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Heritage TDR

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Introduction

The city of Mumbai is filled with ancient structures of neo-classical design/art deco structures which probably are the city’s last connection with its glorious past. In such a scenario, it becomes necessary to preserve this past and all things associated with it. However, there is also a need to redevelop/repair certain old structures.

To strike a balance between these two seemingly conflicting objectives, R. 67 of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai (DC Regulations) provide for the conversion of listed buildings, areas, artefacts, structures and precincts of historical and/or aesthetical/architectural/cultural value. These structures are known as “heritage buildings and heritage precincts”. A precinct generally means a space which has formal or artificial boundary lines around it. Thus, it is like an imaginary carved out area. Mumbai is the first city in India to get heritage protection.

The State Government comes out with a List of such structures and they are known as Listed Buildings/ Heritage Buildings and Listed Precincts/Heritage Precincts. The List divides the structures into three Grades—Grade I, Grade II and Grade III with Grade I being the most important and valuable.

Development/Redevelopment/Repairs of Heritage Buildings/Precincts

Carrying out any of the following activities in relation to heritage buildings/precincts requires the prior permission of the BMC Commissioner:

• Development/redevelopment
• Engineering operation • Additions/alterations/repairs/renovation
• Painting of buildings, replacement of special features
• Demolition of whole or part or plastering of the structure

The BMC Commissioner would consult the Heritage Conservation Committee of the State Government for this purpose. He has powers to overrule the Committee’s recommendations in exceptional cases. The Heritage Conservation Committee and the BMC have often been at loggerheads on several issues and the matters have gone to Court, for instance, hoardings on heritage buildings and precincts was the subject matter of dispute in the case of Dr. Anahita Pandole vs. State, 2004(6) Bom. CR.246. Hoardings in Heritage Precincts have also been the subject of other litigations, such as, Mass Holdings P Ltd vs. MCGM, 2006(1) AIR Bom. 658.

If there are any religious buildings in the List, then any changes required on religious grounds which are mentioned in any sacred texts or as a part of any holy practices shall be treated as permissible. However, they must be in consonance and in accordance with the original structure and architecture, designs, aesthetics and special features.

The above restrictions apply only to Grade I and Grade II heritage buildings.

Changes in Regulations
After consulting the Heritage Committee and with the State Government’s approval, the BMC Commissioner can alter, modify or relax the DC Regulations if it is needed for the conservation, preservation or retention of the historical, aesthetical, cultural or architectural quality of the Heritage Buildings/ Precincts. However, before carrying out any such modifications, he must hear out any persons who will suffer undue loss due to such changes.

Heritage TDR
If any application for development is refused/modified under R. 67, and such act results in depriving the owner/lessee of any unconsumed FSI, then the aggrieved shall be compensated by the grant of a Development Rights Certificate (also known as “Heritage TDR”). TDR from heritage buildings in the island city (that is, up to Mahim) may also be consumed in the same ward in which it originated. The TDR Certificate shall be governed by R. 34 and Appendix VIIA of the DC Regulations.

Before granting the TDR, the Commissioner would determine the extent to which it is required after consulting the Heritage Committee and it requires the prior sanction of the Government.

Restrictions on Heritage Structures Structures must maintain the skyline in the precinct as may be existing in the surrounding area so as not to diminish or destroy the value and beauty of the said listed Heritage Buildings. For instance, a 40-storey tower would look out of place in a group of heritage structures, all of which are 2-3 storeys tall. The tower would spoil the entire skyline of such an area. The BMC has issued Notification No. DCR. 1090/3197/(RDP)/UD-11 dated 25-04-1995 for the height of buildings in A Ward. The height after reconstruction must be limited to the existing height of the buildings of similar age in the area. Even a new building must conform to the general height pattern. In the case of listed heritage buildings and in the case of all buildings within the Fort precinct, clearance is required from the Heritage Committee. However, this restriction does not apply to the Backbay Reclamation Blocks area. Restrictive covenants imposed by the

State/BPT/Collector/BMC, etc., shall be in addition to the conditions of R. 67. However, if there is any conflict, then R. 67 shall prevail. Non-cessed buildings included in the List must be repaired by their owners/lessees and cessed buildings can be repaired by the MHADA/co-operative society/owner/ occupiers.

Grading
Grading of buildings in the List into I, II and III are carried out. Listing does not prevent change or ownership or usage. Care must be taken to ensure that the development permission relating to these buildings is given without delay. The Grading and various conditions for each Grade are as follows:


Conclusion

This is an important legislation to preserve and protect our city’s cultural heritage. Recently, the BMC has proposed to add some more structures to the Heritage List, a move which has been sharply opposed by the real estate developers and residents of those structures. While the debate over what should and what should not be included in the List would rage on, there is no denying that sustainable development with an eye on the past and future is the need in a metropolis like Mumbai.

Succession – Joint Family Property – Sale by Co-parcener without consent of others – validity: Hindu Succession Act 1956 section 30:

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The plaintiff-appellant had filed an Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge. The plaintiff-appellant- filed the aforesaid title suit for declaration that the registered sale deed dated 30-10-1998 executed by defendant No. 2-respondent No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1-respondent No. 1 as inoperative, illegal, without consideration and not binding on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendant No. 2 sold the suit property which is joint family property without the consent of the other coparceners.

The defendants filed the contesting written statement alleging that there had already been severance of status of coparcenary and there had already been separation in the family long ago. The suit property was in possession of the defendant No. 2, therefore, he sold the same to the defendant No. 1.

The trial court dismissed the suit finding that the defendant No. 2 had the authority to sell the property. On appeal, the Lower Appellate Court recording the same finding dismissed the title appeal.

The submission of the learned counsel was that although, there was separation between the parties but there had been no partition by metes and bounds, therefore, unless a consent is obtained by other coparcener/cotenant, the defendant No. 2 could not have transferred the property to the defendant No. 1. It may be mentioned here that in the case of Kalyani vs. Narayanan, AIR 1980 SC 1173, the Apex Court has held that partition is a word of technical import in Hindu law. Partition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenery is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition. In this narrow sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. Such an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenery with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-in-common. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the parties are separate. Therefore, there is no existence of coparcenery family. Now, therefore, even if it is held that there is no partition by metes and bounds accepting the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, then also after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, section 30 which proves that any Hindu may dispose of by Will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him or by her, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus and in the explanation, it is specifically mentioned that the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenery property be deemed to be the property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this section. Now, therefore, even if the property is held to be the joint property then also a coparcener has the right to dispose of the same i.e. his share. The relief claimed by the plaintiff is that because the property is coparcenery property, the coparcener could not have sold the property. This relief claimed by the plaintiff is contrary to the provision as contained in section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, in this case, separation has already been admitted. Whether there is partition or no partition is a matter that can be decided in properly constituted suit. Here, the question raised is as to whether a coparcener can sell his property or not?

In 2009(4) PLJR 225 SC (Gajara Vishnu Gosavi vs. Prakash Nanasahed Kamble & Ors.) the Apex Court has held that undivided share of a coparcener can be subject matter of sale/transfer. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the coparcener cannot transfer is concerned, has got no force in the eye of law.

Brij Kishore Chaubey vs. Ramkaran Singh Yadav AIR 2013 Patna 101

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Service of Notice – Termination of Tenancy – Service of Notice – 15 days notice send by Registered post – Agreement Stipulated 30 days – Suit filed after 30 days of deemed receipt of Notice – Transfer of Property Act section 106, General clauses Act 1897, section 27:

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The defendant was in occupation of one flat and a car parking area in a building on Camac Street. The rent last paid was Rs. 40,000 per month. The defendant entered this flat as a licensee of the plaintiff who was its owner. The licence agreement was dated 29th May, 2006. It was for an initial period of 11 months. It could be extended at the option of the licensee for two further periods of 11 months each. There is not much of a dispute that this licence for all practical purposes was treated as a tenancy. It was extended for two terms up to 28th February, 2009. It could be extended to the maximum extent up to this date. However, Clause 17 provided that before this period the tenancy was terminable at the option of the licensor or licensee. Either party had to give one month’s prior notice.

This option was exercised in 2007. By a notice dated 17th October, 2007 the defendants were asked to vacate the flat by November of that year. Thereafter, a suit was instituted by the plaintiff in the City Civil Court. The plaintiff withdrew that suit on 22nd April, 2010.

The plaintiff issued another notice to the defendant on 16th June, 2010. It was said to be sent by Registered post. A copy of the notice was also affixed on the entrance to the flat in the presence of two witnesses. The plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the flat. This time he gave them 15 days’ notice treating the defendant as a tenant, u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Thereafter, the suit and the Chapter XIII A Application were filed.

The Hon’ble Court observed that under Chapter XIIIA the plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment if on the available evidence on affidavits the Court is in a position to form an opinion that the defendant has no defence to the claim of the plaintiff. If the defendant is able to bring out a prima facie defence, which is equivalent to raising a triable issue, the court grants him leave to defend. Even when the defendant is unable to disclose any defence the Court may, out of sympathy, grant him leave to defend, if it forms the opinion that at a later point of time when the suit is ready for hearing, he has a very outside chance of putting forward some defence. But in that case the Court grants leave to defend upon obtaining security.

A few points of defence have been put forward by the defendant. The first is that this notice was never served. Secondly, 15 days’ notice was inadequate in terms of Clause 17 of the Licence Agreement between the parties which provided for 30 days’ notice.

The licence or lease agreement dated 29th May, 2006 was an unregistered document. Any lease of over one year’s duration can be made only by a registered document. Therefore, the agreement did not affect the property according to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. In other words, the document is to be treated as non est.

If the document is non est no rights are created by it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant was a lessee up to 28th February, 2009. For all purposes the lease was from month to month.

If the terms of the lease or licence agreement dated 29th May, 2006 were inoperative, there was no obligation to give any notice under those terms to determine the lease or tenancy. In those circumstances, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act came into play.

The Court observed that the notice dated 16th June, 2010 was rightly given. Only 15 days’ notice was required to be given under that section. Therefore, the notice determining the tenancy was valid.

Each of the defendants was sent the notice dated 16th June, 2010 by registered post with acknowledgment due. Each notice was delivered at the post office on 17th June, 2010. On each of the postal documents to record receipt there is a remark by the post office that an intimation was left at the office of the defendants on 19th June, 2010. Each of the notices was not claimed.

U/s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, if a document is required to be served by post, service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document. Unless the contrary is proved, service is deemed to have been made at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. U/s. 106(4) of the said Act, the notice u/s.s. (1) is to be sent, inter alia, by post.

Hence it was held there was good service of the section 106 notice dated 16th June, 2010.

Ajay Kumar Singh vs. Dasa AIR 2013 Cal. 125

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Recovery – Realisation of income tax dues – Priority over secured debt – State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.

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The Petitioner, a State owned Corporation and a Financial Institution governed by The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (SFC Act) sanctioned a term loan of Rs. 1,25,00,000 to M/s. Veekay Developers Pvt. Ltd. to establish a Luxury Hotel on 13-09-1995, which term loan was transferred to V.K. Clubs and Homes Pvt. Ltd. By way of security, the borrower—M/s. V.K. Clubs and Homes Pvt. Ltd, created an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds, of the portion of land and building. By way of further security, the said borrower created equitable mortgage over freehold rights in three shops. Additional loan of Rs. 86,00,000 was also sanctioned.

The borrower, having failed to repay the amount due together with interest the petitioner invoked section 29 of the SFC Act and took over possession of the properties, mortgaged and furnished as security.

On 05-12-2000, the Tax Recovery Officer, the second respondent, passed an order attaching the immovable properties, including properties mortgaged of the petitioner invoking Rule 48 of II Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 to recover Rs. 80,03,276 towards income tax dues, from Sri Vivian Kamath D’Souza, M/s. Veekay Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Shalimar Constructions and M/s. Canara Builders. On 23-12-2000, he issued a public notice in Udayavani newspaper informing about the attachment of the immovable properties calling upon anybody who had any claim or right to the said properties, to furnish necessary documents in support of the claim.

On 05-01-2001, petitioner brought to the notice of the second respondent the sanction of the loan on 13-09-1995 and 20-03-1998; the mortgage of the immovable properties, as also taking possession of the said properties on 30-12-1998 and 25-02-1999, invoking section 29 of the ‘SFC Act’. This was followed by notice dated 06-05-2005 to the second respondent, in response to which, a letter dated 27-01-2006 was addressed by the Tax Recovery Officer requesting the petitioner to proceed with the sale of the immovable properties as it had the first charge and to treat the Income-tax Department as a second mortgagee and after appropriation of the sale proceeds, hand over the remainder if any, to hand over the same for appropriation towards income-tax dues. The question before the court was

“Whether realisation of income-tax dues from the assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961 will have priority over the secured debt in terms of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951?”

The Hon’ble Court referred to the Apex Court decision in Union of India and others vs. Sicom Limited and another (2009) 2 SCC 121, observing that under Article 372 of the Constitution, as also well settled principles of law, statutory provisions will prevail over the Crown debt, and coupled with the non-obstante clause in section 46-B of the SFC Act, it would not only prevail over contracts but also other laws. In other words, the ‘SFC Act’, having provided for recovery of debt in preference to all other debts under any other law, the Financial Corporations were entitled to appropriate the sale proceeds towards the discharge of debt due to it, at the first instance.

Regards the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, it is clear that a first charge on the property is created giving priority to the dues of the said statutory authority over all other charges on the property, on the basis of the mortgage. The Income-tax Act, 1961 does not provide for a priority to the statutory charge over all other charges including mortgage under the ‘SFC Act’. The order of the tax recovery officer attaching property mortgaged in favour of the petitioner is quashed and the incometax authorities are restrained from interfering with the process of sale of immovable properties subject matter of mortgage in favour of the Petitioner, for recovery of its dues.

Karnataka State Industrial Investment Development Corporation Ltd vs. CIT, AIR 2013
Karnataka 104.

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Exports—Exemption u/s. 10A—Matter remanded to the Tribunal to consider the transaction of earning of interest on foreign currency deposit in detail to determine whether there existed any nexus between interest and industrial undertaking.

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India Comnet International vs. ITO (2013) 354 ITR 673 (SC)

The assessee, a private limited company established under the Madras Export Processing Zone, a 100% export oriented unit, engaged in the business of development and export of software filed its return of income for the assessment year 2002- 03 on 31st October, 2002, admitting “nil” income after claiming exemption u/s. 10A amounting to Rs. 8,34,84,900. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act by adding to income, the interest on deposits amounting to Rs. 92,06,602. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, namely that the interest income of Rs. 92,06,602 did not qualify for exemption u/s. 10A of the Act and the same had to be assessed to tax under the head “Income from other sources”. The Tribunal following the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (2003) 259 ITR 403 (Mad) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal holding that the interest income was earned out of the export realisation and kept in the foreign currency deposit account, as permitted by the FERA under the banking regulations and that there was no direct nexus between the interest earned and the industrial undertaking since the interest was received on deposit made in banks and it was that deposit which was the source of income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court observed that in that case, the Madras High Court examined in detail the transaction in question and found that the assessee had set up a new industrial undertaking in Kandla Free Trade Zone for manufacturing light engineering goods. The goods therein were exported during the assessment year 1985-86. In the course of business, the assessee was required to open a letter of credit. On such deposit, the assessee earned interest. Under the said circumstances, the High Court held, following the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Sterling Foods reported in [1999] 237 ITR 579 (SC), that the interest received by the assessee was on deposit made by it in the banks; that such deposit was the source of income; and that, the mere fact that the deposit was made for obtaining letter of credit which letter was, in turn, used for the purpose of business undertaking did not establish a direct nexus between the interest and industrial undertaking. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Madras High Court in Menon Import P. Ltd. ( supra) was based on the examination of the transaction in detail which exercise had not been undertaken in the present case.

For the above reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the case to the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal for deciding the matter afresh after examining the transaction in question, as done by the Madras High Court in the case of Menon Import P. Ltd. (supra).

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Foreign Court Decree – Order awarding costs would amount to decree – Execution – CPC section 35A, 44A

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The Defendant-Judgment Debtor challenged the order dated 15th April, 2011 passed by the learned District Judge-2, Nashik, rejecting the Petitioner’s Application for declaration that the recovery proceeding filed by the Respondents-original Plaintiffs be disposed of/dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or even otherwise on facts and further holding that the execution proceeding filed by Respondents being maintainable and the judgment and order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court was executable before District Court at Nashik. The Respondents-original Plaintiffs filed a Suit against the Petitioner-original Defendant in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court in England. In the said Suit, the Petitioner preferred Application dated 11th May, 2006 for declaration that the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court, U.K. would have no jurisdiction to entertain the Claim. The said Application was rejected by the Hon’ble High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, by an order dated 19th October, 2006 and imposed a cost in the sum of £12,429.75 equivalent to Rs. 10,16,753.55 with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Thereafter, the Respondents-original Plaintiffs filed Special (Civil) Darkhast in the Court of District Judge-2, Nashik for execution of the order passed by the Foreign Court, for recovery of sum of Rs. 10,16,753.55 towards decretal amount under Order dated 19th October, 2006 (costs) and Rs. 67,786/- towards interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal amount from the date of the order date i.e. 19th October, 2006 to 14th August, 2007 and further interest till the recovery of the amount. In the said Execution Petition, the Petitioner preferred on 1st March, 2008 an application for declaration that the Execution Application filed by the Respondents is not maintainable as the same is in respect of the costs imposed by a foreign Court. At the time of dismissing the Petitioner’s Interim Application, whereas, the main matter was still pending for hearing and final disposal. This Application for declaration was rejected by the District Judge-2, Nashik by impugned order dated 15th April, 2011 and hence, the Civil Revision Application was filed before the Hon’ble Court.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the explanation in section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure shows that the legislature has intentionally included the term judgment within the meaning of the term decree, for purpose of section 44A of CPC. The intention was to expand or enlarge the scope of term decree for the purpose of this section. Therefore, an order which may not amount to a decree but may amount to judgment would be a “judgment” for the purpose of section 44A of CPC. Thus, awarding costs would amount to decree within the meaning of section 44A and these can be recovered by executing order u/s. 44A of the CPC.

The issue of jurisdiction of the Court to execute order/decree of a country having reciprocal arrangement with our country was decided by the Division Bench of the Court in the matter of Janardhan Mohandas Rajan Pillai (deceased through Lrs.) & Anr. (2010) 4 AIR Bom R. 230. Therefore, the Execution Petition filed by the Respondents for execution of the order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by the English Court was maintainable.

Alcon Electronics P. Ltd vs. Celem S A AIR 2013 Bom 108.

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IFRS Conceptual Framework – Time to Revise

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In July 2013, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a discussion paper on review of the Conceptual Framework for financial reporting for comment only. Comments on this paper need to be given by 14th January, 2014.

The IASB’s discussion paper on the Conceptual Framework provides a welcome opportunity to set out the fundamental principles of accounting necessary to develop robust and consistent standards. Although this is not an immediate project, it would set the tone for the future direction of accounting.

Need for a review of the Conceptual Framework

In recent times, there have been many discussions regarding the extent of fair value accounting under IFRS, the measurement of performance, keeping assets on or off balance sheet etc. which raise questions on the fundamentals of accounting under IFRS. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as the accounting complexities increase, the IASB’s thinking about some of these fundamentals has also evolved. This gave rise to the need for a revised Conceptual Framework which reflects the recent changes in accounting and provides a backbone for future changes.

This discussion paper is designed to obtain initial views and comments on a number of matters, and focuses on areas that have caused problems in practice for standard setters as well as companies. It also sets out the IASB’s preliminary views on some of the topics under discussion.

Key changes envisaged

Revised definitions of assets and liabilities

The revised Conceptual Framework proposes to clarify the existing definitions of assets and liabilities. Rather than the focus of the current definition on inflow or outflow of resources, the proposals suggest that the focus should be on underlying resources or obligations as the basis for determining the recognition of an asset or liability. Given below are the proposed definitions:

(a) an asset is a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events.

(b) a liability is a present obligation of the entity to transfer an economic resource as a result of past events.

(c) an economic resource is a right, or other source of value, that is capable of producing economic benefits.

Additional guidance on applying the definitions of assets and liabilities

The IASB proposes to provide additional guidance on the meaning of economic resource, control, transfer of economic resource, constructive obligations and present obligation. Additional guidance would be provided also on reporting the substance of contractual rights and contractual obligations and executory contracts. These would be helpful to support the proposed new definitions of asset and liability explained above.

Revised guidance on when assets and liabilities should be recognised

The IASB’s preliminary view on recognition is that an entity should recognise all its assets and liabilities unless the IASB decides when developing or revising a particular standard that an entity need not, or should not, recognise an asset or a liability either because of cost benefit considerations or that such recognition would not be a faithful representation.

New guidance on when assets and liabilities should be derecognised

The existing Conceptual Framework does not address derecognition in a comprehensive manner. The IASB’s preliminary view is that an entity should derecognise an asset or a liability when it no longer meets the recognition criteria. However, for cases in which an entity retains a component of an asset or a liability, the IASB should determine, when developing or revising the standards, how the entity would best portray the changes that resulted from the transaction. This could be achieved by way of enhanced presentation or disclosure or continuing to recognise the original asset or liability and treating the proceeds received or paid for the transfer as a loan received or granted.

New way to present information about equity claims against the reporting entity

Financial statements currently do not clearly show how equity instruments with prior claims against the entity affect possible future cash flows to investors. Also, the IASB proposes to address the distinction between equity and liability, specifically the problems of applying the definition of liability consistently within IFRS.

Measurement requirements

This section of the discussion paper provides guidance to assist the IASB in developing measurement requirements in new or revised standards. The proposals state that there are different bases of measurement i.e cost, market prices including fair value and other cash flow based measurements. These bases should be applied based on their relevance, cost benefit analysis and their impact on the profit and loss/other comprehensive income (OCI) statement.

Principles for distinguishing profit or loss from OCI

The extant Framework does not provide guidance on presentation and disclosure. The reporting of financial performance (including the use of OCI and recycling) is a key topic that needs to be addressed. Further, the IASB proposes to provide more guidance in the area of materiality.

This Discussion Paper incorporates the views received through the IASB’s public consultation carried out in 2011. It has detailed discussions around the key topics mentioned above and other topics where different views have been deliberated and the IASB’s preliminary views have been stated out for comment. This is an important project for the IASB as it not only addresses concerns around the fundamental areas as they exist today but also set the principles for standards to be developed in the future.

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GAP in GAAP— Fair Value of Revenue

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Background

Company A sells handsets—either for upfront cash or for payment in installments. Until recently, its pricing was:

• Rs. 810 for upfront cash; or
• 36 monthly installments of Rs. 25 (total Rs. 900), implying an interest rate of 7% pa on the cash price of Rs. 810.

New competitors that sell handsets for cash but not on credit have entered the market—this has led to a drop in the cash sale price to Rs. 621 but A still makes most of its sales on credit on the same terms as before (i.e. Rs. 25 a month for 36 months).

This gives an imputed interest rate of 29% pa on the installment contract relative to the new cash price of Rs. 621. A believes this implied interest rate is unreasonably high. It sells some receivables on a non-recourse basis at yields approximating 7-8% pa.

How should A measure its revenues from handsets?

Options under Indian GAAP

View 1-The fair value of the consideration is the cash sale price (i.e. Revenue Rs. 621)

Since the handsets sold have a cash alternative price that is clearly determinable, revenue should be recognised at this price. In addition, even if the fair value of the consideration were higher than the cash sale price, this premium represents a payment for services to be received (financing services) that should be recognised over the service period as part of finance income rather than immediately as part of revenue from selling the handset.

The support for this view can be found in AS-9 itself. As per the illustration in AS 9 Revenue Recognition, “When the consideration is receivable in installments, revenue attributable to the sales price exclusive of interest should be recognised at the date of sale. The interest element should be recognised as revenue, proportionately to the unpaid balance due to the seller.” Though this paragraph supports the discounting of the installments, it does not provide any guidance on how the interest is determined. Therefore it is possible to determine the cash sale price based on an observable market and to treat the residue as interest, though that interest amount is much higher than the market.

View 2-The fair value of the consideration is the price derived by discounting the installment payments using market-based interest rates (i.e. Revenue Rs. 810)

The support for this view can be found in AS-9 itself. As per the illustration in AS 9 Revenue Recognition, “When the consideration is receivable in installments, revenue attributable to the sales price exclusive of interest should be recognised at the date of sale. The interest element should be recognised as revenue, proportionately to the unpaid balance due to the seller.” Though this paragraph supports the discounting of the installments, it does not provide any guidance on how the interest is determined. Therefore, it is possible to determine the cash sale price by discounting the installments at the market yield of 7% p.a.

In addition, Paragraph 47 of AS 30 Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement (not yet mandatory) states that the initial measurement of financial assets should be based on their fair value and the receivables are the consideration being valued. Therefore, under this view the fair value of the consideration should be derived by discounting the future cash flows using market-related interest rates.

View 3–No discounting (i.e. Revenue Rs. 900)
The illustration in AS-9 requires discounting in the case of installment sales. If the fact pattern was somewhat different, so that the payment was not based on installments, but the sales were on deferred payment terms, then discounting may not be required. For example, sale was made at Rs. 900 but entire payment of Rs. 900 is collected after six months. In such a case, it may be argued that the illustration in AS-9 which applies to installment sales does not apply in this case. This may be particularly true in schemes where a customer paying upfront or a customer paying over a short period, say 6 months, ends up paying the same amount. In other words, there is no interest amount to be imputed or the interest amount is immaterial. An interesting point to note is that under IAS 18 Revenue, revenue is always recognised at fair value of the consideration, and hence discounting is mandatory unless immaterial. Unlike IAS 18, under AS-9 there is no requirement to recognise revenue at fair value. The illustration in AS 9 to discount and separate revenue and finance income is only applicable when the sales are made purely on an installment payment scheme.

View 4-Accounting policy choice
In the absence of any detailed guidance, the author believes that either of the views above can be accepted. I suggest that the Institute should provide guidance as the object of an accounting standard is to eliminate diverse accounting practices.

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DCIT vs. Kaushik Shah Shares & Securities Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and Vivek Varma (JM) ITA No. 2163/Mum/2013 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 10th July, 2013.

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Counsel for revenue / assessee: Surinder Jit Singh/ Jinesh Doshi Section 88E, 115JB—It is the gross tax payable under normal provisions without deducting rebate u/s. 88E is to be compared with tax payable u/s. 115JB. From the higher of the two, rebate u/s. 88E is to be allowed. Rebate u/s. 88E is allowable even from tax payable on book profits u/s. 115JB.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made tax payment under normal provisions by comparing its tax liability (before claiming rebate u/s. 88E) on total income with income u/s. 115JB. The assessee submitted that tax rebate is a step which comes after determining income-tax payable on total income computed as per applicable provisions. It supported its view by income tax return ITR 6 prescribed by CBDT wherein gross tax liability before claim of rebate u/s 88E is first to be compared with tax credit under MAT and then from the higher of the MAT liability and tax liability under normal provisions of the Act, tax rebate u/s. 88E is to be reduced to arrive at a final tax payable by the assessee. The contention of the assessee was rejected by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where it was contended that rebate u/s. 88E was also to be allowed while working out tax liability u/s. 115JB for the purpose of determining tax liability u/s. 115JB. Reliance was placed on decision of Bangalore Bench of ITAT in the case of Horizon Capital Ltd and also on the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Naman Securities Finance Pvt. Ltd. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee on this ground.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the issue is covered by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Horizon Capital Ltd. (ITA No. 434 of 2010 dated 24.10.2011) and by the following decisions of coordinate Bench –

1 Ambit Securities Broking P. Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 7856/M/2011, AY 2008-09, order dated 6.6.2013);
2 DCIT vs. Arcadia Share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1515/M/2012, AY 2008-09, order dated 20.3.2013);
3 SVS Securities Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 6149/M/2011, AY 2008-09, order dated 8.8.2012).
Since the CIT(A) had followed the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Horizon Capital Ltd which was confirmed by the Karnataka High Court and also the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Naman Securities Finance Pvt. Ltd. which in turn has been followed by other co-ordinate Benches, the Tribunal did not see any merit in the grounds raised by the revenue.
The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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136 ITD 315 (Mum.) Arrow Coated Products Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y 2006-07 Dated : 14th March, 2012

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Section 36(1)(vii)—Deduction of bad debts available when debited to P&L Account—In order to claim deduction on account of bad debts, it is not necessary that individual debtor’s account has to be closed by crediting said account—a mere reduction in loans and advances/debtors account to extent of provision for bad and doubtful debt is sufficient

Facts:
The assessee had made provision for bad and doubtful debts in books of accounts in AY 2004-05 of Rs. 70 lakh. The provision was debited to Profit and Loss Account and also correspondingly reduced from gross total sundry debtors in the balance sheet. The individual ledger of debtor account was not written off by the amount of doubtful debts. In the return of income the assessee had not claimed deduction of provision of doubtful debts for AY 2004-05. In AY 2005-06 & 2006-07, the assessee wrote off the provision of doubtful debts of Rs. 20,36,000 (being part of Rs. 70 lakh) from the individual account of debtors thereby closing debtors account. The AO held that as the amount of doubtful debts was not transferred to P&L Account, the claim cannot be allowed. The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held:

After insertion of Explanation to section 36(1)(vii), the taxpayer is now required to debit Profit and Loss Account and also simultaneously reduce debtors account to the extent of corresponding amount. It is not necessary that individual debtors account be closed in order to claim deduction of bad debts. In the present case the assessee had not claimed deduction on account of bad debts in AY 2004-05. It is not required for the assessee to actually close the individual account of each debtor.

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(2012) 135 ITD 233 (Mumbai) Pranik Shipping & Services Limited vs. ACIT (Mumbai ITAT) ITA No.5962 /Mum/2009 18th January, 2012

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Section 36(1)(iii)- Interest free loans given to sister concerns—if assessee held interest free funds and also interest bearing funds, presumption would be that investments were made from interest free funds available with assessee.

Section 40(a)(ia) and section 194A—Business expenditure—assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure for which no accounting entry was passed in books of account— the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier—Since the said interest was neither credited in the books of account nor paid in the year, section 194A cannot be attracted—Once there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

Facts I:
The assessee had given interest-free funds to its sister concerns. The AO observed that no interest was charged on such advances to sister concerns whereas substantial interest was paid on borrowed funds. In absence of any nexus between the interest-free funds advanced and interest-free funds available with the assessee, the AO made disallowance by applying 15% rate of interest. The CIT(A) also upheld the AO’s action.

Held I:
The Tribunal observed that the interest-free funds available at the disposal of the assessee were far in excess of the interest-free loans advanced to the sister concerns. Relying on the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Utility and Power Limited [(2009) 313 ITR 340 (Bom.)], the Tribunal held that if the assessee has interest-free funds as well as interest-bearing funds at its disposal, it shall be presumed that investments were made from interest-free funds available with the assessee. The addition was deleted.

Facts II:
Assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure in the computation of total income for which no accounting entry was passed in the books of account. The AO held that assessee followed cash system of accounting in respect of accounting of interest expenditure and as assessee had not made any payment of interest, the same was not deductible. The Ld CIT(A) held that the assessee had not deducted TDS on interest payable and hence u/s. 40(a)(ia) the deduction was not allowed.

Held II:
The Ld. AO was not justified in applying hybrid system of accounting i.e., applying cash system for accounting of interest expenditure and mercantile system for accounting for all other items. As per section 145, income under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ is to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. The assessee was regularly following mercantile system of accounting.

In the mercantile system of accounting, deduction is allowed on accrual of liability and it is not material whether the amount is paid or not or whether or not it is recorded in the books of account. Assessee’s similar claim of deduction of such interest expenditure was allowed in earlier assessment years also.

As per sections 40(a)(ia) and 194A, the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier. The assessee did not credit such interest in the books of account under any account and further such interest had not been paid during the year. The deduction had been claimed on the basis of mercantile system of accounting straightway in the computation of income, without routing it through books of account, which had been held by us to be allowable. Hence, the mandate of section 194A cannot be attracted. As there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

This loophole was probably not contemplated by the Legislature while enacting the relevant provisions, which has been exploited by the assessee as a measure of tax planning.

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(2011) 135 ITD 398 (Pune) Patni Computer Systems Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y 2002-03 & 2003-04. Dated : 30th June, 2011

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Section 92B—Transfer Pricing—Extension of credit to the Associated Enterprises (‘AEs’) beyond the stipulated credit period vis-a-vis others cannot be construed as an “international transaction” for the purposes of section 92B(1) so as to require adjustment for ascertaining the ALP.

Section 92B—Transfer pricing—Adjustment for cost of consultancy fees paid for undertaking study for the purpose of restructuring the assessee’s organisational structure—Apportionment of impugned cost is permissible only in a situation where there exists a “mutual agreement or arrangement” between two or more AEs for apportionment of cost.

Section 10A—Establishment of three new units at three different locations, with investments in fixed assets is not mere expansion and would be eligible for deduction u/s 10A.

Facts I:
Assessee had international transactions with AEs and on this count, the AEs had some outstandings due to the assessee. Such outstandings were overdue and no interest was charged by the assessee on such amounts. The TPO has considered non-charging of interest as an ‘international transaction’ requiring adjustment to determine the ALP on the basis that the normal period of credit allowed to the AEs was 90 days, and to the other similarly placed customers the credit period allowed was 30 to 45 days. The fundamental question raised by the assessee was as to whether extending the credit limit can be considered as “international transaction” under section 92B(1) of the Act.

Held I:
Relying on the judgement of the Mumbai Bench Tribunal in case of Nimbus Communications Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT. ITA No. 6597/Mum/2009, it was held that a continuing debit balance is not an international transaction per se, but is a result of international transaction. The commercial transaction, as a result of which the debit balance has come into existence, and the terms and conditions, including terms of payment, has to be examined for the purpose of arm’s length price.

Facts II:
The assessee had undertaken a study for the purpose of restructuring the organisational structure. According to the TPO, changes proposed in the study would also give benefits to the AEs and thus an arm’s length allocation of cost of consultancy expenses paid for study was required to be made. According to the Revenue, it was imperative for the assessee to have recovered such costs from the AEs and since the assessee had not done so, certain expenditure was allocated by the TPO on this score.

Held II:
Apportionment of impugned cost is permissible only in a situation where there exists a “mutual agreement or arrangement” between two or more AEs for apportionment of cost. There existed no such agreement or arrangement in the given case. The study reports may bring certain intangible benefits in the form of enhanced productivity to the businesses of the AEs, however, this would not ipso facto justify the apportionment of the cost incurred, where the use of such studies by the AEs is not obligated in terms of any mutual agreement or arrangement between the assessee and the AEs, but the use is only discretionary on the part of the foreign AEs.

Moreover, there would not be any justification for apportioning the expenditure unless it is shown that the expenses incurred on such activities was disproportionate and the benefit which accrued to the AEs in the form of increased business productivity was not merely incidental, but was tangible and concrete. There was no material to show that any tangible and concrete benefit has accrued to the AEs as a result of the expenditure incurred by the assessee in obtaining consultancy.

Facts III:
The AO noted that the assessee has treated three new units as separate independent units for the purpose of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The AO further noted that approval from STPI reflected the new units as expansion of existing units. On the basis of this the AO concluded that the profitability of the aforesaid three units was liable to be combined with that of the corresponding old units and thus the eligible period for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act with respect to the said three units would be reckoned from the first year of the eligibility of the corresponding old units. The CIT(A), however, held that the assessee fulfilled all the conditions prescribed u/s. 10A(2) of the Act. All the three units had their own plant and machinery having substantial investment and substantial turnover and were located in different premises.

Held III:

For claim of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, examination as to whether the three units are independent units and whether they fulfil the conditions prescribed u/s. 10A(2) of the Act is important. There is no prohibition that an expansion in the same line of business achieved by setting up a new independent unit would lead to denial of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The assessee would not be disentitled to deduction u/s. 10A merely due to the fact that the requisite permissions from STPI refer them as expansions of the existing units.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28, S. 37 — Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of unmatured forward contracts on the last date of the accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange prevailing on that date is allowable as a deduction.

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(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS


17 DCIT v. Bank of Bahrain &
Kuwait

ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai (SB)

Before D. Manmohan (VP),

S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and D. K.
Agarwal (JM)

ITA Nos. 4404 & 1883/Mum./2004

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 & 1998-99

Decided on : 13-8-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee :
Ajit Kumar
Sinha/F. V. Irani

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28, S.
37 — Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of unmatured forward contracts on the
last date of the accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange
prevailing on that date is allowable as a deduction.

Per S. V. Mehrotra :

Facts :

The assessee was a non-resident
company carrying on banking business in India. It entered into forward contracts
with its clients to buy or sell foreign exchange at an agreed price on a future
date. On the date of maturity, the execution of the contract resulted in profits
or losses to the assessee. There was no dispute as regards losses arising on
execution of the contracts within the same year. However, in cases where the
date of maturity of the contract fell beyond the end of the accounting period,
the assessee evaluated the unmatured forward contract on the last day of the
accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange prevailing on that
date and booked the profit or loss accordingly. The Assessing Officer (AO) taxed
the profit so booked but did not allow the assessee’s claim of loss, by relying
on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank
(183 ITR 200), on the ground that the loss is incurred on the date of maturity
of the contract and there cannot be any loss prior to such date. In other words,
he held such loss to be notional.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred
an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the assessee’s
appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal.

The assessee supported its claim
by relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Deutsche Bank
A.G., 86 ITD 431 (Mum.). The Tribunal noted that in the case of Deutsche Bank
(supra) the decision of the Madras High Court was distinguished on the ground
that the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether notional or
anticipated loss could be allowed as deduction or not, while the Tribunal was
concerned with the valuation of stock-in-trade. The Bench referred the matter,
since the assessee, as a banker, only entered into contract to sell/buy the
foreign currency at a future date, but did not buy or sell such contracts from
or in the market. It observed that the assessee was not holding these contracts
as stock-in-trade and, therefore, the decision in the case of Deutsche Bank was
not applicable.

The Bench framed the following
question of law for reference :

“Whether on facts and
circumstances of the case, can it be said that where a forward contract is
entered into by the assessee to sell the foreign currency at an agreed price at
a future date falling beyond the last date of accounting period, the loss is
incurred to the assessee on account of evaluation of the contract on the last
date of the accounting period i.e., before the date of maturity of the forward
contract.”

Held :

The Special Bench of the
Tribunal decided this ground in favour of the assessee and held :

(1) Deduction is allowable
under the Act in respect of those liabilities which crystalise during the
previous year. Therefore, the concept of crystalisation of liability under
the Income-tax Act assumes significance vis-à-vis commercial principles in
vogue. As per the commercial principles of policy of prudence, all
anticipated liabilities have to be accounted, but as per Income-tax Act,
only that liability will be allowed which has actually accrued. Due
weightage must be given to commercial principles in deciding such issues.

(2) Anticipated liabilities
which are contingent in nature are not allowable, but if an anticipated
liability is coupled with present obligation and only quantification can
vary depending upon the terms of the contract, then a liability is said to
have crystalised on the balance sheet date.

(3) A contingent liability
depends purely on the happening or not happening of an event, whereas if an
event has already taken place, which, in the present case, is of entering
into the contract and undertaking of obligation to meet the liability, and
only consequential effect of the same is to be determined, then, it cannot
be said that it is in the nature of contingent liability.

    4. The issues relating to accrual of income cannot be decided on the same footing and considerations on which the issues relating to loss/expense is to be decided. In case of loss/expense, it is the concept of reasonable certainty to meet an existing obligation which comes into play which in legal terminology is said to be ‘crystalisation of liability’. When outflow of economic resources in settlement of present obligation can be anticipated with reasonable accuracy, then it is to be recognised as a crystallised liability. This is in consonance with the principle of prudence as considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward Governor of India Pvt. Ltd.

    5. The Revenue’s contention that liability can arise only when contract matures is completely divorced of principles of commercial accounting and, therefore, cannot be accepted. Both legal obligation and commercial principles have to be taken into consideration for deciding such issues.

    6. The anticipated losses on account of existing obligation on 31st March, determinable with reasonable accuracy, being in the nature of expenditure/accrued liability, have to be taken into account while preparing financial statements.

    7. The elements of financial statement can be broadly divided into the following five groups, viz. assets, liabilities, equity, income/gains and expenses/loss. These items are recognised in a financial statement if both the following criteria are met :

    a) future economic benefit will be there from the said events,

    b) the event can be measured in monetary terms.

In the present case, the AO himself has observed in the assessment order that at the time of entering into the contract, the assessee has recorded the income/loss on the basis of difference between the contracted rate and spot rate. Thus, to say that the contract was incapable of being recognised in the books of account, is not correct. The assessee recorded only the net effect of the transaction and not the entire transaction. Whether the deduction is allowable or not, therefore, cannot be guided by this factor.

    8. The AO cannot reject the method of accounting followed by the assessee merely on the ground that a better method of accounting could be the alternate one. However, in the present case, though observations have been made by the AO to this effect, but actual disallowance has been made by treating the impugned amount as contingent liability.

    9. Accounting Standard 11 issued by ICAI is mandatory and mandates that in a situation like in the present case, since the transaction is not settled in the same accounting period, the effect of exchange difference has to be recorded on 31st March.

    10. The foreign exchange currency held by the assessee bank is its stock-in-trade. On facts, this contract was incidental to the assessee’s holding of the foreign currency as current assets. Therefore, in substance, it cannot be said that the forward contract had no trappings of stock-in-trade.

    11. Profits are considered only when actual debt is created in favour of the assessee, but in case of anticipated losses, if an existing binding obligation, though dischargeable at a future date, is determinable with reasonable certainty, then the same is allowable.

    12. The principle that the liability in paraesenti is an allowable deduction but a liability in futuro, which for the time being is only contingent is not allowable has to be applied keeping in view the principles of prudence and applicable Accounting Standards.

13. When  profits  are  being  taxed  by  the Department in respect of such unmatured foreign exchange contracts, then there was no reason to disallow the loss as claimed by the assessee in respect of the same contracts on the same footing.

S. 40(a)(ia) read with S. 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Tax deductible for the year deducted belatedly on the last day of the accounting year and paid before the due date for filing of return — Whether AO justified in disallowing the expenditure u/s.

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New Page 2

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS

16 Bapusaheb Nanasaheb Dhumal v.
ACIT

ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai

Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and

Vijay Pal Rao (JM)

ITA No. 6628/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on :
25-6-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue :
Anil J. Sathe/

S. S. Rana

S. 40(a)(ia) read with S. 194C
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Tax deductible for the year deducted belatedly on
the last day of the accounting year and paid before the due date for filing of
return — Whether AO justified in disallowing the expenditure u/s.40(a)(ia) —
Held, No.

Per Vijay Pal Rao :

Facts :

During the year, the assessee
had paid various sums to contractors but the tax was deducted only on 31-3-2005.
According to the AO, as per the provisions of S. 194C, the assessee was required
to deduct and pay the tax regularly in each month when the contractors were
paid. Since the assessee had deducted full amount of the tax only on 31-3-2005,
he restricted the allowance of deduction only in respect of payments made during
the month of March and disallowed the deduction in respect of the payments which
were credited and made during the period other than the month of March 2005. On
appeal the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue
submitted that the assessee had failed to deduct and pay tax as required
u/s.194C. According to it, S. 40(a)(ia) grants relaxation of time period in
depositing the TDS only in a case when the tax was deductible and deducted in
the last month of the previous year — where the time for deposit of tax is
allowed till the due date of filing of the return u/s.139(1). In cases where the
tax is deductible prior to the month of March, then the same has to be deducted
before the end of the last month of the previous year and paid by the due date
as given in S. 194C. According to it, since the assessee had failed to deduct
and pay tax as required u/s.194C and other provisions of Chapter XVII of the
Act, the AO was justified in disallowing the expenditure claimed. It also relied
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madurai Mills and Co. Ltd.
(89 ITR 445).

Held :

According to the Tribunal the
controversy revolves around the applicability of the provisions of S. 194C while
disallowing the expenditure u/s. 40(a)(ia). According to it, the provisions of
S. 194C are relevant only for the purposes of ascertaining the deductibility of
the tax from the payments made. Once it is determined that the nature of payment
falls under the provisions of Chapter XVII, the disallowance for non-compliance
with TDS provisions would be governed by the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).
According to it, the proviso to S. 40(a)(ia) makes it further clear that even in
the case when the tax has been deductible as per the provisions of Chapter XVII,
but deducted in the subsequent year or deducted during the last month of
previous year, but paid after the due date u/s.139(1) or deducted during the
other months of the previous year, but paid after the end of the said previous
year, then the said sum would be allowed as deduction in the previous year in
which the tax is paid. According to it, if the conditions of deduction and
payment prescribed under Chapter XVII are applicable for disallowance of
deduction, then the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) would be rendered as meaningless.
It further added that as per S. 40(a)(ia) when the tax is deducted, even
belatedly, and deposited belatedly, then deduction is not denied and is
allowable in the previous year in which the tax was deposited. According to it,
the provisions of Chapter XVII were relevant only for ascertaining the
deductibility of the tax at source and not for the actual deduction and payment
for attracting the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).

Therefore, since the assessee
had deducted the tax in the last month of the previous year and deposited the
same before the due date of filing of the return, it allowed the claim of the
deduction of the assessee. It further observed that the case relied on by the
Revenue is not relevant.

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S. 147 — AO cannot assess other income noticed in proceedings

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26 ITO v. Smt. Darshan Kaur

w/o S. Adesh Singh

ITAT Amritsar Bench, Amritsar (SMC)

Before Sh. Joginder Pall (AM)

ITA No. 282/ASR/2007

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 16-11-2007

Counsel for revenue/assessee : M. S. Minhas/

P. N. Arora

S. 147 — Reassessment — When no addition is made on the
ground for which reassessment was initiated, can the AO assess any other income
which comes to his notice in the course of such proceedings — Held, No.

Facts :

The assessee filed return of income for A.Y. 2001-02,
declaring total income of Rs.32,180, which was processed u/s.143(1)(a) of the
Act. Subsequently, based on tax evasion petition, the Assessing Officer
initiated proceedings u/s.147 allegedly on the ground that the assessee had
purchased ½ share of land with one room, on 15-11-2000, for a consideration of
Rs.1,19,250 from undisclosed income. Thus, reassessment proceedings were
initiated to bring to tax unexplained investment in property. In response to
notice u/s.147, the assessee filed return of income declaring total income to be
the same as that shown in his original return. Along with this return of income,
he filed copy of capital account indicating opening capital of Rs.4,56,298. The
assessee had shown withdrawals of Rs.1,25,000 from the said opening capital as
being invested in purchase of property. The assessee explained the source of
opening capital to be accumulated savings of the past. The Assessing Officer
observed that income earned in the past must have been utilised for purchase of
property from which rental income is being shown in the returns. Thus, the
Assessing Officer allowed credit of Rs.1,00,000 of past savings and made an
addition of Rs.3,56,298 on account of opening capital shown in the return. No
addition on account of unexplained investment in purchase of property for which
proceedings were initiated u/s.147 was made. The CIT(A) quashed the order passed
by the Assessing Officer on the ground that no addition in respect of ground for
which proceedings u/s.147 were initiated has been made by the Assessing Officer.
Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the Revenue preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue on the
ground that since the Assessing Officer has not made any addition, in respect of
which proceedings were initiated, he was not competent to bring to tax the
opening capital during the course of completing the reassessment. The Tribunal
observed as under :

(a) No doubt, the amended provisions of S. 147 empower the
AO to assess or reassess the income chargeable to tax, which has escaped
assessment and also any other income chargeable to tax, which has escaped
assessment which comes to his notice subsequently during the proceedings
u/s.147. However, the question of bringing to tax any other income chargeable
to tax, which comes to his notice subsequently during the course of
reassessment proceedings would arise only if the ground for which proceedings
u/s.147 were initiated was found valid.

(b) Since in this case, the AO has not made any addition in
respect of ground for which proceedings were initiated, he was not competent
to bring to tax the opening capital during the course of completing the
reassessment. The AO was competent to initiate separate proceedings u/s.147 to
bring to tax the unexplained capital by dropping the proceedings already
initiated, provided such action was within the time allowed.

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S. 80JJA — Subsidy received from State Government qualifies for deduction.

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25 Arvind Gupta v. ITO


ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Jaipur

Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and

B. P. Jain (AM)

ITA No. 799/JP/07

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 31-3-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mahendra Gargieya & Sharvan
Gupta/D. P. Gupta

S. 80JJA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 –– Whether subsidy
amount received from the State Government qualifies for deduction u/s.80JJA —
Held, Yes.

Facts :

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2003-04, the
assessee was granted subsidy aggregating to Rs.26.16 lacs by the Government of
Rajasthan. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80JJA of the Act, included the
said amount of subsidy. The AO was of the view that the subsidy is not derived
from the specified business and therefore he disallowed the claim of deduction
u/s.80JJA. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the certificate of the Additional
Director of Agriculture made it evident that subsidy was not given to the
manufacturer, but it was a subsidy to the cultivators. As per the procedure laid
down by the Government, the assessee had to receive a part of the sale price
from the Government. Thus, the subsidy was only a part of the selling price and
hence was a trading receipts. The Tribunal agreed with the contentions of the
assessee that the subsidy granted was nothing but a part of the sale price of
the product, which was realised. The Tribunal further observed that u/s.80JJA,
the subjected profit is not confined merely to the undertaking, but profit and
gains should be derived from any business of an undertaking, thus giving it a
wider meaning.


