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India Inc braces for stricter bribery laws

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India Inc is gearing up to face more stringent and specific anti-bribery laws with the government planning to amend the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to cover bribes given domestically by the private sector.

Once this comes into force, the employee concerned and also the company’s management could face imprisonment of upto seven years. It is likely that the proposed IPC amendment would be broad based and, in addition to bribes given to public officials, will also cover bribes within the private sector (such as company A, a supplier, bribing an official in company B to bag huge orders).

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Nine of ten, unemployable – No movement yet on quality control in higher education

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The state of professional higher education in India is abysmal. Consider engineering. All told, there are 1.5 million engineering seats in the country. Almost a third of these are unfilled, so about a million engineers are produced every year. Yet, barely 10 per cent of them are readily employable. About a quarter don’t know enough English to make sense of the curriculum. The tab for this monumental inefficiency is picked up by the companies that draw from this pool. Every year, they end up spending thousands of crores of rupees to retrain the fresh graduates and make them job-worthy. The situation is no better in business schools. Unlike engineering colleges, the rot has not been measured here. But it can’t be vastly different. People are, naturally, disillusioned: the number of students who appear in the entrance examinations for business schools has fallen steadily for three years. There are as many as 300,000 seats on offer; about one-third of this capacity is vacant. As a result, close to a hundred business schools have shut down in the last couple of years. More are bound to follow.

 All engineering colleges and stand-alone business schools are regulated by the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). Business schools under universities are regulated by the University Grants Commission (UGC). The AICTE has thus far focused exclusively on fattening the supply pipe of engineers and MBAs. The logic is that India’s higher-education enrolment ratio is very low compared to other emerging countries; to improve that, the AICTE has been liberal with approvals. This strategy is turning counterproductive. The AICTE should now focus on the quality of education imparted.

Employers complain that the output of engineers and MBAs is poor because the teaching faculty is weak. Engineering colleges and business schools, in turn, say that’s because the salaries are regulated by the AICTE, which keeps them from hiring good teachers. While the norms for engineering colleges are fairly stringent (not less than 2.5 acres of land, at least one acre of land for every 300 students, working capital of at least Rs 1 crore and a studentteacher ratio of not more than 15), those for business schools are lax: 20,000 square feet of built-up area, seven faculty members, 20 computers, 2,000 books in the library and subscription to 30 journals. The lack of entry barriers has caused the glut and the consequent fall in quality. These are issues that the AICTE needs to address urgently.

The crucial reform this sector needs is more effective legislation. Legislative initiatives like the Higher Education and Research Bill, 2011, which seeks to replace the AICTE and the UGC with a commission responsible for ensuring quality, and the National Accreditation Regulatory Authority for Higher Educational Institutions Bill, 2010, which will make it mandatory for all institutes of higher education to be accredited by an independent agency, have not made much headway. Unfortunately, in another craven surrender to its allies, the government reportedly withdrew the latter Bill – two years after its introduction – on Tuesday, because the Trinamool Congress had objections. Surely these objections were not new? If so, why has the human resource development ministry waited for so long to review the Bill? Such lack of seriousness in reform will only worsen the sector’s crisis.

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Readying quacks

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Sometimes, the Indian state demonstrates a naive belief in numbers that obscures the real issues. Take healthcare; by the government’s own reckoning, the country’s doctor-patient ratio should be around 1:1,000. Currently, it is 1:2,000. That’s the kind of problem the government thinks it understands.

Health minister Ghulam Nabi Azad informed the Rajya Sabha about the steps taken to counter this situation. Among other things, the government has relaxed norms for establishing new medical colleges in terms of faculty, land and other infrastructure. It has also relaxed the student/teacher ratio in postgraduate classes and raised the intake capacity at the undergraduate level from 150 to 250. The result will be more doctors, but given the dilution on various counts, it could very well mean poor-quality ones. This is inadequate medicine for an already sick healthcare system.

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Supreme Court on Sahara Matter – A Milestone Decision

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It is a historic decision on several grounds – of the companies being asked to refund huge sums of money, of a pursuit by SEBI till the logical end despite numerous hurdles including inter-regulator conflicts, of certain important rulings on the point of law by the Supreme Court which involved, perhaps on facts, removal of several creases in various laws. It is worth knowing the entire sequence of facts, the issues involved and the orders passed. This article cannot obviously do justice to the 263 page Supreme Court order, but an attempt to highlight important issues has been made.

The matter, of course, is far more complex than being a linear sequence of orders and appeals. It had several detours to Allahabad and other courts but, in essence, it is sufficient to consider this series of orders only. The decision covers many important areas – powers of SEBI, what constitutes an issue to the public, the sanctity in law of Guidelines of SEBI and so on. Concerns have been expressed about the dubious role that the Registrar of Companies performed. The Supreme Court also appears to have endorsed the possibility of criminal action against the Saharas (the two Sahara group companies against whom the orders were passed). These and other issues may need separate analysis as to its scope and implications. Further, the progress of implementation of the order of the Supreme Court in terms of payment of refund monies into the designated bank, identification of the OFCDs holders, etc. will have to be seen. There are reports that the Saharas may pursue further litigation and hence, this matter may develop even further.

The essential facts – as stated in the decisions – are summarised in a simplified manner below. However, one preliminary thought comes to mind. The facts are quite glaring and extreme. The Saharas offered their Optionally Fully Convertible Debentures (“OFCDs”) to crores of people, hiring lakhs of agents through thousands of branches and raised tens of thousands of crores of rupees. And then they claimed, clearly on technical grounds, that there was no issue of securities to the public that would result in need for compliance of SEBI Regulations and other laws for disclosure, investor protection, etc. Further, they refused to provide information to SEBI and adopted delaying tactics. In the face of such facts, one even wonders whether the decision – which rejects every contention of the Saharas and even removes several creases and gaps in law in the process – could be interpreted to some extent as restricted to the facts of the case.

The Saharas, as the Supreme Court records, sought to raise funds through OFCDs. They filed/circulated an information memorandum/ Red Herring Prospectus with the Registrar of Companies, but no documents with SEBI. It took a view that issue of shares to a group of people – described in an extremely broad manner – did not amount to an issue to the public requiring compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, the SEBI Act and Regulations, etc. that dealt with public issues. The Saharas, however, appointed about 10,00,000 agents, opened 2900 branches and offered the OFCDs to crores of people, and issued the OFCDs to some 66 lakh people (it appears that the actual figures may be even higher).

Contrast this with the maximum limit of 49 offerees permitted u/s 67(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, beyond which the offer would become a public offer. When the Sahara Group filed an offer document through a merchant banker for a public issue of shares of another group company, SEBI, having come to know through this offer document of the earlier issues of OFCDs, made preliminary inquiries with the merchant banker. The merchant banker essentially replied, relying on legal opinions, that the earlier issues of OFCDs were in compliance of law but did not provide more details. When SEBI pursued the matter further with the Saharas, they insisted that SEBI had no jurisdiction and that they had complied with the law and would respond only to the Registrar of Companies. In what was seen to be further delaying tactic, they claimed that the issue as to whether they are liable to provide information to SEBI was pending determination before the Law Ministry and SEBI should wait till the matter was resolved. This resulted in gathering of information by SEBI from ROC documents and passing of certain orders by SEBI, petitions before the High Court, etc. and finally, the Order by SEBI which, alongwith the Order on appeal by SAT was upheld by the Supreme Court. Several issues were raised before the Supreme Court. The ruling of the Supreme Court and its implications would need a far more detailed analysis and at this stage, some of the important issues and rulings are highlighted below. Was the offer of OFCDs by the Saharas a “private placement” or an issue to the public? It was noted that the offer was made to “friends, associates, group companies, workers/ employees and other individuals associated/affiliated or connected in any manner with Sahara India Group of Companies”. These persons in reality turned out to be nearly 3 crore in number. When finally the details of the allottees were provided, the Supreme Court was dissatisfied with the details and noted that just the first page of the data was enough to cast doubts on the genuineness of the persons. An allottee was named merely “Kalavati” and the person introducing her was named “Haridwar”. No details were provided on how the allottees formed part of the group described above. The Court held that in view of the first proviso to section 67(3), offer to more than 49 persons would be deemed to be an offer to the public. The fact that the offer was clearly made to more than 49 persons attracted this provision. Apart from the offer to more than 49, another preceding condition, that the offer should have been made as a matter of domestic concern between the persons making and receiving the offer, was also not satisfied in view of the extremely broad description of the offerees. Further, since the OFCDs were transferable, yet another preceding condition – that the offer should not be calculated to be received by persons other than the offerees – was also not satisfied. Thus, the offer was clearly an offer to the public u/s. 67(3) of the Companies Act, 1956.

Whether the OFCDs which admittedly were “hybrids”, were securities and hence amenable to jurisdiction of SEBI? The Saharas contrasted the definition of securities under the SEBI Act/SCRA and the Companies Act, 1956 to submit that the term securities under the SEBI Act/SCRA did not cover hybrids while that under the Companies Act, 1956, covered it. Reliance was placed on the definition under the Companies Act, 1956, which reads:- “2(45AA) “securities” means securities as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), and includes hybrids;” (emphasis supplied). Thus, it was argued by Saharas that since hybrids were specifically included as an addition, it showed that the basic definition of securities under SCRA could not have included hybrids. Thus, in short, the OFCDs, being hybrids, were governed only by the Companies Act, 1956, and SEBI – which derives jurisdiction under the SEBI Act/SCRA, could not govern issue of securities.

The Supreme Court first held that since u/s 55A, SEBI had powers to administer various specified provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, in matters of issue of securities and since securities specifically included hybrids, SEBI did have jurisdiction to that extent.

Then, the Supreme Court examined the definition of hybrid under the Companies Act, 1956, and noted that it covered any security that had the character of more than one type of security including their derivatives. The definition under SCRA defines securities inclusively and not exhaustively. Since, by definition, a hybrid is a “security”, it is covered by definition of “securities” under SCRA. Further, securities under SCRA included “other marketable securities of a like nature” and thus hybrids would once again be covered. It was particularly noted that the OFCDs were transferable, i.e., “marketable” as understood in this context.

Thus, hybrids were held to be securities under SCRA too and hence, SEBI was held to have jurisdiction over them.

It is submitted that this does not fully explain why the definition under the Companies Act, 1956, specifically included hybrids.

Whether the listing of OFCDs on stock exchanges was optional or mandatory?

The Saharas argued that u/s. 60B, there was a clear demarcation of listed and unlisted companies and unlisted companies were required to file the RHP only with the Registrar of Companies. The Saharas were neither listed nor intended to be listed. SEBI countered that section 73 clearly requires that a company seeking to offer securities to the public has to apply for listing to the stock exchanges.

The Supreme Court read section 60B and section 73 harmoniously and held that it was concluded by it earlier that the offer was indeed an offer to the public. In view of this, there was no option left in the manner of applying for listing. Listing was an inevitable consequence of such an offer and thus not optional but mandatory. Requirement of listing automatically brings in the jurisdiction of the SEBI, as it transforms a “public company” into a “listed public company” and thus covered by section 60B too.

Whether Section 55A gave powers to SEBI to administer specific provisions on unlisted companies that did not intend to get their securities listed?

Section 55A gives powers to SEBI to administer certain provisions in case of listed companies and unlisted companies that intended to get their securities listed on the recognised stock exchanges. The Saharas were neither listed nor, they claimed, they intended to get listed. This was even clearly specified in various documents.

The Supreme Court held that the intention could not be grasped and determined out of context of the actions of the Saharas. The Saharas did make an issue to the public. Such a public issue necessarily resulted in their being mandatorily required to get such securities listed. Thus, there is a deemed intention, since they could not carry out acts which require listing and then claim that they do not intend to list their securities.

Even otherwise, the Supreme Court held, section 11 of the SEBI Act was wide enough to give powers to SEBI to protect the interest of investors in securities and to regulate the securities markets by such measures as it thinks fit. This is wide enough to give powers to SEBI under the present facts. Later provisions of the Act do state that SEBI has certain powers over “other persons associated with the securities markets” and public companies, which intend to get their securities listed on the recognised stock exchanges. Even if these are taken to be restrictions for those sections and purposes, they do not apply to the former provisions. Thus, SEBI has adequate powers to govern the unlisted Saharas.

Furthermore, section 11A is even more specific in matters of issue of prospectus, etc. Sections 11B/11C reinforce this conclusion that SEBI has powers to govern listed and unlisted companies. Being a stand alone statute, the SEBI Act cannot be limited even by the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.

Thus, SEBI had the jurisdiction to regulate and administer the unlisted Saharas.

Whether the SEBI DIP Guidelines had statutory force or were mere “departmental instructions”?

The Supreme Court held that the DIP Guidelines did have “statutory force” and that the OFCDs were issued in contravention of the DIP Guidelines as also of the SEBI ICDR Regulations that succeeded them.

Whether there was a pre-planned attempt by the Saharas to bypass the regulatory and administrative authority of SEBI in respect of issue of OFCDs?

It was pointed out by SEBI that the Saharas had modified the explicit format of declaration required to be given in the prescribed format. The prescribed format required the companies issuing a prospectus to state, inter alia, that the guidelines of SEBI have been complied with and no statement is made contrary to the provisions of the SEBI Act or rules made thereunder or guidelines issued thereunder. The Saharas omitted these declarations. There was further attempt to misguide by stating that the offer was by way of private placement when the invitation was extended to approximately three crore persons. The Supreme Court said that it cer-tainly seemed so that there was a pre-planned intention to bypass the regulatory and administrative authority of SEBI.

The manner of issuing the information memorandum/RHP showed that the procedure adopted was “obviously topsy-turvy and contrary to the recognised norms in company affairs”. All this made, the Supreme Court said, the entire approach of the Saharas “calculated and crafty”.

Their repeated refusals to share information and their non-cooperation, the unrealistic and possibly fictitious information provided and other similar factors made the Supreme Court to also state that the whole affair was “doubtful, dubious and questionable”.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the proceedings initiated by SEBI and the Orders of SEBI and SAT. It upheld the Order of SAT for refund of the amounts collected by issue of OFCDs alongwith interest @ 15% per annum. A mechanism was laid down to ensure this including deposit of the amounts with a nationalised bank, appointment of a retired Judge of the Supreme Court to oversee the process and several other directions for safeguarding various interests.

PART A : JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT

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RTI operation being annihilated: On 13th September, 2012, the Supreme Court of India (SC) delivered a judgment which, though a landmark on the subject of RTI, has nearly stopped the operation of RTI at various Commissions. It is a judgment running into 107 para. First, nearly 50 pages analyse the RTI Act. Some of the paragraphs/ sentences therein are:

  •  The value of any freedom is determined by the extent to which the citizens are able to enjoy such freedom. Ours is a constitutional democracy and it is axiomatic that citizens have the right to know about the affairs of the Government which, having been elected by them, seeks to formulate some policies of governance aimed at their welfare. However, like any other freedom, this freedom also has limitations. It is a settled proposition that the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (for short ‘the Constitution’) encompasses the right to impart and receive information. The Right to Information has been stated to be one of the important facets of proper governance. With the passage of time, this concept has not only developed in the field of law, but also has attained new dimensions in its application. The legal principle of ‘A man’s house is his castle. The midnight knock by the police bully breaking into the peace of citizen’s home is outrageous in law’, stated by Edward Coke has been explained by Justice Douglas as follows: “The free State offers what a police state denies- the privacy of the home, the dignity and peace of mind of the individual. That precious right to be left alone is violated once the police enter our conversations.”
  •  The foundation of the power of judicial review, as explained by a nine-judge’s Bench in the case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association & Ors vs Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 441], is the theory that the Constitution which is the fundamental law of the land, is the ‘will’ of the ‘people’, while a statute is only the creation of the elected representatives of the people; when, therefore, the ‘will’ of the legislature as declared in the statute, stands in opposition to that of the people as declared in the Constitution – the ‘will’ of the people must prevail. It is the Constitution which is Supreme in India and not the Parliament.
  •  Certain principles have often been reiterated by this Court, while dealing with the constitutionality of a provision or a statute. Even in the case of Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana & Ors. [(1986) 2 SCC 249] the Court stated that whether it is the Constitution that is expounded or the constitutional validity of the constitution as a statute that is considered, a cardinal rule is to look to the preamble of the guiding light and to the Directive Principles of State Policy as the Book of Interpretation. The Constitution being sui generis, these are the factors of distant vision that help in the determination of the constitutional issues.
  •  The freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. It is a safely valve. ? Justice V R Krishna Iyer in his book “Freedom of Information” expressed the view: “The right to information is a right incidental to the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech and expression. The international movement to include it in the legal system gained prominence in 1946 with General Assembly of the United Nations declaring freedom of information to be a fundamental human right and a touchstone for all other liberties. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of information and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” It may be a coincidence that Article 19 of the Indian Constitution also provides every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression. However, the word ‘information’ is conspicuously absent. But, as the highest Court has explicated, the right of information is integral to freedom of expression. The Court then dealt with scheme of the Act of 2005 (comparative Analysis of Act of 2002 and Act of 2005) To restrict the length of the Article, though very interesting, the same is not being reported here.

 The Court then dealt with the writ matter of validity of the provisions under the RTI Act pertaining to appointment of the Central Information Commissioners (section 12) and of the State Information Commissioners (section 15).

“In order to examine the constitutionality of these provisions, let us state the parameters which would finally help the Court in determining such questions”.

The Court stated:

“The Courts would preferably put into service the principle of ‘reading down’ or ensure the attainment of the object of the Act. These are the principles which clearly emerge from the consistent view taken by this Court in its various pronouncements.”

Four issues framed by the supreme court in para 44 were as under:

  •  To examine the constitutionality of sections 12 and 15 of the RTI Act, the Supreme Court framed the following issues, viz.,

 a. Whether the law under challenge lacks legislative competence?

 b. Whether it violates any Article of Part III of the Constitution, particularly Article 14?

 c. Whether the prescribed criteria and classification resulting therefrom is discriminatory, arbitrary and has no nexus to the object of the Act? and

d. Whether a legislative exercise of power which is not in consonance with the constitutional guarantees and does not provide adequate guidance makes the law just, fair and reasonable?

  • The Supreme Court then dwelt upon determination of the nature of Tribunals, Commissions and their functions in India and referred to the scenario prevalent in some other jurisdictions of the world.
  •  The Supreme Court after analysing the scheme of the RTI Act discussed at length, the kind of duties and responsibilities that the Central Information Commissioner and the State Information Commissioners and other Information Commissioners are expected to perform, and the multifarious functions that the Information Commission is expected to discharge in its functioning, and observed as under:-

“Besides separation of powers, the independence of judiciary is of fundamental constitutional value in the structure of our Constitution. Impartiality, independence, fairness and reasonableness in judicial decision making are the hallmarks of the Judiciary. If ‘Impartiality’ is the soul of Judiciary, `Independence’ is the life blood of Judiciary. Without independence, impartiality cannot thrive, as this Court stated in the case of Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association {(2010) 11 SCC 17}”

“The above detailed analysis leads to an ad libitum conclusion that under the provisions and scheme of the Act of 2005, the persons eligible for appointment should be of public eminence, with knowledge and experience in the specified fields and should preferably have a judicial background. They should possess judicial acumen and experience to fairly and effectively deal with the intricate questions of law that would come up for determination before the Commission, in its day-to-day working. The Commission satisfies abecedarians of a judicial tribunal which has the trappings of a court. It will serve the ends of justice better, if the Information Commission was manned by persons of legal expertise and with adequate experience in the field of adjudication. We may further clarify that such judicial members could work individually or in Benches of two, one being a judicial member while the other being a qualified person from the specified fields to be called an expert member. Thus, in order to satisfy the test of constitutionality, we will have to read into section 12(5) of the Act that the expression ‘knowledge and experience’ includes basic degree in that field and experience gained thereafter and secondly that legally qualified, trained and experienced persons would better administer justice to the people, particularly when they are expected to undertake an adjudicatory process which involves critical legal questions and niceties of law. Such appreciation and application of legal principles is a sine qua non to the determinative functioning of the Commission as it can tilt the balance of justice either way. Malcolm Gladwell said, “the key to good decision making is not knowledge. It is understanding. We are swimming in the former. We are lacking in the latter”. The requirement of a judicial mind for manning the judicial tribunal is a well accepted discipline in all the major international jurisdictions with hardly any exceptions. Even if the intention is to not only appoint people with judicial background and expertise, then the most suitable and practical resolution would be that a ‘judicial member’ and an ‘expert member’ from other specified fields should constitute a Bench and perform the functions in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2005. Such an approach would further the mandate of the statute by resolving the legal issues as well as other serious issues like an inbuilt conflict between the Right to Privacy and Right to Information while applying the balancing principle and other incidental controversies. We would clarify that participation by qualified persons from other specified fields would be a positive contribution in attainment of the proper administration of justice as well as the object of the Act of 2005. Such an approach would help to withstand the challenge to the constitutionality of section 12(5)”

“As a natural sequel to the above, the question that comes up for consideration is as to what procedure should be adopted to make appointments to this august body. Section 12(3) states about the High-powered Committee, which has to recommend the names for appointment to the post of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners to the President. However, this section, and any other provision for that matter, is entirely silent as to what procedure for appointment should be followed by this High Powered Committee. Once we have held that it is a judicial tribunal having the essential trappings of a court, then it must, as an irresistible corollary, follow that the appointments to this august body are made in consultation with the judiciary. In the event, the Government is of the opinion and desires to appoint not only judicial members but also experts from other fields to the Commission in terms of section 12(5) of the Act of 2005, then it may do so, however, subject to the riders stated in this judgment. To ensure judicial independence, effective adjudicatory process and public confidence in the administration of justice by the Commission, it would be necessary that the Commission is required to work in Benches. The Bench should consist of one judicial member and the other member from the specified fields in terms of section 12(5) of the Act of 2005. It will be incumbent and in conformity with the scheme of the Act that the appointments to the post of judicial member are made ‘in consultation’ with the Chief Justice of India in case of Chief Information Commissioner and members of the Central Information Commission and the Chief Justices of the High Courts of the respective States, in case of the State Chief Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners of that State Commission. In the case of appointment of members to the respective Commissions from other specified fields, the DoPT in the Centre and the concerned Ministry in the States should prepare a panel, after due publicity, empanelling the names proposed at least three times the number of vacancies existing in the Commission. Such panel should be prepared on a rational basis, and should inevitably form part of the records. The names so empanelled, with the relevant record, should be placed before the said High Powered Committee. In furtherance to the recommendations of the High Powered Committee, appointments to the Central and State Information Commissions should be made by the competent authority. Empanelment by the DoPT and other competent authority has to be carried on the basis of a rational criteria, which should be duly reflected by recording of appropriate reasons. The advertisement issued by such agency should not be restricted to any particular class of persons stated u/s. 12(5), but must cover persons from all fields. Complete information, material and comparative data of the empanelled persons should be made available to the High Powered Committee. Needless to mention that the High Powered Committee itself has to adopt a fair and transparent process for consideration of the empanelled persons for its final recommendation.

This approach is in no way innovative but is merely derivative of the mandate and procedure stated by this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) wherein the Court dealt with similar issues with regard to constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal. All concerned are expected to keep in mind that the Institution is more important than an individual. Thus, all must do what is expected to be done in the interest of the institution and enhancing the public confidence. A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Centre for PIL and Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. [(2011) 4 SCC 1] had also adopted a similar approach and with respect we reiterate the same.

Giving effect to the above scheme would not only further the cause of the Act but would attain greater efficiency, and accuracy in the decision-making process, which in turn would serve the larger public purpose. It shall also ensure greater and more effective access to information, which would result in making the invocation of right to information more objective and meaningful.

For the elaborate discussion and reasons afore-recorded, we pass the following order and directions:

1.    The writ petition is partly allowed.

2.    The provisions of sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act of 2005 are held to be constitutionally valid, but with the rider that, to give it a meaningful and purposive interpretation, it is necessary for the Court to ‘read into’ these provisions some aspects without which these provisions are bound to offend the doctrine of equality. Thus, we hold and declare that the expression ‘knowledge and experience’ appearing in these provisions would mean and include a basic degree in the respective field and the experience gained thereafter. Further, without any peradventure and veritably, we state that appointments of legally qualified, judicially trained and experienced persons would certainly manifest in more effective serving of the ends of justice as well as ensuring better administration of justice by the Commission. It would render the adjudicatory process which involves critical legal questions and nuances of law, more adherent to justice and shall enhance the public confidence in the working of the Commission. This is the obvious interpretation of the language of these provisions and, in fact, is the essence thereof.

3.    As opposed to declaring the provisions of section 12(6) and 15(6) unconstitutional, we would prefer to read these provisions as having effect ‘post-appointment’. In other words, cessation/termination of holding of office of profit, pursuing any profession or carrying any business is a condition precedent to the appointment of a person as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner at the Centre or State levels.

4.    There is an absolute necessity for the legislature to reword or amend the provisions of section 12(5), 12(6) and 15(5), 15(6) of the Act. We observe and hope that these provisions would be amended at the earliest by the legislature to avoid any ambiguity or impracticability and to make it in consonance with the constitutional mandates.

5.    We also direct that the Central Government and/ or the competent authority shall frame all practice and procedure related rules to make working of the Information Commissions effective and in consonance with the basic rule of law. Such rules should be framed with particular reference to section 27 and 28 of the Act within a period of six months from today.

6.    We are of the considered view that it is an unquestionable proposition of law that the Commission is a ‘judicial tribunal’ performing functions of ‘judicial’ as well as ‘quasijudicial’ nature and having the trappings of a Court. It is an important cog and is part of the court attached system of administration of justice, unlike a ministerial tribunal, which is more influenced and controlled and performs functions akin to the machinery of administration.

7.    It will be just, fair and proper that the first appellate authority (i.e. the senior officers to be nominated in terms of section 5 of the Act of 2005) preferably should be the persons possessing a degree in law or having adequate knowledge and experience in the field of law.

8.    The Information Commissions at the respective levels shall henceforth work in Benches of two members each. One of them being a ‘judicial member’, while the other an ‘expert member’. The judicial member should be a person possessing a degree in law, having a judicially trained mind and experience in performing judicial functions. A law officer or a lawyer may also be eligible, provided he is a person who has practiced law at least for a period of twenty years as on the date of the advertisement. Such lawyer should also have experience in social work. We are of the considered view that the competent authority should prefer a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court for appointment as Information Commissioners. Chief Information Commissioner at the Centre or State level shall only be a person who is or has been a Chief Justice of the High Court or a Judge of the Supreme Court of India.

9.    The appointment of the judicial members to any of these posts shall be made ‘in consultation’ with the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justices of the High Courts of the respective States, as the case may be.

10.    The appointment of the Information Commissioners at both levels should be made from amongst the persons empanelled by the DoPT in the case of Centre and the concerned Ministry in the case of a State. The panel has to be prepared upon due advertisement and on a rational basis as afore-recorded.

11.    The panel so prepared by the DoPT or the concerned Ministry ought to be placed before the High-powered Committee in terms of section 12(3), for final recommendation to the President of India. Needless to repeat that the High Powered Committee at the Centre and the State levels is expected to adopt a fair and transparent method of recommending the names for appointment to the competent authority.

12.    The selection process should be commenced at least three months prior to the occurrence of vacancy.

13.    This judgment shall have effect only prospectively.

14.    Under the scheme of the Act of 2005, it is clear that the orders of the Commissions are subject to judicial review before the High Court and then before the Supreme Court of India. In terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgments of the Supreme Court are law of the land and are binding on all courts and tribunals. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Information Commission is bound by the law of precedence, i.e., judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court of India. In order to maintain judicial discipline and consistency in the functioning of the Commission, we direct that the Commission shall give appropriate attention to the doctrine of precedence and shall not overlook the judgments of the courts dealing with the subject and principles applicable, in a given case. It is not only the higher court’s judgments that are binding precedents for the Information Commission, but even those of the larger Benches of the Commission should be given due acceptance and enforcement by the smaller Benches of the Commission. The rule of precedence is equally applicable to intra appeals or references in the hierarchy of the Commission.

The writ petition is partly allowed with the above directions, however, without any order as to costs. [writ & petition (CIVIL) No. 210 of 2012 in the matter of Namit Sharma vs Union of India decided on 13.09.2012. The judgment was dictated by Swatanter Kumar and the other judge was A. K. Patnaik.]

Repayment of Deposits

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Introduction

One of the most important and easy sources of raising funds for companies and non-banking financial companies has been public deposits. As per statistics from the RBI, as on March 2010, the aggregate public deposits of the NBFC sector were Rs. 17,247 crore. Add to this the amount raised by companies as public deposits u/s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, deposits being accepted by unincorporated entities, and you would have an amount which would be mind boggling. However, since it is very easy to raise these deposits, a very large number of cases of defaults and frauds are also associated with public deposits. Various Central and State Legislations have been enacted to curb the default in repayment of deposits. Some of these Legislations appear to be entrenching each other’s territories and hence, have invited close scrutiny from the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v SEBI, C.A. No. 9813 of 2011, Order Dated 31st August, 2012, is an example of Courts taking the matter of investor repayment very seriously. Although that case was not in relation to public deposits, it does show us the importance the Courts place on these matters. Let us look at some of the important and controversial issues connected with repayment of deposits which the Courts have had an occasion to consider.

Laws Governing Raising of Deposits by Companies

 Deposits generally mean any deposit of money with a company, subject to exclusions mentioned expressly. What does and does not constitute a deposit can be a subject matter of discussion by itself. However, it would suffice to say that the scope of the term is very large. Deposits can be raised by two types of companies:

(a) Non-banking Financial Companies; and

(b) Companies other than NBFCs

Anup P. Shah Chartered Accountant laws and Business The raising of deposits by NBFCs is governed by Chapter III B of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (“the RBI Act”). Pursuant to this Act, the RBI has notified the Non-Banking Financial Companies Acceptance of Public Deposits (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998; Residuary Non-Banking Companies (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1987 and the Miscellaneous Non-Banking Companies (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1977.

 In the case of Companies which are not NBFCs (also known as NBNFCs), the raising of public deposits is governed by s/s. 58A to 58AAA of the Companies Act,1956 read with the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975. These Laws lay down the meaning of the term deposit as well as various conditions subject to which public deposits can be raised by companies or NBFCs.

Repayment of Deposits by NBFCs S/s.

 45Q and 45QQA of the RBI Act provide that every deposit accepted by a NBFC shall be repaid in accordance with the terms and conditions of the deposit. In case the NBFC fails to so repay the deposit, then the Company Law Board is empowered, either suo moto or an application, to order repayment or reschedule the terms and conditions of repayment. The provisions of these sections override all other laws. In case the NBFC fails to comply with the CLB’s Order, then the RBI can launch prosecution in respect of the same. Any person in default is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term of up to three years and a fine of at least Rs. 50 for every day of noncompliance.

In the case of Piyush Rastogi v Moulik Finance and Resorts Ltd., 88 SCL 104 (All), it was held that RBI had power, jurisdiction and authority to file a criminal complaint against default/contravention made in respect of deposits’ repayment by the company and its directors and, therefore, submission of petitioner that initiation of criminal proceedings was illegal and without any jurisdiction was wholly erroneous. In the case of RBI v Integrated Finance Co. Ltd., 145 Comp. Cases 87 (Mad), the Court held that the repayment of a deposit contemplated under the RBI Act was repayment in cash and not in kind. It further held that the jurisdiction of the CLB to order repayment could not be usurped by any other Court. The CLB has held that there are no fetters on the powers of CLB under the RBI Act and in a particular case, the CLB may order repayment of deposits in modification of the parameters fixed by the RBI – B. Bharathi v Rockland Leasing Ltd., 95 Comp. Cases 471 (CLB).

Repayment by Other Companies

If a company, other than an NBFC, accepts deposits in violation of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975 made u/s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, then the same shall be repaid within 30 days. The CLB may, u/s. 58A(9) order the repayment or rescheduling of the repayment of the deposits by companies other than NBFCs. Failure to comply with the CLB’s order may result in an imprisonment of three years and a fine of at least Rs. 500 for every day of non-compliance. Further, in case of defaults in repayment of deposits of small depositors (deposit of Rs. 20,000 or less in a financial year), the company is required to intimate the CLB. The validity of section 58A has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co Ltd v UOI, (1983) 4 SCC 166.

Deposits by Individuals, Firms, AOP
s

The RBI Act prohibits any individual, firm, AOP, etc., from accepting deposits if that person’s business is that of financing/non-banking financial activities/ receiving deposits/any lending, etc. However, loans raised from certain relatives, partner’s capital, etc., are allowed. The penalty for violation of this provision is punishable with imprisonment for a term of upto two years and/or with a fine higher than Rs. 2,000 or upto twice the deposit received by that person.

The validity of these provisions has been upheld in Kanta Mehta v UOI, 62 Comp. Cases 769 (Delhi) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in T. Velayudhan Achari v UOI, (1993) 2 SCC 582. The Supreme Court has also held that the provisions of this section are applicable to money-lenders, being individuals/firms, registered under State Moneylending Acts, e.g., the Bombay Money-lending Act, 1946 and the State Laws cannot override the RBI Act – Kerala Small Financiers’ Association v UOI, 116 Comp. Cases 641 (SC). Very recently, the RBI has clamped down on certain sole proprietary firms of the promoters of some large NBFCs, which were raising deposits in violation of this provision.

Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act)

 In addition to the above two Central Acts, various States, such as, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, etc., have enacted Depositor Protection Acts. One such Act is the MPID Act of 1999 applicable in the State of Maharashtra. MPID is an Act to protect the interest of depositors of Financial Establishments and applies to “deposits” raised by a Financial Establishment. Section 014 of this Act provides that this Act overrides all other laws. Section 2(c) of the MPID Act defines the expression “deposit” to include any receipt of money or acceptance of any valuable commodity by any Financial Establishment to be returned after a specified period or otherwise, either in cash or in kind or in the form of a specified service with or without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit or in any other form. Thus, the definition of the term is much wider than the definition found under the Companies Act or the RBI Act. The definition expressly excludes the following:

(i) Amounts raised by way of share capital, debenture, bond, other instruments in accordance with SEBI Regulations. Thus, the public issue of securities is excluded.

(ii) Partners’ capital in a firm.

(iii) Amounts received from a bank.

(iv)    Any amount received from specified Public Financial Institutions.

(v)    Amounts received in the ordinary course of business by way of, –
(a)    security deposit,
(b)    dealership deposit,
(c)    earnest money,
(d)    advance against order for goods or services;

(vi)    Any amount received from an individual or a firm or an association of individuals not being a body corporate, registered under any enactment relating to money lending which is for the time being in force in the State. Thus, money received from a money-lender registered under the Bombay Money-lending Act, 1946 is not a deposit.

(vii)    Any amount received by way of subscriptions in respect of a Chit.

A    “Financial Establishment” is defined to mean any person accepting deposit under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner. It does not include a Government company or a bank. The term is very wide and covers within its purview, individuals, firms, NBFCs, companies, etc., which receive deposits.

Section 3 of the MPID Act provides that if any Financial Establishment fraudulently defaults in repayment of a deposit on maturity, then every person, including the promoter, partner, director, any other person, employee, etc., responsible for the management or conducting the business/affairs of the Financial Establishment shall be punished. The penalty is a term of upto six years and fine of upto Rs. 1 lakh. In addition, the Financial Establishment shall be liable for a fine of up to Rs. 1 lakh. The provisions of the MPID Act do not overrule the Criminal Procedure Code and all provisions of arrest, bail, etc., provided in the Code would have to be followed – Uday Mohanlal Acharya v State, (2001) 5 SCC 453.

Section 4 provides an additional recourse to the aggrieved depositor. If the State Government is satisfied that there is a default, it may order attachment of the Financial Establishment’s properties. Only property belonging to the defaulter can be attached. Property taken onleave and licence by the defaulter is not his property and cannot be attached – Chimanlal Modi v State, 2004 (2) Bom. CR. (Cri) 866.

Validity of State Depositor Protection Acts

The validity of the MPID and other similar State Depositor Protection Acts have been the subject matter of great debate. The moot point has been that, when there are Central Statutes in the form of the Companies Act and the RBI Act, how can a State Statute legislate on the very same issue? A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vijay C Puljal v State, 128 Comp. Cases 196 (Bom) (FB), had an occasion to consider this issue in detail. Striking down the validity of the MPID Act as being ultra vires, the Bombay High Court held as follows:

(i)    The constitutional validity of s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956 has been upheld by the Supreme Court. It has also held that the Parliament has legislative competence to enact Sections 58A, 58AA and 58AAA of the Companies Act, 1956.

(ii)    The validity of the provisions of the RBI Act and the legislative competence of Parliament to enact Chapter III-C of this Act were upheld by the Supreme Court.

(iv)    The legislation enacted by the MPID Act directly conflicted with the provisions contained in the Central Legislation. The MPID Act has created an offence in respect of the same subject matter by providing different punishments;

(v)    The law enacted by the MPID Act is, in pith and substance, referable to legislative heads contained in the Central Acts. Hence, the State Legislature has enacted a law which it was not competent to enact.

However, the Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Baskaran v State, (2011) 3 SCC 793 has overruled the aforesaid Bombay High Court decision. Although this was a case in relation to the Tamil Nadu Depositors Act, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the decision in the case of Vijay Puljal. The Madras High Court had upheld the validity of the TN Act, and the case before the Supreme Court was in challenge to this Order. The Apex Court took a socialistic view of the situation and upheld all Depositor Protection Acts. Some excerpts from its judgment are as follows:

“18. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Vijay C. Punjal’s case (supra) in support of his contention that the Tamil Nadu Act, like the Maharasthra Act, was unconstitutional being beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. We do not agree.

19.    We have carefully perused the judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vijay’s case (supra) and we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court.

……………..

22.    We are of the opinion that the impugned Tamil Nadu Act enacted by the State Legislature is not in pith and substance referable to the legislative heads contained in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution though there may be some overlapping. In our opinion, in pith and substance the said Act comes under the entries in List II (the State List) of the Seventh Schedule.

23.    It often happens that a legislation overlaps both Lists I as well as List II of the Seventh Schedule. In such circumstances, the doctrine of pith and substance is applied. We are of the opinion that in pith and substance the impugned State Act is referable to Entries 1, 30 and 31 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and not Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.

24.    It is well-settled that incidental trenching in exercise of ancillary powers into a forbidden legislative territory is permissible.

…………

38.    The Court should interpret the constitutional provisions against the social setting of the country and not in the abstract. The Court must take into consideration the economic realities and aspirations of the people and must further the social interest which is the purpose of legislation.

…………….

39.    We fail to see how there is any violation of Article 14, 19(1)(g) or 21 of the Constitution. The Act is a salutary measure to remedy a great social evil. A systematic conspiracy was effected by certain fraudulent financial establishments which not only committed fraud on the depositor, but also siphoned off or diverted the depositor’s funds mala fide.

……………..

44.    We are of the opinion that there is no merit in this petition. The impugned Tamil Nadu Act is constitutionally valid. In fact, it is a salutary mea-sure which was long overdue to deal with these scamsters who have been thriving like locusts in the country.”

Directors’ Duty

Directors of a company/entity accepting public deposits should be extra cautious, because the consequences are quite stringent in nature. In case of any doubt over whether the company is in violation of any Central/State Deposit Law, they should immediately obtain expert advice. Courts, generally, have a sympathetic attitude towards depositors and hence, deposit acceptors should be wary of any non-compliance on their part. The old adage of “better safe than sorry” would work best and hence, they should consider setting a system of checks and balances in place beforehand.

Courts and arbitrators may take their time, but grumbling is prohibited

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Litigants and society in general have become inured to long delays in courts. Decades-old cases no longer shock anyone. Like climate change, the deceleration of the wheels of justice is hardly discernible to the naked eye.

The Supreme Court stated that 37 years of prosecution is not sufficient in itself to conclude that the accused people have been deprived of their fundamental right to speedy trial.

If this is so in criminal cases, the record of civil courts is worse. Property and partition suits take a lifetime of visiting the courts. In a judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court last week, delays in arbitration was the main argument for quashing the award (Oil India Ltd vs Essar Oil Ltd).

The Supreme Court has dealt with this problem in one of the leading cases, ONGC vs Saw Pipes Ltd (2003). It stated that “it is for the parties to take appropriate action of selecting proper arbitrator(s) who could dispose of the matter within reasonable time fixed by them. It is for them to indicate the time-limit for disposal of the arbitral proceedings. It is for them to decide whether they should continue with the arbitrator (s) who cannot dispose of the matter within reasonable time.”

Long delays keep important issues out of sight and out of mind. For instance, some urgent questions in arbitration law have been referred to a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the 2002 Bhatia International case, but the court has shown no haste to resolve them. Instead, it gave precedence to the problem of incorrect legal reporting mooted by an offended foreign telecom major, and spent two months over it.

There are several economic issues crying for early court decision for decades. These gross cases render the rubric of speedy trial mere rhetoric. Who remembers the appeal lying in the Delhi High Court about the attempted murder of a former Chief Justice of India? It was there for nearly four decades. The trial in the 1993 Bombay blast cases is trundling along in the special court, with no end in sight. All these will climb up the judicial ladder in due time. But remember, no grumbling, and inordinate delay will not be heard as a ground to close the dog-eared files.

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2014 (35) STR 564 (Tri. – Chennai) Shriram RPC Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Is penalty leviable when service tax along with interest is paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice? Held, No.

Facts:
On being pointed out by departmental auditor, service tax along with interest was paid. However, Show Cause Notice was issued imposing penalties. Since tax along with interest was paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice, the appellant claimed entitlement of benefit of 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 and also requested for benefits of section 80. Relying on the decision in case of CCE & STC, Bangalore vs. First Flight Couriers 2007 (8) S.T.R. 225 (Kar.), the revenue denied benefit of section 73(3) considering the case as one of suppression.

Held:
Section 73(3) of Finance Act, 1994 was issued with an intention to encourage immediate realisation of short payment and avoid unnecessary litigations. Karnataka High Court in case of ADECCO Flexione Work Force Solutions Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (kar.), had held that unless there is any active suppression, section 73(3) should be applicable considering First Flight Couriers (supra) on a different footing and not finding even bonafide error or doubt regarding legal provisions, the penalty was set aside.

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2014 (35) STR 397 (Tri.-Del.) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Comm. of C.Ex., & ST, Allahabad

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Whether denial of CENVAT Credit on the ground that invoice did not contain service tax registration number of service provider is valid? Held, No

Facts:
CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that service tax registration number of service provider was not mentioned on the invoice. Adjudicating authority though observed the fact of deposit of tax by service provider in the ST-3 returns denied CENVAT Credit.

Held:
In view of production of ST-3 returns, the defect in the invoice had become a rectifiable defect and accordingly, Tribunal allowed CENVAT Credit.

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2014 (35) STR 529 (Tri. – Ahmd.) Patel Air Freight vs. Commr. Of C.Ex. & Service Tax, Vadodara

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In case of invoices paid after availing discounts, is CENVAT Credit available in full or proportionately? Held in view of facts, full credit would be available.

Facts:
The appellants had availed full CENVAT Credit on discounted invoices. The Revenue contended that CENVAT credit should be allowed proportionally. The appellants relied on Circular No. 877/15/2008-CX, dated 17th November, 2008 and Circular No. 122/3/2010- ST, dated 30th April, 2010 which clarified that CENVAT Credit will be available for such amount which has been paid as Excise Duty/Service tax whether at full value or proportionate value.

Held:
There was no evidence brought to prove that reduced service tax was paid. Also, CENVAT credit was availed of amount paid as service tax, full credit was held as available in view of the above refered circulars.

