Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

It is a well-established principle of law that treatment given by the Assessee in its books of account is not decisive/conclusive for determining the taxable income under the Act.

15. Kedaara Captial Fund II LLP vs. Assessment Unit, National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), Delhi and Ors.

[Writ Petition no. 2684 of 2025 dated: 09/09/2025 (Bom) (HC)]

It is a well-established principle of law that treatment given by the Assessee in its books of account is not decisive/conclusive for determining the taxable income under the Act.

The Petitioner is registered with SEBI as a Category II AIF – closed ended fund under the SEBI (AIF) Regulations, 2012. For the purposes of the Act, the Petitioner is regarded as an ‘investment fund’ as defined under Section 115UB. Resultantly, any income from investment activities earned is exempt under Section 10(23FBA). Such income is, however, taxable in the hands of the unit holders of the Petitioner. In other words, assessees like the Petitioner are granted a pass-through status under the Act.

During the year, the Petitioner implemented investments aggregating to ₹1,300.27 Crores using the capital raised from its unit holders. The total portfolio investments of the Petitioner as on 31st March 2022 was ₹8,665.75 Crores. It was an undisputed fact that the Petitioner neither sold any of the investments during the year nor did it earn any income from such investment activities. The only income earned by the Petitioner during the year was short term capital gains of ₹0.99 Crores on cancellation of certain forward contracts. The total expenses incurred by the Petitioner during the year was ₹118.99 Crores. In the books of accounts maintained, these expenses were debited to the statement of profit and loss for the year.

The Petitioner filed its Return of Income for the subject A.Y. 2022–23, declaring NIL income. Further, in such return, the income of short-term capital gains of ₹0.99 Crores was claimed as exempt under Section 10(23FBA) read with 115UB and taxable in the hands of the unit holders. Insofar as the expenses of ₹118.99 Crores incurred during the year, the Petitioner stated that no deduction whatsoever was claimed of such an amount. It was also stated that no carry forward of any loss under any head of income was claimed by the Petitioner. Moreover, it was also stated that a deduction of such an amount has also not been claimed by any of the unit holders as well.

The impugned assessment order was passed on 21st March 2025 disallowing the expenses of ₹103.15 Crores (expenses incurred towards management fees and other related costs of ₹15.84 Crores paid to its investment advisor, Kedaara Capital Advisors LLP, were allowed by the AO) and added the said amount under the head “profits and gains from business and profession” to the total income of the Petitioner. This amount was added by the AO on the ground that the expenses were “neither found genuine nor any income has offered against these expenses”. A notice of demand under Section 156 of the Act raising a tax demand of ₹49.02 Crores, as well as a penalty show cause notice, were also issued pursuant to the above assessment order.

The Petitioner filed the Writ Petition challenging the above order and the consequential notices issued by the AO. Amongst other grounds, the primary challenge was on the ground that the AO has added expenses to the Petitioner’s total income despite the fact that no deduction in respect of such expenses has been claimed either by the Petitioner or the unit holders. Therefore, the question of adding such an amount could never have arisen. The addition made therefore, was wholly without jurisdiction, perverse and arbitrary.

It was further contended that the AO miserably overlooked the fact that the Petitioner has been granted a pass through status under the Act. Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument that the Petitioner incurred non-genuine expenses, nevertheless, such an addition could not have been made in the hands of the Petitioner.

It was further contended that the unrealised gains reported in the financial statements of the Petitioner as ‘surplus’ does not constitute ‘income’ of the unit holders and is not taxable in their hands under Section 115UB. Secondly, in any case, it is a well-settled principle of income tax law that to determine the taxability of a particular item is not governed by how that item is treated by the counterpart assessee. Therefore, the treatment given in the hands of the unit holders cannot govern how the income of the Petitioner is to be determined. Accordingly, it was submitted that the addition made by the AO was completely unlawful, without jurisdiction and illegal.

On the first objection of the Revenue that the Writ Petition ought not to be entertained because there was an alternate remedy available to the Petitioner, the Hon. Court observed that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the Court can exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and interfere in the above matter when an assessment order is completely illegal, contrary to the clear mandate of law prima facie, without jurisdiction.

Further, it was well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the Writ Petition, despite alternate statutory remedies, was not affected in a case where the authority against whom the Writ was filed has usurped its jurisdiction without any legal foundation.

The Hon. Court further observed that it was undisputed that the addition of expenses (of ₹103.15 Crores) made by the Assessing Officer in the impugned order was never ever claimed as a deduction by the Petitioner in its Return of Income. In other words, these expenses were never claimed as a deduction to give rise to the Assessing Officer to add back those deductions in the Income Returned by the Petitioner.

The Hon. Court further observed that the AO failed to recall the well-established principle of law that treatment given by the assessee in its books of account was not decisive/conclusive for determining the taxable income under the Act. Whether an assessee is entitled to a deduction or not entirely depends upon the provisions of the Act de hors the disclosure in its books of account. The Hon. Court referred to decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. CIT [(1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC)], Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. JCIT [[2015] 55 taxmann.com 361 (SC)] and United Commercial Bank vs. CIT [(1999) 240 ITR 355 (SC)].

In view of the above, the Hon. Court held that the addition of ₹103.15 crores made by the Assessing Officer in the income returned by the Petitioner was wholly unsustainable. The Hon. Court further refused to remand the matter back to file of AO.

Penalty 270 A – Writ – Alternate remedy- No virtual hearing was given to the Petitioner as mandated by the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022: AY 2017-18

14. Man Truck & Bus India Pvt Ltd vs. The Assessment Unit, Income-Tax Department & Ors.

[WRIT PETITION NO. 5437 OF 2025 Dated: 09/09/2025. (Bom) (HC)]

Penalty 270 A – Writ – Alternate remedy- No virtual hearing was given to the Petitioner as mandated by the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022: AY 2017-18

On 30th November 2017, the Petitioner had filed its return of income declaring its income as “NIL” after a set-off of the brought forward loss of ₹17.14 Crores. Thereafter, assessment proceedings were completed; and an order was passed on 24th June 2021 under section 143(3) r.w.s 144C (3) of the Act making an addition of ₹31.15 crores, on account of a Transfer Pricing Adjustment.

Being aggrieved by this order, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal before the CIT (Appeals). The Petitioner had filed its Advanced Pricing Agreement Application with the CBDT as far back as on 26th March 2014, which finally culminated in the APA on

21st December 2021 during the pendency of the Appeal. The APA applied to A.Y. 2011-12 to A.Y. 2018-19. Since the APA was entered into between the Petitioner and the CBDT, under the provisions of section 92CD(1), the Petitioner filed its modified Return of Income on 30th March 2022. No assessment order was passed under Section 92CD(3). Therefore, according to the Petitioner, the modified Return filed by the Petitioner under Section 92CD(1) had become final and deemed to be accepted by the Department.

The AO passed penalty order dated 24th March 2025 imposing penalty on the Petitioner under Section 270A of the Act.

The Petitioner contended that since no addition has been made by the AO under Section 92CD(3), penalty proceedings could not lie against the Petitioner under Section 270A of the Act.
It was further contented by the Petitioner that it was mandatory for the officer levying the penalty to grant a virtual hearing to the Petitioner before passing the impugned penalty order. This submission was made based on the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022 formulated by the CBDT.

The Hon. Court observed that it was admitted by the Department that no order under Section 92CD(3) was passed by Respondent No. 2 and the mistake crept in the penalty order because the secondary adjustment of ₹14,16,49,404/- was not visible in the modified return of income filed by the Petitioner and no order under Section 92CD(3) was available with Respondent No.1 at the time of passing the penalty order.

The Hon. Court observed that it was not in dispute that the Petitioner had entered into an APA with the CBDT on 21st December 2021. It was also not in dispute that as per the provisions of Section 92CD(1), the Petitioner filed its return of income on 30th March 2022 and offered to tax a sum of approximately ₹14.16 Crores towards Transfer Pricing Adjustment as per the APA entered into between the Petitioner and the CBDT. The tax on this amount has also been paid by the Petitioner as admitted by the Revenue in its affidavit-in-reply. It was also an admitted fact that no order has been passed under Section 92CD(3) on the modified return of income filed by the Petitioner. All these facts have not been taken into consideration by Respondent No.1 before passing the impugned penalty order. Further, no virtual hearing was given to the Petitioner as mandated by the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022.

Therefore, the impugned penalty order was quashed and the matter remanded to the 1st Respondent to give a virtual hearing to the Petitioner and thereafter pass any fresh order after taking into consideration all relevant facts.

TDS — Payment without TDS — Disallowance u/s. 40a(ia) — Applicability of proviso to 40a(ia) — Inserted by Finance Act 2013 with effect from 01/04/2013 — Curative and beneficial in nature —Retrospective effect from 01/04/2005 — No dispute as that the recipients had paid taxes on such payments — No disallowance can be made u/s. 40a(ia)

40. [2025] TS – 1087 – HC (Bom.)

Principal CIT vs. Morgan Stanley India Capital Pvt. Ltd. A. Y. 2009-10 Date of order 14/08/2025

S. 43B of ITA 1961

TDS — Payment without TDS — Disallowance u/s. 40a(ia) — Applicability of proviso to 40a(ia) — Inserted by Finance Act 2013 with effect from 01/04/2013 — Curative and beneficial in nature —Retrospective effect from 01/04/2005 — No dispute as that the recipients had paid taxes on such payments — No disallowance can be made u/s. 40a(ia)

In the course of scrutiny assessment for the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer disallowed certain expenses of approximately ₹17.64 crores u/s. 40a(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the ground that the assessee had not deducted tax at source.

The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance and held that it was merely a case of short deduction and in doing so relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal (2012 SCC Online Cal13210). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Department.

The Bombay High Court concurred with the decision of the Calcutta High Court’s regarding the retrospective application of the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, introduced effective April 1, 2013 and dismissed the appeal of the Department and held as under:

“i) This proviso deems that an assessee, who fails to deduct tax under Chapter XVII-B but is not considered in default under the first proviso to Section 201(1), is treated as having deducted and paid the tax on the date the payee files their return of income.

ii) Despite the proviso’s introduction in 2013, the court, referring to the co-ordinate bench judgment in the case of Pr.CIT vs. Perfect Circle India Pvt Ltd (Income Tax Appeal No. 707 of 2016, decided January 7, 2019), held that its curative and beneficial nature warrants retrospective application from April 1, 2005, when the main proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) was enacted. Given that the payees (the assessee’s group companies) had paid taxes on the payments received, the Assessing Officer was incorrect in invoking Section 40(a)(ia) to disallow the expenses for the A. Y. 2009-10.

iii) Consequently, there is no substantial question of law requiring further adjudication.”

General Anti-Avoidance Rules — Scope of —Impermissible Avoidance Agreement — Purchase and sale of shares — Cumulative effect of purchase and sale of shares results in loss — No strong material established by the Department to show applicability of s. 96(1) except the timing of transaction — GAAR provisions not applicable — Order passed u/s. 144BA(6) set-aside.

39. (2025) 177 taxmann.com 726 (Telangana)

Smt. Anvida Bundi vs. DCIT

A. Y. 2020-21 Date of order 22/08/2025

Ss. 96 r.w.s 144BA of ITA 1961

General Anti-Avoidance Rules — Scope of —Impermissible Avoidance Agreement — Purchase and sale of shares — Cumulative effect of purchase and sale of shares results in loss — No strong material established by the Department to show applicability of s. 96(1) except the timing of transaction — GAAR provisions not applicable — Order passed u/s. 144BA(6) set-aside.

The Assessee, an individual, held investments in shares and securities. During the year, the assessee sold certain shares (already held by her) and earned long term capital gains of about ₹44.14 crores from sale of shares. In order to deploy the funds available from sale of shares, and keeping in mind the market trend, the assessee purchased shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. to earn short-term capital gains and thereafter to make long-term capital gains from subsequent disposal of investment. The assessee also invested in the units of mutual fund worth ₹32.92 crores during the year. Subsequently, the assessee sold shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. in the same year. The cumulative effect of purchase of shares of M/s. HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. in the open market and sale of shares thereafter resulted in loss of ₹17.65 crores to the petitioner for the same Financial Year 2019-20.

The Department was of the view that the transaction of purchase and sale of shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. during the year amounted to Impermissible Avoidance Agreement (IAA) and the provisions of Chapter X-A, dealing with General Anti-Avoidance Rules were applicable to the said transactions. The assessee filed objections. However, the approving panel passed the order dated 21/03/2023 holding that the transactions undertaken by the petitioner so far as purchase and sale of shares of M/s.HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd., particularly taking into consideration the period of time during which the sale and purchase was made, amounts to “IAA”.

Against the said order, the assessee filed writ petition before the High Court on the contention that the Department had not met any of the criteria envisaged u/s. 96(1) of the Act to treat the transactions as IAA.

The Telangana High Court took note of certain admitted facts such as that the Department had not been able to show or has collected any material to prove that the purchase and sale of shares made by the petitioner was with any of their known persons or entity. There was no nexus between purchase and sale of shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. All the shares were sold through the stock exchange through the DMAT account of the assessee. The assessee was an investor in shares and the purchase and sale of shares by the assessee was not one of the isolated transactions specifically made to save tax. The transactions formed part of the return of the assessee and there was no new material to hold that the so-called arrangement was hit by the GAAR provision. Lastly, except for the timing of transactions, there was also no material to hold the transactions to be an IAA. In view of these facts, the High Court taking note of the report prepared by the expert committee under the Act regarding general anti-avoidance rules held that the report itself has categorically held that sale and purchase through stock market transactions would not come under the GAAR provisions. It was held that timing of a transaction or a taxpayer would not be questioned under the GAAR provisions on sale and purchase of shares made by the assessee. The Telangana High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) So far as the timing part is concerned, which perhaps was the strong point on which the authority concerned has passed the impugned order, it is necessary to take note of the report prepared by the expert committee under the Income Tax Act with regard to general anti-avoidance rules are concerned. The said report itself has categorically held that sale and purchase through stock market transactions would not come under the GAAR provisions. It was held that timing of a transaction or a taxpayer would not be questioned under the GAAR provisions on sale and purchase of shares made by the assessee.

ii) In view of the aforesaid factual matrix of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the Department has not been able to show any arrangement to have been made by the petitioner in the course of selling its shares of M/s.HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd., and it was a pure trading done by the petitioner with no knowledge of purchase and sale carried out by the petitioner. In the absence of any strong material made available by the Department meeting the requirements and ingredients that are reflected under Section 96(1) of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that the writ petition deserves to be and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 23/01/2023 passed by respondent No.3 u/s. 144BA(6) of the Act for the A. Y. 2020-21 is set aside.”

Deduction u/s. 80-IA :— (A) Interest on FD — Funds kept aside periodically by way of FD — Obligation under the license agreement to replace cranes after a certain period — Funds parked in FD to meet contractual obligation — Funds were also parked in FD under a compliance order of the High Court due to a tariff dispute between the assessee and TAMP — Placement of FD imperative for the business — FD was not created for parking of surplus funds — Interest is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA: (B) Interest on TDS refund — TDS wrongly deducted by customers — TDS was directly part of sales receipt of the assessee — Interest on TDS refund arose due to excess TDS deducted by the customers against the payment to be made to the assessee — TDS was part of business receipt of the assessee — Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA on interest received by it on TDS refunded to it.

38. [2025] 177 taxmann.com 707 (Bom.)

Gateway Terminals India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT

A. Y. 2012-13 Date of order 26/08/2025

S. 80-IA of ITA 1961

Deduction u/s. 80-IA :— (A) Interest on FD — Funds kept aside periodically by way of FD — Obligation under the license agreement to replace cranes after a certain period — Funds parked in FD to meet contractual obligation — Funds were also parked in FD under a compliance order of the High Court due to a tariff dispute between the assessee and TAMP — Placement of FD imperative for the business — FD was not created for parking of surplus funds — Interest is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA:

(B) Interest on TDS refund — TDS wrongly deducted by customers — TDS was directly part of sales receipt of the assessee — Interest on TDS refund arose due to excess TDS deducted by the customers against the payment to be made to the assessee — TDS was part of business receipt of the assessee — Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA on interest received by it on TDS refunded to it.

The assessee, a joint venture company, was engaged in the business of operating and maintaining a container terminal at Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) which was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

During the previous year, the assessee earned interest income from FDs maintained with the banks. These funds were kept in FD with banks because under the license agreement with JNPT, the assessee was under an obligation to replace cranes after a certain period. These cranes were a significant portion of the machinery and equipment of the assessee. The failure to replace cranes as per the license agreement would result in revocation of the license. Therefore, a portion of funds were regularly deposited by way of FDs to meet contractual obligations required to be fulfilled in order to continue the business of maintaining the container terminal. Further, interest was also received on FD due to a tariff dispute between assessee and TAMP and, thus, funds were parked in compliance of order of High Court. In addition to the above, the assessee also earned interest on refund of taxes due to wrongful deduction of TDS by the customers of the Appellant.

In the return of income filed by the assessee, for the A. Y. 2012-13, deduction u/s. 80-IA was claimed which included the above interest income. The assessment was completed by allowing the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IA which included interest income on FD. The interest income on income-tax refund was taxed by the Assessing Officer under the head Income from Other Sources.

On appeal before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) enhanced the income of the assessee by denying deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Act in respect of interest on FD on the ground that it was not derived from an industrial undertaking. The Tribunal rejected the appeal filed by the assessee.

The assessee filed an appeal before the High Court against the said order. The assessee also filed miscellaneous application, which was rejected by the Tribunal. Against the order rejecting the miscellaneous application, the assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court.

The Bombay High Court disposed of both the appeal and the writ filed by the assessee and decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i) The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Act on the interest from FDs which was placed by the assessee for planning of replacement of equipments as per the provisions of the agreement with JNPT. The facts that the placement of fixed deposits was imperative for the purpose of carrying on the eligible business of the assessee. The placement of FDs was not for parking surplus funds which were lying idle. The assessee had used these FDs for purchasing cranes for the eligible business and there was a direct nexus between the FDs and the eligible business of the assessee. Thus, in view of the foregoing, the deduction in respect of interest on FD was allowed.

ii) TDS was wrongly deducted by the vendors/customers of the assessee from the payment made to the assessee for using the port facility and, therefore, the TDS wrongly deducted was directly a part of the sales receipt of the assessee from the eligible business. The TDS refund arose to the assessee due to the excess TDS cut by the customers against payment to be made to the assessee and therefore the TDS was a part of the business receipt of the assessee. Had the customers not deducted excess amount of TDS, the assessee would have received the surplus funds which would be used for the business purpose/ repayment of loans etc. The refund received by the assessee was an integral part connected with the receipt of business income by the assessee and the same could not be separated from the business of the assessee. In these circumstances, the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA, on the interest received by it on TDS refunded to it.”

Charitable institution — Exemption u/s. 11 — Charitable purpose — Applicability of proviso to s. 2(15) — Donations received from donors after deducting an amount shown as deduction of tax at source u/s. 194C and 194J — AO treating receipts as consultancy fees and contractual income based on deduction of tax at source rejected exemption u/s. 11 — Assessee’s revision petition u/s. 264 was rejected — Held, proviso to s. 2(15) cannot be invoked alleging that services rendered in relation to trade, commerce or business — Provison under which donor deducted tax alone could not determine nature of receipt — No element of trade, commerce or business activity established — Assessee is entitled to exemption — Assessment order and order rejecting revision petition set aside.

37. (2025) 476 ITR 489 (Delhi)

Aroh Foundation vs. CIT

A. Y. 2017-18 Date of order 05/02/2024

Ss. 2(15) proviso, 11, 12, 13(8), 194C, 194J and 264 of ITA 1961

Charitable institution — Exemption u/s. 11 — Charitable purpose — Applicability of proviso to s. 2(15) — Donations received from donors after deducting an amount shown as deduction of tax at source u/s. 194C and 194J — AO treating receipts as consultancy fees and contractual income based on deduction of tax at source rejected exemption u/s. 11 — Assessee’s revision petition u/s. 264 was rejected — Held, proviso to s. 2(15) cannot be invoked alleging that services rendered in relation to trade, commerce or business — Provison under which donor deducted tax alone could not determine nature of receipt — No element of trade, commerce or business activity established — Assessee is entitled to exemption — Assessment order and order rejecting revision petition set aside.

The assessee is a non-Governmental organisation registered as a charitable institution u/s. 12A, 12AA and 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claims to have been working for the upliftment of the poor, underprivileged children and women, health, preservation of the environment and other social causes. In order to fulfil its charitable objectives, the assessee receives various grants from the Government as well as the private sector which is exempted from tax u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act. During the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2017-18, the assessee received the donations, which included receipts from donors who had deducted tax at source u/s.194C and 194J. The Assessing Officer denied exemption u/s. 11 and 12, treating these receipts as consulting fees and contractual income, invoking the proviso to section 2(15). The assessee’s revision petition u/s. 264 was rejected.

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the rejection order u/s. 264. The assessee contended that at no point of time, except for the A. Y. 2017-2018 was the charitable status of the assessee doubted by the respondent-Revenue and for all previous assessment years, specifically for the A. Ys. 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016, under similar circumstances, exemption u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act was granted to the assessee and even for the subsequent assessment year, i.e., the A. Y. 2018-2019 as well, similar benefit was extended. However, the benefits for the relevant assessment year in question have been denied merely on the ground that the donor has deducted tax at source u/s. 194C and 194J of the Act, while allocating requisite grants to the assessee.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) In the instant case, the sole reason to construe the receipt amounting to ₹5,90,42,892 received by the donors under the tax regime is founded on the assumption that the same is towards professional/technical services or contractual income as tax at source was deducted under sections 194C and 194J of the Act.

ii) We, prima facie, find no merit in the above mentioned rationale as firstly, that alone cannot be the basis to conclude the aforesaid receipt to be considered under the category of consultancy fees and contractual income. Secondly, there is no element of activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business. Thirdly, in the absence of any cogent reason, receipts in question cannot be “advancement of any other object of general public utility”.

iii) If the deductor in its Income-tax return, under misconception, deducts tax at source u/ss. 194C and 194J of the Act, the same would not disentitle the assessee to claim benefit u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act unless the case of the assessee is specifically hit by the proviso of section 2(15) of the Act, which is not the case here. The proviso to section 2(15) of the Act would not get attracted merely on the basis of deduction of tax at source by the donor under a particular head.

iv) It is thus seen that deduction of tax at source by donor would not be the determinative factor for denial of benefits u/ss. 11 and 12 of the Act. The respondent-Revenue, in the instant case, in the preceding years as well as in the succeeding years, under almost similar circumstances, has accepted the exemption claimed by the assessee u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act and, therefore, should not have deviated from its consistent approach in denying benefits to the assessee.

v) Accordingly, we find that the assessment order dated December 22, 2019 and the order passed by the revisional authority dated March 27, 2021 suffer from material perversity. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned orders are hereby, set aside. The receipt of ₹5,90,42,892 shall not be treated as income and the assessee is entitled for exemptions enshrined u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act.”

Business expenditure — Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) — Cash payment in excess of prescribed limit — Effect of s. 40A and rule 6DD — Payments to agents cannot be disallowed — Meaning of agent — Assessee’s supervisor acting as agent of assessee, and accounting to him for amounts received and disbursed to individual labourers — Supervisors not sub-contractors and payments made by them to labourers on assessee’s behalf not to be disallowed u/s. 40A(3).

36. (2025) 477 ITR 95 (Calcutta)

Sk. Jaynal Abddin vs. CIT

A. Y. 2006-07 Date of order 02/04/2024

S. 40A(3) of ITA 1961 and Rule 6DD of ITR 1962 and S 182 of Indian Contract Act, 1872

Business expenditure — Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) — Cash payment in excess of prescribed limit — Effect of s. 40A and rule 6DD — Payments to agents cannot be disallowed — Meaning of agent — Assessee’s supervisor acting as agent of assessee, and accounting to him for amounts received and disbursed to individual labourers — Supervisors not sub-contractors and payments made by them to labourers on assessee’s behalf not to be disallowed u/s. 40A(3).

The appellant-assessee is engaged in the business of embroidery and stitching. The assessee paid a sum of ₹1,21,49,190 for payment to labourers. According to the assessee, the aforesaid amount was paid to the labourers through supervisors who were employees of the assessee. The assessee used to draw a lump-sum amount from bank by cheque through his employees, i.e., supervisors for payment to be made to labourers. The supervisors used to make payment to labourers and give an account to the assessee in the form of a list containing payments made to each individual labourer. In none of the cases, the payment so made by the supervisors to individual labourer exceeded ₹20,000. The Assessing Officer, while passing the assessment order dated December 31, 2008 for the assessment year in question, i.e., A. Y. 2006-07, invoked section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by recording the following facts:

“The ground level labourers were not subject to professional tax, Employees’ State Insurance, provident fund, etc. There were no employer-employee relationship with the assessee and the labourers. The assessee simply got the work done by skilled labourers and the payment is ascertained on the basis of quality and quantity of the work done by them. The assessee in his submission dated December 30, 2008 further clarified that the job allotted to the worker are purely temporary. Workers are paid some times for few months even for a few days. Thus, labour welfare measures are neither taken up nor it is practicable. These workers are quite illiterate, partly homeless and fast changing the employer and work on piece rate on the condition of no work no pay.”

The Assessing Officer therefore inferred that the assessee could not produce satisfactory explanation for violation of the provisions of section 40A(3). Therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed 20 per cent. of ₹1,21,49,191 that is ₹24,29,838 u/s. 40A(3) of the Act.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal and recorded the following finding of fact:

“I have carefully gone through the assessment order and explanation given by the appellant. The Assessing Officer has stated that the payments to the supervisor workers are in excess of ₹20,000 in cash for which he has disallowed the expenses in terms of section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act. It has already been held in the preceding paragraphs that the so-called sub-contractors are actually supervisor worker and employees of the appellant-firm. The payments made to them are meant for disbursement amongst the workers. It would be seen from the labour sheets that no single payment to the worker exceeds ₹20,000 in cash. The practice followed by the appellant is to withdraw the aggregate amount of labour charges from bank and to disburse the same amongst the individual workers through the supervisor. In not a single case, the individual payments to each worker ever exceeded ₹20,000 as would be seen from the monthly pay sheet and wage summary sheet. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and having regard to the case laws cited above, it is held that the disallowance under section 40A(3) made by the Assessing Officer is not called for. Accordingly, the addition of ₹24,29,838 is deleted.”

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue and has recorded the following finding to hold that the supervisors are nothing but sub-contractors of the assessee:

“We observe that the assessee with each of the above so-called supervisors ledger account has enclosed the copies of weekly work sheet showing the name of worker, inter alia, amount paid to each of them. However, on the top of the said work sheet, name of the said supervisor is stated. It is observed that the assessee was making lump-sum payment on an ad hoc basis for the purpose of further disbursement to the workers and not as per the amount payable by them to the individual workers. We also observe from each page of the ledger account placed in paper book (supra) that there is a closing balance. Had these supervisors been merely an employee of the assessee along with the other workers, we are of the considered view that there was no question of any closing balance as on March 31, 2006. If the assessee had made the payments to them for the purpose of further disbursement, the assessee would have paid the amount to the so-called supervisors the amounts which were actually payable to them. However, this is not the case. Considering the entries in the ledger account, it fortifies the views of the Assessing Officer that the so-called group leaders or supervisors are nothing but sub-contractors of the assessee and the workers whose names are mentioned in the work sheet to whom the payments were made through respective so-called group leaders, who were working not under the assessee but under the said so-called group leader.”

On appeal by the assessee the Calcutta High Court framed the following substantial question of law for consideration:

“Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in judging the applicability of section 40A(3) of the Act with reference to the lump-sum amount paid to the leader of each group of workers for the purpose of disbursement to the individual workers on the appellant’s behalf and not with reference to the payment made to each individual worker and in holding that the group leader was the appellant’s sub-contractor or that the individual workers worked not under the appellant but under such group leader and its purported findings in that behalf are arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse?”

The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, answered the question in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i) On perusal of the assessment order, we find that the Assessing Officer has not disputed the specific case of the appellant-assessee that the supervisors are his employees. The specific stand of the appellant-assessee that the supervisors are his employees, was supported by books of account which were before the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer recorded the finding that since the provisions of Employees’ State Insurance, Provident Fund, etc., were not followed by the assessee, therefore, the individual labourers are not employees of the assessee. The Assessing Officer nowhere disputed the stand of the assessee supported by books of account that the supervisors are employees of the assessee. In paragraph 11 of the impugned order the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal recorded a finding based on surmise and presumption that the supervisors are nothing but sub-contractors of the assessee. This finding is perverse inasmuch as firstly it is not supported by any evidence and secondly it is contrary to evidence on record in the form of books of account that the supervisors are the employees who have been paid salary. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order that the supervisors are sub-contractors, is perverse and is hereby set aside.

ii) Section 40A(3) of the Act afore-quoted, as it stood at the relevant time, clearly provides by the second proviso that no disallowance under this sub-section shall be made, where any payment in a sum exceeding ₹20,000 is made otherwise than by a crossed cheque drawn on a bank or by a crossed bank draft; in such cases and under such circumstances as may be prescribed, having regard to the nature and extent of banking facilities available, considerations of business expediency and other relevant factors. Circumstances as referred in the aforesaid second proviso to section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 have been prescribed in rule 6DD of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Rule 6DD(1) clearly provides that no disallowance under sub-section (3) of section 40A shall be made where any payment in a sum exceeding twenty thousand rupees is made otherwise than by a crossed cheque drawn on a bank or by a crossed bank draft in the cases and circumstances where the payment is made by any person to his agent who is required to make payment in cash for goods or services on behalf of such person.

iii) Supervisors of the assessee acted as “agent” of the assessee. The word “agent” and “principal” has been defined in section 182 of the Indian Contract Act. An agent is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with the third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called “principal”. Undisputed facts of the present case are that the appellant had withdrawn the amount from his bank account through his employees, i.e., supervisors for disbursement to individual labourers and the supervisors gave an account of the money so received for payment to labourers. Thus, the appellant-assessee is the principal and the supervisors acted as agent of the assessee. It is settled law that an authority of an agent may be express or implied. Submission of account by a supervisor acting as agent of the assessee, for the amount received and disbursed to individual labourers, leaves no manner of doubt that the supervisors who were employees of the assessee, acted as agents of the assessee for the purposes of disbursement of amount to the labourers. The payment so made by the supervisors had not exceeded ₹20,000 to any individual labourer. As per the provisions of section 211 of the Indian Contract Act, agent is bound to conduct the business of his principal according to the directions given by the principal or in the absence of such direction according to the customs which prevail in doing business of the same kind at the place where the agent conducts such business. In the present set of facts the supervisors acted as agent of the assessee in conducting the assessee’s business. There is no material or evidence on record to indicate or establish that the supervisors were sub-contractors. Under the circumstances, the finding recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the supervisors were sub-contractors is perverse and contrary to law. Consequently, the said finding is hereby set aside.

iv) We have found that the supervisors acted as agent of the assessee to disburse the amount to individual labourers which in no case exceeded ₹20,000 to any individual labour. Therefore, in view of the circumstances prescribed in the second proviso to section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 read with rule 6DD(1) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and the above-referred provisions of the Indian Contract Act, the aforesaid payment of ₹1,21,49,190 cannot fall within the scope of section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961. Consequently, the disallowance to the extent of 20 per cent made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and to add it in the income of the assessee cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.

v) For all the reasons afore-stated, the impugned order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the extent it upholds the disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 for ₹24,29,838 cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. Consequently, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

Applicability of section 132A — Stolen property — Theft at the premises of the assessee — Criminal Case — Stolen property found by the police — Application to the Trial Court for possession of the stolen property — Objection by the Income-tax Department — Ownership documents submitted by the assessee — Objection of the Tax Department not maintainable.

35. (2025) 345 CTR 433 (MP)

Shravan Kumar Pathak vs. State of MP

A. Y. 2022-23 Date of order 09/05/2024

Ss. 132A of ITA 1961 and 397, 401 & 457 of Cr.PC

Applicability of section 132A — Stolen property — Theft at the premises of the assessee — Criminal Case — Stolen property found by the police — Application to the Trial Court for possession of the stolen property — Objection by the Income-tax Department — Ownership documents submitted by the assessee — Objection of the Tax Department not maintainable.

Assessee is an individual. In the facts of this case, a theft took place at the house of the assessee wherein cash amounting to ₹3 crores and 4 kgs of gold was stolen. A police complaint was filed by the assessee and an FIR was registered by the police. After making investigation, the police arrested the accused and recovered the stolen articles. The Assessee filed an application u/s. 457 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the trial court for handing over the possession of articles seized by the police in his favour.

Against the application moved by the assessee applicant u/s. 457 of the CrPC, the Department filed an objection that the applicant kept such a huge cash amount and gold in his house with an intent to avoid tax liability, which otherwise is a loss to the Government and as such, custody of the seized articles should not be handed over to the assessee. In addition, the Assistant Director, Income Tax, had also asked for the custody of the articles recovered from the thieves.

The application filed by the assessee was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that the inquiry by the Department had not been concluded and the amount may be subject matter of confiscation and therefore it would not be proper to hand over the possession to the assessee applicant.

Against this order by the Trial Court, the assessee applicant filed a revision application before the High Court. The Madhya Pradesh High Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held as follows:

“i) From the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is clear that in a criminal case, if any stolen property is seized by the police from the accused, then the Income Tax Department cannot claim possession over the said seized property by issuing notice u/s. 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the reason that the same is a separate proceeding and can be initiated only after decision of the Court.

ii) The trial Court on a mere objection raised by the Income Tax Department cannot reject the application preferred by the applicant for the reason that it is the duty of the Court to see whether the person claiming possession over the seized articles, satisfies the Court by producing cogent evidence of his/her ownership or not. From the record of the trial Court, it reveals that while claiming title over the seized articles, the applicant has not only filed a certificate issued by the Tahsildar but also filed other relevant documents of his title over the same and as such, after considering the same, an order in this regard ought to have been passed, but the Court has failed to do so.

iii) Under such circumstances, the impugned order dated 08/04/2022 (Annexure-P/6) passed by the trial Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, it is hereby set aside.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

8. Vijay Krishnaswami vs. The Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation)

(2025) 177 taxmann.com 807(SC)

Prosecution – The complaint was filed by DDIT after sanction of PDIT before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.II), Egmore, Chennai, on 11.08.2018 – Application under Section 245(C) was filed by the Appellant before the Settlement Commission later – On the date of lodging the prosecution, the finding of concealment of income or imposition of the penalty of more than ₹50,000/- was not recorded by the ITAT – Nothing was brought on record to show that any wilful attempt to evade the payment of tax was made by Assessee – No explanation had been put forth by Revenue to demonstrate as to why PDIT or DDIT did not comply the procedure while lodging prosecution in this case – The act of the authority in continuing prosecution was in blatant disregard to their own binding circular dated 24.04.2008 and in defiance to the guidelines of the Department – Further, in the settlement proceedings, Assessee had disclosed all material facts related to the computation of his additional income and fully satisfied the provisions of Section 245H – The Commission recorded a finding that overall additional income is not on account of suppression of any material facts and it did not disclose any variance from the manner in which the said income had been earned – As such the immunity from penalty under IT Act was granted in exercise of powers under Section 245H – Conduct of the authorities lacked fairness and reasonableness, and the High Court’s approach appeared to be entirely misdirected, having failed to appreciate the factual and legal position in right earnest

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution lodged with the help of proviso to Sub-section (1) to Section 245H was in defiance to the circular dated 24.04.2008, which was in vogue – the Revenue acted in blatant disregard to binding statutory instructions. Such wilful non-compliance of their own directives reflected a serious lapse, and undermined the principles of fairness, consistency, and accountability, which in any manner cannot be treated to be justified or lawful.

On 24.04.2016, search under Section 132 of the IT Act was conducted at the residence of the Appellant, and unaccounted cash of ₹4,93,84,300/- was seized. After taking statement of the Appellant under Section 132(4) of the IT Act, a show-cause notice was issued on 31.10.2017 as to why prosecution should not be initiated against him.

On assailing the same in the writ petition filed by the Appellant, it was dismissed on 17.11.2017 being premature, observing that issuance of show-cause notice is an administrative act and in absence of reply, it cannot be questioned in the writ petition.

The said order was put to challenge in Writ Appeal No. 1617 of 2017 which was dismissed as infructuous vide order dated 06.09.2020 taking into consideration the subsequent developments and the order of the Settlement Commission passed on 26.11.2019. The Division Bench observed that the complaint filed in furtherance to show-cause notice was not challenged before the learned Single Judge in a writ petition, therefore, the said issue cannot be looked into in this appeal, leaving it open to be decided in the appropriate proceedings.

During pendency, the Principal Director Income Tax (Investigation), Chennai, (in short “PDIT”) exercised power under Section 279(1) of the IT Act, and vide order dated 21.06.2018, accorded sanction to Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Chennai, (in short “DDIT”) to initiate prosecution against the Appellant. Thereafter, Respondent-DDIT filed complaint on 11.08.2018 against the Appellant for an offence under Section 276C(1) alleging wilful attempt to evade tax with respect to assessment year 2017-2018 and for not filing the correct return of income.

Being aggrieved, the Appellant filed quashing petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short “CrPC”) being Crl. O.P. No. 28763 of 2018 along with Crl. M.P. Nos. 16786 and 16787 of 2018, praying for quashing of the complaint and pending proceedings.

Pertinently, the Appellant also filed an application under Section 245C of the IT Act on 07.12.2018 before the Settlement Commissioner, Additional Bench, Chennai, (in short “Settlement Commission”) disclosing the entire additional income and sought immunity from levy of penalty as well as prosecution in the matter of alleged evasion of proposed tax.

The Settlement Commission in exercise of powers under Section 245D(4) of IT Act, partly allowed the said application vide order dated 26.11.2019 and granted immunity from levy of penalty, refraining itself to grant immunity from prosecution due to pendency of quashing petition before the High Court of Madras.

By the order impugned, the High Court dismissed the quashing petition and referring the averments of the complaint, observed that for the assessment year 2017-2018, the amount seized has not been shown in earnings, which may amount to evasion of proposed tax. The defence put forth by the Appellant was that the seized amount was an earning of the assessment year 2016-2017 and not of assessment year 2017-2018 for which settlement has been arrived at as per the order of the Settlement Commission. The said defence did not find favour on the pretext that it can be taken by the Appellant during trial. It was also observed that the complaint was filed prior and the application before the Settlement Commission was subsequent. Therefore, the stand of the Appellant indicating that the seized amount was income of the assessment year 2016-2017 may also be looked into during trial. The question of competence of DDIT to initiate the prosecution against the Appellant under Section 279(1) of the IT Act also did not turn in favour of the Appellant in the order impugned.

On the basis of the submissions as advanced by the parties, the Supreme Court was of the view that on the facts, the following questions fell for consideration:

i) Whether continuation of the prosecution initiated by the revenue Under Section 276C(1) against the Appellant after passing an order by the Settlement Commission, would amount to abuse of process of Court?

ii) Whether in the facts of the present case, the High Court was justified to dismiss the quashing petition filed by the Appellant, and if not, what relief can be granted?

The Supreme Court noted that Section 276C deals with two situations. Sub-section (1) pertains to a wilful attempt to evade tax, penalty, or interest that is ‘chargeable’, ‘imposable’, or related to ‘under-reporting of income’. In contrast, sub-section (2) addresses the wilful attempt to evade the ‘payment’ of any tax, penalty, or interest under the Act. Therefore, both sub-sections operate in separate spheres and different stages. The fundamental distinction between the applicability of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) lies to the stage at which the offence allegedly occurs. Section 276C(1) is primarily intended to deter and penalize wilful and deliberate attempts by an Assessee for evasion of taxes, penalties and interest prior to their imposition or charging. The provision applies where there is a conscious and intentional effort to evade tax liability, distinguishing such conduct from bona-fide errors or differences in interpretation. The gist of the offence under Sub-section (1) of Section 276C lies in the wilful attempt to evade the very imposition of liability, and what is made punishable under this Sub-section is not the ‘actual evasion’ but the ‘wilful attempt’ to evade as described in the proviso to Section 276C.

The Supreme Court observed that for the allegations as alleged against Appellant, prosecution under section 279(1) was initiated by Respondent-DDIT in accordance with sanction given by PDIT. The Appellant also challenged the jurisdiction of the DDIT before the High Court, contending that she was not competent to initiate prosecution under section 279(1) of the IT Act.

On consideration of the provisions of section 279, the Supreme Court observed that, in addition to the other offences, looking to the allegations of the present case, the prosecution under section 276C may be lodged with permission of the PDIT. Sub-section (1)(a) creates a bar that the person shall not be proceeded under section 276C in relation to the assessment for the assessment year, of which penalty imposed or imposable on him, has been reduced or waived.

The Supreme Court further observed that the IT Act envisages a robust settlement mechanism under Chapter XIXA, which is titled ‘Settlement of Cases’. It was inserted by means of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (41 of 1975) w.e.f. 01.04.1976. The said amendment was brought pursuant to the recommendations of the ‘Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee’, popularly known as the ‘Wanchoo Committee’, report of December, 1971. ‘Chapter 2’ of the said report, titled ‘Black Money and Tax Evasion’.

In furtherance to recommendations of the Wanchoo Committee, an amendment was brought adding Section 245H, specifying the power of the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from prosecution and penalty.

According to the Supreme Court, on bare reading of the recommendations of the Wanchoo Committee, it was clear that the Assessee from whom the recovery of the unaccounted money has been allegedly reported, may apply before the Settlement Commission disclosing full and true income and the manner in which such income was derived. On such application, the Commission as it thinks fit, may grant immunity from penalty and prosecution of any offence under the IT Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act on such terms and conditions with respect to the subject matter covered under the settlement. The proviso to section 245H(1) is, however, an exception from granting immunity in case where the complaint has been lodged before the date of receipt of application for settlement. At the same time, the prosecution in either situation of section 276C(1) ought to be for wilful attempt to evade or pay tax. On literal construction of the first proviso, the prosecution initiated before the date of receipt of the application under section 245C is saved, and the second proviso restrict the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from the prosecution as specified therein.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid provisions do not, in any manner, affect the basic principles of criminal law that the prosecution has to prove the case on its own. In the facts, for an offence under section 276C(1), for which a prosecution was lodged, wilful attempt to evade tax or penalty, which may be imposable or chargeable, mens rea of the Assessee is required to be proved. In absence, lodging such prosecution would result into futility.

Therefore, the ancillary question which arises is about the efficacy of the continuation of the complaint lodged, even though saved under the first proviso to Section 245H, hampering the power of the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from prosecution.

The Supreme Court, perusing the backdrop, from the recommendations of Wanchoo Committee till the date amendment was brought introducing Section 245H in the IT Act granting power of immunity to Settlement Commission, noted that the Revenue was facing the challenge of minimal prosecution and also for effectively proving the prosecution, what recourse ought to be taken was an issue before them. Simultaneously, the Assessee who in bona-fide manner had disclosed the excess earning specifying the source without any suppression, were facing unnecessary prosecution. Therefore, to streamline the said situation the revenue has issued guidelines time and again. In the guidelines, it was specified that when an Assessee is making an attempt to evade tax or its payment or penalty, if established, it is incumbent on the officers of the revenue to lodge the prosecution. In this regard, circular dated 24.04.2008 was published. Clause 3.3.1 (iii) of the said circular deals with the offences under section 276C(1) of IT Act. The relevant Clause of the said circular is reproduced as under:

“(iii) Offences Under Section 276C(1): Wilful attempt to evade taxes

All cases where penalty under Section 271(1)(C) exceeding ₹50,000/- is imposed and confirmed by the ITAT (if any second appeal has been filed) shall be processed for filing prosecution complaint.

The case for prosecution under this Section shall be processed by the A.O. preferably within 60 days of receipt of the ITAT’s order, if any.

The intent of the above scheme is indicative of the fact that the Department shall proceed to file prosecution/complaint only in those cases wherein penalty exceeding ₹50,000/- has been imposed by ITAT, within 60 days from the date of order of ITAT.”

The Supreme Court noted that the said guideline was based on a judgment of ‘M/s. K.C. Builders Ltd. vs. CIT (2004) 2 SCC 731, wherein the Supreme Court laid down that if penalty for concealment fails, the initiation of the prosecution on the basis of the same material also fails. Therefore, it was advised that after confirmation of concealment of penalty by ITAT, the prosecution may be lodged in terms as specified in the above circular dated 24.04.2008.

Similarly, on 09.09.2019, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (in short “CBDT”) in exercise of power under Section 119 of IT Act issued clarification qua the criteria to be followed for launching prosecution in respect of certain categories of offence under the IT Act, including Section 276C(1). The relevant portion is referred as under-

“iii. Offences Under Section 276C(1): Wilful attempt to evade tax, etc.

Cases where the amount sought to be evaded or tax on under-reported income is ₹25 Lakhs or below, shall not be processed for prosecution except with the previous administrative approval of the Collegium of two CCIT / DGIT rank officers as mentioned in Para 3.

Further, prosecution under this Section shall be launched only after the confirmation of the order imposing penalty by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.”

The Supreme Court noted that the departmental circular dated 24.04.2008, Prosecution Manual, 2009, and CBDT’s circular dated 09.09.2019, provide when the prosecution ought to be lodged by Revenue. The said Circulars have been issued to regulate the lodging of prosecution in genuine cases and to weed out the problems of the tax payers, and also to understand when can the prosecution for Section 276 ought to be lodged and continued. The said circular and clarification have been brought after the statutory scheme of Section 245H(1) and the appended proviso.

The Supreme Court noting the precedents, observed that the Supreme Court has unambiguously held that that the circulars issued by the Revenue are binding on the authorities, and can tone down the rigour of the statutory provision. Therefore, it could be concluded that the circulars as discussed above are binding on the authorities who are administering the provisions of the IT Act.

The Supreme Court, after perusal of the provisions of the IT Act, various circulars issued by the department and also the judgments referred hereinabove, held that if an Assessee has made suppression of income without disclosing the manner in which the excess amount was earned and concealed the account making wilful attempt to evade the tax which may be imposable and chargeable or payable, he/she is required to be prosecuted. Therefore, the recourse to lodge prosecution was made permissible subject to the department’s circular dated 24.04.2008 which provided for confirmation by ITAT in case the penalty imposed under Section 276C(1) is exceeding ₹50,000/-. The Supreme Court noted that the said circular was in vogue on the date of the grant of sanction by PDIT to DDIT for lodging the prosecution against the Appellant. The said circular has been reaffirmed by the Prosecution Manual, 2009 and the clarification issued by the CBDT in 2019. As such, the circulars discussed above, were binding on the authorities and required to be adhered to while lodging the prosecution by the Revenue.

Admittedly, in the present case, the complaint was filed by DDIT after sanction of PDIT before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.II), Egmore, Chennai, on 11.08.2018. Application under section 245(C) was filed by the Appellant before the Settlement Commission later. On the date of lodging the prosecution, the finding of concealment of income or imposition of the penalty of more than ₹50,000/- has not been recorded by the ITAT. Nothing had been brought on record to show that any wilful attempt to evade the payment of tax by Assessee was made. No explanation had been put forth by Revenue to demonstrate as to why PDIT or DDIT did not comply the procedure while lodging prosecution in this case. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the act of the authority in continuing prosecution was in blatant disregard to their own binding circular dated 24.04.2008 and in defiance to the guidelines of the Department.

In contradistinction, the Settlement Commission passed an order under section 245D(4) on 26.11.2019. The said order is relevant, therefore, reproduced as thus:

“XX XX XX XX

PRAYER:

Immunity from penalty and prosecution

6.1 The applicant has prayed for grant of immunity from levy of penalty and prosecution. It could be seen that proceedings Under Section 276C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 are pending before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras. In the circumstances, the applicant cannot be granted immunity waiver from prosecution, for the assessment years which are settled in this order.

6.2 However, the applicant has co-operated during the settlement proceedings. The applicant has disclosed all the facts, material to the computation of his additional income. Thus, the applicant has fully satisfied the provisions of Section 245H. The overall additional income is not on account of any suppression of any material facts in the application. The additional income offered does not disclose any variance from the manner in which the additional income had been earned. Hence, the applicant is entitled to immunity from penalties under the Income-tax Act for the assessment years which are settled in this order.

6.3 Immunity granted to the applicant by this order may be withdrawn, if he fails to pay including interest within the time and the manner as specified in this order or fails to comply with other conditions, if any, subject to which the immunity is granted and, thereupon, the provisions of the Income-tax Act shall apply as if such immunity had not been granted.

6.4 Immunity granted to the applicant, may at any time be withdrawn, if the Commission is satisfied that the applicant had, in the course of settlement proceedings, concealed any particulars, material to the settlement or had given false evidence and, thereupon, the applicant may be tried for the offence with respect to which the immunity was granted or for any other offence of which the applicant appear to have been guilty in connection with the settlement, and the applicant shall become liable to the imposition of any penalty and/or prosecution under the Act, to which the applicant would have been liable had not such immunity been granted.

7. The order shall be void Under Section 245D(6) if it is subsequently found that it has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation of facts.

XX XX XX XX”

According to the Supreme Court, perusal of the said order made it clear that in the settlement proceedings, Assessee had disclosed all the facts material to the computation of his additional income and fully satisfied the provisions of Section 245H. The Commission recorded a finding that overall additional income is not on account of any suppression of any material facts and it does not disclose any variance from the manner in which the said income had been earned. As such the immunity from penalty under IT Act was granted in exercise of powers under Section 245H. From perusal of Section 245-I, it was clear that every order of settlement shall be conclusive as to the matters stated therein and no matter covered by such order shall, save as otherwise provided, be reopened in any proceeding under the Act or under any other law for the time being in force.

In view of the foregoing discussions, in conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution lodged with the help of proviso to Sub-section (1) to Section 245H was in defiance to the circular dated 24.04.2008, which was in vogue. It was the duty of the PDIT and DDIT to look into the facts that in absence of any findings of imposition of penalty due to concealment of fact, the said prosecution could not be proved against the Assessee. It seems, even after passing the order by the Settlement Commission on 26.11.2019 which was brought to the notice of the High Court, the authorities were persistent to pursue the prosecution without looking into the procedural lapses on their part. Such an act could not be construed in right perspective and the Revenue have acted in blatant disregard to binding statutory instructions. Such willful non-compliance of their own directives reflected a serious lapse, and undermined the principles of fairness, consistency, and accountability, which in any manner cannot be treated to be justified or lawful.

The Supreme Court reiterated that, in terms of Section 245-I, the findings of the Settlement Commission were conclusive with respect to the matters stated therein. Once such an order was passed, it was incumbent upon the authorities to inform the High Court that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law, in particular when the Settlement Commission did not record any finding of wilful evasion of tax by the Appellant. Even otherwise, it was the duty of the High Court to examine the facts of the case in their right context and assess whether, in light of the above circumstances, the continuation of the prosecution would serve any meaningful purpose in establishing the alleged guilt. Upon a holistic consideration of the matter, the Supreme Court was of the view that the conduct of the authorities lacked fairness and reasonableness, and the High Court’s approach appeared to be entirely misdirected, having failed to appreciate the factual and legal position in right earnest.

In view of the foregoing discussions, the Supreme Court was constrained to allow these appeals setting aside the order impugned passed by the High Court. It was directed that prosecution lodged by the Revenue against the Appellant shall stand quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, the Supreme Court imposed costs against the Revenue which was quantified at ₹2,00,000/- payable to the Appellant.

Article 13 and Article 24 of India – Singapore DTAA – in terms of the erstwhile Article 13(4), capital gains on shares acquired prior to 01 April 2017 are taxable only in Singapore and Article 24(1) i.e. Limitation of Relief, cannot be invoked if India does not have taxing right over such capital gains.

8. [2025] 174 taxmann.com 1244 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Prashant Kothari vs. Intl Tax Ward

IT Appeal Nos. 5391/Mum/2024

A.Y.: 2016-17 Dated: 29.05.2025

Article 13 and Article 24 of India – Singapore DTAA – in terms of the erstwhile Article 13(4), capital gains on shares acquired prior to 01 April 2017 are taxable only in Singapore and Article 24(1) i.e. Limitation of Relief, cannot be invoked if India does not have taxing right over such capital gains.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of Singapore, had earned capital gains from transfer of listed and unlisted shares which he had acquired before 01.04.2017. As per the computation, the Assessee had both losses and gains from such transfer. In respect of gains, the Assessee contented that in terms of Article 13(4) of the DTAA, such gains were taxable only in Singapore and in respect of loss, he had carried forward such losses under the Act.

The AO invoked the provisions of Article 24(1) of the DTAA dealing with limitation of relief, to contend that Assessee is entitled to treaty benefit, only if such gains are subject to tax in Singapore. The AO asserted that the Assessee failed to establish that his global income is taxable in Singapore. The AO distinguished the rulings on Article 24 by noting that the rulings were not rendered in the context of shares, and status of those Assessees was not that of individuals. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO and dismissed the appeal.

Aggrieved by the order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

Under the erstwhile Article 13(4) (as applicable to the relevant year), the gains from transfer of shares were taxable only in Singapore. Even under the amended DTAA (vide notification dated 23.03.2017), gains from the transfer of shares that were acquired on or before 01.04.2017 continued to be taxable exclusively in Singapore.

Article 24(1) provides for two cumulative conditions: if (i) income derived from a contracting state is either exempt or taxed at lower rate under the treaty; and (ii) such income is subject to tax in other contracting state only to the extent of remittance or receipt and not on the basis of accrual, then such exemption or reduced taxation must be limited to the remittance or receipt.

Article 13(4) did not provide for any exemption from taxation on capital gains. Rather, it provided the right of taxation to residence state. Article 24(1) could be invoked only with respect to exemption provision.

With respect to the second condition, the coordinate bench in Citicorp Investment Bank (Singapore) [(2017) 81 taxmann.com 368 (Mumbai – Trib.)] and APL Co. Pte Ltd v. ADIT [(2017) 185 TTJ 305 (Mumbai)], later affirmed by the Bombay High Court [457 ITR 203 (Bombay)], held that Article 24(1) is not applicable if the income was taxable in Singapore on accrual basis.

The ITAT noted that the above rulings did not deal with the aspect of income taxable in Singapore on a remittance basis. In the absence of information regarding the manner of taxation of such capital gains in Singapore, the ITAT was constrained from commenting on the satisfaction of the second condition of Article 24(1).

The ITAT affirmed that to invoke Article 24(1), twin conditions must be satisfied cumulatively. Since the first condition was not satisfied, the ITAT held that Article 24(1) is not taxable and the capital gains are taxable only in Singapore.

As regards set off of losses computed by the AO, the ITAT followed the decision of the coordinate bench ruling in Matrix Partners India Investment Holdings, LLC vs. DCIT (ITA No. 3097/Mum/2023) (Mumbai -Tribunal) to hold that gains need to be computed for each source of income separately and assessee is entitled to carry forward the loss without setting off against the gains exempt under Article 13(4) DTAA.

Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA – Where supply of drawings and designs is inextricably linked to sale of equipment, consideration received towards drawings and designs cannot constitute FTS

7. [2025] 173 taxmann.com 403 (Delhi – Trib.)

SMS Siemag AG vs. ADIT

IT Appeal Nos. 5580/Del/2011 and 2144/Del/2012

A.Y.: 2007-08 to 2016-17 Dated: 09.04.2025

Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA – Where supply of drawings and designs is inextricably linked to sale of equipment, consideration received towards drawings and designs cannot constitute FTS

FACTS

The Assessee is a tax resident of Germany, engaged in the business of supplying equipment, design, and drawings, and providing services to the metallurgical sector. During AY 2008-09, the Assessee had receipts of ₹ 41 lakhs from Indian companies towards supervisory activities and drawings, which were unconnected with supply of equipment. The Assessee offered these receipts as FTS. Apart from these, the Assessee had also received certain amounts towards offshore supply of drawings and designs.

The AO considered the receipts towards offshore supply of drawings and designs as FTS and assessed the aggregate income at ₹176 crores. The DRP upheld the assessment order.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT. The Group companies also filed similar appeals. Appeal of the Assessee was taken as the lead matter.

HELD

The Tribunal relied on the coordinate bench ruling in Assesses’ own case for AY 2005-06 and SMS Concast AG vs. DDIT [2023] 153 taxmann.com 718 (Delhi – Trib.) and held as follows.

  • The Assessee had supplied drawing and designs from outside India and had also received the consideration outside India. Supply of drawings and designs were inextricably linked to sale of plant and equipment and both drawings and designs and equipment formed part of a single project undertaken for the customer.
  • The schedule of drawings and documentation also indicated that the drawings were specifically related to supply of equipment.
  • Even if the contracts for drawings and the supply of equipment were entered into separately, they cannot be read in isolation.
  • In case of delay in supply of equipment beyond the stipulated time, the purchaser had the right to terminate not only the equipment contract but also the contract for drawings. This demonstrated that the supply of drawings was an integral part of supply of equipment.
  • When the link between supply and services is strong, the payment for services cannot be regarded as FTS under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

Accordingly, ITAT held that receipt of drawings that are interlinked with supply of equipment cannot be regarded as separately chargeable as FTS, either under the Act or under DTAA.

Unsecured Loans – Genuineness and Creditworthiness – AO issued notices u/s 133(6) to only part of the lenders – No summons issued u/s 131 – No incriminating material brought on record – Addition deleted to extent of loans repaid, balance remanded for verification

45. [2025] 123 ITR(T) 660 (Nagpur – Trib.)

Ravindra Madanlal Khandelwal vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax

ITA NO.: 375/NAG/2024

A.Y.: 2018-19 DATE: 18.11.2024

Section 68, 36(1)(iii)

Unsecured Loans – Genuineness and Creditworthiness – AO issued notices u/s 133(6) to only part of the lenders – No summons issued u/s 131 – No incriminating material brought on record – Addition deleted to extent of loans repaid, balance remanded for verification

FACTS I

During the scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer noted that the assessee was in receipt of new unsecured loans from various individuals and entities and sought to verify the genuineness, creditworthiness, and identity of the creditors from whom these loans were reportedly received.

In response to notices under section 142(1), the assessee submitted list of lenders, their PAN, address, ledger confirmation of most of the debtors, interest payment details, details of TDS deducted on interest and the TDS returns of the assessee but they were unable to submit the return of income and bank statements of the lenders. The Assessing Officer had also issued notices u/s 133(6) to various parties.

However, as the Assessing Officer could not verify the creditworthiness of the lenders in the absence of the income tax return and bank statements, the Assessing Officer made addition under section 68.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the addition made by the Assessing Officer holding that the assessee had failed to provide complete and satisfactory documentation that could establish the transactions concerning all creditors and assessee also failed to comply with the notices issued by the Assessing Officer.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD I

The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer, out of total 43 lenders, issued notices under section 133(6) only to 10 lenders out of which 4 lenders confirmed the transaction, while 6 lenders did not respond. The Assessing Officer erred in drawing negative inference based on non-response from few parties. The Assessing Officer had the powers to issue summons under section 131 and enforce attendance of the lenders. However, the said exercise was also not conducted by the Assessing Officer.

Further, Tribunal observed that no enquiry was made by the Assessing Officer by issuing summons and no incriminating evidences were brought on record to dislodge the materials relied upon by the assessee to prove the ingredients of section 68.

The Tribunal deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer on account of cash credit to the extent of repayment of loans made by the assessee either in the same year or succeeding years. And further directed the Assessing Officer to verify Identity, Genuineness and creditworthiness of the lenders for the balance loans.

Interest on Borrowed Funds – Advances to Related Concern – Commercial Expediency Established – No evidence of diversion for non-business purposes – Entire disallowance deleted

FACTS II

The assessee had borrowed funds in his individual capacity and advanced them to a related concern, in which he was both a director and shareholder. The assessee had claimed deduction on account of interest of ₹ 74,32,292 on borrowed funds in his individual capacity. The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee failed to provide adequate documentation to prove that the interest expenses were incurred solely for the purpose of business and the linkage between the borrowed funds and their utilization in business activities was not substantiated satisfactorily and held that the interest expenses might not have been wholly for the purpose of business and for the reasons, the addition was made to the total income of the assessee.

Further, the Assessing Officer observed that the assessee claimed another interest expenses of ₹ 97,66,208 which were asserted to be incurred for earning income from other sources, but were not recorded in the Profit & Loss Account of the business. The Assessing Officer disallowed this expenditure on the grounds that the expenditure claimed was not reflected in the Profit & Loss Account.

The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that the borrowed funds were used for non-business purposes, and the Assessing Officer’s decision to disallow the interest expenses was upheld, as the assessee did not meet the burden of proof required to establish that these expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD II

The Tribunal observed that the explanation provided by the assessee was that the company, being a private limited entity, could not borrow directly from outsiders except from banks/financial institutions as per the Companies Act. Therefore, for business exigencies, the assessee arranged funds personally and transferred them to the company.
The Assessing Officer’s sole objection was non-charging of interest on the advances, and he treated the interest paid on the borrowings as personal expenditure.

The Tribunal held that the borrowed funds were advanced to a related concern, and there is a clear nexus with potential income. The transaction was driven by commercial expediency and the assessee acted to support a business concern in which he had a substantial interest. Further, held that the Assessing Officer brought no evidence of diversion of funds for non-business or personal purposes.

Therefore, the interest expenditure of ₹ 74,32,292 was allowable in full and disallowance was deleted by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal observed that with respect to interest expense of ₹ 97,66,208, the Assessing Officer failed to demonstrate any nexus between borrowed funds and non-business use and the disallowance was based on general statements without specifics. Further, the CIT(A) upheld the order without addressing the assessee’s detailed explanations or analysing fund flow.

The Tribunal held that interest on borrowed capital is allowable if the funds are used for the purposes of the business; the burden is on the Assessing Officer to prove diversion for non-business purposes if he seeks to disallow. In the present case, the AO’s approach of straightaway disallowing the entire claim without pinpointing specific instances of diversion was contrary to settled principles.

Therefore, the entire disallowance of ₹ 97,66,208 was deleted by Tribunal.

Reassessment – Jurisdiction to make additions – No addition made on the issue for which case was reopened – Other additions not sustainable – Reassessment invalid

44. [2025] 124 ITR(T) 410 (Jaipur – Trib.)
Kailash Chand vs. ITO
ITA NO.: 565/JP/2024
A.Y.: 2012-13 DATE: 10.03.2025
Sections: 147 r.w.s. 144

Reassessment – Jurisdiction to make additions – No addition made on the issue for which case was reopened – Other additions not sustainable – Reassessment invalid

FACTS

The assessee was engaged in the business of plying of trucks on hire. He had not filed his return of income for the year under consideration.

The revenue was in possession of the information that the assessee had deposited a sum of ₹ 42.46 lakhs during the financial year 2011-12 in his saving bank account. In the absence of return of income, the above transaction was considered as not verifiable and accordingly, notice under section 148 was issued upon the assessee.

