpayer to file the ITR form unless the various applicable audit reports (tax audit, transfer pricing, trust, MAT) are uploaded electronically. In the ITR form, the date of uploading of each such document has to be mentioned.

Actual uploading of tax audit reports:

Once the CA has registered himself/herself and the client has also registered the CA as the tax auditor, the uploading of the tax audit report (TAR) can be done. This has to be done by the concerned CA. It may be noted that in case of partnership firms who are appointed as the tax auditors, it is the individual partner who has to register himself/herself and not the firm. Also, the same partner will also need a Digital Signa-ture Certificate (DSC) to be able to upload the TAR.

For uploading the TAR, a CA would need to download the utility provided by the tax department on their portal. Once the utility is downloaded onto a local computer, the CA can start feeding in the data. This is offline preparation of the form. The CA also has the option of going online and preparing the form and submitting it immediately thereafter. However, considering the various issues that have already been faced by the CAs who have tried to use the utility, and also considering that this is the first year of e-filing of the TAR, one would need to be very courageous to attempt an online preparation and submission.

A very important feature of the utility provided by the tax department on their site is that it is NOT MS Excel based. This is one of the biggest drawbacks of the said utility. The utility is not user friendly and requires every bit of data to be manually entered by the CA. Also, it does not allow a user to “cut-paste” from any other file. So, if you thought that you could keep an Excel sheet open and then cut from there and paste the data into the utility, you have a shock in store for you. Many CA firms use private software for preparing the computation of income and also the ITR forms. Such firms will need to decide whether they would like to use the utility provided by the Government for uploading the TAR or whether their private software vendors will provide the utility. This article refers to the utility provided by the Government. For running this utility, you will require your computer to have Java Runtime Environment Version 7 Update 6 or above (32 bit) installed in it.

Once the data is entered into the utility, the entire file needs to be validated (on similar lines as the validation required for ITR forms). Upon successful validation, the CA needs to generate a .XML file. The .XML file then has to be uploaded onto the portal with the help of a DSC (which can be either in the form of a .pfx file or a USB token). Once this is done by the CA, the ball then moves to the court of the concerned taxpayer who will get a notification that his CA has uploaded the TAR for his (taxpayer’s) approval. The taxpayer will then have to review the TAR and “Approve” or “Reject” the same. If for any reason, the assessee rejects the TAR, then the concerned CA would need to resolve the difference that the assessee has and then once again generate a fresh .XML file and upload it. The assessee would then again need to log in and “Approve” the same. Once the assessee approves the TAR with the help of a DSC, the same gets officially filed with the Income-tax department and an e-acknowledgement gets generated. This closes the e-filing procedure as far as the TAR is concerned.

Uploading of financials:

Quietly, along with the e-filing of the TAR, the Government has also simultaneously made it mandatory for the tax auditor to also upload the scanned copies of the audited accounts. Fortunately, the tax auditor does not need to feed in the balance sheet and P&L items all over again but merely scan the accounts and upload the same. This has to be done at the time of uploading the TAR. The scanned documents can be either in .TIFF format or in .PDF format. The overall size of the files cannot exceed 20MB. It appears that this limit stands increased to 50MB as per the General Instructions in the utility. However, the main screen where the said accounts are to be uploaded continues to show the size restriction as 20MB.

Actual uploading of other reports:

The same procedure as is adopted for uploading the TAR has to be followed for other forms as well. Thus, whether it is the Transfer Pricing Report in Form 3CEB or the MAT certificate in Form 29B or the audit reports of trusts, the same procedure of uploading data by the CA, validating the file, generating .XML file, uploading the said .XML file with the help of a DSC and then approving of the same by the assessee with the help of his DSC has to be followed. Upon successful “approval” of each report by the assessee, a separate e-acknowledgement gets generated.

Issues currently being faced:

There are a number of hardships that CAs are facing in the context of e-filing of the various audit reports. Some of the important ones (on which the BCAS has already made a representation) are:

1.    After the notification, the forms and the utility files were hosted on the e-filing website in the month of July, 2013 and have undergone several changes. After each change, an assessee, who has partly filled in a report but has not uploaded it, is required to re-feed the entire data, verify and then upload in the latest version, for the report to be furnished on the website. As a result, all the work-in-progress is wasted.

2.    It is not clear as to whether the financial statements to be attached have to be a scanned copy of the manually signed statements or even a PDF file digitally signed will be treated as sufficient compliance. Also, it is unclear as to where the notes to account, the auditor’s report, director’s report and the schedules are to be uploaded. In the portal, there are only the following fields for uploading the accounts:

a)    Balance Sheet

b)    Profit & Loss Account

3.    In respect of several clauses of the Form 3CD, it is normal practice for CAs to give appropriate comments. But in the e-filing utility, there is no space provided for such comments/notes/ remarks/disclaimers etc. In such a situation, would it be legally valid for the assessee/tax auditor to keep the appropriate comments/remarks/explanation in the hard copy and in the utility, mention either “Yes”/”No”/”0” etc. as the case may be? Here the real question is whether an assessee can have two sets of 3CD—one that is uploaded electronically and another one that is signed physically? My personal view is that this would not be correct. However, considering the problem at hand, one needs a written clarification from the Government. The other option that a tax auditor may consider is of putting all comments/remarks/ disclaimers etc. in the 3CA/3CB. However, there seems to be an overall limit on the number of characters that one can feed into the 3CA/3CB. So, in many cases, this option may not work. Also, whether doing such a thing results in the report being perceived to be a qualified report is also a question that needs pondering over.

4.    In the clause relating to depreciation on fixed assets, there is no column to give details of additional depreciation. Further, it appears that date-wise details of all the minor items of additions to fixed assets are also required to be given. This data could run into a few thousand entries for many businesses, and would take substantial time to re-enter.

5.    In the clause relating to quantitative details, often, such data is not available. In such cases, the tax auditor simply reports “Information Not Available”. Now, in the e-filing utility, it is not possible to give such a comment. What does one do in such a situation? In the same clause, in case of manufacturing assessees, if the yield is more than 100%, the utility does not accept the figure. On a lighter vein, does it indicate that the Government does not expect taxpayers to be extra-efficient?

6.    In the clause relating to ratios, in case of service industry or professionals, normally the tax auditor states that “since the activity of the assessee is neither trading nor manufacturing, such ratios are not applicable.” In the e-filing utility, there is no space for such a comment. In this situation, can a tax auditor simply skip this clause?

7.    If one sees the Income-tax Rules, in Form 3CD, Annexure II is still a part thereof despite the fact that from A.Y. 2010-11, the provisions of FBT are made ineffective. The e-filing utility does not provide this Annexure II. It is not clear as to what the exact position is. Can an e-filing utility override the statutory forms prescribed?

8.    In the clause relating to payments covered u/s. 40(A)(2)(b), it appears that every payment so made is required to be reported. Hitherto, the tax auditor used to report only the total amount for each type of transaction with a particular party. Now, it seems that the date-wise transaction details are to be given. This will cause a lot of hardship to the tax auditor while filling in the data.

9.    In the clause relating to loans taken or repaid, one has to give the PAN of the party reported. It appears that the utility matches this PAN with the Government’s PAN records and if the name and PAN do not match exactly then the file does not get validated. If this is true, then this is likely to cause tremendous slowdown in the preparation of the reports.

Thus, as can be seen from the above paragraphs, filing of returns and tax audit and other reports for A.Y. 2013-14 is going to be a very cumbersome and difficult process and unless the tax department comes up with solutions to the numerous problems very soon, we are very clearly headed for an extremely stressful month of September and then later, November. One hopes that the CBDT will read the representations sent by professional bodies like BCAS and act expeditiously.

Clarification on Multi Brand Retail Trading Dated June 6, 2013

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Paragraph 6.2.16.5 of ‘Circular 1 of 2013-Consolidated FDI Policy’

The
Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) has issued a
clarification in the form of FAQ on queries of prospective
investors/stakeholders on FDI policy for multi-brand retail trading.
These clarifications are in respect of Paragraph 6.2.16.5 of ‘Circular 1
of 2013-Consolidated FDI Policy’.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 108 dated June 11, 2013

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Press note 2 (2013 Series) – D/o IPP F. No. 5/3/2005-FC.I Dated June 03, 2013

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 107 dated June 4, 2013

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks / Agencies

Presently, banks can import gold on consignment basis only to meet the genuine needs of exporters of gold jewellery.

This circular provides that, with immediate effect: –

1. Along with banks, all nominated agencies/premier /star trading houses can import gold on consignment basis only to meet the genuine needs of exporters of gold jewellery.

2. Except in the case of import of gold to meet the needs of exporters of gold jewellery, all Letters of Credit (LC) opened by banks/nominated agencies for import of gold under all categories will only be on 100 % cash margin basis and all imports of gold have to be compulsorily on Documents against Payment (DP) basis.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 106 dated May 23, 2013

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Liberalised Remittance Scheme for Resident Individuals – Reporting

Presently, banks are required to submit LRS data in hard copy as well as through the Online Returns Filing System (ORFS) of RBI.

This circular provides that henceforth, i.e. LRS data for 30th June, 2013 and subsequent months have to be uploaded in ORFS on or before the 5th of the following month. Where there is no data to be furnished, banks must to upload ‘nil’ figures in the ORFS system.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 105 dated May 20, 2013

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Export of Goods and Software – Realisation and Repatriation of export proceeds – Liberalisation

Presently, exporters were permitted to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported up to 31st March, 2013 within twelve months from the date of export.

This circular provides that exporters are required to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported up to 30th September, 2013 within nine months from the date of export. However, there are no changes in the provisions with respect to period of realisation and repatriation of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to warehouses established outside India.

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Export of Goods and Services – Simplification and Revision of Softex Procedure at SEZs

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This circular provides that the revised Softex procedure which was applicable only to software exporters in Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) will, with immediate effect, be applicable to all software exporters whether in SPTI/SEZ/EPZ/100% EOU/DTA.

As per the revised procedure, a software exporter whose annual turnover is at least Rs. 1,000 crore or who files at least 600 SOFTEX forms annually on all India basis, will be eligible to submit statements in the revised excel format sheets as per formats Annexed to this circular.

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Investor Education and Protection Fund ( Uploading of Information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with Companies) Rules, 2012

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The Ministry of Finance vide Investor Education and Protection Fund (Uploading of Information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with Companies) Rules, 2012 dated 10-05-2012, requires every Company to file Form 5INV the details regarding unclaimed and unpaid dividends as per provisions of section 205 of the Companies Act, 1956. This information is required to be filed every year within a period of 90 days after holding the AGM or the date on which it should have been held as per the provisions of section 166 of the Act and every year thereafter till completion of the 7 years period.

E-mails have been sent to Companies not complying with the same alongwith the note that in case the amounts lying unpaid is NIL, the same is to be submitted at the following link http://www.iepf.gov. in/IEPFWebProject/jsps/iepf/SubmitDetails.jsp.

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Power of ROCs to obtain declaration/ affidavits from subscribers/first directors at the time of incorporation

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Vide Circular No. 11/2013 dated 29th May 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has given the power to the ROC to obtain declaration/affidavits from subscribers/ first Directors at the time of incorporation to ensure that Companies raise monies in accordance with provisions of Companies Act/Deposit Rules. The affidavits/declarations may also be asked when Company changes its objects Clause to the effect that Company/Directors shall not accept deposits unless the applicable provisions of Companies Act, 1956, RBI Act, 1934 and SEBI Act, 1992 and rules/ directions/regulations made thereunder are duly complied.
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Audit & Auditors under the Companies Bill, 2012

The Companies Bill 2012 (the Bill) was tabled in
the Parliament on 18th December, 2012. The Bill has been undergoing
reviews prior to that and may shortly become an Act. Clauses 139 to 148
under the Chapter X of the Bill deal with “Audit and Auditors”. It would
not be out of place to mention here that the new provisions regarding
Auditing and Auditors will materially change our professional
responsibilities. This article attempts to discuss the criticalities and
the key issues relating to the Chapter in the Bill that deals with our
profession.

Appointment of Auditors [Clause 139]

Key
Provisions The Bill provides that a company will appoint an individual
or a firm as an auditor at its first AGM. Such auditor shall hold the
office till the conclusion of its sixth AGM and thereafter till the
conclusion of every sixth Annual General Meeting. Though the appointment
is for five years, ratification of such appointment is necessary at
every AGM. [Clause 139(1)]

In case of listed companies and
certain other classes of companies to be prescribed compulsory rotation
of audit is provided for a) In case of Individual auditor, after one
term of five years; and b) In case of a firm, after two terms of five
years [Clause 139(2)].

The auditor, after completion of his
term/s, will not be eligible for reappointment for a period of five
years. Also, a firm, which has common partners with the outgoing audit
firm on the date of appointment, cannot be appointed as the auditor of
the company. [Clause 139(2)]

Every company will need to comply
with these requirements within three years from the date when these
provisions come into force. [Clause 139(2)]

Members of the
company may also decide that a) Audit Partner and audit team shall be
rotated after certain interval or b) Audit shall be carried out by joint
auditors. [Clause 139(3)]

RBI and IRDA have powers to regulate
the banking/ insurance companies respectively under the relevant Acts.
Being regulators, these institutions have issued guidelines for
appointment and rotation of auditors. The rotation and the joint audit
requirements enacted by IRDA and RBI, being stricter and by virtue of
special powers given to them in this regard, will prevail over the
provisions of the Bill. In such a case, the appointment criteria will
continue to be as per their respective norms.

An audit firm
(including an LLP) eligible to be appointed should have majority
partners practicing in India qualified for appointment. However, only a
qualified chartered accountant partner will be eligible to sign the
audit report. [Clause 141(2)] Eligibility of an LLP for being appointed
as an auditor is now a part of the Bill. [Clause 139(4)] Under the
Companies Act, 1956 (the Act) a notification was issued to the effect
that an LLP will not be considered as a body corporate for the purpose
of Section 226(3)(a) of the Act. However, doubts were expressed whether
that was sufficient for an LLP to be appointed as an auditor of a
company.

A company may remove the auditor before the expiry of
five year term by passing a special resolution and obtaining prior
approval of the Central Government. [Clause 140(1)]

An auditor
may resign. However, he has to file a statement with ROC and also with
the CAG in case of a company where the appointment of the auditor has
been made by CAG, giving facts and reasons for the resignation [Clause
140(2)].

Comments
Prior to the Bill, the Government
had published the Voluntary Corporate Governance Guidelines in December
2009. According to these Guidelines, rotation of audit firm after five
years was suggested and it provided for compulsory rotation of audit
partner after three years. This entire thought process was aimed towards
providing strict norms of corporate governance and enhancing investor
confidence. However, compulsory rotation of audit partner and
appointment of joint auditors have been left to the discretion of the
members of the company in the Bill. Also, the Bill mandates two terms of
5 years where auditor is a firm as against one term under the above
Guidelines. To that extent, there is dilution from the original
corporate governance norms.

A study of regulatory framework with
regard to appointment of auditors prevailing in various countries shows
that there exists a joint audit system in different forms in many
countries. Joint audit is common in countries like Denmark, Germany,
Switzerland and France. In France, joint audit became a legal
requirement in 1966. All publicly listed companies in France and Denmark
that prepare consolidated (group) financial statements are required to
be audited jointly by two independent auditors and a single audit report
is to be issued. Some mandatory provisions in the Bill in this regard
would have only given boost to the investor sentiments.

Further,
in case of listed companies which have long term audit relationships,
it would be a challenge to cope with a sudden rotation. The new auditor
will have no time for understanding the intricacies of business of the
company. This, in fact, enhances the need for joint audit system prior
to rotating out the existing audit firm and would have provided
continuity and at the same time helped more quality audit firms to
emerge in the country. Nevertheless, the corporate world and auditing
community can come together to take advantage of voluntary provision of
joint audit to overcome these challenges.

As regards the
appointment/reappointment clause in the Bill, existing companies are
required to comply with the regulation within three years. However, the
wording of the clause providing for transition is not clear. Presently,
an auditor is appointed annually. After the enactment of the Bill, the
appointment will take place for 5 years. Hence, the audit firm may be
considered as eligible for appointment for two terms after the
provisions become applicable, since the audit firm will not have
completed the `term’ under clause 139(2)(b) of the Bill though the firm
may have been the auditor of the company for 10 years or more. However,
if we were to go by the spirit and the intent of the Bill, it seems that
the fact that companies are given transition period for three years,
indicates that the firm will not be eligible to be reappointed after
three years post the enactment of the Bill if it has already been the
auditor for 10 years or more.

A question remains whether an
audit firm, which has been the auditor of a company for more than 5
years when the provisions come into force, can be appointed as the
auditor of the company for 5 years at all after? Such appointment will
result in the firm being auditor of the company for more than 10 years
after the transition period. It may be noted that there is no provision
in the Bill to appoint auditor for a period shorter than 5 years. Can
the audit firm, in such a case, issue eligibility certificate under the
Bill?

Considering this, one is not clear how these provisions are going to be implemented in the initial years.

Eligibility, Qualification & Disqualifications of the Auditors [Clause 141]

Key Provisions

A person will not be eligible for appointment as auditor if he, his
relative, or his partner holds any security of or interest in or is
indebted to the company, its subsidiary, holding or associate company or
subsidiary of such holding company.

A person or an audit firm
will be disqualified for appointment if he/it has direct or indirect
business relationships with all types of entities mentioned above.

A
person whose relative is a director or key managerial person by
whatever designation in the company is not eligible for appointment.

A person who is auditor in more than 20 companies will also not be eligible for being appointed as the auditor.

A
person who is convicted by a court of an offence involving fraud is not
eligible for the appointment as auditor for 10 years from the date of
such conviction.

Comments

It is significant to note
that the term used in this clause is “Person”. This term is not defined
in the Bill. In only case of “Business relationship” the term “firm” is
also used. However, in clause 139 the Bill uses the terms “Individual
auditor” and “firm”. Going by the spirit, in my opinion, term “person”
in the context means each individual partner of the firm.

Considering
this, going by the wording of the provisions, it is not clear whether
to attract disqualification to the firm should itself hold any security
or interest etc. in the company? Also, if a partner or his relative is
holding security, whether the firm will be disqualified? Clarification
may be needed on this. Also, where one partner is individually holding
appointment as auditor in more than 20 companies, whether his firm will
be disqualified? Going by the spirit of the clause, this does not seem
to be the case, though the drafting is susceptible to such
interpretation.

Keeping track of whether any relative is holding
any security above rupees one thousand (or the prescribed amount) or is
indebted to the auditee company is going to be extremely difficult. In
case of strained relationship with any of the relatives, a member will
find himself on helpless ground if any of the relatives decides to make
him ineligible for appointment or complains after the signing of audit
report that he was ineligible.

Surprisingly, a person or a
partner whose relative has a business relationship with the auditee
company or its subsidiary, associate etc. is not disqualified. Also, the
clause does not refer to `partner of the firm’ but only to the firm.
Does it mean a partner of a firm can have business relationship with the
company in his individual capacity without the firm attracting
disqualification?

The existing limit of undertaking audit of 20
companies per partner though continues under the Bill, this limit will
now apply while appointing auditors of private companies as well. Under
the Act, this limit is not applicable to private companies. The Bill has
also done away with the sub-limit 10 companies where the paid up share
capital of the company is Rs. 25 lakh or more. It is not clear from the
text of the Bill whether signing of consolidated financial statement in
addition to the stand alone financial statements of the company would be
construed as a separate audit assignment to be covered under the limit
of 20 companies.

The intent of the legislation seems good.
However the drafting of the Clause 141 is highly vulnerable to varied
interpretation (or misuse) . Overall, this clause will require great
amount of deliberations especially from the point of view of severity of
the punishments for violating any of the provisions.

Powers, Duties, Auditing Standards and Reporting Formalities [Clause 143,145,146]

Key Provisions

The
Bill provides that the auditor of a holding company will have right of
access to the records of all its subsidiaries so far as it relates to
consolidation of financial statements.

The Bill also requires the
auditor to report whether he has any reasons to believe that an offence
involving fraud is being or has been committed by any of its officers
or employees. The auditor will have the responsibility to report the
matter to Central Government within the time and manner as may be
prescribed.

At present, the auditor is required to report any
observation with any adverse effect on the functioning of the company in
bold/italics in the audit report. The Bill mandates that such
observation/comments should read at the AGM and can be inspected by any
member.

Currently auditor is required to comment on the internal
control matters and whether such system is commensurate with the size of
the company and nature of its business in respect of purchase of
inventory, fixed assets and for the sale of goods and services. The Bill
requires auditor to comment whether adequate internal financial control
is in place and whether it is operating effectively.

The Bill specifically provides that it is the duty of the auditor to comply with the auditing Standards. [Clause 143(9)].

The
Bill provides for mandatory attendance of auditor’s authorised
representative who is qualified to be appointed as an auditor at the AGM
of the company.

Comments

The right of access to
the auditor to the records of all subsidiaries of the auditee company
for the purposes of consolidation may create certain issues among the
auditors in case the auditor of the subsidiary is different from the
auditor of the holding company.

Requirement of adherence to
auditing standards under the Bill (which was hitherto requirement of
ICAI alone) coupled with the penalties attached for non compliance has
substantially increased the auditors’ responsibility. The cost of audit
will increase and small audits may become unaffordable to both the
company and the auditor.

The scope of audit is materially
broadened with the reporting responsibility on the existence of a fraud.
As per SA240 that deals with the “Auditor’s responsibility relating to
frauds in an audit of financial statements”, the primary responsibility
of prevention and detection of fraud rests with management together with
those charged with governance of the entity. Fraud detections require
an attitude which is inherently different from the at-titude required
for the purpose of an audit. Further, in India in case of audit of
banks, the regulator has prescribed the fraud reporting responsibilities
on the statutory auditor. However, the regulator has given clear
directions with regard to the materiality and corresponding reporting
responsibility to various authorities. The Bill does not state any
materiality limits for the fraud reporting. All these indicate that
auditor has to inform all frauds detected/suspected during course of
audit to the Central Government.

Reporting on effectiveness of
internal control is highly subjective. Any comment thereon in the report
may impact the entity significantly. This will increase the
professional responsibility as well as the liability of the audit firm
very significantly.

Further in respect of reporting on fraud, in
the absence specific guidelines, there is a possibility of difference of
opinion whether any offence involving fraud has taken place. For
example, any strategic investment made by the company that is managed by
relatives of the top management or the Board, or divestment of
investment below market value but much above the cost of acquisition to a
company that is substantially influenced by the relatives of top
management or the board members may be construed to be a fraud. Such
interpretational issues may have to be dealt with very carefully
considering the penalties involved in non compliance of reporting
requirement.

