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Article 13 of India-Ireland DTAA –Right entitlement to equity shares cannot be equated with shares – Under Article 13(6) of India-Ireland DTAA, taxing right in respect thereof vests with Resident State.

2. [2025] 172 taxmann.com 515 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Vanguard Emerging Markets Stock Index Fund vs. ACIT (IT) ITA No: 4657 (MUM) of 2023

A.Y.: 2021-22 Dated: 18th March, 2025

Article 13 of India-Ireland DTAA –Right entitlement to equity shares cannot be equated with shares – Under Article 13(6) of India-Ireland DTAA, taxing right in respect thereof vests with Resident State.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of Ireland, was registered with SEBI as a Foreign Portfolio Investor (FPI). During the relevant AY, the Assessee had earned short-term capital gain of ₹6.53 Crores from transfer of Rights Entitlement (RE). In respect thereof, the Assessee claimed benefit under Article 13(6) of India-Ireland DTAA without setting-off the same against other short-term loss of ₹42.95 Crores.

The AO held that RE was taxable and the total income was to be computed under the Act before claiming any relief under Section 90(2). Accordingly, the AO set off short-term capital gains against capital losses and denied exemption under DTAA.

The DRP held that RE and shares are related assets and the same are granted only to the existing shareholders to subscribe to shares at a discounted price. Hence, Article 13(5) has to be broadly interpreted to include any rights in respect of shares, alienation of which grants source taxation right to India.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

As per Section 62 of the Companies Act, 2013, RE are not to be equated with shares. RE is an offer to subscribe to the shares of the Company that is granted to shareholders.

The SEBI Circular on process of rights issue provides that REs would be credited to demat account and a separate ISIN will be allotted. Trading of RE in demat form is made subject to Securities Transaction Tax at a rate different from shares.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Navin Jindal vs. ACIT [2010] 187 Taxman 283, where it was held that a right to subscribe to additional shares or debentures is a separate and independent right from shares. In terms of Section 55(2)(aa) of the Act, read with Section 2(42A)(d), cost of acquisition of renounced REs is deemed to be Nil.

The OECD Model Convention on Income and Capital, 2017 states that in terms of residual provision of capital gains Article, gains from alienation of capital assets not expressly covered under specific paragraphs ofArticle 13 are to be taxable only in resident state. The UN Model Convention, 2017 also provided the same. In 2017, UN Model Convention was amended to include the concept of other comparable interests, such as interest in partnership or trust in para 13(4) (which deals with share of company that derives value directly or indirectly from immovable property) and 13(5) (which deals with alienation of share of a company) of capital gains article.

The pre-MLI Article 13(4) dealt with alienation of shares of a company that derives significant value directly or indirectly from immovable property. Article 13(5) deals with alienation of shares of a company. In effect, Articles 13(4) and 13(5) of the India-Ireland DTAA do not include ‘other comparable interests’ to shares of a company. However, in 2019, Multilateral Instruments (MLI) amended the scope of Article 13(4) to include ‘comparable interest’ only in relation to partnership or trust. The MLI did not amend the scope of shares of a company to include comparable interest in Article 13(5).

The Tribunal applied Article 3(2) of India-Ireland DTAA, Section 90(3) of the Act and definition of shares as per Section 2(84) of Companies Act. It noted that shares mean a share in company’s capital and includes stock. Therefore, an asset that derives value or comes into existence from another asset cannot be equated with original asset.

In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal held that in terms of Article 13(6), transfer of REs was taxable only in Ireland. The Tribunal further held that capital losses computed under provisions of the Act r.w. Article 13(5) cannot be set-off against gains from Article 13(6) as India does not have taxing rights in respect of such gains.

Ss. 269SS, 271D– Where the loan sanctioned to the assessee was directly disbursed to its vendor by NBFC and the assesseerecognised the liability as a loan through journal entry, such transaction does not contravene section 269SS since the provision does not extend to cases where a debt or liability arises merely due to book entries.

12. (2025) 172 taxmann.com 739 (MumTrib)

Jeevangani Films vs. JCIT

ITA No.: 382 (Mum) of 2025

A.Y.: 2015-16 Dated: 6th March, 2025

Ss. 269SS, 271D– Where the loan sanctioned to the assessee was directly disbursed to its vendor by NBFC and the assessee recognised the liability as a loan through journal entry, such transaction does not contravene section 269SS since the provision does not extend to cases where a debt or liability arises merely due to book entries.

FACTS

The assessee was a partnership firm engaged in the business of film production, distribution, and related activities. It regularly dealt with a vendor M/s. “R” for distribution of film and other work related to promotion, etc. During financial year 2014-15, the assessee was sanctioned a loan of ₹15 lakhs from a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC). The said NBFC disbursed the loan amount directly to M/s. “R” through banking channels. The assessee also made a payment of ₹10 lakhs to the same party from its own funds. Consequently, the assessee recorded the loan from the NBFC in its books of accounts by way of a journal entry recognizing the liability amounting to ₹15 lakhs.

The assessment was completed under section 143(3). Subsequently, penalty proceedings were initiated under Section 271D. During these proceedings, the AO treated the journal entry reflecting the loan as contravening section 269SS and imposed a penalty of ₹15 lakhs under section 271D.

The assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) against the penalty order, who dismissed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) There was no dispute that the amount of ₹15 lakh was paid through banking channels and was duly confirmed by both the NBFC and M/s. “R”. The loan amount of ₹15 lakh was disbursed directly to the said party. Furthermore, the balance amount of ₹10 lakh was paid by the assessee to the same party towards film promotion and other incidental charges. In its books of accounts, the assessee recorded the said transaction through a journal entry, recognizing the liability as a loan. Since the assessee was responsible for repaying the said amount, the loan was duly reflected in its books of accounts.

(b) A plain reading of section 269SS reveals that the provision applies to transactions where a deposit or loan is accepted by an assessee otherwise than by an account payee cheque, an account payee draft, or other prescribed banking modes. The scope of this provision is restricted to transactions involving the acceptance of money and does not extend to cases where a debt or liability arises merely due to book entries. The legislative intent behind section 269SS is to prevent cash transactions, as is evident from clause (iii) of the Explanation to the section, which defines a “loan or deposit” as a “loan or deposit of money.” Consequently, a liability recorded in the books of accounts through journal entries—such as crediting the account of a party to whom money is payable or debiting the account of a party from whom money is receivable—falls outside the purview of section 269SS, as such entries do not involve the actual acceptance of a loan or deposit in monetary form. This is also supported by CIT vs. Triumph International Finance (I) Ltd. [2012] 22 taxmann.com 138 (Bom.), CIT vs. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. [2004] 139 Taxman 115 (Delhi) and CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd. [2014] 48 taxmann.com 118 (Delhi).

Thus, the Tribunal held that the transaction entered into by the assessee was outside the ambit of section 269SS. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

S. 56–Gift received by step-brother from his step-sister is exempt under section 56(2) since the term “relative” includes brother and sister by way of affinity.

11. (2025) 172 taxmann.com 855(Mum Trib)

Rabin Arup Mukerjea vs. ITO

ITA No.: 5884 (Mum) of 202

A.Y.: 2016-17 Dated: 21st March, 2025

S. 56–Gift received by step-brother from his step-sister is exempt under section 56(2) since the term “relative” includes brother and sister by way of affinity.

FACTS

The assessee, Mr. “R”, is an individual and non-resident Indian. He received a property located at Worli, Mumbai in 2016 as gift from Ms. “V”, his step-sister, by way of a registered gift deed wherein Ms. “V” had been referred to as “donor” and “sister”, and Mr. “R” had been referred as “donee” and “brother”.

Subsequently, Mr. “R” decided to sell the property and applied for certificate under section 197for lower rate of TDS. On the basis of this information, the AO issued notice under section 148 for AY 2016-17 on the ground that step-brother and step-sister cannot be treated as “brother and sister of the individual” under clause (e) of Explanation to section 56(2)(vii). Accordingly, he added ₹7.50 crores (being stamp value of the property) in the hands of Mr. “R” as income from other sources.

CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

On the question of whether the gift given by step-sister to step-brother falls within definition of “relative” under section 56(2)(vii), after noting the background of relationship between the assessee and Ms. “V” and the family tree, etc., the Tribunal observed that-

(a) To understand whether step-brother and step-sister can be treated as “relative” for the purpose of Income-tax Act, some inference can be drawn from the provisions of different Acts such as section 45S of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and section 2(77) of the Companies Act, 2013.

(b) According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, “relative” includes persons connected by ties of affinity as well as consanguinity and when used with a restrictive meaning refers to those only who are connected by blood. Individual related by affinity also include individual in a step or adoptive relationship. Thus, the term “relative” would also include “step brother and step sister”.

(c) Although Indian Succession Act is applicable for the right of inheritance where step child has no legal right to inherit the property of his or his step parent, but it does not lead to inference that step brother and step sister who are related by affinity because of marriage of the respective parents cannot be reckoned as brother and sister within the term “relative”.

(d) What is to be seen is whether the step brother and step sister can be said to be relative by way of affinity. Different dictionaries suggest that step sister and step brother are part of the family by affinity and in common sense they are related to each other as brother and sister.

(e) As per the Dictionary meaning of the term “relative”, it includes a person related by affinity, which means the connection existing in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. If the Dictionary meanings are to be referred and relied upon, then the term “relative” would include step brother and step sister by affinity.

(f) If the term “brother and sister of the individual” has not been defined under the Income-tax Act, then, the meaning defined in common law has to be adopted and in absence of any other negative covenant under the Act, brother and sister should also include step brother and step sister who by virtue of marriage of their parents have become brother and sister.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that gift given by step sister, that is, Ms. “V” to her step brother, that is, Mr. “R”, is to be treated as gift from sister to brother and therefore, falls within the definition of “relative” undersection 56(2)(vii) and consequently, property received by brother from sister cannot be taxed under section 56(2).

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed on merits.

S.56–Where the assessee received a new flat in lieu of old flat surrendered under a redevelopment agreement, the transaction would not be regarded as receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration for the purpose of section 56(2)(x).

10. (2025) 173 taxmann.com 51 (MumTrib)

Anil DattaramPitale vs. ITO

ITA No.: 465 (Mum) of 2025

A.Y.: 2018-19

Dated: 17th March, 2025

S.56–Where the assessee received a new flat in lieu of old flat surrendered under a redevelopment agreement, the transaction would not be regarded as receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration for the purpose of section 56(2)(x).

FACTS

The assessee purchased a flat in financial year 1997-98 in “M” Co-op Housing Society. The Society underwent redevelopment as per the agreement entered with the developer. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, the assessee got a new flat vide registered agreement dated 26.12.2017 in lieu of the old flat surrendered by him. The stamp duty value of the new flat was ₹25,17,700 and the indexed cost of the old flat was ₹5,43,040. The AO assessed the difference of ₹19,74,660 as income of the assessee under section 56(2)(x), which was confirmed by CIT(A).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) The facts show that this was a case of extinguishment of old flat and in lieu thereof, the assessee got new flat as per the agreement entered with the developer for redevelopment of the Society. It was not a case of receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration that would fall within the purview of section 56(2)(x).

(b) At the most, the transaction could attract the provisions relating to capital gains, in which case, the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 54 and thus, there would be no tax liability on the assessee on this count as well.

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Sec 69A r.w.s. 115BBE: Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and section 115BBE, since assessee had recorded cash deposits of ₹10.75 lakhs during demonetization period in his books of account and source of cash deposits was also maintained by assessee.

9. [2024] 115 ITR(T) 624 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)

Dipak Balubhai Patel (HUF) vs. ITO

ITA NO.: 942 (AHD.) OF 2023

A.Y.: 2017-18 DATE: 22nd August 2024

Sec 69A r.w.s. 115BBE: Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and section 115BBE, since assessee had recorded cash deposits of ₹10.75 lakhs during demonetization period in his books of account and source of cash deposits was also maintained by assessee.

FACTS

The assessee filed his return of income for the AY 2017-18 declaring total income of ₹5.73 lakhs. The return was taken up for scrutiny assessment. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee in his account with Bank of Baroda deposited a sum of ₹10.75 lakhs during demonetization period and issued show cause notice to explain the above source of cash deposit.

The assessee explained the source of cash deposit was withdrawal from four other banks accounts. The cash deposits were duly reflected in the return of income filed in ITR-2. The assessee was not having any business income but rental income and other sources income only, therefore he had not filed the profit and loss account and balance sheet along with return of income.

The Assessing Officer rejected the books of account by stating that on the verification of the return of income filed for the assessment year 2016-17, assessee had shown closing cash on hand as Nil and in the cash book of financial year 2016-17 i.e. assessment year 2017-18, assessee had shown opening balance to the tune of ₹10.10 lakhs which was not justifiable. Therefore addition was made as unexplained money under section 69A and the same was taxed under section 115BBE.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the additions.

HELD

The ITAT observed that during the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer had rejected the explanation offered by the assessee. In the return of income, the assessee had shown closing cash on hand as Nil but in the cash book shown the opening balance for assessment year 2017-18 to the tune of ₹10.09 lakhs.

The ITAT observed that the assessee before Appellate Commissioner filed copies of previous three years Form 26AS, ITR, Statement of Income, Profit and Loss account and Balance Sheet and further explained the rental income with appropriate TDS under section 194I which was clearly reflected in Form 26AS.

The ITAT observed that after declaration of the demonetisation period, the assessee deposited the withdrawal amounts from his bank account which had been offered for tax by filing return of income as well as subject to deduction under section 194I.

The ITAT observed that in the present case, the assessee had recorded the above cash deposits in his books of account and source of cash deposits during demonetisation period were also maintained by the assessee. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and charging tax under section 115BBE. Thus, ITAT held that the addition made by the Assessing Officer was to be deleted.

Sec 115JB r.w.s. 2(26): Banks constituted as ‘corresponding new banks’ and not registered under Companies Act, 2013 would not fall under the provisions of section 115JB and, therefore, tax on book profits (MAT) would not be applicable to such banks.

8. [2024] 115ITR(T) 481 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Union Bank of India vs. DCIT

ITA NO.: 3740 (MUM.) OF 2018 &424 (MUM.) OF 2020

A.Y.: 2013-14 & 2015-16 DATE: 6th September, 2024

Sec 115JB r.w.s. 2(26): Banks constituted as ‘corresponding new banks’ and not registered under Companies Act, 2013 would not fall under the provisions of section 115JB and, therefore, tax on book profits (MAT) would not be applicable to such banks.

FACTS

For the A.Y. 2015-16, the AO asked the assessee to furnish the computation of book profit and also required theassessee as to why provisions and contingency, debited to the profit and loss account, should not be added back for the computation of book profit u/s115JB. In response, assessee submitted that even though in computation assessee had worked out MAT on book profit, the provision of Section 115JB was itself not applicable to the assessee bank.

However, the AO rejected the assessee’s plea on the ground that the amended provision of Section 115JB w.e.f. 01/04/2013 (by insertion of clause (b) to sub-section (2) to section 115JB), brings within its ambit even the banking companies. Thus, the AO concluded that now the amended provision provides that not only the companies governed by the Companies Act, but also other companies governed by other regulating act including Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are also covered by the provision of Section 115JB.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

HELD

The ITAT observed that according to clause (a) of amended section 115JB, the company has to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with the Companies Act, 2013 and the first proviso to sub-section (2) requires that while preparing the accounts including the profit and loss account, the same should be in accordance with the provisions of section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013. Since the assessee bank has to prepare its accounts in accordance with the provisions contained in the Banking Regulation Act, Schedule III of the Companies Act is not applicable. Thus, clause (a) of section 115JB(2), will not apply.

The ITAT observed that for clause (b), following conditions need to be satisfied for applying section 115JB in the case of a company:-(i) the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 should be applicable; (ii) once this condition is fulfilled, it requires such assessee for the purpose of this section to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with the provisions of the Act governing such company.

The ITAT observed that for an entity to qualify as a company, it must be a company formed and registered under the Companies Act. The assessee was not formed and registered under the Companies Act, and came into existence by a separate Act of Parliament, i.e., ‘Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970’. Hence, it does not fall in the first part of the said section.

The assessee bank was not formed or registered under the Companies Act. Once it is not a company under the Companies Act, then the first condition referred to in clause (b) of section 115JB(2) is not fulfilled, and consequently second proviso below section 129(1) of the Companies Act was also not applicable.

The ITAT observed that section 11 of the Acquisition Act specifies that the corresponding new bank is to be treated as an Indian company for the purpose of income-tax. However, clause (b) in sub-section 2 to section 115JB did not permit treatment of such bank as a company for the purpose of the said clause, because it should be a company to which the second proviso to sub-section (1) to section 129 of the Companies Act was applicable. The said proviso had no application to the corresponding new bank as it was not a banking company for the purpose of the said provision. The expression ‘company’ used in section 115JB(2)(b) was to be inferred to be company under the Companies Act and not to an entity which is deemed by a fiction to be a company for the purpose of the Income-tax Act.

Thus, ITAT held that clause (b) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act inserted by Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 1-4-2013 (from assessment year 2013-14 onwards), is not applicable to the banks constituted as ‘corresponding new bank’ in terms of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. Therefore, the provisions of section 115JB cannot be applied and consequently, the tax on book profits (MAT) are not applicable to such banks.

Important Amendments by The Finance Act, 2025- 3.0 TDS/TCS, Transfer Pricing and Other Important Amendments (The Budget That Whispered Instead Of Roared)

At a time when dinner table debates revolve around Trump Tariffs 2.0 and WhatsApp forwards are more obsessed with global geopolitics than GST, the Union Budget 2025 feels like last season’s fashion—forgotten, folded away, and faintly nostalgic. But leave it to a tax consultant to bring the spotlight back. Through this article, we proudly wave the India-first (and Budget-first) flag, reviving what should still be the nation’s favourite fiscal performance.

And what a curious performance it was. No frantic tinkering. No budgetary plot twists. No midnight notifications capable of inducing mild heart attacks in CFOs. Instead, we got a whisper of a Budget – a minimalist, polite fiscal note that gives rather than grabs. A ₹1 lakh crore tax cut that, depending on whom you ask, is either a bold growth push or a national stimulus for iPhone sales and premium coffee chains.

What we’ve done, true to tradition, is dive deep into the fine print—dissecting every explanation memo and every comma like it was Shakespeare. Because, in taxation, what is left unsaid often carries the heaviest implications.

Beneath this seemingly serene surface lies a quiet shake-up: tweaks in transfer pricing, restrictions on carrying forward losses in business reorganisations and—you guessed it—our beloved TDS and TCS amendments.

So, pour yourself a tax-free chai (while it lasts) and join us on this annual pilgrimage. The Budget may not have roared, but we’re here to make sure its whispers are heard loud and clear.

THE NEW 3-YEAR BLOCK TRANSFER PRICING SCHEME: CERTAINTY WITH A TWIST

Transfer pricing feels like an endless cricket series — you pad up every year, play the same shots, the department appeals every ball, and the final verdict rests with the third umpire at the appellate stage. Enter the Finance Act 2025’s new Block Assessment Scheme for transfer pricing, a provision that promises to break this cycle. Think of it as an “APA-lite” for the masses: a chance to lock in your TP dealings for three years without the Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) saga typically reserved for large multinationals. As the Finance Minister noted, this aligns with global best practices in easing TP compliance.

KEY FEATURES OF THE BLOCK TP ASSESSMENT SCHEME

  •  Three-Year Block Option: Taxpayers can opt to have certain international transactions (and specified domestic transactions) assessed on a multi-year basis. If the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) determines an ALP for a particular year (the “lead year”), that same ALP can apply to the two subsequent years for similar transactions, as long as conditions are met. In effect, one TPO review can cover three assessment years in a row.
  •  Optional and Taxpayer-Initiated: The scheme isn’t automatic; taxpayers must elect to use it. An application has to be made to the TPO in the prescribed form and within a prescribed time limit (to be specified by CBDT).
  • Simultaneous ALP Determination: Once the taxpayer opts in and the TPO accepts the request (the TPO has a month to decide if the option is valid), the TPO will determine the ALP for the two subsequent years, together with the lead year’s assessment. Essentially, the TPO conducts a multi-year analysis: the same pricing methodology (and potentially the same comparables/ benchmark) is applied across the three-year span. This means the ALP for year 1 is “rolled forward” for years 2 and 3, providing continuity (but notably, there’s no backwards-looking benefit – it’s a roll-forward, not a rollback like in some APA cases).
  •  Fast-Tracked Litigation and Certainty: Perhaps one of the biggest draws is the promise of certainty and quicker dispute resolution. If there’s a dispute over the ALP, it effectively covers all three years, which means any appeal can address the block in one go. For instance, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) could hear multiple years together, consolidating proceedings.
  •  Section References: The legal architecture for this scheme is set out via new provisions: Section 92CA(3B) (allowing the multi-year option and TPO’s validation of it); Section 92CA(4A) (requiring the TPO to determine ALPs for the subsequent years once the option is accepted); amendments to Section 92CA(1) (to prevent duplicate references to TPO); and Section 155(21) (enabling the AO to adjust/recompute income for the later years based on the block ALP). Additionally, the scheme is effective from Assessment Year 2026-27 (i.e., FY 2025-26) onwards as per the Finance Act 2025, and it won’t apply in search cases.

The block assessment scheme has been greeted as a positive development, almost a mini-revolution in Indian transfer pricing. Of course, as tax professionals, we know every silver lining may have a cloud – so next, we turn to the fine print and potential challenges lurking behind the optimism.

THE FINE PRINT: TECHNICAL ISSUES AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES

As exciting as the new framework is, it comes with its share of technical complexities and unanswered questions. Seasoned practitioners will want to consider the following issues before jumping on the block assessment bandwagon:

1. Roll-Forward Only – No Retro Relief

The block scheme only works prospectively for future years. It’s explicitly a roll-forward, not a rollback. So, if you had disputes or open issues in prior years,  this scheme won’t magically resolve those – you’re  still on your own for past years. If issues are recurring, this mechanism is speed forward to consolidate litigation and get yourself heard together at the appellate level.

2. Timing of Exercising the Option

A critical practical question is when and how to opt in for the block assessment. The law says the assessee can exercise the option after the TPO has determined an ALP for an assessment year via an application in the prescribed form. But does this mean one must apply after the TPO’s order for year 1 or even earlier? Initial interpretations (and even a CBDT FAQ – Question 5) have caused confusion – suggesting the option might need to be exercised before the TPO determines the ALP for the first year. That would be counter-intuitive since taxpayers would be unlikely to commit to a three-year deal without knowing year one’s result. A fair position should be that the option should be available after the finalisation of the first year’s TP assessment. In such a case, the TPO will have to again start the proceeding for the next two years. The rules should clarify – when to pull the trigger. This clarification will, in turn, decide the success of the novel initiative.

3.Withdrawal and Flexibility (All-or-Nothing?)

Once you opt in, are you locked in for the full three-year block? The law, as written, doesn’t spell out any withdrawal mechanism or mid-course exit. It’s unclear if a taxpayer, having been elected for the block, can later change its mind (say, if year 2’s business circumstances change drastically). There is also an open question of whether the taxpayer must continue the option for both subsequent years or could selectively opt for just one additional year if conditions in the third year diverge. Until guidelines clarify this, opting in is a bit of a leap of faith – taxpayers should be confident that the next couple of years will broadly resemble the first. And if economic conditions or TP dynamics do shift, we may find ourselves testing uncharted waters (with possibly no easy way to unwind the block choice).

4. Defining “Similar Transactions”

The scheme hinges on the concept of “similar” transactions across the years. But how similar is similar enough? The Finance Act memorandum hints at criteria like the same associated enterprise (party), proportional volume, and geographic alignment (location of the AE) over the years. In essence, the transactions should be of the same nature with comparable functional profiles each year (think Rule 10B(2) comparability factors). For example, if you’re providing software development services to your US subsidiary at cost plus 10% in year 1, doing essentially the same in years 2 and 3 with the same subsidiary would qualify. However, this area is ripe for interpretation issues. What if, say, the volume doubles in year 2 – is that still “similar”, or does a scale change knock you out? What if the pricing model is the same, but the contract terms have minor tweaks? The law doesn’t define it, so we anticipate CBDT rules to lay down clear benchmarks for similarity. Ambiguities here could allow the TPO to reject the option if they believe transactions aren’t sufficiently alike. Bottom line: ensure your year 2 and 3 transactions truly mirror year 1 in nature – and watch for a formal definition of “similar” in the upcoming rules.

5. Impact on Comparables and TP Analysis Updates

A multi-year scheme raises the question of how to handle comparable data and analysis for the later years. One interpretation (and arguably the intent) is that the same ALP result or range determined for year 1 would simply carry over to years 2 and 3, giving the taxpayer certainty even if market benchmarks shift. For instance, if, in year 1, the TPO settles that an operating margin of 10-12% is arm’s length for your transaction, then as long as you’re in that range in years 2 and 3, you’d be fine – even if fresh comparables for those years might suggest a different range. This “lock-in” would indeed ease burdens. However, the TPO might choose to only lock in the methodology and comparable set, but still update the comparable companies’ financials for each year. In that case, year 2 and 3 ALPs could be adjusted if the comparables’ performance changes. The safer assumption is that the ALP (price or margin) is intended to be fixed for the block, because anything less wouldn’t truly reduce disputes. But consider practical hitches: databases get updated over time – what if one of your comparables from year 1 drops out in year 3 because it ceased operations or no longer qualifies? Or new comparables emerge? These scenarios could create confusion in applying the year-1 benchmark to later years. Similarly, financial metrics can fluctuate; for example, your working capital or receivables cycle might lengthen in year 2, affecting profitability. Would the TPO allow adjustments or stick to the original benchmark? All these issues underscore the importance of forthcoming guidance. Until then, taxpayers should do their own sanity check: if you are locked in year 1’s analysis for the next two years, would it still be reasonable? If your business is stable, likely yes. If not, tread carefully.

The real challenge lies not in the scheme, but in the very foundation of transfer pricing — a system built on constant external comparisons. As the Bhagavad Gita teaches, true measure lies not in competing with others, but in surpassing your own past self. Perhaps it’s time for transfer pricing too, to reflect inward rather than outward.

6. Handling Multi-Year Transactions (Loans, Guarantees, etc.)

Some related-party dealings naturally span multiple years – inter-company loans, credit lines, intellectual property licenses, long-term service contracts, and corporate guarantees for debt, to name a few. The block scheme seems tailor-made for such continuous transactions, but there are quirks. Take an inter-company loan: you may draw additional amounts in year 2 under the same loan agreement (increasing the outstanding principal). Or a corporate guarantee originally given for a $5 million loan might be upsized to $10 million next year. Are these considered the “same” transactions? Intuitively, yes (same loan or guarantee, just higher quantum), so they should fall under the block’s umbrella of similar transactions. The ALP principle (interest rate or guarantee fee) would remain the same even though the absolute interest or exposure grows. The key point is that such variations in volume under an ongoing arrangement shouldn’t invalidate the option, provided the nature of the service/asset (loan, guarantee) is unchanged. However, taxpayers should be ready to demonstrate that these are continuations of the original deal, not new transactions altogether. If conditions like credit rating or market interest rates shift materially, the TPO might scrutinise whether the pricing still holds arm’s length for later years. Again, clear guidance from CBDT would help confirm that normal ups and downs in volume don’t derail the block agreement for these financing transactions.

7. New or Additional Transactions in the Block Period

A practical challenge arises if a new type of related-party transaction crops up in year 2 or 3 that was not present in year 1. The law allows the block option to be exercised for “all or any” of the transactions in those years, implying you could cover some and exclude others. So, if you introduce, say, a brand new transaction (e.g., start selling machinery to your foreign affiliate in year 2 while year 1 only had service fees), that new transaction is obviously not “similar” to the ones covered by the block. In such cases, that new transaction would fall outside the block scheme and be subject to regular TP assessment for that year. But this bifurcation can get messy. Normally, if any international transaction exists, the AO can refer the case to TPO. Under the block scheme, the AO is barred from referring matters covered by a valid block option. Does the AO then refer only the new transaction to the TPO for that year? The legislation isn’t crystal clear, but presumably, yes – the AO could still trigger a limited scope TPO audit for the uncovered transaction. Moreover, what if the taxpayer simply didn’t report a transaction in year 1, but it comes to light in year 2? The TPO’s block order might have omitted it, and the AO, due to the block, might be handcuffed from referring it. These are procedural grey areas.

8. Adjustment of Income via Section 155(21)

Once a block option is approved and the TPO determines the ALPs for the subsequent two years, how exactly do those later-year assessments get finalised? The answer lies in Section 155(21) (newly inserted), which allows the AO to amend the assessment orders of the subsequent years to align with the TPO’s multi-year order. In practice, the TPO might issue a consolidated TP order covering years 1, 2, and 3 (or separate orders simultaneously). The AO will then recompute the total income for the years 2 and 3 on the basis of that order by passing amendment orders for those years. This mechanism is akin to how APAs are given effect (though APAs use section 92CD). It ensures the block ALP is implemented without needing fresh scrutiny in those years. However, this process raises a few sub-questions: Will the recomputation under 155(21) account for all consequential impacts like interest on shortfall (Sections 234B/C) or MAT calculations for each year? It should, as the law mandates the AO to consider all aspects while recomputing. Also, if those years were originally assessed and closed (say, in case the block option is exercised after assessments are done), the 155(21) route will reopen and amend them – one hopes in a timely manner to avoid any statute limitations issues.

9. Appeal Process and DRP vs Block Adjustments

The introduction of Section 155(21) brings an interesting twist to the appeals procedure. Normally, when a TPO proposes an adjustment, the AO issues a draft assessment order under Section 144C, and the taxpayer can go to the DRP for a quicker resolution before finalising the assessment. But an order under Section 155(21) – which is essentially a rectification/amendment order for the block years – does not have a draft stage; it’s a final order when issued. So, if the taxpayer disagrees with the ALP applied for the year 2 or 3, do they get to approach the DRP for those years? It appears not, since DRP is only for variations proposed in a draft order. The likely scenario is that any dispute on the block ALP will be funnelled through the year 1 draft order’s appeal. In other words, you contest year one’s draft order at the DRP (covering the proposed TP adjustment that will also govern years 2 and 3). The DRP’s directions would then have to be applied to all three years when the AO passes final orders. If one goes to the ITAT, the appeals for all three years could be clubbed (as noted earlier). What if the taxpayer misses the DRP route and goes to the Commissioner (Appeals) for year 1? Then, years 2 and 3, which were amended without draft orders, might each need separate appeals (likely directly to the Commissioner (Appeals) since there is no draft/DRP there). This is somewhat uncharted territory – procedural gaps exist. Additionally, if a TPO rejects the block option (says the transactions aren’t similar or conditions are not met), there’s no immediate way to appeal that decision alone– it would presumably become part of challenging the eventual assessment order.

10. Other Procedural and Administrative Gaps

Beyond the major points above, there are some miscellaneous uncertainties. For one, the law doesn’t specify the timeframe for the TPO to complete the assessments for the two subsequent years once an option is validated – will it be within the same timeline as the lead year’s assessment or some extension? Clarification on this is needed to ensure the benefit isn’t lost to delays. Another subtle point: the block scheme streamlines TP assessments, but regular corporate tax assessments for each year will still occur separately. There’s no mechanism to sync those up, meaning a company could still face scrutiny on other tax issues on an annual basis. So, it’s not a full consolidation of all tax matters, only the TP piece. This could lead to parallel proceedings in a given year – one dealing with block TP adjustment via amendment and another dealing with, say, domestic tax disallowances – which the tax authorities should coordinate to avoid confusion. Finally, consider the strategic angle: how the appeal mechanism will work as each year may have corporate and TP issues. Forms have a special place in appeal proceedings – which form to file, especially when an appeal is governed by a statutory limitation period.

Given the many moving parts in this scheme, the role of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) in issuing detailed rules and guidelines cannot be overstated. Guidelines will determine the fate of the scheme.

SECTION 72A – LOSSES AREN’T IMMORTAL

A cat might boast nine lives, but under the new Finance Act 2025 amendment, tax losses barely get eight. Under the Income-tax Act, Section 72A traditionally lets a successor company “inherit” the accumulated losses and unabsorbed depreciation of a predecessor (in amalgamations, demergers, etc.) as if they were its own. In practice, this meant that when two companies merged, the merged (amalgamated) company treated the past losses as losses of the year of amalgamation – essentially giving the business a fresh eight-year run to utilise those losses.

Old Law: “Fresh” Eight-Year Clock

Before the Finance Act 2025, Section 72A worked in tandem with Section 72: no business loss could be carried forward for more than eight years from the year it arose. But an amalgamation effectively reset that eight-year clock. All accumulated losses of the merging entities became losses of the amalgamated entity in the year of amalgamation, allowing the merged company a brand-new eight-year window to set them off. In other words, legacy losses got a second lease of life every time there was a qualifying reorganisation.

Finance Act 2025 – New Section 72A(6B)

The Finance Act 2025 inserts a new sub-section 72A(6B), drastically curtailing this evergreen carry forward. From April 1, 2025 (effectively AY 2026 27) onward, losses must be carried only within the original eight-year span from the year they first arose. The provision states that for any amalgamation or other reorganisation on/after 1-Apr-2025, a loss that is carried to the successor company can only be used in the remaining assessment years of the original eight-year period. Put simply, amalgamation no longer resets the loss-clock: it merely transfers the remaining life of the loss to the new entity. The Finance Bill even introduces the concept of the “original predecessor entity” – the very first company in the chain of amalgamations – to anchor the clock. This prevents successive mergers from indefinitely extending the loss of life (“evergreening” of losses).

Scope and Effective Date

The new rule applies prospectively. By law, the amendment applies only to any amalgamation or reorganisation effected on or after 1st April, 2025. (In turn, the amendment itself takes effect from 1st April, 2026.) Thus, any merger where the appointed date is before 1-Apr-2025 is governed by the old Section 72A. For deals on/after that date, however, the loss must be traced back to its original computation year.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

To crystallise the change, consider:

1. Example 1 – Pre-Amendment Amalgamation: If Company X had losses and merged into Y on 1-Mar-2025 (before the 1-Apr-2025 cutoff), the pre-amendment rules apply. The losses (say, incurred in AY 2018-19) would be deemed Y’s losses in AY 2024-25, and Y would then have a fresh eight-year window (through AY 2031-32) to set them off. In effect, the merger “rebooted” the clock.

2. Example 2 – Post-Amendment Amalgamation: Suppose Company A incurred a loss in FY 2018-19 (AY 2019-20), and it amalgamates into B on 1-Apr-2026. Under the new rule, B treats that loss as its own, but can carry it forward only within eight years from AY 2019-20. That means the loss must be absorbed by AY 2027-28 (eight years after AY 2019-20). No new eight-year term is granted by the 2026 merger. B can only use whatever remaining years were left on A’s original timeline.

3. Example 3 – Chain Amalgamations: Consider a chain: A Ltd (with losses incurred in 2019-20) merges into B Ltd on 1-Apr-2026, and then B merges into C Ltd on 1-Apr-2028. Under 72A(6B), the “original predecessor entity” for C’s losses is still A Ltd. All of A’s losses must be set off within eight years of 2019-20 (i.e. by AY 2027-28). Neither merger (2026 or 2028) extends beyond that horizon. In practice, C inherits only the residual carry forward years from A’s original loss – the clock keeps ticking from the date of the first loss.

Only Losses (Not Depreciation) Affected

It is crucial to note that Section 72A(6B) speaks only of “loss forming part of the accumulated loss”. Unabsorbed depreciation allowances (also carried under Section 72A) are not curtailed by the new sub-section. It can be continued for an infinite period.

Other Conditions still apply.

All the existing safeguards in Section 72A(2)–(6A) remain intact. In particular, the successor company must still meet continuity conditions (e.g. carrying on the business, achieving the threshold of installed manufacturing capacity. maintaining requisite shareholding by the transferors, etc.) for the inherited losses to be allowable. The amendment simply shortens how long a loss can live; it does not relax the usual reorganisation conditions.

TDS/TCS PROVISIONS

The latest finance proposals have modestly raised a bunch of TDS/TCS thresholds, aiming to reduce compliance pain for small payments. For example, the annual rent threshold under Section 194-I jumps from ₹2.4 lakh annually to ₹50,000 per month (i.e. ₹6 lakh annually), and other sections saw smaller increment (e.g. commission and professional-fee limits rose from ₹15K–30K to ₹20K–50K). Threshold increase should be seen in the light of the overall increase in slab rates, and no tax till you earn ₹12 lakh. It puts more money in the hands of people.

FAREWELL TO SECTION 206AB (NON-FILER SURCHARGE)

Starting 1 April 2025, Section 206AB – which forced higher TDS on “non-filers” – will be repealed. In plain English, if the recipient didn’t file a tax return, payers no longer have to immediately apply a higher TDS rate on payments to him. This change was explicitly made to cut compliance headaches: under the old law, deductors had to check their filing status on the spot and withhold tax. Instances were seen where demands were raised on deductors for non-withholding at 20%. This, in effect, penalised payers for the fault of the recipient. The law has omitted this provision with effect from 1 April 2025. This is significant as the legal effect of the omission is that the provision never existed in law. Thus, the entire demand cannot be enforced. Consider the following observations of the Supreme Court in Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 811

“The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute –book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed.”

194Q VS 206C(1H): ENDING DOUBLE TAXING OF LARGE PURCHASES

There’s often confusion when buying and selling large value of goods: should the buyer deduct TDS under Section 194Q, or should the seller collect TCS under Section 206C(1H)? Under prior rules, 206C(1H) already said no TCS if the buyer had to do some TDS. But in practice, sellers found it hard to know if buyers had actually done their TDS, so sometimes both got applied. To clear this up, the budget proposes that from 1st April, 2025, Section 206C(1H) simply “will no longer be applicable”. In effect, the onus shifts entirely to buyers (via 194Q), and sellers can drop the TCS on those ₹50 lakh+ transactions. This should end the TDS-versus-TCS tug-of-war and make compliance far simpler.

UPDATED RETURNS: MORE TIME, BUT WATCH THE CLOCK

The window to file an updated return (ITR-U) is being doubled. Under the old law, you had 24 months (2 years) from the end of the assessment year to fix omissions; now, it’s 48 months (4 years). That means, for example, an ITR for FY 2023–24 (AY 2024–25) can be updated up until March 31, 2029. This extension is meant to “nudge” voluntary compliance – essentially giving taxpayers more time to spot and report missed income.

However, the law also tacks on strict conditions. You cannot file an updated return after 36 months if reassessment has kicked in. In practice, if an officer has already issued a notice under Section 148A (essentially the show-cause for reassessment) after 36 months, your window closes unless that notice is later quashed. (If a 148A(3) order explicitly finds “no fit case to reopen,” then the 48-month door reopens.) In short, you get extra time only if the tax department hasn’t already started formal reassessment proceedings late in the game.

PENALTIES ON LATE ITR-U

Filing late just got pricier. Section 140B of the Act imposes an additional tax (a bit like a penalty) on updated returns, calculated as a percentage of the extra tax and interest due. Originally, it was 25% of the tax plus interest if you filed within 12 months of year-end and 50% if filed within 24 months. The amendments introduce two new tiers: now it’s 60% if you file after 24 up to 36 months, and a whopping 70% if you wait out to 36–48 months. In plain terms, the longer you stall, the stiffer the surcharge – so procrastinators face heavier hits.

CONCLUSION: A BUDGET THAT UNDERSTOOD THE BEAUTY OF RESTRAINT

If there’s a timeless lesson in tax policy, it is this: sometimes, the best amendment is no amendment at all. This year’s Budget seems to have embraced that wisdom — preferring fine-tuning over frenzy and choosing to strengthen the framework rather than constantly reshaping it. A “less is fair” philosophy quietly runs through the Finance Act 2025: thoughtful corrections, calibrated expansions, and a deliberate effort to simplify rather than complicate.

In that sense, this Budget has stood the test of time. Amidst the noise of global uncertainty, Trump Tariff and economic recalibrations, the Indian tax system was offered something rare — stability.

And as we write this, perhaps there’s a quiet sense of history too. This Budget series in the BCAJ may well become a nostalgic bookmark — the last commentary on the Income-tax Act, 1961. With the new Income-tax Act, 2025 on the horizon, we stand at the threshold of a new chapter — one that promises modernisation, new hope for a new India and, more importantly, admission of the ultimate truth – even law is not permanent.

For now, we raise a modest toast to a Budget that whispered instead of shouted — and to a law that, for one final time, chose elegance over excess.

Section 36(1)(vii): Advances written off – Allowable: Section 10B – Deduction – Site Transfer Income : Tribunal last fact-finding authority ought to have given independent finding while reversing decision of lower authorities :

Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-11 vs. Watson Pharma Pvt. Ltd.,

[ITXA No. 1770 OF 2017, Dated: 26th March, 2025, (Bom) (HC)]

AY 2010-11.

Section 36(1)(vii): Advances written off – Allowable:

Section 10B – Deduction – Site Transfer Income : Tribunal last fact-finding authority ought to have given independent finding while reversing decision of lower authorities :

The Assessee is a wholly owned subsidiary of M/s. Watson Lab., USA and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and R & D facilities in India and also renders contract manufacturing services to its associate enterprises.

During the year under consideration, the assessee wrote-off various advances which were given in earlier years in the course of its business and same could not be recovered. The claim was made under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, and in the alternative under Section 28 of the Act. The assessee vide letter dated 4th March, 2014 addressed to the Assessing Officer (AO) gave the details of such write off by way of enclosures. These details pertain to more than 50 parties on account of various transactions which were stated in the remarks column e.g., AMC lift maintenance, raw materials, professional fees etc.

The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) disallowed the claim under Section 28 on the ground of want of evidence. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondent-assessee. The Tribunal has given reason that the genuineness of the advances have not been doubted by the revenue and further books of account have been audited by the statutory auditors and, therefore, the write off should be allowed after setting off the credit balances. The net balance written off which were allowed by the Tribunal was ₹7,66,713/-.

The ld. counsel for the appellant-revenue relied upon the order of the DRP and submitted that the claim was not sustainable. Against this, the learned counsel for the respondent-assessee submitted that the respondent-assesseehad filed the details of these advances with the AO and DRP vide letter dated 4th March, 2014 and the Tribunal after considering the said letter has allowed the claim.

The Hon. Court observed that on a perusal of the letter dated 4th March, 2014 and its enclosures, these are advances to more than 50 parties against which either the advances are not recoverable or the respondent-assessee has not received any services. The amount ranges from ₹200 to ₹3 lakh, major amounts being in few thousands. The DRP has not considered this letter and, therefore, observations made by the DRP that the claim is without evidence is incorrect. The Tribunal has correctly considered the details filed along with letter dated 4 March 2014 and allowed the claim. Further, the total income declared by the respondent-assessee is more than ₹30 crore and the net balance written off is only ₹7,66,713/-. This comparison is only to show when the income offered is more than ₹30 crore, small amounts write off would constitute reasonableness and more so looking at the nature of the write off detailed in enclosure to letter dated 4th March, 2014. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the claim of the respondent-assessee.

Regarding the second issue i.e. deduction under section 10B of the Act, it was observed that the respondent-assessee was eligible for deduction under Section 10B of the Act with respect to its Goa unit and Ambarnath unit. The respondent-assessee has claimed deduction under Section 10B on “Site Transfer Income” of ₹19,61,98,000/- with respect to these two units. The DRP denied the deduction under section 10B on “Site Transfer Income” on the ground that same does not represent the income derived from the business of eligible unit. The Tribunal has allowed the claim.

The Ld. Counsel for the appellant-revenue submitted that the Tribunal has not given any reasons for allowing the claim of deduction under section 10B on “Site Transfer Income”. Accordingly, the relief given by the Tribunal without giving any reason would be contrary to the well-settled principle that the appellate authority has to give reasons which constitute the heart of the decision. The department relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 and more particularly paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said order.

The Hon. Court noted the operative part of the Tribunal on this issue which reads as under :-

“We have heard the counsels for both the parties at length and we have also perused the orders passed by respective authorities, judgments relied by the parties and while taking into consideration the facts of the case, we are of the considered view that the Site Transfer Income is a part of business income earned by the assessee and is eligible for deduction while computing deduction u/s 10B of the Income Tax Act.”

The Hon. Court observed that the approach of the Tribunal is not appreciable. The Tribunal has merely stated that after hearing both the parties and perusing the orders and judgments, the Site Transfer Income is eligible for deduction under Section 10B of the Act.

According to Hon. Court the Tribunal ought to have given the reasons as to how “Site Transfer Income” constitutes the income derived from the business of the undertaking. The said reasoning is totally absent. The operative part is only the conclusion but before coming to the conclusion, the Tribunal ought to have given its reasons, especially since it is the case of reversal of the order passed by the AO and DRP and the Tribunal being the final fact finding authority and first appellate authority in this case was expected to give the reasons before coming to the conclusion which are absent in the present case. There is no discussion as to how the said decision is applicable to the Site Transfer Income before giving relief to the respondent-assessee. The Tribunal has given independent reasoning when it came for various other income being eligible but did not give any reasoning on “Site Transfer Income.”

It is well-settled that the duty to give reasons in support of adverse orders is a facet of the principles of natural justice and fair play. In several cases, the necessity of providing reasons by a body or authority to support its decision was considered before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that on the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority affecting the parties’ rights must speak for itself.

The Hon. Court referred and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and Brothers (2010) 4 SCC 785 , wherein it has held that a litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons to reject his claim / prayer. Only then would a party be able to challenge the order on appropriate grounds. Recording of reasons would also benefit the appellate court. As arguments bring things hidden and obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment, where the law and factual matrix of the case are discussed, provides lucidity and foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the courts. The reason is the very life of the law. When the reason for a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice and avoids uncertainty.

The Hon. Court held that the absence of reasons essentially introduces an element of uncertainty and dissatisfaction and gives entirely different dimensions to the questions raised before the higher / appellate courts. The Court noted that there was hardly any statutory provision under the Income tax Act or the Constitution itself requiring the recording of reasons in the judgments. Still, it was no more res-integra and stands unequivocally settled by different decisions of the Court, holding that the courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned judgments / orders.

In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached.”

 In view of the above observations, the Hon Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for deciding the ground of deduction under Section 10B qua “Site Transfer Income.”

Section 143(3) : Notice and Assessment order – Non-existing entity – fact of merger was intimated to the officer, prior to the assessment order – Order bad in law:

3. Commissioner of Income Tax-LTU vs. Shell India Markets Pvt. Ltd. (Erstwhile Shell Technology India Pvt. Ltd.)

[ITXA No. 2381 OF 2018,

Dated: 27th March, 2025 (Bom)

(HC)] AY 2007-08 :

Section 143(3) : Notice and Assessment order – Non-existing entity – fact of merger was intimated to the officer, prior to the assessment order – Order bad in law:

The Respondent-Assesseehad raised an additional ground before Tribunal that a notice and assessment order has been issued on a non-existing entity namely “Shell Technology India Private Limited” and therefore same is void. The Tribunal decided this ground in favour of the Respondent- Assessee and quashed the assessment order by accepting the submission of the Respondent-Assessee that the notice and order was issued in the name of a non-existing entity i.e. “Shell Technology India Pvt. Ltd.”, although the fact of the merger of this company into “Shell India Market Limited” was intimated to the officer, prior to the assessment order vide letter 21st September, 2010.

The learned counsel for the Appellant- Revenue, submitted that the appeal can be disposed of by following various orders of the Hon. Court, wherein the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. [2019] 416 ITR 613 (SC)and PCIT (Central)-2 vs. M/s. Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd. [2022 443 ITR 194 (SC) have been considered. He specifically relied on the order and judgment passed by the bench in the case of Reliance Industries Limited vs. P. L. Roongta And Ors. WP No. 772 of 1992 along with ors (Bombay)

The assessee contended that the notice and order ought to have been issued in the name of the transferee company “Shell India Market Private Limited” and not against the transferor company “Shell Technology India Private Limited”.

The Hon. Court held that the notice and order should have been issued in the name of the transferee company “Shell India Market Private Limited” and not the transferor company “Shell Technology India Private Limited”. The decisions relied supports that if the Assessing Officer has been intimated about the fact of merger, then the notice should have been issued in the name of the transferee company and not the transferor company. Since in the instant case the notice and the assessment order is passed in the name of the transferor company “Shell Technology India Private Limited” and not the transferee company “Shell India Market Private Limited”, same are bad in law.

The Hon. Court clarified that the present Appeal was dismissed only on the ground that the notice and assessment order has been passed in the name of the transferor company. However, this order would not preclude the Appellant-Revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the transferee company, in accordance with law for assessing the income in the hands of the transferee company. The Appeal was accordingly disposed of.

Search and seizure — Assessment of third person — Mandatory condition u/s. 158BD — Initiation of proceedings by assessee’s AO without satisfaction note from searched person’s AO — Failure to follow mandatory procedure — High Court held that initiation of proceedings without jurisdiction:

13. Principal CIT vs. MiliaTracon Pvt. Ltd.:

[2025] 473 ITR 155 (Cal.):

Block period 01/04/1996 to 07/05/2002:

Date of order 3rd July, 2024:

Ss.132 and 158BD of ITA 1961

Search and seizure — Assessment of third person — Mandatory condition u/s. 158BD — Initiation of proceedings by assessee’s AO without satisfaction note from searched person’s AO — Failure to follow mandatory procedure — High Court held that initiation of proceedings without jurisdiction:

A search conducted at the premises of UIC group led to the discovery of certain share certificates issued in the name of the assessee. The Assessing Officer of the assessee initiated proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without recording a satisfaction note as mandated and the assessee denied any undisclosed income. Subsequently, summons were issued to four individuals u/s. 131 but could not be served. The Assessing Officer of the assessee communicated the reasons for initiation of proceedings through a letter. The assessee submitted block returns of income and contested the proceedings, asserting that they were improperly initiated.

The Assessing Officer passed an assessment order. The satisfaction note reproduced in the assessment order was prepared by the Assessing Officer of the assessee and not by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, as required u/s. 158BD.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the validity of the initiation of proceedings but granted relief on certain additions. The Tribunal reversed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals), concluding that the initiation of proceedings was without jurisdiction since the mandatory requirements of recording satisfaction and transferring documents by the Assessing Officer of the searched person to the assessee’s Assessing Officer were not followed.

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenues and held as under:

“i) U/s. 158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961, satisfaction note has to be recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person and send it to the Assessing Officer of such other person, the third party.

ii) The initiation of proceedings u/s. 158BD was unauthorised and lacked jurisdiction. The satisfaction note required u/s. 158BD must be recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person and sent to the Assessing Officer of the third person assessee. This requirement was not met in this case, as the note was prepared by the Assessing Officer of the assessee, contrary to statutory provisions. Additionally, the mandatory procedure for transferring seized documents to the assessee’s Assessing Officer was not followed. There was no illegality in the order of the Tribunal.”

Refund — Effect of section 240 — Refund consequent on appellate order — Refund should be granted without application for it. Interest on refund — Effect of section 244 — Deduction of tax at source — Tax deducted at source and deposited has to be treated as tax duly paid — Such amount be taken into consideration in computing interest on refund — Interest payable from first day of April of relevant Assessment Year to the date on which refund is ultimately granted:

12. ESS Singapore Branch vs. DCIT:

[2025] 473 ITR 541 (Del.):

A. Y. 2014-15: Date of order 22nd August, 2024:

Ss.199, 240 and 244 of  ITA 1961

Refund — Effect of section 240 — Refund consequent on appellate order — Refund should be granted without application for it. Interest on refund — Effect of section 244 — Deduction of tax at source — Tax deducted at source and deposited has to be treated as tax duly paid — Such amount be taken into consideration in computing interest on refund — Interest payable from first day of April of relevant Assessment Year to the date on which refund is ultimately granted:

The Assessee filed return of income for AY 2014-15 and claimed a refund of ₹3,65,970. The case was selected for scrutiny wherein the Assessing Officer raised an issue as to whether the revenue earned by the assessee including the consideration for live feed, would constitute royalty and thus be taxable. The Assessing Officer framed the draft assessment order holding that the consideration received towards live feed was taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), affirmed the view taken by the AO pursuant to which the final order was passed.

On appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that there was a clear distinction between a copyright and a broadcasting right, broadcast or live coverage which does not have a copyright, and therefore, payment for live telecast was neither payment for transfer of any copyright nor any scientific work so as to fall under the ambit of royalty under Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vi) and decided the appeal in favour of the assessee. Further, the Tribunal gave directions to the Assessing Officer to verify and grant credit for tax deducted at source as claimed by the assessee. Pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal, the assessee filed application before the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer restricted the benefit of TDS to the amount which was claimed in the return of income on the ground that amount reflected in Form 26AS was not claimed by the assessee in the return of income. It was also held that for the purposes of refund, the assessee had to follow the procedure as laid out in section 239 of the Act.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition filed by assessee and held as follows:

“i) The unquestionable mandate of section 240 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 , as would be manifest from a reading of that provision, is that in cases where a refund becomes due and payable consequent to an order passed in an appeal or other proceedings, the Assessing Officer is obliged to refund the amount to the assessee without it having to make any claim in that behalf.

ii) Tax deducted at source duly deposited becomes liable to be treated as tax duly paid in terms of section 199 and interest thereon would consequently flow from the first day of April of the relevant assessment year to the date on which the refund is ultimately granted by virtue of section 244A(1)(a) of the Act.

iii) The undisputed position was that the Assessing Officer was called upon to give effect to a direction framed by the Tribunal. Viewed in that light, the stand taken by the Assessing Officer was unsustainable in so far as it restricted the claim of the assessee to the disclosures made in the return of income. It was wholly illegal and inequitable for the Department to give short credit to the tax duly deducted and deposited based on the claim that may be made in a return of income.

iv) Direction issued to respondents to acknowledge the credit of tax deducted at source as reflected in form 26AS of the assessee amounting to ₹2,27,83,28,430 and to recompute the total refund at ₹2,03,40,32,090.”

Reassessment — Condition precedent — Reason to believe that income has escaped assessment — Delay in submitting Form 10 for accumulation of income — Not a ground for re-assessment. Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Board Circular acknowledging difficulties of assessee’s in uploading form — Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim — Re-assessment not justified. Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Matter of procedure Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim —Re-assessment not justified

11. Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India vs. DCIT:

[2025] 473 ITR 696 (Del.):

A. Y. 2016-17: Date of order 5th August, 2024:

Ss.11(2), 147, and 148A of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Condition precedent — Reason to believe that income has escaped assessment — Delay in submitting Form 10 for accumulation of income — Not a ground for re-assessment.

Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Board Circular acknowledging difficulties of assessee’s in uploading form — Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim — Re-assessment not justified.

Charitable purpose — Requirement of digital submission of Form 10 for accumulation of income — Matter of procedure Failure to file in time — No dispute as to genuineness of claim —Re-assessment not justified:

The Assessee is a company registered u/s. 8 of the Companies Act and holds registration u/s. 12AA of the Act. Re-assessment proceedings were initiated against the assessee for the A. Y. 2016-17 on account of failure to digitally file and upload Form 10 on or before the due date of filing return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Act. While the assessee filed Forms 10A and 10B after the due date of return of income, however, the same were submitted before the Assessing Officer prior to the completion of the assessment proceedings. Assessment order was framed on 1st December, 2018 and the accumulation u/s. 11(2) was accepted.

The re-opening of assessment was challenged in a writ petition filed before the High Court. The Delhi High Court allowed the Petition of the assessee and held as follows:

“i) Section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, speaks of a statement in the prescribed form (form 10) being “furnished” to the Assessing Officer. The change in the “prescribed manner” u/s. 11(2)(a) for the submission of form 10 and which moved to a digital filing was introduced for the first time by virtue of the Finance Act, 2015 ([2015] 373 ITR (St.) 25) and the Income-tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2016 ([2016] 380 ITR (St.) 66). Prior to those amendments, all that section 11(2)(a) required was for the assessee to apprise the Assessing Officer, by a notice in writing, of the purposes for which the income was sought to be accumulated and the mode of its investment or deposit in accordance with section 11(5). The requirement of form 10 being furnished electronically was undisputedly introduced for the first time by way of the 2016 Amendment Rules. The electronic submission of form 10 is essentially a matter of procedure as opposed to being a mandatory condition which may be recognised to form part of substantive law. An action for reassessment would have to be based on the formation of an opinion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. That primordial condition would clearly not be satisfied on the mere allegation of a delayed digital filing of form 10.

ii) The action for reassessment was not founded on income liable to tax having escaped assessment. The Department also did not question the acceptance of the accumulations in terms of section 11(2) in the assessment order dated 1st December, 2018. The entire action for reassessment was founded solely on form 10 having been submitted after 17th October, 2016 which was the due date in terms of section 139(1). The order u/s. 148A(d) dated 31st March, 2023 and the consequent initiation of reassessment proceedings through notice u/s. 148 of the Act of even date were not valid and were liable to be quashed.”

Reassessment—Scope of jurisdiction of AO— Notice — Reasons recorded — Grounds must be recorded before issue of notice — AO is not entitled to record additional reasons thereafter —Re-assessment based on other grounds recorded after issue of notice not valid — Order and notice quashed: Re-assessment — Applicability of Explanation 3 to section 147 — Explanation applied only where power to re-assess validly invoked:

10. ATS Infrastructure Ltd. vs. ACIT:

[2025] 473 ITR 595 (Del.):

A. Ys. 2014-15 to 2016-17: Date of order 18th July, 2024:

Ss.147, 148, 148A(b) and 148A(d) of ITA 1961:

Reassessment—Scope of jurisdiction of AO— Notice — Reasons recorded — Grounds must be recorded before issue of notice — AO is not entitled to record additional reasons thereafter —Re-assessment based on other grounds recorded after issue of notice not valid — Order and notice quashed:

Re-assessment — Applicability of Explanation 3 to section 147 — Explanation applied only where power to re-assess validly invoked:

Notice u/s. 148A(b) was issued on the ground that the assessee had received loan from its 100% subsidiary. In response to the notice, the assessee submitted that the assessee had not received any loan from its subsidiary but on the contrary it had repaid the loan. The Assessing Officer, vide order dated 23rd July, 2022 passed u/s. 148A(d) of the Act accepted the explanation of the assessee. However, he alleged that the assessee had not been able to completely explain the source of the money which was used to repay a part of the loan and therefore the amount towards loan of ₹25,53,42,435 was treated as income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment.

