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Oil and gas exploration and development costs

New Page 1ESSAR OIL LTD. — (31-3-2007)

6. Oil and gas exploration and development costs

The Company follows the ‘Full Cost Method’ of accounting for
its oil and gas exploration and development activities, whereby all costs
associated with acquisition, exploration and development of oil and gas
reserves, are capitalised under capital work-in-progress, irrespective of
success or failure of specific parts of the overall exploration activity within
or outside a cost centre (known as ‘cost pool’). Exploration and survey costs
incurred are held outside cost pools until the existence or otherwise of
commercial reserves are determined. These costs remain undepleted pending
determination, subject to there being no evidence of impairment. Costs are
released to its cost pool upon determination or otherwise of reserves. When any
field in a cost pool is ready to commence commercial production, the accumulated
costs in that cost pool are transferred from capital work-in-progress to the
gross block of assets under producing properties. Subsequent exploration
expenditure in that cost pool will be added to gross block of assets, either on
commencement of commercial production from a field discovery or failure. In case
a block is surrendered, the accumulated exploration expenditure pertaining to
such block is transferred to the gross block of assets. Expenditure carried
within each cost pool (including future development cost) will be depleted on a
unit-of-production basis with reference to quantities, with depletion computed
on the basis of the ratio that oil and gas production bears to the balance
proved and probable reserves at commencement of the year. The financial
statements of the Company reflect its share of assets, liabilities, income and
expenditure of the joint-venture operations, which are accounted on the basis of
available information on line-to-line basis, with similar items in the Company’s
financial statements to the extent of the participating interest of the Company
as per the various joint-venture agreement(s).

Revenue recognition :

Revenue on sale of goods is recognised when the property in
the goods is transferred to buyer for a price, or when all significant risks and
rewards of ownership have been transferred to the buyer and no effective control
is retained by the Company in respect of the goods transferred to a degree
usually associated with ownership and no significant uncertainty exists
regarding the amount of consideration that will be derived from the sale of
goods.

Revenue on transactions of rendering services is recognised,
either under the completed service contract method or under the proportionate
completion method, as appropriate. Performance is regarded as achieved when no
significant uncertainty exists regarding the amount of consideration that will
be derived from rendering the services.


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Oil and gas assets

New Page 1CAIRN INDIA LTD. — (31-12-2006)

4. Oil and gas assets :

Cairn India Group follows the ‘Successful Efforts Method’ for
accounting for oil and gas assets as set out by the Guidance Note issued by the
ICAI on ‘Accounting for Oil and Gas Producing Activities’.

Expenditure incurred on the acquisition of a licence interest
is initially capitalised on a licence-by-licence basis. Costs are held,
undepleted, within exploratory & development wells in progress until the
exploration phase relating to the licence area is complete or commercial oil and
gas reserves have been discovered.

Exploration expenditure incurred in the process of
determining exploration targets which cannot be directly related to individual
exploration wells is expensed in the period in which it is incurred.

Exploration/appraisal drilling costs are initially
capitalised within exploratory & development wells in progress on a well basis
until the success or otherwise of the well has been established. The success or
failure of each exploration/appraisal effort is judged on a well-by-well basis.
Drilling costs are written off on completion of a well, unless the results
indicate that oil and gas reserves exist and there is a reasonable prospect that
these reserves are commercial.

Where results of exploration drilling indicate the presence
of oil and gas reserves which are ultimately not considered commercially viable,
all related costs are written off to the Profit and Loss Account. Following
appraisal of successful exploration wells, when a well is ready for commencement
of commercial production, the related exploratory and development wells in
progress are transferred into a single-field cost centre within producing
properties, after testing for impairment.

Where costs are incurred after technical feasibility and
commercial viability of producing oil and gas is demonstrated and it has been
determined that the wells are ready for commencement of commercial production,
they are capitalised within producing properties for each cost centre.
Subsequent expenditure is capitalised when it enhances the economic benefits of
the producing properties or replaces part of the existing producing properties.
Any costs remaining associated with such part replaced are expensed in the
financial statements.

Net proceeds from any disposal of an exploration asset within
exploratory and development wells in progress are initially credited against the
previously capitalised costs and any surplus proceeds are credited to the Profit
and Loss Account. Net proceeds from any disposal of producing properties are
credited against the previously capitalised cost and any gain or loss on
disposal of producing properties is recognised in the Profit and Loss Account,
to the extent that the net proceeds exceed or are less than the appropriate
portion of the net capitalised costs of the asset.


(c) Depletion :



The expenditure on producing properties is depleted within
each cost centre. Depletion is charged on a unit-of-production basis, based on
proved reserves for acquisition costs and proved and developed reserves for
other costs.


(d) Site restoration costs :



At the end of the producing life of a field, costs are
incurred in removing and restoring the site of production facilities. Cairn
India Group recognises the full cost of site restoration as an asset and
liability when the obligation to rectify environmental damage arises. The site
restoration asset is included within producing properties of the related asset.
The amortisation of the asset, calculated on a unit-of-production basis on
proved and developed reserves, is included in the ‘depletion and site
restoration costs’ in the Profit and Loss Account.

Revenue from operating activities :

Revenue represents the Cairn India Group’s share of oil, gas
and condensate production, recognised on a direct-entitlement basis and tariff
income received for third-party use of operating facilities and pipelines in
accordance with agreements.


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Accounting for Oil and Gas Activity

New Page 1RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. — (31-3-2007)

3. Accounting for Oil and Gas Activity :

The Company has adopted ‘Full Cost Method’ of accounting for
its oil and gas activity and all costs incurred in acquisition, exploration and
development are accumulated considering the country as a cost centre. Oil and
gas joint ventures are in the nature of jointly controlled assets. Accordingly,
assets and liabilities as well as income and expenditure are accounted on the
basis of available information, on line-by-line basis with similar items in the
Company’s financial statements, according to the participating interest of the
Company.

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Exploration, Development & Production Costs

New Page 1Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. — (31-3-2007)

1. Exploration, Development & Production Costs :

5.1 Acquisition cost :


Acquisition cost of an oil and gas property in
exploration/development stage is taken to acquisition cost under the respective
category. In case of overseas projects, the same is taken to capital work in
progress. Such costs are capitalised by transferring to producing property when
it is ready to commence commercial production. In case of abandonment, such
costs are expensed. Acquisition cost of a producing oil and gas property is
capitalised as producing property.

5.2 Survey costs :


Cost of surveys and prospecting activities conducted in the
search of oil and gas are expensed in the year in which these are incurred.

5.3 Exploratory/Development wells in progress :


5.3.1 All acquisition costs, exploration costs involved in
drilling and equipping exploratory and appraisal wells, cost of drilling
exploratory type stratigraphic test wells are initially capitalised as
exploratory wells in progress till the time these are either transferred to
producing properties on completion as per policy no. 5.4.1 or expensed in the
year when determined to be dry or of no further use, as the case may be.

5.3.2 All wells under as ‘exploratory wells in progress’
which are more than two years old from the date of completion of drilling are
charged to Profit and Loss Account except those wells which have proved reserves
and the development of the fields in which the wells are located has been
planned.

5.3.3 All costs relating to development wells are initially
capitalised as development wells in progress and transferred to producing
properties on completion as per policy no. 5.4.1.

5.4 Producing properties :


5.4.1 Producing properties are created in respect of an
area/field having proved developed oil and gas reserves, when the well in the
area/field is ready to commence commercial production.

5.4.2 Cost of temporary occupation of land, successful
exploratory wells, all development wells, depreciation on related equipment and
facilities, and estimated future abandonment costs are capitalised and reflected
as producing properties.

5.4.3 Depletion of producing properties :


Producing properties are depleted using the ‘Unit of
Production Method’. The rate of depletion is computed with reference to the area
covered by individual lease/licence/asset/amortisation base by considering the
proved developed reserves and related capital costs incurred including estimated
future abandonment costs. In case of acquisition, cost of producing properties
is depleted by considering the proved reserves. These reserves are estimated
annually by the Reserve Estimates Committee of the Company, which follows the
International Reservoir Engineering Procedures.

5.5 General administrative expenses :


General administrative expenses at assets, basins, services,
regions and headquarters are charged to Profit and Loss Account.

5.6 Production costs :


Production costs include pre-well head and post well head
expenses including depreciation and applicable operating costs of support
equipment and facilities.

Abandonment costs :

7.1 The full eventual estimated liability towards costs
relating to dismantling, abandoning and restoring offshore well sites and allied
facilities is recognised at the initial stage as cost of producing property and
liability for abandonment cost, based on the latest technical assessment
available at current costs with the Company. The same is reviewed annually.

7.2 Cost relating to dismantling, abandoning and restoring
onshore well sites and allied facilities are accounted for in the year in which
such costs are incurred, as the salvage value is expected to take care of the
abandonment costs.

Revenue recognition :

15.1 Revenue from sale of products is recognised on transfer
of custody to customers.

15.2 Sale of crude oil and gas produced from exploratory
wells in progress in exploratory areas is deducted from expenditure on such
wells.

15.3 Sales are inclusive of all statutory levies except Value
Added Tax (VAT). Any retrospective revision in prices is accounted for in the
year of such revision.

15.4 Revenue in respect of fixed price contracts is
recognised for the quantum of work done on the basis of percentage of completion
method. The quantum of work done is measured in proportion of cost incurred to
date to the estimated total cost of the contract or based on reports of physical
work done.

15.5 Finance income in respect of assets given on finance
lease is recognised based on a pattern reflecting a constant periodic rate of
return on the net investment outstanding in respect of the finance lease.

15.6 Revenue in respect of the following is recognised when
there is reasonable certainty regarding ultimate collection :

(a) Shortlifted quantity of gas.
(b) Gas pipeline transportation charges and statutory duties thereon.
(c) Reimbursable subsides and grants.
(d) Interest on delayed realisation from customers.
(e) Liquidated damages from contractors.

ACC LTD. — (31-12-2007)

New Page 1ACC LTD. — (31-12-2007)

From Notes to Accounts :

There are no Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, as defined
in the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 to whom the
Company owes dues on account of principal amount together with interest and
accordingly no additional disclosures have been made.

The above information regarding Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises has been determined to the extent such parties have been identified
on the basis of information available with the Company. This has been relied
upon by the auditors.


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FULFORD (INDIA) LTD. — (31-12-2007)

New Page 1FULFORD (INDIA) LTD. — (31-12-2007)

From Notes to Accounts :

The Company has not received any intimation from the
suppliers regarding status under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (the act) and hence disclosure regarding :

(a) Amount due and outstanding to suppliers as at the end
of accounting year;

(b) Interest paid during the year;

(c) Interest payable at the end of the accounting year, and

(d) Interest accrued and unpaid at the end of the
accounting year, has not been provided.


The Company is making efforts to get the confirmations from
the suppliers as regards their status under the Act.


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Honeywell Automation India Ltd. — (31-12-2007)

New Page 1HONEYWELL AUTOMATION INDIA LTD. — (31-12-2007)

From Notes to Accounts :

Disclosure in accordance with Section 22 of the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 :

Particulars

Amount (Rs.
‘000)


(a) Principal amount remaining unpaid and

206,945

Interest due
thereon

(b) Interest
paid in terms of Section 16


(c) Interest due and payable for the period of delay in
payment


(d) Interest accrued and remaining unpaid


(e) Interest due and payable even in succeeding years

The Company has compiled the above information based on
verbal confirmations from suppliers. As at the year end, no supplier has
intimated the Company about its status as a Micro or Small Enterprise or its
registration under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006.

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MRF LTD. — (30-9-2007)

New Page 1MRF LTD. — (30-9-2007)

From
Schedules :

A. Current
Liabilities :




Rs. crore

Rs. crore

Sundry Creditors :

Outstanding dues of Micro Enterprises & Small Enterprises
(Note 5)

3.30

1.50


Outstanding dues of creditors other than Micro
Enterprises & Small Enterprises

411.68

370.73


From Notes to Accounts :




8. There are no delays in the payment of dues to micro,
small and medium enterprises, to the extent such parties have been identified
on the basis of information available with the Group. Previous year’s figures
stated in Schedule 8 represent amounts due to small-scale industrial
undertakings.



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HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LTD.

New Page 1HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LTD.

— (31-12-2007)

From Schedule :

Sundry Creditors (Refer Note 21)

From Notes to Accounts :

There are no Micro and Small Enterprises, to whom the Company
owes dues, which are outstanding for more than 45 days as at 31st December,
2007. This information as required to be disclosed under the Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 has been determined to the extent such
parties have been identified on the basis of information available with the
Company.

&

HONEYWELL AUTOMATION INDIA LTD. — (31-12-2007)


From Notes to Accounts :

Disclosure in accordance with Section 22 of the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 :

Particulars

Amount (Rs.
‘000)


(a) Principal amount remaining unpaid and

206,945

Interest due
thereon

(b) Interest
paid in terms of Section 16


(c) Interest due and payable for the period of delay in
payment


(d) Interest accrued and remaining unpaid


(e) Interest due and payable even in succeeding years

The Company has compiled the above information based on
verbal confirmations from suppliers. As at the year end, no supplier has
intimated the Company about its status as a Micro or Small Enterprise or its
registration under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006.

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S & S Power Switchgear Ltd.

New Page 1S & S POWER SWITCHGEAR LTD.

— (30-9-2007)

From Notes to Accounts :

7. The Company is in the process of identifying the
small-scale units and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and hence :

(a) Interest, if any, payable as per Interest on Delayed
Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Ordinance, 1993
and the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is not
ascertainable, and

(b) Amount payable to small-scale units is not
ascertainable.


From Auditors’ Report :



(g) Subject to the foregoing, in our opinion and to the
best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, the
said financial statements read along with the notes thereon, subject to the
dues to the small-scale industry units (Refer Note 7 of Schedule 15)
, give
the information required by the Companies Act, 1956, in the manner so required
and give a true and fair view in conformity with the accounting principle
generally accepted in India.



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Abbott India Ltd. — (30-11-2007)

New Page 1ABBOTT INDIA LTD. — (30-11-2007)

From Schedules :

A. Current Liabilities :

 
Rupees in millions

As at 30-11-2006 Rupees in millions

Sundry Creditors :

Due to Micro & Small Enterprises (Refer Note B 27 —
Schedule 16)



Others†

308.4

286.6

† Previous year includes an amount of Rs.36.7 million due to
small-scale industrial undertakings.



From Notes to Accounts :




(a) An amount of Rs.4.4 million and Nil was due and
outstanding to suppliers as at the end of the accounting year on account of
Principal and Interest, respectively.

(b) No interest was paid during the year.

(c) No interest is payable at the end of the year other
than interest under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006.

(d) No amount of interest was accrued and unpaid at the end
of the accounting year.

The above information and that given in Schedule 10 —
‘Current Liabilities and Provisions’ regarding Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises has been determined to the extent such parties have been
identified on the basis of information available with the Company. This has
been relied upon by the auditors.



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Search and seizure — Amounts lying in the bank account cannot be withdrawn and seized.

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12 Search and seizure — Amounts lying in the bank account
cannot be withdrawn and seized.


[K. C. C. Software Ltd. v. DIT (Inv), (2008) 298 ITR 1
(SC)]

During the course of search and seizure action, the
Department issued warrant of authorisation u/s.132 on 4-10-2005 in respect of
bank accounts (which were disclosed in the regular books of accounts) and
withdrew the cash by demand drafts. On 8-10-2005, the bank informed the assessee
about the search and seizure and the withdrawals made by the Department. On
28-10-2005, the assessee was supplied with copy of the Panchnama. On 29-10-2005,
the assessee requested the Department to adjust a sum of Rs.77,68,177 towards
self-assessment tax for the A.Y. 2005-06 from the seized amount of
Rs.1,81,91,982 and to release the balance. On 29-11-2005, an application was
made u/s.132B for release of the seized amount. On 16-2-2006, the assessee
requested that a further amount of Rs.40,00,000 be adjusted from the seized
amount against advance tax for A.Y. 2006-07 and to release the balance.

Since the Department failed to respond to the request of the
assessee, writ petitions were filed to release the amounts seized after the
adjustments as requested and to quash and set aside the warrants of
authorisation dated 4-10-2005. In reply filed by the Department, it was inter
alia
contended that the application made u/s.132B was disposed of on
1-2-2006 and that the bank accounts in question were undisclosed.

In rejoinder the assessee pointed out that the said order
dated 1-2-2006 was not served upon them. The Delhi High Court dismissed the
petitions observing that the Department had taken a stand that there was
estimated tax liability of approx. Rs.10 crores and the satisfaction note dated
13-9-2005 of ADIT, Unit 1 and notings of the Director (Investigation) clearly
indicated that the stand of the assessee was without substance.

Before the Supreme Court, the assessee contended that the
seizure was without jurisdiction and that there was no power u/s.132B for
retaining any amount seized for the purpose of meeting estimated liability. The
stand of the Revenue was that as the assessee was unable to satisfactorily
explain the sources of fund lying in the bank account, the same were seized and
an authorised officer has full power and jurisdiction to seize cash balance
lying in bank account as these would come within the meaning of ‘money’ and/or
‘assets’ as provided u/s. 132(1)(iii). Further, the money had been withdrawn in
terms of ‘Search and Seizure Manual, 1989’, particularly paragraphs 5.01 and
5.02 thereof. Further, reference to S. 153A in S. 132B showed that the amount
could be retained for the estimated liability.

The Supreme Court, after referring to the ‘Search and Seizure
Manual’ held that it was clear that the same was relatable to cash seized and
cash in bank is conceptually different from cash in hand. The Supreme Court
referred to the authorities to conclude that the banker is not an agent or
factor but he is a debtor. The Supreme Court held that it is impermissible to
convert assets to cash and thereafter impound the same. However, the Supreme
Court did not go into the broader issue in view of the fact that there was no
challenge to the order passed u/s.132B and did not grant any relief to the
assessee and as there was time up to 31-3-2008 for completing the assessment,
the Supreme Court directed that the amount seized be kept in interest-bearing
fixed deposit, as in the event the assessee succeeds, it would be entitled to
interest as provided in statute.


 

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Assessment — Evidence — Out of the ten summons issued five parties appeared and gave evidence in favour of the assessee, but other five did not appear as the summons could not be served upon them — No adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee.

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11 Assessment — Evidence — Out of the ten summons issued five
parties appeared and gave evidence in favour of the assessee, but other five did
not appear as the summons could not be served upon them — No adverse inference
can be drawn against the assessee.


[Anis Ahmad and Sons v. CIT(A), (2008) 297 ITR 441
(SC)]

The appellant-assessee was carrying on business as commission
agent in raw hides and skins. The raw hides and skins comprised of buffalo
hides, cow hides, katta and katai or goat and sheep skins. The goods are brought
in the mandi (market) by vyaparis (traders) through trucks. These vyaparis go to
different arhatdaars (commission agents) of their choice where they get the
goods counted.

The amount is first entered in the bilti register, after that
bundles are prepared and each vyapari is given his lot number. Sometimes, the
vyaparis request the arhatdaar to pay the freight chargers of the trucks. The
arhatdaar opens an account of each vyapari in his ledger book where the numbers
of different types of each vyapari and the numbers of different types of pieces
of raw hides are entered without entering the money value thereof. The vyaparis
sometimes stay in the mandi for 4 or 5 days to study the market themselves and
then they give instructions to arhatdaars for selling their goods.

When goods are sold, the sale price minus commission and
other charges are credited to the account of the vyaparis and commission charges
or other charges receivable are credited to the relevant accounts and the full
sale price of the goods is debited to the account of the purchaser. The
arhatdaars maintains full details, such as weight rate, the names of vyaparis
whose goods are sold and names of the purchasers in taul/shumar bahi. This book
contains original entry. Thereafter, entries are passed through jakar and posted
in the relevant accounts of the ledger. This practice is being followed by each
and every arhatdaar.

The vyaparis are paid the balance amount generally in cash,
in instalments or full after receipt of the amount from the customers. The rate
of commission on different types of hides and skins is settled by the
association and no arhatdaar can charge anything more on that account. The
appellant-assessee filed its income-tax return for the A.Y. 1984-85 declaring
Rs.1,32,830 as its total income as commission agent. The Income-tax Officer,
vide assessment order dated March 13, 1987, framed u/s.143(3) of the Act,
treated the appellant-assessee as ‘a trader’ and not as ‘a commission agent’ and
assessed its total income at Rs.4,06,810.

Being aggrieved, the appellant-assessee preferred an appeal
before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) vide order dated April 4, 1988, partly allowed the appeal. The
appellant-assessee and the respondent-Income-tax Department feeling aggrieved
against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) filed two separate
appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated
August 19, 1993, without going into the merits of the case, set aside the
assessment order and remanded the file back to the Assessing Officer to re-scrutinise
the entire accounts after giving the appellant-assessee an opportunity of being
heard and also giving the appellant-assessee an opportunity of filing any
evidence in support of its claim that there was no discrepancy in its accounts
as pointed out by the Assessing Officer or as found out by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) in his order dated April 4, 1988.

On remand, the Assessing Officer issued summons to ten
traders u/s.131(1) of the Act. In response to the summons, five traders appeared
and gave evidence in favour of the appellant-assessee. The remaining five
traders did not appear because they could not be served with the summons as they
were residing outside the State of U.P.

The assessing authority drew an adverse inference against the
claim of the appellant-assessee and assessed Rs.2,30,704 as the total income for
the A.Y. 1984-85, treating the transactions with the absentee traders as having
been done by the appellant-assessee in the capacity of ‘trader’ and not as
‘commission agent’.

The appellant-assessee assailed the impugned order dated
March 29, 1996, of the assessing authority before the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals), who, vide his order dated June 9, 1997, set aside the addition by
holding the appellant-assessee as an ‘arhatiya’. The Revenue, feeling aggrieved,
preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal. The Tribunal by
its order dated January 15, 2004, allowed the appeal and held that the
appellant-assessee has failed to produce any evidence that the transactions, in
question, were not conducted by the appellant-assessee as  ‘vyapari’, but the
transactions were conducted on commission basis. Being aggrieved by the said
order, the appellant-assessee filed an income-tax appeal before the High Court.
The High Court has concurred with the findings recorded by the Assessing Officer
as confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and dismissed the appeal in limine.

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the record revealed
that for the year 1983-84, the assessing authority had accepted the claim of the
appellant-assessee dealing in the business of hides and skins as ‘a commission
agent’. The appellant-assessee filed a chart of payments made to the purchasers
by the traders through the appellant-assessee acting as a commission agent. The
five traders who appeared before the assessing authority had supported the claim
of the appellant-assessee to be a commission agent and not ‘a trader’ and the
assessing authority has accepted their evidence holding the appellant-assessee
as a commission agent in respect of the transactions conducted with them by the
traders.

The Supreme Court held that the appellant-assessee could not be held responsible for non-appearance of those five traders to whom the summons were issued by the assessing authority, as they are residing outside the State of U.P. For non-appearance of those traders, no adverse inference ought to have been drawn by the authorities below and the appellant-assessee has led satisfactory evidence that its business is only that of a commission agent and not ‘a trader’ dealing in the goods.

Valuation of closing stock — Application to review the decision in CIT v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. — Rejected

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4 Valuation of closing stock — Application to
review the decision in CIT
v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. — Rejected


[Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CIT, (2007) 295 ITR 453 (SC)]

The Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd., [(2007) 291
ITR 391] had held that goods should not be written down below the cost, except
where there is an actual or anticipated loss and if the fall in the price is
only such as it would reduce merely the prospective profits, there would be no
justification to discard the initial valuation at cost. The assessee’s
application to review the aforesaid judgment was rejected by the Supreme Court,
holding that no case for review was made out.

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Questions of Law — No interference made on findings — Questions of law left open.

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2 Questions of Law — No interference made on
findings — Questions of law left open.


[CIT v. Alfa Laval (India) Ltd., (2008) 295 ITR 451 (SC)]

The Bombay High Court in Alfa Laval (India) Ltd. v. Deputy
Commissioner of Income-tax, (266 ITR 418) had held as follows :

(1) the assessee is entitled to value the closing stock at
market value or at cost, whichever is lower and the Assessing Officer was not
justified in valuing the items in question at 50% of the cost without
disclosing the basis of such valuation as against valuation made by the
assessee at 10% of the cost based upon auditor’s certificate and which items
were in fact sold in the subsequent year at a price less than 10%.

(2) the depreciation written back as a result of change in
the basis of working out depreciation in compliance with the Circular of the
Company Law Board and credited to the profit and loss account should not be
reduced in working out the relief u/s.32AB(3) of the Act, as it could be said
that there was withdrawal of amount from reserve or provisions.

(3) the interest from customers and sales tax set-off
received by the assessee being assessed as the part of business profits under
head ‘Profits or gains of business or profession’, the same could not be
excluded while calculating deductions u/s.80HHC of the Act.

 

On an appeal against the aforesaid order by the Department to
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal stating that it was
not the case which required interference and left the question of law open.

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Rectification of mistake — Non-consideration of material on record amounts to mistake apparent from record.

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3 Rectification of mistake —
Non-consideration of material on record amounts to mistake apparent from record.


[Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. CIT, (2007) 295 ITR
466]

The assessee-company, engaged in the manufacture of portable
generator sets in technical collaboration with Honda Motor Company, Japan filed
its return of income for the A.Y. 1991-92 on December 30, 1991, declaring nil
income. During the relevant year, the assessee had taken a term loan in foreign
exchange for import of machinery. On account of fluctuation in the foreign
exchange rate, the liability of the assessee to repay the loan in terms of
rupees went up by Rs.7,10,910. By referring to the provisions of S. 43A, the
assessee enhanced the figure of WDV (written-down value) of the block of assets
and claimed depreciation accordingly. The Assessing Officer came to the
conclusion that such revision in the actual cost was not admissible as S. 43A
refers to adjustment qua the actual cost of the machinery on account of increase
or decrease in the liability of unpaid loans utilised for the purchase of
machinery. Aggrieved by the said decision, the matter was carried in appeal by
the assessee before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who took the view
that the claim of the assessee was admissible in view of the fact that in the
year preceding the A.Y. 1991-92, increased depreciation was given to the
assessee. On this aspect, therefore, the Department carried the matter in appeal
to the Tribunal for both the A.Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92. The Tribunal held that
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had erred in allowing the enhanced
depreciation as u/s.43A. Actual payment was a condition precedent for availing
of the benefit under that Section. According to the Tribunal, if actual payment
was not made after fluctuation, then the value of the asset cannot be increased
by adding the increase on account of fluctuation. On the facts, the Tribunal
found that in the present case, there was no actual payment after the
fluctuation and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to claim the benefit
u/s.43A. The assessee moved the Tribunal for rectification of mistake apparent
from its order. In the rectification application, the assessee pointed out the
earlier judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of
Deputy CIT v. Samtel Color Limited,
in which it was held that enhanced
depreciation was allowable even on notional increase in the cost of the asset on
account of exchange rate fluctuation and despite the fact that the additional
liability resulting from the said fluctuation had not been paid by the assessee.
It was held that the word ‘paid’ in S. 43(2) meant amount actually paid or
incurred according to the method of accounting. In this connection, reliance was
also placed by the Tribunal on Circular No. 5-P of the Central Board of Direct
Taxes, dated October 9, 1967. The Tribunal, allowed the rectification
application filed by the assessee stating that the judgment of the Co-ordinate
Bench in Samtel Color Limited (supra) had escaped its attention. Against
the said order, the Department carried the matter in appeal to the High Court.
The High Court came to the conclusion, relying on its earlier decision, that the
power to rectify any mistake was not equivalent to a power to review or recall
the order sought to be rectified. The High Court came to the conclusion that in
the guise of rectification, the Tribunal had, in fact, reviewed its earlier
order which fell outside the scope of S. 254(2) of the 1961 Act and,
consequently, the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal passed in
Miscellaneous Application. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal
was justified in exercising its powers u/s.254(2) when it was pointed out to the
Tribunal when the original order came to be passed but it had committed a
mistake in not considering the material which was already on record. The
Tribunal has acknowledged its mistake, it has accordingly rectified its order.
According to the Supreme Court, the High Court was not justified in interfering
with the said order.

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Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme — Though the declaration was originally rejected for the reason that no appeal was pending as the delay was not condoned, the declaration ought to have been subsequently accepted when Tribunal held that there was no delay.

New Page 1

1 Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme — Though the
declaration was originally rejected for the reason that no appeal was pending as
the delay was not condoned, the declaration ought to have been subsequently
accepted when Tribunal held that there was no delay.


[Swan Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008) 296 ITR 1
(SC)]

 

The appellant is a composite textile mill engaged in the
manufacture of cotton yarn, man-made yarn, cotton fabrics and man-made fabrics,
as well as processing amongst other activities. For the period from October,
1994 to February, 1997, the appellant was served with 14 show-cause notices for
recovery of differential duty of approximately Rs.50 lakhs. The said show-cause
notices were adjudicated by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,
Mumbai-II vide order-in-original Nos. 781/398/97 to 794/411/97, dated November
12, 1997, confirming the demands covered thereunder along with interest. The
Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise also imposed penalty of Rs.5,000. There
being incorrect computation, he directed the Range Superintendent to verify
figures and work out a fresh demand. The Range Superintendent re-worked the duty
amount of Rs.9,40,753 and issued a demand notice on May 18, 1998, requiring the
appellant to pay the said amount along with penalty of Rs.5,000. Dissatisfied
with the order dated November 12, 1997, passed by the Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise and the order of Range Superintendent, dated May 18, 1998, the
appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Central Excise
(Appeals) on September 2, 1998, along with a stay application. The Commissioner
of Central Excise (Appeals), vide order dated December 28, 1998, asked the
appellant to deposit the amount of duty and penalty within four weeks from the
date of the order. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 came out with a scheme known as
‘Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998’ (for short ‘KVSS’). The said scheme provided
for settling the tax arrears by paying 50 per cent of the disputed tax arrears.
Under the KVSS, the Commissioner of Central Excise was appointed as designated
authority. The scheme was operative from September 1, 1998, to January 31, 1999.
The appellant filed a declaration u/s.89 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998,
before the Commissioner of Central Excise on December 31, 1998. The aforesaid
declaration filed by the appellant came to be rejected by the designated
authority, vide his order dated February 25, 1999, on the ground that the appeal
was filed by the appellant before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals)
after the limitation for filing the appeal had already expired and that delay in
filing the appeal was not condoned by the Commissioner of Central Excise
(Appeals). Aggrieved by the order in appeal dated February 25, 1999, the
appellant preferred an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control)
Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Bench, Mumbai (for short, ‘the Tribunal’). The
Tribunal vide its order dated November 29, 1999, held that the appeal preferred
by the appellant before the Commissioner (Appeals) was within time and,
accordingly, set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and remanded the
matter back to him for fresh disposal in accordance with law. On remand, the
Commissioner (Appeals) vide order dated June 29, 2001, upheld the order dated
November 12, 1997. After the Tribunal passed by the order on November 29, 1999,
holding that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Commissioner
(Appeals) was within time, the appellant approached the designed authority, vide
its letter dated April 24, 2001, for reconsideration of the earlier order dated
February 25, 1999, and give the appellant the benefit of the KVSS in the matter
of the application filed u/s.89 of the KVSS on January 28, 1999. The
Superintendent of Central Excise, Range-II, on January 18, 2002, informed the
appellant that the application u/s.89 of the KVSS was re-examined by the Chief
Commissioner’s Office, Mumbai, and since the KVSS no longer exists, the question
of accepting the application does not arise. The appellant approached the Bombay
High Court by filing a writ petition. The appellant challenged principally the
order dated February 25, 1999, passed by the designated authority. It prayed for
direction to the respondents to accept the appellant’s declaration dated
December 31, 1998, made u/s.89 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, in respect of
the KVSS and restrain the respondents from recovery of interest amount of
Rs.11,58,647 as per the demand dated December 7, 2005. Analysing the various
provisions of the KVSS, the High Court held that since the appeal was filed
after the limitation and the delay was not condoned, the appellant was not
entitled to get the benefit of KVSS. On appeal the Supreme Court held that
undisputedly, the Tribunal had held that the appeal was within time. That being
so, for the purpose of the KVSS, the appeal was to be treated as pending. The
ratio in CIT v. Shatrusailya Digvijaysingh Jadeja, (2005) 7 SCC 294, was
clearly applicable. In the instant case, the appeal is to be treated as pending.
The High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition. The Supreme
Court set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the orders of the
designated authority, rejecting the declaration filed by the appellant.

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Wealth Tax : Valuation of immovable property sublet by tenant : To be determined on basis of rent and deposit received by assessee from tenant, irrespective of rent and deposit received by tenant from sub-tenant

New Page 1

12 Wealth-tax : Valuation of immovable property sublet by
tenant : For determining the value of the property u/r. 3 of Schedule III to W.
T. Act, 1957 the rent and deposit received by the assessee from the tenant and
not the rent and deposit received by the tenant from the sub-tenant or ultimate
user of the premises are to be taken into account.


[CWT v. Spellbound Trading (P) Ltd., 214 CTR 324 (Bom.)]

Dealing with Rule 3 of Schedule III to the Wealth-tax Act,
1957 for valuation of immovable property, the Bombay High Court held as under :

“Rent and deposit received by the assessee from the tenant and not the rent
and deposit received by the tenant from the sub-tenant or ultimate user of the
premises are to be taken into account for determining the value of the property
under Rule 3 of Schedule III to the Wealth-tax Act.”



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Survey : S. 69 and S. 133A : Addition to income merely on the basis of the statement recorded in the course of survey : Invalid

New Page 1

11 Survey : S. 69 and S. 133A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
2001-02 : Addition to income merely on the basis of the statement recorded in
the course of survey : Not valid.


[CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, 214 CTR 589 (Mad.)]

On 24-07-2001, survey action u/s.133A of the Income-tax Act,
1961 was carried out in the premises of the assessee, wherein a statement of the
partner was recorded offering an additional income of Rs.20,00,000 for the A.Y.
2001-02 and Rs.30,00,000 for the A.Y. 2002-03. The said statement was retracted
by the assessee through a letter dated 3-8-2001. The Assessing Officer made
additions to the income on the basis of the survey. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal
deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“S. 133A does not empower any I. T. Authority to examine
any person on oath, hence, any such statement has no evidentiary value and any
admission made during such statement cannot, by itself, be made the basis for
addition.”




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Settlement of cases : Abatement of proceedings : Constitutional validity : By way of interim relief Settlement Commission directed not to consider application of assessee having abated u/s.245HA for want of compliance with S. 245D(2D) as amended by the Fi

New Page 1

27 Settlement of cases : Abatement of
proceedings : S. 245D(2D) and S. 245HA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Constitutional
validity : By way of interim relief, Setlement Commission directed not to
consider the application of the assessee having abated u/s.245HA for want of
compliance with S. 245D(2D) as amended by the Finance Act, 2007.


[Sunita Textiles Ltd v. CIT & Ors., 216 CTR 74 (Bom.)]

The constitutional validity of S. 245D(2D) and S. 245HA as
amended by the Finance Act, 2007 was
challenged by filing writ petition. The Bombay High
Court admitted the writ petition and granted interim relief directing the
Settlement Commission not to consider the settlement application filed by the
petitioner having abated u/s.245HA for want of compliance with S. 245D(2D) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.





 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that the earlier CIT(A)’s
order has become final and also the AO passed the consequent orders in
giving effect to the said CIT(A)’s order. There was no further appeals by
the Revenue. Though the said CIT(A)’s order is erroneous in view of the
Supreme Court judgment in the case of CIT v. Venkateshwara Hatcheries
(P) Ltd.,
237 ITR 174 (SC), the same has not been set aside by the
process known to law.

(ii) The Tribunal is correct in holding that the
Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment u/s.147.
Unless and until the said order is set aside by the process known to law,
the said order is valid in law, as well as it binds on the lower
authorities. Hence, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to circumvent
the earlier order passed by the CIT(A) which had become final. Under such
circumstances, the Assessing Officer should not reopen the assessment and
seek to adjudicate on the issue which was already adjudicated by the
Appellate authority.

(iii) The Tribunal correctly decided the matter and the
reasons given by the Tribunal are based on valid materials and evidence,
and there is no error or legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so
as to warrant interference.”

Valuation of stock : Revenue to prove valuation incorrect : Cannot rely on statement by assessee to its bank

New Page 1

28 Valuation of stock : Rejection of
valuation : Burden on Revenue to prove valuation incorrect : Revenue
cannot rely on statement by assessee to its bank : A.Y. 1991-92.

[CIT v. Acrow India Ltd., 298 ITR 447 (Bom.)]


For the A.Y. 1991-92, the Assessing Officer made an
addition of Rs.17,79,248 by revaluing the closing stock relying on the
statement given by the assessee to its bank. The Tribunal deleted the
addition.


The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by
the Revenue and held as under :


“(i) As far as this aspect is concerned, the
statement given by the respondent-assessee to the bank is sought to be
relied on by the Revenue. As far as that aspect is concerned, the
Tribunal has clearly held that the valuation of the stock declared to
the bank is in fact inflated and that the correct valuation of the stock
was not suppressed from the Revenue.


(ii) The Tribunal has relied on the judgment of the
Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. N. Swamy, (2000) 241 ITR
363. There the Division Bench has held that the burden of proof in such
a case is on the Revenue and the same could not be discharged by merely
referring to a statement of the assessee to a third party.


(iii) In our view, there is no reason to interfere
with the decision of the Tribunal, inasmuch as it has followed the
decision of the Division Bench of this Court and the Madras High Court.”

S. 147 : CIT(A) allowed deductions u/s.80HH and u/s.80I : Reopening of assessment by AO on basis of subsequent Supreme Court decision is not valid

New Page 1

26 Reassessment : S. 147 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94 : CIT(A) allowed deductions u/s.80HH
and u/s. 80I : Reopening of assessment by AO on the basis of subsequent
Supreme Court decision is not valid.


[CIT v. Ramachandra Hatcheries, 215 CTR 370
(Mad.)]

For the A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94, the assessee’s claim
for deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80I was disallowed by the Assessing Officer.
In appeal the CIT(A) allowed the claim. The Assessing Officer gave effect to
the order of the CIT(A) and allowed the claim. Subsequently, the Assessing
Officer reopened the assessment for disallowing the claim relying on the
subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v.
Venkateshwara Hatcheries (P) Ltd.,
237 ITR 174 (SC). The Tribunal held
that the reopening of the assessment was not valid.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that the earlier CIT(A)’s
order has become final and also the AO passed the consequent orders in
giving effect to the said CIT(A)’s order. There was no further appeals by
the Revenue. Though the said CIT(A)’s order is erroneous in view of the
Supreme Court judgment in the case of CIT v. Venkateshwara Hatcheries
(P) Ltd.,
237 ITR 174 (SC), the same has not been set aside by the
process known to law.

(ii) The Tribunal is correct in holding that the
Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment u/s.147.
Unless and until the said order is set aside by the process known to law,
the said order is valid in law, as well as it binds on the lower
authorities. Hence, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to circumvent
the earlier order passed by the CIT(A) which had become final. Under such
circumstances, the Assessing Officer should not reopen the assessment and
seek to adjudicate on the issue which was already adjudicated by the
Appellate authority.

(iii) The Tribunal correctly decided the matter and the
reasons given by the Tribunal are based on valid materials and evidence,
and there is no error or legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so
as to warrant interference.”

Cash credit : S. 68 : Long-term capital gain : Transaction of shares : Addition treating transaction bogus : Addition not valid in absence of cogent material

New Page 1

24 Cash credit : S. 68 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : Long-term capital gain : Transaction of sale of shares : Addition
treating transaction bogus : Addition not valid in the absence of cogent
material.


[CIT v. Anupam Kapoor, 299 ITR 179 (P&H)]

The assessment in this case was completed u/s. 143(3) read
with S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said assessment was reopened on
receipt of the intimation from the DDIT (Investigation), Gurgaon, stating that
the long-term capital gain on sale of shares declared by the assessee was false
and the transaction was not genuine. In the course of reassessment proceedings,
the assessee furnished evidence in support of the claim of long-term capital
gain. The AO made an addition of Rs.1,74,552, being the consideration on sale of
shares, as unexplained cash credit. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the
addition, holding that the AO had not discharged his onus and there was no
material or evidence with the AO to come to the conclusion that the transaction
shown by the assessee was a bogus transaction. The Commissioner (Appeals) took
the view that if a company was not available at the given address, it could not
conclusively prove that the company was non-existent. The Tribunal upheld the
decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the purchase contract note,
contract note for sales, distinctive numbers of shares purchased and sold, copy
of the share certificates and the quotation of shares on the date of purchase
and the sale were sufficient material to show that the transaction was not
bogus, but a genuine transaction.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There was no material before the AO, which could have
led to a conclusion that the transaction was a device to camouflage activities
to defraud the Revenue. No such presumption could be drawn by the AO merely on
surmises or conjectures.

(ii) The Tribunal took into consideration that it was only
on the basis of a presumption that the AO concluded that the assessee had paid
cash and purchased the shares. In the absence of any cogent material in this
regard, having been placed on record, the AO could not have reopened the
assessment.

(iii) The assessee had made an investment in a company,
evidence whereof was with the AO. Therefore, the AO could not have added the
income, which was rightly deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the
Tribunal.”

 


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Dividend income : Deduction u/s.80M : Distribution of interim dividend before due date insufficient compliance of requirement.

New Page 1

25 Dividend income : Deduction u/s.80M of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Distribution of dividend before due
date : Distribution of interim dividend before due date is in sufficient
compliance of the requirement.


[CIT v. Saumya Finance & Leasing Co. (P) Ltd., 215
CTR 359 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee company had filed return
of income including dividend income of Rs.2,69,16,774 and had claimed a
deduction of Rs.2,19,97,105 u/s.80M of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis
of the distribution of interim dividend of Rs.2,19,97,105 before the due date
for filing the return. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the
ground that the condition of distribution of dividend before due date is not
satisfied. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, it was contended on behalf of the
Revenue that the interim dividend was declared by the assessee company in the
financial year 1997-98 and out of income accrued in the said year. It was
further contended that the dividend declared and paid in the subsequent year
could not be a permitted deduction from the income in a previous year, since
the said dividend was paid out of income accruing in the subsequent year.

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“(i) On the bare reading of S. 80M it is clear that the
deduction as permitted is of an amount equal to so much of the amount of
income by way of dividend declared by the company as does not exceed the
amount of dividend distributed by the assessee on or before the due date. S.
80M does not provide for the nature of the dividend distributed by the
assessee company. It does not state that the nature of the dividend
distributed must be for the financial year under assessment.

(ii) Accepting the argument of the Revenue will amount to
laying down an additional restriction to the effect that the dividend
distributed by the assessee company must be for the financial year under
assessment. Laying down such restricting qualification will amount to doing
violence to the plain and clear meaning of the words as contained in S. 80M.

(iii) This is not a case where a literal construction to
be given to S. 80M would lead to an absurd result. The intention of the
Legislature while enacting S. 80M was clearly to ensure that the dividend
income received by the assessee company should be permitted as a deduction
only if it is redistributed as dividend income to its shareholders. The
section provided that the said distribution is to be made before the due
date of the filing of the returns. This has been done by the present
respondent and all the requirements of S. 80M are clearly met by them.”

Cash credit : S. 68 : Gift from NRI : Copy of deed and affidavit filed : In absence of anything to show that transaction was by way of money laundering, addition cannot be made u/s.68 : Absence of blood relationship is not relevant

New Page 1

23 Cash credit : S. 68 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : Gift from NRI : Copy of gift deed and affidavit of NRI donor
filed : In the absence of anything to show that the transaction was by way
of money laundering, addition can-not be made u/s.68 : Absence of blood
relationship or close relationship between the donor and the donee is not
relevant.


[CIT v. Padam Singh Chouhan, 215 CTR 303 (Raj.)]

The Revenue had preferred an appeal against the decision
of the Tribunal, deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer u/s.68
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The following question was raised in the
appeal :

“Whether in the facts and the circumstances of the
case, the learned Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition of
Rs.4,50,000, Rs.2,50,000 and Rs.2,00,000, which have been received on
account of gift when no relation has been established from whom gifts have
been received, whether the finding of the learned Tribunal is perverse ?”

 


The Rajasthan High Court decided the question in favour
of the assessee, dismissed the appeal and held as under :

“(i) There is no legal basis to assume that to
recognise the gift to be genuine, there should be any blood relationship,
or any close relationship between the donor and the donee. Instances are
not rare, when even strangers make gifts, out of very many considerations,
including arising out of love, affection and sentiments. When the assessee
has produced the copies of the gift deeds and the affidavits of the
donors, in the absence of anything to show that the act of the assessee in
claiming gift was an act by way of money laundering, simply because he
happens to receive gifts, it cannot be said that that is required to be
added in his income.

(ii) The Assessing Officer has assumed doubts against
the donor, merely on the basis of his having deposited certain amounts in
his accounts soon before making the gifts, and that the assessee had
withdrawn the amounts deposited by him, including the amount of the said
gifts in a short span of time. With this, the AO has found, that the facts
created doubts, that how the assessee as well as his family members are
receiving such huge gifts from a person residing abroad, and concluded
that it appears that the gifts are not genuine, and only a managed affair
of the assessee.

(iii) The CIT(A) has reversed his findings by holding
that the assessee had clearly shown from the assessment proceedings that
the gifts were made out of love and affection towards the assessee, and it
is a matter of God’s grace to create love and affection between donors and
donee, and that to have love and affection between two persons, blood
relation is not required, and looking to the status of the donors, the
amount gifted was very meager. Then it was found by the CIT(A) that the
assessee has also furnished the copies of the gift deeds and affidavits of
the donors. In the opinion of the CIT(A), it is not a case where the
assessee had first given such amounts to the donors, and the donors
returned back to the assessee by way of gift. The CIT(A) had gone through
the bank accounts of the donors, copies thereof are on record, and found
that there was sufficient cash balance on the date of gift to the
assessee, in respect of both the donors, and thus, the addition was
deleted.

(iv) The Tribunal has affirmed this finding by relying
upon certain judgments.

Capital gains : Income from sale of milk : Sale of calves : Cost of acquisition not ascertainable : Capital gain not chargeable

New Page 1

22 Capital gains : Assessee deriving
income from sale of milk : Sale of calves : Cost of acquisition not
ascertainable : Capital gain not chargeable to tax.


[Dy. CIT v. Smt. Suniti Singh, 215 CTR 326 (MP)]

The assessee was running a dairy and was deriving income
from sale of cow milk. In the relevant year, the assessee had sold calves. The
assessee claimed that the profit on sale of calves is not chargeable to tax as
the cost of acquisition is not ascertainable. The Assessing Officer observed
that the assessee had claimed depreciation on calves forming a part and parcel
of the live stock and, therefore, it was stock in trade of the assessee and
income from the sale of such stock in trade is liable to tax. Accordingly, the
Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.68,000. The Tribunal accepted the
assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The business of the assessee relates to sale of milk
and the female cows constitute assets and they are exploited for production
of milk. The primary motive of the assessee is to fertilise the cows so that
they can yield milk. The income is derived through sale of milk and all
expenses which have gone into are to upkeep them and maintenance of cows,
like purchase of fodder, medicines, etc. are exclusively designed for
obtaining milk and the said expenditure has been shown as revenue
expenditure in the P&L a/c.

