Category: Allied Laws

The Honourable Court observed that powers vested in the Election Commission under Art. 324 (1) of the Constitution of India are wide in nature. The exercise of powers is, however, not without a check. The power has to be exercised with legal circumspection. It is rather more to supplement to the grey areas where no law or legislation is existing and it is necessary to issue directions or pass orders to ensure free and fair poll. The power is complementary and supplemental. It cannot be exercised contrary to the provisions of law, nor should it violate the existing laws.

Action of the authorities in intercepting vehicles indiscriminately on the road at random and then carrying out the search in the hope or nurturing a doubt that the vehicle may contain a cash of more than Rs.2.5 lakh or other articles, without establishment of prima facie grounds or without there being any basis or subjective satisfaction on the part of the authorities would definitely be a violation of the right to privacy of such citizens. If there is a concrete information with the authorities that a vehicle is to pass through a particular route carrying a large amount of currency or other articles like liquor, arms, etc. likely to be used in the election process, then perhaps the authorities may be justified in intercepting the same and effecting the seizure of the same. In the present case, a very unique mode is being adopted. Even if the authorities are satisfied that the cash recovered from a particular individual is not to be used for any election purpose, but still the authorities would inform the Income-tax officials regarding the same for taking appropriate action. This amounts to direct intrusion on the powers of the Income-tax authorities as laid down under Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Honourable Court held that the instruction issued by the Election Commission insofar as it empowers its officers to randomly and indiscriminately search any vehicle on the road and seize cash of Rs.2.5 lakh, if recovered from the vehicle or an individual or a person, as ultra vires being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and also beyond the powers conferred on the Election Commission. The Court directed the Election Commission that the instructions shall not be implemented and there shall not be any indiscriminate or random search or seizure of any vehicle, unless there is any reliable or credible information with the Election Commission reduced into writing.

Bhagyoday Janparishad (Reg. NGO) through President vs. State of Gujarat thro. CS & Ors. AIR 2013 Gujarat 14

The Court observed that the statutory mandate contained in this provision is clear. It starts with a non obstante clause. It clearly states that notwithstanding any thing contained in any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the dues of the workmen and debts due to the secured creditors to the extent that such debts rank under clause (c)of the proviso to s/s. (1) of section 529 shall be paid pari passu and in priority to all other debts.

The claims made by the appellant relate to his tax dues which as per his submission would categorise u/s. 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994. Section 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act,1994 clearly stipulates that this provision is subject to the provision of section 530 of the Companies Act,1956. Section 530 deals with the dues of the company to a Central or a State or a local authority of Revenue, taxes, cesses, etc.

Provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act (a Central legislation) have to override the provisions of section 53of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act of 1994 (a State legislation). Even otherwise section 53 of the Act of 1994 (under which the appellant is claiming his right) clearly specifies that the tax liability will be subject to the provisions of section 530 of the Companies Act; section 530 of the Companies Act has to be read subject to the provisions of section 529A of the said Act. There appears to be no conflict between the State Act and the Central Act. That apart, even if there is a conflict between a State legislation and a Central legislation, the Central legislation must prevail.

Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Government of M.P. vs. Official Liquidator (2012) 56 VST 335 (Del.) (High Court)

The Honourable Court observed that under the articles of association, the shareholder company had the right to withdraw its nominee. The moment the nomination was withdrawn, the withdrawal became effective and the nominee director ceased to be a director of the company. From the letter of withdrawal sent to the first accused company and the letter of information sent to the Registrar of Companies, it had been prima facie proved by means of unimpeachable documents that the petitioner was not a nominee director of the first accused company on or after 8th January, 2009. Therefore, she was not liable for punishment u/s. 138 of the 1881 Act for the offence said to have been committed by the company subsequent to the date of withdrawal. The Court further observed that resignation of a director will take effect from the moment the resignation letter is sent and it is later on acknowledged by the company.

The question of resigning from the office of director will arise, only if, the person happens to be a director and not a nominee director. If he is a nominee director, he is primarily responsible for the company which nominated him. He may send his resignation to the company which nominated him and even without any such resignation letter, the company which nominated him will be at liberty to withdraw his nomination. In either event, if a resignation letter is submitted by a nominee director to the company which nominated him, thereafter it is for that company to act upon it and to withdraw the nomination of the nomination of the nominee director. As there is no provision for resignation by the director, there is no provision for withdrawal also in the Companies Act, 1956. But such withdrawal is governed by the memorandum and articles of association.