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S. 32(1) read with S. 43(6) — WDV of block brought forward from preceeding year to be reduced by WDV of assets discarded.

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24 Yamaha Motors India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Delhi

Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and

Deepak R. Shah (AM)

ITA No. 1986 (Del.) 2005

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 23-5-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ved Jain/

Surkesh K. Jain

S. 32(1) read with S. 43(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Depreciation — Block of assets — certain assets forming part of block of assets
were discarded — Whether WDV of the block brought forward from the immediately
preceding previous year needs to be reduced by the WDV of the assets which have
been discarded — Held, the scrap value of the assets discarded needs to be
reduced from the WDV of the block of assets brought forward.

Facts :

The assessee had capitalised certain assets at Rs.4,71,51,016
on 1-11-1996. WDV of these assets as on 31.3.1999 was Rs.2,32,07,141. These
assets were discarded and written off by the assessee in the books of accounts
during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2001-02. The discarded assets were not
disposed of or sold during the relevant financial year. The assessee while
computing the WDV of the block of assets qualifying for depreciation did not
reduce the WDV of the block brought forward from immediately preceding previous
year by the WDV of the assets discarded. The AO disallowed a sum of Rs.58,01,785 being depreciation on assets written off in the books of accounts,
on the ground that these assets have not been used for the purpose of the
business of the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. The
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the scheme of depreciation effective
from 1-4-1988 has done away with the assetwise depreciation by substituting the
same by the scheme of block of assets by putting all the assets entitled to the
same rate of depreciation in one block of assets. The WDV of the block can now
be adjusted only in the manner provided in Ss.(6) of S. 43 of the Act. The
action of the AO in reducing the WDV of a block of assets by WDV of individual
assets by working out the same on the basis of asset-wise depreciation was held
by the Tribunal to be not in accordance with the provisions of S. 43(6)(c) of
the Act. The Tribunal held that what needs to be reduced from WDV of a block of
assets in the present case is only the scrap value of assets which have been
discarded during the year under consideration.


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S. 14 — Income from redemption of deep discount bonds taxed as capital gains

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23 C. S. Gosalia v. ITO


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

V. K. Gupta (AM)

ITA No. 1373/Mum./2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Decided on : 30-7-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Ajay C. Gosalia/

S. Srivastava

S. 14 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Heads of income — Deep
discount bonds held as investment — Taxability of gains earned on redemption
thereof — Held that income arising therefrom is taxable as capital gains and not
as income from other sources.

Per V. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee had purchased 64 deep discount bonds between
February 1999 and April 1999 through Bombay Stock Exchange for a total cost of
Rs.4.9 lacs. The same were held by the assessee as investment and he had not
offered to tax any income thereon in the year of holding. The said bonds were
redeemed by IDBI on 31-3-2002, resulting into gain of Rs.2.78 lacs. The said
gain was offered to tax by the assessee as long-term capital gain.

According to the AO, the income was liable to be taxed as
‘Income from other sources’ as per the Board Circular dated 15-2-2002. The
asssessee’s contention that the Circular relied on by the AO was applicable to
bonds issued after 15-2-2002 and his case was covered by the earlier Circular
dated 12-3-1996 was rejected. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the
AO.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee and held that the
subsequent Circular issued by the Board was not retrospective in nature and the
case of the assessee was covered by the earlier Circular of the Board viz.,
the Circular dated 12-3-1996. It also took note of the fact that the
assessee was holding the bonds as investment. Accordingly, the assessee’s appeal
was allowed.


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S. 115JA — Capital gains credited directly to capital reserve in balance sheet not to be considered in book profit.

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New Page 9

22 ACIT v. Vijay Furniture Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd.


ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sushma Chawla (JM) and

Abraham P. George (AM)

ITA No. 7104/Mum./2005

A. Y. 2000-01. Decided on : 9-7-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : B. K. Singh/

Jayesh Dadia

S. 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital gain earned
during the year was directly credited to capital reserve in balance sheet —
Whether AO justified in adding such gain to the book profit — Held, No.

Per Sushma Chawla :

Facts :

During the year under consideration the assessee had earned
capital gain of Rs.8.81 crore. In the accounts the said capital gain was
credited directly to the capital reserve in the balance sheet. The as-sessee had
claimed the capital gain as exempt u/s. 54E of the Act.

As per the accounts of the assessee, there was a book loss.
However as per the Assessing Officer, the capital gain was required to be
credited to the profit and loss account. Thus, according to him, there was a
book profit u/s.115JA. Applying the ratio of the Bombay High Court decision in
the case of Veekaylal Investment Co. Ltd., he assessed the income at Rs.2.66
crore, after adjusting the book loss disclosed in the Profit and Loss Account
against the capital gains.

The CIT(A), relying on the Apex Court decision in the case of
Appollo Tyres Ltd. and of the Mumbai High Court decision in the case of Kinetic
Motor Co. Ltd., held that the Assessing Officer had no power to recast the
profit disclosed in the audited accounts. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in
the case of Appollo Tyres Ltd. and of the Mumbai High Court in the case of
Akshay Textile Trading & Agencies Pvt. Ltd. agreed with the CIT(A) and held that
the AO has no power to recast the profit once the same was certified by the
statutory auditors, and only those adjustments which are permitted by
Explanation to Ss.(2) of S. 115JA of the Act, can be made.

Cases referred to :



1. Appollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, 255 ITR 273 (SC)

2. CIT v. Akshay Textile Trading & Agencies Pvt. Ltd.,
203 Taxation 303 (Bom.)

3. Kinetic Motor Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, 262 ITR 330
(Mum.)

4. CIT v. Veekaylal Investment Co. Ltd., 249 ITR 330
(Bom.)


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S. 272A(2)(e) — Delay in return due to non-availability of accounts condoned.

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New Page 9

21 ADIT (E) v. Shri Vardhaman Sthanakvasi Jain
Sangh


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA Nos. 961 to 965/Mum./2006

A.Y. 1998-99 to 2002-03. Decided on : 16-5-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Malathi Sridharan/ K. Shivaram
and Paras Savla

S. 272A(2)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for delay
in furnishing of return — Delay was on account of non-availability of the
accounts — Whether cause of the delay was reasonable to condone the delay —
Held, Yes.

Per Bench :

Facts :

In respect of the years under appeal there was delay in
filing of returns of income which ranged between 553 days to 1,649 days. The
delay according to the assessee, was due to non-availability of accounts which
were taken by the accountant of the assessee and which could be obtained by the
assessee after long persuasion, in the year 2003-04. This resulted into delay in
finalisation of accounts and in auditing thereof. However, according to the
Assessing Officer, there was no reasonable cause for the failure to file the
return within the stipulated time and relying on the Bombay High Court decision
in the case of Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical Relief, levied a penalty
u/s.272A(2)(e) of the Act, which aggregated to Rs.6.44 lacs computed @ Rs.100
for each day of default. On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on the decisions listed at
S. Nos. 2 to 4 below and deleted the penalty.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue went in appeal before the
Tribunal and relied on the order of the Assessing Officer, and the Bombay High
Court decision relied on by the Assessing Officer.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A). Further, according to
the Tribunal, the returns filed by the assessee were non-est returns.
Therefore, relying on the Tribunal decision in the case of Rupam Cut Piece
Centre, it held that no penalty can be imposed.

Cases referred to :



1. Rupam Cut Piece Centre, 42 TTJ 533

2. CIT v. Sulekha Works Pvt. Ltd., 156 ITR 190
(Cal.)

3. CIT v. Vishnu Brass Parts Works Taxation, 48(1)
Guj.

4. CIT v. Maheshprasad Gupta, 178 ITR 468 (MP)

5. DIT (Exemption) v. Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical
Relief,
250 ITR 488 (Mum.)



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Reassessment: Limitation: Exclusion from limitation: S/s. 147, 148, 149 and 150: A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2002-03: Reassessment pursuant to order of appellate authority in case of third party: Condition precedent for exclusion of limitation: Assessee must be given opportunity to be heard: Order of Tribunal in case of third party holding that interest income belonged to assessee: Notice for reassessment beyond six years to assessee without giving opportunity to be heard: Notice barred by time:

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Rural Electrification Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT; 355 ITR 345 (Del):

The assessee advanced loans to a co-operative society which created a special corpus fund. The society earned interest on the special fund but did not disclose it in its return of income on the ground that the money actually belonged to the assessee and that any income earned thereon was on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal agreed with the submissions of the society and held that the interest was not taxable in the hands of the society but ought to be taxed in the hands of the assessee. On the basis of the said observations of the Tribunal the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 23-03-2011 for reopening the assessment for the A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2002-03.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, set aside the notices issued u/s. 148 and held as under:

“i) Before a notice u/s. 148 can be issued beyond the time limit prescribed u/s. 149, the ingredients of Explanation 3 to section 153 have to be satisfied. Those ingredients require that there must be a finding that income which is excluded from the total income of one person is income of another person. The second ingredient is that before such a finding is recorded, such other person should be given an opportunity of being heard.

ii) When the Tribunal held in favour of the society concluding that the interest was not taxable in its hands and that the interest ought to have been taxed in the hands of the assessee, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the assessee. No opportunity of hearing was given to the assessee prior to the passing of the order by the Tribunal in the case of the society.

iii) As such, one essential ingredient of Explanation 3 was missing and, therefore, the deeming clause would not get triggered. Thus, section 150 would not apply and, therefore, the bar of limitation prescribed by section 149 was not lifted. In such a situation, the normal provisions of limitation prescribed u/s. 149 would apply.

iv) Those provisions restrict the time period for reopening to a maximum of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The notices u/s. 148 having been issued beyond the period of six years were time barred.”

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Penalty u/s.29(8) of MVAT Act vis-à-vis High Court judgment

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VAT

S. 29(8) about levy of
penalty was amended from 1-7-2009. The amended S. 29(8), from 1-7-2009, reads as
under :

“29. Imposition of penalty
in certain instances :


(8) Where, any person or
dealer has failed to file within the prescribed time, a return for any
period as provided in S. 20, the Commissioner shall impose on him, a sum of
rupees five thousand by way of penalty. Such penalty shall be without
prejudice to any other penalty which may be imposed under this Act.”


It appears that from
1-7-2009 the quantum of penalty is sought to be fixed and also to make it
mandatory. Simultaneously, by amendment in S. 85(2) (b-2) the above penalty
order is made non-appealable. The learned Commissioner of Sales Tax has issued
Circular No. 22T of 2009, dated 6-8-2009 in which the implications of the above
amendments are explained and amongst others it is mentioned as under :


“3.
Penalty for non-filing or late filing of
returns — S. 29(8) is substituted :


(e) Amended sub-section
provides mandatory penalty and is in addition to any other penalty provided
under the Act.

(f) The officer shall
not have any discretion whether to levy or not to levy the penalty as also
to decide the quantum of penalty.

(g) The penalty order
passed under this Section is made non-appeallable; therefore there shall be
no appeal against the levy of penalty. [S. 85(2) amended]

(h) Needless to state
that since the levy of penalty for non-filing or late filing of returns has
become mandatory; there is no need to issue the show-cause notice before the
levy of such a penalty.”


The above mandatory levy of
penalty, in all circumstances, without right of appeal and without hearing
opportunity was agitating the minds of traders/dealers. On the behest of Tax
Consultants Association, Sangli and Federation of Association of Maharashtra,
writ petitions in case of Sanjay Dresses and Ravindra Udyog were filed before
Hon. Bombay High Court. In both the writ petitions the following challenges were
made :


(1) The S. 29(8) is
ultra vires the Constitution. It does not allow discretion in the matter of
levy of penalty. There can be a number of instances where delay will be due
to circumstances beyond control of the dealer, like medical emergency,
computer failure and others. The penalty amount of Rs.5000 may also exceed
the tax amount payable in return, e.g. tax payable may be Rs.100 but penalty
would be Rs.5000. The penalty is not commensurate to the object to be
achieved. This will be confiscatory as well as amounting to levy of tax on
income rather the penalty.

(2) That the order is
not appealable was also challenged. The penalty, being discretionary, the
mechanism of appeal is necessary.

(3) The penalty cannot
be levied without hearing. It is against the principles of natural justice.
Even assuming that the penalty is mandatory, still it may be levied in case
where return is not due, or the return is filed but not noticed by the
Department, etc., if levied without hearing. Therefore the hearing is a
must.

(4) The penalty be
deleted/reduced on the facts of the case.


When the above writ
petitions came up for hearing, the High Court was of the opinion that since
penalty order is passed without hearing, it is bad in law. At this juncture the
learned advocate on behalf of the Department tried to argue that post-levy
remedy is available like rectification. However when the High Court pointed out
that the hearing is required before the penalty order is passed, the learned
advocate conceded that the hearing is necessary before levy of penalty u/s.29(8)
and requested to set aside the order and remand back the matter. It is at this
point the High Court passed the order (Sanjay Dresses W.P. 1705 of 2009, dated
6-8-2010 and Ravindra Udyog W.P. 1214 of 2010, dated 6-8-2010, one of which is
reproduced below). When pointed out to the High Court that there are other
challenges, the High Court has specifically stated in the order that even after
passing a speaking penalty order, if there is a grievance, the petitioner can
again file a writ petition. Thus the other challenges are kept open to be dealt
with in subsequent matter, which may take place later.

“In the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
— Writ Petition No. 1705 of 2010

M/s. Sanjay Dresses …
Petitioner

v.

The State of Maharashtra …
Respondent

C. B. Thakar for the
petitioner.

V. A. Sonpal, ‘A’ Panel
counsel for the respondent.

Coram : V. C. Daga and S. J.
Kathawalla, JJ.

Dated : 6th August 2010.

P.C. :

Perused petition.

Heard learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Sonpal, learned counsel for the respondent.

    2. Mr. Sonpal, during the course of hearing, urged that the impugned order levying penalty be set aside and the matter be remitted back for consideration afresh so as to enable the Department to comply with the requirement of principles of natural justice. He further submits that fresh notice will be issued to the petitioner indicating the grounds on which the Department proposes to levy penalty. That the petitioner would be given an opportunity to reply the same and after considering the reply and affording personal hearing to the petitioner a reasoned order would be passed dealing with all the contentions raised by the petitioner.

    3. In the above view of the submission, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition reserving his right to challenge adverse order on the grounds as may be available in law including the grounds raised in this petition. All contentions of the parties on merits are kept open.

    4. Petition stands disposed of as withdrawn in terms of this order with no order as to cots.
(S. J. Kathawalla, J.)    (V. C. Daga, J.)”

Conclusion :

    1) The other challenges like Constitutional validity, and non-appealability are still open issues before the High Court.

    2)Since the Department itself has accepted that hearing is necessary before levy of penalty, the said principle will be required to be followed in case of other dealers also. The Department cannot take a stand that hearing is required to be given only to those who come before the High Court and not to others, though principle of giving hearing before levy of penalty u/s.29(8) is accepted. It will be an absurd contradiction and also discriminatory. If any other dealer approaches the High Court on the same ground, surely it will be difficult for the Department to save the situation in view of their own admission about giving hearing.

Follow-up action in case of penalty orders already passed:

Since 1st July 2009, a large number of penalty orders have already been passed without giving hearing. Such dealers can now file Form 307 (Rectification) and ask for cancellation of such orders, as bad in law. The Department will be required to cancel the same, give hearing and then pass reasoned orders, if required.

It may be noted that, in several cases, in the matters of levying penalty, the courts and tribunals have ruled that penalty cannot be levied if there is a genuine reason for the delay.

Inter-State works contract vis-à-vis application of composition scheme provided under local act :

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VAT

Inter-State works contract vis-à-vis application of
composition scheme provided under local act :


After 11-5-2002 inter-State works contracts are also liable
to tax under the CST Act. A question arises about deciding the value of goods
for levy of tax. Since works contract is a composite contract, involving supply
of goods as well as rendering of services, it becomes necessary to determine the
value of goods from the composite value for levy of tax under the CST Act.
Normally the said value is to be decided as per the guidelines given by the
Supreme Court in case of M/s. Gannon Dunkerly and Co. (88 STC 204) (SC). For
ready reference the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below :

“The value of the goods involved in the execution of a
works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by taking into account
the value of the entire works contract and deducting there-from the charges
towards labour and services which would cover :

(a) labour charges for execution of the works;

(b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and
services;

(c) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;

(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery
and tools used for execution of the works contract;

(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel,
etc., used in execution of the works contract the property in which is not
transferred in the course of execution of a works contract; and

(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent
it is relatable to supply of labour and services;

(g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour
and services;

(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is
relatable to supply of labour and services.

The amounts deductible under these heads will have to be
determined in the light of the facts of a particular case on the basis of the
material produced by the contractor.”

However to decide the value of goods, as per above
guidelines, is sometimes very difficult depending upon complexity of the
contract. Under Local Sales Tax Laws, a standard deduction method (i.e.,
abatement at fixed percentage) is provided for giving deduction for labour
portion and the balance is considered as value of the goods. Under the CST Act,
enabling provision for prescribing standard deduction rates is made by way of
proviso to S. 2(h) (definition of ‘sale price’) of the CST Act. However, till
today no such standard deduction rates are prescribed. Therefore, a question
arises as to whether a dealer can opt for such deduction rates provided under
the Local Act, for deciding the value of goods under the CST Act. Though the
issue was debatable, but, after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Mahim Patram (6 VST 248)(SC) it has became fairly clear. In light of the
observations made by the Supreme Court, it is felt that determination of value
of goods in a works contract is a part of assessment procedure and since by S.
9(2) of the CST Act the provisions of the Local Act for assessment are made
applicable to the CST Act also, the provisions about standard deduction can also
apply for determination of taxable value of works contracts under the CST Act,
1956. However after taking deduction of labour charges on standard deduction
basis, the further issue is about dividing the turnover in relation to
particular slab rates, like liable to 4%/12.5%, etc.

The determination of tax rate for a particular turnover under
the CST Act is provided u/s.8 of the CST Act, 1956. There is no other provision
under the CST Act for deciding the rate of tax. Therefore, though one can
determine the value of the goods, the division of the same in different slab
rates is again a complex issue. Under the Local Act, to avoid the difficulties
of reducing contract value by labour charges as well as deciding taxable value
into different slab rates, etc., the composition schemes are provided. Under
such composition schemes the dealer can pay the tax on total contract value
(lump sum) at prescribed percentage. Thus, such composition schemes make
taxation of works contracts easier and simpler. For example, under the MVAT Act,
2002, two composition schemes for works contracts are provided. Under one of the
schemes, on notified construction contract, a dealer can pay at the rate of 5%
of the total contract value, whereas under the other general scheme, a dealer
can pay at the rate of 8% of the total contract value. Such schemes are normally
optional and they are in lieu of tax payable as per normal rates under the Local
Act. As under such schemes there is no determination of rate of tax as per S. 8
of the CST Act, it was felt that such optional composition schemes cannot apply
to inter-State works contracts. S. 8 provides for deciding rate of taxes as per
legal provisions and there is also no alternative composition scheme under the
CST Act for paying tax on lump sum contract value.

However, it appears that the said issue is also now resolved
by the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority (CSTAA). This authority, which is
set up to determine inter-State tax disputes under the CST Act, when two or more
states are involved, is constituted under the provisions of the CST Act, 1956.
The said authority has recently decided the above issue in the case of
Commissioner of VAT v. State of Haryana,
(23 VST 10). In this case the issue
was about the nature of contract as well as determining assessable value of the
contract. The facts were that the contractor had received a contract from the
Government of New Delhi for improvement of roads, etc. For completing the said
work the contractor transported bituminous mixture (known as dense asphalt
concrete) from Haryana to New Delhi. The New Delhi authorities wanted to tax the
transaction as local sale. The Haryana Government protested the same on the
ground that it is inter-State sale from Haryana liable to tax in Haryana under
the CST Act, 1956. CSTAA agreed to this proposition of the Haryana Government.

The next issue under the said judgment was about discharging
of the CST liability on the said contract in Haryana. In Haryana, there was
composition scheme and a contractor could opt for the same. The CSTAA observed
as under :


“Just as in the Ll.P, Trade Tax Act, in the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 too, there are provisions dealing with the manner of determination of sale price of goods involved in a works contract. The relevant provisions are the following:

The definition of ‘sale’ includes consideration for the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract [vide (ze) of clause (ii)]. Clause (zg) defines ‘sale price’. Explanation thereto which is relevant for our purpose reads thus:
 
“Explanation (i): In relation to the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in execution of a works contract, sale price shall mean such amount as is arrived at by deducting from the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable toa person for the execution of such works contract, the amount representing labour and other service charges incurred for such execution, and where such labour and other service charges are not quantifiable, the sale price shall be the cost of acquisition of the goods and the margin of profit on them prevalent in the trade plus the cost of transferring the property in the goods and all other expenses in relation thereof till the property in them, whether as such or in any other form, passes to the contractee and where the property passes in a different form shall include the cost of conversion.”

Thus the manner of ascertainment of sale price has been specified in Explanation (i). Then, Rule 49 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 provides for a lump sum scheme of tax payment in respect of works contract. The framing of such rule is in accordance with S. 9 of the HVAT Act. It reads thus:

“A contractor liable to pay tax under the Act may, in respect of a works contract awarded to him for execution in the State, pay in lieu of tax payable by him under the Act on the transfer of property (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of the contract, a lump sum calculated at four percent of the total making an application to the appropriate assessing authority within thirty days of the award of the contract to him, containing the following particulars ….

and appending therewith a copy of the contract or such part thereof as relates to total cost and payments.”

Thus, the procedure for arriving at the sale price in relation to works contract has been put in place in the HVAT Act which was enacted in 2003 by repealing the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. It is, therefore clear that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahim Patram case (2007) 6 VST 248 applies with equal force to the present case.”

In light of above observations it appears that the CSTAA has considered both, deduction method as well as composition scheme, as applicable to the CST Act, 1956. Therefore, a dealer can now safely opt for composition scheme under the CST Act also for discharging tax liability on inter-State works contracts. This may be useful to dealers in discharging liability on inter-State works contract by opting for a simple method.

Liability of Builders — “K. Raheja” explained

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VAT

A controversy is floating around as to whether Builders or
Developers are liable to sales tax (VAT) on sale of premises such as flats,
offices, etc.


It is well understood that sales tax (VAT) may be levied on
sale of goods and not on sale of immovable properties, and the transactions of
sale of flats, offices, etc. are in the nature of sale of immovable properties,
hence the same are outside the purview of sales tax laws. However, there may be
a situation where the builder or developer may commence construction activity
for building, etc. and while the construction is on, the builder may enter into
an agreement with the prospective buyer for sale of premises. These are normally
referred to as ‘Under-Construction Contracts’. The controversy is about the
above transactions. The Revenue Department is of the opinion that the work
carried on by the builder/developer, after entering into such Under-Construction
Contract, is liable to sales tax as works contract. The argument is that since
there is an agreement for sale of premises and the work, using the property of
the builder, is done after such agreement, the property used in such work can be
said to have been transferred in the execution of works contract and hence the
liability will accrue. In fact this was the issue taken up by the Sales Tax
Department in Karnataka in case of K. Raheja. The matter went to the Supreme
Court.

The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in 2005 in the case
of K. Rehaja Construction, which is reported in 141 STC 298. Based on this
judgment, the Department is taking a view that all under-construction agreements
are liable to sales tax as works contracts. A similar view is also tried to be
adopted by the Sales Tax Department of Maharashtra as is evident from Circular
issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax bearing No. 12T of 2007, dated 7-2-2007.
In the ‘Sales Tax Corner’ of BCAJ (March, 2007), we have analysed the position
and observed that in spite of the judgment in the case of K. Raheja, all the
under-construction agreements cannot be liable to sales tax. The distinguishing
features in K. Raheja were also highlighted. In the case of K. Raheja, there
were in fact two separate agreements, one for sale of land and other for
construction, though embodied in one agreement. It is under these circumstances,
the Supreme Court observed that there is a separate sale of land and a separate
contract for construction. Therefore it was held by the Court that it is a works
contract liable to sales tax. In light of the above observations of the Supreme
Court it was pointed out that if in the under-construction contract the price of
land is not mentioned separately, then the judgment in the case of K. Raheja
cannot apply.

Recently the Gauhati High Court had an occasion to deal with
similar controversy in the case of Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others v.
Union of India,
(15 VST 17). The issue was in relation to service tax on
builders. While deciding the issue, the High Court has dealt with the effect of
the judgment of K. Raheja. A gist of the judgment is as under :

The petitioner was involved in development and sale of
immovable properties like, flats, etc. They entered into ‘flat purchase
agreements’ with various purchasers, wherein the petitioner-company allotted and
sold flats to the purchasers. The petitioner-company entered into an agreement
for sale of flat, which was registered. The Service Tax Department issued notice
on the ground that the petitioner- company is providing ‘Commercial or
Industrial Construction Service/Construction of Complex Service’. The
petitioner-company filed writ petition before the High Court and contended that
the transaction between the petitioner and the flat purchaser was purely a
transaction of sale of flat (i.e., sale of immovable property) and not a
contract for rendering of service of any nature whatsoever.

The High Court observed that in the case of
petitioner-company, the petitioner was not shown to have undertaken any
construction work for and on behalf of proposed customer and the title in the
flat passed to the customer only on execution of sale deed and registration
thereof. Until the time the sale deed was executed, the title and interest
including the ownership and possession in the construction made remained with
the petitioner. The construction activities which the petitioner had been
undertaking were in respect of the petitioner’s own work and it was only the
constructed work which was sold by the petitioner-company to the buyer, who
might have entered into agreement for sale before construction had actually
started or during the progress of construction activity. Any advance made by a
prospective buyer was against the consideration for sale of flat to the
prospective buyer and not for the purpose of obtaining services from the
petitioner. Under the above circumstances, the Gauhati High Court held that the
transaction cannot be liable to service tax.

The same principle will apply even for deciding the liability
under sales tax laws. As there is no element of rendering services while
selling the flat, similarly there cannot be sale of material, as ultimately in
such an agreement the flat, an immovable property is sold.


Amongst others, in relation to the judgment of K. Raheja, the
High Court observed as under :


34. Referring to K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka Assistant, (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 RC 105; (2005) 5 SCC 162, learned Assistant Solicitor-General has submitted that when the construction activities are carried on by a person by creating its own agency, it would amount to construction services. There can be no doubt that when a person creates an entity and engages such entity for its own constructional activities for the purpose of construction of residential complex, not for itself but for others, it would amount to construction service. What may, however, be pointed out is that the decision of the Apex Court in K. Raheja Development (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 SCC 162, which the respondents rely upon, is not applicable to the case at hand, inasmuch as this decision was rendered on the facts of its own case. In the present case, the petitioner-company is not shown to have under-taken any construction work for and on behalf of proposed customer / allottees and the title, in the flat/ apartments so constructed, passes to the customer only on execution of sale deeds and registration thereof. Until the time the sale deed is executed, the title and interest, including the ownership and possession in the constructions made, remain with the petitioner-company. The payments made by prospective purchasers in instalments, are aimed at facilitating purchase of the flat/premises by these probable purchasers, so that they may not be required to pay whole consideration at a time. From the condition so incorporated in the relevant agreement for sale, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner company is making construction for and on behalf of the probable allottees or purchasers.

35. Further, in K. Raheja Development Corporation (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 RC 105; (2005) 5 SCC 162, the Apex Court was considering the issue relating to ‘sales tax’ and the issue therein was not at all related to ‘service tax’. While interpreting the provisions of ‘sales tax’ under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, the Apex Court held in K. Raheja Development Corporation (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 RC 105; (2005) -I 5 SCC 162, that the definition of ‘works contract’ given under the Finance Act, 1994 is very wide and is not restricted to the ‘works contract’ as commonly understood, i.e., a contract to do some work on behalf of someone else. The Apex Court, therefore, held as under (at page 302 of STC) :

“…..The definition would  therefore  take within its ambit any type of agreement wherein construction of a building takes place either for cash or deferred payment, or valuable consideration. To be also noted that the definition does not lay down that the construction must be on behalf of an owner of the property or that the construction cannot be by the owner of the property. Thus even if an owner of property enters into an agreement to construct for cash, deferred payment or valuable consideration a building or flats on behalf of anybody else it would be a works contract within the meaning of the term as used under the Finance Act, 1994./1

36. In K. Raheja Development  Corporation  (2005) STC 298 (SC); 2005 5 RC 105; (2005) 5 SCC 162, the agreement provided that K. Raheja Development Corporation, as developers, on its own behalf, and also as developer for those persons, who would eventually purchase the flats, do the construction works. Thus, K. Raheja Development Corporation was not only undertaking construction work on its own behalf, but also on behalf of others who were prospective buyers. It is, in such circumstances, that K. Raheja Development Corporation was treated to have been doing the ‘works contract’. In the present case there is no material to show that the petitioner-company constructs the flat/ apartments on behalf of the prospective allottees and, hence, it cannot be said that the constructions done by the petitioner-company are the constructions undertaken by the petitioner-company for and on behalf of their prospective buyers/allottees. Thus, there is no ‘service’ rendered by the petitioner-company to the prospective allottees. Similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Assotech Realty Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 8 VST 738, wherein the Court has held as under (atpage  759):

“……In the present case, we find that  the petitioner is constructing the flats/ apartments not for and on behalf of the prospective allottees but otherwise. The payment schedule would not alter the transaction. The right, title and interest in the construction continue to remain with the petitioner. It cannot be said that the constructions were undertaken for and on behalf of the prospective allottees and, therefore, the constructions in question undertaken by the petitioner would not fall under clause (m) of S. 2 read with S. 3F of the Act and are outside the purview of the provisions of the Act. In other words, they cannot be subjected to tax under the Act and the action, in imposing tax on such constructions treating them to be works contract, is wholly without jurisdiction ….

If the above observations are read along with the detailed facts narrated in the Supreme Court judgment, it transpires that if the land price is shown separately, then a presumption can be made that there is sale of land and construction thereon is a separate transaction. This will amount to carryon work on behalf of others i.e., on behalf of prospective buyers. Therefore, where there is no such separation, the ratio of the above judgment will apply and there cannot be any liability under sales tax as works contract. Though one can wait for a direct judgment on the issue, the above judgment will be useful for understanding the effect of K. Raheja Construction and for advancing the contention that builders/ developers cannot be liable to sales tax in relation to each and every under-construction agreement. The liability will depend upon the facts of each case based upon terms of agreement, etc.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14 dated 22nd July, 2013

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Export of Goods and Software – Realisation and Repatriation of export proceeds – Liberalisation

This circular clarifies that exporters are required to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported upto 30th September, 2013 within nine months from the date of export i.e. the provision will be applicable for exports undertaken between 1st April, 2013 and 30th September, 2013. However, there are no changes in the provisions with respect to period of realisation and repatriation of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to warehouses established outside India.

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Challenge to Arbitration Award issued in foreign country should be in the country where award is published

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In the present case, the parties agreed that the arbitration would be held at Geneva, Switzerland. Hence, the Swiss law could be the curial law. The parties agreed, rules framed by ICC, Paris would be the appropriate procedure. In any event, Indian law would have no role to play when the parties expressly agreed that they would have sitting of arbitration abroad where Indian law would have no force.

When there was no express designated venue, the law applicable to the seat of arbitration would be the curial law.

If a contracting party feels, his counterpart in contract committed any breach, place of committing of breach would be ordinarily place where he should ventilate his grievance. Similarly, when arbitration is held in a particular place and losing party feels, the Tribunal did not decide issue in the way it ought to have, he has to approach the Court where arbitration was held and/or award was published unless parties mutually agree to be guided by another law or law of place where contract was performed.

Coal India Ltd vs. Canadian Commercial Corporation AIR 2013 (NOC) 265 (Cal.)

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NEW BANKING LICENSES-THE WAY FORWARD

1. Objective and Evolution of Global Banking

The word “bank” was borrowed from Middle French “banque”, from Old Italian “banca”, from Old High German “banc” which means “bench, counter”. Benches were used as desks or exchange counters during the Renaissance by Florentine bankers , who used to make their transactions atop desks covered by green tablecloths. Today, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) the world’s largest bank , has about $2.43 trillion of deposits, which is almost higher than the nominal GDP of India, Italy, Russia, France and the UK.

Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 defines a bank as “a banking company which transacts the business of banking in India”. Further, section 5 (b) of the Act defines banking as “accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, or deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise.”

Typically, the provision of deposit and loan products normally distinguishes banks from other types of financial firms. The core activity of banks is to act as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. However, several banks have successfully leveraged this relationship with depositors and borrowers (channel) to provide all sort of financial services ranging from core services (ATM, Cards, project finance) to ancillary services (Bancassurance, Investment banking, Wealth Management, etc.) to complex & structured solutions (Mortgage Backed Securities, Collateralised Debt Obligation, etc.). For example, other income (non-funded revenues) of Axis Bank was at ~20% of total revenues in FY13.

Conversely, non-financial entities having eminent distribution networks have migrated to the role of providing banking services. For example, Japan Post Bank which is owned by Japan Post Holdings Co., has the largest public deposit in Japan ($1.81 trillion) garnered through a nationwide network of post offices. However, the bank primarily invests its money in government bonds and acts merely as a savings bank. In India, the Department of Posts has applied for a banking license and perhaps is pursuing a similar model.

Banks can create new money when they make a loan. New loans throughout the banking system generate new deposits elsewhere in the system. The money supply is usually increased by the act of lending, and reduced when loans are repaid faster than new ones are generated. In the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2007, there was a big increase in the money supply, largely caused by much more bank lending, which served to push up property prices and increase private debt. The amount of money in the economy in the UK went from £750 billion to £1700 billion between 1997 and 2007, much of the increase caused by bank lending. In fact in many European countries, bank assets dwarf the size of the local economy and are far in excess of other regions in the world as per Table 1.

Excessive or risky lending can cause borrowers to default, the banks then become more cautious, so there is less lending and therefore less money so that the economy can go from boom to bust as happened in the UK and many other Western economies after 2007. Consequently, European banks’ profits have plummeted from 46% to 1.58% in the Top 1000 bank profits list whereas Asia’s banks have increased their profits from 19% to 56%.

2.    Evolution of Banking in India and need for new banking licenses

While global banking has seen regional disproportional growth due to country specific economic and regulatory requirements, India has its own model for financial development and its regulations. To a great extent, the conservative approach adopted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has helped insulate the domestic banks from global crisis; on the other hand, none of the Indian banks have become global in size.

India has 168 Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) and 82 cooperative banks. Of the 168 SCBs, 82 are Regional Rural Banks and 26 are Public Sector Banks. Thus, only 60 banks are private of which, 40 are foreign banks. According to RBI’s quarterly statistics on deposits and credit of scheduled commercial banks in March 2012, PSBs accounted for approximately 75% per cent of the aggregate deposits. This lopsided structure, where all the eggs are in the same basket, increases the risks to the economy and erodes financial stability while adding a lot of stress on the public banks to increase financial Inclusion. Further, Indian banks will have to bring in additional capital of Rs. 5 lakh crore to meet Basel III norms. The government on its part has to infuse Rs. 90,000 crore into the PSBs to maintain majority shareholding under Basel III.

RBI has as a strategy, since the economic liberalisation in 1991, has followed the cycle of permitting new bank licenses once every decade—in 1993, 2003 and 2013. This permits RBI to regulate the growth and stability of the banking system as well as the new entrants.

The key economic environment under which new banking licenses will be awarded in 2013 could be summarised as below:

•    Overall economic growth

We are in a situation where economic growth has collapsed, industrial output has stagnated for two years, jobs are being shed, consumer inflation is close to 10%, the current account deficit (CAD) in the balance of payments is nearly 5% of GDP at last count, investment is fleeing abroad, external debt maturing in the current fiscal year exceeds $170 billion and the rupee is touching new lows against the dollar each week. While the RBI and the Government are intervening with short-term measures, longer term initiatives are imperative.

As per the discussion paper on the entry of new banks into the private sector (Discussion Paper): “It is generally accepted that greater financial system depth, stability and soundness contribute to economic growth. But beyond that for growth to be truly inclusive requires broadening and deepening the reach of banking. A wider distribution and access of financial services helps both consumers and producers raise their welfare and productivity.”

There are three fundamental reasons for this cor-relation: (1) the banking system creates a more stable employment environment and provides more business opportunity, (2) it helps enlarging the per capita GDP as it brings the unaccounted sector into its fold and (3) it brings additional capital to the banking system, which has a snowball effect.

•    Financial Inclusion

As per the census of India about 59% of households had access to banking services in 2011 and the all-India average population per bank branch was 12,500 in 2012. The majority of India’s 6,50,000 villages do not have even one bank branch, and just 3.5 of every 10 Indians have access to formal banking services in the country, according to a 2011 World Bank survey. Only 37,471 branches were operational in rural India, as of March 2012, while the total banking outlets in villages (including branches, business correspondents and other modes) number just 1,81,753.

While the existing banks also function as per the same mandate (one rural branch out of every four branches), the entry of new players, with a specific and deeper financial inclusion as a license condition, should augment the overall rural presence.

•    Efficiency and Competition

While the overall efficiency of banks in India is increasing, there exists a lot of scope to improve the efficiency of the public sector banks. Net impaired assets (net NPAs + restructured assets) have increased rapidly in FY12 and FY13. Net impaired assets to net worth ratios are now at alarming levels, particularly for PSU banks. Barring BOB and SBI, for all other PSU banks, net impaired assets are almost equal to or even more than 1Q14 net worth. However, for private sector banks, stress levels are very much under control and manageable. Net impaired assets as a percentage of net worth is ~10% for private sector banks (except for Axis Bank at 14% and ICICI Bank at 12%).

Even for private banks, bringing in fresh competition from well-managed business houses, having proven track record in both profitability and setting up pan-India networks (e.g. telecom), will improve the competition and bring in innovation into the system which will only benefit the consumer. Currently, since there are only 3-4 private banks which have pan-India presence, entry of larger business houses will provide competition and much required depth to the financial system in India.

3.    New banking license guidelines

RBI granted licenses to 10 private players between 1993 and 2003. The players were ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, UTI Bank (now Axis), Global Trust Bank (GTB), IDBI Bank, Times Bank, Centurion Bank, Bank of Punjab, IndusInd Bank, and businessman CR Bhansali, who was accorded an in-principle approval but the bank never materialised. Of the 10, four were promoted by financial institutions and the remaining six by individual banking professionals. As it turned out, all those promoted by individuals either failed or merged with other banks, (viz., GTB with Oriental Bank of Commerce and Times Bank, Bank of Punjab and Centurion Bank with HDFC Bank).

The central bank become more cautious, and be-tween 2004 and 2010 granted licenses only to Kotak Mahindra Bank and Yes Bank.

The failures/mergers were essentially due to (1) weak corporate governance/frauds (CR Bhansali and GTB) and (2) lack of promoter interest or deep pockets (Times Bank, Bank of Punjab and Centurion Bank). RBI also noted that the experience of the Local Area Banks have also not been encouraging due to small size and concentration risk. Similar is the situation with RRBs.

The discussion paper thus notes: “The experience of the Reserve Bank over these 17 years has been that, only those banks that had adequate experience in broad financial sector, financial resources, trust-worthy people, strong and competent managerial support could withstand the rigorous demands of promoting and managing a bank.”

Further, Indian regulators have also learnt that during the 2008 crisis, it was the strength of the Indian JV partner which helped sustain the business, for example, an entity like Tata AIG. Further, RBI also learnt that only domestic banks (unlike foreign banks) have been able to penetrate the country and support financial inclusion.

In light of the macroeconomic situation and experiences both domestically and internationally (Lehman Brothers collapse, etc), RBI has come out with guidelines for issuance of new banking licenses. The table below attempts to summarise the key conditions of the guidelines and rationale for the same:

While the objective tests have been laid down as above, RBI has retained subjectivity in the allotment of banking license to give itself flexibility in decision making. It is expected that the RBI may consider the following and perhaps more, while evaluating each of the applications:

•    Industrial and business houses having a long history of building and nurturing new businesses in highly regulated sectors such as Telecom, Power,

Automobiles, Defence, infrastructure projects like Airports, Highways, Dams, Ports probably may be considered favourably as industrial and business houses with presence across various sectors would face a higher reputational risk compared to a pure individual promoter or financial services player.

•    Background of promoter, directors and top executives. No objection certificate of the promoter’s credentials, integrity and background will probably be taken from banks, other regulatory agencies and also from investigating agencies.

•    Corporate governance standards in the corporate entity, extent of financial activities carried out by the industrial/business house, comfort with the corporate structure within the group, whether ownership is diversified and separate from management and the source of promoters’ equity.

4.    Applicants and way forward

Unlike an NBFC License, a banking license is controlled with an occasional window which opens briefly, once in a decade. Essentially, some sort of excitement is expected over the number of applicants. In 1993, 13 applications were received out of which 10 were awarded the license. In 2003, 100+ applications were received out which license was awarded only to two. When the current guidelines of 2013 were announced, media reports expected over 100 applications to be received by RBI before the cut-off date of 1st July, 2013. To everyone’s surprise, only 26 applicants were received. Expected big names like Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd opted not to apply citing that the new rules may be too hard for businesses to implement.

Of course, each applicant would have done his cost benefit analysis before applying. The apparent benefits, amongst others, would be

(1)    Scalability and stability of business,

(2)    Better cost of capital due to access to public deposits,

(3)    Distribution network so as to improve the fee based income (eg- Bancassurance), and

(4)    Return on investments. Table 2 indicates the share price performance of new banks commenced since 1993.

The key challenges for setting up the bank would, amongst others, be

(1)    Stringent regulations, not just for the bank, but for all financial regulated entities in the Applicant group and

(2)    Cost on account of priority sector lending, branch expansion and financial inclusion.

The bigger issue arises from the fact that the conditions are expected to be complied with from day one of the commencement of the bank business. RBI has emphasised that it will not deviate from the guidelines while allotting licenses and thus, will not grant any exemptions.

The list of applicants along with a possible classification, and RBI’s potential key consideration for that bucket is tabled below.

RBI is now expected to set up a committee to screen and shortlist the applicants who will be called for interviews and discussion on the business plan. The in-principle approvals for the licenses are expected to be issued anywhere before the election next year and most probably between January to March 2014. It also needs to be seen if Mr Raghuram Rajan, the new RBI Governor (and former IMF chief economist) who was not in favour of the government giving banking licenses to industrial houses, has a decisive role to play in the grant of the banking licenses. His opinion has been that existing peers, like NBFCs and MFIs, should be given preference over corporates owing to their experience in this business. According to Mr Rajan, “If corporates are given license, the regulator needs to ensure there is no inter-company lending, proper risk management processes are followed and there is enough transparency.”5

Of the number of applicants, RBI will now be required to address several critical questions, including:

•    How many banking licenses should be issued, assuming the industry is likely to consolidate?

•    Will players with pan-India focus be given preference over regional players? Or whether both the categories of applicant will be considered?

•    Whether large industrial houses with experience in setting up pan-India networks like telecom, automobiles, etc., will get preference?

* The authors are senior officials of a well-known financial company. The views expressed in the article are their personal views.

1Medici Bank

2The Bankers Top 1000 World Banks Ranking – July 2013

5http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-02/ news/29374475_1_banking-licence-corporate-houses-raghuram-rajan

E-filing of tax returns goes to the next level

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Readers would be aware of the e-filing requirements with reference to income-tax returns. These were brought onto the statute long back and, by now, most of us are well versed in the process of e-filing of the ITR forms. We also have the e-filing requirements under Company Law whereby we have been filing documents electronically with the MCA. For the past few years, ever since the e-filing of returns was made mandatory, we have had a situation where the audited accounts, the tax audit report, the MAT certificate etc., have not been submitted to the tax department unless specifically called for during a scrutiny. This, in my opinion, has inadvertently led to a bit of leniency being shown by many of our members in terms of timely closure of documentation and filing.

Background:
Section 139 requires certain categories of persons to file tax returns in India. Section 139(1) states that the returns need to be in prescribed form. Rule 12 lays down the prescribed forms. Proviso to Rule 12(3) as amended vide Notification No. 37/2011/F. No. 149/68/2011-SO(TPL) dated 01-07-2011 makes it mandatory for some of these categories of return filers to e-file their returns mandatorily. For others, there is an option to e-file the returns (section 139(1B)) but only if they are assessable in specified cities. Section 139(1B) empowers the Government to formulate a scheme for e-filing. In pursuance of this power, the “Furnishing of Return of Income on Internet Scheme 2004” was notified on 30-9-2004. Then, this scheme was superseded by the “Electronic Furnishing of Return of Income Scheme 2007” vide notification No. SO 1281 (E) d. 27-70-2007.

As per Rule 12 (2), ITR-1, 2, 3, 4, 4S, 5 & 6 are not required to be accompanied by any documents. For A.Y. 2009-10, vide Circular No. 3/2009 d. 21-05-2009, the TP reports were to be filed physically before the due date. Thereafter, we have not had any such similar circulars but the practice of filing the TP reports on or before the due date for filing the returns has continued.

Recent notifications:

Now, on 1st May, 2013, the CBDT issued a Notification (No. 34/2013/F. No. 142/5/2013-TPL) which made amendments to Rule 12 whereby, the following proviso has been inserted in sub Rule (2) w.e.f. 1st April, 2013:

“Provided that where an assessee is required to furnish a report of audit under sections 44AB, 92E or 115JB of the Act, he shall furnish the same electronically.”

It is on account of this amendment that now, tax payers who are subject to a tax audit or a transfer pricing audit or who have to pay MAT, are now required to file the respective reports electronically.

Subsequent to the abovementioned notification, another notification has been issued on 11th June, 2013 (Notification No. 42/2013/ F.No.142/5/2013-TPL) which amended the proviso to Rule 12(2) which was inserted by the earlier notification dated 1st May. Now, the amended proviso reads as under:

“Provided that where an assessee is required to furnish a report of audit specified under sub-clauses (iv), (v), (vi) or (via) of clause (23C) of section 10, section 10A, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, section 44AB, section 80-IA, section 80-IB, section 80-IC, section 80-ID, section 80JJAA, section 80LA, section 92E or section 115JB of the Act, he shall furnish the same electronically.”

As a result of the above amendment, now, many more reports are required to be filed electronically.

Another interesting amendment that was made vide the notification dated 11th June is the insertion of second proviso to sub rule (3) of Rule 12. The newly inserted proviso reads as under:

“Provided further that a person who is required to furnish any report of audit referred to in proviso to sub-rule (2) electronically, other than a person to whom clause (aaa) or clause (ab) of the first proviso is applicable, shall furnish the return, in Form as applicable to him, in the manner specified in clause (ii) or clause (iii).”

The cumulative impact of all the amendments is that any taxpayer who is subject to any audit will have to file the audit report electronically and, in addition, also have to file its tax return electronically.

The new e-filing regime:
Before we look at the details of the new e-filing regime, a quick look at the changes in type of tax return forms that can be filed for A.Y. 2013-14:

 Form No.

 Change applicable from A.Y. 2013-14

 ITR-1 (Sahaj) 

 Cannot be used by an individual having:
i. A loss under IFOS
ii. A claim for foreign tax credit/relief under section 90/90A/91
iii. Exempt income exceeding Rs. 5,000

 ITR-4S (Sugam)

Cannot be used by an individual/HUF having:
i. A claim for foreign tax credit/relief under section 90/90A/91
ii. Exempt income exceeding Rs. 5,000

Similarly, the amended position regarding how the tax returns can be filed with effect from A.Y. 2013-14:

Registration of Chartered Accountant on e-filing portal:

Significantly, the onus of uploading the tax audit report, transfer pricing report, MAT certificate, trust audit report etc., has been cast on the concerned Chartered Accountant who signs such a report/certificate. As a result, the process of e-filing of such reports would begin with the concerned CA having to register himself/herself on the e-filing portal. It may be noted that many CAs would already be registered with the said portal and would have been filing their personal tax returns electronically. However, even such CAs would still need to register themselves once again on the portal. For this, one would need to visit www. incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in and register on the site under the sub-category of “Chartered Accountants” under the main category of “Tax Professional”.

While registering, the CA will have to provide his ICAI Membership Number and date of enrolment with the ICAI. We need to be careful with this data since I am informed by a Regional Council Member of ICAI that this data is cross-verified by the portal with the ICAI records. While this information is not verified by me, if it is true, then even a small mistake may lead to problems in registration. Once the CA is registered successfully, he/she would get a notification by email and on a mobile (so, both these fields are mandatory and we will have to provide a valid email ID and a valid mobile number while registering). The activation link received through email has to be activated and then the registration would be completed. The CA would then get a new login name which is based on this ICAI Membership Number as opposed to the PAN-based login ID that we are generally accustomed to.

Once the CA registers on the site, his client will then need to register the CA as the signatory to the respective report/certificate. So, for example, in case of a taxpayer XYZ Pvt. Ltd., the tax audit report will be signed by CA Mr. A, the transfer pricing report will be signed by CA Ms. B and the MAT certificate will be signed by CA Mr. C, then the said company will have to log onto the e-filing portal and register each of these CAs for the respective report/ certificate. When this is done, the concerned CA will get a mail informing that a particular taxpayer has registered the CA as its signatory. The message contains the following line:

Dear AMEET NAVINCHANDRA PATEL,

User AAXXXXXX1B has added you as the CA for FORM3CA, FORM3CB for 2013-14.