(ii) The calves came into being in the process so that
the female cows can be utilised to produce and eventually the milk is sold.
The male calves are sold as they are of no value to the assessee as they
cannot produce milk. There is no material on record to show that the selling
of calves is a part of the business activity of the assessee. Facts brought
on record clearly show that the asessee is engaged in the business activity
which relates to sale of milk.

(ii) The Tribunal is right in holding that the sale of
calves by the assessee cannot be regarded as capital gain since the cost of
acquisition is not ascertainable.”

Accounts, Audit & the Companies Bill

Editorial

The Companies Bill has finally seen the light of day. By
virtue of the fact that it was introduced in the Lok Sabha, whose term will
shortly come to an end, it is likely to lapse, and would have to be reintroduced
in the new Lok Sabha. This Companies Bill has been debated and discussed for the
past five years, and therefore there were high expectations that it would
address the various shortcomings of the present Companies Act.


The Companies Bill does contain some wholesome provisions
relating to accounts. Consolidated accounts will now be required by all
companies having subsidiaries. The format of the final accounts will be
prescribed by rules.

The National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards will
also now advise the Central Government on the formulation of auditing standards,
with the standards issued by the Institute being applicable until auditing
standards are laid down by the Central Government after consultation with the
National Advisory Committee on Accounting and Auditing Standards. Effectively,
the powers of the Institute are being whittled down so far as they relate to
prescribing auditing standards for audit of companies.

Auditors are to be expressly prohibited from providing
certain services to an audit client, such as accounting, internal audit, design
and implementation of financial information systems, actuarial services,
investment banking services, outsourced financial services, investment advisory
services, etc., most of which are in any case prohibited today under the Code of
Conduct. Management services is however also one of the prohibited services.

The disqualification relating to indebtedness of the auditor
is being broadened, with even the minuscule limit of Rs.1,000 being sought to be
done away with. Therefore, any indebtedness (even of Re.1) would attract
disqualification. However, so far as shareholding limit is concerned, a
percentage beyond which shareholding is not permissible would be prescribed,
instead of an absolute prohibition. Further, this prohibition would apply not
only to holding of the securities of the company itself, but also to holding of
securities of its holding company, its subsidiary, its fellow subsidiary or its
associate company.


Unfortunately, the format of the audit report has been made
more complicated instead of being simplified, with mandatory reporting on
certain additional items. Further, a couple of the items seem to indicate a lack
of understanding of the subject — for instance, whether the financial statements
comply with the accounting standards


and the auditing standards.

Obviously the financial statements cannot comply with the auditing standards —
only the audit process and the auditor’s report can comply with such standards.
Also, one of the points to be reported is the observations or comments of the
auditors which have an adverse effect on the functioning of the company. It is
obvious that the observations or comments of the auditors cannot have an adverse
effect on the functioning of the company, but may amount to an adverse comment
on the functioning of the company. A residual point “such other matters as may
be prescribed” leaves the door open for complicating the audit report further.


The most unfortunate part of the provisions relating to audit
is the punishment that can be meted out to an auditor of a company for
contravention of any of the provisions of S. 126 to S. 129 (powers and duties of
auditors and auditing standards, prohibition on rendering certain services and
auditor to sign audit reports, attend general meeting). The punishment
prescribed is a fine of between Rs.25,000 to Rs.5,00,000. For knowing or willful
contravention, the punishment is imprisonment up to one year or fine between
Rs.1,00,000 and Rs.25,00,000 or both.

The provisions unfortunately do not draw a distinction
between major and minor contraventions. For instance, with so many auditing
standards, it is possible that one small aspect of an auditing standard may not
have been complied with by the auditor. Or the auditor may have been prevented
by circumstances from attending the Annual General Meeting, though he may have
had every intention of doing so. There could have been valid reasons for not
following a particular auditing standard. To penalise an auditor under such
circumstances seems rather unfair, particularly given the fact that promoters of
companies are rarely penalised for gross violations by companies under their
control. One wonders whether it is a classic case of a situation where just
because the real culprit cannot be found or punished, the nearest person found
available is caught and punished for the misdeeds of the other !

One hopes that these provisions are rationalised before they
are enacted. I am sure that the Institute and the BCAS would also take up all
these and other issues with the Government.

Gautam Nayak

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S. 27 — Notice by Speed Post is deemed to have been served by ordinary post within 2-3 days, further absence of assessee

New Page 2

II. Reported : 



53 Notice : Service by Speed Post : Notice
u/s.143(2) dispatched by Speed Post and not received back is deemed to have been
served in the ordinary course of post within 2/3 days by virtue of presumption
u/s.27 of General Clauses Act, 1897, in the absence of any rebuttal on the side
of the assessee.

[CIT v. Madhsy Films (P) Ltd., 301 ITR 69 (Del.); 216
CTR 145 (Del.)]

Pursuant to the return of income filed by the assessee on
31-10-2001, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, on 23-10-2002 fixing the date of hearing on 29-10-2002 and sent by
Speed Post and completed the assessment after issuing further notices. The
assessee challenged the validity of the assessment order, on the ground that the
notice u/s.143(2) of the Act was not served on the assessee within the
prescribed period. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and quashed the
assessment order.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) In the present case, the notice has been issued on
23-10-2002 and was sent through Speed Post on 25-10-2002 at the address of the
company. S. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that service by post
is deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting
by registered post, a letter containing a notice required to be served. Unless
the contrary is proved, the service is deemed to have been effected at the
time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. This
presumption is rebuttable, but in the absence of proof to the contrary, the
presumption of proper service or effective service of notice would arise.

(ii) There is nothing on record to show that the notice
dated 23-10-2002 dispatched on 25-10-2002 by Speed Post was undelivered or
received back. Under the normal circumstances, a presumption will lie that
this notice has reached the assessee within 2/3 days. Since the envelop
containing the notice has not been received back by the Department, there is a
presumption that it has reached the assessee and this presumption has not been
rebutted by the assessee at all. No affidavit has been filed by the assessee
to the effect that the notice was not received by it.

(iii) Under the circumstances, notice u/s.143(2) was served
upon the assessee within the prescribed period and as such the finding given by
the Tribunal that no notice u/s.143(2) has been served upon the assessee within
the prescribed period is hereby set aside and the substantial question of law is
decided in the negative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.”

Section A : Treatment of Foreign Exchange Fluctuations as per AS-11 — ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ issued under the Companies Acounting Standards) Rules, 2006

New Page 1Section A : Treatment of
Foreign Exchange Fluctuations as per AS-11 — ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign
Exchange Rates’ issued under the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006


  • Reliance Industries Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to Accounts :

The Company has continued to adjust the foreign currency
exchange differences on amounts borrowed for acquisition of fixed assets to the
carrying cost of fixed assets in compliance with Schedule VI to the Companies
Act, 1956 as per legal advice received, which is at variance to the treatment
prescribed in Accounting Standard (AS-11) on ‘Effects of Changes in Foreign
Exchange Rates’ notified in the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules 2006. Had
the treatment as per AS-11 been followed, the net profit after tax for the year
would have been higher by Rs.29.65 crore.

From Auditors’ Report :

In our opinion and read with Note No. 5 of Schedule ‘O’
regarding accounting for foreign currency exchange differences on amounts
borrowed for acquisition of fixed assets, the Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss
Account and Cash Flow Statement dealt with by this report are in compliance with
the Accounting Standards referred to in Ss.(3C) of S. 211 of the Companies Act,
1956.

  • ACC Ltd. — (31-12-2007)


From Accounting Policies on Foreign Currency Translation :

Exchange differences :

Exchange differences arising on the settlement of monetary
items or on reporting company’s monetary items at rates different from those at
which they were initially recorded during the year, or reported in previous
financial statements, are recognised as income or as expenses in the year in
which they arise, except those arising from investments in non-integral
operations. Exchange differences arising in respect of fixed assets acquired
from outside India on or before accounting period commencing after December 7,
2006 are capitalised as a part of fixed asset.

  • Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to Accounts :

Consequent to the Notification of Companies (Accounting
Standards) Rules, 2006, the exchange differences relating to import of fixed
assets, which were hitherto being capitalised as part of the cost of fixed
assets, have been recognised in Profit and Loss Account. As a result of this
change, the profit for the year ended 31st March 2008 has decreased by Rs. 76.07
lacs.

  • Tata Elxsi Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to Accounts :

Adoption of Revised Accounting Standard :

Treatment of Foreign Fluctuation :

The Company has adopted the Accounting Standard 11 ‘The
Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ (AS-11) issued under the Companies
(Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006, consequent to which exchange differences
arising on restatement/payment of foreign currency liabilities contracted for
purchase of fixed assets are charged to the Profit and Loss account.

Prior to the adoption of AS-11, the Company adjusted the
exchange differences arising on restatement/payment of such liabilities against
the cost of the related asset. Consequent to the change in accounting policy,
the profit before tax for the year and exchange gain is higher by Rs.1.90 lakhs.

  • Ramkrishna Forgings Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to results submitted to BSE :

As per the legal advice received by the Company with regard
to treatment for the foreign currency exchange difference on amount borrowed for
acquisition of fixed assets from country outside India, the foreign currency
exchange difference has been adjusted to carrying cost of fixed assets in
compliance with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956 which is at variance with
the treatment prescribed in Accounting Standard (AS-11) on ‘Effects of Change in
Foreign Currency Rates’ as notified in the Companies (Accounting Standard)
Rules, 2006. Had the treatment as per AS-11 been followed, the net profit after
tax, net block as well as reserves and surplus would be lower by Rs.2,33,92,121.

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Taxing Charity

Editorial

The recent amendments to the Income Tax Act carried out by
the Finance Act 2008 in relation to taxation of charitable trusts reflect very
poorly on the Government, and raise serious doubts as to its intentions. It
seems to be part of a disturbing trend to punish all for the transgressions of a
few.


On the face of it, the amendment seems innocuous. The
definition of charitable purpose has been amended to provide that one of the
limbs, any other object of general public utility, shall not include the
carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any
activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or
business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the
nature of use or application or retention of the income from such activity.

The ostensible reason for such amendment given by the
Government is that it desires to deny the benefit of exemption to purely
commercial and business entities, which wear the mask of a charity. A very
plausible reason indeed !

However, the amendment goes far beyond the stated reason. It
not only covers such business activities, but also activities which are
rendering services in relation to trade, commerce or business. The term ‘in
relation to’ being a very broad term, would rope in various activities carried
out by charitable trusts genuinely to raise funds for their other charitable
activities.

To illustrate, some of the charitable activities which may be
impacted include activities such as micro-credit, sale of greeting cards with
designs painted by the handicapped, sale of products manufactured by handicapped
persons, issue of certificates of origin by chambers of commerce, organising of
seminars, trade fairs and exhibitions, etc. These are all activities, which are
part of the objects, but are subservient to the main object. Carrying on any
such activity could result in complete loss of the exemption. Fortunately, pure
fund-raising activities may not be impacted.

Today, charity is not restricted to traditional activities of
education, medical relief or relief of poverty. Most NGOs carry on activities in
different spheres, which help improve the life of the general public. Be it
protection of the environment, eradication of corruption and promotion of
transparency in Government, improving the lot of tribals or other disadvantaged
groups, promotion of art and culture — all these are equally charitable
activities, though there may be some involvement of business for fund-raising,
assistance, etc.

No less a person than the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi,
as well as his son (and heir-apparent?) Rahul Gandhi, have acknowledged that
only a fraction of funds spent by the Government for welfare of the downtrodden
actually reach the intended beneficiaries, and that NGOs can provide a far
superior delivery mechanism. In such circumstances, should the Government not be
promoting the activities of NGOs, rather than seeking to transfer funds from
NGOs to itself ? Ultimately, Government is supposed to exist for the people.
Should the need of and benefit to the general public not be the paramount
guiding factor in such matters ?

The Finance Minister has gone on record to clarify that
genuine charitable organisations will not in any way be affected, and that the
activities of Chambers of Commerce and similar organisations rendering services
to their members would continue to be regarded as “advancement of any other
object of general public utility”. If that indeed was the intention, what
prevented the Government from reflecting such intention in the provisions of the
law itself ? Are we to believe that the Government is incapable of expressing
its intention through precise wording of the law ? And that too when we have an
eminent lawyer at the helm of the Finance Ministry ?

We are further told that the CBDT, as usual, will come out
with an explanatory circular containing guidelines for determining whether an
entity is carrying on any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business
or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or
business. Of late, it is noticed that such circulars do not provide any guidance
on debatable issues, but merely parrot the provisions of the section. One hopes
that at least this time the circular will really be explanatory !

Such circulars explaining provisions of the Finance Act are
generally issued by the CBDT only in December. Do charitable trusts have to keep
their activities on hold till December to find out whether their activities are
permissible or not, or to know whether they are liable to pay advance tax or
not ? One hopes that one is proved wrong for once, and at least on this aspect,
a circular is issued immediately. Not to do so is to do grave injustice to
charity and cause a severe loss to the general public !

Gautam Nayak

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The changing profession

Editorial

In this 40th year of publication of the Journal, the Society
enters its 60th year. Obviously, this calls for a celebration, and what better
way to do it than by stepping back and taking stock of changes in the social and
economic environment in which the profession functions, and various developments
in the CA profession in India and the world over, and do some crystal-ball
gazing, so that each one of us can gear up for what the future holds in store.

To help us understand the changing scenario, we have invited
4 eminent and widely respected professionals to contribute to this Special
Issue, giving us their thoughts on the direction that the profession is heading
during the 21st century, and on the skills, practices and qualities that a
professional needs to inculcate to succeed. These successful professionals — Mr.
Y. H. Malegam, a past President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India and an authority on accounting and auditing; Mr. Sohrab E. Dastur, eminent
tax lawyer; Mr. T. V. Mohandas Pai, Director of Infosys Technologies Ltd.; and
Mr. Deepak Ghaisas, CEO of i-flex Solutions Ltd. — bring us their perspectives
both from the viewpoint of professionals as well as industry.

The CA profession is comparatively young, having really come
into its own in the 20th century. Over the years, it has been quick to adapt to
the changing environment, leading to a wider variety of services being rendered
by an increasingly larger number of professionals.

Recent years have seen a substantial churn in the profession.
Most newly-qualified CAs now seek employment in industry, but at the top end,
one also sees many CAs from large firms joining industry, while industry
veterans leave industrial employment to try their hand at consulting. Many CAs
are also giving up their individual practices, either to join the Big 4, or to
join industry. Can one discern some trend behind these happenings ? What does
this portend for individual and small practices ?

One also notices a greater emphasis in the profession on
marketing (witness the recent relaxation on advertising by CAs) and human
resources. Are smaller firms at a disadvantage and how can they level the
playing field? In the larger firms, one sees all services other than statutory
audit and certification being rendered through corporate entities. Is the
distinction between the profession and business increasingly getting blurred ?
Due to corporatisation and in the rush to squeeze out maximum efficiency from
our practice, and in seeking maximisation of revenues, are we losing sight of
the principles which set a professional apart from a businessman ? Or are we
acting like ostriches, by sticking to our principles, ignoring the impact of the
changes taking place all around us in society ?

Accounting concepts and standards are becoming increasingly
complex, while auditing practices and procedures are also constantly evolving to
keep pace with developments in the corporate world and the expectations of
society. Is it realistic to expect so many professionals to learn increasingly
complex concepts throughout their lives — learning, unlearning and relearning
all the time ? Are we chasing a mirage hoping to meet the public expectation, or
do we risk becoming irrelevant if we do not adapt ? Have we projected ourselves
on too high a pedestal, and become victims of our own projection ?

Are the skills that we learn as CAs really valued by
industry, or do we need to undergo a reorientation before we can be absorbed by
industry ? Does our training prepare us sufficiently to meet the challenges of
the real corporate world that we aspire to scale ?

All these issues have been addressed by these 4 eminent and
successful professionals, giving us some guidance on the path that we need to
traverse.

The message seems to be that :

— we risk losing our distinct identity as a profession and
the high respect and public esteem that we command by compromising on our
principles;

— we risk losing public confidence in our core function of
auditing if we do not maintain our quality and integrity;

— smaller firms also can grow to compete with the larger
firms through consolidation and networking;

— changes in accounting and auditing are inevitable, if
public confidence in the accounting and auditing process is to be sustained;

— the wide variety of skills that we possess ensure that
there will always be a valuable role for us to play in any industry;

— we need to put our heads together to work out ways to
make life simpler not only for us, but also for shareholders and regulators,
for whose benefit we have evolved all these complex standards and concepts.


In this scenario, the 21st century seems to hold even greater
potential for the CA profession than in the 20th century !

Gautam Nayak Editor

 Ashok Dhere Editor, Special Issue

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S. 143(2) — Service of notice by Speed Post, in absence of material on record, no pre-sumption of service within 24 hours

New Page 2

II. Reported :






 



52 Notice : Service by Speed Post : No
presumption of service within 24 hours : Notice u/s.143(2) dated 29-10-2002 sent
by Speed Post on 30-10-2002 at Delhi address given in the return and redirected
and served at Noida address of assessee on 6-11-2002 : No presumption that the
notice was served at the former address on or before 31-10-2002 in the absence
of material on record.

[Nulon India Ltd v. ITO, 216 CTR 142 (Del.)]

Pursuant to the return of income filed by the assessee on
31-10-2001, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 on 29-10-2002, which was sent through Speed Post on 30-10-2002 at
Delhi address mentioned in the return. The notice was redirected and was served
at the Noida address of the assessee on 6-11-2002. The assessee challenged the
validity of the assessment order passed pursuant to the said notice, on the
ground that the notice was not served within the prescribed period. The Tribunal
rejected the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) As per material placed on record, the notice in
question has been dispatched on 30-10-2002 and thereafter it has been
redirected to the Noida address of the assessee. There is nothing on record to
show as to on which date this notice was received at the given address of the
assessee and on which date the same was redirected. As per the order of the
CIT(A) placed on record, the Assessing Officer was asked for comments and vide
his letter dated 12/20th October, 2004, the Assessing Officer stated : “The
notice was served by Speed Post which must be delivered to the assessee within
24 hours, that is, by morning of 31st October.” So the AO is also not sure nor
specific as to when the notice in question has been served upon the assessee.
It is only a presumption that notice which has been sent by Speed Post on 30th
October 2002, must have been delivered to the assessee by 31st October 2002.

(ii) There is no presumption under law that any notice sent
by Speed Post must have been delivered to the assessee within 24 hours.
Moreover, there is nothing on record to show at whose instance the notice was
redirected and sent at the address of Noida. So, from the material available
on record, it may be concluded that no notice u/s.143(2), which is mandatory
requirement of law, has been served upon the assessee within prescribed
period.

(iii) Under the circumstances, the appeal filed by the
assessee is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set
aside.”

S. 133A and S. 132(4) : Statement in survey operation offering income : Not conclusive : Subsequent retraction of statement : Amount offered not assessable as income

New Page 2

44 Survey : Statement : Difference between
S. 133A and S. 132(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Statement in
survey operation offering income : Not conclusive : Subsequent retraction of
statement : Amount offered not assessable as income.


[CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, 300 ITR 157 (Mad.)]

In the course of survey operation, a partner of the assessee-firm
made a statement offering additional income of Rs.20 lakhs. The said statement
was retracted by a letter dated 3-8-2001, stating that the partner from whom a
statement was recorded was new to the management and he could not answer the
enquiries made and as such, he agreed to an ad hoc addition. The Assessing Officer made the addition
on the basis of the statement. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The principles relating to S. 133A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 are as follows : (i) an admission is an extremely important piece of
evidence, but it cannot be said that it is conclusive and it is open to the
person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect. And that the
assessee should be given a proper opportunity to show that the books of
account do not correctly disclose the correct state of facts; (ii) in
contradistinction to the power u/s.133A, S. 132(4) enables the authorised
officer to examine a person on oath and any statement made by such person
during such examination can also be used in evidence under the Act. On the
other hand, whatever statement is recorded u/s.133A is not given any
evidentiary value, obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised
to administer oath and to take any sworn statement which alone has evidentiary
value as contemplated under law; (iii) The expression “such other materials or
information as are available with the Assessing Officer” contained in S. 158BB
would include the materials gathered during the survey operation u/s.133A;
(iv) the material or information found in the course of survey proceeding
could not be a basis for making any addition in the block assessment; and (v)
the word ‘may’ used in S. 133A(3)(iii) of the Act, viz., “record the
statement of any person which may be useful for, or relevant to, any
proceeding under the Act” makes it clear that the materials collected and the
statement recorded during the survey u/s.133A are not conclusive piece of
evidence by itself.

(ii) In view of the scope and ambit of the materials
collected during the course of survey action u/s.133A shall not have any
evidentiary value, it could not be said solely on the basis of the statement
given by one of the partners of the assessee firm that the disclosed income
was assessable as lawful income of the assessee.”


 

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S. 281 : In order to declare a transfer as fraudulent, appropriate proceedings should be taken as required to be taken u/s.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

New Page 2

45 Void transfer u/s.281 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : In order to declare a transfer as fraudulent u/s.281, appropriate
proceedings should be taken as required to be taken u/s.53 of Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. Order of TRO declaring transfer void was without
jurisdiction.


[Ms. Ruchi Mehta v. UOI, 170 Taxman 289 (Bom.)]

The petitioner purchased rights, title and interest of one
‘S’ who was defaulter under the Act, in a shop and accordingly a sale deed was
executed between the builder and the petitioner. Later, the TRO attached the
said shop for recovery of tax dues of ‘S’. On appeal, the Commissioner set aside
the action of attachment of the subject property. Thereafter, the TRO in
exercise of his powers u/s.281, passed an order declaring the sale of shop as
null and void.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner and held as under :

“(i) S. 281 had come up for consideration before the
Supreme Court in case of TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, (1998) 234
ITR 188. The Supreme Court observed that S. 281 merely declared what the law
was. The Supreme Court further held that S. 281 does not prescribe any
adjudicatory machinery for deciding any question which may arise u/s.281. The
Court further observed that in order to declare a transfer as fraudulent under
this Section, appropriate proceedings would have to be taken in accordance
with law in the same manner as they are required to be taken u/s.53 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

(ii) Considering the law declared by the Supreme Court in
the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, it would be clear that the action of
the TRO in declaring the transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner
as void was clearly without jurisdiction.

(iii) The impugned order also attached civil consequences.
The TRO, before passing any such order, ought to have given an opportunity to
the petitioner if, in law, the TRO could exercise jurisdiction u/s.281. That
opportunity was also not given. The order, therefore, must also be set aside for
violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play.”

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S. 132B : Cash found during search satisfactorily explained : Application for release made within 30 days : Cash should be released.

New Page 2

43 Search and seizure : Release of cash : S.
132B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Cash found in the course of search satisfactorily
explained : Application for release made within 30 days : Cash should be
released.


[Bipin Vimalchand Jain v. ADIT, 169 Taxman 396 (Bom.)]

In the course of the search action, cash amounting to
Rs.1,28,34,090 was found at the business premises of the petitioner. The
petitioner explained that out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.1.14 crores
belonged to one VJ and the explanation was verified and found to be correct by
the authorities. The petitioner filed application u/s.132B(1)(i) seeking release
of the said cash on the ground that it belonged to VJ. The Assessing Officer
rejected the application on the ground that assessment u/s.153A was pending and
seized cash was required to be applied for satisfying liabilities on completion
of that assessment.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner, directed release of cash and held as under :

“(i) Under the first proviso to S. 132B(1)(i), on an
application made for release of the seized asset within 30 days from the end
of the month in which the asset was seized, the Assessing Officer on being
satisfied regarding the nature and source of acquisition of such asset is
empowered to recover the existing liability out of such asset and release the
remaining portion of the asset.

(ii) In the instant case, it was not in dispute that the
application seeking release of the seized cash to the extent of Rs.1.14 crores
was made within 30 days of the seizure. Once the explanation given by the
petitioner regarding the nature and source of acquisition of the seized cash
was, on verification, found to be correct, then the amount of Rs.1.14 crores,
which belonged to VJ, could not be retained by the Assessing Officer by
rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.

(iii) The only reason given in the impugned order for
rejecting the application was that the assessment made u/s.153A was yet to be
finalised. In the absence of any material on record to suggest that the seized
cash represented the undisclosed income of the petitioner, respondent No. 2
could not have rejected the application made u/s.132B(1)(i) merely on the
ground that assessment u/s.153A was pending. In other words, application
u/s.132B(1)(i) could be rejected only if the Assessing Officer had reason to
believe that the seized cash represented the undisclosed income of the
petitioner liable to be assessed in the year in which search took place. In
the impugned order, it was not even remotely suggested that the seized cash
represented the undisclosed income of the petitioner.

(iv) In the circumstances, the impugned order was to be
quashed and set aside, with the direction to the Assessing Officer to release
the seized cash to the petitioner along with interest.”


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S. 263 : After certificate having been issued under KVSS, Commissioner not justified in exercising his revisionary power.

New Page 2

42 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1995-96 : KVSS 1998 : After certificate having been issued under
KVSS, Commissioner not justified in exercising power u/s.263.


[Siddhartha Tubes Ltd. v. CIT, 170 Taxman 233 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessment of the assessee company
was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the pendency of
appeal the assessee filed declaration under KVSS 1998. The declaration was
accepted and a certificate, as contemplated u/s.90(2) of the Scheme was duly
issued and the matter was finally settled. Thereafter, the Commissioner set
aside the assessment order u/s. 263 with a direction to recalculate the
deduction u/s.80HH, u/s.80-I and u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal upheld the order passed
by the Commissioner.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee
and held as under :

“(i) The Commissioner, in his order, had duly observed that
the Assessing Officer was not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee
and had, thus, recalculated deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I after excluding
the profit from export of trading goods. It was, therefore, not on any
concealment of information that it was proposed to procede u/s.263, nor any
steps were suggested for cancellation of the declaration as per the provisions
of the KVSS.

(ii) Under those circumstances, as after the certificate
having been issued under the KVSS, it was not permissible to revise the said
assessment order u/s.263 and the Tribunal, therefore, had erred in holding to
the contrary.”


 

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S. 69D : Where documents represented bilateral transaction and were not on hundi paper, the provisions not applicable

New Page 2

41 Deemed income : S. 69D of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : Amount borrowed or repaid on hundi : Document represented
bilateral transaction and not on hundi paper : S. 69D not applicable.


[CIT v. Ram Niwas, 170 Taxman 5 (Del.)]

Amongst the documents found in the course of search, one
document was drawn on a letter-head of the assessee and was treated as hundi. On
the basis of the said hundi and the presumption available u/s.69D of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer assessed the amount of such hundi in
the assessee’s hands. The Commissioner deleted the addition and the Tribunal
upheld the deletion.

 

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under :

“(i) The primary requirement for invoking the deeming
provision of S. 69D is that the document must be a hundi and it is only
thereafter that the deeming provision comes into play. The lower authorities
had found that the document was not a hundi. Clearly, the document in question
was not a hundi, because it represented a bilateral transaction and it was
also not on a hundi paper. In the absence of those vital ingredients, the
document could not be described as a hundi and, therefore, the presumption
u/s.69D would not be available to the Revenue.

(ii) The contention of the Revenue that the document was
found from the premises of ‘K’ and, therefore, it must be deemed to be a hundi,
could not be accepted. From where a document is found cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, explain the nature of the document.”
 


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S. 41(1) : Amount in question continued to be shown as liability in balance sheet. S. 41(1) not applicable

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40 Deemed income : S. 41(1) of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1989-90 : Assessee continued to show amount in question as
liability in balance sheet : CIT set aside the assessment u/s.263 on the ground
that proper enquiry of assessability u/s.41(1) not made : Not justified.

[CIT v. Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation, 170 Taxman
123 (Mad.)]

After the completion of the assessment u/s.143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 the Commissioner set aside the assessment order exercising
powers u/s. 263 on the ground that the assessee had surrendered the Group
Gratuity Scheme to the LIC and received certain amount; and that while
completing the assessment, the Assessing Officer had not made any proper enquiry
with respect to assessability of the said sum and directed the AO to assess the
said amount u/s.41(1). The Tribunal cancelled the order of the Commissioner
passed u/s.263.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) From the reasoning given by the Tribunal, it was clear
that the assessee had continued to show the admitted amount as a liability in
the balance sheet. The undisputed fact was that it was a liability reflected
in the balance sheet. Once it was shown as a liability by the assessee, the
Commissioner was wrong in holding that the same was assessable u/s.41(1).
Unless and until there is a cessation of liability, S. 41 will not be pressed
into service.

(ii) Thus the reasoning given by the Tribunal was based on
valid materials and evidence and, hence, there was no error or legal infirmity
in the order of the Tribunal so as to warrant interference.”

 

 

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S. 80-IB : Conversion of polymer granules into specialised polymer alloys in powder form amounts to manufacture

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39 Deduction u/s.80-IB of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2002-03 : Conversion of polymer granules into specialised polymer
alloys in powder form amounts to manufacture : Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IB.


[CIT v. Shri Swasan Chemicals (M) P. Ltd., 300 ITR 115
(Mad.)]

The assessee-company was engaged in the manufacture of
plastic powder out of plastic granules. For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee’s
claim for deduction u/s.80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the
Assessing Officer on the ground that the activity undertaken by the assessee in
producing the plastic powder did not amount to manufacture. The Tribunal allowed
the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The Tribunal had recorded a finding that the assessee was
manufacturing various products of polymer powders. The finished products were
completely different from the raw materials. The product range itself was wide
and the products carried different technical nomenclature. The Tribunal had
come to the right conclusion which needed no interference.”


 

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S. 54B : Exemption from capital gains tax cannot be denied where land was purchased in the joint name of the son

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37 Capital gains : Exemption u/s.54B of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : B. P. 1-4-1988 to 15-7-1998 : Sale of agricultural land
and out of sale proceeds, purchase of agricultural land in his name and in the
name of his only son : Exemption u/s.54B allowable.


[CIT v. Gurnam Singh, 170 Taxman 160 (P&H)]

In the relevant period, the assessee had sold agricultural
land and out of the sale proceeds, the assessee, along with his son, had
purchased another agricultural land and claimed deduction u/s.54B of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that exemption from capital gains was available only in case the sale proceed
was invested by the assessee for purchasing another agricultural land and not in
respect of the land purchased by any other person. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Undisputedly, the assessee had sold the agricultural land
which was being used by him for agricultural purposes. Out of its sale
proceeds, the assessee had purchased another piece of land in his name and in
the name of his only son, who was a bachelor and was dependent upon him, for
being used for agricultural purposes within the stipulated time. Undisputedly,
the purchased land was being used by the assessee only for agricultural
purposes and merely because in the sale deed his only son was also shown as
co-owner, it did not make any difference, because the purchased land was still
being used by the assessee for agricultural purposes. It was not the case of
the Revenue that the said land was being used exclusively by his son.”


 

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S. 80-IA : Twisting and texturising of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) amounts to manufacturing or production

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38 Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Twisting and texturis-ing of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY)
amounts to manufacturing or production: Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IA.


[CIT v. Emptee Poly-Yarn (P) Ltd., 170 Taxman 332 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee-company’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IA was disallowed on the ground that the activity of processing
of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) was not an industrial activity. The Tribunal
allowed the claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“From the material considered it would be clear that POY
has different physical and chemical properties and when POY chips undergo the
process of texturising and/or twisting the yarn, i.e., twisted and/or
texturised or both, result in a product having different physical and chemical
properties. In other words, the process applied to POY, either for the purpose
of texturising or twisting, constitutes manufacture as the article produced is
recognised in the trade as distinct commodity pursuant to the process it
undergoes and which amounts to manufacture. Under the Central Excise Act, the
Union of India itself treats POY as distinct from POY drawn twisted or
texturised or both. The process amounts to manufacture as the original
commodity loses its identity. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal would
have to be upheld.


 

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Scrutiny of Income-tax Returns

Editorial

The scrutiny of Income-tax returns for the assessment year
2006-07 is on in full swing, given the deadline of 31st December 2008 for
completion of assessment proceedings. The large number of cases selected for
scrutiny has resulted in most chartered accountants and tax practitioners
running around, trying to cope with the spate of assessment proceedings, and
assessing officers wondering whether it would be possible to complete such a
large number of assessments within the limited timeframe. Given the
inconvenience caused to such a large number of taxpayers in the form of
compiling substantial data and information, the question which really arises is
— Is selection of such a large number of cases for scrutiny really justified ?
Do such assessment proceedings really result in any significant tax collection ?


If one analyses the number of cases selected for scrutiny,
one notices that the overwhelming majority of cases consists of high net worth
individuals who have disclosed significant incomes, and who have also made
significant investments or purchased or sold properties. These cases seem to
have been selected under Computer-Aided Scrutiny Selection (CASS) on the basis
of information received through Annual Information Returns (AIR) regarding
investment, purchase and sale of property, etc. Given the fact that there was no
provision or place for declaration of such investments or purchase and sale of
property in the Income-tax returns for assessment year 2006-07, the Income-tax
Department seems to have blindly selected all these cases for scrutiny, even
though the income for that year may be far in excess of such investments. Most
of these cases result in nil or negligible addition to the assessed income,
yielding no additional tax revenue to the Government.

One reads press reports that as against 3.2 lakh returns
scrutinised in 2007-08, the tax authorities intend to scrutinise about 5 lakh
cases during the current year. Given the fact that most assessing officers in a
city like Mumbai had almost 300 cases to handle last year, it seems that they
would be handling almost 450 cases each in the current year — a Herculean task
indeed !

Even this would be manageable if the assessments were taken
up earlier and the assessing officers followed the CBDT instructions issued last
year, that in cases selected for scrutiny by the computerised process on the
basis of AIR information, only the transactions relating to such information
should be verified with the tax returns, to ensure that such payments are made
out of taxable income. Unfortunately, for most officers, old habits die hard and
they tend to burden themselves with unnecessary details called for from the
assessees, hoping to find scope for some addition or the other, though unrelated
to the AIR information. For the tax authorities to then plead shortage of
officers for carrying out its other functions in time, is totally unjustified.

Take the simple job of issuing refunds for the assessment
year 2007-08. It would be interesting to ask the tax authorities whether any
such refunds have actually been issued so far, though more than one year has
elapsed since the date of filing returns, and the tax authorities claim to have
fully computerised their processes. Almost all taxpayers are still waiting for
the tax authorities to get their act in order, and complete the simple process
of issue of their tax refunds. Obviously, the tax authorities would claim that
their hands are too full with handling scrutiny assessments and selecting cases
for scrutiny for the assessment year 2007-08.

A CBDT press release issued in mid-July 2008 stated that the
Tax Department has taken several steps to expedite processing and scrutiny of
tax returns. This includes doing away with the requirement of filing TDS
certificates and launch of a refund banker scheme, which is claimed to be
currently under implementation in six regions, including Mumbai. Under the
scheme, refunds are to be credited directly to the bank account of the taxpayer.

Unfortunately, the ground reality is quite different. So far,
the Department keeps on sending letters asking for bank account numbers, though
the bank account number may have been mentioned in the return. For months
thereafter, there is no sign of any refund. One therefore wonders as to when the
CBDT talks of ‘under implementation’, at what stage it is ! Would one have to
wait for a few more years for the Tax Department to resolve its own internal
problems and finally grant one’s legitimate refunds ?

The said press release says that the Government has
sanctioned 7051 additional manpower in November 2006 and that recruitment of
additional manpower will be completed by 2010. Do we have to wait till then ?

So many tall claims have been made by the Tax Department in
the past, that when one reads of any such claims or plans, one takes these with
a pinch of salt. In the same press release, the CBDT claims that the CASS system
has been further refined to focus on quality selection of cases with revenue
potential, rather than selecting large quantity of cases. Do the facts bear this
out ?

One can only pray for the day when the actions of tax authorities match their
words !

Gautam Nayak

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The Bursting of the Bubble

Editorial

The last few months have seen the eruption of a major crisis
in the financial services and banking sector, particularly in the USA. Entities
hitherto regarded as icons and pillars of Wall Street have bitten the dust. Even
entities regarded as too big to fail have succumbed to this financial crisis.
Giants such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, AIG, Washington Mutual, have all either gone under or had to be bailed
out by the US Government or other entities. Giants such as Citibank, UBS, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs have been shaken to seek financial assistance. This
crisis is already being compared to the great depression of the 1930s. It is
therefore evident that what we are witnessing is not just a minor storm which
will quickly blow over, but a full-fledged hurricane which will leave
devastation in its wake. Given the dominance of American financial services
entities and banks over the world economy, the repercussions are bound to be
felt all over the world.

What does this imply for us here in India ? The Government,
the Finance Minister and various other government functionaries have been rather
too quick to clarify that this will not affect India significantly, since Indian
banks and financial services companies have not over-extended themselves. While
the direct impact may not be as significant as in the US, even in these early
days after the eruption of the crisis in the US, one reads various reports
everyday about the indirect effects of this crisis in India.

One direct impact of course has been on the subsidiaries of
such companies in India, where bankruptcy/sale has created uncertainty about the
continuation of business by these entities. Employees of such subsidiaries are
suddenly left wondering whether they will have their jobs at the end of the
month or not. With job uncertainty looming, employees are hesitant to spend as
freely as before, impacting demand for goods and services.

Most infotech companies in India have had a high level of
exposure to the banking, financial services and insurance sector. The chaos and
turmoil in this sector will significantly impact their growth, and the frenzied
hiring by companies will definitely now be a thing of the past. Unrealistic
salary hikes may no longer be the norm for the next few years.

The second impact will certainly be on foreign direct
investment. Many of these entities had been investing directly themselves or had
been active in raising foreign funds for investment in India either through the
private equity route or through different types of funds. Such initiatives will
obviously now be significantly reduced, as these entities would focus their
energies on raising funds to ensure their own survival. Lending by these
entities would also be restricted, in order to limit their exposure.

Liquidity has almost dried up, particularly for risky
businesses and ventures. Banks and financial companies have become extremely
cautious in lending. Businesses which had based their expansion plans on the
basis of recent growth figures have started cutting back on their proposals to
expand. This is bound to affect growth of Indian industry and business — the
days of assured growth are over.

The real estate market, which had assumed the proportions of
a speculative bubble, has been particularly impacted in two ways. There are few
takers willing to splurge their liquidity on buying real estate, or renting real
estate at the prevailing unrealistic levels. Real estate developers have so far
been desperately holding on to their prices, hoping that the crisis will soon
tide over. However, the easy flow of money that fuelled the growth in real
estate prices has dried up, and not only that, money committed to certain
projects by some foreign investors is no longer forthcoming. Further, most of
the foreign capital in this sector which had been attracted on the back of
assured returns offered by Indian developers would soon start falling due for
payment, aggravating the liquidity crisis of Indian real estate developers.
There is bound to be a shakeout in this sector, with the highly leveraged
players forced to sell out to better capitalised developers. Hopefully, real
estate prices will now gravitate to more realistic and sane levels.

Our understanding of finance is undergoing a thorough
revision. Complex financial concepts such as value at risk, complex derivatives,
securitisation, which were once regarded as cutting tools of the financial
services business, are now shunned. Stand-alone investment-banking, so far
regarded as a money-spinner, is no longer regarded as a viable business.
Government intervention, which was sought to be minimised during good times, is
now welcomed.

All in all, the next couple of years at least should see
tightening of conditions on the economic front, with a natural fallout on all
services and businesses, including on our profession. Fortunately, the
Government still has scope for liberalisation of various sectors of the economy,
which can help improve efficiency and create opportunities for business, so that
we continue to see some growth, unlike the developed countries of the West,
which expect to see a decline.

As professionals, we also have the advantage of seeing newer
areas of practice emerging, which can help us grow in spite of the slowdown. We
need to prepare ourselves to meet this challenge, so that we are not caught
unawares by the slowdown. We also need to be extra careful in our audits, to
ensure that we are not blamed for business failures sought to be covered up by
managements.

There is however a silver lining. Major bankruptcies, such as
in the US, are unlikely in India. In the long run, new financial structures will
emerge. The US dominance may reduce with Asian countries emerging stronger. This
crisis may mark the beginning of a new phase in the world economy, with
opportunities for all of us in the long run.

Gautam Nayak

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The Challenge of Change — Always Ahead

Editorial

Ever since we took up the study of chartered accountancy, it
has been ingrained in us that constant professional change is something that we
have to necessarily live with and adapt to. No other profession is perhaps
subjected to so many changes happening at such frequent intervals in the subject
matter of its practice. All of us have got accustomed to and have adapted to the
annual wholesale changes in the tax laws. However, today in India, we are at a
stage where every sphere of our practice is in a state of flux, where change is
happening at a much greater pace, requiring us not only to learn new laws and
skills, but also to unlearn a part of what we have learnt in the past.


In auditing, our core area of practice, we not only have
various auditing standards to comply with, but totally new accounting standards
and practices of IFRS to understand over the next couple of years. As if that
were not sufficient, a Companies Bill has been introduced to replace the 52-year
old Companies Act that we are familiar with.

In internal auditing, we have a new set of standards being
put in place, which we need to adapt to and comply with. Our income tax law has
always seen new taxes or new provisions every year — we are threatened by
wholesale changes in the form of the new Direct Taxes Code. Fortunately, that is
not likely to happen in the immediate future. Our service tax law is ever
changing with new services and new provisions added every year — along with the
recently introduced VAT law and Central Excise, this is now likely to be
encompassed within a totally new goods and services tax, in a couple of years.

The amount of knowledge that we would be required to acquire
over the next two or three years makes us think that perhaps we are once again
studying for our CA course !

The recent downswing and turmoil in the world economy and the
Indian economy throws up its own challenges. There is of course the challenge of
ensuring growth in one’s professional career, in spite of severe downturns in
the business cycle. More significantly, the recent business failures have raised
questions internationally, regarding the relevance of auditing as practised
today, and various accounting concepts, such as mark-to-market. We are yet to
embrace some of those concepts in India, and even before we do so, they may
undergo significant changes or be discarded internationally !

Why, even the manner in which we practise has to undergo a
change. The increasing strength of global firms, the increased expectations of
clients due to globalisation, the increased competition for talented people due
to entry of global businesses in India, increasing computerisation and e-filing
— all these are challenges which one has to face.

Each one of us has to clearly now sit down, think, choose and
chalk out our own growth strategy. Should one consider joining a large firm
drawing a good remuneration ? Should one network with other similar minded
firms, with each firm focussing on a niche area of practice ? Or should one
merge with other similar minded firms ? Should one convert the partnership firm
into a limited liability partnership ? Should one continue on one’s own with a
focussed approach of concentrating either on a few areas of practice or with a
few clients ? Or should one join industry ?

We are fortunate today to have so many choices of change.
Each alternative has its own risks and rewards. Based on one’s own perception of
levels of acceptable risk and desired rewards, each one of us has to make a
choice. Not making any change by ignoring the massive changes happening all
around us is not an option at all — that will only result in our professional
stagnation or decline.

We need to look at the challenges or threats that we face as
opportunities. Many of us may not have learnt certain laws in the past, such as
sales tax or VAT, excise duty, etc. The introduction of new laws facilitates our
learning of these laws from their inception, and provides us an opportunity of
offering services in newer areas of practice. The introduction of service tax in
1994 is a classic example — so many of us have learnt that law and are today
focussed on that area of practice for our growth.

The Journal, as always, seeks to support you in your efforts
to meet the challenge of change. In this issue, under the painstaking efforts of
the past editor of the Journal and Chairman of the Diamond Jubilee Celebration
Committee, K. C. Narang, we bring you special articles contributed by eminent
chartered accountants and other professionals from various spheres of life, to
help you understand and prepare for changes happening or likely to happen in
different spheres of our practice.

We hope this will facilitate your making the right choices in
time to meet the challenges of change, and ensure your rapid professional
development and growth.


Gautam Nayak

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Question of Law — Investment allowance — Whether allowable in one year or in several years is a question of law — Decision of Madras High Court not applicable.

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14 Question of Law — Investment allowance — Whether allowable
in one year or in several years is a question of law — Decision of Madras High
Court not applicable.


[CIT v. Lucas TVS Ltd., (2008) 297 ITR 429 (SC)]

The Assessing Officer was of the view that investment
allowance u/s.32A is only to be allowed in one assessment year and not in
several assessment years. The appeal related to the A.Ys. 1989-90, 1991-92 and
1992-93. The Tribunal held otherwise. The High Court dismissed the appeal in
view of its decision in Southern Asbestos Cement Ltd v. CIT, (2003) 259
ITR 631 (Mad.) in which it was held that the investment allowance in respect of
the incremental cost of the machinery, necessitated by the fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates is allowable to the assessee in the respective years in
which cost arose in view of S. 43A(1) of the Act.

On an appeal, the parties conceded before the Supreme Court
that S. 43A(1) relates to fluctuations of foreign exchange and its effect on the
valuation of the assets and that it had nothing to do with the question as to
whether it is allowable in one year and therefore the decision of the High Court
had no application. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the
order of the High Court and remitted the matter for fresh adjudication after
formulating the question of law involved.


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E-filing, e-payment and e-TDS — Successful ?

Editorial

The Income Tax Department does not seem to believe in the
proverb ‘Act in haste, repent at leisure’. All its recent actions show that it
believes in introducing new procedures in a hurry without creating the necessary
infrastructure for it, without learning from its past mistakes, and without
regard to the enormous difficulties to taxpayers. It believes that keeping quiet
about the problems caused by premature introduction of such initiatives can
enable it to claim its initiatives to have been a success — forget about
taxpayers who suffer the brunt of such problems !


The new PAN numbers were introduced without the necessary
infrastructure in place, resulting in non-allotment of PAN, mismatched PAN cards
and allotment of multiple PAN numbers.

When e-filing of TDS returns was introduced, along with the
Tax Information Network (TIN), we were informed that all data relating to TDS
and payment of taxes would be captured by the system, doing away with the need
for issue of physical TDS certificates and the need for filing challans along
with the returns of income. The reality, as many taxpayers have found to their
dismay, is that the TIN displays only a part of the tax deducted at source from
their receipts, and that correction of data captured by TIN is an extremely
difficult task. To top it all, their legitimate refunds are held up on account
of such system problems, due to the CBDT insisting that credit for TDS should be
granted only on the basis of the TIN figures, and not on the basis of physical
TDS certificates, as provided by law. Many taxpayers were slapped with huge
demands, instead of the large refunds due to them. A few taxpayers were
fortunate to receive their refunds after approaching the Ombudsman (one such
order is reproduced on page 163).

With e-filing of returns, we were told that this would speed
up the processing of returns and issue of refunds. The reality we find is that
the processing of returns filed for assessment year 2007-08 has barely begun,
though by now, the processing of such returns should have been completed.