The Assessee challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition before the High Court mainly contending that the Department had changed their stand and sought to re-open the assessment on a ground which did not form part of the original notice.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, quashed the proceedings and held as follows:

“i) The validity of the reassessment proceedings initiated u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, upon issue of a notice u/s. 148, would have to be adjudged from the stand point of the reasons which formed the basis for the formation of opinion with respect to escapement of income. That opinion cannot be one of changing or fresh reasoning or a felt need to make further enquiries or undertake an exercise of verification. The court would be primarily concerned with whether the reasons which formed the basis for formation of the requisite opinion are tenable and sufficient to warrant invocation of section 147.

ii) The enunciation with respect to the indelible connection between section 148A(b) and section 148A(d) are clearly not impacted by Explanation 3. U/ss. 147 and 148 the subject of validity of initiation of reassessment would have to be independently evaluated and cannot be confused with the power that could ultimately be available in the hands of the Assessing Officer and which could be invoked once an assessment has been validly reopened. Explanation 3 which forms part of section 147, would apply only when it is found that the power to reassess had been validly invoked and the formation of opinion entitled to be upheld in the light of the principles which are well settled. The Explanations would be applicable to issues which may come to the notice of the Assessing Officer in the course of proceedings of reassessment subject to the supervening requirement of the reassessment action itself having been validly initiated and the assessment has been validly reopened. Explanation 3, cannot consequently be read as enabling the Assessing Officer to attempt to either deviate from the reasons originally recorded for initiating action u/s. 147 or section 148 nor can the Explanations be read as empowering the Assessing Officer to improve upon, supplement or supplant the reasons which formed the basis for initiation of action under these provisions.

iii) The proviso to section 147 linked the initiation of reassessment to the existence of information which already existed or was in the possession of the Assessing Officer which was the basis for formation of the opinion that income liable to tax had escaped assessment. The provision fortified the view that the foundational material alone would be relevant for the purposes of evaluating whether reassessment powers u/s. 147 were justifiably invoked. Accordingly, the reassessment proceedings were unsustainable. Considering the import of Explanation 3 as well as the language in which section 147 stood couched, there was no justification to differ from the legal position which had been enunciated in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT [2011] 336 ITR 136 (Delhi); which had been affirmed and approved subsequently in CIT (Exemption) vs. Monarch Educational Society [2016] 387 ITR 416 (Delhi); and CIT vs. Software Consultants [2012] 341 ITR 240 (Delhi). Consequently, the order u/s. 148A(d) and the subsequent notice u/s. 148 were quashed. The Department was granted liberty to take such action as may otherwise be permissible in law.”

Reassessment — Faceless assessment — Notice — New procedure — Effect of provisions of s. 151A and notification dated 29th March, 2022 issued by Central Government — Notice issued by jurisdictional AO invalid:

9. Everest Kanto Cylinder Ltd. vs. Dy./ Asst. CIT:

[2025] 473 ITR 148 (Bom.):

A. Y. 2017-18: Date of order 4th July, 2024:

Ss. 147, 148, 148A(b), 148A(d) and 151A of ITA 1961:

Reassessment — Faceless assessment — Notice — New procedure — Effect of provisions of s. 151A and notification dated 29th March, 2022 issued by Central Government — Notice issued by jurisdictional AO invalid:

On a writ petition challenging the initial notice issued by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer u/s. 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the order passed on such notice u/s. 148A(d) and the consequent notice issued u/s. 148 for the A. Y. 2017-18 for reopening the assessment u/s. 147 the Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“The jurisdictional Assessing Officer did not have jurisdiction to issue the notice u/s. 148 to reopen the assessment u/s. 147 in view of the provisions of section 151A read with the notification dated 29th March, 2022 ([2022] 442 ITR (St.) 198) issued by the Central Government. The initial notice issued u/s. 148A(b) and the order u/s. 148A(d) were set aside. The consequent notice issued u/s. 148 was illegal and invalid.”

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Limitation — Date of commencement of limitation period — Reference to DRP — Directions of DRP uploaded on 31st January, 2022 in income-tax business application portal visible and accessible by AO — Intimation of order of DRP received by AO on 3rd February, 2022 and assessment completed on 22nd March, 2022 — Held, assessment order barred by limitation:

8. CIT vs. Ramco Cements Ltd.:

[2025] 474 ITR 9 (Mad):

A. Y. 2017-18: Date of order 19th December, 2024:

Ss.143(3), 144B and 144C(13) of ITA 1961

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Limitation — Date of commencement of limitation period — Reference to DRP — Directions of DRP uploaded on 31st January, 2022 in income-tax business application portal visible and accessible by AO — Intimation of order of DRP received by AO on 3rd February, 2022 and assessment completed on 22nd March, 2022 — Held, assessment order barred by limitation:

The order of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) was uploaded on 31st January, 2022 in the Department’s portal of Income-tax Business Application for National e-Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi. The order was received by the Assessing Officer on 3rd February, 2022 as per the case history data and the proceedings were completed by the Assessing Officer on 22nd March, 2022. On the questions of whether the date of receipt of direction of the DRP was 31st January 2022 or 3rd February, 2022 and whether the completion of proceedings by 22nd March, 2022 was within the time limit stipulated u/s. 144C(13), the Madras High Court, dismissing the appeal filed by the Revenue, held as under:

“i) The commencement of limitation for the passing of the final assessment order is 30 days from the end of the month when the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel are received by the Assessing Officer. Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is a code by itself that provides for very strict timelines for completion of an assessment. Hence the stipulation in regard to limitation cannot be reckoned in a manner so as to give rise to more than one interpretation, where either party can take benefit of a later date.

ii) The communication from the Dispute Resolution Panel to the Tribunal confirmed that the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel had been uploaded in the Income-tax Business Application on 31st January, 2022 itself. Since the Income-tax Business Application portal could be accessed by both the assessee as well as the Assessing Officer on their furnishing necessary credentials, the point that remained to be determined was how there could be two dates, i. e., 31st January, 2022 and 3rd February, 2022, when the same order was served upon the Faceless Assessment Officer and which date was to be reckoned as the point of commencement of limitation.

iii) The internal processes followed by the Income-tax Department make it possible for the user to initiate proceedings in the Income-tax Business Application portal using two methodologies. According to the unmasking report, if the Dispute Resolution Panel user selects the option of “draft order u/s. 144C” in the screen, then a link is created with the assessment module such that the direction passed by the Dispute Resolution Panel would automatically be reflected in the case history or notings of the Assessing Officer, both the Faceless Assessment Officer and jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The second method is where the Dispute Resolution Panel user has initiated proceedings, by using the option of manually entering the details of the order u/s. 144C in the screen. In such circumstances, the Dispute Resolution Panel order does not reflect automatically in the case history or notings of the assessment proceedings. According to the report, the second option had been availed by the Dispute Resolution Panel user and hence though the order was uploaded by the Dispute Resolution Panel user in the Income-tax Business Application on 31st January, 2022 itself, such uploading was not noticed by the Assessing Officer. However, as far as the Assessing Officer was concerned, an advisory issued by the Income-tax Business Application team on visibility of orders passed by Dispute Resolution Panels to other Income-tax Business Application users, was relevant. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the advisory stipulated the two methods or options for uploading of the order. However, whatever be the method chosen, the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel would be visible in the 360-degree screen to the Faceless Assessment Officer, if any assessment work-item were pending with him, in relation to a permanent account number. In other words, in the event of pending assessment proceedings, he would have to key in the concerned permanent account number of the assessee, such that, panoramic, 360-degree visibility was available to him to view the Dispute Resolution Panel directions as and when uploaded, which in the assessee’s case was on 31st January, 2022. The order of assessment dated 22nd March, 2022 had been passed u/s. 143(3) read with section 144C(13) read with section 144B. This provision required an assessment to be framed only in faceless mode by a Faceless Assessment Officer and it was he who had framed the assessment. The advisory had made it clear that the Faceless Assessment Officer would be able to view the Dispute Resolution Panel order in the 360-degree screen, since the assessment was pending with him. This feature had evidently been provided to ensure that an officer could access or receive the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel as soon as it was uploaded by the Secretariat of the Dispute Resolution Panel and the pending proceedings would be completed within the statutory limitation provided. Hence, there was no protection available to the Department by the Dispute Resolution Panel user having selected the second manual option, since an Assessing Officer, in order to ensure that the assessment proceedings were strictly in accordance with statutory limitation, had been given full and complete access to all inputs required for completion of the assessment including the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel immediately on their uploading into the Income-tax Business Application portal by the Dispute Resolution Panel. Clearly, limitation could not be dependent on varying user functionalities which were nothing but internal processes. If such contention was accepted, the commencement of limitation would vary depending on the option exercised by the user which would defeat the purpose of statutory limitation. The starting point of limitation was thus to be reckoned from the earliest instance when the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel would be visible to the officer and could not be taken to fluctuate from one methodology to another depending on the option exercised by the user. The concluding portion of the advisory stated that the Dispute Resolution Panel order would be visible in the 360-degree screen to the Faceless Assessment Officer for his ready access. Therefore, all that was required to gain complete and up-to-date access to all relevant data in regard to an assessment would be available on the 360-degree screen.

iv) The fact that the Faceless Assessment Officer had merely chosen to await intimation when the order u/s. 144C had admittedly been uploaded on the Income-tax Business Application by the Dispute Resolution Panel user, and his consequent belated response, could not lead to a situation of disadvantage to the assessee, particularly when the advisory provides a methodology by which the Faceless Assessment Officer could access the document uploaded by the Dispute Resolution Panel simultaneously. The Tribunal was right in holding that the date of receipt of the direction of the Dispute Resolution Panel by the Assessing Officer was 31st January, 2022 being the date of uploading of the order of the Dispute Resolution Panel in the Department’s portal or website though the intimation of the Dispute Resolution Panel’s order was received by the Assessing Officer only on 3rd February, 2022 as per the case history data and the completion of the proceedings by the Assessing Officer on 22nd March, 2022.”

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal — Powers of Appellate Tribunal — Power to rectify mistakes in its order — Failure to follow law laid down by jurisdictional High Court — Mistake to be rectified — Matter remanded to Tribunal: Precedent — Decision of High Court — Binding on all income-tax authorities under its jurisdiction:

7. Uttar Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. vs. ITO:

[2025] 473 ITR 729 (Guj):

A. Y. 2010-11, 2012-13 to 2014-15:

Date of order 1st April, 2024:

S. 254 of ITA 1961

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal — Powers of Appellate Tribunal — Power to rectify mistakes in its order — Failure to follow law laid down by jurisdictional High Court — Mistake to be rectified — Matter remanded to Tribunal:

Precedent — Decision of High Court — Binding on all income-tax authorities under its jurisdiction:

The petitioner-company is owned by the Government of Gujarat and carrying on business of distribution of electricity. For the A. Y. 2013-14, the petitioner filed return of income on 30th September, 2013 declaring the total income at ₹nil after claiming set-off of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation. The case of the petitioner was selected for scrutiny assessment by issuing notice dated 4th September, 2014 u/s. 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and final assessment order was passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 29th December, 2016. The Assessing Officer, while framing the assessment, treated the interest income received on staff loan and other advances along with the miscellaneous receipt as income from other sources as against the income from business or profession as declared by the petitioner. Other additions were also made by the Assessing Officer.

The CIT(Appeals) partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. In the appeal before the Tribunal the assessee had relied on the judgment of the jurisdictional Gujarat High Court which was not considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the Miscellaneous Application filed by the assessee seeking review of the order of the Tribunal.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The decision of a High Court, is binding on all subordinate courts and Appellate Tribunals within the territory of the State and subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court. Not following the binding decision of the co-ordinate Bench and jurisdictional High Court rendered on identical facts would be a mistake apparent on record which could be rectified by the Appellate Tribunal u/s. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

ii) The Tribunal could not have taken a different view from what was already taken by the co-ordinate Bench under similar facts which was confirmed by this court in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT in Tax Appeal No. 63 of 2020 dated 16th March, 2020 (Guj). The Tribunal in Gujarat UrjaVikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT in Tax Appeal No. 63 of 2020 dated 16th March, 2020 (Guj) had held that interest income on staff loans was required to be treated as “business income” instead of “income from other sources” which was confirmed on appeal by this court. The decisions of the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal and this court were binding upon the Tribunal. When the Tribunal had not followed the decision on the identical facts by the co-ordinate Bench which was confirmed by this court, there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record in the order passed by the Tribunal which ought to have been considered by the Tribunal and the miscellaneous application filed by the assessee could not have been dismissed.

iii) The order of the Tribunal was set aside. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal to pass orders afresh. [Matter remanded.]”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

2. Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors.

(2025) 473 ITR 394 (SC)

Offences and Prosecutions – Offence under Section 276CC of the Act – Wilful failure by the Assessee in furnishing the return of income which he is required to furnish under Sub-section (1) of Section 139 – The date immediately following the due date for filing of return which is to be considered as the date of commission of the offence – Guidelines for Compounding of Offence, 2014 – The guidelines allow only those offences to be treated as the “first offence” which are committed by the Assessee either prior to a notice that he is liable to prosecution under the Act for the commission of such offences or those offences which are voluntarily disclosed by the Assessee to the Department before they come to be detected – The latter part of the definition of the expression “first offence” is not to curtail the scope of the first half but to expand its ambit by including those cases where the Assessee comes forward on his own initiative and discloses the commission of the offence

The Appellant before the Supreme Court was an individual earning income by way of salary and also by way of share of profit of partnership firm engaged in the business of chemicals. He filed his income tax returns for the AY 2011-12 and 2013-14 on 4th March, 2013 and 29th November, 2014 respectively declaring his income to be  ₹49,79,700/- and ₹31,87,420/- respectively. The due dates for the filing of returns for AY 2011-12 and 2013-14 were 30th September, 2011 and 31st October, 2013 respectively and as such there was delay on the part of the Appellant in filing the return of income for the said assessment years.

On 27th October, 2014, a show cause notice was issued to the Appellant by the Commissioner of Income Tax – III, Baroda alleging violation of Section 276CC of the Act for the AY 2011-12. The notice stated that:

“On examination of records, it is seen that you have furnished your return of income for the assessment year 2011-12 declaring total income of ₹49,79,700/- on 4.3.2013. Further, after allowing credit of prepaid taxes, you were liable to pay self assessment tax of ₹0/- by due date of filing of return. Later, your return of income was processed Under Section 143(1) of the Act 20.3.2013 determining demand of ₹0/- out of which ₹0 is still pending.”

Although the due date for filing the income tax return for the AY 2011-12 was 1st August, 2011 yet the Appellant had filed the same with delay on 4th March, 2013. The notice further stated that after allowing for the credit of prepaid taxes, the Appellant was liable to pay self-assessment tax of ₹0/- which however remained unpaid by the due date prescribed for the filing of return of income. In the last, the Appellant was called upon to show cause as to why proceedings under Section 276CC of the Act should not be initiated against him.

The Appellant replied to the aforesaid show cause notice along with the application for compounding in accordance with the Guidelines for Compounding of Offence, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2008 guidelines”). The application, along with application for compounding the delay in filing of return of income for two other years came to be allowed vide order dated 11th November, 2014.

Thereafter, on 12th March, 2015, the Appellant received another show cause notice as regards launching of prosecution under Section 276CC of the Act for the AY 2013-2014 issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Vadodara – III. The notice stated that the Appellant had furnished the return of income for AY 2013-14 declaring a total income of ₹31,87,420/- on 29th November, 2014 and after allowing for the credit of prepaid taxes the Appellant was liable to pay self-assessment tax of ₹2,78,740/-. The notice further called upon the Appellant to show cause as to why proceedings under Section 276CC of the Act should not be initiated against him as he had filed his return of income after the expiry of the due date.

The Appellant replied to the aforesaid notice along with an application for compounding as per the Guidelines for Compounding of Offence, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2014 guidelines”). In his reply, the Appellant stated that he had filed the return of income belatedly because necessary funds were not available with him to enable him to pay the assessed amount of tax. He further stated that the delay in filing of the return of income was neither deliberate nor wilful.

By an order dated 14th February, 2017 passed under Section 279(2) of the Act, the Respondent No. 1 rejected the compounding application of the Appellant. The Respondent No. 1 took the view that the case of the Appellant was not fit for compounding as a committee comprising of Principal CCIT Gujarat, CCIT Vadodara, DGIT (Investigation) Ahmedabad and the CCIT – II Ahmedabad in the minutes recorded of the meeting dated 25th January, 2017 had opined that the Assessee had filed his return of income for AY 2013-14 after the show cause notice for the offence under Section 276CC for offence during AY 2011-12 had already been issued. Therefore, as per the committee, the offence committed by the Appellant under Section 276CC for the AY 2013-14 would not be covered by the expression “first offence” as defined in the 2014 guidelines.

The Appellant challenged the aforesaid order passed by the Respondent No. 1 before the High Court of Gujarat by way of Special Civil Application No. 5386 of 2017. The Appellant, who was the Petitioner before the High Court, contended that his compounding application had been rejected by Respondent No. 1 solely on the ground that the offence alleged to have been committed by the Appellant of belated filing of the return of income for AY 2013-14 was not covered by the expression “first offence” as defined in the 2014 guidelines. The Appellant further submitted that the show cause notice for the initiation of prosecution issued under Section 276CC of the Act for AY 2013-14 was issued on 12th February, 2015 whereas he had already filed the return of income for the said assessment year on 29th November, 2014, that is, much before the issuance of show cause notice on 12th February, 2015 and therefore it could not be said that it was not the first offence. It was also contended by the Appellant that the Respondent had erroneously computed the date of issuance of show cause notice for AY 2011-12 for the purpose of holding that the Appellant had committed the offence post that date. Lastly, it was argued by the Appellant that the 2014 guidelines are only general guidelines and are not in the nature of strict law and thus are to be construed accordingly. The Appellant submitted that the general nature of the guidelines was also suggested by the heading “offences generally not to be compounded” used in the said Guidelines.

However, the High Court rejected the Special Civil Application of the Appellant vide the impugned judgment and order dated 21st March, 2017 taking the view that the contention of the Appellant was based on a misreading of the Clause 8(ii) of the 2014 guidelines. The High Court held that although the show-cause notice for AY 2011-12 was issued on 27th October, 2014, yet the Appellant filed the return of income for the AY 2013-14 on 29th November, 2014 and thus could be said to have committed the offence under Section 276CC of the Act for the AY 2013-14 after the show cause notice for the AY 2011-12 had already been issued. It was further observed by the High Court that the circumstances surrounding the delay in the filing of return of income by the Appellant were not required to be considered in detail by the compounding authority and the same would be considered during the course of the trial.

In such circumstances referred to above, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that Section 276CC punishes the wilful failure by the Assessee in furnishing the following types of returns in due time:

a. Return of fringe benefits which he is required to furnish under Sub-section (1) of Section 115WD or by notice given under Sub-section (2) of the said Section or Section 115WH; or

b. Return of income which he is required to furnish under Sub-section (1) of Section 139 or by notice given under Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148 or Section 153A.

The Supreme Court further noted that Section 139(1) inter alia provides that every person shall, on or before the due date, furnish a return of his income during the previous year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed. Sub-section (4) of Section 139 provides that if a person has failed to furnish the return of income within due time prescribed under Sub-section (1), then he may furnish the return for any previous year at any time before the end of the relevant assessment year or before the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier.

According to the Supreme Court, to fully understand the import of Section 276CC of the Act, it was necessary to understand the meaning of the expressions “wilfully fails” and “in due time” used in the said provision respectively.

The Supreme Court observed that in Prakash Nath Khanna vs. CIT reported in (2004) 9 SCC 686, it was called upon to look into the scope and meaning of the expression “in due time” appearing in Section 276CC of the Act and whether it refers to the time period referred to in Section 139(1) or the time period referred to in Section 139(4). The Supreme Court, after discussing the various methods of statutory interpretation, took the view that the legislative intent behind Section 276CC, undoubtedly, was to restrict the meaning of the expression “in due time” used in the said provision to the time period referred to in Section 139(1) and not to the time period referred to in Section 139(4). Explaining the meaning of the expression “wilful failure”, the Court observed that the same has to be adjudicated factually by the trial court dealing with the prosecution of the case. The Court further observed that by virtue of Section 278E, the trial court has to presume the existence of culpable mental state and it would be open to the Accused to plead the absence of the same in his defence.

According to the Supreme Court, what was discernable from the aforesaid decision of Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT was that an offence under Section 276CC could be said to have been committed as soon as there is a failure on the part of the Assessee in furnishing the return of income within the due time as prescribed under Section 139(1) of the Act. Subsequent furnishing of the return of income by the Assessee within the time limit prescribed under Sub-section (4) of Section 139 or before prosecution is initiated does not have any bearing upon the fact that an offence under Section 276CC has been committed on the day immediately following the due date for furnishing return of income.

Thus, the Supreme Court was of the view that the Appellant was right in his contention that the point in time when the offence under Section 276CC could be said to be committed is the day immediately following the due date prescribed for filing of return of income under Section 139(1) of the Act, and the actual date of filing of the return of income at a belated stage would not affect in any manner the determination of the date on which the offence under Section 276CC of the Act was committed.

According to the Supreme Court, this could also be discerned from Section 139(8) of the Act. A perusal of the provisions of section 139(8) makes it clear that irrespective of whether the return of income is filed by an Assessee after the specified date or is not furnished at all, the Assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate 15% reckoned from the day immediately following the specified date notwithstanding the fact that the Assessing Officer has extended the date for furnishing of return.

According to the Supreme Court accepting the contention of the Respondents would mean that the commission of an offence under Section 276CC is made contingent upon the filing of the actual belated return by an Assessee. This could never have been the intention of the legislature in enacting the provision as such a reading would mean that no Assessee would file a return of income after the due date has expired and despite such failure would be able to escape any liability under Section 276CC of the Act.

The Supreme Court observed that in the present case, the due-date for filing the return of income for the AY 2011-12 was 30th September, 2011. The Appellant filed his return with delay on 04th March, 2013. Hence, as the return was filed beyond the due date for filing the return, an offence under Section 276CC could be said to have been committed by the Appellant prima facie.

Similarly, the due date for filing the return of income for the AY 2013-14 was 31st October, 2013, whereas the Appellant filed the return for the said year on 29th November, 2014. Hence, the Appellant once again breached the requirement of Section 276CC and thus committed an offence as defined under the said provision.

According to the Supreme Court, even otherwise, it has not been disputed by the Appellant that an offence under Section 276CC was committed by him for AYs 2011-12 and 2013-14 respectively, and he had preferred compounding applications for both the assessment years. While his compounding application for the AY 2011-12 came to be allowed, his compounding application for the AY 2013-14 was rejected by Respondent No. 1 and the rejection was upheld by the High Court vide the impugned order.

The Supreme Court noted that the Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014 were issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Department of Revenue, Government of India in supersession of the previous guidelines which were issued on 16th May, 2008. These guidelines were one in line of many guidelines which were issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes from time to time to provide guiding principles for the exercise of the power conferred by Section 279(2) of the Act which allows compounding of offences by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Director General either before or after the institution of proceedings.

The Supreme Court noted that Paragraph 8 of the guidelines prescribes offences which are generally not to be compounded under the compounding guidelines. It provides that a Category A offence which is sought to be compounded by an applicant in whose case compounding was allowed in the past in an offence under the same Section for which the present compounding application has been made on three occasions or more shall not be compounded. Secondly, it prescribes that category B offences will not be generally compounded other than the first offence as defined in the guidelines.

A “first offence” has been defined as follows:
“First offence means offence under any of the Direct Tax Laws committed prior to (a) the date of issue of any show- cause notice for prosecution or (b) any intimation relating to prosecution by the Department to the person concerned or (c) launching of any prosecution, whichever is earlier;

OR

Offence not detected by the department but voluntarily disclosed by a person prior to the filing of application for compounding of offence in the case under any Direct Tax Acts. For this purpose, offence is relevant if it is committed by the same entity. The first offence is to be determined separately with reference to each Section of the Act under which it is committed.”

The Supreme Court noted that as per Paragraph 12.4 of the 2014 guidelines the compounding fee to be levied in the case of an offence under Section 276CC is to be reckoned from the date immediately following the date on which return was due. The Supreme Court opined that this is in consonance with Section 139(8) of the Act and further fortifies the argument of the Appellant that it was not the date of actual filing of belated return, but the date immediately following the due date for filing of return which is to be considered as the date of commission of the offence.

The Supreme Court observed that the show cause notice for the AY 2011-12 was issued to the Appellant on 27th October, 2014. However, the offence under Section 276CC of the Act could be said to have been committed on the dates immediately following the due date for furnishing the return of income for both these assessment years respectively. Thus, the offence for the AY 2011-12 could be said to have been committed on 1st October, 2011 and the offence for the AY 2013-14 could be said to have been committed on 1st November, 2013. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, it could be said that both the offences under Section 276CC of the Act were committed prior to the date of issue of any show cause notice for prosecution.

The Supreme Court noted the Respondents had contended that even if the offences committed by the Appellant for AY 2011-12 and AY 2013-14 could be said to have been committed before the issuance of the show cause notice dated 27th October, 2014, the Appellant would still be covered by the subsequent part of the definition of “first offence” as the Appellant had voluntarily disclosed the commission of the offences for the AY 2011-12 and 2013-14 respectively by filing belated return of income for the said assessment years. In other words, the Respondents contended that the very act of filing belated return of income by the Appellant amounts to voluntary disclosure of commission of offence for the purpose of Paragraph 8 of the 2014 guidelines which defines the expression “first offence”.

The Supreme Court found it difficult to agree with the contention advanced by the Respondents that even if the Appellant is not covered by the first part of the definition of the expression “first offence”, he will still be covered by the latter half.

The Supreme Court observed that the scheme that permeates Paragraph 8 of the 2014 guidelines allows only those offences to be treated as the “first offence” which are committed by the Assessee either prior to a notice that he is liable to prosecution under the Act for the commission of such offences or those offences which are voluntarily disclosed by the Assessee to the Department before they come to be detected. The latter part of the definition of the expression “first offence” is not to curtail the scope of the first half but to expand its ambit by including those cases where the Assessee comes forward on his own initiative and discloses the commission of the offence. The meaning as sought to be given by the Respondents to Paragraph 8 of the 2014 guidelines would turn the very purpose of having a two-fold definition of “first offence” on its head and thus cannot be accepted for it would take away the incentive of coming forward and voluntarily disclosing the commission of offences from erring-Assessees.

The Supreme Court further observed that Paragraph 4 of the 2014 guidelines specifies that compounding is not a matter of right of the Assessee and the competent authority may allow the compounding application upon being satisfied that the applicant fulfills the eligibility conditions and keeping in mind the conduct of the applicant, nature and magnitude of the offence and the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, Paragraph 7 of the guidelines prescribes the eligibility conditions and Paragraph 8 provides those cases which are generally not to be compounded. Paragraph 9 carves out an exception and empowers the Minister of Finance to relax the conditions laid down in Paragraph 8 of the 2014 guidelines and allow compounding in a deserving case.

According to the Supreme Court, a plain reading of the 2014 guidelines reveals that while it is mandatory that the eligibility conditions prescribed under Paragraph 7 are to be satisfied, the restrictions laid down in Paragraph 8 have to be read along with Paragraph 4 of the Act which provides that the exercise of discretion by the competent authority is to be guided by the facts and circumstances of each case, the conduct of the Appellant and nature and magnitude of offence. Seen thus, it becomes clear that the restrictions laid down in Paragraph 8 of the guidelines are although required to be generally followed, the guidelines do not exclude the possibility that in a peculiar case where the facts and circumstances so require, the competent authority cannot make an exception and allow the compounding application.

The Supreme Court also had the benefit of looking at the Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2019 and the Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2022 issued by the CBDT. In both the said Guidelines, the offence under Section 276CC has been made a Category A offence instead of a Category B offence and is compoundable up to three occasions. According to the Supreme Court, although this would not have any direct implication on the case at hand since the same is governed by the 2014 guidelines, yet what it indicates is that there is a clear shift in the policy of the Department when it comes to the compounding of offences under Section 276CC in particular and in making the compounding regime more flexible and liberal in particular.

For all the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court held that the High Court fell in error in rejecting the writ petition filed by the Appellant against the order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Vadodara rejecting the application for compounding. The offence as alleged to have been committed by the Appellant under Section 276CC of the Act for the AY 2013-14 was, without a doubt, covered by the expression “first offence” as defined under the 2014 guidelines and thus the compounding application preferred by the Appellant could not have been rejected by Respondent No. 1 on this ground alone.

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court as well as the order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Vadodara dated 14th February, 2017 rejecting the compounding application of the Appellant.

The Supreme Court directed that the Appellant shall prefer a fresh application for compounding before the competent authority within two weeks from the date of this judgment and the same shall be adjudicated by the competent authority having regard to the conduct of the Appellant, the nature of the offence and the facts and circumstances of the case within a period of four weeks from the date on which the application is filed by the Appellant. The proceedings pending before the Trial Court shall remain stayed pending the decision of the competent authority on the compounding application of the Appellant. In the event the fresh compounding application of the Appellant is accepted by the competent authority, the proceedings pending before the Trial Court shall stand abated. If the compounding application is rejected by the competent authority, then the trial shall continue and be brought to its logical conclusion.

The appeal was disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Section 194T – When Taxman Becomes A Silent Partner

Just as partners were settling into their cozy routines of profit-sharing (and occasional stationery disputes), Section 194T stormed into their lives like an uninvited relative at a family dinner—bringing along uncomfortable questions on mismatched Form 26AS entries, accidental GST invitations and sleepless nights for accountants. So, before your accountant contemplates early retirement, dive into this article and decode how to stay friends with the taxman (without losing your partners).

Budget Day in a Chartered Accountant’s life is no less dramatic than the final episode of a Netflix thriller—filled with suspense, sudden twists, and characters (read: taxpayers) you genuinely root for. WhatsApp groups explode faster than popcorn in the microwave, Excel sheets open quicker than umbrellas in Mumbai rains, and suddenly, everyone becomes a tax guru on LinkedIn. Gone are the nostalgic days when earnest CAs gathered in packed study circles, scribbling meticulous budget notes—today, they’re all busy crafting witty LinkedIn posts that get more likes than actual attendance at study circles! Tax professionals, lawyers, and CAs sharpen their keyboards (farewell, pencils!) to dissect, decode, and divine the implications—hoping, praying, and often failing to figure out: who gets hit this year?

This time, it was the humble partnership firm and its partners who found themselves at the receiving end of a legislative surprise—Section 194T, introduced via the Finance Act (No. 2) of 2024. It came in like an uninvited guest at a birthday party: no warning, no cake, just impact. As memes were made and coffee mugs cracked, tax teams scrambled to understand how this provision would affect the sacred bond between a firm and its partners. Many firms (including ours) realised—perhaps for the first time—that the best way to understand the law is to feel its full weight… personally.

However, before we cry over spilt revenue, let’s take a step back and admire the beauty of partnerships. A partnership is a living, breathing embodiment of the phrase Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—the world is one family—except here, the family files a return, divides profits, and sometimes fights over stationery expenses. While firms operate with collective force, the moment profit-sharing discussions begin, the kumbaya turns into a Game of Thrones episode. Seniority, goodwill, rain-making ability, negotiation prowess (and sometimes just how loud one can argue in partner meetings) all go into deciding who gets how much of the pie.

In this article, we set out to explore how one provision will trigger far reaching impact. The conventional story of a pound of flesh holds good – there will be pain, there will be scar, but no drop of blood. Moreover, of course, all this against the backdrop of traditional issues faced by firms: the perennial people crunch (more humans, fewer hands), client fee pressure, and the age-old CA paradox—“Why is my own assignment never billable?”

So, brace yourself as we untangle the interwoven threads of tax, teamwork, and turf wars. After all, when the firm is the stage, and profits are the script, Section 194T might just rewrite the title to: “To be or not to be a partner.” If you are the managing partner or heading compliance, expect your phone to buzz soon—your partners, after reading this, are likely typing a WhatsApp message right now: “Have you read this? We need to discuss!” You might as well stay ahead—block out 15 minutes to finish this article before their queries land in your inbox.

PARTNERSHIP TAX BASICS

Before diving into case studies, it’s important to understand how partnerships are taxed and how partners are compensated under the Income-tax Act. Here is a quick refresher:

  •  Meaning of Partnership firm, partner – firm

“Partnership” is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profit of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all.

Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually “partners” and collectively “a firm”, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the “firm name”.

Partner and partnership stems from legal agreement. The scheme of taxation will accordingly apply to partners who are partners in the agreement. People who are designated as partners to external stakeholders but who are not parties to the partnership deed will not be governed by the scheme.

  •  Firm as a Separate Entity

A partnership firm (including an LLP) is a separate person for tax purposes (per Section 2(31)). The firm files its own return and pays tax on its income like any other assessee, with a flat tax rate for firms of approximately 34.944%. It is possible that partners may be taxed at 39% or upwards. Given that the share of profit is exempt, this tax rate arbitrage is significant.

  •  Share of Profit – Tax-Free for Partners

After the firm pays tax on its profits, those profits can be distributed to partners as their share of the profit, which is exempt in the partners’ hands under Section 10(2A). This avoids double taxation of the same profit. Notably, this exemption holds true even in unusual scenarios – for instance, if the firm’s taxable income is nil due to brought-forward losses, a partner’s share of profit is still exempt. The same applies if the partner is not an individual, but another firm – a partnership firm receiving profit from another firm also enjoys a Section 10(2A) exemption1.


1. Jalaram Transport vs. ACIT [2025] 170 taxmann.com 303 (Raipur - Trib.); 
Radha Krishna Jalan vs. CIT [2007] 294 ITR 28 (Gauhati High Court)

In short, once the income has suffered tax at the firm level, it is not taxed again when passed through as a profit share.

One ongoing controversy is the meaning of share of profit, i.e. what is exempt. Is profit credited in books of account exempt, or is profit computed in accordance with profit and gains of the business or profession exempt, or is profit computed based on firm total income exempt? The difference between book profit and taxable profit is for a variety of reasons: depreciation charge, computation of capital gain (say due to 31st March 2018 grandfathering), tax exemption for GIFT City unit, disallowance under Act, etc. This issue has been the subject matter of controversy in under-noted decisions2 Share of profit would also include income not taxable in the hands of the firm.3 The conclusion of this controversy will be important as the amount paid in excess of the share of profit will be remuneration, which will be subject to TDS under section 194T.


2. Circular No. 8/2014 dated 31-3-2014; S. Seethalakshmi vs. ITO [2021] 128
taxmann.com 175 (Chennai - Trib.); Explanation to section 10(2A);
3. Vidya Investment & Trading Co. (P.) Ltd vs. UOI [2014] 43 taxmann.com 1
(Karnataka).
  •  Remuneration & Interest – Taxable for Partners

In addition to profit share, many partners receive remuneration from the firm – this can be called salary, bonus, commission, monthly drawings, etc. – as well as interest on capital if they’ve invested capital in the firm. These payments are taxable in the hands of the partners (not as “Salaries”, though, but as business income). Section 28(v) specifically treats any salary, bonus, commission or interest from the firm as a partner’s business profit. For the firm, such payments are deductible expenses, but only if they meet the conditions of Section 40(b). Section 40(b) imposes an upper cap on how much partner’s remuneration can be deducted by the firm, linked to the “book profit” of the firm. For example, for a firm with low profits, there is a ceiling (e.g. ₹3 lakh or 90% of book profit or 60% of book profit, etc., as per 40(b)) on deductible remuneration. Amounts beyond the 40(b) limit, if paid, will be disallowed – meaning the firm can’t deduct them (and will pay firm-level tax on those). This excess is not taxable as remuneration in the hands of the partner as per Explanation to section 28(v)

  •  Reconstitution of Firm – Special Rules

When a firm is reconstituted (say, a partner retires, a new partner joins, or profit-sharing ratios change), there can be additional tax implications under Sections 9B and 45(4). In essence, these provisions tax certain capital assets or money distributions that happen upon reconstitution or dissolution. Section 9B deems the firm to have sold any assets or inventory distributed to a partner (triggering capital gains or business income at the firm level). Section 45(4) then may tax the firm on any money or asset given to a partner in excess of that partner’s capital account balance (a formula essentially taxing the firm for paying out accumulated reserves or goodwill). The key point is that these provisions tax the firm, not the partner. The partner’s receipt in such cases (be it cash or assets during retirement or reconstitution) is typically not taxed in the partner’s hands (it is treated as a realisation of their capital interest). Thus, if a partner gets paid during a reconstitution event, that payment might trigger tax for the firm under 45(4)/9B, but the partner doesn’t separately pay income tax on it. As we’ll see, Section 194T specifically carves these situations out of its scope, recognising that those payouts are not in the nature of taxable remuneration to the partner.

With this groundwork laid, let’s introduce the protagonist of our story: Section 194T – the new TDS provision that has sent partnership firms back to the drawing board.

SECTION 194T – THE TAXMAN JOINS THE PARTNERSHIP

Effective from 1st April, 2025, any partnership firm or LLP making payments to its partners now faces a tax withholding duty. In plain language, the firm must deduct tax at source (TDS) at 10% on most forms of partner payouts. Here are the key features of Section 194T:

  •  Scope of Payments

“Any amount in the nature of salary, remuneration, commission, bonus or interest” paid or credited to a partner is covered. The law uses broad terms (“by whatever name called”), ensuring that whether you label it monthly salary, annual bonus, commission for bringing in clients, or interest on capital, it’s all under Section 194T’s umbrella.

  •  Exclusions:

Notably, genuine profit distributions are not mentioned in that list – so the taxman isn’t taking a bite out of the exempt share of profit. Similarly, withdrawals of capital (like when a partner takes out some of their capital or upon retirement) are outside Section 194T. In other words, Section 194T targets what we might call “partner compensation” but not the return of capital or after-tax profit share. The Memorandum to the Finance Bill and subsequent analysis clarify that payments on dissolution or reconstitution (governed by 45(4)/9B as discussed) are not subject to TDS under 194T. The firm doesn’t have to withhold tax when merely giving a partner his own capital or post-tax accumulated profit – those are more like balance sheet transactions, not income payments.

  •  Threshold – A Whopping ₹20,000

Yes, twenty thousand rupees per year, aggregated per partner. If the total of covered payments to a partner is ₹20,000 or less in the financial year, no TDS is required. However, if it likely exceeds ₹20,000, then TDS applies from rupee one. Practically, ₹20k is a very low bar – even a small firm paying token interest on capital will breach it.

  •  Timing of Deduction

Like most TDS provisions, it’s whichever is earlier – the moment of credit to the partner’s account (including credit to their capital account) or actual payment. This prevents clever timing tricks. For example, if a firm accrues a bonus to the partner’s capital account at year-end instead of paying it out, that credit is enough to trigger TDS in that year.

Practically, some elements of remuneration, like bonuses or commissions, are linked with firm performance. Typically, books are finalised towards September, i.e. near to tax audit due date. Now, the law requires a deduction of TDS on the said amount which is determined later. The TDS for March needs to be deposited by April 30, and the TDS return needs to be filed by May. Practically, the firm will have to deduct tax on a provisional basis and thereafter amend the TDS return to reflect accurate figures.

  • Residents, Non-Residents, Working, Non-Working – All Partners

Unlike some sections that distinguish non-residents (section 195) or require the payee to be a “specified person,” Section 194T casts a wide net. There’s no exception for non-resident partners (so resident firm paying, say, interest to an NRI partner must deduct 10% plus applicable surcharge/cess, subject to treaty relief later). If a partner is non-resident, it may be better view to treat such partner as having business connection in India and deduct tax at 30% plus cess and surcharge under section 195.

Even minor partners or partner’s representatives are covered. Also, it doesn’t matter whether the partner is a “working partner” taking an active part or a sleeping partner – interest paid to a dormant partner is equally subject to TDS. Essentially, if you have a “partner” label, any taxable payment from the firm triggers the tax withholding – period!

  • No Escape via Lower TDS Certificate

Interestingly, Section 194T was drafted without a provision to allow lower or NIL deduction certificates under Section 197. Tax professionals noted that you cannot approach the Assessing Officer to reduce the 10% rate, even if the partner’s final tax liability may be lower. Perhaps the logic was simplicity (10% is reasonably moderate). In any case, each partner will have to claim a refund or adjustment when filing returns if 10% TDS overshoots his actual tax liability (for example, if a partner’s income falls below the basic exemption or he has sizeable deductible expenditure against his partnership income).

  •  Compliance Burden & Consequences

Firms now have to obtain TAN, deduct 10% every time a partner’s pay is credited/paid, deposit the TDS by the due date, file TDS returns, and issue TDS certificates to partners. Non-compliance has teeth: the usual disallowance under Section 40(a) (ia) will apply. That means if a firm fails to deduct or pay the TDS, 30% of the corresponding partner payment will be disallowed as an expense, adding to the firm’s own taxable income, plus interest and penalties on the TDS default itself. In short, the cost of ignoring 194T is far heavier than the pain of compliance.

KEY CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 194T

Section 194T (introduced w.e.f. April 1, 2025) brings partnership firms into the TDS net for payments to partners. While the intent is to improve reporting, it has thrown up some quirky tax compliance and reporting challenges. Below, we unpack the major issues.

MISMATCH BETWEEN FORM 26AS AND PARTNERS’ INCOME (SECTION 28(V) VS 10(2A))

One immediate challenge is the mismatch between the income shown in Form 26AS and the income the partner actually offers to tax under Section 28(v). Section 28(v) taxes a partner’s remuneration, interest, bonus or commission from the firm as business income, while Section 10(2A) exempts the partner’s share of profit from the firm. Trouble arises when a firm, in an abundance of caution, deducts TDS on conservative estimatesincluding amounts that might eventually be just the partner’s profit share. For instance, firms often allow partners to take profit draws (interim withdrawals of anticipated profits) during the year. If the firm treats these draws as potentially taxable payments and deducts 10% TDS on them, the partner’s Form 26AS will reflect a higher “income” (under Section 194T) than what the partner actually needs to declare as taxable income in return.

Such a scenario is not just theoretical – it is expected in practice. Consider an example: A partner withdraws ₹30 lakh over the year from the firm against upcoming profits. By year-end, the firm’s books decide that out of this, ₹20 lakh is salary (allowable under the deed and taxable for the partner), and the remaining ₹10 lakh is adjusted against the partner’s share of profit. Under Section 194T, the firm, being conservative, might have deducted TDS on the full ₹30 lakh during the year. Consequently, Form 26AS for the partner shows ₹30 lakh credited (with TDS of ₹3 lakh). However, in the partner’s return, only ₹20 lakh is offered as income under Section 28(v) (the ₹10 lakh profit share is not taxable, thanks to Section 10(2A)). This “26AS vs. ITR” mismatch can set off alarm bells in the tax processing system.

Why does this mismatch happen? Section 194T requires TDS at the time of credit or payment, whichever is earlier. If the firm hasn’t definitively credited any salary/interest until year-end, any mid-year withdrawal is technically a “payment” and attracts TDS by law. In our example, every withdrawal got hit with TDS in real time. However, at year-end, when the dust settled, part of those withdrawals were not taxable income at all. The result: Form 26AS shows more income than the partner’s taxable business income. TDS ends up being “deducted where it is not actually deductible,” leading to tax being collected on amounts that never became taxable income. In short, the partner cannot make “income” from himself/herself, yet the TDS mechanism temporarily pretends that they did.

TDS CREDIT WOES UNDER SECTION 143(1)(A) AND RECTIFICATION NEEDS

The mismatch above isn’t just academic – it has real cash flow implications for partners. The Income Tax Department’s CPC (Centralized Processing Center) loves matching figures. When the partner’s return is processed under Section 143(1)(a), the system may notice that the income reported under Profits and Gains from Business/Profession is lower than the amounts on which TDS was deducted per Form 26AS. A straight-laced algorithm does not automatically grasp that the “missing” amount was exempt under Section 10(2A). Instead, it may treat it as under-reported income or disallowance. The immediate effect could be a denial of a portion of the TDS credit – the tax on the “mismatched” amount – in the intimation. In our example, the CPC might allow credit of TDS only proportional to the ₹20 lakh income acknowledged and hold back credit for the ₹10 lakh portion unless that income is brought into the computation. This leaves the partner with a tax-due notice or reduced refund, quite an unwelcome surprise.

Such partial credit denials have been observed whenever income–TDS mismatches occur. It often falls under the umbrella of a “mistake apparent from the record” that requires fixing. The partner then must file a rectification application under Section 154 to resolve the issue. In the rectification, one would cite that the seeming income shortfall was actually exempt profit income (backed by Section 10(2A) and the partnership firm’s audited accounts). Only after this hoop is jumped can the full TDS credit be restored. This procedure is about as enjoyable as watching paint dry – an additional compliance burden that eats up time for both the taxpayer and the department.

The irony is not lost on anyone: the department issues speedy refunds nowadays, yet much of that could be avoidable if the tax were not over-collected in the first place. So, partners finding only partial TDS credit in their 143(1) intimations should not be shocked; instead, gear up to file for rectification, citing the exempt income rationale. It is an extra step in implementing 194T, almost built-in by design.

THE GST ANGLE: WHEN TDS DATA TRIGGERS INDIRECT TAX TROUBLE

Section 194T’s fallout isn’t limited to direct tax. It has an indirect tax twist, thanks to data sharing between departments. Generally, a partner’s remuneration is not considered a “service” and thus not subject to GST – the logic being that a partner isn’t an employee but also isn’t exactly an outside service provider to their firm. In fact, the CBIC has clarified that the salary paid by a partnership firm to its partners “will notbe liable for GST.”. So far, so good on paper – the partner’s income from the firm should be outside GST’s scope.

However, practical reality can differ, especially when compliance data is picked up blindly. GST authorities have started leveraging Form 26AS and income-tax data to smoke out cases where they believe someone exceeded the GST registration threshold without registering. A partner’s receipts under Section 194T could inadvertently light such a beacon. Here’s how: Form 26AS might show substantial “payments to Mr X (Partner) from ABC Firm”, say ₹25 lakh in a year, with TDS under Section 194T. To a GST officer scanning data, that looks like Mr X provided services worth ₹25 lakh (crossing the ₹20 lakh threshold for services) without GST registration. The risk is higher if the nomenclature in the TDS records or books hints at something like “commission” or “professional fees” rather than just “partner’s salary.” Descriptions matter – a label like “partner’s commission” could be misread as if the partner acted as an outside agent to the firm rather than in the capacity of the partner. And crossing ₹20 lakh in any “service” receipts is like waving a big red flag in front of GST authorities.

In short, Section 194T can unintentionally invite the GST inspector to the party. The partner and the firm then have to prove a negative – that these receipts were not for any independent service. It is an added challenge to ensure that tax compliance in one law (TDS) doesn’t create confusion in another. One might quip that a partner now needs not only a good CA but also a good GST consultant on speed dial, just in case the left hand (direct tax) doesn’t tell the right hand (indirect tax) what it’s actually up to.

ACCOUNTANT – THE UNSUNG HERO (OR VILLAIN?) OF SECTION 194T COMPLIANCE

In the whirlwind of partner withdrawals, the accountant emerges not just as someone who balances books, but as the narrator who clearly categorises each payment. Indeed, an accountant capable of distinguishing between withdrawals from previous capital, share of profit, bonus, remuneration, interest, reimbursements, loans from the firm, or simply advances against future payments is nothing short of a rare gem. If your firm happens to have such a precious resource, my advice: keep it secret and keep it safe!

The sheer variety of payment nomenclatures is enough to confuse even the most diligent AO—leading to scenarios where the Taxman may meticulously scrutinise partner capital accounts, placing the horse firmly before the cart and demanding justification for TDS compliance decisions. Accurate accounting thus becomes the saving grace, the ultimate shield against unwarranted scrutiny.

Of course, this is far easier said than done. For most CA firms, self-accounting typically resembles a frantic race against the year-end – where many (or the majority) of the firms finalise the books and file tax returns almost on the eve of the compliance due date. Perhaps, if technology ever advances sufficiently, BCAJ could even host a live poll among readers—if only to humorously reaffirm the author’s suspicion that accountants who excel in accurate partner payment narratives are as common as multi-bagger sightings in Dalal Street!

PRACTICAL TIPS TO MITIGATE THE CHAOS

Implementing Section 194T need not be a nightmare scenario. Firms and partners can take practical steps to mitigate these issues and smooth out the rough edges:

  •  Align Income Reporting in the ITR

To pre-empt mismatches, partners may consider reporting the gross amount of firm-related receipts in their income tax return and then separately deducting/exempting the share of profit. In practice, this means if Form 26AS shows ₹30 lakh under Section 194T, the partner can report ₹30 lakh as gross receipts under business/profession in the ITR computation, then claim the ₹10 lakh (in our example) as exempt under Section 10(2A). This way, the income reported matches Form 26AS, and the exempt portion is clearly disclosed as such. It’s a bit of a workaround – effectively telling CPC, “Yes, I got ₹30 lakhs, but ₹10 lakh is tax-free” – but it can save you from the CPC’s automated mismatch adjustments.

Bottom line: mirror the Form 26AS in your ITR to the extent possible, and then claim your lawful exemptions within the return.

  •  Smart TDS Strategy for Firms

Firms can reduce mismatches by timing and characterising partner payments carefully. One approach is to credit partner remuneration and interest only at year-end (when profits are ascertained) and treat all interim withdrawals as drawings against capital or anticipated profits. If no specific portion of a draw is designated as “salary/interest” during the year, arguably, no TDS is required on mere drawings. The TDS can be deducted when the remuneration is actually credited (i.e. when it becomes income in the sense of Section 28(v)). Of course, firms must be cautious – this works best when the deed or mutual agreement supports it, and there is confidence that by year-end, some remuneration will indeed be authorised. If the firm ends up not crediting any salary due to losses or low profits, then no TDS on drawings was needed at all – avoiding the scenario of “tax paid without corresponding income”. In essence, don’t let the TDS tail wag the dog: deduct tax when income is crystallised, not simply whenever a partner taps the firm’s ATM. This requires discipline and documentation but can save everyone from unnecessary refund / reconciliation workouts.

  •  Partnership Deed Clauses – Clarity is King

It all starts with the deed – A sacred document which, before this amendment, was in some drawer which is today difficult to locate. To prevent misunderstandings, the partnership deed should explicitly define the nature of partner withdrawals and payments. For instance, include a clause that “any drawing by a partner during the year shall be treated as an advance against that partner’s share of profit unless specifically characterised as salary or interest by a resolution/entry.” This makes it clear that until the year-end decision, a withdrawal is not a salary payment, thereby strengthening the case for not deducting TDS on it (since it isn’t “income” yet in Section 28(v) sense). Similarly, for retiring partners, the deed (or retirement agreement) should spell out that any lump sum paid is in settlement of the retiring partner’s capital, share of accumulated profits, and goodwill. Use terms like “share of profit till the date of retirement” rather than calling it a “fee” for departure. This not only helps direct tax (by clarifying that Section 10(2A) covers the profit portion) but is also a shield against GST misinterpretation. If a GST officer inquires, a well-drafted deed allows the response: “This amount was a capital/share settlement as per deed clause X, not a consideration for any service.” In short, paperwork can prevent peril – document the intent so that no one later can recharacterise the nature of the payment.

  •  Communication and Consistency

Partners and finance teams should maintain clear communication regarding these payments. Internally, everyone should know what the firm’s policy is on drawings and TDS, so that a lower-than-expected credit or a surprise GST query does not catch a partner off guard. Externally, if a notice does arrive (be it a 143(1)(a) intimation or a GST notice), respond promptly and factually. For a tax credit mismatch, a brief Section 154 rectification application with a note referencing “TDS on the exempt share of profit (Section 10(2A) not included in total income)” usually suffices to set things right. For a GST notice, a well-reasoned reply citing the CBIC clarification that partner remuneration isn’t taxable, along with a copy of the partnership deed and Form 26AS, should clarify the situation.

By taking these steps, firms and partners can turn Section 194T from a head-scratcher into a manageable routine. As the saying goes (with a 194T twist): “Deduct your tax and credit it too – but keep the paperwork straight to avoid a boo-boo!” And that, in essence, captures the balancing act now required in the post-194T era of partnership taxation.

CONCLUSION

The broader message for firms is clear: adapt and move on. Review your partnership agreements. Educate your partners – especially those accustomed to tax-free profit shares – that henceforth, their bank alerts will show slightly lighter credits (but not to worry, it’s their own tax being prepaid).

Ultimately, Section 194T doesn’t change how profits are split in theory – rainmakers will still rain, team players will still team – but it adds a new layer of accountability and cash-flow management to the mix.

One can end on a lighter note: if you thought partner meetings were intense when debating billable hours or client receivables, wait until someone brings up who’s contributing what to the firm’s TDS deposit each month! The silver lining is that this provision has united every kind of partner – from the golf afternoon equal sharer to the midnight oil grinder – in a single cause: figuring out how to comply. The takeaway for practitioners is to embrace Section 194T as just another business reality, as our clients did when it came to section 194Q and section 194R.

Keep calm, deduct on, and let’s get back to doing what we do best – serving clients – while the TDS Challan gets its regular date with the bank.

Important Amendments by The Finance Act, 2025 – 2.0 Block Assessment in Search Cases

Introduction

The procedure of block assessment to be made in cases where a search has been conducted under Section 132 or a requisition has been made under Section 132A was earlier introduced in 1995. Under this erstwhile scheme of block assessment, in addition to the assessments which were to be conducted in a regular manner, a special assessment was required to be made assessing only the ‘undisclosed income’ relating to the ‘block period’ in a case where the search has been conducted.

In 2003, these provisions dealing with block assessment in search cases were made inapplicable for the reasons as stated in the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2003 which are reproduced below –

The existing provisions of the Chapter XIV-B provide for a single assessment of undisclosed income of a block period, which means the period comprising previous years relevant to six assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search was conducted and also includes the period up to the date of the commencement of such search, and lay down the manner in which such income is to be computed. The main objectives for the introduction of the Chapter XIV-B were avoidance of disputes, early finalization of search assessments and reduction in multiplicity of proceedings. The idea was to have a cost-effective, efficient and meaningful search assessment procedure.

However, the experience on implementation of the special procedure for search assessments (block assessment) contained in Chapter XIV-B has shown that the new scheme has failed in its objective of early resolution of search assessments. The new procedure postulates two parallel streams of assessment, i.e., one of regular assessment and the other for block assessment during the same period, i.e., during the block period. Controversies have sprung up, questioning the treatment of a particular income as ‘undisclosed’ and whether it is relatable to the material found during the course of a search etc. Even where the facts are clear, litigation on procedural matters continues to persist. The new procedure has thus spawned a fresh stream of litigation.

Thus, the experience was that providing for two parallel assessments; one for undisclosed income and the other for regular income, had resulted in a lot of litigation. As a result, the new Sections 153A, 153B and 153C were introduced wherein it was provided that the assessments pending as on the date of initiation of search would abate and only one assessment would be made wherein the total income of the assessee, including undisclosed income, was required to be assessed. Further, separate assessment was required to be made for every year involved unlike the single assessment for the entire block period as provided under Chapter XIV-B. In 2021, these provisions for making the assessment in the cases of the search were merged with the provisions dealing with reassessments in general, as provided in Sections 147 to 151 with the appropriate amendments.

Thereafter, in the last year, the Finance Act (No.2), 2024, had once again restored the scheme of ‘block assessment’ as provided in Chapter XIV-B but in a revised form. This was made effective from 1-9-2024, i.e. when the search was initiated on or after 1st September, 2024. Unlike the erstwhile scheme of block assessment, which had provided for making parallel assessments of the undisclosed income of the block period and of the regular income, the revised scheme of block assessment provided for making only one assessment of the block period wherein the total income was required to be assessed including the undisclosed income as well as the other regular incomes.

However, the Finance Act, 2025 has made further amendments to the provisions of Chapter XIV-B having retrospective effect from 1st September, 2024, i.e. the date from which these provisions were reintroduced by the Finance Act (No. 2) 2024. One of the major amendments which have been made by the Finance Act 2025 is that the scope of the block assessment has been restricted to the assessment of only the ‘undisclosed income’ instead of the ‘total income’. Although the amended provisions do not provide expressly that the assessment of the undisclosed income and of the regular income would be made separately, it implies that there would be two parallel assessments once again as were being made under the erstwhile scheme of the block assessment, which was in force till 2003. Therefore, the provisions which were considered to be highly litigation prone in 2003 have been reintroduced in the Act by the Finance Act, 2025, with effect from 1st September, 2024. Further, it is worth noting that this amendment was made at the time of passing of the Finance Bill, and, therefore, there is no mention of the reasons for making such an amendment in the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill 2025.

In this article, the important amendments to Chapter XIV-B made by the Finance Act 2025 have been discussed and analysed.

Restricting the scope of assessment to the undisclosed income

Section 158BA provides that the Assessing Officer shall make the assessment of the block period in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIV-B in a case where the search is initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under Section 132A on or after 1st September, 2024. Under this provision, the Assessing Officer was required to make the assessment of the ‘total income’. Now, this section has been amended to provide that the Assessing Officer shall make the assessment of the ‘total undisclosed income’ of the block period. The marginal heading of this section has also been changed appropriately by replacing the words ‘assessment of total income’ with the words ‘assessment of total undisclosed income’.

The consequential changes have also been made to the other provisions of Chapter XIV-B by replacing the reference to the assessment of total income with the assessment of total undisclosed income.

Thus, as mentioned earlier, the basic principle of the scheme of block assessment itself has been changed with retrospective effect from 1st September, 2024 restricting it now to the assessment of only undisclosed income.

It is worth noting that surprisingly no changes have been made to the provisions dealing with the abatement of the assessments under the other provisions of the Act pending as of the date of initiation of the search. Section 158BA(2) has remained unamended which provides that the assessment or reassessment under the other provisions of the Act pertaining to any assessment year falling in the block period on the date of initiation of search or making of requisition shall abate and shall be deemed to have abated on the date of initiation of search or making of requisition. Although these pending assessments are considered to have been abated, the Assessing Officer is going to make the assessment of only the undisclosed income while making block assessment under the amended provisions. There is no clarity as to whether and how the Assessing Officer would be assessing the income other than the undisclosed income in respect of those assessment years in respect of which the assessments were in progress but have abated as a result of the search being conducted. Therefore, it appears that this particular aspect has remained to be considered while making the amendments to the provisions dealing with the block assessment.

Further, under the erstwhile provisions dealing with the block assessment (as it was in existence prior to 2003), in which assessment was required to be made of only the undisclosed income in the manner same as which is provided now, there was an Explanation to Section 158BA(2) by which the position of the block assessment vis-à-vis the assessment under the other provisions was being clarified as under –

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that—

(a) the assessment made under this Chapter shall be in addition to the regular assessment in respect of each previous year included in the block period;

(b) the total undisclosed income relating to the block period shall not include the income assessed in any regular assessment as income of such block period;

(c) the income assessed in this Chapter shall not be included in the regular assessment of any previous year included in the block period.