Filing of tax returns only after uploading other reports:

It may be noted that it is no longer possible for a taxpayer to file the ITR form unless the various applicable audit reports (tax audit, transfer pricing, trust, MAT) are uploaded electronically. In the ITR form, the date of uploading of each such document has to be mentioned.

Actual uploading of tax audit reports:

Once the CA has registered himself/herself and the client has also registered the CA as the tax auditor, the uploading of the tax audit report (TAR) can be done. This has to be done by the concerned CA. It may be noted that in case of partnership firms who are appointed as the tax auditors, it is the individual partner who has to register himself/herself and not the firm. Also, the same partner will also need a Digital Signa-ture Certificate (DSC) to be able to upload the TAR.

For uploading the TAR, a CA would need to download the utility provided by the tax department on their portal. Once the utility is downloaded onto a local computer, the CA can start feeding in the data. This is offline preparation of the form. The CA also has the option of going online and preparing the form and submitting it immediately thereafter. However, considering the various issues that have already been faced by the CAs who have tried to use the utility, and also considering that this is the first year of e-filing of the TAR, one would need to be very courageous to attempt an online preparation and submission.

A very important feature of the utility provided by the tax department on their site is that it is NOT MS Excel based. This is one of the biggest drawbacks of the said utility. The utility is not user friendly and requires every bit of data to be manually entered by the CA. Also, it does not allow a user to “cut-paste” from any other file. So, if you thought that you could keep an Excel sheet open and then cut from there and paste the data into the utility, you have a shock in store for you. Many CA firms use private software for preparing the computation of income and also the ITR forms. Such firms will need to decide whether they would like to use the utility provided by the Government for uploading the TAR or whether their private software vendors will provide the utility. This article refers to the utility provided by the Government. For running this utility, you will require your computer to have Java Runtime Environment Version 7 Update 6 or above (32 bit) installed in it.

Once the data is entered into the utility, the entire file needs to be validated (on similar lines as the validation required for ITR forms). Upon successful validation, the CA needs to generate a .XML file. The .XML file then has to be uploaded onto the portal with the help of a DSC (which can be either in the form of a .pfx file or a USB token). Once this is done by the CA, the ball then moves to the court of the concerned taxpayer who will get a notification that his CA has uploaded the TAR for his (taxpayer’s) approval. The taxpayer will then have to review the TAR and “Approve” or “Reject” the same. If for any reason, the assessee rejects the TAR, then the concerned CA would need to resolve the difference that the assessee has and then once again generate a fresh .XML file and upload it. The assessee would then again need to log in and “Approve” the same. Once the assessee approves the TAR with the help of a DSC, the same gets officially filed with the Income-tax department and an e-acknowledgement gets generated. This closes the e-filing procedure as far as the TAR is concerned.

Uploading of financials:

Quietly, along with the e-filing of the TAR, the Government has also simultaneously made it mandatory for the tax auditor to also upload the scanned copies of the audited accounts. Fortunately, the tax auditor does not need to feed in the balance sheet and P&L items all over again but merely scan the accounts and upload the same. This has to be done at the time of uploading the TAR. The scanned documents can be either in .TIFF format or in .PDF format. The overall size of the files cannot exceed 20MB. It appears that this limit stands increased to 50MB as per the General Instructions in the utility. However, the main screen where the said accounts are to be uploaded continues to show the size restriction as 20MB.

Actual uploading of other reports:

The same procedure as is adopted for uploading the TAR has to be followed for other forms as well. Thus, whether it is the Transfer Pricing Report in Form 3CEB or the MAT certificate in Form 29B or the audit reports of trusts, the same procedure of uploading data by the CA, validating the file, generating .XML file, uploading the said .XML file with the help of a DSC and then approving of the same by the assessee with the help of his DSC has to be followed. Upon successful “approval” of each report by the assessee, a separate e-acknowledgement gets generated.

Issues currently being faced:

There are a number of hardships that CAs are facing in the context of e-filing of the various audit reports. Some of the important ones (on which the BCAS has already made a representation) are:

1.    After the notification, the forms and the utility files were hosted on the e-filing website in the month of July, 2013 and have undergone several changes. After each change, an assessee, who has partly filled in a report but has not uploaded it, is required to re-feed the entire data, verify and then upload in the latest version, for the report to be furnished on the website. As a result, all the work-in-progress is wasted.

2.    It is not clear as to whether the financial statements to be attached have to be a scanned copy of the manually signed statements or even a PDF file digitally signed will be treated as sufficient compliance. Also, it is unclear as to where the notes to account, the auditor’s report, director’s report and the schedules are to be uploaded. In the portal, there are only the following fields for uploading the accounts:

a)    Balance Sheet

b)    Profit & Loss Account

3.    In respect of several clauses of the Form 3CD, it is normal practice for CAs to give appropriate comments. But in the e-filing utility, there is no space provided for such comments/notes/ remarks/disclaimers etc. In such a situation, would it be legally valid for the assessee/tax auditor to keep the appropriate comments/remarks/explanation in the hard copy and in the utility, mention either “Yes”/”No”/”0” etc. as the case may be? Here the real question is whether an assessee can have two sets of 3CD—one that is uploaded electronically and another one that is signed physically? My personal view is that this would not be correct. However, considering the problem at hand, one needs a written clarification from the Government. The other option that a tax auditor may consider is of putting all comments/remarks/ disclaimers etc. in the 3CA/3CB. However, there seems to be an overall limit on the number of characters that one can feed into the 3CA/3CB. So, in many cases, this option may not work. Also, whether doing such a thing results in the report being perceived to be a qualified report is also a question that needs pondering over.

4.    In the clause relating to depreciation on fixed assets, there is no column to give details of additional depreciation. Further, it appears that date-wise details of all the minor items of additions to fixed assets are also required to be given. This data could run into a few thousand entries for many businesses, and would take substantial time to re-enter.

5.    In the clause relating to quantitative details, often, such data is not available. In such cases, the tax auditor simply reports “Information Not Available”. Now, in the e-filing utility, it is not possible to give such a comment. What does one do in such a situation? In the same clause, in case of manufacturing assessees, if the yield is more than 100%, the utility does not accept the figure. On a lighter vein, does it indicate that the Government does not expect taxpayers to be extra-efficient?

6.    In the clause relating to ratios, in case of service industry or professionals, normally the tax auditor states that “since the activity of the assessee is neither trading nor manufacturing, such ratios are not applicable.” In the e-filing utility, there is no space for such a comment. In this situation, can a tax auditor simply skip this clause?

7.    If one sees the Income-tax Rules, in Form 3CD, Annexure II is still a part thereof despite the fact that from A.Y. 2010-11, the provisions of FBT are made ineffective. The e-filing utility does not provide this Annexure II. It is not clear as to what the exact position is. Can an e-filing utility override the statutory forms prescribed?

8.    In the clause relating to payments covered u/s. 40(A)(2)(b), it appears that every payment so made is required to be reported. Hitherto, the tax auditor used to report only the total amount for each type of transaction with a particular party. Now, it seems that the date-wise transaction details are to be given. This will cause a lot of hardship to the tax auditor while filling in the data.

9.    In the clause relating to loans taken or repaid, one has to give the PAN of the party reported. It appears that the utility matches this PAN with the Government’s PAN records and if the name and PAN do not match exactly then the file does not get validated. If this is true, then this is likely to cause tremendous slowdown in the preparation of the reports.

Thus, as can be seen from the above paragraphs, filing of returns and tax audit and other reports for A.Y. 2013-14 is going to be a very cumbersome and difficult process and unless the tax department comes up with solutions to the numerous problems very soon, we are very clearly headed for an extremely stressful month of September and then later, November. One hopes that the CBDT will read the representations sent by professional bodies like BCAS and act expeditiously.

Levy on Restaurants & Hotels Held Unconstitutional

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Background

Service tax levy was introduced on Restaurants & Hotels as under:

• Services provided by air-conditioned restaurants with license to serve liquor, with effect from 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%.

• Short Term Accommodation Services provided by hotels, with effect from 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 50%.

The above services have been discussed earlier in this column in the August, 2011 and September, 2011 issues respectively of BCAJ and in particular, the dual taxation issues arising therefrom. The same are not repeated for the sake of brevity.

The above stated levies continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced with effect from 01-07-2012 also, with a few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement. However, the scope of air-conditioned restaurant service was substantially expanded with effect from 01-04- 2013, withdrawing the condition of having license to serve liquor. Far reaching implications of this amendment also were discussed in the April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. With these facts in the background, discussed below is the recent Kerala High Court’s ruling wherein levy of service tax on restaurants and hotels has been held beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. Considering that levy of tax on supply of food or drink whether by way of or as a part of service is a State subject, the levy by the Centre is held unconstitutional in a Single Member Bench’s decision.

Kerala High Court Ruling in Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association & Others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER)

The Petitioners through writ petitions challenged the validity of sub-clause (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) of clause 105 of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) and section 66 of the Act, as amended by the Finance Act 2011 relating to levy of service tax on taxable services referred there and for consequential reliefs. The relevant portion reads as under:

“(zzzzv) Services provided or to be provided to any person, by a restaurant, by whatever name called, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the financial year, which has license to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises;

(zzzzw) Services provided or to be provided to any person, by a hotel, inn, guest house, club or camp-site, by whatever name called, for providing of accommodation for a continuous period of less than three months;”

Contentions of the Petitioner

The main contention urged by the petitioners was that the imposition of service tax in relation to serving of food or beverage including alcoholic beverages represents only sale of goods which transaction squarely falls under Entry 54 of List II (State List) of the 7th schedule to the Constitution of India and therefore within the exclusive competence of the State legislature. The service tax was originally introduced by Parliament in exercise of the residuary power under Entry 97 of List I. Though Entry 92 C has been introduced to List I of the 7th schedule which enables the Union to levy “taxes on services”, the said entry had not come into effect as it was not notified by the Government. Similarly the State legislature had enacted Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, by which tax is levied for accommodation. By introducing service tax on the basis of sub-clauses (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) to clause 105 of section 65, the Parliament has encroached upon the legislative powers of the State under Entry 54 and 62 of List II.

Hence, the main contention of the petitioners was with reference to the legislative competence of Parliament to impose a tax on sale of goods/ luxuries which is absolutely the domain of the State legislation.

Contention of the Revenue

The respondents contended that the legislation has been brought in terms of Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 of List I of the 7th schedule. Therefore according to the respondent, on a perusal of judgments cited by them it is all the more clear that service tax can be imposed on the service involved during the sale of a product and so long as the Statute does not transgress upon any restriction contained in the Constitution, contentions regarding lack of legislative power cannot be sustained. It is further contended that the Sales Tax Act and the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act are framed by the State Government. Service tax levied by the Government of India is not for serving alcoholic beverages and it is a tax on the services provided by restaurants and hotels. In that view of the matter, according to them, the challenge to the provisions aforesaid is absolutely baseless and seeks for dismissal of the writ petitions.

Questions for Consideration before the Court

The following questions arose for consideration by the Court:

Whether “taxes on the sale and purchase of goods” in Entry 54 of List II of the seventh schedule covers service in the light of the definition of “tax on sale and purchase of goods” under Article 366 (29A)(f) of the Constitution of India.

Whether the service provided in a hotel, inn, guest house, club etc. imposed with luxury tax under the State Act in terms of Entry 62 of List II can be separately assessed and imposed by the Union with service tax, invoking the residuary powers at Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution.

Judgment relied upon by the Revenue for Consideration of Constitutionality of a statute

The judgment in State of M.P. vs. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312) = (2012-TIOL-44-SC-MISC) was relied upon by the respondent to highlight the principles to be kept in mind by courts while considering constitutionality of a statute and the Supreme Court held as under:

“32. While dealing with constitutional validity of a taxation law enacted by Parliament or State Legislature, the Court must have regard to the following principles:

(i) there is always presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law made by Parliament or a State Legislature,

(ii) no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable or irrational but some constitutional infirmity has to be found,

(iii) the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law as Parliament and State Legislatures are supposed to be alive to the needs of the people whom they represent and they are the best judge of the community by whose suffrage they come into existence,

(iv) hardship is not relevant in pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a fiscal statute or economic law, and

(v) in the field of taxation, the legislature enjoys greater latitude for classification.”

Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. State of A.P. [(2008) 2 SCC 254], Govt. of A.P. vs. P. Laxmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720] and Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 236). There is no dispute regarding the proposition as held in the above judgments and hence the only enquiry is to find out whether the impugned legislation has trenched upon the legislative powers of the State Government, keeping in mind the limitations as held in the aforesaid judgments.

• Important and Relevant Judgments for consideration by the Court

  •  In Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. vs. State of U.P., (2005) 2 SCC 515) = (2005-TIOL-10-SC-LT-CB) the Supreme Court held as under:

“83. Hence on an application of general principles of interpretation, we would hold that the word “luxuries” in Entry 62 of List II    means the activity of enjoyment of or indulgence in that which is costly or which is generally recognised as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society and not articles of luxury.”

“93. Given the language of Entry 62 and the legislative history we hold that Entry 62 of List II does not permit the levy of tax on goods or articles. In our judgment, the word “luxuries” in the entry refers to activities of indulgence, enjoyment or pleasure. Inasmuch as none of the impugned statutes seek to tax any activity and admittedly seek to tax goods described as luxury goods, they must be and are declared to be legislatively incompetent. However, following the principles in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. while striking down the impugned Acts we do not think it appropriate to allow any refund of taxes already paid under the impugned Acts. Bank guarantees if any furnished by the assessees will stand discharged.”

In T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 632) = (2004-TIOL-36-SC-ST) the Supreme Court was considering whether the imposition of service tax on the services rendered by the mandap-keepers was intra vires the Constitution, and held as under:

“44. In regard to the submission made on Article 366(29-A)(f), we are of the view that it does not provide to the contrary. It only permits the State to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink by whatever mode it may be made. It does not conceptually or otherwise include the supply of services within the definition of sale and purchase of goods. This is particularly apparent from the following phrase contained in the said sub-article “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods”. In other words, the operative words of the said sub-article are supply of goods and it is only supply of food and drinks and other articles for human consumption that is deemed to be a sale or purchase of goods.”

In K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. vs. State of T.N., (2000) 1 SCC 521) = (2002-TIOL-884-SC-CT-CB) while considering the entitlement of the States to levy tax on the sale of food and drink a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court held as under:

“9. The provisions of sub-clause (f) of clause (29-A) of Article 366 need to be analysed. Sub-clause (f) permits the States to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink. The supply can be by way of a service or as part of a service or it can be in any other manner whatsoever. The supply or service can be for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The words of sub-clause (f)    have found place in the Sales Tax Acts of most States and, as we have seen, they have been used in the said Tamil Nadu Act. The tax, therefore, is on the supply of food or drink and it is not of relevance that the supply is by way of a service or as part of a service. In our view, therefore, the price that the customer pays for the supply of food in a restaurant cannot be split up as suggested by learned counsel. The supply of food by the restaurant-owner to the customer though it may be a part of the service that he renders by providing good furniture, furnishing and fixtures, linen, crockery and cutlery, music, a dance floor and a floor show, is what is the subject of the levy. The patron of a fancy restaurant who orders a plate of cheese sandwiches whose price is shown to be Rs.50 on the bill of fare knows very well that the innate cost of the bread, butter, mustard and cheese in the plate is very much less, but he orders it all the same. He pays Rs. 50 for its supply and it is on Rs. 50 that the restaurant-owner must be taxed.”

Other judgments considered by the Court were as follows:

  •     Assn. of Leasing & Financial Services Companies vs. UOI (2011) [2 SCC 352 = 2010–TIOL–87–SC–ST– LB.]

  •     All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI (2007) [TIOL–149 –SC– ST]

  •     BSNL vs. UOI (2006) [TIOL–15–SC–CT–LB]

  •     Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn of India vs. UOI (2002) [TIOL- 699 –SC–MISC]

•    Observations & Findings of the Court

On a consideration of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that:

Para 18

“There are two judgments which throw light on the subject matter in issue. Those are K. Damoda-rasamy Naidu (Supra) and T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (Supra). In fact, the effect of Article 366(29-A)(f) has been considered by the Supreme Court in Assn. of Leasing & Financial Service Companies (Supra) and other judgments referred above includ-ing BSNL (Supra) . But the factual situation with reference to the case on hand is available only in the cases referred above. But it could be seen that in T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (Supra) the question was with reference to services rendered by mandap-keepers which is not the situation here. Here the factual situation is almost similar to the statement of law as held by the Supreme Court in K. Damodarasamy Naidu (Supra).”

Para 19

Now, coming to Article 366(29-A)(f) of the Constitution of India one could see that a deeming provision has been incorporated by way of 46th amendment to the Constitution of India and the history of such a legislation has been clearly dealt with in the judgments cited above. The very purpose of incorporating the definition of tax on sale or purchase of goods in Article 366 was to empower the State Governments to impose tax on the supply, whether it is by way of or as a part of any service of goods either being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink either intoxicating or not intoxicating whether such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The words “and such transfer delivery or supply of goods” is deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer. Therefore the incidence of tax is on the supply of any goods by way of or as part of any service. When food is supplied or alcoholic beverages are supplied as part of any service, such transfer is deemed to be a sale. Apparently, the transfer is during the course of a service and when the deeming provision permits the State Government to impose a tax on such transfer, there cannot be a different component of service which could be imposed with any service tax in exercise of the residuary power of the Central Government under Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution of India.

Para 20

Therefore, it can be seen from Article 366(29-A)(f) that service is also included in the sale of goods. If the constitution permits sale of goods during service as taxable, necessarily Entry 54 has to be read giving the meaning of sale of goods as stated in the Constitution. If read in that fashion, necessarily service forms part of sale of goods and State Government alone will have the legislative competence to enact the law imposing a tax on the service element forming part of sale of goods as well, which they have apparently imposed. I am supported to take this view in the light of the Constitution Bench judgment in K. Damodarasamy Naidu (Supra).

Para 21

Coming to the next question regarding the imposition of service tax in respect of hotel, inn, guest house, club or camp site etc., the contention of the petitioners is based on Entry 62 of List II. What exactly is the meaning of the expression ‘luxuries’ in Entry 62 of List II has been held by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (Supra), wherein it is held that luxuries is an activity of enjoyment or indulgence which is costly or which is generally recognised as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society. While giving the said meaning to Entry 62 and if we look at the sub-clause (zzzzw), the service tax is imposed on services provided in a hotel and other similar establishments when State Legislature had enacted the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act by exercising their legislative power under Entry 62 of List II. When applying the dictum laid down in Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (supra) which gives an extended meaning to the word ‘luxuries’, I am of the view that the amendment now made to the service tax trenches upon the legislative function of the State under Entry 62 of List II.

Having come to the aforesaid findings, these writ petitions are allowed as follows:

•    It is declared that sub-clauses (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) to clause 105 of section 65 of the Finance Act 1994 as amended by the Finance Act 2011 is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament as the sub-clauses are covered by Entry 54 and Entry 62 respectively of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

•    That if any payments have been made by the petitioners on the basis of the impugned clauses, they are entitled to seek refund of the same.

Impact of Kerala High Court Ruling

•    As per the Court order, the petitioners are entitled to seek refund of service tax. However, it may not be easy and feasible inasmuch as the restaurants merely collect service tax from the customers and pay to the Government. Hence, if the service tax collected (rightly or wrongly) is duly deposited with the Government, onus stands discharged under the law. Alternatively, the prospect of each customer filing for refund of tax is highly unlikely.

•    Since the ruling is a consequence of a Writ Petition and there being presently no other conflicting High Court ruling, a view could be adopted (although debatable) to the effect that this ruling is applicable to restaurants across the country. However, the Government would without any doubt file an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High Court Order. Hence, it would appear that there is no finality on the issue.

•    Whether the Kerala High Court ruling would apply under the negative list based taxation regime introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, is a matter which is being intensely debated.

It is interesting to note the following clarification issued in the context of Negative List regime of service tax:

•    Extracts from Education Guide (TRU Circular dt. 20/6/12)

Para 6.9

Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as part of the activity. [Section 66E (i) of the Act]

Para 6.9.1

What are the activities covered in this declared list entry?

The following activities are illustration of activities covered in this entry –

•    Supply of food or drinks in a restaurant;

•    Supply of food and drinks by an outdoor caterer.

In terms of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, supply of any goods being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case [2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. This declared list entry has been incorporated to capture this position of law in simple terms.

Based on the above, the Government could contend that what is being taxed is only the service component without encroaching upon the powers of the State Government under the Constitution. This aspect would have to be judicially tested.

The 46th amendment to the Constitution which introduced clause 29A to the Article 366 contained six transactions which were deemed to be a transaction of sale or purchase of goods. For example, tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract is one of the deemed sales transportation under this amendment.

After the judgment by the Kerala High Court, an old debate is likely to be revived. The question arises is that whether on similar grounds, the levy of service tax on a transaction of works contract where the buyer only intends to buy, say for example a constructed building and pay consideration on per square foot of constructed building could also be challenged? The buyer of the building has no interest in the services that the builder has used in construction of such building. Therefore, can the Central Government tax the services that are provided in a works contract when these transactions are deemed sales under the Constitution?

The clause 29A was introduced in Article 366 of the Constitution, as it was felt necessary to declare those transactions as deemed sale of goods which could otherwise lead to a dilemma in classification between sale of goods and/or services.

•    Yet another question arising out of this situation is, shouldn’t there be a similar provision in the Constitution to declare the other portion of such transactions as the deemed/declared services as is done for sales tax/VAT, before the same could be brought under the tax net by the Centre?

There are no ready answers to the above posers. However, it appears that, there could to be a fresh round of litigations and resultant uncertainties.

Conclusion

To conclude, it would appear that the Kerala High Court does not resolve the larger burning issue of dual taxation of transactions by the Centre and the States whereby the increased burden is being felt by the end user/consumer. To put it in simple terms, an ideal scenario would be that in case of composite transactions, one component is taxed by the States and the other by the Centre in terms of clear statutory provisions. However, presently despite the fact that service tax is being levied on the service component (40%), the States continue to charge VAT on the 100% amount, resulting in dual taxation and increased burden on the end user/consumer.

It is expected that the GST regime would address this burning issue impacting businesses and end users. However, it is felt that the Government needs to urgently address this issue without waiting for the introduction of GST Regime whereby Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers can have a dialogue with the Centre and States and arrive at an agreement for a consistent abatement regime across the country which can be adopted by the Centre as well as the States.

Registration Act- Proposal to modify law on land registration tabled in Parliament

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A proposal to modify India’s land registration law
to make for clear titles and help the government to fairly compensate
owners if their land was acquired for industrialization was tabled in
the Rajya Sabha.

The amendments to the Registration Act, 1908,
mainly relate to ensuring transparency and digitization that will help
establish clear land ownership. The Registration (Amendment) Bill, 2013,
was cleared by the cabinet in June.

Land acquisition is a
complex and contentious subject in India due to the lack of
documentation and the absence of contemporary land records. This has
been causing problems for investors trying to buy land for
infrastructure projects.

The proposed amendments include
registration of documents relating to the adoption of a daughter to
ensure gender equity, opening of the miscellaneous register that
contains details of all registered documents to public scrutiny, and
promotion of electronic registration of documents.

“Documents
such as power of attorney, developers/ promoters agreements and any
other agreements relating to the sale or development of immovable
property now need to be mandatorily registered. This is being done with
the intention of minimize cases of document forgery,” the ministry said.

“A new section 18A is proposed to be inserted (into the Act) to
provide for prohibition of registration of certain types of
properties,” it said. This is to prevent unauthorized people from
obtaining false registrations.

In addition, the government has
proposed the deletion of section 28 of the 1908 law, which allows a
person with immovable property in more than one state to register
documents relating to transfer in any of these states.

Many of
the changes proposed will also help in the award of compensation to land
owners under the proposed Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill, 2012, which
is pending before Parliament.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 09-08-2013)
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Young India & polls 2014

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What do Indians want and what are their concerns?

In the rare cases where such questions are asked, there are no surprises: price rise, corruption, job creation, law and order, education and health, the precise ranking varying from survey to survey.

More than 50% of India’s population is under-25 and there will be a clutch of new voters in 2014. Priorities of under-25s aren’t necessarily the same as priorities of those over 65. With gerontocracy characterising political leadership, there is a disconnect between what Young India wants and what Old India thinks Young India wants.

Old India lives in yesterday and, unfortunately, uses its prism to deliver policies for tomorrow, when Old India will no longer be around. Young India will live in tomorrow and will be hamstrung by policies Old India fashions today.

One doesn’t know whether the structural shift will lead to a shift in electoral dynamics in 2014. What one does know is that few political parties and leaders have understood that a shift is taking place. This is reflected in discourse and debates and will be reflected in manifestos and vision documents. The Bible states, “Your young men will see visions, your old men will dream dreams.”

While the old men will dream of coming back to power, it should be a function of a vision that is sold to Young India of betterment of lives and economic empowerment, not doles and handouts. It should be a vision of where we want India to be in 2025, or beyond. That differentiates 20/20 vision from myopia.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 05-08-2013)
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Govt files review petition against SC verdicts on lawmakers

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The Union government decided to take up cudgels on behalf of the political class, or at least those members of it who could find themselves on the wrong side of the law, and also opposed any move to place restrictions on the freebies they can promise voters in their manifestos.

Both moves were criticized by political reform activists who see them as part of efforts by the political establishment to protect its own interests.

The government filed a review petition in the Supreme Court (SC) against verdicts of the apex court that disqualified lawmakers who were convicted by a court and barred those in prison or those who had been convicted from contesting elections.

The decision, the petition said, would jeopardize a government that has a thin majority, they said, citing the contents of the petition. Supreme Court advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan was critical of the government’s petition. “It boggles my mind as to how governance is anyway prejudiced if a criminal politician is allowed to continue in the House, with his disqualification stayed,” he said. “A wafer-thin majority government ought not to be protected merely because its majority is maintained on the shoulders of criminals.”

Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act gave a window of opportunity to convicted lawmakers to appeal within three months, during which period, disqualification would not take effect. Disqualification would be on hold until the appeal was disposed of by the court. The apex court struck down this provision.

There has been strong opposition to the verdict by all political parties on the grounds that the “supremacy of the Parliament” should be maintained.

The petition asserted Parliament’s right to legislate on the disqualification of members, as the Constitution hasn’t specified the grounds. It also raised the issue of the irreversible impact of the disqualification to the extent that the reversal of a conviction wouldn’t lead to restoration of membership.

The government is also seeking a reference to a “larger constitution bench as it relates to interpretation of articles in the constitution” and that failure to do so would constitute an error.

Sankaranarayanan said the section is discriminatory.

“The simple fact is section 8 (4) discriminates between a sitting legislator and the rest of the populace, simply because one of them occupies a place of high position of power and the others don’t,” he said.

At the Election Commission-convened meeting, the political parties also opposed guidelines for manifestoes, criticizing a 5 July order of the apex court that asked the commission to come up with guidelines on freebies offered by parties in their manifestos.

All major national political parties said that there should be no such restriction.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 13-08-2013)
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India’s darkest hour – Companies, bankers and experts have all given up hope of an economic recovery

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I recently spent a week in India meeting a wide range of economic participants – companies (both large and small), banks, industry experts and economic commentators. What is clear is that the economy is entering another down leg. The bountiful monsoon may save us to an extent, but things are getting worse in terms of industrial production and private sector capital expenditure.

Of the factors that were expected to lead to an acceleration in the rate of economic growth – falling interest rates, unclogging of the investment cycle and some pickup in exports – none seem to be playing out. In meeting after meeting, I felt that people had finally given up. All the enthusiasm generated by Finance Minister P Chidambaram in his first six months in office has dissipated. It is extraordinarily difficult to implement most of the policy.

Industrialists have absolutely no interest in making any fresh investments, and have very little confidence that projects that are currently stuck will start moving. Capital goods providers also seem to see little sign of the public sector investment stepup that the finance minister talks about. Domestic order books remain subdued. Even consumption seems vulnerable; most of the participants agreed that consumption beyond a point couldn’t keep growing independent of the broader economy.

Everyone is convinced that this growth slowdown is largely self-inflicted. We have lost the plot and cannot blame our travails on external factors. The business class has given up the hope that the country would ever get back to the high growth rates achieved in 2003-07. Most have made business plans assuming that growth will be at best six per cent over the coming few years. Cost cutting and asset rationalisation, not growth, are at the top of their agenda. The complaint that India was uncompetitive in terms of infrastructure, land, labour (adjusted for productivity) and capital remains. If this is true, how will any new manufacturing investment happen?

Most small and medium-sized entrepreneurs seem to be fed up with the daily harassment of doing business in India. Basically, when India was booming, the sheer adrenaline of growing at nine per cent was exciting enough for investors to put up with the hassles of doing business. Now at five per cent growth – and dropping – the upside of doing business here does not seem to justify the hassles. Every industrialist I met had bought property overseas in the last 18 months and was in the process of creating a parallel establishment as a hedge.

In short, the mood was deeply pessimistic. Many now fear for the country’s future. It is always darkest before the dawn, and this deep pessimism may be a contrarian indicator, but even rational and sensible people now seem to have given up. While it is truly difficult to be positive at present, one should not forget that we are a democracy with checks and balances. We have a very young and hugely aspirational population. The political system will eventually have to adapt to the needs and wishes of this huge demographic. We will have to make the systemic changes to bring growth back. It is wrong to think that we have permanently lost our way. The risk is that we could have some more pain ahead, maybe even a crisis before the required changes happen.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr. Akash Prakash in Business Standard dated 30-07-2013)
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Civil Service – Why Durga’s Shakti matters for India

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This is not about Durga Shakti anymore. It is about the many Durga Shaktis in the IAS and the paramount need to protect them. And this is about why Durga’s Shakti matters to not just the IAS, but also to India’s health as a democracy. It is about creating strong, upright civil servants and not civil “servants” and the need for the political executive to understand that honest, upright officers are not their personal vassals. It is about protecting and preserving the constitutional democracy of India whose lynchpin is the permanent executive working in tandem with the political executive, and where the former is not expected to be subservient to the latter, much less carry out its illegal orders.

The political executive needs to understand that every single enforcement action by any IAS officer will necessarily have a repercussion, both good and perhaps some bad, and indeed it must have a repercussion for it get to its desired objective and be effective. That must not become a convenient scapegoat for the political executive to suspend or even transfer inconvenient officers. Being a rubber stamp destroys institutions and, with them, individuals forever. The political executive must learn to have good officers around them, who may not and should not, always agree with them, which alone makes for impartial, honest advice. They need to learn to get along with those officers who know when to say “No Minister” as much as when to say “Yes Minister”.

In Durga’s specific case there is a clear violation of procedure by the government of UP. This makes for a manifestly colourable exercise of power. The UP government stands in violation of several provisions and the officers who signed the orders, without applying their mind and judgement, should have exemplary damages imposed on them by the courts.

Constitutional protection of the IAS under Article 311 is integral to our democracy and without it, India can might as well disband the IAS and bring in a USstyle spoils system instead.

What are young, conscientious IAS officers supposed to do when they witness violations of law in their jurisdiction? Wring their hands helplessly or take action? Who is causing communal tension- a senior minister sanctioning the loot of natural resources by invoking the name of God in full public view, or an officer who has stopped the encroachment of public land and upheld the spirit of the January 19, 2013 judgment of the Supreme Court?

IAS bashing is no longer the favourite avocation for India’s politicians; it is now their favourite vocation. Many in the IAS break the law, loot the exchequer, collude with a rapacious political executive and the common weal is often dammed in the process. Yet every single day, all across the country, away from the glare of the media, there are many more doing enormous good work and holding the country together in circumstances in which no corporate sector professional, or even members from the hallowed armed forces, would like to work in. They need to be treated with respect and fairness, especially by those who disagree with some decision of theirs, just as they are expected to treat others likewise.

(Source: Extracts from Article by Mr. Srivatsa Krishna in the Times of India dated 04-08-2013)
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India’s Ecosystem is Pro-Big, Anti-Small

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Indices representing small and mid-cap stocks have plunged. Both small and mid-caps, on the other hand, are down about 25% each. The vertiginous drop in these indices represents the real story of Indian businesses. Sensex companies, with their deep pockets and even deeper connections to India’s political, administrative and financial elites, will weather most crises unscathed. But smaller companies, without any patrons, will come out bruised.

Decades of crony capitalism have created a deep division among India’s businesses: among those with access to the powers-that-be and those without. The former run giant businesses, relatively insulated from domestic or global turbulence. Smaller businesses, which include start-up and first-time ventures, are nimbler, more entrepreneurial and often more creative in the ways they go about things. That should have given them some advantages in a properly-functioning market. But in India, success hinges on massaging the system and clearing massive regulatory hurdles. One manufacturing project can require around 30 clearances from all levels of government. In this sort of market, smaller enterprises are punished. This is in stark contrast with the West: in Germany, the mid-cap index is up 33%, in London by 35% and in New York, small caps are up 31%.

This anti-democratic cronyism is likely to drive many small and mid-size businesses out of India. Already, sugar and farm companies in Maharashtra are planning to move parts of their businesses to Africa, where land is plentiful, local markets have demand, exports to Europe are duty-free and cronyism of the desi variety is absent. Unless India clears up the policy clutter, our nimbler companies will continue to vote with their feet.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 14-08-2013)
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A third of India’s top firms face severe debt crisis

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Economic slowdown and the accompanying demand destruction have taken a heavy toll on India’s top companies. The worst-hit are those that had launched aggressive growth plans, largely funded through debt, believing the demand growth in the years to come would be robust.

Many of these firms now find themselves in a spiral of declining profitability, shrinking market capitalisation and rising liabilities. This raises a question mark over their financial viability. On this parameter, nearly a third of India’s top companies are either financially insolvent or on the verge of it. They can’t use equity markets to raise enough capital to fund these projects or lighten their debt burden. Of the 406 firms in the BSE-500 list (excluding banking and financial ones) that have declared their results so far, the market capitalisation of 143 is either below their debt or just a notch above. The sample includes companies with average market capitalisation (during July this year) of less than 1.5 times their net debt as at the end of 2012-13.

According to figures from Capitaline, at the end of March this year, these companies were sitting on a debt of Rs 13.2 lakh crore — nearly twice their average market capitalisation in July. Two years ago, however, it was the other way around. In July 2011, their market value was 40 per cent higher than their net debt. Over the past two years, their debt (adjusted for cash and other liquid investments on their books) has risen 61 per cent, while their market capitalisation has declined 40 per cent. This has shut for these companies the equity window for project funding or debt repayment.

The list includes companies like Tata Steel, Hindalco Industries, Tata Power, L&T, Jaypee Associates, Adani Power, GMR Infra, GVK Power, JSW Steel, Reliance Infra, IndianOil, HPCL, Shri Renuka Sugars, Bajaj Hindusthan and Suzlon. Their marketcap- to-debt-coverage ratio will look even worse if deferred tax liability and contingent liabilities are included. Most of these firms also have high debt-to-equity ratio (greater than 1.0), poor interest coverage ratio (less than 2.0) and falling profitability.

(Source: The Business Standard dated 12-08-2013)
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Wealth-tax : Penalty : Legal representative : S. 15B, S. 18 and S. 19 of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1983-84 and 1984-85 : Assessee filing returns and receiving notices for penalty : Penalty order passed after death of assessee

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II. Reported :

  1. Wealth-tax : Penalty : Legal representative : S. 15B, S. 18 and S. 19 of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1983-84 and 1984-85 : Assessee filing returns and receiving notices for penalty : Penalty order passed after death of assessee on legal representative : Not justified.

[ACIT v. Late Shrimant F. P. Gaekwad, 313 ITR 192 (Guj.)]

For the A.Ys. 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1983-84 and 1984-85 the assessee had filed the returns of wealth. At the time of assessment, penalty proceedings were initiated u/s.18(1)(a), u/s.18(1)(c) and u/s.15B of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The assessee expired in 1988 before the penalty proceedings could be completed. The estate of the assessee devolved upon his mother who also passed away and thereafter it devolved upon the sister of the assessee. On 29-8-2003 the Assessing Officer passed penalty orders u/s.18(1)(a), u/s.18(1)(c) and u/s.15B of the Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty orders.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) No penalty order was passed during the life-time of the deceased. To make the legal representative liable for penalty u/s.19(1) it was not enough that the penalty proceedings should be initiated during the lifetime of the deceased. It was also necessary that such penalty proceedings must result in penalty orders during his lifetime. Therefore, neither S. 19(1) nor S. 19(3) casts any obligation on the executor, administrator or other legal representative to pay the amount of penalty as they were not liable to face any such penalty proceedings for which they have not committed any default.

(ii) The default, if any, was committed by the assessee and the assessee was not alive when the penalty proceedings culminated in penalty orders.”

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Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2001-02 : Reason to believe : Satisfaction not of AO of the assessee but borrowed from another AO : Not sufficient : Reopening not valid.

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II. Reported :

  1. Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
    A.Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2001-02 : Reason to believe : Satisfaction not of
    AO of the assessee but borrowed from another AO : Not sufficient : Reopening
    not valid.

[CIT v. Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd., 313 ITR 231 (Raj.)]

The assessee company had leased out certain plant and
machinery to another company. The depreciation claimed by the assessee on the
capital asset so leased out was allowed by the Assessing Officer. The lessee
had claimed revenue expenditure for the lease rent paid to the assessee but
the Assessing Officer had allowed depreciation on the capital value of the
plant and machinery. On noticing this fact, the Assessing Officer of the
assessee, reopened the completed assessments and disallowed the claim for
depreciation. The Tribunal held that the reopening was not valid as the
satisfaction was not of the Assessing Officer of the assessee, but that of the
Assessing Officer of the lessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The reassessment proceedings had been initiated only on
account of the opinion of the Assessing Officer of the lessee and the
Tribunal was right in finding that it was ‘borrowed satisfaction’ which was
not sufficient to confer power on the Assessing Officer to initiate
reassessment proceedings against the assessee.”

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Penalty : Concealment : S. 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : Bona fide claim for exemption in terms of conflicting determination of law : Assessee disclosed entire facts : Imposition of penalty not justified : Judgment of Supreme Court in

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II. Reported :

  1. Penalty : Concealment : S. 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act,
    1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : Bona fide claim for exemption in terms of
    conflicting determination of law : Assessee disclosed entire facts :
    Imposition of penalty not justified : Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of
    UOI v. Dharmendra Textile Processors, 306 ITR 277 (SC) considered.

[CIT v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation, 314 ITR 215
(P&H)]

The assessee, a warehousing corporation had made a claim
for exemption u/s.10(29) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of which there
were conflicting decisions. The claim for exemption was disallowed by the
Assessing Officer and a penalty of Rs. 1,04,61,330 was imposed u/s.271(1)(c)
of the Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The deduction claimed by the assessee was legitimate
and bona fide in terms of the conflicting determination of law on the
proposition in question. The categorical finding at the hands of the
Tribunal in its order was that the assessee had disclosed the entire facts
without having concealed any income. There was no allegation against the
assessee that it had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The
determination of the Tribunal had not been controverted even in the grounds
raised in the appeal. The assessee was guilty of neither of the two
conditions. Therefore, in the absence of the two pre-requisites postulated
u/s.271(1)(c) it was not open to the Revenue to inflict any penalty on the
assessee.

(ii) The second contention advanced by the appallent-Revenue
was that the impugned order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
deleting the penalty imposed on the respondent-assessee u/s.271(1)(c) of the
Act was not sustainable in law because of the clear judgment in UOI v.
Dharmendra Textile Processors,
(2008) 306 ITR 277. According to the
learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue, the entire income which remained
undisclosed, ‘with or without’ any conscious act of the assessee was liable
to penal action. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellant-Revenue that the concept of law with regard to levy of penalty has
drastically changed in view of the said judgment, inasmuch as now penalty
can be levied even when an assessee claims deduction or exemption by
disclosing the correct particulars of its income. According to the learned
counsel, if an addition is made in quantum proceedings by the Revenue
authorities, which addition attains finality, an assessee per se
becomes liable for penal action u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. It is the vehement
contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue that a penalty
automatically becomes leviable against the respondent-assessee u/s.271(1)(c)
of the Act, after the finalisation of quantum proceedings. In this behalf,
it is also pointed out that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court,
referred to above, the dichotomy between penalty proceedings and assessment
proceedings stands completely obliterated.

(iii) It is also essential for us to notice, while
dealing with the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant-Revenue, that the issue which arose for determination before the
Supreme Court in UOI v. Dharmendra Textile Processors (supra)
was whether u/s.11AC inserted in the Central Excise Act, 1944, by the
Finance Act, 1996, penalty for evasion of payment of tax had to be
mandatorily levied, in case of short of levy or non-levy of duty under the
Central Excise Act, 1944, irrespective of the fact whether it was an
intentional or innocent omission. In other words, the Apex Court was
examining a proposition whether mens rea was an essential ingredient
before penalty u/s.11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, could be levied. In
view of the factual position noticed herein above, the issue of mens rea
does not arise in the present controversy because the ingredients, before
any penalty can be imposed on an assessee u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, were not
made out in the instant case as has been concluded in the foregoing
paragraph. Thus viewed, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for
the appellant-Revenue is, besides being a judgment under a different
legislative enactment, is totally inapplicable to the facts and
circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we find no merit even in the second
contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue.”

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment : S. 132 and S. 158B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal cannot go into validity or otherwise of administrative decision for conducting search and seizure.

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II. Reported :


58. 


Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment : S. 132 and S. 158B of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal cannot go into validity or otherwise of
administrative decision for conducting search and seizure.


[CIT v. Paras Rice Mills, 313 ITR 182 (P&H)]


In an appeal before the Tribunal against a block assessment order the assessee
raised the ground that the search and the consequent block assessment order were
not valid. The Tribunal held that the search and seizure was illegal as no
material was produced to show that the requirements of S. 132 (1) of the Act
were complied with.


On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held as under :


“While hearing an appeal against the order of assessment, the Tribunal could not
go into the question of validity or otherwise of any administrative decision for
conducting search and seizure. It could be challenged in an independent
proceeding where the question of validity of the order could be gone into. The
appellate authority was concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the
assessment.”

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment : S. 132 and S. 158B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal can look into validity of search : Authorisation for search not valid : Consequent search and block assessment also not valid : Tribunal justif

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II. Reported :

  1. Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment :
    S. 132 and S. 158B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal can look into validity
    of search : Authorisation for search not valid : Consequent search and block
    assessment also not valid : Tribunal justified in setting aside block
    assessment order.

[CIT v. Smt. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.)]

In the appeal before the Tribunal against the block
assessment order the assessee contended that there was no material with the
Director to form the belief as was required u/s.132(1) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 and therefore the search and the block assessment order were not valid.
The Tribunal held that the search was not valid in the absence of
authorisation based on reasons as required u/s.132(1) and consequently the
block assessment was illegal.

On appeal by the Revenue challenging the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to look into the validity of search the Rajasthan High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Since the assessment in the present case is made
under Chapter XIV-B and when it was specifically challenged by the assessee,
that the circumstances contemplated by S. 132(1) did not exist, this is a
matter which goes to the root of the matter about jurisdiction of the
assessing authority to proceed under Chapter XIV-B, the Tribunal was very
much justified, and had jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether
the search was conducted consequent upon the authorisation having been
issued in the background of the existence of eventualities and material
mentioned in 132(1).

(ii) The basic ingredient of the term ‘block period’
u/s.158B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is that it relates to a certain number
of years relating to and relevant to the search conducted u/s.132. The
conclusion is that there should be a search conducted u/s.132. S. 132
contemplates existence of certain eventualities, in the event of existence
whereof, the competent authority should have reason to believe the existence
of the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of S. 132(1). The
consequence is that if the requirement of Ss.(1) about the existence of the
reason to believe consequent upon the information in the possession of the
concerned authority is not satisfied there could possibly be no
authorisation, irrespective of the fact that it may have been made and in
turn if a search is conducted in pursuance of the authorisation issued in
the absence of the requisite sine qua non the search cannot be a
‘search’ u/s.132 of the Act, as contemplated by the provisions of S. 158B of
the Act.

(iii) The Revenue failed to produce records containing
relevant material including information in the possession of the competent
authority, on the basis of which it had entertained the reason to believe
the existence of one or more of the eventualities covered by clauses (a) to
(c) of S. 132(1). In the absence of a legal search, in accordance with
provisions of S. 132 the ‘block period’ or the previous year in which the
search was conducted could not be said to have come into existence and
therefore any assessment order based on such search could not stand.

(iv) The Tribunal was justified in holding that when the
authorisation to conduct the search based on reasons germane to S. 132(1)
did not exist the search became invalid and that the assessment order based
on such search could not stand and had rightly set it aside.”

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Litigation between public sector undertaking of State Government and Income-tax Department : No power to decide whether appeal to be admitted : Refusal to admit appeal relegating parties to Committee of Disputes : Not permiss

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II. Reported :

  1. Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Litigation between public
    sector undertaking of State Government and Income-tax Department : No power to
    decide whether appeal to be admitted : Refusal to admit appeal relegating
    parties to Committee of Disputes : Not permissible.

[Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. v. ITAT,
314 ITR 14 (Guj.)]

The assessee, a public sector undertaking of the Government
of Gujarat, filed appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The
Department also filed cross appeals. Without going into the merits of the
matter, the Tribunal non-suited the parties by refusing to admit the appeals
without approval of the Committee of Disputes.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petitions and
appeals against the said orders of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Supreme Court in the three ONGC cases and in
Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of AP v. Collector,
(2003) 3
SCC 472 and MTNL v. Chairman CBDT, (2004) 267 ITR 647 was dealing
with disputes between a public sector undertaking of the Central Government
and a Department of the Central Government or between two Departments of the
State Government of Andhra Pradesh. The directions given and the
observations made by the Supreme Court therein have to be read in the
context and against the backdrop of the controversy before the Court,
including the litigants who were before it. There is no order made by the
Supreme Court which relates to a dispute between the Union of India and a
State, or a public sector undertaking of the Union of India and a State, or
between two States inter se, the term ‘State’ here meaning and
including the State Government, a Department of the State Government or an
undertaking of the State Government. None of these cases suggest that the
Committee set up by the Central Government would have jurisdiction to
consider resolution of such disputes between a State and the Union, the
respective Departments and undertakings included.

(ii) Hence, it is not possible to expand the scope of the
directions of the Supreme Court so as to include a dispute between a
Department of the Central Government and a State Government undertaking.

(iii) The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a creature of
statute. Such a constituted Tribunal is required to exercise powers and
discharge the functions conferred on the Tribunal by the Act. The Tribunal,
therefore, cannot exercise powers or discharge functions which are not
conferred on the Tribunal by the Act.

(iv) The powers available to the Tribunal are governed by
the provisions of S. 253 and S. 254 of the Act. These provisions cannot be
read to mean that the Tribunal has power to hold that an appeal is not
admitted.

(v) Both the assessee and the Department are statutorily
vested with a right under the Act by virtue of S. 253(1), (2) and (4) of the
Act to file an appeal or cross-objections. Such right granted by the statute
cannot be divested by the Tribunal on an erroneous assumption of powers
arrogated to itself under a mistaken belief of law.

(vi) The Tribunal had assumed powers which it did not
have, for determining whether the appeal was to be admitted or not. There
was no such requirement in the facts of the case to approach the Committee
as the assessee and the Income-tax Department could not be asked to go and
obtain clearance from a Committee which had no jurisdiction over them.

(vii) The appeals filed by the assessee and the
Department before the Tribunal were accordingly restored to the file of the
Tribunal for being heard and decided afresh on the merits in accordance with
law.”

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Reassessment : Notice u/s.148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1993-94 : Assessee Co-operative Housing Society : Notice u/s.148 issued claiming that transfer fee is liable to tax relying on judgment of Bombay High Court in CIT v. The Presidency

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I. Unreported :

  1. Reassessment : Notice u/s.148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
    A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1993-94 : Assessee Co-operative Housing Society : Notice
    u/s.148 issued claiming that transfer fee is liable to tax relying on judgment
    of Bombay High Court in CIT v. The Presidency Co-operative Housing Society,
    216 ITR 321 (Bom.) : Reopening not valid : Notice quashed.


[Mittal Court Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. v. ITO
(Bom.),
W. P. No. 526 of 1996, dated 17-7-2009]

In this case the assessee is a co-operative society of
commercial premises. As provided in the bye-laws the assessee had received
transfer fees from the transferees. On the basis of principles of mutuality
the transfer fees were not offered for tax. The Assessing Officer issued
notice u/s.148 proposing to assess the transfer fees to tax relying on the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. The Presidency
Co-operative Housing Society,
216 ITR 321 (Bom.).

On a writ petition challenging the notice u/s.148, the
Bombay High Court quashed the notice and held as under :

“(i) Notices basically have been issued on the ground
that the transfer fees received by the petitioners from incoming members was
assessable to tax considering the judgment of this Court in the case of
CIT v. The Presidency Co-operative Housing Society,
216 ITR 321 (Bom.)

(ii) We have in the judgment delivered today in
Income-tax Appeal No. 931 of 2004 and other connected appeals distinguished
the same on the ground that the issue of mutuality had not at all been in
issue before the learned Bench when it decided the reference. Once we have
held the transfer fee even paid by incoming members is not assessable to tax
applying the doctrine of mutuality, the notice issued would be without
jurisdiction and consequently will have to be set aside.”