We now have a situation where taxpayers who want to file
their TDS returns are told that such returns will not be accepted unless the
returns contain a minimum percentage of PANs of deductees. No groundwork has
been done to ensure that all deductees necessarily obtain and furnish their PANs,
no provisions have been made to enable deductors to force deductees to obtain
and furnish PANs, and yet deductors are prevented from complying with their
statutory obligations ! All this, merely by issue of a press release ! To top it
all, it is highly likely that penalties would be levied on such deductors who
are unable to file their TDS returns for no fault of their own.

As if this were not enough, we now have mandatory e-payment
of taxes for certain categories of taxpayers from 1st April 2008, for corporates,
and individuals and partnership firms who were liable to tax audit in the
earlier year. Banks are still unprepared for such large e-payments. It takes at
least 20 days to activate this e-payment facility with most of the banks. Many
banks refuse to open an account if such account is merely intended to be used
for e-payment of taxes. This would in effect force taxpayers to change their
longstanding bankers, though they may be fully satisfied with their services.

One individual taxpayer, who pays advance tax of about Rs.50
lakhs in each instalment, and who approached one of the nationalised banks which
is authorised for such e-payments, was flabbergasted to discover that the bank
would accept e-payment of a maximum amount of Rs 5 lakhs in a day. He is still
trying to figure out how he can make his advance tax payments !

The Society has made a representation regarding the
difficulties being faced by taxpayers in complying with e-payment at such short
notice (reproduced on page 245), but does the Income Tax Department ever heed
any advice or take into account the difficulties of taxpayers? In this
consumer-centric age, should not the voice of taxpayers be heard and respected
by the Income Tax Department, which depends upon taxpayers for all its
revenues ?

One thought that payment of taxes and filing of tax returns
were sacrosanct duties of taxpayers. It however appears that the Income Tax
Department, which is resorting to such initiatives to conceal its own internal
deficiencies and problems, is putting hurdles in the way of taxpayers who wish
to comply with their obligations. A strange situation indeed !

Let us hope that the Income Tax Department realises the need to consult
taxpayers and their representatives, take into account the various difficulties
being faced, provide the necessary infrastructure and enabling legislation, and
then undertake new initiatives. This alone will lead to real success of such
initiatives !

Gautam Nayak

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Appeal to Tribunal : Powers of Single member : S. 255(3) : Income computed by AO less than Rs.5 lakhs : CIT(A) enhanced it to more than Rs.5 lakhs : Single member can decide appeal.

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21 Appeal to Tribunal : Powers of Single
member : S. 255(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Income computed by
AO less than Rs.5 lakhs : CIT(A) enhanced it to more than Rs.5 lakhs : Single
member can decide the appeal.


[CIT v. Mahakuteshwar Oil Industries, 298 ITR 390
(Kar.)]

The assessee was a manufacturer of edible oil. For the A.Y.
1996-97, it had declared the total income of Rs.8,660 in the return of income.
The Assessing Officer computed the total income at Rs.2,27,614. The Commissioner
enhanced the income to Rs.13,89,795. In appeal before the Tribunal, the Single
Member of the Tribunal decided the appeal and granted relief to the assessee.

 

In the appeal preferred by the Revenue, the following
questions were raised :

“(i) Whether the single member of the Tribunal had
jurisdiction to decide the appeal when the subject matter of appeal was
exceeding Rs.5,00,000 ?

(ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in reversing the
findings of the Appellate Commissioner, when the assessee failed to discharge
the burden of proof as required u/s.68 of the Income-tax Act ?

 


The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“(i) A single member of the Tribunal can exercise powers if
the income computed by the Assessing Officer is less than Rs.5 lakhs, even
though the same has been enhanced by the Commissioner (Appeals) in excess of
Rs.5 lakhs.

(ii) The Tribunal had given a categorical finding that the
assessee was willing to examine the creditors as its witnesses to prove that
it had availed of loans from them. No records were produced to show that the
assessee had not made such a statement either before the Assessing Officer or
before the Commissioner (Appeals). When the Revenue had got the records to
show whether the assessee was willing to examine any of the witnesses or not,
when such documents were not placed before the Court, one would have to draw
an adverse inference against the Revenue.”

 


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Scientific Research and Development Expenditure : S. 35 : Whether machine being used for R&D purpose or for manufacturing, AO not authority to decide but prescribed authority u/s.35(3)

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10 Scientific Research and Development Expenditure :
Deduction u/s.35 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1999-00 : Axial machine and
computers : Whether machine being used for research and development purposes or
for manufacturing activity : Assessing Officer not an authority to decide :
Matter to be referred to prescribed authority u/s.35(3)


[CIT v. Deltron Ltd., 297 ITR 426 (Del.)]

The assessee incurred an expenditure of Rs.87,22,447 on
purchasing an axial machine along with machinery spares and computers. For the
A.Y. 1999-2000, it claimed the expenditure as a research and development
expenditure u/s.35(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer looked
at the brochure of the machine and came to the conclusion that the machine was
not used for research and development work and disallowed the claim. The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the AO could not have disallowed the
expenditure without following the procedure prescribed u/s.35(3). Thereafter,
the Revenue could have made an attempt to find out the actual use of the
machine, but it did not do so. The Tribunal confirmed the view taken by the
Commissioner (Appeals).

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“(i) The prescribed authority in this case was not the
Assessing Officer and he could not determine whether the machinery was used by
the assessee for research and development purposes or not.

(ii) Even assuming that the Assessing Officer had the
authority, the least that would have been expected from him was to confirm
physically whether or not the machine was being used for research and
development purposes. No conclusion could be arrived at by the Assessing
Officer by merely looking at the brochure. Therefore, there was no error in
the order passed by the Tribunal.

(iii) Moreover, since there was a gap of so many years, it
would not be appropriate to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer to
refer the matter to the prescribed authority to decide the question whether
the machinery was used for research and development purposes or not.”




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Reforms — Fast Forward ?

Editorial

The UPA Government has finally won the trust vote, and is no
longer dependent on the support of the Communist parties. So far, over the past
few years, it was held out that the Government wanted to usher in reforms, but
that since these were opposed by the Communist parties, these could not be
effected. Now that it is free of its shackles, there are high expectations from
the Government on the reforms front. The Government has given indications of
imminent reforms in the banking, insurance and pensions sectors. These are of
course important parts of the structural reforms necessary to ensure that the
economy continues to grow at a healthy pace, notwithstanding the global
slowdown. One hopes that these reforms will finally see the light of the day.


Unfortunately, the past track record of the Government, even
on non-controversial reforms, does not provide much encouragement. Take the case
of the Companies Bill. When the UPA Government came to power four years ago, a
White Paper for Company Law reforms along with a draft Companies Bill was
circulated. We were told that the Government was determined to ensure that the
Companies Act was replaced by a new Companies Act, which would be more
company-friendly and suited to the present business environment, within its
term. The Minister concerned had gone so far as to point out that his
predecessors had not succeeded in doing so, as their Governments fell before the
law could be passed, but that he was determined to ensure that the new Companies
Act was in place during his tenure. What is the position today ? Till today, the
new Companies Bill has not even been introduced in the Parliament.

We have had umpteen number of committees recommending a
complete overhaul of direct tax laws. For each of the last three years, we have
heard promises that the new direct taxes code would soon be in place within the
next year or so. At least, there has been some consistency in this. Whenever
this has been mentioned over the years, the time frame has been consistent —
within the next one year ! Till now, the new direct taxes code has not even been
placed before the Cabinet, nor any draft circulated for public comments.
Perhaps, this is fortunate. From what feedback one has received from the people
involved in reviewing this draft legislation, the harshness and complications of
the provisions have only been enhanced in the draft code, rather than being
simplified and reduced.

The Limited Liability Partnership Bill, which would allow
professionals to compete with their global counterparts by having larger
partnership firms, was introduced in the Parliament with much fanfare in
December 2006. It was then referred to a standing committee, which has given its
suggestions in November 2007. On 1st May 2008, the Cabinet approved a new draft
of the Limited Liability Partnership Bill, which was to be introduced in the
Parliament. This Bill is yet to be enacted by the Parliament.

While one does not doubt the importance of the reforms
relating to banking, insurance and pensions, the smaller and easier reforms can
definitely be pushed through with much lesser effort on the part of the
Government. One understands that the Government has different priorities, but
surely a part of its efforts can be directed towards such necessary but smaller
reforms.

While enacting these laws, it is essential for the Government
to ensure that these laws are fair, clear and do not leave much scope for
harassment. What businessmen are looking forward to is clarity and fairness of
various legal provisions, so that they can focus on carrying on their business
more efficiently and on expansion of their businesses, rather than wasting their
time in unwanted litigation, cumbersome compliance procedures and warding off
undue harassment by Government officials. It is only then that businesses and
the economy as a whole can continue to grow rapidly, so that India’s economic
potential is truly unleashed.

It is now accepted worldwide that the international clout of
a country depends upon its economic strengths. Other countries are willing to
bend backwards to accommodate the views and expectations of economically strong
countries, to secure economic benefits for themselves. One hopes that the
Government creates an environment in which businessmen can thrive, so that the
country as a whole improves its bargaining power.

In the whole debate on the nuclear deal, the merits and
demerits of the deal to the country were not even considered. One wishes that a
day will come when all political parties keep the long-term benefits to the
country as their paramount touchstone for deciding on whether to support the
Government or not, rather than let individual politicians’ personal agenda or
their party’s agenda or ideology come in the way of what most Indians believe is
in the interest of the country. Only then can we be said to have matured as a
real democracy !

Only time will tell whether these expectations of ours from the Government
and politicians are too high !

Gautam Nayak

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Deficiency in service by company/dealer supplying LPG cylinders and regulators : Consumer Protection Act 1986 S. 2(1)(g).

New Page 17 Deficiency in service by company/dealer supplying LPG cylinders and
regulators : Consumer Protection Act 1986 S. 2(1)(g).

 

Death caused due to leakage from LPG cylinder/regulator. The
NCDRC held that it was duty of Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) to provide technical
facilities to its consumers and periodically examine the cylinder or the
regulator to find out its defects.

 

As the Indian oil company also did not ask its dealer to get
the regulator and cylinder examined by any expert, the dealer and Indian Oil
Corporation were held jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the
complainant.

[ Regional Manager IOC Ltd., Bhopal v. Rakesh Kumar
Prajapati & Ors.,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 1988 (NCC)]



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Straight-lining of Lease

Business Combinations under IFRS

New Page 1As mergers and
acquisitions are fairly common nowadays and accounting implications significant,
there has been considerable focus and debate on how business combinations are
accounted for. Theoretically there are two methods, the pooling method and the
purchase method. The pooling method is applied when two business equals combine
into a new entity, with no acquirer being clearly identified. The purchase
method is applied when an acquirer is clearly identified in a business
combination. It may be noted that pooling is allowed only if certain conditions
indicating the merger of equals is fulfilled.

Under the pooling method the excess of consideration for
acquisition over the book value of the assets acquired is adjusted against
reserves, since the underlying transaction is a get-together of two enterprises
and consequently there is no goodwill to be recorded as an asset. Whereas under
the purchase method the consideration paid over and above the fair value of the
net assets acquired is captured as goodwill, which going forward is
tested for impairment. Under the purchase method, all identifiable assets
and liabilities are fair valued, irrespective of whether those
assets/liabilities were recorded or not in the books of the acquiree.

IFRS 3 — Business Combinations now prohibits pooling
method, since permitting two methods vitiated comparability and created
incentives for structuring business combinations to qualify for pooling, and
achieve the desired accounting objective, given that the two methods produced
quite different results. Besides in the real world it is improbable that there
would be combination of business equals with the acquirer not being
identifiable. Therefore, IFRS 3 now allows only the purchase method. With the
abolition of pooling method, there is no more incentive under IFRS to structure
deals, so as to qualify for the pooling method.


Fair value accounting under IFRS 3 reflects the true
value of an acquisition and the premium paid, i.e., goodwill. Going ahead
it would also result in an appropriate depreciation/amortisation of assets
acquired, since the fair value rather than book value of the assets would be
depreciated. It results in greater transparency and management responsibility
for the acquisition and the price paid to acquire the business. Any future
impairment of acquisition goodwill will put to question the appropriateness of
management’s decision to acquire the business.

Considerable judgment will be called for in applying IFRS 3,
including the identification and valuation of intangible assets and contingent
liabilities. Unfortunately, IFRS 3 provides limited guidance on determining fair
value of assets and liabilities acquired. There exists some guidance that
valuation report should be taken.

An interesting point to note is that IFRS 3
prohibits
amortisation of goodwill and requires goodwill to be
tested
only for impairment. Amortisation of goodwill results in an
even spread of charge to the income statement over several years; contrarily, a
huge one-off impairment charge on impairment of goodwill, as required by IFRS 3,
will bring in substantial volatility to the income statement.

Under Indian GAAP, there is no comprehensive standard dealing
with business combinations. In fact there are as many as six standards that deal
with various types of business combinations and accounting for goodwill. Many of
these requirements are disparate and inconsistent, for example, goodwill
resulting from an amalgamation has to be compulsorily amortised over not more
than 5 years, whereas there is no compulsion to amortise goodwill on acquisition
of a subsidiary. Another example is that acquisition accounting in the case of
acquisition of a subsidiary or an associate is based on book values, whereas
amalgamation other than which fulfil pooling conditions, can be accounted either
using book values or fair values of net assets acquired.

As stated above, acquisition accounting of sub-sidiaries,
associates and joint ventures under Indian GAAP is based on book values rather
than fair values. Unlike Indian GAAP, IFRS 3 requires assets and liabilities
acquired, including contingent liabilities, to be recorded at fair value.
Contingent liabilities are not recorded as liabilities under Indian GAAP.
Contingent
liabilities are fair valued and recorded under IFRS in an
acquisition, since the consideration paid for a business by an acquirer is also
influenced by the nature and quantum of contingent liabilities of the acquiree.
For reasons mentioned above, goodwill determined under Indian GAAP is a plug-in
number, unrealistic and of little use in analysing the business combination.

IFRS 3 requires all Business Combinations (excludes common
control transactions) within its scope to be accounted as per purchase method
and prohibits pooling method. Indian GAAP permits both purchase method and
pooling of interest method, in the case of amalgamations. Pooling of interest
method is allowed only if the amalgamation satisfies certain specified
conditions.

In IFRS 3, acquisition accounting is based on substance.
Reverse acquisition under IFRS is accounted assuming the legal acquirer is the
acquiree. For example, a big private limited company to seek quick listing may
be legally acquired by a small listed company. Under IFRS, the private company
would be treated as an acquirer though legally it was acquired by the listed
company. In Indian GAAP, acquisition accounting is based on legal
form and in the above example the listed company would be treated as an
acquirer.

Business combination accounting under Indian GAAP is outdated
and does not reflect the underlying substance and the true premium paid for an
acquisition. Because of the inconsistent and disparate requirements across
various standards, it provides incentives for deal structuring. It is high time
that IFRS 3 is adopted in India without waiting for 2011.

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Capital Gains Account Scheme — Due Date for Deposit

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 An assessee is entitled to exemption for long-term
capital gains arising on transfer of any asset u/s.54F, if he purchases or
constructs a residential house within the stipulated period (one year before or
two years after the date of transfer for purchase, and three years after the
date of transfer for construction). The exemption available is of such amount of
capital gain in the ratio of the cost of the new house to the net sale
consideration on transfer of the assets.

1.2 Ss.(4) of S. 54F provides that the amount of net
consideration, which is not appropriated by the assessee towards the purchase of
the new asset within one year before the date of transfer of the original asset,
or which is not utilised by him for the purchase or construction of the new
asset before the date of furnishing the return of income u/s.139, shall be
deposited by him before furnishing such return into an account with a bank under
the Capital Gains Account Scheme, and utilised in accordance with such scheme.
If this is done, the amount actually utilised by the assessee for the purchase
or construction of the new asset together with the amount so deposited is deemed
to be the cost of the new asset for computing the exemption u/s.54F. In other
words, pending actual utilisation for purchase or construction of the new house,
the amount has to be deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme. The amount
deposited under the scheme can be utilised only for the purpose of making
payment for purchase or construction of the new house.

1.3 At times, it may so happen that the assessee fails to
deposit the amount under the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date
for filing the return of income u/s.139(1), but actually purchases or constructs
a new residential house before the due date for filing belated return of income
u/s.139(4), i.e., within the stipulated time period of two/three years.
The question that arises in such a case is whether the benefit of the exemption
u/s.54F can yet be availed of by the assessee in spite of such failure.

1.4 While the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal has held that the
assessee is not entitled to the exemption in such a case, the Bangalore Bench of
the Tribunal has held that the assessee can still avail of the benefit of the
exemption if such utilisation is before the due date for filing belated return
of income u/s.139(4).

2. Taranbir Singh Sawhney’s case :


2.1 The issue first came up before the Delhi Bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Taranbir Singh Sawhney v. Dy. CIT, 5 SOT 417.

2.2 In this case, the assessee sold certain shares on 25th
June 1996, and deposited the sale proceeds in his bank account on 3rd August
1996. He purchased a residential house on 1st December 1997, without depositing
any amount under the Capital Gains Account Scheme. Thereafter, the assessee
filed his return of income on 13th November 1998, claiming exemption u/s.54F of
the capital gains on sale of shares on account of property purchased on 1st
December 1997.

2.3 The Assessing Officer denied the claim for exemption
u/s.54F, on the ground that the conditions specified in that Section were not
fulfilled by the assessee, since the assessee did not deposit such consideration
in an account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme pending purchase of a
residential house. According to the Assessing Officer, the date of acquisition
of the new residential property was 1st December 1997, which was after the due
date applicable to the assessee of furnishing his return of income u/s.139(1),
i.e., 30th June 1997. According to the Assessing Officer, the net
consideration was neither appropriated towards the purchase of residential
property before the due date, nor was it deposited in the account under the
Capital Gains Account Scheme before that date, resulting in non-fulfilment of
the conditions prescribed u/s.54F. The AO therefore denied the exemption
u/s.54F.

2.4 Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee submitted
that he had opened an independent bank account for depositing the sale proceeds
for onward investment in a residential property, that the entire sale proceeds
so deposited in his bank ac-count were ultimately used for acquiring residential
property, that this account was only used for the purchase of property, and
therefore, in sum and in substance, he had complied with the provisions of S.
54F. the assessee claimed that not maintaining a bank account under the Capital
Gains Account Scheme was a technical breach, the conditions specified in S. 54 F
having been substantially complied with. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the
assessee’s contentions and dismissed the appeal.

2.5 Before the Tribunal, it was argued that the denial of
exemption was done on a mere technical lapse. It was claimed that the sale
proceeds of shares were utilised only for the purpose of investment in the new
house property and not for any other purpose. Though the sale proceeds were not
deposited in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme 1988, they
were kept in a separate bank account and utilised only for the purpose of
investment in the house property. Accordingly, the assessee had substantially
complied with the conditions specified in S. 54F. It was submitted that the
exemption provisions should be construed liberally, as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, 196 ITR 188, and that the
provisions of S. 54F should be construed in the manner to further its objectives
and not to restrain it.

2.6 The Tribunal noted the fact that the appropriation of net
consideration in the house property was not made before the due date of filing
of the return as specified u/s.139(1), and that therefore the net consideration
ought to have been deposited in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account
Scheme, 1988. Since this had not been done, according to the Tribunal, it
disentitled the assessee from exemption. According to the Tribunal, the plea of
the assessee that it was a mere technical breach was not a relevant criterion to
decide the eligibility of the assessee for exemption. The Tribunal also held
that the plea of the assessee that the provisions be construed liberally so as
to further its objectives was not tenable having regard to the clear provisions
of law. The Tribunal therefore rejected the assessee’s claim for exemption
u/s.54F.

3. Nipun Mehrotra’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Bangalore
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Nipun Mehrotra v. ACIT, 110 ITD 520.

3.2 In this case, the assessee sold shares for a total net sale consideration of Rs.11,10,833, out of which Rs.9,00,000 was paid as part consideration for acquisition of a new flat between February 2000 and June 2000. The assessee had earlier paid an amount of Rs.22lakhs to the builder for purchase of the flat between February 1999 and October 1999.A further sum of Rs.4 lakhs was paid on 4th September 2000 and Rs.3,98,000 was paid after September 2000 till March 2001. The assessee accordingly claimed exemption u/ s.54F of the entire capital gains.

3.3 The Assessing Officer considered only the payments made after the sale of shares, and since the assessee had made payments of only Rs.9 lakhs before the due date of filing of the return of income, denied exemption u/ s.54F in respect of net sale consideration of Rs.2,10,833, on the ground that the assessee should have invested this amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date of filing the return of income for assessment year 2000-01, i.e., before 31st July 2000.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, holding that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous and that, in the name of liberal interpretation, the provisions could not be circumvented.

3.5 Before the Tribunal, the Department argued that the assessee had not placed any evidence on record to suggest that the sale consideration received from the sale of shares were utilised for the purchase of the new asset, as a sum of Rs.22 lakhs was paid before the shares were sold. According to the Department, the investment of Rs.22 lakhs could not be considered for the purpose of allowing exemption u/ s.54F.

3.6 The tribunal considered the provisions of S. 54F(4). It noted that the assessee had to utilise the amount for the purchase or construction of the new asset before the date of furnishing the return of income u/s.139. Since there was no mention of any sub-section of S. 139, according to the Tribunal, one could not interpret that S. 139 mentioned therein should be read as S. 139(1). Following the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajesh Kumar [alan, 286 ITR 274 in the context of S. 54(2), the Tribunal was of the view that S. 139 mentioned in S. 54F included not only S. 139(1),but all sub-sections of S. 139.

3.7 According to the Tribunal, the intention behind the insertion of Ss.(4) in S. 54F was to dispense with the rectification of assessments in case the taxpayer failed to acquire the corresponding new asset. Therefore, if the new asset was acquired before the date of filing of the return u/s.139, then the assessee could file such return and there would be no need of rectification. The Tribunal noted that the decision of the Gauhati High Court was not available to the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Taranbir Singh Sawhney (supra).

3.8 The Tribunal therefore held that the assessee was entitled to the exemption of the entire amount of Rs.11,10,833 u/s.54F.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is true that the Bangalore Bench has not noted the fact that the subsequent part of S. 54F(4) expressly refers to S. 139(4) – “Such deposit being made in any case not later than the due date applicable in the case of the assesee for furnishing the return of income under Ss.(l) of S. 139 in an account….. “

4.2 However, it is essential to understand the background behind the introduction of the requirement of depositing the amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme. Prior to introduction of this requirement, it was noticed that assessees would claim the exemption u/ s.54F, by stating their intention to invest in a residential house within the prescribed time period. There was no mechanism for the Assessing Officer to verify whether such investment was made within the prescribed time, and it was felt that many assessees obtained the exemption without any actual investment in a residential house. Hence, this requirement was introduced to ensure that the exemption was not obtained under a false statement that the investment would be made within the prescribed period.

4.3 From that perspective, so long as the investment is made before the date of filing of the income tax return, whether u/s.139(1) or u/s.139(4), the purpose of introduction of the Capital Gains Account Scheme is achieved, namely, ensuring that the investment has actually been made before the return is filed.

4.4 As held by the Gauhati  High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar [alan (supra), in construing a beneficial enactment, the view that advances the object of the enactment and serves the purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the beneficial enactment. Therefore, even if the investment in the house property has been made before the date of filing of the belated return, the purpose of the legislature is achieved, and it is not appropriate to deny the exemption on the ground that there has been a delay in investment, and accordingly a failure to invest in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme.

4.5 The requirement to invest in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme is therefore really a procedural requirement to ensure that investment is made in a residential house as claimed in the return of income, where such investment has already not been made. To deny the exemption when there has been substantial compliance by actual investment in a house, on the ground that investment has not been made in the Capital Gains Account Scheme within the prescribed time limit, appears to be unjustified. The time limit therefore needs to be read down as including the time limit for filing of a belated return of income, as held by the Gauhati High Court.

4.6 Therefore,  the view  taken  by the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal  appears  to be a better view of the matter, as compared  to the view taken by the Delhi Bench.

Rectification of mistake — No finding on the decision cited by the appellant.

New Page 1

8 Rectification of mistake — No finding on
the decision cited by the appellant.


The appellant had filed appeal before the CESTAT. In the
written submission filed before the Tribunal the appellant had relied on two
Tribunal decisions in its favour. The appeal was heard ex parte. The
Tribunal by referring to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CCE,
Ahmedabad v. Ramesh Food Products,
2004(174) ELT 310 (SC) disposed of the
appeal. No reference was made to the judgments of the Tribunal which were relied
upon by the appellant. The appellant, therefore, filed an application for
rectification, pointing out that the appellant had relied upon two judgments of
the Tribunal in his submissions. The Tribunal, however, disposed of his appeal
without considering those judgments. The Tribunal again dismissed the
rectification application. On further appeal the High Court observed that the
procedure that has been followed by the Tribunal is not in accordance with law.
If in the opinion of the Tribunal, the two judgments of the Tribunal on which
the appellant was relying, were not relevant, the Tribunal could have said so in
its judgment. The course adopted by the Tribunal, of even not referring to the
judgments of the Tribunal or which the appellant was relying, is not proper. It
was for the Tribunal to point out, after considering the judgments of the
Tribunal on which the appellant was relying, why those judgments were not relied
and how, according to the Tribunal, the matter is covered by the judgment of the
Supreme Court. In view of the above, the appeal was allowed by remanding the
matter back to the Tribunal.

[ Stanlek Engineering P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex.
Mumbai,
2008 (229) ELT 61 (Bom.)]

 


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Fraud and Audit

Article

Preamble :



After the Enron debacle, auditing all over the world has come
under the scanner. The age-old saying that ‘an auditor is a watchdog and not a
blood hound’ is being re-examined, if not questioned. Legislation which seeks to
lay a greater emphasis on detection and reporting of fraud by auditors has been
introduced all over the globe. In this context, the article examines an
auditor’s duty as regards detection and reporting of fraud. It examines the
causative factors that led to Enron’s bankruptcy and some of the subsequent
legislation in India and ICAI’s pronouncements affecting an auditor’s duty and
responsibility towards the issue of fraud. For this purpose, the relevant
clauses in the Companies (Auditors Report) Order, 2003 (CARO), the Auditing and
Assurance Standard (AAS) 4, and certain observations made in a recent High Court
judgment in Maharashtra (Note 3) have been considered
. To get an
international flavour, the article also examines the findings of the O’Malley
Report (Note 1) on audit effectiveness. To make this study more interesting, the
new enhanced role of the auditor is examined with the help of a case study
.

Comparison of auditing scenarios before and after the turn of the
millennium :

In the last decade, two things have impacted the auditors’
role a great deal : (a) The rapidly evolving IT environment, and (b) the Enron
debacle in 2001. E-commerce and computerisation in all walks of life, for all
the conveniences offered, have made business practices and business models more
complex. New business models have sprung up as commerce transcends not only
distances, but also time zones, currencies, and countries. Data volumes are huge
and products with incredible technical specifications are introduced every other
day. Consequently, the audit scenarios in this rapidly changing IT environment
have become far more challenging. Amidst this, the Enron bankruptcy (as well as
the fall of several other corporate giants during the 2001-02 period), brought
the auditor’s role under the scanner. Panic buttons were pressed all over the
world and new legislation and statutory pronouncements enhancing the role of
auditors were announced. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act came into force in 2002 with
revolutionary reporting and disclosure requirements in audited accounts. For the
first time the CEO and CFO were obligatorily required to attest the financial
statements and also comment on existence of fraud. World over, questions were
raised about the performance of the auditors. Undoubtedly, the auditor’s role
was questioned. Auditing practices, and auditing standards were revisited to
make auditors address the issue of fraud, thereby emphasising the need for
greater audit effectiveness. In order to understand the auditor’s role from the
point of view of detection and reporting of fraud, it would be useful to conduct
a simple case study.

Case Study of a ‘Van Sales’ — business model :

Consider a business model applying the ‘Van Sales’ method of
selling Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG). This model was conceived by a company
with a view to reach out to geographically far-flung untapped areas of potential
demand. The model required deployment of a fleet of multiple trailer vans
stacked with FMCGs like soaps, toothpastes, gels, creams, biscuits, etc. The van
crew would consist of a driver and a sales representative given a specific
route, (which could be hundreds of kilometres long in the country), to find
retailers, shops and other buying entities to sell the products. Both cash and
credit sales were permissible within policy norms. These sales operations were
monitored through palm-top computers and small portable printers provided to
salesmen in the vans. Each palm-top was linked to the main central server at the
head office. The salesmen made efforts to maximise their sales by approaching
retailers/shops and buying outlets spotted all along the route. The sales
deliveries, invoices and collection receipts were raised at the remote locations
by the salesmen using the palm-top computers and printers provided. The palm-top
sales system had well-designed controls built in to monitor credit limits, sales
returns, discounts, and promotion/festival/season offers. Each van would return
to the main warehouse to replenish its stocks and deposit the collections after
a tour was completed. In addition, all the vans were required to report, all
together, once in a year at one central place to facilitate stock verification,
which was carried out by the management. In such a business model, how does the
auditor perceive his role and what kind of audit procedures does he apply ?

Conventionally, an auditor would apply the following
procedures :

(a) Review and vouchsafe sales, receivables and inventory
data furnished to him at the head office, through the central server,

(b) Carry out tests of the sales application software for
evaluation of controls,

(c) Apply substantive tests to ensure compliance with
rates, discounts, etc., and terms and conditions in sales policies,

(d) Apply substantive tests to ensure that collections
deposited at the warehouse by the van crew were deposited into the bank,

(e) Observe the annual stock verification procedure of
stocks in vans, and,

(f) Debtors’ scrutiny and call for confirmations from
debtors.


Would the foregoing tests be enough for him to express an opinion on the correctness of the sales, collections, and debtors? A couple of decades ago, the foregoing audit plan would have been considered adequate. Unless some serious indication or sign of fraud came up in his routine audit, or was brought to his notice, the thought of a possible fraud or misuse would not even have crossed an auditor’s mind. In other words, he would not be specifically hunting for such a sign or indicator of fraud, nor would he even consider discussing with his team the possibility that any process or control could be exposed or circumvented to commit fraud. However, in the current auditing scenario, the above procedures would not be adequate. An auditor has a duty to consider the overall business model with ‘professional scepticism’ to understand its vulnerability and then apply appropriate audit procedures to maximise his chances that any sign or indicator will be spotted. For example, in the above case study, the auditor would have to consider the business model and its control systems with professional scepticism. If he does this, he will immediately realise that a business of this kind is fraught with several significant risks of revenue loss in myriad ways.

Huge geographical distances within which the van stocks move, virtually unmonitored and unchecked, along with sales to parties with unknown credentials expose the business model to risks of stock shortages, pilferage of cash or stocks, fictitious sales, unaccounted sales returns, teeming and lading of collections, abuse or misuse of vans for personal purposes or parallel business, etc. Countless other kinds of misuse could take place. While drafting his audit plan, the auditor cannot be completely impervious to these possibilities and merely carry out the tests stated above, on data given to him. He has to think of and apply various customised tests to address all the business risks envisaged. If he does not do this, fraud will occur and devastate a business as happened in Enron’s case. The failure of the auditors of Enron to detect irregularities and/or their apparent will-ingness to support some questionable transactions, permitted wrongful accounting practices and diluted or misleading disclosures and eventually brought Enron to bankruptcy. Corporate governance was at its nadir and exposed that audit effectiveness was very low. It would be immensely useful to study some of the findings in the Enron investigation.

Insights from Enron bankruptcy:

There is a very comprehensive report tabled on February 1, 2002 by Enron’s Special Investigative Committee (Note 2), which had a mandate to examine in detail certain transactions as regards their nature, what went wrong, why they took place and who was responsible. This report provided not only valuable information about the possible causative factors which led to Enron’s bankruptcy, but also insights of immense value to auditors, such as issues relating to accounting practices, corporate governance, audit effectiveness, management over-sight and public disclosures. Much of the subsequent legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002, and other acts and auditing standards around the world were based on the revelations in this report. Some of the major revelations are summarised below as they are relevant to the subject matter of this article:

1.    The auditors’ and legal advisors’ role. The report revealed that the legal advisors of Enron and their auditors had actually reviewed these transactions and had even cleared them. The report did not actually go to the extent of stating that the auditors had participated in the wrongdoing. However, a reader can draw his own conclusions about this aspect from the meaningful disclosures about the enormous fees paid to them during the relevant period. Auditors billed US$5.7 million for advice for these transactions alone, above and beyond the regular audit fees. At the minimum, there was gross negligence on the part of the auditors.

2.    Corporate Governance failure.
The report clearly indicated that the Board failed to stop or deter transactions of conflicting interest to Enron. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) had dual and conflicting interests in the suspected transactions. The Board was aware, at least about the CFO’s interest, yet it failed to exercise sufficient checks and controls to ensure that all dealings were above board, fair and equitable to Enron interests.
 

3.    Ineffectiveness of audit procedures to spot malicious ‘off-balance sheet’ transactions. Auditors ignored the implications of transactions with entities referred to as ‘Special Purpose Vehicles’ (SPVs) which were created to enable Enron to camouflage its losses and debts and remove them from Enron’s balance sheet. SPVs with whom such transactions were effected were adroitly portrayed as external independent entities (which they were not), so that it was possible to conceal Enron’s losses and debts, without the necessity of disclosing these in Enron’ sown financial statements. These SPVs were, in fact, entities owned and controlled by Enron’s own employees.

4.    Ineffectiveness of audit procedures to spot book entries. The report pointed out that the management resorted to ‘complex structuring of transactions that lacked fundamental economic substance’. In simple words – book entries were created without basis and in contravention of accounting principles, possibly like ‘hawala’ entries commonly referred to in India.

5.    Misleading Disclosures.
The disclosures in the reports were ‘obtuse, and did not com-municate the essence of the transactions’. The disclosures were made to ‘downplay the significance of related-party transactions, and in some respects, to disguise their substance and import’.

If one considers the possible business risks in the above case study and the Enron fraud there are a lot of similarities. In the above case study, the overall business risk could be quite high. The SPVs in the above case study could be fictitious retailers and creative book entries could be fictitious sales, the creative accounting treatment could be use of teeming and lading practices and perpetrating other sales, collection and inventory accounting manipulations. The conventional audit plan would not necessarily expose these frauds.

Thus, concerns of audit effectiveness were raised in India too, and the auditor’s role and CARO and ICAI’s auditing standards have been revised. The relevant clauses of these pronouncements have been examined below:

1.    Auditing Assurance Standard –  AAS 4 :

This is a specific auditing and assurance standard pronounced by the ICAI (effective from April 1, 2003), relating to an auditor’s duty as regards ‘fraud and error’ in financial statements. This standard states that the primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud and error rests with both (1) those charged with governance, and (2)    the management of an entity. The standard also spelt out the auditor’s enhanced responsibility and laid down expectations of a far more penetrative audit than ever before in the past. The salient features of this AAS 4 are:

(a)    An attitude of professional skepticism. No longer can an auditor rely merely on any management representation. In effect, he must obtain evidence that either agrees with, or, brings into question the reliability of management representations. An auditor must adopt, necessarily, an attitude of professional sk ticism that will enable him to identify and properly evaluate matters that increase the risk of a material misstatement in the financial statements resulting from fraud or error. He now has to examine and question the management’s influence over the control environment, industry conditions, and operating characteristics and financial stability.

(b)    Importance of teamwork in conducting an audit. The standard also expresses the importance of teamwork. In planning the audit, the auditor should discuss with other members of the audit team, the susceptibility of the entity to material misstatements in the financial statements resulting from fraud or error.

(c)    Perform additional, extended orcommensurate audit procedures where fraud is suspected. When the auditor encounters circumstances that may indicate that there is a material misstatement in the financial statements resulting from fraud or error, the auditor should perform procedures to determine whether the financial statements are materially misstated.

(d)    Reporting obligations When the auditor identifies a misstatement resulting from fraud, or a suspected fraud, or error, the auditor should consider the auditor’s responsibility to communicate that information to management, those charged with governance and, in some circumstances, when so required by the laws and regulations, to regulatory and enforcement authorities also.

(e)    Where an auditor has obtained evidence that fraud exists, even materiality is not a point for consideration for communicating this matter to the appropriate level of the management timely.

Thus as per AAS 4, an auditor has to virtually move heaven and earth to satisfy him-self while carrying out an audit, that no serious red flags exist. If they do exist, he has to necessarily apply appropriate procedures to confirm his suspicions or dispel his doubts, about the existence of fraud. In case there is evidence of fraud, then, even materiality is not a factor for consideration – the matter of fraud has to be communicated to the appropriate level of management on a timely basis and he has to even consider reporting it to those charged with corporate governance.


CARO also casts a sigmficant responsibility on the auditor which has been considered next.

2.    Clauses of CARO relating to reporting of fraud by auditors:

Clauses 4(iv) and 4(xxi) of CARO are very important for auditors, especially with regard to their duty towards fraud. 4(iv) requires an auditor to report whether there are adequate internal control procedures commensurate with the size of the company and the nature of its business, for the purchase of inventory and fixed assets and for the sale of goods. What is significant is that the auditor is expected to report whether there is a continuing failure to correct major weaknesses in internal control. The key phrase is ‘continuing failure’. The continuing failure could stem from incompetence or fraud, but either way the auditor cannot ignore the possibility of existence of fraud. If he reports such a continuing failure but not a fraud, and if fraud is discovered later, the auditor may find himself in an unenviable situation to escape the responsibility for not carrying out appropriate audit procedures and also perhaps for not reporting the fraud. Clause 4(xxi) is even more serious, in that, it actually casts a direct responsibility on the auditor to report whether any fraud on or by the company has been noticed or reported during the year; if the answer is affirmative, the nature of the fraud and the amount involved have to be indicated. Here too, it is pertinent to note that materiality is not a factor for consideration by the auditor. If a fraud has been noticed or even reported, he has no choice but to report its nature and the amount involved. Furthermore, by virtue of being an auditor, and the very definition of audit as explained later, his duty does not end merely in mentioning that a fraud was noticed or reported; as an auditor his role automatically requires him to carry out an investigation and apply such other checks and verifications so as to enable him to be satisfied that the fraud is not isolated and that it does not have any other implications on the financial information he is expressing an opinion on.

Thus, CARO clearly spells out the duty of the auditor towards fraud detection and reporting.
In the recent past, an auditor’s duty towards fraud detection was further accentuated by the High Court in a recent judgment given below.

3. Sales Tax Practitioners’ Association (STPA) of Maharashtra v. the State of Maharashtra (Note 3):
This case is also very relevant to this article because it examines the definition of audit and concludes that detection of fraud is of primary importance in an audit. While considering the petition of the STP (refer note 3 for details) the High Court examined the very definition of audit. After considering certain definitions, it concluded that the word audit has a specific connotation in the matter of examination, investigation and auditing of. accounts, where detection of fraud is of primary importance. One of the definitions of audit referred to is that of R A Irish in his book ‘Practical Auditing’. It says that an audit may be said to be a skilled examination of such books, accounts and vouchers as will enable the auditor to verify the balance sheet. The main objects of an audit are: (a) to certify the correctness of the financial position as shown in the balance sheet and the accompanying revenue statements, (b) the detection of errors and (c) the detection of fraud – the detection of fraud is generally regarded as being of primary importance. The High Court also observed ‘The object and purpose of compulsory audit is to facilitate the prevention of evasion of taxes, administrative convenience …. “. It is a specialised job which can be undertaken only by a person professionally competent and trained to audit. Thus, auditors are expected to possess skills which could act as even a deterrent for tax evasion fraud. However, the High Court, also accentuated the risks accompanying the privileges: “The Chartered Accountant, by his very privileged status exposes himself to the consequences of civil liability for negligence, liability for professional misconduct in disciplinary proceedings under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, and sometimes to criminal liability under the Penal Code.”

Thus the above judgment clearly emphasises that an auditor’s role includes fraud and error detection and detection of fraud is of primary importance and that the auditor is exposed to severe penal consequences for non-performance of his duty.

4.    Insights from the O’Malley Report:

Thus far, this article has reviewed the auditor’s role within the domain of the Indian legislation and the ICAI’s pronouncements. It would be useful to examine some views from the international arena too. In this regard, there can be nothing better than the O’Malley Panel Report (Note 1). The Panel made some important revelations about the auditor’s role towards fraud. The Panel recommended that auditors should perform some ‘forensic-type’ procedures on every audit to enhance the prospects of detecting material financial statement fraud. Audit work would be based and directed to detect and find the possibility of dishonesty and collusion, overriding of controls and falsification of documents. Auditors would be required, during this phase, in some cases on a surprise basis, to perform substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud. The Panel recommendation also calls for auditors to examine non-standard entries, and to analyse certain opening financial statement balances to assess, with the benefit of hindsight, how certain accounting estimates and judgments or other matters were resolved. The intent of this recommendation is twofold: to enhance the likelihood that auditors will be able to detect material fraud, and to establish implicitly a deterrent to fraud. This can be achieved by greater audit effectiveness which would pose a threat to perpetrators in successful concealment of fraud. The Panel also advocated stronger standard setting for auditors. It observed that the Auditing Standards Board should make auditing and quality control standards more specific and definitive to help auditors enhance their professional judgment. The Panel recommended that audit firms should review, and where appropriate, enhance their audit methodologies, guidance, and training materials; and peer reviewers should ‘close the loop’ by reviewing those materials and their implementation on audit engagements and then reporting their findings.

Audit firms should put more emphasis on the performance of high-quality audits in communications from top management, performance evaluations, training, and compensation and promotion decisions.

The auditor’s enhanced role towards fraud:

In the past, the issue of fraud was a ‘once in a blue moon’ phenomenon for auditors. There was no compulsion for an auditor to keep an eye open for red flags or warning bells, or even to under-take extended audit procedures in areas where potential red flags were noticed. Therefore, the actual reporting of fraud in any report ‘was rare. Furthermore, auditors had limited digital tools and techniques, nor any specialised training to be able to conduct interviews, mathematical data pattern analysis, nor did they have trained investigators to carry out field inquiries. The scenario changed completely after the Enron debacle and the advances in IT. Society’s expectations increased and auditors have started using sophisticated software, digital tools and have done further research and training to address the issue of fraud. Risk-based auditing plans and fraud risk detection is now a component of all audit plans.

Considering all the  foregoing, consider the case study of the van sales business once again. Is the auditor concerned about all the business risks envisaged – stock shortages, pilferage of cash or stocks, fictitious sales, unaccounted sales returns, teeming and lading of collections, abuse or mis-use of vans for personal purposes or parallel business, etc. ? Yes, the auditor must necessarily recognise these risks, and based on the issues brought out in AAS 4, CARO, O’Malley Report and the High Court judgment, an auditor cannot complete his audit of this business merely on the conventional audit plan detailed earlier. In order to really provide a meaningful opinion on the van sales operating results, an auditor would have to supplement the conventional audit plan with at least the following :

1.    Process study and Gap Assessment: The control environment of the entire business model has to be studied and examined by the auditor. Complete process walk through study of the van sales process has to be carried out by the auditor to identify vulnerabilities and gaps in the controls. An overall gap assessment of unaddressed risks must be conducted. In the case study illustrated, an auditor would have to study all the built-in controls in each of the processes on a typical route of a sales van. For example, he must study all the processes such as loading the van, scheduling the route, visiting the retailers, raising invoices, and issuing collection receipts, accepting sales returns and submitting an account, at the end of the day.

2.    Teamwork: Have a brainstorm session for designing appropriate audit tests and procedures with all the members of the team to address the risks, corresponding controls in place and gaps identified in step 1 earlier.

3.    Testing of controls: Based on steps 1 and 2 above, and other appropriate audit tests to address the risks would have to be applied including surprise tests at warehouse, visits to some retailers, and covert observation of van sales operations by having observers on the route.

4.    Additional IT tests of palm-top computer/ printer controls for sales invoicing and issuance of cash receipts to address the issue of fictitious documents.

The above is not an exhaustive list – it is merely an indication of the penetrative approach which an auditor must adopt. Depending upon his findings, he may need to report errors/fraud or control weaknesses in CARO. As per the CARO reporting requirement if these weaknesses have been continuing persistently without being addressed by the management, it may stem from fraud and therefore needs appropriate tests and verifications. The auditor needs to decide at what level of management he needs to report the issue of fraud, and perhaps to the audit committee as well. In such a case, as per the O’Malley Panel, forensic-type procedures may also be necessary, which may include multi-dimensional trend analysis of sales and collections, examination of palm top logs for changes, deletions, alterations, warehouse stock discrepancies, etc.

Conclusion:

While the duty of detecting and preventing fraud lies primarily with the management, the auditor’s role is not insulated from this issue. Auditors cannot be a substitute for the enforcement of high standards of conduct by management, but, auditors can be an important factor in promoting high standards’. Auditors must possess the discipline, fortitude and ability to stand up to management or to an audit committee or board of directors. They need to be able to say, “No, that’s not right!” where deemed essential. The O’Malley Panel called on all individual professional auditors to heed this message’: “Only quality audits serve the public interest, and the public is the auditor’s most important client.”

Back to basics — Audit

Article

What is Audit :


Audit is an independent examination of financial information
of any entity when such an examination is conducted with a view to expressing an
opinion thereon. Audit is supposed to provide credibility to the accounts
presented. Audits are conducted for different purposes. Internal or management
audit objective is to aid management or owner of an entity to ascertain specific
aspect of an entity or may be for overall comfort of the management.

Evolution of Audit :

Previously business of an enterprise was run by owners
themselves. But with the increase in scale and complexity of operations,
ownership and management of the business was separated. In earlier days business
was conducted with own resources, without the help of funds borrowed
from outsiders. Now the proportion of borrowed funds utilised in the business
has increased and is in multiples of own fund. As a result, there are different
stakeholders for an enterprise, such as shareholders, lenders, employees, etc.
All the stakeholders are interested in protecting their own interest. With the
emphasis on governance, audit has gained much more importance. Audit is no more
conducted merely for statutory compliance. Expectations from audit by the
management, independent directors, investors and regulators have increased.

A change in nature and scale of operations has also resulted
into a change in the manner of record keeping. Enterprises have shifted from
manual records to computerised system of book keeping. Most of the records are
now kept in computerised format. Certain important controls are built in the
computerised system itself. With the opening up of the economy, exposure of
domestic businesses to the world market has increased. It has given rise to
substantial foreign currency transactions, various types of financial
products/instruments and different way of addressing the fund requirement. As a
result, accounting has also become much more complex. To deal with some of the
complexity, number of accounting standards have been introduced/revised which
are mandatory.

The new challenges have obviously brought a change in the
audit approach as well. To bring uniformity in audit and to maintain its
quality, various standard auditing practices have been prescribed by The
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). In all, there are more than
35 Auditing and Assurance Standards which have been issued by ICAI. With a view
to converge them with the International Standards, recently they have been
renumbered and are now called Engagement & Quality Control Standards. These
auditing standards are guide to an auditor for conducting an audit in an
effective manner. It also provides elaborate procedures and tools for conduct of
audit.