Under the current provisions as amended by the Finance Act 2025, no such clarity has been provided expressly as to whether the block assessment would be in addition to the regular assessment to be made under the regular provisions or there would be only one assessment, i.e. the block assessment. The very fact that the block assessment only deals with the undisclosed income implies that it is intended that the regular assessment can be made in addition to the block assessment for the purpose of making the assessment of the income other than the undisclosed income. However, if that is the case, then the question arises as to why such regular assessments, which were pending as of the date of initiation of the search are considered to have been abated.

Computation of the total undisclosed income of the block period

Section 158BB provides the manner of computing the income which needs to be assessed by the Assessing Officer under Section 158BA. Since this section was providing for the computation of the total income, it has also been amended consequentially to provide for the computation of only undisclosed income.

The amended provisions of Section 158BB provide that the total undisclosed income of the block period which is required to be assessed shall be the aggregate of the following –

(a).Undisclosed income declared by the assessee in the return furnished under Section 158BC;

(b).Undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer under Section 158BB(2).

The ‘undisclosed income’ has been defined in Section 158B(b), and there has been no change in this definition except for the inclusion of the virtual digital asset in the list of several assets like money, bullion, etc., which can be regarded as the undisclosed income if they are representing the income or property which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of the Income-tax Act.

Further, the provisions of Section 158BB have also been amended to specifically provide that the following income shall not be included in the total undisclosed income of the block period –

(a).The total income determined under the applicable provisions of the Act (like Section 143(1), 143(3), 144, 147, 153A, 153C, 158BC(1) etc.) prior to the date of initiation of the search or the date of the requisition, in respect of any previous year falling within the block period. Therefore, the income already assessed will not be included in the total undisclosed income.

(b).The total income declared in the return of income filed under Section 139 or in response to a notice under Section 142(1) prior to the date of initiation of the search or the date of requisition in respect of any previous year falling within the block period, if it is not covered by (a) above.

(c).The income as computed by the assessee in respect of the period as specified below and subject to the condition as mentioned below –

However, if the Assessing Officer is of the opinion that any part of such income referred to in the above table as computed by the assessee is undisclosed, then he may recompute such income accordingly.

Undisclosed income of any other person

Section 158BD provides for the assessment of the undisclosed income of any other person, i.e. the person other than a person in whose case the search was initiated under Section 132 or requisition was made under Section 132A. Such other person is required to be assessed when the Assessing Officer is satisfied that any undisclosed income emanating from the search belongs to or pertains to or relates to that person.

It was provided that the block period for the purpose of making the assessment of such other person would be the same period which has been considered to be the block period in the case of the person in whose case the search was conducted. However, it is quite possible that multiple persons are covered by the same search which has been conducted. In such case, the last of the authorisations for the search in the case of such different persons might be executed on different dates. As a result, the block period would not be the same and it would differ from person to person who has been searched. Therefore, in such a case, difficulty will arise in determining the block period for the purpose of making the assessment of the other person who was not covered by the search but the undisclosed income belonging to him has been found.

Therefore, the provisions of Section 158BD have now been amended to provide that where more than one person was covered by the search, then the block period for such another person would be the period which has been considered to be the block period in the case of such person amongst all the persons in whose case the search was conducted which is ending on a later date.

Extension of the time limit for furnishing the return of income in response to the notice issued under Section 158BC

As per Section 158BC, the concerned person is required to submit the return of income in response to the notice issued by the Assessing Officer in this regard. Consequent to the shift in the scheme of the block assessment from the assessment of the total income to the assessment of only undisclosed income, the amendment has also been made in this Section to provide that the return of income shall be filed declaring only the undisclosed income and not the total income.

Further, this return of income is required to be submitted within a period, not exceeding sixty days, as may be specified in the notice issued in this regard. The amendment has been made to provide that the time allowed for furnishing the return of income may be extended by a further period of thirty days if the following conditions are satisfied –

i. In respect of the previous year immediately preceding the previous year of search, the due date for furnishing the return has not expired prior to the date of initiation of such search;

ii. The assessee was liable for audit under Section 44AB for such previous year;

iii. The accounts of such previous year have not been audited on the date of issuance of such notice; and

iv. The assessee requests in writing for an extension of time for furnishing such return to get such accounts audited.

Other amendments

A few other amendments have also been made in Chapter XIV-B, which are summarised as under –

  •  The ‘undisclosed income’ as defined in section 158B shall now even include ‘virtual digital asset’ in addition to any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing, etc.
  •  Section 158BA(4) provides that any block assessment which is pending in a case where a subsequent search has been initiated, or requisition has been made shall be duly completed, and thereafter, the block assessment in respect of such subsequent search or requisition shall be made. This provision has been amended to refer to the assessment ‘required to be made’ instead of the assessment which was ‘pending’. Therefore, not only the block assessment which was commenced and pending but also the block assessment required to be made consequent to the search already conducted earlier shall be completed first before making the block assessment in respect of the subsequent search.
  • Section 158BA(2) provides for the abatement of the assessment or reassessment or recomputation which is being conducted under any other provisions of the Act other than the block assessment and which is pending on the date of initiation of the search or making of the requisition. Also, section 158BA(3) provides for the abatement of reference made to the Transfer Pricing Officer under section 92CA(1) or the order passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer under section 92CA(3) during the course of such pending proceeding for assessment or reassessment or recomputation.

Further, section 158BA(5) provides for the revival of such pending proceeding under any other provisions if the proceeding initiated for the block assessment under Chapter XIV-B or the order of assessment passed under section 158BC(1) has been annulled in appeal or any other legal proceeding. However, this provision providing for revival was referring only to the ‘assessment’ or ‘reassessment’ which had been abated under sections 158BA(2) or 158BA(3). Now, this provision has been amended to refer not only to the ‘assessment’ or ‘reassessment’ but also to ‘recomputation’ or ‘reference’ or ‘order’.

  •  Section 158BE provides that the assessment order in respect of the block period shall be passed within twelve months from the end of the month in which the last of the authorisations for the search was executed or requisition was made. This provision has been amended to provide the period of twelve months shall be reckoned from the end of the quarter in which such last authorisation was executed or requisition was made.
  • Section 158BI provided that the provisions of Chapter XIV-B shall not apply where the search was initiated, or the requisition was made before 1st September, 2024, and proceedings in relation to such search or requisition shall be governed by the other provisions of the Act. This section has been completed and omitted with retrospective effect from 1st September, 2024.

Important Amendments by The Finance Act, 2025 -1.0 Charitable Trusts

Important Amendments by the Finance Act, 2025 are covered in three different Articles. It is not possible to cover all amendments at length, and hence, the focus is only on important amendments with a detailed analysis of their impacts. This in-depth analysis will serve as a future guide to know the existing provisions, current amendments, their rationale and impact. We hope that the detailed analysis will enrich the readers. – Editor

The Finance Act, 2025 carried out four amendments in the provisions relating to the exemption of charitable or religious trusts. All these amendments have somewhat relaxed the harshness of the provisions providing partial relief to charitable and religious trusts.

PERIOD OF REGISTRATION FOR SMALL TRUSTS

Every charitable or religious trust seeking exemption under sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is required to be registered under section 12A. The procedure for this is laid down in section 12AB. There are 7 types of applications laid down under section 12A(1)(ac). One of these is a case where an application is made by a trust which was not registered so far under section 12A and which has not yet commenced its activities at the time of making the application [clause (vi)(A) of section 12A(1)(ac)]. Such a trust is granted a provisional registration for a period of 3 years. In all other cases [clauses (i) to (v) and (vi)(B)], registration is currently granted for a period of 5 years by the Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) or Principal CIT.

By insertion of a proviso to section 12AB(1) with effect from 1st April, 2025, the Finance Act 2025 now grants a longer period of registration of 10 years to certain types of small trusts in all these cases where the period of registration was earlier 5 years, except for one category – clause (vi)(B), i.e. trusts which have commenced their activities and which have never been allowed exemption under clause (iv), (v), (vi) or (via) of section 10(23C) or under section 11 or section 12 before the date of the application since commencement of their activities. These trusts [clause (vi)(B)], even if they are small trusts, will continue to be granted registration only for a period of 5 years. Similarly, the period of registration of trusts covered by clause (vi)(A) remains unchanged at 3 years. There is also no change in the period of section 80G approval, even for eligible small trusts, which remains the same at 5 years.

The small trusts which are eligible to be granted the benefit of the longer period of exemption of 10 years are those trusts whose total income (before considering the exemption under sections 11 and 12) during each of the two previous years preceding the date of application does not exceed ₹5 crore. If income in any of the two years exceeds this limit, the benefit of such a longer period of registration would not be available.

The Finance Minister, in her Budget Speech, has stated:

“I propose to reduce the compliance burden for small charitable trusts / institutions by increasing their period of registration from 5 years to 10 years”.

The Explanatory Memorandum explains the rationale behind this amendment as under:

“2. It has been noted that applying for registration after every 5 years increases the compliance burden for trusts or institutions, especially for the smaller trusts or institutions.

3. To reduce the compliance burden for the smaller trusts or institutions, it is proposed to increase the period of validity of registration of trust or institution from 5 years to 10 years, in cases where the trust or institution made an application under sub-clause (i) to (v) of the clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, and the total income of such trust or institution, without giving effect to the provisions of sections 11 and 12, does not exceed ₹5 crores during each of the two previous years, preceding to the previous year in which such application is made.”

In the FAQs issued, the amendments have been explained as under:

Q.2. What amendment has been carried out in respect of registration of trusts?

Ans. The period of validity of registration of a trust or institution with income below ₹5 Crore has been increased from 5 years to 10 years in certain cases.

Q.3. Which cases shall benefit from the above amendment?

Ans. The amended provisions shall be applicable to certain small trusts or institutions whose total income does not exceed ₹5 crores in each of the two previous years, preceding the previous year in which application is made.

In computing income for this limit of ₹5 crore:

i.  The income of the trust has to be considered on a commercial income basis based on the method of accounting followed by the trust;

ii. all incomes of the trust, including donations, have to be considered;

iii.  in case the trust is carrying on a business, the net business income of the trust is to be considered;

iv. Corpus donations are also to be considered, adopting a conservative view, as the tax authorities are of the view that such donations are income which may be exempt under section 11(1)(d);

v.  Administrative expenses are not to be deducted, unless such expenses are incurred to earn the income;

vi. Only profit on the sale of assets as per books of account is to be considered as income, and not the entire sales proceeds nor the capital gains as computed under the head “Capital Gains”.

Since the amendment is with effect from 1st April, 2025, and is a procedural amendment, it applies to all cases where registration is granted on or after 1st April, 2025. There is a doubt as to whether it would apply to extend existing registrations automatically, since it also applies to cases covered by clause (i) of section 12A(1)(ac). From the manner in which the proviso is drafted, the amendment will not extend to cases of existing registrations – it will apply only to approvals granted after that date. All those cases where the registration was granted for a period of 5 years from 1st April, 2021 to 31st March, 2026, including such small trusts, would now need to apply for renewal of their registration on or before 30th September, 2025. The renewed registration, when granted, would then be for a period of 10 years if the trust qualifies for such a longer period of registration.

A large number of trusts (approximately 2,50,000 trusts) with existing registration as of 31st March, 2021, would have been granted registration for a period of 5 years till 31st March, 2026. The applications of all these trusts would have to be processed within a period of 6 months by 31st March 2026, a mammoth task indeed, if all documents and activities of each such trust have to be scrutinised. Not only that, during the same period, section 80G renewal applications of the vast majority of trusts having such approval would also have to be processed. Since a large number of such trusts are small trusts with a total income of less than ₹5 crore, it would have been better had the amendment extended the existing 5-year registration automatically to a period of 10 years, in the case of all such trusts whose total income is less than ₹5 crore for the 2 years ending 31st March 2024 and 31st March 2025. This would have ensured that the focus of the renewal process would then be on the larger trusts.

One aspect which needs to be kept in mind by such small trusts is that after the next renewal period of 10 years, at the time of subsequent renewal, details would have to be provided of activities, etc., over the longer time period of the last 10 years. It would, therefore, be essential for such trusts to maintain a year-wise record of such activities on an ongoing basis to avoid a situation where the trust is unable to provide details of activities carried out from the date of the last renewal till the date of a subsequent application for renewal. Similarly, the records of the trust would have to be maintained for such a longer period, so as to facilitate reply to any query that may be raised during the process of scrutiny of the renewal application.

SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTOR – SECTION 13(3)

Under section 13(1)(c), if any part of the income or property of the trust is utilised for the benefit of a person specified in section 13(3), such income is subjected to tax at the rate of 30% under section 115BBI, besides attracting a penalty at 100% of such amount under section 271AAE for the first offence, and at 200% of such amount for subsequent offences.

The persons specified in section 13(3) include a person who has made donations exceeding ₹50,000 in aggregate to the trust since its inception till the end of the relevant year (a substantial contributor). This limit was ₹5,000 from 1976 to 1984, ₹25,000 from 1985 to 1994 and ₹50,000 thereafter till 2025. Effectively therefore, this limit, which was earlier being modified every 10 years, had remained unchanged for 30 years. The absurdity of such a low limit resulted in a situation where most large trusts were unable to keep a list of such donors (which is one of the documents required to be kept by a charitable trust), and therefore, in cases of the audit reports (Form 10B or 10BB) in most of the trusts, there was a qualification to the effect that the trust had been unable to identify and maintain a list of such substantial contributors.

This limit of ₹50,000 in aggregate has now been increased with effect from 1st April 2025 (i.e. AY 2025-26) to a more reasonable aggregate limit of ₹10,00,000, with an additional alternative limit of donations exceeding ₹1,00,000 for the year. Therefore, a person would be regarded as a substantial contributor either if he has made aggregate donations exceeding ₹10,00,000 over the years or has made a donation exceeding ₹1,00,000 during the relevant year. Hitherto, since there was only an aggregate limit, a person who became a substantial contributor in one year would always remain a substantial contributor for future years, since he had already crossed the aggregate limit of ₹ 50,000. Now, given the two alternative limits, it is possible that a person who is a substantial contributor in one year on account of donations exceeding ₹1,00,000 in that year may not be a substantial contributor in a subsequent year due to the fact that he may not have contributed more than ₹ 10,00,000 in aggregate over the years.

Unfortunately, many trusts, particularly large trusts which have been in existence for many decades, would continue to face difficulty in compiling a list of such substantial contributors with accuracy, since the list has to take into account the aggregate donations received over the past many decades, an impossible task. It would perhaps have been better if the limit of aggregate donations had been made applicable only to donations made in the last few years – maybe 5 years or 10 years, which would have ensured proper compliance by all trusts.

RELATIVE AND CONCERN OF SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTORS – SECTION 13(3)

The list of specified persons in section 13(3) also included:

♦ any relative of persons referred to in clauses (a) – author or founder, (b) – substantial contributor, (c) – any member of the HUF if a HUF was an author, founder, or substantial contributor, and

♦any concerns in which any of the above (including trustees and relatives of such persons) has a substantial interest.

The definition of “relative”, contained in Explanation 1 to section 13, was fairly vast, as under:

(i) spouse of the individual;

(ii) brother or sister of the individual;

(iii) brother or sister of the spouse of the individual;

(iv) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual;

(v) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the individual;

(vi) spouse of a person referred to in any of the above clauses;

(vii) any lineal ascendant or descendant of a brother or sister of either the individual or of the spouse of the individual.

Here also, obtaining such details of relatives, particularly from substantial contributors, was an impossible task for the trust, as no donor would want to give so many personal details to an organisation to which he was doing a favour by donating. Similarly, obtaining details of concerns in which donors or their relatives have a substantial interest was again almost impossible.

The Finance Act 2025 has amended the definition of specified persons in section 13(3) by excluding relatives of substantial contributors and concerns in which substantial contributors or their relatives have substantial interest from this definition.

The Explanatory Memorandum has also recognised the practical difficulty as under:

“Suggestions have been received that there are difficulties in furnishing certain details of persons other than author, founder, trustees or manager etc. who have made a ‘substantial contribution to the trust or institution’, that is to say, any person whose total contribution up to the end of the relevant previous year exceeds fifty thousand rupees. These details are about their relatives and the concerns, in which they are substantially interested.”

However, relatives of the author or founder, trustees or manager, and concerns in which the author or founder, trustees or manager or their relatives have a substantial interest would continue to be regarded as specified persons. The FAQs clarify this as under:

“Q.7. Whether the relaxation provided to specified person also covers author, founder of trust, trustees, member or manager of the trusts?

Ans. It is clarified that the relaxation shall not apply to author, founder of trust, trustees, member or manager of the trusts”.

Unfortunately, there has been no amendment to the definition of “relative”, which is fairly wide and ropes in even a person not closely related; to illustrate, a brother-in-law’s or sister-in-law’s granddaughter would also be covered. Fortunately, her husband would not be covered! Even for a trustee, to provide such a detailed list of relatives and concerns in which they are substantially interested is indeed a tall task. Getting new trustees today is, as it is, a difficult proposition for most trusts – such detailed compliance adds to the reluctance of persons to take on what is often an honorary and thankless post. One wishes and hopes that the definition of relative is aligned with that under the Companies Act 2013, which only extends to first-degree relatives – spouse, member of HUF, father, mother, son, son’s wife, daughter, daughter’s husband, brother and sister. Unfortunately, even in the draft Income Tax Bill 2025, the same definition of “relative” is continued.

CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION – SECTION 12AB

Section 12AB(4) provides for cancellation of registration of a trust, if it has committed specified violations. The list of specified violations is contained in the explanation to s.12AB(4). Clause (g) of the explanation refers to a situation where the application referred to in s.12A(1)(ac) (i.e. application for registration or renewal of registration under s.12A) is not complete or contains false or incorrect information.

This clause has been amended by the Finance Act 2025, to remove the reference to application not being complete with effect from 1st April 2025. The amended specified violation would now cover only a situation where the application contains false or incorrect information and would apply to situations where the cancellation order is being passed after 1st April 2025.

The Explanatory Memorandum states that:

“ It is noted that even minor default, where the application referred to in clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A is not complete, may lead to cancellation of registration of trust or institution, and such trust or institution becomes liable to tax on accreted income as per provisions of Chapter XII-EB of the Act.

It is, therefore, proposed to amend the Explanation to sub-section (4) of section 12AB so as to provide that the situations where the application for registration of trust or institution is not complete, shall not be treated as specified violation for the purpose of the said sub-section.”

In the FAQs, it is clarified as under:

Q.4. What amendment has been carried out in provisions relating to ‘specified violation’ in the case of trusts or institution?

Ans Under current provision an ‘incomplete’ application for registration is treated as specified violation. This may result in cancellation of registration and consequently, fair market value of the assets becomes chargeable to tax under the Act.

In order to prevent harsh consequences for default of filing incomplete application, the above amendment has been carried out. The trust or institution shall be able to complete the application and the same shall be considered for the purposes of registration.”

This amendment really rectifies a drafting mistake made when the provision was introduced, as if an application was incomplete, under rule 17A(6), the Commissioner has the power to reject the application and cancel the registration. While processing the application, the fact that it is incomplete would be obvious, resulting in a rejection, which may not always be the case with respect to incorrect or false information provided in the form, which may come to light later. Hence, the provision for cancellation was perhaps justified for false or incorrect information, but not for incomplete application.

Post amendment, an issue that may arise is whether an omission to provide certain information may amount to giving false or incorrect information. To illustrate, a practical situation often faced is when the Commissioner has cancelled the registration of a trust, and the Appellate Tribunal has set aside such an order of cancellation. One of the questions to be answered in Form 10AB is whether any application for registration made by the applicant in the past has been rejected. This question has to be answered only with a “yes” or “no”. If the trust states “no”, would this amount to giving false or incorrect information? This should not amount to giving incorrect or false information, as when the Tribunal sets aside the order of rejection of the Commissioner, that rejection order ceases to exist. At best, it can be said to be a provision of incomplete information, though that too may not hold good, as the form itself merely requires ticking of the appropriate box without any further details.

CONCLUSION

These amendments, though providing some relief to charitable trusts, do not really address all the issues and problems being faced in these areas by charitable trusts, as discussed above. These amendments have also been incorporated in the draft of the Income Tax Bill 2025, which has been introduced in Parliament, and therefore, one may have to wait for some time for any further amendments in this regard unless the Income Tax Bill 2025 is appropriately amended before being enacted.

Article 7(3) of India-UAE and Section 44Cof the IT Act – Prior to amendment with effect from 1st April, 2008, while computing the profits of PE, expenses incurred by HO were allowable without any restriction as per domestic tax law governing computation of income

1- [2025] 171 taxmann.com 230 (SB)

Mashreq Bank Psc vs. DCIT

ITA No:1342 (MUM) of 2006

A.Y.:2002-03Dated: 6th February, 2025

Article 7(3) of India-UAE and Section 44Cof the IT Act – Prior to amendment with effect from 1st April, 2008, while computing the profits of PE, expenses incurred by HO were allowable without any restriction as per domestic tax law governing computation of income

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of the UAE, was engaged in banking business in India through branches. The branch claimed deduction towards expenses incurred by HO without any restriction on the quantum of deduction. Further, it claimed certain expenses that were directly incurred outside India by HO as they were related to business operations of Indian branch.

Applying Section 44C, the AO restricted deduction of HO expenses to 5% of average adjusted total income. Further, the AO denied deduction for certain expenses (such as, SWIFT charges and global accounting software maintenance expenses) that were directly incurred by HO for branch operations.

CONSTITUTION OF SPECIAL BENCH

In Assessee’s case for AY 1996-97, ITAT held that Article 25(1) provided for computation of income and Article 7(3) of India-UAE DTAA should not be interpreted in a manner to restrict the application of domestic law. For AY 1998-99 and 2001-02, ITAT did not follow its earlier order and held that Article 7(3) did not restrict deduction of head office expenses. Therefore, provisions of DTAA should prevail over domestic law. ITAT further noted that amendment to Protocol to India-UAE DTAA with effect from 01 April 2008 restricted allowability of HO expenses.
Given the conflicting view in the Assesses’ own cases and other cases, a Special Bench was constituted at department’s request.

HELD

Head Office Expenses

Article 7(3) deals with determination of profits of PE. It provides for deducting all expenses incurred for PE business, including general and administrative expenses. Prior to amendment of India-UAE DTAA vide Protocol (Notification no. SO 2001(E) (NO) 282/2007, dated 28-11-2007), the Article did not restrict quantum of deduction or provide for reference to domestic law.

The first part of Article 25(1) provides that domestic law provisions deal with income and capital taxation arising in respective states. The later part provides that if any express provision under DTAA is contrary to domestic law, taxation shall be governed by DTAA and not by domestic law. This position aligns with interpretation of Section 90(2) namely, DTAA provisions shall override domestic law provisions to the extent beneficial to Assessee.

The scope of Article 25(1) as regards computation of business profits cannot be interpreted in a way that imposes restrictions on the manner of computing tax liability under Article 7(3), or to read restrictions under domestic law into DTAA. There was no need to introduce limitation via the Protocol if Article 25(1) was to be interpreted otherwise. Article 25(1) and Article 7(3) operate differently as the former deals with eliminating double taxes and later deals with determining business profits.

Provisions contained under DTAA must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the terms employed by the contracting states. Prior to its amendment, Article 7(3) did not restrict allowability of expenses. This position was changed after re-negotiation of India-UAE DTAA. The amended Article 7(3) was intended to be applied w.e.f. 1st April, 2008. Hence, in absence of an express provision, it could not be applied retrospectively.

India has entered into certain DTAAs, such as those with UK and Germany, which impose restrictions on allowability of expenses, and certain DTAAs, such as those with France, Mauritius, and Japan, which do not impose any such restrictions. This indicates that conditions imposed under respective DTAAs are based on bilateral negotiations between the partners and consideration of economic and political factors.

Therefore, Article 7(3) is an express provision that overrides the provisions of Section 44C of the Act.

DIRECT EXPENSES BY THE HO FOR BRANCH OPERATIONS

Section 44C defines the term ‘head office expenditure’. These are common expenses incurred by HO for HO and various branches and are subsequently allocated to respective branches.

Circular No. 649 dated 31st February, 1993, provides that while computing business profits, the expenditure covered by Section 44C must be allowed without imposing any restriction.

Therefore, an expenditure exclusively incurred outside India for Indian branches must be allowed as a deduction without any limits.

Sec. 48 r.w.s. 50A & 55A.: Assessing Officer has no right to replace Government approved valuer’s opinion with his own.

7 [2024] 116 ITR(T) 261 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Piramal Enterprises Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA NO.:3706 & 5091(MUM.) OF 2010

AY.: 2005-06

Dated: 11th January, 2024

Sec. 48 r.w.s. 50A & 55A.: Assessing Officer has no right to replace Government approved valuer’s opinion with his own.

FACTS I

The assessee had sold a flat at Malabar Hills during the year under consideration and for computing the cost of Acquisition of the said flat the assessee adopted the fair market value as on 1-4-1981 based on valuation report of government valuer. The AO after rejecting the valuation made by the valuer, calculated the cost of acquisition by assessing the rate at ₹1480 per sq. ft. as compiled in the reference book and thereby made an addition of ₹2,98,680/-.

Aggrieved by the order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the addition. Aggrieved by the CIT(A) order, the assessee preferred an appeal before ITAT.

HELD I

The ITAT observed that for the year under consideration, the AO had no power to refer the matter for valuation to the Department Valuation Officer (DVO) but rather had power under section 50A of the Act to refer the case to the valuation officer in case the valuation adopted by the assessee was lower than the fair market value. But at the same time section 50A of the Act inserted by Finance Act, 2012 is prospective in nature as has been held by Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in case of CIT vs. Puja Prints[2014] 43 taxmann.com 247/224 Taxman 22/360 ITR 697 (Bom.).

The ITAT held that when the assessee had calculated the cost of acquisition on the basis of fair market value determined by the government valuer the AO had no right to replace the government approved valuer’s opinion on his own.

Thus, the appeal of the assessee was allowed to the extent of this ground.

Sec. 24.: Where assessee continued to be owner of part premises of House, rental income should be assessed only under the head income from house property and assessee would be entitled for statutory deduction @30% under section 24(a) for same.

FACTS II

The AO had treated the rental income earned by the assessee during the year under consideration from the let out portion of the property named “RP house” as income from other sources instead of income from house property on the ground that the assessee was not the owner of the property. The CIT(A) had confirmed the action of AO.

Aggrieved by the CIT(A) Order, the assessee preferred an appeal before ITAT.

HELD II

The ITAT followed the order passed by the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal on the identical issue in its own case for A.Y. 2003-04 & 2004-05 wherein rental income earned by the assessee from let out portion of RP house was treated as income from house property and directed the AO to assess the rental income of let out portion of RP house as income from house property.

S. 115BBC – Where the tax department had recognized the assessee-trust as both charitable and religious in terms of approvals granted under section 80G and section 10(23C)(v) and therefore, its case was covered by exception under section 115BBC(2), it cannot be held that the Assessing Officer had formed a legally valid belief for the purpose of section 147 that the cash donations received by the assessee were taxable under section 115BBC. S. 11(1)(a) – Accumulation under section 11(1)(a) is allowable on the gross receipts of the assessee and not on net receipts. S. 11(2) – Any inaccuracy or deficiency in Form No. 10 would not be fatal to the claim of accumulation under section 11(2).

6 (2025) 171 taxmann.com 392 (Mum Trib)

Sai Baba Sansthan Trust vs. DCIT

ITA Nos.: 932 & 935(Mum) of 2023

A.Ys.: 2013-14

Dated: 17th January, 2025

S. 115BBC – Where the tax department had recognized the assessee-trust as both charitable and religious in terms of approvals granted under section 80G and section 10(23C)(v) and therefore, its case was covered by exception under section 115BBC(2), it cannot be held that the Assessing Officer had formed a legally valid belief for the purpose of section 147 that the cash donations received by the assessee were taxable under section 115BBC.

S. 11(1)(a) – Accumulation under section 11(1)(a) is allowable on the gross receipts of the assessee and not on net receipts.

S. 11(2) – Any inaccuracy or deficiency in Form No. 10 would not be fatal to the claim of accumulation under section 11(2).

FACTS – I

The assessee was a charitable organisation registered under section 12A, section 80G and section 10(23C)(v). It was having a temple complex in the town of Shirdi consisting of Samadhi of a popular Saint fondly called as “Shri Sai Baba” and also other deities. The assessee usually receives huge amount of cash donations by way of hundi collections / charity box collections from the followers/devotees of Shri Sai Baba where the name and address of the contributor is not maintained. The assessee filed its return of income for A.Y. 2013-14 declaring NIL income which was processed under section 143(1).

Taking note of the Annual Information Report (AIR) for A.Y. 2013-14 and based on the stand taken by him for A.Y. 2015-16, the AO sought to reopen the assessee’s assessment by issuing notice under section 148 dated 23.3.2018 on the basis that cash deposits of ₹257 crores received by the assessee were taxable as anonymous donations under section 115BBC.The writ petition filed by the assessee against the notice was rejected by the High Court. SLP against the said High Court judgment was also rejected by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the AO proceeded to pass the reassessment order wherein he determined the total income of the assessee at ₹67.01 crores, besides bringing the anonymous donations of ₹175.53 crores to tax @ 30% under section 115BBC.

On appeal, CIT(A) held that the reopening of the assessment was valid. On merits, CIT(A) held that the assessee was both charitable and religious trust and hence it would fall within the exceptions provided under section 115BBC(2). Consequently, he held that the anonymous donations received by the assessee were not taxable in the hands of the assessee. However, on other issues, CIT(A) confirmed the additions.

Aggrieved, both the parties filed appeals before the Tribunal.

HELD – I

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) At the time of recording of reasons for reopening, the AO should have been aware of the approval granted to the assessee under section 10(23C)(v) which is granted to a trust existing wholly for public religious purposes or wholly for public religious and charitable purposes. If the approvals under section 80G and section 10(23C)(v) granted by the income tax authorities were read together, there should not have been any doubt that the tax department has recognized the assessee trust as existing “wholly for charitable and religious purposes” which was covered by the exception listed in section 115BBC(2). Accordingly, had the AO considered both these approvals, he would not have entertained the belief that the assessee would be covered by section 115BBC.

(b) The AO had relied upon the approval granted under section 80G only and had chosen a document which would suit his requirement and ignored another important document which went in favour of the assessee, which is not permitted in law.

(c) Even on merits, in the appeals for AY 2015-16 to 2018-19, the Tribunal had held that the assessee was a charitable and religious trust, which order was upheld by the Bombay High Court vide its order dated 8.10.2024 in (2024) 167 taxmann.com 304 (Bombay).

Thus, the Tribunal held that the belief entertained by the AO, without considering the record in totality, could not be considered as a legally valid belief under section 147 and accordingly, the reopening of assessment was not valid.

HELD – II

On the issue of accumulation under section 11(1)(a), following the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Programme for Community Organisation,(2001) 248 ITR 1 (SC), the Tribunal held that accumulation under section 11(1)(a) is to be allowed on the gross receipts and not on the net receipt.

FACTS – III

In the return of income, the assessee had claimed accumulation of income under section 11(2) to the tune of ₹183.26 crores. During the course of assessment proceedings, it came to light that the assessee had omitted to disclose receipts from educational and medical activities to the tune of ₹78.84 crores. The assessee agreed to the addition of said amount and prayed that the deduction under section 11(1)(a) @ 15% of the above receipts should be allowed and further claimed enhanced accumulation under section 11(2) for the balance amount of ₹67.01 crores.

The AO noticed that the Form No. 10 filed by the assessee during assessment proceedings had certain deficiencies such as (a) it did not mention the date;(b) it did not quantify the amount to be accumulated; (c) the Board resolution passed for accumulation mentioned all types of objects; and (d) the amount to be accumulated was incorrectly mentioned as ₹575 crores. Therefore, he rejected the claim for enhancement of accumulation under section 11(2). However, he allowed the claim of accumulation of ₹183.26 crores as was originally claimed in the return of income.

CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

HELD – III

The Tribunal observed that the AO, even after pointing out the deficiencies in Form No. 10, had allowed the claim of accumulation under section 11(2) as originally claimed in the return of income. Therefore, such deficiencies should not come in the way of allowing the enhanced accumulation claimed by the assessee during assessment proceedings. In any case, as held by Gujarat High Court in CIT (E) vs. Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purshottam Public Charitable Trust, (2019) 102 taxmann.com 122 (Gujarat), any inaccuracy or lack of full declaration in the prescribed format by itself would not be fatal to the claimant for the purpose of section 11(2). Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the enhanced amount of accumulation claimed under section 11(2).

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and the appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

S. 270A – Where the Assessing Officer had not specified in the assessment order or in the notice issued under section 274 read with section 270A as to under which limb of section 270A(2) or section 270A(9) the case of the assessee fell, no penalty under section 270A was leviable. S. 270A – Where the profit of the assessee had been estimated by resorting to section 145(3), no penalty under section 270A was leviable

5 (2025) 171 taxmann.com 133(Pune Trib)

DCIT vs. Chakradhar Contractors and Engineers (P.) Ltd.

ITA No.:1939 & 1940(Pun) of 2024

A.Y.: 2020-21 & 2021-22.

Dated: 26th December, 2024

S. 270A – Where the Assessing Officer had not specified in the assessment order or in the notice issued under section 274 read with section 270A as to under which limb of section 270A(2) or section 270A(9) the case of the assessee fell, no penalty under section 270A was leviable.

S. 270A – Where the profit of the assessee had been estimated by resorting to section 145(3), no penalty under section 270A was leviable

FACTS

The assessee was a company engaged in the business of construction. It filed its return of income declaring total income by estimating the income from contract work at 7.37% of the turnover. The AO completed scrutiny assessment by estimating the income from contract work at 10 per cent of the turnover, which the assessee accepted and paid the due taxes thereon.

Subsequently, the AO initiated penalty proceedings under section 270A. Referring to section 270A(9), he levied penalty @ 200% of the tax payable on the under-reported income in consequence of misreporting.

On appeal, CIT(A) cancelled the penalty on the ground that the AO had not specified the sub-limb under section 270A(9)(a) to (g) and therefore, the penalty was not sustainable.

Aggrieved, the tax department filed appeals before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal held that where the Assessing Officer had not specified, either in the assessment order or in the notice issued under section 274 read with section 270A, as to under which limb of provisions of section 270A(2) or section 270A(9) the case of the assessee falls, no penalty under section 270A was leviable.

Further, applying the various decisions under erstwhile section 271(1)(c) that penalty was not leviable when the profit was estimated, the Tribunal held that since the profit of the assessee had also been estimated by resorting to the provisions of section 145(3), no penalty under section 270A was leviable.

Accordingly, the appeals of the tax department were dismissed.

S. 12AB – Absence of registration under Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 cannot be a ground to deny registration under section 12AB since such non-registration did not prohibit the assessee to carry out its objects.

4 (2025) 171 taxmann.com 569 (Jaipur Trib)

APJ Abdul Kalam Education and Welfare Trust vs. CIT(E)

ITA No. 567 (Jpr) of 2024

A.Y.: N.A.

Date of Order: 15th January, 2025

S. 12AB – Absence of registration under Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 cannot be a ground to deny registration under section 12AB since such non-registration did not prohibit the assessee to carry out its objects.

FACTS

The assessee was running a hostel. It obtained provisional registration under section 12A(1)(ac)(vi) on 3.8.2022. Thereafter, it applied for final registration on 30.9.2023.

CIT(E) rejected the application for final registration and cancelled the provisional registration on the grounds that (a) non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (RPT) was in violation of section 12AB(1)(b)(ii)(B); (b) it was not specifically mentioned in the trust deed that foreign donations will be taken only after prior approval under Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA); and (c) the assessee was not able to prove genuineness of its activities.

Aggrieved with the order of CIT(E), the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT..

HELD

Distinguishing Aurora Educational Society v. CCIT, (2011) 339 ITR 333 (Andhra Pradesh) and New Noble Educational Society vs. CCIT, (2022) 448 ITR 594 (SC) on the ground that the said cases applied to educational institutions only, the Tribunal observed that a plain reading of section 12AB (1) (b) (ii) (B) shows that compliance of requirement of any other law is required if compliance under such other law is material for achieving its objects. Section 17 of the RPT Act, 1959 requires that trustees of the trust have to apply for registration of a public trust. However, there is no section in the RPT Act, 1959 which prohibits a trust to carry out its objects if it is not registered under the RPT Act, 1959. Both the statutes, namely Income-tax Act and RPT Act, have their own provisions and implications and none of them have overriding effect. Even if the assessee trust was not registered with the RPT Act, 1959 and the concerned officials under the RPT Act, 1959 deemed it necessary to get the entity registered under section 17 of the RPT Act, 1959, appropriate action could be taken against the trustees of the trust. However, this issue cannot be a hurdle in getting registration under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to not deny registration on this ground.

Considering the provisions of FCRA, the Tribunal directed the assessee trust to incorporate the relevant amendment in the trust deed mentioning that prior to receiving any foreign remittance whatever may be the form or nomenclature, prior approval will be taken from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, and produce the same for verification (in original) before CIT (E). Accordingly, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of CIT(E).

Since the assessee had furnished all the information and documents such as Income an Expenditure Account, note on activities etc. and the observations of the CIT(E) were either wrong or self-contradictory in nature, the Tribunal held that the CIT(E) was wrong in rejecting the registration on the ground of genuineness of activities and directed him to accept the reply of the assessee in toto.

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Reassessment Notice issued beyond the surviving time limit would be time-barred. Surviving time limit can be calculated by computing number of days between the date of issuance of deemed notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act and 30thJune, 2021. The clock of limitation which has stopped w.e.f. date of issuance of S. 148 notices under the old regime (which is also the date of issuance of deemed notices) would start running again when final to the notice deemed to have been issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act is received by the AO.

3 Addl CIT vs. Ramchand Thakurdas Jhamtani

ITA No. 3553/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of order: 28th February, 2025

Section: 149

Reassessment Notice issued beyond the surviving time limit would be time-barred. Surviving time limit can be calculated by computing number of days between the date of issuance of deemed notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act and 30th June, 2021. The clock of limitation which has stopped w.e.f. date of issuance of S. 148 notices under the old regime (which is also the date of issuance of deemed notices) would start running again when final to the notice deemed to have been issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act is received by the AO.

FACTS

For AY 2014-15, a notice u/s 148 of the Act (old regime) was issued to the Assessee on 07.06.2021 (i.e., after the expiry of 4 years but before the expiry of 6 years from the end of AY 2014-2015). Subsequently, in compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court, dated 4.5.2022, in the case of UOI vs. Ashish Agarwal [444 ITR 1 (SC)], communication, dated 25.05.2022, was sent to the Assessee intimating that the aforesaid notice issued u/s 148 of the Act (under old regime) would be treated as the show-cause notice issued in terms of Section 148A(b) of the Act (under new regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2021). The Assessing Officer (AO) also shared with the Assessee material / information on the basis of which he had formed a belief that income had escaped assessment.

The Assessee filed reply on 09.06.2022. Thereafter, order u/s 148A(d) of the Act was passed on 24.07.2022 after taking approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT), Mumbai. This was followed by issuance of notice on 24.07.2022 u/s 148 of the Act (new regime). The reassessment proceedings culminated into passing of the Assessment Order, dated 26.05.2023, passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act.

Aggrieved by the assessment, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who vide Order dated 16.05.2024 allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred the present appeal before the Tribunal challenging the relief granted by the CIT(A), while the Assessee has filed cross-objection challenging the validity of the re-assessment proceedings.

The contention, on behalf of the Assessee was that the AO has passed order u/s 148A(d) of the Act and has issued notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) after the expiry of surviving period as computed according the judgment of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal [(2024) 469 ITR 46]. Therefore, both, the order u/s 148A(d) of the Act and the notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) are barred by limitation.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the issue which arises for consideration is whether the order, dated 24.07.2022, passed u/s 148A(d) of the Act and notice, dated 24.07.2022, issued u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) were passed / issued within the prescribed time. It noted that there is no dispute as to facts. It is admitted position that the notice issued u/s 148 of the Act (old regime) on 24.07.2022, was treated as notice issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act by the Assessing Officer (AO). Thereafter, order u/s 148A(d) of the Act, was passed on 24.07.2022, and the same was followed by issuance of notice dated 24.07.2022, u/s 148 of the Act (new regime). Thus, the notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) was issued after the expiry of 6 years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

The Tribunal noted the observations of Apex Court in the case of UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal [(2024) 469 ITR 46] which have been made in relation to the interplay between the judgment of the SC in the case of UOI vs. Ashish Agarwal [444 ITR 1] and TOLA.

The Tribunal held that on perusal of the observations of the Apex Court it becomes clear that the assessing officer was required to complete the procedures within the ‘surviving time limit’ which can be calculated by computing the number of days between the date of issuance of the deemed notice u/s 148A(d) of the Act and 30th June 2021 (i.e. the extended time limit provided by TOLA for issuing reassessment notices u/s 148, which fell for completion from 20.03.2020 to 31.3.2021).

The clock of limitation which has stopped with effect from the date of issuance of S. 148 notices under the old regime (which is also the date of issuance of the deemed notices), would start running again when final reply to the notice deemed to have been issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act is received by the AO. It was clarified that a reassessment notice issued beyond the surviving time limit would be time-barred.

The Tribunal observed that, in the present case, notice u/s 148 of the Act (old regime) was issued on 07.06.2021 and was deemed to be notice issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act (new regime). Thus, the surviving time limit can be calculated by computing the number of days between the date of issuance of the deemed notice (i.e., 07.06.2021) and 30.06.2021, which comes to 23 days. The clock started ticking only after Revenue received the response of the Assesses to the show causes notices on 09.06.2022. Once the clock started ticking, the AO was required to complete these procedures within the surviving time limit of 23 days which expired on 02.07.2022. Since notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued on 24.07.2022 which fell beyond the surviving time limit that expired on 02.07.2022, the Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 148 of the Act to be time-barred and therefore, bad in law.

The Tribunal quashed notice dated 24.7.2022 issued u/s 148 of the Act (new regime), the consequential reassessment proceedings and the Assessment Order, dated 26.5.2023, passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act.

Thus, Cross-Objection raised by the Assessee was allowed and accordingly, all the grounds raised by the Revenue in the departmental appeal in relation to the relief granted by the CIT(A) on merits were dismissed as having been rendered infructuous.

In view of the First Proviso to S. 149(1)(b) of the Act a notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed u/s 149(1)(b) of the Act (new regime) applies prospectively. The said Proviso limits the retrospective operation of S. 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assesses.

2 Addl CIT vs. Ramchand Thakurdas Jhamtani

ITA No. 3552/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2015-16

Date of Order: 28th February, 2025

Section: 149

In view of the First Proviso to S. 149(1)(b) of the Act a notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed u/s 149(1)(b) of the Act (new regime) applies prospectively. The said Proviso limits the retrospective operation of S. 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assesses.

FACTS

For AY 2015-16, notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued to the Assessee on 30.06.2021 (i.e., after the expiry of 4 years but before the expiry of 6 years from the end of the relevant AY). Subsequently, in compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court, dated 4.5.2022, in the case of UOI vs. Ashish Agarwal [444 ITR 1 (SC)], communication, dated 25.05.2022, was sent to the Assessee intimating that the aforesaid notice issued u/s 148 of the Act (under old regime) would be treated as the show-cause notice issued in terms of Section 148A(b) of the Act (under new regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2021). The Assessing Officer (AO) also shared with the Assessee material / information on the basis of which he had formed a belief that income had escaped assessment. Thereafter, order u/s 148A(d) of the Act was passed on 27.07.2022 which was followed by issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act on 27.07.2022.

The reassessment proceedings culminated into passing of the Assessment Order, dated 29.05.2023, passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act.

Aggrieved by the assessment made, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal videhis Order dated 16.05.2024.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred the present appeal before the Tribunal challenging the relief granted by the CIT(A), while the Assessee filed cross-objection challenging the validity of the re-assessment proceedings.

HELD

The Tribunal, first dealt with the cross objections of the Assessee. It noted that the issue which arises for consideration is whether notice, dated 27.07.2022, issued u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) is barred by limitation specified in S. 149 of the Act as contended, on behalf of the Assessee.

The Tribunal observed that it is admitted position that the notice, dated 30.06.2021, issued u/s 148 of the Act (old regime) was treated as notice issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act by the AO. Thereafter, order u/s 148A(d) of the Act was passed on 27.07.2022, and the same was followed by issuance of notice, dated 27.07.2022, issued u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) (i.e. after the expiry of 6 years from the end of the Assessment Year 2015-2016).

The Tribunal noted the contention made on behalf of the Assessee that as per First Proviso to S. 149(1) of the Act, no notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) could have been issued after 31.03.2022.

The Tribunal noted the relevant portions of the decision of the SC, in the case of UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal [(2024) 469 ITR 46], dealing with notice issued u/s 148 for AY 2015-16 and in relation to first proviso to section 149(1) of the Act (new regime). On perusal of the relevant extracts of the said decision of the SC, the Tribunal held that the SC has clarified as under –
(a) a notice could be issued u/s 148 of the new regime for AY 2021-2022 and assessment years prior thereto only if the time limit for issuance of such notice continued to exist u/s 149(1)(b) of the old regime;

(b) in view of the First Proviso to S. 149(1)(b) of the Act a notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of issuance of the notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed u/s 149(1)(b) of the Act (new regime) applies prospectively. The said Proviso limits the retrospective operation of S. 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assesses.

Having noted that, in the present case, the time limit of 6 years from the end of AY 2015-2016 expired on 31.03.2022, the Tribunal held that, as per S. 149(1)(b) read with First Proviso to S. 149(1) of the Act (new regime), notice u/s 148 of the Act could not have been issued for the AY 2015-2016 after 31.03.2022. It held that notice, dated 27.07.2022, issued u/s 148 of the Act was barred by limitation.

The Tribunal also noted that before the Apex Court in the case of Rajeev Bansal [(2024) 469 ITR 46], the Revenue has conceded that for the AY 2015-16, notices issued on or after 01/04/2021, would have to be dropped and this has been recorded by the SC in para 19 of the decision of the Apex Court.

In view of the above, the Tribunal quashed the notice, dated 27.07.2022, issued u/s 148 of the Act and the consequent the Assessment Order, dated 29.05.2023, passed u/s 147 read with Section 144B of the Act as being bad in law.

Thus, Cross-Objection raised by the Assessee was allowed and accordingly, all the grounds raised by the Revenue in the departmental appeal in relation to the relief granted by the CIT(A) on merits were dismissed as having been rendered infructuous.

Non-compliance by the AO with the provisions contained in S. 148A(d) r.w.s. 151(ii) of the new regime affects the jurisdiction of the AO to issue a notice u/s 148 of the Act. Since the order u/s 148A(d) dated 30.7.2022 and also notice u/s 148 were issued with approval of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax instead of Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, the consequential reassessment proceedings and also the order dated 25.5.2023 passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act were quashed as bad in law and were held to be violative of the provisions contained in Ss. 148A(d), 148 and 151(ii) of the Act.

1 Addl CIT vs. Ramchand Thakurdas Jhamtani

ITA No. 3551/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of Order: 28th February, 2025

Sections: 148, 148A, 151

Non-compliance by the AO with the provisions contained in S. 148A(d) r.w.s. 151(ii) of the new regime affects the jurisdiction of the AO to issue a notice u/s 148 of the Act. Since the order u/s 148A(d) dated 30.7.2022 and also notice u/s 148 were issued with approval of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax instead of Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, the consequential reassessment proceedings and also the order dated 25.5.2023 passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act were quashed as bad in law and were held to be violative of the provisions contained in Ss. 148A(d), 148 and 151(ii) of the Act.

FACTS

A notice u/s 148 of the Act (old regime) was issued to the Assessee for the AY 2017-2018 on 28.06.2021 (i.e., after the expiry of 3 years but before 30.06.2021 — extended period time granted by TOLA1 ). Subsequently, in compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court, dated 4.5.2022, in the case of UOI vs. Ashish Agarwal [444 ITR 1 (SC)], communication, dated 27.05.2022, was sent to the Assessee intimating that the aforesaid notice issued u/s 148 of the Act (under old regime) would be treated as the show-cause notice issued in terms of S. 148A(b) of the Act (under new regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2021). The AO also shared with the Assessee material/information on the basis of which he had formed a belief that income had escaped assessment.


1 Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020

Thereafter, order u/s 148A(d) of the Act was passed on 30.07.2022 after taking approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT), Mumbai. This was followed by issuance of notice on 30.07.2022 u/s 148 of the Act (new regime). The reassessment proceedings culminated into passing of the Assessment Order, dated 25.05.2023, passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act.

The appeal preferred by the Assessee against the aforesaid Assessment Order was allowed by the CIT(A) vide Order, dated 16.05.2024.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred the present appeal before the Tribunal challenging the relief granted by the CIT(A), while the Assessee filed cross-objection challenging the validity of the re-assessment proceedings.

HELD

The Tribunal, at the outset, observed that the issue which arises for consideration is whether the PCIT or the PCCIT was the Specified Authority for seeking approval for passing order u/s 148A(d) of the Act and issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) for the AY 2017-18.

The Tribunal having considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal [(2024) 469 ITR 46], to the extent it has dealt with issue of approval from Specified Authority in terms of section 151 of the Act, noted that the Supreme Court has clarified as under –

(a) under new regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 Assessing Officer was required to obtain prior approval or sanction of the ‘Specified Authority’ at four stages – at first stage under Section 148A(a), at second stage under Section 148A(b), at third stage under Section 148A(d), and at fourth stage under Section 148. In the case of Ashish Agarwal [444 ITR 1] the Apex Court waived off the requirement of obtaining prior approval u/s 148A(a) and u/s 148A(b) of the Act only. Therefore, the AO was required to obtain prior approval of the ‘Specified Authority’ according to Section 151 of the new regime before passing an order u/s 148A(d) or issuing a notice u/s 148;

(b) under new regime if income escaping assessment is more than ₹50 lakhs a reassessment notice could be issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant previous year only after obtaining the prior approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner(PCCIT) or Principal Director General (PDGIT) or Chief Commissioner (CCIT) or Director General (DGIT);

(c) the test to determine whether TOLA will apply to Section 151 of the new regime is this: if the time limit of three years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20th March, 2020 and 31st March, 2021, then the ‘Specified Authority’ under Section 151(i) has an extended time till 30th June 2021 to grant approval;

(d) S. 151(ii) of the new regime prescribes a higher level of authority if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Thus, non-compliance by the AO with the strict time limits prescribed u/s 151 affects their jurisdiction to issue a notice under section 148;

(e) grant of sanction by the appropriate authority is a precondition for the assessing officer to assume jurisdiction under section 148 to issue a reassessment notice.

The Tribunal held that, in the present case, the period of 3 years from the end of the AY 2017-2018 fell for completion on 31.3.2021. The expiry date fell during the time period of 20.3.2020 and 31.3.2021, contemplated u/s 3(1) of TOLA. Resultantly, the authority specified u/s 151(i) of the new regime could have granted sanction till 30th June, 2021.

On perusal of the order, dated 30.07.2022, passed u/s 148A(d) of the Act the Tribunal found that the aforesaid order was passed after taking approval from PCIT. The Tribunal held that since the aforesaid order was passed after the expiry of 3 years from the end of the AY 2017-2018, as per the new regime, the authority specified under Section 151(ii) of the Act (i.e. PCCIT or CCIT) was required to grant approval. The Tribunal also noted that even the notice, dated 30.07.2022, was issued u/s 148 of the Act (new regime) after obtaining the prior approval of the PCIT.

The Tribunal concluded that, in the present case, the approval has been obtained by authority specified u/s 151(i) of the new regime instead of the authority specified u/s 151(ii) of the new regime.

The Tribunal held that non-compliance by the AO with the provisions contained in S. 148A(d) r.w.s. 151(ii) of the new regime affects the jurisdiction of the AO to issue a notice u/s 148 of the Act. Accordingly, the order, dated 30.07.2022 passed u/s 148A(d) of the Act, the consequential reassessment proceedings and the order, dated 25.05.2023, passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act were quashed as being bad in law as being violative of the provisions contained in Ss. 148A(d), 148 and 151(ii) of the Act.

The Tribunal allowed the cross objections filed by the assessee and dismissed, as infructuous, all the grounds raised by the Revenue in the appeal in relation to the relief granted by CIT(A) on merits.

Section: 279(2) :Prosecution — Compounding of offence – compounding application could not have been rejected on delay alone — Limitation — CBDT guidelines dated 16th November, 2022

2. M/s. L. T. Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Chief Commissioner of Income

[W.P. (L) 21032/2024,

Dated: 4th March, 2025 (Bom) (HC)]

Section: 279(2) :Prosecution — Compounding of offence – compounding application could not have been rejected on delay alone — Limitation — CBDT guidelines dated 16th November, 2022

The Petitioner challenged the Chief Commissioner’s order dated 17 January 2024, made under Section 279(2) of the Act, dismissing the Petitioner’s application for compounding the offence.

The Chief Commissioner has dismissed this application on the sole ground that it was filed beyond 36 months from the date of filing of the complaint against the petitioners. The Chief Commissioner has relied upon paragraph 9.1 of CBDT guidelines dated 16 November 2022 for compounding offences under the Income-tax Act 1961.

The Hon. Court referred to the Co-ordinate bench decision of this Court vide order dated 18th July, 2023 disposing of the Writ Petition (L) No.14574 of 2023 (Sofitel Realty LLP and Ors vs. Income-tax Officer (TDS) and Ors) wherein the Hon. Court considered similar CBDT guidelines dated 23 December 2014. In the context of such guidelines and clauses like Clause 9 of the 2022 guidelines, the Court held that since the Income-tax Act, 1961 had provided for no period of limitation to apply for compounding, such period could not have been introduced through guidelines. In any event, no rigid timeline could have been introduced through such guidelines. This Court held that the compounding application could not have been rejected on delay alone.

The court further referred to the Madras High Court decision in the case of Kabir Ahmed Shakir vs. The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors Writ Petition No.17388 of 2024 dated 30/08/2024 which was rendered in the context of the 2022 CBDT guidelines.

The counsel for the revenue, however, submitted that even where no limitation is prescribed by the State, the application has to be filed within a reasonable period. Further, she referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. [2025] 171 taxmann.com 268 (SC) and submitted that the CBDT guidelines of 2014 were upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme court, including, the paragraph which has prescribed limitation period to file application for compounding.

The Hon. Court observed that the above paragraph states that para 8 of the 2014 guidelines [which had referred to the period of limitation] does not exclude the possibility that in the peculiar case where the facts and circumstances so required, the competent authority should consider the explanation and allow the compounding application. This means that notwithstanding the so-called limitation period in a given case, the competent authority can exercise discretion and allow compounding application.

The Hon. Court observed that the competent authority has treated the guidelines as a binding statute. On the sole ground that the application was made beyond 36 months, the same has been rejected. The competent authority has exercised no discretion as such. The rejection is entirely premised on the notion that the competent authority had no jurisdiction to entertain a compounding application because it was made beyond 36 months. Such an approach was inconsistent with the rulings of this Court, Madras High Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the revenue.

The impugned order dated 17th January, 2024 was set aside and the Chief Commissioner was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s application for compounding.

Section: 254 (1): Principles of natural justice violated — impugned order passed without hearing the petitioner and / or his representative and without considering the written submissions:

1. Vijay Shrinivasrao Kulkarni vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & Ors.

[WP (C) No. 17572 OF 2024]

AY 2019-20

Dated: 4th February, 2025 (Bom) (HC)]

Arising from ITAT Pune ITA No.1159/Pun/2023 order dated 12th March 2024

Section: 254 (1): Principles of natural justice violated — impugned order passed without hearing the petitioner and / or his representative and without considering the written submissions:

The petitioner assessee in the present case is a 64 year old retired serviceman, who earned income primarily from salary for the Assessment Year 2019-20. He was then an employee of M/s. Pfizer Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd. posted at Aurangabad, from where he derived his salary income.

The petitioner filed his original income tax return for the A.Y. 2019-20 on 1 August 2019 declaring a total income of ₹57,84,740/- The petitioner had claimed relief under section 89(1) of the Act for an amount of ₹ 13,22,187/-. Subsequently, the petitioner’s case was selected for scrutiny. In response to notices, the petitioner submitted copies of computation of income, Form 26AS, Form 16, Form 10E along with other supporting documents.

The AO issued a show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order dated 16 September 2021 to the petitioner directing him to furnish his reply on or before 19 September, 2021. The petitioner filed his submissions / reply dated 16 September 2021 to the show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order issued by AO. The petitioner also requested for the grant of a personal hearing through video conferencing, which was so granted on 23 September 2021.

According to the petitioner, the relief claimed by him under section 89(1) of the Act warranted consideration, as such amount was a salary advance, justifying such relief. However, the petitioner during assessment proceedings withdrew such relief as claimed under section 89(1) and alternatively claimed receipts of Ex-Gratia and other incentives as capital receipts. This was with reference to the amounts received from his employer, i.e., Pfizer Healthcare on account of closure of its plant at Aurangabad and in terms of the settlement to all permanent employees under the financial scheme for employees of Aurangabad 2019, dated 9 January 2019.

The AO proceeded to pass the assessment order dated 29 September 2021. While passing such order, the petitioner’s submissions were rejected on the ground that the amount received by the Petitioner on termination of employment cannot be treated as salary in advance, as claimed by the Petitioner. Thus, the relief claimed by the petitioner under section 89(1) of the Act for an amount of R13,22,187/- was rejected by the assessment order.

The Petitioner being aggrieved by the said assessment order, approached the National Faceless Appeal Centre by filing an appeal. It was during the proceedings initiated by the petitioner before the NFAC that various notices under section 250 of the Act were issued to the petitioner. However, the petitioner’s Chartered Accountant could not respond to the above notices, and sought adjournments, mainly on the ground that a senior CA was intended to be engaged to defend the petitioner in the said proceedings.

The NFAC proceeded to pass an ex-parte order dated 8 September 2023, rejecting the petitioner’s appeal filed before it, thereby confirming the assessment order passed by AO.

The Petitioner, approached ITAT, Pune, by filing an appeal. The appeal filed by the Petitioner was listed for hearing on 11 March 2024 before the Division Bench of ITAT, Pune. The petitioner’s advocate submitted that the matter was required to be remanded to the NFAC, on the ground that the order of the NFAC was an ex-parte order, as it was passed in absence of a hearing being granted to the petitioner / his representative. The Petitioner’s CA also filed an affidavit in this regard. The ITAT rejected the petitioner’s prayer to remand the matter to NFAC and insisted on hearing the appeal on merits. The Petitioner’s advocate then requested for a short adjournment, so that a paper book could be submitted. However, such request was denied. The Petitioner’s advocate then requested to the ITAT to grant one day’s time to submit such paper book and to take up appeal for hearing on merits on the next date. Such request was also rejected by the ITAT. The Petitioner’s advocate was directed to submit written submissions and paper book on the basis of which, the ITAT would pass appropriate orders. The Petitioner through his legal representative accordingly submitted written submissions, along with the paper book and case laws on 12 March 2024, before the ITAT.

