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Representative assessee: Section 163: Liability of representative assessee is limited to connected income: No liability for assessment of unconnected income.

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[General Electric Co. v. DDIT (Del.), WP No. 9100 of 2007, dated 12-8-2011]

Genpact India is an Indian company. The whole of the share capital of Genpact India was held by a Mauritius company. The whole of the share capital of the Mauritius company was in turn held by General Electric Co., USA. The Assessing Officer found that the shares of Genpact India were transferred outside India. He held that the transaction of transfer of shares of Genpact India has resulted in capital gains to General Electric, USA. Therefore, he issued a notice u/s.163 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 proposing to treat Genpact India as an agent of General Electric and to assess the capital gain in its hands as a representative assessee. General Electric Co. filed writ petition challenging the notice.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“(i) The mere fact that a person is an agent or is to be treated as an agent u/s.163 and is assessable as ‘representative assessee’ does not automatically mean that he is liable to pay taxes on behalf of the non-resident.

(ii) U/s.161, a representative assessee is liable only ‘as regards the income in respect of which he is a representative assessee’. This means that there must be some connection or concern between the representative assessee and the income.

(iii) On facts, even assuming that Genpact India was the ‘agent’ and so ‘representative assessee’ of General Electric, there was no connection between Genpact India and the capital gains alleged to have arisen to General Electric. Genpact India is sought to be taxed as representative assessee when it had no role in the transfer of shares. Merely because these shares relate to Genpact India that would not make Genpact India as agent qua deemed capital gain purportedly earned by General Electric Co.

(iv) Consequently, the section 163 proceedings seeking to assess Genpact India for the capital gains of General Electric were without jurisdiction.”

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Clarification reg. service tax on fees charged for Issuance of Country of Origin Certificate (COOC) — Circular No. 145/14/ 2011-ST dated 19-8-2011.

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By this Circular it has been clarified that services provided by Chamber of Commerce and any other authorised agencies for issuance of COOC with reference to national character of export goods upon examination of the origin of their composition, service tax as applicable on fees charged by such organisation shall be categorised under ‘Technical Inspection and Certification Agency Service’. It has been further clarified that service tax paid on ‘Technical Inspection and Certification’ of export goods is eligible for refund under Notification 17/2009-ST, dated 7th July, 2009.
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E-filing of service tax returns made mandatory for all service providers — Notification No. 43/2011-Service Tax, dated 25-8-2011.

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With this Notification now all assessees who are registered under the service tax law will have to file all half-yearly service tax returns electronically from October 1, 2011.
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Administrative relief to unregistered dealers — Trade Circular No. 13T of 2011, dated 30-8-2011.

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As per earlier Circular No. 33T of 2007, dated 18th April, 2007, delay in obtaining certificate of 4 registration beyond 5 years shall not be entitled to get any administrative relief. Now subject to the terms and conditions specified in this Circular, a dealer can get administrative relief even if delay in getting certificate of registration exceeds 5 years.
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(2011) 39 VST 302 (Bom.) Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, Mumbai v. Cadila Healthcare Limited

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Rate of tax — Table margarine — Not hydrogenated vegetable oil or vegetable oil — Taxable at 12.5% under residual Entry E-1 — Schedule Entry C-100, 102 and E-1 of Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

Facts:
The Commissioner of Sales Tax filed appeal against the decision of the Tribunal, dated August 2, 2008, holding that Nutralite table margarine sold by the dealer is covered by Schedule C-Entry 102 of the MVAT Act and taxable at 4%. Entry 100 of Schedule C covers vanaspati (hydrogenated vegetable oil), whereas Entry 102 of Schedule C covers vegetable oil. It was argued before the Tribunal by the dealer that Nutralite table margarine is vanaspati and if it is not vanaspati, then it is vegetable oil covered by Schedule Entry C-102 taxable at 4%. The Tribunal held that Nutralite table margarine is vegetable oil taxable at 4% under Entry 102 of Schedule C of the MVAT Act. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and held against the dealer that Nutralite table margarine is not vanaspati and not a vegetable oil and taxable at 12.5%.

Held:
(i) Margarine is used for baking, cooking and Nutralite table margarine sold by the dealer is used for cooking and as a spread. Palm oil is subjected to process of emulsification and the resultant product that emerges is Nutralite table margarine. Admittedly, table margarine is considered to be a distinct marketable commodity under the Central Excise Act.

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(2011) 39 VST 257 (SC) Hyderabad Engineering Industries v. State of Andhra Pradesh

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Inter-State sale/stock transfer — Dispatch of goods to branch outside the State — Against the ‘Forecasts’ for delivery of goods to the buyer — Under sale agreement — Is inter-state sale — Liable to tax u/s.3(a) and 6A of the CST Act, 1956.

Facts:
The assessee claimed inter-State Stock transfers to its various depots situated outside the State as per ‘Forecasts’ to be delivered to M/s. Usha International Ltd. (UIL), under an agreement for sale entered with it. The sales tax authorities disallowed the claim of inter-State stock transfer and levied tax @10% under the CST Act. The Company filed appeal before SC against the judgment of the High Court confirming levy of CST on disputed inter-State stock transfers treated as inter-State sales by the assessing authorities.

Held:
(1) The consistent view of this Court appears to be that even if there is no specific stipulation or direction in the agreement, for an inter-State movement of goods, if such movement is an incident of that agreement or if the facts and circumstances of the case denote it, the conditions of section 3(a) would be satisfied.

(2) In the instant case, the movement of goods from the assessee’s factory to its various godowns situated in different parts of country was pursuant to ‘Sales agreements’ coupled with ‘Forecasts’ which are nothing but ‘indents’ or firm orders. It does not matter how much goods were delivered to the branch office, which just acted as a conduit pipe before it ultimately reached the purchasers’ hands. All that matters is that the movement of the goods is in pursuance of the contract of sale or as of necessary incident to the sell itself.

(3) After considering the facts of the case, finding of fact by the assessing authorities duly confirmed by the Tribunal, SC held that impugned delivery of goods by the dealer’s factory to its various depots situated outside the State for delivery of goods to UIL against ‘Forecasts’ and ultimate delivery of goods to UIL by its depots to UIL is an inter-State sale liable to tax under the CST Act in the State of AP.

Accordingly the appeal filed by the dealer was dismissed.

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(2011) 23 STR 276 (Tri.-Chennai) — UCAL Fuel System Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai.

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Cenvat Credit of Service Tax — Services in respect of preparation of documents for pre-shipment and post-shipment of export goods — Eligible claim of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The appellants, M/s. UCAL Fuel System Ltd. were availing services in respect of preparation of documents for pre-shipment and post-shipment of export goods and were claiming credit of services paid on the same. The appellants were denied Cenvat credit of service tax of Rs.1,28,914 as the service provider did not mention the nature of the taxable services in any of the documents, on the basis of which appellants claimed the credit. The appellants argued that the services rendered had direct nexus with the business of the manufacture of the assessee’s final product and hence were in the nature of business auxiliary service.

Held:
After observing bills and other documents of the appellants, the Tribunal held that services availed by the appellants were business auxiliary services in nature and they were entitled to avail Cenvat credit of service tax paid on such services as per Rule 2(1) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

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Sudhir Thackersey Charitable Trust v. DIT ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM) ITA No. 5031/Mum./2010 Decided on: 26-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: A. H. Dalal/ V. V. Shastri

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Section 12AA — Registration of Trust — Delay in application for registration — Refusal to grant registration on the ground that the trust was claiming exemption u/s.11 even though it was not registered — Whether the refusal was on the valid ground — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee trust came into existence vide trust deed dated 24th August, 2006. It had not applied for registration till 30-10-2009. However, all along the trust was carrying on its activities and duly filing its return of income with claims for exemption u/s.11. The DIT refused to grant registration for the reason that the assessee was claiming exemption u/s.11 even though it had not complied with the mandatory provisions of registration. According to him the assessee had concealed its income by claiming exemption which otherwise it was not entitled to.

Held:
According to the Tribunal the reason for refusal to grant registration as given by the DIT was not relevant to the consideration on which an application for registration of a trust or charitable institution is to be examined. Further, it also noted that the assessee had admitted an inadvertent lapse in nonfiling of registration application and also the fact that the trust had not accepted any donation, other than corpus donation at the time of formation of the trust. According to it, the lapse by the assessee cannot be visited with the consequence of its being declined registration later also, which approach was not supported either by any specific legal provisions or plain logic or rationale. The DIT was only required to examine if the objects of the trust were charitable and the activities were bona fide. Further noting that the assessee had placed enough relevant details and supportive evidences in support of the trust objects being charitable and the activities being bona fide, the Tribunal directed the DIT to grant registration.

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Krishna Land Developres Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and Asha Vijay Raghavan (JM) ITA No. 1057/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on : 12-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rakesh Joshi/ A. K. Nayak

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Sections 22, 28 — Rental income for letting out premises, which are duly notified as IT Park and can be used only for a specific purpose along with provision of complex service facilities and infrastructure for operation such business is chargeable to tax under the head ‘Income from Business’.

Facts:
The assessee had let out on leave and licence basis for a period of 33 months property purchased by it along with the infrastructure, equipment and facilities, which were prescribed both by the Ministry of Commerce as well as the CBDT. The I.T. Park was duly notified by the Ministry of Commerce and also by the CBDT. The assessee offered licence fees in respect of this activity, for taxation, under the head ‘Income from Business’. The Assessing Officer (AO) relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shambhu Investments P. Ltd. v. CIT, 263 ITR 143 (SC) held that the income is assessable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the property in question was not a simple building but an I.T. Park with all infrastructure facilities and services. It observed that the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, notifies certain buildings as I.T. Park only if various facilities and infrastructure, as specified by the Department, are provided. It noted that all the technical requirements, infrastructures, facilities and services were being provided for in the building and it was for this reason that not only the Ministry of Commerce & Industries but also the CBDT notified the same as an I.T. Park which entitles the assessee to earn certain incentives. It also observed that the intention of the assessee while purchasing the property is to participate in the I.T. Park and it cannot be said that the intention is only to invest in property. The Tribunal observed that:

“The assessee is offering complex services by way of providing operation place in a notified I.T. Park, with all services and amenities such as infrastructure facilities, waiting room, conference room, valet parking, reception, canteen, 24 hours’ securities, internal facilities, high-speed lift, power back-up, etc. Just because a sister concern incurred this expenditure and claims reimbursement from the assessee, it cannot be said that the facilities are not provided for by the assessee. Whoever maintains them, the fact remains that it is the assessee who ultimately bears such expenditure for the services and undertakes to provide such services. The facilities are made available by the assessee to the person occupying the premises.”

The Tribunal noted that the Gujarat High Court has in the case of Saptarshi Services Ltd. 265 ITR 379 (Guj.) held that the income earned from business centre is to be assessed under the head ‘Income from Business and Profession’ and SLP filed by the Revenue against this judgment was rejected by the Supreme Court [264 ITR 36 (St)]. It also noted that the Mumbai Bench of ITAT has in the case of ITO v. Shanaya Enterprises, (ITA No. 3648/Mum./2010, A.Y. 2006-07, order dated 30th June, 2011) held that when the property is used for specific purposes and in the nature of providing complex services, the income is taxable under the head ‘Income from Business’.

Applying the propositions laid down in the abovementioned decisions, the Tribunal held that since the property can be used only for a specific purpose i.e., I.T. operation and the assessee has provided complex service facilities and infrastructure for operating such business, the income in question be assessed under the head ‘Income from Business & Profession’. It set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) and allowed this ground of the assessee’s appeal.

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Mahalaxmi Sheela Premises CHS Ltd. v. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and Vijay Pal Rao (JM) ITA Nos. 784, 785 & 786/Mum./2010 A.Ys.: 2000-01 to 2002-03 Decided on: 30-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Hiro Rai/ P. C. Maurya

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Sections 22, 28 and 58 — Income received on lease of a portion of terrace of the building and a wall of the building for the purpose of fixing of hoarding, neon sign, etc., is assessable under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

Facts:
The assessee leased out portion of terrace of the building and a wall of the building to one Mrs. Sudha Vora, for the purpose of fixing of hoarding, neon sign, etc. The Assessing Officer, while assessing the total income for A.Y. 2000-01, assessed the income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ on the ground that the amount received by the assessee was not for letting of a building or terrace or any land appurtenant thereto but on account of allowing Mrs. Sudha Vora to display the advertisement of neon sign, illuminated hoarding, of a size 60 ft x 20 ft on the terrace and also illuminated hoarding of size 20 ft x 50 ft on a vertical wall of a building facing Pedder Road. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) held that the terrace has not been let out but merely permission has been granted to use the terrace only to set up the hoarding and to display the hoarding. He also observed that the lessee could use only a portion of the terrace and the purpose of utilisation was not for stay, etc. He upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the following case laws:

(1) ITO v. Cuffe Parade Sainara Premises Co-op. Society Ltd., (ITA No. 7225/Mum./2005, order dated 28-4-2008)

(2) Dalamal House Commercial Complex Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No. 2286/ Mum./2008, order dated 29-5-2009)

(3) Sharda Chambers Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No. 1234/Mum./2008, order dated 1-9-2009)

(4) Matru Ashish CHS Ltd. v ITO, (ITA No. 316/ Mum./2010, order dated 27-8-2010)

(5) S. Sohan Singh v. ITO, (16 ITD 272) (Del.); and

(6) CIT v. Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op. Society Ltd., (ITA No. 3183 of 2010/Mum.).