 



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Settlement Commission : Abatement of proceedings : S.245D(4A)(1), S.245HA(1) (iv) and S. 245HA(3) not valid : Settlement applications not disposed of by 31-3-2008 for reasons not attributable to the applicant cannot be treated as having abated.

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I. Unreported :


 



  1. Settlement Commission : Abatement of
    proceedings : S.245D(4A)(1), S.245HA(1) (iv) and S. 245HA(3) not valid :
    Settlement applications not disposed of by 31-3-2008 for reasons not
    attributable to the applicant cannot be treated as having abated.

[Star Television News Ltd. v. UOI (Bom.), W.P. No.
952 of 2008 dated 7-8-2009]

The Finance Act, 2007, amended S. 245D(4A) and S. 245HA to
provide that if in respect of a settlement application filed before 1-6-2007,
the Settlement Commission did not pass a final order before 31-3-2008, the
proceedings would abate. In a group of writ petitions the constitutional
validity of the said amendment was challenged. The Bombay High Court allowed
the petitions and held as under :

“(i) The fixing of the cut-off date u/s.245D(4A)(i), the
abatement of proceedings u/s.245HA(1)(iv) and the making available of
confidential information u/s.245HA(3) for no fault of the applicant are
ultra vires
the Constitution. In order to save these provisions from
being struck down as being unconstitutional, they will have to be read down
as applying only to cases where the Settlement Commission is unable to pass
an order on or before 31-3-2008 for any reasons attributable on the part of
the applicant.

(ii) Accordingly, the Settlement Commission has to
consider whether the proceedings have been delayed on account of any reasons
attributable on the part of the applicant. If it comes to the conclusion
that it is not so, then it has to proceed with the application as if not
abated.

(iii) The Government shall consider appointment of more
benches of the Settlement Commission if it desires early disposal of pending
applications.”


 



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Co-operative housing society : Commercial premises : Transfer fees and non-occupancy charges : Principle of mutuality applies : Notification of State of Maharashtra putting restriction on amount of transfer fees applies only to residential societies and n

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I. Unreported :

  1. Co-operative housing society : Commercial premises :
    Transfer fees and non-occupancy charges : Principle of mutuality applies :
    Notification of State of Maharashtra putting restriction on amount of transfer
    fees applies only to residential societies and not to commercial premises :
    Transfer fees and non-occupancy charges not liable to tax.

[Mittal Court Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. v. ITO
(Bom.),
ITA No. 999 of 2004, dated 17-7-2009]

In this case the assessee is a co-operative society of
commercial premises. As provided in the bye-laws, the assessee had received
transfer fees from the transferees and non-occupancy charges from the members.
As regards the transfer fees the Tribunal relied on the decision of the
Special Bench in the case of Walkeshwar Triveni Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd v. ITO,
(2004) 88 ITD 159 (Mum.) (SB) and held that the
transfer fees being received from the transferee is not exempt on the basis of
the principles of mutuality. As regards the non-occupancy charges the Tribunal
held that the principles of mutuality would be applicable, but subject to the
10% limit prescribed by the State Government.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High Court referred
to its judgment in the case of Sind Co-op. Housing Society v. ITO, (Bom.),
ITA No. 931 of 2004, dated 17-7-2009 (see August issue) and held as under :

“(i) In Income-tax Appeal No. 931 of 2004 along with
other appeals which we have decided by the separate judgment today, we have
set out the various facts and consequently, the Government Notifications
involved as also the provisions of the Act and the Rules and as such, it is
not necessary to refer to them once again. Suffice it to say that the
Notification issued by the State of Maharashtra putting restrictions on the
amount of transfer fee when the member desires to transfer his shares or
occupancy rights applies only in respect of housing residential societies.
In the instant case, the appellants before us are not housing residential
societies and consequently, those Notifications would not be applicable.

(ii) Insofar as the transfer fee is concerned, the
Tribunal held that it is covered by the decision of the Special Bench in the
case of Walkeshwar Triveny Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. The Tribunal
also noted that the transferees were admittedly not members of the assessee
society on the date on which the payments were made to the assessee society.
The transferees were admitted as members of the society and flats were
entered in their names only after the impugned payments were made to the
assessee society. It was also found that the amounts were paid in excess of
the Government Notifications and consequently, the amount paid as transfer
fees are exigible to tax.

(iii) There is an agreement by which the amount is paid
by the transferee. Insofar as the society is concerned, even if receipt is
issued in the name of transferee it is the nature of admission fee which
could be appropriated only on the transferee being admitted. Merely because
the amount may be appropriated earlier, it will not lose the character of
the amount being paid by a member. As held by us in Income-tax Appeal No.
931 of 2004, the same reasonings will apply to the appellants/petitioners
before us. In the circumstances, question as framed has to be answered in
the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

(iv) That brings us to the issue insofar as non-occupancy
charges are concerned. Non-occupancy charges are again payable by a member
on account of the fact that the member is not occupying premises. Bye-laws
themselves provide for non-occupancy charges. Contribution therefore, is by
the member. Object of the contribution is for the purpose of increasing the
society’s funds, which could be used for the object of the society. Object
of the society as noted earlier is to provide service, amenities and
facilities to its members. In these circumstances, in our opinion, the
principles of mutuality as discussed in Income-tax Appeal No. 931 of 2004
must also apply.

(v) The learned counsel for the Revenue contended that
the amount of non-occupancy charges over and above 10% of the maintenance
charges should be held to be assessable to tax. In our opinion, the 10%
limit is not applicable to the commercial society like the appellant
herein.”

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Business expenditure : S. 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Expenditure incurred on issue of convertible debentures : Is revenue expenditure allowable as deduction ?

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I. Unreported :


52. 


Business expenditure : S. 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Expenditure incurred on
issue of convertible debentures : Is revenue expenditure allowable as
deduction ?


[CIT v. M/s. Secure Meters Ltd. (Raj.), ITA No. 8 of 2007, dated
20-11-2008 (Not reported)]


The assessee incurred expenditure on issue of convertible debentures : The
assessee’s claim for deduction of the expenditure was rejected on the ground
that it is capital expenditure. The Tribunal held that the expenditure is
revenue expenditure and allowed the deduction.


In appeal, the Revenue contended that convertible debentures were akin to shares
and that in line with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India
v. CIT,
225 ITR 798 (SC), the expenditure was capital in nature.


The Rajasthan High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“A debenture, when issued, is a loan. The fact that it is convertible does not
militate against it being a loan. In accordance with the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of India Cement v. CIT, 60 ITR 52 (SC), expenditure on
loan is always revenue in nature even if loan is taken for capital purposes.
Consequently the expenditure on convertible debenture is admissible as revenue
expenditure.”

 

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Appeal to High Court : Power to condone delay : S. 260A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No power to condone delay : Delay in filing appeal cannot be condoned

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I. Unreported :

  1. Appeal to High Court : Power to condone delay : S. 260A of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : No power to condone delay : Delay in filing appeal
    cannot be condoned.

[CIT v. M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd. (Bom.), N. M.
No. 787 of 2009 in I.T. Appeal (L) No. 3592 of 2008, dated 8-7-2009]

In this Notice of Motion the Revenue was seeking
condonation of delay in filing the appeal u/s.260A of the Income-tax Act,
1961.

Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Chaudharana Steels (P) Ltd v. CCE,
(2009) 238 ELT 705 (SC) the Bombay High
Court held that the High Court had no power to condone delay in filing appeal
u/s.260A of the Act.

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Impact of IFRS on the real estate sector : Developing a new reporting framework

IFRS

Impact of IFRS on the real estate sector : Developing a new
reporting framework

As Indian companies get poised to converge with IFRS in April
2011, some of the sectors may witness significant changes in the financial
statements used for reporting their performance to various stakeholders. The
foremost amongst them is the real estate industry. This article seeks to discuss
these changes and their related impact in greater detail.

Revenue recognition :

Generally, developers start marketing the project before
construction is complete or perhaps, even before construction has started.
Buyers enter into agreements to acquire a spe+cific unit within the building on
completion of the construction. The contracts may require the buyer to pay a
deposit and progress payments, which are refundable only if the developer fails
to complete and deliver the unit.

Under IFRS, IFRIC 15 Agreements for the Construction of
Real Estate provides detailed guidance on recognition of revenue from real
estate contracts. Under the Indian GAAP, the matter is currently dealt through
the Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Developers
issued by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’).

There are significant differences between the accounting
recommended under the two pronouncements.

Under the Indian GAAP, the ICAI Guidance Note permits the
real estate development contracts to be accounted on percentage of completion
method.

Accounting for real estate construction arrangements under IFRS

An agreement for construction of real estate can be accounted
as :


(a) Construction contract, which is within the scope of
IAS 11 on construction contracts; or

(b) Sale of goods and service, which is within the scope
of IAS 18 on revenue recognition.


An agreement for construction of real estate meets the
definition of a construction contract when the buyer is able to specify major
structural elements of the design of the real estate before construction begins
and/or specify major structural changes once construction is in progress
(whether or not it exercises that ability). In such cases, IAS 11 on
construction contracts applies.

In contrast, an agreement for construction of real estate in
which buyers have only limited ability to influence the design of the real
estate, e.g., to select a design from a range of options specified by the
entity, or to specify only minor variations to the basic design, is an agreement
for sale of goods within the scope of IAS 18. IAS 18 prescribes the following
criteria for revenue recognition — Revenue from the sale of goods shall be
recognised when all the following conditions have been satisfied :


(a) the entity has transferred to the buyer the
significant risks and rewards of ownership of the goods;

(b) the entity retains neither continuing managerial
involvement to the degree usually associated with ownership, nor effective
control over the goods sold;

(c) the amount of revenue can be measured reliably;

(d) it is probable that the economic benefits
associated with the transaction will flow to the entity; and

(e) the costs incurred or to be incurred in respect of
the transaction can be measured reliably.


An analysis of general agreements for sale of real estate in
India shows that the buyers have only limited ability to influence the design of
the real estate, in fact they have no influence over the basic design/layout of
the building/apartment. Hence the sale would generally fall under IAS 18
principles as an agreement for sale of goods.

There could be two scenarios under sale of goods :




? the entity may transfer to the buyer control and the significant risks and
rewards of ownership of the real estate in its entirety at once (e.g.,
at completion, upon delivery). In such cases, the revenue will be recognised
only at the point of completion coupled with delivery.



? the entity may transfer to the buyer control and the significant risks and
rewards of ownership of the work in progress in its current state as
construction progresses, and then the revenue is recognised on percentage
completion method, provided all criteria (mentioned above) of IAS 18 are
satisfied.




Determining continuing managerial involvement :

At the time of signing the provisional letter of allotment or
the agreement for sale, generally the seller has significant pending acts to
perform for completion of its obligations to deliver the apartment. All
decisions related to construction are with the seller and also, the construction
risk is to the account of the seller. This indicates continuing managerial
involvement in the property.

Determining transfer of risks and rewards :

The following indicators in real estate sale agreements
demonstrate that the risk and rewards of ownership are not continuously
transferred to the buyer :


— If the agreement is terminated before completion of the
construction by the buyer, the buyer does not retain the work-in-progress
and the developer does not have the right to be paid for the work performed.
The developer has to refund the money received from the buyer.

— The agreement does not give the buyer the right to take
over the incomplete property in case of default by the developer or
otherwise.


These indicate that the seller effectively retains control
and has continuing managerial involvement over the flats until possession is
transferred.

Hence the completed contract method will have to be applied
and revenue shall be recorded in its entirety on transfer of possession.
Construction costs incurred will be carried in the books of the developer as
work-in-progress under ‘Inventory’.

Difference from accounting for construction contracts :

As discussed above, determining whether an agreement for the
construction of real estate is within the scope of IAS 11 or IAS 18 depends on
the terms of the agreement and all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Such
a determination requires judgment with respect to each agreement.

IAS 11 applies when the agreement meets the definition of a construction contract set out in paragraph 3 of IAS 11: ‘a contract specifically negotiated for the construction of an asset or a combination of assets ….’ An agreement for construction of real estate meets the definition of a construction contract when the buyer is able to specify major structural elements of the design of the real estate before construction begins and/ or specify major structural changes once construction is in progress (whether or not it exercises that ability).

One view could be that IAS 11 should apply to all agreements for the construction of real estate. In support of this view, it is argued that:

    a) these agreements are in substance construction contracts. The typical features of a construction contract — land development, structural engineering, architectural design and construction — are all present

    b) IAS 11 requires a percentage of completion method of revenue recognition for construction contracts. Revenue is recognised progressively as work is performed. Because many real estate development projects span more than one accounting period, the rationale for this method — that it ‘provides useful information on the extent of contract activity and performance during a period’ (IAS 11 paragraph 25) — applies to real estate development as much as it does to other construction contracts. If revenue is recognised only when the IAS 18 conditions for recognising revenue from the sale of goods are met, the financial statements do not reflect the entity’s economic value generation in the period and are susceptible to manipulation.

In reaching the consensus that IAS 11 should apply only when the agreement meets the definition of a construction contract and apply IAS 18 when the agreement does not meet the

definition of a construction contract, the IFRIC noted that:

    a) the fact that the construction spans more than one accounting period and requires progress payments are not relevant features to consider when determining the applicable standard and the timing of revenue recognition;

    b) determining whether an agreement for the construction of real estate is within the scope of IAS 11 or IAS 18 depends on the terms of the agreement and all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Such a determination requires judgement with respect to each agreement. It is not an accounting policy choice;

    c) IAS 11 lacks specific guidance on the definition of a construction contract and further application guidance is needed to help identify construction contracts.

The IFRIC concluded that the most important distinguishing feature is whether the customer is actually specifying the main elements of the structural design. In situations involving the sale of real estate, the customer generally does not have the ability to specify or alter the basic design of the product. Rather, the customer is simply choosing elements from a range of options specified by the seller or specifying only minor variations to the basic design. The IFRIC decided to include guidance to this effect in the Interpretation to help clarify the application of the definition of a construction contract.

Currently under the Indian GAAP, guidance note on recognition of revenue by real estate developers states that revenue can be recognised once significant risks and rewards are transferred. In case of real estate sales, price risk is considered as the most significant risk; and the buyer has the right to sell or transfer his interest in the property without any conditions or with immaterial conditions attached. Thus under the current scenario, revenue from real estate sales can be recognised on the completion of an agreement for sale, even though the legal title or possession has not been delivered.

Consolidation of land acquisition companies:
Real estate companies in India are regulated under the Land Ceiling Act, 1976, which fixes a maximum limit on the area of land that may be owned by one company. To overcome these restrictions, real estate companies float various special purpose entities (SPEs) that purchase land from the market. A real estate company may have differing arrangements with SPEs. These arrangements would have to be closely evaluated and in light of SIC Interpretation 12 Consolidation — Special Purpose Entities.

In certain cases, real estate companies directly or indirectly hold 100% or majority share capital of such SPEs and/or have majority representation on their board of directors. However in other cases, the share capital of SPEs, which is generally a small amount, is held by a third party that also controls the governing body of the SPE. In such cases, the real estate companies are involved with the SPE in various other ways, such as provision of finance to carry out the activities, exclusive rights to develop land, provide guarantee against finance taken by SPEs, guarantee minimum return to the shareholders and/or enter contract, which may restrict the decision-making powers of SPE.

Under the Indian GAAP, companies consolidate only those entities where they directly or indirectly hold majority share capital and/or have majority representation on the board of directors or other governing bodies. However, under IFRS a special purpose entity may have to be consolidated even in cases where a company is not holding majority share or controlling the composition of the governing board of the SPE on account of certain arrangements like provision of finance to carry out the activities, exclusive rights to develop land, etc. which may be indicative of a control. As per SIC 12, the following circumstances, for example, may indicate a relationship in which an entity controls an SPE and consequently should consolidate the SPE?:

  a)  In substance, the activities of the SPE are being conducted on behalf of the entity according to its specific business needs, so that the entity obtains benefits from the SPE’s operation.

b)    In substance, the entity has the decision-making powers to obtain majority of the benefits of the activities of the SPE or, by setting up an ‘autopilot’ mechanism, the entity has delegated these decision-making powers.

   c)  In substance, the entity has rights to obtain majority of the benefits of the SPE and therefore may be exposed to risks incident to the activities of the SPE.

 d)   In substance, the entity retains majority of the residual or ownership risks related to the SPE or its assets in order to obtain benefits from its activities.

Upon transition to IFRS, real estate companies will need to evaluate their relationship with SPEs based on the criteria laid down in SIC 12. Further, real estate companies will also need to examine whether such consolidation may have any legal or other implications.

Structured financing arrangements:

Structured financing arrangements for entities floated by real estate companies for projects, would need to be closely evaluated to identify the substance of the transaction; and accounting will have to reflect this underlying substance. For example, instruments issued for which the entity has an obligation to pay cash would need to be classified as debt and the underlying committed returns or fluctuations in the value of such instruments would have to be recorded in the income statement. This would also increase the volatility of the reported earnings and reduce reported profits.

Impacts of change in financial reporting framework on other operational areas:

Executive compensation plans:

Some real estate companies pay commissions/ variable incentives to employees based on sales or profits. Given the impact of IFRS, there will be a high degree of volatility in the reported revenues and reported profits of companies, thereby impacting these compensation plans. Further in case of payments to directors, which in India is limited to a specified percentage of profits, companies will need to address the impact on managerial remuneration due to insufficient profits in the period when construction activity is ongoing but possession is not transferred, though companies would have positive cash flows.

Tax:

Another important area which deserves attention is the impact on the tax liability for a company due to the change in the accounting framework with special emphasis on changes in revenue recognition. It will be important to understand whether tax authorities will recognise profits under IFRS as taxable profits and thereby postpone the tax incidence till the possession of the property is transferred. Alternatively, the authorities may require the companies to recompute revenue using percentage of completion method for tax purposes. Further, interplay between the minimum alternate tax (MAT) provisions and the reported profits under IFRS would be equally important.

Debt covenants:

In preparing its first IFRS financial statements, an entity recognises all assets and liabilities in accordance with the requirements of IFRS, and derecognises assets and liabilities that do not qualify for recognition under IFRS. Further, the entity would have to reclassify items that it recognised in accordance with previous GAAP as one type of asset, liability or component of equity, but are a different type of asset, liability or component of equity in accordance with IFRS.

This may impact various business ratios like gearing, liquidity and profitability ratios of a first-time adopter. Further, a reclassification of a long-term loan as current due to, say, a default in meeting any covenant (example business ratios) may impact debt covenants of other loans. In extreme situations, it may even impact the company’s ability to continue as a going concern. It would be therefore pertinent to conduct a detailed examination of the various loan and borrowing agreements and identify the covenants which may be impacted by the transition. An early discussion with the lenders of funds around these areas would go a long way in avoiding last minute surprises.

Conclusion:

As convergence with IFRS is inevitable, the key now lies in getting this transition right. The most important factors for real estate companies would be educating their stakeholders including investors, bankers and align internal budgets and performance measurement matrices. Companies would have to closely examine various debt covenants and clearly identify the ones which may be impacted due to the transition and discuss the same with their financiers/ bankers. At the same time, it will have to sensitise the market participants with respect to the unique impact of certain standards on the industry. This in turn would help to realign the valuation matrices based on the different set of accounting policies that will be used by these companies to report their performance results. Given the aforesaid implications, an early start towards the convergence process is pertinent for both preparers and users of financial statements to understand the impact on how the financial performance will be reported going forward.

Consolidation — redefining control and reflecting true net worth

Background :

    Consolidated financial statements in India have traditionally been a reporting requirement only for listed companies. Companies not listed on stock exchanges are not required to prepare or present consolidated financial statements.

    The fundamental change under IFRS is that IFRS recognises consolidated financial statements as the primary set of financial statements for any entity that has subsidiaries or joint ventures or associates. The only exception for an entity not to report consolidated financial statements is if it meets all the following conditions :

    (a) the parent is itself a wholly-owned subsidiary, or is a partially-owned subsidiary of another entity and its other owners, including those not otherwise entitled to vote, have been informed about, and do not object to, the parent not presenting consolidated financial statements;

    (b) the parent’s debt or equity instruments are not traded in a public market;

    (c) the parent did not file, nor is it in the process of filing, its financial statements with a securities commission or other regulatory organisation for the purpose of issuing any class of instruments in a public market; and

    (d) the ultimate or any intermediate parent of the parent produces consolidated financial statements available for public use that comply with International Financial Reporting Standards.

    In this article we shall discuss the differences in principles of consolidation as laid down in IAS 27 ‘Consolidated and separate financial statements’ under IFRS and AS-21 ‘Consolidated financial statements’ under Indian GAAP. We will cover some of the implementation challenges and impact of the subtle differences in the consolidation standard between Indian GAAP and IFRS in our next article.

Key differences and implication :

Definition of control :

    Under the IFRS framework, consolidation is based on the power to control (i.e., the ability of one entity to control another). Hence, understanding what constitutes ‘control’ is of utmost importance. Control is defined as the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as to obtain benefits from its activities. This definition is not unlike what is stated under AS-21 in Indian GAAP. However, where Indian GAAP takes a narrow view and assumes that holding a majority of the voting interest of an entity automatically results in controlling the entity, IFRS treats the same as a rebuttable presumption. Thus, IFRS provides that control is presumed to exist when the parent owns, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, more than half of the voting power of an entity, unless in exceptional circumstances, it can be clearly demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute control.

    The implication of the control principles under IFRS is that companies cannot consolidate an entity only based on holding of current voting interests. Since consolidation is based only on control, only one holding entity will practically be able to demonstrate such control and hence there will never be a scenario where the same entity is being consolidated by two separate holding entities as a subsidiary. As a result of the transition to IFRS, the holding in the entity will need to be re-looked for assessment of potential voting rights held and more importantly an evaluation of the nature of any veto rights held by other shareholders, which are discussed below.

Potential voting rights :

    In assessing control, the impact of potential voting rights that currently are exercisable should be considered. Such potential voting rights may take many forms, including call options, warrants, convertible shares, and contractual arrangements to acquire shares. This is because the potential voting rights give the holders the power to control the entity because they can step in and acquire control at any time if they wish to.

    For example, X owns 40% of the voting power in A, Y owns 25% and Z owns the other 35%. Further, X holds a call option to acquire from Y an additional 20% of the voting power in A; the call option can be exercised at any time. Accordingly, it is X that has the power to govern A. Therefore X consolidates A, but reflects 60% as non controlling interest.

Participative rights with other shareholders :

    The presumption of control may be rebutted in exceptional circumstances if it can be demonstrated clearly that such ownership does not constitute control. To ascertain whether ownership constitutes control, the rights of minority interests need to be analysed. In many cases minorities have certain rights even if another party owns the majority of the voting power in an entity. Sometimes these rights are derived from law, and other times from the entity’s constitution.

    IFRSs do not address the issue of minority rights but as discussed above it is necessary to consider the nature and extent of the rights of minority in determining control, including the distinction between participating rights that allow minority to block significant decisions that would be expected to be made in the ordinary course of business, and rights that are protective in nature. Since IFRS does not have specific literature on minority rights, guidance is drawn from EITF 96-16 under US GAAP to determine if certain rights are participative and hence demonstrate absence of control with the majority shareholder. Examples of participative rights are :

  •      Approval from minority shareholders for selecting, terminating, and setting the compensation of management responsible for implementing the investee’s policies and procedures.

  •      Approval from minority shareholders for establishing operating and capital decisions of the investee, including budgets, in the ordinary course of business.

For example, two companies A and B come together to form a company X in which company A holds 75% with 3 directors on the board of company X and company B holds 25% with 2 directors on the board of company X. By virtue of majority holding, company A consolidates company X as a subsidiary under Indian GAAP. The Articles of Association of company X state that for certain decisions, a unanimous approval of the board of directors is required. These decisions include approving the annual and semi-annual budgets of the company and selection and appointment of senior management personnel. In such a case, Under IFRS, company A does not control company X, instead it shares joint control over it along with company B. Hence it shall not consolidate company X as a subsidiary but account for it as a joint venture arrangement.

Indirect holding:

Indirect holding mayor may not result in one entity having control over another. Although the total ownership interest may exceed 50%, this may not mean that the entity has control.

For example, entity L owns 35% of the voting power in entity N, and 40% of the voting power in entity M. M owns 60% of the voting power in N. There-fore, L has, directly and indirectly, a 59% [35% + (60% x 40%)] ownership interest in N.

However, L doesn’t control 59% of the vote because it does not have control over the votes exercised by M; rather, it is limited to significant influence. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary indicators, L does not control N and should  not consolidate  N.

Non-controlling interest (‘NCI’) :

Minority interests are referred as non-controlling interests (‘NCI’) under the revised IAS 27 standard and are presented as a part of consolidated equity. It is defined as ‘the equity in a subsidiary not attributable, directly or indirectly, to a parent’. This is unlike Indian GAAP, where minority interests are reflected outside consolidated equity (generally, as a liability).

Losses applicable to NCI are allocated irrespective of whether the NCI has a contractual obligation to make good such losses to the parent, even if doing so causes the NCI to be in a deficit position. Once again, this is unlike the treatment of excess losses under Indian GAAP.

Changes in controlling interests:

Under IFRS, changes in the  parent’s ownership interest in a subsidiary after control is obtained that do not result in a loss of control need to be accounted for as transactions with owners in their capacity as owners. As a result no gain or loss on such changes is recognised in the income statement. Also, no change in the carrying amounts of assets (including goodwill) or liabilities is recognised as a result of such transactions.

For example, Entity A owns 60% of the shares in Entity B. On 1st January 2010 Entity A acquires an additional 20% of Entity B. The consideration transferred for the additional shares of Entity B is INR 400. The carrying amount of non-controlling interest in the consolidated financial statements of Entity A on 1st January 2Q10 is INR 500.

The acquisition of the 20% interest of the non-controlling interest is recorded as follows:

Entity A recognises the decrease in equity in its consolidated financial statements. No adjustments are made to the recognised amounts of assets and liabilities or to goodwill.

Under Indian CAAP, the above acquisition of 20% additional interest would result in additional good-will for .the difference between the consideration transferred (INR 400) and the book value of the minority interest purchased.

Similarly, a reduction in equity interests from 80% to 60% due to sale of shares to minority interests (however control retained by the Company) would also have been adjusted in equity in the same manner as above, unlike Indian CAAP where a gain or loss on such sale of stake would have been rec-ognised in profit and loss e.g., : If the sale of 20% stake was made for a consideration of INR 500 (thus reducing the overall stake from 80% to 60%), and the net assets of the subsidiary were INR 1500 – Under IFRS, this transaction would result into an additional credit of INR 300 (1500*20%) to non-controlling interests and a credit of INR 200 to other equity, whereas under Indian CAAP the adjustment of INR 200 would have been recognised as a gain in the income statement.

Under IFRS, when a change in controlling interests results in loss of control (e.g., due to sale of investment in the subsidiary, due to which the investee company ceases to be a subsidiary), such a change is accounted for in two parts. Firstly, derecognise the net assets and goodwill of the subsidiary and recognise the relating gain or loss in income statement (by comparing it to the fair value of consideration received). Secondly, recognise any balance investment in the former subsidiary at fair value.

For example, Entity A owns 60% of the shares in Entity B. On 1st January 2010 Entity A disposes of a 20% interest in Entity B and loses control over Entity B. The consideration received for the sale of shares of Entity B is INR 400. At the date that Entity A disposes of a 20% interest in Entity B, the carrying amount of the net assets of Entity B is INR 1,750. The amount of non-controlling interest in the consolidated financial statements of Entity A on 1st January 2010 is INR 700. The fair value of the remaining 40% investment is determined to be INR 800.

Entity A would record the following entry to reflect its disposal of a 20% interest in Entity B at 1st January 2010 :

The gain represents the increase in the fair value of the retained 40% investment of INR 100 [INR 800 – (40% x INR 1,750)], plus the gain on the sale of the 20% interest disposed of INR 50 [INR 400 – (20% x INR 1,750)].

Assuming that the remaining interest of 40% represents an associate, the fair value of INR 800 represents the cost on initial recognition and IAS 28-Accounting for associates applies going forward.

Under Indian CAAP, the gain on sale in the above case would be recognised based on the difference between the consideration received (INR 400) and the proportionate carrying value of the investment in the subsidiary. The carrying value of the balance investment would not be revalued to the fair value
unlike  IFRS.    ‘

Special purpose entities:

Under IFRS, there is no requirement for the parent to have a shareholding in a subsidiary, and this is not a necessary pre-condition for control. Sometimes an entity is created to accomplish a narrow and well-defined objective (e.g., conduct research and development activities, securitise financial assets, or own a specified asset). Such entities are referred to as Special Purpose Entities (SPE) and SIC 12 ‘Consolidation – Special purpose entities’ lays down the guidance for consolidation of SPEs. Important to bear in mind when analysing an SPE is the requirement to account for the substance and economic reality of a transaction rather than only its legal form. Conditions where an entity controls an SPE and hence needs to apply consolidation are given below:

a) in substance, the activities of the SPE are being conducted on behalf of the entity according to its specific business needs so that the entity obtains benefits from the SPE’s operation;

    b) in substance, the entity has the decision-making powers to obtain the majority of the benefits of the activities of the SPE or, by setting up an ‘autopilot’ mechanism, the entity has delegated these decision-making powers;

    c) in substance, the entity has rights to obtain the majority of the benefits of the SPE and there-fore may be exposed to risks incidental to the activities of the SPE; or

    d) in substance, the entity retains the majority of the residual or ownership risks related to the SPE or its assets in order to obtain benefits from its activities.

Using this approach, several SPE’s that have been set up by Indian companies for specific purposes (without any direct holding of voting interest or Board representation) may need to be consolidated, if the conditions of SIC 12 are met. This involves significant use of judgment and an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances of the case. Such entities are typically not consolidated under Indian CAAP. In the Indian context, some of the above parameters may get triggered in arrangements of ‘toll manufacturers’ – a practice which is fairly common in the FMCC and pharmaceuticals industry.

Conclusion:

Consolidation is an area which needs careful evaluation on convergence with IFRS. The changes due to such transition could result in a change in the group i.e., subsidiaries which were earlier part of the group may now become joint ventures or associates; and special purpose entities which were earlier not consolidated would now form part of the consolidation group. Consolidation in IFRS essentially revolves around the concept of unilateral control of the financial and operating policies of the investee company and lays importance on substance over form. It is important to note here that IASB has issued an Exposure Draft ‘ED 10 – Consolidated Financial Statements’ that under one standard now covers concepts of participative and protective rights of non-controlling interest and special purpose entities.

The liability Special Court (Trial of offences relating to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992. Has precedence over other liability u/s.11(2)(a) — Scope of powers under the Act

The liability Special Court (Trial of offences relating to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992. Has precedence over other liability u/s.11(2)(a) — Scope of powers under the Act.

    [DCIT v. State Bank of India & Ors., (2009) 308 ITR 1 (SC)]

    The present appeals were filed against the judgment and order of the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for conducting trial of offences related to transactions in securities. By the impugned judgment and order, the Special Court allowed the application filed by Respondent No. 1, the State Bank of India and directed the appellant to deposit an amount of Rs. 546.22 crores with the Custodian along with interest at 9% per annum. The Special Court while issuing the said direction held that the income-tax liability for the statutory period of the notified party, namely, Mr. Harshad S. Mehta u/s. 11(2)(a) did not at that stage appear to be in excess of Rs.140 crores approximately, subject to further orders that the Court might pass at a later stage. In the impugned judgment and order a further direction was issued that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the amount lying deposited with the Custodian and, therefore, a direction was also issued to the Custodian to pay to the banks, namely, the State Bank of India and the Standard Chartered Bank against their decrees the principal amount, from the amount in deposit with the Custodian as also from the amount that was likely to be coming back from the Income-tax Department. As the said amount was inadequate to fully satisfy the claims of the banks with respect to the principal amount, it was further held that the same would be disbursed by the Custodian on pro rata basis and after receiving an undertaking from the banks to the Court that they would bring back the amount, if so required, on such terms and conditions as may be directed by the Court.

    The issue sought to be raised by the appellant, Income-tax Department by filing the present appeal was whether the Special Court constituted under the aforesaid Act was right in scaling down the priority tax demand by delving into the merits of the assessment orders and by deciding the matter as an appellate authority, which directions according to the appellant were in violation of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta v. Custodian, (1998) 5 SCC 1.

    The Supreme Court noted that the subject-matter of the appeal related to the security scam of Harshad S. Mehta and the period relevant to the said scam related to the A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment proceedings for both the aforesaid years in respect of Harshad S. Mehta after gathering information from many sources and after giving an opportunity to the assessee to furnish details/explanations on the same. The Income-tax Officer passed an assessment order assessing the income for the A.Y. 1992-93 at Rs.2,014 crores and for the A.Y. 1993-94 at Rs. 1,396 crores. The assessment orders were challenged before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) by the assessee and were largely confirmed. Cross-appeals have been filed by the Revenue as also by the assessee for the A.Y. 1992-93, which are pending with the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, whereas for the A.Y. 1993-94 appeal filed by the assessee is pending for admission. The orders of assessment were largely confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) resulting in raising a tax demand of Rs.1,743 crores by the Income-tax Department.

    The Supreme Court observed that in terms of the provisions of S. 11(2)(a) of the Act, the Income-tax Department has first right on appropriation of the assets of Harshad S. Mehta lying in the custody of the Custodian against its tax demand for the A.Y. 1992-93 and the A.Y. 1993-94 as tax component. Therefore, the Income-tax Department is required to be paid in priority over the liabilities payable to the banks, financial institutions and other creditors, particularly for the aforesaid relevant two years which were considered as statutory period.

    In terms of the aforesaid provisions and at the request of the Income-tax Department, the Custodian had earlier released a sum of Rs.686.22 crores to the Department pursuant to various orders passed by the Special Court, which were confirmed by the Supreme Court. The said interim release of funds of Rs.686.22 crores to the Department was subject to filing of an affidavit/undertaking by the Secretary (Revenue), Government of India that the amount would be brought back to the Court/custodian along with interest within a period of four weeks, if so directed by the Special Court.

    In Harshad Shantilal Mehta v. Custodian, (1998) 5 SCC 1 it was held by the Supreme Court that such priority would be restricted to the tax component of the demand for priority period relevant to the A.Y. 1992-93 and the A.Y. 1993-94. The Supreme Court also held that the Special Court cannot sit in appeal over the order of tax assessment but in case of any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice in the assessment proceedings where tax assessed is disproportionately high in relation to funds available, the Special Court could scale down the tax liability to be paid in priority.

Applications were filed by the State Bank of India (hereafter referred to as ‘the SBI’) and also by other banks including Standard Chartered Bank (herein-after referred to as ‘the SCB’) before the Special Court seeking direction to scale down the priority demand on the ground that there was gross miscarriage of justice in making an order of assessment in the case of the notified party, namely, Harshad S. Mehta. In the said applications reference was also made to the decrees on admission passed in favour of the banks against Harshad S. Mehta which according to the banks had become final and binding. Relying on the said decrees it was contended on behalf of the banks that passing of decrees prove tha t the concerned money which is assessed as income in the hands of Harshad S. Mehta as his income was, in fact, money belonging to the banks and, therefore, there was a miscarriage of justice as the Income-tax Department had considered the said amount/sum to be the income of Harshad S. Mehta. It was also submitted that miscarriage of justice also crept in, in respect of, additions on account of over-sold securities, unexplained stock and unexplained deposits in banks, etc. The aforesaid applications were heard by the Special Court wherein the Income-tax Department refuted the aforesaid submissions that there has been any miscarriage of justice in making the order of assessment in the case of Harshad S. Mehta. However, the Special Court under the impugned order dated September 29, 2007, accepted the pleas raised by the SBI and other banks in part with a direction to scale down the priority demand in the case of Harshad S. Mehta in the following terms and on the following grounds:

Consequently, it was held that if the above amounts were excluded from the total assessed income of the statutory period, the total income would be reduced to approximately Rs.277 crores, and therefore, it was held by the Special Court that the tax liability of Harshad S. Mehta for the aforesaid two assessment years payable u/s.ll(2)(a) of the Act in no case would exceed Rs.149 crores. In terms of the aforesaid findings and conclusions arrived at by the Special Court, directions were issued directing the Income-tax Department to deposit with the Custodian an amount of Rs.546.22 crores with interest at 9% per annum from the date of receipt of the amounts amounting Rs.686.22 crores, with a further direction that the said amount which is to be deposited by the Income-tax Department along with other amount lying deposited with the Custodian would be released in favour of the banks in terms of observations made in the impugned order.

After considering the legislative provisions of the Act and the judicial interpretation in the decision of Harshad Shantilal Mehta v. Custodian, (1998) 5 SCC I, the Supreme Court held that the following general principles regarding the powers of Special Court while discharging the tax liability emerge:

i) The Special Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the assessment of tax liability of a notified person by the authority or Tribunal or Court authorised to perform that function by the statute under which the tax is levied. A claim in respect of tax assessed cannot be re-opened by the Special Court and the extent of liability, therefore, cannot be examined by the Special Court.

ii) The claims relating to the tax liabilities of a notified person are, along with revenues, cesses and rates entitled for the statutory period, to be paid first in the order of priority and in full, as far as may be, depending upon various circumstances.

iii) The ‘taxes due’ refer to ‘tax as finally assessed’. The tax liability can properly be construed as tax liability of the notified person arising out of transaction in securities during the ‘statutory period’ of April I, 1991 to June 6, 1992.

iv) The priority, however, which is given u!s. 11(2)(a) to such tax liability only covers such liability for the period April I, 1991 to June 6, 1992. Every kind of tax liability of the notified person for any other period is not covered by S. 11(2)(a), although the liability may continue to be the liability of the notified person. Such tax liability may be discharged either under the directions of the Special Courtu /s.11(2)(c), or the taxing authority may recover the same from any subsequently acquired property of a notified person or in any other manner from the ‘notified ‘person in accordance with law.

v) The Special Court can decide how much of the tax liability will be discharged out of the funds in the hands of the Custodian and the Special Court can, for the purpose of disbursing the tax liability, examine whether there is any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice in assessment proceedings.

vi) Where the assessment is based on proper material and pertains to the ‘statutory period’, the Special Court may not reduce the tax claimed and pay it out in full, but if the assessment is a ‘best judgment’ assessment, the Special Court may examine whether the taxes so assessed are grossly disproportionate to the properties of the assessee in the hands of the Custodian, applying the Wednesbury Principle of Proportionality and other issues of the said nature. The Special Court may in these cases, scale down the tax liability to be paid out of the funds in the hands of Custodian. Such scaling down, however, should be done only in serious cases of miscarriage of justice, fraud or collusion, or where tax assessed is so disproportionately high in relation to the funds in the hands of the Custodian as to require scaling down in the interest of the claims of the banks and financial institutions and to further the purpose of the Act. The Special Court must have strong reasons for doing so.

In the light of the above, the Supreme Court observed that the fact that decrees have been obtained by the banks in respect of certain dues of Harshad S. Mehta could not be disputed by the Income-tax Department. It also could be disputed by the Income-tax Department that the amounts for which decrees have been obtained by the banks have become final and binding. But then, it was submitted that the taxes due have been ascertained and arrived at in terms of the provisions of the Act and that the banks have failed to establish by producing the relevant documents on record that the said amount, which is decreed in favour of the bank, has been wrongly included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period.

As the priority in payment of tax liability u/s.11(2)(a) is only for the statutory period and not any other period, the Supreme Court found that the appellant was justified while contending that if the banks had a right, title or interest in the attached property on the date of the Notification u!s.3 of the Act for which decrees had been obtained and if the banks were claiming that the said amount had wrongly been included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period, then the banks were required to show the nexus between the said decreed amount and the amount which was included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period.

Secondly with respect to the issue of duplication of a sum of Rs. 601.22 crores it was contended by the appellant that the same was correlated to the first issue and a finding on the said issue could be given only once the finding with respect to the first issue is arrived at. According to the Supreme Court there was no finding either on the issue of nexus or on the issue of duplication by the Special Court in the impugned judgment. Probably the reason for the same was that the said issues were not raised before the Special Court and even if they were raised before the Special Court the same were not addressed or considered in the manner in which they should have been done.

The Supreme Court was of the view that for the adjudication of the disputes which were raised in the present appeal, a finding on the said issues and questions would be mandatory and the same could not be dispensed with under any circumstances.

The Supreme Court observed that in the absence of relevant documents, neither it would be possible nor would it be appropriate for it to give a finding on the said issues and questions. Therefore in the opinion of the Supreme Court all such disputed questions were required to be decided by the Special Court after giving an opportunity to the parties to place all the relevant documents before it so as to enable it to come to a proper and considered finding.

However, while remanding the matter for a finding on the said issues and questions, the Supreme Court held that if the nexus is shown by the banks between the amounts for which decrees have been obtained, which have become final and binding and the amount which is included in the income in the hands of Harshad S. Mehta by the Department, the same will have to be disbursed to the banks by the Special Court. It also held that on account of over-sold securities if the delivery was given by Harshad S. Mehta and the transaction was complete, only the difference between the payable and receivable would be taken and not the gross amount. How-ever, the issue as to whether the decrees were on account of oversold securities and, if so, was there any duplication or whether the decrees were on account of siphoning of the funds, was required to be adjudicated by the Special Court on appreciation of the relevant documents.

The Supreme Court, however, clarified that so far as the amounts of Rs.253 crores and Rs. 101 crores are concerned, the appellants had not stated that the said amounts were not included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period. The consent decrees obtained in respect of Rs.2S3 crores were not challenged by the appellant, which led the Special Court to believe that the appellant had accepted the settlement and accordingly scaled down the said amount from the income of Harshad S. Mehta. Similar was the case with the amount of Rs.101 crores. Thus, the scaling down of the said amount was upheld and would not be disturbed.

Bad debt — Write-off — After 1st April, 1989, if an assessee debits an amount of doubtful debt to the profit and loss account and credits the asset account like Sundry Debtors’ Account, it could constitute a write-off of an actual debt and it is not neces

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28 Bad debt — Write-off —
After 1st April, 1989, if an assessee debits an amount of doubtful debt to the
profit and loss account and credits the asset account like Sundry Debtors’
Account, it could constitute a write-off of an actual debt and it is not
necessary to square off each individual account.


[Vijaya Bank v. CIT & Anr.,
(2010) 323 ITR 166 (SC)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the
Assessing Officer disallowed a sum of Rs.7,10,47,161 which the assessee-bank had
reduced from loans and advances or debtors on the ground that the impugned bad
debt had not been written off in an appropriate manner as required under the
accounting principles. According to him, the impugned bad debt supposedly
written off by the assessee-bank was mere provision and the same could not be
equated with the actual write-off of the bad debt, as per the requirement of S.
36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the 1961 Act’ for short) read with
explanation thereto which Explanation stood inserted in the 1961 Act by the
Finance Act, 2001, with effect from April 1, 1989. The assessee carried the
matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [‘CIT(A)’, for
short], who opined that it was not necessary for the purpose of writing off of
bad debts to pass corresponding entries in the individual account of each and
every debtor and that it would be sufficient if the debit entries are made in
the profit and loss account and corresponding credit is made in the ‘bad debt
reserve account’. Against the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) on this point, the Department preferred an appeal to the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’, for short). Before the Tribunal, it was argued
on behalf of the Department that write-off of each and every individual account
under the head ‘Loans and advances’ or ‘debtors’ was a condition precedent for
claiming deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act. According to the Department,
the claim of actual write-off of bad debts in relation to banks stood on a
footing different from the accounts of the non-banking assessee(s), though it
was not disputed that S. 36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act covered banking as well as
non-banking assessees. According to the assessee, once a provision stood created
and, ultimately carried to the balance sheet wherein loans and advances or
debtors depicted stood reduced by the amount of such provision, then there was
actual write-off, because, in the final analysis, at the year end, the so-called
provision did not remain and balance sheet at the year ended only carried the
amount of loans and advances or debtors, net of such provision made by the
assessee for the impugned bad debt. The Tribunal, upheld the above contention of
the assessee on three grounds. Firstly, according to the Tribunal, the assessee
had rightly made a provision for bad and doubtful debt by debiting the amount of
bad debt to the profit and loss account so as to reduce the profit of the year.
Secondly, the provision account so created was debited and simultaneously the
amount of loans and advances or debtors stood reduced and, consequently, the
provision account stood obliterated. Lastly, according to the Tribunal, loans
and advances or the sundry debtors of the assessee as at the end of the year
lying in the balance sheet was shown as net of ‘provision for doubtful debt’
created by way of debit to the profit and loss account of the year.
Consequently, the Tribunal, on this point, came to the conclusion that deduction
u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act was allowable.

On the question whether it
was imperative for the assessee to close each and every individual account and
its debtors in its books or a mere reduction in the loans and advances to the
extent of the provision for bad and doubtful debt was sufficient, the answer
given by the Tribunal was that, in view of the decision of the Gujarat High
Court in the case of Vithaldas H. Dhanjibhai Bardanwala v. CIT, reported in
(1981) 130 ITR 95, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was right in coming
to the conclusion that since the assessee had written off the impugned bad in
its books by way of a debit to the profit and loss account simultaneously
reducing the corresponding amount from loans and advances or debtors depicted on
the assets side in the balance sheet at the close of the year, the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act. This view was not accepted
by the High Court which came to the conclusion by placing reliance upon a
judgment in the case of CIT v. Wipro Infotech Limited that in view of the
insertion of the Explanation, vide the Finance Act, 2001, with effect from April
1, 1989, the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Vithaldas H.
Dhanjibhai Bardanwala (supra) no more held the field and, consequently, mere
creation of a provision did not amount to actual write-off of bad debts.

In the civil appeals filed
against the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed that broadly,
two questions arose for its determination. The first question that arose for
determination concerned the manner in which actual write-off takes place under
the accounting principles. The second question that arose for determination was,
whether it was imperative for the assessee-bank to close the individual account
of each debtor in its books or a mere reduction in the ‘loans and advances
account’ or debtors to the extent of the provision for bad and doubtful debt was
sufficient.

According to the Supreme
Court, the first question was considered by it in Southern Technologies Ltd. v.
Joint CIT, (2010) 320 ITR 577, in which it had an occasion to deal with the
first question and in that case it had been held that after 1st April, 1989, if
an assessee debits an amount of doubtful debt to the profit and loss account and
credits the asset account like sundry debtors’ account, it would constitute a
write-off of an actual debt. However, if an assessee debits ‘provision for
doubtful debt’ to the profit and loss account and makes a corresponding credit
to the ‘current liabilities and provisions’ on the liabilities side of the
balance sheet, then it would constitute a provision for doubtful debt. In the
latter case, the assessee would not be entitled to deduction.

In regards to view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in Vithaldas H. Dhanjibhai Bardanwala (supra) and sequent insertion of Explanation in S. 36(1)(vii) w.e.f. April 1, 1989 the Supreme Court clarified that in the aforesaid judgment of the Gujarat High Court, a mere debit to the profit and loss account was sufficient to constitute actual write-off, whereas after the Explanation, the assessee is now required not only to debit the profit and loss account, but simultaneously also reduce the loans and advances or the debtors from the assets side of the balance sheet to the extent of the corresponding amount so that at the end of the year, the amounts of loans and advances/debtors is shown as net of the provisions for the impugned bad debt. According to the Supreme Court, the High Court had lost sight of this aspect in its impugned judgment. The Supreme Court, on the first question, therefore, held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act as there was actual write-off by the assessee in its books.

Coming to the second question, the Supreme Court noted that what is being insisted upon by the Assessing Officer is that mere reduction of the amount of loans and advances or the debtors at the end would not suffice and, in the interest of transparency, it would be desirable for the assessee-bank to close each and every individual account of loans and advances or debtors as a pre-condition for claiming deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act. This view has been taken by the Assessing Officer because the Assessing Officer apprehended that the assessee-bank might be taking the benefit of deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act, twice over. The Supreme Court held that it cannot decide the matter on the basis of apprehensions/desirability. It is always open to the Assessing Officer to call for the details of individual debtor’s account if the Assessing Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the assessee has claimed deduction, twice over. The Supreme Court observed that the assessee had instituted recovery suits in courts against its debtors. If individual accounts were to be closed, then the debtor/defendant in each of those suits would rely upon the bank statement and contend that no amount is due and payable in which event the suit would be dismissed.

The Supreme Court further observed that according to the Department, it was necessary to square off each individual account, failing which there was likelihood of escapement of income from assessment. According to the Department, in cases where a borrower’s account is written off by debiting the profit and loss account and by crediting loans and advances or debtors accounts on the assets side of the balance sheet, then as and when in the subsequent years if the borrower repays the loan, the assessee will credit the repaid amount to the loans and advances account not to the profit and loss account, which would result in escapement of income from assessment. On the other hand, if bad debt is written off by closing the borrower’s account individually, then the repaid amount in subsequent years will be credited to the profit and loss account on which the assessee-bank has to pay tax. The Supreme Court held that although, prima facie, this argument of the Department appeared to be valid, on a deeper consideration, it is not so for three reasons. Firstly, the head office accounts clearly indicated, in the present case, that on repayment in subsequent years, the amounts were duly offered for tax. Secondly, one had to keep in mind that under the accounting practice, the accounts of the rural branches have to tally with the accounts of the head office. If the repaid amount in subsequent years is not credited to the profit and loss account of the head office, which is ultimately what matters, then there would be a mismatch between the rural branch accounts and the head office accounts. Lastly, in any event, S. 41(4) of the 1961 Act, inter alia, lays down that where a deduction has been allowed in respect of a bad debt or a part thereof u/s.36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act, then if the amount subsequently recovered on any such debt is greater than the difference between the debt and the amount so allowed, the excess shall be deemed to the profit and gains of business and, accordingly, chargeable to income-tax as the income of the previous year in which it is recovered. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that the Assessing Officer was sufficiently empowered to tax such subsequent repayments u/s.41(4) of the 1961 Act and, consequently, there was no merit in the contention that if the assessee succeeded, then it would result in escapement of income from assessment.

The Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the judgment of the Tribunal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.

Bad debt — After April 1, 1989, it is not necessary for the assessee to establish that the debt, in fact, has become irrecoverable.

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27 Bad debt — After April 1,
1989, it is not necessary for the assessee to establish that the debt, in fact,
has become irrecoverable.


[T.R.F. Ltd. v. CIT,
(2010) 323 ITR 397 (SC)]

The Supreme Court was
concerned with the appeals for the A.Y. 1990-91 and the A.Y. 1993-94. The
Supreme Court observed that prior to April 1, 1989, every assessee had to
establish, as a matter of fact, that the debt advanced by the assessee had, in
fact, become irrecoverable. That position got altered by deletion of the word
‘established’, which earlier existed in S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (‘the Act’, for short).

The Supreme Court held that
this position in law was well settled. After April 1, 1989, it is not necessary
for the assessee to establish that the debt, in fact, has become irrecoverable.
It is enough if the bad debt is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of
the assessee. The Supreme Court further held that however, in the present case,
the Assessing Officer had not examined whether the debt had, in fact, been
written off in the accounts of the assessee. When a bad debt occurs, the bad
debt account is debited and the customer’s account is credited, thus, closing
the account of the customer. In the case of companies, the provision is deducted
from sundry debtors. This exercise having not been undertaken by the Assessing
Officer, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for de
novo consideration of the above-mentioned aspect only and that too only to the
extent of the write-off.

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Co-operative society — Whether the society could be said to be engaged in a cottage industry or whether it could be said to be engaged in a collective disposal of labour of its members — Though Court did not interfere in the matter in absence of material,

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26 Co-operative society —
Whether the society could be said to be engaged in a cottage industry or whether
it could be said to be engaged in a collective disposal of labour of its members
— Though Court did not interfere in the matter in absence of material, a
direction was given to determine the issue having regard to the bye-laws of the
society and Janata Cloth Scheme of the Central Government.


[CIT v. Rajasthan Rajya
Bunker S. Samiti Ltd.
, (2010) 323 ITR 365 (SC)]

The assessee-society, an
apex society carried on the activity of manufacturing of cloth by supplying raw
material, i.e., yarn, to the weavers, who were the members of the primary
society. The weavers produced cloth strictly in accordance with the directions
given and under the control of the assessee. The assessee paid weaving charges
to the weavers and thereafter marketed and sold the goods so produced. During
the relevant assessment years, cloth was manufactured and sold under the Janata
Cloth Scheme of the Government of India.

For the relevant assessment
years, the assessee claimed a deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(vi) and u/s.80P(2)(a)(ii)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’, for short).

The narrow question which
arose for determination before the Supreme Court in those cases was — whether
the assessee-society could be said to be engaged in a cottage industry
u/s.80P(2)(a)(ii) of the Act or whether it could be said to be engaged in the
collective disposal of labour of its members u/s.80P(2)(a)(vi) of the Act ?

It was the contention of the
Department that the weavers were not the members of the apex society. They were
the members of the primary societies. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled
to claim the benefit of deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(vi) of the Act.

According to the Supreme
Court on both these questions, the Assessing Officer ought to have called for
the bye-laws. It appeared that the bye-laws were not produced before the
Assessing Officer. It appeared that the bye-laws had not been examined by the
Assessing Officer. Further, it was not clear as to whether a weaver could or
could not have become a member of the apex-society under the bye-laws. Even to
answer the question whether the assessee-society was engaged in the cottage
industry, the Department ought to have called for the bye-laws. This exercise
had not been done. In the circumstances, for the relevant assessment years, the
Supreme Court did not interfere with the findings given by the lower courts.
However, the Supreme Court made it clear that this order would not come to the
way of the Department in making assessment for the future assessment years.
However, in such an event, the Department will decide the applicability of S.
80P of the Act [including the proviso to S. 80P(2)] keeping in mind the
provisions of the bye-laws. The said provisions of the bye-laws would point to
the nature of the business of the assessee as also entitlement of the weavers to
become members of the apex society. The Department will examine the Janata
Scheme of the Central Govt. to decide whether the payments made thereunder would
be entitled to deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(ii) and u/s.80P(2)(a)(vi) of the Act.

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S. 206C — State Govt. liable to collect tax at source from leaseholders and deposit it with Central Government

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II. Reported :




 


50 Collection of tax at source : S. 206C of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Applicability to State Govt. : State Govt. comes within
the purview of ‘person’ u/s.206C(1C) and is liable to collect tax at source from
lease-holders and deposit it with the Central Govt.

[Government of Madhya Pradesh v. TRO, 217 CTR 137
(MP)]

 

The Government of Madhya Pradesh had granted various quarry
leases to private persons. The State Govt. had failed to collect tax at source
as required u/s.206C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The IT Department raised
demand for such failure and initiated coercive steps for recovery of the demand.
The State Govt. filed writ petition challenging the action.

 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the action taken by the
Revenue and held as under :

“(i) Article 289 exempts property and income of the State
Govt. from taxation by the Union of India. In the present case, the proposed
action of the respondent Department or the Union of India is not to tax the
property or income of the State Govt. What is being taxed in this case is
income accrued by the leaseholders to whom
lease is granted by the State Govt. It is, therefore, taxing the income earned
by the leaseholders on the basis of the grant made by the State Govt.
Accordingly, the provisions of Article 289 of the Constitution of India will
not apply.

(ii) Complete reading of the provisions indicate that the
person collecting tax u/s.206C would include not only a company but also the
Central Govt. and the State Govt. and therefore, the word every ‘person’
appearing in S. 206C would include both the Central Govt. and the State Govt.
Complete reading of this Section
along with definition of ‘person’ clearly indicates that the State Govt. comes
within the purview of ‘person’ as contemplated u/s.206C(1C) and is liable to
collect tax at source from the lease-holders and deposit it with the Central
Govt.

(iii) So far as the argument with regard to the word
‘every person’ missing after the word ‘seller’ is concerned, the word ‘seller’
and ‘every person’ u/s.206C(1) and u/s.206C(1C) are used with
regard to different purpose. Mere absence of the word ‘every person’ in the
definition of ‘seller’ as contained in Explanation cl. (c) to S. 206C
cannot be construed to mean that the provisions of S. 206C do not apply to the
State Govt.”

S. 56(2)(id) — Interest on Govt. securities not maturing in previous year, then amount in P&L account is not material

New Page 2

II. Reported :






 



51 Income : Accrual of : S. 56(2)(id) of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1989-90 : Banking company : Interest on Government
securities not maturing in relevant previous year : Amount shown in profit and
loss account : Not material : Amount not assessable in A.Y. 1989-90.

[CIT v. Federal Bank Ltd., 301 ITR 188 (Ker.)]

 The assessee was a banking company. Interest on Government
securities was credited in its profit and loss account in the A.Y. 1989-90. The
assessee claimed that the interest was not assessable as the securities did not
mature during the previous year. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and
assessed the interest income. The Tribunal accepted the claim and deleted the
addition.


On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) After the amendment of 1988, interest on securities
was assessable as income from other sources u/s.56(2)(id) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, unless it is chargeable to income-tax under the head ‘Profits and
gains of business or profession’. Income accrued obviously means income that
has become due or receivable by the assessee.

(ii) Since the assessee was banking company, the interest
on securities was assessable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business and
profession’. Since the securities had not matured for payment, the assessee
was obviously not entitled to interest, and the interest was really not due to
them in the previous year. Merely because the assessee had declared it as
amount receivable in the course of time, it did not mean that interest on
income had in fact accrued to the assessee. Though interest due or receivable
is assessable under the mercantile system, since the interest on securities
involved in this case was neither received, nor receivable during the previous
year, such interest could not be assessed.”

S. 12A — Non-consideration of registrration application within time fixed would result in deemed registration

New Page 2

II. Reported :



 


49 Charitable Trust : Registration u/s.12A
of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Effect of non-passing of order within the time limit :
Non-consideration of the registration application within the time fixed by S.
12AA(2) would result in deemed registration.

[Society for the promotion of Education Adventure Sport &
Conservation of Environment v. CIT,
216 CTR 167 (All.)]

 

The petitioner is a society running a school. Up to A.Y.
1998-99 it was exempted u/s.10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, it
did not seek separate registration u/s.12A of the Act so as to claim exemption
u/s.11. S. 10(22) being omitted by the Finance Act, 1998, the petitioner applied
for registration u/s.12A of the Act, with retrospective effect, that is since
the inception of the petitioner society; i.e., 11-1-1993. The application
was made on 24-6-2003. No order was passed on the application within the time
period of six months as required u/s.12AA(2) of the Act. Therefore, the
petitioner filed writ petition before the Allahabad High Court contending that
the registration should be deemed to have been granted.

 

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and held
as under :

“(i) Taking the view that non-consideration of the
registration application within the time fixed by S. 12AA(2) would result in
deemed registration, may at the worst cause loss of some revenue or income-tax
payable by the individual assessee. On the other hand, taking the contrary
view and holding that not taking a decision within the time fixed by S.
12AA(2) is of no consequence would leave the assessee totally at the mercy of
the IT authorities, inasmuch as the assessee has not been provided any remedy
under the Act against non-decision.

(ii) Besides, the above view does not create any
irreversible situation, because, u/s.12AA(3), the registration can always be
cancelled by the CIT, if he is satisfied that the objects of such trust or
institution are not genuine or the activities are not being carried out in
accordance with the objects of the trust or institution. The only drawback is
that such cancellation would operate prospectively.

(iii) Moreover, this view furthers the object and purpose
of the aforesaid statutory provision. For the interpretation of a statute
‘purposive construction’ of the enactment which gives effect to the
legislative purpose/intendment, if necessary must be followed and applied.
Considering the pros and cons of the two views, by far the better
interpretation would be to hold that the effect of non-consideration of the
application for registration within the time fixed by S. 12AA(2) would be a
deemed grant of registration.

(iv) There is no good reason to make the assessee suffer
merely because the IT Department is not able to keep its officers under check
and control, so as to take timely decisions in such simple matters, such as
consideration of application for registration even within the large six months
period provided u/s.12AA(2).

(v) Accordingly, the respondents are directed, subject to
any order which may be passed u/s. 12AA(3), to treat the petitioner society as
an institution duly approved and registered u/s. 12AA and to recompute its
income by applying the provisions of S. 11. Accordingly, a formal certificate
of approval will be issued forthwith to the petitioner by respondent No. 2.”

 


levitra

S. 163 — Assessee neither has business connection with NRI, nor any income received by NRI, then assessee not a trustee of NRI

New Page 2

II. Reported :

47 Agent of non-resident : Liability in
special cases : S. 163 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Search and seizure : Block
assessment u/s.158BD : Assessee was not having any business connection with the
non-resident Indian brother, nor any income came into existence as having been
received by the non-resident : Assessee not a trustee of non-resident :
Provisions of S. 163(1)(c) and (d) not attracted : Tribunal justified in not
treating assessee as agent of non-resident.

[CIT v. Rakesh Chander Goyal, 216 CTR 136 (P&H)]

 

In the course of search at the residential premises of the
assessee, it was found that the non-resident brother of the assessee, Shri Raj
Kumar Goyal, was maintaining some bank accounts which needed explanation.
Therefore, proceedings u/s.158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were initiated in
the case of the non-resident brother. The Assessing Officer passed an order
u/s.163 of the Act, treating the assessee as an agent of the non-resident
brother. The CIT(A) set aside the order of the AO holding that neither there is
any business connection, nor the existence of income u/s.9(1) of the Act to the
non-resident Indian, which is a condition precedent for invoking sub-clause (c)
and (d) of S. 163(1) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the decision of CIT(A).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“In view of its conclusion that the assessee was not having
any business connection with the non-resident Indian brother, nor any income
came into existence as having been received by the non-resident Indian and the
Department having also failed to prove the assessee as a trustee of the
non-resident Indian, the Tribunal was justified in not treating the assessee
as an agent of non- resident.”

 


levitra

S. 131 and S. 143 — Assessee not allowed to cross-examine third party. Assessment order not valid

New Page 2

II. Reported :



 


48 Assessment : Validity : S. 131 and S. 143
of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Statement of third party relied on by AO : Third party
retracted statement subsequently : Assessee not allowed to cross-examine third
party : Principles of natural justice violated: Assessment order not valid.

[Prakash Chand Nahta v. CIT, 301 ITR 134 (MP)]

 

The assessee was carrying on the business of trading in
silver ornaments, utensils, etc. Certain silver ornaments found in the course of
search were explained by the assessee as being purchased by the assessee from
one R. R who had initially denied the transaction in his statement, but he
subsequently retracted the statement and accepted the transaction. The assessee
had filed the correspondence made by him and R regarding the payment of the
amount. The Assessing Officer accepted all the entries recorded in the amanat
book except the entries pertaining to R. The affidavit of R and the bank
transaction made by him were ignored. On the basis of the original statement
made by R, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.3,49,225. The assessee
made a prayer u/s.131 of the Act to summon R for cross-examination. The prayer
was not acceded to and the assessment order was passed. The Tribunal upheld the
assessment order observing that the statement of R was fairly communicated to
the assessee and that apart, it was not the case of the assessee that he did not
know what R had stated.

 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee and held as under :

“The Assessing Officer had not summoned R in spite of the
request made u/s.131 of the Act, the evidence of R could not have been used
against the assessee and in the absence of affording a reasonable opportunity
of being heard by summoning the said witness, the assessment order was
vitiated.”

 


levitra

S. 220(6) — Order on stay application to be passed by AO, not by subordinate

New Page 2

I. Not reported :


46 Recovery : Stay during pendency of appeal
before CIT(A) : S. 220(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Order on stay application
should be passed by the Assessing Officer and not by a subordinate authority :
In view of CBDT Instruction No. 96, dated 21-8-1969, in case of high pitched
assessment,
i.e., where the assessed income is twice or more than
the returned income, assessee would be entitled to an absolute stay of the
demand in the normal course.


[Valvoline Cummins Ltd. v. DCIT and ors. (Del.), WP(C)
2511/2008 dated 20-5-2008]

 

For the A.Y. 2005-06, the petitioner-company had filed the
return of income computing the income of Rs.7.5 crores. The Additional
Commissioner having jurisdiction to assess the assessee-company assessed the
income at Rs.58.68 crores and raised a demand of Rs.25.01 crores. The assessee-company
preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) and made an application to the Assessing
Officer (the Additional Commissioner) for stay of the demand u/s.220(6) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 during the pendency of the appeal before the CIT(A). The
Additional Commissioner advised the assessee to approach the Dy. Commissioner
who had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. Accordingly, the assessee moved
an application on 8-2-2008, requesting the Dy. Commissioner to stay the demand.
When these applications for stay were pending, the assessee was served with a
notice u/s.221 of the Act, dated 14-2-2008 requiring it to show why penalty
should not be levied since the demand of tax has not been deposited by the
assessee. Therefore, the assessee moved another application to the Dy.
Commissioner on 22-2-2008, requesting to stay the demand. On 27-2-2008, the Dy.
Commissioner passed an order directing the assessee to pay 15% of the net
demand; i.e., Rs.3.75 crores on or before 3-3-2008. The assessee pointed
out that Rs.1 crore had already been paid and requested for instalment for the
balance Rs.2.75 crores. Since there was no response, apprehending coercive
action by the Department, the assessee filed a writ petition before the Delhi
High Court.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held :

“(i) Pursuant to the order dated 16-5-2007 read with a few
subsequent letters in this connection, the Commissioner of Income-tax passed a
jurisdiction order dated 1-8-2007, whereby the Additional Commissioner was
entitled to exercise the powers and perform the function of an AO in respect
of some cases (including that of assessee). It is pursuant to these orders
that the Additional Commissioner passed an assessment order on 30-12-2007 in
the case of the assessee. The Additional Commissioner/AO does not become
functus officio
immediately on passing an assessment order, he continues
to be the AO in respect of the assessee and therefore he must deal with the
application filed by the assessee u/s.220(6) of the Act.

(ii) The contention of the Revenue is that the Dy.
Commissioner has concurrent jurisdiction over the matter along with the
Additional Commissioner and, therefore, he was fully competent to dispose of
the stay petition filed by the assessee. On the issue of concurrent
jurisdiction, in the case of Berger Paints India Ltd. v. ACIT, 246 ITR
133 (Cal.) the Calcutta High Court had explained the meaning of the expression
concurrent to mean two authorities having equal powers to deal with a
situation, but the same work cannot be divided between them. It appears to us
quite clearly that there is a distinction between concurrent exercise of power
and joint exercise of power; when power has been conferred upon two
authorities concurrently, either one of them can exercise that power and once
a decision is taken to exercise the power by any one of those two authorities,
that exercise must be terminated by that authority only. It is not that one
authority can start exercising a power and the other authority having
concurrent jurisdiction can conclude the exercise of that power. This perhaps
may be permissible in a situation where both the authorities jointly exercise
power, but it certainly is not permissible where both the authorities
concurrently exercise power.

(iii) In the facts of the present case, since the
Additional Commissioner had exercised the power of an AO, he was required to
continue to exercise that power till his jurisdiction in the matter was over.
His jurisdiction in the matter was not over merely on the passing of the
assessment order, but it continued in terms of S. 220(6) of the Act in dealing
with the petition for stay. What has happened in the present case is that
after having passed the assessment order, the Additional Commissioner seems to
have washed his hands off the matter and left it to the Dy. Commissioner to
decide the stay application filed u/s.220(6) of the Act. We are of
the opinion that this was not permissible in law.

(iv) Learned counsel for the Revenue, however, sought to
justify this by referring to an order dated 21-8-2007 passed by the Additional
Commissioner, in which it is stated as follows : For the removal of doubts it
is further clarified that after completion of assessment, the remaining
functions in the cases specified in the Schedule, appended hereto, whether
legal or administrative, shall be discharged by the DCIT, Circle-17(1), New
Delhi in accordance with law. In our opinion, the above paragraph relied upon
by the counsel for the Revenue goes well beyond the power conferred upon the
Additional Commissioner, in the sense that he has virtually abdicated the
power conferred upon him by S. 220(6) of the Act. The power u/s.220(6) of the
Act being a statutory power, the Additional Commissioner could not abdicate or
relinquish it. That apart, we find that the Additional Commissioner had no
authority in law to delegate his power to the Dy. Commissioner when he was
conferred a statutory power by the CBDT. The Principle of delegates non
potest delegare
would clearly apply.

(v) Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that
learned counsel for the assessee is right in his contention that the
application filed by the assessee on 1-2-2008 was required to be dealt with
only by the Assessing Officer, which in this case was the Additional
Commissioner.

vi) Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that by addressing further letters to the Dy. Commissioner on 8-2-2008 and 22-2-2008, the assessee had acquiesced in the jurisdiction or power of the Dy. Commissioner to deal with the application for stay filed by the assessee. We are of the opinion, and this is well settled, that mere acquiescence in the exercise of power by a person who does not have jurisdiction to exercise that power, cannot work as an estoppel against him. Consequently, the mere fact that the assessee addressed letters dated 8-2-2008 and 22-2-2008 to the Dy. Commissioner does not mean that the Dy, Commissioner had jurisdiction over the matter. The assessee could not confer jurisdiction on the Dy. Commissioner to deal with the application filed u/ s. 220(6) of the Act. Moreover, we also find that the assessee had approached the Dy. Commissioner (apparently) only on the asking of the Additional Commissioner, otherwise the fact still remains that the assessee had made its first request to the Additional Commissioner on 1-2-2008. It was only at the instance of the Ad-ditional Commissioner that the assessee had approached the Dy. Commissioner with the letters dated 8-2-2008 and 22-2-2008. Surely, this cannot be used to the disadvantage of the assessee.

vii) It may be recalled that the returned income of the assessee was Rs.7.2S crores, but the assessed income is Rs.58.68 crores, which is almost 8 times the returned income. CBDT Instruction No. 96, dated 21-8-1969 provides that where the income determined is substantially higher than the returned income, that is, twice the latter amount or more, then the collection of tax in dispute should be held in abeyance till the decision on the appeal is taken. In this case, the assessment is almost 8 times the returned income. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee would, in normal course, be entitled to an absolute stay of the demand on the basis of the above Instruction.”

Disclosure of Accounting Policies by Professional Bodies

5 International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Foundation — (31-12-2009)

    Accounting Policies :

    (a) Basis of preparation :

    These financial statements have been prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, on the historical cost basis, as modified by the revaluation of financial assets and liabilities, including derivative financial instruments, at fair value through profit or loss. The policies have been consistently applied to all years presented, unless otherwise stated.

    For the purposes of organising the financial information the IASC Foundation has categorised income and expenses into two categories. Standard-setting and related activities include all activities associated with standard-setting and support functions required to achieve the organisations objectives. Publications and related activities include information related to the sales of print and electronic IFRS materials, educational activities and Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL).

    (b) Contributions :

    Contributions are recognised as revenue in the year designated by the contributor.

    (c) Publications and related revenue :

    Subscriptions to the IASC Foundation’s comprehensive package and eIFRS products are recognised as revenue on a time-apportioned basis over the period covered by the subscriptions. Royalties are recognised as revenue on an accrual basis. Publications’ direct cost of sales comprises printing, salaries, promotion, computer and various related overhead costs.

    (d) Inventories :

    Inventories of current publications are valued at the lower of net realisable value and the cost of printing the publications, on a first-in-first-out basis. Inventories that have been superseded by new editions are written off.

    (e) Depreciation :

    Leasehold improvements and furniture and equipment are initially measured at cost, and depreciated on a straight-line basis (in the case of leasehold improvements over the period of the lease). All other assets are depreciated over 5 years, except computer equipment, which is depreciated over 3 years.

    (f) Foreign currency transactions :

    The IASC Foundation’s presentational and functional currency is sterling. Transactions denominated in currencies other than sterling are recorded at the exchange rate at the date of the transaction. Differences in exchange rates are recognised in the Statement of Comprehensive Income. Monetary assets and liabilities are translated into sterling at the exchange rate at the end of the reporting period.

    (g) Operating leases — Office accommodation :

    Lease payments for office accommodation are recognised as an expense on a straight-line basis over th e non-cancelable term of the lease. Leases in which a significant portion of the risks and rewards of ownership are retained by the lessor are classified as operating leases. The aggregate benefit of lease incentives is recognised as a reduction of the rental expense over the lease term on a straight-line basis.

    (h) Financial assets :

    Regular purchases and sales of financial assets are recognised on the trade date, the date on which the IASC Foundation is committed to purchase or sell the asset. Investments are recognised initially at fair value plus transaction costs for all financial assets not carried at fair value through profit or loss. Financial assets are derecognised when the rights to receive cash flows from the investments have expired or have been transferred and the IASC Foundation has transferred substantially all risks and rewards of ownership. The IASC Foundation classifies financial assets as subsequently measured at either amortised cost or fair value based on its business model for managing the financial assets and the contractual cash flow characteristics of the financial asset. All financial assets, except for bonds and derivatives, are carried at amortised cost as the objective is to hold these assets in order to collect contractual cash flows and those cash flows are solely principal and interest. Investments in bonds are classified as subsequently measured at fair value through profit or loss, and the corresponding gains or losses are included within profit (loss) before tax. Bond holdings are discussed more fully in Note 10.

    (i) Derivative financial assets and liabilities :

    The IASC Foundation uses contributions, primarily in US dollars and euro, to fund a portion of sterling obligations arising from its activities. In accordance with its financial risk management policy, the IASC Foundation does not hold or issue derivative financial instruments for trading purposes; the forward foreign currency hedges are entered into to provide certainty regarding funding to protect against currency fluctuation on future cash flows that are designated in US dollars and euro. Derivative financial instruments are recognised and subsequently measured at fair value. The corresponding gains or losses are included within profit (loss) before tax.

    (j) Provisions and contingencies :

    Provisions are recognised when the following three conditions are met — the IASC Foundation has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event, it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, and a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. The amount of the provision represents the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the obligation at the end of the reporting period. Provisions are measured at the present value of the expenditure expected to be required to settle the obligation using a pre-tax rate that reflects current market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the obligation. The increase in the provision due to the passage of time is recognised as interest expense.

    (k) Critical accounting estimates and judgments :

    The IASC Foundation makes estimates and assumptions regarding the future. In the future, actual experience may differ from those estimates and assumptions. The Trustees consider there are none that are material to the preparation of the financial statements.

        l) New standards and interpretations issued:

    The financial statements have been drawn up on the basis of accounting standards, interpretations and amendments effective at the beginning of the accounting period on 1 January 2009, except for that explained below. The IASC Foundation has concluded that there are no other relevant standards or interpretations in issue not yet adopted.

    l Standard adopted early IFRS 9 Financial Instruments was issued in November 2009 and is required to be applied from 1st January 2013. The presentation of the IASC Foundation’s financial statements has not significantly changed as a result of the early adoption of the new standard as it did not change the measurement of any assets.

        m) Reclassification of items in the financial statements:

    In order to conform to the current year’s presentation in the financial statements, the following comparative amounts were reclassified. The changes in presentation are to improve the information provided :

        Recruitment expenses are included in Other Costs and listed in Note 9. The prior year amount of £ 126,000 was presented as follows : £ 121,000 was included in salaries, wages and benefits; £ 5,000 was included in Trustees’ fees. A corresponding change has been made to the statement of cash flows and the details of salaries, wages and benefits as disclosed in Note 5.

        Fundraising expenses are included in Other Costs and listed in Note 9. In the prior year, £ 36,000 was listed separately in the statement of comprehensive income.

        The details of accommodation expenses presented in Note 8(a) has been expanded to disclose the amount included in publication costs.

        The details of cash holdings presented in Note 10(a) have been clarified by listing currencies irrespective of their country location.

    6. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of  India — (31-3-2009)

    Statement on Significant Accounting Policies:

    I.    Accounting convention:

    These accounts are drawn up on historical cost basis and have been prepared in accordance with the applicable Accounting Standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and are on accrual basis unless otherwise stated.

    II) Revenue recognition:

        a. Membership Fee

    i. The Entrance Fee is collected at the time of admission of a person as a member and one-third thereof is recognised as income in that year.

    ii. Annual Membership and Certificate of Practice Fee(s) are recognised in the year as and when these become due.

    b. Distant Education and Post-Qualification Course Fee are recognised over the duration of the course.

    c.Examination Fee is recognised on the basis of conduct of examination.

    d. Subscription for Journal is recognised in the year as and when it becomes due.
    e. Revenue from Sale of Publications is recognised at the time of preparing the sale bill i.e., when the property in goods as well as the significant risks and rewards of the property get transferred to the buyer.

    Income from Investments:

        i. Dividend on investments in units is recognised as income on the basis of entitlement to receive.

        ii.     Income on Interest-bearing securities and fixed deposits is recognised on a time-proportion basis taking into account the amount out-standing and the rate applicable.

    III. Allocations/transfer to reserves & surplus and earmarked fund :

    a) Admission Fee from Fellow Members and brd portion of the Entrance Fee from persons ad-mitted as Members are taken to Infrastructure Reserve.

    b) Donations received during the year for build-ings and for research purpose are accounted for directly under the respective Reserves Account.

    c) 25% of the Distant Education Fee not ex-ceeding 50% of the net surplus of the year is transferred to Education fund.

    d) 0.75% of Membership Fee (Annual and Certificate of Practice Fee) received from the members during the year is allocated to the Employees’ Benevolent Fund.

    e) Transfer to Education Reserve from the following earmarked funds :

 

    f) Income from investments of Earmarked Funds is allocated directly to Earmarked Funds on opening balances of the respective Earmarked Funds on the basis of weighted average method.

    IV.    Fixed assets/depreciation and amortisation :

    a) Fixed Assets excluding land are stated at historical cost less depreciation.

    b) Freehold land is stated at cost. Leasehold land is stated at the amount of premium paid for acquiring the lease rights. The premium so paid is amortised over the period of the lease.

    c) Depreciation is provided on the written down value method at the following rates as approved by the Council based on the useful life of the respective assets :

  

       
    d) Depreciation on additions is provided on monthly pro-rata basis.

    e) Library books are depreciated at the rate of 100% in the year of purchase.

    f) Intangible Assets (Software) are amortised equally over a period of three years.

        V) Investments:

    a. Long-term investments are carried at cost and diminution in value, other than temporary is provided for.

    b. Current investments are carried at lower of cost or fair value.
     

    VI.    Inventories:

    Inventories of paper, consumables, publications and study material are valued at lower of cost or net realisable value. The cost is determined on FIFO Method.

    VII. Foreign currency transactions:

        a) Foreign currency transactions are recorded on initial recognition in the reporting currency by applying to the foreign currency amount at the exchange rate prevailing on the date of transaction.

        b) All incomes and expenses are translated at average rate. All monetary assets/liabilities are translated at the year-end rates whereas non-monetary assets are carried at the rate on the date of transaction.

        c) Any income or expense on account of ex-change rate difference is recognised in the Income and Expenditure Account.

    VIII.    Employee benefits:

        a) Short-term employee benefits are charged off in the year in which the related service is rendered.

        b) Post-employment and other long-term employee benefits are charged off in the year in which the employee has rendered services. The amount charged off is recognised at the present value of the amounts payable determined on the basis of actuarial valuation. The actuarial valuation is done as per Projected Unit Credit Method. Actuarial gain and losses in respect of post-employment and other long-term benefits are charged to Income & Expenditure Account and are not deferred.

        c) Retirement benefits in the form of Provident Fund are a defined contribution scheme and the contribution to the Provident Fund Trust is charged to the Income and Expenditure Account for the period when the contribution to the respective fund is due.

    IX.    Impairment of assets:

        a) The carrying amounts of assets are reviewed at each Balance Sheet date if there is any indication of impairment based on internal/ external factors. An impairment loss is recognised wherever the carrying amount of an asset exceeds its recoverable amount. The recoverable amount is higher of asset’s net selling price and value in use. In assessing the value in use, the estimated future cash flows are discounted to their present value at the weighted cost of capital.

        b) After impairment, depreciation is provided on the revised carrying amount of the assets over its remaining useful life.

        x. Provisions:

    A provision is recognised when an enterprise has a present obligation as a result of past events; it is probable that an outflow of resources will be required to settle the obligation, in respect of which a reliable estimate can be made. Provisions are not discounted to its present value and are determined based on best estimates required to settle the obligations at the Balance Sheet date. These are reviewed at each Balance Sheet date and adjusted to reflect the current best estimates.

    7. Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society — (31-3-2010)

    Significant accounting policies:

        a) Method of Accounting:

    Accounts are maintained on accrual basis.

        b) Fixed Assets and Depreciation:

    Fixed assets are stated at cost. Depreciation is provided on fixed assets as per the written-down value method at the rates prescribed in the Income Tax Rules except for books on which depreciation is provided at the rate of 50% per annum.

        c) Investments:

    Investments are stated at cost of acquisition less permanent diminution (if any) in compliance with AS-13 issued by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

        d) Inventories:

    Inventories are stated at cost.

        e) Life Membership & Entrance Fees:

    Life Membership fees and Entrance fees are credited to Corpus Fund.

        f) Gratuity:

    The premium payable each year on the Group Gratuity Policy taken with Life Insurance Corporation of India is recognised as Gratuity expenses of that year.

Section A : Treatment of Profit/loss on Derivative Transactions

From Published Accounts

Compiler’s Note :


Also refer BCAJ June 2008 for other disclosures on the above.

&
Hexaware Technologies Ltd. — (31-12-2007)


From Notes to Accounts :

The Company, in the month of November 2007, reported about
having entered into foreign currency transactions (financial derivatives) which
were not communicated to the senior management and the Board of Directors. These
transactions have since been settled and the net loss on account of such
transactions aggregates Rs.1,029.95 million at the year end. The Company’s
profit for the year, turned into a loss, consequent to the loss on such foreign
currency transactions. The said loss being one-time and non-recurring has been
considered and disclosed as an exceptional item in the Profit and Loss account.

The Company, during the year, suffered a foreign exchange
loss of Rs.750.05 million, which is aggregate of foreign exchange gain (net) of
Rs.279.90 million and exceptional foreign exchange loss (net) of Rs.1,029.95
million as stated in the Note No. 7 of schedule 12(B). Considering the aggregate
loss on foreign currency transactions during the year as aforesaid, the foreign
exchange loss of exceptional nature of Rs.1,029.95 million has been disclosed as
stated in the Note No. 7 of Schedule 12(B) and the balance amount of Rs.279.90
million (gain) has been disclosed under ‘Administration and other expenses’ and
previous year’s figures have been accordingly regrouped.

&
The Great Eastern Shipping Co Ltd.


— (31-3-2008)

From Notes to Accounts :

Hedging Contracts :

The Company uses foreign exchange forward contracts, currency
and interest swaps and options to hedge its exposure to movements in foreign
exchange rates. The use of these foreign exchange forward contracts, currency
and interest swaps and options reduce the risk or cost to the Company and the
Company does not use the foreign exchange forward contracts, currency and
interest swaps and options for trading or speculation purposes.


(i) Derivate instruments outstanding:

(a) Commodity futures contracts for import of Bunker :

Details not reproduced

(b) Forward exchange contracts :

Details not reproduced

(c) Forward Exchange Option contracts :

Details not reproduced

(d) Interest rate swap contracts :

Details not reproduced

(e) Currency Swap Contract :

Details not reproduced


(ii) Un-hedged foreign currency exposures as on March 31 :

Details not reproduced

(iii) The above-mentioned derivative contracts having been
entered into, the hedge foreign currency risk and the exposure to bunker price
risk, are being accounted for on settlement as per the accounting policy
consistently being followed by the Company for the past several years. The
mark-to-market (loss)/gain on the foreign exchange derivative contracts and the
mark-to-market gain on the commodity futures outstanding as on March 31, 2008
amounted to Rs.(5520) lakhs and Rs.17 lakhs, respectively. The said losses and
gains have not been provided for in the accounts for the year ended March 31,
2008.

From Auditors’ Report

(e) Without qualifying our opinion, we draw attention to :

(iii) Note 17(iii) of Schedule 20, Notes to Accounts
regarding derivative contracts entered into by the Company to hedge foreign
currency risks and bunker price risk. As per the policy consistently followed
by the Company in the past, such derivative contracts are accounted only on
settlement and the mark-to-market (loss)/ gain thereon amounting to Rs.(5520)
lakhs and Rs.17 lakhs, respectively has not been provided for in the accounts
for the year ended March 31, 2008.


&
Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd.


— (31-3-2008)

From Notes to Accounts :

Forward Contracts to cover Forex Risk :

Forward contracts to the tune of US$ 208 million are
outstanding as on 31st March 2008, which were entered into to hedge the risk of
changes in foreign currency exchange rates on future export sales against
existing long-term export contract. The notional mark-to-market loss on these
unexpired contracts as on 31-3-2008 amounting to Rs.120.47 million has not been
considered in the financial statements. The actual gain/loss could vary and be
determined only on settlement of the contract on their respective due dates.

&
ALSTOM Projects India Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Significant Accounting Policies :




2.8.4 Forward Exchange Contracts not intended for trading
or speculation purposes

The premium or discount arising at the inception of
forward exchange contracts is amortised as expense or income over the life
of the contract. Exchange differences on such contracts are recognised in
the statement of profit and loss in the year in which the exchange rates
change. Any profit or loss arising on cancellation or renewal of forward
exchange contract is recognised as income or as expense for the year.



Derivative instruments :

The Company uses derivative financial instruments such as forward exchange contracts to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations. Accounting policy for forward exchange contracts is given in note 2.8.4.

The foreign exchange contracts other than those covered under AS-l1, enter,ed for non-speculative purposes, including the underlying hedged items, are valued on the basis of a fair value on marked-to-market basis and any loss on valuation is recognised in the Profit and Loss account, on a port-folio basis. Any gain arising on this valuation is not recognised by the Company in line with the principle of prudence as enunciated in Accounting Standard 1 – ‘Disclosure of Accounting Policies’. Any subsequent changes in fair values, occurring after the balance sheet date are accounted for in the period in which they arise.

Finolex  Cables  Ltd. –   (31-3-2008)

From Notes  to Accounts

10A. Quantitative information of derivative instruments outstanding as at the balance sheet date:

Not reproduced.

B. The Company has entered into derivative transactions with an objective to hedge the financial risks associated with its business viz. foreign exchange and interest rate.

C. The Company has not hedged the following foreign currency exposures:

i) Borrowings grouped under secured loans equivalent to Rs.999.250 Million (Previous year Rs.1,476.875 million) and under unsecured loans equivalent to Rs.739.657 million. (Previous year Rs.652.678 million).

ii) Creditors for imports equivalent to Rs.39.393 million (Previous year 45,961 million).

iii) Receivables equivalent to RS.171.991million. (Previous year Rs.195.630 million).

d) Loss on derivative/forex transactions in-cludes Rs.92.000 million loss on certain outstanding derivatives at the balance sheet date assessed by the management based on the principle of prudence. In respect of other contracts, since they are in the nature of ef-fective hedge, profit/loss, if any, has not been ascertained separately.

ITC Ltd. –   (31-3-2008)

From Notes  to Accounts:

Derivative    Instruments:

The company uses Forward Exchange Contracts and Currency Options to hedge its exposures in foreign currency related to firm commitments and highly probable forecasted transactions. The information on Derivative Instruments is as follows:

a) Derivative Instrument outstanding as at year end:

Not  reproduced.

b) Foreign exchange currency exposures that have not been hedged by a derivative instrument or otherwise as at year end:

Not reproduced.

c) Consequent to the announcement issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India in March 2008 on Accounting for Derivatives, the Company has marked to market the outstanding derivative contracts as at 31st March, 2008 and accordingly, unrealised gains of Rs.9.05 crores (net of taxes) have been ignored. As a result, profit after tax for the year and reserves are lower by Rs.9.05 crores.

Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. – (31-3-2008)

From Notes to Accounts:

ii) As on March 31, 2008, the Corporation has foreign currency borrowings (excluding FCCB) of USD 1,079.58 million equivalent (Previous year USD 1,068048 million). The Corporation has undertaken principal-only swaps, currency options and forward contracts on a notional amount of USD 808 million equivalent (Previous year USD 777 million) to hedge the foreign currency risk. Further, interest rate swaps on a notional amount of USD 230 million equivalent (Previous year USD 391 million) are outstanding, which have been undertaken to hedge the interest rate risk on the foreign currency borrowings. As on March 31,2008, the Corporation’s net foreign currency exposure on borrowings net of risk management arrangements is USD 447.13 million (Previous year USD 100.17 million).

As a part of asset liability management and on account of the increasing response to the Corporation’s Adjustable Rate Home Loan product as well as to reduce the overall cost of borrowings, the Corporation has entered into interest rate swaps wherein it has converted its fixed-rate rupee liabilities of a notional amount of Rs.12,265 crores (Pre-vious year Rs.7,265 crores) as on March 31,2008 for varying maturities into floating rate liabilities linked to various benchmarks. In addition, the Corporation has entered into cross-currency swaps of a notional amount of USD 652 million equivalent (Previous year USD 643 million), wherein it has converted its rupee liabilities into foreign currency liabilities and the interest rate is linked to the benchmarks of respective currencies.

iii) Gains/losses arising out of foreign exchange fluctuations in respect of foreign currency borrowings, net of risk management arrangements, are to the account of the Corporation. Wherever the Corporation has entered into a forward contract or an instrument, that is in substance, a forward exchange contract, the difference between the forward rate and the exchange rate on the date of the transaction is recognised as income or expense over the life of the contract. The amount of exchange difference in respect of such contracts to be recognised as expense in the Profit and Loss account over subsequent accounting periods is Rs.97.78 crores (Previous year Rs. 45.54 crores).

Other monetary assets and liabilities in foreign currencies are revalued at the rates of exchange prevailing at the year end. The reduced liability, net of risk management arrangements, of Rs.8.67 crores (Previous year Rso4.31cores [net of loss on mark to market of derivatives Rs.103.04 crores]) arising upon revaluation at the year end (based on the prevailing exchange rate) has been credited to the Provision for Contingencies account.

iv) Cross-currency swaps and other derivatives have been marked to market at the year end. The net gain of Rs.293.59 crores on such mark to market of derivatives is included under Advance Payments (Schedule No.7) and not recognised in the Profit and Loss account in view of the recent announcement by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), which requires the principle of prudence to be followed in accounting for mark-to-market gains/losses on derivatives.

SRF Ltd. –   (31-3-2008)

From Significant  Accounting Policies

a) Transactions in foreign currencies are recorded at the rate prevalent on the date of transactions.

b) All foreign currency liabilities and monetary assets are stated at the exchange rate prevailing as at the date of balance sheet and the difference taken to Profit and Loss account as exchange fluctuation loss or gain.

c) Pursuant to ICAI announcement for adoption of AS-30 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, the Company has accounted for the hedge accounting of all the hedging instruments including derivatives in accordance with paragraph 99 and 106 of the said standard, affecting either the Profit and Loss account or hedging reserve (equity segment) as the case may be. The debit balance, if any, in the hedging reserve is being shown as a deduction from free reserves.

d) The Company discloses the open and hedged foreign exchange exposure as note to the accounts.

From Notes  to Accounts:

SRF has entered into long-term contracts for the transfer / sale of Carbon Emission Reductions (CER) with reputable global buyers. The cash flow from these sales forms the mainstay of SRF’s multi-year capital expansion plan, and as such these cash flows need to be both stable and secure. To ensure stability of revenues in foreign currency from the transfer / sale of CERs, the Company has entered into forward contracts with the banks to part sell Euros to be earned out of future CER sales.

The details of the forex exposure of the Company as on 31 March, 2008 are as under:

Details not reproduced.

The Company has not entered into any hedging transactions in the nature of speculation in 2007-08 (Previous year Nil).

Tube Investments  of India  Ltd. (31-3-2008)
From Significant Accounting Policies:

The Company uses forward contracts to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations relating to certain firm commitments and forecasted transactions. The Company designates these as cash flow hedges.

The use of forward contracts is governed by the Company’s policies on the use of such financial derivatives consistent with the Company’s risk management strategy. The Company does not use derivative financial instruments for speculative purposes.

Forward contract derivatives instruments are initially measured at fair value, and are remeasured at subsequent reporting dates. Changes in the fair value of these derivatives that are designated and effective as hedges of future cash flows are recognised directly in ‘Hedge Reserve Account’ under shareholders’ funds and the ineffective portion is recognised immediately in the Profit and Loss account.
 
Changes in the fair value of derivative financial instruments that do not qualify for hedge accounting are recognised in the Profit and Loss account as they arise.

Hedge accounting is discontinued when the hedging instrument expires or is sold, terminated, or ( exercised, or no longer qualifies for hedge account-ing. At that time, for forecasted transactions, any cumulative gain or loss on the hedging instrument recognised under shareholders’ funds is retained there until the forecasted transaction occurs. If a hedged transaction is no longer expected to occur, the net cumulative gain or loss recognised under shareholders’ funds is transferred to the Profit and Loss account for the year.

From Notes  to Accounts:

Pursuant to the announcement of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) in respect of ‘Accounting for Derivatives’, the Company has opted to follow the recognition and measurement principles relating to derivatives as specified in AS-30 ‘Financial Instruments, Recognition and Measurement’, issued by the ICAI, from the year ended 31st March,2008.

Consequently, as of 31st March 2008, the Company has recognised mark-to-market (MTM) losses of Rs.3.03 cr. relating to forward contracts and other derivatives entered into to hedge the foreign currency risk of highly probable forecast transactions that are designated as.effective cash flow hedges, in the Hedge Reserve Account as part of the shareholders funds.

The MTM net loss on undesignated/ineffective forward contracts amounting to Rs.0.65 cr. has been recognised in the Profit & Loss account.

Business expenditure — Interest expenditure — Matter remanded to the High Court to determine whether the transactions were entered into with the idea of evading tax.

New Page 1

26. Business expenditure — Interest expenditure — Matter
remanded to the High Court to determine whether the transactions were entered
into with the idea of evading tax.

[CIT v. Ashini Lease Finance P. Ltd., (2009) 309 ITR
320 (SC)].

The Assessing Officer for the A.Y.s 1996-97 and 1997-98
found that borrowed funds were invested to acquire control of AEC.
Accordingly, he disallowed the interest expenses u/s.36(1)(iii). This was on
the footing that the assessee had paid interest to Torrent Financiers and
Torrent Leasing and Finance Private Limited (sister companies of the assessee).
According to the order of assessment, the borrowed funds were deployed by the
assessee-company during the relevant year in order to purchase equity shares
of AEC, which company was subsequently taken over not by the assessee but by
the Torrent group. During the relevant year, the total investment made by the
assessee in the takeover and acquisition of business of AEC amounted to only
Rs.22,59,969. The Assessing Officer detected that after acquiring the shares
of AEC Ltd. the assessee sold the shares of AEC at Rs.63,57,925 and further
that subsequently, the said AEC Ltd. had been taken over and acquired by the
Torrent group. The record indicated, prima facie, that the assessee-company
had acquired the shares of AEC through finances arranged mainly from the
Torrent group (sister companies) along with two other companies, only to
enable the Torrent group to acquire and take over the business of AEC.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the
Tribunal both however found that the borrowings were for the purposes of
business. The question, therefore, which arose for consideration before the
High Court was: Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction in respect of
interest paid by it to the Torrent group? The High Court held that whether the
borrowings were for the purpose of business or not, was basically based on the
finding of fact. The High Court held that considering the concurrent finding
of fact, there was no perversity in the order. On an appeal the Supreme Court
held that prima facie, it appeared that the High Court had lost sight
of the facts which, if proved and established, indicate circular trading was
entered into solely with the idea of evading tax. The Supreme Court expressed
the prima facie view only in support of its order as relevant aspects
had not been considered by the Tribunal and, observed that the above reasons
should not be taken as its conclusion. Therefore, according to the Supreme
Court the High Court had erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground that no
substantial question of law arose for determination.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court
and restored tax appeals to the file of the High Court with a direction to the
High Court to dispose of these appeals in accordance with law.

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Industrial undertaking — In order to constitute an industrial undertaking the important criteria to be applied is to identify the item in question, the process undertaken by it and the resultant output

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25. Industrial undertaking — In order to constitute an
industrial undertaking the important criteria to be applied is to identify the
item in question, the process undertaken by it and the resultant output — Matter
remanded to Tribunal in the absence of details of activities of a hospital.

[Down Town Hospital Ltd. v. CIT, (2009) 308 ITR 188
(SC)]

The appellant-assessee, a hospital, had made investment in
plant and machinery. It operated a nursing home in Guwahati. The assessee
claimed deduction u/s.80HH for the A.Y. 1994-95. The Assessing Officer (AO)
held that the assessee was not an industrial undertaking. It was, therefore,
not eligible for deduction and, consequently, the assessee’s claim for
deduction stood disallowed.


Aggrieved by the said order the matter was carried in
appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the
relief following his earlier decision for A.Y. 1993-94, that the assessee was
an industrial undertaking. On appeal the Tribunal held that in view of two
decisions of two separate High Courts, namely, the Rajasthan High Court [CIT
v. Trinity Hospital,
(1997) 225 ITR 178 (Raj.)] and the Kerala High Court
[CIT v. Upasana Hospital, (1997) 225 ITR 845 (Ker)] the assessee-hospital
was an industrial undertaking entitled to deduction u/s.80HH.


On an appeal by the Department, the Guwahati High Court
(251 ITR 683) held that in the absence of any materials to show that the
activities carried on in the Hospital or nursing home amounted to manufacture
or production of any article or thing, the assessee was not entitled to relief
u/s.80HH and u/s.80I.


On an appeal, the Supreme Court held that in order to
constitute an industrial undertaking, u/s.32A or u/s.80HH, the important
criteria to be applied by the Assessing Officer is to identify the item in
question, the process undertaken by it and the resultant output. For example,
if the item is a data processing machine/computer, the question as to whether
the printout from that computer is as a result of manufacture is one of the
tests to be applied in judging whether the undertaking which buys this article
is an industrial undertaking or not. Unfortunately, in the present case there
was no identification of the items installed in the hospital by the Tribunal
and, therefore, it was not possible for it to express any opinion as to
whether the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.80HH of the Income-tax Act.


The impugned order of the Guwahati High Court was set aside
therefore, by the Supreme Court, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal
for deciding the case de novo in accordance with law.



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Appeals — Revenue cannot file an appeal involving a dispute for which no appeal is filed for earlier years if there is no change in the fact situation.

New Page 1

24. Appeals — Revenue cannot file an appeal involving a
dispute for which no appeal is filed for earlier years if there is no change in
the fact situation.