It was in the above backdrop that the ITAT proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 12 March, 2024, the Petitioner being aggrieved by such order approached this court by filing a writ petition.

The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner is seriously prejudiced by the actions of the ITAT in passing the impugned order dated 12th March, 2024. He further referred to the following orders passed by the ITAT on the same day, i.e., 12th March, 2024, which are summarized below:-

The ITAT had in similar facts and circumstances remanded the matter to the JCIT-A/the NFAC for further consideration on merits. However, ITAT did not adopt the same approach in the present case. According to him, a fair approach ought to have been adopted by the ITAT considering the facts of the case, as no prejudice would have been caused to the Dept.

The Dept contended that the ITAT was justified in concluding, that there was no need to remand the proceedings to AO as such remand would be an exercise in futility. Accordingly, the ITAT was justified in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner.

The Hon. Court observed that this is a case where the violation of the settled principles of natural justice is not just apparent but real, palpable and clearly visible. The Petitioner is deprived of an opportunity to present its case not only before the NFAC but also subsequently before the ITAT. Not affording a reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner to present its case had perpetuated from the ex-parte order passed by NFAC which was not noticed by the ITAT in passing the impugned order.

It was not disputed that the NFAC under the faceless regime passed an ex-parte appeal order, without affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. Thus, evaluation of assessment of the petitioner’s income and rejecting the submissions of the petitioner was undertaken also ought to have been appropriately undertaken by following the natural rules of fairness adhering to the principles of natural justice and such infirmity at least should have been addressed by the ITAT in passing the impugned order.

The Court further observed that on a perusal of the impugned order of the ITAT makes it clear that it proceeded to deal with the case of the petitioner on merits as is evident from the order. The Petitioner submitted that considering the fact that the order impugned before the ITAT itself was passed by NFAC was passed ex-parte, it would be just and proper for the ITAT to remand the matter to NFAC for passing orders on merits, after considering submissions of the petitioner. Also, the written submissions being tendered on behalf of the petitioner before the ITAT on 12th March, 2024 have not being considered in the impugned order being passed by the Tribunal. The Court referred judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. DTC Mazdoor Union._AIR 1999 SC 564 wherein it was held that Article 14 guarantees a right of hearing to a person who is adversely affected by an administrative order. The principle of audi alteram partem is a part of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In light of such decision, the petitioner ought to have been granted an opportunity of being heard which, partakes the characteristic of the fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The Hon. Court further referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Madras vs. Chenniyappa Mudiliar (1969) 1 SCC 591 wherein the Supreme Court in interpreting the section 33(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 has held that the Appellate Tribunal was bound to give a proper decision on question of fact as well as law, which can only be done if the appeal is disposed-off on merits and not dismissed owing to the absence of the appellant. There is no escape from the conclusion that under the said provision, the Appellate Tribunal had to dispose-off the appeal on merits which could not have been done by dismissing the appeal summarily for default of appearance. The Court observed that the principles laid down in the said decision would squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, in as much as the Petitioner was neither heard nor were his written submissions placed before the ITAT, considered.

The Hon. Court set aside the impugned order of the ITAT dated 12th March, 2024. Accordingly, the proceedings were remanded to the ITAT, for de novo hearing of the appeal filed before it.

Revision — Non-resident — Application by assessee for revision — Provisions of section 155(14) — Claim for tax deducted at source on amount not taxable in India — Credit not reflected in Form 26AS at time when return originally filed for relevant assessment year but reflected in subsequent assessment year — Commissioner cannot reject application on ground revised return not filed — Department to refund tax deducted at source with statutory interest: A.Y. 2015-16

6. Munchener Ruckversicherungs Gesellshaft Aktiengesellschaft In Munchen vs. CIT (International Taxation)

[2025] 473 ITR 53 (Del.):

A. Y. 2015-16

Date of order: 3rd September, 2024

S. 155(14) and 264 of ITA 1961

Revision — Non-resident — Application by assessee for revision — Provisions of section 155(14) — Claim for tax deducted at source on amount not taxable in India — Credit not reflected in Form 26AS at time when return originally filed for relevant assessment year but reflected in subsequent assessment year — Commissioner cannot reject application on ground revised return not filed — Department to refund tax deducted at source with statutory interest:

The assessee was a non-resident. For the A.Y. 2015-16, the assessee declared nil income asserting that its receipt of an amount would not be subject to tax in India in terms of the provisions u/s. 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and claimed refund of tax deducted at source on the basis the tax credit statement being form 26AS, which included the tax deducted by an entity BALIC. The assessee submitted that the tax deducted at source pertaining to the last quarter of F. Y. 2014-15 was credited by BALIC on 21st January, 2016, that consequently, the original tax deducted at source stood increased. In the return for the A. Y. 2016-17 wherein the claim for tax deducted at source credit stood embedded on account of such amount having by then being captured in form 26AS and which amount had remained unclaimed in A. Y. 2015-16.

The Commissioner (International Taxation) was of the view that since the income received from BALIC was offered to tax, the assessee would not be entitled to the grant of tax deducted at source credit. He held that the assessee had failed to file revised return of income and rejected the assessee’s application u/s. 264.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Section 155 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prescribes that where credit for tax has not been given on the ground of either a certificate having not been furnished or filed, but which is subsequently presented before the Assessing Officer, it would be sufficient for the assessment order being amended. Section 155(14) places the Assessing Officer under a statutory obligation to amend the order of assessment once it is established that the contingencies stated in that provision are duly established. Sub-section (14) neither contemplates nor mandates the original return being amended or revised and takes care of contingencies where tax deducted at source is either subsequently credited or is reflected in form 26AS after a time lag. An assessee may face such a spectre on account of a variety of unforeseeable reasons.

ii) Since the tax which was deducted at source by BALIC stood duly embedded in form 26AS which was produced by the assessee and the income earned from that entity had never been held to be subject to tax under the Act, the refusal on the part of the Department to refund that amount was illegal and arbitrary. The factum of tax having been deducted at source by BALIC and pertaining to income transmitted in the A. Y. 2015-16 was not disputed and stood duly fortified from the disclosures which appeared in form 26AS pertaining to that assessment year. It was also not disputed that BALIC had credited the tax deducted at source on 21st January, 2016 and as a consequence of which, the credit was not reflected at the time when the return had been originally filed for the assessment year 2015-16.

iii) The order passed u/s. 264 rejecting the assessee’s application was quashed. The Department was directed to refund the amount of tax deducted at source along with statutory interest.”

Revision — Revision order — Validity — Non-resident — Claim for benefits under DTAA — Opinion of Commissioner that assessee conduit company used for treaty shopping not stated in notice — Assessee not given an opportunity to satisfy Commissioner regarding his view — Order of Tribunal setting side revision order not erroneous: A.Y. 2017-18

5. CIT (International Taxation) vs. Zebra Technologies Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.

[2025] 472 ITR 745 (Del.):

A. Ys. 2017-18

Date of order: 23rd October, 2024

S. 263 of ITA 1961

Revision — Revision order — Validity — Non-resident — Claim for benefits under DTAA — Opinion of Commissioner that assessee conduit company used for treaty shopping not stated in notice — Assessee not given an opportunity to satisfy Commissioner regarding his view — Order of Tribunal setting side revision order not erroneous:

The assessee was a non-resident and distributed electronic products and services related to after sales, repairs, and technical support services to the customers across the globe. It held tax residency certificate of Singapore and sought to avail of the benefit of India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement ([1982] 134 ITR (St.) 6). In the A. Y. 2017-18, the assessee received a sum for rendition of technical support, repairs and maintenance services under an agreement with an Indian entity and also an amount in USD from offshore sale of products. According to the assessee, since it did not have a permanent establishment in India and also did not make available technical know-how, knowledge, and skill to the Indian entity under the agreement, the receipts were not chargeable to tax in India under the Act by virtue of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The Assessing Officer accepted the assessee’s explanation in response to the notices u/ss. 142(1) and 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 during the assessment proceedings which culminated in an assessment order.

The Commissioner was of the view that the Assessing Officer did not conduct the necessary inquiries and verified the facts for accepting the assessee’s claim that its income was not chargeable to tax under the Act by virtue of India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, that he did not call for the relevant details or verified whether the assessee had a permanent establishment in India during the relevant period, that he did not carry out any inquiry to ascertain whether any commercial substance existed in Singapore and whether the assessee was merely a conduit company and used with an object to obtain the tax benefit under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. Accordingly, he invoked his power u/s. 263.

The Tribunal faulted the Commissioner for not affording the assessee an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it was merely a conduit without any substance and had entered into an agreement for the purposes of taking an advantage of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) There was no fault with the order of the Tribunal in setting aside the revision order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 263 on the ground that the assessee was not afforded an opportunity to counter the allegation that it was a conduit company without any substance.

ii) In the show-cause notice the Commissioner had faulted the Assessing Officer for not undertaking certain enquiries including verifying whether, (i) the assessee had a permanent establishment in India, (ii) in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, the income was chargeable as fees for technical services, (iii) tax at source at the rate of 10 per cent. on all the remittances made to the assessee were deducted, (iv) the condition as set out in article 12 of the India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement in regard to taxation of fees for technical services were satisfied, (v) regarding the commercial substance of the assessee in Singapore and (vi) it was a conduit company formed for obtaining the tax benefits under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

iii) These observations were made only for the purposes of calling upon the assessee to show cause why the proceedings not be initiated u/s. 263 of the Act but, thereafter, the Commissioner had not put the issue regarding treaty shopping to the assessee. The tentative opinion formed by the Commissioner that the assessee was a conduit company for the reasons as articulated in the revision order was not put to the assessee. Hence, the assessee had not been given an opportunity to satisfy the Commissioner regarding such view for the A. Y. 2017-18.”

Recovery of tax — Grant of stay of demand — Stay of recovery pending appeals before Commissioner (Appeals) — Effect of office memorandum issued by CBDT — Rejection of stay of demand for non-deposit of 20% of disputed demand — Application to the Principal Commissioner — Direction to deposit 40% — Authorities failed to consider prima facie merits of the case — Financial hardship and likelihood of success — Orders rejecting stay of demand unsustainable — Matter remanded to the AO with directions to consider in light of earlier decision: A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2020-21

4. Sushen Mohan Gupta vs. Principle CIT

[2025] 473 ITR 173 (Del.)

A. Y. 2010-11 to 2020-21

Date of order: 22nd March, 2024

Ss. 156, 220(1), 220(6) and 246A of ITA 1961

Recovery of tax — Grant of stay of demand — Stay of recovery pending appeals before Commissioner (Appeals) — Effect of office memorandum issued by CBDT — Rejection of stay of demand for non-deposit of 20% of disputed demand — Application to the Principal Commissioner — Direction to deposit 40% — Authorities failed to consider prima facie merits of the case — Financial hardship and likelihood of success — Orders rejecting stay of demand unsustainable — Matter remanded to the AO with directions to consider in light of earlier decision:

A search and seizure action was conducted and subsequently notices u/s. 153A of the Act for the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2019-20 were issued and on culmination of proceedings so drawn, the assessment orders came to be framed on 30th September, 2021 raising a cumulative demand of ₹ 1,85,62,19,390 for the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2020-21.

The Assessee filed appeals before the CIT(A) which are pending. Against the enforcement of demand, the Assessee filed application for stay of demand before the Assessing Officer which came to be rejected on the ground that the Assessee had not deposited 20% of the outstanding demand and therefore the application could not be entertained. In rejecting the assessee’s application for stay of demand, the Assessing Officer relied upon the Office Memorandums of the CBDT dated 29-02-2016 and 31-07-2017.

Thereafter, the Assessee filed application for rectification of mistakes which was disposed and the revised demand recoverable from the Assessee was computed at ₹1,81,37,14,107. The Assessee thereafter filed another stay application before the Assessing Officer for the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2020-21. During the pendency of the said stay application, the Assessee was served with a letter seeking payment of the outstanding demand followed by a demand notice issued u/s. 220(1) of the Act. In response to the aforesaid, the Assessee filed a detailed response stating that the original assessment was wholly arbitrary and rendered unsustainable in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pr.CIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. The Assessee also offered to pledge properties owned by an entity in which the Assessee’s family members were directors / shareholders to secure the outstanding demand to the extent of 20%. The Assessee’s prayer was rejected.

Aggrieved, the Assessee approached the Principal Commissioner for grant of interim protection against the outstanding demands. The Principal Commissioner disposed the application by observing that during search operations, various incriminating documents were found and seized and credible evidence were collected. He, thus, disposed of the applications of stay of demand and directed the assessee to deposit demand which was 40 per cent of total outstanding demand within 15 days of receipt of his order.

The Assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as follows:

“i) The Central Board of Direct Taxes’ Office Memorandum [F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC], dated 29th February, 2016 could not be read as mandating a pre-deposit of 20 per cent. of the outstanding demand, without reference to the prima facie merits of a challenge that may be raised by an assessee in respect of an assessment order.

ii) The assessee had approached the Principal Commissioner in terms of the provisions made in the Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016. The view taken by the second respondent, that applications for stay could neither be countenanced nor entertained till the assessee deposited 20 per cent. of the pending demand was untenable and erroneous. The Principal Commissioner had proceeded to cause even greater prejudice to the assessee by requiring him to deposit 40 per cent. of the outstanding demand.

iii) According to para 4(C) of the Office Memorandum [F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC], dated February 29, 2016 stated to the effect that where stay of demand was granted by the Assessing Officer on payment of 15 per cent. of the disputed demand and the assessee was still aggrieved, he could approach the jurisdictional administrative Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner for a review of the decision of the Assessing Officer. The Principal Commissioner could not be recognised to stand empowered to subject the assessee to more onerous conditions. Rather than examining the challenge raised by the assessee to the assessment orders and evaluating the prima facie merits of the challenge had in one sense placed him under a harsher burden of depositing 40 per cent. of the outstanding demand as opposed to the direction of 20 per cent. deposit by the second respondent as a pre-condition for the consideration of application for stay under section 220(6) .

iv) Both the authorities had failed to consider the aspect of prima facie merits, likelihood of success and undue hardship. Therefore, their orders were unsustainable and hence quashed and set aside. The matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer to examine the applications for stay afresh considering the legal position.”

Reassessment — Exemption u/s. 10B — Newly established hundred per cent. export oriented establishments — Reassessment — Notice — Survey — Denial of claim for deduction u/s. 10B in original assessment — Grant of deduction by Tribunal — Fresh survey during pendency of revenue’s appeal before court — Reassessment on ground of availability of new material would tantamount to getting over anomalous situation — Reassessment proceedings to disallow claim for deduction once again impermissible — Notice and order rejecting assessee’s objections quashed and set aside: A.Y. 2009-10

3. Sesa Sterlite Ltd. vs. ACIT

[2025] 472 ITR 591 (Bom.)

A. Y. 2009-10

Date of order: 4th September, 2024

Ss.10B, 133A, 147 and 148 of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Exemption u/s. 10B — Newly established hundred per cent. export oriented establishments — Reassessment — Notice — Survey — Denial of claim for deduction u/s. 10B in original assessment — Grant of deduction by Tribunal — Fresh survey during pendency of revenue’s appeal before court — Reassessment on ground of availability of new material would tantamount to getting over anomalous situation — Reassessment proceedings to disallow claim for deduction once again impermissible — Notice and order rejecting assessee’s objections quashed and set aside:

The assessee was in the business of manufacturing and production of iron ore and had three units situated at Amona, Chitradurga and at Codli. These units are export-oriented undertakings and for the assessment year 2009-10, the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 10B. A survey u/s. 133A was carried out at the assessee’s premises wherein the authorities sought to ascertain the relevant facts in connection with the claim for deduction u/s. 10B. The Assessing Officer issued a notice dated July 16, 2014 u/s. 148 to reopen the assessment u/s. 147. The Assessees objections were rejected.

The Assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice and the order rejecting the objection. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Section 10B(2) provided that section 10B applied to any undertaking which fulfilled all the conditions therein. The assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 10B in respect of the three export-oriented units for the A. Y. 2009-10 and a survey u/a. 133A had been carried out at its premises in connection with the claim for deduction u/s. 10B. The assessment order u/s. 143(3) was passed by the Assessing Officer whereunder the claim for deduction u/s. 10B was disallowed in its entirety for the reasons given by the Assessing Officer. He had held that the assessee’s units were not engaged in the business of manufacture and production of any article or thing, that the assessee had not produced satisfactory evidence with regard to the date of commencement of production, that the approval granted by the Development Commissioner for one unit was not ratified by the Board and that the profits of the units was determined without taking into consideration the cost of the wastage from other units which was utilised in the alleged production that was carried out in the unit under reference, and the units were not new units and the setting up of the units in the old mines which were operated by the assessee could not be regarded as new units and that the assessee had not maintained separate books of account for the export oriented units. The Commissioner (Appeals) had upheld the denial of the claim of deduction under section 10B by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal had dealt with all the reasons given by the Assessing Officer and had upheld the claim for deduction u/s. 10B. Therefore, entitlement to deduction u/s. 10B had been the subject matter of appeal before the appellate authorities. During the pendency of the tax appeal before this court, a fresh survey was conducted u/s. 133A and on the basis of the materials which were found during the survey in 2014, reassessment u/s. 147 was sought to be justified for the purpose of denying the claim for deduction u/s. 10B. Thus, the reasons of the Assessing Officer in support of his finding could be several but what was relevant was the subject matter of the tax appeal. The third proviso to section 147, which provided that the Assessing Officer could assess or reassess such income, other than the income involving matters which were the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision, which was chargeable to tax and had escaped assessment, would come into effect.

ii) When the fresh survey u/s. 133A was conducted in the year 2014 during the pendency of the tax appeal before this court, the new materials found by the Assessing Officer were sought to be placed before the Tribunal and this court and the issue under consideration was whether the assessee was entitled to claim deduction u/s. 10B. Assuming that the reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 was allowed to continue on the basis of the new materials a situation could arise to be held that the assessee was entitled to claim deduction u/s. 10B, whereas in the reassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer on the basis of the new materials could conclude that the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction u/s. 10B.

iii) Reassessment proceedings were obviously to get over such an anomalous situation that the third proviso to section 147 was meant to cover. If the reassessment proceedings were allowed to continue, it would virtually amount to having an effect of sitting in appeal over the orders passed by this court and the Tribunal which could not be countenanced. Though it was the allegation that fresh evidence was unearthed during the course of fresh survey in March 2014, which indicated that the units considered as new units were not new units but an amalgamation of the existing units. The exercise really was to rely on these materials in support of the findings earlier recorded by the Assessing Officer which was already subject matter of challenge before the competent forum. Assumption of jurisdiction to reopen the assessment was without jurisdiction to once again disallow a claim for deduction u/s. 10B. The notice dated 16th July, 2014 issued u/s. 148 to reopen the assessment u/s. 147 for the A. Y. 2009-10 and the order rejecting the assessee’s objections were quashed and set aside.”

Public Interest Litigation — Return of Income — Filing of return in electronic form — Modification of online filing system —Jurisdiction of revenue authorities — Utility not providing for making claim for rebate under section 87A read with proviso to section after 5-7-2024 — Attempt to restrict or prohibit assessee from making particular claim at threshold itself in return of income unconstitutional — No provision under Act which debars assessee to make claim under section 87A qua tax computed at rates specified in provisions of chapter XII other than section 115BAC — Statutory safeguards and remedies in provisions of Act for consequences if claim made in self assessment found to be incorrect or not bona fide — Allowance or disallowance of claim to be deduced by interpretative and adjudicating process — Assessee cannot be debarred from making claim in return of income whether online or manual — Directions issued to modify utility to enable assessees file returns or revised returns of income — NFAC cannot continue assessment proceedings in concluded assessment — Assessment order passed by NFAC set-aside: A.Y. 2024-25

2. Chamber of Tax Consultants & Ors vs. DGIT (Systems)

[2025] 473 ITR 85 (Bom.)

A. Y. . 2024-25

Date of order: 24th January, 2025

Ss. 87A, 115BAC, 139, 139(5) and 139D of  ITA 1961

Public Interest Litigation — Return of Income — Filing of return in electronic form — Modification of online filing system —Jurisdiction of revenue authorities — Utility not providing for making claim for rebate under section 87A read with proviso to section after 5-7-2024 — Attempt to restrict or prohibit assessee from making particular claim at threshold itself in return of income unconstitutional — No provision under Act which debars assessee to make claim under section 87A qua tax computed at rates specified in provisions of chapter XII other than section 115BAC — Statutory safeguards and remedies in provisions of Act for consequences if claim made in self assessment found to be incorrect or not bona fide — Allowance or disallowance of claim to be deduced by interpretative and adjudicating process — Assessee cannot be debarred from making claim in return of income whether online or manual — Directions issued to modify utility to enable assessees file returns or revised returns of income — NFAC cannot continue assessment proceedings in concluded assessment — Assessment order passed by NFAC set-aside:

The Department releases utility for filing income tax returns online every year. The Department published a change in utility with effect from 05-07-2024. The said change unilaterally disabled the assessees from claiming rebate u/s. 87A. As a result, taxpayers, despite being statutorily eligible, were effectively deprived of their entitlements solely due to technical modifications introduced by the revenue.

The Chamber of Tax Consultants filed a petition seeking direction to modify the system and put in place by the Department for filing income tax returns for AY 2024-25 so as to allow the assessees at large to take benefit of rebate available u/s. 87A. It was contended that this unilateral modification is arbitrary, lacks justification, and deprives eligible taxpayers of statutory benefits. The Respondents’ actions violate the principles of fairness and transparency expected from public authorities and seek judicial intervention to ensure compliance with statutory provisions.

The Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) The Department could not restrain or prohibit an assessee from claiming section 87A rebate by modifying their utility by which an assessee was forbidden at the threshold itself from making such a claim in the return of income. The provisions of the Act were not so clear as to arrive at a definite conclusion that a rebate under section 87A could not be granted from the tax computed under the other provisions of Chapter XII. Certainly, such a claim whether eligible or not could be examined in the proceedings under section 143(1) or section 143(3). Merely because few selected cases were picked up for scrutiny would not mean and would not authorise any authority under the Act to prevent an assessee from making the claim on which more than one view was possible. Merely because many returns of income were required to be processed and only a few of them were selected for scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) could not be a ground to tweak the utility to prevent at the very threshold, an opportunity to raise a claim on a debatable issue based upon the interpretation of the provisions in sections 87A and 115BAC. Considering the mandates of articles 265 and 300A, ends, howsoever laudable, cannot justify means.

ii) Assuming that the legal provisions were ambiguous, the Department cannot resolve such ambiguity by adopting an interpretation favouring itself through the device of simply tweaking the utility and preventing the assessee from even raising a claim. Therefore, the main question is not whether the interpretation proposed by the learned counsel for the petitioners or that proposed by the learned Additional Solicitor General is correct, but the main question is whether the Department can insist that its interpretation prevails or triumphs because it has the capacity to and has exercised this capacity to tweak the utility and prevent an assessee to even raise a debatable claim. The provisions of the Income-tax Act do not permit the Department to do this without transgressing the constitutional boundaries

iii) The issue raised on the claim u/s. 87A was, at best, highly debatable and contentious. Therefore, the Department would not be justified in assuming that its interpretation was open and shut, and based upon such a conclusion, shut out bona fide claims for rebate under section 87A and could not be done by exercising administrative powers instead of quasi-judicial powers. Disputed claims, except to the limited extent explicitly permitted by the law, could not ordinarily be disposed of by the executive acting in its executive capacity. This is more so when the executive is itself a party to the lis. One of the foundations of our Constitution is the rule of law. This posits that all three organs of governance, the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary function under and in accordance with the law as enshrined in our Constitution.

iv) The Department did not show any provision under the Act which expressly debarred an assessee to raise or make the claim u/s. 87A qua the tax computed at the rates specified in the provisions of Chapter XII other than section 115BAC. There was no rebuttal to the petitioner’s contention that a provision like section 112A(6) had been expressly enacted wherever the Legislature intended to deny such a benefit. Therefore, in so far as the prayers of the petitioners were concerned that the utility should permit an assessee to at least make a claim under section 87A, it could not be rejected at the threshold.

v) Whether rebate u/s. 87A was to be allowed only on the tax calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 115BAC or also on taxes calculated under other provisions of Chapter XII would require interpretation of the interplay of section 87A and section 115BAC To what extent the overriding provisions contained in section 115BAC(1A) would result in allowability or denial of rebate under section 87A would have to be examined by interpretative process. The impact of the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Chapter” would also have to be examined along with other provisions for adjudicating the claim under section 87A. What was the purport of the proviso to section 87A on the claim proposed to be made would have to be interpreted in conjunction with the provisions of section 115BAC(1A) and other connected sections. How the phrase “total income” should be construed for section 87A and section 115BAC along with the definition sections, charging sections and scope of total income and the scheme of the Act, would have to be examined. Whether the provisions of section 115BAC restricted itself only to tax rates or computation of total income would also have to be examined. If such exercise was required to be undertaken before coming to a definite conclusion as to whether the rebate under section 87A was to be granted or denied on the tax computed under the provisions of Chapter XII other than section 115BAC, had to be deduced by interpretative and adjudicating process. Therefore, the Department was not justified in modifying the utility from 5th July, 2024, by which an assessee was debarred at the threshold from making the claim, which claim was contentious or debatable.

vi) A combined reading of section 87 and section 87A would mean an assessee has to make a claim, the entitlement of which is to be examined by processing the return under section 143(1) or section 143(3) and the same should be allowed as a deduction. Section 87 which provides for rebate under section 87A uses the phrase “there shall be allowed from the amount of income tax . . .”. The proviso to section 87A uses the phrase “. assessee shall be entitled to a deduction . . .”. If a claim was not made, the Department could contend that the claim could not be allowed.

vii) In the absence of any concrete case, the petitioner’s prayer to direct the Department to make the utilities for filing the return of income online flexible so as to allow an assessee to self compute the income and there should not be any restriction on making of any claim whatsoever and to not release any utilities or make any changes in the utilities for filing of the return of income under section 139 which would not allow any assessee to raise any claim, could not be granted unless there was a demand for justice which had been rejected or a failure on the part of the Department to exercise its duty under the Act. The court should grant no relief in such broad and general terms because the ramifications would be unclear.

viii) The Department was directed to modify the utilities for filing of the return of income u/s. 139 of the Act immediately, thereby allowing the assessees to make a claim of rebate under section 87A of the Act read with the proviso to section 87A , in their return of income for the assessment year 2024-25 and subsequent years including revised returns to be filed u/s. 139(5).”

Exemption u/s. 10(38) — Long-term capital gains — Book profits — Minimum alternate tax — Amendments in provisions of sections 10 and 115JB — Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal not erroneous in allowing exemption u/s. 10(38) on long-term capital gains from sale of shares of amalgamating companies with assessee: A.Y. 2015-16

1. Principle CIT vs. Hespera Reality Pvt. Ltd

[2025] 472 ITR 630 (Del.)

A. Y. 2015-16

Date of order: 24th December

Ss.10(38) and 115JB of ITA 1961

Exemption u/s. 10(38) — Long-term capital gains — Book profits — Minimum alternate tax — Amendments in provisions of sections 10 and 115JB — Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal not erroneous in allowing exemption u/s. 10(38) on long-term capital gains from sale of shares of amalgamating companies with assessee:

During the F.Y. 2014-15 relevant to the A.Y. 2015-16, five companies which held shares of the entity IBHFL merged with the assessee and three of these companies sold their shares. Since the said amalgamating companies were merged with the assessee with effect from August 1, 2014, the income earned from the transaction of sale of IBHFL shares were assessed in the hands of the assessee. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the amount of long-term capital gains was required to be added to the book profits u/s. 115JB and that the amount was not entitled to exemption u/s. 10(38).

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the entire amount of long-term capital gains was not liable to be included as income chargeable to tax u/s. 10(38) and accordingly, deleted the disallowance but upheld the Assessing Officer’s decision regarding the computation of book profits for the purpose of determination of minimum alternate tax u/s. 115JB. On the question, whether the long-term capital gains that arose from the sale of investments were exempted u/s. 10(38), the Tribunal concurred with the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and rejected the appeal of the Department.

Delhi High Court dismissed the further appeal by the Department and held as under:

“i) The proviso to section 10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was introduced by virtue of the Finance Act, 2006 ([2006] 282 ITR (St.) 14). The inclusion of the proviso was corresponding to the amendments to Explanation 1 of section 115JB. By virtue of the Finance Act, 2006, the Explanation to section 115JB was amended and expenditure incurred in respect of the income exempt u/s. 10, with the exceptions of section 10(38) was excluded for the purposes of calculation of book profits and minimum alternate tax under section 115JB. In other words, the expenditure incurred for earning such income as was exempt from taxation by virtue of section 10(38) was required to be accounted for as expenditure for determining the book profits. Correspondingly, income u/s. 10(38) was also included as a part of the book profits but other incomes covered u/s. 10 were excluded.

ii) The proviso to section 10(38) was added by virtue of the Finance Act, 2006 to abundantly clarify that the income from capital gains on certain assets, which are excluded from the income u/s. 10(38) would be included in computing book profits u/s. 115JB. The proviso to section 10(38) cannot be read in the reverse to mean that if the gains are not included as book profits u/s. 115JB they are liable to be included as income for the purposes of assessment to tax under the normal provisions, notwithstanding that the gains are required to be excluded from income chargeable to tax u/s. 10(38).

iii) There was no fault with the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, in rejecting the Department’s contention and holding that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 10(38) of the long-term capital gains on account of sale of shares by the amalgamating companies, which was denied by the Assessing Officer.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

1. K. Krishnamurthy vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax

(2025) 171 taxmann.com 413 (SC)

Penalty under section 271AAA — The imposition of penalty is not mandatory – Penalty may be levied if there is undisclosed income in the specified previous year — It is obligatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to demonstrate and prove that undisclosed income of the specified previous year was found during the course of search or as a result of the search – Appellant admitted ₹2,27,65,580/- as income for AY 2011-12 during the search before DDIT (Inv.) as well as substantiated the manner in which the said undisclosed income was derived and paid tax together with interest thereon, albeit belatedly, therefore, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) was not attracted on the said amount of  ₹2,27,65,580 — Appellant had not offered in the declaration before the DDIT(Inv.) any income on land transactions belonging to Mr. Sharab Reddy and Mr. NHR Prasad Reddy — Appellant offered ₹2,49,90,000/- under the head “Income From Other Sources” on account of these land transactions during the course of assessment proceedings only and not at any time during the search — Penalty under Section 271AAA(1) of the Income-tax Act 1961 was therefore leviable on the said amount.

A Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’) dated 19th January, 2009 was entered into between Mr. Hashim Moosa on the one hand and the Appellant as well as Mr. Surendra Reddy on the other, for procuring lands at a certain price from the land procurers, i.e. the Appellant and Mr. Surendra Reddy. As per Clause 10 of this MOU, ₹10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten lakhs only) was paid to the procurers for arranging facilitation of transfer of land from the landowners to Mr. Hashim Moosa / his nominees. No other payment, except a reimbursement under Clause 11, was contemplated under this MOU.

A transaction was entered into between Mr. Hashim Moosa and the Space Employees’ Co-operative Society Ltd. (in short ‘Society’) on 26th September, 2009. It was in order to facilitate purchase of land for this transaction that the MOU dated 19th January, 2009 was entered into by the Appellant with Mr. Hashim Moosa.

A search and seizure operation was carried out at the Appellant’s premises on 25th November, 2010, under section 132 of the Act. The Appellant disclosed an income of ₹2,27,65,580/- as a consequence of the search and seizure.

A notice dated 21st August, 2012 under Section 142(1) of the Act was issued to the Appellant calling for return of income for Assessment Year (‘AY’) 2011-2012. The Appellant filed his return of income on 05th November, 2012. The Appellant returned a total income of ₹4,77,11,330/- for Previous Year (‘PY’) 2010-2011, relevant to AY 2011-2012.

The Respondent issued the Assessment Order dated 15th March, 2013 for PY 2010-2011 relevant to AY 2011-2012, in respect of the Appellant. The total income assessed was ₹4,78,02,616/-.

The Assessing Officer noted that Space Employees’s Co-operative Housing Society Limited entered into an MOU on 26-09-2009 with Mr. HashimMoosa for acquiring 120 acres (which was further extended to 150 acres) of lands in Hoskote Taluk for a consideration of ₹74,26,980/- per acre. The Society will pay Mr. Moosa ₹73,26,980/- per acre of registered land to and the balance ₹1 lakh per acre shall be deposited in a Joint Escrow Account till the entire 120 acres of land is registered in favour of the Society.

To procure lands for the Society, Mr. HashimMoosa had entered into an MOU on 19-01-2009 with Mr. K. Krishna Murthy (Appellant) and P. Surendra Reddy for procuring lands @ ₹70,00,000/- per acre.

Mr. Krishnamurthy (Appellant) and Mr. Ananda Reddy had transferred 16.25 acres of lands which are in the names Mr. NHR Prasada Reddy and Mr. Sharab Reddy in favour of the Society.

On the basis of the copies of sale deeds collected from the Society, it was seen that Mr. N.H.R. Prasad Reddy sold 7 acres and 36 guntas of land to the Society and received total sale consideration of ₹4,34,50,000/-. Similarly, his brother Mr. N.H. Sharaba Reddy sold 10 acres and 33 guntas of lands to the Society and received sale consideration of ₹5,95,37,500/-. Overall they had sold 18 acres and 29 guntas of land and received total sale consideration of ₹10,29,87,500/. The consideration received by them works out to ₹55,00,000/- per acre.

Though, the Assessee had admitted that he had undertaken transaction and had promised to get alternative lands to Mr. NHR Prasad Reddy & Sharab Reddy, he had not offered any income on this count before the DDIT (Inv.). The Assessee offered an amount of ₹2,49,90,000/- during the course of assessment proceedings under the head income from other sources (income from assignment of rights) being the difference between the cost of lands which he has acquired on behalf of the brothers and cost of lands at which it is transferred to society.

On 30th September, 2013, an order imposing penalty under section 271AAA of the Act was passed against the Appellant for AY 2011-2012. The Respondent imposed penalty on the Appellant solely on the ground that the Appellant did not make payment of tax and penalty in terms of section 271AAA(2) of the Act after receipt of Show Cause Notice and considering the entire received income as the undisclosed income.

On the same day, another order imposing penalty under Section 271AAA of the Act was passed in respect of AY 2010-2011. Penalty at the rate of 10% (Ten per cent) was imposed on the entire returned income i.e. ₹4,78,02,616/- amounting to ₹47,80,261/-.

The CIT (Appeals), Bangalore allowed the appeal preferred against the Penalty Order dated 30th September, 2013 in respect of AY 2010-2011 accepting the submission of the Appellant that 2009-10 cannot be the ‘specified previous year’ for the purpose of Section 271AAA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Appeal preferred against the Penalty Order dated 30th September, 2013 in respect of AY 2011-2012 was however rejected solely relying on Section 271AAA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the basic condition existing in the section has not been fulfilled.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (‘ITAT’) vide order dated 17th October, 2016 rejected the Appellant’s appeal against the CIT(A) order again on the ground of non-compliance with Section 271AAA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Appellant preferred an appeal under section 260A of the Act.

Before the High Court, it was contended by the Assessee that it had admitted an undisclosed income of ₹2,27,65,580/- and filed returns showing income of ₹4,78,02,616/-. Nothing was found during the course of search. Assessee had voluntarily filed return of income more than what he had admitted before the DDIT. The machinery section had thus failed and therefore, penalty could not have been imposed.

According to the High Court compliance of all three conditions in sub-clause (2) of Section 271AAA of the Act were mandatory and the third condition namely, the payment of tax, together with interest, if any, had not been fulfilled by the Assessee.

On the question as to whether penalty prescribed @10% of undisclosed Income under section 271AAA of the Act can be reduced, if the tax together with interest on the undisclosed income as declared by the Assessee in the course of search in a statement under Section 132(4) is partly complied with, the High Court held that admittedly, the Appellant had not disclosed the income at all. But for search, the same could not have been unearthed. Having filed the returns, the Assessee did not comply with the third condition of sub-section (2). The assessee was therefore not entitled to any relief.

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the Appellant vide the judgment dated 2nd August, 2022.

On 6th January, 2023, the Supreme Court was pleased to issue notice confined to the second question urged before the High Court.

The Supreme Court noted that Section 271AAA(1) of the Income-tax Act 1961 stipulates that the Assessing Officer may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act, direct the Assessee, in a case where search has been carried out to pay by way of a penalty, in addition to the tax, a sum computed at the rate of 10% (Ten per cent) of the undisclosed income of the specified previous year. The Supreme Court was of the view that the imposition of penalty therefore is not mandatory. Consequently, penalty under this Section may be levied if there is undisclosed income in the specified previous year.

According to the Supreme Court, though under Section 271AAA(1) of the Income-tax Act 1961, the Assessing Officer has the discretion to levy penalty, yet this discretionary power is not unfettered, unbridled and uncanalised. Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. [See: Som Raj and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. 1990:INSC:53 : (1990) 2 SCC 653].

The Supreme Court noted that Section 271AAA(2) of the Act stipulates that Section 271AAA(1) shall not be applicable if the Assessee — (i) in a statement under sub-section (4) of Section 132 in the course of the search, admits the undisclosed income and specifies the manner in which such income has been derived; (ii) substantiates the manner in which the undisclosed income was derived; and (iii) pays the tax, together with interest, if any, in respect of the undisclosed income.

Consequently, if the aforesaid conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied and the tax together with interest on the undisclosed income is paid up to the date of payment, even with delay, in the absence of specific period of compliance, then penalty at the rate of 10% (Ten per cent) under section 271AAA of the Act 1961 is normally not leviable.

The Supreme Court further noted that the expression ‘Undisclosed Income’ has been defined in Explanation (a) appended to Section 271AAA of the Act. According to the Supreme Court, as Section 271AAA is a penalty provision, it has to be strictly construed. The fact that the Assessee had surrendered some undisclosed income during the course of search or that the surrender was emerging out of the statements recorded during the course of search was not sufficient to fasten the levy of penalty. The onus was on the Assessing Officer to satisfy the condition precedent stipulated in the said Explanation, before the charge for levy of penalty is fastened on the Assessee.

Consequently, it is obligatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to demonstrate and prove that undisclosed income of the specified previous year was found during the course of search or as a result of the search.

The Supreme Court further noted that the expression ‘specified previous year’ has been defined in Explanation (b) appended to Section 271AAA of the Act 1961. Since in the present case, the search was conducted on 25th November, 2010 and as the year for filing returns under Section 139(1) of the Act 1961 which ended prior to that date had expired on 31st July, 2010, Explanation b(i) was not applicable so as to make AY 2010-11 the specified previous year. Consequently, by virtue of Explanation b(ii), AY 2011-12 (the year in which the search was conducted) was the specified previous year in the present case for the purpose of Section 271AAA(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court further held that in the present case, the Appellant admitted ₹2,27,65,580/- as income for AY 2011-12 during the search before DDIT (Inv.) as well as substantiated the manner in which the said undisclosed income was derived and paid tax together with interest thereon, albeit belatedly.

Consequently, all the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 271AAA(2) stood satisfied and, therefore, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) was not attracted on the said amount of ₹2,27,65,580/-.

However, in the assessment order dated 15th March, 2013 passed under Section 143(3) of the Act, which has attained finality, it was an admitted position that the Appellant had not offered in the declaration before the DDIT(Inv.) any income on land transactions belonging to Mr. Sharab Reddy and Mr. NHR Prasad Reddy. From the assessment order dated 15th March, 2013, it was apparent that the Appellant offered ₹2,49,90,000/- under the head income from other sources on account of these land transactions during the course of assessment proceedings only and not at any time during the search.

The argument that the said transactions had not been found in the search at the Appellant’s premises but had been found due to ‘copies of sale deeds collected from the society’ had no merits as the sale deeds had been collected as a result of the search and in continuation of the search. The Supreme Court was of the view that as the causation for collecting the sale deeds from the Society was the search at the Appellant’s premises, it cannot be said that the said documents were not found in the course of the search.

The Supreme Court further held that the expression ‘found in the course of search’ is of a wide amplitude. It does not mean documents found in the Assessee’s premises alone during the search. At times, search of an Assessee leads to a search of another individual and / or further investigation / interrogation of third parties. All these steps and recoveries therein would fall within the expression ‘found in the course of search’.

The Supreme Court reiterated that since income of `2,49,90,000/- constituted undisclosed income found during the search, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable on the said amount. Also, as the said amount was not admitted in the declaration before the DDIT(Inv.) during the course of search but was disclosed by the Appellant only during the assessment proceedings, and that too, after the Assessing Officer had asked for copies of the sale deeds from the Society, the exception carved out in Section 271AAA(2) was not attracted to the said portion of the income.

The Supreme Court disposed the appeal with a direction to the Appellant to pay penalty at the rate of 10% (Ten per cent) on ₹2,49,90,000/- and not on ₹4,78,02,616.

Do Provisions Of S.68 Of Income-Tax Act, 1961 Apply To Donations Received By A Charitable Trust?

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Charitable or religious trusts are generally funded by donations (voluntary contributions) received from donors. Such donations are taxable as income (subject to exemption in respect of application and accumulation), as they fall within the definition of income under s.2(24)(iia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”), which reads as under:

“voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly or partly for such purposes or by an association or institution referred to in clause (21) or clause (23), or by a fund or trust or institution referred to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or by any university or other educational institution referred to in sub-clause (iiiad) or sub-clause (vi) or by any hospital or other institution referred to in sub-clause (iiiae) or sub-clause (via) of clause (23C) of section 10 or by an electoral trust.”

Such donations are also regarded as income from property held for charitable or religious purposes by virtue of the provisions of section 12(1). Section 12(1) reads as under:

“Any voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly for such purposes (not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution) shall for the purposes of section 11 be deemed to be income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes and the provisions of that section and section 13 shall apply accordingly.”

A charitable or religious trust registered under section 12A of the Act is entitled to exemption under section 11 in respect of its income from property held for charitable or religious purposes, which would include such donations, to the extent of such income applied, accumulated, etc. as provided in section 11. Therefore, such donations are income in the first place, and are thereafter entitled to exemption to the extent permitted by section 11.

Section 68 of the Act provides for taxation of unexplained cash credits. Section 68 provides as under:

“Where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee maintained for any previous year, and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, satisfactory, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year.”

Such unexplained cash credits are taxable at the rate of 60%, plus surcharge at the rate of 25% of such tax, plus education cess of 4% on the tax plus surcharge, i.e. at an effective tax rate of 78%.

An issue has arisen before the High Courts as to whether the provisions of section 68 apply to donations received by charitable trusts; in other words, whether donations received by a charitable trust, which may otherwise qualify for exemption, can be taxed as unexplained cash credits. While the Delhi, Allahabad and Karnataka High Courts have held that such donations received by a charitable trust cannot be brought to tax under section 68, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that such donations can be taxed under section 68.

KESHAV SOCIAL & CHARITABLE FOUNDATION’S CASE

The issue first came before the Delhi High Court in the case of DIT(E) vs. Keshav Social & Charitable Foundation 278 ITR 152.

In this case, during the relevant year, the assessee was a charitable trust registered under section 12A. It received donations amounting to ₹18,24,200. The assessee had spent more than 75% of the donations for charitable purposes.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to furnish details of the donations, i.e. the names and addresses of the donors and the mode of receipt of donations. The assessee was unable to satisfactorily explain the donations. The assessing officer (AO) was of the view that the donations were perhaps fictitious donations, and that the assessee had tried to introduce unaccounted money into its books by way of donations. Therefore, the amount of ₹18,24,200 was treated as cash credit under section 68, and the benefit of exemption under section 11 was denied in respect of such donations.

In first appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) was of the view that the AO was not justified in treating the donations received as income under section 68. He noted that the assessee had disclosed the donations as its income, and had spent 75% of the amount for charitable purposes. Therefore, in his view, the assessee had not committed any default. The Commissioner (Appeals) therefore directed the AO to allow exemption to the assessee under section 11, holding that the treatment of the donations of ₹18,24,200 as income under section 68 was incorrect.

In second appeal, the Tribunal was of the view that since more than 75% of the donations received by the assessee was spent on charitable purposes, the addition of ₹18,24,200 was not correct. The Tribunal accepted the argument of counsel for the assessee that once a donation was received, it was deemed to be received for a charitable purpose unless the donation was received towards the corpus of the trust.

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the revenue, it was submitted that essentially what the assessee was trying to do was to launder its black money or unaccounted income by converting it into donations, and it should not be permitted to do so.

Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S Rm M Ct M Tiruppani Trust 230 ITR 636, the High Court observed that every charitable or religious trust was entitled to exemption for income applied to its charitable or religious purposes in India. It noted that on the facts of the case before it, more than 75% of the donations for charitable purposes had been applied for its objects.

The Delhi High Court observed that to obtain the benefit of the exemption under section 11, the assessee was required to show that the donations were voluntary. The High Court further observed that the assessee had not only disclosed its donations, but had submitted a list of donors. According to the High Court, the fact that the complete list of donors was not filed or that the donors are not produced, did not necessarily lead to the inference that the assessee was trying to introduce unaccounted money by way of donation receipts. This was more particularly so in the facts of the case, where admittedly more than 75% of the donations were applied for charitable purposes.

The High Court held that section 68 had no application to the facts of the case, because the assessee had in fact disclosed the donations of ₹18,24,200 as its income. The High Court observed that it could not be disputed that all receipts, other than corpus donations, would be income in the hands of the assessee. Accordingly, there was full disclosure of income by the assessee, and also application of the donations for charitable purposes.

The High Court therefore upheld the decision of the Tribunal, holding that the provisions of section 68 would not apply to the donations received by the assessee trust.

This decision of the Delhi High Court was followed by the Delhi High Court in DIT v Hans Raja Samarak Society217 Taxman 114 (Del)(Mag), by the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v Uttaranchal Welfare Society 364 ITR 398, and by the Karnataka High Court in the cases of DIT(E) v. Sri BelimathaMahasamsthana Socio Cultural & Education Trust 336 ITR 694 and CIT v MBA Nahata Charitable Trust 364 ITR 693.

MAYOR FOUNDATION’S CASE

The issue came up again recently before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Mayor Foundation v CIT 170 taxmann.com 749.

In this case, the assessee was a company registered under section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956. It was also registered under section 12A and section 80G of the Act. It was running one educational institution, Mayor World School, at Jalandhar. The assessee had filed its income tax return, disclosing Nil income. During the year, it received corpus donations of ₹1,43,40,039.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO sought to verify the names and addresses of the donors. Notices were issued u/s 133(6) to some donors. 14 donors could be verified, and 7 were found not genuine as the donors’ identity was doubtful. A show cause notice was issued as to why such doubtful donations amounting to `53 lakh should not be taxed as anonymous donations under section 115BBC.

The assessee responded seeking more time to establish contact with such donors and obtain their due replies. None of the donors were produced before the AO. It was pointed out that such donations were received through bank accounts, and certain confirmations were received from 3 company donors.

The AO noticed the following in respect of these 3 companies:

  1.  In the case of all 3, first notices were first returned unserved. Responses were received to the second notices.
  2.  2 of the companies were located in West Bengal, and the replies were sent by post from Mumbai General Post Office.
  3.  2 of the companies were shown as struck-off in the ROC records, and 1 was reflected as dormant.
  4.  There seemed to be no working directors in all 3 companies.
  5.  The assessee had failed to produce any director or shareholder of all the 3 companies.

The AO therefore concluded that the assessee had received huge donations, the sources of income were not genuine, the companies were not working, and the genuineness, identity, sources and credit worthiness of these companies had not been proved. Besides addition of donations of ₹8,00,000,other donations of ₹40 lakh and ₹8 lakh were added as undisclosed cash credit under section 68, and tax was levied under section 115BBC and 115BBE.

In first appeal, the assessee submitted copies of income tax returns and proved the credit worthiness of 2 donees, who were NRIs, and who had given the rupee donations of ₹48 lakh. These additions of ₹48 lakh were deleted. The addition of donations of ₹8 lakh from the 3 corporate entities under section 68 was sustained in first and second appeals, on account of inability to prove any relationship between the donors and the donee, their whereabouts not being produced in the form of documents, and the companies having been struck off or being defunct.

The reasoning which prevailed with the Tribunal was that these companies had been struck-off the record of the Registrar of Companies, and therefore had to be treated as shell companies. Therefore, their identity was in question, the existence of the corporate body having been duly rejected by the Registrar of Companies. The existence of the donors itself was questioned, and the assessee was unable to produce any document in support of their action to restore the company before a judicial authority.

The questions of law raised before the High Court were:

“a. Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in concurring with the findings of CIT(A) and in confirming the impugned income of ₹8,00,000 under the provisions of section 115BBC, section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Income Tax Act, 1961 being perverse and against the statutory provisions and as upheld in catena of judgments?

b. Whether the orders of the authorities below are illegal, erroneous, without jurisdiction and thus perverse?”

Before the Punjab & Haryana High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that there was sufficient material produced on record to show that the three companies existed and had been filing returns at the time of the corpus donations. Reliance was placed upon the documents in support of the publication that the amounts had been received by way of cheque. It was submitted that the companies were incorporated in 1992, and even if they were no longer registered at the time when the matter was inquired, there was no such reason why addition could have been made. It was submitted that the requisite communication had been made by the companies with the tax authorities, Ledger copy of the accounts and the income tax returns for the year and bank statements had been sent to the assessing officer. The three companies had acknowledged the donations that they had given.

The High Court observed that the companies at West Bengal had sought to give the details of the donations from Mumbai, and it was in such circumstances, that the AO came to the conclusion that the expression given was not bona fide. Opportunity was given to produce the directors, which was not done. It was due to this that the tax authorities had taken the view that the companies were no longer functional and not functioning and struck off by the Registrar of Companies. The High Court observed that nothing had been brought on record that these companies were actually functioning at the time of donations, and when they were struck off.

Under such circumstances, the High Court was of the opinion that the genuineness, identity and credit worthiness of these companies was rightly doubted by the AO, and under such circumstances, the additions had been made.

The High Court was therefore of the view that the question of law raised before it did not arise, keeping in view the facts and circumstances, as the appellant could not produce sufficient material before the authorities to dispel the suspicion which had been raised about the donations received from the companies which were not even based geographically close to the educational institution, and the reason to grant the donations were never properly explained.

OBSERVATIONS

It may be noted that in Mayor Foundation’s case (supra), neither before the Tribunal nor before the High Court were the decisions of other High Courts on the issue cited. Therefore, the Tribunal and the High Court merely decided the matter in that case on the basis of the facts before them, without really examining the legal issues involved in respect of the very applicability of section 68. Further, it seems that in that case, both section 115BBC as well as section 68 were invoked, which was patently incorrect, as the same income cannot be subjected to tax twice.

Section 68 seeks to bring to tax receipts which are not offered to tax as income, such as capital or loans received by a taxpayer. When the charitable trust has already included donations received as income in the first place, the question of applicability of section 68 should not arise.

Section 115BBC is a special provision introduced by the Finance Act 2006 with effect from AY 2007-08, to tax anonymous donations received by charitable trusts at the flat rate of 30%. The CBDT, vide Circular No. 14 of 2006 dated 28th December, 2006,has clarified that section 115BBC has been introduced” to prevent channelisation of unaccounted money to these institutions by way of anonymous donations”. An anonymous donation has been defined as a voluntary contribution where the recipient does not maintain details of the identity, indicating name and address of the donor. This is therefore a specific provision to tax donations received by charitable trusts where the donors are bogus entities. As opposed to this, the provisions of section 68 are general provisions to tax all types of cash credits which are unexplained, and apply to all types of assessees.

Section 115BBC is therefore a specific provision, while section 68 is a general provision. It is well-settled law that the specific provision of law would prevail over a general provision. Therefore, section 115BBC would prevail over the provisions of section 68 in the case of donations received by a charitable trust.

The Bombay High Court, in the recent case of Everest Education Society v ACIT 164 taxmann.com 744, while deciding a review petition against its order upholding treatment of donations as anonymous donations under section 115BBC, observed in paragraph 7 of the judgment that:

“Section 68 of the Act was not applicable since the applicant had disclosed the income from donation.”

Further, the Delhi High Court decision in Keshav Social and Charitable Foundation’s case (supra) has been upheld by the Supreme Court in a short decision disposing of the appeal, in the case reported as DIT(E) v Keshav Social and Charitable Foundation 394 ITR 496.

One aspect of the matter which also needs to be considered is that in Keshav Social & Charitable Foundation’s case, the donations were general donations, while in Mayor Foundation’s case, the donations were corpus donations. Would this make any difference to the aspect of applicability of the provisions of section 68?

This should really not make any difference on account of the following:

a. The provisions of section 115BBC apply equally to corpus donations as they do to general donations.

b. In the view of tax authorities, corpus donations are also income as defined in section 2(24)(iia) in the first place, and are thereafter exempt under section 11(1)(d) if the conditions specified therein are fulfilled.

c. In Uttaranchal Welfare Society’s case before the Allahabad High Court, the question before the High Court was in relation to taxability of corpus donations received under section 68. There also, the Allahabad High Court held that section 68 could not be applied to such corpus donations.

Therefore, the provisions of section 68 should not apply to donations received by registered charitable trusts (whether corpus or otherwise), and if at all, the provisions of section 115BBC may apply in such cases where details of the donor are lacking.

Article 11 India-Luxembourg DTAA – Assessee, having satisfied that it is not a conduit entity, is entitled to the benefits under DTAA and considering commercial and economic substance.

15. [2025] 170 taxmann.com 475 (Delhi – Trib.)

SC Lowy P.I. (LUX) S.A.R.L. vs. ACIT

ITA No: 3568 (Delhi) of 2023

A.Y.: 2021-22

Dated: 30th December, 2024

Article 11 India-Luxembourg DTAA – Assessee, having satisfied that it is not a conduit entity, is entitled to the benefits under DTAA and considering commercial and economic substance.

FACTS

Assessee is a Limited Liability Company and a tax resident of Luxembourg. The Assessee is a subsidiary of a Cayman Island entity and a step-down subsidiary of an offshore fund located in the Cayman Islands. The Assessee is registered as a Category II – Foreign Portfolio Investor registered with SEBI, who has invested in corporate bonds and pass-through certificates of securitization trust.

It offered the interest income from bonds at 10% under Article 11 and claimed treaty benefits with respect to business income and capital gains under Article 7 and Article 13(6) of DTAA, respectively.

The AO verified the financial statements, SEBI registration, and Articles of Association to conclude that the real owner of the income is the ultimate Parent located in the Cayman Islands, with whom India does not have DTAA. The entire holding structure involves treaty shopping, and a TRC is insufficient to claim treaty benefits and beneficial ownership of income. Therefore, the AO denied the tax benefits under DTAA and taxed the interest income from bonds and securitization trusts at 40% and short-term gains at 30%.

The DRP upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

  •  The Assessee has provided a valid TRC and satisfied the conditions prescribed under Article 29 dealing with the limitation of benefits. Having not raised any red flags on the TRC, the revenue cannot overlook the TRC without bringing any evidence to prove that the entity exists as a conduit. The Delhi High Court, in Tiger Global International III Holdings [2024] 165 taxmann.com 850 (Delhi), has held that revenue can look beyond TRC only in case of tax fraud, sham transactions or illegal activities.
  •  The Assessee was incorporated as an investment holding company in Luxembourg, and it has been in existence since 2015 and invested in distressed assets. As a Category – II FPI, it invested in securitization trust/corporate bonds in FY 2018-19. Its geographical concentration shows that it had only 14% investment in India, and the remaining investments were spread across jurisdictions.
  •  The Assessee had paid taxes and filed returns in Luxembourg with respect to income earned from Indiaand other jurisdictions. Substantial operational costs, includes consulting fees, litigation fees, professional charges, and administrative expenses, are incurred in Luxembourg.
  •  The Assessee is in existence to date and continues to hold the investments. This substantiates that they control the assets and the income thereon for their own account; hence, they cannot be regarded as a conduit entity. The AO did not bring any evidence to support his views and presumptions.
  •  The genuineness of the entity is substantiated through various activities, and it operated as a stand-alone entity without depending on its holding company.

The limitation of benefits under Article 29 as amended by Multilateral Instruments (Article 7) requires bringing on record the relevant facts andcircumstances to prove that the principal purpose of arrangements and transactions is only for the purpose of taking treaty benefit. The Revenue, without any cogent materials, failed to establish that the assessee is a conduit entity. Therefore, the benefits of the treaty cannot be denied.

Article 8 of India-USA DTAA – Whether code sharing revenue falls under the scope of ‘operations of aircraft’ and is entitled to relief under the DTAA.

14. [2024] 169 taxmann.com 8 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Delta Air Lines, Inc. vs. ACIT (International Taxation)

ITA No: 235 (Mum.) of 2022

A.Y.: 2018-19

Dated: 7th November 2024

Article 8 of India-USA DTAA – Whether code sharing revenue falls under the scope of ‘operations of aircraft’ and is entitled to relief under the DTAA.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of the USA, was engaged in the business of aircraft operations in international traffic. It had established a branch office in India, a permanent establishment that was admitted to facilitate the booking of air passenger tickets and freights. The Assessee had three streams of international journey income, namely (i) transportation using their own aircraft, (ii) transportation with a combination of own aircraft and third-party carriers vide code sharing arrangements for one or more parts of the journey, and (iii) entire transportation using third party carriers under code-sharing arrangements.

The Assessee filed NIL return of income claiming benefits under Article 8 of the DTAA. The AO denied the Article 8 benefit w.r.t second and third stream of income, stating income under code sharing cannot be regarded as derived from the operation of aircraft in international traffic. Further, AO was of the view that code sharing arrangements cannot be regarded as a space or a slot charter.

