Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

Bridging the GAAP

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

9 Bridging the GAAP



The Asian Crisis in the 1990s made the world sit up
and recognise the need for corporate governance as a mechanism to safeguard
investments in public enterprises and heightened the importance of having a
global Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for comparability and
transparency of financial information across continents. The US accounting
scandals of Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia or the European scandals of Ahold or
Parmalat enforced the view that a framework of governance and global GAAP needs
to emerge to safeguard capital in companies, which in the digital age is without
the protection of political or physical borders.


David Tweedie, the Chairman of International
Accounting Standards Board said in the Europe Club of Canada on 25 April 2008
that : “In the midst of the Asian financial crisis, several companies whose
financial statements seemed to indicate that they were secure, suddenly went
bankrupt casting great doubt on the veracity of the statements and in particular
the national accounting standards in use. While it is important not to overstate
the role of accounting standards and practices in precipitating the Asian
financial crisis, it is clear that confidence in financial reporting practices
in that region disappeared.” “As a consequence, financing, much of it short term
in nature and not subject to any capital controls, was withdrawn. Interest rates
rose, investment ground to a halt, and an economic slowdown followed. In the
aftermath of the crisis, it was unlikely that confidence in the existing or any
revised national standards could be restored rapidly, indeed, if ever. The
obvious choice was to move to an internationally accepted set of standards.”
Since 2001, the mission given to IASB was to create a single set of
principles-based global financial reporting standards that are used throughout
the world’s capital markets. The overriding principle is that irrespective of
the country of origin of a transaction, whether in New York, New Delhi, or
London, the accounting should provide a consistent answer to the same economic
transaction.” The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, National
Committee of Accounting Standards and the government of India have affirmed that
India will transition into International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as
the accounting principles for the country from April 1, 2011. Entities which are
either listed companies or companies filing for a listing or companies having
over a threshold of sales of 100 crore or public debt of over 25 crore are
covered by the first wave. These are called public interest entities. The small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) will be covered at a later date which is yet to be
decided.

The dilemma — incremental or big bang approach ?
Nations around the world are faced with the dilemma of whether their national
accounting standards should be aligned to IFRS or take the big bang approach of
adopting IFRS as written by IASB and follow standards that are globally applied,
irrespective of the economic environment.

In India, a debate is raging amongst various
stakeholders, including the government whether we should converge or adopt IFRS.
While the former would mean that we amend and modify IFRS standards to be
relevant to India, the latter would mean that we adopt IFRS standards as they
are written by IASB to be the accounting language of India. ICAI in their
decision paper on convergence has stated, “Convergence with IFRS — all at one
approach — that IFRS will be adopted for public interest entities for accounting
periods starting on or after 2011”. But doubts are now arising due to differing
views of various stakeholders on how the roadmap to 2011 will be drawn.

IFRS with modifications by various countries would
result in multiple and possibly conflicting versions of IFRSs globally. A
misplaced sense of national pride or intense pressure from industries make
countries amend or alter IFRS principles to suit the national requirements. This
becomes IFRS as applied by a specific country as opposed to IFRS as issued by
IASB. This would defeat the purpose of global convergence, which is to move
toward a single set of high-quality accounting standards for use throughout the
world. This rationale is reflected in the US Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) announcement of the elimination of the requirement for
foreign private issuers to reconcile their IFRS financial statements to US GAAP.
The SEC has stated that the reconciliation requirement is being dispensed with
only for financial statements prepared using IFRSs as issued by the IASB so as
“to encourage the development of IFRS as a uniform global standard, not a
divergent set of standards applied differently in every nation”.

We have this wonderful opportunity to move into a
globally acceptable financial principles, which is considered comprehensive and
followed by over 120 countries in the world. By 2011, IFRS is expected to be
followed by 150 countries. How can we call ourselves a global power and not
adopt global standards as our own ? In due time, by virtue of India’s economic,
intellectual and geo-political weight, we will be a principal player in
formulating these standards.

Way forward the roadmap to 2011 needs to be
comprehensive as it has been detailed in the ICAI’s concept paper on convergence
with IFRS in India. Out of the 38 effective IFRS standards, there are only 2
standards in India that have no difference with IFRS and six have minor
differences. Eighteen standards of IFRS will need a level of technical
preparedness by the industry and the professionals for implementation or would
have conceptual differences with the Indian standards. Ten standards need
changes in laws and regulations for them to comply with the principles of IFRS.
The effort to harmonise is still huge as there has to be a consensus amongst the
various stakeholders including the government as some of the provisions of the
Companies Act or other Acts like the RBI Act etc., need to be amended for
compliance with IFRS principles.

The tax laws, companies law and other laws for specialised industries including banking, insurance etc., need to be reviewed to determine the differences with IFRS as we currently apply them and mechanism to deal with them on convergence.

Though IFRS has been written with the intention of global application, we would also need to evaluate whether under the Indian economic environment, application of any specific IFRS principle would make our industries vulnerable to the results and if there is a compelling reason that such applications will be inappropriate in India. Such deviations should be few and rare.
 
There is still a long road ahead. We need all the stakeholders – the industry, ICAI, government, RBI, SEBI, tax authorities and other regulators to engage in the transition process to IFRS. The debate we need to engage in is to holistic ally review, if any, application is inappropriate for India and address such issues in the transition provisions including those relating to first time adoption. The thought behind actions needs to be clearly articulated and debated. We have some time ahead and can meet the deadline of 2011, but clarity of thought and speed of action would be of essence.

We need all stakeholders – industry, ICAI, government, RBI, SEBI, tax authorities – to engage in the transition to IFRS, says Kaushik Dutta.

(Source: BusinessStandard,25-8-2008)

Large US banks may fail amid recession

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

8 Large US banks may fail amid
recession



Credit market turmoil has driven the US into a
recession and may topple some of the nation’s biggest banks, said Kenneth Rogoff,
former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.


“The worst is yet to come in the US,” Rogoff said
in an interview in Singapore. “The financial sector needs to shrink; I don’t
think simply having a couple of medium-sized banks and a couple of small banks
going under is going to do the job.”

The US housing slump has triggered more than $ 500
billion of credit market losses for banks globally and led to the collapse and
sale of Bear Stearns Cos, the fifth-largest US securities firm. Rogoff said the
government should nationalise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the nation’s biggest
mortgage-finance companies, which have lost more than 80% of market value this
year.

US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson asked Congress
on July 13 for emergency powers to inject “unspecified” amounts of government
funds into the companies if necessary.

Banks repossessed almost three times as many US
homes in July as a year earlier and the number of properties at risk of
foreclosure jumped 55%, according to RealtyTrac Inc, an Irvine, California-based
seller of foreclosure data. US builders probably broke ground on the fewest
houses in 17 years last month, according to a Bloomberg News survey.

Rogoff told a conference in Singapore that the
credit crisis is likely to worsen and a large bank may fail, Reuters reported
earlier. Rogoff, 55, is a professor of economics at Harvard University. He was
the IMF’s chief economist from August 2001 to September 2003.

The world’s largest economy is already in a
recession, and the housing market will continue to deteriorate, Rogoff said. The
US slowdown will last into the second half of next year, he said, predicting a
faster recovery in Europe and Asia.

The Federal Reserve, which has left its key
interest rate at 2% after the most aggressive series of rate reductions in two
decades, risks raising inflationary pressures, he said.

(Source : Bloomberg, Singapore — Business
Standard, 20-8-2008)

 

levitra

Two-thirds US firms paid no income tax in 1998-2005

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

7 Two-thirds US firms paid no
income tax in 1998-2005


Two out of every three United States corporations
paid no federal income taxes from 1998 through 2005, according to a report
released by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress.


The study, which is likely to add to a growing
debate among politicians and policy experts over the contribution of businesses
to Treasury coffers, did not identify the corporations or analyse why they had
paid no taxes. It also did not say whether they had been operating properly
within the tax code or illegally evading it.


The study covers 1.3 million corporations of all
sizes, most of them small, with a collective $ 2.5 trillion in sales. It
includes foreign corporations that do business in the United States.

Among foreign corporations, a slightly higher
percentage, 68%, did not pay taxes during the period covered — compared with 66%
for United States corporations. Even with these numbers, corporate tax receipts
have risen sharply as a percentage of federal revenue in recent years.

The GAO study was done at the request of two
Democratic Senators, Carl Levin of Michigan and Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota.
In recent years, Senator Levin has held investigations on tax evasion and urged
officials and regulators to examine whether corporations were abusing tax laws
by shifting income earned in higher-tax jurisdictions, like the United States,
to overseas subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.

Senator Levin said in written remarks that “this
report makes clear that too many corporations are using tax trickery to send
their profits overseas and avoid paying their fair share in the United States.”
But the GAO said that it did not have enough data to address the role of what
some policy experts say is a crucial factor in profits sent overseas.

That factor, known as transfer pricing, involves
corporations charging their overseas subsidiaries lower prices for goods and
services, a common move that lowers a corporation’s tax bill. A number of
corporations are in transfer-pricing disputes with the Internal Revenue Service.

Either way, the nearly 1,000 largest United States
corporations were more likely than smaller ones to pay taxes.

In 2005, one in four large United States
corporations paid no taxes on revenue of $1.1 trillion, compared with 66% in the
overall pool. Large corporations are those with at least $ 250 million in assets
or annual sales of at least $ 50 million.

At a basic corporate tax rate of 35%, all the
corporations covered in the study in theory owed $ 875 billion in federal income
taxes. But because the tax code allows corporations to claim legally an array of
deductions, write-offs, operating losses and tax credits, the actual taxes paid
were much lower.

Joshua Barro, a staff economist at the Tax
Foundation, a conservative research group, said that the largest corporations
represented only 1% of the total number of corporations, but more than 90% of
all corporate assets.

The vast majority of the large corporations that
did not pay taxes had net losses, he said, and thus no income on which to pay
taxes. “The notion that there is a large pool of untaxed corporate profits is
incorrect.” In 2004, a GAO study said that 7 in 10 of all foreign corporations
doing business in the United States, or foreign-controlled corporations, paid no
taxes from 1996 through 2000, compared with 6 in 10 United States corporations.

(Source : Business Standard, 14-8-2008)

 

levitra

Compliance Report of Transfer Orders, 2008 — Scant respect for Government — CBDT directions

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

6 Compliance Report of Transfer
Orders, 2008 — Scant respect for Government — CBDT directions


CBDT has noticed that nearly 50% of the officers
transferred are not relieved so far and so have not joined their new places of
posting. This is non-compliance of Government’s order and has been viewed
seriously by the Competent Authority.

Board notices that many officers are not being
relieved by CCIT (CCAs)/DGsIT on the pretext that their representations are
pending before the Board. Board wants the field to note that as per Para 11 of
Transfer Policy, further representations from the officer would be considered
only after the officer joins his place of posting and applies through proper
channel and such petition shall not confer any right whatsoever on the officer
to continue on their previous post in defiance of Government’s orders. Failure
to comply with the Governments orders would lead to actions both against the
non-complying officer as well as their Controlling officer.


Now the CBDT directs that, all officers under order
of postings may be relieved immediately and a consolidated report of their
relieving as well as joining dates may be sent to the Board by 18th August 2008
without fail. [CBDT F.No.A-35015/44/2008-Ad.VI, dated 13th August, 2008]. This
is today — we are almost sure that disobedience will continue. How can these
disobedient officers instill any discipline in their subordinates ?


Disobedience of the Board is not confined to CBDT;
CBEC is no better. On 16th August 2008, Saturday — a holiday for the CBEC, the
Board issued a transfer order of 11 Joint Commissioners/Additional
Commissioners. What was the urgent need for issuing this order on a Saturday,
especially when the whole of Government of India was on a vacation with three
holidays ? (CBEC office order No. 195/2008 dated 16-8-2008)

(Source : Taxindiaonline.com)

levitra

India’s Best Kept Secret — The Official Secrets Act — An ‘Invalid’ Act ?

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

5 India’s Best Kept Secret — The
Official Secrets Act — An ‘Invalid’ Act ?


The State’s regressive omerta code, was never
notified. It isn’t actually a law !


Here’s the untold story of the Official Secrets Act
(OSA) 1923: It was passed in April 1923 by the Legislative Council. The Act was
never notified in the Gazette of India.


To become law, every Act must be notified in the
Gazette of India. The National Archives of India, Ministries of Home and Law say
they are
not in possession of any such Notification. None exists in the 1923 Gazette of
India either.

The OSA was amended twice, in 1951 and 1967, and
made more stringent. But only the amendments were notified in the ‘Extraordinary
Gazette of India’. Legal luminaries say that if an Act is not notified, it is an
‘invalid’ law.

Why The British wanted OSA :

In 1923, Bolsheviks could fester unrest in India
directly or indirectly. They have “increased our troubles on the North West
Frontier and Waziristan”. This could “lead to a rupture with Afghanistan”.
Prominent ‘Mussalman’ leaders have shown sympathy with the Afghans. Unwise to
disregard possibility of ‘fanatical Muslims in India’ acting in sympathy with
them. Increased Japanese activity in Burma calls for better means for ‘obtaining
information’, Post- (First World) War enemy powers are out to ferret secrets. In
the event of a war between Japan and America, the former may try to arouse
Indian feelings against the British Empire. There are no existing laws to deal
effectively with such activities.

(From the note prepared by General C. W. Jacob,
Chief of General Staff, in 1921. Document sourced from the National Archives of
India, Delhi.)

“I checked all the dates from 1923 and no such
Notification for the OSA exists.” Maj. Gen. V. K. Singh Ex-Raw.

“It’ll jeopardise any more future prosecutions
under the OSA. Technically, it’ll all be invalid.” Hosbet Suresh, Ex-Judge,
Bombay HC.

“If it has not been notified, the very validity of
the Act can be challenged in Court.” Rajindar Sachar, Ex-CJ, Delhi HC.

“After the RTI Act came into force, the OSA has no
place . . . even its relics cannot remain.” Veerappa Moily, Congress pointsman.

“The law was perpetuated by the bureaucracy, to
insulate itself from public scrutiny.” Aruna Roy, Ex-NAC Member.

In 2007, the Administrative Reforms Commission
(ARC) headed by senior Congress leader Veerappa Moily finally decided to bite
the bullet on the draconian Official Secrets Act (OSA). It put it on record that
an Act “enacted in the colonial era” (1923) had no place in democratic India.
The controversial piece of legislation had to either be amended or scrapped. But
as is wont to happen, a committee of secretaries set up later by the upa
Government examined and rejected the Moily panel recommendation. The status
now : a Cabinet subcommittee is taking a
second look at the suggestions put up by the ARC.

Meanwhile, research into the origins of the OSA has
thrown up a shocker, putting a question mark on the very validity of the Act.
Documents accessed under the RTI Act from the Ministries of Home Affairs (MHA)
and Law and Justice, as well as the National Archives of India (NAI), show the
OSA was never notified in the Gazette of India—a mandatory requirement to make
any Act a law.

(Source : An article by Saikat Datta, Outlook
India

— From Internet)

 

levitra

Revenue Department tells FIPB to reject telecom FDI from tax havens

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

4 Revenue Department tells FIPB to
reject telecom FDI from tax havens


In another instance of Indian tax authorities
adopting a hard-nosed stance to prevent abuse of tax avoidance treaties, the
Revenue Department recently opposed a proposal of a Cyprus-based company to
increase its stake in an Indian telecom services company from 40% to nearly 74%.


The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB)
rejected the proposal on security concerns and the Revenue Department is saying
the source of funds is not clear.


Advising FIPB, the nodal agency for approving
foreign investment proposals, to reject the proposal, the Department pointed out
that gains from the future sale of the shares in question would not be taxable
in India due to the double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA) with Cyprus.

The Revenue Department’s stance assumes importance
given that India is trying to renegotiate the Cyprus treaty with an eye on
taxing capital gains taxable in the jurisdiction in which the income is earned.
This is not the first instance of such an effort by India. In fact, it has
already reworked the DTAA with the United Arab Emirates and removed the capital
gains tax exemption clause. India is also trying to renegotiate a similar treaty
with Mauritius.

It may be recalled that the Tax Department is
currently in litigation with Vodafone on paying withholding tax for acquiring
Hong Kong-based Hutchison’s stake in a Mauritius-based outfit that held a
majority stake in Indian mobile service provider Hutch-Essar.

FDI is rising sharply from Cyprus and Mauritius,
compared with inflows from developed countries like the United States and the
United Kingdom. From an inflow of $ 58 million in 2006-07, FDI from Cyprus rose
sharply to $ 834 million in 2007-08. In the first two months of the current
fiscal, FDI from Cyprus stood at $ 177 million.

Similarly, FDI from Mauritius rose from $ 6.3
billion in 2006-07 to $ 11 billion the next year. In the first two months of the
current fiscal, FDI from Mauritius stood at $ 2.85 billion.

With overseas companies structuring their
investments to maximise benefits and minimise tax cost by routing investments
through tax havens, preventing abuse of tax treaties is high on the agenda of
the Indian Revenue authorities.

(Source : Business Standard, 19-8-2008)

levitra

Exploring Benford’s Law — Digital Analysis with Computer-Assisted Audit Tools (CAATs)

Jai India

Light Elements

As soon as the UPA Government won the ‘confidence vote’
(manufactured or otherwise, God knows) our prince of Delhi, Rahul Gandhi flew by
a chopper to meet Kalawati and Shashikala, poor women in Vidarbha in Maharashtra,
whose poverty was exposed by the prince very vividly to move the stone-hearted
(that is what the prince presumes) MPs to support the controversial nuclear deal
with the supercop America, consequently, to save the Government.


Kalawati and Shashikala were busy with their chores. Our
prince was very enthusiastic and excited as the chopper was hovering over the
village of Kalawati and Shashikala. He was trying to locate them through his
binoculars in the farms below. Eventually the prince could spot the honourable
ladies not through binoculars, but when the chopper landed. The prince greeted
Kalawati and Shashikala with folded hands (it should be the other way round).
But the prince was in a hurry. Reluctantly, Kalawati and Shashikala just looked
at the prince.

“You didn’t recognise me. I am Rahul Gandhi from Delhi” said
the prince dusting his Ray Ban goggles. Dynastic young MPs from the Congress
party and its allies (note we are in ‘coalition era’, so allies) accompanying
the prince Rahul shouted in chorus ‘Rahulji Zindabad’, ‘Rahulji Aage Badho, Hum
Tumhare Sath Hai’. With this slogan-shouting, the tiny village came to life. The
otherwise jobless villagers thronged to where the prince had located Kalawati
and Shashikala, first to have a close look of the ‘chopper’ and then for a
cursory glimpse of a would-be Prime Minister of India.

“Silence, Silence” one of the young MPs screamed with full
steam in his lungs.

“Ladies and Gentlemen !”

“Why are you leaving out the children ?” a query came from
the crowd.

“Ok, Ok Ladies, Gentlemen and Children, including children on
the waists of their mothers — now I hope you would be happy. Rahulji is back
with you after winning ‘confidence vote’ to inform and interact with you about
the nuclear energy deal”. As he ended his mini introductory speech, somebody
from the crowd queried,

“Who is this Rahul ? I mean Rahul Mahajan or Rahul Gandhi ?”

“Oh my God ! my dear uncle I mean, Rahuljiiiii Gandhijiiiiii . . .  . .”

There was big laughter. As the noise died down, the prince
Rahul took charge of the gullible mob of villagers and started his speech :

“As an Indian (why Indian ?) I stand before you. My dear
countrymen, trust me, we won the motion of confidence moved by our (what do you
mean by our Prime Minister ?) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh just a few hours
ago. I am here to convey to you how ‘nuclear deal’ with the USA is the only
solution to eradicate ‘your’ poverty, I mean poverty in this country. When I met
Kalawati and Shashikala from your village before the Parliamentary Session
convened for the confidence motion, I heard their plight, their children cannot
study at night due to power shortage in this area. I realised that nuclear
energy is the only solution to remove the poverty in this country. You will ask
me, how ? With nuclear energy there will be rapid industrial growth. India will
be the industrial hub of the world. It will create millions of jobs. Then there
will be no poverty in the country. Therefore my dear countrymen, nuclear energy
is the only solution to remove poverty from this country. I am sure after long
long years, at least 20 to 30 years, we will have full-fledged nuclear energy in
the country if we now strike a deal with America. Consequently, sons of Kalawati
and Shashikala will get jobs.

My dear countrymen, one more thing I would like to tell you,
we should not worry about how the world will impact us. We should impact the
world. We should train ourselves to dream of things that never were there and
ask why not, then only we will become a super power in the world of tomorrow.
Say, Jai India, Jai India, Jai India !”

All young MPs and villagers recited the new slogan coined by
the prince of modern India with a bit of confusion, some were saying ‘Jai Hind’
and some were saying ‘Jai India’. What a speech indeed ! It appeared that
majority of villagers were more confused than convinced by the speech of the
prince.

All the young MPs including the prince felt thirsty. Of late
they realised that they were under the scorching sun of Vidarbha where monsoon
plays hide and seek. When they thronged the chopper to grab a water bottle, alas
the villagers had either consumed or taken away all the crates of water bottles.
The prince was very furious. He asked to check the whereabouts of the pilot. The
pilot was smoking in a relaxed mood behind the tree just a stone’s throw away
from the chopper. Somebody shouted his name. Hurriedly the pilot took a last
drag and spun the butt. He appeared before the prince. The prince started to
berate the pilot left, right and centre. An old villager in his 70s came forward
and intervened,

“My son why are you so angry with the pilot ? Cool down, this
area has been suffering from water shortage since your great grandfather was
Prime Minister of this country. People in this village are thirsty as well as
hungry. They may have consumed the water bottles. For them a drop of water is
more important than one megawatt of electricity created with the help of nuclear
energy. Apart from your great grandpa, neither your grandma, nor your father
could remove the poverty from this country. My son, poverty is our ancestral
property. You talked about future of this country after 20 to 30 years, but what
about those intervening period of 20 to 30 years, poverty will grow in geometric
progression. So my son, don’t try to cook a ‘khichadi’ [nuclear energy, rapid
industrialisation, jobs to millions, no poverty ?] of Birbal under the fire of
‘nuclear energy’ for us.”

“You talked about impacting the world, mind you, with empty stomachs and dry throats of millions, living without shelter, you cannot impact the world. It is easier said than done (in the Parliament of India) to impact the world.”

My son, your great grandfather discovered ancient India and wrote a book ‘Discovery of India’. Now it is for you to ‘Rediscover’ India after independence and don’t write a book, it is not enough now, but ‘write off’ the poverty in this country. Jai Hind.”

There was a loud applause. Spontaneously all of them shouted “Jai Hind, Jai Hind, Jai Hind.”

The prince of New Delhi with his head down to the ground slowly walked towards ‘East’ where the chopper was parked.

Lalu gave railway jobs in lieu of land

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

2 Lalu gave railway jobs in lieu of
land



In the worst attack on Railway Minister Lalu Prasad
since the allegations of his involvement in the fodder scam in the 1990s, the
JD(U) on Tuesday claimed that Lalu and his family acquired landed properties
worth over Rs.100 crore over the last four years through means that are not
above board.


State JD(U) President Rajiv Ranjan Singh released
land registry papers running in 500 pages as ‘evidence’. He claimed Lalu
‘invented’ three methods for amassing land. One, poor people’s plots were
transferred in the name of family members as deed of absolute sale in return for
railway jobs. Two, lands were gifted to Lalu’s kin by RJD leaders. Three, plots
exchanged ownerships in return of favours by the Railway Ministry.

The plots have been registered in the names of
Lalu’s wife Rabri Devi, daughter Misa Bharti and sons Tej Pratap and Tejaswi.
Some of the them have also been registered in the name of Delhi-based Delight
Marketing Company, owned by Lalu aide and Union Minister Prem Gupta’s wife,
Singh said.

The JD(U) leader said Lalu’s father-in-law Shiv
Prasad Choudhary was a landless poor in government records and, as such, was
given government land in 2000. Four years later, he became Shiv Prasad Yadav and
‘purchased’ land measuring 20 katthas and 21 dhurs from two persons. In 2006, he
gifted the land to Rabri.

Union Ministers Kanti Singh, Raghunath Jha and
Jayaprakash Yadav, too had gifted land to Lalu’s kin, Singh claimed, hinting it
was to wangle ministerial berths.

(Source : The Times of India, 13-8-2008)

levitra

SEBI set to fine 7 investment bankers for ‘shoddy work’

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

1 SEBI set to fine 7 investment
bankers for ‘shoddy work’


Capital market regulator SEBI is set to impose
penalties on some of India’s top investment bankers for what it considers
‘shoddy work’ done by them while handling public offerings over the past few
years. The regulator’s Market Intermediaries Regulation and Supervision
Department (MIRSD) has uncovered serious shortcomings in the due diligence
process for initial public and rights offerings, besides open offers, carried
out by seven investment bankers — Kotak, Enam, DSP Merrill Lynch, SBI Caps, HSBC,
Keynote and Aryaman Financial.

The regulator’s investigation has revealed major
lapses in the due diligence process relating to initial public offerings, rights
issues and also open offers, according to an official close to the development.
SEBI has set in motion adjudication proceedings for imposing a monetary penalty
against all these bankers, an official said.


He added that arbitration proceedings against Enam
and Kotak pertain to YES Bank and IDFC IPOs dating back to 2006. A SEBI probe
had revealed a scam involving manipulation of retail category in these IPOs. DSP
Merrill Lynch was also rapped by SEBI for the YES Bank IPO, as the regulator’s
inspection showed that the details of the promoters as mentioned in the IPO
document were different from those filed with the Reserve Bank of India.

HSBC and SBI Caps were charged with failure in
disclosing key details in open offers managed by them. In some cases, the
regulator has found 10-15 lapses in the offer documents, the official said. In
several cases, bankers have not followed the prescribed procedures while
conducting due diligence, said SEBI officials. SEBI Chairman C. B. Bhave had
told ET, in an interview shortly after taking over, that one of the issues SEBI
was actively looking at was to make merchant bankers more responsible,
post-issue.

In some cases, the merchant bankers had not even
verified the plant and machinery of the companies, the issues of which they had
managed. Besides, litigation against the company directors was not mentioned in
the public issue documents. Errors were also noticed in financial details
provided in the documents.

SEBI’s inspection also found serious deficiencies
in some IPOs. For instance, in one IPO, the regulator found out that the
post-issue capital of the company was higher than its authorised capital — a
clear indication of poor due diligence carried out by the issue’s merchant
banker. The same mistake was found in Weal Infotech IPO’s case and the regulator
has pulled up the merchant banker to the issue, Aryaman Financial.

SEBI has taken a grim view of the fact that
merchant bankers, who are entrusted with the task of vetting a public issue,
have failed to discharge their responsibilities fully, which is detrimental to
the interest of investors. Five of the merchant banks who were served notice by
SEBI declined to comment on the issue when ET contacted them. Keynote Financial
said it had not received any notice from the regulator. Officials of Aryaman
Financial were not available for comment.

It is not only in IPOs that serious lapses on the
part of merchant bankers were detected. Even in case of open offers, SEBI has
indicted merchant bankers. The market watchdog has taken HSBC to task on the
Garware Offshore open offer. In this instance, SEBI found out that the open
offer document did not furnish important details of the target company. The
offer was made by India Star Mauritius and the financial details of the
acquiring company were not given in the offer document.

Even the company’s paid-up capital was wrongly
mentioned in the financial data, officials said. SEBI has prescribed a standard
letter of offer containing various financial and other parameters of the
company. In fact, HSBC was given a warning by the regulator in an earlier case.

SEBI has moved against SBI Caps for the investment
bank’s failure to provide a vital piece of information about a company in the
open offer document. The open offer was made by a company listed on a regional
stock exchange, but the document did not mention the fact that the company would
soon list on BSE. Many investors tendered their shares in the offer, since they
did not possess the requisite information.

(Source : The Economic Times, 12-8-2008)

levitra

Consistency

fiogf49gjkf0d

Namaskaar

What is consistency ? We know it, we realise it, we practise
it. As a matter of fact — we accountants practise it with a fetish. For
example :

  •  We
    seek ‘consistency’


  •  in accounting policies to make financial statements true and fair.


  •  in disclosure practices to make financial statements easily understandable and
    comparable.


  •  in the quality of food we eat. Restaurants which are consistent with the
    quality of food are patronised and successful.



  •  We
    seek consistency





  •   to improve the quality of service we render.



  •   in the improvement of the quality of services we receive.



  •   in satisfaction and happiness.



  •   to improve ourselves because without this continuous and consistent
    improvement we will either stagnate or more often than not deteriorate.



Law affirms ‘consistency’ despite ‘estoppel’. There are
innumerable court decisions affirming consistency.

Consistency in action and behaviour is thus what we
continuously practise. Sadguru Jaggi says we are a ‘joy factory’ and we must
continuously and with consistent practice improve the quality and quantity of
joy.

It has been rightly said that ‘consistency’ (repetition) in
action leads to ‘habit’ and habit builds character and character in human beings
is what we not only seek in our lives but also seek in others. Character is what
makes a man and a nation. Character is what Ram sought to build in people by
being an example — that is why he is named ‘Maryada Purushottam’. Character is
what Bhishmapitamaha advised Yudhishthir when he sought his advise on ‘how to be
a good ruler’. Character is what Gandhi sought to build in us Indians by
practising what he preached. I repeat, character is the product of
‘consistency’.

Above all, we seek success and it can be achieved by creating
a congenial and rewarding work environment. Hence, let us continuously and
consistently practise the concept ‘bloom wherever we are planted’.

Another ‘C’ we should consistently practise to make our lives
rewarding is ‘Compassion’. Let us never forget that there is a difference
between charity and compassion. ‘Compassion’ is an emotion — emotion of taking
care — care from the heart and without even seeking any form of acknowledgement.
The practice of this ‘C’ enriches our lives.

Though not relevant to the subject of this ‘C’ — I would like
to share a thought with you on the two ‘C’s one should always shun and
these are: ‘conceit’ and ‘cunning’. They are twin sisters and have
a disastrous influence on our lives. Let us not forget that wars have been
fought due to conceit — whether it is the Ram-Ravan fight, or The Mahabharat or
world wars. Families and business houses have been destroyed because of the
conceited and/or cunning behaviour of one individual. These are emotions from
which all of us suffer and the fullness of life is marred by them. So let us
with conviction and consistency shun them to make our life happy.

We have talked about four ‘C’s earlier — that is —
commitment, conviction, comparison and conditioning. I intend to close this ‘C’
series with ‘consistency’. I also believe that adopting any one of these five
‘C’s will automatically lead to the adoption of the other four ‘C’s. So let us
adopt and practise these ‘C’s to make our lives rewarding, successful and above
all, contended and happy.

levitra

Now . . . . Is Life Still Worth Living ?

fiogf49gjkf0d

Namaskaar

About a fortnight ago, I was most pleasantly surprised to
meet Ms. Sneha Phene in the company of Ms. Benazeer Patil. They had managed to
dig out a piece that was published in the GLC annual magazine for 1957-58.
Though I remembered that the college had won the Boman-Behram Inter-Collegiate
Trophy, I had forgotten that the piece had been published in the magazine.


Reading the piece transported me to the St. Xavier’s College
hall where the Boman-Behram trophy competition was held annually. Prof. Colaco
from that college was the leading light amongst the organisers. I have been
asked how different the article would be if I were to rewrite it. I do not think
it would change materially, though I would have signed my name as ‘Sohrab’ and
not ‘Soli’. I presume the reason for the question is the general feeling that
the hopes of youth give place to the despair of age. As a popular song says :

“Those were the days, my friend

We thought they’d never end

We’d sing and dance forever and a day

We’d live the life we choose

We’d fight and never lose

For we were young and sure to have our way.”




Today, at an age when much time has gone by and little
remains, the question is ‘Has life been worth living ?’ I would answer this with
a most emphatic ‘Yes’. Undoubtedly, some difficult professional decisions have
had to be made. In the period 1956-58, the Law degree was a two years’ course,
after graduation. As one neared completion of the course, several cautionary
warnings were received : There was not much future in the profession, one would
have to compromise values, one required a ‘Godfather’ to succeed, the Court
language would change to Hindi, Marathi, etc. The ignoring of the advice of such
prophets of doom has indeed made life worth living. Then there was the choice
whether to go in for general practice or to specialise, and lastly, whether to
be a solicitor or counsel and very importantly whose chambers to join as a
‘devil’. Fortunately, I made the right choices — perhaps more by chance than
design.

I have just said that the message of the prophets of doom was
ignored. Let me hasten to add that often it seemed that they were dead on right.
In my first year, I earned the princely sum of Rs.30 and that too because the
Counsel to whom the solicitor wanted to deliver the brief — for an adjournment —
was not readily traced and I was found — as usual — to be warming a seat in the
library !

One fact which I did not realise 45 years and more ago is
that the secret for life being worth living for a professional is an
understanding spouse and children who can adjust to having a parent coming home
at 8.30 p.m. or later. If this understanding is absent, life sours. They say
that female lawyers of eminence are less in number than the male variety. If
true, it only means that the female spouse is more understanding than the male
one ! But more seriously, there are professionals who unfortunately get so
immersed in their work that they do not have time to build such relationships.
They realise only in their middle age that fawning clients are no substitute for
a loving family, who will care for you, unmindful of whether you deliver.

I have perceptively been asked how the connotation of life
has changed from my student days. One most unfortunate development (for which I
alone have to be blamed for being a bad organiser) has been that I do not find
time for friends as I used to. Gone are the days when one sat at Pyrkes (which
was near Flora Fountain) or in an Irani restaurant exchanging notes and solving
the problems of the world over a cup of tea. (Beer was not freely available then
and in any event, who had the money so to indulge oneself ?) Those happy moments
just to sit by the sea have become rarer. To quote again from the same song so
popular in the fifties of the last century :

“Then the busy years went rushing by us

We lost our starry notions on the way

If by chance I’d see you in the tavern (Pyrkes ?)

We’d smile at one another and we’d say

Those were the days . . . . .




Just tonight I stood before the tavern

Nothing seemed the way it used to be

In the glass I saw a strange reflection

Was the lonely fellow really me ?



One disturbing development which has affected life was and
now is, is the increasing feeling, particularly amongst juniors in the
profession, that the streams of justice are not as clear and unmuddled as
heretofore. The highest in the land have spoken about the over-hanging sceptre
of corruption in the administration of justice. But still, on a personal level,
the joie de vivre and the desire to see new places, climb hills
(unfortunately, one now gets out of breath more easily), swim in the ocean and
have new experiences remains. Yes, all said and done life was, has been and,
hopefully, will be worth living. So let me end on a song :

“Oh my friends we are older but no wiser

For in our hearts, the dreams are just the same.”

(This article was written by the author in 2002-03, as a sequel
to his talk in 1957,

which was reproduced in the September 2008 issue of the BCAJ).


levitra

ORDERS OF CIC/SICs

fiogf49gjkf0d

r2i

Part A : ORDERS OF CIC/SICs


 

 
S. 2(h) of the RTI Act — Public Authority :


Different High Courts in a number of cases have decided
whether a particular body or institution is a Public Authority or not u/s.2(h)
of the Act. Hereunder are listed some of the decisions :

l
Decision of the High Court of Karnataka :


Textile Co-operative Bank is provided aid or assistance by
the State Government for the benefit of the weavers, who may be members of the
Bank in respect of loans availed by them. On these facts, it could not be held
that the said aid or assistance is provided to the Bank. Accordingly, the Bank
is not a non-Government organisation substantially financed by the State
Government. Hence, it is not covered under clause (d)(ii) of S. 2(h), and is not
a Public Authority. [Textile Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. the Karnataka Information
Commission & Others,
W.P. No. 20004 of 2007 (GM-RES) and C.W.P. No. 18599 of 2007 (GM-RES) decided on
17-2-2010, (2010 (1) ID 521)]

l Single
Bench decision of Bombay High Court :


There is no direct or indirect control by the State
Government over the affairs of Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank
Ltd. The control was not deep or pervasive.

Hence the said Bank was not covered within the meaning of S.
2(h) of the RTI Act. [AIR 2009 Bombay 75, (2009 (2) ID 156)]

l
Division Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court :


The Court held “A perusal of the definition of ‘public
authority’ shows that ‘public authority’ would mean any authority or body or
institution established or constituted apart from other things by the
Notification issued by an order made by the appropriate Government. It is to
include even any body owned, controlled or substantially financed or
non-Government Organisation substantially financed directly or indirectly by the
funds provided by the appropriate Government. It is undisputed that the
petitioners are receiving substantially grant-in-aid from the Chandigarh
Administration. Once a body is substantially financed by the Government, the
functions of such body partake the character of ‘public authority’. The
petitioner has claimed that they are getting only 45% grant-in-aid after
admitting that initially the grant-in-aid paid to them was to the extent of 95%.
If on account of policy of the Government the grant-in-aid to the extent of 95%
which was given initially allowing the petitioner to build up its own
infrastructure and reducing the grant-in-aid later would not result into an
argument that no substantial grant-in-aid is received and therefore it could not
be regarded as ‘public authority’. Therefore, the Court did not find any
substance in the stand taken by the petitioner that it is not a ‘public
authority’ “

[D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society & Ors. v.
Director of Public Instruction & Ors.,
AIR 2008 (Pb& Hry.) 117; (2008 (2) ID
382)]

l
Single Bench decision of High Court of Allahabad :

The question for consideration was whether the petitioner,
which is a Girls High School, recognised and receiving grant-in-aid from the
State Government, is a ‘public authority’ as defined u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act.

The Court held as follows : “In my opinion, whenever there is
even an iota of nexus regarding control and finance of public authority over the
activity of a private body or institution or an organisation, etc. the same
would fall under the provisions of S. 2(h) of the Act. The provisions of the Act
have to be read in consonance and in harmony with its objects and reasons given
in the Act which have to be given widest meaning in order to ensure that
unscrupulous persons do not get benefits of concealment of their illegal
activities or illegal acts by being exempted under the Act and are able to hide
everything from the public. The working of any such organisation or institution
of any such private body owned or under control of public authority shall be
amenable to the Right to Information Act. The petitioner being an institution
recognised under the provisions of the U.P. High School and Intermediate
Education Act, 1929 and receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government is
therefore, covered under the aforesaid Act.”

[Dhara Singh Girls High School Ghaziabad v. State of Utta
Pradesh & Ors.,
AIR 2008 Allahabad 92; (2008 (2) ID 179)]

l
The High Court of Orissa :


The Court was considering the case of Southern Electricity
Supply Company of Orissa Ltd. (the Company) which is a subsidiary of Grid
Organisation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) which is a wholly-owned Government Company.
Submission of the Company was that it is a public limited company and hence it
is not a ‘public authority’ as defined in S. 2(h) of the RTI Act. The Court held
that u/s.2(h) even non-Government organisation substantially financed directly
or indirectly by the funds provided by the appropriate Government would come
within the ambit of Public Authority. Admittedly the petitioner company is a
subsidiary of GRIDCO, wholly-owned Government Company, it is governed by the
different rules and regulations framed by the State Government, the rate of
tariff is regulated by the Orissa Electricity Reforms Act. Moreover, this
distribution company, and three similar other companies, are discharging
governmental function of distribution and supply of electricity to the people of
the State, which is an essential public duty.

All these go to show that the State Government has a deep and
pervasive control over the petitioner company and such control is not mere
regulatory. In view of the above, the Court came to the conclusion that the said
company falls within the definition of Public Authority as defined u/s. 2(h) of
the RTI Act. [Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Ltd v. State of
Orissa and Others,
W.P.(C) No. 8698 of 2006 decided on 9-12-2009; (2010 (1)
ID 524)]

 
S. 2(f) — ‘Information’ :


The writ petitioners, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), claim to be aggrieved by an order of the Central Information Commission (CIC), dated 23-12-2008 to the extent that the Commission directed disclosure of the applicant complainant’s answer sheet to the information applicant. The applicant had elicited various kinds of information, including a copy of the answer sheet of the examination attempted by him. The Assistant Solicitor General who appeared on behalf of ICAI contended that the question as to the right to information and the right of the class of individuals who attempt examinations to access their answer sheets is squarely covered by the rulings of the Supreme Court in Secretary, West Bengal Council for Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das, [2007 (8) SCC 242] and President, Board of Secondary Education, Orissa & Anr. v. D. Suvankar & Anr., [2007 (1) SCC 603].

The argument was that the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court unalterably fixed the character of the right, in the sense that the declarations exclude the right of a candidate participating in the examination process to access information about the examination process by demanding copies of answer sheets. The subsidiary argument made by the ASG was that the right to seek answer sheets, if at all, could be claimed as part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and since the Supreme Court excluded that possibility, having regard to the objects of the RTI Act, i.e., effectuation of provisions of the right to freedom of expression and information, the possibility of accessing such class of information stands excluded from the right to freedom of expression.

The Court stated that under the scheme of the enactment, all classes of information except those which are explicitly exempted from disclosure u/s.8 have to be revealed. The exemption regime is itself broad and covers various diverse matters, including commercial information, trade secrets and so on. The information authorities set up under the enactment are empowered by S. 10 to sever such information which should not be disclosed from such class of information. The Court then stated as under : “The argument of the petitioner that since the Supreme Court declared the law in such matters, and that candidates who seek copies of answer sheet cannot claim it as a matter of right, is unpersuasive.”

The Supreme Court’s decisions were similar in both the instances; in Ayan Das case and D. Suvankar case, the context was wide directions by the High Court, requiring revaluation/re-verification (in the Suvankar case) and direction to reassess through another examiner in Ayan Das’s case. There is no discussion or mention of the RTI Act. Concededly, the judgments were not examining information application under the RTI Act. Yet, a close scrutiny of the facts mentioned in both the judgments reveals that the claims were not premised on any of the provisions of the enactment. Apparently, they were in the context of writ petitions filed before the High Court. The judgments, therefore, have to be read in their terms, and in the contextual setting. There is no gain saying that the judgments of the Supreme Court on an issue constitute law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. Yet, the judgments are in the context of what is declared and what is not declared.

The ‘unarticulated’ argument of no right under Article 19(1)(a) by the learned ASG cannot, therefore, be accepted. Doing so would mean that this Court would be reading into the two judgments on the intention to overbear the provisions of the RTI Act; a result too startling to accept. As regards the second contention that since the Supreme Court held that there is no right to claim disclosure of answer sheets or copies, and the same is not part of the Right to Freedom of Expression and, therefore, implicitly excluded from the RTI Act; this contention too cannot be accepted.

The mere fact that the statement of objects of, or the long title to the RTI Act mentions that it is a practical regime of the right to information for citizens, would not mean that a cribbed interpretation has to be placed on its provisions, on the same notion of implicit exclusion of that which would legitimately fall within Article 19(1)(a). No rule of interpretation or judgment of the Supreme Court was discussed or relied on the point that the ruling in Suvankar’s case excluded the right to access answer sheets, which would otherwise fall within the expression and, therefore, would fall within the purview of the RTI Act.

The interpretation canvassed would lead to startling consequences when in the absence of enacted law under Article 19(2), the Court would be legislating, as it were, without the possibility of such exclusion being tested in Courts. A salutary rule of interpreting the Constitution is that fundamental rights should be construed broadly, to enable citizens to enjoy them [Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) (1) SCC 717]; Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) (3) SCC 654]. In any event, the Act confers positive rights which can be enforced through its mechanism.

This Court should be extremely slow in interpreting such rights, dealing with personal liberties and freedoms on the basis of some inarticulate premise of a judgment. For the above reasons the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition and held the same to be misconceived.

[ICAI v. Central Information Commission & Anr., W.P. (C) 8529/2009 decided on 30-4-2009; (2010 (1) ID 587)]

                                                         PART B : THE RTI ACT 2005

5th CIC Annual Convention, 2010:

Central Information Commission held a 5th Annual Convention, 2010 on 13th and 14th September 2010 at DRDO Bhavan, New Delhi. I was invited by the Commission to attend the same and have actively participated there. Sessions were very well conducted and provided a tlot of information on the development of RTI in India and the road ahead. Theme of the Convention was: ‘RTI: Challenges and Opportunities’. In coming few issues, I shall provide details thereof. To start with, I reproduce the keynote remarks of Shri Gopalkrishna Gandhi at the inaugural session, some being the highlight of the Convention:

After the IPC, the FIR and PIL, the best known three-letter acronym in Indian Governance is RTI. I think it has overtaken the others in frequency of use outside the agencies of law enforcement. And it engenders as much awe as IPC, FIR and PIL. It also generates, as PIL does, but even more so, two reactions : The first is admiration amongst its users or potential users. Ki aisaa ek baraa hathiyaar hamaare haathon mein aayaa hai.

The second is apprehension amongst those it targets or is likely to target. Ki humen dhake huaa pardaa ab khul gayaa hai. The first reaction, the reaction of admiration, is a good and wholesome reaction. Kyuunki qaanuun barhiyaa hai, bahaadur hai, har pradesh mein laguu ho gayaa hai.

RTI Act ab jan chukaa hai. Aaj uskii pehchaan hai, shaharon mein hi nahiin, chhote nagaron aur dehaat mein bhii. Haalaanki kuchh pradeshon mein vah mazbuti se aage barha hai aur kuchh aur pradeshon mein ab bhi ladkhadaate hue chaltaa hai.

Qaanuun-hukumat-awaam kaa is tarah ek honaa bahut achhi baat hai, which has to be admired. Lekin duusraa reaction jo hai, apprehension vaalaa, vah intahaa ghalat aur buraa hai. The Right to Information must never be allowed to degenerate into the Right to Bully, or into a form of vigilantism. Kyunki vah qanuun jo darr paidaa kartaa hai, vah iktarfaa hotaa hai, vah vishvaas, bharosaa, aitbaar nahiin barhaataa hai. Aur aaj humko vishvaas, aitbaar ki sakht zururat hai.

AAj RTI ko aaye paanch saal ho gaye hain. Humko aaj uske prabhaav oar, uske asar par, ghaur karnaa chaahiye. Kyaa hai uskaa asar ? RTI mein ek bare aandolan ki fateh hui hai. Aur uskaa shreyas sabse pahle jaataa hai Aruna Roy ko, jinhone Rajasthan mein RTI ki zaruurat mahsuus kari aur phir uske liye aandolan shuru kiyaa, aur uske liye logon kaa samarthan praapt kiyaa.

Andolanon ko logon kaa samarthan tab hi haasil hotaa hai jab logon ko us andolan mein tuk, tark, aur tathya dikhe. Varnaa nahin. Is qanuun ne hazaaron ke dil ujaagar kiye hain. Is qanuun ne kaiyon ko insaaf dilaayaa hai, kai ghaflaton, ghalatiyon, ghus aur ghor anyaayon ka is qanun ne muquabilaa kiyaa hai. Lekin phir bhii RTI ko aaj bhii ek smarthan kii, support aur backing ki zaruurat hai.

Aaj bhi RTI ke qaanuun banjaane ke baad bhi usko yah kyuun chaahiye ? Vajah yah hai : Yah qanuun kaiyon ke kaanon tak pahunchaa hai, kai hazaaron, lakhon kaanon tak pahunchaa hai, lekin phir bhi kai auron — karoron — ke kaanon ke upar se sarsaraataa huaa pravesh kar gayaa hai daftaron mein. Is baat mein vaise koi kharaabi nahiin. Daftaron ke binaa koi qanuun nahin chaltaa. Lekin daftaron kaa ek ajib tariqaa hotaa hai. Ve qanuunon ko apne kuuchon mein mehmaan banaa dete hain.