In spite of this, worldwide many enterprises are suddenly
folding and many of them have gone into liquidation. When such an event happens,
role of the auditor is always questioned and in many cases auditors are found to
have committed lapses in their work. The question which arises is whether all
these auditing standards and using modern techniques have improved quality of
audit ? I believe that it has not yielded expected results as the basics of
the audit are either forgotten
or not applied properly. In the subsequent
paragraphs, I have discussed certain basics which should not be forgotten in the
new era. In my view, these basics need to be applied along with the modern
techniques of ‘audit’ to improve quality of audit.

Basics of Audit :

1. Cut-off procedure and checking :


Cut-off is a process by which one accounting period is
separated from another. It is important to have proper check of cut-off
documents to make sure that there is no over or understatement of revenue or
expenses. In the computerised environment it is difficult to check ‘cut-off’
procedures. It is important to understand the accounting software used and
control in the system by which no new transactions can be entered after the
cut-off date. It is important to check certain physical records such as
invoices, purchase orders, receipts and issue notes with the entry in the
computer software. To meet the stricter time deadline, one should not compromise
checking of ‘cut-off’ procedures.

2. Control in the Computerised

Environment :

One should not blindly rely on the accounting software used
in the preparation of financial statements. In-built checks and balances in the
accounting software should be examined and it is necessary to confirm that they
meet the internal control norms. It is also necessary to ascertain other
software packages which interact with the accounting software and one must
ensure that there is no possibility of unauthorised intervention. It is also
important to keep record of changes made in the accounting system and their
implication. In case there is a weakness noticed in the computer system, manual
controls exercised to overcome the same should be verified. In manual record
keeping any changes made in the records are apparent, while in case of
computerised system it is not so. It is important to check the history file
created by the system to ascertain changes made in the record.

There is a general feeling that computer-generated statements
will not have any totalling error and will capture all the relevant items. Many
times this results into an error. It is therefore important to confirm that
relevant fields are properly captured in totalling. Simple technique like hash
total will ensure that relevant items are properly considered.

3. Prudence :


With the emphasis of fair value accounting in the modern world, accounting prudence is forgotten. The importance of prudence is highlighted only when something goes wrong. One should always keep in mind prudence even at the time of fair value accounting. In other words, when one is calculating fair value of assets or liabilities, prudence should be giVen importance and in the shadow of fair value, assets should not be overvalued or liabilities should not be undervalued. One should remain conservative in recognising revenue and in case of uncertainty, should follow the principle of postponing the revenue till the time certainty of its recovery is established. At the same time probable loss or expense should be recognised in the financial statements and should not be reversed till the time probability exists of its materialising. As India is preparing for conversion of its accounting standards to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), it is also moving towards fair value accounting and in this journey it is important to keep the principle of prudence alive. With the recent financial crisis the world is facing, a debate has already started in the United States and Europe about blind acceptance of fair value accounting.

4. Substance over Form:
This concept is quite important in current scenario. With the advent of various structured products in the financial market, it is important to understand the intrinsic nature of a product. Without this understanding, there can be fatal error in accounting. In-depth understanding of the product is required before one judges its accounting treatment. Many times, implication of certain clauses in such agreements are not known even to the management of the company and in the process they are not aware of risks the organisation is exposed to. It is the duty of the auditors to go into the important terms and conditions of such products and if necessary, make management aware of the substance and its implication. In a situation where audit firm does not have internal expertise in understanding such products, one should not shy away from taking help of another fellow member or an expert. Many frauds happen when substance is different than form. Auditors need to keep in mind that form of instrument should not over-shadow its substance. An audit team needs to have proper training, so that such instances can be detected to make appropriate adjustments in accounting.

5. Professional Judgment:
With so many quality control (auditing) standards and importance given to documentation, audit is becoming a rule-based exercise and many times lacks proper application of mind. Here, I am not trying to undermine importance of documentation. It is important to have proper documentation to prove that proper audit was conducted and to avoid charge of negligence. At the same time, professional judgment is also important, which is gained by experience. Professional judgment is an art and is an important element of any audit.

An experienced auditor is aware of the need to develop a rapport with key personnel of the organisation without compromising independence. It is important to have constructive conversation with key employees in departments other than finance. Many times such interaction gives important clues to something wrong happening in the accounting. A Latin meaning of the word ‘Audit’ is ‘he hears’ and this quality of hearing others is important part of audit. The acquisition of technical knowledge and skill, no matter how extensive, will take one so far and no further. Good auditors are those who have developed their intuitive skills in a manner that technical knowledge can be applied in a given situation. Professional judgment is also to be applied in ascertaining that audit findings are material enough to affect true and fairness of the financial statements presented. For materiality, one should not merely go by percentage of profit or sales, but should apply his professional judgment for correct reporting on the financial statements.

Substantive Tests:

Substantive test is one of the important audit tests performed. It is a test of transactions and balances, and other procedures such as an analytical review, which provides audit evidence as to the completeness, accuracy and validity of financial information contained in the accounting records. The nature, extent and timing of the tests are determined by the degree of reliance which the auditor can place on the internal and operational controls.

Successful of audit depends upon proper selection of samples. Nowadays, substantive tests are conducted in a routine manner. Samples are chosen on the basis of random number selections. What is missing is proper designing of substantive tests. There should be intelligent selection of samples based on the review of main ledger accounts and after conducting analytical review. One should also remember that vouching has its place in audit, though this method of audit testing is time-consuming. By vouching the auditor goes behind the accounting records and traces the entries to their source. Where the internal controls system is weak, vouching may not be effective as the information may have been purposely entered and may be contrary to the facts. In case of a reasonable internal control in place, vouching should be carried out of key operational areas.

Before I conclude I would strongly recommend that the auditor should ensure that the business carried on by the auditee is authorised by its objects clause and the various authorities within the company operate within their sanctioned prescribed limits.

Conclusion

The challenge is to have a blend of basic and modern techniques for an effective audit. Basics of audit should not be forgotten whilst implementing modern audit techniques and approach.

Revision u/s.264 — Additional Evidence

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 U/s.264 of the Income-tax Act, the Commissioner is
empowered to revise any order passed by an authority subordinate to him, either
of his own motion or on an application by the assessee for revision. Such
revision order is to be passed after calling for the record of the proceeding in
which the order has been passed, and making inquiry or causing inquiries to be
made.

1.2 The issue has come up before the Courts as to whether,
while considering an application for revision, the Commissioner can take into
account any material or evidence which was not placed before the Assessing
Officer or lower authority passing the order, or events subsequent to the order
sought to be revised.

1.3 While the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts have taken the
view that the Commissioner can take into account such evidence, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view that the Commissioner can consider
only such evidence as was before the subordinate authority who has passed the
order sought to be revised.

2. Phool Lata Somani’s case :


2.1 The issue had arisen before the Calcutta High Court in
the case of Smt. Phool Lata Somani v. CIT, 276 ITR 216.

2.2 In this case, the assessee had made certain investments
in respect of which proof of investment had not been filed before the Assessing
Officer, not even during assessment proceedings. No deduction had therefore been
allowed by the Assessing Officer in respect of such investments.

2.3 The assessee filed a revision application to the
Commissioner u/s.264, claiming deduction in respect of such investment, and
furnished the particulars of investment along with the application for revision.
The Commissioner declined to entertain the revision application on the ground
that the assessee failed to produce the evidence relating to the investment made
by her before the Assessing Officer, despite an opportunity being given to do
so.

2.4 The assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court
challenging such rejection of her revision application. Before the High Court,
on behalf of the assessee it was claimed that the order of the Commissioner was
bad in law as the Commissioner failed to consider the scope and purview of S.
264, which is wider than the power vested u/s.263. It was claimed that the
Commissioner ought to have inquired into the matter as to whether the assessee
failed to produce evidence or furnish particulars. It was further pointed out
that the assessee produced copies of the document showing investments which are
required to be exempted and therefore all required particulars were furnished
with the application for revision. Though it was true that at the time of
assessment the assessee could not produce the document for a variety of reasons,
it was urged that in exercise of his plenary jurisdiction, the Commissioner
should have done justice by allowing the assessee to furnish the document so as
to get the exemption. According to the assessee, the term ‘records’ meant such
records as are available at the time of the decision of the Commissioner, not
limited to the records at the time of passing order by the Assessing Officer.

2.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued before the Court
that the power u/s.264 was absolutely a discretionary power, and the
Commissioner, after having perused records and report furnished by the Assessing
Officer, thought it fit not to interfere with the order passed by the Assessing
Officer. According to the Revenue, the Commissioner in lawful exercise of
jurisdiction had found that the assessee was always a defaulter, and in spite of
opportunity being given, the documents of investment and particulars thereof
were not shown. As such, the Commissioner did not give a premium to the lapses
or laches of the assessee.

2.6 The Court noted the difference between the powers u/s.263
and those u/s.264, particularly the fact that while the power u/s.263 could not
be applied at the instance of the assessee or even at the instance of the
Revenue, but only by the Commissioner himself, the power u/s.264 could be
exercised by the Commissioner, either of his own motion or on an application by
the assessee. It noted that in the case before it, the assessee had made the
application. It was the duty coupled with the power of the Commissioner to make
an inquiry or call for records for inquiry.

2.7 According to the Calcutta High Court, this provision
could be invoked on the application of the assessee for his benefit or for
prejudice. Upon inquiry if it was found that the assessee had been prejudiced by
any order of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner could undo such wrong with
this power by adopting appropriate, just and lawful measure. The Calcutta High
Court noted that the Kerala High Court had examined the scope of the power
u/s.264 in the case of Parekh Brothers v. CIT, 150 ITR 105. It had taken
the view that the regional power conferred on the Commissioner u/s.264 was very
wide, and that he had the discretion to grant or refuse relief and the power to
pass such order in revision as he thought fit. The discretion, which the
Commissioner had to exercise, was undoubtedly to be exercised judicially, not
arbitrarily according to his fancy.

2.8 Therefore, according to the Calcutta High Court, there
was nothing in S. 264 which placed a restriction on the Commissioner’s
revisional power to give relief to the assessee in a case where the assessee
detected mistakes after the assessment was completed, on account of which he was
over assessed. According to the Court, it was open to the Commissioner to
entertain even a new ground not urged before the lower authorities while
exercising revisional powers.

2.9 According to the Court, the Commissioner, instead of relying solely on the reports of the records of the case, should have made inquiry considering the documents placed before him by the assessee. At least this should have been reflected in the order that he had taken note on the date of making application of the revision, of the tax exempt investment. The Court was of the view that there could have been a variety of reasons for not producing evidence at the time of the assessment; this did not mean that the assessee was precluded from produc-ing evidence of contemporaneous nature at a later stage by filing an application for revision.

2.10 According to the Calcutta High Court, the power of the Commissioner u/ s.264 was to do justice, to prevent miscarriage of justice being rendered. From the records, it appeared that the assessee produced unimpeachable documents showing investment which was otherwise eligible to be taken note of for grant of deduction, and if it had been allowed by the Commissioner, then the assessee would not have suffered over-assessment.

2.11 The Calcutta High Court was therefore of the view that the Commissioner had unjustly refused to entertain the assessee’s application, and therefore the Court set aside the order of the Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for deciding the matter afresh on merits.

2.12 A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramdev Exports v. CIT, 251 ITR 873. In this case, the assessee had not claimed deduction u/s.80HHC at the time when the returns were filed. The income returned by the assessee had been accepted by the Assessing Officer u/s.143(3), and therefore the Commissioner rejected the revision application without going into the merits of the deduction claimed. The Gujarat High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner, directing the Commissioner to reconsider the application on merits.

3. M. S. Raju’s  case:

3.1 The issue again came up recently for consideration before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. S. Raju v. Dy. CIT, 216 CTR (AP) 203.

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a film producer, and certain damages of Rs 30 lakhs were claimed from him for late release of the film. These damages pertained to incomes which were offered to tax in AY. 2001-02, though the dispute arose after the end of the previous year and the amount was ultimately settled and paid after the end of the previous year.

3.3 The liability was not recorded in the accounts relating to AY. 2001-02, nor was there any reference to such amount in the audit report. The assessee however claimed deduction of such amount from its taxable income, which claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the dis-allowance on the ground that the dispute continued till October 2001. The Tribunal held that the liability did not accrue during the relevant previous year, and therefore could not be allowed as a deduction.

3.5 For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee filed its return of income without claiming deduction of such damages. The assessment order was completed u/s.143(3) without any claim for such deduction. The assessee filed a revision application u/ s.264 before the Commissioner, requesting him to direct the Assessing Officer to allow deduction of Rs.30 lakhs paid as damages.

3.6 The Commissioner rejected the assessee’s revision application holding that the assessment order for A.Y. 2002-03 made no reference to any claim for deduction of Rs.30 lakhs having been made by the assessee, and that since no such issue arose in the assessment proceedings, the subject matter of the petition had no bearing on the assessment made for A.Y. 2002-03.

3.7 Before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the Commis-sioner had refused to exercise jurisdiction merely on a technical ground, which had resulted in denial of a genuine deduction available to the assessee. It was further argued that the Assessing Officer, in his assessment order for A.Y. 2001-02, had accepted that the liability for compensation had arisen during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2002-03, and that the Revenue could not now be permitted to totally deny the relief.

3.8 The Andhra  Pradesh High Court examined the provisions of S. 264 for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Commissioner was entitled to examine the question raised for the  first  time  before  him which did not form part of the record before the Assessing Officer or even part of the order of assessment. The Court noted the explanation to S. 263(1) substituted by the. Finance Act, 1988 with effect from 1st June 1988, which defined the word ‘record’ to include all records relating to any proceedings under the Act available at the time of examination by the Commissioner, and the absence of similar provision u/ s.264.

3.9 According to the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the omission to insert a similar definition of the word ‘record’ in S. 264, while inserting this defini-tion in S. 263, was significant. The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressed its inability to agree with the opinion of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramdev Exports (supra), since the conscious omis-sion by Parliament to insert a provision in S. 264 similar to explanation (b) of S. 263(1) was not
noticed by the Gujarat High Court. It also did not agree with the opinion of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Phool Lata Somani’s case.

3.10 The Andhra Pradesh High Court therefore held that the term ‘record’ u/s.264 was only the record of proceedings before the assessing authority, and as the assessee had not claimed any such deduction in the return filed before the assessing authority, he was held not to be entitled to raise this question for the first time in revision proceedings u/ s.264. The Andhra Pradesh High Court therefore dismissed the assessee’s writ petition.

4. Observations:

4.1 In the case of CRT v. Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products & Camphor Works, 231 ITR 53, in the context of S. 263, the Supreme Court held as under:

“It, therefore, cannot be said, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent, that the correct and settled legal position, with respect to the meaning of the word ‘record’ till 1st June 1988 was that it meant the record which was available to the ITO at the time of passing of the assessment order. Further, we did not think that such a narrow interpretation of the word ‘record’ was justified in view of the object of the provision and the nature and scope of the powers conferred upon the CIT. The revisional power conferred on the CIT u/ s.263 is of wide amplitude. It enables the CIT to call for and examine the record of any proceeding under the Act. It empowers the CIT to make or cause to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary in order to find out if any order passed by the AO is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. After examining the record and after making or causing to be made an inquiry if he considers the order to be erroneous, then he can pass the order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify. Obviously, as a result of the inquiry, he may come in possession of new material and he would be entitled to take the new material into account. If the material, which was not available to the ITO at the time he made the assessment, could thus be taken into consideration by the CIT after holding an enquiry, there is no reason why the material which has already come on record, though subsequent to the making of the assessment, cannot be taken into consideration by him. Moreover, in view of the clear words used in clause (b) of the explanation to S. 263(1), it has to be held that while calling for and examining the record of any proceeding u/s.263(1), it is and it was open to the CIT, not only to consider the record of that proceeding but also the record relating to that proceeding available to him at the time  of examination…….”

4.2 From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the term ‘record’ has been held to include subsequent records as well, not only on account of the explanation, but on account of the scheme and purpose of S. 263.

4.3 The reason for insertion of the explanation to S. 263(1) was to overcome the issue of different Court decisions. The mere fact that no similar amendment was carried out to S. 264 does not mean that the term ‘record’ for that-Section has a totally different meaning. In the context of S. 264, there was no such controversy till the amendment to S. 263, and therefore no reason for any such amendment.

4.4 As  rightly observed by  the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts, the purpose of S. 264 is to do justice to the assessee. If a technical and narrow view is taken of the record permitted to be considered by the Commissioner, it will result in a mis-carriage of justice, and defeat the very purpose of that Section.

4.5 As noted by the Supreme Court in the context . of S. 263, the very fact that even u/ s.264, the Commissioner is permitted not only to examine the record, but also to make enquiries, which could throw up additional facts, clearly indicates that he can consider all facts which are before him, and not merely the facts which were before the Assessing Officer. No purpose would be served by the Commissioner making enquiries if he is not allowed to consider the facts arising out of the enquiries.

4.6 Therefore, the ratio of the decisions of the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts seem to represent the better view of the matter, that the Commissioner can  examine all the  facts  and  record before  him while  passing an order u/ s.264.

Impact of IFRS on Banks

Accountant Abroad

International accounting standards will make it harder for
banks to keep assets off their balance sheets, a UK regulator said on Monday,
while the United States continues to mull whether to broaden its use of foreign
rules.

Under current U.S. accounting rules, companies can keep
certain loans, such as those linked to risky mortgages and credit card debt, in
off-balance sheet vehicles known as ‘qualified special purpose entities’ (QSPEs).

The United Kingdom adheres to international financial
reporting standards (IFRS), which have more flexible accounting rules, but have
forced firms to include more assets on their books. It is said that having a
precise rule may be advantageous, but a precise rule also makes it possible to
design something that is precisely just outside the rule. Therefore the more
principles-based approach under IFRS adopted under UK (Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles) makes it much more difficult to design something in such
a way that it is off-balance sheet.

Few companies that have to adopt international accounting
standards have had to put about 200 off-balance sheet entities back on their
books. Many of the vehicles that were brought back on the balance sheet were
originally created using U.S. accounting rules and “a lot” were set up as QSPEs.
The SEC is examining whether to allow domestic companies to use international
standards instead of U.S. accounting rules.

Foreign-listed firms in the United States can already forego
U.S. standards for international rules and the SEC is expected to come up with a
“roadmap” to broaden use of IFRS. The treatment of off-balance sheet items is
one of many accounting methods that is being examined and debated.

The U.S. accounting rule maker, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, will soon propose to eliminate the QSPEs. However, the board
has delayed the implementation of the rule change and said it should take effect
for reporting periods after November 15, 2009.

China pushes forward producing accounting, auditing and financing talents :

China’s three National Accounting Institutes are to teach
annually 100,000 people and help them become senior professionals in accounting,
auditing, and financing over the next five to ten years.

Meanwhile, another 1,000 will receive training and teaching
from the three institutes and reach an international level of competence each
year, according to the Chairman of the Institutes’ board of directors.

He raised these two ambitious goals after a board meeting
recently, which analysed the achievements and experiences of the institutes over
the past ten years.

Beijing National Accounting Institute was the first of the
three to be founded in 1998, and had taught more than 130,000 people over the
past decade, averaging 13,000 per year, according to figures from the
institute’s journal. The other two are in the eastern metropolis of Shanghai and
the coastal city of Xiamen, founded in 2000 and 2002, respectively.

Led and supported by multiple state departments, the
institutes are expected to produce talents in accounting, auditing and
financing, who will work as experts and professionals in the country’s
macro-economy management departments, large and medium-sized enterprises and
financial organisations.

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IFRS implementation Û Auditors’ Training

Accountant Abroad

Earning your stripes as a certified public accountant is not
an easy job. This is about to get even more complicated as the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission is moving toward adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

There is going to be a scramble to train people who are in or
headed for financial accounting careers. Plus, there will be a host of issues
that arise for the profession: Training institutes and firms will be stretched
to prepare auditors for the switch. Accounting firms may face new legal
liability. And, investors will have a new breed of financial statements to
study. There’s work ahead for all involved.


Principle-based v. rule-based :


One thing most accountants have probably learned is this :
U.S. GAAP largely is considered a rules-based set of standards, while IFRS is
considered more principles-based and, therefore, subject to more interpretation.
This requires that accountants know business, the economics behind transactions
and the accountant’s responsibility to society to report things that reflect
economic reality. Without this knowledge, data could be presented in ways that
could be misunderstood or misleading. If rules are going to be less specific,
then intent needs to be understood.

Will professors focus more on principles and the conceptual
framework for the rules rather than on the rules themselves ? But will there be
time to teach anything but regulations and the how-to mechanics of accounting ?
These questions remain un- answered.

There is a need to graduate students who know more ‘canon’
than context since partners and managers can do the interpretive work. There is
a requirement for entry-level people who know enough rules to be effective when
sent out on a job. Most agree that principles will be of increasing importance
in training the next generation of accountants as there is more judgment needed
in applying IFRS.

However, this does not take away the fact that focus needs to
be on the conceptual framework, which is more heavily relied upon in IFRS.
Professors can round out this knowledge by comparing IFRS specifics to those of
U.S. GAAP.

This brings in the issue of litigation. One can take a legal
stand when it comes to rules by saying that ‘These are the rules. We made sure
the company conformed to them.’ This is not the same with principles. They can
be interpreted differently, and the interpretation that seemed like a good idea
during audit might not look as good in front of a jury. In light of legal
issues, the shift to fewer rules and more principles will prompt accountants to
hone skills in documenting interpretations and procedures clearly and concisely,
resulting in the entry-level person turning into a critical thinker and a good
writer.

The other point to ponder is discussions between auditors and
corporate management over disclosures and unqualified financial statements. IFRS
may give managers more power in negotiating with auditors over rules’
interpretation and adverse opinions in statements. Issuing an audit opinion is
the auditor’s discretion including the type of opinion to issue. However, there
is a school of thought which opines that this could result in additional
disclosures in the financial statements whether by way of a footnote or
otherwise. If this takes place, then investors will need to work harder to
understand the financial health of companies they’re researching.

World-class catch-up :

Since 2005, companies in the European Union have been
adhering to IFRS, a circumstance that some feel puts U.S. markets at a
disadvantage. “Banks are interested in IFRS because U.S. regulations place a
significant cost on firms.”

GAAP compliance makes U.S. markets more expensive places to
raise capital and less competitive than foreign markets. That was particularly
true for foreign firms, as they had to reconcile statements to U.S. GAAP prior
to this past January, when the SEC dropped the GAAP-reconciliation requirement.
The fact that the SEC said it’s OK to file under IFRS is tantamount to saying
those standards are acceptable.

IFRS may soon be acceptable for U.S. securities issuers, too.
The SEC voted on August 27, 2007 to publish for public comment a proposed
roadmap that could lead to the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers beginning in 2014.
The proposed multi-year plan sets out several milestones that, if achieved,
could lead to the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers in their filings with the
commission. With market globalisation as a driver, the push to bring U.S.
accounting in line with international standards is definitely on. This is going
to result in a requirement for much more robust IFRS education. Academics expect
IFRS questions to first appear on the CPA exam this year. Convergence between
the two standards — U.S. GAAP and IFRS — already is under way.

(Source : knowledge.Wpcarey.com)

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Security alert

Accountant AbroadLately there
have been quite a few reported cases of lost customer data both in the
government or public sector domain as well as in private corporate sector. This
is forcing information security up the corporate agenda.

It seems as though with every new day comes a fresh
revelation of an organisation that has lost some customer data. First there was
the loss by Revenue & Customs Department of two discs containing details of 25
million child benefit recipients. Then the Ministry of Defence admitted that
details of 600,000 applicants to the armed forces were stolen from a laptop in
the boot of a naval officer’s car. Those were just the two largest such
revelations in the UK. There have been many others, such as the loss by the
vehicle registrar in Northern Ireland of the personal details of more than 6,000
car owners.

It is not only government bodies that are failing to protect
customer data. Private businesses are also struggling. To give just two examples
in insurance industry, Norwich Union has lost £3m of customer money through
identity fraud, and Nationwide lost a laptop containing 11m customers’ details.
There are signs that cases such as these are finally driving the issue of data
security up the corporate agenda, forcing senior executives to consider the many
ways in which sensitive data can go astray.

Perhaps the most obvious way to lose data is through the
physical loss of a storage device such as a laptop, a disc or an external hard
drive. According to recent research, business travellers in the UK lose a
staggering 8,500 laptops and other mobile devices in UK airports every year.
Stockport Primary Care Trust recently revealed that it lost the personal medical
records of 4,000 NHS patients on a USB stick.

Helen Hart, a senior associate at law firm Stevens & Bolton
LLP, says : “Data should only be able to be copied over to portable storage
devices with the consent of the company and with such data being passworded. As
passwords can be cracked quite easily by experienced hackers, data should be
encrypted if possible. Organisations that already encrypt information should use
the most up-to-date technology as older methods are easier to hack.”

According to Jim Fulton, vice-president of marketing at
Digital Persona, more and more companies are beginning to use fingerprint
biometric technology. He says : ‘The technology has evolved and is now more
reliable and durable, as well as more affordable and practical. Fingerprint
readers are being embedded into an increasing number of mobile devices like
phones, PDAs, laptops and even USB memory sticks.’

However, for most data it is not necessary to go this far.
Secure encryption is by and large very simple and affordable. In fact, as Jim
Selby, European product manager for Kingston Technology, points out : “The most
shocking aspect of the loss of 25m records by the Revenue, the data on the two
discs could easily have been stored on an inexpensive and easy to use encrypted
two gigabyte USB drive costing just about £ 65.”

Last year, US clothing retailer TJX, had 45m records stolen
in what is perhaps the largest corporate data theft on record. The thieves
managed this by simply parking outside one of the company’s shops and accessing
its wireless Internet system. As Mario Zini, business development director at
Claranet, says : ‘Companies are making ever greater use of the Internet, and
this is exposing their data to ever greater risk.’

Most corporates are now well used to fending off hackers.
Patrick Walsh, director of product management and marketing for eSoft, outlines
the extent of the attacks : “If you put a computer on the public Internet, it
will be scanned by hackers within minutes. If a service such as a Secure Shell
server is publicly available, it is likely to be a matter of minutes before
hackers attempt common username and password combinations at fast rates. An
unpatched Windows machine on the public Internet without a firewall will be
compromised in under 10 minutes.”

He goes on to outline the following steps that companies can
take to protect their systems : “Antivirus scanning must happen for all files
that come into an organisation, not just those that arrive as email attachments.
Websites known to host phishing attacks, malware, and exploits should be
blocked. This list must be updated in real time. Peer-to-peer and instant
messaging applications should be strictly controlled. Email with phishing
attacks should be blocked before it reaches the end user. All confidential data
between home offices, branch offices, and headquarters should be encrypted and
sent over a virtual private network.”

While those technical enhancements will go a long way towards
protecting a company’s customer data, on their own they are not sufficient.
Martha Bennett, research director at Datamonitor, says : “Information security
is much like physical security. Whatever sophisticated alarm systems a home
owner puts in place, burglars will always find a way in if they try hard
enough.” Any business that wants to protect its customer data needs to go beyond
a purely technical solution to implement proper processes and training.

David Cole, security consultant at risk management
specialists DNV IT Global Services, says : “One of the main areas where
organisations fall down in securing information is lack of employee training.
Many have focussed on installing the latest technology to protect their data
while not addressing the weakest link in any organisation — employees
themselves. Good training can bring the threat of data theft alive for
employees, to help them understand and advocate information security policy.”

Providing  this  training  is far  from  simple.  The threats  change  on an almost  daily basis, and few people are sufficiently enthused  by data security to maintain   a focus  on  it.  Joe  Fantuzi,   CEO  of Workshare, describes how one of his products  can help:  “The  key is continual  reinforcement.   Our Workshare Protect scans all documents  leaving the system  to check for any sensitive  data,  and  then asks the user if he or she actually wants  to send it out. Google recently sent out a Power Point presention that  contained  confidential  information  on projected financials in the speaker notes. If they’d used our system they would probably have been spared this embarrassment.”

Clearly, there is much to be done. William McKinney, marketing director of Sterling Commerce, stresses the importance of building a strategy. “Companies tend to be reactive,” he says “Don’t just leap on the latest threat in the media. – Take time to look at your business and work out where the threats lie. Where are your points of weakness? Which is the most sensitive data ?”

Devising and implementing this strategy is a long-term project that will require most businesses to invest significant quantities of time and money. However, a growing number of businesses are sufficiently concerned by the threats of not only fines from regulators, but also negative media coverage that they are starting to act. It is not before time.

Better  data  security  in seven  steps:

    1. Classify your data according to its sensitivity and confidentiality to ensure that the security measures are appropriate to the risk.

    2. Perform a formal risk assessment to identify security vulnerabilities and to ensure appropriate risk mitigation.

    3. Embed formal accountability for data security in job descriptions.

    4. Employ appropriate tools such as encryption and biometrics where sensitivity or confidentiality is a key issue.

    5. Ensure the corporate audit committee has information security as a key item on its agenda.

    6. Encourage the board to recognise its final accountability for security. It needs to ask the right questions and allocate appropriate resources.

    7. Provide all staff with repeated education and reminders about their responsibility for security.

(Source:    accountancymagazine.com/March2008)

Surety’s liability : where liability of principal debtor is extinguished, the surety’s liability gets automatically terminated – contract act s. 128

New Page 1

4 Surety’s liability : where liability of
principal debtor is extinguished, the surety’s liability gets automatically
terminated : contract act s. 128.


In the instant case, the suit against the principal debtor
was dismissed for default and decision became final. Therefore, under law, there
was no liability surviving against debtor for realisation of amount due to the
creditor.

 

The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that once the liability of
principal debtor was extinguished, the sureties’ liability gets automatically
terminated. Therefore, without making the principal debtor liable for payment of
amount to the creditor, the sureties cannot be made liable for recovery of the
amount.

 

A surety is a person who comes forward to pay the amount in
the event of the borrower failing to pay the amount, unless it is held by a
competent Court through a decree that he is not liable to pay the amount due to
the creditor and when he denies the liability, it becomes difficult for the
creditor to realise the amount. In the event of a decree in favour of the
creditor against the principal borrower, the wings of the decree can also be
extended against the sureties as their liability is co-extensive with the
principal debtor. Once there is a decree, the creditor is at liberty to proceed
either against the principal borrower or sureties, provided that the remedy of
the surety is available for recovery of the amount against the principal debtor
after payment of the amount to the creditor.

[M/s. Kurnool Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. P. Narasimha &
Ors.,
AIR 2008 AP 38.]

 


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Unfair trade practice by car manufacturer : Consumer Protection Act. S. 2(1)(r) and S. 2(1)(g)

New Page 1

5 Unfair trade practice by car manufacturer :
Consumer Protection Act. S. 2(1)(r) and S. 2(1)(g).


The consumer purchased a Mercedez Benz, a luxurious car :
There was one manufacturing defect pointed out, which required repeated repairs
after its purchase. It was held that the consumer was entitled to get
replacement or refund of purchase price of car. Non-replacement of vehicle would
tantamount to unfair trade practice.

[M/s. Controls & Switchgear Company Ltd. v. M/s. Daimler-Chrysler India
Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 385 (NCC)]

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Precedent : Constitution of India, Article 141

New Page 1

3 Precedent : Constitution of India, Article
141.


Every decision contains three basic postulates : (a) findings
of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is
the inference which the judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (b)
statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed
by the facts; and (c) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A
decision is an authority for what it actually decides What is of the essence in
a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein, nor what flows
logically from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of
the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is
alone binding as a precedent. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as
Euclid’s theorems, nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of
their context.

[Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Rajkumari & Ors.,
AIR 2008 SC 403]

 


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Adoption : Law does not recognise an adoption by a Hindu of any person other than a Hindu: Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 6

New Page 1

1 Adoption : Law does not recognise an
adoption by a Hindu of any person other than a Hindu: Hindu Adoption &
Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 6.


The petitioner Kumar Sursen, who was then a minor had filed
the petition for grant of caste certificate and residential certificate on basis
that he was the adopted son of Kamal Prasad Roy and was residing with him at
village Madarpur in the district of Vaishali. The district authorities had
dismissed the petition, on the ground that the petitioner was in fact a Muslim
boy named Sahadat and is the natural son of Majid Mian and Ayesha Khatoon. The
petitioner’s case was that he was adopted by Kamal Prasad Roy. The said Kamal
Prasad Roy does not dispute the above fact. He, accordingly, wanted this boy to
have this caste and his residential certificates.

 

The Patna High Court held that under the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 6 thereof permits adoption by a Hindu of a Hindu child
alone. Law does not recognise an adoption by a Hindu of any person other than a
Hindu. If that be so, the adoption, as sought to be done in respect of the
petitioner by Kamal Prasad Roy, has no legal sanctity, though it may be morally
binding between the parties. If that be so, then unfortunately the boy cannot
get the caste certificate of his alleged adoptive parents. Similarly, he cannot
get a residential certificate and both cannot be granted in his name showing him
son of Kamal Prasad Roy.

 

Writ application was dismissed, as such giving liberty to the
petitioner or his alleged adoptive parents to approach for grant of requisite
certificate.

[ Kumar Sursen v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2008
Patna 24]

HUF recovery of loan : Karta of HUF can enter into contract for mortgage of undivided share of his minor son for legal necessity

New Page 1

2 HUF recovery of loan : Karta of HUF can
enter into contract for mortgage of undivided share of his minor son for legal
necessity.


The undivided share of the appellant in the joint Hindu
family was mortgaged by his father as karta for family business and for legal
necessity. At the time of availing of the loan, the appellant was a minor. The
respondent bank filed the original application against five borrowers for
recovery of Rs.67 lakhs. The Debts Recovery Tribunal held in favour of the bank.
Thereafter, the bank proceeded to recover the due amount by putting to auction
the mortgaged property. The appellant preferred objections before the Recovery
Officer. Which were rejected by the Recovery Officer.

 

On appeal, the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal dismissed the
appeal, holding that the debt had not been raised by the appellant’s father as a
karta for his personal benefit and had not been taken for immoral or illegal
purposes. The loan and credit facilities were availed of by the appellant’s
father as karta of the joint Hindu family very much for legal necessity that is
family business. The appellant could challenge the mortgage with regard to his
share only on establishing that the mortgage had been created without legal
necessity or that it was tainted with illegaility or immorality. The mortgage
was binding on the appellant.

 

The property belonging to a joint family is ordinarily
managed by the father or other senior member for the time being of the family.
The manager of a joint Hindu family is called the karta. So long as the members
of a family remain undivided, the senior member of the family is entitled to
manage the family property. The karta or manager has the power to contract debts
for family purpose and family business. A joint Hindu family may have no
business at all, and yet debts may be contracted by the manager for a joint
family purpose. Such debts are binding on other members. Besides the power to
contract debts for the family business, the manager has the power of making
contracts, giving receipts and compromising or discharging claims ordinarily
incidental to the business. Indeed without a general power of that kind, it
would be impossible to carry on the business. The power of the manager of a
joint Hindu family to alienate the joint family property is analogous to that of
a manager for an infant heir. The manger of a joint Hindu family has the power
to alienate for value, joint Hindu family property, so as to bind the interest
of both adults and minors in the property, provided that the alienation is made
for legal necessity for the benefit of the estate.

[ Rajat Pangaria v. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur &
Ors.,
(2008) 141 Comp Cas 323 (DRAT) (Delhi)]

 


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ICAI’s announcement on accounting for derivatives – Practical issues and challenges

Accounting Standards

Application of AS-30, Financial Instruments: Recognition and
Measurement is recommendatory from 1-4-2009 and mandatory from 1-4-2011.
However, in the meanwhile various regulatory authorities were concerned about
the manner in which derivative losses were being accounted for. To ensure that
losses on account of exposure to derivatives are duly provided in financial
statements, the ICAI has recently issued an Announcement on accounting of
derivatives. The Announcement is applicable to all derivatives except for
forward exchange contracts covered under AS-11, The Effects of Changes in
Foreign Exchange Rates. The Announcement applies to financial statements for the
period ending on or after 31 March, 2008. The Announcement prescribes following
accounting guidance for derivatives :


• Entities should do accounting for all derivatives in
accordance with AS-30. In case AS-30 is followed by the entity, a disclosure
of the amounts recognised in the financial statements should be made.

• In case an entity does not follow AS-30, the entity
should mark-to-market all the outstanding derivative contracts on the balance
sheet date. The resulting mark-to-market losses should be provided for keeping
in view the principle of prudence as enunciated in AS-1, Disclosure of
Accounting Policies.

• The entity should disclose the policy followed with
regard to accounting for derivatives in its financial statements.

• In case AS-30 is not followed, the losses provided for
should be separately disclosed by the entity.

• In case of derivatives covered under AS-11, that standard
would apply.

• The auditors should consider making appropriate
disclosures in their reports if the aforesaid accounting treatment and
disclosures are not made.

The objective of ICAI in providing clarification on
accounting for derivative is to ensure that financial statements reflect a true
and fair picture of the financial position. The Announcement comes at the fag
end of the financial year and leaves very little time for corporates to
implement it. Derivative deals are complex and companies will require time to
ensure proper fair valuation of such contracts.

Accounting Standards are required to be notified under the
Companies (Accounting Standard) Rules, 2006. In the absence of the Announcement
being notified under the Act, the question of its legal validity arises.
Companies may argue that they are not bound to comply with accounting treatment
prescribed in the Announcements. However, auditors are required to qualify the
accounts, if an ICAI Announcement is not followed. Companies wanting to avoid a
qualification from the auditor are indirectly forced to comply. The Announcement
therefore creates a surrogate rather than a legal requirement for companies to
follow. The author believes that due process of law has been by-passed.

The Announcement prescribes that accounting for derivatives
can be done in accordance with AS-30. Should AS-30 be early adopted in its
entirety or is the early adoption limited to accounting principles relating to
derivatives and hedge accounting ? AS-30 is not yet notified in the Companies
(Accounting Standard) Rules, 2006. If AS-30 has to be adopted in its entirety,
it will conflict with some existing accounting standards notified in the
Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006, such as accounting for investments
under AS-13 and accounting for forward contracts under AS-11. On the other hand,
AS-30 cannot be applied selectively for derivative and hedges, since it
contradicts the requirement of the Indian GAAP framework which prohibits
selective application of standards. This dichotomy is insoluble.

The Announcement is based on the framework of ‘Prudence’. If
prudence is all that it takes to make financial statements true and fair, then
it begs the question, why does one need any other accounting standards ? AS-30
requires recognition of unrealised gains on derivatives as well. So also, under
AS-11, speculative contracts are marked to market and both gains and losses are
recognised. Therefore as can be seen ‘Prudence’ has been overtaken by the
framework of ‘fair valuation’. If fair value is the framework that is the
cornerstone of future accounting standards, it is illogical to issue an
Announcement based on the concept of ‘Prudence’.

The Announcement is not applicable to forward exchange
contracts covered under AS-11. To determine whether a particular derivative
contract is covered under scope of AS-11 or the announcement, it is crucial to
decide whether such derivative contract is in substance a forward exchange
contract. AS-11 defines forward exchange contract as ‘an agreement to exchange
different currencies at a forward rate’. Forward rate is defined as ‘the
specified exchange rate for exchange of two currencies at a forward rate’.
Paragraph 36 of AS-11 also states “An enterprise may enter into a forward
exchange contract or another financial instrument that is in substance a forward
contract, which is not intended for trading or speculation purposes, to
establish the amount of the reporting currency required or available at the
settlement date of a transaction”. Considering the definition of forward
contracts, it would be easy to conclude in case of derivative instruments like
plain vanilla USD-INR forward contract undertaken to hedge USD receivable is
covered under AS-11. However, whether a purchase option, written option or
option with exotic features such as knock-in-knock-out, range options, etc.
would be within the scope of AS-11 is a question mark.

The Announcement states “In case an entity does not follow
AS-30, keeping in view the principle of prudence as enunciated in AS-1 the
entity is required to provide for losses in respect of all outstanding
derivative contracts at the balance sheet date by marking them to market”. There
is no guidance given in the Announcement regarding how such losses should be
computed. Theoretically, following options are possible : (a) losses can be
computed on each contract basis (b) losses can be computed based on portfolio
basis — net loss is determined for each category of derivatives such as option
contracts or commodity contracts (c) losses can be computed on global-company
basis — net loss on entire portfolio of derivatives taken together. Guidance is
also needed on whether losses should be calculated considering fair value
changes in the derivatives only or whether offsetting gain on the hedged item
can be considered for determining net losses.

The Announcement does not clarify whether losses on embedded derivatives need to be provided or not. A corporate may incorporate a stand-alone derivative in another host contract and try to avoid recognition of losses on the derivatives.

The Announcement requires provision for mark-to-market losses. Many of the derivative instruments are proprietary products of banks, which do not have any ready market. Therefore such derivatives are rather marked to a model, which is usually bank-specific, rather than marked-to-market. Fair valuation of derivatives, particularly long-term derivatives, is likely to be highly subjective, since it would involve considerable extrapolation. In many  cases such long-term judgments do not match with the actual situation that emerges later. Hence fair valuation of illiquid instruments tends to be very unreliable. In a survey done by Ernst & Young, it was found that stock option expense as a percentage of reported results could vary as much as 40% to 155% by just tinkering with the assumptions, but within the boundaries of the Standard.

The whole issue of whether these contracts are wagering contracts is something that will be eventually settled in the court of law. It is probably too early to say if the liability will eventually devolve on the corp orates or on the bank. Neither does the Announcement cover these uncertainties, nor does it clearly state if what is being dealt with are only foreign exchange derivatives or all types of derivatives.

From the above it is evident that there are various complex issues in the implementation of the Announcement, which ICAI needs to clarify. Unless clarity is provided on the above issues, various companies will follow different accounting policies to compute losses on derivative contracts. This will hamper comparability and result in subjectivity and inconsistency in accounting for derivatives. The ICAI should defer the applicability of the Announcement till the time clarity on the above-mentioned issues is provided to the Industry. In the meanwhile, the requirement should be restricted to disclosure of derivative losses only. ICAI may also consider advancing the 2011 mandatory date for AS-30 to 2009.

Gaps in GAAP – Consolidation of Foreign Subsidiaries

Accounting Standards

Consider the following query and response.


Query :

Parent Limited (P), India, has a subsidiary S Limited,
Singapore. During the year, S Limited acquires a subsidiary — SS Limited, UK.
The GAAP followed by each of these companies are :

P Indian GAAP

S Singapore GAAP

SS UK GAAP

SS Limited uses the corridor approach for accounting pension
plans in its financial statements and the same is used by S Limited for
consolidation without any adjustments. S Ltd. computes goodwill on consolidation
as per Singapore GAAP based on fair value of net assets of SS on the date of
acquisition. For the CFS — consolidated financial statements — of P under Indian
GAAP — can net assets of SS be recorded at fair value ? Also, can the financial
statements of SS Limited be incorporated without any adjustments to pension
obligation ?

Response :

Paragraph 3 of AS-21 states that “In the preparation of CFS,
other accounting standards also apply in the same manner as they apply to the
separate financial statements.” Thus it may be noted that in the CFS, though
AS-21 permits different accounting policies they nevertheless have to be those
that are acceptable under Indian GAAP. Indian GAAP does not allow corridor
approach under AS-15 (Revised), nor can goodwill be determined using fair value.
Therefore CFS will have to be redrawn as per Indian GAAP policies. In CFS of P,
acquisition of SS will be recorded at book value and goodwill determined
accordingly. Further, all actuarial gains and losses will be accounted for and
deferral using corridor approach will not be permitted.

Moral of the story :

Wide disparities in accounting standards across borders
create unnecessary burden on preparer’s besides creating confusion in the minds
of users of financial statements. Some of us are familiar with conservative
accounting under German GAAP. Despite that, in 1993, under German GAAP
Daimler-Benz reported a profit of 168 million Deutsche Marks, but under US GAAP
for the same period, the company reported a loss of almost a billion Deutsche
Marks, largely caused by pension blues. To the user of financial statements, a
company that makes profit under Indian GAAP and loss under IFRS or vice versa
is clearly not a comprehensible situation.

It may be noted that IFRS are already adopted in the UK and
Singapore. Had India been on IFRS, Indian CFOs will not have to struggle with
multiple reports. Elimination of multiple reports is just one of the advantages
of converging to a global standard like IFRS. The ICAI’s announcement to
converge to IFRS by 2011 (actually 2010, since comparatives under IFRS would be
required) is a step in the right direction. However, lot of work to converge to
IFRS is still pending including obtaining regulatory amendments for the same and
providing clarity on income-tax issues. These milestones need to be achieved on
a war footing; otherwise the whole convergence exercise could get trapped in a
hopeless tangle.

levitra

Browsers — Part I

Gaps in GAAP – Accounting for MAT Credit

Accounting Standards

The Finance Act, 2000, w.e.f. 1-4-2001, introduced S. 115JB
according to which a company is liable to pay MAT under the provisions of the
said section in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year
commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2001. The MAT under this Section is
payable where the normal income-tax payable by such company in the previous year
is less than 10% of its book profit which is deemed to be the total income of
the company. Such company is liable to pay income-tax at the rate of 10% of its
book profit. The Finance Act, 2005, inserted Ss.(1A) to S. 115JAA, to grant tax
credit in respect of MAT paid u/s.115JB of the Act with effect from A.Y.
2006-07.


The salient features of MAT credit u/s.115JAA as applicable,
in respect of tax paid u/s.115JB, are as below :

(a) A company, which has paid MAT, would be allowed credit
in respect thereof.

(b) The amount of MAT credit would be equal to the excess
of MAT over normal income-tax for the assessment year for which MAT is paid.

(c) No interest is allowable on such credit.

(d) The MAT credit so determined u/s.115JB can be carried
forward up to seven succeeding assessment years.

(e) The amount of MAT credit can be set off only in the
year in which the company is liable to pay tax as per the normal provisions of
the Act and such tax is in excess of MAT for that year.

(f) The amount of set-off would be to the extent of excess
of normal income-tax over the amount of MAT calculated as if S. 115JB had been
applied for that assessment year for which the set-off is being allowed.


Whether MAT credit can be considered as an asset ?

As per the “Guidance Note on Accounting for Credit
Available in Respect of Minimum Alternative Tax Under the Income-tax Act, 1961″,
issued by the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
,
although MAT credit is not a deferred tax asset under AS-22, yet it gives rise
to expected future economic benefit in the form of adjustment of future
income-tax liability arising within the specified period. A question, therefore,
arises whether the MAT credit can be considered as an ‘asset’ and in case it can
be considered as an asset, whether it should be so recognised in the financial
statements.

MAT paid in a year in respect of which credit is allowed
during the specified period under the Act is a resource controlled by the
company as a result of past event, namely, the payment of MAT. MAT credit has
expected future economic benefits in the form of its adjustment against the
discharge of the normal tax liability if the same arises during the specified
period. Accordingly, the Guidance Note concluded that MAT credit is an ‘asset’.
However, it is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that the
future economic benefits associated with it will flow to the enterprise and the
asset has a cost or value that can be measured reliably.