Renuka Ramanath vs. Yes Bank Ltd. (2012) 174 Comp. Cas 465 (Mad.)

In accordance with the terms of the license, the petitioner was granted permission to carry on the business. Condition No. 5 thereof required the licensee to pay the license fee by the 5th of every succeeding month and non-payment of the license fee entailed cancellation of the license apart from the levy of penalty of 24% p.a. on the arrears of the license fee till the date of payment in full. Condition No. 10 thereof set out that the licensee shall not act to the detriment of the interests of the Devasthanams in any manner. Condition No. 13 reserved the right of access and entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the Officers and Staff of the T.T.D. Condition No. 15 set out that the license was liable to be cancelled for violation of any of these terms and conditions of the license. The writ petitioner quietly entered upon the demised premises on 04-08-2008 and he was entitled to remain in possession thereof for a period of three years, which was to expire on 03-08-2011, subject of course to his payment of the monthly license fee of Rs. 4,535/-.

The Court observed that section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, defined “license” as, where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. It is manifestly clear that every license originates in a grant made by one person in favour of another or a definite number of other persons. By implication a license cannot be granted to a fluctuating body of persons who will not be answering the expression of definite number of other persons. Most importantly, what has been granted was only to do something which would in the absence of such grant be unlawful to be done by the other persons. Equally important to notice is the fact that the person to whom the grant is made, does not acquire any right whatsoever, including easementary right or any interest in the property. It can, therefore, be deduced that a grant, which is called license merely authorised the person or persons to whom the grant is made, a right of possession for enjoyment and hence such a right is not juridical possession but amounts to mere occupation.

Possession being a legal concept, one of the most essential ingredients of it is the specification of the actual period of time granted for such occupation. Therefore, a bare license, without anything more is always revocable at the will of the licensor, since the grant itself is limited by a period of time, and the payment of license fee does not by itself create an interest in the licensed property. Consequently, mere acceptance of the license fee even for the periods subsequent to the revocation of the license would not amount to acquisance of the possession of the licensee. It merely amounts to fictional or unreal extension of the period of license without in any manner affecting the rights of the owner from securing eviction of the person or persons to whom the grant is initially made. In law, grantor or the licensor is always liable to be treated to be in possession of the land in question all through the subsistence of the license and even beyond. Hence, it would be open to the licensor to re-enter the premises and reinstate himself once the period of license granted by him expires. This power to re-enter or to reinstate himself is conditioned by not using more force than is actually necessary. As per Section 54 of the Easements Act, the grant of a license may be express or implied from the conduct of the grantor, and Section 60 of the said Act sets out the circumstances when a license can be revoked and Section 61 sets out that such a revocation can be express or even implied. Section 62 listed out nine circumstances when a license is deemed to be revoked.

Of them, Clause (c) clearly discloses that a license is deemed to be revoked when it has been granted for a limited period and the said period expired. Thus, it becomes evident that a license granted for a limited period is deemed to have been revoked upon expiry of the period of grant. Section 63 recognised that, where a license is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. What would be the reasonable time required for achieving these objectives is therefore dependent upon the facts and circumstances prevailing in each case. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed in this regard. Section 64 recognised the right of the licensee, when he was evicted without any fault of his by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right which he was granted, to recover compensation from the grantor, for the breach of the grant.

The term ‘Lease’ has been defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The expression ‘lease’ normally connotes the preservation of the demised estate put in occupation and enjoyment thereof for a specified period or in perpetuity for consideration; the corpus user thereof does not disappear and at the expiry of the term or on successful termination the same is handed over to the lessor subject to the terms of the contract, either express or implied (see State of Karnataka and others vs. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar and others (1993) Supp 3 SCC 290).

In juxtaposition, a license confers a right to do or continue to do something in or upon immovable property of grantor which but for the grant of the right, may be unavailable. It creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of the grantor. Thus, the distinction between the ‘lease’ and license’ lies in the interest created in the property demised. It is therefore essential to gather the intention of the parties to an instrument from the terms contained therein and also by scrutinising the same in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The description ascribed by the parties to the terms may, evidence the intention but may not be very decisive. The crucial test, therefore, is whether the instrument is intended to create or not to create an interest in the property which is the subject matter of agreement between the parties. If it is in fact intended to create an interest in the property, it becomes a lease and if it does not, it is a mere license. In determining whether the agreement creates a lease or a license, the test of exclusive possession, though not decisive, is of great significance. Thus, there is no readily available litmus test to distinguish a ‘lease’ as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, from a ‘license’ as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act, 1882, but the nature and character of the transaction, the terms settled by the parties and the intent of the parties hold the key. Therefore, if an interest in the immovable property entitling the transferee to enjoyment is created it becomes a lease, and if mere permission to use without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, it becomes a license.