The assessee made part compliance and submitted the copy of balance sheet and profit and loss account. Thereafter despite various opportunities provided, the assessee remained non-compliant and the Assessing Officer went on making the addition on account of depreciation, interest on loan etc. which were based on the profit and loss account and balance sheet filed by the assessee and the Assessing Officer had abstained from making any addition on account of cash deposited to the saving bank account as alleged in the reasons recorded for re-opening of the case.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the reason recorded for reopening was the alleged unexplained cash deposits of ₹ 42.46 lakhs and no addition was made on this issue in the reassessment order.

In such circumstances, the AO loses jurisdiction to assess other income which comes to his notice during reassessment proceedings. Once the Assessing Officer is satisfied with the reasons recorded for reopening the case, they no longer have the jurisdiction to tax any other income.

Placing reliance on CIT vs. Shri Ram Singh [2008] 306 ITR 343 (Rajasthan High Court), CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd. [2010] 195 Taxman 117 (Bombay High Court), Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT [2011] 12 taxmann.com 74 (Delhi High Court), the Tribunal held that the settled legal position is “If no addition is made in respect of the issue for which the assessment is reopened, the AO has no jurisdiction to assess any other income in reassessment proceedings.”

In the result, the appeal by the assessee was allowed.

Mere existence of any object allowing the charity to carry out activity outside India will not enable CIT(E) to deny registration under section 12AB.

43. (2025) 176 taxmann.com 561 (Mum Trib)

TIH Foundation for IOT and IOE vs. CIT

ITA No.: 2904/Mum/2025

A.Y.: 2025-26 Dated: 10.07.2025

Section: 12AB

Mere existence of any object allowing the charity to carry out activity outside India will not enable CIT(E) to deny registration under section 12AB.

FACTS

The assessee was a not-for-profit company incorporated under section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013, established pursuant to the directions of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India, and hosted by IIT Bombay. It was granted registration under section 12AB for A.Y. 2021-22 to A.Y. 2025-26. It applied for renewal of registration under section 12AB.

CIT(E) rejected the application for registration for the reason that there was a possibility of future endeavour by the assessee which would require expenditure outside India which would be in violation of section 11.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) The only basis for rejection of registration by CIT(E) was the possibility of the assessee incurring expenditure outside India in furtherance of its objects, which, according to him, contravened section 11. However, such reasoning did not find support either in the statutory scheme of section 12AB or in judicial precedents.

(b) In the present case, the assessee had neither undertaken any impermissible application of income nor had CIT(E) brought on record any specific violation of conditions prescribed under Section 12AB(1)(b) or Explanation to Section 12AB(4). The objects of the assessee were in line with the mission of the Central Government under the NM-ICPS initiative, and the activities were genuine and aimed at technological development in public interest.

Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee and directed the CIT(E) to grant registration to the assessee under section 12AB.

Amendment in section 11(3)(c) vide Finance Act 2022 omitting extra period of one year following the expiry of the period of accumulation of five years applies prospectively in respect of fresh accumulations under section 11(2) made from assessment year 2023-24 onwards and not to earlier years.

42. (2025) 176 taxmann.com 661 (Mum Trib)

Dadar Digamber Jain Mumukshu Mandal vs. CIT

ITA No.: 2446/Mum/2025

A.Y.: 2023-24 Dated: 15.07.2025

Section: 11

Amendment in section 11(3)(c) vide Finance Act 2022 omitting extra period of one year following the expiry of the period of accumulation of five years applies prospectively in respect of fresh accumulations under section 11(2) made from assessment year 2023-24 onwards and not to earlier years.

FACTS

The assessee trust filed its original return of income, declaring total income of ₹14,37,197. The return was processed under section 143(1) making an adjustment of ₹ 75,66,540 being additions under section 11(3) on account of unutilised set aside / accumulated funds under section 11(2) relating to FY 2016-17 (₹ 35,66,540) and FY 2017-18 (₹ 40,00,000).

Aggrieved, the assessee went in appeal before CIT(A), who upheld the additions.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed as follows:

(a) Under the un-amended section 11(3) (as it stood before Finance Act, 2022), the assessee gets an extended period of one more year, in total, six years for utilisation of accumulated income and on expiry of the said period, by virtue of the deeming fiction, the unutilised accumulated income shall be brought to tax in the previous year following the expiry of period of six years.

(b) The Finance Act, 2022 has amended and omitted the extra period of one year following the expiry of the initial period of accumulation of five years. Therefore, unlike under the un-amended provisions wherein the income which is not utilised for the purposes it was accumulated can be brought to tax on the expiry of the sixth year, under the amended law, that income can be brought to tax on the expiry of five years itself.

(c) Considering both language as well as the intent, the amendment which has been brought in by the Finance Act, 2022 relates to accumulation of income pertaining to previous year starting from 1st April, 2022 onwards relevant to AY. 2023-24 and subsequent assessment years and in that sense, has to be applied prospectively in respect of fresh accumulations and not in respect of existing accumulations which continue to remain guided by the erstwhile provisions at the relevant point in time when the accumulations were made in the respective financial years.

(d) As far as the accumulation relating to the period of FYs. 2016-17 and 2017-18 are concerned, the assessee had the time window till 31-03-2023 and 31-03-2024 respectively by which it has to utilize accumulated income and in that view of the matter, the amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2022 does not debar the assessee from availing the said time window in respect of existing accumulations and the amendment has to be read prospectively in respect of fresh accumulations for the period pertaining to previous year starting from 1st April, 2022 onwards.

The Tribunal also noted that a similar view has been taken by a number of benches of the Tribunal.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that –

(i) for accumulation relating to FY 2016-17, since the assessee had utilised the r 35,66,450 during FY 2022-23, that is, within stipulated period of 6 years, the addition deserves to be deleted.

(ii) for accumulation relating to FY 2017-18, the assessee had time window to utilise the accumulated income till 31.3.2024 under the un-amended law and thus, the question of bringing the same to tax during AY 2023-24 did not arise.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Best judgment assessment made by the AO under section 144 cannot be substituted by the judgment of CIT exercising revisionary powers under section 263.

41. (2025) 176 taxmann.com 819 (Mum Trib)

Bhagwan Vardhman Shwetamber Murtipujak Tapagacch Jain Sangh vs. CIT

ITA No.: 2378/Mum/2024

A.Y.: 2012-13 Dated: 23.07.2025

Sections: 144,263

Best judgment assessment made by the AO under section 144 cannot be substituted by the judgment of CIT exercising revisionary powers under section 263.

FACTS

The assessee was not registered under section 12A. It filed its return of income. The return was selected for scrutiny assessment and accordingly, notices were issued and served upon the assessee. None attended the proceedings and the AO framed the order ex-parte to the best of his judgment under section 144. In the order, the AO allowed corpus expenditure of ₹ 10,97,699 against the corpus donation of ₹ 38,42,558 received during the year and treated the balance of ₹ 27,44,859/- as income of the assessee.

Invoking revisionary powers under section 263, CIT held that AO did not make any enquiry and because of which the expenditure claimed by the assessee was allowed and only the balance corpus was assessed to tax, and therefore, the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT against the order under section 263.

HELD

Following the decision of the coordinate bench in Sanjay Umarshi Dand vs. Pr. CIT [IT Appeal No. 321(Nag.) of 2024, dated 10-2-2025), the Tribunal held that since the assessment order was an ex-parte order under section 144 by which the AO assessed income of the assessee to the best of his judgement, the judgement of the AO cannot be substituted with the judgement of the CIT(E) by invoking revisionary powers under section 263.

Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee, set aside the order of the CIT and restored the order of the AO.

Claim of capitalized interest, supported by evidence, which interest has been disallowed while computing capital gains, cannot be subject matter of levy of penalty under section 270A, in view of the ratio of decision of the Apex Court in Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. [189 Taxmann 322 (SC)]

40. Urmila Rajendra Mundra vs. ITO

ITA No. 577/Jp./2025

A.Y.: 2022-23 Date of Order: 1.8.2025

Section: 270A

Claim of capitalized interest, supported by evidence, which interest has been disallowed while computing capital gains, cannot be subject matter of levy of penalty under section 270A, in view of the ratio of decision of the Apex Court in Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. [189 Taxmann 322 (SC)]

FACTS

The assessee claimed deduction of interest, which was capitalised, while computing capital gains arising on sale of immovable property. While assessing total income, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the interest which was capitalised by the assessee, though the same was backed by documentary evidence. The assessee did not prefer an appeal against this disallowance.

Subsequently, the AO initiated proceedings for levy of penalty under section 270A for under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting thereof. In response, the assessee submitted that the claim of interest was supported by copies of bank statements and since there was not much tax outflow due to brought forward losses, the assessee chose not to file an appeal. Also, the notice did not specify how the assessee has misreported the income.

The AO held that the assessee has misreported income of ₹ 4,89,159 and levied a penalty of ₹ 2,03,488 thereon being 200% of the tax on misreported income.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the assessee, in the course of assessment proceedings, had substantiated the amount of interest by submitting bank statements in respect of borrowings made. The Tribunal held the contention of the AO and the CIT(A) that the claim was not backed by evidence to be devoid of merit. The Tribunal held that mere non-acceptance of the claim made by the assessee cannot be a reason to automatically levy penalty for misreporting or even under-reporting of income. It stated that this view is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts Ltd. [189 Taxman 322 (SC)]. In view of this decision of the Apex Court, the Tribunal held that it did not see any reason to sustain the penalty imposed.

Also, the bench noticed that the notice issued did not specify whether the assessee has misreported income or has under-reported the same. Due to this lapse on the part of the AO, it held, the penalty cannot be sustained without specifying the charge against the assessee. This view was supported by the ratio of the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of G R Infraprojects Ltd. vs. ACIT [159 taxmann.com 80].

In view of the decisions relied upon and also in view of the facts of the case being similar to those before the courts in the said decisions, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the penalty levied.

Where the Assessing Officer in the assessment proceedings did not make any enquiry as to whether the equipment received by the assessee free of cost from its holding / subsidiary companies was received on returnable basis or otherwise, the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. If, in the set aside proceedings, the assessee satisfies the AO by substantiating based on the documents that the equipments were received on returnable basis then the AO will decide the issue on hand in the light of the order of the Tribunal in the case of Sony India Software Center Private Limited [170 taxmann.com 309 (Bang.-Trib.)]

39. LSI India Research & Development Pvt Ltd. vs. PCIT

ITA No. 1061/Bang./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of Order: 23.7.2025

Sections: 28(iv), 263

Where the Assessing Officer in the assessment proceedings did not make any enquiry as to whether the equipment received by the assessee free of cost from its holding / subsidiary companies was received on returnable basis or otherwise, the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

If, in the set aside proceedings, the assessee satisfies the AO by substantiating based on the documents that the equipments were received on returnable basis then the AO will decide the issue on hand in the light of the order of the Tribunal in the case of Sony India Software Center Private Limited [170 taxmann.com 309 (Bang.-Trib.)]

FACTS

The assessee preferred an appeal against the order passed by PCIT under section 263 of the Act holding the assessment framed under section 143(3) r.w.s 144(3) and 144B of the Act to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and further directing the Assessing Officer (AO) to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law.

The assessee, during the year under consideration, received capital assets amounting to ₹ 42,89,70,248 on free of cost / loan basis from holding / subsidiary companies. According to the PCIT, these fixed assets represented income of the assessee chargeable to tax under section 28(iv) of the Act. However, the assessee, in its return of income filed under section 139(1), had not offered the same for taxation. Similarly, the assessment had been framed without any enquiry so as to offer such equipment received free of cost as income under section 28(iv) of the Act. PCIT, in his show cause notice, proposed to hold the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

In response to the show cause notice, the assessee submitted that the equipments were acquired for limited purpose of testing the software development. Further, these equipments were received on returnable basis and were for the benefit of recipient / customer and not for the assessee. Accordingly, it was submitted that these equipments cannot be treated as benefit / perquisite under section 28(iv) of the Act.

The PCIT, in his order under section 263 of the Act, observed that the assessee company has been provided with customized / specific assets (primarily in the nature of testing equipment) by the relevant group companies. From the submission the usable period of these assets is not clear. These assets, if used for more than one year, should be treated as capital assets. He also observed that it is not clear as to when these assets were returned to the group companies / disposed. Hence, these should be considered as benefit / perquisite arising out of business / profession. He held the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and directed the AO to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law after examining the aforementioned facts. He directed the AO to conduct necessary enquiries and verification and give the assessee an opportunity to substantiate his claim with necessary supportive evidence and explain why the proposed addition / disallowance should not be made. He shall make a fresh assessment in accordance with law and CBDT instructions on the subject.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where relying on the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Sony India Software Center Private Limited [170 taxmann.com 309 (Bang.-Trib.)], it was contended that since these equipments were received on returnable basis the provisions of section 28(iv) of the Act are not applicable. Without prejudice it was submitted that the direction given by PCIT be modified to the extent that if the assessee substantiates that these equipments were received on returnable basis on production of documentary evidence then the same cannot be treated as a benefit / perquisite taxable under section 28(iv) of the Act.

The Revenue contended that since the assessee has not produced any evidence suggesting that the equipments were received on returnable basis the principles laid down by the Tribunal in Sony India Software Center Private Limited (supra) are not attracted.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the issue on hand is limited to the extent whether the equipments were received by the assessee on returnable basis and, therefore the same cannot be made subject to the addition under section 28(iv) of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment order has been held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue since no enquiry was made by the AO during the assessment proceedings qua receipt of equipment free of cost. Even before the PCIT the assessee could not demonstrate that the equipments have been received on returnable basis. The Tribunal further noted that the PCIT has not given any direction to the AO for making addition of r 42,89,70,248 representing the equipment received on free of cost basis meaning thereby the assessee has been granted a fresh opportunity to substantiate that the equipments were received on returnable basis. The Tribunal held that there is no infirmity in the direction given by the PCIT.

The Tribunal also held that if the assessee satisfies the AO by substantiating based on the documents that the equipments were received on returnable basis then the AO will decide the issue on hand in the light of the order of the Tribunal in the case of Sony India Software Center Private Limited (supra).

Subject to assessee bringing on record the relevant evidence of the amount of tax deducted at source and deposited with the Government, the assessee cannot be denied her lawful right by restricting the TDS credit to the amount reflected in Form 26AS.

38. Sonali Dhawan vs. ITO, International Tax

ITA No. 3748/Mum./2025

A.Y.: 2023-24

Date of Order: 5.8.2025

Section: 143(1), Rule 37BA

Subject to assessee bringing on record the relevant evidence of the amount of tax deducted at source and deposited with the Government, the assessee cannot be denied her lawful right by restricting the TDS credit to the amount reflected in Form 26AS.

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee sold a house property for a consideration of ₹ 2,76,20,500 from which the buyer deducted ₹ 48,00,000 as TDS. The fact of deduction of TDS as well as its deposit with the Government were recorded in the Sale Deed itself.

The assessee filed her return of income wherein she reflected the amount of capital gain arising on sale of house property and also credit claim of TDS. However, while processing the return of income, CPC accepted the return of income but did not grant TDS credit of ₹ 47,99,525 out of ₹ 48,00,000 claimed by the assessee in her return of income. The reason for denial of credit was stated by CPC to be mismatch between the amount claimed and that reflected in Form 26AS. Form 26AS contained only partial amount of TDS and therefore assessee was denied credit of TDS claimed in the return of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who directed the AO to grant TDS credit as per relevant Form 26AS.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the assessee it was submitted that not only has tax been deducted at source but the same has also been deposited and these facts are evident from the sale deed itself. Further, as per provisions of section 143(1)(c) of the Act, so long as TDS is deducted even if it is not paid by the deductor, co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal have gone ahead and held that credit for TDS cannot be denied to the assessee and in support of this proposition reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Mukesh Padamchand Sogani vs. ACIT [ITA No. 29/PUN/2022; A.Y.: 2009-10; order dated 31.1.2023] and that mere fact that TDS is not reflected in Form 26AS for reasons unknown to the assessee and beyond the control of the assessee cannot be a basis for denial of TDS credit which has been duly deducted and deposited by the buyer.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that there could be varied technological or other reasons where the relevant data pertaining to the assessee doesn’t get reflected in Form 26AS at the relevant point in time. The CPC may have the limitation to look beyond what has been claimed by the assessee and reflected in IT system more particularly in Form 26AS. At the same time where an aggrieved assessee brings the relevant evidence on record as in the instant case, the assessee cannot be denied her lawful right in terms of credit of TDS where the same has been duly deducted and deposited subject to necessary verification. The Tribunal remarked that it has been informed that for the TDS on sale of property, the prescribed form is the tax payer receipt which contains the requisite particulars of tax deposited unlike Form 16/16A issued in other cases. In light of the same, the Tribunal directed the AO to verify the taxpayer receipt issued by Canara Bank dated 17.6.2022 for an amount of ₹ 48,00,000 as available in the assessee’s paper book and if the same is found in order allow the necessary credit of TDS amounting to ₹ 48,00,000 so claimed by the assessee in her return of income.

If books of accounts are not maintained, foundation of audit collapses and therefore penalty cannot be levied for not getting the accounts audited.

37. Bhaveshbhai Haribhai Kanani vs. ITO 
ITA No. 254/RJT/2025
A.Y.:  2018-19
Date of Order: 5.8.2025
Sections:  44AB, 271B

If books of accounts are not maintained, foundation of audit collapses and therefore penalty cannot be levied for not getting the accounts audited. 

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, engaged in the business of trading of brass scrap, filed his return of income declaring therein a turnover of ₹ 1,03,43,628 and offered net profit of ₹ 7,91,012 as his income. The income declared in the return on an admitted turnover worked out to 7.65%.  In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed a further turnover of ₹ 11,93,30,453 and that assessee had declared income under section 44AD as “no account case”, he issued a show cause notice as to why the provisions of section 44AB have not been complied with.

The AO estimated the income to be 4% of total turnover of ₹ 11,93,30,453 which worked out to ₹ 44,73,218.  After reducing from this amount, the profit of ₹ 7,91,012 offered in the return of income, the balance of ₹ 39,82,206 was added to the returned income.

Since the assessee had not furnished an audit report as required by the provisions of section 44AB of the Act, proceedings were initiated for levy of penalty under section 271B of the Act.  In response, the assessee submitted that default u/s 44AB of the Act was on account of mistake of accountant of assessee under wrong belief and mistake of accountant cannot put assessee to jeopardy.  The AO imposed penalty of ₹ 1,50,000 u/s 271B of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the assessee declared income under section 44AD of the Act.  As per scheme of section 44AD of the Act, the assessee was not required to maintain books of account.  The Tribunal held that since the assessee did not maintain books of accounts, no penalty should be imposed under section 271B.  The Tribunal noted that the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Bisauli Tractors [(2008) 299 ITR 219 (All.)] has held that when the assessee has not maintained books of accounts, the question of getting the books audited under section 44AB would not arise.  Therefore, penalty under section 271B would not be leviable.  The Tribunal noted that if no books are maintained, foundation of audit collapses and, hence penalty cannot be imposed.  It also noted that apart from this, during the assessment proceeding itself, the AO has estimated the income of the assessee, therefore, the penalty on estimation should not be levied.  It remarked that an order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty would not ordinarily be imposed, unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or guilty of conduct, contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard to obligation.  The penalty will not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so.  Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all relevant circumstances.  Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose a penalty will be justified in refusing to impose a penalty when there is technical or venial breach of the provision of the Act.  The Tribunal held that the assessee was not supposed to maintain books of accounts u/s 44AD of the Act, therefore, penalty under section 271B of the Act should not be imposed.  The Tribunal deleted the penalty of ₹ 1,50,000 imposed by the AO.

Appeal – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process – Appeals cannot proceed while the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, 2016, was in operation: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-13 Mumbai vs. Shirpur Gold Refinery Ltd,

ITA Nos. 729/2018, 798/2018 & 773/2018

Dated 23.07.2025

Appeal – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process – Appeals cannot proceed while the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, 2016, was in operation: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The Resolution Professional on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the Respondent Company was undergoing a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (for short “IBC, 2016”). Since the company was undergoing a CIRP, and there was a moratorium in effect/in force under Section 14 of the IBC, 2016, the above Appeals cannot proceed. In this regard, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6, New Delhi vs. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd [(2017) SCC Online DEL 12759]. He submitted that, the Delhi High Court had clearly held that during the period of moratorium, the Appeals filed by the Revenue before the High Court [against the orders of the ITAT], cannot proceed. He submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court was subjected to an Appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also, relying upon section 238 of the IBC, 2016, came to the conclusion that the Delhi High Court correctly decided the law and proceeded to dismiss the Special Leave Petition. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is reported in (2018) 18 SCC 786. He, therefore, submitted that the above Appeals cannot proceed.

On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue submitted that though it is correct that recovery proceedings could not be proceeded with against the Assessee because of the moratorium, the same would not preclude the completion of the assessment proceedings. Since the above Appeals are in relation to assessment proceedings and penalty proceedings, the Appeals can continue. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Revenue relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sundaresh Bhatt (Liquidator) of ABG Shipyard vs. Central Board of Indirect Tax and Customs [(2023) 1 SCC 472].

The Hon. Court observed that the present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited (supra). This decision of the Delhi High Court was subjected to challenge by the Revenue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded to dismiss the SLP by making the following observations: –

“1. Heard. Delay, if any, is condoned.

2. Given Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,2016, it is obvious that the code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income Tax Act. We may also refer in this connection to Dena Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co. and its progeny, making it clear that income tax dues, being in the nature of crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons.

3. We are of the view that the High Court of Delhi, is, therefore, correct in law. Accordingly, the special leave petitions are dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.” (emphasis supplied)

The Hon. Court observed that the above Appeals cannot proceed while the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, 2016, was in operation.

As regards the judgment relied upon by the learned advocate for the Revenue in the case of Sundaresh Bhatt (Liquidator) of ABG Shipyard (supra) the Hon. Court observed that the same is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. That decision was rendered under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and was in relation to completing assessment or reassessment of duties and other levies and not in relation to any Appeal being prosecuted before the High Court. Therefore, the reliance placed on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Sundaresh Bhatt (Liquidator) of ABG Shipyard (supra) was wholly misplaced.

The Court adjourned the Appeals sine die with liberty to the parties to mention the matter after any further orders were passed by the NCLT, namely, either approving a resolution plan in relation to the Assessee, or ordering that it be wound up. At that time, the Court will consider whether the above Appeals can proceed or otherwise.

Capital Gains – Personal effect – Vintage car owned by the Appellant was not his personal effect – the gain arising on sale thereof was liable to be taxed under the head ‘Capital Gains’

12. Narendra I. Bhuva vs. Assistant Commissioner

ITA 681/Mum/2003 dated 14.08.2025

AY: 1992-1993. (BOM)(HC)

Capital Gains – Personal effect – Vintage car owned by the Appellant was not his personal effect – the gain arising on sale thereof was liable to be taxed under the head ‘Capital Gains’

The Assessee was a salaried employee. The Assessee had income from house property, share income, dividend, etc. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noticed that the Assessee has purchased a vintage car namely “Ford Tourer” 1931 Model from one Mr. Jesraj Singh of Delhi sometime in the year 1983 for a consideration of ₹ 20,000/-. The said car was sold for a consideration of ₹ 21,00,000/- to one Mrs. Kamalaben Babubhai Patel. On a query made by the Assessing Officer, the Assessee by a communication dated 28 January 1994, apprised the Assessing Officer that the car was shown as a personal asset in Wealth-tax and same was an exempt asset. The Assessing Officer by an order dated 8 March 1994, added the sum of ₹ 20,80,000/- as income to the Assessee on account of sale of motor car as business income.

The Assessee filed an appeal. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT (A)] inter alia held that vintage cars are not generally used frequently as maintenance costs of these cars are very high. The car was shown as personal asset in wealth tax returns. The Assessee never claimed any depreciation in respect of the car. There was no need for purchase of foreign exchange for spare parts as the parts were locally fabricated. The CIT(A) set aside the addition of sum of ₹ 20,80,000/- under the head ‘profits from sale of car’.

Being aggrieved by the order, the Revenue preferred an Appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). The ITAT reversed the finding of CIT (A) and held that the vintage car was not used by the Assessee as personal effect. The order passed by the CIT (A) was set aside by the ITAT and the Appeal preferred by the Revenue was allowed.

On Appeal before Hon. High Court, the Assessee submitted that the ITAT was not justified in law in holding that the vintage car owned by the Assessee was not his personal asset and thus the gain arising on sale whereof was liable to be taxed under the head ‘capital gain’. It was further submitted that the ITAT has not disputed or controverted any of the basic facts or arguments of the Assessee that the car was being accepted as personal asset by the department itself and the maintenance expenses were debited to the capital account as part of personal withdrawals. It was also submitted that the finding recorded by the ITAT that no evidence has been adduced by the Assessee to show that the car was used as a personal asset is perverse. It was submitted that the finding that the car was not part of any car rally organized by the Government was irrelevant.

On the other hand, the Revenue supported the order passed by the ITAT and has submitted that the finding recorded by the ITAT does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference of the Court in exercise of powers under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (ITA). The Hon Court considered the provisions of Section 2(14) of the ITA, and observed that capital assets do not include personal effects, that is to say movable property including wearing apparel and furniture, but excluding jewellery held for personal use by the Assessee or any other member of his family dependent on him. Thus, the personal effects must be for personal use for being excluded from the definition of the term ‘capital assets.

The Hon. Court further considered a pari-materia provision namely Section 2(4A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in H.H. Maharaja Rana Hemant Singhji vs. CIT Rajasthan (1976) 103 ITR 61 (SC). The Supreme Court in the said decision dealt with the expression ‘personal effects and the relevant extract of the judgment reads as under:

7. The expression “personal use” occurring in clause (ii) of the above quoted provision is very significant. A close scrutiny of the context in which the expression occurs shows that only those effects can legitimately be said to be personal which pertain to the assessee’s person. In other words, an intimate connection between the effects and the person of the assessee must be shown to exist to render them “personal effects”.

Thus, the Hon Court observed that for treating a movable property as personal effects, an intimate connection between the effects and the person of the Assessee must be shown. In case before the Apex Court though the silver bars and silver coins were proved to be used for puja, the same was held to be not constituting personal use. It is also held that the expression ‘intended for personal or household use’ does not mean capable of being intended for personal or household use but it means normally or commonly intended for personal or household use. Thus, capability of a car for personal use would not ipso facto lead to automatic presumption that every car would be personal effects for being excluded from capital assets of the Assessee. Thus, before arriving at a finding with regard to personal effects, the evidence with regards to personal use is necessary.

The Hon. Court observed that the Assessee had failed to adduce any evidence with regard to the vintage car being put to personal use and therefore the ITAT had rightly reversed the order passed
by the CIT(A), which had applied irrelevant considerations of wealth tax returns and non-claiming of depreciation in respect of the car by the Assessee. The CIT(A) had failed to appreciate
that the said aspects were irreverent for deciding personal use of the car by the Assessee. The ITAT on the other hand concentrated only on the aspect of personal use of the car by the Assessee. The Hon. Court noted that it was not the case of the Assessee that the finding of fact recorded by the CIT(A) was perverse.

The Hon. Court further observed that none of the judgments relied upon by the Assessee are relevant for deciding the present Appeal which involves failure on the part of the Assessee to lead evidence to prove personal use of the vintage car. Therefore, what needed to be proved was that the car was used as a personal asset by the Assessee. It was therefore incumbent upon the Assessee to lead evidence to show that he actually used the car personally. It was an admitted position that the Assessee failed to adduce evidence to prove that the car was used personally by him. On the other hand, there were several indicators showing that the car was never used by the Assessee for personal use, such as (i) Assessee using company’s car for commute (ii) car not being used even occasionally by the Assessee (iii) vintage car not being parked at the Assessee’s residence (iv) Assessee’s inability to prove that he spent any amount on its maintenance for keeping the same in running condition and (v) a salaried employee purchasing a vintage car as pride of possession.

The Hon. Court noted that the failure to produce evidence to prove personal use appeared to be an admitted fact. The Appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Solicitor’s fees — Assessability as income — Amount received by solicitor from clients for certain specific task — Amount is received in fiduciary capacity — Amount is not assessable as income.

34. (2025) 475 ITR 473 (Cal):

CIT vs. Sanderson & Morgans:

A. Y. 2007-08: Date of order 7/2/2024:

S. 4 of ITA 1961

Solicitor’s fees — Assessability as income — Amount received by solicitor from clients for certain specific task — Amount is received in fiduciary capacity — Amount is not assessable as income.

The assessee was a solicitor. For the A. Y. 2007-08, in the return of income, the assessee had shown receipts from profession of ₹ 1,82,02,958. As per the certificate of tax deduction at source, the amount received was ₹ 5,56,88,817. The assessee was required to explain the difference of ₹ 3,74,85,859. The assessee explained that it had been receiving advances from its clients, a portion of which was spent on behalf of the client for counsel’s fees, stamp paper, court fees stamp, payment to rent controller, bank draft in lieu of stamp duty and registration fees, etc. The assessee also gave complete details of payment made head-wise. The Assessing Officer recognised that the money was spent by the assessee on behalf of its clients but added the differential amount of ₹ 3,74,85,859 to the income of the assessee.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the amount was not assessable as income of the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) When a solicitor receives money from his client, he does not do so as a trading receipt but he receives the money of the principal in his capacity as an agent and that also in a fiduciary capacity. The money so received does not have any profit-making quality about it when received. It remains money received by a solicitor as “client’s money” for being employed in the client’s cause. The solicitor remains liable to account for this money to his client. It is not assessable as his income.

ii) No adverse on the basis of section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be drawn against the assessee. The money received by the assessee from clients were held by the assessee in a fiduciary capacity. That apart, the payment made by the assessee as agent on behalf of its clients (principal) under various heads, had not been doubted or disputed and instead a finding of fact regarding such payment had been arrived by Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. The amount was not assessable as income in the hands of the assessee.”

Revision u/s. 264 — Scope of Power of Commissioner — Mistake in the return of income — Detected when intimation u/s. 143(1) issued/received — Time limit to file revised return expired — Powers of the Commissioner wide enough to rectify a bonafide mistake committed by the assessee even after the expiry of the time limit to file revised return.

33. 2025 (7) TMI 1439 (Cal.):

Crown Electromechanical Pvt Ltd. vs. Pr.CIT:

A.Y.: 2022-23: Date of order 15/07/2025:

Ss. 264 of ITA 1961

Revision u/s. 264 — Scope of Power of Commissioner — Mistake in the return of income — Detected when intimation u/s. 143(1) issued/received — Time limit to file revised return expired — Powers of the Commissioner wide enough to rectify a bonafide mistake committed by the assessee even after the expiry of the time limit to file revised return.

The Assessee filed its return of income for A. Y. 2022-23 declaring total income at ₹ 9,54,872. However, due to oversight certain figures which were required to be provided in the profit and loss account under Part – A of the return were not included. Subsequently, the return was processed and intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued wherein the total income was determined at ₹3,58,76,000 and a demand of ₹1,02,60,400 was determined to be payable by the assessee. It is only when the intimation u/s. 143(1) was issued that the assessee detected the mistake in the return of income filed by the assessee.

By the time the assessee received intimation u/s. 143(1), the time limit to file revised return had expired. Therefore, the assessee resorted to section 264 and filed an application before the Principal Commissioner along with audited accounts and tax audit report and claimed that the profit of the assessee for the assessment year under consideration was only ₹ 9,54,872 as against ₹ 3,58,76,000 determined in the intimation issued u/s. 143(1) and thereby requested the Principal Commissioner to consider the income of the assessee correctly. The application was rejected vide order dated 4.3.2025 on the ground that apart from the assessee, none is competent to alter the return filed by the assessee.

Against this order of the Principal Commissioner, the assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court. The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The learned advocate representing the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. vs.CIT; (2006) 284 ITR 323 (SC) on the question whether the assessee could make a claim for deduction other than by filling a revised return.

ii) I note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case Goetze (India) Ltd. (supra) was dealing with the claim of deduction of the assessee introduced by way of a letter to the Assessing Officer which was disallowed on the ground that there was no provision under the Income Tax Act to make amendment in the return of income by modifying the application at the assessment stage without revising the return. Although, the assessee on an appeal had succeeded before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), the department was able to secure a favorable order by way of reversal on the further appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The matter thus, travelled to the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the above and the power of the Tribunal u/s. 254 of the said Act observed that the tribunal can entertain for the first time a point of law provided the fact on the basis of which the issue of law can be raised was before the Tribunal. While observing as such, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had, however, made it clear that the exercise of powers by Assessing Authority does not impinge upon the power of the Income Tax Tribunal u/s. 254 of the
said Act.

iii) Although, much stress has been laid on the aforesaid judgment, however, I find that in the said cause as noted above, the question as to whether an error by an assessee could be corrected by a revisional authority u/s. 264 was not an issue. As rightly pointed out by the learned advocate representing the petitioner and as would appear from the scheme of Section 264, the consistent view of this Court and all the other High Courts that the power u/s. 264 can be exercised when a bona fide mistake has been committed even by the assessee, an appropriate rectification of the return can be effected thereunder, as has been noted in the judgment delivered in the case of in Ena Chaudhuri vs. ACIT; (2023) 148 taxmann.com 100 (Cal.) in paragraph-11 thereof. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow:

“11. In my considered view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, Commissioner in refusal to consider the aforesaid claim of the petitioner has misinterpreted and misconstrued the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (supra) as well as the scope of jurisdiction confer upon him u/s. 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by equating the same with that of the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in considering the claim of any allowance/deduction by an assessee in return or without filling any revised return.”

iv) In view thereof, it is clear that respondent no. 1 had committed error in failing to exercise jurisdiction, thereby rejecting the above application. Having regard thereto, I remand the matter back to the appropriate authority to decide the cause on the basis of the observation made herein. Accordingly, the order passed by respondent no. 1 is set aside.”

Recovery of tax — Stay of demand pending appeal before CIT(A) — Condition requiring 20 per cent., deposit of outstanding demand is contrary to law — Instruction issued by CBDT misconceived — Non-consideration of prima facie merits and undue hardship — Mechanical approach rejecting stay application solely due to non-deposit of 20 per cent amount is contrary to law — Order of conditional stay set aside — Matter remanded.

32. (2025) 475 ITR 96 (Del):

Centre For Policy Research vs. CIT:

A. Y. 2022-23: Date of order 09/05/2024:

Ss. 156 and 220(6) of ITA 1961

Recovery of tax — Stay of demand pending appeal before CIT(A) — Condition requiring 20 per cent., deposit of outstanding demand is contrary to law — Instruction issued by CBDT misconceived — Non-consideration of prima facie merits and undue hardship — Mechanical approach rejecting stay application solely due to non-deposit of 20 per cent amount is contrary to law — Order of conditional stay set aside — Matter remanded.

The assessee was registered as a charitable trust u/s. 12A r.w.s. 12AA and 12AB(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee’s registration was cancelled with retrospective effect, which formed the subject matter of a separate writ petition wherein interim orders were passed. Following this cancellation, an assessment order was passed for the A. Y. 2022-23. The assessee filed appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) u/s. 246A of the Act. The assessee also applied for stay of the demand u/s. 220(6) of the Act, during the pendency of the Appeal. The Assessing Officer passed an order requiring the assessee to deposit 20 per cent of the outstanding demand as a precondition for granting protection, failing which recovery proceedings would be initiated.

The assessee filed writ petition against this order. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The order rejecting the stay of demand u/s. 220(6) did not consider either the prima facie merits of the case or the issue of undue hardship to the assessee. The Assessing Officer had erred in proceeding in the assumption that the application for stay of demand could not be entertained without 20 per cent pre-deposit which was a requirement mentioned in the CBDT office memorandum. Such requirement could not be treated as inflexible or inviolable. The quantum of deposit would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case after considering factors such as prima facie case, undue hardship, and likelihood of success.

ii) We, accordingly, allow the instant writ petition and set aside the impugned order dated May 3, 2024. The matter shall in consequence stand remitted to the Assessing Officer who shall examine the application for stay of demand afresh and bearing in mind the legal principles as enunciated in National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) vs. Dy. CIT (Exemption) [(2024) 470 ITR 493 (Delhi)].”

Penalty u/s. 270A — Debatable issue — Receipts chargeable to tax as ‘Fees for Technical Service’ u/s. 9(1)(vii) or ‘Fees for included services’ under Article 12 of the DTAA between India and USA — Divergent views taken by the High Courts — Two views possible — Penalty u/s. 270A not leviable.

31. 2025 (8) TMI 768 (Kar):

Pr.CIT(IT) vs. IBM Australia Limited.:

A. Y. 2018-19: Date of order 31/07/2025:

Ss. 9(1)(vii) and 270A of ITA 1961

Penalty u/s. 270A — Debatable issue — Receipts chargeable to tax as ‘Fees for Technical Service’ u/s. 9(1)(vii) or ‘Fees for included services’ under Article 12 of the DTAA between India and USA — Divergent views taken by the High Courts — Two views possible — Penalty u/s. 270A not leviable.

The Assessee Company is a tax resident of Australia filed its return of income and claimed a refund. During the year under consideration, the Assessee had received a sum of about ₹ 65.38 crores from IBM India Limited, a company incorporated in India towards IT Support, including recovery of salary expenses of the employees that were seconded to IBM India. The Assessee’s return was selected for scrutiny and the subject matter of dispute was as to whether the said receipts were chargeable to tax as ‘Fees for Technical Service’ (FTS) u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or Fees for Included Service under Article 12 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and USA. The Assessing Officer penalty u/s. 270A of the Act.

The Tribunal set aside the penalty. The Tribunal had examined the nature of the disputes and had further noted that the decision of this Court in Flipkart Internet (P). Limited vs. DCIT (International Taxation): [2022] 139 taxmann.com 595], had favoured the Assessee. The Tribunal held that given the nature of the disputes, clearly, two views are possible. Thus, the penalty u/s. 270A of the Act could not be levied, as the question involved was a vexed one.

The Karnataka High Court dismissed the appeal of the Department and upheld the view of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The question whether such receipts would fall within the scope of FTS/FIS has been subject matter before various Courts. The Hon’ble High Court noted that while most High Courts took a favourable view that such proceeds would not fall within FTS, the Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Centrica India Offshore Private Limited v. CIT [(2014) 44 taxmann.com 300 (Del.)] had taken the view that secondment of employees would result in absorption of knowledge by the entity to whom such employees had been seconded. Given the possible views, the assessee had opted for Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and settled the issue regarding the levy of tax.

ii) The Assessee operated under the reasonable and bona fide belief that the payments received were not subject to taxation under the Act. We find no infirmity in the said order and no substantial question of law exists for consideration by this court.”

Offence and prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Assessee filed a return, accepted with a refund — French Government information under DTAA alleged assessee held Swiss bank accounts — A search conducted u/s. 132 — No incriminating evidence found — Addition made on account of alleged foreign accounts — Tribunal set it aside — Criminal complaints u/s. 276C, 276D, and 277 for tax evasion and non-compliance with a notice to sign a consent form filed — Information from French, not Swiss, authorities was unauthenticated, and no evidence supported tax evasion — Without credible evidence, sections 276C, 276D, and 277 were inapplicable, and complaints were quashed — Non-signing of consent form was penalized under section 271, not warranting criminal proceedings.

30. [2025] 176 taxmann.com 771 (Del.):

Anurag Dalmia vs. ITO:

A. Ys. 2006-07 and 2007-08:

Date of order 21/07/2025:

Ss. 276C r.w.s. 5, 271, 276D and 277 of ITA 1961

Offence and prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Assessee filed a return, accepted with a refund — French Government information under DTAA alleged assessee held Swiss bank accounts — A search conducted u/s. 132 — No incriminating evidence found — Addition made on account of alleged foreign accounts — Tribunal set it aside — Criminal complaints u/s. 276C, 276D, and 277 for tax evasion and non-compliance with a notice to sign a consent form filed — Information from French, not Swiss, authorities was unauthenticated, and no evidence supported tax evasion — Without credible evidence, sections 276C, 276D, and 277 were inapplicable, and complaints were quashed — Non-signing of consent form was penalized under section 271, not warranting criminal proceedings.

The assessee filed Income Tax Returns for 2006-07 and 2007-08, declaring total income, which were finalized with refunds issued u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In 2011, French authorities, under the DTAA, informed that the assessee held bank accounts in HSBC Private Bank, Switzerland, linked to four accounts as a beneficial holder.

Based on the information received, a search u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out on 20.01.2012 at the premises of the assessee but no incriminating material was found against the assessee. Assessee’s statements were recorded u/s. 132(4) wherein the assessee denied having any account in HSBC Bank.

In response to the notice issued u/s. 153A, the assessee filed return of income declaring the same income as was previously disclosed in his earlier returns. In the course of assessment, the assessee was required to sign the consent waiver form to procure details of his Bank account from the Swiss Bank. The assessee attended the proceedings through his Chartered Accountant and submitted response and filed the details from time to time. Thereafter, the assessment was completed vide order dated 23.03.2015 wherein certain additions on account of undisclosed alleged Foreign Bank Accounts, particularly the HSBC Bank in Switzerland and the interest presumed to have been received from the alleged Foreign Bank Accounts for the years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were made u/s. 69 of the Act. Additionally, a penalty along with interest, was imposed vide order dated 30.06.2015.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. On further appeal before the Tribunal, the additions made by the AO were set aside.

Subsequently, in January 2016, criminal complaint u/s. 276C(1)(i), 277(1) and 276(D) of the Act were filed against the assessee for wilful attempt to evade tax in relation the alleged Foreign Bank Accounts in HSBC Bank, Switzerland, alleged false verification given while filing original Return of Income; non-compliance of notice wherein the assessee was required to sign “the Consent Form”.

The assessee filed Criminal Petition before the Hon’ble High Court seeking quashing of the complaints on the ground that the appeal was decided in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal and since the order of the AO was set aside, the criminal proceedings initiated against the assessee became infructuous.

The High Court resolved the petitions in favour of the assessee, on broadly 3 questions as follows:

i. Whether the information received from France under DTAA can be relied upon to initiate criminal case against the accused?

The Hon’ble High Court held that unauthenticated documents received from the French Government under the DTAA without verification by Swiss Authorities and unaccompanied by supporting incriminating material found during a search do not provide sufficient grounds to initiate criminal proceedings. The presence of the assessee’s name in such documents alone does not shift the burden of proof onto the assessee.

ii. Whether the assessee could be compelled to sign the consent waiver form?

The Hon’ble Court stated that failing to sign the Consent Waiver Form, without authenticated incriminating evidence, cannot be considered an offence under Section 276D or as evidence of undisclosed income; however, this non-compliance may result in a penalty under Section 271(1)(b) but does not warrant criminal prosecution.

iii. Whether criminal complaints can be sustained when the assessment order has been set aside by the Tribunal for want of incriminating material?

The Court also concluded that criminal complaints u/s. 276C(1)(i), 276D, and 277(1) are not sustainable when the ITAT has set aside the Assessment Order due to lack of incriminating material, as there is no prima facie case for concealment or false statement that would justify prosecution.

The court emphasised that prosecution requires sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, which was absent here, and thus quashed the criminal complaints.

Assessment — Rejection of books of account — Estimation of net profit at 8% — Disallowance u/s. 43B while computing income and tax liability — Since profit was estimated after rejecting books of account Tribunal could not restore the matter to the Assessing Officer to consider whether addition was required to be made.

29. [2025] 177 taxmann.com 181 (Cal.):

Skyscraper Projects (P.) Ltd. vs. Addl.CIT:

A. Ys. 2012-13: Date of order 28/07/2025:

S. 43B of ITA 1961

Assessment — Rejection of books of account — Estimation of net profit at 8% — Disallowance u/s. 43B while computing income and tax liability — Since profit was estimated after rejecting books of account Tribunal could not restore the matter to the Assessing Officer to consider whether addition was required to be made.

The Assessee is engaged in the business of civil construction. The assessee filed its return of income for AY 2012-13. The Assessee’s return was selected for scrutiny. In the course of assessment, the Assessing Officer rejected the books of account of the Assessee and estimated the net profit at 8%, as was done in the earlier assessment years. However, while computing the tax liability, the Assessing Officer made a disallowance u/s. 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and added the said amount while computing tax liability.

CIT(A) held that once the Assessing Officer has estimated the income after rejecting books of account, it is presumed that all the provisions of sections 29 to 43D have been considered and no further addition on account of section 43B was required. On appeal by the Department the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer to verify the claim of the assessee in respect of the VAT / Service tax liability paid during the year which had already suffered tax on account of addition made under section 43B of the Act in the preceding year.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, took note of the various decisions by the other High Courts which laid down the position that when the profits are estimated, it implies that the Assessing Officer has not relied on the books of accounts and if this fact is accepted then the estimation made by the Assessing Officer of net profit will take care of every addition related to business income or business receipts and no further disallowance can be made and held as under:

“i) In the light of the above legal position and also the undisputed fact being that the gross profit was estimated after rejecting the books of accounts, the order passed by the learned Tribunal restoring the matter to the Assessing Officer is unnecessary and not called for. For the above reasons, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

ii) The substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee and the order passed by the CIT(A) dated 19th August, 2019 stands restored.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

7. PCIT vs. Nya International

(2025) 482 ITR 281 (SC)

Revision – Erroneous and prejudicial – To exercise jurisdiction under Section 263 of the 1961 Act, the Commissioner of Income Tax should examine the merits and only on reaching a finding that the re-assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue make an addition – The jurisdiction could not be exercised on the basis of ‘no inquiry and verification’, where a case is of wrong conclusion

The assessee firm M/s. Nya International had filed its return of income for the assessment year 2012-13 on 16.08.2012 declaring total income as NIL.

The case thereafter was selected for scrutiny and assessment and an order was passed under Section 143(3) of the Act on 25.03.2015.

Information was received from DDIT (Ivn) Unit-7(2) Mumbai that the assessee was maintaining a bank account no. 5500111032480 with ING Vysya Bank having credit entry of ₹70,13,43,319/- and the bank account was not disclosed by the assessee in its return of income for the year under consideration. During the year, the assessee firm had claimed exemption under Section 10AA of the Act of ₹87,21,44,414/- but the exemption under Section 10AA was disallowed by the Assessing Officer while passing an assessment order for the assessment year 2013-14 and 2014-15.

Accordingly, the case was reopened under section 147 of the Act by issuing a notice under Section 148 and an order was passed on 31.12.2019 making a disallowance of ₹87,21,44,414/-.

By exercising powers under Section 263 of the Act, the Principal CIT (Surat) took up the order in revision noticing that the assessee firm was maintaining total three bank accounts – two with the Allahabad Bank and one with ING Vysya Bank. This was not disclosed in the ITR filed for the assessment year 2012-13. In the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer had not made any inquiry and therefore the order was erroneous insofar as it was prejudicial to the interest of revenue.

A show cause notice was issued and thereafter the order dated 31.12.2019 was set aside with a direction to the Assessing Officer to reframe the assessment.

The assessee challenged the correctness of the order of the revisional authority dated 18.02.2022.

The Tribunal by the order impugned held that there was no reason for the Principal CIT to exercise powers under section 263 of the Act as it was a case where it could not be said that the Assessing Officer had passed an order which could be termed as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Tribunal held that it was not the case of the learned Principal CIT that the Assessing Officer failed to make any additions/disallowance; the Assessing Officer conducted enough inquiries to examine the debit and credit in the bank statement and he also examined the eligibility to claim deductions under Section 10AA of the Act and that is why he disallowed the deduction under section 10AA of the Act. It was not shown by the Principal CIT that the Assessing Officer had failed to examine the issue during the assessment proceedings based on the submissions and verification of the assessment records.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue against the order of the Tribunal in light of the findings that the Assessing Officer had conducted sufficient inquiry and examined the eligibility to claim deduction under section 10AA of the Act. It was not a case of ‘no inquiry’ or ‘lack of inquiry’. According to the High Court, when an opinion is formed as a result of the inquiries, which was in the exclusive domain of the Assessing Officer, it is not open for the revisional authority to arrive at conclusions merely on the basis of a subjective exercise.

This special leave petition filed by the Revenue was also dismissed as misconceived and completely contrary to the law pertaining to Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court noted that the notice under Section 148 of the 1961 Act referred to two reasons. The first reason was with regard to non-declaration of the account in ING Vysya Bank with a credit of ₹ 70,13,43,319/-. The second reason was with regard to the claim of deduction under Section 10AA of the 1961 Act.

It was an accepted position that a reassessment order under Section 148 read with Section 143(3) of the 1961 Act was passed. Addition was not made for the first reason.

In the given facts, according to the Supreme Court, the assertion by the Revenue that inquiry and verification of the bank account was not made was ex-facie incorrect. This being the position, this was not a case of failure to investigate, but as no addition was made, the Revenue could argue that it was a case of wrong conclusion and decision in the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, to exercise jurisdiction under Section 263 of the 1961 Act, the Commissioner of Income Tax should have examined the merits and only on reaching a finding that the re-assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, made an addition. This was not a case of ‘no inquiry and verification’, but as made out by the Revenue, a case of wrong conclusion. The difference between the two situations is clear and has different consequences. This being the position, according to the Supreme Court, the High Court was right in dismissing the appeal preferred by the Revenue.

Format for Scrutiny Notice under S. 143(2)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

A notice under s. 143(2) is required to be served by the Assessing Officer(‘AO’) or the prescribed Income Tax Authority, to the assessee, in a case where the AO considers it necessary to ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or has not claimed excessive loss or has not under-paid the taxes. Such a notice shall call upon the assessee to attend the office of the AO or to produce evidence in support of the return of income on a date specified in the notice. This notice shall be served before the expiry of 3 months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished. No form or the format for issue of the notice has been prescribed in s.143(2) of the Act.

Under the powers vested u/s. 119 of the Act, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (”CBDT”), vide Notification No. 225 / 157 / 2017 / ITA. II dt. 23rd June, 2017 has prescribed the modified formats for issue of the notice under s.143(2) by the AO where a case of an assessee is selected for scrutiny. The formats require the AO to inform the assessee that his case is selected for scrutiny and also inform that the scrutiny would be limited or complete, besides informing him that the proceedings will be conducted manually or electronically. Three separate formats have been prescribed to be used based on the nature of scrutiny or return. The Notification informs that any notices thereafter should be issued in the revised formats only.

Cases have arisen wherein the notices issued by the AO are found to be not in the prescribed format, leading some of the assessees to challenge the validity of the notices and the consequent assessment orders. Conflicting decisions of different benches of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal are available on the subject. The Delhi and the Kolkata Benches have held that the Assessment Order passed in pursuance of a notice issued not in the prescribed format are bad-in-law and not sustainable. In contrast, the Bangalore Bench has held that such a notice does not vitiate the assessment order and the defect in the notice, if any, is cured by the other provisions of the Act.

ANITA GARG’S CASE

The issue recently was examined by the Delhi bench of the Tribunal in the case of Anita Garg, ITA No. 4053 / Del / 2024 dt. 30th July, 2025 for A.Y. 2017-18. In the said case, the assessee appellant had inter alia raised the following additional ground; “On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Assessing Officer erred in issuing notice under s. 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 9.8.2018 in violation of CBDT Instruction F.No.225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017. Therefore, the said notice is invalid, and assessment framed pursuant thereto is vitiated in law.

The appellant assessee submitted before the Tribunal that:

  •  the notice under s. 143(2) of the Act issued to the assessee did not specify whether it was a limited scrutiny or a complete scrutiny or a compulsory manual scrutiny,
  •  the CBDT had specifically provided vide instruction no. F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II Dated 23-06-2017, that the notice under s. 143(2) could be issued in one of the three formats, which have been prescribed, but the notice issued was not in accordance with the said instruction, and therefore, the assessment framed consequently was invalid and void ab initio.
  •  the notice issued under s. 143(2) by the AO on 24.09.2018 was void ab initio,
  •  the notice was issued in violation of the binding CBDT Instruction No. F.No.225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017,
  •  the CBDT under s. 119 of the Act had issued the above instruction prescribing mandatory revised formats for all scrutiny notices to be issued under s. 143(2) of the Act,
  •  the instructions were binding on all the Income tax authorities,
  •  reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank vs. CIT (237 ITR 889) and Back Office IT Solution Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India (2021) SCC Online (Del) 2742,
  •  referring to para 3 of the above instructions of CBDT it was submitted that the Board had directed that all scrutiny notices under s. 143(2) of the Act should be thereafter issued in the revised formats only,
  •  in the present case, the AO did not issue the notice in the prescribed revised format and that was a direct violation of the CBDT’s binding instructions. Reliance was placed on the following direct decisions:
  1.  Hind Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT, Circle – 10(1) [ITA Nos. 608 &; 610/KOL/2024] dated 6.5.2025;
  2.  Tapas Kumar Das vs. ITO, Ward-50(5), Kolkata [ITA No. 1660/KOL/2024] dated 11.03.2025;
  3.  Sajal Biswas vs. I.T.O, WD 24(1), HOOGHLY [I.T.O, WD24(1), HOOGHLY] [ITA No.1244/KOL/2023] dated 26.03.2025; and
  4.  Srimanta Kumar Shit vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [I.T.A. No.1911/KOL/2024].”
  •  the issuance of notice under s. 143(2) in proper format was a jurisdictional requirement and any defect therein went to the root of the assessment proceedings, and
  •  a notice issued in violation of law could not have conferred on the AO the power to proceed with scrutiny assessment, and the notice dated 22.09.2018 issued under s. 143(2) was invalid and unenforceable in law.

The Revenue on the other hand submitted that the notice was a computer-generated notice and the non-mentioning of the fact of either limited or complete scrutiny or compulsory manual scrutiny would not render the issuance of notice under s. 143(2) of the Act as invalid.

On hearing the rival contentions, the bench noted that an identical situation had arisen before the Kolkata bench of the Tribunal in the case of Hind Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT in ITA Nos. 608 and 610/Kol/2024 dated 06.05.2025 wherein the Kolkata bench, on examination of the facts and in consideration of the law, quashed the assessment framed pursuant to the notice issued under s. 143(2), which was not in the prescribed format as per the CBDT instructions.

The Delhi bench quoted extensively from the said order of the Kolkata bench in the case of Hind Ceramics Pvt Ltd.(Supra), which bench had in turn relied upon the decision of the coordinate Bench in the case of Tapas Kumar Das (Supra) which in turn had relied upon the decision of the coordinate bench in the case of Shib Nath Ghosh, ITA No. 1812 / Kol / 2024, besides resting its case on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank (Supra) to hold that the instructions of the CBDT were binding on the AO.

The Delhi Bench also took notice of the decisions of the Kolkata Bench in the case of Sajal Biswas (Supra) and Srimanta Kumar Shit (Supra) to finally hold that the assessment framed by the AO u/s. 143(3) dt. 27.12.2019 pursuant to the notice issued u/s. 143(2) dt. 22.09.2018 was bad in law and void ab initio, in as much as the said notice was not in the prescribed format.

VEERANNA MURTHY RAGHAVENDRA’S CASE

The issue had arisen, a year before, in the case of Shri. Veeranna Muruthy Raghavendra Dikshit in ITA No. 1072 / Bang / 2024 for A.Y. 2017-18. One of the additional grounds raised by the assessee before the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal was; “The notice issued u/s.143(2) of the Act dated 24.09.2018 is bad at law as it is not (in) accordance in the format prescribed by the Central Board of Direct Taxes as per Instructions (F.No.225/157/2017/ITA.II) dated 23.06.2017; therefore all consequential assessment proceedings including the assessment order are rendered bad at law in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

On behalf of the assessee appellant, it was vehemently submitted that the notice under s. 143(2) of the Act dated 24.9.2018 was bad in law as it was not in accordance with the format prescribed by the CBDT Instruction in F.No.225/157/2017/ITA.II dated 23.6.2017. The Revenue on the other hand, supported the orders of authorities below.

The Bangalore bench heard the rival contentions and perused the materials available on record in respect of the additional ground of appeal, contesting the validity of the issue of notice in a format not prescribed by the CBDT.

The Bangalore bench took notice of the CBDT Instruction F.No.225/157/2017/ITA.II dated 23/06/2017. In addition, the bench took special notice of sections 282A, 292B and 292BB of the Act.

On reading of section 282A, the bench observed that a notice issued by an Income Tax Authority should be signed and issued in the paper format or be communicated in the electronic format; the notice should be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of the designated income tax authority was printed, stamped or written thereon. The bench further observed that there was no dispute about signing of the notice, nor about the fact that it was communicated in electronic format, and there was also no dispute in the present case about the name, office and the designation of the authority printed on the notice. The notice therefore was found to be genuine by the bench.

The purpose behind the introduction of section 292B of the Act, as noted by the bench, was to ensure that technical pleas on the grounds of mistake, defect, and omission should not invalidate the assessment proceedings, when no confusion or prejudice was caused due to non-observance of technical formalities.

On reading of section 292BB, the bench found that an assessee was precluded from taking any objection with regard to service of notice in an improper manner if he had appeared in any proceedings or co-operated in any enquiry relating to an assessment. In the present case, the bench noted that during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee had filed his reply and co-operated with the proceedings by way of filing submissions on different dates, and therefore, the assessee was not entitled to take the ground before the Tribunal for the first time as he had not raised any objection before the AO before the completion of assessment proceedings. In the considered opinion of the Tribunal, as the assessee had co-operated with the proceedings by way of filing various submissions on different dates as well as he had not raised any objection before the AO on or before the completion of the assessment proceedings, the provisions contained in section 292BB of the Act should (not) apply to the case of the assessee.

In the facts of the case and the provisions of s. 282A, 292B and 292BB the bench observed that;

  •  the primary requirement was to go into and examine the question of whether any prejudice or confusion was caused to the assessee. If no prejudice/confusion was caused, then the assessment proceedings and the consequent orders could not and should not be vitiated and were saved on the said grounds of mistake, defect or omission in the notice.
  •  it was an undisputed fact that the notice under s. 143(2) of the Act dated 24.9.2018, was served on the assessee, as was noted in the assessment order,
  • the assessee had filed submissions / replies / explanations in response to notices issued by the AO and accordingly, the assessee had cooperated with the proceedings before the AO.
  •  the assessee had also not raised any objection before the AO with regard to the issue of notice, that it was not in the prescribed format as per the CBDT Instruction, on or before the completion of the assessment proceedings.
  •  there was also no dispute about signing and issue of notice in electronic format or about the name, office and designation of the authority and about the printing thereof.

Upon careful consideration of the arguments presented, it was evident to the bench that while the format of the notice was important, the primary concern was whether the notice effectively communicated the necessary information to the respondent or not. The bench was of the strong opinion that the notice, even though not in the prescribed format, served the intent and purpose of the Act, which was to inform the assessee and ensure that there was no confusion in the mind of the assessee about initiation of the proceedings under the Act, and hence the defective notice was protected under section 292B of the Act.

The bench did not find that any prejudice/confusion was caused to the assessee and the assessee had filed explanations/submissions and had co-operated during the course of assessment proceedings. Therefore, merely because of the procedural irregularities, the plea of the assessee that, the notice was invalid just because it was not issued as per the format prescribed by the CBDT, could not be accepted.

OBSERVATIONS

The conflict under consideration involves two issues;

  •  whether the instructions of the CBDT of 2017 prescribing the revised format for issue of notices u/s. 143(2) is binding on the AO, and
  •  whether provisions of s.282A, 292B and 292BB cure the defect if any, in the notice arising out of the AO not issuing the notice in the revised format.

The first issue is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank, 237 ITR 889 whereunder the Supreme Court held that the instructions of the CBDT issued under the power vested u/s. 119 of the Act are binding on the AO. The Court in that case held as under;

(a) ” the authorities responsible for administration of the Act shall observe and follow any such orders, instructions and directions of the Board;

(b) such instructions can be by way of relaxation of any of the provisions of the section specified therein or otherwise;

(c) the Board has power, inter alia, to tone down the rigour of the law and ensure a fair enforcement of its provisions by issuing circulars in exercise of its statutory powers under section 119 of the IT Act;

(d) the circulars can be adverse to the IT Department but still are binding on the authorities of the IT Department, but cannot be binding on the assessee, if they are adverse to the assessee.

(e) the authority which wields the power for its own advantage under the Act, has a right to forgo the advantage when required to wield it in a manner it considers just by relaxing the rigour of the law by issuing instructions in terms of Section 119 of the Act.”

There does not seem to be any disagreement on the binding nature of the Circular by the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of Veeranna Muruthy Raghavendra Dikshit (Supra). The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court has been applied by the Courts in the cases of Crystal Phosphates Ltd., 152 taxmann.com 232 (P&H), AVI Oil India (P.) Ltd., 323 ITR 242 (P&H), Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia, 270 ITR 572 (AP) and Amal Kumar Ghosh 45 taxmann.com 482 (Calcutta), in the context of instructions issued by the CBDT in respect of notices u/s. 143(2).

The applicability of Instruction No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017 has been specifically examined by different benches of the Tribunal, in the following cases to hold that a notice not in compliance of the instructions of 2017 was without jurisdiction and the subsequent order passed was bad in law.

1. Hind Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT, Circle – 10(1), Kolkata, [ITA Nos. 608 &; 610/KOL/2024] for A.Y. 2017-18 dated 06.05.2025;

2. Tapas Kumar Das vs. ITO, Ward-50(5), Kolkata, [ITA No. 1660/KOL/2024] for A.Y. 2017-18 dated 11.03.2025;

3. Sajal Biswas vs. I.T.O, Wd 24(1), Hooghly, [ITA No.1244/KOL/2023] for A.Y. 2017-18 dated 26.03.2025;

4. Srimanta Kumar Shit vs. ACIT, Kolkata, [I.T.A. No.1911/KOL/2024] for A.Y. 2017-18 dated 19.11.2024;

5. Shib Nath Ghosh vs. ITO, Kolkata, [ITA No. 1812/KOL/2024 for A.Y. 2018-19 dated 29.11.2024.”

The remaining issue relates to the curative nature of the provisions of s. 282A, 292B and 292BB. In this regard, it is appropriate at the outset, to take notice of the settled position in law that holds that any of the aforesaid provisions do not cure a defect which goes to the root of assessment. A lapse or a defect which has roots in the jurisdiction of the AO to assess the income itself and pass the assessment order cannot be cured by the aforesaid provisions. Issuing the notice in the prescribed format is an essential condition for assuming the jurisdiction by the AO to assess an income of the assessee, and any defect therein cannot be cured by resorting to s. 292B of the Act, as is noted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of AVI – Oil India (P.) Ltd., 323 ITR 242 (P&H).

S.282A deals with authentication of notice in certain circumstances. The provision of s.282A has a very limited application, where it helps in deciding whether a notice is genuine or not. In the case under consideration, there is no dispute that the notice issued was genuine and authentic. The dispute is about whether such a notice is valid in law or not. It is respectfully submitted that S.282A has no relevance for deciding the issue of validity of the notice which is not in the prescribed format.