The Ld. DRP and Ld. AO followed the order of the coordinate bench in Assesse’s own case for AY 2010-11 [2015] 57 taxmann.com 1 (Mumbai) to uphold the denial of the treaty benefit qua code-share revenue. The reasoning that was adopted in earlier ITAT ruling, as also by DRP, was as under:

  •  The taxpayer must derive profit from the operation of an aircraft in international traffic as an owner/charter/lessor of the aircraft.
  •  In the case of a code-sharing arrangement, the taxpayer’s activities were only the booking of tickets, and the actual transport of passengers was carried out by a third-party airline. The same cannot hence be regarded as profits derived from international traffic carried out by the assessee.
  • Activities directly linked to the transport of passengers by the Assessee would only fall under the ambit of Article 8(2)(b). Since the transportation is carried on by other airlines, and it cannot be regarded as having direct nexus with activities carried on by the Assessee; hence, the activity relating to transportation by other airlines cannot fall under Article 8(2)(b).
  •  The ruling of the coordinate bench of the tribunal in the case of MISC Berhard [2014] 47 taxmann.com 50 (Mumbai) is not applicable to the case on hand. The MISC (supra) case dealt with revenue earned from feeder vessels, which was used to transport cargo from the Indian Port to the Hub Port and for further transportation by the third party than to mother vessels for the final destination. In the case of Assessee, there are no such instances of transporting to the hub port and then to the final destination. Since the ruling was rendered in the context of India-UK DTAA, the same cannot be applied to India-US DTAA.
  •  The code-sharing arrangement cannot be regarded as slot/space charter for qualifying under Article 8(2) as the assessee does not have exclusivity over space or flights booked.

HELD

On further appeal, the co-ordinate bench dissented with their earlier ruling on account of subsequent judicial developments and ruled in favour of the taxpayer basis the following:

  • The Bombay High Court in Balaji Shipping [2012] 24 taxmann.com 229 (Bombay) held that slot chartering by shipping companies for transportation by third-party shippers could fall under the scope of Article 9 of India-UK DTAA. The High Court held that both the following scenarios were covered under Article 9 i.e., (i) use of a third-party ship for movement between a port in India to the hub port and then for the final destination and (ii) use of a third-party ship for transport from the port in India to the final destination.
  • The Bombay High Court in APL Co. Pte. Ltd [2016] 75 taxmann.com 32 (Bombay) has applied the ruling of Balaji Shipping (supra) while interpreting the India-Singapore DTAA since both treaties’ wordings are parimateria. Therefore, this will have a binding effect when the wording of various treaties is similar. Although the passengers are transported through other airlines, the Assessee issues the tickets up to the final destination. The code-sharing arrangements facilitate the Assessee in providing services to specific destinations where they do not operate. Therefore, applying the Balaji Shipping (supra) ratio rendered in the context of shipping income receipts from code-sharing arrangements is entitled to benefit under Article 8 of DTAA.
  • When the assessee books a seat on a third-party airline through a code-sharing arrangement, it could be regarded as a charter of space in the aircraft, and the entire aircraft need not be chartered.
  • The codes used by the Assessee for booking tickets in third-party airlines are unique to them and are used for partial or complete journeys. This establishes the link between transportation by a third party and the operations of the Assessee, and they transport the passenger on behalf of the Assessee.

Sec. 28: Where during search at residential premises of director of assessee-company, AO found that assessee had made out of books sales and added entire undisclosed sales to income of assessee, however, Commissioner (Appeals) restricted same to profit element embedded therein estimated at rate of 8 per cent of sales, since revenue had not given any basis to justify applying higher rate of net profit at 12.5 per cent instead of 8 per cent, addition restricted by Commissioner (Appeals) to 8 per cent of sales was to be upheld. Also, Commissioner (Appeals) failed to give benefit of income surrendered by assessee voluntarily against addition confirmed by him on account of unaccounted sales, Assessing Officer was to be directed to grant assessee benefit of income surrendered by assessee against addition confirmed by Commissioner (Appeals).

84. ACIT vs. Conor Granito (P.) Ltd

[2024] 116 ITR(T) 479 (Rajkot – Trib.)

ITA NO.: 143 (RJT) OF 2021

CO NO.: 01 (RJT) OF 2022

A.Y.: 2019-20

Dated: 12th January, 2024

Sec. 28: Where during search at residential premises of director of assessee-company, AO found that assessee had made out of books sales and added entire undisclosed sales to income of assessee, however, Commissioner (Appeals) restricted same to profit element embedded therein estimated at rate of 8 per cent of sales, since revenue had not given any basis to justify applying higher rate of net profit at 12.5 per cent instead of 8 per cent, addition restricted by Commissioner (Appeals) to 8 per cent of sales was to be upheld. Also, Commissioner (Appeals) failed to give benefit of income surrendered by assessee voluntarily against addition confirmed by him on account of unaccounted sales, Assessing Officer was to be directed to grant assessee benefit of income surrendered by assessee against addition confirmed by Commissioner (Appeals).

FACTS

During search at the residential premises of the director of the assessee-company, various incriminating material by way of WhatsApp message / images were discovered and on analysis of the same, it was discovered that the assessee had made out of books sales which during the impugned year amounted to ₹2,35,42,980/-. The Assessing Officer added entire undisclosed sales to the income of the assessee. The ld.CIT(A), however, restricted the same to the profit element embedded therein estimated at the rate of @ 8 per cent of the sales.

Aggrieved, the revenue filed an appeal and assessee filed cross objections before the Tribunal –

HELD

ITAT observed that the contention of the Revenue was that the ld.CIT(A) ought to have applied 12.5 per cent net profit rate instead of 8 per cent. However, the Revenue had not given any basis to justify applying higher rate of net profit at 12.5 per cent.

ITAT held that net profit to be applied was to be at justifiable rate depending upon nature of the business and other facts. It should not be an ad hoc rate and there has to be a reasonable basis for applying a particular net profit rate in each case. The DR had not supported his contention of applying 12.5 per cent GP rate with any reasonable basis. ITAT held that profit rate specified in the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Simit P. Sheth, [2013] 356 ITR 451 as cited by DR could not be justifiable rate in assessee’s case as the nature of activities of both the assessees were not identical.

Therefore, ITAT did not find any merit in the contentions of the DR that the ld.CIT(A) ought to have applied a net profit of 12.5 per cent in the present case. The ground raised by the Revenue was accordingly rejected.

Thus, the appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

With respect to Cross Objections filed by the assessee, the ld.CIT(A) had failed to give benefit of the income surrendered by the assessee voluntarily against addition confirmed by him on account of unaccounted sales.

In the light of the same, ITAT directed the assessing officer to grant assessee the benefit of the income surrendered of ₹15 lakhs against the addition confirmed by the ld.CIT(A).

The Cross Objection was accordingly allowed.

Sec. 69A: Assessee deposited cash during demonetisation period of `10.75 lakhs which was recorded in his books of account and source of cash deposits was also maintained by assessee. However, Assessing Officer made addition as unexplained money under section 69A and taxed same under section 115BBE. ITAT held that Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and charging tax under section 115BBE as assessee had recorded in his books of accounts and also explained source of such cash deposits.

83. Dipak Balubhai Patel (HUF) vs. ITO

[2024] 115ITR(T) 624 (Ahmedabad- Trib.)

ITA NO.:942(AHD) OF 2023

AY.: 2017-18

Dated: 22nd August, 2024

Sec. 69A: Assessee deposited cash during demonetisation period of `10.75 lakhs which was recorded in his books of account and source of cash deposits was also maintained by assessee. However, Assessing Officer made addition as unexplained money under section 69A and taxed same under section 115BBE. ITAT held that Assessing Officer was not correct in invoking provisions of section 69A and charging tax under section 115BBE as assessee had recorded in his books of accounts and also explained source of such cash deposits.

FACTS

The assessee was a HUF who derived income from House Property and Income from Other Sources. The case was selected for scrutiny assessment and the Assessing Officer found that assessee deposited a sum of ₹10,75,000/- during demonetisation period and issued show cause notice to explain the source of cash deposit.

The assessee explained the source of cash deposit as withdrawal from four other banks accounts of the assesse and the said deposits were duly reflected in his Return of Income. Further since assessee did not have any business income, therefore he had not filed the Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet along with Return of Income. However, the assessee filed the same before the
Assessing Officer along with cash book, wherein cash on hand as on 1st April, 2016 as opening balance was ₹10,09,933/-, which was deposited during demonetisation period.

However, Assessing Officer rejected the Books of Accounts by stating that assessee had shown Closing Cash on hand as zero in return of income filed for the A.Y. 2016-17, and in the Cash Book of F.Y. 2016-17 i.e. A.Y. 2017-18, assessee has shown Opening Balance to the tune of ₹10,09,933/- which was not justifiable and therefore made addition as unexplained money u/s. 69A of the Act.

Aggrieved against the addition, the assessee filed an appeal before CIT(A) who confirmed the additions by observing that during the previous 3 years, except 2 or 3 instances, all withdrawals were less than ₹10,000 and the appellant claimed that the withdrawals were preserved during last 3 years in his hand and were deposited in the year under consideration.

Since 95 per cent of the withdrawals were less than ₹10,000, CIT(A) observed that as per common sense these cash withdrawals were for day to day expenses and if the appellant had so much of cash with him then what was the need for frequent withdrawals of ₹5,000 and ₹10,000. The CIT(A) relied on decisions of CIT vs. Durga Prasad More [1971] 82 ITR 540 (SC) and Sumati Dayal vs. CIT [1995] 214 ITR 801 (SC) where the Supreme Court has laid down Human Probability test as one of the important test in order to check genuineness of the transactions entered into the books of account of the assesses. Hence it was held by CIT(A) that the appellant failed to satisfactorily explain the source of ₹10,75,000 cash deposited in the bank account and the assessing officer was correct in treating this amount as unexplained cash under section 69A.

The appellant being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(Appeals) filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT observed that during the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer had rejected the explanation offered by the assessee as the assesse had showed closing cash on hand as Nil in the Return of Income but in the cash book showed the opening balance for A.Y. 2017-18 to the tune of ₹10,09,933/-.

The ITAT further observed that the assessee had filed copies of previous three years Form 26AS, ITR, Statement of Income, Profit and Loss account and Balance Sheet before CIT(A)and further explained that rental income was offered to tax with appropriate TDS u/s. 194I of the Act which was reflecting in Form 26AS records. Since the assessee was a Senior Citizen, he withdrew and kept substantial balance in his bank accounts for emergency medical needs. However, after declaration of the demonetization period, the assessee deposited the withdrawal amounts from his other bank accounts.

The ITAT observed that Assessing Officer erroneously treated cash deposits as unexplained cash and also invoked Section 115BBE of the Act and charged at 60 per cent rate which was not applicable to the present case since the cash deposits were reflected in the books of accounts maintained by the assessee. The ITAT relied on decision in case of Balwinder Kumar ([2023] 151 taxmann.com 338 (Amritsar – Trib.)) and Sri Sriram Manchukonda (2021 TaxCorp (AT.) 91806 Visakhapatnam ITAT) wherein co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal held in favour of the assessee.

Respectfully following the above judicial precedents, ITAT observed that the addition made by AO u/s. 69A will be applicable only when the assessee is found to be the owner of any money etc. which is not recorded in the books of accounts maintained by him and any explanation offered by the assessee is not satisfactory in the opinion of the Assessing Officer.

ITAT observed that in the present case, the assessee had recorded the cash deposits in his books of accounts and source of cash deposits during demonetization period were also been maintained by the assessee. Therefore, ITAT held that the A.O. was not correct in invoking provisions of Section 69A of the Act and charging tax u/s. 115BBE of the Act. Thus the addition made by the Assessing Officer were deleted.

In the result, the appeal filed by the Assessee was allowed.

S. 127–Where the case of the assesse was transferred from one AO to another AO in a different city / locality / place, PCIT was under a statutory obligation to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

82. Amit Kumar Gupta vs. ITO

(2025) 171 taxmann.com 16 (Raipur Trib)

ITA Nos.: 404 & 405 (Rpr) of 2024

A.Ys.: 2011-12 & 2012-13

Dated: 13th January, 2025

S. 127–Where the case of the assesse was transferred from one AO to another AO in a different city / locality / place, PCIT was under a statutory obligation to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

FACTS

During the relevant year, the assessee had made cash deposits amounting to ₹17,05,824 into his bank account but did not file his income tax return. Based on the information gathered from NMS / ITS module, the AO (ITO-1, Ambikapur) initiated proceedings under section 147 by issuing notice under section 148 dated 23rd March, 2018. Thereafter, pursuant to an order under section 127 dated 7.9.2018 passed by PCIT-1, Bilaspur, the assessee’s case was transferred from ITO-1 Ambikapur to ITO-3, Korba. Since the assessee did not come forth with any explanation in response to notice under section 142(1), the AO taxed the entire cash deposit as unexplained money under section 69A vide his order under section 144 read with section 147 dated 16th December, 2018.

The assessee challenged the assessment order before CIT(A), inter alia, on the ground that PCIT had transferred his case from one ITO to another ITO without affording any opportunity of being heard as required under section 127. CIT(A) dismissed the appeal, inter alia, holding that he was not the appropriate forum to challenge the order under section 127 passed by PCIT.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) As can be gathered from section 127(3), in a case where the PCIT transfers the case of as assessee from any AO to any other AO and the offices of all such officers are not situated in the same city, locality or place, then he remains under a statutory obligation to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and only after recording his reasons for doing so,
transfer such case. In the assessee’s facts, the case had been transferred pursuant to the order of PCIT, Bilaspur dated 7th September, 2018 from ITO-1, Ambikapur to ITO-3, Korba, that is, offices of said officers were not situated in the same city, locality or place, and therefore, on a conjoint reading of section 127(1) / (3), he was obligated to have given an opportunity to the assessee prior to transfer of his case.

(b) CIT(A) was not right in holding that he was not vested with any jurisdiction to deal with the specific challenge raised by the assessee as regards the validity of the assessment order that was framed by the A.Ode-hors a valid assumption of jurisdiction on his part in absence of an order of transfer under section 127 as required per the mandate of law.

Accordingly, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate the challenge of the assessee as regards the validity of the jurisdiction that was assumed by the A.O for framing of the assessment order passed under section 144 read with section. 147 dated 16th December, 2018 de-hors an order of transfer under section 127 as per the mandate of law.

S. 80G – Where the application for final approval under section 80G was rejected due to incorrect section code in the application, the issue was remanded back to the file of CIT(E) to grant final approval under correct provision if assessee-trust was otherwise eligible.

81. Rotary Charity Trust vs. CIT(E)

(2025)170 taxmann.com 797(Mum Trib)

ITA No.: 6133(Mum) of 2024

A.Y.: 2024-25

Dated: 9th January, 2025

S. 80G – Where the application for final approval under section 80G was rejected due to incorrect section code in the application, the issue was remanded back to the file of CIT(E) to grant final approval under correct provision if assessee-trust was otherwise eligible.

FACTS

Assessee was a registered charitable trust incorporated on 25th September, 1996, engaged in promoting various public charitable activities especially providing education to weaker section of the society and to specially-abled children. It made an application for provisional registration under section 80G of the Act, which was granted under clause (iv) of first proviso to section 80G(5) on 4th April, 2022 which was valid for the period starting 4th April, 2022 to AY 2024-25. Subsequently, the assessee filed application in Form 10AB for final registration; in this Form, instead of selecting section code “clause (iii) of first proviso to section 80G(5)”, the assessee inadvertently once again selected “sub-clause (B)of clause (iv) of first proviso to section 80G (5)”.

CIT(E) rejected the application on the ground that the assessee was not fulfilling the stipulated conditions prescribed undersection 80G(5)(iv)(B).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that there was merit in the claim of the assessee that it had selected the wrong section code inadvertently while filing the application for final approval in Form 10AB and it was not given the opportunity of being heard by CIT which otherwise would have allowed the assessee to explain the facts to avoid the rejection.

Following the decision in North Eastern Social Research Centre vs. CIT(E), (2024) 165taxmann.com 12 (Kolkata – Trib.), the Tribunal remitted the issue back to the CIT(E) with a direction to grant final approval under clause (iii) to first proviso to section 80G(5) if the assessee was otherwise found eligible.

S.12AB, 13 — Where the applicant trust was a charitable cum religious trust and its objects were for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste, that is, Jains, it was not entitled to registration under section 12AB.

80. Soudharma Brihad Tapogachchiya Tristutik Jain Sangha Samarpanam vs. CIT(E)

(2025)170 taxmann.com 590 (AhdTrib)

ITA No.:1571 (Ahd) of 2024

A.Y.: N.A.

Dated: 3rd January, 2025

S.12AB, 13 — Where the applicant trust was a charitable cum religious trust and its objects were for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste, that is, Jains, it was not entitled to registration under section 12AB.

The assessee-trust was settled on 5th January, 2023 with objects which required it to follow the principles of Jainism, etc. and was registered with the Assistant / Deputy Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad. It filed application for registration under section 12AB in Form 10AB on 13th January, 2024 before CIT(E). In this application, the applicant mentioned that it had charitable objects in addition to religious objects.

CIT(E) denied registration under section 12AB on the ground that the assessee was a composite trust and its object was restricted to benefit of a particular religious community or caste, that is, Jains, which was a “specified violation” under clause (d) of Explanation below section 12AB(4) read with section 13(1)(b).

Aggrieved with the order of CIT(E), the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

FACTS

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) A perusal of the main objects of the trust made it abundantly clear that all the objects were related to religious activities, more particularly relating to “Jain Community” and to propagate “Jainism”, that is, charitable cum religious in nature and was for the benefit of “Jains” which was a specific violation under clauses (c)/ (d) to Explanation to section12AB(4).

(b) In CIT vs. Dawoodi Bohara Jamat, (2014) 364 ITR 31 (SC), the Supreme Court held that section 13(1)(b)(which prescribed the circumstances wherein the exemption would not be available to a religious or charitable trust)was applicable even to a composite trust / institution having both religious and charitable objects. Section 13(1)(b)was required to be read in conjunction with the provisions of sections 11 and 12 towards determination of eligibility of a trust to claim exemption under the aforesaid provisions, while granting registration.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the order denying registration to the assessee did not require any interference and dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

While computing long term capital gains, interest on funds borrowed for purchase of property, duly indexed will be allowed as a deduction. Prior to amendment vide Finance Act, 2023 there was no such restriction for excluding the deduction claimed on account of interest paid under Section 24(b) or under the provisions of chapter VIA.

79. DCIT vs. Neville Tuli

ITA No. 3203/Mum./2023

A.Y.: 2013-14

Date of Order: 26th November, 2024

Section: 48

While computing long term capital gains, interest on funds borrowed for purchase of property, duly indexed will be allowed as a deduction. Prior to amendment vide Finance Act, 2023 there was no such restriction for excluding the deduction claimed on account of interest paid under Section 24(b) or under the provisions of chapter VIA.

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee sold a property, held by him as a long term capital asset, for a consideration of ₹27 crore. This property was purchased from borrowed funds. While computing long term capital gains arising on sale of this property, the assessee deducted ₹9,90,67,611 being indexed cost of acquisition and ₹3,95,42,739 being indexed cost of interest paid to the bank (this was shown under “indexed cost of improvement”) and offered long term capital gain of ₹13,13,89,649.

The amount of interest claimed as deduction while computing long term capital gains was net of the amount claimed in earlier years under section 24(b) of the Act. In earlier years, interest up to ₹1,50,000 was claimed and was allowed as deduction under section 24(b) of the Act.

In the background of the above facts, the Assessing Officer, in the course of assessment proceedings framed two questions viz. (i) Whether interest paid is a cost of acquisition / cost of improvement; and (ii) whether the benefit of indexation is to be allowed to interest cost. The AO having perused the provisions of section 55 held that interest payment on housing loan cannot be said to be expenditure of a capital nature incurred in making any additions or alterations to the capital asset by the assessee after it became his property. He also held that, on a reading of section 55, it is clearly evident that in no situation does the cost of acquisition involve bringing in any cost incurred after the date of acquisition, unless the cost of improvement and, in the instant case there is no improvement to the property. The AO supported his view by the ratio of the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of V Mahesh, ITO vs. Vikram Sadanand Hoskote [(2017) 18 SOT 130 (Mum.)] and Harish Krishnakkant Bhatt vs. ITO [(2004) 91 ITD 311 (Ahd. Trib.)].

The AO disallowed the sum of ₹3,95,42,739 and added the same to the income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who during the course of appellate proceedings noted that a similar claim was allowed in earlier years as well. Having considered the relevant provisions of the Act and the judicial precedents on the issue, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal preferred by the assessee.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that in earlier assessment years as well, the assessee has claimed similar deduction of interest expenditure under the head income from house property and as cost of acquisition / improvement, which has been continuously allowed by the revenue authorities and therefore rule of consistency is required to be followed.

The Tribunal also noted that the Finance Act, 2023 has w.e.f. 1st April, 2024 amended the provisions of section 48 to provide that the cost of acquisition of the asset or cost of improvement thereto shall not include the deductions claimed on account of interest under clause (b) of section 24 or under the provisions of Chapter VIA. It held that for the period prior to the insertion of the said provision which is applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2024, no such restriction can be imposed and / or made applicable. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has also taken note of this amendment and has rightly held it to be not clarificatory.

The Tribunal after considering the ratio of various decisions on which reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee held that the interest paid on the borrowed funds for the purchase of property for the period prior to the provision inserted vide Finance Act, 2023 which was made applicable from 1st April, 2024, over and above claimed u/s 24(b) of the Act, would be deductible while computing the capital gains. Thus, we answered the question posed accordingly.

The Tribunal held that the order passed by CIT(A) does not suffer from any perversity, impropriety and / or illegality. It upheld the order passed by CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

For the purpose of computing the ‘tax effect’, in the present case, only the grounds raised by the Revenue having an impact of determination of total income under the normal provisions of the Act ought to be considered for the reason that the Assessee would continue to be assessed under normal provisions of the Act even if all the grounds raised by the Revenue in departmental appeal are assumed to be allowed in favour of the Revenue.

78. ACIT vs. Bennett Property Holdings Company Limited

ITA No. 556/Mum./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of order: 12th December, 2024

Section: CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2024 dtd. 15th March, 2024 r.w. Circular No. 9 of 2024 dtd 17th September, 2024

For the purpose of computing the ‘tax effect’, in the present case, only the grounds raised by the Revenue having an impact of determination of total income under the normal provisions of the Act ought to be considered for the reason that the Assessee would continue to be assessed under normal provisions of the Act even if all the grounds raised by the Revenue in departmental appeal are assumed to be allowed in favour of the Revenue.

FACTS

For AY 2017-18, the Assessee company, primarily engaged in the business of earning rental income by letting out properties and running business centres, filed original return of income which was subsequently revised. The Assessing Officer (AO), in an order passed under section 143(3), assessed the total income of the Assessee under the normal provisions of the Act at ₹1,20,45,17,348/- and computed Book Profits of the Assessee under Section 115JB of theAct at ₹1,33,19,94,660/-. Since the tax payable on Book Profits was less than the tax payable on the income computed under normal provisions of the Act, the Assessee was assessed to tax under normal provisions of the Act.

Aggrieved by the additions made by the AO while assessing the total income, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) challenging certain additions / disallowances made under normal provisions of the Act viz. (i) disallowance of ₹6,38,05,371/- under Section 14A of the Act; (ii) addition taking deemed annual letting value of the immovable properties lying vacant during the relevant previous year at ₹23,28,000; and (iii) denial of claim of set off of accumulated loss of ₹12,86,53,730 and unabsorbed depreciation of ₹15,65,15,799 relatable to real estate service undertaking of Banhem Estates & IT Parks Ltd. That demerged into the Assessee pursuant to composite scheme of amalgamation and arrangement approved by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court vide order, dated 2nd December, 2016.

The assessee also challenged the following additions made by the AO while computing the amount of book profits u/s 115JB viz. (i) increase in Book Profits by Extra Depreciation of ₹4,38,18,551; (ii) increase in Book Profits by ₹6,38,05,371 disallowed under Section 14A of the Act by invoking provisions contained in Clause (f) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB of the Act; and (iii) rejection of Assessee’s claim of substitution of long-term capital gain (computed by taking index cost of acquisition) in place of the profit on sale of capital asset appearing in the statement of Profit & Loss Account for the purpose of computing Book Profits.

The assessee also raised additional grounds seeking credit for TDS in respect of companies / undertakings forming part of composite scheme and also challenged computation of interest under section 234B of the Act.

The appeal preferred by the Assessee was disposed off by the CIT(A)as partly allowed vide order, dated 13th December, 2023. The CIT(A) granted partial relief by (a) deleting the addition made under normal provisions of the Act in respect in respect of deemed rental income estimated at ₹23,28,000/-, and (b) accepting Assessee’s contention that no disallowance of expenses can be made in respect of any exempt income by invoking provisions contained in Section14A read with Rule 8D of the IT Rules while computing Book Profits under Section 115JB of the Act.

Since, both, the Assessee as well as the Revenue were aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A), the present cross-appeals were preferred before the Tribunal.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that the Assessee has been assessed under normal provisions of the Act. Even if the grounds raised by the Revenue in relation to the computation of ‘Book Profits’ under Section 115JB of the Act are allowed in favour of the Revenue, the Assessee would be assessed to tax under the normal provisions of the Act. It was submitted that the grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue pertaining to the additions / disallowance made under the normal provisions of the Act carry tax effect below the specified monetary of ₹60 Lacs fixed by Central Board of Direct Taxes(CBDT) for filing Departmental Appeal before the Tribunal limit. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the Revenue should be dismissed as withdrawn in view of Circular No. 5 of 2024, dated 15th March, 2024, read with Circular No. 9 of 2024, dated 17th September, 2024, issued by CBDT.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Revenue has preferred appeal challenging the deletion of addition in respect of deemed annual letting income of ₹23,28,000 under normal provisions of the Act. The Revenue has also challenged the relief granted by the CIT(A) by accepting Assessee’s claim that the ‘Book Profits’ could not be increased by ₹6,38,05,371 (being amount disallowed under Section 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D of the IT Rules), by invoking provisions contained in clause (f) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB of the Act. Thus, the Tribunal observed that Revenue has raised grounds having impact on the computation of income under normal provisions of the Act and the computation of ‘Book Profits’ under Section 115JB of the Act.

The Tribunal perused the Circular No. 5 & 9 of 2024 issued by the CBDT and held that Circular No.5 of 2024, dated 15th March, 2024, when read with Circular No.9 of 2024, dated 17th September, 2024, issued by CBDT clarifies that the monetary limit of ‘tax effect’ for filing departmental appeals before Tribunal has been increased from ₹50 Lakhs to ₹60 Lakhs. It has also been clarified in Circular No. 9 of 2024 that the aforesaid monetary limit for filing the appeal before the Tribunal would also apply to the pending departmental appeals.

The Tribunal held that for the purpose of computing the ‘tax effect’ involved in the present appeal preferred by the Revenue only the grounds raised by the Revenue having an impact of determination of total income under the normal provisions of the Act ought to be considered. This is because the Assessee has been assessed under the normal provisions of the Act and this would continue to be the case even if all the grounds raised by the Revenue (whether related to computation of income under normal provisions of the Act or related to computation of Book Profits under 115JB of the Act) are allowed.

On examination the grounds raised by the Revenue having impact on computation of income under normal provisions of the Act, the Tribunal found that tax effect involved in the present appeal is below the monetary limit of Rs.60 Lakhs fixed by the CBDT for the purpose of filing departmental appeal before the Tribunal.

On perusal of Para 5.1 of Circular No. 5 of 2024 containing the definition of `tax effect’, the Tribunal observed that ‘tax effect’ has been defined to mean the tax on the total income assessed and the tax that would have been chargeable had such total income been reduced by the amount of income in respect of the issues against which appeal is intended to be filed. It held that when computed as aforesaid, the tax effect in the appeal preferred by the Revenue would fall below the specified monetary limit of ₹60 Lakhs for filing departmental appeals. On perusal of the computation submitted by the Assessee the Tribunal found that the tax effect in the appeal preferred by the Revenue would only be ₹5,63,973 for the reason that the Assessee would continue to be assessed under normal provisions of the Act even if all the grounds raised by the Revenue in departmental appeal are assumed to be allowed in favour of the Revenue. Thus, accepting the contention of the Assessee, we dismiss the appeal preferred by the Revenue as ‘withdrawn’ in terms of Circular No.5 & 9 of 2024 issued by CBDT.

Dismissing the appeal under section 249(4) is unsustainable in a case where an assessee who has not filed the return of income has submitted before the AO that its income is exempt from tax and therefore it is not required to pay advance tax.

77. Srirampura Prathamika Krishi Pathina Sahakara Sangha Ltd. vs. ITO

ITA No. 1731/Bang./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of Order: 9th January, 2025

Section: 249(4)

Dismissing the appeal under section 249(4) is unsustainable in a case where an assessee who has not filed the return of income has submitted before the AO that its income is exempt from tax and therefore it is not required to pay advance tax.

FACTS

The assessee, a primary agricultural credit co-operative society, providing credit facilities to its members and also supplying the items like kerosene, fertilisers, food grains, etc. to its members did not file return of income. The notice u/s 142(1) of the Act was issued on 4th January, 2018 calling for return of income for the assessment year 2017-18 on or before 3rd February, 2018 but the assessee has neither filed any return of income nor filed any submission or response to the above notice.

Further, during the course of assessment proceedings, the AO found that assessee has deposited huge cash into his bank account with CDCC bank Hosadurga. The information has also been called for from the bank u/s 133(6) of the Act and on verification of the same, it was found that the assessee had deposited during the demonetised period a sum of ₹13,82,000/-.

The AO in his assessment order observed that the assessee vide letter dated 5th September, 2019 furnished the details of income and expenditure statement, profit & loss account and cash book. Further, the assessee in the said letter stated that they have exempted income for the financial year 2016-17 and therefore, not filed the income tax return for the said period.

The AO found the submission made by the assessee as not satisfactory and as the assessee had deposited cash in old currencies of denomination of ₹500/- & ₹1,000/-, amounting to ₹13,32,000/- into their bank account, the entire deposits were treated as assessee’s unaccounted income for the assessment year 2017-18 by invoking the provisions of section 69A of the Act and taxed u/s 115BBE of the Act.

Further, as the assessee had audited his books of accounts as per the provisions of the State Co-operative Society Act of Karnataka and the net profit as per income and expenditure statement was amounting to ₹1,13,376/- and hence a sum of ₹1,13,376/- was also considered by the AO as income of the assessee and brought to tax and accordingly, assessed on a total income of ₹14,45,376/-.

Aggrieved by the assessment completed u/s 144 of the Act dated 25th November, 2019, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC who dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that the assessee had not paid the tax on returned income and the particulars of payment was also not mentioned in column 8 of Form 35. Further, as there was no response to deficiency letter dated 3rd June, 2024,the CIT(A) held that as the assessee has not paid tax on returned income / particulars of payment was not mentioned in column 8 of Form 35, the appeal of the assessee is not maintainable as per section 249(4) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed the appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

It is pertinent to note that section 249(4)(b) of the Act is clear that appeal before the CIT(A) should be admitted only when the assessee has paid an amount equal to the amount of advance tax, which was payable by him. Where the return of income has not been filed the proviso to said section also describe that the assessee will get exemption from this clause, if an application is made before the CIT(A) for not paying an amount equal to the amount of advance tax for any good and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing. The Tribunal noted that in the instant case, the AO in para 6 of the assessment order has observed that the assessee vide letter dated 5th September, 2019 had stated that they have exempted income for the financial year 2016-17 and therefore, not filed the income tax return for the said period. Before the Tribunal, as well, it was submitted that the assessee’s income is exempted and therefore, the question of paying advance tax does not arise in the case of the assessee as no amount is payable by the assessee. Being so, the Tribunal was of the opinion that dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the same is not maintainable as per section 249(4) of the Act is not sustainable as the income of the assessee is exempt from income tax. The assessee is not liable to pay any advance tax even though they have not filed the return of income.

While computing capital gains on slump sale under section 50B r.w.s. 48, transfer expenses are allowable as a deduction. There is no scope of deviation from the statutory provision regarding computation of capital gains in case of slump sale. The first limb i.e. “the expenditure incurred in connection with transfer” cannot be excluded from being claimed as deduction for the purposes of computation u/s 50B.

76. DCIT vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd.

ITA No. 3369/Mum./2023

A.Y.: 2009-10

Date of Order: 20th December, 2024

Sections: 2(42C), 48, 50B

While computing capital gains on slump sale under section 50B r.w.s. 48, transfer expenses are allowable as a deduction. There is no scope of deviation from the statutory provision regarding computation of capital gains in case of slump sale. The first limb i.e. “the expenditure incurred in connection with transfer” cannot be excluded from being claimed as deduction for the purposes of computation u/s 50B.

FACTS

The Assessing Officer, while reassessing the total income of the assessee, under section 147 of the Act disallowed the sum of ₹27.08 crore claimed by the assessee to be expenditure incurred on transfer while calculation of capital gains on slump sale under section 50B of the Act. The sum of ₹27.09 crore disallowed comprised of Financial Advisory Fee of ₹8.31 crore and other expenses of ₹18.77 crore. The contention of the assessee was that this sum is allowable u/s 48(i) of the Act. These contentions did not find favour with the AO who held that section 50B is a code in itself for computation of capital gains arising on slump sale. Therefore, no other provision other than provision of section 50B shall be applicable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed this ground of appeal.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal, where on behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on decision of Delhi High Court in case of free CIT vs. Nitrex Chemicals India Ltd [(2016) 75 taxman.com 282] and also on the decision of coordinate bench of theTribunal in case of Wockhardt Hospitals Ltd vs. ACIT [ITA Nos.7454/MUM/2013 and 7021/Mum./2013 for AY2010-11; Order dated 6th January, 2017], wherein in the context of computation of capital gains arising on slump sale of an undertaking, deduction was allowed in respect of expenditure incurred in connection with such transfer by reference to section 48(i) of the Act..

HELD

There is no scope for deviation from the statutory provision regarding computation of capital gains on slump sale.

Section 48 has two limbs –

(i) expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer;

(ii) the cost of acquisition of the asset and the cost of any improvement thereto.

The networth replaces the value as per section 48(ii). However, the first limb, which is, “the expenditure incurred in connection with the transfer”, cannot be excluded from being claimed as deduction for the purposes of computation under section 50B. The Legislature in its wisdom, clearly excludes indexation of such cost of acquisition and cost of improvement, for the purposes of slump sale in Section 50B itself. The Tribunal placed reliance on decision of Delhi High Court in case of PCIT vs. Nitrix Chemicals India Pvt. Ltd [(2016) 75 taxmann.com 282] and held that while computing capital gains arising on slump sale, in accordance with the provisions of section 50B that includes only the networth of the undertaking treating it as a cost of acquisition and cost of improvement without considering the provision of section 48(i), will be in contradiction to the intention of the Legislature.

The Tribunal observed that there is no dispute that the expenditures claimed by the assessee are incurred in connection with the transfer of the business as a going concern. Then, not computing the capital gains of the slump sale in accordance with the provisions of section 50B that require to treat cost of acquisition and cost of improvement and is allowable as a deduction as per section 48 (ii) of the act as net worth of the undertaking, and not to consider the expenditure incurred for the purpose of transfer as per section 48(i) will be in contradiction to the intention of the Legislature. It held that section 50B cannot be read and understood as argued by the Ld.DR, because the computation provision section 48 to the extent applicable to section 50B as mentioned in clause (2) of section 50B would then become ineffective and inapplicable to a slump sale.

The Tribunal did not agree with the arguments made on behalf of the revenue and held them to be not founded on the basic principles of interpretation. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the ground of appeal filed by the revenue.

Section 148: Reassessment assessment cannot be opened twice for the same reason.

27. SarikaKansal vs. ACIT

[W.P.(C) 7940/2024 & CM APPL. 32747/2024]

Dated: 30th January, 2025

(Del) (HC).] AY 2017-18

Section 148: Reassessment assessment cannot be opened twice for the same reason.

The petitioner challenged to the impugned order under Section 148A(d) of the Act and the impugned notice 148 of the Act. First, that the impugned order has been passed without considering that the information on the basis of which it was the subject matter of reassessment proceedings, which culminated in an order dated 29th March, 2022 passed under Section 147 read with Section 144B of the Act.

The second ground is that the impugned notice is beyond the period of limitation. According to the petitioner, the limitation for issuance of the impugned notice expired on 31st March, 2024.

The grounds on which the petitioner’s assessment is sought to be reopened revolves around transactions, whereby the petitioner had sold 1,70,000 (One Lac Seventy Thousand) shares of a company named Trustline Real Estate Private Limited (hereafter TREPL) to one Mr. Samir Dev Sharma at the rate of ₹42/- per share. The Assessing Officer (hereafter AO) suspects that the said shares were sold at an apparent consideration, which is below the fair market value with an intent to avoid tax.

The petitioner disputes the same and contends that her income for AY 2017-18 has been reassessed for the same reason that she had sold the shares of TREPL at a value, which was less than the fair market value.

Thus, the first and foremost question to be addressed is whether the AO had reopened the assessment for AY 2017-18 for the same reason that has led the AO to pass the impugned order holding that it is a fit case for issuance of the impugned notice.

The petitioner is an individual and there is no dispute that she files her income tax returns regularly. She had filed her return for AY 2017-18 on 2nd August, 2017 declaring her taxable income as ₹74,77,750/-. The said income also included income arising from sale of 1,70,000 (One Lac Seventy Thousand) shares of TREPL at the rate of ₹42/- per share. The petitioner claims that the said rate was settled on the basis of valuation report, whereby the shares of TREPL were valued taking into account its underlying assets including the first and third floor of the property bearing the address A-20, Friends Colony East, New Delhi (hereafter the Friends Colony property). The petitioner’s return was processed under Section 143(1) of the Act.

On 31st March, 2021, the AO issued a notice under Section 148 of the Act, as in force at the material time, calling upon the petitioner to file her return for AY 2017-18 within a period of fifteen days from the date of the said notice. Subsequently, the AO furnished the reasons for reopening the assessment.

It is apparent from perusal of the reasons that the petitioner’s assessment was reopened on the premise that the petitioner as well as certain other companies had sold the shares of TREPL to one Mr. Samir Dev Sharma during the Financial Year 2016-17 at an abysmally low value. During the course of the reassessment proceedings, the AO issued a notice under Section 143(2) read with Section 147 of the Act calling upon certain information including the information that was relevant for determining the market value of the Friends Colony property. The petitioner responded to the said notice and provided the information as sought for. The petitioner had explained that TREPL owns two floors of the Friends Colony property — first and third floors each having covered area of 2,248.44 sq. ft.

The petitioner asserted that the market value of the Friends Colony property, as determined by the government approved valuer, was ₹8,58,90,408/-(Rupees Eight Crores Fifty-eight Lakhs Ninety Thousand Four Hundred and Eight only) and she had also furnished the copies of the valuation report, balance sheet and profit and loss account of TREPL. A letter dated 24th March, 2022 furnished by the petitioner to the AO in response to the notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Act. The explanation as provided by the petitioner was accepted and the AO passed an assessment order dated 29th March, 2022 accepting the petitioner’s returned income.

Now the AO once again issued a notice dated 28th March, 2024 under Section 148A(b) of the Act enclosing therewith an annexure containing information which according to the AO, suggested that the petitioner’s income had escaped assessment and accordingly, called upon the petitioner to show cause why her assessment for AY 17-18 not be opened.
The Court observed that it was apparent from the reasons that the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act was issued on the assumption that the petitioner had sold the shares of TREPL at an apparent value which was less than its fair value. It is important to note that whereas in the earlier round of proceedings, the AO had reasoned that income amounting to ₹18,91,41,050/- for AY 2017-18 had escaped assessment, the AO now stated that the information available suggested that the income amounting to ₹32,35,81,536/- had escaped assessment. The said view was premised on the basis that the value of the Friends Colony property was ₹32,35,81,536/- and the petitioner had sold the entire Friends Colony property to Mr. Samir Dev Sharma by transferring the shares of TREPL, which owned the said property. It is material to note that this was clearly the subject matter of examination in the previous round of the reassessment proceedings that had commenced by virtue of the notice dated 31st March, 2021 issued under Section 148 of the Act.

The petitioner responded to the notice by a letter dated 10th April, 2024. Once again, the petitioner reiterated that TREPL owned only two floors of the Friends Colony property – first and third floors and each of the said floors measured 2,248 sq.ft.

The petitioner furnished a valuation report which was furnished earlier disclosing the value of the two floors of the Friends Colony property which was owned by TREPL as ₹8,60,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Crores Sixty Lac Only). She reiterated that the fair market value of the shares sold by her and as determined in terms of Rule 11UAA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 would amount to ₹42/- per share after considering the market value of the two floors of the Friends Colony property. The AO passed the impugned order holding that it is a fit case for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. The impugned order proceeds on the basis that the entire shareholding (25,00,000 shares) of TREPL were transferred to one Mr. Samir Dev Sharma by three persons for a consideration of ₹10,50,00,000/-

The impugned order proceeds on the assumption that TREPL owned the entire Friends Colony property ad-measuring 500 sq. yds. (418.064 sq. mtrs.) and the circle rate in the given area is ₹7,74,000/- per sq. meter. Thus, the value of the immovable property owned by TREPL is ₹32,35,81,536/- and the same had been transferred indirectly by sale of shares of TREPL. The impugned order on the aforesaid basis computes the fair market value of the shares of TREPL sold by the petitioner.

The Hon. Court observed that it is clear that the information on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed was subject matter of examination in the earlier round of reassessment under Section 147 of the Act. The AO’s reason to believe that the petitioner’s income had escaped assessment, which had led to the issuance of notice dated 31st March, 2021, was founded on an assumption that the petitioner had sold the shares of TREPL at a price below its correct value. The notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Act during the said proceedings and the petitioner’s response dated 24th March, 2022 issued to the said notice clearly establishes that the examination revolved around the value of the immovable property held by TREPL (Friends Colony property). The petitioner’s response dated 24th March, 2022 indicates that the petitioner had forwarded the audited balance sheet and the profit and loss account of TREPL and had also explained that TREPL owned only two floors of the Friends Colony property. The AO had examined the said response and accepted the same. Clearly, the impugned order has been passed in respect of the same issue that was subject matter of examination in the earlier round.

The learned counsel for the Revenue contended that there was a difference in the issue involved as the impugned order has been passed on the information that TREPL had owned the entire Friends Colony property. He contended that in the earlier round, the AO had accepted that TREPL held only part of the Friends Colony property, however, information now available suggests that TREPL owns the entire Friends Colony property.

Undisputedly, the impugned order has been passed on the basis that TREPL owns the entire Friends Colony property. However, the same was clearly an issue in the earlier round as well and the petitioner had clearly explained the extent of property owned by TREPL. In her response to the notice dated 28th March, 2024 issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act, the petitioner had reiterated that TREPL owns only two floors of the Friends Colony property and there is no material on record available with the AO to contradict the same. The impugned order does not discuss why the petitioner’s assertion that TREPL owns only two floors of the Friends Colony property had been ignored. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Revenue also does not address the said issue. The counter affidavit merely reiterates what is stated in the impugned order.

The Court observed that it is apparent that the impugned order has been passed on surmises without any cogent material to controvert that TREPL owns only two floors of the Friends Colony property and not the entire building at the material time.

The question whether the TREPL owned the entire Friends Colony property is one that is easily verifiable by the AO. However, as noted above, the AO has completely ignored the petitioner’s response to the notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act in this regard in the impugned order. Similar approach has also been adopted in the counter affidavit as well.

Section 148A(d) of the Act mandates that the AO is required to pass an order on the basis of record and considering the response to the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act. In this case, the record indicates that the information on the basis of which the assessment is sought to be reopened was fully examined in the earlier round of reassessment under Section 147 read with Section 144B of the Act. The petitioner’s response clearly stated that TREPL owned only two floors of the Friends Colony property and there is nothing credible on record that controverts it. The impugned order does not even advert to the said issue.

Thus, the impugned order and the impugned notice were quashed and set aside.

Section: 148 — Reassessment — Non-existing entity — notice issued to a non-existing entity post-merger was a substantive illegality and not some procedural violation:

26. City Corporation Limited vs. ACIT Circle – 1 Pune &Ors.

[WP (C) No. 6076 TO 6081 OF 2023]

Dated: 29th January, 2025

(Bom) (HC)] [Assessment Years : 2013-14 to 2019-20]

Section: 148 — Reassessment — Non-existing entity — notice issued to a non-existing entity post-merger was a substantive illegality and not some procedural violation:

The assessee is engaged in constructing and developing infrastructure facilities. In terms of the NCLT’s order dated 27th April, 2020, the CCL got merged with its wholly owned subsidiary “Amanora Future Tower Pvt. Ltd.” (AFTPL), with effect from 1st April, 2018.

By communication dated 27th April, 2020, the Petitioner informed the Income Tax Authority of the merger effective 1st April, 2018. This intimation bore the stamp and endorsement of receipt from the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1(1), Pune.

In the return filed on behalf of the Respondents, no dispute was raised about receiving this intimation on 27th August, 2020.

On 31st March, 2023, the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1(1), Pune, issued a notice dated 31st March, 2013 under Section 148 of the Act, to AFTPL seeking to reopen the case in PAN: AAKCA3074H. The Assistant Commissioner obtained approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax to issue notice to “Amanora Future Towers Private Limited (now merged with City Corporation Limited)”.

The Petitioner thereupon instituted the writ Petitions, questioning the impugned notice dated 31st March, 2023, inter alia, on the ground that, post-merger, AFTPL was a non- existing entity. Therefore, no notice under Section 148 of the Act, could have been issued to AFTPL.

The learned counsel for the Petitioner, relied on Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (2019) 107 taxmann.com 375 (SC); Uber India Systems (P.) Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income(2024) 168 taxmann.com 200 (Bombay); and Alok Knit Exports Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 6(1)(1), Mumbai (2021) 130 taxmann.com 457 (Bombay); in support of the contention that the notice issued to a non- existing entity post-merger was a substantive illegality and not some procedural violation. Accordingly, he urged that the impugned notices be quashed and set aside.

The learned counsel for the Respondents, submitted that issuing notices in the name of AFTPL was not illegal. He also submitted that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax specifically approved the issuance of such notices. It was submitted that the material on record shows that the notice was meant to be served upon the Petitioner. However, due to certain technical glitches, the utility system generated a notice in the name of AFTPL. He said the facts in the present case were like those in Skylight Hospitality LLP vs. Asstt. CIT(2018) 92 taxmann.com 93/254 Taxman 390 (SC). He submitted that, in this case, the Delhi High Court upheld a notice issued to the company that had already merged. Accordingly, it was urged that these Petitions may be dismissed.

The Hon. Court observed that the merger between City Corporation Limited and Amanora Future Towers Private Limited, which was effective from 1st April, 2018, was not disputed. This merger was based on the NCLT’s order dated 27th April, 2020. There was also no dispute about the Petitioner, vide a communication received by the Income Tax Department on 27th August, 2020 informing about the merger effective 1st April, 2018. No dispute was raised about the department not receiving the intimation on 27th August, 2020 or about the department being unaware of the merger. Still, the impugned notices dated 31st March, 2023 under Section 148 of the Act, were issued only in the name of “Amanora Future Towers Private Limited”. The crucial factor being that all such notices were issued to and in the name of ‘Amanora Future Towers Private Limited’

As of the date of the issue of the impugned notices, the noticee ‘Amanora Future Towers Private Limited’ could not have been regarded as a ‘person’ under Section 2(31) of the Act. In fact, that was a non-existent entity. In Maruti Suzuki case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that notice issued in the name of a non-existent company is a substantive illegality and not merely a procedural violation of the nature adverted to in Section 292B of the Act.

The Hon. Court noted that in the Maruti Suzuki case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the merged company had no independent existence after the merger. The Court noted that even though the Assessing Officer was informed of the merged company having ceased to exist due to the approved merger scheme, the jurisdictional notice was issued only in its name. The Court held that the basis on which jurisdiction was invoked was fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the merged entity ceases to exist upon the approved merger scheme. Participation in the proceedings by the petitioner company into which the merged company had merged or amalgamated could not operate as an estoppel against the law.

Similarly in Ubber India Systems case, the Coordinate Bench held that where by virtue of an order passed by the NCLT, the assessee company stood amalgamated with the petitioner, notice issued under Section 148A(b) and Section 148 to the assessee, which was a non-existent company was illegal, invalid and non-est. Similarly, in Alok Knit Exports Ltd(supra), another Coordinate Bench where the Assessing Officer had committed a fundamental error by issuing notice under Section 148 of the IT Act in the name of an entity which had ceased to exist because of it having merged with the petitioner company, the stand of the Assessing Officer that this was only an error which could be corrected under Section 292B could not be sustained.

The Court observed that in the affidavit filed by the tax department there is a clear admission that the amalgamation of the company was brought to the notice of the Department. The only explanation is that “notice was issued on the non-existing company due to technical glitch in the system wherein no field in the notice u/s 148 of the Act is editable.”

The affidavit states that files were moved proposing notices in the names of both entities, AFTPL and the Petitioner (CCL). There was a reference to seizure proceedings, the two PAN numbers, and the lack of an editable field on this notice. Therefore, it was submitted that the notice was generated on AFTPL’s PAN.

In short, the averments in the affidavit purport to apportion the blame on the department’s utility system. Based upon this, the fundamental error is sought to be passed off as a mere technical glitch.

The Court held that based on the above averments and the arguments, the fundamental error in issuing the impugned notices against a non-existing company despite full knowledge of the merger cannot be condone. The impugned notices, which are non-est cannot be treated as “good” as urged on behalf of the Respondents. In Maruti Suzuki case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that issuing notice in the name of a non-existing company is a substantive illegality and not a mere procedural violation of the nature adverted to in Section 292B of the Act.

The department contention about the facts in the present case being akin to those in Skylight Hospitality LLP case could not be accepted. The Court held that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Skylight Hospitality LLP (supra) against the judgment of the Delhi High Court rejecting its challenge was dismissed in the peculiar facts of the case, which weighed with the Court in concluding that there was merely a clerical mistake within meaning of Section 292B. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in Maruti Suzuki case the notice under Section 143(2) under which jurisdiction was assumed by the assessing officer, was issued to a non-existent company. The assessment order was issued against the amalgamating company. “This is a substantive illegality and not a procedural violation of the nature adverted to in Section 292B”.

The Hon. Court also referred to decisions in case of Anokhi Realty (P) Ltd. Vs. Income-tax Officer(2023) 153 taxmann.com 275 (Gujarat); Adani Wilmar Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax(2023) 150 taxmann.com 178 (Gujarat) and in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax -7, Delhi vs. Vedanta Limited ITA No. 88 of 2022 decided on 17th January, 2025.

Accordingly, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside.

Search and seizure — Assessment in search cases — Precedents — Additions to income cannot be made on data appearing in pen-drive not unearthed during search which does not constitute incriminating material.

89. Principal CIT vs. Vikram Dhirani

[2025] 472 ITR 342 (Del)

A. Y. 2007-08

Date of order: 20th August, 2024

Ss.132 and 153A of ITA 1961

Search and seizure — Assessment in search cases — Precedents — Additions to income cannot be made on data appearing in pen-drive not unearthed during search which does not constitute incriminating material.

In an appeal by the Revenue, on the question whether the Tribunal erred in deleting the addition made to the income of the assessee in the assessment made pursuant to a search u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A. Y. 2007-08, dismissing the appeal, the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) Since the assessment initiated in respect of the A. Y. 2007-08 was one which had already stood concluded, the Tribunal had held that since the pen-drive and the data appearing thereon having not been unearthed in the course of the search u/s. 132 of the Act, it would not constitute incriminating material. It had consequently followed the view consistently taken by this court.

ii) The assessment was confined to section 153A and consequently the significance of the incriminating material found in the course of the search alone would be the basis for any additions to the income. Since the pen-drive was an article which was not recovered in the course of the search but constituted material which had been obtained by the Department through the exchange of information route, there was no ground to interfere with the view expressed by the Tribunal.”

Offences and Prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Delay in payment of tax does not amount to evasion of tax — Prosecution not valid:

88. HansaMetallics Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT

[2025] 472 ITR 737 (P&H)

A. Y. 2012-13

Date of order: 22nd January, 2024

S. 276C of ITA 1961

Offences and Prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Delay in payment of tax does not amount to evasion of tax — Prosecution not valid:

The Assessee filed its return of income for A. Y. 2012-13 on 29th December, 2012 declaring total income at ₹8,20,53,544. As per the return of income, the self-assessment tax was pending. The self-assessment tax was paid belatedly on 10th July, 2013 along with interest.

The Assessing Officer issued a notice dated 11th February, 2014 requiring the Assessee and its directors to show cause as to why the prosecution proceedings u/s. 276C(2) should not be initiated. On the basis of legal opinion sought from the standing counsel of the Income-tax Department, a complaint was filed u/s. 276C read with section 278B of the Act.

Thereafter, the Criminal Court came to the conclusion that a case was made out and charges were framed.

The Assesseecompany and its directors filed a petition for quashing the complaint and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. The Assessee’s contention was that there was no evasion of tax at all. Though there was a delay in payment of tax, but the said tax was admitted / acknowledged in the return of income. On the other hand, the Department contended that the Assessee was well within his financial limits to pay the tax at the time of filing return of income, yet it did not choose to pay the tax and thereby caused loss to the revenue.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) Prosecution u/s. 276C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with the other provisions of the Act can only be launched if there was a wilful evasion or attempt at evasion of either tax, penalty or interest. Delay in payment of Income-tax would not amount to evasion of tax.

ii) It was not in dispute that the Income-tax was self assessed and payment thereof was also made, though belatedly. The tax along with interest was paid on July 10, 2013. The show-cause notice for delayed payment was sent only on February 11, 2014 and February 24, 2014 pursuant to which the complaint was instituted. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination could it be held that there was any evasion of tax on the part of the assessees, though there was a delay in the payment of the tax for which interest was paid. The prosection was not valid.”

Investment business — Scope of definition of transfer — Capital loss — Reduction in number of shares and face value of shares remaining same — Change in redeemable value of shares — Extinguishment of rights in shares — No transfer within meaning of s. 2(47).

87. Principal CIT vs. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd.

[2025] 472 ITR 561 (Kar)

A. Y. 2014-15

Date of order: 20th February, 2023

S. 2(47) of ITA 1961

Investment business — Scope of definition of transfer — Capital loss — Reduction in number of shares and face value of shares remaining same — Change in redeemable value of shares — Extinguishment of rights in shares — No transfer within meaning of s. 2(47).

In an appeal by the Revenue,on the question whether the Tribunal was right in setting aside the disallowance of capital loss claimed by the assessee by holding that there was extinguishment of rights of shares when no such extinguishment of rights was made out by the assessee as required under section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and there was no reduction in face value of shares, dismissing the appeal, the Karnataka High Court held as under:

“i) The undisputed facts were that pursuant to the order passed by the High Court of Bombay, number of shares had been reduced to 9,988. The face value of the shares had remained same at ₹10 even after the reduction. The Assessing Officer’s view that the voting power had not changed as the percentage of the assessee’s share of 99.88 per cent. had remained unchanged was untenable because if the shares were transferred at face value, the redeemable value would be ₹99,880 whereas the value of 14,95,44,130 number of shares would have been ₹1,49,54,41,300.

ii) The Tribunal had rightly followed the authority in Karthikeya vs. Sarabhai v. CIT [1997] 228 ITR 163 (SC); (1997) 7 SCC 524; 1997 SCC OnLine SC 152, with regard to meaning of transfer by holding that there was no transfer within the meaning of the expression “transfer” as contained in section 2(47). There was no error in the order of the Tribunal setting aside the disallowance of capital loss claimed by the assessee by holding that there was extinguishment of rights of shares.”

Capital or revenue receipt — Interest on short-term fixed deposit — Capital work-in-progress — Assessee joint venture formed by public sector undertakings to acquire coal mines overseas — Interest earned on fixed deposit of share capital prior to acquisition of coal mines and amounts returned on abandonment of proposal — Interest earned prior to commencement of business on funds brought in form of share capital for specific purpose — Interest received on fixed deposit part of capital cost and to be treated as capital work-in-progress.

86. Principal CIT vs. International Coal Ventures Pvt. Ltd.

[2025] 472 ITR 307 (Del)

A. Ys. 2012-13

Date of order: 20th December, 2024

S.4 of ITA 1961

Capital or revenue receipt — Interest on short-term fixed deposit — Capital work-in-progress — Assessee joint venture formed by public sector undertakings to acquire coal mines overseas — Interest earned on fixed deposit of share capital prior to acquisition of coal mines and amounts returned on abandonment of proposal — Interest earned prior to commencement of business on funds brought in form of share capital for specific purpose — Interest received on fixed deposit part of capital cost and to be treated as capital work-in-progress.

The assessee was a joint-venture company formed by five public sector undertakings, SAIL, CIL, RINL, NMDC and NTPC, for the purpose of ensuring adequate and dependable coal supply for its promoter companies. During the financial year relating to the A. Y. 2012-13, the assessee pursued a proposal to acquire and develop a coal mine overseas and received equity contributions from some of these undertakings. The amounts received from RINL were kept in a fixed deposit with a bank. Subsequently since the proposal for acquisition of the coal mine which was being pursued was abandoned, the assessee refunded the amount received from RINL. Since the assessee had earned interest on the amount received from RINL, it paid interest to RINL which confirmed that the amount received by it was accounted for as income in its hand and tax was paid.