The conditions of the grant leave no doubt that the parties have only intended the transaction to be a mere license but not a lease. Particularly, condition No. 13, which reserved the right of entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the officers and staff of the T.T.D any time during the subsistence of the license makes the position clear that the possession of the licensed premises remained with the second respondent – Devasthanam, all through, and the writ petitioner has only been granted a license to use the premises. Further, the monthly fee, which formed the consideration for the grant, was called as license fee. Right to recall the grant for violation of the terms and conditions, prematurely, is another pointer.

In view of the above it was held that Suit premises was not leased out but granted on license only.

According to the petitioners, bagasse is remains of sugarcane after the juice has been extracted by pressure between rolls of a mill. The Central Government issued a notification u/s. 5A of the Central Excise Act dated 1st March 2006, thereby granting exemption as well as concessional rate of duties for various goods. At Serial No. 82 of the Table of this Notification, “Bagasse boards” are classified at clause (vi) and rate of duty prescribed for these goods is nil.

The petitioner company came to know from the Association that the goods in question were chargeable to nil rate of duty and that other members of the Association at Kolhapur, State of Maharashtra, were allowed to clear these goods at nil rate of duty. Petitioner wrote a letter dated 1st June 2006 requesting the Assistant Commissioner for clarification whether Bagasse boards manufactured by the petitioner were chargeable to nil rate of duty or not. The petitioner did not receive any response from the excise authorities. As there was no reply at the end of the Assistant Commissioner or from any other excise authorities, the petitioner started clearing their goods, namely, bagasse boards at nil rate of duty.

Ultimately, the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show-cause notice dated 20th June 2007, proposing to recover a sum of Rs. 28,75,624/- as excise duty on the quantities of Bagasse boards cleared by the petitioner company on the ground that the goods were covered under another Notification dated 1st March 2006.

In the course of hearing of Writ Petition, it was pointed out three clarification were issued by the Government of India and the Board, two letters of the C.B.E. & C. addressed to the Chief Commissioner, Hyderabad and the Chief Commissioner, Pune are specifically relied upon by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Pune while allowing benefit to one M/s. Eco Board Industries Limited.

It had been clarified by the Government of India through the Board that benefit of Notification was available to pre-laminated bagasse board, such clarification is binding to all Central Excise Officers and no officer of the Central Excise could take a contrary view, more so, when the Central Excise Officers of Patna, Lucknow, Sholapur, Kolhapur, Pune, Hyderabad, etc. have followed the clarifications and allowed the benefit of exemption for similar products, namely, pre-laminated bagasse board, to manufacturers within their jurisdiction.

The Court observed that firstly, any clarification issued by the Board is binding on the Central Excise Officers who are duty-bound to observe and follow such circulars. Whether Section 37B is referred to in such circular or not is not relevant. The Court quoted the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ranadey Micronutrients vs. Collector of Central Excise 1996 (87) ELT 19 (SC), wherein a circular which was in favour of the assessee issued by the Board was sought to be repudiated by the Central Excise Department on the ground that it was only a letter and not an order issued u/s. 37B. The Apex Court observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment as under:

“There can be no doubt whatsoever, in the circumstances, that the earlier and later circulars were issued by the Board under the provisions of Section 37B, and the fact that they do not so recite does not mean that they do not bind Central Excise Officers or become advisory in character. There can be no doubt whatsoever that after 21st November, 1994, Excise duty could be levied upon micronutrients only under the provisions of Heading 31.05 as “other fertilisers”. If the later circular is contrary to the terms of the statute, it must be withdrawn. While the later circular remains in operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that it is not valid.”

Therefore, the submission that the letters issued by the Board in the present case were communications answering queries raised by the Commissioners of particular areas and hence, such letters were not binding because they were not issued u/s. 37B is not the correct proposition as canvassed by the Counsel appearing for the Revenue.

When other Central Excise authorities of equal and higher rank have followed and acted as per the clarifications, the Commissioner, Surat, could not have taken a contrary view on the assumption that the clarifications were only letters and not orders u/s. 37B.