Daftaron ki koshish hoti hai ki qanuunon ko kam se kam taqliif ho, ziyaada se ziyaada aaraam miley. Lekin RTI aaraam ke liye nahiin banaa hai. Vah kaam ke liye banaa hai. Usko mehnat chaahiye, raahat nahiin. Daftaron ko RTI se darnaa nahin chaahiye, us se khisakne kii koshish nahiin karnii chaahiye. Mein sarkaari prabandhakon ko kahungaa ki RTI se ek ho jaayiye, usko apnaayiye, uski madad se haqiqat ko pahchaaniye, usko durust kariye. Jab bhii RTI ki tahat public se koi savaal aataa hai sarkaari daftaron ko uskaa svaagat karnaa chaahiye aur uskaa puraa, sahi, aur sachchaa javaab buland aavaaz mein denaa chaahiye.

It is not just RTI’s great good fortune, but India’s that a person of the veracity of Wajahat Habibullah has been India’s first Chief Information Commissioner. He has set RTI on track, set the RTI-Government equation on track. The Chief Information Commissioners in the States have also been working extremely hard, often with inadequate infrastructure, often as single Commissioners, and often without that continual backing from the State Administration that is required. I would like to congratulate all of them on this occasion for what they have achieved. They, with the Lok Ayuktas, and the State Commissions for Human Rights are Institutions of Conscience, They are, what may be called, the Zameer-e -Hind. Pradeshon mein jo commissioner aur PIOs bane hain, unko Rajya sarkaaron se saari suvidhayen aur sammaan milne chaahiye. RTI ki adhikaariyon ko iske liye intezaar karnaa pare yah sarkaari chhabi ke liye thiik nahiin.

RTI mein gopaniyataa kaa ek aham savaal hai. Is se sarkaaron ko kuchh bechainii hoti hai. RTI Act mein gopaniyataa kii surakshaa hui hai. Honi chahiye. Jaise hum hain, vaisa hi desh hai. Humen hum sab ko — kuchh maamlon mein gopaniyataa kii zuruurat hotii hai. Kuchh rishte aise hote hain, jahaan gopaniyataa zuruuri hoti hai. Sarkar aur desh ke rishton mein bhii kuchh aise lamhe aate hain, jahaan gopaniiyataa aavashyak ban jaatii hai. Vaisii gopaniyata kuchh nazaakaton kii hifaazat ke liye hotii hain. Khulepan— transparency — ka yah matlab nahiin ki hum aisii nazaakaton ko bhuul jaayen.

I would certainly include in these the confidential communications between a head of State and head of Government, both at the Centre and in the State. At the same time I would say that whenever an occasion arises when a head of State and head of Government share thoughts on matters of public importance, they must simultaneously take the public into confidence and place in the public domain, an operative summary of their discussions or correspondence to obviate speculation.

File notings kii baat aatii hai. Is par bhii bechainiyaan rahiin hain aur Chief Information Commissioner sahib kii is par aham ruling bhii aayii hai. Main sirf itnaa kah duun ki afsaron or saare note-writers ko notings likhte vaqt muddon par sochnaa chaahiye, haqiqat ko dhyaan mein rakhnaa chaahiye, qanuun ko dhyaan mein rakhnaa chahiye. Notes yah soch kar na likhiye ki ‘kahiin aage jaa kar RTI vaalii taqlioif na ho jaaye’. Aur na hi aisii notes likhne kii koshish kiijiye jis se ki RTI ke taramandal mein aap ek chamaktaa sitaaraa ban jaaen.

The RTI Act should not make note files monosyllabic or laconic, nor should it encourage prolixity in the hope of ‘RTI immortality’. Bureaucracy RTI ke maamle mein apne puraane mindset se abhi baahar aanaa siikh rahii hai. Sadiyon se afsaron ne thakur-suhaati sunii hai, maai-baapii, hukum-huzuurii dekhii hai. Unhe bataayaa gayaa hai ki savaal afsar baithe hue karegaa, javaab uske samne kharaa huaa insaan degaa. Aaj jab afsar RTI ke learner hai, aur RTI shikshak, to unko yah mat kahiye ‘chal utth, khare ho’. Yaa ‘chal utth, sar par khare ho’. Afsar aaj ek baraa pahluu siikh rahaa hai, vishvasaniya aur transparent RTI-compliant shaasan mein, siirshaasan mein nahiin. Gandhiji in Decemeber 30, 1926 ke din ‘Young India’ mein likhaa thaa: “Those who seek justice must come with clean hands”.

‘Clean hands’ means that those using the Act must use it responsibly. The architects and engineers and the persons running the Act should make users of the Act realise the difference between stressing and straining a point, between portraying and exaggerating a situation and between emphasising and magnifying a problem. RTI adherents and users should encourage serious questions and discourage frivolous or malicious ones. I have heard of persons who have been unsuccessful in interviews promptly doing an RTI to challenge the procedures of the appointing authorities, thereby paralysing the functioning of those bodies. A good instrument can be misused.

RTI’s protectors must not let that happen. The RTI Act is a potential remedy for discontent. It should not become a weapon in the hands of malcontents. Discontent in India is a reality. Malcontents in India are no less so. A strict and disciplinarian head-of-office can be bullied by RTI threats. This bullying can be lethal if it is based on deliberate distortions of facts and if it is based on half truths. Even a ‘truth’, a ‘fact’, can sometimes be misused. William Blake
famously said : ‘A truth told with bad intent beats all the lies you can invent’. RTI protectors and NGOs must be mindful of that. RTI should not be used to hurt anyone or anything, except opaqueness. RTI Act afsaron ko haqiqat kii dhuul se vaaqif karne ko hai, uski naak dhuul mein ragadne ke liye nahiin.

Today, RTI is facing probably its greatest challenge. So effective has it become, so rich in results, so amazingly potent that those with something to hide are afraid of it. Fear is a cousin of panic. And so we hear of those who have had the courage to use RTI against the powerful and the entrenched have had to pay dearly for their courage, even with their lives.

This is intolerable. If it is true that the unnatural death of persons who have filed RTI applications is connected with their RTI action, the law-enforcers have to visit the guilty with the speed of light and, under due process, bring the guilty demonstrably to account. And politics should be allowed to play no role in the proceedings. It is as imperative to keep politics out of RTI as it is to keep it out of the judiciary.

In fact, even more so because over the decades the judiciary has built up systems to safeguard its space; RTI establishments are yet to do so. Those who have died in the course of RTI work are martyrs to more than the Right to Information; they are martyrs to transparent and good governance and the rule of law. They are martyrs to the cause of a civilised and liberal rule of law. RTI Act ne logon ko aavaaz dilaayii hai, divaaron ko sunne par majbuur kiyaa hai. Surdas ke shabdon mein: Jaake kripa, Pangu giri langhai, Andhau ko sab kachhu darisaaii, Bahirau sune, guung puni bolai, Ranka chale sir chhatra dharaayii.
    
                                            

                                               PART C:  Informatton on & Around

    SIC’s validity under cloud:

S. 15 of the RTI Act provides that every State Government shall by Notification in the Official Gazette constitute a body to be known as State Information Commission to exercise powers conferred, etc. under the RTI Act. Even after 5 years since the RTI Act, 2005 came into existence, the Maharashtra State Government has not issued such Notification. Technically, all the orders by the Information Commission will be illegal and have no force of law. What a state of affairs !

    SRA biggest job attraction:

The Slum Rehabilitation Authority, building proposal, vigilance and development planning departments are the most lucrative, hence the most sought-after postings in the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation as revealed under the RTI application. According to the information sought by RTI activist Anil Galgali, BMC officials, chiefly engineers are asking for prime postings in these four departments of the Corporation. Further, in order to get postings in these departments, these officials have approached various politicians seeking letters of recommendation from them. According to the RTI reply, the officials seeking the postings have not only got recommendation from state politicians, but also Union Ministers. The SRA, building proposal, vigilance and development planning departments deal with builders who are ready to give big money so that their proposals are passed by the BMC. Further, many transactions take place under the table in these departments.

    SIC’s orders being challenged by the Government:

In a first case of its kind after the landmark Right to Information Act came into force five years ago, the Congress-led Democratic Front Government has refused to implement Chief Information Commissioner Suresh Joshi’s order to provide information to controversial bureaucrat V. M. Lal. Lal had filed an application under RTI before the GAD Public Information officer. He sought specific copies of the notings made by the concerned Department on the ongoing probe against him. A probe was conducted against him by veteran bureaucrat Asoke Basak. Lal’s contention was that Basak had given him a clean chit in all the eight charges. He alleged that on the basis of certain notings in his file, GAD did not agree with the findings of Basak and ultimately it recommended a punishment to him. In his application Lal had asked for all relevant notings and documents. The PIO took the view that since no final decision was taken the entire process remains incomplete. According to provisions of the RTI Act it was not binding on the PIO to provide the information sought. We have received CIC Suresh Joshi’s order to provide information to Lal. In our opinion the order is bad in law. If we implement the order, it will have an adverse impact on the administration. “As per the opinion expressed by the law and judiciary department, now we are moving the High Court against the CIC order,” said a senior official.

    Mhada’s duties:

The Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (Mhada) is duty-bound under the law to give the owner of a repaired building an opportunity to claim a compensation if the value of the debris (mostly Burma teak) turns out to be more than the cost of repairs. RTI query revealed that the relevant rule providing for this point is mostly not observed. There are around 16,000 buildings in Ctentral Mumbai that are more than 70 years old and in dire need of repairs. However, landlords are generally not interested in spending any money on them. The tenants of such buildings pay Mhada a cess in lieu of which it undertakes repairs through its repairs board. Many of these buildings were built from stone/bricks and wood. The wood is largely in good condition and fetches a very high price in the market. Going by the law, the wood becomes the property of the repairs board. However, after repair it is supposed to give a formal notice to the landlord that he may submit a claim for compensation if he feels that the cost of the wood is more than the cost of repair. RTI activist Milind Mulay found out that though 1,740 buildings were repaired using the cess and MLA/MLC fund between April 1, 2006 and November 14, 2009, not a single landlord was given this notice. It is surprising how senior officers who sign the file before releasing payment to the contractor do not notice the violation of their own rule.

    `26 lakh vanished:

Nearly `26 lakh collected by the BEST to provide relief after 1971 Bangladesh war seems to have vanished into thin air. The BEST had collected the amount from bus commuters as the Bangladesh Refugee Relief Surcharge from 1971-73 and the Scarcity Relief Surcharge in 1973-74. However, neither the BEST nor the Transport Commissioner’s office where it claims to have deposited the money has any information on how the money was spent. This was revealed when RTI activist Manoranjan Roy filed an application asking the BEST how much money was collected as surcharge and where it wasspent. The BEST revealed that it had collected `13.85 lakh under the head of ‘Bangladesh Refugee Relief Surcharge’ from December 1971 to March 1973 and a sum of `12.94 lakh under the head of ‘Scarcity Relief Surcharge’ from April 1973 to March 1974. However, the BEST said that it had deposited the money with the transport department as the sum is collected on behalf of the Government of Maharashtra and was being remitted to the office of the Transport Commissioner every month. When Roy filed an RTI with the Transport Commis-sioner’s office, the department admitted that such surcharges imposed by the BEST were deposited with it, but said it had no record of the `26 lakh. Roy has now filed a PIL, demanding an inquiry into the management of funds by BEST.

    `45 crore vanished:

Bet you did not know this — every time you pay for your local train ticket fare you end up paying a fraction of the amount as ‘safety charges’. Central Railway (CR) collected `45 crore as safety charges during 2008-2009. However, they have no idea as to how this money has been utilised. The safety charge is collected to provide safety to passengers and other amenities. It includes construction of flyovers at unmanned railway crossings, boundary walls, purchasing safety devices for track maintenance, track replacements, putting posters on railway-crossing gate and signalling equipment. Kalbadevi-based social activist, Pravin Tripathi, had filed a Right to Information application seeking details about the safety charges collection of 2008-2009. CR replied to him saying: “The details of used-up money collected as safety charges `45,45,73,426 (for 2008-2009) is not available in this office, hence cannot be provided.” “Railways should have provided me details about the usage of safety charges collected but they failed to. I think it’s because the amount has not been used for passengers and they should, therefore, return this amount to passengers,” Tripathi told MID-DAY. “If a year’s collection works out to `45 crore, for 10 years it may add up to around `450 crore. The railways should furnish details about our money, there is no passenger safety at stations, no ambulance, no first-aid box at stations”, said Tripathi. Do you know that approximately 37 lakh people commute on the Central Railway every day?

    Private schools now fall within RTI Act ambit:

The CIC has ruled that private educational institutions— whether government-funded bodies, and issues related to their management and regulation come under the ambit of the Right to Information.

    File notings being shielded:

Bureaucrats manage to hide file notings on all files and petitions processed at Andhra Pradesh State Secretariat. They use stick-notes (post-its) on all files in the State Secretariat as these can be removed in case of an RTI query, leaving no trace of favoritism. There’s colour coding too. A particular colour means a particular minister is perusing the file (with a vested interest). Also, ink colour indicates the sign of approval or otherwise, etc. Any noting in black usually means negative, blue means neutral, green means clear and magenta means relaxation of rules!

Securities Laws : A Tale of Two Amendments — Recent controversial amendments by SEBI

fiogf49gjkf0d

r2i

Part A : CIC’s decisions



Very interesting and significant issue before CIC :


The applicant, Shri Arun Agrawal, has sought following
information from CPIO, Ministry of Law and Justice :

“Entire file containing papers along with notings, etc.
relating to the appointment and scope of the brief of special envoy Shri
Virendra Dayal to obtain papers relating to Volcker Report and his report to
the Ministry after meeting the UN officials.”


The application was transferred to the Ministry of External
Affairs and then to the Prime Minister’s Office and then to the Ministry of
Finance, Department of Revenue. Everybody denied having such a file in their
office.

The appellant’s prayer before CIC are :

“It appears reasonable to conclude that the Special Envoy
and the Enforcement Directorate deliberately did not collect the documents for
contract M/09/35, M/10/17 and M/11/25 by which allotments were made to
Reliance Petroleum on payment of illegal surcharge.

It is for this reason that the documents are sought and it
is for this reason that the Government has invoked the provisions of Clause
8(1)(a) of the RTI Act 2005.”


On account of the Volcker Report, Shri Natwar Singh had to
resign as the Foreign Minister. Allegation of Shri Arun Agrawal is as follows :

“Documents from the Volcker report establish that Reliance
was a non-contractual beneficiary for lifting five times more oil than shown
to have been lifted by Congress and Natwar Singh combined. It figures in every
table of the oil for food programme report of the U.N., in which the names of
the Congress and Natwar figure (Annexure A — the five tables in which Indian
entity figures). The contract nos. for Reliance Petroleum in which it figured
as non-contractual beneficiary and paid illegal surcharge were M/09/35,
M/10/17 and M/11/25.

The Government deliberately did not refer the said
contracts in which Reliance Petroleum was the non-contractual beneficiary
(according to the Volcker Report) while referring the non-contractual
beneficiary contract No. M/10/57 of Congress Party and contract No. M/09/54 of
Natwar Singh, to the Pathak Inquiry Authority for reasons well known.”


To determine this issue, CIC decided to examine the Virendra
Dayal Report and find out who holds this report. All the three parties have
denied having such report in their records. It was then gathered that probably
the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) holds this report. The said DoE informed
that they fall under the 2nd schedule of the RTI Act and hence exempt to
disclose information. DoE further volunteered to say that the matter is under
investigation and therefore exempt u/s.8(1)(h) of the RTI Act.

The question that is now to be determined by CIC is as to
whether an exemption claimed u/s.24(1) in this manner can be acceptable by a
quasi-judicial authority acting under a Statute (i.e., CIC).

Under the circumstances, the Commission decided to call for a
report from the Directorate of Enforcement which has to be submitted within 7
days from the date of receipt of the Order affirming :

(i) whether the information asked for by the applicant,
i.e.,
entire file containing papers along with notings, etc. relating to
the appointment, scope of brief of special envoy, Shri Virendra Dayal, to
obtain papers relating to Volcker Report and his report to the Ministry after
meeting the UN officials is held by them or not ?

(ii) to file their written submissions as to why this
Commission should not order its disclosure under the First Proviso to S. 24(1)
of the Act ?


In (ii) above, if the plea is taken that the information
cannot be disclosed u/s.8(1)(h), the Directorate will submit reasons for the
same as required by the Delhi High Court in cases of this nature in W.P.(C) No.
3114/2007 — Shri Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information Commissioner and Ors.

This decision is made on 15-9-2008. We wait anxiously to find
out what is finally determined in this case — both as to corruption charge on
Reliance Petroleum and the powers of CIC v. the Protection u/s.24(1) of the
RTI Act
.

[Shri Arun Agrawal v. PMO, No. 2nd Adjunct to Appeal
No. CIC/WB/A/2007/00417, dated 15-9-2008]



  •  Multiple RTI applications :


The appellant, Shri Ajay Sharma asked for huge information to
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited through different RTI applications
related to sanctioned strength of employees at different levels and the details
of functioning of canteen.

The information asked for has been denied stating that it is
not in public interest.

Decision :

On perusal of the documents submitted by the parties, it is noted that both the parties have erred. The appellant has unnecessarily submitted multiple applications for seeking information relating to canteen and staffing pattern, which are not confidential. The appellant should have asked for the information through a single application and also submitted only one appeal before the Commission against the decision of the respondent, which could have economised the resources in seeking and providing the information. Likewise, the CPIO could have given a comprehensive response in respect of all the appeals, rather then giving an identical reply in all the cases.

In view of the foregoing, the appellant is advised to prepare a comprehensive list of required information and resubmit to the CPIO, who should provide a pointwise response and thus furnish the information on the basis of available records within 15 working days from the date of receipt of fresh application. If any information is to be denied, the reasons for doing so should clearly be indicated for review, if necessary, by the Commission. The applicant should be free to seek inspection of relevant records and files so as to clearly specify the required information.

CIC also made a remark that a large amount of information asked for should be put in public domain in compliance of with S. 4(1) of the RTI Act.

[Shri Ajay Sharma v. HPCL, decision No. 3199/ IC(A)/2008, dated 1-9-2008]


Part B : The RTI Act

Attempt is being made that in this part besides reporting on the development and discussions on RTI Act at various forums, some Courts’ decisions be reported. Herewith that beginning:

S. 8(1)(j) :

Issue:

Whether information disclosing the names of the persons including address and amount, who have received more than Rs.1 lac from the Chief Minister Discretionary Fund can be given to the information seeker or it is an information, which stands exempted u/s.8(1)G) of the Act.

Held:

That the information asked for is not an information which is covered u/s.8(1)(j), nor does it stand exempted otherwise.

S.11:

Issue:

When beneficiary of the grant from Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund is under an obligation to use the money so paid for the very same purpose, for which it has been paid – with the obligation upon the beneficiary to return the unused money in one go, and that too within the prescribed period, for which utilisation certificate has to be furnished by the District Magistrate after necessary verification – can it be said that it is an information which can seek confidentiality within meaning of S. 11 of the Act or can be treated as confidential by the beneficiary, treating it to be a third-party information.

Held: No

[PlO, Chief Minister Office v. SIC, UP and Others, decided on 1-7-2008 by the High Court of Allahabad]

Part C : Other News

• Seam in PM’s and CM’s special relief packages:

RTI application has revealed that a six-time former MP and relatives of a sitting MLA besides several former MLAs are among the well-off people who have helped themselves to the relief measures meant for poor, bereaved families in Yavatmal district, the epicenter of the farmers’ suicides.

The revelations point to large-scale corruption and irregularities in the implementation of the schemes. The schemes were meant to help the near and dear ones of those indebted farmers who were the sole breadwinners of their families and who had ended their lives, or other BPL families living along the State dairy’s milk procurement route. Its purpose was to enable the distressed families to supplement their income as farming had become uneconomical in this mainly unirrigated cotton-growing region.

• Dwindling number of tigers in Maharashtra’s forests:

The Times of India invoked the Right to Information Act to find out how much time the field directors spent on the field and found out that, on an average, they spent just 50 days a year inside forests. This has had a disastrous effect on wildlife management, say former forest officials and environmentalists, and may be one of the reasons that have led to the dwindling number of tigers in Maharashtra’s forests.

•  Medical  Insurance  card:

Allwyn Ribeiro was most irked when he was turned away for the nth time by the Government Hospital at Byculla, Mumbai. The 43-year-old office superintendent for Central Railways had made three earlier trips to the hospital to collect his medical insurance card.

Frustrated,  on the advice of an RTI activist, Ribeiro filed RTI application  and asked the Public Information Officer of the Byculla  hospital  about:  (a) the progress  of his file, and  (b) how many  such applications  they had  processed  in the last six months. He hardly expected his application to prompt such efficacy. “The very next day I received a call from the hospital to say ‘Come, pick up your card’,” says Ribeiro, who now swears by the effectiveness of the RTI Act.

• Four new Central Information Commissioners (CIC) :

Present CIC has five Commissioners including the Chief CIC. In this month (September) 4 more CICs are appointed:

Most interesting and unexpected, is the appointment of Shailesh Gandhi. He can be ranked as one of the most senior and effective RTI activists in the country. Entire RTI-activists’ community is looking forward to great performance by him, especially, in reduction of pendency of appeals in CIC office.

• UTI under RTI ?
The Bombay High Court has stayed the Central Information Commission (CIC)’s Order on the applicability of the Right to Information Act, 2005 on UTI Asset Management Company. UTI Mutual Fund and UTI Trustee Company have filed a writ petition challenging the CIC’s Order.

CIC had ruled that “Even though there is no specific provision in the RTI Act that a body owned, controlled or substantially funded by another public authority is also a public authority, yet from the purpose and object of the RTI Act, it is crystal clear that there should be transparency in the functioning of any institution, in which public money is deployed. The four sponsors are public authorities and when they, in turn, own another entity, such an entity has to be treated as a public authority.

Economic Times reports on RTI :

A very well-written article appeared in The Economic Times on 19-9-2008 written by two journalists. Extract from it :

What could a labourer running from pillar to post for his ration card, a student waiting eagerly for his passport, a housewife struggling without water supply or a senior citizen suffering due to pollution caused by an unauthorised factory near his residence have in common? The Right to Information (RTI) Act – the salvation for these diverse problems.

A notable achievement of the UPA Government along with the Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, this key to information has empowered the aam aadmi to fight the formidable fortress of secrecy that enabled unscrupulous babus to shirk work and breed corruption. RTI is no magic that can make corruption vanish in a jiffy, but it has put the fear of scrutiny firmly in the minds of Government employees. Gone is the air of confidence that enabled the corrupt in the Government to demand ‘speed money’ openly without any apprehension of being caught. The experience till now suggests that most Government departments attempt to clear pending work when they are questioned and responsibility is fixed.

Arbitration & Other Laws

Laws and Business

Introduction :

An arbitration is always a fall out of disputes. Disputes
occur for various reasons and under various laws. Hence, while dealing with an
arbitration, one needs to keep in mind the provisions of the other laws. They
more often than not, would have a bearing upon the arbitration proceedings or
the award or the validity of the same. One must always remember that an
arbitration is not an island by itself. It draws on and feeds on other laws.



2. Arbitration &
Company Law :


One of the foremost questions which arises is the necessity
for a company to have an arbitration clause in its memorandum of association. It
is not an object of a company to refer matters to Arbitration but it is a power.
Hence, it is not necessary for a company to have an arbitration clause in its
memorandum of association, but it is definitely advisable.

The next question which arises is who can refer a matter for
arbitration on behalf of a company. A variety of persons can refer a dispute to
arbitration :

  •       Board of Directors


  •      Managing Director


  •      Any Committee/Executive specifically authorised by the Board to do so


  •      Any Power of Attorney holder of the Company.





However, this would be subject to any express provisions on
this aspect in of memorandum and articles of association.

2.3 Disputes which are typical to a company and which can be
referred to ‘arbitration’ may include those arising on account of :

  •    Oppression & Mismanagement


  •  Shareholders’/Joint Venture Agreement


  •  Share Subscription Agreement


  •  Agreements with VCs/Private Equity

Oppression & Mismanagement :


S. 397 and S. 398 of the Companies Act provide for a petition to the Company
Law Board in all cases of oppression of minority by majority and mismanagement
of the affairs of the company by the majority. The question that arises, is can
the agreement between parties provide that the same would be referred to
arbitration ?

S. 8 and S. 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
provide that a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter
which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies
not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the
dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. Further, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a judicial authority, when
seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming
through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
The CLB has exclusive jurisdiction for all matters u/s.397 and u/s.398 but that
does not preclude reference to arbitration. Thus, S. 8 and S. 45 are mandatory
provisions and if the petition matters are within the scope of the arbitration
agreement, then the CLB is bound to refer the issues to arbitration.

However, the CLB cannot order a reference to arbitration
unless a party to the proceedings applies for the same — EIH Ltd. v. Mashobra
Resort, 119 Comp. Cases 993 (CLB). If the oppression petition is contested by
the parties on merits without reference to arbitration, then the CLB would not
grant any stay against the petition — Suresh Jain v. Hindustan Ferro, 96 Comp.
Cases 507 (CLB).

The CLB will decide all matters of oppression and
mismanagement even which are outside the scope of the arbitration agreement —
Khandwala Securities Ltd. v. Kowa Spinning Ltd., 97 Comp. Cases 632 (CLB).

Joint venture/Shareholders’ agreement :


JV/shareholders’ agreements provide for the ‘Management and
Conduct of Business’ of a Company. A usual clause found in such agreements is
that all disputes would be referred to arbitration. A question which arises is
that can the company also be made a party to the arbitration along with the JV
partners/shareholders ?

Articles of association are the regulations which bind a
company and its shareholders. Only if the provisions of arbitration are
incorporated in the articles of association, can the company be made a party to
such proceedings :

  •  Shanti Prasad v. Kalinga Tubes, (1965) 35 Comp. Cases 351 (SC)


  •  V. B. Rangaraj v. V. B. Gopalkrishnan, (1992) 73 Comp. Cases 201 (SC)


  • B. K. Shah v. Magotteaux Int., 111 Comp. Cases 220 (CLB)







A transfer of shares pursuant to an arbitration award is not
a case of a transfer, but it is a transmission of shares by operation of law.
Thus, it falls under the second proviso to S. 108 of the Companies Act and does
not require a transfer form for the company to register the transfer of shares.
The transfer in such a case is not based upon the volition of the parties, but
by operation of law — Dinesh Nagindas Shah v. Pankaj Aluminium Industries P.
Ltd., 102 SCL 161 (Bom.).

A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Western Maharashtra Development Corporation v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., reported in (2010) 154 Comp. Cases 593 (Bom.), had ruled that an Arbitration Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give an award on the basis of a Shareholders’ Agreement containing restrictive clauses in the SHA. This was because the SHA itself was invalid, since the articles of a public company could not contain clauses restricting the transfer of shares and it was contrary to S. 108 of the Companies Act, 1956. Hence, the arbitration agreement which was founded on the SHA was void. The Arbitrator had ignored the express provision of S. 108 and lost sight of the very concept of free transferability of shares of a public limited company. Hence, his award was set aside. Very recently, a two-Member Bench of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Ruia and Others, (Appeal No. 855 of 2003) has overruled this decision of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. Hence, as the position now stands, an arbitration award dealing with restrictive clauses in a public limited company would be valid. This is a very important judgment since almost all PE/VC/ JV agreements as well as shareholders’ agreements contain such clauses. Thus, if any dispute arises on these clauses, the parties can apply for arbitration.


Winding-up petitions :

Can a petition for winding-up of a company u/s.433 of the Companies Act be referred to arbitration? Various decisions have held that an arbitration clause does not oust jurisdiction of a Court for winding-up petitions. Only disputes are referable to arbitration. A petition for winding-up is not an ‘action’. The power to order a winding-up is only under the Companies Act and only with the High Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Telecom v. Sterlite Industries Ltd., 97 Comp. Cases 683 (SC), has held that a claim in a petition for winding-up is not for money. Hence, no reference to arbitration can be made for winding-up of a company. Further, arbitration proceedings are not a bar to winding-up petitions — ABG Heavy Ind. v. Hindustan Shipyard, (2001) 105 Comp. Cases 413 (Bom.).

In Hewlett Packard v. BPL Net Com, (2002) 110 Comp. Cases 575 (Kar.), the Court held that if there is an arbitration clause in an agreement, the Court can yet entertain a winding-up petition as per its discretion. There is no automatic stay on winding-up merely because the subject-matter of dispute carries an arbitration clause. An arbitration agreement is binding on a company even after a winding-up petition. The legal status of the company continues till the company is dissolved. The only change is that instead of the Board of Directors the Liquidator steps into its shoes :

  •     Goetze India v. Pure Drinks, (1999) 3 Comp. LJ. 68 & (1994) 80 Comp. Cases 363 (P&H)

  •     Maruti Ltd. v. B. G. Shirke & Co., (1981) 51 Comp. Cases 11 (P&H)

    446 of the Companies Act provides that once an order for winding-up is made, no suit/legal proceeding can be initiated against the company unless permission of Court is taken. Proceedings would also include ‘arbitration proceedings’. Thus, the leave of the Court would be required to commence arbitration proceedings against such a company — British India Corp. v. S.S. & T. Machinery, (2001) 106 Comp. Cases 467 (Kar.). The Court can declare an arbitration/ award to be null if done without its permission. Permission of the Court ordering winding-up is a must. Even a third party can plead that arbitration is null if no Court permission was obtained — Vasantha Ramanan v. Official Liquidator, (2003) 114 Comp. Cases 747 (Mad.).

VC/Private Equity Agreement :

These agreements always provide for a Deadlock Resolution between the Management Team and Venture Capital Funds. The usual clause provides that :

  •     The disputes would be first resolved through friendly consultations.

  •     If the disputes are yet not resolved, then arbitration would be the exclusive means of resolving any dispute.

Arbitration and HUF :

A question which arises is that who has power to refer to arbitration on behalf of an HUF? The father/ manager/karta has power to refer disputes relating to joint family property to arbitration, provided reference is for the benefit of the family — Shantilal v. Munshilal, (1932) 56 AIR 595 (Bom). Other members of the HUF are bound by the reference and the award made thereon — Balaji v. Nana, (1903) 27 Bom 287.

An agreement between HUF members to appoint arbitrators for partition amounts to a severance of the joint status of the HUF from the date of the agreement — Kashinathsa v. Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077.

An arbitration award is liable to ‘stamp duty’ of Rs.100 under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. An award is defined as a decision in writing of an Arbitrator/ Umpire made on reference for submitting differences, not being an award directing a partition.

However, if it is an instrument of partition, then the duty is different. An instrument of partition includes an award by an a arbitrator directing a partition. The duty on the same is levied @ 2% on the market value of the separated share of the property. Thus, the value on which stamp duty is levied is the total market value of the property less the largest share partitioned. If all shares are equal, then deduct any one share.

Arbitration and registration :

Earlier there was a controversy on whether an ‘arbitration award’ needed to be registered under the Registration Act, 1908. However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi, AIR 1955 SC 491, Kashinathsa v. Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077, M. Chelamayya v. M. Venkatratanam, AIR 1972 SC 1121 have clarified the position as follows :

    a) If the award creates right, title and interest in immovable property, then registration is compulsory.

    b) If it is a mere declaration of a pre-existing rights or reference to past partition and not creating right in praesenti — then ‘no registration’ is required.

    c) An ‘unregistered award’ which affects or purports to affect right, title or interest in any immovable property is inadmissible as evidence.

    d) However, an unregistered award is a valid award and not a waste paper. It creates rights and obligations between the parties.

In Akbarali v. Mumtaz Hussain, AIR 1987 Bom. 39 it was held that if a right is claimed under the award or is to be enforced by way of a suit, then registration of the award is a must. In Harendra Mehta v. Mukesh Mehta, (1999) 97 Comp. Case 265 (SC), it was held that foreign awards need not be registered.

In Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kaur, AIR 1970 SC 833, the Court held that if the award affects the partition of immovable property, then it requires registration.

Conclusion:

Whether a CA appears as a representative of one of the parties as an advisor, as an arbitrator, as a valuer or as an expert, he must always bear in mind the interplay of other laws on the award. A slip-up on any one law may render the award ineffective/ unenforceable. One is reminded of Humbert Wolfe’s golden quote :

“Making innumerable statutes, men
Merely confuse what God achieved in ten ! !”

Stamp duty on conveyances — Across India

Part A — Classification of services

CONTROL SELF ASSESSMENT IN RETAIL STORE AUDITS

Internal Audit

Every successful audit is based on sound planning and an
atmosphere of constructive involvement and communication between the auditor and
the auditee. The purpose of writing this article is to provide insights on the
use of a tool for organisations with dispersed geographical locations,
especially the retail sector.

Any corporate body establishes Internal Controls & Procedures
to ensure that employees abide by laws, regulations and human resources policies
when performing tasks. One of the many tools available to gauge internal control
effectiveness for organisations is the Control Self Assessment (CSA) activities.

Definition of Control :

The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines control and
control processes as :

“A control is any action taken by management, the board, and
other parties to manage risk and increase the likelihood that established
objectives and goals will be achieved. The management plans, organises, and
directs performance of sufficient actions to provide reasonable assurance that
objectives and goals will be achieved.

Control processes are the policies, procedures, and
activities that are part of a control framework, designed to ensure that risks
are contained within the risk tolerances established by the risk management
process. Risk management is a process to identify, assess, manage, and control
potential events or situations to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of the organisation’s objectives.”

Generally, controls are of two types :

Preventive controls :

Designed to discourage errors or prevent irregularities from
occurring. They are proactive controls that help prevent a loss. Examples :
Separation of duties, proper authorisation, adequate documentation, and physical
control over assets.

Detective controls :

Designed to find errors or irregularities after they have
occurred. Examples : Reviews, analyses, variance analyses, reconciliations,
physical inventories and audits.

Internal controls are policies and instructions within an
organisation that top leadership puts into place to prevent losses resulting
from malfunction, employee carelessness, error, fraud and neglect. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, introduced as a consequences of internal control
failures across the globe, has emphasised that the need for internal control
compliance & documentation.

From a retail perspective, there is an increased attention to
governance, compliance and risk management spread across many thousands of
locations. This necessitates retailers to implement an appropriate store
compliance process in order to monitor the identification of issues and remedial
measures. Primary focus of retailers is on reducing costs, increasing margins,
reducing shrinks, balancing inventory levels, managing vendors, tackling
regulators and attracting customers.

An effective store compliance process can be achieved through
traditional store audits or through a self assessment technique.




 Traditional Audits :



  •  In a traditional audit, the internal audit team
    identifies issues and suggests remedial measures. The field work is
    undertaken by the audit team which visits the stores. The major challenge in
    this traditional approach is that all stores may not be visited and/or there
    can be infrequent coverage. The audit team personnel require training,
    travel budgets and their presence ‘interrupts’ store operations. Undoubtedly
    such an approach is costly, untimely and at times ineffective.


  Control self assessment :



  •   Control self assessment is operations oriented. It provides auditors with
    additional hands and eyes, specialised expertise, operational
    knowledge and a commitment to implement internal audit recommendations. To
    implement the CSA methodology, it is imperative that there is a buy-in by
    the top management. Training to all operating managers is another critical
    pre-requisite. CSA is a cost effective and efficient alternative for wider
    store audit coverage. Wider coverage leads to increased availability of
    information for managing and monitoring retail operations. CSA significantly
    increases the accountability of the store managers who, in any case, are the
    control owners and places the responsibility of control in their hands.




Why CSA ?

Who is responsible for internal control? The auditors, right?
Wrong! Everyone plays a part in the internal control system. Ultimately, it is
the management’s responsibility to ensure that controls are in place. That
responsibility is delegated to each area of operation, which must ensure that
internal controls are established, properly documented and maintained. Every
employee has some responsibility towards the functioning of this internal
control system. Therefore, all employees need to be aware of the concept and
purpose of internal controls. Internal audit’s role is to assist management in
their overlooking and operating responsibilities through independent audits and
consultations designed to evaluate and promote the systems of internal control.

This is where CSA, as a technique, can play an important
role. Modern Internal Auditors need to understand and practise this technique.

CSA defined :

The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines Control Self
Assessment as :

“Control self assessment (CSA) is a technique that allows
managers and work teams directly involved in business units, functions or
processes to participate in assessing the organisation’s risk management and
control processes. In its various forms, CSA can cover objectives, risks,
controls and processes.”

Internal auditors can utilise CSA programmes for gathering
relevant information about risks and controls; for focussing audit work on high
risk, unusual areas; and to forge greater collaboration with operating managers
and work teams. Business Managers can utilise CSA programmes to clarify business
objectives and to identify and deal with the risks in achieving those
objectives.

Internal auditors, in a consulting role, often act as facilitators to help managers in the assessment of risks and controls. Involvement of people working in evaluation of risks and controls utilises the expertise of the organisation, increases buy-in to any action items and focusses efforts on important business activities.

However, CSA is not a complete process by itself. It does not substitute the auditing effort. The audit function has to validate the CSA results, develop the remedial action plan and ensure a timely follow-up on issues identified during the CSA process. This combined effort is the most cost effective and result-oriented method of monitoring all stores on a regular basis.

Benefits of CSA in retail:

  •     Better buy-in of results because of the participative and collaborative approach.

  •     Does not require a battalion of internal auditors.

  •     Ensures complete coverage of all stores.

  •     Optimum utilisation of all resources for an audit.

  •     Cost effective.

  •     Better appreciation of issues since the store managers have a more intimate eye on store operations.

  •     Focus is on key risks & controls which is monitored by the corporate audit team.

  •     Store managers can give more appropriate remedial measures requiring corporate audit only to review and follow-up on the remedial plans.

  •     Helps store managers to understand and assume responsibility and accountability for effective control and risk.

Pre-requisites of an effective CSA in retail:

  •     Mature state of operations.

  •     Corporate culture should support and value communication, openness and trust.

  •     Organisation should have clear objectives.
  •     Internal Audit should study existing processes deeply.

  •     Clearly defined parameters for CSA.

  •     System to collect, corroborate and analyse information collected through CSA.

  •     Training of staff.

    Lastly, ‘above par’ facilitation skills of the Internal Auditor. In most successful implementation of CSA, the top-most reason for successes has been the facilitation skills of the Internal Auditor.

Undoubtedly, CSA is an integrated part of the audit process for mitigating risks and adding value to the organisations, especially in retail.

 

Sr.

Review
area

Compliance status

 

 

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Yes/No/NA)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cashiering

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

Entire cash sales for the day is deposited

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2

All
credit card sales for the day are supported by credit card slips

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3

Sales
through other mode of payments (MOP) such as gift coupons, etc. are

 

 

 

 

backed by the MOP

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4

Petty
cash, float cash & sales cash are kept separately

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5

Petty
cash expenditure is authorised by store manager

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6

Petty
cash expenditure is recorded on a daily basis

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inventory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7

Goods
receipt notes are prepared for all goods received in the store

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8

Damaged
goods are segregated and kept separately in the backroom

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9

Expired
goods are identified and kept separately in the backroom

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10

All
damaged and expired goods received during the month are sent back to the

 

 

 

 

distribution centre/vendor in the last week of the month

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11

Physical
inventory verification is carried out as per plan

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Front Office Management

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12

Goods
are arranged on the shelves as per the planogram of the store

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13

Correct
labels are displayed on the shelves

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

14

High-shrink
items are kept near the cashier

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

15

Near-expiry
items are identified and marked down as per policy

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

17

Promotion
schemes launched in the store are properly updated in the billing

 

 

 

 

software

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Legal & Compliance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

18

All
certificates requiring mandatory display are displayed

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19

All
certificates expiring during the month are sent for renewal

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

20

Notice,
if any, received from any government department is immediately

 

 

 

 

communicated to the central legal department of the company

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPREME COURT ON PUNISHMENT UNDER SECURITIES LAWS — Prohibition to access securities markets is only a procedural direction

fiogf49gjkf0d

Securities Laws

(1) The Supreme Court has
recently laid down a principle in securities laws that can have far-reaching
effects for existing and future cases. Essentially, it has held that prohibiting
a person from operating in the securities markets is not a ‘punishment’, nor is
it a penalty. That being so, even if SEBI did not have power to so prohibit when
the act complained of took place, and though such power was derived many years
later, such prohibition can still be made for such act. Undoubtedly, this is
because of the peculiar nature of securities laws and their objectives.
Nevertheless, this decision requires us to view securities laws in a different
light and in a special way and hence this decision, though a few months old now,
is worth discussing.

(2) In an extreme sense (and
even to exaggerate a little), SEBI now does not need powers to punish. A change
in the law is sufficient to cover even old violations. Now, SEBI cannot complain
that it does not have enough teeth to deal with wrongdoers !

(3) Let us summarise the
issues involved first. The law gives powers to SEBI to issue various types of
orders against persons who are found to have violated any of the securities
laws. As it happens with experience, the Parliament modifies from time to time
the law and thus the powers may get enhanced or modified later on. Will SEBI be
able to use such enhanced powers even in respect of violations prior to such
amendment ? Will the constitutional protection under Article 20 against
retrospective amendment of law providing for punishment in respect of offences
be available in such a case ? The Supreme Court has answered this question in
the positive in the context of securities laws in the matter of SEBI v. Ajay
Agarwal
.

(4) A brief review of the
facts as stated in the decision is first made. The chronology of events would
particularly need to be noted, since they have direct bearing on the issues
raised and the final decision of the Court.

(5) It appears that the
respondent is the promoter of a company (Appellant is SEBI) that made a public
issue. Without going into more details, it can be summarised that, as per the
decision, there was a factual finding that there were certain material
false statements in the prospectus
for the public issue. Pursuant to this,
SEBI held inquiries and after proceedings SEBI passed the final order (‘the
Order’) in 2004.

(6) The chronology of
important events is as follows. The company issued a prospectus in October 1993
and the public issue was made in November 1993. Thereafter, certain incorrect
statements were found in the prospectus relating to disclosures of pledge of
shareholding of the promoters, dividends, etc. Apparently, these were not
disputed. Finally, SEBI passed an order debarring the respondent from buying,
selling, etc. in the securities markets for 5 years.

(7) This order finally
reached the Supreme Court. The essential issue was, since the order was passed
under certain provisions of the SEBI Act that came into force only in 2002,
whether an order could be made in respect of violations committed in 1993.
SEBI’s point was that the order was passed in 2004, i.e., after the law
was amended. It may be added that there were some prior proceedings and issues
but the Supreme Court was concerned with the final order passed in 2004.

(8) This raises a
fundamental constitutional issue (in the words of the Supreme Court) “the right
of a person not to be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in
force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence and not to
be subject to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under
the law in force at the time of commission of the offence”.

(9) The Supreme Court noted
that for this protection under Article 20 to be available, first, there has to
be an offence and, secondly, such offence should be subject to a
penalty.

(10) The Supreme Court noted
that the respondent was not subjected to any penalty. The Supreme Court first
observed, :

“In the instant case, the
respondent has not been held guilty of committing any offence nor has he been
subjected to any penalty. He has merely been restrained by an order for a
period of five years from associating with any corporate body in accessing the
securities market and also has been prohibited from buying, selling or dealing
in securities for a period of five years.”

(11) Then, the Supreme Court
turned to the issue whether the violation in respect of which SEBI had passed
the order was an ‘offence’ as defined in law. The Supreme Court held as
follows :

“The word ‘offence’ under
Article 20 sub-clause (1) of the Constitution has not been defined under the
Constitution. But Article 367 of the Constitution states that unless the
context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply for the
interpretation of the Constitution, as it does for the interpretation of an
Act.

If we look at the
definition of ‘offence’ under the General Clauses Act, 1897 it shall mean any
act or an omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.
Therefore, the order of restrain for a specified period cannot be equated with
punishment for an offence as has been defined under the General Clauses Act.”

(12) The Supreme Court then
analysed the history and object of the SEBI Act and observed as follows :

“If we look at the legislative intent for enacting the said Act, it transpires that the same was enacted to achieve the twin purposes of promoting orderly and healthy growth of securities market and for protecting the interest of the investors. The requirement of such an enactment was felt in view of substantial growth in the capital market by increasing participation of the investors. In fact such enactment was necessary in order to ensure the confidence of the investors in the capital market by giving them some protection.

40. The said Act is pre-eminently a social welfare legislation seeking to protect the interests of common men who are small investors.

41. It is a well-known canon of construction that when the Court is called upon to interpret provisions of a social welfare legislation, the paramount duty of the Court is to adopt such an interpretation as to further the purposes of law and if possible eschew the one which frustrates it.

    42.Keeping this principle in mind if we analyse some of the provisions of the Act, it appears that the Board has been established u/s.3 as a body corporate and the powers and functions of the Board have been clearly stated in Chapter IV and u/s.11 of the said Act.”

    13. Then the Court considered the real nature of the powers that enabled SEBI to pass such an order of restraint. The Court held that this was a procedural Section and any procedural Section can apply to pending as well as future proceedings. The Supreme Court observed:

“Provisions of S. 11-B being procedural in nature can be applied retrospectively…  The Appellate Tribunal made a manifest error by not appreciating that S. 11-B is procedural in nature. It is a time- honoured principle if the law affects matters of procedure, then prima facie it applies to all actions, pending as well as future.”

    14. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the order of SEBI restraining the respondent in the manner stated earlier.

    15. One observation of the Supreme Court, though may be held as obiter dicta, is still worth noting as it could be taken in an extreme sense by SEBI and applied in its proceedings. It is stated in paragraph 37 of the order of the Supreme Court that:

“Even if penalty is imposed after an adjudicatory proceeding, person on whom such penalty is imposed cannot be called an accused.”.

This statement is not taken further to a logical conclusion perhaps because this was not the issue before the Court. But it would be interesting to see how SEBI views this statement in its later decisions. One can imagine that even if power to levy penalties through adjudicatory orders is procedural, then the powers of SEBI would be even stronger and more discretionary and with lesser safeguards than one would expect.

    16. To conclude, the Supreme Court has laid an important precedent not just in terms of the subject matter of this decision, but also in the approach towards interpretation of securities laws and how securities laws should be treated differently. Securities laws, thus, is well on its way to becoming a special and very distinct subject by itself to which many general rules of interpretation may not apply.

Amendments in Port/AIrpor Services

1. Statutory provisions :

[Finance Act, 1994, (as amended from time to time) ‘Act’]

(a) Port Services :

S. 65(82) of the Act :

‘Port Service’ means any service rendered within a port or other port in any manner.

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services means any service provided or to be provided :

(zn) to any person by any other person in relation to port services in a port in any manner :

Provided that the Provisions of S. 65A shall not apply to any services when the same is rendered wholly within the port :

. . . . . . . . .

(zzl) to any person, by any other person, in relation to port services in other port in any manner :

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within other port :

(b) Airport Services :

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services mean any service provided or to be provided :

(zzm) to any person, by airports authority or by any other person, in any airport or a civil enclave.

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within the airport or civil enclave.

2. Departmental clarifications :

(a) Extracts from Department Circular DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU, dated 26-2-2010) —(Annexure B) :

1. Service provided in an airport or port :

    1.1 Two services, namely, Port Services and the Airport Services were introduced in Budget 2001 and 2004, respectively. The services provided by minor ports covered under other port became taxable from 2003. The purpose behind creating these was that since a number of activities are undertaken within the premises of port and airports, it would be easier to consolidate all such services under one head.