S.292B deals with return of income, etc. in certain circumstances specified in the said section. It is provided that the return of income, assessment, notice and summons could not be considered as invalid merely by reason of any mistake or defect or omission if such return, notice, etc. is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. On two counts, this provision cannot help the AO to cure the jurisdictional defect in the notice; firstly, not issuing the notice in the prescribed revised format cannot be considered as a mistake, defect or omission; secondly such a notice can never be held to be in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. A prejudice is caused when the notice does not intimate the objective and the purpose behind the selection of a case for scrutiny, and the confusion it causes where the notice fails to define the scope of the scrutiny assessment. Had it not been so, the CBDT would not have taken pains to define the objective and the scope by issuing the instructions specifically for directing the course of action in the desired and defined manner.

S.292BB deals directly with issue of a notice and provides for the circumstances wherein the notice is deemed to be valid, provided the assessee has appeared in any proceeding or cooperated in an inquiry relating to an assessment. On a bare reading, it is apparent that the provision deals with the service of notice upon an assessee and proceeds to deem that service of the notice was valid in the listed circumstances which are a) where notice is not served upon assessee or b) is not served in time or c) served in an improper manner. It is respectfully submitted that the application of s. 292BB is limited to curing the defect of the listed nature in service of the notice and not a defect in the notice itself, either in the contents of the notice or in the manner and the format of notice.

In any case, the law is settled in respect of the position that s. 292BB does not cure the jurisdictional defect in the notice, which goes to the root of the validity of the notice itself. As noted earlier, the issue under consideration, in the context of notices issued u/s. 143(2), before 2017, has been examined by the High Courts to hold that such notices not issued in the format prescribed, up to 2017, were invalid. The ratio of these decisions of the High Courts shall apply with equal force to the issue of notices in the year 2017 and onwards.

In cases where the jurisdiction itself is lacking, the fact that the assessee had not objected to the notice and that he had complied with the notice by co-operating in the assessment proceedings does not have any significant relevance; acceptance of notice and compliance with the requirement of the notice do not have the ability to cure a defect that goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the AO and the assessment order passed by him. Likewise, in the matters of jurisdiction, it is irrelevant whether any prejudice or confusion was caused to the assessee by not issuing the notice in the prescribed format. In our considered opinion, a notice without jurisdiction is invalid, even where it has not prejudiced or caused confusion to the assessee.

Articles 7 and 12 of India-Korea DTAA – the Assessee is entitled to set off business loss incurred by PE against Fees for technical services (FTS) earned by HO

6. [2025] 174 taxmann.com 500 (Delhi – Trib.)

Hyosung Corporation vs. ACIT

IT Appeal Nos. 2943/Mum/2023

A.Y.: 2021-22 Dated: 23 April 2025

Articles 7 and 12 of India-Korea DTAA – the Assessee is entitled to set off business loss incurred by PE against Fees for technical services (FTS) earned by HO

FACTS

The Assessee was a tax resident of Korea. It was engaged in power business in India. After setting off the business loss of PE against income of HO from FTS, the Assessee filed a return of its income in India, declaring Nil income, and claimed refund of taxes.

The AO denied set-off of losses of PE against FTS and taxed the FTS on the gross basis. The DRP upheld the order of the AO.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

The determination of income under different heads must be made by giving effect to the set-off mechanism provided under Sections 70 and 71 of the Act.

The Assessee had two streams of income: (i) income earned through PE constituted under Article 7 of India-Korea DTAA; and (ii) FTS earned by HO under Article 12 of India-Korea DTAA. Both income streams fall under the head of business income under the Act. The treaty provisions shall apply only after the determination of total income.

Section 115A(1)(b) provides that if the total income includes income in the nature of FTS, the same shall be charged to tax as per the prescribed rates. Therefore, first the total income should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act, including set-off of losses.

While section 115A(3) bars the Assessee from claiming expenditure or allowances, it does not bar set off of loss. Wherever required, the legislature has specifically barred an assessee from setting off losses, e.g., 115BBDA(2), 115BBH(2). In the absence of a specific bar, the Assessee is permitted to set-off the loss as per Section 71.

The coordinate bench of ITAT in Foramer S.A vs. DCIT [1995] 52 ITD 115 (Delhi) had allowed depreciation allowance while computing profits, even though DTAA did not provide for the same. The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in CIT vs. Davy Ashmore India Limited [1991] 190 ITR 626 (Calcutta) held that when there are no express provisions under the DTAA, the provisions of income tax should govern taxation of income.

Following the above ratio, the ITAT held that while the DTAA did not have any provision for set-off of loss, the Act had provisions pertaining to such set-off. Hence, the same should be followed to determine total income. Accordingly, the Assessee was entitled to set off loss in PE against FTS.

Article 13 of India-Cyprus DTAA – Investment Holding Company located in Cyprus is a tax resident of Cyprus – qualifies for benefit under Article 13 of DTAA in respect of gain arising from sale of shares of Indian company.

5. [2025] 174 taxmann.com 498 (Delhi – Trib.)

Gagil FDI Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA NO.2661/Delhi/2024

A.Y.: 2021-22 Dated: 7 May 2025

Article 13 of India-Cyprus DTAA – Investment Holding Company located in Cyprus is a tax resident of Cyprus – qualifies for benefit under Article 13 of DTAA in respect of gain arising from sale of shares of Indian company.

FACTS

The Assessee was incorporated as an investment holding company and wholly owned subsidiary of GA Global. Both entities were residents of Cyprus. Cyprus tax authority had granted a tax residency certificate to the Assessee. The Assessee had pooled investments from various investors across the globe. During the relevant AY, the Assessee had earned long-term capital gain aggregating to ₹959 Crores from sale of shares of National Stock Exchange India Limited (NSEIL). The Assessee contended that in terms of Article 13(5) of India-Cyprus DTAA, gains were taxable only in Cyprus. The Assessee further contended that in terms of Article 10(2) of India-Cyprus DTAA, dividend earned by it from Indian companies qualified for benefit of lower rate of tax.

The AO noted that the service provider in Cyprus was mentioned in Panama Leaks. Further, the beneficiaries of income were located in the USA, and key decisions of the Assessee were also taken by the controlling entity in the US . Therefore, treating the Assessee as a shell company, the AO alleged that it was established with the purpose of claiming benefit under India-Cyprus DTAA to the Assessee.

Observing that approval or scrutiny by various Indian regulators at the time of investment in India is routine, the DRP rejected the contention of the Assessee that it was a regulated entity and confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

Various Indian regulatory authorities had carried out detailed scrutiny and granted approvals for investments in NSEIL. SEBI had been seeking fitness test from the Assessee every year. Therefore, scrutiny carried out by such authorities could not be said to be routine in nature.

Perusal of board minutes showed that most of the board members were based in Cyprus. The investment / disinvestment-related decisions were made in Cyprus. Hence, it could not be said that the USA entity controlled and managed the Assessee.

The name of the entity mentioned in Panama Leaks is different from the service provider of the Assesse. The AO or DRP had not provided any evidence or findings to link the professional entity with the entity named in the Panama leaks.

The Assessee was organized as an investment holding company in Cyprus. It had raised funds from investors across the globe [Bermuda (91.15%), Germany (8.65%) and Delaware (0.21%)]. Hence, the observation that beneficiaries were located in the USA was inappropriate.

The ITAT noted that on similar facts, in Saif II-Se Investments Mauritius Ltd. vs. ACIT [2023] 154 taxmann.com 617 (Delhi – Trib.), the coordinate bench had allowed benefits under India-Mauritus DTAA considering the factors such as period of holding, nature of investment activity, TRC and approvals granted by various regulators.

Accordingly, the ITAT held that the Assessee could not be regarded as a pass-through entity, there was no treaty abuse and consequently the Assessee qualified for benefit under India-Cyprus DTAA.

No additions under section 68 when the identity and creditworthiness of the loan lender was established.

36. [2025] 122 ITR(T) 194 (Mum – Trib.)

Kaisha Lifesciences (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax

ITA NO.: 4311/MUM/2023

A.Y.: 2020-21 DATE: 24.10.2024

Sections 68 & 35(2AB)

No additions under section 68 when the identity and creditworthiness of the loan lender was established.

FACTS I

The assessee is engaged in the business of developing high-quality medication through in-house research of medicine. For the year under consideration, the assessee had filed its return of income on 30/01/2021 declaring a total income of Rs. NIL.

The assessee’s case was selected for complete scrutiny proceedings. During the assessment proceedings, the Ld. AO held that the assessee had failed to explain the nature and source of credit of unsecured loan of ₹2,30,00,000 from Mr. Karius Dadachanji and accordingly added the same to the total income of the assessee under section 68 of the Act.

Aggrieved by the order, the assessee filed an appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A), vide impugned order, dismissed the ground raised by the assessee on this issue and upheld the addition made by the AO under section 68 of the Act.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD I

The ITAT observed that there was no dispute regarding the fact that the assessee had received an unsecured loan of ₹2,30,00,000 from Mr. Karius Dadachanji. It was further undisputed fact that as on 01.04.2019 opening balance of the loan account was ₹3,06,80,000 and during the year, had repaid a sum of ₹3,55,00,000. The ITAT observed that the loan account was a running account.

The assessee had submitted the following details – the ledger of the unsecured loans, bank statement reflecting receipt of ₹2,30,00,000/-, repayment of ₹3,55,00,000/-, Return of Income of Mr. Karius Dadachanji for the AY 2020-21 and loan confirmation from Mr. Karius Dadachanji.

Upon perusal of the abovementioned documents, the ITAT held that the assessee sufficiently proved the identity and creditworthiness of the loan lender, who is nothing but a 50% shareholder in the assessee company and the loan was taken not from any stranger but a 50% shareholder for the routine course of business to meet business-related expenditure under a running account.

Assessee is entitled to claim deduction under section 35(2AB) of the Act even in respect of the expenditure incurred prior to the approval date for the year under consideration in accordance with the guidelines issued by DSIR.

FACTS II

During the year, the assessee had incurred expenditure of ₹2,16,49,662 under section 35(2AB) of the Act, and as a qualifying expenditure, it had claimed the deduction of ₹3,24,74,493 under the said section which is 150% of the actual expenditure incurred.

The AO observed that the competent authority, i.e. Secretary, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (“DSIR”), granted approval under section 35(2AB) of the Act on 23.10.2020 for the period 25.10.2019 to 31.03.2020. The assessee had claimed weighted deduction @150% of the capital and revenue expenditure incurred prior to the approval period i.e. 25.10.2019.

The AO disallowed claim of ₹28,03,707 being excess claim under section 35(2AB) i.e. the weighted deduction @150% in respect of revenue expenditure incurred prior to approval date and disallowed sum of ₹5,70,811 being capital expenditure incurred prior to approval date.

Aggrieved by the order, the assessee was in appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) dismissed the ground on the basis that the assessee has not been able to substantiate the correctness of the claim by any documentary evidence.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD II

The ITAT observed that it is provided in clause 5 of the Guidelines for Approval in Form 3CM that the approval to the in-house R&D centres having valid recognition by DSIR are considered from 1st April of the year in which the application is made in Form 3CK.

The ITAT held that the R&D facility of the assessee was already approved by the DSIR and so the assessee was entitled to claim deduction under section 35(2AB) of the Act even in respect of the expenditure incurred prior to 25.10.2019, i.e. from 01.04.2019, for the year under consideration in accordance with the guidelines issued by DSIR.

Case Laws followed-

 Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. vs. Union of India [2017] 84 taxmann.com 45/250 Taxman 113/397 ITR 728 (Delhi) – Delhi High Court

CIT vs. Claris Lifesciences Ltd. [2008] 174 Taxman 113/[2010] 326 ITR 251 – Gujarat High Court.

In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Expenditure – Deduction under Chapter VI-A – Allowability of CSR expenditure under Section 80G despite disallowance under Section 37(1) – Voluntariness of contribution not a precondition – No reciprocal benefit to donor – Deduction permissible subject to fulfillment of conditions of Section 80G.

35. [2025] 122 ITR(T) 194 (Delhi – Trib.)

Cheil India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax

ITA NO.: 29/DEL/2024

A.Y.: 2020-21 DATE: 28.10.2024

Sections 80G & 37(1)

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Expenditure – Deduction under Chapter VI-A – Allowability of CSR expenditure under Section 80G despite disallowance under Section 37(1) – Voluntariness of contribution not a precondition – No reciprocal benefit to donor – Deduction permissible subject to fulfillment of conditions of Section 80G.

FACTS

The assessee, Cheil India Pvt. Ltd., a company governed by the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, incurred Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure during the financial year relevant to AY 2020-21 and claimed deduction of ₹2,57,66,663 under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The donations were made to institutions duly registered and notified under section 80G.

The Assessing Officer, while completing the assessment under section 143(3) read with section 144B, disallowed the entire claim under section 80G, holding that CSR expenditure, being statutorily mandated under section 135 of the Companies Act, lacked the element of voluntariness, which is a fundamental requirement under section 80G.

The expenditure was further excluded under Explanation 2 to section 37(1), as not being incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business. The AO accordingly added the disallowed amount to the assessee’s total income and also charged interest and initiated penalty proceedings under section 270A.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance reiterating that the expenditure had been incurred to comply with legal obligations, not out of voluntary motive.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Coordinate Bench in Ratna Sagar Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2556/Del/2023], wherein it was held that Section 80G and Section 37(1) operate in distinct statutory domains. Section 37(1) deals with deduction while computing business income, and Section 80G applies post computation of gross total income under Chapter VI-A, and therefore the disallowance under section 37(1) does not preclude the benefit under section 80G.

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) inserted by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, specifically bars CSR expenditure from being claimed as a business expense, but does not prohibit deduction under section 80G.

The Tribunal held that even if CSR spending is mandatory under section 135 of the Companies Act, the donations made to eligible institutions under section 80G are philanthropic in nature. Section 80G permits deduction even for mandatory donations, so long as the donee institutions are eligible and the payment is made without quid pro quo.

In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.

Where the assessee had opted for presumptive taxation under section 44AD, the AO could not make an addition on account of alleged bogus purchase since the assessee was under no obligation to explain individual entries of purchase.

34. (2025) 175 taxmann.com 996 (Ban Trib)

Lakshmanram Bheemaji Purohit vs. ITO

ITA No.: 196/Bang/2025

A.Y.: 2018-19 Dated: 25.06.2025

Sections 44AD, 69C

Where the assessee had opted for presumptive taxation under section 44AD, the AO could not make an addition on account of alleged bogus purchase since the assessee was under no obligation to explain individual entries of purchase.

FACTS

The assessee was an individual engaged in the business of trading of waste home products. He filed his return of income on 08.08.2018 declaring total income of ₹5,87,014 as per provisions of section 44AD.

Information was received by the AO that assessee had received bogus purchase bill of ₹16,09,692 from one M/s. ARS Enterprises. It was alleged that this was a bogus tax invoice wherein false input credit was claimed under GST. Assessee was asked to furnish the details. Assessee submitted that he had filed return of income under section 44AD and therefore the details of purchases were not maintained. He also submitted a chart showing the purchase of goods from ARS Enterprises. The AO rejected the explanation and made addition of ₹16,09,692 by passing assessment order under section 143(3) read with section 144B.

Against this, assessee went in appeal before CIT(A), which was dismissed by him.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) If the assessee had opted for presumptive taxation under section 44AD, the assessee was not required to maintain the books of account as well as the details of purchases made. This was relevant till the total turnover of the assessee did not exceed the prescribed limit under section 44AD. Thus, prima facie, the assessee could not have been asked the information of purchases.

(b) AO had merely relied upon the information furnished by the GST department and did not gather any evidence on his own for making the addition. As held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT vs. Surinder Pal Anand, (2010) 192 Taxman 264 (Punjab & Haryana), the assessee was not under an obligation to explain individual entry of purchases unless such entry has nexus with gross receipts. In the present case, the purchases did not have any nexus with the gross receipt as gross receipt shown by the assessee remained undisputed and was never tested by the Revenue to be beyond the specified limit.

Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted the addition and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Where the assessee made donation to a foundation approved under section 80G in pursuance of its CSR obligations, it was entitled for deduction under section 80G.

33. (2025) 175 taxmann.com 982 (Mum Trib)

Axis Securities Ltd. vs. PCIT

ITA No.: 2736/Mum/2025

A.Y.: 2020-21 Dated: 17.06.2025

Section 80G

Where the assessee made donation to a foundation approved under section 80G in pursuance of its CSR obligations, it was entitled for deduction under section 80G.

FACTS

The assessee was a company engaged in the business of broking, distribution of financial products etc. During the year, the assessee made donation to Axis Foundation of ₹1,93,66,947. It had classified the amount of donation as “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) expenses under section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 in its books of account and suo moto disallowed the same in computation of income in accordance Explanation 2 of section 37. However, it claimed the donation as deduction under section 80G. The said claim was duly disclosed in the computation of income and tax audit report, which was examined and allowed by the AO while passing the order of assessment under section 143(3).

PCIT invoked revision jurisdiction under section 263 and passed an order holding that deduction under section 80G was erroneously allowed since donation was in nature of CSR expenditure which is not voluntary in nature and thus not eligible for deduction under section 80G.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed as follows:

(a) it is an undisputed fact that donation made by the assessee was to entities registered under section 80G and that the assessee was otherwise eligible to claim deduction under section 80G

(b) Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates the quantum of CSR expenses; however, it does not mandate to whom and how the amount to be spent. The assessee at its discretion can choose the mode of spending towards CSR. The donations made by the assessee to Axis Foundation were made voluntarily as there was no reciprocal commitment from the donees. In any case, section 80G does not put any condition for the donation to be voluntary in nature for the purpose of claiming deduction.

(c) CBDT Circular No. 1/2015 dated 21.01.2015 clearly states that the restriction on claiming deduction of CSR expense is only with respect to Section 37(1) wherein it will not be deemed to be a business expenditure for the purpose computing income under the head ‘Profits and Gains from Business or Profession’. The Circular itself clarifies that CSR expenditure will be allowable under other sections under the same head of income. In view of CBDT Circular, it is clear that there is no express bar in claiming deduction in respect of CSR expenditure, other than under Section 37(1). This is also supported by Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ (“MCA”) General Circular No. 01/2016 dated 12.01.2016.

(d) In the case of ACIT vs. Sharda Cropchem Limited [IT Appeal No. 6163 (Mum) of 2024], the coordinate bench of ITAT held that donations which are classified as CSR expenditure are eligible for deduction under section 80G.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled for deduction claimed under section 80G towards CSR expenditure incurred by it.

Following Inter Gold (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT (ITA No. 4400/Mum/2023), the Tribunal also held that section 263 cannot be invoked for denial of deduction claimed under section 80G in respect of donations classified as CSR.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Exemption under Section 11 should not be denied to the assessee merely on account of delay in filing audit report in Form 10B within the stipulated time if the same was furnished before passing of intimation under section 143(1).

32. (2025) 175 taxmann.com 1076 (Ahd Trib)

Bhakt Samaj Vikas Education Trust vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 775/Ahd/2025

A.Y.: 2021-22 Dated: 25.06.2025

Section 11

Exemption under Section 11 should not be denied to the assessee merely on account of delay in filing audit report in Form 10B within the stipulated time if the same was furnished before passing of intimation under section 143(1).

FACTS

The assessee was a trust registered under section 12A. It filed its return of income on 29.03.2024 for A.Y. 2021-22. The return of income was processed under section 143(1), disallowing the claim of exemption under section 11 on the ground that the assessee had not filed the audit report in Form 10B prior to the due date for furnishing return of income under Section 139(1). CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

Following the decisions of the Gujarat High Court and other judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that it is a well-settled law that delay in filing of Form 10B is a procedural default and if other conditions have been met, then mere delay in filing of Form 10B should not disentitle the assessee from claiming exemption under Section 11, if the said audit report was available with the Department before passing of order / intimation under Section 143(1).

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Only profit element embedded in unaccounted receipts can be taxed and not the entire amount of such receipts.

31. IT(SS) A No. 46/Ahd./2023 and 434/Ahd./2023; IT(SS) A. No. 119 & 120/Ahd./2023

Robin Ramavtar Goenka vs. ACIT

A.Y.s: 2018-19 & 2019-20 Date of Order : 30.05.2025

Sections: 28, 68, 69C

Only profit element embedded in unaccounted receipts can be taxed and not the entire amount of such receipts.

FACTS

The assessee, engaged in real estate business, was part of Sankalp Group. During the course of search action conducted on 30.10.2018 at the premises of Sankalp group, incriminating material such as handwritten diaries, loose papers, unrecorded bills and other documents were seized. These materials revealed evidence of on-money transactions, unaccounted cash sales and cash payments related to land purchases, brokerage, salaries, personal expenses and purchase of jewellery.

The Assessing Officer (AO) made substantial additions in the hands of the assessee and protective addition in the hands of his accountant.

The AO treated unaccounted receipts as undisclosed income and unaccounted payments as unexplained expenditure under section 69C of the Act. He rejected the contentions of the assessee that both receipts and payments were part of normal business activities and that only the profit element therein, estimated at 8% to 10% should be taxed.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who restricted the addition to 14% of the unaccounted payments since the unaccounted payments were greater than unaccounted receipts.

Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A) both the assessee and the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The assessee contended that the rate of 14% adopted by the CIT(A) was excessive and did not reflect real income. It was contended that seized material clearly indicated that both unaccounted receipts and payments were incurred in the course of business. It is only profit element embedded in the receipts which needs to be taxed. Reliance was placed on several decisions of the Tribunal and High Courts.

HELD

The Tribunal agreed with the methodology of CIT(A) of applying a 14% profit rate to unaccounted payments but agreed with the submissions made on behalf of the assessee that the rate was excessive considering the actual profit ratios in real estate business.

The Tribunal directed the AO to reassess the income by adopting a more reasonable profit rate closer to industry standard of 8 to 10% of unaccounted receipts ensuring that only real income is taxed. The Tribunal remanded the matter back to AO for adjudication. It upheld the decision of the CIT(A) to restrict the addition to profit element.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Notice under section 143(2) of the Act which has not been issued in consonance with the CBDT Instruction F No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017 is invalid and an assessment framed consequent to such invalid notice is also invalid and needs to be quashed.

30. Tapan Kumar Das vs. ITO

ITA No. 1660/Kol/2024

A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of Order : 11.03.2025

Sections: 143(2), CBDT Instruction dated 23.6.2017

Notice under section 143(2) of the Act which has not been issued in consonance with the CBDT Instruction F No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017 is invalid and an assessment framed consequent to such invalid notice is also invalid and needs to be quashed.

FACTS

The assessee filed the return of income on 30.10.2017, declaring total income of ₹3,75,780/-, which was selected for scrutiny under Computer Assisted Scrutiny Selection (CASS). Thereafter the notice u/s 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act were issued along with the questionnaire which were duly served upon the assessee. When there was no compliance in the assessment proceedings, the AO framed the ex-parte assessment u/s 144 of the Act vide order dated 27.12.2019, wherein an addition of ₹25,74,500/- was made on account of unexplained money u/s 69A of the Act deposited in the bank account of the assessee during demonetization period.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the addition on the ground that there was no compliance on the part of the assessee.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it raised an additional ground which it claimed to be purely a legal issue viz. that the notice issued under section u/s 143(2) in violation of CBDT Circular No. F.NO.225/157/2017/ITA-11 dated 23.06.2017.

HELD

The Tribunal found that the additional ground raised by the assessee to be purely legal issue qua which all the facts were available in the appeal folder and no further verification of facts was required to be done at the end of the AO. Accordingly, the Tribunal admitted the same for adjudication by following the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Jute Corporation of India Ltd. vs. CIT [187 ITR 688 (SC)] and National Thermal Power Co. Ltd v. CIT [(1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC)].

After hearing the rival contentions and perusing the materials available on record, the Tribunal found that the notice under section 143(2) of the Act has not been issued in consonance with the CBDT Instruction F No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017.

The Tribunal held that, the notice issued u/s 143(2) of the Act which is not in the prescribed format as provided under the Act is an invalid notice and accordingly, all the subsequent proceedings thereto would be invalid and void ab initio. It observed that the case of the assessee finds support from the decision of Shib Nath Ghosh vs. ITO in ITA No. 1812/KOL/2024 for A.Y. 2018-19 vide order dated 29.11.2024.

The Tribunal held the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act to be invalid notice and quashed the assessment since it was framed consequent to an invalid notice and therefore was invalid.

 

S. 36(1)(iii) : Interest on unpaid conversion fees for the period after the mall has been put to use, constitutes revenue expenditure and is allowable under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. S. 43CA : If as on the date of agreement to sell, the collectorate rates for levy of stamp duty are not available, then the value declared by assessee in sale deed on which stamp duty has been paid is to be construed as the correct value and no addition is required to be made. S. 43CA : For the purpose of section 43CA, interest on delayed payment of consideration needs to be aggregated with the sale consideration and such aggregate amount is to be compared with the valuation done by DVO.

29. TS-671-ITAT-2025 (Chandigarh)

CSJ Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

A.Y.s: 2014-15 and 2015-16

Date of Order : 28.05.2025

Sections: 36(1)(iii), 43CA

S. 36(1)(iii) : Interest on unpaid conversion fees for the period after the mall has been put to use, constitutes revenue expenditure and is allowable under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

S. 43CA : If as on the date of agreement to sell, the collectorate rates for levy of stamp duty are not available, then the value declared by assessee in sale deed on which stamp duty has been paid is to be construed as the correct value and no addition is required to be made.

S. 43CA : For the purpose of section 43CA, interest on delayed payment of consideration needs to be aggregated with the sale consideration and such aggregate amount is to be compared with the valuation done by DVO.

FACTS I

The assessee company purchased 20.16 acres of industrial land from Pfizer Ltd. The assessee company obtained approval from Chandigarh Housing Board. It was required to pay conversion fee of ₹185.45 crore, 10% was to be paid as down payment and remaining over a period of 9 years on equated annual instalments with interest @ 8.25% per annum. The assessee company paid ₹18,54,54,744 as down payment on 17.3.2007 and balance was payable in nine equated annual instalments together with interest commencing from 26.03. 2008.

The assessee capitalised the conversion fee payable as cost of land creating a deferred conversion fee liability. The interest pertaining to the construction period was treated as pre-operative expenditure till completion of the mall, office and service building and occupancy certificate was granted. It had capitalised the alleged interest expenditure as per proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Upon the shopping mall having been put to use, interest expenditure was claimed as revenue expenditure.

During the previous year relevant to AY 2014-15, interest on conversion fee was ₹5,69,00,665 – out of this ₹4,91,74,146 pertained to assets put to use (mall and office and service building) and was therefore claimed as revenue expenditure under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and ₹77,26,519 pertained to hotel building and was capitalised under pre-operative expenditure as per proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the act. The Assessing Officer (AO) did not allow the claim of the assessee on the ground that even interest expenditure towards payment of conversion fee paid by the assessee would give enduring benefit in all subsequent years and hence treated the same as capital expenditure.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by relying on the decision in the case of Sanjay Dahuja vs. ACIT [ITA Nos. 95 and 96/Chd./2017] where the Tribunal held that interest on conversion charges after land was first put to use for conducting commercial activities shall not form part of actual cost of land. He also observed that the Delhi bench of ITAT has, on identical facts, taken the same view in DDIT vs. Micron Instruments (P.) Ltd. 38 ITR (T) 242 (Delhi). He also noted that his predecessor in case of Vijay Passi ITA No. 255/2015-16 for AY 2013-14 has also taken the same view.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD I

The Tribunal noted that the asset in the case of the assessee was put to use on 14.3.2013. Till the shopping mall was under construction and asset was not put to use, the assessee has capitalised the interest but for the period from which the asset is put to use, the expenditure is allowable as a revenue expenditure under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. It observed that the CIT(A) has made an elaborate discussion (which has been extracted in the order of the Tribunal) and has followed the order of the Tribunal in the case of Vijay Passi ITA No. 255/2015-16 and has also referred to other judgments. It held that the view taken by CIT(A) is in consonance with the proposition laid down by ITAT as well as in consonance with section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and therefore no interference is called for. The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

FACTS II

The assessee company purchased 20.16 acres of industrial land from M/s Pfizer Ltd. in Chandigarh. The company obtained approval from Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB) for conversion of land from industrial use. It was required to pay conversion fee of ₹1,85,45,47,440. Of this, 10% was to be paid as down payment and balance in nine equated annual instalments with interest at 8.25%. The assessee developed shopping mall on this land.

It entered into agreements to sell in respect of shop numbers A 501 to 503 and B 408 and B 409. The agreement to sell for shop numbers A 501 to 503 were entered on 25.1.2011. The consideration was payable 25% on booking and balance on dates mentioned in the agreement. The buyer made a payment of ₹2,60,00,000 vide cheque on 25.1.2011. There was some dispute between assessee and buyer and ultimately sale deed was executed in the previous year relevant to AY 2014-15. The Assessing Officer (AO) confronted the assessee qua section 43CA.

The AO made an addition to the total income of the assessee. The assessee had declared a loss of ₹65,92,02,520 in the assessment year 2014-15 which was reduced to ₹30,98,19,874.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who referred the valuation of the property to DVO for determining the Fair Market Value of the property and upon receipt of the report from DVO he upheld the addition on the basis of the report of the DVO thereby partly confirming the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that (i) the agreement to sell was entered on 25.1.2011, at that point of time, section 43CA was not on the statute and therefore no addition be made by virtue of provisions of section 43CA; (ii) sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 43CA provide that stamp duty value on the date of agreement to sell be adopted instead of stamp duty value on the date of sale deed and since there was no collectorate rates available for collecting stamp duty on the date of agreement to sell, the fiction created by section 43CA fails. The assessee supported this contention by making a reference to the report of the DVO which rather than adopting the collectorate rate made an observation that adopting collectorate rate to work out FMV of the subject property may not be appropriate in this case; (iii) interest of ₹6.19 crore has been received from the buyer for the period during which dispute remained between the parties. This interest is part and parcel of sale consideration. If sale proceeds and interest are aggregated and then compared with the value worked out by DVO then the difference is 6.51% which is less than the tolerance limit of 10% provided in section 43CA.

HELD II

At the outset, Tribunal observed that section 43CA is pari materia to section 50C. Having noted the provisions of section 43CA, the Tribunal noted that agreement to sell was entered into on 25.01.2011, part payment was made on 25.01.2011 by account payee cheque, the balance payment was not paid as per schedule due to dispute but subsequently interest has been paid for the delayed period. The collectorate rate as on 25.01.2011 ought to have been adopted. Neither the AO nor the DVO could lay their hands on correct rate of stamp valuation authority as on that day. The Tribunal held that the value declared by assessee in sale deed on which stamp duty has been paid is to be construed as the correct value and no addition was required to be made.

The Tribunal proceeded to look at the issue from another angle as well. It held that the alleged interest charged from the buyer would partake character of sale proceeds because it is interest on delayed realisation of sale proceeds for registration of sale deed. For this, the tribunal took support from the decisions in the context of section 80I where it is held that interest would partake character of business income and deduction under section 80I would be applicable. It observed that upon comparison of the aggregate of sale consideration and interest with the valuation done by DVO the difference is less than 10% and on this count also no addition is called for. The Tribunal held that this view is fortified by the order of ITAT in the assessee’s own case for AY 2017-18 [ITA No. 73/Chd./2024; Order dated 06.08.2024].

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal of the assessee.

Assessment order framed by the ITO u/s 143(3) of the Act, without an order under section 127 conferring jurisdiction on him, is bad in law and needs to be quashed.

28. TS-559-ITAT-2025 (Delhi)

Navita Gupta vs. ITO

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of Order : 30.04.2025

Sections: 127, 143(2), 143(3)

Assessment order framed by the ITO u/s 143(3) of the Act, without an order under section 127 conferring jurisdiction on him, is bad in law and needs to be quashed.

FACTS

The assessee preferred an appeal against the order of CIT(A) confirming the addition made under section 69 r.w.s. 115BBE of the Act.

In the course of appellate proceedings before the Tribunal, it was mentioned that the notice under section 143(2) of the Act, for assessment, was issued by ITO, Ward 38(2), New Delhi; whereas the assessment order was passed by ITO Ward 5(2)(3), Noida. The assessment order was passed by the ITO at Noida without there being a transfer order under section 127 of the Act for shifting of jurisdiction from the ITO at Delhi to the ITO at Noida. It was submitted that since the assessment is framed by ITO Ward 5(2)(3), Noida on the basis of notice issued u/s 143(2) of the Act by ITO Ward 38(2), New Delhi, the assessment order passed under section 143(3) of the Act is bad in law. For this proposition, reliance was placed on the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Saroj Sangwan vs. ITO [ITA No. 2428/Delhi/2023; Order dated 17.5.2024] and on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in PCIT vs. Vimal Gupta in ITA No. 515/2016 dated 16.10.2017.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that an identical issue came up for consideration of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Saroj Sangwan (supra). Having noted the observations and the decision in the case of Saroj Sangwan (supra) and also in the case of Vimal Gupta (supra), the Tribunal held that the assessment framed by the ITO, Ward 5(2)(3), Noida without a transfer order having been passed under section 127 of the Act, is bad in law and therefore needs to be quashed.

Charitable Trust – Condonation of the delay of 24 days in filing Form 10B.

11. Mirae Asset Foundation vs. PCIT – 6.

WP No. 713 of 2025 dated 07/07/2025 (Bom) (HC) AY 2021-22 Section 119(2)(b)

Charitable Trust – Condonation of the delay of 24 days in filing Form 10B.

The 1st Respondent refused to condone the delay of 24 days in filing Form 10B for AY 2021-22. Consequently, the exemption claimed by the Petitioner-Foundation, a Charitable Trust, was denied to the Petitioner.

The Hon. Court observed that it is not in dispute that the delay in filing Form 10B is only 24 days. The ground on which delay is not condoned is that even after the filing of Form 10B with a delay of 24 days, no application for condonation of delay was filed immediately and the same was submitted only about 9 months later. Therefore, the delay was not condoned.

The Court further observed that as far as the condonation of delay is concerned, admittedly there was only 24 days delay in filing Form 10B. Further, it was true that the application seeking condonation of delay was filed after about 9 months. However, this delay was not such that should deny the Petitioner from filing Form 10B with a delay of 24 days. Further, if this delay was not condoned, there will be genuine hardship to the Petitioner, inasmuch as, the Petitioner would be denied the exemption otherwise claimed under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, which is a substantial amount. The Court relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Sarvodaya Charitable Trust vs. Income Tax Officer (exemption) [2021] 125 taxmann.com 75 (Gujarat) wherein a view was taken that in cases like delay in filing Form 10B, the approach of the Authorities ought to be equitious, balancing and judicious and availing of exemption should not be denied merely on the bar of limitation. This is more so, when the legislature has conferred wide discretionary powers to condone the delay on the authorities concerned.

As far as the argument of Revenue that the Petitioner has not digitally signed Form 10B, the said argument was found to be factually incorrect.

The impugned order dated 11th December 2024 under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act was accordingly quashed and set aside.

Rectification of Mistake – Subsequent ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be a ground for invoking the provisions of Section 254(2).

10. ITAT PUNE & Others vs. Prakash D. Koli

[WP NO. 10075 OF 2024. Dated: 8/07/2025 ]

Section 254(2)

Rectification of Mistake – Subsequent ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be a ground for invoking the provisions of Section 254(2).

In the present case, initially, the Assessing Officer made a disallowance of ₹24.74 lakhs in the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act on the ground that the Assessee had deposited the employee’s share of EPF and ESI etc., belatedly, and hence, they were not allowed to claim a deduction of this amount under Section 36 (1)(va) of the Act. Being aggrieved by this disallowance, the Assessee filed an Appeal before the CIT(A) without any success. In these circumstances, the Assessee finally approached the ITAT. The ITAT, by its order dated 22nd June 2022 [passed under Section 254(1)], observed that the employee’s share of EPF and ESI etc., was deposited prior to the due date of filing of returns under Section 139(1), and hence, the Assessee is entitled to the deduction. It accordingly allowed the deduction under Section 36(1)(va) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd., (2013) 350 ITR 327 (HP).

After passing of the Tribunal’s order dated 22nd June, 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services P. Ltd., & Ors. vs. CIT & Others [(2022) 448 ITR 518 (SC)], overruled the proposition laid down in Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd., (supra). In other words, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the deposit of the employee’s share of EPF and ESI etc., can be allowed as a deduction to the Assessee under Section 36(1)(va) only if it is deposited before the time limits prescribed under the respective statutes, and not if it is deposited only prior to the due date of filing returns under Section 139(1).

In light of this decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and which was rendered on 12th October, 2022, the Revenue moved a Rectification Application before the ITAT by invoking the provisions of Section 254(2) of the Act. It is in this Rectification Application that the impugned order is passed, wherein the Tribunal has allowed the Miscellaneous Application filed by the Revenue, and holding that the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer is sustained.

The only ground on which the Rectification is allowed is on the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Court in Checkmates Services (supra). As mentioned earlier, this judgment was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 12th October, 2022 which is after the date when the original order was passed by the ITAT on 22nd June, 2022 holding that the Assessee was entitled to this deduction under Section 36 (1)(va).

The Hon. Court held that a subsequent ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be a ground for invoking the provisions of Section 254(2). Section 254(2) can be invoked with a view to rectify any mistake apparent from the record and not otherwise. Admittedly, on the date when the original order was passed by the ITAT on 22nd June, 2022, it followed the law as it stood then. That was overruled subsequently by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Checkmates Services (supra). Hence, on the date when the Tribunal passed its original order (on 22nd June, 2022), it could not be said that there was any error or mistake apparent on the record, giving jurisdiction to the Tribunal to invoke Section 254(2) of the Act.

The Hon. Court referred to the decision of of Infantry Security and Facilities through, proprietor Tukaram M. Surayawanshi vs. The Income Tax Officer, Ward 4 (5) [Writ Petition No. 17175 and other connected matters decided on 3rd December, 2024] wherein the Hon. Court was concerned with the exact same decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Checkmates Services (supra). The Division Bench, after examining the law on the subject, came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was in patent error in exercising jurisdiction under Section 254(2), and passing the impugned order.

In light of the aforesaid discussion, the Petition was allowed.

Capital Asset – Loss – The insurance claim received against dead horses – Taxability.

9. Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) Mumbai vs. M/s Poonawalla Estate Stud & Agricultural Farm.

[ITXA No. 541 of 2003, 535 of 2003 and 540 of 2003 dated: 09/07/2025. (Bom) (HC)]

[AYs : 1988 -1989, 1990-91, 1991-92 & 1995-96]

Section 41(1) vis a vis 45

Capital Asset – Loss – The insurance claim received against dead horses – Taxability.

The Assessee was carrying on the business of breeding, rearing and selling racehorses since the year 1967. At its Stud Farm, there were several mares and stallions. When a male horse or female horse was born, it was being treated as a stock in trade till it attained the age of 2 years. The value of such horses was determined by the Assessee on the basis of expenditure incurred on feeding, medical treatment, training etc. After the horse crossed the age of 2 years, it was either sold or was given on lease for horse racing or transferred to the Plant for being used for breeding activities. The horses have a racing life of about 3 to 5 years. Thereafter, they are mainly used for breeding and therefore such horses are treated as Plant and Machinery and accordingly in the Books of Accounts, the costs of such horses were added to the total of cost of livestock plant. Therefore, all expenses incurred on a horse till attaining the age of 2 years formed part of costs of such horse. After the horse was transferred to the Plant, the expenses incurred on feeding, medical treatment etc. were being claimed as a revenue expenditure. Though the horses were treated as a plant by the Assessee, the depreciation is stated to be not allowed in view of provisions of Section 43(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the revenue income generated upon sale, lease of a horse, the same was offered for taxation.

During the year ending 31 October 1987, relevant to Assessment Year 1988-89, two mares namely, ‘Certainty’ and ‘Gracian Flower’ died, the costs of which in the Books of Accounts of the Assessee was ₹40,000/- and ₹30,000/- respectively. Both the horses were insured with M/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. at ₹6,00,000/- and ₹1,00,000/- respectively on the basis of the market value of the said two mares. Accordingly, the Insurance Company sanctioned the insurance claim and paid ₹6,00,000/- and ₹1,00,000/- respectively to the Assessee. However, the Assessing Officer on its own, allowed ₹40,000/- and ₹30,000/- being debited to the Profit & Loss Account under Section 36(1)(vi) of the Act which provides for deduction. In the same year, the Assessee had debited to its Profit & Loss Account, an amount of ₹3,60,902/- being the loss on disposal of assets (Mares and Stallions).

In the Assessment Order, the Assessing Officer held that the Assessee ought not to have added such loss on the death of mares while computing the total income chargeable to tax as loss on death of an animal is an allowable deduction under Section 36(1)(vi) of the Act. Accordingly, the said loss of ₹3,60,902/- was allowed under Section 36(1)(vi) while computing the total income which included ₹40,000/- being the costs of the Mare “Certainty” for which the Assessee had received insurance claim of ₹6,00,000/-. The cost of the Mare “Gracian Flower” of ₹30,000/- was not allowed in Assessment Year 1988-89 as the same had remained to be debited to the Profit & Loss Account. The Assessing Officer further held that the insurance claim received by the Assessee from the Insurance Company for death of the Mares – Certainty and Gracian Flower was to be deemed as income of the Assessee under Section 41(1) of the Act. The said findings recorded by the Assessing Officer have been upheld in Appeal by Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Aggrieved by the decision of ITAT, the Appellant has filed the Appeal under Section 260A of the Act.

The Hon. Court observed that what has been done in the present case is to shift the income of the Assessee under the head ‘capital gains’ to the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ for the purpose of applicability of provisions of Section 41(1) of the Act, after realising that the said income was not chargeable to tax under Section 45 of the Act. There is no dispute to the position that the Mares were being treated as Livestock Plant and hence considered as capital assets of the Assessee. The issue for consideration is whether the loss of capital asset, which is recouped in the form of insurance claim can be shifted from the head ‘Capital Gain’ under Section 45 of the Act to the head ‘Profits and Gains of business or profession’ under Section 41(1) of the Act?

The Hon. Court noted the cardinal principle of taxation that the heads of income provided in various sections of the Income Tax Act are mutually exclusive and where any item of income falls specifically under one head, it is to be charged for taxation under that head alone and no other. To paraphrase, the income derived from different sources falling under a specific head has to be computed for the purposes of taxation in the manner provided by the appropriate section and no other. Thus, it is impermissible for the Revenue to impose tax on income forming part of particular head and governed by particular section, by shifting the same under another head for the purpose of applicability of another section of the Act. If the department finds that an income under a particular head does not become liable to tax on account of provision of a Section governing that head, it is impermissible to shift that income to another head merely because the Department thinks that the very same income, upon its shift to another head, can be taxed under another Section of the Income Tax Act. These principles have been reiterated in several judgments namely Cadell Wvg. Mill Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2001] 249 ITR 265 (Bombay) and CIT vs. D. P. Sandhu Bros. Chembur (P.) Ltd. [2005] 273 ITR 1 (SC).

Thus, the Hon. Court held that the Revenue has grossly erred in shifting the amount of insurance claim received by the Assessee from the head ‘capital gains’ to another head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ for the purpose of bringing the same to taxation under Section 41(1) of the Act. The Revenue itself has treated the horses as ‘capital assets’. This position is affirmed by all the three Authorities. The fact that the Revenue authorities allowed deduction u/s. 36(1)(vi) only means that they are treated as capital asset of the assessee. After treating the horses as ‘capital assets’ of the Assessee, the insurance receipt would obviously become capital gain for the Assessee, which can only be taxed under the provisions of Section 45 of the Act. The Revenue however found that it was not possible to tax the said ‘capital gain’ under Section 45 of the Act and therefore decided to treat the income as ‘profit’ under Section 41(1) of the Act. This is clearly impermissible.

As regards treatment of the receipt under an insurance claim for the purpose of income-tax, the Court observed that the Revenue itself has treated the horses as ‘capital asset’ of the Assessee. Therefore, if a capital is lost on account of death of a horse, any amount received towards insurance claim of such loss would obviously be on capital account. Section 45 of the Act deals with capital gains and subsection (1) thereof provides that any profits or gains arising from ‘transfer’ of capital assets effected in the previous year shall be chargeable to income tax under the head ‘capital gains’.

The issue therefore is whether insurance receipt consequent to death of a horse would amount to ‘transfer’ within the meaning of Section 45 of the Act. The term ‘transfer’ has been defined under Section 2(47) of the Act. It is contended by the Assessee that insurance receipt on death of a horse would not be covered by definition of the term ‘transfer’ in relation to capital asset. Death of a horse cannot be treated as ‘transfer’ under Section 2(47) of the Act as a transfer presumes both existence of asset, as well as transferee to whom it is transferred.

The Hon Court observed that this position is well settled by the judgment in Vania Silk Mills (P.) Ltd. [1991] 191 ITR 647 (SC) in which the issue before the Apex Court was whether money received towards insurance claim on account of damage/destruction of capital asset would be on account of ‘transfer’ of the asset within the meaning of Section 45. The Apex Court held that when an asset is destroyed there is no question of transferring it to others. The destruction or loss of the asset, no doubt, brings about the destruction of the right of the owner or possessor of the asset, in it. But it is not on account of transfer. It is on account of the disappearance of the asset. The extinguishment of right in the asset on account of extinguishment of the asset itself is not a transfer of the right but its destruction. By no stretch of imagination, the destruction of the right on account of the destruction of the asset can be equated with the extinguishment of right on account of its transfer. Section 45 speaks about capital gains arising out of “transfer” of asset and not on account of “extinguishment of right” by itself. The capital gains are attracted by transfer and not merely by extinguishment of right howsoever brought about. Hence an extinguishment of right not brought about by transfer is outside the purview of Section 45. Transfer presumes both the existence of the asset and of the transferee to whom it is transferred. It is true that the definition of “transfer” in Section 2(47) of the Act is inclusive, and therefore, extends to events and transactions which may not otherwise be “transfer” according to its ordinary, popular and natural sense. The expression “extinguishment of any rights therein” will have to be confined to the extinguishment of rights on account of transfer and cannot be extended to mean any extinguishment of right independent of or otherwise than on account of transfer.

The above position was reiterated by the Madras High Court in Division Bench judgment in Neelamalai Agro Industries Ltd. [2003] 259 ITR 651 (Madras) where there was a fire accident in the factory of the Assessee who received compensation from the insurance company. The Apex Court proceeded to regard insurance receipt as ‘transfer’ under Section 2(47) of the Act and brought to tax, part of the said compensation claimed under Section 45 of the Act.

In CIT vs. Pfizer Ltd. [2011] 330 ITR 62 (Bombay) the Apex Court held that receipt under insurance claim would be treated in the like manner as if receipt arises on the sale of the asset.

Thus, following the ratio of the judgments in Vania Silk Mills (P.) Ltd., Pfizer Ltd and Neelmalai Agro Industries Ltd., the money received towards insurance claim on account of damage to or destruction of capital asset cannot be treated as transfer of capital assets so as to attract tax under the provisions of Section 45(1) of the Act.

Having realized that the insurance receipt cannot be taxed as capital gain under Section 45 of the Act, the Assessing Officer has taken recourse to the provisions of Section 41(1) of the Act for the purpose of bringing the insurance receipt to tax.

Section 41 provides for taxation of ‘profits’. The Court already held that it is impermissible to shift the insurance receipt as a part of ‘capital asset’ from the realm of Section 45 by treating it as ‘profits’ merely because the tax becomes leviable under Section 41. The heading ‘capital gains’ governed by the provisions of Section 45 is mutually exclusive from the heading ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ governed by Section 41 of the Act. Following these principles, it was impermissible for the Revenue to treat insurance receipts on loss of horses as profits under Section 41 of the Act.

Further, even if it is assumed that provisions of Section 41 of the Act can be invoked in the facts of the present case, the receipt towards insurance claim would still be outside the purview of Section 41(1) of the Act as the same does not satisfy the conditions laid down therein. Section 41(1) can be pressed into service only if an allowance is granted in one year and subsequently the amount is received in another year. In the present case, the insurance receipt is assessed by the Assessing Officer in the same year in which the deduction was granted. Section 41(1) essentially applies to a situation where deduction is made by the Assessee in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability and subsequently the Assessee secures an amount in respect of such loss or expenditure, the amount obtained by such person becomes ‘profits’ and accordingly can be charged to income tax.

The contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the expression used under Section 41(1) is ‘any amount’ and that even insurance receipt would be covered by the expression ‘any amount’ was held to be totally unfounded as no deduction was allowable under Section 36(1)(vi) of the Act in respect of the two horses for which insurance claim is received. Therefore, the insurance claim received towards death of the two horses could not be charged to tax under Section 41(1) of the Act, even independent of the principle of impermissibility to shift income of Assessee from one head to another for the purpose of taxation.

Therefore, the horses in respect of which the insurance claim was received were Assessee’s capital assets and that therefore insurance receipt arising therefrom could only have been considered as capital receipt, not chargeable to tax.

The Court further observed that the Legislature made a provision by inserting sub-section (1A) to Section 45 to cover the amount received under insurance claim on destruction of capital asset to tax. However, the said provision came to be introduced by Finance Act, 1999 w.e.f. 1 April 2000 and the same has no application to the present case. Thus, the insurance claim received towards destruction of capital asset has been brought to taxation for the first time from 1 April 2000. Going further, it is seen that provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 45 apply only where the destruction occurs on account of one of the four specified events. It is therefore highly doubtful whether destruction of capital asset of livestock on account of death of the animal would really be covered by the provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 45. However, since the said provision under Section 45(1A) was not even available during the relevant Assessment Year, the issue of applicability of the said provision in case of destruction of asset of livestock on account of death of an animal is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

The Revenue was directed to treat the entire amounts of insurance claim received by the Assessee for death of horses as capital receipt governed only by provisions of Section 45(1) of the Act.

TDS — Statutory authority — Duty to be fair in its commercial dealings — Statutory authority entering into contract with firm for supply of material and performance of engineering work — Tax deducted at source not deposited with Department — Statutory authority retaining part of bill amounts due to firm for its income-tax contingency — Statutory authority had no right to retain any amount due to firm — High Court directed the statutory authority to return withheld amount with interest — Cost imposed on statutory authority to be recovered from its managing director.

28. (2025) 474 ITR 271 (Jharkhand):

Anvil Cables (P) Ltd. vs. State of Jharkhand:

Date of order 08.04.2024:

Sections 195 and 201(1A)

TDS — Statutory authority — Duty to be fair in its commercial dealings — Statutory authority entering into contract with firm for supply of material and performance of engineering work — Tax deducted at source not deposited with Department — Statutory authority retaining part of bill amounts due to firm for its income-tax contingency — Statutory authority had no right to retain any amount due to firm — High Court directed the statutory authority to return withheld amount with interest — Cost imposed on statutory authority to be recovered from its managing director.

The petitioner-firm provided comprehensive engineering, procurement and construction services to the core sector industries in India. The State authority JBVNL entered into a contract with the petitioner for rural electrification work. The JBVNL deducted tax at source at two per cent. From the bill raised by the petitioner for the supply of material and also retained an amount on the pretext of “Income-tax contingencies”. The petitioner requested the JBVNL to release such amount so withheld and also informed that the amount withheld by it was not reflected in Form 26AS. The JBVNL stated that the amount withheld had been kept back to safeguard its interest and that the kept back amount would be released or the tax deducted at source certificate would be issued depending on the outcome of the appeal filed by it against the demand notice u/s. 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Jharkhand High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) In our opinion, the demand notice issued to the JBVNL that it committed default in not making tax at source deductions cannot cloak the JBVNL with any authority or even an excuse to withhold a certain amount from the running bills of the contractor. This is quite curious that the JBVNL seeks to take a stand before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that it was not under an obligation to deduct two per cent tax deducted at source from the running bills of the contractor raised towards the supply of materials and, on the other hand, it has retained ₹2,90,32,000 towards payment of two per cent tax at source deductions on that count. This is also relevant that the deductions by the JBVNL starting from the financial year 2016-2017 have accumulated to ₹2,90,32,000 but it did not deposit the said amount with the Income-tax Department. The amount so withheld from the running bills of the petitioner-firm is speculative and a kind of wagering step by JBVNL. The JBVNL has no authority in law to withhold ₹2,90,32,000 as “kept back” amount for the purpose of litigation with the Income-tax Department. The action of JBVNL in withholding ₹2,90,32,000 is therefore held illegal and had to be returned with interest.

ii) This is well-settled that the explicit terms of the contract are always the final words with regard to the intention of the parties. In ONGC Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. [(2003) 5 SCC 705; 2003 SCC OnLine SC 545.] the hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the intention of the parties is to be gathered from the words used in the agreement. In Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corporation [(1990) 3 SCC 752; 1990 SCC OnLine SC 43.] the hon’ble Supreme Court held that the State or its instrumentalities are “State” under article 12 of the Constitution and its actions even in commercial transactions must be reasonable, fair and just. In Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corporation [(1990) 3 SCC 752; 1990 SCC OnLine SC 43.] , the hon’ble Supreme Court further indicated that the requirement of being just, fair and reasonable on the part of the State and its instrumentalities extends in cases where no formal contract has been entered.

iii) Any unjust retention of money or property of another shall be against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The unauthorised deductions from the running bills of the petitioner-firm are patently illegal. Such deductions caused losses to the petitioner-firm which filed its Income-tax returns but was deprived of ₹2,90,32,000 and thereby suffered business or atleast interest losses. On the other hand, the JBVNL was unjustly enriched and need to restitute the petitioner-firm. The refund of ₹2,90,32,000 must therefore carry interest as a matter of course. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. UOI [(2011) 8 SCC 161; (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 87; 2011 SCC OnLine SC 961.] , the hon’ble Supreme Court held that this is the bounden duty of the court to neutralise unjust enrichment by imposing compound interest and punitive costs.

iv) As per clause 10.7.4 of the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission, Ranchi (Electricity Supply Code) Regulation, 2015, the interest rate to be paid on any excess amount paid by the consumer is equivalent to the interest rate paid by the consumer on delay payment surcharge. Therefore, the JBVNL shall pay interest over the withheld amount of ₹2,90,32,000 as per clause 10.7.4 of the Regulation of 2015.

v) The petitioner-firm was unnecessarily dragged to the court and, that too, knowingly and for no fault on its part. The litigation file that has been produced in the court reveals that a decision in the context of the order dated March 14, 2024 passed by this court has been taken at the highest level of the managing director of JBVNL. Therefore, we are of the definite opinion that the JBVNL must be saddled with cost of ₹5 lakhs which shall be recovered from the managing director. This writ petition is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.”

TDS — Credit for TDS — Tax deducted by employer but not deposited with Government — In view of provision of section 205, it is made clear that the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from that income — Both the circular dt. 1st June 2015 and the Office Memorandum dt. 11th March 2016 have been issued in consonance with the provisions contained in section 205 — Department shall not deny the benefit of tax deducted at source by the employer during the relevant financial years to the assessee — Credit of the tax shall be given to the Assessee and if in the interregnum, any recovery or adjustment is made by the Department, the assessee shall be entitled to the refund, with statutory interest

27. [2025] 343 CTR 133 (Ori):

Malay Kar vs. UOI:

AY. 2013-14: Date of order 03.05.2024:

Sections 199 and 205

TDS — Credit for TDS — Tax deducted by employer but not deposited with Government — In view of provision of section 205, it is made clear that the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from that income — Both the circular dt. 1st June 2015 and the Office Memorandum dt. 11th March 2016 have been issued in consonance with the provisions contained in section 205 — Department shall not deny the benefit of tax deducted at source by the employer during the relevant financial years to the assessee — Credit of the tax shall be given to the Assessee and if in the interregnum, any recovery or adjustment is made by the Department, the assessee shall be entitled to the refund, with statutory interest.

The Assessee is an employee of M/s. Corporate Ispat Alloys Ltd. During the previous year relevant to A. Y. 2013-14, the Assessee received gross salary of ₹25,39,766 out of which a sum of ₹5,90,112 was deducted at source u/s. 192 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, in the Form 26AS, TDS of only ₹3,21,379 was reflected as deducted and paid by the employer. Thus, there was a difference of ₹2,68,733. The return of income filed by the Assessee was processed and intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Act was issued. The said intimation was issued without taking into account TDS of ₹2,68,733 deducted by the employer and interest u/s. 234B and 234C was also charged for shortfall in payment of prepaid taxes.

On receipt of intimation, the Assessee addressed a letter to the Managing Director of the employer company for the mismatch of tax deducted u/s. 192 of the Act. The Assessee also sent a letter to the Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS) for initiation of appropriate action against the deductor / employer. The Assessee’s contention was that as per section 143(1)(c), the CPC is under legal obligation to take into account the tax deducted at source, tax collected at source, advance tax, etc. Despite the communication made to CIT(TDS), there was no communication with regard to the steps taken by the authority.

Due to inaction on the part of CPC in granting credit of tax u/s. 143(1)(c), the Assessee filed writ petition before the High Court. The Hon’ble Orissa High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) The circular and the Office Memorandum have been issued in consonance with the provisions contained in s. 205 of the IT Act. In the Office Memorandum dt. 11th March, 2016, it has been mentioned that the Board had issued directions to the field officers that in case of an assessee whose tax has been deducted at source but not deposited to the Government’s account by the deductor, the deductee assessee shall not be called upon to pay the demand to the extent tax has been deducted from his income. It was further specified that s. 205 of the IT Act puts a bar on direct demand against the assessee in such cases and the demand on account of tax credit mismatch in such situations cannot be enforced coercively.

ii) Sec. 205 of the IT Act read with CBDT circular, referred to above, being statutory one, the said provision has to be adhered to in letter and spirit and to give effect to such provision, CBDT circular was issued on 1st June, 2015 and the Office Memorandum was issued on 11th March, 2016. Therefore, for tax credit mismatch cannot be enforced coercively against the petitioner assessee.

iii) In view of the provisions contained in s. 205 of the IT Act, which provides that where tax is deductible at the source the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from that income and its applicability is not depending upon the credit for tax being given under s. 199 of the IT Act. Thereby, the Department shall not deny the benefit of tax deducted at source by the employer during the relevant financial years to the petitioner. The credit of the tax shall be given to the petitioner and if in the interregnum, any recovery or adjustment is made by the Department, the petitioner shall be entitled to the refund, with the statutory interest”

Return — Condonation of delay — Mistake in filling appropriate columns in the return vis a vis intimation by CPC — Assessee submitted corrected return in response to intimation dated 03.09.2019 issued by the CPC — Since the time to file revised return had expired on 31.03.2019, the Assessee filed corrected / revised return u/s. 119(2)(b) — Respondent was only required to consider the revised return as there was only a correction of mistake in the presentation of the correct figures — No impact of the corrected return on the income of the Assessee — It was only to facilitate the CPC to process the return so that Assessee is entitled to refund — Respondent ought to have allowed the application to condone the delay in filing the corrected / revised return.

26. [2025] 344 CTR 179 (Guj.):

Ujala Dyeing & Printing Mills (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT:

A.Y.: 2018-19: Date of order 04.03.2025:

Secions 119(2)(b), 143(1)(a) and 237

Return — Condonation of delay — Mistake in filling appropriate columns in the return vis a vis intimation by CPC — Assessee submitted corrected return in response to intimation dated 03.09.2019 issued by the CPC — Since the time to file revised return had expired on 31.03.2019, the Assessee filed corrected / revised return u/s. 119(2)(b) — Respondent was only required to consider the revised return as there was only a correction of mistake in the presentation of the correct figures — No impact of the corrected return on the income of the Assessee — It was only to facilitate the CPC to process the return so that Assessee is entitled to refund — Respondent ought to have allowed the application to condone the delay in filing the corrected / revised return.

The Assessee, a private limited company, filed its return of income for AY 2018-19 on 24.09.2018 declaring total income at ₹81,85,340 and claimed a refund of ₹38,08,115. On 03.09.2019, the Assessee received an intimation from CPC pointing out mismatch in respect of disallowance of expenditure reported in Form 3CD but not taken into account in computing the total income of the Assessee. This was as a result of clubbing of disallowance of expenditure under column 23 instead of column 15 and column 18. In response to the intimation, the Assessee corrected its return of income and filed the corrected return of income electronically as per the intimation received from CPC. Since the mistake was corrected by showing disallowance under correct columns, the total income of the Assessee in the corrected return remained unchanged.

The CPC regarded the return as belated revised return and forwarded the same to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and deemed it to be a return filed u/s. 119(2)(b) of the Act and intimated the Assessee vide letter dated 23.09.2019. Pursuant to receipt of the said communication, the Assessee filed applications dated 30.07.2020 and 06.08.2020 u/s. 119(2)(b) to condone the delay in filing the corrected return of income so as to consider it as revised return for processing the same by the CPC.

Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 10.05.2023 was issued requiring the Assessee to show cause why the application for condonation of delay should not be rejected. The Assessee filed its response and also furnished the details called for by further notice. However, the application was rejected vide order dated 23.08.2023. Thereafter the Assessee, vide letters dated 07.10.2023 and 10.02.2024 requested the Assessing Officer to process the original return filed by the Assessee. Since no response was received, the Assessee filed grievance on 16.03.2024 before the CBDT which was also rejected on 18.02.2024. Once again, the Assessee wrote a letter to the Assessing Officer to grant the refund of ₹38,08,120.

Since no response was received, the Assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) The CPC issued the intimation dated 03/09/2019 pointing out the mistake in the return and therefore the petitioner was called upon to submit the response thereto. The petitioner having found such mistake has therefore rightly filed a corrected/revised return under Section 119 (2) (b) of the Act as the time to file the revised return had already expired on 31/03/2019 as per the provision of Section 139(5) of the Act. The respondent was therefore only required to consider such revised return as there was only a correction of the mistake in the presentation of the correct figures in the column-15 and column-18 instead of clubbing the same in column-23 of the return and instead thereof, the respondent has enlarged the scope of Section 119(2)(b) by not redressing such minor corrections to be made in the return of income and has rejected the same on the ground of genuine hardship and advising the petitioner to avail the other legal resources under Section 254 or Section 154 of the Act unmindful of the fact situation that there was no impact on the corrected return on the taxable income of the petitioner and it was only to facilitate the CPC to process the return so that the petitioner is entitled to the refund, if any, so as to compute the taxable income of the petitioner in accordance with law as provided under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent no.2 ought to have allowed the applications to condone the delay in filing the corrected/revised return which was a formality only as only the correct presentation in Form-ITR-6 was not made by the petitioner which has prevented the CPC from processing the return.

ii) Such an irresponsible approach by the respondent no.2 being unmindful of the fact situation has resulted into filing of this petition causing great hardship to the petitioner preventing and denying the legitimate refund to which the petitioner was otherwise eligible to get in the year 2019 itself.

iii) Considering the above fact situation and in view of the foregoing reasons, these petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. Impugned order dated 24/08/2023 passed u/s. 119 (2)(b) is hereby quashed and set aside and the delay in filing the revised return is hereby ordered to be condoned and respondent no.1 is directed to process/transmit the revised return filed by the petitioner on 6/09/2019 to CPC to process the same in accordance with law.”