Prohibition of undertaking certain services [Clause 144]

Key Provisions

The
Bill provides stringent norms for independence of the auditors. Under
the Bill, an audit firm will not be able to provide certain services
directly or indirectly to a company where it is appointed as the auditor
or to its holding company or subsidiary

companies. (Clause 144) The prohibited services are as under: –

1.    Accounting and book keeping services

2.    Internal Audit

3.    Management services

4.    Design and implementation of any financial sys-tems

5.    Actuarial services

6.    Rendering of outsourced financial services

7.    Investment banking or advisory services

It
is important to note that the restrictions of undertaking the above
mentioned prohibited services apply not only to the firm undertaking the
audit but to all other connected entities of the firm namely:

i)  All its partners;

i)    Its parent, subsidiary or associate entity; and

ii)   
Any other entity in which the firm or any of its partners has (or can
exercise) significant influence or control or whose name, trade-mark,
brand is used by the firm of any of its partners.

The auditor
will have to comply with the above restrictions before the end of the
first financial year after the enactment of the Bill.

Comments

The
Bill uses term “Management Services” for one of the prohibited
services. Under ICAI standard, the term “Management Consultancy
Services” is used for indicating prohibited service. The term
“Management Consultancy Services” used by ICAI at present specifically
excludes Tax services. In my opinion, though there is minor difference
in the terminology used in the Bill and by ICAI, an auditor will be able
to render services related to Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes.

Punishment for contraventions [Clause 147]


Key Provisions
If
there are any contraventions of any of the provisions relating to audit
and auditor by the company then the company and every officer in
default will be punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 10,000 and maximum
of Rs. 5 lakh and/or imprisonment extending up to 1 year. [Clause
147(1)]

In a case the auditor contravenes provisions of clauses
139 or 143 to 145 of the Bill, the auditor may become liable to a
minimum fine of Rs. 25,000, which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. However, if
it is proved that the contraventions have taken place knowingly or
wilfully with the intent to deceive the company, its shareholders, its
creditors, or tax authorities, the auditor will be punishable with
imprisonment for a term up to one year and minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh
which may go up to Rs. 25 lakh. [Clause 147(2)]

In the event the
auditor is convicted of intentionally deceiving the company,
shareholder, creditors or tax authorities he will be liable to refund
the remuneration received by him to the company and incur liability to
pay damages to all such persons/ authorities for loss arising out of
incorrect or misleading statements made in his audit report. [Clause
147(3)]

Further, if proved that partner or partners of the audit
firm have acted in a fraudulent manner or abetted or colluded in fraud
then the liability for such act will be that of the firm and the
concerned partners jointly and severally. [Clause 147(s) and Explanation
to Clause 140(5)]

Members or depositors or any class of them are
entitled to claim damages, compensation or demand any suitable action
from/or against audit firm for any improper or misleading statement made
in the audit report. [Clause 245(1)(g)(ii)]

Comments

The
Bill rests a heavy responsibility on the audit profession and the
provisions are open to abuse. Eventually, even if the auditor is able to
prove that his actions were not fraudulent or that he had sufficient
evidence to support his comment in the report he has submitted, the
audit firm carries the risk of damage to reputation on account of
accusations. It is necessary to provide sufficient defense measure for
the auditing community at large.

National Financial Reporting Authority [Clause 132]

The
discussion in regard to audit and auditors cannot be complete without
mentioning the immergence of the new authority National Financial
Reporting Authority (NFRA). The existing advisory committee under the
Act known as NACAS will be replaced by NFRA with much wider powers. It
will a) Make recommendation on formulation and laying down accounting
and auditing standards; b) Monitor and enforce the compliance of
accounting and auditing standards; c) Oversee the quality of service of
the professions associated with ensuring compliances with standards and
suggest measures required for improvement in the quality of service; and
d) Perform such other functions as may be prescribed.

NFRA has
been also entrusted with wide powers such as to investigate suo moto or
on reference made by the Central Government into matters of professional
or other misconduct committed by a chartered accountant or a firm of
chartered accountants. Once NFRA commences investigation, ICAI or any
other body cannot initiate or continue proceedings in such matters. NFRA
will have the same powers as vested in a civil court under Code of
Civil Procedures.

For proven misconduct, NFRA will have power to
levy penalty amounting to not less than Rs. 1 lakh but which may extend
to five times the fees received in a case of an individual and not less
than Rs. 10 lakh but which may extend to ten times in case of a firm.

NFRA
will also have the authority to debar a firm or a member from engaging
in practice as a member of ICAI for a minimum period of six months or
such higher period not exceeding 10 years as may be decided by NFRA.

Comments

NFRA
is authorised to act as a regulator for members registered under the CA
Act. This means it may also take action against the company officials
if they are chartered accountants. With constitution of NFRA, powers of
ICAI in regulating members’ conduct will be diminished.

Excessive Powers to Make Rules

In
spite of having in the Bill stringent regulations relating to the audit
and auditors, the Bill has given powers to the Central Government to
prescribe rules at as many as 19 places in Chapter X alone (in the
entire Bill at 346 places). A summary of provisions where powers to
prescribe rules have been given is as under:

Procedure for selection of auditors [Clause 139(1)]

Eligibility conditions for appointment as auditor [Clause 139(1)]

Classes of companies that require rotation of auditor [Clause 139(2)]

Approval from Central Government for removal of auditor [Clause 140(1)]

Statement by the auditor to be filed with ROC in case of resignation [Clause 140(2)]

The value of security that my be held in auditee company [Clause 141(3)(d)(i)]

Amount up to which auditor may be indebted to auditee company [Clause 141(3)(d)(ii)]

Amount of guarantee that may be given to the company in respect of any third person [Clause 141(3)(d)(iii)]

Nature of business relationship with the company [Clause 141(3)(e)]

Information to be included in the “financial Statements” [Clause 143(2)]

Matters that an audit report should include [Clause 143(3)(j)]

Duties and powers of auditors in respect of branches outside India [Clause 143(8)]

Time limit and manner of reporting of fraud to the Central Government [Clause 143(12)]

Prohibited services by an auditor [Clause 145]

Class of companies that need to maintain Cost re-cords [Clause 148(1)]

Items of cost that should be included in books of account [Clause 148(1)]

Net worth or turnover of the companies that require Cost audit [Clause 148(2)]

Manner of calculating remuneration of a Cost Audi-tor [Clause 148(3)]

Conclusion

It
is necessary for all of us to take serious cognizance of all these
provisions in the Bill. We need to understand the entire direction in
which the legislation is moving and be ready to build necessary
professional expertise as well as safeguards in the interest of the
profession.

Right of Privacy – Instruction issued by Election Commission empowering its officer to randomly and indiscriminately search any vehicle on road – Ultra Vires – Constitution of India Art. 21.

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A Writ Petition (PIL) was filed at the instance of a registered N.G.O. substantially challenging the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of the Instructions on Election Expenditure Monitoring (2012) issued by the Election Commission of India under the purported exercise of power under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. According to the Instructions, various teams, such as, flying squad, static surveillance team, expenditure monitoring cell, etc. have been constituted. The teams which have been constituted have been empowered to intercept and search indiscriminately any vehicle or any person/individual at any time. On search, if any cash of more than Rs.2.5 lakh or any other articles, such as, gold, diamonds, etc. are found from the possession of such a person, then the members of the said team have been empowered to interrogate the particular person, and if unexplained cash, without proper documents is found in the possession of any person and is suspected to be used for bribing the voters, it would be seized and action would be taken under the provisions of the law. The Instructions further provide that if cash found is more than Rs.2.5 lakh and no criminality is suspected, i.e., without any election campaign material and no party functionary or worker of the contesting candidates/parties are present in the vehicle, to prove the nexus, then the members of the team would intimate about the recovery of such cash to the Assistant Director of Income Tax in charge of the district. The Assistant Director would depute the Inspector or he himself would reach at the spot for taking appropriate action according to the provisions of the Income Tax Laws.

The Honourable Court observed that powers vested in the Election Commission under Art. 324 (1) of the Constitution of India are wide in nature. The exercise of powers is, however, not without a check. The power has to be exercised with legal circumspection. It is rather more to supplement to the grey areas where no law or legislation is existing and it is necessary to issue directions or pass orders to ensure free and fair poll. The power is complementary and supplemental. It cannot be exercised contrary to the provisions of law, nor should it violate the existing laws.

Action of the authorities in intercepting vehicles indiscriminately on the road at random and then carrying out the search in the hope or nurturing a doubt that the vehicle may contain a cash of more than Rs.2.5 lakh or other articles, without establishment of prima facie grounds or without there being any basis or subjective satisfaction on the part of the authorities would definitely be a violation of the right to privacy of such citizens. If there is a concrete information with the authorities that a vehicle is to pass through a particular route carrying a large amount of currency or other articles like liquor, arms, etc. likely to be used in the election process, then perhaps the authorities may be justified in intercepting the same and effecting the seizure of the same. In the present case, a very unique mode is being adopted. Even if the authorities are satisfied that the cash recovered from a particular individual is not to be used for any election purpose, but still the authorities would inform the Income-tax officials regarding the same for taking appropriate action. This amounts to direct intrusion on the powers of the Income-tax authorities as laid down under Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Honourable Court held that the instruction issued by the Election Commission insofar as it empowers its officers to randomly and indiscriminately search any vehicle on the road and seize cash of Rs.2.5 lakh, if recovered from the vehicle or an individual or a person, as ultra vires being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and also beyond the powers conferred on the Election Commission. The Court directed the Election Commission that the instructions shall not be implemented and there shall not be any indiscriminate or random search or seizure of any vehicle, unless there is any reliable or credible information with the Election Commission reduced into writing.

Bhagyoday Janparishad (Reg. NGO) through President vs. State of Gujarat thro. CS & Ors. AIR 2013 Gujarat 14

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Recovery of tax – Company in liquidation – First charge – Conflict between State legislation and Central legislation – Central legislation must prevail : Companies Act Section 529A & 530.

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This appeal was directed against the order of the Official Liquidator wherein the present appellant (Commercial Tax, Government of M.P.) had been ranked as a preferential creditor. The appellant contended that in terms of the provisions of section 33C of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and section 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994, any amount of tax/penalty/interest payable by a dealer or other Person under this Act shall be first charge on the property of the dealer or Such person and as such he be treated pari passu with the secured creditors. The claim of the appellant is in the sum of Rs. 1,40,60,422 ; they are sales tax, Central tax and entry tax dues payable by the company (in liquidation) for its Morena unit and Gwalior unit. The appellant is aggrieved by the finding returned by the Official Liquidator that he be ranked as a preferential creditor and not a secured creditor.

The Court observed that the statutory mandate contained in this provision is clear. It starts with a non obstante clause. It clearly states that notwithstanding any thing contained in any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the dues of the workmen and debts due to the secured creditors to the extent that such debts rank under clause (c)of the proviso to s/s. (1) of section 529 shall be paid pari passu and in priority to all other debts.

The claims made by the appellant relate to his tax dues which as per his submission would categorise u/s. 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994. Section 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act,1994 clearly stipulates that this provision is subject to the provision of section 530 of the Companies Act,1956. Section 530 deals with the dues of the company to a Central or a State or a local authority of Revenue, taxes, cesses, etc.

Provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act (a Central legislation) have to override the provisions of section 53of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act of 1994 (a State legislation). Even otherwise section 53 of the Act of 1994 (under which the appellant is claiming his right) clearly specifies that the tax liability will be subject to the provisions of section 530 of the Companies Act; section 530 of the Companies Act has to be read subject to the provisions of section 529A of the said Act. There appears to be no conflict between the State Act and the Central Act. That apart, even if there is a conflict between a State legislation and a Central legislation, the Central legislation must prevail.

Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Government of M.P. vs. Official Liquidator (2012) 56 VST 335 (Del.) (High Court)

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Nomination – Nominee Director – Withdrawal to take effect immediately – Resignation to take effect moment letter is sent: Companies Act, 1956:

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The first accused “M/s. Subhiksha Trading Services Ltd” is a company incorporated under the Companies Act of 1956. The complainant is a banking company. A complaint was filed against a company and its directors for an offence punishable under sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petitioner, who was one of the accused, filed a petition u/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contending that (i) she was a nominee director who had submitted her resignation prior to issuance of the cheque which had been dishonoured; (ii) that the shareholder company which had nominated her to the board of directors of the accused – company had sent the letter of withdrawal to the accused company as well as to the Registrar of Companies, which was acknowledged; (iii) that she had also intimated her resignation to the board of directors of the accused company; and (iv) that there was absence of specific averments as to how she was in charge of day to day affairs of the company;

The Honourable Court observed that under the articles of association, the shareholder company had the right to withdraw its nominee. The moment the nomination was withdrawn, the withdrawal became effective and the nominee director ceased to be a director of the company. From the letter of withdrawal sent to the first accused company and the letter of information sent to the Registrar of Companies, it had been prima facie proved by means of unimpeachable documents that the petitioner was not a nominee director of the first accused company on or after 8th January, 2009. Therefore, she was not liable for punishment u/s. 138 of the 1881 Act for the offence said to have been committed by the company subsequent to the date of withdrawal. The Court further observed that resignation of a director will take effect from the moment the resignation letter is sent and it is later on acknowledged by the company.

The question of resigning from the office of director will arise, only if, the person happens to be a director and not a nominee director. If he is a nominee director, he is primarily responsible for the company which nominated him. He may send his resignation to the company which nominated him and even without any such resignation letter, the company which nominated him will be at liberty to withdraw his nomination. In either event, if a resignation letter is submitted by a nominee director to the company which nominated him, thereafter it is for that company to act upon it and to withdraw the nomination of the nomination of the nominee director. As there is no provision for resignation by the director, there is no provision for withdrawal also in the Companies Act, 1956. But such withdrawal is governed by the memorandum and articles of association.

Renuka Ramanath vs. Yes Bank Ltd. (2012) 174 Comp. Cas 465 (Mad.)

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License or lease – Determination – Distinction : Transfer of Properly Act Sec. 105

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The Petitioner, a Publisher-cum-Chief Editor of a local news paper published from Tirupathi, challenged the legality and validity of the orders passed by the second respondent on 16.03.2012 declining to extend the period of license and requesting the petitioner to vacate the premises under his occupation within three days.

In accordance with the terms of the license, the petitioner was granted permission to carry on the business. Condition No. 5 thereof required the licensee to pay the license fee by the 5th of every succeeding month and non-payment of the license fee entailed cancellation of the license apart from the levy of penalty of 24% p.a. on the arrears of the license fee till the date of payment in full. Condition No. 10 thereof set out that the licensee shall not act to the detriment of the interests of the Devasthanams in any manner. Condition No. 13 reserved the right of access and entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the Officers and Staff of the T.T.D. Condition No. 15 set out that the license was liable to be cancelled for violation of any of these terms and conditions of the license. The writ petitioner quietly entered upon the demised premises on 04-08-2008 and he was entitled to remain in possession thereof for a period of three years, which was to expire on 03-08-2011, subject of course to his payment of the monthly license fee of Rs. 4,535/-.

The Court observed that section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, defined “license” as, where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. It is manifestly clear that every license originates in a grant made by one person in favour of another or a definite number of other persons. By implication a license cannot be granted to a fluctuating body of persons who will not be answering the expression of definite number of other persons. Most importantly, what has been granted was only to do something which would in the absence of such grant be unlawful to be done by the other persons. Equally important to notice is the fact that the person to whom the grant is made, does not acquire any right whatsoever, including easementary right or any interest in the property. It can, therefore, be deduced that a grant, which is called license merely authorised the person or persons to whom the grant is made, a right of possession for enjoyment and hence such a right is not juridical possession but amounts to mere occupation.

Possession being a legal concept, one of the most essential ingredients of it is the specification of the actual period of time granted for such occupation. Therefore, a bare license, without anything more is always revocable at the will of the licensor, since the grant itself is limited by a period of time, and the payment of license fee does not by itself create an interest in the licensed property. Consequently, mere acceptance of the license fee even for the periods subsequent to the revocation of the license would not amount to acquisance of the possession of the licensee. It merely amounts to fictional or unreal extension of the period of license without in any manner affecting the rights of the owner from securing eviction of the person or persons to whom the grant is initially made. In law, grantor or the licensor is always liable to be treated to be in possession of the land in question all through the subsistence of the license and even beyond. Hence, it would be open to the licensor to re-enter the premises and reinstate himself once the period of license granted by him expires. This power to re-enter or to reinstate himself is conditioned by not using more force than is actually necessary. As per Section 54 of the Easements Act, the grant of a license may be express or implied from the conduct of the grantor, and Section 60 of the said Act sets out the circumstances when a license can be revoked and Section 61 sets out that such a revocation can be express or even implied. Section 62 listed out nine circumstances when a license is deemed to be revoked.

Of them, Clause (c) clearly discloses that a license is deemed to be revoked when it has been granted for a limited period and the said period expired. Thus, it becomes evident that a license granted for a limited period is deemed to have been revoked upon expiry of the period of grant. Section 63 recognised that, where a license is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. What would be the reasonable time required for achieving these objectives is therefore dependent upon the facts and circumstances prevailing in each case. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed in this regard. Section 64 recognised the right of the licensee, when he was evicted without any fault of his by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right which he was granted, to recover compensation from the grantor, for the breach of the grant.

The term ‘Lease’ has been defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The expression ‘lease’ normally connotes the preservation of the demised estate put in occupation and enjoyment thereof for a specified period or in perpetuity for consideration; the corpus user thereof does not disappear and at the expiry of the term or on successful termination the same is handed over to the lessor subject to the terms of the contract, either express or implied (see State of Karnataka and others vs. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar and others (1993) Supp 3 SCC 290).

In juxtaposition, a license confers a right to do or continue to do something in or upon immovable property of grantor which but for the grant of the right, may be unavailable. It creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of the grantor. Thus, the distinction between the ‘lease’ and license’ lies in the interest created in the property demised. It is therefore essential to gather the intention of the parties to an instrument from the terms contained therein and also by scrutinising the same in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The description ascribed by the parties to the terms may, evidence the intention but may not be very decisive. The crucial test, therefore, is whether the instrument is intended to create or not to create an interest in the property which is the subject matter of agreement between the parties. If it is in fact intended to create an interest in the property, it becomes a lease and if it does not, it is a mere license. In determining whether the agreement creates a lease or a license, the test of exclusive possession, though not decisive, is of great significance. Thus, there is no readily available litmus test to distinguish a ‘lease’ as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, from a ‘license’ as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act, 1882, but the nature and character of the transaction, the terms settled by the parties and the intent of the parties hold the key. Therefore, if an interest in the immovable property entitling the transferee to enjoyment is created it becomes a lease, and if mere permission to use without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, it becomes a license.

The conditions of the grant leave no doubt that the parties have only intended the transaction to be a mere license but not a lease. Particularly, condition No. 13, which reserved the right of entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the officers and staff of the T.T.D any time during the subsistence of the license makes the position clear that the possession of the licensed premises remained with the second respondent – Devasthanam, all through, and the writ petitioner has only been granted a license to use the premises. Further, the monthly fee, which formed the consideration for the grant, was called as license fee. Right to recall the grant for violation of the terms and conditions, prematurely, is another pointer.

In view of the above it was held that Suit premises was not leased out but granted on license only.

Clarification issued by Board – Binding on officers: Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

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The petitioners were engaged in the business of manufacturing of plain particle boards and prelaminated particle boards popularly known as ‘Bagasse boards’, which are goods falling under Chapter 44 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

According to the petitioners, bagasse is remains of sugarcane after the juice has been extracted by pressure between rolls of a mill. The Central Government issued a notification u/s. 5A of the Central Excise Act dated 1st March 2006, thereby granting exemption as well as concessional rate of duties for various goods. At Serial No. 82 of the Table of this Notification, “Bagasse boards” are classified at clause (vi) and rate of duty prescribed for these goods is nil.

The petitioner company came to know from the Association that the goods in question were chargeable to nil rate of duty and that other members of the Association at Kolhapur, State of Maharashtra, were allowed to clear these goods at nil rate of duty. Petitioner wrote a letter dated 1st June 2006 requesting the Assistant Commissioner for clarification whether Bagasse boards manufactured by the petitioner were chargeable to nil rate of duty or not. The petitioner did not receive any response from the excise authorities. As there was no reply at the end of the Assistant Commissioner or from any other excise authorities, the petitioner started clearing their goods, namely, bagasse boards at nil rate of duty.

Ultimately, the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show-cause notice dated 20th June 2007, proposing to recover a sum of Rs. 28,75,624/- as excise duty on the quantities of Bagasse boards cleared by the petitioner company on the ground that the goods were covered under another Notification dated 1st March 2006.

In the course of hearing of Writ Petition, it was pointed out three clarification were issued by the Government of India and the Board, two letters of the C.B.E. & C. addressed to the Chief Commissioner, Hyderabad and the Chief Commissioner, Pune are specifically relied upon by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Pune while allowing benefit to one M/s. Eco Board Industries Limited.

It had been clarified by the Government of India through the Board that benefit of Notification was available to pre-laminated bagasse board, such clarification is binding to all Central Excise Officers and no officer of the Central Excise could take a contrary view, more so, when the Central Excise Officers of Patna, Lucknow, Sholapur, Kolhapur, Pune, Hyderabad, etc. have followed the clarifications and allowed the benefit of exemption for similar products, namely, pre-laminated bagasse board, to manufacturers within their jurisdiction.

The Court observed that firstly, any clarification issued by the Board is binding on the Central Excise Officers who are duty-bound to observe and follow such circulars. Whether Section 37B is referred to in such circular or not is not relevant. The Court quoted the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ranadey Micronutrients vs. Collector of Central Excise 1996 (87) ELT 19 (SC), wherein a circular which was in favour of the assessee issued by the Board was sought to be repudiated by the Central Excise Department on the ground that it was only a letter and not an order issued u/s. 37B. The Apex Court observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment as under:

“There can be no doubt whatsoever, in the circumstances, that the earlier and later circulars were issued by the Board under the provisions of Section 37B, and the fact that they do not so recite does not mean that they do not bind Central Excise Officers or become advisory in character. There can be no doubt whatsoever that after 21st November, 1994, Excise duty could be levied upon micronutrients only under the provisions of Heading 31.05 as “other fertilisers”. If the later circular is contrary to the terms of the statute, it must be withdrawn. While the later circular remains in operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that it is not valid.”

Therefore, the submission that the letters issued by the Board in the present case were communications answering queries raised by the Commissioners of particular areas and hence, such letters were not binding because they were not issued u/s. 37B is not the correct proposition as canvassed by the Counsel appearing for the Revenue.

When other Central Excise authorities of equal and higher rank have followed and acted as per the clarifications, the Commissioner, Surat, could not have taken a contrary view on the assumption that the clarifications were only letters and not orders u/s. 37B.