[CIT v. J. K. Charitable Trust, (2009) 308 ITR 161
(SC)]

The challenge in the appeals in each case before the
Supreme Court was to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court answering the reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Allahabad Bench (in short ‘the ITAT’) u/s.256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(in short ‘the Act’) in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. For
answering the references in favour of the assessee, the High Court relied upon
its judgment for two previous assessment years, i.e., 1972-73 and
1973-74 in the assessee’s case which is reported in CIT v. J. K. Charitable
Trust,
(1992) 196 ITR 31. The present dispute relates to several
assessment years i.e., 1972-73 (in respect of an assessment reopened
u/s.147(1) of the Act) and the A.Y.s 1975-76 to 1982-83.


Learned counsel for the Revenue-appellant submitted before
the Supreme Court that each assessment year is a separate assessment unit and
the factual scenario had to be seen. The dispute related to the question
whether the respondent-assessee’s trust was hit by the provisions of S.
13(1)(c) and S. 13(2)(a)(f) and (h) of the Act and, therefore, could not be
given the benefit of exemption provided u/s.11 of the Act.


Learned counsel for the assessee submitted before the
Supreme Court that for several years no appeal had been filed even though the
factual position was the same, i.e., for the A.Y. 1983-84 up to the A.Y.
2007-08. No appeal was filed even against the decision reported in CIT v.
J. K. Charitable Trust,
(1992) 196 ITR 31. It was also pointed out that
several other High Courts had taken a similar view and no appeal was preferred
by the Revenue against any of the judgments of the different High Courts.
Reference is made to the decisions reported in CIT v. Trustees of the Jadi
Trust,
(1982) 133 ITR 494 (Bom.), CIT v. Hindusthan Charity Trust,
(1983) 139 ITR 913 (Cal.), CIT v. Sarladevi Sarabhai Trust, (No. 2)
(1988) 172 ITR 698 (Guj.) and CIT v. Nirmala Bakubhai Foundation,
[1997] 226 ITR 394 (Guj).


Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that even though
appeal had not been preferred in respect of some assessment years, that did
not create a bar for the Revenue filing an appeal for other assessment years.


Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in
C. K. Gangadharan v. CIT, (2008) 304 ITR 61.


The Supreme Court noted that the factual scenario was
undisputed that for a large number of assessment years no appeal had been
filed. The basic question, therefore, was whether the Revenue could be
precluded from filing an appeal even though in respect of some other years
involving identical dispute no appeal was filed.


The Supreme Court observed that in this case, it was
accepted by the learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue that the fact
situation in all the assessment years was the same. According to him, if the
fact situation changes, then the Revenue could certainly prefer an appeal
notwithstanding the fact that for some years no appeal was preferred. The
question was of academic interest in the present appeals as undisputedly the
fact situation was the same. The Supreme Court therefore held that the appeals
were without merit and were accordingly dismissed.



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Manufacture/Production — Conversion of jumbo rolls of photographic films into small flats and rolls in the desired sizes amounted to manufacture /production of a article or thing.

New Page 1

23. Manufacture/Production — Conversion of jumbo rolls of
photographic films into small flats and rolls in the desired sizes amounted to
manufacture /production of a article or thing.

[India Cine Agencies v. CIT, (2009) 308 ITR 98(SC)]

In all the appeals before the Supreme Court the common
question that was involved was related to the entitlement of benefit in terms
of S. 32AB, S. 80HH and S. 80-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short the
‘Act’). In all the cases the issue was the effect of conversion of jumbo rolls
of photographic films into small flats and rolls in the desired sizes. The
assessees’ contention was that the same amounted to manufacture/production, as
the case may be. The stand of the Revenue was that it was not either
manufacture or production. In some cases the High Court held that in any
event, because of item 10 of the Eleventh Schedule, no deduction was
permissible. The High Court decided in favour of the Revenue and, therefore,
the appeals were filed by the assessee before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court after referring the dictionary meaning of the words ‘manufacture’ and
‘produce’ and noting the precedents on the subject held that the assessee was
entitled to the allowance u/s.32AB, u/s.80HH and u/s.80I of the Act. The
Supreme Court observed that the matter could yet be looked from another angle.
If there was no manufacturing activity, then the question of referring to item
10 of the Eleventh Schedule for the purpose of exclusion did not arise. The
Eleventh Schedule, which was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1977, with
effect from 1-4-1978, has reference to S. 32A, S. 32AB, S. 80CC(3)(a)(i), S.
80-I(2), S. 80J(4) and S. 80A(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The appeals were allowed.

Authors’ Note :

Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 has introduced definition of the
term ‘manufacture’ in S. 2(29BA) w.e.f. 1.4.09.

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Search and seizure : Block assessment : S. 158BD of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Documents seized considered for assessment of third person : Notice could not be issued on assessee u/s.158BD.

New Page 2

Reported :


53 Search and seizure :
Block assessment : S. 158BD of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Documents seized
considered for assessment of third person : Notice could not be issued on
assessee u/s.158BD.

[Superhouse Overseas Ltd.
and Anr. v. Dy. CIT,
325 ITR 448 (All.)]

Search and seizure operation
u/s.132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was carried out at the residence of one T. A
diary was seized and proceedings u/s.158BC were initiated in the case of T.
Notices u/s.158BD were issued in the name of the petitioners.

The petitioners filed writ
petitions before the Allahabad High Court and challenged the notices. The
petitioners pointed out to the Court that the material on the basis of which the
notices u/s. 158BD were issued, had been considered by the Settlement Commission
in the case of E, an association of persons and the Settlement Commission had
passed an order u/s.245D(4) of the Act in which on the basis of the diary,
income had been determined and that in pursuance of the order of the Settlement
Commission, the association of persons had duly deposited the tax.

The Allahabad High Court
allowed the writ petitions and held as under :

“Once the diary which was
the basis for the issue of the notices u/s.158BD had been considered in the case
of the association of persons and the income arising thereof had been assessed
in the case of the association of persons, the notices u/s.158BD did not survive
and were liable to be quashed.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 Limitation : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reopening of assessment on certain items and reassessment completed : Revision in respect of other items u/s.263 : Period of limitation to be counted from the original assessment.

New Page 2

Reported :

52 Revision : S. 263 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 Limitation : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reopening of assessment on
certain items and reassessment completed : Revision in respect of other items
u/s.263 : Period of limitation to be counted from the original assessment.

[Ashoka Buildcom Ltd. v.
ACIT,
191 Taxman 29 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05 the
original assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an
order dated 27-12-2006. Subsequently the assessment was reopened by issuing a
notice u/s. 148, dated 6-3-2007 on the basis that the benefit u/s.72A had been
wrongly allowed to the assessee. Reassessment was completed by an order u/s.147
dated 27-12-2007 withdrawing the benefit given to the assessee u/s.72A of the
Act. Thereafter, on 30-4-2009 the Commissioner issued notice u/s.263 proposing
to revise the assessment order dated 27-12-2007.

The assessee filed writ
petition and challenged the notice on the ground that what is sought to be
revised is the original assessment order dated 27-12-2006 and not the
reassessment order dated 27-12-2007 and accordingly the notice u/s.263, dated
30-4-2009 is beyond the period of limitation and hence invalid. The Bombay High
Court allowed the petition, quashed the notice and held as under :


“(i) While seeking to
exercise his jurisdiction u/s. 263, the Commissioner did not find any error
in the order of reassessment dated 27-12-2007 as regards the disallowance of
the assessee’s claim on the basis of the provisions of S. 72A. The impugned
notice adverted to issues which, as a matter of fact, did not form either
the subject-matter of the notice that was issued u/s.148 on 6-3-2007, nor
the order of reassessment thereupon which was passed on
27-12-2007. The jurisdiction u/s.263 was sought to be exercised with
reference to issues which were unrelated to the grounds on which the
original assessment was reopened and reassessment was made.

(ii) Ss.(2) of S. 263
stipulates that no order shall be made U/ss.(1) after the expiry of two
years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be
revised was passed. That period of two years from the end of the financial
year in which the original order of assessment dated 27-12-2006 was passed,
had expired on 31-3-2009. Hence, the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction
in respect of the original order of reassessment was barred by limitation.

(iii)
Where an assessment has been reopened u/s. 147 in relation to a particular
ground or in relation to certain specified grounds and subsequent to the
passing of the order of reassessment, the jurisdiction u/s.263 is sought to
be exercised with reference to issues which did not form the subject of the
reopening of the assessment or the order of reassessment, the period of
limitation provided for in Ss.(2) of S. 263 would commence from the date of
the order of assessment and not from the date on which the order reopening
the
reassessment has been passed.

(iv) The submission of
the Revenue was that when several issues are dealt with in the original
order of assessment and only one or more of them are dealt with in the order
of reassessment passed after the assessment has been reopened, the remaining
issues must be deemed to have been dealt with in the order of reassessment.
Hence, it had been urged that the omission of the Assessing Officer, while
making an order of reassessment, to deal with those issues u/s. 143(3), read
with S. 147, constituted an error which could be revised in exercise of the
jurisdiction u/s.263. The submission could neither be accepted as a matter
of first principle, based on a plain reading of the provisions of S. 147 and
S. 263, nor was it sustainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court.

(v) For those reasons,
the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction u/s.263 was barred by
limitation.”



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Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : AO issuing notice u/s.148 on basis of information given by Dy. Director and directions from Dy. Director and Addl Commissioner : AO not applying his mind : Notice and reassessment p

New Page 2

Reported :

50 Reassessment : S. 147 and
S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : AO issuing notice u/s.148 on
basis of information given by Dy. Director and directions from Dy. Director and
Addl Commissioner : AO not applying his mind : Notice and reassessment
proceedings not valid.

[CIT v. SFIL Stock
Broking Ltd.,
325 ITR 2852 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the
return of income filed by the assessee was processed u/s.143(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, on the basis of the information given by the
DDIT (Investigation) that the assessee was allegedly the beneficiary of a bogus
claim of long-term capital gain, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 of
the Act and made an addition of Rs.20,70,000 in the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal quashed the reassessment proceedings holding it to be illegal.

The Delhi High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) The first sentence
of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer was mere information
received from the DDIT (Investigation). The second sentence was a direction
given by the same Deputy Director to issue a notice u/s.148. The third
sentence again comprised a direction given by the Additional Commissioner to
initiate proceedings u/s.148 in respect of cases pertaining to the relevant
ward.

(ii) The Assessing
Officer referred to the information and the two directions as reasons on the
basis of which he was proceeding to issue notice u/s.148.

(iii) These could not be
the reasons for proceeding u/s.147/148 of the Act. As the first part was
only an information and the second and the third parts of the reasons were
mere directions, it was not at all discernible as to whether the Assessing
Officer had applied his mind to the information and independently arrived at
a belief that, on the basis of the material which he had before him, income
had escaped assessment.

(iv) There was no
substantial question of law for consideration.”



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Rectification : S. 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest u/s.234B not levied in assessment order relying on decision of Supreme Court : Subsequent retrospective amendment : Order not erroneous : Rectification not valid.

New Page 2

Reported :


51 Rectification : S. 154 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest u/s.234B not levied in assessment order relying
on decision of Supreme Court : Subsequent retrospective amendment : Order not
erroneous : Rectification not valid.

[Shriram Chits
(Bangalore) Ltd. v. JCIT,
325 ITR 219 (Karn.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the
assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act. Following the judgment of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. Ranchi Club Ltd.; 247 ITR 209 (SC) interest was
not levied u/s. 234B of the Act. Subsequently, in view of the subsequent
retrospective amendment to S. 234B by the Finance Act, 2001 the Assessing
Officer rectified the assessment order u/s.154 of the Act and levied interest
u/s.234B of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the order of rectification.

The Karnataka High Court
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under :


“(i) In view of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Max India Ltd.; 295 ITR 282,
it was not possible for the Assessing Officer to reopen the case since the
Assessing Officer had rightly passed the order relying upon the judgment of
CIT v. Ranchi Club Ltd.; 247 ITR 209 (SC) while passing the order of
assessment.

(ii) Just because there
was a subsequent amendment, the Assessing Officer could not reopen the file.
The order of rectification was not valid.”



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Loss return : Delay in filing : Condonation of delay : S. 119(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : CBDT has power to condone the delay.

New Page 2

Reported :


49 Loss return : Delay in
filing : Condonation of delay : S. 119(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05
: CBDT has power to condone the delay.

[Lodhi Properties Co.
Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue,
191 Taxman 74 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05 the
assessee had filed return loss seeking carry forward of loss. The last date for
filing was 1-11-2004. The assessee’s representative reached the Central Revenue
building at around 5.15 p.m. on 1-11-2004. He was sent from one room to the
other and by the time he reached the room where his return was to be accepted,
it was already 6.00 p.m., when he was told that the return would not be accepted
because the counter had been closed. In such circumstance the return was filed
on the next day, i.e., on 2-11-2004. The assessee filed an application
u/s.119(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the CBDT for condonation of delay of
one day.

On a writ petition filed by
the assessee challenging the order of rejection, the Revenue contended that
since it was a case of a loss return, there was no provision under the law for
condoning the delay and that S. 119(2)(b) does not apply to such a case.

The Delhi High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under :


“(i) The CBDT has the
power u/s.119(2) to condone the delay in the case of a return which is filed
late and where a claim for carry forward of losses is made.

(ii) In the instant
case, the impugned order u/s. 119 passed by the CBDT was a non-speaking one.
Normally, the matter would have been remanded to the CBDT to consider the
application of the assessee afresh. However, in the instant case, the delay
was only of one day and the circumstances had been explained and had not
been controverted by the respondents. A sufficient cause had been shown by
the assessee for the delay of one day in filing the return. If the delay was
not condoned, it would cause genuine hardship to the assessee. Thus, in the
circumstances of the case, instead of remanding the matter to the CBDT, the
delay of one day in filing of the return was to be directed to be condoned.”



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Capital gains : Transfer : A.Y. 1993-94 : Renunciation of right to subscribe to rights shares : Short-term capital loss : Renunciation in favour of general public : Does not amount to transfer : Loss notional : Not deductible.

New Page 2

Reported :

48. Capital gains : Transfer
: A.Y. 1993-94 : Renunciation of right to subscribe to rights shares :
Short-term capital loss : Renunciation in favour of general public : Does not
amount to transfer : Loss notional : Not deductible.

[CIT v. United Breweries
Ltd.,
325 ITR 485 (Kar.)]

As a holding company of a
company M, the assessee had the right to subscribe to 61,26,394 rights shares in
M. The assessee subscribed only to 22,75,650 shares and renounced the right to
subscribe 1,54,100 shares for a consideration of Rs.22,84,000. As a result the
right to subscribe to the balance 38,50,744 rights shares was lost. The assessee
claimed that before the rights issue of shares, the market quotation of shares
in M was Rs.80 per share and after the rights issue was completed the market
price came down to Rs.70 per share. The assessee therefore contended that on
account of this diminution in the value of shares by Rs.10 per share the
assessee incurred a loss to right to subscribe to 38,50,744 shares at the rate
of Rs.10 per share and that the total net loss was Rs.3,62,23,440. The Assessing
Officer rejected the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue the
Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) There was no
transfer of the rights in the rights shares in question by the transferor to
the transferee. In other words, the rights were renounced by the assessee in
favour of unknown persons and that too for ‘nil consideration’. Though the
transferor was the assessee, the act of transfer was not complete inasmuch
as there was no transfer in favour of the transferee. Transfer in favour of
an unknown person could not be a transfer.

(ii) When a share can be
sold at a profit either in the open market or at the face value at Rs.10,
there was no question of suffering of loss in the facts of the case. The
loss was only notional. As there was no transfer by way of renunciation, the
question of allowing capital loss in respect of notional loss would not
arise.”



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Bad debts : S. 36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No evidence that amount not taken into account in computing income of prior years : Bad debt allowable as deduction.

New Page 2

Reported :

47. Bad debts : S.
36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No evidence that amount not taken into
account in computing income of prior years : Bad debt allowable as deduction.

[CIT v. Dwarika
Industrial Development and Chains (P) Ltd.,
325 ITR 211 (All.)]

In the relevant year, a sum
of Rs.6,27,735 was lying under the head ‘sundry debtors’, which the company was
not able to realise as this money was due and payable by one NB. The assessee
had sent several letters directing the debtor to pay the amount, but the debtor
did not even acknowledge the same. The assessee therefore, wrote off the said
amount as bad debt and claimed deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act,
1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the
conditions for allowance of the bad debt as provided u/s.36(2)(i) have not been
clearly brought out. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim on
the ground that the Assessing Officer has not pointed out that this debt has not
been taken into account in computing the income in any earlier or previous year.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) It was the specific
case of the assessee that the amount represented the sales effected to NB,
but because of the fact that there was no documentary evidence in support of
the claim as also the acknowledgement of the letters, the said amount was
written off. The Assessing Officer did not make any comment on this issue
and instead proceeded on the ground by simply saying that merely because the
amount has become bad the assessee cannot claim to reduce the income and
placed reliance on S. 36(2)(i) of the Act.

(ii) In our opinion, the
Commissioner (Appeals) had rightly observed that the Assessing Authority did
not find any material on record to show that the said amount has not been
taken into account in computing the income of any previous years.

(iii) That being the
position, in our considered opinion, the Tribunal had rightly upheld the
deletion.”



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Disallowance of expenditure : S. 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A are constitutionally valid : They apply w.e.f. A.Y. 2007-08 : Rule 8D is not ultra vires S. 14A : It applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09.

New Page 2

Unreported :


46 Disallowance of
expenditure : S. 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A are
constitutionally valid : They apply w.e.f. A.Y. 2007-08 : Rule 8D is not


ultra vires
S. 14A : It applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09.


[Godrej & Boyce v. DCIT (Bom.),
WP No. 758 of 2010 dated 12-8-2010]

In the writ petition
challenging the validity of S. 14A and Rule 8D, the Bombay High Court has held
as under :


“(i) S. 14A supersedes
the principle of law that in the case of a composite business, expenditure
incurred towards tax-free income could not be disallowed and incorporates an
implicit theory of apportionment of expenditure between taxable and
non-taxable income. Once a proximate cause for disallowance is established,
which is the relationship of the expenditure with income which does not form
part of the total income, a disallowance u/s.14A has to be effected.

(ii) The test which has
been enunciated in Walfort for attracting the provisions of S. 14A is that
“there has to be a proximate cause for disallowance which is its
relationship with the tax exempt income”. Once the test of proximate cause,
based on the relationship of the expenditure with tax exempt income is
established, a disallowance would have to be effected u/s.14A.

(iii) The provisions of
Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A are constitutionally valid. Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of
S. 14A are not retrospective. They apply w.e.f. 1-4-2007 i.e., from
A.Y. 2007-08.

(iv) In the affidavit in
reply that has been filed on behalf of the Revenue an explanation has been
provided for the rationale underlying Rule 8D. In the written submissions
which have been filed by the Additional Solicitor General it has been
stated, with reference to Rule 8D(2)(ii) that since funds are fungible, it
would be difficult to allocate the actual quantum of borrowed funds that
have been used for making tax-free investments. It is only the interest on
borrowed funds that would be apportioned and the amount of expenditure by
way of interest that will be taken (as ‘A’ in the formula) will exclude any
expenditure by way of interest which is directly attributable to any
particular income or receipt (for example, any aspect of the assessee’s
business such as plant/machinery, etc.).

(v) Rule 8D is not
ultra vires
the provisions of S. 14A. The Assessing Officer cannot
ipso facto
apply Rule 8D, but can do so only where he records
satisfaction on an objective basis that the assessee is unable to establish
the correctness of its claim.

(vi) Rule 8D is
prospective and applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09. For prior years the Assessing
Officer has to enforce the provisions of S. 14A(1).

(vii) U/s.14A(1), it is
for the Assessing Officer to determine as to whether the assessee had
incurred any expenditure in relation to the earning of income which does not
form part of the total income. The Assessing Officer would have to arrive at
his determination after providing an opportunity to the assessee to furnish
its accounts and to place on record all relevant material in support of the
circumstances which are considered to be relevant and germane.

(viii) The argument that
dividend on shares/units is not tax-free in view of the dividend
distribution tax paid by the payer u/s.115-O is not acceptable, because such
tax is not paid on behalf of the shareholder, but is paid in
respect of the payer’s own liability.”



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S. 27 — Notice by Speed Post is deemed to have been served by ordinary post within 2-3 days, further absence of assessee

New Page 2

II. Reported : 



53 Notice : Service by Speed Post : Notice
u/s.143(2) dispatched by Speed Post and not received back is deemed to have been
served in the ordinary course of post within 2/3 days by virtue of presumption
u/s.27 of General Clauses Act, 1897, in the absence of any rebuttal on the side
of the assessee.

[CIT v. Madhsy Films (P) Ltd., 301 ITR 69 (Del.); 216
CTR 145 (Del.)]

Pursuant to the return of income filed by the assessee on
31-10-2001, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, on 23-10-2002 fixing the date of hearing on 29-10-2002 and sent by
Speed Post and completed the assessment after issuing further notices. The
assessee challenged the validity of the assessment order, on the ground that the
notice u/s.143(2) of the Act was not served on the assessee within the
prescribed period. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and quashed the
assessment order.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) In the present case, the notice has been issued on
23-10-2002 and was sent through Speed Post on 25-10-2002 at the address of the
company. S. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that service by post
is deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting
by registered post, a letter containing a notice required to be served. Unless
the contrary is proved, the service is deemed to have been effected at the
time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. This
presumption is rebuttable, but in the absence of proof to the contrary, the
presumption of proper service or effective service of notice would arise.

(ii) There is nothing on record to show that the notice
dated 23-10-2002 dispatched on 25-10-2002 by Speed Post was undelivered or
received back. Under the normal circumstances, a presumption will lie that
this notice has reached the assessee within 2/3 days. Since the envelop
containing the notice has not been received back by the Department, there is a
presumption that it has reached the assessee and this presumption has not been
rebutted by the assessee at all. No affidavit has been filed by the assessee
to the effect that the notice was not received by it.

(iii) Under the circumstances, notice u/s.143(2) was served
upon the assessee within the prescribed period and as such the finding given by
the Tribunal that no notice u/s.143(2) has been served upon the assessee within
the prescribed period is hereby set aside and the substantial question of law is
decided in the negative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.”

S. 143(2) — Service of notice by Speed Post, in absence of material on record, no pre-sumption of service within 24 hours

New Page 2

II. Reported :






 



52 Notice : Service by Speed Post : No
presumption of service within 24 hours : Notice u/s.143(2) dated 29-10-2002 sent
by Speed Post on 30-10-2002 at Delhi address given in the return and redirected
and served at Noida address of assessee on 6-11-2002 : No presumption that the
notice was served at the former address on or before 31-10-2002 in the absence
of material on record.

[Nulon India Ltd v. ITO, 216 CTR 142 (Del.)]

Pursuant to the return of income filed by the assessee on
31-10-2001, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 on 29-10-2002, which was sent through Speed Post on 30-10-2002 at
Delhi address mentioned in the return. The notice was redirected and was served
at the Noida address of the assessee on 6-11-2002. The assessee challenged the
validity of the assessment order passed pursuant to the said notice, on the
ground that the notice was not served within the prescribed period. The Tribunal
rejected the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) As per material placed on record, the notice in
question has been dispatched on 30-10-2002 and thereafter it has been
redirected to the Noida address of the assessee. There is nothing on record to
show as to on which date this notice was received at the given address of the
assessee and on which date the same was redirected. As per the order of the
CIT(A) placed on record, the Assessing Officer was asked for comments and vide
his letter dated 12/20th October, 2004, the Assessing Officer stated : “The
notice was served by Speed Post which must be delivered to the assessee within
24 hours, that is, by morning of 31st October.” So the AO is also not sure nor
specific as to when the notice in question has been served upon the assessee.
It is only a presumption that notice which has been sent by Speed Post on 30th
October 2002, must have been delivered to the assessee by 31st October 2002.

(ii) There is no presumption under law that any notice sent
by Speed Post must have been delivered to the assessee within 24 hours.
Moreover, there is nothing on record to show at whose instance the notice was
redirected and sent at the address of Noida. So, from the material available
on record, it may be concluded that no notice u/s.143(2), which is mandatory
requirement of law, has been served upon the assessee within prescribed
period.

(iii) Under the circumstances, the appeal filed by the
assessee is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set
aside.”

Direct Taxes Code

Editorial

The Finance Minister has kept
his word and released the draft of the Direct Taxes Code for public comment
within the promised time — in fact, one week in advance. It is now time for us
to study the code in detail, understand its implications and make
representations to the Government. The question that we need to ask is — at
first glance, has the Direct Taxes Code really lived up to the expectations ?

Undoubtedly, significant
efforts have gone into drafting of the Direct Taxes Code and into simplification
of complex provisions. The language of the Direct Taxes Code is definitely a
significant improvement on the legalistic and convoluted language of the Income
Tax Act. Unnecessary complications such as the concepts of previous year and
assessment year, which made understanding of the income tax provisions difficult
to most laymen, have been sought to be eliminated. To that extent, the
Government certainly needs to be complimented for its efforts.

Most individual taxpayers have
been enthused by the significant proposed reductions in individual tax rates,
with taxes at the Rs.10 lakh and Rs.25 lakh levels coming down from Rs.2,10,120
and Rs.6,73,620 levels to Rs.84,000 and Rs.3,84,000, respectively. However, one
aspect which most people have not realised is that their taxable incomes would
also be much higher under the Direct Taxes Code, on account of taxation of
withdrawal of provident fund monies, taxation of insurance monies, taxation of
capital gains on sale of equity shares at normal rates of tax, etc. Tax
exemption schemes would effectively be replaced by tax deferment schemes under
the EET method.

There are quite a few other
fundamental changes to the tax laws which are being made through the Direct
Taxes Code. Minimum Alternate Tax (‘MAT’) would no longer be based on book
profits, but on the gross assets of the company. The entire rationale behind
introduction of MAT, to tax companies which showed book profits and paid
dividends but paid no taxes, is therefore now being tossed aside, and MAT sought
to be justified by the rationale of need for productivity. Would MAT on gross
assets really increase productivity of companies, or just further hamper
loss-making companies ? The Government seems to believe that companies choose to
make losses, even when they are capable of making profits ! By that logic, the
day may not be far off when norms for productivity of different industries would
be laid down, and any company not meeting the norms of profitability would be
taxed on the income which, in the Government’s opinion, it ought to have earned.

The reduction in corporate tax
rates is being neutralised by MAT and changes in incentive provisions. Incentive
deductions for various industries, such as infrastructure, power, etc., are
being replaced effectively by accelerated depreciation, which is really not a
substitute for the profit deduction which has hitherto been available. Would
such an incentive be sufficient to enthuse companies to undertake such priority
activities ? It may perhaps be better not to have any such incentive at all, but
to ensure speedy project approvals and clearances to encourage such activities.
Unfortunately, we may end up with the worst of both — a poor tax incentive, as
well as delays in project approvals.

The general anti-avoidance rule
being sought to be introduced has the maximum potential for misuse by tax
authorities. Given the approach of tax authorities, who view every transaction
with a jaundiced eye, regarding it as having been entered into for tax
avoidance, such a provision should have inbuilt effective safeguards, if at all
it is to be introduced. Otherwise, the amount of litigation being seen in
relation to transfer pricing would certainly be dwarfed by litigation which
would be unleashed by such a provision. One thought that the objective behind
the new code is to reduce uncertainty and litigation, not encourage it. Such a
provision is therefore inconsistent with the objectives of the new code.

It is not only domestic
taxpayers who would end up with difficulties under the Direct Taxes Code. Though
all existing tax treaties may be renotified to override the Direct Taxes Code,
the general anti-avoidance rules, the provisions relating to rectification,
reassessment and revision on the basis of any order in the case of any person,
could see tax proceedings dragging on without finality.

All these provisions would
certainly mean plenty of work for chartered accountants and tax lawyers. But I
think no self-respecting professional would like such additional work if it is
at the cost of difficulties and uncertainties caused to the business community
and to taxpayers in general. One hopes that the Government will at least really
pay some heed to the representations which would be made, and not enact such
provisions which would offset the good work done in the Direct Taxes Code
.


Gautam Nayak

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ICAI and Its (Student) Members

Editorial

In the month of July, results of the CA final examination
were announced. Only about 3.5% of students passed both the groups in the old
course, while the corresponding percentage in the new course was a little better
at 6.5%. There is great anguish amongst the student community on account of such
dismal results. Details of the recent results are given in the feature `ICAI and
its Members’ in this issue of the Journal. If the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India were to publish statistics of students passing the final CA
examination within five years from the date of their enrolment to the course, it
will certainly be an eye-opener.

It is time that all of us take a closer look at the CA course
– its structure, entry requirements, education, training, examination system and
other aspects.

Over the last few years, many changes have taken place;
examinations have been renamed and eligibility criteria for the students
changed. CPT was introduced to attract young talented students to the course,
just as students take up engineering, medicine or law after passing the Higher
Secondary Examination. On one hand, we are asking students to join the CA course
after Higher Secondary level, while on the other, we seek recognition for the CA
course as equivalent to master’s degree for the purpose of doing PhD. One really
needs to decide whether the CA course should be placed as an undergraduate
course or a post-graduate course. Today, it is neither.

When CPT was introduced, it was expected that students will
give up their college education (or opt for a correspondence degree course) and
concentrate on CA. But that expectation has been belied, possibly due to the
uncertainty of passing CA examinations. So today the students attend (do they
really?) college, coaching classes and office and are also expected to study for
the examinations.

The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), of which
our Institute is a member, through the International Accounting Education
Standards Board (IAESB), issues International Education Standards (IES) and
other documents on training for professional accountants. IES1 `Entry
Requirements to a Programme of Professional Accountant Education’ in paragraph 2
states, “The aim of this IES is to ensure that students hoping to become
professional accountants have an educational background that enables them to
have a reasonable possibility of achieving success in their studies, qualifying
examinations and practical experience period. To fulfil this requirement, member
bodies may require certain entrants to take pre-entry proficiency tests.” Does
CPT or the commerce education that is imparted today at the undergraduate level
ensure that the students have a fair chance of passing the final examination
within a reasonable period? The answer is in the negative.

Often, students choose their career based on the cost of the
course and monetary prospects rather than their aptitude. In courses which have
tougher entry points, generally only students with the right aptitude and
calibre enter and ultimately most of them taste success. An easy entry and
subsequent difficult examinations reminds one of Abhimanyu in Mahabharat, who
had the expertise to enter the battle formation of `Chakravyuha’ but did not
know how to exit. This is an injustice to students who join the course in a
herd, but even at the end of five years, are unable to clear the final
examination. It creates a large pool of disheartened and disillusioned youth
whose qualification is ‘CA fail’. This does not augur well either for the
society in general or students and the profession in particular.

Coming to the course content, one wonders if the syllabus has
become too unwieldy for the students to handle. Even if one presumes that
students do not refer to the bare text of various laws, accounting and auditing
standards, the amount of reading that is required is voluminous. A student
passing IPCC in the first attempt appears for the final examination within a
period of about 2 to 2½ years. During this period, he is serving articles and
possibly would have appeared for college examinations as well. Even with the
maximum available leave, can a student acquire the level of knowledge that is
expected to qualify as a CA?

Most professional courses have a semester pattern with
evaluation spread over the duration of the course. This may not be possible for
the CA course, but can we think of permitting appearing only for one group at a
time or modular examination with say two papers at a time? That may reduce the
burden on students. By giving an option of appearing for both the groups at the
final examination, we are abetting failure.

At the final examination, a large number of subjects require
expert level knowledge. Does the education and training imparted ensure that?
Even in the best law schools in India, what the students get is a solid
foundation in law to understand and interpret legal issues with core knowledge
of basic laws. While it is absolutely necessary that standards of the course
should consistently remain high, we need to be clear in our mind as to what we
mean by high standards. A student passing the final examination must have
knowledge of core subjects, analytical capability and high ethical standards;
and last but not the least, he/she ought to have developed the capacity to
learn. Framework to IES, in paragraph 21, states, “In a constantly changing work
environment, both learning to learn and a commitment to lifelong learning are
integral aspects of being a professional accountant.”

Today, for a chartered accountant, there are a large number
of career options apart from the traditional areas of taxation and auditing. One
may consider permitting choice of subjects at the final CA examination rather
than expecting the student to have expert knowledge in a large number of
subjects. In fact, many years back, the final examination consisted of three
groups and for one group, a student had a choice of selecting from three
combinations.

There are few things that students need to keep in mind.
Success in any examination requires comprehension of the subject, retention of
knowledge, recalling and applying the same and finally, the presentation. Most
students rely heavily on retention without giving adequate emphasis on the other
aspects. While retention is essential, it is certainly not sufficient.

At the same time, one wonders whether in an era where
information is just a click away, can we have open book examinations in some
subjects that will test the students’ analytical capacity and application of
knowledge? When Late Jal Dastur, CA, wrote papers consisting of case studies for
conferences, he would cite all the relevant sections of the Company Law and yet,
the case studies would be so interesting and challenging.

Students, today, have lost the habit of writing and therefore, the capacity to express themselves in the written form. Also, due to extensive use of computers, there is hardly any occasion for the use of a pen between two examinations. As a result, students are unable to complete the paper. Maybe, in future, some of the papers will be in the nature of multiple choices or online tests requiring little writing. But it is also a fact that in the commercial world, written communication has its own importance, whether one is making submissions to the tax authorities or writing a report in the corporate world. The scheme of Sunday Test Papers, with all its drawbacks, gave students practice of writing answers, kept the students in touch with the syllabus and ensured regular evaluation. It was in the interest of the students.

Students who take up engineering, medicine or law have the benefit of classroom training. Even qualified CAs need to attend CPE programmes. Is it fair to expect CA students to gain expert level knowledge with only self study? Examination results have demonstrated that coaching classes have not helped the students. However, we have done precious little to provide a substitute. With the advent of information technology, we should be able to provide students with structured online training and facilities to resolve doubts and queries quickly through the medium of the Internet and toll-free numbers. A modest beginning has been done with the launch of the CA Shiksha portal.

One aspect that has been ignored is the timely mentoring of students. All the principals have this duty toward their students. It is important that mentoring should include advice to move to an alternate career option at an appropriate time and not after valuable years have been lost after futile examination attempts.

I leave these thoughts with you.

Scrutiny of Income-tax Returns

Editorial

The scrutiny of Income-tax returns for the assessment year
2006-07 is on in full swing, given the deadline of 31st December 2008 for
completion of assessment proceedings. The large number of cases selected for
scrutiny has resulted in most chartered accountants and tax practitioners
running around, trying to cope with the spate of assessment proceedings, and
assessing officers wondering whether it would be possible to complete such a
large number of assessments within the limited timeframe. Given the
inconvenience caused to such a large number of taxpayers in the form of
compiling substantial data and information, the question which really arises is
— Is selection of such a large number of cases for scrutiny really justified ?
Do such assessment proceedings really result in any significant tax collection ?


If one analyses the number of cases selected for scrutiny,
one notices that the overwhelming majority of cases consists of high net worth
individuals who have disclosed significant incomes, and who have also made
significant investments or purchased or sold properties. These cases seem to
have been selected under Computer-Aided Scrutiny Selection (CASS) on the basis
of information received through Annual Information Returns (AIR) regarding
investment, purchase and sale of property, etc. Given the fact that there was no
provision or place for declaration of such investments or purchase and sale of
property in the Income-tax returns for assessment year 2006-07, the Income-tax
Department seems to have blindly selected all these cases for scrutiny, even
though the income for that year may be far in excess of such investments. Most
of these cases result in nil or negligible addition to the assessed income,
yielding no additional tax revenue to the Government.

One reads press reports that as against 3.2 lakh returns
scrutinised in 2007-08, the tax authorities intend to scrutinise about 5 lakh
cases during the current year. Given the fact that most assessing officers in a
city like Mumbai had almost 300 cases to handle last year, it seems that they
would be handling almost 450 cases each in the current year — a Herculean task
indeed !

Even this would be manageable if the assessments were taken
up earlier and the assessing officers followed the CBDT instructions issued last
year, that in cases selected for scrutiny by the computerised process on the
basis of AIR information, only the transactions relating to such information
should be verified with the tax returns, to ensure that such payments are made
out of taxable income. Unfortunately, for most officers, old habits die hard and
they tend to burden themselves with unnecessary details called for from the
assessees, hoping to find scope for some addition or the other, though unrelated
to the AIR information. For the tax authorities to then plead shortage of
officers for carrying out its other functions in time, is totally unjustified.

Take the simple job of issuing refunds for the assessment
year 2007-08. It would be interesting to ask the tax authorities whether any
such refunds have actually been issued so far, though more than one year has
elapsed since the date of filing returns, and the tax authorities claim to have
fully computerised their processes. Almost all taxpayers are still waiting for
the tax authorities to get their act in order, and complete the simple process
of issue of their tax refunds. Obviously, the tax authorities would claim that
their hands are too full with handling scrutiny assessments and selecting cases
for scrutiny for the assessment year 2007-08.

A CBDT press release issued in mid-July 2008 stated that the
Tax Department has taken several steps to expedite processing and scrutiny of
tax returns. This includes doing away with the requirement of filing TDS
certificates and launch of a refund banker scheme, which is claimed to be
currently under implementation in six regions, including Mumbai. Under the
scheme, refunds are to be credited directly to the bank account of the taxpayer.

Unfortunately, the ground reality is quite different. So far,
the Department keeps on sending letters asking for bank account numbers, though
the bank account number may have been mentioned in the return. For months
thereafter, there is no sign of any refund. One therefore wonders as to when the
CBDT talks of ‘under implementation’, at what stage it is ! Would one have to
wait for a few more years for the Tax Department to resolve its own internal
problems and finally grant one’s legitimate refunds ?

The said press release says that the Government has
sanctioned 7051 additional manpower in November 2006 and that recruitment of
additional manpower will be completed by 2010. Do we have to wait till then ?

So many tall claims have been made by the Tax Department in
the past, that when one reads of any such claims or plans, one takes these with
a pinch of salt. In the same press release, the CBDT claims that the CASS system
has been further refined to focus on quality selection of cases with revenue
potential, rather than selecting large quantity of cases. Do the facts bear this
out ?

One can only pray for the day when the actions of tax authorities match their
words !

Gautam Nayak

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Impact of IFRS on Banks

Accountant Abroad

International accounting standards will make it harder for
banks to keep assets off their balance sheets, a UK regulator said on Monday,
while the United States continues to mull whether to broaden its use of foreign
rules.

Under current U.S. accounting rules, companies can keep
certain loans, such as those linked to risky mortgages and credit card debt, in
off-balance sheet vehicles known as ‘qualified special purpose entities’ (QSPEs).

The United Kingdom adheres to international financial
reporting standards (IFRS), which have more flexible accounting rules, but have
forced firms to include more assets on their books. It is said that having a
precise rule may be advantageous, but a precise rule also makes it possible to
design something that is precisely just outside the rule. Therefore the more
principles-based approach under IFRS adopted under UK (Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles) makes it much more difficult to design something in such
a way that it is off-balance sheet.

Few companies that have to adopt international accounting
standards have had to put about 200 off-balance sheet entities back on their
books. Many of the vehicles that were brought back on the balance sheet were
originally created using U.S. accounting rules and “a lot” were set up as QSPEs.
The SEC is examining whether to allow domestic companies to use international
standards instead of U.S. accounting rules.

Foreign-listed firms in the United States can already forego
U.S. standards for international rules and the SEC is expected to come up with a
“roadmap” to broaden use of IFRS. The treatment of off-balance sheet items is
one of many accounting methods that is being examined and debated.

The U.S. accounting rule maker, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, will soon propose to eliminate the QSPEs. However, the board
has delayed the implementation of the rule change and said it should take effect
for reporting periods after November 15, 2009.

China pushes forward producing accounting, auditing and financing talents :

China’s three National Accounting Institutes are to teach
annually 100,000 people and help them become senior professionals in accounting,
auditing, and financing over the next five to ten years.

Meanwhile, another 1,000 will receive training and teaching
from the three institutes and reach an international level of competence each
year, according to the Chairman of the Institutes’ board of directors.

He raised these two ambitious goals after a board meeting
recently, which analysed the achievements and experiences of the institutes over
the past ten years.

Beijing National Accounting Institute was the first of the
three to be founded in 1998, and had taught more than 130,000 people over the
past decade, averaging 13,000 per year, according to figures from the
institute’s journal. The other two are in the eastern metropolis of Shanghai and
the coastal city of Xiamen, founded in 2000 and 2002, respectively.

Led and supported by multiple state departments, the
institutes are expected to produce talents in accounting, auditing and
financing, who will work as experts and professionals in the country’s
macro-economy management departments, large and medium-sized enterprises and
financial organisations.

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Governance – Rethinking Takeover Regulations in UK in the Wake of Kraft’s Conquest of Cadbury

Accountant Abroad

Workers at the Cadbury plant
in Keynsham, in the west of England, thought they had a sweet deal. In the
middle of a takeover bid for the British confectioner last year, the U.S. food
company Kraft pledged that the factory, earlier slated for closure by Cadbury,
would remain open if it won the company. When the deal wrapped, though, the
pledge soured. Too much of Keynsham’s production had apparently been shifted to
Poland to reverse its closure, Kraft lamented. The plant, after more than 75
years making chocolate, will shut next year, its staff of 400 among the early
casualties of the $ 18 billion deal.

Few hostile bids for a
British firm and a beloved brand have ruffled the country’s business and
political chiefs the way Kraft did. But the debate took a twist. Although the
Americans were excoriated for their U-turn, the pivotal role of short-term
Cadbury investors in handing the firm to Kraft sparked calls for a rethink of
the way takeovers are governed in the U.K.

And that’s exactly what the
Takeover Panel, the independent body that sets the rules for deals involving
U.K. firms, is doing — undertaking a review of the mergers and acquisitions
process with an eye on reform. The government is poised to unveil its own
recommendations for change, Business Secretary Vince Cable said to a
parliamentary committee on July 20.

Few would dispute any
British claim of being the takeover capital of Europe. According to Dealogic,
which tracks global M&A, the U.K. has seen more than twice as many of its
companies bought since 2005 as any of Europe’s other leading economies. Among
the conquests : airport operator BAA bought by Spain’s Ferrovial, British Energy
bought by France’s EDF and iconic car maker Jaguar and steel maker Corus taken
over by India’s Tata Group.

Chalk at least some of that
up to the Anglo-Saxon brand of capitalism, one that European continental
regulators have often resisted. France, for instance, has bluntly protected its
‘national champion’ companies from hostile offers. With boards and the
government less able to meddle in the takeover process in Britain, says Roger
Barker, head of corporate governance at the London- based Institute of
Directors, it is “very much an outlier in terms of the openness of our market
for corporate control.”

To make deals tougher for
acquirers to execute, the Takeover Panel is considering ways to grant
longer-term shareholders in a target firm more power to decide the fate of an
offer. One proposal being considered would see the threshold for an acquisition
increased from 50% plus one of the voting rights to 60% or higher. Another would
disenfranchise investors who buy a target’s shares after an offer has been made
by denying them the right to vote on the bid.

Both ideas have their flaws.
U.K. corporate law permits a shareholder to control a company with 50% plus one
by, for instance, issuing resolutions to dismiss the board and appoint a new
one. That such a stake would no longer grant ownership seems incongruous.
Depriving newer investors of the right to vote on a takeover, meanwhile, makes
presumptions about their motives and desirability that won’t always be fair.
After all, the reason there are short-term shareholders is that some long-term
shareholders sell out. They are voting with their feet. Disenfranchising on
those grounds, says Michael McKersie — an assistant director at the Association
of British Insurers, which represents major investors in U.K. stocks — “is just
a form of discrimination.”

Other proposals, though, are
less fraught. Giving shareholders in a bidding company a say in the process
seems sensible, since those left holding stock in the combined entity have far
more to lose from a poorly judged acquisition. Big deals involving a British
buyer sometimes require approval from the bidding company’s shareholders. For
instance if Kraft were a U.K. company, it would have needed shareholders to
approve the move for buying out Cadbury.

The City is not anticipating
revolutionary change within the Takeover Panel’s recommendations. Any radical
measures to ensure that deals are decided on the basis of long-term-shareholder
value rather than short-term speculation, would be more likely to come from the
government. The Institute of Directors’ Barker, for one, is betting on the
government to take some significant action. Officials are already mulling plans
to subject big deals to greater regulatory scrutiny before an offer has
officially been tabled. That’s far too late to help workers at the Cadbury plant
in Keynsham. But it just might make the deal’s aftertaste a touch less bitter !

(Source : Time, 16-8-2010)

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HR Management in the Accounting Practice

Implementing the basic elements of HR Management can deliver powerful results for any size of firm — small, medium or big.

The secret lies in weaving this discipline of management into the everyday running of our practices.

The need for HR management :

    People are the key ingredient of a professional practice. This is true whether the firm employs 10, 100 or 1000 people.

    Most accounting practices struggle to employ and retain people. The gap between demand and supply is the most obvious reason why finding enough people (leave aside good talent) is so difficult. The problem is accentuated because different sectors (with very different paying capacities and glamour quotients) now compete for the same talent pool.

    Retaining people is an equally big challenge because new employment opportunities (at significantly higher salaries and other perquisites and attractions) are opening up every day.

    The result is that at most times we are short-staffed. Because of attrition we are unable to build and maintain a stable team with steadily improving skill sets. This results in upward delegation, putting the proprietor/partner and senior staff under constant execution and delivery pressure. There is the constant stress of missed deadlines and mistakes in delivery. This leaves us with little time and mind-space to grow and qualitatively improve our practice . . . and of course achieve the elusive work-life balance.

What we want :

    As employers, we all want people who have the right attitude and appropriate and adequate skill sets to work for us. We would like to have a work environment in which our people enjoy working. We want our people to be committed to the Firm. And of course, we are concerned about salary cost since it is the biggest item on our profit and loss account.

    And what employees (and articled clerks) want is professional development through learning and exposure, recognition for their work, a healthy work environment and of course, fair remuneration.

    On the face of it, there is close congruence between the employer’s and employee’s needs which should guide our behaviour and actions to meeting these needs.

Reality check :

    However, the truth is that most of us are so busy with day-to-day execution issues that we don’t pay any conscious attention to the people aspect of our practice. Its not that we don’t care or we don’t want to do it. We do. But our efforts in this direction are often passive, unfocussed, unstructured and sporadic.

The essential elements of HRM :

    The basic objectives of HR management are :

  •         Hiring the right people
  •         Retaining them
  •         Growing them

    The following are the key processes of HRM that would help meet these objectives :

        Recruitment and selection :

Writing clear job descriptions for each position : This is the foundation of good selection and performance management since it brings clarity to what exactly to expect from each position in the organisation. A good job description looks at all aspects of the job. In an accounting practice, the aspects could be clients, service delivery, people and growth and profitability. The specific expectations under each aspect can then be spelt out for each level of staff.

Identifying competencies required for each job/position : Using the job description we can identify the skills and competencies that would be required in order to meet the expectations of that role. Examples of skills and competencies are : expert knowledge of accounting — Accounting Standards and presentation of financial statements (in Schedule VI format), ability to supervise teams, and good report writing ability.

Systematic selection process : At the best of times, selecting people is a tricky business. Not only should the person we select be technically competent, s/he should also be a good fit for the practice in terms of attitude and temperament. Hiring mistakes are costly. An incompetent person puts delivery at risk, an undisciplined person sets a bad example to other staff, an aggressive and rude person can put client relationship at serious risk, and so on. Hence, having a systematic approach to hiring is critical to reduce the risk of a bad choice. A simple three-step process could be :

Initial screening based on CVs and job descriptions : Screening CVs in the context of your expectations help to filter out those that are obviously not a good fit for the position, either in terms of education or in terms of experience and exposure or perhaps even attitude.

 Written tests for assessing technical ability : A good way to shortlist candidates is to put them through suitable tests that establish at least the baseline competency required for the job. After all, it would be a waste of time to interview everyone who applies for the job or whose CV is prima facie suitable.

Interview: This is the most important tool in selection, since it is an opportunity to assess the candidate face to face. Simply put, a good interview is one in which you find out whatever you need to know of the candidate in terms of the position in the shortest possible time. The thing to guard against is focus sing too much on technical knowledge at the expense of other attributes that are Decessary for the job. Needless to say, to get the most out of an interview, even the interviewer must plan and prepare carefully!

Performance management:

Training & Development: Development of people cannot be left to chance. It is also not the responsibility only of the employee. The organisation has (at least) an equal interest in ensuring that its people grow. This growth is in terms of technical competence, management ability and emotional maturity. While some skills and competencies can be taught (and learnt), others are acquired through experience. Again, there are technical skills and ‘soft’ skills. Whom to teach what? And who will teach? How? While these are no doubt tricky questions with no easy answers, the following approach may help to show the way:

  • Identify the skill gap for each person in your team. Job descriptions and competencies for each job can be a good point of reference to determine skill gaps.

  • Based on the skill gaps you have identified, determine the training that would need to be provided. Also choose carefully the format you will use. For example, while ‘classroom’ training is the easiest to deliver, there is a risk that it tends to be theoretical and if not delivered well, is ineffective. On the other hand, workshops and focussed case studies are much more effective, but they need careful preparation and skilful facilitation. Coaching and men toring are useful where you need to focus on the individual development of certain members of your team .