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 232 (Gujarat) – Cema Electric Lighting Products India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

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Whether assesse is entitled to the CENVAT Credit in respect of catering services received when consideration is recovered from the beneficiaries/assessee’s own employees? Held, No

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer availed CENVAT Credit of entire payment made to the canteen contractor even though the amount is recovered from its employees/ beneficiaries of canteen service. The demand was confirmed under Rule 14 of the CCR in respect of the amount recovered. Both Appellate authorities confirmed the demand.

Held:
The appellant is not entitled for CENVAT Credit if the amount is recovered from the beneficiaries/its own employees while running the canteen. Further, it was held that concurrent finding of facts by both the authorities below, that full details were not furnished and entire amount was recovered, justifies the invocation of extended period of limitation

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S. 43 (5) — Loss suffered in F&O transactions could not be considered as speculation loss.

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions


(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


6 R. B. K. Securities Ltd.
v. ITO


ITAT ‘B’ Bench Mumbai

Before G. C. Gupta (JM) and

A. L. Gehlot (AM)

ITA No. 2465/Mum./2006

A.Y. 2003-04. Decided on : 21-7-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Prakash K. Jotwani/ Niraj
Bansal

S. 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Speculation loss —
Whether the loss suffered in F&O transactions could be considered as speculation
loss — Held, No.

Per G. C. Gupta :

Issue :

Whether the losses suffered in F&O transactions could be
considered as speculation loss.

Held :

Relying on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of SSKI
Investors Services Pvt. Ltd., it was held that dealings in derivatives was a
separate kind of transaction which did not involve any purchase & sale of shares
and therefore loss on account of derivative trading cannot be treated as
speculative loss. Further, the Tribunal also referred to the Bangalore Tribunal
decision in the case of C. Bharath Kumar, where the constructive or implied
delivery was held to be as good as actual delivery. Based on the same, the
Tribunal held that the loss claimed by the assessee on F&O transaction was a
business loss and not speculation loss as contended by the Revenue.

Cases referred to :



1. DCIT v. SSKI Investors Services Pvt. Ltd., (2008)
113 TTJ (Mumbai) 511,

2. C. Bharath Kumar v. DCIT, (2005) 4 SOT 593 (Bang.)

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S. 12A(a) — Once CIT is satisfied about objects of the trust and genuineness of activities, he is required to grant registration w.e.f. date of creation

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions


(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)




5 The Indus Entrepreneur
v. The CIT-II


ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Jaipur

Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and

B. P. Jain (AM)

ITA No. 32/JP/2008

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 20-6-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mahendra Gargieya/

J. L. Basumatari

Assessee society was registered under Rajasthan Societies
Registration Act on 1-9-2005 — Assessee applied to CIT for registration
u/s.12A(a) of Income-tax Act, 1961 — CIT vide his order dated 7-11-2007 granted
registration w.e.f. 1-4-2007 — Whether once CIT is satisfied about objects of
the trust and genuineness of activities, he is required to grant registration
w.e.f. 1-9-2005 — Held, Yes.

Per B. P. Jain :

Facts :

The assessee is a Society registered under Rajasthan
Societies Registration Act on 1-9-2005. The assessee applied for registration on
10-4-2007 before the CIT. The CIT granted registration u/s.12A(a) of the Act
vide its order dated 7-11-2007 w.e.f. 1-4-2007. The assessee made application to
make the said registration effective from 1-9-2005.

Held :

At the outset, the Tribunal noted that the CIT has committed
an error by observing that the application has been made on 10-4-2007, whereas
the same was made on 2-8-2006. A reminder letter dated 10-4-2007 was made to the
CIT, which was wrongly taken as the date of application. Having noted this
error, the Tribunal held as under :

As per the Act, the assessee is required to make the
application in Form 10A before 1-1-1973 or before the expiry of the period of
one year from the date of creation of the trust. In the instant case, the Trust
was created on 1-9-2005 and the assessee has submitted the application on
2-8-2006, which is in time. The CIT is required to grant registration w.e.f.
1-9-2005, if he is satisfied about the objects of the trust and genuineness of
the activities. In the present case, the learned CIT is satisfied about the
objects and genuineness of the activities of the trust and so he has granted
registration, though from a wrong date on a wrong interpretation of the facts of
the case.

The learned CIT is required to pass an order for granting or
refusing the registration u/s.12AA(1)(b) of the Act before 6 months from the end
of the month in which the application is received. The language of the provision
makes it mandatory for the learned CIT either to grant or refuse the
registration within the stipulated period, failing which the assessee is
entitled to assume that its application has been accepted and the registration
granted.

Accordingly, the learned CIT was directed to grant
registration w.e.f. 1-9-2005.


Editor’s note : S. 12AA has been amended w.e.f. 1-6-2007,
whereby the exemption is now available from the financial year in which the
application is made.

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When the assessee converted his immovable property into stock-in-trade and entered into development agreement, the said transaction cannot be said to be a sale of immovable property.

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 part A: reported decisions

 

6 (2010) 42 DTR (Chennai
ITAT) 127

R. Gopinath (HUF) v. ACIT

A.Ys. : 2004-05 & 2005-06.
Dated : 24-7-2009

 

When the assessee converted
his immovable property into stock-in-trade and entered into development
agreement, the said transaction cannot be said to be a sale of immovable
property.

Facts :

The assessee converted his
land from capital asset to stock-in-trade and thereafter entered into a
development agreement dated 1-9-2003 along with a supplementary development
agreement dated 23-12-2003 with a developer, whereby the assessee provided his
land measuring 44,090 sq.ft. to the developer and in return the developer was to
give the assessee a built-up area of 25,285 sq.ft.

The assessee offered capital
gains accrued on conversion of land to stock-in-trade proportionate to the
built-up area sold in different years.

The Assessing Officer was of
the view that the long-term capital gain on transfer of land was assessable in
the year in which the assessee handed over the possession of the land to the
developer itself, pursuant to the agreement.

Held :

S. 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act does not provide the conditions for transfer, but it provides
protection to the transferee of any immovable property by a written contract.

S. 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act is borrowed only with respect to the transfer of capital asset as
provided u/s.2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the same is not applicable in
other cases which do not fall u/s.2(47).

The sale/transfer of
stock-in-trade cannot be equated with transfer of capital asset u/s.2(47). The
decisions relied upon by the learned Departmental representative as well as the
lower authorities are with respect to the transfer of capital asset u/s.2(47)
and not in respect to stock-in-trade.

The assessee handed over the
possession of the property for construction of residential apartments by the
developer. The assessee did not receive any consideration for handing over the
possession of the property to the developer, but to get the built-up area of
25,130 sq.ft.

In the absence of the
transfer of the title of the property and any consideration at the time of
development agreement, the handing over of the possession was merely a temporary
measure for carrying out the construction work by the developer and the
exclusive possession of the property in legal sense remains with the assessee.

The nature of the transaction between the
parties by way of development agreement cannot be said to be a sale of immovable
property which is stock-in-trade.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 45 — The gain arising on transfer of FSI/TDR is chargeable to tax under the head ‘capital gain’ and not under the head ‘Other Sources’ — However, as there is no cost of acquisition of the asset transferred, there will be no liabi

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 part A: reported decisions


5 (2010) TIOL 512 ITAT-Mum.

ITO v. Shri Ram Kumar
Malhotra

ITA No. 4843/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated :
14-5-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 45
— The gain arising on transfer of FSI/TDR is chargeable to tax under the head
‘capital gain’ and not under the head ‘Other Sources’ — However, as there is no
cost of acquisition of the asset transferred, there will be no liability to
capital gains.

Facts :

The assessee, in the year
1977, acquired the property under the registered lease and became co-owner of
the property and was holding 5t shares of the society. The assessee entered into
a development agreement with M/s. P. R. Investsment for the development of the
said property (bungalow) to construct 7-storied building as per approved plans.
The assessee retained proportionate FSI in the said plot for his own residential
accommodation to be constructed by the developer for a consideration of
Rs.21,00,000. The balance FSI was to be utilised by the developer for
construction of the building. The developer was authorised to use the TDR as per
applicable law. Thus, the assessee gave development rights to the developer for
construction of the property. The assessee regarded income arising from transfer
of development rights to be chargeable to tax as capital gains.

The Assessing Officer taxed
the proceeds as Income from other sources on the ground that the assessee had
not extinguished his right, title and interest in the property in any manner and
continued to hold leasehold rights in the property jointly with Shri Anil Kumar
Malhotra. The arrangement under the development agreement, according to the AO,
was to enable the developer to bring in marketable TDR on the plot and construct
and develop the same and sell the constructed area to outside people of his
choice who will have no right, title and interest in the plot of land.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who directed the AO to tax the gain arising on
transfer of FSI/TDR as capital gain and to make necessary calculation of sale
consideration and cost of acquisition and/or improvement and also allow
exemption u/s.54 and u/s.54EC to the extent of investments made, after due
verification.

Aggrieved, the Revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal following the
ratio of the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of New Shailaja Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. v. ITO, (2009 TIOL 58 ITAT-Mum.), ITO v. Lotia Court Co-op.
Hsg. Soc. Ltd., (2008 TIOL 404 ITAT-Mum.), Jethalal D. Mehta v. Dy. CIT, (2 SOT
422) (Mum.) and Maheshwar Prakash 2 CHS v. ITO, 20 DTR 269 (Mum.) held that the
CIT(A) was right in holding that the gain arising on transfer of FSI/TDR is
chargeable to tax under the head ‘capital gain’ and not under the head ‘other
sources’. However, as there is no cost of acquisition of the asset transferred,
there will be no liability to capital gains.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32 — Router and switches when used along with a computer and when their functions are integrated with a ‘computer’ would be included in the block of ‘computer’ entitled to depreciation at the rate of 60%.

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 part A: reported decisions

 

4 (2010) TIOL 473 ITAT-SB-Mum.

DCIT v. Datacraft India Ltd.

ITA No. 7462 & 754
/Mum./2007

A.Ys. : 2003-04 and 2002-03.
Dated : 9-7-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32
— Router and switches when used along with a computer and when their functions
are integrated with a ‘computer’ would be included in the block of ‘computer’
entitled to depreciation at the rate of 60%.

Facts :

The assessee-company was
engaged in data communication, design, development, purchase and sale of
networking products, etc. The assessee claimed depreciation amounting to
Rs.3,27,67,150 at the rate of 60% under the head ‘Computers’. The assessee had
included routers and switches in the block of computers. The Assessing Officer
(AO) held that routers and switches were entitled to depreciation at the general
rate of 25% as applicable to plant and not as claimed by the assessee at 60%.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the routers and switches fall
under the block of ‘computers’. He allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The President referred the following
question to the Special Bench (SB) for its consideration :

“Whether routers and
switches can be classified as computer entitled to depreciation at 60% or have
to be classified as general plant and machine entitled to depreciation only at
25%.”

Held :

The SB noted that the term
‘computers’ is not defined in the Act. Even the General Clauses Act does not
define the term ‘computers’. The term ‘computer systems’ has been defined in S.
36(1)(xi) but considering the fact that the object of S. 36(1)(xi) is quite
distinct from that of S. 32 the SB was of the opinion that the definition of the
term ‘computer system’ given in the Explanation to S. 36(1)(xi) cannot be
applied as such (for giving meaning to ‘computer’) in the context of S. 32.
Considering the scheme of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and also the
objects of the said Act, the SB noted that the rationale behind the Information
Technology Act, 2000 is quite distinct from that of the Income-tax Act and since
both these acts are not pari materia the definition of ‘computer’ as given in
the Information Technology Act, 2000 cannot be applied in the context of S. 32
of the Act. Considering the general parlance meaning of the term ‘computer’ and
also that of ‘routers’ and ‘switches’ the SB held that router and switches can
be classified as computer hardware when they are used along with a computer and
when their functions are integrated with a ‘computer’. It held that when a
device is used as part of the computer in its functions, then it would be termed
as a computer to be included in the block of ‘computer’ entitled to depreciation
at the rate of 60%.

The appeal filed by the
Revenue was dismissed.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Principle of mutuality — Principle of mutuality is applicable to the assessee even though it is an incorporated company —Interest earned by the mutual association from banks, bonds, etc. on surplus funds is not liable to tax.

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3 (2010) TIOL 481 ITAT-Mum.

ITO v. Hill Properties Ltd.

ITA No. 6223/Mum./2009 and

ITA No. 6249/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated :
16-7-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Principle of mutuality — Principle of mutuality is applicable to the assessee
even though it is an incorporated company —Interest earned by the mutual
association
from banks, bonds, etc. on surplus funds is not liable to tax.

Facts :

The assessee-company
constructed a building, flats in which were allotted to shareholders. The
assessee in its return of income claimed the amounts collected towards share
transfer fees : Rs.62,20,000; nominee occupancy charges and repairs :
Rs.3,00,000; security deposits (non-refundable) : Rs.5,85,000 and interest and
dividend: Rs.11,95,577 to be not chargeable to tax on the ground of mutuality.
The assessee received nominee occupancy charges in respect of flats which were
given on rent by the members. Non-refundable security deposits were received by
the assessee from shareholders who carried out repairs to their flats. The
Assessing Officer (AO) in an order passed u/s.147 of the Act taxed all these
amounts on the ground that the principle of mutuality applies only to
co-operative bodies and as regards transfer fees he held that since the transfer
fees were received from incoming members, in view of the ratio of the Special
Bench decision of the ITAT in the case of Walkeshwar Triveni CHS Ltd. the same
are taxable. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) held that the
principle of mutuality applies. He held that the share transfer fees, nominee
occupancy charges and security deposits (non-refundable) to be not chargeable to
tax. He, however, held that interest and dividend is chargeable to tax since in
case of interest and dividend contributors to the common fund are non-members of
the
assessee-company, who are not entitled to participate in the surplus.

Aggrieved the assessee and
the Department preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that in
earlier years, in the as-sessee’s own case, the Tribunal has accepted that the
principle of mutuality is applicable even in the case of an assessee being a
company. The Tribunal following the orders of the Tribunal in the as-sessee’s
own case and the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Bankipur Club Ltd.
(226 ITR 97) (SC) confirmed the decision of the CIT(A) that principle of
mutuality is applicable to the assessee even though it is an incorporated
company.

The Tribunal following the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sind Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd., held the share transfer fees to be not chargeable to tax because
of the principle of mutuality.

The Tribunal having noted
that non-refundable security deposits were received by the assessee from its
members who wanted to carry out some repairs in their flats and the identity of
the contributors and the participants in the surplus was preserved, held the
same to be not chargeable to tax.

Non-occupancy charges were
held to be not liable to tax by following the decision of the Bombay High Court
in the case of Mittal Court Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. (2009 TIOL 548 HC
Mum.-IT).

Interest earned from banks
on surplus funds was held to be not liable to tax by following the order of the
Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 and also the order of the
Tribunal in the case of Bombay Gymkhana Ltd. (ITA No. 7624/Mum./2007 dated
20-4-2009).

The appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed and the appeal of the Department was dismissed.

 

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S. 254(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Principle of consistency qua judicial forums is not unexceptionable; if the subsequent Bench finds it difficult to follow the earlier view due to any convincing reason, the earlier view cannot be thrust upon it; whe

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 2 (2010) 129 TTJ 521 (Mum.)
(SB)


The Maharashtra State Coop.
Bank Ltd.
v.

ACIT

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated :
22-1-2010

(a) S. 254(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Principle of consistency qua judicial forums is not
unexceptionable; if the subsequent Bench finds it difficult to follow the
earlier view due to any convincing reason, the earlier view cannot be thrust
upon it; when a matter is referred to the Larger Bench, the appeal needs to be
decided on merits rather than following the earlier view taken by the Tribunal
in assessee’s own case.

(b) S. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Interest u/s.244A received by assessee, a co-operative
bank, on refund of income-tax paid by it in relation to the banking business
carried on by it is covered within the expression ‘profits and gains of
business’ occurring in S. 80P(2)(a) and the assessee is entitled to deduction
u/s.80P(2)(a)(i).

S. 254(1) :

The principle of consistency
qua the judicial forums is not unexceptionable. It is true that ordinarily the
order passed by the earlier Bench on the same point should be respected and
followed. But if the subsequent Bench finds it difficult to follow the earlier
view due to any convincing reason, such as change in the factual or legal
position or non-raising or non-consideration of an important argument by the
earlier Bench having bearing on the issue, then the earlier view cannot be
thrust upon it. So when a matter is referred to the Larger Bench, the view
earlier taken by the Division Bench ceases to be binding on the Special Bench
though it retains the persuasive value. In view of the above-discussed legal
position, the action of the Division Bench in referring the matter for
consideration by a Special Bench is perfectly in order since it found itself
unable to agree with the earlier view taken by another Division Bench of the
Tribunal in the assessee’s own case. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the
action of the Division Bench in making reference for the constitution of the
Special Bench when it found it difficult to accept the earlier view taken in the
assessee’s own case. Under these circumstances the exception to the application
of principle of consistency gets attracted and the appeal needs to be decided on
merits rather than following the earlier view taken by the Tribunal in its own
case.

The Tribunal relied on the
decisions in the following cases :

(a) Union of India &
Anr. v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd.,
(1990) 87 CTR (SC) 180/(1990) 49 ELT 322
(SC)

(b) Dy. CIT v. Reliance
Industries Ltd.,
(2004) 82 TTJ (Mumbai) (SB) 765/(2004) 88 ITD 273
(Mumbai) (SB)

S. 80P(2)(a)(i) :

The Assessing Officer,
during the reassessment proceedings, opined that the interest received by the
assessee on income tax refund was on account of non-banking activity. The CIT(A)
also accepted the Assessing Officer’s order.

The Special Bench, relying
on the decisions in the following cases, ruled in favour of the assessee :

(a) ITO (ITA No.
4252/Mumbai/2000) and Punjab State Co-op. Bank v. Dy. CIT, (2000) 113
Taxman 128 (CHD) (Mag.)

(b) Cambay Electric
Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1978
CTR (SC) 50/(1978) 113 ITR 84 (SC)

The Special Bench noted as
under :

(1) The assessee was
carrying on banking business over the years and tax was collected by the
Revenue in relation to such banking business. Thus, there is a nexus between
the payment of income-tax, its refund and interest on such refund with the
business of banking. But for the carrying on of the banking business, the
assessee would not have paid the income-tax which was refunded to it. Since
income-tax was paid in relation to the banking business, the interest on
income-tax refund will be considered as ‘gain’ (not ‘profit’) of banking
business covered within the expression ‘profits and gains’ of banking
business. Therefore, interest on refund of income-tax would be covered within
the expression ‘profits and gains of business’, notwithstanding the
fact that it falls under the head ‘income from other sources’.

(2) The direct nexus of
interest on income-tax refund is with the payment of income-tax but when the
relation between income-tax and the income on which it was paid is traced, it
comes to light that the same was for the business of banking. Thus, there
exists a commercial and casual connection between the interest on income-tax
refund and the banking business.

(3) Therefore, the
assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) on the amount of interest
received u/s.244A on the refund of tax.

 

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Penalty proceedings being separate and independent, the assessee can show that finding recorded in the quantum proceedings is not reliable and sufficient to impose penalty.

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 part A: reported decisions


1 (2010) 125 ITD 313 (Ahd.)
(TM)

Dhirajlal Maganlal Shah v.
ITO

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated :
25-9-2009

 

Penalty proceedings being
separate and independent, the assessee can show that finding recorded in the
quantum proceedings is not reliable and sufficient to impose penalty.

Facts :

During the scrutiny
assessment the Assessing Officer found that the assessee had paid a sum of
Rs.4,68,305 to some SJT as transport charges. The Assessing Officer held that
the payment was not a genuine one and disallowed the same. On appeal, the CIT(A)
confirmed the disallowance and so did the Tribunal. The Assessing Officer
initiated the penalty proceedings.

In reply to the show-cause
notice, the assessee contended that he had produced all the evidences, including
copies of account payee cheques, in respect of the impugned payment. He further
contended that the Assessing Officer was not able to appreciate the facts of the
case and merely levied penalty only on the basis that the bills produced were
unsigned. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the levy of penalty.

On further appeal to the
Tribunal, the Members differed. The Accountant Member held that there was no
evidence that the payment was made through account payee cheque. He further
observed that the findings of the ITAT in quantum appeal that the assessee has
not discharged the onus has become final. Further, relying on the decision of
Dharmendra Textiles 306 ITR 227 (SC) and other decisions, he upheld the levy of
penalty.

The Judicial Member on the
other hand, observed that the assessee had furnished all the evidences and
details. The bank statement also confirmed the payment made to SJT. He concluded
that the explanations offered by the assessee was not false.

On matter being referred to
the third Member, the following was observed and held :

Held :

It is a settled law that
finding recorded in assessment proceedings is not conclusive, although it is
entitled to great weight. The penalty proceedings being separate and independent
proceedings, the assessee can always show that the finding recorded in the
quantum proceedings is not reliable and sufficient to impose penalty. The
assessee had produced all the evidences along with the bank statements. The
payment was made through account payee cheque. In this background there is no
justification to term the explanation of the assessee as false and levy penalty.

 

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S. 80IB(10) — Land purchased in 1996 — Revised plan approved, commencement certificate issued, and use of land for non-agricultural purposes permitted after 1-10-1998 — Whether AO justified in denying deduction u/s.80IB(10) on ground that commencement of

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Part B — Unreported Decisions


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1 ITO, 14(3)(3) v.


Shri Vimalchand M. Dhoka

ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before K. C. Singhal (JM) and V. K. Gupta (AM)

ITA No. 5520/Mum./2005

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 19-5-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Sanjay Agarwal/

Vimal Punmiya


S. 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — In respect of
Lonavala Project of the assessee for which deduction was claimed u/s.80IB(10),
land was purchased in 1996 — Wall was constructed — WIP of this project on
31-3-1998 was stated to be Rs.10,17,615 — Original plan expired after validity
period of one year — Revised plan was approved and commencement certificate
issued on 30-9-2000 — User of land for non-agricultural purposes was permitted
on 28-6-2001 — Whether AO justified in denying deduction u/s.80IB(10) on the
ground that the condition u/s.80IB(10)(a)
viz. commencement of the
construction after 1-10-1998 was not satisfied — Held, No.


Per V. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of textiles and
construction. In A.Y. 2002-03, in respect of construction business, the assessee
claimed deduction u/s.80IB(10) at Rs.62,21,131 in respect of his projects at
Virar and Lonavala. In respect of Lonavala project, land was purchased in 1996
for Rs.5.50 lakhs and work-in-progress as on 31-3-1998 was shown at
Rs.10,17,615. The AO disallowed the claim for deduction u/s.80IB(10) of
Rs.3,32,369 in respect of Lonavala project, on the ground that the project had
commenced prior to 1st October 1998, since land for Lonavala project was
purchased in 1996 and as on 31st March 1998, certain expenses were shown as
work-in-progress and also a wall was constructed. According to the AO, the
project did not satisfy the condition stated in S. 80IB(10)(a). Before the CIT(A)
the assessee contended that :

(a) no construction work actually took place before 1st
October 1998;

(b) the wall was constructed merely to prevent the entry of
trespassers;

(c) the plan, originally submitted, expired after the
validity period of one year, hence revised plan was submitted, which was
approved by the concerned statutory authorities and, thereafter construction
work started after 1-10-1998;

(d) the land was an agricultural land and conversion of
land use was permitted only on 28-6-2001;

(e) the expenses shown in the balance sheet were of
administrative nature and not of construction activity. The CIT(A) found force
in the arguments of the assessee that the expenses incurred on architect fees,
landscape and elevation on filling the plot are the expenses which were
necessary for submitting the plan for the project and that incurring of these
expenses cannot be taken as commencement of the project. The fact that
permission for conversion of land from agricultural use to non-agricultural
use was issued on 28-6-2001 and also the commencement certificates were issued
by the relevant authority only on 30-9-2000 also weighed with the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) also stated that before getting the order for conversion and
commencement certificate, the construction activity cannot be started. He,
therefore, agreed with the assessee and directed the AO to grant deduction to
the assessee as claimed by it. The Revenue preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.


Held :

The expenses incurred for change of land use and other
administrative/other land development expenses incurred prior to statutory
approvals, which approvals have been received after 1st October 1998 cannot
result into commencement of the project before 1st October 1998. The Tribunal
observed that the CIT(A) has examined the issue in detail and found itself to be
in agreement with the findings of the learned CIT(A), hence the Tribunal
confirmed the order passed by CIT(A). Accordingly, appeal filed by the Revenue
was dismissed.

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S. 14A – Where surplus earned is more than the investment made, no disallowance u/s.14A could be made

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photocopying and postage.)



4 Faze Three Exports Ltd. v. Addl. CIT


ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and V. D. Rao (JM)

ITA Nos. 7701 and 4677/Mum./2004 and 2005

A.Ys. : 2001-02 and 2002-03. Decided on : 28-7-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Jitendra Jain/Bharat Bhushan

S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Disallowance of expenses
in relation to exempt income — Assessee, an exporter, had made investments in
shares of different companies, including group companies — Assessee able to show
earnings more than the amount of investment made — Whether Assessing Officer
justified in disallowing interest — Held, No.

Per J. Sudhakar Reddy :

Facts :

The assessee was in the business of exports of goods. As the
assessee had investments in equity shares, in addition to Rs.4.52 crore invested
in preference shares of a group company in the year under appeal, the Assessing
Officer disallowed part of the interest cost u/s.14A of the of the Act.

On appeal the CIT(A) held that interest paid on term loan,
discounting charges and other bank charges as well as interest on vehicles’ loan
cannot be disallowed, as the same can be held to have been utilised for specific
purposes. However, with reference to interest paid on packing credit, the CIT(A)
was of the view that the same could be subjected to S. 14A, and he accordingly,
restricted the disallowance to Rs.4.57 lacs.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue justified the orders of the
authorities below and contended that certain interest expenditure could
definitely be attributable to the investments made by the assessee. It further
relied on the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Motor General Finance
Ltd.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the CIT(A) had erroneously
concluded that the packing credit was available for all the activities of the
assessee and that since the assessee was having only one bank account, it should
be presumed that the investment had also gone out of packing credit loan and the
same was required to be apportioned. The Tribunal noted that as per the terms of
the packing credit facility, the fund is released only against export orders.
According to the Tribunal, the presumption of the CIT(A) that the assessee would
have violated the stipulation laid down by the bank was unwarranted, especially
when there was no evidence in that regard. Further, it was noted that the
assessee was able to demonstrate that its earning during each of the years was
much more than the investment made in the particular year. It had own fund of
Rs.48.44 crore as against the borrowed fund of Rs.6.3 crore, while the
investment in equity was Rs.4.52 crore. Based on the above and also relying on
the Supreme Court decision in the case of Munjal Sales Corpn., the Tribunal
allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Cases referred to :



1. Munjal Sales Corpn. v. CIT, 298 ITR 298 (SC)

2. CIT v. Motor General Finance Ltd., 254 ITR 449
(Del.)



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S. 43B – Interest on Custom duty not covered in S. 43B

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3 Royal Cushion Vinyl Products Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sushma Chowla (JM) and

Abraham P. George (AM)

ITA No. 2824/M/2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Decided on : 31-7-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mayur Shah/

K. M. Varma

S. 43B of Income-tax Act, 1961 — Interest on Customs duty —
Whether such interest falls within the ambit of provisions of S. 43B — Held, No.

Per Abraham P. George :

Facts :

The assessee was a manufacturer of PVC flooring, leather
cloth, etc. It had imported certain raw materials under advance licence without
the payment of customs duty. This exemption was granted with the condition that
the assessee would export required value of goods. However, for its failure to
export goods, the assessee was made to pay the customs duty of Rs.9.52 crore,
which was waived on goods imported, along with the interest of Rs.3.78 crore. In
its tax audit report, the assessee had shown Rs.13.20 crore as disallowable
u/s.43B. However, in its return of income filed, the assessee had disallowed the
sum of Rs.9.52 crore only i.e., the amount equal to the custom duty. The
interest of Rs.3.78 crore was claimed as not covered u/s.43B. The Assessing
Officer as well as the CIT(A) held that the interest was disallowable u/s.43B.

Held :

The Tribunal referred to the Calcutta High Court decision in
the case of Hindustan Motors Ltd., where it was held that interest payable under
the Customs Act, 1962 was not part and parcel of customs duty payable and hence,
such interest did not attract S. 43B of the Act. According to it, the same High
Court followed the said decision in Orient Beverages Ltd., where it was held
that interest payable on outstanding municipal taxes could not be disallowed
u/s. 43B. Further, it also referred to the Apex Court decision in the case of
Harshad Mehta, where it was held that penalty or interest could not be
considered as tax. In view of the same, and the fact that there were no
decisions of the jurisdictional High Court, though there were decisions which
were against the assessee but of a different High Court, the Tribunal allowed
the appeal and deleted the disallowance of Rs.3.78 crore.

Cases referred to :



1. Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. CIT, 218 ITR 450 (Cal.)

2. CIT v. Orient Beverages Ltd., 247 ITR 230 (Cal.)

3. Harshad Mehta v. Custodian and Others, 231 ITR
871 (SC)



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Whether CIT(A) was justified in refusing to admit additional evidence — Held, No

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2 Anmol Colours India (P) Ltd.
v. ITO


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur

Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and

B. P. Jain (AM)

ITA No. 379/JP/2008

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 20-6-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue :

Mahendra Gargieya/P. C. Sharma

Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 and gave the assessee various opportunities to produce documents in
support of the return filed — None appeared for the assessee — AO proceeded to
make an ex-parte assessment u/s.144 by treating addition to unsecured loans and
share application money during the year as unexplained u/s.68 of the Act —
Before CIT(A), assessee contended that it had given all documents/evidences to
its counsel who failed to appear before the AO — Assessee should not be made to
suffer for no lapse on his part — Assessee filed application under Rule 46A
along with documents/ evidences for admission thereof as additional evidence —
CIT(A) refused to admit additional evidence — Whether CIT(A) was justified in
refusing to admit additional evidence — Held, No.

Per B. P. Jain :

Facts :

The assessee was served notice u/s.143(2) of the Act on
29-10-2003. Thereafter, the assessee was given various opportunities and show
cause for producing the documents in support of the return filed. No one
appeared and the AO proceeded to make an ex-parte assessment u/s.144 of
the Act. The AO treated the addition to the unsecured loans and share
application money during the year as unexplained u/s.68 of the Act and added the
same to the income of the assessee. The AO further denied the claim of the
business loss of Rs.1,77,365 and treated the business income as Nil. Before the
CIT(A), the assessee contended that all the documents/evidences were given to
the counsel of the assessee and that the assessee was totally dependent upon his
counsel for representing the matter before the AO, but he did not care to attend
the proceedings. It was submitted that the assessee should not be made to suffer
for the serious lapse on the part of his counsel. The assessee stated that upon
receipt of the assessment order it came to know for the first time about the
additions made by the AO. The affidavit in this regard was filed before CIT(A).
The assessee contended that the circumstances were beyond the control of the
assessee and therefore, assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from
producing the documents/evidence before the AO. The assessee filed an
application under Rule 46A and produced the necessary evidences, before the
CIT(A), which were, in the opinion of the assessee, required for disposal of the
case. The CIT(A), upon receipt of the application along with documents/evidences
sent the said application along with documents/evidences to the AO. In response
thereto, the AO wrote a letter to the CIT(A) stating that assessee had not
appeared and had not produced any evidence despite various opportunities and now
on the basis of evidence filed before the CIT(A), the said loans and share
application money are verifiable from the books of the assessee. Upon receipt of
the letter from the AO, the CIT(A) held that none of the conditions specified
under Rule 46A are fulfilled and therefore he refused to admit the additional
evidence and confirmed the action of the AO. The assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

Held :

The explanation of the assessee appears to be bona fide
and the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from producing the evidence
which it was called upon to produce before the AO. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not
justified in not admitting the additional evidence under Rule 46A of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962.

When the application under Rule 46A along with documents was
sent to the AO and the AO in his letter to the CIT(A) stated that on the basis
of evidence filed before the CIT(A), the said loans and share application money
are verifiable from the books of the assessee, then the CIT(A) within his power
under sub-rule 4 of Rule 46A could direct the AO to examine the
documents/evidences filed by the assessee to dispose of the appeal.

The powers of the first Appellate Authority are very wide and
co-terminus with those of the AO and what AO can do, he can do and what AO fails
to do, that also he can do [refer Kanpur Coal Syndicate, 53 ITR 225 (SC)]. S.
251 and S. 252 of the Act have also been worded keeping the same spirit, as also
Rule 46A.

S. 250(4) empowers the CIT(A) to make further inquiries on
its own or to direct the AO to make further inquiry and to report to him.

The embargo put on his power under Rule 46A(1) and (2) has
also been loosened by sub-rule 4 which empowers the CIT(A) to direct the
production of any document/examination of witness, to enable him to dispose of
the appeal. Thus, the legislative intent is quite clear and the CIT(A) should
not jump straightway to reject, if the appellant files some evidence before him
under the provisions of Rule 46A(1).

The powers of the CIT(A) as submitted above are also to be
interpreted in the context of the amended law, wherein he is no more empowered
to restore back any matter which was earlier u/s.251(1)(a), necessitating a
compulsory admission of the evidence before him in the interest of justice.

Since all the evidences have to be examined by the AO,
therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter is restored back to the file
of the AO who will examine the evidences filed by the assessee before the CIT(A)
and decide the issue de novo, but by providing adequate opportunity of
being heard to the as-sessee. The assessee may submit further documents or
evidences as required in support of his claim before the AO. The AO is directed
to act accordingly.


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Ex debito justitiae

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The Word

The expression ‘ex debito justitiae’ literally stands
for doing justice. In legal usage, it speaks of a remedy which enables one to
get justice when principles of equity and justice are violated in any order of
the Court. The principle embodied in the maxim is that a Court of plenary
jurisdiction should have powers to correct its own judgments and order of
subordinate Courts, regardless of any specific power conferred on it, for the
purpose of preventing abuse of process and grave palpable errors.


2. A judgment pronounced by a Court is generally final until
disturbed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. However, if for any reason — a
glaring omission or a patent mistake — there is some manifest illegality or want
of jurisdiction in the order, the Courts are empowered to remedy the abuse of
process by reviewing its decisions on petition or suo motu ‘ex debito
justitiae’
, as no suitor should suffer for the wrong of the Court.

3. Drawing distinction between remedies available for regular
and irregular orders, the Privy Council in Isaacs v. Robertson, (1984) 3
AER 140 observed that “if an order is regular it can be set aside by an
Appellate Court; if the order is irregular, it can be set aside by the Court
that made it on application being made to that Court either under the rules of
that Court dealing expressly with setting aside orders for irregularity or,
‘ex debito justitiae’
, if the circumstances warranted, namely, violation of
the rules of natural justice or fundamental rights.

4. Cases of frank failure of natural justice are obvious
cases where relief is granted as of right. The principle finds acceptance in S.
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads :

“151. Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be
necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the
Court.”


5. In criminal cases, the maxim was recognised in spirit by
S. 561A of the 1898 Code which finds expression in S. 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Section reads :

“482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”


6. The Apex Court relied heavily on the maxim in A. R.
Antulay v. R. S. Nayak & Anr.,
[1988 AIR 1513 (SC)] where the appellant, the
then Chief Minister of Maharashtra who resigned in deference to a High Court
judgment, but continued as MLA, was charged before the Special Judge u/s.161 and
u/s. 165 IPC for taking gratification in respect of official act. After several
proceedings in lower and the High Court, the Supreme Court, in appeal before it,
set aside the order of the Special Judge discharging the accused and, as the
proceedings had dragged too long, withdrew the case from the Special Judge
suo motu
and assigned it to a sitting Judge of the High Court. As the order
of the Supreme Court was in disregard of the provisions of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1952, under which such offences could be tried by Special Judge
only, the same was challenged before the High Court and then, in appeal, before
the Supreme Court. Admitting the wrong, the Court repelled the argument that as
the Superior Court is deemed to have general jurisdiction, the law presumes that
the Court acted within jurisdiction. The Court observed that ‘the impugned
direction were in deprival of the constitutional rights, contrary to the express
provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, in violation of the
principles of natural justice, and without precedent in the background of the
Act of 1952. The directions definitely deprived the appellant of certain rights
of appeal and revision and his rights under the Constitution. The Court further
observed “having regard to the enormity of the consequences of the error to the
appellant and by reason of the fact that the directions were given suo motu,
there is nothing which detracts the power of the Court to review its judgment
‘ex debito justitiae’
, in case injustice has been caused.

7. The maxim can operate even against the express bar on
review, if circumstances so require. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra,
1978 AIR, SC 47, the appellant was prosecuted u/s.500 IPC for making defamatory
statement against the then Law Minister Shri A. R. Antulay. The same was
challenged on the ground that the statement made was in personal capacity. The
challenge having been rejected by the Sessions Judge, revision petition was
filed before the High Court, which was held not maintainable on the ground of
specific bar in relation to interlocutory orders in S. 397(2) of the Cr. P.C.
Holding that the High Court has inherent power to be exercised ‘ex debito
justitiae’
to do the real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone Courts exist, the Supreme Court observed that “The instant case
wherein the order impugned rejected the application challenging the jurisdiction
of the Court to proceed with the trial, undoubtedly fell for exercise of the
power of the High Court in accordance with S. 482, even assuming, although not
accepting that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is
impermissible.” Similar issue was involved in V. C. Shukla v. State, 1980
AIR 962 SC where the jurisdiction to issue directions by the Judge of Special
Court for charges to be framed against the appellant were challenged. The High
Court held the revision petition not maintainable on the ground of the order
being interlocutory. Not agreeing with the High Court, the Supreme Court held
that “apart from the revisional power, the High Court under the code of 1898
possessed an inherent power to pass order ‘ex debito justitiae’ in order
to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

8.    The power of review or revision ‘ex debito justi-tiae’ is exercisable only by Courts exercising original, appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The High Court’s power to grant stay of demand in reference proceedings u/s.256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 came for consideration before the Supreme Court in CIT Delhi v. Bansidhar and Sons, [157 ITR 665 (SC)]. The assessee sought injunction and stay of demand relying upon the inherent jurisdiction u/ s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was granted by the High Court on condition of furnishing of adequate security. Upholding the Revenue’s challenge, the Supreme Court ruled that the power to act I ex debito justitiae’ related to matters of procedure and not substantive rights of the parties. In answering questions or disposing of references either u/ s.66 of the 1922 Act or S. 256 of 1961 Act, the High Courts do not exercise any jurisdiction conferred upon them by the C.P.C. or the Charters or by the Act establishing respective High Courts. It is a special jurisdiction of a limited nature conferred by the Income-tax Act for limited purpose of”obtaming the High Court’s opinion on questions of law. Rendering advice has nothing to do with recovery of tax or granting stay. Therefore, the concept of granting stay In a reference’ ex debito justitiae’ does not arise. That concept might arise in case of the Appellate Authority exercising its power to grant stay where there is no express provision.

9.    With the deletion of S. 256 and insertion of S. 260A and S. 260B conferring Appellate jurisdiction on High Courts, the aforesaid observations no longer remain relevant.

10.    Even though it is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which the petition ‘ex debito justitiae’ is maintainable, the Courts have been acting only in cases of grave justice and breach of principle of natural injustice where consequences are grave for the aggrieved. In Shivnath Prasad v. State of W.B. and Others, [2006] INSC 62, the High Court’s order refusing to intervene in proceedings launched u/s.120B, u/s.406, u/s.417 and u/s.420 of IPC against R S Lodha in connection with the allegedly forged will of Late Smt. Priyamvada Birla was challenged. An argument was made that since the complaint was frivolous, vexatious, oppressive and malicious, the High Court should have exercised its powers u/ s.482 of Cr. P. C, because such powers are required to be exercised ‘ex debito justitiae’ or for the ends of justice. After going in detail into the facts of the case and scope of the inherent power enshrined in S. 482, the Apex Court declined to inter-fere and the appeal was dismissed.

Processing of returns for A.Y. 2007-08 and steps to clear the backlog. Instruction No. 12/2008, F.No.225/106/2008-ITA-II dated 5-9-2008 (reproduced).

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2 Processing of returns for A.Y. 2007-08 and
steps to clear the backlog. Instruction No. 12/2008, F.No.225/106/2008-ITA-II
dated 5-9-2008 (reproduced).

Kindly refer to the above.

 


2. A review of CAP-II statements for June and July 2008 shows
a large pendency of returns for A.Y. 2007-08 in almost all CCIT Regions. The
Board had earlier kept a target of 4-6 months for processing of returns. The
criteria for matching claims for granting TDS certificates were relaxed in June
2006, in order to expedite the processing of pending returns and necessary
instruction in this regard was issued vide Instruction No. 6/2008, dated 18th
June, 2008. However, the number of returns processed has not shown any
significant improvement. A large number of electronic returns for A.Y. 2007-08
as also refund returns are still pending for processing. The Board is concerned
about the slow pace of progress in this regard. In order to speed up the
processing of pending returns for A.Y. 2007-08, it has been decided to adopt the
following strategy :

(1) All pending returns for A.Y. 2007-08 involving refund
claims (including electronic returns with refund claims) must be processed on
priority basis by 30th September, 2008. Where any scrutiny assessment is
pending in these cases, refund should be issued only after completion of the
scrutiny assessment.

(2) For processing electronic returns involving refund
claims, TDS data supplied by DGIT (Systems) on CDs along with AST instructions
68 may be utilised.

(3) Refund returns involving inter-RCC migration of PAN may
be processed on TMS.

(4) Since data of electronic returns is already on the
system, once this is acquired into the RCC data base, it will become part of
the selection process under CASS. Therefore, electronic returns for A.Y.
2007-08 not involving refund claims can be taken up for processing after 30th
September. However, it has to be ensured that all such returns are acquired
and incorporated into RCC data base before the next round of CASS is run.

(5) Returns in forms ITR-4 and 5 filed in paper made by
business assessees and not covered by S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961
should be taken up for processing on AST at the stations on network on
priority basis at the earliest before the next round of selection through
CASS.

(6) Salary returns for A.Y. 2007-08 in which there is no
refund or demand and the TDS claim is below Rs.5 lakh, may be given the last
priority for processing.

 


This may be brought to the notice of all concerned for strict
compliance. Any difficulties arising in processing of returns on AST may be
brought to the notice of DGIT (Systems) and, wherever necessary, to the Board.

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Scrutiny of FBT returns — Instruction No. 11/2008, F.No.225/44/2008-ITA-II, dated 5-9-2008 (reproduced)

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Scrutiny of FBT returns — Instruction No.
11/2008, F.No.225/44/2008-ITA-II, dated 5-9-2008 (reproduced)


Kindly refer to the above.

 

2. I am directed to state that all the corporate cases
selected for scrutiny as per the guidelines contained in the Action Plan
document 2008-09, which have returned income of Rs.5 crore or more and where
provisions of Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) apply, assessment order shall also be
passed u/s.115WE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after scrutiny of all such cases.

 

This may be brought to the notice of all concerned.

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Miscellaneous

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Part D : Miscellaneous


5 The Employees’ Provident Fund
Organisation has launched a facility for online verification of status of the
claim under the EPF. The facility can be availed at http://epfindia.nic.in/indiaepf%5Cloginnew.aspx
the user needs to select his State, the EPF office, Establishment Code,
Extension code, if any and then enter the employee number to ascertain the claim
status.

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The Cost Inflation Index has been notified for the financial year 2008-09 as 582 — Notification No. 86/2008 [f. no. 142/8/2008-tpl], dated 13-8-2008.

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4 The Cost Inflation Index has been notified
for the financial year 2008-09 as 582 — Notification No. 86/2008 [f. no.
142/8/2008-tpl], dated 13-8-2008.

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Income earned in foreign countries to be included in the total income of the Resident in India — Notification No. 90/2008 and 91/2008, dated 28-8-2008.

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3 Income earned in foreign countries to be
included in the total income of the Resident in India — Notification No. 90/2008
and 91/2008, dated 28-8-2008.