If Excise authority of a particular Commissionerate or State refuses to allow benefit of exemption to manufacturers located in that Commissionerate or State but other manufacturers located elsewhere are allowed such exemption, then the same would be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also of Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution of India.

Darshan BoardLam. Ltd vs. UOI 2013 (287) E.L.T. 401 (Guj.)

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 58, dated 15-12-2011 — Risk management and interbank dealings.

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This Circular has, with immediate effect, made the following changes:

(1) Under contracted exposures — Forward contracts booked by residents irrespective of the type and tenor of the underlying exposure, once cancelled, cannot be rebooked.

(2) Under probable exposure based performance:

(a) For importers availing of the above past performance facility, the facility stands reduced to 25% of the limit as computed above, i.e., 25% of the average of the previous three financial years’ (April to March) actual import/ export turnover or the previous year’s actual import/export turnover, whichever is higher. In case of importers who have already utilised in excess of the revised/reduced limit, no further bookings may be allowed under this facility.

(b) All forward contracts booked under this facility by both exporters and importers hence forth will be on fully deliverable basis. In case of cancellations, exchange gain, if any, must not be passed on to the customer.

(3) All cash/tom/spot transactions can be undertaken for actual remittances/delivery only and cannot be cancelled/cash-settled.

(4) Hedging by FII — Forward contracts booked by the FII, once cancelled, cannot be rebooked. The forward contracts may, however, be rolled over on or before maturity.

(5) Treasury functions of authorised dealers

(a) Net Overnight Open Position Limit (NOOPL) to be reduced across the board.

(b) Intra-day open position/daylight limit must not exceed the existing NOOPL approved by RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 57, dated 13-12-2011 — Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) — Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) — Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999.

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Presently, all applications for compounding are received and processed by the Compounding Authority at RBI Central Office at Mumbai.

This Circular has decentralised compounding contraventions in respect of the following at its Regional Office:

(i) Delay in reporting of inward remittance,

(ii) Delay in filing of form FC-GPR after allotment of shares, and

(iii) Delay in issue of shares beyond 180 days.

All applications must be made to the Regional Offices at:

(i) Bhopal, Bhubaneshwar, Chandigarh, Guwahati, Jaipur, Jammu, Kanpur, Kochi, Patna and Panaji for amount of contravention below Rupees one crore (Rs.10,000,000).

(ii) Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai and New Delhi for amount of contravention without any limit.

All applications other than those dealt with by the Regional Offices will continue to be dealt with by the Compounding Authority at RBI Central Office at Mumbai.

Also, annexed to this Circular are formats required to be submitted along with the compounding application in respect of the following contraventions :

(1) Details to be furnished along with application for compounding of contravention relating to Foreign Direct Investment in India.

(2) Details to be furnished along with application for compounding of contravention relating to External Commercial Borrowing.

(3) Details to be furnished along with application for compounding of contravention relating to overseas investment.

(4) Details to be furnished along with application for compounding of contravention relating to branch/liaison office in India.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 56, dated 9-12-2011 — Foreign investment in pharmaceuticals sector — Amendment to the Foreign Direct Investment Scheme.

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This Circular, based on Press Note 3 (2011 Series), dated November 8, 2011, has amended FDI policy for pharmaceuticals sector as under:

(i) FDI, up to 100%, under the Automatic Route, would continue to be permitted for greenfield investments in the pharmaceuticals sector.

(ii) FDI, up to 100%, would be permitted for brownfield investment (i.e., investments in existing companies), in the pharmaceutical sector, under the Approval Route.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 55, dated 9-12-2011 — Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India — Issue of equity shares under the FDI scheme allowed under the Government route.

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Presently, companies are permitted to issue equity shares/preference shares under the Approval Route by conversion of import of capital goods/ machineries/ equipment (including second-hand machineries) and pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.), subject to terms and conditions.

This Circular has modified two of the conditions as follows:

 

 

 

A.P.
(DIR Series)

Earlier
condition

Revised
condition

Circular
No. 74,

 

 

 

 

 

dated
30-6-2011

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Para 3(I)(d)

All
such conversions of import payables for

Applications
complete in all respects, for

 

capital
goods into FDI should be completed

conversion
of import payables for capital

 

within
180 days from the date of shipment of

goods
into FDI being made within 180 days

 

goods.

from
the date of shipment of goods.

 

 

 

Para 3(II)(d)

The
capitalisation should be completed within

The
applications complete in all respects,

 

the
stipulated period of 180 days permitted for

for
capitalisation being made within the

 

retention
of advance against equity under the

period
of 180 days from the date of in-

 

extant
FDI policy.

corporation
of the company.

 

 

 

 

 

 

CAS-14 — Cost Accounting Standard on pollution control cost.

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The Institute of Cost Accountants of India has issued the Cost Accounting Standard CAS 14 on ‘Pollution Control Cost’ and it deals with principles and methods of determining the pollution control costs. This standard deals with the principles and methods of classification, measurement and assignment of pollution control costs, for determination of cost of product or service, and the presentation and disclosure in cost statements. It is issued with the objective of bringing uniformity and consistency in the principles and methods of determining the pollution control costs with reasonable accuracy. It is to be applied to cost statements which require classification, measurement, assignment, presentation and disclosure of pollution control costs including those requiring attestation.

Full version of the same can be accessed at
http://casbicwai.org/CASB/docs/CASB/CAS_14_Pollution_ Control_Final.pdf

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118 dated June 26, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

Presently, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad are required to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank/Working Group, within 15 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

This circular has extended the said period to 30 days from the present 15 days, Hence, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad can now to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank / Working Group, within 30 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Renminbi (RMB)

This circular states that the facility of availing of ECB in Renminbi (RMB) has been discontinued with immediate effect.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 116 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Civil Aviation Sector

Presently, the Civil Aviation sector could avail of ECB for working capital purposes within 12 months from the date of issue of the erstwhile circular (i.e. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 24th April, 2012).

This circular has extended the said period and hence, the Civil Aviation sector can now avail of ECB for working capital purposes upto 31st December, 2013.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 115 dated June 25, 2013

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Buyback/prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs)

This circular has extended the last date of the existing scheme for Buyback/Prepayment of FCCB, under the approval, route to 31st December, 2013 from 31st March, 2013.

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Alteration to Schedule XIV of Companies Act — Inclusion of intangible assets created under certain circumstances.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued a notification dated 17th April 2012 to make alterations in Schedule XIV of the Companies Act pertaining to the rates of depreciation, to insert the category of intangible assets created under Build, Operate and Transfer, Build, Own, Operate and Transfer or any other form of Public-Private Partnership Route. Full version of the Circular can be accessed at

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ GSR_(E)_17apr2012.pdf

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Timeline for submission of annual audited financial results for financial year 2011-12.

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SEBI vide its Circular No. CFD/LA/SK/AT/8278/2012, dated 11th April 2012 has given an option to listed entities for submission of financial results for quarter ended F.Y. 2011-12 and in respect of annual audited results for F.Y. 2011-12, to either:

  • Submit limited reviewed Q4 results within 45 days from end of the quarter and thereafter submit annual audited results as soon as they are approved by the Board. (or)
  •  Submit annual audited results within 60 days from the end of the fourth quarter along with Q4 results.

This one-time measure has been taken in view of the difficulty faced in submission of annual financial results along with Q4 results owing to the first-time adoption of the revised Schedule VI.

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Amendments to the Equity Listing Agreement — Change in format for interim disclosure of results.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide Circular No. CFD/DIL/4/2012, dated 16-4-2012, revised the format of Balance Sheet under Schedule VI of the Companies Act as was notified in Notification dated 28-2-2011. Pursuant to the same, it has been decided to carry out consequential amendments to listing Agreement regarding interim disclosure of financial results by listed entities to the stock exchange. Full version of the Circular is available on SEBI website at www.sebi.gov.in under the categories ‘Legal Frame and Listing.’

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 104, dated 4-4- 2012 — Authorised Dealer Category-II — Permission for additional activity and opening of Nostro account.

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1. Issue of foreign exchange pre-paid cards

Presently,
only Authorised Dealers Category-I banks are permitted to issue foreign
exchange pre-paid cards to residents travelling on private/business
visit abroad.

This Circular now permits Authorised Dealers
Category-II also to issue foreign exchange pre-paid cards to residents
travelling on private/business visits abroad, provided:

 (1) AD Category-II adheres to KYC/AML/CFT requirements.

(2) Settlement in respect of foreign exchange prepaid cards is effected through AD Category-I banks.

2. Opening of Nostro Accounts

This Circular permits AD Category-II to open Nostro accounts subject to the following terms and conditions:

(i) Only one Nostro account for each currency must be opened.

(ii)
Balances in the account must be utilised only for the settlement of
remittances sent for permissible purposes and not for the settlement in
respect of foreign exchange prepaid cards.

(iii) Idle balance cannot be maintained in the said account.

(iv) Reporting requirements as prescribed are complied with.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 101, dated 2-4-2012 — Overseas Direct Investments — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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Presently, an Indian Party requires prior permission of RBI to open, hold and maintain Foreign Currency Account in a foreign country for the purpose of overseas direct investments in that country. This Circular permits an Indian Party to open, hold and maintain Foreign Currency Account (FCA) abroad for the purpose of overseas direct investments without obtaining prior permission from RBI, provided:

(1) The Indian Party is eligible to undertake overseas direct investments.

(2) The host country Regulations require that investments into the country are to be routed through a designated account in that country.

(3) FCA is opened, held and maintained as per the regulations of the host country.

 (4) Remittances sent to the FCA by the Indian party are utilised only for making overseas direct investment into the overseas JV/WOS.

(5) Any amount received in the account by way of dividend and/or other entitlements from the overseas JV/WOS are repatriated to India within 30 days from the date of credit.

 (6) The Indian Party submits details of debits and credits in the FCA on yearly basis to the designated bank along with a certificate from the Statutory Auditors of the Indian party certifying that the FCA was maintained as per the host country laws and applicable FEMA regulations/provisions.

(7) FCA so opened must be closed immediately or within 30 days from the date of disinvestment from overseas JV/WOS or cessation thereof.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 100, dated 30-3-2012 — Trade credits for imports into India — Review of all-in-cost ceiling.

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This Circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling or Trade Credits, as mentioned below, will continue up to September 30, 2012:

Sr.

No.

Average maturity period

All-in-cost over 6 month LIBOR for the respective
currency of borrowing or applicable benchmark

1

Up to one year

350 bps

2

More than 1 year and up to 3 years

350 bps

All-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling/processing charges, out-of-pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 99, dated 30-3-2012 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Review of all-in-cost ceiling.

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This Circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue up to September 30, 2012:

Sr.

Average maturity period

All-in-cost over 6 month No. LIBOR for the respective currency of borrowing or applicable benchmark

1

Three years and
up to five years

350 bps

2

More than five years

550 bps

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 98, dated 30-3- 2012 — Discontinuation of supplying printed GR forms by Reserve Bank.

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This Circular states that with effect from July 1, 2012, GR forms will only be available online from RBI website www.rbi.org.in at the following link:

“Notification -> FEMA -> Forms -> For Printing of GR Form”.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52, dated 23-11-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Parking of ECB proceeds.

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Presently, borrowers are permitted to either keep ECB proceeds abroad or remit these funds to India, pending utilisation for permissible end-uses.

This Circular states that henceforth all proceeds of ECB raised abroad and meant for Rupee expenditure in India should be brought back immediately by the borrowers for credit to their Rupee accounts with banks in India. These Rupee funds cannot be used for investment in capital markets, real estate or for inter-corporate lending. Only ECB proceeds meant for foreign currency expenditure can be retained abroad pending utilisation.

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Deficiency in service by company/dealer supplying LPG cylinders and regulators : Consumer Protection Act 1986 S. 2(1)(g).

New Page 17 Deficiency in service by company/dealer supplying LPG cylinders and
regulators : Consumer Protection Act 1986 S. 2(1)(g).

 

Death caused due to leakage from LPG cylinder/regulator. The
NCDRC held that it was duty of Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) to provide technical
facilities to its consumers and periodically examine the cylinder or the
regulator to find out its defects.

 

As the Indian oil company also did not ask its dealer to get
the regulator and cylinder examined by any expert, the dealer and Indian Oil
Corporation were held jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the
complainant.

[ Regional Manager IOC Ltd., Bhopal v. Rakesh Kumar
Prajapati & Ors.,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 1988 (NCC)]



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Co-operative Housing Society – Builders have to execute the conveyance: Consumer Protection Act:

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23 Co-operative Housing Society – Builders have to execute
the conveyance: Consumer Protection Act:


Environ Emanual Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd vs. The Environ
Enterprises INC, dated 19.9.2008; Consumer Complaint No. 91 /2008. (Consumer
Grievances Redressal Forum, Konkan Bhavan, Navi Mumbai)

The complainant society is a duly registered co-operative
housing society under the Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act. In the year 2003,
the opponent builder handed over the possession of the flats to the members of
the society. But, the conveyance deed had not been executed to transfer the land
and building in favour of the society. The society visited the opponent a number
of times and placed their demand before them in writing. The complainant society
had filed this complaint as the opponent had provided defective service to the
complainant society. The complainant society further prayed that order may be
issued to provide occupation certificate, building completion certificate,
documents pertaining to ownership of building to the complainant society, and
also to register the conveyance deed in favour of the society.

The Consumer Forum held that as per the provisions of law, it
is the duty of the opponent builder to register the conveyance deed in favour of
the complainant society.

As the opponent builder had not registered the conveyance
deed in favour of the complainant society, the Consumer Forum was of the opinion
that as per the provisions of the Act, it was the responsibility of the builder
to take initiative to register the society of the flat owners. It was also the
responsibility of the builder to take initiative to register the conveyance deed
in favour of the society. Even though a period of three years has elapsed since,
the opponent has not registered the conveyance deed in favour of the society. As
per the Forum, this act of the opponent was not acceptable. As per Sec. 2(1)(g)
of Consumer Protection Act, this act of the opponent comes under the purview of
“defective services”. The opponent builder was directed to comply with all the
legal procedures to register the conveyance deed in favour of the society within
a period of two months from the date of the order.

 

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Appellate Tribunal – Exparte order: Tribunal must decide appeal on merits, if assessee files submissions in writing

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22 Appellate Tribunal – Exparte order:  Tribunal must
decide appeal on merits, if assessee files submissions in writing


Chemipol vs. UOI

(2009) 244 ELT 497 (Bom)

The appellant’s appeal before the CESTAT was dismissed for
non prosecution. The application filed by the appellant for setting aside the
order of dismissal for non prosecution was rejected by the Tribunal.

In a further appeal, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the
Tribunal has no power to dismiss an appeal for default on the part of an
appellant in making an appearance. Even if the appellant is absent, the Tribunal
is required to decide the appeal on the merits. The Tribunal presently has its
benches only in four or five places in India. An appellant, who on account of
his place or residence or business being far away from the place of sitting for
the Tribunal, may not, except at a high cost, be able to attend the hearing;
especially when we know that matters are usually adjourned for several times. In
such an event, if the appellant files on record his submissions in writing, the
Tribunal must decide the appeal on the merits and on the basis of the said
submissions. In that case, the Tribunal would not have a power to dismiss the
appeal; but where the appellant, in spite of notices, is persistently absent,
and the Tribunal, considering the facts of the case, is of the view that the
appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal, can, in the exercise of
its inherent power, dismiss the appeal for non prosecution. The conclusion of
the Tribunal that the appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal must
be arrived at based on the facts of each case, and not merely on account of the
absence of the appellant on a solitary occasion.

In the present case, the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on
account of the absence of the appellant only on the occasion. The fact that the
appellant immediately thereafter applied for restoration of the appeal, shows
his intention: that he was interested in prosecuting the appeal, and maybe he
had a justifiable cause for his absence on one occasion. In the circumstances,
the Tribunal ought to have restored the appeal into the file.

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Rectification of mistake — No finding on the decision cited by the appellant.

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8 Rectification of mistake — No finding on
the decision cited by the appellant.


The appellant had filed appeal before the CESTAT. In the
written submission filed before the Tribunal the appellant had relied on two
Tribunal decisions in its favour. The appeal was heard ex parte. The
Tribunal by referring to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CCE,
Ahmedabad v. Ramesh Food Products,
2004(174) ELT 310 (SC) disposed of the
appeal. No reference was made to the judgments of the Tribunal which were relied
upon by the appellant. The appellant, therefore, filed an application for
rectification, pointing out that the appellant had relied upon two judgments of
the Tribunal in his submissions. The Tribunal, however, disposed of his appeal
without considering those judgments. The Tribunal again dismissed the
rectification application. On further appeal the High Court observed that the
procedure that has been followed by the Tribunal is not in accordance with law.
If in the opinion of the Tribunal, the two judgments of the Tribunal on which
the appellant was relying, were not relevant, the Tribunal could have said so in
its judgment. The course adopted by the Tribunal, of even not referring to the
judgments of the Tribunal or which the appellant was relying, is not proper. It
was for the Tribunal to point out, after considering the judgments of the
Tribunal on which the appellant was relying, why those judgments were not relied
and how, according to the Tribunal, the matter is covered by the judgment of the
Supreme Court. In view of the above, the appeal was allowed by remanding the
matter back to the Tribunal.

[ Stanlek Engineering P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex.
Mumbai,
2008 (229) ELT 61 (Bom.)]

 


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Withdrawal of draft Dematerialisation of Certificate Rules.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has in consultation with the Law Ministry withdrawn the draft of Dematerialisation of Certificates Rules, 2011 as per the Notification issued on 28-10-2011.

Cost Accounting Records Rules prescribed for various products in supersession of the earlier Rules.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued the Cost Accounting Records Rules applicable to various products in supersession of the Rules issued thereof earlier. Full Notifications can be accessed on:

    1. Telecommunications http://www.mca.gov.in/ Ministry/notification/pdf/TELECOM_CARR_869E. pdf

    2. Sugar Industry http://www.mca.gov.in/ Ministry/notification/pdf/SUGAR_CARR_872E. pdf

    3. Pharmaceutical Industry http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ PHARMA_CARR_874E.pdf

    4. Petroleum Industry http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/PETROLEUM_CARR_870E. pdf

    5. Fertiliser Industry http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/Fertilizer_CARR_873E.pdf

    6. Electricity Industry http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ELECTRICITY_CARR_871E.pdf

Companies Bill.

The Companies Bill, 2011 as presented in the Parliament on 14th December 2011 can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/The_Companies_Bill_2011.pdf.

The Bill, proposes significant changes to the existing corporate law provisions. The Bill has 470 clauses as against 658 sections in the existing Companies Act, 1956.

Unlisted Public Companies (Preferential Allotment) Amendment Rules, 2011.

The MCA vide Notification dated 14th December 2011, has issued the Unlisted Public Companies (Preferential Allotment) Amendment Rules, 2011 wherein it has mentioned that Preferential allotment means allotment of share or any other instrument convertible to shares including hybrid instruments issued under the provisions of section 81(1A) i.e., further issue of shares to existing shareholders and the allotment has to be made within 60 days of receipt of application money, else it is to be repaid in 15 days, failing which it is to be repaid with 12% p.a. interest.

The Rules shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.

Company Law Settlement Scheme (CLSS 2011) extended to 15th January 2012.

The MCA vide Circular No. 71/2011, dated 15th December 2011 has extended the last date for availing benefit under Company Law Settlement Scheme (CLSS), 2011 to 15th January, 2012 and has stressed that the Scheme will not be extended beyond 15th January, 2012. The statutory documents like Balance Sheets, Annual Returns not filed with the ROC can be filed under this scheme by paying additional 25% fee and immunity from prosecution is granted by the ROC.

Allocations of regions under the Regional Director.

The MCA has notified vide its Notification dated 16th December 2011 the respective regions under the 6 regional Directors and their headquarters.

Extension of date for submission of PAN details In DIN-4.

The MCA vide Circular No. 70/2011, dated 15th December 2011 has extended the last date for filing form DIN-4 by DIN holders for furnishing their Income-tax PAN and to update Income-tax PAN details to 29th February, 2012. These details are required to be given in case of mismatch of details between the DIN and the PAN, for which the ROC has issued letters to DIN holders requesting that the same be updated.

Further, to ascertain whether a DIN holder needs to submit such details, the same can be done through the Quick Link on the MCA 21 homepage by entering the DIN no. and his PAN card.

Cost Accounting Records and Cost Audit Record Rules — Clarifications regarding applicability and compliance requirements.

The Ministry has issued clarifications vide Circular No. 68/2011, dated 30-11-2011 regarding cost accounting records and cost audit wherein it is clarified that:
    1) Companies covered under Companies Cost Accounting Records Rules, 2011 are only required to file a compliance report in Form B notified in the Circular and not details of cost records.

    2) Companies falling under the said Rules 2011 for the first time shall keep cost records and cost details, statements, schedules, etc. in good order for the next eight financial years beginning with first year of application of the said Rules.

    3) To maintain the appointment of Cost Auditor under the rules as independent and at arm’s length, it is clarified that cost auditor(s) appointed u/s.233B(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 (whether for one or all of the company’s products covered under cost audit), shall not provide any other services to the company relating to

i) design and implementation of cost accounting system; or

ii) the maintenance of cost accounting records, or

iii) act as internal auditor, whether acting individually, or through the same firm or through other group firms where he or any partner has any common interest.

However it is clarified that cost auditors are allowed to certify the compliance report or provide any other services as may be assigned by the company, but which shall not include any of the services mentioned above.

Cost Accounting Records and Cost Audit Record Rules — Clarifications about coverage of certain sectors thereunder.

The MCA has vide Circular No. 67/2011, dated 30th November, 2011 has issued clarifications regarding coverage of certain sectors in the Cost Audit Record Rules. It has mentioned that the rules are not applicable to wholesale and retail activities, those engaged in job work, export-oriented units having 100% captive consumption, etc.

Suit by grandfather on behalf of minor — Next friend can be any person — Civil Procedure Code, Order 32 Rule 2.

[Iqbal Ahmad Khan v. Master Mahmood Raza Khan Sherwani, AIR 201 All. 136]

The plaintiff was a minor and filed the suit through his grandfather. An application had been moved by the defendant before the Trial Court that the suit was not maintainable on the ground that it had not been filed through the next friend and, therefore, it was not maintainable under Order XXXII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court observed that the father was not alive though the mother was alive, but the suit had been filed through the grandfather. Under Order XXXII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the word used is ‘next friend’. The ‘next friend’ is not confined to the natural guardian only. The Patna High Court in the case of Narain Singh v. Sapurna Kuer and Ors., AIR 1968 Pat. 318 had observed that a next friend can be any person, not necessarily any of the guardians enumerated in section 4 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Therefore, the suit filed by the minor through grandfather cannot be said to be not maintainable.