MAT credit should be recognised as an asset only when and to
the extent there is convincing evidence that the company will pay normal
income-tax during the specified period. Such evidence may exist, for example,
where a company has, in the current year, a deferred tax liability because its
depreciation for the income-tax purposes is higher than the depreciation for
accounting purposes, but from the next year onwards, the depreciation for
accounting purposes would be higher than the depreciation for income-tax
purposes, thereby resulting in the reversal of the deferred tax liability to an
extent that the company becomes liable to pay normal income-tax.

EAC Opinion :

The Expert Advisory Committee has addressed the MAT issue in
the Compendium of Opinions, Volume XXV, Query No. 24, titled ‘Creation of
deferred tax asset in respect of MAT credit under Ss.(1A) of S. 115JAA of the
Income-tax Act, 1961.’ The EAC noted that payment of MAT does not result in any
timing differences, since it does not give any rise to any difference between
accounting income and taxable income which are arrived at before adjusting the
tax expense; viz., MAT in this case. Accordingly, it would not be correct
to recognise any deferred tax asset in respect of MAT under AS-22. The author
agrees with this view.

However, unfortunately the EAC has remained silent on whether
MAT credit can be recognised as other asset if not as deferred tax asset. In the
opinion of the author, the answer is in the affirmative in light of the
recommendations of the Guidance Note discussed above. The author recommends that
in future in order to remove any scope for doubt or confusion, the EAC should
respond to queries comprehensively.

levitra

Waiver of interest

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration


1.1 Any amount of tax, specified as payable in a notice of
demand u/s.156, is required to be paid within 30 days of the service of notice
as mandated by S. 220(1) of the Income-tax Act.

1.2 The assessee is liable to pay simple interest @ 1% for
every month or part thereof, for default in payment of the amount of tax
referred to in para 1.1 above, as per S. 220(2) of the Act. The interest levied
u/s.220(2) is to be reduced and the excess interest paid is to be refunded in
cases where the unpaid tax on which interest was levied itself is reduced on
account of orders u/s.154, u/s.155, u/s.245D, u/s. 250, u/s.254, u/s.260A,
u/s.262 and u/s.264.

1.3 A provision has been made for reduction or waiver of the
interest levied or leviable u/s.220(2) by insertion of S. 220(2A) w.e.f.
1-10-1994 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment ) Act, 1984 where-under the CBDT and
now the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is empowered to reduce or waive the
interest u/s.220(2) on satisfaction of the conditions specified therein.

1.4 The said S. 220(2A) reads as under :

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss.(2), the Chief
Commissioner or Commissioner may reduce or waive the amount of interest paid
or payable by the assessee under the said sub-section if he is satisfied
that :

(i) payment of such amount has caused or would cause
genuine hardship to the assessee;

(ii) default in the payment of the amount on which
interest has been paid or was payable under the said sub-section was due to
the circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and

(iii) the assessee has co-operated in any inquiry
relating to the assessment or any proceeding for the recovery of any amount
due from him.”


1.5 In the context of S. 220(2A), the issue that has come up
for consideration of the Courts, repetitively, is, whether an assessee is
obliged to satisfy all the three conditions laid down in S. 220(2A) for
reduction or waiver of interest or that compliance of any one or two of them
will enable the assessee to seek reduction or waiver of interest. In short, the
issue that is for consideration is whether the compliance of three conditions
specified in S. 220(2A) is cumulative or alternative. Recently, the Karnataka
High Court dissenting from the view of the Kerala, Allahabad and Madras High
Courts held that cumulative compliance of the three conditions is not required
for being eligible for reduction or waiver of interest u/s.220(2A) of the Act.

2. Ramapati Singhania’s case :


2.1 In the case of Ramapati Singhania, 234 ITR 655 (All), the
assessee’s application, made u/s.220(2A), for waiver of interest was rejected
for non-compliance of some of the conditions of the said Section. In the writ
petition filed by the assessee, he inter alia pleaded before the High
Court that for the purposes of seeking a waiver u/s.220(2A) it was not necessary
for him to have complied with all the conditions of the said Section and that he
was eligible for the requested waiver even in circumstances where some of the
conditions of the said Section stood complied with. It was emphasised that
payment of tax on capital gains without permitting the set-off of the amount to
which the petitioner was entitled u/s.50B of the Estate Duty Act, caused genuine
hardship to the assessee and thus the petitioner was justified in not making the
payment of taxes in time.

2.2 The Allahabad High Court observed that to avail of the
benefit, it was for the person seeking the relief to make out a case that the
requirements of those provisions were fulfilled and that on a plain reading of
that provision, it was evident that all the three conditions set out therein
must be satisfied cumulatively and if any of these requirements were wanting in
a given case, the discretion to reduce or waive, might be legitimately refused.

2.3 The Court accordingly upheld the action of the
authorities in denying the waiver of interest charged for delayed payment of
taxes.

3. M. V. Amar Shetty’s case :


3.1 In M. V. Amar Shetty v. CCIT & Anr., 219 CTR 141 (Karn.),
the assessee filed a writ petition being aggrieved by an order dated 21st August
2007 passed by the Chief CIT rejecting his request u/s. 220(2A) of the
Income-tax Act seeking reduction on waiver of the interest payable on the
delayed payment of tax demanded pursuant to a notice issued u/s.156 of the Act
and for defaulting in payment of tax. The petition was rejected by the Single
Judge of the Court, against which an appeal was filed by the assessee before the
Division Bench of the Court.

3.2 It was pleaded for the assessee that the impugned order
passed by the CCIT had been passed in violation of the provisions of S. 220(2A)
of the Act and was passed without an application of mind to the conditions
mentioned under the sub-section and that the request made by the petitioner had
been rejected in an arbitrary manner. It was inter alia submitted that
the finding that the petitioner had not satisfied condition (c) for waiver of
interest charged u/s.220(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by not co-operating
with the Department by filing returns or in the assessment proceedings/payment
of tax demand was not correct and it was also submitted that the CCIT had taken
into consideration the report of the AO, which was not made known to the
assessee and therefore, the order impugned was bad on that ground also.

3.3 For the CCIT, it was submitted that the order passed was
just and proper and did not call for any interference by the Court in the appeal
and that the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition.
Reliance was placed upon two judgments in the cases of G.T.N. Textiles Ltd.
v. DCIT & Anr.,
217 ITR 653 (Ker.) and Ramapati Singhania v. CIT & Ors.,
234 ITR 655 (All.) to submit that all the three conditions laid down in S.
220(2A) should have been satisfied before interest could be waived under the
said provision and that in the instant case the CCIT had categorically held that
condition (iii) of S. 220(2A) had not been fulfilled and therefore, the assessee
was not entitled to relief under the said provisions.

3.4 The Court on consideration of the submissions made by both the sides, was not persuaded to accept the submission made on behalf of the CCIT that, all the three conditions laid down in Ss.(2A) of S. 220 should be satisfied before relief could be given to an assessee under the said provision, as was enunciated in the two judgments referred to above and cited before the Court. The Karnataka High Court accordingly directed for due consideration of the assessee’s request for waiver of interest.

4.  Observations:

4.1 S. 220(2A), begins with a non obstante clause and is a self-contained provision. It overrides the charging provision as contained in S. 220(2). At the same time the said provision restricts the power of the authority concerned to reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable by an assessee only on satisfaction of the conditions set out in the three causes of S. 220(2A). For claiming relief u/ s. 220(2A), the assessee has to satisfy the three conditions, namely, (i) he has to show that the payment of the amount has caused or would cause genuine hardship to him, (ii) that the default in payment of the amount of tax on which interest has been paid or was payable was due to circumstances beyond his control, and (iii) further that he had co-operated in the enquiry relating to the assessment or any proceeding for recovery of any amount due from him.

4.2 In G.T.N. Textiles Ltd., 217 ITR 653 (Ker.), the assessee had filed an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge, 199 ITR 347, who had dismissed the original petition challenging the rejection of the application for waiver of interest levied u/ s. 220(2) of the Act. The Court in that case held that the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A) of the Act. The Commissioner in the said case had found that one of the necessary conditions for exercising the power u/ s. 220(2A) that the payment of interest has caused or would cause genuine hardship to the assessee was not satisfied in the case of the petitioner who was earning very good income from its business. On the facts of the case, the Kerala High Court upheld the order of the Single Judge.

4.3 In the case of Eminent Enterprises v. CIT, 236 ITR 883 (Ker.), the Kerala High Court again held that even where the first condition was most satisfied, the assessee could not avail waiver of interest.

4.4 Again in the case of Metallurgical & Engineering Consultants (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 243 ITR 547, (Pat.) the Court held that all the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A). Where the Commissioner had found that the first condition was not satisfied on the basis of certain facts, and had refused to waive interest u/ s.220(2), there was no scope for the High Court to interfere with such a discretionary order.

4.5 Lately, the Madras High Court in the case of Auro Foods Ltd., 239 ITR 548, held that an assessee for the purposes of waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A) has to satisfy all the three conditions and that non-compliance of anyone of them may expose his petition to rejection by the authorities.

4.6 On a plain reading of S. 220(2A), it is evident that all the three conditions set out therein are to be satisfied cumulatively for seeking a valid relief. Where any of the requirements has not been fulfilled the discretion to reduce or waive may be legitimately refused. Thus satisfaction of one or more but not all conditions may not make an assessee eligible for reduction or the waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A). This is the way the Courts have interpreted the law with the exception of the Karnataka High Court.

4.7 The order of the Karnataka High Court provides for fresh thinking on an almost settled position in law. The Court perhaps has been impressed by the important fact that the provision of S. 220(2A) has been inserted for granting relief to an assessee in circumstances which are found to be judicious by the Court and in a case where the Court finds the case of the assessee to be so judicious, the relief should not be denied on the ground of numerical non-compliance, but instead be granted in a deserving case.

Cryptic order of the AO dropping penalty proceedings Revision u/s.263

closements

Introduction :


1.1 Various orders are passed by the Assessing Officer (AO)
under different provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). Since the
Department has no right of appeal against such orders passed before the first
appellate authority, there is an inbuilt mechanism in the Act to supervise and
monitor the correctness of such orders to safeguard the interest of the Revenue.
Accordingly, a power of revision is vested with the Commissioner of Income-tax
(CIT) to revise, etc. such orders passed by the AO as provided in that Section.

1.2 U/s.263, if the CIT considers that the order passed by
the AO is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue, he may pass such orders thereon as the circumstances of the case
justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling
the assessment and directing a fresh assessment, of course, after providing
opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Such order, under this Section, can
be passed within a time limit provided in the Section. Certain other relevant
terms are also defined in the Section, with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.3 For the purpose of exercising jurisdiction u/s. 263, two
cumulative conditions are required to be satisfied, namely, (i) that the order
of the AO is erroneous, and (ii) that it is prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue as held by the Apex Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Company
Limited (243 ITR 83). It is further held that the phrase ‘prejudicial to the
interest of the Revenue’ is of wide import and is not confined to loss of tax.
At the same time, the phrase has to be read in conjunction with erroneous order
passed by the AO. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO
cannot be termed as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, e.g.,
when the AO has adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has
resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the AO has
adopted one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an
erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue unless the view taken
by the AO is unsustainable in law.

1.4 Once penalty proceedings are initiated against the
assessee under the provisions of Act, in response to the same, various
explanations, etc. are filed by the assessee to show that the case is not fit
for imposing such penalty. After considering the same, the AO decides as to
whether penalty should be levied or not. When the AO decides not to levy the
penalty and passes an order dropping the penalty proceedings without mentioning
reasons for the same in the order, it was under consideration as to whether the
order passed by the AO dropping the penalty proceedings attracts and justifies
the revision by the CIT u/s.263 merely because reasons for dropping the penalty
proceedings are not mentioned in such order.

1.5 Recently the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
issue referred to in Para 1.4 above in the case of Toyota Motor Corporation.
Though the judgment of the Court is very short, it is felt that it has
far-reaching consequences in the actual day-to-day practice and therefore, it is
thought fit to consider the same in this column.


CIT v. Toyota Motor Corporation, 218 CTR 628 (Del.) :


2.1 In the above case, the financial years involved were
1988-89 to 1997-98. The facts are not available in the judgment. It seems that
the penalty proceedings u/s.271C for non-deduction of tax were initiated. It
also seems that the matter of liability to deduct tax and the fact of
non-deduction of tax were not in dispute at that stage. It also seems that the
assessee had explained his case and had shown his bona fides for the same
and after considering the same, the AO had decided not to levy the penalty and
the following order dated 9-7-1999 was passed :

“The penalty proceedings initiated in this case u/s.271C
r/w S. 274 of the IT Act, 1961 are hereby dropped.”


2.2 The CIT initiated the proceedings u/s.263 to revise the
above order passed by the AO and after hearing the assessee, took the view that
the AO did not verify several issues and facts as mentioned in the order passed
by him, nor did the AO carry out necessary investigations to come to the
conclusion that penalty is not leviable. Based on this, the CIT treated the
order of the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and
set aside the same with a direction to pass fresh order after making necessary
enquiries, etc. and after giving opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

2.3 When the order of the CIT passed u/s.263 came up for
consideration before the Tribunal, it was held that the AO had carried out due
verification of relevant facts and the assessee has also shown its bona fides
and its reasonable belief in not deducting tax at the appropriate stage. The
penalty proceedings were not dropped casually by the AO, but the same was done
after verification of full facts disclosed by the assessee in reply.
Accordingly, the order passed u/s.263 was set aside.

2.4 At the instance of the Revenue, the matter came up before
the High Court, for which the following substantial question of law was framed :

“Whether AO could have passed an order u/s. 271C of the IT
Act, 1961 without giving any reasons whatsoever ?”


2.5 For deciding the above question, and after noting the
reasons given by the Tribunal for deciding the issue in favour of the assessee,
the Court observed as under (page 630) :


“We are unable to appreciate this reasoning given by the Tribunal simply because that the AO him-self did not say any such thing in his order. There is no doubt that the proceedings before the AO are quasi-judicial proceedings and a decision taken by the AO in this regard must be supported by reasons. Otherwise, every order, such as the one passed by the AO, could result in a theoretical possibility that it may be revised by the CIT u/ s.263 of the Act. Such a situation is clearly impermissible.”

2.6 The Court, then, stated that it is necessary for the parties to know the reasons for the conclusion arrived at by the authorities. The order of the AO should be self-contained order giving the relevant facts and the reasons for his conclusion. The Court finally decided the issue against the assessee and held as under (page 630) :

“We find that the order passed by the AO is cryptic, to say the least, and it cannot be sustained. The Tribunal cannot substitute its own reasoning to justify the order passed by the AO when the AO himself did not give any reason in the order passed by him.

Under the circumstances, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and remand the matter back to the file of the AO to decide the issue afresh in terms of the order passed by the CIT u/ s.263 of the Act.”

Toyota Motors Corporation v. CIT, 218 CTR 539 (SC) :

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court. Somehow, the Apex Court has not dealt with the issue in detail and dismissed the appeal.

3.2 While deciding the issue against the assessee, the Court observed as under :
“We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The High Court has held that the AO had disposed the proceedings stating the penalty proceedings initiated in this case u/s.271C r/w S. 274 of the IT Act, 1961 are hereby dropped. According to the High Court, there was no basis indicated for dropping the proceedings. The Tribunal referred to certain aspects and held that the initiation of proceedings u/ s. 263 of the IT Act, 1961 (in short, the ‘IT Act’) was impermissible when considered in the background of the materials purportedly placed by the assessee before the AO. What the High Court has done is to require the AO to pass a reasoned order. The High Court was of the view that the Tribunal could not have substituted its own reasoning which were required to be recorded by the AO. According to the assessee all relevant aspects were placed for consideration and if the officer did not record reasons, the assessee cannot be faulted.

We do not think it necessary to interfere at this stage. It goes without saying that when the matter be taken up by the AO on remand, it shall be his duty to take into account all the relevant aspects including the materials, if any, already placed by the assessee, and pass a reasoned order.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it seems that even an order passed by the AO dropping the penalty proceedings should be with reasons. The AO has to record the reasons for which penalty proceedings are dropped.

4.2 Unfortunately, the Apex Court did not appreciate the contention of the assessee that all relevant aspects were placed before the AO for consideration and if the AO did not record reasons, the assessee cannot be faulted.

4.3 In response to show-cause notice for levy of penalty, the only thing the assessee can do is to offer explanation and make out a case for non-levy of penalty. However, it is difficult to understand as to how the assessee can ensure that while dropping the penalty proceedings, the AO should incorporate reasons also in the order? It seems that it is this position which must have led the Tribunal to decide the issue in favour of the assessee after verifying the factual position that the order was passed by the AO after making necessary verifications, etc. Unfortunately, this factual position has neither been appreciated by the High Court, nor by the Apex Court. In both these judgments, there is not even a discussion on this practical as well as legal difficulty faced by the assessee.

4.4 In practice, we understand that in most cases, orders for dropping the penalty proceedings are cryptic and without reasons and the same are, more or less, on the same line as in the above case. Considering the constraints of the administration and the AO in particular, it is necessary to accept the position that if the assessee has given proper explanation and shown his bona fides to the satisfaction of the AO, penalty matters should be treated as concluded even if the reasons for such satisfactions are ‘not formally mentioned in the order passed by the AO. Therefore, the above judgment of the Apex Court, to that extent, requires reconsideration. Till this happens, perhaps, the CITs while exercising. their jurisdiction u/ s.263 should consider this in the interest of justice.

Taxability of interest on disputed compensation

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Government under the Constitution of India is vested
with the power to compulsorily acquire the private property of its subject in
the given circumstances on payment of compensation. This compensation may in
some cases get enhanced, by the Government or by a Court, where the owner of the
property challenges the quantum of compensation. In such cases of enhancement,
the owner in addition to the compensation is granted interest on the delayed
payment which usually spreads over a period exceeding a year. It is also seen
that the Government in turn challenges the orders of enhancement and interest
thereon, passed by the Courts, before the higher forum, before whom the issue is
finally settled.

1.2 In the circumstances stated in paragraph 1.1, the issues
that arise under the law of income-tax are; whether the compensation received is
taxable or not; whether the interest received thereon is taxable or not and if
yes in which year it will be taxable and whether the interest can be taxed
pending the finalisation of the dispute surrounding the quantum of compensation.

1.3 The first issue referred to in paragraph 1.2 is sought to
be taken care of by insertion of S. 45(5) which provides for taxation of deemed
capital gains on compulsory acquisition of a property. The second issue about
the year of taxation of the interest is rested by the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of Ramabai v. CIT, 181 ITR 400 (SC), wherein it was held that
the interest received on additional compensation should not be taken to have
been accrued in the year of the order, but should be held to have accrued year
after year from the date of handing of the possession of the property till the
date of the order granting the interest and should be spread over the period for
which the same was granted and should be taxed in the respective years. The
third issue continues to emerge repeatedly before the Courts requiring the
Courts to address the issue of the taxability of interest pending its
finalisation.

1.4 A good number of decisions of the High Courts confirms
that the interest on enhanced compensation cannot be taxed till such time the
same is free of any dispute and it is only when the payment thereof is free of
any disputes that it can be brought to tax. As against this, the Revenue
regularly relies on the sole decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which
held that the interest should be taxed in the year in which the same was
received under the order of additional compensation and the fact that the
Government had filed an appeal against the order of enhancement shall not defer
the taxation.

2. M. Sarojini Devi’s case :


2.1 The issue came up for consideration of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of CIT v. M. Sarojini Devi, 250 ITR 759. In that
case, land belonging to the assessee had been acquired by the Government in the
year 1966 and compensation was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The
amount of compensation was challenged by the assessee and on reference,
compensation at a higher rate was awarded in the previous year relevant to the
A.Y. 1976-77, together with an interest of Rs.43,642 for the period 1966 to
1975. The State Government challenged the said order of enhancement in an appeal
before the Supreme Court, which was pending. The Assessing Officer held that the
entire amount of interest on enhanced compensation was liable to tax in A.Y.
1976-77.

2.2 The assessment was challenged in appeal before the
Appellate Commissioner who held that the amount of interest received by the
assessee could not be taxed, as the matter had not become final and an appeal
was pending before the Supreme Court. In deciding the issue, he relied on a
judgment of the same Court in CIT v. Smt. Sankari Manickyamma, 105 ITR
172 (AP). On further appeal before the Tribunal, the Appellate Commissioner’s
view was upheld by following the said decision of the Court.

2.3 The Revenue being aggrieved referred the following
question to the Court : “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the interest on compensation for the assessment year for which the
interest should be brought to tax is the one in which it was awarded or the year
in which issue of quantum of compensation becomes final ?”

The question raised was reframed by the Court as follows;
“Whether the AO has to wait till the final disposal by the final Court in an
acquisition matter before the interest accrued is taxed ?”

2.4 The Court on consideration of the facts noted that the
question was already answered by the Supreme Court in Rama Bai v. CIT,
181 ITR 400 (SC). The Court observed that the fact that the compensation was
enhanced by the High Court in an appeal and the interest accruing thereon was
received by the assessee made him liable to pay the tax, however, the interest
would be spread over the period for which it accrued to him, in accordance with
the Supreme Court judgment. It also noted that in case the judgment enhancing
the compensation in favour of the assessee was reversed by the Supreme Court,
the assessee, even after payment of tax on the accrued interest, would not be
remediless, as he could seek refund of the tax so paid, by making appropriate
application for rectification of the assessment. Lastly, the Court was of the
view that the judgment relied upon by the Tribunal in Smt. Sankari Manickyamma’s
case, 105 ITR 172 (AP), stood reversed in view of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Rama Bai’s case, 181 ITR 400.

2.5 The Andhra Pradesh High Court for the above reasons,
answered the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

3. Karanbir Singh’s case :


3.1 The Punjab & Haryana High Court recently was required to
deal with the issue in the case of CIT v. Karanbir Singh, 216 CTR 585. In
that case land belonging to the assessee was acquired by the Punjab State
Electricity Board in 1962. During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1986-87,
the assessee received enhanced compensation and interest to the tune of
Rs.11,87,485 and Rs.17,06,686, respectively. The State Government filed an
appeal against the said order of enhancement, which appeal was pending at the
time of assessment. The AO held that the entire amount of interest received of
Rs.17,06,686 was assessable in the assessee’s hands for the A.Y. 1986-87, as the
amount was actually received during that year.

3.2 Aggrieved by the order of assessment on this count, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) and inter alia contended that the amount of interest received by the assessee was not taxable in his hands during the year in question in terms of judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., 161 ITR 524. The CIT(A) did not accept the contention of the assessee, but directed for taxing only that amount of interest which accrued to the assessee during the assessment year in question, by relying on the decision in the case of Smt. Rama Bai v..CIT, 181 ITR 400 (SC).

3.3 The assessee, being still aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the Tribunal where the Tribunal relying upon decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd.’s case (supra) accepted the appeal of the assessee by holding that no amount of interest should be taxable, as the matter regarding compensation had not attained finality and was still fluid.

3.4 At the instance of the Revenue, the following question was referred to the Punjab & Haryana High Court; “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the amount of interest on enhanced compensation received in June, 1985 in consequence upon judgment of District Judge and the amount having been utilised/invested in discretion of the assessee was not includible in the total income of the assessee ?”

3.5 The Revenue contended that the principles of law laid down in Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd.’s case (supra) were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the right to receive compensation by the assessee was not in dispute and it was only the quantification thereof on account of which the appeals were pending at the relevant time; that merely because the quantum issue had not attained finality, the amount which had actually been received and was available at the discretion of the assessee could not be held to be non-taxable, as the same would be totally against the spirit of the taxing statute. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Smt. M. Sarojini Devi (supra).

3.6 The High Court noted that against a solitary judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. M. Sarojini Devi’s case (supra), there were many judgments of different Courts taking a view in favour of the assessee on the issue, namely, CIT v. Laxman Das & Anr., 246 ITR 622 (All), Director of IT (Exemption) v. Goyal Charitable Trust, 125 CTR (Del.) 426, 215 ITR 672 (Del.), Chief CIT & Anr. v. Smt. Shantavva, 188 CTR (Kar.) 162,267 ITR 67 (Kar.) and CIT v. Abdul Mannan Shah Mohammed, 248 ITR 614 (Bom.). It also noted that a special leave peti-tion in a similar case was dismissed by the Supreme Court reported in CIT v. [anabaiViihabai Dudhe, 268 ITR (St) 215.

3.7 The High Court agreed that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. M. Sarojini Devi’s case (supra) had taken the view that the AO need not wait till the matter regarding assessment of compensation attained finality, however, for arriving at the above conclusion, much discussion was not available in that judgment. As against that, the Court found that in a number of judgments as referred to above, different Courts had held that such interest was to be taxed in the year of settlement of dispute and that under similar circumstances, a special leave petition to appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court had also been dismissed.

3.8 Keeping in view the totality of circumstances and the ratio of judgment referred to above, the Court decided the issue’ in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, by holding that the Revenue was not entitled to tax the amount of interest received by the assessee on account of acquisition of land till such time the proceedings in reference thereto attained a finality.

Observations:

4.1 The Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., 161 ITR 524 (SC), held that when the Government had appealed against the award and the- additional amount of compensation was deposited in the Court, it was not taxable at that stage, as the additional compensation would not accrue as income when it was specifically disputed by the Government in appeal.

4.2 A position  that has emerged  and  has gained acceptance on account of the above decision of the Supreme  Court  is that  where  the disputed  additional compensation does not accrue till such time the dispute relating thereto is settled; the question of taxing interest thereon should not arise at all, as the same has also not accrued till then.

4.3 The Bombay High Court following  the above referred Supreme Court decision in the case of Abdul Mannan Shah’s case (supra) held that in view of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, there was no merit in the Revenue’s appeal and that no substantial question of law arose as the judgment of the Supreme Court, on facts, squarely applied to the facts of the case before them. In that case, the Court was required to consider the taxability of the interest on enhanced compensation pending the appeal by the Government.

4.4 Recently a similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court in Paragon Constructions (I) (P) Ltd. v. CIT & Anr., 274 ITR 413, in a matter pertaining to arbitration where the amount of arbitration award received by the assessee was not held to be taxable till the proceedings attained a finality.

4.5 The issue appears to be fairly settled in favour of the assessee, not only by the decisions of the High Courts, but also by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) and in all fairness the Revenue should accept the position law laid down under these decisions to be final where the right to receive enhanced compensation itself is disputed by the Government. This acceptance will in turn avoid any futile litigation. The interest on enhanced compensation whenever in dispute before whichever forum should not be brought to tax till such time there remains no dispute regarding the quantum of enhanced compensation payable or paid in pursuance of an order of compulsory acquisition.

4.6 It is at the same time appropriate to note that the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) held that when the right to receive enhanced compensation itself was under dispute and was not absolute that the compensation cannot be said to have accrued, however, where the right was admitted and only quantification thereof was disputed, the taxation of the admitted undisputed amount need not be deferred. In that case, the enhanced compensation awarded by the arbitrators was allowed to be withdrawn on furnishing of a security bond that the amount released would be refunded in the event of the assessee found to be disentitled to the compensation so enhanced. In Abdul Mannan Shah’s case (supra), the case before the Bombay High Court, the assessee was permitted to withdraw the amount of interest deposited in the Court on furnishing the security for refund.

Status of ‘Not Ordinarily Resident’ — S. 6(6)

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 In case of Individual (also HUF), if he is ‘Resident’ as
per the provisions of S. 6(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’), he can
also be regarded as ‘Not Ordinarily Resident’ (NOR) if he satisfies the
conditions provided u/s.6 (6) of the Act. Prior to its amendment by the Finance
Act, 2003 (with effect from 1-4-2004), this provision was very useful and
beneficial, especially for Indians residing abroad for a long time and returning
to India after their long stay outside India at their retirement age. These
provisions also became a tool for arranging one’s affairs in such a manner that
one cleared the status of NOR by remaining outside India for a shorter period of
two to three years continuously. Similar provisions were also contained in S. 4B
of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (1922 Act). The status of NOR gives an advantage of
non-taxability of foreign income in most cases. In the post-amendment period
(from A.Y. 2004-05) , the conditions for acquiring the status of NOR have been
made very stringent. However, we are not concerned in this write-up with the
post-amendment provisions and therefore, in this write-up, reference is made
only to pre-amendment provisions. For the sake of convenience, the reference of
HUF is also avoided in this write-up.

1.2 Once an Individual is regarded as ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), he
can also be regarded as NOR, if, he has not been ‘Resident’ in India in nine
years out of the ten previous years preceding that year [preceding years], or
has not been in India during the seven preceding years for a period of, or
periods amounting in all to, 730 days or more. As stated earlier, similar
provisions were also contained in S. 4B of the 1922 Act. In view of this, an
Individual, who is ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), unless he is NOR, is regarded as what is
popularly known as Ordinarily Resident. Accordingly, Individual can either be
Ordinarily Resident or NOR.

1.3 The consistent judicial as well as Departmental view was,
if an Individual is ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), he is regarded as Ordinarily Resident,
if, he satisfies both the conditions contained in S. 6(6), viz. (i) he
should be ‘Resident’ in India [u/s.6(1)] for nine years out of ten preceding
years AND (ii) he should be in India for an aggregate period of 730 days or more
in the preceding seven years. In other words, he can be regarded as NOR, if he
is in India for an aggregate period of less than 730 days in the seven preceding
years. OR effectively, he is ‘Non-Resident’ (NR) for at least two years u/s.6(1)
in ten preceding years. This was the consistent view under the Act as well as
under the 1922 Act till the Gujarat High Court took a different view in the case
of Pradip J. Mehta, which ultimately resulted into amendment in S. 6(6) in 2003
to keep the provisions in line with the view expressed by the Gujarat High
Court. The High Court took the view that an Individual has to be NR u/s.6(1) for
nine years out of the ten preceding years to acquire the status of NOR in a case
where he was in India for 730 days or more in seven preceding years. Therefore,
the controversy came-up with the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and existed
for the pre-amendment period. In fact, the Department was also attempting to
take a view that the amendment of 2003 is clarificatory and will also apply to
earlier years. Therefore, the issue became very vital.

1.4 The judgment of the Gujarat High Court referred to in
para 1.3 above, came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently and the
issue has now got resolved. Therefore, though the provisions have been amended
in 2003, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column, as the same will
be useful in many pending cases of the pre-amendment period.


Pradip J. Mehta v. CIT, 256 ITR 647 (Guj.) :


2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were : the assessee
had claimed status of NOR for the A.Y. 1982-83. The assessee was in India for
196 days in the relevant previous year and was also in India for more than 730
days (1402 days) in the seven preceding years. However, out of ten preceding
years, the assessee was NR for two years and hence, he claimed that as he was
not ‘Resident’ for nine years out of ten preceding years, he should be regarded
as NOR. The Assessing Officer (AO) took the view that for an Indian to become
NOR, he should be NR for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years and
as the assessee was NR only for two years out of the ten preceding years, he
cannot be regarded as NOR and accordingly he is Ordinarily Resident and his
foreign income is taxable in India. The First Appellate Authority, as well as
ITAT confirmed the view of the AO and the issue came up before the Gujarat High
Court at the instance of the assessee.

2.2 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was,
inter alia, contended that the intention of the Legislature in enacting
the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of Act was that, if an individual was not a
‘Resident’ for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years, he should be
treated as NOR. According to the counsel, the assessee was ‘Resident’ in India
for eight years out of ten preceding years, which means he was not a ‘Resident’
in India for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years. Therefore, he
falls in the category of NOR.

2.2.1 In support of his contention, the counsel for the
assessee drew the attention of the Court on the judgment of Patna High Court in
the case of C.M. Townsend (97 ITR 185), in which the High Court, while dealing
with the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of the Act, has held that the assessee will be
regarded as NOR, if he was not a ‘Resident’ in India for a period of nine years
out of ten preceding years. In that case that was so, though the assessee was in
India for more than 730 days in seven preceding years. Similar view was also
taken by the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) reported in (223 ITR 379).
Reliance was also placed on the judgments of the Bombay High Court in Manibhai
S. Patel (23 ITR 27) of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of P.B.I.
BAVA (27 ITR 463), in which also similar view was taken under the 1922 Act. The
attention of the Court was also drawn to the observations on the commentaries of
the learned authors Kanga and Palkhivala in their book the Law and Practice of
Income Tax, 7th Edition, in which similar conditions of S. 6(6) have been
clearly explained by relying on various judgments referred to therein.

2.3 On behalf of the Revenue, the counsel supported the reasonings of the Tribunal in support of its decision. It was also contended that the condition in the first part of S. 6 (6)(a) of the Act requires an individual not to be ‘Resident’ in India for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years for being treated as NOR.
 

2.4 After referring to the provisions contained in S. 6(6)(a) and noting the fact that similar provisions were contained in S. 4B of the 1922 Act, the Court stated that the short question raised for the assessee was that he should be treated as NOR because he was ‘Resident’ in India for a period of eight years and not nine years, as the law requires out of ten preceding years. In other words, he would be NOR, even if for all the remaining eight years out of ten years he was ‘Resident’ in India.

2.5 Referring to the contentions  of the assessee, the Court  stated  as under (page  654) :

“This contention though appearing to be attractive at first blush, is not at all warranted by the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of the Act. S. 6(6)(a) does not define ‘ordinarily resident in India’, but describes ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. It resorts to the concept of ‘resident in India’, for which the criteria are laid down in S. 6(1) of the Act. On its

plain construction clause (a) of S. 6(6) would mean that if an individual has in all the nine out of ten previous years preceding the relevant previous year not been resident in India as contemplated by S. 6(1), he is a person who is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. To say that an individual who has been resident in India for eight years out of ten preceding years should be treated as ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, does not stand to reason and such contention flies in the face of the clear provision of clause (a) of S. 6(6) which contemplates the period of nine years out of ten preceding years of not being a resident in India before an individual could be said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, which position will entitle such person to claim exemption under 5(1)(c) of the Act in respect of his foreign income. An individual who has not been resident in India, within the meaning of S. 6(1), for less than nine out of ten preceding years does not satisfy that statutory criteria laid down for treating such individual as a person who can be said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, as defined by S. 6(6). A resident of India who goes abroad and is not a resident in India for two years during the preceding period of ten years will therefore, not satisfy the said condition of not being a resident of India for nine out of ten years.”

2.6 The Court, then, noted that as per one of the conditions of S. 6(6)(a), if the assessee is in India for 730 days or more in seven preceding years, he does not become NOR. The Court also noted that u/s.6(1)(c), the individual will become ‘Resident’ if his total stay in India is 365 days or more in the preceding four years. The Court then observed as under (Page 655) :

“…………It would therefore, be strange  to treat a person who has been resident in India in eight years out of ten preceding years as an individual who is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. This mis-conception that has also crept in the commentaries of some learned authors on which reliance was placed, arises, because one tries to search for a definition of ‘ordinarily resident’ in India in S. 6(6)(a), which as observed above, only lays down the condition of not being resident in India for nine out of ten preceding years for being treated as ‘not ordinarily resident of India’ besides the other condition of not being in India for seven hundred and thirty or more days in the preceding seven years………..”

2.7 The Court, then, stated that ‘ordinarily resident’ for the purpose of income tax connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences. For this, the Court referred to certain decisions given in the UK and stated that the motive of presence here is immaterial, it is a question of quality which the presence assumes.

2.8 The Court, while deciding the issue against the assessee, finally concluded as under (page 656) :

“The foreign income of every resident even when it is not brought into the country is chargeable to tax except when the resident is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. For an individual including a resident in order to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ so as to escape tax on his foreign income, it must be shown that the position is covered by clause (a) of Ss.(6) of S. 6 of the Act. When an individual has been a resident in India for nine out of ten preceding years, then in order to escape tax on his foreign income, he must not have been in India for seven hundred and thirty days or more in the aggregate during the preceding seven years. The test is one of presence and not absence from India and the length of presence will determine when an individual is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. In order that an individual is not an ordinarily resident, he should satisfy one of the two conditions laid down in S. 6(6)(a) of the Act, the first condition is that he should not be resident in India in all the nine out of ten years preceding the accounting year and the second condition is that he should not have during the seven years preceding that year, been in India for a total period of seven hundred and thirty or more days.”

2.9 In the above judgment, somehow, the Court chose to not to deal with the reasonings of the judgments on which reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee (referred to in para 2.2.1 above).

Pradip J. Mehta  v. CIT, 300 ITR 231 (SC) :

3.1 The judgment of the Gujarat High Court referred to in para 2 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court. For the purpose of dealing with the issue, the Court noted the facts of the case of the assessee in brief. It seems that the Court has believed that the assessee was NR in three years out of ten preceding years while the factual position seems to be (as is apparent form the judgment of the High Court) that the assessee was NR for two years in ten preceding years. However, this factual misleading/wrong noting does not make any dif-ference in principle and therefore, one may ignore the same.

3.2 After considering the facts and the relevant provisions and the observations of the High Court (major part referred to in para 2.5 above), the Court noted the fact that certain decisions of the High Court and AAR (referred to in para 2.2.1 above) were cited on behalf of the assessee in support of his claim. The Court, then, considered those judgments/rulings and observed as under:

“The aforesaid decisions cited by the assessee have been noted by the High Court. The High Court answered the reference in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, without either agreeing or disagreeing with the view taken by the various High Courts and the Authority for Advance Rulings, which is presided over by a retired judge of the Supreme Court.”

3.3 The Court noted that S. 6(6)(a) of the Act cor-responds to and is in pari materia with S. 4B of the 1922Act. The Court then referred to the background of introduction of S. 4B in the 1922Act and speeches made during the assembly debates on proposed Section at that time which was referred to in the judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of P.B.I. BAVA (supra). Referring to this as well as other judgments, the Court observed as under (page 240) :

“The Indian Income-tax Act of 1922was replaced by the Income-tax Act of 1961.The Law Commission of India has recommended the total abolition of the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922Act defining ‘Ordinary Residence’ of the taxable entities. The Income-tax Bill, 1961 (Bill No. 27 of 1961), did not contain any such provision. On the legislative anvil, it was felt necessary to keep the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922 Act intact and therefore,S. 6(6)had to be enacted in the 1961Act. Referred to Chaturvedi & Pithisaria’s Income Tax Law, fifth Edition, volume I 1998, page 565.”

3.4 The Court also took note of Departmental Circular (being Circular letter dated 5-12-1962)issued by Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, addressed to Secretary,Indian Chamber of Commerce, (Calcutta) in which also the effect of the provisions was explained, which supports the stand of the assessee. It was also noted that the letter was issued after having communications with the Ministry of Finance.

3.5 The Court also took note of the fact that the Law Commission of India had recommended that the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922 Act be deleted, but that suggestion was not accepted by the Legislature. The Court then stated as under (Page 242):

“………Rather, on the legislative anvil, it was felt necessary to keep S. 4B of the 1922Act intact and, accordingly, S. 6(6), which corresponds to and is in pari materia with S. 4B of the 1922act, was enacted in the 1961 Act. This shows the legislative will. It can be presumed that the Legislature was in the know of the various judgments given by the different High Courts interpreting S: 4B, but still the Legislature chose to enact S. 6(6) in the 1961Act, in its wisdom, the Legislature felt necessary to keep the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922Act intact. It shows that the Legislature accepted the interpretation put by the various High Courts prior to the enactment of the 1961Act. It is only in the year 2003that the Legislature amended S. 6(6) of the 1961Act, which came into effect from April 1, 2004”.

3.6 The Court then clearly stated that it is well settled that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably, the Court would adopt interpretation which is in favour of the taxpayer and against the Revenue. For this, the Court also drew support from other judgments of the Apex Court.

3.7 Referring to the various judgments of the Apex Court, the Court also reiterated the settled position that the Circulars issued by the Department are binding on the Department. The Court also noted that Circular letter issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal has reference to the correspondence resting with the Ministry of Finance, wherein it is stated that the Department’s view has all along been the same as contended on behalf of the assessee. While deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, the Court finally concluded as under (page 243):

“In these circumstances, a person will become an ordinarily resident only if (a) he has been residing in nine out of ten preceding years; and (b) he has been in India for at least 730 days in previous seven years.

Accordingly, this appeal is accepted. The order passed by the High Court and the authorities below are set aside. It is held that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erred in its interpretation of S. 6(6) of the Act and the view taken by the Patna High Court, Bombay High Court and Travoncore-Cochin High Court has laid down the correct law……..”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that in the pre-amended provisions, the assessee has to be ‘Resident’ for nine years out of ten preceding years as well as he should also be in India at least for 730 days in the preceding seven years to be regarded as ‘Ordinarily Resident’. If, anyone of these conditions is not satisfied, he would be regarded as NOR under the preamended provisions.

4.2 The amendment    made by the Finance Act, 2003 is prospective and will not apply to period prior to A.Y.2004-05.

4.3 The Court has emphatically reiterated its earlier position that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably the interpretation favouring the taxpayer and against the Revenue should be adopted.

4.4 One more important principle reiterated by the Apex Court is that the judgments cited before the Courts in support of the contentions should be dealt with and reasons should be recorded for taking a contrary view.

The complementary nature of relationship between the legal profession and the CA profession in the past and the future 135

Article

I have stopped accepting invitations to give lecturers or
write papers. At the age of 76 and after a reasonably successful career, I can
possibly afford such a luxury. However, when Gautam Nayak, the Editor of the BCA
Journal asked me to write an article for the special issue of the Journal on the
occasion of the Diamond Jubilee of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society, I
was tempted to accept the invitation, firstly being a fond reader of the
Journal, but really because of the subject on which I was asked to write.


During my long professional career spanning over five
decades, the nature of specialised work done by me has always brought me in
close contact with the accountancy profession, so much so that today I can claim
to have more personal friends in the accountancy profession as compared to the
legal profession. Possibly, this well-known fact has earned me the privilege of
being invited by the Society to write this article on the complementary nature
of relationship between the two professions in the past and in the future, as I
see it.

As G. P. Kapadia, who is acknowledged to be the father of the
CA profession in India, fondly put it, the legal profession and the CA
profession are sister professions which complement each other. I firmly believe
that neither can survive, exist or successfully practise without the active
help, support and co-operation of the other. Moreover, it is noticed that a
practising lawyer with accountancy qualifications or a practising chartered
accountant with legal qualifications has always been more successful as compared
to the others in the profession. The reasons are obvious.

Present scenario :

Presently, the sphere of work of CA firms has extended far
beyond the normal accounts, audit and taxation functions, and needs constant
legal inputs. Similarly, the work of law firms has increased as a result of
increasing mergers, acquisitions, trans-border transactions and complicated
financial structuring, needing constant support from CA firms. Consequently,
during the recent years CA firms and law firms have been working in closer
coordination with each other than ever before.

Both law and accountancy are venerable professions with old
and ingrained traditions. There are many similarities between the practice of
law and the practice of accountancy, particularly with respect to business and
corporate lawyers. Both accountants and lawyers play an integral role in the
smooth operation of trade, commerce and industry. Both are crucial to the
development and execution of the transactions that fuel industry and business
and thrive on reputation built after years of practice and expertise. On the
lighter side, both also have a relatively equal capacity to wreck havoc on the
financial sector in case they turn a blind eye to the fraudulent activities of a
client.

Dynamic changes in laws and the manner in which transactions
are entered into also play a vital role. Cross-border transactions have
necessitated the importance of international taxation and interpretation of
double taxation avoidance agreements/treaties. For such interpretation, lawyers
and accountants both have to advise their clients on the best way to solve any
problem, which may evolve during such transactions or better still, for carrying
out the most effective tax planning.

These days one sees at least three different trends in
working of a CA firm. Most of the CA firms have what is popularly known as ‘best
friend relationship’ with one or more law firms and all legal issues are dealt
with in consultation with lawyers. One also comes across CA firms who have
qualified legal personnel on their rolls or law firms who have qualified CAs
working for them. Though this is possible only at a junior level, it helps the
concerned firm to offer to its client services covering the other field. The
third trend which one notices these days (and which may in some cases prove
risky) is that even without qualified legal persons on its roll, some CA firms
offer extended services to the clients like purchase or sale of ownership
premises or drafting of documents like wills or trusts.

The scope of work of CA firms is no longer restricted to
accountancy, audit and taxation. Presently, CA firms render diverse other
services, which to some extent encroach legal field. No one can object to a CA
firm venturing to do legal work. However, it could lead to serious consequences
if CAs were to undertake drafting of complicated legal documents like wills or
trusts, which needs not just deep knowledge of law, but also expertise in
drafting, and which cannot be done merely by following precedents. The same
holds true also for lawyers who advise clients on complex taxation provisions
while drafting these complicated legal documents.

Recently, I came across a will containing some complicated
provisions, which was drafted by a senior Chartered Accountant. On the first
reading of the will, it was clear that the draftsman had followed some good
English precedent and used the normal legal terminology. However, on further
consideration I found some major flaws in drafting, which could have created
misunderstanding amongst the beneficiaries and possibly led to long-drawn
litigation. Luckily, the will was brought to me by the testator for
interpretation of some provisions and was suitably revised.

Future possibility :

In view of the current complementary nature in relationship
between two professions, future can only bring convergence.

Given the similarity and the interdependence between the two
professions, the need is for establishment of multidisciplinary firms so long as
separate firms are constituted for non-exclusive areas. In the context of
globalisation of services, establishment of firms formed by tie-up between
lawyers and chartered accountants would provide professionals from both the
professions a level playing field and strengthen the scope of services that can
be provided by them.

A major obstacle in the way of establishing such a multi-disciplinary firm is clause 2 of Chapter III Part IV of Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 which provides that, an advocate shall not enter into a partnership or any other arrangement for sharing remuneration with any person or legal practitioner who is not an advocate. The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 provided similar regulation, which was later amended by the Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Act, 2006. The amended Act now makes an enabling provision permitting partnership with any person whose qualifications are recognised by the Central Government or the Council for purpose of permitting such partnership. Another hurdle to such establishment is S. 11 of the Companies Act, 1956, which restricts the maximum number of partners to twenty, which is to be done away with soon.

The future – as I see it – shows a distinct possibility of multidiscipline partnerships, with the necessary changes in the Chartered Accountants Act and the Advocates Act and blessings of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and the Bar Council of India. One can visualise a partnership or LLP with top lawyers like Soli Dastur being in partnership with Y. H. Malegam or Bansi Mehta.

While some of the big international CA firms had tried to set up in-house legal cells, the experiment does not seem to have worked well so far. I do not see a day far when even multinational muitidiscipline partnerships (or LLPs) will enter the field. Imagine Deloittes or E&Ys of the world joining hands with AZBs or Amarchands of India to form a multidiscipline organisation. Whatever is said and done, one thing is certain that the two professions will always continue to have very close relationship, complementing and supplementing each other.

Monetary limit for filing of appeal by Income-tax Department

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Income-tax Department, aggrieved by an order of the
CIT(A), has the right to appeal u/s.253 to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and
to the High Court u/s.260A when aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal. An appeal
can also be filed before the Supreme Court with the permission of the Court
against the decision of the High Court. Every year a large number of appeals are
filed by the Income-tax Department, some of which are filed in a routine manner.
Prosecuting these appeals, filed as a matter of course, results in a huge annual
expenditure, at times exceeding the benefit derived from such prosecution.