The CBDT has notified that when the income earned by a
Resident Indian outside India, is taxed outside India as per the provisions of
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements, such foreign income needs to be included
in the total income of the Resident in their return of income in India. Also,
relief would be granted as per the elimination of double taxation avoidance
provisions provided in the respective Agreements applicable to the assessee.
This provision equally applies to Indian associations as specified in S. 90A of
the Act also.

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Classification of New Services notified through Finance Act, 2010 under Export of Services Rules, 2005 — Circular No. 129/11/2010-ST, dated 21-9-2010

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


SERVICE TAX UPDATE

15 Classification of New
Services notified through Finance Act, 2010 under Export of Services Rules, 2005
— Circular No. 129/11/2010-ST, dated 21-9-2010.

To resolve the doubts raised
by the service tax payers regarding classification of new services introduced by
the Finance Act, 2010, the CBEC has clarified that all the new services shall
fall in category 3(iii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 and Taxation of
Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006
popularly known as Import Rules, 2006. Consequently for services to be
classified as an eligible export, the same must be provided to a service
recipient located outside India and for services to be classified as import of
service the same must be provided from outside India to a service recipient
located in India.

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Delhi HC pulls up IT Dept. for filing appeal where issue of law is well-settled

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17 Delhi HC pulls up IT Dept. for filing appeal
where issue of law is well-settled


Income-tax Department has come under sharp criticism from the
Delhi High Court for filing appeal against Tax Tribunal decisions in which issue
of law is well-settled.

A Bench comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice
Manmohan said that the judicial capital is extremely limited and should not be
wasted in needless litigations.

“In our view, appeals should not be filed in matters where
either no question of law arises or the issue of law is a settled one. We give
this direction because the ‘judicial capital’ in terms of manpower and resources
is extremely limited,” the Court said. The Court’s direction came on a petition
filed by the Revenue Department challenging an order of Tax Tribunal ITAT.

The Court, which was inclined to impose cost on the
Department, refrained by warning it to be careful in future before filing appeal
against ITAT.

 

(Source : Internet – www.forum4finance.com dated
10-8-2010)



“Only economic prosperity can produce progress. Prosperity arises out of
innovation and enterprise, from the technological ingenuity and the skills
that are housed in the great companies. Prosperity needs to move seamlessly
across the world so that no country is left behind. This means the corporate
CEO and the ambassador are locked in partnership.”


— PEPSICO Chairperson & CEO, Indra Nooyi addressing Indian Ambassadors in New
Delhi.

(Source :
The Economic Times, dated 14-9-2010)

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CAG slams tax authorities’ weakness for appeals

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16 CAG slams tax authorities’ weakness for appeals


The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG)
has come down heavily on the Tax Department for fostering “a perception that it
has a tendency to opt for appeals even when it is on a weak wicket” and this “appealititis
is more detrimental when applied on small taxpayers constituting a large chunk
of appellants.” In a first-of-its-kind holistic study of appeals, the CAG report
on the Appeal Process, tabled in the Parliament on Friday, minced no words when
it said point-blank that the proliferation of appeals decisions were prompted by
counsels of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. They could also be fuelled by the
Assessing Officers (AOs) deciding to play safe “rather than judge a case on its
merits and save the system of the strain that weak cases place on it.”

Stating that the dimensions of disputes in
income-tax remain ‘staggering,’ the report said the aggregate amount locked up
in appeal at various levels is `2.2 lakh crore, which could almost wipe off the
revenue deficit of the Union Government in 2008-09. It said that for the span
2006-09, the audit analysed data and 48% of the demands raised by AOs remain
uncollected with disputes accounting for 45% of the uncollected demands, and 22%
of the demands raised in assessments at disputes by taxpayers. Even as the
implementation of Appellate orders is placed low in the AOs priorities,
inadequate attention on correctness in implementation of Appellate orders led to
mistakes amounting to `1,456 crore in 385 cases, it said, adding that 97% of
these mistakes led to under-assessment of tax benefitting the taxpayer which
“raises doubts on the integrity of the process.”

The audit also highlighted the constraints under
which it had undertaken this study in the absence of a centralised database on
appeals at the State level which hampered the selection of the audit samples.
“Poor maintenance of records across the assessment and judicial wings of the
Department is an area of concern,” it said, adding that the Department produced
only 49% of the records it requisitioned for audit and it was as low as 5% in
the case of Delhi office. Despite a steady reduction in the number of appeals
referred to the Commissioners of Income-tax (CsIT), the inventory of appeals
with CsIT was building up because of low disposal of appeals which was one-third
of the targeted level, it said. At the current levels of disposal, the CsIT
(Appeals) would take 2.4 years to clear the inventory. The average time taken
for disposal of a case is 14 months, which is substantially longer than the
global norms. It further said low-end appeals (with demand less than Rs.1 crore),
constituted 66% of the total appeals. Hence, CAG suggests hiving off of small
taxpayers’ disputes and such segregation would promote greater focus on the ‘big
ticket’ appeals with rationalisation of workload of the CsIT (A). Stating that
the assessment process is evidently unable to satisfy the small taxpayer, the
category which is least equipped to bear the cost of litigation, the CAG said
that this must be viewed alongside the fact that the success rate of the
Department at various levels of appeals is “low and appeals go decidedly in
favour of the taxpayers.” Even as there are some provisions in the Act such as
imposition of penalty that lead to disputes, it said deviations from prescribed
procedures by AOs have also contributed to rows. It also excoriated the tendency
to escalate the disputes to higher levels and “instances of inaction in such
cases where a second appeal would have safeguarded revenue.” There is lack of
consistency while considering a case for second appeal with divergent actions
weakening the Departmental stand in appeals. “The absence of independent
evaluation of decisions for escalation creates unchecked avenues for arbitrary
exercise of discretionary powers by the AOs,” it said, and added that there is a
need to remove ambiguities in the provisions of the Act to reduce the use of
discretion by the AOs. It said the penal provisions of the Act calls for a
relook, since “the deterrent edge to these provisions is being blunted due to
inability to sustain the penalty orders in appeals.”

(Source : The Hindu Business Line, dated 13-8-2010)

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Oxford English Dictionary — Online dictionary spells doom for printed version

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15 Oxford English Dictionary — Online dictionary
spells doom for printed version


It’s been in print for over a century, but in
future the Oxford English Dictionary — the authoritative guide to the English
language — may only be available to peruse online. Publisher Oxford University
Press said that burgeoning demand for the dictionary’s online version has far
outpaced demand for the printed versions. By the time the lexicographers behind
the dictionary finished revising and updating the latest edition — a gargantuan
task that will take many more years — publishers are doubtful there will still
be a market for the printed form.

The online Oxford English Dictionary now gets 2
million hits a month from subscribers. The current printed edition — a hefty
20-volume, £ 750 set published in 1989 — has sold about 30,000 sets in total.

The first instalment of the Oxford English
Dictionary was published in 1884, and it kept growing for decades until the
complete text went out in 1928. It was the first comprehensive English
dictionary since Samuel Johnson’s ‘A Dictionary of the English Language’
published in 1755, and has evolved to become the accepted authority on the
meaning and history of words.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 30-8-2010)

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App for docs : iPhone app to replace the stethoscope ?

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14 App for docs : iPhone app to replace the
stethoscope ?


The iPhone could soon replace the doctors’ best
friend, the traditional stethoscope, thanks to a free application created by a
University College London researcher.

Peter Bentley invented the ‘iStethoscope’
application which monitors heartbeat through sensors in the iPhone as just a bit
of fun. And, more than three million doctors across the world are signing up for
the free application.

(Source : The Hindu, dated 1-9-2010)

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IT Dept. worried with 50% TDS data mismatch cases

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13 IT Dept. worried with 50% TDS data mismatch
cases


Tax deducted at source (TDS) has become a
problematic issue with the Income-tax Department, as in more than 50% TDS refund
cases, it is facing an uphill task in matching the data provided in the
assessee’s income-tax returns with the TDS deductor’s information available with
the NSDL.

And the mismatch is resulting in the assessee
running from pillar to post to get back the refund due to him from the
Department.

“It’s a pan-India problem; the Government wants the
system to be fully computerised so that things are streamlined,” said Jamshedpur
Commissariat DCIT (TDS) S. M. S. Tauheed recently.

 

(Source : The Financial Express, dated
10-8-2010)

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Govt. to change role of accounting standards body

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12 Govt. to change role of accounting standards body


The Government plans to redefine the functions of
the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS) to convert it
into an independent regulatory entity to monitor the quality of audit undertaken
across the corporate sector in the country.

The proposal, made by the Corporate Affairs
Ministry to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance that looked into the
Companies Bill, 2009, says the revamped NACAS should be allowed to oversee and
monitor the performance of standard-setting bodies for the accountancy and audit
professions.

Autonomous institutions such as the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and the Institute of Company Secretaries
of India, under the administrative control of the Corporate Affairs Ministry,
are the standard-setting bodies for accountancy and audit professions.

The Ministry response came after the Parliamentary
Committee, which submitted its report last week, expressed concerns over the
global economic crisis and the failure of big companies and suggested the
formation of an independent regulator to recommend standards for corporate
financial reporting, corporate audit and the quality of service of professionals
associated with ensuring compliance with such standards. It also wanted this
body to oversee, monitor and supervise the bodies involved in setting such
standards.

(Source : Internet www.taxguru.in, dated
10-9-2010)

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House Panel calls for harmonisation of Provisions of Companies Bill with International Financial Reporting norms

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11 House Panel calls for harmonisation of
Provisions of Companies Bill with International Financial Reporting norms


 

The Standing Committee
of the Parliament, which thoroughly examined The Companies Bill, 2009, has
observed that there are several matters included in the Bill, which need
modification with a view to harmonising them with the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Committee has, therefore, desired that all such
matters requiring harmonisation with IFRS should be considered and appropriate
amendments may be made in the relevant proposals contained in the Bill. The
Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) presented its Twenty-First Report, which
pertains to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, to the Parliament recently.

The Committee’s
examination of the subject and the replies of the Ministry received thereon
reveal that the following provisions/clauses of the Bill require modification
for achieving convergence with IFRS :



2(1)(b) :
(Definition of the term ‘accounting standard’)

 

46(2) : Utilisation of securities premium
account

 

49(1) : -do-

 

59(3) : Reduction of share capital

 

110(2) : Prescription of depreciation rates

 

117(1)

and

 

117(4) : Financial statements to comply with
accounting standards

 

201 :
Schemes of mergers and


amalgamations.




(Source : www.taxindiaonline.com, dated
8-9-2010)

 

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CVC Report — A plan to curb corruption

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10 CVC Report — A plan to curb corruption


It’s a truism that corruption is pervasive in
India. An equally troubling aspect is that our leaders, administrators and civil
society are aware of the problem. And in spite of a plethora of laws to control
the problem, it only continues to grow.

Now the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has
issued a national anti-corruption strategy that it hopes will make a difference.
There is much to be said in favour of the report : It high-lights the issue very
well and makes a series of thoughtful solutions. But that is just about what CVC
can do. The levers that can ameliorate the problem lie elsewhere.

The matter is clearly highlighted in section III
of the report where CVC talks about the strategy to address political and
administrative corruption. The problem of funding electoral and other
expenditures of political parties is highlighted clearly. Insensitivity of civil
servants and their remoteness from citizens at large is also discussed.

The CVC’s solution to these problems is threefold.
One, strengthening political will to confront corruption; two, building ethical
competence in public officials; and finally, strengthening administrative
reforms. This is like putting the cart before the horse. If political will did
exist, then the matter would have been sorted out a long time ago.

By putting a large part of the onus on
strengthening of political will, CVC has taken the problem in a different,
psychological, direction. That is a different and intractable issue.

The solutions are fine on paper, as is the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The reality is very different and altogether
nasty.

(Source : The Mint, dated 30-8-2010)

(Can legal and administrative measures alone
eliminate corruption ?)

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National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme — A joke worth Rs.1

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9 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme — A
joke worth Rs.1


 

Here’s the cruel underbelly of modern India :
Villagers in Rajasthan’s Tonk district are paid `1 per day for work under the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), and a State
Minister justifies it as consistent with the work done.

 

The political apathy and corruption that cause such
incidents are well known. But at issue are MGNREGS’ structural weaknesses which
make rooting corruption out a tough task. Why was the work not supervised for
quantity and quality ? Perhaps because, as a recent report suggests, village
leaders in the state discourage third-party supervision of MGNREGS.

Supervision is also required at higher levels — not
even the smallest amount of work justifies a wage of `1 per day. The problem is
little political will exists to undertake the high cost of monitoring
corruption. The results are conflicting responsibilities and interests for the
administration, and a cruel joke for the poor.

(Source : Quick Edit in The Mint Newspaper,
dated
30-8-2010)

[Is the cost incurred by our nation on our
non-performing MPs and MLAs and other political representatives justified ?]

 

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SC — Damages for road deaths without deciding on guilty

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8 SC — Damages for road deaths without deciding on
guilty


In two judgments last
week, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that in road accidents, insurance companies
should pay compensation under the ‘no-fault liability’ clause in the Motor
Vehicles Act, irrespective of the circumstances of the deaths. In one appeal,
Indra Devi v. Bagada Ram,
the death was invited by the negligence of the
deceased driver himself. The Rajasthan HC asked the recipients of the
compensation to return the amount with interest to New India Assurance Co. as
the claimants were not entitled to the amount. The SC set aside the High Court
order and asserted the ‘no-fault liability’ u/s.140 of the Act did not depend
upon the conduct of the driver or the victim. In the second case, Eshwarappa
v. CS Gurushanthappa,
the drunk driver and his four friends died while
rashly driving to a temple without informing the car-owner. The Accidents
Tribunal denied any compensation. However, the SC ruled even in such cases,
‘no-fault liability’ cannot be avoided.

(Source : The
Business Standard, dated 23-8-2010)

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Eight gifts that do not cost a penny !

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7 Eight gifts that do not cost a penny !


1. The gift of
listening :

But you must REALLY
listen.

No interrupting, no
daydreaming,

No planning your
response.

Just listening.

2. The gift of
affection :

Be generous with
appropriate hugs,

Kisses, pats on the
back, and handholds.

Let these small
actions demonstrate the

Love you have for
family and friends.

3. The gift of
laughter :

Clip cartoons.

Share articles and
funny stories.

Your gift will say,
“I love to laugh with you.”

4. The gift of a
written note :

It can be a simple

“Thanks for the
help” note or a full sonnet.

A brief, handwritten
note may be remembered

For a lifetime, and
may even change a life.

5. The gift of a
compliment :

A simple and
sincere,

“You look great in
red,”

“You did a super
job,”

Or “That was a
wonderful meal”

Can make someone’s
day.

6. The gift of a
favour :

Every day, go out of
your way

To do something
kind.

7. The gift of
solitude :

There are times when
we want nothing better

Than to be left
alone.

Be sensitive to
those times and give

The gift of solitude
to others.

8. The gift of a
cheerful disposition :

The easiest way to
feel good is

To extend a kind
word to someone.

Really, it’s not
that hard to say,

“Hello” or “Thank
You”.

(Source :
Internet)

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With Rs.75K crore stuck in disputes, Tax Department proposes e-solutions

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5 With Rs.75K crore stuck in disputes, Tax
Department proposes e-solutions


 

The Income-tax Department has proposed a national
e-management system for quick disposal of tax disputes, with more than `75,000
crore, an amount close to a fifth of the Government’s annual direct tax
collections, locked in litigations.

The new system will allow the Tax Department to
make optimum use of its workforce, reduce painful wait for the disposal of tax
appeals and free up resources quickly.

The system would track the entire life cycle of
appeals to ensure expeditious settlement through a more equitable distribution.

More than 1.78 lakh appeals were pending with the
Commissioner Appeals (Income-tax), the first level of litigation, as on February
1, 2010, with amounts locked-up running into several thousands of crores.

(Source : The Economic Times, dated 30-8-2010)

(In our view, the real issues are lack of knowledge
and expertise, productivity and integrity in the Appellate machinery and
non-adherence to the decisions of the Higher Courts leading to repetitive
appeals.)

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An obituary of Common Sense printed in the London Times

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6 An obituary of Common Sense printed in the London
Times


 

Today we mourn the passing of a beloved old friend,
Common Sense, who has been with us for many years. No one knows for sure how old
he was, since his birth records were long ago lost in bureaucratic red tape. He
will be remembered as having cultivated such valuable lessons as :



  •   Knowing when to
    come during the rain;


  •   Why the early bird
    gets the worm;


  •   Life isn’t always
    fair; and


  •   Maybe it was my
    fault.


Common Sense lived by
simple, sound financial policies (don’t spend more than you can earn) and
reliable strategies (adults, not children, are in charge).

His health began to
deteriorate rapidly when well-intentioned but overbearing regulations were set
in place. Reports of a 6-year-old boy charged with sexual harassment for kissing
a classmate; teens suspended from school for using mouthwash after lunch; and a
teacher fired for reprimanding an unruly student, only worsened his condition.

Common Sense lost
ground when parents attacked teachers for doing the job that they themselves had
failed to do in disciplining their unruly children.

It declined even
further when schools were required to get parental consent to administer sun
lotion or an aspirin to a student; but could not inform parents when a student
became pregnant and wanted to have an abortion.

Common Sense lost the
will to live as the churches became businesses; and criminals received better
treatment than their victims.
Common Sense took a beating when you couldn’t defend yourself from a burglar in
your own home and the burglar could sue you for assault.
Common Sense finally gave up the will to live, after a woman failed to realise
that a steaming cup of coffee was hot. She spilled a little in her lap, and was
promptly awarded a huge settlement.

Common Sense was
preceded in death, by his parents, Truth and Trust, by his wife, Discretion, by
his daughter, Responsibility, and by his son, Reason.

He is survived by his
4 stepbrothers :

I Know My Rights

I Want It Now

Someone Else Is To
Blame

I’m A Victim

Not many attended his
funeral because so few realised he was gone. If you still remember him, pass
this on. If not, join the majority and do nothing.

(Source :
Internet)

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I-T ex-official moves SC to make declaration of foreign bank A/cs mandatory while filing returns

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4 I-T ex-official moves SC to make declaration of
foreign bank A/cs mandatory while filing returns



The Supreme Court has admitted a petition, filed by
a retired Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, which suggests that a legislation be
made to make it mandatory for taxpayers to declare offshore bank accounts while
filing annual returns. The premise behind the suggestion is to enable the
Government to take effective measures to seize wealth parked in Swiss and other
offshore bank accounts by Indian residents.

The petitioner is KVM Pai, retired Chief
Commissioner of Income tax, Mumbai and the suggestion it contains is in
consonance with the recent legislation passed in the US making it compulsory for
US residents to declare their offshore bank accounts, even if such declarations
do not yield any tax revenue. Mr. Pai also pitches for the setting up of an
intelligence unit under the auspices of the Income-tax administration to help
detect those who have illegal deposits in offshore banks and corroborate the
data with the information furnished in their tax returns.

Quoting a 1980 study carried out by International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Mr. Pai pointed out that Indians hold the largest share of
deposits in Swiss banks. Referring to other studies quoted in the petition, he
points out that there are deposits worth $ 11.6 trillion in tax havens. One such
reference relates to Raymond Baker’s ‘Capitalism’s Achilles Heel’ which holds
that half the world’s slush money lying in tax havens belongs to Indians. Mr.
Baker has recently estimated the annual capital flight to tax havens at $1
trillion per year.

Mr. Pai also states in his petition that the
governments of France and the US have been successful in securing the release of
huge unreported funds from Swiss banks belonging to US residents but the Indian
Government did not make any such serious effort except for scheduling meetings
with Swiss authorities.

Recently, due to pressure from the US and the UK,
the Swiss government agreed to disclose the names of account holders, but only
if the respective governments formally ask for it. It is understood that the
Swiss government has agreed to provide France the details of 3,000 French
customers who have deposits worth $ 4.3 billion in Swiss accounts and the US
government with details of 4,450 customers having $ 18 billion in deposits.

(Source : The Economic Times, dated 30-8-2010)

 

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Return of double-dip fears — Jackson Hole conference shows US still not out of the hole

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3 Return of double-dip fears — Jackson Hole
conference shows US still not out of the hole



We have come a long way from the ‘Great Panic of
2008’, but there’s a long road ahead to robust growth, confident consumer
spending and lower unemployment. That was the essence of US Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s speech at this year’s Jackson Hole conference last week.
It was a rather subdued Mr. Bernanke who sought to reassure his audience, by all
accounts. Confessing candidly that “central bankers alone cannot solve the
world’s problems”, Mr. Bernanke exuded guarded
optimism about the sustainability of the ongoing recovery in the US economy. He
conceded that the recovery “appears somewhat less vigorous than we expected”,
and did not rule out the possibility of deflationary tendencies reasserting
themselves. The thrust of Mr. Bernanke’s statement, which his critics have
attacked as “Nero fiddling while Rome is burning”, was to suggest that the good
news from the US economy was not good enough. Based on the latest national
income growth data for the US, released last week, US authorities have revised
downward the annual estimated rate of growth from the more optimistic initial
number of 2.4% to a significantly lower 1.6% in the quarter ending June 2010.
Export growth is near zero, unemployment levels are high and consumer spending
is still weak. “The prospect of high unemployment for a long period of time,”
said Mr. Bernanke, “remains a central concern of policy.”


Mr. Bernanke’s prognosis suggests that the spectre
of double-dip recession continues to haunt US policy-makers. It is now clear
that the economic slowdown the US faces is more structural than cyclical. This
means there are limits to monetary policy, a fact that Mr. Bernanke openly
confessed even as he assured his audience that the US Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) would be open to using all the weapons in its monetary policy
arsenal to stimulate growth, prevent deflation and ensure price stability.
Ending his speech, Mr. Bernanke said, rather chillingly, “Although what I have
just described is, I believe, the most plausible outcome, macroeconomic
projections are inherently uncertain, and the economy remains vulnerable to
unexpected developments.” That is more than a sobering thought. Are Mr. Bernanke
and his Jackson Hole companions being more cautious than necessary or more
optimistic than warranted ? Perhaps the Jackson Hole audience was trying to make
up for past hubris or is afflicted by the paranoia of failed magicians. The
problem for the US is that while monetary policy is unlikely to make much of a
difference, there isn’t much room for fiscal policy either, though the Barack
Obama administration has done more than most developed country governments to
use fiscal policy to stimulate demand. The US needs a boost of confidence in
itself and an investment in its capabilities.

(Source : The Business Standard, dated
30-8-2010)

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Tax evasion at the top

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2 Tax evasion at the top


The Government gave out some interesting numbers.
The Revenue Secretary told a news conference that nearly 96% of the 32.5 million
who pay income-tax reported a taxable income of under `5 lakh; and only 2.2% (i.e.,
715,000 people) reported taxable income of over `8 lakh. Why is this
interesting ? Because when you match these with the income numbers put out by
the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), on the basis of its
household surveys, some numbers make sense while others don’t. For instance,
NCAER projected for 2009-10 that some 32.3 million households would have annual
incomes of over `2 lakh — which is a reasonably good fit with the total number
of people paying income-tax (the threshold being taxable income of Rs.1.6 lakh).

When you look at the high-income category, however,
the numbers diverge hugely. NCAER says that in 2009-10, there should have been
3.8 million families with annual income of over Rs.10 lakh, a figure that is
more than five times the 715,000 people who report income over `8 lakh (on the
plausible assumption that taxable income of `8 lakh is broadly compatible with
total income of Rs.10 lakh, because of the various tax exemptions available).
Admittedly, some households have more than one income earner, so it could be a
case of clubbing the incomes of husband and wife. Still, it would appear that,
while there is probably not much tax evasion by the middle class, those in the
upper class continue to be predominantly tax evaders.

The good news is that the extent of evasion may be
coming down — sharply. Back in 2004-05, only 122,000 people reported taxable
income of over Rs.10 lakh, whereas nearly six times that number now report
taxable incomes of over Rs.8 lakh. While incomes have been rising rapidly at the
top of the pyramid, few would have expected that India’s highest earners would
multiply so rapidly over five years. In other words, tax compliance has improved
dramatically — but even then, the scope for much greater compliance exists.

That conclusion would be contested by Surjit Bhalla,
who has argued that the rich are the most tax compliant group in the country
(with only 50% practising evasion !). He has used National Sample Survey data to
contend that there were 250,000 people with incomes over Rs.10 lakh in 2004-05
(when there were only 122,000 people reporting that amount of tax income), and
that the population of high-income earners would have gone up to 360,000 in
2006-07. On that kind of track, the number by 2009-10 should have been about
620,000. But since we have 715,000 reporting taxable income of `8 lakh and more,
it looks like 100% tax compliance by the high-rollers —which strains credulity.

Still, if compliance is improving, thank the spread
of tax deduction at source, and the cross-matching of computerised data with
regard to credit card spends, mutual fund investments and the like. But if one
were to assume that three-box cars are bought by only those in this income
bracket, there is another data point worth looking at — because 350,000
three-box cars were sold in the country last year. On the assumption that most
people buy a new car after five years, this figure too suggests many more
high-income people than exist in the tax records.

The point of focussing on this group is that 60% of
all income-tax revenue (or Rs.72,000 crore) comes from these 715,000 people ! If
the number coming into this category were to double, income-tax collections
would go through the roof.





(Source :
The Business Standard, dated 4-9-2010

— Weekend
Ruminations by T. N. Ninan)




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Centre moves SC on levy of service tax on rental income

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Miscellanea

Raman Jokhakar
Tarunkumar Singhal
Chartered Accountants

15 Centre moves SC on levy of service tax on
rental income

 

The Centre today sought the Supreme Court’s intervention in
deciding the constitutional validity of the Finance Act, 2007 that empowers the
Government to impose service tax on rental income from commercial properties.

A Bench headed by Justice B. N. Agrawal while seeking reply
from Retailers’ Association of India, Confederation of Real Estate Developers’
Associations of India and Multiplex Association of India
on the transfer petition filed by the Centre also stayed proceedings before
various High Courts.

The Centre through the Department of Revenue has sought
transfer of petitions pending before the High Courts of Bombay, Madras, Kolkata,
Punjab and Haryana and Kerala on the ground that there was a likelihood of
conflicting decisions.

According to the petition, retailers, real estate developers
and multiplex owners had filed writ petitions before various High Courts
challenging levy of service tax on leasing, letting, renting or any other
similar arrangement in respect of immovable property for use in furtherance of
business or commerce.

It further said that they had challenged the constitutional
validity of the Finance Act, 2007 on the ground that it was beyond the
legislative competence of the Union and thus Parliament cannot levy
such a tax.

(Source : Internet, 19-8-2008 —

Also widely reported in print media)


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SC asks tax authorities to seek technical help

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1 SC asks tax
authorities to seek technical help


The Supreme Court has asked the Central Board of
Direct Taxes (CBDT) and other tax authorities to get help of technical experts
while deciding income-tax liability of cellular service providers.

The order came after a batch of appeals by
income-tax authorities against the ruling of the Tribunal favouring Bharti
Cellular Ltd. and other service providers. The question was whether manual
intervention was involved in the technical operations by which cellular service
providers were given the facility by BSNL/MTNL for interconnection.

A related question was whether TDS was to be
deducted by service providers when they paid interconnect charges/access/port
charges to BSNL.

“The problem which arises in these cases is that
there is no expert evidence from the side of the Department to show how human
intervention takes place, particularly, during the process when calls take
place,” the order passed by a Bench headed by Chief Justice S. H. Kapadia said.
“We are only highlighting these facts to emphasise that these types of matters
cannot be decided without any technical assistance available on record.”

The Supreme Court underlined “with the emergence of
our country as one of the BRIC countries and with the technological advancement,
matters like the present one will keep on recurring and hence, the time has come
when the Department should examine technical experts so that the matters could
be disposed of expeditiously and further it would enable the Appellate forums,
including this Court, to decide legal issues based on factual foundation.”

(Source : The Business Standard, dated
23-8-2010)

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Cyber News

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14 Cyber News

Design flaws in bank sites

A
majority of websites suffer from design-related flaws which could make their
customers vulnerable to cyber-theft, according to a recent study by Atul Prakash,
an Indian-American professor at the University of Michigan and his doctoral
students, Laura Falk and Kevin Borders. The team surveyed web-sites of 214
financial institutions and found that three-fourths of them had at least one
design flaw. Significantly, these were not flaws that could be fixed with a
patch, but stemmed from the very flow and layout of the sites, the researchers
revealed “Our focus was on users who try to be careful, but unfortunately some
bank sites make it hard for customers to make the right security decisions when
doing online banking,” Prakash said. Such flaws leave cracks in security that
hackers could exploit to gain access to private information and accounts, the
study noted.

 

  Studying abroad

A
California-based education information provider recently launched
www.studyplaces.com, targeted primarily at Indian students who form a chunk of
overseas universities in many parts of the world. The portal disseminates
information, connects and guides students to over 2,00,000 courses from 10,000
colleges worldwide including universities in India, the US, UK, Europe,
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Canada and West Asia. It utilises the
expertise of professionals, many of them alumni of Stanford, IIMS, IITS and
Wharton, to offer guidance to students looking for higher study options. “The
portal is an attempt to help students make the right career choice based on
credible information and professional counseling,” says founder Amitabh Nagpal.
It offers platform for career counselling and college planning and helps
students find, compare, evaluate and select the right course and institution. In
addition, it provides free online counselling and free practice tests for AIFEE,
GMAT, IIT-JEE, TOEFL, etc. The site has a team of 20 counselors, each
specialising in one or more educational domains, which use tools such as
psychometric tests to ascertain students’ aptitude and interests. The students
can also access information on fee structures, expenses involved, life on
campus, and application procedures.

 

  Saving time

The
Wall Street’s www. ExecutiveLibrary.com is an amazing site for those interested
in accessing information for research and other uses. Since early 1990s, the
world has been using the Net to research finance, stocks, economic trends,
demographics, and industry information. And the problem has been not a lack of
information but a surfeit of data, with fewer and fewer sources providing useful
information. To address this, the portal has created a public directory that
lists only the most relevant business sites. Currently, the portal has links to
1,500 useful sites where users can read news, research companies, get answers to
legal questions, hunt for jobs, look up medical information, download software,
and find other information. In addition to a content-heavy homepage, which lists
hundreds of news and reference sources, users can avail the research link which
provides access to the government, financial market research, statistics,
economy, business and law, marketing and advertising information. In that sense,
it’s a great time-saver for those who use the Net for professional and credible
information on a regular basis.

(Source
: Business India, 21-9-2008)

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Delhi High Court convicted Senior

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13 Delhi High Court convicted
Senior

Advocates

The Delhi High Court convicted senior advocates R.
K. Anand and I. U. Khan in the BMW expose case for obstructing administration of
justice. “They are senior advocates and they did not tender either conditional
or unconditional apology for their conduct in the BMW case,” a Division Bench of
Justices Manmohan Sarin and Madan B. Lokur said, in their 112-page verdict in
the contempt case relating to the expose.


Recommending that they be stripped of their
designation of senior advocate, the Court asked them not to appear in the Delhi
High Court and its subordinate Courts for the next four months as punishment.


The Bench also imposed a fine of Rs.2,000 on each
of them and rapped them for their ‘irresponsible’ behaviour, saying “we are not
dealing with young lawyers. Both are seasoned lawyers and such conduct was not
expected of them.

(Source : Internet, 21-8-2008

— Also widely reported in print media)

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Foreign cos must report exempted income to I-T.

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12 Foreign cos must report exempted income to I-T.


Taxmen will now be able to keep a closer tab on
income exempt under foreign tax treaties. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT)
has said that any income arising in India, but exempt from the country’s tax
laws, because of a double tax avoidance treaty, must be first reported to the
Tax Department before availing the exemption.

Even if the income is taxable outside India, the
assessee must include it in the total income chargeable to tax in India, the
board has said in a recent notification. “Relief will be granted in accordance
with the method for elimination or avoidance of double taxation provided in such
agreement,” the Notification added.

With a large number of foreign companies operating
in India, the Department has found that there are many cases where either they
are not reporting their exempt income or underreporting it.

While the assessee can avail the same foreign tax
credit even now, the Tax Department will get a much better understanding of his
earnings, a Finance Ministry official explained.

The Department’s missive, however, only relates to
earnings of resident companies and individuals. Tax experts are of the view that
with increased movement of workers and the cross-border nexus between companies,
the Notification will help the Department get a better understanding of the
income of such assessees.

“It looks like the Department’s intention is to get
a complete picture of a person’s global earnings regardless of the benefits
under the tax treaties,” Amitabh Singh, partner Ernst and Young said. The
clarification is the latest in the CBDT’s efforts to plug loopholes in the
country’s international tax laws given that a large number of MNCs have set up
shops in India through back offices and subsidiaries and are availing benefits
under tax treaties.

(Source : Internet, 8-9-2008)

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Plastic containers may be deadly for your brain.

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11 Plastic containers may be
deadly for your brain.


Plastic containers may be deadly for your brain.
Canadian researchers have found that Bisphenol A (BPA), the chemical used in
making plastic containers, might be responsible for impairing many brain
functions such as learning and remembering.

They also fear that it could be a factor behind
Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia and depression.

BPA is globally used in making plastic water
bottles, baby food bottles, food containers and dental prostheses.

In their study, the researchers at the University
of Guelph found that BPA might be leaking into the solid or liquid foods kept in
the plastic containers.

When these foods and liquids are consumed, they
said, the chemical might be getting into the human system, disrupting
communication between brain neurons which is vital in understanding and
remembering.

(Source : The Times of India, 5-9-2008)

 

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MNCs seek detectives’ help to check IPR violations

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10 MNCs seek detectives’ help to
check IPR violations


In order to provide brand protection and curb
duplication of products, IT, pharma, electronics, telecom and electrical goods
manufacturing giants are approaching private detectives to safeguard them
against Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) violation.


Detective agencies have also been approached by
national and international industry associations to extend help for safeguarding
their products.


According to an ongoing study commissioned by the
Ministry of Human Resource Development, the estimated losses due to piracy in
motion pictures is 7.3%, sound recordings and musical compositions 24.5%, books
21%, and the highest is in the software domain, reaching 292.8%.

While recent trend of piracy has badly affected
Indian film and musical industry, we are doing our best to bring this fake
business to end.

To recommend improvements in the working of the
Intellectual Property (IP) regime in India in terms of IT enabling and
networking of operations and enhancing human resource capabilities, the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries (Ficci) and Department
of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
have also joined hands to set up a working group.

DIPP has taken note of Ficci’s recommendations and
it has been decided to digitise all the patents granted till date and open it up
for online public access.

Showing concern over the trend, the patent office
has started e-filing of patent and trademark applications through its website
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in.

The term ‘Intellectual Property’ reflects the idea
that its subject matter is the product of the mind or the intellect. These could
be in the form of patents, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, plant variety
protection and copyright.

According to the data released by the industries
body, the filing of patent applications has increased from 4,824 in the year
1999-2000 to 28,882 applications in the year 2006-07. The grant of patents has
shot up from 1,881 in 1999-2000 to 7,359 in 2006-07.

“Although companies and administration are doing
their best to stop it, we feel that a separate wing from the government to
tackle this crime would help us and the firms,” an expert said.

(Source : Business Standard, 25-8-2008)

 

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Bridging the GAAP

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9 Bridging the GAAP



The Asian Crisis in the 1990s made the world sit up
and recognise the need for corporate governance as a mechanism to safeguard
investments in public enterprises and heightened the importance of having a
global Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for comparability and
transparency of financial information across continents. The US accounting
scandals of Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia or the European scandals of Ahold or
Parmalat enforced the view that a framework of governance and global GAAP needs
to emerge to safeguard capital in companies, which in the digital age is without
the protection of political or physical borders.


David Tweedie, the Chairman of International
Accounting Standards Board said in the Europe Club of Canada on 25 April 2008
that : “In the midst of the Asian financial crisis, several companies whose
financial statements seemed to indicate that they were secure, suddenly went
bankrupt casting great doubt on the veracity of the statements and in particular
the national accounting standards in use. While it is important not to overstate
the role of accounting standards and practices in precipitating the Asian
financial crisis, it is clear that confidence in financial reporting practices
in that region disappeared.” “As a consequence, financing, much of it short term
in nature and not subject to any capital controls, was withdrawn. Interest rates
rose, investment ground to a halt, and an economic slowdown followed. In the
aftermath of the crisis, it was unlikely that confidence in the existing or any
revised national standards could be restored rapidly, indeed, if ever. The
obvious choice was to move to an internationally accepted set of standards.”
Since 2001, the mission given to IASB was to create a single set of
principles-based global financial reporting standards that are used throughout
the world’s capital markets. The overriding principle is that irrespective of
the country of origin of a transaction, whether in New York, New Delhi, or
London, the accounting should provide a consistent answer to the same economic
transaction.” The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, National
Committee of Accounting Standards and the government of India have affirmed that
India will transition into International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as
the accounting principles for the country from April 1, 2011. Entities which are
either listed companies or companies filing for a listing or companies having
over a threshold of sales of 100 crore or public debt of over 25 crore are
covered by the first wave. These are called public interest entities. The small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) will be covered at a later date which is yet to be
decided.

The dilemma — incremental or big bang approach ?
Nations around the world are faced with the dilemma of whether their national
accounting standards should be aligned to IFRS or take the big bang approach of
adopting IFRS as written by IASB and follow standards that are globally applied,
irrespective of the economic environment.

In India, a debate is raging amongst various
stakeholders, including the government whether we should converge or adopt IFRS.
While the former would mean that we amend and modify IFRS standards to be
relevant to India, the latter would mean that we adopt IFRS standards as they
are written by IASB to be the accounting language of India. ICAI in their
decision paper on convergence has stated, “Convergence with IFRS — all at one
approach — that IFRS will be adopted for public interest entities for accounting
periods starting on or after 2011”. But doubts are now arising due to differing
views of various stakeholders on how the roadmap to 2011 will be drawn.

IFRS with modifications by various countries would
result in multiple and possibly conflicting versions of IFRSs globally. A
misplaced sense of national pride or intense pressure from industries make
countries amend or alter IFRS principles to suit the national requirements. This
becomes IFRS as applied by a specific country as opposed to IFRS as issued by
IASB. This would defeat the purpose of global convergence, which is to move
toward a single set of high-quality accounting standards for use throughout the
world. This rationale is reflected in the US Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) announcement of the elimination of the requirement for
foreign private issuers to reconcile their IFRS financial statements to US GAAP.
The SEC has stated that the reconciliation requirement is being dispensed with
only for financial statements prepared using IFRSs as issued by the IASB so as
“to encourage the development of IFRS as a uniform global standard, not a
divergent set of standards applied differently in every nation”.

We have this wonderful opportunity to move into a
globally acceptable financial principles, which is considered comprehensive and
followed by over 120 countries in the world. By 2011, IFRS is expected to be
followed by 150 countries. How can we call ourselves a global power and not
adopt global standards as our own ? In due time, by virtue of India’s economic,
intellectual and geo-political weight, we will be a principal player in
formulating these standards.

Way forward the roadmap to 2011 needs to be
comprehensive as it has been detailed in the ICAI’s concept paper on convergence
with IFRS in India. Out of the 38 effective IFRS standards, there are only 2
standards in India that have no difference with IFRS and six have minor
differences. Eighteen standards of IFRS will need a level of technical
preparedness by the industry and the professionals for implementation or would
have conceptual differences with the Indian standards. Ten standards need
changes in laws and regulations for them to comply with the principles of IFRS.
The effort to harmonise is still huge as there has to be a consensus amongst the
various stakeholders including the government as some of the provisions of the
Companies Act or other Acts like the RBI Act etc., need to be amended for
compliance with IFRS principles.

The tax laws, companies law and other laws for specialised industries including banking, insurance etc., need to be reviewed to determine the differences with IFRS as we currently apply them and mechanism to deal with them on convergence.

Though IFRS has been written with the intention of global application, we would also need to evaluate whether under the Indian economic environment, application of any specific IFRS principle would make our industries vulnerable to the results and if there is a compelling reason that such applications will be inappropriate in India. Such deviations should be few and rare.
 
There is still a long road ahead. We need all the stakeholders – the industry, ICAI, government, RBI, SEBI, tax authorities and other regulators to engage in the transition process to IFRS. The debate we need to engage in is to holistic ally review, if any, application is inappropriate for India and address such issues in the transition provisions including those relating to first time adoption. The thought behind actions needs to be clearly articulated and debated. We have some time ahead and can meet the deadline of 2011, but clarity of thought and speed of action would be of essence.

We need all stakeholders – industry, ICAI, government, RBI, SEBI, tax authorities – to engage in the transition to IFRS, says Kaushik Dutta.

(Source: BusinessStandard,25-8-2008)

Large US banks may fail amid recession

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8 Large US banks may fail amid
recession



Credit market turmoil has driven the US into a
recession and may topple some of the nation’s biggest banks, said Kenneth Rogoff,
former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.


“The worst is yet to come in the US,” Rogoff said
in an interview in Singapore. “The financial sector needs to shrink; I don’t
think simply having a couple of medium-sized banks and a couple of small banks
going under is going to do the job.”

The US housing slump has triggered more than $ 500
billion of credit market losses for banks globally and led to the collapse and
sale of Bear Stearns Cos, the fifth-largest US securities firm. Rogoff said the
government should nationalise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the nation’s biggest
mortgage-finance companies, which have lost more than 80% of market value this
year.

US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson asked Congress
on July 13 for emergency powers to inject “unspecified” amounts of government
funds into the companies if necessary.

Banks repossessed almost three times as many US
homes in July as a year earlier and the number of properties at risk of
foreclosure jumped 55%, according to RealtyTrac Inc, an Irvine, California-based
seller of foreclosure data. US builders probably broke ground on the fewest
houses in 17 years last month, according to a Bloomberg News survey.

Rogoff told a conference in Singapore that the
credit crisis is likely to worsen and a large bank may fail, Reuters reported
earlier. Rogoff, 55, is a professor of economics at Harvard University. He was
the IMF’s chief economist from August 2001 to September 2003.

The world’s largest economy is already in a
recession, and the housing market will continue to deteriorate, Rogoff said. The
US slowdown will last into the second half of next year, he said, predicting a
faster recovery in Europe and Asia.

The Federal Reserve, which has left its key
interest rate at 2% after the most aggressive series of rate reductions in two
decades, risks raising inflationary pressures, he said.

(Source : Bloomberg, Singapore — Business
Standard, 20-8-2008)

 

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Two-thirds US firms paid no income tax in 1998-2005

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7 Two-thirds US firms paid no
income tax in 1998-2005


Two out of every three United States corporations
paid no federal income taxes from 1998 through 2005, according to a report
released by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress.


The study, which is likely to add to a growing
debate among politicians and policy experts over the contribution of businesses
to Treasury coffers, did not identify the corporations or analyse why they had
paid no taxes. It also did not say whether they had been operating properly
within the tax code or illegally evading it.


The study covers 1.3 million corporations of all
sizes, most of them small, with a collective $ 2.5 trillion in sales. It
includes foreign corporations that do business in the United States.

Among foreign corporations, a slightly higher
percentage, 68%, did not pay taxes during the period covered — compared with 66%
for United States corporations. Even with these numbers, corporate tax receipts
have risen sharply as a percentage of federal revenue in recent years.

The GAO study was done at the request of two
Democratic Senators, Carl Levin of Michigan and Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota.
In recent years, Senator Levin has held investigations on tax evasion and urged
officials and regulators to examine whether corporations were abusing tax laws
by shifting income earned in higher-tax jurisdictions, like the United States,
to overseas subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.

Senator Levin said in written remarks that “this
report makes clear that too many corporations are using tax trickery to send
their profits overseas and avoid paying their fair share in the United States.”
But the GAO said that it did not have enough data to address the role of what
some policy experts say is a crucial factor in profits sent overseas.