Right to Information — Disclosure of order sheet noting and note sheets of public authority — Right to Information Act S. 8(j).

[Arun Luthra v. Chattisgrah State Information Commission & Ors., AIR 2011 Chhatisgarh 128]

On an application filed seeking disclosure of order sheets and note sheets of public authority relat-ing to matter of encroachment, the State Chief Information Commissioner had directed the Public Information Officer of the Raipur Development Authority to supply the information in the form of order sheets.

The petitioner filed the petition challenging the le-gality of the order. The Court observed that as far as clause 8(j) of the Act is concerned, it would not come in the way of disclosure of information of the nature, which has been directed by the Chief Information Commissioner. The exemption from disclosure of the information under clause 8(j) of the Act is in relation to those categories of information, which are personal, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual. The disclosure of order sheets and note sheets of a public authority with regard to various actions taken by it, cannot be said to be a matter relating to personal information of the petitioner, having no relation to any public activity or interest. Moreover, it cannot be said that the disclosure of note sheets of the public functionary with regard to whatsoever activity it has undertaken in its capacity as such, would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the petitioner. In any case, such exemption is not absolute, because even assuming that the information is personal in nature, disclosure of such, would be permissible, if the Information Officer is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information. The Court held that the disclosure of the order sheets or note sheets of the Development Authority with regard to steps, if any, taken after the order of the Court, would not be in any manner, a matter relating to disclosure of personal information of the category as stated under clause 8(j) of the Act.

The Court further observed that as far as violation of section 11 of the Act is concerned, the contents of note sheets and order sheets maintained by public authority, cannot be said to be information supplied by a third party to the Public Information Officer as confidential. From the fact there was no material disclosed to the Court to show that any confidential information given by the petitioner to the Development Authority was sought to be disclosed under the order impugned. In the order, the Chief Information Commissioner had not directed the Public Information Officer to disclose any information disclosed by the petitioner and treated by the Development Authority as confidential. There was no information sought by the respondent which is of the nature as contemplated u/s.11 of the Act, though the order of the Chief Information Commissioner is merely confined to disclosure of order sheets and note sheets after the order of the Court.

The provisions of section 3 of the Act state that subject to the provisions of the Act, all citizens shall have the right to information. If the same is read along with section 6 of the Act, it would be clear that in order to seek dis-closure of information, an information seeker is neither required to disclose invasion of any of his rights, nor any legal injury much less state reasons as to why he is seeking such information. The right is only subject to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, whatever may be the motive of the respondent and whether or not, any of his rights are affected, there is an obligation to provide information by the Information Officer, which of course, would be subject to other provisions of the Act.

Stamp Duty — Gift deed — Market value not relevant : Stamp Act, 1899.

[Sumit Gupta v. State of UP and Ors., AIR 2011 All. 135]

The instrument in question was a deed of gift dated 11 -2-2009 executed by one Ramesh Chand Lohia in favour of his grandson in respect of a property of Rs.61 lakh in value, as disclosed in the gift deed. However, on the objection of Sub-Registrar its value was enhanced to Rs.61 lakh for the purposes of stamp duty and on the said value stamp duty of Rs.4,27,100 was duly paid.

The matter was referred u/s.33/47-A of the (Indian) Stamp Act, 1899 for determination of the market value and the deficiency in payment of stamp duty was determined.

The said order was challenged and upheld in ap-peal. The important aspect involved in the petition was whether the authorities under the Act are competent u/s.47-A of the Act to determine the market value of the property referred to in the gift deed in question for the purposes of levy of stamp duty.

The Court observed that a gift deed is chargeable to stamp duty under Article 33 of Schedule 1-B of the Act. It provides that a gift is chargeable to stamp duty as a conveyance provided under Article 23 Clause (a) for a consideration equal to the value of the property.

In the said Article words used are ‘value of the property’ as distinguished from the ‘market value’, meaning thereby that for the purposes of determining stamp duty on a gift deed, market value is not required to be mentioned/determined. The disclosure of the value of the property in the gift is sufficient for the purposes of payment of stamp duty.

Thus, there is a clear departure in the language used in Article 33 of the Schedule 1-B of the Act and section 47-A of the Act. Section 47-A of the Act uses the expression in ‘market value’, whereas for levying stamp duty on a gift deed Article 33 of Schedule 1-B of the Act uses the expression ‘value of the property’.

The Legislature in its wisdom has differently used the words ‘value of the property’ and ‘market value’ in the Act. It is not without purpose. ‘Market value’ refers to the value of the property prevailing in the market on which the prospective purchaser is ready and willing to purchase and seller is ready and willing to sell the property in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, market value is a bilateral transaction depended upon the will of two persons. On the other hand, ‘value’ simply connotes the estimated monetary worth of the property in the eyes of the seller and is in the nature of a unilateral act.

Therefore, the market value is not at all relevant for levying stamp duty on a gift deed and the provisions of section 47-A of the Act does not come into play which necessitate determination of market value.

Rights of daughter to ancestral property — Overriding effect of Act — Hindu Succession Act section 4(1)(a) and 6.

[Smt. Gulabbai Chhaganlal & Ors. v. Smt. Kamalabai Lakhan & Ors., AIR 2011 MP 156]

The appellant No. 1 was the wife while appellants No. 2 and 3 and respondents No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 were sons and daughter of the deceased. The appellants filed a suit on 7-11-2001 for permanent injunction, wherein it was alleged that the property shown in Schedule of the plaint was recorded in the Revenue record in the name of the appellants and respondents No. 3 and 4 (sons).

It was alleged that as per family personal law, daughters (respondent No. 1 and 2) had no right in ancestral property. It was alleged that daughters were claiming their rights illegally. Undisputedly, the appellants and respondents were members of one family and were legal representatives of de-ceased Shri Chhaganlal. The suit was dismissed.

The Court observed that the right which was be-ing claimed by the appellants was based on family customs. As per Clause (a) of s.s (1) of section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in that Act. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, any custom or usage as part of that law prevailing in the family automatically ceased to have effect. Apart from this, the appellants had failed to establish any rule prevailing in the family, which denied rights of daughter in the ancestral property. In view of the above, the appeal was dismissed.

Dishonour of cheque — Cheque presented after expiry of six months from date of issuance — Complaint not maintainable — Negotiable Instruments Act, S. 138.

[Prabhakar Sinha v. The State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 2011 (NOC) 367 (Pat.)]

The complainant gave Rs.50,000 as friendly loan to the petitioner vide cheque dated 7-9-2004 for an amount of Rs.20,000 drawn on ICICI Bank, Dhanbad Branch and he gave Rs.30,000 in cash to the petitioner. It was further disclosed that the petitioner subsequently on 4-2-2005 issued a cheque of Rs.50,000 dated 4-1-2005 drawn on Bank of Baroda, Patna Branch. However, at the time of handing over the cheque, it was requested by the petitioner to present the same after a fortnight. As appears from the complaint-petition that in the meanwhile the petitioner was kidnapped and he was released after a week and as such the complainant kept the presentation of the cheque in abeyance. Subsequently, the petitioner periodically requested the complainant not to present the cheque. After confirmation given by the petitioner that there was sufficient amount in his account, the cheque was presented in Bank. However, on 16-7-2005, the cheque was returned to the complainant unpaid due to the reason of insufficient funds in account of the petitioner. The complainant again contacted the petitioner, who promised to deposit sufficient amount in his account by 25-7-2005. Accordingly, the complain-ant again produced the cheque on 26-7-2005 for its encashment, but the same again bounced back. The complainant received such intimation on 6-8-2005. The complainant further disclosed that on 25-8- 2005, the complainant got a legal notice issued to the petitioner and despite that the petitioner did not clear the due amount. The learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna, by its order dated 19-12- 2005, took cognizance of offence u/s.420 of the Indian Penal Code and section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner challenged the said order before the High Court, wherein the Court held that since the cheque itself was presented after expiry of six months from the date of issuance, section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will not attract. The Magistrate committed an error in passing the impugned order of the cognizance moreso when the facts disclosed in the complaint-petition do not make a case for either application of section 420 of the Penal Code or section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The impugned order of cognizance was therefore quashed.

New plea — Pure question of law can be raised at any time — Civil Procedure Code section 96.

New Page 1

4 New plea —
Pure question of law can be raised at any time — Civil Procedure Code section
96.


[ Ashok Kumar Dulichand
Sharma v. Jethmal Motilal Jedia & Ors., AIR 2010 (NOC) 36 Bom.]


The plaintiff had filed a
suit for declaration that the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant No.
1 was void. The plaintiff had also prayed that the agreement of sale and the
power of attorney executed were null and void. The suit was dismissed. In appeal
before the Court, the appellant plaintiff contented that the registration of
sale deed is void, since the power of attorney itself was not registered as
contemplated by section 32 and section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908. The ld.
counsel for the respondent objected to such a plea being considered on two
counts. First, that such a plea is not raised in the Trial Court and second; had
such plea been raised in the Trial Court, the respondent would have shown that
his case falls in the proviso to section 33.

The Court held that the
first ground needs to be rejected because this was purely a question of law and
could be raised at any time and in any case. As far as the second ground is
concerned, such exemption is granted to a person executing power of attorney and
not to the person in whose favour it is executed. The plaintiff never claimed
such an exemption and was a fit person. Thus the person authorised must hold
registered power of attorney and if he does not hold registered power of
attorney, the registration at his instance is void. The registration of the sale
deed is, therefore, void.


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Precedent — Binding nature — Only ratio decidendi of judgment which constitutes binding precedent.

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3 Precedent
— Binding nature —
Only ratio
decidendi
of judgment which
constitutes binding precedent.


[Amar Kumar Mahto & Anr. v.
State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2010 Patna 19]

A review application had
been filed by the petitioner for review of order of the learned Single Judge
passed even in absence of the learned counsel for the petitioner, writ
application of the
petitioner was dismissed on merits.

The petitioner relied upon
the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kishori Prasad v.
State of Bihar, [reported in 2008(2) PLJR 458] and contended that when the
counsel for the petitioner was not present, the ordinary course open to the
learned Single Judge was either to postpone the hearing of the case or dismiss
it for want of prosecution. But in no circumstance could the same be decided on
merits.

The respondents, in reply,
referred to a later decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Kedar Nath Tripathi v. The State of Bihar, [reported in 2008(3) PLJR 470]. He
submitted that the later Division Bench in the case of Kedar Nath Tripathi
(supra)
considered the decision of the earlier Division Bench in the case of
Kishori Prasad (supra), and explained the same as not laying down correct
proposition of law.

The Court observed that the
doctrines of ‘binding precedent’ and ‘per incurium’ are deeply embedded
in the judicial system and have been discussed and explained in long series of
judicial pronouncements of English Courts as well as the Supreme Court and the
different High Courts of this country.

Doctrines of ‘decision
per incuriam
’ and ‘decision sub silentio’ are exceptions to the fundamental
rules of administration of justice, which require certainty in law and
consistency in judicial decisions for the system to work efficiently and in the
interest of society. Hence, the doctrine of binding precedent was evolved by the
English Courts, laying down that judicial propriety and decorum demand the same
to be followed by the Judges as a rule to ensure uniformity in law and judicial
decisions, unless certain exceptional circumstances are held to exist. Thus,
judicial discipline requires a Co-ordinate Bench to follow the judgment of an
earlier Co-ordinate Bench rendered on the issues of law for general application.
That is why in absence of a law laid down or interpreted by the Apex Court under
Article 141 for universal application, the law laid down by one High Court on
the same issue also has a persuasive value for the other Courts in the country.
This indispensable foundation for dispensation of justice has been evolved to
provide at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the
conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal
rules and to avoid, to the maximum, uncertainty and confusion in the application
of law in the process of healthy development of social fabric. But it is not
that the whole judgment and all observations and findings therein are to be
taken as binding precedent by a subsequent Co-ordinate Bench. It is only the ‘ratio
decidendi
’ of the judgment which constitutes a binding precedent.

The ‘obiter dicta’ of
a Judge has also no precedential value. It is only a considered enunciation of
law by the Judge on points arising or raised in the case directly, which has a
precedential value, and not the unnecessary statements or opinion, out of
context, made beyond the occasion, unnecessary for the purpose at hand or made
by way of passing remark.

Decisions rendered ‘per
incuriam
’ also fall outside the category of binding precedent. Hence
decisions, contrary to the provisions of the Act or patently erroneous are not
to be treated as binding precedent. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’ and
‘per incuriam’ are those decisions rendered in ignorance of some clear statutory
provision or in ignorance of some law laid down by the Apex Court or a clear
decision of a Co-ordinate or Larger Bench of the same Court on the question of
law of universal
application.

But merely a different
opinion or a possible different interpretation of law cannot be a ground to hold
an earlier decision of a Co-ordinate Bench as rendered ‘per incuriam’ or ‘sub
silentio’ or not a binding precedent.

Thus, it is only a decision,
rendered contrary to law, statutory or Judge-made, or a binding precedent, or an
obligatory authority, and patently erroneous, is ‘per incuriam’. In the
circumstances, the Court found that there was no merit in the review
application.

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Retracted confession : No reliance can be placed on the retracted statement, unless the same was corroborated substantially in material particulars by some independent evidence : FERA, 1973.

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5 Retracted confession : No reliance can be
placed on the retracted statement, unless the same was corroborated
substantially in material particulars by some independent evidence : FERA,
1973.

Search action was undertaken at the office
premises of the appellant on 25-10-1994. He was detained for next two
succeeding days where he allegedly made two statements before the authorities
under the Act. He is stated to have confessed that he was responsible for
remittance of the foreign exchange.

On 28-10-1994, he was produced before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay (CMM). Before the CMM he filed an application
retracting his confession. Thereafter the respondent initiated proceeding
u/s.8(3) of the Act. The appellant contended that no reliance should be placed
on the retracted confession statement unless the same was corroborated
substantially in material particulars by some independent evidence.

The authority on the basis of the confession
imposed a consolidated penalty of Rs.10 lacs. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed
the appeal and held that the onus of proof was on the appellant that the
confession was obtained from him by threat, coercion or force. On further
appeal the High Court upheld that finding of the Tribunal.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court
observed that indisputably, a confession made by an accused would come within
the purview of S. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The FERA Act is a
special Act, which confers various powers upon the authorities prescribed
therein. Even the salutary principles of mens rea and actus reus
in a proceeding under the Act may not be held to be applicable. It was now a
well-settled principle that presumption of innocence as contained in Article
14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a human
right, although per se it may not be treated to be a fundamental right
within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

It was a trite law that evidences brought on
record by way of confession which stood retracted must be substantially
corroborated by other independent and cogent evidences, which would lend
adequate assurance to the Court that it may seek to rely thereupon. In some of
the cases retracted confession has been used as a piece of corroborative
evidence and not as the evidence on the basis whereof alone a judgment of
conviction and sentence has been recorded.

A person accused of commission of an offence is
not expected to prove to the hilt that the confession had been obtained from
him by any inducement, threat or promise by a person in authority. The burden
is on the prosecution to show that the confession is voluntary in nature and
not obtained as an outcome of threat, etc. if the same is to be relied upon
solely for the purpose of securing a conviction. With a view to arrive at a
finding as regards the voluntary nature of a statement or otherwise of a
confession which has since been retracted, the Court must bear in mind the
attending circumstances which would include the time of retraction, the nature
thereof, the manner in which such retraction has been made and other relevant
factors. Law does not say that the accused has to prove that retraction of
confession made by him was because of threat, coercion, etc., but the
requirement is that it may appear to the Court as such.

In the instant case, the Investigating Officers
did not examine themselves. The authorities under the Act as also the Tribunal
did not arrive at a finding upon application of their mind to the retraction
and rejected the same upon assigning cogent and valid reasons therefor.
Whereas mere retraction of a confession may not be sufficient to make the
confessional statement irrelevant for the purpose of a proceeding in a
criminal case or a quasi-criminal case, but there cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that the Court is obligated to take into consideration the pros and
cons of both the confession and retraction made by the accused. It is one
thing to say that a retracted confession is used as a corroborative piece of
evidence to record a finding of guilt, but it is another thing to say that
such a finding is arrived at only on the basis of such confession although
retracted at a later stage.

The Court further observed that the appellant was
arrested on 27-10-1994; he was produced before the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate on 28-101994. He retracted his confession and categorically stated
the manner in which such confession was purported to have been obtained.
According to him, he had no connection with any alleged import transactions,
opening of bank accounts, or floating of company export control, bill of entry
and other documents or alleged remittances. He stated that confessions were
not only untrue, but also involuntary.

The allegation that he was detained in the Office of
Enforcement Department for two days and two nights had not been refuted. No
attempt was made to controvert the statements made by the appellant in his
application filed on 28-10-1994 before the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate. Furthermore, the Tribunal as also the authorities misdirected
themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves a correct
question. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that issuance and services of a
show-cause notice subserves the requirements of law only because by reason
thereof an opportunity was afforded to the proceedee to submit its
explanation. The Tribunal ought to have based its decision on applying the
correct principles of law. The statement made by the appellant before
the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate was not a bald statement. The inference that burden of proof that
he had made those statements under threat and coercion was solely on the
proceedee does not rest on any legal principle. The question of the
appellant’s failure to discharge the burden would arise only when the burden
was on him. If the burden was on the Revenue, it was for it to prove the said
fact. The Tribunal on its independent examination of the factual matrix placed before it did not arrive at any finding that the confession being free from any threat, inducement or force could not attract the provisions of S. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.

In view of the above the appeal was allowed.

[Vinod Solanki v. UOI & Anrs., Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 2008, dated 18-12-2008, Supreme Court. (source: itatonline.org), 2009 (233) ELT 157 (SC)

Liability of legal heirs — Partner — Loan borrowed by firm on mortgage — Partnership Act 1932 section 18 and section 22.

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1 Liability
of legal heirs — Partner — Loan borrowed by firm on mortgage — Partnership Act
1932 section 18 and section 22.


[Smt. Bramaramba v. T.
Madhawarao & Co. & Ors., AIR 2010 (NOC) 244 (Mad.)]

Loan was borrowed by firm on
mortgage. Promissory note was executed by partners in name and on behalf of
firm. Partners admitted borrowing and execution of promissory note.
Subsequently, partnership dissolved on account of death of one of partners. The
Court held that remaining partners were personally liable to discharge the debt.
The estate of deceased partner also answerable to suit debt apart from mortgaged
property. However, legal heirs of deceased partner were not personally liable
for suit debt, but were entitled to share of balance amount of sale proceeds of
mortgaged property in auction. Amount due under promissory note, not binding on
legal heirs.

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Public action : Bank has discretion to sell property below reserve price : Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002, Rule 9

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4 Public action : Bank has discretion to sell
property below reserve price : Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002,
Rule 9.

In the instant case, the Bank invited bids for
sale of the house and as per the Bank it had received highest bid of Rs.50
lakhs and reserved price of the house has been fixed at Rs.60 lakhs by the
Bank. Question arose as to whether the Bank can sell the house in a price less
than the reserve price ? The Court held that as per proviso of Rule 9(2) no
sale under this rule shall be confirmed if the amount offered by sale price is
less than the reserve price, however, the proviso to the aforesaid Rule
further provides that if the authorised officer fails to obtain a price higher
than reserve price, he may with the consent of the borrower and the creditor
effect the sale at such price.

Question arose whether authorised officer is
bound to sell the immovable property with the consent of the borrower and
secured creditor, if he fails to obtain higher price than reserve price or it
is the discretion of the authorised officer to obtain the consent of the
borrower and secured creditor or without consent he can effect the sale at
lower than the reserve price. The Court held that as per the aforesaid Rule
the Bank is obliged not to auction sale the property below the reserve price.
However, in the aforesaid Rule the word ‘may’ in the facts of the case cannot
be interpreted as a mandatory dictate to the Bank not to sell the property
below the reserve price. When the word ‘may’ has been used in statute or rule
it cannot always be interpreted that it is a mandatory provision and in view
of the provisions of the aforesaid Rule the word ‘may’ cannot be construed as
mandatory, because the Act has been enacted to facilitate recovery of loan by
financial institutions. It may be possible that in certain circumstances, as
in the instant case, financial institution is not in a position to fetch or
receive the reserve price, hence it has a discretion to sell the property
below the reserve price of the property.

[Smt. Godawari Shridhar v. Union Bank of India
& Anr.,
AIR 2009 Madhya Pradesh 13]

[Farhd K. Wadia v. UOI & Others, Civil
Appeal No. 7131 of 2008 {Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 22939 of 2004), dated
5-12-2008 Supreme Court}

(source : itatonline.org) 2009 (1) scale
293]

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Hindu Marriage : A marriage under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be entered into by two Hindus : Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

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2 Hindu Marriage : A marriage under Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 can be entered into by two Hindus : Hindu Marriage Act,
1955.

The issue involved in the instant case is as
under: Whether a marriage entered into by a Hindu with a Christian is valid
under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ?

The appellant, who is a Roman Catholic Christian
allegedly married the respondent, who is a Hindu, on 24-10-1996, in a temple
only by exchange of ‘Thali’ and in the absence of any representative from
either side. Subsequently, the marriage was registered on 2-11-1996 u/s.8 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Soon thereafter, on 13-3-1997, the
respondent-wife filed a petition before the Family Court u/s.12(1)(c) of 1955
Act, for a decree of nullity of the marriage entered into between the parties
on 24-10-1996 on the grounds mentioned in the said petition.

The main ground for declaring the marriage to be
a nullity was mainly misrepresentation by the appellant regarding his social
status and that he was a Hindu by religion, although it transpired after the
marriage that the appellant and his family members all professed the Christian
faith. The Family Court dismissed the said petition against which an appeal
was preferred by the respondent before the High Court, which allowed the
appeal by its judgment and order dated 12-9-2002 upon holding that the
marriage between a Hindu and a Christian under the 1955 Act is void ab
initio
and that the marriage was, therefore, a nullity.

The appellant filed a Special Leave Petition out
of which the present appeal arises. The argument advanced on behalf of the
appellant, that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not preclude a Hindu from
marrying a person of some other faith.

The Court observed that there is no dispute that
at the time of the purported marriage between the appellant and the respondent
the appellant was a Christian and continues to be so, whereas the respondent
was a Hindu and continues to be so. There is also no dispute that the marriage
was alleged to have been performed under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and was
also registered u/s.8 thereof.


The provisions of S. 5 of the 1955 Act which
prescribes the conditions for a Hindu marriage are as follows :

“A marriage may be solemnised between any two
Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely : . . . .”

The Preamble to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,

reads as follows : “An Act to amend and codify the law relating
to marriage among Hindus.”