In the appeal by the Revenue, on the question whether interest on funds that were called for and earmarked for a specific purpose of acquiring a coal mine and deposited in the short-term fixed deposit could be construed as incidental to setting up the business of acquisition of a coal mine, dismissing the appeal, the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) The accounting treatment of capitalising expenses during the preoperative stage of setting up a business, rests on the rationale that the cost incurred for setting up the profit-making apparatus is required to be accounted for as the value of that asset. Such expenditure is incurred for bringing the undertaking into existence. Thus, it would not be apposite to treat such preoperative expenses as revenue expenses since it cannot be matched with the revenue receipts. The amount incurred for construction or acquisition of the asset would necessarily have to be accounted as the cost of that capital asset. This principle applies only in cases where substantial time is required to construct the asset or bring the asset to use. The financial costs for such assets are thus
considered as a part of the intrinsic value of the asset. There is a distinction between the price of an asset and its cost. On the same principles, the amounts received which are directly linked to the
acquisition or construction of the asset, are required to be reduced from the capital cost of the said asset. In one sense, such receipts mitigate the cost of the capital asset and it is essential to reflect the correct cost of the asset.

ii) The Accounting Standard 16 applies to a “qualifying asset”, which is defined as an asset that takes substantial period to get ready for its intended use or sale and also explains that the substantial period of time as contemplated under the standard, primarily depends upon the circumstances of each case. Ordinarily, the same should be considered as twelve months unless a shorter or longer period is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. It also explains that for estimating this period, “the time which an asset takes technologically or commercially, to get ready for its intended use or sale”, is required to be considered.

iii) Accounting treatment of various items are guided by an overarching principle that final accounts should reflect the true and fair view of the reported entity. In order for a capital value of an asset (which takes a considerable time to bring it to intended use) to be fairly disclosed on historical cost basis, it would be essential to subsume within the cost of the said asset all elements of expenditure, which directly contribute to the cost of that asset. It is for this reason that general administrative cost of an entity which cannot be attributed to a particular asset is not construed as the cost of that asset. But the expenditure that is directly linked to the construction or acquisition of a qualifying asset, is required to be treated as a part of its cost.

iv) If the interest was earned on the amounts which were temporarily kept in fixed deposits in the course of acquisition of the coal mine to set up the assessee’s business, the interest earned would require to be accounted for as the part of the capital value of the business or asset. A caveat was added that such accounting treatment was or would be applicable only if the nature of the asset was such that required time for construction or for putting it in use. Illustratively, the same would be applicable where the asset is to be constructed, developed or is of a nature that required considerable time to bring it to use. In case where a plant is being set up in a factory and the requisite funds for setting up the same are deployed for a period of time, the interest paid on the amount borrowed for the said purpose and interest earned on temporary deposits during the course of deployment are required to be accounted for as a part of the capital costs. This is not true for an off-the-shelf product. Illustratively, if a motor vehicle is purchased from borrowed capital, neither the interest paid nor the interest earned on the funds borrowed for payment of consideration of the same can be accounted for as a part of the cost of the said asset.

v) The assessee was set up to acquire resources to ensure supply of coal and at the material time it was in the process of negotiation for acquiring a coal mine, to set up its business, and thus called for capital from its shareholders for the purpose of payment of the acquisition costs. It was the part of the said funds that were kept in the short-term fixed deposit in the bank for pending payment of the construction. The attempt to acquire the coal mine was aborted and thus the amounts borrowed were repaid to RINL. It was not disputed that the funds in question were not surplus funds of the assessee, the same were called for and were earmarked for acquisition of a coal mine overseas which was to be the assessee’s undertaking as the assessee was formed for the purpose of acquiring and operating a coal mine overseas.

vi) The interest received on borrowed funds, which were temporarily held in interest-bearing deposit, was a part of the capital cost and was required to be capitalised as capital work-in-progress.”

Best judgment assessment — Estimation of gross receipt — Special Audit Report — Relates only to a particular A. Y. — Special Audit Report for earlier year cannot be the basis to conclude following of similar pattern by Assessee in later A. Y. — Disallowance of administrative and entire salary expenditure —Matter remanded to the AO for re-computation of income.

85. World Vision India vs. NFAC

[2025] 472 ITR 564(Mad.)

A. Y. 2018-19

Date of order: 19th December, 2024

Ss. 37, 142(2A) and 144of ITA 1961:

Best judgment assessment — Estimation of gross receipt — Special Audit Report — Relates only to a particular A. Y. — Special Audit Report for earlier year cannot be the basis to conclude following of similar pattern by Assessee in later A. Y. — Disallowance of administrative and entire salary expenditure —Matter remanded to the AO for re-computation of income.

The assessee filed its return of income for AY 2018-19. The said return was selected for scrutiny assessment. The assessment was completed and order dated 14th September, 2021 was passed. In the said order, the Assessing Officer relied upon special audit report dated 2nd June, 2017 as also the assessment orders passed for A. Ys. 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2017-18. The report dated 2nd June, 2017 was prepared u/s. 142(2A) of the Act for AY 2014-15, pursuant to which the assessment orders for AYs 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2017-18 were passed. The orders for AY 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2017-18 were challenged in appeal before the CIT(A).

In the A. Y 2018-19, the Assessing Officer concluded that the Assessee had applied 67 per cent of the gross receipts for charitable purposes and for the balance the Assessee had failed to establish any documents to substantiate that the amount was utilised for charitable purposes and therefore the demand has been confirmed.

The Assessee filed a writ petition challenging the assessment order mainly on the ground that the basis for coming to the conclusion that the Assessee has failed to utilize the amount for charitable purposes is based on the special audit report dated 2nd June, 2017 which was generated for AY 2014-15. The Hon’ble Madras High Court allowed the petition and remanded the matter back to the AO for the re-computation of income and held as follows:

“i) Prima facie reliance on the special audit report u/s. 142(2A) generated for the earlier assessment years could not be a basis to conclude that the similar pattern would have been followed by the assessee during the subsequent assessment years and to do so would amount to assessment by sampling. The special audit report was for the A. Y. 2014-15. In terms of section 142(2A) the special audit report could relate only for a particular assessment year since the expression used is, “if at any stage of the proceedings before him”, the Assessing Officer, having regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts, volume of the accounts, doubts about the correctness of the accounts, multiplicity of transactions in the accounts or specialised nature of business activity of the assessee, and the interests of the Revenue, was of the opinion that it was necessary so to do, he may, with the previous approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, direct the assessee to get either or both of, (i) getting the accounts audited by an accountant, as defined in sub-section (2) of section 288 , nominated by the competent authority or (b) getting the inventory valued by a cost accountant nominated by the competent authority.

ii) The assessment order indicated that no allowance had been made for the expenses incurred by the assessee towards administrative and salary expenses of the assessee and had only been allowed to accumulate 15 per cent. of the gross receipt. It was the contention of the Department that if no other amount was to be allowed, the Department had to make best judgment assessment u/s. 144. Therefore, the assessment order was set-aside and the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order on the merits and in accordance with law independently without getting influenced by the special audit report u/s. 142(2A) generated for the A. Y. 2014-15. Since the re-computation of income required a proper consideration, the assessee was directed to give a proper reply with proper evidence explaining the expenses which it sought to exclude.”

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Ex parte assessment order — Notices of demand and penalty — Validity — Notices u/s. 142(1) and 143(2) — Mandatory condition — Failure to serve notices on assessee — Notices sent to unregistered e-mail address though assessment orders for earlier and subsequent A. Ys. sent to correct e-mail address — Reliance on assessee’s permanent account number database or alternate e-mail address cannot substitute for statutory compliance — Procedural irregularities in issuing and serving notices undermine jurisdiction and legality of entire assessment process — Ex parte assessment order and consequent demand, penalty notices quashed — Department given liberty to issue fresh notices if necessary in accordance with law:

84. Neha Bhawsingka vs. UOI

[2025] 472 ITR 335 (Cal)

A. Y. 2022-23

Date of order: 22nd November, 2024

Ss.142(1), 143(2), 144, 144B, 156, 271(1)(d) and 271AAC(1) of ITA 1961

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Ex parte assessment order — Notices of demand and penalty — Validity — Notices u/s. 142(1) and 143(2) — Mandatory condition — Failure to serve notices on assessee — Notices sent to unregistered e-mail address though assessment orders for earlier and subsequent A. Ys. sent to correct e-mail address — Reliance on assessee’s permanent account number database or alternate e-mail address cannot substitute for statutory compliance — Procedural irregularities in issuing and serving notices undermine jurisdiction and legality of entire assessment process — Ex parte assessment order and consequent demand, penalty notices quashed — Department given liberty to issue fresh notices if necessary in accordance with law:

The assessee was in trading business. For the A. Y. 2022-23, an intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sent to the assessee’s registered e-mail address, confirming that the return was processed without any discrepancies. Similar communications for the earlier A. Ys. 2019-20 to 2021-22 and the subsequent year 2023-24 were also sent to the same registered e-mail address. While accessing the Income-tax portal, the assessee’s tax consultant discovered that several notices, including u/ss. 143(2) and 142(1) and show-cause notices were issued against the assessee for the A. Y. 2022-23 and sent to an unregistered e-mail address. The ex parte assessment order was passed u/s. 144 read with section 144B making disallowances on account of purchases as non-genuine and unsecured loan as unexplained credit u/s. 68. Penalty notices u/ss. 271(1)(d) and 271AAC(1) were also issued.

The assessee filed a writ petition contending that the assessment order and demand notices were vitiated since they were not served at the assessee’s registered e-mail address as required u/s. 282 but were sent to an unregistered e-mail address which was not associated with her. The Calcutta High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

i) The assessment order passed u/s. 144 read with section 144B, the consequent demand notice u/s. 156 and the penalty notices u/s. 271(1)(d) and 271AAC(1) were vitiated due to procedural lapses and non-compliance with statutory provisions. The notices u/s. 143(2) and 142(1) were not served to the assessee at her registered e-mail address as mandated u/s. 282 but were sent to an unregistered e-mail address, thereby depriving the assessee of a fair opportunity to respond, violating the principles of natural justice.

ii) The assessee had a legitimate expectation, arising from consistent past practices, that all communications would be sent to her registered e-mail address. The failure to adhere to this established protocol and the absence of proper service of notices invalidated the subsequent assessment proceedings and the ex parte assessment order passed u/s. 144 and 144B. The Revenue’s reliance on the assessee’s permanent account number database or an alternate e-mail address could not substitute for statutory compliance. Procedural irregularities in issuing and serving notices undermine the jurisdiction and legality of the entire assessment process. The assessment order could not be completed without issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2). Hence, the assessment proceedings and the assessment order without issuing the notice u/s. 143(2) were bad in law.

iii) Accordingly, the assessment order, demand notice and penalty notices were quashed and set aside. The authorities were directed to issue fresh notices, if deemed necessary, strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and ensuring proper service to the assessee.”

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Jurisdiction of NFAC — Exempt income — Jurisdictional AO passing assessment order giving effect to order of Tribunal on issue of disallowance u/s. 14A — Order attaining finality — NFAC cannot continue assessment proceedings in concluded assessment — Assessment Order passed by NFAC set-aside.

83. Religare Enterprises Ltd. vs. NFAC

[2025] 472 ITR 329 (Del)

A. Y. 2013-14

Date of order: 28th November, 2024

Ss. 143(3), 144B and 254 of ITA 1961

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Jurisdiction of NFAC — Exempt income — Jurisdictional AO passing assessment order giving effect to order of Tribunal on issue of disallowance u/s. 14A — Order attaining finality — NFAC cannot continue assessment proceedings in concluded assessment — Assessment Order passed by NFAC set-aside.

The Assessee filed revised return of income for AY 2013-14 declaring total income at ₹2,70,87,75,810. This included income from dividend amounting to ₹4,14,800 which was exempt. The Assessee had not claimed any deduction in respect of expenses amounting to ₹1,83,55,525 u/s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny and an addition of ₹1,93,79,583 was made u/s. 14A of the Act in addition to the amount of ₹1,83,55,525 already disallowed u/s. 14A of the Act. The AO also made disallowances in respect of fines and penalties.

The CIT(A) partly allowed wherein the CIT(A) deleted the additional disallowance made by the AO. In the appeal before the CIT(A), the Assessee had raised an additional ground and claimed allowance of ₹1,83,55,525 which it had not done under the revised return.

The Tribunal remanded the matter regarding disallowance u/s. 14A and disallowance of fines and penalties to the AO for consideration afresh with the direction that the disallowance u/s. 14A was required to be worked out in respect of only those investments which were yielding exempt income. Thereafter, the Assessee filed a Miscellaneous Application requesting that the AO be directed to restrict the disallowance to the extent of exempt income. The Miscellaneous Application was allowed and the Tribunal modified its order and directed that the disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act be restricted to the exempt income.

Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the Jurisdictional AO passed an order dated 4th February, 2023 to give effect to the directions issued by the Tribunal and restricted the disallowance u/s. 14A to the extent of dividend income. However, the AO did not give any specific findings in respect of fines and penalties. The Assessee also did not file any appeal against the said order.

Thereafter, the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) issued an intimation informing the Assessee that the assessment would be completed in accordance with the procedure u/s. 144B of the Act. Against this, the Assessee filed its objections for continuing any proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal as the Jurisdictional AO had already passed an order to give effect to the order passed by the Tribunal. However, the NFAC passed an order, once again making the same disallowance u/s. 14A and disregarded the directions of the Tribunal. The NFAC also expressly stated that its order would supersede the order of the Jurisdictional AO.

The Assesseefiledwrit petition against the said order of NFAC. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as follows:

“i) There is no provision under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for continuing assessment proceedings after an assessment order is passed. Concluded assessments cannot be opened except by recourse to specific provisions including section 147 of the Act.

ii) The issue of disallowance u/s. 14A had stood concluded by the order dated February 4, 2023. The Assessing Officer did not issue any specific findings regarding the fines and penalties amounting to Rs. 35,18,803 and the assessee had not filed any appeal against such decision. Notwithstanding that an order dated February 4, 2023 passed by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, the National Faceless Assessment Centre had proceeded to pass another order. Although, the jurisdictional Assessing Officer had passed an order giving effect to the order dated February 25, 2021 and the order dated February 25, 2021 as modified by the order dated April 1, 2022 by the Tribunal, the National Faceless Assessment Centre had issued an intimation dated February 15, 2023 informing the assessee that the assessment would be completed in accordance with the procedure u/s. 144B . The assessee had filed its objections for continuing any proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal since the jurisdictional Assessing Officer had already passed an order dated February 4, 2023 giving effect to the orders passed by the Tribunal.

iii) The National Faceless Assessment Centre had passed an order dated March 29, 2023 once again reiterating the disallowance of ₹3,60,51,977 made u/s. 14A, which included an additional disallowance of ₹1,93,79,583 which was made by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order dated March 28, 2016. Although, the National Faceless Assessment Centre had found that the order dated April 1, 2022 passed by the Tribunal had confined the disallowance u/s. 14A to ₹4,14,800, such directions were disregarded and had also expressly stated that its order would supersede the order dated February 4, 2023 passed by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The order dated February 4, 2023 passed by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer had set out that it was an order to give effect to the order passed by the Tribunal wherein it was held to the effect that after appeal effect income of the assessee (since merged with REL) for the assessment year 2013-14 was recomputed at ₹2,69,43,53,890 under the normal provisions of the Act. Credit for tax deducted at source, advance tax and regular taxes paid were given after verification and interests u/s. 234A, 234B, 234C and 234D were being charged, as applicable.

iv) Therefore, there was no doubt that the proceedings pursuant to the directions issued by the Tribunal stood concluded by the order dated February 4, 2023. The initiation of further proceedings by the National Faceless Assessment Centre pursuant to the orders passed by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction. The assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) read with sections 254 and 144B was set aside.”

Assessment — Order of assessment to give effect to order of Tribunal — Limitation — Commencement of limitation — Receipt of order of Tribunal — Meaning of “received” — Actual receipt of certified copy of the order not necessary — Knowledge of order of Tribunal sufficient.

82. Sunshine Capital Ltd. vs. DCIT

[2025] 472 ITR 293 (Del.)

A. Y. 2008-09

Date of order: 16th April, 2024

Ss.153 and 254 of ITA 1961

Assessment — Order of assessment to give effect to order of Tribunal — Limitation — Commencement of limitation — Receipt of order of Tribunal — Meaning of “received” — Actual receipt of certified copy of the order not necessary — Knowledge of order of Tribunal sufficient.

The case of the Assessee was selected for scrutiny and assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed after making various additions. CIT(A) partly allowed the Assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal, vide its order dated 08-10-2018 remanded the matter to the AO for the purpose of fresh assessment. The Tribunal also deleted the demand reflected on the Income Tax Portal.

Thereafter, the Assessee made several representations from July 2020 to August 2021 to the Department praying for rectification of the error with respect to the demand being reflected on the portal as well as the issue of refund. But there was no action by the Department. Since no reply was received by the Assessee upon representations, the Assessee filed an application in August 2021 in accordance with the Right to Information Act (RTI) to give effect to the order passed by the Tribunal. Pursuant to the RTI application, the AO passed an order in November 2021 wherein it expressed its inability to give appeal effect on the ground that it had not received the order passed by the Tribunal through proper channel. Against this order, the Assessee filed an appeal in December 2021 which came to be disposed vide order passed in January 2022 whereby it was decided that the information provided to the Assessee was adequate.

Thereafter, in February 2022, the Assessee filed an application to the registry of the Tribunal seeking information on service of order passed by the Tribunal. The Assessee was informed by the registry in March 2022 that the order passed by the Tribunal was duly sent to the CIT(Judicial) on 24th August, 2018 for further action. In March 2022, the Assessee also made subsequent representations to rectify the error with respect to the demand reflected on the portal, but to no avail.

The Assessee therefore filed writ petition challenging the inaction on the part of the Department and contended that despite the order passed by the Tribunal being communicated to the concerned authority of the Income tax Department within stipulated time, the Department failed to pass a fresh assessment order. The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, stipulates that an order for fresh assessment pursuant to an order u/s. 254 or section 263 or section 264 of the Act may be made at any time before the expiry of a period of nine months. The provision further encapsulates that the period has to be calculated from the end of the financial year in which the order u/s. 254 of the Act is received by the authorities mentioned in the section. Regarding the word “received” the language couched in section 260A of the Act is similar to that of section 153(3). The contextual interpretation of the phrase “received” postulates the time when the parties are notified about the pronouncement and are represented at that instant in the open court. The legislative intent behind the enactment of section 254(3) of the Act does not prescribe shifting of the onus of proving the receipt of the order under the provision on the assessee, the expression “is received” used in section 153(3) of the Act cannot mean to extend the limitation till perpetuity. The expression “received” employed in section 153(3) of the Act would not strictly mean that a certified copy of the order of the Tribunal, in the given facts and circumstances, ought to have been necessarily supplied to the concerned authority through an appropriate mechanism devised by the respondents. Further, section 254(3) of the Act casts a duty upon the Tribunal to send the copy of the orders passed under section 254 of the Act to the assessee as well as to the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. A conspectus of section 254 read with section 153(3) of the Act would reveal that the provisions cannot be made applicable to the detriment of the assessee.

ii) The material on record showed that the Tribunal sent the order of the remand to the Department on October 24, 2018, but the Department denied having received it. It was sufficient to take note of the Tribunal’s stand of sending a copy of the order to the Department. Moreover, the assessee, as early as on July 30, 2020 itself, made the first communication to the Department to give effect to the order in appeal. The record would show that the subsequent representation sent by the assessee on July 9, 2021 to the Department contained all the requisite information of the orders passed by the concerned authorities in the case of the assessee. No concrete steps had been taken by the Department. Except harping upon the word “received”, the Department had not taken any measure to give effect to the order in appeal. Taking into consideration the Tribunal’s response that the concerned order was sent on October 24, 2018, the Department ought to have passed the order to give effect to the order in appeal within twelve months from then. However, that had not been done by the Department till date.

iii) Since the Department had failed to comply with the order of the Tribunal in passing a fresh assessment order within the stipulated time, the writ petition was to be allowed with the directions to the Department to ensure that the demands of quantum amounting to ₹34.70 crores and penalty amounting to ₹33.98 crores being reflected in the Income-tax Business Application portal were removed within two weeks, that the amount of ₹25,44,671 lying with the Department were refunded to the assessee with applicable interest as per law, that the properties of the assessee were released within two weeks of the passing of this judgment, and that the three bank accounts were defreezed by the Department within two weeks.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

19. PCIT vs. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd.

(2025) 170 taxmann.com 305 (SC)

Capital gains – Reduction of share capital – The reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and subsequent proportionate reduction in the shareholding of the Assessee would be squarely covered within the ambit of the expression “sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset” used in Section 2(47) the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Percentage of shareholding of the assessee in the Company prior to, and post, reduction in Share Capital is not relevant – Loss incurred on erosion of the net worth is allowable as capital loss.

The Respondent-Assessee was a company engaged in the business of investing in shares, leasing, financing and money lending. The Assessee had made an investment in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd. (ANNPL), an Indian company engaged in the business of telecasting news, by purchasing 14,95,44,130 shares having face value of ₹10/- each. Thereafter, the Assessee purchased 38,06,758 shares from other parties, thereby increasing its shareholding to 15,33,40,900 shares which constituted 99.88% of the total number of shares of the company, i.e., 15,35,05,750.

The said company incurred losses, as a result of which the net worth of the company got eroded. Subsequently, the company filed a petition before the Bombay High Court for reduction of its share capital to set off the loss against the paid-up equity share capital. The High Court ordered a reduction in the share capital of the company from 15,35,05,750 shares to 10,000 shares. Consequently, the share of the Assessee was reduced proportionately from 15,33,40,900 shares to 9,988 shares. However, the face value of shares remained the same at ₹10 even after the reduction in the share capital. The High Court also directed the company for payment of ₹3,17,83,474/- to the Assessee as a consideration.

During the year, the Assessee claimed long term capital loss accrued on the reduction in share capital from the sale of shares of such company. However, the Assessing Officer while disagreeing with the Assessee’s claim held that reduction in shares of the subsidiary company did not result in the transfer of a capital asset as envisaged in Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer took the view that although the number of shares got reduced by virtue of reduction in share capital of the company, yet the face value of each share as well as shareholding pattern remained the same. Hence there was no extinguishment of the rights of the shareholders. Extinguishment of rights would mean that the assessee has parted with those shares or sold off those shares to second party, which was not the case here.

In appeal the CIT(A) vide order dated 14th December, 2017 while distinguishing the facts of the present case from those involved in the decision of the Supreme Court in Kartikeya V. Sarabhai vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (reported in (1997) 7 SCC 524) held that any extinguishment of rights would involve parting the sale of percentage of shares to another party or divesting rights therein. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

However, the ITAT reversed the order passed by the CIT(A) and allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee observing that the decision of the Supreme Court in Kartikeya vs. Sarabhai (supra) was squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. On the account of reduction in number of shares held by the Assessee company in ANNPL, the Assessee has extinguished its right of 15,33,40,900 shares and in lieu thereof, the Assessee received 9,988 shares at ₹10/- each along with an amount of ₹3,17,83,474/-. The Assessee’s claim for capital loss on account of reduction in share capital in ANNPL was therefore allowable.

The Revenue went in appeal before the High Court. The High Court, dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and affirmed the order passed by the ITAT, observing that the AO’s view that the voting power of the Assessee had remained unchanged was untenable. The rationale was that if the shares were transferred at face value, the redeemable value would be ₹99,880/- whereas the value of 14,95,44,130 number of shares would have been ₹1,49,54,41,300/. According to the High Court, the ITAT had rightly followed the judgement in the case of Kartikeya V. Sarabhai vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax (supra).

The Supreme Court after having heard the learned ASG appearing for the Revenue, and having gone through the materials on record, were of the view that no error, not to speak of any error of law, was committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order.

According to the Supreme Court, whether reduction of capital amounts to transfer was no longer res integra in view of its decision in Kartikeya V. Sarabhai (supra).

According to the Supreme Court, the following principles are discernible from its aforesaid decision:

a. Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which is an inclusive definition, inter alia, provides that relinquishment of an asset or extinguishment of any right therein amounts to a transfer of a capital asset. While the taxpayer continues to remain a shareholder of the company even with the reduction of share capital, it could not be accepted that there was no extinguishment of any part of his right as a shareholder qua the company.

b. A company under section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 has a right to reduce the share capital and one of the modes which could be adopted is to reduce the face value of the preference share.

c. When as a result of the reducing of the face value of the share, the share capital is reduced, the right of the preference shareholder to the dividend or his share capital and the right to share in the distribution of the net assets upon liquidation is extinguished proportionately to the extent of reduction in the capital. Such a reduction of the right of the capital asset clearly amounts to a transfer within the meaning of Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the face value per share has remained the same before the reduction of share capital and after the reduction of share capital. However, as the total number of shares have been reduced from 15,35,05,750 to 10,000 and out of this the Assessee was holding 15,33,40,900 shares prior to reduction and 9,988 shares after reduction, it can be said that on account of reduction in the number of shares held by the Assessee in the company, the Assessee has extinguished its right of 15,33,40,900 shares, and in lieu thereof, the Assessee received 9,988 shares at ₹10 each along with an amount of ₹3,17,83,474.

The Supreme Court observed that in the case of Kartikeya v. Sarabhai (supra) it has not made any reference to the percentage of shareholding prior to reduction of share capital and after reduction of share capital. In that case, it was observed that reduction of right in a capital asset would amount to ‘transfer’ under Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Sale is only one of the modes of transfer envisaged by Section 2(47). Relinquishment of any rights in it, which may not amount to sale, can also be considered as transfer and any profit or gain which arises from the transfer of such capital asset is taxable under Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court noted the decision of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Jaykrishna Harivallabhdas reported in (1998) 231 ITR 108 where the Court clarified that receipt of some consideration in lieu of the extinguishment of rights is not a condition precedent for the computation of capital gains as envisaged under Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court further noted that in the case of Anarkali Sarabhai vs. CIT reported in (1997) 224 ITR 422, it was observed that the reduction of share capital or redemption of shares is an exception to the Rule contained in Section 77(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 that no company limited by shares shall have the power to buy its own shares. In other words, the
Court held that both reduction of share capital and redemption of shares involve the purchase of its own shares by the company and hence will be included within the meaning of transfer Under Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

In view of the aforesaid, the Supreme Court held that that the reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and subsequent proportionate reduction in the shareholding of the Assessee would be squarely covered within the ambit of the expression “sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset” used in Section 2(47) the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue authorities.

Note: The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Anarkali Sarabhai has been analysed in the column “Closements” in April, 1997 issue of BCAJ.

Whether Obtaining Prior Approval For Reopening Of Assessment Has Become An Empty Ritual?

I. INTRODUCTION

The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, inserted new sections 148, 148A, and 151 relating to the reopening of assessment in the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”).

Sections 148 inter alia provides for procedure for reopening of assessment and section 148A inter alia provides for passing of an order before issuance of notice for reopening of assessment under section 148. As per these sections, the acts of issuing notice for reopening of assessment and passing an order before the issue of notice for reopening of assessment can be done by the Assessing Officer only after obtaining prior approval of the specified authority laid down under section 151, which states that specified authority for section 148 and 148A shall be the Additional Commissioner or the Additional Director or the Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director as the case may be.

In this write-up, an attempt is made to show the manner in which the rigours of provisions relating to obtaining prior approval for the reopening of assessment have been toned down as per the recent amendment, and thus, the said provisions have become an empty ritual.

II. IMPORTANT OBSERVATIONS OF THE COURTS IN THE CASE OF REOPENING OF ASSESSMENT

It would be apposite to refer to the important observations of the Courts in the case of reopening of assessment as under :

  1.  The Gujarat High Court in the case of P. V. Doshi vs. CIT (1978) 113 ITR 22 has held that provisions relating to the reopening of assessment are to lay down the necessary safeguards in the wider public interest by way of fetters on the jurisdiction of the authority itself, and they could not be said to be merely for the private benefit of the individual assessee concerned.
  2.  The Supreme Court in the case of ChhugamalRajpal vs. S. P. Chaliha (1971) 79 ITR 603 has held that the provisions of section 151 must be strictly adhered to because it contains important safeguards.
  3.  The Supreme Court in the case of ITO vs. LakhmaniMewal Das (1976) 103 ITR 437 has held that the powers of the Income Tax Officer to reopen assessment, though wide, are not plenary. The reopening of the assessment after the lapse of many years is a serious matter. The Act, no doubt, contemplates the reopening of the assessment if grounds exist for believing that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment.
  4.  The Supreme Court, in the case of has observed, “We must keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on the fulfilment of certain preconditions, and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, the review would take place”.
  5.  The Bombay High Court, in the case of German Remedies Ltd. vs. DCIT (2006) 285 ITR 26, has held that it is a settled position of law that though the powers conferred under section 147 of the Income Tax Act for reopening the concluded assessment are very wide, the said power cannot be exercised mechanically or arbitrarily.

Thus, in spite of the fact that Courts have held that the provisions relating to the reopening of assessment are to lay down the necessary safeguards in the wider public interest, by the recent amendments by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, the provisions relating to obtaining approval of the specified authority for the reopening of assessment, which acted as an important safeguard, have been watered down to facilitate carrying out of reassessment by the assessing authorities, by toning down the rigours of the provisions relating to “approval” as discussed hereafter.

III. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 151 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT

It would be apt to have the background of the following provisions of the Act before discussing the provisions relating to approval as provided under section 151 of the Act.

  1.  Earlier, prior to 31st March, 1989, the definition of the “Assessing Officer” under section 2 (7A) of the Act included only the Assistant Commissioner, the Income Tax Officer or the Deputy Commissioner. Thereafter, consequent to subsequent amendments to sub-section (7A) to section 2 from time to time, other officers were included in the definition of “Assessing Officer”, which has been stated hereafter.
  2.  (i) Presently, subsection (7A) to section 2 of the Act, which defines “Assessing Officer” as meaning the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Director or Deputy Director or the Income Tax Officer who is vested with the relevant jurisdiction by virtue of directions or orders issued under subsection (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120 or any other provisions of this Act and the Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or Joint Commissioner or Joint Director who is directed under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of that section to exercise or perform all or any of the powers and functions conferred on, or assigned to an Assessing Officer under this Act.

(ii) Sections 116 to 118 deal with the Income Tax Authorities, both quasi-judicial and executive. As per the notifications issued by the Board from time to time pursuant to powers vested in it under section 118, the hierarchy of these authorities is in the same order as provided in section 116. The relevant portion of the said section 116 has been reproduced as under, just to indicate which of these authorities fall within the ambit of the definition of “Assessing Officer” as per section 2 (7A) of the Act :

(a) xx

(aa) xx

(b) xx

(ba) xx

(c) xx

(cc) Additional Directors of Income Tax or Additional Commissioners of Income Tax or xx.

(cca) Joint Directors of Income Tax or Joint Commissioners of Income Tax or xx

(d) Deputy Directors of Income Tax or Deputy Commissioners of Income Tax or xx

(e) Assistant Directors of Income Tax or Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax

(f) Income Tax Officers

(g) xx

(h) xx

(iii) As per section 2 (28C), the Joint Commissioner includes an Additional Commissioner. Further, as per section 2 (28D), the Joint Director includes an Additional Director. Therefore, as per notification issued under section 118 r.w.s. 116, Joint Commissioner of Income Tax is subordinate to Additional Commissioner, but by virtue of section 2 (28C), the rank of Joint Commissioner and Additional Commissioner is at par. Similarly, as per notification issued under section 118 r.w.s. 116, the Joint Director is subordinate to the Additional Director, but by virtue of section 2 (28D), the rank of Joint Director and Additional Director is at par.

3.  Under the then provisions of section 151 operative up to 31st March, 1989, no notice under section 148 could be issued :

a. After the expiry of eight years from the end of the relevant assessment year without the approval of the Board.

b. After the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year without the approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner.

After the amendment of section 151 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, the sanctioning authorities depended upon whether an earlier assessment was made under section 143 (3) or section 147 of the Act or not, and also the period after the expiry of the assessment year beyond which the assessment is reopened. The said section provided that where the notice is issued after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, the approval of the Chief Commissioner or the Principal Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner was required.

From the above provisions, it is clear that where the assessment is reopened beyond the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, the approving authorities were not assessing authorities.

But sub-section (2) of section 151 permitted approval of certain Assessing Authorities where the assessment earlier made under section 143 (3) or section 147 is reopened within four years from the end of the assessment year. Thus, approving authorities and Assessing Authorities happened to be the same only in specified cases where the reopening of the assessment was made within four years from the end of the assessment year. It is submitted that the said provisions relating to the approval of assessing authorities were not in tune with the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions discussed hereafter. After the rationalisation of provisions relating to the reopening of assessment by the Finance Act, 2021, and further amended by the Finance Act, 2023, the approving authorities depended upon whether less than three years or more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. But in both the said cases, the approving authorities were not assessing authorities. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that prior to the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2021 and the Finance Act, 2023, earlier section 151 made the distinction between the reopening of assessments after the expiry of a specified number of years or those which are not, as also whether assessment made earlier was under section 143 (3) or section 147. In such cases, where the reopening of assessment was made beyond a specified number of years or in cases where an earlier assessment was made under section 143 (3) or section 147, the approval of Superior Authorities, who were not assessing authorities, was required. The amendments to section 151 made by the Finance Act, 2021 and the Finance Act, 2023 mandated the approval of Superior Authorities who were not Assessing Authorities in all cases, depending upon whether the reopening of assessment was made within three years or beyond the period of three years from the end of the assessment year. Shockingly, as per the recent amendment to section 151 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, reopening of assessment can be made with the approval of specified authorities who happen to be the assessing authorities. The Superior Authorities, like the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner, etc., have not been included in the definition of “specified authority” under the amended section 151 of the Act.

The Uttaranchal High Court in the case of McDermott International Inc. vs. Addl. CIT (259 ITR 138) has held that the provision for sanction under section 151 is a safeguard so that the assessee need not be unnecessarily harassed by the Assessing Officer.

After the present amendment to section 151, the specified authorities for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A are the Additional Commissioner or the Additional Director or the Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director, as the case may be. The specified authorities enumerated under section 151 fall within the definition of “Assessing Officer” as per section 2 (7A) of the Act, the hierarchy of which is given as above as per section 116 of the Act. If approval of any of them is to be obtained, then the same must be sought by the Assessing Authority who is below their rank as specified authorities are themselves Assessing Officers. Thus, the Additional Commissioner or the Additional Director or the Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director, who are themselves the Assessing Authorities, can give approval to the Assessing Authorities below their rank to reopen the assessment. As all these authorities fall within the definition of “Assessing Officer” as per section 2 (7A) of the Act, the amendment made is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. This is for the reason that the Superior Authorities like the Board, the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, etc., have been removed from the definition of “specified authority” under section 151 of the Act, with the result that important safeguards in the form of approval of superior authorities as hitherto provided under the predecessor section 151 and earlier section 151, have been removed, with the result that the rigours of obtaining approval have been substantially toned down.

IV. MEANING OF ASSESSMENT AND APPROVAL AND MIX–UP OF ASSESSING POWER AND APPROVING POWER NOT PROPER

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “assessment” as the process of ascertaining and adjusting the shares respectively to be contributed by several persons towards a common beneficial object according to the benefit received. It is often used in connection with assessing property taxes or levying property taxes. The same Dictionary defines “approval” to mean an act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting to some act or thing done by another. In the case of Vijay S. Sathaye vs. Indian Airlines & Others (AIR SCW 6213), the Supreme Court has held that approval means confirming, ratifying, assenting, and sanctioning some act or thing done by another. In the case of Manpower Group Services India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (430 ITR 399), the Delhi High Court has held that approval means to agree with the full knowledge of the contents of what is approved and pronounce it as good. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. V/s. Union of India (2018) 6 GSTROL 351, it has been observed by the Gauhati High Court that grant of approval means due application of mind on the subject matter approved, which satisfies all the legal and procedural requirements. In the context of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Supreme Court, in the case of Vijayadevi Naval Kishore Bhartia v/s. Land Acquisition Officer (2003) 5 SCC 83, has drawn the distinction between the approving authority and the appellate authority. It has been observed that the Collector, after assessing the land, makes an award for its acquisition and works out compensation payable under section 11 of the said Act, and his award is sent to the Commissioner for his approval as per proviso to section 11 (1) of the said Act. It has further been observed that the said Act has not conferred an appellate jurisdiction on the Commissioner under the proviso to section 11 (1) of that Act, but the appropriate government exercises the appellate power. On the same logic, there is a distinction between the assessing authority and the approving authority. Thus, the assessing power, approving power and appellate powers are separate and distinct, and there should not be a mix-up of the said powers.

Reading section 151 of the Act with section 2 (7A) of the Act, the approving authorities, i.e. Additional Commissioner or the Additional Director or Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director, may act as the assessing authorities as also approving authorities. Further, the Joint Commissioner and Additional Commissioner are of the same rank. Again, the Joint Director and the Additional Director are of the same rank. It is a paradox that all these authorities perform dual functions of assessing and approving authorities.

In certain circumstances, the provisions of section 151 may become unworkable.

For example, the Assessing Authority who proposes to issue notice under section 148 may be a Joint Commissioner. How can the Additional Commissioner accord his sanction for reopening as both the Joint Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner are of equal rank? The same reasoning applies in the case of the Joint Commissioner and the Joint Director, as both are of equal rank. In such cases, the sanction for reopening would be vitiated by official bias, resulting in a violation of the principles of natural justice. Reliance is placed on the ratio of the following decisions :

i. In GullapalliNageshwara Rao vs. A. P. State Road Transport Corporation (Gullapalli I) AIR 1959 SC 308, the petitioners were carrying on the motor transport business. The Andhra State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for nationalisation of motor transport in the State and invited objections. The objections filed by the petitioners were received and heard by the Secretary, and thereafter, the scheme was approved by the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court upheld the contention of the petitioners that the official who heard the objections was ‘in substance’ one of the parties to the dispute, and hence, the principles of natural justice were violated.

ii. In Mahadayal vs. CTO AIR 1961 SC 82, according to the Commercial Tax Officer, the petitioner was not liable to pay tax, and yet, he referred the matter to his superior officer and, on instructions from him, imposed tax. The Supreme Court set aside the decision.

iii. Again, no man can be a judge in his own cause. If it is so, his action is vitiated.

V. LEGAL POSITION OF APPROVAL/SANCTION

1. In the case of the State (Anti–Corruption Branch) Government of NCT of Delhi &Anr. vs. R. C. Anand& Another (2004) 4 SCC 615, it has been held by the Supreme Court as under :

“The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence, including the transcript of the tape record, have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies the application of the mind. The order of sanction must ex-facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority.”

2. In the case of Chhugamal Rajpal v/s. S. P. Chaliha (Supra), which related to the reopening of assessment, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the report submitted by the Income Tax Officer under section 151 (2) did not mention any reason for concluding that it was a fit case for the issue of a notice under section 148 and the Commissioner mechanically accorded his permission. On these facts, it was held by the Supreme Court that important safeguards provided in sections 147 and 151 were lightly treated by the Income Tax Officer as well as by the Commissioner, and therefore, notice issued under section 148 of the Act was invalid and had to be quashed.

From the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the approving / sanctioning authority, while approving the documents placed before him, should apply his mind, and the approval / sanction must ex–facie disclose that the approving/sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. Therefore, if the assessment order is passed by the Additional Commissioner, who is also the Sanctioning Authority, the question arises as to how the aforesaid provisions would be workable. This question arises because the specified authorities stated under section 151 include the Additional Commissioner, who can happen to be the Assessing Officer, as per the definition of Assessing Officer under section 2 (7A) of the Act.

VI. PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SUPERIOR AUTHORITIES – A CASUAL APPROACH

It is submitted that though the legislature considered obtaining approval / sanction of the Superior Authorities as a safeguard provided to the assessees, the Assessing Officers consider the said provisions of obtaining approval lightly, and the Superior Authorities also act casually in granting approval. The same is evident from the observations of the Bombay and the Allahabad High Courts in the below-noted cases.

  1.  In the case of German Remedies Ltd. v/s. DCIT (2006) 287 ITR 494 in the context of obtaining sanction for the reopening of assessment, the Bombay High Court has observed as under :
    “It is not in dispute that the Assessing Officer on 15th September, 2003, had himself carried file to the Commissioner of Income-tax and on the very same day, the rather same moment in the presence of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax granted approval. As a matter of fact, while granting approval, it was obligatory on his part to verify whether there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose full and true relevant facts in the return of income filed for the assessment of income of that assessment year. It was also obligatory on the part of the Commissioner to consider whether or not the power to reopen is being invoked within 4 years from the end of the assessment year to which they relate. None of these aspects have been considered by him, which is sufficient to justify the contention raised by the petitioner that the approval granted suffers from non-application of mind. In the above view of the matter, the impugned notices and, consequently, the order justifying the reasons recorded are unsustainable. The same are liable to be quashed and set aside.”
  2.  In the case of PCIT vs. Subodh Agarwal (2023) 450 ITR 526 in the context of obtaining sanction for issuing notice to conduct search assessment, the Allahabad High Court has observed as under :

“In the instant case, the draft assessment order in 38 cases, i.e. for 38 assessment years placed before the Approving Authority on 31-12-2017, was approved on the same day, i.e., 31st December, 2017, which not only included the cases of respondent-assessee but the cases of other groups as well. It is humanly impossible to go through the records of 38 cases in one day to apply an independent mind to appraise the material before the Approving Authority. The conclusion drawn by the Tribunal that it was a mechanical exercise of power, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.”

VII. CONCLUSION

Though the specified authorities of the rank above the assessing authorities can give their approval/sanction for the issue of notice for reopening of assessment under section 148 and passing of order before the issue of notice under section 148 for the reopening of assessment under section 148A, there will not be any accountability as all of them are the Assessing Officers who, perform their duties sitting in the offices usually situated in the same floor of a building. There are chances of getting substantive irregularities getting cured as superior Authorities, such as the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner, etc., have no role to play in giving approval / sanction. Thus, the provisions relating to obtaining prior approval have become an empty ritual. The obtaining of prior approval in such cases may also suffer from a bias, and there is every chance of assessees being harassed by the Assessing Authorities. See the observation of the Uttaranchal High Court in the case of McDermott International Inc. vs. Additional CIT (Supra). Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Manek Lal v/s. Premchand AIR 1957 SC 425 has observed that reasonable apprehension or reasonable likelihood of bias is a vitiating factor.

One is reminded of the Chief Justice of the USA, Justice John Marshall, who had said in the year 1801 that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy”. The fitting reply came about a hundred years later from another Judge from the USA, Justice Holmes, who said, “The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits”. Such is the importance of Courts. The eminent Jurist and the legendary Tax Counsel Late Mr Nani Palkhivala had said in one of his famous budget speeches that “the bureaucrats are the unacknowledged legislatures of India.” Thus, it is submitted that they have amended section 151 in such a manner that their colleagues do not face any problem in obtaining prior approval while issuing notice for reopening of assessment. The amended provisions have ensured that no matter goes to the Courts on the ground of invalid approvals / sanctions for reopening of assessment by eclipsing several Court decisions where the Courts have quashed reopening of assessment only on the ground of invalid approval / sanction.

In spite of the fact that Courts have observed that for a wider public interest, adequate safeguards should be provided for resorting to the reopening of assessment, the legislature has been making amendment after amendment by removing adequate safeguards to implement the above provisions and making such provisions simple and smooth for the assessing authorities to execute the same. The Hon’ble Finance Minister, while presenting the (Finance No. 2) Bill 2024 in para 140 of her Budget Speech, has stated, “I propose to thoroughly simplify the provisions for reopening and reassessments.” One should ask her a question as to whether such simplification is for the benefit of the Income Tax officials or the benefit of taxpayers.

Article 4 and 12 of India-USA DTAA — Single Member LLC is a taxable entity under US Tax laws, hence entitled to a beneficial rate under the DTAA.

13. General Motors Company USA vs. ACIT, International Taxation

[2024] 166 taxmann.com 170 (Delhi – Trib.)

ITA No: 2359 and 2360 (Delhi) of 2022

A.Y.: 2014-15 & 2015-16

Dated: 5th September, 2024

Article 4 and 12 of India-USA DTAA — Single Member LLC is a taxable entity under US Tax laws, hence entitled to a beneficial rate under the DTAA.

FACTS

General Motors Company USA was a single-member LLC incorporated under the laws of the USA that received fees for technical/included services from two Indian entities. The Assessee claimed the rate of taxation was 15% as per Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA, which is beneficial compared to the rate of 25% under Section 115A for the relevant AY.

The AO believed that the LLC was not subjected to taxation in its own hands as per US tax laws and could not qualify as a ‘resident’ under Article 4 of DTAA. Further, the LLC is not liable to tax in US as it is a fiscally transparent entity and is not partnership or trust to get covered by Article 4(1)(b) of the treaty.. Accordingly, the AO concluded that even if the member of the LLC was a resident of the USA and pays tax on their share of the LLC’s income, the single-member LLC was not entitled to the treaty benefits.

The DRP concurred with the draft order.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

  •  The status of a corporation has to be determined based on the laws in which such LLC is formed. Publication No. 3402 of the Department of Treasury, IRS, USA explained the taxation of LLCs. Depending on its election, a two-member LLC could have been regarded as a corporation, partnership, or disregarded entity for federal tax purposes. A single-member LLC could be regarded as a corporation or a disregarded entity, and income is taxed in the hands of the owner.
  •  Instruction No. 8802 provides instructions for the application for a Tax Residency Certificate (‘TRC’) by an entity subject to US Tax. Further, Form No. 6166 provides that a fiscally transparent entity formed in the US that does not have US owners is not entitled to a TRC.
  •  The TRC issued by the IRS shows that the income of the single-member LLC is taxed in its owner’s hands; hence, the LLC was liable to tax, and the scope of such phrase had to be determined as per US tax laws.
  •  The Assessee satisfied the requirement of being a resident under Article 4 by incorporation and its separate existence from its member. Therefore, it qualifies as a person under DTAA and is entitled to benefits under DTAA.

Section 92, 92A, and 92B(2) – Whether transaction between the foreign Head Office (HO) and its Project Office (PO) in India is subject to transfer pricing provisions.

12. TBEA Shenyang Transformer Group Company Limited vs. DCIT (International Taxation)

[2024] 169 taxmann.com 145 (SB)

ITA No: 581 (Ahd.) of 2017

A.Y.: 2012-13

Dated: 11th November, 2024

Section 92, 92A, and 92B(2) – Whether transaction between the foreign Head Office (HO) and its Project Office (PO) in India is subject to transfer pricing provisions.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of the Republic of China, obtained a contract for offshore and onshore supply and services via separate agreements. A PO was formed in India to carry out onshore supply and service. A portion of onshore services had been subcontracted to third parties. The HO in China had received and also made payments on behalf of the PO due to the non-availability of a bank account in India at the relevant time.

The AO treated the transaction as reimbursement and referred it to the TPO for ALP determination. The TPO found that the rates received from PGCIL (contractor) for civil work were lower than those paid to subcontractors, suggesting that the PO was not adequately compensated at arm’s length price (ALP), leading to losses.

A Special Bench was constituted on a reference made by the Division Bench because of apparently conflicting views on the applicability of TP provisions to the transactions between an HO and its PE.

Assesses’ Arguments before SB

  •  Even if the PE is considered an enterprise per Section 92F, it does not treat PE as separate from its foreign company.
  •  There is no international transaction as per Section 92 and only fund movement between HO and PO, and the actual transactions are between PE and third parties.
  •  The Taxpayer argued that under Section 90 of the Act, the DTAA provisions override the Act to the extent they are beneficial. Further, Article 9 stipulates that TP adjustments are applicable only when one of the enterprises involved is a resident of the other contracting state. Since neither the HO nor the PE is considered a resident, the Taxpayer contended that transactions between them should not be subject to TP adjustments as per the DTAA.

HELD

  •  The object of fair and equitable tax allocation should be kept in mind while interpreting transfer pricing provisions. The crucial aspect of the case is that the PO had incurred losses while rendering services on behalf of the HO, and an evaluation of whether an independent party would enter such a contract to perform similar services is required.

Whether PE is a separate enterprise

  •  The determination of ALP is computed for an ‘enterprise’, and not for a person. There is a clear distinction between the two terms under the Act. Interpreting the term enterprise as a person will make certain provisions redundant; hence, such interpretation should be avoided.
  •  The SB referred to Article 7(2) and observed that the PE had to be treated as a separate and distinct enterprise to determine business profits.

Income arising from International Transactions

  •  The HO had undertaken the receipts and payments on behalf of the PE. The agreement entered by the HO had a bearing on the PE’s revenue and consequential income. Hence, income had to be understood in a commercial and business sense.
  •  Section 92F(v) defines the term ‘transaction’ and includes arrangement or understanding. The arrangement entered by HO led to a substantial loss in the hands of PO; hence, it must be subject to transfer pricing.

Associated Enterprise

  •  Sections 92A(1) and 92A(2) must be read together and satisfied cumulatively. Section 92A(2) provides scenarios by which an enterprise may participate in management, capital, or control of another.
  •  The SB noted that in cases involving a PE, traditional tests like holding voting power through shares or appointment of directors may not apply, as a PE does not have its own share capital or directors. The SB however indicated that the clauses of the AE definition that refer to the control by one enterprise over the other enterprise on account of certain commercial relationships (e.g. dependence on intangible property or substantial supplier or customer relationships etc.) may apply in HO-PE situations.
  •  The SB directed the division bench to analyze the applicability of Section 92A(2) clauses based on the facts and circumstances.

Deemed International Transactions

  •  The SB also highlighted the difference between Sections 92B(1) and 92B(2). The SB observed that under 92B(1), an international transaction is evaluated at an associated enterprise level, whereas under 92B(2), it was evaluated at a transaction level.
  •  The SB observed that section 92B(2) was triggered when the transaction between an enterprise and an unrelated person was influenced by the associated person of the enterprise. Such influence may be in the form of price or terms and conditions.
  •  The PO carried out the obligations of the contract entered by the HO and incurred substantial losses. When the PO was made to accept the contract terms concluded by HO, provisions of Section 92B(2) may apply.
  •  The SB directed the division bench to analyze the applicability of 92B(2) based on the facts and circumstances.

Treaty Override

  •  The purpose of Article 9 is limited to broadly confirming that similar rules exist in domestic law. Article 9(1) does not bar adjustment of profit under the domestic law even if the conditions differ from those of Article 9(1).
  •  Even if the DTAA is assumed to prevail, profits must be attributed to the PE as if it were an independent enterprise, in line with Article 7 of the DTAA. The SB concluded that this approach aligns with the arm’s length principle and found no conflict between Article 9 of the DTAA and TP regulations of the Act.
  •  Article 7(2) provided that PE had to be treated as a separate and distinct enterprise to determine profits. This reflects the transfer pricing principles, which intend to evaluate how the independent parties would have dealt in an uncontrolled situation. Thus, contention of the assessee that there is a conflict between Article 9 of DTAA and Act is rejected.

Sec. 43A: Where the assessee claimed expenses on account of foreign exchange fluctuation, which were merely reinstatement of losses as per accounting standards and there was no actual payment or remittance, section 43A could not apply.

75. Bando (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT

[2024] 114 ITR(T) 275 (Delhi – Trib.)

ITA NO.: 7743 (DEL) OF 2018

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of Order: 11th July, 2024

Sec. 43A: Where the assessee claimed expenses on account of foreign exchange fluctuation, which were merely reinstatement of losses as per accounting standards and there was no actual payment or remittance, section 43A could not apply.

FACTS

During the year the assessee had claimed losses on account of foreign exchange fluctuation of ₹6,42,33,238/-. The AO had disallowed amount of ₹4,20,57,880/- u/s 37(1) treating exchange fluctuation as capital expenditure on account of ECB loan being utilized for purpose of acquiring capital asset which had enduring benefit. Aggrieved by the order, the assessee was in appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) in its order sustained the disallowance by invoking the provisions of section 43A instead of section 37 invoked by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal –

HELD

The ITAT observed that the assessee had reinstated income or loss from fluctuation of currency as per accounting standards AS11 and the assessee was regularly following the same system of accounting in the previous years and subsequent years.

The ITAT observed that disallowance u/s 37 and u/s 43A of the Act, both operate in different spheres. Section 43A is a deeming provision for adding or deducting, the fluctuation loss or profit, from the cost of asset whereas disallowance u/s 37 was however for the reasons that capital expenditures are specifically disallowed.

The ITAT held that there was no ground to invoke section 43A since there was merely reinstatement of losses on account of fluctuation in foreign exchange currency and there was no actual payment or remittance. The ITAT following the concept of consistency, allowed the losses claimed for foreign exchange fluctuation.

The appeal of the assessee was accordingly allowed.

Sec. 68: Where the assessee company had placed on record with the AO supporting documentary evidence substantiating the authenticity of its claim of having received share application money from the investor company, viz. confirmation, bank statement, copies of the return of income, financial statements of the investor company, copy of share application forms, copy of PAN, copy of memorandum and articles of association, copy of board resolution and return of allotment in Form No.2, though notice u/s 133(6) was not complied with by the investor company, the AO on the said standalone basis could not draw adverse inferences in the hands of the assessee company for addition u/s 68 in respect of share capital and share premium.

74. ITO vs. Shree Banke Bihari Infracon (P.)Ltd.

[2024] 115ITR(T) 223(Raipur – Trib.)

ITA NO.:95 (RPR) OF 2020

CO.: 8(RPR) OF 2023

AY.: 2013-14

Date of Order: 18th March, 2024

Sec. 68: Where the assessee company had placed on record with the AO supporting documentary evidence substantiating the authenticity of its claim of having received share application money from the investor company, viz. confirmation, bank statement, copies of the return of income, financial statements of the investor company, copy of share application forms, copy of PAN, copy of memorandum and articles of association, copy of board resolution and return of allotment in Form No.2, though notice u/s 133(6) was not complied with by the investor company, the AO on the said standalone basis could not draw adverse inferences in the hands of the assessee company for addition u/s 68 in respect of share capital and share premium.

FACTS

The assessee company was engaged in the business of real estate and building work. The assessee company had e-filed its return of income on 21st December, 2013 declaring a total income of ₹229,982/-. The assessee company’s case was selected for scrutiny proceedings u/s 143(2) of the Act.

During the course of assessment proceedings, it was observed that the assessee company had claimed to have received share capital and share premium of ₹2.05 crores from M/s. Modakpriya Merchandise Pvt. Ltd [the investor company].

The AO had issued notices u/s 142(1) of the Act which was returned unserved by postal authority. The A.O. sought for a direction from the Jt. CIT, Range-4, Raipur, and under his direction issued a commission u/s. 131(1)(d) of the Act. The A.O. directed his Inspector to carry out a spot verification about the existence of the investor company at its old address. The Inspector vide his report dated 23rd March, 2016 informed the A.O. that the investor company was neither available at the address that was provided to him nor any board evidencing the availability of the investor company was found at the said address.

The AO observed that the assessee company had failed to discharge the onus that was cast upon it as regards proving the authenticity of its claim, the identity of the investor company was not established and except for the aforesaid transaction of payment made towards share capital / premium, the bank account of the investor company revealed no other transaction.

Accordingly, the AO being of the view that the assessee company in the garb of share capital/premium had laundered its unaccounted money, thus, made an addition of the entire amount of Rs.2.05 crore (approx.) u/s. 68 of the Act. Aggrieved by the order, the assessee company filed an appeal before the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) observed that the inquiry was done on the back of the assessee company and results of enquiry were not confronted to the assessee before making the addition. The CIT(A) further observed that the AO made inquiry at wrong address of Synagogue Street Kolkata instead of correct address of Mango Lane, Kolkata. The CIT(A) observed that the availability of the investor company could not be gathered by the AO for the reason that the necessary inquiries were carried out at an incorrect address, i.e., the old address of the assessee company. It was also observed that the ARs were attending hearing before the AO and AO could have very well informed the result of the inquiry across the table to the AR. All the documents in respect of M/s Modakpriya Merchandise Pvt. Ltd. such as ITR, audited balance sheet, bank account statement, ROC certificate were furnished. It was observed by CIT(A) that the investment of ₹2.05 crore made by the investor company with the assessee company was sourced from the sale of its investments, and complete details of the same were filed with the AO. Without finding any fault in the documents furnished by the appellant, no adverse finding can be made by the AO.

The CIT(A) observed that the assessee had discharged its onus to prove the existence of the investor company, genuineness of the transaction and the creditworthiness of the investor company and thus, deleted the addition made by the AO.

The revenue being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(Appeals) filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT observed that the investor company had shifted from its old address “Synagogue Street, Kolkata” to its new address: “3, Mango Lane, 4th Floor, Kolkata(WB)-700 001”, however, the spot verification was carried out at its old address. The ROC records of the investor company also revealed its new address. The AO himself on Page 3 of his order had referred to the new address of the investor company. In spite of the above facts, the AO drew the adverse inference about the unavailability of the investor company at its old address and doubted the genuineness of the transactions. The ITAT did not approve the adverse inferences drawn by the AO.

The ITAT observed that the department had accepted the investment of ₹39.99 lacs (approx.) made by the investor company with M/s. Rupandham Steel Pvt. Ltd. during A.Y.2017-18, vide its order u/s. 143(3) dated 31st December, 2019 while framing the assessment for A.Y 2017-18 of M/s. Rupandham Steel Pvt. Ltd. and thus it dispels all doubts about the existence of the investor company.

The ITAT further observed that the AO had issued notice u/s. 133(6) of the Act at the new address of the investor company but it had carried out necessary verifications at its old address. The ITAT held that though notice u/s 133(6) was not complied with, the AO on the said standalone basis could not draw adverse inferences in the hands of the assessee company.

The ITAT observed that the assessee company had placed on record with the AO supporting documentary evidence substantiating the authenticity of its claim of having received share application money from the investor company, viz. confirmation of the investor company, bank statement, copies of the return of income, financial statements of the investor company, copy of share application forms, copy of PAN, copy of memorandum and articles of association, copy of board resolution and return of allotment in Form No. 2. The ITAT also observed that on a perusal of the bank account of the investor company, the amount remitted to the assessee company as an investment towards share application money was not preceded by any cash deposits in the said bank account but is sourced from bank transfers made through RTGS and had filed the confirmations of the source of RTGS as well.

The ITAT held that the assessee company had discharged the double facet onus that was cast upon it as regards proving the authenticity of its claim of having received genuine share application money from the investor company –

i by substantiating based on documentary evidence the “nature” and “source” of the amount so credited in its books of account, i.e. receipt of the share application money from the investor company; and

ii by coming forth with a duly substantiated explanation about the “nature” and “source” of the sum so credited in the name of the investor company, as per the mandate of the “1st proviso” to Section 68 of the Act.

In the result, the appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

S. 12AB–CIT(E) cannot deny registration under section 12AB on the ground that some of the objects of the applicant-trust had an element of commerciality.

73. (2025) 170 taxmann.com 198 (IndoreTrib)

Aruva Foundation vs. CIT

ITA No.: 398 & 399(Ind) of 2024

A.Y.: N.A.

Date of Order: 11th December, 2024

S. 12AB–CIT(E) cannot deny registration under section 12AB on the ground that some of the objects of the applicant-trust had an element of commerciality.

FACTS

The assessee-company was incorporated under section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 with the objects of, inter alia, selling and marketing of products developed by the weaker sections of the society. It was granted provisional registration / approval under section 12AB and section 80G. Subsequently, it applied to CIT(E) for grant of final registration / approval under section 12AB as well as section 80G.

CIT(E) rejected assessee’s application under section 12ABon the ground that some of the objects of the assessee as mentioned in the Memorandum of Association clearly showed that its intention was to carry out various commercial activities and also to engage in trading of various products and therefore, it was not eligible to obtain registration under section 12AB. He also rejected the application under section 80G on the ground that as a consequence of denial of registration under section 12AB, approval under section 80G was not available to the assessee. Further, the said application was also belated.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeals before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) Proviso to section 2(15) defining ‘charitable purpose itself allows commerciality in the activities of assessee but up to a ceiling limit of 20 per cent. Further, section 11(4A) grants exemption to commercial or business activity on fulfillment of certain requirements.

(b) Section 13(8) also provides that the exemption under section 11/12 shall be denied in that previous year only in which the proviso to section 2(15) is violated. Therefore, these provisions of law clearly show that even if any object or activity of assessee, out of various multiple objects and activities, has element of commerciality, that would result in denial of exemption under section 11/12 to that extent and in that particular previous year only; but the CIT(E) in exercise of power under section 12AB cannot deny registration to assessee.