Reassessment — Limitation — Notice challenged in writ petition before the High Court — Direction of the Court and quashing of assessment order — Case sent back for deciding assessee’s objection and to pass further orders — No observations on the merits of the case — Applicability of extended period of limitation — In consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction Department cannot claim the benefit of extended period of limitation – Assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 and 144B is beyond the period of limitation.

25. [2025] 343 CTR 181 (Bom.):

Wavy Construction LLP vs. ACIT:

A. Y. 2012-13:

Date of order 20.12.2024:

Sections 143(3), 144B, 147, 148, 153(3)(ii) and 260

Reassessment — Limitation — Notice challenged in writ petition before the High Court — Direction of the Court and quashing of assessment order — Case sent back for deciding assessee’s objection and to pass further orders — No observations on the merits of the case — Applicability of extended period of limitation — In consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction Department cannot claim the benefit of extended period of limitation – Assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 and 144B is beyond the period of limitation.

The Assessee filed its return of income for AY 2012-13 on 29.09.2012. The return was processed and intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued. Subsequently, in 2018, notice u/s. 133(6) was issued by the DDIT(I&CI) calling for details in respect of transaction of sale of land by the Assessee. The Assessee filed the details and replies from time to time. Thereafter, in the aforesaid backdrop, notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued on 29.03.2019 for re-opening of assessment. The Assessee filed its objections against the re-opening of assessment. The objections raised by the Assessee were rejected vide order dated 25.11.2019 and the assessment was completed vide order dated 19.05.2021.

The Assessee filed a writ petition challenging the notice issued u/s. 148 and the order disposing objections passed by the Assessing Officer. The Hon’ble High Court, vide order dated 13.12.2019 granted ad interim stay on the notice and the further proceedings. The said interim order continued until 21.09.2021 when the High Court passed the final order disposing the writ petition. While disposing the writ petition, the High Court remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer thereby directing him to consider the objections filed by the Assessee and pass further orders and also gave opportunity to the Assessee to make further submissions. However, there were no observations / findings given on the merits of the case.

In accordance with the directions of the High Court, an opportunity was given to the Assessee and the Assessee filed further submissions. Thereafter, the objections of the Assessee were rejected vide order dated 14.10.2021. The assessment proceedings were transferred to the National Faceless Assessment Centre. Notices were issued u/s. 142(1). However, since the Assessee was not aware of the issuance of notice us/. 142(1), the same remained to be replied. Subsequently, a show cause notice was issued upon the Assessee requiring the Assessee to furnish the response as to why the proposed addition should not be made. In response to the show cause notice, the Assessee filed its reply contending that the assessment was time barred. The Assessee stated that the as per provisions of section 153(2), the time limit for passing the order was 9 months from the end the financial year in which notice u/s. 148 was issued and since the notice u/s. 148 was issued on 29.03.2019, the time limit to pass the order expired on 31.12.2019. Further, the Assessee submitted that even if the period during which the proceedings were stayed by the High Court were excluded, the order ought to have been passed on or before 20.11.2021. It was submitted that all the notices issued after 20.11.2021 were time barred and had no validity in law. The Assessee also filed its response on the merits of the case. Once again show cause notice was issued in September 2022 which was replied by the Assessee and final assessment order came to be passed on 28.09.2022 wherein addition as proposed to be made was added to the total income of the Assessee.

Against this order of re-assessment, the Assessee once again filed a writ petition before the High Court. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) It is clear that the order dated 21 September 2021 passed by the Division Bench (supra) does not contain any findings necessary for disposal of the writ petition in a particular manner, so as to govern the issues which would be decided by the Assessing Officer. We may observe that in the context in hand when the Revenue seeks to take recourse to sub-section (6)(i) of Section 153 of the IT Act so as to avail all the benefits of extended period as stipulated by such provision, necessarily the Court is required to apply the principles as enunciated in the decisions as noted by us hereinabove, so as to make an exception from the applicability of sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3), (5) and (5A) can be, only in the event when such assessment, reassessment and recomputation is being made qua the assessee “in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction” of any Court, as relevant in the present facts.

ii) The words “in consequence of or to give effect” would be required to be read in conjunction. As both these expressions are complementary to each other namely that such assessment, reassessment or recomputation is required to be made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order of the nature as specified in clause (i) of sub-section (6). Thus, the consequence needs to be created by such order and as a result of a finding or direction as may be contained in an order, as the provision envisages. It is but for natural, that any finding or direction needs to be taken to its logical conclusion and which is the sequel which would emanate from a finding or direction in the order. Thus, the intention of the legislature in providing for such expression is that an order which clause (i) of sub-section (6) talks about, is necessarily required to be an order which not only guides, but controls the course of such assessment, reassessment or recomputation, and not otherwise.

iii) As the order dated 21 September 2021 passed by this Court on the petitioner’s writ petition (supra) do not, in any manner, record a finding or issues directions as understood in terms of clause (i) of sub-section(6) of Section 153. We do not see how the Revenue can avoid the consequence of the limitation in the present case, being triggered by the first proviso below Explanation 1. In our opinion, as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioner, applying the provisions of clause (ii) below Explanation 1 read with the first proviso below Explanation 1, certainly the limitation for the Assessing Officer to pass the Assessment Order had come to an end on 20 November 2021 i.e. sixty days from 21 September 2021 (orders passed by the High Court) by applying the extended period as per the first proviso below Explanation 1, whereas the impugned assessment order has been passed almost ten months after the limitation expired. Thus, the case of the Revenue in regard to applicability of the extended period under sub-section (6)(i) of Section 153 cannot be accepted.”

Non-resident — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Payment to non-resident — Royalty — Amount paid for use and resale of computer software through distribution or end user licence agreement is not royalty — Not assessable in India.

24. (2025) 475 ITR 57 (Bom):

CIT(LTU) vs. Reliance Industries Ltd.:

Date of order 21.06.2024:

Section 9(1)(vi)

Non-resident — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Payment to non-resident — Royalty — Amount paid for use and resale of computer software through distribution or end user licence agreement is not royalty — Not assessable in India.

In its application as filed u/s. 195(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee raised contentions as to why remittance made to such foreign parties was not liable to be taxed as “royalty”, under the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. Such application of the assessee was rejected by an order dated September 14, 2003 passed by the Deputy Director of Income-tax (International Taxation).

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed appeal filed by the assessee. In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the primary issue which had arisen for consideration of the Tribunal was as to whether the remittance made by the assessee to foreign parties on account of purchase of certain computer software, required for the business of the assessee, would be liable to tax in India as “royalty” under the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or would it be a business income of the recipient companies. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue,

In the appeal filed by the Revenue before the High Court the following substantial question of law which we have reframed:

“Whether the payments made by the assessee for obtaining computer software were liable to be to taxed in India as royalty under the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act?”

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) In the case of Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [(2021) 432 ITR 471 (SC); (2022) 3 SCC 321; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 159; (2021) 125 taxmann.com 42 (SC).] the Supreme Court laid down that amount paid by resident Indian end user and distributer to non-resident computer software manufacturers and suppliers, as consideration for the resale or use of the computer software through end user licence agreement and distribution agreement, is not royalty for the use of copyright of computer software, and that it does not give rise to any income taxable in India.

ii) Accordingly, the remittance made by the assessee to foreign parties on account of purchase of certain computer software, required for the business of the assessee, would not be liable to tax in India as “royalty” under the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.”

Glimpses Of Supreme Court Rulings

5. PCIT vs. MD Industries Pvt. Ltd.

(2025) 473 ITR 751 (SC)

Settlement of a case – Appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) – When the application before the Settlement Commission is pending and an order under Section 245D(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the application is yet to be passed, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) should keep the appellate proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of the application by the Settlement Commission – It is only if the application for settlement is rejected without providing for terms of settlement that Section 245HA of the Act will be applicable and the appellate proceedings will stand revived.

A survey action u/s.133A of the Act was carried out in the premises of Shri Pankaj Danawala CA and in the premises of MD Industries by the DDIT (Inv) II, Surat on 11.03.2005. During the survey Shri Pankaj Danawala CA, was found to have created large number of bogus capital build-up cases in the name of different persons by adopting various modus operandi. Further, such funds were transferred to the various assessees of MD group. Shri Pankaj Danawala, in his statement recorded during the survey, accepted this fact and Shri Kirit Patel, the Director of MD Industries Pvt. Ltd. vide his statement recorded on oath u/s.131 of the Act on 20.05.2005 had further confirmed and owned up the bank accounts and benamidars.

MD Industries Pvt. Ltd. (the assessee) filed application for settlement on 09.03.2006 before the Settlement Commission.

The Assessing Officer meanwhile passed an assessment order Section 143(3) of the Act on 28.12.2006.

The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(Appeal) who dismissed the appeals without entering into the merits on account of the pendency of the application filed by the assessee before the Settlement Commission as per the provisions of section 245F(2) of the Act.

The Settlement Commission admitted the twenty applications of the M. D. Group under Section 245(H)(A) vide order dated 20.02.2008. The Settlement Commission by order dated 31.03.2008 disposed of all the settlement applications filed by the petitioner as abated on account of the amendment in the Act.

The order of the Settlement Commission was challenged before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court on 28.04.2008. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court by common order dated 07.08.2009 involving 9 out of 20 applicants remanded the matter back to the Settlement Commission for fresh consideration.

Thereafter, the report under Rule 9 of the Settlement Commissioner Rules was submitted by the CIT before the Settlement Commission and the assessee raised objections to the said report vide submissions dated 10.09.2018 which was forwarded by the Settlement Commission to the Principal CIT(1), Surat. The Principal CIT(1), Surat, vide letter dated 18.10.2018 submitted comments on the submission of the assessee and thereafter several hearings were conducted before the Settlement Commission in the proceeding under section 245D(4) of the Act.

The assessee thereafter filed an appeal before the ITAT challenging the order dated 06.09.2007 passed by the CIT(Appeal) with an application to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. The ITAT by order dated 06.12.2019 condoned the delay of 4379 days and remitted the matter back to the CIT(Appeal) for fresh consideration on merits.  The Revenue preferred Misc. Applications before the Tribunal for recall of the aforesaid order dated 06.12.2019, on the ground that there was a mistake apparent on record, It was submitted that as the applications were pending before the Settlement Commission, the Tribunal could not have proceeded with the appeals filed by the assessee as the jurisdiction over the matter would lie before the Settlement Commission as per Section 245F(2) of the Act and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal. It was further pointed out to the Tribunal that as the CIT(Appeal) had dismissed the appeal of the assessee for want of jurisdiction, and the disposal was only for statistical purposes, it was not an appealable order. It was also pointed out to the Tribunal that there was mistake apparent on record as the Tribunal has relied upon the order passed in ITA No.1635 to 1638 and 1655 of 2016. However, the facts of those cases are not identical to that of the assessee, as in those cases the applications were not admitted by the Settlement Commission, whereas in the case of the assessee the applications were admitted by the Settlement Commission.

The Tribunal by impugned common order dated 02.01.2021 dismissed all the Miscellaneous applications.

Being aggrieved the Revenue preferred writ petitions before the High Court.

The High Court did not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and came to the conclusion that there was no mistake apparent on record in the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after following the decision of the Coordinate Bench, had condoned the delay and as the CIT(A) did not adjudicate the issue on merits (the CIT(A) dismissed the appeals of the respondent-assessee as not maintainable in view of the order passed by the Settlement Commission on the ground that the matters have abated), the Tribunal had rightly remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) in light of the decision of the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in case of the Kirit M. Patel in ITA No.1639, 1821 and 1822 of 2016 dated 29.05.2018.

The High Court dismissed these petitions as being without any merit.

The Revenue filed Special leave Applications before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that the application before the Settlement Commission were pending and an order under section 245D(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the application was yet to be passed.

According to the Supreme Court, it is only if the application for settlement is rejected without providing for terms of settlement that Section 245HA of the Act will be applicable and the appellate proceedings will stand revived.

According to the Supreme Court, the stand of the Revenue that the assessee must give up his right to contest the assessment order on merits, if the settlement application is rejected, without providing for terms of settlement was misconceived and therefore rejected the same.

The Supreme Court in the peculiar facts of the case held that the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay, as well as setting aside the order of the CIT(A) and restoring the first appeal. Recording the aforesaid, the Supreme Court dismissed the present special leave petition. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the CIT(A) should keep the appellate proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of the application by the Settlement Commission in terms of the Act.

6. Woodland (Aero Club) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

(2025) 474 ITR 322 (SC)

Appeal to the High Court – Substantial questions of law – Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant before the High Court erroneously contended that two substantial questions of law were covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court against the Assessee, but that was not so – Supreme Court was of the view that an opportunity must be given to the Appellant herein to make submissions on those two substantial questions of law and for the purpose of reconsidering whether they were covered by the judgment of the Court against the Assessee or not

When the appeal (ITA 267/2023) had come for admission before the Delhi High Court on 18th May, 2023, Mr Jain the Counsel for the Appellant had submitted that while a substantial part of the issue in the appeal was covered by the judgment of Supreme Court rendered in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(2022) 448 ITR 518 (SC)], there was one limb which still remained alive. According to him, in certain cases, the due date which arose under the subject statute for deposit of employees’ contribution towards provident fund, arose on a National Holiday, for instance, 15th August, and the deposit was made on the following day. In support of the plea that this aspect is pending examination by the Court, Mr Jain has cited the order of the Coordinate Bench, in ITA No. 12/2023 titled as Pr. Commissioner Of Income Tax-7 vs. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Mr. Jain said that he would have to move an application for amendment, so that this aspect of the matter, which otherwise emerges from the record, could be embedded in the grounds of appeal. The Court was pleased to grant leave in that behalf.

On 5th September, 2023, the Delhi High Court observed that the appeal was required to be admitted qua one issue and framed the following question of law:

“Whether the Income tax Appellate Tribunal misdirected itself on facts and in law in failing to notice that ₹44,28,453, the amount payable towards the provident fund and ₹72,131, the amount payable towards the Employees’ State Insurance, fell due on a National Holiday, i.e. August 15, 2018 and, therefore the deposit made on the following date, i.e., August 16, 2018 was amenable to deduction?”

The High Court allowed the appeal of the Appellant following its decision in Pr. CIT vs. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Delhi 5984).

The Appellant though having succeeded in the appeal approached the Supreme Court.

Learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted before the Supreme Court that on 18.05.2023, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant expressly submitted before the High Court that two substantial questions of law raised in the appeal were covered by the judgment of the Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1423) and therefore, only one substantial question of law remained for consideration. On the basis of the said submission, the High Court considered only one substantial question of law and answered the said substantial question of law in favour of the Appellant herein (Assessee) and against the respondent (Revenue). However, the appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted before the Supreme Court that although the third substantial question of law was answered in favour of the appellant herein, nevertheless, the appellant was aggrieved, in the sense that an erroneous submission was made on behalf of the appellant on 18.05.2023 to the effect that two other substantial questions of law had been covered by the judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra). In fact, the said submission was not in accordance with law and the High Court ought to have considered the said two substantial questions of law also raised by the Appellant herein. Nevertheless, there can be no error, as such, in the order dated 18.05.2023. But the fact remained that the appellant had now lost an opportunity of making its submissions on the two other substantial questions of law on account of the submission made on behalf of the appellant. Learned senior counsel, therefore, prayed that the appellant herein may be given an opportunity to make submissions before the High Court on the other two substantial questions of law, which were raised before the High Court in ITA No.267 of 2023. Alternatively, the Supreme Court may hear the appeal on those two substantial questions of law. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted a copy of the order dated 18.05.2023 passed in ITA No.267 of 2023, by which the appellant was aggrieved. The same was taken on record.

Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Respondent submitted that the impugned order dated 05.09.2023, per se, would not call for any interference at all. It was on the basis of the submission made by learned counsel for the Appellant herein that the High Court proceeded to consider only one of the substantial questions of law and observed that the other two substantial questions of law were covered by the Judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Thus, the appellant cannot now seek to assail the order dated 05.09.2023 in this appeal in the absence of there being any challenge to the order dated 18.05.2023, inasmuch as the said order remains on the file of the High Court and the High Court has thereafter proceeded to dispose of the appeal on 05.09.2023. He, therefore, submitted that at this stage there can be no interference with the impugned order and hence, the appeal may be dismissed.

The Supreme Court considered the arguments advanced at the bar and also the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to the effect that the learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the appellant before the High Court erroneously contended that two substantial questions of law were covered by the judgment in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) against the Assessee, but that was not so.

In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that an opportunity must be given to the Appellant to make submissions on those two substantial questions of law and for the purpose of reconsidering whether they were covered by the judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) against the Assessee or not.

For the aforesaid purpose, the Supreme Court set aside the order dated 05.09.2023, although the said order has been accepted by both sides and there was no challenge to the same in the context of there being any error in the said order, but being assailed only for the purpose of seeking to assail the order dated 18.05.2023 and for seeking restoration of ITA NO.267 of 2023 on the file of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on setting aside the order dated 05.09.2023.

In the circumstances, the Supreme Court did not go into the merits of the order dated 05.09.2023 passed in ITA NO.267 of 2023 by the High Court of Delhi for the simple reason that the same had been accepted by both sides. However, the said order had to be set aside as it is a final order of the High Court, so as to enable ITA No.267 of 2023 being restored on the file of the High court. Consequently, the Supreme Court also set aside the interim order dated 18.05.2023.

In the result, ITA No.267 of 2023 was restored on the file of the High Court. The parties were given liberty to advance their arguments on all substantial questions of law which have been raised by the appellant herein. The High Court was requested to dispose of the said appeal in accordance with law.

Point Of Taxability of Dividend, Interest, Royalties & FTS Income of Non-Residents Under Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 90(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“IT Act”) provides that the Central Government may enter into an agreement with the government of any country outside India or any specified territory outside India for the granting of relief in respect of:

a) income on which taxes have been paid both in India and that country/territory,

b) income-tax chargeable under the IT Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country/territory, where the agreement is for:

i) the avoidance of double taxation of income under the IT Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country/territory, or

ii) exchange of information for the prevention of evasion or avoidance of income-tax, and for recovery of income-tax under the IT Act.

Section 90(2) of the IT Act provides that, an assessee can choose to apply the provisions of the DTAA or the IT Act, whichever is more beneficial.

Section 9 of the IT Act deems certain income to accrue or arise in India. Such income includes, inter alia, dividend, interest, royalties and fees for technical services (“FTS”) payable by a resident of India to a non-resident (clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii)), subject to certain exceptions specified in those clauses.

In almost all the DTAAs that India has entered into with other countries, there are clauses pertaining to taxation of dividend, interest, royalties and FTS. Typically, these clauses provide that the dividend, interest, royalty or FTS paid by a resident of one State (country) to a resident of the other State would be taxable in the source country and also provide the maximum rate of tax to be paid in the source country. The Article of the DTAA that deals with the treatment of Interest usually reads as “interest paid by a resident of a contracting state to a resident of another contracting state”, with similar language employed in DTAA for dividend and royalties and FTS Articles.

A controversy has arisen before the courts and the tribunal about the true meaning of the term “paid” used in these articles of DTAAs i.e. whether such interest, royalties and FTS would be taxable as income of the non-residents only on actual payment to the non-residents, or whether the term ‘paid’ used in the DTAA covers such income even where the same is yet payable and therefore does not alter the point of taxation of such income. In other words, such income can be taxed once it is payable. Since such payments are governed by the requirement to deduct tax at source (“TDS”), a corollary issue has also come up whether the payer can be treated as an assessee-in-default for not deducting TDS at the time of credit, and whether the expenditure in respect of such interest, royalties and FTS can be disallowed in the hands of the payer under section 40(a)(i) for non-deduction of TDS.

While the Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai and Ahmedabad benches of the Tribunal have held that such amounts are taxable as income of the non-residents only on actual payment, the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal has held that such income of the non-resident can be taxed on accrual, i.e. even where it is payable and not paid. In the context of the issues of TDS and the allowance of expenditure, it has been held that in most cases that TDS is deductible only on actual payment, while the Bangalore Tribunal has held that TDS is deductible on credit.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S CASE

The issue came up before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johnson vs. ADIT 60 SOT 109.

In this case, the assessee was a tax resident of the USA deriving income from royalty, and claiming the benefit of the India-USA DTAA. It filed its return for AY 2004-05 offering income of ₹7,16,69,537 to tax and paid tax thereon at 15%. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) accepting the returned income and tax thereon at 15%.

A notice u/s 148 was issued proposing reassessment on the ground that its Indian subsidiaries had credited an amount of ₹52,07,53,780 to its account during the year ended 31st March 2004 as royalty, and the assessee had offered only ₹7,16,69,537 to tax. Therefore, according to the notice, an amount of ₹44,90,84,243 had escaped assessment. It was also proposed to levy tax at the rate of 20%, instead of 15% adopted in the assessment.

In its reply to the notice u/s 148, inter alia, the assessee (a US company) pointed out that it had consistently been following the cash method of accounting for more than 13 years, and that this had been accepted by the Commissioner (Appeals) in an appeal for an earlier year. The Indian subsidiaries followed the mercantile system of accounting as required by the Companies Act, 1956. The amount accrued had actually been paid to it in the years ending March 2006 and March 2007. Besides, the amount mentioned in the notices was incorrect, as only ₹38,48,76,032 had been credited to its account in the books of its subsidiaries during the year, as was evident from the Transfer Pricing report in Form 3CEB.

The AO brought to tax the entire amount of ₹52,07,53,780 on the ground that no documentary evidence had been filed, and that the TDS certificates had mentioned this amount which was the reason for the addition. The DRP rejected the objections of the company without considering the merits of the issues.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, the issues raised included the jurisdiction, the legality of bringing to tax the entire royalty income, provisions of DTAA, mistake in AO’s order in considering the entire amount as accrued ignoring assessee’s contention of amount not received during the year, not giving credit of tax deducted at source and levy of interest, etc. The assessee contended that it was offering income on receipt basis consistently over the last so many years, based on the DTAA between India and the USA.

On behalf of the revenue, reliance was placed on the order of the AO and the principles relied upon by the AO on legality of reopening and reason for taxing the income on accrued basis. It was also submitted that an anomalous situation might arise when an assessee did not offer income and the deductors would not deduct tax at source as the amount was not taxable, and provisions of the Act could become inoperable.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed all the TDS certificates along with the return and claimed credit of TDS only to the extent attributable to income offered to tax. The Tribunal observed that the AO in the scrutiny assessment u/s 143(3) had stated that the issue of Royalty was referred to TPO and TPO u/s 92CA(3) had not made any adjustment to the Arms Length Price. AO also left a note regarding the tax levied as per DTAA.

Interestingly, by the time assessment u/s 143(3) was passed by the AO for AY 2004-05, the CIT(A) had already decided a similar issue in AY 2003-04. In that year, the assessee had shown royalty of ₹24,66,34,994, whereas the TPO had fixed royalty income at ₹26,53,07,141, because in the audit report in Form No.3CEB, the amount reported was ₹26,53,07,141. The CIT(A) accepted that the royalty was taxable as per the cash method of accounting consistently followed by the assessee.

The Tribunal therefore observed the following facts:

a. Assessee was following cash system of accounting

b. The TDS was deducted at the same rate upon crediting to the account of assessee by the deductors.

c. The Royalty income was being offered on receipt and TDS to that extent only was claimed.

d. There was no escapement of income as income, as and when received, was being offered by assessee in that year.

e. Assessee’s consistent practice was according to the provisions of law and accepted up to AY 2003-04, even before reopening of the assessment in the year before it.

In assessment proceedings, clarification had been sought from the assessee regarding the claim of TDS when income was being offered to tax on cash basis, which had been accepted by the AO.

The Tribunal noted the provisions of Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA, which provided as under:

“ARTICLE 12

Royalties and fees for included services – 1. Royalties and fees for included services arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

2. However, such royalties and fees for included services may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the royalties or fees for included services is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed …

The definition of Royalties, vide Article 12(3) was as under:

“3. The term “royalties” as used in this Article means:

(a) Payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of or the right to use, any copyright of a literary, artistic, or scientific work, including cinematograph films or work on film, tape or other means of reproduction for use in connection with ratio or television broadcasting, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience, including gains derived from the alienation of any such right or property which are contingent on the productivity, use or disposition thereof; and

(b) Payments of any kind received as consideration for the use of or the right to use, any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, other than payments derived by an enterprise described in paragraph 1 of Article 8 (Shipping and Air Transport) from activities described in paragraph 2(c) or 3 of Article 8″.

The Tribunal noted that, as could be seen from the above, the words used in Article 12(1) was “paid to a resident of the other contracting state”. The term royalties also meant “payment of any kind received”. Since the word used in the DTAA was ‘paid’ or ‘received’, the assessee’s contention that amounts could not be taxed on accrual basis was correct. As per the Tribunal, this interpretation was also supported by the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of DIT (IT) vs. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft ITA no 124 of 2010 dt.22.10.12 wherein the Hon’ble Bombay High Court on a question as follows:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Royalty and fees for technical services should be taxed on receipt basis without appreciating the fact that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Standard Triumph Motors Private Limited v. CIT 201 ITR 391 that the credit entry to the account of assessee non-resident in the books of the Indian company amounted to receipt by the non-resident?” had held as under:

“As regards first question is concerned, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal referring to Para 1 to 3 under Article IIX-A of the Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty with the Federal Germany Republic as per Notification dated 26th August, 1985 held that the assessment of royalty or any fees for technical services should be made in the year in which the amounts are received and not otherwise. Counsel for the Revenue relied upon the Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case, which in our opinion, has no relevance to the facts of the present case, as it relates to the period prior to the issuance of Notification dated 26th August, 1985. In this view of the matter the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in holding that the royalty and fees for technical services should be taxed on receipt basis cannot be faulted”.

The Tribunal therefore observed that there was no dispute with reference to taxation of the royalties on receipt basis in so far as a recipient who was a resident of the other contracting state, like the assessee, was concerned, as per the DTAA. On this basis and other arguments, the Tribunal held the reassessment proceedings to be bad in law and annulled the order of reassessment.

A similar view has been taken by the Tribunal in the following cases:

  1.  DCIT vs. Uhde Gmbh 54 TTJ 355 (Bom) – royalty & FTS under India-Germany DTAA
  2.  DDIT vs. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 2009 taxmann,com 1019 (Mum) – royalty & FTS under India-Germany DTAA
  3.  Siemens Aktiengesellschaft vs. DDIT 175 taxmann.com 1012 (Mum) – royalty & FTS under India-Germany DTAA
  4. Gurgaon Investments Ltd vs. DDIT 182 ITD 424 (Mum) – interest under India-Mauritius DTAA
  5.  Pramerica ASPF II Cyprus Holding Ltd vs. DCIT 157 ITD 1177 (Mum) – interest under India -Cyprus DTAA
  6.  ABB Switzerland Ltd vs. DCIT 154 taxmann.com 132 (Bang) – Royalty & FTS under India-Switzerland DTAA
  7.  Booz Allen & Hamilton (India) Ltd & Co Kg vs. ADIT 152 TTJ 497 (Mum) – FTS under India-USA DTAA
  8.  CSC Technology Singapore Pte Ltd vs. ADIT 50 SOT 399 (Delhi) – royalty & FTS under India-Singapore DTAA
  9.  Pizza Hut International LLC vs. DDIT 54 SOT 425 (Del) – royalty under India-USA DTAA
  10.  DCIT vs. TMW ASPF i Cyprus Holding Company Ltd – interest under India-Cyprus DTAA
  11.  National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd vs. DCIT 96 TTJ 765 (Mum) – FTS under India-Switzerland DTAA in the context of deduction of TDS u/s 195
  12.  DCIT vs. Elitecore Technologies (P) Ltd 164 taxmann.com 571 (Ahd) – royalty under India-USA DTAA in the context of disallowance u/s 40(a)(i)
  13.  DCIT vs. Inzi Control India Ltd 101 taxmann.com 112 (Chennai) – royalty and FTS under India-Korea DTAA in the context of disallowance u/s 40(a)(i)
  14.  Saira Asia Interiors (P.) Ltd vs. ITO 164 ITD 687 (Ahd) – royalty under India-Italy DTAA in the context of deduction of TDS u/s 195
  15.   Sophos Technologies (P.) Ltd vs. DCIT 100 taxmann.com 374 (Ahd) – royalty under India- Russia and India-Israel DTAAs in the context of disallowance u/s 40(a)(i)

GOOGLE INDIA (P) LTD’S CASE

The same issue had again come up before the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of Google India (P) Ltd vs. ACIT 190 TTJ 409.

In this case, the assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary of a US Co, Google International, LLC. The assessee was appointed as a non-exclusive authorized distributor of Adword programs to the advertisers in India by Google Ireland, and was granted the marketing and distribution rights of Adword program to the advertisers in India. The assessee credited a sum of ₹119 crore to the account of Google Ireland without deduction of tax at source.

Proceedings were initiated u/s.201, calling upon the appellant why it should not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax at source on the sum payable to Google Ireland. The AO held that the amount payable to Google Ireland was royalty, and that TDS should have been deducted on the amount credited. The AO held that u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act, royalty was charged on accrual basis and the actual receipt of the same by the recipient was immaterial for the purpose of deduction of taxes. The AO relied upon the following judgments:

Trishla Jain vs. ITO 310 ITR 274 (Punj. & Har.),
AegKtiengesselschaft vs. IAC 48 ITD 359 (Bang.),
Allied Chemical Corpn. vs. IAC 3 ITD 418 (Bom.)(SB), and
Dana Corporation USA vs. ITO 28 ITD 185 (Bom.)

Further, the AO took the support of s. 43(2) of the I.T. Act which defines ‘paid’ as:

“(2) ‘Paid” means actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting upon the basis of which the profits or gains are computed under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”;

Accordingly, the AO concluded that the meaning of the term “paid” includes amount incurred i.e. where it becomes payable.

On first appeal, the Commissioner(Appeals) decided the issues against the assessee and confirmed the withholding tax liability in the hands of the assessee, on the basis that the amount payable by the assessee to Google Ireland was in the nature of royalty under the provisions of the Act as well as under the India-Ireland DTAA. He did not adjudicate on the specific ground relating to the royalty being taxable only on payment.

Before the Tribunal, elaborate arguments were advanced on behalf of both the assessee as well as the revenue on the aspect of whether the amounts payable to Google Ireland were in the nature of royalty, and on the period of limitation u/s 201.

On behalf of the assessee, it was argued that assuming the amount payable to Google Ireland was in the nature of ‘royalty’, then in terms of Article 12 of the India-Ireland DTAA, income in the nature of royalty was chargeable to tax in the hands of the non-resident only on receipt basis. Attention was drawn to Article 12 of the India-Ireland DTAA, which read as under:

1. Royalties or fees for technical services arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

2. However, such royalties or fees for technical services may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which they arise, and according to the laws of that State.

3. (a) The term “royalties” as used in this Article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films or films or tapes for radio or television broadcasting any patent, trademark, design or model plan, secret formula or process or for the use of or the right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, other than an aircraft or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.

Accordingly, it was submitted that so far as taxability of Royalty was concerned, twin conditions of “arising in India” as also the “payment” are to be satisfied. Reliance was placed on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd (supra). Further, it was also submitted that the term ‘royalty’ in Article 12(3)(a) of the India-Ireland DTAA is defined to mean payment of any kind received as a consideration for the use or right to use copyright, patent, trademark, etc. A plain reading of the above phrase means that an amount can be characterized as royalty under the DTAA only on payment and not merely on accrual. In other words, until the amount is paid, the amount accrued or due cannot partake the character of royalty.

It was argued that even if one were to state that the point of taxation is the “arising” of the income in India, the same can be finally taxed only on the basis of the amount “paid” to the non-resident. Reliance was placed upon the Delhi Tribunal decision in the case of Pizza Hut International LLC (supra). Hence, it was submitted that mere “accrual” without “payment” would not crystallise the charge under the DTAA, irrespective of the position under the Act and accordingly Royalty should not be taxable in India.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Standard Triumph Motors Co Ltd (supra) was sought to be distinguished on the ground that the decision did not take into account the provisions of the DTAA as probably none existed at that time, and that the decision of the Delhi ITAT in the case of Pizza Hut International LLC (supra) factored in the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Standard Triumph Motors, while holding that the royalty can be considered as taxable in the hands of the recipient on a receipt basis.

Reliance was also placed on the Bombay High Court ruling in the case of Siemens Aktiengesellschaft [IT Appeal No. 124 (Bom.) of 2010, dated 22-10-2012], and the Tribunal rulings in the cases of Booz. Allen & Hamilton (India) Ltd. & Co. (supra), Johnson & Johnson (supra) and CSC Technology Singapore Pte Ltd. (supra).

It was also submitted on behalf of the assessee that the liability to withhold taxes in the hands of the payer was on payment basis and not on accrual basis. For the purpose of determining whether an amount is chargeable to tax in the hands of a non-resident, the provisions of the relevant DTAA would also need to be factored in. It was submitted that the charge under the DTAA on royalty was triggered only when the amount was paid and not when the amount was accrued or even due. Accordingly, royalty receivable by Google Ireland would be chargeable to tax under the India – Ireland DTAA only when actually received and accordingly, the liability to withhold under section 195 would arise only when the sum became chargeable in the hands of Google Ireland i.e. when the amount was paid. Reliance was placed on the Tribunal decision in the case of Saira Asia Interiors (P.) Ltd (supra).

Therefore, it was submitted that withholding liability in the hands of the assessee would arise only on payments made and not on the amounts payable to Google Ireland. Therefore, as section 195 of the Act cast an obligation on the payer to withhold tax only when the same was chargeable to tax in India, withholding of tax, if any, would be required only at the time of actual remittance and not on the credit in the books of accounts. Hence, there was no requirement for withholding of tax in the relevant years as the amounts remained unpaid during the years under consideration.

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that when the withholding tax liability in the subject year was determined on payment basis under the DTAA, the assessee may claim in the year of receipt that the taxability in the hands of the payee would arise on accrual basis and accordingly, liability to withhold would be the year of accrual. It was argued that the provisions of section 195 has to be read along with charging provisions i.e. sections 4, 5,9 and 90 of the Act. On conjoint reading of the above provisions, it was clear that the amounts paid by the assessee to Google Ireland were chargeable under the Act on accrual basis.

If the language of the definition of royalty under the DTAA was read, the words “payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of’ had to be read together, and it would only mean the classification of the income and not the method of accounting. The assessee would be receiving amounts from IT services and IT enabled services from Google Ireland, and would pay Google Ireland for marketing and distribution services for Adword program. The assessee was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Google. In view of the close connection between Google India and Google Ireland, the payments to be received by the assessee provides IT services and IT enabled services could be adjusted towards payment towards marketing
and distribution services for Adword program. The fact that the assessee had not reflected the amounts paid to Google Ireland in the P&L account would further justify the above aspect. The words “payment of any kind received” had to be read as any mode of payment either by book adjustment/credit or actual payment.

It was further submitted on behalf of the revenue that the DTAA did not determine the method of accounting and the year of taxability in respect of parties to the agreement. What DTAA provided for was the extent of taxability of income and the percentage of the tax on the income liable for tax and the distribution of tax among the countries party to the DTAA. Hence, the language employed in defining the meaning of royalty could not be read to mean the method of accounting. The DTAA did not deal with the year of taxability or the method of accounting of either of the parties.

The only section which imposed obligation on the assessee was s. 195(1). The section obligated the assessee to deduct tax at source in respect of the income chargeable under the Act. The section did not empower the payer to examine the applicability of the DTAA to the payee. The language of section 90(2) was clear and unambiguous that the option to exercise the benefit of either the Act or the DTAA was conferred on the non-resident. Hence, at the stage of payment, without there being any indication by the recipient, the payer could not step into the shoes of recipient to exercise the option provided u/s 90(2) and claim the benefit of the DTAA. The application of DTAA was not automatic and it was only on the specific exercise of option by the recipient subject to fulfillment of certain conditions as contemplated under the DTAA. In the absence of any material or enquiry by the assessee, the assessee could not jump to the conclusion that the amount was not chargeable under the DTAA. What is to be considered at the time of payment by the assessee was only regarding the chargeability under the Act and the assessee could not be permitted to take shelter under the DTAA, as the benefit of DTAA was conferred only on the non-resident recipient.

It was further submitted on behalf of the revenue that the argument that receipt in the hands of Google Ireland was liable to be taxed on cash basis was completely baseless, for the reason that Google Ireland itself had admitted the Mercantile system of accounting being followed in its income tax returns of earlier years. If the assessee’s case was accepted that liability to deduct tax at source would arise in the year of payment as the same was taxable on receipt basis in the hands of the non-resident, in the event of the non-resident exercising the option u/s 90(2) to claim benefit of the provisions of the Act, and specifically in view of the Mercantile system of accounting being followed by the non-resident, if the non-resident claimed that the same was taxable on accrual basis u/s 4, 5 and 9, read with the specific language of section 195(1), the contention was clearly illogical and contrary to the scheme of the Act.

The Tribunal noted from the Services Agreement that payment was required to be made within 90 days after receipt of the invoice. It was abundantly clear that the distribution fees (Royalty) was payable during the year and up to final trued-up on the basis of the duly audited accounts of the assessee. There was no doubt that the payment was due and payable by the assessee to Google Ireland within the year it became due.

According to the Tribunal, the argument that the payment made by the assessee to Google Ireland was not a sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act, was not available for the payer to be raised. The necessary safeguards were provided by the Act in the form of Section 195(2), which clearly provided that in case the assessee was having any doubt about the chargeability to tax of the payment, then the assessee may make an application to the AO for the purpose of determining whether the sum was chargeable to tax or not and if yes, on what proportion. No such application was made u/s.195(2) to the AO. The assessee on its own, without having knowledge, information and privy to the accounting standard and accounting practice of Google Ireland, had treated the payment as a business profit of Google Ireland in its books of account. A uniform policy was required to be adopted for deduction of TDS by the person responsible for paying an amount to a non-resident. There was no caveat or condition laid by the Act on the person responsible for paying to non-resident. In the view of the Tribunal, whether it was business profit or royalty, in both the circumstances, so far as the assessee was concerned, the assessee was duty-bound to deduct the TDS unless there was an adjudication by the AO to the contrary u/s.195(2).

According to the Tribunal, the assessee’s argument that, under the provisions of India -Ireland DTAA, the royalty was chargeable to tax in the hands of the non-resident on receipt basis was to be rejected, as the benefit of DTAA, was only available to the non-resident and not to the resident payer. Moreover, the assessee could not claim that the royalty was chargeable to tax in the hands of the non-resident on receipt basis, as the assessee had no access to the accounting method followed by Google Ireland. Since Google Ireland was following the mercantile method of accounting and not the cash method of accounting, it should have shown the distribution fees (royalty) on accrual basis and not on receipt basis. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, the argument of chargeability of royalty in the hands of Google Ireland on receipt basis was required to be rejected.

The Tribunal also observed that the scope and ambit of DTAA as per section 90 was to grant relief from double taxation, to promote mutual economic relations, trade and investment, for exchange of information for prevention of evasion or avoidance of income-tax chargeable under this Act or in other country, or for recovery of income-tax under this Act or under corresponding laws. According to the Tribunal, the DTAA could only provide the characterisation of the income, the country where it was to be paid and at what rate the said income was to be taxed. However, in the Tribunal’s view, it was not within the scope of the DTAA to provide when (i.e. year of accrual or receipt) the income was required to be charged.

The Tribunal observed that the literal rule of interpretation was not required to be followed and instead thereof linga or lakshana principle had to be followed, i.e., the intent had to be seen and not the literal rule as pointed out by Lord Denning in his book, ‘The Discipline of Law”. If it went by the literal meaning of the DTAA, then unscrupulous persons may misuse the provision and avoid payment of taxes. To illustrate this, if A company is rendering services to B company, and B company is supplying some technology to A company, then there is a mutual obligation of paying and receiving the amount. It is possible for both A and B either to keep separate accounts for both transactions or they can indulge into adjustment of their accounts by debiting and crediting their accounts without actual payment. In such a situation, there will not be any occasion for B company to receive the actual payment from A company.

The Tribunal further observed that the income arising on account of royalty payable by resident or non-resident in respect of any right, property or information used or services utilized for the purposes of business or profession shall become due and payable as per the provisions of the IT Act, as well as under DTAA when such information is used or service is utilised by the recipient. In the case before it, the distribution fees was credited as accrued by the assessee after utilizing the benefit under the distribution agreement to the account of Google Ireland. Therefore, the same was chargeable to tax when it was credited to the account of Google Ireland and the appellant was duty-bound to deduct TDS at the time of crediting it to the account of Google Ireland. The assessee would not suffer any loss on this account if the payment was made to Google Ireland after deducting the tax. In any case if Google Ireland proved that the amount was not required to be taxed in India, then Google Ireland could claim refund in the assessment proceedings.

The Tribunal also noted that as per the mandate of Article 12(2) of the DTAA, the royalty was to be taxed in the contracting state (India) in accordance with the laws of India. The laws of India provided taxability of royalty on the basis of the accrual (mercantile method) and not on receipt (cash basis). Therefore, once clause 2 of Article 12 applied, the royalty paid by the assessee to Google Ireland was taxable as per Indian law.

The Tribunal was of the view that reliance placed by the assessee on the Delhi Tribunal decision in the case of Pizza Hut International LLC (supra) was misplaced, as, for arriving at the conclusion that the royalty is taxable on cash basis, the Delhi Bench had neither gone into the method of accounting, nor considered Article 12(2) of DTAA which provides that the royalty is taxable in accordance with the laws of India (contracting state/source country).

The Tribunal further noted the fact that the distribution fee payable to Google Ireland from December 2006 to June 2009 remained unpaid till November 2011, when an application for the remittance was made to the Reserve Bank of India, and was actually remitted only in May 2014 after receipt of the approval. According to the Tribunal, the intention of the assessee as well as of Google Ireland was clear and conspicuous that they wanted to avoid the payment of taxes in India. That is why, despite the duty of the assessee to deduct the tax at the time of payment to Google Ireland, no tax was deducted nor any permission was sought for paying the amount. If the permission for paying the amount was taken immediately after entering into the agreement, then this argument of not making the payment as late as May 2014 would not have been available to the assessee. The Tribunal was of the view that this was a clear design to skip the liability by both the assessee as well as Google Ireland through mutual understanding.

According to the Tribunal, in the case on hand, the conduct of the two parties, which were associated enterprises (AEs), clearly showed that both were trying to misuse the provision of DTAA by structuring the transaction with the intention to avoid payment of taxes, which was not permissible in law. The proviso was being abused by them as a device to defer the tax for any length of time by mutual understanding of the parties, particularly when both the parties were under an obligation to pay and receive the payment for the services rendered and for distribution fees (royalty).

The Tribunal also held that the Ahmedabad Tribunal decision in the case of Saira Asia Interiors (supra) was not applicable on the facts of the case before it, on the following grounds:

  1.  There was no mechanism available with the revenue to know whether the actual amount was paid or credited in the hand of Google Ireland or not in the Assessment years under consideration or not, or even before the lapse of time limit to deduct and deposit the tax;
  2.  The assessee had not sought permission for remittance till November 2011, though the agreement was entered into on 12 December 2005;
  3.  This was a case of collusion between the payer and payee;
  4.  When Google Ireland itself was following the mercantile method of accounting, then there was no occasion to adopt the cash method of accounting and conclude that the Royalty would trigger only on actual payment of the amount; and
  5.  The royalty paid to Google Ireland was taxable as per the IT Act, which provided for maintaining the accounts as per mercantile method as per section 145.

Lastly, the Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vodafone South Ltd vs. Dy DIT (IT) 53 taxmann.com 441, where the Tribunal had held that the rights as available to the payee to defend itself in an income tax assessment proceeding are not available to the assessee as payer in equal force, and that provisions of DTAA would not automatically attract in the defense of the payer.

The Tribunal, while holding that the payments to Google Ireland constituted royalty, also held that TDS u/s 195 ought to have been deducted on accrual of the royalty.

While this order of the Tribunal has been subsequently set aside and remanded by the Karnataka High Court by its order reported as 435 ITR 284 (Kar), this was on the ground that the Tribunal had relied upon the material which was never given to the assessee in deciding that the payment constituted royalty. In subsequent decisions of the Tribunal, the amounts paid to Google Ireland have been held to be not taxable in India.

However, in a decision of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ampacet Cyprus Ltd vs. Dy CIT 184 ITD 743, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has expressed its doubt on the interpretation of the term “paid” used in DTAAs, and as to why the definition of “paid” in section 43(2) of the IT Act should not apply. The matter was accordingly referred to a Special Bench. However, before the Special Bench heard the matter, the assessee opted to settle the dispute under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme 2024, and the appeals were accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.

In another case, in L S Automotive India (P) Ltd vs. ACIT 162 taxmann.com 600, the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal considered the issue of disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) of interest paid to a Korean company, the Tribunal observed that since, the DTAA was silent on taxability of interest income i.e., whether on accrual basis or receipt basis, it was viewed that as per provisions of s.195, the payee was responsible for deducting tax at the time of credit or payment, whichever is earlier. However, Since the case law relied upon by the assessee was applicability of DTAA between India and Cyprus and also on payment of royalty and fee for technical services, according to the Tribunal, this issue once again needed to be examined by the AO, in light of the decision of Bombay High Court and also DTAA between India and Korea.

OBSERVATIONS

While technically the decision of the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in Google India no longer holds good as it has been set aside by the High Court for consideration of the material that was not made available to the assessee company, the decision subject to the said infirmity would require serious consideration, as the cases that do not suffer from such infirmity may be guided by the findings on law on the subject under consideration. Also required to be examined is the correctness of the other Tribunal decisions delivered in favour of the assessees, in view of the fact that such correctness has been doubted by the Mumbai bench in Ampacet Cyprus’s case(supra) where the Tribunal observed:

“In all the coordinate bench decisions, there is no discussion whatsoever to the connotations of the expression ‘paid’ and these decisions simply proceed on the basis that because the expression ‘paid’ is used article 11(1) of Indo Cyprus tax treaty, the taxability of interest can only be on cash basis. The expression “paid” is admittedly not defined in the treaty but article 3(2) of Indo Cyprus tax treaty provides that “As regards the application of the Agreement at any time by a Contracting State any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Agreement applies and any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State” What essentially follows is that unless the context otherwise requires, the definition of the undefined treaty term, under the domestic law of the source country i.e. India- and preferably under the domestic tax laws, is to be adopted. It is in this context, Section 43(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 may perhaps be relevant because it provides that “‘paid’ means actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting upon the basis of which the profits or gains are computed under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. While it is indeed true that this meaning cannot be imported in the tax treaty mechanically, without any application of mind and as a sort of automated process, undoubtedly a call is to be taken by the bench as to whether or not this domestic law meaning of the expression ‘paid’ will be relevant. There could possibly be a school of thought that a decision rendered in this context, without specifically dealing with the implications of section 43(2) read with article 3(2), could possibly be per incuriam. A conscious call is required to be taken on these aspects. While on this issue, we may further add that one will have to see whether Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Standard Triumph Motor Co. Ltd v CIT 201 ITR 391 which, inter alia, observes that “it must be held in this case that the credit entry to the account of the assessee in the books of the Indian company does amount to its receipt by the assessee and is accordingly taxable and that it is immaterial when did it actually receive it in UK”, will have any bearing on the connotations of expressions “paid” appearing in the Indo Cyprus tax treaty. As a corollary to these discussions, connotations of the expression “paid” appearing in article 11 of Indo Cyprus tax treaty are required to be examined in some detail, and that exercise can at best be conducted by a bench of three or more members so that the decision is unfettered by the decisions of the division benches in this regard.”

Further, in Ampacet Cyprus’s case(supra), while referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Siemens Akitengesellschaft (supra), which had held that the royalty and FTS should be treated on receipt basis, the Tribunal noted that this decision pertained to the old India-Federal Republic of Germany DTAA, which came to an end on 1 April 1997, from which date the hybrid method of accounting also came to an end. The Tribunal further observed:

“Considering that essentially business concerns prepare their accounts on the basis of mercantile method of accounting in general, even accounting of any income, such as interest and royalties, on cash basis was no longer permissible. To suggest, therefore, that interest or royalty income could be taxed in the hands of the foreign company on cash basis on the first principles is no longer permissible, and, as for the connotations of the expressions “paid” in the light of article 2(2), as it was numbered in the old Indo German tax treaty, read with section 43(2), this issue never came up for consideration at any stage at all. As article 2(2) was not even discussed, the relevance of section 43(2) or of Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Standard Triumph Motor Co. Ltd (supra) did not come up for Their Lordships’ kind consideration at all. It is also important to note that so far as article 3(2) of the Indo Cyprus treaty is concerned, it uses the expression “the meaning that it (i.e. the undefined treaty term) has at that time under the law of that State (i.e. under the Indian law)”. It is also worth examining whether, in this context, the scope of ‘Indian law’ will include not only the law legislated by the Parliament but also the law laid down by Hon’ble Courts above. A view is thus indeed worth exploring as to whether the meaning assigned to the expression “received by an assessee”, which essentially corresponds to and has to treated as equivalent to “paid to the payee”, by Hon’ble Supreme Court is to be assigned to the treaty of the undefined treaty expression “paid”. Obviously, this exercise was not done by the coordinate bench, nor this aspect of the matter was pointed out by the learned counsel appearing before Their Lordships, and thus Their Lordships had no occasion to examine this aspect of the matter either. To this extent, the impact of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Standard Triumph Motor Co. Ltd (supra) remained unexamined. That aspect of the matter is thus, de hors the judgment of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court, does seem to be in an unchartered territory on which call may indeed be taken by the Tribunal.”

The analysis and the concerns and conclusions of the Tribunal in the cases of Cyprus Ampacet and Google India require greater consideration than the one given so far. Firstly, the purpose of a DTAA is to avoid double taxation, and to achieve that it provides for the taxing rights of the respective countries. In doing so, in addition the DTAA provides for the rates of tax and for grant of credit of taxes where an income is doubly taxed.

Secondly, s.43(2) has defined the term ‘paid’ to include the amount ‘payable’. A question arises whether the meaning provided in s.43(2) should be applied in interpretation of the DTAA while applying the provisions of the IT Act. The applicability of the definition of the term “paid” in s.43(2) of the IT Act to mean “actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting” is a challenge that requires greater consideration.

Thirdly, the Supreme Court in settling the controversy relating to the true meaning of the term ‘payable’ had confirmed that the term is wide enough to cover the cases of ‘paid ’ in determining whether the expenditure paid was liable to be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction or payment of tax at source. Palan Gas Service, 247 Taxman 379 (SC) and Shree Choudhary Transport Company, 272 Taxman 472(SC).

The meaning of the words “paid to” in a DTAA has been clarified in the OECD Commentary on the Model tax Convention. In paragraph 7 of Commentary on Article 10, it states that “The term “paid” has a very wide meaning, since the concept of payment means the fulfilment of the obligation to put funds at the disposal of the shareholder in the manner required by contract or by custom.” Similarly, in paragraph 6 of Commentary on Article 11, the Commentary gives the same meaning to the term “paid”. In Prof. Klaus Vogel’s Commentary on Double Taxation Conventions, it is stated in the Preface to Articles 10 to 12:

“A wide interpretation should be given to the term “paid to”. All forms of satisfying a shareholder’s or creditor’s claim to receiving dividends, respectively interest or royalties, must be covered by it. With respect to dividends, it has been acknowledged by many States that the term covers profit distributions by companies resident of one State that are received by a shareholder resident in the other Contracting State. With regard to interest and royalties, the settlement of an obligation to pay interest or royalties is covered. For instance, the term “paid to” includes a performance in kind or a set-off of amounts due. The settlement may or may not be based on a contract. What is essential is that the creditor has agreed with the compensation concerned.”

“As a result, the term “paid to” does have a meaning dependent on the definition of the items of income concerned: dividend, interest, respectively, royalty. If an item of income is covered by the DTC definition and allocates tax jurisdiction to the State of source, the term “paid to” should be interpreted in such a way that the State of source can realise its entitlement to tax. Such an interpretation fits to the object and purpose of this allocation rule. It also fits to the idea of a wide interpretation in the OECD and UN MC.”

“For the purposes of this DTC, it is clear that the term “paid” is not interpreted autonomously, but based on the domestic tax laws of the Contracting State applying the DTC”.

Further, Explanation 4 to section 90 provides that where a term is not defined in the DTAA but is defined in the IT Act, it shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Act, and explanation, if any, given to it by the Central Government.

It may however be noted that the Bombay High Court did have an occasion to re-examine the issue in the case of CIT vs. Pramerica ASPF II Cyprus Holding Limited ITA 1824 of 2016, vide its order dated 12th March 2019. In this case, the Bombay High Court relied upon its earlier ruling in DIT vs. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, in Income Tax Appeal No.124 of 2010 dated 22.10.2012. In that case, the Bombay High Court had held that the decision of the ITAT in holding that the royalty and FTS should be taxed on receipt basis cannot be faulted. The question raised for its consideration in that case was:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Royalty and fees for technical services should be taxed on receipt basis without appreciating the fact that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Standard Drum (sic) Motors Private Limited vs. CIT 201 ITR 391 that the credit entry to the account of the assessee non-resident in the books of the Indian company amounted to receipt by the non-resident?”

The Bombay High Court had therefore considered the impact of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Standard Triumph Motors while taking the view that it did in Siemens case. In Pramerica’s case, the Bombay High Court, while dismissing the revenue’s appeal, observed that:

“Thus, while interpreting similar clause of Indo-German DTAA in relation to taxing royalty or fees for technical services, this Court had confirmed the decision of tribunal holding that such service can be taxed only on receipt. This decision was later on followed in Income Tax Appeal No.1033/11 dated 20/11/2012 and thereafter in Income Tax Appeal No.2356/11 and connected Appeals vide the order dated 07/03/2013.”

It therefore appears that while the issue is highly debatable, for the time being, the matter is covered by the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Siemens and Pramerica cases, and the other cases relied upon by the Bombay High Court in Pramerica’s case, given that there is no other decision of a High Court on the subject. Therefore, as per the DTAA, such income are taxable in the hands of the non-resident on receipt basis seems to be the prevalent view of the judiciary on the matter.

Sec 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii): Addition on account of difference between stamp duty value and purchase consideration for agricultural land made under a provision which was introduced subsequently – AO could not apply amended provision retrospectively – Further, payment of actual consideration duly established – Addition unsustainable.

27 [2025] 122 ITR(T) 312 (Lucknow- Trib.)

Smt. Vimla Tripathi vs. ITO

ITA NO.: 310 (LKW.) OF 2023

A.Y.: 2013-14 DATE: 31.12.2024

Sec 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii): Addition on account of difference between stamp duty value and purchase consideration for agricultural land made under a provision which was introduced subsequently – AO could not apply amended provision retrospectively – Further, payment of actual consideration duly established – Addition unsustainable.

FACTS:

The assessee filed her return of income for the AY 2013-14. Subsequently, based on third-party information, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee, jointly with another person, had purchased an agricultural land on 01.08.2012 for a declared consideration of ₹12,00,000.

The AO observed that the market value of the land for stamp duty purposes was ₹71,30,000. Upon response from the assessee to notices u/s 142(1), she provided documentary evidence showing details and modes of payment, copies of bank statements and the sale deed.

Finding a discrepancy of ₹59,30,000 between the stamp duty value and actual consideration paid, the AO treated 50% of such difference (i.e., ₹29.65 lakhs) as income of the assessee under section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii), since the property was jointly purchased.

The assessee contended that the transaction took place on 01.08.2012 and provision of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) was introduced by Finance Act, 2013 and came into effect only from 01.04.2014 (A.Y. 2014-15). Therefore, the said provision could not be applied to a transaction undertaken in A.Y. 2013-14.

Despite these submissions, the NFAC dismissed the appeal, upholding the addition made by the AO.

HELD:

ITAT observed that the transaction was carried out in F.Y. 2012-13. The provision under section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii), which sought to tax the difference between stamp duty value and actual consideration for property purchases, was introduced w.e.f. 01.04.2014 and was applicable only from A.Y. 2014-15 onwards. Therefore, it could not be applied retrospectively to a transaction of A.Y. 2013-14.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)’s observation that the transaction was “without consideration” was factually incorrect. The assessee had placed on record the bank statements and the sale deed evidencing payment of ₹6 lakhs (her share of the total ₹12 lakhs consideration). Hence, the transaction involved actual consideration and was not a gift or zero-value transfer.

ITAT further held that, the assessee also raised a valid legal argument that agricultural land is not treated as a “capital asset” under section 2(14) and thus not subject to the deeming provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii), which apply only to capital assets.

Accordingly, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee’s arguments, quashed the order of the CIT(A),  and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition of ₹29.65 lakhs made under section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii).

Sec 145 – Percentage Completion Method (PCM) – Rejection of consistently followed method of accounting without any defects or inconsistencies – Addition of entire actual sale value led to double addition as income had already been recognised on accrual basis under PCM in earlier years – Not permissible – Once accepted, accounting method cannot be altered without just cause.

26 [2025] 122 ITR(T) 154 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)

ITO vs. Sainath Land Developers

ITA NO.: 441 (AHD.) OF 2020

A.Y.: 2015-16 DATE: 31.12.2024

Sec 145 – Percentage Completion Method (PCM) – Rejection of consistently followed method of accounting without any defects or inconsistencies – Addition of entire actual sale value led to double addition as income had already been recognised on accrual basis under PCM in earlier years – Not permissible – Once accepted, accounting method cannot be altered without just cause.

FACTS

The assessee, a partnership firm was engaged in real estate development. The return was selected for limited scrutiny under CASS. During the course of assessment, the Assessing Officer noted that the assessee had shown opening work-in-progress (WIP) of ₹6.47 crores and had sold flats and shops worth ₹4.20 crores during the year. However, the sales reported in the profit and loss account amounted to only ₹55.70 lakhs.

The assessee explained that it had been consistently following the Percentage Completion Method (PCM) of revenue recognition since A.Y. 2012-13, which had been accepted by the Department in earlier assessments.

The AO concluded that the difference between the stock sold (₹4.20 crores) and the sales disclosed (₹55.70 lakhs) represented undisclosed sales and made an addition of the entire ₹4.20 crores to the assessee’s income.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), who deleted the entire addition. The Revenue preferred further appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

ITAT observed that the assessee had consistently followed PCM, which is a recognised method of accounting as per the Accounting Standards issued by the ICAI. The Revenue had accepted this method in earlier years without raising any objection. And AO failed to point out any defects or discrepancies in the books of accounts maintained by the assessee.

ITAT observed that the addition made by the AO resulted in double taxation of the same profits – first when revenue was recognised under PCM in earlier years and again when full actual sales were considered in the current year.

ITAT held that once a method of accounting has been accepted by the Department and regularly followed by the assessee, it cannot be rejected in subsequent years unless a material change in facts is demonstrated. In the present case, no such change or deviation was shown by the AO.

Thus, the ITAT held that the method of accounting consistently and correctly followed by the assessee under the Percentage Completion Method could not be rejected in the absence of any defect or inconsistency, and the addition of ₹4.20 crores was rightly deleted by the CIT(A).

S. 54F – Capital gain arising out of surrender of tenancy rights is eligible for exemption under section 54F if the developer-builder has allotted a residential flat without any consideration against such surrender by executing Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement. S. 56 – Once an income from a source falls within a specific head, the fact that it may indirectly be covered by another head will not make the income taxable under the latter head.

25 (2025) 174 taxmann.com 1015 (Mum Trib)

Vasant Nagorao Barabde vs. DCIT

ITA No.: 5372 (Mum) of 2024

A.Y.: 2018-19 Dated: 22.05.2025

S. 54F – Capital gain arising out of surrender of tenancy rights is eligible for exemption under section 54F if the developer-builder has allotted a residential flat without any consideration against such surrender by executing Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement.

S. 56 – Once an income from a source falls within a specific head, the fact that it may indirectly be covered by another head will not make the income taxable under the latter head.

FACTS

The assessee and his daughter entered into agreement for Permanent Alternate Accommodation (PAA) dated 21.9.2017 with the developer whereby the tenancy rights in respect of residential premises in building “SS” in Mumbai were surrendered. The developer agreed to provide and allot on ownership basis, without any consideration, one flat in the new building proposed to be constructed on the said property. The stamp value of the said property was ₹2,88,85,600. The assessee filed his return of income on 15.08.2018 reporting total income at ₹61,34,820.

Case of the assessee was selected for limited scrutiny for the reason that purchase value of property was less than stamp value. Since no explanation came from the assessee, the AO completed the assessment under section 143(3) making an addition of ₹2,88,85,600, being the stamp duty value for which no consideration was paid by applying section 56(2)(x)(b)(B).

Against this, assessee went in appeal before CIT(A). Before the CIT(A), the assessee filed detailed explanations and additional evidence under rule 46A. However, the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) It was an undisputed fact that both the assessee and his daughter were tenants in the registered agreement for PAA dated 21.09.2017 under which flat in the new building had been allotted by the developer against surrender of tenancy rights. Existence of tenancy was not in dispute.
(b) It was important to note that there was a surrender of tenancy rights against which a new flat had been allotted for which a registered deed was executed. Once there is a surrender of tenancy rights, the factual position which emerges was that tenancy right (which is a capital asset) was transferred and was liable to be taxed under section 45 read with section 48.

(c) The moot point that arose was as to in whose hands this capital gain was to be taxed depending upon who owned the tenancy rights and who transferred the same to the builder against which the new flat was allotted. In present set of facts, it could be either the assessee or his daughter. In either case, deduction under section 54F was available against the capital gain so computed since there was an investment in residential flat allotted by the builder by way of PAA of equivalent stamp duty value of ₹2,88,85,600. Thus, in either hands, the capital gain so computed was eligible for deduction under section 54F in toto.

(d) Once an income from a source falls within a specific head, the fact that it may indirectly be covered by another head will not make the income taxable under the latter head. Thus, applicability of section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) was ruled out.

(e) Claim of the assessee for deduction under section 54F against the capital gain on the impugned transaction was an allowable claim by taking into account the observation of Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. whereby Court held that “nothing impinges on the power of the appellate authorities to entertain such a claim of the assessee.”

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

S. 70 – Short-term capital loss (on which STT was paid) can be set off against short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid) as per section 70(2).

24  (2025) 174 taxmann.com 932 (Mum Trib)

Teacher Retirement System of Texas vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 1371 (Mum) of 2025

A.Y.: 2022-23 Dated: 23.05.2025

S. 70 – Short-term capital loss (on which STT was paid) can be set off against short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid) as per section 70(2).

FACTS

The assessee was a resident of the United States of America, and was registered as a Foreign Portfolio Investor with the Securities and Exchange Board of India. For AY 2022-23, the assessee filed its return of income on 26.07.2022, declaring a total income of ₹1,392,97,42,630. The return filed by the assessee was selected for scrutiny.