The Tribunal noted that in the case of Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. ITO, Mumbai ‘B’ Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 5048/Mum./2004, A.Y. 2001-02 and ITA No. 1433/Mum./2007, for A.Y. 2002-03 and ITA No. 1434/Mum./2007, for A.Y. 2003- 04, order dated 4-11-2009, the facts were that the assessee had allowed a telecom company to erect the tower on their terrace in consideration of an amount of Rs.5,93,700 and claimed it as being chargeable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. The Tribunal following the decision in the case of Sharda Chamber Premises v. ITO, (supra) and ITO v. Cuffe Parade Sainara Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. held such income to be chargeable under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

The Tribunal further noted that the jurisdictional High Court in ITA No. 3183 of 2010 in para 3 of judgment dated 16th August, 2011 confirmed the findings of the Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op. Society Ltd.

In view of the aforesaid binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A), allowed the ground raised by the assessee and directed the AO to assess the income in question under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Part A: ORDERs of SIC & CIC

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RTI Act and RTI Rules: RTI Rules of Bombay High Court

In the September issue of BCAJ, I covered a decision of three-member Bench of Maharashtra State Information Commission. In this issue, I cover one more.

Under the RTI Act, there are two types of authorities to which the Act is applicable: Public Authority and Competent Authority. The latter is defined u/s.2(e) as under:

“Competent authority means —

(i) the Speaker in the case of the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State or a Union Territory having such Assembly and the Chairman in the case of the Council of States or Legislative Council of State;
(ii) the Chief Justice of India in the case of the Supreme Court;
(iii) the Chief Justice of the High Court in the case of the High Court;
(iv) the President or the Governor, as the case may be, in the case of other authorities established or constituted by or under the Constitution;
(v) the Administrator appointed under Article 239 of the Constitution;
This case deals pertains to the Bombay High Court, Mumbai. It is the decision of three-member Bench comprising the then State Chief IC (Shri Vilas Patil), SIC, Amravati (Shri M. L. Shah) and SIC, Aurangabad (Shri D. B. Deshpande).

Shri Anandnatraj submitted an RTI application to PIO, in the office of the Registrar, Bombay High Court (BHC) seeking the information in respect of writ petition Nos. 2650 of 95 and 2689 of 95. He asked for photocopies of all papers filed and orders issued in respect of the petition.

The PIO expressed his inability to furnish the information, stating that “the application was not complete in all respects as received as per the Bombay High Court Right to Information Rules, 2006. As per the said Rules, a Court Fee Stamp of Rs.12 is required on the application, however, Rs.10 Court Fee Stamp is affixed. Hence there is deficit of Court Fees of Rs.2. As per the said Rules, the applicant has to submit the application in prescribed format. Please see High Court website ‘bombayhighcourt.nic.in’ for the said Rules. Moreover, in view of the provision to Rule 9 and Rule 19 of the Bombay High Court Right to Information Rules, 2006 the information in respect of judicial proceeding or records cannot be supplied under Right to Information, but you may obtain the said Information as per the procedure prescribed in the Bombay High Court Rules and Orders”.

The applicant preferred an appeal to the First Appellate Authority (FAA). The grounds of appeal were: “the BHC RTI Rules, 2006 are not consistent and in agreement with the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. As provided in Rule 9 of the said Rules, that is, Rule 9 in para 1 obtaining information in respect of third party is permissible by submission of application in Form ‘A’ as per Rule 3, the same rule in para 2 forbids the information of 3rd party in respect of judicial proceedings and records. The said contradiction in clause 9 needs proper interpretation/classification by the Public Information Officer in his reply.”

FAA responded “it is clear that the reply sent by the Public Information Officer cannot be faulted with. The information sought is relating to record of judicial proceedings and copies of the same can be obtained by applying at the facilitation centre of the High Court.” The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

The applicant then furnished the second appeal to Maharashtra Information Commission. First the appeal was heard by a single member by one SIC, Shri Ramanand Tiwari. However he passed on order that “since the issues involved are very important, I suggest that the case should be heard by the full Bench of the Commission or least a Bench consisting of three Commissioners and directed to the Secretary of the Commission to obtain the orders of the CIC and do the needful.”

Accordingly a three-member Bench heard the matter on 14-3-2011. The appellant submitted his written statement and argued also as briefly noted hereinafter.

The respondent PIO also submitted written statement and argued that the PIO and FAA have acted according to BHC RTI Rules which are made by the Chief Justice of the HC, being the ‘Competent Authority’ u/s.28 of the RTI Act.

The main contention before the Commission was that “rules framed by the Competent Authority u/s.28 of the Act, can only be for giving effect to and for carrying out the provisions of the Right to Information Act and cannot be contrary to the provisions of the Right to Information Act. They would be ultra vires and illegal and consequently unenforceable in view of the provisions of section 22 of the Act”.

“The Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court cannot negate the provisions of the Right to Information Act, since neither section 8, nor section 24 gives exemption in respect of providing information related judicial proceeding and records.”

The Commission made the following decision:

“Hence, it is necessary to examine the rules of Interpretation of the statutes.

Once the Legislature has passed the Act, it is subject to judicial review in respect of the constitutionality and the implementation of the provisions of the said Act.

No doubt, the rules made in exercise of the powers delegated under the principal Act, for carrying out the purpose laid down in the principal Act, cannot travel beyond the scope of the Act, nor can they, themselves, enlarge the scope of statutory provisions. They cannot also militate against the provision under which they were made (AIR 1956 SC, AIR 1957 SC 532).

However, the Rules framed under the Act have the force of the Law. (AIR 1954 All 639).

Therefore, the function of the Court is to apply the law as it stands. It is not for the Court to re-write the law, even though the Court notices anomalies and omission and considers the provision as they stand unreasonable (AIR 1982 Ker. 126).

In view of such principles of interpretation of statutes, the Commission has to give the decision as per the rules framed by the Chief Justice High Court of Judicature of Bombay as a Competent Authority u/s.28 of the Act.

Therefore, the decision of the First Appellate Authority is upheld and there is no necessity to interfere with the order of the First Appellate Authority.

However, in view of the points raised by the appellant, the Commission, in view of provisions of section 25(5) of the RTI Act, recommends to the Public Authority, that is the High Court to examine judicially the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, whether they are in conformity with the provisions or spirit of the RTI Act, and if found not to be in conformity with the provisions or spirit of the Act, then take such steps to promote such conformity”.

[Shri S. Aanandnatraj, Mumbai v. FAA and PIO of High Court of Mumbai, decision dated 29-4-2011 under Appeal No. 5842/02]

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CONTROVERSY: WHETHER RENTING OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY A SERVICE?

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Issue for consideration:

Section 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act or the service tax law) contains provisions relating to taxable service of renting of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of, business or commerce. The service was introduced with effect from 1-6-2007 in the service tax law. The activity of renting an immovable property per se was not perceived as a transaction of service. When airport services were introduced, the Government vide its Circular No. 80/10/2004-ST, dated 17-9-2004 (para 5) also clarified to such effect:

“However, in case a part of airport/civil enclave premises is rented/leased out, the rental/lease charges would not be subjected to service tax, as the activity of letting out premises is not rendering a service.”

The introduction of the category gave rise to resistance to pay service tax chiefly by various retail outlets selling goods and occupying licensed/ leased premises and some other licensees/lessees, engaged in business activity as they do not have the potential to claim CENVAT credit of service tax on licence fees payable for the use of commercial premises. Consequently, writ petitions were filed in various High Courts across the country challenging the levy and constitutional validity thereof. The Delhi High Court first took a position in the case of Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2009 (14) STR 433 (Del.) and held a view that in terms of section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), renting out of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce would not constitute a taxable service and as a result, the Notification dated 22-5-2007 and Circular dated 4-1-2008 were held ultra vires the Act.

In service tax law, the term ‘service’ is not defined but every taxable service introduced in the tax net is separately defined. Therefore, the issue has been that while an immovable property is rented or licensed or leased, whether there is any value addition or whether there exists any element of service?

Background of Home Solutions’ writ petition:
In this writ, the petitioner challenged the legality, validity and vires of Notification No. 24/2007, dated 22-5-2007 and Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST, dated 4-1- 2008 issued by the Government.

It was further alleged that because of the incorrect interpretation of law by the said Notification and the Circular, service tax was sought to be levied on renting of immovable property as opposed to service tax on a service provided in relation to the renting of immovable property.

The petitioners also took an alternative plea that in case it is held that such a tax is envisaged, then the provisions of section 65(90a), section 65(105) (zzzz) and section 66 insofar as they relate to the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property would amount to a tax on land and would therefore fall outside the legislative competence of the Parliament as the subject was covered under Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India and would fall within the exclusive domain of the State Legislatures and therefore the same be declared unconstitutional.

It was, inter alia, submitted that the impugned Notification and the Circular which proceeded on the assumption that the renting of immovable property was itself a service, were contrary to and inconsistent with the charging provision and therefore ultra vires the Act. Since service tax is a value-added tax and can only be levied on the value addition, the words ‘in relation to’ in section 65(105)(zzzz) of the said Act are of great significance. The value addition of service in the present context could be an improvement or the betterment of the property provided by the owner to the lessee or licensee. It is that betterment alone which could qualify as a service. The act of renting of the immovable property by itself does not provide any value addition to any person and therefore cannot be treated as a service. To support this contention reference was made to the various entries falling within the scope of ‘taxable service’, which would reveal that it is only the value addition which is taxable.

The Court held that in terms of section 65(105) (zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994, renting out of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce would not constitute a taxable service and as a result, Notification dated 22-5-2007 and Circular dated 4-1-2008 were ultra vires the Act. The Court distinguished the observations made by the SC in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam’s case [2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)], on which the respondent had placed reliance to the effect that “making available a premises for a period of a few hours for the specific purpose of being utilised as a mandap whether with or without other services would itself be a service and cannot be classified as any other kind of legal concept”. The Court also referred to the observations made by the SC in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners [2007 (7) STR 625 (SC)] wherein the SC, inter alia, had observed that “service tax is a value added tax and that just as excise duty is a tax on value addition on goods, services tax is on value addition by rendition of services. A distinction was also sought to be made between property-based services and performance-based services. The property-based services cover service providers, such as architects, interior designers, real estate agents, construction services, mandap keepers, etc. Whereas the performance-based services are those provided by persons, such as stock-brokers, practising chartered accountants, practising cost accountants, security agencies, tour operators, event managers, travel agents, etc.” Applying the same to renting of immovable property service, the High Court observed “There is no dispute that any service connected with the renting of such immovable property would fall within the ambit of section 65(105)(zzzz) and would be exigible to service tax. The question is whether renting of such immovable property by itself constitutes a service and, thereby, a taxable service. Service tax is a value added tax. It is a tax on the value addition provided by some service providers. Insofar as renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce is concerned, any value addition could not be discerned. Consequently, the renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce by itself does not entail any value addition and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a service.” (emphasis supplied). The Delhi High Court however did not examine alternative plea of constitutional validity. The Government filed an SLP against the said ruling which is admitted, but no stay has been granted against the Delhi HC Ruling. The same is pending for disposal.

The amendment by the Finance Act, 2010:
To overcome the above ruling, the Finance Act, 2010 redefined ‘taxable service’ with retrospective effect from 1-6-2007 as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided –

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person, (*by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting) for use in the course of or, for furtherance of business or commerce.”

* Words substituted for (in relation to renting of immovable property).

As a result, a service provided by renting of immovable property or a service ‘in relation to’ such renting of immovable property, is brought within the tax net. TRU, Circular No. 334/1/2010 — TRU dated 26-2-2010 clarified the amendment as under:

Para 9.2:

“In order to clarify the legislative intent and also bring in certainty in tax liability the relevant definition of taxable service is being amended to clarify that the activity of renting of immovable property per se would also constitute a taxable service under the relevant clause. This amendment is being given retrospective effect from 1-6-2007.”

Thus, renting of immovable property by itself is considered to be a taxable service. In the Finance Act 2010, it has been declared:
“No act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable had this amendment not come into force.”

Recently, the Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court have delivered their judgments on this burning issue and have decided the scope of powers of the Parliament to enact the activity of renting of premises for the use of or for furtherance of business or commerce, as service. Earlier, during F.Y. 2010-11 the other High Courts viz. Orissa High Court, in Utkal Builders Limited v. UOI, [2011 (22) STR 257 (Ori)] and P&H High Court in Shubh Timb Steels Ltd. v. UOI, [2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H)] have also held to the effect that renting of property for commercial purpose was certainly a service and had a value for the service receiver. While the Bombay High Court has extended the interim order to remain in force till September 30, 2011 and some of the petitioners have decided to knock the door of the Supreme Court, hopes of getting a decision in favour of retailers in the special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court against UOI v. Home Solutions Retail India Ltd., [2009 (15) STR J23 (SC)] appears to have dimmed. Both the decisions are briefly analysed below:

Retailers Association of India & Other v. UOI’s case, 2011 (23) STR 561 (Bom.):

The petitioners had in their petition, inter alia, challenged the legislative competence of the Parliament in the context of Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India. The constitutional challenge to the legislative competence of the Parliament was premised on the submission that:

  •     The tax which has been imposed on a taxable service which is defined to mean renting of immovable property is a tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

  •    All four judgments of the Supreme Court, referred to later herein, did not deal with a situation where the legislation would fall within the purview of a specific entry in List II.

  •     Article 246 of the Constitution empowers the State Legislature to make laws “with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II”.

  •     In consequence, the power of the State Legislature is not only to make laws imposing taxes on lands and buildings, but to enact legislation with respect to taxes on lands and buildings;

  •     Entry 49 of List II must receive the broadest possible interpretation and amplitude.