(c) It was also a fact that the assessee had done only charitable activities till date and had not undertaken any activity contemplated under the said “commercial” objects. Therefore, as and when the said activity was actually undertaken by assessee in future, it would be a prerogative of Assessing Officer in that particular year, to ascertain the quantum of exemption under section 11/12 available to assessee.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed and CIT(E) was directed to grant registration under section 12AB.

With regard to the approval under section 80G, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had already filed a fresh application to CIT(E) within the extended timeline of 30.6.2024 [as extended by Circular No. 7/2024 dated 25.04.2024] and therefore, remitted the matter back to the file of CIT(E) for an appropriate adjudication.

S. 12A–If the charitable institution had filed its return of income belatedly but within time allowed under section 139(4), then the tax department must allow exemption under section 11.

72. K M Educational & Rural-development Trust vs. ITO

(2024) 169 taxmann.com 617(Chennai Trib)

ITA No.: 1326(Chny) of 2024

A.Y.: 2018-19

Date of Order: 4th December, 2024

S. 12A–If the charitable institution had filed its return of income belatedly but within time allowed under section 139(4), then the tax department must allow exemption under section 11.

FACTS

The assessee-trust was registered under section 12A. For AY 2018-19, it filed its return of income belatedly on 30th November, 2018 [due date for filing of return under section 139(1) was 30th September, 2018] declaring total income of ₹NIL and claimed a refund of ₹1,96,656. While processing the return of income under section 143(1), the Central Processing Centre (CPC) did not allow the exemption under section 11 on the ground that the return of income / audit report was not filed within the due date under section 139(1).

On appeal, CIT(A) upheld the action of CPC.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

Citing CBDT Circular No.F.No.173/193/2019-ITA-I dated 23rd April, 2019 the Tribunal held that CPC and CIT(A)erred in restricting the time limit for filing return of income to the due date under
section 139(1) and therefore, if the assessee had filed its return of income within the time allowed under section 139, that is, even if it is filed belatedly, then CPC was required to allow the exemption under section 11 by rectifying its intimation under section 143(1)(a).

Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee and restored the issue back to the file of CIT(A) with a direction to pass rectification order as required vide CBDT Circular dated 23rd April, 2019(supra).

S. 54F–Deduction under section 54F is allowable to the assessee even if the new residential property was purchased by him in the name of his wife.

71. VidjayaneDurairaj -VidjayaneVelradjou vs. ITO

(2024) 169 taxmann.com 625 (ChennaiTrib)

ITA No.:1457 (Chny) of 2024

A.Y.: 2012-13

Date of Order: 4th December, 2024

S. 54F–Deduction under section 54F is allowable to the assessee even if the new residential property was purchased by him in the name of his wife.

FACTS

During FY 2011-12, the assessee sold three immovable properties for consideration of ₹50,40,000 and received the sale proceeds in cash. Out of the sale proceeds, he had deposited ₹19,75,000 into his own bank account and an amount of ₹36,00,000 in his wife’s bank account. Thereafter, a residential property was purchased in the assessee’s wife’s name for ₹44,27,994. The assessee did not file his return of income for AY 2012-13.

Vide notice under section 148 dated 27th March, 2018, the Assessing Officer (AO) reopened the assessment on the ground that he had received information from ITS Data that the assessee had deposited cash into his UCO Bank account to the tune of ₹19,75,000. In response thereto, the assessee filed his return of income claiming deduction of ₹44,27,994 under section 54F being capital gain invested into residential property purchased in his wife’s name. The AO did not allow the claim of deduction under section 54F on the ground that the residential property in question was purchased in the name of the assessee’s wife who was also assessed to tax separately and not in the assessee’s name.

The assessee preferred an appeal before CIT(A) who dismissed the same citing the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kamal Kant Kamboj vs. ITO, (2017) 88 taxmann.com 541 (Punjab & Haryana).

Aggrieved with the order of CIT(A), the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the predominant judicial view is that for the purpose of section 54F, new residential house need not be purchased by the assessee in his own name and therefore, following the decision of jurisdictional High Court in erred in CIT vs. V. Natarajan,(2006) 154 Taxman399/287 ITR 271 (Madras), the Tribunal directed the AO to allow deduction under section 54F to the assessee.

 

Penalty levied under section 270A deleted where the assessee having fulfilled the conditions for grant of immunity from levy of penalty u/s 270AA of the Act made a belated application under section 270AA and no opportunity was given to the assessee as also no order passed by the AO rejecting the assessee’s application.

70. Bishwanath Prasad vs. CIT(A)

ITA Nos. 163 to 166/Patna/2023

A.Ys. : 2017-18 to 2020-21

Date of Order: 29th August, 2024

Sections: 270A, 270AA

Penalty levied under section 270A deleted where the assessee having fulfilled the conditions for grant of immunity from levy of penalty u/s 270AA of the Act made a belated application under section 270AA and no opportunity was given to the assessee as also no order passed by the AO rejecting the assessee’s application.

FACTS

All the appeals were against orders passed under section 270A of the Act levying penalty for under-reporting of income. The facts in each of the years under appeal being the same, the Tribunal considered the facts in the case of Nand Kumar Prasad Sah for assessment year 2017-18 and apply the decision to all other appeals.

The assessee, an individual, filed return of income under section 139(1), for AY 2017-18, declaring total income of ₹8,35,425. Subsequently, consequent to search conducted at the business premises of the assessee, the assessee in response to a notice issued under section 153A of the Act filed the return of income declaring therein a total income of ₹13,97,271. The assessment of the assessee for AY 2017-18 stood abated.

The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the assessment under section 153A of the Act by accepting the income returned in response to notice issued under section 153A of the Act. The AO levied penalty with reference to the difference between income assessed under section 153A and the income declared in return of income filed under section 139(1).

The assessee belatedly filed an application under section 270AA for grant of immunity from levy of penalty and initiation of prosecution. The AO rejected the application and levied a penalty of ₹6,20,495.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) claiming that since returned income has been assessed there is no under-reporting under section 270A(2) of the Act. It was also argued that the AO ought to have considered the application for grant of immunity. The CIT(A) dismissed the contentions and confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal where two-fold arguments were raised viz. relying on decision of Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Neeraj Jindal [(2017) 399 ITR 1] it was contended that once the assessee is subjected to search and notice u/s 153A of the Act is issued for furnishing the return and the assessee furnished return since the return filed originally gets abated and become non-est. Therefore, since there is no difference between the returned income and assessed income, no penalty is leviable u/s 270A of the Act. Second fold of the arguments was that the AO erred in rejecting the assessee’s application for grant of immunity without granting an opportunity of being heard which is contrary to the principles of natural justice. Relying on the decision of the Madras HC in Natarajan Anand Kumar vs. DCIT [(2024) 159 taxmann.com 637 (Mad)] it was contended that the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the present case and that the AO ought to have condoned the delay in furnishing application under section 270AA because the assessee satisfied all the conditions required to be satisfied for grant of immunity.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that there is no difference between the income returned under section 153A and assessed income. The Tribunal examined the second fold of the arguments first viz. that the case of the assessee was covered by the decision of the Madras High Court in Natarajan Anand Kumar (supra) and therefore the AO ought to have condoned the delay and granted immunity.

The Tribunal noted that there was no tax and interest payable as per assessment order passed under section 143(3) r.w.s. 153A and assessee had not preferred any appeal against the order of assessment. The application for grant of immunity is required to be filed within one month from the end of the month in which the assessment order is received. Assuming that the assessment order is received by the assessee on the very same date of its passing viz. 31st March, 2022 there is a delay of 45 days in filing an application for grant of immunity. The application of the assessee has been rejected without providing any opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal observed that –

i) the Madras High Court has in Natarajan Anand Kumar (supra) dealt with almost identical issue and held that it was a fit case to condone the delay of 30 days in filing the application for grant of immunity. The Court condoned the delay;

ii) the Delhi High Court in the case of Ultimate Infratech Private Limited v. National Faceless Assessment Centre in WP 6305/2022 dated 20th April, 2022 where the Court has held that upon satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in section 270AA the assessee acquires a right to be granted immunity under section 270AA;

iii) the Rajasthan High Court in GR Infraprojects Ltd. vs. ACIT [(2024) 158 taxmann.com 80] has held that “Sub-section (4) of section 270AA provides that the Assessing Officer shall pass an order accepting or rejecting any application filed by the assessee seeking immunity from imposition of penalty under section 270A within a period of one month from the end of month in which the application under sub-section (1) is received.

The Tribunal held that the ratio laid down in the above decisions is squarely applicable in favour of the assessee and therefore, it was of the considered view since, the assessee has fulfilled the conditions for grant of immunity from levy of penalty u/s 270AA of the Act, the actions of the AO levying penalty u/s 270A of the Act, is not justified because firstly, no opportunity was given to the assessee and secondly, no order has been passed by the AO rejecting the assessee’s application.

The Tribunal held the case of the assessee to be a fit case for immunity of penalty u/s 270AA of the Act and on this ground itself deleted the impugned penalty. In view of the decision of the Tribunal on the second fold of the arguments of the assessee, the Tribunal held that the first fold of the arguments became academic in nature. The penalty levied by AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deleted and the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.

Where Revenue has failed to establish direct nexus between the borrowed funds and interest-free advances, the presumption is that the interest-free advances have been made out of interest-free funds available with the assessee.

69. SiwanaAgri Marketing Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 1094/Ahd./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of Order: 27th November, 2024

Section: 36(1)(iii)

Where Revenue has failed to establish direct nexus between the borrowed funds and interest-free advances, the presumption is that the interest-free advances have been made out of interest-free funds available with the assessee.

FACTS

For A.Y. 2017-18, the assessee filed its return of income declaring a total income of ₹31,91,560. While assessing the total income of the assessee under section 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed ₹65,86,200 under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act on the ground that the assessee had advanced interest-free loans of ₹5.48 crore while incurring significant interest expenses on unsecured borrowings. He held that the assessee failed to demonstrate the nexus of these advances with interest-free funds and did not demonstrate any business purpose.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) contending that interest-free advances were made out of sufficient interest-free funds available with it. The CIT(A) held that the assessee failed to substantiate its claims with adequate evidence or satisfy the legal requirements under the Act. He observed that no fund flow statement or evidence provided to establish the nexus of interest-free funds with advances and that business purpose or commercial expediency has not been demonstrated. He confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee, on the basis of financial statements it was contended that the assessee has sufficient own funds. The net worth as on 31st March, 2016 was ₹30.31 crore and that on 31st March, 2017 was ₹27.11 crore whereas the amount of loan given during the year is only ₹15.75 lakh and the balance is all opening balances. It was also pointed out that no disallowance was made in earlier years despite the existence of similar advances of ₹5.33 crore and assessee has earned net interest income of ₹1.10 crore during the year thereby negating any suspicion of diversion of interest-bearing funds. Reliance was placed on decision of SC in CIT(LTU) vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. [(2019) 410 ITR 466]. It was contended that the reliance placed by AO and CIT(A) on the decision of S A Builders [Appeal (civil) 5811 of 2006 (SC)] was misplaced in light of later SC ruling in Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra).

HELD

The Tribunal, based on material on record, held that had sufficient interest-free funds amounting to ₹27.10 crores as on 31st March, 2017, which were more than adequate to cover the interest-free advances of ₹5.48 crores. It observed that the CIT(A) did not address the assessee’s submission that no disallowance was made in earlier years despite similar advances. The principle of consistency was disregarded. The CIT(A)’s emphasis on the absence of a fund flow statement is unjustified, as the assessee’s financial statements clearly indicated the sufficiency of interest-free funds and the CIT(A)’s reliance on S.A. Builders vs. CIT (supra) is misplaced.

The Tribunal held that while the decision in the case of S A Builders (supra) emphasizes the requirement of commercial expediency, the principles laid down in CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra), a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court clarifies that where sufficient interest-free funds are available, the presumption arises that such advances are made from those funds. Following the principle established in CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra), it is presumed that such advances are made from interest-free funds. The Revenue has failed to establish a direct nexus between borrowed funds and these advances. Therefore, the disallowance of interest expenses under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act cannot be sustained.

Where funds were introduced by the partners of the firm as their capital contribution and their confirmations filed, the onus cast on the assessee stood discharged. If the AO is not satisfied with the explanation then the addition may be made in the hands of the partners but not in the hands of the assessee firm.

68. J K Associates vs. ITO

ITA No. 1200/Ahd./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of Order: 5th December, 2024

Sections: 68, 69A

Where funds were introduced by the partners of the firm as their capital contribution and their confirmations filed, the onus cast on the assessee stood discharged. If the AO is not satisfied with the explanation then the addition may be made in the hands of the partners but not in the hands of the assessee firm.

FACTS

For the assessment year 2017-18, the Assessing Officer (AO) received information that the assessee firm had purchased immovable property of ₹1 crore in Financial Year 2016-17. Since the assessee firm had not filed return of income, he recorded reasons and issued a notice under section 147 of the Act and completed the assessment by making an addition of ₹1 crore in respect of unexplained investment in immovable property.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was submitted that the source of investment in the immovable property was duly explained by the assessee before the AO as well as before the Ld. CIT(A). It was submitted that the property was acquired out of capital contribution made by 12 partners of the firms and the details of amount contributed by the individual partners along with their confirmations was filed before the AO. It was further explained that the partners had made withdrawals from other firms as well as taken loan from other entities for making capital contribution to the assessee firm. Therefore, the identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the partner’s contribution towards the acquisition of property was duly established. Therefore, the AO was not correct in making an addition in the hands of the assessee firm. Relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in PCIT vs. VaishnodeviRefoils&Solvex [(2018) 89 taxman.com 80(Gujrat] it was submitted that in case the AO was not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee, then the addition should have been made in the hands of the individual partners but not in the case of assessee firm.

HELD

The AO was not correct in rejecting the evidences filed by the assessee as self-serving documents. The assessee has discharged its onus by explaining the source of investment made in the immovable property. It is not that the amounts were borrowed by the assessee from 3rd parties; rather all the fund had come from its own 12 partners in the form of their capital contribution. The assessee had discharged its onus to explain the source of investment in the immovable property. The confirmation of the partners was also filed in this regard. If the AO was not satisfied about the creditworthiness of the partners, then the enquiry was required to be made at the end of the partners. No addition in respect of unexplained capital contribution made by the partner can be made in the hands of the firm. The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus to explain the source of investment in the immovable property.

The addition of ₹1 crore made by the AO in respect of unexplained investment in property was deleted.

Credit card dues settled / paid in cash, qualify for addition u/s 69A if the source of cash deposit is not explained.

67. Dipak Parmar vs. ITO

ITA No. 178/Srt./2024

A.Y.: 2017-18

Date of Order: 19th November, 2024

Section: 69A

Credit card dues settled / paid in cash, qualify for addition u/s 69A if the source of cash deposit is not explained.

FACTS

For A.Y. 2017-18, the assessee filed his return of income declaring total income at ₹2,78,400/-. The assessee had made cash payment towards credit card purchases of ₹6,16,142/-. The Assessing Officer ( ‘AO’) asked the assessee to explain the source of the above cash payments. The AO also issued show cause notice which was not replied to by the assessee. Therefore, the AO held that the amount of cash payment of ₹6,16,000/- remained unexplained and constitutes income of the assessee u/s 69A of the Act which is taxable at the rates mentioned in section 115BBE of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who issued seven notices which were not responded neither were any written submissions filed. The CIT(A) concluded that the assessee was not interested in pursuing the appeal and therefore decided the same based on material on record.

The CIT(A) observed that assessee failed to explain the source of cash payment of ₹6,16,000/- towards credit card purchases; hence, the impugned amount constitutes income in the hands of the assessee u/s 69A of the Act. The CIT(A) also relied on the order of Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court, in case of Anil Goel vs. CIT, 306 ITR 212 (P& H) wherein relying on the earlier decision of the High Court in case of Popular Engineer Co. vs. ITAT, 248 ITR 577 (P & H), it was held that elaborate reasons need not be recorded by the CIT(A) as has been done by the AO. The reasons are required to be clear and explicit indicating that the authority has considered the issue in controversy. If the appellate / revisional authority has to affirm such an order, it is not required to give separate reasons, which may be required incase the order is to be reversed by the appellate / revisional authority.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where none appeared on behalf of the assessee and therefore the appeal was decided ex-parte.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made cash payments for credit card purchases i.e. ₹3,37,650/- with RBL Bank Ltd., ₹1,66,492/- with SBI Cards and Payment Services Pvt. Ltd. and ₹1,12,000/- with City Bank. It observed that both AO and CIT(A) issued several notices but assessee chose not to respond to the notices nor file any written submission. Having observed that the provisions of section 69A are clear, the Tribunal held that in the present case, assessee has purchased the credit cards by making cash payments. It is, therefore, clear that assessee was owner of money (cash) which was used to make credit card purchases. However, he has not explained the nature and source of acquisition of such money, being cash, of ₹6,16,142/-. The AO has added the same u/s 69A of the Act due to non-compliance by assessee to the statutory notices as well as the show cause  notice. The CIT(A) has rightly confirmed the addition because assessee did not attend before him or filed any written submission in support of the grounds raised before him.

The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) holding that the provisions of section 69A are clearly attracted to the facts of the case.

Section 143(3) r.w.s. 148: Reopening of assessment — Assessment completed — Petitioner had explicitly sought for a personal hearing — Not granted – breach of the principles of natural justice.

25. Pico Capital Private Limited vs. Dy. CIT Circle – 8(2)(1) &Ors.

[WP(L) No. 15940 OF 2024]

Dated: 7th January, 2025. (Bom) (HC)

Section 143(3) r.w.s. 148: Reopening of assessment — Assessment completed — Petitioner had explicitly sought for a personal hearing — Not granted – breach of the principles of natural justice.

The Petitioner challenged the assessment order dated 26th March, 2024 and notice dated 31st March, 2023 disposing of objections under Section 148A(d) of the Act. However, the Court considered the challenge to the assessment order dated 26th March, 2024 on the ground that it was made in breach of the principles of natural justice.

The Petitioner, in reply to the show cause notice, had explicitly sought for a personal hearing. There is no dispute on this aspect. However, the impugned order stated video conferencing was not required.

The Court noted that though a personal hearing was sought, the same had been denied to the Petitioner on the ground that the Petitioner would have nothing further to add to the reply already filed by the Petitioner. The Court noted that such an approach, would not be appropriate. If the law requires the grant of a personal hearing, then the same should not be ordinarily denied on the grounds that nothing further could be said in the personal hearing. The Petitioner must be allowed to convince the Assessing Officer of the merits of its version. This is more so when a law provides for a personal hearing when requested by the Assessee.

Attention was invited to Circular No.F.No.225/97/2021/ITA-II dated 6th September, 2021 in the context of approval for the transfer of assessments / penalties proceedings to jurisdictional Assessing Officers. It was observed that the Circular provided that the request for personal hearings shall generally be allowed to the assessee with the approval of the Range Head, mainly after the assessee has filed a written submission to the show cause notice. Personal hearings may be allowed for the assessee, preferably through video conference. If Video Conference is not technically feasible, personal hearings may be conducted in a designated area in the Income-Tax Office. The hearing proceedings may be recorded. Given this Circular, the defence raised, or the justification offered by the Respondents’ affidavit cannot be accepted.

The Court noted that though the assessment order was appealable, however, the Court entertained the petition because a case of complete failure of natural justice was made out. No personal hearing was granted to the Petitioner, and such denial was not for valid reasons.

The impugned assessment order dated 26th March, 2024 was set aside, and remand the matter to the concerned Respondent to dispose of the show cause notice issued to the Petitioner following the law and after granting the Petitioner a personal hearing.

Section: 143(1) – Intimation – ICDS adjustment and valuation of inventory – Writ Petition – Alternate remedy – Article 226 of the Constitution of India : Assessment Year 2022-23.

24. Fiat India Automobiles Limited vs. Dy. Director of Income Tax &Ors.

[WP (L) No. 10495 OF 2023]

Dated: 15th January, 2025 (Bom) (HC)

Section: 143(1) – Intimation – ICDS adjustment and valuation of inventory – Writ Petition – Alternate remedy – Article 226 of the Constitution of India : Assessment Year 2022-23.

The Petition challenges an intimation passed under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), dated 26th July 2023 for Assessment Year 2022-23, whereby a demand of approximately ₹6,600 Crores was raised.

The Petitioner submitted that since a huge demand of ₹6,600 had been raised, the remedy of appeal would not be an efficacious remedy. Accordingly, the Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction. It was further submitted that prior to passing the impugned intimation order, no opportunity was given to the Petitioner. It was further submitted that on 28th March, 2024 an order under section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Act came to be passed by the Assessing Officer accepting the return income with a rider which reads as follows :-

“3.1.4…….It is clarified that the issue of ICDS adjustment and valuation of inventory is under adjudication pending with Hon’ble High Court, therefore, no decision with regard to these issues is being taken in this order.”

It was contended that in view of the subsequent 143(3) order, and on a reading of Section 143(4) of the Act, the subject matter of 143(1) gets subsumed in 143(3) proceedings. It was further pointed out that the Petitioner had made an application under Section 154 on 31st July, 2023 for rectifying the mistake which had crept in the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act. The said rectification application had not been disposed of on the ground that the subject matter of 143(1) was pending before the Court in the present Petition.

The Respondents, justified their action in passing 143 (1) order and submitted that since the matter was pending before this Court, the officer in the 143(3) order stated that the issue of ICDS adjustment and valuation of inventory would be subject to the outcome of this Petition.

The Hon. Court observed that at no point of time, the Hon. Court had restrained the Respondents from adjudicating any issue in the regular assessment proceedings. Accordingly, the observations made in the assessment order under Section 143(3), that since the issue of ICDS adjustment and valuation of inventory was pending before the Court, no decision with regard to this issue has been taken, was incorrect. If the officer was of the view that the ad-interim order amounted to restraining the officer from adjudicating this issue in regular assessment proceedings, then, the Respondents should have approached the Court for clarification. However, at no stage the Hon. Court had restrained the Respondents from adjudicating this issue in regular assessment proceedings.

The Court further observed that, the Petitioner had made an application on 31st July, 2023 for rectification of the intimation. The said application of the Petitioner was not decided by the Assessing Officer on the ground that issue of Section 143(1) adjustment is pending before the Court. The Hon. Court again clarified that the Respondents were not restrained by any order of the Hon. Court from passing any order to decide the rectification application filed by the Petitioner on 31st July, 2023. The Hon. Court observed that in the absence of any restraint order by the Court, the stand of the Respondents not to adjudicate the rectification application was misconceived. The officer ought to have adjudicated the rectification application in accordance with law.

The Hon. Court observed that the intimation under challenge is an appealable under Section 246A(1)(a) of the Act. It was the contention of the Petitioner that no notice was given before passing the intimation. However, in the order dated 23th August 2023, the Respondents have stated that an intimation was issued to the Petitioner on 27th May, 2023 requiring a response and since the Petitioner did not respond, the adjustment was made.

The Court held that this would require adjudication of facts whether any prior intimation was served on the Petitioner before passing the impugned intimation. This factual determination cannot be examined by the Court in the writ proceedings. However, the same can be adjudicated efficaciously before the Appellate Authority. The Court noted that in Section 246A, there is no provision of mandatory pre-deposit for admitting and entertaining the appeal. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that the intimation raises a huge demand of ₹6,600 crores, where the remedy of appeal is not efficacious remedy, was rejected. The Court further noted that the Petitioner had the remedy of making an application for stay of the demand and any order passed thereon, if the Petitioner was aggrieved, could be challenged in accordance with law. Therefore, although a huge demand was raised, but in the absence of any pre-deposit for admitting and entertaining the appeal, the Court cannot interfere with the impugned intimation in writ proceedings.

In view of above, the Hon. Court granted the Petitioner liberty to challenge the impugned intimation dated 26th July 2023 by filing an appeal within a period of four weeks from the date of uploading of the present order. The Appellate Authority was directed to consider the appeal on merits without recourse to limitation, since the Petitioner was bonafidely pursuing the Petition before the Court. The Respondent was directed to decide the rectification application dated 31st July 2023 within a period of two weeks from the date of uploading the order after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the Petitioner.

Refund — Adjustment of demand — Recovery of tax — Grant of stay of demand — Powers of the AO — Instructions issued by the CBDT misconstrued — Application for rectification of order pending before Commissioner (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre — Adjustment of refund without considering application for stay of demand arbitrary and illegal — Matter remanded with directions.

81. National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) Vs. DCIT(Exemption)

[2024] 470 ITR 493 (Del.)

A. Ys. 2018-19:

Date of order: 1st March, 2024:

Ss. 154, 220(6) and 237 of ITA 1961:

Refund — Adjustment of demand — Recovery of tax — Grant of stay of demand — Powers of the AO — Instructions issued by the CBDT misconstrued — Application for rectification of order pending before Commissioner (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre — Adjustment of refund without considering application for stay of demand arbitrary and illegal — Matter remanded with directions.

The Assessee filed its return of income for A. Y. 2018-19 and claimed a refund of ₹6,45,65,160 on  account of excess tax deducted at source during the year. The Assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny and assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed after making several additions which resulted into creation of demand of ₹10,26,85,633.

Against the said order, the Assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). The Assessee also filed application for rectification u/s. 154 of the Act for rectifying certain mistakes apparent from the face of the order. The Assessee also filed application for stay of demand. The rectification application filed by the Assessee was rejected by the Assessing Officer. Pending appeal before the CIT(A) and pending disposal of the stay application filed by the Assessee, the Department adjusted the refunds on account of excess tax deducted at source for the A. Ys. 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2020-21 towards the demand raised for the assessment year 2018-19.

The Assessee filed a writ petition challenging the action of the Department. The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) The Office Memorandum [F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC], dated 29th February, 2016 and the Office Memorandum [F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC], dated July 31, 2017 ([2017] 396 ITR (St.) 55) and neither prescribe nor mandate 15 per cent. or 20 per cent. of the outstanding demand under section 156 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 being deposited as a precondition for grant of stay. The earlier Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016, specifically mentions of the discretion vesting in the Assessing Officer to grant stay subject to a deposit at a rate higher or lower than 15 per cent. depending upon the facts of a particular case. The subsequent Office Memorandum dates 31st July, 2017 merely amended the rate to be 20 per cent. and describes the 20 per cent. deposit to be the “standard rate”. The administrative circular would not operate as a fetter upon the power otherwise conferred on a quasi-judicial authority and that it would be wholly incorrect to view the Office Memorandum as mandating the deposit of 20 per cent. of the disputed demand irrespective of the facts of an individual case. The clear and express language employed in sub-section (6) of section 220 states of the Assessing Officer being empowered “in his discretion and subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose in the circumstances of the case”. Therefore, the 20 per cent. pre-deposit stated in the Office Memorandum cannot be viewed as being an inviolate or inflexible condition. The extent of the deposit which an assessee may be called upon to make would have to be examined and answered considering the factors such as prima facie case, undue hardship and likelihood of success.

ii) The Department had proceeded on incorrect and untenable premise that the assessee was obliged to furnish evidence of having deposited 20 per cent. of the disputed demand before filing its application for stay of demand under section 220(6) could have been considered. The interpretation which was sought to be accorded to the Office Memorandum [F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC], dated 29th February, 2016 (amendment of instruction No. 1914, dated 21st March, 1996 which contained the guidelines issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes regarding procedure to be followed for recovery of outstanding demand, including procedure for grant of stay of demand) was misconceived and untenable. The Department had erred in proceeding on the assumption that the application for consideration of outstanding demands being placed in abeyance could not have even been considered without a 20 per cent. pre-deposit of the disputed demand. On the date when the adjustments of the refund towards the demand of the assessment year 2018-19 was made, the application filed by the assessee under section 220(6) had neither been considered nor disposed of. Therefore, the adjustment of the outstanding demand for the assessment year 2018-19 against the available refunds without attending to that application was arbitrary and unfair. The intimation of adjustments being proposed would hardly be of any relevance or consequence once it was found that the application for stay of demand remained pending.

iii)The matter was remitted to the Department for considering the application of the assessee u/s. 220(6) in accordance with the observations made. The issue of the amount of refund liable to be released would abide by the decision which the Department would take pursuant to the directions”.

Recovery of tax — Company — Liability of director of private company — Order u/s. 179 — Condition precedent — Inability to recover tax dues from company.

80. Manjula D. Rita and Bhavya D. Rita vs. Pr. CIT:

[2025] 472 ITR 116 (Bom):

A. Y. 2012-13: Date of order: 19th June, 2023

Ss. 179 and 264 of ITA 1961:

Recovery of tax — Company — Liability of director of private company — Order u/s. 179 — Condition precedent — Inability to recover tax dues from company.

The petitioners are two out of the four legal heirs of one late Dinesh Shamji Rita (the deceased), who was a director of Bhavya Infrastructure India Private Limited (the company) during the A. Y. 2012-13. The other two legal heirs are married daughters of the deceased and petitioner No. 1. The petitioners are impugning an order dated 9th March, 2020 passed by respondent No. 1 u/s. 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) rejecting the petitioner’s application. The order impugned came to be passed while rejecting an application filed by the petitioners impugning an order dated 7th May, 2018 passed under section 179(1) of the Act.

The company had filed its return of income for the A. Y. 2012-13 on 29th September, 2012 declaring an income of ₹62,47,290. An assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 came to be passed on March 30, 2015 by which several additions were made, i. e., a sum of ₹ 18,37,21,188 u/s. 68 of the Act for unexplained cash credit, interest on loan of ₹1,21,11,106 and disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act of ₹2,06,642. A demand of ₹8,66,76,960 was also made u/s. 156 of the Act.

The deceased applied for stay before the Assessing Officer and filed an appeal before the CIT (A). The Assessing Officer rejected the application for stay by an order dated 16th July, 2015. An application was moved by the deceased before the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax for grant of stay of the demand, which application also came to be rejected. The company, though had not accepted the additions/disallowance, voluntarily paid various amounts in October / November, 2017. Certain properties were attached but the attachment order was later vacated. The petitioner’s revision application u/s. 264 of the Act also came to be rejected.

Thereafter, the petitioners received an order dated 7th May, 2018 passed u/s. 179 of the Act against which the petitioners filed another revision application u/s. 264 of the Act. This revision application came to be rejected by the impugned order dated March 9, 2020.

The petitioners filed writ petition and challenged the order dated 9th March, 2020, passed by respondent No. 1 u/s. 264 of the Act rejecting the petitioner’s application. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) It is averred in the petition that the deceased took seriously ill and was ailing for almost six months before succumbing to multiple organ failures on 6th May, 2018, a day before the order dated May 7, 2018, came to be passed u/s. 179 of the Act. The order impugned passed by respondent No. 1 u/s. 264 of the Act also is a very brief order in the sense that the only ground on which the application u/s. 264 of the Act came to be rejected is contained in paragraph 4.2 of the impugned order. Respondent No. 1, without considering any of the submissions made by the petitioners, has simply rejected the application u/s. 264 of the Act noting that the notice of the death of the deceased was not brought to the Assessing Officer by anybody and before the order u/s. 179 of the Act was signed by the Assessing Officer and, therefore, as on the date of the passing of the order, there was nothing invalid.

ii) Before passing an order u/s. 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer should have made out a case as required u/s. 179(1) of the Act that the tax dues from the company cannot be recovered. Only after the first requirement is satisfied would the onus shift on any director to prove that non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company.

iii) There was nothing to indicate the steps were taken to trace the assets of the company. Moreover, the order passed u/s. 179 of the Act did not satisfy any of the ingredients required to be met. In view of non-issuance of notice, the assessee had not been given an opportunity to establish that the non-recovery was not attributable to any of the three factors on his part, i.e., gross neglect or misfeasance or breach of duty.

iv) Without going into the merits on the correctness of the assessment order passed or whether the time was ripe to issue notice under section 179 of the Act, we hereby quash and set aside the order dated 9th March, 2020 passed under section 264 of the Act, so also the order dated 7th May, 2018 passed under section 179 of the Act.”

Reassessment — Notice — Validity — Seizure of cash by police — Cash produced in Magistrate Court and case registered — Proceedings u/s. 132A — Department requisitioning for release of cash — Release or custody of cash only in accordance with provisions of section 451 of Cr.PC 1973 — First proviso to section 148A applicable — Notices valid though issued non-complying with procedures u/s. 148A.

79. Muhammed C. K. vs. ACIT:

[2025] 472 ITR 161 (Ker):

A. Ys. 2020-21 to 2023-24: Date of order: 11th March, 2024:

Ss. 132A, 147, 148 and 148A of ITA 1961: and S. 451 of Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

Reassessment — Notice — Validity — Seizure of cash by police — Cash produced in Magistrate Court and case registered — Proceedings u/s. 132A — Department requisitioning for release of cash — Release or custody of cash only in accordance with provisions of section 451 of Cr.PC 1973 — First proviso to section 148A applicable — Notices valid though issued non-complying with procedures u/s. 148A.

Certain amount of cash was seized from the assessee by the police and was produced before the magistrate court and a case was registered. It was stated that an application u/s. 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was filed before the Magistrate Court to release the money to the Department.

On a writ petition contending that the money ought to be released to him and that since the money in question was never requisitioned as contemplated by the provisions of section 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the notices u/s. 148A, issued for the A. Ys. 2020-21 to 2023-24 without following the procedure prescribed u/s. 148A were illegal and unsustainable the Kerala High Court held as under:

“i) The notices had been issued without following the procedure contemplated u/s. 148A, the notices issued u/s. 148 were not illegal, since on the facts, the situation fell within the first proviso to section 148A, which provided that the procedure u/s. 148A was not applicable in a case covered by the provisions of section 132A, though the Department had filed an application u/s. 451 of the 1973 Code. Though when an item or cash, was produced before a criminal court the Department could not issue a notice u/s. 132A to the court in question, once the item was produced before the court in connection with any criminal case registered by the police or any other law enforcement agency, an application for release or for giving custody of it to the Department could only be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and specifically section 451 of the 1973 Code thereof. That did not take away the fact that the Department had initiated proceedings u/s. 132A to requisition the amount from the police station.

ii) Therefore, the case was covered by the first proviso to section 148A and the procedure prescribed under the provisions of section 148A need not be complied with before issuing the notices u/s. 148 for the A. Ys. 2020-21 to 2023-24.”

Re-assessment — Notice after four years — Advance Ruling — Effect of — Binding only on Assessee and AO in relation to transactions in question — Notice for reassessment for subsequent years issued on the basis of rulings in another case — Transactions similar to those in respect of which ruling rendered in Assessee’s case — No change in law or new tangible material and independent formation of belief by the AO — Notices for re-opening invalid.

78. Mrs. Usha Eswar vs. ITO and Ors.

[2024] 470 ITR 200 (Bom.)

A. Ys. 1997-98 – 2000-01

Date of order: 7th July, 2023

Ss. 147, 148, 245R and 245S of ITA 1961

Re-assessment — Notice after four years — Advance Ruling — Effect of — Binding only on Assessee and AO in relation to transactions in question — Notice for reassessment for subsequent years issued on the basis of rulings in another case — Transactions similar to those in respect of which ruling rendered in Assessee’s case — No change in law or new tangible material and independent formation of belief by the AO — Notices for re-opening invalid.

The assessee was a Non-resident Indian and was regularly assessed to tax in India in respect of income which accrued or arose in India or which was received in India. The Assessee was a resident of Dubai for several years and was a resident of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as per the definition provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and UAE. The Assessee had made an application to the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) seeking tax treatment as well as the rate of tax applicable in respect of income earned by way of dividends, interest and capital gains from sources in India. The said application was not made in respect of a specific assessment year. The AAR found that the Assessee was a resident as per Article 4 of the India — UAE DTAA and that the Assessee was not liable to pay tax in UAE as there was no levy of income tax on an Individual in UAE. The AAR applied the provisions of the Act and Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the DTAA and passed a ruling to the effect that the capital gains from transfer of moveable assets in India will be governed by Article 13(3) and the same will not be taxable in India on or before 1st April, 1994. The dividend income from shares held in India would be taxed at the rate of 15 per cent and income by way of interest on debentures and bonds as well as balance in partnership firm will be taxable at 12.5 per cent. In holding so, the AAR had relied upon its earlier ruling the case of MohsinallyAlimohammedRafik (“Mohsinally”).

Subsequently, after a period of four years, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act for the AYs 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 for re-opening the assessment on the ground that the ruling of the AAR was applicable only in respect of AY 1995-96 and that the AAR, in a subsequent ruling in the case of Cyril Eugene Pereria (“Cyril”), after considering the ruling in the earlier case of Mohsinally’s case, concluded that the benefit of DTAA would not be applicable as the applicant therein was not chargeable to tax in UAE. Therefore, the Assessing Officer concluded that the ratio of the ruling in Cyril’s case would be applicable and the benefits of DTAA were wrongly given to the Assessee for the AYs 1997-98 to 2000-01.

The Assessee filed writ petition challenging the re-opening of the assessment. The Bombay High Court allowed the petitions and held as follows:

“i) Section 245S of the Income-tax Act, 1961 states that the ruling pronounced by the Authority for Advance Rulings binds the Authority under section 245R . It is binding on the applicant who has sought the ruling in respect of the transactions in relation to which the ruling has been sought for and on the Commissioner and the Income-tax authorities subordinate to him in respect of the applicant and the transaction. Sub-section (2) of section 245S provides that the ruling shall be binding unless there is a change in the law or the facts on the basis of which the advance ruling has been pronounced.

ii) The Assessing Officer had manifestly exceeded his jurisdiction in reopening the assessment relying on the subsequent ruling of the Authority for Advance Rulings in the case of Cyril Eugene Pereira, In Re [1999] 239 ITR 650 (AAR). The ruling in that case could not bind the assessee nor could it displace the binding effect of the ruling in the assessee’s case. The transaction in respect of which the assessee had sought a ruling and in respect of which the Authority for Advance Rulings had issued the ruling to the assessee was of the same nature as that for the assessment years 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01. There was no change in law or facts. The Assessing Officer had not personally formed the belief that income liable to tax had escaped assessment and there was no tangible material to conclude that there was any escapement of income. Therefore, the notices under section 148 were set aside. The Director (International Transactions) had ignored the relevant provisions of law. The power to reopen the assessments under section 147 could not have been invoked.”

Deduction of tax at source — Self Assessment Tax — Not required where tax deducted at source on payment — Tax deducted at source from amount received by the Assessee — Assessee entitled to benefit u/s. 205 — Assessee need not produce Form 16A.

77. Incredible Unique Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO:

[2024] 470 ITR 106 (Del)

A. Y. 2011-12

Date of order: 3rd October, 2023

S. 205 of ITA 1961

Deduction of tax at source — Self Assessment Tax — Not required where tax deducted at source on payment — Tax deducted at source from amount received by the Assessee — Assessee entitled to benefit u/s. 205 — Assessee need not produce Form 16A.

The Assessee provided services to an entity by the name of CAL. The value of the service provided amounted to ₹8,50,26,199. The said entity CAL deducted tax at source amounting to ₹24,96,199. Out of ₹24,96,199 deducted by CAL, only an amount of ₹69,897 was deposited towards TDS and the balance ₹24,26,302 remained to be deposited. As a result, the Department did not give full credit of TDS deducted by CAL and raised a demand.

Therefore, the Assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the non-grant of full credit TDS. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) In our view, the petitioner is right inasmuch as neither can the demand qua the tax withheld by the deductor-employer be recovered from him, nor can the same amount be adjusted against the future refund, if any, payable to him.

ii) Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we are inclined to quash the notice dated 28th February, 2018, and also hold that the respondents- Revenue are not entitled in law to adjust the demand raised for the A. Y. 2012-13 against any other assessment year. It is ordered accordingly.”

The High Court dismissed the review petition filed by the Department and held follows:

“i) Under section 205 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the tax is deductible at source, the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from his income. The bar operates as soon as it is established that the tax had been deducted at source and it is wholly irrelevant as to whether the tax deducted at source is deposited or not and whether form 16A has been issued or not. Form 16A is amongst others, a piece of evidence which can establish deduction of tax at source. That said, form 16A is not the only piece of evidence in that regard. In a case where the assessee can show reliable material other than form 16A and prima facie establish the deduction of tax at source. The assessee cannot be left at the mercy of the tax deductor, who for multiple reasons may not issue form 16A or may not deposit the deducted tax.

ii) The assessee admittedly declared in his return of income the tax deducted at source by CAL. and supported this with his ledger account. Not only this, the assessee even filed a complaint dated 25th January, 2017 with the Department alleging that CAL. had deducted but not deposited the tax deducted at source. But no action was taken on its complaint. The assessee could not be burdened with the responsibility to somehow procure form 16A to secure benefit of the provision of section 205.”

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Intimation u/s. 143 — Procedure — Corrections to returns must be intimated to assessee — Reply by assessee must be considered.

76. Northern Arc Investment Managers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. DIT

[2025] 472 ITR 154 (Mad)

Date of order: 10th November, 2023

S. 143 of ITA 1961

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Intimation u/s. 143 — Procedure — Corrections to returns must be intimated to assessee — Reply by assessee must be considered.

A writ petition was filed to direct either the first respondent or the second respondent to permit the petitioner to file their rectification petition to rectify the mistake of double disallowance in the intimation dated July 29, 2023 and also to process the refunds.

The Madras High Court Held as under:

“i) A reading of section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 makes it clear that if there are any corrections, errors, addition or reduction in the return of the assessee, the Department has to intimate it to the assessee. Thereafter, as per the provisions of the Act, the Department is supposed to consider the reply and make suitable modifications in the Income-tax return as requested by the assessee.

ii) The Assessing Officer had not considered the reply filed by the assessee and issued the intimation. The Faceless Assessment Officer has to consider the reply and proceed with the assessee’s case based both on the original returns filed by the assessee and the modified returns after considering the reply of the assessee.”

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

18. HDFC Bank Ltd. vs. State of Bihar &Ors.

(2024) 468 ITR 650 (SC)

Prosecution — Order dated 5th October, 2021 u/s. 132(3) of the IT Act was served upon the Branch Manager of the bank directing the said branch of the bank to stop the operation of any bank lockers, bank — Subsequently, by an order dated 1st November, 2021, the Branch Manager of the said bank was directed to revoke the restraint put on the bank accounts — On 9th November, 2021, the concerned branch of the bank allowed Smt. SunitaKhemka (one of the searched person) to operate her bank locker bearing No. 462 on misinterpretation of the order dated 1st November, 2021 — FIR was registered against Smt. SunitaKhemka and the staff of the bank for the offences punishable u/s. 34, 37, 120B, 201, 207, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the IPC for breach of the order dated 5th October, 2021 — Held — FIR did not show that the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception — Bank being a juristic person, question of mens rea does not arise — There was nothing to show that the bank or its staff members had dishonestly induced someone deceived to deliver any property to any person, and that the mens rea existed at the time of such inducement — As such, the ingredients to attract the offence u/s. 420 IPC would not be available — There was not even an allegation of entrustment of the property which the bank has misappropriated or converted for its own use to the detriment of the Income-tax Officer — As such, the provisions of sections 406 and 409 IPC would also not be applicable — Since there was no entrustment of any property with the bank, the ingredients of section 462 IPC were also not applicable — Likewise, since the offences u/s. 206, 217 and 201 of the IPC requires mens rea, the ingredients of the said sections also would not be available against the bank — FIR/complaint also did not show that the bank and its officers acted with any common intention or intentionally co-operated in the commission of any alleged offences — As such, the provisions of sections 34, 37 and 120B of the IPC would also not be applicable — Thus, continuation of the criminal proceedings against the bank would cause undue hardship to the bank — Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and the FIR were quashed and set aside.

In October, 2021, Smt. Priyanka Sharma, Dy. Director of IT (Inv.), Unit-2 (2), (being Respondent No. 5 in the proceedings before the Supreme Court), conducted a search and seizure operation in the case of several income-tax assessees including Shri Sunil Khemka (HUF), Smt. SunitaKhemka and Smt. ShivaniKhemka at the third floor of Khataruka Niwas, South Gandhi Maidan, Patna. The said search and seizure operation was conducted based on warrants of authorisation issued u/s. 132(1) of the IT Act, 1961 (IT Act’ for short). During the search, it was found that Smt. SunitaKhemka held a bank locker bearing No. 462 in the Bank (appellant-bank before the Supreme Court) at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna.

On the basis of the said operation, on 5th October, 2021, an order u/s. 132(3) of the IT Act was served upon the Branch Manager of the appellant-bank at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna by the concerned Authorised Officer. The order directed the said branch of the appellant-bank to stop the operation of any bank lockers, bank accounts and fixed deposits standing in the names of Shri Sunil Khemka (HUF), Smt. SunitaKhemka and Smt. ShivaniKhemka, among several other individuals and entities, with immediate effect. It was further clarified that contravention of the order would render the Branch Manager liable u/s. 275A of the IT Act and the same would result in penal action.

In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant-bank stopped the operation of the bank accounts, bank lockers and fixed deposits of the individuals/entities mentioned in the order. Further, on 7th October, 2021, the appellant-bank blocked the bank accounts of the income-tax assesses named in the order and also sealed the bank locker bearing No. 462 belonging to Smt. SunitaKhemka.

Subsequently, on 1st November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued an order to the Branch Manager of the appellant bank at its aforementioned branch thereby directing the appellant-bank to revoke the restraint put on the bank accounts of Smt. SunitaKhemka and three other persons, in view of the restraining order dated 5th October, 2021 passed under s. 132(3) of the IT Act. Accordingly, the said persons, including Smt. SunitaKhemka, were to be allowed to operate their bank accounts. The said order was received by the concerned Branch Manager of the appellant bank of 8th November, 2021 at 4:00 p.m. However, on 2nd November, 2021 at 11:24 a.m., an email was sent to the Branch Manager which contained the same order.

Thereafter, on 9th November, 2021, the concerned branch of the appellant-bank allowed Smt. SunitaKhemka to operate her bank locker bearing No. 462 and proper entries recording the operation of the said locker were made in the bank’s records.

Subsequently, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 conducted a search and seizure operation at the bank locker in the concerned branch of the appellant-bank, wherein it was found that Smt. SunitaKhemka had operated her bank locker with the assistance of the concerned officers of the appellant bank. This was validated by the entry made in the bank’s records and the CCTV footage of the bank. Resultantly, the concerned officials of the aforementioned branch of the appellant-bank were found to have breached the restraining order dated 5th October, 2021.

Accordingly, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued summons u/s. 131(1A) of the IT Act to Abha Sinha-Branch Manager, Abhishek Kumar-Branch Operation Manager and Deepak Kumar-Teller Authoriser being the concerned officials of the appellant-bank at its aforementioned branch.

The aforementioned officials attended the office of Respondent No. 5 and their statements were recorded wherein Abha Sinha and Abhishek Kumar stated that there had been an inadvertent error on the part of the bank officials and they had misinterpreted the order dt. 1st November, 2021. Since the said order pertained to the bank accounts of the concerned individuals including Smt. SunitaKhemka, the bank officials had misread the order to understand / assume that the revocation of the restraint extended to the bank lockers as well. Having misunderstood the order, the bank officials under a bona fide assumption that bank locker had been released as well, allowed Smt. SunitaKhemka to operate the same.

The statement of Smt. SunitaKhemka had also been recorded wherein she stated that her accountant Surendra Prasad, after speaking with Deepak Kumar, had informed her that the restraint on the aforementioned bank locker had been revoked and she could operate the said locker. This was specifically denied by Deepak Kumar in his statement.

Dissatisfied with the said explanations, Respondent No. 5 submitted a written complaint to the SHO, Gandhi Maidan Police Station seeking to register an FIR against Smt. SunitaKhemka and the concerned bank officials on the ground that the order dt. 5th October, 2021 had been violated owing to the unlawful operation of the aforementioned locker.

On the basis of the said complaint, on 22nd November, 2021, an FIR being Case No. 549 of 2021 came to be registered against Smt. SunitaKhemka and the staff of the appellant-bank at its aforementioned branch for the offences punishable under ss. 34, 37, 120B, 201, 207, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the IPC at the Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna.

Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the appellant-bank preferred a Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case thereby invoking the inherent power of the High Court u/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’) for the quashing of the FIR. The High Court vide the impugned order dismissed the writ petition finding it to be devoid of merit.

Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-bank filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that for bringing out the offence under the ambit of section 420 IPC, the FIR must disclose the following ingredients: (a) That the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception; (b) That the said inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; and (c) That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement.

According to the Supreme Court, the appellant-bank being a juristic person the question of mens rea could not arise. However, even reading the FIR and the complaint at their face value, there was nothing to show that the appellant-bank or its staff members had dishonestly induced someone, deceived to deliver any property to any person, and that the mens rea existed at the time of such inducement. As such, the ingredients to attract the offence under s. 420 IPC would not be available.

The Supreme Court further observed that insofar as the provisions of section 409 IPC is concerned, the following ingredients will have to be made out: (a) That there has been any entrustment with the property, or with any dominion over property on a person in the capacity of a public servant or banker, etc.; (b) That the said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property.

For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have to be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated it, or converted it to his own use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property.

According to the Supreme Court, in the present case, there was not even an allegation of entrustment of the property which the appellant-bank had misappropriated or converted for its own use to the detriment of the respondent No. 5. As such, the provisions of section 406 and 409 IPC would also not be applicable.

Since there was no entrustment of any property with the appellant-bank, the ingredients of section 462 IPC were also not applicable. Likewise, since the offences under sections 206, 217 and 201 of the IPC requires mens rea, the ingredients of the said sections also would not be available against the appellant-bank.

Further, according to the Supreme Court, the FIR / complaint also does not show that the appellant bank and its officers acted with any common intention or intentionally cooperated in the commission of any alleged offences. As such, the provisions of ss. 34, 37 and 120B of the IPC would also not be applicable.

According to the Supreme Court the present case would squarely fall within categories (2) and (3) of the law laid down by it in the case of State of Haryana &Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal &Ors. 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.

The Supreme Court referred to its following observations in the case of Bhajan Lal &Ors. (supra):

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers under s. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under s. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of s. 155(2) of the Code; (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under s. 155(2) of the Code; (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; and (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

The Supreme Court was of the view that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant-bank would cause undue hardship to the appellant-bank.

In the result, the Supreme Court passed the following order – (i) The appeal is allowed; (ii) The impugned judgment and order dt. 8th June, 2022 passed by the learned Single Bench of the High Court of judicature at Patna in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1375 of 2021 is quashed and set aside; (iii) The First Information Report being Case No. 549 of 2021 registered at Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna on 22nd November, 2021, against certain officials of the appellant-bank working at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna for the offences punishable under ss. 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is also quashed and set aside qua the appellant-bank.

Merger of Intimation under Section 143(1) With Subsequent Assessment Order under Section 143(3)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

The return of income filed by the assessee first gets processed by the CPC under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), and an intimation is issued to the assessee. While processing the return of income, adjustments may be made to the total income as provided in section 143(1) for the reasons as specifically provided in clause (a) of section 143(1) such as arithmetical error, incorrect claim, etc.

Thereafter, a few of the returns are also selected for regular assessment, popularly referred to as scrutiny assessment, by issue of notice under section 143(2) of the Act. The consequential order of regular assessment is then passed under section 143(3) or 144, as the case may be.

In such cases, where the intimation is issued first and then the regular assessment order is passed, the issue often arises as to whether the intimation issued u/s. 143(1) merges with the subsequent assessment order passed. This issue is relevant mainly from the point of view of maintainability of the appeal filed against the intimation issued u/s. 143(1).

In few of the cases, the tribunals have taken a view that the appeal against the intimation issued u/s. 143(1) becomes infructuous in cases where the assessment order has been passed subsequently u/s. 143(3); and that the additions made in the intimation under section 143(1) can be challenged in the appeal against the order under section 143(3). As against this, in few cases, the tribunals have taken a view that the enhancement to the income arising from the adjustments made in an intimation issued u/s. 143(1) cannot be challenged in the appeal filed against the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3), and ought to have been challenged in an appeal against the intimation under section 143(1).

ARECA TRUST’S CASE

The issue had earlier come up for consideration before the Bangalore bench of the tribunal in the case of Areca Trust vs. CIT (A) – ITA No. 433/Bang/2023 dated 26th July, 2023.

In this case, the assessee trust filed its return of income for assessment year 2018-19 on 28th August, 2018 declaring total income at Nil. The return of income was processed by the AO/CPC under section 143(1) of the Act on 28.02.2020. In the said intimation, an amount of ₹23,29,62,417 was considered as income chargeable to tax @ 10 per cent at special rate under section 115BBDA of the Act. Thereafter, the assessment was selected for scrutiny and notice under section 143(2) of the Act was issued on 23rd September, 2019. The assessment under section 143(3) was completed by assessing the total income at the same amount i.e. ₹23,29,62,420/- as per the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act.

Being aggrieved by the order passed under section 143(3) of the Act, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT (A). Before the CIT (A), it was contended that the assessee earned dividend income of ₹23,29,62,417 on mutual funds registered with SEBI and hence the exemption claimed under section 10(35) r.w.s. 10(23) of the Act was to be granted. Further, it was contended that the income was assessed at 10 per cent as per the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act, whereas in the assessment completed under section 143(3) of the Act, it was treated as business profit and taxed at 30 per cent as against the special rate of 10% under section 115BBDA of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee had filed an appeal against the assessment completed under section 143(3) of the Act, wherein no separate addition was made, but which only incorporated the adjustment made under section 143(1) of the Act. Therefore, it was concluded by the CIT(A) that appeal against the order passed under section 143(3) of the Act was not maintainable, and he did not adjudicate the appeal on merits. However, the CIT(A) directed the AO to dispose of the assessee’s rectification application dated 16.06.2020 against the order passed under section 143(1) of the Act. As regards the rate of tax, the CIT(A) directed the AO to tax the income of ₹23,29,62,420 at 10 per cent as per section 115BBDA of the Act, as was done in the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was partly allowed.

The assessee filed a further appeal to the tribunal and reiterated the submissions which were made before the CIT (A).

The tribunal held that section 246A specifically provided for an appeal against intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act. In the case before it, total income had been assessed at ₹23,29,62,420 as per the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act. Therefore, according to the tribunal, the cause of action of the assessee arose from the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act and appeal ought to have been filed against the same. The assessment completed under section 143(3) of the Act merely adopted the assessed figures in the intimation order passed under section 143(3) of the Act. Therefore, no cause of action arose from the order passed under section 143(3) of the Act. Section 143(4) of the Act only mentioned that on completion of regular assessment under section 143(3) or 144 of the Act, the tax paid by assessee under section 143(1) of the Act shall be deemed to have been paid toward such regular assessment. That by itself did not mean there was a merger of the intimation under section 143(1) with that of regular assessment under section 143(3) / 144 (unless the issue had been discussed and adjudicated in regular assessment under section 143(3) / 144 of the Act).

Accordingly, the tribunal dismissed the appeal of the assessee, with the direction that a liberal approach may be taken for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the intimation under section 143(1) if the same was filed by the assessee, since the assessee’s application for rectification of the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act had been filed within time and was pending for disposal.

A similar view has also been taken by the tribunal in the following cases –

  •  Epiroc Mining India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 50/Pun/2024) dated 14.5.2024
  •  Global Entropolis (Vizag) Private Limited vs. AO, NFAC 2023 (8) TMI 81 – ITAT Chennai
  •  Orient Craft Ltd. vs. DCIT (2024) 158 taxmann.com 1124 (Delhi – Trib.)

SOUTH INDIA CLUB’S CASE

Recently, the issue had come up for consideration of the Delhi bench of the tribunalin the case of South India Club vs. Income-tax Officer [2024] 163 taxmann.com 479 (Delhi – Trib)[22-05-2024].

In this case, the assessee society had filed its return of income for assessment year 2018-19 on 30th March, 2019, wherein it had claimed application of income for charitable purposes of ₹6,01,35,500. The return was processed u/s 143(1)(a) of the Act, wherein the exemption claimed u/s. 11 was disallowed on the ground that the total income of the trust, without giving effect to the provisions of section 11 and 12, exceeded the maximum amount which was not chargeable to tax and, therefore, the audit report in Form 10B was required to be submitted along with the return of income. Since, the assessee had not filed its audit report in Form 10B electronically along with or before filing the return of income, exemption u/s 11 was not allowed. Aggrieved with the above order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT (A).

Before the CIT (A), the assessee submitted as under –

  •  The application for registration under Section 12A was submitted on 27th March, 2019. While this application was pending, the assessee filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2018-19 on 30th March, 2019 claiming the exemption u/s. 11.
  • The intimation u/s.143(1) dated 10th November, .2019 was issued by the DCIT, CPC, wherein the exemption claimed u/s. 11 was denied as Form No. 10B was not e-filed in time.
  • The application for registration under Section 12A was rejected by CIT(E) vide his order dated 30th September, 2019. The order of the CIT(E) was appealed and the assessee received a favourable decision of Hon’ble ITAT dated 13th August, 2020 allowing its appeal and directing the CIT (Exemption) to grant registration u/s 12AA.
  • Consequent to the ITAT’s order, the CIT (Exemptions) granted registration by order dated 5th January, 2021.
  •  It was due to the reason that the registration was not granted on the date when the return of income was filed for the year under consideration, that the assessee could not submit the audit report in Form No. 10B.
  • When the CIT (Exemptions) granted registration on 05.01.2021 the income tax scrutiny assessment for the assessment year 2018-19 was pending which was completed on 8th February, 2021 denying the exemption claimed u/s. 11. The appeal was filed before the CIT (A), NFAC and the same was yet pending.
  • On the basis of the above, the assessee pleaded that when the CIT (Exemptions) granted registration to it w.e.f. Assessment year 2019-20 in accordance with sub-section 2 of Section 12A, on the basis of the application filed in March 2019, automatically the second proviso to that sub section had become applicable, granting the benefit of exemption under section 11 and 12 for pending assessments of earlier assessment years, subject only to the condition that there has been no change in objects and activities in the intervening period.
  • Since there was no change in the objects and activities of the appellant during the financial year concerned, the assessee claimed that the benefit of exemption u/s. 11 and 12 was required to be granted, and the second proviso did not prescribe any other pre-condition to become eligible for the exemption.
  • The assessee also took an alternative plea of non-taxability of the amount received during the year on the basis of the principle of mutuality.