  • Deliver the training and TEST the participants. Needless to say, delivery of the training is the heart of the matter. This necessarily has to be effective and efficient. Short sessions of 60 to 90 minutes tend to be more effective than all-day sessions. The trainer’s preparation is critical for ensuring effectiveness. Also, the more participative the session, better is the retention of knowledge. It is very important to test the participants’ knowledge absorption by conducting a test (maybe multiple choice answers) or quiz. Of course, the ultimate test of effectiveness is how well the person actually applies his/her learnings at work!

Appraisals and feedback:

Feedback is a very powerful tool for people development and performance enhancement. While it is human nature to give feedback (usually in the form of criticism and often in public) when things go wrong, such feedback is counter productive in the long term. Also, contrary to normal practice, feedback should also be given when things go right! Feedback works best when it is given close to the event and is objectively given. While positive feedback should be given in public, negative feedback (as a general rule) should be given behind closed doors.

Even if the feedback is provided on an ongoing basis, formal performance appraisals should be conducted at least once a year. It is an opportunity to pause and objectively assess each person’s performance in all its aspects. Here again, using the job description and competencies helps to bring objectivity. In order to make the process transparent, it is useful to get each person to first do a self appraisal and then for the reporting senior to do an independent assessment which is then discussed with the staff member in a one-on-one meeting. Formal appraisals help to identify people with growth potential, training needs for strong as well as underperformers and provide an objective input for deciding on increments and promotions.

However, the one thing that we need to guard against is the ‘halo’ effect that influences the appraisal. ( The ‘halo’ effect means being un-duly influenced by recent events rather than taking the full year’s performance into consideration).

Compensation  and rewards:

Fixed remuneration i.e., monthly salary: Given that this has a direct bearing on the practice’s profitability, most of us are instinctively good at it. However, one may like to be conscious of the following:

  • Since hiring takes place throughout the year, distortions creep into the salary structure. These need to be addressed during the annual increments.

  • Guard against the ‘halo’ effect described above.

  • Our insecurity in respect of staff on whom we are excessively dependent and its impact on their remuneration.

  • Giving in to requests (demands) for higher pay by some employees. While this may, in the short term, retain the person, in the long term it will be seen as unfair by those who are not as aggressive.

Variable remuneration i.e., performance-linked bonus: Most firms pay an annual bonus to their staff. However, it is not very common to link the bonus to performance. Consequently, the bonus becomes an expectation of the staff and therefore loses its influence as a motivation for better performance. If the bonus payment can be clearly linked to performance, it can indeed become a powerful driver for those with real ability. However, a very important condition for implementing such a scheme is that there be clearly defined performance expectations and performance measurements in place. In view of the issues involved in implementing a variable pay scheme, it is not recommended for very small practices and at the early stages of HR management.

Promotion: Done for the right reasons and in the right manner, promotions are a very visible recognition of a person’s abilities and send a powerful message to all staff. On the other hand, done for the wrong reasons or without an objective assessment of the person’s abilities, it sends out an even more powerful negative message ! Hence the points to keep in mind are:

  •     Have clear reasons why the person is being promoted. Assess objectively the person’s capability to handle the new role. Else, you will neither get the role performed satisfactorily, nor will you be able to retain the person – s/he will soon be frustrated and leave.

  •     Communicate the promotion within the organisation (an email announcing the promotion is one way of doing it) giving in brief the background of the person, his/her key achievements in the earlier role and what the new role and responsibilities will be.

  •     Do ensure that the promotion actually results in a bigger role and is not just a change of designation.

Recognition (e.g., awards for exsra-ordinarq performance, special achievement, etc.) : Done for the right reasons and in the right manner, this can be a very powerful motivator for employees. It is not the monetary value of the award that is important, but rather the public acknowledgement of the achievement. Also, objectivity and consistency are key, else the recognition is seen to be hollow and insincere.

 HR administration:

HR administration is the grease on which staff matters run. If not carried out efficiently and in a timely manner, they can result in staff dissatisfaction that can have serious repercussions for the practice. The basic elements are:

  •  Payment of salaries: Timely and correct payment


  •     Leave management: Clear leave policy, applied consistently, records updated promptly and balances struck regularly


  •     Maintaining  employment.  records of staff


  •     Statutory  compliances (PF, ESI, profession tax, etc.)

    Leadership:

For people to perform, it is essential that they have a good feeling about themselves and their organisation and they have a sense of purpose i.e., they feel that they are doing something worthwhile. This is the softest and most intangible element of HR management because it deals with people’s feelings, their emotions. It is also the most difficult but most important element. It needs to be created at the top – at the level of the proprietor or partners of the practice. Only if you yourself feel good about yourself, your practice and your organisation, will you be able to create the ‘feel good factor’ in your organisation. Every person has a different style for dealing with people. Hence there is no one-size-fits-all formula for motivational leadership. It is not important how you do it. But that you do, is. These are some general pointers:

Communicate with your people, share plans to the extent they affect the team. Give them visibil-ity so they know where they are going. This is very important for creating a sense of purpose, one of the key ingredients of ‘feel good’.

Be in touch with your people. Sense their level of motivation. The ability to understand body language is a big asset. Sensitivity and a genuine concern for people are imperative. Employee engagement activities like lunches/dinners, celebrating birthdays and festivals, picnics, etc. are an excellent way to not only give your people a break and an opportunity to de-stress but also to be one with them and to know them in an informal setting.

Celebrate successes. It is what we strive for. So when it comes, it needs to be recognised and welcomed. Else we will take it for granted and eventually lose the joy of achievement.

Show strength and courage in difficult times. Tough times are inevitable. It is in such times that staff actually look to their leaders for direction.

Hence the ‘tone at the top’ will really determine whether the team will rally behind you and put in that extra effort or whether they will look for their self interest and eventually drift away.
 
Give feedback. The powerful message it gives is this: ‘I have been noticed. What I do matters. Someone is interested enough in me and my work to tell me when I go well and when I don’t’. Without feedback, we feel neglected and unwanted.

The challenges  and why we don’t  do it:

1. It’s a big breakfrom the past: In the past (till about 15 years ago), the demand-supply gap for articled clerks and qualified staff ensured that staff was more or less readily available. By and large, clients’ expectations did not go beyond the very basic and the nature of work was such that the proprietors/partners did not have to rely very heavily on their staff for ‘brainware’ – they essentially needed their staff to do the ‘grunt’ work. So hiring, retention and building skills was not much of a constraint and was consequently did not get any serious attention.

2. We don’t have the mindset for this: Perhaps this is a legacy from the past – the point made above – and is the biggest stumbling block. Most of us are too focussed on the technical aspects of our core areas of work and think of HR functions as esoteric, fancy and ‘soft’.

3. I don’t have the time for this: This is a variation of the above.

4. My practice is too small for this: Certainly, this is a seemingly valid argument. Small practices are typically run with fairly informal structures and processes. The personal style of the proprietors/ partners has a dominating influence in the manner in which the practice is run. They are able to stay on top of things and drive the practice by the seat of its pants. In these practices, management ‘happens’ and is not something you need to do consciously,leave alone recognise its distinct facets. We tend to think of ‘formal’ management as relevant to companies and businesses, not to professional practices.

5. I am not trained for this or I don’t know what to do and how to do it
: Our professional training (as articled clerks and the CA syllabus) does not give us any exposure to or training in management skills. Almost all our general management skills are self-taught and acquired from experience and reading. And HR management hardly ever comes on to our management radars.

6. I cant afford  it:  We  have  a feeling  that  ‘this probably costs a lot of money’ and in any case ‘is nice to have, but is not really essential for my practice’.

Busting the challenges:

The economic, social and professional environment has changed dramatically. Survival and success in the profession therefore demands that we look at managing our practices in a more business-like manner, managing all aspects of the practice (of which the technical or delivery aspect is only one) competently.

Given the benefits that good HR management can bring, spending time on this is an investment and not a cost. Initially, it does need extra effort (as any change does) but once set up properly, it is by and large ‘maintenance-free’.

How formal your HR management is will essentially be determined by the size of the practice and your own management style. What is important however, is to have the ‘HR mindset’ and to keep HR management firmly in the radar of practice management.

HR management (like all management) is essentially common sense and does not necessarily require formal training. Certainly, knowledge of basic HR functions would be a big help but is not a pre-requisite to get started.

Very importantly, none of this costs large sums of money. Like we said earlier, it will require an investment – of your time, mind space and common sense.

Ok, now  where do we go from  here?

Once we recognise the reality of the ‘people challenge’ and have dealt with our reasons for ‘Not Doing It’, we are ready to face the task at hand.

Getting started is a four-step process. Here are some questions to get you started:

1. Do I feel the need for HRM  in my practice?  This will test your  need  and its intensity.

2. Do I really want to implement HRM ? This will be your statement of resolution.

3. Why do I want to implement HRM ? This will test your clarity of purpose and also help to identify the ‘pay-offs’ that you expect.

4. Which elements of HRM should I implement? This will depend on the specific needs of your organisation. Your answer to 3 above will give you pointers to identify this. The section ‘Essential Elements of HRM’ above will also help to set this agenda.

5. How do I do it ? Once your reasons for implementing HRM are clear and you have set the agenda, it will then boil down to the actual implementation. The following tips may be useful:

a) Keep it simple. Don’t make a grand design. Don’t aim for the most ideal HRM practices. Do what you believe is right for you and your organisation.

b) Prioritise. Take small steps. Don’t take on too much at one time. Take what matters most first and implement it. Let it start working. Then move on to the next items.

c) Be disciplined. Once you have taken the plunge, stick to the task. Your efforts will take some time to show results, but they will. Have patience … and faith!

End Note:

Adopt HR management practices. They are simple. They are common-sense. Don’t think your practice is too small for it. Don’t be intimidated by the jargon. What is important is that YJU genuinely care for your people and that you have sincerity of purpose and discipline.

You are bound to reap the obvious benefits discussed earlier in this article. But more than that, you will experience the joy of watching people develop and grow, not by accident, but systematically and by design!

Whether Rectification Order can be passed beyond the time limit of four years ?

Closements

1.1 Under the Income-tax Act (the Act), various provisions
are made for rectification of orders passed. S. 254(2) provides for
rectification of orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals (Tribunal).
It is provided that the Tribunal may amend its order at any time within a period
of four years from the date of the order with a view to rectifying any mistake
apparent from the report and the Tribunal shall make such amendment if the
mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or Assessing Officer.
Accordingly, S. 254(2) enables the Tribunal to rectify its own order suo moto
or when the mistake is brought to its notice by the concerned party.


1.2 The time limit for rectifying the orders u/s. 254(2) is
four years from the date of the order. In the past, the issue had come up as to
whether the Tribunal is empowered to pass rectification order even after the
expiry of the time limit of four years, in a case where the application for the
requisite rectification is made within the specified time limit of four years.
The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals
Limited (256 ITR 767) had taken a view that if the assessee has moved the
application within the specified period of four years, the Tribunal is bound to
decide the application on merit and not on the ground of limitation, and
accordingly held that the Tribunal can pass such rectification orders even after
the expiry of the specified period of four years, if the application is moved
within the specified period of four years. However, the Madras High Court had
dissented from this view.

1.3 In view of the above-referred conflicting judgments of
the High Court, the issue was under debate as to whether the Tribunal can pass
the rectification order u/s.254(2) after the specific period of four years in a
case where the application for rectification is made within the specified period
of four years.

1.4 S. 154(7) also provides for time limit of four years from
the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be amended was
passed. This enables the Income-tax authorities to rectify their orders within
the specified time limit. S. 154(8) also provides that the Income-tax
authorities shall pass such order of rectification within six months from the
end of the month in which the application is received by it. According to the
Courts, this time limit of six months is within the overall period of time limit
of four years.

1.5 Recently the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
issue referred to in para 1.3 above in the case of Sree Ayyanar Spinning &
Weaving Mills Limited, and the issue is now resolved. Hence, considering the
importance of the issue in day-to-day practice, it is thought fit to consider
the same in this column.


CIT v. Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited,
296 ITR 53 (Mad.) :

2.1 In the above case, an assessment was completed for the
A.Y. 1989-90 assessing income u/s. 115J. There was some dispute with regard to
the working of Book Profit on the issue of the adjustment of earlier years’
depreciation on account of change in the method of depreciation made by the
assessee in the relevant previous year. The order was confirmed by the First
Appellate authority and the matter came up before the Tribunal. It was remanded
back to the Assessing Officer with certain directions. Again the same order was
passed by the Assessing Officer and the same was also confirmed by the First
Appellate authority. In this second round of appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the
order of the Assessing Officer and took the view that the depreciation relating
to the earlier years should not be adjusted while computing the Book Profits. If
such an adjustment is made, the profit and loss account of the year in question
would not reflect the correct picture. It seems that this order was passed by
the Tribunal on 9-12-1996.

2.2 On 2-8-2000, the assessee moved miscellaneous application
for rectification of above order of the Tribunal u/s.254(2) and raised certain
points therein. Although at the time of making such application, a judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (255 ITR 273) was not
available, relying on the said judgment, the Tribunal finally passed the
rectification order dated 31-1-2003, recalling its earlier order and
subsequently, the consequential order was passed on 12-6-2003. In substance, it
appears that the Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee in the rectification
proceedings relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Apollo
Tyres Limited (supra).

2.3 On the above facts, the rectification order passed by the
Tribunal was questioned by the Revenue before the Madras High Court. On behalf
of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the Tribunal was not
justified in passing the rectification order u/s.254(2) after the expiry of
specified period of four years, though the application for such rectification
was moved by the assessee within the specified period of four years; S. 254(2)
specifies the time limit for passing such an order and hence such order cannot
be passed beyond that specified period. The assessee further contended that in
the case of Income-tax authorities, the rectification of mistake is governed by
S. 154 and even though S. 154(8) provides that the rectification order shall be
passed within the specified period of six months, the same shall be read into
the total period of four years provided in S. 154(7). The statute provides the
specific outer time limit and it may not be proper for the Court to go beyond
the same.

2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia,
contended that the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on merit and not
on the ground of limitation once the application is made within the specified
time limit of four years. For this, reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited
(supra). It was further contended that Circular No. 68, dated 17-11-1971
provides that a mistake arising as a result of subsequent interpretation of law
by the Supreme Court would constitute a mistake apparent from the record and
hence, the Tribunal was justified in relying on the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (supra), though the said judgment was
not available at the time of passing the original order when the application for
rectification was moved.

2.5 After considering the arguments of both the sides and after referring to the provisions dealing with rectification contained in S. 254 as well as S. 154, the Court took the view that the authority is barred from passing the order of rectification be-yond the period of four years specified in S. 154(7) and likewise the Tribunal also should pass the order of rectification u/ s.254(2) only within the specified period of four years. The Court also did not agree with the view of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (supra).

2.6 While deciding the issue in favour of the Rev-enue, the Court finally held as under (page 62) :

“…. it cannot be construed that the power of the Appellate Tribunal to rectify the mistake could be extended indefinitely beyond four years, which time is specifically spelled out by the Legislature in S. 254(2) itself for passing an order of rectification, either suo motu by the Tribunal or on application either by the assessee or by the Assess-ing Officer. The mere usage of ‘and’ between two limbs of S. 254(2) will not, in any way, enlarge the limitation prescribed for passing the order of amendment u/ s.254(2) of the Act. Consequently, any order of amendment that would be passed by the Appellate Tribunal beyond the period of four ( years would lack jurisdiction, assuming the Ap-pellate Tribunal has got a right to pass an order of rectification to rectify the mistake in the light of the subsequent interpretation of law by any Court, as per Circular No. 68, dated November 17, 1971 [see (1972) 83 ITR (ST.) 6]. Therefore, it follows that in any case of rectification, the Income-tax authorities and the Appellate Tribunal are within their power and jurisdiction to amend their respective orders u/ s.154 and u/ s.254, respectively, in the light of subsequent interpretation of law by the Courts, but such power and jurisdiction could be exercised statutorily only . within the time of four years, not beyond the period of four years.”

CIT v. Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Limited, 301 ITR 434 (SC) :

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Madras High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court, wherein the only issue to be considered was whether the Tribunal can pass the order of rectification u/ s.254(2) beyond the specific period of four years when the application for such rectification is moved within the specified period of four years. To consider the issue, the Court noted the relevant facts and the issues raised before the High Court and the grounds on which the Tribunal had passed the order u/s.254(2). The Court also noted that in the appeal before it, the Court is not concerned with the merits of the case, i.e., reworking of computation made by the Assessing Officer. The Court also heard both the parties, wherein on behalf of the Revenue it was contended that on the facts of the c.aseof the assessee, the judgment of the Apex Court In the case of Apollo Tyres Limited (supra) was not applicable. However, the Court stated that though we have referred to the submissions of both the sides on merits, in this case, we are only conerned with the interpretation of S. 254(2) regarding the powers of the Tribunal in the matter of rectification of mistake apparent from the record.

3.2 Having clarified the issue under  consideration the Court noted  the controversy raised  on account of the rectification order  passed by the Tribunal  in response to miscellaneous applications dated 2-8-2000 filed by the assessee  and  the order  of the Tribunal dated 31-1-2003 recalling its order dated 9-12-1996. The Court also noted the conclusion of the High Court and also the fact that the High Court did not go into the merits of the case.

3.3  The Court then referred  to the provisions of S. 254(2) and  observed as under (page  432) :

“Analysing the above provisions, we are of the view that S. 254(2) is in two parts. Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it U / ss.(l). Under the second part of S. 254(2), the reference is to the amendment of the order passed by the Tribunal U/ss.(l) when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in short, the first part of S. 254(2) refers to the suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by the Tribunal, whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the asseSSee pointing out the mistake apparent from the record. In this case, we are concerned with the second part of S. 254(2). As stated above, the application for rectification was made within four years. The application was well within four years. It is the Tribunal which took its own time to dispose of the application. Therefore, in the circumstances, the High Court had erred in holding that the application could not have been entertained by the Tribunal beyond four years.”

3.4 The Court then referred to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (supra), relied on by the counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee and noted the view of the Rajasthan High Court as appearing in the head notes of the said judgment as under (page 438) :

“Once the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of appeal, the Tribunal cannot reject that application on the ground that four years have lapsed, which includes the period of pendency of the application before the Tribunal. If the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of the order, the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on the merits and not on the ground of limitation. S. 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, lays down that the Appellate Tribunal may at any time within four years from the date of the order rectify the mistake apparent from the record, but that does not mean that if the application is moved within the period allowed, i.e., four years, and remains pending before the Tribunal, after the expiry of four years the Tribunal can reject the application on the ground of limitation.”

3.5 Having considered the above-referred view of the Rajasthan High Court, the Court decided the is-sue in favour of the assessee and held as under (page 438) :

“We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshwardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited (2002) 256 ITR 767.

For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore T.e. (A) No. 2/2004 on the file of the Madras High Court for fresh decision on the merits of the matter as indicated here in above. All contentions on the merits are expressly kept open. We express no opinion on the merits of the case whether rectification application was at all maintainable or not and whether the judgment in the case of Apollo Tyres (2002) 255 ITR 273 was or was not applicable to the facts of this case. That question will have to be gone into by the High Court in the above T.e. (A) No. 2/2004.”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, now it is clear that once the application for rectification is moved within the specific period of four years, the Tribunal can pass order u/ s.254(2) even if such a period has expired.

4.2 The above position will also equally apply for passing rectification order u/s.154 by the Income-tax authorities. Therefore, once such a period is expired, it would not be correct for the Income-tax authorities to take a view that it has no power to pass the rectification order u/s.154, even if the application is made within the specified period of limitation.

4.3 So far as the powers of the Income-tax authorities to rectify their order are concerned, there is also time limit of six months provided in S. 154(8). In many cases, this time limit is not observed by the authorities. Even in such cases, it would not be correct for the Income-tax authorities to later on take a stand that since specified mandatory time limit of six months has expired, they have no power to pass the requisite rectification order. With the above judgment of the Apex Court, in our view, even this position becomes clear.

4.4 Interestingly, there is also time limit for passing order for refusing or granting registration to charitable trusts, etc. u/s.12AA, wherein it is provided that every order of granting or refusing the registration under the said provision shall be passed before the expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the relevant application is received – [Refer S. 12AA (2)]. In the context of these provisions, the Special Bench of the Tribunal (Delhi) in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust [(2007) 17 SOT 281] has taken a view that if such an order u/s.12AA(2) is not passed within the specified period of six months, registration shall be deemed to have been granted.

Liability of Partners of Limited Liability Partnerships — is it Limited ?

Article

1. The Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (‘the LLP
Act’) was brought into force with effect from 31st March 2009 to permit
formation of Limited Liability Partnerships (‘LLPs’) in India. The main focus of
the LLP Act is to permit a partnership structure and at the same time, limit the
liability of partners which was heretofore unlimited under the provisions of the
Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (‘the Partnership Act’). This article discusses
briefly the limitation of liability of partners under the LLP Act as compared to
the limitation of liability of a shareholder of a limited company formed and
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Companies Act’) and the manner in
which such liabilities are limited under the LLP Act.

2. A company formed and registered under the Companies Act is
a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders and directors. The extent
to which the liability of shareholders of a limited company, formed and
registered under the Companies Act, towards the debts of such a company is
limited, is contained in the Memorandum of Association thereof. Accordingly, if
a company is limited by shares, a shareholder is not required to make any
contributions for the satisfaction of the debts of the company of any amount
over and above the amounts remaining due and payable on the shares held by him.
Such amount may be called up by the board of directors of the company in the
course of the day-to-day operations of the company or in the event of winding up
thereof, as the case may be. Where a company is limited by guarantee, a
shareholder is, upon a winding-up thereof, required to contribute the amounts
specified in the Memorandum of Association thereof for satisfaction of the debts
of such a company limited by guarantee. S. 426 of the Companies Act clearly sets
out the aforesaid position.

3. We now examine the provisions of the LLP Act in relation
to limitation of liability of the partners of an LLP. The LLP Act does not
specifically provide the manner in which liabilities of the partner would be
limited. However, the same can be deduced from several provisions of the LLP Act
as set out hereinafter.

4. S. 3 of the LLP Act, inter alia, provides that an
LLP is a body corporate separate from its partners, unlike a partnership firm
constituted under the Partnership Act, which has no separate legal existence. S.
4 of the LLP Act, inter alia, provides that the provisions of the
Partnership Act would not apply to an LLP. Ss.(3) and (4) of S. 27 of the LLP
Act, inter alia, provide that an obligation of the LLP whether arising
out of contract or otherwise is solely the obligation of such LLP and the
liabilities of such LLP are to be met out of the property of the LLP. Ss.(1) of
S. 28 of the LLP Act provides that a partner is not personally liable for any
obligation of an LLP solely by reason of being a partner thereof. Ss.(2) of the
said S. 28, inter alia, provides that such partner would be personally
liable for wrongful acts or omissions committed by him, but not those committed
by any other partner of the LLP. Therefore, in terms of the aforesaid provisions
of the LLP Act, a partner of an LLP is not personally liable for the obligations
of such LLP, except those arising as a result of his own wrongful acts or
omissions.

5. However, unlike the Companies Act, the aforesaid
provisions do not specifically indicate the circumstances and extent to which
any partner would be required to make contributions to the LLP. The provisions
in relation to such contributions are contained in S. 32 and S. 33 of the LLP
Act.

6. Ss.(1) of S. 32 of the LLP Act, inter alia,
provides that a partner may make contributions to the LLP in the form of
tangible or intangible property, money, promissory notes and the like. Ss.(2) of
S. 32 of the LLP Act, inter alia, provides that the monetary value of the
contribution of each partner is required to be accounted for and disclosed in
the manner prescribed. Rule 23 (1) of the Limited Liability Partnership Rules,
2009 (‘the Rules’), inter alia, provides that the contribution of such
partner is required to be accounted for and disclosed in the accounts of the LLP
along with the nature of contribution and amounts.

7. Ss.(1) of S. 33 of the LLP Act, inter alia,
provides that the obligation of a partner to contribute money or other property
or to perform services for an LLP is governed by the provisions of the limited
liability partnership agreement (‘the LLP Agreement’) executed between the
partners. The said provisions are broad enough to enable contractual
restrictions to be placed on the obligation of a partner to make contributions,
whether on incorporation of the LLP or dissolution thereof or at any time during
the continuance thereof. Therefore, generally speaking the LLP Agreement may
provide that a particular partner is required to contribute certain amounts upon
execution of the LLP Agreement or in the usual course of its business or for
that matter perform services in the course of the business of the LLP, but is
not required to contribute any amounts upon the winding-up thereof. The LLP
Agreement may also provide that a partner is bound to contribute certain sum
only upon winding-up thereof and not otherwise. The aforesaid clauses could, in
ordinary circumstances, be regarded as sufficient to restrict the liability of a
partner.

8. However, the LLP Act does not itself provide for the
circumstances in which the obligations of the LLP can be enforced against the
partners thereof and we need to consider as to whether provisions such as the
aforesaid are sufficient to protect the interests of a partner of the LLP
against any personal liabilities. We therefore examine the provisions of the LLP
Act which define the circumstances in which an obligation of a partner under the
LLP Agreement can be enforced.

9. It is obvious that an obligation in the LLP Agreement can be enforced against a partner by other partners being parties thereto. In addition thereto, Ss.(2) of S. 33 of the LLP Act, inter alia, provides that a creditor of the LLP which extends credit to or acts on an obligation described in the LLP Agreement may enforce the original obligation against such partner. The said Ss.(2) of S. 33 does not restrict the aforesaid right of the creditor to a circumstance in which the LLP is ordered to be wound-up, but appears to extend such right to the creditor in all circumstances. Therefore, an obligation of a partner to contribute any sum to the LLP can be enforced by a third party against such partner at any point of time and is not limited to the event of winding-up as in case of a company formed and registered under the Companies Act. Similarly, in case a partner has agreed to contribute any service to the customer or clients of the LLP, such an obligation may be enforced by the customer or client of the LLP against the particular partner of the LLP. Ss.(4) of S. 24 of the LLP Act in fact provides that the liability of a partner of the LLP to such LLP or its other partners or to third parties would not cease merely by virtue of his ceasing to be a partner of the LLP. Also, questions may arise as regards the contribution made by a partner at the time of setting-up of the LLP, which contributions are eventually refunded to the partner on account of profits made by the LLP. In such a case, it is necessary to consider as to whether the partner would be obliged to once again bring in such contributions in future, which have been refunded upon the LLP having made profits. All these aspects would have to be taken into account while drafting the LLP Agreement which may differ on a case-to-case basis.

10. To summarise the issue, the LLP Act is a very complicated piece of legislation. The LLP Agreement may need to take care of a large number of issues for protection of its members. Moreover, unlike companies formed and registered under the Companies Act, the LLP Act and the Rules do not prescribe the manner in which the liability of a partner of an LLP is limited. It is’ advisable and essential therefore that the LLP Agreement is carefully drafted by an experienced person so that the same contains all necessary provisions as per the LLP Act, so as to ensure that the liability of a partner thereof to make contributions to an LLP does not extend be-yond what is envisaged and the LLP remains as such in law and in spirit.

Section 92C, the Act – Since the Taxpayer had paid royalty fully and exclusively in course of business and even after paying the same, had earned gross profit at rate better than that earned by comparables, royalty payment was at arm’s length and addition was to be deleted.

22. [2017] 83 taxmann.com 165 (Delhi – Trib.) DCIT vs. Cornell Overseas (P.) Ltd. A.Y. 2003-04, Date of Order: 2nd May, 2017

Section 92C, the Act – Since the Taxpayer had paid royalty fully and exclusively in course of business and even after paying the same, had earned gross profit at rate better than that earned by comparables, royalty payment was at arm’s length and addition was to be deleted.

FACTS
The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of designer garments. During the relevant year, the Taxpayer entered into an agreement with its AE in USA for licensing designs from the AE. Under the agreement, the AE was to supply designs, provide technical know-how, permit use of logo, provide guidelines and expertise through visits of its personnel and access to the market. In consideration, the Taxpayer paid royalty @ 5% of sales of products.

The Taxpayer benchmarked its major international transaction of sale of garments on cost plus method. It earned gross profit of 19% whereas the comparables had earned between 12% to 16%. The Taxpayer considered that the transaction was at ALP since it had earned better net margins as compared to the comparables.

TPO disallowed royalty on the ground that the Taxpayer was a limited risk contract manufacturer. He thus held that payment of royalty did not conform to arm’s length principle. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that the royalty payment was included in the sale price of garments to its AE. Hence, it was automatically benchmarked. Further, since royalty and export transactions were clubbed to arrive at the gross profit margin, which was higher than the comparables, automatically each of the transactions was to be treated as being carried on at ALP.

HELD

  • The royalty paid by the Taxpayer was fully and exclusively incurred in the regular course of business. Even after paying royalty, the Taxpayer earned gross profit @19% which was better than GP of 12% to 16% in case of comparables.

  • Therefore, royalty payment was at arm’s length. The addition made by the AO was not justified and was rightly deleted by CIT(A).

Windows 7

Computer Interface

This write-up is about Windows 7 operating system and the
objective is to highlight the pros and cons about the new operating system.
Generally users in their zeal to keep up with the latest technological
developments, rarely look ahead before leaping towards the unknown and
thereafter blaming others for their folly. This article has been written keeping
such average user in mind and for the record I consider myself to be an average
user too.

Once upon a time there was an operating system called Windows
95 which dominated most of the tech-world/desktop PCs. Windows 95’s dominance
continued when its new avatar i.e., Windows 98 took over. And then there
were others (Windows CE, Windows ME & Windows NT—CE ME NT?????), but none like
Windows XP. Windows XP was a wonderful desktop operating system and it ruled
over desktops for a very long time. Even today after it has (officially) passed
on the reins to Vista, Windows XP continues to overshadow its predecessors as
well as its successor. This is true because many buyers still ask for XP instead
of Vista. As a matter of fact many even sought to uninstall the preloaded
version of Vista in favour of XP. However, with newer applications and
technology being developed every day one needs to move on. With XP being more
popular than Vista and people preferring to downgrade from Vista to XP, what did
Microsoft do ? ? Did it infuse better code in Vista ? Was XP resurrected from
the dead?? . . . . on the contrary it announced the launch of Windows 7.

Microsoft has announced that the launch will be in the last
week of October 2009. In fact, Microsoft has already begun dishing out trial
versions to users in order to get a feedback and plug any bugs. The reactions of
the users however, have been guarded.

While other operating systems came and went, sometimes in the
blink of an eye, yet there were others like Windows XP which stayed firm. But
the question that begs to be answered is WHY ? ? ? An industry expert points out
that what many neglected to figure out was that Vista needed a different machine
and hardware to function properly at its optimum, not an XP designed machine.
It’s like when Bill Gates announced the launch of Windows 98, he said it was
faster than Windows 95 and better to use. What he failed to mention was that it
needed a different machine to work on and not the old machine itself. Oops, a
minor detail ! ! !.


Another fact about Windows Vista is that it gave
dedicated Windows users a tough time. For instance Vista takes up hogged
gigabytes of space, users had to interact with the machine saying ‘yes’ (as
someone put it) a million times before it starts to even contemplate copying a
small file from one place to another.

So what did Microsoft learn from all this (and after a couple
of million dollars down the drain) . . . looks like very little because (once
again) . . . they have forgotten to mention that e-mail, address book, calendar,
photo management, movie editing and instant messaging won’t be available with
Windows 7. These have to be downloaded from Microsoft’s website. What’s more, in
some cases, additional requirements are needed. For instance, the Windows XP
Mode requires an additional 1 GB of RAM, an additional 15 GB of available hard
disk space, and a processor capable of hardware virtualisation with Intel VT or
AMD-V enabled. OOPPSS ! !

There are news reports stating that while designing Windows
7, users were asked, if it were up to them, how would they make XP better ? What
would they want from a new OS ? The feedback was anything that combines
simplicity, sleek design, ease of operation and interactivity sits pretty much
at the top of a ‘to own’ list. The result ? Windows 7. In fact, the marketing
hype from Microsoft says, “To create the next generation OS, which would make
everyday tasks faster and easier and make new things possible, Windows 7
simplifies things with a more streamlined design and one-click access to
applications and files. It has a faster boot-up and shut-down time and comes
bundled with improvements in terms of reliability, battery life and fewer
alerts.” What’s more, Windows 7 promises not only to be faster but in fact
intuitive. Features like multi-touch, JumpLists and HomeGroup have been built in
to enable consumers to interact with their PCs in faster and more intuitive
ways. Enhancements to the Windows taskbar, JumpLists and search are designed to
make navigation much easier. Also, InPrivate browsing in IE 8 prevents browsing
history, temporary Internet files, form data, cookies and usernames and
passwords from being retained by the browser. Controlling the computer by
touching a touch-enabled screen or monitor is another core Windows 7 user
experience.

But the fact is that these features were always available in
MAC OS. For those who’ve used Apple’s systems, it’s easy to see what has been
borrowed. The taskbar looks and works like the Mac OS X’s Doc :
big square icons of your favourite programs. Other Apple borrowings include the
sticky notes programe, multi-touch gestures like rotating an image by twisting
your fingers and pinch to zoom. Aero Shake allows you to get all but one window
out of the way. One needs to grab the top of that window, shake it and all the
other open windows minimise to the taskbar. Shake the window again, and they all
pop back on screen.

Didn’t we see something similar in Vista as well —it was felt
nice initially, but then eventually I used to turn it off because the feature
would either slow down the PC or would result in disrupting other programs.
Whats the point of an enhancement which cannot balance user experience with
costs and performance degradation issues.

Another feature in Windows 7 is Snap. With Snap, one can
simply grab a window and pull it to either side edge of the screen to fill half
of the screen. If one wants to quickly see gadgets or grab a file from the
desktop, all one needs to do is move the mouse to the lower right corner of the
desktop. Peek makes all the windows transparent and one can view the desktop.
Windows Flip is a feature similar to Mac OS X’s Expose. The rate at which
they are borrowing the feature
may be… one may want to wait for the Snow
Leopard (new OS announced by Apple) before switching to Windows 7.


There is also the issue of cost of the software. The cost remains unclear, though initial reports had indicated that the estimated prices for the full Windows 7 package in the US for the premium, professional and ultimate versions would be $ 199.99, $ 299.99 and $ 399.99, respectively. The hype however says that “Firstly, the price for the retail versions of Windows 7 Home Premium and Windows 7 Professional will reduce in the range of 15-25%. Secondly, India pricing for these two versions is lower by 25-40% in comparison with developed markets like the US. Pricing for other retail versions of Windows 7 remains the same as Windows Vista.” Of course this does not include the additional requirements in terms of RAM/CPU, etc. It’s still a wait and watch for me.

After all the cribbing readers may wonder whether its worth the upgrade … maybe … maybe not. Wait for the next write-up before you leap.

Cheers! ! .

This article is merely an attempt to give the readers a bird’s-eye view of the reactions. This article is not intended to be either an endorsement or critique of any particular software or feature.

‘Urban Land’ Under Wealth Tax Act

Controversies

1.
Issue for consideration :


1.1 Wealth tax is chargeable
on the assets specified in S. 2(ea) of the Wealth-tax Act. One of such assets is
an ‘urban land’, which has been defined in Explanation 1(b) of the said Section.
The definition reads as under :


” ‘Urban land’ means land
situate :



(i) in any area which is
comprised within the jurisdiction of a municipality (whether known as a
municipality, municipal corporation, notified area committee, town area
committee, town committee or by any other name) or a cantonment board and
which has a population of not less than ten thousand according to the last
preceding census of which relevant figures have been published before the
valuation date; or

(ii) in any area within
such distance, not being more than eight kilometres from the local limits of
the municipality or cantonment board referred to in sub-clause (i) as the
Central Government may, having regard to the extent of, and scope for,
urbanisation of that area and other relevant considerations, specify in this
behalf by Notification in the Official Gazette,

but does not include land
on which construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the
time being in force in the area in which such land is situated or the land
occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the
appropriate authority or any unused land held by the assessee for industrial
purposes for a period of two years from the date of its acquisition by him or
any land by the assessee as stock-in-trade for a period of ten years from the
date of its acquisition by him.”

1.2 One of the exceptions
contained in the said definition excludes an urban land occupied by any building
which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority or an
unused land held by the assessee for industrial purposes for a period of two
years from the sate of its acquisition.

1.3 We intend to examine
here, the liability to wealth tax in a case where the work for construction of
an industrial building has begun in pursuance of the approval by appropriate
authority, but is not completed within the period of two years or a case where
work for construction of a residential building has begun in pursuance of the
approval by appropriate authority, but is not completed. The case of the
taxpayers for exemption from levy of the wealth tax rests on the contention that
once the work of construction of a building has commenced, the structure even
though incomplete should be recognised as ‘building’ nonetheless, and in the
alternative a land on which the work of constructing a building is in progress,
ceases to be a ‘land’. It is argued that since the building is being
constructed, the same is exempt for the purpose of wealth tax in terms of the
meaning to be given to urban land more importantly on account of the objective
behind the levy of tax. The Revenue, on the other side is of the view that such
a land on which the building is under construction continues to be a land and
therefore liable to wealth tax. The conflicting decisions, available on the
subject, of the High Court highlight the importance of the issue that requires
consideration. The Karnataka and the Gujarat High Courts are of the view that
the land under discussion is liable to wealth tax, while the Kerala and Punjab &
Haryana High Courts hold that no wealth tax is chargeable once the work of
construction has begun.

2.
Giridhar G. Yadalam’s case, 325 ITR 223 (Karn.) :


2.1 Recently the Karnataka
High Court examined this issue in the case of CWT v. Girdhar G. Yadlam.
The assessee in that case was assessed in the status of a Hindu undivided family
and the assessment year in question was 2000-01. The assessee owned a plot of
land which was given to a developer for construction of residential flats in the
year 1995-96, so however the ownership of the same was retained by him as
contended by him in the income-tax proceedings. The assessee had claimed, in the
income-tax proceedings, that it had retained ownership of the land until flats
were fully constructed and possession of the assessee’s share was handed over.
It had contended that the development agreement constituted only permissive
possession for the limited purpose of construction of flats. The assessee
contended that it continued to be the owner of the land till the flats were
sold. A notice u/s.17 of the Wealth-tax Act was issued to the assessee for
bringing to tax the said land under development. On due consideration of the
facts, the Assessing Officer treated the said land as an urban land and brought
it to tax. An appeal was filed against such an order was allowed by the CWT
(Appeals) whose order was confirmed by the Tribunal following its decision in
WTA Nos. 4-5/Bang./2003, dated March 22, 2004.

2.2 Aggrieved by the order
of the Tribunal the Revenue filed an appeal before the Karnataka High Court
raising the following questions of law :


(a) Whether the Tribunal
was correct in holding that the value of properties held by the assessee at
Adugodi and Koramangala is not chargeable to wealth tax, as the same are not
urban land but land with superstructure and cannot form part of the wealth
as defined u/s.2(ea) of the Act ?

(b) Whether the
properties of the assessee cannot be brought to wealth tax assessment ?


2.3 The High Court on appreciation of the opposing contention observed that what was excluded was the land occupied by any building which had been constructed; admittedly, in the case on hand, the building was not fully constructed, but was in the process of construction and hence could not be understood as a building which had been constructed. It held that the Courts had to interpret any definition in a reasonable manner for the purpose of fulfilling the object of the Act and the Courts. It held that the term ‘constructed’ had its own meaning and would mean ‘fully constructed’ as understood in the common parlance.

2.4 The Court further observed that the Tribunal had chosen to blindly follow its earlier order, without noticing the intention of the Legislature and the specific wording in the Section and neither the owner nor the builder nor the occupant would pay any tax to the Government in terms of the Wealth-tax Act, if the order of the Tribunal was accepted. The ‘land occupied by any building which has been constructed’, should be interpreted in a manner that would fulfil the intention of the Legislature.

2.5 The Court did not approve the theory of openness of the land for the purpose of taxation accepted by the Tribunal as in its opinion the Tribunal had failed to notice the principle that each word in taxing status had its own significance for the purpose of taxation. The Court observed that the words ‘land on which the building is constructed’ had not been properly appreciated/ considered by the Tribunal.

2.6 The Court further observed that the interpretation of any word would depend upon the wording in a particular context and the object of the Act as understood in law and therefore, was not prepared to blindly accept the meaning given to the term ‘building’ in the Law Lexicon. That the use of the words ‘building constructed’ in the Act made all the difference for the purpose of interpretation.

2.7 The Court took note of its own judgment in the case of Vysya Bank Ltd. v. DCWT, 299 ITR 335 (Karn.) to buttress its findings in favour of the Revenue. It also distinguished the judgment of the Orissa High Court in CWT v. K. B. Pradhan, 130 ITR 393 (Orissa) which examined the meaning of the term ‘house’ for the propose of the Wealth-tax Act as in the said case, the Court was considering only the word ‘house’ and not ‘building constructed’ as in the case before it.

2.9 The Court further observed that it could not forget that the Parliament in its wisdom had chosen to provide an exemption only under certain circumstances which could not be extended without any legal compulsion in terms of the Act. The Court finally held that a land on which completed building stood, such land alone would qualify for exemption. The Court accordingly accepted the appeal of the Revenue.

    Apollo Tyres Ltd.’s case, 325 ITR 528 (Ker.):
3.1 The Kerala High Court was appraised of the same issue in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CWT, 325 ITR 528 (Ker.). In that case, the assessee, a public limited company was engaged in production and sale of automotive tyres. It was allotted a plot in Gurgaon on December 29, 1995 on which it commenced construction of a commercial building in November, 1997, and completed construction of a four-storeyed building with basement and started occupying it from March 29, 2000. After completion of the construction of the building, the land and building were granted exemption from wealth tax as the said assets fell under the exempted category. However, in the course of assessment for the A.Y. 1998-99, the Wealth-tax Officer assessed the value of the land treating it as urban land u/s.2(ea) rejecting the assessee’s contention that construction of building was in progress on the valuation date, that is, March 31, 1998, and as such the land could not be treated as urban land under Explanation 1(b) to S. 2(ea) of the Act. The first Appellate Authority upheld the claim of exemption of the assessee, but the Tribunal on appeal by the Department, reversed the order of the first Appellate Authority and upheld the assessment order by relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CWT v. Giridhar G. Yadalam (supra).

3.2 The appellant company submitted that the exemption ceased to be available only where, after two years of acquisition, the land was continuously kept vacant without utilising it for construction of building for industrial or commercial purposes. It was highlighted that the assessee had started construction of a commercial building as on the valuation date and in the course of two years and thereafter the assessee had completed the construction of the building and had started using the building which was no longer assessed by the Wealth-tax Officer as the building qualified for exemption. It contended that commencement of construction of the building on the urban land itself was use of the building for industrial purpose.

3.3 The Revenue on the other hand contended that the intention of the Legislature in limiting the exemption for vacant land up to two years was only to ensure that if the assessee wanted to get exemption beyond two years, the assessee should have completed construction of the building in the course of two years and used the building for industrial purposes. It further contended that unless the building was constructed and put to use for industrial purpose, before the year end, the land could not be said to have been used for industrial purpose. In other words, the value of urban land could be assessed to wealth tax until completion of construction of the building and until commencement of use of such building for commercial or industrial purpose.

3.4 The Kerala High Court held that the urban land that was subjected to tax under the definition of ‘asset’ generally covered vacant land, only. It noted the fact that under the exception clause ‘the land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority’ was exempt from the purview of tax which according to the Court clarified that when an urban land was utilised for construction of a building with the approval of the prescribed authority, then the land ceased to be identifiable as urban land; that the section contemplated for taxing such a land on which an illegal construction was made without approval by the appropriate authority and that it was only in such a case that such land would still be treated as urban land, no matter building was constructed thereon; that however, if a building was constructed with the approval of the prescribed authority, then such land went out of the meaning of ‘urban land’.

3.5 The question according to the Kerala High Court to be considered was whether during the period of construction of the building, the urban land on which such construction was made could be assessed to wealth tax. In the Court’s view, once the land was utilised for construction purposes, the land ceased to have its identity as vacant land and it could not be independently valued. The Court pertinently noted that the building under construction whose work was in progress was not brought within the definition of ‘asset’ for the purpose of levy of wealth tax. It also noted that there was no dispute that as and when construction of the building was completed, there could be no separate assessment of urban land and the assessment was thereafter only on the value of the building, if it was not exempted from tax. The commercial building constructed by the appellant assessee, the Court noted, fell within the exemption clause as commercial building was not subjected to wealth tax. The commencement of construction in the opinion of the Court amounted to the use of the land for industrial purpose as without construction of the building the land could not be used for the purpose for which it was allotted.

3.6 For removal of doubts the Court noted that part construction and abandoning further construction would not entitle the assessee for exemption, unless the assessee eventually completed construction of the building and used the building for commercial or industrial purpose. As in the case before the Court, the assessee progressively completed construction of a four-storeyed building with basement and started using it within the course of two years from the valuation date, the assessee was entitled to exemption; that the assessee could not be expected to complete the construction of

    four-storeyed massive building in the course of two years which was the period provided in Explanation 1(b) of S. 2(ea). Keeping in mind the exemption available to productive assets, the Court felt that there was no scope for levy of tax during the period of construction of the productive asset, namely, commercial building by utilising the urban land. In other words, once the non-productive asset like urban land was converted to a productive asset like a building which qualified for exemption, then the assessee could start availing of exemption even during of conversion of such non-productive asset to productive asset. The Court confirmed the eligibility of the assessee for claim of exemption for urban land on which they were constructing a commercial building on the valuation date.

    Observations:
4.1 The present scheme of the wealth tax primarily seeks to tax an unproductive asset and leaves un-taxed an asset, which is put to a productive use. This is amply clarified by the Finance Minister’ speech and the memorandum explaining the objects behind the introduction of the new scheme of wealth tax while moving the Finance Bill, 1992. Once an asset is shown to be a not non-productive asset, it ceases to be outside the ambit of the wealth tax. The activity of construction ensures that the land in question is a ‘productive asset’ and no wealth tax can be levied on an asset which is productive.

4.2 A land on being put to construction cannot be termed as an open land and even perhaps a ‘land.’ A land is a surface of the earth and once the surface is covered, it cannot be termed as the land, leave alone the urban land.

4.3 The decision in Giridhar G. Yadalam’s case under comment was discussed by the Kerala High Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT, (supra), and only thereafter the Court did not subscribe to the view that construction should have been completed within two years. The Kerala High Court found that Giridhar Yadalam’s case was inapplicable, where the assessee constructed the building in stages though the full construction took four years.

4.4 The purpose and the objective behind introduction of the provision, brought in with effect from April 1, 1995, should be kept in mind. It was for bringing to tax an unutilised open land that the provision was introduced. Once a land is admitted to be put to use for the purposes of construction, it ceased to be a chargeable land and should not be subjected to tax if the construction of the building is eventually completed and is not used a subterfuge to avoid any tax. While there is no doubt that a land that is put to use for construction within two years, is exempt for two years from tax, for the period thereafter it is no longer a virgin land, so that it is not liable to tax.

4.5 Once land is married to a superstructure, it can no longer be treated as land simpliciter. It is also not a property capable of being occupied for use and be termed as a building. A building under construction is neither vacant land, nor can it be treated as a building prior to completion as is generally understood for municipal tax. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Polychem Limited, AIR 1974 SC 1779 with regard to municipal tax had held that unfinished building would not justify any valuation, since it cannot be treated as a building. The Madras High Court in CWT v. S. Venugopala Konar, 109 ITR 52 has held that only the amount spent on construction would be the value of the property under construction. The Karnataka High Court referred to the decision in State of Bombay v. Sardar Venkat Rao Gujar, AIR 1966 SC 991, where it was held that a building in order for it to be con-sidered as a building should have walls and a room. The Supreme Court in that case had followed the decision in Moir v. Williams, (1892) 1 QB 264.

4.6 The Gujarat High Court, in CWT v. Cadmach Machinery Co. Pvt. Ltd., 295 ITR 307 (Guj.) found that the land on which construction had started would not be treated as building, so that the land value could be included under the law u/s.40(3)(vi) of the Finance Act, 1993 differing from the decision of the Delhi High Court in CWT v. Prem Nath Mo-tors P. Ltd., 238 ITR 414. Recently, in the case of CIT v. Smt. Neena Jain, WTA Nos. 17 to 20, dated 19-2-2010, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has upheld the view that a house under construction is not liable to WT and is not an urban land.

4.7 The Cochin Bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Mathew L. Chakola v. CWT, 9 SOT 617 (Cochin) and Meera Jacob v. WTO, 14 SOT 486 (Cochin), held that once construction activity started on an urban land, the land lost its character of an urban land and was outside purview of definition of the ‘urban land’. Similarly, in Federal Bank Ltd. v. JCIT, 295 ITR (AT) 212 (Cochin), it was held by the Tribunal that once the building was under construction, the land was no longer a vacant land so as to be made liable for wealth tax u/s.2(ea) of the Wealth-tax Act.

4.8 In the said case of Meera Jacob v. WTO, 14 SOT 486 (Cochin), the Tribunal has also upheld the alternative contention of the appellant that once a land was put to construction, it ceased to be an asset liable to wealth tax, as the activity of construction ensured that the land in ques-tion was a ‘productive asset’ and no wealth tax could be levied on an asset which was productive; wealth tax was chargeable only on such assets which were not productive. For supporting this proposition, the Cochin Bench followed its own decision in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. 295 ITR (AT) 212 (Cochin). The Cochin Bench in the said decision also held that once a land was subjected to construction, it ceased to be an open land; it is only an open land that could be treated as a land; a land was a surface of the earth and once the surface was covered, it ceased to be the land, leave alone the urban land.