That factor, known as transfer pricing, involves
corporations charging their overseas subsidiaries lower prices for goods and
services, a common move that lowers a corporation’s tax bill. A number of
corporations are in transfer-pricing disputes with the Internal Revenue Service.

Either way, the nearly 1,000 largest United States
corporations were more likely than smaller ones to pay taxes.

In 2005, one in four large United States
corporations paid no taxes on revenue of $1.1 trillion, compared with 66% in the
overall pool. Large corporations are those with at least $ 250 million in assets
or annual sales of at least $ 50 million.

At a basic corporate tax rate of 35%, all the
corporations covered in the study in theory owed $ 875 billion in federal income
taxes. But because the tax code allows corporations to claim legally an array of
deductions, write-offs, operating losses and tax credits, the actual taxes paid
were much lower.

Joshua Barro, a staff economist at the Tax
Foundation, a conservative research group, said that the largest corporations
represented only 1% of the total number of corporations, but more than 90% of
all corporate assets.

The vast majority of the large corporations that
did not pay taxes had net losses, he said, and thus no income on which to pay
taxes. “The notion that there is a large pool of untaxed corporate profits is
incorrect.” In 2004, a GAO study said that 7 in 10 of all foreign corporations
doing business in the United States, or foreign-controlled corporations, paid no
taxes from 1996 through 2000, compared with 6 in 10 United States corporations.

(Source : Business Standard, 14-8-2008)

 

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Compliance Report of Transfer Orders, 2008 — Scant respect for Government — CBDT directions

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6 Compliance Report of Transfer
Orders, 2008 — Scant respect for Government — CBDT directions


CBDT has noticed that nearly 50% of the officers
transferred are not relieved so far and so have not joined their new places of
posting. This is non-compliance of Government’s order and has been viewed
seriously by the Competent Authority.

Board notices that many officers are not being
relieved by CCIT (CCAs)/DGsIT on the pretext that their representations are
pending before the Board. Board wants the field to note that as per Para 11 of
Transfer Policy, further representations from the officer would be considered
only after the officer joins his place of posting and applies through proper
channel and such petition shall not confer any right whatsoever on the officer
to continue on their previous post in defiance of Government’s orders. Failure
to comply with the Governments orders would lead to actions both against the
non-complying officer as well as their Controlling officer.


Now the CBDT directs that, all officers under order
of postings may be relieved immediately and a consolidated report of their
relieving as well as joining dates may be sent to the Board by 18th August 2008
without fail. [CBDT F.No.A-35015/44/2008-Ad.VI, dated 13th August, 2008]. This
is today — we are almost sure that disobedience will continue. How can these
disobedient officers instill any discipline in their subordinates ?


Disobedience of the Board is not confined to CBDT;
CBEC is no better. On 16th August 2008, Saturday — a holiday for the CBEC, the
Board issued a transfer order of 11 Joint Commissioners/Additional
Commissioners. What was the urgent need for issuing this order on a Saturday,
especially when the whole of Government of India was on a vacation with three
holidays ? (CBEC office order No. 195/2008 dated 16-8-2008)

(Source : Taxindiaonline.com)

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India’s Best Kept Secret — The Official Secrets Act — An ‘Invalid’ Act ?

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5 India’s Best Kept Secret — The
Official Secrets Act — An ‘Invalid’ Act ?


The State’s regressive omerta code, was never
notified. It isn’t actually a law !


Here’s the untold story of the Official Secrets Act
(OSA) 1923: It was passed in April 1923 by the Legislative Council. The Act was
never notified in the Gazette of India.


To become law, every Act must be notified in the
Gazette of India. The National Archives of India, Ministries of Home and Law say
they are
not in possession of any such Notification. None exists in the 1923 Gazette of
India either.

The OSA was amended twice, in 1951 and 1967, and
made more stringent. But only the amendments were notified in the ‘Extraordinary
Gazette of India’. Legal luminaries say that if an Act is not notified, it is an
‘invalid’ law.

Why The British wanted OSA :

In 1923, Bolsheviks could fester unrest in India
directly or indirectly. They have “increased our troubles on the North West
Frontier and Waziristan”. This could “lead to a rupture with Afghanistan”.
Prominent ‘Mussalman’ leaders have shown sympathy with the Afghans. Unwise to
disregard possibility of ‘fanatical Muslims in India’ acting in sympathy with
them. Increased Japanese activity in Burma calls for better means for ‘obtaining
information’, Post- (First World) War enemy powers are out to ferret secrets. In
the event of a war between Japan and America, the former may try to arouse
Indian feelings against the British Empire. There are no existing laws to deal
effectively with such activities.

(From the note prepared by General C. W. Jacob,
Chief of General Staff, in 1921. Document sourced from the National Archives of
India, Delhi.)

“I checked all the dates from 1923 and no such
Notification for the OSA exists.” Maj. Gen. V. K. Singh Ex-Raw.

“It’ll jeopardise any more future prosecutions
under the OSA. Technically, it’ll all be invalid.” Hosbet Suresh, Ex-Judge,
Bombay HC.

“If it has not been notified, the very validity of
the Act can be challenged in Court.” Rajindar Sachar, Ex-CJ, Delhi HC.

“After the RTI Act came into force, the OSA has no
place . . . even its relics cannot remain.” Veerappa Moily, Congress pointsman.

“The law was perpetuated by the bureaucracy, to
insulate itself from public scrutiny.” Aruna Roy, Ex-NAC Member.

In 2007, the Administrative Reforms Commission
(ARC) headed by senior Congress leader Veerappa Moily finally decided to bite
the bullet on the draconian Official Secrets Act (OSA). It put it on record that
an Act “enacted in the colonial era” (1923) had no place in democratic India.
The controversial piece of legislation had to either be amended or scrapped. But
as is wont to happen, a committee of secretaries set up later by the upa
Government examined and rejected the Moily panel recommendation. The status
now : a Cabinet subcommittee is taking a
second look at the suggestions put up by the ARC.

Meanwhile, research into the origins of the OSA has
thrown up a shocker, putting a question mark on the very validity of the Act.
Documents accessed under the RTI Act from the Ministries of Home Affairs (MHA)
and Law and Justice, as well as the National Archives of India (NAI), show the
OSA was never notified in the Gazette of India—a mandatory requirement to make
any Act a law.

(Source : An article by Saikat Datta, Outlook
India

— From Internet)

 

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Revenue Department tells FIPB to reject telecom FDI from tax havens

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4 Revenue Department tells FIPB to
reject telecom FDI from tax havens


In another instance of Indian tax authorities
adopting a hard-nosed stance to prevent abuse of tax avoidance treaties, the
Revenue Department recently opposed a proposal of a Cyprus-based company to
increase its stake in an Indian telecom services company from 40% to nearly 74%.


The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB)
rejected the proposal on security concerns and the Revenue Department is saying
the source of funds is not clear.


Advising FIPB, the nodal agency for approving
foreign investment proposals, to reject the proposal, the Department pointed out
that gains from the future sale of the shares in question would not be taxable
in India due to the double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA) with Cyprus.

The Revenue Department’s stance assumes importance
given that India is trying to renegotiate the Cyprus treaty with an eye on
taxing capital gains taxable in the jurisdiction in which the income is earned.
This is not the first instance of such an effort by India. In fact, it has
already reworked the DTAA with the United Arab Emirates and removed the capital
gains tax exemption clause. India is also trying to renegotiate a similar treaty
with Mauritius.

It may be recalled that the Tax Department is
currently in litigation with Vodafone on paying withholding tax for acquiring
Hong Kong-based Hutchison’s stake in a Mauritius-based outfit that held a
majority stake in Indian mobile service provider Hutch-Essar.

FDI is rising sharply from Cyprus and Mauritius,
compared with inflows from developed countries like the United States and the
United Kingdom. From an inflow of $ 58 million in 2006-07, FDI from Cyprus rose
sharply to $ 834 million in 2007-08. In the first two months of the current
fiscal, FDI from Cyprus stood at $ 177 million.

Similarly, FDI from Mauritius rose from $ 6.3
billion in 2006-07 to $ 11 billion the next year. In the first two months of the
current fiscal, FDI from Mauritius stood at $ 2.85 billion.

With overseas companies structuring their
investments to maximise benefits and minimise tax cost by routing investments
through tax havens, preventing abuse of tax treaties is high on the agenda of
the Indian Revenue authorities.

(Source : Business Standard, 19-8-2008)

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Exploring Benford’s Law — Digital Analysis with Computer-Assisted Audit Tools (CAATs)

Jai India

Light Elements

As soon as the UPA Government won the ‘confidence vote’
(manufactured or otherwise, God knows) our prince of Delhi, Rahul Gandhi flew by
a chopper to meet Kalawati and Shashikala, poor women in Vidarbha in Maharashtra,
whose poverty was exposed by the prince very vividly to move the stone-hearted
(that is what the prince presumes) MPs to support the controversial nuclear deal
with the supercop America, consequently, to save the Government.


Kalawati and Shashikala were busy with their chores. Our
prince was very enthusiastic and excited as the chopper was hovering over the
village of Kalawati and Shashikala. He was trying to locate them through his
binoculars in the farms below. Eventually the prince could spot the honourable
ladies not through binoculars, but when the chopper landed. The prince greeted
Kalawati and Shashikala with folded hands (it should be the other way round).
But the prince was in a hurry. Reluctantly, Kalawati and Shashikala just looked
at the prince.

“You didn’t recognise me. I am Rahul Gandhi from Delhi” said
the prince dusting his Ray Ban goggles. Dynastic young MPs from the Congress
party and its allies (note we are in ‘coalition era’, so allies) accompanying
the prince Rahul shouted in chorus ‘Rahulji Zindabad’, ‘Rahulji Aage Badho, Hum
Tumhare Sath Hai’. With this slogan-shouting, the tiny village came to life. The
otherwise jobless villagers thronged to where the prince had located Kalawati
and Shashikala, first to have a close look of the ‘chopper’ and then for a
cursory glimpse of a would-be Prime Minister of India.

“Silence, Silence” one of the young MPs screamed with full
steam in his lungs.

“Ladies and Gentlemen !”

“Why are you leaving out the children ?” a query came from
the crowd.

“Ok, Ok Ladies, Gentlemen and Children, including children on
the waists of their mothers — now I hope you would be happy. Rahulji is back
with you after winning ‘confidence vote’ to inform and interact with you about
the nuclear energy deal”. As he ended his mini introductory speech, somebody
from the crowd queried,

“Who is this Rahul ? I mean Rahul Mahajan or Rahul Gandhi ?”

“Oh my God ! my dear uncle I mean, Rahuljiiiii Gandhijiiiiii . . .  . .”

There was big laughter. As the noise died down, the prince
Rahul took charge of the gullible mob of villagers and started his speech :

“As an Indian (why Indian ?) I stand before you. My dear
countrymen, trust me, we won the motion of confidence moved by our (what do you
mean by our Prime Minister ?) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh just a few hours
ago. I am here to convey to you how ‘nuclear deal’ with the USA is the only
solution to eradicate ‘your’ poverty, I mean poverty in this country. When I met
Kalawati and Shashikala from your village before the Parliamentary Session
convened for the confidence motion, I heard their plight, their children cannot
study at night due to power shortage in this area. I realised that nuclear
energy is the only solution to remove the poverty in this country. You will ask
me, how ? With nuclear energy there will be rapid industrial growth. India will
be the industrial hub of the world. It will create millions of jobs. Then there
will be no poverty in the country. Therefore my dear countrymen, nuclear energy
is the only solution to remove poverty from this country. I am sure after long
long years, at least 20 to 30 years, we will have full-fledged nuclear energy in
the country if we now strike a deal with America. Consequently, sons of Kalawati
and Shashikala will get jobs.

My dear countrymen, one more thing I would like to tell you,
we should not worry about how the world will impact us. We should impact the
world. We should train ourselves to dream of things that never were there and
ask why not, then only we will become a super power in the world of tomorrow.
Say, Jai India, Jai India, Jai India !”

All young MPs and villagers recited the new slogan coined by
the prince of modern India with a bit of confusion, some were saying ‘Jai Hind’
and some were saying ‘Jai India’. What a speech indeed ! It appeared that
majority of villagers were more confused than convinced by the speech of the
prince.

All the young MPs including the prince felt thirsty. Of late
they realised that they were under the scorching sun of Vidarbha where monsoon
plays hide and seek. When they thronged the chopper to grab a water bottle, alas
the villagers had either consumed or taken away all the crates of water bottles.
The prince was very furious. He asked to check the whereabouts of the pilot. The
pilot was smoking in a relaxed mood behind the tree just a stone’s throw away
from the chopper. Somebody shouted his name. Hurriedly the pilot took a last
drag and spun the butt. He appeared before the prince. The prince started to
berate the pilot left, right and centre. An old villager in his 70s came forward
and intervened,

“My son why are you so angry with the pilot ? Cool down, this
area has been suffering from water shortage since your great grandfather was
Prime Minister of this country. People in this village are thirsty as well as
hungry. They may have consumed the water bottles. For them a drop of water is
more important than one megawatt of electricity created with the help of nuclear
energy. Apart from your great grandpa, neither your grandma, nor your father
could remove the poverty from this country. My son, poverty is our ancestral
property. You talked about future of this country after 20 to 30 years, but what
about those intervening period of 20 to 30 years, poverty will grow in geometric
progression. So my son, don’t try to cook a ‘khichadi’ [nuclear energy, rapid
industrialisation, jobs to millions, no poverty ?] of Birbal under the fire of
‘nuclear energy’ for us.”

“You talked about impacting the world, mind you, with empty stomachs and dry throats of millions, living without shelter, you cannot impact the world. It is easier said than done (in the Parliament of India) to impact the world.”

My son, your great grandfather discovered ancient India and wrote a book ‘Discovery of India’. Now it is for you to ‘Rediscover’ India after independence and don’t write a book, it is not enough now, but ‘write off’ the poverty in this country. Jai Hind.”

There was a loud applause. Spontaneously all of them shouted “Jai Hind, Jai Hind, Jai Hind.”

The prince of New Delhi with his head down to the ground slowly walked towards ‘East’ where the chopper was parked.

Lalu gave railway jobs in lieu of land

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2 Lalu gave railway jobs in lieu of
land



In the worst attack on Railway Minister Lalu Prasad
since the allegations of his involvement in the fodder scam in the 1990s, the
JD(U) on Tuesday claimed that Lalu and his family acquired landed properties
worth over Rs.100 crore over the last four years through means that are not
above board.


State JD(U) President Rajiv Ranjan Singh released
land registry papers running in 500 pages as ‘evidence’. He claimed Lalu
‘invented’ three methods for amassing land. One, poor people’s plots were
transferred in the name of family members as deed of absolute sale in return for
railway jobs. Two, lands were gifted to Lalu’s kin by RJD leaders. Three, plots
exchanged ownerships in return of favours by the Railway Ministry.

The plots have been registered in the names of
Lalu’s wife Rabri Devi, daughter Misa Bharti and sons Tej Pratap and Tejaswi.
Some of the them have also been registered in the name of Delhi-based Delight
Marketing Company, owned by Lalu aide and Union Minister Prem Gupta’s wife,
Singh said.

The JD(U) leader said Lalu’s father-in-law Shiv
Prasad Choudhary was a landless poor in government records and, as such, was
given government land in 2000. Four years later, he became Shiv Prasad Yadav and
‘purchased’ land measuring 20 katthas and 21 dhurs from two persons. In 2006, he
gifted the land to Rabri.

Union Ministers Kanti Singh, Raghunath Jha and
Jayaprakash Yadav, too had gifted land to Lalu’s kin, Singh claimed, hinting it
was to wangle ministerial berths.

(Source : The Times of India, 13-8-2008)

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SEBI set to fine 7 investment bankers for ‘shoddy work’

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1 SEBI set to fine 7 investment
bankers for ‘shoddy work’


Capital market regulator SEBI is set to impose
penalties on some of India’s top investment bankers for what it considers
‘shoddy work’ done by them while handling public offerings over the past few
years. The regulator’s Market Intermediaries Regulation and Supervision
Department (MIRSD) has uncovered serious shortcomings in the due diligence
process for initial public and rights offerings, besides open offers, carried
out by seven investment bankers — Kotak, Enam, DSP Merrill Lynch, SBI Caps, HSBC,
Keynote and Aryaman Financial.

The regulator’s investigation has revealed major
lapses in the due diligence process relating to initial public offerings, rights
issues and also open offers, according to an official close to the development.
SEBI has set in motion adjudication proceedings for imposing a monetary penalty
against all these bankers, an official said.


He added that arbitration proceedings against Enam
and Kotak pertain to YES Bank and IDFC IPOs dating back to 2006. A SEBI probe
had revealed a scam involving manipulation of retail category in these IPOs. DSP
Merrill Lynch was also rapped by SEBI for the YES Bank IPO, as the regulator’s
inspection showed that the details of the promoters as mentioned in the IPO
document were different from those filed with the Reserve Bank of India.

HSBC and SBI Caps were charged with failure in
disclosing key details in open offers managed by them. In some cases, the
regulator has found 10-15 lapses in the offer documents, the official said. In
several cases, bankers have not followed the prescribed procedures while
conducting due diligence, said SEBI officials. SEBI Chairman C. B. Bhave had
told ET, in an interview shortly after taking over, that one of the issues SEBI
was actively looking at was to make merchant bankers more responsible,
post-issue.

In some cases, the merchant bankers had not even
verified the plant and machinery of the companies, the issues of which they had
managed. Besides, litigation against the company directors was not mentioned in
the public issue documents. Errors were also noticed in financial details
provided in the documents.

SEBI’s inspection also found serious deficiencies
in some IPOs. For instance, in one IPO, the regulator found out that the
post-issue capital of the company was higher than its authorised capital — a
clear indication of poor due diligence carried out by the issue’s merchant
banker. The same mistake was found in Weal Infotech IPO’s case and the regulator
has pulled up the merchant banker to the issue, Aryaman Financial.

SEBI has taken a grim view of the fact that
merchant bankers, who are entrusted with the task of vetting a public issue,
have failed to discharge their responsibilities fully, which is detrimental to
the interest of investors. Five of the merchant banks who were served notice by
SEBI declined to comment on the issue when ET contacted them. Keynote Financial
said it had not received any notice from the regulator. Officials of Aryaman
Financial were not available for comment.

It is not only in IPOs that serious lapses on the
part of merchant bankers were detected. Even in case of open offers, SEBI has
indicted merchant bankers. The market watchdog has taken HSBC to task on the
Garware Offshore open offer. In this instance, SEBI found out that the open
offer document did not furnish important details of the target company. The
offer was made by India Star Mauritius and the financial details of the
acquiring company were not given in the offer document.

Even the company’s paid-up capital was wrongly
mentioned in the financial data, officials said. SEBI has prescribed a standard
letter of offer containing various financial and other parameters of the
company. In fact, HSBC was given a warning by the regulator in an earlier case.

SEBI has moved against SBI Caps for the investment
bank’s failure to provide a vital piece of information about a company in the
open offer document. The open offer was made by a company listed on a regional
stock exchange, but the document did not mention the fact that the company would
soon list on BSE. Many investors tendered their shares in the offer, since they
did not possess the requisite information.

(Source : The Economic Times, 12-8-2008)

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Consistency

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Namaskaar

What is consistency ? We know it, we realise it, we practise
it. As a matter of fact — we accountants practise it with a fetish. For
example :

  •  We
    seek ‘consistency’


  •  in accounting policies to make financial statements true and fair.


  •  in disclosure practices to make financial statements easily understandable and
    comparable.


  •  in the quality of food we eat. Restaurants which are consistent with the
    quality of food are patronised and successful.



  •  We
    seek consistency





  •   to improve the quality of service we render.



  •   in the improvement of the quality of services we receive.



  •   in satisfaction and happiness.



  •   to improve ourselves because without this continuous and consistent
    improvement we will either stagnate or more often than not deteriorate.



Law affirms ‘consistency’ despite ‘estoppel’. There are
innumerable court decisions affirming consistency.

Consistency in action and behaviour is thus what we
continuously practise. Sadguru Jaggi says we are a ‘joy factory’ and we must
continuously and with consistent practice improve the quality and quantity of
joy.

It has been rightly said that ‘consistency’ (repetition) in
action leads to ‘habit’ and habit builds character and character in human beings
is what we not only seek in our lives but also seek in others. Character is what
makes a man and a nation. Character is what Ram sought to build in people by
being an example — that is why he is named ‘Maryada Purushottam’. Character is
what Bhishmapitamaha advised Yudhishthir when he sought his advise on ‘how to be
a good ruler’. Character is what Gandhi sought to build in us Indians by
practising what he preached. I repeat, character is the product of
‘consistency’.

Above all, we seek success and it can be achieved by creating
a congenial and rewarding work environment. Hence, let us continuously and
consistently practise the concept ‘bloom wherever we are planted’.

Another ‘C’ we should consistently practise to make our lives
rewarding is ‘Compassion’. Let us never forget that there is a difference
between charity and compassion. ‘Compassion’ is an emotion — emotion of taking
care — care from the heart and without even seeking any form of acknowledgement.
The practice of this ‘C’ enriches our lives.

Though not relevant to the subject of this ‘C’ — I would like
to share a thought with you on the two ‘C’s one should always shun and
these are: ‘conceit’ and ‘cunning’. They are twin sisters and have
a disastrous influence on our lives. Let us not forget that wars have been
fought due to conceit — whether it is the Ram-Ravan fight, or The Mahabharat or
world wars. Families and business houses have been destroyed because of the
conceited and/or cunning behaviour of one individual. These are emotions from
which all of us suffer and the fullness of life is marred by them. So let us
with conviction and consistency shun them to make our life happy.

We have talked about four ‘C’s earlier — that is —
commitment, conviction, comparison and conditioning. I intend to close this ‘C’
series with ‘consistency’. I also believe that adopting any one of these five
‘C’s will automatically lead to the adoption of the other four ‘C’s. So let us
adopt and practise these ‘C’s to make our lives rewarding, successful and above
all, contended and happy.

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Now . . . . Is Life Still Worth Living ?

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Namaskaar

About a fortnight ago, I was most pleasantly surprised to
meet Ms. Sneha Phene in the company of Ms. Benazeer Patil. They had managed to
dig out a piece that was published in the GLC annual magazine for 1957-58.
Though I remembered that the college had won the Boman-Behram Inter-Collegiate
Trophy, I had forgotten that the piece had been published in the magazine.


Reading the piece transported me to the St. Xavier’s College
hall where the Boman-Behram trophy competition was held annually. Prof. Colaco
from that college was the leading light amongst the organisers. I have been
asked how different the article would be if I were to rewrite it. I do not think
it would change materially, though I would have signed my name as ‘Sohrab’ and
not ‘Soli’. I presume the reason for the question is the general feeling that
the hopes of youth give place to the despair of age. As a popular song says :

“Those were the days, my friend

We thought they’d never end

We’d sing and dance forever and a day

We’d live the life we choose

We’d fight and never lose

For we were young and sure to have our way.”




Today, at an age when much time has gone by and little
remains, the question is ‘Has life been worth living ?’ I would answer this with
a most emphatic ‘Yes’. Undoubtedly, some difficult professional decisions have
had to be made. In the period 1956-58, the Law degree was a two years’ course,
after graduation. As one neared completion of the course, several cautionary
warnings were received : There was not much future in the profession, one would
have to compromise values, one required a ‘Godfather’ to succeed, the Court
language would change to Hindi, Marathi, etc. The ignoring of the advice of such
prophets of doom has indeed made life worth living. Then there was the choice
whether to go in for general practice or to specialise, and lastly, whether to
be a solicitor or counsel and very importantly whose chambers to join as a
‘devil’. Fortunately, I made the right choices — perhaps more by chance than
design.

I have just said that the message of the prophets of doom was
ignored. Let me hasten to add that often it seemed that they were dead on right.
In my first year, I earned the princely sum of Rs.30 and that too because the
Counsel to whom the solicitor wanted to deliver the brief — for an adjournment —
was not readily traced and I was found — as usual — to be warming a seat in the
library !

One fact which I did not realise 45 years and more ago is
that the secret for life being worth living for a professional is an
understanding spouse and children who can adjust to having a parent coming home
at 8.30 p.m. or later. If this understanding is absent, life sours. They say
that female lawyers of eminence are less in number than the male variety. If
true, it only means that the female spouse is more understanding than the male
one ! But more seriously, there are professionals who unfortunately get so
immersed in their work that they do not have time to build such relationships.
They realise only in their middle age that fawning clients are no substitute for
a loving family, who will care for you, unmindful of whether you deliver.

I have perceptively been asked how the connotation of life
has changed from my student days. One most unfortunate development (for which I
alone have to be blamed for being a bad organiser) has been that I do not find
time for friends as I used to. Gone are the days when one sat at Pyrkes (which
was near Flora Fountain) or in an Irani restaurant exchanging notes and solving
the problems of the world over a cup of tea. (Beer was not freely available then
and in any event, who had the money so to indulge oneself ?) Those happy moments
just to sit by the sea have become rarer. To quote again from the same song so
popular in the fifties of the last century :

“Then the busy years went rushing by us

We lost our starry notions on the way

If by chance I’d see you in the tavern (Pyrkes ?)

We’d smile at one another and we’d say

Those were the days . . . . .




Just tonight I stood before the tavern

Nothing seemed the way it used to be

In the glass I saw a strange reflection

Was the lonely fellow really me ?



One disturbing development which has affected life was and
now is, is the increasing feeling, particularly amongst juniors in the
profession, that the streams of justice are not as clear and unmuddled as
heretofore. The highest in the land have spoken about the over-hanging sceptre
of corruption in the administration of justice. But still, on a personal level,
the joie de vivre and the desire to see new places, climb hills
(unfortunately, one now gets out of breath more easily), swim in the ocean and
have new experiences remains. Yes, all said and done life was, has been and,
hopefully, will be worth living. So let me end on a song :

“Oh my friends we are older but no wiser

For in our hearts, the dreams are just the same.”

(This article was written by the author in 2002-03, as a sequel
to his talk in 1957,

which was reproduced in the September 2008 issue of the BCAJ).


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ORDERS OF CIC/SICs

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Part A : ORDERS OF CIC/SICs


 

 
S. 2(h) of the RTI Act — Public Authority :


Different High Courts in a number of cases have decided
whether a particular body or institution is a Public Authority or not u/s.2(h)
of the Act. Hereunder are listed some of the decisions :

l
Decision of the High Court of Karnataka :


Textile Co-operative Bank is provided aid or assistance by
the State Government for the benefit of the weavers, who may be members of the
Bank in respect of loans availed by them. On these facts, it could not be held
that the said aid or assistance is provided to the Bank. Accordingly, the Bank
is not a non-Government organisation substantially financed by the State
Government. Hence, it is not covered under clause (d)(ii) of S. 2(h), and is not
a Public Authority. [Textile Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. the Karnataka Information
Commission & Others,
W.P. No. 20004 of 2007 (GM-RES) and C.W.P. No. 18599 of 2007 (GM-RES) decided on
17-2-2010, (2010 (1) ID 521)]

l Single
Bench decision of Bombay High Court :


There is no direct or indirect control by the State
Government over the affairs of Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank
Ltd. The control was not deep or pervasive.

Hence the said Bank was not covered within the meaning of S.
2(h) of the RTI Act. [AIR 2009 Bombay 75, (2009 (2) ID 156)]

l
Division Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court :


The Court held “A perusal of the definition of ‘public
authority’ shows that ‘public authority’ would mean any authority or body or
institution established or constituted apart from other things by the
Notification issued by an order made by the appropriate Government. It is to
include even any body owned, controlled or substantially financed or
non-Government Organisation substantially financed directly or indirectly by the
funds provided by the appropriate Government. It is undisputed that the
petitioners are receiving substantially grant-in-aid from the Chandigarh
Administration. Once a body is substantially financed by the Government, the
functions of such body partake the character of ‘public authority’. The
petitioner has claimed that they are getting only 45% grant-in-aid after
admitting that initially the grant-in-aid paid to them was to the extent of 95%.
If on account of policy of the Government the grant-in-aid to the extent of 95%
which was given initially allowing the petitioner to build up its own
infrastructure and reducing the grant-in-aid later would not result into an
argument that no substantial grant-in-aid is received and therefore it could not
be regarded as ‘public authority’. Therefore, the Court did not find any
substance in the stand taken by the petitioner that it is not a ‘public
authority’ “

[D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society & Ors. v.
Director of Public Instruction & Ors.,
AIR 2008 (Pb& Hry.) 117; (2008 (2) ID
382)]

l
Single Bench decision of High Court of Allahabad :

The question for consideration was whether the petitioner,
which is a Girls High School, recognised and receiving grant-in-aid from the
State Government, is a ‘public authority’ as defined u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act.

The Court held as follows : “In my opinion, whenever there is
even an iota of nexus regarding control and finance of public authority over the
activity of a private body or institution or an organisation, etc. the same
would fall under the provisions of S. 2(h) of the Act. The provisions of the Act
have to be read in consonance and in harmony with its objects and reasons given
in the Act which have to be given widest meaning in order to ensure that
unscrupulous persons do not get benefits of concealment of their illegal
activities or illegal acts by being exempted under the Act and are able to hide
everything from the public. The working of any such organisation or institution
of any such private body owned or under control of public authority shall be
amenable to the Right to Information Act. The petitioner being an institution
recognised under the provisions of the U.P. High School and Intermediate
Education Act, 1929 and receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government is
therefore, covered under the aforesaid Act.”

[Dhara Singh Girls High School Ghaziabad v. State of Utta
Pradesh & Ors.,
AIR 2008 Allahabad 92; (2008 (2) ID 179)]

l
The High Court of Orissa :


The Court was considering the case of Southern Electricity
Supply Company of Orissa Ltd. (the Company) which is a subsidiary of Grid
Organisation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) which is a wholly-owned Government Company.
Submission of the Company was that it is a public limited company and hence it
is not a ‘public authority’ as defined in S. 2(h) of the RTI Act. The Court held
that u/s.2(h) even non-Government organisation substantially financed directly
or indirectly by the funds provided by the appropriate Government would come
within the ambit of Public Authority. Admittedly the petitioner company is a
subsidiary of GRIDCO, wholly-owned Government Company, it is governed by the
different rules and regulations framed by the State Government, the rate of
tariff is regulated by the Orissa Electricity Reforms Act. Moreover, this
distribution company, and three similar other companies, are discharging
governmental function of distribution and supply of electricity to the people of
the State, which is an essential public duty.

All these go to show that the State Government has a deep and
pervasive control over the petitioner company and such control is not mere
regulatory. In view of the above, the Court came to the conclusion that the said
company falls within the definition of Public Authority as defined u/s. 2(h) of
the RTI Act. [Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Ltd v. State of
Orissa and Others,
W.P.(C) No. 8698 of 2006 decided on 9-12-2009; (2010 (1)
ID 524)]

 
S. 2(f) — ‘Information’ :


The writ petitioners, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), claim to be aggrieved by an order of the Central Information Commission (CIC), dated 23-12-2008 to the extent that the Commission directed disclosure of the applicant complainant’s answer sheet to the information applicant. The applicant had elicited various kinds of information, including a copy of the answer sheet of the examination attempted by him. The Assistant Solicitor General who appeared on behalf of ICAI contended that the question as to the right to information and the right of the class of individuals who attempt examinations to access their answer sheets is squarely covered by the rulings of the Supreme Court in Secretary, West Bengal Council for Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das, [2007 (8) SCC 242] and President, Board of Secondary Education, Orissa & Anr. v. D. Suvankar & Anr., [2007 (1) SCC 603].

The argument was that the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court unalterably fixed the character of the right, in the sense that the declarations exclude the right of a candidate participating in the examination process to access information about the examination process by demanding copies of answer sheets. The subsidiary argument made by the ASG was that the right to seek answer sheets, if at all, could be claimed as part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and since the Supreme Court excluded that possibility, having regard to the objects of the RTI Act, i.e., effectuation of provisions of the right to freedom of expression and information, the possibility of accessing such class of information stands excluded from the right to freedom of expression.

The Court stated that under the scheme of the enactment, all classes of information except those which are explicitly exempted from disclosure u/s.8 have to be revealed. The exemption regime is itself broad and covers various diverse matters, including commercial information, trade secrets and so on. The information authorities set up under the enactment are empowered by S. 10 to sever such information which should not be disclosed from such class of information. The Court then stated as under : “The argument of the petitioner that since the Supreme Court declared the law in such matters, and that candidates who seek copies of answer sheet cannot claim it as a matter of right, is unpersuasive.”

The Supreme Court’s decisions were similar in both the instances; in Ayan Das case and D. Suvankar case, the context was wide directions by the High Court, requiring revaluation/re-verification (in the Suvankar case) and direction to reassess through another examiner in Ayan Das’s case. There is no discussion or mention of the RTI Act. Concededly, the judgments were not examining information application under the RTI Act. Yet, a close scrutiny of the facts mentioned in both the judgments reveals that the claims were not premised on any of the provisions of the enactment. Apparently, they were in the context of writ petitions filed before the High Court. The judgments, therefore, have to be read in their terms, and in the contextual setting. There is no gain saying that the judgments of the Supreme Court on an issue constitute law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. Yet, the judgments are in the context of what is declared and what is not declared.

The ‘unarticulated’ argument of no right under Article 19(1)(a) by the learned ASG cannot, therefore, be accepted. Doing so would mean that this Court would be reading into the two judgments on the intention to overbear the provisions of the RTI Act; a result too startling to accept. As regards the second contention that since the Supreme Court held that there is no right to claim disclosure of answer sheets or copies, and the same is not part of the Right to Freedom of Expression and, therefore, implicitly excluded from the RTI Act; this contention too cannot be accepted.

The mere fact that the statement of objects of, or the long title to the RTI Act mentions that it is a practical regime of the right to information for citizens, would not mean that a cribbed interpretation has to be placed on its provisions, on the same notion of implicit exclusion of that which would legitimately fall within Article 19(1)(a). No rule of interpretation or judgment of the Supreme Court was discussed or relied on the point that the ruling in Suvankar’s case excluded the right to access answer sheets, which would otherwise fall within the expression and, therefore, would fall within the purview of the RTI Act.

The interpretation canvassed would lead to startling consequences when in the absence of enacted law under Article 19(2), the Court would be legislating, as it were, without the possibility of such exclusion being tested in Courts. A salutary rule of interpreting the Constitution is that fundamental rights should be construed broadly, to enable citizens to enjoy them [Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) (1) SCC 717]; Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) (3) SCC 654]. In any event, the Act confers positive rights which can be enforced through its mechanism.

This Court should be extremely slow in interpreting such rights, dealing with personal liberties and freedoms on the basis of some inarticulate premise of a judgment. For the above reasons the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition and held the same to be misconceived.

[ICAI v. Central Information Commission & Anr., W.P. (C) 8529/2009 decided on 30-4-2009; (2010 (1) ID 587)]

                                                         PART B : THE RTI ACT 2005

5th CIC Annual Convention, 2010:

Central Information Commission held a 5th Annual Convention, 2010 on 13th and 14th September 2010 at DRDO Bhavan, New Delhi. I was invited by the Commission to attend the same and have actively participated there. Sessions were very well conducted and provided a tlot of information on the development of RTI in India and the road ahead. Theme of the Convention was: ‘RTI: Challenges and Opportunities’. In coming few issues, I shall provide details thereof. To start with, I reproduce the keynote remarks of Shri Gopalkrishna Gandhi at the inaugural session, some being the highlight of the Convention:

After the IPC, the FIR and PIL, the best known three-letter acronym in Indian Governance is RTI. I think it has overtaken the others in frequency of use outside the agencies of law enforcement. And it engenders as much awe as IPC, FIR and PIL. It also generates, as PIL does, but even more so, two reactions : The first is admiration amongst its users or potential users. Ki aisaa ek baraa hathiyaar hamaare haathon mein aayaa hai.

The second is apprehension amongst those it targets or is likely to target. Ki humen dhake huaa pardaa ab khul gayaa hai. The first reaction, the reaction of admiration, is a good and wholesome reaction. Kyuunki qaanuun barhiyaa hai, bahaadur hai, har pradesh mein laguu ho gayaa hai.

RTI Act ab jan chukaa hai. Aaj uskii pehchaan hai, shaharon mein hi nahiin, chhote nagaron aur dehaat mein bhii. Haalaanki kuchh pradeshon mein vah mazbuti se aage barha hai aur kuchh aur pradeshon mein ab bhi ladkhadaate hue chaltaa hai.

Qaanuun-hukumat-awaam kaa is tarah ek honaa bahut achhi baat hai, which has to be admired. Lekin duusraa reaction jo hai, apprehension vaalaa, vah intahaa ghalat aur buraa hai. The Right to Information must never be allowed to degenerate into the Right to Bully, or into a form of vigilantism. Kyunki vah qanuun jo darr paidaa kartaa hai, vah iktarfaa hotaa hai, vah vishvaas, bharosaa, aitbaar nahiin barhaataa hai. Aur aaj humko vishvaas, aitbaar ki sakht zururat hai.

AAj RTI ko aaye paanch saal ho gaye hain. Humko aaj uske prabhaav oar, uske asar par, ghaur karnaa chaahiye. Kyaa hai uskaa asar ? RTI mein ek bare aandolan ki fateh hui hai. Aur uskaa shreyas sabse pahle jaataa hai Aruna Roy ko, jinhone Rajasthan mein RTI ki zaruurat mahsuus kari aur phir uske liye aandolan shuru kiyaa, aur uske liye logon kaa samarthan praapt kiyaa.

Andolanon ko logon kaa samarthan tab hi haasil hotaa hai jab logon ko us andolan mein tuk, tark, aur tathya dikhe. Varnaa nahin. Is qanuun ne hazaaron ke dil ujaagar kiye hain. Is qanuun ne kaiyon ko insaaf dilaayaa hai, kai ghaflaton, ghalatiyon, ghus aur ghor anyaayon ka is qanun ne muquabilaa kiyaa hai. Lekin phir bhii RTI ko aaj bhii ek smarthan kii, support aur backing ki zaruurat hai.

Aaj bhi RTI ke qaanuun banjaane ke baad bhi usko yah kyuun chaahiye ? Vajah yah hai : Yah qanuun kaiyon ke kaanon tak pahunchaa hai, kai hazaaron, lakhon kaanon tak pahunchaa hai, lekin phir bhi kai auron — karoron — ke kaanon ke upar se sarsaraataa huaa pravesh kar gayaa hai daftaron mein. Is baat mein vaise koi kharaabi nahiin. Daftaron ke binaa koi qanuun nahin chaltaa. Lekin daftaron kaa ek ajib tariqaa hotaa hai. Ve qanuunon ko apne kuuchon mein mehmaan banaa dete hain.

Daftaron ki koshish hoti hai ki qanuunon ko kam se kam taqliif ho, ziyaada se ziyaada aaraam miley. Lekin RTI aaraam ke liye nahiin banaa hai. Vah kaam ke liye banaa hai. Usko mehnat chaahiye, raahat nahiin. Daftaron ko RTI se darnaa nahin chaahiye, us se khisakne kii koshish nahiin karnii chaahiye. Mein sarkaari prabandhakon ko kahungaa ki RTI se ek ho jaayiye, usko apnaayiye, uski madad se haqiqat ko pahchaaniye, usko durust kariye. Jab bhii RTI ki tahat public se koi savaal aataa hai sarkaari daftaron ko uskaa svaagat karnaa chaahiye aur uskaa puraa, sahi, aur sachchaa javaab buland aavaaz mein denaa chaahiye.

It is not just RTI’s great good fortune, but India’s that a person of the veracity of Wajahat Habibullah has been India’s first Chief Information Commissioner. He has set RTI on track, set the RTI-Government equation on track. The Chief Information Commissioners in the States have also been working extremely hard, often with inadequate infrastructure, often as single Commissioners, and often without that continual backing from the State Administration that is required. I would like to congratulate all of them on this occasion for what they have achieved. They, with the Lok Ayuktas, and the State Commissions for Human Rights are Institutions of Conscience, They are, what may be called, the Zameer-e -Hind. Pradeshon mein jo commissioner aur PIOs bane hain, unko Rajya sarkaaron se saari suvidhayen aur sammaan milne chaahiye. RTI ki adhikaariyon ko iske liye intezaar karnaa pare yah sarkaari chhabi ke liye thiik nahiin.

RTI mein gopaniyataa kaa ek aham savaal hai. Is se sarkaaron ko kuchh bechainii hoti hai. RTI Act mein gopaniyataa kii surakshaa hui hai. Honi chahiye. Jaise hum hain, vaisa hi desh hai. Humen hum sab ko — kuchh maamlon mein gopaniyataa kii zuruurat hotii hai. Kuchh rishte aise hote hain, jahaan gopaniyataa zuruuri hoti hai. Sarkar aur desh ke rishton mein bhii kuchh aise lamhe aate hain, jahaan gopaniiyataa aavashyak ban jaatii hai. Vaisii gopaniyata kuchh nazaakaton kii hifaazat ke liye hotii hain. Khulepan— transparency — ka yah matlab nahiin ki hum aisii nazaakaton ko bhuul jaayen.

I would certainly include in these the confidential communications between a head of State and head of Government, both at the Centre and in the State. At the same time I would say that whenever an occasion arises when a head of State and head of Government share thoughts on matters of public importance, they must simultaneously take the public into confidence and place in the public domain, an operative summary of their discussions or correspondence to obviate speculation.

File notings kii baat aatii hai. Is par bhii bechainiyaan rahiin hain aur Chief Information Commissioner sahib kii is par aham ruling bhii aayii hai. Main sirf itnaa kah duun ki afsaron or saare note-writers ko notings likhte vaqt muddon par sochnaa chaahiye, haqiqat ko dhyaan mein rakhnaa chaahiye, qanuun ko dhyaan mein rakhnaa chahiye. Notes yah soch kar na likhiye ki ‘kahiin aage jaa kar RTI vaalii taqlioif na ho jaaye’. Aur na hi aisii notes likhne kii koshish kiijiye jis se ki RTI ke taramandal mein aap ek chamaktaa sitaaraa ban jaaen.

The RTI Act should not make note files monosyllabic or laconic, nor should it encourage prolixity in the hope of ‘RTI immortality’. Bureaucracy RTI ke maamle mein apne puraane mindset se abhi baahar aanaa siikh rahii hai. Sadiyon se afsaron ne thakur-suhaati sunii hai, maai-baapii, hukum-huzuurii dekhii hai. Unhe bataayaa gayaa hai ki savaal afsar baithe hue karegaa, javaab uske samne kharaa huaa insaan degaa. Aaj jab afsar RTI ke learner hai, aur RTI shikshak, to unko yah mat kahiye ‘chal utth, khare ho’. Yaa ‘chal utth, sar par khare ho’. Afsar aaj ek baraa pahluu siikh rahaa hai, vishvasaniya aur transparent RTI-compliant shaasan mein, siirshaasan mein nahiin. Gandhiji in Decemeber 30, 1926 ke din ‘Young India’ mein likhaa thaa: “Those who seek justice must come with clean hands”.

‘Clean hands’ means that those using the Act must use it responsibly. The architects and engineers and the persons running the Act should make users of the Act realise the difference between stressing and straining a point, between portraying and exaggerating a situation and between emphasising and magnifying a problem. RTI adherents and users should encourage serious questions and discourage frivolous or malicious ones. I have heard of persons who have been unsuccessful in interviews promptly doing an RTI to challenge the procedures of the appointing authorities, thereby paralysing the functioning of those bodies. A good instrument can be misused.