During the assessment proceedings, it was observed that the assessee computed the net short-term capital gains amounting to ₹312,17,86,831, after set off the short-term capital loss [on which securities transaction tax (STT) was paid], which is taxable at 15% under section 111A, against the short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid), which is taxable at 30% under section 115AD. Thereafter, the assessee set-off the balance loss against the short-term capital gains earned on the transaction of sale of share subjected to STT. The AO held that section 111A and 115AD provide different rate of taxes and the assessee’s manner of setting-off its short-term capital loss, taxable at 15%, first against the short-term capital gains taxable at 30%, and the balance set off against the short-term capital gains taxable at 15% was disallowed. Accordingly, vide draft assessment order dated 14.3.2024, he computed the short term capital gain by first setting off 15% loss against 15% gains, and thereafter, set off with other gains.
Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) rejected the objections filed by the assessee and upheld the computation of capital gains made by the AO vide draft assessment order.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT

HELD

The sole issue before the Tribunal was whether the short-term capital loss (on which STT was paid) can be set off against short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid)

Following the decisions of co-ordinate bench in a number of cases, the Tribunal observed that as per the provisions of section 70(2), the short-term capital loss can be set off against gain from any other capital asset. Section 70(2) does not make any further classification between the transactions where STT was paid and the transactions where STT was not paid and the term “similar computation” in section 70(2) only refers to the computation as provided under sections 48 to 55.

Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to accept the methodology adopted by the assessee for the computation of capital gains.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed on this ground.

S. 56 – The term “immovable property” in section 56(2)(x) includes agricultural land. S. 56 – Where the assessee disputes the stamp duty value, the Assessing Officer is required to refer the matter to District Valuation Officer (DVO).

23 (2025) 174 taxmann.com 1111 (Ahd Trib)

Clayking Minerals LLP vs. ITO

ITA No.: 82 (Ahd) of 2025

A.Y.: 2018-19 Dated: 27.05.2025

S. 56 – The term “immovable property” in section 56(2)(x) includes agricultural land.

S. 56 – Where the assessee disputes the stamp duty value, the Assessing Officer is required to refer the matter to District Valuation Officer (DVO).

FACTS

The assessee filed its income tax return on 30.08.2018, declaring a loss of ₹1,24,010 for AY 2018-19. Subsequently, the case was selected for limited scrutiny to examine whether the purchase value of a property was less than the value determined by the stamp valuation authority under section 56(2)(x). During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noted that the assessee purchased a property for ₹42,72,000 having stamp duty value of ₹1,15,62,880. The assessee contended that since the property was agricultural land at the time of purchase, it did not qualify as a “capital asset” as per section 2(14), and therefore, section 56(2)(x) was not applicable. The AO held that section 56(2)(x) was attracted and taxed the difference of ₹72,90,880 between the purchase consideration and the stamp duty value under the head “income from other sources”.

CIT(A) affirmed the addition of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) On a plain reading, it is seen that section 56(2)(x) mentions the term “any immovable property”. The term “immovable property” has not been defined in section 56(2)(x) or in any other section in the Income Tax Act. This renders the word to be interpreted in general parlance. In general understanding of the term, the word “immovable property” means an asset which cannot be moved without destroying or altering it. Going by the general definition, “immovable property” would include any rural agricultural land, in absence of any specific exclusion in section 56(2)(x).

(b) Notably, section 56(2)(x) does not use the word “capital asset”. The sale of rural agricultural land is exempt in the hands of the seller since the word “capital asset” has been specifically defined to exclude agricultural land in rural areas under section 2(14). Thus, sale of rural agricultural land shall not give rise to any capital gains in the hands of the seller as it is not considered as a capital asset itself. However, from the point of view of the “purchaser” of immovable property, section 56(2)(x) mentions “any immovable property” which going by the plain words of the statute, does not specifically exclude “agricultural land”.

(c) However, since the assessee had disputed the stamp duty value, the AO was required to make a reference to the DVO for the purpose of valuing the same as per third proviso to section 56(2)(x).

Accordingly, the matter was referred to the file of the AO with a direction to refer the valuation to DVO as requested by the assessee.

Editor’s Note: Please refer detailed analysis of this judgement in the Controversy Column of this issue on page 60

The expression “on the occasion of marriage” used in proviso to section 56(2)(vii) cannot be given restricted meaning. When the gift is associated with the event of marriage, the immediate reason or cause for the gift is the marriage of the recipient, it would be covered by the said expression and the relationship between the gift and the marriage is the relevant factor and not the time of making the gift.

22 Dhruv Sanjay Gupta vs. JCIT

ITA No. 5749/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of Order : 20.6.2025

Section : 56(2)(vii)

The expression “on the occasion of marriage” used in proviso to section 56(2)(vii) cannot be given restricted meaning. When the gift is associated with the event of marriage, the immediate reason or cause for the gift is the marriage of the recipient, it would be covered by the said expression and the relationship between the gift and the marriage is the relevant factor and not the time of making the gift.

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee claimed to have received gifts of ₹2,11,35,523 which he claimed to have been received on the occasion of his marriage. The assessee got married on 8.12.2012. The amounts of gifts received on occasion of marriage comprised of a sum of ₹2 crore received from Shri Anil Kumar Goel and balance ₹11,35,523 from Siddharth Jatia.

Anil Kumar Goel is the first cousin from paternal grandfather. The cheque from Anil Kumar Goel was dated 8.12.2012 and the Memorandum of Gift dated 8.12.2012 was also executed for the said gift. The cheque got cleared and credited to the bank account of the assessee on 18.12.2012 i.e. 10 days after the date of marriage. As regards second gift of ₹11,35,523 it was submitted that Siddharth Jatia is a family friend from Singapore and has gifted USD 21,000 vide cheque dated 4.12.2012 which has been gifted vide Gift Deed dated 4.12.2012. This cheque was cleared on 2.1.2013.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the amounts claimed by the assessee to be gifts on the occasion of marriage were received by the assessee after the occasion of the marriage, based on dates of clearing of cheques and amount getting credited to the bank account of the assessee. He thus, held that these transactions of gift received by the assessee are sham transactions wherein assessee has been used as a benami to build up his capital.

While treating the transaction of gift as sham transaction, AO observed in his order that there was a meagre balance in the bank account of the donor, Shri Anil Kumar Goel as on 13.12.2012 at ₹7,523. Also, on 16.12.2012, the balance was only ₹8,39,201. It was only on 17.12.2012 that the donor received ₹1.40 Crores from one, Shri Pinku Bagmar and ₹50 lakhs from grandfather of the assessee, i.e., Shri Devki Nandan Gupta. It was out of these funds that the cheque of gift given to the assessee was encashed and funds got transferred to the bank account of the assessee. According to the AO, the funds got transferred much after the date of marriage which occurred on 08.12.2012.

The AO took a view that no person can give a gift of money on a particular day which he does not possess or does not actually have. On the date of cheque i.e. 08.12.2012, Shri Anil Kumar Goel did not have sufficient balance in his bank account to give the gift of ₹2 Crores which was actually transferred to the assessee on 18.12.2012 after the receipt of moneys from Shri Pinku Bagmar and Shri Devki Nandan Gupta. Thus, he concluded that the amounts received by the assessee as gifts are not covered under the proviso to section 56(2)(vii), since the same were not received on the occasion of marriage but much later after the marriage. The AO also made an observation that gift received by the assessee was transferred back to Shri Devki Nandan Gupta on 19.12.2012. According to the AO, if assessee has received the gift for his marriage, then what was the need for him to transfer the same on the next day to Shri Devki Nandan Gupta. Based on these observations, AO concluded that transaction of gift is a sham transaction and assessee has been used as benami in the transactions between Shri Anil Kumar Goel and Shri Devki Nandan Gupta for building up of capital without incidence of tax.

In respect of the second gift from Shri Siddharth Jatia, the AO enquired from the bank by issuing notice u/s.133(6) about the said transaction. Based on this enquiry, AO noted that the said credit of amount of ₹11,35,523 mentioned by the bank is against export advance proceeds USD 4,779.85 by Manish Export. Based on this fact, AO concluded that it is not a gift received on the occasion of marriage but a sum received by the assessee without any consideration and therefore chargeable to tax.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where further documentary evidences were submitted to substantiate creditworthiness of Shri Anil Kumar Goel and also of Devki Nandan Gupta. As regards certificate given by the Bank it was submitted that the Bank had inadvertently given a wrong certificate. Foreign Inward Remittance Certificate in Form 10H was produced to demonstrate that the amount received was gift.

HELD

The Tribunal held that the AO has taken a microscopic view of the term used in proviso to section 56(2)(vii) relating to “on the occasion of marriage”. The expression “on the occasion of marriage” used in proviso to section 56(2)(vii) cannot be given restricted meaning. When the gift is associated with the event of marriage, the immediate reason or cause for the gift is the marriage of the recipient, it would be covered by the said expression and the relationship between the gift and the marriage is the relevant factor and not the time of making the gift. Clause (b) of the proviso to section 56(2)(vii) mentions that the provisions of clause (vii) shall not apply to any sum of money or any property received “on the occasion of marriage of an individual”.

The Tribunal held that the observations made by the authorities below to be more of surmises and conjectures in nature rather than those made by bringing any cogent material on record to disprove the documents and the explanations furnished by the assessee. The Tribunal having taken into account all the documentary evidences and explanations, found that the gifts received by the assessee on the occasion of his marriage, though the amount were credited at a later date, which is 10 days after the date of marriage in the case of gift received from Shri Anil Kumar Goel and 15 days in the case of gift received from Shri Siddharth Jatia, i.e., on 02.01.2013 since the cheque was issued from the Singapore branch of the bank of the donor, are covered by the proviso to section 56(2)(vii) as the same are received by the assessee on the occasion of his marriage. Microscopic view taken by the AO of the expression “on the occasion of marriage” to receive a gift on the day of marriage as well as to get the account credited on the same date was held to be devoid of real-life situations.

The Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

Where assessee is otherwise eligible to claim deduction and has submitted computation, mere typographical error in claiming deduction under section 54 instead of section 54F does not disentitle the assessee from getting relief under section 54F. Limitation of allowing deduction only if claimed in the return of income applies only to the AO and not to the Appellate Authority which can allow correct claim if facts on record support the claim being made.

21 Seema Srivastava vs. ITO

[2025] 175 taxmann.com 374 (Patna – Trib.)]

A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of Order : 6.6.2025

Sections : 54, 54F

Where assessee is otherwise eligible to claim deduction and has submitted computation, mere typographical error in claiming deduction under section 54 instead of section 54F does not disentitle the assessee from getting relief under section 54F. Limitation of allowing deduction only if claimed in the return of income applies only to the AO and not to the Appellate Authority which can allow correct claim if facts on record support the claim being made.

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee in her return of income declared capital gains arising on sale of immovable property and claimed deduction under section 54. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of deduction made under section 54 on the ground that the asset sold was not a residential house. Although section 54F could have applied, the AO held that assessee had not claimed deduction under section 54F nor submitted the requisite details.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and contended that she was eligible to claim deduction under section 54F but had inadvertently claimed it under section 54 and this was a clerical error which should have been ignored and the rightful claim under section 54F should have been allowed. The CIT(A) rejected the ground of appeal and held that the eligibility of claim under section 54F was not substantiated.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal considered the rival submission and having gone through the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. vs. CIT [(2006) 284 ITR 323] agreed with the contention of the assessee that the limitation for allowing the deduction by filing a revised return is applicable only to the AO and not to the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the CIT(A) ought to have allowed the deduction u/s 54F of the Act. It held that since this is a purely legal issue and the mistake occurred at the level of the AO and on behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that the matter may be sent back to the AO as he has disallowed the claim without specifying the fact that section 54F of the Act was not applicable.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee had purchased a residential house and was eligible for deduction u/s 54F of the Act, the order of the CIT(A) was to be set aside and the matter was remitted to the AO to allow the claim u/s 54F of the Act on the basis of evidence filed by the assessee. In case any further evidence is required, the same may also be furnished by the assessee before the AO. The action of the Tribunal was in light of the settled judicial principle that the claim under a wrong section does not bar the assessee from making the claim under the correct section, if the assessee is otherwise eligible. Even though the deduction has to be claimed in the return of income for being allowed by the AO, however, this limitation is only for the Assessing Authority and the Appellate Authority can grant the exemption/deduction claimed if the facts on record convey so. ,

 

Non-filing of Form 68 is only a technical or venial breach which should not snatch away the substantive right to claim immunity from levy of penalty, which assessee got vested with on fulfilment of substantive conditions mandated in Clause (a) & (b) of sub-section (1) of section u/s. 270AA of the Act.

20 New Dawath Traders vs. ITO

TS-119-ITAT-2025 (Mum.)

A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of Order : 14.2.2025

Sections: 270A, 270AA

Non-filing of Form 68 is only a technical or venial breach which should not snatch away the substantive right to claim immunity from levy of penalty, which assessee got vested with on fulfilment of substantive conditions mandated in Clause (a) & (b) of sub-section (1) of section u/s. 270AA of the Act.

FACTS

The assessee firm engaged in the business of wholesale rice trade in the name and style of M/s. Dawath Traders filed its return of income for AY 2017-18, on 30.10.2017, disclosing total income at ₹6,52,740. Later, the premises of the assessee was surveyed u/s.133A of the Act on 17.03.2017 and based on the survey findings, the return was selected for scrutiny and the AO assessed total income at ₹55,46,812 and since, the assessee has offered ₹30 lakhs under PMGKY Scheme, net-assessed income came down to ₹25,46,812.

Pursuant to the assessment order dated 30.12.2019, assessee remitted the tax computed at ₹8,70,297 within 30 days of the demand, and didn’t file any appeal against the assessment order dated 30.12.2019. Thus, assessee claimed that it was eligible/entitled for immunity from imposition of penalty u/s.270AA of the Act. However, the AO didn’t agree, because assessee didn’t file Form 68 before him, within the period stipulated under sub-section (2) of section 270AA of the Act. Accordingly, he issued notice u/s.270A of the Act, despite having taken note of the assessee’s assertion that it had paid tax & interest as per the assessment order u/s.143(3) of the Act dated 30.12.2019 [within the period specified in the notice of demand] and not having preferred an appeal against the assessment order.

The AO levied penalty u/s.270A of the Act, alleging assessee’s failure to explain on merits against disallowance/addition made in the assessment order and imposed penalty u/s.270A of the Act for under-reporting of income by levying penalty of ₹2,72,549 @ 50% of the amount of tax payable on under-reported income.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO by observing that immunity [from levy of penalty u/s.270A of the Act] could have been granted only if the assessee had filed Form 68 within one month from the end of the month in which the assessment order has been received. In the absence of filing of such form, he rejected the claim of immunity and also observed that the assessee didn’t bring any evidence to show that the assessee’s case would fall under Rule 6DD of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 to exclude the transaction from violation of sec.40A(3) of the Act, which led to the disallowance of Rs.47,64,072.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the assessee-firm has fulfilled conditions prescribed u/s.270AA of the Act for claiming immunity from imposition of penalty u/s.270A of the Act by duly remitting the tax & interest as per the order of the assessment as well as not filing any appeal against the assessment order dated 30.12.2019. Thus, it is noted that the assessee has fulfilled the conditions under Clause (a) & Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 270AA of the Act. However, the assessee didn’t file before the AO the application for immunity in Form 68 as prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 270AA of the Act. In case, if the assessee had filed Form 68 within the prescribed period stated in subsection (2), [i.e. within one month from the end of the month in which the assessment order was received by assessee] then the AO should have granted immunity from imposition of penalty u/s.270A of the Act. Having fulfilled both the conditions for grant of immunity as stipulated under clause (a) & (b) of sub-section (1) of section 270AA of the Act, which are substantive in nature except not filing Form 68 before AO, the assessee, in substance assessee was entitled for claiming immunity from imposition of penalty u/s.270A of the Act.

The Tribunal observed that courts are meant to do substantial justice between the parties, and that technical rules or procedure should not be given precedence over doing substantial justice. Undoubtedly, justice according to the law, doesn’t merely mean technical justice, but means that law is to be administered to advance justice [refer the decision dated 30.10.2017 of the Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya vs. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya in Civil Appeal No.155549 of 2017].

In the given factual background, according to the Tribunal, non-filing of Form 68 was only a technical or venial breach which should not snatch away the substantive right to claim immunity from levy of penalty, which assessee got vested with on fulfilment of substantive conditions mandated in Clause (a) & (b) of sub-section (1) of section u/s.270AA of the Act. The Tribunal noted that it has been further brought to its notice that assessee has filed Form 68 [a copy of which is found placed at Page Nos.1-3 of the Paper Book which has been uploaded in the IT portal].

Considering the overall facts, the Tribunal held that no penalty ought to have been levied u/s.270A of the Act for under-reporting of income. It directed deletion of the penalty levied.

Section 144C(5): Document Identification Number [‘DIN’] – Circular No.19/2019 [F.No.225/95/2019-ITA II] dated 14.08.2019 – DIN has to be generated for DRP proceedings :

8 Commissioner of Income Tax, International Taxation vs. M/s. Laserwords US Inc.,

[T.C.A. No. 46 OF 2025 and CMP Nos. 5208 and 5211 of 2025 Dated: 10/06/2025, (Madras) (HC).]

[ Arising out of ITAT: “D” Bench, Chennai, dated 22.12.2023 passed in IT (TP) A.No.44/CHNY/2021 for the AY 2015-16.]

Section 144C(5): Document Identification Number [‘DIN’] – Circular No.19/2019 [F.No.225/95/2019-ITA II] dated 14.08.2019 – DIN has to be generated for DRP proceedings :

The ITAT by impugned order held that the direction issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel [‘DRP‘] under Section 144C(5) of the Act did not contain a Document Identification Number [‘DIN’] as mandated by the Central Board of Direct Taxes by its Circular No.19/2019 [F.No.225/95/2019-ITA II] dated 14.08.2019. The subsequent communication intimating the DIN for DRP proceedings did not satisfy the conditions prescribed in paragraph No.3 of the said circular. Accordingly, the said directions were invalid in law and as a sequitur, the assessment order which was impugned before the ITAT was liable to be quashed. In the instant case, the assessment order also did not contain a DIN.

The counsel for appellant/revenue, submitted that the DRP proceedings had a valid DIN and the DIN was also subsequently communicated to the assessee by another communication. Accordingly, the requirement under the circular has been complied with; and that in any case, the assessee had not challenged the directions issued by DRP. Hence, the impugned assessment order ought not to have been quashed.

The counsel for respondent/assessee submitted that apart from the fact that a DIN was not generated electronically for DRP proceedings, the subsequent communication does not satisfy the requirement in paragraph No.3 of the circular, i.e., to state the reasons in the prescribed format for not generating the DIN. In the instant case, the assessment order also does not contain a DIN; and that therefore, the impugned order by ITAT does not call for any interference.

The Hon. Court observed that it is well-settled that circulars issued by CBDT in exercise of its powers under Section 119 of the Act are binding on the revenue. The consequences of not following the directions issued in the circular are also provided in the circular.

The Court further observed that Paragraph No.4 of the circular makes it clear that any communication which is not in conformity with paragraph No. 2 and 3 of the circular, shall be treated as invalid and shall be deemed to have never been issued.

Further, paragraph No.3 of the circular provides for exceptional circumstances where the mandatory requirement may not be adhered to, but requires that if an order/communication is issued without a DIN, it could be done after recording reasons in writing in the file and with prior written approval of the Chief Commissioner / Director General of Income Tax. Paragraph No.3 also states that if DIN is not generated and quoted in the body of the communication, then reasons for not generating and quoting DIN should be mentioned in a specific format set out in paragraph No.3 of the circular. The argument of the appellant/revenue that, even if the directions of the DRP did not contain a valid DIN, it would not render the said DRP directions invalid because the proceedings of the DRP do not result in an order requiring the generation of DIN as per the circular, cannot hold water.

The Court observed that it is the case of appellant that there was a DIN generated and it was written in hand in the proceedings of DRP and subsequently, communicated to assessee on the same day, i.e., on 12.02.2021. Therefore, appellant conceded that DIN has to be generated for DRP proceedings.

Secondly, the issue was no longer res integra. Relying on a decision of Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Ashok Commercial Enterprises vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Taxation [2023] 154 taxmann.com 144 (Bombay) it was observed that even a satisfaction note would fall within the scope of paragraph No.2 of the circular. Accordingly, in the view of the Hon. Court, there cannot be any doubt that the directions of the DRP (which consists of a collegium of three Income Tax Commissioners) also would fall within the scope of paragraph No.2 of the circular.

Apart from the fact that the DRP proceedings did not contain a valid DIN and was invalid for the reasons stated above, the assessment order also in this case did not contain a DIN. There was no explanation offered by the appellant for not generating the DIN in the assessment order. Therefore, the Appeal was dismissed.

Section 2(15): Charitable activity – commercial activity – violation of section 13(2) – ITAT is the last fact-finding authority: [section 260A]

7 Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) Mumbai vs. Kutchi Sarvodaya Nagar

[ITXA No. 1887 OF 2018, Dated: 11/06/2025; A.Y. 2011-12 (Bom) (HC)]

Section 2(15): Charitable activity – commercial activity – violation of section 13(2) – ITAT is the last fact-finding authority: [section 260A]

The Assessee is a Trust registered with Director of Income Tax (Exemption), Mumbai under Section 12A of the Act. The Assessee filed its Return of Income declaring a total income of ₹NIL. The Assessee, Trust was constructing houses for its members and this was the only activity of the Trust for the last 50 years. The construction of these houses was for deserving vegetarians. For the purpose of construction, the Assessee Trust acquired 51,000 Sq. yards of land from Shri. V. K. Chedda at ₹2.75 Per Sq. yard. 352 persons came forward to participate and contributed ₹501/- as a membership fee and accordingly a sum of ₹1,76,352/- was collected and from that amount the said plot was purchased in the year 1962. It was also observed from the Income and Expenditure Account and the Balance-sheet that the Assessee had collected ₹48.68 crores from its members as instalments, till date, towards construction of flats. Transfer fees to the tune of ₹6.35 crores was also collected by the Assessee till date. For the year under consideration i.e. A.Y. 2011-12, the Assessing Officer observed that the Assessee had collected ₹1.15 crores as transfer fees from new members and the Assessee – Trust was also in receipt of interest on investment amounting to ₹1,07,67,876/-. The Assessing Officer was, therefore, of the view that the Assessee was engaged in a commercial activity by constructing houses on the property of the Assessee Trust and was selling the same to the members. The members and the Assessee Trust were alienating the flat along with the membership, and for this alienation, the Trust had collected a sum of ₹6.35 crores as transfer fees from its members till date. Therefore, the Assessing Officer found that the activity of the Trust was not found charitable in nature and was found commercial in nature. Since the officials of the Assessee Trust were getting the flats for their residence, the activity of the Trust was also found contrary to the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act and hence, the proposal for cancellation of registration of the Assessee Trust, as a Charitable Trust, was sent to the DIT(E), Mumbai. The activity of the Trust was also not found to be covered under the concept of mutuality. In short, the Assessing Officer, found that the Assessee Trust was not entitled to the exemption as contemplated under Section 11 of the Act.

The CIT(A), after examining the facts and circumstances of the case, inter alia came to the conclusion that in fact, there was no sale of houses to any members, and except for defaulter – members who have nominated / substituted their membership, there was no instance of admitting new members in general. Even though the nominated members had to fulfil the criteria of membership and, therefore, as such no transfer of any asset had taken place in terms of sale/purchase/trading/commerce. The CIT(A) also came to the conclusion that the finding of the Assessing Officer that the ‘activity of the Assessee Trust was a commercial activity’ was arrived at from the error that members are not fixed, that flats were sold for consideration which was received by the old member and which is not known to the Trust. The CIT(A) came to a factual finding that there is no case of sale consideration, or sale of houses in the market, and there is no transaction of sale or purchase in the admission of the new member in place of the defaulting member, who is admitted only after specifying the eligibility conditions in that behalf and confirming the Deed of the Trust and its objects. The CIT(A) also found that admittedly the Assessee Trust is not a party to any transaction between two inter se members and, therefore, the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Act was also not attracted. The CIT(A), therefore, partly allowed the Appeal filed by the Assessee.

The Revenue carried the matter in Appeal before the ITAT. The ITAT too, after examining the facts in detail, came to the conclusion that the CIT(A) had passed the order judiciously and correctly, which required no interference at the appellate stage.

The Hon. High Court observed that the entire case has been decided purely on facts. The ITAT is the last fact-finding authority which had come to the conclusion that the Assessee Trust is not carrying on any commercial activity and, therefore, is entitled to the exemption under Section 11 of the Act. This finding of the ITAT is purely based on the facts of the case, which were also analysed by the CIT(A) before he partly allowed the Appeal of the Assessee Trust.

In these circumstances, as the decision of the ITAT is purely based on facts, the Appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Reassessment — International transactions — Arm’s length price — Condition precedent — Notice after four years — Failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment — Unless assessee shown to be aware of facts, it cannot be said to have failed to disclose them — Nothing to show assessee was aware of third party prices — Transfer pricing study of assessee accepted by Transfer Pricing Officer and assessment completed on basis thereof — Presumption that query raised was considered in assessment — Assessment on basis of change of opinion — Notice not valid:

23 Sanofi India Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT:

(2025) 474 ITR 114 (Bom):

A. Y. 2007-08: Date of order 29 February 2024:

Ss. 92CA, 143(3) 147 and 148 of ITA 1961:

Reassessment — International transactions — Arm’s length price — Condition precedent — Notice after four years — Failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment — Unless assessee shown to be aware of facts, it cannot be said to have failed to disclose them — Nothing to show assessee was aware of third party prices — Transfer pricing study of assessee accepted by Transfer Pricing Officer and assessment completed on basis thereof — Presumption that query raised was considered in assessment — Assessment on basis of change of opinion — Notice not valid:

The assessee petitioner filed its return of income for the A. Y. 2007-2008 on October 30, 2007 declaring a total income of ₹2,33,67,08,748. Subsequently, a revised return was filed on March 25, 2009 wherein a claim of additional tax deducted at source of ₹19,86,957 was made. The case was selected for scrutiny and assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was made on December 28, 2010 determining a total income of ₹240,48,78,390.

Subsequently, the petitioner received a notice dated November 11, 2013 u/s. 148 of the Act for the A. Y. 2007-2008, has escaped assessment. By a communication dated December 16, 2013, the petitioner also received the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment. The petitioner objected to the reopening and the petitioner’s objections were rejected by an order dated March 31, 2015.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The revenue contended that the reopening was based on the transfer pricing study of the subsequent assessment year, which is the A. Ys. 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. In our view, that would still not help the Assessing Officer to overcome the condition to reopen, namely, failure to truly and fully disclose material facts.

ii) As held by the apex court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO [(1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC); 1960 SCC OnLine SC 10.] , the duty of an assessee does not extend beyond the full and truthful disclosure of all primary facts. Once all the primary facts are before the assessing authority, it requires no further assistance by way of disclosure. It is for the Assessing Officer to decide what inferences of facts can reasonably be drawn and what legal inferences have ultimately to be drawn. The duty of the assessee, the court held, is to disclose fully and truly all primary relevant facts, it does not extend beyond that.

iii) In N.D. Bhatt, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner vs. I.B.M. World Trade Corporation [(1995) 216 ITR 811 (Bom); 1993 SCC OnLine Bom 243.], the Division Bench of this court relying on Indian Oil Corporation vs. ITO [(1986) 159 ITR 956 (SC); (1986) 3 SCC 409; 1986 SCC (Tax) 552; 1986 SCC OnLine SC 161.] observed that the assessee is under an obligation to disclose only all basic facts and the assessee cannot be expected to draw any inference or to disclose any inference to be made from these basic facts. The court also observed that the assessee must be aware of those facts, which are not disclosed before it can be said that there is any omission or failure on his part to disclose the same. In this case, there is not even an allegation that the assessee was aware of the prices at which the third-party companies had imported glimepride and analgin. Reasons also do not record how the assessee must have been aware of those facts. The fact is, a transfer pricing study was submitted by the assessee and the Transfer Pricing Officer has accepted it. Based on the order under sub-section (3) of section 92CA of the Act from the Transfer Pricing Officer, the Assessing Officer has proceeded to compute the total income of the assessee under sub-section (4) of section 92C of the Act in conformity with the arm’s length price as determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer.

iv) In the circumstances, there is nothing to indicate that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to truly and fully disclose any material fact. It has also to be noted that once a query is raised during the assessment proceedings and the assessee has replied to it, it follows that the query raised was subject of consideration of the Assessing Officer while completing the assessment. From the reasons recorded, it is rather obvious that reopening of the assessment by the impugned notice is merely on the basis of “change of opinion” and that “change of opinion” does not constitute justification and/or reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

v) In the circumstances, rule that was granted on May 8, 2015 is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), and the notice dated November 11, 2013 issued under section 148 of the Act to reopen the assessment for the assessment year 2007-2008 together with the order dated March 31, 2015 dealing with the petitioner’s objections, are quashed and set aside.”

Reassessment — Validity — Undisclosed income — Evidentiary value of photocopy of document — Addition on basis of photocopy of sale agreement received by way of complaint for which original document not produced — Burden to prove authenticity of evidence on AO — No evidence of undisclosed income except photocopy of alleged sale agreement of property — Held, addition to income unsustainable and assessment order invalid:

22 Principal CIT vs. Rashmi Rajiv Mehta:

(2025) 474 ITR 97 (Del):

A. Y. 2010-11: Date of order 4 March 2024:

Ss. 69, 143(3) and 147 of ITA 1961:

Reassessment — Validity — Undisclosed income — Evidentiary value of photocopy of document — Addition on basis of photocopy of sale agreement received by way of complaint for which original document not produced — Burden to prove authenticity of evidence on AO — No evidence of undisclosed income except photocopy of alleged sale agreement of property — Held, addition to income unsustainable and assessment order invalid:

The instant appeals relate to the A. Y. 2010-2011. The genesis of the case pertains to receipt of information by the Assessing Officer in the form of a photocopy of an alleged agreement to sell dated March 5, 2010. The said photocopy of the agreement to sell indicated that the land in Ghittorni, Delhi, was to be purchased against a total consideration of ₹11,00,00,000, wherein, the assessee was described to be a co-purchaser. It has been alleged that the assessee paid a sum of ₹2,75,00,000 as advance for purchase of the said land, which amounted to 25 per cent. of the total consideration. Out of the said amount, a sum of ₹1,38,00,000 was stated to have been paid by way of a cheque and the remaining amount, i.e., ₹1,37,00,000 was allegedly paid in the form of cash at the time of the execution of the said agreement to sell.

In view of the above, a notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued to the assessee on September 26, 2014. The assessee appears filed the return on November 7, 2014, declaring a total income of ₹44,676 for the A. Y. 2010-2011. Consequently, proceedings u/s. 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act were initiated against the assessee. The Assessing Officer, while relying on the photocopy of the said agreement to sell vide assessment order dated March 28, 2016, inter alia, made an addition of ₹9,00,00,000 to the income of the assessee on account of purchase of the said land from undisclosed sources.

The Commissioner(Appeals) vide order dated December 15, 2017, restricted the addition of ₹9,00,00,000 to ₹1,37,00,000, on the ground that it is only the aforesaid amount which can be attributed to the income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year. However, the veracity of the photocopy of the alleged agreement to sell was not doubted by the Commissioner (Appeals). On cross appeals by the Revenue and the assessee both the Tribunal vide common order dated May 28, 2019 dismissed the appeal preferred by the Revenue and the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

On appeal by the Revenue the Delhi High Court framed the following substantial question of law for consideration.

“A. Whether the photocopy of a document, some part of information/facts recorded on it found to be correct in verification, could be treated as a valid document or not in the absence of the original?”

The High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The entire foundation for addition is laid on the basis of the photocopy of the alleged agreement to sell dated March 5, 2010. The original copy of the said document has not seen the light of the day. Further, there is no other evidence to support the veracity of the recitals made in the aforesaid alleged agreement. Therefore, under the facts of the present case, the same cannot be construed to be a sustainable ground for making addition to the income of the assessee.

ii) We, thus, find that these appeals do not raise any substantial question of law. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has rightly opined that under the facts of the present cases, sustaining an addition on the basis of photocopy of alleged agreement to sell would be completely unwarranted and unjustifiable. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.”

Reassessment — Procedure for initiation of proceedings — Objections of assessee for re-opening to be disposed of in separate order — Assessing Officer passing consolidated order disposing of objections and completing re-assessment simultaneously — Violation of principles of natural justice — No reasonable opportunity given to assessee to challenge rejection of objections — Writ petition maintainable — Held, notice and order without jurisdiction and hence quashed:

21 Kesar Terminals and Infrastructure Ltd. vs. DCIT:

[2025] 474 ITR 498 (Bom.):

A. Y. 2011-12: Date of order 7 January 2025:

Ss. 147 and 148 of ITA 1961:

Reassessment — Procedure for initiation of proceedings — Objections of assessee for re-opening to be disposed of in separate order — Assessing Officer passing consolidated order disposing of objections and completing re-assessment simultaneously — Violation of principles of natural justice — No reasonable opportunity given to assessee to challenge rejection of objections — Writ petition maintainable — Held, notice and order without jurisdiction and hence quashed:

The Assessee’s return of income for AY 2011-12 was selected for scrutiny and assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was completed after revising the claim u/s. 80-IA of the Act. Subsequently, notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued on 30.03.2021 proposing to re-open the assessment. In response to the said notice, the Assessee filed return of income 7.04.2021 and on 12.05.2021 requested for reasons for re-opening the assessment. On 6.07.2021, the reasons were furnished to the Assessee. Against the reasons recorded for re-opening of assessment, the Assessee filed objections on 04.08.2021. Thereafter, a notice dated 22.11.2021 was issued u/s. 142(1) of the Act directing the Assessee to justify its claim u/s. 80-IA of the Act. However, the order disposing objections was not passed by the Assessing Officer and directly notice was issued u/s. 142(1) of the Act. In response to the said notice, the Assessee filed its reply requesting the Assessing Officer to dispose of the objections before proceeding further. However, the Assessee’s objections were not disposed of and a consolidated re-assessment order dated 31.03.2022 was passed wherein the objections filed by the Assessee were also disposed.

On writ petition filed by the Assessee against the said order, the Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) An Assessing Officer cannot pass a combined or consolidated order simultaneously disposing of objections to reopening of the assessment u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and completing the reassessment, as it violates principles of natural justice and mandated procedure. The assessee must be given reasonable opportunity to challenge rejection of objections before assessment is completed.

ii) Since the consolidated order warranted interference due to non-compliance with jurisdictional parameters, relegating the assessee to the alternate remedy would not be appropriate. This court has interfered with consolidated orders in identical circumstances, making assessments and disposing of objections. Therefore, the Department’s objection based on exhaustion of alternate remedy was unsustainable. The assessee had clarified that it had instituted a statutory appeal u/s. 246A after the filing of the writ petition only to protect from the bar of limitation. Its statement to withdraw the appeal was accepted. The notice and the consolidated order were set aside, stating that apart from the fact that the making of such consolidated or combined orders was not approved in decided cases, such a procedure involved breaching the principles of natural justice and fair play.

iii) For all the above reasons, we allow this petition and make the rule absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) and quash, cancel and set aside the impugned notice dated March 30, 2021 and impugned order dated March 31, 2022”.

Penalty — Share Application Money — Share application money otherwise than by account payee cheque or bank draft — Neither loan nor deposit but for participation in capital of company — Share application money is neither repayable after notice nor repayable after a period of time — Provisions of s. 269SS or s. 269T or consequential penalty provisions u/s. 271D or s. 271E not applicable:

20 CIT vs.Vamshi Chemicals Ltd:

[2025] 474 ITR 422 (Cal.):

A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08: Date of order 6 May 2024:

Ss. 269SS, 269T, 271D and 271E of ITA 1961

Penalty — Share Application Money — Share application money otherwise than by account payee cheque or bank draft — Neither loan nor deposit but for participation in capital of company — Share application money is neither repayable after notice nor repayable after a period of time — Provisions of s. 269SS or s. 269T or consequential penalty provisions u/s. 271D or s. 271E not applicable:

During the assessment years under appeal, the assessee received share application money for issue of preference shares amounting to ₹20,000 or more from persons otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft. The Assessing Officer issued a show cause notice for penalty u/s. 271D / 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Assessee violated the provisions of section 269SS. The Additional Commissioner imposed penalty u/s. 217D for A.Y.s 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08 and imposed penalty u/s/ 271E for A.Y.s 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08.

The Tribunal held that share application money or its repayment is neither a loan nor a deposit and as such provisions of section 269SS or 269T were not attracted and consequently no penalty could be imposed u/s. 271D or 271E of the Act.

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal of the Department and held as follows:

“i) The words “loan or deposit” has been defined in Explanation (iii) to section 269T of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which is not an expansive definition. It provides that “loan or deposit” means any loan or deposit of money which is repayable after notice or repayable after a period and, in case of a person other than a company including loan or deposit of any nature. Share application money is neither repayable after notice nor repayable after a period. It is for participation in the capital of the company. Share application money is for participation in capital of a company which is neither a loan nor a deposit. Therefore, neither under the definition of the words “loan or deposit” as given in Explanation (iii) to section 269T of the Act, 1961 nor in ordinary sense, share application money can be said to be a loan or deposit. Once share application money is neither loan nor deposit, then neither section 269SS nor section 269T shall attract. Consequently, no penalty either u/s. 271D or u/s. 271E could be imposed.

ii) Looking into the objects and purpose of sections 269SS and 269T read with Explanation defining the words “loan and deposit”, the share application money received could neither be said to be loan nor a deposit, and was for participation in capital of the assessee which was neither a loan nor a deposit and, therefore, the provisions of these sections would not be attracted. Consequently, no penalty u/s. 271D or section 271E could be imposed.

iii) Hence, there was no illegality in the order of the Tribunal holding that the receipt of share application money or its repayment was neither a loan nor a deposit and as such, the provisions of section 269SS or 269T were not attracted and consequently no penalty could be imposed u/s. 271D or section 271E.”

Income — Interest — Capital or revenue receipt — Precedents — Purchase of property in auction paying full consideration — Auction subsequently nullified by Court order — Interest received on amount by direction of Court not compensation — Amount Bonafide receipt by Assessee as successful auction bidder and not as compensation from order of Court — Held, interest receipt capital in nature and not assessable as income from other sources:

19 Pr. CIT vs. INS Finance and Investment Pvt. Ltd.:

[2025] 475 ITR 83 (Del):

A. Y. 2011-12: Date of order 30 May 2024:

S. 56(2)(viii) of ITA 1961:

Income — Interest — Capital or revenue receipt — Precedents — Purchase of property in auction paying full consideration — Auction subsequently nullified by Court order — Interest received on amount by direction of Court not compensation — Amount Bonafide receipt by Assessee as successful auction bidder and not as compensation from order of Court — Held, interest receipt capital in nature and not assessable as income from other sources:

The Assessee had acquired a right to purchase a property through an auction carried out by Punjab National Bank (PNB) and thereafter paid the entire purchase price. However, subsequently, the auction came to be annulled and the Punjab and Haryana High Court, vide order dated 21 September 2010 directed for refund of the whole amount deposited by the Assessee along with interest accrued thereon.

The Assessee added an amount of ₹3,19,07,676 to the Capital Reserve in the Balance Sheet. The Assessee also claimed TDS credit of ₹54,41,122. In the scrutiny assessment for AY 2011-12, the Assessing Officer was of the view that the interest so received along with the refund of amount deposited by the Assessee was not a capital receipt and thus made addition of ₹3,19,07,676 to the total income of the Assessee.

The CIT(A) affirmed the order of the Assessing Officer. However, for the purpose of computation, the CIT(A) directed that ₹3,19,07,676 should be offered as income by dispersing it over a period concerning other relevant AYs. Against this order of the CIT(A), both the Assessee as well as the Assessing Officer filed rectification application u/s. 154 of the Act. The Assessee contended that the amount should be considered as capital receipt and the Assessing Officer contended that the apportionment of the amount over the other AYs was contrary to the provisions of section 145A(b) and therefore should not be apportioned. However, the CIT(A) allowed the application of the Assessee and modified its earlier order and held that the amount received was in the nature of a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The Tribunal held that the interest received by the Assessee was capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

The Delhi High Court, dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as follows:

“i) It is crystal clear that the interest accrued on the compensation received herein can be termed as a capital receipt and thus, the same is not chargeable to tax. In the present case, the amount in question was received due to the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No. 1470/2010 on account of cancellation of the auction.

ii) The Tribunal had appropriately characterised the interest on the amount received by the assessee under the court order as capital receipt and rightly held that it was not chargeable to tax. It was ex facie evident from the order of the Tribunal that it had considered the aspect that the amount received by the assessee was not in the nature of debt but was received on account of cancellation of the auction of the property.

iii) However, it is pertinent to point out that this amount cannot be characterised as compensation granted by the Court on account of cancellation of the auction. Rather, such an amount was a bonafide amount of the successful auction bidder, which he had deposited against the purchase of the land. The amount so received by the assessee was the entitlement of the successful bidder which was given back to the assessee vide an order of the Court. Thus, when the amount in question was not in the nature of compensation, then, as a natural corollary, the interest accrued on the said amount cannot tantamount to revenue receipts and hence, the same cannot be subjected to tax as per Section 56(2)(viii) of the Act.”

Income — Valuation of shares — Shares allotted as part of employee stock purchase scheme — Lock-in period during which shares could not be transferred — Valuation of shares taking into account restrictive condition:

18 Ravi Kumar Sinha vs. CIT:

[2025] 474 ITR 594 (Del.):

A.Ys.: 1997-98 to 1999-00: Date of order 14 August 2024:

S. 17 of ITA 1961

Income — Valuation of shares — Shares allotted as part of employee stock purchase scheme — Lock-in period during which shares could not be transferred — Valuation of shares taking into account restrictive condition:

The Assessee was allotted 11,50,500 shares at ₹15 per share under the Employees Stock Purchase Scheme (ESPS). Out of these, 25% of the shares were subject to lock-in period of 12 months and the balance 75% of the shares were subject to lock in period of 18 months. During the previous financial year, the Assessee paid only ₹10.50 per share against the issue price of ₹15 per share. The employer company obtained independent valuation report in respect of the shares in question, the value of which was determined at ₹22.50 per share. In the return of income filed by the Assessee, the Assessee took the position that due to lock-in period, the shares were not marketable and therefore the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the shares could not exceed the face value of the shares. Thus, the Assessee did not offer any income in respect of the shares. The Assessing Officer held that the market price of the shares was ₹49.45 per share and the Assessee was allotted shares at a concessional rate of ₹15 per share and therefore the difference of ₹34.45 was liable to be taxed as perquisite u/s. 17(2)(iiia) of the Act. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of ₹3,96,34,725.

The CIT(A) held that since the shares were subject to a lock-in and therefore not available for trade, it would be inappropriate to take the quoted price appearing on the Stock Exchange for the purpose of determining FMV. However, keeping in mind the valuation report, the CIT(A) held that the FMV should be taken at ₹22.50 per share. Against the said order of the CIT(A), both the Assessee as well as the Department filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee, and held as follows:

“i) In DY. CGT vs. BPL LTD. [2022] 448 ITR 739 (SC); 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1405 , the Supreme Court observed that equity shares which are quoted and transferable in the stock exchange are to be valued on the basis of the current transactions and quotations in the open market. The market quotations would reflect the market value of the equity shares that are transferable in a stock exchange, but this market price would not reflect the true and correct market price of shares suffering restrictions and bar on their transferability. It is a fact that the market price fluctuates, and the share prices can move up and down. Share prices do not remain static. Equally, the restriction or bar on transferability has an effect on the value/price of the shares. Easy and unrestricted marketability are important considerations that would normally impact valuation/price of a share. The expression “if sold in the open market” does not alter the nature of the property. What the expression postulates is to permit the assessee or the authorities to assume a sale in the open market, which is to limit the property to be valued at the price that a person would be prepared to pay in the open market with all rights and obligations. The value would not exceed the sum, which a willing purchaser would pay, given the fact that the right to purchase is restricted or barred. This does not imply that the valuation of the shares can be made artificially and by ignoring the restrictions on the property. Valuation cannot ignore the limitations attached to the shares.

ii) The shares in question would become transferable post the lock-in-period. In the light of the restriction with respect to marketability and tradeability of the stock in question, the fair market value could not have been recognised to exceed the face value of the shares and thus the determinative being ₹15. The valuation report was at best a medium adopted by the employer in order to broadly ascertain its obligations for the purposes of withholding tax. It could not have consequently been taken into consideration for the purposes of determining the fair market value. The face value alone would be conclusive for purposes of taxation.

iii) Well-settled position in law is that the Act does not contemplate a tax being levied on notional income.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

4 Shital Fibers Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax

[2025] 174 Taxmann.com 807 – SC

Industrial Undertaking – Special Deduction – Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA, does not provide that when a deduction is allowed under Section 80-IA, while considering the claim for deduction under any of the provision under heading ‘C’, the deduction allowed under Section 80-IA should be deducted from the gross total income – The restriction under Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA is not on computing the total gross income.

A group of appeals / petitions had been referred to a Bench of three Judges in view of the Order dated 10th December, 2015 in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore vs. Micro Labs Limited (2015) 17 SCC 96 [(2015) 64 Taxmann.com 199-SC] which recorded the difference of opinion between two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court.

For the sake of convenience, the Supreme Court referred to the facts of the case in Civil Appeal No. 14318 of 2015.

The Appellant was a company which filed a return declaring net taxable income at ₹46,99,293 for the Assessment Year 2002-03. The Appellant claimed deductions under Section 80-HHC and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the IT Act’). The return was accepted on 31st October, 2002.

Reassessment proceedings under Section 147 of the IT Act were initiated in respect of the said Assessment Year by a notice dated 10th December 2008 by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Range II, Jalandhar, based on the judgment dated 17th July, 2008 of the jurisdictional ITAT, in ITA Nos. 320 and 321, Amritsar Bench in respect of Appellant’s case for the assessment year 2003-04 and 2004-05. In the said notice dated 10th December, 2008, under Section 147 of the IT Act, it was observed that a deduction of ₹90,43,347 was claimed by the Appellant under Section 80-IB on the total profit of ₹4,19,40,609. The Appellant claimed a deduction of ₹1,76,90,799 under Section 80-HHC. Reliance was placed by the Revenue on the decision of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘ITAT’), Chennai (Special Bench) in the case of ACIT vs. Rogini Garments 108 ITD 49.

In the case of ACIT vs. Rogini Garments (supra), ITAT held that in order to prevent the taxpayers from taking undue advantage of existing provisions of the IT Act by claiming repeated deductions in respect of the same amount of eligible income, in-built restriction was introduced by enacting sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA with effect from 1st April, 1999.

The Appellant filed response to the notice under Section 143(2). The Appellant relied upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of SCM Creations vs. ACIT 304 ITR 319 wherein it was held that sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA does not bar computation of deductions provided under different provisions of the IT Act. But, it merely restricts the allowability of deductions to the extent of profits and gains of business. However, by the Order dated 12th March, 2009, Additional Commissioner of the Income Tax rejected the argument of the Appellant and deductions claimed by the Appellant under Section 80-IA and 80-HHC were disallowed.

The appeal preferred by the Appellant against the said Order was dismissed by Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). In appeal preferred by the Appellant before the ITAT, the Appellant was unsuccessful.

Thereafter, an appeal was preferred before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which came to be dismissed by the impugned judgement and order. The High Court relied upon its own decision in the case of Friends Casting (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2011) 50 DTR Judgments 61. The High Court took the view that sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA bars claim for deduction under any other provision of Chapter VI-A, if deduction under Section 80-IA has been allowed. In fact, a decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. (2011) 332 ITR 42 (Bom) was also referred. However, the High Court did not agree with the view taken by Bombay High Court. In addition, the High Court relied upon a decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Great Eastern Exports vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2011) 332 ITR 14 (Del).

The Supreme Court noted that section 80-HHC provides for a deduction in respect of profits retained for export business. The provision is applicable to a company or a person engaged in business of export out of India of any goods or mercantile to which the Section applies. In computing the total income, the Assessee is entitled to deduction to the extent of percentage of profits set out in Sub-section (1B) of Section 80-HHC.

Section 80-IA deals with deductions in respect of profits and gains from industrial undertakings or enterprises engaged in infrastructure development etc. Sub-section (1) provides that when the gross total income of an Assessee includes any profits and gains derived by an undertaking or an enterprise from any business referred to in Sub-section (4), in computing total income, the Assessee will be entitled to deduction of an amount equal to hundred per cent of profits and gains derived from such business for ten consecutive years.

Section 80-IB deals with deductions in respect of profits and gains from certain industrial undertakings other than infrastructure development undertakings. The deduction under said provision is applicable when gross total income of an Assessee includes any profit or gain derived from any business mentioned in various Sub-sections of Section 80-IB. An Assessee is entitled to a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to such percentage and for such number of assessment years as specified in the Section.

According to the Supreme Court, the provision of Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA must be considered, in this context. The Supreme Court upon analysis of sub-section (9) observed that, it is applicable where any amount of profits and gains of an undertaking or enterprise is claimed and allowed under Section 80-IA. The deduction is to the extent of percentage of profits and gains derived from certain category of businesses. Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA provides that the deduction to the extent of profit or gain shall not be allowed under any other provisions under heading ‘C’ of Chapter VI-A. It is further provided in Sub-section (9) that in no case, the deduction allowed under any other provision of Chapter VI-A under the heading ‘C’ shall exceed profits and gains of such eligible business of undertakings or enterprises, as the case may be.

Therefore, on plain reading of Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA, the Supreme Court held that if a deduction of profits and gains under Section 80-IA is claimed and allowed, the deduction to the extent of such profits and gains in any other provision under the heading ‘C’ is not allowed. The deduction to the extent allowed under Section 80-IA cannot be allowed under any other provision under heading ‘C’. Therefore, if deduction to the extent of ‘X’ is claimed and allowed out of gross total income of ‘Y’ under Section 80-IA and the Assessee wants to claim deduction under any other provision under the heading ‘C’, though he may be entitled to deduction ‘Y’ under the said provision, he will get deduction under the other provisions to the extent of (Y-X) and in no case total deductions under heading ‘C’ can exceed the profits and gains of such eligible business of undertaking or enterprise.

Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA, on its plain reading, does not provide that when a deduction is allowed under Section 80-IA, while considering the claim for deduction under any of the provision under heading ‘C’, the deduction allowed under Section 80-IA should be deducted from the gross total income. The restriction under Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA is not on computing the total gross income. It restricts deduction under any other provision under heading ‘C’ to the extent of the deduction claimed under Section 80-IA.

According to the Supreme Court, the view taken by the Bombay High Court, in the case of Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. (supra) was correct.

The Supreme Court further noted that Shri Dipak Misra, J (as he then was), in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the decision in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore vs. Micro Labs Limited (2015) 17 SCC 96 had approved the view taken by Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court referred to the following relevant paras –

“Paragraphs 47 and 48 read thus:

47. It is in the context of Section 80-HHC that Sub-section (9) of Section 80-I has come up for interpretation. There is no dispute that Sub-section (9) of Section 80-I would be applicable as the Assessee would be entitled to deduction Under Section 80-IA as well as under Section 80-HHC. The contention of the Revenue is that the said sub-section mandates that deduction under Section 80-HHC has to be computed not only on the profits of business as reduced by the amounts specified in Clause (baa) and Sub-section (4-B) of Section 80-HHC but by also reducing the amount of profit and gains allowed as a deduction under Section 80-IA(1) of the Act. In other words, the gross total income eligible for deduction under Section 80-HHC would be less or reduced by the deduction already allowed under Section 80-IA. Thus, the gross total income eligible for deduction would not be the gross total income as defined in Sub-section (5) of Section 80-B read with Section 80-B, but would be the gross total income computed under Sub-section (5) of Section 80-B read with Section 80-AB less the deduction Under Section 80-IA. An example will make the position clear. Supposing an Assessee has gross total income of ₹1000 and is entitled to deduction under Sections 80-IA and 80-HHC and the deduction under Section 80-IA is ₹300, then the gross total income of which deduction under Section 80-HHC is to be computed would be ₹700, and not ₹1000.

48. On the other hand, the case of the Assessee is that the gross total income would not undergo a change or reduction for the purpose of Section 80-HHC. The two deductions will be computed separately, without the deduction allowed under Section 80-IA being reduced from the gross total income for computing the deduction under Section 80-HHC. The reason being that Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA does not affect computation of deduction under Section 80-HHC, but postulates that the deduction computed under Section 80-HHC so aggregated with the deduction under Section 80-IA does not exceed the profits of the business.

In paragraphs 53 and 54 of the same decision, it is held thus:

53. The first part of Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA refers to the computation of profits and gains of an undertaking or enterprise allowed under Section 80-IA in any assessment year and the amount so calculated shall not be allowed as a deduction under any other provisions of this Chapter. It is in this context that the Bombay High Court has rightly pointed out that there is a difference between allowing a deduction and computation of deduction. The two have separate and distinct meanings. Computation of deduction is a stage prior and helps in quantifying the amount, which is eligible for deduction. Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA does not bar or prohibit the deduction allowed under Section 80-IA from being included in the gross total income, when deduction under Section 80-HHC(3) of the Act is computed. In this context it has been held that the expression “shall not be allowed” cannot be equated with the words “shall not qualify” or “shall not be allowed in computing deduction”. The effect thereof would be that while computing deduction under Section 80-HHC, the gross total income would mean the gross total income before allowing any deduction Under Section 80-IA or other Sections of Part C of Chapter VI-A of the Act. But once the deduction Under Section 80-HHC has been calculated, it will be allowed, ensuring that the deduction Under Sections 80-HHC and 80-IA when aggregated do not exceed profits and gains of such eligible business of undertaking and enterprise.

54. As I find, the legislature has used the expression “shall not qualify” in Sections 80-HHB(5) and 80-HHD(7), but the said expression has not been used in Sub-section (9) of Section 80-IA. The formula prescribed in Sub-section (3) of Section 80-HHC is a complete code for the purpose of the said computation of eligible profits and gains of business from exports of mercantiles and goods. It has reference to total turnover, turnover from exports in proportion to profits and gains from business in Clause (a) and so forth under Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 80-HHC(3) of the Act. In case the gross total income is reduced or modified taking into account the deduction allowed under Section 80-IA, it would lead to absurd and unintended consequences. It would render the formula under Sub-section (3) of Section 80-HHC ineffective and unworkable as highlighted in para 30 of the decision in Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. [Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. vs. CIT, (2011) 332 ITR 42 (Bom)] with reference to Clause (b) of Section 80-HHC(3). Even when I apply Clause (a) and calculate eligible deduction under Section 80-HHC, it would give an odd and anomalous figure. To illustrate, I would like to expound on the earlier example after recording that the gross total income of ₹1000 was on assumed total turnover of ₹10,000 which includes export turnover of ₹5000 and the deduction allowable under Section 80-IA was 30% and the deduction allowable under Section 80-HHC was 80% of the eligible profits as computed under Section 80-HHC(3). The stand of the Revenue is that without alteration or modification of the figures of total turnover and the export turnover, the gross total income would undergo a reduction from ₹1000 to ₹ 700 as ₹300 has been allowed as a deduction under Section 80-IA. This would result in anomaly for the said figure would not be the actual and true figure or the true gross total income or profit earned on the total turnover including export turnover and, therefore, would give a somewhat unusual and unacceptable result. There is no logic or rationale for making the calculation in the said impracticable and unintelligible manner.”

The Supreme Court accordingly, answered the reference and directed the Registry to place the appeals / petitions before appropriate Bench.

Applicability Of Section 56(2)(X) To Receipt Of Rural Agricultural Land

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 56(2)(x) provides for the taxability of certain receipts, which inter alia include the receipt of any immovable property as well as receipt of any other property, either without consideration or for a consideration which is less than its stamp duty value. Earlier, a similar provision was contained in section 56(2)(vii). For this purpose, the term ‘property’ is defined in clause (d) of the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) as the capital asset of the assessee as specified therein, which, inter alia, includes immovable property, being land or building or both.

The issue has arisen as to whether the receipt of agricultural land, which does not fall within the definition of the term ‘capital asset’ under section 2(14), is covered within the ambit of section 56(2)(x) or not. The Jaipur bench of the tribunal has held that in order to apply the provisions of section 56(2)(x) to agricultural land, it must fall within the definition of “capital asset”. As against this, the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal has held that all types of immovable property would get covered within the ambit of section 56(2)(x), irrespective of whether it falls within the definition of capital asset or not.

PREM CHAND JAIN’S CASE

The issue had earlier come up for consideration of the Jaipur bench of the tribunal in the case of Prem Chand Jain vs. ACIT [2020] 183 ITD 372.

In this case, during the previous year relevant to assessment year 2014-15, the assessee had purchased two pieces of agricultural land for an aggregate consideration of ₹5,50,000, which were valued by the Sub-Registrar at ₹8,53,636. On this basis, the Assessing Officer made an addition of the difference of ₹3,03,596 u/s. 56(2)(vii)(b) in the hands of the assessee under the head “Income from other sources”.

Before the CIT (A), the assessee contended that since the purchased land was agricultural, his case was not covered u/s. 56(2)(vii)(b). However, the CIT (A) rejected this argument of the assessee on the ground that no express exclusion was provided for agricultural land from the said section. Accordingly, the CIT (A) confirmed the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

In the appeal before the tribunal, the assessee invited the attention to the amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2010 whereby clause (d) of the Explanation to Section 56(2)(vii), which provided the definition of the term ‘property’, was amended. In the opening portion of the definition of the term ‘property’, for the word “means – ”, the words “means the following capital asset of the assessee, namely:–“ were substituted with retrospective effect from 1-10-2009.

It was submitted that in section 56(2), an explanation has been provided to clause (vii) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself. As the word “property” has been used in sub-clause (b) and (c) of clause (vii), and the Explanation was for the purpose of this clause, i.e. for clause (vii), the Explanation removed all doubts, obscurity or vagueness of the main enactment and clarified the property to be covered in its ambit, so as to make it consistent with the dominant objective, which it seemed to subserve.

The assessee fairly pointed out that what had been defined was the term ‘property’ and not the term ‘immovable property’ for the purpose of Section 56(2). However, the term ‘property’ was defined to mean the following capital asset of the assessee, namely immovable property being land or building or both, shares and securities, jewellery, archaeological collections, drawings, paintings, sculptures, any work of an art or bullion. From the above definition, it was evident that ‘property’ covered only the immovable properties which were in the nature of ‘capital asset’.

However, Section 56(2)(vii) has used the word ‘any immovable property’ while fixing the charge of taxation. Therefore, the challenge was whether the phrase ‘any’ should be interpreted in light of ‘capital asset’ or in its normal meaning. If the former interpretation is adopted, then only such immovable properties which were in nature of capital assets were getting covered in the ambit of Section 56(2). If the latter interpretation is adopted, then any kind of immovable property was covered, and there was no necessity to go and examine whether such immovable property would fit under the definition of capital asset.

The assessee contended that as per the rules of interpretation, where the language of the Act was clear, the former interpretation was more accurate, keeping the intent of the legislature in the background. Further, the phrase ‘capital asset’ as defined vide Section 2(14) was not only for the purposes of capital gains, but for the entire purposes of the Act, and hence the immovable property which was not in the nature of capital asset was not taxable under section 56(2). On the basis of this, and more particularly in view of the specific amendment made in this regard, the assessee contended that the intention of the legislature was very clear that the deeming provision of section 56(2)(vii)(b) would apply if and only if the asset received was a capital asset.

Since the impugned property purchased by the assessee was not a capital asset as defined in section 2(14), it was submitted that it was not taxable as income from other sources u/s. 56(2)(vii)(b). Without prejudice, it was submitted that the matter should have been referred to the DVO for determination of the fair market value since the assessee had objected to the DLC value adopted by the Assessing Officer.

On the other hand, the revenue contended that the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) were clearly attracted in the instant case. Further, no proof had been submitted before the AO that agriculture land so purchased was not a capital asset. Further, it was also submitted that the assessee had not made any specific request for reference of the matter to the DVO. Therefore, in absence thereof, the Assessing Officer was not required to refer the matter to the DVO.

Referring to the provisions of section 56(2)(vii), the tribunal held that provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) referred to any immovable property. The provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) referred to any property other than an immovable property. The meaning of the term “property” has been provided in Explanation (d) to section 56(2)(vii) where the term “property” has been defined to mean capital asset of the assessee, namely immovable property being land or building or both. Where the term “property” has been defined to mean a capital asset as so specified, and where an immovable property as so specified being land, building or both was not held as a capital asset, it would not be subject to the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b). Therefore, where the agricultural land did not qualify as falling in the definition of capital asset, provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) could not be invoked.

However, in the instant case, since there were no findings of the lower authorities with regard to whether the agriculture land acquired by the assessee fell in the definition of capital asset or not, the tribunal set-aside the matter to the file of the AO for the limited purposes of examining whether the two plots of agricultural land so acquired fell within the definition of capital asset or not.

A similar view has been taken by the tribunal in the case of Ramnarayan vs. ITO (ITA No. 767/Del/2024 – order dated 14-6-2024), Yogesh Maheshwari vs. DCIT 187 ITD 618 (Jaipur), Dipti Garg vs. ITO 162 taxmann.com 347 (Jaipur), Mubarak Gafur Korabu vs. ITO 117 taxmann.com 828 (Pune), Ram Prasad Meena vs. ITO 119 taxmann.com 217 (Jaipur).

CLAYKING MINERALS LLP’S CASE

The issue, recently, came up for consideration before the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal in the case of Clayking Minerals LLP vs. Income-tax Officer [2025] 174 taxmann.com 1111 (Ahmedabad – Trib.).

In this case, for the assessment year 2018-19, the assessee filed its income tax return on 30.08.2018, declaring a loss of ₹1,24,010/-. Subsequently, the case was selected for ‘Limited Scrutiny’ through CASS to examine whether the purchase value of a property was less than the value determined by the stamp valuation authority under section 56(2)(x) of the Act.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noted that the assessee purchased a property during the relevant year for ₹42,72,000/, whereas the stamp duty value of the same was ₹1,15,62,880/-. The assessee contended that the land in question, located at Ghanshyam Nagar Sosa, Kundal, Mahesana, was agricultural at the time of purchase on 21.09.2017. The land was later converted to non-agricultural use after obtaining permission from the Collector on 23.10.2017, and the property was registered on 26.03.2018. The assessee submitted that since the property was agricultural land at the time of purchase, it did not qualify as a “capital asset” as per section 2(14), and therefore, section 56(2)(x) was not applicable.

However, the Assessing Officer held that although the land was purchased as agricultural, the assessee’s intention was always to use it for non-agricultural purposes, as evident from the early application and subsequent conversion. The Assessing Officer placed reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Smt. Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim v. CIT [1993] 204 ITR 631 in which it was held that agricultural status depends on actual use and intention, and not merely on classification in revenue records. Since the land was not used for agricultural purposes and was bought with a clear intention to convert it, the AO was of the view that it did not qualify as a capital asset. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer held that the provisions of section 56(2)(x) of the Act were attracted, and the difference of ₹72,90,880/- between the purchase consideration and the stamp duty value was liable to be taxed as “income from other sources”.