The Court observed that the Preamble itself
indicates that the Act was enacted to codify the law relating to marriage
amongst Hindus. S. 2 of the Act which deals with application of the Act, and
has been reproduced hereinabove, reinforces the said proposition.

S. 5 of the Act thereafter also makes it clear
that a marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus if the conditions
contained in the said Section were fulfilled. The usage of the expression
‘may’ in the opening line of the Section, does not make the provision of S. 5
optional. On the other hand, it in positive terms, indicates that a marriage
can be solemnised between two Hindus if the conditions indicated were
fulfilled. In other words, in the event the conditions remain unfulfilled, a
marriage between two Hindus could not be solemnised. The expression ‘may’ used
in the opening words of

S. 5 was not directory, as has been sought to be
argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage
under the Act between two Hindus. S. 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along
with S. 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood u/s.5, could be solemnised
according to the ceremonies indicated therein. Accordingly the appeal was
dismissed.

[Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani,
Civil Appeal No. 2446 of 2005, dated 4-12-2008 Supreme Court. (Source :
itatonline.org) 2008 (16) SCALE 109]

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Noise pollution : Silence is one of the human rights as noise is injurious to human health : Violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India

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3 Noise pollution : Silence is one of the
human rights as noise is injurious to human health : Violation of Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The question involved in the appeal was as under
: Whether musical functions in an open theatre being Rang Bhavan should be
allowed to be carried on or not despite the fact that it is situated within
100 meters of an educational institution and a hospital ?

Rang Bhavan is an institution owned and run by
the State of Maharashtra. It is the only open theatre in the city of Mumbai.
It is let out on hire for the purpose of holding music and cultural programmes.
It charges a meagre amount for allowing private parties to hold functions. It
has a sitting capacity of 4000 persons. It is stated that the world’s greatest
artists, both Western and Indian, have performed therein. Dr. Yeshwant Trimbak
Oke & Ors. filed a public interest litigation bearing PIL No. 2053 of 2003 for
a direction to the State to curb noise pollution in general in the city of
Mumbai and particularly during the festive season of Navratri and Ganesh Utsav.
An order was passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, directing
that no loudspeaker permission be granted in respect of ‘Silence Zone’ as
defined and discussed in the Noise Pollution (Regulation & Control) Rules,
2000, as amended from time to time.

While the said order was operating, the appellant
made an application to book Rang Bhavan from 13th to 15th August, 2004 in
regard to performance of Western Cultural Music. The said application was
rejected by the State by an order dated 2-6-2004.

The Directorate of Cultural Affairs in a letter
dated 9-7-2004 addressed to the Secretary, Power Productions, also informed
that in accordance with the High Court’s order no. 2503, dated 25-9-2003,
Rangbhavan, Dhobi Talao, Mumbai, the open-air theatre comes under the silence
zone and hence the use of loudspeakers has been banned.

Contending that the said Rang Bhavan had been
lying closed for the past few years and the directions issued by the High
Court are not in consonance with the rules governing noise pollution framed by
the State of Maharashtra, a writ petition was filed by the appellant herein.
The purported public interest litigation was filed by the appellant herein to
seek an exception to the earlier order of the Bombay High Court.

The Court observed that the High Court in the
earlier public interest litigation, being writ petition No. 2053 of 2003,
admittedly passed an order of injunction. If the said order was required to be
modified or clarified and/or relaxation was to be prayed for and granted in
regard to Rang Bhavan, the appellant should have filed an application in the
said proceeding. An independent public interest litigation to obtain a relief
which would be contrary to and inconsistent with the order of injunction
passed by the Court was not maintainable. Inter alia, the doctrine of
comity or amity demands the same.

Silence Zone is an area comprising not less than
100 metres around hospitals, educational institutions, courts, religious
places or any other area which is declared as such by the competent authority.

Thus contention of the appellant that the State
Government has not declared the said zone was an irrelevant point. The High
Court, while passing its interim order dated 25-9-2003, did not state that
silence zone was required to be declared, but passed the order of restraint in
respect of silence zone, as ‘defined and discussed in the Rules’. The parties
thereto and particularly the State of Maharashtra had understood the said
order in that light.

Interference by the Court in respect of noise
pollution is premised on the basis that a citizen has certain rights being
‘necessity of silence’, ‘necessity of sleep’, ‘process during sleep’ and
‘rest’, which are biological necessities and essential for health. Silence is
considered to be golden. It is considered to be one of the human rights as
noise is injurious to human health which is required to be preserved at any
cost.

As there was no merit in this appeal the petition
was dismissed.

[Farhd K. Wadia v. UOI & Others, Civil
Appeal No. 7131 of 2008 {Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 22939 of 2004), dated
5-12-2008 Supreme Court}

(source : itatonline.org) 2009 (1) scale
293]

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Co-operative Housing Society cannot be said to be public authority : Right to Information Act, S. 2(h)

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1 Co-operative Housing Society cannot be said to
be public authority : Right to Information Act, S. 2(h).

It is the case of the society that in the month of
Feb. 1970 it was registered under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act,
1959. The society is governed by bye-laws approved by the respondent. It is
contended that the society has not received any financial assistance from the
State Govt. and therefore the society cannot be a public authority within the
scope of the Act. But the respondent No. 2 Registrar of Cooperative Societies
has issued a notification dated 22-9-2005 to the effect that all co-operative
societies in the State are public authorities. When certain members sought for
information, the other members of the society opposed divulging information
pertaining to them. Therefore, the society rejected their request to furnish the
information on both counts. When the appeal was preferred to the Chairman of the
society, he wrote a letter to respondent No. 2 pointing out the provisions of
the Act. The Respondent No. 2 by his reply dated 30-10-2006 intimated the
Chairman of the society stating that u/s.2(h)(d) of the Act all co-operative
societies are public authorities. The respondent No. 1/Karnataka Information
Commission, on the basis of the notification dated 22-9-2005, by order dated
1-9-2006, directed the Registrar of Co-op. Societies to seek information from
the society and furnish the same to the applicant. The petitioner society
therefore filed writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the
Court.

The Court observed that in the instant case the
petitioner/housing society is neither owned nor funded nor controlled by the
State. It is not the case of the State that the notification dated 22-9-2005 has
been issued u/s.2(h)(d) of the RTI Act. Solely on the basis of supervision and
control by the Registrar of Societies; and the definition of ‘public servant’ in
the Karnataka Co-op. Societies Act and in the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 a
society cannot be termed as ‘public authority’. So as to include a society
within the definition of the term ‘public authority’, it should fulfil the
conditions stipulated in sub-clause (d) of clause (h) of S. 2 of the RTI Act.
Therefore the petition was allowed holding that the petitioner-society was not a
public authority under the provision of the RTI Act, 2005.

[Dattaprasad Co-op. Hsg. Society Ltd., Bangalore
v. Karnataka State Chief Information Commissioner & Anr.,
AIR 2009 Karnataka
1.]

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Surety’s liability : where liability of principal debtor is extinguished, the surety’s liability gets automatically terminated – contract act s. 128

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4 Surety’s liability : where liability of
principal debtor is extinguished, the surety’s liability gets automatically
terminated : contract act s. 128.


In the instant case, the suit against the principal debtor
was dismissed for default and decision became final. Therefore, under law, there
was no liability surviving against debtor for realisation of amount due to the
creditor.

 

The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that once the liability of
principal debtor was extinguished, the sureties’ liability gets automatically
terminated. Therefore, without making the principal debtor liable for payment of
amount to the creditor, the sureties cannot be made liable for recovery of the
amount.

 

A surety is a person who comes forward to pay the amount in
the event of the borrower failing to pay the amount, unless it is held by a
competent Court through a decree that he is not liable to pay the amount due to
the creditor and when he denies the liability, it becomes difficult for the
creditor to realise the amount. In the event of a decree in favour of the
creditor against the principal borrower, the wings of the decree can also be
extended against the sureties as their liability is co-extensive with the
principal debtor. Once there is a decree, the creditor is at liberty to proceed
either against the principal borrower or sureties, provided that the remedy of
the surety is available for recovery of the amount against the principal debtor
after payment of the amount to the creditor.

[M/s. Kurnool Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. P. Narasimha &
Ors.,
AIR 2008 AP 38.]

 


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Unfair trade practice by car manufacturer : Consumer Protection Act. S. 2(1)(r) and S. 2(1)(g)

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5 Unfair trade practice by car manufacturer :
Consumer Protection Act. S. 2(1)(r) and S. 2(1)(g).


The consumer purchased a Mercedez Benz, a luxurious car :
There was one manufacturing defect pointed out, which required repeated repairs
after its purchase. It was held that the consumer was entitled to get
replacement or refund of purchase price of car. Non-replacement of vehicle would
tantamount to unfair trade practice.

[M/s. Controls & Switchgear Company Ltd. v. M/s. Daimler-Chrysler India
Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 385 (NCC)]

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Precedent : Constitution of India, Article 141

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3 Precedent : Constitution of India, Article
141.


Every decision contains three basic postulates : (a) findings
of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is
the inference which the judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (b)
statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed
by the facts; and (c) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A
decision is an authority for what it actually decides What is of the essence in
a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein, nor what flows
logically from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of
the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is
alone binding as a precedent. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as
Euclid’s theorems, nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of
their context.

[Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Rajkumari & Ors.,
AIR 2008 SC 403]

 


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Adoption : Law does not recognise an adoption by a Hindu of any person other than a Hindu: Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 6

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1 Adoption : Law does not recognise an
adoption by a Hindu of any person other than a Hindu: Hindu Adoption &
Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 6.


The petitioner Kumar Sursen, who was then a minor had filed
the petition for grant of caste certificate and residential certificate on basis
that he was the adopted son of Kamal Prasad Roy and was residing with him at
village Madarpur in the district of Vaishali. The district authorities had
dismissed the petition, on the ground that the petitioner was in fact a Muslim
boy named Sahadat and is the natural son of Majid Mian and Ayesha Khatoon. The
petitioner’s case was that he was adopted by Kamal Prasad Roy. The said Kamal
Prasad Roy does not dispute the above fact. He, accordingly, wanted this boy to
have this caste and his residential certificates.

 

The Patna High Court held that under the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 6 thereof permits adoption by a Hindu of a Hindu child
alone. Law does not recognise an adoption by a Hindu of any person other than a
Hindu. If that be so, the adoption, as sought to be done in respect of the
petitioner by Kamal Prasad Roy, has no legal sanctity, though it may be morally
binding between the parties. If that be so, then unfortunately the boy cannot
get the caste certificate of his alleged adoptive parents. Similarly, he cannot
get a residential certificate and both cannot be granted in his name showing him
son of Kamal Prasad Roy.

 

Writ application was dismissed, as such giving liberty to the
petitioner or his alleged adoptive parents to approach for grant of requisite
certificate.

[ Kumar Sursen v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2008
Patna 24]

HUF recovery of loan : Karta of HUF can enter into contract for mortgage of undivided share of his minor son for legal necessity

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2 HUF recovery of loan : Karta of HUF can
enter into contract for mortgage of undivided share of his minor son for legal
necessity.


The undivided share of the appellant in the joint Hindu
family was mortgaged by his father as karta for family business and for legal
necessity. At the time of availing of the loan, the appellant was a minor. The
respondent bank filed the original application against five borrowers for
recovery of Rs.67 lakhs. The Debts Recovery Tribunal held in favour of the bank.
Thereafter, the bank proceeded to recover the due amount by putting to auction
the mortgaged property. The appellant preferred objections before the Recovery
Officer. Which were rejected by the Recovery Officer.

 

On appeal, the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal dismissed the
appeal, holding that the debt had not been raised by the appellant’s father as a
karta for his personal benefit and had not been taken for immoral or illegal
purposes. The loan and credit facilities were availed of by the appellant’s
father as karta of the joint Hindu family very much for legal necessity that is
family business. The appellant could challenge the mortgage with regard to his
share only on establishing that the mortgage had been created without legal
necessity or that it was tainted with illegaility or immorality. The mortgage
was binding on the appellant.

 

The property belonging to a joint family is ordinarily
managed by the father or other senior member for the time being of the family.
The manager of a joint Hindu family is called the karta. So long as the members
of a family remain undivided, the senior member of the family is entitled to
manage the family property. The karta or manager has the power to contract debts
for family purpose and family business. A joint Hindu family may have no
business at all, and yet debts may be contracted by the manager for a joint
family purpose. Such debts are binding on other members. Besides the power to
contract debts for the family business, the manager has the power of making
contracts, giving receipts and compromising or discharging claims ordinarily
incidental to the business. Indeed without a general power of that kind, it
would be impossible to carry on the business. The power of the manager of a
joint Hindu family to alienate the joint family property is analogous to that of
a manager for an infant heir. The manger of a joint Hindu family has the power
to alienate for value, joint Hindu family property, so as to bind the interest
of both adults and minors in the property, provided that the alienation is made
for legal necessity for the benefit of the estate.

[ Rajat Pangaria v. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur &
Ors.,
(2008) 141 Comp Cas 323 (DRAT) (Delhi)]

 


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Advocate – Enrolment – Disqualification of persons above the age of 45 years from being enrolled as Advocates – Not proper : Advocates Act, section 24(1)(e)

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26 Advocate – Enrolment – Disqualification of persons above
the age of 45 years from being enrolled as Advocates – Not proper : Advocates
Act, section 24(1)(e)


M.R. Kondal vs Bar Council of India & Ors

AIR 2009 HP 85

Rule 3 of the Enrolment Rules of 2006, framed by the Bar
Council of Himachal Pradesh, disqualifies persons above the age of 45 years from
being enrolled as advocates.

The rationale for the said rule was that those who retire
from various government, quasi-government and other institutions may use their
past contacts to canvass for cases on being enrolled as advocates. If this were
to occur, the dignity and repute of the profession would be jeopardised.

The petitioner, at the time of filing the petition, was aged
52 years. In the year 1994, he joined the LL.B course and successfully completed
the same in the year 1997. He also obtained the LL.M. degree in September 2000.
The petitioner is aggrieved by Rule 3 of the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh,
Advocates Enrolment Rules, 2006.

According to the petitioner, the State Bar Council has no
authority to put a condition of the maximum age as prescribed under the
aforesaid rules. It is also alleged that the criteria so laid down had no nexus
with the object sought to be achieved.

The Hon’ble Court observed that there was no specific
provision in section 7 of the Act, which enumerates the functions of the Bar
Council of India, empowering it to fix the maximum age beyond which entry into
the profession would be barred. The functions of the Bar Council of India
enumerated in section 7 also do not envisage laying down a stipulation
disqualifying persons otherwise qualified from entering the legal profession,
merely because they have completed the age of 45 years.

No material had been placed on record that there was any
material available with the State Bar Council to show that state government or
quasi government servants indulge in undesirable activities after entering the
profession. Therefore, the rule was discriminatory since it only debars those
persons from entering the profession who have completed 45 years of age; and
there was nothing to show what the criteria was for fixing the age limit of 45
years.

The rules which lay down that a person who has completed the
age of 45 years shall not be entitled to be enrolled as an advocate was struck
down as being void and unconstitutional.

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Release deed — Exemption from payment of stamp duty — Stamp Act Schedule 1

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30 Release deed — Exemption from payment of
stamp duty — Stamp Act Schedule 1

Article 55.

 

On perusal of Article 55, Schedule 1 of the Indian Stamp Act,
1899 if any person renounced his interest, share or part, then he may be
exempted from payment of stamp duty if the release is made of ancestral property
in favour of brother or sister or son or daughter or father or mother or nephew
or niece. The nature of the property has to be ancestral.

 

The nature of the property sought to be transferred to the
petitioner cannot be considered ancestral in nature, because the property has
been transferred to the petitioner by Smt. Santoshi who is real sister of
petitioner’s father. In such a situation, the nature of the property cannot be
considered to be ancestral, because the property has come to Smt. Santoshi, from
her sons by virtue of release deed. It was thereafter that his aunt Smt.
Santoshi executed another release deed bearing No. 1909 in favour of the
petitioner. The meaning of expression ‘nephew’ used in Article 55 of Schedule I
of the Act cannot be extended to the petitioner who is alien to the property in
the hands of Smt. Santoshi. Accordingly, the petitioner has not been able to
prove that the nature of the property is ancestral and therefore ad valorem
stamp duty as per the Act was leviable.

[ Harender Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR
2008 P & H 217]

 


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Recovery of interest : Debtor cannot be penalised with interest on amount that remained unpaid due to accounting errors : Contract Act S. 72.

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31 Recovery of interest : Debtor cannot be
penalised with interest on amount that remained unpaid due to accounting
errors : Contract Act S. 72.


The petitioner-company was sanctioned a loan of Rs. 54 lakhs
for setting modern roller flour mill in 1987. On 24-5-2005 from the Branch
Office at Motihari of the respondent corporation from which loan had been
originally disbursed, the petitioner received statements of account showing a
total outstanding of Rs.6,12,361.70. The petitioner on the very same day paid
the entire amount and thereafter requested for being granted a non-dues
certificate. After two months, the petitioner was informed that after
meticulously recalculating the dues of the petitioner, it is found that an
amount of Rs.1,54,966.95 is still due and if the petitioner pays the same amount
by 31-8-2005, non-dues certificate would be issued. Correspondence was then
exchanged with the petitioner protesting that as per accounts furnished, the
total outstanding shown therein was paid by the petitioner, then, on what
account such huge dues were now projected against him. From the head office of
the corporation a letter was issued stating that there was mistake in charging
interest in the loan account in the initial stage. The Court observed that more
than a decade and a half back some accounting errors were committed by the
Corporation of small amount which all put together on recasting the account for
the 20 years with accrued interest was Rs.1.50 lacs. On such wrong accounting
the petitioner was now held liable to pay Rs.1,55,489.95. In other words, due to
Corpn. accounting mistake of about Rs.29,000 made more than a decade and a half
back the petitioner must suffer and pay over Rs.1.50 lakhs as compensation to
the Corpn. for Corporation’s own mistake.

 

The Court observed that under what law can the petitioner is
made to suffer for a mistake committed not by him but by the Corporation itself.
If such an action is permitted, the result would be that by such a delayed
action the Corporation would gain at expense of the entrepreneur for its own
mistake. Had the Corporation made the demand, the petitioner would have paid and
avoided the heavy interest burden which is sought to be enforced against him
now. This action is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust enrichment on the
part of the Corporation and cannot be permitted.

 

The Court relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of
Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar,
2007 AIR SCW 1911.

. . . . . It is settled principle of law that a man cannot
be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain
favorable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he should prevent
a thing from being done and shall not avail himself of the non-performance he
has occasioned. To put it differently ‘a wrongdoer ought not’ be permitted to
make a profit out of his own wrong . . . . . .

[ Radha Flour Mills P. Ltd. & Anr v. Bihar State Financial Corpn. & Ors.,
AIR 2009 Patna 12]

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Precedent : Failure of Revenue to appeal in the case of one assessee; not open to it to question decision in the case of another assessee.

New Page 1

29 Precedent : Failure of Revenue to appeal
in the case of one assessee; not open to it to question decision in the case of
another assessee.


Where the Appellate authority allowed the appeals filed by
the assessee ‘A’ and ‘B’ holding the transactions exempt from tax and the
Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the State relating to those
two assessees by its common order dated March 26, 2003, thereby confirming the
order of the Appellate authority and the State aggrieved by the common order
filed writ petitions.

 

The Court observed that admittedly in respect of assessee B
the Dy. Commercial Tax Officer had passed a final order implementing the order
of the Asst. Commissioner confirmed by the Tribunal and had also ordered refund
to the assessee. If an earlier order is not appealed against by the Revenue and
had attained finality, it is not open to the Revenue to accept the judgment on
the same question in the case of one assessee and question its correctness in
the case of other assessee. Discrimination between two sets of assessees in
respect of a common order is not permissible. Therefore the writ petitions were
liable to be dismissed.

[State of Tamil Nadu v. Vaikundam Rubber Co. Ltd. & Anr.,
(2008) 18 VST 93 (Mad.)]

 


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Bank guarantee : Bank guarantee given for performance of particular contract cannot be encashed for alleged breach of another contract : Contract Act S. 126.

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28 Bank guarantee : Bank guarantee given for
performance of particular contract cannot be encashed for alleged breach of
another contract : Contract Act S. 126.


A contract agreement was arrived at between the petitioner
and the respondents for maintenance of Abu Road-Deesa Section National Highway.
As per the contract, during the period when the contract was in operation, the
petitioner had submitted two bank guarantees.

 

There was no dispute pertaining to the contract of
maintenance pursuant to which the aforesaid both the bank guarantees were
tendered by the petitioner. But there was dispute between the respondents and
the petitioner pursuant to another contract for calculation of toll and
maintenance of Samakhyali-Gandhidham National Highway No. 8-A. The respondents
authority found that there is huge loss caused by the petitioner in the said
contract by not crediting the actual toll, etc. and therefore, it had involved
the bank guarantee submitted pursuant to the said contract, namely, Samakhali
Gandhidham National Highway and it also invoked the bank guarantee which is
subject matter of the present petition pertaining to Abu Road-Deesa National
Highway No. 14. Under these circumstances, the petitioner had approached the
Court by preferring the present petition.

 

The Court observed that had the bank guarantee been given in
its absolute term, irrespective of any contract whatsoever, it might stand on
different footing, but in the present case, it is an admitted position that the
bank guarantee was given by way of performance of contract for maintenance of
Abu Road-Deesa National Highway and it was not irrespective of any contract
between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 authority. Therefore, the
contention raised on behalf of the respondent No. 1 cannot be accepted.

 

The impugned action of respondent No. 1 for encashing the
bank guarantee submitted for maintenance of Abu Road-Deesa Section National
Highway is quashed and set aside.

[ Jivanlal Joitaram Patel v. National Highways Authority
of India & Ors.,
AIR 2008 Gujarat 181]

 


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FSI-TDR : FSI/TDR is benefit arising from the land, consequently must be held as immovable property : Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963.

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27 FSI-TDR : FSI/TDR is benefit arising from
the land, consequently must be held as immovable property : Flats (Regulation of
the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963.


The agreement under consideration is an agreement for
entrusting the work of development to a party with added rights to sell the
constructed portion to flat purchasers, who would be forming a Co-operative
Housing Society to which society, the owner of the land, is obliged to convey
the constructed portion as also the land beneath construction on account of
statutory requirements.

 

The Court observed that an immovable property under the
General Clauses Act, 1897 u/s.3(26) has been defined as under :

” (26). ‘immovable property’ shall include land, benefits
to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently
fastened to anything attached to the earth.” If, therefore, any benefit arises
out of the land, then it is immovable property. Considering S. 10 of the
Specific Relief Act, such a benefit can be specifically enforced unless the
respondents establish that compensation in money would be an adequate relief.