  •     Especially when read in the context of Entry 97 of List I, the width and ambit of Entry 49 of List II cannot be curtailed with reference to the residuary power of the Parliament; and

  •     A tax whether levied on the basis of rent, annual value, or capital value would constitute a tax on lands having regard to the ambit of Entry 49 of List II. A tax based on leasing of a land and computed by rental value cannot be rested on Entry 97 of List I, because it is in substance, a tax on a transaction of letting of land and Entry 49 of List II would preclude a levy by the Parliament of a service tax on letting.

Relevant legal provisions:

Article 246 of the Constitution of India:

“246. Subject-matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.

(1)    Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union List).

(2)    Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), the Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Concurrent List).

(3)    Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).

(4)    The Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included (in a State) notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.”


Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India:

List I — Union List — Entry 97 — Residuary power:

97.    Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.

List II — State List — Entry 49:

49.    Taxes on lands and buildings.

In order to address the constitutional challenge in the above petitions, the Court briefly traced the evolution of judicial thought on the issue of imposition of service tax (paras 5 to 10) by referring to the following four Supreme Court decisions in which the controversy was analysed:

(i)    Tamil Nadu Kalayana Mandapam Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)

(ii)    Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI, 2005 (182) ELT 33 (SC)

(iii)    All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Associa-tion v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) and

(iv)    Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC).

The Court, based on the analysis of the legislative provisions contained in (i) Article 246 of the Constitution of India read with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II read with Entry 49, and (ii) residuary powers under Entry 97 of List I, noted that “If the subject on which the Parliament has enacted legislation is found, upon determining its true nature and character not to fall within the purview of a field reserved to the States, the Parliament would have legislative competence in any event under Entry 97 of List I read with Article 248. The essential question that falls for determination in the present case is whether the levy of a service tax on a taxable
service which the Parliament defined to be the renting of immovable property falls within the exclusive province of the State Legislatures under Entry 49 of List II.”

The Court referred to the following judgments of the Supreme Court where the scope and ambit of Entry 49 of List II has been interpreted:

  •    Ralla Ram — AIR 1949 FC 81:

In this case, the Federal Court held that merely because the Income- tax Act adopted annual value as the standard for determining income, it would not necessarily follow that if the same standard were to be employed as a measure for any other tax (in the given case — an annual tax on buildings and lands situated in the rating areas as stipulated in the Schedule at a particular rate), that tax also became a tax on income. The Court distinguished between the nature of tax and nature of machinery quantifying the tax and the Bombay High Court averred that Ralla Ram’s case is an authority for the proposition that it is the essential nature of the tax and not the nature of the machinery, which must be looked at in determining the validity of the impost.

  •    Sudhir Chandra v. Wealth Tax Officer

— AIR 1969 SC 59:

This case dealt with a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Wealth Tax Act of 1957 on the ground that it transgressed upon a field reserved to the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II. The Bombay High Court noted that while explaining the scope of Entry 49, the Supreme Court held:

“But the legislative authority of the Parliament is not determined by visualising the possibility of exceptional cases of taxes under two different heads operating similarly on taxpayers. Again Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule con-templates the levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as units. It is normally not concerned with the division of interest or ownership in the units of lands or buildings which are brought to tax. Tax on lands and buildings is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and bears a definite relation to it. Tax on the capital value of assets bears no definable relation to lands and buildings which may form a component of the total assets of the assessee.”
(emphasis supplied).

  •     Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Hazareth — AIR 1970 SC 999:

In this case, the constitutional validity of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 was considered. The Court ruled that however wide a taxing entry in the State List may be, it would still not authorise a tax which is not expressly mentioned. If the pith and substance of the law did not fall within the purview of Entry 49 of the State List, the Parliament, it was held, would undoubtedly possess that power under Article 248 and Entry 97 of the Union List. While holding that the Gift Tax Act, 1958 was not a tax on lands and buildings, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that Entry 49 postulates a tax resting upon the general ownership of lands and buildings and a tax which is imposed directly upon lands and buildings.

  •    D. G. Gose & Co. v. State of Kerala — 1980 2 SCC 410:

The Bombay High Court noted that in this case the above principle was reiterated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court holding that a tax on buildings is “a direct tax on the assessee’s buildings as such, and is not a personal tax without reference to any particular property”.

  •     India Cement Ltd. — AIR 1990 SC 85:

Referring to the observation by the Supreme Court in this case to the effect that “there is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land” and held that the tax levied under the Income-tax Act, 1961 on income “though computed in an artificial way from house property” was levied on the income and not house property and therefore, did not fall within the purview of Entry 49 of List II. The Bombay High Court also noted that a principle was enunciated (in a judgment of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India) that a tax on lands and buildings would not comprehend within its purview a tax on income arising from land or building.

The Bombay High Court observed that the above judgments of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the settled principle of law is that a tax on lands and buildings is a tax on the general ownership of lands and buildings. In order that a tax must fall under Entry 49 of List II, the tax must be one directly on lands and buildings. A tax which is levied on the income which is received from lands or buildings is not a tax on lands or buildings.

The petitioners’ submission was that a tax on land within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II can take into account the use to which the land is put. The service tax imposed by the Parliament on renting of immovable property takes account of the user of the land or building and, hence, the service tax on renting of immovable property is a tax which the State Legislatures could conceivably impose under Entry 49 of List II. In support of the contention, it was urged that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, (AIR 1965 SC 1561) is an authority for the proposition that in order to be a tax on land, the charge under the legislation must be on the land as a unit. In that case, a tax was imposed u/s.62 of the Assam Local Self Government Act, 1953. Section 62(1) stipulated that the local Board may order that no land shall be used as a market otherwise than under a licence to be granted by the Board. U/ss.(2) which was the charging provision, it was stipulated that on the issue of an order u/ss.(1), the Board may grant a licence for the use of any land as a market and impose an annual tax thereon. While upholding the validity of the tax, the Supreme Court noted that the tax was, in substance, a tax on the land but the charge only arises on land which was used for a market.

Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of W.B., [1995 Supp (1) SCC 707] which dealt with a challenge to the validity of a cess imposed under the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. The levy was challenged in Goodricke on the ground that it was not a tax on lands and buildings. The Supreme Court held that the subject -matter of the tax and the levy was land on the premise that the entire land covered in the tea estate was treated as a separate category of land as a unit for the purposes of the levy of tax. Merely because a tax on lands or buildings is imposed with reference to the income or yield of lands or buildings, it would not cease to be a tax on lands or buildings.


Residuary power of the Parliament to legislate:
Referring to observations made by the SC in the cases of:

  •     UoI v. H. S. Dhillon — AIR 1972 SC 106,
  •     Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax — AIR 1970 SC 169,
  •     Sat Pal & Co. — AIR 1979 SC 1550,
  •     International Tourist Corp. — 1981 2 SCC 318, and few of the above-referred judgments, the Bombay High Court noted that “while the Court must give a broad and liberal interpretation to Entry 49 of List II, the interpretation to be placed on that entry must nevertheless be meaningful. In each case, the Court must have regard to the true nature and character of the levy in determining as to whether in pith and substance, the tax is a tax on land and buildings. If the essential nature of the levy is the imposition of a tax on land and buildings, it would fall within Entry 49 of List II. If on the other hand, the essential nature and character of the levy is not a tax on land and buildings, then the exercise of interpretation would not bring within its purview a tax which is not one on land and buildings.”

To determine the character of the levy under challenge, analysis of section 66 (charging section), section 65(105)(zzzz), section 65(90a) and section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 was made and it was held that:

(a)    The charge of tax is not on lands or buildings.
(b)    The charge of tax is on a taxable service.
(c)    The measure of tax is the gross amount charged by the service provider.
(d)    The charge of tax is not on lands or buildings as a unit nor is the tax on lands or buildings.
(e)    To be a tax on lands and buildings under Entry 49 of List II, the tax must be directly a tax on lands and buildings. That is not the true character of an impost on taxable services.

On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited, [(2004) 10 SCC 201] in support of the submission that the law in the present case is a law which imposes a tax on land and buildings. It was urged that in paragraph 129 of the judgment the Supreme Court, inter alia, has laid down the following principles regarding:

“(6) ‘Land’, the term as occurring in Entry 49 of List II, has a wide, connotation. Land remains land though it may be subjected to different user. The nature of user of the land would not enable a piece of land being taken out of the meaning of land itself. Different uses to which the land is subjected or is capable of being subjected provide the basis for classifying land into different identifiable groups for the purpose of taxation. The nature of user of one piece of land would enable that piece of land being classified separately from another piece of land which is being subjected to another kind of user, though the two pieces of land are identically situated except for the difference in nature of user. The tax would remain a tax on land and would not become a tax on the nature of its user.

(7)    To be a tax on land, the levy must have some direct and definite relationship with the land. So long as the tax is a tax on land by bearing such relationship with the land, it is open for the Legislature for the purpose of levying tax to adopt any one of the well-known modes of determining the value of the land such as annual or capital value of the land or its productivity. The methodology adopted, having an indirect relationship with the land, would not alter the nature of the tax as being one on land.”

In this frame of reference, the Bombay High Court noted that though as per this decision the expression ‘land’ in Entry 49 of List II has a wide connotation, the judgment in Kesoram Industries (supra) does not mark a departure from the ambit and content of Entry 49 of List II which has been laid down in the previous decisions of the Court including the judgments of the Constitution Bench in Nawn’s case and in Hazareth’s case (supra) or for that matter the decision of the Bench of seven learned Judges in Dhillon’s case (supra) and held that service tax that has been legislated upon by the Parliament is not a tax on land. The true nature and character of the levy is not a tax on land or buildings. The charge of tax is a taxable service which the Parliament regards as being rendered. The renting of immovable property is an activity which in the legislative wisdom of the Parliament involves a conferment of service and it is in that legislative exercise that the Parliament has proceeded to impose a levy of service tax. The measure of tax u/s.67 is the gross amount charged by the service provider for the service which is provided or which is to be provided by him. In the case of renting of immovable property, the measure is the rental. The measure of the tax does by no means indicate that the tax is a tax imposed on land or buildings.

The Bombay High Court noted that the decision in Godfrey Philips [(2005) 2 SCC 515] is not a decision which elucidates the scope of Entry 49 of List II to the Seventh Schedule. Whereas, the ambit of Entry 49 has been explained in several judgments of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as well as in the judgment of the Bench consisting of seven Judges in Dhillon (supra).

The Bombay High Court reiterated that since properly construed a tax which has been imposed by the Parliament is not in essence and in its true character a tax on land and buildings, the tax cannot nonetheless be held as a tax within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II in spite of the true nature and character of the levy. The essential nature and character of the levy is one which is referable to the residuary power of the Parliament under Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97. The Parliament, it may be noted, introduced Entry 92C into List I by the Constitution (Eighty Eighth Amendment) Act, 2003 to specifically deal with taxes on services. That provision has still not been enforced. In the circumstances, the true nature and character of the levy of service tax in the present case is a levy under the residuary power which has been conferred upon the Parliament.

Whether renting of immovable property has an element of ‘service’?

The Court did not accept the submission of the petitioners that there is no service involved in letting out of the immovable property and, there-fore, it was not open to the Parliament to impose service tax on the supposition that taxable service is involved on the premise that “The submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Parliament when it legislates upon a matter is entitled to make an assessment of fact on the basis of which the legislation is designed and drafted. An underlying assessment of fact by the Parliament on the basis of which a law has been enacted cannot be amenable to judicial review absent a case of manifest arbitrariness. That apart, it is equally well settled that the Legislature in enacting a law is entitled to provide for a deeming fiction …….. The fact that the service which is provided may not, to the petitioners, accord with what is commonly regarded as a service would not militate against the validity of the legislation…….. In the affidavit in reply that has been filed in these proceedings it has been stated that renting of property is considered to add value to the activity of the person who has rented the property. When a person has a property at a particular location, he is able to charge a higher sum for the merchandise sold therefrom than he would be able to charge if he were to sell the same merchandise from a place which does not have the same locational advantage. Renting of a property, it has been submitted, adds value to the activities of a person renting the property.” The Court also referred to the judgment of the SC in the case of Navnitlal C. Jhaveri v. K. K. Sen, Assistant Comm. of I. Tax AIR 1965 SC 1375. [refer paras 28 to 31].

The Court finally decided “Therefore in our view, looked at from either standpoint, the legislative basis that has been adopted by the Parliament in subjecting taxable services involved in the renting of property to the charge of service tax cannot be questioned. The assumption by a legislative body that an element of service is involved in the renting of immovable property is certainly not an assumption which can be regarded by the Court as being so manifestly absurd or perverse as to lead to an inference that the Parliament had treated as a service, an item which in no rational sense could be regarded as involving service. But more significantly, even if the Court were to proceed on the basis, suggested by the petitioners that no element of service is involved, that would not make the legislation beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. So long as the legislation does not trench upon a field which has been reserved to the State Legislatures, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the law must be treated as valid and within the purview of the field set apart for the Parliament. There is, it must be emphasised, no violation set up of any provision in Part III of the Constitution, (save and except on the issue of retrospectivity which would be considered subsequently).”

Retrospectivity:

The Court did not accept the challenge to the legislation on the ground that it is retrospective is lacking in substance by referring to (i) the plenary power of the Parliament to enact legislation, (ii) the Delhi High Court’s judgment in the case of Home Solutions and further observing that: “The provision was given retrospective effect so as to cure the deficiency which was found upon interpretation by the Delhi High Court”, (iii) the affidavit in reply by the UOI, (iv) the SC’s judgment in the case of Bakhtawar Trust v. M. D. Narayan, 2003 5 SCC 298, and (v) to the judgments in the cases of Shubh Timb Steels Limited v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H) and Utkal Builders Limited v. Union of India, 2011 (22) STR 257 (Ori.) wherein the constitutional validity of the provision has been upheld.