    1.2 It was reported that divergent practices are being followed regarding classification of services being performed within port/airport area. In some places all services performed in these areas (even those falling within the definition of other taxable services) are being classified under the port/airport services. Elsewhere, individual services are classified according to their individual description on the ground that the provisions S. 65A of Finance Act, 1994 prescribes adoption of a specific description over a general one.

    1.3 Further both the definitions use the phrase ‘any person authorised by port/airports’. In many ports/airports there is no procedure of specifically authorising a service provider to undertake a particular activity. While there may be restriction on entry into such areas and the authorities often issue entry passes or identity cards, airports/port authorities seldom issue authority permission letter to a service provider authorising him to undertake a particular task. Many taxpayers have claimed waiver of tax under these services on the ground that the port/airport authority has not specifically authorised them to provide a particular service.

    1.4 In order to remove these difficulties, the definition of the relevant taxable services are being amended to clarify that all services provided entirely within the port/airport’s premises would fall under these services. Further specific authorisation from port/air port authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

(b) Extracts from Dept. Circular No. 334/03/2010-TRU, dated 1-7-2010 :

    Para 4.1 :

    In the Finance Bill, 2010, with intent to ease the classification disputes, the definitions of port, other port and airport services were amended to comprehensively cover under their ambit, all services provided within an airport or a port or other port, irrespective of whether or not such activities are authorised by the authorities or whether or not they are otherwise classifiable as distinct taxable services. In effect, all services that are wholly rendered within the prescribed area of the port or other port or an airport, are to be classified within the ambit of ‘port services’ or ‘airport services’.

    Para 4.2 :

    During the post-budget interactions with the stakeholders, apprehensions were expressed that the change may have certain unintended effects and certain services (including certain essential services) hitherto exempted, may attract service tax unintentionally. Further, it was also pointed that the abatements and exemptions presently available under individually defined taxable services would get denied when provided within airport or port, merely as they would now be taxable under newly introduced taxable services.

    Para 4.3(v) :

    Currently abatements are available to certain services such as ‘Renting of a cab’, ‘Erection, Commissioning & Installation Service’, ‘Goods Transport Agency service’ and ‘Construction Services’. Similar abatements would be available to such services, when provided wholly within an airport or a port or other port, under the new definition of airport or port or other port services. (Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010 as corrected by corrigendum dated 30th June, 2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010.)

    Para 4.4 :

    All other services carried out within a port or other port or an airport would be subjected to service tax under the category of port/other port/airport services.

3. Background & Amendment :

        a) Under the existing provisions for a service to be considered as ‘port services,’ two conditions were required to be satisfied?:

        i) the service must be provided by a port or a person authorised by that port, and

        ii) the service must be in relation to vessel or goods

    In Homa Engineering Works v. CCE, (2007) 7 STR 546 (Tri-Mum.), where the appellant provided dry-dock repairs to its client within the port premises, it was held that such services would not be liable to service tax under ‘Port Services’ due to the following reasons?:

        The appellant was not a port or a person specifically authorised by that port under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (MPTA 63) to provide a particular service on its behalf;

        The service such as dry-dock repairs were not in the nature of ‘Port Services’ since the port itself was not statutorily allowed to undertake such service under the MPTA 63; and

        On an application of S. 65A of the Act, such services were more appropriately classifiable under ‘Maintenance or Repairs’ service.

    This decision of the Tribunal was followed in several cases both in the context of major ports as well as other ports. In CCE v. Kokan Marine Agencies, (2009) 13 STR 79 (KAR) the Karnataka High Court upheld the Tribunal’s view which was based on Homa Engineering (supra) case.

    In order to overcome the judicial pronouncements, definition of ‘Port Services’ is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010, to the following effect:

  •             Service need not be provided by the port or a person authorised by the port;
  •             Service need not be in relation to vessel or goods, and
  •             Service need not also be one which the port can undertake under the MPTA 63 or the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

    In terms of the amended definition of taxable service, all services rendered wholly within the port would be classified as port services and not under any other category of service, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        b) Amendments on lines similar to ‘Port Services’ have been made in respect of Airport Services. Under the existing provisions, in order to fall within ‘airport services, the following was essential:

  •             the service should be provided by an ‘airport’ or a ‘person authorised by the airport’; and
  •             the service should be provided in an airport or civil enclave.

    The definition of ‘taxable service’ in the context of airport services is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010 to the effect that all the services rendered by an airport authority or by ‘any person’ in an airport or civil enclave would be covered under the category of ‘airport services’ and specific authorisation from the airport authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

    Further, all services rendered wholly within the airport would be classified as airport services and not under any other category of services, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        4. Exemptions in regard to amended Port/ Airport Services:
    a) Notification No. 31/10-ST, dated 22-6-2010:

    The following services provided within a port or an airport have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        
    i) repair of ships or boats or vessels belonging to the Government of India including Navy or Coast Guard or Customs, but does not include Government-owned Public Sector Undertakings;

        ii) repair of ships or boats or vessels where such process of repair amounts to ‘manufacture’ and has the meaning assigned to it in clause(f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944;

        iii) supply of water;

        iv) supply of electricity;

        v) treatment of persons by a dispensary, hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty clinic (except cosmetic or plastic surgery service);

        vi) services provided by a school or centre to provide formal education other than those services provided by commercial coaching or training centre;

        vii) services provided by fire service agencies;

        viii) pollution control services.

        b) Notification No. 38/10-ST and Notification No. 42/10-ST, both dated 28-6-2010:
    Commercial or Industrial Construction Services [Clause 65(105)(zzq)] provided wholly within the port/other port for construction, repair, alteration and renovation of wharves, quays, docks, stages, jetties, piers and railways has been exempted from payment of service tax. Similarly, services provided wholly within airport also are exempted.

        c) Notification No. 41/10-ST, dated 28-6-2000:

    The following services provided wholly within the port or other port or airport; have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        i) taxable service provided by a cargo handling agency in relation to agricultural produce or goods intended to be stored in a cold storage;

        ii)taxable service provided by storage or ware-house keeper in relation to storage and warehousing of agricultural produce or any service provided for storage of or any service provided by a cold storage;

        iii) taxable service in relation to transport of export goods in an aircraft by an aircraft operator;

        iv) taxable service of site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition and such other similar activities.

        Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 1-3-2010:
    These Notifications have amended Notification No. 1/2006-ST, dated 1-3- 2006 (read with corrigendum dated 1-3-2010) and Notification No. 13/2008-ST, dated 1-3- 2008, respectively, whereby abatement available under the following existing taxable categories would continue to be available even if these services would now be classified as port services/other port or airport services:

  •         Rent-a-cab service

  •             Commissioning and installation agency
  •             Commercial or industrial construction
  •             Construction of complex
  •             Transportation of goods by rail
  •             Transport of goods by road.


        5.Some issues:

    The basic objective of the amendment, as stated in the Department Circular, is to overcome the judicial view [Homa Engineering case and Konkan Marine Agencies (supra)] whereby the service providers escaped taxation. A close reading of the amended provisions indicates that the amendments in Port/ Airport Services have resulted in large number of issues, legal as well as procedural and administrative. Some of the important issues are discussed hereafter.

    5.1 Whether services rendered wholly within port/ airport would cover service categories which were otherwise not taxable:

    Attention is drawn to Notification No. 31/10-ST dated 20- 6-2010 [Para 4 (a) above], under which specified list of services rendered within port/ airport, have been exempted from payment of service tax. These services include supply of water, supply of electricity and some other services which are not liable to service tax. Does this mean that these services provided within port/airport premises would have been liable to service tax if the exemption Notification had not been issued?? There is no ready answer to this. However it appears that Govt.’s intention is to tax all services rendered wholly within port/airport even if the relevant service does not fall under the taxable service categories specified u/s.65(105) of the Act or is specifically excluded in certain cases.

    This poses a very significant legal issue inasmuch as under the statutory provisions of the Act, the term ‘service’ is not defined. However, taxable services which are liable to service tax have been specified u/s.65(105) of the Act.

    Under Central Excise, it has been held that powers have been granted u/s.5A (1) of Central Excise Act, 1944 to grant exemption. It has been held in Bata India v. ACCE, 2 ELT J211 (PAT) that if a product is not excisable under any Tariff Entry, an exemption Notification issued u/s.5A cannot have the effect of making such a product excisable. The principle laid down is relevant. However, under the law relating to service tax, there is no exhaustive list of taxable services like Central Excise Tariff.

    It would appear that whether a service not otherwise specified u/s.65(105) of the Act, can be taxed under port/airport services, is a highly contentious issue.

    5.2 Services rendered wholly within port/airport —Practical aspects:

    It is pertinent to note that in order to be taxed under the amended port/airport service, it is essential that services are wholly rendered within a port/airport. Hence, if a service is partly rendered outside the port/airport, it would not be taxable under port/airport services but would continue to be taxable under the respective service category.

    This condition it likely to create substantial practical difficulties/hardships. As it is well known, the services are categorised for the purpose of export/ import into 3 categories viz.:

  •             Location of Immovable property

  •             Performance of service

  •             Location of service recipient

    The emphasis in the amendment is on services that can be rendered through physical action/ performance. This may pose substantial practical difficulties. In case of services under criteria of location of service recipient, where a service provider may not necessarily be located at the location of the service recipient.

    It would appear that if it can be established that a service is not wholly rendered within a port/airport, the amended provisions would not apply.

    Let us consider some illustrations.

        a) A practising CA renders consultation services to a client based within port premises. If the services are provided by the CA through physical presence within the port, it would be taxable under port service. However, if the same service is rendered by the CA through a meeting in his office outside port premises, it would be taxable as practising CA service.

    Take the case of auditing services. Audit is conducted by a CA for the above-referred client in his office located within port premises. However, finalising of balance sheet and issue of audit report is done at the CA’s office outside the port premises. In such a scenario, the question arises as to whether such services would be taxable as ‘Port Services’ or Practising CA Services. It is possible to contend that services are not rendered wholly within ‘Port Premises’.

        b) A Goods Transport Agency (GTA) provides services within port/airport as well as outside. If a GTA, provides services wholly within the port/ airport premises, such service would be taxable under port/airport service.

    With regard to GTA services, liability in case of certain specified entities to pay service tax is cast on the persons making the payment to GTA. However, as yet, no consequential amendment has been made in regard to GTA service. Hence, in regard to GTA services wholly rendered within port/airport premises, it appears that GTA would be liable to discharge the service tax liability and not the person making the payment, as was the case before 1-7-2010. Further, a GTA providing services where the freight for a whole consignment does not exceed `1,500 for an individual consignment, the freight does not exceed `750, it is exempt from service tax under Notification No. 34/2004-ST, dated 3-12-2004. Now when a GTA provides transportation service wholly within the port premises and even if each trip is invoiced for less than `1,500, he will be required to register himself under port service and charge service tax to the client, however after availing abatement of 75% thereon.

    5.3 Exemptions issued are ad hoc and inconsistent: A perusal of list of exemptions issued as stated in para 4 above reveals that there are inconsis-tencies and omissions which are likely to cause hardships. To illustrate:

        a) Commercial or industrial construction service rendered wholly within port/airport has been exempted. However, the following have not been exempted:

  •         Works contract services
  •         Residential construction (say, officers/staff quarters)

    The above inconsistencies/omissions need to be speedily addressed.

        b) Cargo handling services in relation to agricultural produce and goods stored in a cold storage have been rightly exempted. However, it needs to be noted that u/s.65(23) of the Act, handling of export cargo is excluded from the purview of Cargo Handling Service liable to service tax. If such services are rendered wholly within a port/ airport it would appear that in the absence of exemption, such services would be taxable under Port/Airport Service.

    5.4 Implications in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:

    Under Rule 6(5) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 service tax paid on 16 specified services is fully available as CENVAT Credit, unless such services are provided exclusively for exempted service.

    Management, Maintenance or Repairs is one of the specified services under Rule 6(5). If such service is rendered wholly within port/airport premises, the same would be classifiable, w.e.f. 1-7-2010, under port/airport service. The list of specified services under Rule 6(5) does not include port /airport services. Hence, in such a case, benefit hitherto available under Rule 6 (5) would now not be available. This is an unintended consequence of the amendment.

Representation in respect of Procedure for Registration of Digital Signature and uploading of Income-tax Returns using Digital Signature

fiogf49gjkf0d

Representation

Representation

3rd September, 2010

To,

Chairman,

Central Board of Direct
Taxes,

Government of India,

North Block, Vijay Chowk,

New Delhi-110001.

Dear Sir,


Subject
:
Representation in respect of
Procedure for Registration of Digital Signature and uploading of Income-tax
Returns using Digital Signature


We refer to the amendment to
Rule 12 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules) which has made it mandatory
for all companies filing ITR-6 to digitally sign the I-T return for A.Y. 2010-11
and the Note regarding changes in the Procedure for Registration of Digital
Signature and uploading of Income-tax Returns using Digital Signature (The
Changed Procedure Note).

The Changed Procedure :

A. Para C of the Changed
Procedure Note recognises that in the following scenarios, taxpayers may find it
difficult to register the DSC as per the existing procedure as mentioned in the
aforesaid Note :

1. “Non-resident companies
where the Directors are foreign nationals.

2. Companies where the I-T
return is being filed for the first time.

3. Companies where the
Managing Director has changed and other Directors are either unavailable or
also have changed.

In all such cases it is
difficult to verify the identity of the person and his relationship with the
Entity for which he is the authorised signatory. With a view to make
registration simpler in such cases, the procedure has been changed to enable
registration of a DSC where the PAN is also provided in the DSC as per the
latest Interoperability guidelines issued by the Chief Controller of
Certifying Authorities. Such DSCs with encrypted value of PAN are now
available in the market.”

B. Para D of the Changed
Procedure Note prescribes the changes in the process of Registration of DSC on
the e-filing website. In this scenario, the Authorised Signatory has been given
the following options :

1. To select the existing
procedure to register the DSC, in case the scenarios mentioned in sub-para 1,
2, or 3 in para C of the Note, as reproduced above, are not applicable; or

2. “To select the new
procedure as given below :

(a) The Authorised
Signatory must use a fresh DSC having encrypted value of his PAN, as issued
by Certifying Authorities with effect from 1-8-2010.

(b) Enter Authorised
Signatory’s PAN number while registering the DSC. The same person must also
enter the same PAN in the Verification portion of the I-T Return which he is
signing in his capacity as Director/ Partner/Karta/Authorised Signatory.

(c) If the Authorised
Signatory’s PAN number matches the encrypted value of the PAN present in the
DSC — then the DSC will be registered after selecting the appropriate type
of DSC (.pfx or USB token) and clicking on ‘Select Your .pfx File
Certificate’.

(d) In case an
Individual is registering his DSC for submitting own ITR (ITRs 1-4 case)
then his PAN as per his login should match the encrypted PAN contained in
the DSC — then the DSC will be registered after selecting the appropriate
type of DSC (.pfx or USB token) and clicking on ‘Select Your .PFX File
Certificate’.

(e) Now, the I-T Return
for the Self/Company/Firm/Entity PAN can be signed using this registered
DSC.”



The implications of the Changed
Procedure :

C. As mentioned in para
B.2.a above, as per the new procedure, the Authorised Signatory must use a fresh
DSC having encrypted value of his PAN.

D. The relevant portion of
the Rule 114C of the Rules provides as under :



“Class or classes of
persons to whom provisions of S. 139A shall not apply 114C.

(1) The provisions of S. 139A shall not apply to following class or
classes of persons, namely :

(a)

(b) the non-residents
referred to in clause (30) of S. 2;”


E. Accordingly, as per the
explicit provisions of Rule 114C(1)(b), provisions of S. 139A do not apply in
case of non-residents.

F. However, in order to sign
the return with Digital Signature and upload the Return of Income in Form ITR-6,
the non-resident directors of the foreign companies would be compelled to obtain
the PAN in India and after obtaining the PAN would have to obtain a fresh DSC
having encrypted value of their PAN and then only they would be able to
digitally sign and upload the Returns of Income in Form ITR-6 for the A.Y.
2010-11.

G. Thus, effectively, in
case of non-residents, though the Rules do not require them to have a PAN in
India, the same has been made mandatory indirectly by the Changed Procedure
Note, particularly in case of foreign companies.

Practical difficulties :

H. It is irrational and
unlawful to insist upon a large number of directors of foreign companies to have
PAN in order to enable them to obtain DSCs having encrypted value of their PAN,
in order to enable them to sign the return of income of their companies.

    I. Most of the Directors signing the Returns of Income of the Companies, would have no connec-tion with India and also have no income at all in India and yet they would be forced to obtain the PAN in India, merely for the purposes of signing the Return of Income of the companies of which they are directors.

    J. The documentary requirements and procedure for obtaining PAN, particularly the requirement of Consularisation of the proof of identity and proof of address in case of foreign citizens which takes a lot of time, cost and effort, would cause undue hardship and anguish among many non-resident directors and foreign companies, particularly in view of the fact that PAN is NOT required as per the explicit provision contained in Rule 114C.

    K. We understand that the Consularisation process in many cases takes about a month’s time. In that event it would be very difficult or nearly impossible for many directors of foreign companies to obtain their PAN before 30-9-2010 and then to obtain their DSCs having the encrypted value of their PAN. This would result into unnecessary and unavoidable delay in filing the Returns of the foreign companies, due for filing on or before 30-9-2010 for ITAY 2010-11. Further in case of loss return, the company may lose the benefit of carry forward of loss if the return is not filed in time.

    L. Answer to Q 5 of the FAQs attached with the aforesaid Changed Procedure Note, provides that the Power of Attorney (PoA) holder is authorised to sign ITR of foreign company as per S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961. The PoA holder can register his DSC having encrypted value of his PAN against the foreign company PAN as per the new procedure.

    M. However, it is to be noted that in most cases the foreign companies are NOT comfortable or at ease, for various commercial and business consid-erations, to give PoA to third parties for signing the Return of Income with their digital signature. Conversely, an Indian resident may be unwilling to act as an authorised signatory of a foreign company and step into the shoes of such an assessee.

    N. Further, practically, most of the private limited companies (which form a bulk of the thousands of companies that file tax returns in India) have been filing their e-returns for past few years without DSC. For all such companies, it would now be mandatory to obtain a PAN-encrypted DSC. The time available for such a large number of companies to do this is very short and this is likely to cause a serious problem in smooth filing of returns in the month of September.

Our request?:

    P. In view of the above mentioned practical difficulties, we request you to amend the rules and make the digital signing of the Returns OPTIONAL particularly in case of non-resident/foreign companies.

    O. Alternatively, the entire process of signing the Return Form ITR-6 with digital signature should be made simple i.e., without PAN and the requirement of obtain DSCs having encrypted value of their PAN, should be done away with.
 

Q. We sincerely hope that you would consider the above and issue a public clarification by way of a Notification/Circular and/or make necessary amendments in the rules. It is further requested that a copy of the said Notification/Circular be sent to the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society.

Considering the urgency of the matter and in view of the very limited time available to enable companies and their signatories to comply with the new procedure, an early response in the matter would be greatly appreciated.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

Mayur Nayak                  Kishor Karia
President                         Chairman
                                  Taxation Committee

Appeal by Income-tax Act, 1961

LIGHT ELEMENTS

Dear Pranabda (Finance
Minister),

Recently you tabled Direct
Tax Code (popularly known as DTC which reminds me of DDT used for killing
mosquitoes) in the Parliament in August, 2010 when inflation was raining cats
and dogs outside. What a great achievement ! You’ve been the Finance Minister a
number of times. Your predecessors (like P. Chidambaram, the most innovative
Finance Minister we’ve ever had) and you have tinkered me, amended me,
simplified (?) me by adding or deleting sections, sub-sections, clauses,
sub-clauses, explanations, using all the alphabets and roman numbers available
on earth and what not through the finance bills and ordinances one after
another. Still you’re unhappy with me. I’ve been in service of the nation since
1961, nearly 50 years. I could have celebrated my golden jubilee in 2011. But
alas ! You’re trying to evict me from the Indian economy for no worthwhile
reasons in sight. That’s what I hear from economists (excluding our Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh), tax experts, chartered accountants,
industrialists, even laymen, etc. Believe me, I have everything you want. But
you’re deliberately ignoring it since you are a man of words. You want to leave
a mark on the annals of Indian economy. So it’s nothing but a prestige issue. I
wonder, is it not possible for you to achieve your avowed objective of
simplification through me, though your predecessors and you’ve kept simplifying
me for years together. Do you think with the introduction of my ‘step’ law, I
mean DTC, everything will be simple and easy ? Had it been so, why did you
revise the DTC before its birth ? My dear Pranabda, from my experience since
1961, I can say that income-tax law in India can never be simple, it’ll continue
to be complicated, be it me or DTC. Even you’ll agree with me, at least in
private if not openly. Look, the term ‘simplification’ is very illusory, it is
like a mirage. With the passage of time something that’s simple today becomes
complicated tomorrow. Moreover, on the one hand you talk about simplification
and on the other hand you introduce stringent anti-tax avoidance provisions to
make the life of taxpayers miserable and at the mercy of tax authorities with
powers to suspect (read as discretionary powers). Is it a way to simplify
income-tax law ? In fact, I’ve been more abused by tax authorities than by
taxpayers of this country.


Regarding withdrawal of various exemptions — a number of exemptions have been
phased out in the past. In fact, I am burdened with the number of redundant
sections, sub-sections, clauses, sub-clauses, and explanations for years now. I
didn’t utter a word.

My
dear Pranabda, eventually what you want is ‘tax’ on income. I heard that with
the introduction of DTC, revenue will go down substantially due to changes in
slabs in the initial years of DTC. Is it worth it ? When taxpayers are ready to
pay, why are you losing this revenue ? Your political party is voted to power by
‘aam adami’ and not by taxpayers. You must be aware that your party needs
official money for welfare schemes of the ‘aam adami’ to get re-elected and
govern this country. I urge you to let me continue. You’re committing a blunder.
People have already started criticising the DTC as my ‘clone’ or as old wine in
a new bottle and what not. I feel very sad.

So
my dear Pranabda, I earnestly request you to let me continue to serve this
country of millions. I’m capable of generating enough revenue for the
government. I won’t spare any tax dodger, be it a politician of your party or
opposition. You can make me as simple as you please. Give more discretionary
powers to tax authorities so that they can directly withdraw tax from the
taxpayer’s bank account apart from raids and surveys. I’m sure that I have
enough power to deal with economic offenders. If you find me inadequate on this
front, make me more stringent by introducing death penalty to economic
offenders. I don’t mind. Introduce ‘daily advance tax’ like a piggy collection
for corporate tax-payers, forget about MAT. Keep on reversing the decisions of
the Supreme Court and lower courts shielding the taxpayers by amending me from
time to time, I don’t mind.


Lastly let me celebrate the golden jubilee of my existence – 2011.

Jai Hind !

Yours faithfully,

Income-tax Act, 1961

levitra

Short-Term Capital Gains on Shares Taxed at a Rate Higher Than Normal Slab Rate — Anomaly in S. 111A

S. 111A(1) and the proviso thereto, read as under :

Tax on short-term capital gains in certain cases.

111A. (1) Where the total income of an assessee includes any income chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’, arising from the transfer of a short-term capital asset, being an equity share in a company or a unit of an equity-oriented fund and —

(a) the transaction of sale of such equity share or unit is entered into on or after the date on which Chapter VII of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 comes into force; and

(b) such transaction is chargeable to securities transaction tax under that Chapter, the tax payable by the assessee on the total income shall be the aggregate of —

(i) the amount of income-tax calculated on such short-term capital gains at the rate of fifteen per cent; and

(ii) the amount of income-tax payable on the balance amount of the total income as if such balance amount were the total income of the assessee :

Provided that in the case of an individual or a Hindu undivided family, being a resident, where the total income as reduced by such short-term capital gains is below the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax, then such short-term capital gains shall be reduced by the amount by which the total income as so reduced falls short of the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax and the tax on the balance of such short-term capital gains shall be computed at the rate of 15%.

        Short-term capital gains arising from transfer of equity shares is taxable u/s.111A @ 15%. The proviso to S. 111A(1) gives some relief to a resident individual or HUF in case such income of the assessee forms part of the income within the basic exemption limit.

        As per literal reading of the proviso to S. 111A(1), in such a case, that portion of such short-term capital gains which exceeds basic exemption limit, would be taxable @ 15%. In other words, such an assessee is entitled to claim basic exemption in respect of such short-term capital gains, but the excess of such income above the basic exemption limit is taxable @ 15%.

        The Finance Act, 2009 provides for a 10% tax slab on income between `1,60,000 to `3,00,000 for individuals (other than specified individuals) and HUFs for A.Y. 2010-11. Further, the Finance Act, 2010 provides for a 10% tax slab on income between `1,60,000 to `5,00,000 for individuals (other than specified individuals) and HUFs for A.Y. 2011-12.

        A literal reading of the proviso to S. 111A(1) would make such short-term capital gains arising to a resident individual/HUF falling within the income bracket of `1,60,000 to `3,00,000 (or `1,60,000 to `5,00,000, as the case may be) liable to tax @ 15%, whereas normal income (i.e., incomes other than such short-term capital gains) falling within such income brackets would be taxable @ 10%.

        It would be recalled that S. 111A was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. 1-4-2005, on restructuring of the provisions relating to taxation of capital gains on transfer of equity shares. This could never have been the intention of the law-makers to tax such short-term capital gains at a rate higher than the tax rate on other income falling within the above-mentioned slab.

        Therefore, there is a clear and patent anomaly which has crept in after increase in the rate of tax u/s.111A(1) from 10% to 15% by the Finance Act, 2008, coupled with significant restructuring of the tax slabs by the Finance Act, 2009 and 2010. This anomaly is likely to give rise to litigation. This anomaly is adversely impacting small taxpayers the most. To provide clarity to the assessees and the Assessing Officers, this anomaly requires to be corrected by way of an amendment to the law.

        Pending such an amendment, we would request CBDT to kindly issue a suitable Circular/Instruction granting relief to the taxpayers in such cases.

Is it fair to burden small companies and firms with surcharge on FBT ?

Is It Fair

1. Introduction :


Ordinarily, the Government resorts to surcharge on income-tax
for mobilising resources for tackling a particular situation — like natural
calamity, war, etc. It is intended to be a short-term measure. There is also an
implication of sharing the revenues with the states. However, in recent years,
the surcharge has almost come to stay for ever. It is further aggravated by the
education cess. Some solace is provided in terms of marginal reliefs; or some
threshold limits of income above which the surcharge becomes applicable.

2. Applicability of surcharge :


S. 2 of Finance Act, 2008 deals with the rates of income-tax.

Ss.(3) of S. 2 applies to persons covered under Chapter XII
or Chapter XIIA, Chapter XII H, S. 115JB; and so on. Clause (c) of 2nd proviso
to Ss.(3) states that in the case of every firm and domestic company, the
surcharge will be 10% of the income-tax where the total income exceeds one crore
rupees; whereas clause (a) of the same proviso makes surcharge applicable to
individuals, HUFs, AOPs, etc. when total income exceeds ten lakh rupees. This is
understandable.

However, the 4th proviso deals with surcharge on FBT. Here,
clause (a) states that in respect of AOP and BOI, surcharge on FBT is applicable
if the value of fringe benefits exceeds Rs.10 lakh. Thus, it is in line with
surcharge on normal income-tax. And when it comes to firms and domestic
companies, in terms of clause (b) of the 4th proviso, the surcharge on FBT will
apply to all such entities, irrespective of their total or the value of fringe
benefit.

There is a similar distinction in Ss.(9) as well.

3. Anomaly :


The 2nd proviso states that surcharge is applicable on the
normal income-tax where the income is chargeable to tax u/s.115A, 115AB,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and u/s.115JB; or fringe benefits chargeable to
tax u/s.115WA.

It is not clear as to what is the relevance of including S.
115WA in the 2nd proviso, when the 4th proviso specifically deals with FBT.

Further, there is no reason why there should be a
discrimination in respect of FBT when the surcharge on normal tax applies only
to large companies having income exceeding Rs. one crore.

It is a fact that FBT is already a burden on the employer
firm or company. There is no justification as to why all firms and companies be
subjected to surcharge on FBT, irrespective of their income/value of fringe
benefits.

If it is viewed that FBT is basically in respect of the
benefits to the employees, it is common knowledge that majority of the employees
in majority of the organisations are most likely to have total income less than
Rs.10 lakhs.

Clause (a) of the 4th proviso gives the benefit of threshold
limit of FB value for AOPs and BOIs, but clause (b) deprives the firms and
domestic companies of this benefit.

4. Suggestions :


(a) The relevance of including S. 115WA in the second proviso
should be clarified, and

(b) Some threshold limit on FB be also prescribed for firms and domestic
companies in respect of levy of surcharge on FBT.

levitra

Larger Bench Ruling on Valuation: Material Supplied by Receiver of Service, Whether Includible in Taxable Value

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction:
In commercial or residential construction activity, it is commonly found that a developer or owner, appointing a contractor to construct a building or a structure, purchases important building material like cement and steel on its own account and supplies the same to the contractor for the use in the building construction contracted to the contractor. Since the contractor carries out the construction activity with its labour, various equipments and other material such as bricks, sand etc., the material bought by oneself and used for one’s own construction is commonly referred to as free supply of material to the contractor. However, the fact of the matter is that the material belongs to the contractee and it is not given free to the contractor as gift or donation. The contractor receives the material for use in the contractee’s project. The discussion herein relates to controversy over the issue whether such material forms part of the value of contractor’s services for determination of service tax liability thereon.

Relevant statutory provisions:
• Section 66 – Charging section

“There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve per cent of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (zzzzw) of clause (105) of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.” [emphasis supplied]

• Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) deals with valuation of a taxable service for the charge of service tax. This section with effect from 18-04-2006 was substituted whereby its scope was expanded. Nevertheless, the basic mode and characteristic of valuation of a taxable service remained unaltered.

Prior to 18-04-2006, the said section 67 read as follows:

“For the purpose of this chapter, the value of any taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him.

[emphasis supplied]

Explanation 1 ………… Explanation 2 ……….. Explanation 3 ………..”

(There were certain inclusions and exclusions provided in the above explanations which are not produced for the sake of brevity).

The substituted section 67 with effect from 18-04- 2006 reads as under:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall, —

(i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;

(ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money as, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;

(iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.

(2) Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.

(3) the gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.

Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, —

(a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided;

(b) ………..

(c) “gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account …………………..” [emphasis supplied]

Commercial construction service was introduced in the service tax law with effect from 10th September, 2004 whereas residential construction service became taxable from 16th June, 2005. A variety of construction agreements are entered into by developers or builders with their contractors. Some contracts involve construction services with all the material to be supplied by their contractor/s and in some others, the owner/developer purchases critical materials like cement and steel on his own account. In order that the material supplied by a contractor in a composite contract would not have to suffer service tax, the Government issued Notification No.15/2004-ST and subsequently Notification No.18/2005-ST as regards residential construction on identical lines.

Notification No. 15/2004-Service Tax read as follows:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the taxable service provided by a commercial concern to any person, in relation to construction service, from so much of the service tax leviable thereon under section 66 of the said Act, as is in excess of the service tax calculated on a value which is equivalent to thirty-three per cent of the gross amount charged from any person by such commercial concern for providing the said taxable service:

Provided that this exemption shall not apply in such cases where –

(i) the credit of duty paid on inputs or capital goods has been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; or (

ii) the commercial concern has availed the benefit under the notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance, (Department of Revenue) No. 12/2003-Service Tax, dated the 20th June, 2003 [G.S.R. 503 (E), dated the 20th June, 2003.”

[emphasis supplied]

Consequent upon the introduction of the above service, Central Board of Excise & Customs (the Board) issued Circular No.80 dated 17-09-2004 wherein, inter alia, the reason for issue of Exemption Notification No.15/2004-ST was contained in para 13.5 as extracted below:

“13.5. The gross value charged by the building contractors include the material cost, namely, the cost of cement, steel, fittings and fixtures, tiles etc. Under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the service provider can take credit of excise duty paid on such inputs. However, it has been pointed out that these materials are normally procured from the market and are not covered under the duty paying documents. Further, a general exemption is available to goods sold during the course of providing service (Notification No. 12/2003-ST) but the exemption is subject to the condition of availability of documentary proof specially indicating the value of the goods sold. In case of a composite contract, bifurcation of value of goods sold is often difficult. Considering these facts, an abatement of 67% has been provided in case of composite contracts where the gross amount charged includes the value of material cost. (refer notification No.15/04-ST, dated 10-09-2004) This would, however, be optional subject to the condition that no credit of input goods, capital goods and no benefit (under notification no. 12/2003-ST) of exemption towards cost of goods are availed.”

With effect from 01-03-2005, vide Notification No.4/2005-ST, an explanation was inserted in the above Notification viz. “For the purpose of the Notification, the gross amount charged shall include the value of goods and materials supplied or provided or used for providing the said taxable service provided by the said service provider.”

In terms of this explanation, the revenue contended that when cement or steel is supplied by the builder/developer/owner, the same should form part of the value for determining 67% abatement. Widespread litigation occurred on this issue across the country. The Madras High Court provided an interim relief in a writ filed by Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 2007 (7) STR 123 (Mad) holding that:

“On a reading of the explanation, this court is prima facie of the view that such an insistence is not in accordance with the explanation. To that extent there will be an interim order as prayed for.”

Based on the above interim order, the Delhi High Court in Era Infra Engineering Ltd. 2008 (11) STR 3 (Del) also provided interim relief to the appellant.

Conflicting decisions by two co-ordinate Benches of Tribunal:

Subsequently, the Bangalore Tribunal in Cemex Engineers vs. CST Cochin 2010 (17) STR 534, relying on the observation of the Madras High Court in Larsen & Toubro (supra), held that the value of goods supplied and provided by the client cannot be included for calculating service tax and that such inclusion would be contrary to the provisions of section 67 of the Act which specifies that the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service. As against this, in Jaihind Projects Ltd. vs. CST, Ahmedabad 2010 (18) 650 (Tri.-Ahmd), the Appellant engaged in laying pipelines provided commercial or industrial construction service to companies such as ONGC, GAIL, Essar Projects Ltd. etc. In all cases, pipes were supplied by the receiver of service to the Appellant. The department raised a dispute contending that the value of pipes supplied by receiver ought to have been included in the value for determining taxable value of 33% while availing the benefit of Notification No.15/2004-ST. The Tribunal held that even under section 67 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, the pipes being essential component of providing pipeline service, it must be treated as consideration other than money and therefore the value of such pipes must be included in the gross value to be offered for service tax payment. As regards Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST, the Tribunal held that the ‘Explanation’ has explained the meaning of “gross amount charged” and since the assessee has opted to avail the abatement under the Notification, he must include the value of goods supplied for the purpose of determining taxable value. The Tribunal further noted that if the value of the pipes used is not included, the Appellant would not be eligible to claim abatement under Notification No.15/04-ST as amended. The Tribunal also recorded that discriminatory results would ensue between two pipeline service providers if one uses pipes provided by him and the other uses one provided by the receiver client. Therefore, when the receiver supplies the material, the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation comes into play as the objective of the Explanation and the proviso is to ensure uniformity in different situations. Further, reliance on Circular No.80/10/2004-ST dated 17-09-2004 by the Appellant was negated by holding that the Explanation brought about from 01-03-2005 did not exist at the time of issue of the circular.

The above conflicting decisions led the Division Bench of the Delhi Tribunal to make a reference to the Larger Bench wherein 23 appeals got bunched together. The decision dated 6th September, 2013 is discussed below:

M/s. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd. & 22 Others 2013-TIOL-1331-CESTAT-DEL-LB:

The question before the Larger Bench (the Bench or LB) was whether the value of the material supplied by the recipient of the taxable service free of cost to the provider of service should also be included for availing tax benefit under Notification No.15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004 as amended by Notification No.4/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005. The above Notification as well as Notification 18/2005-ST issued in respect of residential construction service along with all other abatement Notifications later got merged into a single one viz. Notification No.1/2006 -ST dated 01-03- 2006 without any change in the notification per se. Although the issue relates to the construction industry and a vast number of contractors providing construction services, the decision assumes greater importance as the scope of provision of valuation contained in section 67 of the Act is examined and dealt with at a great length.

Revenue’s contention in brief:

The Revenue discussed various alternative schemes available under the service tax provisions for valu-ation of construction service as follows:

•    CENVAT credit of material including cement and TMT bars used while providing construction service and remitting full value of the service.

•    Benefit under Notification 12/2003-ST of exemp-tion to the extent of value of goods sold during the course of providing service.

•    Benefit under Notification 15/2004-ST wherein a generic abatement of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in case of composite contracts when the gross amount charged includes value of material used upon condition of non-availment of credit on inputs and capital goods and the benefit under the above referred Notification
12/2003-ST.

•    In case of works contracts under a scheme, service tax at a very low rate on the gross amount wherein value of goods or abatement is not deducted.

In the above background, it was contended that Explanation to Notification 15/2004-ST as amended provided that where an assessee opts for the benefit of abatement of 67%, the value of all the goods must be included for determining the value of the contract without availing CENVAT credit of inputs or capital goods or the benefit of exclusion of goods sold under Notification No.12/2003-ST.

The word ‘used’ in the explanation clearly means irrespective of the source of supplies. If the material/ goods were used in the construction service, the value of such goods ought to be included to avail abatement of 67%. Further, even u/s. 67 of the Act, the value of goods whether supplied by the provider or the receiver, if used for providing taxable service, constitute the “gross amount charged” for providing taxable service and lastly, in terms of the contract between the parties, free supplies constitute the consideration by the receiver to the provider of construction service and this value is accordingly taxable u/s. 67 and therefore, it must be declared and offered for tax if 67% abatement benefit is availed. The Revenue interalia relied on N M Goel & Co. vs. Sales Tax Officer (1989) 1 SCC 335 wherein steel and cement supplied by PWD to the assessee were to be deducted from the bills payable by PWD and thus PWD sold these goods to the assessee, though the goods were used for construction for the benefit of PWD. The Bench, in this frame of reference, observed that as against the above case of N. M. Goel & Co. (supra), in the instant case of free supply by the receiver, the agreements between the parties do not provide for recovery of cost of free materials by the recipient from the service provider and the case does not help achieve resolution of the referred issue. The Bench further observed that it did not dispute the fact of integral nexus between free supplies with the construction activity. However, essentially whether such free supplies by the recipient would constitute consideration accruing to the service provider so as to be includible in the “gross amount charged” for the purpose of computation of the taxable value u/s. 67 or to be included in the “gross amount charged” for availing benefit under the abatement Notification as comprehended within the meaning of the word ‘used’ in the Explanation.

Discussion & Analysis contained in the Decision:

Contentions presented by the Appellants were referred to the order of the Hon‘ble Bench in the analysis that follows:

•    Section 67 deals with valuation of taxable services and intends to define what constitutes the value received by the service provider as consideration from the recipient for the service provided. Implicitly, the consideration— monetary or otherwise—must flow from the receiver to the provider of service and should accrue to the benefit of the latter. For interpreting the term ‘consideration’, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Ku. Sonia Bhatia vs. State of UP & Others AIR 1981 SC 1274 wherein it was held that “consider-ation means a reasonable equivalent for other valuable benefits passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.” The Bench, thus observed that even on an extravagant inference, free supply of cement and steel would not constitute a non-monetary consideration by the recipient to the provider particularly because material supplied is retained by the service recipient (misprinted as provider in the order). The Bench also relied on the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (29) STR-DEL and observed that the High Court considered the challenge of constitutionality of Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 to the extent it includes reimbursement of expenses in the value of taxable service and also that the said Rule is ultra vires sections 66 and 67 of the Act. The High Court held that section 66, the charging section, levies tax only on the taxable services and this inbuilt mechanism ensures that only taxable services shall be evaluated u/s. 67. On construing provision of section 66 and section 67(1)(i) together and harmoniously, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider and nothing more and nothing less than consideration paid as quid pro quo for the service can be brought to charge. The Bench thus observed that the legislative text of sections 66 and 67 being clear and unambiguous and in the light of the judgment in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. (supra) “the conclusion is compelling and inviolable that value of free supplies by a construction service recipient would not constitute non- monetary consideration to the service provider nor form part of the gross amount charged for the service provided” and consequently could not constitute value of tax-able service. As per this analysis, the Bench held that the conclusions in Jaihind Projects Ltd. proceeded on a flawed interpretation of section 67. Further, on bringing uniformity of incidence as discussed in this decision, the Bench relying on Union of India & Others vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. & Others 1983 (14) ELT 198 (6) (SC) and UOI vs. Nitdip Textile Processors P. Ltd. 2011 (273) ELT 321 (SC) observed that advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees are accidental, inevitable and inherent in every taxing statute. Further, referring and relying on Moriroku UT India (P) Ltd. vs. State Of U.P. 2008 (224) ELT 365 (SC), the Bench observed as follows:

“Sales-tax or trade-tax under the 1948 Act is leviable on sale, whether actual or deemed, and for every sale there has to be a consideration. On the other hand, excise duty is a levy on a taxable event of ‘manufacture’ and it is calculated on the ‘value’ of manufactured goods. Excise duty is not concerned with ownership or sale. The liability under the excise law is event-based and irrespective of whether the goods are sold or captively consumed. Under the excise law, the liability is there even when the manufacturer is not the owner of raw material or finished goods (as in the case of job workers). For sales-tax purposes, what has to be taken into account is the consideration for transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer. For this purpose, tax is to be levied on the agreed consideration for transfer of property in the goods and in such a case cost of manufacture is irrelevant. The provisions relating to measure (section 4 of 1944 Act read with Excise Valuation Rules, 2000) aim at taking into consideration all items of costs of manufacture and all expenses which lead to value addition to be taken into account and for that purpose Rule 6 makes a deeming provision by providing for notional additions. Such deeming fictions and notional additions in excise law are totally irrelevant for sales-tax purposes.” [emphasis supplied].

Based on the observations in Moriroku UT India (P)    Ltd. (supra), the Bench concluded that a clear principle emerged therefrom that consideration for the transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer is only to be held as consideration for the levy of tax unlike event-based excise duty and this principle would equally apply to the levy of service tax and particularly in the context of specific language of section 67 of the Act.

•    For the next issue of the Explanation inserted in Notification No.15/2004, the Bench observed that the Explanation purports to define “gross amount charged” and the abatement of 67% is in respect of the “gross amount charged” by the service provider to the recipient, the identical expression employed in section 67(1)(i). The question, therefore, requiring examination is whether the Notification No. 04/2005-ST amending Notification No. 15/2004-ST enlarged the contents of the said expression. The Bench while considering various contentions advanced for the Appellants observed that the nuance of the substantial contention of the Appellants was that goods used by the provider of the construction service for providing such service in the Explanation to the Notification No.15/2004-ST must connote those goods as are charged to the service recipient. However, the revenue contested that the literal meaning of the word ‘used’ be given its full effect and ought not to be restricted to the other two expressions ‘supplied’ and ‘provided’ with reference only to the “gross amount charged”. On behalf of the assessees, contention was made to employ interpretative principle of “Noscitur A Sociis” or the analogy of the “ejusdem generis” to hold that goods and material used for providing the construction service, the value of which is charged to the service recipient. Considering the term ‘used’ problematic, examination and analysing of the said principle of noscitur was found imperative and a number of judgments and quotes on the subject matter were referred to in aid thereof which inter alia included;

•    Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1991 SC 151

•    Paradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana vs. State of Punjab AIR 1998 SC 171

•    Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla and Another vs. A. D. Divelkar and Others 2002-TIOL-447-SC-MISC-CB

The Bench finally concurred with the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants while elaborating on the noscitur a sociis principle that when the Notification exempts service tax to the extent of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in relation to construction service, section 67 enacts that the value of taxable service shall be the “gross amount charged” which would not include the value of free supplies, as any value to constitute consideration, monetary or otherwise should flow from a recipient to the provider of service and this being the pre-condition u/s. 67, the expression “gross amount charged” in the Explanation could not be construed as expanding the scope of the said expression. Likewise, the reliance placed by the Appellants inter alia on CIT, Bangalore vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460 was noted and the Bench observed the principle laid therein to the effect that when four important components of concept of a tax system (viz. the nature of the imposition of a tax which prescribes the taxable event, the person on whom the levy is imposed, the rate of tax and the measure or value to which the rate is applied), are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law and any uncertainty and vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity. Considering this principle analogous to the principle that liability to tax could not be inferred on a doubtful or ambiguous provision and the benefit of ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the assessee, the Hon‘ble Bench concluded that the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST is inherently ambiguous and more so in the context of other expressions therein i.e., supplied or provided, the noscitur principle must be applied to conclude that only such goods/materials which are ‘supplied’ by the service provider or ‘provided’ by the service provider or ‘used’ when supplied or provided by the service provider i.e. goods and material whether supplied, provided or used in the construction and charged on the service recipient and value where-of is received by the service provider towards a consideration that accrues to the provider’s benefit would alone comprise the “gross value charged” by the construction service provider within the meaning of section 67 and for availing benefit of Notification 15/2004- ST. Alternatively, it can also be stated that since the free supplies i.e. incapable of computation provision of section 67(1)(iii) would not apply as free supply would not fall within section 67, the computation provisions fail and consequently restriction on availability of benefit of exemption would be nugatory. Based on the above, the reference was answered in the following words in para 16 of the order:

“Para 16:

“(a) The value of goods and materials supplied free of cost by a service recipient to the provider of the taxable construction service, being neither monetary or non- monetary consideration paid by or flowing from the service recipient, accruing to the benefit of service provider, would be outside the taxable value or the gross amount charged, within the meaning of the later expression in section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; and

(b)    Value of free supplies by service recipient do not comprise the gross amount charged under Notification No. 15/2004-ST, including the Explanation thereto as introduced by Notification No. 4/2005-ST.”

Conclusion:

Despite the above, the observation of the Bench concluded in para 15 is important. “This is not to say that an exemption Notification cannot enjoin a condition that the value of free supplies must also go into the gross amount charged for valuation of the taxable service. If such intention is to be effected, the phraseology must be specific and denuded of ambiguity.” The question now arises is whether the effect of above ruling would be extended to the composition scheme under the works contract service or the works contracts under the negative list based taxation.

Under the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007, service tax @2% or 4% during application period was payable on the gross amount charged. An Explanation was inserted with effect from 07 -07 -2009 to include “the value of all goods used in or in relation to the execution of the works contract, whether supplied under any other contract for a consideration or otherwise.”

Further, the above Rule 3(1) contained “notwith-standing anything contained in section 67 of the Act and Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006………”, means a non-obstante provision. However, determination of value of services involved in the execution of works contract under Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (Valuation Rules) was subject to the provisions of section 67.

Similarly, in the post-negative list period, service tax is to be paid on a specific percentage of the total amount charged for the works contract in accordance with the substituted Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules. The term “total amount” is defined to include the fair market value of all goods and services supplied in or in relation to the execution of the works contract. As per the substituted Rule 2A also, the value of service portion in the execution of a works contract is to be determined subject to provisions of section 67.

Thus, in both the cases, the question remains as to whether the Explanation and its phraseology is unambiguous enough to expand the scope of the term “gross amount charged” to include the value of free supplies is again a matter of interpretation. However, the treatise of the above landmark decision would serve as a guidance to resolve many vexed issues on the subject of valuation. However, the finality on this issue of valuation is unlikely in the near future.