1.2 Realising the leakage of substantial revenue and with the
intent to avoid litigation, the Government of India, in all its Revenue
Departments, has evolved a policy of refraining from filing an appeal before the
higher authorities, where the monetary effect of the contentious issues causing
grievance, in terms of tax, is less than the acceptable limit. This benevolent
policy of the Government prevents the Courts from being flooded with the cases.

1.3 In pursuance of this policy, the Central Board of Direct
Taxes issues instructions to the Income-tax authorities, directing them to avoid
filing of appeals, where the tax effect of an issue causing a grievance is less
than the monetary limit prescribed under such instructions. Presently,
Instruction No. 2 of 2005, dated October 24,2005, advises the authorities to
refrain from filing appeal before the Tribunal, w.e.f. 31-10-2005, in cases
where the tax effect of the disputed issues is Rs.2,00,000 or less and before
the High Court where such tax effect is Rs.4,00,000 or less and before the
Supreme Court where such tax effect is Rs.10,00,000 or less.

1.4 The said Circular of 2005 is issued in substitution of
the Instruction No. 1979, dated 27-3-2000 which provided that no appeal be
filed, by the Income-tax Dept. before the Tribunal in cases where the tax effect
of the disputed issues is Rs.1,00,000 or less and before the High Court where
such tax effect is Rs.2,00,000 or less and before the Supreme Court where such
tax effect is Rs.5,00,000 or less. The said Circular of 2000 was in substitution
of the Instruction No. 1903, dated 28-10-1992, wherein monetary limits of
Rs.25,000 before the Tribunal, Rs.50,000 for filing reference to the High Court
and Rs.1,50,000 for filing appeal to the Supreme Court were laid down. The said
instruction was in substitution of Instruction No. 1777, dated 4-11-1987.

1.5 It is common to come across cases where the monetary
limit, prescribed by the CBDT prevailing at the time of filing an appeal, has
undergone an upward revision before the time of the hearing of such appeal. In
such cases, the issue that often arises is about the applicability of the
upwardly revised limits, relying upon which the defending assessees contend that
the appeal by the Income-tax Department is not maintainable. The issue was
believed to be settled in favour of the taxpayers by a decision of the Bombay
High Court till recently when the validity of the said decision, in the context
of Instruction of 2005, has been doubted by another Bench of the same Court.

2. Pithwa Engg. Works’ case :


2.1 The issue first came up for consideration in the case of
CIT v. Pithwa Engineering Works, 276 ITR 519 (Bom). The Court examined
whether in deciding the maintainability of an appeal by the Income-tax
Department, the monetary limit of the tax effect, upwardly revised and
prevailing at the time of adjudicating an appeal, should be applied in
preference to the limit prevailing a the time of filing an appeal. In the said
case, at the time of filing the appeal before the High Court, the Instruction
then prevailing, provided for a monetary limit of Rs.50,000. However at the
time, when the appeal came up for hearing , this limit was revised to
Rs.2,00,000 vide Circular dated 27-3-2000.

2.2 The Court took note of its own decision in the case of
CIT v. Camco Colour Co.,
254 ITR 565, where-in it was held that the
instructions issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, dated March
27,2000 were binding on the Income-tax Department. Under the said Instruction,
the monetary limit, for filing a reference to the High Court, earlier fixed at
Rs.50,000 was revised and fresh instructions were issued to file references only
in cases where the tax effect exceeded Rs.2,00,000.

2.3 The Court in the case before them observed that the said
instructions dated March 27, 2000 reflected the policy decision taken by the
Board, not to contest the orders where the tax effect was less than the amount
prescribed in the above Circular with a view to reduce litigation before the
High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Court did not find any force in the
contention of the Revenue that the said Circular was not applicable to the old
referred cases as such a contention was not taken to a logical end.

2.4 The Bombay High Court negatived the submission of the
Revenue that so far as new cases were concerned, the said Circular issued by the
Board was binding on them and in compliance with the said instructions, they did
not file references if the tax effect was less than Rs.2 lakh, however, the same
approach was not to be adopted with respect to the old referred cases where the
tax effect was less than Rs.2 lakh. The Court did not find any logic behind such
an approach. The Court held that the Circular of 2000 issued by the Board was
binding on the Revenue.

2.5 The Court further proceeded to observe that the Court
could very well take judicial notice of the fact that by passage of time money
value had gone down, the cost of litigation expenses had gone up; the assesses
on the file of the Department have increased; consequently the burden on the
Department had also increased to a tremendous extent; the corridors of the
superior Courts were choked with huge pendency of cases. The Court noted that in
the aforesaid background, the Board had rightly taken a decision not to file
references if the tax effect was less than Rs.2 lakh and the same policy needed
to be adopted by the Department even for the old matters.

2.6 Finally the Court held that the Board’s Circular dated
March 27, 2000 was very much applicable even to the old references which were
still undecided and the Income-tax Department was not justified in proceeding
with the old references, wherein the tax impact was minimal and further there
was no justification to proceed with decades old references having negligible
tax effect.

3. Chhajer Packaging’s case :


3.1 The issue recently came up for consideration, once again, before the same Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Chhajer Packaging and Plastics Pvt. Ltd., 300 ITR 180 (Born). In that case, the appeal was filed by the Income-tax Department prior to 24-10-2005, the date when Circular No.2 of 2005 was issue for an upward revision of the monetary limit from Rs.2,OO,OOO to Rs.4,OO,OOO.

3.2 The assessee company in that case, raised the preliminary objection, by relying upon Instruction/ Circular No.2 of 2005, dated October 242005 to plead that since the limit of appeal u/ s.260A of ‘the Act to be preferred was raised to Rs.4 lakh and as the tax effect in its case did not exceed Rs.4 lakh, the Department ought not to have pursued its appeal.

3.3 The above-stated submission of the company was opposed by the Revenue, by contending that the present appeal was filed by the Department in August, 2004, while instruction was issued only on October 24, 2005, which was prospective in nature and therefore, the appeal by the Income-tax Department did not fall within the ambit of the instruction dated October 24, 2005.

3.4 The assessee company in its turn relined upon – the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court at Bombay, in CIT v. Pithwa Engg. Works, 276 ITR 519, wherein the Court dealt with a similar Circular dated March 27,2000, wherein financial limit for preferring appeals u/ s.260A of the Act before the High Court, was raised to Rs.2 lakh. Reliance was placed on the following observations in the penultimate paragraph (page 521) ; ” In our view, the Board’s Circular dated March 27, 2000, is very much applicable even to the old references which are still undecided” to claim that the Circular was applicable to the appeals which were still pending.

3.5 The  Bombay High Court at the  outset observed that the views of the Court in  Pithwa Engineering’s case  pertained to Circular dated March 27, 2000. Thereafter the Court referred to Instruction  No. 2/2005,  dated  October 24, 2005, paragraph 2 “In partial modification of the above  instruction, it has now been decided by the Board that appeals will henceforth be filed only in cases where the tax effect exceeds  the revised  monetary limits given  hereunder”.

3.6 Taking  into consideration the portion underlined for the purpose of emphasis, the Court held that the Revenue was justified in contending that the Circular was applicable only prospectively and that it made no reference to pending matters. On the basis of the text and considering the applicability of the Circular dated October 24, 2005, the Court declined to follow the view taken by the Court in Pithwa Engineering’ case regarding the earlier circular.

4. Observations:

4.1 The available  statistics  reveal that the number of appeals  filed by the Income-tax  Department  far outnumber  the appeals  filed by the taxpayers.  This simple statistics convey an important  and alarming fact when read with the fact that ninety  per cent of these  appeals  are decided  against  the Income-tax Department.  The emerging  conclusion  is that most of these appeals  are filed as a matter  of course,  in a routine  manner  without  application  of mind as to the viability, efficacy and the cost involved  in prosecuting these appeals. The Government  today, is the biggest litigant.

4.2  The aforesaid  facts when examined  in the light of another  equally  disturbing  fact that  the Courts today  are flooded  with the number  of cases, which if disposed  of at the present  pace,  will be adjudicated  after a scaringly long  period.

4.3  It is realisation    of these  facts and of the enormous  costs involved    therein that  the Government of India  evolved a benevolent policy  of refraining from pursuing appeals where the  tax  effect in monetary terms  was negligible. It also decided to review the prescribed monetary limits from time to time, keeping in mind the  inflation factor. This avowed  policy has been religiously  followed  by the Government  by revising  the said limits periodically.

4.4  It is this policy background   that  was  kept  in mind  by the Bombay High Court  while deciding  in Pithwa  Engineering’s   case that  the  revised  monetary limits should  be applied  at the time of adjudicating  the appeals.  This was done to promote  the said avowed  policy of avoiding  litigation  and promote the breathing  space in the corridors  of Court and was not done to defeat  the power  of an executive to provide  guidelines  for administration   of the law that it is vested  with.  This angle  of the Court, if appreciated,  will enable  the Income-tax  Department to welcome  the said decision  with open arms.

4.5 Unfortunately, in Chaajer Packaging’s case the aspects narrated in the above paragraph were not pressed as is apparent from the reading thereof or the Court was not impressed by the same, if they were brought to the attention of the Court. We are sure that had the avowed policy of the Government and the logic of the Court in Pithwa Engineering’s case been brought to the notice of the Court, the decision in Chhajer Packaging’s case could have been different.

4.6 The Bombay High Court even in Carrico Colour Co.’s case, 254 ITR 565 (Born.), much before the Pithwa Engineering’s case had applied the Circular of 2000 in deciding a reference on 26-11-2001 which was filed in 2000 and pertained to A.y. 1990-91.

4.7 With utmost respect to the Court, attention is invited to Paragraph 7 of the said instruction of 2000 which reads as ‘ This instruction will come into effect from 1st April, 2000.’ The said Circular dated 27-3-2000 was specifically made effective from a later date i.e., 1st April, 2000 and was otherwise prospective. In spite of the said Circular being specified to be prospective in its nature, the Court in Pithwa Engineering’s case had held the same to be retrospective. This fact takes away the logic supplied in Chhajer Packaging’s case wherein relying on the use of the term ‘henceforth’ in paragraph 2 of the instructions of 2005, it was held that the said instructions of 2005 were not prospective.

4.8 The Bombay High Court in our opinion should have followed its own decision in Pithwa Engineering’s case as per the law of precedent, as the facts were the same in both the cases. In case of a disagreement, the later case should have been referred to the full Bench. The said decision needs a reconsideration.

Disallowances u/s.14A of Income-tax Act

Article

1. Background :


1.1 S. 14A has been inserted in Chapter IV of the Income tax
Act by the Finance Act, 2001, with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962. This
Section provides for disallowance of expenditure incurred in relation to income
which is not included in the total income of the assessee (i.e. exempt
income). The operative part of this Section reads as under :

“For the purposes of computing the total income under this
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by
the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total
income under this Act.”

1.2 Proviso to the Section was added by the Finance Act, 2002
w.e.f. 11-5-2001. It provides that the A.O. cannot reopen the assessment u/s.147
for any assessment year prior to A.Y. 2001-02 for this purpose or pass any
rectification order u/s.154 for prior years to disallow any such expenditure.

1.3 In the case of CIT v. Indian Bank Ltd., (56 ITR
77), Supreme Court had decided in 1964 that the condition for deductibility of
an expenditure does not depend upon its quality of directly or indirectly
producing taxable income and, therefore, there was no warrant for disallowing a
proportionate part of the interest referable to moneys borrowed for the purchase
of tax free securities. This principle was reiterated in the case of CIT v.
Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.,
(82 ITR 452). In this case it was held that no
part of managing agency commission can be disallowed on the ground that it
partly relates to managing sugarcane cultivation, the income from which was
exempt from tax. Again, in the case of Rajasthan State Warehousing
Corporation v. CIT,
(242 ITR 450) the above principle was once again
reiterated by the Supreme Court. In this case, it was held that if business is
one and indivisible, the expenditure cannot be apportioned and disallowed to the
extent it may relate to income which is exempt from income tax.

1.4 It may be noted that the explanatory memorandum issued
with the Finance Bill, 2001, gives the purpose for which the amendment is made.
This reads as under :

“Certain incomes are not includible while computing the
total income as these are exempt under various provisions of the Act. There
have been cases where deductions have been claimed in respect of such exempt
income. This in effect means that the tax incentive given by way of exemptions
to certain categories of income is being used to reduce also the tax payable
on the non-exempt income by debiting the expenses incurred to earn the exempt
income against taxable income. This is against the basic principles of
taxation whereby only the net income, i.e., gross income minus the
expenditure, is taxed. On the analogy, the exemption is also in respect of the
net income. Expenses incurred can be allowed only to the extent they are
relatable to the earning of taxable income.

It is proposed to insert a new S. 14A so as to clarify the
intention of the legislature since the inception of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
that no deduction shall be made in respect of any expenditure incurred by the
assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income
under the Income-tax Act.”


1.5 From the above, it appears that only direct expenses
incurred for earning the income which is exempt will be covered by S. 14A. Even
in the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above there is nothing to
infer that direct expenses incurred for earning exempt income is allowable.
Therefore, even in the absence of a provision contained in the new S. 14A law
was well settled. There is nothing in this Section to suggest that indirect
expenses will be disallowed.

1.6 In actual implementation of this provision, the
Income-tax Department has been taking the view that all items of income
(including dividend on shares and units of Mutual Funds etc. on which Dividend
Distribution Tax is paid) stated in S. 10 of the Income-tax Act are governed by
S. 14A. The intention of this legislation was to disallow only direct expenses
incurred for earning exempt income. In almost all cases even indirect expenses
are also being disallowed on proportionate basis. In order to ensure uniform
approach, S. 14A was amended by the Finance Act, 2006, w.e.f. 1-4-2007 (A.Y.
2007-08). By this amendment Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) were added in S. 14A to provide
that AO shall determine the amount of expenditure incurred in relation to the
exempt income in accordance with such method as may be prescribed by Rules. The
reasons for making this amendment in S. 14A are explained in Paras 11.1 to 11.3
of CBDT Circular No. 14/2006 of 28-12-2006.

2. New Rule 8D :


2.1 In exercise of the powers given in S. 14A(2) C.B.D.T. has
issued a Notification No. S.O. 547(E) on 24-3-2008 (299 ITR (ST) 88). This
notification amends the Income-tax Rules by insertion of a new Rule 8D providing
for a “Method for determining amount of expenditure in relation to income not
includible in total income”. Reading this Rule it is evident that the Rule
provides for disallowance of not only direct expenditure incurred for earning
the exempt income but also for disallowance of proportionate indirect
expenditure. This is clearly contrary to the main objective with which S. 14A
was enacted.

2.2 Broadly stated, the new Rule 8D provides as under :

(i) The method prescribed in the Rule is to be applied only if the AO is not satisfied with :

(a) The correctness of the claim of expenditure incurred for earning the exempt income made by the assessee or

(b) The claim made by the assessee that no expenditure has been incurred for earning exempt income.

(ii) The method prescribed in the Rule states that the expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income shall be the aggregate of the following amounts :

(a) The amount of expenditure directly relating to income which does not form part of total income.

(b)In the case of interest on borrowed funds which is not directly attributable to any particular income or receipt, the amount computed in accordance with this following formula:

A*B/C

A = Amount of interest, other than the amount of interest which is directly attributable to the exempt income stated in (a) above.

B = The average of value of investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of the total income, as appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee, on the first day and the last day of the relevant accounting year.

C = The average of total assets as appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee, on the first day and the last day of the relevant accounting year. The term ‘Total Assets’ means total assets as appearing in the balance sheet excluding the increase on account of revaluation of assets but including the decrease on account of revaluation
of assets.

c) An amount equal to 1h % of the average of the value of investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of the total income, as appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee, on the first day and the last day of the relevant accounting year.

2.3 From the above Rule, it will be noticed that CBDT has, instead of prescribing a simple method, prescribed a complicated formula. By applying this formula, in most cases, expenditure which has no connection with earning the exempt income will get disallowed. Some of the issues relating to this New Rule require consideration:

    i) As stated in para 2.2(ii)(b) above, interest which is directly attributed to borrowed funds used for the purpose of earning taxable income or receipts will not be considered for disallowahce of proportionate interest u/s.14 A. Therefore, interest on term loan taken for purchase of Plant & Machinery, Motor car loan, amount borrowed for acquiring factory or office building or any other business asset will not be considered for such disallowance.

    ii) It is not mentioned that interest which is disallowable u/s.43B or u/s.36(1)(iii) will also be excluded. But it can be assumed that only such expenditure, which is otherwise allowable in the computation of total income, will be considered for disallowance u/s.14A.

    iii) In the above formula in para 2.2(ii)(b) above while explaining the terms ‘B’ and ‘C’ there is a reference to the average value of investments and total assets as per the Balance Sheet of the assessee. It is not clear as to what figures shall be adopted in the cases of non-corporate assessees, such as Individuals and HUFs who do no maintain books of accounts.

    iv) In explanation to the term ’12’ it is stated that for considering average value of Investments, we have to consider “Investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of the total income”. This will mean that even if there is no income from some or all of the investments, the average value of these investments will enter the formula for disallowance of proportionate interest. This will mean that in some cases where there is no income from such investments and no exemption from tax is claimed on any income, proportionate interest will be disallowed. In some cases, if income from some investments is say only Rs.1lac on which exemption is claimed, but disallowance of proportionate interest under the formula may work out to Rs.2 lacs.

v) While explaining the term ‘C’ it is stated that average of Total Assets as per Balance sheet should be taken. It can be assumed that items like (a) Preliminary Expenses not written off, (b) Deferred Revenue expenses, (c) Deferred Tax Assets, (d) Debit Balance of Profit & Loss AI c. etc., which do not represent any tangible or intangible asset, appearing in the Balance sheet of the assessee will be excluded from Total Assets.

    vi) Similarly, current liabilities which are to be deducted from current assets in the case of the company can be added while working out the amount of Total Assets.

    vii) The formula given in para 2.2.(ii)(c) above, states that amount equal to 1/2% of the average value of investments, income from which is exempt from tax, should also be disallowed ul s.14A. This provision is not at all equitable. Such disallowance is to be made with reference to average value of such investments from which exempt income is received or not. This disallowance has no relation to either the exempt income or to the expenditure claimed by the assessee. In many cases the amount worked out may exceed the exempt income or may exceed even the total expenditure (for taxable as well as exempt income) incurred by the assessee. If we take the illustration of a closely held Investment company it is common knowledge that the administrative expenses are nominal as compared to the value of the investments. In such cases, the amount to be disallowed under the formula will far exceed the total expenses. It is suggested that a very strong representation should be made for deletion of this part of the New Rule. In any event, it should be represented that the total disallowance under the formula should not exceed 5% of the income for which exemption is claimed.

 The validity of the New Rule 8D can be challenged on the ground that S. 14A authorises CBDT to prescribe the method for determination of expenditure incurred in relation earning the exempt income, but the method prescribed by this Rule only determines the notional cost for holding investments which mayor may not yield an exempt income. Such notional cost for holding the investment has no relationship with the actual expenditure incurred and claimed by the assessee. There-fore, the New Rule goes beyond the authority given to CBDT by S. 14A

2.4 As stated earlier, the above amendment giving power to CBDT to prescribe the method for determination of expenditure to be disallowed u/ s.14A was made by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. AY. 2007-08. Therefore, the above method, as now pre-scribed by New Rule 8D, should apply to computation of income for AY. 2007-08 and onwards. However, there are certain judicial pronouncements which suggest that amendment made in S. 14A(2) and (3) made by Finance Act, 2006, is a procedural provision and, therefore, the method for computation of disallowable expenditure, whenever pre-scribed, will be applicable to all pending assessments for earlier years also. Reference in this connection  may be made  to the following  decisions:

(i) ACIT v. Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd., 108 ITD 457 (Mum.)

(ii) Kalpataru Construction Overseas (P) Ltd. v. DCIT, 13 SOT 194 (Mum.)

(iii) DCIT v. Seksaria Biswar Sugar Factory Ltd., 14 SOT 66 (Mum.)

(iv) Prakash Heat Treatment & Industries (P) Ltd. v. ITO, 14 SOT 348 (Mum.)

(v) DCIT v. Smita Conductors Ltd., 16 SOT 251 (Mum.)

(vi) Narotamdas Bhau v. ACIT,  15 SOT 629 (Mum.)

(vii) Conwood Agencies (P) Ltd. v. ITO, 15 SOT 308 (Mum.)

Contrary view has been taken in the case of Vidyut Investments Ltd. v. ITO, 10 SOT 284 (Delhi) where it is held that S. 14A(2) and (3) will only apply w.e.f. AY. 2007-08 and onwards.

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There are many ways that PowerPoint can be used. Some are
common, some less so. In this write-up we will try to deal with some of them
with an eye on how they can help users. But as always, there may be more than
just what this list mentions, so don’t limit yourself to the standard uses
listed below. The more common uses of PowerPoint are :




  • Presenter-based slide show



  • Independent slide show loops



  • Informational kiosks



  • Interactive training/testing software



  • Web design



  • Combinations



Presenter-based slide show :

Most of the time, presentations are designed to supplement a
meeting. The meeting may be just a few people, or thousands. In this type of
show you have a person or people giving a talk to a group. Sometimes the
presenter will run the PowerPoint via a podium PC or a remote control, while at
other times a person will be dedicated to just running the PowerPoint, but in
each case the primary focus of the meeting is the presenter and the information,
not PowerPoint.

Independent slide show loops :

Sometimes an independent slideshow is used. This is most
common at mega events, wedding receptions, anniversaries and reunions. This
style of PowerPoint presentation can also be used for company introductions,
product information, etc. Here the slide show is the sole focus and the
informational content will tell the whole story. Because there is no live focus,
the PowerPoint presentation will have to keep the viewers’ attention through the
use of graphics, sounds, animations and content, for instance, the electronic
scoreboard in a cricket stadium churning out animations at the fall of a wicket
or when Dhoni hits a six.

Informational Kiosk :

PowerPoint can also be used to run billboards, checkout line
advertising, information centre displays, and even trade show info booths. In
some cases there will need to be information collected from the viewer (for
post-meeting follow-up) and in others, self-updating information (weather, stock
reports, event scheduling). Drill down information may be available by having
the viewer touch a button on the screen or click on a button. This allows a
viewer to select what information they are interested in.

Interactive testing/training :

PowerPoint is a great testing program and can be either
web-based or machine-based. A single user or group is shown a question and must
respond to advance the presentation. The presentation may branch to different
learning paths depending on the users’ choices, giving additional information
for areas where the users do not answer correctly. Often the scores are recorded
for later evaluation.

Web design :

PowerPoint can be used to design web-based presentations.
These can be exported to a code that is more web-friendly (HTML), but is limited
to the abilities of the users’ browsers. It can also be used to supplement a
web-based meeting, similar to a presenter-based slide show. While PowerPoint can
be used to design a website from scratch, it is not the best tool for this job.

Combinations :

Most of these groups are not exclusive, meaning that you may
combine aspects of one with aspects of another. In this way, PowerPoint may
become what you need it to be.

Planning a PowerPoint presentation :

The first step always, always, always, in planning a
PowerPoint presentation should be to turn off the computer. OK that was meant to
be a joke. Let’s take a step back and collect some of what you know by answering
a few questions :

  • Who is this presentation for ?
  • Who is your intended audience ?
  • What type of presentation method is best suited for this type of audience ?
  • What should have the audience’s attention ?
  • When is it needed by ?
  • Will this be a one-time or a presentation that will need updating regularly ?
  • Who or what am I dependant on to complete this on time ?
  • Who is responsible for the presentation content/script/storyboard ?
  • Will it need to run on all computers, a specific computer or my computer ?
  • What version of PowerPoint do I have (or will the other computers have) ?
  • What basic steps can I break up the project into?

The first question leads to the second, which should answer the third. This is the most critical part of the show-building process. Write it down if you have to and tape it to the monitor, but knowing your audience will help everything else fall into place.

It’s not that presentations are used in the business scenario only. There are non-business uses also, for example:

You can do a Power Point photo show for a birthday or an anniversary, wherein a photo album type loop will run during the whole party. So, you know that your audience is family members and friends, it should run as an unassisted Kiosk loop, that will be one of several focuses for the party as people drift over to watch it for a bit. You also know that the anniversary party is in 5 weeks, and will be a one-time show. You will need to get pictures from dozens of relatives, and will need to decide yourself which ones get included and what music to set it to, but she wants to see it before the party. It will need to run on their computer, which has Power Point 2003, but will also be distributed to anyone that wants a copy. You have her permission to ask for some help from your cousins with the following steps: collecting pictures, sorting pictures, scanning pictures, inserting pictures into slides, rearranging slides, finishing presentation, copying to CDs, labelling CDs. Wow, this is a lot of information, but it defines what you will need to do.

In the next write-up we will cover how to power your presentations using animations.

You can post your comments to me on sam.client@gmail.com


Virtual Data Rooms — Part 2

Computer Interface

The previous write-up was about the importance of information
for decision making, specifically in mergers and acquisition. Sensitive
information can make or break the deal or tilt the scales either way. As
mentioned, the confidentiality is of prime importance, given the fact that the
target is laying bare his soul (literally). The dilemma is how to make
information available, simultaneously, to a selected large group of
individuals/experts, within the limited time and costs while maintaining control
on the flow and the use of the information provided. See picture 1.

Virtual Data Rooms (VDRs) are online repositories, providing
an infrastructure for uploading and sharing digitised data. These data rooms can
contain documents — files, letters, records and transcripts —but may also
include other relevant information in any form, from audiotapes to soil samples.
The data in the data room are resources that represent legal proof of the target
company’s asset value and reveal its earning potential and ultimately its value.

Before entering a data room, potential buyers typically have
a good understanding of the target and its business, and have a preliminary
opinion on the consideration they are willing to pay for the target. In these
cases, potential buyers inspect documents to discover hidden earning potential
that may be capitalised upon or to uncover hidden risks that are not publicly
known. The potential buyer sends its team of experts to verify their known
information about the target with the contents of the data room and to gather
new information.

The prime objective of review is to act diligently and verify
in detail the information presented by the target. In a well executed due
diligence process, an expert in the field would inspect each document in the
data room, regardless of whether the information is obvious.

A Virtual Data Room has several advantages over a Physical
Data Room such as :

Text recognition :

Offered by some VDR providers; allows text in scanned
documents to be recognised by a computer program, effective for searching and
spell-checking.

Search function :

A key feature of a VDR; enables users to search documents for
specific words and phrases, similar to Internet search engines. A significant
improvement over PDRs, where document searches are done using the document index
and are only document-level searches that do not allow for searching of specific
words and phrases.

Q&A function :

Buyers are permitted to ask sellers, questions related to the
data room and its contents, securely and efficiently. VDR users may ask
questions through the VDR screen interface by clicking on a ‘Q&A’ icon; some
VDRs may allow for routing of questions directly to the appropriate operations
team member. While asking and replying to a question, both buyer and seller
representatives may easily refer to the document in question by simply clicking
on its icon.

Audit trail function :

The target can in real terms track the documents, including
viewing access by frequency, date and user; enhances transparency of the data
room process. This gives the target the ability to profile and rank potential
buyers, based on their level of interest and indicates the most frequently
accessed documents; this is important in ascertaining the buyers that should
proceed to a second round of due diligence, which usually involves disclosing
sensitive company documents. In the event of legal proceedings or misuse of
confidential documents in the VDR, the audit trail provides proof that a certain
user acceses specific documents. Alternatively, the buyer may use the same tool
against the target if documents are not made available to the buyer.

Dynamic indexing :

Allows sellers to upload ‘late’ documents to the VDR by
efficiently placing them in their appropriate position in the VDR index; allows
the seller to quickly reorder documents in the index and to inform potential
buyers through email or SMS of changes to the index and data room contents. A
complete change of the index however may not be possible. This is a significant
improvement over the paper-based, manual indexing system and filing of PDRs,
which were prone to errors and sometimes resulted in buyers not being informed
of updates to data room contents.

Restricted use :

In a PDR, the data room supervisor has to physically manage
documents that may or may not be permitted to be copied; as against this, in a
VDR, digital documents are flagged as restricted with respect to copying,
printing, downloading or viewing. Further, restrictions may be placed on certain
portions of documents, and may allow for contingent restrictions, such as
allowing a legal expert to download only legal documents, but not financial
documents. Viewing restrictions may be placed on sensitive documents available
only during a second round of due diligence.

Watermarking :

A security feature for digital documents in a VDR;
watermarking is the printing of certain words (such as the user’s name) across
the face of a document as identification and allows tracking of the document in
the event of illegal distribution.

Variety of file formats :

VDRs can usually store files of varying formats, including
PDF, Excel, PowerPoint, Word, GIF, MPEG, JPEG, and TIFF, eliminating the need to
convert files to a specific file type or the VDR system will transform the files
into a specific format required by the system.

A basic SWOT analysis between the Physical & Virtual Data
Room can be summarised below :

Advantages of VDRs to buyer :

  • Cost savings
  • Tune savings
  • Comfort
  • Transparency
  • Fair playing field


Disadvantages to buyer:

  • Additional work
  • Competitive price
  • Reading documents online
  • System speed
  • Non-digital information


Advantages of VDRs to seller:

  • Simplicity
  • Ease of setup
  • Cost savings
  • Competitive price
  • Legal compliance
  • Time savings
  • Security


Disadvantages to seller:

  • Security


So the next time you are involved in a due diligence exercise, do make it a point to assess the positives and negatives highlighted in this write-up. Probably the next time you could add value by advising your client on how to manage risk in the process.

Whether Rectification Order can be passed beyond the time limit of four years ?

Closements

1.1 Under the Income-tax Act (the Act), various provisions
are made for rectification of orders passed. S. 254(2) provides for
rectification of orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals (Tribunal).
It is provided that the Tribunal may amend its order at any time within a period
of four years from the date of the order with a view to rectifying any mistake
apparent from the report and the Tribunal shall make such amendment if the
mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or Assessing Officer.
Accordingly, S. 254(2) enables the Tribunal to rectify its own order suo moto
or when the mistake is brought to its notice by the concerned party.


1.2 The time limit for rectifying the orders u/s. 254(2) is
four years from the date of the order. In the past, the issue had come up as to
whether the Tribunal is empowered to pass rectification order even after the
expiry of the time limit of four years, in a case where the application for the
requisite rectification is made within the specified time limit of four years.
The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals
Limited (256 ITR 767) had taken a view that if the assessee has moved the
application within the specified period of four years, the Tribunal is bound to
decide the application on merit and not on the ground of limitation, and
accordingly held that the Tribunal can pass such rectification orders even after
the expiry of the specified period of four years, if the application is moved
within the specified period of four years. However, the Madras High Court had
dissented from this view.

1.3 In view of the above-referred conflicting judgments of
the High Court, the issue was under debate as to whether the Tribunal can pass
the rectification order u/s.254(2) after the specific period of four years in a
case where the application for rectification is made within the specified period
of four years.

1.4 S. 154(7) also provides for time limit of four years from
the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be amended was
passed. This enables the Income-tax authorities to rectify their orders within
the specified time limit. S. 154(8) also provides that the Income-tax
authorities shall pass such order of rectification within six months from the
end of the month in which the application is received by it. According to the
Courts, this time limit of six months is within the overall period of time limit
of four years.

1.5 Recently the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
issue referred to in para 1.3 above in the case of Sree Ayyanar Spinning &
Weaving Mills Limited, and the issue is now resolved. Hence, considering the
importance of the issue in day-to-day practice, it is thought fit to consider
the same in this column.


CIT v. Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited,
296 ITR 53 (Mad.) :

2.1 In the above case, an assessment was completed for the
A.Y. 1989-90 assessing income u/s. 115J. There was some dispute with regard to
the working of Book Profit on the issue of the adjustment of earlier years’
depreciation on account of change in the method of depreciation made by the
assessee in the relevant previous year. The order was confirmed by the First
Appellate authority and the matter came up before the Tribunal. It was remanded
back to the Assessing Officer with certain directions. Again the same order was
passed by the Assessing Officer and the same was also confirmed by the First
Appellate authority. In this second round of appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the
order of the Assessing Officer and took the view that the depreciation relating
to the earlier years should not be adjusted while computing the Book Profits. If
such an adjustment is made, the profit and loss account of the year in question
would not reflect the correct picture. It seems that this order was passed by
the Tribunal on 9-12-1996.

2.2 On 2-8-2000, the assessee moved miscellaneous application
for rectification of above order of the Tribunal u/s.254(2) and raised certain
points therein. Although at the time of making such application, a judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (255 ITR 273) was not
available, relying on the said judgment, the Tribunal finally passed the
rectification order dated 31-1-2003, recalling its earlier order and
subsequently, the consequential order was passed on 12-6-2003. In substance, it
appears that the Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee in the rectification
proceedings relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Apollo
Tyres Limited (supra).

2.3 On the above facts, the rectification order passed by the
Tribunal was questioned by the Revenue before the Madras High Court. On behalf
of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the Tribunal was not
justified in passing the rectification order u/s.254(2) after the expiry of
specified period of four years, though the application for such rectification
was moved by the assessee within the specified period of four years; S. 254(2)
specifies the time limit for passing such an order and hence such order cannot
be passed beyond that specified period. The assessee further contended that in
the case of Income-tax authorities, the rectification of mistake is governed by
S. 154 and even though S. 154(8) provides that the rectification order shall be
passed within the specified period of six months, the same shall be read into
the total period of four years provided in S. 154(7). The statute provides the
specific outer time limit and it may not be proper for the Court to go beyond
the same.

2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia,
contended that the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on merit and not
on the ground of limitation once the application is made within the specified
time limit of four years. For this, reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited
(supra). It was further contended that Circular No. 68, dated 17-11-1971
provides that a mistake arising as a result of subsequent interpretation of law
by the Supreme Court would constitute a mistake apparent from the record and
hence, the Tribunal was justified in relying on the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (supra), though the said judgment was
not available at the time of passing the original order when the application for
rectification was moved.

2.5 After considering the arguments of both the sides and after referring to the provisions dealing with rectification contained in S. 254 as well as S. 154, the Court took the view that the authority is barred from passing the order of rectification be-yond the period of four years specified in S. 154(7) and likewise the Tribunal also should pass the order of rectification u/ s.254(2) only within the specified period of four years. The Court also did not agree with the view of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (supra).

2.6 While deciding the issue in favour of the Rev-enue, the Court finally held as under (page 62) :

“…. it cannot be construed that the power of the Appellate Tribunal to rectify the mistake could be extended indefinitely beyond four years, which time is specifically spelled out by the Legislature in S. 254(2) itself for passing an order of rectification, either suo motu by the Tribunal or on application either by the assessee or by the Assess-ing Officer. The mere usage of ‘and’ between two limbs of S. 254(2) will not, in any way, enlarge the limitation prescribed for passing the order of amendment u/ s.254(2) of the Act. Consequently, any order of amendment that would be passed by the Appellate Tribunal beyond the period of four ( years would lack jurisdiction, assuming the Ap-pellate Tribunal has got a right to pass an order of rectification to rectify the mistake in the light of the subsequent interpretation of law by any Court, as per Circular No. 68, dated November 17, 1971 [see (1972) 83 ITR (ST.) 6]. Therefore, it follows that in any case of rectification, the Income-tax authorities and the Appellate Tribunal are within their power and jurisdiction to amend their respective orders u/ s.154 and u/ s.254, respectively, in the light of subsequent interpretation of law by the Courts, but such power and jurisdiction could be exercised statutorily only . within the time of four years, not beyond the period of four years.”

CIT v. Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited, 301 ITR 434 (SC) :

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Madras High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court, wherein the only issue to be considered was whether the Tribunal can pass the order of rectification u/ s.254(2) beyond the specific period of four years when the application for such rectification is moved within the specified period of four years. To consider the issue, the Court noted the relevant facts and the issues raised before the High Court and the grounds on which the Tribunal had passed the order u/s.254(2). The Court also noted that in the appeal before it, the Court is not concerned with the merits of the case, i.e., reworking of computation made by the Assessing Officer. The Court also heard both the parties, wherein on behalf of the Revenue it was contended that on the facts of the c.aseof the assessee, the judgment of the Apex Court In the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (supra) was not applicable. However, the Court stated that though we have referred to the submissions of both the sides on merits, in this case, we are only conerned with the interpretation of S. 254(2) regarding the powers of the Tribunal in the matter of rectification of mistake apparent from the record.

3.2 Having clarified the issue under  consideration the Court noted  the controversy raised  on account of the rectification order  passed by the Tribunal  in response to miscellaneous applications dated 2-8-2000 filed by the assessee  and  the order  of the Tribunal dated 31-1-2003 recalling its order dated 9-12-1996. The Court also noted the conclusion of the High Court and also the fact that the High Court did not go into the merits of the case.

3.3  The Court then referred  to the provisions of S. 254(2) and  observed as under (page  432) :

“Analysing the above provisions, we are of the view that S. 254(2) is in two parts. Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it U / ss.(l). Under the second part of S. 254(2), the reference is to the amendment of the order passed by the Tribunal U/ss.(l) when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in short, the first part of S. 254(2) refers to the suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by the Tribunal, whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the asseSSee pointing out the mistake apparent from the record. In this case, we are concerned with the second part of S. 254(2). As stated above, the application for rectification was made within four years. The application was well within four years. It is the Tribunal which took its own time to dispose of the application. Therefore, in the circumstances, the High Court had erred in holding that the application could not have been entertained by the Tribunal beyond four years.”

3.4 The Court then referred to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (supra), relied on by the counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee and noted the view of the Rajasthan High Court as appearing in the head notes of the said judgment as under (page 438) :

“Once the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of appeal, the Tribunal cannot reject that application on the ground that four years have lapsed, which includes the period of pendency of the application before the Tribunal. If the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of the order, the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on the merits and not on the ground of limitation. S. 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, lays down that the Appellate Tribunal may at any time within four years from the date of the order rectify the mistake apparent from the record, but that does not mean that if the application is moved within the period allowed, i.e., four years, and remains pending before the Tribunal, after the expiry of four years the Tribunal can reject the application on the ground of limitation.”

3.5 Having considered the above-referred view of the Rajasthan High Court, the Court decided the is-sue in favour of the assessee and held as under (page 438) :

“We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (2002) 256 ITR 767.

For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore T.e. (A) No. 2/2004 on the file of the Madras High Court for fresh decision on the merits of the matter as indicated here in above. All contentions on the merits are expressly kept open. We express no opinion on the merits of the case whether rectification application was at all maintainable or not and whether the judgment in the case of Apollo Tyres (2002) 255 ITR 273 was or was not applicable to the facts of this case. That question will have to be gone into by the High Court in the above T.e. (A) No. 2/2004.”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, now it is clear that once the application for rectification is moved within the specific period of four years, the Tribunal can pass order u/ s.254(2) even if such a period has expired.

4.2 The above position will also equally apply for passing rectification order u/s.154 by the Income-tax authorities. Therefore, once such a period is expired, it would not be correct for the Income-tax authorities to take a view that it has no power to pass the rectification order u/s.154, even if the application is made within the specified period of limitation.

4.3 So far as the powers of the Income-tax authorities to rectify their order are concerned, there is also time limit of six months provided in S. 154(8). In many cases, this time limit is not observed by the authorities. Even in such cases, it would not be correct for the Income-tax authorities to later on take a stand that since specified mandatory time limit of six months has expired, they have no power to pass the requisite rectification order. With the above judgment of the Apex Court, in our view, even this position becomes clear.

4.4 Interestingly, there is also time limit for passing order for refusing or granting registration to charitable trusts, etc. u/s.12AA, wherein it is provided that every order of granting or refusing the registration under the said provision shall be passed before the expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the relevant application is received – [Refer S. 12AA (2)]. In the context of these provisions, the Special Bench of the Tribunal (Delhi) in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust [(2007) 17 SOT 281] has taken a view that if such an order u/s.12AA(2) is not passed within the specified period of six months, registration shall be deemed to have been granted.

Concealment Penalty — Whether mens rea is essential ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act (the Act) provides for
levy of penalty (Concealment Penalty) in cases where the assessee has concealed
particulars of his income (‘Concealment of Income) or furnished inaccurate
particulars of such income (Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars). Explanation 1 to
S. 271(1) provides a legal fiction whereunder any addition or disallowance is
deemed to represent Concealed Income for the purpose of levy of Concealment
Penalty, provided conditions of the Explanation are satisfied. The Explanation
provides that (i) where the assessee fails to offer an explanation in respect of
any facts, material to the computation of total income or offers an explanation
for the same, which is found to be false, or (ii) where the assessee is not able
to substantiate the explanation offered by him and fails to prove that the same
is bona fide and that all the facts relating to the same and material to
the computation of his income have been disclosed by him, then the amount added
or disallowed shall be deemed to represent Concealed Income. This Explanation
shifts the burden of proof from the Department to the assessee. In substance,
the Explanation provides for a deeming fiction whereunder any addition or
disallowance made to the total income shall be regarded as Concealed Income for
the purpose of levy of Concealment Penalty under the circumstances mentioned
therein (hereinafter this Explanation 1 is referred to as the said Explanation).
The said Explanation has undergone change from time to time and the same was
last substituted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which was
subsequently amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1986 with effect from 10-9-1986.

1.2 Various issues are under debate with regard to the
provisions relating to levy of Concealment Penalty. One such issue is with
regard to nature of this penalty and whether mens rea is essential
ingredient for invoking the provisions for imposing Concealment Penalty.

1.3 Recently in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Dilip N. Shroff (291 ITR 519), it was, inter alia, held that the order
imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and ‘Concealment of Income’
and ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’, both refer to deliberate act on the
part of the assessee. In substance, the Court expressed the view that mens
rea
is essential ingredient for invoking provisions relating to the
Concealment Penalty. Therefore, this became one of the major defences for the
assessee in the matter of levy of Concealment Penalty.

1.4 Subsequently, another Bench of the Apex Court while
dealing with similar provisions relating to the levy of penalty under the
Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder (the Excise Act),
expressed a doubt about the correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra) on the principle laid down therein that
for levy of such Concealment Penalty deliberate act of ‘Concealment of Income’
or ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’ on the part of the assessee is essential.
This Division Bench felt that correct position in law in this regard is laid
down in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, SEBI’s case
[(2006) 5 SCC 361], wherein it is held that such penalty provisions are for
breach of civil obligation and hence mens rea is not an essential
ingredient of such provisions. In short, it is held that willful concealment is
not essential for attracting such civil liabilities of penalty. Accordingly, the
issue was referred to larger Bench.

1.5 Recently, the Apex Court (larger Bench consisting of
three judges) delivered the judgment on the issue referred to paras 1.2 and 1.4
above in the case of Dharmendra Textiles Processors, disapproving the above
principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra).
This may have far-reaching consequences in the matter of levy of Concealment
Penalty in day-to-day practice and also in terms of litigation on the issues
relating to levy of Concealment Penalty. Therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column.


Dilip N. Shroff v. JCIT, 291 ITR 519 (SC) :

2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were: For the A.Y.
1998-99, the assessee had computed long-term capital loss of Rs.34.12 lakhs on
transfer of 1/4th interest in property at Mumbai and the same was computed by
taking Fair Market Value (FMV) of the property as on 1-4-1981 as the cost of
acquisition as provided in S. 55(2)(b) of the Act and, it seems, on that basis
Indexed Cost was determined. The FMV was determined (based on the Registered
Valuer’s Report) at Rs.2.52 crores. However, for the purpose of assessment, such
valuation was obtained from the District Valuation Officer (DVO), who had
determined such FMV at Rs.1.44 crores. This had resulted into a long-term
capital gain of Rs.3.09 crores as against long-term capital loss of Rs.34.12
lakhs computed and shown by the assessee. On these facts, Concealment Penalty of
Rs.68.78 lakhs was imposed, which was confirmed by the First Appellate authority
as well as the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal preferred by the assessee before
the High Court u/s.260A of the Act was dismissed in limine. Under this
circumstance, the issue relating to the levy of Concealment Penalty came up
before the Apex Court in the above case.

2.2 The Apex Court allowed the appeal of the assessee by
taking a view that ‘Concealment of Income’ as well as ‘Furnishing of Inaccurate
Particulars’, both refer to deliberate act on the part of the assessee and mere
omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act.

2.3 In the above case, the Apex Court also made the following
important observations :


(i) By reason of such concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars alone, the assessee does not ipso facto become liable for penalty. Imposition of penalty is not automatic. Levy of penalty is not only discretionary in nature, but such discretion is required to be exercised on the part of the Assessing Officer, keeping the relevant factors in mind.

(ii) While considering the scope of the Explanation, the Court stated that if the ingredients contained in the main provisions as also the Explanation appended thereto are to be given effect to, despite deletion of the word’ deliberate’, it may not ‘be of much significance. The expression ‘conceal’ is of great importance. It signifies a deliberate act or omission on the part of the assessee. Such deliberate act must be either for the purpose of ‘Concealment of Income’ or ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’.

(iii) The term ‘inaccurate  particulars’ is not defined.
 
Furnishing of an assessment of value of the property may not by itself be furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Even if the Explanations are taken recourse to, a finding has to be arrived at having regard to clause (A) of Explanation 1 that the Assessing Officer is required to arrive at a finding that the explanation offered by an assessee, in the event he offers one, was false. He must be found to have failed to prove that such explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the income were not disclosed by him. Thus, apart from his explanation being not bona fide, it should have been found as of fact that he has not disclosed all the facts which were material to the computation of his income.

iv) The order imposing penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, the burden lies on the Department to establish that the assessee had concealed his income. Since the burden of proof in penalty proceedings varies from that in the assessment proceedings, a finding in an assessment proceeding that a particular receipt is income cannot automatically be adopted, though a finding in the assessment proceeding constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceedings. In the penalty proceedings, thus, the authorities must consider the matter afresh, as the question has to be considered from a different angle.

v) Before a penalty can be imposed, the entirety of the circumstances must reasonably point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represented income, and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars thereof.

vi) ‘Concealment of Income’ and ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’ are different and both refer to deliberate act on the part of the assessee. A mere omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act of suppressioveri or suggestiofalsi. Although it may not be very accurate or apt, but suppressioveri would amount to concealment, suggestiofalsi would amount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Union of India and Others v. Dharmendra Textiles Processors and Others, 306 ITR 277 (SC) :

3.1 In the above case (as well as other cases), when it came up before another Division Bench, the question was whether the provisions of S. llAC of the Excise Act (as inserted by the Finance Act, 1996 with the intention of imposing mandatory penalty on persons who evaded payment of taxes) should be read to contain mens rea as essential ingredient, and whether there is scope of levying penalty below the prescribed minimum. The Revenue’s stand was that the said Section should be read as penalty for statutory offence and once there is a default, the authority has no discretion in the matter of imposing penalty and the authority, in such cases, was duty bound to impose penalty as prescribed. On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee reference was made to S. 271(1)(c) of the Act taking the stand that S. llAC of the Excise Act is identically worded and in a given case, it was open to the authority not to impose any penalty. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). The Division Bench was of the view that the basic scheme for the imposition of Concealment Penalty under the Act and penalty u/s.llAC of the Excise Act is common, and was of the view that the law laid down in Chairman, SEBI’S case (supra) is correct and had doubted the correctness of the above principle laid down in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). Accordingly, the matter was referred to Larger Bench, effectively to decide whether mens rea is essential ingredient of S. llAC of the Excise Act, and whether the authority has any discretion in the matter of levy of penalty u/s.llAC of the Excise Act, when there is a breach. We are not concerned with the issue relating to discretion of the authority as to levy or not to levy the penalty under the said S. llAC (as, in this context, there is a difference between the two provisions, particularly on account of the said Explanation) and other background of the said case in this write-up and therefore, the same is not referred to.