If Excise authority of a particular Commissionerate or State refuses to allow benefit of exemption to manufacturers located in that Commissionerate or State but other manufacturers located elsewhere are allowed such exemption, then the same would be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also of Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution of India.

Darshan BoardLam. Ltd vs. UOI 2013 (287) E.L.T. 401 (Guj.)

    The petitioner was the widow of Gopaldas Kanhyalal Gujarati. The late Gopaldas Kanhyalal Gujarati had participated in the Indian Independence Movement and was receiving Freedom Fighter’s Pension from the Government of Maharashtra. He had applied for Freedom Fighter’s Pension from the Central Government. The same was rejected. A fresh application was submitted alongwith required documents. In the meantime, the husband of the petitioner expired. After that, the petitioner pursued the matter and submitted all required documents. In spite of receiving of the application, the Central Government has neither granted pension nor communicated anything to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the present petition had been filed.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that on the issue there were conflicting decisions of Co-ordinate Benches of the Supreme Court. Under such circumstances it was open to the Court to consider the judgment which in its opinion is the better in point of law, irrespective of when the judgments were pronounced. The Supreme Court noted that the judgment in Surja & Ors vs. UOI, 1992 SC 777 was rendered on the peculiar facts of that case and then declared the position of law, that an applicant must have actually suffered a minimum imprisonment of six months less the remission period of one month. Therefore, it was not possible to take a view different than the view taken in the case of Surja (Supra) which was binding under Art. 141 of the Constitution.

    [Gulabbai w/o. Gopaldas Gujrati vs. Union of India & ors. Writ Petition No. 1299 of 2008 Dated 9/7/2008 AIR (2009) (NOC) 763 (Bom) (2008) (6) AIR Bom R 857]

    The question for consideration was whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference application under unamended Section 35 H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Unamended Section 35G speaks about appeal to the High Court. Sub-Section 2(a) enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal to the High Court within 180 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party. There is no provision to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed period of 180 days.

    Unamended Section 35H speaks about reference application to the High Court. As per sub-section (1), the Commissioner of Central Excise or other party within a period of 180 days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35C direct the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from such order of the Tribunal. Here again as per sub-section (1), application for reference is to be made to the High Court within 180 days and there is no provision to extend the period of limitation for filing the application to the High Court beyond the said period and to condone the delay.

    In this matter the Court was concerned with ‘reference application’ made to the High Court under Section 35H (1) of the Act before amendment of the Central Excise Act by Act 49/2005 (w.e.f. 28.12.2005) by which several provisions of the Act were omitted including Section 35H.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that except providing a period of 180 days for filing reference application to the High Court, there is no other clause for condoning the delay if reference is made beyond the said prescribed period. In the case of appeal to the Commissioner, Section 35 provides 60 days time and in addition to the same, the Commissioner has power to condone the delay up to 30 days if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35B provides 90 days time for filing appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (5) therein enables the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number of days if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35EE which provides 90 days time for filing revision by the Central Government and, proviso to the same enables the revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period of 90 days if sufficient cause is shown, whereas in the case of appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference to the High Court under Section 35H of the Act, total period of 180 days has been provided for availing the remedy of appeal and the reference. However, there is no further clause empowering the High Court to condone the delay after the period of 180 days. Chapter VIA of the Act provides appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though the Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35H, the Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.

    As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only, from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the Legislature intended the Appellate Authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days, which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the Legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days, respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. In view of the above, the Court held that the Legislature provided sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision and the High Court has no power to condone delay.

    [Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. M/s. Hongo India (P) Ltd & Anr., Supreme Court dt. 27/3/2009 (Full Bench). (Source: itatonline.org)]

    One Mr. Chandra Bhushan Saran, father of appellant No. 1 and maternal grandfather of appellant no. 2 was allotted third floor residential premises of the building ‘Devonshire House’. Since he was appointed as a Director and Technical Advisor of one M/s. Automobile Products of India Ltd. (‘API Ltd.’). The suit premises was owned by Her Highness Vijaya Raje Scindia Maharani of Gwalior and was taken on lease by API Ltd. for residential needs of its employee.

    Subsequent to Mr. C. B. Saran’s resignation he was appointed as the Managing Director of XLO Ltd., respondent No. 1 herein. Mr. C. B. Saran was entitled to rent-free accommodation and for the sake of convenience, the API Ltd. executed a licence agreement in respect of the suit premises in favour of respondent no. 1. Accordingly, Mr. C. B. Saran along with his family, which consisted of his wife, son and daughter, continued to occupy the said premises.