A Netherlands resident company received payments for grant of licence for off-the-shelf software to an Indian customer. No right in the copyright was transferred. The AAR held that payments were not royalty or FTS under DTAA and since the company did not

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 5

Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


2 GeoQuest Systems B.V., In re

AAR No. 774 of 2008 (AAR)

Article 7, 12 of India-Netherlands DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vi) (vii) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 6-8-2010

A Netherlands resident company received payments for grant of
licence for off-the-shelf software to an Indian customer. No right in the
copyright was transferred. The AAR held that payments were not royalty or FTS
under DTAA and since the company did not have PE in India, payments were not
taxable in India.

Facts :

The applicant was a company incorporated in the Netherlands
(‘DutchCo’). It was engaged in the business of supplying special-purpose
computer software for use in exploration and production of mineral oils. The
software was not prepared to suit the special requirements of any particular
customer and hence DutchCo described it as off-the-shelf. Under an agreement
DutchCo granted an exclusive non-transferable licence for the software to an
Indian company. DutchCo was to retain all IPRs in the software as well as in
modifications and updates. DutchCo was to supply the software package to the
customer outside India and the customer was to pay the consideration also
outside India. On termination of the agreement the customer was to discontinue
the use of the software and return the same. The agreement also contained
certain other restrictions on use of the software by the customer.

The issue before the AAR was, whether the income from supply
of the software would be taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act or DTAA ?

Drawing distinction between transfer of copyright in a
product and transfer of a copyrighted product, DutchCo contended before the AAR
that the transfer was of a copyrighted product and hence, the consideration
should not be taxed as royalty.

The tax authority initially contended that the payment was
royalty but later on contended that as per the AAR ruling in Airports Authority
of India, In re (323 ITR 211) (AAR), it was FTS.

Held :

The AAR observed that the core question was whether the
payment conferred any rights in the copyright or right to use the copyright. The
AAR relied on its earlier rulings in Factset Research Systems Inc., In re (317
ITR 169) (AAR) and Dassault Systems K K, In re (322 ITR 125) (AAR) wherein it
was held that what was transferred to the end-user was copyrighted software but
not copyright therein and mere transfer of computer software de-hors any
copyright does not amount to royalty.

The AAR distinguished its earlier ruling in Airports
Authority of India, In re (323 ITR 211) (AAR) and observed that in that case,
apart from the licence of the software, the contract also envisaged imparting of
technical knowledge and hence, that ruling was not applicable to this case.

The AAR relied on the OECD commentary and held that Article
12.4 of DTAA contemplates conferring of right of use of copyright. As transfer
of such right was not evident from the agreement, the payments were not in the
nature of royalty or FTS under DTAA. As DutchCo did not have a PE in India, the
payments were not taxable in India.

levitra

A Singapore resident company had a PE in India, which provided information available in public domain to subscribers. The AO held that the income was FTS under the Income-tax Act and taxable on gross basis and not on net basis as claimed by the taxpayer u

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


1 2010 TII 72 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

JCIT v. Telerate

Article 7(3), 12 of India-Singapore DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 18-2-2010

 

A Singapore resident company had a PE in India, which
provided information available in public domain to subscribers. The AO held that
the income was FTS under the Income-tax Act and taxable on gross basis and not
on net basis as claimed by the taxpayer under DTAA. The Tribunal held that the
assessee can choose between DTAA and the Income-tax Act and tax authority cannot
thrust provisions of the Income-tax Act unless they are more beneficial.

Facts :

The taxpayer was a company resident in Singapore (‘SingCo’).
SingCo had established a branch in India which was a PE in terms of Article
5(2)(b) of India-Singapore DTAA. SingCo was engaged in collecting and
disseminating information on financial, derivatives and commodities market,
which was available in public domain. The information was transmitted to
subscribers of Indian branch office on continuous basis through telephone lines
or V-Sat.

The AO held that SingCo was rendering technical services and
therefore, its income was ‘fees for technical services’ u/s.9(1)(vii) of the
Income-tax Act. The AO further held that notwithstanding provisions of Article
12(6) of DTAA, which envisages taxing FIS of PE as business profits under
Article 7(3), income should be computed in terms of S. 44D of the Income-tax Act
and consequently, income should be taxed on gross basis @ 24% in terms of S.
115A of the Income-tax Act.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that the facts were similar to those in
DCIT v. Boston Consulting Group Pte. Ltd., (2005) 94 ITD 31 (Mum.) and relying
on that decision held that :




? If the assessee chooses to be covered by provisions of DTAA, the Revenue
cannot thrust provisions of the Income-tax Act on him;



? Provisions of the Income-tax Act cannot come in to play unless they are
more beneficial;



? Article 12(4)(b) of DTAA does not cover non-technical ‘consultancy
services’.




levitra

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Business expenditure — Payment of severance pay on closure of manufacturing business and expenditure incurred on market research — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

part B: unreported decisions


2 KJS India Pvt. Ltd. v.
DCIT

ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi

Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa
(VP) and

Rajpal Yadav (JM)

ITA No. 2422/Del./2007 and
2168/Del./2009

Decided on : 30-7-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue
: Salil Kapoor & Pankuj Rawat/

Kavita Bhatnagar & H. K. Lal

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 — Business expenditure — Payment of severance pay on closure of
manufacturing business and expenditure incurred on market research — Whether
allowable — Held, Yes.

Per Rajpal Yadav :

Facts :

The assessee was in the
business of manufacturing of powdered soft drink in the name and style of TANG.
During the year under appeal it closed down its manufacturing business and paid
the sum of

`93.92 lacs by way of
severance pay to its employees. Its claim to allow such payment as business
expenditure was disallowed by the AO on the following grounds :

(1) As per its Form 3CD
the Board of Directors decided to discontinue the business of production of
powdered soft drink due to non-viability of operations and accordingly, the
assessee had ceased its business operations;

(2) As per its Notes on
Accounts, the assessee had decided to sell its business and hence, its
accounts were not prepared on going-concern basis;

(3) Severance cost was
incurred for closure of the business;

(4) U/s.37 only those
expenditure which are incurred for the running of business was allowable.

Another issue before the
Tribunal was about the allowability of expenditure of

`24.52 lacs incurred on
market research. According to the AO the assessee had incurred the expenses for
developing and designing a new product. Therefore, he disallowed the said
expenditure by treating the same as capital in nature as according to him, the
expenditure had resulted in providing benefit of enduring nature to the assessee.

On appeal the CIT(A) upheld
the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the
Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and pointed out that even
the directors in their Board meeting had specifically observed that the business
of manufacturing was closed.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the
assessee besides manufacturing, was also engaged in the business of trading. It
had not closed down the business, but it had only suspended one of the business
activities viz. that of manufacturing of powdered soft drink. It had continued
to carry on its trading business. According to the Tribunal the business cannot
be construed to mean one single activity. Further, relying on the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Ravindranathan Nair, Sasoon J. David Co. Pvt.
Ltd., Narayan Swadesh, of the Delhi High Court in the cases of DCM Ltd. and
Anita Jain, of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Assam Oil Co. Ltd. and of
the Madras High Court in the case of Simpson & Co. Ltd., it held that the
expenses incurred towards severance cost was an allowable expenditure.

The Tribunal went through
the reports of the market agency and noted that the study was to upgrade sale of
its existing product with the help of market survey. It was not for the
development and design of a new product. Accordingly, relying on the decisions
of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Ananda Bazar Patrika and of the Bombay
High Court in the case of J. K. Chemicals Ltd. it held that the expenditure was
allowable as business expenditre.

Cases referred to :

 

4.

CIT v. Assam Oil Co. Ltd., 154 ITR 647
(Cal.);

 

1.

Ravindranathan Nair
v. CIT, 247 ITR 178

 

5.

CIT v. Simpson &
Co. Ltd., (Mad.);

 

(SC);

 

6.

CIT v. Ananda Bazar
Patrika, 184 ITR 542

2.

Sasoon J. David Co.
Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, 118 ITR

 

 

(Cal.);

 

261;

 

7.

CIT v. J. K.
Chemicals Ltd., 207 ITR 985

3.

Narayan Swadesh v.
CIT, 26 ITR 765 (SC);

 

 

(Bom.)





S. 55A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Valuation report of Departmental Valuation Officer — To determine fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 whether reference to DVO can be made — Held, No.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

part B: unreported decisions


1 ITO v. Surendra V. Shah

ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP) and

Pramod Kumar (AM)

ITA No. 5667/Mum./2008

Decided on : 23-7-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee
:

Naveen Gupta/Dr. Rashmi J.
Zaveri

Per Pramod Kumar :

Facts :

S. 55A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 — Valuation report of Departmental Valuation Officer — To determine
fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 whether reference to DVO can be made —
Held, No.

The issue before the
Tribunal was whether the AO can resort to Departmental Valuation Officer’s (DVO)
report for ascertaining fair market value of an asset as on 1st April, 1981 and
for the purpose of computing cost of acquisition u/s.55(2)(b)(i).

Held :

According to the Tribunal a
reference to DVO can only be made u/s.55A. Further relying on the decision of
the Mumbai Bench of Tribunal in the case of Daulai Mohta (HUF) which decision
was subsequently approved by the Bombay High Court, the Tribunal upheld the
order of the CIT(A) to the effect that the reference to the DVO was invalid.

levitra

2013 (31) STR 270 (Bom) Welspun Syntex Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs

fiogf49gjkf0d
Stay – conducting Agreement – Business Support Service vs. Renting of immovable property service – serious triable issue – complete waiver of pre-deposit.

Facts:
The Appellant entered into a conducting agreement for use of its plant, machinery & equipments by the other company for consideration. The department contended that tax was leviable on the same under “support services of business or commerce”.

The Appellant contended that the said activity became taxable with effect from 01-06-2007 under the category of “Renting of Immovable Property Service” and discharged service tax accordingly. It further relied on Fine Switchgear vs. CCE, 2012 (25) STR 443 wherein it was held that when a new entry was carved out subsequently for the purpose of service tax, it had to be held that the same was not covered by any prior existing category of service.

Held:
The Hon. High Court allowing the appeal held that the appellant made out a prima facie case on merits raising a serious triable issue and hence it is eligible for complete waiver of pre-deposit.

levitra

2013-TIOL-03-ARA-ST M/s. Tandus Flooring India Pvt. Ltd. vs. the Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore

fiogf49gjkf0d
Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012-marketing and sales in India to a firm in China ans USA – place of provision is location of service receiver – Rule 3 applicable – Export.

Facts:
The applicant, an Indian company (wholly-owned subsidiary of a Singapore company) with the objective of strengthening and enhancing sales of the products of Tandus USA and Tandus China to its Indian customers against consideration receivable in freely convertible foreign exchange, agreed to provide services of marketing and promotion of products to Indian service recipients. The services also included demonstration of products, communication with customers, management of dealer accounts, coordination with representatives of customers, etc. The applicant sought advance ruling on the following questions:

• What would be the place of provision of the marketing and support services provided in India by the company to Tandus US and Tandus China in terms of the Place of Provision of Service Rules 2012 (introduced vide Notification No. 28/2012–S.T. dated 20-06-2012)?

• Whether the said services would also qualify as export of taxable services under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994?

Held:
Considering the case of service proposed to be provided from Indian territory to a business entity located outside India and referring to Circular No.111/5/2009 dated 24-02-2009, it was observed that the benefit of service accrued outside India. Accordingly, in terms of the applicable Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, the Hon. Authority held that the service so provided by Tandus India was covered under the default Rule 3 which stipulated that the place of provision shall be the location of the service recipient i.e., Tandus USA and Tandus China and thus service was deemed to be provided in a non-taxable territory. Further, referring to Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the Hon. Authority held that since the applicant satisfied all the conditions of the said Rule, the services so provided would tantamount to export.

levitra

INPUT TAX CREDIT under VAT: Whether Ascertainment of Tax on Transaction is Required?

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
After introduction of VAT in Maharashtra, getting input tax credit (ITC) has become a herculean task for dealers. A number of objections are raised while granting ITC (set off of tax paid on purchases). The basic objection is that it is the claimant buyer dealer who has to obtain confirmation of tax payment from the vendor. Thus, an impossible task is required to be accomplished by the buying dealers.

The difficulties are much more with the issue of ‘hawala’ dealers having surfaced. Everyone is now well aware that the Sales Tax Department has put up a list of more than 2,000 dealers as suspicious dealers, commonly described as ‘hawala’ dealers, on the website. In respect of ‘hawala’ dealers, no set-off is allowed irrespective of producing confirmation or any other supporting document. Neither assessment orders of the said vendors (so-called havala dealers) are passed nor crossexamination, to rebut the charge of non-genuine transactions etc., is allowed. Such actions of disallowing setoff, in the hands of purchasers, are against the principles of natural justice and invalid in the eyes of law.

Judgment in case of Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries, Kolhapur vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (51 VST 1)(Bom)

In almost all such cases, the Department is relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the above case. No doubt, in the above judgment, the Hon’ble High Court has upheld the Constitutional validity of section 48(5) of the MVAT Act, which provides that the ITC should not exceed the amount of tax paid on the said goods into the State Treasury. However, the Sales Tax Department is taking a stand that after above judgment the Department has nothing to do with vendors. Once the Department’s records show that there is no payment by the vendor, set-off can be disallowed without complying with any other process. For this purpose, the Department is verifying tax payment of vendors by their own means like non-filing of returns, non-availability of vendor or listed suspicious (hawala) dealer, etc.

We understand that if the Government has not received money on the same goods in its treasury than the set-off can be disallowed to the buyer as per the above judgment. But the disallowance cannot be a unilateral action. The Department has to follow the principles of natural justice.

It may be worthwhile to note that in above judgment Hon’ble High Court has not directed disallowance of set-off in the hands of all the buyers without assessment of vendor/s or without giving other opportunities as per law to the claimant buyer/s.

Ascertainment of tax payment on transactions is required

Therefore, the present procedure adopted by the Sales Tax Department is grossly erroneous. As per law, no set-off can be disallowed without ascertainment of tax payment on the given transaction and more particularly on the ‘goods’ involved.

The above position is reiterated as per the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal.

Gallery 7 vs. State of Maharashtra (VAT S.A. No.120 of 2011 dated 17-12-2012)

This is the judgment in which, amongst others, the issue of disallowance of set-off in relation to ‘hawala’ dealer is discussed and considered by the Hon’ble Tribunal. There were different reasons due to which set-off was disallowed on various purchase transactions. One of the purchases, on which set-off was disallowed, was from a declared ‘hawala’ dealer namely, M/s. Venkatesh Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. In the first appeal the set-off disallowance was confirmed. Therefore, this second appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Tribunal. After discussing the facts, the Hon’ble Tribunal has remanded the matter back to the first appellate authority with following directions:-

“14. We have considered the rival submissions. We have gone through the record underlying the assessment and the audit done by the assessing officer. We have also gone through the record underlying the appeal order.

i) The main issue in this appeal is about the claim of set-off. The levy of interest u/s. 30(3) is consequent to the dues of taxes which have arisen from disallowance of the claim of set-off. Quantum of penalty u/s. 29(3) is also dependant on the quantum of dues of tax and also the amount of set-off claimed in excess. It would therefore, be necessary to deal with the issue of claim of set-off. It is seen from the perusal of both the assessment order and the appeal order that this issue was not handled seriously by both the assessing officer and the appellate officer. While, in certain instances, the claim of set-off was disallowed by the assessing officer on the ground of non-production of tax invoice, it was allowed by the appellate officer on the ground that the seller was not traceable as reported by the sales tax inspector, the claim was allowed by the appellate officer just by observing that it could not be said that the seller was not doing business in the financial year 2006-2007 and there was no report of the sales tax inspector stating that no returns were filed and no tax was paid by the supplier. Without actually examining whether tax collected from the appellant was in fact paid by the supplier into the government treasury, set-off of an amount of Rs. 78,0375/- which was disallowed by the assessing officer was granted by the appellate officer. We are of the view that, it was necessary for the appellate officer to examine the claim and decide the admissibility of the claim not only on the basis of production or non-production of tax invoice but also after examining whether tax charged in the invoice by the supplier were paid into the government treasury or not. We are of the view that for proper appreciation of the issue, it would be necessary to remand the matter to the appellate officer with direction to him to examine the entire claim of set-off afresh in the light of the provision of section 48(5) of the MVAT Act. It would also be necessary to remand the matter to the appellate officer with the view to examine the appellants claim made in the written submission to grant further set-off in respect of the transactions of purchases allegedly effected by the appellant from M/s. Akshila Trade Ltd. and M/s. Bahubali Trading Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Venkatesh Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. who were found to have defaulted in paying taxes allegedly collected from the appellant.” (Emphasis supplied)

This judgment lays down the correct position in respect of disallowance of set-off including where there is allegation of ‘hawala’ purchases. Unless there is ascertainment of tax payment on the transaction, the set-off cannot be disallowed. It clearly shows that merely on an allegation of the dealer being a hawala dealer set-off cannot be disallowed. It is expected that the lower authorities will follow the above decision and avoid disallowing set-off on a mere allegation of hawala purchase.

Assessment of hawala dealer
It is surprising that the Sales Tax Department is not taking any interest in the assessment of so called ‘hawala’ dealers or just avoiding the assessment of the suspicious vendors on the ground that they are declared ‘hawala’ dealers by them.

Devyani Trading Company vs. The State of Maharashtra (S.A.No.684 to 687 of 2010 dated 15-09- 2012)

In this judgment, the Hon’ble Tribunal has dealt with a similar situation where the vendor has submitted that his transactions are not of sale/ purchase, but financial transaction. In fact the registration of the vendor was cancelled on account of not doing genuine business.

In spite of the above, the dealer was assessed by the Enforcement Officer. In the second appeal, the stand was repeated that there was no genuine business and no tax should be levied. The Tribunal observed that there are transactions with other dealers and therefore, the stand of the appellant that he has not done genuine business cannot be accepted. The Hon’ble Tribunal observed as under:-

“6. The appellant has routed huge transactions through these banks and the State has definitely lost huge tax. The appellant were provided number of opportunities by the appellate Assistant Commissioner to prove that the transactions on financial transactions not involving sales. The transactions entered into or through the bank account of the appellant and the appellant cannot plead that he is not aware about the nature of these transactions. Crores of rupees transactions have been routed through these bank accounts and the appellant cannot say that these are financial transactions not liable to tax. In fact, the existence of these accounts and concealment of the information about their existence gives rise to mens rea.

The appellants have randomly taken various inspections of accounts and not cooperated with the department in explaining the matter in payment of tax and is squarely liable to pay the tax. Accordingly, we confirm the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (Appeals) and reject the Second Appeal petitions. Hence, the order.”

The legal position that emerges is that, under the name of ‘hawala’ no dealer can escape the legal liability. The Sales Tax Department not assessing the vendors under the name of ‘hawala’ is really illegal and it is causing great loss to the Government Treasury. It is expected that the Department will follow the above dictum of the Hon’ble Tribunal and avoid big loss of revenue to the Government. This will also save innocent buyers from illegal disallowance of set-off.

Conclusion

ITC is the lifeline of the VAT system. It has to have a sound, strong and logical apparatus. The dealer, while selling his goods considers the availability of set-off of taxes paid on his purchases. Any disallowance of set-off will be a direct loss to him. Therefore, before disallowing set-off u/s 48(5), due legal process is required to be followed by the Department. The above two judgments in relation to the issue, should certainly be taken as guidance by the Sales Tax Department.

ITO vs. Zinger Investments (P) Ltd. ITAT Hyderabad `A’ Bench Before Chandra Poojari (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM) ITA No. 275/Hyd/2013 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 21st August, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: M. H. Naik/ Inturi Rama Rao.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sections 2(42C), 50B—Transfer of undertaking, with all its assets and liabilities under a scheme of amalgamation, where no monetary consideration is involved, cannot be considered to be a slump sale within the meaning of section 2(42C).

Facts:
The assessee filed return of income declaring nil income. In the course of assessment proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that under the scheme of amalgamation approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court u/s. 391 and 394 of the Companies Act the manufacturing division of the assessee company was transferred to M/s. Novopan Industries Ltd. with all its assets and liabilities as per the terms of scheme of amalgamation approved by the High Court. The assessee in return for the transfer of assets and liabilities received the investments of Rs. 25,24,05,000 besides the allotment of 38 equity shares of Rs. 10 each to the shareholders of the assessee company for every 100 equity shares held in the assessee company. The net worth of the assessee company as on 31-3-2006 was Rs. 681.22 lakh.

The AO held the transfer of manufacturing division to M/s. Novopan Industries Ltd to be a `slump sale’ within section 50B attracting liability of capital gains. He computed long-term capital gain by adopting full value of consideration to be Rs. 31,52,12,500 being aggregate of Rs. 6,28,07,500 (being shares issued to shareholders) and Rs. 25,24,05,000. He considered Rs. 6,81,22,000 to be the cost of acquisition. Accordingly, he determined long-term capital gain to be Rs. 24,70,90,500. He rejected the contention of the assessee that there was no monetary consideration and therefore the transfer under consideration was not a slump sale.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal, having noted the facts, observed that there is no monetary consideration received by the assessee company for transfer of manufacturing division. To qualify as a slump sale u/s. 2(42C), two conditions have to be satisfied viz., (1) there must be transfer of one or more undertaking as a result of sale and (2) the sale should be for a lumpsum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities. The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Motors & General Stores Pvt. Ltd. 66 ITR 692 (SC) and also CIT vs. R. R. Ramakrishna Pillai 66 ITR 725 (SC) wherein it was held that where a person carrying on business transfers assets to a company in consideration of allotment of shares, it would be a case of exchange, but not sale.

The Tribunal held that since there is no monetary consideration involved in transferring the manufacturing division with all its assets and liabilities to M/s. Novapan Industries Ltd. under scheme of amalgamation approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it cannot be considered to be a slump sale within the meaning ascribed u/s. 2(42C) of the Act so as to attract the liability of capital gains u/s. 50B of the Act. The Tribunal did not find any reason to interfere with the finding of CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

levitra

ITO vs. Gope M. Rochlani ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM) ITA No. 7737/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 24th May, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: D. K. Sinha/ Dr. P. Daniel.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c). The expression “due date” in Explanation 5A encompasses a belated return filed u/s. 139(4). Even a belated return filed u/s. 139(4) will be entitled to the benefit of immunity from penalty.

Facts: The assessee, a partner of the firm M/s. Madhav Constructions, in its return of income for assessment year 2008-09, filed u/s. 139(4), returned a total income of Rs. 1,31,19,140. The returned income included a sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 declared by it in the statement recorded u/s. 132(4) of the Act in the course of search action on Madhav Group. In an order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A, the income returned by the assessee was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO). Thereafter, the AO initiated proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) on the ground that the income was offered only as a consequence of search and the return of income in which it was declared was filed after due date u/s. 139(1). He held that the assessee’s case was covered by Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c). He rejected the assessee’s contention that the sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 declared was offered voluntarily on an estimated basis and the same was accepted in the assessment order and hence the provisions of section 271(1)(c) are not applicable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground that income was offered on an estimated basis and therefore the additional income so offered and accepted could not be held to be concealed income nor could it amount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
In Explanation 5A, the legislature has not specified the due date as provided in section 139(1) but has merely envisaged the words “due date”. This “due date” can be very well inferred as due date of filing of return of income filed u/s. 139 which includes section 139(4). Where the legislature has provided the consequences of filing of return of income u/s. 139(4), then the same has also been specifically provided for eg., section 139(3). Thus, the meaning of the words “due date” sans any limitation or restriction as given in clause (b) of Explanation 5A cannot be read as “due date as provided in section 139(1)”. The words “due date” can also mean date of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(4).

The Tribunal also noted that in the context of sections 54F and 54(2), in the case of CIT vs. Rajesh Kumar Jalan (286 ITR 276)(Gau); CIT vs. Jagriti Aggarwal (339 ITR 610)(P & H) and CIT vs. Jagtar Singh Chawla (ITA No. 71 of 2012, order dated 20th March, 2013), it has been held that provisions of section 139(4) are actually an extension of due date of section 139(1) and therefore due date for filing return of income can also be reckoned with the date mentioned in section 139(4).

The Tribunal held that the assessee gets the benefit/ immunity under clause (b) of Explanation to section 271(1)(c), because the assessee has filed its return of income within “due date” and therefore, the penalty levied by the AO cannot be sustained on this ground. It held that it is not affirming the findings and conclusions of CIT (A). However, the penalty levied was deleted in view of the interpretation of Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

levitra

Om Stock & Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `C’ Bench Before Sanjay Arora (AM) and Vijay Pal Rao (JM) ITA No. 441/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Prakash Jhunjhunwala/T. Roumuan Paite

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sections 44AB, 271B—Value of transactions of online trading in commodities through MCX without taking delivery do not constitute turnover for computing the limits u/s. 44AB of the Act. There is no element of turnover where there is no physical delivery of commodities given or taken.

Facts:
The assessee company, a member of Multi Commodity Exchange of India (MCX) was engaged in online business of trading in commodities. The transactions carried on by the assessee were speculative in nature. The bills issued by the Exchange on a daily basis represented mark to market bills and not actual sales/purchase turnover. The transactions were without taking delivery. The entire transaction was squared off at the end of the day or was carried forward to the subsequent day. The net amount, as per contract notes, was either debited or credited to the account of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer (AO), considering the value of the transactions carried out by the assessee on MCX to be the sales figure, invoked section 271B for violation of section 44AB. He held that the turnover of the assessee was more than Rs. 40 lakh, being the limit prescribed u/s. 44AB for getting the accounts audited and obtaining and furnishing the report as required by the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it placed reliance on the following decisions:

Banwari Sitaram Pasari HUF vs. ACIT (29 Taxmann 137) (Pune ITAT)

Growmore Exports Ltd. vs. ACIT (72 TTJ 691) (Mum ITAT)

CIT vs. Growmore Exports Ltd. (Appeal No. 18 to 20 of 2001) (Mum HC).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Pune Bench of ITAT has in the case of Banwari Sitaram Pasari (supra), following the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Growmore Exports Ltd. (supra) held that the transaction of buying and selling of commodities where no physical delivery is taken or given is a speculative activity and there is no element of turnover in such transactions.

The Tribunal also noted that the view taken by the Tribunal in the case of Growmore Exports Ltd. has been confirmed by the Bombay High Court vide decision dated 19-12-2007 and speaking order has been passed in the connected case of CIT vs. Harsh Estate Pvt. Ltd. where the Court has observed as under:

“In other words the finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the purchase was coupled with delivery has been reversed by the order of ITAT. Nothing has been brought to our attention from the record that the said finding of reversal is perverse warranting this court to take a view different from the view of the Tribunal. We, therefore, proceed on the footing that though there was transaction of shares it was not coupled with delivery. Once there was no delivery, the sale price of the shares could not have been considered as the turnover but only the difference between the price at which the shares were purchased and consequently sold by the broker…

Considering the findings on merits namely that there was no delivery and consequently the sales prices of the shares could not have been considered, it is not necessary to go into the other aspects. In the light of the above, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.”

The Tribunal considering the above mentioned decisions held that the value of sale transaction of commodity through MCX without delivery cannot be considered as turnover for the purpose of section 44AB. It deleted the penalty levied u/s. 271B.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

levitra

Works Contract executed through Sub-contractor — Whether single transaction or multiple transactions ?

fiogf49gjkf0d
VAT

A very interesting question was dealt with by Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Others, reported in 148 STC 616
(A.P.). The facts were that L&T received a contract from its customer (contractee).
Part of the contract was executed through subcontractors. The sub-contractors
had issued tax invoices to L&T and tax on the same was paid by the respective
sub-contractors. L&T was assessed for the period 1-4-2005 to 31-1-2006 under A.P.
VAT Act. In the returns filed for the above period, L&T had not included the
turnover affected through subcontractors. The Assessing Officer was of the view
that such turnover is includible in the turnover of L&T.


L&T argued that there was no such need in view of particular
provisions of the A P Vat Act and also on the principle of single transaction
theory. In other words, L&T contended that there was direct sale by the
subcontractors to the contractee and hence no turnover of subcontractor was
includible in its turnover. The Assessing Officer held that there was sale by
subcontractor to L&T i.e., to the principal contractor and again by L&T
to the contractee. In view of the above, the Assessing Officer held the turnover
affected through subcontractors as liable to tax in the hands of L&T. L&T filed
writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The High Court held that in view
of the established position by the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of
Builders’ Association of India (73 STC 370), the turnover of subcontractor is
not includible in the turnover of L&T.

Against the above judgment the State of A.P. filed SLP in the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has now decided this issue vide its judgment in
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Others. The
judgment is reported in 2008 VIL 30 SC dated 26-8-2008. The Supreme Court has
dealt with the issue in the light of specific provisions of the A.P. VAT Act and
also the Constitution’s provisions like Article 366(29A)(b).

The Supreme Court observed that there can be two types of
works contracts : one, relating to construction and two, relating to movable
properties like repairs, etc. . . After taking note of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Gannon Dunkarley and Co. (9 STC 353), the Supreme
Court referred to the 46th amendment made to the Constitution by which deemed
sale categories were provided by way of Article 366 (29A). The Supreme Court
also observed that the above amendment to the Constitution has been approved by
the Constitution Bench in the case of Builders’ Association of India (73 STC
370). The Supreme Court also noted the provision in the A.P. Act which provides
for payment of tax on the value of the goods at the time of incorporation of
such goods in the works executed at the rates applicable to the goods
. In
the light of above, the Supreme Court held that the taxable event is transfer of
property in goods involved in the execution of works contract and the said
transfer of property takes place when the goods are incorporated in the works.
The value at such point of time is a taxable value. In view of the above
provision, the Supreme Court observed that the scheme of taxation indicates that
there is a ‘deemed sale’ by the dealer executing the work, i.e., in this
case the subcontractor. The Supreme Court further observed that it is the
sub-contractor only, who affects transfer of property in goods, as no goods
vests in the main contractor, so as to be subject matter of a re-transfer. The
Supreme Court, in fact, observed as under :

“‘By virtue of Article 366 (29A)(b) of the Constitution
once the work is assigned by the contractor (L&T), the only transfer of
property in goods is by the subcontractor(s) who is a registered dealer in
this case and who claims to have paid taxes under the Act on the goods
involved in the execution of the works. Once the work is assigned by L&T to
its subcontractor(s), L&T ceases to execute the works contract in the sense
contemplated by Article 366(29A)(b), because property passes by accretion and
there is no property in goods with the contractor which is capable of a
re-transfer, whether as goods or in some other form.

17. The question which is raised before us is : whether the
turnover of the subcontractors (whose names are also given in the original
writ petition) is to be added to the turnover of L&T. In other words, the
question which we are required to answer is : whether the goods employed by
the subcontractors occur in the form of a single deemed sale or multiple
deemed sales. In our view, the principle of law in this regard is clarified by
this Court in the case of Builders’ Association of India (supra) as
under :

“Ordinarily, unless there is a contract to the contrary, in
case of works contract the property in the goods used in the construction of a
building passes to the owner of the land on which the building is constructed,
when the goods or materials used are incorporated in the building.”


On behalf of the State of A.P. the argument was that there
are two deemed sales i.e., one from subcontractor to main contractor and
the other from main contractor to contractee. It was emphasised that contractee
has no privity of contract with the sub-contractor, hence it cannot be a single
transaction. On the above line of argument, the Supreme Court observed as
under :


“19. If one keeps in mind the above-quoted observation of this Court in the case of Builders’ Association of India (supra), the position becomes clear, namely, that even if there is no privity of contract between the contractee and the subcontractor, that would not do away with the principle of transfer of property by the subcontractor by employing the same on the property belonging to the contractee. This reasoning is based on the principle of accretion of property in goods. It is subject to the contract to the contrary. Thus, in our view, in such a case, the work executed by a sub-contractor results in a single transaction and not as multiple transactions. This reasoning is also borne out by S. 4(7) which refers to value of goods at the time of incorporation in the works executed. In our view, if the argument of the Department is to be accepted, it would result in plurality of deemed sales which would be contrary to Article 366(29A) (b) of the Constitution as held by the impugned judgment of the High Court. Moreover, it mayresult in double taxation which may make the said 2005 Act vulnerable to challenge as violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 265 of the Constitution of India as held by the High Court in its impugned judgment.”

Thus, it can be said that the legal position which emerges at present is that in relation to construction activity, even though the subcontractors are involved, still there cannot be multiple transactions. The taxation will be only once. The Supreme Court has not dealt with the issue about such transactions in relation to moveable properties. It also appears that in relation to construction activity if there is anything contrary to the above understanding, then the position may be different. This is evident from observations in para 19 reproduced above. It may also be worth noting that in relation to similar construction activity, in case of L&T only, the Karnataka High Court has taken a different view while dealing with levy of turnover tax under the erstwhile Karnataka Sales TaxAct and it is held that there are multi-point transactions, one from subcontractor to main contractor and the other from main contractor to contractee. This judgment is reported in 16 VST 616. However, the judgment is dated 3-2-2006, that is prior to the above Supreme Court judgment. In view of this latest judgment of the Supreme Court, the controversy should be laid to rest.

Recent amendment – Scope of E-filing of returns expanded:
The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, has issued Notification under Rule 17(5)(a) of the MVAT Rules, 2005 dated 30-8-2008. By this Notification the scope of E filing of returns has been expanded. Hitherto, dealers having tax liability exceeding Rs.I0 lakhs or refund exceeding Rs.l crore in the previous year (i.e., liable to file monthly returns) were liable to file E-returns. Now dealers having tax liability exceeding Rs.l lakh or refund exceeding Rs.I0 lakhs in the previous year are also made liable to file E-returns. In other words, in addition to dealers filing monthly returns, dealers filing quarterly returns are also now required to file E-returns. This position applies from the quarter starting 1st July, 2008. Therefore, for the quarter ending 30th September, 2008 and onwards, dealers covered by provisions of quarterly returns, will be required to file their returns by way of E-returns. Dealers filing monthly returns will continue to file E-returns, as earlier.

[2012] 137 ITD 163 (Panaji) DCIT vs. Jayalakshmi Mahila Vividodeshagala Souharda Sahakari Ltd. AY 2007-08 to 2009-10 Dated: 30th March, 2012

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 80P and section 5(b), 5(cci) and 5(ccv) of Banking Regulation Act,1959–assessee society engaged in business of providing credit facilities to its members and collecting deposits–section 80P was amended w.e.f. 01-04-2007 and hence AO denied deduction as assessee was a co-operative bank– Held that principal business of assessee was not to accept deposits from the public for the purpose of lending or investment—hence, principal business was not banking business–assessee society entitled to deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i).

Facts:
The assessee-society was engaged in business of providing credit facilities to its members by granting loans for various purposes. It also collected deposits. It availed deduction u/s. 80P. However, section 80P was amended w.e.f. 01-04-2007 whereby s/s. (4) was introduced which denied the deduction u/s. 80P to co-operative banks (other than primary agricultural credit society or a primary rural development bank). The AO denied deduction to assessee holding assessee as being a co-operative bank. The CIT(A) allowed deduction to assessee.

Held:
As per explanation to s/s. (4) of 80P, co-operative bank as defined in section 5(cci) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1959 means a state co-operative bank, a central co-operative bank and a primary cooperative bank. Assessee is not a state or central co-operative bank. The primary co-operative bank as defined in section 5(ccv) means a co-operative society (other than agricultural credit society) (1) the primary object or principal business of which is transaction of banking business, (2) the paid-up share capital and reserves of which are not less than one lakh of rupees and (3) the bye-laws of which do not permit admission of any other co-operative society as a member. The conditions No. (2) and (3) are applicable to assessee.

Banking business as defined u/s. 5(b) means the accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise.

Going through the aims and objects of the assessee society, it is observed that none of the aims and objects allows the assessee to accept deposits of money from the public for the purpose of lending or investment. The assessee is therefore held as not to be a primary co-operative bank and in consequence thereof, it cannot be a co-operative bank as defined in the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Thus the assessee is entitled to deduction u/s. 80P.

levitra

[2012] 138 ITD 278 (Pune) Ramsukh Properties vs. DCIT A.Y. 2007-08 Dated: 25th July, 2012

fiogf49gjkf0d
Assessee entitled to benefit u/s. 80(IB)(10) in respect of partially complete housing project if project could not be completed in specified time for reasons beyond its control.

Facts:
The assessee was a firm engaged in the business of builders and promoters. Its housing project consisted of six buildings having 205 flats. The housing project was not fully completed in time as specified under 80(IB)(10)(a) and hence it received completion certificate for 173 flats only. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of all the 205 flats as the project has been substantially completed and as such the completion certificate was obtained. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee for granting whole deduction in respect of whole project as well as alternative claim with regard to the proportionate deduction on the ground that the project was not completed within the stipulated period of time. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the action of the Assessing Officer.

Held:
Out of 205 flats, completion certificate was obtained and furnished before the AO for 173 flats only. The request for granting whole deduction in respect of whole project has rightly been rejected because deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) could not be granted to assessee on incomplete construction at relevant point of time. However, the fault of noncompletion of construction was not attributable to assessee. In case such a contingency emerges which makes the compliance with provisions of section 80- IB(10) impossible, then benefit bestowed on an assessee cannot be completely denied. Such liberal interpretation should be used in favour of assessee when he is incapacitated in completing a project in time for reasons beyond his control. The phrase “completion” is a relative and not absolute term. Accordingly, even part completion must be construed as completion. The provisions of taxing statute should be construed harmoniously with the object of statue to effectuate the legislative intention.

Hence, it was held that the assessee is entitled for benefit u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act in respect of 173 flats completed before prescribed limit.

levitra

Bad debts: Deduction u/s. 36(1)(vii): A. Y. 2004- 05: Where books of account are not closed and not signed by Board of Directors and not adopted by shareholders as per Companies Act, it is legally permissible to make adjustments before they are finally adopted: Where accounts of assessee were open and subject to correction by auditors, bad debts could be written off even after closure of accounting period, as there is neither any condition nor any provision u/s. 36(1)(vii), that writing off of

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd.; [2013] 36 taxmann.com 96 (All):

For the A. Y. 2004-05, the assessee’s claim for deduction of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the decision to write off bad debt was not taken in the relevant previous year. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following questions were raised before the High Court:

“i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that assessee can keep his accounts open for an indefinite period and pass an entry at a later stage even after 12 months from the closure of the accounting period?

ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the claim of bad debts of the assessee on the ground that it has been written off in the accounts of the relevant previous year while failing to appreciate that decision to write off bad debt was not taken in the relevant previous year and the same were actually not done in the previous year by 31st March?”

The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) On perusal of the provisions, it reveals that the only requirement for allowing the bad debt u/s. 36 (1) (vii) of the Income-tax Act, is that any bad debt or part thereof is written off as irrecoverable and secondly, they should be written off in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year. In the instant appeal, neither the department nor the assessee disputes that the debt had become bad and it was written off.

ii) The prescription as provided is to write off bad debt by the assessee in the accounts ‘for the previous year’, but it does not say to write off bad debt ‘in the previous year’. Thus, there is a vast difference if the word ‘in’ would have been there in place of ‘for’. Further, the words ‘accounts of the assessee’ are qualified with further words ‘for the previous year’. Thus, it only means that the accounts in which the Act of writing off is to be done by the assessee should be for the previous year. Therefore, the law requires to write off the bad debt in the accounts of the assessee in the relevant accounting year. There is neither any condition nor any provision that the writing off should be done in the previous year, i.e. before end of the financial year.

iii) In the present case, debts relating to the period 1987-88 and 1998-99 claimed in the accounts which were prepared up to 31-03-2004 and as the accounts of the assessee are open and subject to corrections by the Auditors, as per the Companies Act, then such writing off can be done in those account books. No new legal proposition has been brought to our notice for treating the debt as bad or irrecoverable should be taken in the previous year itself. In other words, where account books are not closed and not signed by the Board of Directors and not adopted by the shareholders as per the Companies Act, it is legally permissible to make adjustments before they are finally adopted.

iv) Further, it is admitted that the original return, on the basis of unaudited accounts, was filed on 01-11-2004. After audit had taken place and report of the Auditors was accepted, revised return was filed on 18-08-2005 and it is only in the revised return, the debts to the tune of Rs. 2 crore and odd had been declared as bad. The ground taken by the Assessing Authority and Appellate Authority for not accepting the said bad debts during the assessment year under consideration, i.e. 2004-05 is contrary to the provisions of section 36 (1) (vii) of the Income-tax Act, and further in view of the interpretation as stated here-in-above. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly allowed the appeal of the assessee.

v) In view of above, the questions are answered in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and is in favour of the assessee.”

levitra

Appellate Tribunal: Power and scope: Section 80-IA: A. Ys. 2002-03 to 2008-09: CIT(A) holding rental income from towers constructed in industrial park was business income and eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA: Revenue not challenging this finding before Tribunal: Tribunal cannot pass remand order for further enquiry on issue of character of receipt:

fiogf49gjkf0d
R. R. Industries Ltd. vs. ITO; 356 ITR 97 (Mad):

The assessee constructed towers in the industrial park and let them out to software concerns providing a platform with plug and play infrastructure. It claimed deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the rental income as business income. The Assessing Officer assessed the income as income from house property and disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IA. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had complied with section 80-IA(4)(iii) and accordingly was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA. He held that the income received by the assessee was to be assessed as income from business. He also agreed in principle that the deduction u/s. 80-IA would be allowed, even if the rental income was assessed as income from house property.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue challenged the view of the Commissioner (Appeals) only on his holding the income derived from letting out of industrial park buildings as income from business as against the finding made by the Assessing Officer that it was to be treated as income from house property. No question was raised on the view of the Commissioner (Appeals) that irrespective of the character of the receipt, the deduction was available. On considering the nature of the receipt, the Tribunal agreed with the submission of the assessee that income derived by developing and operating or maintaining an industrial park was assessable under the head “profits and gains of business and profession” as could be inferred from the provisions of section 80-IA(4)(iii) of the Act. The Tribunal held that the assessee as well as the Revenue had not brought out any materials to show that the facilities developed by the assessee after completion of the development was treated as an industrial park by any authority and it was not clear whether the alleged industrial park was so notified by the Central Government or not. In the absence of any material to show that what was predominant in the letting out in the building and whether the facilities were incidental, the Tribunal viewed that it was necessary to restore the issue back to the Assessing Officer for proper verification.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) When the Revenue had accepted the view of the Commissioner (Appeals) on section 80-IA that the assessee had complied with section 80-IA(4)(iii), nothing remained for an enquiry either as to the nature of the receipt or for that matter the facilities developed to be treated as an industrial park to consider the question of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4)(iii).

ii) The view of the Commissioner (Appeal) in this regard did not call for any interference. The Revenue did not challenge the order of the Commissioner on the section 80-IA deduction before the Tribunal.

iii) Thus, when the character of the receipt was not a question to be gone into in the matter of considering the claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4)(iii), no useful purpose would be served for the Revenue to again insist on a decision on the character of the receipt.

iv) The order of the Tribunal was set aside and the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.”

levitra

Motor Accident–Compensation on account of death–In law the presumption is that the employer at the time of payment of salary deducts income tax on the estimated income of the deceased employee from the salary and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary the salary as shown in the last pay certificate should be accepted for calculating the compensation payable to the dependent(s).

fiogf49gjkf0d
Vimal Kanwar And Ors. vs. Kishore Dan And Ors. [2013] 354 ITR 95 (SC)

On 14th September, 1996, one Mr. Sajjan Singh Shekhawat, Assistant Engineer with the Public Works Department, was sitting on his scooter which was parked on the side of the road and was waiting for one Junior Engineer, N. Hari Babu, and another whom he had called for discussion. At that time, a driver of a Jeep No. RJ10C0833 came driving from the railway station side with high speed, recklessly and negligently and hit the scooter. Sajjan Singh along with his scooter came under the jeep and was dragged with the vehicle. Due to this accident, fatal injuries were caused to him and on reaching the hospital he expired. The scooter was also damaged completely. The wife of the deceased was aged about 24 years; the daughter was aged about 2 years and the mother was aged about 55 years at the time of death of the deceased. They jointly filed an application to the Tribunal alleging that negligent and rash driving by the driver of the jeep caused the death of Sajjan Singh and claimed compensation of Rs. 80,40,160.

The Tribunal determined the compensation to be granted in favour of the appellants at Rs. 14,93,700 jointly.

Though the High Court noticed certain mistakes in determination of the compensation it upheld the same. In determining the compensation, a notional deduction of income tax was made by the High Court from the salary of the deceased apart from the deduction of annual pension and came to the conclusion that the award passed by the Tribunal was just and proper.

Before the Supreme Court, the grievance of the appellants was as follows:

(i) No amount can be deducted towards provident fund, pension and insurance amount from the actual salary of the victim for calculating compensation.

(ii) In the absence of any evidence, the court suo motu cannot deduct any amount towards income tax from the actual salary of the victim.

(iii) On the facts of the present case, the Tribunal and the High Court should have doubled the salary by allowing 100% increase towards the future prospects, and

(iv) The Tribunal and the High Court failed to ensure payment of just and fair compensation.

The first issue therefore was “whether provident fund, pension and insurance receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantages’ liable for deduction”. The Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid issue fell for consideration before it in Mrs. Helen C. Rebello vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation reported [1999] 1 SCC 90. In the said case, it was held that provident fund, pension, insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc., are all “pecuniary advantages” receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statue occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction.

The second issue was “whether the salary receivable by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction”. The Supreme Court held that “Compassionate appointment” can be one of the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. In case the employee dies in harness, i.e., while in service leaving behind the dependents, one of the dependents may request for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of the deceased employee died in harness. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death and has no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointment may have nexus with the death of an employee while in service but it is not necessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. An employee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain the family of the deceased one of the dependents may be entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot be termed as “pecuniary advantage” that comes under the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on such appointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

The third issue was “whether the income tax is liable to be deducted for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act”. The Supreme Court observed that in the case of Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121, it was held that “generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation”. It was further observed that “where the annual income is in taxable range, the words “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less tax”.

The Supreme Court noticed that in the present case, none of the respondents brought to the notice of the court that the income tax payable by the deceased Sajjan Singh was not deducted at source by the employer State Government. No such statement was made by Ram Avtar Parikh, an employee of the Public Works Department of the State Government who placed on record the last pay certificate and the service book of the deceased. The Tribunal or the High Court on perusal of the last pay certificate, did not notice that the income tax on the estimated income of the employee was not deducted from the salary of the employee during the said month or financial year. In the absence of such evidence, it was to be presumed that the salary paid to the deceased Sajjan Singh as per the last pay certificate was paid in accordance with law, i.e., by deducting the income tax on the estimated income of the deceased Sajjan Singh for that month or the financial year. The appellants had specifically stated that assessment year applicable in the instant case was 1997-98 and not 1996-97 as held by the High Court. They had also taken specific plea that for the assessment year 1997-98 the rate of tax on income more than Rs.40,000 and up to Rs.60,000 was 15% and not 20% as held by the High Court. The aforesaid fact was not disputed by the respondents. In view of the finding as recorded above and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as discussed, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in deducting 20% from the salary of the deceased towards income tax for calculating the compensation. As per law, the presumption would be that the employer State Government at the time of payment of salary deducted income-tax on the estimated income of the deceased employee from the salary and in the absence of any evidence, the Supreme Court held that the salary as shown in the last pay certificate at Rs. 8,920 should be accepted which if rounded of came to Rs. 9,000 for calculating the compensation payable to the dependent(s).