3.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that in S. 11AC of the Excise Act, no reference to any mens rea is made and this is clear from the other relevant provisions also. It was further contended that the reliance on the judgment in the case of Dilip N:Shroff (supra) is misplaced, as in that case the question relating to discretion of the authority as to levy or not to levy the penalty was not the basic issue. In fact, S. 271(1)(c) of the Act provides for some discretion and therefore, that decision has no relevance. S. nxc provides for a mandatory penalty once the breach is committed. So far as the present case is concerned, the only dispute is whether the discretion has been properly exercised, which is a question of fact. Reliance was placed on the Chairman, SEBI’s case (supra).

3.3 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the factual scenario in each case has to be examined. It was further contended that S. 271C of the Act uses the expression ‘shall be liable’, whereas S. 271B uses the expression ‘shall pay’ in support of the contention that there is a discretion to reduce the penalty. The reference, for this purpose, was also made to S. 271F and S. 272A of the Act. It was further contended that even if it is held that the Section gives the impression that the imposition of penalty is mandatory, yet there was scope for exercise of discretion as held by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, (106 STC 604). It was also contended that various degrees of culpability envisaged in S. llAC cannot be placed on the same pedestal. Certain further arguments were made with reference to S. llAC of the Excise Act and the rules made there under, with which we are not concerned in this write-up, as the same primarily may be relevant in the context of the Excise Act.

3.4 After considering the arguments of both the sides, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Excise Act and the rules made thereunder as well as the provisions of S. 271 and S. 271C of the Act. The Court then stated that in Chairman, SEBI’s case (supra), after referring to the statutory scheme, it was pointed out that there was a scheme attracting the imposition of penalty in that Act (SEBIAct) under different circumstance (i.e., penalty with reference to breach of civil obligation and penalty related to criminal proceedings). The Court further stated that in that case, after referring to certain provisions of the SEBI Act, the Court has held as under (pages 294/295) :

“The scheme of the SEBI Act of imposing penalty is very clear. Chapter VI-A nowhere deals with criminal offences. These defaults for failures are nothing but failures or default of statutory civil obligations provided under the Act and the Regulations made thereunder. It is pertinent to note that S. 24 of the SEBI Act deals with the criminal offences under the Act and its punishment. Therefore, the proceedings under Chapter VI-A are neither criminal nor quasi-criminal. The penalty leviable under the Chapter or under these Sections is penalty in cases of default or failure of statutory obligation or in other words breach of civil obligation. In the provisions and scheme of pen-alty under Chapter VI-A of the SEBI Act, there is no element of any criminal offence or punishment as contemplated under criminal proceedings. Therefore, there is no question of proof of intention or any mens rea by the appellants and it is not an essential element for imposing penalty under the SEBI Act and the Regulations …. “.

3.5 After referring to the view expressed by the Apex Court in Chairman, SEBl’s case (supra), the Court stated that the Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that mens rea is not an essential element of imposing penalty for breach of civil obligation. For this, the Court made reference to various decisions of the Apex Court under different statutes dealing with this issue and taking similar view. Amongst this, the Court also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Tranvancore Agency (171 ITR 455), in which the Court was concerned with the levy of penalty u/ s. 271(I)(a) (since omitted from A.Y. 1989-90) for failure to furnish the return of income as required u/s.139(1) of the Act. In that case, the Court compared these provisions with S. 276C of the Act dealing with prosecution in cases where the person willfully fails to furnish the return of income as required u/s. 139(1) of the Act. In that case, having referred to both these Sections, the Court has stated that “it is clear that in the former case what is intended is a civil obligation, while in the latter what is imposed is a criminal sentence”. In that case, the Court has concluded that in the proceedings u/ s.271(I)(a) of the Act, the intention of the Legislature seems to emphasis the fact of loss of revenue and to provide a remedy for such a loss, although no doubt, an element of coercion is present in the penalty. Therefore, accordingly to the Court in that case, there is nothing in S. 271(I)(a), which required that mens rea must be proved before the penalty can be levied under that provision.

3.6 Dealing with the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (supra), on which also heavy reliance was placed on behalf of the .assessee, the Court stated that the same is not of any assistance, because the same proceeded on the basis of a concession and in any event, did not indicate the correct position in law.

3.7 The Court then referred to settled position of interpretation that the Court cannot read anything into the statutory position or stipulated condition, when the language is plain and unambiguous. The Court also referred to various decisions of the Apex Court relating to the principle of construction of statutory provisions. The Court, then, dealing with the principle of interpretation of the statute, stated as under (pages 300-301) :

“Two principles of construction – one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole, appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity, and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or Section must be construed together and every clause of a Section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. ‘An intention to produce an unreasonable result’ said Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1965) 3 All ER 539 (CA) (All ER page 544 I) ‘is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available’. Where to apply words literally would ‘defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result’, we must ‘do some violence to the words’ and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRe, (1963) AC 557(HL) where at AC page 577 he also observed: (All Er page 664-1)’. This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such (that it rarely emerges)”.

3.8 Dealing with the judgment in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra), the Court stated as under (page 302) :

“It is of significance to note that the conceptual and contextual difference between S. 271(I)(c) and S. 276C of the Income-tax Act was lost sight of in Dilip N. Shroff’s case (2007) 8 Scale 304 (sc)

The Explanations appended to S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act entirely indicate the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing the return. The judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case (2007) 8 Scale 304 (SC) has not considered the effect and relevance of S. 276C of the Income-tax Act. The object behind the enactment of S. *272(1)(c) read with the Explanations indicates that the said section has been enacted to provide for remedy for loss of revenue. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. Wilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as is the case in the matter of prosecution u/ s.276C of the Income-tax Act”.

should be read as 271(1)(c)

3.9 Finally, in the context of the issue under consideration, the Court took the view (so far as it is relevant for this write-up) that Dilip N. Shroff’s case was not correctly decided. In this context, the Chairman, SEBI’s case has analysed the legal position in the correct perspective. The Court then stated that the matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench to deal with the matter in the light of this decision, only so far as cases where there is challenge to the vires of the relevant provisions and rules made under the Excise Act.

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, it is now clear that mens rea is not an essential ingredient of the provisions dealing with Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c). It is also clear that the nature of such Concealment Penalty is not quasi-criminal, but the same is for breach of civil obligation and therefore, willful concealment is not essential for levy of such penalty.

4.2 In view of the above, the cases relating to the levy of Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) will have to be decided on the basis of provisions of S. 271(1)(c) read with the Explanations (Explanation 1 in particular) to S. 271.

4.3 From the judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, it seems that the same overrules the judgment of the Apex Court in the Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that deliberate act on the part of the assessee will have to be proved for levy of Concealment Penalty (i.e., mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions) and the order imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature. It seems that the other observations made by the Apex Court in Dilip N. Shroff ‘s case in the context of Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) should continue to hold good, as the larger Bench of the Apex Court was not specifically concerned with those points as well as the language of the S. 271(1) (and the Explanations thereto) of the Income-tax Act.

Whether free/subsidised transport facility is liable to Fringe Benefit Tax — S. 115WB(3)

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 Finance Act, 2005 introduced new provisions relating to
Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) with effect from A.Y. 2006-2007 by introducing New
Chapter XII-H in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). S. 115WA provides that the
additional Income-tax (referred to in the Act as FBT) shall be charged in
respect of fringe benefits provided or deemed to have been provided by an
employer to his employees during the previous year on the value of such fringe
benefits.

1.2 S. 115WB(1) defines ‘Fringe Benefit’ as any consideration
for employment provided by way of any privilege, service, facility or amenity,
directly or indirectly, by an employer, whether by way of reimbursements or
otherwise, to his employees (including former employees). The other part of the
definition contained in this sub-section is not relevant for this write-up. The
meaning of fringe benefit provided u/s.115WB(1) referred to hereinbefore is
hereinafter referred to as ‘General Fringe Benefit’.

1.3 S. 115WB(2) provides that the fringe benefit shall be
deemed to have been provided by the employer to his employee, if the employer
has in the course of his business or profession [including any activity whether
or not such activity is carried on with the object of deriving income, profits
or gain] incurred any expense on, or made any payment for, the purposes of
certain expenses enumerated therein (hereinafter the fringe benefit considered
under this sub-section is referred to as ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ and expenses
enumerated for this purpose are referred to as Specified Expenses).

1.4 S. 115WB(3) provides that for the purpose of Ss.(1),
the privilege, services, facility or amenity (i.e., General Fringe
Benefit) does not include perquisite in respect of which the tax is paid or
payable by the employee or any benefit or amenity in the nature of free or
subsidised transport or any such allowance provided by the employer to his
employees for the journeys by the employees from their residence to the place of
work or for returning back to the residence (here in this write-up, this
facility of transport is referred to as ‘Free/Subsidised Transport Facility)’.

1.5 The FBT is payable on the value of the Fringe Benefit
which has to be valued as provided in S. 115WC. The CBDT, in its Circular No. 8,
dated 29-8-2005 (hereafter referred to as the said Circular), has also clearly
stated that if there is no provision for method of valuing any particular fringe
benefit, even if it falls in the category of ‘General Fringe Benefit’, the same
is not liable to FBT. It may be noted that u/s.115WC (which is the only
provision which provides for method of valuing the fringe benefit), there is no
provision to compute any value of ‘General Fringe Benefit’. The computation is
provided only in respect of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ and other specified fringe
benefits referred to in S. 115WB(1) with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.6 Since the provisions of S. 115WB(3) which provides for
exemption from the levy of FBT are specifically made applicable to S. 115WB(1),
the issue was under debate as to whether the exemption provided therein can be
claimed in respect of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ [referred in S. 115 WB(2)]. The
CBDT in the said Circular has stated that the ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ provided
in S. 115WB(2) expands the scope of the meaning of the term of ‘Fringe Benefit’
provided in S. 115WB(1) (i.e., ‘General Fringe Benefit’). The issue is
relevant as otherwise there is no specific provision providing method of valuing
the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ and accordingly, such fringe benefit is not subject
to FBT liability as mentioned in para 1.5 above. The Authority for Advance
Ruling (AAR) had an occasion to consider this issue in the case of R&B Falcon
(A) (P.) Ltd.

1.7 Recently, the issue referred to in para 1.6 above came up
for consideration before the Apex Court while considering the correctness of the
ruling of the AAR referred to in para 1.6 above and the issue is now settled.
This is the first judgment of the Apex Court dealing with the provisions
relating to FBT and therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this
column.


R & B Falcon (A) Pty. Ltd., in re


— 289 ITR 369 (AAR)

2.1 In the above case, the issue relating to scope of the
exemption provided in S. 115WB(3) came up for consideration before the AAR and
the issue referred to in para 1.6 also came up for consideration. In the above
case, the brief facts were: the applicant was non-resident company incorporated
under the laws of Australia. It was engaged in the business of providing Mobile
Offshore Drilling Rig (MODR) along with crew on a day-rate charter-hire basis to
drill offshore wells. The applicant entered into a contract in October, 2003
with ONGC for supplying MODR along with the equipments and offshore crew
(employees). The employees of the applicant worked on MODR on commuter basis.
Under this system, an employee works on MODR for 28 days (called ‘on days’),
which is then alternated by 28 days field brake (called ‘off days’), when he
stays at the place of his residence in his home countries like Australia, U.K.,
USA, etc. They are transported from their home country to the MODR in two laps-
the first is from a designated base city in the home country to a designated
city in India for which the applicant provides free air ticket of economy class
and second is from that city in India to MODR through helicopter, especially
hired by the applicant for this purpose. On completion of 28 days of duty on
MODR, they are transported back to their home country in the same manner. They
are not paid any conveyance/transport allowance.

2.2 On the above facts, the following question was raised
before the AAR :

“Whether transportation cost incurred by R & B Falcon (A)
Pty. Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Applicant’) in providing
transportation facility for movement of offshore employees from their
residence in home country to the place of work and back is liable to Fringe
Benefit Tax (‘FBT’) ?”


2.3 The comments of the Commissioner made to the Applicant’s application, inter alia, stated that there is no element of transportation of these employees from the place of work and back on day-to-day basis, the expenses incurred on such transportation are covered within the scope of ‘General Fringe Benefits’ u/s.115WB(1)(a) as well as within the  scope    of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefits’ u/s.115 WB(2)(F),no taxes are paid by the employees for the transportation and therefore, such expenses incurred by the employer are liable to FBT. It was also stated that the applicant has a PE in India and has been filing returns of its income u/ s.44BB of the Act.

2.4 On behalf of the applicant, it was pointed oU.t that there are three categories of employees working under the applicant (i) employees based on land who attend to the administration, etc., (ii) Indian employees working on the rig, and (iii) foreign nationals (employees) who are transported to the rig from outside India. This application relates to the third category of the employees. It was, inter alia, further contended that considering its nature, such transportation of offshore employees does not fall within the charge of FBT u/s.115WA. Further, this position is made clear by the Circular No.8 of 200 which clearly excludes such transportation of employees from the ambit of the charge of FBT. The same position is also made clear by S. 115WB(3)and the view of the Commissioner is not tenable in law. On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the employees are carried in batches to the rig and they are alternated after each period of 28 days, such employees live on the rig for 28 days while they were on work there and therefore, the place of their residence is the rig and as such no ‘Free/Subsidised Transport Facility’ as contemplated in S. 115WB(3) is involved. A reference was also made to various questions and answers contained in the said Circular  to support    its case.

2.5 After considering the contentions raised by both the sides, the AAR noted the relevant provisions contained in 115WA, 115WB and 115WC and stated that the other provisions are mainly procedural provisions which are not relevant for the question under consideration.

2.6 Considering the provisions contained in S. 115WA, the AAR noted that FBT is leviable in respect of fringe benefit provided or deemed to have been provided by an employer to his employees during the previous year. It was further noted that S. 115WB(1)refers to fringe benefit provided to the employees in consideration for the employment and S. 115WB(2)provides that if employer incurs specified expenses, the fringe benefits shall be deemed to have been provided by the employer to his employees. Then the AAR referred to relevant part of the specified expenses in clause ‘F’ (Conveyance) and ‘Q’ [tour and travel (including foreign travel)] .

The AAR further noted that the rigor of FBT leviable on the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ is to some extent mitigated by 5. 115WB(3),which is clarificatory in nature. There are two exclusions provided in this sub-section viz. (i) ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of perquisites in respect of which tax is paid or payable by the employee; and (ii) ‘Pree /Subsidised transport Facility’ provided to the employee. The AAR then stated that rationale of the first exclusion appears to be to avoid double taxation of the same ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of the perquisites.

2.7 According to the AAR, 5. 115WB(1) does not take within its fold free or concessional tickets provided by an employer to his employees for the purpose of journey outside India. A combined reading of both the sub-sections would show that the ambit of such ‘General Fringe Benefit’ would not take in its ambit’ conveyance’ , and ‘tour and travel’ (including foreign travel); otherwise the said expressions could not have been elements of the deeming provisions contained in 5s.(2). The AAR also stated that the first limb of exclusion is not applicable in this case, as it is nobody’s case that the employees have paid or are liable to pay tax on the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of perquisites, if any. According to the AAR, the transportation expenses in question being related to employees’ journeys outside India, the same is also not covered within the ambit of second limb of exclusion contained in 115WB(3). Accordingly, the AAR took the view that such transportation expenses are liable to FBT and the same are not excluded by virtue of the provisions of 5. 115WB(3). Finally, the AAR opined as under (page 238) :

“Now it may be recalled that we have held above that 5s.(1) of 5. 115WB does not take in its fold free or concessional tickets provided by an employer to his employees for the purpose of journeys outside India, therefore, it follows that the transportation costs incurred by the applicant in bringing the offshore employees from the place of their residence outside India to the rig (in India) will not fall within the second limb of 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB.”

2.8 The AAR then proceeded to consider whether such transportation expenses would fall within the meaning of ‘conveyance’, or ‘tour or travel’ (includ-ing foreign travel)’, as contemplated in S. 115WB(2). To resolve this controversy, the AAR stated that the terms ‘residence’, ‘tour or travel’, ‘conveyance’ and ‘transport’ should be understood. They are not defined as they are not technical terms. The AAR then noted the dictionary meanings of these terms as well as the concept of residence explained in Model Convention on Income and Capital issued by the OECD in the context of the tie-breaker rule for residence. The AAR took the view that the term ‘residence’ connotes a place of abode where a person intends to dwell for considerable length of time and not a place where a person is required to stay for a short duration in connection with his duties like the stay at the rig. Accordingly, the AAR did not accept the contention of the Revenue that the place of residence of the offshore employees is the rig where they stay for doing their duties. Referring to the dictionary meaning, the AAR also stated that conveyance and transport are used many a time interchangeably and the terms tour and travel are used to denote movement from one place to another, one country to another, both for pleasure, as well as for discharging of duty. One of the meanings of tour specifically refers to ‘on an oil rig’. The AAR then stated that the provision of free ticket for travelling of employees from home country to designated city in India would fall under clause (Q) ‘tour and travel’ and journey from the chopper based in India to the rig by helicopter would fall under clause (F) – ‘Conveyance’.

2.9 Finally, while deciding the issue against the as-sessee, the AAR held as under (page 242) :

“…. It is interesting to note question No. 24 and answer thereto in the said Circular. That question deals with the case of foreign company, which sends its employees on tour to India; the answer provides that the liability to pay FBT would depend upon whether or not the company is an employer in India. A foreign company is treated as an employer in India provided it has employees. based in India; if such foreign company has no employees based in India, it is not an employer in India and is not liable to pay FBT in India. It has been pointed out above that the applicant has three categories of employees – (i) employees working on land and dealing with administration; (ii) Indian employees working on the rig, and (ill) foreign employees transported to India for the purpose of working on the rig. Therefore, the employer though a foreign company will be treated as employer in India inas-much as a section of its employees are based in India. It is worthwhile to point out that the liability of the foreign company to pay Fringe Benefit Tax on sending its employees on tour and travel to India depends on whether the foreign company is an employer in India and not whether the employees are working in India. After a careful reading of the questions and answers in the Circular it has been pointed out above that Question No. 104 relating to transportation of employees whether free or on subsidised basis for journeys from their residence to the place of work and from the place of work to their residence, refers to the residences of the employees within India and that the same position will govern sub-section (3) of 5. 115WB.”

R & B Falcon (A) (Pty.) Ltd. v. CIT, 301 ITR 309 (5C) :

3.1 The above-referred ruling of the AAR came up for consideration before the Apex Court. After referring to the facts of the case, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of Chapter XII-H. The Court also referred to the objects of the introduction of the said provisions as stated in the said Circular and noted that an employer in India is liable to FBT in respect of the value of Fringe Benefits provided by him to his employees and deemed to have been provided by him to his employees. The Court also noted from the said Circular that if there is no provision for computing the value of any particular Fringe Benefit, such Fringe Benefit, even it may fall within the 5. 115WB(1)(a) (i.e., ‘General Fringe Benefits’) is not liable to FBT.

3.2 The Court then referred to some of the questions and answers given in the said Circular. The Court noted the answer to question No. 20, in which, it is, inter alia stated that in case of Indian Company having employees based both in India as well as outside India and incurs the Specified Expenses, the value of such Fringe Benefit is determined, as a proportion of total amount of expenses incurred for identified purposes. For this purpose, such expenses attributable to operations in India should be taken into account. The Court also noted answer to question No. 21, in which, while dealing with the FBT liability of Indian Company carrying on business outside India, where none of its employees in such business is liable to pay tax in India, it is stated that the Indian Company would be liable to FBT,if its employees are based in India. Therefore, if such Indian Company does not have any employees based in India, such Company would not be liable to FBT.The Court also noted the question No. 104 with regard to FBT liability on the expenditure incurred by the employer for the purpose of providing ‘Pree /Subsidised Transport Facility’.

3.3 Having referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and some paras of the said Circular, the Court noted that in the above case, with regard to FBT liability for providing transportation and moves. ment of offshore employees from their residence and home countries outside India to the place to rig and back, the AAR has opined as under (page 524) :

“(1) The exemption  provision  contained in 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB is restricted to 5s.(1) whereas the exemption falls under the deeming provision contained in 5s.(2).

(2) Residence within the meaning of the said provision would mean residence in India and as the employees concerned are residents of the countries outside India, 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB is not applicable”

3.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, cone tended that the distinction between 5s.(1) and (2) is highly artificial and unless both the provisions are read into 5s.(3), the same would be rendered otiose; the Parliament has not restricted the operation of that provision only to regular employees and hence no restrictive meaning can be given to the said provisions; residence of the employees being not restricted to the territory of India, the AAR are committed serious error in taking a view that the place of residence would mean residence in India in 115WB(3);the CBDT itself, in the said Circular, has expressed view that 5s.(2) is merely in expansion of 5s.(1) and overall reading of the said Circular als indicates that the FBT is not payable in respect of the expenditure incurred by the employer for an employee who is not based in India.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the FBT is a new concept in terms where of any consideration for employees provided, inter alia, for facility or amenity comes within the purview of FBT liability, the tax is payable only when employer incurs specified expenses and such exemption has to be granted only on the tax leviable U/ss.(l). The terms residence, transport, etc. must be given broad meaning, which would lead to conclusion that only when employees are provided ‘Free /Subsidised Transport Facility’ on regular basis, the exemption should be granted. The Parliament has used the words’ employees’, ‘journey’ and hence the same would only mean that it should cover only the journey undertaken by the employees for regularly attending the work on periodic basis.

3.6 After considering argument on both the sides, the Court stated that the object for imposition of FBT is evident from the said Circular, which is to bring about an equity. The intention of the Parliament to tax the employer where on the one hand he deducts the expenditure for the benefit of employees and on the other hand, on the employees getting the direct or indirect benefits from such expenditure, no tax is leviable. Indisputably, Ss.(3) refers to Ss.(l) only and ex-facie, it does not have any application to the ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’. The CBDT categorically states in answer to question No.7 that Ss.(2) provides for an expansive definition. Having noted these positions, the Court stated as under (pages ‘526/527) :

“Does it mean that Ss.(2) is merely an extension of Ss.(l) or it is an independent provision? If Ss.(2) is merely an extension of Ss.(1), Mr. Ganesh may be right, but we must notice that S. 115 WA provides for imposition of tax on expenditure incurred by the employer on providing its employees certain benefits. Those benefits which are directly provided are contained in Ss.(l). Some other benefits, however, which the employer provides to the employees by incurring any expenditure or making any payment for the purpose enumerated therein in the course of his business or profession, irrespective of the fact as to whether any such activity would be carried on a regular basis or not, e.g., entertainment would, by reason of the legal fiction created, also be deemed to have been provided by the employer for the purpose of Ss.(2). Whereas Ss.(1) envisages any amount paid to the employee by way of consideration for employment, what would be the limits thereof are only enumerated in Ss.(2). We, therefore, are of the opinion that Ss.(1) and Ss.(2), having regard to the provisions of S. 115WAas also Ss.(3) of S. 115WB must be held to be operating in different fields.”

3.7 The Court further explained the effect of the provisions of S. 115WB(3) and stated as under (page 527) :

“A statute, as is well known, must be read in its entirety. What would be the subject-matter of tax is contained in Ss.(l) and Ss.(2). 5s.(3), therefore, provides for an exemption. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the latter part of the contents of Ss.(3) must be given its logical meaning. What is sought to be excluded must be held to be included first. If the submission of the learned Solicitor General is accepted, there would not be any provision for exclusion from payment of tax on amenity in the nature of free or subsidised transport.

Thus, when the expenditure incurred by the employer so as to enable the employee to undertake a journey from his place of residence to the place of work or either reimbursement of the amount of journey or free tickets therefor are provided by him, the same, in our opinion, would come within the purview of the term by way of reimbursement or otherwise.”

3.8 Finally while upholding the view of the AAR that ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ is not covered within the scope of S. 115WB(3), the Court held as under (page 528) :

“The Parliament, in introducing the concept of fringe benefits, was clear in its mind insofar as on the one hand it avoided imposition of double taxation, i.e., tax both on the hands of the employees and employers; on the other, it intended to bring succour to the employers offering some privilege, service, facility or amenity which was otherwise thought to be necessary or expedient. If any other construction is put to Ss.(l) and Ss.(3), the purpose of grant of exemption shall be defeated. If the latter part of Ss.(3) cannot be given any meaning, it will result in an anomaly or absurdity. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that the Court shall avoid such construc-tions which would render a part of the statutory provision otiose or meaningless – Visitor v. K. S. Misra, (2007) 8 SCC 593; CST v. Shri Krishna Engg. Co., (2005) 2 SCC 692.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that AAR was right in its opinion that the matters enumerated in Ss.(2) of S. 115WB are not covered by Ss.(3) thereof, and the amenity in the nature of free or subsidised transport is covered by Ss.(l).”

3.9 The Court then proceeded to consider the view of the AAR that in S. 115WB(3), after the word ‘residence’ the words ‘in India’ should be read and stated that the AAR was not correct in taking such a view. In this context, the Court further observed as under (pages 528/529) :

” …For the purpose of obtaining  the benefit of the said exemption, however, the expenditure must be incurred on the employees directly for the purposes mentioned therein, namely, they are to be provided transport from their residence to the place of work or from such place of work to the place of residence. Any expenditure incurred for any other purpose, namely, other than for their transport from their residence to the place of work or from the place of work to the place of residence would not attract the exemption provision. The assessing authority, therefore, must, in each case, would have a right to scrutinise the claim. CBDT has the requisite jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of Income-tax Act. The interpretation of CBDT being in the realm of executive construction should ordinarily be held to be binding, save and except where it violates any provisions of law or is contrary to any judgment rendered by the courts. The reason for giving effect to such executive construction is not only the same as contemporaneous which would come within the purview of the maxim temporania caste pesto, even in certain situation a representation made by an authority like Minister presenting the Bill before the Parliament may also be found bound thereby.”

3.10 The Court then stated that there is no provision in S. 115WB(3) that the employees’ residence must be based in India and therefore, provision must be given its natural meaning. Hence, it would be difficult to accept the contention that employees’ residence must be based in India for that purposes. The Court further observed as under (page 530) :

“However, it appears that the contention that such expenditure should be paid on a regular basis or what would be the effect of the words “employees’ journey” did not fall for consideration of AAR. What, therefore, is relevant would be the nature of expenses. The question as to whether the nature of travelling expenditure incurred by the appellant would attract the benefits sought to be granted by. the statute did not and could not fall for consideration of the AAR. Its opinion was sought for only on one issue. It necessarily had to confine itself to that one and no other. No material in this behalf was brought on record by the parties. Whether the payments were made to them on a regular basis or whether the expenditures incurred, which strictly come within the purview of S. 115WB or not must, therefore, be answered having regard to the materials placed on records. If any question arises as to whether the agreement entered into by and between the appellant and the employees concerned would attract, in given cases, the liability under Fringe Benefit Tax would have, thus, to be determined by the assessing authority.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court it is now clear that the exemption contained in the S. 115WB(3)is applicable only to the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ and the same cannot be extended to ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’.

4.2 For the purpose of S. 115WB(3), the place of residence of an employee need not be in India. The provision also applies to employees having residence outside India.

4.3 This is the first judgment of the Apex Court dealing with FBT provisions and it appears that these provisions should be interpreted bearing the object for which the same are introduced, as observed by the Court. The above judgment is also useful to avoid double taxation of the same amount (i.e., in the hands of employer as well as employees).

4.4 From the above judgment it also becomes important to note that while interpreting these provisions, the views expressed in the said Circular should also be given due weightage. Likewise, the representation made by the Minister at the time of introduction of the Bill also carries a great weight.

Tenancy : Tenant can be evicted if subletting is done without the consent in writing of the landlord

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10 Tenancy : Tenant can be evicted if
subletting is done without the consent in writing of the landlord.

The appellant No. 1 was inducted as a tenant in the year 1956
by the erstwhile owners of the suit shop. He was all along in continuous
possession of the suit shop and was conducting the business from the same along
with his brother, under the name and style of M/s. Mitra Book Depot. The rent
receipts issued by the landlord were in the name of M/s. Mitra Book Depot as
tenant.

Subsequently, a business was started in a portion of the suit
shop in the name of M/s. Mitra Stores and M/s. Lucky Confectioners being
appellants 2 to 4. In the year 2000, the owners sold the suit shop to one Anil
Anand. However, the rent of the suit shop was continued to be paid to erstwhile
owners by the appellant. Mr. Anil Anand sold the suit shop to the respondent by
a registered deed of sale in year 2000. However, the appellant No. 1 went on
depositing the rent in the name of the original landlord. Finally, in February,
2002, the respondent filed an eviction petition before the Rent Controller,
Delhi u/s.14(1)(b) of the Act on the ground of subletting by the appellant No.
1. The Rent controller passed the order of eviction by holding, inter alia,
that the case of subletting was duly proved as from the evidence on record, both
oral and documentary, it was clear that an independent business was run by the
appellants and that they were in exclusive possession of a portion of the suit
shop.

The appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court of
Delhi and the High Court dismissed the same.


 S. 14(1)(b) of the Act, reads as under :

“That the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June,
1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or
any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the
landlord.”

On further appeal the Supreme Court observed that if a tenant
had sublet or assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or
any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the
landlord, he would be liable to be evicted from the said premises as per S.
14(1). That is to say, the following ingredients must be satisfied before an
order of eviction can be passed on the ground of subletting :


(1) the tenant has sublet or assigned or parted with the
possession of the whole or any part of the premises;

(2) Such subletting or assigning or parting with the
possession has been done without obtaining the consent in writing of the
landlord.

 


In Kailasbhai Shukaram Tiwari v. Jostna Laxmidas Pujara
and Anr.,
Manu/SC/2529/2005, while dealing with a case of subletting under
the Bombay Rules, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (57 of 1947),
the Apex Court observed that the question as to whether a person is a member of
the family of the tenant must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the
case. It observed in paragraph 14 as follows :

“Apart from the parents, spouse, brothers, sisters, sons
and daughters, if any other relative claims to be a member of the tenant’s
family, some more evidence is necessary to prove that they have always resided
together as members of one family over a period of time. The mere fact that a
relative has chosen to reside with the tenant for the sake of convenience,
will not make him a member of the family of the tenant in the context of rent
control legislation.”

 


In the facts of the case, the appellant No. 1 had parted with
the exclusive possession of a part of the suit premises in favour of the
appellant Nos. 2 to 4 without obtaining the consent in writing, either of the
erstwhile landlord or the purchaser respondent, nor the appellant could prove
that appellant nos. 2 to 4 being the family members were assisting him it the
business, hence the appeal was dismissed.

[Vaishakhi Ram & Ors. v. Sanjeev Kumar Bhatiani, Civil Appeal No. 1559
of 2008, dated 25-2-2008, Supreme Court of India.]

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Stamp duty : Cousins not being members of the family do not fall with definition of word ‘family’ under Stamp Act : S. 45(a).

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9 Stamp duty : Cousins not being members of
the family do not fall with definition of word ‘family’ under Stamp Act : S.
45(a).


The respondents herein are the sons of two brothers. They
entered into a deed of partition in respect of certain properties and presented
the same for registration. The respondents paid the fixed stamp duty as per
Article 45(a) of the Act. The District Registrar did not agree with the stamp
duty and held the said document as a pending document.

 

On appeal for release of documents, the Madras High Court
observed that the document presented for registration though titled as partition
deed was not actually a partition deed between two blood brothers. The
respondents were first cousins and the document was one falling under Article
45(b) of the Act. The word ‘family’ means as defined under Article 58 and reads
as under :

“Father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, grandchild.
In the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, ‘father’ shall
include an adoptive father, ‘mother’ an adoptive mother, ‘son’ an adopted son
and ‘daughter’ an adopted daughter.”

 


Thus, it is seen that the word, ‘family’ is given a
restrictive meaning in its application to Article 58 and the same meaning is
imported to the word ‘family’ appearing in Article 45 of the Act. Consequently,
the respondents would be entitled to claim the benefit of concessional rate of
stamp duty under Article 45(a) only if both of them are members of a family,
within the meaning of the definition of the word, ‘family’ under Article 45(a).
Therefore, prima facie, the objection raised by the appellants i.e.,
District Registrar with regard to the nature of the document is well founded.
Under such circumstances, it was not possible to order the release of the
documents.

[ District Registrar, Tindivanam and Anr. v. V.
Ranganathan & Anr.,
AIR 2008 Mad 73.]

 


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Deficiency in services by airline

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7 Deficiency in services by airline :

Consumer Protection Act. 2(1)(g).

The airline unilaterally cancelled the ticket without
intimating to the passenger prior to cancellation of tickets of onward journey.
Notice on ticket stipulated that passenger if breaks journey for more than 72
hours had to reconfirm the onward reservation. Telephones of the airline were
busy when passengers tried to reconfirm, nor emails of passenger were replied.

 

In these circumstances it was held that as the telephone
system was not functioning, the clause mentioned on ticket cannot be applied.
The airline was held deficient in its services.

[ Air India v. Prakash Singh & Anr., AIR 2008 (NOC)
666 (NCC)]

 


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Maintenance : Mother can claim maintenance against her son : S. 125 of Cr. P.C.

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8 Maintenance : Mother can claim maintenance
against her son : S. 125 of Cr. P.C.


The respondent herein is the mother of the present applicant
Rafiuddin. The respondent was divorced in the year 1973. She had no source of
income and nobody was ready to maintain her. Therefore she claimed maintenance
from the present applicant i.e., son.

The Court relying on the decision in case of Mahendrakumar
Ramrao Gaikwad v. Golbhai Ramrao Gaikwad and Anr.,
2000(2) Mh. L. J. 378 (Bom.)
held that the son cannot be absolved from his responsibility to maintain his
mother; even though the husband may be alive, son is one of those persons from
whom a woman can claim maintenance u/s. 125 of Cr. P.C.

 

The mother would be entitled to claim maintenance from the
son u/s.125 of Cr. P.C., irrespective of the fact that the husband is alive.

[ Rafiddin v. Smt. Salecha Khatoon, AIR 2008 NOC 776
(Bom.)]

 


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Co-operative Housing Society : A member of tenant co-partnership housing society is not a tenant of the society : Rent Act 1947, S. 5(11) and Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, S. 29.

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6 Co-operative Housing Society : A member of
tenant co-partnership housing society is not a tenant of the society : Rent Act
1947, S. 5(11) and Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, S. 29.


The respondent No. 1 Belfer Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. was a
tenant co-partnership housing society which held both land and flats constructed
thereon and Dr. Gopal Mahadevo Dhadphale respondent No. 2 was admitted as member
of the society. The said respondent No. 2 inducted M/s. Anita Enterprises and
M/s. Anita Medical Systems P. Ltd. being appellants no. 1 and 2 in Room No. 1
and 2 of the said premises on monthly rent. Both the appellants were put in
possession of the aforesaid premises. Thereafter certain dispute arose between
respondent No. 2 and the appellants. The appellants filed two separate suits for
a declaration that they were tenants with regard to the aforesaid premises. The
suit was dismissed by Trial Court.

 

Meanwhile the society raised a dispute before the
Co-operative Court u/s.91 of the Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act, 1960 for
evicting the appellants from the premises. The Co-op. Court decided the dispute
in favour of the society and passed eviction order against the appellant. The
Division Bench of the High Court upheld the orders of the Co-op Court.

 

S. 12 of the Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act lays down that
the Registrar shall classify all societies into one or other of the classes of
societies defined in S. 2 and also into such subclasses thereof, as may be
prescribed. Rule 10 prescribes such classification of the societies and under
Rule 10(1)(5) three types of housing societies have been enumerated.


Class

Sub-class

Examples of societies falling in the class or subclass,
as the case may be

1. 2. 3
Housing society (a) Tenant ownership
housing society
Housing societies
where land is held either on leasehold or freehold basis by societies and
houses are owned or are to be owned by members.
(b) Tenant
Co-partnership housing society.
Housing societies
which hold both land and buildings either on leasehold or freehold basis and
allot them to their members.
(c) Other housing
societies.
House mortgage
societies and House construction societies.

 

In the case of tenant co-partnership housing society, it is
clear from the rules that the ownership of the land and building both remains
with the society and a member cannot be said to be co-owner, but in the case of
tenant ownership housing society, the ownership of the land remains with the
society, but ownership of the building/flat vests in the member. So far as
tenant within the meaning of S. 5(11) of the Rent Act is concerned, he has a
mere right to occupy. He is entitled to the protection of the statute so long as
grounds for eviction are not made out and can be evicted only by instituting a
suit in a Court enumerated u/s.28 of the Rent Act.

 

The concept of tenant co-partnership housing society was
considered by the Apex Court in the case of Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa
Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.,
(1990) 2 SCC 288, wherein it was noticed
that the title to the property, i.e., the land and building/flat both,
vests in the society.

 

The status of a member in a tenant co-partnership housing society is very peculiar. The ownership of the land and building both vests in the society and the member has, for all practical purposes, right of occupation in perpetuity after the full value of the land and building and interest accrued thereon have been paid by him. Although dejure, he is not owner of the flat allotted to him, but, in fact, he enjoys almost all the rights which an owner enjoys, which includes right to transfer in case he fulfils the two pre-conditions, namely, he occupies the property for a period of one year and the transfer is made in favour of a person who is already a mem-ber or a person whose application for membership has been accepted by the society or whose appeal u/ s.23 of the Societies Act has been allowed by the Registrar or to a person who is deemed to be a member U/ss.(IA) of S. 23 of the Societies Act. In case any of these two conditions is not fulfilled, a member cannot be said to have any right of transfer. Thus, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sanwarmal (supra) is that a member has more than a mere right to occupy the flat, meaning thereby higher than tenant, which is not so in the case of a tenant within the meaning of S. 5(11) of the Rent Act. Therefore the status of a member in the case of tenant co-partnership housing society cannot be said to be that of a tenant within the meaning of S. 5(11) of the Rent Act, as such there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the society and the member. Thus the appellants were not entitled to protection of the Rent Act. In view of the above, the appeals were dismissed.

[M/s. Anita Enterprises & Anr. v. Belfer Co-op. Hsg. Society Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 746]

Sale becomes absolute and title vests in auction purchaser on issuance of sale certificate : Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).

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20 Sale becomes absolute and title vests in
auction purchaser on issuance of sale certificate : Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 (SARFAESI Act).


As the borrowers have not complied with the notice of demand
issued under 13(2) of SARFAESI Act, the second respondent/bank directed the
borrowers to discharge the loan amounts with interest within 60 days. The
borrowers invoking S. 17 of the SARFAESI Act filed application before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal II, Chennai, challenging the said notices issued by the second
respondent/bank, but the same were dismissed.

 

In view of the default in discharging the loans by the
borrowers, the second respondent/bank, exercising its powers u/s.13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act issued notice informing the borrowers that constructive possession
of the secured assets were taken over by them and the same would be through for
sale after the expiry of 30 days from that date, by way of public auction. In
the absence of any headway by the borrowers in re-payment, the third respondent,
who is the authorised officer of the second respondent bank, brought the
property for public auction.

 

The SARFAESI Act is a Special Act which aims to accelerate
the growth of economy of our country, empowering the lenders, namely,
nationalised banks, private sector banks and other financial institutions to
realise their dues from the defaulted borrowers who are very lethargic in
repayment of the loans borrowed by them, by exercising their right of
expeditious attachment and foreclosure for the enforcement of security.

 

The High Court observed that Ss.(8) of S. 13 of the Act gives
an opportunity to the borrowers to redeem the property given in security to the
secured creditor by paying the dues on or before the date fixed for sale and if
the payment is made, the secured creditor shall not proceed with the sale or
transfer. But, in the case on hand, the borrowers did not come forward to settle
the dues on or before the date fixed for sale. The borrowers approached the
secured creditor, by way of three cheques after the sale was confirmed in favour
of the appellant, who was the highest bidder and therefore, the secured creditor
rightly returned those cheques stating that the sale was already over and sale
certificate alone was to be issued, which would be done shortly. Subsequently,
the sale certificate came to be issued by the third respondent authorised
officer as per sub-rule (7) of Rule 9 of the SARFAESI Rules.

 

The borrowers should have approached the secured creditor or
the authorised officer before the date fixed for sale and not after the sale as
provided U/ss.(8) of S. 13 of the SARFAESI Act. Only if the borrowers approach
the secured creditor or the authorised officer before the date fixed for sale or
transfer and tender or pay all the dues to the secured creditor, the Section
creates a bar on the secured creditor or authorised officer to proceed further
with the proposed sale or transfer. In this case, admittedly, the date fixed for
the sale was 19-12-2005. But, even according to the version of the borrowers,
they approached the secured creditor only on 2-1-2006. In such circumstances,
the contention of the borrowers is without any basis and contrary to the
provisions contained in Ss.(8) of S. 13 of the Act.

[ K. Chidambara Manickam v. Shakeena & Ors., AIR 2008 Madras 108]

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Gift of share in immovable property in a co-operative society requires registration : Registration Act S. 17(1)(A)

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19 Gift of share in immovable property in a
co-operative society requires registration : Registration Act S. 17(1)(A)


The gift of share in immovable property in a co-operative
society or a gift of share in the society, which has the effect of transfer of
rights over the immovable property, is not exempt from being registered.

[ Brigadier Harjit Singh v. M/s. Rangmahal Theatre,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 1334 (Bom.)]

 


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Share broker and Stock Exchange render ‘services’ to the investors and investor would be ‘consumer’ : Consumer Protection Act S. 2(1)(d) and S. (2)(1)(o).

New Page 1

15 Share broker and Stock Exchange render
‘services’ to the investors and investor would be ‘consumer’ : Consumer
Protection Act S. 2(1)(d) and S. (2)(1)(o).


The respondent share broker who was a member of the DSE
committed default in making payment or delivery of shares for which demand had
to be made by the complainant investor.

U/s.19 of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, no
person can organise or assist in organising or be a member of any stock exchange
other than a recognised stock exchange for the purpose of assisting in, entering
into or performing any contracts in securities. In view of aforesaid bar on
doing business as a share broker, a person has to become a member of a
recognised stock exchange. Without
becoming member of a stock exchange, share brokers are not permitted to have any
transaction in purchase and sale of shares. Therefore, the stock exchange is
apparently a service provider for purchase and sale of shares and not only does
the broker render ‘service’ in the purchase and sale of listed securities but
the stock exchange is also required to render service to the investors.

Further, the Delhi Stock exchange (DSE) is also a service
provider as stated in the memorandum and articles of Association because it
controls the mode, manner, time and place of performance of contract between the
broker member and the investors. DSE is required to establish and had
established Delhi Stock Exchange Customer Protection Fund. Every Member of the
DSE is required to become a member of the fund and contribute annually to the
Fund. If a member of DSE is declared as defaulter, the trustee of the fund step
into the shoes a defaulter member. This fund is established to protect and
safeguard interests of investors, particularly small investors from losses other
than that of speculative nature arising out of default of member brokers of the
stock exchange.

It was held that the complainant investor would be a consumer
who is affected by the services provided by the share broker and therefore he
would be eligible to be paid from the fund of the Stock Exchange.

[Senior Manager, Delhi Stock Exchange & etc. v. Ravindar Pal Singh & Anr.,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 962 (NCC); 2008 (1) ALJ 560]

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Recovery of debts : Recovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act : S. 19(7).

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13 Recovery of debts : Recovery of debts due
to Banks and Financial Institutions Act : S. 19(7).


The petitioner, his father and brother had jointly and
severally taken a loan from State Bank of India. On default the State Bank of
India initiated certificate proceedings against the three. At the time of
initiation of the proceeding itself the father and the brother had died. The
certificate was issued against all the three. The certificate officer later
dropped the proceedings and on appeal the collector remanded the matter back to
certificate officer to proceed against the petitioner.

On writ by the petitioner, it was held by the Court that the
certificate proceeding against the two dead person was void and unenforcecable.
But so far as the petitioner is concerned, the certificate issued was valid and
binding.

The loan was taken ‘jointly and severally’. The expression
‘jointly and severally’ implies their joint liability as well as individual for
entire loan amount. It was open for the creditor to proceed either against one
of the joint loanees or against all of them.

In view of the above the writ petition of the petitioner was
dismissed.

[Anand Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR
2008 Patna 53]

 


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Void Agreement : Tenancy Rights cannot be attached and auctioned — Consequent auction and sale certificate issued to purchaser would be void. Contract Act S. 24 and S. 65.

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14 Void Agreement : Tenancy Rights cannot be
attached and auctioned — Consequent auction and sale certificate issued to
purchaser would be void. Contract Act S. 24 and S. 65.


The defendant No. 2 is a private limited company and because
of non payment of income tax, the recovery officer had issued a proclamation
which was published in govt. Gazette for sale of the property. The property
included the business alongwith the tenancy rights of the defendants over the
disputed premises.

The original plaintiffs bid was accepted in the auction and
the later on he deposited the amount with the income tax department. Nobody had
taken any objection nor had applied for setting aside the same within 30 days
from the date of auction. The defent No. 1 through income tax officer issued
sale certificate in favour of the original plaintiff. The suit premises was
actually property of LIC and defendant No. 2 was a tenant over the same.

The income tax authorities failed to put the plaintiff in
possession of the suit premises. Therefore, the original plaintiff filed suit
for possession of the suit premises alongwith movable articles. The trial court
held that the sale certificate in favour of the plaintiff was illegal, null,
void and unenforceable in law.

Before the Court the plaintiff alternatively contended that
if the sale was illegal the Union of India (Income tax Dept.) was liable to pay
compensation to him or atleast refund the amount alongwith interest.

S. 23 of the Indian Contract Act provides that the
consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by
law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions
of any law. S. 24 provides that if the consideration is for an object which is
unlawful, the agreement is void.

Transfer of tenancy is not permitted under the law and,
therefore the object of the auction being the sale of tenancy rights was
unlawful and, therefore, auction as well as the sale certificate are void and
unenforceable.

S. 65 of the Indian Contract Act provides that when an
agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person,
who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to
restore it, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received
it. In view of this clear legal position, income tax authorities, who had
received the consideration amount from the plaintiff for the contract of sale,
which turned out to be void, was liable to restore and refund the said amount to
the plaintiff.

The defendant No. 1 Union of India was liable to refund that
amount to the plaintiff with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date
of suit till the realization of the amount to the plaintiff.

[Smt. Chandan Mulji Nishar & Ors. v. UOI & Ors., AIR
2008 (NOC) 396 (Bom.); 2007 (6) AIR Bom R 698]

 


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Family arrangement or partition deed : For the purpose of stamping & Registration the contents of document are to be taken into consideration and not nomenclature — Transfer of Property Act; S. 5, Stamp Act, S. 35.