Cinemax India Limited’s case
— 2010 TIOL 535 HC AHM-ST:

Petitioners in these petitions challenged the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property on the grounds that:

(i)    The amendment is unconstitutional being beyond legislative competence of the Parliament.
(ii)    The Delhi High Court having held that renting of immovable property is not a service in absence of any value addition, the Union of India can never change the nature of tax by changing the event of transaction.
(iii)    The amendment not being clarificatory cannot be retrospectively enforced.

The Union of India, on the other hand took the ground that renting of immovable property is taxable service if such renting is for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce.

The petitioners inter alia contended that renting of immovable property does not amount to service as it is a transaction whereby rights in or in relation to immovable property is transferred for a certain period for consideration based on market value of the property. It is not an activity involving performance, skill or knowledge on behalf of petitioners, it was also contented that end- use i.e., the use which the licensee/lessee puts the property to cannot be determinative of the nature of transaction or can create a taxable event. At the most, it can bring about valid classification for taxation. The act of the consumer is not value addition for considering an activity a ‘service’. The value addition must be done by the service provider and in this context reliance was placed on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners & Others v. UOI & Others, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) and Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC). Further, with reference to an example it was discussed that when a landlord/licensor has property capable of being used both for residence and/or for commercial purpose, it is an irrational proposal to contend that if it is licensed for commercial use, there is value addition and therefore taxable ‘event’ occurs and no taxable event occurs when provided for residential use. There is no difference per se in the activity.

Whereas, the Revenue inter alia contended that the Legislature defined immovable property for the purpose of taxing event and only when it is used for furtherance of business or commerce, it is taxed and thus it made a class different from what is defined under other enactment like Transfer of Property Act. There is always a value addition when an immovable property is provided for furtherance of business and commerce to the recipient of service. Relying on Tamil Nadu Kalyan Mandap Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC), it was contended that definition of taxable service includes renting in the course of furtherance of business. Like in the case of catering contracts, for the fact that tax on sale of goods is involved does not mean that service tax cannot be levied on the aspect of catering which is a service. The event of making available business premises is rendition of service though it may be an event of leasing or licensing under the Transfer of Property Act and/or Easement Act. Reliance was placed on the case of Shubh Timb Steels Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H). For the purpose of validation of the Act for retrospective amendment relying on Gujarat Ambuja Cement v. UOI, 2005 TIOL 53 SC-ST, it was contended that the amendment cured defect and which was within legislative competence. Relying on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners, 2007

(7)    STR 625 (SC), it was contended that service tax is on value addition by rendition of services. Relying on similar view expressed in Moti Laminates P. Ltd. v. CCE, 1995 (76) ELT 241 (SC) wherein it was held that there is no difference between production and manufacture of saleable goods and production of marketable/saleable services in the form of an activity undertaken by the service provider for consideration.

The Gujarat High Court observed that in normal course of renting of immovable property, service tax is not attracted in absence of any activity in-volving performance, skill, expertise or knowledge. Renting of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce is an activity which amounts to rendition of service in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce. Relying on the decisions of Association of Leasing and Financial Services v. UOI (supra), the Court observed that service tax is a tax on activity, whereas sales tax is a tax on sale of thing or goods. Taxable event under the service tax is each exercise/activity undertaken by the service provider and it is imposed every time service is rendered to customer/client, it is a value added tax. Citing Tamil Nadu Kalyan Mandapam (supra)’s case, it was held that service could not be struck down on the ground that it does not conform to a common understanding of the word, ‘service’ so long as it does not transgress any specific restriction contained in the constitution.

Thus, when a service recipient uses an immovable property in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce, it can safely be stated that the service provider has rendered service enabling the service recipient in value addition. Meaning thereby that such activity undertaken by service provider for value addition in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce i.e., to carry on the activity or business or commerce of the service recipient amounts to rendition of service and will fall within the meaning of the definition of ‘service tax’ and there was no case made out to declare section 65(105)(zzzz) as unconstitutional or ultra-vires any provision of the constitution.

Conclusion:

In summation, various petitions before both the Courts viz. the Bombay High Court and the Gujarat High Court, respectively, have been dismissed upholding the activity of renting/leasing/licensing of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of business as service. In addition thereto, the constitution validity is also upheld as service tax on the activity of renting is not considered a tax on land or buildings. Also the Courts have concluded to the effect that there exists value addition for the recipient or consumer of service when premises are provided for the use of business. The grounds of rejection of petitions by the P&H High Court in Shubh Timb (supra) and the Orissa High Court in Utkal Builders (supra) are not discussed hereinabove. While the Orissa High Court has not dealt with whether or not value addition exists in renting of immovable property or whether it is a necessary ingredient for a transaction to be held as ‘taxable service’, the P&H High Court has observed that even if there is no value addition, the impugned provision cannot be held void. Whereas, all the four High Courts have upheld legislative competence of the Parliament and retrospectivity with a focus on different aspects, it appears that litigation at the level of the Apex Court may mainly revolve around the aspect of value addition and whether or not the tax levied as service tax could be considered a tax on land and buildings.

Bhumiraj Homes Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. S. Syal (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM) ITA No. 2170/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on : 25-3-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Pradip Kapasi/ Naresh Kumar Balodia

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Section 80IB(10) — Deduction in case of housing project — (1) For computation of built-up area for commercial purpose whether proportionate area covered by staircase, passage, lift area and liftroom, etc. is also to be considered — Held, No. (2) While considering the size of the plot whether the unbuilt-up area should be bifurcated in proportion to commercial as well as residential area — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee, a builder developer had claimed a deduction of Rs.2.55 crore u/s.80IB(10) representing the profits of the housing project. In the original assessment deduction u/s.80IB(10) was disallowed to the extent it was relatable to profits of the commercial area. In the re-assessment proceeding u/s.147, the AO disallowed the remaining part of the deduction which was earlier allowed as in his opinion only the projects approved as ‘housing projects’ were eligible and not those approved as ‘residential as well as commercial projects’ by the local authority.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue contended that the commercial area exceeded 10% of the total built-up area computed on the following basis, hence, the order of the AO was to be upheld. It was submitted that:

  • Built-up area for commercial purpose should include proportionate area covered by staircase, passage, lift area and lift-room;
  • While considering the size of the plot, unbuiltup area should be bifurcated in proportion to commercial as well as residential area. Plot size so calculated was less than 1 acre. It also relied on the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal decision in the case of Bengal Abuja Housing Development Ltd. v. DCIT, (ITA No. 1595/Kol./2005, dated 24-3-2006).

Held:
The Tribunal did not agree with the Revenue’s contention that unbuilt-up area should be bifurcated in proportion to commercial as well as residential area. According to it, in any project there would always be some portion of the area which remains unbuilt and is required to be kept open as per the plans approved. According to the Tribunal the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal was not on the point advocated by the Revenue. As regards the contention to include proportionate area covered by staircase, passage, lift area and lift-room, the Tribunal noted that since all shops and commercial establishments were in the ground floor, such areas cannot be considered to compute built-up area for commercial purpose. Further, relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Brahma Associates (ITA No. 1194 of 2010), it allowed the appeal of the assessee.

levitra

(2011) 128 ITD 459/ 9 taxmann.com 121 (Mum.) ACIT v. Safe Enterprises A.Y.: 2005-06.

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Section 143 r.w.s. 133A — Assessee can retract the admission made during survey in respect of concealed income with sufficient evidence and hence no addition of the said amount can be made.

Facts:
The assessee-firm was engaged in the business of civil contracts. During the course of survey, it was noticed that three invoices amounting to Rs. 76,33,179 were not entered into the books of accounts. The AO hence concluded that the labour receipts were suppressed. The partner of the firm agreed to the above findings and offered Rs.76 lakhs as additional income on that account.

However, in the immediate post-survey proceedings, the assessee was able to produce all the related documents before the assessing authority, thus retracting his earlier admission. The Assessing Officer made addition of the impugned amount despite retraction by the assessee. On appeal to the CIT(A) by the assessee the learned CIT(A) considered the matter in great detail and ultimately deleted the said additions. Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.

Held:

1. Survey is essentially an evidence gathering exercise. It is an established position of law that if a disclosure is made by the assessee either under mistaken belief of facts and law due to mental pressure from the survey party or under coercion, he can retract the statement and the admission so made.

2. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Pullan Gode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala that admission was an extremely important piece of evidence, but it cannot be said to be conclusive. It is open to the person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect.

3. Also it was held in CIT v. Ramdas Motor Transport and Jaikishin R. Agarwal v. ACIT that if the admission in the statement is not supported by any asset or document, the retraction may be genuine.

4. The assessee, in the post-survey proceedings as well as assessment proceedings had amply demonstrated through credible evidence the source of labour receipts.

Consequently, the ITAT upheld the order of the CIT(A).

levitra

(2011) TIOL 530 ITAT-Kol. ITO v. Rajesh Kr. Garg A.Y.: 2006-2007.

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Sections 40(a)(ia), 194C — When tax was not deducted at source on the basis of Form 15I received by the assessee from the payee and the assessee failed to file Form 15J with the jurisdictional CIT, disallowance cannot be made merely on the basis that the Form 15J was not filed in time with the jurisdictional CIT.

Facts:
The assessee, engaged in business of transportation of goods through hired trucks, made payments aggregating to Rs.28.01 lakhs in respect of 42 vehicles and actual payment was exceeding Rs.50,000 per vehicle, without deduction of tax at source since it had received declarations from the payees in Form 15I. However, the assessee did not file Form 15J within the prescribed time to the jurisdictional CIT. The Assessing Officer disallowed the sum of Rs.28.01 lakhs u/s.40(a)(ia), though the declarations were produced before him in the course of assessment proceedings, on the ground that the authenticity of receiving Form 15I is not discharged due to non-filing of Form 15J with the jurisdictional CIT. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) stated that the Act does not say that Form 15I is to be treated as non-est due to non-filing of Form 15J by the assessee with the jurisdictional CIT. He held that Form 15I comes into effect before the actual payment or crediting to the account takes place, whereas the due date for furnishing the particulars in Form 15J is 30th June following the financial year. The appellant was to stop deduction of tax on payments as and when he received Form 15I from the sub-contractor. He also observed that the AO had not doubted the existence of Form 15I at the time of making the payment by the assessee. He deleted the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Before the Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that this issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of ITAT, Mumbai ‘F’ Bench in the case of Shri Vipin P. Mehta v. ITO, (ITA No. 3317/Mum./2010, A.Y. 2006-07, order dated 20th May, 2011) and also by the decision of Ahmedabad ‘A’ Bench in the case of Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad v. Dy. CIT, (OSD) (ITA No. 2228/Ahd./2009, A.Y. 2006-07, order dated 29-4-2011).

The Tribunal found that the assessee had obtained Form 15I and filed during the course of assessment proceedings but failed to file Form 15J with the jurisdictional CIT. The Tribunal found the issue to be covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Vipin P. Mehta (supra). Following the ratio laid down by the said decision, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and deleted the addition made by the AO.

The Tribunal decided this ground of appeal in favour of the assessee.

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(2011) TIOL 511 ITAT-Mum. Manali Investments v. ACIT A.Y.: 2005-06.

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Sections 2(29A), 2(29B), 2(42A), 2(42B), 48, 49, 50 and 74 — Brought forward long-term capital loss can be set-off against capital gain computed u/s.50 in respect of a long-term capital asset.

Facts:
The assessee, engaged in the business of finance and investments, sold meters and transformers, which were its depreciable assets, for a consideration of Rs.1,45,99,988. The gain arising on such sale was shown as long-term capital gain. The AO noticed that these meters and transformers were purchased in earlier years for a consideration of Rs.8,75,99,928 and on these 100% depreciation was claimed and allowed in the respective first year itself. The AO invoked the provisions of section 50 and regarded the gain to be short-term capital gain. The assessee, placing reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Ace Builders Pvt. Ltd., (281 ITR 210) (Bom.) contended that such profit on sale of meters and transformers, which were otherwise long-term capital assets, was required to be considered as long-term capital gain for the purposes of set-off against brought forward loss arising on transfer of long-term capital assets. The AO rejected this contention of the assessee and treated the amount of Rs.145.99 lakhs as short-term capital gain on sale of assets which resulted into not allowing set-off against brought forward loss from the long-term capital assets.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The effect of section 50 is that once depreciation has been allowed under this Act on a capital asset which forms part of a block of assets, then capital gain on the transfer of such assets shall not be computed in accordance with the provisions of sections 48 and 49, but the income so resulting shall be deemed to be the capital gains arising from the transfer of short-term capital assets in the manner provided in the latter section. Section 50 is a deeming provision and only by legal fiction income from the transfer of otherwise long-term capital assets (held for a period of more than 36 months) is treated as capital gains arising from the transfer of short-term capital assets. Such deeming provision has to be restricted only up to the point which has been covered within the provisions of section 50. The prescription of section 50 is to be extended only up to computation of capital gains. Once the amount of capital gain is determined in case of depreciable assets as per this section, ignoring the mandate of sections 48 and 49 which otherwise deal with the mode of computation of capital gains, the function of this provision shall come to an end and the capital gain so determined shall be dealt with as per the other provisions of the Act. If the assessee is otherwise eligible for any benefit under the Act which is attached to a longterm capital asset, the same shall remain intact. It cannot be denied simply for the reason that on the transfer of such a long-term capital asset, the short-term capital gain has been computed as per section 50.

There can be two stages, viz. firstly, the computation of capital gain on the transfer of otherwise longterm capital assets u/s.50 and secondly, when such capital gain has been so computed, the applicability of other provisions dealing with the short-term or long-term capital assets.