RTI’s protectors must not let that happen. The RTI Act is a potential remedy for discontent. It should not become a weapon in the hands of malcontents. Discontent in India is a reality. Malcontents in India are no less so. A strict and disciplinarian head-of-office can be bullied by RTI threats. This bullying can be lethal if it is based on deliberate distortions of facts and if it is based on half truths. Even a ‘truth’, a ‘fact’, can sometimes be misused. William Blake
famously said : ‘A truth told with bad intent beats all the lies you can invent’. RTI protectors and NGOs must be mindful of that. RTI should not be used to hurt anyone or anything, except opaqueness. RTI Act afsaron ko haqiqat kii dhuul se vaaqif karne ko hai, uski naak dhuul mein ragadne ke liye nahiin.

Today, RTI is facing probably its greatest challenge. So effective has it become, so rich in results, so amazingly potent that those with something to hide are afraid of it. Fear is a cousin of panic. And so we hear of those who have had the courage to use RTI against the powerful and the entrenched have had to pay dearly for their courage, even with their lives.

This is intolerable. If it is true that the unnatural death of persons who have filed RTI applications is connected with their RTI action, the law-enforcers have to visit the guilty with the speed of light and, under due process, bring the guilty demonstrably to account. And politics should be allowed to play no role in the proceedings. It is as imperative to keep politics out of RTI as it is to keep it out of the judiciary.

In fact, even more so because over the decades the judiciary has built up systems to safeguard its space; RTI establishments are yet to do so. Those who have died in the course of RTI work are martyrs to more than the Right to Information; they are martyrs to transparent and good governance and the rule of law. They are martyrs to the cause of a civilised and liberal rule of law. RTI Act ne logon ko aavaaz dilaayii hai, divaaron ko sunne par majbuur kiyaa hai. Surdas ke shabdon mein: Jaake kripa, Pangu giri langhai, Andhau ko sab kachhu darisaaii, Bahirau sune, guung puni bolai, Ranka chale sir chhatra dharaayii.
    
                                            

                                               PART C:  Informatton on & Around

    SIC’s validity under cloud:

S. 15 of the RTI Act provides that every State Government shall by Notification in the Official Gazette constitute a body to be known as State Information Commission to exercise powers conferred, etc. under the RTI Act. Even after 5 years since the RTI Act, 2005 came into existence, the Maharashtra State Government has not issued such Notification. Technically, all the orders by the Information Commission will be illegal and have no force of law. What a state of affairs !

    SRA biggest job attraction:

The Slum Rehabilitation Authority, building proposal, vigilance and development planning departments are the most lucrative, hence the most sought-after postings in the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation as revealed under the RTI application. According to the information sought by RTI activist Anil Galgali, BMC officials, chiefly engineers are asking for prime postings in these four departments of the Corporation. Further, in order to get postings in these departments, these officials have approached various politicians seeking letters of recommendation from them. According to the RTI reply, the officials seeking the postings have not only got recommendation from state politicians, but also Union Ministers. The SRA, building proposal, vigilance and development planning departments deal with builders who are ready to give big money so that their proposals are passed by the BMC. Further, many transactions take place under the table in these departments.

    SIC’s orders being challenged by the Government:

In a first case of its kind after the landmark Right to Information Act came into force five years ago, the Congress-led Democratic Front Government has refused to implement Chief Information Commissioner Suresh Joshi’s order to provide information to controversial bureaucrat V. M. Lal. Lal had filed an application under RTI before the GAD Public Information officer. He sought specific copies of the notings made by the concerned Department on the ongoing probe against him. A probe was conducted against him by veteran bureaucrat Asoke Basak. Lal’s contention was that Basak had given him a clean chit in all the eight charges. He alleged that on the basis of certain notings in his file, GAD did not agree with the findings of Basak and ultimately it recommended a punishment to him. In his application Lal had asked for all relevant notings and documents. The PIO took the view that since no final decision was taken the entire process remains incomplete. According to provisions of the RTI Act it was not binding on the PIO to provide the information sought. We have received CIC Suresh Joshi’s order to provide information to Lal. In our opinion the order is bad in law. If we implement the order, it will have an adverse impact on the administration. “As per the opinion expressed by the law and judiciary department, now we are moving the High Court against the CIC order,” said a senior official.

    Mhada’s duties:

The Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (Mhada) is duty-bound under the law to give the owner of a repaired building an opportunity to claim a compensation if the value of the debris (mostly Burma teak) turns out to be more than the cost of repairs. RTI query revealed that the relevant rule providing for this point is mostly not observed. There are around 16,000 buildings in Ctentral Mumbai that are more than 70 years old and in dire need of repairs. However, landlords are generally not interested in spending any money on them. The tenants of such buildings pay Mhada a cess in lieu of which it undertakes repairs through its repairs board. Many of these buildings were built from stone/bricks and wood. The wood is largely in good condition and fetches a very high price in the market. Going by the law, the wood becomes the property of the repairs board. However, after repair it is supposed to give a formal notice to the landlord that he may submit a claim for compensation if he feels that the cost of the wood is more than the cost of repair. RTI activist Milind Mulay found out that though 1,740 buildings were repaired using the cess and MLA/MLC fund between April 1, 2006 and November 14, 2009, not a single landlord was given this notice. It is surprising how senior officers who sign the file before releasing payment to the contractor do not notice the violation of their own rule.

    `26 lakh vanished:

Nearly `26 lakh collected by the BEST to provide relief after 1971 Bangladesh war seems to have vanished into thin air. The BEST had collected the amount from bus commuters as the Bangladesh Refugee Relief Surcharge from 1971-73 and the Scarcity Relief Surcharge in 1973-74. However, neither the BEST nor the Transport Commissioner’s office where it claims to have deposited the money has any information on how the money was spent. This was revealed when RTI activist Manoranjan Roy filed an application asking the BEST how much money was collected as surcharge and where it wasspent. The BEST revealed that it had collected `13.85 lakh under the head of ‘Bangladesh Refugee Relief Surcharge’ from December 1971 to March 1973 and a sum of `12.94 lakh under the head of ‘Scarcity Relief Surcharge’ from April 1973 to March 1974. However, the BEST said that it had deposited the money with the transport department as the sum is collected on behalf of the Government of Maharashtra and was being remitted to the office of the Transport Commissioner every month. When Roy filed an RTI with the Transport Commis-sioner’s office, the department admitted that such surcharges imposed by the BEST were deposited with it, but said it had no record of the `26 lakh. Roy has now filed a PIL, demanding an inquiry into the management of funds by BEST.

    `45 crore vanished:

Bet you did not know this — every time you pay for your local train ticket fare you end up paying a fraction of the amount as ‘safety charges’. Central Railway (CR) collected `45 crore as safety charges during 2008-2009. However, they have no idea as to how this money has been utilised. The safety charge is collected to provide safety to passengers and other amenities. It includes construction of flyovers at unmanned railway crossings, boundary walls, purchasing safety devices for track maintenance, track replacements, putting posters on railway-crossing gate and signalling equipment. Kalbadevi-based social activist, Pravin Tripathi, had filed a Right to Information application seeking details about the safety charges collection of 2008-2009. CR replied to him saying: “The details of used-up money collected as safety charges `45,45,73,426 (for 2008-2009) is not available in this office, hence cannot be provided.” “Railways should have provided me details about the usage of safety charges collected but they failed to. I think it’s because the amount has not been used for passengers and they should, therefore, return this amount to passengers,” Tripathi told MID-DAY. “If a year’s collection works out to `45 crore, for 10 years it may add up to around `450 crore. The railways should furnish details about our money, there is no passenger safety at stations, no ambulance, no first-aid box at stations”, said Tripathi. Do you know that approximately 37 lakh people commute on the Central Railway every day?

    Private schools now fall within RTI Act ambit:

The CIC has ruled that private educational institutions— whether government-funded bodies, and issues related to their management and regulation come under the ambit of the Right to Information.

    File notings being shielded:

Bureaucrats manage to hide file notings on all files and petitions processed at Andhra Pradesh State Secretariat. They use stick-notes (post-its) on all files in the State Secretariat as these can be removed in case of an RTI query, leaving no trace of favoritism. There’s colour coding too. A particular colour means a particular minister is perusing the file (with a vested interest). Also, ink colour indicates the sign of approval or otherwise, etc. Any noting in black usually means negative, blue means neutral, green means clear and magenta means relaxation of rules!

Securities Laws : A Tale of Two Amendments — Recent controversial amendments by SEBI

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Part A : CIC’s decisions



Very interesting and significant issue before CIC :


The applicant, Shri Arun Agrawal, has sought following
information from CPIO, Ministry of Law and Justice :

“Entire file containing papers along with notings, etc.
relating to the appointment and scope of the brief of special envoy Shri
Virendra Dayal to obtain papers relating to Volcker Report and his report to
the Ministry after meeting the UN officials.”


The application was transferred to the Ministry of External
Affairs and then to the Prime Minister’s Office and then to the Ministry of
Finance, Department of Revenue. Everybody denied having such a file in their
office.

The appellant’s prayer before CIC are :

“It appears reasonable to conclude that the Special Envoy
and the Enforcement Directorate deliberately did not collect the documents for
contract M/09/35, M/10/17 and M/11/25 by which allotments were made to
Reliance Petroleum on payment of illegal surcharge.

It is for this reason that the documents are sought and it
is for this reason that the Government has invoked the provisions of Clause
8(1)(a) of the RTI Act 2005.”


On account of the Volcker Report, Shri Natwar Singh had to
resign as the Foreign Minister. Allegation of Shri Arun Agrawal is as follows :

“Documents from the Volcker report establish that Reliance
was a non-contractual beneficiary for lifting five times more oil than shown
to have been lifted by Congress and Natwar Singh combined. It figures in every
table of the oil for food programme report of the U.N., in which the names of
the Congress and Natwar figure (Annexure A — the five tables in which Indian
entity figures). The contract nos. for Reliance Petroleum in which it figured
as non-contractual beneficiary and paid illegal surcharge were M/09/35,
M/10/17 and M/11/25.

The Government deliberately did not refer the said
contracts in which Reliance Petroleum was the non-contractual beneficiary
(according to the Volcker Report) while referring the non-contractual
beneficiary contract No. M/10/57 of Congress Party and contract No. M/09/54 of
Natwar Singh, to the Pathak Inquiry Authority for reasons well known.”


To determine this issue, CIC decided to examine the Virendra
Dayal Report and find out who holds this report. All the three parties have
denied having such report in their records. It was then gathered that probably
the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) holds this report. The said DoE informed
that they fall under the 2nd schedule of the RTI Act and hence exempt to
disclose information. DoE further volunteered to say that the matter is under
investigation and therefore exempt u/s.8(1)(h) of the RTI Act.

The question that is now to be determined by CIC is as to
whether an exemption claimed u/s.24(1) in this manner can be acceptable by a
quasi-judicial authority acting under a Statute (i.e., CIC).

Under the circumstances, the Commission decided to call for a
report from the Directorate of Enforcement which has to be submitted within 7
days from the date of receipt of the Order affirming :

(i) whether the information asked for by the applicant,
i.e.,
entire file containing papers along with notings, etc. relating to
the appointment, scope of brief of special envoy, Shri Virendra Dayal, to
obtain papers relating to Volcker Report and his report to the Ministry after
meeting the UN officials is held by them or not ?

(ii) to file their written submissions as to why this
Commission should not order its disclosure under the First Proviso to S. 24(1)
of the Act ?


In (ii) above, if the plea is taken that the information
cannot be disclosed u/s.8(1)(h), the Directorate will submit reasons for the
same as required by the Delhi High Court in cases of this nature in W.P.(C) No.
3114/2007 — Shri Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information Commissioner and Ors.

This decision is made on 15-9-2008. We wait anxiously to find
out what is finally determined in this case — both as to corruption charge on
Reliance Petroleum and the powers of CIC v. the Protection u/s.24(1) of the
RTI Act
.

[Shri Arun Agrawal v. PMO, No. 2nd Adjunct to Appeal
No. CIC/WB/A/2007/00417, dated 15-9-2008]



  •  Multiple RTI applications :


The appellant, Shri Ajay Sharma asked for huge information to
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited through different RTI applications
related to sanctioned strength of employees at different levels and the details
of functioning of canteen.

The information asked for has been denied stating that it is
not in public interest.

Decision :

On perusal of the documents submitted by the parties, it is noted that both the parties have erred. The appellant has unnecessarily submitted multiple applications for seeking information relating to canteen and staffing pattern, which are not confidential. The appellant should have asked for the information through a single application and also submitted only one appeal before the Commission against the decision of the respondent, which could have economised the resources in seeking and providing the information. Likewise, the CPIO could have given a comprehensive response in respect of all the appeals, rather then giving an identical reply in all the cases.

In view of the foregoing, the appellant is advised to prepare a comprehensive list of required information and resubmit to the CPIO, who should provide a pointwise response and thus furnish the information on the basis of available records within 15 working days from the date of receipt of fresh application. If any information is to be denied, the reasons for doing so should clearly be indicated for review, if necessary, by the Commission. The applicant should be free to seek inspection of relevant records and files so as to clearly specify the required information.

CIC also made a remark that a large amount of information asked for should be put in public domain in compliance of with S. 4(1) of the RTI Act.

[Shri Ajay Sharma v. HPCL, decision No. 3199/ IC(A)/2008, dated 1-9-2008]


Part B : The RTI Act

Attempt is being made that in this part besides reporting on the development and discussions on RTI Act at various forums, some Courts’ decisions be reported. Herewith that beginning:

S. 8(1)(j) :

Issue:

Whether information disclosing the names of the persons including address and amount, who have received more than Rs.1 lac from the Chief Minister Discretionary Fund can be given to the information seeker or it is an information, which stands exempted u/s.8(1)G) of the Act.

Held:

That the information asked for is not an information which is covered u/s.8(1)(j), nor does it stand exempted otherwise.

S.11:

Issue:

When beneficiary of the grant from Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund is under an obligation to use the money so paid for the very same purpose, for which it has been paid – with the obligation upon the beneficiary to return the unused money in one go, and that too within the prescribed period, for which utilisation certificate has to be furnished by the District Magistrate after necessary verification – can it be said that it is an information which can seek confidentiality within meaning of S. 11 of the Act or can be treated as confidential by the beneficiary, treating it to be a third-party information.

Held: No

[PlO, Chief Minister Office v. SIC, UP and Others, decided on 1-7-2008 by the High Court of Allahabad]

Part C : Other News

• Seam in PM’s and CM’s special relief packages:

RTI application has revealed that a six-time former MP and relatives of a sitting MLA besides several former MLAs are among the well-off people who have helped themselves to the relief measures meant for poor, bereaved families in Yavatmal district, the epicenter of the farmers’ suicides.

The revelations point to large-scale corruption and irregularities in the implementation of the schemes. The schemes were meant to help the near and dear ones of those indebted farmers who were the sole breadwinners of their families and who had ended their lives, or other BPL families living along the State dairy’s milk procurement route. Its purpose was to enable the distressed families to supplement their income as farming had become uneconomical in this mainly unirrigated cotton-growing region.

• Dwindling number of tigers in Maharashtra’s forests:

The Times of India invoked the Right to Information Act to find out how much time the field directors spent on the field and found out that, on an average, they spent just 50 days a year inside forests. This has had a disastrous effect on wildlife management, say former forest officials and environmentalists, and may be one of the reasons that have led to the dwindling number of tigers in Maharashtra’s forests.

•  Medical  Insurance  card:

Allwyn Ribeiro was most irked when he was turned away for the nth time by the Government Hospital at Byculla, Mumbai. The 43-year-old office superintendent for Central Railways had made three earlier trips to the hospital to collect his medical insurance card.

Frustrated,  on the advice of an RTI activist, Ribeiro filed RTI application  and asked the Public Information Officer of the Byculla  hospital  about:  (a) the progress  of his file, and  (b) how many  such applications  they had  processed  in the last six months. He hardly expected his application to prompt such efficacy. “The very next day I received a call from the hospital to say ‘Come, pick up your card’,” says Ribeiro, who now swears by the effectiveness of the RTI Act.

• Four new Central Information Commissioners (CIC) :

Present CIC has five Commissioners including the Chief CIC. In this month (September) 4 more CICs are appointed:

Most interesting and unexpected, is the appointment of Shailesh Gandhi. He can be ranked as one of the most senior and effective RTI activists in the country. Entire RTI-activists’ community is looking forward to great performance by him, especially, in reduction of pendency of appeals in CIC office.

• UTI under RTI ?
The Bombay High Court has stayed the Central Information Commission (CIC)’s Order on the applicability of the Right to Information Act, 2005 on UTI Asset Management Company. UTI Mutual Fund and UTI Trustee Company have filed a writ petition challenging the CIC’s Order.

CIC had ruled that “Even though there is no specific provision in the RTI Act that a body owned, controlled or substantially funded by another public authority is also a public authority, yet from the purpose and object of the RTI Act, it is crystal clear that there should be transparency in the functioning of any institution, in which public money is deployed. The four sponsors are public authorities and when they, in turn, own another entity, such an entity has to be treated as a public authority.

Economic Times reports on RTI :

A very well-written article appeared in The Economic Times on 19-9-2008 written by two journalists. Extract from it :

What could a labourer running from pillar to post for his ration card, a student waiting eagerly for his passport, a housewife struggling without water supply or a senior citizen suffering due to pollution caused by an unauthorised factory near his residence have in common? The Right to Information (RTI) Act – the salvation for these diverse problems.

A notable achievement of the UPA Government along with the Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, this key to information has empowered the aam aadmi to fight the formidable fortress of secrecy that enabled unscrupulous babus to shirk work and breed corruption. RTI is no magic that can make corruption vanish in a jiffy, but it has put the fear of scrutiny firmly in the minds of Government employees. Gone is the air of confidence that enabled the corrupt in the Government to demand ‘speed money’ openly without any apprehension of being caught. The experience till now suggests that most Government departments attempt to clear pending work when they are questioned and responsibility is fixed.

Arbitration & Other Laws

Laws and Business

Introduction :

An arbitration is always a fall out of disputes. Disputes
occur for various reasons and under various laws. Hence, while dealing with an
arbitration, one needs to keep in mind the provisions of the other laws. They
more often than not, would have a bearing upon the arbitration proceedings or
the award or the validity of the same. One must always remember that an
arbitration is not an island by itself. It draws on and feeds on other laws.



2. Arbitration &
Company Law :


One of the foremost questions which arises is the necessity
for a company to have an arbitration clause in its memorandum of association. It
is not an object of a company to refer matters to Arbitration but it is a power.
Hence, it is not necessary for a company to have an arbitration clause in its
memorandum of association, but it is definitely advisable.

The next question which arises is who can refer a matter for
arbitration on behalf of a company. A variety of persons can refer a dispute to
arbitration :

  •       Board of Directors


  •      Managing Director


  •      Any Committee/Executive specifically authorised by the Board to do so


  •      Any Power of Attorney holder of the Company.





However, this would be subject to any express provisions on
this aspect in of memorandum and articles of association.

2.3 Disputes which are typical to a company and which can be
referred to ‘arbitration’ may include those arising on account of :

  •    Oppression & Mismanagement


  •  Shareholders’/Joint Venture Agreement


  •  Share Subscription Agreement


  •  Agreements with VCs/Private Equity

Oppression & Mismanagement :


S. 397 and S. 398 of the Companies Act provide for a petition to the Company
Law Board in all cases of oppression of minority by majority and mismanagement
of the affairs of the company by the majority. The question that arises, is can
the agreement between parties provide that the same would be referred to
arbitration ?

S. 8 and S. 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
provide that a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter
which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies
not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the
dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. Further, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a judicial authority, when
seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming
through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
The CLB has exclusive jurisdiction for all matters u/s.397 and u/s.398 but that
does not preclude reference to arbitration. Thus, S. 8 and S. 45 are mandatory
provisions and if the petition matters are within the scope of the arbitration
agreement, then the CLB is bound to refer the issues to arbitration.

However, the CLB cannot order a reference to arbitration
unless a party to the proceedings applies for the same — EIH Ltd. v. Mashobra
Resort, 119 Comp. Cases 993 (CLB). If the oppression petition is contested by
the parties on merits without reference to arbitration, then the CLB would not
grant any stay against the petition — Suresh Jain v. Hindustan Ferro, 96 Comp.
Cases 507 (CLB).

The CLB will decide all matters of oppression and
mismanagement even which are outside the scope of the arbitration agreement —
Khandwala Securities Ltd. v. Kowa Spinning Ltd., 97 Comp. Cases 632 (CLB).

Joint venture/Shareholders’ agreement :


JV/shareholders’ agreements provide for the ‘Management and
Conduct of Business’ of a Company. A usual clause found in such agreements is
that all disputes would be referred to arbitration. A question which arises is
that can the company also be made a party to the arbitration along with the JV
partners/shareholders ?

Articles of association are the regulations which bind a
company and its shareholders. Only if the provisions of arbitration are
incorporated in the articles of association, can the company be made a party to
such proceedings :

  •  Shanti Prasad v. Kalinga Tubes, (1965) 35 Comp. Cases 351 (SC)


  •  V. B. Rangaraj v. V. B. Gopalkrishnan, (1992) 73 Comp. Cases 201 (SC)


  • B. K. Shah v. Magotteaux Int., 111 Comp. Cases 220 (CLB)







A transfer of shares pursuant to an arbitration award is not
a case of a transfer, but it is a transmission of shares by operation of law.
Thus, it falls under the second proviso to S. 108 of the Companies Act and does
not require a transfer form for the company to register the transfer of shares.
The transfer in such a case is not based upon the volition of the parties, but
by operation of law — Dinesh Nagindas Shah v. Pankaj Aluminium Industries P.
Ltd., 102 SCL 161 (Bom.).

A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Western Maharashtra Development Corporation v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., reported in (2010) 154 Comp. Cases 593 (Bom.), had ruled that an Arbitration Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give an award on the basis of a Shareholders’ Agreement containing restrictive clauses in the SHA. This was because the SHA itself was invalid, since the articles of a public company could not contain clauses restricting the transfer of shares and it was contrary to S. 108 of the Companies Act, 1956. Hence, the arbitration agreement which was founded on the SHA was void. The Arbitrator had ignored the express provision of S. 108 and lost sight of the very concept of free transferability of shares of a public limited company. Hence, his award was set aside. Very recently, a two-Member Bench of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Ruia and Others, (Appeal No. 855 of 2003) has overruled this decision of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. Hence, as the position now stands, an arbitration award dealing with restrictive clauses in a public limited company would be valid. This is a very important judgment since almost all PE/VC/ JV agreements as well as shareholders’ agreements contain such clauses. Thus, if any dispute arises on these clauses, the parties can apply for arbitration.


Winding-up petitions :

Can a petition for winding-up of a company u/s.433 of the Companies Act be referred to arbitration? Various decisions have held that an arbitration clause does not oust jurisdiction of a Court for winding-up petitions. Only disputes are referable to arbitration. A petition for winding-up is not an ‘action’. The power to order a winding-up is only under the Companies Act and only with the High Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Telecom v. Sterlite Industries Ltd., 97 Comp. Cases 683 (SC), has held that a claim in a petition for winding-up is not for money. Hence, no reference to arbitration can be made for winding-up of a company. Further, arbitration proceedings are not a bar to winding-up petitions — ABG Heavy Ind. v. Hindustan Shipyard, (2001) 105 Comp. Cases 413 (Bom.).

In Hewlett Packard v. BPL Net Com, (2002) 110 Comp. Cases 575 (Kar.), the Court held that if there is an arbitration clause in an agreement, the Court can yet entertain a winding-up petition as per its discretion. There is no automatic stay on winding-up merely because the subject-matter of dispute carries an arbitration clause. An arbitration agreement is binding on a company even after a winding-up petition. The legal status of the company continues till the company is dissolved. The only change is that instead of the Board of Directors the Liquidator steps into its shoes :

  •     Goetze India v. Pure Drinks, (1999) 3 Comp. LJ. 68 & (1994) 80 Comp. Cases 363 (P&H)

  •     Maruti Ltd. v. B. G. Shirke & Co., (1981) 51 Comp. Cases 11 (P&H)

    446 of the Companies Act provides that once an order for winding-up is made, no suit/legal proceeding can be initiated against the company unless permission of Court is taken. Proceedings would also include ‘arbitration proceedings’. Thus, the leave of the Court would be required to commence arbitration proceedings against such a company — British India Corp. v. S.S. & T. Machinery, (2001) 106 Comp. Cases 467 (Kar.). The Court can declare an arbitration/ award to be null if done without its permission. Permission of the Court ordering winding-up is a must. Even a third party can plead that arbitration is null if no Court permission was obtained — Vasantha Ramanan v. Official Liquidator, (2003) 114 Comp. Cases 747 (Mad.).

VC/Private Equity Agreement :

These agreements always provide for a Deadlock Resolution between the Management Team and Venture Capital Funds. The usual clause provides that :

  •     The disputes would be first resolved through friendly consultations.

  •     If the disputes are yet not resolved, then arbitration would be the exclusive means of resolving any dispute.

Arbitration and HUF :

A question which arises is that who has power to refer to arbitration on behalf of an HUF? The father/ manager/karta has power to refer disputes relating to joint family property to arbitration, provided reference is for the benefit of the family — Shantilal v. Munshilal, (1932) 56 AIR 595 (Bom). Other members of the HUF are bound by the reference and the award made thereon — Balaji v. Nana, (1903) 27 Bom 287.

An agreement between HUF members to appoint arbitrators for partition amounts to a severance of the joint status of the HUF from the date of the agreement — Kashinathsa v. Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077.

An arbitration award is liable to ‘stamp duty’ of Rs.100 under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. An award is defined as a decision in writing of an Arbitrator/ Umpire made on reference for submitting differences, not being an award directing a partition.

However, if it is an instrument of partition, then the duty is different. An instrument of partition includes an award by an a arbitrator directing a partition. The duty on the same is levied @ 2% on the market value of the separated share of the property. Thus, the value on which stamp duty is levied is the total market value of the property less the largest share partitioned. If all shares are equal, then deduct any one share.

Arbitration and registration :

Earlier there was a controversy on whether an ‘arbitration award’ needed to be registered under the Registration Act, 1908. However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi, AIR 1955 SC 491, Kashinathsa v. Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077, M. Chelamayya v. M. Venkatratanam, AIR 1972 SC 1121 have clarified the position as follows :

    a) If the award creates right, title and interest in immovable property, then registration is compulsory.

    b) If it is a mere declaration of a pre-existing rights or reference to past partition and not creating right in praesenti — then ‘no registration’ is required.

    c) An ‘unregistered award’ which affects or purports to affect right, title or interest in any immovable property is inadmissible as evidence.

    d) However, an unregistered award is a valid award and not a waste paper. It creates rights and obligations between the parties.

In Akbarali v. Mumtaz Hussain, AIR 1987 Bom. 39 it was held that if a right is claimed under the award or is to be enforced by way of a suit, then registration of the award is a must. In Harendra Mehta v. Mukesh Mehta, (1999) 97 Comp. Case 265 (SC), it was held that foreign awards need not be registered.

In Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kaur, AIR 1970 SC 833, the Court held that if the award affects the partition of immovable property, then it requires registration.

Conclusion:

Whether a CA appears as a representative of one of the parties as an advisor, as an arbitrator, as a valuer or as an expert, he must always bear in mind the interplay of other laws on the award. A slip-up on any one law may render the award ineffective/ unenforceable. One is reminded of Humbert Wolfe’s golden quote :

“Making innumerable statutes, men
Merely confuse what God achieved in ten ! !”

Stamp duty on conveyances — Across India

Part A — Classification of services

CONTROL SELF ASSESSMENT IN RETAIL STORE AUDITS

Internal Audit

Every successful audit is based on sound planning and an
atmosphere of constructive involvement and communication between the auditor and
the auditee. The purpose of writing this article is to provide insights on the
use of a tool for organisations with dispersed geographical locations,
especially the retail sector.

Any corporate body establishes Internal Controls & Procedures
to ensure that employees abide by laws, regulations and human resources policies
when performing tasks. One of the many tools available to gauge internal control
effectiveness for organisations is the Control Self Assessment (CSA) activities.

Definition of Control :

The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines control and
control processes as :

“A control is any action taken by management, the board, and
other parties to manage risk and increase the likelihood that established
objectives and goals will be achieved. The management plans, organises, and
directs performance of sufficient actions to provide reasonable assurance that
objectives and goals will be achieved.

Control processes are the policies, procedures, and
activities that are part of a control framework, designed to ensure that risks
are contained within the risk tolerances established by the risk management
process. Risk management is a process to identify, assess, manage, and control
potential events or situations to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of the organisation’s objectives.”

Generally, controls are of two types :

Preventive controls :

Designed to discourage errors or prevent irregularities from
occurring. They are proactive controls that help prevent a loss. Examples :
Separation of duties, proper authorisation, adequate documentation, and physical
control over assets.

Detective controls :

Designed to find errors or irregularities after they have
occurred. Examples : Reviews, analyses, variance analyses, reconciliations,
physical inventories and audits.

Internal controls are policies and instructions within an
organisation that top leadership puts into place to prevent losses resulting
from malfunction, employee carelessness, error, fraud and neglect. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, introduced as a consequences of internal control
failures across the globe, has emphasised that the need for internal control
compliance & documentation.

From a retail perspective, there is an increased attention to
governance, compliance and risk management spread across many thousands of
locations. This necessitates retailers to implement an appropriate store
compliance process in order to monitor the identification of issues and remedial
measures. Primary focus of retailers is on reducing costs, increasing margins,
reducing shrinks, balancing inventory levels, managing vendors, tackling
regulators and attracting customers.

An effective store compliance process can be achieved through
traditional store audits or through a self assessment technique.




 Traditional Audits :



  •  In a traditional audit, the internal audit team
    identifies issues and suggests remedial measures. The field work is
    undertaken by the audit team which visits the stores. The major challenge in
    this traditional approach is that all stores may not be visited and/or there
    can be infrequent coverage. The audit team personnel require training,
    travel budgets and their presence ‘interrupts’ store operations. Undoubtedly
    such an approach is costly, untimely and at times ineffective.


  Control self assessment :



  •   Control self assessment is operations oriented. It provides auditors with
    additional hands and eyes, specialised expertise, operational
    knowledge and a commitment to implement internal audit recommendations. To
    implement the CSA methodology, it is imperative that there is a buy-in by
    the top management. Training to all operating managers is another critical
    pre-requisite. CSA is a cost effective and efficient alternative for wider
    store audit coverage. Wider coverage leads to increased availability of
    information for managing and monitoring retail operations. CSA significantly
    increases the accountability of the store managers who, in any case, are the
    control owners and places the responsibility of control in their hands.




Why CSA ?

Who is responsible for internal control? The auditors, right?
Wrong! Everyone plays a part in the internal control system. Ultimately, it is
the management’s responsibility to ensure that controls are in place. That
responsibility is delegated to each area of operation, which must ensure that
internal controls are established, properly documented and maintained. Every
employee has some responsibility towards the functioning of this internal
control system. Therefore, all employees need to be aware of the concept and
purpose of internal controls. Internal audit’s role is to assist management in
their overlooking and operating responsibilities through independent audits and
consultations designed to evaluate and promote the systems of internal control.

This is where CSA, as a technique, can play an important
role. Modern Internal Auditors need to understand and practise this technique.

CSA defined :

The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines Control Self
Assessment as :

“Control self assessment (CSA) is a technique that allows
managers and work teams directly involved in business units, functions or
processes to participate in assessing the organisation’s risk management and
control processes. In its various forms, CSA can cover objectives, risks,
controls and processes.”

Internal auditors can utilise CSA programmes for gathering
relevant information about risks and controls; for focussing audit work on high
risk, unusual areas; and to forge greater collaboration with operating managers
and work teams. Business Managers can utilise CSA programmes to clarify business
objectives and to identify and deal with the risks in achieving those
objectives.

Internal auditors, in a consulting role, often act as facilitators to help managers in the assessment of risks and controls. Involvement of people working in evaluation of risks and controls utilises the expertise of the organisation, increases buy-in to any action items and focusses efforts on important business activities.

However, CSA is not a complete process by itself. It does not substitute the auditing effort. The audit function has to validate the CSA results, develop the remedial action plan and ensure a timely follow-up on issues identified during the CSA process. This combined effort is the most cost effective and result-oriented method of monitoring all stores on a regular basis.

Benefits of CSA in retail:

  •     Better buy-in of results because of the participative and collaborative approach.

  •     Does not require a battalion of internal auditors.

  •     Ensures complete coverage of all stores.

  •     Optimum utilisation of all resources for an audit.

  •     Cost effective.

  •     Better appreciation of issues since the store managers have a more intimate eye on store operations.

  •     Focus is on key risks & controls which is monitored by the corporate audit team.

  •     Store managers can give more appropriate remedial measures requiring corporate audit only to review and follow-up on the remedial plans.

  •     Helps store managers to understand and assume responsibility and accountability for effective control and risk.

Pre-requisites of an effective CSA in retail:

  •     Mature state of operations.

  •     Corporate culture should support and value communication, openness and trust.

  •     Organisation should have clear objectives.
  •     Internal Audit should study existing processes deeply.

  •     Clearly defined parameters for CSA.

  •     System to collect, corroborate and analyse information collected through CSA.

  •     Training of staff.

    Lastly, ‘above par’ facilitation skills of the Internal Auditor. In most successful implementation of CSA, the top-most reason for successes has been the facilitation skills of the Internal Auditor.

Undoubtedly, CSA is an integrated part of the audit process for mitigating risks and adding value to the organisations, especially in retail.

 

Sr.

Review
area

Compliance status

 

 

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Yes/No/NA)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cashiering

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

Entire cash sales for the day is deposited

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2

All
credit card sales for the day are supported by credit card slips

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3

Sales
through other mode of payments (MOP) such as gift coupons, etc. are

 

 

 

 

backed by the MOP

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4

Petty
cash, float cash & sales cash are kept separately

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5

Petty
cash expenditure is authorised by store manager

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6

Petty
cash expenditure is recorded on a daily basis

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inventory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7

Goods
receipt notes are prepared for all goods received in the store

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8

Damaged
goods are segregated and kept separately in the backroom

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9

Expired
goods are identified and kept separately in the backroom

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10

All
damaged and expired goods received during the month are sent back to the

 

 

 

 

distribution centre/vendor in the last week of the month

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11

Physical
inventory verification is carried out as per plan

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Front Office Management

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12

Goods
are arranged on the shelves as per the planogram of the store

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13

Correct
labels are displayed on the shelves

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

14

High-shrink
items are kept near the cashier

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

15

Near-expiry
items are identified and marked down as per policy

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

17

Promotion
schemes launched in the store are properly updated in the billing

 

 

 

 

software

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Legal & Compliance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

18

All
certificates requiring mandatory display are displayed

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19

All
certificates expiring during the month are sent for renewal

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

20

Notice,
if any, received from any government department is immediately

 

 

 

 

communicated to the central legal department of the company

Yes / No / NA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPREME COURT ON PUNISHMENT UNDER SECURITIES LAWS — Prohibition to access securities markets is only a procedural direction

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Securities Laws

(1) The Supreme Court has
recently laid down a principle in securities laws that can have far-reaching
effects for existing and future cases. Essentially, it has held that prohibiting
a person from operating in the securities markets is not a ‘punishment’, nor is
it a penalty. That being so, even if SEBI did not have power to so prohibit when
the act complained of took place, and though such power was derived many years
later, such prohibition can still be made for such act. Undoubtedly, this is
because of the peculiar nature of securities laws and their objectives.
Nevertheless, this decision requires us to view securities laws in a different
light and in a special way and hence this decision, though a few months old now,
is worth discussing.

(2) In an extreme sense (and
even to exaggerate a little), SEBI now does not need powers to punish. A change
in the law is sufficient to cover even old violations. Now, SEBI cannot complain
that it does not have enough teeth to deal with wrongdoers !

(3) Let us summarise the
issues involved first. The law gives powers to SEBI to issue various types of
orders against persons who are found to have violated any of the securities
laws. As it happens with experience, the Parliament modifies from time to time
the law and thus the powers may get enhanced or modified later on. Will SEBI be
able to use such enhanced powers even in respect of violations prior to such
amendment ? Will the constitutional protection under Article 20 against
retrospective amendment of law providing for punishment in respect of offences
be available in such a case ? The Supreme Court has answered this question in
the positive in the context of securities laws in the matter of SEBI v. Ajay
Agarwal
.

(4) A brief review of the
facts as stated in the decision is first made. The chronology of events would
particularly need to be noted, since they have direct bearing on the issues
raised and the final decision of the Court.

(5) It appears that the
respondent is the promoter of a company (Appellant is SEBI) that made a public
issue. Without going into more details, it can be summarised that, as per the
decision, there was a factual finding that there were certain material
false statements in the prospectus
for the public issue. Pursuant to this,
SEBI held inquiries and after proceedings SEBI passed the final order (‘the
Order’) in 2004.

(6) The chronology of
important events is as follows. The company issued a prospectus in October 1993
and the public issue was made in November 1993. Thereafter, certain incorrect
statements were found in the prospectus relating to disclosures of pledge of
shareholding of the promoters, dividends, etc. Apparently, these were not
disputed. Finally, SEBI passed an order debarring the respondent from buying,
selling, etc. in the securities markets for 5 years.

(7) This order finally
reached the Supreme Court. The essential issue was, since the order was passed
under certain provisions of the SEBI Act that came into force only in 2002,
whether an order could be made in respect of violations committed in 1993.
SEBI’s point was that the order was passed in 2004, i.e., after the law
was amended. It may be added that there were some prior proceedings and issues
but the Supreme Court was concerned with the final order passed in 2004.

(8) This raises a
fundamental constitutional issue (in the words of the Supreme Court) “the right
of a person not to be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in
force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence and not to
be subject to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under
the law in force at the time of commission of the offence”.

(9) The Supreme Court noted
that for this protection under Article 20 to be available, first, there has to
be an offence and, secondly, such offence should be subject to a
penalty.

(10) The Supreme Court noted
that the respondent was not subjected to any penalty. The Supreme Court first
observed, :

“In the instant case, the
respondent has not been held guilty of committing any offence nor has he been
subjected to any penalty. He has merely been restrained by an order for a
period of five years from associating with any corporate body in accessing the
securities market and also has been prohibited from buying, selling or dealing
in securities for a period of five years.”

(11) Then, the Supreme Court
turned to the issue whether the violation in respect of which SEBI had passed
the order was an ‘offence’ as defined in law. The Supreme Court held as
follows :

“The word ‘offence’ under
Article 20 sub-clause (1) of the Constitution has not been defined under the
Constitution. But Article 367 of the Constitution states that unless the
context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply for the
interpretation of the Constitution, as it does for the interpretation of an
Act.

If we look at the
definition of ‘offence’ under the General Clauses Act, 1897 it shall mean any
act or an omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.
Therefore, the order of restrain for a specified period cannot be equated with
punishment for an offence as has been defined under the General Clauses Act.”

(12) The Supreme Court then
analysed the history and object of the SEBI Act and observed as follows :

“If we look at the legislative intent for enacting the said Act, it transpires that the same was enacted to achieve the twin purposes of promoting orderly and healthy growth of securities market and for protecting the interest of the investors. The requirement of such an enactment was felt in view of substantial growth in the capital market by increasing participation of the investors. In fact such enactment was necessary in order to ensure the confidence of the investors in the capital market by giving them some protection.

40. The said Act is pre-eminently a social welfare legislation seeking to protect the interests of common men who are small investors.

41. It is a well-known canon of construction that when the Court is called upon to interpret provisions of a social welfare legislation, the paramount duty of the Court is to adopt such an interpretation as to further the purposes of law and if possible eschew the one which frustrates it.

    42.Keeping this principle in mind if we analyse some of the provisions of the Act, it appears that the Board has been established u/s.3 as a body corporate and the powers and functions of the Board have been clearly stated in Chapter IV and u/s.11 of the said Act.”

    13. Then the Court considered the real nature of the powers that enabled SEBI to pass such an order of restraint. The Court held that this was a procedural Section and any procedural Section can apply to pending as well as future proceedings. The Supreme Court observed:

“Provisions of S. 11-B being procedural in nature can be applied retrospectively…  The Appellate Tribunal made a manifest error by not appreciating that S. 11-B is procedural in nature. It is a time- honoured principle if the law affects matters of procedure, then prima facie it applies to all actions, pending as well as future.”

    14. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the order of SEBI restraining the respondent in the manner stated earlier.

    15. One observation of the Supreme Court, though may be held as obiter dicta, is still worth noting as it could be taken in an extreme sense by SEBI and applied in its proceedings. It is stated in paragraph 37 of the order of the Supreme Court that:

“Even if penalty is imposed after an adjudicatory proceeding, person on whom such penalty is imposed cannot be called an accused.”.

This statement is not taken further to a logical conclusion perhaps because this was not the issue before the Court. But it would be interesting to see how SEBI views this statement in its later decisions. One can imagine that even if power to levy penalties through adjudicatory orders is procedural, then the powers of SEBI would be even stronger and more discretionary and with lesser safeguards than one would expect.

    16. To conclude, the Supreme Court has laid an important precedent not just in terms of the subject matter of this decision, but also in the approach towards interpretation of securities laws and how securities laws should be treated differently. Securities laws, thus, is well on its way to becoming a special and very distinct subject by itself to which many general rules of interpretation may not apply.

Amendments in Port/AIrpor Services

1. Statutory provisions :

[Finance Act, 1994, (as amended from time to time) ‘Act’]

(a) Port Services :

S. 65(82) of the Act :

‘Port Service’ means any service rendered within a port or other port in any manner.

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services means any service provided or to be provided :

(zn) to any person by any other person in relation to port services in a port in any manner :

Provided that the Provisions of S. 65A shall not apply to any services when the same is rendered wholly within the port :

. . . . . . . . .

(zzl) to any person, by any other person, in relation to port services in other port in any manner :

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within other port :

(b) Airport Services :

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services mean any service provided or to be provided :

(zzm) to any person, by airports authority or by any other person, in any airport or a civil enclave.

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within the airport or civil enclave.

2. Departmental clarifications :

(a) Extracts from Department Circular DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU, dated 26-2-2010) —(Annexure B) :

1. Service provided in an airport or port :

    1.1 Two services, namely, Port Services and the Airport Services were introduced in Budget 2001 and 2004, respectively. The services provided by minor ports covered under other port became taxable from 2003. The purpose behind creating these was that since a number of activities are undertaken within the premises of port and airports, it would be easier to consolidate all such services under one head.

    1.2 It was reported that divergent practices are being followed regarding classification of services being performed within port/airport area. In some places all services performed in these areas (even those falling within the definition of other taxable services) are being classified under the port/airport services. Elsewhere, individual services are classified according to their individual description on the ground that the provisions S. 65A of Finance Act, 1994 prescribes adoption of a specific description over a general one.

    1.3 Further both the definitions use the phrase ‘any person authorised by port/airports’. In many ports/airports there is no procedure of specifically authorising a service provider to undertake a particular activity. While there may be restriction on entry into such areas and the authorities often issue entry passes or identity cards, airports/port authorities seldom issue authority permission letter to a service provider authorising him to undertake a particular task. Many taxpayers have claimed waiver of tax under these services on the ground that the port/airport authority has not specifically authorised them to provide a particular service.

    1.4 In order to remove these difficulties, the definition of the relevant taxable services are being amended to clarify that all services provided entirely within the port/airport’s premises would fall under these services. Further specific authorisation from port/air port authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

(b) Extracts from Dept. Circular No. 334/03/2010-TRU, dated 1-7-2010 :

    Para 4.1 :

    In the Finance Bill, 2010, with intent to ease the classification disputes, the definitions of port, other port and airport services were amended to comprehensively cover under their ambit, all services provided within an airport or a port or other port, irrespective of whether or not such activities are authorised by the authorities or whether or not they are otherwise classifiable as distinct taxable services. In effect, all services that are wholly rendered within the prescribed area of the port or other port or an airport, are to be classified within the ambit of ‘port services’ or ‘airport services’.