New Page 1

12 Family arrangement or partition deed :
For the purpose of stamping & Registration the contents of document are to be
taken into consideration and not nomenclature — Transfer of Property Act; S. 5,
Stamp Act, S. 35.



The father and mother of the plaintiff owned properties
comprising of houses, shops and vacant sites and they died intestate leaving
behind the plaintiff and defendants as their legal heirs. The defendant
attempted to partition the properties with the help of local people and
panchayatdars which was not agreed to by the plaintiff. After prolonged
negotiation the defendants ultimately agreed for an amicable partition of
movable and immovable properties. When the plaintiff claimed for division of
ard
share the defendants resisted the same and the plaintiff filed the suit.


 

According to the defendant the agreement for partition was
reduced to writing before the panchayatdars and signed by the plaintiff and
defendants. The trial judge rejected the document produced by the defendants on
the ground that it was a partition deed and unless it is stamped and registered
the same cannot be admitted.

 

The Court held that to decide about the nature of a document
whether it requires to be stamped or to be registered, it is the contents of the
document, that are to be taken into consideration and not the nomenclature
alone.

 

The law is well settled that in cases where partition among
the joint owners had already taken place and the factum of the partition
effected earlier was put in writing on a later point of time and the properties
are enjoyed as per the said partition, the same can be termed as a family
arrangement and need not be treated as a partition deed and therefore, the
question of stamping and registering the same does not arise. On the other hand,
if an agreement itself creates a right for the first time as a document, then
one has to consider the contents of the agreement, instead of the nomenclature.
Merely because it is stated in the agreement that in respect of the gold, jewels
and silver utensils the same have already been divided among the family members
in the presence of panchayatdars, it does not mean that all other immovable
properties have also been divided already. A reading of the entire agreement
clearly showed that there was no recital to the effect that it was for recording
the earlier partition which had already taken place that the said agreement was
entered into. In that view of the matter, the said agreement cannot be marked as
a document, since it requires to be stamped and registered so as to be admitted
in evidence.

 

In this regard the Hon’ble Court relied on the Division Bench
decision in case of A.C. Lakshmipathy v. A. M. Chakrapani Reddiar & Ors.,
2001 (1) Law Weekly 257 wherein the legal position is summed up as under :

(a) “I. A family arrangement can be made orally.

(b) If made orally, there being no document, no question of
registration arises.

(c) If the family arrangement is reduced to writing and it
purports to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or
interest of any immovable property, it must be properly stamped and duly
registered as per the Indian Stamp Act and Indian Registration Act.

(d) If the family arrangement is stamped but not
registered, it can be looked into for collateral purposes.

(e) A family arrangement which is not stamped and not
registered cannot be looked into for any purpose in view of the specific bar
in S. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act.” and applying the above guidelines to the
facts of the case and contents of the document which is sought to be marked,
concluded that the agreement was purported to create, declare, assign, limit
and extinguish right, title and interest over the immovable properties and
therefore, the document was required to be properly stamped and duly
registered under the Indian Stamp Act and the Indian Registration Act.
Therefore, the document requires execution on proper stamp papers and
registration as per the Indian Registration Act.

[Vincent Lourdhenathan Dominique v. Josephine Syla
Dominique,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 1173 (Mad.)]

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Audio CD admissible in evidence

New Page 1

11 Audio CD admissible in evidence :

Evidence Act 1875 S. 65B

In a matrimonial proceeding for dissolution of marriage the
husband had produced an audio CD wherein the wife had abused and theatered the
husband on a cell phone which was recorded on audio CD and produced in Court.
The trial court admitted the audio CD as evidence; against the said order the
wife filed the present revision petition.

 

The petitioner wife had contended that the audio CD was
fabricated and inadmissible as evidence because the cell phone which was primary
evidence was not produced.

 

The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the trial
court allowed the audio CD to be admitted reserving the right of the petitioner
to cross examine the respondent husband of its contents. The court directed the
trial court to consider the objection raised by the petitioner regarding
admissibility of the audio CD and decide the same.

[G. Shyamala Ranjini v. M. S. Tamizhnathan, AIR 2008
(NOC) 476 (Mad).]

 


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The Finance Act, 2008

Templates in Excel

Whether Concealment Penalty can be levied in case of reduction in loss ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 If the assessee has concealed particulars of his income
or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, a penalty u/s.271(1)(c)
(Concealment Penalty) can be imposed under the Income-tax Act (the Act). The
amount of such Concealment Penalty shall not be less than 100% (or more than
300%) of the amount of tax sought to be evaded (‘the tax on concealed income’).

1.2 The expression, ‘the amount of tax sought to be evaded’ (i.e.,
‘the tax on concealed income’) is defined in Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)(c),
which, inter alia, effectively provided (before amendment w.e.f. A.Y.
2003-2004) that the same represents the difference between the tax on assessed
income and the tax on returned income (assuming that the difference between the
returned income and the assessed income is treated as concealed income). This
explanation, inter alia, also provided that when concealed income exceeds
the total income, then the tax that would have been chargeable on concealed
income as if such concealed income is the total income of the assessee, is
treated as ‘tax on concealed income’. This explanation was inserted w.e.f.
1-4-1976 (hereinafter, the same is referred to as the said Explanation).

1.3 As there was difference of opinion amongst the High
Courts on the issue that if the income disclosed in the return as well as the
income assessed is in negative (even after making certain
additions/disallowances), whether Concealment Penalty can be imposed or not. An
appropriate amendment was made to take care of such situation u/s.271(1)(c) as
well as in the said Explanation by the Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. A.Y. 2003-2004
(hereinafter, such amended provisions are referred to as post-amendment
provisions and the earlier provisions are referred to as pre-amended
provisions). These amendments made by the Finance Act, 2002 are referred to as
Amendment of 2002. The post-amendment provisions made the position explicitly
clear that Concealment Penalty can be imposed even if income assessed is
negative and the assessee is not liable to pay any income-tax.

1.4 In the context of pre-amended provisions, the issue
referred to in para 1.3 above was decided by the Apex Court in the case of
Virtual Soft Systems Limited (289 ITR 83), wherein the Court took the view that
Concealment Penalty cannot be imposed in a case where the assessment has
resulted into loss where the assessee is not liable to pay any tax and the
Amendment of 2002 was applicable w.e.f. 1-4-2003 (i.e., A.Y. 2003-2004)
and the same is not clarificatory/declaratory in nature and hence the same is
prospective. This judgment has been considered in this column in the April, 2007
issue of the Journal.

1.5 The correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) was doubted by another Bench
of the Apex Court and hence the issue decided therein came up for
reconsideration before a larger Bench (three Judges) of the Apex Court in the
case of Gold Coin Health Food P. Limited, wherein the earlier judgment has been
overruled. Though this judgment will affect only the cases governed by the
pre-amended provisions (i.e., up to A.Y. 2002-03), considering its
importance and the fact that there may be many pending matters involving this
issue in respect of that period, it is thought fit to consider the same in this
column.


CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food P. Ltd.,


304 ITR 308 (SC) :

2.1 In the above case, the larger Bench of the Apex Court was
constituted to consider the correctness of the judgment of the Division Bench of
the Apex Court in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) and to
decide whether Concealment Penalty can be imposed in case of reduction in loss
under the pre-amended provisions. In that case, the Department had placed
reliance on Notes of Clauses relating to the Amendment of 2002 to contend that
the said amendment was clarificatory in nature and consequently it was
applicable retrospectively. This argument was rejected by the Court. Another
Division Bench, which doubted the correctness of the said judgment, noted that
the Division Bench in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra)
had rejected this argument, but it was of the view that the true effect of the
Amendment of 2002 was not considered in that case, as it was prima facie
of the view that merely because the amendment was stated to take effect from
1-4-2003, that cannot be the ground to hold that the same did not have a
retrospective effect.

2.2 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia,
contended that the purpose behind making the provisions relating to Concealment
Penalty is to penalise the assessee for (a) concealing particulars of income;
and/or (b) furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income, and hence, whether
the assessee’s income was a profit or loss was really of no consequence. It was
further contended that the word ‘any’ used in the expression in addition to ‘any
tax payable’ found in the provision makes the position clear that the penalty
was in addition to any tax and even if no tax was payable, the penalty was
leviable. The Amendment of 2002 was made to clarify this position as some High
Courts took a contrary view. This was not a substantive amendment which created
penalty for the first time. Even Notes on Clauses make the position clear that
the amendment was clarificatory in nature and would apply to all assessments
even prior to A.Y. 2003-04.

2.3 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee, it was,
inter alia,
contended that the judgment in the case of Virtual Soft Systems
Limited (supra) lays down the correct principle in law and that position
was rightly noted by various High Courts, more particularly by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in the case of Prithipal Singh and Co. (183 ITR 69) and the
Department’s appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court (249
ITR 670). It was further contended that the Amendment of 2002 enlarged the scope
of levying Concealment Penalty and therefore, does not operate retrospectively
and is applicable only w.e.f. 1-4-2003. It was also pointed out that the
memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2002 also states that
this amendment will take effect from 1-4-2003.

2.4 After considering the arguments advanced on behalf of both the parties, the Court noted that in the judgment in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra), it was also observed that even if the statute does contain a statement to the effect that the amendment is clarificatory or declaratory, that is not the end of the matter. The Court has also to analyse the nature of the amendment to decide whether, in reality, it is clarificatory or declaratory. Hence, the date from which the amendment is made operative does not conclusively decide the issue. The Court also noted the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Reliance Jute and Industries Limited (120ITR 921) wherein, it was observed that the law to be applied in income-tax assessments is the law in force in the assessment year, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication.

2.5 The Court then stated that it will be necessary to focus on the definition of the term ‘income’, which is inclusively defined in S. 2(24) and includes losses, i.e., negative profits. Having stated so, the Court drew support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harprasad & Co. P. Ltd. (99 ITR 118) and  observed as under    (page 313) :

“…. This Court held with reference to the charging provisions of the statute that the expression ‘income’ should be understood to include losses. The expression ‘profits and gains’ refers to positive income, whereas losses represent negative profit or in other words minus income. This aspect does not appear to have been noticed by the Bench in Virtual’s case (2007) 9 SCC 665. Reference to the order by this Court dismissing the Revenue’s Civil Appeal No. 7961 of 1996 in CIT v. Prithipal Singh and Co. is also not very important because that was in relation to the A.Y. 1970-71 when Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)(c) was not in existence. The view of this Court in Harprasad’s case leads to the irresistible conclusion that income also includes losses. Explanation 4(a) as it stood during the period April 1, 1976 to April 1, 2003 has to be considered in the background.”

2.6 The Court then stated that it appears that what the Amendment of 2002 intended was to make the position explicit, which otherwise was implied. For this, the Court noted the following recommendation of Wanchoo Committee pursuant to which a relevant portion of the said explanation was inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1976 (page 313) :

“We are not unaware that linking concealment penalty to tax sought to be evaded can, at times, lead to some anomalies. We would recommend that in cases where the concealed income is to be set off against losses incurred by an assessee under other heads of income or against losses brought forward from earlier years, and the total income thus gets reduced to a figure smaller than the concealed income or even to a minus figure, the tax sought to be evaded should be calculated as if the concealed income were the total income.”

2.7 Referring to the Circular No. 204, dated 24-7-1976, issued by the CBDT explaining the provisions along with which the said Explanation was introduced, the Court noted that in the said Circular also it is stated that even if the total income is reduced to the minus figure, ‘the tax on concealed income’ still means the tax chargeable on the concealed income as if it were the total income. The Court, then, observed as under (page 314) :

“A combined reading of the Committee’s recommendation and the Circular makes the position clear that Explanation 4(a) to S. 271(I)(c) intended to levy the penalty not only in a case where after addition of concealed income, a loss returned, after assessment becomes positive income, but also in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss and finally the assessed income is also a loss or minus figure. Therefore, even during the period between April 1, 1976 and April 1, 2003, the position was that the penalty was leviable even in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss.”

2.8 Considering the relevance of the Notes on Clauses, while interpreting the provisions on such issues, the Court stated that the same are relevant and for that drew support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Yuvraj Amarinder Singh (156 ITR 525). The Court also noted the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Poddar Cement P. Ltd. (226 ITR 625), wherein it was stated that the circumstances under which the amendment was brought in existence and consequences of the amendment will have to be taken care of while deciding the issue as to whether the amendment was clarificatory or substantive in nature and, whether it will have retrospective effect or not. The Court then referred to various judgments of the Apex Court, in which the Court has considered cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. In these judgments, it was also made clear that the presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.

2.9 Having referred to the principles and tests to be applied to determine whether a particular amendment is to be regarded as clarificatory or substantive in nature or whether it will have retrospective effect or not, the Court finally overruled the view of the Division Bench in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) and held as under (page 318) :
“The above being the position, the inevitable conclusion is that Explanation 4 to S. 271(I)(c) is clarificatory and not substantive. The view expressed to the contrary in Virtual’s case (2007) 9 SCC 665 is not correct.”

Conclusion:

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, reversing the judgment of the division bench of the Apex Court in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra), the position now emerges is that, under the pre-amended provisions also, the Concealment Penalty can be imposed even in a case where the assessment has resulted into reduction in loss and there is no tax payable by the assessee.

3.2 From the above judgment, it also appears that for the purpose of determining the nature of amendment (i.e., whether the same is clarificatory or substantive in nature), the position as existed before the amendment and the purpose for which the amendment is made is very relevant.

News report

Cancerous Corruption

Top service tax officer arrested for attempt to extort Rs.2 lakh


A Service Tax Superintendent, who attempted to extort Rs.2
lakh from a city transporter by threatening him of penal action for alleged
Service Tax evasion, was arrested by the CBI on Friday
night. A person who acted as facilitator on behalf of the tax official has also
been arrested.

According to CBI sources, Service Tax Superintendent, S. G.
Desai, 45, and his accomplice Neerav Mayekar, were arrested from a hotel
opposite Vile Parle railway station when they accepted the bribe of Rs.1 lakh,
being the first instalment of Rs.5 lakh bribe demanded by the tax official.

The complainant runs a ‘packers & movers’ service in Goregaon.
Desai whose office scrutinises Service Tax payment by business establishments
had sent a notice to the complainant saying he had
paid Service Tax at the rate of 3.65 per cent, though he was supposed to file it
at the rate of 12.63 per cent.

When the complainant objected, Desai asked him to furnish
accounts for the past five years and later allegedly demanded Rs.5 lakh to
settle the matter. The amount was finally settled at Rs.2 lakh, of which Rs.1
lakh was to be paid on Friday night. The CBI laid a trap and arrested the duo
while accepting the money.

(Source : Mumbai Mirror Bureau)

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Open document format

Computer Interface

History :


Documentation became a part of our culture ever since the
written word was invented. Documentation as we all know, is the simplest method
of allowing understanding and referencing. The methods of documentation have of
course evolved over the years along with the formats in which the data
was stored. So also, data formats have been around for as long as
computing. They reflected the varying capabilities and functions of different
computing systems and have evolved as these computing systems have evolved. In
the decades since, a wide range of formats (TXT, PDF, HTML, and DOC, just to
name a few) became popular because they meet specific user needs and tap into
new computing capabilities as they evolved. Then came the increasing
expectations and demands and technology met them by changing at a scorching
pace. Advances were being made in the field literally on a day-to-day basis, to
the extent that redundancy actually became an inbuilt attribute.

With such advances and the passage of time, the ones who
don’t match the pace, fade away in the dark corners of technological redundancy.
Many of us have experienced disappearance of older formats. For instance : Punch
cards were once commonplace, but you wouldn’t think of using them today.
WordStar was once what everyone used as their word processor; now, even filters
to read the format are less and less common. (More closer to heart Tally 4.5 to
Tally 9, Windows 3.11 to Vista and so on so forth). Luckily, WordStar format is
similar to ASCII and is thus mostly recoverable. But there are times when I
can’t read some important PowerPoint 4 files in today’s PowerPoint, only 7 years
later. This has come to a point that a file you created in a software less than
half a decade ago is no longer usable. This because the software/application no
longer accepts (supports) it.

Today




  •  When you buy a music CD you know it will fit in your CD player.



  •  When you buy canned food, you know it will work with your can opener.



  •  When you buy a toaster, you know it will work with the power plugs in your
    house.



  • When you visit a website, do you need to know what software that website runs
    to create the web page ?



  •  When you send an email, do you need to know what email client your friend
    has ?



Then why should it be different for your documents ? You
should be able to send your documents to your customers without knowing what
office software they run and be confident that it would work. Have you ever had
trouble opening a document that someone sent you ? Have you ever bought a copy
of an application software that you didn’t want because you have to read
documents that only work with that version of an application software ? Have you
ever wondered why there is so little choice in office software ?


  •  What if you could send a file to anyone and know that they can read it ?



  •  What if you could buy any product you want and know that you can still
    communicate with your customers ?



This is where the OpenDocument Format (ODF), an open,
XML1-based file format for office documents comes into the picture.
OpenDocuments include text documents, spreadsheets, drawings, presentations and
more. An OpenDocument is freely available for any software maker to use and
implement and does not favour any vendor over all the others. The creation of
XML-based document formats continues this evolution, and even within this
category a number of formats are being developed, including ODF2, Open XML3 and
UOF4. We should expect the creation of new formats in the future as the
technology evolves, and, as has always been the case, users should be able to
choose the formats that work best for them.

Recent developments :

One objective of open formats like OpenDocument is to
guarantee long-term access to data without legal or technical barriers, and some
governments have come to view open formats as a public policy issue.
OpenDocument is intended to be an alternative to proprietary formats,
including the commonly used DOC, XLS, and PPT formats used by
Microsoft Office
and other applications. Up until Feb. 15th 2008, these
latter formats did not have documentation available for download, and were only
obtainable by writing directly to Microsoft Corporation and signing a
restrictive non-disclosure agreement. As of Feb. 15th 2008, Microsoft
offers documents for download claiming to accurately specify the aforementioned
document formats (although this claim hasn’t been independently verified yet).
Microsoft is supporting the creation of a plug-in for Office to allow it to use
OpenDocument. The OpenDocument Foundation, Inc. has created a similar
plug-in that will allow continued use of Microsoft Office.

The OpenDocument format (ODF, ISO/IEC 26300, full name :
OASIS Open Document Format for Office Applications) is a free and open file
format for electronic office documents, such as spreadsheets, charts,
presentations and word processing documents. While the specifications were
originally developed by Sun, the standard was developed by the Open Office XML
technical committee of the Organisation for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS) consortium and based on the XML format originally
created and implemented by the OpenOffice.org office suite (see OpenOffice.org
XML).

Case for the Governments to adopt open document formats:

Case for the Governments to adopt open document formats:
In all humility, with whatever limited knowledge I have about technology and of the trends that are taking shape, I am now getting paranoid about the whole e filing process and the initiatives adopted by the Government.

Although the process was in bits and pieces (fits and start is more like it), the process adopted by the Government has been rather haphazard. Instead of learning from each other’s experience, every department has tried to do their “own thing”.
 
For instance : the e-filing process was kicked off by the Government in 2004. At the time text files were in vogue (still is with the etds process), then came the PDF- (MCA 21 and ITRs for Corp orates in AY 06-07). The last year it was Excel and XML and the story will go on.

This year the Government is pushing for efiling not only for Income Tax, but also for Service Tax, VAT . and other laws. Even here, there is no uniformity. The Income-tax Department is using XML format, VAT authorities seem to be following suit, but the Excise & Service Tax authorities are still depending on an HTML format (EASIEST), the MCA relies on the PDF format.

The concern stems from the fact that governments don’t create office documents, so that they can be tossed in the shredder. They often have to be accessible decades (or centuries) later, and many of them – have to be accessible to any citizen, regardless of what equipment they use or will use. Having said this, the question that needs to be answered is has the Government given a serious thought to the fact that although, PDF is a very useful display format, it has a different purpose – while it’s great at preserving formatting, it doesn’t let you edit the data meaningfully. HTML is great for web pages, or short, but it’s just not capable enough for data mining and data retrieval. Both HTML and PDF will continue to be used, but they cannot be used as a complete replacement.

The writing on the wall suggests that the taxpayer, along with dealing with the many intricacies in law, will now be saddled with the additional burden of dealing with multiple data formats. Nobody knows what will happen 5-7 years down the line when presumably better formats are in vogue. Unless the Government realises the pitfalls and makes conscientious efforts in developing/adopting standardised/ open standard software, we will all have to save our old software packages and the files generated thru them, on floppies/CDs/DVD, etc. and pray that they still work when the sleeping giant wakes up.

Slump sale and S. 50B

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 50B provides for taxation of capital gains arising in
a slump sale. ‘Slump sale’ has been defined by S. 2(42C) to mean transfer of one
or more undertakings as a result of sale for a lump sum consideration without
values being assigned to individual assets and liabilities in such sales other
than for the purposes of payment of stamp duty. An ‘undertaking’ has been
defined vide S. 2(19AA) to include any part or a unit or a division thereof or a
business activity as a whole.

1.2 These provisions are introduced by the Finance Act, 1999
w.e.f. 1-4-2000 to put to rest the serious doubts prevailing for long about the
taxability or otherwise of gains in slump sale of business on a going concern
basis.

1.3 The newly introduced provisions besides providing for the
taxability of such gains provide for the detailed mechanism for determination of
the period of holding and the computation of capital gains.

1.4 The doubts about the taxability of gains in slump sale
for the period up to A.Y. 1999-2000 continue to persist with the views with
equal force persisting. While some Benches of the Tribunal have favoured the
taxability, others have exempted the gains form the ambit of taxation.

1.5 As if the above-referred controversy was in-sufficient, a
new controversy has arisen about the applicability of the newly inserted
provisions to the pending assessments. A recent decision of one of the Benches
of the Tribunal has taken a view conflicting with the prevailing view that the
said provisions were prospective in nature.

2. Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.’s case :


2.1 In the case of ACIT v. Asea Brown Boveri Ltd., 110
TTJ 502 (Mum.), the Tribunal was concerned with the issue as to whether the
transaction in question was a slump sale or an itemised sale. It was also
concerned about the taxability or otherwise of the gains arising on transfer of
a business in a slump sale. Though the Tribunal in this case had held that the
impugned transaction did not amount to slump sale, it was felt necessary to deal
with the issue of taxability of profits or gains if the impugned transaction was
held to be a slump sale without prejudice to the aforesaid finding.

2.2 The Tribunal for the reasons recorded in their order held
that profit arising on slump sale was taxable, as it was possible to compute the
capital gains including the cost of acquisition in some manner and the limited
question before them was about the mode of computation to be adopted for working
out the profits/gains from the slump sale. The Tribunal noted that there were
two provisions which were relevant in this behalf : (i) the provisions of S.
50B, which were specific to the computation of capital in case of slump sales,
and (ii) the general provisions of S. 45, which were applicable in the absence
of special procedure prescribed in S. 50B.

2.3 On applicability of S. 50B, the Revenue submitted that
once the transaction was held to be a slump sale, the taxability of the profits
and gains arising on such sale had to be brought to tax u/s.50B of the IT Act,
as the said S. 50B, being a procedural and computational provision, was
retroactive in its operation and therefore should govern all the pending
proceedings. Against the contentions of the Revenue, the assessee, on the other
hand, contended that S. 50B did not have retrospective operation and hence the
taxability of profits/gains from a slump sale could not be considered u/s.50B
which Section was operative from A.Y. 2000-01, only.

2.4 The Tribunal after taking note of the several
provisions including that of S. 2(42C) and S. 2(19AA) confirmed that S. 50B had
been inserted in the IT Act by the Finance Act, 1999 w.e.f. 1st April 2000 and
was applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2000-01, while the appeal before them related to A.Y.
1997-98 and accordingly the newly inserted provisions were not available on the
statute book for the assessment year under appeal. This fact however did not
deter the Tribunal to apply the said provisions of S. 50B, as in their opinion
the concept of slump sale which hitherto judicially recognised was now been
codified and inserted in the form of clause (42C) in S. 2 of the IT Act; that
what was earlier the judge-made law was now a codified law; the Bombay High
Court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. ITO, 264 ITR 193 held
that the concept of slump sale initially evolved under judge-made law was
subsequently recognised by the Legislature by inserting S. 2(42C); that
insertion of the new provisions was nothing but codification of what was
hitherto judicially recognised and S. 2(42C) was nothing but declaration of the
existing law of slump sale.

2.5 The Tribunal further noted that the Court in the said
case was concerned with the A.Y. 1995-96 when S. 50B was not in existence and
still the Court accepted that profits and gains arising on slump sale were
taxable, which in the opinion of the Tribunal showed that it had always been the
law that profits and gains from slump sale were taxable; the natural corollary
to the said decision was that the provisions of S. 50B(1) declaring that any
profit or gain arising from the slump sale would be chargeable to tax as capital
gains, was merely declaratory of the law as it then existed.

2.6 The Tribunal also proceeded to answer the obvious question as to what was the necessity of en-acting S. 50B when it was merely declaratory of the existing law. The Tribunal observed that the answer to that question lay in the provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 50B, which provided for the mechanism for the computation of cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement. It noted that the absence of any statutory mode of computation of cost of acquisition/improvement, difficulties were being experienced in the computation of capital gains arising from the slump sale, which were resolved by introduction of S. 50B; the heading of S. 50B which read: “Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of slump sale” clarified that S. 50B dealt with computation of capital gains in cases of slump sale; while Ss.(l) of S. 50B declared the existing law and thus put the same beyond the pale of any doubt, Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) thereof merely laid down the machinery for computation of capital gains from slump sale.

2.7 The Tribunal  proceeded to examine whether the computational provisions in S. 50B(2) and (3), enacted to provide simplicity, uniformity and certainty, the three pillars of taxation for the computation of capital gains, were retroactive or not. In order to answer this question, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in CWT v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, 210 ITR 886 (SC), wherein it had been held that machinery provisions, which provide for the machinery for the quantification of the charge, were procedural provisions and therefore would have retroactive operation and apply to all pending proceedings. Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 50B are thus procedural provisions inasmuch as they have been enacted to quantify and thereby simplify the procedure for computation of cost of acquisition/improvement in cases of slump sale. Based on the aforesaid findings, the Tribunal held that the provisions of S. 50B(2) and (3) were machinery provisions and hence would have retroactive operation and apply to all pending matters.

2.8 In deciding the issue the Tribunal also rejected the plea of the assessee that S. 50B could not have retroactive operation as it would mean, by the same logic, that the amendments made in S. 55(2)(a) deeming the cost of acquisition of certain assets to be nil would equally have retroactive operation. The assessee for this contention had relied on CIT v. D.P. Sandu Brothers Chembur (P) Ltd., 273 ITR 1, wherein it was held that the amendments to S. 55(2)(a) -(., deeming the cost of acquisition of a tenancy right to be nil had only prospective effect and not retrospective effect. The aforesaid decision was found to be rendered in the context of the provisions of S. 55(2)(a), which deemed the cost of acquisition of tenancy right to be nil and not in the context of S. 50B(2) and (3) which merely simplified and standardised the procedure for computation of cost of acquisition/improvement in cases of slump sale.

3. Sankheya Chemicals’ case:

3.1 In Sankheya Chemicals Ltd. v. ACIT, 8 SOT 50 (Mum.), the Chemical Division of the assessee-company was sold as a going concern on 1st April, 1990 for a lump sum price of Rs.20 lakhs. The said business consisted of the leasehold rights of the land, factory building, plant and machinery and electrical installation which was transferred to the subsidiary company, along with other assets and liabilities including transfer of raw material and other licences, etc.

3.2 The same Mumbai Tribunal was inter alia asked to consider whether provisions of S. 50B were retroactive in its operation so as to bring within its net the gains of transfer of a business for a slump consideration prior to introduction of S. 50B.

3.3 Taking into consideration the facts of the case in totality, the Tribunal held that no tax was exigible to the gains arising on the transfer of the business undertaking as a going concern by the assessee-company and the gains on such transfer were not includible in the hands of the assessee as income from short-term capital gains by relying on Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. v. DCIT, 90 ITD 344 (Hyd.). The Tribunal also noted that S. SOBof the IT Act was introduced w.e.f. 1st April 2000 and in the facts of the present case, the business undertaking was sold on 1st April 1990, i.e., prior to the introduction of the provisions of S. SOBof the IT Act.

3.4 The Mumbai Tribunal in this case noted with approval the decision of the Hyderabad Bench in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (supra) which held as under:  “……S. 50 and S. SOB are mutually exclusive.  In other  words,  S. 50B is attracted when  there  is a slump  sale and  S. 50 is attracted when  there is an itemised  sale. S. SOBwas not applicable  for the assessment  year  in question,  as it had no retrospective  operation.  So, the position that emerged  was that what  was transferred  by the assessee was the cement  unit as a going  concern  for a lump sum price, and so, the sale in question  was a slump  sale, and so, S. 50 was not attracted,  (para 34)…..  “

Observations:

4.1 With utmost respect for the Bench of the Tribunal delivering the decision in the case of Asea Brown Boveri’s case, it is to be noted that the Tribunal erred in not appreciating the correct ratio of the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. The Court in that case while deciding the appeal in favour of the assessee had nowhere directly or indirectly stated that the provisions of S. SOB were retrospective in its operation. The Coud was only asked to decide whether the transfer in the said case was a slump sale or an itemised sale. This is clear from p. 235 of the said report as under : “In this appeal, we were only required to consider whether the transaction was a slump sale and having come to the conclusion that there was a sale of business as a whole, we have to remand the matter back to the AO to compute the quantum of capital gains. For that purpose, the AO will have to decide the cost of the undertaking for the purposes of the computing capital gains that may arise on transfer. That, the AO will also be required to decide its value u/ s.55 of the IT Act. Further, the AO will be required to decide on what basis indexation should be allowed in computing the capital gains and the quantum thereof. Lastly, the AO,will be required to decide the quantum of depreciation on the block of assets. It may be mentioned that these parameters which we have mentioned are not exhaustive. They are some of the parameters under the Act.” In fact, the Court only directed the authorities to compute gains if that was possible and nothing beyond that. The Court in that case was not concerned with the issue as to whether there at all arose any taxable capital gains on slump sale.

4.2 The Tribunal itself noted with approval that in Premier Automobiles case (supra) the Court had left the issue of working out the cost of acquisition to the AO with the observations, which even the Tribunal found to be quite significant. It further ob-served that “the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the aforesaid case has not excluded the applicability of the parameters prescribed in S. 50B(2) and for computing the cost of acquisition/improvements in cases of slump sale”. This observation makes it clear that the Bombay High Court nowhere confirmed the applicability of the said provisions.

4.3 Thus, contrary to what has been stated by the Tribunal, we do not find that the said decision of the Tribunal was in conformity with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Premier Automobiles case in-asmuch as the issue adjudicated by the Tribunal was never before the High Court in the said case.

4.4 The Supreme Court in Sandu Bros. (supra) was asked to examine whether the provisions of S. 55 providing for adoption of Nil cost in case of tenancy was retrospective and was applicable to assessment years prior to AY. 1995-96. The Supreme Court after analysing the facts and the law held that the said provisions had only prospective application. The issue before the Tribunal in Asea Borwn Boveri’s case was largely similar and the assessee was right in relying on the said decision to support its case that provisions of S. SOBwere not to apply retroactively.

4.5 The Tribunal itself noted that the provisions of S. SO Band Ss.(l) in particular had the effect of removing existing anomaly about the taxation of gains on slump sale. This finding of the Tribunal confirmed that the new provision created a specific charge on such gains for the first time by providing the elaborate mechanism for making the said charge effective. The definitions of the terms ‘slump sale’, ‘undertaking’ and ‘net worth’ give a fresh meaning to the understanding of the said terms and therefore make it all the more difficult to support the Tribunal’s view that the newly inserted provisions are retroactive. Even the Legislature has nowhere expressed that the provisions were clarificatory, leave alone retroactive. Neither the provisions, nor the notes on clauses and the memorandum explaining the provisions as also the Circular following the insertion make such a claim.

4.6 The issue was examined by the Hyderabad Bench in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (supra), which clearly held that the provisions of S. 50Bwere not retrospective or retroactive. This decision was followed by the Mumbai Bench in the Sankheya Chemicals’ case (supra), which sadly was not taken note of.

4.7 The better view is that S. SOB should be applied prospectively and not retrospectively. The issue however calls for adjudication by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in view of the cleavage of the opinions amongst the Benches.

Article : World Wide Tax Trends — Thin Capitalisation

Article

There are broadly two ways in which a company may be
financed. One is by the issue of shares in the equity and the other is by
borrowing. The methods by which companies garner their capital affects the
taxation of corporate income. This arises because the computation of the taxable
income of the company and also that of the persons providing the capital are
both affected by the way in which that capital is provided.


In practice, companies are frequently financed partly by
equity contributions and partly by loans. The proportion of a company’s capital
which is financed by each method may well be determined by considerations which
arise from economic or commercial necessity and may have nothing to do with tax.
As a consequence of the fundamental difference between loan and equity capital,
however, the tax treatment of a company and the contributors of its capital also
necessarily differs fundamentally according to whether the capital is equity or
loan capital. With respect to the taxation of its income or profits, the basic
difference is that the shareholder’s reward — the distribution to him of
profits, usually in the form of a dividend — is not deducted in arriving at the
taxable profit of the company. Interest on a loan, however, is usually allowed
as a deductible expense in computing the taxable profits of the company paying
it (being effectively regarded as an expense of earning those profits).

Financial leverage is an important aspect in outbound tax
planning and the planning is typically aimed at effective use (deductibility) of
interest on debt incurred (whether third-party or internal) in conjunction with
a transaction. It may also be possible to claim deduction for interest in more
than one tax jurisdiction through judicious planning.

This can be illustrated as below :


The steps would include :



  • The Company in India takes a loan from external sources in India;



  • The Company in India funds the Intermediary Company with equity;



  • The Intermediary Company gives a loan to the Buy Company (a local company set
    up in the same jurisdiction as the target company for the purpose of
    acquisition). It also infuses equity into this Company;



  • The Buy Company, then acquires the Target Company.



The interest payments on and repayments of the debt are
generally serviced by the Target’s future cash flows, whereas, the debt is
secured by the assets of the Target and the assets of the Buy Company (which in
most instances is a pure holding company).

In the above illustration, it may be possible to claim a
deduction for the interest in India and also in Country B. Further, if tax
consolidation is possible in Country B, then interest costs of the Buy Company
can be offset against the profits of the Target Company. At best, the home
country would only be able to retain a withholding tax on interest payments,
which may again be mitigated or reduced through proper treaty planning.

The expression ‘thin capitalisation’ is commonly used to
describe a situation where the proportion of debt to equity exceeds certain
limits. Thin capitalisation legislation is a tool used by tax authorities to
prevent what they regard as a leakage of tax revenues as a consequence of the
way in which a corporation is financed. Financing a resident corporation with
debt is considerably more efficient from a tax point of view than financing with
equity. The difference in tax treatment is an incentive to provide capital to
the corporation in the form of debt instead of equity. If there are no thin
capitalisation rules, it is relatively easy for a non-resident to advance funds
to a resident corporation in a way that is characterised as debt, so that the
payments on the debt are deductible as interest payments. This is true for
controlling shareholders in particular, because they are probably indifferent to
the form in which their investment is structured, and thus are likely to be
guided by tax considerations when structuring the legal form of their
investment.

The object of Thin Capitalisation Regulations is to prevent the use of excessive ‘in-house’ loans which would be detrimental to the revenue of home country (where the borrower is resident), by reason of the fact that profits would effectively be shifted to the foreign lender, as the interest payments would be tax deductible in the home country.

Countries, through Thin Capitalisation Regulations ensure that the deductions for interest on debt owed to connected parties, is allowable in the home country as a deduction in the hands of the borrower, only if within the permissible limits. While financial leverage has, on its own standing, its own value, this is definitely impaired when interest is not deductible either wholly or partially.

Overview of the Thin Capitalisation Regulations in some key jurisdictions:

A wide variety of methods are used to deal with thin capitalisation in various countries. These approaches range from complex legislation to no specific thin capitalisation legislation at all.

Within this range {our general approaches may be distinguished: (1) the fixed ratio approach (2) the subjective approach (3) application of rules concerning hidden profit distributions; and (4) the ‘no rules’ approach.

The emphasis on the above factors or combinations of factors often varies from country to country. Measures taken by countries to limit excessive debt financing by shareholders are either based on specific legislation or administrative rules or on practice.

Under the ‘fixed ratio’ approach, if the debtor company’s total debt exceeds a certain proportion of its equity capital, the interest on the loan or the interest on the excess of the loan over the approved proportion is automatically disallowed and/or treated as a dividend. The ratio may be used as a safe-haven rule. In this backdrop it should be noted that countries which use the fixed ratio approach usually have specific thin capitalisation legislation.

The basis of the ‘subjective’ approach is to look at the terms and nature of the contribution and the circumstances in which the financing has been made and to decide, in the light of all facts and circumstances, whether the real nature of the contribution is debt or equity. Some countries using the subjective approach have specific legislation. Other countries use more general rules if these are available, such as general anti-avoidance legislation, provisions on ‘abuse of law’, provisions on substance over form. There are also countries that apply ‘hidden profit distribution’ rules to reclassify interest as dividends. In some of these countries the hidden profit distribution rules are applied along , with specific rules which limit the deduction of interest on loans from shareholders. The general principles of transfer pricing rules may also playa role in this respect. The underlying idea is that if the loan exceeds what would have been lent in an arm’s-length situation, the lender must be considered to have an interest in the profitability of the enterprise and the loan, or any amount in excess of the arm’s-length amount, must be seen as being designed to procure share in the profits.

This article provides an overview of the the Thin -‘” Capitalisation Regulations in five major world economies: France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).

While some countries, like France, have detailed regulations, others like the UK, do not specify a debt: equity ratio, but merely give the right to the Inland Revenue to challenge the interest deductions keeping in view the arm’s-length principle.

France:

Deductibility of Interest – an overview:

New Thin Capitalisation Regulations were introduced for the financial year beginning on or after January 1, 2007. Related party interest falling within the scope of the new Regulations is tax-deductible only to the extent that it meets two tests, which are applicable on a standlone basis at the level of each borrowing company, as opposed to a consolidated basis.

These tests are the Arm’s-Length Test and the Thin Capitalisation Test.

Conditions for disallowance:

Under the Arm’s-Length Test, the interest rate is capped to the higher of the following two rates:

• The average annual interest rate on loans granted by financial institutions that carry a floating rate and that have a minimum term of two year; and

• The interest rate at which the French Company ould have borrowed from any unrelated financial institution (for example, a bank) in similar circumstances.

The portion of interest that exceeds the higher of the above thresholds is not tax-deductible and must be added back to the French Company’s taxable income for the relevant financial year.

Under the Thin Capitalisation Test, the deductibility of interest may be restricted, even if the conditions specified under the Arm’s-Length Test have been met with.

Here, the interest paid in excess of the following three thresholds is not tax-deductible:
 
The Thin Capitalisation Regulations now stand combined with the General Interest Limitation rules.
 
•    The debt-to-equity  ratio threshold,  which is calculated in accordance with the following for- The Business Tax Reform (2008), introduced a new mula (The amount of interest that meets the concept for restriction of the interest deduction. The Arm’s-Length Test x 150% of the net equity of restriction applies regardless of whether the inter-the borrower at either the beginning or end of est is paid to a related party or an unrelated lender, the financial year. The total indebtedness of the such as a bank. French borrowing company resulting from borrowing from related companies);

•    The earning threshold, which equals 25% of the adjusted current income. The adjusted current income is the operation profit before deducting the following items: tax; related-party interest; depreciation and amortisation; and certain spe-cific lease rents;

The interest income threshold, which equals interest received by the French Company from related companies.

If the interest that is considered to be tax-deductible under the Arm’s-Length Test exceeds all three of the above thresholds, the portion of the interest that exceeds all three of the above thresholds is not tax-deductible, unless the excess amount of interest lower than Euro 150,000.The nondeductible portion of interest is added back to the taxable income of the borrowing entity. However, it can be carried forward for deduction in subsequent financial years. A 5% reduction applies each year to the balance of the interest carried forward to future financial years beginning with the second subsequent financial year .

Exemptions:
The above thresholds that limit the deductibility of interest do not apply if the French borrowing company can demonstrate that the consolidated debt-to-equity ratio of its group is higher than the consolidated debt-to-equity ratio of the French borrowing Company on a standalone basis (based on its statutory accounts). In determining the consolidated debt-to-equity ratio of the group, French and non-French affiliated companies and consolidated net equity and consolidated group indebtedness (excluding inter-company debt) must be taken into account.

Germany:
Deductibility of Interest – An overview:

The Thin Capitalisation Regulations now stand combined with the General Interest Limitation rules.

The Business Tax Reform (2008), introduced a new concept for restriction of the interest deduction. The restriction applies regardless of whether the interest is paid to a related party or an unrelated lender, such as a bank.

This new Regulation, which is effective for tax years beginning after 25 May 2007 and ending on after 1 January 2008, applies to companies resident in Germany, companies residing abroad but maintaining a permanent establishment in Germany and partnerships with German branch.

Conditions for disallowance:
The new rule disallows’ excess net interest expense,’ which is defined as the excess of interest expenses over interest income if such excess exceeds 30% of the earnings before (net) interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA).

Exemptions:
The limitation rule does not apply if any of the following conditions is satisfied:

•    The net interest expense is less than Euro 1 million;

•    The Company is not a member of a consolidated group (a group of companies that can be consolidated under International Financial Re-porting Standards);

•    The equity ratio of the German subgroup is equal to or higher than the equity ratio for the group as a whole, as shown on the balance sheet of the preceding fiscal year (so-called ‘escape clause’). A ‘group’ is defined as a group of entities that could be consolidated under IFRS, regardless of whether a consolidation has been actually carried out. The escape clause does not apply if any entity in the worldwide group has received loans from a related party not included in the group and if the interest paid on such debt exceeds 10% of the net interest expense.

The Netherlands:

Deductibility  of Interest –    An overview:

Since 1 January 2004, when the Thin Capitalisation Regulations first came into effect, there have been several amendments, such as broadening the definition of debt.

In general, in the Netherlands, interest expenses (and other costs) with respect to related party loans (or deemed related party loans) may be partly or completely disallowed if the taxpayer is part of a group, as defined under Dutch generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP /international financial reporting standards (IFRS). Further, even if an external debt is formally granted by a third party but is in fact owed to a related party, the Thin Capitalisation Regulations apply.

Conditions for disallowance:

The Regulations provide two ratios to determine the amount of excess debt.

Under the first ratio, which is a fixed ratio, the average fiscal debt may not exceed more than three times the Company’s average fiscal equity plus Euro 500,000. For the purpose of this ratio, debt is defined as the balance of the company’s loan receivables and loan payables. The balance sheet for tax purposes is used to determine the average debt and equity.

The second ratio is  the group ratio. When the Company files its corporate tax return, it may elect to apply for the group ratio. Under this alternative, the Company may look at the commercial consolidated debt-to-equity ratio of the (international) group of which it is a member. If the Company’s commercial debt-to-equity ratio does not exceed the debt-to-equity ratio of the group, the tax deduction for interest on related-party loans is allowed.

In certain circumstances, The Dutch Supreme Court has also in its judgements re-characterised loans as informal capital contributions.

The deduction of interest paid including related costs and currency exchange results, by a Dutch company on a related-party loan is disallowed to the extent that the loan relates to one of the following transactions:

•    Dividend distributions or repayments of capital by the taxpayer or by a related company or
a related  individual  resident  in the Netherlands;

•    Capital contributions by a taxpayer, by a related Dutch company or by a related individual resident in the Netherlands into a related company; or

•    The acquisition or extension of an interest by the taxpayer, by a related individual resident in the Netherlands in a company that is related to the taxpayer after this acquisition or extension.

Exemptions:

This interest deduction limitation does not apply  if either of the  following conditions are  satisfied:

•    The loan and the related transaction are primarily based on business considerations;

•    At the level of the creditor, the interest on the loan is subject to a tax on income or profits that results in a levy of at least 10% on a tax base determined under Dutch standards, disregarding the patent and group interest boxes (which offer certain tax concessions. However, effective from 1 January 2008, even if the income is subject to tax of at least 10% at the level of the creditor, interest payments are not deductible if the tax authorities can demonstrate it to be likely that the loan or the related transaction is not primarily based on business considerations. The measure described in the preceding sentence applies to loans that were in existence on 1 January 2008, with no grandfathering.

The United States:

Deductibility of Interest – An overview:
The US has thin capitalisation principles under which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may attempt to limit the deduction for interest expenses if a US corporation is thinly capitalised. In such case, funds loaned to it by a related party may be recharacterised by the IRS as equity. As a result, the corporation’s deduction for interest expense may be considered distributions to the related party and be subject to withholding tax.

Conditions for disallowance:

It can be said that the US adopts a facts-and-circumstances approach in determining whether or not a US corporation is thinly capitalised and whether an instrument should be treated as equity or debt.

While no fixed rules exist, a debt-to-equity ratio of 3 : 1 or less is usually acceptable to the IRS, provided the US corporation can adequately service the debt without the help of related parties.

However, a deduction is disallowed for certain ‘disqualified’ interest paid on loans made or guaranteed by related foreign parties that are not subject to U.S. tax on the interest received. This disallowed interest may be carried forward to future years and allowed as a deduction.

In addition under the US Treasury Regulations, interest expense accrued on a loan from a related foreign lender must be actually paid before the US borrower can deduct the interest expense.

Exemptions:
No interest deduction is disallowed under the above provision if the payer corporation’s debt-to-equity ratio does not exceed 1.5. If the debt-to-equity ratio exceeds this amount, the deduction of any ‘excess interest expense’ of the payer is deferred.

The United Kingdom:

 As mentioned earlier, the Regulations in the UK are broad based rather than specific. In other words, UK’s transfer pricing measures apply to the provision of finance (as well as to trading income and expenses). As a result, Companies are required to self assess their tax liability on financing transactions using the arm’s length principle. Consequently, the Inland Revenue may challenge interest deductions on the grounds that, based on all of the circumstances, the loan would not have been made at all, or that the amount loaned or the interest rate would have been less, if the lender was an unrelated third party acting at arm’s length.

European Union (EU) aspects of Thin Capitalisation Rules:

In the case of EU countries, the tax environment is subject to significant external influence in the form of the Ee Treaty and decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ decision in the Lankhorst-Hohorst has revived discussions on the compatibility of thin capitalisation rules with the non-discrimination principle of the EC Treaty. The ECJ held in that case that the German thin capitalisation rules which applied only to non-resident companies violated the freedom of establishment provision contained in Article 43 of the EC Treaty. A number of EU countries have thereafter decided to amend their thin capitalisation rules and extent their applicability to resident companies as well.

Thus, in any tax planning exercise involving a financial leverage, Thin Capitalisation Regulations must be taken into cognisance, especially if one of the objectives of such an exercise is to minimise the Global Effective Tax Rate.