As has been held in the case of Ace Builders (supra), the view that by virtue of the operation of section 50, the capital gain so computed becomes that arising from the transfer of a short-term capital asset for all purposes is incorrect.

The effect of provision of section 74 is that the brought forward loss from long-term capital assets can be set off only against long-term capital gain within the period prescribed in s.s(2) of section 74.

In the instant case, capital gain has arisen from the transfer of an asset which was held for a period of more than three years and no long-term capital gain has entered into the computation of total income of the assessee on this transaction. This amount would also retain the character of long-term capital gain for all other provisions and consequently qualify for set-off against the brought forward loss from the long-term capital assets.

The appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.

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Insurance business: Section 44: A.Y. 2002-03: The amount set apart by insurance company towards solvency margin as per directions given by IRDA is to be excluded while computing actuarial valuation surplus: Pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund would continue to be governed by provisions of section 44, irrespective of fact that income from such fund is exempted.

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[CIT v. Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd., 201 Taxman 115 (Bom.); 12 Taxman.com 388 (Bom.)]

The assessee was engaged in the life insurance business. In its return of income for the A.Y. 2002-03, it computed actuarial valuation surplus by excluding the provision for reserve on account of solvency margin amounting to Rs.3,500 crores and loss in Jeevan Suraksha Fund. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee and passed the assessment order by adding the amount on account of the provision for solvency margin and loss from Jeevan Suraksha Fund, inter alia, on the ground that the provision for solvency margin was not an ascertained liability; and that income from Jeevan Suraksha Fund being exempt u/s.10(23AAB), the loss incurred from the said fund could not be adjusted against the taxable income. The Tribunal deleted the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) A plain reading of Rule 2 of the First Schedule to the Act, makes it clear that the annual average of the surplus from the insurance business has to be arrived at by adjusting the surplus or deficit disclosed by the actuarial valuation made in accordance with the Insurance Act, 1938.

(ii) In the instant case, the Chairman of IRDA had directed that the solvency calculations of the assessee did not conform to the requirements of the Regulations that have been stipulated by the Regulatory Authority. It was further directed that the deficiency in the solvency margin was to the extent of Rs.10,000 crores and the assessee was directed to set right the said deficiency over a period of three years by making a provision which would be kept apart in the policy-holders’ fund and no part of the said provision would be available for distribution either to the policy-holders or to the Government of India. Accordingly, the assessee had set apart Rs.3,500 crores towards solvency margin in the assessment year in question.

(iii) The Tribunal, after considering various decisions of the Apex Court as also, the High Court and section 64(VA) of the Insurance Act, 1938, held that the amounts set apart towards the solvency margin as per the directions given by the IRDA was ascertained liability which was required to be set apart as per the Regulations framed by IRDA and, hence, liable to be excluded while computing the actuarial valuation surplus.

(iv) In those circumstances, the decision of the Tribunal in holding that the funds set apart as solvency margin had to be excluded while determining the distributable profits of the assessee could not be faulted.

(v) So far as loss incurred by the assessee from Jeevan Suraksha Fund was concerned, the Jeevan Suraksha Fund is a pension fund approved by the Controller of Insurance appointed by the Central Government to perform the duties of the Controller of Insurance under the Insurance Act. The loss incurred in the Jeevan Suraksha Fund has been considered by the actuary as a business loss, as per the valuation report as on the last day of the financial year, allowable u/s.44 read with the First Schedule to the Act. The fact that the income from such fund has been exempted u/s.10(23AAB) w.e.f. 1-4-1997, does not mean that the pension fund ceases to be insurance business, so as to fall outside the purview of the insurance business covered u/s.44.

(vi) In other words, the pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund would continue to be governed by the provisions of section 44, irrespective of the fact that the income from such fund is exempted, or not. Therefore, while determining the surplus from the insurance business, the actuary was justified in taking into consideration the loss incurred under Jeevan Suraksha Fund.

(vii) The object of inserting section 10(23AAB) as per the Board Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998 was to enable the assessee to offer attractive terms to the contributors. Thus, the object of inserting section 10(23AAB) was not with a view to treat the pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund outside the purview of insurance business, but to promote insurance business by exempting the income from such fund.

(viii) Therefore, in the facts of the instant case, the decision of the Tribunal in holding that even after insertion of section 10(23AAB), the loss incurred from the pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund had to be excluded while determining the actuarial valuation surplus from the insurance business u/s.44 could not be faulted.”

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(2011) 39 VST 213 (Bom.) Addl. Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bunge India P. Ltd.

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Rate of tax — Margarine — Hydrogenated oil — Vanaspati — Taxable at 4% — Schedule Entry C-100 of Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

Facts:
The Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, filed an appeal to the Bombay High Court, against the decision of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, dated July, 9 2010, holding that margarine sold under the brand name ‘Lotus Margarine’ is vanaspati within the meaning of Schedule Entry C-100 of the MVAT Act, 2002 and is taxable at 4%. The High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the Tribunal.

Held:
(i) As per the opinion of the expert, margarine is a food in plastic form or liquid emulsion containing not less than 80% fat oil, vanaspati and margarine, all are essentially mixed triglycerides of the fatty acid. Oil and vanaspati contained moisture only in trace quantities, whereas margarine being formulated product contained about 12 to 16% moisture and other additives. Margarine is formulated using hydrogenated vegetable oil.

(ii) The High Court took in to account the fact that the margarine produced by other manufacturers viz., Kamani or Godrej is taxable at 4%, so under the principle of parity margarine which is produced by the respondent is rightly made taxable at 4% by the Tribunal.

(iii) Further, during the period from 2006 to 2008 the margarine produced by the respondent was classified in Schedule C, Entry 100 as vanaspati and was taxable at 4% till the decision of the AO, so there is no need to change the view.

(iv) Accordingly, the High Court affirmed the view taken by the Tribunal holding that margarine is vanaspati to be classified under Schedule C, Entry 100 of the MVAT Act, 2002 and taxable at 4%.

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(2011) 39 VST 191 (WBTT) Shri Rameshkumar Mehta and Another v. Commercial Tax Officer

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Sales tax — Refund — Dealer entitled to refund as per returns filed where assessment is set aside as time-barred — Sections 30, 45(1) and 60 of West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994.

Facts:
The dealer applied for refund of excess payment as per returns filed and amount paid after assessment under compulsion, where assessment order was set aside by the Tribunal being barred by limitation. The Department rejected his application against which dealer filed an application before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal. Since there was difference in opinion between technical and judicial members, the matter was referred to the Full Bench for decision.

Held:

(1) Absence of an assessment order does not and cannot mean that the assessee’s tax liability under the Act remains uncertified or un-quantified. If the assessment is not made, then the assessee’s tax liability gets quantified as per the amount of tax payable on the basis of the return figures. If the assessment is made, tax liability is quantified as determined/ assessed amount.

(2) Setting aside of an assessment order on the ground that it was time-barred and failure to pass an assessment order have the same legal impact.

(3) Section 60 of the Act providing for grant of refund did not confine refund only to excess payments made after an assessment order.

(4) Accordingly, the dealer is entitled to get refund of tax paid in excess, if the tax payable under the Act, even if excess payment is made voluntarily, if there is no unjust enrichment thereby. Accordingly, the application was allowed with direction to grant refund of TDS as well as paid after the assessment.

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(2011) 23 STR 399 (Tri.-Chennai) — Perambalur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy.

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Demand raised under Cargo handling agency
services — Cenvat credit on GTA services denied for want of proper
documents — CBEC’s Circular F.No. B-11/1/2002-TRU, dated 1-8-2002 — Once
activity not leviable and service tax paid, credit eligible — Demand
set aside.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in the
activity of loading or unloading of cargo and were paying service tax
under the category of GTA services. The demand of service tax was raised
on the ground that the services rendered by the appellants were in fact
‘Cargo handling services’ and the Cenvat credit was inadmissible as the
same was taken without any prescribed documents. The appellants
submitted that in light of the CBEC’s Circular F.No. B-11/1/2002-TRU,
dated 1-8-2002, individuals undertaking the activity of loading or
unloading cargo would not be liable to service tax as ‘Cargo handling
agency’.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that once the
activity itself was held not to be leviable to service tax and the
service tax was paid at the insistence of the Department, the assessees
were entitled to claim Cenvat credit. Accordingly, the demand together
with interest and penalty was set aside.

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(2011) 23 STR 392 (Tri.-Del.) — Small Industries & Development Bank of India v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh.

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Banking and other financial services — Whether foreclosure of loan is towards rendering of service or is ending of service and whether the same can be treated as lending of service.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing banking and financial services. The dispute arose in relation to the amount of Rs.8,06,059 collected on account of premium on pre-payment of direct loans from their customers 1-9-2004 to 31-3-2006. The demand of Rs.82,215 was confirmed against the appellants treating the amount collected as service charges received for services rendered under the category of banking and financial services. The appellants inter alia submitted that the amount received towards re-scheduling of loan and foreclosure of loan is not towards rendering any services and is in fact a case of ending the services.

Held:
Reflecting on the definition of ‘Banking and financial services’ as provided in section 65(10) of the Finance Act, 1994 during the relevant period, the Tribunal observed that the authorities did not indicate as to which sub-clause of the definition of the activity foreclosure falls under. Foreclosure premium was kind of a compensation for possible loss of interest revenue on the loan amount returned by the customers. Setting aside the appeal, it was held that the activity of foreclosure could not be treated as ‘Banking and financial services’.

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(2011) 23 STR 385 (Tri.-Del.) — Rajasthan State Warehousing Corp. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Demand — Amount collected by assessee in relation to handling, transportation and supervision charges while providing storage and warehousing charges — Service tax paid when pointed out by Department.

Held: No intention to evade tax — Extended period not invocable — Demand, interest and penalty be consequently reduced — Penalty u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 set aside.

Facts:
The appellants were a public sector undertaking engaged in the business of warehousing fertilisers and other items and were registered with the service tax authorities for payment of service tax on ‘Storage and warehousing charges’. During the audit conducted by the service tax authorities, it was observed that the appellants were recovering supervising charges from their customers which was being paid to the handling and transportation contractors appointed by them. The appellant started paying service tax on handling and transportation charges as also supervision charges under the ‘Cargo handling services’. A show-cause notice was issued against the appellants demanding tax as ‘Cargo handling services’ rendered during the past and sevice tax demand of Rs. 79,43,447 was confirmed against the appellants along with interest and penalty. The appellants inter alia contended that there was no intention to evade service tax and failure to pay service tax was due to the non-understanding of the appellants regarding the term ‘Cargo handling agency’ services provided by them. Therefore, the demand for period beyond 12 months be dropped.

Held:
The Tribunal considering the status of the appellants as a public sector undertaking and their conduct after the matter was pointed out to them held that there was no intention to evade payment of tax. Demand, interest and penalty u/s.75 was to be paid in respect of normal period and the penalty u/s.78 was held as not maintainable.

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(2011) 23 STR 375 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Galaxy Data Processing Centre.

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Business Auxiliary service — Computerisation of energy billing for Rajasthan State Electricity Board — Assessee feeding data provided by clients in computer network system with the software created specially for the client — No service undertaken on behalf of client as having no contact with customers — Work using custom-made software classifiable as Information Technology service.

Facts:
The appellants were ordered by Rajasthan State Electricity Board (RSEB) for computerisation of energy billing and related MIS, relevant formats, performas and information, for which the appellant developed a software only for RSEB. SCN was issued alleging that the services rendered by them amounted to BAS and thus service tax was payable and penalties were leviable. On appeal by the party, the Commissioner concluded that service rendered were in the nature of information technology service which is not included under the category of business service. Relying on the decision in the case of Dataware Computers & Ors. v. CCE & CST (Appeals), Guntur 2008 (87) RLT 325 (CESTAT-Bang.), the appellants contended that they have merely undertaken computer-enabled service of data processing and generation of reports and bills which came under Information Technologies service and not under BAS.

Held:
It was observed that the assessee had not undertaken any service on behalf of their clients as they did not have contract with the customer of their clients and were not issuing bills directly to the customers of their clients. The work of data processing using custom-made software deserves to be considered as Information Technology services. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and penalty set aside.

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Deduction u/s.10A: A.Y. 2004-05: Export proceeds received beyond 6 months: RBI approval under FEMA: Sufficient compliance u/s.10A: Amount received late entitled to deduction.

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[CIT v. Morgan Stanley Advantage Services Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.), ITA No. 4027 of 2010, dated 30-8-2011]

The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A.Y. 2004-05, for availing benefit u/s.10A, the assessee was required to realise the export proceeds by 30-9-2004. The assessee received export proceeds of Rs.2.20 crores in December 2004. On 7-10-2004, the assessee had made an application to the RBI seeking extension of time for realisation of the export proceeds. Reminders were sent on 24-1-2007 and 30-3-2007. By its letter dated 25-4-2007, the RBI confirmed the realisation of the amount under the provisions of FEMA. There was no separate approval under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the said amount of Rs.2.20 crores u/s.10A of the Act. The Tribunal held that once the assessee has applied for extension and has completed all the formalities and in response the RBI has taken the remittance on record, then non-issuance of a formal letter of approval by the RBI cannot be held against the assessee for none of its fault. The Tribunal further held that in the facts of the present case, it must be held that the extension has been granted in substance and, therefore, the benefit of section 10A has to be allowed to the assessee on the ground that the extension is deemed to have been granted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In our opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal. In the present case, the note appended to the RBI’s letter dated 25-4-2007 no doubt records that the approval granted by the RBI is under FEMA and the said approval should not be construed as approval by any Authority or Government under any other laws/regulations. The question is, whether the extension of time for realisation of the export proceeds by the Competent Authority under FEMA can be said to be the approval granted by the Competent Authority u/s.10A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

(ii) ‘Competent Authority’ in section 10A means the RBI or such other Authority as is authorised under any law for the time being in force for regulating payments and dealings in foreign exchange. Admittedly, RBI is the Competent Authority under FEMA which regulates the payments and dealings in foreign exchange. Thus, what section 10A(3) of the Act provides is that the benefits u/s.10A(1) would be available if the export proceeds are realised within the time prescribed by the Competent Authority under FEMA. In the present case, the competent authority under FEMA, namely, the RBI, has granted approval in respect of the export proceeds realised by the assessee till December, 2004. Therefore, the approval granted by RBI under FEMA would meet the requirements of section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In other words, once the competent authority under FEMA which regulates the payments and dealings in foreign exchange has approved realisation of the export proceeds by the assessee till December 2004, then it meets the requirements of section 10A(3) and consequently the assessee would be entitled to the benefits u/s.10A(1) of the Act.