The fourth issue was “whether the compensation awarded to the appellants was just and proper”. According to the Supreme Court for determination of this issue, it was required to determine the percentage of increase in income to be made towards prospects of advancement in future career and revision of pay.

According to the Supreme Court, admittedly, the date of birth of the deceased Sajjan Singh being 1st February, 1968; the submission that he would have continued in service upto 1st February, 2026, if 58 years is the age of retirement or 1st February, 2028, if 60 years is the age of retirement required to be accepted. The Supreme Court observed that he was only 28 years 7½ months old at the time of death. In normal course, he would have served the State Government minimum for about 30 years. Even if one does not take into consideration the future prospect of promotion which the deceased was otherwise entitled and the actual pay revisions taken effect from 1st January, 1996, and 1st January, 2006, it cannot be denied that the pay of the deceased would have doubled if he would have continued in the services of the State till the date of retirement. Hence, this was a fit case in which 100% increase in the future income of the deceased should have been allowed by the Tribunal and the High Court which they failed to do. The Supreme Court having regard to the facts and evidence on record, estimated the monthly income of the deceased Sajjan Singh at Rs. 9,000 x 2 = Rs. 18,000 per month. From this his personal living expenses, which should be one-third, there being three dependents, were deducted. Thereby, the ‘actual salary’ came to Rs. (18,000-6,000=12,000) per month or Rs. 12,000 x 12 = 1,44,000 per annum. As the deceased was 28½ years old at the time of death the multiplier of 17 was applied, which was appropriate to the age of the deceased. The normal compensation would then work out to be Rs. 1,44,000 x 17 = Rs. 24,48,000 to which the Supreme Court added the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the estate by providing a conventional sum of R. 1,00,000; loss of love and affection for the daughter Rs. 2,00,000; loss of love and affection for the widow and the mother at Rs. 1,00,000 each, i.e., Rs. 2,00,000 and funeral expenses of Rs. 25,000.

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, in all a sum of Rs. 29,73,000 was a fair, just and reasonable award in the circumstances of this case. The rate of interest of 12% was allowed from the date of the petition filed before the Tribunal till payment is made.

Disallowance of an expenditure ‘Payable’ u/s. 40(a)(ia)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Issue for Consideration
Section 40(a)(ia) is placed in Chapter IV D that deals with computation of profits and gains of business or profession. The said section lists out various expenditures that are not deductible in computing such profits and gains notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 30 to 38.

The part, relevant for the discussion of the issue under consideration here, reads as under:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38, the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession” –

(a) In the case of any assessee

(i) —————–

(ia)any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid, on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139:

Provided …………………………………………………..
Provided  further ………………………………………
Explanation: …………………………………………….

On an apparent reading of the provision, it appears that an expenditure of the nature specified in the section, payable to a resident, shall not be allowed to be deducted where tax is deductible at source but has not been paid.

Since its introduction by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. assessment year 2005-06, this provision has been the subject matter of one or more controversies, some of them grave, including the challenge to the constitutionality of the provisions. The resistance of the taxpayers attracts sympathy on account of the fact that the provisions are very harsh as they call for disallowance of a genuine business expenditure, in its entirety, simply on account of non-deduction or non-payment of a miniscule amount. This torturous treatment attracts fierce opposition from the taxpayers and provides a breeding ground for an endless spate of litigation involving innovative contentions.

One such proposition, that found favour with the tribunal, is that the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) be restricted to the amount that remained unpaid or payable at the end of the year on which tax is not deducted or is deducted but has not been deposited with the Government. The tribunal based its finding on the use of the term ‘payable’ in section 40(a)(ia) to hold that the said term conveyed that the expenditure that is ‘ paid’ during the year is not disallowable even where the tax is not deducted or is not deposited after deduction. In short, the disallowance is to be restricted to the expenditure that is ‘payable’ and is not to be extended to cover an expenditure that has been ‘paid’.

The Special Bench of the tribunal in Merilyn Shipping & Transports vs. Addl. CIT, 136 ITD 23 (Vishakhapatnam) accepted this line of thinking by holding that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable in respect of such expenditure, the payment for which was made during the year without deducting tax at source. It held that the disallowance was possible only in respect of such expenditure, the payment for which was outstanding at the end of the year.

This decision of the special bench has subsequently been expressly overruled by two decisions of the Calcutta High Court and also by a decision of the Gujarat High Court. In contrast, the Allahabad High Court recently noted that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) applied only to such expenditure, the payment for which had remained outstanding at the year end. In the meanwhile, the operation of this decision of the special bench was put under an interim suspension by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. However, it is believed that the operation of such suspension was limited to Merilyn Shipping & Transports or at the most to the assesses in the state of Andhra Pradesh.

Any issue concerning section 40(a)(ia) assumes importance, as the said provision seeks to disallow a genuine business expenditure, for non-deduction or payment of an insignificant amount of tax.

2. Crescent Export Syndicate’s case

The issue arose before the Calcutta High Court, for the first time, in the case of CIT vs. Crescent Export Syndicate, 33 taxmann.com 250. In this case, the court was concerned with two appeals involving a common issue. In both the cases, the tribunal, relying on the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports, deleted the disallowance by the AO by holding that:

“If all the amounts have been paid, then obviously following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports, no addition shall be made. If any amount is found to be payable as on the year end, then the Assessing Officer shall give the assessee adequate opportunity to substantiate his case as to why the disallowance, if any, should not be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(1) (ia) of the Act”.

“As the issue claimed by the assessee is that there is nothing payable as on 31-03-2006 and this expenditure of Rs. 1,08,80,559/- is paid during the year and nothing remains payable, it means that the issue is covered. Principally, we have agreement with the assessee’s counsel and are of the view that the issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee. Principally, we allow this issue of the assessee but subject to the verification by AO that these expenses are paid within the year i.e., up to 31-03-2006 and nothing remains payable. Hence, this appeal of assessee in principle is allowed in favour of the assessee but subject to verification.”

The revenue filed appeals in both the matters requesting the Calcutta High Court to set aside the orders of the tribunal.

On behalf of the assessee, the following important contentions were placed for the consideration of the court;

• The Legislature has replaced the words “amounts credited or paid” used in the Finance Bill with the word “payable” in the final enactment. The change clearly conveyed the legislative intent of restricting the scope of the disallowance to the amounts ‘payable’ by excluding those amounts that were ‘paid’ during the year.

• Such change was not without any purpose. By changing the words from “credited or paid” to “payable”, the legislative intent has been made clear that only the outstanding amount or the provision for expense liable for TDS was sought to be disallowed in the event there was a default of TDS. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of CIT vs. Kelvinator of India, 320 ITR 561 wherein the court, in the context of section 147, examined the implications of the deletion of the word ‘opinion’ used in the Finance Bill with the words “reason to believe” on enactment of the Bill, on receipt of representations against the omission of the words “reason to believe”,

• A construction which required, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which resulted in rejection of words, had to be avoided, unless it was covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity. In the present provision of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act, there was no such exception and the only word used by the legislature was “payable”.

•    The legislative intent had been made clear by consciously replacing the words “credited or paid” with “payable”, that only the outstanding amount or the provision for expenses were liable for TDS were to be disallowed in the event there was default in not following the TDS provisions under Chapter XVII-B of the Act.

•    Sections 194 L and 194 LA provided that tax was to be deducted only at the time of payment. The language in these sections therefore showed that the legislature, where desired, had used different language in different sections.

•    Reference was made, for explaining the scope and effect of section 40(a)(ia), to the circular No.5 of 2005, dated 15th July, 2005, issued by the CBDT to show that the intention to introduce the provision was to curb bogus payments by creating bogus liability.

•    Section 40(a)(ia) created a legal fiction for the amounts outstanding or remained payable i.e. at the end of every year as on 31st March and such fiction could not be extended for taxing the amounts already paid.

•    Section 201 took care of tax to be collected in the hands of the payee and other TDS provisions under

Chapter XVIIB of the Act. No further legal fiction from elsewhere in the statute could be borrowed to extend the field of section 40(a)(ia) for disallowing the genuine and reasonable expenditure on the amounts of expenditure already paid.

•    That there might be two possible constructions. However, the construction that the word ‘payable’ was interchangeable with the word ‘paid’ made the position of the assessee, who had already paid his dues, without deducting tax, worse than the assessee who had not as yet paid his dues. In the case of the assessees, who had paid the dues without deduction of tax, disallowance of the expenditure was permanent and they had no means of deducting the tax later on relatable to the amount already paid in the earlier year and thus the relief contemplated by the proviso could never be availed by them.

•    While the income in the hands of the recipient was taxed, the payer did not get the benefit thereof. A second proviso to clause (ia), effective from 1st April, 2013, was enacted to lessen the rigour of clause (ia).

The Calcutta High Court, on hearing the rival contentions, observed and held as under:

•    The main thrust of the majority view, in the decision of the special bench, was based on the fact that the legislature had replaced the expression “amounts credited or paid” with the expression “payable” in the final enactment.

•    The tribunal fell into an error in not realising that a comparison between the pre-amendment and post-amendment law was permissible for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied or the object sought to be achieved by an amendment which precisely was what was done by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Kel-vinator of India Ltd. 187 Taxman 312. But the same comparison between the draft and the enacted law was not permissible. Nor could the draft or the bill be used for the purpose of regulating the meaning and purport of the enacted law. It was the finally enacted law which was the will of the legislature.

•    The tribunal once having held “that where the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used”, then it was not open to seek to interpret the section on the basis of any comparison between the draft and the section actually enacted nor was it open to speculate as to the effect of the so-called representations made by the professional bodies.

•    The tribunal having held that “Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act created a legal fiction by virtue of which even the genuine and admissible expenses claimed by an assessee under the head ‘income from business and profession,’ if the assessee does not deduct TDS on such expenses, are disallowed”, was it open to the tribunal to seek to justify that by stating that “this fiction cannot be extended any further and, therefore, cannot be invoked by Assessing Officer to disallow the genuine and reasonable expenditure or the amounts of expenditure already paid”? Did that not amount to deliberately reading something in the law which was not there?

•    The tribunal sought to remove the rigour of the law by holding that the disallowance should be restricted to the money which was yet to be paid. What the Tribunal by majority did was to supply the casus omissus which was not permissible and could only have been done by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case as was done in the case of Bhuwalka Steel Industries vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board , 2 SCC 273.

The Calcutta High Court thereafter endeavoured to show that no other interpretation was possible in the following words:

•    The key words used in section 40(a)(ia), according to the court, were “on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII –B”. If the question was “which expenses are sought to be disallowed?”, the answer was bound to be “those expenses on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII –B”.

Once that was realised, nothing turned on the basis of the fact that the legislature used the word ‘payable’ and not ‘paid or credited’. Unless any amount was payable, it could neither be paid nor credited. If an amount had neither been paid nor credited, there could be no occasion for claiming any deduction.

•    The language used in the draft was unclear and susceptible to giving more than one meaning. By looking at the draft it could be said that the legislature wanted to treat the payments made or credited in favour of a contractor or sub-contractor differently than the payments on account of interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or fees for technical services because the words “amounts credited or paid” were used only in relation to a contractor or sub-contractor. This differential treatment was not intended. Therefore, the legislature provided that the amounts, on which tax was deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B, payable on account of interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services or to a contractor or sub-contractor should not be deducted in computing the income of an assessee in case he had not deduced, or after deduction had not paid, within the specified time. The language used by the legislature in the finally enacted law was clear and unambiguous whereas the language used in the bill was ambiguous.

•    There could be no denial that the provision in question was harsh. But that was no ground to read the same in a manner which was not intended by the legislature. The law was deliberately made harsh to secure compliance of the provisions requiring deductions of tax at source. It was not the case of an inadvertent error. The suggestion that the second proviso inserted to be made effective from

1st April, 2013 should be held to have retrospective effect, could also not be acceded to for the same reason indicated above.

For the reasons discussed above, the court held that the majority views expressed in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports were not acceptable and the appeal was allowed in favour of the revenue.

3.    Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd.’s case

The issue again came up for consideration of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. in ITA No. 122 0f 2013, copy available on www. itatonline.org.

The assessee, a shipping service company, engaged the services of another company for ship management work, on its behalf, for which it paid an amount of Rs. 1.17 crore, without deduction of tax at source, on the ground that the said payment represented the reimbursement of expenses incurred by the service provider. The AO disagreed with the view of the assessee company and disallowed the entire payment u/s 40(a)(ia).

On appeal against the order of the AO, the CIT (A) held that “In the light of the above facts ——————– , when such type of expenses incurred by the appellant were totally paid and not remained payable as at the end of the relevant accounting period, provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are not applicable ………………………………. it is held that the AO was not justified in making addition of Rs.1,17,68,621/- on account of disallowance made under section 40 (a) (ia) of the I.T. Act, 1961. The same is directed to be deleted. Grounds Nos. 2 & 3 are allowed.”

The Tribunal, besides upholding the assessee’s claim that no tax was required to be deducted on a reimbursement, held that section 40(a)(ia) applied only to amounts that were “payable” as at the end of the year and not to amounts that had already been “paid” during the year relying on the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Merilyn Shipping and Transport Ltd 136 ITD 23 (SB) where a similar view was taken.

On appeal by the Income-tax Department, the Allahabad High Court was asked to answer the following:

“(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble ITAT has rightly confirmed the order of the CIT (A) and thereby deleting the disallowance of Rs. 1,17,68,621/- made by the Assessing Officer under section 40(a)(ia) of the I.T. Act, 1961 by ignoring the fact that the company M/s Mercator Lines Ltd. had performed ship management work on behalf of the assessee M/s Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. and there was a Memorandum of Understanding signed between both the companies and as per the definition of memorandum of understanding, it included contract also.”

The Allahabad High Court, vide an order dated 09-07-2013, observed that the Revenue could not take any benefit from the observations made by the Special Bench of the tribunal in the case of Merilyn Shipping and Transport Ltd. to the effect that section 40 (a) (ia) was introduced in the Act with a view to augment the revenue through the mechanism of tax deduction at source and the provision was brought on statute to disallow the claim of even genuine and admissible expenses under the head ‘Income from Business and Profession’ in case the assessee did not deduct tax on such expenses and that the default in deduction of tax would result in disallowance of expenditure.

The court, importantly, in the context, noted that for disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that tax had not been deducted, the amount should be payable and not which had been paid by the end of the year.

4.    Observations

Clarity breeds confusion. The Special Bench of the tribunal in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports, 136 ITD 23 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam) held that the language of section 40(a)(ia) was clear and the Calcutta High Court in Crescent Exports Syndicate’s case (supra) also held that the language was clear and unambiguous, to arrive at the conflicting decisions. Now, if the language is clear how could there have been different and importantly diverse views on the meaning of the word ‘payable’? Either one of the views is wrong or there is a genuine possibility of two views on the issue under consideration. We would prefer the latter view to hold that the term ‘payable’, when read in the context and in the background of the circumstances that surrounded its use and also the subsequent insertion of the second proviso for granting relief on payment of tax by the payee, is capable of conveying two views, both of which are possible. Needless to say that when two views are possible, a view beneficial to the taxpayer should be adopted, Vegetable Products 88 ITR 192 (SC). There are no two views on this aspect of the law of interpretation.

The Calcutta High Court’s observations on the legislative intent, if there ever was one, are interesting and so are its observations bordering on the strictures when it held that the language of the law was clear and the tribunal was wrong in gathering the legislative intent. Having said so, the court itself tried to support what in its view was clear with deductive logic supported by analytical tools to provide a harmonious interpretation. No harmony is required to be infused where the language is clear. With utmost respect, it appears that the time is ripe to altogether give up on using the tool of legislative intent as an aid to interpretation. A grave notice is required to be taken of the fact that most of these legislations are passed without any debate and even understanding of the law and it may be that the persons voting in favour of passing the legislation may not even be aware of the subject matter of the vote and of the fact that such a law is being passed with their votes. There is a strong case for the courts, in the present times, to be in tune with the times and supply such interpretation which is just and harmonious and more importantly the one that identifies with common sense.

The situation has the effect of putting the tribunal in an unenviable situation. The conflicting decisions of the High Courts have once again paved the pathway for a fresh consideration of the subject by the tribunal. Usually in such cases, the tribunal charts its own course and is allowed to do so. However, the interesting part is that in the case under consideration, there already is a special bench view, not in one case but in two cases. Merilyn Shipping & Transports, 136 ITD 23 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam) and reiterated in Rajamahendri Shipping & Oilfields Pvt. Ltd. 19 ITR(T) 616 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam). Can a division bench of the tribunal ignore the decision of the special bench to take a view contrary to what has been laid down by a special bench? While the benches of the tribunal functioning within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts shall follow the judgments in favour of the revenue, it will be most apt for the benches in other jurisdictions to take note of the controversy and decide the case in favour of the taxpayer by following the beaten track that requires the adoption of the view that is favourable to him, applying the principle of interpretation that requires favouring the taxpayer in cases of doubt.

A view is being expressed that the decision in Vector Shipping’s case cannot be considered to be laying any law on the subject of allowability of an expenditure where no tax is deducted, once it is shown that the payment for such an expenditure is made during the year, as was held by the special bench. It is contended by the holders of this view that the question put up for consideration of the court was primarily concerned with the liability of the assessee to deduct tax at source and the court confirmed the tribunal’s findings that the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source and refused to admit the appeal of the revenue on the ground that no question of law was involved.

Under this view, the observations of the Allahabad High Court should be treated as the obiter dicta and not a binding decision. At this point, it is apt to reproduce the exact words of the Allahabad High Court, to the extent relevant, which read as “It is to be noted that for disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that TDS has not been deducted, the amount should be payable and not which has been paid by the end of the year.” These words are not words that can be taken lightly by anyone seriously dealing with the interpretation of law by consigning it to the status of irrelevant observations made out of context. The court in that case has taken a detailed notice of the order of the CIT(A) and of the tribunal, both of which directly and expressly dealt with the issue of the meaning of the term ‘payable’. In fact, the issue of liability to TDS was an issue of lesser importance to the appellate authorities and perhaps to the AO, as well. The only other thing the court noted in the order, was also about addressing the argument of the revenue to the effect that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) should be read in a manner so as to advance the case of recovery of tax. The court strongly rejected any such contention which was directly surrounding the interpretation of the word ‘payable’. These facts clearly confirmed that the issue under consideration here was duly addressed by the court in the said case, as well.

We are fully conscious that, in the times when the courts and the tribunals are more in favour of deciding an issue by following a decision of the higher court, on an application of the law of precedent, it may be difficult for a taxpayer to persuade a tribunal not to follow the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts’ comprehensive decisions and to consider the case on merits independently. This is evident in the decision of the Tribunal in Rishti Stock & Shares Pvt. Ltd.‘s case decided by the Mumbai tribunal on 02-08-2013 in CO No. 263/M/2012 arising out of the appeal ITA 112/M/2012, where the Tribunal preferred to follow the Calcutta and Gujarat High Court decisions.

The Calcutta High Court, in Crescent Export Syndicate’s case, delivered its judgment on 03-04-2013 and followed it up in yet another decision delivered on 04-04-2013 in CIT vs. Md. Javed Hossein Mondal, 33 taxmann.com 123. The Gujarat High Court examined the issue in CIT vs. Sikandarkhan N. Tunwar, 295 CTR 75 and vide an order dated 02-05-2013 decided the issue in favour of the revenue independent of the aforesaid two decisions of the Calcutta High Court. The Allahabad High Court in Vector Shipping’s case delivered the decision on 09-07-2013, once again independent of the aforesaid three decisions. Before all this, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had stayed the operation of the Special Bench’s decision in Merilyn Shipping‘s case. Maybe the benefit of ‘2G speed’ was not available to the Department’s counsel in Vector Shipping’s case .

The decision of the Calcutta High Court, like the decision of the special bench, is an erudite decision that has comprehensively analysed the different aspects touching the issue. In comparison, the decision of the Allahabad High Court does not reveal in detail the basis that led it to hold that no disallowance was to be made of an expenditure, the payment of which was made before the year-end without deducting tax at source. The court in that case has confirmed the findings of the tribunal that the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source on such payments. This however cannot be construed to mean that the court had not applied its mind to the law on the subject or that it had not taken a conscious note of the issue at hand. To distinguish and ignore the express observa-tions and findings on law of a High Court under the pretext that it does not represent the verdict of the court is not a very attractive proposition to any serious student of law. Such a decision deserves equal respect, more so when the reading of the contents confirms that the only issue that was discussed was about the interpretation of section. 40(a)(ia), as otherwise the court concurred with the finding of the fact of the tribunal that the tax was not deductible in the case before it .

The position on the issue under consideration has assumed significance with the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Vector Shipping’s case which has restored the issue for a fresh consideration. The issue should be taken as one that is wide open till such time as it is addressed by the apex court of the land. The Supreme Court has recently allowed the transfer of case for examining the constitutional validity of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). Please see Maruthi Tubes (P) Ltd., 37 taxmann.com 31.

Accounting and Auditing Professional – Introspect and Act!

fiogf49gjkf0d
When this issue reaches the hands of readers, most of my professional colleagues would have completed one of the most onerous tasks of the year, that is of issuing a tax audit report. Every year, a month before the due date, there is a clamour for an extension and this year was no different. It is true that for this year, the problem was compounded by the government requiring the tax audit report to be uploaded in electronic format and an increment in the details to be furnished in the income tax return. An extension for uploading the tax audit form has been granted, but my colleagues term the concession as inadequate. This is for the reason that in a majority of the cases, the compiling of the data that is required for income tax return as well as the tax audit report has always been treated by the client /auditee as the responsibility of the tax auditor.

The problems created and the tension that my professional colleagues face is primarily on account of the fact that the division of roles and responsibilities between the client and auditor have not been understood and appreciated by both. Clients have always taken the view that compliance is the responsibility of the auditor. This attitude is prevalent amongst the small entities to large multinationals, with only the degree varying. Apart from clients, lawmakers and regulators have also started shifting the onus of verification of compliance with the provisions to Chartered Accountants. The profession has welcomed these moves as professional opportunities. The fact that this entails an additional responsibility is lost sight of. The role and responsibility of the client in this compliance process is also not emphasised and he is not educated about this aspect. Over the years, Chartered Accountants have accepted this position, without appreciating whether they are equipped to perform the tasks that they would be required to, and whether the remuneration is commensurate.

To appreciate the actual problem faced by professionals, one must understand the overall scene. As explained in the earlier paragraphs, the responsibilities on the auditor are continuously increasing. To illustrate, the Income-tax Act alone has 46 provisions which require either an audit or certification by a Chartered Accountant. The Companies Act and State laws would add to this list. In fact, the responsibilities the Companies Act, 2013, imposes on an auditor are so onerous that senior professionals believe that new entrants to the profession would be discouraged from joining it. These are the challenges at the micro level.

At the macro level, one wonders if this is going to be the scenario for Chartered Accountants, in practice, is there an adequate number of Chartered Accountants available and have they been suitably equipped. In the year 2000, the number of Chartered Accountants in the country was 92,960 and those holding certificates, numbered 65,843 constituting 71% of the total membership. In the year 2013 the figure stands at 2,17,119 with certificate of practice being held by 103,636 persons, constituting 48% of the membership. Clearly, the number of persons joining the auditing profession which is expected to carry out these tasks has dwindled. As a consequence, younger professionals who are better equipped to handle issues requiring use of technology and newer skill-sets are not entering professional practice. On the one hand, increasing demands are being made on the profession, while the number of those with the wherewithal to satisfy these demands is reducing. There is a substantial gap between demand for good professionals and their availability. This leads to entrusting the responsibility to those who are unable to discharge it. The result is a widening expectation gap and dissatisfaction and disillusionment on both sides. What then is the solution?

Clearly, no other profession is better equipped to handle these responsibilities. Given this situation, three things need to be done. Firstly, users of services, whether they be auditees, tax authorities, regulators or the public have to appreciate the scope and limitations of the responsibilities of the professional. This aspect of the matter has to be dealt with on a war footing, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) must carry out a continuous campaign in this regard. Secondly, lawmakers and regulators have to interact with professionals before they suggest changes in laws and regulations which require furnishing of a plethora of details by taxpayers which are required to be certified/authenticated by Chartered Accountants. There is no point in collecting a huge database when one does not have the ability to digest and utilise the existing data.

Finally, and not in the least, professionals have to continuously upgrade their skills. Many of my senior colleagues would do well to remember that, while the experience that they have acquired over the years is undoubtedly invaluable, it cannot be a substitute for new knowledge and skills. The world is changing quickly and if we do not act it will drive past us.

Apart from this, the profession must interact with clients, and apprise them of their role and responsibility. We must learn to say `no’ whenever it is necessary. If we do not do this immediately, the primacy of the ICAI, an institution which is more than six decades old, will be lost. As a corollary, the respect that the profession enjoys in society will gradually evaporate. There is an erroneous perception that the existing apparatus is unable to meet the expectations. The provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, empowering the Central Government to prescribe accounting standards, and the constitution of the Financial Reporting Authority, which will oversee audit performance, are examples of this perception. Those concerned must take note of these developments. The writing is on the wall. I only hope that the leaders of our profession have the foresight and the fortitude to read it!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
levitra

Forgiveness

fiogf49gjkf0d
‘Forgiveness is something you do for yourself’. George Kohlrieser

To practise ‘forgiveness’ one must understand ‘hurt’— hurt is the result of some act which is against our expectations and/or represents unfulfilled expectations. Both these not only result in hurt but also cause misery. The issue is: what is forgiveness and what does it do? ‘Forgiveness’ puts an end to the inner struggle that rages within, and teaches us to face life with tolerance, understanding and equanimity’. ‘Forgiveness’ is the task of transcending concepts of justice and fairness’. ‘Forgiveness’ is an attitude of compassion and understanding with which we choose to react to the world.’

Forgiveness is a gift we choose to give ourselves. Forgiveness is a choice—a choice when exercised puts our mind and heart at rest—but higher than forgiveness is to forget the instance that caused the hurt. The issue is, can we accept what has happened? Can we consider it a bad dream and like all bad dreams, forget about it? It is rightly said that it is easier to forgive but difficult to forget. Combine the two to make forgiveness complete. This is difficult—nay, very difficult—but possible. Once one can forget the hurt—forgiveness becomes easy. ‘Forgiving and forgetting’ when practiced together heal both the mind and the matter (body). David Schwerin says:

‘By forgiving people who have done us wrong, We can give ourselves the greatest gift’.

To the above quote I would like to add that it is also a gift to those who have hurt us and in case we can forget the hurt, then it would be the finest gift to ourselves.

We are living in a ‘me decade’ and in this decade, hurt is easy and forgiveness is forgotten. This is evident from recent research in the USA which brings out:
• The capacity to feel for others has dropped by 48%.
• Ability to see other’s point of view has declined by 34%. These are figures as compared to 1979. Hence, to practice forgiveness we now need to:
• Move from ‘self-justification’ to ‘self-control and selfdiscipline’.
• To be fair, honest, truthful and objective—being objective means being non-emotional—develop warmth for others and treat them with dignity and refrain from making callous comments.
We have discussed about ‘forgiving’. I believe we should also be aware of seeking ‘forgiveness’. There is no human being who can say that he has never hurt anyone—even Krishna hurt Gandhari who held him responsible for the Mahabharata and had to suffer her curse. Hence, let us also develop the art of seeking forgiveness of those whom we may have hurt by thought, word or deed. I believe seeking forgiveness is as relevant as ‘forgiving’.
However, according to Swami Shivananda, we can seek forgiveness only when we ‘eradicate self-justification’— we all indulge in ‘self-justification’ all the time. It requires courage to overcome the ego that tells us that we can do no wrong and that our hurt is the result of a fault of others. Hence, let us become aware of this malice. True happiness lies in both forgiving and seeking forgiveness.
To practice ‘forgiveness’ we must know what ‘forgiveness’ results in. In my perception, forgiveness:
• Reduces tension, guilt, anger and suffering.
• Frees us from the burden of expectations and feelings of grudge.
• Transcends our concepts of fairness.
• Makes us humane.
• Liberates us from being ‘constrained’ and sets us free.
• Removes our desire for revenge and retribution , and above all
• Restores relationships. It has been rightly said: ‘Forgiveness is the precious lubricant which keeps all relationships smooth and friction free’.
Let us remember that forgiveness is not running away from facts and feelings. It requires courage to overcome our ego—our hurt and unfulfilled expectations. Mahatma Gandhi said:
‘The weak can never forgive. Forgiveness is an attribute of the strong’.
I also believe that a true and sincere apology is not defeat but victory over a bad situation. It is not humiliation but it exhibits humility and maturity to accept responsibility for our actions and exhibits our care for other’s feelings and value for relationship. I repeat it takes courage to apologise and seek forgiveness. Believe it is very difficult to say ‘Mujhe Maaf Kar Do’.
In conclusion, I quote George Shim: ‘We get what we give. If we give hatred, we receive hatred; if we give love, we receive love’.
And this is what St. Francis of Assisi propagates: ‘It is in pardoning that we are pardoned’.
levitra

Salary: Perquisites: S/s. 17(2), r.w.s. 10(10CC): Assessees were employees of a foreign company, working in India: Tax arising in India on income of employees was borne by foreign employer: Amounts paid directly by employer to discharge employees’ incometax liability is exempt u/s. 10(10CC): Not a perquisite: Social security, pension and medical insurance contributions paid by employer are not taxable as perquisites: Where tax is deposited in respect of non-monetary perquisite, it is exempt u/s<

fiogf49gjkf0d
Yoshio Kubo vs. CIT; [2013] 36 taxmann.com 1 (Delhi)

The
assessees were employees of a foreign company who were seconded to
India to serve in the Indian subsidiary. The foreign employers bore the
tax arising in India on the income of the employees. The foreign
employer also made contributions towards social security, pension and
medical insurance in compliance with the legal requirements in the
country of its incorporation. The revenue sought to bring to tax such
contributions as well as the tax paid by the employer as perquisite u/s.
17(2), in the hands of the employees. The revenue also contended that
the tax borne by the employer was a monetary perquisite and further tax
should be added to the salary by a multiple stage grossing up process.
The revenue also included the tax refunds in the income of the assessee
employees, as the tax had been borne by the employer.

In appeals
before the High Court the assessee contended that such perquisites were
exempt u/s. 10(10CC). The Delhi High Court held as under:

”1. Whether income tax paid by employer on behalf of assessee was exempted non-monetary perquisite:

1.1
A plain reading of section 10(10CC) reveals that if the perquisite that
is – ‘not provided for by way of monetary payment’ – u/s. 17 (2), the
tax paid on such income would be excluded from the calculation of income
altogether; it would not be deemed a perquisite.

1.2 Section
17(2) has not undergone any substantial change by the amendment of 2002.
The only change is in the introduction of section 10(10CC) which states
that tax actually paid by the employer to discharge an employee’s
obligation – ‘not amounting to a monetary benefit’ would not be included
as the employees’ income. If seen from the context of section 17(2),
and the previous history to that provision, as well as the pre-existing
provision of section 10(5B) and the interpretation placed on section
17(2), read with other provisions which disallow payments made on behalf
of the employee, by the employer, so long as the benefit is not
expressed in monetary terms in the hands of the employee, in the sense
that it is not funded as part of the salary, but paid in discharge of
the obligation, of any sort, either contractual (i.e., rent, services,
etc . availed of by the employee) or legal (tax) directly by the
employer, it should not be treated as a monetary benefit. The reason for
this is that section 10(10CC) is neutral about the kind of benefit
availed by the employee.

1.3 Parliament was aware of the
pre-existing law, and therefore, stepped in to clarify that only a
monetary benefit directly in the hands of the employee as a payment by
the employer would be excluded from section 10(10CC). This may be in the
form of any benefit to pay rent, or discharge any manner of obligation,
tax not excluded. This intention is manifest from the expression –
‘tax’ on such income actually paid. To construe this newly introduced
provision in any other manner would be to defeat the Parliamentary
intent. Section 40(a)(v) fortifies the interpretation of this court in
providing that while calculating income of the employer, the tax paid by
the employer on non-monetary perquisites is not deductible. This
provision too was introduced in 2002. The logic of excluding, as a
non-monetary perquisite, amounts paid to discharge obligations of the
employee, from the meaning of income, by virtue of section 10(10CC) is
that now, with the introduction of section 40(c)(v), such amounts are
not deductible in the employer’s hands.

1.4 In the light of the
above discussion, it is held that amounts paid directly by the employer
to discharge its employees’ income tax liability do not fall within the
excluded category of monetary benefits payable to the employee; they
fall within the included category, u/s. 10(10CC) as amounts paid
directly as taxes. Correspondingly, they cannot now be claimed as
deductions by virtue of section 40(c)(v ). The revenue’s appeals on this
aspect fail.

2. Whether social security, pension and medical insurance contributions by employer are perquisites:

2.1
The revenue’s contentions are insubstantial and meritless. The assessee
does not get a vested right at the time of contribution to the fund by
the employer. The amount standing to the credit of the pension fund
account, social security or medical or health insurance would continue
to remain invested till the assessee becomes entitled to receive it. In
the case of medical benefit, the revenue could not support its
contentions by citing any provision in any policy or scheme which was
the subject matter of these appeals, where the vesting right to receive
the amount under the scheme or plan occurred. One cannot be said to
allow a perquisite to an employee if the employee has no right to the
same. It cannot apply to contingent payments to which the employee has
no right till the contingency occurs. The employee must have a vested
right in the amount. In the case of CIT vs. Mehar Singh Sampuran Singh
Chawla [1973] 90 ITR 219 (Delhi), it was held that the contribution made
by the employer towards a fund established for the welfare of the
employees would not be deemed to be a perquisite in the hands of the
employees concerned as they do not acquire a vested right in the sum
contributed by the employer.

2.2 When the amount does not result
in a direct present benefit to the employee, who does not enjoy it, but
assures him a future benefit, in the event of contingency, the payment
made by the employer, does not vest in the employee.

2.3 In view
of the above discussion, it is held that the revenue’s appeals have to
fail; amounts paid by employers to pension, or social security funds or
for medical benefits, are not perquisites within the meaning of the
expression, u/s. 17(2)(v), and therefore, the amounts paid by the
employer in that regard are not taxable in the hands of the
employee-assessee.

3. Regarding grossing up:

3.1
It has been discussed and concluded that what is not exempt u/s.
10(10CC), is perquisite in the shape of monetary payment to the
employee. If it is a payment to a third party like payment of taxes to
the government, it would be exempt u/s. 10 (10CC).

3.2 The
Tribunal in the present cases, held that tax paid by the employer on
behalf of the employee is a non-monetary perquisite. In other words,
taxes paid by the employer can be added only once in the salary of the
employee. Thereafter, tax on such perquisites is not to be added again.

3.3
Whenever tax is deposited in respect of a non-monetary perquisite, the
provision of section 10(10CC) applies, thus excluding multiple stage
grossing up. The purpose and intent of introducing the amendment to
section 10(10CC) was to exclude the element of income, which would have
arisen otherwise, as a perquisite, and as part of salary. Once that
stood excluded, and option was given to the employer u/s. 192(1A) to
honour the agreement with the employee, Parliament could not have
intended its inclusion in any other form, even for the purpose of
deduction at source. Doing so would defeat the intent behind section
10(10CC). This court, therefore, answers the question in favour of the
assessee and against the revenue.

4. Regarding assessability of TDS refunds

4.1 In this case, it is clear that the amount was not paid to the employee or due to him, from the employer, according to the terms of the contract governing the relationship. It was paid to the Government, over and above the tax due on the salary. It was not for benefit of the assessee. It never, therefore, bore the characteristic of salary or perquisite. Till assessment was made, the amount could not be refunded to the assessee.

4.2 The revenue’s position overlooks that all receipts are not taxable receipts. Before a receipt is brought to tax, the nature and character of the receipt in the hands of the recipient has to be considered. Every receipt or monetary advantage or benefit in the hands of its recipient is not taxable unless it is established to be due to him. If the amount is not due, the recipient, in this case, the employee is obliged to pay back the sum to the person, to whom it belongs. A perquisite or such amount, to be taxed, should be received under a legal or eq-uitable claim, even contingent.

4.3 The receipt of money or property, which one is obliged to return or repay to the rightful owner, as in the case of a loan or credit, cannot be taken as a benefit or a perquisite. The amounts paid in excess by the employer, and refunded to the employee never belonged to the latter; he cannot be therefore taxed. The question of law is therefore, answered against the revenue, and in favour of the assessees.”

Provisional attachment: Section 281B: A. Y. 2011-12: Provisional attachment should be commensurate with claim of revenue:

fiogf49gjkf0d
KDH Properties P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 356 ITR 1 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee company had filed return of income computing loss of Rs. 2,67,00,000. Subsequently, pursuant to survey u/s. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer impounded books of account and documents. The Assessing Officer also passed provisional attachments of properties and also the debts and security deposits due from third parties.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The provisional attachment made in terms of section 281B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, should be commensurate with the claim of Department, more particularly to safeguard the interests of the Revenue. The Assessing Officer should form an opinion as to what extent of property is required to protect the interest of the Revenue. It cannot be an arbitrary claim based on no materials. It should stand the test of reasonableness and avoid arbitrariness.

ii) If the petitioner were able to establish the valuation of the property as stated by cogent and proper materials acceptable to the Department subject to final assessment, the property could continue to be under provisional attachment as per section 281B and all other debts and security deposits due from third parties could be released from the provisional attachment.”

levitra

Housing Project: Income from: Deduction u/s.80-IB(10): Interest on delayed payment by purchasers due from contractors and suppliers: Part of income derived from development of housing project: Entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB(10):

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Pratham Developers: 355 ITR 507 (Guj):

The assessee was in the business of developing and building housing projects and accordingly was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 11,05,556 ( Rs. 4.36 lakh – interest received from purchasers on delayed payments and Rs. 8.70 lakh – balances written off in case of contractors and suppliers) by way of disallowance out of the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). The Assessing Officer held that these sums did not represent the assessee’s income from the development of housing project. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Interest received on delayed payments by the purchasers was part of income derived from the business of the assessee. It was entitled to special deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) in respect of the amount.

ii) During the course of the business in developing the housing project, the assessee had made payments to suppliers towards various purchases made. On such payments, the assessee would occasionally deduct sum amounts and pay the bill. The difference between the bill amount and the payment actually made would be the amount generated during the course of business. The assessee was entitled to special deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of such sum.”

levitra

Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi); Rule 2CA of I. T. Rules, 1962: Assessee society running a degree college made application for approval u/s. 10(23C) (vi) for A. Y. 2009-10 onwards: Commissioner rejected application on grounds that (i) approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was available only to an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes while memorandum of assessee stipulated other objects as well,

fiogf49gjkf0d
Neeraj Janhitkari Gramin Sewa Sansthan vs. CCIT; [2013] 36 taxmann.com 105 (All):

The assessee, a society, was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was running a degree college in Mainpuri. It was also registered with the Income-tax Department. It made an application for approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) for assessment year 2009-10 onwards. The Commissioner rejected the said application on the grounds that (i) the approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was available only to an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes while the memorandum of the assessee-society stipulated other objects as well, and (ii) the application for approval should have been filed by the educational institution while it had been made by the society.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The first and foremost question which is required to be considered is whether the application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) at the instance of the assessee-society was maintainable or not. The Supreme Court in the case of American Hotel & Lodging Association Educational Institute vs. CBDT [2008] 301 ITR 86/ 170 Taxman 306 had considered the effect of insertion of clause (vi) in section 10(23C) by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, w.e.f. 01-04-1999 and held that the provisions of clause (vi) of section 10(23C) are analogous to provisions of section 10(22). The Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to consider the effect of section 10(23C)(vi) in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust vs. Union of India [2010] 327 ITR 73/ 188 Taxman 402 and while replying to a specific question whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 was eligible to apply for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) held that the application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was maintainable at the instance of a society. Similar view had been taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Digember Jain Society for Child Welfare vs. DGIT (Exmp.) [2010] 329 ITR 459/185 Taxman 255. Therefore, the application filed by the assessee-society cannot be rejected on the ground that it is not at the instance of ‘educational institution’ as referred to u/s. 10(23C)(vi) and rule 2CA.

ii) The next question which now arises for consideration is whether the assessee’s application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) can be rejected on the ground that the memorandum of association provides for various other objects apart from educational activities. In this regard, the argument of the assessee is that even though under the unamended bye-laws of the society various other aims and objects were mentioned, but according to application for approval the society is only carrying on educational activities. In the application, there is a specific assertion that the only source of income of the society is the nominal fees being charged from students and it has no other source of income. The assessee has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Allahabad Court in the case of C.P. Vidya Niketan Inter College Shikshan Society vs. Union of India [Writ petition No. 1185 of 2011, dated 16-10-2012].

iii) Perusal of the impugned order shows that the pleading in this regard has not been taken into consideration. Further in the impugned order although there is a finding that the assesseesociety is having many objects other than educational, but there is no application of mind to the assertion made by the society that it is only pursuing the educational activity and no other. Where a society is pursuing only educational objects and no other activity, then the application by such a society for grant of approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) cannot be rejected on the ground that its aims and objects contain several other objects apart from educational and application by such a society is perfectly maintainable.

iv) Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Commissioner was liable to be quashed. The matter required to be sent back to the Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with the observations made above.”

levitra

Capital gains: Section 50C: r.w.ss. 16A and 24 of W. T. Act, 1957: Sale of immovable property for consideration of Rs. 2,06,18,227: Stamp duty value – Rs. 4,04,48,000: Value as per DVO – Rs. 2,83,19,289: Value as per Registered valuer of assessee – Rs. 2,23,41,000: AO adopted value of Rs. 2,83,19,289 as per DVO: Tribunal adopted value of Rs. 2,23,41,000 as per registered valuer without giving opportunity to DVO: Tribunal not justified in doing so:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Prabhu Steel Industries Ltd.: [2013] 36 taxmann. com 393 (Bom):

The assessee admitted long-term capital gains from sale of immovable property and adopted actual sale consideration of Rs. 2,06,18,227 as basis for computation. The Assessing Officer found that as per concerned Stamp Valuation Authority, the market value of the property was Rs. 4,04,48,000. On reference, the valuation officer estimated the fair market value on the date of transfer to be Rs. 2,83,19,289. Meanwhile, the assessee submitted a report of Registered Valuer disclosing fair market value on the date of transfer to be Rs. 2,23,41,000. The Assessing Officer worked out long-term capital gain on basis of report of valuation officer and made addition. The Tribunal held that the fair market value worked out by the assessee’s registered valuer alone should have been used for computing the longterm capital gain, as it was reasonably arrived at after making allowances for various encumbrances attached to the subject property and rejected the valuation arrived at by the Valuation Officer after noting that the Valuation Officer treated stamp duty valuation as base rate, instead of actual sale instance value. Further, it held that though such report is binding on Revenue Authorities, it is not binding on the Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) It is apparent from section 16A of Wealth Tax Act that these provisions mandate that after the Assessing Officer receives report of Valuation Officer u/s. 50C, he has to act in conformity with the valuation of the capital asset worked out therein. Thus, an order of Valuation Officer determining the market value of the asset on the date of transfer u/s. 50C(2) is made appealable even for the purpose of Income-tax Act, 1961 as per scheme in section 23A of Wealthtax Act. S/s. (6) of section 23A stipulates that when the valuation of any asset is objected to in an appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) has to extend an opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer, who has made order u/s. 16A. It therefore, follows that when in an appeal, such exercise of valuation officer is disputed, the Appellate Authority has to extend an opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer.

ii) Section 24 speaks of further appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. As per section 24(5) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957; the Appellate Tribunal has to extend opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer, and this provision is pari materia with section 23(6) above. Therefore, when order of CIT (Appeal), is questioned in further appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has to keep in mind the provisions of section 24(5) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and has to extend an opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer.

iii) As per the statutory scheme when the report/order of Valuation Officer u/s. 50C(2) is objected to by assessee, the CIT (Appeals) or Tribunal are obliged to extend an opportunity of hearing to such Valuation Officer.

iv) The Tribunal has found faults with the report/ order of District Valuation Officer. Admittedly, the said Valuation Officer had not been heard and no opportunity was extended to him. This is contrary to obligation cast upon it by the proviso of section 24(5) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 as attracted by section 50C(2).

v) In this situation, a mandatory requirement of law has been violated in present matter. Hence, the impugned order of the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside and the proceedings are restored back to the file of the Tribunal for taking decision afresh, in accordance with law.”

levitra

Business expenditure: Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 35DDA: A. Y. 2007-08: Payment to employees under voluntary retirement scheme: Compliance with Rule 2BA is for benefit u/s. 10(10C): No such compliance mandatory for deduction in the hands of employer u/s. 35DDA: Deduction allowable:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. State Bank of Mysore; 356 ITR 468 (Kar):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee, a public sector bank, had claimed deduction of Rs. 7,09,53,323.23 as deductible expenditure incurred to meet the claims of employees who had taken voluntary retirement. The Assessing Officer allowed the deduction as revenue expenditure. Exercising the powers u/s. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Commissioner held that the expenditure was in the nature of capital expenditure and disallowed the amount on the ground, inter alia, that even applying the provisions of section 35DDA the voluntary retirement scheme was not in consonance with rule 2BA of the I. T. Rules 1962. The Tribunal held that this was a case where the scheme was covered u/s. 35DDA. The condition imposed in Rule 2BA with reference to the recipient for the purpose of section 10(10C) was not attracted to the provisions of section 35DDA. Since under the provisions u/s. 35DDA the entire amount could not be allowed as deduction, but it could be spread over a period of five years, one-fifth of the expenditure could be allowed and the balance spread over the following four assessment years.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no mention of any rule in section 35DDA. On the other hand, in rule 2BA there is a specific reference to section 10(10C). The language of rule 2BA made it clear that the amount received is by the employee and for the purpose of claiming the benefit u/s. 10(10C). This has nothing to do with the employer’s claim, which is a different claim u/s. 35DDA.

ii) The Tribunal rightly took the view that rule 2BA is attracted and applicable only to a circumstance, where the benefit u/s. 10(10C) is sought for and not in a situation where the provisions of section 35DDA are called in aid.”

levitra

Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 43B(b) r/w.s. 36(va): Contribution to provident fund: Due date mentioned in section 36(va) is due date mentioned in section 43B(b): Contribution made after due date specified by Provident Fund Authority but before due date for filing return: Amount deductible:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Kichha Sugar Co. Ltd.: 356 ITR 351 (Uttarakhand):

The assessee employer, had deposited the employees’ contribution towards provident fund before the due date for filing of the return but after the due date specified by the Provident Fund Authority. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and treated the amount as income relying on the provisions of section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal, the Revenue contended that in view of section 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 2(24)(x), such payment though made to the provident fund authorities, should be treated to be income of the assessee. The Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The due date as mentioned in section 36(1) (va) is the due date as mentioned in section 43B(b), i.e. payment/contribution made to the provident fund authority any time before filing the return for the year in which the liability to pay accrued along with the evidence to establish the payment thereof.

ii) The Assessing Officer proceeded on the basis that “due date” as mentioned in section 36(1) (va) is the due date fixed by the provident fund authority, whereas in the matter of culling out the meaning of the word “due date”, as mentioned in the section, the Assessing Officer was required to take note of section 43B(b) and by not taking the note of the provisions contained therein committed a gross error, which was correctly rectified by the Commissioner (Appeals) and rightly confirmed by the Tribunal.

iii) The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.”

levitra

2013 (31) STR 343 (Tri.– Bang) Ambience Constructions India Ltd vs. Comm. of ST, Hyderabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund of service tax paid under mistake of law – limitation period of section 11B is applicable.