    Para 4.2 :

    During the post-budget interactions with the stakeholders, apprehensions were expressed that the change may have certain unintended effects and certain services (including certain essential services) hitherto exempted, may attract service tax unintentionally. Further, it was also pointed that the abatements and exemptions presently available under individually defined taxable services would get denied when provided within airport or port, merely as they would now be taxable under newly introduced taxable services.

    Para 4.3(v) :

    Currently abatements are available to certain services such as ‘Renting of a cab’, ‘Erection, Commissioning & Installation Service’, ‘Goods Transport Agency service’ and ‘Construction Services’. Similar abatements would be available to such services, when provided wholly within an airport or a port or other port, under the new definition of airport or port or other port services. (Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010 as corrected by corrigendum dated 30th June, 2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010.)

    Para 4.4 :

    All other services carried out within a port or other port or an airport would be subjected to service tax under the category of port/other port/airport services.

3. Background & Amendment :

        a) Under the existing provisions for a service to be considered as ‘port services,’ two conditions were required to be satisfied?:

        i) the service must be provided by a port or a person authorised by that port, and

        ii) the service must be in relation to vessel or goods

    In Homa Engineering Works v. CCE, (2007) 7 STR 546 (Tri-Mum.), where the appellant provided dry-dock repairs to its client within the port premises, it was held that such services would not be liable to service tax under ‘Port Services’ due to the following reasons?:

        The appellant was not a port or a person specifically authorised by that port under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (MPTA 63) to provide a particular service on its behalf;

        The service such as dry-dock repairs were not in the nature of ‘Port Services’ since the port itself was not statutorily allowed to undertake such service under the MPTA 63; and

        On an application of S. 65A of the Act, such services were more appropriately classifiable under ‘Maintenance or Repairs’ service.

    This decision of the Tribunal was followed in several cases both in the context of major ports as well as other ports. In CCE v. Kokan Marine Agencies, (2009) 13 STR 79 (KAR) the Karnataka High Court upheld the Tribunal’s view which was based on Homa Engineering (supra) case.

    In order to overcome the judicial pronouncements, definition of ‘Port Services’ is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010, to the following effect:

  •             Service need not be provided by the port or a person authorised by the port;
  •             Service need not be in relation to vessel or goods, and
  •             Service need not also be one which the port can undertake under the MPTA 63 or the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

    In terms of the amended definition of taxable service, all services rendered wholly within the port would be classified as port services and not under any other category of service, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        b) Amendments on lines similar to ‘Port Services’ have been made in respect of Airport Services. Under the existing provisions, in order to fall within ‘airport services, the following was essential:

  •             the service should be provided by an ‘airport’ or a ‘person authorised by the airport’; and
  •             the service should be provided in an airport or civil enclave.

    The definition of ‘taxable service’ in the context of airport services is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010 to the effect that all the services rendered by an airport authority or by ‘any person’ in an airport or civil enclave would be covered under the category of ‘airport services’ and specific authorisation from the airport authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

    Further, all services rendered wholly within the airport would be classified as airport services and not under any other category of services, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        4. Exemptions in regard to amended Port/ Airport Services:
    a) Notification No. 31/10-ST, dated 22-6-2010:

    The following services provided within a port or an airport have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        
    i) repair of ships or boats or vessels belonging to the Government of India including Navy or Coast Guard or Customs, but does not include Government-owned Public Sector Undertakings;

        ii) repair of ships or boats or vessels where such process of repair amounts to ‘manufacture’ and has the meaning assigned to it in clause(f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944;

        iii) supply of water;

        iv) supply of electricity;

        v) treatment of persons by a dispensary, hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty clinic (except cosmetic or plastic surgery service);

        vi) services provided by a school or centre to provide formal education other than those services provided by commercial coaching or training centre;

        vii) services provided by fire service agencies;

        viii) pollution control services.

        b) Notification No. 38/10-ST and Notification No. 42/10-ST, both dated 28-6-2010:
    Commercial or Industrial Construction Services [Clause 65(105)(zzq)] provided wholly within the port/other port for construction, repair, alteration and renovation of wharves, quays, docks, stages, jetties, piers and railways has been exempted from payment of service tax. Similarly, services provided wholly within airport also are exempted.

        c) Notification No. 41/10-ST, dated 28-6-2000:

    The following services provided wholly within the port or other port or airport; have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        i) taxable service provided by a cargo handling agency in relation to agricultural produce or goods intended to be stored in a cold storage;

        ii)taxable service provided by storage or ware-house keeper in relation to storage and warehousing of agricultural produce or any service provided for storage of or any service provided by a cold storage;

        iii) taxable service in relation to transport of export goods in an aircraft by an aircraft operator;

        iv) taxable service of site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition and such other similar activities.

        Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 1-3-2010:
    These Notifications have amended Notification No. 1/2006-ST, dated 1-3- 2006 (read with corrigendum dated 1-3-2010) and Notification No. 13/2008-ST, dated 1-3- 2008, respectively, whereby abatement available under the following existing taxable categories would continue to be available even if these services would now be classified as port services/other port or airport services:

  •         Rent-a-cab service

  •             Commissioning and installation agency
  •             Commercial or industrial construction
  •             Construction of complex
  •             Transportation of goods by rail
  •             Transport of goods by road.


        5.Some issues:

    The basic objective of the amendment, as stated in the Department Circular, is to overcome the judicial view [Homa Engineering case and Konkan Marine Agencies (supra)] whereby the service providers escaped taxation. A close reading of the amended provisions indicates that the amendments in Port/ Airport Services have resulted in large number of issues, legal as well as procedural and administrative. Some of the important issues are discussed hereafter.

    5.1 Whether services rendered wholly within port/ airport would cover service categories which were otherwise not taxable:

    Attention is drawn to Notification No. 31/10-ST dated 20- 6-2010 [Para 4 (a) above], under which specified list of services rendered within port/ airport, have been exempted from payment of service tax. These services include supply of water, supply of electricity and some other services which are not liable to service tax. Does this mean that these services provided within port/airport premises would have been liable to service tax if the exemption Notification had not been issued?? There is no ready answer to this. However it appears that Govt.’s intention is to tax all services rendered wholly within port/airport even if the relevant service does not fall under the taxable service categories specified u/s.65(105) of the Act or is specifically excluded in certain cases.

    This poses a very significant legal issue inasmuch as under the statutory provisions of the Act, the term ‘service’ is not defined. However, taxable services which are liable to service tax have been specified u/s.65(105) of the Act.

    Under Central Excise, it has been held that powers have been granted u/s.5A (1) of Central Excise Act, 1944 to grant exemption. It has been held in Bata India v. ACCE, 2 ELT J211 (PAT) that if a product is not excisable under any Tariff Entry, an exemption Notification issued u/s.5A cannot have the effect of making such a product excisable. The principle laid down is relevant. However, under the law relating to service tax, there is no exhaustive list of taxable services like Central Excise Tariff.

    It would appear that whether a service not otherwise specified u/s.65(105) of the Act, can be taxed under port/airport services, is a highly contentious issue.

    5.2 Services rendered wholly within port/airport —Practical aspects:

    It is pertinent to note that in order to be taxed under the amended port/airport service, it is essential that services are wholly rendered within a port/airport. Hence, if a service is partly rendered outside the port/airport, it would not be taxable under port/airport services but would continue to be taxable under the respective service category.

    This condition it likely to create substantial practical difficulties/hardships. As it is well known, the services are categorised for the purpose of export/ import into 3 categories viz.:

  •             Location of Immovable property

  •             Performance of service

  •             Location of service recipient

    The emphasis in the amendment is on services that can be rendered through physical action/ performance. This may pose substantial practical difficulties. In case of services under criteria of location of service recipient, where a service provider may not necessarily be located at the location of the service recipient.

    It would appear that if it can be established that a service is not wholly rendered within a port/airport, the amended provisions would not apply.

    Let us consider some illustrations.

        a) A practising CA renders consultation services to a client based within port premises. If the services are provided by the CA through physical presence within the port, it would be taxable under port service. However, if the same service is rendered by the CA through a meeting in his office outside port premises, it would be taxable as practising CA service.

    Take the case of auditing services. Audit is conducted by a CA for the above-referred client in his office located within port premises. However, finalising of balance sheet and issue of audit report is done at the CA’s office outside the port premises. In such a scenario, the question arises as to whether such services would be taxable as ‘Port Services’ or Practising CA Services. It is possible to contend that services are not rendered wholly within ‘Port Premises’.

        b) A Goods Transport Agency (GTA) provides services within port/airport as well as outside. If a GTA, provides services wholly within the port/ airport premises, such service would be taxable under port/airport service.

    With regard to GTA services, liability in case of certain specified entities to pay service tax is cast on the persons making the payment to GTA. However, as yet, no consequential amendment has been made in regard to GTA service. Hence, in regard to GTA services wholly rendered within port/airport premises, it appears that GTA would be liable to discharge the service tax liability and not the person making the payment, as was the case before 1-7-2010. Further, a GTA providing services where the freight for a whole consignment does not exceed `1,500 for an individual consignment, the freight does not exceed `750, it is exempt from service tax under Notification No. 34/2004-ST, dated 3-12-2004. Now when a GTA provides transportation service wholly within the port premises and even if each trip is invoiced for less than `1,500, he will be required to register himself under port service and charge service tax to the client, however after availing abatement of 75% thereon.

    5.3 Exemptions issued are ad hoc and inconsistent: A perusal of list of exemptions issued as stated in para 4 above reveals that there are inconsis-tencies and omissions which are likely to cause hardships. To illustrate:

        a) Commercial or industrial construction service rendered wholly within port/airport has been exempted. However, the following have not been exempted:

  •         Works contract services
  •         Residential construction (say, officers/staff quarters)

    The above inconsistencies/omissions need to be speedily addressed.

        b) Cargo handling services in relation to agricultural produce and goods stored in a cold storage have been rightly exempted. However, it needs to be noted that u/s.65(23) of the Act, handling of export cargo is excluded from the purview of Cargo Handling Service liable to service tax. If such services are rendered wholly within a port/ airport it would appear that in the absence of exemption, such services would be taxable under Port/Airport Service.

    5.4 Implications in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:

    Under Rule 6(5) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 service tax paid on 16 specified services is fully available as CENVAT Credit, unless such services are provided exclusively for exempted service.

    Management, Maintenance or Repairs is one of the specified services under Rule 6(5). If such service is rendered wholly within port/airport premises, the same would be classifiable, w.e.f. 1-7-2010, under port/airport service. The list of specified services under Rule 6(5) does not include port /airport services. Hence, in such a case, benefit hitherto available under Rule 6 (5) would now not be available. This is an unintended consequence of the amendment.

Representation in respect of Procedure for Registration of Digital Signature and uploading of Income-tax Returns using Digital Signature

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Representation

Representation

3rd September, 2010

To,

Chairman,

Central Board of Direct
Taxes,

Government of India,

North Block, Vijay Chowk,

New Delhi-110001.

Dear Sir,


Subject
:
Representation in respect of
Procedure for Registration of Digital Signature and uploading of Income-tax
Returns using Digital Signature


We refer to the amendment to
Rule 12 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules) which has made it mandatory
for all companies filing ITR-6 to digitally sign the I-T return for A.Y. 2010-11
and the Note regarding changes in the Procedure for Registration of Digital
Signature and uploading of Income-tax Returns using Digital Signature (The
Changed Procedure Note).

The Changed Procedure :

A. Para C of the Changed
Procedure Note recognises that in the following scenarios, taxpayers may find it
difficult to register the DSC as per the existing procedure as mentioned in the
aforesaid Note :

1. “Non-resident companies
where the Directors are foreign nationals.

2. Companies where the I-T
return is being filed for the first time.

3. Companies where the
Managing Director has changed and other Directors are either unavailable or
also have changed.

In all such cases it is
difficult to verify the identity of the person and his relationship with the
Entity for which he is the authorised signatory. With a view to make
registration simpler in such cases, the procedure has been changed to enable
registration of a DSC where the PAN is also provided in the DSC as per the
latest Interoperability guidelines issued by the Chief Controller of
Certifying Authorities. Such DSCs with encrypted value of PAN are now
available in the market.”

B. Para D of the Changed
Procedure Note prescribes the changes in the process of Registration of DSC on
the e-filing website. In this scenario, the Authorised Signatory has been given
the following options :

1. To select the existing
procedure to register the DSC, in case the scenarios mentioned in sub-para 1,
2, or 3 in para C of the Note, as reproduced above, are not applicable; or

2. “To select the new
procedure as given below :

(a) The Authorised
Signatory must use a fresh DSC having encrypted value of his PAN, as issued
by Certifying Authorities with effect from 1-8-2010.

(b) Enter Authorised
Signatory’s PAN number while registering the DSC. The same person must also
enter the same PAN in the Verification portion of the I-T Return which he is
signing in his capacity as Director/ Partner/Karta/Authorised Signatory.

(c) If the Authorised
Signatory’s PAN number matches the encrypted value of the PAN present in the
DSC — then the DSC will be registered after selecting the appropriate type
of DSC (.pfx or USB token) and clicking on ‘Select Your .pfx File
Certificate’.

(d) In case an
Individual is registering his DSC for submitting own ITR (ITRs 1-4 case)
then his PAN as per his login should match the encrypted PAN contained in
the DSC — then the DSC will be registered after selecting the appropriate
type of DSC (.pfx or USB token) and clicking on ‘Select Your .PFX File
Certificate’.

(e) Now, the I-T Return
for the Self/Company/Firm/Entity PAN can be signed using this registered
DSC.”



The implications of the Changed
Procedure :

C. As mentioned in para
B.2.a above, as per the new procedure, the Authorised Signatory must use a fresh
DSC having encrypted value of his PAN.

D. The relevant portion of
the Rule 114C of the Rules provides as under :



“Class or classes of
persons to whom provisions of S. 139A shall not apply 114C.

(1) The provisions of S. 139A shall not apply to following class or
classes of persons, namely :

(a)

(b) the non-residents
referred to in clause (30) of S. 2;”


E. Accordingly, as per the
explicit provisions of Rule 114C(1)(b), provisions of S. 139A do not apply in
case of non-residents.

F. However, in order to sign
the return with Digital Signature and upload the Return of Income in Form ITR-6,
the non-resident directors of the foreign companies would be compelled to obtain
the PAN in India and after obtaining the PAN would have to obtain a fresh DSC
having encrypted value of their PAN and then only they would be able to
digitally sign and upload the Returns of Income in Form ITR-6 for the A.Y.
2010-11.

G. Thus, effectively, in
case of non-residents, though the Rules do not require them to have a PAN in
India, the same has been made mandatory indirectly by the Changed Procedure
Note, particularly in case of foreign companies.

Practical difficulties :

H. It is irrational and
unlawful to insist upon a large number of directors of foreign companies to have
PAN in order to enable them to obtain DSCs having encrypted value of their PAN,
in order to enable them to sign the return of income of their companies.

    I. Most of the Directors signing the Returns of Income of the Companies, would have no connec-tion with India and also have no income at all in India and yet they would be forced to obtain the PAN in India, merely for the purposes of signing the Return of Income of the companies of which they are directors.

    J. The documentary requirements and procedure for obtaining PAN, particularly the requirement of Consularisation of the proof of identity and proof of address in case of foreign citizens which takes a lot of time, cost and effort, would cause undue hardship and anguish among many non-resident directors and foreign companies, particularly in view of the fact that PAN is NOT required as per the explicit provision contained in Rule 114C.

    K. We understand that the Consularisation process in many cases takes about a month’s time. In that event it would be very difficult or nearly impossible for many directors of foreign companies to obtain their PAN before 30-9-2010 and then to obtain their DSCs having the encrypted value of their PAN. This would result into unnecessary and unavoidable delay in filing the Returns of the foreign companies, due for filing on or before 30-9-2010 for ITAY 2010-11. Further in case of loss return, the company may lose the benefit of carry forward of loss if the return is not filed in time.

    L. Answer to Q 5 of the FAQs attached with the aforesaid Changed Procedure Note, provides that the Power of Attorney (PoA) holder is authorised to sign ITR of foreign company as per S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961. The PoA holder can register his DSC having encrypted value of his PAN against the foreign company PAN as per the new procedure.

    M. However, it is to be noted that in most cases the foreign companies are NOT comfortable or at ease, for various commercial and business consid-erations, to give PoA to third parties for signing the Return of Income with their digital signature. Conversely, an Indian resident may be unwilling to act as an authorised signatory of a foreign company and step into the shoes of such an assessee.

    N. Further, practically, most of the private limited companies (which form a bulk of the thousands of companies that file tax returns in India) have been filing their e-returns for past few years without DSC. For all such companies, it would now be mandatory to obtain a PAN-encrypted DSC. The time available for such a large number of companies to do this is very short and this is likely to cause a serious problem in smooth filing of returns in the month of September.

Our request?:

    P. In view of the above mentioned practical difficulties, we request you to amend the rules and make the digital signing of the Returns OPTIONAL particularly in case of non-resident/foreign companies.

    O. Alternatively, the entire process of signing the Return Form ITR-6 with digital signature should be made simple i.e., without PAN and the requirement of obtain DSCs having encrypted value of their PAN, should be done away with.
 

Q. We sincerely hope that you would consider the above and issue a public clarification by way of a Notification/Circular and/or make necessary amendments in the rules. It is further requested that a copy of the said Notification/Circular be sent to the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society.

Considering the urgency of the matter and in view of the very limited time available to enable companies and their signatories to comply with the new procedure, an early response in the matter would be greatly appreciated.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

Mayur Nayak                  Kishor Karia
President                         Chairman
                                  Taxation Committee

Appeal by Income-tax Act, 1961

LIGHT ELEMENTS

Dear Pranabda (Finance
Minister),

Recently you tabled Direct
Tax Code (popularly known as DTC which reminds me of DDT used for killing
mosquitoes) in the Parliament in August, 2010 when inflation was raining cats
and dogs outside. What a great achievement ! You’ve been the Finance Minister a
number of times. Your predecessors (like P. Chidambaram, the most innovative
Finance Minister we’ve ever had) and you have tinkered me, amended me,
simplified (?) me by adding or deleting sections, sub-sections, clauses,
sub-clauses, explanations, using all the alphabets and roman numbers available
on earth and what not through the finance bills and ordinances one after
another. Still you’re unhappy with me. I’ve been in service of the nation since
1961, nearly 50 years. I could have celebrated my golden jubilee in 2011. But
alas ! You’re trying to evict me from the Indian economy for no worthwhile
reasons in sight. That’s what I hear from economists (excluding our Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh), tax experts, chartered accountants,
industrialists, even laymen, etc. Believe me, I have everything you want. But
you’re deliberately ignoring it since you are a man of words. You want to leave
a mark on the annals of Indian economy. So it’s nothing but a prestige issue. I
wonder, is it not possible for you to achieve your avowed objective of
simplification through me, though your predecessors and you’ve kept simplifying
me for years together. Do you think with the introduction of my ‘step’ law, I
mean DTC, everything will be simple and easy ? Had it been so, why did you
revise the DTC before its birth ? My dear Pranabda, from my experience since
1961, I can say that income-tax law in India can never be simple, it’ll continue
to be complicated, be it me or DTC. Even you’ll agree with me, at least in
private if not openly. Look, the term ‘simplification’ is very illusory, it is
like a mirage. With the passage of time something that’s simple today becomes
complicated tomorrow. Moreover, on the one hand you talk about simplification
and on the other hand you introduce stringent anti-tax avoidance provisions to
make the life of taxpayers miserable and at the mercy of tax authorities with
powers to suspect (read as discretionary powers). Is it a way to simplify
income-tax law ? In fact, I’ve been more abused by tax authorities than by
taxpayers of this country.


Regarding withdrawal of various exemptions — a number of exemptions have been
phased out in the past. In fact, I am burdened with the number of redundant
sections, sub-sections, clauses, sub-clauses, and explanations for years now. I
didn’t utter a word.

My
dear Pranabda, eventually what you want is ‘tax’ on income. I heard that with
the introduction of DTC, revenue will go down substantially due to changes in
slabs in the initial years of DTC. Is it worth it ? When taxpayers are ready to
pay, why are you losing this revenue ? Your political party is voted to power by
‘aam adami’ and not by taxpayers. You must be aware that your party needs
official money for welfare schemes of the ‘aam adami’ to get re-elected and
govern this country. I urge you to let me continue. You’re committing a blunder.
People have already started criticising the DTC as my ‘clone’ or as old wine in
a new bottle and what not. I feel very sad.

So
my dear Pranabda, I earnestly request you to let me continue to serve this
country of millions. I’m capable of generating enough revenue for the
government. I won’t spare any tax dodger, be it a politician of your party or
opposition. You can make me as simple as you please. Give more discretionary
powers to tax authorities so that they can directly withdraw tax from the
taxpayer’s bank account apart from raids and surveys. I’m sure that I have
enough power to deal with economic offenders. If you find me inadequate on this
front, make me more stringent by introducing death penalty to economic
offenders. I don’t mind. Introduce ‘daily advance tax’ like a piggy collection
for corporate tax-payers, forget about MAT. Keep on reversing the decisions of
the Supreme Court and lower courts shielding the taxpayers by amending me from
time to time, I don’t mind.


Lastly let me celebrate the golden jubilee of my existence – 2011.

Jai Hind !

Yours faithfully,

Income-tax Act, 1961

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Short-Term Capital Gains on Shares Taxed at a Rate Higher Than Normal Slab Rate — Anomaly in S. 111A

S. 111A(1) and the proviso thereto, read as under :

Tax on short-term capital gains in certain cases.

111A. (1) Where the total income of an assessee includes any income chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’, arising from the transfer of a short-term capital asset, being an equity share in a company or a unit of an equity-oriented fund and —

(a) the transaction of sale of such equity share or unit is entered into on or after the date on which Chapter VII of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 comes into force; and

(b) such transaction is chargeable to securities transaction tax under that Chapter, the tax payable by the assessee on the total income shall be the aggregate of —

(i) the amount of income-tax calculated on such short-term capital gains at the rate of fifteen per cent; and

(ii) the amount of income-tax payable on the balance amount of the total income as if such balance amount were the total income of the assessee :

Provided that in the case of an individual or a Hindu undivided family, being a resident, where the total income as reduced by such short-term capital gains is below the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax, then such short-term capital gains shall be reduced by the amount by which the total income as so reduced falls short of the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax and the tax on the balance of such short-term capital gains shall be computed at the rate of 15%.

        Short-term capital gains arising from transfer of equity shares is taxable u/s.111A @ 15%. The proviso to S. 111A(1) gives some relief to a resident individual or HUF in case such income of the assessee forms part of the income within the basic exemption limit.

        As per literal reading of the proviso to S. 111A(1), in such a case, that portion of such short-term capital gains which exceeds basic exemption limit, would be taxable @ 15%. In other words, such an assessee is entitled to claim basic exemption in respect of such short-term capital gains, but the excess of such income above the basic exemption limit is taxable @ 15%.

        The Finance Act, 2009 provides for a 10% tax slab on income between `1,60,000 to `3,00,000 for individuals (other than specified individuals) and HUFs for A.Y. 2010-11. Further, the Finance Act, 2010 provides for a 10% tax slab on income between `1,60,000 to `5,00,000 for individuals (other than specified individuals) and HUFs for A.Y. 2011-12.

        A literal reading of the proviso to S. 111A(1) would make such short-term capital gains arising to a resident individual/HUF falling within the income bracket of `1,60,000 to `3,00,000 (or `1,60,000 to `5,00,000, as the case may be) liable to tax @ 15%, whereas normal income (i.e., incomes other than such short-term capital gains) falling within such income brackets would be taxable @ 10%.

        It would be recalled that S. 111A was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. 1-4-2005, on restructuring of the provisions relating to taxation of capital gains on transfer of equity shares. This could never have been the intention of the law-makers to tax such short-term capital gains at a rate higher than the tax rate on other income falling within the above-mentioned slab.

        Therefore, there is a clear and patent anomaly which has crept in after increase in the rate of tax u/s.111A(1) from 10% to 15% by the Finance Act, 2008, coupled with significant restructuring of the tax slabs by the Finance Act, 2009 and 2010. This anomaly is likely to give rise to litigation. This anomaly is adversely impacting small taxpayers the most. To provide clarity to the assessees and the Assessing Officers, this anomaly requires to be corrected by way of an amendment to the law.

        Pending such an amendment, we would request CBDT to kindly issue a suitable Circular/Instruction granting relief to the taxpayers in such cases.

Is it fair to burden small companies and firms with surcharge on FBT ?

Is It Fair

1. Introduction :


Ordinarily, the Government resorts to surcharge on income-tax
for mobilising resources for tackling a particular situation — like natural
calamity, war, etc. It is intended to be a short-term measure. There is also an
implication of sharing the revenues with the states. However, in recent years,
the surcharge has almost come to stay for ever. It is further aggravated by the
education cess. Some solace is provided in terms of marginal reliefs; or some
threshold limits of income above which the surcharge becomes applicable.

2. Applicability of surcharge :


S. 2 of Finance Act, 2008 deals with the rates of income-tax.

Ss.(3) of S. 2 applies to persons covered under Chapter XII
or Chapter XIIA, Chapter XII H, S. 115JB; and so on. Clause (c) of 2nd proviso
to Ss.(3) states that in the case of every firm and domestic company, the
surcharge will be 10% of the income-tax where the total income exceeds one crore
rupees; whereas clause (a) of the same proviso makes surcharge applicable to
individuals, HUFs, AOPs, etc. when total income exceeds ten lakh rupees. This is
understandable.

However, the 4th proviso deals with surcharge on FBT. Here,
clause (a) states that in respect of AOP and BOI, surcharge on FBT is applicable
if the value of fringe benefits exceeds Rs.10 lakh. Thus, it is in line with
surcharge on normal income-tax. And when it comes to firms and domestic
companies, in terms of clause (b) of the 4th proviso, the surcharge on FBT will
apply to all such entities, irrespective of their total or the value of fringe
benefit.

There is a similar distinction in Ss.(9) as well.

3. Anomaly :


The 2nd proviso states that surcharge is applicable on the
normal income-tax where the income is chargeable to tax u/s.115A, 115AB,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and u/s.115JB; or fringe benefits chargeable to
tax u/s.115WA.

It is not clear as to what is the relevance of including S.
115WA in the 2nd proviso, when the 4th proviso specifically deals with FBT.

Further, there is no reason why there should be a
discrimination in respect of FBT when the surcharge on normal tax applies only
to large companies having income exceeding Rs. one crore.

It is a fact that FBT is already a burden on the employer
firm or company. There is no justification as to why all firms and companies be
subjected to surcharge on FBT, irrespective of their income/value of fringe
benefits.

If it is viewed that FBT is basically in respect of the
benefits to the employees, it is common knowledge that majority of the employees
in majority of the organisations are most likely to have total income less than
Rs.10 lakhs.

Clause (a) of the 4th proviso gives the benefit of threshold
limit of FB value for AOPs and BOIs, but clause (b) deprives the firms and
domestic companies of this benefit.

4. Suggestions :


(a) The relevance of including S. 115WA in the second proviso
should be clarified, and

(b) Some threshold limit on FB be also prescribed for firms and domestic
companies in respect of levy of surcharge on FBT.

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Larger Bench Ruling on Valuation: Material Supplied by Receiver of Service, Whether Includible in Taxable Value

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Introduction:
In commercial or residential construction activity, it is commonly found that a developer or owner, appointing a contractor to construct a building or a structure, purchases important building material like cement and steel on its own account and supplies the same to the contractor for the use in the building construction contracted to the contractor. Since the contractor carries out the construction activity with its labour, various equipments and other material such as bricks, sand etc., the material bought by oneself and used for one’s own construction is commonly referred to as free supply of material to the contractor. However, the fact of the matter is that the material belongs to the contractee and it is not given free to the contractor as gift or donation. The contractor receives the material for use in the contractee’s project. The discussion herein relates to controversy over the issue whether such material forms part of the value of contractor’s services for determination of service tax liability thereon.

Relevant statutory provisions:
• Section 66 – Charging section

“There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve per cent of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (zzzzw) of clause (105) of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.” [emphasis supplied]

• Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) deals with valuation of a taxable service for the charge of service tax. This section with effect from 18-04-2006 was substituted whereby its scope was expanded. Nevertheless, the basic mode and characteristic of valuation of a taxable service remained unaltered.

Prior to 18-04-2006, the said section 67 read as follows:

“For the purpose of this chapter, the value of any taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him.

[emphasis supplied]

Explanation 1 ………… Explanation 2 ……….. Explanation 3 ………..”

(There were certain inclusions and exclusions provided in the above explanations which are not produced for the sake of brevity).

The substituted section 67 with effect from 18-04- 2006 reads as under:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall, —

(i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;

(ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money as, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;

(iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.

(2) Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.

(3) the gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.

Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, —

(a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided;

(b) ………..

(c) “gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account …………………..” [emphasis supplied]

Commercial construction service was introduced in the service tax law with effect from 10th September, 2004 whereas residential construction service became taxable from 16th June, 2005. A variety of construction agreements are entered into by developers or builders with their contractors. Some contracts involve construction services with all the material to be supplied by their contractor/s and in some others, the owner/developer purchases critical materials like cement and steel on his own account. In order that the material supplied by a contractor in a composite contract would not have to suffer service tax, the Government issued Notification No.15/2004-ST and subsequently Notification No.18/2005-ST as regards residential construction on identical lines.

Notification No. 15/2004-Service Tax read as follows:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the taxable service provided by a commercial concern to any person, in relation to construction service, from so much of the service tax leviable thereon under section 66 of the said Act, as is in excess of the service tax calculated on a value which is equivalent to thirty-three per cent of the gross amount charged from any person by such commercial concern for providing the said taxable service:

Provided that this exemption shall not apply in such cases where –

(i) the credit of duty paid on inputs or capital goods has been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; or (

ii) the commercial concern has availed the benefit under the notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance, (Department of Revenue) No. 12/2003-Service Tax, dated the 20th June, 2003 [G.S.R. 503 (E), dated the 20th June, 2003.”

[emphasis supplied]

Consequent upon the introduction of the above service, Central Board of Excise & Customs (the Board) issued Circular No.80 dated 17-09-2004 wherein, inter alia, the reason for issue of Exemption Notification No.15/2004-ST was contained in para 13.5 as extracted below:

“13.5. The gross value charged by the building contractors include the material cost, namely, the cost of cement, steel, fittings and fixtures, tiles etc. Under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the service provider can take credit of excise duty paid on such inputs. However, it has been pointed out that these materials are normally procured from the market and are not covered under the duty paying documents. Further, a general exemption is available to goods sold during the course of providing service (Notification No. 12/2003-ST) but the exemption is subject to the condition of availability of documentary proof specially indicating the value of the goods sold. In case of a composite contract, bifurcation of value of goods sold is often difficult. Considering these facts, an abatement of 67% has been provided in case of composite contracts where the gross amount charged includes the value of material cost. (refer notification No.15/04-ST, dated 10-09-2004) This would, however, be optional subject to the condition that no credit of input goods, capital goods and no benefit (under notification no. 12/2003-ST) of exemption towards cost of goods are availed.”

With effect from 01-03-2005, vide Notification No.4/2005-ST, an explanation was inserted in the above Notification viz. “For the purpose of the Notification, the gross amount charged shall include the value of goods and materials supplied or provided or used for providing the said taxable service provided by the said service provider.

In terms of this explanation, the revenue contended that when cement or steel is supplied by the builder/developer/owner, the same should form part of the value for determining 67% abatement. Widespread litigation occurred on this issue across the country. The Madras High Court provided an interim relief in a writ filed by Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 2007 (7) STR 123 (Mad) holding that:

“On a reading of the explanation, this court is prima facie of the view that such an insistence is not in accordance with the explanation. To that extent there will be an interim order as prayed for.”

Based on the above interim order, the Delhi High Court in Era Infra Engineering Ltd. 2008 (11) STR 3 (Del) also provided interim relief to the appellant.

Conflicting decisions by two co-ordinate Benches of Tribunal:

Subsequently, the Bangalore Tribunal in Cemex Engineers vs. CST Cochin 2010 (17) STR 534, relying on the observation of the Madras High Court in Larsen & Toubro (supra), held that the value of goods supplied and provided by the client cannot be included for calculating service tax and that such inclusion would be contrary to the provisions of section 67 of the Act which specifies that the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service. As against this, in Jaihind Projects Ltd. vs. CST, Ahmedabad 2010 (18) 650 (Tri.-Ahmd), the Appellant engaged in laying pipelines provided commercial or industrial construction service to companies such as ONGC, GAIL, Essar Projects Ltd. etc. In all cases, pipes were supplied by the receiver of service to the Appellant. The department raised a dispute contending that the value of pipes supplied by receiver ought to have been included in the value for determining taxable value of 33% while availing the benefit of Notification No.15/2004-ST. The Tribunal held that even under section 67 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, the pipes being essential component of providing pipeline service, it must be treated as consideration other than money and therefore the value of such pipes must be included in the gross value to be offered for service tax payment. As regards Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST, the Tribunal held that the ‘Explanation’ has explained the meaning of “gross amount charged” and since the assessee has opted to avail the abatement under the Notification, he must include the value of goods supplied for the purpose of determining taxable value. The Tribunal further noted that if the value of the pipes used is not included, the Appellant would not be eligible to claim abatement under Notification No.15/04-ST as amended. The Tribunal also recorded that discriminatory results would ensue between two pipeline service providers if one uses pipes provided by him and the other uses one provided by the receiver client. Therefore, when the receiver supplies the material, the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation comes into play as the objective of the Explanation and the proviso is to ensure uniformity in different situations. Further, reliance on Circular No.80/10/2004-ST dated 17-09-2004 by the Appellant was negated by holding that the Explanation brought about from 01-03-2005 did not exist at the time of issue of the circular.

The above conflicting decisions led the Division Bench of the Delhi Tribunal to make a reference to the Larger Bench wherein 23 appeals got bunched together. The decision dated 6th September, 2013 is discussed below:

M/s. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd. & 22 Others 2013-TIOL-1331-CESTAT-DEL-LB:

The question before the Larger Bench (the Bench or LB) was whether the value of the material supplied by the recipient of the taxable service free of cost to the provider of service should also be included for availing tax benefit under Notification No.15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004 as amended by Notification No.4/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005. The above Notification as well as Notification 18/2005-ST issued in respect of residential construction service along with all other abatement Notifications later got merged into a single one viz. Notification No.1/2006 -ST dated 01-03- 2006 without any change in the notification per se. Although the issue relates to the construction industry and a vast number of contractors providing construction services, the decision assumes greater importance as the scope of provision of valuation contained in section 67 of the Act is examined and dealt with at a great length.

Revenue’s contention in brief:

The Revenue discussed various alternative schemes available under the service tax provisions for valu-ation of construction service as follows:

•    CENVAT credit of material including cement and TMT bars used while providing construction service and remitting full value of the service.

•    Benefit under Notification 12/2003-ST of exemp-tion to the extent of value of goods sold during the course of providing service.

•    Benefit under Notification 15/2004-ST wherein a generic abatement of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in case of composite contracts when the gross amount charged includes value of material used upon condition of non-availment of credit on inputs and capital goods and the benefit under the above referred Notification
12/2003-ST.

•    In case of works contracts under a scheme, service tax at a very low rate on the gross amount wherein value of goods or abatement is not deducted.

In the above background, it was contended that Explanation to Notification 15/2004-ST as amended provided that where an assessee opts for the benefit of abatement of 67%, the value of all the goods must be included for determining the value of the contract without availing CENVAT credit of inputs or capital goods or the benefit of exclusion of goods sold under Notification No.12/2003-ST.

The word ‘used’ in the explanation clearly means irrespective of the source of supplies. If the material/ goods were used in the construction service, the value of such goods ought to be included to avail abatement of 67%. Further, even u/s. 67 of the Act, the value of goods whether supplied by the provider or the receiver, if used for providing taxable service, constitute the “gross amount charged” for providing taxable service and lastly, in terms of the contract between the parties, free supplies constitute the consideration by the receiver to the provider of construction service and this value is accordingly taxable u/s. 67 and therefore, it must be declared and offered for tax if 67% abatement benefit is availed. The Revenue interalia relied on N M Goel & Co. vs. Sales Tax Officer (1989) 1 SCC 335 wherein steel and cement supplied by PWD to the assessee were to be deducted from the bills payable by PWD and thus PWD sold these goods to the assessee, though the goods were used for construction for the benefit of PWD. The Bench, in this frame of reference, observed that as against the above case of N. M. Goel & Co. (supra), in the instant case of free supply by the receiver, the agreements between the parties do not provide for recovery of cost of free materials by the recipient from the service provider and the case does not help achieve resolution of the referred issue. The Bench further observed that it did not dispute the fact of integral nexus between free supplies with the construction activity. However, essentially whether such free supplies by the recipient would constitute consideration accruing to the service provider so as to be includible in the “gross amount charged” for the purpose of computation of the taxable value u/s. 67 or to be included in the “gross amount charged” for availing benefit under the abatement Notification as comprehended within the meaning of the word ‘used’ in the Explanation.

Discussion & Analysis contained in the Decision:

Contentions presented by the Appellants were referred to the order of the Hon‘ble Bench in the analysis that follows:

•    Section 67 deals with valuation of taxable services and intends to define what constitutes the value received by the service provider as consideration from the recipient for the service provided. Implicitly, the consideration— monetary or otherwise—must flow from the receiver to the provider of service and should accrue to the benefit of the latter. For interpreting the term ‘consideration’, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Ku. Sonia Bhatia vs. State of UP & Others AIR 1981 SC 1274 wherein it was held that “consider-ation means a reasonable equivalent for other valuable benefits passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.” The Bench, thus observed that even on an extravagant inference, free supply of cement and steel would not constitute a non-monetary consideration by the recipient to the provider particularly because material supplied is retained by the service recipient (misprinted as provider in the order). The Bench also relied on the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (29) STR-DEL and observed that the High Court considered the challenge of constitutionality of Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 to the extent it includes reimbursement of expenses in the value of taxable service and also that the said Rule is ultra vires sections 66 and 67 of the Act. The High Court held that section 66, the charging section, levies tax only on the taxable services and this inbuilt mechanism ensures that only taxable services shall be evaluated u/s. 67. On construing provision of section 66 and section 67(1)(i) together and harmoniously, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider and nothing more and nothing less than consideration paid as quid pro quo for the service can be brought to charge. The Bench thus observed that the legislative text of sections 66 and 67 being clear and unambiguous and in the light of the judgment in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. (supra) “the conclusion is compelling and inviolable that value of free supplies by a construction service recipient would not constitute non- monetary consideration to the service provider nor form part of the gross amount charged for the service provided” and consequently could not constitute value of tax-able service. As per this analysis, the Bench held that the conclusions in Jaihind Projects Ltd. proceeded on a flawed interpretation of section 67. Further, on bringing uniformity of incidence as discussed in this decision, the Bench relying on Union of India & Others vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. & Others 1983 (14) ELT 198 (6) (SC) and UOI vs. Nitdip Textile Processors P. Ltd. 2011 (273) ELT 321 (SC) observed that advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees are accidental, inevitable and inherent in every taxing statute. Further, referring and relying on Moriroku UT India (P) Ltd. vs. State Of U.P. 2008 (224) ELT 365 (SC), the Bench observed as follows:

“Sales-tax or trade-tax under the 1948 Act is leviable on sale, whether actual or deemed, and for every sale there has to be a consideration. On the other hand, excise duty is a levy on a taxable event of ‘manufacture’ and it is calculated on the ‘value’ of manufactured goods. Excise duty is not concerned with ownership or sale. The liability under the excise law is event-based and irrespective of whether the goods are sold or captively consumed. Under the excise law, the liability is there even when the manufacturer is not the owner of raw material or finished goods (as in the case of job workers). For sales-tax purposes, what has to be taken into account is the consideration for transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer. For this purpose, tax is to be levied on the agreed consideration for transfer of property in the goods and in such a case cost of manufacture is irrelevant. The provisions relating to measure (section 4 of 1944 Act read with Excise Valuation Rules, 2000) aim at taking into consideration all items of costs of manufacture and all expenses which lead to value addition to be taken into account and for that purpose Rule 6 makes a deeming provision by providing for notional additions. Such deeming fictions and notional additions in excise law are totally irrelevant for sales-tax purposes.” [emphasis supplied].

Based on the observations in Moriroku UT India (P)    Ltd. (supra), the Bench concluded that a clear principle emerged therefrom that consideration for the transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer is only to be held as consideration for the levy of tax unlike event-based excise duty and this principle would equally apply to the levy of service tax and particularly in the context of specific language of section 67 of the Act.

•    For the next issue of the Explanation inserted in Notification No.15/2004, the Bench observed that the Explanation purports to define “gross amount charged” and the abatement of 67% is in respect of the “gross amount charged” by the service provider to the recipient, the identical expression employed in section 67(1)(i). The question, therefore, requiring examination is whether the Notification No. 04/2005-ST amending Notification No. 15/2004-ST enlarged the contents of the said expression. The Bench while considering various contentions advanced for the Appellants observed that the nuance of the substantial contention of the Appellants was that goods used by the provider of the construction service for providing such service in the Explanation to the Notification No.15/2004-ST must connote those goods as are charged to the service recipient. However, the revenue contested that the literal meaning of the word ‘used’ be given its full effect and ought not to be restricted to the other two expressions ‘supplied’ and ‘provided’ with reference only to the “gross amount charged”. On behalf of the assessees, contention was made to employ interpretative principle of “Noscitur A Sociis” or the analogy of the “ejusdem generis” to hold that goods and material used for providing the construction service, the value of which is charged to the service recipient. Considering the term ‘used’ problematic, examination and analysing of the said principle of noscitur was found imperative and a number of judgments and quotes on the subject matter were referred to in aid thereof which inter alia included;

•    Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1991 SC 151

•    Paradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana vs. State of Punjab AIR 1998 SC 171

•    Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla and Another vs. A. D. Divelkar and Others 2002-TIOL-447-SC-MISC-CB

The Bench finally concurred with the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants while elaborating on the noscitur a sociis principle that when the Notification exempts service tax to the extent of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in relation to construction service, section 67 enacts that the value of taxable service shall be the “gross amount charged” which would not include the value of free supplies, as any value to constitute consideration, monetary or otherwise should flow from a recipient to the provider of service and this being the pre-condition u/s. 67, the expression “gross amount charged” in the Explanation could not be construed as expanding the scope of the said expression. Likewise, the reliance placed by the Appellants inter alia on CIT, Bangalore vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460 was noted and the Bench observed the principle laid therein to the effect that when four important components of concept of a tax system (viz. the nature of the imposition of a tax which prescribes the taxable event, the person on whom the levy is imposed, the rate of tax and the measure or value to which the rate is applied), are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law and any uncertainty and vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity. Considering this principle analogous to the principle that liability to tax could not be inferred on a doubtful or ambiguous provision and the benefit of ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the assessee, the Hon‘ble Bench concluded that the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST is inherently ambiguous and more so in the context of other expressions therein i.e., supplied or provided, the noscitur principle must be applied to conclude that only such goods/materials which are ‘supplied’ by the service provider or ‘provided’ by the service provider or ‘used’ when supplied or provided by the service provider i.e. goods and material whether supplied, provided or used in the construction and charged on the service recipient and value where-of is received by the service provider towards a consideration that accrues to the provider’s benefit would alone comprise the “gross value charged” by the construction service provider within the meaning of section 67 and for availing benefit of Notification 15/2004- ST. Alternatively, it can also be stated that since the free supplies i.e. incapable of computation provision of section 67(1)(iii) would not apply as free supply would not fall within section 67, the computation provisions fail and consequently restriction on availability of benefit of exemption would be nugatory. Based on the above, the reference was answered in the following words in para 16 of the order:

“Para 16:

“(a) The value of goods and materials supplied free of cost by a service recipient to the provider of the taxable construction service, being neither monetary or non- monetary consideration paid by or flowing from the service recipient, accruing to the benefit of service provider, would be outside the taxable value or the gross amount charged, within the meaning of the later expression in section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; and

(b)    Value of free supplies by service recipient do not comprise the gross amount charged under Notification No. 15/2004-ST, including the Explanation thereto as introduced by Notification No. 4/2005-ST.”