The CIT (A) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee against the assessment order on the ground that the impugned land had been purchased by the assessee for industrial purpose and this fact was mentioned in the certificate of the District Collector, Surendra Nagar. It was held by him that the decisions relied upon by the assessee wherein it was held that if agricultural land is transferred to a non-agriculturist, it will not cease to be agricultural land were not applicable to the facts of the assessee’s case.

Before the tribunal, the assessee contended that the CIT(A) had erred in law and on facts by upholding the action of the Assessing Officer in failing to refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO), despite specific requests made by the assessee. The assessee submitted that the addition made without such reference renders the assessment order void and legally untenable, for which it placed reliance upon several decisions. The assessee also submitted that the addition made under section 56(2)(x) was not sustainable since the land in question was rural agricultural land when it was purchased on 21.09.2017 for ₹42,72,000/-. Although the land was subsequently permitted for use for bona fide industrial purposes, such conversion was post-purchase, and therefore, the nature of the land at the time of acquisition remained agricultural.

With respect to the issue of the applicability of the provisions of section 56(2)(x) to the agricultural land, the tribunal proceeded to deal with it on the assumption for argument’s sake that the land in question qualified as an “agricultural land”. After referring to section 56(2)(x), the tribunal observed that it referred to the term “any immovable property”. The term “immovable property” has not been defined in section 56(2)(x) of the Act or in any other section in the Income Tax Act. Therefore, in the opinion of the tribunal, the term “immovable property” was required to be interpreted in general parlance. In general understanding of the term, the word “Immovable Property” meant an asset which could not be moved without destroying or altering it. Therefore, going by the general definition, the tribunal held that “immovable property” would include any rural agricultural land, in absence of any specific exclusion in section 56(2)(x) of the Act. The tribunal observed that section 56(2)(x) of the Act did not use the word “capital asset”. The sale of rural agricultural land was exempt in the hands of the seller since the word “capital asset” has been specifically defined to exclude agricultural land in rural areas under section 2(14). Thus, sale of rural agricultural land did not give rise to any capital gains in the hands of the seller as it was not considered as a capital asset itself.  However, from the point of view of the “purchaser” of immovable property, as stated, section 56(2)(x) mentioned “any immovable property” which, going by the plain words of the Statute, did not specifically exclude “agricultural land”.

Therefore, the tribunal held that the agricultural land could not be taken out of the purview of section 56(2)(x) of the Act.

A similar view had been taken by the Jaipur bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Trilok Chand Sain 174 ITD 729. According to the Tribunal, the reference to “immovable property” was not circumscribed or limited to any particular nature of immovable property. It referred to any immovable property which by its grammatical meaning would mean all and any property which is immovable in nature, i.e., attached to or forming part of the earth surface. Importantly, this decision was rectified by the tribunal, itself, on a Miscellaneous Application by Trilok Chand Sain by holding that the scope of s 56(2)(vii) did not cover the receipt of an agricultural land. In between, the Rajasthan High Court has admitted the appeal of the assessee on 1st July, 2020 against the first order of the tribunal.

OBSERVATIONS

Clause (x) of section 56(2) (as well as the other clauses which were in effect prior to 1-4-2017) has three sub-clauses under which the receipt as specified in the respective sub-clause becomes taxable. The first sub-clause (a) refers to the receipt of any sum of money without consideration. The next sub-clause (b) refers to the receipt of ‘any immovable property’ either without consideration or for an inadequate consideration. The last sub-clause (c) refers to the receipt of ‘any property, other than immovable property’, either without consideration or for an inadequate consideration.

The Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) defines the meaning of certain terms which have been used in the above referred clause (x). Clause (d) of the Explanation defines the term ‘property’ and its definition is reproduced below –

(d) “property” means the following capital asset of the assessee, namely:-

(i) immovable property being land or building or both;

(ii) shares and securities;

(iii) jewellery;

(iv) archaeological collections;

(v) drawings;

(vi) paintings;

(vii) sculptures;

(viii) any work of art;

(ix) bullion;

The Explanation inserted w-e.f. 1.10.2009 has the effect of defining the term ‘property’ for the purposes of the main provision contained in clause (vii) and now clause(x). The main clause deals with the property as well as immovable property. For reasons best known, the term immovable property is defined in a roundabout manner; instead of defining the term directly and independently, the same is defined while defining the term ‘property’. The possible reason could be that the legislature wanted to limit the meaning of the term to the ‘capital asset’ only besides for the term ‘property’. Be that it may be, it is clear to us that the meaning of the term is to be gathered from the Explanation to the clause (vii). There does not seem to be any other way for gathering the meaning of the term ‘immovable property’’; any attempt to confer the meaning independent of the Explanation, would make entry (i) of sub-item(d) of the Explanation otiose and therefore such an interpretation that makes some part of the law redundant should be avoided. On acceptance of this important rule of interpretation, the next step is to give meaning to the term ‘capital asset’ used in the opening part of sub-item (d) of the Explanation. It is clear that the opening part of the Explanation is meant to relate to all the entries (i) to (ix) in the said sub-item that included an ‘immovable property” besides many other entries. Where each of the entries, in order for it to be covered by the Explanation and the main provision, has to be a capital asset in the hands of the recipient; taking any other view is very difficult (if not impossible) and might lead to violation of the provision and the intention of the legislature.

By no means can it be said that the definition as provided above does not apply to sub-clause (b) of section 56(2)(x), which deals with the taxability in respect of the receipt of an immovable property. Therefore, the observation of the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal in the case of Clayking Minerals LLP (supra) that the term ‘immovable property’ has not been defined in section 56(2) does not appear to be correct.

Having said that, the definition of the term ‘property’ as given in clause (d) of Explanation is required to be taken into consideration while interpreting sub-clause (b) of section 56(2)(x). The inevitable conclusion would be that the relevant portion of that definition, referring to ‘the following capital asset of the assessee’, would also apply in so far as the immovable property is concerned. Therefore, in order to create the charge of tax u/s. 56(2)(x) upon the receipt of the immovable property, it should first be in the nature of the capital asset of the assessee. The immovable property, which is not in the nature of the capital asset of the assessee, therefore will not come within the purview of section 56(2)(x). This position has been made clear by Chaturvedi & Pithisaria’s Income-tax Law, Volume 4 (sixth edition) p. 4796.

Now, the crux of the issue is whether the term ‘capital asset’ used here would be interpreted as defined in section 2(14) of the Act. Here, it would be worthwhile to refer to the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2010 by which the concerned amendment was made, inserting the reference to the term ‘capital asset’. The relevant extract is reproduced below for reference –

The provisions of section 56(2)(vii) were introduced as a counter evasion mechanism to prevent laundering of unaccounted income under the garb of gifts, particularly after abolition of the Gift Tax Act. The provisions were intended to extend the tax net to such transactions in kind. The intent is not to tax the transactions entered into in the normal course of business or trade, the profits of which are taxable under specific head of income. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the definition of property so as to provide that section 56(2)(vii) will have application to the ‘property’ which is in the nature of a capital asset of the recipient and therefore would not apply to stock-in-trade, raw material and consumable stores of any business of such recipient.

It can be observed that the objective of the making the amendment was to exclude the transactions entered into in the normal course of business or trade i.e. transactions of stock-in-trade etc. from the purview of the taxability u/s. 56(2). It is with this intention that the amendment was made providing that the ‘property’ should be in the nature of a capital asset for applying the provisions of clause(vii) or (x).

Since the language of the provision is very clear and unambiguous and so is the intention spelt out by the memorandum, it is correct to cover only such immovable property that qualifies as a ‘capital asset’ while applying the provisions of clause (vii) or (x) of s.56(2) and in doing so the meaning of the term ‘capital asset’ should be gathered from s.2(14) as that is the only provision of the Act that defined the term for the purposes of the Act. The said term so defined in s.2(14) excludes an agricultural land and therefore the Jaipur bench was right in applying the provisions of s.2(14) while holding that the provisions of s.56(2)(vii) were not attracted on receipt of the agricultural land. Needless to say, the assessee is under onus to conclusively establish that the nature of the land was agricultural as held by the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal.

Also, this provision is an anti-avoidance measure to check under-statement of consideration. Normally, under-statement of consideration is resorted to in order to avoid capital gains tax. Since capital gains on sale of agricultural land is not chargeable to tax, there is therefore no incentive to under-state the consideration. In a sense, therefore, applying this provision to the purchase of agricultural land may not have been intended. Please see Fitwell Logic Pvt. Ltd. 1 ITR(T) 286(Del.) and Ashok Soni, 102 TTJ (Del) 964; Navneet Kumar Thakkar, 112 TTJ (Jd) 76 : 298 ITR 42 (Jd) (AT) ; Kishan Kumar , 215 CTR (Raj) 181 and 315 ITR 204 (Raj) .

The Jaipur bench of the tribunal in the case of Yogesh Maheshwari vs. DCIT 187 ITD 618 (Jaipur), in paragraph 11 observed “Now, coming to the decision of Jaipur Bench of Tribunal in Trilok Chand Sain (supra), wherein provisions of cl. (b) of s. 56(2)(vii) of the Act were considered. However, they have failed to take into cognizance the provisions of cl. (c) of said section, which talks of property other than immovable property. The Tribunal in para 6 refers only to the definition of ‘immovable property’ and hold that it is not circumscribed or limited to any particular nature of property. However, cl. (c) very clearly talks of property other than immovable property and the word ‘property’ has further been defined under cl. (d) of Explanation thereunder. In the totality of the above said facts and circumstances, there is no merit in reliance placed upon by the learned Departmental Representative for the Revenue on the ratio laid down by Jaipur Bench of Tribunal in ITO vs. Trilok Chand Sain (supra). In view of clear-cut provisions of the Act, we find no merit in the orders of authorities below in making the aforesaid addition in the hands of assessee. The ground of appeal No.1 raised by assessee is thus, allowed.”

Therefore, the view taken by the Jaipur bench of the Tribunal in Prem Chand Jain’s case, and followed in numerous other ITAT decisions, seems to be the better view of the matter, that the provisions of section 56(2)(x) do not apply to receipt of agricultural land.

Article 8 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Shipping Company is not entitled to benefit under Article 8 if its place of effective management is located in a third country; on facts, booking agent did not constitute DAPE.

4. [2025] 172 taxmann.com 857 (Mumbai – Trib.)

DCIT (IT) vs. Bay Lines (Mauritius)

IT Appeal Nos. 4858 and 4859 (Mum.) of 2018

CO Nos. 185 and 186 (Mum.) OF 2019

A.Y.: 2013-14 & 2024-15 Dated: 28th March, 2025

Article 8 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Shipping Company is not entitled to benefit under Article 8 if its place of effective management is located in a third country; on facts, booking agent did not constitute DAPE.

FACTS

The Assessee was a shipping company incorporated in Mauritius. Mauritius Tax Authorities had issued a tax residency certificate to the Assessee. The Assessee contended that the freight income received by it was exempt from tax in India under Article 8 of India-Mauritius treaty. The AO observed that the Place of Effective Management (‘POEM’) of the Assessee was in UAE (i.e. neither in Mauritius nor in India). Hence, the Assessee did not qualify for benefit under Article 8. Accordingly, the AO held that such income would be subject to provisions of Article 7 of India-Mauritius DTAA. The AO further observed that the booking agent in India habitually concluded contracts on behalf of the Assessee. Hence, it constituted a dependent agent PE (“DAPE”) of the Assessee. Accordingly, the AO held that the shipping income was taxable in India in terms of Article 7 of India-Mauritius DTAA.
In appeal, while upholding the contention of the AO that the shipping income earned by the Assessee was not covered by Article 8 of India-Mauritius DTAA, the CIT(A) held that the booking agent in India was an independent agent and as it did not conclude contracts in India on behalf of the Assessee, nor did it maintain stock of goods in India on behalf of the Assessee. Accordingly, the agent did not constitute DAPE of the Assessee in India.

Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), both the revenue and the Assessee preferred an appeal to the ITAT.

HELD

As per Article 8(1) of India-Mauritius DTAA, profits of a shipping company from the operation of ships in international traffic is taxable in the contracting state where the POEM of the company is situated.

Since the Assessee had not pressed the issue of location of POEM, on basis of the findings of the ITAT in the Assessee’s own case, it concluded that the POEM of the Assessee was in UAE. As the POEM of the Assessee was neither in Mauritius nor in India, the ITAT held that the Assessee did not qualify for benefit under Article 8(1) of India-Mauritius DTAA.

The ITAT further held that the booking agent did not constitute DAPE of the Assessee in India for the following reasons:

  •  The activities of the booking agent were limited to accepting bookings on behalf of the Assessee. The booking agent did not conclude contracts on behalf of the Assessee in India. The AO had not provided any evidence in support of the contention that the booking agent had concluded contracts in India on behalf of the Assessee.
  • The booking agent was an agent of independent status since the revenue derived from booking services for the Assessee constituted only 25% of its revenue from all operations.

Therefore, the ITAT held that in absence of a PE in India of the Assessee, its freight income was not taxable in India.

Note: It may be noted that despite concluding that the POEM of Mauritius company was in UAE, the ITAT did not clarify why it could be considered to be resident in Mauritius? The ITAT also did not clarify whether the Assessee could qualify for benefit, if any, under India-UAE DTAA.

Article 13 of India-Singapore DTAA – Short Term Capital Gains from transfer of mutual funds is taxable under Article 13(5) of DTAA, and taxing right vests only with State of Residence.

3. [2025] 173 taxmann.com 570 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Anushka Sanjay Shah vs. ITO (IT)

IT (IT) A NO.174 (MUM) OF 2025

A.Y.: 2022-23 Dated: 26th March, 2025

Article 13 of India-Singapore DTAA – Short Term Capital Gains from transfer of mutual funds is taxable under Article 13(5) of DTAA, and taxing right vests only with State of Residence.

FACTS

The Assessee is a non-resident Indian and a tax resident of Singapore. During the relevant AY, the Assessee had earned short-term capital gain from sale of debt-oriented and equity-oriented mutual funds, amounting to ₹0.89 Crores and 0.47 Crores, respectively. The Assessee had contended that she was a tax resident of Singapore. Hence, she qualified for benefits under Article 13(5) of India-Singapore DTAA and therefore, only Singapore had taxing rights on such gain.

The AO held that gains from transfer of mutual funds were taxable in India and denied benefit under Article 13(5) of DTAA. The DRP held that units of mutual funds derive substantial value from assets located in India, therefore, such gains are taxable in India.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT relied on the coordinate bench ruling in DCIT vs. K.E. Faizal [2019] 178 ITD 383 (Cochin – Trib.), wherein the ITAT dealt with the meaning of the term ‘shares’ in the context of India-UAE DTAA. Article 13(4) of UAE provides taxing rights to India in respect of gains from transfer of shares and in case of other property, the taxing rights vested with state of residence.

Further, the ITAT relied on the following aspects that were dealt with by the Coordinated bench:

  •  The ITAT applied Article 3(2) of DTAA, section 90(3) of the Act, and definition of ‘share’ as per Section 2(84) of Companies Act. It noted that shares mean a share in company’s capital and include stock.
  •  The term ‘company’ means a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 or under previous law. As per SEBI Mutual Fund Regulations 1995, a mutual fund in India can be established only in the form of a trust and not as company. Hence, units of mutual funds cannot be regarded as shares.
  •  As per Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956, the term ‘Securities’ includes shares, scrips, stocks….and unit or any other instrument issued to investors under any mutual fund scheme. The definition categorically provides that shares and units are two different classes of securities. Therefore, units of mutual funds cannot be regarded as shares.

Following the ratio of the decision of the coordinate bench, the ITAT held that under the residuary clause in Article 13(5) of India-Singapore DTAA, short-term capital gains on sale of mutual funds shall be taxable only in Singapore.

S. 271(1)(c) – Where the AO did not specify in the penalty notice the limb of section 271(1)(c) under which penalty had been initiated, such notice was ambiguous and void ab initio and all subsequent proceedings became nullity in the eyes of law.

19. (2025) 174 taxmann.com 59 (Raipur Trib)

Nilima Agrawal vs. ITO

ITA No.: 126 (Rpr) of 2025

A.Y.: 2015-16 Dated: 24 April 2025

S. 271(1)(c) – Where the AO did not specify in the penalty notice the limb of section 271(1)(c) under which penalty had been initiated, such notice was ambiguous and void ab initio and all subsequent proceedings became nullity in the eyes of law.

FACTS

The AO issued penalty notice under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) where the notice referred to both the limbs under section 271(1)(c), that is, concealed the particulars of income and furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The AO had not struck off the inappropriate limb.

CIT(A) / NFAC upheld the penalty order.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) The legal parameters that have been set forth by the judicial pronouncements is that through the penalty proceedings initiated against the assessee, he is put to pecuniary burden. Accordingly, it is essential from the aspect of natural justice that he should be made aware of the charges for which penalty is levied against him so that he can be ready with his defense.

(b) The bedrock of any judicial system is based on ultimate epitome of natural justice. This cannot be eroded by any process of law until and unless fraud is detected or malafide conduct is detected on the part of the assessee.

(c) In the present case, the ambiguity that was existing in the notice issued under section 274 read with section 271(1) (c) hampered the rights of the assessee from the perspective of natural justice. There was no evidence placed on record by the revenue to suggest any malafide conduct on the part of the assessee. Therefore, at the threshold, the parameters of the penalty notice had to be decided and as per the principles laid down by the Courts, before issuance of penalty notice, the A.O was required to apply his mind to the material on record and specify clearly to the assessee what is being put against him. In other words, which limb of Section 271(1)(c) was attracted in the given facts and circumstances of the case must be specified in the notice which is sent to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that since in the penalty notice was ambiguous where both the limbs were clubbed together, such notice itself was void ab initio, and therefore, all the subsequent proceedings became a nullity in the eyes of law. Thus, it held that the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC itself became non-est.

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

S. 12AB – Where objects of assessee-trust were for benefit of residents and members of a specific society and were not meant for public at large, assessee-trust was not entitled to registration under section 12AB.

18. (2025) 173 taxmann.com 744 (Ahd Trib)

Dwarika Greens Foundation vs. CIT(E)

ITA No.: 1812 (Ahd) of 2024

A.Y.: N.A. Dated: 17 April 2025

S. 12AB – Where objects of assessee-trust were for benefit of residents and members of a specific society and were not meant for public at large, assessee-trust was not entitled to registration under section 12AB.

FACTS

The assessee-trust was registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act on 23.06.2020. It filed an application in Form 10AB for registration under section 12AB.

During the registration proceedings, CIT(E) observed that the objects of the Trust were for the benefit of the residents of the Dwarika Green Society and its members and are not for the benefit of the public at large and therefore, he denied registration under section 12AB to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) Perusal of clause (d) to Explanation of Section 12AB(4) clearly lays down that registration of the trust or institution established for charitable purpose created or established after the commencement of the Act, wherein the trust has applied any part of its income for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste can be cancelled. In this context perusal of the main objects of the assessee made it abundantly clear that all the objects enumerated therein were related to members of the Dwarika Green Society which was a specific violation under clauses (c) and (d) to Explanation to Section 12AB(4).

(b) CIT (E) had considered the provisions of section 13(1)(b), which was applicable only in a case of charitable trust or institution created or established after commencement of the Act and only for the benefit of the residents of the Dwarika Green Society and its members and thereby denied the registration, which was well within the provision of amended section 12AB.

Thus, the Tribunal held that since the objects of the assessee-trust which was meant only for the residents and members of the society and not for public at large, there was no infirmity in the order passed by CIT(E).

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed.

S. 194IA – Even though the transferee’s share in the sale transaction exceeded the threshold, where the amount paid to each seller / transferor was below ₹50,00,000, the assessee was not required to deduct tax under section 194IA.

17. (2025) 173 taxmann.com 772 (Ahd Trib)

Archanaben Rajendrasingh Deval vs. ITO

ITA No.: 1465 (Ahd) of 2024

A.Y.: 2015-16 Dated: 2 April 2025

S. 194IA – Even though the transferee’s share in the sale transaction exceeded the threshold, where the amount paid to each seller / transferor was below ₹50,00,000, the assessee was not required to deduct tax under section 194IA.

FACTS

The assessee, along with co-owner, purchased agricultural land for a total consideration of ₹1,23,67,360, and her share in the said transaction was ₹53,67,360, which was paid in two parts to two separate sellers – ₹21,83,680 and ₹31,83,680 respectively. She did not deduct TDS on the said payments contending that the payment to each seller was below ₹50,00,000.

The AO invoked the provisions of section 194IA and held the assessee to be an assessee-in-default under section 201(1) for non-deduction of TDS and levied consequential interest under section 201(1A).

CIT(A) affirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal found merit in the submission of the assessee that the amendment made by way of insertion of a proviso to section 194IA(2), by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 with effect from 1.10.2024, was not applicable to the present year under appeal (AY 2015-16).

Following Bhikhabhai H. Patel vs. DCIT (ITA No. 1680/Ahd/2018, order dated 31.01.2020) and Vinod Soni vs. ITO (ITA No. 2736/Del/2015, order dated 10.12.2018), the Tribunal held that since the assessee had paid ₹21,83,680 to one seller and ₹31,83,680 to another seller, both of which were individually below ₹50,00,000, the provisions of section 194IA were not attracted and therefore, the assessee could not have been held to be an assessee-in-default under section 201(1).

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Payment of consideration, pursuant to an unregistered agreement, towards interior fit out costs claimed as cost of improvement, entered into prior to receiving possession of the property held to be allowable.

16. Shivani Bhasin Sachdeva vs. Assessment Unit

ITA No. 3218/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2021-22 Date of Order: 21 January 2025

Section : 48

Payment of consideration, pursuant to an unregistered agreement, towards interior fit out costs claimed as cost of improvement, entered into prior to receiving possession of the property held to be allowable.

FACTS

The assessee, in the return of income filed, returned capital gains on sale of immovable property for a consideration of ₹15.21 crore and while computing capital gains arising from sale thereof had claimed deduction of cost of acquisition of ₹9.96 crore and ₹2.47 crore as cost of improvement. The assessee was asked to furnish details of cost of improvement claimed in respect of the property sold along with evidences.

From the response furnished by the assessee, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that assessee had purchased a flat on 27.12.2017 which was booked in October 2009. On 31.5.2010, the assessee had entered into an agreement with DLF Hotel and Apartment Pvt. Ltd. to carry out improvement. The AO was of the opinion that since the property was purchased on 27.12.2017 it was not possible to have made improvements without having owned the property. He also remarked that the agreement dated 31.5.2010 is an unregistered agreement. The AO, believing that improvement cannot happen before purchase disallowed the claim of ₹2.47 crore made by the assessee towards cost of improvement.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that the payments made pursuant to agreement dated 31.5.2010 was for civil and electrical work as the flat was purchased “khokha”. After receiving occupancy certificate, civil and electrical work was completed on 29.3.2014 and letter of possession was given on 31.3.2014. The assessee leased the flat w.e.f. 25.6.2014 and sold it vide agreement for sale of flat dated 4.11.2020. The assumption of the AO that assessee could not have spent cost of improvement before taking ownership of the flat is against the facts of the case.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the entire quarrel revolves around the fact that the assessee had purchased the flat on 27.12.2017, therefore, the assessee could not have spent cost of improvement paid to DLF Hotels and Apartments Pvt. Ltd. as per agreement dated 31.5.2010. The Tribunal noted the relevant clauses of the said agreement dated 31.5.2010 which provided detailed particulars of the fit-out work to be carried out under the said Agreement. It was pursuant to the said Agreement that the payments were made by the assessee and the AO has not disputed them.

The Tribunal held that after completion of the fit-out work which is now integral part of the apartment, letter of possession was received on 31.3.2014. Immediately after having received possession, flat was leased. These demonstrative evidences, according to the Tribunal, demolish the view taken by the AO that the assessee could not have incurred cost of improvement prior to 27.12.2017.

The Tribunal set aside the findings of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow cost of improvement as claimed by the assessee.

Property received by assessee from his step-sister is not taxable under section 56(2)(vii). Receipt of property from step-sister qualifies as a receipt from a relative viz. sister.

15. Rabin Arup Mukerjea vs. ITO, International Tax

ITA No. 588/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2016-17 Date of Order: 21 March 2025

Section : 56(2)(vii)

Property received by assessee from his step-sister is not taxable under section 56(2)(vii). Receipt of property from step-sister qualifies as a receipt from a relative viz. sister.

FACTS

The assessee, a non-resident individual, did not have any source of income in India and was therefore not filing return of income. In January 2021, he made an application under section 197 for grant of certificate authorising the payer to deduct tax on sale of his property at a lower rate. The property being sold by the assessee was received by him as a gift from Ms. Vidhie Mukerjea vide a Registered Deed of Gift dated 21.1.2016.

The Assessing Officer (AO) was of the view that the receipt of property was not from a relative and therefore should have been taxed under section 56(2)(vii) and therefore he recorded reasons and reopened the assessment for assessment year 2016-17.

The AO in his order disposing objections raised by the assessee to reopening the assessment rejected the contention of the assessee that the step-brother and step-sister are covered within the ambit of the definition of the expression “relative” provided in clause (e) of the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) of the Act. He held that step-brother and step-sister cannot be treated as relatives. The AO drew a pictorial tree of the members in the family.

The AO holding that the receipt of property from step-sister does not qualify as a receipt from a relative, taxed ₹7,50,68,525 under section 56(2)(vii) of the Act.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO and held that the definition stated in section 56(2) is to be interpreted keeping the blood relationship, lineal ascendant and lineal descendant and hence no further meaning could be ascribed to this term.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it cited various provisions of different Acts to canvass that `step’ child has been recognised in various Acts e.g. section 2(15B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, section 45S of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and section 2(77) of the Companies Act, 2013.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that Ms. Vidhie is daughter of Ms. Indrani Mukerjea from her husband Mr. Sanjeev Khanna whereas Mr. Rabin Mukerjea is first son of Mr. Peter Mukerjea with his first wife Mrs. Shabnam Singh. After the marriage of Ms. Indrani Mukerjea with Mr. Peter Mukerjea, Ms. Vidhie Mukerjea and Mr. Rabin Mukerjea became step-sister and step-brother due to alliance of marriage between their respective parents.

The Tribunal having noted the definition of the expression “relative” in clause (e) to the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii), observed that ergo, the Act uses the word `brother and sister of an individual’, in common parlance, there are 5 kinds of brother and sister relations.

The Tribunal considered the meaning of the term “relative” as given in Black’s Law Dictionary and also the meaning of the term “affinity” as explained in various dictionaries.

It held that as per the Dictionary meaning of the term “relative”, it includes a person related by affinity, which means the connection existing in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. If the aforesaid Dictionary meaning is to be referred and relied upon, then the term ‘relative’ would include step-brother and step-sister by affinity. If the term `brother and sister of the individual’ has not been defined under the Act, then the meaning defined in common law has to be adopted and in the absence of any other negative covenant under the Act, it held that brother and sister should also include step-brother and step-sister who by virtue of marriage of their parents have become brother and sister.

The Tribunal held that the property received by the assessee from his step-sister being received  from a relative is not taxable under section 56(2)(vii) of the Act.

Section 50 applies only if the asset qualifies for inclusion in block of assets and therefore for grant of depreciation. Accordingly, section 50 was held not to apply to gains on transfer of trademarks since they were acquired by the assessee before the amendment by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 providing for inclusion of intangible assets in block and grant of depreciation thereon.

14. TS – 131 – ITAT – 2025 (Mum.)

Johnson & Johnson Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of Order: 10 February 2025

Sections : 2(11), 32, 50

Section 50 applies only if the asset qualifies for inclusion in block of assets and therefore for grant of depreciation. Accordingly, section 50 was held not to apply to gains on transfer of trademarks since they were acquired by the assessee before the amendment by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 providing for inclusion of intangible assets in block and grant of depreciation thereon.

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee, engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale of pharmaceutical formulation, sold two trade marks “Coldarin” and “Raricap”. Gains arising on transfer of these trademarks were offered for taxation under the head “Capital gains” as long-term capital gains. The Assessing Officer (AO) issued show cause notice asking the assessee to explain why the gains were offered as “long-term” and not as “short-term”. In response, the assessee submitted that the trademark “Coldarin” was acquired on 16.3.1998 and the trademark “Raricap” was acquired on 29.7.1992. It was submitted that since both these trademarks were acquired before 1.4.1998, they did not qualify for depreciation under section 32(1)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of section 50 did not apply and consequently the gains were offered for taxation as “long-term capital gains”.

The AO held that allowance granted to absorb such expenditure is depreciation and nothing else. Nomenclature used by the assessee does not change the character of the allowance. Accordingly, he held that capital gains accruing on transfer of both trademarks fell within ambit of section 50 of the Act as The assessee availed depreciation in respect of cost of acquisition of these trademarks.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed the same.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that in line with the accounting policy followed by the assessee the cost of trademark was charged by the assessee to the profit & loss account for financial year 1992-93 and similar treatment was given in computation of total income for AY 1993-94 and entire cost of trademark “Raricap” was claimed as deduction. As regards cost of trademark “Coldarin”, the same was claimed in Profit & Loss Account over a period of seven years in equal instalments. However, for tax purposes the cost so charged to P & L Account was disallowed and added back to taxable income but deduction was claimed under section 35AB in 6 equal instalments from AY 1998-99 to AY 2003-04.

The revenue contended that since the cost of trademarks was amortised, the allowance granted to absorb such expenditure is depreciation and the nomenclature does not change the real character of the allowance. Therefore, the capital gains accruing to the assessee squarely fall within the ambit of section 50 of the Act. The assessee contended that it is only intangible assets acquired on or after 1.4.1998 which qualified for inclusion in block of assets and claim of depreciation. Since the two trademarks sold were acquired prior to 1.4.1998, the same did not form part of block of assets in respect of which depreciation has been allowed. Therefore, the provisions of section 50 do not have any application to the facts of the present case. Both the trademarks having been held for a period of more than 3 years before their transfer, gain arising on transfer thereof has rightly been offered for taxation as “long-term capital gain”.

The Tribunal noted that the intent of section 50 is clear from its heading as well viz. that it provides for procedure for computation of capital gains in case of transfer of capital assets which form part of the block of assets and in respect of which depreciation has been allowed under the Act.

The Tribunal having noted the provisions of sections 2(11), 32 and 50 and also the Explanatory Memorandum to Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1998 concluded that depreciation is granted on intangible assets acquired on or after 1.4.1998. The expression “block of assets” includes intangible assets within its ambit only w.e.f. 1.4.1999. Prior thereto there was no provision in the Act for inclusion of intangible assets into the block of assets. The Tribunal held that provisions of section 50 did not have applicability to the facts of the present case. It quashed the findings of the lower authorities and upheld the action of the assessee in treating the capital gains to be “long-term”.

Disallowance in respect of interest expenditure, attributable to interest free advances, under section 36(1)(iii), is unsustainable when commercial expediency in transaction is substantiated.

13. TS-53-ITAT-2025 (Mum.)

ACIT vs. T Bhimjiyani Realty Pvt. Ltd.

A.Y.: 2018-19 Date of Order: 25 January 2025

Section: 36(1)(iii)

Disallowance in respect of interest expenditure, attributable to interest free advances, under section 36(1)(iii), is unsustainable when commercial expediency in transaction is substantiated.

FACTS

The assessee company, engaged in real estate business was developing a residential project at Thane. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that assessee had borrowed funds and was paying interest on such borrowings. It had also given interest free advances to various persons. Accordingly, the AO disallowed ₹16.98 crore being interest expenditure attributable to interest free advances.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed this ground of appeal.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where the assessee, apart from supporting the legal principles followed by CIT(A), relying on the ratio of the following decisions, also argued that the advances were made in earlier years and in those years the AO did not make a disallowance, therefore no disallowance is called for in the year under consideration.

i) ITO vs. Abhinand Investment Ltd. [ITA No. 982/Kol./2016; Order dated 7.2.2018];

ii) CIT vs. Sridev Enterprises [192 ITR 165 (Kar.)];

iii) Virendar R Gandhi vs. ACIT [Tax Appeal No. 20 of 2004 and 124 of 2005 dated 27.11.2014].

HELD

The Tribunal noticed that the AO took a view that the assessee should have charged interest on advances given by it. It also noted that CIT(A) has followed 2 legal principles – first being examination of existence of commercial expediency in the transaction. It noted that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in S A Builders vs. CIT [288 ITR 1 (SC)] is to examine if there is “commercial expediency” in giving of an interest free advance. If there exists “commercial expediency” then the same cannot be considered as diversion of interest bearing funds, since the same is for the purpose of business and under section 36(1)(iii) interest on capital borrowed for the purposes of business is allowable as deduction. The second legal principle which was followed by CIT(A) was, the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. [313 ITR 340 (Bom.)], that if an assessee has both interest bearing funds as also interest free funds then the presumption is that the investment has first been made out of interest free funds. In that case disallowance of interest under section 36(1)(iii) shall not arise.

The Tribunal noted that each of the interest free advances were given pursuant to MOUs which were entered into by the assessee company in the course of carrying on of its business and for the purpose of business. It observed that the advances have been made in connection with business ventures with expectation of profits from the deal that will be entered by the respective parties. Since advances were made in the course of business with an expectation to earn share of profits from the deal, the CIT(A) held that the advances were made out of commercial expediency. It also noted that the advances were given in earlier years and AO did not make any disallowance in those years.

The Tribunal held that THE CIT(A) was justified in deleting the disallowance made by AO.

Section 43B(H) Of The Income Tax Act And MSME Payments: Interpreting The Fine Print

The Finance Act 2023 introduced clause (h) in section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with a laudable objective of helping micro and small business enterprises recover their dues faster and improve their cash flows. The provision is made for allowance of expenses that are paid beyond the prescribed time limit only upon actual payment. However, this provision has resulted in a number of issues, as the allowance of expenses under the Income-tax Act is subject to provisions of the other Act, namely, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). Recently, in March 2025, the criteria for the classification of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises have been revised, widening its coverage. This article deals with various interesting aspects of section 43B(h) as well as the relevant provisions of the MSMED Act.

INTRODUCTION

Recent Notification No. S.O. 1364(E) dated 21st March, 2025, issued by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in line with various other initiatives for the MSME industry declared by the government in Budget 2025, brought about a significant revision in the criteria for the classification of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, altering the thresholds for investment and turnover that determine MSME status. These changes have expanded the coverage of enterprises falling within the MSME definition, thereby bringing a larger set of business relationships under the purview of various regulatory and tax provisions designed to safeguard the interests of such entities.

The revised recognition criteria as per this Notification are as under:

Against this backdrop, section 43B(h) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) — introduced by the Finance Act, 2023 — has gained renewed attention.

The introduction of clause (h) to section 43B of the Act marked a significant legislative intervention designed to enhance the financial discipline in commercial dealings with Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs). Applicable from the Assessment Year 2024–25 onwards, this provision introduces a conditional disallowance of expenditure under the Income Tax Act, 1961, in cases where payments to MSEs are not made within the timelines prescribed under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). Therefore, tax-deductibility of an otherwise legitimate business expenditure has been tethered directly to compliance with another legislation — the MSMED Act.

Section 43B of the Act, since its inception, has functioned as an anti-avoidance provision, disallowing certain statutory and contractual liabilities unless they are actually paid. Traditionally, these have included items such as taxes, contributions to employee welfare funds, and interest on loans from public financial institutions. Clause (h) extends this principle to amounts payable to micro and small enterprises beyond the timelines prescribed under the MSMED Act.

However, a key distinction between clause (h) of section 43B of the Act and the other clauses of the said section must be noted. While the other clauses allow the deduction of specified categories of expenditure only upon actual payment, clause (h) restricts deduction only in respect of payments to micro and small enterprises that are made beyond the timelines prescribed under the MSMED Act. In other words, clause (h) does not provide that all amounts payable to MSEs shall be allowed only on a payment basis; rather, it disallows only those payments that are not made within the prescribed time limit under the MSMED Act. The practical implications of this distinction are discussed in the forthcoming paragraphs.

While the language of this clause is straightforward in its drafting, its interplay with the relevant provisions of the MSMED Act gives rise to several practical implications.

For the sake of convenience, the relevant extracts of section 43B(h) of the Act are reproduced here as under:

43B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of-

…..

(h) any sum payable by the assessee to a micro or small enterprise beyond the time limit specified in section 15 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006),

shall be allowed irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him

…..

Explanation 4. -For the purposes of this section,-

…..

(e) “micro enterprise” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (h) of section 2 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006);
…..

(g) “small enterprise” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (m) of section 2 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006).”

Therefore, the provision mandates that any sum payable to a micro or small enterprise — as defined under the MSMED Act —beyond the time limits prescribed thereunder shall be allowed as a deduction under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’ only in the year in which it is actually paid.

Section 15 of the MSMED Act, in turn, stipulates that payments to suppliers for goods or services must be made either within fifteen days of the day of acceptance (or deemed acceptance) of the goods or services or within the period agreed upon in writing between the buyer and the supplier — provided that such period does not exceed forty-five days.

In this context, the day of acceptance means the day of actual delivery of goods or rendering of services; or where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within a period of fifteen days of delivery of goods or rendering of services as the case may be, the day of acceptance would mean the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier. The day of deemed acceptance means where no objection is made as above within fifteen days, the day of actual delivery of goods or rendering of services.

Further, as per section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, supplier is defined to mean a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the prescribed authority and includes certain specified entities.

From the reading of section 43B(h) of the Act r.w.s. 15 & section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, it is clear that the provisions of section 43B(h) are applicable only in case of payments to micro and small enterprises and not in case of medium enterprises.

Let us see some of the practical implications arising from the provision:

(A) IDENTIFICATION OF QUALIFYING ENTERPRISES FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 43B(H)

One of the pressing challenges posed by section 43B(h) is the burden of identification. It is incumbent upon the assessee to identify which of its suppliers qualify as micro or small enterprises under the MSMED Act.

Medium enterprises eligible for benefits available to small or micro enterprises:

In this context, it is important to take note of the Notification No. S.O. 2119(E) dated 26th June, 2020, issued by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, which lays down the criteria for the classification of micro, small and medium enterprises based on investment, turnover, etc., as subsequently amended by Notification No. S.O. 4926(E) dated 18th October, 2022. It states that in case of an upward change in terms of investment in plant and machinery or equipment or turnover or both, and consequent re-classification, an enterprise shall continue to avail of all non-tax benefits of the category (micro or small or medium), as it was in before the re-classification, for a period of three years from the date of such upward change.

To illustrate – From 1st April, 2024, a supplier is classified as a medium enterprise on account of it exceeding the investment/turnover criteria specified for small enterprises. However, up to 31st March, 2024, the supplier was classified as a small enterprise. During FY 2024-25, the said supplier provides services to the assessee. In this case, even though as on the date of providing services to the assessee, the supplier was classified as a medium enterprise, said supplier is still entitled for three more years to all the non-tax benefits available to a small enterprise under the MSMED Act. The benefits under section 15 and section 16 of the MEMED Act (i.e. prescribed time limits for payments to MSEs and interest payable on delayed payments) are clearly in the nature of non-tax benefits. Consequently, even though the supplier holds the Udyam certificate as a medium enterprise as on the date of providing services, the assessee is still required to make payment within the timelines specified under section 15 of the MSMED Act, and non-compliance with these timelines may lead to consequential disallowance under section 43B(h) of the Act if payment is not made within the same financial year.

Therefore, in the case of medium enterprises, it may not be sufficient to rely on the status of the supplier mentioned on the Udyam Registration, and the assessee shall have to maintain a register of suppliers with their status for three previous years as well to avoid the risk of misstatements in tax computations. It is also unclear whether obtaining such status confirmation annually would suffice or whether it needs to be maintained on a transaction-by-transaction basis.

On the other hand, one may argue that the words micro or small enterprise appearing in clause (h) of section 43B restrict the scope of applicability of this section only to micro and small enterprises as defined in clause (h) and clause (m) of section 2 of the MSMED Act r.w. section 7(1) thereof, and that the Notifications mentioned above would not extend the scope of applicability of section 43(B) to medium enterprises even if those are entitled to the benefits of section 15 of the MSMED Act for three years after upward re-classification of status as per the said Notifications. However, this proposition would require further in-depth analysis, and as of now, there is no clarity available on the issue.

Exclusion of Traders:

Retail and wholesale traders are allowed to be registered as MSMEs on the Udyam Registration Portal. However, benefits to Retail and Wholesale trade MSMEs are restricted to Priority Sector Lending only, and they are not entitled to any other benefits under the MSMED Act, including the time limits for payment prescribed under section 15 and applicability of interest on delayed payments under section 16 of the MSMED Act. This has been clarified vide Central Government’s office memorandum 1/4(1)/2021- P&G Policy, dated 1st September, 2021.

Though there is no express provision in the MSMED Act which may indicate that the trader MSEs are not covered within the definition of MSMEs, relying on the said Office Memorandum, buyers are taking a view that in the case of trader MSEs, section 15 and section 16 of MSMED will not apply and consequently, provisions of section 43B of the Act will also not be attracted.

Till the time the said Office Memorandum remains effective, it would appear to be a reasonable view to take for the assessees.

(B) DATE OF ACCEPTANCE IN THE PRACTICAL SCENARIO

The date of delivery of goods/rendering of services and the date of acceptance — both critical to computing the due date under section 15 of the MSMED Act — are often subject to practical disputes or internal accounting ambiguities, especially in industries with staggered delivery schedules. For instance, in industries like construction or manufacturing, deliveries are often made in parts or batches, whereas the buyer may inspect and approve the goods after complete delivery. In such cases, the question of whether the period of 15 days available for raising an objection should be counted from the date of partial delivery or from the date of complete delivery can be a contentious one.

Let us consider another case where services are rendered by the supplier, and an invoice is raised after the expiry of 15 days from the date of rendering of services, within which period the buyer is required to raise objections, if any. If there is an objection with respect to the invoice raised vis a vis the services rendered, such objection can be raised by the buyer only after receiving the invoice. In such cases, can the date of rendering services be said to be the date of deemed acceptance?

Similarly, under EPC contracts, typically, there is a retention clause which is intended to serve as a performance guarantee. The retention amount, often calculated at a certain percentage of the total invoice amount, is held back for an agreed defect liability period. Since the MSMED Act does not exempt the retention amounts and therefore payment beyond the due date specified under section 15 may attract disallowance even when no interest is demanded by the supplier in accordance with the agreed commercial terms. Whether it is possible to contend that in respect of the retention money, the date of delivery/rendering of services should be construed as the date on which the defect liability period ends, is another debatable issue.

(C) YEAR-END PROVISIONS

In respect of the year-end provisions made by following the accrual and matching concept, the actual liability to pay may arise in the subsequent year. To give an example, the provision for tax audit fees made in the books as on 31st March, 2024 would become actually payable in FY 2024-25 after the services are rendered. As on the date of issuing the tax audit report, it would not be known whether the payment will be made by the assessee to the tax auditor (assuming it to be an SME) within the stipulated time after raising the invoice. Therefore, as on the date of issuing the tax audit report, it would be impossible to determine as to whether the provision qualifies as ‘sum payable by the assessee beyond the time limit specified in section 15 of MSMED Act’.

As pointed out in the opening paragraphs, it is important to note that, unlike other clauses of section 43B, clause (h) gets attracted only when there is a delay in payment to MSEs, and the provision does not stipulate that all amounts payable to MSEs are allowable on payment basis.

Therefore, in the case of year-end provisions which are not due for payment before the date of making computation of income, whether such provisions would fall within the ambit of section 43B of the Act is uncertain as on the date of making such computation of income.

Strictly interpreting the provision, one may take a view that where an expense is otherwise allowable, the disallowance under section 43B(h) would be triggered only if it is established that payment was made beyond the time limit prescribed under the MSMED Act. In the absence of such a finding at the time of making the computation of income, the expense ought to be allowed. However, when viewed in light of the legislative intent behind the provision, the position is not entirely free from doubt.

CONCLUSION

In summation, while the intent behind section 43B(h) is laudable — to empower MSEs by improving their cash flow discipline — its implementation has ushered in a new layer of tax risk and documentation burden for larger businesses. As with many well-intentioned provisions, the practicalities of execution could result in unintended hardship. It is commonly observed that larger businesses may not yet be equipped with systems to capture all the details required for ensuring compliance with section 15 of the MSMED Act. This may lead to a scenario where, rather than promoting the MSME sector, the additional compliance burden and tax risks dissuade larger enterprises from engaging with small suppliers, thereby proving counterproductive to the government’s objective of supporting and integrating MSMEs into mainstream supply chains. Tax practitioners will thus play a critical role in sensitising clients, setting up supplier verification systems, and aligning accounts payable processes to ensure proper compliance with the provisions and consequent reporting in the tax audit report.

Section 271(1)(c) : Penalty – Notice must be precise and there should be no room for ambiguity – Veena Estate (P.) Ltd. (Bom) distinguished.

6. Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax- 2, Thane vs. Pacific Organics Pvt. Ltd., [ITXA No. 58 OF 2020, Dated: 29/04/2025 (Bom) (HC)]

Section 271(1)(c) : Penalty – Notice must be precise and there should be no room for ambiguity – Veena Estate (P.) Ltd. (Bom) distinguished.

The ITAT held that the penalty show cause notice was ambiguous, as the relevant portions were not ticked, or the irrelevant portions were not struck off.

The Hon. Court referred to the Full Bench decision, in the case of Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 1, Belgaum [2021] 125 taxmann.com 253 (Bombay), wherein it was held that if the notice contains no caveat that the inapplicable portion was to be deleted, any action based on such notice would be inferred. The Full Bench held that the notice must be precise and there should be no room for ambiguity.

The tax department relied upon Veena Estate (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax [2024] 158 taxmann.com 341 (Bombay) wherein, the Appellant-Assessee, who had never raised any ground about the ambiguity of the notice before the Assessing Officer, Appellate Authority and ITAT, attempted to raise such a ground for the first time in an Appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This was not allowed by the coordinate bench.

The Hon. Court observed that such facts do not exists in the present Appeal, and therefore, the decision in Veena Estate (P.) Ltd. (Supra) was distinguishable. The ITAT had rightly followed the Full Bench in the case of Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh (supra).

The Appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Section 37 : Disallowing write-off of the deposits and interest – the business loss incurred by the appellant company u/s 28 of the Act in the course of its business – commercial expediency: Section 115J : The provision does not contain any reference to concept of ‘above the line’ or ‘below the line’:

5. M/s. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. CIT

City – II, Mumbai

[ITXA No. 416 OF 2003, Dated: 2nd May, 2025 (Bom)(HC)][AY 1990-91]

Section 37 : Disallowing write-off of the deposits and interest – the business loss incurred by the appellant company u/s 28 of the Act in the course of its business – commercial expediency:

Section 115J : The provision does not contain any reference to concept of ‘above the line’ or ‘below the line’:

The appeal pertains to Assessment Year 1990-91. Facts are that the assessee is a public limited company and is engaged in the manufacture of Jeeps, Tractors, Implements and other products. The assessee filed the return of income for the period from 1st April, 1989 to 31st March, 1990 (Assessment Year 1990-91). The Assessing Officer, by an order of assessment dated 26th March, 1993, inter alia; held that the assessee had placed deposits with certain concerns, who have declined to pay the deposits and interest on the ground that the deposits are linked to the amounts provided to M/s. Machinery Manufacturers Corporation Ltd. (MMC) by them, which have now become irrecoverable as MMC was directed to be wound-up by the Bombay High Court by an order passed on 16th April, 1989. It was further held that amount of deposit and interest due to the assessee has been adjusted by various concerns against loan given by them to MMC. Therefore, the assessee cannot claim to have not recovered its dues. It was also held that the assessee had liquidated the liability of MMC which act is for consideration other than business. The Assessing Officer, therefore, disallowed a sum of ₹49,18,786/- claimed under the head miscellaneous expenses as well as a sum of ₹200.47 lac claimed by the assessee on account of deduction of write-off of deposits and interest.

On appeal, the CIT(Appeals) held that the assessee did not incur the expenditure to carry on the business and the business of the MMC was not the business carried out by the assessee. Therefore, the expenses incurred by the assessee are not admissible under Section 37(1) of the 1961 Act. The CIT (Appeals), while computing the book profit under Section 115J of the 1961 Act, held that the provision for warranties made by the assessee cannot be allowed.

The Tribunal, by an order dated 25th February, 2003 confirmed the disallowance in view of the order passed by the Tribunal in assessee’s own case being ITA No.6886/Bom/92 for the Assessment year 1989-90. The Tribunal further held that the provision for warranties made by the assessee on the estimated basis in view of the past experience cannot be termed as an ascertained liability. It was also held that a provision for past services liability in respect of retirement gratuity has to be added back. It was also held that the amount was debited in the profit and loss account below the line and hence, it cannot be said that the profit and loss account was prepared as per Part II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act and cannot be disturbed.

The Hon. High Court referred to the decision of Hon. Supreme Court, in CIT vs. Delhi Safe Deposit Co. Ltd. [1982] 133 ITR 756 (SC) wherein the court examined the question, whether an expenditure incurred on account of commercial expediency is admissible as deduction under Section 37 of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court held that the expenditure incurred was a deductible expenditure.

The Court observed that the claim of the assessee for the expenditure of 42.89 lac and the deduction of write-off ₹622.01 lac being the amount lent to MMC including interest due and advances for purchase of machinery given in the course of dealing with MMC was disallowed by the authorities under the Act for the preceding year i.e. the year 1989-90. The assessee filed an appeal viz. ITXA No.626 of 2002 which was decided by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court vide order dated 9th June, 2023 in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax.

It was observed that the revenue, while negating the claim of the assessee for allowing the expenses, has relied upon the order passed by it in ITA No.6886/Bom/92 for the Assessment Year 1989-90. The aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal was set aside by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (order dated 9th June, 2023). The order passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has been accepted by the revenue and it has not filed any SLP against the judgment of the Division Bench.

The Hon. Court agreed with the view taken by Division Bench of this Court in assessee’s own case in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (order dated 9th June, 2023) for the following reasons. Admittedly, MMC is a subsidiary of the assessee and assessee held 27% equity capital of MMC since its incorporation. The assessee promoted MMC on 15th May, 1946. From the date of incorporation of the assessee, it was the managing agent of MMC and the assessee has acted as a managing agent till 1974 when the Companies Act, 1974 abolished the Managing Agency System. However, due to severe recession in the textile industry, MMC started making losses. Thereupon, the MMC was wound-up. The assessee, in its board meeting held on 27th March, 1989 agreed to incur expenditure for maintenance of MMC. Thereafter, on 10th July, 1990, the Board of Directors of the assessee agreed to resolve the dispute to meet the expenditure till the affairs of MMC were wound-up. The Board of Directors approved the expenditure of ₹49,19,000/- (Rupees Forty-nine lac nineteen thousand only) made by the assessee in the previous year relevant to Assessment Year 1990-91. The assessee held substantial portion of equity capital of MMC and MMC was regarded in public and official circles as a Mahindra Company. The assessee, in order to protect and preserve the assets and to protect the value of goodwill attached to the assessee by various sections of the society and on the ground of commercial expediency, incurred expenditure, which is permissible as deduction.

The contention urged on behalf of the revenue in opposition to the aforesaid claim had already been dealt with by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Therefore, even otherwise, the assessee is entitled to deduction of the sum of ₹49,18,786/- as well as a sum of ₹200.47 lac.

As far as the second substantial question of law on Section 115J of the Act, the same mandates that in case of a company whose total income as computed under the provisions of the Act is less than 30% of the book profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with the provisions of Part II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act 1956, after certain adjustments, the total income chargeable to tax will be 30% of the said book profit. Explanation to Section 115J (1A) provides that the net profit so computed is to be increased by certain amounts and it is to be reduced by certain amounts which are mentioned therein. The provision does not contain any reference to concept of ‘above the line’ or ‘below the line’.

The Hon. Court referred to decision of the Hon.Supreme Court, in Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. Commissioner of income tax [2002] 255 ITR 273 (SC) wherein it dealt with the issue whether the Assessing Officer can question the correctness of the profit and loss account prepared by the assessee and certified by the statutory auditors of the Company as having been prepared in accordance with the requirements of part II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. It was held that sub section (1A) of Section 115J mandates the company to maintain its accounts in accordance with the requirements of Companies Act and is bodily lifted from the Companies Act into the Act of 1961 for the limited purpose of making the said account so maintained as a basis for computing the company’s income for levy of income-tax. It was also held that the provision does not empower the authority under the Act to probe into the account accepted by the authorities under the Companies Act. It was also held that if the legislature intended the Assessing Officer to reassess the company’s income, then it would have stated in Section 115-J that “income of the company is accepted by the Assessing Officer”.

The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Malayala Manorama Company Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Trivandrum [2008] 300 ITR 251. Thus, from the aforesaid enunciation of law by the Supreme Court, it is evident that the Assessing Officer does not have jurisdiction to go behind the net profit shown in profit and loss account except to the extent provided in Explanation to Section 115J. For the aforementioned reasons the second substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Settlement Commission — Settlement of case — Power of Settlement Commission — Immunity from penalty and prosecution — Factors to be considered — Assessee co-operated in process of settlement and made full and true disclosure — Settlement Commission exercising discretion to proceed with application and granting immunity from penalty and prosecution considering Bonafide conduct of assessee — Order of Settlement commission need not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction:

17 . Dy. CIT vs. ASM Traxim Pvt. Ltd.:

[2025] 474 ITR 25 (Del):

A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2011-12:

Date of order 28th October, 2024:

Ss. 245C, 245D(4) and 245H of ITA 1961:

Settlement Commission — Settlement of case — Power of Settlement Commission — Immunity from penalty and prosecution — Factors to be considered — Assessee co-operated in process of settlement and made full and true disclosure — Settlement Commission exercising discretion to proceed with application and granting immunity from penalty and prosecution considering Bonafide conduct of assessee — Order of Settlement commission need not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction:

During the search u/s. 132 and survey u/s. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Department seized documents and material and also recorded the statements of various individuals of the assessee-company which belonged to the same group. During the pendency of assessment proceedings u/s. 153A and 153C Settlement applications were filed based on a combined or consolidated account which was prepared by chartered accountants. The Settlement Commission held such accounts to be unreliable on grounds of discrepancies found and the auditors themselves having expressed reservations with respect to the finding in their report and which was also qualified by various disclaimers. The Settlement Commission thereafter, directed a joint verification of all available primary records. Pursuant to the joint verification the Settlement Commission rejected the audited book results and based upon the joint verification determined the income for the purpose of disposal of the settlement applications.

On a writ petition filed by the Revenue challenging the order of the Settlement Commission u/s. 245D(4) in so far as it granted immunity to the assessee from prosecution and penalty proceedings the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) Once the conditions of full and true disclosure is held to be satisfied, the same would not partake of a separate or different hue for the purpose of section 245H of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Any view to the contrary if taken, would result in an incongruous situation arising since it would constrain the court to hold that the test of full and true disclosure applies differently for the purpose of computation and grant of immunity from prosecution and penalty proceedings. While the power to grant immunity stands enshrined in a separate provision in Chapter XIX-A, such power is exercised Contemporaneously by the Settlement Commission while disposing of an application u/s. 245D for settlement . The Statute does not prescribe the power of computation and grant of immunity being exercised on the basis of tests and precepts which could be said to be separate or distinguishable. Section 245H postulates the power of immunity being liable to be invoked identically on a full and true disclosure of income and co-operation rendered before the Settlement Commission. The Act confers a finality and conclusiveness upon orders made by the Settlement Commission. This becomes evident from the reading of section 245-I which proscribes any matter or issue which stands concluded by an order of the Settlement Commission being reopened in any proceedings under the Act. The Legislature intended to imbue finality upon an order of the Settlement Commission is further underscored by section 245-I using the expression “save as otherwise provided ….”. Thus, an order under Chapter XIX-A could be reviewed or reopened only on grounds set out therein and no other.

ii) The Settlement of the case was primordially based on the applicant making a full and true disclosure before the Settlement Commission which was enjoined thereafter to conduct proceeding in terms of the provisions contained in Chapter XIX-A. It was such disclosure which was thereafter tested and evaluated by the Settlement Commission in terms as contemplated under subsection (2) and (2C) of section 245D. The applications as made by the assessee had crossed that threshold. The Computation of income itself was concluded by the Settlement Commission based upon a joint verification that was undertaken. The assesses themselves had taken a stand that their audited accounts were not liable to be taken in to consideration and that they could not form the basis for the proceedings as were laid before the Settlement Commission and had admitted that those accounts were unreliable. It was in such backdrop they had participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Commission and had agreed to collaborate in the ascertainment of a true and correct computation of income for the A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2011-12 being undertaken. It was this position as struck by parties which appear to have informed the decision of the Settlement Commission to order a joint verification.

iii) The Settlement Commission had at no stage concluded that the application as made were liable to be rejected either on the ground that the assessee had failed to make a full and true disclosure or that they had failed to co-operate in the proceedings. If these twin conditions were found to be satisfied for the purpose of section 245D(4), such issue could not be questioned or reagitated while examining the validity of the discretionary power exercised by the Settlement Commission u/s. 245H. Both section 245D(4) and section 245H are premised on identical considerations. It would be incorrect to uphold the contention of a perceived dichotomy between the opinion with respect to full and true disclosure u/s.245D and that which would guide section 245H.

iv) The essential ingredients liable to be borne in consideration by the Settlement Commission for the purpose of grant of immunity are co-operation by the applicant in the computation of total income in the settlement proceedings and a full and true disclosure of income being made. The joint survey which was undertaken was itself based on all original documents and material having been duly placed by the assessee. It was therefore, not alleged that the assessee either failed to co-operate in those proceedings or withheld information. Chapter XIX-A also does not envisage the Settlement Commission to be bound by the voluntary disclosure that an applicant may choose to make. It is empowered to enquire and investigate as well as call for report and material before completing the computation of income. The order of the Settlement Commission u/s. 245D(4) did not warrant interference under article 226 of the Constitution of India.

v) The power to sever and disgorge a part which is offending and unsustainable could be wielded, provided it does not impact the very foundation of an order. The consideration for the framing of an order u/s. 245D(4) and 245H did not proceed on a consideration of factors which could be said to be distinct or independent. Both were informed by and founded upon co-operation and full and true disclosure and which were the essential prerequisites for computation of the settlement amount as well as consideration of grant of immunity. These two factors thus constituted the very substratum of an application for settlement. Interfering with the grant of immunity on grounds as suggested by the Department would essentially amount to the court questioning the validity of the acceptance of the application itself by the Settlement Commission and that was not even their suggestion in these proceedings. If the twin statutory conditions are found to be satisfied and thus meriting an order of settlement u/s. 245D(4) being rendered, the position would not very or undergo a change when it came to the question of grant of immunity.”

Salary — Perquisites :— 1) Meaning of perquisite — Condition precedent for considering payment as perquisite — Amount must have been paid to the Assessee as employee — Stock options provided to ex-employees — Stock option was not perquisite — No exercise of stock option — No income chargeable to tax; 2) Assessability — Stock options given to ex-employee — No exercise of stock option — No income chargeable to tax:

16. Sanjay Baweja vs. DCIT(TDS):

[2025] 474 ITR 376 (Del.):

Date of order 30th May, 2024:

Ss. 5 and 17(2) of ITA 1961

Salary — Perquisites :— 1) Meaning of perquisite — Condition precedent for considering payment as perquisite — Amount must have been paid to the Assessee as employee — Stock options provided to ex-employees — Stock option was not perquisite — No exercise of stock option — No income chargeable to tax; 2) Assessability — Stock options given to ex-employee — No exercise of stock option — No income chargeable to tax:

The Assessee is an ex-employee of a company FIPL, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of FMPL, and FMPL in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of FPL, Singapore. In 2012, FPL introduced an Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) wherein FPL granted certain stock options to eligible persons, including employees of its subsidiaries. As per the plan, the Assessee was granted 1,27,552 stock options on and from 01-11-2014 to 31-11-2016 with a vesting schedule of four years. Due to the restructuring at FPL, the Assessee received a communication in April 2023 from FPL that based on the number of options held by the Assessee as on 23-12-2022, FPL had, as a one-time measure, decided to grant compensation of USD 43.67 per option towards loss in the value of options. Further, it was also stated that FPL would be withholding tax on the said compensation.

Thereafter, the Assessee filed an application u/s. 197 for no deduction of tax by FPL. However, the application was rejected on the ground that the amount received would be in the nature of perquisite u/s. 17(2)(vi) of the Act. Against the said rejection, the Assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court. The Delhi High Court allowed the petition of the Assessee and held as follows:

“i) An amount received by an employee as a perquisite would be taxable. Perquisites, as defined in section 17(2) of the Act, constitute a list of benefits or advantages, which are made taxable and are incidental to employment and received in excess of salary. As per section 17(2)(vi) of the Act, perquisites include the value of any specified security allotted or transferred, directly or indirectly, by the employer, or former employer, free of cost or at a concessional rate to the employee-assessee. The most crucial ingredient of this inclusive definition is “determinable value of any specified security received by the employee by way of transfer or allotment, directly or indirectly, by the employer”. As per Explanation (c) to section 17(2)(vi) of the Act, the value of specified security could only be calculated once the option is exercised. A literal understanding of the provision would provide that the value of specified securities or sweat equity shares is dependent upon the exercise of option by the assessee. Therefore, for an income to be included in the inclusive definition of “perquisite”, it is essential that it is generated from the exercise of options, by the employee. Hence the condition precedent for considering a payment as a perquisite, is that the payment must be made by an employer to his employee.

ii) The manner or nature of payment, as comprehensible by the deductor, would not determine the taxability of such transaction. It is the quality of payment that determines its character and not the mode of payment. Unless the charging section of the Income-tax Act, 1961 elucidates any monetary receipt as chargeable to tax, the Department cannot proceed to charge such receipt as a revenue receipt and that too on the basis of the manner or nature of payment, as comprehensible by the deductor of tax at source.

iii) The stock options were merely held by the assessee and had not been exercised till date and thus, they did not constitute income chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee as none of the contingencies specified in section 17(2)(vi) of the Act had occurred. Moreover, the compensation was a voluntary payment and not transfer by way of any obligation. The present was not a case where the option holder had exercised his right. Rather, the facts suggested that the assessee had not exercised his options under the plan till date. Due to the disinvestment of the business from the Singapore company, the board of directors of that company had decided to provide a one-time voluntary payment to all the option holders pursuant to employees stock option plan. The management proceeded by noting that there was no legal or contractual right under the plan to provide compensation for loss in current value or any potential losses on account of future accretion to the stock option holders. The payment in question was not linked to the employment or business of the assessee, rather it was a one-time voluntary payment to all the option holders of stock options, pursuant to the disinvestment of the business from the Singapore company. Even though the right to exercise an option was available to the assessee, the amount received by him did not arise out of any transfer of stock options by the employer. Rather, it was a one-time voluntary payment not arising out of any statutory or contractual obligation. The rejection of application was not valid. [Since the transaction already took place on July 31, 2023, liberty was accorded to the assessee to file an application for refund of the tax deducted at source before the Department. The Department was further directed to consider the application of the assessee.]”