(iii) Moreover, in the present case, the RBI which is the Competent Authority under FEMA as also u/s.10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has neither declined nor rejected the application made by the assessee seeking extension of time u/s.10A of the Act. Therefore, the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in holding that the approval granted under FEMA constitutes a deemed approval granted by the RBI u/s.10A(3) of the Act cannot be faulted.”

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Business income/House property income: Rent from leave and licence of office premises: Assessable as business income.

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[The Scientific Instrument Co. Ltd. v. CIT (All.), ITA No. 1 of 2003, dated 12-8-2011]

The assessee company was carrying on business of import and sale of scientific instruments. It purchased premises at Nariman Point, Mumbai in 1982 and had its regional office there. In November 1987, the assessee gave the property on leave-and-licence basis to Citibank. The rental income so received was offered to tax by the assessee as ‘business profits’. The Assessing Officer assessed the income as ‘income from house property’. The Tribunal upheld the assessment.

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In Universal Plast Ltd. v. CIT, 237 ITR 454 (SC), tests were laid down as to when income from property is assessable as ‘business profit’ and as ‘income from house property’.

(ii) Applying these tests, the rental income has to be assessed as ‘business profits’ because

(a) All assets of the business were not rented out by the assessee and it continued the main business of dealing in scientific apparatus, etc.

(b) The property was being used for the regional office and was let out by way of exploitation of business assets for making profit.
(c) The assessee had not sold away the properties or abandoned its business activities. The transaction is a ‘commercial venture’ taken in order to exploit business assets and for receiving higher income from commercial assets.”

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Offences and prosecution — False verification in return — Since the signature on return was not disputed at the time of assessment and penalty proceedings, it amounted to admission and the accused could not have been acquitted for the reason that prosecution was not able to prove the signature of the accused.

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[ITO v. Mangat Ram Norata Ram Narwana & Anr., (2011) 336 ITR 624 (SC)]

M/s.
Mangat Ram Norata Ram is a partnership firm carrying on the business of
sale and purchase of machinery, iron pipes and spare parts. One Mr. Hem
Raj happened to be one of its partners. M/s. Mangat Ram Norata Ram
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the firm’) filed its income-tax return for
the A.Y. 1988-89 on July 14, 1988 through its counsel, which was signed
and verified by Hem Raj, its partner. The income-tax return showed the
income of the firm Rs.1,02,800. Return was accompanied by statement of
income, trading accounts, profit and loss account, partnership account
and balance sheet for the A.Y. 1988-89. The assessment was completed by
the then Income-tax Officer u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act for
Rs.1,47,370.

The books of account of the firm were taken into
possession by the Sales Tax Department, which were obtained by the
Income-tax Department and on its perusal, discrepancies relating to
entries of income, sale and purchase, bank account, etc., were noticed
and accordingly a notice u/s.148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was issued requiring the
respondents to furnish a revised return within 30 days. The respondents
did not comply with the notice and thereafter notice u/s.142(1) of the
Act was issued and the assessee-firm ultimately filed its incometax
return declaring its income of Rs.1,47,870. This return was said to be
duly signed and furnished by the accused Hem Raj, which was accompanied
by a revised statement of income, trading account and profit and loss
account. All these documents were also signed by the accused Hem Raj. On
consideration of the same, the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
made addition of Rs.1,28,000 with the trading account, Rs.1,10,000 in
the bank account and Rs.19,710 as additional income and assessed the
total income to Rs.3,68,200 and directed for initiating penalty
proceedings.

Ultimately, the minimum penalty of Rs.1,24,950 was
imposed u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act and further a sum of Rs.7,890 and
Rs.12,680 u/s.271(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent firm filed appeal
against the imposition of penalty which was dismissed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The respondents had paid the
penalty inflicted on the firm.

A complaint was also lodged for
prosecution of the respondents u/s.276C(1), 277 and 278 of the Act. The
Trial Court on appraisal of the evidence held both the respondents
guilty and awarded a fine of Rs.1,000 each u/s.276C(1), 277 and 278 of
the Act to the firm, whereas, Hem Raj was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine Rs.1,000 on each count and
in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months.

The
firm and Hem Raj aggrieved by their conviction and sentence preferred
appeal and the Appellate Court set aside the conviction and sentence on
the ground that sanction for prosecution was not valid. The Appellate
Court further held that the prosecution has not been able to prove the
signature of Hem Raj in the return filed, and hence, the conviction is
bad on that ground also. The Income-tax Officer aggrieved by the
acquittal of the accused preferred an appeal and the High Court by its
impugned judgment upheld the order of the acquittal and while doing so
observed that the sanction is valid but maintained the order of
acquittal on the ground that the prosecution has not been able to prove
that the return was signed/verified by Hem Raj.

On further
appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the prosecution had led evidence
to prove that the revised return was filed by the firm under the name
of the accused Hem Raj and on that basis assessment was made by the
assessing authority. There is further evidence to show that aggrieved by
the order of assessing authority, an appeal was preferred before the
Appellate Authority under the signature of the accused Hem Raj, which
was dismissed and the penalty was paid. At no point of time the accused
Hem Raj made any objection that the return did not bear his signature
and was not filed by him. It is trite that admission is the best
evidence against the maker and it can be inferred from the conduct of
the party. Admission implied by conduct is strong evidence against the
maker, but he is at liberty to prove that such admission was mistaken or
untrue. By proving conduct of the accused Hem Raj in not raising any
dispute at any point of time and paying the penalty, the prosecution has
proved his admission of filing and signing the return. Once the
prosecution has proved that, it was for the accused Hem Raj to
demonstrate that he did not sign the return. There is no statutory
requirement that signature on the return has to be made in the presence
of the income-tax authority. Nothing has been brought in evidence by the
accused Hem Raj that the signature did not belong to him on the return
and the penalty was paid mistakenly. The Supreme Court was of the view
that the Appellate Court had misdirected itself in not considering the
evidence in a right perspective and acquitting the accused, so also the
High Court which failed to correct the apparent error.

Accordingly,
the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and the impugned orders were set
aside and the judgment of conviction passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate was restored. However, the Supreme Court reduced the
substantive sentence from one year to six months on each count and they
were directed to run concurrently.

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BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING — IMPLICATIONS U/S.56(2)(viia)

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The Finance Bill, 2010 witnessed the introduction of a new provision in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (IT Act), being the insertion of clause (viia) to sub-section (2) of section 56 of the IT Act, with effect from 1st day of June 2010.

Until such time, only individuals and Hindu Undivided Families (HUF) were covered within the provisions of section 56(2). As explained in the Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2010, clause (viia) was inserted in section 56(2) to prevent the practice of transferring shares of an unlisted company without consideration or at a price lower than the Fair Market Value (FMV) and to bring it under the tax net.

The legislative intent behind introduction of this provision was to prevent laundering of unaccounted income under the pretext of gifts, especially after abolition of the Gift Tax Act. Hence, these provisions are in the nature of anti-abuse provisions.

These provisions apply only if the recipient of shares is a company and in which public are not substantially interested or a firm. The term ‘firm’ has now been inclusively defined u/s.2(23)(i) to include a Limited Liability Partnership as defined (LLP), under the LLP Act, 2008.

We reproduce below the relevant extract of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act:

“(viia) where a firm or a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, receives, in any previous year, from any person or persons, on or after the 1st day of June, 2010, any property, being shares of a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, —

(i) without consideration, the aggregate fair market value of which exceeds fifty thousand rupees, the whole of the aggregate fair market value of such property;

(ii) for a consideration which is less than the aggregate fair market value of the property by an amount exceeding fifty thousand rupees, the aggregate fair market value of such property as exceeds such consideration:

Provided that this clause shall not apply to any such property received by way of a transaction not regarded as transfer under clause (via) or clause (vic) or clause (vicb) or clause (vid) or clause (vii) of section 47.

Explanation — For the purposes of this clause, ‘fair market value’ of a property, being shares of a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation to clause (vii);”

The provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act are therefore, attracted upon fulfilling of the following conditions:

(a) Recipient is a firm or a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, as defined u/s.2(18) of the IT Act closely held company;
(b) Transferor can be any person;
(c) Recipient must ‘receive’ shares of a closely-held company; and
(d) Shares should be received without consideration or for inadequate consideration.

Therefore any receipt of shares of a closely-held company, without consideration or for inadequate consideration, is taxable in the hands of the recipient.

For the purposes of this section, consideration would be deemed to be inadequate, if the difference between the actual consideration and the FMV (to be determined as per prescribed Valuation Rules) of the property exceeds Rs.50,000.

As per Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, the FMV of unquoted shares is to be determined as under:

(a) Equity shares: Book value of the shares to be computed as follows:

(A – L) x (PV)
—————-
(PE)

Where,
A = Book value of the assets in balance sheet as reduced by any amount paid as advance tax under the Income-tax Act and any amount shown in the balance sheet including the debit balance of the profit and loss account or the profit and loss appropriation account which does not represent the value of any asset.

L = Book value of liabilities shown in the balance sheet but not including the following amounts —

(i) the paid-up capital in respect of equity shares;

(ii) the amount set apart for payment of dividends on preference shares and equity shares where such dividends have not been declared before the date of transfer at a general body meeting of the company;

(iii) reserves, by whatever name called, other than those set apart towards depreciation;

(iv) credit balance of the profit and loss account;

(v) any amount representing provision for taxation, other than amount paid as advance tax under the Income-tax Act, to the extent of the excess over the tax payable with reference to the book profits in accordance with the law applicable thereto;

(vi) any amount representing provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities;

(vii) any amount representing contingent liabilities other than arrears of dividends payable in respect of cumulative preference shares.

PE = Total amount of paid-up equity share capital as shown in balance sheet.

PV = the paid-up value of such equity shares.

Please note, here FMV does not imply the actual market value of the shares at which shares may be transacted between parties. It is the value of shares as determined based on book value of the assets and liabilities of the company.

(b) Other than equity shares: Price which the shares will fetch in the open market, to be determined by a valuation report of a Merchant Banker or a Chartered Accountant.

If, in case the company has issued Compulsory Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS), then unless it has been actually converted to equity shares, it would be regarded as ‘other shares’. Thus, on any transfer of CCPS before its conversion, one will have to consider its market value, as stated above, to ascertain the implications u/s.56(2)(viia).

The tax officer is given the power to refer the questions of FMV of equity shares and other shares, to a valuation officer. For this purpose, necessary changes have been made u/s.142A(1) of the IT Act, with effect from 1st July 2010.

In order to avoid hardships in genuine cases, certain exceptions have been provided in the said provision as listed below:
(a) Receipt of shares in an Indian company by amalgamating foreign company from the amalgamated foreign company, in a scheme of amalgamation;

(b) Receipt of shares in an Indian company by resulting foreign company from the demerged foreign company, in a scheme of demerger;

(c) Receipt of shares in case of business reorganisations of a co-operative bank;

(d) Receipt of shares in the resulting company by the shareholders of the demerged company, under a scheme of demerger; and

(e) Receipt of shares in the amalgamated company by the shareholders of the amalgamating company, under a scheme of amalgamation.

Thus, the receipt of shares of a closely-held company, for reasons, other than as mentioned above, would attract the provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act.

It is pertinent to note that corresponding amendments to section 49 by insertion of sub-section (4) have been incorporated, so as to provide that if provisions of section 56(2)(viia) are invoked, then the FMV of the shares so determined would be regarded as the ‘cost of acquisition’ in the hands of the recipient. This is to ensure that once the recipient is taxed on the differential value of the consideration, i.e., difference between FMV and the actual consideration, then such recipient is entitled to add such value towards its cost of acquisition of the shares.

The applicability of these provisions to certain transactions which are not specifically included in the list of exceptions will have to be judged by interpretation of the provisions as they read vis-à-vis the actual legislative intent. A strict interpretation may lead to absurd results while digging the legislative intent may lead to a liberal interpretation.

In this article, we have dealt with certain peculiar situations which may arise in corporate restructuring.

1.    Receipt of shares pursuant to fresh issue of shares at a price less than FMV or issue of bonus shares by the company

In case, where a closely-held company restructures its capital base, it may consider the option of further issue/rights issue to new/existing shareholders. Unlike listed companies which are subject to pricing guidelines on preferential allotment, closely-held companies are free to issue shares at a price as decided by its board of directors.

Thus, legally a closely-held company is entitled to issue shares at less than the book value of its existing shares, being the FMV for the purposes of section 56(2). Now, whether such an issue of shares at less than FMV can be covered within the ambit of section 56(2)(viia)? Also, would there be any taxability u/s.56(2)(viia) in case of bonus issue by a company which due to its very nature would always be received by the shareholders without any consideration?