Conclusion:

Despite the above, the observation of the Bench concluded in para 15 is important. “This is not to say that an exemption Notification cannot enjoin a condition that the value of free supplies must also go into the gross amount charged for valuation of the taxable service. If such intention is to be effected, the phraseology must be specific and denuded of ambiguity.” The question now arises is whether the effect of above ruling would be extended to the composition scheme under the works contract service or the works contracts under the negative list based taxation.

Under the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007, service tax @2% or 4% during application period was payable on the gross amount charged. An Explanation was inserted with effect from 07 -07 -2009 to include “the value of all goods used in or in relation to the execution of the works contract, whether supplied under any other contract for a consideration or otherwise.”

Further, the above Rule 3(1) contained “notwith-standing anything contained in section 67 of the Act and Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006………”, means a non-obstante provision. However, determination of value of services involved in the execution of works contract under Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (Valuation Rules) was subject to the provisions of section 67.

Similarly, in the post-negative list period, service tax is to be paid on a specific percentage of the total amount charged for the works contract in accordance with the substituted Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules. The term “total amount” is defined to include the fair market value of all goods and services supplied in or in relation to the execution of the works contract. As per the substituted Rule 2A also, the value of service portion in the execution of a works contract is to be determined subject to provisions of section 67.

Thus, in both the cases, the question remains as to whether the Explanation and its phraseology is unambiguous enough to expand the scope of the term “gross amount charged” to include the value of free supplies is again a matter of interpretation. However, the treatise of the above landmark decision would serve as a guidance to resolve many vexed issues on the subject of valuation. However, the finality on this issue of valuation is unlikely in the near future.

A Netherlands resident company received payments for grant of licence for off-the-shelf software to an Indian customer. No right in the copyright was transferred. The AAR held that payments were not royalty or FTS under DTAA and since the company did not

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


2 GeoQuest Systems B.V., In re

AAR No. 774 of 2008 (AAR)

Article 7, 12 of India-Netherlands DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vi) (vii) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 6-8-2010

A Netherlands resident company received payments for grant of
licence for off-the-shelf software to an Indian customer. No right in the
copyright was transferred. The AAR held that payments were not royalty or FTS
under DTAA and since the company did not have PE in India, payments were not
taxable in India.

Facts :

The applicant was a company incorporated in the Netherlands
(‘DutchCo’). It was engaged in the business of supplying special-purpose
computer software for use in exploration and production of mineral oils. The
software was not prepared to suit the special requirements of any particular
customer and hence DutchCo described it as off-the-shelf. Under an agreement
DutchCo granted an exclusive non-transferable licence for the software to an
Indian company. DutchCo was to retain all IPRs in the software as well as in
modifications and updates. DutchCo was to supply the software package to the
customer outside India and the customer was to pay the consideration also
outside India. On termination of the agreement the customer was to discontinue
the use of the software and return the same. The agreement also contained
certain other restrictions on use of the software by the customer.

The issue before the AAR was, whether the income from supply
of the software would be taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act or DTAA ?

Drawing distinction between transfer of copyright in a
product and transfer of a copyrighted product, DutchCo contended before the AAR
that the transfer was of a copyrighted product and hence, the consideration
should not be taxed as royalty.

The tax authority initially contended that the payment was
royalty but later on contended that as per the AAR ruling in Airports Authority
of India, In re (323 ITR 211) (AAR), it was FTS.

Held :

The AAR observed that the core question was whether the
payment conferred any rights in the copyright or right to use the copyright. The
AAR relied on its earlier rulings in Factset Research Systems Inc., In re (317
ITR 169) (AAR) and Dassault Systems K K, In re (322 ITR 125) (AAR) wherein it
was held that what was transferred to the end-user was copyrighted software but
not copyright therein and mere transfer of computer software de-hors any
copyright does not amount to royalty.

The AAR distinguished its earlier ruling in Airports
Authority of India, In re (323 ITR 211) (AAR) and observed that in that case,
apart from the licence of the software, the contract also envisaged imparting of
technical knowledge and hence, that ruling was not applicable to this case.

The AAR relied on the OECD commentary and held that Article
12.4 of DTAA contemplates conferring of right of use of copyright. As transfer
of such right was not evident from the agreement, the payments were not in the
nature of royalty or FTS under DTAA. As DutchCo did not have a PE in India, the
payments were not taxable in India.

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A Singapore resident company had a PE in India, which provided information available in public domain to subscribers. The AO held that the income was FTS under the Income-tax Act and taxable on gross basis and not on net basis as claimed by the taxpayer u

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


1 2010 TII 72 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

JCIT v. Telerate

Article 7(3), 12 of India-Singapore DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 18-2-2010

 

A Singapore resident company had a PE in India, which
provided information available in public domain to subscribers. The AO held that
the income was FTS under the Income-tax Act and taxable on gross basis and not
on net basis as claimed by the taxpayer under DTAA. The Tribunal held that the
assessee can choose between DTAA and the Income-tax Act and tax authority cannot
thrust provisions of the Income-tax Act unless they are more beneficial.

Facts :

The taxpayer was a company resident in Singapore (‘SingCo’).
SingCo had established a branch in India which was a PE in terms of Article
5(2)(b) of India-Singapore DTAA. SingCo was engaged in collecting and
disseminating information on financial, derivatives and commodities market,
which was available in public domain. The information was transmitted to
subscribers of Indian branch office on continuous basis through telephone lines
or V-Sat.

The AO held that SingCo was rendering technical services and
therefore, its income was ‘fees for technical services’ u/s.9(1)(vii) of the
Income-tax Act. The AO further held that notwithstanding provisions of Article
12(6) of DTAA, which envisages taxing FIS of PE as business profits under
Article 7(3), income should be computed in terms of S. 44D of the Income-tax Act
and consequently, income should be taxed on gross basis @ 24% in terms of S.
115A of the Income-tax Act.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that the facts were similar to those in
DCIT v. Boston Consulting Group Pte. Ltd., (2005) 94 ITD 31 (Mum.) and relying
on that decision held that :




? If the assessee chooses to be covered by provisions of DTAA, the Revenue
cannot thrust provisions of the Income-tax Act on him;



? Provisions of the Income-tax Act cannot come in to play unless they are
more beneficial;



? Article 12(4)(b) of DTAA does not cover non-technical ‘consultancy
services’.




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S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Business expenditure — Payment of severance pay on closure of manufacturing business and expenditure incurred on market research — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

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part B: unreported decisions


2 KJS India Pvt. Ltd. v.
DCIT

ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi

Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa
(VP) and

Rajpal Yadav (JM)

ITA No. 2422/Del./2007 and
2168/Del./2009

Decided on : 30-7-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue
: Salil Kapoor & Pankuj Rawat/

Kavita Bhatnagar & H. K. Lal

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 — Business expenditure — Payment of severance pay on closure of
manufacturing business and expenditure incurred on market research — Whether
allowable — Held, Yes.

Per Rajpal Yadav :

Facts :

The assessee was in the
business of manufacturing of powdered soft drink in the name and style of TANG.
During the year under appeal it closed down its manufacturing business and paid
the sum of

`93.92 lacs by way of
severance pay to its employees. Its claim to allow such payment as business
expenditure was disallowed by the AO on the following grounds :

(1) As per its Form 3CD
the Board of Directors decided to discontinue the business of production of
powdered soft drink due to non-viability of operations and accordingly, the
assessee had ceased its business operations;

(2) As per its Notes on
Accounts, the assessee had decided to sell its business and hence, its
accounts were not prepared on going-concern basis;

(3) Severance cost was
incurred for closure of the business;

(4) U/s.37 only those
expenditure which are incurred for the running of business was allowable.

Another issue before the
Tribunal was about the allowability of expenditure of

`24.52 lacs incurred on
market research. According to the AO the assessee had incurred the expenses for
developing and designing a new product. Therefore, he disallowed the said
expenditure by treating the same as capital in nature as according to him, the
expenditure had resulted in providing benefit of enduring nature to the assessee.

On appeal the CIT(A) upheld
the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the
Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and pointed out that even
the directors in their Board meeting had specifically observed that the business
of manufacturing was closed.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the
assessee besides manufacturing, was also engaged in the business of trading. It
had not closed down the business, but it had only suspended one of the business
activities viz. that of manufacturing of powdered soft drink. It had continued
to carry on its trading business. According to the Tribunal the business cannot
be construed to mean one single activity. Further, relying on the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Ravindranathan Nair, Sasoon J. David Co. Pvt.
Ltd., Narayan Swadesh, of the Delhi High Court in the cases of DCM Ltd. and
Anita Jain, of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Assam Oil Co. Ltd. and of
the Madras High Court in the case of Simpson & Co. Ltd., it held that the
expenses incurred towards severance cost was an allowable expenditure.

The Tribunal went through
the reports of the market agency and noted that the study was to upgrade sale of
its existing product with the help of market survey. It was not for the
development and design of a new product. Accordingly, relying on the decisions
of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Ananda Bazar Patrika and of the Bombay
High Court in the case of J. K. Chemicals Ltd. it held that the expenditure was
allowable as business expenditre.

Cases referred to :

 

4.

CIT v. Assam Oil Co. Ltd., 154 ITR 647
(Cal.);

 

1.

Ravindranathan Nair
v. CIT, 247 ITR 178

 

5.

CIT v. Simpson &
Co. Ltd., (Mad.);

 

(SC);

 

6.

CIT v. Ananda Bazar
Patrika, 184 ITR 542

2.

Sasoon J. David Co.
Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, 118 ITR

 

 

(Cal.);

 

261;

 

7.

CIT v. J. K.
Chemicals Ltd., 207 ITR 985

3.

Narayan Swadesh v.
CIT, 26 ITR 765 (SC);

 

 

(Bom.)





S. 55A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Valuation report of Departmental Valuation Officer — To determine fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 whether reference to DVO can be made — Held, No.

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part B: unreported decisions


1 ITO v. Surendra V. Shah

ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP) and

Pramod Kumar (AM)

ITA No. 5667/Mum./2008

Decided on : 23-7-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee
:

Naveen Gupta/Dr. Rashmi J.
Zaveri

Per Pramod Kumar :

Facts :

S. 55A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 — Valuation report of Departmental Valuation Officer — To determine
fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 whether reference to DVO can be made —
Held, No.

The issue before the
Tribunal was whether the AO can resort to Departmental Valuation Officer’s (DVO)
report for ascertaining fair market value of an asset as on 1st April, 1981 and
for the purpose of computing cost of acquisition u/s.55(2)(b)(i).

Held :

According to the Tribunal a
reference to DVO can only be made u/s.55A. Further relying on the decision of
the Mumbai Bench of Tribunal in the case of Daulai Mohta (HUF) which decision
was subsequently approved by the Bombay High Court, the Tribunal upheld the
order of the CIT(A) to the effect that the reference to the DVO was invalid.

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2013 (31) STR 270 (Bom) Welspun Syntex Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs

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Stay – conducting Agreement – Business Support Service vs. Renting of immovable property service – serious triable issue – complete waiver of pre-deposit.

Facts:
The Appellant entered into a conducting agreement for use of its plant, machinery & equipments by the other company for consideration. The department contended that tax was leviable on the same under “support services of business or commerce”.

The Appellant contended that the said activity became taxable with effect from 01-06-2007 under the category of “Renting of Immovable Property Service” and discharged service tax accordingly. It further relied on Fine Switchgear vs. CCE, 2012 (25) STR 443 wherein it was held that when a new entry was carved out subsequently for the purpose of service tax, it had to be held that the same was not covered by any prior existing category of service.

Held:
The Hon. High Court allowing the appeal held that the appellant made out a prima facie case on merits raising a serious triable issue and hence it is eligible for complete waiver of pre-deposit.

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2013-TIOL-03-ARA-ST M/s. Tandus Flooring India Pvt. Ltd. vs. the Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore

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Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012-marketing and sales in India to a firm in China ans USA – place of provision is location of service receiver – Rule 3 applicable – Export.

Facts:
The applicant, an Indian company (wholly-owned subsidiary of a Singapore company) with the objective of strengthening and enhancing sales of the products of Tandus USA and Tandus China to its Indian customers against consideration receivable in freely convertible foreign exchange, agreed to provide services of marketing and promotion of products to Indian service recipients. The services also included demonstration of products, communication with customers, management of dealer accounts, coordination with representatives of customers, etc. The applicant sought advance ruling on the following questions:

• What would be the place of provision of the marketing and support services provided in India by the company to Tandus US and Tandus China in terms of the Place of Provision of Service Rules 2012 (introduced vide Notification No. 28/2012–S.T. dated 20-06-2012)?

• Whether the said services would also qualify as export of taxable services under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994?

Held:
Considering the case of service proposed to be provided from Indian territory to a business entity located outside India and referring to Circular No.111/5/2009 dated 24-02-2009, it was observed that the benefit of service accrued outside India. Accordingly, in terms of the applicable Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, the Hon. Authority held that the service so provided by Tandus India was covered under the default Rule 3 which stipulated that the place of provision shall be the location of the service recipient i.e., Tandus USA and Tandus China and thus service was deemed to be provided in a non-taxable territory. Further, referring to Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the Hon. Authority held that since the applicant satisfied all the conditions of the said Rule, the services so provided would tantamount to export.

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INPUT TAX CREDIT under VAT: Whether Ascertainment of Tax on Transaction is Required?

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Introduction
After introduction of VAT in Maharashtra, getting input tax credit (ITC) has become a herculean task for dealers. A number of objections are raised while granting ITC (set off of tax paid on purchases). The basic objection is that it is the claimant buyer dealer who has to obtain confirmation of tax payment from the vendor. Thus, an impossible task is required to be accomplished by the buying dealers.

The difficulties are much more with the issue of ‘hawala’ dealers having surfaced. Everyone is now well aware that the Sales Tax Department has put up a list of more than 2,000 dealers as suspicious dealers, commonly described as ‘hawala’ dealers, on the website. In respect of ‘hawala’ dealers, no set-off is allowed irrespective of producing confirmation or any other supporting document. Neither assessment orders of the said vendors (so-called havala dealers) are passed nor crossexamination, to rebut the charge of non-genuine transactions etc., is allowed. Such actions of disallowing setoff, in the hands of purchasers, are against the principles of natural justice and invalid in the eyes of law.

Judgment in case of Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries, Kolhapur vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (51 VST 1)(Bom)

In almost all such cases, the Department is relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the above case. No doubt, in the above judgment, the Hon’ble High Court has upheld the Constitutional validity of section 48(5) of the MVAT Act, which provides that the ITC should not exceed the amount of tax paid on the said goods into the State Treasury. However, the Sales Tax Department is taking a stand that after above judgment the Department has nothing to do with vendors. Once the Department’s records show that there is no payment by the vendor, set-off can be disallowed without complying with any other process. For this purpose, the Department is verifying tax payment of vendors by their own means like non-filing of returns, non-availability of vendor or listed suspicious (hawala) dealer, etc.

We understand that if the Government has not received money on the same goods in its treasury than the set-off can be disallowed to the buyer as per the above judgment. But the disallowance cannot be a unilateral action. The Department has to follow the principles of natural justice.

It may be worthwhile to note that in above judgment Hon’ble High Court has not directed disallowance of set-off in the hands of all the buyers without assessment of vendor/s or without giving other opportunities as per law to the claimant buyer/s.

Ascertainment of tax payment on transactions is required

Therefore, the present procedure adopted by the Sales Tax Department is grossly erroneous. As per law, no set-off can be disallowed without ascertainment of tax payment on the given transaction and more particularly on the ‘goods’ involved.

The above position is reiterated as per the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal.

Gallery 7 vs. State of Maharashtra (VAT S.A. No.120 of 2011 dated 17-12-2012)

This is the judgment in which, amongst others, the issue of disallowance of set-off in relation to ‘hawala’ dealer is discussed and considered by the Hon’ble Tribunal. There were different reasons due to which set-off was disallowed on various purchase transactions. One of the purchases, on which set-off was disallowed, was from a declared ‘hawala’ dealer namely, M/s. Venkatesh Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. In the first appeal the set-off disallowance was confirmed. Therefore, this second appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Tribunal. After discussing the facts, the Hon’ble Tribunal has remanded the matter back to the first appellate authority with following directions:-

“14. We have considered the rival submissions. We have gone through the record underlying the assessment and the audit done by the assessing officer. We have also gone through the record underlying the appeal order.

i) The main issue in this appeal is about the claim of set-off. The levy of interest u/s. 30(3) is consequent to the dues of taxes which have arisen from disallowance of the claim of set-off. Quantum of penalty u/s. 29(3) is also dependant on the quantum of dues of tax and also the amount of set-off claimed in excess. It would therefore, be necessary to deal with the issue of claim of set-off. It is seen from the perusal of both the assessment order and the appeal order that this issue was not handled seriously by both the assessing officer and the appellate officer. While, in certain instances, the claim of set-off was disallowed by the assessing officer on the ground of non-production of tax invoice, it was allowed by the appellate officer on the ground that the seller was not traceable as reported by the sales tax inspector, the claim was allowed by the appellate officer just by observing that it could not be said that the seller was not doing business in the financial year 2006-2007 and there was no report of the sales tax inspector stating that no returns were filed and no tax was paid by the supplier. Without actually examining whether tax collected from the appellant was in fact paid by the supplier into the government treasury, set-off of an amount of Rs. 78,0375/- which was disallowed by the assessing officer was granted by the appellate officer. We are of the view that, it was necessary for the appellate officer to examine the claim and decide the admissibility of the claim not only on the basis of production or non-production of tax invoice but also after examining whether tax charged in the invoice by the supplier were paid into the government treasury or not. We are of the view that for proper appreciation of the issue, it would be necessary to remand the matter to the appellate officer with direction to him to examine the entire claim of set-off afresh in the light of the provision of section 48(5) of the MVAT Act. It would also be necessary to remand the matter to the appellate officer with the view to examine the appellants claim made in the written submission to grant further set-off in respect of the transactions of purchases allegedly effected by the appellant from M/s. Akshila Trade Ltd. and M/s. Bahubali Trading Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Venkatesh Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. who were found to have defaulted in paying taxes allegedly collected from the appellant.” (Emphasis supplied)

This judgment lays down the correct position in respect of disallowance of set-off including where there is allegation of ‘hawala’ purchases. Unless there is ascertainment of tax payment on the transaction, the set-off cannot be disallowed. It clearly shows that merely on an allegation of the dealer being a hawala dealer set-off cannot be disallowed. It is expected that the lower authorities will follow the above decision and avoid disallowing set-off on a mere allegation of hawala purchase.

Assessment of hawala dealer
It is surprising that the Sales Tax Department is not taking any interest in the assessment of so called ‘hawala’ dealers or just avoiding the assessment of the suspicious vendors on the ground that they are declared ‘hawala’ dealers by them.

Devyani Trading Company vs. The State of Maharashtra (S.A.No.684 to 687 of 2010 dated 15-09- 2012)

In this judgment, the Hon’ble Tribunal has dealt with a similar situation where the vendor has submitted that his transactions are not of sale/ purchase, but financial transaction. In fact the registration of the vendor was cancelled on account of not doing genuine business.

In spite of the above, the dealer was assessed by the Enforcement Officer. In the second appeal, the stand was repeated that there was no genuine business and no tax should be levied. The Tribunal observed that there are transactions with other dealers and therefore, the stand of the appellant that he has not done genuine business cannot be accepted. The Hon’ble Tribunal observed as under:-

“6. The appellant has routed huge transactions through these banks and the State has definitely lost huge tax. The appellant were provided number of opportunities by the appellate Assistant Commissioner to prove that the transactions on financial transactions not involving sales. The transactions entered into or through the bank account of the appellant and the appellant cannot plead that he is not aware about the nature of these transactions. Crores of rupees transactions have been routed through these bank accounts and the appellant cannot say that these are financial transactions not liable to tax. In fact, the existence of these accounts and concealment of the information about their existence gives rise to mens rea.

The appellants have randomly taken various inspections of accounts and not cooperated with the department in explaining the matter in payment of tax and is squarely liable to pay the tax. Accordingly, we confirm the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (Appeals) and reject the Second Appeal petitions. Hence, the order.”

The legal position that emerges is that, under the name of ‘hawala’ no dealer can escape the legal liability. The Sales Tax Department not assessing the vendors under the name of ‘hawala’ is really illegal and it is causing great loss to the Government Treasury. It is expected that the Department will follow the above dictum of the Hon’ble Tribunal and avoid big loss of revenue to the Government. This will also save innocent buyers from illegal disallowance of set-off.

Conclusion

ITC is the lifeline of the VAT system. It has to have a sound, strong and logical apparatus. The dealer, while selling his goods considers the availability of set-off of taxes paid on his purchases. Any disallowance of set-off will be a direct loss to him. Therefore, before disallowing set-off u/s 48(5), due legal process is required to be followed by the Department. The above two judgments in relation to the issue, should certainly be taken as guidance by the Sales Tax Department.

ITO vs. Zinger Investments (P) Ltd. ITAT Hyderabad `A’ Bench Before Chandra Poojari (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM) ITA No. 275/Hyd/2013 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 21st August, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: M. H. Naik/ Inturi Rama Rao.

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Sections 2(42C), 50B—Transfer of undertaking, with all its assets and liabilities under a scheme of amalgamation, where no monetary consideration is involved, cannot be considered to be a slump sale within the meaning of section 2(42C).

Facts:
The assessee filed return of income declaring nil income. In the course of assessment proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that under the scheme of amalgamation approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court u/s. 391 and 394 of the Companies Act the manufacturing division of the assessee company was transferred to M/s. Novopan Industries Ltd. with all its assets and liabilities as per the terms of scheme of amalgamation approved by the High Court. The assessee in return for the transfer of assets and liabilities received the investments of Rs. 25,24,05,000 besides the allotment of 38 equity shares of Rs. 10 each to the shareholders of the assessee company for every 100 equity shares held in the assessee company. The net worth of the assessee company as on 31-3-2006 was Rs. 681.22 lakh.

The AO held the transfer of manufacturing division to M/s. Novopan Industries Ltd to be a `slump sale’ within section 50B attracting liability of capital gains. He computed long-term capital gain by adopting full value of consideration to be Rs. 31,52,12,500 being aggregate of Rs. 6,28,07,500 (being shares issued to shareholders) and Rs. 25,24,05,000. He considered Rs. 6,81,22,000 to be the cost of acquisition. Accordingly, he determined long-term capital gain to be Rs. 24,70,90,500. He rejected the contention of the assessee that there was no monetary consideration and therefore the transfer under consideration was not a slump sale.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal, having noted the facts, observed that there is no monetary consideration received by the assessee company for transfer of manufacturing division. To qualify as a slump sale u/s. 2(42C), two conditions have to be satisfied viz., (1) there must be transfer of one or more undertaking as a result of sale and (2) the sale should be for a lumpsum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities. The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Motors & General Stores Pvt. Ltd. 66 ITR 692 (SC) and also CIT vs. R. R. Ramakrishna Pillai 66 ITR 725 (SC) wherein it was held that where a person carrying on business transfers assets to a company in consideration of allotment of shares, it would be a case of exchange, but not sale.

The Tribunal held that since there is no monetary consideration involved in transferring the manufacturing division with all its assets and liabilities to M/s. Novapan Industries Ltd. under scheme of amalgamation approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it cannot be considered to be a slump sale within the meaning ascribed u/s. 2(42C) of the Act so as to attract the liability of capital gains u/s. 50B of the Act. The Tribunal did not find any reason to interfere with the finding of CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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ITO vs. Gope M. Rochlani ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM) ITA No. 7737/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 24th May, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: D. K. Sinha/ Dr. P. Daniel.

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Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c). The expression “due date” in Explanation 5A encompasses a belated return filed u/s. 139(4). Even a belated return filed u/s. 139(4) will be entitled to the benefit of immunity from penalty.

Facts: The assessee, a partner of the firm M/s. Madhav Constructions, in its return of income for assessment year 2008-09, filed u/s. 139(4), returned a total income of Rs. 1,31,19,140. The returned income included a sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 declared by it in the statement recorded u/s. 132(4) of the Act in the course of search action on Madhav Group. In an order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A, the income returned by the assessee was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO). Thereafter, the AO initiated proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) on the ground that the income was offered only as a consequence of search and the return of income in which it was declared was filed after due date u/s. 139(1). He held that the assessee’s case was covered by Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c). He rejected the assessee’s contention that the sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 declared was offered voluntarily on an estimated basis and the same was accepted in the assessment order and hence the provisions of section 271(1)(c) are not applicable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground that income was offered on an estimated basis and therefore the additional income so offered and accepted could not be held to be concealed income nor could it amount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
In Explanation 5A, the legislature has not specified the due date as provided in section 139(1) but has merely envisaged the words “due date”. This “due date” can be very well inferred as due date of filing of return of income filed u/s. 139 which includes section 139(4). Where the legislature has provided the consequences of filing of return of income u/s. 139(4), then the same has also been specifically provided for eg., section 139(3). Thus, the meaning of the words “due date” sans any limitation or restriction as given in clause (b) of Explanation 5A cannot be read as “due date as provided in section 139(1)”. The words “due date” can also mean date of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(4).

The Tribunal also noted that in the context of sections 54F and 54(2), in the case of CIT vs. Rajesh Kumar Jalan (286 ITR 276)(Gau); CIT vs. Jagriti Aggarwal (339 ITR 610)(P & H) and CIT vs. Jagtar Singh Chawla (ITA No. 71 of 2012, order dated 20th March, 2013), it has been held that provisions of section 139(4) are actually an extension of due date of section 139(1) and therefore due date for filing return of income can also be reckoned with the date mentioned in section 139(4).

The Tribunal held that the assessee gets the benefit/ immunity under clause (b) of Explanation to section 271(1)(c), because the assessee has filed its return of income within “due date” and therefore, the penalty levied by the AO cannot be sustained on this ground. It held that it is not affirming the findings and conclusions of CIT (A). However, the penalty levied was deleted in view of the interpretation of Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Om Stock & Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `C’ Bench Before Sanjay Arora (AM) and Vijay Pal Rao (JM) ITA No. 441/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Prakash Jhunjhunwala/T. Roumuan Paite

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Sections 44AB, 271B—Value of transactions of online trading in commodities through MCX without taking delivery do not constitute turnover for computing the limits u/s. 44AB of the Act. There is no element of turnover where there is no physical delivery of commodities given or taken.

Facts:
The assessee company, a member of Multi Commodity Exchange of India (MCX) was engaged in online business of trading in commodities. The transactions carried on by the assessee were speculative in nature. The bills issued by the Exchange on a daily basis represented mark to market bills and not actual sales/purchase turnover. The transactions were without taking delivery. The entire transaction was squared off at the end of the day or was carried forward to the subsequent day. The net amount, as per contract notes, was either debited or credited to the account of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer (AO), considering the value of the transactions carried out by the assessee on MCX to be the sales figure, invoked section 271B for violation of section 44AB. He held that the turnover of the assessee was more than Rs. 40 lakh, being the limit prescribed u/s. 44AB for getting the accounts audited and obtaining and furnishing the report as required by the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it placed reliance on the following decisions:

Banwari Sitaram Pasari HUF vs. ACIT (29 Taxmann 137) (Pune ITAT)

Growmore Exports Ltd. vs. ACIT (72 TTJ 691) (Mum ITAT)

CIT vs. Growmore Exports Ltd. (Appeal No. 18 to 20 of 2001) (Mum HC).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Pune Bench of ITAT has in the case of Banwari Sitaram Pasari (supra), following the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Growmore Exports Ltd. (supra) held that the transaction of buying and selling of commodities where no physical delivery is taken or given is a speculative activity and there is no element of turnover in such transactions.

The Tribunal also noted that the view taken by the Tribunal in the case of Growmore Exports Ltd. has been confirmed by the Bombay High Court vide decision dated 19-12-2007 and speaking order has been passed in the connected case of CIT vs. Harsh Estate Pvt. Ltd. where the Court has observed as under:

“In other words the finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the purchase was coupled with delivery has been reversed by the order of ITAT. Nothing has been brought to our attention from the record that the said finding of reversal is perverse warranting this court to take a view different from the view of the Tribunal. We, therefore, proceed on the footing that though there was transaction of shares it was not coupled with delivery. Once there was no delivery, the sale price of the shares could not have been considered as the turnover but only the difference between the price at which the shares were purchased and consequently sold by the broker…

Considering the findings on merits namely that there was no delivery and consequently the sales prices of the shares could not have been considered, it is not necessary to go into the other aspects. In the light of the above, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.”

The Tribunal considering the above mentioned decisions held that the value of sale transaction of commodity through MCX without delivery cannot be considered as turnover for the purpose of section 44AB. It deleted the penalty levied u/s. 271B.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Works Contract executed through Sub-contractor — Whether single transaction or multiple transactions ?

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VAT

A very interesting question was dealt with by Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Others, reported in 148 STC 616
(A.P.). The facts were that L&T received a contract from its customer (contractee).
Part of the contract was executed through subcontractors. The sub-contractors
had issued tax invoices to L&T and tax on the same was paid by the respective
sub-contractors. L&T was assessed for the period 1-4-2005 to 31-1-2006 under A.P.
VAT Act. In the returns filed for the above period, L&T had not included the
turnover affected through subcontractors. The Assessing Officer was of the view
that such turnover is includible in the turnover of L&T.


L&T argued that there was no such need in view of particular
provisions of the A P Vat Act and also on the principle of single transaction
theory. In other words, L&T contended that there was direct sale by the
subcontractors to the contractee and hence no turnover of subcontractor was
includible in its turnover. The Assessing Officer held that there was sale by
subcontractor to L&T i.e., to the principal contractor and again by L&T
to the contractee. In view of the above, the Assessing Officer held the turnover
affected through subcontractors as liable to tax in the hands of L&T. L&T filed
writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The High Court held that in view
of the established position by the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of
Builders’ Association of India (73 STC 370), the turnover of subcontractor is
not includible in the turnover of L&T.

Against the above judgment the State of A.P. filed SLP in the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has now decided this issue vide its judgment in
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Others. The
judgment is reported in 2008 VIL 30 SC dated 26-8-2008. The Supreme Court has
dealt with the issue in the light of specific provisions of the A.P. VAT Act and
also the Constitution’s provisions like Article 366(29A)(b).

The Supreme Court observed that there can be two types of
works contracts : one, relating to construction and two, relating to movable
properties like repairs, etc. . . After taking note of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Gannon Dunkarley and Co. (9 STC 353), the Supreme
Court referred to the 46th amendment made to the Constitution by which deemed
sale categories were provided by way of Article 366 (29A). The Supreme Court
also observed that the above amendment to the Constitution has been approved by
the Constitution Bench in the case of Builders’ Association of India (73 STC
370). The Supreme Court also noted the provision in the A.P. Act which provides
for payment of tax on the value of the goods at the time of incorporation of
such goods in the works executed at the rates applicable to the goods
. In
the light of above, the Supreme Court held that the taxable event is transfer of
property in goods involved in the execution of works contract and the said
transfer of property takes place when the goods are incorporated in the works.
The value at such point of time is a taxable value. In view of the above
provision, the Supreme Court observed that the scheme of taxation indicates that
there is a ‘deemed sale’ by the dealer executing the work, i.e., in this
case the subcontractor. The Supreme Court further observed that it is the
sub-contractor only, who affects transfer of property in goods, as no goods
vests in the main contractor, so as to be subject matter of a re-transfer. The
Supreme Court, in fact, observed as under :

“‘By virtue of Article 366 (29A)(b) of the Constitution
once the work is assigned by the contractor (L&T), the only transfer of
property in goods is by the subcontractor(s) who is a registered dealer in
this case and who claims to have paid taxes under the Act on the goods
involved in the execution of the works. Once the work is assigned by L&T to
its subcontractor(s), L&T ceases to execute the works contract in the sense
contemplated by Article 366(29A)(b), because property passes by accretion and
there is no property in goods with the contractor which is capable of a
re-transfer, whether as goods or in some other form.

17. The question which is raised before us is : whether the
turnover of the subcontractors (whose names are also given in the original
writ petition) is to be added to the turnover of L&T. In other words, the
question which we are required to answer is : whether the goods employed by
the subcontractors occur in the form of a single deemed sale or multiple
deemed sales. In our view, the principle of law in this regard is clarified by
this Court in the case of Builders’ Association of India (supra) as
under :

“Ordinarily, unless there is a contract to the contrary, in
case of works contract the property in the goods used in the construction of a
building passes to the owner of the land on which the building is constructed,
when the goods or materials used are incorporated in the building.”


On behalf of the State of A.P. the argument was that there
are two deemed sales i.e., one from subcontractor to main contractor and
the other from main contractor to contractee. It was emphasised that contractee
has no privity of contract with the sub-contractor, hence it cannot be a single
transaction. On the above line of argument, the Supreme Court observed as
under :


“19. If one keeps in mind the above-quoted observation of this Court in the case of Builders’ Association of India (supra), the position becomes clear, namely, that even if there is no privity of contract between the contractee and the subcontractor, that would not do away with the principle of transfer of property by the subcontractor by employing the same on the property belonging to the contractee. This reasoning is based on the principle of accretion of property in goods. It is subject to the contract to the contrary. Thus, in our view, in such a case, the work executed by a sub-contractor results in a single transaction and not as multiple transactions. This reasoning is also borne out by S. 4(7) which refers to value of goods at the time of incorporation in the works executed. In our view, if the argument of the Department is to be accepted, it would result in plurality of deemed sales which would be contrary to Article 366(29A) (b) of the Constitution as held by the impugned judgment of the High Court. Moreover, it mayresult in double taxation which may make the said 2005 Act vulnerable to challenge as violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 265 of the Constitution of India as held by the High Court in its impugned judgment.”

Thus, it can be said that the legal position which emerges at present is that in relation to construction activity, even though the subcontractors are involved, still there cannot be multiple transactions. The taxation will be only once. The Supreme Court has not dealt with the issue about such transactions in relation to moveable properties. It also appears that in relation to construction activity if there is anything contrary to the above understanding, then the position may be different. This is evident from observations in para 19 reproduced above. It may also be worth noting that in relation to similar construction activity, in case of L&T only, the Karnataka High Court has taken a different view while dealing with levy of turnover tax under the erstwhile Karnataka Sales TaxAct and it is held that there are multi-point transactions, one from subcontractor to main contractor and the other from main contractor to contractee. This judgment is reported in 16 VST 616. However, the judgment is dated 3-2-2006, that is prior to the above Supreme Court judgment. In view of this latest judgment of the Supreme Court, the controversy should be laid to rest.

Recent amendment – Scope of E-filing of returns expanded:
The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, has issued Notification under Rule 17(5)(a) of the MVAT Rules, 2005 dated 30-8-2008. By this Notification the scope of E filing of returns has been expanded. Hitherto, dealers having tax liability exceeding Rs.I0 lakhs or refund exceeding Rs.l crore in the previous year (i.e., liable to file monthly returns) were liable to file E-returns. Now dealers having tax liability exceeding Rs.l lakh or refund exceeding Rs.I0 lakhs in the previous year are also made liable to file E-returns. In other words, in addition to dealers filing monthly returns, dealers filing quarterly returns are also now required to file E-returns. This position applies from the quarter starting 1st July, 2008. Therefore, for the quarter ending 30th September, 2008 and onwards, dealers covered by provisions of quarterly returns, will be required to file their returns by way of E-returns. Dealers filing monthly returns will continue to file E-returns, as earlier.

[2012] 137 ITD 163 (Panaji) DCIT vs. Jayalakshmi Mahila Vividodeshagala Souharda Sahakari Ltd. AY 2007-08 to 2009-10 Dated: 30th March, 2012

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Section 80P and section 5(b), 5(cci) and 5(ccv) of Banking Regulation Act,1959–assessee society engaged in business of providing credit facilities to its members and collecting deposits–section 80P was amended w.e.f. 01-04-2007 and hence AO denied deduction as assessee was a co-operative bank– Held that principal business of assessee was not to accept deposits from the public for the purpose of lending or investment—hence, principal business was not banking business–assessee society entitled to deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i).

Facts:
The assessee-society was engaged in business of providing credit facilities to its members by granting loans for various purposes. It also collected deposits. It availed deduction u/s. 80P. However, section 80P was amended w.e.f. 01-04-2007 whereby s/s. (4) was introduced which denied the deduction u/s. 80P to co-operative banks (other than primary agricultural credit society or a primary rural development bank). The AO denied deduction to assessee holding assessee as being a co-operative bank. The CIT(A) allowed deduction to assessee.

Held:
As per explanation to s/s. (4) of 80P, co-operative bank as defined in section 5(cci) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1959 means a state co-operative bank, a central co-operative bank and a primary cooperative bank. Assessee is not a state or central co-operative bank. The primary co-operative bank as defined in section 5(ccv) means a co-operative society (other than agricultural credit society) (1) the primary object or principal business of which is transaction of banking business, (2) the paid-up share capital and reserves of which are not less than one lakh of rupees and (3) the bye-laws of which do not permit admission of any other co-operative society as a member. The conditions No. (2) and (3) are applicable to assessee.

Banking business as defined u/s. 5(b) means the accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise.

Going through the aims and objects of the assessee society, it is observed that none of the aims and objects allows the assessee to accept deposits of money from the public for the purpose of lending or investment. The assessee is therefore held as not to be a primary co-operative bank and in consequence thereof, it cannot be a co-operative bank as defined in the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Thus the assessee is entitled to deduction u/s. 80P.

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[2012] 138 ITD 278 (Pune) Ramsukh Properties vs. DCIT A.Y. 2007-08 Dated: 25th July, 2012

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Assessee entitled to benefit u/s. 80(IB)(10) in respect of partially complete housing project if project could not be completed in specified time for reasons beyond its control.

Facts:
The assessee was a firm engaged in the business of builders and promoters. Its housing project consisted of six buildings having 205 flats. The housing project was not fully completed in time as specified under 80(IB)(10)(a) and hence it received completion certificate for 173 flats only. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of all the 205 flats as the project has been substantially completed and as such the completion certificate was obtained. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee for granting whole deduction in respect of whole project as well as alternative claim with regard to the proportionate deduction on the ground that the project was not completed within the stipulated period of time. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the action of the Assessing Officer.

Held:
Out of 205 flats, completion certificate was obtained and furnished before the AO for 173 flats only. The request for granting whole deduction in respect of whole project has rightly been rejected because deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) could not be granted to assessee on incomplete construction at relevant point of time. However, the fault of noncompletion of construction was not attributable to assessee. In case such a contingency emerges which makes the compliance with provisions of section 80- IB(10) impossible, then benefit bestowed on an assessee cannot be completely denied. Such liberal interpretation should be used in favour of assessee when he is incapacitated in completing a project in time for reasons beyond his control. The phrase “completion” is a relative and not absolute term. Accordingly, even part completion must be construed as completion. The provisions of taxing statute should be construed harmoniously with the object of statue to effectuate the legislative intention.

Hence, it was held that the assessee is entitled for benefit u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act in respect of 173 flats completed before prescribed limit.

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Bad debts: Deduction u/s. 36(1)(vii): A. Y. 2004- 05: Where books of account are not closed and not signed by Board of Directors and not adopted by shareholders as per Companies Act, it is legally permissible to make adjustments before they are finally adopted: Where accounts of assessee were open and subject to correction by auditors, bad debts could be written off even after closure of accounting period, as there is neither any condition nor any provision u/s. 36(1)(vii), that writing off of

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CIT vs. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd.; [2013] 36 taxmann.com 96 (All):

For the A. Y. 2004-05, the assessee’s claim for deduction of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the decision to write off bad debt was not taken in the relevant previous year. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following questions were raised before the High Court:

“i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that assessee can keep his accounts open for an indefinite period and pass an entry at a later stage even after 12 months from the closure of the accounting period?

ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the claim of bad debts of the assessee on the ground that it has been written off in the accounts of the relevant previous year while failing to appreciate that decision to write off bad debt was not taken in the relevant previous year and the same were actually not done in the previous year by 31st March?”

The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) On perusal of the provisions, it reveals that the only requirement for allowing the bad debt u/s. 36 (1) (vii) of the Income-tax Act, is that any bad debt or part thereof is written off as irrecoverable and secondly, they should be written off in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year. In the instant appeal, neither the department nor the assessee disputes that the debt had become bad and it was written off.

ii) The prescription as provided is to write off bad debt by the assessee in the accounts ‘for the previous year’, but it does not say to write off bad debt ‘in the previous year’. Thus, there is a vast difference if the word ‘in’ would have been there in place of ‘for’. Further, the words ‘accounts of the assessee’ are qualified with further words ‘for the previous year’. Thus, it only means that the accounts in which the Act of writing off is to be done by the assessee should be for the previous year. Therefore, the law requires to write off the bad debt in the accounts of the assessee in the relevant accounting year. There is neither any condition nor any provision that the writing off should be done in the previous year, i.e. before end of the financial year.

iii) In the present case, debts relating to the period 1987-88 and 1998-99 claimed in the accounts which were prepared up to 31-03-2004 and as the accounts of the assessee are open and subject to corrections by the Auditors, as per the Companies Act, then such writing off can be done in those account books. No new legal proposition has been brought to our notice for treating the debt as bad or irrecoverable should be taken in the previous year itself. In other words, where account books are not closed and not signed by the Board of Directors and not adopted by the shareholders as per the Companies Act, it is legally permissible to make adjustments before they are finally adopted.

iv) Further, it is admitted that the original return, on the basis of unaudited accounts, was filed on 01-11-2004. After audit had taken place and report of the Auditors was accepted, revised return was filed on 18-08-2005 and it is only in the revised return, the debts to the tune of Rs. 2 crore and odd had been declared as bad. The ground taken by the Assessing Authority and Appellate Authority for not accepting the said bad debts during the assessment year under consideration, i.e. 2004-05 is contrary to the provisions of section 36 (1) (vii) of the Income-tax Act, and further in view of the interpretation as stated here-in-above. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly allowed the appeal of the assessee.

v) In view of above, the questions are answered in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and is in favour of the assessee.”

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Appellate Tribunal: Power and scope: Section 80-IA: A. Ys. 2002-03 to 2008-09: CIT(A) holding rental income from towers constructed in industrial park was business income and eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA: Revenue not challenging this finding before Tribunal: Tribunal cannot pass remand order for further enquiry on issue of character of receipt:

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R. R. Industries Ltd. vs. ITO; 356 ITR 97 (Mad):

The assessee constructed towers in the industrial park and let them out to software concerns providing a platform with plug and play infrastructure. It claimed deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the rental income as business income. The Assessing Officer assessed the income as income from house property and disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IA. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had complied with section 80-IA(4)(iii) and accordingly was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA. He held that the income received by the assessee was to be assessed as income from business. He also agreed in principle that the deduction u/s. 80-IA would be allowed, even if the rental income was assessed as income from house property.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue challenged the view of the Commissioner (Appeals) only on his holding the income derived from letting out of industrial park buildings as income from business as against the finding made by the Assessing Officer that it was to be treated as income from house property. No question was raised on the view of the Commissioner (Appeals) that irrespective of the character of the receipt, the deduction was available. On considering the nature of the receipt, the Tribunal agreed with the submission of the assessee that income derived by developing and operating or maintaining an industrial park was assessable under the head “profits and gains of business and profession” as could be inferred from the provisions of section 80-IA(4)(iii) of the Act. The Tribunal held that the assessee as well as the Revenue had not brought out any materials to show that the facilities developed by the assessee after completion of the development was treated as an industrial park by any authority and it was not clear whether the alleged industrial park was so notified by the Central Government or not. In the absence of any material to show that what was predominant in the letting out in the building and whether the facilities were incidental, the Tribunal viewed that it was necessary to restore the issue back to the Assessing Officer for proper verification.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) When the Revenue had accepted the view of the Commissioner (Appeals) on section 80-IA that the assessee had complied with section 80-IA(4)(iii), nothing remained for an enquiry either as to the nature of the receipt or for that matter the facilities developed to be treated as an industrial park to consider the question of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4)(iii).

ii) The view of the Commissioner (Appeal) in this regard did not call for any interference. The Revenue did not challenge the order of the Commissioner on the section 80-IA deduction before the Tribunal.

iii) Thus, when the character of the receipt was not a question to be gone into in the matter of considering the claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4)(iii), no useful purpose would be served for the Revenue to again insist on a decision on the character of the receipt.

iv) The order of the Tribunal was set aside and the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.”