Offences and prosecution — Deduction of tax at source — Delay in payment of tax deducted at source — Delayed payment of tax deducted at source to Department with interest without objection by Department — Delay explained by assessee as due to crisis in company — No malafide intention of evasion on part of assessee — Prosecution after a lapse of more than three years quashed:

15. SVSVS Projects Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Telangana:

[2025] 474 ITR 306 (Telangana):

A.Ys. 2011-12: Date of order 30th January, 2024:

S. 276B of ITA 1961:

Offences and prosecution — Deduction of tax at source — Delay in payment of tax deducted at source — Delayed payment of tax deducted at source to Department with interest without objection by Department — Delay explained by assessee as due to crisis in company — No malafide intention of evasion on part of assessee — Prosecution after a lapse of more than three years quashed:

There was an allegation against the Assessee that for the AY 2011-12, TDS was deducted by the Assessee but not deposited with the Central Government in time. As per the data available online, there was a delay on 39 occasions and on the basis of several such delays, it was alleged that the Assessee deliberately did not deposit tax to the credit of Central Government which was a punishable offence u/s. 276B. The Assessing Officer issued a letter dated 16/01/2013 stating that the tax deducted at source payable was ₹77,37,097 which was delayed and the interest for such delay was ₹13,36,278. However, the Assessee had paid interest of ₹12,37,164 and therefore balance interest of ₹99,114 was payable u/s. 201(1A) of the Act. The said balance interest was paid on 19th March, 2013.

Subsequently, on 14th March, 2014, a letter was issued by the Commissioner proposing to launch prosecution for not depositing the TDS with the Central Government within the stipulated time and an opportunity of hearing was given to the Assessee on 7th April, 2014. On 25/07/2014, the Assessee responded by stating that the entire amount of TDS along with interest was paid and that the delay was not wilful or negligent but due to financial crisis in the company. On 2nd December, 2016, the Commissioner granted sanction for prosecution and complaint was filed by the Assessing Officer on 3rd February, 2017.

The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the Assessee and held as follows:

“i) The payment of the entire tax deducted at source for the A. Y. 2011-12 with interest was paid by the assessee even prior to the letter addressed by the Income-tax Officer. Having received the notice, the balance of tax deducted at source interest was also paid. The Department had accepted both the tax deducted at source amounts and the interest component without any objection. Having accepted the entire amount nearly one year thereafter, the proposal for launching prosecution was made and two years and nine months thereafter sanction was accorded by the Commissioner for prosecution. No doubt, the tax deducted at source was credited to the Central Government account, though with a delay. However, the penal interest that was attracted was totally paid without raising any objection. The delay had occurred on 39 occasions and since the payments were delayed, the interest component was collected.

ii) The assessee had clarified that the delay in crediting the tax deducted at source to the Central Government account was on account of crisis in the company. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the company entertained any fraudulent intention to avoid payment of the tax deducted at source. No useful purpose would be served at this length of time by prosecuting the assessee. When the entire amount of tax deducted at source with interest had been paid even prior to the first communication from the Department and the balance interest amount had been paid after notice, it would be appropriate to quash the proceedings against the assessee. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings against the assessee before the Special Judge for Economic Offences were quashed.”

A. Offences and Prosecution — Sanction for prosecution — Deduction of tax at source — Delay in depositing with revenue — Assessee depositing tax deducted with Revenue for A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2018-19 with interest though belatedly — Effect of circulars issued by CBDT — Interpretation of provisions of s. 276B to include delay in deposit of tax deducted at source manifestly arbitrary — Prosecution quashed: B. Offences and prosecution — Sanction for prosecution — Principal Officer — Directors of Assessee company prosecuted for delay in payment of tax deducted at source with Revenue — Non-issue of notice and order to treat any of them as principal officer of the assessee — No order imposing penalty as “deemed to be an assessee in default” on assessee or its directors — Criminal complaints against directors of assessee not stating consent, connivance or negligence on their part as required u/s. 278B(2) — Directors of assessee cannot be prosecuted: C. Offences and prosecution — Deduction of tax at source — Scope of s. 278B(2) — Conduct of business of company must have nexus with the offence committed — Amendment in law from year 1997 — Use of the phrase “as required by or under the provisions of Chapter VII-B” — Linked only with and explains manner of deduction of tax and payment thereof — Assessee deposited entire tax deducted at source with Revenue for A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2018-19 with interest belatedly — Prosecution quashed:

14. Hemant Mahipatray Shah vs. Anand Upadhyay:

[2025] 482 ITR 1 (Bom.):

A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2018-19: Date of order 12th August, 2024:

Ss. 2(35)(b), 201, 221, 276B, 278B and 279(1) of ITA 1961

A. Offences and Prosecution — Sanction for prosecution — Deduction of tax at source — Delay in depositing with revenue — Assessee depositing tax deducted with Revenue for A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2018-19 with interest though belatedly — Effect of circulars issued by CBDT — Interpretation of provisions of s. 276B to include delay in deposit of tax deducted at source manifestly arbitrary — Prosecution quashed:

B. Offences and prosecution — Sanction for prosecution — Principal Officer — Directors of Assessee company prosecuted for delay in payment of tax deducted at source with Revenue — Non-issue of notice and order to treat any of them as principal officer of the assessee — No order imposing penalty as “deemed to be an assessee in default” on assessee or its directors — Criminal complaints against directors of assessee not stating consent, connivance or negligence on their part as required u/s. 278B(2) — Directors of assessee cannot be prosecuted:

C. Offences and prosecution — Deduction of tax at source — Scope of s. 278B(2) — Conduct of business of company must have nexus with the offence committed — Amendment in law from year 1997 — Use of the phrase “as required by or under the provisions of Chapter VII-B” — Linked only with and explains manner of deduction of tax and payment thereof — Assessee deposited entire tax deducted at source with Revenue for A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2018-19 with interest belatedly — Prosecution quashed:

The petitioner is a Director of a company M/s. Hubtown Ltd (‘the Assessee Company’). During the previous years relevant to A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2018-19. The Assessee Company deducted tax at source but delayed paying the same to the Government.

Show cause notices were issued to the Assessee Company and its Directors which were replied and the explanations provided. However, the Assessing Officer arrived at a conclusion that the Assessee and its Directors were responsible for paying tax as per section 204 and had, therefore, committed default u/s. 200 read with rule 30 of the Income-tax Rules without reasonable cause to pay the tax so deducted under the various sections of the Act from payments made to various parties, which amounted to an offence punishable u/s. 276B read with section 278B.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS) gave sanction u/s. 279(1) to prosecute the Assessee Company and its Directors u/s. 276B r.w.s. 278B as prima facie they were liable to be prosecuted under these sections. Accordingly, complaints were filed before the Magistrate Court. The Magistrate arrived at a conclusion and issued process against the Assessee Company and the Petitioner.

The order of the Magistrate was challenged before the Sessions Court by filing criminal revision application. However, the Sessions Court also rejected the revision application and confirmed the issuance of process directed by the Magistrate.

The Petitioner Director filed writ petition against the said order of the Sessions Court. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) The scope of section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as amended by the Finance Act, 1997 ([1997] 225 ITR (St.) 113), will have to be understood in its correct perspective. It covers cases of failure to pay and not mere delay in deposit of tax deducted at source. In the unamended provisions prior to the year 1997, the words “as required by or under the provisions of Chapter XVII-B” could be read along with the words “both”. Under the amended provisions from the year 1997, the criminal liability is attracted on failure to pay. The phrase “as required by or under the provisions of Chapter XVII-B” is separately mentioned in clause (a) of section 276B and hence, is linked only with and explains the manner in which tax is required to be deducted and not the manner of payment thereof. Therefore, under the amended provisions, if the tax deducted at source has been paid in full, even with some delay, section 276B would not be attracted.

ii) Prosecution u/s. 276B should not normally be proposed when the amount involved and/or the period of default is not substantial and the amount in default has also been deposited in the meantime to the credit of the Government. No such situation will apply to levy of interest u/s. 201(1A). In this context CBDT bearing F. No. 255/339/79-IT(Inv.), dated May 28, 1980 may be referred to.

iii) The provisions of 278B(1) is for prosecuting an offender, the term “conduct of business of the company” must have a nexus with “the offence committed” and hence, in the context of such offence u/s. 276B ought to be interpreted (which is in relation to “failure to pay” the tax deducted at source) to be the “principal officer” who has been made responsible, u/s. 204(iii) , for paying the tax deducted at source to the Government. The proviso to section 278B(1) prescribes “absence of knowledge” as a valid defence for invoking the section. Where a person is declared a “principal officer” of a company by an “order” under section 201(1), it would, prima facie, fulfil the requirement of presumption of knowledge. The term “director” which has been separately defined u/s. 2(20) has not been used in section 278B(1). As such director is not covered thereunder. Sub-section (2) of section 278B which commences with a non obstante clause provides an action to prosecute a person which expressly applies to a director. Emphasis is on the words “with the consent”, “connivance” or “attributable to the neglect” of such director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company.

iv) Admittedly, tax deducted at source by the assessee had already been deposited with interest as provided u/s. 201(1A). No notice had been issued by the Assessing Officer to any of the petitioners u/s. 2(35)(b) to treat any of them as principal officer of the assessee. The complaints had been filed against the assessee and the petitioners who were its directors, for delay in depositing the tax deducted at source. The taxes deducted at source by the assessee had already been deposited with interest as provided for u/s. 201(1A). No order as contemplated u/s. 201(1) read with section 201(3) had been passed treating any of the petitioners as principal officer of the assessee and by which such principal officer was “deemed to be assessee-in-default”. No order imposing penalty, either initially or further penalty, as “deemed to be an assessee-in-default” u/s. 221 has been passed against the assessee or any of the petitioners for the A. Y. 2017-18. Though the petitioners were “directors” of the assessee, no contention had been made in the complaints regarding “consent”, “connivance” or “negligence” as required u/s. 278B(2)

v) A combined reading of circulars dated May 28, 1980 and April 24, 2008 contemplate that prosecution ought not to be launched where the tax has been deposited. The words “where the amount of default has been deposited in the meantime” in the circular dated May 28, 1980 signify such intent and the words “in addition to the recovery steps as may be necessary in such cases” in circular dated April 24, 2008 also signifies that there are pending arrears which need to be recovered. The ratio laid down in Madhumilan Syntex Ltd. vs. Union of India [2007] 290 ITR 199 (SC), would not be applicable in view of the circular dated April 24, 2008 and, therefore, it cannot be treated as a precedent for the period after April 24, 2008. The circular dated April 24, 2008 prescribes that the prosecution is to be launched within sixty days of detection of the default. Though the circular also prefixes the requirement with the words “preferably”, it also signifies that if not in sixty days the period cannot extend indefinitely for an unreasonable period. If section 276B is interpreted to include the delay in deposit of tax deducted at source it would make the provision manifestly arbitrary.

vi) The definition of “principal officer” as contemplated in section 2(35) , required the Assessing Officer to issue notice to any person connected with the management or administration of the assessee for his intention of treating him as the ”principal officer” thereof. The obligation did not end with mere issue of a notice. Section 201(1) , proviso to section 201(1) and 201(3) made it mandatory for the Assessing Officer to pass an order. The order was also appealable under section 246(1)(i). The order would determine which officer of the assessee was proposed to be dealt as “principal officer” and in view of the exclusion under the proviso to section 201(1), whether the assessee and its principal officer should be “deemed to be assessee-in-default”.

vii) Section 2(35)(b) postulates the Assessing Officer to issue notice of his “intention to treat” a person connected with the management and administration of an assessee as its “principal officer” that mere issuance of notice would not ipso facto become a final “determination” of classification and identification of a person as “principal officer”. Since treating a person as such would not only have civil but also penal consequences. As such, an order making such determination was necessary. Such “adjudication” was contemplated u/s. 201 when such person other than the assessee was held to be a principal officer and was also thereafter deemed to be an assessee-in-default. Any person aggrieved by such order would have remedies available under section 246(1)(i). The term “principal officer” has been used singular and not in plural and the word “officer” is further premised by the word “principal” which signifies “main” officer and not all the officers who may in some way be connected with the management or administration of the company.“Determination” could therefore, be done only while passing an order u/s. 201(1). Section 204(iii) also defines and fixes the responsibility for paying the tax deducted at source in relation to the company on its “principal officer”.

viii) The offences being offences u/s. 276B would imply that the failure to pay the tax deducted at source must have direct relation, namely, consent, connivance or neglect of such person.

ix) The Revenue had not invoked the provisions of section 221 read with section 201(1) to impose penalty against the assessee or the principal officer of the assessee for “failure to pay the whole or any part of tax, as required by or under this Act” and hence could not be permitted to prosecute the petitioners for the same substantive act which was also categorized as an “offence” u/s. 276B . As such, further trial of the petitioners by the criminal court was not permissible which would tantamount to abuse of process of the court. The orders of issuance of process by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrates and the orders rejecting the criminal revision applications by the Additional Sessions Court were quashed and set aside.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

3. Vaibhav Goel and Ors. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 49 of 2022 Decided on: 20.03.2025

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code – After the approval of the Resolution Plan on 21st May 2019, the Income Tax Department issued demand notices dated 26th December 2019 and 28th December 2019 under the IT Act concerning assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14, respectively to the Corporate Debtor undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process – Held – All the dues including the statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if not a part of the Resolution Plan, shall stand extinguished and no proceedings could be continued in respect of such dues for the period prior to the date on which the adjudicating authority grants its approval under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated concerning the corporate debtor M/s. Tehri Iron and Steel Casting Ltd. (‘the CD’). The Joint Resolution Applicants submitted a Resolution Plan dated 21st January 2019. The National Company Law Tribunal (‘the NCLT’), vide its order dated 21st May 2019, approved the Resolution Plan submitted by the Appellants.

The Resolution Plan had referred to the liability of ₹16,85,79,469/- (Rupees Sixteen-crores, eighty-five lakhs, seventy-nine thousand, four-hundred and sixty- nine only) of the Income Tax Department for the assessment year 2014-15 based on the demand dated 18th December 2017 which was rectified under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the IT Act’). The liability was shown in the Resolution Plan under the heading “Contingent liabilities”.

After the approval of the Resolution Plan, the Income Tax Department issued demand notices dated 26th December 2019 and 28th December 2019 under the IT Act concerning assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14, respectively, in respect of the CD. However, admittedly, no claim about the demands for the two assessment years was submitted before the Resolution Professional. The Monitoring Professional, addressed a letter to the Income Tax Department, contending that the demands for the two aforesaid assessment years were unsustainable in law.

As the Income Tax Department issued a letter dated 2nd June 2020 asserting the said demands, the Monitoring Professional applied to the NCLT for declaring that the demands made by the Income Tax Department pertaining to assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 were invalid. It was urged that the said demands were invalid as no claim in respect thereof was made before the Resolution Professional until the Resolution Plan was approved by the order dated 21st May 2019. By the order dated 17th September 2020, the NCLT dismissed the application, holding it to be frivolous. The costs of ₹1 lakh were made payable by the Joint Resolution Applicants and the Monitoring Professional.

Being aggrieved by the said order, an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (for short, ‘the IB Code’) was preferred before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘the NCLAT’). By the impugned judgment and order dated 25th November, 2021, the NCLAT dismissed the said appeal.

An appeal under Section 62 of ‘the IB Code’ against the judgment and order dated 25th November 2021 passed by the NCLAT was filed before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that in view of its decision in Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Pvt. Ltd. 2021:INSC:250 : (2021) 9 SCC 657, all the dues including the statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if not a part of the Resolution Plan, shall stand extinguished and no proceedings could be continued in respect of such dues for the period prior to the date on which the adjudicating authority grants its approval under Section 31 of the IB Code. In this case, the income tax dues of the CD for the assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 were not part of the approved Resolution Plan. Therefore, in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 31, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the above decision, the dues of the Income Tax Department owed by the CD for the assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 stood extinguished.

The Supreme Court noted that its decision in the case of Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Pvt. Ltd. 2021:INSC:250 : (2021) 9 SCC 657 was specifically relied upon before the NCLAT. This decision was brushed aside by the NCLAT, firstly on the ground that the said decision was not relied upon before NCLT and, secondly, on the ground that the Appellants had not challenged the Resolution Plan. According to the Supreme Court, the NCLAT unfortunately had ignored the binding precedent and the legal effect of the approval of the Resolution Plan as laid down in paragraphs 102.1 to 102.3 of the aforementioned decision. The reason given by NCLAT that the decision of this Court could not be considered as it was not cited before the NCLT was perverse.

The Supreme Court further noted that on the application made by the Monitoring Professional, the NCLT issued notice to the Income Tax Department by order dated 27th August 2020. However, by the order dated 17th September 2020, which was impugned before the NCLAT, without considering the merits and without recording reasons, the NCLT held that the application was frivolous as the Monitoring Professional was seeking relief, which the Bench did not consider at the time of the approval of the Resolution Plan. The NCLT also imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Joint Resolution Applicants and the Monitoring Professional. The Supreme Court did not approve NCLT’s approach of not considering the application on merits and dismissing the same without recording any reasons and also by imposing costs. According to the Supreme Court, the order of payment of costs was unwarranted.

In view of the above discussion, the Supreme Court held that the Resolution Plan approved on 21st May 2019 was binding on the Income Tax Department. Therefore, the subsequent demand raised by the Income Tax Department for the assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 was invalid.

According to the Supreme Court, once the Resolution Plan is approved by the NCLT, no belated claim can be included therein that was not made earlier. If such demands are taken into consideration, the Joint Resolution Applicants will not be in a position to recommence the business of the CD on a clean slate. On this aspect, the Supreme Court noted that in paragraph 107 of its decision in the case of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. 2019:INSC:1256 : (2020) 8 SCC 531 it was held as under:

“107. For the same reason, the impugned NCLAT judgment [Standard Chartered Bank v. Satish Kumar Gupta,] in holding that claims that may exist apart from those decided on merits by the resolution professional and by the Adjudicating Authority/Appellate Tribunal can now be decided by an appropriate forum in terms of Section 60(6) of the Code, also militates against the rationale of Section 31 of the Code. A successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly be faced with “undecided” claims after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to a hydra head popping up which would throw into uncertainty amounts payable by a prospective resolution applicant who would successfully take over the business of the corporate debtor. All claims must be submitted to and decided by the resolution professional so that a prospective resolution applicant knows exactly what has to be paid in order that it may then take overand run the business of the corporate debtor. This, the successful resolution applicant does on a fresh slate, as has been pointed out by us hereinabove. Forthese reasons, NCLAT judgment must also be set aside on this count.”

According to the Supreme Court, the additional demands made by the Income Tax Department in respect of the assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 would operate as roadblocks in implementing the approved Resolution Plan, and Joint Resolution Applicants would not be able to restart the operations of the CD on a clean slate.

The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the demands raised by the Income Tax Department against the CD in respect of assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 were invalid and could not be enforced. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of NCLT and NCLAT and allowed the appeal accordingly.

Consideration for Issue of Shares by a Company

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Receipt of consideration for issue of shares by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, in excess of the face value of such shares, is taxable in the year of receipt, to the extent of the amount that exceeds the fair market value of the shares, as per the provisions of clause (viib) of sub-section (2) of s.56 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

This provision does not apply to the receipts by a venture capital undertaking from a venture capital company or a fund or a specified firm besides the receipts by a company from a class of notified persons, for example a start-up company.

Rules 11U and 11UA provide for the method of determining the fair market value of the shares by following the Net Asset Value method or the Discounted Cash Flow method. In the alternative, the fair market value shall be such value as is substantiated by the company to the satisfaction of the AO based on the value of its assets.

An interesting issue has arisen in respect of applicability of S.56(2)(viib) of the Act, where shares are issued by a closely held company at a premium on conversion of loans into share capital.

The Chandigarh Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that such a conversion of a loan into share capital does not attract the provisions of S.56(2)(viib). In contrast, the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal recently held that the provisions do apply following the decisions of the Kolkata and Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal.

I. A. HYDRO ENERGY’S CASE

The issue arose in the case of CIT vs. I.A Hydro Energy (T) Ltd., before the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 548/CHD/2022 dt. 11.10.2023 for assessment year 2018-19. In that case, the assessee, an Indian company, engaged in the business of generation and distribution of electricity, owned a Hydro Electric Project in Chanju, Himachal Pradesh. For the relevant year, the assessee filed the return of income on 18.10.2018 under section 139(1) of the Act declaring a loss of ₹67,15,30,280. The assessment in the case of the assessee was completed vide order dated 12.04.2021 passed under section 143(3) read with sections 143(3A) & 143(3B) assessing the total income of the assessee at ₹135,36,85,457/- after making addition of ₹202,50,00,000/- u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act. The AO noted that the assessee company had issued equity shares at a premium, which was in excess of the fair market value of the shares issued. On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition made by the assessing officer. Aggrieved, the Income-tax Department filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

In appeal, it was pointed out by the Revenue that the assessee company was incorporated on 23.03.2017 and prior to that, business was carried out in the status of a partnership firm, namely M/s. I A Energy, which was constituted on 18.06.2010. On conversion of the partnership firm into a company, all the partners of the firm became shareholders. Later on, unsecured loans given by the erstwhile partners were converted into equity shares, which were issued at a premium. The assessee had, during the year, allotted 2,25,00,000 shares of face value ₹10 each at a premium of ₹90 each while the market value of the shares as per the Net Asset Value (NAV) method and Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules was far less than the value at which the shares had been allotted. The assessee had submitted that the value of the shares had been determined at ₹106 per share by the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method and had submitted the CA certificate in support of the same. The CA certificate mentioned that all the values of variables in the DCF method had been taken as per figures provided by the management of assessee company. The assessee failed to produce any valid justification in respect of projection of financial statements, which were baseless, unsubstantiated and far removed from the actual business and financial realities of the assessee company.

The Revenue, on the above facts, requested the Tribunal to consider the following grounds :

1. The Ld CIT (A) erred in deleting the addition of ₹202.50 Crores under the Head “Income from Other Sources” u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act on account of excess amount per share paid as premium.

2. The Ld CIT (A) erred in holding that there is no case of application of Section 56(2)(viib) to the facts of appellant’s case where pre-existing unsecured loans of partners / shareholders were converted into equity shares at premium and the facts of the assessment order do not indicate any case of tax abuse involved in such share conversion.

3. The Ld CIT (A) erred in deleting the addition as the DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) valuation used by the assessee was done with fictitious figures having no correlation with actual affairs of the assessee company.

The Revenue challenging the impugned order, contended that the CIT (A) erred in deleting the addition of ₹202.50 Crores made by the AO u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act under the head “Income from Other Sources” on account of excess of fair market value per share paid as premium; that the CIT (A) erred in holding that there was no case for application of Section 56(2)( viib) to the facts of appellant’s case, where pre-existing unsecured loans of partners / shareholders were converted into equity shares at a premium and the facts of the assessment order did not indicate any case of tax abuse involved in such share conversion; that the CIT (A) erred in deleting the addition based on DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) valuation used by the assessee which was done with fictitious figures having no correlation with actual affairs of the assessee company;

In response, on behalf of the assessee company, it was contended that no money/consideration was actually received by the assessee on conversion of loans to shares, after a conversion of the partnership firm to the assessee company, and that thereby, the provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act were not applicable. It was further submitted that Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act provided for taxation, where the company received any consideration in excess of fair market value of shares; that the assessee had not received any money/ consideration on issuance of shares; the shares had been issued in lieu of already outstanding loans received from existing shareholders itself.

It was reiterated that the assessee company came into existence on 23.03.2017 by conversion of the Firm. All the partners of the Firm became shareholders of the company. The Firm was also enjoying substantial amount of loan facility from its partners, who granted loans from time to time vide loan agreement(s) of 2010. It was upon conversion of the firm to a Company that the existing loans were converted into equity shares, and thereby the assessee issued 2,25,00,000 equity shares of ₹10 each at a premium of ₹90 in lieu of outstanding loans. It was submitted that the aforesaid unsecured loans received from the partners, starting from the year 2010, had always been accepted as genuine in the hands of the Firm in as much as no doubt/addition/ disallowance in respect of such loans had been made in completed scrutiny assessment(s) for AYs 2013-14, 2014-15, 2016-17 and 2017-18.

It was submitted that it was apparently clear that no fresh consideration/ money had flown to the assessee company on issue of shares during the relevant year. In effect, the loans were received in preceding years and were outstanding and had merely changed form during the relevant year, i.e., from ‘loan’ to ‘equity share capital’; there was no consideration received by the assessee company during the year in lieu of shares allotted, warranting application of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

It was mentioned that clause (viib) of sub section (2) of section 56 was inserted vide Finance Act, 2012 with a view to curb the practice of closely held companies introducing undisclosed money of promoters / directors by issuing shares at high premium, over and above the book value of shares of the company, to escape the rigours of section 68 of the Act.

Attention had been drawn to the Budget Speech, 2012 wherein the object behind the introduction of Section 56(2)(viib) in the Act besides the Circular No. 1 /2011 dated 6th April, 2011 issued by the Board.

The decision of the CIT(A) was reproduced in para 12 of its order by the Chandigarh bench to support the case for no addition. The relevant parts of the said decision were:

In view of the aforesaid, considering that section 56(2)(viib) of the Act is aimed at curbing practice of routing unaccounted/ black money, the said provisions would not, in our respectful submission, apply in case of bona-fide transaction of conversion of existing loans, accepted as genuine in the year of receipt, to share capital, that, too, related to existing shareholders refer PCIT vs. Cinestaan Entertainment Pvt Ltd. : ITA No. 1007/2019 (Del HQ; C/earview Healthcare (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO: 181 ITD 141 (Del Trib.); Vaani Estates (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO: 172 ITD 629 (Chennai Trib.).

28. Further, Circular No.1/201I dated 6 April, 2011 issued by the CBDT explaining the provision of section 56(2)(vii) of the Act specifically states that the section was inserted as a counter evasion mechanism to prevent money laundering of unaccounted income. In paragraph 13.4 thereof, it is stated that “the intention was not to tax transactions carried out in the normal course of business or trade, the profit of which are taxable under the specific head of income”. The said circular, it is respectfully submitted, further fortifies the contention of the assessee that the provision of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act are not applicable to genuine business transaction without there being any evidence stating otherwise.

29. In view of the aforesaid, in absence of any money/ consideration flowing to the assessee company on issue of shares and keeping in mind the avowed objective behind introduction of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act, the said section has no application. In that view of the matter, addition made by the assessing officer under section 56(2)(viib) of the Act is liable to be deleted at the threshold, on the said ground itself.

30. It is further submitted that once the transaction is tested by the tax department and the assessing officer is satisfied that the transaction is a genuine business transaction, i.e., without any element of tax avoidance, then, there is no requirement to further test FMV of issue of shares at premium, applying provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

The Tribunal reiterated that in pursuance of the aforesaid loan agreement(s), the pre-incorporation loan given by the erstwhile partners (now shareholders) were converted into shares of the assessee company, by issue of fresh equity shares of ₹10 each at premium of ₹90 per share (total ₹100 per shares) during the relevant year. A copy of the Valuation Report obtained by the assessee from its Chartered Accountant has been filed.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A), while deleting the addition made by the AO, had observed as follows :

(ii) The appellant has referred to the objective behind provision of Section 56(2)(viib) introduced by Finance Act, 2012 by relying on the Budget Speech 2012 and contended that section was introduced as an anti-abuse provision to arrest circulation of unaccounted y in the economy. Reference to Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in the case of K.P. Verghese Vs. lTO, 131 ITR 597 was also made wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the h of Finance Minister while Introducing Finance Bill, carries considerable weightage to determine the intent behind the provisions inserted/amended. It was thus, contended that bonafide transaction of conversion of existing loans accepted as genuine in the year of receipt to share capital and that too for existing shareholders will not fall under the purview of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

(iii) It was also contended that once the transaction is tested by the tax department and found genuine without any element of tax avoidance, there cannot be any requirement to test FMV of issue of shares at premium applying the provision of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. The appellant has relied on the decision in Clearview Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. ITQ 181 ITD 141 (Delhi bench). Cinestaan Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., 170 ITD 809 (Delhi bench) and similar other decisions to support this contention.

(iv) As regards the rejection of appellant’s valuation of DCF method, it is contended that the choice of valuation method is available to the assessee (NAV or DCF) as per provision of Rule 11UA of IT. Rules and the AO substituting the method of valuation by NAV is completely beyond jurisdiction and invalid. The appellant relied on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone M-Pera Ltd. Vs. DCIT, 164 ITR 257, wherein the Hon’ble Court held that the AO cannot change the method adopted by the assessee for share valuation by DFC method which was violation of Rule 11UA. The appellant has referred to similar decision of Mumbai ITAT, Bangalore, ITAT Delhi ITAT to emphasize that the AO could not have substituted the- assessee’s choice of method of valuation as mandated by Rule 11UA of IT. Rules.

v) The appellant has referred to the decision of CIT Vs. WA Hotels Pvt. Ltd., 276 Taxmann 330 (MAD) to support its contention that variation between projection and actual results cannot be the ground for rejection of DCF method to value shares. In the case of VVA Hotels, Hon’ble Madras High Court held that unless the AO is able to bring out any evidence of abuse of benevolent provision with an intention to defraud the revenue, the option given to the assessee shall be held to be absolute as regards DCF method of share valuation. The appellant also referred to similar other decisions to support this view point. In the case of Creditapha Alternative Investment Advisors Pvt. Ltd., 134 Taxmann.com 223, Hon’ble Mumbai ITAT held that the Assessing Officer has no authority to pick and choose the valuation method and make addition as it was the assessee who has option to choose the method of valuation.

vi) Appellant contended that the AO cannot on his “ipse dixit” reject the valuation report of an expert and supported this contention by referring to relevant decisions of various Courts / tribunals . The appellant relied on the decision in the case of Urmin marketing Pvt ltd 122 Taxmann.cm.40 (Aha; wherein it was held that the valuation report prepared by technical expert cannot be disturbed by the AO without taking opinion of the technical person. vii) The appellant contended that even the observations of the AO as regards variation in projected figures and actual figures were duly explained through detailed charts and reasonable assumptions made.

After considering the AO’s findings in the assessment order and appellant’ submission, following facts emerge

i) It is undisputed fact that the appellant did not receive any consideration for allotment of shares in the previous year relevant to current assessment year. The AO has not discussed this fact neither countered this contention of the appellant. It is a clear fact that the erstwhile partners of the erstwhile Firm (converted into appellant company) had given loans to the said firm which was converted into share capital of those partners becoming the shareholders. The AO has mentioned in the assessment order that the loans outstanding as on 01.04.2017 were converted into share capital. The shares were issued at Rs.10 per share face value and premium of Rs.90 per share. After plain reading of S.56(2)(viib), there is no doubt that this provisions is applicable to the considerations received in the previous year under consideration for taxing the excess premium charged over and above fair market value of shares determined as per prescribed method under Rule 11UA. In the current facts of the case, the appellant did not receive any consideration in the current assessment year and the outstanding loans of existing partners of erstwhile firm was converted into the shares of the appellant company. Thus, prima facie, there is no justification for the AO to apply Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act in the appellant’s case. The said consideration in the form of unsecured loans were received from the partner of the erstwhile firm in the year 2010 (as evidenced from loan agreement) and the AO could not bring out any material facts to show that such conversion of loans to equity shares was a ploy to defraud revenue of the tax on such transaction. In fact, the loans received in earlier years also got tested through scrutiny assessments completed for assessment year 2013-14, 2014-15, 2016-17 and 2017-18 in the case of the erstwhile firm. Thus, it can be concluded that the AO has not made out any case that the share conversion by the appellant led to defrauding revenue of its due taxes. Thus, firstly ,the amount is not received in the relevant previous year makes the applicability of S.56(2)(viib) invalid in the case of the appellant and secondly, the legislative intent to arrest abuse of tax laws to defraud revenue is also not available in the current facts of the case as the receipt of loans in the earlier years were from the existing partners of the erstwhile firm which got duly verified in the scrutiny of various assessment years after loans receipt”.

The Tribunal noted that the ld. CIT(A) had observed that it was an undisputed fact that the appellant did not receive any consideration for allotment of shares in the previous year relevant to the current assessment year; that the AO had not discussed that fact nor countered that contention of the appellant; it was a clear fact that the erstwhile partners of the erstwhile Firm (converted into appellant company) had given loans to the said firm, which were converted into share capital of those partners, who became the shareholders; the AO had mentioned in the assessment order that the loans outstanding as on 01.04.2017 were converted into share capital; the shares were issued at ₹10 per share face value and premium of ₹90 per share.

The Tribunal observed that on a plain reading of S.56(2)(viib), there was no doubt that the provision was applicable to the consideration received in the previous year under consideration for taxing the excess premium charged over and above fair market value of shares determined as per prescribed method under Rule 11UA. In the current facts of the case, the appellant did not receive any consideration in the current assessment year, and only the outstanding loans of existing partners of erstwhile firm was converted into the shares of the appellant company. Thus, prima facie, there was no justification for the AO to apply Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act in the appellant’s case. The said consideration in the form of unsecured loans was received from the partners of the erstwhile firm in the year 2010, as evidenced from loan agreements, and the AO could not bring out any material facts to show that such conversion of loans into equity shares was a ploy to defraud revenue of the tax on such transaction.

In fact, the loans received in earlier years also got tested through scrutiny assessments completed for assessment year 2013-14, 2014-15, 2016-17 and 2017-18 in the case of the erstwhile firm. Thus, it could be concluded that the AO had not made out any case that the share conversion by the appellant led to defrauding revenue of its due taxes. Thus, firstly, the fact that the amount is not received in the relevant previous year made the applicability of S.56(2)(viib) invalid in the case of the appellant and secondly, the legislative intent to arrest abuse of tax laws to defraud revenue was also not available in the current facts of the case, as the receipt of loans in the earlier years were from the existing partners of the erstwhile firm, which got duly verified in the scrutiny of various assessment years after receipt of the loans.

In PCIT vs. Cinestaan Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., 433 ITR 82 ( Del), it was contended on behalf of the Assessee-Respondent before the High Court, inter alia, that section 56(2)(viib) of the Act was not applicable to genuine business transactions; that the genuineness and creditworthiness of the strategic investors was not doubted by either the AO, or the CIT(A); that sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of the Explanation to section 56(2)(viib) was not applicable to the case of the Respondent-Assessee and the Assessee was not required to satisfy the Assessing Officer about the valuation done; and that in accordance with sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of the Explanation to section 56(2)(viib). the Respondent-Assessee had an option to carry out a valuation and determine the fair market value of the shares only on the Discounted Cash Flow Method (the DCF Method), which was appropriately followed by the Respondent-Assessee.

In view of the above facts and discussion, it was apparent to the Chandigarh bench that there was no case of application of Section 56(2)(viib) to the facts of the appellant’s case where pre-existing unsecured loans of partners/shareholders were converted into equity shares at a premium, and the facts of the assessment order did not indicate any case of tax abuse involved in such share conversion. Even the AO’s decision to substitute DCF method of share valuation by NAV method was not in accordance with Rule 11UA of the IT Rules. Accordingly, the addition of ₹202,50,00,000 u/s. 56(2)(viib) of the Act was deleted.

PARASMANI GEMS’S CASE

The issue was again recently examined by the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Parasmani Gems (P) Ltd., vs. DCIT, 210 ITD 215, for assessment year 2013-14. In that case, the assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of gold and diamond jewellery. In assessing the total income for A.Y. 2013-14, the AO found that the assessee had issued shares of face value of ₹10 with a premium on two occasions during the financial year under consideration, first on 03.11.2012 at a premium of ₹90 per share, and again on 26.03.2013 at a premium of ₹31.67 per share only to three persons namely, Daxesh Manharlal Soni, Kunal Manharlal Soni & Nirav Manharlal Soni, against the loans received from such persons in the past.

It was explained to the AO that the shares allotted on 03.11.2012 were on the basis of fair market value of the shares as determined under Discounted Cash Flow method, supported by a report of the Accountant that was filed. The AO was not satisfied with the working of the FMV of the shares as per the DCF method of valuation adopted by the assessee and instead, he worked out the value of the shares as per Net Asset Value method, which worked out to ₹34.55 share only. Accordingly, the AO held that the premium charged to the extent of ₹55.45 (90-34.55) per share was excessive and accordingly a part of the share premium of ₹94,26,500 was added u/s.56(2)(viib) of the Act, which was, subsequently on rectification, reduced to ₹27,72,500 only.

Aggrieved with the order of the AO, the assessee had filed an appeal before the First Appellate Authority, which had been dismissed by the FAA. The assessee in the second appeal, before the Tribunal, raised the following relevant grounds of appeal, besides a few others:

(1) That on facts and in law, the learned CIT(A) has grievously erred in confirming the addition of ₹27,72,500/- made u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

(2) That on facts, evidence on record, and in law, the learned CIT (A) ought to have accepted the valuation done by appellant’s C.A. and ought to have held that the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act are not applicable and the entire addition ought to have been deleted, as prayed for.”

For the assessee, besides a few other contentions not considered here for the sake of brevity, it was submitted on the issue under consideration herein that there was no fresh introduction of capital during the year; that the assessee had taken loans from the three shareholders, which were converted into share capital during the year and thus, no fresh consideration towards issue of shares was received during the year. The assessee relied upon the decision of the Chandigarh bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. I.A. Hydro Energy Pvt. Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 548 (Chd.) of 2022, dated 11-10-2023, and submitted that when no amount was received during the year towards share capital, the applicability of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act was invalid. The Tribunal was further informed that the decision of the Chandigarh bench was confirmed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in ITA No.4 of 2024 dated 31.05.2024/Principal Commissioner of Income-tax vs. I.A. Hydro Energy (P.) Ltd., 299 Taxman 304 (HP).

On behalf of the Revenue, on the issue under consideration herein, besides a few other submissions not considered here, it was submitted that Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act prescribed “any consideration for issue of shares” and that the word “consideration” had a much wider implication. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of ITAT Mumbai in the case of Keep Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO [IT Appeal No. 1692 (Mum.) of 2023, dated 31-8-2023, wherein an identical issue of conversion of loan advanced in the past into equity shares with share premium was involved, and the Mumbai bench had held that the transaction was covered by the provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. Reliance was placed also upon the decision of the Kolkata bench of the Tribunal in the case of Milk Mantra Dairy (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax 196 ITD 333 (Kol.). It was also submitted that the assessee had issued shares on two occasions i.e. on 03.11.2012 and again on 26.03.2013, both during the same financial year. While shares on 03.11.2012 were issued at a premium of ₹90/- per share, the shares allotted next on 26.03.2013 were issued at a premium of ₹31.67 per share only. The assessee had not explained the huge difference in the fair market value of the shares in the two allotments made during the same financial year; the premium of ₹31.67 charged by the assessee in the second allotment on 26.03.2013 itself proved that the premium of ₹90 charged earlier in the first allotment was not as per the correct FMV.

The Tribunal examined the facts and the ratio of the decision of coordinate bench of ITAT, Chandigarh, in the case of I.A. Hydro Energy Pvt. Ltd. (supra) on the contention of the assessee that that there was no  fresh inflow of funds in respect of allotment of shares, and that it was only an accounting entry for conversion of loans into share capital and therefore, the provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act were not at all attracted.

The Ahmedabad bench of the Tribunal noted that the coordinate bench of Chandigarh Tribunal, in that case, did hold that in the case of conversion of loan into share capital, no consideration was received; that such conversion of loan into share capital did not lead to defrauding the Revenue of its due taxes; that the said decision of Chandigarh Bench of Tribunal was upheld by the Himachal Pradesh High Court; that the Hon’ble High Court, on the basis of the finding recorded by the Tribunal held that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal before the court, and that the issue of whether provision of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act was applicable in the case of conversion of loan into share capital, was not independently examined by the Court. The relevant part of the order of the High Court was reproduced by the Tribunal:

“18. We are of the opinion that the orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as the CIT(Appeals), are fairly comprehensive. Both of them have concurrently found that no consideration was received by the assessee-firm for allotment of the shares, therefore Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act would not apply, and that it would have applied only if consideration was received for such a transaction.

19. Also, both the Tribunal and the CIT(Appeals) have held that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to substitute the NAV method of assessing the valuation of shares, once the assessee had exercised option of a DCF valuation method as per Rule 11UA(2) of the Income Tax Rules.

20. We agree with the reasoning adopted by the CIT(Appeals) confirmed by the ITAT on all aspects and find that no substantial questions of law arise in this appeal for consideration by this Court.

21. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed.”

The Tribunal disagreed with the contention of the assessee that the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of I.A. Hydro Energy Pvt. Ltd. (supra) should be followed to maintain the judicial discipline and that the views expressed by even a non-jurisdictional High Court deserved utmost respect and reverence, that had the unquestionable binding force of law. The Tribunal instead held that a mere declaration by the court that no substantial question of law was involved, on the basis of findings of the lower authorities, could not be considered as a binding precedent. The Tribunal incidentally observed that in the case before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the AO had no jurisdiction to substitute NAV method of valuation of shares when the assessee had opted DCF method of valuation. In contrast, noted the Tribunal, in the case before them, the assessee had not explained as to why the first allotment of shares was at a premium of ₹90 per share, whereas the second subsequent allotment, after a gap of 5 months, was made at a premium of ₹31.80 per share only. Thus, the facts of the case were found to be totally different and, therefore, the ratio of the decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court was not followed in view of the peculiar facts of the case before them. Further, the Tribunal observed that the judgement of the non-jurisdictional High Court, in any event, did not constitute unquestionably binding judicial precedent.

The provision of the Act as well as the Memorandum for introduction of this provision, the Tribunal noted, made it explicit that if the consideration was received for issue of shares that exceeded the fair value of such shares, then the consideration received for such shares, as exceeding the fair market value of the shares, shall be chargeable to tax under the head income from other sources. It noted that there was no stipulation in section 56(2)(viib) that it would be applicable only in the case of receipt of any ‘amount’ or ‘money’ on account of share application money. Rather the words used in the section were ‘any consideration for issue of shares’ which had a very wide implication. The Ahmedabad bench noted with approval the decision of the co-ordinate bench of Kolkata in the case of Milk Mantra Dairy (P.) Ltd. (supra).

The Ahmedabad bench again noted that the co-ordinate bench of Mumbai in the case of Keep Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had categorically held that the conversion of loan amount into equity shares would not exonerate the assessee from application of provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

Keeping in view the language of the section, which used the term ‘consideration’, which was of wider import when compared with the word ‘amounts’, the Tribunal was inclined to agree with the decisions of Mumbai and Kolkata benches on the issue. As a result, the contention of the assessee that provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act were not attracted in the case of conversion of loan amount into share capital was rejected. In the considered opinion of the Ahmedabad bench, the provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act did apply in the case of conversion of loan into share capital. It observed that the view adopted by the Chandigarh Bench would make the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) otiose for all such transactions of conversion of securities, which was not desirable. It therefore, upheld the order passed by the CIT(A), and the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.

OBSERVATIONS

The relevant part of s.56(2)(viib),introduced by Finance Act, 2012 reads as under;

where a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, receives, in any previous year, from any person, any consideration for issue of shares that exceeds the Face value of such shares, the aggregate consideration received for such shares as exceeds the fair market value of the shares:

Provided that this clause shall not apply where the consideration for

issue of shares is received—

(i) by a venture capital undertaking from a venture capital company or a venture capital fund [or a specified fund]; or

(ii) by a company from a class or classes of persons as may be notified by the Central Government in this behalf:

The legislative intent behind the introduction of the deeming fiction was explained by the Finance Minister in the Budget Speech and in the Explanatory Memorandum.

On a composite reading of the provision and the background documents the following emerge;

  •  The provision represents a deeming fiction,
  •  It seeks to tax a receipt of consideration on issue of shares in given circumstances,
  •  The charge of the tax is in the year of receipt of consideration,
  •  The provision is an anti-avoidance measure that seeks to bring to book such cases which are intended to avoid tax by adopting such measures that are undesirable.

It is said that bad facts make for bad law, and the decision of the Ahmedabad bench, with respect, is a case that goes on to prove the same. In that case, the company, during the same year, had issued shares on two occasions, first at a premium of ₹90 per share and then later on at a paltry value of premium of ₹31.57 per share, providing a serious suspicion about the intentions of the company, more so when no material change had happened in the financials of the company between the two issues. This fact itself perhaps led the bench to overlook or keep aside the other relevant consideration of the need for actual receipt during the year and the motive behind the transaction, and also the fact that the valuation based on DCF supported the valuation.

The overwhelming urge to bring to book an errant company might have led the bench to disregard the fact that there was no apparent intention to avoid taxes and further led the bench to disregard the ratio of the decision of the High Court, which had, in clear terms with specific findings, approved the decisions of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. To hold that the said decision of the High Court was delivered only on the lack of substantial question of law with respect to the case was not correct. Also, not correct was to hold that the decision of non-jurisdictional High Court was not binding on the bench more, so where there was no contrary decision of the Court on the subject nor was any such decision cited by the bench. The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in the decision, had considered the important facts, and on due consideration, had held that the appeal of the Revenue did not involve the substantial question of law. The decision of the Court therefore was delivered on the due consideration of the facts and the law, as was clear from the relevant part of the order reproduced by the bench itself in the body of the order.

The CIT(A) and the Tribunal, in the case of I.A. Hydro Energy Ltd., gave due consideration and the weightage demanded of the case before them to the Budget speech and the Explanatory Memorandum and a few other decisions of the Delhi High court, to hold that the deeming fiction of s.56(2)(viib) had no application in cases where there was no intention to avoid tax and that there was no proof of such intention.

The decision of the Chandigarh Bench in I.A.Hydro Energy’s case has been recently confirmed on the ground that no substantial question of law arose out of the decision of the Tribunal. This decision of the Court is reported in 339 CTR (HP) at page 375. This decision of the Court was cited before the Ahmedabad Bench but was not followed by the Bench in as much as the Bench found the case to be distinguishable on the reasonings discussed above.

The provision was first introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 01.04.2013 and was originally restricted in its scope to receipts by a company from a resident. The scope, however, was enlarged by the Finance Act, 2023 to encompass receipts from any person, resident or non-resident, w.e.f 01.04.2024. At the time of introduction, specific methodology was not provided for computation of the fair market value but later on, rules were prescribed for valuation. The rules for valuation have been notified w.e.f 29.11.2012. This provision has ceased to apply w.e.f. 01.04.2025 as per the amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2024.

The important issue that remains to be examined is whether a conversion of a loan into share capital could be considered as a “receipt” for attracting the provision. Alternatively, can a receipt of an amount classified as a loan in a different year be construed as a “receipt” on passing of an accounting entry, in a subsequent year for recording the conversion or treatment of a loan into a share capital. Can it be contended that there was no receipt of any amount in the year of issue of share capital?

For attracting a charge of taxation under the relevant provision, twin conditions, besides a few more conditions, are required to be satisfied; one such condition is a receipt in a previous year, and the other condition is that the receipt must represent a consideration for issue of shares. Apparently, the year of receipt of the amount is different than the year of issue of shares and, in any case, these two events are different, even if they fall in the same year, unless the receipt in the first place itself was for issue of shares. In the circumstances, unless the act of passing an accounting entry is considered or classified as an act of receipt representing the consideration for issue of shares, the charge of tax in the year of conversion may fail, as no express provision to that effect is ingrained in the law. Even on the count that the provision in question is a deeming provision and seeks to bring to tax an ordinary transaction of the issue of share capital, which is otherwise on capital account, as an income, it therefore requires a strict interpretation.

Obviously, the loan, when received was refundable, and such a receipt cannot be classified as a receipt of consideration for issue of shares and surely not a receipt that could be taxed in the absence of the applicability of provisions of s. 68 of the Act. This section too would seek to tax the receipt in the year of actual receipt of loan, and not in the year of passing the accounting entry. A small, related issue, not inconsequential, could also be about the year of determination of the fair market value of the shares; should the valuation be in the year of receipt of loan or the year of passing an accounting entry.

The relevant part of the order of the CIT(A), passed in the appeal by I.A.Hydro Energy Ltd. and confirmed by the Chandigarh bench succinctly explains the reason behind not attracting the deeming fiction;

“It is undisputed fact that the appellant did not receive any consideration for allotment of shares in the previous year relevant to current assessment year. The AO has not discussed this fact neither countered this contention of the appellant. It is a clear fact that the erstwhile partners of the erstwhile Firm (converted into appellant company) had given loans to the said firm which was converted into share capital of those partners becoming the shareholders. The AO has mentioned in the assessment order that the loans outstanding as on 01.04.2017 were converted into share capital. The shares were issued at ₹10 per share face value and premium of ₹90 per share. After plain reading of S.56(2)(viib), there is no doubt that this provisions is applicable to the considerations received in the previous year under consideration for taxing the excess premium charged over and above fair market value of shares determined as per prescribed method under Rule 11UA. In the current facts of the case, the appellant did not receive any consideration in the current assessment year and the outstanding loans of existing partners of erstwhile firm was converted into the shares of the appellant company. Thus, prima facie, there is no justification for the AO to apply Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act in the appellant’s case. The said consideration in the form of unsecured loans were received from the partner of the erstwhile firm in the year 2010 (as evidenced from loan agreement) and the AO could not bring out any material facts to show that such conversion of loans to equity shares was a ploy to defraud revenue of the tax on such transaction. In fact, the loans received in earlier years also got tested through scrutiny assessments completed for assessment year 2013-14 2014-15, 2016-17 and 2017-18 in the case of the erstwhile firm. Thus, it can be concluded that the AO has not made out any case that the share conversion by the appellant led to defrauding revenue of its due taxes. Thus, firstly, the amount is not received in the relevant previous year makes the applicability of S.56(2)(viib) invalid in the case of the appellant and secondly, the legislative intent to arrest abuse of tax laws to defraud revenue is also not available in the current facts of the case as the receipt of loans in the earlier years were from the existing partners of the erstwhile firm which got duly verified in the scrutiny of various assessment years after loans receipt”.

Circular No.1/2011 dated 6th April, 2011 issued by the CBDT explaining the provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Act specifically states that the section was inserted as a counter evasion mechanism to prevent money laundering of unaccounted income. In paragraph 13.4 thereof, it is stated that “the intention was not to tax transactions carried out in the normal course of business or trade, the profits of which are taxable under the specific head of income”. The said circular, it is respectfully submitted, further fortifies the contention of the assessee that the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act are not applicable to genuine business transactions without there being any evidence to the contrary.

The better view, supported by the decisions of the High Courts, is that unless a case is made out for tax evasion, the deeming fiction should not be activated.

Agricultural Income Revisited

Agricultural income has always been the subject matter of discussion among professionals. It has enjoyed an uninterrupted exemption for more than a century. The same is sought to be continued in the Income Tax Bill 2025. The bill makes some cosmetic changes in the concept of agricultural income as envisaged.

The objective of this article is to explore the idea of Agricultural Income and examine all the relevant provisions, key judgments, and Constitutional mandates. In the course of the article, the author has taken the liberty of sowing the seeds of his views.

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DEFINITIONS

The story begins with Entry 82 of the Union List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India, which empowers the Union to levy tax on Income other than Agricultural Income. Entry 46 of the State List makes tax on Agricultural income a State subject. In fact, many states (like Bihar, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Maharashtra) have passed legislation to this effect, making Agricultural Income taxable in those States, though the implementation or enforcement of those statutes could be a matter of debate.

Under Article 366(1) of the Constitution, Agricultural Income means “agricultural income as defined for the purpose of enactments relating to Indian Income Tax”. The Income Tax Act 1961 defines “Agricultural Income” but doesn’t define “Agriculture”. The meaning we ascribe to the term “Agricultural” is at the core of how we construe the expressions “agricultural purpose” or “agricultural income”.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines Agriculture as the art or science of cultivating the ground, including harvesting of crops, and in a broad sense, the science or art of production of plants and animals useful to man, including in a variable degree, the preparation of these products for man’s use. In the broad sense, it includes farming, horticulture, and forestry, together with such subjects as butter, cheese, making sugar, etc.

Merriam-Webster dictionary defines Agriculture as the science, art, or practice of cultivating the soil, producing crops, and raising livestock, and in varying degrees, the preparation and marketing of the resulting products.

If we go by the above definitions, a broader connotation emerges suggesting that it is not always necessary that some labour and effort are employed to plough the soil and sow the seeds for an activity to be called Agriculture. Even dairy farming or poultry farming can be considered as Agriculture within its expanded meaning.

If we further dig into the etymology of the word “Agriculture,” it is derived from the Latin word “agricultura”, which is a combination of the word “ager”, meaning “field”, and “cultura”, meaning “cultivation”. Therefore, the word “agriculture” literally means “cultivation in the field”. The word “cultivation” implies an active and intentional process of fostering growth and development. Land can be cultivated to foster any form of life, whether plants or animals. So, where there is an intentional plantation of a certain type of grass to feed the cattle and facilitate their healthy growth, it must fall within the literal meaning of the word “agriculture”.

AGRICULTURE UNDER EXISTING TAX LAW

However, such a wide interpretation of the term also gave rise to many disputes. One of them was with respect to scenarios where income was generated out of land without directly performing any labour or toil on the land, like ploughing, sowing, etc. For example, a question often arose whether the phenomenon of plants and fruits growing spontaneously and naturally in the forest, without the intervention of human agency, should be considered as Agriculture. This, in particular, and other disputes in general, were put to rest by the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Benoy Kumar Sahas1. In the judgement penned by Bhagwati J, for the first time, a structure to interpret the term agriculture was laid down. In essence, the following principles emerged:

1. Basic Operations are Essential:

  •  Human Skill and Labour: Agriculture must involve basic operations on the land itself that utilise human skills and labour. This includes tilling, sowing, planting and similar efforts before germination.
  •  Not Just Subsequent Operations: Activities after germination, such as weeding, pruning, and harvesting, are not enough on their own to be considered agriculture. They must be carried out as an extension of the basic operation. It is only then that the whole of the integrated activity is considered as Agriculture.

2. Agriculture Includes all Kinds of Products Raised on Land:

  •  Regardless of the nature of the product – whether for humans or for the consumption of the beast.

3. Activities Must be Related to the Land

  •  Not Just Land-Related: The mere fact that an activity has some connection with or is in some way dependent on land is not sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term. For instance, breeding and rearing of livestock, dairy farming, butter and cheese making, and poultry farming would not by themselves be agricultural purposes2.

1  (Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas (1957) 32 ITR 466 (SC))
2  (The Law and Practice of Income Tax, by Arvind P Datar, Eleventh Edition, Vol -1, p. 85)

However, this must be understood holistically along with this disclaimer from the judgement- “The question still remains whether there is any warrant for the further extension of the term “agriculture” to all activities in relation to the land or having a connection with the land including breeding and rearing of livestock, dairy-farming, butter and cheese-making, poultry-farming, etc.”.

Dairy Farming

While the general principle as emerged in Benoy Kumar Sahas is that Dairy Farming may not be considered as Agriculture for want of a direct connection with the land, however, this idea needs to be analysed in the light of judgement by the Rangoon HC in case of Kokine Dairy3.

Roberts, C.J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, observed:

“Where cattle are wholly stall-fed and not pastured upon the land at all, doubtless it is a trade, and no agricultural operation is being carried on: where cattle are being exclusively or mainly pastured and are nonetheless fed with small amounts of oil-cake or the like, it may well be that the income derived from the sale of their milk is agricultural income.”

This, however, is not in consonance with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Benoy Kumar Sahas (supra), where it was held that dairy farming by itself would not constitute agriculture.


3 (Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Kokine Dairy, 6 ITR 502, 509, 1938)

Poultry Farming

While the central issue before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mulakaluru Co-operative Rural Bank4 was not the classification of Poultry Farming as Agriculture, it formed a key component of the ratio decidendi. This judgement underscores the varied and variegated interpretation of the term agriculture and illustrates a potential departure from the established framework in Benoy Kumar. The court held that “No doubt, poultry farming being an extended form of agriculture, certainly qualified eggs to be treated as ‘agricultural produce’ for the purpose of section 80P(2)(iii ).”


4 (CIT v Mulakaluru Cooperative Rural Bank Ltd 173 ITR 629, 1988)

Slaughter Tapping of Rubber

Kerala HC, in the case of KC Jacob,5 held that income generated by the owner from the slaughter tapping on rubber trees was an agricultural income:

“Here, the slaughter-tapping was by the owner himself. The rubber obtained by him, in whatever manner he tapped his trees, is his, and the receipts by him from the sale of rubber obtained by such tapping is “income derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes”, within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act 1950.”

This takes us to an important question, whether income derived passively from standing trees, like that of rubber, mango, coconut etc., after their initial planting can be regarded as agricultural income.

As established, supra in the case of KC Jacob, income derived by the owner from the slaughter-tapping of a “standing” rubber tree is agriculture income. Thus, there is no requirement to perform the basic operation of tilling, sowing, etc. on land every year. This inference can be extended to mango, coconut and other such standing trees as well. But what would be the scenario where the existing owner did not originally plant the trees? E.g., if a ready mango farm were purchased by the assessee –would the income arising out of the sale of mangoes every year still be regarded as agricultural income? While the answer can vary depending on the facts of the case, but in general, where the sine qua non of agricultural operation, i.e. tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting, and similar operations on the land are missing, courts may be more inclined to deem the same as originating from a commercial activity rather than an agricultural pursuit and treat the income as non-agricultural income. Figuratively – the person reaping the fruits may not be the same as the person who sowed the seeds, but the world appreciates only when the person reaping the fruits had himself sown the seeds.


5 (K.C. Jacob vs Agricultural Income-Tax Officer. 110 ITR 402, 1977)

SECTION 2(1A) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 1961

With the above background, let us dissect the clauses. Broadly, Section 2(1A) splits the agricultural income into two parts – 1. Depending on the Source, It would either be from Land or Building 2. Depending on the type of Operations- it could be out of agriculture or operations necessary to render the produce fit for market.

Clause 2(1A)(a): This clause focuses on Land being the source of income. It has three mutually inclusive requirements:

(i) Rent or Revenue Derived from Land: The word ‘rent’ means payment of money in cash or kind by any person to the owner in respect of a grant of right to use land. The expression ‘revenue’ is, however, used in the broad sense of return, yield or income and not in the sense of land revenue only6. The Apex court’s decision in the case of Bacha Guzdar established the principle that the expression “revenue derived from land” envisages a direct association with the land. Thus, it was held that “Dividend received from a company earning agricultural income is not agricultural income in the shareholder’s hands7. One should bear in mind that to bring a certain income within the ambit of this clause, it is not necessary that such income should arise by the performance of any agricultural activity – e.g. the compensation received from the government for the requisitioned agricultural land was deemed to possess the character of rent or revenue derived from agricultural land, thus qualifying as agricultural income exempt from tax.8


6 (Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1980, 3 Taxman 266 (Allah. HC))
7 (Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 1 (SC))
8 (Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/S. All India Tea And Trading Co. Ltd. (1996) 8 SCC 478)

Land Situated in India: Thus, any revenue or rent from agricultural land situated outside India will be out of the purview. The point to note here is that there is no distinction made between urban and rural land. Similarly, the classification of the land in Govt records is also immaterial. This essentially means, e.g., even if the land is classified as Non-Agricultural (NA) it still qualifies for the exemption so long as the third condition is also fulfilled. By virtue of these conditions, income from Fishing in natural waters should ideally be out of the scope of agricultural income.

(ii) Land Used for Agricultural Purposes: We have already explored in detail the scope of meaning of Agriculture. It is the use to which the land is put that is to be seen and not the nature of the land. Very often, we come across parcels of land on the outskirts of big cities that were lush green fields just a few years ago, but now, on those lands, commercial shops have come up, and the owners are earning rent out of it. Though the land may still be agricultural lands in the revenue records, they are no longer used for agricultural purposes. Such rents cannot be treated as agricultural income. Mushroom farming is typically done in a controlled environment and not directly on land. Instead, the soil is placed on racks vertically, and the mushroom is cultured. The question before the ITAT Hyderabad was whether it is an agricultural activity. The gist of the decision is that while soil is an integral component of land, and land itself is a part of the earth, the act of cultivating soil in trays while retaining its fundamental characteristic as ‘land’ does not diminish the agricultural nature of activities conducted upon it. The essence of agriculture remains, even when the soil is separated from its broader terrestrial context9.


9 (Dcit, Circle-2(1), Hyderabad vs Inventaa Chemicals Ltd., 2018)

Clause 2(1A)(b): This clause focuses on the performance of the actual activity of agriculture. Only such income that arises from activities mentioned in the clause will be considered as agricultural income. Further, such activities must be performed on the land as mentioned in clause (b). It provides for three categories of activities:

(i) Agriculture: It is important to note the wording of sub-clause (b)(i)- it says any income derived “by Agriculture” and not “by sale of Agricultural Produce”. It clarifies the intention of the legislature to include even “produce” held by a farmer for self-consumption or produce lying in stock to be considered as “agricultural income”. The Madras HC judgement in the case of Vaidyanatha Mudaliar reinforces this understanding. The judgement was with respect to the issue raised under the Madras Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1955.

(ii) Performance of any process to make the produce fit to be taken to the market: Like in sub-clause (b)(i) above, here too, “sale” of the produce is not required to bring it into the ambit of “agricultural income”. It is the enhancement in the value of the produce after performing the said process that is considered as agricultural income. The process should be one as is ordinarily performed by other cultivators in the locality. The expression “ordinarily performed” is contextual to the locality/region. So, where in the concerned region in the case of Brihan Maharashtra Sugar10, sugarcane was generally sold as such without subjecting it to the process of converting it into gur (jaggery) or sugar, the same when applied in the given case, the income arising from such process was held to be non-agricultural. It is the cultivator or the receiver of rent in kind who alone should have performed such process, e.g., if the standing crop of tobacco is purchased by a trader and he performs “curing” (a process which is ordinarily employed by a cultivator of tobacco to render it fit for sale in the market) on the tobacco after harvesting the income so derived by curing cannot be considered as agricultural income because a trader in this example is neither a “cultivator” nor an owner who is “receiver of rent in kind”.


10 (brihan maharashtra sugar syndicate ltd v CIT(1946) 14 ITR 611 (BOM))

(iii) Sale of Agricultural Produce: In Clause 2(1A)(b), this is the only sub-clause that envisages the “Sale” of Agricultural Produce. However, the stage at which the produce is sold is restricted to the stage the produce is at after applying the process applied to make it fit for the market. e.g., a farmer is involved in preparing and selling ready to cook chapatis in packages. He performs all the agricultural processes for wheat cultivation, from tilling to harvest to threshing, cleaning and packaging chapatis. The sub-clause covers the stage only till threshing and cleaning, as at this stage, the wheat is fit to be sold in the market.