 


Can FSI/TDR be said to be a benefit arising from the land ?
In Sikandar & Ors. v. Bahadur & Ors., XXVII Indian Law Reporter, 462, a
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that right to collect market
dues upon a given piece of land is a benefit arising out of land within the
meaning of S. 3 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877. A lease, therefore, of
such right for a period of more than one year must be made by registered
instrument. A Division Bench of the Oudh High Court in Ram Jiawan and Anr. v.
Hanuman Prasad and Ors.,
AIR 1940 Oudh 409 also held that bazar dues
constitute a benefit arising out of the land and therefore a lease of bazar dues
is a lease of immovable property. A similar view has
been taken by another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt.
Dropadi Devi v. Ram Das and Ors.,
AIR 1974 Allahabad 473 on a consideration
of S. 3(26) of General Clauses Act. From these judgments what appears is that a
benefit arising from the land is immovable property. FSI/TDR being a benefit
arising from the land, consequently must be held to be immovable property and an
agreement for use of TDR consequently can be specifically enforced, unless it is
established that compensation in money would be an adequate relief.

 


[Chheda Housing Development Corpn., a Partnership firm
v. Bibijan Shaikh Farid & Ors.,
2007 (3) MHLJ 402 (Bom.).]

 


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Hindu Law – Joint family property – Partition – Members suing for partition not bound to bring into hotchpot all family property

7. Hindu Law – Joint family property – Partition – Members suing for partition not bound to bring into hotchpot all family property:

Dhapibai vs. Tejubai    AIR 2013 MP 149

The defendant No.1 and 2 Tejubai and Supdibai are the real sisters of plaintiff No.1 Dhapubai. The property under dispute is the agriculture lands of late Bhilya father of Plaintiff No. 1 and defendant. As per allegations made, plaintiff No. 1 being the youngest daughter, after her marriage with the plaintiff No. 2, both continued to reside and live with Bhilya. The couple looked after Bhilya and managed his affairs including cultivation over the land in dispute. It was alleged that Bhilya died intestate in the year 2001, therefore his interest would devolve exclusively upon the plaintiffs as per custom and usage and not upon other surviving members of the family. It was further alleged that defendants were trying to interfere in the possession over the land in dispute therefore, the suit for permanent injunction.

Defendants denied the claim of plaintiffs that they exclusively succeeded to the Bhilyas interest in the agricultural land in dispute as per custom or usage. They also denied existence of any such usage and custom. They claimed that upon the death of Bhilya, his daughters jointly succeeded and each and equal share. They also filed a counter claim claiming 1/4th share in the land in dispute.

The Trial Judge, on due consideration of evidence found no merit and substance in the case set up by the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the trial court found that defendants were able to establish their counter claim, accordingly while dismissing plaintiffs suit, a partition decree was passed in favour of respondents.

The lower appellate court continued the dismissal of the suit while affirming the decree of partition passed in favour of respondents. Hence, the second appeal.

Referring to section 332 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st Edition), it was submitted that a member suing for partition is bound to bring into hotchpot all family property in order that there may be complete and final partition between coparceners. In this connection, it was submitted by the plaintiff that since the defendants did not include the residential house of Bhilya in their counter claim therefore, it was liable to be dismissed and courts below erred in allowing the counter claim. The submission ignores the fact that a partition may be partial either in respect of property or in respect of the person making it. It is open to the members of joint family to make a division and severance of interest in respect of a part of the joint estate section 325 of Mullas Hindu Law. The appeal was dismissed.

Companies Act, 2013 – Accounts and Audit Provisions

The existing Companies Act was enacted in 1956 with the object to consolidate the law relating to corporate sector and to regulate its activities. This Act is in force for the last over 56 years and has been amended several times. In view of changes in national and international economic environment and growth of our economy, the Government has decided to replace the Companies Act, 1956, by a new legislation. Originally Companies Bill, 2009 was introduced in the Lok Sabha in August, 2009 and was referred to Parliamentary Standing Committee. The Government received several suggestions from various stakeholders. After due consideration of various recommendations, a fresh Companies Bill, 2011 was introduced in the Lok Sabha and again referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee. Lok Sabha has passed this Bill as Companies Bill, 2012 on 18th December, 2012. Now the Rajya Sabha has also passed the Bill in August, 2013. The President has given his assent on 29th august, 2013. Thus the Companies Act, 2013, has now been enacted and will come into force from the date to be notified by the Government. It may be noted that out of 470 Sections, 98 Sections have come into force with effect from 12-09-2013 by a notification issued by the Government. Sections 128 to 133 and 138 to 148 of this Act deal with Accounts, Audit and Auditors. These provisions will have far reaching implications for the Audit Profession. In this article some important provisions contained in the Companies Act, 2013 are discussed.

1.    Maintenance of Accounts

1.1 New section 128 of the Companies act, 2013 (New Act) provides for books of accounts to be maintained by the company. This section is similar to the existing section 209 of the Companies Act, 1956. The new section provides that every company shall prepare and keep at its registered office and at its branches such books of account and other relevant papers as may be prescribed. The company can maintain such books and records in the electronic mode. It is clarified in the section that the books of account should be kept on accrual basis and according to the double entry system. The section also provides that the company shall retain the books of accounts with the relevant vouchers and relevant other financial records for a period of 8 financial years. Recently, the government has issued some Draft rules framed under the New Act for public comments. Draft rules 9.1 and 9.2 deal with procedure for maintenance of accounts by Companies.

1.2 It may be noted that for the first time new section 2(41) defines the term “Financial Year” to mean the period ending on 31st March of every year. Therefore, every company will now be required to maintain accounts from 1st April to 31st March which is the accounting year to be adopted for Income tax purpose. There is only one exception to this rule in the case of a holding company or subsidiary company incorporated outside India which is required to maintain its accounts for a financial year which is different from April to March. In such a case, different financial year can be adopted by getting approval of the National Company Law Tribunal (Tribunal). Further, if any existing company is adopting different financial year it will have to fall in line with the new provision within a period of two years from the date on which the new Companies Act comes into force.

2. Financial Statements

2.1 New Section 129 provides for preparation of financial statements.

The term ‘Financial Statement’ is defined in the new section 2(40) to include balance sheet, profit and loss account/income and expenditure account, cash flow statement, statement of changes in equity and any explanatory note annexed to the above. Section 2(40) has come into force from 12-09-2013. New section 129 corresponds to existing section 210. It provides that the financial statements shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and shall comply with the accounting standards notified under new section 133. It is also provided that the financial statements shall be prepared in the form provided in new schedule III.

2.2 It may be noted that in the new schedule III the provisions for preparation of balance sheet and statement of profit and loss have been given which are on the same lines as in the existing schedule VI. Further, in the new Schedule III detailed instructions have been given for preparation of consolidated financial statements as consolidation of accounts of subsidiary companies is now made mandatory in section 129.

2.3 It may be noted that for the first time a provision has been made in the new section 129(3) that if a company has one or more subsidiaries it will have to prepare a consolidated financial statement of the company and of all the subsidiaries in the form provided in the new schedule III. The company has also to attach along with its financial statement, a separate statement containing the salient features of the financials of the subsidiary companies in such form as may be prescribed by the rules. It is also provided that if the company has interest in any associate company or a joint venture the accounts of that associate company as well as joint venture shall be consolidated. For this purpose “associate company” has been defined in new section 2(6) to mean a company in which the reporting company has significant influence i.e. it has control of atleast 20% of the total share capital of the company or has control on the business decisions under an agreement. The Central Government has power to exempt any class of companies from complying with any of the requirements of this section and the rules made under the section.

2.4 New section 136 provides for right of members to get copies ofaudited financial statements, auditors’ report, Board Report etc. at least 21 days before the date of AGM. In the case of a listed company it will be sufficient if a statement containing the salient features of such documents in the prescribed form is sent to the members at least 21 days before the AGM. Further, new section 137 provides for filing of the financial statement etc. with ROC. These provisions are similar to existing sections 219 and 220.

2.5 Draft Rules 9.3 and 9.4 provide for procedure to be followed and the Forms for compliance with Section 129.

3.    Reopening of Accounts

3.1 New sections 130 and 131 provide for the manner in which a company can reopen or recast its books of account or financial statements. This is a new provision made in the company legislation for the first time. At present, the Government has taken the view that the accounts once adopted by the members of the company at the AGM cannot be reopened or recast.

3.2    New section 130 provides that if it is found that (i) the accounts for a particular year were prepared in a fraudulent manner or (ii) the affairs of the company were mismanaged during the relevant period casting a doubt on the reliability of financial statements, an application will have to be made by the Central Government, the Income tax Authorities, the SEBI, any other statutory regulatory body or authority or any concerned party to a competent Court or Tribunal. On receipt of the order of the Court/Tribunal the company will have to reopen its accounts or recast its financial statements in conformity with the order. The accounts so revised or recast shall be considered as final.

3.3 New section 131 provides for voluntary revision of financial statements or Director’s Report. Under this section, if it appears to the directors that (i) financial statement or (ii) report of the Board of Directors for a particular financial year does not comply with the provisions of the new sections 129 or 134, they can revise the financial statement or director’s report in respect of any of the three preceding financial years. For this purpose the directors have make an application to the Tribunal in the prescribed manner and obtain its order. Before giving such an order the Tribunal has to give notice of hearing to the Central Government and the Income tax Authorities. It is also provided that such revised financial statement or report of directors shall not be prepared more than once in any financial years. Further, detailed reasons for such revision will have to be disclosed by the directors in their report to the members in the relevant financial year in which revision is made.

3.4 The Central Government has been authorised to make Rules about the procedure for such voluntary revision of financial statements and director’s report. These Rules will also provide for reporting requirements applicable to the auditors of the company. Draft rules 9.5 to 9.8 provide for the procedure to be followed by the Company for this purpose.

4.    Accounting and Auditing Standards

4.1 New Sections 132, 133 and 143(10) provide for issue of Accounting and Auditing Standards. Existing Sections 210A and 211(3A) to (3C) deal with notification of Accounting Standards on the advice of National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACS). It may be noted that NACAS is now replaced by a new authority called National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) with very wide powers.

4.2 New Section 132 provides for constitution of NFRA, its functions and powers. Briefly stated these provisions are as under.

(i)    The Central Government will constitute NFRA consisting of a chair person, who shall be a person of eminence and having expertise in accounting, auditing, finance or law and such other full-time or part-time members, not exceeding 15, as may be prescribed.

(ii)    Terms and conditions and the manner of appointment of chairperson and members of NFRA and other related matters shall also be prescribed.

4.3 New Section 133 provides that the Central Government will prescribe the Standards of Accounting or any addendum to such standards as recommended by the Institute of Chartered Accountant of India (ICAI) in consultation with and after examination of recommendations made by NFRA. These Accounting Standards will be binding on the companies as well as their auditors. New section 143(10) provides that the Central Government will prescribe standards of Auditing or any addendum to such standards in a similar manner. It is also provided that until such auditing standards are notified by the Government, the existing Auditing Standards issued by ICAI will be binding on the auditors. It may be noted that new Section 133 has come into force from 12-09-2013. However, Section 132 providing for constitution of NFRA has not yet come into force. In such an event it is difficult to understand how powers u/s. 133 will be exercised by the government under this Section. Further, it is not clear as to what is the position of NACAs at present. Draft Rule 9.9 provides that the existing accounting standards made under the Companies Act, 1956, shall continue till the new standards are framed.

5.    The functions of NFRA:

5.1 New Section 132 provides for functions of NFRA as under:-

(a)    to recommend to the Central Government about formation of Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards for adoption by Companies and their auditors.

(b)    to monitor and enforce the compliance with the accounting and auditing standards in such manner as is prescribed in the Rules.

(c)    to oversee the quality of service of the profession associated with ensuring compliance with such standards.

(d)    to suggest measures required for improvement in the quality of service by the professionals (i.e. chartered accountants, Cost accountants and company secretary) and such other related mat-ters as may be prescribed.

(e)    to perform such other functions relating to the above matters as may be prescribed by the Rules.

5.2 The powers which NFRA can exercise are as under.

(a)    Power to investigate, either on its own or on a reference made by the Central Government, in cases of such bodies corporate or persons, as may be prescribed, into the matters of performance or other misconduct committed by a Chartered Accountant or a Firm of Chartered Accountants. Once NFRA initiates this investigation, ICAI will have no authority to initiate or continue any proceedings in such matters.

(b)    NFRA shall have the same powers as vested in a civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In other words it can issue summons, enforce attendance, inspect books and other records, examine witness etc.

(c)    If any professional or other misconduct is proved, NFRA can impose penalty as under.

•    In the case of an Individual CA. minimum penalty of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to 5 times of the fees received by the Individual.

•    In the case of a C.A. Firm, minimum penalty of Rs. 10 lakh which may extend to 10 times the fees received by the Firm.

•    NFRA can debar any Chartered Accountant or a CA Firm from practice for a minimum period of six months or for such higher period not exceeding 10 years.

5.3 Any person/firm aggrieved by any order of NFRA can file appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Central Government has been empowered to appoint such Appellate Authority consisting of the chairperson and not more than two other members. The qualifications of those constituting the Appellate Authority and all other related matters will be prescribed by the Rules.

5.4 The above provisions in new section 132 will over ride any provisions contained in any other statute. This will mean that the council of ICAI will not be able to exercise its powers relating to disciplinary action against auditors of companies. Even powers to formulate auditing standards, ensure quality of audit etc. are now vested in NFRA. To this extent the autonomy conferred on ICAI under the C.A. Act, 1949, is partially taken away.

6.    Rotation of Auditors

6.1 ICAI had successfully objected to the introduction of the system of Rotation of Auditors for the last six decades. Several commissions and Parliamentary Committees had agreed that rotation of auditors is not in the interest of the Accounting Profession and the corporate sector. In spite of this, provision for rotation of auditors has now been introduced by enactment of new section 139 in the New Act.

6.2 Appointment of Auditors:

The provisions of new section 139 dealing with appointment of auditors can be briefly stated as under.

(i)    After incorporation of a company, the first auditors (Individual or Firm of CA) should be appointed by the Board of Directors within 30 days. If the Board does not make such appointment, an extraordinary general meeting of members will have to be called within 90 days for appointment of auditors. The first auditors shall hold office upto the conclusion of first AGM.

(ii)    At the first AGM, the auditors will have to be appointed for a period of 5 years i.e. from conclusion of the AGM to the conclusion of the sixth AGM. This appointment will have to be ratified by the members every year at each AGM during this period of 5 years.

(iii)    Before appointment, the auditors will have to give their consent in writing along with a certificate in accordance with the prescribed conditions. The auditor has also to give a certificate that the criteria for his appointment given in new section 141 is satisfied.

(iv)    After such appointment, the company will have to file a notice with ROC within 15 days and also inform the auditors.

(v)    Draft Rules 10.1 and 10.2 provide for the procedure for selection of Auditors and conditions of their appointment.

6.3 Procedure for Rotation of Auditors:

(i)    The system of Rotation of Auditors has been introduced in the case of Auditors of listed companies and other class of companies (specified companies) as may be prescribed by rules. This is provided in new section 139(2) as under.

(a)    If the auditor is an Individual, he cannot be auditor of such a company for more than 5 consecutive years.

(b)    If a firm/LLP is auditor, it cannot be auditor of such a company for more than two terms of 5 consecutive years (i.e. 10 years)

(c)    In the case of an Individual who has been auditor for one term of 5 years, he cannot be reappointed by the company for the next 5 years. In the case of a firm/LLP who has been auditors of such a company for 10 years cannot be reappointed by the company for the next 5 years. It may be noted that any firm/LLP which has one or more partners who are also partners in the outgoing audit firm/LLP cannot be appointed as auditors during this 5 year period.

(d)    After the Companies Act, 2013, comes in force, every existing listed or specified company will have to comply with the above provisions relating to Rotation of Auditors within 3 years from such commencement. From the wording of second proviso to Section 139(2) it is not clear whether, for the purpose of Rotation, the period prior to the New Act coming into force should be counted for calculating the period of 10 years. Draft Rule 10.4(4)(i) states that for the purpose of Rotation the period for which the Auditor has been holding office as Auditor prior to the commencement of the New Act shall be taken into account in calculating the period of 5 or 10 consecutive years.

(e)    Thus, if an Auditor (Individual) was Auditor of any specified Company for 5 consecutive years or a Firm has been Auditors of such a Company for 10 consecutive years prior to the New Act coming into force, such Auditors will be subject to the new provisions for Rotation. As stated in Para 9.2 below, the provisions relating to Rotation will also apply to Branch Auditors.

(f)    The Central Government can make Rules to prescribe the manner in which companies shall rotate their auditors. It may be noted that Draft Rule 10.1 to 10.4 provide for procedure for Rotation of Auditors.

(g)    It may be noted that Draft Rule 10.3 provides that theabove provisions for Appointment and Rotation of Auditors will apply, besides listed Companies, to all public and private companies, other than one-person Company or small Companies.

(ii)    New section 139(3) provides that the members of any company can resolve at any AGM that the audit firm/LLP appointed by it shall rotate the audit partner and his team at such internals as specified in their resolution.

(iii) It may be noted that section 139 specifically provides that the term ‘Firm’ shall include a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP). Section 141 also states that a body corporate will not include a LLP. In other words, any company can appoint LLP wherein majority of the partners are practicing chartered accountants, as auditors of the company.

(iv)    In the case of Government companies, the C & AG has been given power to appoint auditors within the specified time limit. Provisions have also been made for filling up casual vacancy in the office of the auditors in Government companies as well as private sector companies. There are also provisions to deal with contingencies where retiring auditors are not be reappointed. It is also provided that in the cases of private sector companies where Audit Committees are constituted, the appointment of auditors can only be made by the Board/

AGM after consideration of the recommendation of the audit committee. These procedures are on similar lines as provided in the existing Companies Act with minor modifications

6.3 Since the C.A. Act permits Chartered Accountants to form LLP for professional practice and the new Companies Act permits such LLP to render service as auditors of companies, it is necessary to suggest to the Government for amendment of section 47 of the Income tax Act. At present, section 47 (xiiib) provides for exemption from capital gains tax when a company is converted into LLP, subject to certain conditions. There is no similar exemption given on conversion of firm into LLP. Unless this exemption is given by amending section 47 of the Income tax Act, it will be difficult for existing C.A. firms to convert into LLP for rendering audit service. Let us hope that council of ICAI will make suitable representation to the Central Government for amendment of Income tax Act.

7.    Removal of Auditors

7.1 New Section 140 provides for Removal, Resignation etc. of Auditors. The procedure given in this section is more or less similar to the existing procedure in section 225 with the following difference.

(i)    Under new section 140 an auditor can be removed from his office before the expiry of his term only after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government and after passing a Special Resolution by the Members. For this purpose the company will have to comply with the prescribed rules.

(ii)    If an auditor resigns from his office, he is required to file, within 30 days, a statement in the prescribed form with the company and ROC.

In the case of a Government company, this form is also required to be filed with C& AG.
In this statement the auditor has give reasons and other facts relevant for his resignation. For failure to comply with this requirement, the auditor is punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 50,000/- which may extend upto Rs. 5 lakh.

(iii)    If the auditor is found to have, directly or indirectly, acted in a fraudulent manner or abetted or colluded in any fraud by the company or any of its officers, the Tribunal can, on its own or on an application by the company, Central Government or any concerned person, direct the company to change the auditors. In the case of such an application by the Central Govern-ment for change of Auditors, the Tribunal can, within 15 days, pass an order that the auditor shall not function as such and the Central Government will be able to appoint another auditor. The auditor who is removed by the Tribunal cannot be appointed as an auditor of that company for 5 years. Further, under the new section 447 the auditor who is guilty of fraud will be punishable with imprisonment for a minimum term of six months which may extent to 10 years and shall also be liable to pay a minimum fine of an amount involved in the fraud which may extend to 3 times the said amount. If the fraud involves public interest the minimum period of imprisonment will be 3 years.

7.2 Draft Rules 10.5 and 10.6 provide for procedure for removal and resignation of an Auditor.

8.    Eligibility and Qualification of Auditors

8.1 New section 141 deals with eligibility, qualifications and disqualifications of Auditors. This section is similar to the existing section 226 with the following modifications.

(i)    A firm of Chartered Accountants can be appointed as auditors of a company only if ma-jority of its partners are partners practicing in India.

(ii)    As stated earlier, a LLP can be appointed as auditors of a company. However, in such a case only those partners of LLP who are chartered accountants in practice can be authorised to act and sign on behalf of the LLP.

(iii)    It is provided that no Individual or Firm of chartered accountants can be appointed as auditors of a company if the Individual, his partner or partner of the firm or any relative of such persons hold any shares in the company, its holding or subsidiary or associate company. However, a relative of such persons can hold shares of the F.V of Rs. 1,000/- or such higher amount prescribed by the rules. Draft Rule 10.7(2) increases this limit from Rs. 1,000/- to Rs.1 Lakh. Similarly, the limit for indebtedness to the Company, its subsidiary etc. is also fixed

(iv)    A person whose relative is a director or is in employment of the company as a director or key managerial personnel cannot be appointed as auditor.

(v)    A person who is associated with any entity which is engaged in consulting and specialized services as specified in the new section 144 cannot be appointed as auditor.

8.2 Draft Rule 10.7 provides for circumstances under which an Auditor will be disqualified.

9. Powers and Duties of Auditors

9.1 New section 143 provides for powers and duties of Auditors. This section is similar to existing section 227. In the Auditor’s Report on the financial statements, apart from the existing reporting requirements, the auditor has to state (i) the observations or comments on the financial transactions or matters which have any adverse effect on the functioning of the company and (ii) whether the company has adequate internal financial controls system in place and the operating effectiveness of such controls. The Central Government is also authorized to expand the requirements of reporting by the Auditor. Draft Rule 10.8 states that the Audit Report shall now state the views of the Auditors in respect of (a) whether the Company has disclosed the effect of any pending litigations on its financial position in its financial statement, (b) whether the company has made provision for foreseeable losses on long term contracts, including derivative contracts and (c) whether there has been delay in depositing money into the Investor Education and Protection Fund by the Company.

9.2 New section 143(8) provides for appointment of Branch Auditors.

This section is similar to the existing section 228. At present if the statutory auditor is not to conduct the audit of the branch members can appoint branch auditors at AGM or authorise the Board of Directors to make such appointment. New section provides that the Branch Auditors will have to be appointed by the members in AGM as provided in new section 139. From this provision it is evident that the Branch Auditors will have to be appointed for a consecutive period of 5 years. Similarly, it appears that the Branch Auditors will be subject to the system of Rotation of Auditors u/s. 139(2) in the audit of a listed company or a specified company as stated to above.