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Motor Accident–Compensation on account of death–In law the presumption is that the employer at the time of payment of salary deducts income tax on the estimated income of the deceased employee from the salary and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary the salary as shown in the last pay certificate should be accepted for calculating the compensation payable to the dependent(s).

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Vimal Kanwar And Ors. vs. Kishore Dan And Ors. [2013] 354 ITR 95 (SC)

On 14th September, 1996, one Mr. Sajjan Singh Shekhawat, Assistant Engineer with the Public Works Department, was sitting on his scooter which was parked on the side of the road and was waiting for one Junior Engineer, N. Hari Babu, and another whom he had called for discussion. At that time, a driver of a Jeep No. RJ10C0833 came driving from the railway station side with high speed, recklessly and negligently and hit the scooter. Sajjan Singh along with his scooter came under the jeep and was dragged with the vehicle. Due to this accident, fatal injuries were caused to him and on reaching the hospital he expired. The scooter was also damaged completely. The wife of the deceased was aged about 24 years; the daughter was aged about 2 years and the mother was aged about 55 years at the time of death of the deceased. They jointly filed an application to the Tribunal alleging that negligent and rash driving by the driver of the jeep caused the death of Sajjan Singh and claimed compensation of Rs. 80,40,160.

The Tribunal determined the compensation to be granted in favour of the appellants at Rs. 14,93,700 jointly.

Though the High Court noticed certain mistakes in determination of the compensation it upheld the same. In determining the compensation, a notional deduction of income tax was made by the High Court from the salary of the deceased apart from the deduction of annual pension and came to the conclusion that the award passed by the Tribunal was just and proper.

Before the Supreme Court, the grievance of the appellants was as follows:

(i) No amount can be deducted towards provident fund, pension and insurance amount from the actual salary of the victim for calculating compensation.

(ii) In the absence of any evidence, the court suo motu cannot deduct any amount towards income tax from the actual salary of the victim.

(iii) On the facts of the present case, the Tribunal and the High Court should have doubled the salary by allowing 100% increase towards the future prospects, and

(iv) The Tribunal and the High Court failed to ensure payment of just and fair compensation.

The first issue therefore was “whether provident fund, pension and insurance receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantages’ liable for deduction”. The Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid issue fell for consideration before it in Mrs. Helen C. Rebello vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation reported [1999] 1 SCC 90. In the said case, it was held that provident fund, pension, insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc., are all “pecuniary advantages” receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statue occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction.

The second issue was “whether the salary receivable by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction”. The Supreme Court held that “Compassionate appointment” can be one of the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. In case the employee dies in harness, i.e., while in service leaving behind the dependents, one of the dependents may request for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of the deceased employee died in harness. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death and has no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointment may have nexus with the death of an employee while in service but it is not necessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. An employee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain the family of the deceased one of the dependents may be entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot be termed as “pecuniary advantage” that comes under the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on such appointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

The third issue was “whether the income tax is liable to be deducted for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act”. The Supreme Court observed that in the case of Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121, it was held that “generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation”. It was further observed that “where the annual income is in taxable range, the words “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less tax”.

The Supreme Court noticed that in the present case, none of the respondents brought to the notice of the court that the income tax payable by the deceased Sajjan Singh was not deducted at source by the employer State Government. No such statement was made by Ram Avtar Parikh, an employee of the Public Works Department of the State Government who placed on record the last pay certificate and the service book of the deceased. The Tribunal or the High Court on perusal of the last pay certificate, did not notice that the income tax on the estimated income of the employee was not deducted from the salary of the employee during the said month or financial year. In the absence of such evidence, it was to be presumed that the salary paid to the deceased Sajjan Singh as per the last pay certificate was paid in accordance with law, i.e., by deducting the income tax on the estimated income of the deceased Sajjan Singh for that month or the financial year. The appellants had specifically stated that assessment year applicable in the instant case was 1997-98 and not 1996-97 as held by the High Court. They had also taken specific plea that for the assessment year 1997-98 the rate of tax on income more than Rs.40,000 and up to Rs.60,000 was 15% and not 20% as held by the High Court. The aforesaid fact was not disputed by the respondents. In view of the finding as recorded above and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as discussed, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in deducting 20% from the salary of the deceased towards income tax for calculating the compensation. As per law, the presumption would be that the employer State Government at the time of payment of salary deducted income-tax on the estimated income of the deceased employee from the salary and in the absence of any evidence, the Supreme Court held that the salary as shown in the last pay certificate at Rs. 8,920 should be accepted which if rounded of came to Rs. 9,000 for calculating the compensation payable to the dependent(s).

The fourth issue was “whether the compensation awarded to the appellants was just and proper”. According to the Supreme Court for determination of this issue, it was required to determine the percentage of increase in income to be made towards prospects of advancement in future career and revision of pay.

According to the Supreme Court, admittedly, the date of birth of the deceased Sajjan Singh being 1st February, 1968; the submission that he would have continued in service upto 1st February, 2026, if 58 years is the age of retirement or 1st February, 2028, if 60 years is the age of retirement required to be accepted. The Supreme Court observed that he was only 28 years 7½ months old at the time of death. In normal course, he would have served the State Government minimum for about 30 years. Even if one does not take into consideration the future prospect of promotion which the deceased was otherwise entitled and the actual pay revisions taken effect from 1st January, 1996, and 1st January, 2006, it cannot be denied that the pay of the deceased would have doubled if he would have continued in the services of the State till the date of retirement. Hence, this was a fit case in which 100% increase in the future income of the deceased should have been allowed by the Tribunal and the High Court which they failed to do. The Supreme Court having regard to the facts and evidence on record, estimated the monthly income of the deceased Sajjan Singh at Rs. 9,000 x 2 = Rs. 18,000 per month. From this his personal living expenses, which should be one-third, there being three dependents, were deducted. Thereby, the ‘actual salary’ came to Rs. (18,000-6,000=12,000) per month or Rs. 12,000 x 12 = 1,44,000 per annum. As the deceased was 28½ years old at the time of death the multiplier of 17 was applied, which was appropriate to the age of the deceased. The normal compensation would then work out to be Rs. 1,44,000 x 17 = Rs. 24,48,000 to which the Supreme Court added the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the estate by providing a conventional sum of R. 1,00,000; loss of love and affection for the daughter Rs. 2,00,000; loss of love and affection for the widow and the mother at Rs. 1,00,000 each, i.e., Rs. 2,00,000 and funeral expenses of Rs. 25,000.

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, in all a sum of Rs. 29,73,000 was a fair, just and reasonable award in the circumstances of this case. The rate of interest of 12% was allowed from the date of the petition filed before the Tribunal till payment is made.

Disallowance of an expenditure ‘Payable’ u/s. 40(a)(ia)

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Issue for Consideration
Section 40(a)(ia) is placed in Chapter IV D that deals with computation of profits and gains of business or profession. The said section lists out various expenditures that are not deductible in computing such profits and gains notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 30 to 38.

The part, relevant for the discussion of the issue under consideration here, reads as under:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38, the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession” –

(a) In the case of any assessee

(i) —————–

(ia)any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid, on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139:

Provided …………………………………………………..
Provided  further ………………………………………
Explanation: …………………………………………….

On an apparent reading of the provision, it appears that an expenditure of the nature specified in the section, payable to a resident, shall not be allowed to be deducted where tax is deductible at source but has not been paid.

Since its introduction by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. assessment year 2005-06, this provision has been the subject matter of one or more controversies, some of them grave, including the challenge to the constitutionality of the provisions. The resistance of the taxpayers attracts sympathy on account of the fact that the provisions are very harsh as they call for disallowance of a genuine business expenditure, in its entirety, simply on account of non-deduction or non-payment of a miniscule amount. This torturous treatment attracts fierce opposition from the taxpayers and provides a breeding ground for an endless spate of litigation involving innovative contentions.

One such proposition, that found favour with the tribunal, is that the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) be restricted to the amount that remained unpaid or payable at the end of the year on which tax is not deducted or is deducted but has not been deposited with the Government. The tribunal based its finding on the use of the term ‘payable’ in section 40(a)(ia) to hold that the said term conveyed that the expenditure that is ‘ paid’ during the year is not disallowable even where the tax is not deducted or is not deposited after deduction. In short, the disallowance is to be restricted to the expenditure that is ‘payable’ and is not to be extended to cover an expenditure that has been ‘paid’.

The Special Bench of the tribunal in Merilyn Shipping & Transports vs. Addl. CIT, 136 ITD 23 (Vishakhapatnam) accepted this line of thinking by holding that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable in respect of such expenditure, the payment for which was made during the year without deducting tax at source. It held that the disallowance was possible only in respect of such expenditure, the payment for which was outstanding at the end of the year.

This decision of the special bench has subsequently been expressly overruled by two decisions of the Calcutta High Court and also by a decision of the Gujarat High Court. In contrast, the Allahabad High Court recently noted that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) applied only to such expenditure, the payment for which had remained outstanding at the year end. In the meanwhile, the operation of this decision of the special bench was put under an interim suspension by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. However, it is believed that the operation of such suspension was limited to Merilyn Shipping & Transports or at the most to the assesses in the state of Andhra Pradesh.

Any issue concerning section 40(a)(ia) assumes importance, as the said provision seeks to disallow a genuine business expenditure, for non-deduction or payment of an insignificant amount of tax.

2. Crescent Export Syndicate’s case

The issue arose before the Calcutta High Court, for the first time, in the case of CIT vs. Crescent Export Syndicate, 33 taxmann.com 250. In this case, the court was concerned with two appeals involving a common issue. In both the cases, the tribunal, relying on the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports, deleted the disallowance by the AO by holding that:

“If all the amounts have been paid, then obviously following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports, no addition shall be made. If any amount is found to be payable as on the year end, then the Assessing Officer shall give the assessee adequate opportunity to substantiate his case as to why the disallowance, if any, should not be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(1) (ia) of the Act”.

“As the issue claimed by the assessee is that there is nothing payable as on 31-03-2006 and this expenditure of Rs. 1,08,80,559/- is paid during the year and nothing remains payable, it means that the issue is covered. Principally, we have agreement with the assessee’s counsel and are of the view that the issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee. Principally, we allow this issue of the assessee but subject to the verification by AO that these expenses are paid within the year i.e., up to 31-03-2006 and nothing remains payable. Hence, this appeal of assessee in principle is allowed in favour of the assessee but subject to verification.”

The revenue filed appeals in both the matters requesting the Calcutta High Court to set aside the orders of the tribunal.

On behalf of the assessee, the following important contentions were placed for the consideration of the court;

• The Legislature has replaced the words “amounts credited or paid” used in the Finance Bill with the word “payable” in the final enactment. The change clearly conveyed the legislative intent of restricting the scope of the disallowance to the amounts ‘payable’ by excluding those amounts that were ‘paid’ during the year.

• Such change was not without any purpose. By changing the words from “credited or paid” to “payable”, the legislative intent has been made clear that only the outstanding amount or the provision for expense liable for TDS was sought to be disallowed in the event there was a default of TDS. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of CIT vs. Kelvinator of India, 320 ITR 561 wherein the court, in the context of section 147, examined the implications of the deletion of the word ‘opinion’ used in the Finance Bill with the words “reason to believe” on enactment of the Bill, on receipt of representations against the omission of the words “reason to believe”,

• A construction which required, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which resulted in rejection of words, had to be avoided, unless it was covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity. In the present provision of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act, there was no such exception and the only word used by the legislature was “payable”.

•    The legislative intent had been made clear by consciously replacing the words “credited or paid” with “payable”, that only the outstanding amount or the provision for expenses were liable for TDS were to be disallowed in the event there was default in not following the TDS provisions under Chapter XVII-B of the Act.

•    Sections 194 L and 194 LA provided that tax was to be deducted only at the time of payment. The language in these sections therefore showed that the legislature, where desired, had used different language in different sections.

•    Reference was made, for explaining the scope and effect of section 40(a)(ia), to the circular No.5 of 2005, dated 15th July, 2005, issued by the CBDT to show that the intention to introduce the provision was to curb bogus payments by creating bogus liability.

•    Section 40(a)(ia) created a legal fiction for the amounts outstanding or remained payable i.e. at the end of every year as on 31st March and such fiction could not be extended for taxing the amounts already paid.

•    Section 201 took care of tax to be collected in the hands of the payee and other TDS provisions under

Chapter XVIIB of the Act. No further legal fiction from elsewhere in the statute could be borrowed to extend the field of section 40(a)(ia) for disallowing the genuine and reasonable expenditure on the amounts of expenditure already paid.

•    That there might be two possible constructions. However, the construction that the word ‘payable’ was interchangeable with the word ‘paid’ made the position of the assessee, who had already paid his dues, without deducting tax, worse than the assessee who had not as yet paid his dues. In the case of the assessees, who had paid the dues without deduction of tax, disallowance of the expenditure was permanent and they had no means of deducting the tax later on relatable to the amount already paid in the earlier year and thus the relief contemplated by the proviso could never be availed by them.

•    While the income in the hands of the recipient was taxed, the payer did not get the benefit thereof. A second proviso to clause (ia), effective from 1st April, 2013, was enacted to lessen the rigour of clause (ia).

The Calcutta High Court, on hearing the rival contentions, observed and held as under:

•    The main thrust of the majority view, in the decision of the special bench, was based on the fact that the legislature had replaced the expression “amounts credited or paid” with the expression “payable” in the final enactment.

•    The tribunal fell into an error in not realising that a comparison between the pre-amendment and post-amendment law was permissible for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied or the object sought to be achieved by an amendment which precisely was what was done by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Kel-vinator of India Ltd. 187 Taxman 312. But the same comparison between the draft and the enacted law was not permissible. Nor could the draft or the bill be used for the purpose of regulating the meaning and purport of the enacted law. It was the finally enacted law which was the will of the legislature.

•    The tribunal once having held “that where the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used”, then it was not open to seek to interpret the section on the basis of any comparison between the draft and the section actually enacted nor was it open to speculate as to the effect of the so-called representations made by the professional bodies.

•    The tribunal having held that “Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act created a legal fiction by virtue of which even the genuine and admissible expenses claimed by an assessee under the head ‘income from business and profession,’ if the assessee does not deduct TDS on such expenses, are disallowed”, was it open to the tribunal to seek to justify that by stating that “this fiction cannot be extended any further and, therefore, cannot be invoked by Assessing Officer to disallow the genuine and reasonable expenditure or the amounts of expenditure already paid”? Did that not amount to deliberately reading something in the law which was not there?

•    The tribunal sought to remove the rigour of the law by holding that the disallowance should be restricted to the money which was yet to be paid. What the Tribunal by majority did was to supply the casus omissus which was not permissible and could only have been done by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case as was done in the case of Bhuwalka Steel Industries vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board , 2 SCC 273.

The Calcutta High Court thereafter endeavoured to show that no other interpretation was possible in the following words:

•    The key words used in section 40(a)(ia), according to the court, were “on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII –B”. If the question was “which expenses are sought to be disallowed?”, the answer was bound to be “those expenses on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII –B”.

Once that was realised, nothing turned on the basis of the fact that the legislature used the word ‘payable’ and not ‘paid or credited’. Unless any amount was payable, it could neither be paid nor credited. If an amount had neither been paid nor credited, there could be no occasion for claiming any deduction.

•    The language used in the draft was unclear and susceptible to giving more than one meaning. By looking at the draft it could be said that the legislature wanted to treat the payments made or credited in favour of a contractor or sub-contractor differently than the payments on account of interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or fees for technical services because the words “amounts credited or paid” were used only in relation to a contractor or sub-contractor. This differential treatment was not intended. Therefore, the legislature provided that the amounts, on which tax was deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B, payable on account of interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services or to a contractor or sub-contractor should not be deducted in computing the income of an assessee in case he had not deduced, or after deduction had not paid, within the specified time. The language used by the legislature in the finally enacted law was clear and unambiguous whereas the language used in the bill was ambiguous.

•    There could be no denial that the provision in question was harsh. But that was no ground to read the same in a manner which was not intended by the legislature. The law was deliberately made harsh to secure compliance of the provisions requiring deductions of tax at source. It was not the case of an inadvertent error. The suggestion that the second proviso inserted to be made effective from

1st April, 2013 should be held to have retrospective effect, could also not be acceded to for the same reason indicated above.

For the reasons discussed above, the court held that the majority views expressed in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports were not acceptable and the appeal was allowed in favour of the revenue.

3.    Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd.’s case

The issue again came up for consideration of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. in ITA No. 122 0f 2013, copy available on www. itatonline.org.

The assessee, a shipping service company, engaged the services of another company for ship management work, on its behalf, for which it paid an amount of Rs. 1.17 crore, without deduction of tax at source, on the ground that the said payment represented the reimbursement of expenses incurred by the service provider. The AO disagreed with the view of the assessee company and disallowed the entire payment u/s 40(a)(ia).

On appeal against the order of the AO, the CIT (A) held that “In the light of the above facts ——————– , when such type of expenses incurred by the appellant were totally paid and not remained payable as at the end of the relevant accounting period, provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are not applicable ………………………………. it is held that the AO was not justified in making addition of Rs.1,17,68,621/- on account of disallowance made under section 40 (a) (ia) of the I.T. Act, 1961. The same is directed to be deleted. Grounds Nos. 2 & 3 are allowed.”

The Tribunal, besides upholding the assessee’s claim that no tax was required to be deducted on a reimbursement, held that section 40(a)(ia) applied only to amounts that were “payable” as at the end of the year and not to amounts that had already been “paid” during the year relying on the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Merilyn Shipping and Transport Ltd 136 ITD 23 (SB) where a similar view was taken.

On appeal by the Income-tax Department, the Allahabad High Court was asked to answer the following:

“(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble ITAT has rightly confirmed the order of the CIT (A) and thereby deleting the disallowance of Rs. 1,17,68,621/- made by the Assessing Officer under section 40(a)(ia) of the I.T. Act, 1961 by ignoring the fact that the company M/s Mercator Lines Ltd. had performed ship management work on behalf of the assessee M/s Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. and there was a Memorandum of Understanding signed between both the companies and as per the definition of memorandum of understanding, it included contract also.”

The Allahabad High Court, vide an order dated 09-07-2013, observed that the Revenue could not take any benefit from the observations made by the Special Bench of the tribunal in the case of Merilyn Shipping and Transport Ltd. to the effect that section 40 (a) (ia) was introduced in the Act with a view to augment the revenue through the mechanism of tax deduction at source and the provision was brought on statute to disallow the claim of even genuine and admissible expenses under the head ‘Income from Business and Profession’ in case the assessee did not deduct tax on such expenses and that the default in deduction of tax would result in disallowance of expenditure.

The court, importantly, in the context, noted that for disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that tax had not been deducted, the amount should be payable and not which had been paid by the end of the year.

4.    Observations

Clarity breeds confusion. The Special Bench of the tribunal in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports, 136 ITD 23 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam) held that the language of section 40(a)(ia) was clear and the Calcutta High Court in Crescent Exports Syndicate’s case (supra) also held that the language was clear and unambiguous, to arrive at the conflicting decisions. Now, if the language is clear how could there have been different and importantly diverse views on the meaning of the word ‘payable’? Either one of the views is wrong or there is a genuine possibility of two views on the issue under consideration. We would prefer the latter view to hold that the term ‘payable’, when read in the context and in the background of the circumstances that surrounded its use and also the subsequent insertion of the second proviso for granting relief on payment of tax by the payee, is capable of conveying two views, both of which are possible. Needless to say that when two views are possible, a view beneficial to the taxpayer should be adopted, Vegetable Products 88 ITR 192 (SC). There are no two views on this aspect of the law of interpretation.

The Calcutta High Court’s observations on the legislative intent, if there ever was one, are interesting and so are its observations bordering on the strictures when it held that the language of the law was clear and the tribunal was wrong in gathering the legislative intent. Having said so, the court itself tried to support what in its view was clear with deductive logic supported by analytical tools to provide a harmonious interpretation. No harmony is required to be infused where the language is clear. With utmost respect, it appears that the time is ripe to altogether give up on using the tool of legislative intent as an aid to interpretation. A grave notice is required to be taken of the fact that most of these legislations are passed without any debate and even understanding of the law and it may be that the persons voting in favour of passing the legislation may not even be aware of the subject matter of the vote and of the fact that such a law is being passed with their votes. There is a strong case for the courts, in the present times, to be in tune with the times and supply such interpretation which is just and harmonious and more importantly the one that identifies with common sense.

The situation has the effect of putting the tribunal in an unenviable situation. The conflicting decisions of the High Courts have once again paved the pathway for a fresh consideration of the subject by the tribunal. Usually in such cases, the tribunal charts its own course and is allowed to do so. However, the interesting part is that in the case under consideration, there already is a special bench view, not in one case but in two cases. Merilyn Shipping & Transports, 136 ITD 23 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam) and reiterated in Rajamahendri Shipping & Oilfields Pvt. Ltd. 19 ITR(T) 616 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam). Can a division bench of the tribunal ignore the decision of the special bench to take a view contrary to what has been laid down by a special bench? While the benches of the tribunal functioning within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts shall follow the judgments in favour of the revenue, it will be most apt for the benches in other jurisdictions to take note of the controversy and decide the case in favour of the taxpayer by following the beaten track that requires the adoption of the view that is favourable to him, applying the principle of interpretation that requires favouring the taxpayer in cases of doubt.

A view is being expressed that the decision in Vector Shipping’s case cannot be considered to be laying any law on the subject of allowability of an expenditure where no tax is deducted, once it is shown that the payment for such an expenditure is made during the year, as was held by the special bench. It is contended by the holders of this view that the question put up for consideration of the court was primarily concerned with the liability of the assessee to deduct tax at source and the court confirmed the tribunal’s findings that the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source and refused to admit the appeal of the revenue on the ground that no question of law was involved.

Under this view, the observations of the Allahabad High Court should be treated as the obiter dicta and not a binding decision. At this point, it is apt to reproduce the exact words of the Allahabad High Court, to the extent relevant, which read as “It is to be noted that for disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that TDS has not been deducted, the amount should be payable and not which has been paid by the end of the year.” These words are not words that can be taken lightly by anyone seriously dealing with the interpretation of law by consigning it to the status of irrelevant observations made out of context. The court in that case has taken a detailed notice of the order of the CIT(A) and of the tribunal, both of which directly and expressly dealt with the issue of the meaning of the term ‘payable’. In fact, the issue of liability to TDS was an issue of lesser importance to the appellate authorities and perhaps to the AO, as well. The only other thing the court noted in the order, was also about addressing the argument of the revenue to the effect that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) should be read in a manner so as to advance the case of recovery of tax. The court strongly rejected any such contention which was directly surrounding the interpretation of the word ‘payable’. These facts clearly confirmed that the issue under consideration here was duly addressed by the court in the said case, as well.

We are fully conscious that, in the times when the courts and the tribunals are more in favour of deciding an issue by following a decision of the higher court, on an application of the law of precedent, it may be difficult for a taxpayer to persuade a tribunal not to follow the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts’ comprehensive decisions and to consider the case on merits independently. This is evident in the decision of the Tribunal in Rishti Stock & Shares Pvt. Ltd.‘s case decided by the Mumbai tribunal on 02-08-2013 in CO No. 263/M/2012 arising out of the appeal ITA 112/M/2012, where the Tribunal preferred to follow the Calcutta and Gujarat High Court decisions.

The Calcutta High Court, in Crescent Export Syndicate’s case, delivered its judgment on 03-04-2013 and followed it up in yet another decision delivered on 04-04-2013 in CIT vs. Md. Javed Hossein Mondal, 33 taxmann.com 123. The Gujarat High Court examined the issue in CIT vs. Sikandarkhan N. Tunwar, 295 CTR 75 and vide an order dated 02-05-2013 decided the issue in favour of the revenue independent of the aforesaid two decisions of the Calcutta High Court. The Allahabad High Court in Vector Shipping’s case delivered the decision on 09-07-2013, once again independent of the aforesaid three decisions. Before all this, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had stayed the operation of the Special Bench’s decision in Merilyn Shipping‘s case. Maybe the benefit of ‘2G speed’ was not available to the Department’s counsel in Vector Shipping’s case .

The decision of the Calcutta High Court, like the decision of the special bench, is an erudite decision that has comprehensively analysed the different aspects touching the issue. In comparison, the decision of the Allahabad High Court does not reveal in detail the basis that led it to hold that no disallowance was to be made of an expenditure, the payment of which was made before the year-end without deducting tax at source. The court in that case has confirmed the findings of the tribunal that the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source on such payments. This however cannot be construed to mean that the court had not applied its mind to the law on the subject or that it had not taken a conscious note of the issue at hand. To distinguish and ignore the express observa-tions and findings on law of a High Court under the pretext that it does not represent the verdict of the court is not a very attractive proposition to any serious student of law. Such a decision deserves equal respect, more so when the reading of the contents confirms that the only issue that was discussed was about the interpretation of section. 40(a)(ia), as otherwise the court concurred with the finding of the fact of the tribunal that the tax was not deductible in the case before it .

The position on the issue under consideration has assumed significance with the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Vector Shipping’s case which has restored the issue for a fresh consideration. The issue should be taken as one that is wide open till such time as it is addressed by the apex court of the land. The Supreme Court has recently allowed the transfer of case for examining the constitutional validity of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). Please see Maruthi Tubes (P) Ltd., 37 taxmann.com 31.

Accounting and Auditing Professional – Introspect and Act!

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When this issue reaches the hands of readers, most of my professional colleagues would have completed one of the most onerous tasks of the year, that is of issuing a tax audit report. Every year, a month before the due date, there is a clamour for an extension and this year was no different. It is true that for this year, the problem was compounded by the government requiring the tax audit report to be uploaded in electronic format and an increment in the details to be furnished in the income tax return. An extension for uploading the tax audit form has been granted, but my colleagues term the concession as inadequate. This is for the reason that in a majority of the cases, the compiling of the data that is required for income tax return as well as the tax audit report has always been treated by the client /auditee as the responsibility of the tax auditor.

The problems created and the tension that my professional colleagues face is primarily on account of the fact that the division of roles and responsibilities between the client and auditor have not been understood and appreciated by both. Clients have always taken the view that compliance is the responsibility of the auditor. This attitude is prevalent amongst the small entities to large multinationals, with only the degree varying. Apart from clients, lawmakers and regulators have also started shifting the onus of verification of compliance with the provisions to Chartered Accountants. The profession has welcomed these moves as professional opportunities. The fact that this entails an additional responsibility is lost sight of. The role and responsibility of the client in this compliance process is also not emphasised and he is not educated about this aspect. Over the years, Chartered Accountants have accepted this position, without appreciating whether they are equipped to perform the tasks that they would be required to, and whether the remuneration is commensurate.

To appreciate the actual problem faced by professionals, one must understand the overall scene. As explained in the earlier paragraphs, the responsibilities on the auditor are continuously increasing. To illustrate, the Income-tax Act alone has 46 provisions which require either an audit or certification by a Chartered Accountant. The Companies Act and State laws would add to this list. In fact, the responsibilities the Companies Act, 2013, imposes on an auditor are so onerous that senior professionals believe that new entrants to the profession would be discouraged from joining it. These are the challenges at the micro level.

At the macro level, one wonders if this is going to be the scenario for Chartered Accountants, in practice, is there an adequate number of Chartered Accountants available and have they been suitably equipped. In the year 2000, the number of Chartered Accountants in the country was 92,960 and those holding certificates, numbered 65,843 constituting 71% of the total membership. In the year 2013 the figure stands at 2,17,119 with certificate of practice being held by 103,636 persons, constituting 48% of the membership. Clearly, the number of persons joining the auditing profession which is expected to carry out these tasks has dwindled. As a consequence, younger professionals who are better equipped to handle issues requiring use of technology and newer skill-sets are not entering professional practice. On the one hand, increasing demands are being made on the profession, while the number of those with the wherewithal to satisfy these demands is reducing. There is a substantial gap between demand for good professionals and their availability. This leads to entrusting the responsibility to those who are unable to discharge it. The result is a widening expectation gap and dissatisfaction and disillusionment on both sides. What then is the solution?

Clearly, no other profession is better equipped to handle these responsibilities. Given this situation, three things need to be done. Firstly, users of services, whether they be auditees, tax authorities, regulators or the public have to appreciate the scope and limitations of the responsibilities of the professional. This aspect of the matter has to be dealt with on a war footing, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) must carry out a continuous campaign in this regard. Secondly, lawmakers and regulators have to interact with professionals before they suggest changes in laws and regulations which require furnishing of a plethora of details by taxpayers which are required to be certified/authenticated by Chartered Accountants. There is no point in collecting a huge database when one does not have the ability to digest and utilise the existing data.

Finally, and not in the least, professionals have to continuously upgrade their skills. Many of my senior colleagues would do well to remember that, while the experience that they have acquired over the years is undoubtedly invaluable, it cannot be a substitute for new knowledge and skills. The world is changing quickly and if we do not act it will drive past us.

Apart from this, the profession must interact with clients, and apprise them of their role and responsibility. We must learn to say `no’ whenever it is necessary. If we do not do this immediately, the primacy of the ICAI, an institution which is more than six decades old, will be lost. As a corollary, the respect that the profession enjoys in society will gradually evaporate. There is an erroneous perception that the existing apparatus is unable to meet the expectations. The provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, empowering the Central Government to prescribe accounting standards, and the constitution of the Financial Reporting Authority, which will oversee audit performance, are examples of this perception. Those concerned must take note of these developments. The writing is on the wall. I only hope that the leaders of our profession have the foresight and the fortitude to read it!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
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Forgiveness

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‘Forgiveness is something you do for yourself’. George Kohlrieser

To practise ‘forgiveness’ one must understand ‘hurt’— hurt is the result of some act which is against our expectations and/or represents unfulfilled expectations. Both these not only result in hurt but also cause misery. The issue is: what is forgiveness and what does it do? ‘Forgiveness’ puts an end to the inner struggle that rages within, and teaches us to face life with tolerance, understanding and equanimity’. ‘Forgiveness’ is the task of transcending concepts of justice and fairness’. ‘Forgiveness’ is an attitude of compassion and understanding with which we choose to react to the world.’

Forgiveness is a gift we choose to give ourselves. Forgiveness is a choice—a choice when exercised puts our mind and heart at rest—but higher than forgiveness is to forget the instance that caused the hurt. The issue is, can we accept what has happened? Can we consider it a bad dream and like all bad dreams, forget about it? It is rightly said that it is easier to forgive but difficult to forget. Combine the two to make forgiveness complete. This is difficult—nay, very difficult—but possible. Once one can forget the hurt—forgiveness becomes easy. ‘Forgiving and forgetting’ when practiced together heal both the mind and the matter (body). David Schwerin says:

‘By forgiving people who have done us wrong, We can give ourselves the greatest gift’.

To the above quote I would like to add that it is also a gift to those who have hurt us and in case we can forget the hurt, then it would be the finest gift to ourselves.

We are living in a ‘me decade’ and in this decade, hurt is easy and forgiveness is forgotten. This is evident from recent research in the USA which brings out:
• The capacity to feel for others has dropped by 48%.
• Ability to see other’s point of view has declined by 34%. These are figures as compared to 1979. Hence, to practice forgiveness we now need to:
• Move from ‘self-justification’ to ‘self-control and selfdiscipline’.
• To be fair, honest, truthful and objective—being objective means being non-emotional—develop warmth for others and treat them with dignity and refrain from making callous comments.
We have discussed about ‘forgiving’. I believe we should also be aware of seeking ‘forgiveness’. There is no human being who can say that he has never hurt anyone—even Krishna hurt Gandhari who held him responsible for the Mahabharata and had to suffer her curse. Hence, let us also develop the art of seeking forgiveness of those whom we may have hurt by thought, word or deed. I believe seeking forgiveness is as relevant as ‘forgiving’.
However, according to Swami Shivananda, we can seek forgiveness only when we ‘eradicate self-justification’— we all indulge in ‘self-justification’ all the time. It requires courage to overcome the ego that tells us that we can do no wrong and that our hurt is the result of a fault of others. Hence, let us become aware of this malice. True happiness lies in both forgiving and seeking forgiveness.
To practice ‘forgiveness’ we must know what ‘forgiveness’ results in. In my perception, forgiveness:
• Reduces tension, guilt, anger and suffering.
• Frees us from the burden of expectations and feelings of grudge.
• Transcends our concepts of fairness.
• Makes us humane.
• Liberates us from being ‘constrained’ and sets us free.
• Removes our desire for revenge and retribution , and above all
• Restores relationships. It has been rightly said: ‘Forgiveness is the precious lubricant which keeps all relationships smooth and friction free’.
Let us remember that forgiveness is not running away from facts and feelings. It requires courage to overcome our ego—our hurt and unfulfilled expectations. Mahatma Gandhi said:
‘The weak can never forgive. Forgiveness is an attribute of the strong’.
I also believe that a true and sincere apology is not defeat but victory over a bad situation. It is not humiliation but it exhibits humility and maturity to accept responsibility for our actions and exhibits our care for other’s feelings and value for relationship. I repeat it takes courage to apologise and seek forgiveness. Believe it is very difficult to say ‘Mujhe Maaf Kar Do’.
In conclusion, I quote George Shim: ‘We get what we give. If we give hatred, we receive hatred; if we give love, we receive love’.
And this is what St. Francis of Assisi propagates: ‘It is in pardoning that we are pardoned’.
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Salary: Perquisites: S/s. 17(2), r.w.s. 10(10CC): Assessees were employees of a foreign company, working in India: Tax arising in India on income of employees was borne by foreign employer: Amounts paid directly by employer to discharge employees’ incometax liability is exempt u/s. 10(10CC): Not a perquisite: Social security, pension and medical insurance contributions paid by employer are not taxable as perquisites: Where tax is deposited in respect of non-monetary perquisite, it is exempt u/s<

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Yoshio Kubo vs. CIT; [2013] 36 taxmann.com 1 (Delhi)

The
assessees were employees of a foreign company who were seconded to
India to serve in the Indian subsidiary. The foreign employers bore the
tax arising in India on the income of the employees. The foreign
employer also made contributions towards social security, pension and
medical insurance in compliance with the legal requirements in the
country of its incorporation. The revenue sought to bring to tax such
contributions as well as the tax paid by the employer as perquisite u/s.
17(2), in the hands of the employees. The revenue also contended that
the tax borne by the employer was a monetary perquisite and further tax
should be added to the salary by a multiple stage grossing up process.
The revenue also included the tax refunds in the income of the assessee
employees, as the tax had been borne by the employer.

In appeals
before the High Court the assessee contended that such perquisites were
exempt u/s. 10(10CC). The Delhi High Court held as under:

”1. Whether income tax paid by employer on behalf of assessee was exempted non-monetary perquisite:

1.1
A plain reading of section 10(10CC) reveals that if the perquisite that
is – ‘not provided for by way of monetary payment’ – u/s. 17 (2), the
tax paid on such income would be excluded from the calculation of income
altogether; it would not be deemed a perquisite.

1.2 Section
17(2) has not undergone any substantial change by the amendment of 2002.
The only change is in the introduction of section 10(10CC) which states
that tax actually paid by the employer to discharge an employee’s
obligation – ‘not amounting to a monetary benefit’ would not be included
as the employees’ income. If seen from the context of section 17(2),
and the previous history to that provision, as well as the pre-existing
provision of section 10(5B) and the interpretation placed on section
17(2), read with other provisions which disallow payments made on behalf
of the employee, by the employer, so long as the benefit is not
expressed in monetary terms in the hands of the employee, in the sense
that it is not funded as part of the salary, but paid in discharge of
the obligation, of any sort, either contractual (i.e., rent, services,
etc . availed of by the employee) or legal (tax) directly by the
employer, it should not be treated as a monetary benefit. The reason for
this is that section 10(10CC) is neutral about the kind of benefit
availed by the employee.

1.3 Parliament was aware of the
pre-existing law, and therefore, stepped in to clarify that only a
monetary benefit directly in the hands of the employee as a payment by
the employer would be excluded from section 10(10CC). This may be in the
form of any benefit to pay rent, or discharge any manner of obligation,
tax not excluded. This intention is manifest from the expression –
‘tax’ on such income actually paid. To construe this newly introduced
provision in any other manner would be to defeat the Parliamentary
intent. Section 40(a)(v) fortifies the interpretation of this court in
providing that while calculating income of the employer, the tax paid by
the employer on non-monetary perquisites is not deductible. This
provision too was introduced in 2002. The logic of excluding, as a
non-monetary perquisite, amounts paid to discharge obligations of the
employee, from the meaning of income, by virtue of section 10(10CC) is
that now, with the introduction of section 40(c)(v), such amounts are
not deductible in the employer’s hands.

1.4 In the light of the
above discussion, it is held that amounts paid directly by the employer
to discharge its employees’ income tax liability do not fall within the
excluded category of monetary benefits payable to the employee; they
fall within the included category, u/s. 10(10CC) as amounts paid
directly as taxes. Correspondingly, they cannot now be claimed as
deductions by virtue of section 40(c)(v ). The revenue’s appeals on this
aspect fail.

2. Whether social security, pension and medical insurance contributions by employer are perquisites:

2.1
The revenue’s contentions are insubstantial and meritless. The assessee
does not get a vested right at the time of contribution to the fund by
the employer. The amount standing to the credit of the pension fund
account, social security or medical or health insurance would continue
to remain invested till the assessee becomes entitled to receive it. In
the case of medical benefit, the revenue could not support its
contentions by citing any provision in any policy or scheme which was
the subject matter of these appeals, where the vesting right to receive
the amount under the scheme or plan occurred. One cannot be said to
allow a perquisite to an employee if the employee has no right to the
same. It cannot apply to contingent payments to which the employee has
no right till the contingency occurs. The employee must have a vested
right in the amount. In the case of CIT vs. Mehar Singh Sampuran Singh
Chawla [1973] 90 ITR 219 (Delhi), it was held that the contribution made
by the employer towards a fund established for the welfare of the
employees would not be deemed to be a perquisite in the hands of the
employees concerned as they do not acquire a vested right in the sum
contributed by the employer.

2.2 When the amount does not result
in a direct present benefit to the employee, who does not enjoy it, but
assures him a future benefit, in the event of contingency, the payment
made by the employer, does not vest in the employee.

2.3 In view
of the above discussion, it is held that the revenue’s appeals have to
fail; amounts paid by employers to pension, or social security funds or
for medical benefits, are not perquisites within the meaning of the
expression, u/s. 17(2)(v), and therefore, the amounts paid by the
employer in that regard are not taxable in the hands of the
employee-assessee.

3. Regarding grossing up:

3.1
It has been discussed and concluded that what is not exempt u/s.
10(10CC), is perquisite in the shape of monetary payment to the
employee. If it is a payment to a third party like payment of taxes to
the government, it would be exempt u/s. 10 (10CC).

3.2 The
Tribunal in the present cases, held that tax paid by the employer on
behalf of the employee is a non-monetary perquisite. In other words,
taxes paid by the employer can be added only once in the salary of the
employee. Thereafter, tax on such perquisites is not to be added again.

3.3
Whenever tax is deposited in respect of a non-monetary perquisite, the
provision of section 10(10CC) applies, thus excluding multiple stage
grossing up. The purpose and intent of introducing the amendment to
section 10(10CC) was to exclude the element of income, which would have
arisen otherwise, as a perquisite, and as part of salary. Once that
stood excluded, and option was given to the employer u/s. 192(1A) to
honour the agreement with the employee, Parliament could not have
intended its inclusion in any other form, even for the purpose of
deduction at source. Doing so would defeat the intent behind section
10(10CC). This court, therefore, answers the question in favour of the
assessee and against the revenue.

4. Regarding assessability of TDS refunds

4.1 In this case, it is clear that the amount was not paid to the employee or due to him, from the employer, according to the terms of the contract governing the relationship. It was paid to the Government, over and above the tax due on the salary. It was not for benefit of the assessee. It never, therefore, bore the characteristic of salary or perquisite. Till assessment was made, the amount could not be refunded to the assessee.

4.2 The revenue’s position overlooks that all receipts are not taxable receipts. Before a receipt is brought to tax, the nature and character of the receipt in the hands of the recipient has to be considered. Every receipt or monetary advantage or benefit in the hands of its recipient is not taxable unless it is established to be due to him. If the amount is not due, the recipient, in this case, the employee is obliged to pay back the sum to the person, to whom it belongs. A perquisite or such amount, to be taxed, should be received under a legal or eq-uitable claim, even contingent.

4.3 The receipt of money or property, which one is obliged to return or repay to the rightful owner, as in the case of a loan or credit, cannot be taken as a benefit or a perquisite. The amounts paid in excess by the employer, and refunded to the employee never belonged to the latter; he cannot be therefore taxed. The question of law is therefore, answered against the revenue, and in favour of the assessees.”

Provisional attachment: Section 281B: A. Y. 2011-12: Provisional attachment should be commensurate with claim of revenue:

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KDH Properties P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 356 ITR 1 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee company had filed return of income computing loss of Rs. 2,67,00,000. Subsequently, pursuant to survey u/s. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer impounded books of account and documents. The Assessing Officer also passed provisional attachments of properties and also the debts and security deposits due from third parties.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The provisional attachment made in terms of section 281B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, should be commensurate with the claim of Department, more particularly to safeguard the interests of the Revenue. The Assessing Officer should form an opinion as to what extent of property is required to protect the interest of the Revenue. It cannot be an arbitrary claim based on no materials. It should stand the test of reasonableness and avoid arbitrariness.

ii) If the petitioner were able to establish the valuation of the property as stated by cogent and proper materials acceptable to the Department subject to final assessment, the property could continue to be under provisional attachment as per section 281B and all other debts and security deposits due from third parties could be released from the provisional attachment.”

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Housing Project: Income from: Deduction u/s.80-IB(10): Interest on delayed payment by purchasers due from contractors and suppliers: Part of income derived from development of housing project: Entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB(10):

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CIT vs. Pratham Developers: 355 ITR 507 (Guj):

The assessee was in the business of developing and building housing projects and accordingly was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 11,05,556 ( Rs. 4.36 lakh – interest received from purchasers on delayed payments and Rs. 8.70 lakh – balances written off in case of contractors and suppliers) by way of disallowance out of the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). The Assessing Officer held that these sums did not represent the assessee’s income from the development of housing project. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Interest received on delayed payments by the purchasers was part of income derived from the business of the assessee. It was entitled to special deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) in respect of the amount.

ii) During the course of the business in developing the housing project, the assessee had made payments to suppliers towards various purchases made. On such payments, the assessee would occasionally deduct sum amounts and pay the bill. The difference between the bill amount and the payment actually made would be the amount generated during the course of business. The assessee was entitled to special deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of such sum.”

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