The CIT (A) took the view that the intimation issued u/s. 143(1) merged with the subsequent order passed u/s. 143(3) and, therefore, the appeal on this issue had become infructuous. In addition to this, the CIT (A) also held that the filing of Form 10B before the filing of return was compulsory to grant exemption u/s 11 even in a case where the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) was considered. On that basis, the CIT (A) held that the exemption could not be granted even in an appeal against the order passed u/s. 143(3) without there being any application for condonation of delay by the assessee in respect of filing of Form 10B.Against this order of the CIT (A), the assessee filed an appeal before the tribunal.
Before the tribunal, apart from contending that the exemption u/s. 11 ought to have been granted to it in view of the Second Proviso to Section 12A, the assessee also submitted that once an assessment was selected for scrutiny; notice u/s 143(2) had been issued and an order had been passed u/s 143(3), the intimation u/s 143(1) merged into the assessment order and lost its standalone existence. On this basis, it was contended that intimation u/s. 143(1) and consequential demand should be quashed. The assessee relied upon the following decisions in support of this contention —

  •  ACIT vs. GPT-Bhartia JV (I.T.A No. 13/Gty/ 2022 dated 9th June, 2023)
  •  Dura Roof Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (I.T.A No. 49/Gty/ 2022 dated 14th June, 2023)
  •  M P Madhyam vs. DCIT (I.T.A No. 424 & 426/Ind/2022 dated 30th August, 2023)

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that there was no decision of the jurisdictional High Court available with respect to the point that upon issuing of notice u/s 143(2) of the Act, passing of the order u/s 143(1) of the Act was impermissible. Further, regarding the issue of pending assessment at the time of granting of registration, it was agreed that the assessment was pending at the time of grant of registration. However, it was submitted that whether other conditions for claiming deductions u/s 11 were fulfilled or not, had to be verified.

The Delhi bench of the tribunal held that the validity of the intimation issued u/s 143(1) was limited to mere intimation of correctness and accuracy of the income declared in ROI and its accuracy based on the information submitted along with the ROI. It did not carry the legitimacy of an assessment. When the return of income was assessed under the regular assessment, then it lost its individuality and merged with the regular assessment. The tribunal concurred with the view of the CIT (A) that the intimation u/s 143(1) merged with the order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act and the appeal against the said intimation became infructuous. However, it was further held that the CIT (A) should have stopped with the above findings and should not have proceeded to decide the issue on merits, because it was brought to his knowledge that the assessee had filed an appeal against the regular assessment order. Therefore, he had travelled beyond his mandate. The issue of allowability of section 11 was already considered in the regular assessment and that issue was already in appeal before another appellate authority. Therefore, reviewing the same by the CIT(A) in an appeal against the intimation u/s. 143(1), which had become infructuous, was uncalled for. With respect to the applicability of the Second Proviso to Section 12A, the tribunal held that this issue has to be raised before the FAA in the appeal against regular assessment passed u/s 143(3).

Accordingly, it was held that the intimation passed u/s 143(1) had merged with the regular assessment passed u/s 143(3), and it did not have legs to stand on its own, once the regular assessment proceedings were initiated.
A similar view has also been taken by the tribunal in the following cases –

  •  National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. vs. DCIT (ITA No. 732/Mum/2023)
  • Lokhandwala Foundation vs. ITO (ITA No. 1702/Mum/2020)

OBSERVATIONS

The issue under consideration is whether, in a case where the regular assessment has been made, the intimation issued under section 143(1) still survives, or it loses its existence and merges with the assessment order passed after the issue of intimation.

There is no express provision under the Act providing for such merger of the intimation issued under section 143(1) with the assessment order passed subsequently either under section 143(3) or under section 144. However, there are several provisions under the Act which need to be considered for the purpose of deciding the issue under consideration, which are discussed below:

  •  Firstly, the processing of the return and issuing intimation under section 143(1) is not expressly prohibited in a case where the notice has already been issued under section 143(2) selecting the return for the purpose of scrutiny assessment. In fact, in sub-section (1D), as it stood prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 2017, it was provided that the processing of a return shall not be necessary, where a notice has been issued to the assessee under sub-section (2). However, by virtue of the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2017, the provisions of sub-section (1D) have been made inapplicable to the returns pertaining to AY 2017-18 and thereafter. Therefore, the Act provides for both i.e. processing of the return of income as well as making the assessment, if that is required in a particular case. Had it been intended that the intimation issued under section 143(1) should get merged with the assessment order passed subsequently, then the law would not have provided for processing of the return of income at all in a case where the case had already been selected for the scrutiny assessment and that too on a mandatory basis.
  •  Section 246 and section 246A provide for the list of orders against which the appeal can be filed by the assessee. Here, both the orders i.e. the intimation issued u/s. 143(1) and the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) or 144 have been listed separately. Therefore, it is clear that an appeal can be filed before the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or Commissioner (Appeals) against both; intimation as well as the assessment order. For filing the appeal against the intimation issued u/s. 143(1), section 246A does not differentiate between cases where the assessment order has been passed subsequently or not. Therefore, technically, the provisions permit filing of the appeal against the intimation issued under section 143(1), even in a case where the appeal has already been filed against the assessment order, if the delay in filing that appeal is condonable.
  •  An intimation under section 143(1) may not have been appealable at a time when no adjustments were permitted under section 143(1)(a). Now that such adjustments are permitted, the right of appeal has been restored, which indicates that such adjustments have to be agitated separately in appeal.
  •  There is no provision in the law for merger of the two appeals, if two appeals are filed separately against the intimation under section 143(1) and against the assessment order under section 143(3). Both appeals have to be adjudicated separately. Withdrawal of any one of the appeals is possible only with the permission of the Commissioner (Appeals).
  •  In civil law, the doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine that is rooted in the idea of maintenance of the decorum of the hierarchy of courts and tribunals. The doctrine is based on the simple reasoning that there cannot be, at the same time, more than one operative order governing the same subject matter. As stated by the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, “Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law”. However, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Supreme Court in State of Madras vs. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd.(1967) 1 SCR 732, “… doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior tribunal and the other by a superior tribunal, passed in an appeal on revision, there is a fusion of merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute. In our opinion, the application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisionaljurisdiction.”In this case, both the appeals are before the same level of appellate authority, and in the absence of any specific provision, the doctrine of merger of appeals should not apply.
  •  Further, the adjustments made to the returned income while processing the return under section 143(1) and the additions or disallowances made while passing the assessment order are treated differently in so far as the levy of penalty under section 270A is concerned. The former is not considered to be under-reporting of income by the assessee, whereas the latter is considered to be under-reporting of income. Therefore, the enhancement made to the total income of the assessee by way of adjustments as permissible under section 143(1) does not lead to levy of penalty under section 270A. However, the enhancement made to the total income of the assessee by virtue of the assessment order might result in levy of a penalty under section 270A, if other relevant conditions are satisfied. Section 270A(2)(a) provides that a case where the income assessed is greater than the income determined in the return processed under section 143(1)(a) is to be regarded as under-reporting. If a view is to be taken that the intimation issued under section 143(1) gets merged with the assessment order and it loses its existence, then the provisions of section 270A(2)(a)may become redundant.
  •  Also, the intimation issued under section 143(1) is deemed to be a notice of demand under section 156 in a case where any sum is determined to be payable by the assessee under that intimation. Therefore, the assessee is required to make the payment of the said demand within a period of thirty days as provided in section 220. In case if such demand has not been paid within a period of thirty days, then the consequences as provided under the Act like levy of interest under section 220(2) or levy of penalty under section 221 etc. would follow. If a view is to be taken that the intimation issued under section 143(1) gets merged with the assessment order and loses its existence, then it might be possible to also argue that the assessee will not be liable for any consequences that would have otherwise arisen for non-payment of the demand raised in the intimation within a period of thirty days.

Considering the above, it appears that the better view is that the intimation issued under section 143(1) will not lose its existence, even in a case where the assessment order has been passed subsequently. It is only the demand raised vide that intimation, if it has remained outstanding, which will get merged with the demand raised consequent to the passing of the assessment order, wherein the tax liability will be recomputed based on the income assessed finally. Therefore, appeals filed against intimations under section 143(1)(a) would have to be decided independent of the appeals against assessment orders under section 143(1)(a).

It is therefore advisable to file an appeal against adjustments under section 143(1)(a), which according to the assessee are not tenable, and such appeal should be filed independent of whether assessment proceedings under section 143(2) are initiated or not. Such adjustments need not again be the subject matter of the appeal against the assessment order under section 143(3) though retained in that assessment. Of course, as a matter of abundant precaution, till such time as the CBDT does not clarify its views on this matter, the assessee may still choose to take up such matters in the appeal, particularly if the issue has been discussed and has been examined during the assessment proceedings

Article 11 of India-China DTAA — Interest received by China Development Bank qualified for exemption under Article 11(3) since, in fact, it was a financial institution owned by the Government of China.

11 [2024] 165 taxmann.com 603 (Delhi – Trib.)

Income Tax Officer vs. Tata Teleservice Ltd

ITA No: 1393 (Delhi) of 2023

A.Y.: 2016-17

Dated: 21st August, 2024

Article 11 of India-China DTAA — Interest received by China Development Bank qualified for exemption under Article 11(3) since, in fact, it was a financial institution owned by the Government of China.

FACTS

For FY 2015-16, the assessee had made interest payments to M/s. China Development Bank (‘CDB’), a tax resident of China without deducting taxes under Section 195. As per the assessee, CDB was wholly controlled by the Government of China. Therefore, in terms of source rule exemption as provided in Article 11(3) of India-China DTAA, the interest received by CDB was not taxable in India.

While the appeal related to AY 2016-17, in 2018, India and China subsequently executed a Protocol to DTAA, and the amended Protocol explicitly mentioned that ‘CDB’ was a qualified entity for Article 11(3).

According to the TDS officer, CDB was not eligible for exemption since the Government of China held only a 36.45 per cent stake in CDB. Therefore, he treated the assessee as an ‘assessee in default’ for not deducting taxes on interest payments. The officer did not grant an exemption since the protocol amendment entered into effect only on 17th July, 2019. The CIT(A) held that CDB qualified for the benefit of exemption.

Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the Department appealed to ITAT.

HELD

  •  The Ministry of Finance of China directly held 36.45 per cent stake in CDB. Four other entities, which were controlled by other state-owned entities or limited liability companies or funds established under the law of the People’s Republic of China held the remaining stake in CDB.
  •  Audited financial statements of CDB clearly showed that entities that owned CDB were funded either by the Administration of Foreign Exchange or the State Council of China.
  •  The erstwhile Article 11(3) provided the benefit to financial institutions wholly owned by the Government of China, and such provision was expansive in nature.
  •  The newly inserted Article 11(3) vide Notification No.S.O.2562(E)(No.54/2019/F.No.503/02/2008-FTD-II dated 17th July, 2019) provides similar benefit to financial institutions.
  •  Further, the protocol amended vide notification dated 17th July, 2019 specifically included CDB in the list of financial institutions eligible for benefit under Article 11(3).
  •  Under the existing and amended Article 11(3), CDB was a financial institution wholly owned by the Chinese Government and, therefore, it was entitled to the benefit of exemption. Hence, the Assessee could not be treated as ‘assessee in default’.

Article 12 of India-US DTAA — Sincereceipts for providing access to online courses and conduct of examinations did not satisfy ‘make available’ condition, it was not taxable as fees for included services.

10 [2024] 165 taxmann.com 683 (Delhi – Trib.)

Coursera Inc vs. ACIT (International Taxation)

ITA No: 2416 & 3646 (Delhi) of 2023

A.Y.: 2020-21 & 2021-22

Dated: 21st August, 2024

Article 12 of India-US DTAA — Sincereceipts for providing access to online courses and conduct of examinations did not satisfy ‘make available’ condition, it was not taxable as fees for included services.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of the USA, provided access to online courses and degrees offered by educational institutions and universities through its global online learning platform. The Assessee earned fees for enabling Indian institutions to access its platform. According to the assessee, in terms of Article 12 of India-USA DTAA, such fees were not taxable in India, either as royalties or fees for included services (‘FIS’).

According to the AO, the receipts were in nature of FIS under Article 12(4) due to the following assertions:

  • The services rendered were not confined to ‘content service’ but included a range of user-specific services that involved significant human intervention.
  • Training element was involved in navigating the features of the platform.
  • Since the assessee was not an education institution, the exception made in Article 12(5) was not applicable.

DRP directed the AO to verify the specific agreement and pass a speaking order. In his order passed pursuant to directions of DRP, the AO treated the receipts as FIS.

Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

  •  The educational institutions create the courses and conduct examinations, not the Assessee. The competition certificate issued by the university bears the logo of the Assessee.
  •  The Assessee only provides access to the content created by the universities and does not create any content on their own. Upon payment of fees, the users access the content/study materials through the Assessee’s online platform. The Assessee acts as a facilitator between the universities and users. Hence, the Assessee was an aggregation service provider. The Assessee does not render any technical services while providing users with access.
  •  The AO brought no evidence on record to prove that the Assessee rendered technical services. Even assuming that services are technical in nature, the same could not be regarded as FIS unless the ‘make available’ condition was satisfied. Mere customisation of the webpage does not regard the service as technical. The burden was on the revenue to prove that the assessee had transferred technical knowledge, know-how, or skill as envisaged under Article 12(4).
  •  Relying on the rulings in the case of Elsevier Information Systems GmbH vs. Dy. CIT (IT) [2019] 106 taxmann.com 401 (Mumbai) andRelx Inc. ACIT [2023] 149 taxmann.com 78 (Delhi – Trib.), the ITAT held that receipts towards granting of access to data / information through the platform are towards ‘copyrighted article’. Hence, the same cannot be regarded as royalty.
  •  Further, providing access to data to users of the database does not involve any human intervention and, hence, cannot be regarded as fees for technical services as held by the Supreme Court in Bharati Cellular Ltd 330 ITR 239.

S. 17(3) — Voluntary severance compensation received by an employee for loss of employment could be regarded as capital receipt not subject to tax as profits in lieu of salary under section 17(3).

66 (2024) 168 taxmann.com 369(Ahd. Trib)

Sudhakar Ratan Shanker Gautam vs. ITO

ITA No.: 1033(Ahd) of 2024

A.Y.: 2018-19

Dated: 3rd October, 2024

S. 17(3) — Voluntary severance compensation received by an employee for loss of employment could be regarded as capital receipt not subject to tax as profits in lieu of salary under section 17(3).

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, was employed with “Y” which was subsequently acquired by “E”. Following this acquisition, the assessee’s employment was terminated on 26th October, 2017 on account of redundancy, and he received a severance compensation of ₹15,50,905. This amount was claimed as a capital receipt not chargeable to tax in the return of income filed for AY 2018-19 on 31st August, 2018.

The AO treated this amount as “profits in lieu of salary” under section 17(3) and added it to the total income of the assessee. On appeal, CIT(A) observed that since the compensation received by the assessee was related to the termination of employment, it should be treated as “profits in lieu of salary” under section 17(3)(i), thereby confirming the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that–

(a) Gujarat High Court [in Arunbhai R. Naik vs. ITO, (2015) 64 taxmann.com 216 (Guj)] and various ITAT decisions have consistently held that voluntary severance payments made without contractual obligation are capital receipts and not subject to tax as profits in lieu of salary.

(b) The severance payment received by the assessee was paid for the loss of employment and not for past services. It is consistently held that payments, when not tied to services rendered, are capital in nature and not taxable as salary income. Since the employer had no obligation to pay further amounts upon termination, the compensation should be deemed a capital receipt and thus not taxable under Section 17(3).

(c) Under section 17(3), “profits in lieu of salary” is a key provision that seeks to tax certain payments received by an employee in connection with the termination of employment. On the other hand, capital receipts, especially in the context of employment, typically relate to compensation for the loss of a source of income and are generally not taxable, unless specified. This distinction is critical in determining whether a severance payment or other termination-related compensation is subject to tax as salary income or can be treated as a non-taxable capital receipt.

(d) Section 56(2)(xi), w.e.f. 1st April, 2019, deals with compensation received or receivable in connection with the termination or modification of terms of employment contracts. However, this amendment applies to assessment years starting from AY 2019-20 onwards and not to the case in question.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that severance compensation received by the assessee was a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax under section 17(3).

Where the assessee was not only for the benefit of its members but also for benefit of insurance consumers from the general public, it was regarded as engaged in charitable activity in the nature of advancement of object of general public utility and therefore, principle of mutuality could not be applied. Where participation in the annual meet of the assessee was free of cost, it was not a case of rendering of any service for a fee and therefore, proviso to section 2(15) did not apply.

65 Insurance Brokers Association of India vs. ITO

ITA No. 3955 & 3958 / Mum / 2024

A.Ys.: 2016-17 & 2018-19

Date of Order: 13th November, 2024

Section 2(15), principle of mutuality

Where the assessee was not only for the benefit of its members but also for benefit of insurance consumers from the general public, it was regarded as engaged in charitable activity in the nature of advancement of object of general public utility and therefore, principle of mutuality could not be applied.

Where participation in the annual meet of the assessee was free of cost, it was not a case of rendering of any service for a fee and therefore, proviso to section 2(15) did not apply.

FACTS

The assessee was a company registered under section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 in 2001 and was registered as a charitable organization under section 12A of the Act. For AY 2016-17 and 2018-19, the assessee filed its return of income claiming exemption under section 11 of the Act.

For AY 2016-17 and AY 2018-19, the case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny. Relying on Circular No. 11/2008 dated 19th December, 2008, the AO held that the assessee cannot claim exemption under section 11 of the Act since 1st proviso to section 2(15) of the Act was applicable and also held that the principle of mutuality was applicable in assessee’s case and brought to tax the interest income and other income.

CIT(A) confirmed the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

On the question of applying the principle of mutuality, the Tribunal observed that-

(a) It was not in dispute that the assessee was a charitable organisation since it was registered under section 12A of the Act and that the tax department till now had not held the assessee to be otherwise.

(b) A perusal of the financial statements of the assessee showed that the income consisted of subscription fee from members, sponsorship fees for annual event, and bank interest. Further, a perusal of the brochure of the annual event showed that the event was held for the benefit of insurance consumers and brokers and that the events were conducted without collecting any fees.

(c) The assessee was not only for the benefit of members but was also for the benefit of insurance consumers from general public and therefore, the assessee could be regarded as engaged in charitable activity in the nature of advancement of object of general public utility.

Therefore, the Tribunal held that the principle of mutuality was not applicable in the assessee’s case.

On the question of the applicability of proviso to section 2(15), the Tribunal observed that the income of the assessee did not contain any revenue from any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business. Further, the participation in the annual meet for which the sponsorship fees was received was free of cost and therefore, it could not be held to be a service for a fee for rendering services. Relying on observations of the Supreme Court in ACIT vs. Ahmadabad Urban Development Authority, (2022) 143 taxmann.com 278 (SC), the Tribunal held that the AO was not correct in denying the benefit of section 11 by invoking proviso to section 2(15).

Accordingly, the appeals of the assessee were allowed.

Ss. 12AB, 2(15) – Where the objects and activities of the trust showed that its charitable activities were for the general public at large and not only for the alumni and faculty of the university, it was entitled to registration under section 12AB.

64 (2024) 168 taxmann.com 526 (AhdTrib)

Indus Alumni Association vs. CIT(E)

ITA No.: 916 (Ahd) of 2024

A.Y.: N.A.

Dated: 4th November, 2024

Ss. 12AB, 2(15) – Where the objects and activities of the trust showed that its charitable activities were for the general public at large and not only for the alumni and faculty of the university, it was entitled to registration under section 12AB.

FACTS

The assessee was a trust registered under Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950. The main objects of the trust were educational, medical relief and charitable in nature. It was created for the benefit and advancement of the whole mankind of the society without discrimination of caste, creed, sex and religion of any person.

The assessee obtained provisional approval for registration under section 12AB in 2022 and thereafter, applied for final registration under section 12AB by filing Form 10AB on 23rd September, 2023.

After considering the details filed by the assessee, CIT(E) held that the objects of the trust were for the benefit / welfare / interest of the members of the association only, namely alumni and faculty members of Indus University and not for the benefit of the public at large. Accordingly, the trust does not fall within the ambit of charitable purposes as defined under section 2(15) and is not eligible for registration under section 12AB.

Aggrieved with the order of CIT(E), the trust filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that-

(a) Looking into the objects of the trust, it cannot be held that the assessee had been formed only for the benefit of a particular set of public, namely alumni and faculty members of the University.

(b) Perusal of the activities carried out by the trust, namely — food donation, blood donation, women empowerment, English learning, awareness of ecological concept, new library for the under privileged school children in a village clearly demonstrate that the trust was not doing charitable activities only for the alumni members of the University but for the general public at large.

(c) In any case, this aspect should be considered at the time of grant of exemption under section 11 and the provisions of section 13 should not be invoked at time of grant of registration under section 12AB.

The Tribunal also observed that this view was supported by decision of co-ordinate bench in Parul University Alumni Association vs. CIT(E),(2024) 162 taxmann.com 98 (AhdTrib).

Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed and the impugned order was set aside with a direction to CIT(E) to grant final registration under section 12AB to the assessee-trust.

Annual value of vacant flats held as stock-in-trade is not chargeable as `Income from House Property’.

63 Palm Grove Beach Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA No. 3858/Mum./2024

A.Y. : 2017-18

Date of Order : 11th October, 2024

Sections: 22, 23

Annual value of vacant flats held as stock-in-trade is not chargeable as `Income from House Property’.

FACTS

The assessee, engaged in the business of development of housing complexes, industrial parks and running five star hotels at Kodaikanal, e-filed the return of income for A.Y. 2017-18, declaring total income to be a loss of ₹1,22,20,66,420/-. While assessing the total income of the assessee under section 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) inter alia taxed deemed annual letting value of finished property held in stock.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before learned CIT(A), who partly allowed the assessee’s appeal by reducing the estimated annual value to 2.5 per cent as against 8.5 per cent determined by the AO in the assessment order.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal, at the outset, observed that the main point for consideration is as to whether the flats held by the assessee as stock-in-trade, be treated as income from house property. The Tribunal noted that the issue is no more res integra and that in this connection the observations made by the Bombay High Court in the case of PCIT, Central 1 vs. Classique Associates Ltd (order dated 28th January, 2019) are important. The Tribunal considered the observations of the court in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the order of the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court has, in its decision, considered the ratio of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Neha Builders (296 ITR 661) and of the Apex Court in Chennai Properties and Investments Ltd. vs. CIT (377 ITR 673). The Tribunal having reproduced the observations of the Bombay High Court found it futile to reproduce the observations of the Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court. It also observed that the co-ordinate bench in the assessee’s own case by common order dated 1st July, 2021 passed in ITA NO. 1973/MUM/2019 and 1974/MUM/2019 for A.Y. 2014-15 and 2015-16 respectively.

The allotment letter issued by developer is to be construed as an ‘agreement’ for the purpose of section 56(2)(vii)(b). Consequently, benefit of proviso to section 56(2)(vii)(b) will be available and valuation of the property as on the date of allotment letter will need to be considered and not the valuation as on the date of conveyance.

62 Tamojit Das vs. ITO

ITA No. 1200/Kol./2024

A.Y.: 2015-16

Date of Order: 3rd October, 2024

Sections :56(2)(vii)(b)

The allotment letter issued by developer is to be construed as an ‘agreement’ for the purpose of section 56(2)(vii)(b). Consequently, benefit of proviso to section 56(2)(vii)(b) will be available and valuation of the property as on the date of allotment letter will need to be considered and not the valuation as on the date of conveyance.

FACTS

In the course of assessment proceedings, for AY 2015-16, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee has purchased a residential flat jointly with his wife Smt. Gargi Das through Deed of Conveyance, which was registered on 28th October, 2014 before District Sub-Registrar-II, South 24-Parganas. The value of the said transaction was declared by the assessee at ₹24,05,715/- as against stamp duty valuation of ₹38,74,500/-.

When assessee was confronted with, then the assessee submitted that he has booked this flat with Greenfield City Project LLP and first payment was made on 08.06.2010. In support of his contention, he filed (i) copy of receipt from Greenfield City Project LLP, (ii) letter of allotment by Greenfield City Project LLP dated 10.06.2010 and (iii) copy of typical floor plan purported to be allotment of flat to the assessee.

The AO did not equate the allotment letter and payment of the installment by the assessee through account payee cheque as an agreement contemplated in proviso appended to sub-Clause (2) of section 56(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He made the addition of the difference between the transaction value and the stamp duty value i.e. ₹14,68,785/- as a deemed gift within the meaning of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an application under section 154 wherein he emphasised that the letter given by the developer demonstrating the booking of the flat amounts to an agreement. The AO rejected the application.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the dispute is whether the allotment letter by the developer is to be construed as an agreement or not. The Tribunal perused the copy of the allotment letter. It also noted that the payments of amounts starting from 1st June, 2010 have been made through account payee cheques and that part payment has been made before issuance of the allotment letter.

The Tribunal held the interpretation by both the lower authorities to be incorrect. It held that the allotment letter is be equated to an agreement to sale. The agreement is not required to be a registered document. The only requirement in the law is that agreement should be followed by payments through banking channel, so that its veracity cannot be doubted. It observed that in the present case, the assessee has established the genuineness of the allotment letter by showing that payments were made through account payee cheques. Therefore, the valuation date for the purpose of any deemed gift is the date when first payment was made, in this case it happened around June, 2010. It held that the AO has erred in taking the valuation of the property as on 28th October, 2014.

Section 148 — Reassessment — On deceased person — Not permissible

23 Mary Gene Gracious vs. ITO Ward 20(1)(1), Mumbai
[WP(L) 3460 OF 2024
Dated: 10th December, 2024, (Bom-HC)

Section 148 — Reassessment — On deceased person — Not permissible

The Petitioner challenged the action as resorted by the respondents against Mr. Gene Gracious, the husband of the petitioner by issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 29th July, 2022, which was preceded by a notice issued under Section 148A(b) dated 26th May, 2022, and an order passed thereon under Section 148A(d) dated 29thJuly, 2022.

The case of the petitioner is that the impugned notice under Section 148 and the action prior thereto as initiated by respondent no.1 are non-est and illegal in as much as Mr. Gene Gracious against whom these notices were issued, passed away on 09 November 2016. A Death Certificate issued by Department of Health, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.

The Petitioner relying on various decisions contended that the petition is required to be granted as respondent no. 1 could not have resorted to impugned action by issuance of notices underSection 148A(b) and 148, and passing an order under Section 148A(d), against a deceased person.

The Court observed that the Supreme Court has held it to be the first principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or interests are being affected should be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself (UMC Technologies Private Limited vs. Food Corporation of India &Anr., Civil Appeal No. 3687 of 2020, decided on 16th November, 2020). This basic jurisprudential principle becomes applicable when any action of such nature was being initiated against Mr. Gene Gracious. Once Mr. Gene Gracious passed away, there was no question of his defending such action or being heard so as to accord any sanctity to such order, and the consequential notice under Section 148 of the Act. The entire action under clause (b) and clause (d) of Section 148A of the Act were of no consequence being non-est. In this situation, even the legal heirs cannot be bound by such order which is non-est, void ab initio.

Also, the scheme of provisions of Section 148A read with Section 148 as applicable in the facts of the present case (AY 2015-16) rests on a foundation that no notice under Section 148 could have been issued without a prior show-cause notice being issued to an assessee. Further, a hearing would need to be granted to the assessee on such show cause notice and thereafter an order could be passed. All this is certainly not possible to be undertaken against a deceased person and / or even against a non-existing entity [refer Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, New Delhi vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. [2019] 107 taxmann.com 375 (SC).]

Once such mandatory legal compliance itself could not be achieved, on such sole ground, the notice issued under Section 148 preceded by earlier actions is required to be held to be non-est and void ab initio. The department cannot maintain issuance of the notice as impugned to a deceased person.

In the present case, admittedly, the concerned assessee Mr. Gene Gracious passed away on 9th November, 2016, the show cause notice under Section 148A(b) of the IT Act was issued on 26th May, 2022 and an order thereon was passed on 29th July, 2022 under Section 148A(d), as also the impugned notice under Section 148 was also issued on 29th July, 2022. All this has happened after the said assessee, Mr. Gene Gracious had passed away.

In view of the above, the petition deserves to be allowed.

Deduction in respect of the broken period interest — securities held as stock in trade: Expenditure incurred by the assessee on the issue of Fully Convertible Debentures.

22 HDFC Bank Ltd. (formerly, Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd.) vs. The DCIT Spl. Range – 15
[ITXA No. 58 OF 2006]
Dated: 13th November, 2024. (Bom) (HC) [Arising from ITAT order dated 12th September, 2005]
Assessment Year: 1993-94

Deduction in respect of the broken period interest — securities held as stock in trade: Expenditure incurred by the assessee on the issue of Fully Convertible Debentures.

The appellant is inter alia engaged in the business of providing long term finance in the course of which, various securities are held as stock in trade. These securities are purchased from time to time, which carry interest. The purchase price includes the component of interest for the broken period. The securities which remain unsold at the end of the year are shown in the closing stock at cost. However, while computing the income, the assessee claims deduction on account of interest for the broken period in respect of unsold securities since according to assessee, the entire interest income accrues to the assessee on the fixed date falling after the end of previous year. However, the assessee offered the interest income in respect of such securities in the next year either when the securities were sold or when interest is received.

The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee and disallowed the sum. The reason for disallowance was that broken period interest formed part of the price of the asset purchased, which has already been debited to Profit & Loss Account and, therefore, question of allowing deduction did not arise in view of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Vijaya Bank Ltd. vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax [1991] 187 ITR 541 (SC).

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) also agreed with the Assessing Officer and confirmed the order passed by the Assessing Officer. Against such order passed by the CIT(A), the appellant carried the matter to the Tribunal. The Tribunal also did not accept the contentions as urged on behalf of the assessee that the interest on securities is taxable as business income, since securities are held as stock in trade. As the interest paid on purchase of securities would be on revenue account, the same would entitle the assessee to claim a revenue loss, being the consistent accounting method followed by the assessee. The Tribunal, while rejecting the assessee’s contention, was of the view that when the securities are purchased by the appellant along with interest thereon, the price paid becomes the cost of the asset which is to be debited to Profit & Loss Account. The Tribunal observed that the assessee debited the entire cost of the purchase including broken period interest to Profit & Loss Account as per the commercial practice. Hence, if the security is sold, then profit would form part of the Profit & Loss Account as sales would be credited. It was observed that when such security was not sold, then as per the settled principle of accountancy, it has to be shown in the closing stock either at cost or market price whichever is lower. There is no other method of accounting for computing business profit. The Tribunal rested its view referring to the decision of Supreme Court in Chainrup Sampatram vs. Commissioner of Income-tax [1953] 24 ITR 481 (SC). It is for such reason the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the question of allowing any deduction separately did not arise.

On further appeal, the Assessee relied on the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court in American Express International Banking Corporation vs. Commissioner of Income-tax [2002] 258 ITR 601 (Bombay) wherein similar questions as the present questions were raised for the consideration of the Division Bench. The key issue which fell for consideration there was with regard to the correct treatment of the broken period interest and whether the broken period interest (net) paid by the assessee at the time of purchase of securities was a part of the capital costs of the investment. The Court considered the Revenue’s contention that the payment for the broken period interest (net) cannot be claimed as a revenue expenditure. It was the assessee’s contention that the banks were valuing the securities/interest held by it at the end of each year and offered to tax, the appreciation in their value by way of profits/interest earned. In answering such question, the Court considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank Ltd. (supra), and the question was answered in favour of the assessee.

The decision of the Division Bench in American Express International Banking Corporation (supra) was assailed before the Supreme Court in the proceedings of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC.301-303/2004, which came to be rejected by an order dated 27th January, 2004.

The Assessee further relied on the order passed by the Hon Court in ITA No. 278 of 1997 in the case of Citi Bank N.A. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax wherein similar issues had arisen for consideration of the Court, when the Court answered the questions in favour of the assessee. The order dated 16 April, 2003 passed by the Division Bench was carried to the Supreme Court in the proceedings of Civil Appeal No. 1549 of 2006 in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Citi Bank N.A. The Supreme Court rejected the Revenue’s appeal by its judgment dated 12 August, 2008 where the Supreme Court, while referring to the decision in Vijaya Bank Ltd. vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore (supra), as also the decision in case of American Express (supra), rejected the Revenue’s appeal. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in dismissing another appeal filed by the Revenue in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Citi Bank N.A., for AY 1982-83.

The Court’s attention was also drawn to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (2024) 167 taxmann.com 430 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by this Court in Citi Bank N.A. (supra), American Express International Banking Corporation(supra) as also in HDFC Bank Ltd. vs. CIT (2014) 49 taxmann.com 335.

In view of the above, the questions of law were answered in affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Insofar as the other question of law, the same pertains to a deduction in respect of the expenditure incurred by the assessee on the issue of Fully Convertible Debentures. The assessee had made a ‘rights issue’ of Fully Convertible Debentures (FCDs) and in such connection, had incurred expenditure on account of printing expenses, advertisement, professional fees, stamp duty and filing fees, bank charges, packages, etc. This expenditure was claimed as a deduction in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in India Cement Ltd. vs. CIT (1966) 60 ITR 52 (SC). The assessee’s claim for deduction was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the real intention of the assessee was to increase its capital and not to raise borrowed capital. On appeal, CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer inter alia following the decision of the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 225 ITR 798. It is against such decision of the CIT(A), the assessee approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal in confirming the order passed by the CIT(A) observed that there was no dispute on the entire issue on share capital in parts. It was observed that the true intention was not to raise a loan, but to raise share capital to increase its capital base. The Tribunal opined that it was therefore necessary to apply the ratio of the decision of Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India Ltd. (supra). Accordingly, the expenditure incurred on such public issue was not allowed as a deduction confirming the order passed by the CIT(A), against which the present appeal has been filed.

In assailing such orders of the Tribunal, assessee firstly relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. ITA No. 93 of 2000 dated 13th September, 2013 wherein one of the issues which fell for consideration was whether the Tribunal was legally correct in allowing debenture issue expenses on the issue of convertible debentures. In answering such issue in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, the Delhi High Court observed that the said question would stand covered by the decision of Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Havells India Ltd. (2013) 352 ITR 376 (Del.), which followed the decision of the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd.(supra) and the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Secure Meters Ltd. (2010) 321 ITR 621 (Raj.). In Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Delhi High Court has taken a similar view. A similar view was also taken in case of The Commissioner of Income Tax- 6 vs. M/s. Faze Three Ltd. Income Tax Appeal No. 1761 of 2014 decided on 16th March, 2017.

In answering such question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, the Court held that the expenditure incurred thereon was revenue in nature, referring to the decision in Secure Meters Ltd. (supra), as also in Havells India Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that as the debentures were to be converted in the near future into equity shares, the expenditure incurred needs to be allowed as revenue expenditure on the basis of the factual position as reflected by the accounts and which was the consistent view being accepted by the Courts. The Court also observed that the Revenue has not been able to show any reason which would require the Court to take a different view from the one taken by the various High Courts in the country on an identical issue.

In the light of the above discussion, the question of law also needs to be answered in affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

Resultantly, the Appeal stands allowed .

Refund of tax — interests payable thereon — delayed payment of refunds burdens the public exchequer with such interest amounts – Rules would be required to be framed — Accountability to be fixed

21 Bloomberg Data Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. DCIT Circle – 6(1)(2) &Ors.
[WP (L) No. 31412 OF 2024]
Dated: 2nd December, 2024 (Bom) (HC)]

Refund of tax — interests payable thereon — delayed payment of refunds burdens the public exchequer with such interest amounts – Rules would be required to be framed — Accountability to be fixed

The Petitioner being aggrieved by the Revenue’s inaction of the refund being not granted to the petitioner for the Assessment Year 2016-17 and 2013-14, and which was being adjusted for the refund for 2023-24, approached the Court. The Petitioner claimed that a large sum of refund of ₹77,64,71,629/- was not being granted to the Petitioner. The Revenue department filed their reply affidavit.

The Court noted that after the earlier orders were passed by the Court, on 29th November, 2024 a refund of ₹77,64,71,629/- was granted in the proportion of ₹45,84,30,382/- for A. Y. 2016-17 and ₹31,80,41,247/- for the A.Y. 2013-14. However, an interest of ₹1,83,37,215/- for A.Y. 2016-17 and ₹1,27,21,649/- for A.Y. 2013-14, totalling to an amount of ₹3,10,58,865/- (₹3.10 crores) was due and payable to the Petitioner which was not granted.

The Court observed that in these situations, payment of interest is an unwarranted burden required to be borne by the Government of India. The Hon. Court was concerned with several similar proceedings reaching the Court. The Court observed that it was not aware as to whether the income tax department has any procedure of any internal control / checks in such matters, in which the interest burden keeps increasing purely for departmental reasons, which may be either negligence or a casual approach on the part of the officials, not taking prompt and timely steps on such issues. Secondly, whether there is any routine audit, as to who would become accountable for such huge interest amounts being required to be paid by the Government of India, when there are refund amounts which are admittedly payable to the assessee’s. Any delay being caused in making payments of such refund and the interests payable thereon, is attributable wholly to the officials of the department, as it is they who are not taking prompt actions.

The Hon Court observed that the petition brings to the fore a serious concern in the laxity of the Respondent-department in the matter of refund of tax to the petitioner and which is an admitted amount. The Court also observed that routinely cases are reaching the Court where refunds for no rhyme or reason are stuck, they are either not being processed or if even processed, they are not being released and in such cases the interest burden on the Government of India / Public exchequer keep mounting every passing day. Once the tax payer is entitled to the refund and when there are no proceedings against the assessee in that regard are intended to be taken by the Revenue, the refund of the tax amount ought to be immediately granted to the assessee. If this is being followed in breach, merely on account of negligence / laxity on the part of the department, it results into an unwarranted interest burden being imposed on the public exchequer. It may be quite easy for the tax officials not to be serious on such issue, however, it cannot be forgotten that such interest payment goes from the taxpayers’ pockets.

The Court observed that why this laxity or lack of prompt and appropriate communication between two authorities / departments, should result in Government of India being unwarrantedly saddled with huge interest amounts is the issue. This can certainly be avoided by an effective mechanism, by having a meaningful and prompt flow of instructions between the concerned officers, handling the assessee’s case. Such unwarranted interest amounts being required to be paid, if saved can be utilised for other essential public expenditures. It is the citizens of the country who are being deprived of the benefits of such amounts instead of the same being paid to the assessee’s, on account of the negligence and / or the fault of the officers of the department. The Court observed that it is routinely seen that when the matters reach the Court, the Revenue instantly takes a position that the refund would be credited to the assessee, without disputing the claim of the assessee for refund, as in such cases there is no defence to such petitions, as it is a statutory obligation on the part of the Revenue to refund that amounts and on such refunds huge interest amounts are paid to the assessee.

The Court directed the Respondent to place an affidavit on record, after taking appropriate instructions from the CBDT and after confirming such affidavit from the CBDT, as to approach the concerned officials are required to follow, in such situations so as to avoid burdening the public exchequer with interest payments.

The Court further observed that if already the rules are not in place, such rules would be required to be framed. If any rules are already framed, as to why such rules are not being strictly adhered. The mechanism by which accountability needs to be fixed on the particular officers, whose actions are increasing the burden on the Government of India, is required to be immediately looked into.

The Court also noted that it was equally conscious that the delayed payment of refunds not only burdens the public exchequer with such interest amounts being required to be paid, but it also brings about a situation that the assessees’ are deprived of these amounts causing them a serious prejudice. Also, the Government of India would not be in a clear position to utilise such funds for any public purpose, as these funds are required, to be in any case paid to the assessee. Thus, any situation of an unjust enrichment is not acceptable. The situation in hand is of a delay, by which a serious prejudice to both the revenue and to the assessee is caused.

Trust — Educational institution — Registration — Validity — Application for registration erroneously made while charitable institution continued to be registered — Assessee permitted to withdraw application filed inadvertently:

75 Purandhar Technical Education Society vs. CIT(Exemption)
[2024] 468 ITR 711 (Bom)
A.Ys. 2022-23 to 2026-27
Date of order: 8th July, 2024
Ss. 12A, 12AA and 12AB of ITA 1961

Trust — Educational institution — Registration — Validity — Application for registration erroneously made while charitable institution continued to be registered — Assessee permitted to withdraw application filed inadvertently:

The assessee was a trust engaged in educational activities and was granted registration u/s. 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee stated that it could not trace the certificate and although it availed of the benefits for certain number of years without any objection from the Department, the authorities called upon the assessee to produce the registration certificate. Hence, the assessee made an application on 14th October, 2019 to obtain a duplicate certificate of registration u/s. 12A but was not responded. The assessee made a fresh application on 19th April, 2022. The assessee contended that both the applications were not decided and the duplicate certificate was also not issued. On 25th March, 2022, the assessee applied for a fresh provisional certificate u/s. 12A(1)(ac)(i) in the prescribed form 10A as per rule 17A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, that although the application for provisional registration was made on 4th April, 2022, an order on form 10AC u/s. 12A(1)(ac)(i) for the A. Y. 2022-23 to 2026-27 was passed by the competent authority thereby granting registration to the assessee. Thereafter, the assessee inadvertently applied for registration under the same provision in form 10AB on 30th September, 2022. The Commissioner (Exemption) issued notices requiring the assessee to submit copy of the provisional registration granted u/s. 12AB and the assessee furnished the necessary details. Another notice was received by the assessee on 9th March, 2023 to which the assessee failed to submit a reply. On 31st March, 2023, the Commissioner (Exemption) passed an order rejecting the assessee’s mistaken application on the ground that the assessee did not possess a copy of the provisional registration granted u/s. 12AB.

The assessee filed a writ petition contended that the Commissioner (Exemption) might take further actions to cancel the registration dated 4th April, 2022, of the assessee and seeking to be fully protected under the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Society for the Promotion of Education [2016] 382 ITR 6 (SC) and to permit withdrawal of the application inadvertently filed u/s. 12A(1)(ac)(i) :

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The assessee having already been granted registration u/s. 12A(1)(ac)(ii) read with section 12AB(1)(a) of the 1961 Act on April 1, 2022, for a period of five years, i.e., from the A. Y. 2022-23 to 2026-27, there was no need to make a fresh application on September 30, 2022 under which the order rejecting the application for registration had been passed.

ii)Hence the assessee could withdraw its application filed u/s. 12A(1)(ac)(i) , dated September 30, 2022 rendering the order dated March 31, 2023 of no consequence.”

Return — Delay in filing return — Application for condonation of delay — Limitation — Period to be computed with reference to date on which return had been filed

74 Vivek Krishnamoorthy vs. Pr. CIT
[2024] 469 ITR 605 (Kar)
A. Y. 2013-14
Date of order: 2nd November, 2023
S. 119 of ITA 1961

Return — Delay in filing return — Application for condonation of delay — Limitation — Period to be computed with reference to date on which return had been filed

The assessee had to file his Income-tax return before 31st March, 2015 but the Income-tax return was filed on 22nd August, 2015, and because Income-tax return was belated by about five months, an application was filed on 15th November, 2021 under section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for condonation of delay in filing the Income-tax return. The application was rejected on the ground of limitation.

The assessee filed a writ petition against the order. The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) In the case of a delay in filing an application to condone delay in filing returns according to the terms of Circular No. 9 of 2015 dated June 9, 2015 ([2015] 374 ITR (St.) 25) the period of six years will have to be computed with reference to the date when the belated Income-tax return is filed.

ii) The assessee’s application for condonation of delay in filing the Income-tax return on August 22, 2015 was to be restored for consideration in the light of the reasons offered to explain the delay between March 31, 2015 and August 22, 2015 and with the directions to consider the application within a reasonable period from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.”

Recovery of tax — Stay of recovery during first appeal — Requirement of deposit — Discretion to forgo requirement and grant stay — Debatable issue — Direction for stay of recovery proceedings without deposit

73 Chaitanya Memorial Educational Society vs. CIT(Exemption)
[2024] 469 ITR 571 (Telangana)
A. Y. 2018-19
Date of order:9th October, 2023
S. 220(6) of ITA 1961

Recovery of tax — Stay of recovery during first appeal — Requirement of deposit — Discretion to forgo requirement and grant stay — Debatable issue — Direction for stay of recovery proceedings without deposit

The Commissioner (Exemption) while deciding a stay application u/s. 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, pending an appeal challenging the assessment order for the A. Y. 2018-19, allowed the application subject to the assessee depositing an amount of ₹35 lakhs out of the total outstanding demand of ₹2,50,33,530.

The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) In considering whether a stay of demand should be granted, the court is duty bound to consider not merely the issue of financial hardship, if any, but also whether a strong prima facie case raising a serious triable issue has been raised which would warrant dispensation of deposit.

ii) The contention of the assessee was that the assessee had been availing of the exemption from payment of Income-tax on account of the fact that the assessee was a charitable institution and the works executed by it again were with a charitable purpose. Since the assessee availed of the benefits all along prior to the issuance of the demand notice and even in the subsequent years as well, no prejudice was going to be caused if the stay application u/s. 220(6) of the Act, was decided in favour of the assessee. Moreover, though the appeal was filed as early as on April 17, 2021 and the rectification application also was filed on March 20, 2021, both the rectification application and the appeal were still pending consideration or were undecided for more than 2½ years. The Assessing Officer should have allowed the application u/s. 220(6).

iii) In view of the same, we are inclined to allow the writ petition. The impugned order dated September 4, 2023 for the reasons stated above stands set aside/quashed. It is ordered that there shall be stay of the recovery of the entire demand raised by respondent No. 4 dated March 19, 2021 till the disposal of the appeal filed by the petitioner on April 17, 2021.”

Offences and prosecution — Wilful evasion of tax — Deletion of penalty with regard to same issues on ground that there was no concealment of income — Prosecution not valid.

72 RohitkumarNemchandPiparia vs. Dy. DIT(Investigation)
[2024] 469 ITR 593 (Mad)
A. Y. 2008-09
Date of order: 16th November, 2023
S. 276C(1) of ITA 1961

Offences and prosecution — Wilful evasion of tax — Deletion of penalty with regard to same issues on ground that there was no concealment of income — Prosecution not valid.

The assessee was a non-resident for more than 40 years. The respondent lodged a complaint for the offence u/s. 276C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 alleging that during the course of the enquiry by the Investigation Wing, it was noticed that in the bank account maintained by the petitioner, there was unusual credit of large amount through real time gross settlement and funds were debited for investment in the stock market. The petitioner had entered into 165 share transactions during the financial year 2007-08 and filed his return of income for the A. Y. 2008-09 on February 5, 2009 declaring a taxable income of ₹3,10,226. However, the petitioner has not disclosed any capital gains in the return of income filed for the financial year 2007-08 relevant to the A. Y. 2008-09. Further, the petitioner entered into 165 share transactions to the tune of ₹155.20 crores and short-term capital gains arose from the said transactions is ₹52.13 crores. Though tax has been deducted, it was not fully deducted and the petitioner did not disclose in his return of income under the head “Capital gain” and paid the tax. Thus, the petitioner failed to show the same in his return of income and attempted to evade payment of tax. Only after deduction by the Income- tax Department, the petitioner had share transactions during the relevant financial year and accepted the same. Therefore, the petitioner committed the offence punishable u/s. 276C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The assessee filed a Criminal writ petition for quashing the proceedings. The Madras High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) The Commissioner (Appeals) held in the appeal that the assessee was under the bona fide belief that there was no tax liability to be discharged by him on account of his residential status as non-resident external accounts and the deduction of tax at source made by the bank. Thus, the intention to conceal income by furnishing inaccurate particulars was not established. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the penalty imposed on the assessee.

ii) Therefore, once the penalty on the assessee was deleted, the prosecution initiated by the respondent could not be sustained.”

Income from House Property and Business Income — Difference — Finding by Tribunal that the Assessee Company had been formed with the object of developing Commercial Properties — Rental income from such properties is assessable as business income

71 Pr. CIT vs. M. P. Entertainment and Developers Pvt. Ltd.
[2024] 469 ITR 421 (MP)
A. Ys. 2011-12 to 2014-15
Date of order: 16th April, 2024
Ss. 22 and 28 of ITA 1961

Income from House Property and Business Income — Difference — Finding by Tribunal that the Assessee Company had been formed with the object of developing Commercial Properties — Rental income from such properties is assessable as business income

The Assessee had constructed a shopping cum entertainment mall in the name of Malhar Megha Mall and declared the nature of business as carrying on the business of purchase for development of the land, estates, structure and rented income from immovable properties. In the scrutiny assessment for the A. Ys. 2011-12 to 2014-15, the Assessing Officer observed that only part of the construction of the mall was complete and the assessee had started deriving rent from shops and other space in the mall and showed such income under the head Business & Profession. However, as per the Assessing Officer, the Assessee should have bifurcated under the head Income from House Property and Income from Business. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer restricted the claim of depreciation at the rate of 51.6 per cent of the occupied area of the Mall.

The CIT(A) deleted both the additions made by the Assessing Officer. The CIT(A) held that income from letting out properties were essentially required to be computed as Income from Business u/s. 28 and cannot be treated as Income from House Property. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Department and held that where the letting of the property is the main object of the Assessee, its income has to be computed under the head Income from Business and it cannot be treated as Income from House Property.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the appeal of the Department held as follows:

“i) In determining whether a particular income is income from house property or business income, in the case of Sultan Brothers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [1964] 51 ITR 353 (SC) the Supreme Court held that each case has to be looked at from the businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was the doing of business or exploitation of the property by the owner.

ii) The Tribunal had found that the main object of the assessee was the business of constructing, owning, acquiring, developing, managing, running, hiring, letting out, selling out or leasing multiplexes, cineplexes, cinema halls, theatres, shops, shopping malls, etc., according to its memorandum and articles of association. The income was liable to be categorised as income derived from the shopping mall under the head of “Income from business” u/s. 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer did not find any material against the assessee to come to the conclusion that sub-leasing of the premises was only a part of its predominant object. The assessee right from the construction of the mall till the matter was taken into scrutiny had been offering income from the business of constructing, owning, acquiring, developing, managing, running, hiring, letting out, selling out or leasing multiplexes, cineplexes, cinema halls, theatres, shops, shopping malls, etc., sub-licensed by it under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”.

iii) Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal had rightly set aside the order of the Assessing Officer treating the income as one from house property.”

Company — Computation of Book Profits — Scope of section 115JB — Disallowance u/s. 14A — Amount disallowed cannot be taken into consideration when computing book profits

70 Pr. CIT vs. Moon Star Securities Trading and Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd.
[2024] 469 ITR 15 (Del.)
A. Y. 2011-12
Date of order: 11th March, 2024
Ss. 14A and 115JB of ITA 1961

Company — Computation of Book Profits — Scope of section 115JB — Disallowance u/s. 14A — Amount disallowed cannot be taken into consideration when computing book profits

The assessee earned dividend income of ₹58,09,619. In respect of the dividend income, the Assessee made disallowance u/s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, in the scrutiny assessment, the AO enhanced the disallowance u/s. 14A to ₹12,65,71,862 computed as per section 14A r.w.r. 8D and made addition under the normal provisions as well as to the book profits computed under the provisions of section 115JB of the Act.

The CIT(A) partly allowed the appeal of the Assessee and restricted the disallowance to ₹2,08,72,836 as against the disallowance of ₹12,65,71,862 determined by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance on the ground that there was no satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer. Further, the Tribunal held that the disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act could not be made while computing book profits u/s. 115JB of the Act.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal of the Department and held as follows:

“i) Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by virtue of a deeming fiction, considers book profits as the total income of the assessee which is calculated post authorised adjustments to the profits shown in audited Profit and loss account of the assessee. A bare perusal of the provisions would signify that sub-section (1) prescribes the mode and manner of computing the total income of the assessee u/s. 115JB of the Act.

ii) Clause (f) of Explanation 1 only alludes to the amounts of expenditure relatable to any income to which section 10 (excluding provisions contained in clause (38) thereof) or section 11 or section 12 apply. The Assessing Officer does not have the jurisdiction to go behind the net profit shown in the profit and loss account except to the extent provided in the Explanation to section 115JB. The scheme of section 115JB, particularly in relation to clause (f) of Explanation 1 therein, does not envisage any addition of disallowance computed u/s. 14A of the Act to calculate the minimum alternate tax as per section 115JB of the Act. Rather, the two provisions stand separately as no correlation exists between them for the purpose of determining the taxable income.”

Charitable institution — Exemption — Scope of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 11 — Explanation to section 11 cannot be applied — Accumulated income — Donations to extent of 15 per cent. of surplus income accumulated to other charitable institutions for short period — Not permanent endowments made or donations imbued with some degree of permanency — Donations reversed — Exemption could not be denied

69 CIT(Exemption) vs. Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation
[2024] 468 ITR 723 (Del)
A. Y. 2009-10
Date of order: 31st May, 2024
S. 11 of ITA 1961

Charitable institution — Exemption — Scope of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 11 — Explanation to section 11 cannot be applied — Accumulated income — Donations to extent of 15 per cent. of surplus income accumulated to other charitable institutions for short period — Not permanent endowments made or donations imbued with some degree of permanency — Donations reversed — Exemption could not be denied

The assessee was a charitable institution registered u/s. 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assesseeutilised the accumulated fund to extend corpus donations to other charitable institutions in the A. Y. 2009-10. The Assessing Officer was of the view that extending donations to other charitable trusts would amount to utilisation of the funds for a purpose other than those for which the surplus was accumulated u/s. 11(2) which was violative of section 11(3)(c) and section 11(3)(d).

Before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee contended that the surplus accumulated income to the extent of 15 per cent. was handed out as donations to other charitable institutions for a temporary period of less than two months and that since the contravention was for a very short period, the exemption u/s. 11(2) should not be withdrawn. The Commissioner (Appeals) held in favour of the assessee on the issue of accumulation of 15 per cent. u/s. 11(2) and his order was affirmed by the Tribunal.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) Donations extended to other charitable institutions would meet the test of application of income for charitable purposes. Section 11(3)(c) and (d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deals with situations where the income so accumulated is either not utilised or applied for a charitable purpose. It is only in such a situation that the deemed income would lose the sheen of protection of exemption which would otherwise be applicable by virtue of section 11.

ii) In terms of the Finance Act, 2002 ([2002] 255 ITR (St.) 9), an Explanation was appended to section 11(2) which gets attracted in a situation where income referable to clauses (a) or (b) of section 11(1) and so accumulated or set apart is credited or paid to institutions specified therein, not being liable to be treated as application of income for charitable or religious purposes. Explanation 1 to section 11(1) applies to situations where the income applied to charitable causes falls short of 85 per cent. of the income derived. Section 11(2) on the other hand constitutes a gateway which enables the charity to stave off the spectre of the income which is not applied for a charitable purpose coming to be included in the total income of the assessee.

iii) The donations, to the extent of 15 per cent. of the accumulated surplus income, made by the assessee in the A. Y. 2009-10 would not be hit by Explanation 2, inserted by the Finance Act, 2017 ([2017] 393 ITR (St.) 1) with effect from 1st April, 2018 since Explanation 2 applied only to amounts credited or paid to certain categories of institutions and those being in the nature of a contribution accompanied by a direction that the amounts extended would form part of the corpus of those entities. Although the donations were made out of the accumulated income, the money was retrieved within two months.

iv) Section 11(3) and the adverse consequences would have been attracted provided the accumulated income was diverted for a purpose other than charitable or religious, or where it was not utilised for the purpose for which it was so accumulated or set apart during the period of five years contemplated u/s. 11(2)(a). The assessee did not make a permanent endowment or one where the donation stood imbued with some degree of permanency. It also was not that the money was lost or became unavailable to be applied. Since the donations were reversed and had been advanced only for an extremely short duration, the Tribunal had not erred in allowing deduction u/s. 11(1) to the extent of 15 per cent on the deemed income u/s. 11(3)(c) or section 11(3)(d) and for justifiable reasons, had answered the issue in favour of the assessee.”

Capital gains — Transfer — Possession taken in part performance of contract — Agreement must be registered — Joint Development Agreement — Not registered — Ownership of capital asset retained by Assessee throughout — Possession clauses suggesting possession to be parted with for limited purpose of development — Unregistered agreement not effecting transfer of property u/s. 2(47)

68 Prithvi Consultants Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT
[2024] 470 ITR 37 (Bom.)
A.Ys. 2005-06 to 2011-12
Date of order: 5th September, 2023
S. 2(47)(v) of ITA 1961, Ss. 17(1A) of Registration Act, 53A of Transfer of Property Act 1882

Capital gains — Transfer — Possession taken in part performance of contract — Agreement must be registered — Joint Development Agreement — Not registered — Ownership of capital asset retained by Assessee throughout — Possession clauses suggesting possession to be parted with for limited purpose of development — Unregistered agreement not effecting transfer of property u/s. 2(47)

In December 2008, the Assessee entered into two Joint Development Agreements (JDA) in respect of two plots of land. These agreements were not registered as required u/s. 17(1A) of the Registration Act. A search and seizure action was carried on in the case of one Mr. PK and others, where the said two JDAs were found. The Department issued notice u/s. 153C of the Act requiring the Assessee to file return of income for the AY 2009-10. Subsequently, notices were issued u/s. 153A and 142(1) for the AYs 2005-06 to 2010-11 as well as notice u/s. 143(2) for AY 2011-12 to conduct inquiry and the assessment of the Assessee’s income. In response to the notices, the Assessee filed response submitting that the Assessee had not received any consideration under the two JDAs. Further the transaction did not constitute transfer u/s. 2(47) of the Act. In March 2013, the Assessee cancelled the two JDAs because of non-performance by the Developer. However, in the assessment, the Assessing Officer concluded that the two JDAs constituted transfer u/s. 2(47) of the Act. He referred to the minimum guaranteed amounts reflected in the JDAs and concluded that additional income had accrued to the Assessee even though the Assessee may not have received any amount.

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the Assessee. On Department’s appeal before the Tribunal, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the assessment order was restored.

On appeal by the Assessee the High Court framed the following questions for consideration:

“i) Whether in the light of section 17(1A) read with section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, the unregistered agreement dated December 31, 2008, can be construed as a document effecting transfer of the subject properties in terms of section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

ii) Whether in the absence of income having accrued to the appellant in terms of the agreement dated December 31, 2008, the appellant can be made liable to pay tax on capital gains in terms of section 45 read with section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The Bombay High Court decided the above questions of law in favour of the Assessee and held as follows:

“i) The Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 made simultaneous amendments in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. By these amendments, the words “the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or” in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, have been omitted. Simultaneously, sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 , were also amended, clarifying that unless the document containing the contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property (for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is registered, it shall not have any effect in law, other than being received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

ii) The joint development agreements dated December 31, 2008, were not registered, though they were required to be compulsorily registered under section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908, post the introduction of this provision by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001. In the JDAs the ownership of the capital asset was retained by the assessee throughout. The clauses relating to parting of possession, besides being unclear, suggested that at the highest, possession was to be parted with for the limited purpose of development. The unregistered agreement dated December 31, 2008, could not be construed as a document effecting transfer of the subject properties in terms of section 2(47) of the Act.”