9.3 As stated earlier, the auditors will have to comply with the Auditing Standards while conducting Audit of any company as provided in new section 143(10).

9.4 It is also provided in section 143 that if an auditor, during the course of audit, has reason to believe that an offence involving fraud is being committed by the officers/employees against the company, the auditor will have to report to the Central Government in the prescribed manner. If the auditor fails to comply with this reporting requirement, without reasonable cause, he shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 25 lakh. Draft Rule 10.10 provides for procedure for reporting such frauds by the auditors. From this it is evident that under this Section only Matrial Fraud is to be reported. It is also clarified in Rule 10.10(2) that for this purpose materiality shall mean (a) Frauds that happening frequently or (b) Frauds where the amount involved or likely to be involved are not less than 5% of the net profit or 2% of turnover of the preceding financial year of the Company.

9.6 It may be noted that a Chartered Accountant having at least 10 years experience in Company matters can now be appointed as a Company Liquidator as provided in new Section 275. Under this Section, it is provided that when a Company is being wound up by the Tribunal, it can appoint a professional i.e. Chartered Accountant, Advocate, Company Secretary, Cost Accountant or such professional whose name is on the Panel maintained by the Central Government in the prescribed manner as a liquidator. Such liquidator has to perform duties of Liquidator as provided in the Act.

10. Auditor not to render non-audit services

10.1 New section 144 provides that Auditor of a company shall render only such other services to the company as may be approved by the Board of Directors or the Audit Committee. However, it is specifically provided that the auditor shall not render, directly or indirectly, other services such as (a) accounting and book keeping services, (b) internal audit, (c) design and implementation of any financial information system (d) actuarial services, (e) investment advisory services, (f) investment banking services, (g) rendering of outsourced financial services, (h) management services and (i) any other kind of services as may be prescribed.

10.2 It may be noted that this is a new provision and there is no restriction of this type in the existing Companies Act. Therefore, if any auditor is rendering any such non-audit service to the company before the new Act comes into force, he will have to comply with this provision of new section 144 before the end of the financial year after the new Act comes into force.

10.3 It is also provided in this section that the prohibited non-audit services cannot be rendered by the following associates of the auditor.

(i)    If the auditor is an Individual :- The Individual himself, his relative any person connected or associated with him, or any entity in which the Individual has significant influence or control or whose name or trade mark/brand is used by the Individual.

(ii)    If the auditor is a firm or LLP:- Such firm/LLP either itself or through its partner or through its parent, subsidiary or associate or through any entity in which the firm/LLP or its partner has significant influence or control or whose name, trade mark or brand is used by the firm/LLP or any of its partners.

10.4 From the above it appears that under this section the auditor can render non-audit service such as tax audit, direct or indirect tax advice, company law advice, tax or company law representation before appropriate authorities, FEMA matters and other related services.

11.    Cost Auditors:

New Section 148 provides for appointment of Cost Auditors by Board of Directors of Companies engaged in the business of manufacture of such goods as may be notified by the Government. The procedure for appointment and reporting by the Cost Auditor is similar to the existing procedure. Draft Rule 10.11 provides for procedure for fixing remuneration of Cost Auditor.

12.    Penalty Provisions

New section 147 provides for punishment for contra-vention of the provisions of new sections 139 to 146. These penalty provisions are as under.

(i)    If a company contravenes any of the provisions of new sections 139 to 146 it shall be liable to pay minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. Further, every officer who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment upto one year and minimum fine of Rs. 10,000/- which may extend to Rs. one lac or with both.

(ii)    If an auditor of a company contravenes any of the provisions of sections 139 and 143 to 145, the auditor shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. If it is found that the auditor has contravened those provisions knowingly or willfully with the intention to deceive the company, its share holders, creditors or tax authorities, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term upto one year and with a minimum fine of Rs. one lakh which may extend upto Rs. 25 lakh.

(iii)    If any auditor is convicted of an offence as stated in (ii) above, he shall be liable to (a) refund the remuneration received by him to the company and (b) pay for damages to the company, statutory bodies/authorities or to any other persons for loss arising out of incorrect or misleading statements of particulars made in his audit report.

(iv)    In the case of audit of a company which is conducted by an audit firm, if it is proved that any partner or partners of the audit firm have acted in a fraudulent manner or abetted or colluded in any fraud by the company, its
Directors or officers, the civil or criminal liability, as provided in this Act or any other law, for such act shall be joint and several of the firm and each of its partners.

(v)    New section 148 provides for audit of cost records in specified companies. This section is more or less similar to existing section 233B with some modifications. It may be noted that the above penalty provisions contained in new section 147 are applicable to the company as well as the Cost Auditor in the same manner as stated above.

13.    To Sum Up

13.1 The above provisions relating to accounts and audit contained in the Companies Act, 2013 will have far reaching impact on the companies and auditors. It appears that these provisions are being made with a view to curb the present day tendency on the part of some companies to manipulate accounts with a view to benefit those in management or with a view to reduce tax. Some of these provisions are very harsh and they are likely to affect the development of the corporate sector and the profession of Chartered Accountants.

13.2 The New Act will curtail the autonomy of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to issue Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards. These standards will now be notified by the Government in consultation with NFRA. This is a new national authority to be appointed by the Government with very wide powers. This National Authority will be able to take disciplinary action against erring auditors and award punishment to them. Therefore, the autonomy of ICAI to take disciplinary action against its members will be curtailed to this extent. It appears that the Central Government is now loosing the confidence reposed in the Council of ICAI for the last over 6 decades and started transferring this important function of regulating the C.A. profession to other Government controlled Agencies. It is surprising that the Council of ICAI has not taken general membership into confidence and no public protest has been made when such legislation was being made by the Parliament.

13.3 Considering the responsibilities being placed on the auditors it appears that small and medium size audit firms will find it difficult to continue in audit practice. No such audit firm will be able to undertake such responsibilities with threat of litigation in the event of unintended and genuine mistakes. The provisions relating to restrictions on number of years one can continue to remain auditor of a company and restriction on rendering other services will also impact the ability of such small and medium size firms to continue in audit practice. Let us hope that the provisions for removal of auditors, awarding punishment and other harsh provisions will be implemented by the Government and other authorities in a reasonable, sympathetic and fair manner.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 104 dated 17th May, 2013

28. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 104 dated 17th May, 2013
    
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Issue of equity shares under the FDI scheme allowed under the Government route against pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses

Presently, shares can be allotted to a foreign investor under the Approval Route of the FDI Scheme against payments made by him (the foreign investor) towards pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.) only if the payment is routed through the bank account of the investee company.

This circular has modified the said condition and provides that equity shares can be allotted to a for-eign investor under the Approval Route of the FDI Scheme against payments made by him (the foreign investor) towards pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.) if the payment is routed through the bank account of the investee company or the payment is made from the bank account opened by the foreign investor as provided under FEMA Regulations. The amended paragraph is as under: –

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 103 dated 13th May, 2013

27. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 103 dated 13th May, 2013
    
Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies

Presently, gold can be imported by the nominated banks/agencies on a consignment basis. Ownership of the gold will rest with the supplier and the nominated banks/agencies only act as agents of the supplier. Remittances towards the cost of import have to be made as and when sales take place.

This circular restricts the import of gold on consignment basis, by providing that banks can import gold on consignment basis, only to meet the genuine needs of exporters of gold jewellery.

Relaxation of Additional Fees for some forms till 31-03-2013

Accounting Standards – Twenty seven tales on Consolidated Financial<br /> Statements (AS 21)

14. Relaxation of Additional Fees for some forms till 31-03-2013

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No. 7/2013, dated 20-03-2013 relaxed the additional fees payable on filing of various forms with the MCA till 31-03-2013 which was earlier relaxed till 28-02-2013 vide the general Circular no. 3/2013 dated 08-02-2013.

Transmission Formalities (Part II)

(Last Month, we looked at some transmission formalities which the deceased’s family has to carry out. We continue with some more such procedures in this Concluding Part.)

Death claim for Bank Accounts

Pursuant to the RBI’s Circular, all nationalised and private banks now have simplified processes in case of death claims for bank accounts of deceased. The salient features in this respect are as follows:

(a)    Bank Accounts/Lockers with survivor/nominee clause

In the case of deposit accounts/lockers where the depositor had utilised the nomination facility or where the account was opened with the survivorship clause, the payment of the balance in the deposit account can be made to the survivors/nominee of a deceased deposit account holder provided:

(i)    the bank verifies the identity of the survivors/nominee and the fact of death of the account holder, through appropriate documentary evidence;

(ii)    there is no order from the competent court restraining the bank from making the payment from the account of the deceased; and

(iii)    it has been made clear to the survivor(s)/ nominee that he would be receiving the payment from the bank as a trustee of the legal heirs of the deceased depositor, i.e., such payment to him shall not affect the right or claim which any person may have against the survivor(s)/nominee to whom the payment is made.

(b)    Bank Accounts/Lockers without the survivor/ nominee clause

In cases where the deceased depositor/locker holder had not made any nomination or for accounts other than those styled as ‘either or survivor’, and if the legal heirs of the deceased customer are identifiable and there is no dispute amongst the legal heirs, then banks generally settle the claims without insisting for obtaining Succession Certificate/Letter of Administration etc. These claims are generally settled after obtaining an Indemnity with or without Surety in favour of the bank. In case only one of the legal heirs wants to claim/receive the amount or contents of locker etc., then he must obtain a Power of Attorney in his favour from the other legal heirs.

(c)    Premature Termination of term deposit accounts

In the case of term deposits, banks incorporate a clause in the account opening form itself to the effect that in the event of the death of the depositor, premature termination of term deposits would be allowed. Such premature withdrawal would not attract any penal charge.

(d)    Treatment of flows in the name of the deceased depositor

With regard to the treatment of pipeline flows in the name of the deceased account holder, banks generally adopt either of the following two approaches:

(i)    The bank could be authorised by the survivor(s)/nominee of a deceased account holder to open an account styled as ‘Estate of Mr.X, the Deceased’ where all the pipeline flows in the name of the deceased account holder could be allowed to be credited, provided no withdrawals are made.

OR

(ii)    The bank could be authorised by the survivor(s)/nominee to return the pipeline flows to the remitter with the remark ‘Account holder deceased’ and to intimate the survivor(s)/nominee accordingly. The survivor(s)/nominee/legal heir(s) could then approach the remitter to effect payment through a negotiable instrument or through ECS transfer in the name of the appropriate beneficiary.

(e) Time limit for settlement of claims

Banks generally settle the claims in respect of deceased depositors and release payments to survivor(s)/nominee(s) within a period not exceeding 15 days from the date of receipt of the claim subject to the production of proof of death of the depositor and suitable identification of the claim(s), to the bank’s satisfaction.

PPF of the Deceased

A nomination can be made even in respect of a person’s balance standing in the Public Provident Fund or PPF. If such a nomination has been made, the nominee or nominees may make an application in Form G together with proof of death of the subscriber and on receipt of such application, all amounts standing to the credit of the subscriber after making adjustment, if any, in respect of interest on loans taken by the subscriber shall be repaid by the Accounts Office itself to the nominee or nominees.

Where there is no nomination in force at the time of death of the subscriber, the amount standing to the credit of the deceased after making adjustment, if any, in respect of interest on loans taken by the subscriber, is repaid by the legal heirs of the deceased on receipt of application in Form G in their behalf, from them.

A balance of upto Rs. 1 lakh may be paid to the legal heirs on production of (i) a letter of indemnity, (ii) an affidavit, (iii) a letter of disclaimer on affidavit, and (iv) a certificate of death of subscriber.

Jewellery/Bullion of the Deceased

The Executor should distribute the jewellery/bullion belonging to the deceased in accordance with his Will. While making such distribution, the beneficiaries should also be given copies of the bills of the jewellery/bullion so that they can keep a record of the cost of acquisition and period of holding since both of these relate back to that of the deceased.

Art and Antiques of the Deceased

The Executor should distribute the Art/Sculptures/ Antiques belonging to the deceased in accordance with his Will. One element to consider when inheriting a work of art or any antiques is the provenance, or the actual history of ownership. This lays down precisely who was the original owner of the work, i.e., the title history. A provenance is very valuable during a resale and fetches a higher price than a work without one. Internationally, sellers of antiques who can provide ownership proof of the items with ancestors can demand a higher price. Again the original purchase bill/proof would help.

Digital Assets of the Deceased
While most people prepare a Will for their assets, how many people prepare a Digital Will? A Digital Will bequeaths a person’s online assets, such as, email accounts, online photos, Facebook account, cloud data, passwords, etc. There are no specific laws in India for a Digital Will and even the Information Technology Act, 2000 does not deal with this situation.

Hence, what happens to a person’s digital assets and online records when he dies is largely controlled by the Terms of Service that ac-company the different websites or companies with which a person has accounts. The terms of some of the popular service providers are as follows:

•    Gmail does not delete a deceased’s account and states that in “rare cases,” it may be able to provide the account content to an authorised representative of the deceased user. The applicant would have to prove his identity, a death certificate and proof of relationship.

•    Hotmail sends a copy of any email messages that may be stored on a deceased’s account, along with any existing contact lists, and will ultimately close the account upon request. It will not provide the password to an account or transfer owner-ship of the account. In most cases, email account contents are deleted after nine months of inactivity, and the account itself is deleted after an additional three months; for a total of one year.

•    Yahoo permanently deletes all content and terminates the account upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate. It will not provide access to user’s accounts or email. The Yahoo! account is non-transferable and any rights to the Yahoo! ID or contents within the account terminates upon your death.

•    Facebook prepares a memorial of the deceased’s account to allow friends and family to write on his wall. The account may be closed upon a formal request from his next of kin or upon a legal request.
•    LinkedIn removes a deceased’s account, after receiving a Death Certificate and the alternative email address registered in the deceased member’s account.

•    Twitter allows family members to remove the deceased’s account and/or save a backup of his public tweets.

•    PayPal allows the Executor of the Estate to close the account.

•    iTunes provides that when a person buys music, movies and books, he is acquiring a non-transferable license for personal use. It does not provide for anything on the death of an account holder.

Foreign Assets of the Deceased

With the introduction of the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of the RBI, residents are now able to acquire foreign securities, immovable property, foreign assets, etc. The bequest/transmission of these foreign assets would be in accordance with the provisions of the applicable foreign law in this respect. The FEMA Regulations provide that a person resident in India may acquire foreign securities by way of inheritance from a person resident in or outside India. However, there is no provision under the FEMA Regulations as to whether foreign immovable property can be inherited by another person resident in India from a person who has acquired it under the LRS.

HUF of the Deceased

On the death of the deceased, his/her eldest child, whether a son or a daughter, would become the Karta of the deceased’s HUF. Necessary steps should be taken for inducting the new Karta as authorised signatory of all bank accounts, demat accounts, etc., of the HUF.

On the death of a Hindu, his/her interest in an HUF passes by any one of the following two modes:

(a)    As per the Hindu Succession Act, a Hindu can make a testamentary disposition of his interest in an HUF. Thus, if he has included his HUF interest in his Will then its disposition would be in accordance with his Will.

(b)    If no will is prepared in respect of the undivided share, then it passes on the legal heirs of the deceased and is governed by the succession rules laid down under the Hindus Succession Act.
Thus, if a father dies, leaving behind his mother, wife, son and daughter and there are three other members in his own HUF, then his interest will devolve by intestate succession upon his legal heirs, i.e., the mother, wife, son and daughter. Thus, the mother would also stand to get a share in her son’s HUF. Prior to 2005, it would have devolved only upon the HUF members and hence, their interest would have increased from ¼ each to 1/3 each. This is an important change brought about by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005.

Son liable for Father’s Debts?

Under the Hindu Law, a son was personally liable for the debts of his deceased father. This was known as the son’s pious obligation. It was considered that without clearing the debts, his father would not rest in peace. The Supreme Court in the case of Pannalal vs. Mt. Naraini, AIR 1952 SC 170, also upheld this theory but held that the liability of the son is limited only to his share in the joint family property or the property inherited by him from his father.

Section 6(4) of the Hindu Succession Act has been amended in 2005 to do away with the theory of pious obligation. Thus, now a Hindu son’s share in the joint family property or the property inherited by him from his father is not liable for recovery of debts. However, debts prior to 9th September, 2005 (the date of amendment of the Act) would yet be covered by the old law.

No Objection Certificate

In several cases of transmission, the entities may require the legal heirs of the deceased to furnish a No Objection Certificate in favour of the person receiving the asset on transmission. For instance, if a deceased leaves behind a wife and two children and the transmission of an asset is in favour of the wife, then an NOC may be required from the children. An NOC can be executed on a plain paper.

In some cases, an Indemnity is also required. An Indemnity protects the entity which allows the transmission from any legal claims/loss. An Indemnity is to be executed on a stamp paper of Rs. 200 in Maharashtra and requires to be notarised.

Taxation of the Deceased

In the year of death, there would be two assessments in respect of the deceased. U/s. 159 of the Income -tax Act, the Legal Representative of a de-ceased assessee would be liable to pay tax in the like manner and to the same extent as that of the deceased. Section 2(29) of the Act defines the term Legal Representative to mean a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person. There could be more than one legal representatives but compliance may be practically done by any one legal representative.

The Legal Representative would be liable to pay tax on the income of the deceased received/accruing to him up to the date of his demise. In respect of income, such as interest which accrues on a yearly basis, the income would have to be apportioned between the period up to date of death and thereafter.

A separate procedure is prescribed for e-filing of Return of Income by legal representative. The procedure is available on the Income-tax Department’s Website. As per the procedure, the PAN of legal representative is required to be registered with the Income-tax Department. Based thereon, a legal representative will be able to file return of income by mentioning in verification part, the details and PAN of legal representative, while the form of the return of income may carry the PAN of the deceased. To file a return of income with digital signature, the legal representative is also required to register his digital signature.

In respect of the period commencing from the date of death until the period when the deceased’s Estate is fully executed, his Executors would be liable to tax u/s. 168 of the Act. U/s. 168(3), a separate assessment would be made on the Executor commencing from the date of death up to the date of complete distribution of the Estate to the beneficiaries. In addition to the Return filed by the Executor in his representative capacity u/s. 168, he would also file a Return in his own personal capacity. A PAN may be obtained in the name of the Estate of the deceased.

If there is only one Executor, then he is taxed as if he were an individual. However, if there is more than one Executor, then all of them are taxed as if they were an Association of Persons (AOP). Further, the residential status of the Executor would be that of the deceased during the previous year in which he died. Thus, if the deceased was a non-resident, then the Executor would also be a non-resident.

The assessment in the hands of the Executor shall be made for each completed previous year which begins from the date of the death of the deceased and continues till such time as a complete distribution is made to the beneficiaries according to their several interests. While computing the income of the Executor, any distribution which has already been effected to a specific legatee shall be excluded from the income of the Executor. The same would be taxed in the hands of the specific legatee to whom the distribution was made.

The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Manonmani, 245 ITR 48 (Mad), has held that these provisions apply only when a person dies after leaving a will, i.e., they do not apply to intestate deaths.

Taxation of the Beneficiaries

In respect of any asset received under a Will or by succession, inheritance or devolution, the cost of the asset to the beneficiary and the period of holding to the beneficiary would be the same as that to the deceased. Similarly, for claiming depreciation, the actual cost in case of an asset acquired by inheritance is the actual cost to the previous owner. Recent High Court decisions have held that the benefit of indexation is also available to   the    beneficiary    from    the    date    on    which    it    would    have    
been available to the deceased – Arun Shungloo Trust vs. CIT, (2012) 205 Taxman 456 (Delhi); CIT vs. Manjula J.Shah (Mumbai), (2012) 204 Taxman 691 (Bom).

The provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act do not apply to gifts received without consideration if they are received under a will or by way of inheritance. Thus, even if a Will leaves everything to a person    who    is    not    a    “defined    relative”    under    section    56(2) of the Income-tax Act, say, a friend, then the recipient is not liable to tax on the gift so received by him by virtue of this express exemption.

FEMA and Transmission


The FEMA, 1999 and its Regulations contain certain provisions for legacies involving a resident testator and a non-resident legatee or vice-versa. These are as follows:

(i)  A person resident in India may hold, own, transfer or invest in foreign currency, foreign security or any immovable property situated outside India if such asset was inherited from a person who was resident outside India.

(ii)  A person resident outside India may hold, own, transfer or invest in Indian currency, Indian security or any immovable property situated in India if such asset was inherited from a person who was resident in India.

(iii)  A foreign national of non-Indian origin who is not a Nepalese or a Bhutanese may have inherited assets in India from a person resident in India who acquired the assets (being immovable property, securities, cash, etc.) when he was an Indian resident. Such a Person of Indian Origin or a Foreign Citizen can remit an amount not exceeding $ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a    will,    and    a    tax    clearance/no-objection    certificate    from the Income-tax Department. “Assets” for this purpose include, funds representing a deposit with a bank or a firm or a company, provident fund balance or superannuation benefits, amount of claim or maturity proceeds of insurance policies, sale proceeds of shares, securities, immovable properties or any other asset held in accordance with the FEMA Regulations.

(iv)  A Non-Resident Indian or a Person of Indian Origin, who has received a legacy under a will, can remit from his Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Account an amount not exceeding $ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a will, and a tax clearance/no-objection certificate from the Income-tax Department. The meaning of the term “Assets” is the same as that under (iii) above.

(v)         In    case    of    a    remittance    exceeding    that    specified    in (ii) and (iii), an application can be made to the Reserve    Bank    of     India     in    Form    LEG.    

(vi)   A Person of Indian Origin may acquire any immovable property in India by way of inheritance from a person resident in India or a person resident outside India who acquired the property in accordance with the prevailing foreign exchange law, i.e., FEMA or FERA.

Takeover Regulations
The SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 apply in case of certain transfers in listed companies. If the prescribed threshold limits are breached, then the acquirer of the shares has to make a public offer, i.e.,    an    offer     to    acquire    shares     from    the public. However, the provisions relating     to    making    of    an    open    offer    do not apply to an acquisition of shares of a listed company received by way of transmission, succession or inheritance. The Acquirer is required to file a Report with the stock exchanges where the shares are listed within four days of the acquisition.

Chartered Accountant’s Role
Normally, a CA in his capacity as an Auditor is not directly involved with succession/transmission issues. Nevertheless, a CA can provide a lot of value added services to his clients if he is aware of the law in this respect. He can be of great assistance to his clients in complying with various transmission formalities. It is an area where he can assist his   client and avoid unnecessary problems.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 68, dated 17-1-2012 —Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings — Commodity hedging.