Facts:
The Appellant, engaged in providing services of lodging and boarding in a hotel, paid service tax on 16-01-2008 under the category of “Renting of immovable property”. Since the taxing entry specifically excluded the said activity, the Appellant filed a refund claim on 28-01-2009 by virtue of payment under mistake of law.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal relying on Mafatlal Industries vs. UOI 1997 (89) ELT 247 (SC) dismissed the appeal and held that since the provisions of law excluding the said activity existed while the payment was made and also when the refund claim was filed, the provisions of section 11B relating to time bar cannot be ruled out on the pretext of “payment under mistake of law” and the refund was eligible for rejection.

(Note: When tax was paid where there was no liability to pay, the Hon. High Courts have decided in favour of the assessees in Natraj & Venkat Associates 2010 (17) STR 3 (Mad.) and in KVR Constructions 2012 (26) STR 195 (Kar.))

levitra

2013 (31) STR 370 (Tri.-Chennai) Amalgamations Repco Ltd vs. C. C. Ex, Chennai

fiogf49gjkf0d
CENVAT credit – period prior to Notification No. 17/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009 – CHA and other services availed by manufacturer for exports – credit admissible

Facts:
The Appellant-manufacturers- availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on CHA and other services used at ports for exporting goods, prior to the introduction of Notification No. 17/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009.

The department denied the CENVAT credit on the grounds that such services did not have any nexus with the manufacture and that the business activities sought to be included in the extended definition of input service did not include services rendered in the port area.

Held:
Considering various decisions of coordinate Benches and High Courts, the Hon. Tribunal allowed the appeal and held that it was the policy of the Government not to burden the export goods with domestic taxes and thus, the exporters were either exempted from taxes or were provided for alternative schemes of rebate/drawback of duties etc. Notification No. 17/2009–ST dated 07-07-2009 granted exemption to various taxable services provided to an exporter. Since the period involved was prior to the said notification date, the only way of following the EXIM policy and freeing export goods from domestic taxes is to allow the credit of service tax paid in respect of such consignments.

levitra

2013 (31) STR 300 (Tri.-Ahmd) Gujarat Co- 0p. Milk Mktg. Federation Ltd. vs. CCE, Vadodara:

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund – Technical testing & analysis service used for export of goods – Absence of written contract between exporter and importer – No refund admissible.

Facts:
The Appellant, an exporter of goods, filed a refund claim for service tax paid on technical testing & analysis service. The Respondent rejected the said refund claim on the ground that the Notification provided for the existence of written agreement/ contract for such technical testing/analysis before export of goods which the appellant had not entered.

Held:
Since there was an absence of written contract between the Appellant and foreign party for technical testing of goods before export and also that there was no reference in the export order for the prerequisite of testing, the appeal was rejected.

levitra

2013 (31) STR 285 (Tri.-Ahmd) Comm. of ST vs. Krishna Communications

fiogf49gjkf0d
CENVAT credit – output servioces written off as bad debts – No reversal of CENVAT credit is required.

Facts:
The respondents providing advertising services were duly registered with the department and discharged service tax liability as and when the payments were received. The amounts already billed but subsequently found irrecoverable, were written off by it as bad debts.

The department demanded reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit taken on input services on account of such output service invoices being written off as bad debts which the Commissioner (Appeals) dropped holding that credit on input services was taken correctly and that the said input services were used for providing output services liable for payment of service tax.

The appellants contended that the value of bad debts constituted only 0.8% and that the eligibility of availment and utilisation the credit was not in question.

Held:
Observing that there cannot be one-to-one corelation for availing and utilising CENVAT credit of input services with provision of output service, the Hon. Tribunal held that the reasoning of the first appellate authority was correct and in consonance with the law and requires no interference and thus, rejected revenue’s appeal.

levitra

2013-TIOL-1068-CESTAT-MUM Magarpatta Township Development & Construction Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

fiogf49gjkf0d
Valuation – Notional interest on Interest-free security deposit, whether amounts to additional additional consideration – Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant provided renting of immovable property services and collected interest-free security deposit from the lessees for the damages, if any, caused to the property. The department contended to levy tax along with interest and penalty on the notional interest on security deposit considering it as an additional consideration for the provision of service. Relying on the decision of ISPL Industries Ltd. 2003 (154) ELT 3 (SC), the appellant contended that there was no evidence on record which proved that the security deposit in any way influenced the rent of property leased out and it was merely a presumption on part of the department.

Held:
Applying the case of ISPL Industries Ltd. (supra), the Hon. Tribunal observed that there was no evidence on record to prove that the notional interest on interest-free security deposit influenced the consideration received by the appellant and thus granted full waiver from pre-deposit.

levitra

2013-TIOL-1261-CESTAT-MUM Laxmi Tyres vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune

fiogf49gjkf0d
Valuation – re-treading of tyres – Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 – whether ‘sale’ includes ‘deemed sale’ Held “No’ – gross amount charged liable to tax.

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in retreading of tyres and thus claimed the benefit of Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 by deducting approximately 70% as material cost on which sales tax/VAT was paid and service tax was paid only on 30% of the remaining value.

Relying on Aggarwal Colour Advance Photo System 2011-TIOL-1208-CESTAT-DEL-LB which stated that the term ‘sold’ appearing in the said notification was to be interpreted using the definition of ‘sale’ in the Central Excise Act, 1944 and not as per the meaning of deemed sale under Article 366 (29A) (b) of the Constitution the department contented that tax was payable on the entire amount.

The appellant relied on the cases of Chakiti Ranjini Udyam 2009 (16) STR 172 (Tri-Bang) and PLA Tyre Works 2009 (14) STR 32 (Tri-Chennai) in support of its contentions.

Held:
Perusing the sample invoice issued by the appellant and relying on the larger Bench’s decision in Aggarwal Colour Advance Photo System (supra), the Hon. Tribunal disposed the appeal and held that the appellant was not eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST and liable to discharge service tax liability on the gross amount charged for the said transaction.

(Note: Further, an application for Rectification of Mistake was filed by the appellant to consider the aspect of time bar not considered at the time of hearing of appeal which was dismissed by the Hon. Tribunal as the same would tantamount to ‘review’ of own order which is not permissible under law-2013-TIOL-1345-CESTAT-MUM).

levitra

2013-TIOL-1295-CESTAT-MAD M/s. C. H. Robinson Worldwide Freight India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

fiogf49gjkf0d
Stay – Taxability of ocean freight collected by multi-modal transporter – whether ‘reimbursement of expenditure while provoding Business Support Service’ or ‘Business Auxiliary Services’ – Held – neither reply to SCN nor OIO provide a clear picture of activity – ordered pre-deposit of part amount.

Facts:
The appellant, a multi-modal transporter, charged service tax under heads like terminal handling, bill of lading, agency charges etc., and diligently discharged the same under the category of “Business Support Services”. They also collected ocean freight on which no service tax was paid. The department contended to levy tax on the same considering it as reimbursable expenditure and thus issued SCN and demanded tax on such value of ocean freight under the category of “Business Support Service” which the adjudicating authority confirmed under the category “Business Auxiliary Service”.

Relying on the decision of O.K. Play (India) Ltd. 2005 (180) ELT 300 (SC), the department contended that the said service was rightly classified under “Business Auxiliary Service” and further relied on Leaap International Pvt. Ltd. which ordered a pre-deposit in a similar case under the category “Business Auxiliary Service”.

The appellant contended that 1) the order of the Adjudicating Authority was beyond the scope of the SCN, 2) there was no taxing entry under the Finance Act, and 3) Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Valuation) Rules, 2006 was struck down in the case of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrafts Pvt. Ltd. and thus no demand was warranted.

Held:
Referring to the submissions made by the appellant, the Hon. Tribunal stated that the reply to the SCN and order-in-original did not provide a clear picture of the activity and thus ordered a pre-deposit of part amount.

(Note: The Hon. Tribunals, on similar facts, allowed the appeal in Interocean Shipping Company vs. CST, Delhi (2012) 28 Taxamann. com 238 (New Delhi – CESTAT); remanded the matter in Agility Logistics Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST–30 Taxmann.com 382 (Chennai– CESTAT); and granted full waiver of pre-deposit in M/s. Freight Systems Pvt. Ltd vs. CST, Chennai 2012-TIOL-1558-CESTAT-Mad).

levitra

2013-TIOL-1270-CESTAT-MAD Thiru Arooran Sugars Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tiruchirapalli.

fiogf49gjkf0d
CENVAT Credit—’rent a cab service’, ‘telephone service’ and ‘contract bus service’ – no distinction between services used at factory and corporate office and both are eligible CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer, availed CENVAT of “Rent-a-cab Service”, “Telephone Services” and “Contract Bus Services” received at the corporate office against which the department demanded tax, interest and penalty.

The department contended that providing “rent-acab service” for officers at the corporate office was a welfare activity and not related to manufacturing. It further contended that the said services do not fall within the inclusive portion of the definition and argued that unless proved that the said services were essential for the manufacture, they cannot be considered as input services.

Held:
Allowing the appeal, the Hon. Tribunal held that:

• As many Courts and Tribunals have already held earlier, rent-a-cab service is covered under the definition of “input service” and that it also includes the transportation of executives and employees from residence to corporate office and back.

• All the three services (supra) are covered by the definition of input service and that no distinction can be made between the factory and corporate office as per the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

• Where the expenditure is incurred by the company in its books of accounts there is a presumption in favour of the appellant that the service is availed in relation to its business and thus no nexus is required to be proved so long as Revenue did not contend anything to the contrary.

(Note: In a similar case in 2013 (31) STR 441 (Tri-Bangalore) Emcon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Bangalore also the Hon. Tribunal allowed the credit of rent-a-cab service. Further, in case of rent-a-cab service, the issue pertains to the period prior to 01-04-2011, i.e., prior to amendment of definition of “input service”).

levitra

2013-TIOL-1322-CESTAT-MUM M/s Seva Automotive Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur

fiogf49gjkf0d
Valuation – value of spare parts sold during rendering of service not to be included in transaction value – matter remanded.

Facts:
The department contended to levy tax on the value of spare parts sold during rendering of services which were charged separately in the bill/ invoice and on which VAT/sales tax liability was also discharged. 

Held:
Relying on the Board Circular dated 23-08-2007 and on the decisions of Ketan Motors Ltd. and Sudarshan Motors, the Hon. Tribunal allowed the appeal by way of remand and held that the cost of spare parts sold during the rendering of service cannot form part of the transaction value.

levitra

2013-TIOL-834-CESTAT-DEL M/s. Cerebral Learning Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Commercial training and coaching services – validity of CBEC Circular No. 59/8/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 vis-a-vis Exemption Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 – Held, circular is ultra vires.

Facts:
The Appellants provided “Commercial Training & Coaching Services” and composed and furnished course materials relevant to the coaching to its students. Relying upon Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 granting exemption to the value of goods or materials sold, the Appellants separately raised an invoice of the materials sold and did not charge service tax on the same.

Relying on Circular No. 59/8/2003-ST dated 20-06- 2003 which stated that the Exemption Notification was applicable only where the value of the course material met the description of the standard textbooks which were priced, the department contended to levy tax along with interest and penalty on the said value of supply of materials.

Held:
Considering the circular to be misconceived, illegal and contrary to the statutory Exemption Notification dated 20-06-2003, the Hon. Tribunal stated that where the legislature had spoken in exercise of its statutory power exemption granted by the Central Government u/s. 93 of the Act, the CBEC had no manner of power, authority or jurisdiction to deflect the course of an enactment or the exemption granted. Grant of exemption from the liability to tax was a power exclusively authorised to the Central Government and no participatory role to the Board. In seeking to restrict the generality of the exemption granted by the Central Government, the CBEC transgressed into the domain of the Central Government which was clearly prohibited.

levitra

2013 (31) STR 334 (Tri.– Ahmd) Chowgule & Co. (Salt) Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCEx., Rajkot

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund – wrong classification- service tax paid under category notified under Notification – Refund claim allowed.

Facts:
The
Appellant filed a refund claim under Notification No. 17/2009 –ST,
dated 07-07-2009 in respect of service tax paid on stevedoring &
documentation charges classified by the vendor under “Other Port
Services”. The department contended that since the said charges were
classifiable under “Cargo Handling Services” as per the Karnataka High
Court decision in case of M/s. Konkan Marine Agencies 2009 (13) STR 7
(Kar), the refund was liable to be rejected.

Held:
Examining
the notification, the Hon. Tribunal observed that the refund claim was
required to be sanctioned where service tax was paid under the category
of services notified under the notification. The service providers were
registered under the category of “Other Port Services” which was
notified in the said notification and thus, the appeal was allowed

levitra

2013 (31) STR 279 (P&H) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana vs. City Cables

fiogf49gjkf0d
Benefit of reduced penalty – non-paymeny of penalty along with service tax and interest – 2nd proviso to section 78 applicable – directed to pay only 25% of the penalty.

Facts:
The respondent was a cable operator unregistered with the service tax department. After a search was conducted, the respondent deposited the entire amount of service tax with interest thereon before the issue of show cause notice. The adjudicating authority demanded tax along with interest and penalties and the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside penalties. On appeal, the Hon. Tribunal directed the respondent to pay penalty of 25% of the service tax demanded, relying upon J.R. Fabrics 2009 (238) ELT 209 and Bajaj Travels 2011 (21) STR 497 (P&H). The revenue appealed against the said order of the Hon. Tribunal contending that the benefit of reduced penalty of 25% can be availed only if the respondent had deposited the said amount within 30 days of the order.

Held:
Relying upon the decisions of the Delhi High Court in K.P. Pouches 2008 (228) ELT 31 and J. R. Fabrics (supra), the Hon. High Court allowed the appeal and held that the respondent was required to be informed to avail the benefit of reduced penalty. Such option only could have satisfied the purpose of insertion of such benefit in the Act. Since the amount of tax was already deposited before the issue of SCN, the direction of the Hon. Tribunal was fair, reasonable and met the ends of justice.

levitra

2013-TIOL-720-ITAT-MUMBAI ITO vs. Wadhwa and Associates Realtors Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 695/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Dated: 03-07-2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
S/s. 194I, 201(1) – Lease premium paid to acquire leasehold land is not rent and tax on such payment, made by the assessee to MMRDA, is not deductible u/s. 194I.

Facts:
The assessee, a private limited company dealing in real estate, during the previous year under consideration paid a sum of Rs. 949.92 crore for allotment of a plot of land namely C-59 in ‘G’ Block of Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (E), Mumbai as per lease deed dated 22-11-2004 and also for additional FSI in respect of the said plot. The lease premium was paid without deduction of tax at source u/s. 194I. The Assessing Officer (AO) held that this payment attracted provisions of section 194I and since the assessee failed to deduct tax at source it has committed default within the meaning of section 201(1) of the Act and therefore, he treated the assessee to be an assessee in default and directed the assessee to make payment of interest along with TDS totaling to Rs. 314.26 crore.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A) where it contended that the payment under consideration was not covered by the term `rent’ u/s. 194I but was made to MMRDA (a) for additional built-up area and (b) for granting free-of-FSI area of Rs. 4 crore. The CIT(A) observed that the amount charged by MMRDA as lease premium was equal to the rate prevalent as per stamp duty recovery for acquisition of the commercial premises. These rates are prescribed for transfer of property and not for use as let-out tenanted property. He also observed that even the additional FSI was given for additional charges as per Ready Reckoner rates only. He found that the whole transaction towards grant of leasehold transaction rights to the assessee is nothing but a transaction of transfer of property and the lease premium is the consideration for the purchase of the said leasehold rights. Relying on the ratio of the decision of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of M/s. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (ITA Nos. 1955/M/99, 2181/M/99, 4853/M/04, 4485/M/04, 4854/M/04, 356/M/01and 5850/M/00) he decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that a careful reading of the lease deed shows that the premium is not paid under a lease but is paid as a price for obtaining the lease, hence it precedes the grant of lease. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be equated with the rent which is paid periodically. It also noted that the payment to MMRDA is also for additional built-up area and also for granting free-of-FSI area, such payment cannot be equated to rent. It held that the assessee has made payment to MMRDA under Development Control for acquiring leasehold land and additional builtup area. Considering the precedents relied upon by the CIT(A) and the definition of the term `rent’ as provided in section 194I, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

levitra

2013-TIOL-764-ITAT-INDORE DCIT vs. Roop Singh Bagga ITA No. 44/Ind/2013 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Dated: 31-05-2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
S/s. 40(a)(ia), 271(1)(c)–Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) does not attract penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). Making an incorrect claim in law does not tantamount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. Levy of penalty is not justified merely because the assessee has claimed certain expenditure that expenditure is not eligible in view of the provisions of section 40 (a)(ia) of the Act and for that reason, expenditure is disallowed.

Facts: The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the assessee, a transport contractor, found that payment of freight was made without deducting tax at source. Accordingly, he disallowed the freight u/s. 40(a)(ia). The assessee did not challenge the addition and paid tax thereon. The AO also levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) with reference to the disallowance so made by him. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who following the decisions of the Hyderabad `A’ Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Seaway Shipping Ltd. (ITA No. 80H/2011, order dated 11th June, 2010) and Ahmedabad `D’ Bench of the Tribunal in the case of L.G. Chaudhary (2012-TIOL-205-ITAT-AHM) deleted the penalty.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal noted that—

(a) the default for non-deduction of tax in respect of payment for freight charges was accepted by the assessee himself by filing letter dated 21-12- 2009 before the Assessing Officer;

(b) the Supreme Court has in the case of Suresh Chand Mittal (supra) observed that additional income offered by the assessee to buy peace and to come out of vexed litigation would be treated as bona fides;

(c) the issue with regard to levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on the plea of non-deduction of tax u/s. 40a(ia) has been considered by the coordinate Bench in the case of Seaway Shipping Ltd and L.G. Choudhary (supra) wherein exactly on the similar issue, levy of penalty was held to be not justified;

(d) Supreme Court in the case of Reliance Petro Products (P) Ltd. (322 ITR 158)(SC) has categorically observed that “By any stretch of imagination, making an incorrect claim in law cannot tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars”.

The Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A) and decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

levitra

2013-TIOL-746-ITAT-DEL ACIT vs. Delhi Public School ITA No. 4878 & 4879/Del/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09 & 2009-10. Dated: 24-05-2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
 S/s. 194C, 194I–Payments made by school to bus
owners/contractors for transportation of students from their home to
school and back qualify for deduction of tax at source u/s. 194C and not
u/s. 194I.

Facts:
The assessee, a school, had
taken on hire vehicles which were used for carrying students from their
homes to school and back. In view of the contracts entered into by the
assessee with the bus owners, the assessee deducted tax u/s. 194C.
Before the Assessing Officer (AO) the assessee submitted that
considering the fact that the contract provided for transportation of
children, drivers and conductors were appointed by the contractor, after
school trips were over the contractor was free to utilise the vehicle
for any manner and purpose, tax was deductible u/s. 194C. However, the
AO held that since the name of the school was written on the buses and
also that the buses were in exclusive possession of the school, the
transporter cannot ply buses for any purpose other than for the school.
He, accordingly, held that the payments made qualify for deduction of
tax u/s. 194I and not u/s. 194C. The AO calculated the difference in
amount deductible u/s. 194I and the amount deducted u/s. 194C.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A). The CIT(A) noted that the
contract was on a per trip basis for specified route. The rates per trip
were frozen for a period of one year. The vehicle i.e., the school bus
remains in possession of the transporter and the staff required to
operate the vehicle was also engaged by the transporter. All costs
incurred for running and maintenance of buses including the salaries of
driver and conductor were to be incurred by the transporter. Once the
trips made by these buses for carrying and dropping children from/to
school are complete, the transporter is at liberty to use the vehicle in
any manner. Following the ratio of the following decisions he held that
the contract was a works contract and provisions of section 194I were
not applicable.

a) Lotus Valley Education Society vs. ACIT (TDS) Noida 46 SOT 77 (Delhi) (URO)

b) Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority vs. ACIT 46 SOT 75 (Ahd) (URO)

c) ACIT (TDS) vs. Accenture Services Pvt. Ltd. 44 SOT 290 (Mumbai)

d) ITO vs. Indian Oil Corporation (15 Taxmann. com 210)(Delhi ITAT)

He decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The
Tribunal noted that the issue is covered by various cases decided by
the Tribunal. It also noted that the facts are similar to the facts in
the case of Lotus Valley Education Society vs. ACIT (TDS), which was
decided by Delhi Bench in ITA No. 3254 & 3255 /Del/2010. Relying
upon the observations in para 6 of the said order the Tribunal decided
the issue in favour of the assessee.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

levitra

SA 240 (Revised): A Practical Insight

fiogf49gjkf0d
In our professional practice, how often do we come across defences such as:

“Whatever I did was in the interest of the organisation without any intention of personal gratification whatsoever”.

“You need to pay bribes to get your work done, there is no other way”.

“If the senior executives can have their fat bonuses, then why can’t I have my piece of cake?”

“Cooking the books or creative accounting is not fraud; it is just bending the rules”.

These are the usual defences which one puts forth when faced with the prospect of being held answerable or responsible for fraud (or even potential fraud). But let us examine the auditor’s duty and responsibility relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements.

SA 240 (Revised) (which is effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after 1st April 2009) deals with “the auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud and error in an audit of financial statements” and defines fraud as “an intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those charged with governance, employees or third party, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage”. The distinction between ‘fraud’ and ‘error’ is whether the underlying action resulting in misstatements is intentional (i.e. fraud) or unintentional.

Let us understand the application of SA 240 (Revised) with the following two case studies. These cases represent ‘frauds’ as they were intentionally committed by the management/employees to gain an illegal advantage resulting in misstatement in financial statements resulting either from misappropriation of assets (cash in the first case) or fraudulent financial reporting (misstatement of inventories in the second case).

Case 1

Background
ABC Ltd. was engaged in the manufacturing of hot rolled steel plates. The manufacturing process involves melting iron ore and converting the molten ore into iron sheets of required size(s). During the course of production, a given proportion of ore had to be scrapped. The scrap generated was measurable in terms of standard yield and was also dependent on the quality of ore used. The scrap generated was sold to two scrap dealers at an agreed upon price. Scrap sales as a percentage of total income were insignificant. The entire process of scrap sales was handled by the CFO under the direct supervision of the Managing Director. The documentation maintained by the CFO for scrap sales included the quantity sold, the price charged and the quotations supporting the price charged as well payment of statutory levies such as excise and VAT. The realisation of scrap sales was never an issue as scrap was always sold on the basis of ‘advance payment by cheque’. From an audit standpoint, given that scrap sales (as recorded in the books) did not constitute a material amount, the auditors’ verification was restricted to ensuring compliance with excise and VAT rules and performing an overall analytical review.

The real situation was quite different. The actual quantity of scrap generated was much higher than that recorded in the books. The actual price realisation was also significantly higher with the difference between the amount disclosed in the books and actual price being received in cash. The cash was used to make facilitation payments (‘bribes’) to secure favours/approvals from various authorities in relation to day-to-day business operations. The actual scenario came to light when the business with the scrap dealer was discontinued on account of dispute and the scrap dealer informed the board of directors of the arrangement.

Analysis with respect to SA 240 (Revised)

Responsibility of management and those charged with governance

Per SA 240 (Revised), the primary responsibility to ensure prevention and detection of fraud and error rests with the management and those charged with governance. Since senior management was involved in the fraud, it was imperative that those charged with governance exercised much greater control and supervision over management function. They should have, using their authority of management oversight, ensured that this aspect of the company’s operation was reviewed independently and reported.

? Understanding the entity’s internal controls— The entire process of scrap sales was being managed by the CFO who had the authority to negotiate the rates with the scrap dealer, was responsible for dispatch of scrap and was also responsible for ultimate collection. There was no segregation of duties resulting in one individual being able to initiate and complete the entire transaction singlehandedly. There was an absence of an independent check of the overall reconciliation of materials consumed and goods produced. There was no independent verification of the quotes obtained to support the prices charged. This could have been mitigated by establishing a process of selection of scrap dealers such as tendering or by formulating a scrap negotiation committee comprising operational/functional heads responsible for negotiating terms with scrap dealers.

? Deterrents to improper conduct by management— The arrangement was being managed by the CFO with the knowledge of the Managing Director leading to management override of controls. Establishing a ‘code of conduct’ mandating compliance by one and all and stipulating disciplinary action (including termination and legal recourse) for non-compliance could have acted as a deterrent in fraud prevention/detection.

? Independent review by internal audit function reporting directly to those charged with governance could also have assisted in fraud detection/prevention. In situations where the entity has an internal audit function, the auditor can make enquiries of the internal auditor about any specific procedures performed to detect fraud and whether satisfactory responses were received from management to any findings resulting from those procedures.

? Whistle-blower mechanism—In terms of SA 315, responsibilities of those charged with governance include oversight of the design and effective operation of whistle blower procedures, establishment of these procedures could act as a ‘deterrent’.

Auditors’ Responsibilities

Per SA 240 (Revised), owing to the inherent limitations in an audit, the auditor cannot obtain absolute assurance that the material misstatements in the financial statements (either because of fraud or error) will be detected. The auditor has to, however, obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement and should therefore ensure that they have followed the auditing procedures in accordance with the auditing standards generally accepted in India. However, the auditor could be held responsible where the misstatements due to fraud or error remained undetected due to nonapplication of the required audit procedures and professional scepticism.

In this regard it is important to note that the risk of not detecting a material misstatement due to fraud is greater than that arising from an error, since fraud may involve a sophisticated modus operandi, and could include collusion, forgery and intentional misrepresentation. This risk increases with management fraud since they are in a position to manipulate records and override controls.

In the given case, applying the guidance given in SA 240 (Revised) and SA 200 (Revised) Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in accordance with Standards on Auditing, the auditors should have considered the following factors while auditing scrap sales:

Identify and assess fraud risk—the auditor should have designated scrap sales as an area susceptible to fraud in view of the fact that scrap sales were controlled entirely by the CFO and the Managing Director.

Understanding of the entity’s business and maintaining professional scepticism—the auditors should have considered obtaining deeper understanding of the manufacturing process, understood the relationship of scrap generated with quantity produced and enquired into reasons why the quantity of scrap generated as recorded in the books was low in relation to finished goods produced. The auditors could also have considered the usual quantum of scrap generated in similar/like industries and related this to the scrap quantity recorded in the company’s books. The auditors should have compared the rates charged to scrap dealers with independent sources such as market prices of steel scrap.

Understanding of internal control environment—There was no segregation of duties as the entire function was being performed by the CFO and MD. Further, as senior management was involved, there existed the risk of management override of controls. The auditor should have communicated these deficiencies in internal controls to those charged with governance and should also have formally enquired whether the governance body has any knowledge of actual, suspected or alleged fraud relating to scrap sales.

Respond appropriately to identified (or suspected) fraud—The auditors should have given due consideration to controls over scrap sales while reporting on internal controls in the Companies (Auditor’s Report)
Order, 2003 (‘CARO’) report. Post identification of the fraud, the auditor would have to appropriately modify the reporting relating to paragraph 4(xxi) of the CARO report.

As such, applying analytical procedures alone on the consideration that scrap income was insignificant to the overall financial statements was not appropriate and would not constitute sufficient appropriate audit evidence.

CASE 2

Background

XYZ Ltd. was engaged in the business of manufacturing gypsum boards, the primary raw material for which is natural gypsum. Gypsum was purchased in huge quantities in rock form in uneven size and shape. Given the quantity, size and shape, gypsum had to be stored in open spaces resulting in gypsum being exposed to the external environment. No physical verification was conducted during the year and at year-end, physical verification was not feasible given the huge quantum and uneven size/shape of the material in stock, the technical specifications (in terms of extent of exposure to light/air/water) as well as inability to draw inference based on test check. The quantity in stock was therefore certified by an independent surveyor and the auditors’ relied on the surveyor’s report. The quantity reported by the surveyor was used by the company to account for stocks in the books at the year-end.

The actual scenario was far different than that disclosed in the books. The quantity of gypsum in stock reported by the independent surveyor was as instructed by the factory manager. The factory manager reported the desired results given the arrangement with the valuer and the auditor’s reliance on the valuer’s work. The fraud came to light when during the course of interim audit for the subsequent financial year, the auditor insisted on physical verification of the stock by weighment at a point in time when the quantity of gypsum in the warehouse was at the lowest level. The quantity weighed physically was far less than that shown in the books at the time of physical verification.

Analysis with respect to SA 240 (Revised)

Responsibility of management and those charged with governance

In the present case, the perpetrator of the fraud was a functional manager (factory employee) as against a member of senior management in Case
1.    The responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud primarily rests with the management; however, the administration and monitoring of controls in Case 2 would be different. This could have been achieved by:
Management evaluation of the expertise of the independent valuer engaged by the factory manager including considering obtaining a separate valuation from another valuer (given the quantum of stocks involved). Management could also independently test the methodology applied and assumptions made by the valuer in arriving at the likely quantity of stocks lying in the open ware-house.

Mandating physical verification by physical weighment of stocks at least once in a year and reconciliation of physical balances with book records, and also considering increasing the frequency of verification (based on the significant value of such stocks).

Formulating a policy of rotation of valuers at appropriate intervals.

Employees performing functions having high susceptibility to fraud being made to compulsorily avail annual leave.

Monitoring control in the form of an over-all exercise reconciling quantity of gypsum purchased, expected gypsum consumption (relative to finished goods produced) and derived closing inventory of gypsum would have also revealed the overstatement of closing inventory as per books.

Establishing a ‘code of conduct’ mandating compliance by one and all and stipulating disciplinary action (including termination and legal recourse) for non-compliance could have acted as a deterrent in fraud prevention/detection.

Auditors’ Responsibilities

Per SA 240 (Revised), while performing risk assessment procedures to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment, the auditor should perform procedures to identify material misstatements due to fraud which includes A 620—Using the Work of an Expert requires that an auditor ought to have satisfied himself as to the expert’s skills, competencies and objectivity. The auditor should have considered whether the source data used by the expert, the assumptions made and methodology used is reasonable having regard to the auditor’s knowledge of the client business.

incorporating an element of unpredictability in selecting the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. Accordingly, the auditor could have mandated that management conduct actual physical verification of stocks at a time other than the year-end and the auditor being present at such count.

The auditor should have performed analytical procedures to deduce the expected quantity of gypsum that would be in closing inventory at the year-end considering the production and expected input-output yield.

The auditor would need to appropriately modify his opinion in relation to paragraph 4(ii) of the CARO report relating to physical verification of inventories. Consequent to the fraud being detected, the auditor would need to consider modifying the audit opinion as well as consider fraud reporting under paragraph 4(xxi) of CARO report.

As such, mere reliance on the expert’s work by the auditors could not be considered as sufficient audit evidence for the purpose of expressing an opinion.


Whom should the auditor communicate with when the fraud is detected?

On fraud being identified or where the auditor has obtained information that fraud exists, the auditor must inform the same to the appropriate level of management who are primarily responsible for the prevention and detection of fraud. If the auditor suspects the fraud involving management, the communication should be done to those charged with governance. In other cases it should be to the management, at least one level above the level at which the fraud is suspected.

Although the auditor’s professional duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information may preclude him from reporting to any outside entity, the auditor’s legal responsibilities may override his duty of confidentiality on certain occasions, for e.g., when an auditor is required to disclose information under any law or under a directive of a judicial body/court.

Management Representations

The auditor should obtain written representations from the management or those charged with governance which include acknowledging their responsibility for the design, implementation and maintaining internal controls to prevent and detect fraud, that they have disclosed to the auditor the results of management’s assessment of the risk that the financial statements may be misstated on account of fraud and their knowledge of actual, suspected or alleged fraud. However, the obtaining of mere representation does not absolve an auditor from the responsibilities cast upon him under SA 240.

Compatibility with the corresponding International Standards of Auditing-ISA 240

The application section of paragraph A6, A56 and A66 of ISA 240 specifically deals with the application of the requirement of ISA 240 to the audits of public sector entities. However, since SA 240 (Revised) applies to all entities irrespective of their form, nature and size, a specific reference to the applicability of the Standard to public sector entities has not been included.

However the spirit of the corresponding para-graphs in ISA 240 has been retained in SA 240 (Revised) as follows:

Para A6 has been retained such that in certain cases the auditor may be required by the legislature or the regulator to specifically report on the instances of the actual/ suspected fraud in the client entity.

Para A56 has been retained such that the auditors may not have an option to withdraw from the engagements in certain cases.

Para A66 has been retained such that the requirement for reporting fraud, whether or not discovered through the audit process, may be subject to the specific provisions of the audit mandate or related legislation or regulation.

Conclusion:

Considering the nature and characteristics of a fraudulent act and the responsibility cast upon the auditor, it is imperative that due professional scepticism is exercised throughout the audit and the requirements of SA 240 (Revised) are followed to assist the auditor in identifying and assessing the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and in designing procedures to detect such mis-statement.

Changing Face of the Auditor’s Report

fiogf49gjkf0d
Our July 2013 issue focused on accountability. There cannot be a more relevant backdrop to the recent global developments taking place in enhancing the role of audit and the auditor’s reporting model.

A concern we have often heard but has remained unaddressed over the decades is the ‘expectation gap’ between the role of an auditor as expected or perceived by the users of the financial statements and what the real role of an auditor is under the applicable laws and regulations. The primary reason for this gap is the lack of communicative value of the auditor’s report. Investors have often indicated that auditors, in the audit process, obtain and review critical information relating to the company, areas of significant impact on the company’s financial position and exercise of management judgement around these areas. These insights do not make it through to the auditor’s report creating a gap between the information that is available to the auditors and their appointers. Consequently, the primary purpose of the audit report has remained limited to opining on whether the financial statements pass or fail the ‘true and fair’ presentation test.

To address these concerns, regulators around the world have worked together and are proposing changes in what is seen as an overhaul of the auditor reporting model.

On 25th July 2013, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued an exposure draft (the ED) of Reporting on Audited Financial Statements: Proposed New and Revised International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). The ED revises a number of existing ISAs and proposes a new ISA. The new ISA (ISA 701) Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report introduces requirements to include ‘key audit matters’ (KAMs) in the auditor’s report of listed entities. KAMs are those matters that the auditor considers of most significance in the audit of the entity’s current period financial statements.

Other changes to the auditor’s report are proposed by revising other ISAs including ISA 700 Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements.

In summary, key changes in the auditor’s report proposed are as follows:

• Reporting Key Audit Matters

• A new section on the auditor’s opinion on the management’s assessment and appropriateness of the use of going concern basis and whether the auditor has identified a material uncertainty casting significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern

• A statement of auditor’s independence and compliance with other ethical responsibilities under the applicable law and regulations

• An improved description of the auditor’s responsibilities

• Reporting on the auditor’s responsibilities relating to other information

• Engagement partner’s name in the auditor’s report of listed entities.

While the IAASB was working on these proposals, the regulator on the other side of the North Atlantic Ocean wasn’t far behind. Within a matter of few days, on 13 August 2013, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued its own new auditing standard The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion with related amendments for public comment. The objective of this new PCAOB standard is, in essence, the same as that of the IAASB’s, i.e., to make the auditor reporting model more informative and relevant to investors and other financial statement users.

In addition to the existing pass/fail opinion, key proposals of the new PCAOB auditing standard in the auditors’ report are as follows:

• Reporting Critical Audit Matters (CAMs) identified and addressed by the auditor during the audit of the current period’s financial statements.

• Enhance the current reporting language by including the phrase ‘whether due to error or fraud’ in the context of whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements

• A specific statement on the auditor tenure (i.e. the year since the auditor has been serving the company consecutively)

• A specific statement on the auditor independence and compliance with the United States federal securities laws and the applicable rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the PCAOB

• Communication related to other information in accordance with the new PCAOB auditing standard proposed concurrently—The Auditor’s Responsibilities Regarding Other Information in Certain Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements and the Related Auditor’s Report

Although the IAASB’s and the PCAOB’s proposals refer to the key reporting matters differently—key audit matters vs. critical audit matters—the guidance around how these matters will be determined by an auditor is similar. These are both identified as significant risks or areas involving significant auditor judgment; areas that posed significant difficulty in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence or forming an opinion on the financial statements; and those that required an auditor to significantly change the planned audit approach. Under both sets of standards, these are matters of such importance that they are communicated by the auditors with those charged with governance, e.g. the audit committee.

In addition to the IAASB and the PCAOB proposals, the European Commission is also working on similar projects that will change the auditor reporting model through new/revised accounting and audit directives. The changes proposed by the IAASB and the PCAOB are expected to be effective from fiscal periods beginning on or after 15th December 2015. However, different countries may adopt a different timeline in implementing these changes in their version of the ISAs. For example, even ahead of the IAASB’s proposals, in June 2013, the Financial Reporting Council already revised ISA 700 (UK & Ireland) The Independent Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements and is effective from the periods commencing on or after 1st October 2012 for the companies reporting against the UK Corporate Governance Code. Some of the changes in the ISA 700 (UK & Ireland) are over and above those proposed by the IAASB. For example, the ISA (UK & Ireland) also requires the auditor to report on how the concept of materiality was applied in planning and performing an audit.

The way ahead
These changes seem distant and are still at the proposal stage. It should be borne in mind though that these are based on extensive outreach activities conducted by the international regulators and have closely followed each other’s projects. Therefore, these are quite likely to make their way through to the final standards.

As regards the impact on audit reporting in India is concerned, the global developments may put forward an interesting challenge to the regulators and standard-setters in India. Currently, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2003 already require reporting on specific items but these may not align with the definition of a key/ critical audit matter referred to in the IAASB and the PCAOB proposals. Also, there are proposals that do not currently exist in an auditor’s report under the Indian Companies Act. Accordingly, it will have to be seen whether Indian audit reports get even longer by bringing on board these additional sections to make it more consistent with the global reporting model or get a bit more concise by replacing/ removing some of the items reported on currently.

levitra

Google Hangout – II

fiogf49gjkf0d
At the outset, I would like to mention that when I started penning the series titled Google Hangout, I had intended to cover more than just the features of the Google Hangout app. The intention was to build a bit of background and create awareness of where we were and where we are heading. While there is a growing perception that Google Hangout may be a game-changer, there is very little awareness as to what are the dynamics involved. In this series on Google Hangout, I have endeavoured to bring out some of the facts which I thought would put things in perspective. The concluding write-up of this series will cover some of the features which suggest that Google Hangout will change the way we communicate with each other.

About this write-up
: This is the 2nd part of the series of articles on Google Hangout. This write-up focuses mainly on the events before Google Hangout was put up in the public domain and how these events directly or indirectly will influence the things to come—one of which is the success of Google Hangout as an instant messaging app.

The previous article briefly discussed the events related to the development of the app-based ecosystem and the rise and decline of various players in the arena of instant messaging apps. In this write-up, we will discuss some of the popular instant messaging apps, which are relevant today, but in the foreseeable future may become ‘also rans’.

The previous write-up briefly touched upon the early events leading to the advent and subsequent developments related to the instant messaging ecosystem. The previous write-up also discussed why Short Messaging Service (SMS) became popular. Thereafter, BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) came into the picture and shook up the world. Today, the scene has changed; the tide has turned for BBM, which is fast losing ground to newer and more nimble players in the market. The following paragraphs, are some of the facts which help the readers understand some of the key factors at play.

The rise and fall of SMS

As discussed in the previous write-up, between the years 2000–2005, SMS was a popular means of communication. The (prohibitive) minimum cost of a voice call was the primary reason. But as time went by, technological advancements, easy and cheap access to mobile telephony, drop in the minimum cost per call, etc., led to the decline in the popularity of SMS as a means of communication. Once voice call rentals started to fall, users started realising that there were disadvantages to using an SMS, i.e., other than the difference in the cost of an SMS vs. voice call, factors such as limit to number of characters per SMS, limitations of the keypad on the phone, perceived need for rich media compared to plain vanilla text, abuse of the SMS system by mass advertisers, etc.

One may say that the role of SMS as an enabler of instant communication reached its peak when it became the de facto means of mass communication. At its peak, SMS was used to exchange greetings during festivals like Diwali, Christmas and Id; banks and other service providers sent updates of transactions related to money transfers, credit card use, bank balance; users exchanged daily SMS’s (containing jokes, positive thoughts, etc) on a mass scale. A whole new ecosystem had spawned due to mass SMS-ing.

While mass SMS-ing capability was the bright side, there was a dark side too. Mass advertisers started targeting a number of mobile users for mass messaging. Consumers across the country started receiving (mostly unwanted) messages. These would range from offers to supply services of a plumber, AC repairmen, to selling insurance, stock trading tips, so on and so forth. Somehow this development seemed inevitable. Mass marketers then found that their calls to mobile phone users (for selling various products and services) were being ignored due to the caller ID facility. Mass advertisers realised that while a call could be ignored, there was no way to stop someone from sending an SMS. The abuse became so rampant that the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was forced to clamp down hard. TRAI imposed several restrictions such as the National Do Not Call Registry, imposed requirement to register mass advertisers and enforced a limit on the number of messages per phone number per day, among other diktats.

Thus, the fate of SMS as a means of instant communication was more or less sealed. Today, savvy users consider SMS-ing not only an expensive option; they also find it to be a limiting factor when they want to reach out to their ever-expanding network of friends.

The rise and (eminent) fall of BBM
During 2005–2010, i.e., right about the time that the reign of SMS was nearing its end, BBM started gaining ground as the de facto means of instant messaging and communications. The BlackBerry (BB) device was already quite popular as a smart device for official communication (i.e., emailing). With a growing number of users and easy access to the BB data services, BBM started covering ground lost by SMS. By 2008-09, BBM was already accepted by the corporate world as a reliable instant messaging service. In the BB world, email was the official means of corporate communication and BBM was the unofficial yet cool means of communication. Users formed groups and used BBM to exchange jokes, positive messages, etc., just like they had used SMS in the past. The advantage that BBM offered was zero cost. As pointed out in my last write-up, while the BBM service itself was free, one would need to purchase a BB (approx cost 18K plus) and pay for the data charges. Another relevant point was that right up to 2007-08, users would restrict their BB subscription to mail and data services, voice calls were used sparingly. Apparently, at that time, BB had not been permitted due to which the cost of a voice call was far too high. Soon thereafter, various Indian telecom players started offering BB services (data & voice) at an affordable cost. Even then a user would have to purchase a BB device, the cost of which was quite steep for the common man.

Post 2008, a series of changes took place:

• Increase in the penetration of mobile technology— widespread usage across the country
• Advent of global players in the telecom sector
• Falling rentals for voice calls
• Introduction of 3G technology
• Easy access to Internet, through smart phones
• Introduction of better quality of smart phones
• Rise of the iPhone

While one could argue both ways on all of the above factors, it remains an accepted fact that easy access to the Internet and availability of cheaper technology, i.e., both hardware as well as software, were the key factors to the upheaval that was to come. By 2008, Nokia had already started losing ground to BB devices. It was no longer a “status symbol”. At that time, users (and to a great extent Nokia too) started realising the perils of not keeping up with the changing times. Users realised that Nokia’s Symbian-based phones could not match up with increasing end-user expectations, mainly related to emailing and access to the Internet. Also, BB was uniquely positioned because it offered a full QWERTY keyboard. While other device makers did try to play ‘catch-up’, they had already missed the boat.

BB’s troubles really began to surface after the introduction of the iPhone 4. It was slick, userfriendly and what many industry watchers would say ‘path-breaking’. There were several reasons for and against the iPhone, some of which are:

• It was expensive but users felt it was worth it.

•    While users were restricted to the iOS and the iTunes environment, these environments themselves provided for so much that one did not feel the need to look beyond that factor. As a matter of fact, the feeling was that none of the other players provided so much.

•    There was a paradigm shift in the user interface environment. While a standard number pad was considered as a serious limitation, the famed QWERTY keyboard and track ball/pad also seemed to be laborious when compared the iPhone’s touch-based interface.

The dynamics were completely stacked against the QWERTY keyboard when Apple introduced Siri, its much touted voice-based interface.

•    The ease in Internet access gave much needed succour to Internet-dependant apps like Google Talk and WhatsApp. (Here I would confess that I started using an iPhone just about then— around December 2009, and at the instance of my mentor, installed WhatsApp. To be candid, I was more than happy to see my phone bill go down due to the lower number of SMS’s).

•    The Apple app store made sure that more and more (free as well as paid) apps kept cropping up. Users were spoilt for choices. It was only a matter of time that they realised the limitations in the offerings of BBM.

•    The increasing popularity of the apps market place and introduction of iPhone clones was a strong sign that BB, and as a natural consequence BBM, would see that its days were numbered.

•    Many IT players saw the growing popularity of instant messaging apps and felt that there was a gap between what BBM had to offer and what the consumers at large were expecting. Thus, WhatsApp, WeChat, etc., came into the market. Text-based messaging was destined to be a thing of the past. People were already expecting more. Between WhatsApp and We-Chat they got to sent voice-based messages, videos, pictures, map locations, etc. It seemed that BBM was already gasping for breath at that time.

While there are several other facts which one would want to consider, I think it would be suf-ficient to say that players like Nokia (which recently decided to sell out to Microsoft) and BB (taking losses, likely to cut approx 5,000 jobs, considering a sellout, recent announcement that it would of-fer BBM on Android phones) are feeling the heat or as one can say, are dropping out of the race.

The next write-up will be about the popularity of apps like Skype, WhatsApp, WeChat, etc., and how these apps (like their predecessors) are likely to face competition from Google Hangout—the new kid on the block.

I wish all the readers the best of luck with the tax audit season.

Disclaimer: The purpose of this article is not to promote any particular site or person or software. Further comments about various products and services are based on the user experience related information available in the public domain. There is no intention to malign any product or service in any manner whatsoever. The sole intention is to create awareness and to bring into the limelight some thought-provoking content.

TS-349-ITAT-2013(Del) ITO vs. Kendle India Pvt. Ltd. A.Y. 2008-09, Dated: 26.07.2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
S/s. 9, 195 – Procurement of information on clinical trials not used by the taxpayer for its own technical knowhow, but for onward transmission is not royalty

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company (I Co.), entered into a master clinical services agreement (MCSA) with an overseas drug manufacturing company (FCo.) for clinical trials.

In pursuance thereto, I Co. entered into an arrangement with a Sri Lankan Company (SCo.) to undertake clinical trials in Sri Lanka. SCo. in turn had a tie-up with a clinical trial unit (CTU) of a Sri Lankan university for the conduct of clinical trials. The reports received from SCo. were passed on to FCo. by the Taxpayer.

I Co. applied for a nil withholding tax order on its payments to SCo. on the basis that the remittance was a business profit, not taxable in the absence of SCo.’s permanent establishment (PE) in India under the India-Sri Lanka DTAA. This DTAA does not have an article on technical services unlike many of the DTAAs signed by India.

The Tax Authority held that the payment was for imparting commercial experience to FCo. through the Taxpayer and hence constituted royalty under Article 12(3) of the India-Sri Lanka DTAA.