After studying clause 2(1A)(b), an obvious question emerges. Why is there a need to provide for the treatment of income at different stages? The answer to this is that there can be more than one stakeholder in the entire journey of produce, from tilling to making it fit for market. And often, every stakeholder may add value to the value chain. However, the intention of the legislature appears to be to give exemption only to defined contributors till a defined stage.

Clause 2(1A)(c ): The source of income here is the annual value of the House Property. It should meet the four criteria to be considered as Agricultural Income:

i) Used As: dwelling house, or as a store-house, or other out-building.

ii) Occupied By: receiver of rent/revenue or cultivator.

iii) Reason for Occupation: connection of occupier with the land used for agricultural purposes.

iv) Situation of Building: Immediate vicinity of the said Land, and it’s not located within the area specified limits with specified population.

It should be noted here that many buildings in or within the specified limits of municipalities or cantonments will not get the benefit of clause(c ) even if the other criteria are met. The limits are provided in the proviso to clause (c ) of sec 2(1A). The intention of the legislature seems to include only such buildings that are located in rural areas. And the legislature is mindful of the fact that the influence of urbanisation on the use of land is not restricted to the political limits of municipalities or cantonments but is extended even beyond. So, in order to arrest tax evasion by disguising the use of buildings for given agricultural purposes, the law provided for an extended limit of the urban area.

Explanation 1 to Section – 2(1A): Section 2(14), excludes, in general, Agricultural Land from the definition of Capital Asset. Thus, there cannot be Capital Gains on the transfer of such agricultural land. However, it provides for certain exceptions that cover land situated within defined municipal and cantonment limits. Thus, gains on the transfer of such land will be taxed as Capital Gains. A situation might arise where a person describes/discloses such gains are “revenue derived from land” under clause (a) of S. 2(1A) and claims the exemption as agricultural income. To pre-empt such situations, Explanation 1 makes it abundantly clear that such income will not be considered as “income derived from land”.

But this leaves us with an interesting question- while there will not be any Capital gains from the transfer of agricultural land (section – 2(14)), what about the potential of taxing it as non-agricultural income? Some cogent arguments against it can be:

It is Agricultural Income and hence exempt: Explanation 1 to section 2(1A) binds only the exceptions mentioned under section 2(14)(iii); thus, where agricultural land other than that falling within the ambit of clauses (a) and (b) of section 2(14)(iii) (a) and (b) is transferred, the gains could be “revenue derived from the land” and hence is agricultural Income.

It is a Capital Receipt: As a general principle, a receipt that doesn’t partake in the nature of Income cannot be brought to tax under the Income Tax Act. The latter view seems to be the better view.

EXPANDING SCOPE OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME

Explanation 3 to Section – 2(1A): The explanation provides that any income derived from saplings or seedlings grown in a nursery shall be deemed to be agricultural income. However, a question arises whether income from the sale of flower bouquets by a person who owns and manages the nursery will also be agricultural income. The answer might depend on the extent and form of processing involved beyond the basic agricultural operations. So, where the bouquets are simple assemblages of flowers and foliage grown in the nursery, it could be argued that the income remains closely tied to agricultural activity. However, if the process involves significant value addition, such as elaborate flower arrangement, the value addition could be considered as non-agricultural in nature.

SEGREGATING AGRICULTURAL INCOME AND BUSINESS INCOME

How do we disintegrate a composite income which is partially agricultural and partially non-agricultural?

Under the authority of section 295, the Board may make rules for, inter alia, the manner in which and the procedure by which the income shall be arrived at in the case of income derived in part from agriculture and in part from business.

Rule 7 provides the portion that is taxable as business income is calculated by deducting the market value of the agricultural produce used as raw material in the business. No further deductions are allowed for expenses incurred by the assessee as a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind.

Market value is the average value at which the produce is sold in its raw form or after basic processing to make it marketable. And where the produce is not marketable, it will be a sum of,

i) Expenses incurred in cultivating the produce.
ii) Land revenue or rent paid.
iii) A reasonable profit as assessed by AO.

Rule 7 is a general rule that applies to all situations with composite income. However, there are specific rules with respect to certain businesses where, perhaps, determining the market value of the raw material is not feasible owing to some practical complications like heavy fluctuations in the rates, etc. Rules 7A, 7B and 8 provide for a fixed proportion of the total composite income to be considered as non-agricultural income and subjected to tax, removing any ambiguity.

Rule 7A- Income from Manufacture of Rubber

The rule outlines how to calculate income from selling certain rubber products (centrifuged latex, cenex, latex-based crepes, brown crepes, or technically specified block rubbers). If these products are made or processed from field latex or coagulum obtained from rubber plants grown by the seller in India, the income from their sale is treated as business income. Out of this business income, 35% is considered taxable.

Rule 7B- Income from Manufacture of Coffee

(1) If one grows and cures coffee in India and then sells it, the income from this sale is considered business income, and 25% of it will be taxed.

(1A) If one grows, cures, roasts, and grinds coffee in India and then sells it (even if one adds chicory or other flavourings), the income is also considered business income, but in this case, 40% of it will be taxed.

Rule 8- Income from Manufacture of Tea

If one grows and manufactures tea in India and then sells it, the income from this sale is considered business income, and 40% of it will be taxed.

EVIDENCES TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME

Where agricultural Income is declared in the return of income, the assessee must maintain robust records to substantiate the claim if scrutiny arises. Ordinarily, these evidences includes,

  •  Proof of Ownership of Land
  • Proof of Cultivation Rights: These could be a Lease Agreement.
  • Proof of Actual Agricultural Operations: Bills of seeds and fertilisers,
  • Proof of Sale
  • Commission Agent’s Receipt etc.
  • Banks Statements

CONCLUSION

Though the concept of agricultural income was first introduced in the Indian Income Tax Act 1886 the same has evolved with time. And even today, determining its scope requires significant caution. While the interpretation is heavily influenced by the Benoy Kumar Sahas case, which insists on basic operations, in today’s fast-changing technological landscape, the very idea of “basic operations” can be challenged. For example, “Hydroponics” is the technique of growing plants using a water-based nutrient solution rather than soil11. It completely bypasses the need for tilling or sowing the land. Classifying the income generated through such a process would, perhaps, call for an amendment in the definition in the Act, which currently hinges on land.

Also, the assessee must be wary: merely deriving income from land or performing any process on land isn’t enough. Overlooking specific criteria for land use, building occupancy, or nature of processing can lead to reclassification of income and an unexpected tax burden.


11 (https://www.nal.usda.gov/farms-and-agricultural-production-systems/hydroponics, n.d.)

Article 13 of India-Ireland DTAA –Right entitlement to equity shares cannot be equated with shares – Under Article 13(6) of India-Ireland DTAA, taxing right in respect thereof vests with Resident State.

2. [2025] 172 taxmann.com 515 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Vanguard Emerging Markets Stock Index Fund vs. ACIT (IT) ITA No: 4657 (MUM) of 2023

A.Y.: 2021-22 Dated: 18th March, 2025

Article 13 of India-Ireland DTAA –Right entitlement to equity shares cannot be equated with shares – Under Article 13(6) of India-Ireland DTAA, taxing right in respect thereof vests with Resident State.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of Ireland, was registered with SEBI as a Foreign Portfolio Investor (FPI). During the relevant AY, the Assessee had earned short-term capital gain of ₹6.53 Crores from transfer of Rights Entitlement (RE). In respect thereof, the Assessee claimed benefit under Article 13(6) of India-Ireland DTAA without setting-off the same against other short-term loss of ₹42.95 Crores.

The AO held that RE was taxable and the total income was to be computed under the Act before claiming any relief under Section 90(2). Accordingly, the AO set off short-term capital gains against capital losses and denied exemption under DTAA.

The DRP held that RE and shares are related assets and the same are granted only to the existing shareholders to subscribe to shares at a discounted price. Hence, Article 13(5) has to be broadly interpreted to include any rights in respect of shares, alienation of which grants source taxation right to India.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

As per Section 62 of the Companies Act, 2013, RE are not to be equated with shares. RE is an offer to subscribe to the shares of the Company that is granted to shareholders.

The SEBI Circular on process of rights issue provides that REs would be credited to demat account and a separate ISIN will be allotted. Trading of RE in demat form is made subject to Securities Transaction Tax at a rate different from shares.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Navin Jindal vs. ACIT [2010] 187 Taxman 283, where it was held that a right to subscribe to additional shares or debentures is a separate and independent right from shares. In terms of Section 55(2)(aa) of the Act, read with Section 2(42A)(d), cost of acquisition of renounced REs is deemed to be Nil.

The OECD Model Convention on Income and Capital, 2017 states that in terms of residual provision of capital gains Article, gains from alienation of capital assets not expressly covered under specific paragraphs ofArticle 13 are to be taxable only in resident state. The UN Model Convention, 2017 also provided the same. In 2017, UN Model Convention was amended to include the concept of other comparable interests, such as interest in partnership or trust in para 13(4) (which deals with share of company that derives value directly or indirectly from immovable property) and 13(5) (which deals with alienation of share of a company) of capital gains article.

The pre-MLI Article 13(4) dealt with alienation of shares of a company that derives significant value directly or indirectly from immovable property. Article 13(5) deals with alienation of shares of a company. In effect, Articles 13(4) and 13(5) of the India-Ireland DTAA do not include ‘other comparable interests’ to shares of a company. However, in 2019, Multilateral Instruments (MLI) amended the scope of Article 13(4) to include ‘comparable interest’ only in relation to partnership or trust. The MLI did not amend the scope of shares of a company to include comparable interest in Article 13(5).

The Tribunal applied Article 3(2) of India-Ireland DTAA, Section 90(3) of the Act and definition of shares as per Section 2(84) of Companies Act. It noted that shares mean a share in company’s capital and includes stock. Therefore, an asset that derives value or comes into existence from another asset cannot be equated with original asset.

In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal held that in terms of Article 13(6), transfer of REs was taxable only in Ireland. The Tribunal further held that capital losses computed under provisions of the Act r.w. Article 13(5) cannot be set-off against gains from Article 13(6) as India does not have taxing rights in respect of such gains.

Ss. 269SS, 271D– Where the loan sanctioned to the assessee was directly disbursed to its vendor by NBFC and the assesseerecognised the liability as a loan through journal entry, such transaction does not contravene section 269SS since the provision does not extend to cases where a debt or liability arises merely due to book entries.

12. (2025) 172 taxmann.com 739 (MumTrib)

Jeevangani Films vs. JCIT

ITA No.: 382 (Mum) of 2025

A.Y.: 2015-16 Dated: 6th March, 2025

Ss. 269SS, 271D– Where the loan sanctioned to the assessee was directly disbursed to its vendor by NBFC and the assessee recognised the liability as a loan through journal entry, such transaction does not contravene section 269SS since the provision does not extend to cases where a debt or liability arises merely due to book entries.

FACTS

The assessee was a partnership firm engaged in the business of film production, distribution, and related activities. It regularly dealt with a vendor M/s. “R” for distribution of film and other work related to promotion, etc. During financial year 2014-15, the assessee was sanctioned a loan of ₹15 lakhs from a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC). The said NBFC disbursed the loan amount directly to M/s. “R” through banking channels. The assessee also made a payment of ₹10 lakhs to the same party from its own funds. Consequently, the assessee recorded the loan from the NBFC in its books of accounts by way of a journal entry recognizing the liability amounting to ₹15 lakhs.

The assessment was completed under section 143(3). Subsequently, penalty proceedings were initiated under Section 271D. During these proceedings, the AO treated the journal entry reflecting the loan as contravening section 269SS and imposed a penalty of ₹15 lakhs under section 271D.

The assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) against the penalty order, who dismissed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) There was no dispute that the amount of ₹15 lakh was paid through banking channels and was duly confirmed by both the NBFC and M/s. “R”. The loan amount of ₹15 lakh was disbursed directly to the said party. Furthermore, the balance amount of ₹10 lakh was paid by the assessee to the same party towards film promotion and other incidental charges. In its books of accounts, the assessee recorded the said transaction through a journal entry, recognizing the liability as a loan. Since the assessee was responsible for repaying the said amount, the loan was duly reflected in its books of accounts.

(b) A plain reading of section 269SS reveals that the provision applies to transactions where a deposit or loan is accepted by an assessee otherwise than by an account payee cheque, an account payee draft, or other prescribed banking modes. The scope of this provision is restricted to transactions involving the acceptance of money and does not extend to cases where a debt or liability arises merely due to book entries. The legislative intent behind section 269SS is to prevent cash transactions, as is evident from clause (iii) of the Explanation to the section, which defines a “loan or deposit” as a “loan or deposit of money.” Consequently, a liability recorded in the books of accounts through journal entries—such as crediting the account of a party to whom money is payable or debiting the account of a party from whom money is receivable—falls outside the purview of section 269SS, as such entries do not involve the actual acceptance of a loan or deposit in monetary form. This is also supported by CIT vs. Triumph International Finance (I) Ltd. [2012] 22 taxmann.com 138 (Bom.), CIT vs. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. [2004] 139 Taxman 115 (Delhi) and CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd. [2014] 48 taxmann.com 118 (Delhi).

Thus, the Tribunal held that the transaction entered into by the assessee was outside the ambit of section 269SS. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

S. 56–Gift received by step-brother from his step-sister is exempt under section 56(2) since the term “relative” includes brother and sister by way of affinity.

11. (2025) 172 taxmann.com 855(Mum Trib)

Rabin Arup Mukerjea vs. ITO

ITA No.: 5884 (Mum) of 202

A.Y.: 2016-17 Dated: 21st March, 2025

S. 56–Gift received by step-brother from his step-sister is exempt under section 56(2) since the term “relative” includes brother and sister by way of affinity.

FACTS

The assessee, Mr. “R”, is an individual and non-resident Indian. He received a property located at Worli, Mumbai in 2016 as gift from Ms. “V”, his step-sister, by way of a registered gift deed wherein Ms. “V” had been referred to as “donor” and “sister”, and Mr. “R” had been referred as “donee” and “brother”.

Subsequently, Mr. “R” decided to sell the property and applied for certificate under section 197for lower rate of TDS. On the basis of this information, the AO issued notice under section 148 for AY 2016-17 on the ground that step-brother and step-sister cannot be treated as “brother and sister of the individual” under clause (e) of Explanation to section 56(2)(vii). Accordingly, he added ₹7.50 crores (being stamp value of the property) in the hands of Mr. “R” as income from other sources.

CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

On the question of whether the gift given by step-sister to step-brother falls within definition of “relative” under section 56(2)(vii), after noting the background of relationship between the assessee and Ms. “V” and the family tree, etc., the Tribunal observed that-

(a) To understand whether step-brother and step-sister can be treated as “relative” for the purpose of Income-tax Act, some inference can be drawn from the provisions of different Acts such as section 45S of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and section 2(77) of the Companies Act, 2013.

(b) According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, “relative” includes persons connected by ties of affinity as well as consanguinity and when used with a restrictive meaning refers to those only who are connected by blood. Individual related by affinity also include individual in a step or adoptive relationship. Thus, the term “relative” would also include “step brother and step sister”.

(c) Although Indian Succession Act is applicable for the right of inheritance where step child has no legal right to inherit the property of his or his step parent, but it does not lead to inference that step brother and step sister who are related by affinity because of marriage of the respective parents cannot be reckoned as brother and sister within the term “relative”.

(d) What is to be seen is whether the step brother and step sister can be said to be relative by way of affinity. Different dictionaries suggest that step sister and step brother are part of the family by affinity and in common sense they are related to each other as brother and sister.

(e) As per the Dictionary meaning of the term “relative”, it includes a person related by affinity, which means the connection existing in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. If the Dictionary meanings are to be referred and relied upon, then the term “relative” would include step brother and step sister by affinity.

(f) If the term “brother and sister of the individual” has not been defined under the Income-tax Act, then, the meaning defined in common law has to be adopted and in absence of any other negative covenant under the Act, brother and sister should also include step brother and step sister who by virtue of marriage of their parents have become brother and sister.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that gift given by step sister, that is, Ms. “V” to her step brother, that is, Mr. “R”, is to be treated as gift from sister to brother and therefore, falls within the definition of “relative” undersection 56(2)(vii) and consequently, property received by brother from sister cannot be taxed under section 56(2).

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed on merits.

S.56–Where the assessee received a new flat in lieu of old flat surrendered under a redevelopment agreement, the transaction would not be regarded as receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration for the purpose of section 56(2)(x).

10. (2025) 173 taxmann.com 51 (MumTrib)

Anil DattaramPitale vs. ITO

ITA No.: 465 (Mum) of 2025

A.Y.: 2018-19

Dated: 17th March, 2025

S.56–Where the assessee received a new flat in lieu of old flat surrendered under a redevelopment agreement, the transaction would not be regarded as receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration for the purpose of section 56(2)(x).

FACTS

The assessee purchased a flat in financial year 1997-98 in “M” Co-op Housing Society. The Society underwent redevelopment as per the agreement entered with the developer. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, the assessee got a new flat vide registered agreement dated 26.12.2017 in lieu of the old flat surrendered by him. The stamp duty value of the new flat was ₹25,17,700 and the indexed cost of the old flat was ₹5,43,040. The AO assessed the difference of ₹19,74,660 as income of the assessee under section 56(2)(x), which was confirmed by CIT(A).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) The facts show that this was a case of extinguishment of old flat and in lieu thereof, the assessee got new flat as per the agreement entered with the developer for redevelopment of the Society. It was not a case of receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration that would fall within the purview of section 56(2)(x).

(b) At the most, the transaction could attract the provisions relating to capital gains, in which case, the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 54 and thus, there would be no tax liability on the assessee on this count as well.

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Sec 69A r.w.s. 115BBE: Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and section 115BBE, since assessee had recorded cash deposits of ₹10.75 lakhs during demonetization period in his books of account and source of cash deposits was also maintained by assessee.

9. [2024] 115 ITR(T) 624 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)

Dipak Balubhai Patel (HUF) vs. ITO

ITA NO.: 942 (AHD.) OF 2023

A.Y.: 2017-18 DATE: 22nd August 2024

Sec 69A r.w.s. 115BBE: Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and section 115BBE, since assessee had recorded cash deposits of ₹10.75 lakhs during demonetization period in his books of account and source of cash deposits was also maintained by assessee.

FACTS

The assessee filed his return of income for the AY 2017-18 declaring total income of ₹5.73 lakhs. The return was taken up for scrutiny assessment. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee in his account with Bank of Baroda deposited a sum of ₹10.75 lakhs during demonetization period and issued show cause notice to explain the above source of cash deposit.

The assessee explained the source of cash deposit was withdrawal from four other banks accounts. The cash deposits were duly reflected in the return of income filed in ITR-2. The assessee was not having any business income but rental income and other sources income only, therefore he had not filed the profit and loss account and balance sheet along with return of income.

The Assessing Officer rejected the books of account by stating that on the verification of the return of income filed for the assessment year 2016-17, assessee had shown closing cash on hand as Nil and in the cash book of financial year 2016-17 i.e. assessment year 2017-18, assessee had shown opening balance to the tune of ₹10.10 lakhs which was not justifiable. Therefore addition was made as unexplained money under section 69A and the same was taxed under section 115BBE.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the additions.

HELD

The ITAT observed that during the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer had rejected the explanation offered by the assessee. In the return of income, the assessee had shown closing cash on hand as Nil but in the cash book shown the opening balance for assessment year 2017-18 to the tune of ₹10.09 lakhs.

The ITAT observed that the assessee before Appellate Commissioner filed copies of previous three years Form 26AS, ITR, Statement of Income, Profit and Loss account and Balance Sheet and further explained the rental income with appropriate TDS under section 194I which was clearly reflected in Form 26AS.

The ITAT observed that after declaration of the demonetisation period, the assessee deposited the withdrawal amounts from his bank account which had been offered for tax by filing return of income as well as subject to deduction under section 194I.

The ITAT observed that in the present case, the assessee had recorded the above cash deposits in his books of account and source of cash deposits during demonetisation period were also maintained by the assessee. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and charging tax under section 115BBE. Thus, ITAT held that the addition made by the Assessing Officer was to be deleted.

Sec 115JB r.w.s. 2(26): Banks constituted as ‘corresponding new banks’ and not registered under Companies Act, 2013 would not fall under the provisions of section 115JB and, therefore, tax on book profits (MAT) would not be applicable to such banks.

8. [2024] 115ITR(T) 481 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Union Bank of India vs. DCIT

ITA NO.: 3740 (MUM.) OF 2018 &424 (MUM.) OF 2020

A.Y.: 2013-14 & 2015-16 DATE: 6th September, 2024

Sec 115JB r.w.s. 2(26): Banks constituted as ‘corresponding new banks’ and not registered under Companies Act, 2013 would not fall under the provisions of section 115JB and, therefore, tax on book profits (MAT) would not be applicable to such banks.

FACTS

For the A.Y. 2015-16, the AO asked the assessee to furnish the computation of book profit and also required theassessee as to why provisions and contingency, debited to the profit and loss account, should not be added back for the computation of book profit u/s115JB. In response, assessee submitted that even though in computation assessee had worked out MAT on book profit, the provision of Section 115JB was itself not applicable to the assessee bank.

However, the AO rejected the assessee’s plea on the ground that the amended provision of Section 115JB w.e.f. 01/04/2013 (by insertion of clause (b) to sub-section (2) to section 115JB), brings within its ambit even the banking companies. Thus, the AO concluded that now the amended provision provides that not only the companies governed by the Companies Act, but also other companies governed by other regulating act including Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are also covered by the provision of Section 115JB.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

HELD

The ITAT observed that according to clause (a) of amended section 115JB, the company has to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with the Companies Act, 2013 and the first proviso to sub-section (2) requires that while preparing the accounts including the profit and loss account, the same should be in accordance with the provisions of section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013. Since the assessee bank has to prepare its accounts in accordance with the provisions contained in the Banking Regulation Act, Schedule III of the Companies Act is not applicable. Thus, clause (a) of section 115JB(2), will not apply.

The ITAT observed that for clause (b), following conditions need to be satisfied for applying section 115JB in the case of a company:-(i) the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 should be applicable; (ii) once this condition is fulfilled, it requires such assessee for the purpose of this section to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with the provisions of the Act governing such company.

The ITAT observed that for an entity to qualify as a company, it must be a company formed and registered under the Companies Act. The assessee was not formed and registered under the Companies Act, and came into existence by a separate Act of Parliament, i.e., ‘Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970’. Hence, it does not fall in the first part of the said section.

The assessee bank was not formed or registered under the Companies Act. Once it is not a company under the Companies Act, then the first condition referred to in clause (b) of section 115JB(2) is not fulfilled, and consequently second proviso below section 129(1) of the Companies Act was also not applicable.

The ITAT observed that section 11 of the Acquisition Act specifies that the corresponding new bank is to be treated as an Indian company for the purpose of income-tax. However, clause (b) in sub-section 2 to section 115JB did not permit treatment of such bank as a company for the purpose of the said clause, because it should be a company to which the second proviso to sub-section (1) to section 129 of the Companies Act was applicable. The said proviso had no application to the corresponding new bank as it was not a banking company for the purpose of the said provision. The expression ‘company’ used in section 115JB(2)(b) was to be inferred to be company under the Companies Act and not to an entity which is deemed by a fiction to be a company for the purpose of the Income-tax Act.

Thus, ITAT held that clause (b) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act inserted by Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 1-4-2013 (from assessment year 2013-14 onwards), is not applicable to the banks constituted as ‘corresponding new bank’ in terms of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. Therefore, the provisions of section 115JB cannot be applied and consequently, the tax on book profits (MAT) are not applicable to such banks.

Important Amendments by The Finance Act, 2025- 3.0 TDS/TCS, Transfer Pricing and Other Important Amendments (The Budget That Whispered Instead Of Roared)

At a time when dinner table debates revolve around Trump Tariffs 2.0 and WhatsApp forwards are more obsessed with global geopolitics than GST, the Union Budget 2025 feels like last season’s fashion—forgotten, folded away, and faintly nostalgic. But leave it to a tax consultant to bring the spotlight back. Through this article, we proudly wave the India-first (and Budget-first) flag, reviving what should still be the nation’s favourite fiscal performance.

And what a curious performance it was. No frantic tinkering. No budgetary plot twists. No midnight notifications capable of inducing mild heart attacks in CFOs. Instead, we got a whisper of a Budget – a minimalist, polite fiscal note that gives rather than grabs. A ₹1 lakh crore tax cut that, depending on whom you ask, is either a bold growth push or a national stimulus for iPhone sales and premium coffee chains.

What we’ve done, true to tradition, is dive deep into the fine print—dissecting every explanation memo and every comma like it was Shakespeare. Because, in taxation, what is left unsaid often carries the heaviest implications.

Beneath this seemingly serene surface lies a quiet shake-up: tweaks in transfer pricing, restrictions on carrying forward losses in business reorganisations and—you guessed it—our beloved TDS and TCS amendments.

So, pour yourself a tax-free chai (while it lasts) and join us on this annual pilgrimage. The Budget may not have roared, but we’re here to make sure its whispers are heard loud and clear.

THE NEW 3-YEAR BLOCK TRANSFER PRICING SCHEME: CERTAINTY WITH A TWIST

Transfer pricing feels like an endless cricket series — you pad up every year, play the same shots, the department appeals every ball, and the final verdict rests with the third umpire at the appellate stage. Enter the Finance Act 2025’s new Block Assessment Scheme for transfer pricing, a provision that promises to break this cycle. Think of it as an “APA-lite” for the masses: a chance to lock in your TP dealings for three years without the Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) saga typically reserved for large multinationals. As the Finance Minister noted, this aligns with global best practices in easing TP compliance.

KEY FEATURES OF THE BLOCK TP ASSESSMENT SCHEME

  •  Three-Year Block Option: Taxpayers can opt to have certain international transactions (and specified domestic transactions) assessed on a multi-year basis. If the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) determines an ALP for a particular year (the “lead year”), that same ALP can apply to the two subsequent years for similar transactions, as long as conditions are met. In effect, one TPO review can cover three assessment years in a row.
  •  Optional and Taxpayer-Initiated: The scheme isn’t automatic; taxpayers must elect to use it. An application has to be made to the TPO in the prescribed form and within a prescribed time limit (to be specified by CBDT).
  • Simultaneous ALP Determination: Once the taxpayer opts in and the TPO accepts the request (the TPO has a month to decide if the option is valid), the TPO will determine the ALP for the two subsequent years, together with the lead year’s assessment. Essentially, the TPO conducts a multi-year analysis: the same pricing methodology (and potentially the same comparables/ benchmark) is applied across the three-year span. This means the ALP for year 1 is “rolled forward” for years 2 and 3, providing continuity (but notably, there’s no backwards-looking benefit – it’s a roll-forward, not a rollback like in some APA cases).
  •  Fast-Tracked Litigation and Certainty: Perhaps one of the biggest draws is the promise of certainty and quicker dispute resolution. If there’s a dispute over the ALP, it effectively covers all three years, which means any appeal can address the block in one go. For instance, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) could hear multiple years together, consolidating proceedings.
  •  Section References: The legal architecture for this scheme is set out via new provisions: Section 92CA(3B) (allowing the multi-year option and TPO’s validation of it); Section 92CA(4A) (requiring the TPO to determine ALPs for the subsequent years once the option is accepted); amendments to Section 92CA(1) (to prevent duplicate references to TPO); and Section 155(21) (enabling the AO to adjust/recompute income for the later years based on the block ALP). Additionally, the scheme is effective from Assessment Year 2026-27 (i.e., FY 2025-26) onwards as per the Finance Act 2025, and it won’t apply in search cases.

The block assessment scheme has been greeted as a positive development, almost a mini-revolution in Indian transfer pricing. Of course, as tax professionals, we know every silver lining may have a cloud – so next, we turn to the fine print and potential challenges lurking behind the optimism.

THE FINE PRINT: TECHNICAL ISSUES AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES

As exciting as the new framework is, it comes with its share of technical complexities and unanswered questions. Seasoned practitioners will want to consider the following issues before jumping on the block assessment bandwagon:

1. Roll-Forward Only – No Retro Relief

The block scheme only works prospectively for future years. It’s explicitly a roll-forward, not a rollback. So, if you had disputes or open issues in prior years,  this scheme won’t magically resolve those – you’re  still on your own for past years. If issues are recurring, this mechanism is speed forward to consolidate litigation and get yourself heard together at the appellate level.

2. Timing of Exercising the Option

A critical practical question is when and how to opt in for the block assessment. The law says the assessee can exercise the option after the TPO has determined an ALP for an assessment year via an application in the prescribed form. But does this mean one must apply after the TPO’s order for year 1 or even earlier? Initial interpretations (and even a CBDT FAQ – Question 5) have caused confusion – suggesting the option might need to be exercised before the TPO determines the ALP for the first year. That would be counter-intuitive since taxpayers would be unlikely to commit to a three-year deal without knowing year one’s result. A fair position should be that the option should be available after the finalisation of the first year’s TP assessment. In such a case, the TPO will have to again start the proceeding for the next two years. The rules should clarify – when to pull the trigger. This clarification will, in turn, decide the success of the novel initiative.

3.Withdrawal and Flexibility (All-or-Nothing?)

Once you opt in, are you locked in for the full three-year block? The law, as written, doesn’t spell out any withdrawal mechanism or mid-course exit. It’s unclear if a taxpayer, having been elected for the block, can later change its mind (say, if year 2’s business circumstances change drastically). There is also an open question of whether the taxpayer must continue the option for both subsequent years or could selectively opt for just one additional year if conditions in the third year diverge. Until guidelines clarify this, opting in is a bit of a leap of faith – taxpayers should be confident that the next couple of years will broadly resemble the first. And if economic conditions or TP dynamics do shift, we may find ourselves testing uncharted waters (with possibly no easy way to unwind the block choice).

4. Defining “Similar Transactions”

The scheme hinges on the concept of “similar” transactions across the years. But how similar is similar enough? The Finance Act memorandum hints at criteria like the same associated enterprise (party), proportional volume, and geographic alignment (location of the AE) over the years. In essence, the transactions should be of the same nature with comparable functional profiles each year (think Rule 10B(2) comparability factors). For example, if you’re providing software development services to your US subsidiary at cost plus 10% in year 1, doing essentially the same in years 2 and 3 with the same subsidiary would qualify. However, this area is ripe for interpretation issues. What if, say, the volume doubles in year 2 – is that still “similar”, or does a scale change knock you out? What if the pricing model is the same, but the contract terms have minor tweaks? The law doesn’t define it, so we anticipate CBDT rules to lay down clear benchmarks for similarity. Ambiguities here could allow the TPO to reject the option if they believe transactions aren’t sufficiently alike. Bottom line: ensure your year 2 and 3 transactions truly mirror year 1 in nature – and watch for a formal definition of “similar” in the upcoming rules.

5. Impact on Comparables and TP Analysis Updates

A multi-year scheme raises the question of how to handle comparable data and analysis for the later years. One interpretation (and arguably the intent) is that the same ALP result or range determined for year 1 would simply carry over to years 2 and 3, giving the taxpayer certainty even if market benchmarks shift. For instance, if, in year 1, the TPO settles that an operating margin of 10-12% is arm’s length for your transaction, then as long as you’re in that range in years 2 and 3, you’d be fine – even if fresh comparables for those years might suggest a different range. This “lock-in” would indeed ease burdens. However, the TPO might choose to only lock in the methodology and comparable set, but still update the comparable companies’ financials for each year. In that case, year 2 and 3 ALPs could be adjusted if the comparables’ performance changes. The safer assumption is that the ALP (price or margin) is intended to be fixed for the block, because anything less wouldn’t truly reduce disputes. But consider practical hitches: databases get updated over time – what if one of your comparables from year 1 drops out in year 3 because it ceased operations or no longer qualifies? Or new comparables emerge? These scenarios could create confusion in applying the year-1 benchmark to later years. Similarly, financial metrics can fluctuate; for example, your working capital or receivables cycle might lengthen in year 2, affecting profitability. Would the TPO allow adjustments or stick to the original benchmark? All these issues underscore the importance of forthcoming guidance. Until then, taxpayers should do their own sanity check: if you are locked in year 1’s analysis for the next two years, would it still be reasonable? If your business is stable, likely yes. If not, tread carefully.

The real challenge lies not in the scheme, but in the very foundation of transfer pricing — a system built on constant external comparisons. As the Bhagavad Gita teaches, true measure lies not in competing with others, but in surpassing your own past self. Perhaps it’s time for transfer pricing too, to reflect inward rather than outward.

6. Handling Multi-Year Transactions (Loans, Guarantees, etc.)

Some related-party dealings naturally span multiple years – inter-company loans, credit lines, intellectual property licenses, long-term service contracts, and corporate guarantees for debt, to name a few. The block scheme seems tailor-made for such continuous transactions, but there are quirks. Take an inter-company loan: you may draw additional amounts in year 2 under the same loan agreement (increasing the outstanding principal). Or a corporate guarantee originally given for a $5 million loan might be upsized to $10 million next year. Are these considered the “same” transactions? Intuitively, yes (same loan or guarantee, just higher quantum), so they should fall under the block’s umbrella of similar transactions. The ALP principle (interest rate or guarantee fee) would remain the same even though the absolute interest or exposure grows. The key point is that such variations in volume under an ongoing arrangement shouldn’t invalidate the option, provided the nature of the service/asset (loan, guarantee) is unchanged. However, taxpayers should be ready to demonstrate that these are continuations of the original deal, not new transactions altogether. If conditions like credit rating or market interest rates shift materially, the TPO might scrutinise whether the pricing still holds arm’s length for later years. Again, clear guidance from CBDT would help confirm that normal ups and downs in volume don’t derail the block agreement for these financing transactions.

7. New or Additional Transactions in the Block Period

A practical challenge arises if a new type of related-party transaction crops up in year 2 or 3 that was not present in year 1. The law allows the block option to be exercised for “all or any” of the transactions in those years, implying you could cover some and exclude others. So, if you introduce, say, a brand new transaction (e.g., start selling machinery to your foreign affiliate in year 2 while year 1 only had service fees), that new transaction is obviously not “similar” to the ones covered by the block. In such cases, that new transaction would fall outside the block scheme and be subject to regular TP assessment for that year. But this bifurcation can get messy. Normally, if any international transaction exists, the AO can refer the case to TPO. Under the block scheme, the AO is barred from referring matters covered by a valid block option. Does the AO then refer only the new transaction to the TPO for that year? The legislation isn’t crystal clear, but presumably, yes – the AO could still trigger a limited scope TPO audit for the uncovered transaction. Moreover, what if the taxpayer simply didn’t report a transaction in year 1, but it comes to light in year 2? The TPO’s block order might have omitted it, and the AO, due to the block, might be handcuffed from referring it. These are procedural grey areas.

8. Adjustment of Income via Section 155(21)

Once a block option is approved and the TPO determines the ALPs for the subsequent two years, how exactly do those later-year assessments get finalised? The answer lies in Section 155(21) (newly inserted), which allows the AO to amend the assessment orders of the subsequent years to align with the TPO’s multi-year order. In practice, the TPO might issue a consolidated TP order covering years 1, 2, and 3 (or separate orders simultaneously). The AO will then recompute the total income for the years 2 and 3 on the basis of that order by passing amendment orders for those years. This mechanism is akin to how APAs are given effect (though APAs use section 92CD). It ensures the block ALP is implemented without needing fresh scrutiny in those years. However, this process raises a few sub-questions: Will the recomputation under 155(21) account for all consequential impacts like interest on shortfall (Sections 234B/C) or MAT calculations for each year? It should, as the law mandates the AO to consider all aspects while recomputing. Also, if those years were originally assessed and closed (say, in case the block option is exercised after assessments are done), the 155(21) route will reopen and amend them – one hopes in a timely manner to avoid any statute limitations issues.

9. Appeal Process and DRP vs Block Adjustments

The introduction of Section 155(21) brings an interesting twist to the appeals procedure. Normally, when a TPO proposes an adjustment, the AO issues a draft assessment order under Section 144C, and the taxpayer can go to the DRP for a quicker resolution before finalising the assessment. But an order under Section 155(21) – which is essentially a rectification/amendment order for the block years – does not have a draft stage; it’s a final order when issued. So, if the taxpayer disagrees with the ALP applied for the year 2 or 3, do they get to approach the DRP for those years? It appears not, since DRP is only for variations proposed in a draft order. The likely scenario is that any dispute on the block ALP will be funnelled through the year 1 draft order’s appeal. In other words, you contest year one’s draft order at the DRP (covering the proposed TP adjustment that will also govern years 2 and 3). The DRP’s directions would then have to be applied to all three years when the AO passes final orders. If one goes to the ITAT, the appeals for all three years could be clubbed (as noted earlier). What if the taxpayer misses the DRP route and goes to the Commissioner (Appeals) for year 1? Then, years 2 and 3, which were amended without draft orders, might each need separate appeals (likely directly to the Commissioner (Appeals) since there is no draft/DRP there). This is somewhat uncharted territory – procedural gaps exist. Additionally, if a TPO rejects the block option (says the transactions aren’t similar or conditions are not met), there’s no immediate way to appeal that decision alone– it would presumably become part of challenging the eventual assessment order.

10. Other Procedural and Administrative Gaps

Beyond the major points above, there are some miscellaneous uncertainties. For one, the law doesn’t specify the timeframe for the TPO to complete the assessments for the two subsequent years once an option is validated – will it be within the same timeline as the lead year’s assessment or some extension? Clarification on this is needed to ensure the benefit isn’t lost to delays. Another subtle point: the block scheme streamlines TP assessments, but regular corporate tax assessments for each year will still occur separately. There’s no mechanism to sync those up, meaning a company could still face scrutiny on other tax issues on an annual basis. So, it’s not a full consolidation of all tax matters, only the TP piece. This could lead to parallel proceedings in a given year – one dealing with block TP adjustment via amendment and another dealing with, say, domestic tax disallowances – which the tax authorities should coordinate to avoid confusion. Finally, consider the strategic angle: how the appeal mechanism will work as each year may have corporate and TP issues. Forms have a special place in appeal proceedings – which form to file, especially when an appeal is governed by a statutory limitation period.

Given the many moving parts in this scheme, the role of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) in issuing detailed rules and guidelines cannot be overstated. Guidelines will determine the fate of the scheme.

SECTION 72A – LOSSES AREN’T IMMORTAL

A cat might boast nine lives, but under the new Finance Act 2025 amendment, tax losses barely get eight. Under the Income-tax Act, Section 72A traditionally lets a successor company “inherit” the accumulated losses and unabsorbed depreciation of a predecessor (in amalgamations, demergers, etc.) as if they were its own. In practice, this meant that when two companies merged, the merged (amalgamated) company treated the past losses as losses of the year of amalgamation – essentially giving the business a fresh eight-year run to utilise those losses.

Old Law: “Fresh” Eight-Year Clock

Before the Finance Act 2025, Section 72A worked in tandem with Section 72: no business loss could be carried forward for more than eight years from the year it arose. But an amalgamation effectively reset that eight-year clock. All accumulated losses of the merging entities became losses of the amalgamated entity in the year of amalgamation, allowing the merged company a brand-new eight-year window to set them off. In other words, legacy losses got a second lease of life every time there was a qualifying reorganisation.

Finance Act 2025 – New Section 72A(6B)

The Finance Act 2025 inserts a new sub-section 72A(6B), drastically curtailing this evergreen carry forward. From April 1, 2025 (effectively AY 2026 27) onward, losses must be carried only within the original eight-year span from the year they first arose. The provision states that for any amalgamation or other reorganisation on/after 1-Apr-2025, a loss that is carried to the successor company can only be used in the remaining assessment years of the original eight-year period. Put simply, amalgamation no longer resets the loss-clock: it merely transfers the remaining life of the loss to the new entity. The Finance Bill even introduces the concept of the “original predecessor entity” – the very first company in the chain of amalgamations – to anchor the clock. This prevents successive mergers from indefinitely extending the loss of life (“evergreening” of losses).

Scope and Effective Date

The new rule applies prospectively. By law, the amendment applies only to any amalgamation or reorganisation effected on or after 1st April, 2025. (In turn, the amendment itself takes effect from 1st April, 2026.) Thus, any merger where the appointed date is before 1-Apr-2025 is governed by the old Section 72A. For deals on/after that date, however, the loss must be traced back to its original computation year.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

To crystallise the change, consider:

1. Example 1 – Pre-Amendment Amalgamation: If Company X had losses and merged into Y on 1-Mar-2025 (before the 1-Apr-2025 cutoff), the pre-amendment rules apply. The losses (say, incurred in AY 2018-19) would be deemed Y’s losses in AY 2024-25, and Y would then have a fresh eight-year window (through AY 2031-32) to set them off. In effect, the merger “rebooted” the clock.

2. Example 2 – Post-Amendment Amalgamation: Suppose Company A incurred a loss in FY 2018-19 (AY 2019-20), and it amalgamates into B on 1-Apr-2026. Under the new rule, B treats that loss as its own, but can carry it forward only within eight years from AY 2019-20. That means the loss must be absorbed by AY 2027-28 (eight years after AY 2019-20). No new eight-year term is granted by the 2026 merger. B can only use whatever remaining years were left on A’s original timeline.

3. Example 3 – Chain Amalgamations: Consider a chain: A Ltd (with losses incurred in 2019-20) merges into B Ltd on 1-Apr-2026, and then B merges into C Ltd on 1-Apr-2028. Under 72A(6B), the “original predecessor entity” for C’s losses is still A Ltd. All of A’s losses must be set off within eight years of 2019-20 (i.e. by AY 2027-28). Neither merger (2026 or 2028) extends beyond that horizon. In practice, C inherits only the residual carry forward years from A’s original loss – the clock keeps ticking from the date of the first loss.

Only Losses (Not Depreciation) Affected

It is crucial to note that Section 72A(6B) speaks only of “loss forming part of the accumulated loss”. Unabsorbed depreciation allowances (also carried under Section 72A) are not curtailed by the new sub-section. It can be continued for an infinite period.

Other Conditions still apply.

All the existing safeguards in Section 72A(2)–(6A) remain intact. In particular, the successor company must still meet continuity conditions (e.g. carrying on the business, achieving the threshold of installed manufacturing capacity. maintaining requisite shareholding by the transferors, etc.) for the inherited losses to be allowable. The amendment simply shortens how long a loss can live; it does not relax the usual reorganisation conditions.

TDS/TCS PROVISIONS

The latest finance proposals have modestly raised a bunch of TDS/TCS thresholds, aiming to reduce compliance pain for small payments. For example, the annual rent threshold under Section 194-I jumps from ₹2.4 lakh annually to ₹50,000 per month (i.e. ₹6 lakh annually), and other sections saw smaller increment (e.g. commission and professional-fee limits rose from ₹15K–30K to ₹20K–50K). Threshold increase should be seen in the light of the overall increase in slab rates, and no tax till you earn ₹12 lakh. It puts more money in the hands of people.

FAREWELL TO SECTION 206AB (NON-FILER SURCHARGE)

Starting 1 April 2025, Section 206AB – which forced higher TDS on “non-filers” – will be repealed. In plain English, if the recipient didn’t file a tax return, payers no longer have to immediately apply a higher TDS rate on payments to him. This change was explicitly made to cut compliance headaches: under the old law, deductors had to check their filing status on the spot and withhold tax. Instances were seen where demands were raised on deductors for non-withholding at 20%. This, in effect, penalised payers for the fault of the recipient. The law has omitted this provision with effect from 1 April 2025. This is significant as the legal effect of the omission is that the provision never existed in law. Thus, the entire demand cannot be enforced. Consider the following observations of the Supreme Court in Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 811

“The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute –book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed.”

194Q VS 206C(1H): ENDING DOUBLE TAXING OF LARGE PURCHASES

There’s often confusion when buying and selling large value of goods: should the buyer deduct TDS under Section 194Q, or should the seller collect TCS under Section 206C(1H)? Under prior rules, 206C(1H) already said no TCS if the buyer had to do some TDS. But in practice, sellers found it hard to know if buyers had actually done their TDS, so sometimes both got applied. To clear this up, the budget proposes that from 1st April, 2025, Section 206C(1H) simply “will no longer be applicable”. In effect, the onus shifts entirely to buyers (via 194Q), and sellers can drop the TCS on those ₹50 lakh+ transactions. This should end the TDS-versus-TCS tug-of-war and make compliance far simpler.

UPDATED RETURNS: MORE TIME, BUT WATCH THE CLOCK

The window to file an updated return (ITR-U) is being doubled. Under the old law, you had 24 months (2 years) from the end of the assessment year to fix omissions; now, it’s 48 months (4 years). That means, for example, an ITR for FY 2023–24 (AY 2024–25) can be updated up until March 31, 2029. This extension is meant to “nudge” voluntary compliance – essentially giving taxpayers more time to spot and report missed income.

However, the law also tacks on strict conditions. You cannot file an updated return after 36 months if reassessment has kicked in. In practice, if an officer has already issued a notice under Section 148A (essentially the show-cause for reassessment) after 36 months, your window closes unless that notice is later quashed. (If a 148A(3) order explicitly finds “no fit case to reopen,” then the 48-month door reopens.) In short, you get extra time only if the tax department hasn’t already started formal reassessment proceedings late in the game.

PENALTIES ON LATE ITR-U

Filing late just got pricier. Section 140B of the Act imposes an additional tax (a bit like a penalty) on updated returns, calculated as a percentage of the extra tax and interest due. Originally, it was 25% of the tax plus interest if you filed within 12 months of year-end and 50% if filed within 24 months. The amendments introduce two new tiers: now it’s 60% if you file after 24 up to 36 months, and a whopping 70% if you wait out to 36–48 months. In plain terms, the longer you stall, the stiffer the surcharge – so procrastinators face heavier hits.

CONCLUSION: A BUDGET THAT UNDERSTOOD THE BEAUTY OF RESTRAINT

If there’s a timeless lesson in tax policy, it is this: sometimes, the best amendment is no amendment at all. This year’s Budget seems to have embraced that wisdom — preferring fine-tuning over frenzy and choosing to strengthen the framework rather than constantly reshaping it. A “less is fair” philosophy quietly runs through the Finance Act 2025: thoughtful corrections, calibrated expansions, and a deliberate effort to simplify rather than complicate.

In that sense, this Budget has stood the test of time. Amidst the noise of global uncertainty, Trump Tariff and economic recalibrations, the Indian tax system was offered something rare — stability.

And as we write this, perhaps there’s a quiet sense of history too. This Budget series in the BCAJ may well become a nostalgic bookmark — the last commentary on the Income-tax Act, 1961. With the new Income-tax Act, 2025 on the horizon, we stand at the threshold of a new chapter — one that promises modernisation, new hope for a new India and, more importantly, admission of the ultimate truth – even law is not permanent.

For now, we raise a modest toast to a Budget that whispered instead of shouted — and to a law that, for one final time, chose elegance over excess.

Section 36(1)(vii): Advances written off – Allowable: Section 10B – Deduction – Site Transfer Income : Tribunal last fact-finding authority ought to have given independent finding while reversing decision of lower authorities :

Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-11 vs. Watson Pharma Pvt. Ltd.,

[ITXA No. 1770 OF 2017, Dated: 26th March, 2025, (Bom) (HC)]

AY 2010-11.

Section 36(1)(vii): Advances written off – Allowable:

Section 10B – Deduction – Site Transfer Income : Tribunal last fact-finding authority ought to have given independent finding while reversing decision of lower authorities :

The Assessee is a wholly owned subsidiary of M/s. Watson Lab., USA and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and R & D facilities in India and also renders contract manufacturing services to its associate enterprises.

During the year under consideration, the assessee wrote-off various advances which were given in earlier years in the course of its business and same could not be recovered. The claim was made under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, and in the alternative under Section 28 of the Act. The assessee vide letter dated 4th March, 2014 addressed to the Assessing Officer (AO) gave the details of such write off by way of enclosures. These details pertain to more than 50 parties on account of various transactions which were stated in the remarks column e.g., AMC lift maintenance, raw materials, professional fees etc.

The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) disallowed the claim under Section 28 on the ground of want of evidence. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondent-assessee. The Tribunal has given reason that the genuineness of the advances have not been doubted by the revenue and further books of account have been audited by the statutory auditors and, therefore, the write off should be allowed after setting off the credit balances. The net balance written off which were allowed by the Tribunal was ₹7,66,713/-.

The ld. counsel for the appellant-revenue relied upon the order of the DRP and submitted that the claim was not sustainable. Against this, the learned counsel for the respondent-assessee submitted that the respondent-assesseehad filed the details of these advances with the AO and DRP vide letter dated 4th March, 2014 and the Tribunal after considering the said letter has allowed the claim.

The Hon. Court observed that on a perusal of the letter dated 4th March, 2014 and its enclosures, these are advances to more than 50 parties against which either the advances are not recoverable or the respondent-assessee has not received any services. The amount ranges from ₹200 to ₹3 lakh, major amounts being in few thousands. The DRP has not considered this letter and, therefore, observations made by the DRP that the claim is without evidence is incorrect. The Tribunal has correctly considered the details filed along with letter dated 4 March 2014 and allowed the claim. Further, the total income declared by the respondent-assessee is more than ₹30 crore and the net balance written off is only ₹7,66,713/-. This comparison is only to show when the income offered is more than ₹30 crore, small amounts write off would constitute reasonableness and more so looking at the nature of the write off detailed in enclosure to letter dated 4th March, 2014. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the claim of the respondent-assessee.

Regarding the second issue i.e. deduction under section 10B of the Act, it was observed that the respondent-assessee was eligible for deduction under Section 10B of the Act with respect to its Goa unit and Ambarnath unit. The respondent-assessee has claimed deduction under Section 10B on “Site Transfer Income” of ₹19,61,98,000/- with respect to these two units. The DRP denied the deduction under section 10B on “Site Transfer Income” on the ground that same does not represent the income derived from the business of eligible unit. The Tribunal has allowed the claim.

The Ld. Counsel for the appellant-revenue submitted that the Tribunal has not given any reasons for allowing the claim of deduction under section 10B on “Site Transfer Income”. Accordingly, the relief given by the Tribunal without giving any reason would be contrary to the well-settled principle that the appellate authority has to give reasons which constitute the heart of the decision. The department relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 and more particularly paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said order.

The Hon. Court noted the operative part of the Tribunal on this issue which reads as under :-

“We have heard the counsels for both the parties at length and we have also perused the orders passed by respective authorities, judgments relied by the parties and while taking into consideration the facts of the case, we are of the considered view that the Site Transfer Income is a part of business income earned by the assessee and is eligible for deduction while computing deduction u/s 10B of the Income Tax Act.”

The Hon. Court observed that the approach of the Tribunal is not appreciable. The Tribunal has merely stated that after hearing both the parties and perusing the orders and judgments, the Site Transfer Income is eligible for deduction under Section 10B of the Act.

According to Hon. Court the Tribunal ought to have given the reasons as to how “Site Transfer Income” constitutes the income derived from the business of the undertaking. The said reasoning is totally absent. The operative part is only the conclusion but before coming to the conclusion, the Tribunal ought to have given its reasons, especially since it is the case of reversal of the order passed by the AO and DRP and the Tribunal being the final fact finding authority and first appellate authority in this case was expected to give the reasons before coming to the conclusion which are absent in the present case. There is no discussion as to how the said decision is applicable to the Site Transfer Income before giving relief to the respondent-assessee. The Tribunal has given independent reasoning when it came for various other income being eligible but did not give any reasoning on “Site Transfer Income.”

It is well-settled that the duty to give reasons in support of adverse orders is a facet of the principles of natural justice and fair play. In several cases, the necessity of providing reasons by a body or authority to support its decision was considered before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that on the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority affecting the parties’ rights must speak for itself.

The Hon. Court referred and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and Brothers (2010) 4 SCC 785 , wherein it has held that a litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons to reject his claim / prayer. Only then would a party be able to challenge the order on appropriate grounds. Recording of reasons would also benefit the appellate court. As arguments bring things hidden and obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment, where the law and factual matrix of the case are discussed, provides lucidity and foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the courts. The reason is the very life of the law. When the reason for a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice and avoids uncertainty.

The Hon. Court held that the absence of reasons essentially introduces an element of uncertainty and dissatisfaction and gives entirely different dimensions to the questions raised before the higher / appellate courts. The Court noted that there was hardly any statutory provision under the Income tax Act or the Constitution itself requiring the recording of reasons in the judgments. Still, it was no more res-integra and stands unequivocally settled by different decisions of the Court, holding that the courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned judgments / orders.

In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached.”

 In view of the above observations, the Hon Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for deciding the ground of deduction under Section 10B qua “Site Transfer Income.”

Section 143(3) : Notice and Assessment order – Non-existing entity – fact of merger was intimated to the officer, prior to the assessment order – Order bad in law:

3. Commissioner of Income Tax-LTU vs. Shell India Markets Pvt. Ltd. (Erstwhile Shell Technology India Pvt. Ltd.)

[ITXA No. 2381 OF 2018,

Dated: 27th March, 2025 (Bom)

(HC)] AY 2007-08 :

Section 143(3) : Notice and Assessment order – Non-existing entity – fact of merger was intimated to the officer, prior to the assessment order – Order bad in law:

The Respondent-Assesseehad raised an additional ground before Tribunal that a notice and assessment order has been issued on a non-existing entity namely “Shell Technology India Private Limited” and therefore same is void. The Tribunal decided this ground in favour of the Respondent- Assessee and quashed the assessment order by accepting the submission of the Respondent-Assessee that the notice and order was issued in the name of a non-existing entity i.e. “Shell Technology India Pvt. Ltd.”, although the fact of the merger of this company into “Shell India Market Limited” was intimated to the officer, prior to the assessment order vide letter 21st September, 2010.

The learned counsel for the Appellant- Revenue, submitted that the appeal can be disposed of by following various orders of the Hon. Court, wherein the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. [2019] 416 ITR 613 (SC)and PCIT (Central)-2 vs. M/s. Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd. [2022 443 ITR 194 (SC) have been considered. He specifically relied on the order and judgment passed by the bench in the case of Reliance Industries Limited vs. P. L. Roongta And Ors. WP No. 772 of 1992 along with ors (Bombay)

The assessee contended that the notice and order ought to have been issued in the name of the transferee company “Shell India Market Private Limited” and not against the transferor company “Shell Technology India Private Limited”.

The Hon. Court held that the notice and order should have been issued in the name of the transferee company “Shell India Market Private Limited” and not the transferor company “Shell Technology India Private Limited”. The decisions relied supports that if the Assessing Officer has been intimated about the fact of merger, then the notice should have been issued in the name of the transferee company and not the transferor company. Since in the instant case the notice and the assessment order is passed in the name of the transferor company “Shell Technology India Private Limited” and not the transferee company “Shell India Market Private Limited”, same are bad in law.

The Hon. Court clarified that the present Appeal was dismissed only on the ground that the notice and assessment order has been passed in the name of the transferor company. However, this order would not preclude the Appellant-Revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the transferee company, in accordance with law for assessing the income in the hands of the transferee company. The Appeal was accordingly disposed of.

Search and seizure — Assessment of third person — Mandatory condition u/s. 158BD — Initiation of proceedings by assessee’s AO without satisfaction note from searched person’s AO — Failure to follow mandatory procedure — High Court held that initiation of proceedings without jurisdiction:

13. Principal CIT vs. MiliaTracon Pvt. Ltd.:

[2025] 473 ITR 155 (Cal.):

Block period 01/04/1996 to 07/05/2002:

Date of order 3rd July, 2024:

Ss.132 and 158BD of ITA 1961

Search and seizure — Assessment of third person — Mandatory condition u/s. 158BD — Initiation of proceedings by assessee’s AO without satisfaction note from searched person’s AO — Failure to follow mandatory procedure — High Court held that initiation of proceedings without jurisdiction:

A search conducted at the premises of UIC group led to the discovery of certain share certificates issued in the name of the assessee. The Assessing Officer of the assessee initiated proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without recording a satisfaction note as mandated and the assessee denied any undisclosed income. Subsequently, summons were issued to four individuals u/s. 131 but could not be served. The Assessing Officer of the assessee communicated the reasons for initiation of proceedings through a letter. The assessee submitted block returns of income and contested the proceedings, asserting that they were improperly initiated.

The Assessing Officer passed an assessment order. The satisfaction note reproduced in the assessment order was prepared by the Assessing Officer of the assessee and not by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, as required u/s. 158BD.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the validity of the initiation of proceedings but granted relief on certain additions. The Tribunal reversed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals), concluding that the initiation of proceedings was without jurisdiction since the mandatory requirements of recording satisfaction and transferring documents by the Assessing Officer of the searched person to the assessee’s Assessing Officer were not followed.

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenues and held as under:

“i) U/s. 158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961, satisfaction note has to be recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person and send it to the Assessing Officer of such other person, the third party.

ii) The initiation of proceedings u/s. 158BD was unauthorised and lacked jurisdiction. The satisfaction note required u/s. 158BD must be recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person and sent to the Assessing Officer of the third person assessee. This requirement was not met in this case, as the note was prepared by the Assessing Officer of the assessee, contrary to statutory provisions. Additionally, the mandatory procedure for transferring seized documents to the assessee’s Assessing Officer was not followed. There was no illegality in the order of the Tribunal.”

Refund — Effect of section 240 — Refund consequent on appellate order — Refund should be granted without application for it. Interest on refund — Effect of section 244 — Deduction of tax at source — Tax deducted at source and deposited has to be treated as tax duly paid — Such amount be taken into consideration in computing interest on refund — Interest payable from first day of April of relevant Assessment Year to the date on which refund is ultimately granted:

12. ESS Singapore Branch vs. DCIT:

[2025] 473 ITR 541 (Del.):

A. Y. 2014-15: Date of order 22nd August, 2024:

Ss.199, 240 and 244 of  ITA 1961

Refund — Effect of section 240 — Refund consequent on appellate order — Refund should be granted without application for it. Interest on refund — Effect of section 244 — Deduction of tax at source — Tax deducted at source and deposited has to be treated as tax duly paid — Such amount be taken into consideration in computing interest on refund — Interest payable from first day of April of relevant Assessment Year to the date on which refund is ultimately granted:

The Assessee filed return of income for AY 2014-15 and claimed a refund of ₹3,65,970. The case was selected for scrutiny wherein the Assessing Officer raised an issue as to whether the revenue earned by the assessee including the consideration for live feed, would constitute royalty and thus be taxable. The Assessing Officer framed the draft assessment order holding that the consideration received towards live feed was taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), affirmed the view taken by the AO pursuant to which the final order was passed.

On appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that there was a clear distinction between a copyright and a broadcasting right, broadcast or live coverage which does not have a copyright, and therefore, payment for live telecast was neither payment for transfer of any copyright nor any scientific work so as to fall under the ambit of royalty under Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vi) and decided the appeal in favour of the assessee. Further, the Tribunal gave directions to the Assessing Officer to verify and grant credit for tax deducted at source as claimed by the assessee. Pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal, the assessee filed application before the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer restricted the benefit of TDS to the amount which was claimed in the return of income on the ground that amount reflected in Form 26AS was not claimed by the assessee in the return of income. It was also held that for the purposes of refund, the assessee had to follow the procedure as laid out in section 239 of the Act.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition filed by assessee and held as follows:

“i) The unquestionable mandate of section 240 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 , as would be manifest from a reading of that provision, is that in cases where a refund becomes due and payable consequent to an order passed in an appeal or other proceedings, the Assessing Officer is obliged to refund the amount to the assessee without it having to make any claim in that behalf.

ii) Tax deducted at source duly deposited becomes liable to be treated as tax duly paid in terms of section 199 and interest thereon would consequently flow from the first day of April of the relevant assessment year to the date on which the refund is ultimately granted by virtue of section 244A(1)(a) of the Act.

iii) The undisputed position was that the Assessing Officer was called upon to give effect to a direction framed by the Tribunal. Viewed in that light, the stand taken by the Assessing Officer was unsustainable in so far as it restricted the claim of the assessee to the disclosures made in the return of income. It was wholly illegal and inequitable for the Department to give short credit to the tax duly deducted and deposited based on the claim that may be made in a return of income.

iv) Direction issued to respondents to acknowledge the credit of tax deducted at source as reflected in form 26AS of the assessee amounting to ₹2,27,83,28,430 and to recompute the total refund at ₹2,03,40,32,090.”

Reassessment — Condition precedent — Reason to believe that income has escaped assessment — Delay in submitting Form 10 for accumulation of income — Not a ground for re-assessment. Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Board Circular acknowledging difficulties of assessee’s in uploading form — Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim — Re-assessment not justified. Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Matter of procedure Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim —Re-assessment not justified

11. Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India vs. DCIT:

[2025] 473 ITR 696 (Del.):

A. Y. 2016-17: Date of order 5th August, 2024:

Ss.11(2), 147, and 148A of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Condition precedent — Reason to believe that income has escaped assessment — Delay in submitting Form 10 for accumulation of income — Not a ground for re-assessment.

Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Board Circular acknowledging difficulties of assessee’s in uploading form — Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim — Re-assessment not justified.

Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Matter of procedure Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim —Re-assessment not justified:

The Assessee is a company registered u/s. 8 of the Companies Act and holds registration u/s. 12AA of the Act. Re-assessment proceedings were initiated against the assessee for the A. Y. 2016-17 on account of failure to digitally file and upload Form 10 on or before the due date of filing return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Act. While the assessee filed Forms 10A and 10B after the due date of return of income, however, the same were submitted before the Assessing Officer prior to the completion of the assessment proceedings. Assessment order was framed on 1st December, 2018 and the accumulation u/s. 11(2) was accepted.

The re-opening of assessment was challenged in a writ petition filed before the High Court. The Delhi High Court allowed the Petition of the assessee and held as follows:

“i) Section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, speaks of a statement in the prescribed form (form 10) being “furnished” to the Assessing Officer. The change in the “prescribed manner” u/s. 11(2)(a) for the submission of form 10 and which moved to a digital filing was introduced for the first time by virtue of the Finance Act, 2015 ([2015] 373 ITR (St.) 25) and the Income-tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2016 ([2016] 380 ITR (St.) 66). Prior to those amendments, all that section 11(2)(a) required was for the assessee to apprise the Assessing Officer, by a notice in writing, of the purposes for which the income was sought to be accumulated and the mode of its investment or deposit in accordance with section 11(5). The requirement of form 10 being furnished electronically was undisputedly introduced for the first time by way of the 2016 Amendment Rules. The electronic submission of form 10 is essentially a matter of procedure as opposed to being a mandatory condition which may be recognised to form part of substantive law. An action for reassessment would have to be based on the formation of an opinion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. That primordial condition would clearly not be satisfied on the mere allegation of a delayed digital filing of form 10.

ii) The action for reassessment was not founded on income liable to tax having escaped assessment. The Department also did not question the acceptance of the accumulations in terms of section 11(2) in the assessment order dated 1st December, 2018. The entire action for reassessment was founded solely on form 10 having been submitted after 17th October, 2016 which was the due date in terms of section 139(1). The order u/s. 148A(d) dated 31st March, 2023 and the consequent initiation of reassessment proceedings through notice u/s. 148 of the Act of even date were not valid and were liable to be quashed.”