This Circular permits all AD Category-I banks:

1.    To grant permission to listed companies to hedge the price risk in respect of any commodity (except gold, silver, platinum) in the international commodity exchanges/markets as specified under the delegated route.

2.    To grant permission to unlisted companies to hedge price risk on import/export in respect of any commodity (except gold, silver, platinum) in the international commodity exchanges/markets subject to guidelines Annexed to this Circular.

Partition — Co-owner — Possession of vendee — Transfer of Property Act, S. 44 & Partition Act, S. 4.

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5 Partition — Co-owner —
Possession of vendee — Transfer of Property Act, S. 44 & Partition Act, S. 4.

[Ram & Ors. v. Ram Kishan
& Ors.,
AIR 2010 Allahabad 125.]

The plaintiffs and
defendants were co-owners of house. The defendants sold their share in the house
in favour of defendant No. 1, namely, Shri Ram Kishan who took possession
forcibly. Therefore
the plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the sale and prayed for
mandatory injunction against the defendant No. 1.

The Allahabad High Court
observed that when the stranger to the family acquires an interest in an
immovable property or dwelling house of an undivided family, he has the right to
seek partition. S. 4 of the Partition Act gives a right to a member of the
family, who has not transferred his share, to purchase the transferee’s share,
when the transferee files a suit for partition.

These are two valuable
rights of the members of the undivided family. Particularly when the right to
joint possession is denied to a transferee in order to prevent a transferee who
is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in which the other
members of the transferor’s family had a right to live. Without there being any
physical formal partition of an undivided immovable property, a co-sharer cannot
put his vendee in possession. It was a settled law that the purchaser of a co-parcener’s
undivided interest in the joint family property was not entitled to the
possession of what he had purchased. He can only claim a right to sue for
partition of the property and seek allotment of that which on partition might be
found to fall to the share of the co-parcener whose share he had purchased. It
was therefore obvious that even if the sale deed whereby the undivided share has
been alienated was legally permitted to be executed, the transferee cannot force
his way into the dwelling house of the co-owners until and unless he files a
suit for partition and obtains an order from the Court or makes a settlement
with the
co-owners who have not transferred their shares.

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Firm — Registration — Reconstitution of firm — No separate registration necessary — S. 60 and S. 63 of Partnership Act.

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3 Firm — Registration —
Reconstitution of firm — No separate registration necessary — S. 60 and S. 63 of
Partnership Act.


[Noble Kuries v.
Sebastian Antony & Ors.,
AIR 2010 Kerala 99.]

Whether a fresh registration
of the partnership firm is required consequent to its reconstitution to maintain
a suit in view of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act and whether
non-intimation of reconstitution of the partnership firm to the Registrar of
Firms would affect maintainability of the suit.

On account of some of the
partners retiring and another person coming in, the partnership firm was
reconstituted on 1-4-1986. S. 59 of the Act deals with registration of the
partnership. There is no provision in the Act which states that when there is
reconstitution of a firm which is already registered, a further registration is
required after such reconstitution. What is required is only intimation to the
Registrar of Firms about the reconstitution/change as provided u/s.60 to u/s.63
of the Act. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Bharat Sarvodaya
Mills v. Mohatta Bros.,
(AIR 1969 Gujarat 178) held that no separate
registration is necessary where there is reconstitution of a continuing firm. In
this case the firm had obtained registration from the Registrar of Firms. Hence
after reconstitution of that firm it was not necessary to have a fresh
registration of the reconstituted firm.

Then the question is what
are the consequences of not intimating the Registrar of Firms about
reconstitution even if it is assumed so, on the maintainability of the suits. S.
60 to S. 63 of the Act require any change in the constitution of a registered
partnership firm to be intimated to the Registrar of Firms. But neither the Act,
nor the Rules provide any time limit for that.

Thus, there could be no time
limit for intimation of the reconstitution or other change in a registered
partnership to the Registrar of Firms, though intimation has to be given within
a reasonable time.

Editor’s Note: The
Partnership Act 1932 as applicable in Maharashtra provides for time limit for
intimating changes in the constitution and other particulars of a registered
partnership firm to the Registrar of Firms.

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Limitation — Acknowledgement of debt — On each repayment of loan limitation get extended — Limitation Act, S. 18, S. 19.

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4 Limitation —
Acknowledgement of debt — On each repayment of loan limitation get extended —
Limitation Act, S. 18, S. 19.

[Dena Bank, Durg v. Smt.
Chameli Bai and Ors.,
AIR 2010 Chhattisgarh 49]

The Bank filed a civil suit
for recovery of loan advance to the defendant for purchase of tractor and
trolley. The loan was repayable in half-yearly instalments in seven years with
interest The Bank pleaded that the defendant kept depositing various amounts and
thus on each repayment of loan, the limitation period got extended by three
years.

The Court held that the
period of limitation for suits relating to accounts for the balance due on a
mutual, open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands
between the parties, is three years and the time from which period begins to run
is to be computed from the close of the year, in which the last item admitted or
proved is entered in the account; such year is to be computed as in the account
as per Article 1 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.

In the present case also,
the account between the parties was at all times an open and current one. From
the transactions reflecting from the statement of account, it was clear that it
was mutual during the relevant period. As per S. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1891,
the plaintiff-Bank has submitted statement of account duly certified by the Bank
officer and the same is a prima facie evidence of the existence of such
entries, and the same may be treated as sufficient evidence to hold that the
defendant No. 1 deposited the sums towards repayment of loan on various
occasions. Thus, by virtue of S. 19 read with aforesaid Article 1 of the
schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, fresh extended period of limitation of
three years is to be computed from the close of the year in which the last item
is admitted or proved as entered in the account.

The Suit was not barred by
limitation.

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Appeal by Department — Measures to reduce litigation.

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2 Appeal by Department —
Measures to reduce litigation.

[Commr. of Central Excise
v. Techno Economic Services P. Ltd.,
(2010) 255 ELT 526 (Bom.)]

While dismissing an appeal
filed by the Revenue wherein the amount in dispute was Rs.1,21,219 the Court
noted that number of appeals are being filed before the Court; wherein the
customs duty and/or central excise duty involved was negligible. It was noticed
that most of the times the duty impact ranges between

`2 to 3 lakh; wherein,
normally, senior advocates appear on behalf of the Revenue assisted by two
junior advocates. In spite of engaging multiple advocates, adjournments were
sought. The matters were allowed to remain pending in the Court for a
substantially long period of time. With the result, they come up for hearing on
more than two or three occasions. Adjournments were always taken and granted by
the Court considering the substantial cause shown for the adjournment. All this
results in payment of heavy professional charges to the advocates appearing for
the Department. Sometimes the expenses incurred by the Revenue were
disproportionate to the stakes involved in the appeal and/or petition filed by
the Department.

In the aforesaid scenario,
the Court took the judicial notice of the fact that the Centre and the States
had acquired the ‘government is the largest litigant’ tag, accounting for 70% of
the 3 crore cases — over 2.1 crore pending in various Courts.

The Court, observed that the
Central Government had formulated a National Litigation Policy (NLP) to shed the
tag ‘Largest Litigant’. Thus, keeping in view the policy of the Central
Government, it invited attention of the Chairman of the Central Board of Excise
and Revenue (‘the Board’) to consider the necessity of taking policy decision
not to file cases; wherein the duty/tax impact was negligible. The similar
policy was already in vogue so far as the Income-tax Department was concerned.
The Central Board of Direct Taxes vide its Circular dated 27th March, 2000
followed by other Circulars dated 24th October, 2005 and 15th May, 2008 had
taken a policy decision not to file appeals or references wherein the tax effect
is less than the amount prescribed in the instructions issued from time to time,
so as to reduce litigation before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The
said policy decision taken by the CBDT had reduced the volume of litigation,
with the result, their officers were in a position to concentrate on the cases
involving heavy stakes.

It has, therefore, become
necessary for the Board to impress upon the Departmental heads not to go for
appeals and litigation wherein tax or duty impact was not substantial, otherwise
it results in harassment to the assessees and creates unnecessary burden on the
infrastructure of the Revenue Department. The ‘let the Court decide’ attitude
needs to be given go-bye.

The Chairman of the Central
Board of Excise and Revenue shall consider the necessity of issuing a Circular,
on the lines of the Circulars issued by the CBDT, so as to reduce litigations
arising out of indirect tax legislations.

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Appeal — Merger of order — Once the Appellate Authority disposes a matter, the order passed by the subordinate authority gets merged in such order.

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1 Appeal — Merger of order —
Once the Appellate Authority disposes a matter, the order passed by the
subordinate authority gets merged in such order.


[Box and Carton India P.
Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex. Delhi,
2010 (255) ELT 423 (Trib. Del.)]

The applicant had filed a
rectification application before CESTAT alleging various mistakes apparent on
the record in the order and pleaded that the order needs to be rectified.
Against the said order of the CESTAT the applicant had also approached the
Supreme Court and the appeal was dismissed by the Court. The applicant in the
rectification proceedings submitted that the issue raised in the rectification
application was not raised in the appeal before the Supreme Court and therefore
the principle of merger cannot be applied.

The CESTAT held that it was
a settled doctrine of merger that once the Appellate Authority is seized with
the matter, and particularly in relation to the merits of the case, whatever
order is passed in such proceedings by the Appellate Authority, becomes a final
order and becomes an executable order. In other words, once the proceedings in
appeal are disposed off by an order by the Appellate Authority, the order passed
by the subordinate authority, gets merged in such order.

Once the party takes the
step to take the matter at appellate stage on conclusion of the proceedings at
original stage and the Appellate Court, considering the matter on merits,
disposes the same either by way of reversal, modification or confirmation, the
operative order would be that of the Appellate Authority. It would all depend
upon exercise of powers by the Appellate Authority. Once the Appellate Authority
finds no case for interference in the order passed by the lower authority and
dismisses the appeal, the order of the original authority would get merged in
the order of the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the order which would be
executable will be that of the Appellate Authority.

The Tribunal considering the
law laid down by the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala,
(2000) 6 SCC 359 held, that an order passed by the Apex
Court in its appellate jurisdiction either by reversing, modifying or confirming
the order of the lower court or lower authority would result in merger of order
of the lower Court or the lower authority in the order of the Apex Court,
irrespective of the fact as to whether such order of the Apex Court is a
speaking order or a non-speaking order.

It was further held that
once the applicant had approached the Supreme Court against such order and
having tried to get it set aside, it was not permissible for the applicant
thereafter to approach the Tribunal under the guise of rectification of the
order and to seek de novo hearing of the appeal. What in essence the
applicant was seeking in the matter was not the correction of the order, but
reassessment of the matter on the ground that the Tribunal failed to take note
of the fact that the documents which the Commissioner was expecting the parts to
produce were already in possession thereof. Undoubtedly, this could have been
the ground for the appellants before the Apex Court in the appeal field by the
appellants.

In any case, it is settled
law that the party is not entitled to raise the points in piecemeal by way of
different proceedings in that regard. If the party does not raise a point at an
appropriate stage and the matter stands concluded by final order, then the party
would be debarred from raising such point thereafter by reopening the matter.
That is principle embedded in Explanation 4 of S. 11 of the CPC. Considering the
same, it is not permissible to allow the applicant to raise issue under the
guise of filing rectification of application.

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Precedent : Conflicting judgments of Co-ordinate Benches : Court to consider judgment which in its opinion is better in point of law : Constitution of India, Art.141 :

9. Precedent : Conflicting judgments of Co-ordinate Benches : Court to consider judgment which in its opinion is better in point of law : Constitution of India, Art.141 :

    The petitioner was the widow of Gopaldas Kanhyalal Gujarati. The late Gopaldas Kanhyalal Gujarati had participated in the Indian Independence Movement and was receiving Freedom Fighter’s Pension from the Government of Maharashtra. He had applied for Freedom Fighter’s Pension from the Central Government. The same was rejected. A fresh application was submitted alongwith required documents. In the meantime, the husband of the petitioner expired. After that, the petitioner pursued the matter and submitted all required documents. In spite of receiving of the application, the Central Government has neither granted pension nor communicated anything to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the present petition had been filed.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that on the issue there were conflicting decisions of Co-ordinate Benches of the Supreme Court. Under such circumstances it was open to the Court to consider the judgment which in its opinion is the better in point of law, irrespective of when the judgments were pronounced. The Supreme Court noted that the judgment in Surja & Ors vs. UOI, 1992 SC 777 was rendered on the peculiar facts of that case and then declared the position of law, that an applicant must have actually suffered a minimum imprisonment of six months less the remission period of one month. Therefore, it was not possible to take a view different than the view taken in the case of Surja (Supra) which was binding under Art. 141 of the Constitution.

    [Gulabbai w/o. Gopaldas Gujrati vs. Union of India & ors. Writ Petition No. 1299 of 2008 Dated 9/7/2008 AIR (2009) (NOC) 763 (Bom) (2008) (6) AIR Bom R 857]

Condonation of delay : High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the reference application under unamended Sec.35H(1) of Central Excise Act, 1944.

8. Condonation of delay : High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the reference application under unamended Sec.35H(1) of Central Excise Act, 1944.

    The question for consideration was whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference application under unamended Section 35 H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Unamended Section 35G speaks about appeal to the High Court. Sub-Section 2(a) enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal to the High Court within 180 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party. There is no provision to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed period of 180 days.

    Unamended Section 35H speaks about reference application to the High Court. As per sub-section (1), the Commissioner of Central Excise or other party within a period of 180 days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35C direct the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from such order of the Tribunal. Here again as per sub-section (1), application for reference is to be made to the High Court within 180 days and there is no provision to extend the period of limitation for filing the application to the High Court beyond the said period and to condone the delay.

    In this matter the Court was concerned with ‘reference application’ made to the High Court under Section 35H (1) of the Act before amendment of the Central Excise Act by Act 49/2005 (w.e.f. 28.12.2005) by which several provisions of the Act were omitted including Section 35H.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that except providing a period of 180 days for filing reference application to the High Court, there is no other clause for condoning the delay if reference is made beyond the said prescribed period. In the case of appeal to the Commissioner, Section 35 provides 60 days time and in addition to the same, the Commissioner has power to condone the delay up to 30 days if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35B provides 90 days time for filing appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (5) therein enables the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number of days if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35EE which provides 90 days time for filing revision by the Central Government and, proviso to the same enables the revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period of 90 days if sufficient cause is shown, whereas in the case of appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference to the High Court under Section 35H of the Act, total period of 180 days has been provided for availing the remedy of appeal and the reference. However, there is no further clause empowering the High Court to condone the delay after the period of 180 days. Chapter VIA of the Act provides appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though the Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35H, the Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.

    As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only, from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the Legislature intended the Appellate Authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days, which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the Legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days, respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. In view of the above, the Court held that the Legislature provided sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision and the High Court has no power to condone delay.

    [Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. M/s. Hongo India (P) Ltd & Anr., Supreme Court dt. 27/3/2009 (Full Bench). (Source: itatonline.org)]

Recovery of tax : Dues from company cannot be recovered from its directors who are partner in firm.

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26 Recovery of tax : Dues from company cannot be recovered
from its directors who are partner in firm.


The petitioner is a partnership firm originally constituted
in the year 1984 and it is running a cinema theatre under a duly granted licence.
The partnership firm was registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The
petitioner firm is also an assessee on the file of the respondent under the
Tamil Nadu Entertainment Tax Act, 1939.

M/s. Sri Mappillai Vinayagar Spinning Mills Ltd. and M/s. Sri
Manicka Vinayagar Spinning Mills Ltd. are limited companies incorporated under
the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and some of the partners in the petitioner firm
are directors of the said limited companies.

According to the petitioner, the petitioner is not having any
arrears of entertainment tax. A notice of attachment in Form No. 5 had been
issued by the respondent u/s.27 of the Revenue Recovery Act and by the said
notice the respondent had attached the petitioner’s property for the sales tax
arrears of other two private limited companies and another partnership firm.
Being aggrieved by that, the petitioner filed the above writ petition.

The Court observed that the properties of the petitioner, a
firm, were attached by the Commercial Tax officer for non-payment of sales tax
arrears under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 of two other companies
and another firm on the ground that the partners of the petitioner firm were
also admittedly the directors of the two companies and partners of the assessee
firm.

The Court held that the company being a legal entity by
itself could sue and be sued as a legal entity and any dues from the company had
to be recovered only from that company and not from its directors. Therefore,
the proceedings for attachment of the properties of the petitioner firm on the
ground that the partners of the petitioner firm were also directors of the two
private limited companies, could not be sustained.

[Sri Mappillai Vinayakar Cine Complex v. Commercial Tax Officer,
(2008) 146 Comp. Cas 110 (Mad.)]

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A company is entitled to invoke the provision of Sec.630 of Companies Act so as to retrieve its property being withheld wrongfully by legal representatives of the employee: Companies Act, 1956.

7. A company is entitled to invoke the provision of Sec.630 of Companies Act so as to retrieve its property being withheld wrongfully by legal representatives of the employee: Companies Act, 1956.
    2. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is with regard to the scope of and ambit of the provisions of Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, more specifically, as to whether the proceedings under the said provisions would cover within its purview only an employee of the company or also persons claiming a right through him or under him.

    One Mr. Chandra Bhushan Saran, father of appellant No. 1 and maternal grandfather of appellant no. 2 was allotted third floor residential premises of the building ‘Devonshire House’. Since he was appointed as a Director and Technical Advisor of one M/s. Automobile Products of India Ltd. (‘API Ltd.’). The suit premises was owned by Her Highness Vijaya Raje Scindia Maharani of Gwalior and was taken on lease by API Ltd. for residential needs of its employee.

    Subsequent to Mr. C. B. Saran’s resignation he was appointed as the Managing Director of XLO Ltd., respondent No. 1 herein. Mr. C. B. Saran was entitled to rent-free accommodation and for the sake of convenience, the API Ltd. executed a licence agreement in respect of the suit premises in favour of respondent no. 1. Accordingly, Mr. C. B. Saran along with his family, which consisted of his wife, son and daughter, continued to occupy the said premises.

    Mr. C. B. Saran expired in Germany and on his demise his son Mr. Sanjay Saran, by virtue of his employment with respondent No. 1, the suit premises was allotted in his favour.

    It is pertinent to mention here that in the year 1976, API Ltd. filed a suit before the Small Causes Court against the respondent no. 1 and Mr. C. B. Saran disputing the tenancy right in relation to the suit property. After the demise of Mr. C. B. Saran his legal heirs were substituted in the said suit.

    The respondent no. 1 instituted a proceeding under Section 630 of the Act against the present appellants. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 26.06.2007 found the appellants guilty under Section 630 of the Act. The appellants were directed to vacate the suit premises within 4 months from the date of the said order and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 4 months.

    The appellants filed a criminal appeal before the Sessions Judge which was dismissed. Against the said dismissal, the two appellants preferred a criminal revision application before the High Court of Bombay, which was also dismissed. It is against the said order that the appellants have approached the Apex Court.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that the main purpose to make action an offence under Section 630 is to provide a speedy and summary procedure for retrieving the property of the company where it has been wrongly obtained by an employee or officer of the company or where the property has been lawfully obtained but unlawfully retained after termination of the employment of the employee or the officer. Sub-section (1) is in two parts. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) create two different and separate offences. Clause (a) contemplates a situation wherein an officer or employee of the company wrongfully obtains possession of any property of the company during the course of his employment to which he is not entitled, whereas clause (b) contemplates a case where an officer or employee of the company having any property of the company in his possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the company. Under this provision, it may be that an officer or an employee may have lawfully obtained possession of any property during the course of his employment, still it is an offence if he wrongfully withholds it after termination of his employment. Clause (b) also makes it an offence, if any officer or employee of the company having any property of the company in his possession knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the Act. In terms of sub-section (2), the Court is empowered to impose a fine on the officer or employee of the company if found in breach of the provision of Section 630 of the Companies Act and further to issue direction if the Court feels it just and appropriate for delivery of the possession of the property of the company.

    The capacity, right to possession and the duration of occupation are all features which are integrally blended with the employment. Once the right of the employee or the officer to retain the possession of the property gets extinguished either on account of termination of services, retirement, resignation or death, they (persons in occupation) are under an obligation to return the property back to the company and on their failure to do so, they render themselves liable to be dealt with under Section 630 of the Act for retrieval of the possession of the property.

Copyright : A joint owner of a copyright, without the consent of the other joint owner cannot grant licence or interest in the copyright : Copyright Act, 1957.

6. Copyright : A joint owner of a copyright, without the consent of the other joint owner cannot grant licence or interest in the copyright : Copyright Act, 1957.

    The petitioner sought injunction restraining the respondents from transferring, licensing or sub- licensing any rights in the copyright of the film ‘Victoria No. 203’ to any third party.

    The facts giving rise to the controversy between the parties are that the petitioner is the producer and first owner of copyright in the film ‘Victoria No. 203’. By an agreement dated 26th July 2007, the petitioner assigned to the respondent alongwith him joint ownership in the ratio of 50 : 50 of the rights in the negative of the film. There was some dispute between the parties as to whether copyright in the film or only in the negatives of the film are assigned. That would be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. Clause No. 8(d) of the agreement provides that the respondents shall be entitled to enter into an agreement in respect of his rights (under the agreement) by making the petitioner the confirming party to the agreement. The agreement provides that all disputes and differences arising between the parties in connection with the agreement shall be resolved by mutual consent, failing which the disputes shall be referred to arbitration. Pending constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and reference, the petitioner has claimed interim injunction.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that the petitioner was the producer and original holder of the copyright in the film. Perusal of clause No.8 of the agreement prima facie showed that the petitioner had made the respondents joint owners of the copyright to the extent of 50%, the petitioner had further given the right to the respondents to exploit the said copyright by entering into an agreement with others, but subject to petitioner being made the confirming party to the agreement. According to the petitioner, the respondents have negotiated with a third party for exhibiting of the film abroad without the consent of the petitioner.

    Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Power Control Appliances vs. Sumeet Machines P. Ltd., (1994) Vol. 2 SCC 448, it was held that in respect of joint ownership of a copyright, the use of the copyright must be made jointly by the co- owners and individual use by any one of the co- owners is not permissible.

    A joint owner of a copyright cannot, without the consent of the other joint owner, grant a licence or interest in the copyright. The respondents cannot exploit the copyright singly or individually. The exploitation of the copyright must be jointly made by the petitioner and respondents, as they are the joint owners. The respondents are not entitled to grant licence for exploitation of the film ‘Victoria No. 203’ without the concurrence of the petitioner. In view of above, the petitioner was entitled to an injunction pending the arbitration.

    [Angath Arts P. Ltd. vs. Century Communications Ltd. & Anr. AIR 2009 Bom. 26.]