4.9 It is exempt primarily for the reason that land on which construction is in progress is not an asset u/s.2(ea) as it has not been so listed. A land acquired for industrial use will be exempt for two years after its acquisition provided the construction starts during the third year. Once the construction has begun, as stated, the land ceases to be chargeable to wealth tax, subject to the condition that such construction eventually leads to completion of building. It needs to be appreciated that the exemption given for a land on which construction is in progress is in relaxation of levy of wealth tax on urban land.

4.10 In the case of Vysya Bank Ltd. v. DCWT 299ITR335 (Karnataka) the Bank had entered into an agreement for purchase of property on June 17, 1978 and was put in possession of the property. The Assessing Officer ruled that the assessee had become the owner of the property and was liable to wealth tax. On an appeal by the assessee to the Court, the Karnataka High Court examined the meaning of the terms ‘assets’ and ‘urban land’ and also the judgment of the Apex Court in CWT v. Bishwanath Chatterjee, (1976), 103 ITR 536 and ultimately ruled that the Assessing Authority was not justified in including the vacant land in the net wealth of the assessee for the purpose of computation of wealth as on the valuation date for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act.

4.11 It is relevant to note that there are no rules for valuation of a property under construction. Neither there is a provision which state that such a property should be valued merely as land.

4.12 As noted by the Kerala High Court, the better view is that the decisions of the Karnataka High Court and the Gujarat High Court need review.

Slump sale and S. 50B

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 50B provides for taxation of capital gains arising in
a slump sale. ‘Slump sale’ has been defined by S. 2(42C) to mean transfer of one
or more undertakings as a result of sale for a lump sum consideration without
values being assigned to individual assets and liabilities in such sales other
than for the purposes of payment of stamp duty. An ‘undertaking’ has been
defined vide S. 2(19AA) to include any part or a unit or a division thereof or a
business activity as a whole.

1.2 These provisions are introduced by the Finance Act, 1999
w.e.f. 1-4-2000 to put to rest the serious doubts prevailing for long about the
taxability or otherwise of gains in slump sale of business on a going concern
basis.

1.3 The newly introduced provisions besides providing for the
taxability of such gains provide for the detailed mechanism for determination of
the period of holding and the computation of capital gains.

1.4 The doubts about the taxability of gains in slump sale
for the period up to A.Y. 1999-2000 continue to persist with the views with
equal force persisting. While some Benches of the Tribunal have favoured the
taxability, others have exempted the gains form the ambit of taxation.

1.5 As if the above-referred controversy was in-sufficient, a
new controversy has arisen about the applicability of the newly inserted
provisions to the pending assessments. A recent decision of one of the Benches
of the Tribunal has taken a view conflicting with the prevailing view that the
said provisions were prospective in nature.

2. Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.’s case :


2.1 In the case of ACIT v. Asea Brown Boveri Ltd., 110
TTJ 502 (Mum.), the Tribunal was concerned with the issue as to whether the
transaction in question was a slump sale or an itemised sale. It was also
concerned about the taxability or otherwise of the gains arising on transfer of
a business in a slump sale. Though the Tribunal in this case had held that the
impugned transaction did not amount to slump sale, it was felt necessary to deal
with the issue of taxability of profits or gains if the impugned transaction was
held to be a slump sale without prejudice to the aforesaid finding.

2.2 The Tribunal for the reasons recorded in their order held
that profit arising on slump sale was taxable, as it was possible to compute the
capital gains including the cost of acquisition in some manner and the limited
question before them was about the mode of computation to be adopted for working
out the profits/gains from the slump sale. The Tribunal noted that there were
two provisions which were relevant in this behalf : (i) the provisions of S.
50B, which were specific to the computation of capital in case of slump sales,
and (ii) the general provisions of S. 45, which were applicable in the absence
of special procedure prescribed in S. 50B.

2.3 On applicability of S. 50B, the Revenue submitted that
once the transaction was held to be a slump sale, the taxability of the profits
and gains arising on such sale had to be brought to tax u/s.50B of the IT Act,
as the said S. 50B, being a procedural and computational provision, was
retroactive in its operation and therefore should govern all the pending
proceedings. Against the contentions of the Revenue, the assessee, on the other
hand, contended that S. 50B did not have retrospective operation and hence the
taxability of profits/gains from a slump sale could not be considered u/s.50B
which Section was operative from A.Y. 2000-01, only.

2.4 The Tribunal after taking note of the several
provisions including that of S. 2(42C) and S. 2(19AA) confirmed that S. 50B had
been inserted in the IT Act by the Finance Act, 1999 w.e.f. 1st April 2000 and
was applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2000-01, while the appeal before them related to A.Y.
1997-98 and accordingly the newly inserted provisions were not available on the
statute book for the assessment year under appeal. This fact however did not
deter the Tribunal to apply the said provisions of S. 50B, as in their opinion
the concept of slump sale which hitherto judicially recognised was now been
codified and inserted in the form of clause (42C) in S. 2 of the IT Act; that
what was earlier the judge-made law was now a codified law; the Bombay High
Court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. ITO, 264 ITR 193 held
that the concept of slump sale initially evolved under judge-made law was
subsequently recognised by the Legislature by inserting S. 2(42C); that
insertion of the new provisions was nothing but codification of what was
hitherto judicially recognised and S. 2(42C) was nothing but declaration of the
existing law of slump sale.

2.5 The Tribunal further noted that the Court in the said
case was concerned with the A.Y. 1995-96 when S. 50B was not in existence and
still the Court accepted that profits and gains arising on slump sale were
taxable, which in the opinion of the Tribunal showed that it had always been the
law that profits and gains from slump sale were taxable; the natural corollary
to the said decision was that the provisions of S. 50B(1) declaring that any
profit or gain arising from the slump sale would be chargeable to tax as capital
gains, was merely declaratory of the law as it then existed.

2.6 The Tribunal also proceeded to answer the obvious question as to what was the necessity of en-acting S. 50B when it was merely declaratory of the existing law. The Tribunal observed that the answer to that question lay in the provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 50B, which provided for the mechanism for the computation of cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement. It noted that the absence of any statutory mode of computation of cost of acquisition/improvement, difficulties were being experienced in the computation of capital gains arising from the slump sale, which were resolved by introduction of S. 50B; the heading of S. 50B which read: “Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of slump sale” clarified that S. 50B dealt with computation of capital gains in cases of slump sale; while Ss.(l) of S. 50B declared the existing law and thus put the same beyond the pale of any doubt, Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) thereof merely laid down the machinery for computation of capital gains from slump sale.

2.7 The Tribunal  proceeded to examine whether the computational provisions in S. 50B(2) and (3), enacted to provide simplicity, uniformity and certainty, the three pillars of taxation for the computation of capital gains, were retroactive or not. In order to answer this question, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in CWT v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, 210 ITR 886 (SC), wherein it had been held that machinery provisions, which provide for the machinery for the quantification of the charge, were procedural provisions and therefore would have retroactive operation and apply to all pending proceedings. Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 50B are thus procedural provisions inasmuch as they have been enacted to quantify and thereby simplify the procedure for computation of cost of acquisition/improvement in cases of slump sale. Based on the aforesaid findings, the Tribunal held that the provisions of S. 50B(2) and (3) were machinery provisions and hence would have retroactive operation and apply to all pending matters.

2.8 In deciding the issue the Tribunal also rejected the plea of the assessee that S. 50B could not have retroactive operation as it would mean, by the same logic, that the amendments made in S. 55(2)(a) deeming the cost of acquisition of certain assets to be nil would equally have retroactive operation. The assessee for this contention had relied on CIT v. D.P. Sandu Brothers Chembur (P) Ltd., 273 ITR 1, wherein it was held that the amendments to S. 55(2)(a) -(., deeming the cost of acquisition of a tenancy right to be nil had only prospective effect and not retrospective effect. The aforesaid decision was found to be rendered in the context of the provisions of S. 55(2)(a), which deemed the cost of acquisition of tenancy right to be nil and not in the context of S. 50B(2) and (3) which merely simplified and standardised the procedure for computation of cost of acquisition/improvement in cases of slump sale.

3. Sankheya Chemicals’ case:

3.1 In Sankheya Chemicals Ltd. v. ACIT, 8 SOT 50 (Mum.), the Chemical Division of the assessee-company was sold as a going concern on 1st April, 1990 for a lump sum price of Rs.20 lakhs. The said business consisted of the leasehold rights of the land, factory building, plant and machinery and electrical installation which was transferred to the subsidiary company, along with other assets and liabilities including transfer of raw material and other licences, etc.

3.2 The same Mumbai Tribunal was inter alia asked to consider whether provisions of S. 50B were retroactive in its operation so as to bring within its net the gains of transfer of a business for a slump consideration prior to introduction of S. 50B.

3.3 Taking into consideration the facts of the case in totality, the Tribunal held that no tax was exigible to the gains arising on the transfer of the business undertaking as a going concern by the assessee-company and the gains on such transfer were not includible in the hands of the assessee as income from short-term capital gains by relying on Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. v. DCIT, 90 ITD 344 (Hyd.). The Tribunal also noted that S. SOBof the IT Act was introduced w.e.f. 1st April 2000 and in the facts of the present case, the business undertaking was sold on 1st April 1990, i.e., prior to the introduction of the provisions of S. SOBof the IT Act.

3.4 The Mumbai Tribunal in this case noted with approval the decision of the Hyderabad Bench in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (supra) which held as under:  “……S. 50 and S. SOB are mutually exclusive.  In other  words,  S. 50B is attracted when  there  is a slump  sale and  S. 50 is attracted when  there is an itemised  sale. S. SOBwas not applicable  for the assessment  year  in question,  as it had no retrospective  operation.  So, the position that emerged  was that what  was transferred  by the assessee was the cement  unit as a going  concern  for a lump sum price, and so, the sale in question  was a slump  sale, and so, S. 50 was not attracted,  (para 34)…..  “

Observations:

4.1 With utmost respect for the Bench of the Tribunal delivering the decision in the case of Asea Brown Boveri’s case, it is to be noted that the Tribunal erred in not appreciating the correct ratio of the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. The Court in that case while deciding the appeal in favour of the assessee had nowhere directly or indirectly stated that the provisions of S. SOB were retrospective in its operation. The Coud was only asked to decide whether the transfer in the said case was a slump sale or an itemised sale. This is clear from p. 235 of the said report as under : “In this appeal, we were only required to consider whether the transaction was a slump sale and having come to the conclusion that there was a sale of business as a whole, we have to remand the matter back to the AO to compute the quantum of capital gains. For that purpose, the AO will have to decide the cost of the undertaking for the purposes of the computing capital gains that may arise on transfer. That, the AO will also be required to decide its value u/ s.55 of the IT Act. Further, the AO will be required to decide on what basis indexation should be allowed in computing the capital gains and the quantum thereof. Lastly, the AO,will be required to decide the quantum of depreciation on the block of assets. It may be mentioned that these parameters which we have mentioned are not exhaustive. They are some of the parameters under the Act.” In fact, the Court only directed the authorities to compute gains if that was possible and nothing beyond that. The Court in that case was not concerned with the issue as to whether there at all arose any taxable capital gains on slump sale.

4.2 The Tribunal itself noted with approval that in Premier Automobiles case (supra) the Court had left the issue of working out the cost of acquisition to the AO with the observations, which even the Tribunal found to be quite significant. It further ob-served that “the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the aforesaid case has not excluded the applicability of the parameters prescribed in S. 50B(2) and for computing the cost of acquisition/improvements in cases of slump sale”. This observation makes it clear that the Bombay High Court nowhere confirmed the applicability of the said provisions.

4.3 Thus, contrary to what has been stated by the Tribunal, we do not find that the said decision of the Tribunal was in conformity with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Premier Automobiles case in-asmuch as the issue adjudicated by the Tribunal was never before the High Court in the said case.

4.4 The Supreme Court in Sandu Bros. (supra) was asked to examine whether the provisions of S. 55 providing for adoption of Nil cost in case of tenancy was retrospective and was applicable to assessment years prior to AY. 1995-96. The Supreme Court after analysing the facts and the law held that the said provisions had only prospective application. The issue before the Tribunal in Asea Borwn Boveri’s case was largely similar and the assessee was right in relying on the said decision to support its case that provisions of S. SOBwere not to apply retroactively.

4.5 The Tribunal itself noted that the provisions of S. SO Band Ss.(l) in particular had the effect of removing existing anomaly about the taxation of gains on slump sale. This finding of the Tribunal confirmed that the new provision created a specific charge on such gains for the first time by providing the elaborate mechanism for making the said charge effective. The definitions of the terms ‘slump sale’, ‘undertaking’ and ‘net worth’ give a fresh meaning to the understanding of the said terms and therefore make it all the more difficult to support the Tribunal’s view that the newly inserted provisions are retroactive. Even the Legislature has nowhere expressed that the provisions were clarificatory, leave alone retroactive. Neither the provisions, nor the notes on clauses and the memorandum explaining the provisions as also the Circular following the insertion make such a claim.

4.6 The issue was examined by the Hyderabad Bench in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (supra), which clearly held that the provisions of S. 50Bwere not retrospective or retroactive. This decision was followed by the Mumbai Bench in the Sankheya Chemicals’ case (supra), which sadly was not taken note of.

4.7 The better view is that S. SOB should be applied prospectively and not retrospectively. The issue however calls for adjudication by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in view of the cleavage of the opinions amongst the Benches.

Exemption for services provided by certain associations of dying units — Notification No. 42/2011- Service Tax, dated 25-7-2011.

The above Notification has exempted the club and association services provided in relation to ‘project’ by an ‘association of dyeing units’. The term ‘project’ is explained as common facility set up for treatment and recycling of effluents and solid waste discharged by dyeing units, with financial assistance from the Central or State Government.

Clarification on Completion of Service under Point of Taxation Rules — Circular No. 144/13/2011-ST, dated 18-7-2011.

The Service Tax Rules and Point of Taxation Rules require the assessee to issue an invoice within 14 days of Completion of Service (COS), but the term COS is not clearly defined anywhere, hence CBEC has come up with clarification vide this Circular.

Accordingly, COS would not just mean physical completion of work, but would also include completion of some other auxiliary activities and basic formalities like quality testing, etc. which are pre-requisites to arrive at the invoiceable figure.

E returns in Profession Tax — Notification VAT/AMD.1010/IB/PT/Adm-6, dated 14-7-2011.

With effect from 1st August, 2011, every dealer holding Professional Tax Registration Certificate shall pay the tax in Challan MTR6 and file the electronic return in Form IIIB in respect of period from 1st April, 2006.

3 more banks can collect VAT — Notification No. VAT.1511/C.R.94/Taxation 1, dated 22-7-2011.

By this Notification, three more banks, namely, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Vijaya Bank and Andhra Bank have been added to collect MVAT & CST w.e.f. 22-7-2011.

Due date for payment of Profession Tax extended — Notification No. PFT/2011/Adm – 29/NTF, dated 13-7-2011.

For the year 2011-12, due date for payment of Profession Tax has been extended from 30th June, 2011 to 31st August, 2011 for the tax payable by an enrolled person who has already enrolled on or before 31st May, 2011.

PTEC & PTRC not applicable to Mathadi Mandal, Mathadi Kamdar — Trade Circular 12T of 2011, dated 3-8-2011.

By this Circular it is clarified that Profession Tax is not applicable to Mathadi Mandal, Mathadi Kamdar and Hamal.

Import of services whether liability of recipient prior to 18-4-2006 existed? Charging section i.e., section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 introduced w.e.f. 18-4-2006, demand prior to 18-4-2006, relying on Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, wholly impermissible.

(2011) 23 STR 15 (Guj.) — Commr., Service Tax v. Quintiles Data Processing Centre (I) P. Ltd.

Import of services whether liability of recipient prior to 18-4-2006 existed? Charging section i.e., section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 introduced w.e.f. 18-4-2006, demand prior to 18-4-2006, relying on Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, wholly impermissible.

Facts:

The assessee received management consultant’s service from the service provider stationed outside India. The Department relied on Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 to recover service tax from the assessee on the premise that the service was provided by a person from a country other than India but the service was received by the assessee in India. The Tribunal relying on the decisions in the case of Indian National Shipowners Association v. Union of India, 2009 (13) STR 235 held that the assessee was not liable to pay any service tax for the period prior to 18-4-2006, the date with effect from which section 66A was introduced in the Finance Act, 1994. The Revenue contended that the facts in the aforementioned case were different and that in the present case the management consultant service was received in India. The respondent contended that in absence of any charging section prior to 18-4-2006, reliance could not be placed on Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 to levy service tax from the recipient.

Held:

Following the judgments in the case of Laghu Udyog Bharti v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 276 SC and Indian National Shipowners Association v. Union of India, 2009 (13) STR 235, the Court held that any demand of service tax in absence of the charging section prior to 18-4-2006 by merely rely-ing on Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) was wholly impermissible.

Section 32(1) — Depreciation is allowable on pre-operative expenses which are revenue in nature, allocated to fixed assets since the expenses were incurred on setting up fixed assets and in pre-operative period the assessee was only engaged in putting up fixed assets on rented land.

(2011) TIOL 434 ITAT-Del.Cosmic Kitchen Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT ITA No. 5549/Del./2010 A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 13-5-2011

Facts:

In
pre-operative period, the assessee had incurred expenditure of
Rs.16,93,153, which was debited under 8 heads, all of which were revenue
in nature. The assessee was not able to link any expenditure with a
particular item of fixed asset. However, since during the pre-operative
period the assessee was engaged only in putting up fixed assets on
rented land, it had capitalised this sum of Rs.16,93,153 to various
items of fixed assets in the ratio of cost of the asset to total cost.
The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed Rs.2,70,744 being the amount of
depreciation on this sum of Rs.16,93,153 on the ground that the
expenditure incurred is revenue in nature and there is no link between
item of asset and the expenditure incurred. Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

In
view of the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Food
Specialities Ltd., 136 ITR 203 (Del.) and also the ratio of the
decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Lucas-TVS Ltd., 110 ITR 346
(Mad.), the expenditure was required to be capitalised. Also the
proportionate method of allocating the expenditure to various items of
fixed assets is fair and reasonable. Accordingly, the assessee is
entitled to claim depreciation on the sum of Rs.16,93,153 being
pre-operative expenses capitalised to various items of fixed assets. The
Tribunal decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.

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GAPS in GAAP – Amalgamation after the Balance Sheet Date

Accounting Standards

Paragraph 27 of AS-14
‘Accounting for Amalgamations’ states as follows :

When an amalgamation is effected
after the balance sheet date but before the issuance of the financial statements
of either party to the amalgamation, disclosure is made in accordance with AS-4,
‘Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date’, but the
amalgamation is not incorporated in the financial statements. In certain
circumstances, the amalgamation may also provide additional information
affecting the financial statements themselves, for instance, by allowing the
going concern assumption to be maintained.

It has been noticed that there
is a mixed accounting practice with regards to High Court orders for
amalgamation received after the balance sheet date but before the issuance of
the financial statements. Many companies incorporate them in the financial
statements, a few have not. The mixed practice has arisen because the term
effected after the balance sheet date can be interpreted in more than
one way. This can be explained with the help of a simple example.

Query :

Big Ltd. has a year end 31
December 2007. It had earlier filed an application with the High Court for
merging Small Ltd. with itself with an appointed date of 1 January 2006. The
High Court passed the merger order on 4 January 2008, and the same was
filed on the same day with the ROC at which point in time it became
effective.
Accounts for the year ended 31 December 2007 were signed on 15
January 2008. Should Big Ltd. consider the merger in its financial statements
for the year ended 31 December 2007 ?

Response :

View 1 :

No. The effective date of
amalgamation is the date when the amalgamation order is filed with ROC, which in
this case is, 4 January 2008. Therefore, the amalgamation has become effective
after the balance sheet date. Hence, in the 31 December, 2007 financial
statements, appropriate disclosures are made but the amalgamation is not
incorporated in the financial statements.

View 2 :


Yes.
The reference to effective date in AS-14 could be interpreted to mean the
appointed date. In this case the High Court has passed an order for merger with
an effective date of 1 January 2006.

From a plain reading of AS-14 it
appears that View 1 is a more appropriate answer. AS-14, paragraph 27 when
applied in this case, seems to suggest that the merger event is an event after
the balance sheet date and hence should be recorded after the balance sheet
date. The actual merger takes place only when the order is passed by the High
Court and filed with the ROC. Those significant events (High Court order
and filing with the ROC) had not happened before or at the balance sheet date.

However practice seems to
suggest that View 2 is more prevalent. This is probably for the reason that the
effective date is interpreted to be the appointed date. Moreover, as the event
(High Court order and filing with ROC) has already happened prior to issuance of
financial statements, it would not be prudent not to incorporate them in the
financial statements
merely because the order was passed and filed with ROC
after the balance sheet date. The disadvantage with View 2 is companies may
arbitrarily choose to time the issuance of the financial statements to either
account or ignore the amalgamation transaction in the financial statements.

The author believes that whilst the technically
right answer is View 1, at the present moment and in the absence of any contrary
opinion from the ICAI, both views may be sustainable.

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Gaps in GAAP – Guidance Note on Accounting for Employee Share-based Payments

Accounting Standards

The Guidance Note allows either the fair value method or the
intrinsic method to account for employee share-based payments. The manner in
which the Guidance Note is drafted is based on the fair valuation principle
(more or less on the basis of IFRS). The intrinsic method is inadequately
covered by a sweeping paragraph (see below), without thought to the unintended
consequences that it may cause.

“Accounting for employee share-based payment plans dealt with
heretobefore is based on the fair value method. There is another method known as
the ‘Intrinsic Value Method’ for valuation of employee share-based payment
plans. Intrinsic value, in the case of a listed company, is the amount by which
the quoted market price of the underlying share exceeds the exercise price of an
option. For example, an option with an exercise price of Rs.100 on an equity
share whose current quoted market price is Rs.125, has an intrinsic value of
Rs.25 per share on the date of its valuation. If the quoted market price is not
available on the grant date, then the share price nearest to that date is taken.
In the case of a non-listed company, since the shares are not quoted on a stock
exchange, value of its shares is determined on the basis of a valuation report
from an independent valuer. For accounting for employee share-based payment
plans, the intrinsic value may be used, mutatis mutandis, in place of the
fair value.” (paragraph 40 of the Guidance Note)

When the above oversimplified paragraph is applied in the
context of some aspects of ESOP, it could result in certain unexpected results.
Let’s explain this with the help of a small example where a share settlement is
changed to cash settlement on vesting.

Now, let’s say one ESOP is granted that will vest at the end
of 3 years at an exercise price of Rs.90. At the date of grant the fair value of
the share is also Rs.90. The value of the option is estimated to be Rs.30. In
this example, if the fair value model is applied, Rs.10 will be charged in each
of the next three years. If the intrinsic model is applied, there will be no
charge.

So far so good, but now things will get a little complicated
as we move from a share-settled ESOP scheme to a cash-settled ESOP scheme. As
per the Guidance Note, “if an enterprise settles in cash, vested shares or stock
options, the payment made to the employee should be accounted for as a deduction
from the relevant equity account (e.g., Stock Options Outstanding
Account) except to the extent that the payment exceeds the fair value of the
shares or stock options, measured at the settlement date. Any such excess
should be recognised as an expense.” (paragraph 28 of the Guidance Note)

Assume in the above example, the share price is Rs.150 at
vesting date (end of the third year). The Company collects exercise price Rs.90
from the employee and pays Rs.150 (cash settlement). As already discussed above,
for accounting of employee share-based payment plans, the intrinsic value may be
used, mutatis mutandis, in place of the fair value. The requirement of
the Guidance Note will be changed as follows (if intrinsic rather than fair
value method is used) : “if an enterprise settles in cash, vested shares or
stock options, the payment made to the employee should be accounted for as a
deduction from the relevant equity account (e.g., Stock Options
Outstanding Account) except to the extent that the payment exceeds the intrinsic
value of the shares or stock options, measured at the settlement date.
Any such excess should be recognised as an expense.”

The payment of Rs.150 does not exceed the intrinsic value of
the shares at the settlement date, i.e. Rs.150. Hence the strange
conclusion is that there is no excess which needs to be recognised as an
expense.

This is strange because had the ESOP been a cash-settled
employee share-based payment plan from inception, the Company would have
charged Rs.60 as per the Guidance Note over 3 years of the scheme (see Appendix
IV of the Guidance Note). However, it appears that if a company has a
share-based plan to start with, but is then eventually settled in cash, no
charge is required in the profit and loss account.

The above dichotomy has arisen primarily because of an
unintended interplay between paragraph 28 and paragraph 40 of the Guidance Note,
which was predominantly written to provide guidance on fair value accounting of
ESOP, with the intrinsic method being inadequately addressed by a sweeping
paragraph (paragraph 40), which has caused a GAP in GAAP.


This issue needs to be immediately addressed by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India.

 

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GAPs in GAAP – Accounting for carbon credits

Accounting Standards

A number of Indian companies generate carbon credit under the
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). The amount involved is material enough to
the overall viability of a project.

Under IFRS, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
had issued an interpretation IFRIC 3 Emission Rights, which was withdrawn
in June 2005. Thus, the IASB is still debating on an appropriate treatment for
CERs (Carbon Emission Reduction). Under IFRS most entities generating CERs
treat
the same as government grant covered under IAS 20 Accounting
for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance
. This is
because an international agency grants the same. Accordingly, based on IAS 20
requirements, a generating entity recognises CERs as asset once there is a
reasonable assurance that it will comply with conditions attached and CERs will
be received.

IAS 20 gives an option to measure such grant either at
fair value or nominal value. Most entities will measure the CERs at fair
value
to ensure appropriate matching with the costs incurred. They will
recognise the same in the income statement in the same period as the related
cost which the grant is intended to compensate.
The corresponding debit will
be to intangible assets in accordance with IAS 38 Intangible Assets.


No guidance is currently available under Indian GAAP;
consequently various practices exist (a) income from sale of CERs is recognised
upon execution of a firm sale contract for the eligible credits, since prior to
that there is no certainty of the amount to be realised (b) income from CERs is
recognised at estimated realisable value on their confirmation by the concerned
authorities (c) income from CER is recognised on an entitlement basis based on
reasonable certainty after making adjustments for expected deductions.

The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued an Exposure Draft (ED) of the
Guidance Note on Accounting for Self-generated Certified Emission Reductions.
The ED proposes to lay down the manner of applying accounting principles to CERs
generated by an entity.

As per the ED the generating entity should recognise CERs as
asset only after receipt of communication for credit from UNFCCC and provided it
is probable that future benefits associated with CERs will flow to the entity
and costs to generate CERs can be measured reliably. Further, such assets meet
the definition of the term ‘inventory’ given under AS-2 Valuation of
Inventories
and hence are valued at lower of cost and net realisable value.
Only the costs incurred for the certification of CERs bring the CERs into
existence and, therefore, only those costs should be included in the cost of
inventory. All other costs are either not directly relevant in bringing the
inventory to its present location and condition or they are incurred before CERs
come into existence as per the prescribed criteria. Thus, those costs cannot be
inventorised.

The ED will result in significant cost and revenue
mismatch
in the financial statements. This is because entities would need to
expense most of their costs as soon as incurred (with an insignificant amount
being capitalised as inventory), but will recognise revenue arising from CERs
only when these are actually sold. Clearly the accounting recommended by the
ICAI is very different from existing practices under Indian GAAP, and hence
every company that has significant revenue from carbon credits will have to
consider the impact of the ED very carefully.

The treatment prescribed in the ED appears to be inconsistent
with the existing Indian GAAP literature in more than one regard. The ED
requirement to recognise CERs as asset only when these are credited by UNFCCC in
a manner to be unconditionally available is contrary to the principles currently
followed for recognition of an asset. In most cases, recognition of an asset is
based on criteria of probability/reasonable assurance as against absolute
certainty prescribed in ED. For example, both under AS-9 Revenue Recognition
and AS-12 Accounting for Government Grants, recognition of income is
based on the criteria of reasonable assurance.

The ED is also inconsistent with an Expert Advisory
Committee’s (EAC) opinion on export incentives. As per the EAC opinion DEPB
credit should be recognised in the year in which the export was made, without
waiting for its actual credit in the subsequent year, provided there are no
insignificant uncertainties of ultimate collection. The EAC opinion is based on
the application of the existing accounting principles, including definition of
the term ‘asset’ given in the Framework, which is based on the
probability theory.

In the authors view, the ED should not have been issued since
it clearly conflicts with the existing requirement and practices under both
Indian GAAP and IFRS and is contrary to the definition of an asset in the
Framework.
As India is adopting IFRS and the guidance in these areas is
being developed under IFRS, issuing India-specific guidance is duplicating the
effort and creating more differences in how the 2 GAAPs are applied, which will
have to be then taken care of in 2011, which is the transition date for adopting
IFRS.

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Foreign Exchange Reserves — What Do They Represent ?

Foreign Exchange Reserves

The thoughts expressed in this article emerged when the
global financial crisis was at its peak in the beginning of 2009. The focus is
on Foreign Currency Reserves. It all began with questions such as :





  •   What will happen if China withdraws its reserves from the USA ?



  •   Can China not invest its huge foreign exchange reserves in its own
    economy ?



The above questions are applicable globally. But China and
the USA, being the largest creditor and debtor in the world ideally represent
the global scenario. The article explores the concept of foreign currency
reserves and the related concerns.

Fundamentals :

What do foreign currency reserves of a country mean ?




  •   Does it mean ‘cash balance’ in other country’s currency ?



  •   Does it imply that the more the reserves, the richer is the country ?




Nature of foreign currency :

To cite an example, say China has exported goods and services
worth US $ 1,000 to the USA. Assume that these are net exports (export minus
import). This transaction has resulted in a liability for the USA and for China
it is a claim over the USA. Can China utilise this claim for its domestic
economy ? Or for investing in US treasury bills ? Or for any other purpose ?

To understand this, let us understand the nature of export,
import, payment, claim, etc. (Please note that dictionary definitions are not
relevant.)

Generation of claim :


Let us assume that Chinese residents have exported goods and
services to US residents for US $ 1,000. Chinese residents get US $ 1,000. That
is, Chinese residents get a claim over the US government. These Chinese
residents sell the currency or the claim to the Chinese government. The Chinese
government, in turn, pays Renminbis (RMB) to the Chinese residents. I.e.,
China buys the US $ claim from Chinese residents.

The corresponding effect is that the Chinese residents
substitute their claim over the USA, with claim over China. When any person
holds a currency of any government, it is a loan to the government, or a claim
over the government. All currencies are a ‘promises to pay’.

The Chinese residents utilise the RMBs for their expenses of
raw materials, labour, etc. The surplus will be used for investments,
consumption, etc. Effectively, the Chinese exporters pay for raw materials and
expenses to other Chinese residents. This is followed by further payments to
more Chinese residents and so on. Thus, all the RMBs received against US $ 1,000
get distributed amongst the Chinese residents. These residents will put the
money in the bank or mutual fund, which will invest in infrastructure, etc. It
may be noted that the claims being country-specific, it is immaterial whether
Chinese residents or Chinese government holds US $ claims. It is difficult (and
impractical) for individuals to get foreign exchange claims from other
governments. Hence such claims are normally held by governments.

Now, foreign exchange reserve is the Chinese government’s
claim over the USA. Can China invest these reserves in its infrastructure ? It
cannot. It has already been invested/utilised when Chinese residents sold their
US $ to Chinese government and utilised the RMBs for expenditure or investment.

Basically, what China has to do is recover the equivalent of
the claim from the USA. Claim can be expressed in different ways — it is an
intangible made up of confidence that the other country will settle the claim in
future; it is the goodwill; it is a paper entry.

Investment in treasury bills :

It is said that China is investing in US treasury bills. Why
is it doing so ? What else can it do ? When it invests in treasury bills, it is
really substituting non-interest bearing cash for interest bearing treasury
bills. It is assured of interest income till the USA settles its claim. Hence,
when we say China is investing in US treasury bills, it is not really investing
but is only substituting one claim with another; and it does not have a choice.

Can China withdraw its investment in the US treasury bills ?
This is consequential to investment. When it cannot really ‘invest’, it cannot
really withdraw. However, when it wants to withdraw its investment in the US
treasury bills, what can it do ? It can sell the treasury bills and regain US $,
and the cash claim still remains. Therefore, foreign currency reserves or
treasury bills are ‘claims’.

Withdrawal of reserves :

Can China withdraw the US $ reserves ? Prima facie it
cannot. As we have seen, US $ is only a claim. Withdrawal of reserves can happen
only if the currency is backed by something valuable like gold. Therefore, if
the USA has commodity equal to US $ 1,000, it can give that commodity against US
$ 1,000. As currencies are backed by promises or goodwill, investing in or
withdrawing from treasury bills really does not mean much. It can sell the claim
by way of these securities to another person, provided there is a buyer. This is
discussed in later paragraphs.

Sovereign Wealth Fund :

What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) ? The foreign exchange
reserves of a country are invested abroad through special purpose vehicles known
as SWF. So if the Chinese government’s claim is converted into an SPV, it will
be called an SWF. SWFs invest in other country’s capital. In the example of
China, the SWF will either buy capital in the USA or sell US $ to buy capital in
other countries. SWFs are supposed to give better yields than treasury bills. In
an SWF one asset is converted into another asset — cash into treasury bills
which in turn is converted into investment through SWF.

If India were to set up a SWF and invest in other countries,
it will be borrowing and then investing elsewhere. By borrowing, one gets
foreign exchange, but that is not a true reserve. One cannot establish an SWF
out of borrowed capital. SWFs are usually set up by countries that have current
account surplus. Therefore it was a right decision by India not to establish an
SWF.

How does China settle its ‘claim’ over USA?

There are following ways:

    i) The USA exports to China goods/commodities worth US $ 1,000 (net). China may either buy goods and consume it; or may buy gold and hold it. However, if the USA does not have the goods or commodities that China requires, the account cannot be settled.

    ii) The USA sells China its capital — say China buys property and business in the USA. This way, China owns a little bit of the USA.

    iii) China sells its claim over the USA to someone else i.e., it sells US $ and buys other currency in the market. However, this means that it is buying another country’s claim in exchange of its claim over the USA. The other country is buying a claim over the USA. This does not absolve USA of its liability.

    iv) It buys capital in other countries and pays for it in US $ i.e., China uses its export surplus to buy capital in other countries and sell its US claim [combination of steps (ii) and (iii)].

    v) China writes off the claim.

The first two are the only ways to per se settle the account. The third and the fourth options do not really settle the account. The liability of debtor remains. The last option is not a desirable way of settling the account.

In actual practice all or some of the above happens continuously. The balances/claims keep changing. There is never a perfect settlement of claims. All countries simultaneously can never have an export surplus. Someone has to be a net importer at some time or the other.

When a person buys more than what he can sell and cannot pay, he has to sell his capital. If he doesn’t have capital, the amount is written off by the creditor. This rarely happens in case of countries over a long period of time. As time horizon is vastly different for individuals and countries, one may not be able to see things immediately and obviously.

If China wants to withdraw its reserves, it can only sell its claim to others — provided there are others who are prepared to buy. If there is no one prepared to buy, the supply being more than the demand, the value of US $ will depreciate. The situation is similar to any shareholder owning a major stake of a company’s stocks. If such shareholder sells, the value of shares goes down. In such a case value of his unsold share also comes down and he suffers.

Considering the above, the only way to settle the claim in the long term is — the net importing country becomes a net exporter or it sells capital. Those countries which have raw material or goods to sell may be able to do it. Arab countries have oil and hence are able to sell oil and have surpluses.

What happens to those countries that do not have raw materials or manufacturing sector necessary for generating export surplus? They can:

  •     Export services (It includes licensing of tech-nology, rendering services as employee or consultant, etc.)


  •     Sell tourism services


  •     Provide undesirable services like tax evasion facilities through tax havens, gambling, etc.


India imports goods for which it does not have exportable surplus. Therefore, it sells services — software services, etc. The services should be valuable enough to generate export surplus. In absence of a current account surplus, a country can sell capital. However, selling capital has its own issues.

What happens if a country cannot settle the claims?
If settlement runs over a long period of time and claims become large, then the creditor will demand either sale of capital or sale of goods with a hefty discount. (If a country is indebted, generally its goods and capital command a lower price.) Therefore, to generate export surplus, such country has to sell cheap — it has to devalue its currency.

A cheap currency should normally help a country to sell its goods and thus settle the claim. If it cannot generate export surplus, it has to sell capital. Does selling capital (accepting foreign investment) create a liability? In case of FDI, one can say that the country has sold capital and therefore the reserve is a true reserve. However, even FDI is a loan in one way, but it is better than ECB. In case of FDI, there are other issues like foreigners owning and influencing the country’s policy. This is particularly true when large corporate invests in a comparatively smaller country.

If the capital of a country is attractive, one can sell the same and treat the proceeds as reserve. Therefore many countries have liberal FDI policy. What makes a country’s capital attractive?? For example, capital in the USA may be more valuable than, say, in India or China. A number of factors contribute to this — security, clear ownership laws, perception, etc.

Despite China having a current account surplus, why is it that US $ is overvalued and Chinese RMB is undervalued?? There could be several reasons. One of them is perception and the other is time lag. As mentioned above, time horizons of individuals and countries are different. In case of countries it takes many decades before a perception is corrected or reversed. Just a current account surplus is not sufficient. If a country can generate a foreign exchange surplus by sale of capital, it contributes to appreciation of currency. The USA has been able to do that.

However, in spite of selling capital, if the claim cannot be settled, what happens? In such a case, the situation is similar to a bankrupt person. Both the creditor and debtor lose. The creditor loses the claim and the debtor loses his credit and is declared insolvent.

Confidence:

It all leads to the conclusion that ultimately what is the confidence of people in claims of others? Confidence is built up of due several things including perceptions. Perceptions keep changing. The USA enjoys the most confidence as it has several institutions and processes which other countries do not have. These include freedom, ownership of asset, dispute resolution mechanism, security, power of fighting difficulties, etc. Also living conditions are better in the USA.

However, this confidence of the USA is under threat. Unless it regains the confidence, it will not be able to maintain the value of its currency. All those countries who hold US $ as their reserves, will suffer losses. The only way in which the USA can settle its claim is that by cutting its expenditure and generating export surplus.

India’s foreign exchange reserves:

India has a current account deficit — its import of goods and services is more than its export revenues. Still India has a reserve of US $ 250 bn. What does this reserve represent? It represents sale of capital and borrowings. It must be remembered that foreign exchange reserves is only a bank balance (a claim). Only export surplus or current account surplus is a true reserve. Foreigners have invested in land, industry, etc. To that extent they are owners of India. When foreigners give loans (ECBs), they have a claim over the Indian government/ residents. The foreign currency that comes in through sale of capital (FDI) or by accepting foreign loans (ECBs) goes in to foreign currency reserve. But simultaneously, there is a liability for the country to refund the loan when due and pay the foreigner when there is divestment of FDI. In a way, therefore, FDI is also a liability for India as a whole. In practice, when countries sell capital it is not treated as a liability. But in the International Investment Position Reports, these are shown as liabilities.

Conclusion:

Foreign exchange reserves represent only claims. It does not represent wealth, unless one is confident of encashing it before its value is eroded. Only time will tell whether Chinese reserves are really valuable or not. The best situation is when the claims of countries remain within reasonable limits as it preserves the confidence. Both, large current account surpluses or deficits are not desirable for any country.

TDS is highly tedious

Article

Terminology used in this Article :


TDS is Tax Deducted at Source. This is a
misnomer. This is not a tax at all.

TDS is only a Tentative Deposit of Sum
which is later refunded or appropriated towards tax assessed and levied on
another. Till such time this is not tax and this is not Government’s money.

AT is Advance Tax. An assessee knows and estimates what he is
earning in the current year, for which he pays estimated tax. This is a tax
payment but TDS is not a tax payment, but only a Tentative Deposit
of Sum.

HIC is abbreviation for Honest Innocent Citizen.

Payee is the assessee on whose behalf a Tentative Deposit of
Sum is made with a bank.

The basic assessment procedure under the IT law is — an
assessee has to file the Return of Income, the computation of which is made by
deducting the expenditure from the income and the net income is to be taxed. A
net loss may also arise. It is the duty of the Department to make the
assessment, levy tax and collect the same.

The Department also envisages collection by way of Advance
Tax on the estimated income the assessee is earning in the current year.

The Income-tax Department is maintained to do the exercise of
assessment, levy of tax and collect. This governmental agency is expected to be
efficient in the matter of levy and collection of such taxes. Inefficiency and
lethargy should not be there and the governmental agency cannot shirk its
responsibility and shift such responsibility on the HIC.

Further, S. 269 mandatorily has made payments above Rs.20000
to be made only by cheques. Even though this is much against the law of ‘legal
tender’, when payments are made by cheques, the recipient automatically
discloses it in his accounts, which is to come to the notice of the I.T.
Department. It is difficult to suppress the same. If in spite it is suppressed,
the I.T. Department is to unearth the same.

‘Bonded Labour’ under the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)
Act, 1976 means ‘forced or partly forced labour under which a debtor enters into
an agreement with the creditor’. HIC is declared an ‘assessee in default’ and
thereby presumed legally a ‘debtor’ and the Government a ‘creditor’. Such a law
is against the Constitution and would be ‘bonded labour’ under the Bonded Labour
Abolition Act, 1976.

The following questions and answers would give a proper
appraisal of the issue :

(1) Can a HIC be mandatorily forced to undertake the work/labour
of collecting and remitting TDS into the bank much against his will and consent,
and that too without any consideration or remuneration ?

Whether such enforcing of work/labour is bonded labour which
would infringe the personal freedom and liberty of a HIC guaranteed under the
Constitution ?




Ans. : HIC are mandatorily forced and made responsible to
collect TDS and deposit in a bank, failing which such HIC is deemed an ‘assessee
in default’.

An HIC is to make payment for services and utilities availed
by him, which is his expenditure and liability. Unless such liability is timely
cleared, his business and business relationship suffers.

The provisions relating to TDS in the Income-tax Act run to
35 pages and the IT Rules to some pages. These are cumbersome and an HIC cannot
understand and follow them. Qualified auditors do not undertake this table work
as this is considered a clerical work. Clerks may be appointed, but they are not
trained and well versed. Moreover, it is not a work for a full-time clerk. If
part-time freelance clerks are employed, the business secrets cannot be kept.

Forcing a person and making him responsible to do a
particular work, namely, collecting and remitting TDS is practically an
‘enforced bonded labour, which infringes on one’s personal freedom and liberty
assured in the Constitution of India. No person could be compelled by any law to
undertake a particular work against his will and consent. This is against the
Constitution.

(2) What are the cumbersome procedures and services to be
complied with by such HIC ?



Ans. :

(a) Refer Income-tax Reckoner and determine how much tax has
to be deducted from each kind of payment made by HIC. Different services with
different tariffs need a competent assistant who can rightly understand them.
Several services fall under two categories and any decision becomes debatable.

(b) Two cheques are to be written, one for the payment less
TDS and the other for the TDS amount. If the magnitude of the business is more,
the volume of cheque writing multiplies.

(c) The TDS cheques have to be rightly entered in the TDS
challan. Writing of challans is now laborious and meticulous care is necessary,
as the computer Forms are cumbersome.

d) When the deduction  is made as per law, many recipients do not furnish their PA No. Either they have not obtained it or they have misplaced it. The HIC deductor has no power or authority to insist on their giving the PA No. Even if he discharges the responsibility of collecting and depositing in bank, the HIC is punished for the lack of PA No. of the recipient. This is not the mistake of the HIC, but punishment is provided u/s.206. This is ridiculous. The Government is keen to get the TDS money. The HIC collects and deposits it and discharges his function. The Government must be satisfied with such money deposited. The HIC should not be punished if the recipient does not furnish his PA No. when the address is given.

e) The TDS cheque written has to be sent to the bank with the challan filled and an assistant is to go to the bank.

f) When the cheque is received by the bank, acknowledgement is never given immediately, but deferred till the cheque gets encashed. An assistant has to go to the bank several times to collect the challan acknowledged. If the collection of the challan is forgotten, no proof will be available. Monitoring this is a cumbersome responsibility. When the challan acknowledgement is given by the bank, they scribble in the challan No., and it is not decipherable many a time. The assistant going to the bank is helpless.

g) The challan has to be collected and it is to be rightly placed in the file and safeguarded. ThIS requires a filing assistant. If this challan is missed, nuisance entails.

h) Within one month individual certificates have to be prepared and the number of forms for such purpose are so many and the right form and updated form has to be used. Such forms have to be purchased from the printers as and when required. An assistant has to go to buy this form and many a time the form is not readily available. Filling up this form is not easy by an assistant unless he knows his job.

i) In such certificates the Director or a responsible person has to sign even though he cannot be made to check the particulars contained in the form. This is to be counter-checked by another assistant. When the signatory of the certificate is authorised is another issue.

j) Once in three months the Quarterly Return manually with all the deduction details referring to each and every transaction is to be prepared, which is an elaborate and meticulous work.

k) The Quarterly Return details have to be fed in computer, which requires a software and a data programmer and the accuracy has to be checked. For any typographical mistake of the data programmer, the HIC is punished.

1) The acknowledgement for having filed the Quarterly Return has to be preserved. The Department on many occasions sends notices for not having received the same. Jurisdictional changes and jurisdictional clashes arise and notices are received, which have to be replied.

For so much of honorary work done by HIC incurring enormous expenses, he is always cornered as ‘Assessee in default’ – an irony of fate.

The fact remains, the Sections, the nature of transactions, the procedures, the multifarious forms, are so cumbersome, even the Income-tax Officials find it difficult to understand.

Irrespective of the onerous difficulties  unduly cast on the HIC, the writer suggests a simple remedy. TDS stamps can be sold in post offices. When payments are made by cash/ cheques, TDS stamps will also be issued along with, duly endorsed. Such stamps will be pasted in the Returns. Even this the Department will misplace. The assessee should always send a xerox and obtain acknowledgment from the Department. Cumbersome procedures can be avoided. If TDS stamps are not issued in time, interest is to be charged automatically by the Department at the time of assessment.

3) When such services are honorarily rendered, whether the HIe can be punished/penalised for any lapses?

Ans. : Rendering service in the interest of the country is to be appreciated and honoured. The TDS provisions and especially the recently introduced Section 40(1)(ia) are draconian and against all can-nons of law, justice, equity and fair play. Legally such laws cannot be sustained.

If the IT Department is not efficient to collect rightful taxes from an assessee, it cannot make an HIC ‘assessee in default’ in the place of the defaulting tax-payer who only has to be punished. Thereby, this provision amounts to letting off defaulters, Department and the assessees and punishing an HIe. There is no justice and equity in penalising HIe.

4) Whether such punishment or penalising be more than the punishment prescribed under law for the real defaulter or evader of taxes?

Ans. : Cases have now arisen that the punishment on the HIC is much more than the punishment prescribed for the real defaulter. The defaulter commits the crime, but the punishment prescribed for the defaulter is much less than the punishment prescribed for the HIC for failure to deduct Tentative Deposit and remit to the bank.

If an HIC makes a payment, and if he does not deduct tax at source, such payment is considered as income in the hands of the HIe. When the payment is made, the payee deducts his expenditure and pays income tax only on his net income. If the payee evades taxes, the punishment on this is very much less than the punishment given to the HIC when the total payment is considered as income in the hands of the HIC for no fault of him, which gets assessed at about 33%.
 
Several instances have come to light when agents, under law of agency, collect money and remit to their principal. Over-zealous officers consider that on such collection and payment by agents, tax should be deducted, failing which the entire payment made to their Principal is treated as income in the hands of such agent. All these penalties and punishments are not equitable as HICs are forced with such work and responsibility due to the indolence and inefficiency of Governmental agency in preventing tax evasion. Such an attitude by the over-zealous officers is driving HIC to the roads.

5) When taxes have been paid on the income by the payee, whether punishment for non-deduction of tax be imposed on the HIC ?

Ans. : When an honest payee has paid his taxes on all his income less his expenditure and given valid proof for the same, the proceedings and actions under law should be dropped. Duplication of payment of taxes arising on the self same transaction is unethical. The deductor should not be punished when the rightful payee has paid his taxes if this is proved by the payer. There is no legal sanction for such duplication in tax levy and collection.

6) Whether the payment made to the payee can be deemed as income of the HIC by any stretch of imagination?

Ans. : Agents render services for their principals, The law of agency applies between them. Some agents are authorised to collect by their principals. They collect in their name, on behalf of their principals. The principals receive the same and disclose in their accounts. The principals incur various expenses which are deducted from the receipts from their agents. Over-zealous officers insist that such agents should deduct tax at source from payments made by them to their principals. While there is no need for such tax deduction, the officers assess the sum total of amounts paid as income in the hands of the agents. While the principal is to pay tax on his net income, the agent is forced to pay tax on the gross income of the principal. This is totally ridiculous. The gross receipt of the principal cannot be deemed to be the income of the agent. The Section 40(1)(ia) has to be reconsidered.

Concluding, the Constitutional validity, equity and justice of the law relating to TDS needs a judicial review.