The application of section 56(2)(viia) to allotment of bonus does not seem to be the legislative intent. This is supported by the Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2010 which indicates that section 56(2)(viia) ought to apply only in case of ‘transfer’ of shares. In case of allotment of shares, there is no ‘transfer’ of shares. Further, even the meaning of the words ‘receives any property’ contemplates that the property should be in existence before it can be received. Whereas, in case of issue of shares by a company, shares come into existence only at the time of allotment.

Additionally, in case of bonus issue, it is a case of capitalisation of reserves which in any case belong to the shareholders. Therefore, the shareholders do not receive shares without consideration, rather what they receive is in lieu of an existing right in the profits of the company. Hence, 56(2)(viia) ought not to apply to a bonus issue.

2.    Conversion of debentures into equity shares at a pre-agreed value

Similar to issue of equity shares, it is common for companies to issue debentures which are convertible into equity shares of the company at a later date. At the time of issue of such instrument, the subscriber would have paid the entire value of the debenture and would have agreed to the terms and conditions regarding the conversion ratio of debentures into equity shares.

A question that arises is at the time of actual conversion of debentures, if the FMV of the equity shares is higher than the price paid by the debenture holders to acquire the debentures, would section 56(2)(viia) apply?

Similar to the issue of equity shares for cash, on conversion of debentures, the company would issue equity shares to debenture-holder in consideration of the value of the debentures being surrendered to the company. On allotment of shares by the company at the time of conversion of debenture, new shares are brought into existence at such point of time and hence section 56(2)(viia) ought not to apply on conversion of debentures into equity shares.

3.    Implications for non-resident recipients

Section    56(2)(viia) does    not make any distinction between resident and non-resident companies/ firms. Therefore, receipt of any shares of a closely held company by a non-resident without consideration or for an inadequate consideration would be taxable as ‘Income from other sources’ under the IT Act.

However, if the non-resident is a resident of a foreign country with which India has entered into a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), his taxability in India would depend on the relevant DTAA. Under the DTAA, the said income may be governed by the Article dealing with ‘Other Income’. It may be noted that the DTAAs entered by India with countries like Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Mauritius, etc., provide that ‘Other Income’ earned by a resident of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in the Contracting State where the taxpayer is resident, except if the tax-payer carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment (PE) or the person provides independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein. In other words, section 56(2)(viia) may not apply to a non-resident, if he does not have a PE or fixed base in India.

If the non-resident is a resident of a foreign country with which India has not entered into a DTAA, then the provision of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act would apply and income earned by such non-resident would be subject to tax in India.

4.    Sale of an undertaking comprising of shares on a slump-sale basis

When a closely-held company acquires an ‘undertaking’ by way of a ‘slump sale’ and the undertaking, inter alia, comprises of shares of a company in which public are not substantially interested, whether it can be said that provisions of section 56(2)(viia) get attracted.

In such a case, can it be said that the transfer is of certain assets and liabilities as a whole for a lump sum consideration and that it would not be possible to artificially allocate consideration towards the shares, which form part of the undertaking?

Even if one were to ignore the practical difficulty, section 56(2)(viia) should not apply to sale of an undertaking, because the words used in section 56(2)(viia) are ‘receives any property, being shares of a company …….’ which means that the property being transferred/received should be shares of a company. In case of sale of an undertaking, the property being transferred would be an ‘undertaking’ and not ‘shares’ per se. To attract section 56(2)(viia), the subject matter of receipt should be ‘property being shares’ and not property being an undertaking which may include shares of a company in which public are not substantially interested. Several Court decisions have recognised ‘undertaking’ as a distinct capital asset or a distinct property. If sale of an undertaking on a slump sale is viewed as a sale of individual assets like plant and machinery, shares, etc. and subjected to section 56(2)(viia), it would go to diluting the meaning of slump sale.

However, the above argument may be looked at differently by the Revenue authorities, in case of transfer of an undertaking where the undertaking comprises only of shares of a company, i.e., an Investment Division.

5.    Capital reduction/Buyback of shares

Amongst others, companies resort to capital reduction u/s.100-103 of the Companies Act as part of their corporate restructuring. One of the ways of doing capital reduction is by way of cancellation of shares either partially or fully (in case a class of shares is being cancelled). Depending on the purpose of capital reduction and the liquidity in the company, the board of directors may decide to pay the shareholders certain amount of consideration per share. In case of closely-held companies, the FMV as defined for the purpose of section 56(2)(viia) of the shares may or may not be relevant in deciding the consideration on cancellation of shares. Post introduction of section 56(2)(viia), the issue is whether this section will get attracted in the hands of a company if the consideration paid is less than the FMV of the shares cancelled.

On the same lines, can it be said that a buyback of shares by a closely-held company u/s.77A of the Companies Act, 1956 will attract the provisions of 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act?

The key issue here is whether the meaning of the words ‘receives’ as used in the provision can extend to buyback or capital reduction for mere cancellation purposes? As the word ‘receives’ is not defined under the IT Act, it gives room to varied interpretations.

While the ‘transfer’ of shares pursuant to capital reduction/buyback are taxable transfers in the hands of the transferor, the tax authorities may contend that these would constitute ‘receipt’ in the hands of the company cancelling or buying back the shares and therefore should be subjected to section 56(2)(viia) if the consideration paid to the shareholders is less than the FMV.

A relevant point, that the company does not receive its shares, but only cancels its share capital pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Companies Act. In fact, the Companies Act does not permit a company to hold its own shares. Even if one were to say that a company receives its own shares on buyback or cancellation of shares, it is for the limited purpose of cancellation of those shares and therefore the company does not actually ‘receive’ any property, in the nature of shares.

However, litigation on applicability of section 56(2)(viia) to buyback or reduction cannot be ruled out.

6.    Transfer of shares by a partner of a firm/LLP

When a partner of a firm/LLP transfers shares of a closely-held company by way of capital contribution to a firm/LLP, section 45(3) of the IT Act would apply. As per section 45(3), the amount recorded in the books of accounts is deemed to be the full value of the consideration for computing the capital gain in the hands the partner.

If, the value so recorded in the books of the firm/ LLP is less than the FMV as determined under the valuation rules, then it may be possible that the difference between the FMV and the price at which transfer is made by the partner, may be considered as income of the firm/LLP u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act.

While undertaking any business reorganisation, a closely-held company will have to evaluate the applicability and the possible implications u/s.56(2) (viia) of the IT Act. Since this is a recently introduced provision, various interpretations can emerge.  

Cross-border Secondments — Tax implications

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Just as the ambiguity over tax implications on secondment of expats to India appeared to be settling down, the Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’) has vide its ruling in the case of Verizon Data Services1, reopened the Pandora’s box by holding that salary reimbursement of seconded employees is taxable in India as Fees for Included Services (‘FIS’)/ Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’).

This article discusses key tax implications arising on Secondment of employees of Foreign Company to Indian Company, in light of the existing regulations and various judicial precedents.

Introduction
Increasing number of MNCs establishing business in India has led to a huge surge in the number of ‘Expatriates’ working in India. The term ‘expatriate’ has not been defined in the Act. However, as per various legal dictionaries2, expatriate means someone who is removed from/voluntarily leaves one’s own country to reside in or become a citizen of another country.

Typically, Foreign Companies (‘FCo’) depute their employees to India either in connection with some project or for rendering services to the Indian company (‘ICo’) or to safeguard their interest in India (stewardship functions). For this purpose FCo may enter into a contract to depute their employees to ICo for a predetermined time period. FCos also depute their employees to India as a part of a Foreign Collaboration Agreement (‘FCA’) under which they are obliged to provide complete support to ICo in carrying out business ventures.

‘Deputation’, in common parlance means appointment, assignment to an office, function. The dictionary meaning of the term ‘Second’ is to transfer temporarily to another unit or employment for a special task3. However, as a common practice, both these terms are used interchangeably.

Dual employment

To retain employment with FCo and safeguard the social security/retirement benefits in their home country, expats desire to continue to be on the payroll of FCo and receive salary in their home country. Accordingly, the foreign entity will be regarded as the ‘Legal Employer’. On the other hand, the expats function under the control and supervision of the ICo which eventually bears their salary costs by reimbursing the same to FCo. Thus, ICo can be regarded as the ‘Real’ or ‘Economic employer’.

The concept of ‘Dual Employment’ is also recognised in section 192(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’). The Section provides for withholding tax compliances in case of ‘Simultaneous employment’ or ‘Successive employment’ with an option to the employee to choose one of the employers who can consolidate the withholding tax obligations in respect of his salary.

With this background, let us understand the tax implications arising out of the said arrangements. Key tax implications on secondments

  • Expats — Salary received by expatriate employees could be subject to tax in India as such
  • Foreign Companies — FCo deputing expats could be subject to tax in India.

For the purposes of this article, we have only discussed the taxability of FCos in India.

Tax implications in the hands of FCo
Taxation of payments made to FCos in India, pursuant to secondment contracts has been a subject-matter of litigation since quite some time now. The Indian Revenue authorities have been contending that by sending their employees to India, the foreign entities are actually rendering services to the ICo or carrying out business in India. Accordingly, they hold that;

  • the payments made by Indian entities are in the nature of Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’); or
  • the foreign entities have a Permanent Establishment (‘PE’) in India by virtue of the employees’ presence in India.

Consequently, ICo is held liable to withhold taxes u/s.195 of the Act, before making payments to FCo.

On the other hand, FCos believe that merely by seconding their employees to work under the supervision and control of ICo, they are not rendering any services in India. The amount recharged to ICo is mere recovery of salary costs of secondee paid by FCo in the home country and no taxable income arises in India.

Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) and Article 12/13 dealing with FTS in many DTAAs specifically excludes ‘salaries’ from the scope of FTS. Thus, if it can be established that the secondee is the employee of ICo, then the salary cost recharged by FCo cannot be regarded as FTS.

As regards PE, by virtue of its employees’ presence in India, FCos are exposed to two types of PEs; (i) Service PE and (ii) Fixed Place PE. One of the most important factors to mitigate the PE risk in case of secondment arrangements is establishing the fact that the ICo is the real employer of the expats and FCo does not have any presence in India through them.

Thus, the moot question is whether the secondee, who renders services to ICo can be regarded as its employee, even though he continues to remain on the payroll of FCo.

Contract of service and contract for service

A contract, by virtue of which an employer-employee relationship is established, is regarded as a Contract of Service, whereas contracts which entail services to be rendered by one entity to another could be regarded as Contracts for Services. The importance of this distinction is also recognised by the OECD4 in their ‘Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital’ published in July 2010 (‘hereinafter referred to as the OECD commentary’).

In order to draw distinction between ‘contract of service’ and ‘contract for service’, one needs to understand what constitutes an employment relationship in case of such contracts. Thus, interpretation of the term ‘employer’ assumes paramount significance.

Employer
The term ‘employer’ is not defined in the OECD model convention or in the Indian domestic law. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in various decisions5 has laid down the following key tests to determine the existence of employment relationship.

  • Control and supervision over the method of doing work;
  • Payment of wages or other remunerations;
  • Power of selection of the employee;
  • Right of suspension or dismissal of the employee

Further, the OECD Commentary6 has also laid down the following key factors for determining an employer-employee relationship:

  • Authority to instruct the individual regarding the manner in which the work is to be performed
  • Control and responsibility for the place of work
  • Remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided
  • Provision of tools and materials to employee
  • Determination of the number and qualifications of the individual seconded
  • Right to select the individual to perform work and to terminate contractual agreements with the employee for that purpose
  • Right to impose disciplinary sanctions related to the work of that individual
  • Determination of holidays and work schedule.

The OECD commentary7 also provides that the financial arrangement between the two enterprises would also be one of the relevant factors in determining the nature of the relationship.

Renowned author, Professor Klaus Vogel in his treatise on Double Taxation Conventions has provided his views on the term ‘employer’ as follows

“An employer is someone to whom an employee is committed to supply his capacity to work and under whose directions the latter engages in his activities and whose instructions he is bound to obey.”8

As per Prof. Vogel’s hypothesis9, the determination of employer rests with the degree of personal and economic dependence of the employee towards the enterprises involved. Thus, if the employee works exclusively for the ICo and was released for the period in question by the FCo, he may be regarded as an employee of the ICo.

Thus, the aforesaid criteria can be applied in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the ICo and the Secondee.

Judicial precedents

Having discussed what constitutes an employer-employee relationship, let us now look at the stand adopted by Indian judicial authorities in case of such secondment contracts. The common issue before the judiciary is whether the reimbursement of salary cost by ICo to FCo could be regarded as income of the FCo (FTS or otherwise) and be subject to withholding tax u/s.195 of the Act?

Having regard to the terms of the secondment contracts and after applying the tests discussed above, the Indian judicial authorities, in various cases10  have held that reimbursement of salary costs of seconded employees cannot be regarded as income of the FCo. Consequently, there is no withholding tax requirement u/s.195 of the Act. Some of the key common observations in most of these decisions are discussed below:

  •   Expats are deputed to work under the control and supervision of the ICo. FCo is not responsible for the actions of the expats. Thus, FCo does not render any technical service to the ICo.

  •   Since payment by ICo is towards reimbursement of salary cost borne by FCo, no income can be said to accrue to FCo in India.
  •     Referring to Klaus Vogel’s commentary and the relevant facts, ICo could be regarded as an ‘economic employer’ of the secondees. Agreement constituted an independent contract of service.

  •     Since the deputed employees were not subject to the control and supervision of the FCo, there would be no Service PE.