    Mr. C. B. Saran expired in Germany and on his demise his son Mr. Sanjay Saran, by virtue of his employment with respondent No. 1, the suit premises was allotted in his favour.

    It is pertinent to mention here that in the year 1976, API Ltd. filed a suit before the Small Causes Court against the respondent no. 1 and Mr. C. B. Saran disputing the tenancy right in relation to the suit property. After the demise of Mr. C. B. Saran his legal heirs were substituted in the said suit.

    The respondent no. 1 instituted a proceeding under Section 630 of the Act against the present appellants. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 26.06.2007 found the appellants guilty under Section 630 of the Act. The appellants were directed to vacate the suit premises within 4 months from the date of the said order and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 4 months.

    The appellants filed a criminal appeal before the Sessions Judge which was dismissed. Against the said dismissal, the two appellants preferred a criminal revision application before the High Court of Bombay, which was also dismissed. It is against the said order that the appellants have approached the Apex Court.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that the main purpose to make action an offence under Section 630 is to provide a speedy and summary procedure for retrieving the property of the company where it has been wrongly obtained by an employee or officer of the company or where the property has been lawfully obtained but unlawfully retained after termination of the employment of the employee or the officer. Sub-section (1) is in two parts. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) create two different and separate offences. Clause (a) contemplates a situation wherein an officer or employee of the company wrongfully obtains possession of any property of the company during the course of his employment to which he is not entitled, whereas clause (b) contemplates a case where an officer or employee of the company having any property of the company in his possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the company. Under this provision, it may be that an officer or an employee may have lawfully obtained possession of any property during the course of his employment, still it is an offence if he wrongfully withholds it after termination of his employment. Clause (b) also makes it an offence, if any officer or employee of the company having any property of the company in his possession knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the Act. In terms of sub-section (2), the Court is empowered to impose a fine on the officer or employee of the company if found in breach of the provision of Section 630 of the Companies Act and further to issue direction if the Court feels it just and appropriate for delivery of the possession of the property of the company.

    The capacity, right to possession and the duration of occupation are all features which are integrally blended with the employment. Once the right of the employee or the officer to retain the possession of the property gets extinguished either on account of termination of services, retirement, resignation or death, they (persons in occupation) are under an obligation to return the property back to the company and on their failure to do so, they render themselves liable to be dealt with under Section 630 of the Act for retrieval of the possession of the property.

    The facts giving rise to the controversy between the parties are that the petitioner is the producer and first owner of copyright in the film ‘Victoria No. 203’. By an agreement dated 26th July 2007, the petitioner assigned to the respondent alongwith him joint ownership in the ratio of 50 : 50 of the rights in the negative of the film. There was some dispute between the parties as to whether copyright in the film or only in the negatives of the film are assigned. That would be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. Clause No. 8(d) of the agreement provides that the respondents shall be entitled to enter into an agreement in respect of his rights (under the agreement) by making the petitioner the confirming party to the agreement. The agreement provides that all disputes and differences arising between the parties in connection with the agreement shall be resolved by mutual consent, failing which the disputes shall be referred to arbitration. Pending constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and reference, the petitioner has claimed interim injunction.

    The Hon’ble Court observed that the petitioner was the producer and original holder of the copyright in the film. Perusal of clause No.8 of the agreement prima facie showed that the petitioner had made the respondents joint owners of the copyright to the extent of 50%, the petitioner had further given the right to the respondents to exploit the said copyright by entering into an agreement with others, but subject to petitioner being made the confirming party to the agreement. According to the petitioner, the respondents have negotiated with a third party for exhibiting of the film abroad without the consent of the petitioner.

    Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Power Control Appliances vs. Sumeet Machines P. Ltd., (1994) Vol. 2 SCC 448, it was held that in respect of joint ownership of a copyright, the use of the copyright must be made jointly by the co- owners and individual use by any one of the co- owners is not permissible.

    A joint owner of a copyright cannot, without the consent of the other joint owner, grant a licence or interest in the copyright. The respondents cannot exploit the copyright singly or individually. The exploitation of the copyright must be jointly made by the petitioner and respondents, as they are the joint owners. The respondents are not entitled to grant licence for exploitation of the film ‘Victoria No. 203’ without the concurrence of the petitioner. In view of above, the petitioner was entitled to an injunction pending the arbitration.

    [Angath Arts P. Ltd. vs. Century Communications Ltd. & Anr. AIR 2009 Bom. 26.]