On appeal, the CIT(A) ruled in favour of I Co. The CIT(A) held that the nature of services rendered by SCo and CTU does not qualify as “royalty” either in terms of the Act or the India-Sri Lanka DTAA. The services may be characterised as fees for technical or professional services (FTS) or business profits. In the absence of the FTS article, these services are to be treated as business profits which can only be taxed in India if SCo. has a PE in India.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

I Co. argued that the information provided is akin to providing study report or book which is general in nature. The payment is in fact for availing services from SCo. pursuant to which SCo. follows a standard protocol to generate data consistently with the practice adopted worldwide. SCo. is thus only compiling the data of a routine nature which cannot be called technical information which determines the decision to commercially manufacture the drug or not.

Held:
After considering the facts, the Tribunal upheld the reasoning of CIT(A) and ruled that, though, the payment is for procuring commercial information, it is not royalty because:

• The services rendered by SCo. are for supply of information which the I Co. is not using for any technical knowhow.

• The I Co. is acting as a conduit. The remittance is for procurement of commercial information for onward transmission to FCo.

levitra

TS-433-ITAT-2013 (Mum) Reliance Infocom Ltd. (now known as Reliance Communications Ltd.) & others. vs. DDIT(IT). A.Ys: Various years, Dated: 06-09-2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
S/s. 9, 195 – Payment for Software Licence under a standalone agreement, and not an integral part of purchase of equipment (embedded software) is consideration for transfer or use of copyright and is taxable as royalty, both under the Act and various DTAAs. Purchase of embedded software amounts to purchase of copyrighted article, not taxable as royalty.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian telecom company, wanted to establish a wireless telecommunications network in India. It entered into a contract with an Indian company (ICo.) for supply of hardware, software and services for establishing the network. The software supply contract was thereafter assigned by ICo. to its Foreign Group Company (FCo.) under a tripartite agreement between the Taxpayer, FCo. and ICo. FCo. supplied software under this agreement. Various other shrink-wrap/off-the-shelf software were acquired from third parties. All software was meant for use in operation of network equipments.

The Tax Authority considered the payments made to FCo. to be in the nature of royalty and rejected the nil withholding application made by the Taxpayer.

On appeal, the CIT(A) observed that the Taxpayer was forbidden to decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, decode, modify or sub-license the software, as per the agreements and hence as the Taxpayer only had a “copy of software” without any part of “copyright of the software”, the payments did not amount to royalty.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal, based on facts distinguished the decisions in the case of Motorola Inc. [270 ITR (AT) 62 (SB)], Delhi High Court in Erickson [343 ITR 370] and Nokia Networks [25 taxmann.com 225]. The Tribunal noted that in the above decisions there was purchase of software along with hardware and the same was purchase of “copyrighted article” and no “copyright” was involved. Software was an integral part of the supply of equipment for telecommunications, generally called embedded software and there was no separate sale of software.

In the present case, the Taxpayer purchased the software by virtue of a standalone “software license agreement”. The software was neither an integral part of purchase of equipment nor was it embedded software. The delivery was separate, in the form of CDs, mostly abroad and was installed in India separately.

The Tribunal also concluded as follows:

FCo. transferred a license to use its copyright to the Taxpayer where FCo. continued to be the owner of the copyright and all other IPRs. The licence granted for making use of the “copyright” in respect of shrink-wrapped software/off-the-shelf software, authorising the end user to make use of its own network equipment, would also amount to transfer of part of the copyright. Consequently, this would amount to transfer of “right to use the copyright” for internal business.

The Karnataka HC decisions in the cases of Samsung [345 ITR 494 (Kar)] and Synopsis International [212 Taxman 454 (Kar)] dealt with facts similar to the facts in the present case. The Karnataka HC held that the end users of the computer program are granted use of a “copyright” when a license to make copies of the computer program for back-up or archival purposes is given.

In another Karnataka HC decision in the case of Lucent Technologies [348 ITR 196 (Kar)], wherein, on similar facts, it was held that payment for purchase of copy of a computer program that was supplied as a bundled contract, along with hardware on which the computer program was to be installed, was taxable as royalty.

Based on the above, the Tribunal ruled that payment made by the Taxpayer to FCo. and various other suppliers was taxable as royalty.

levitra

TS-357-ITAT-2013(Mum) ITO vs. M/s. Pubmatic India Pvt. Ltd A.Ys: 2008-09, Dated: 26-07-2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 195 – Purchase of online advertisement space and its sale being independent business transactions, cannot be considered as conducting business on behalf of Seller Company. There is no dependent agent permanent establishment (DAPE) for principal to principal dealings; Payments in the nature of business income not taxable in absence of PE and not liable to withholding tax in India.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian company (I Co.), and its parent company, a resident of the US (US Co.), are engaged in the business of providing services of internet advertising and marketing services. I Co. caters to Indian clients whereas the US Co. caters solely to clients outside India and generally in the US. In case of advertisements on foreign websites, the US Co. purchases the advertisement space from foreign website owners and sells them to I Co. at cost plus mark-up and I Co. in turn, sells to I Co.’s clients. In India, a similar procedure, in reverse, is followed when foreign clients of the US Co. want to place advertisements on Indian websites.

I Co. made payments to US Co. towards purchase of online advertising space without deducting taxes.

The Tax Authority disallowed the payments made by the I Co. for failure to deduct taxes and contended that the I Co. constituted a DAPE for US Co. as I Co. was habitually conducting business on behalf of the US Co. in India and the activities of the I Co. were devoted wholly or almost wholly on behalf of US Co.

On appeal, the CIT(A) ruled in favour of I Co. by holding that the I Co. and US Co. are independent parties transacting on arm’s length and therefore I Co. did not constitute DAPE.

Held:
On appeal by the tax authority, the Tribunal based on the following reasons held that I Co. was an independent party and did not constitute a DAPE of US Co. Further, purchase of advertisement space on a foreign website by I Co. from US Co. constituted a trading receipt of US Co., not taxable in India in the absence of a PE.

• The advertisement space from US Co. was purchased for I Co.’s customers and was not a transaction which was carried out on behalf of US Co. Further the same was sold at cost plus mark-up being an arm’s length price to I Co on a principal-to-principal basis. All risks and rewards of the business were borne by I Co.

• The advertisement space was in turn ‘sold’ by I Co. to customers at a different price and the same income has been offered as business income of I Co.

• The similarity of business activity does not, by itself, indicate that I Co is acting or doing business on behalf of US Co.

Further, neither I Co. nor US Co. was providing services or goods to the clients of the other party or dealing with the clients of the other party.

• Accordingly, remittance was towards business income which was not taxable in absence of PE.

levitra

TS-341-ITAT-2013(Mum) Sargent & Lundy, LLC, USA vs. ADCIT (IT) A.Ys: 2007-08, Dated: 24-07-2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Provision of blueprints i.e., technical designs and plans, without recourse and capable of being used in the future satisfies the test of ‘make available’ as stipulated under the India-US DTAA; taxable as fees for included services

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a US tax resident (US Co.), was a consulting firm engaged in providing services to the power industry. The US Co. provided services in the nature of operating power plants, decommissioning, consulting, project solutions and other engineering based services.

The US Co. entered into an agreement with an Indian Company (I Co.) for rendering consulting and engineering services in relation to ultra-mega power projects in India as per which, the US Co. was required to prepare necessary designs and documents.

The Tax Authority observed that the services were technical in nature and accordingly, taxable as fees for technical services (FTS) under the Act. Further, the services rendered by the US Co. satisfied the test of ‘make available’ under the India-US DTAA and, thus, were taxable as fees for included services (FIS).

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal on the issue whether the services rendered can be regarded as ‘making available’ technical knowledge, skill etc. under the India-US DTAA.

Held:
The expression ‘make available’, in the context of FIS, contemplates that the services are of such a nature that the payer of the services comes to possess the technical knowledge so provided, which enables the payer to utilise the same in the future.

Reliance was placed on the decision of the Karnataka High Court (HC) in De Beers India Minerals Pvt. Ltd [346 ITR 467] wherein the HC had observed that technical knowledge is ‘made available’ if the person acquiring such knowledge is possessed of the same and enabling the person to apply it in the future, on its own.

In the facts, the US Co. renders technical services in the form of technical plans, designs, projects etc. which are nothing but blueprints of the technical side of the projects. Such services were rendered at a pre-bid stage and is quite natural, that such technical plans etc. are meant for use in the future, if and when, I Co. takes up the bid for installation of the projects.

When the technical services provided by the US Co. are of such nature, which are capable of use in the future, the same satisfies the test of ‘make available’ as envisaged under the India-US DTAA. Accordingly, the services rendered by the US Co qualify as FIS and are, therefore, taxable in India.

levitra

Digest of Recent Important Foreign Decisions-Part II

fiogf49gjkf0d
In this article, some of the recent important foreign decisions are covered. 1. The Netherlands; Luxembourg; European Union: the Netherlands Supreme Court: Reinvestment reserve taxable in the Netherlands also, if a company had its place of effective management in Luxembourg at time of sale of immovable property located in the Netherlands.

On 22nd March 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV vs. Tax Administration (No. 11/0599; BX6710), on whether or not the Netherlands may tax a reinvestment reserve (herinvesteringsreserve) resulting from the sale of immovable property located in the Netherlands by a company whose place of effective management at that time was located in Luxembourg and thereafter in the Netherlands. Details of the case are summarised below.

(a) Facts. X BV (the Taxpayer), was established under Dutch law and in 1995 it transferred its place of effective management to Luxembourg. In 1998 and 1999, the Taxpayer sold two buildings located in the Netherlands. The profits from the sale were placed in a reinvestment reserve. In 2001, the replacement reserve was converted into an ‘agioreserve’. Thereafter, the tax inspector imposed a supplementary assessment based on the fact that the company no longer had the intention to replace the building. The Taxpayer appealed the assessment.

(b) Legal background. Article 3.54 of the Dutch Income Tax Act (ITA) provides that, in situations where the sale price of the asset exceeds the book value of that asset, the difference may be allocated to a reserve (reinvestment reserve). This reserve may only continue to exist as long as the intention to replace the disposed asset exists, subject to conditions.

(c) Decision. The Court of Appeal held that the amounts placed in the reserve were taxable in 2001, because from the tax return it followed that the replacement intention no longer existed.

In addition, the Court held that it is not incompatible with the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) that sale profits are taxed in a later year than that in which those were realised.

Furthermore, the Court held that as long as the replacement reserve was kept, the Taxpayer was still deriving profits from business activities in the Netherlands.

Finally, due the fact that under the Luxembourg – Netherlands Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1968) (as amended through 1990) the taxing rights with respect to immovable property are allocated to the situs state (the Netherlands), the Court decided that the Netherlands is authorised to tax the replacement reserve after the company no longer intended to replace the buildings.

2. United States; United Kingdom: Tax benefits from structured financial transaction denied for lack of economic substance

The US Tax Court has disallowed foreign tax credits (FTCs), expense deductions, and foreignsource income treatment from a structured financial transaction based on the economic substance doctrine. (Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, as Successor in Interest to The Bank of New York Company, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 2, Docket No. 26683-09 (11 February 2013)).

The case involved a US banking company (BNY) and its affiliated group that entered into a complex series of transactions, referred to as the Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities transaction (the STARS transaction), with a financial services company headquartered in the United Kingdom (Barclays). The STARS transaction was developed by an international accounting firm.

To carry out the STARS transaction, BNY first created a structure, referred to as the STARS structure, by using BNY’s existing subsidiary (REIT Holdings), and organising and funding special purpose entities (InvestCo, DelCo, and BNY STARS Trust). Through the STARS structure, BNY shifted the BNY group’s existing assets, referred to as the STARS assets, to DelCo and the trust.

Since a UK entity became the trustee for the trust, replacing BNY, the income arising from the trust assets were subject to a 22% UK income tax. Members of the STARS structure entered into a series of stripping transactions aimed to accelerate the UK taxes due on the trust income.

In addition, BNY and Barclays entered into a series of agreements and transactions, referred to as the STARS loan, including subscription agreements, forward sale agreements, a zero-coupon swap, a credit default swap, and security arrangements. The net effect of such transactions was to create a secured loan from Barclays.

On its US consolidated return, BNY reported the income from the STARS assets as foreign-source income. BNY also claimed FTCs of approximately $200 million for the UK taxes paid on the trust income. BNY further claimed deductions for interest, fees and transactions costs related to the STARS transaction.

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reclassified the income as US-source income, and disallowed the FTCs and the deductions on the basis that the STARS transaction lacked economic substance.

The US Tax Court, in applying the economic substance doctrine to the present case, followed the law of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which an appeal of the present case would be heard.

The US Tax Court stated that, in analysing the economic substance of a transaction, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluates both the objective prong of the test (i.e. whether a transaction created a reasonable opportunity for economic profit exclusive of tax benefits) and the subjective prong of the test (i.e. whether a taxpayer had a legitimate non-tax business purpose) as factors to consider in an overall inquiry, rather than as discreet prongs of a “rigid two-step analysis”, i.e. a finding of a lack of either economic profits or a non-tax business purpose can be but is not necessarily sufficient for a court to conclude that a transaction is invalid.

As the first step in the inquiry, the US Tax Court bifurcated the STARS transaction and decided to focus on the STARS structure. The US Tax Court explained that the disputed FTCs were generated by circulating income through the STARS structure, and that the STARS loan was not necessary for the STARS structure to produce the FTCs. The US Tax Court held that the STARS structure lacked objective economic substance because it did not increase the profitability of the STARS assets, and, to the contrary, it reduced their profitability by adding substantial transactional costs, e.g. professional service fees and foreign taxes.

The US Tax Court found that the STARS assets would have generated the same income regardless of being transferred to the trust because the main activity of the STARS structure was to circulate income between itself and Barclays, the net result of which was effectively nothing, and because BNY continued to manage and control the STARS assets after the transfer of the assets to the STARS structure.

The US Tax Court further held that the STARS structure lacked subjective economic substance, rejecting BNY’s claim that the STARS structure was used to obtain a low-cost loan from Barclays. The US Tax Court held that BNY’s true motivation was tax avoidance based on its findings that the STARS structure did not bear any reasonable relationship to the loan in terms of banking, commercial, or business functions, and that the STARS loan was not low cost and instead was significantly overpriced and required BNY to incur substantially more transaction costs than a similar loan available in the marketplace.

Then, the US Tax Court held that, considering the above-mentioned findings, the STARS transaction would still lack economic substance even if the STARS structure and the loan were evaluated as an integrated transaction. The US Tax Court stated that any income from investing the loan proceeds was not income arising from the integrated STARS transaction, but rather from a separate and distinct transaction, and therefore any such income, and BNY’s expectation of such income, should be excluded from the economic substance analysis.

The US Tax Court determined that the STARS transaction should be disregarded for US tax purposes because it lacked economic substance. Accordingly, the US Tax Court denied the claimed FTCs for the UK taxes paid on trust income, as well as the deductions for the expenses related to the STARS transaction, including the UK taxes for which FTCs were denied.

In addition, the US Tax Court rejected BNY’s argument that the US Congress intended to provide the FTC for transactions like STARS. The US Tax Court stated that Congress enacted the FTC to alleviate double taxation arising from foreign business operations. The US Tax Court held that the UK taxes at issue did not arise from any substantive foreign activity, but instead were produced through prearranged circular flows from assets held, controlled, and managed within the United States.

The US Tax Court also rejected BNY’s position that the income from the trust is treated as foreign-source income under a “resourcing” provision in article 23(3) of the former US-UK treaty (1975). The US Tax Court held that the income should be treated as being derived by BNY within the United States, and thus the US-UK treaty was not applicable.

In the present case, the US Tax Court considered the foreign taxes paid in furtherance of the invalidated transaction as expenses in calculating the pre -tax profits of the transaction. The US Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held to the contrary in IES Industries Inc. vs. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001) and Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (see United States-1, News 14 January 2002).

The present case concerned the 2001 and 2002 taxable years, and thus predated the codification of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 as section 7701(o) of the US Internal Revenue Code (see United States-1, News 15 September 2010). As a result, section 7701(o) was not directly ap-plied by the US Tax Court, although the court did note that the legislative history to section 7701(o) supported the bifurcation approach used in the court’s analysis.


3.    Canada; Bahamas: Canadian Federal Court up-holds requirement for information in transfer pricing case

The Canadian Federal Court gave its decision on 20th March 2013 on the Applicant’s motion in the case of Soft-Moc Inc. vs. The Minister of National Revenue. The application was for judicial review of a decision of the tax authorities to issue a Foreign-Based Information Requirement (Requirement) requiring the Applicant to obtain and provide to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) certain foreign-based information and documents sought by the tax authorities in order to, inter alia, determine whether or not consideration paid to four corporations located in the Bahamas that are wholly owned by the 90% shareholder of the Applicant was at arm’s length.

The Applicant’s motion argued that the Requirement should be set aside on account of being unreasonable on the basis that:

(1)    it is overly broad in scope;
(2)    it requires the production of information and documents that are not relevant to the administration and enforcement of the Income Tax Act; and
(3)    it requests certain information that cannot be obtained or provided by the Applicant because such information is confidential and proprietary, non-existent, or otherwise unavailable. In the alternative, the Applicant sought to revise the Requirement to delete certain questions.

The Federal Court of Canada dismissed the motion. It found, inter alia, that:

(1) the information was not overly broad. It accepted the evidence of the tax authorities that the information was necessary to conduct the transfer pricing audit. In particular, it was necessary to determine whether certain services were performed in the Bahamas or Canada and, if in the Bahamas, how the services were provided, and to determine the appropriate transfer pricing methodology to be applied so that the Minister could ascertain whether the transfer price paid was an arm’s-length transfer price;

(2)    the information is relevant. S/s. 231.6 of the Income Tax Act makes it clear that “foreign-based information or document” means any information or document that is available, or located outside of Canada and that “may be relevant” to the administration or enforcement of the Act, including the collection of any amount payable under the act by any person. The case law provides that the threshold for the tax authorities to overcome is fairly low and their powers broad. Further, there is no evidence that the Requirement captured irrelevant business dealings of the four companies in the Bahamas; and

(3)    there was no evidence the information was confidential, proprietary or sensitive. The Court, in particular, rejected the Applicant’s argument that the information could not be disclosed because the four companies in the Bahamas were refusing to provide the information. Since the majority shareholder of the Applicant owned the other four companies this was tantamount to the shareholder of the Applicant refusing to provide the information. Further, there was no evidence that providing the information would require extensive effort or destroy its value.

4.    Belgium; United States: 1970 Treaty between Belgium and US – Belgian Supreme Court decides that reduction of tax credit for foreign interest by multiplication with a debt financing coefficient is compatible with treaty

On 15th March 2013, the Belgian Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie) decided two cases (recently published) on the avoidance of double taxation on interest under the former Belgium-United States Income Tax Treaty (1970) (as amended through 1987). Details of the case are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. Belgian companies received interest from US companies under the 1970 treaty with the United States. The receiving Belgian companies had debts. Therefore, the amount of the fixed credit for the withholding tax on interest was reduced as it was multiplied with a debt financing coefficient

(see below).

(b)    Legal background.

Domestic law

For foreign interest a fixed tax credit corresponding to the actual amount of the foreign tax paid is granted, with a maximum of 15%.

The amount of the credit calculated must be multiplied by a debt financing coefficient, i.e. a coefficient which takes into account the amount of interest charges incurred by the company in proportion to the total income received.

Therefore, the credit must be multiplied by the following fraction (article 287 of the ITC):

– the numerator is the total income (including the gross business income) less capital gains minus the difference between the income from movable property and capital less distributed dividends; and
– the denominator of the fraction is equal to the total income (including the gross business income) less capital gains.

An example to clarify:
Assume that (in EUR):
–  total income: 5,000;
–  capital gains: 500;
– financial charges relating to foreign-source interest: 250;
–  foreign-source interest: 500; and
–  foreign tax at source (10%): 50.

The foreign tax credit is calculated as follows:

–    first step: actual foreign tax credit

(foreign-source interest minus foreign tax at source x foreign withholding tax rate at source with a fixed maximum of 15%)/(100 minus foreign withholding tax rate with a maximum of 15%)

The amount under the first step is, therefore:

(500 – 50) x 10/(100 – 10) = 50.
–    second step: debt financing coefficient

(total income minus capital gains) minus financial charges relating to foreign -source interest/(total income minus capital gains)

The debt financing coefficient under the second step is, therefore:

((5,000 – 500) – 250)/(5,000 – 500) = 4,250/4,500 = 0.944.

The foreign tax credit would then be 50 x 0.944 = 47.2.

Situation under tax treaties

Most Belgian tax treaties provide for a credit in accordance with the rules under Belgian domestic law. Some treaties, like the former 1970 treaty with the United States, provide that later changes to the domestic method on the avoidance of double taxation are only taken into account to the extent that those do not amend the principles of the tax credit.

(c)    Issue. The issue was whether the restriction of the fixed foreign tax credit by the multiplication with a debt financing coefficient is compatible with the treaty.

(d)    Decision. The Court rejected the companies’ argument that the debt financing coefficient is incompatible with the principles behind the fixed foreign tax credit. The companies based this argument on the fact that, due to multiplication with such coefficient, the credit varies per taxpayer and per assessment year. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the debt financing coef-ficient should not take all debts of the company into account but only the debt financing of the interest-bearing debt claim.

The Court followed the argument of the government that the introduced debt coefficient system constitutes an amendment of the credit calculation, which does not deprive the credit from its fixed character because it is determined by a fixed formula and set parameters.

Consequently, the Court held that the restriction of the fixed foreign tax credit by means of a debt financing coefficient is compatible with the former tax treaty with the United States.

5.    Finland; United States: Finnish Supreme Administrative Court rules on tax liability of beneficiary in a US discretionary trust – details

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 27 March 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:51. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. Taxpayer A (A), who resided in Finland, was a beneficiary in a trust which was originally set up in the United States by his grandmother (the Settlor). After the Settlor died, the trust was sub-divided per capita among six beneficiaries including A’s father (i.e. 1/6). After A’s father died, the sub-trust was further sub-divided per stirpes (i.e. 1/6 x 1/3) among three beneficiaries including A. Under the trust rules, the trustee, who was a US bank, was entitled to decide on whether, when and how much to distribute funds from the trust to the beneficiaries (i.e. discretionary trust).

A applied for an advance ruling from the tax administration on various aspects of the tax treatment of the income he would receive from the trust. The tax authorities took the view that setting up a trust meant transferring assets inter vivos without consideration to the beneficiaries and hence would be regarded as a gift for tax purposes. They, however, refused to give any advance ruling in the case due to the fact that the gift had already been received at the moment the trustee had received information on the death of A’s father in 1988.

(b)    Legal background. Finnish law does not entail the concept of trust but the tax authorities have issued guidance on the tax treatment of trusts. Under the Inheritance and Gift Tax Law (the Law), the liability to pay gift tax is when the donee receives the gift.

(c)    Issue. The issue is when a beneficiary in a discretionary trust receives the trust assets and consequently becomes liable to gift tax.

(d)    Decision. The Court ruled that the tax liability of a beneficiary in a discretionary trust begins only after the beneficiary acquires the ownership to the trust funds and has the assets at his disposal. The Court emphasised that under the trust deed the trustee had the sole discretion over which assets, if any, would be distributed to the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were not the legal owners of the trust assets and did not have any powers to decide on the distribution of the assets. As A’s father was not under US law regarded as the legal owner of the trust assets, he could neither have donated the trust assets nor those assets would belong to his estate after his death. Hence, A had not received a gift within the meaning of the Law and the tax authorities did not have a right to refuse to give an advance ruling. The case was referred back to the tax administration.

6.    United States; Switzerland: Treaty between US and Switzerland – image right payments are exempt from US tax as royalties

The US Tax Court held that the compensation paid to a Swiss resident for use of his image rights in the United States is royalty income that is not taxable in the United States under the US-Switzerland treaty (Sergio Garcia vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 6, Docket No. 13649-10 (14 March 2013)). The US Tax Court also determined the proper allocation of income received under the endorsement contract between the image rights and the personal services that were required to be performed.

The petitioner in the present case was a world-renowned professional golfer, who was a Span-ish citizen but was a resident of Switzerland for the purpose of the 1996 US-Switzerland treaty (the Treaty). The petitioner entered into an endorsement agreement with a US company, TaylorMade Golf Co. (TaylorMade) to allow TaylorMade to use the petitioner’s image rights (i.e. his image, likeness, signature, voice, etc.) in promoting TaylorMade’s golf products worldwide.

The petitioner also agreed to perform personal services, including using TaylorMade’s certain products both on and off the golf course, playing in golf events, testing TaylorMade’s products, and making personal appearances. The relevant endorsement agreement included a provision assigning 85% of the endorsement fees to the use of the petitioner’s image rights and 15% of the fees to his personal services.

The petitioner then sold his image rights licensed by TaylorMade for use in the United States to a Swiss company, which in return assigned the US image rights to a US company. Both companies were established, and more than 99% owned, by the petitioner.

The petitioner filed his IRS Forms 1040-NR (US Nonresident Alien Income Tax Return) and reported a portion of the personal service payments as his US source income effectively connected with a US trade or business. However, he did not report any of the image right pay-ments. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued the petitioner a notice of deficiency.

The US Tax Court first discussed (part II of the opinion) the question of allocating the endorsement fees between payments for image rights and payments for personal services, and determined that 65% of the remuneration should be allocated to the use of the image rights and 35% of the remuneration should be allocated to the personal service. The US Tax Court analysed and compared other endorsement contracts by professional athletes, and stated that the allocation was made in the present case considering all the facts and circumstances.

The US Tax Court then held (part III of the opinion) that the petitioner’s image rights are a separate intangible that generated royalties, as defined by article 12(2) of the Treaty. Article 12(1) of the Treaty grants a right to tax royalties exclusively to a state of the beneficial owner’s residence. Therefore, the US Tax Court concluded that the compensation for use of the petitioner’s US image rights was not taxable to the petitioner in the United States, even if the compensation were income to the petitioner, rather than to the Swiss company owned by him.

In reaching this conclusion, the US Tax Court rejected the IRS’s argument that the petitioner’s image right payments are governed by article 17 of the Treaty (Artistes and Sportsmen), which allows income derived by entertainers or sportsmen to be taxed in the contracting state in which they perform their personal activities.

The US Tax Court relied on the US Technical Explanation to article 17, which assigns income to article 17 or to another article of the Treaty, in this case article 12, based on whether the income is “predominantly attributable” to the services or to other activities or property rights. The US Tax Court determined that the income from the image rights was not predominantly attributable to the petitioner’s performance as a professional golfer in the United States and therefore properly dealt with under article 12.

The US Tax Court noted that, because the parties agreed that the remuneration for the use of the petitioner’s image rights outside the United States is not taxable in the United States, this issue did not need to be discussed.

The US Tax Court further held that the petitioner was liable for US tax on all of his US source personal service income. The US Tax Court declined to consider the petitioner’s claim that his income for personal services, other than wearing TaylorMade products while golfing, might not be taxable in the United States under the Treaty. The US Tax Court explained that, because the petitioner raised this issue for the first time in his post-trial opening brief, it was prejudicial to the IRS and thus was too late.

Accordingly, the US Tax Court determined that none of the petitioner’s royalty income is taxable to the petitioner in the United States, but that all of his US source personal service compensation is taxable to the petitioner in the United States.

7.    United States: US Court of Appeals disallows favourable dividend treatment for Subpart F income

The US Tax Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-cuit has held that taxpayers’ Subpart F income attributable to earnings of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) invested in US property should be taxed as ordinary income, rather than as qualified dividend income eligible for reduced rates of taxation (Osvaldo Rodriguez and Ana M. Rodriguez vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 12-60533, 5 July 2013)

The taxpayers were Mexican citizens and permanent residents of the United States (i.e. green card holders) who owned all of the stock of a CFC incorporated in Mexico.

The taxpayers included earnings of the CFC that were invested in US property as part of their US gross income as required by IRC sections 951 and 956. IRC sections 951 and 956 are provisions of IRC Subpart F, which are intended to prevent CFC shareholders from deferring US tax obligations by keeping the CFC’s earnings abroad instead of repatriating such earnings through the payment of dividends. In particular, IRC section 956 treats earnings of a CFC that are invested in US property as if they had been repatriated to the United States, and therefore subjects US shareholders of the CFC to current taxation on such earnings.

The taxpayers took the position that the amounts included in income under IRC sections 951 and 956 (“section 951 inclusions”) constituted “qualified dividend income” under IRC section 1(h)(11) and thus were entitled to a lower tax rate (i.e. 15% for the taxpayers) than a tax rate applicable to ordinary income (i.e. 35% for the taxpayers).

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayers, based on its determination that section 951 inclusions should be taxed as ordinary income. After the US Tax Court ruled in favour of the IRS (see United States-1, News 14 December 2011), the taxpayers filed this appeal.

IRC section 1(h)(11)(B)(i)(II) defines qualified dividend income as including dividends received from qualified foreign corporations. IRC section 316(a) defines a dividend as any distribution of property made by a corporation to its share-holders, thus implying a change in the manner in which the property is owned, i.e. a change from ownership by the corporation to owner-ship by the shareholders.

The US Court of Appeals held that section 951 inclusions do not qualify as actual dividends because section 951 inclusions do not involve any transfer of ownership or any distribution to shareholders, and instead are calculated purely on the basis of CFC-owned US property and the CFC’s earnings, with the ownership of the property remaining in the hands of the corporation.

The taxpayers argued that they could have caused the CFC to make an actual dividend payment of the earnings, in which case the dividend would have unquestionably been treated as qualified dividend income eligible for the lower tax rate, a point that the IRS conceded. The US Court of Appeals rejected the taxpayers’ argument, however, on the basis that the taxpayers had effectively chosen to proceed as they did.

The US Court of Appeals further held that section 951 inclusions do not qualify as deemed dividends because, when Congress decides to treat certain inclusions as dividends, it explicitly states so, but Congress has not so designated the inclusions at issue in the present case.

Accordingly, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the US Tax Court that the taxpayer’s section 951 inclusions did not constitute qualified dividend income subject to a lower tax rate.

8.    Finland; Estonia: Finland’s Supreme Administrative Court rules on using location savings in TP cases

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 4th March 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:36. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. A Oyj, a company resident in Finland, had a fully owned subsidiary in Estonia, B AS, which operated as a contract manufacturer for A Oyj. The remuneration A Oyj paid to B AS was determined by using the Transactional Net Margin Method and included a cost-plus margin of 7.95% as established in a transfer pricing (TP) analysis. The cost-plus margin took into consideration all the costs of the manufacturing activities corrected by the location savings (i.e. savings obtained by locating activities to Estonia where the price level was lower than in Finland). In an ordinary assessment of A Oyj for the tax years 2004 and 2005, the tax authorities approved deductions only for the actual expenses of B AS added with a 7.95% cost-plus margin. A Oyj appealed and required that the location savings should also be taken into account when setting the correct price.

(b)    Issue. The issue was whether or not the location savings should be taken into account when setting the appropriate price between the Finnish A Oyj and its Estonian subsidiary.

(c)    Decision. A Oyj’s appeal was partly rejected. The Court emphasised that the location savings could not be considered in the pricing of the goods because the activities by B AS were not comparable to the activities previously performed by A Oyj. A Oyj’s activities had mainly been handcrafts made at home using simple tools, whereas the manufacturing in Estonia was suited for industrial production. Consequently, the location savings principle could not be applied as suggested by A Oyj. The Court, nevertheless, increased slightly the amount of acceptable deductions by A Oyj as it found the cost-margin of 7.95% low.

Furthermore, the Court made a reference to the law proposal text where it was stated that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have the status of an international standard in the field of TP and can thus be regarded as an important source when interpreting the arm’s length principle. The Court emphasised that although chapter 9 on TP issues in business restructurings was added to the OECD guidelines in 2010, it could still be used when interpreting a case regarding tax years 2004 and 2005 because it did not include fundamentally new interpretative recommendations for chapter 1, which was already in force in 2004.

9.    The Netherlands: Supreme Court: alienation costs for the sale of a substantial shareholding are not deductible

On 13th January 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV. vs. Staatssecretaris van Financiën (No. 12/01616, LJN:BY0612), which was recently published. The case concerned the deductibility of alienation expenses for the sale of a substantial shareholding. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. X BV (the Taxpayer), formed a fiscal unity with a 100%-owned subsidiary. On 21st November 2008, all shares of the subsidiary were sold and the fiscal unity was dissolved. The Taxpayer made costs for the sale of the subsidiary. Those costs were incurred after the signing of the letter of intent to sell the shares, but for the date of transfer of the shares by notarial deed.

The Taxpayer deducted those costs from its 2008 taxable profits. The tax inspector rejected the deduction of the costs due the application of the participation exemption of article 13(1) of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CITA).

(b)    Legal background. Article 13(1) CITA provides that costs from the acquisition and alienation of a participation in a resident or non-resident company are not deductible if the participation exemption applies. The participation exemption provides, under conditions, for an exemption of income and capital gains derived by corporate taxpayers from qualifying participations of at least 5% in the capital of the domestic or foreign subsidiary.

Under the fiscal unity regime of article 15 of the CITA, a parent company and its subsidiary are treated as one taxpayer for corporate income-tax purposes if the parent company owns a participation of at least 95% in the subsidiary. The main consequences include:

– the corporate income tax return is filed on a consolidated basis;

– losses of one company are set off against profits of another company of the fiscal unity; and

– assets, liabilities and dividend distributions can be transferred between companies of the fiscal unity without tax consequences.

The fiscal unity is (partially) dissolved after the sale of shares of a subsidiary. Article 14 of the Fiscal Unity Decree (the Decree), provides that the sale is deemed to take place after the dissolution of the fiscal unity. This means that the companies concerned are again treated as separate entities, as a result of which the participation exemption applies to the case at hand because the conditions were met.

(c)    Decision. The Court confirmed the decision of District Court Breda that the costs are not deductible. The Court held decisive that costs made for the sale of participation are not deductible under the participation exemption. Due to the fact that, based on article 14 of the Decree, the sale is deemed to take place after the termination of the fiscal unity, the participation exemption applied in the case at hand.

Therefore, the Court held that the alienation costs were not deductible. The Court held irrelevant that costs were already made when the fiscal unity still existed because of the direct link between the costs and the sale.

In addition, the Court considered that the legislator could not have intended that those costs are deductible.

In this context, the Court confirmed the decision of the District Court that alienation costs related to participation must be treated the same as acquisition costs. Therefore, the Court decided that, based on earlier case law, the Taxpayer’s view cannot be upheld because it would mean that costs from the alienation of the subsidiary which was part of a fiscal unity would be differently treated than costs made for the acquisition of the subsidiary, which afterwards is included in a fiscal unity.

Note. The outcome of the decision seems logical because otherwise a mismatch would arise. This is because the costs would then be deductible while the sale proceeds are exempt under the participation exemption.

[Acknowledgement/Source: We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period 18-03-2013 to 16-07-2013.]

2013 (31) STR 480 (Tri.-Del.) Rambagh Palace Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur

fiogf49gjkf0d
Valuation – Rules of classification- Mandap Keeper service – room charges of hotel accommodation service not to be included – Hotel accommodation and Mandap Keeper are distinct services.

Facts:
The Appellants provided mandap keeper’s services and convention services and discharged service tax on banquet charges, banquet sundries and banquet food. The Appellants, however, did not discharge service tax on the value of room charges booked by them for the purpose of marriage, conference, meetings etc. The department contended to include such room charges in the value of mandap keeper services.

Held:
Relying on the decision of Merwara Estates vs. C.C.E., Jaipur 2009 (16) STR 268 (Tri.-Del.), the Hon. Tribunal held that renting of hotel rooms cannot be held to be covered under the definition of mandap keeper services especially when the hotel has an identity, responsibility and function distinguishable from the mandap. The Tribunal further observed that the activity of giving hotel rooms on rent to customers, who might organise functions in the hotel, was different from that of the activity of a mandap keeper and that the definition of mandap keeper did not cover temporary accommodation of hotel rooms or boarding or temporary residence. Further, the functions were also not held in hotel rooms which were used for stay.

levitra

2013 (31) STR 472 (Tri-Del.) Commissioner of C. Ex., Indore vs. Spendex Industries Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
GTA services – payment of service tax through CENVAT Credit – Held, permissible in law.

Facts: The Respondents received GTA services and paid service tax under reverse charge mechanism by utilising CENVAT credit which the department disallowed.

The revenue contended that since the services were not output services, the Respondents were not entitled to use CENVAT credit for payment of tax.

The Respondents contended that inasmuch as they were liable to pay tax in respect of GTA services received by them, they were required to be treated as provider of taxable services in terms of the relevant rules. They further relied upon the Delhi Tribunal’s divisional bench decision in case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur 2011 (24) STR 670 (Tri.-Del.) and Delhi Tribunal’s decision in case of Dhillon Kool Drinks & Beverages Ltd. 2011 (263) ELT 241 (Tri.-Del.) relating to a similar case.

Held:
Relying on the divisional bench decision in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. (Supra), it was held that the recipient of services from GTA i.e. the Respondents were liable to pay service tax and were deemed to be service providers in view of Rule 2(r) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and therefore, were covered under Rule 2(p) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and, thus, the Respondents were eligible to utilise CENVAT credit to pay off service tax liability.

levitra

[2012] 137 ITD 318 (Chennai) Shri Rengalatchumi Education Trust vs. ITO (OSD) Exemptions A.Y. 2004-05 to 2007-08 Dated 25th March, 2011

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sections 32 and 11 – Assessee entitled to depreciation on capital asset even if cost of acquisition of such asset was earlier allowed as application of income while computing income u/s. 11

Facts:
Assessee trust claimed depreciation while computing its income for the respective assessment years. The Ld. AO held that as the cost of addition to asset was claimed by the assessee as application of income for the respective assessment years, assessee could not further claim depreciation on the very same assets and hence disallowed the claim of depreciation.

Held:
For the purpose of determining the income of trust eligible for exemption u/s. 11, income should be construed strictly in commercial sense (i.e., normal accounting principles), without reference to the heads of income specified in section 14. The income to be considered is the book income and not the total income as defined in section 2(45). The concept of commercial income necessarily envisages deduction of depreciation on the assets of the trust. This position is as confirmed by the CBDT vide its circular No.5-P (LXX-6), dated 19-6-1968. Normal accounting principles clearly provide for deducting depreciation to arrive at income. Income so arrived at (after deducting depreciation) is to be applied for charitable purpose. Capital expense is application of income so determined. Hence, there is no double deduction or double claim of the same amount as application. Thus, depreciation is to be deducted to arrive at income and it is not application of income.

Note:
1. Supreme Court decision in case of Escorts Ltd. vs. Union of India [1993]199 ITR 43 was distinguished
2. Readers may also refer two decisions of Hon’ble Bombay High Court viz.
• DIT (Exemption) vs. Framjee Cawasjee Institute [1993] 109 CTR 463 and
• CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection (IBPS) [2003] 264 ITR 110

levitra

2013 (31) STR 367 (Tri.-Delhi) Jindal Vegetable Products Ltd. vs. CCE Meerut–II

fiogf49gjkf0d
Penalty u/s. 78 – retrospective amendment settled the issue – extended period cannot be invoked.

Facts:
The Appellant did not pay tax under the category “Renting of Immovable Property Services” for the period 2007-08 and 2008-09 against which a show cause notice was issued in 2010 (after retrospective amendment) invoking extended period and imposing penalties u/s. 76 and u/s. 78 on the pretext of fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Continental Foundation Jt. Venture 2007 (216) ELT 177 held that, where there were doubts regarding the interpretation of provisions of law during the period of dispute, extended period cannot be invoked.

levitra

Income : Excess cash received at cash counters of bank : Liable to be repaid to the real owner : Not income of assessee.

New Page 2

6 Income : Excess cash
received at cash counters of bank : Liable to be repaid to the real owner : Not
income of assessee.


[CIT v. Bank of Rajasthan
Ltd.,
326 ITR 526 (Bom.)]

The assessee-bank claimed
that the excess cash received at the cash counter is liable to be repaid to the
real owner and therefore it cannot be treated as income of the assessee. The
Assessing Officer did not accept this contention and treated the excess cash as
income of the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal
held that the liability on account of excess cash received at the cash counters
of the bank represents the liability to pay the customers as and when they may
demand payment. The Tribunal, therefore held that it can not be considered as
income of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Before the Tribunal
reliance was placed on the cash manual of the assessee which provides that the
bank has to make a record of the excess cash, this has to be considered as
liability of the bank and the collection is required to be handed back to the
real owner in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

(ii) The reasoning of the
Tribunal has not been demonstrated to suffer from any perversity.

(iii) The question raised
does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

levitra

Income : Accrual of : Amount due to assessee in terms of royalty agreement : Dispute between parties and arbitration proceedings pending : No accrual of income : Assessment only on completion of arbitration proceedings.

New Page 2

5 Income : Accrual of :
Amount due to assessee in terms of royalty agreement : Dispute between parties
and arbitration proceedings pending : No accrual of income : Assessment only on
completion of arbitration proceedings.


[FGP Ltd. v. CIT, 326
ITR 444 (Bom.)]

The assessee had a royalty
agreement with one M/s. UPT, under which certain amounts were payable to the
assessee. The assessee company had not received any amount as UPT had denied
that any amount was due and payable by it to the assessee-company and
arbitration proceedings were pending. The Assessing Officer added the amount to
the total income of the assessee holding that the income has accrued. The
Tribunal upheld the addition.

On appeal by the assessee,
the Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The real income of
the assessee can be assessed and the test before the income can be taxed is
whether there is real accrual of income.

(ii) There was no real
accrual of income. There was dispute between the parties which was pending in
arbitration during the assessment year. The income received by the assessee
would be liable to be assessed only after passing of an award.”

levitra

Charitable purpose : Registration u/s.12A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Rejection on the ground that amended deed not produced : Amended deed is not a pre-requisite condition : Matter remanded.

New Page 2

4 Charitable purpose :
Registration u/s.12A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Rejection on the ground that
amended deed not produced : Amended deed is not a pre-requisite condition :
Matter remanded.


[CIT v. R. M. S. Trust,
326 ITR 310 (Mad.)]

The assessee, a charitable
trust, came into existence on December 1, 1995. On 10-3-2006 the assessee-trust
filed application for registration u/s.12A. The application was belated by more
than 10 years for which condonation petition was filed stating that the delay
was due to ignorance of law. The Commissioner of Income-tax noticed that the
requisite clause indicating that any amendment to the trust deed would be
carried out after obtaining approval from the Commissioner of Income-tax, has
not been incorporated, and on that ground directed the assessee-trust to file an
amended deed duly registered along with notes on the activities of the trust
with regard to various expenses debited in the income and expenditure account.
The assessee did not respond to the letter. Therefore, the Commissioner held
that the assessee-trust was not entitled to registration u/s.12AA and exemption
u/s.80G(vi) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The amended trust
deed is not a pre-requisite as required by the Commissioner and it is also not
a pre-requisite condition for registering the applicant as a trust as per the
provisions of the Act. The requisition made by the Commissioner is an
extra-statutory requisition.

(ii) Hence, the Tribunal,
by reason of the impugned order, had set aside the rejection made by the
Commissioner and remitted to decide the issue afresh after affording a
reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(iii) We do not find any
reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal.”

levitra

Charitable or religious trust : Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Additional condition by way of Explanation to S. 11(2) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2003 is to apply only to accumulations in excess of 15% u/s. 11(2) and not to accumulation

New Page 2

3 Charitable or religious
trust : Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Additional
condition by way of Explanation to S. 11(2) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2003 is to apply
only to accumulations in excess of 15% u/s. 11(2) and not to accumulations up to
15% u/s.11(1)(a).


[DIT Exemption v. Bagri
Foundation,
192 Taxman 309 (Del.)]

The assessee was a trust
duly registered u/s.12AA and duly recognised u/s.80G(5)(vi) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. For the relevant year, i.e., A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee had
shown certain gross income and deducted therefrom the amount applied for
charitable purposes by way of donation to another charitable trust, BLB, as
corpus donation and to others. The source of the amount over and above the
income of the year was the accumulation of income of the past. The AO added the
amount of donations to the income of the assessee, holding that owing to the
Explanation appended to S. 11(2) with effect from the A.Y. 2003-04, any donation
made out of income accumulated or set apart during the period of accumulation or
thereafter to any trust or institution registered u/s.12AA was liable to be
added in the income of the donor-trust. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
deleted the addition holding the donation by the assessee to BLB trust was made
out of excess of income over expenditure and not out of amount accumulated
u/s.11(1)(a). The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It is clear from S.
11(1)(a) that the income applied for charitable purposes is not to be included
in the total income for the relevant year. In CIT v. Shri Ram Memorial
Foundation,
(2004) 269 ITR 35/140 Taxman 263 (Delhi), the Court has held
that when a donor-trust, which is itself a charitable and religious trust,
donates its income to another trust, the provisions of S. 11(1)(a) can be said
to have been met by such donor-trust and the donor-trust can be said to have
applied its income for religious and charitable purposes, notwithstanding the
fact that the donation is subject to a condition that the donee-trust will
treat the donation as towards its corpus and can only utilise the accruing
income from the donated corpus for religious and charitable purposes.

(ii) Explanation to S.
11(2) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2003, provides that the amount accumulated cannot be
donated to another trust. The Explanation to S. 11(2) is nothing but an
additional condition attached to accumulation in excess of 15% permitted
u/s.11(2). It cannot be held as a condition on accumulation up to 15% as
provided for in S. 11(1)(a) also. There is no rational classification for
imposing the restriction as contained in the Explanation to the accumulation
up to 15% also when there is no such restriction to donating the entire income
of a year to another charitable trust.

(iii) If the Legislature
intended to completely ban/discourage inter se donation between trusts,
it would have changed the position as existing in law, as noticed in the case
of Shri Ram Memorial Foundation (supra). The Legislature did not do so.

(iv) Even after the
insertion of the Explanation, if a trust donates its entire income for a year
to another charitable trust, it would still be entitled to exemption
u/s.11(1)(a). It defies logic as to why such donations cannot be permitted out
of 15% accumulation permitted u/s.11(1)(a) itself.

(v) There is, however,
rationale for imposing the restriction as contained in the Explanation to
accumulations in excess of 15%. Such accumulations, but for the conditions
imposed in S. 11(2) and in the Explanation aforesaid, would have been liable
to be taxed. One of the conditions in S. 11(2)(a) is the purpose for which
accumulation in excess of 15% being made is to be notified; another condition
is of the accumulation being permitted for a period not exceeding 5 years; yet
another condition is as to the modes in which the accumulation can be
invested. There are no such restrictions on accumulation u/s.11(1)(a).

(vi) The scheme of the
Section indicates that the additional condition by way of the aforesaid
Explanation is intended to apply only to accumulations in excess of 15%
u/s.11(2) and not to accumulations up to 15% u/s.11(1)(a). The Explanation is
not found to be intended to take away something from the accumulation up to
15% permitted without any condition whatsoever u/s.11(1)(a).

(vii) It also followed
that even if the donations by the assessee were to be out of accumulations
from previous years and not out of surplus reserves, the same would still not
be liable to be included in the total income as assessed by the Assessing
Officer and the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal would
still be upheld. It was nobody’s case that the said accumulations were beyond
the accumulation of 15% permitted in S. 11(1)(a).”

levitra

Charitable purpose : Exemption u/s.11 : S. 11, S. 12A and S. 13(1)(d) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Interest-free loan by assessee-society to another society : Loan neither ‘investment’, nor ‘deposit’ : Both societies having similar objects, re

New Page 2

2 Charitable purpose :
Exemption u/s.11 : S. 11, S. 12A and S. 13(1)(d) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
2005-06 : Interest-free loan by assessee-society to another society : Loan
neither ‘investment’, nor ‘deposit’ : Both societies having similar objects,
registered u/s.12A and approved u/s.80G : Loan later repaid : Assessee entitled
to exemption u/s.11.


[DIT (Exemption) v. Acme
Educational Society,
(Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2005-06, the
Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee-society for exemption
u/s.11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee-society had
given a loan of Rs.90,50,000 to another educational society, whose president was
the brother of the president of the assessee-society. The Assessing Officer held
that there was a violation of S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 11(5) of the Act. The
Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim and held that there was no
violation of S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 11(5) of the Act, as both societies had
similar objects and that the Assessing Officer had not brought anything on
record to show that the advance of Rs.90,50,000 was a ‘deposit’ or ‘investment’.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) The interest-free
loan of Rs.90,50,000 given by the assessee-society to another society did
not violate S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 11(5) of the Act, as the loan was
neither an ‘investment’, nor a ‘deposit’. Moreover both societies had
similar objects and were registered u/s.12A of the Act and had approvals
u/s.80G.

(ii) The fact that the
loan was interest-free and had been subsequently returned was also
significant.”



levitra

Appellate Tribunal : Rectification u/s.254(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Appellate order u/s.254(1) gets merged in rectification order only on issues raised in rectification application and not on other issues decided by Tribunal in appeal,

New Page 2

1 Appellate Tribunal :
Rectification u/s.254(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Appellate
order u/s.254(1) gets merged in rectification order only on issues raised in
rectification application and not on other issues decided by Tribunal in appeal,
Appellate order u/s.254(1) survives and is available for rectification again on
any other issue on an application filed by either of parties : Once
rectification application filed by one of parties is considered and decided by
Tribunal rightly or wrongly, another rectification application on same issue is
not maintainable.


[CIT v. Aiswarya Trading
Co.,
192 Taxman 385 (Ker.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, while
deciding the appeal, the Tribunal did not consider one of the grounds raised by
the assessee pertaining to the levy of interest u/s.220(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. Therefore, the assessee filed rectification application before the
Tribunal to rectify the Appellate order, which was allowed by the Tribunal. The
Department thereafter filed a rectification application for rectifying the order
issued by the Tribunal in the assessee’s rectification application. The Tribunal
held that the Department’s rectification application was on the very same issue
agitated by the assessee in its rectification application and allowed by the
Tribunal and, therefore, it was not maintainable u/s.254(2).

On appeal, the Revenue
contended that by virtue of the merger of the rectification order in the
Appellate order, the application filed u/s.254(2) by the Revenue was still
maintainable.

The Kerala High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) The second
application on the very same issue is not maintainable before the Tribunal.
In fact, merger applies only on issues decided in rectification proceedings
and the Tribunal’s order issued u/s.254(1) will remain unaffected on all
matters other than those covered by the rectification order issued
u/s.254(2). In other words, even after the Tribunal rectifies the Appellate
order u/s.254(2) on any issue raised, still the original order can be
rectified on any other issue decided by the Tribunal.

(ii) However, if the
rectification application filed by one of the parties is allowed or rejected
by the Tribunal, the very same issue cannot be agitated in another
rectification application by the opposite party. If this is done and allowed
to be entertained by the Tribunal, then what happens is that the Tribunal
gets an opportunity to review its own order for which it has no powers under
the statute. Therefore, once the rectification application filed by one of
the parties is considered and decided by the Tribunal rightly or wrongly,
another rectification application on the same issue is not maintainable
against the order issued by the Tribunal u/s.254(2).

(iii) In the instant
case, the question of liability for interest payable by the assessee u/s.
220(2) rightly or wrongly was decided by the Tribunal in the rectification
application filed by the assessee in its favour and, therefore, the
Department could not seek to rectify the very same order again u/s.254(2) by
filing another application.

(iv) Consequently, the
order of the Tribunal was to be upheld.”



levitra

Valuation of closing stock : Change in method of valuation as per AS 2 : Resultant variation in income : Not taxable.

New Page 2

11 Valuation of closing stock : A.Y.
2001-02 : Change in the method of valuation as per Accounting Standard 2, which
is mandatory : Resultant variation in income : Not taxable.


[CIT v. George Oakes Ltd., 303 ITR 357 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the Assessing Officer made an addition
representing the reduction of profit due to change in the method of valuing the
closing stock. In the relevant year the closing stock was valued in accordance
with the Accounting Standard 2, which is mandatory. The Tribunal deleted the
addition on the ground that that the change of accounting method was bona
fide
.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) When the change of accounting method is bona fide
and is recognised in accounting principles, the resultant variation in income
cannot be forced to be taxed upon the assessee.

(ii) Being compulsory, the company had adopted the
Accounting Standard (AS-2) as per the guidelines prescribed by the ICAI. There
was a specific finding that the assessee valued its opening stock in one way
and the closing stock in another method, during the relevant year when the
Accounting Standard (AS-2) had come into effect in the earlier year. The
change in the accounting method had not been found to have been made with a
mala fide
intention. Such a change in the method of accounting was bona
fide
and was made mandatory by the ICAI to be followed in the preparation
of financial accounts. Under such circumstances, in the year of change, some
discrepancy was bound to happen in the profitability of the company as
compared to the previous year. However, in succeeding years, there would not
be any discrepancy on this account.

(iii) The reasons given by the Tribunal were based on valid materials and evidence, and did not warrant any interference.”

levitra

TDS : Works contract : S. 194C : Purchase of packing material carrying printed work : Essentially a sale/purchase : Not a works contract : Purchaser not liable to deduct tax at source.

New Page 2

10 TDS : Works contract : S. 194C of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Purchase of packing material carrying
printed work : Essentially a sale/purchase : Not a works contract : Purchaser
not liable to deduct tax at source.


[CIT v. Dy. Chief Accounts Officer, Markfed, Khanna,
304 ITR 17 (P&H)]

The assessee had purchased printed packing material, but did
not deduct tax at source on the payment therefor. The Assessing Officer was of
the view that the transaction was a works contract. Therefore, he levied penalty
and interest for not deducting tax at source u/s.194C of the Income-tax Act,
1961. The Tribunal deleted the penalty and the interest.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There was no dispute that the main purpose of the
assessee in buying packing material was to obtain goods for the purpose of
packing its finished products. The factum of such packing material carrying
some printed work could only be regarded as the work executed by the supplier
incidental to the sale to the assessee. The fact of some printing being done
as a part of supply was of no consequence to the contract being essentially of
a sale of chattel. The predominant object underlying the contracts was
sale/purchase of goods and the only intention of the assessee was to buy
packing material.

(ii) Admittedly, the raw material for the manufacturing of
such packing material was not supplied by the assessee. Thus, it was a case of
sale and not a contract for carrying out any work.

(iii) The purchase of particular printed packing material
by the assessee was a contract for sale and outside the purview of S. 194C.”

 


levitra

Investment allowance : S. 32A : Dumpers, tippers and hydraulic excavators are construction equipment vehicles, not road transport vehicles : Eligible for investment allowance

New Page 2

8 Investment allowance : S. 32A of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1992-93 : Dumpers, tippers
and hydraulic excavators are construction equipment vehicles and not road
transport vehicles : Eligible for investment allowance.


[CIT v. Gotan Lime Stone Khanij Udyog, 170 Taxman
442 (Raj.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of running
hydraulic excavators and tippers for cement companies on hire basis by
realising rent for operation of the same. For the A.Ys. 1989-90, 1990-91 and
1992-93, its claim for investment allowance on the hydraulic excavators and
tippers was declined by the Assessing Officer on the ground that they were
road transport vehicles and, moreover, the same were not used by the assessee
for its own business. The Commissioner(A) and the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989, the dumpers,
tippers and hydraulic excavators are construction equipment vehicles within
the definition of Rule 2(ca) of the 1989 Rules and are non-transport
vehicles by virtue of Explanation attached to this definition, and cannot be
categorised as road transport vehicles for the purpose of entitlement of
investment allowance u/s.32A.

(ii) The construction equipment vehicles like dumpers,
tippers and hydraulic excavators are not road transport vehicles and profit
gained out of it by letting them out on hire basis to a cement producing
industrial undertaking could not debar them from claiming investment
allowance u/s.32A.”

Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) : Estimated addition : No evidence of concealment of income : Penalty could not be imposed

New Page 2

9 Penalty : Concealment of income : S.
271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1992-93 : Estimated addition : No
evidence of concealment of income : Penalty could not be imposed.


[CIT v. Sangrur Vanaspati Mills Ltd., 303 ITR 53
(P&H)]

For the A.Y. 1992-93, the assessee had filed return of
income disclosing income of Rs.65,18,970. The Assessing Officer rejected the
accounts, estimated the sales and made an addition of Rs.66,16,865. The
Assessing Officer also imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 for concealment of income. The Tribunal deleted the penalty on the ground
that there was no conclusive evidence that sales estimated by the Assessing
Officer were made outside the books of account.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
held that the Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty.

 


levitra

Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Separate accounts maintained for export sales and domestic sales : Deduction not to be on basis of total turnover of all business : Assessee entitled to deduction fully on export

New Page 2

6 Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Separate accounts maintained for export
sales and domestic sales : Deduction not to be on basis of total turnover of all
business : Assessee entitled to deduction fully on export profits.


[CIT v. M. Gani and Co., 301 ITR 381 (Mad.)]

The assessee was a manufacturer of garments and fancy items
and an exporter. For the A.Y. 2001-02 the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the export turnover ignoring the results of
domestic turnover. The Assessing Officer considered the composite turnover
comprised of both export turnover and domestic turnover and recomputed the
deduction u/s. 80HHC. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The assessee having maintained separate books of account
for export business and domestic business, it was entitled to deduction
u/s.80HHC of the Act fully on the export profit.”

 


levitra

Income : Dividend : In whose hands to be taxed : A sold shares to B : Change in ownership of shares not registered : Income from dividend assessable in the hands of A and not in the hands of B

New Page 2

7 Income : Dividend : In whose hands to be
taxed : A.Y. 1994-95 : A sold shares to B : Change in ownership of shares not
registered : Income from dividend assessable in the hands of A and not in the
hands of B.


[CIT v. Aatur Holdings P. Ltd., 302 ITR 92 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the Assessing Officer made an addition
to the total income of the assessee as dividend income. The CIT(A) found that
the shares were not registered in the name of the assessee and deleted the
addition holding that the dividend income had to be received by the registered
share holders only. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Merely because a person may have purchased or been in
receipt of shares, in the absence of the shares being registered in his name
in the books of account of the company, such a person is not entitled to
receive the dividend. The dividend has to be paid by the company in the name
of registered shareholders and it is the registered shareholders alone who
can claim dividend u/s.27 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1956.

(ii) Nothing was brought to show that under the provisions
of the Companies Act or the provisions of Securities Contracts (Regulation)
Act, 1956, there were any other standard or statutory rules under the
Income-tax Act by which dividend could be taxed in the hands of the assessee.
Moreover, the burden of proving that an amount received in the year of
account was taxable lies on the Department.”

 


 


levitra

Exemption : S. 10(11) : Interest income accrued in provident fund account of employees after retirement : Continue to qualify for exemption u/s.10(11).

New Page 2

4 Exemption : S. 10(11) of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 to 2004-05 : Interest income accrued in the provident fund
account of employees after retirement : Would continue to qualify for exemption
u/s.10(11).


[Subhash Bansal v. ITO, 170 Taxman 601(P&H)

The petitioner was a senior citizen and an employee and a
retired employee of the Punjab State Electricity Board. In this case, in the
writ petition filed by the petitioner, the question before the Punjab and
Haryana High Court was as to whether interest income, that had accrued on the
credit balance in the provident fund governed by the Provident Fund Act, 1925
after the retirement, would continue to qualify for exemption from income-tax.

 

The High Court held as under :

“(i) A perusal of S. 10(11) would show that any payment
received by an assessee from a provident fund, to which the 1925 Act applies,
would not constitute a part of total income. In other words, it would, thus,
qualify for exemption from income-tax. It is, thus, obvious that since payment
of interest is received by the assessee-employee from provident fund, it would
also qualify for exemption from income-tax, provided the provisions of 1925
Act apply.

(ii) The reply given by the CBDT in its letter dated
15-6-2006 clarified the issue that interest on GPF is exempt from income-tax
as per the provisions of S. 10(11) and no TDS is required to be deducted from
the payment of interest on GPF after the date of retirement of an employee.

(iii) The petition succeeded and the Revenue was to be
directed to extend the benefit of exemption from income-tax to the interest
income that had accrued to the employees of the Board on the credit balance
which had been retained by them by exercising option in their provident fund
account after their retirement in terms of Regulation 38.”

 


levitra

Charitable Trust : Certificate u/s.80G : Renewal of certificate denied on the ground that one particular expenditure is for an activity termed as spending for a particular religion : Not justified.

New Page 2

3 Charitable Trust : Certificate u/s.80G of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Renewal of certificate denied on the ground that one
particular expenditure is for an activity which may be termed as spending for a
particular religion : Not justified.


[Umaid Charitable Trust v. UOI, 171 Taxman 94 (Raj.)]

The assessee trust was granted exemption certificate u/s.80G
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the period from 1-4-2001 to 31-3-2004. However,
renewal of the certificate for a further period was refused on the ground that
the assessee had incurred expenditure exceeding 5% of its total income on a
particular religion, namely, colouring and repairing of Lord Vishnu’s temple.

Allowing the writ petition filed by the Trust, the Rajasthan
High Court held as under :

“(i) Mere one contribution by the assessee trust to another
trust which carried out repairs and renovation of Lord Vishnu’s temple, did
not disentitle the assessee from renewal of its exemption certificate u/s.80G.
The line of distinction between the religious purpose and a charitable purpose
is very thin and no watertight compartment between the two activities can be
very well established. Unless the objective of the charitable trust in
question itself is of spending its income for a particular religion and it is
so found in the trust deed, the Income-tax Department cannot reject the
renewal of the trust as a charitable trust u/s.80G, merely because one
particular expenditure is for an activity which may be termed as spending for
a particular religion.

(ii) In the instant case, the repairs and renovation of
Lord Vishnu’s temple did not necessarily mean that expenditure in question was
for a particular religion only. All people, who have faith in Lord Vishnu’s
temple, belong to different sects and have faith in different religions and
also visit the temple of Lord Vishnu. The Revenue had not shown that entry in
the said temple was restricted to the persons of one particular community or
sect following one religion. Hinduism is not one particular religion and
different sects following Hindu philosophy do visit temple of Lord Vishnu, be
that Jains, Sikhs, Brahmins, etc. There is no watertight compartment between
different castes or sects following one particular religion. Freedom of
religion is guaranteed by the Constitution of India under Article 25.
Therefore, by taking such a pedantic and narrow approach, it could not be said
that character of the charitable trust was lost if one particular expenditure
was made for repairs and renovation of Lord Vishnu’s temple and that too by
way of contribution to another trust.

(iii) A perusal of the trust deed of the assessee produced
on record showed that the objective of the trust was clearly charitable one
and was not for any particular religion even wholly or substantially. Nothing
had been pointed out in the impugned order that the assessee had been
constantly spending money for a particular religion.

(iv) There was no leaning in favour of any particular
religion in the trust deed of the assessee-trust and, therefore, once such
exemption was granted to the assessee upon scrutiny of its application and it
held for at least three years, as was shown by the impugned order itself and
the trust deed indicated that the said trust was constituted long back on
27-8-1963 and had been carrying on such charitable activities, there was no
justification for rejecting its renewal u/s.80G, which is a matter of right.”


levitra

Business deduction : S. 43B : Deposit with customs authorities as per demand notice under the head Special Value Branch (SVB) is deductible in the year of actual payment.

New Page 2

1 Business deduction : S. 43B of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1999-00 : Deduction to be allowed on actual payment : Deposit
with customs authorities as per demand notice under the head Special Value
Branch (SVB) is deductible in the year of actual payment.


[CIT v. Hughes Escorts Communications Ltd., 170 Taxman
571 (Del.)]

In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1999-00, the
assessee company had paid Rs.26,60,128 by way of Special Value Branch (SVB)
deposit as per the demand notice issued by the Customs authorities. The said
amount was not claimed by way of deduction before the AO. The claim for
deduction was made for the first time before the CIT(A) by way of additional
ground. It was the contention of the assessee that the additional payment was
called a deposit pending final determination of the actual duty and it is an
amount that is to be paid on demand to the Customs authorities, that the
assessee really had no option but to make the payment. The CIT(A) allowed the
claim for deduction and held that if the whole or any part of this amount is
found to be not payable to the Customs authorities on the relevant goods, then
such amount shall be brought to tax u/s.41(1)(a) of the Act, in the relevant
year. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) The assessee really had no option but to make the
payment as per the demand notice issued by the Customs authorities. At the
time of making the payment it was not known whether the demand would fall
short of the actual liability or in excess of the actual liability. Taking
this into consideration, the Tribunal felt that it would not be appropriate to
limit the claim of the assessee only to the extent of the actual liability. It
was found that there is no error in directing the Assessing Officer to make a
verification with regard to the excess payment, if any, and to tax the amount
if it has not already been taxed. The Tribunal also limited the liability of
the actual amount to the assessment year under consideration.

(ii) We cannot find any fault in the view taken by the
Tribunal primarily because the liability was required to be discharged by the
assessee on demand and the assessee had no option but to make the payment.
This clearly falls within S. 43B(a) of the Act.”

 


levitra

Business expenditure/bonus : S. 37(1) and S. 36(1)(ii) : ‘Good work reward’ paid to employees, not dependent on profit/loss : does not constitute ‘bonus’ u/s. 36(1)(ii) : Allowable as normal business expenditure u/s.37(1)

New Page 2

2 Business expenditure/bonus : S. 37(1) and
S. 36(1)(ii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : ‘Good work reward’ paid to employees, not
dependent on profit/loss : Does not constitute ‘bonus’ u/s.36(1)(ii) : Allowable
as normal business expenditure u/s.37(1).


[Shriram Pistons & Rings Ltd. v. CIT, 171 Taxman 81
(Del.)]

The assessee had claimed the deduction of the ‘good work
reward’ paid to the employees as business expenditure u/s.37(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal considered as to whether it constitutes
‘bonus’ within the meaning of S. 36(1)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal held that it
does not constitute bonus.

 

In reference, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There is nothing to suggest that the ‘good work
reward’ given by the assessee to its employees has any relation to the profits
that the assessee may or may not make. It appears from the order of the
Tribunal that it has relation to good work that is done by the employee during
the course of his employment and that at the end of the financial year on the
recommendation of a senior officer of the assessee, the reward is given to the
employee. Consequently, the ‘good work reward’ cannot fall within the ambit of
S. 36(1)(ii) of the Act as contended by the Revenue.

(ii) The ‘good work reward’ is allowable as business
expenditure u/s.37(1) of the Act.”

 


levitra

New Industrial Undertaking — Special deduction — The gross total income of the assessee has first got to be determined after adjusting losses, etc., and if the gross total income of the assessee is ‘nil’, the assessee would not be entitled to deductions u

New Page 2

2 New Industrial Undertaking — Special
deduction
— The gross total income of the assessee has first got
to be determined after adjusting losses, etc., and if the gross total income of
the assessee is ‘nil’, the assessee would not be entitled to deductions under
Chapter VI-A of the Act.


[Synco Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 444
(SC)]

The appellant-assessee is a company incorporated under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of oil and
chemicals. It has a unit for oil division at Sirohi District, Rajasthan. It has
also a chemical division at Jodhpur. The appellant had earned profit in the
A.Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92 in both the units. However, the appellant had suffered
losses in the oil division in earlier years. The appellant claimed deductions
u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I of the Act, claiming that each unit should be treated
separately and the loss suffered by the oil division in earlier years is not
adjustable against the profits of the chemical division while considering the
question whether deductions u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I were allowable.

 

The Assessing Officer noticed that the gross total income of
the appellant before deductions under Chapter VI-A was ‘nil’. Therefore, he
concluded that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of deductions under
Chapter VI-A. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant carried the matters in appeal
before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who confirmed the view of the
Assessing Officer by dismissing the same. Therefore, the appellant preferred
appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal held that gross total income of the appellant
had got to be computed in accordance with the Act before allowing deductions
under any Section falling under Chapter VI-A and as the gross total income of
the appellant after setting off the business losses of the earlier years was
‘nil’, the appellant was not entitled to any deduction either u/s.80HH or S.
80-I of the Act. In that view of the matter the Tribunal dismissed the appeals
filed by the appellant. The High Court also dismissed the same by judgment dated
July 23, 2001.

 

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that Ss.(1) of S.
80A lays down that while computing the total income of an assessee, deductions
specified in S. 80C to S. 80U shall be allowed from his gross total income. This
Section has introduced a new concept of ‘gross total income’ as distinguished
from the ‘total income’ i.e., the net or taxable income.

 

Clause (5) of S. 80B defines the expression ‘gross total
income’ to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of
the Act before making any deductions under Chapter VI-A of the Act. It follows,
therefore, that deductions under Chapter VI-A can be given only if the gross
total income is positive and not negative. If the gross total income of the
assessee is determined as ‘nil’, then there is no question of any deduction
being allowed under Chapter VI-A in computing the total income.

 

The Assessing Officer has to take into account the provisions
of S. 71 providing for set-off of loss from one head against income from another
and S. 72 providing for carry forward and set-off of business losses. S. 32(2)
makes provisions for carry forward and set-off of the unabsorbed depreciation of
a particular year. The effect of the abovementioned provisions is that while
computing the total income, the losses carried forward and depreciation have to
be adjusted and thereafter the Assessing Officer has to work out the gross total
income of the assessee.

 

Ss.(2) of S. 80A specifically enacts that the aggregate of
deductions under Chapter VI-A should not exceed the gross total income of the
assessee. If the gross total income is found to be a net loss on account of the
adjustment of losses of the earlier years or ‘nil’, no deduction under this
Chapter can be allowed.

 

As noticed earlier clause (5) of S. 80B of the Act is that
‘gross total income’ to mean the total income computed in accordance with the
provisions of the Act without making any deductions under Chapter VI-A. The
effect of clause (5) of S. 80B of the Act is that “gross total income” will be
arrived at after making the computation as follows :

(i) making deductions under the appropriate computation
provisions;

(ii) including the incomes, if any u/s.60 to u/s.64 in the
total income of the individual;

(iii) adjusting intra-head and/or inter-head losses; and

(iv) setting off brought forward unabsorbed losses and
unabsorbed depreciation, etc.

 


The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court was
justified in holding that the loss from the oil division was required to be
adjusted before determining the gross total income and as the gross total income
was ‘nil’, the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction under Chapter VI-A
which includes S. 80-I also. The proposition of law, emerging from the above
discussion is that the gross total income of the assessee has first got to be
determined after adjusting losses, etc., and if the gross total income of the
assessee is ‘nil’, the assessee would not be entitled to deductions under
Chapter VI-A of the Act.

levitra

Business expenditure — If income from an activity is assessed as an income, expenditure incurred in respect of that activity should be allowed.

New Page 2

1 Business expenditure — If income from an
activity is assessed as an income, expenditure incurred in respect of that
activity should be allowed.


[Kerala Road Lines v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 343 (SC)]

The assessee entered into an agreement with M/s. Peirce
Leslie (India) Ltd. on September 27, 1983, for purchase of 466 cents of land
with buildings thereon at Calicut. It was agreed that the sale deed will either
be got executed in favour of the assessee or its nominees. As per the agreement,
if the purchase price was not paid within the specified time, the assessee was
liable to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The buildings standing on
the lands were demolished and the scrap materials were sold for Rs.5,88,001.
This income was treated as business income. Under the agreement, the assessee
had to pay an interest of Rs.4 lakhs for the delayed payment of purchase
consideration.

 

The assessee claimed this amount as a revenue expenditure.
The assessing authority disallowed the claim of the assessee on the ground that
the payment of interest on the purchase of the property would be in the nature
of capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure.

 

This order of the assessing authority was confirmed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the intention of the
assessee was to enter into an adventure in the nature of trade and ultimately
the assessee had retained only 65.57 cents of land with it and the remaining
land was purchased by the sister concerns of the assessee in small pieces. It
was held that since the assessee was only an intermediary for the other sister
concerns, the part of interest referable to the lands sold to the sister
concerns could not be allowed as revenue expenditure. Thus, the Commissioner of
Income-tax gave part relief and allowed the interest referable to 65.57 cents of
land retained by the assessee. The assessee, being aggrieved, filed an appeal
before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal accepted the appeal, set aside the order passed
by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the assessee had
entered into an agreement to purchase the entire property including buildings
standing thereon. The buildings were demolished and structures standing thereon
were sold as scrap material for Rs.5,88,001. This sum was offered for assessment
as business income and assessed as such. The payment of interest of Rs.4 lakhs
for the delayed payment of purchase consideration has been provided in the
agreement and thus, the payment of interest was a contractual obligation. It was
held by the Tribunal that, the payment of interest was to be viewed as an
expenditure u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, especially when the sale
proceeds of the scrap materials from the demolished structures have been treated
as business income and ultimately allowed the claim of the assessee for
deduction of interest.

 

The High Court, without answering the question as to whether
the expenditure is capital or revenue in nature, reversed the decision of the
Tribunal by holding that the assessee was not doing the business in real estate;
that the business of the assessee was transport only and, therefore, the
expenditure would not be covered by the provisions of S. 37(1) of the Act.

 

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the Department, it was held
that once the Revenue has accepted the sum of Rs.5,88,001 (being sale proceeds
from the scrap material of the structures standing on the lands) as business
income, then correspondingly the assessee would be entitled to claim the sum of
Rs.4 lakhs as revenue expenditure paid as interest on the delayed payment of the
purchase consideration.

levitra

Educational Institution : Exemption u/s. 10(22) : Institution run for educational purposes : No evidence that capitation fees charged : Institution entitled to exemption u/s.10(22)

New Page 2

5 Educational Institution : Exemption u/s.
10(22) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Institution run for educational
purposes : No evidence that capitation fees had been charged : Institution
entitled to exemption u/s. 10(22).


[CIT v. Khalsa Rural Hospital and Nursing Training
Institute,
304 ITR 20 (P&H)]

The assessee-trust was running a rural hospital and training
institute for nurses. During the course of assessment proceedings for the A.Y.
1997-98, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had claimed exemption
u/s.11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the
exemption u/s.11 and made an addition of Rs.40 lakhs on account of capitation
fee. The Tribunal allowed exemption u/s.10(22) of the Act.

 

The Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed the appeal filed by
the Revenue and held as under :

“There was nothing on record to show that the assessee-trust
was charging any capitation fee. The Assessing Officer had not found any
irregularity in the accounts of the trust. There was no document to show that
the trust was being run for any purpose of profit except that for any
educational purposes. The assesse was entitled to exemption u/s.10(22).”

 


levitra

Framework to IFRS : The foundation to financial accounting concepts

IFRS

Purpose and scope of framework :

The Framework to IFRS (‘the framework’) sets out the concepts
that underline the preparation and presentation of financial statements for
external users. The basic purpose of the IFRS framework is to (i) assist the
standard-setting body with the development and review of existing and new
accounting standards; (ii) assist the preparers of financial statements in
applying the IFRS; (iii) assist the auditors to assess whether the financial
statements are prepared in line with IFRS; and (iv) assist the users of
financial statements to interpret the financial statements prepared in
conformity with IFRS.

The framework is not an accounting standard and hence does
not prescribe recognition, measurement and disclosure requirements. As per the
framework, in limited circumstances where there is a conflict between the
framework and the accounting standards, the accounting standard is required to
be followed. Further, the framework is applied in preparation of general-purpose
financial statements, which under IFRS are consolidated financial statements.
This is a significant departure from traditional Indian GAAP where the
general-purpose financial statements are separate financial statements of the
reporting entity.

The framework deals with :


(i) the objective of financial statements;

(ii) the qualitative characteristics that determine the
usefulness of information in financial statements;

(iii) the definition, recognition and measurement of the
elements from which financial statements are constructed; and

(iv) concepts of capital and capital maintenance.



Objective of financial statements :

The objective of the financial statements is to provide
information about the financial position, financial performance and cash flows
of the reporting entity to the users of financial statements.

As compared to Indian GAAP, IFRSs place more emphasis on cash
flows. For instance, the framework states that financial statements provide
information on the ability of an entity to generate cash and cash equivalents
and of the timing and certainty of their generation. Users are better able to
evaluate this ability to generate cash and cash equivalents if they are provided
with information that focusses on the (1) financial position, (2) performance,
and (3) changes in financial position of an entity.

The information about financial position of an entity is
affected by the economic resources it controls, its financial structure, its
liquidity and solvency, and its capacity to adapt to changes in the environment
in which it operates. Information about the performance of an entity, in
particular its profitability, is required in order to assess potential changes
in the economic resources that it is likely to control in the future.
Information concerning changes in the financial position of an entity is useful
in order to assess its investing, financing and operating activities during the
reporting period.

Underlying assumptions :

The framework sets out the underlying assumptions upon which
the IFRS accounting standards are based.

Accrual basis of accounting :

    The financial statements are prepared on the accrual basis of accounting, i.e., the effects of transactions and other events are recognised when they occur (and not as cash or its equivalent is received or paid) and they are recorded in the accounting records and reported in the financial statements of the periods to which they relate.

Going concern :

    The financial statements are normally prepared on the assumption that an entity is a going concern and will continue in operation for the foreseeable future.

Prudence :

    Unlike Indian GAAP, IFRS does not consider ‘Prudence’ as an underlying assumption. For instance, the unrealised gains on an ‘available-for-sale financial asset’ is required to be recognised under IFRS, whereas the same is prohibited under Indian GAAP on the grounds of prudence. The framework makes it clear that prudence means exercising a degree of caution in making judgments under conditions of uncertainty, but that it should not lead to the creation of hidden reserves or excessive provisions.

Qualitative characteristics of financial statements :

    The qualitative characteristics are the attributes that make the information provided in financial statements useful to users. There are four principal qualitative characteristics
    (1) understandability, (2) relevance, (3) reliability, and (4) comparability, of which some are divided into sub-categories.

1. Understandability :

    Information should be presented in a manner that it is readily understood by users.

2. Relevance :

    Information must be relevant to the decision-making needs of users. Information has the quality of relevance when it influences the economic decisions of users by helping them evaluate past, present or future events or confirming, or correcting, their past evaluations. Financial statements must have both predictive value and confirm past events.

Materiality :

    The relevance of information is affected by its nature, and materiality. In some cases the nature of information alone is sufficient to determine its relevance (e.g., managerial remuneration). In other cases both nature and materiality are important (e.g., estimates of provisions that involve significant judgment). Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decision of users taken on the basis of the financial statements (e.g., no provision made on non-performing assets in case of banks). As materiality depends on the size and nature of the item or error judged in the surrounding circumstances, materiality provides a threshold or cut-off point rather than being a primary qualitative characteristic which information must have if it is to be useful.

    Either the size or the nature of the item, or a combination of both, could be the determining factor. Consideration of materiality is relevant to judgments regarding both the selection and application of accounting policies and to the omission or disclosure of information in the financial statements.

    Materiality needs to be assessed on disclosures in case when items may be aggregated, the use of additional line items, headings and sub-totals. Materiality also is relevant to the positioning of these disclosures (on the face of the financial statements or in the notes). As such, IFRSs are not intended to apply to immaterial items.

        3. Reliability:

    Information has the quality of reliability when it is free from material error and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully that which it either purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent. Information may be relevant but so unreliable in nature or representation that its recognition may be potentially misleading. Reliability depends on:

        a) Faithful representation:
    To be reliable, information must represent faithfully the transactions and other events it either purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent, e.g., a statement of financial position should represent faithfully the transactions and other events that result in assets, liabilities and equity at the reporting date which meet the recognition criteria.

        b) Substance over form:
    Information must be accounted for and presented in accordance with its substance and economic reality and not merely its legal form.

        c) Neutrality:

    Information must be free from bias. Financial statements are not neutral, if by the selection or presentation of information, they influence the making of a decision or judgment in order to achieve a predetermined result or outcome.

        d) Prudence:
    Prudence is the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgments needed in making the estimates required under conditions of uncertainty. However, the exercise of prudence does not allow, for instance, the creation of hidden reserves or excessive provisions, the deliberate understatement of assets or income, or the deliberate overstatement of liabilities or expenses, because the financial statements would not be neutral and, therefore, not have the quality of reliability.

        e) Completeness:
    To be reliable, the information must be complete within the bounds of materiality and cost. An omission can cause information to be false or misleading and thus unreliable and deficient in terms of its relevance.

        4. Comparability:
    Users must be able to compare the financial statements of an entity (a) through time — internal comparability and (b) with different entities — external comparability. The measurement and display of the financial effect of like transactions and other events must be carried out in a consistent manner throughout an entity and over time for that entity and in a consistent manner for different entities. It is important that the accounting policies used and changes to these are disclosed. It also is important that the financial statements present corresponding information for the preceding periods.

    Constraints on relevant and reliable information:

        1. Timeliness:
    If there is undue delay in the reporting of information it may lose its relevance. Management may need to balance the relative merits of timely reporting and the provision of reliable information.

        2. Benefit and cost:
    The benefits of information should be greater than the cost of providing it. The evaluation of benefits and costs is, however, a judgmental process.

        3. Balance between qualitative characteristics:

    In practice, a balancing or trade-off between qualitative characteristics is often necessary. The relative importance of the characteristics in different cases is a matter of professional judgment.

    Definitions of assets, liabilities and equity:

        1. Assets:
    An asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity. The future economic benefit embodied in an asset is the potential to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the flow of cash and cash equivalents to the entity. Like Indian GAAP, the physical form is not essential to the existence of an asset, e.g., patents and copyrights. However, unlike Indian GAAP, the legal ownership is not of primary concern under IFRS; economic ownership is the essential characteristic.

        2. Liabilities:
    A liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits. It is important to note here the term ‘present obligation’ (as opposed to ‘future commitment’), i.e., a decision by management to buy an asset in the future does not give rise to a present obligation — an obligation normally arises only when the asset is delivered or when management enters into an irrevocable agreement to acquire the asset.

        3. Equity:

    Equity is the residual interest in the assets of the entity after deducting all its liabilities. Although equity is defined as a residual, it may be sub-classified in the balance sheet. For instance, in a corporate entity, funds contributed by shareholders, retained earnings, reserves representing appropriations of retained earnings and reserves representing capital maintenance adjustments may be shown separately.

    Recognition criteria for assets and liabilities: Assets and liabilities must be recognised if the recognition criteria are satisfied. Items are to be recognised as assets or liabilities (or as income and expenses) if:

        1. it is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item will flow to or from the entity, and

        2. the item has a cost or value that can be measured with reliability.

    The recognition criteria stresses on the ‘probability’ rather than ‘certainty’ of occurrence of future economic benefits. The probability of future economic benefits is to be assessed when the financial statements are prepared. The concept of probability refers to the degree of uncertainty that the future economic benefits associated with the item will flow to or from the entity. Assessments of the degree of uncertainty attaching to the flow of future economic benefits are made on the basis of the evidence available when the financial statements are prepared.
    Specific criteria for recognition of assets:

  •             Probable that future economic benefits will flow to the entity, and
  •             The cost or value can be reliably measured.

    The future economic benefits may flow to the entity in a number of ways. For instance:

  •             Inventories, fixed assets and know-how may be used in the production of goods or services to be sold by the entity;

  •             Cash and cash equivalents, receivables or marketable securities may be exchanged for other assets;

  •             Cash and cash equivalents may be used to settle a liability; or

  •             Cash and cash equivalents may be distributed to the owners of the entity.

    Specific criteria for recognition of liabilities:

  •             Probable outflow of resources will result from settlement of a present obligation, and

  •             The amount can be measured reliably. The settlement of a present obligation usually involves the entity giving up assets in order to satisfy the claim of the other party.

    Settlement may occur in a number of ways, for instance, by:

  •             The payment of cash or cash equivalents as is the case with most payables;
  •             The transfer of other assets, for example, in a barter transaction or in some business combination;

  •             The rendering of services to the other party as is the case with a liability for warranty repairs; or

  •             The replacement of the obligation with another obligation.

    Definition of income and expense:

    Income:
    Income is an increase in economic benefits during the accounting period, in the form of direct inflow, enhancement of assets, or decrease in liabilities; and that results in increase in equity, other than those relating to contributions from equity participants.

    The definition of income encompasses both revenue and gains. Revenue arises in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity, including sales, fees, interest, dividends, royalties and rent. Gains represent other items that meet the definition of income and may not arise in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity (e.g., gains on the disposal of non-current assets). Gains represent increase in economic benefits and as such is no different in nature from revenue. Hence, gains are not regarded as constituting a separate element in the framework. Unlike Indian GAAP, the definition of income also includes unrealised gains (e.g., unrealised gains arising on the revaluation of marketable securities).

    Expense:

    The definition of expenses encompasses losses as well as those expenses that arise in the course of the ordinary activities of the entity. Losses represent other items that meet the definition of expense and may, or may not, arise in the course of the ordinary activities of the entity.

    Recognition criteria for income and expense: The recognition criteria for income and expense are the same as for the recognition of assets and liabilities.

    Income is recognised in the profit and loss account when increase in future economic benefits related to an increase in an asset or a decrease of a liability has arisen that can be measured reliably. This means, in effect, that recognition of income occurs simultaneously with the recognition of increase in assets or decrease in liabilities.

    Expenses are recognised in the profit and loss account when decrease in future economic benefits related to a decrease in an asset or an increase of a liability has arisen that can be measured reliably. This means, in effect, that recognition of expenses occurs simultaneously with the recognition of an increase in liabilities or a decrease in assets.

    Measurement of elements of financial statements:
    Different measurement bases mentioned in the framework are historical cost, current cost, realisable (settlement) value and present value.

    Historical cost:
    Assets are recorded at the amount of cash or cash equivalents paid or the fair value of the consideration given to acquire them at the time of their acquisition. Liabilities are recorded at the amount of proceeds received in exchange for the obligation, or in some circumstances (for example, income taxes), at the amounts of cash or cash equivalents expected to be paid to satisfy the liability in the normal course of business.

    Current cost:
    Assets are carried at the amount of cash or cash equivalents that would have to be paid if the same or an equivalent asset was acquired currently. Liabilities are carried at the undiscounted amount of cash or cash equivalents that would be required to settle the obligation currently.

    Realisable (settlement) value:

    Assets are carried at the amount of cash or cash equivalents that could currently be obtained by selling the asset in an orderly disposal. Liabilities are carried at their settlement values; that is, the undiscounted amounts of cash or cash equivalents expected to be paid to satisfy the liabilities in the normal course of business.

    Present value:

    Assets are carried at the present discounted value of the future net cash inflows that the item is expected to generate in the normal course of business. Liabilities are carried at the present discounted value of the future net cash outflows that are expected to be required to settle the liabilities in the normal course of business. This is different from Indian GAAP, where the assets and liabilities are recognised at transaction values without reference to the time value of money.

    Key GAAP differences in the frameworks:

  •             The primary financial statement is consolidated financial statement under IFRS framework, unlike Indian GAAP where the primary financial statement is standalone financial statements.
  •             Unlike Indian GAAP, IFRS does not identify ‘Prudence’ as one of the fundamental accounting assumptions in preparation of financial statements. Thus unrealised gains of available-for-sale securities are recognised under IFRS, unlike Indian GAAP.
  •             As compared to Indian GAAP, IFRS places more importance on the statement of cash flows as it provides information on the ability of an entity to generate cash and cash equivalents and of the timing and certainty of their generation.
  •             Unlike Indian GAAP, the legal ownership is not a criterion for recognition of an asset. IFRS recognises an asset based on the assessment of ‘control’ over the economic benefits accruing from the asset.
  •             Unlike Indian GAAP, certain assets and liabilities are recognised at the present value of future cash flows when the time value of money is significant.

    While barring the above differences, the framework under Indian GAAP and IFRS are similar, the said differences will have far-reaching implications on the Indian industry. Some of the accounting and reporting GAAP differences have their roots in the differences in the underlying frameworks.

Section A : Notes regarding Revenue Recognition Disputed Interest income 59

New Page 1Hotel Leelaventure Ltd. — (31-3-2008)

From Notes to Accounts :

The Honourable Supreme Court of India has upheld the interest
claim of the Company against HUDCO vide their order dated 12th February 2008.
The Company has recognised interest income of Rs.46.15 crores (Previous years
Rs.10.63 crores) during the year under review. Computation of interest payable
is disputed by HUDCO and the matter is pending before the Execution Court
i.e.,
The High Court of Delhi. Total disputed interest income recognised by
the Company till 31st March 2008 amounted to Rs.110.30 crores.

From Auditors’ Report :



(f) In our opinion, and to the best of information and
according to the explanation given to us, the said accounts, give the
information required by the Companies Act, 1956 in the manner so required,
subject to our inability to express an opinion on the impact of disputed
interest income recognised as referred to in Note 10 of Schedule K to the
accounts and read with other notes, give a true and fair view :


Recognition of Sales on despatch of goods from works


Setco Automotive Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Accounting Policies :




(i) Sales and services are accounted for on dispatch of
products from the works.


From Notes to Accounts :

The sales determined in accordance with the accounting policy
followed (Refer Note 7, Schedule 17) include Rs.954.80 lacs (Rs.312.55 lacs)
being sales value of dispatches in transit as on 31st March 2008. The inventory
value thereof amounts to Rs.690.83 lacs (Rs.223.47 lacs).

From Auditors’ Report :

In our opinion, the Balance Sheet, Profit & Loss Account and
Cash Flow Statement dealt with by this report comply with the accounting
standards referred to in sub-section (3C) of Section 211 of the Companies Act,
1956; except as regards :

(i) Accounting Standard-9, which provides for recognition of
revenue from sales only on transfer of significant risks and rewards of
ownership to the buyer, whereas the Company has been recognising sales on
dispatch of goods from works. As a result, goods in transit valued at Rs.690.83
lacs have been recognised as sales at a value of Rs.954.80 lacs. [Refer
Accounting Policy 7(i) of Schedule 17 and Note 08 of Schedule 18]


levitra

Block assessment — Appeal to the Tribunal (prior to 1-10-1998) against the assessment order could be filed even in the absence of payment of admitted tax.

New Page 1

6 Block assessment — Appeal
to the Tribunal (prior to 1-10-1998) against the assessment order could be filed
even in the absence of payment of admitted tax.


[CIT v. Pawan Kumar
Laddha,
(2010) 324 ITR 324 (SC)]

At the hearing of the appeal
filed by the assessee before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the order
u/s.158C of the Act, the Revenue raised a preliminary objection as to the
maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the assessee having not paid
the admitted tax before filing the appeal, the appeal preferred by him should be
dismissed as not maintainable. In this connection, reliance was placed by the
Department in support of its preliminary objection on S. 249(4)(a) of the 1961
Act.

After going through to
provisions of S. 249(4)(a) and S. 253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act, which at the
relevant time, dealt with an order passed by the Assessing Officer u/s.158C(c)
of the 1961 Act, the Appellate Tribunal held that one cannot read S. 249(4)(a)
into the provisions of S. 253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act, that while S. 253(1) was an
enabling provision giving right of appeal to the assessee to file an appeal to
the Appellate Tribunal, there was no provision similar to S. 249(4)(a), which
fell in Chapter XX-A in S. 253(1)(b), hence, it was not a condition mandatory to
the filing of the appeal to the Appellate Tribunal to pay undisputed tax amount
as condition precedent. Consequently, according to the Appellate Tribunal, there
was no merit in the contention of the Department that an assessee must pay the
admitted tax due before or at the time of filing of the appeal before the
Appellate Tribunal.

Aggrieved by the decision of
the Appellate Tribunal on the preliminary objection raised by the Department,
the matter was carried in appeal u/s.260A of the 1961 Act by the Department to
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, which affirmed the view of the
Appellate Tribunal. Hence, the civil appeals were filed before the Supreme
Court.

The Supreme Court held that
Chapter XX deals with ‘Appeals and revisions’. Chapter XX is divided into
headings ‘A’ to ‘F’ S. 246 enumerates a list of orders of the Assessing Officer
against which appeals would lie. In that list of orders, an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal u/s.253(1) is not mentioned. This was a very important
indicia to show that each heading in Chapter XX deals with a different subject
matter and one could not read the words in Chapter XX-A into the words used in
Chapter XX-B. Chapter XX-A deals with appeals to the Deputy Commissioner and the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), whereas Chapter XX-B deals with appeals to
the Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, reference to the High Court lies under
Chapter XX-C. It was for this reason that the Supreme Court came to the
conclusion that each heading was a stand-alone item and, therefore, one could
not read the provisions of S. 249(4)(a) into S. 253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act.
According to the Supreme Court, if the argument of the Department was to be
accepted, then, in that event, no appeal or reference could lie even to the High
Court without complying with the provisions of S. 249(4)(a) of the 1961 Act.
This could not be the scheme of the Chapter XX of the 1961 Act. There was one
more reason why the Supreme Court was of the view that 249(4)(a) could not be
read into S. 253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act. S. 253(1)(b) refers to an assessee
filing an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against an order passed by an
Assessing Officer u/s.158BC(c) of the 1961 Act, Clause (b) came to be inserted
into S. 253(1) by the Finance Act, 1995, and, that too, with effect from 1st
July, 1995. The very concept of block assessment came to be inserted in the
Income-tax Act, 1961, with effect from 1st July, 1995, whereas the words ‘this
Chapter’ in S. 249(4) came to be inserted in the Income-tax Act, 1961, vide the
Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from 1st October, 1975. This
was one more reason to confine the expression ‘this Chapter’ in S. 249(4) to
Chapter XX-A without it being extended to S. 253(1)(b) which is there in Chapter
XX-B. Further, under the scheme of Chapter XX as stated above, no appeal
u/s.249(4)(a) in Chapter XX-A was admissible without the assessee having paid
the admitted tax due on the income returned by him. It appeared that once S.
249(4)(a) is treated as a mandatory condition for filing an appeal before the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and once that condition stood satisfied at
the time of his filing an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals),
then there was no necessity for the assessee to once again pay the admitted tax
due as a condition precedent to his filing the appeal before the Appellate
Tribunal u/s.253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court held that lastly, one
must keep in mind the principle that the doctrine of incorporation cannot be
invoked by implication. A provision which insists on the assessee satisfying a
condition of paying the admitted tax as condition precedent to his filing of
appeal u/s.253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act is a restrictive provision. Such a
restrictive provision must be clearly spelt out by the Legislature while
enacting the statute. The Courts have to be careful in reading into the Act such
restrictive provisions as that would tantamount to judicial legislation which
the Courts must eschew. It is for the Parliament to specifically say that no
appeal shall be filed or admitted or maintainable without the assessee(s) paying
the admitted tax due. That has been done only in the case of an appeal u/s.
249(4)(a) of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court held that it could not read such a
restrictive provision into S. 253(1)(b) of the 1961 Act. If it did so, it was
judicially legislating by reading something into the Act which was not there.

levitra