However, in case of AT&S India Pvt. Ltd.11, it was held that compensation paid by ICo to FCo constituted FTS liable to withholding tax u/s.195 of the Act. While arriving at the said ruling, the AAR made the following key observations:

  •     FCo was the real employer of the secondees as it retains right over the employees and has power to remove/replace them

  •     Pursuant to foreign collaboration agreement, FCo had undertaken to render the services to ICo and hence, lent the services of its seconded employees on payment of compensation by ICo

  •     The recipient of the compensation was FCo and not the seconded employees. Further, the payment was not merely reimbursement of salary, it also included other costs

  •     Thus, compensation referred to in the secondment agreement was for rendering ‘services of technical or other personnel’ — hence taxable as FTS and liable to withholding of tax u/s.195.

Here the key fact noted by the AAR was that the secondment agreement was in connection with the foreign collaboration agreement, whereby FCO had undertaken to render services to ICo. Accordingly, payments made pursuant to the secondment agreement were held taxable in the nature of fees for services rendered by FCo.

Verizon ruling

This recent AAR ruling has reignited the somewhat settled position as regards secondment contracts.

Facts

The applicant, Verizon India (‘VI’) is engaged in providing software and allied services to its parent, Verizon US (‘VUS’). GTE Overseas Corporation (‘GTE’), another US-based affiliate is engaged in business activity similar to VI. VI entered into an agreement with GTE for secondment of its three employees to India. The structure of the arrangement is depicted below:

One of the secondees assumed the position of managing director of VI while the other two employees liaised between VI and VUS, and supervised its day-to-day operations.

The salient features of the agreement were:

  •     Employees would function exclusively under the control and supervision of VI;

  •     Employees would continue to remain on the payroll of GTE;

  •     GTE would be absolved from the responsibility/ liability of the work, actions performed and the quality of results produced by its employees;

  •     GTE had the authority to replace and terminate the employees;

  •     GTE would disburse the salary of the secondees and get the same reimbursed from VI without any mark-up;

  •     VI would be liable for the Indian withholding tax compliances and the payments to GTE would be made ‘Net of taxes’.

Key questions before the Authority

  •    Whether the amounts reimbursed to GTE would constitute income accruing to GTE and therefore the same is liable to deduction of tax in accordance with the provisions of section 195 of the Act?

  •     If yes, then whether the payment is taxable as Fees for Included Services (‘FIS’) under the Act read with the India-USA DTAA?

AAR Ruling12

The AAR held that the seconded employees are employees of GTE and not VI. The payments made for performing managerial services would be regarded as FIS under the India-USA DTAA. Also, managerial services are directly covered under FTS as defined under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Hence, the payment is taxable and VI would be liable to withhold tax u/s.195 of the Act. While arriving at the said conclusion, the AAR made the following key observations:

  •    Since the control and supervision of the company vests with the managing director, GTE has rendered managerial services to the applicant.

  •     The ‘net of tax’ payment clause in the agreement suggests that the services provided by GTE were liable to tax in India.

  •     Since the employees continue to be on the payroll of GTE, get their salaries from it and can be terminated only by GTE, GTE is the employer of the seconded employees.

  •     The nature of the two receipts, one in the hands of GTE and the other in the hands of employees by way of salaries spring from different sources and are of different character and represent different species of income.

  •     As per MOU of the DTAA it is clear that ‘make available’ clause would be applicable only to technical services. ‘Make available’ clause does not apply to managerial services, the payments for which are otherwise covered within the ambit of FIS under Article 12(4) of the DTAA.

  •     Since the amount reimbursed by the applicant is taxable as FIS, the question of PE is merely of an academic interest. Accordingly, the same was not delved into.

Analysis

  •     AAR has not appreciated that managing director is subject to the superintendence and control of Board of Directors and MOA/AOA of the company. The fact that a managing director can be regarded as an employee of the company has been discussed in several judicial precedents14. The AAR also failed to consider the Tribunal rulings in the cases of IDS Software and Karlstorz Endoscopy India, which dealt with similar facts.

  •     AAR failed to consider Circular No. 720 of the CBDT, dated 30th August 1995, which clarifies that each section relating to tax withholding under Chapter XVII of the Act deals with a particular kind of payment and excludes all other sections in that Chapter and that the payment of any sum shall be liable to deduction of tax only under one section. This Circular was duly relied upon in the case of HCL15. Withholding tax on reimbursements u/s.195 which have already suffered tax u/s.192 amounts to double taxation.

  •     While analysing whether the ICo is the real employer, the AAR ignored the key tests laid down by the Supreme Court, OECD guidelines and Klaus Vogel’s commentary on International Hiring Agreements.

  •    AAR has misinterpreted the FIS clause in the India-US treaty by holding that for services that are technical or consultancy in nature, the make-available clause would not apply. Various judicial precedents16 have held that services which are not technical in nature are not covered within the scope of FIS clause.

  •    The AAR ruling is also not in line with other decisions pronounced on similar issue by various authorities in the cases of HCL Infosystems, Cholamandalam MS General Insurance, IDS Software Solutions, etc.

Key takeaways

  •     Since the law is not yet settled and various judicial authorities have adopted different interpretations, drafting of the secondment agreement by clearly defining the nature of relationships between various parties assumes paramount significance.

  •    While drafting the agreement, the principles promulgated by the OECD and the tests laid down by the Apex Court which determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship should be kept in mind.

  •     The documentation and conduct of the seconded employees may also influence taxation of such transactions.

  •    A periodic review of the documentation and compliance process in line with the latest judicial precedents could help in mitigating risk.

Conclusion

The conflicting rulings by various authorities and the uncertainty on taxability of payments made pursuant to secondment contracts continue to create a dilemma in minds of Indian as well as multinational corporations deputing their employees in India. However, to put at rest the stir created by such rulings, concrete clarification from the Legislature17 or the final word from the Apex Court in the near future is the need of the hour. Till then it’s a wait-and-watch situation for all18.

1       Verizon Data Services India Private Limited v. CIT (AAR No. 865 of 2010)

2       a. Law Lexicon (2nd Edition, reprint 1999 on page 681) — ‘Renunciation of allegiance, one voluntary renunciation of citizenship in order to become a citizen of another country’

b.     Black’s law dictionary (Sixth Edition, page 576) — The voluntary act of abandoning renouncing one’s country and becoming the citizen or subject of another

c.     Webster — Residing in a foreign country

d.    Oxford — Remove onself from homeland

3       As noted by the AAR Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. (2009 TIOL 02 ARA-IT)

4       Para 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 15

5       Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal (25 ITR 449); Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal (40 ITR 17); Ram Prashad (86 ITR 122)
 
6. Para 8.14 of the Commentary on Article 15

7       Para 8.15 of the Commentary on Article 15

8       Page 899

9       Page 885

10     IDS Software Solutions v. ITO, 2009 TII 22 ITAT-Bang-Intl; Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. (‘CM’)(2009 TIOL 02 ARA-IT) (Advance Rulings); Tekmark Global Solutions LLC (‘TLLC’) (131 TTJ 173) (Mumbai-ITAT); ACIT v. Karlstorz Endoscopy India Pvt. Ltd. (‘KI’) (ITA No. 2929/ Del/2009)

11     AT&S India Pvt. Ltd. — 287 ITR 421 (‘AAR’) — Distinguished in case of Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd.

12     AAR ruling is binding only on the applicant and the Income-tax officer in respect of transaction in relation to which the ruling is sought. However, persuasive value may be drawn in other similar cases.

13     DIT v. Morgan Stanley and Co. Inc. 292 ITR 416 (SC)

14     K. R. Kothandaraman v. CIT (1966) 62 ITR 345 (Mad), Scottish Court of Sessions in Anderson v. James Sutherland(1941) S.C. 203, Ram Prashad v. CIT (1972) 86 ITR 122 (SC)

15     In HCL Infosystems Ltd. v. DCIT, (76 TTJ 505, later affirmed by Delhi High Court in 272 ITR 261), Delhi ITAT held that reimbursement of salary cost of personnel seconded by Indian company to foreign company was not subject to tax withholding u/s.195

16     Raymonds Ltd. 80 TTJ 120 (Mum.), Boston Consulting Group – 93 TTJ 293, McKinsey & Co. Inc (Philippines) & others 99 TTJ 857 (Mum.)

17     The Legislature has recognised the ambiguity and has endeavoured to provide some clarity on the subject by defining the term employer in the proposed Direct TaxesCode, 2010.

18     Verizon has filed an appeal before the High Court against the said ruling. The outcome is eagerly awaited.

(2011) 57 DTR (Visakha) (Trib.) 299 Swaraj Enterprises v. ITO A.Y.: 1999-2000.

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Section 40(b) — Partners may choose not to provide depreciation in books and in such case AO is not entitled to deduct the cumulative depreciation from capital balances for working out interest u/s.40(b).

Facts:
The assessee paid interest to its partners and claimed the same as deduction. There was no dispute that the partnership firm had complied with the conditions prescribed u/s.40(b) of the Act. The dispute was related to the determination of the capital account balances of the partners on which the interest is payable. The assessee claimed interest on the capital account balances of the partners as disclosed in its books of account. However, during the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the firm did not provide for depreciation on the fixed assets in its books. However for the purpose of computing the total income, it has claimed depreciation in accordance with section 32 of the Act. Thus it was noticed that the net profits for book purposes have been shown at a higher figure by not charging depreciation, which would consequently increase the capital balances of the partners. In that case, the assessee would claim deduction of more amount of interest on the capital balances so inflated by not providing depreciation on the fixed assets. The AO felt that it is compulsory for the assessee to provide for depreciation in the books also.

Hence the AO reworked the capital balances of the partners by reducing the cumulative amount of depreciation therefrom and accordingly allowed the interest computed on such reduced capital balances. The learned CIT(A), confirmed the order of the A.O. The learned CIT(A) relied upon the decision of the SMC Bench of Visakhapatnam in the case of Arthi Nursing Home v. ITO, (2008) 119 TTJ (Visaka) 415 in order to reject the appeals filed by the assessee before him.

Held:
In the case of Arthi Nursing Home (supra), the SMC Bench, inter alia, placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of British Paints Ltd. (1991) 188 ITR 44, wherein it was held that the AO has a right and also duty to consider whether the books disclose the true state of accounts and the correct income can be deduced therefrom. The computation of total income is not affected by the amount of depreciation provided for in the books of account and the position remains the same even if no depreciation is provided for in the books. Hence, in our view, the ratio laid down in the case of British Paints Ltd. (supra) shall not apply in respect of depreciation, as it will not affect the computation of total income under the Income-tax Act.

Under the Partnership Act, there is no statutory compulsion to provide for depreciation in the books of account or to follow the accounting standards prescribed by the ICAI, though it may be in the interest of the partnership firms to follow the said accounting standards.

In Explanation 5 to section 32, the words ‘whether or not the assessee has claimed the deduction in respect of depreciation’ would show that the assessee has an option not to claim depreciation while computing his total income, but the said option shall be ignored by the AO and he will deduct depreciation from the total income of the assessee. Thus, there is no statutory compulsion for the partnership concerns to provide for depreciation in the books of account under Explanation 5 to section 32.

The AO is authorised only to verify whether the payment of interest to any partner is authorised by and is in accordance with the terms of partnership deed and also it relates to the period falling after the date of partnership deed. Besides the above, the AO should restrict the rate of interest, if the rate authorised in the partnership deed is more than the rate specified in section 40(b)(v) of the Act. Thus, it could be seen that nowhere it is provided that the AO is entitled to disallow the payment of interest to partners by reworking the capital account balances of the partners.

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Relevance of audit reports

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The auditors amongst us must be heaving a sigh of relief. The 30th September deadline has gone by. Many of us would have issued audit reports under the Companies Act, Income Tax Act and various other statutes. It is time to examine the utility and relevance of these reports which are the result of the toil we have all undergone.

These may seem to be harsh words but if we are honest to ourselves, we will be able to accept the truth. Preparation of financial statements is universally an object driven exercise, the reflection of the true state of affairs is rarely one of them. To most, it is ensuring the minimum tax burden, to some others it is keeping investors and lenders happy, and to the CEO it is the proof of his performance. It is left to the hapless auditor to examine whether the statements are true and fair.

It is in this context we must take a look at the audit reports that we issue. One often faces a question from young professionals as to whether it is “necessary” or “mandatory” to report a particular aspect. If we are to express an opinion on truth and fairness of the financial statement we need to disclose and report on every matter that has a material impact rather than making the letter of the statue a fortress to protect ourselves.

I do not believe that the blame lies only at our door, though we cannot escape our share of it. The tax audit report which is the bread and butter for many professionals in this country is an apt illustration. To the auditee the best report is one which causes it the least tax damage. He is not concerned with the content of the report. This is not only the attitude of small businessmen, but the largest of corporations including those in the public sector. The tax gatherer for whom these reports are issued pays scant attention to them. The authorities neither have the time nor the inclination to utilise these reports. Take the case of the report under the Companies Act. CARO 2003 has been with us for eight years now, but I wonder to what extent the regulators have used report under CARO. To both the entity and the regulator these reports appear to be a compliance formality.

The problem is compounded by the complexity of the accounting language. Accounting is supposed to be the language of business. However, the plethora of accounting and reporting standards and frequent changes in them has made this language incomprehensible. The AS, the Ind AS, IFRS can confuse the most competent professional and therefore one has sympathy for the plight of the entrepreneur. It is almost as if we had been asked to speak in Sanskrit, while the listener understands a Bambaiya Hindi. My suggestion to the authorities is to reserve Sanskrit for the gods of business and profession and permit commoners to converse in the language that they understand.

Auditing is the backbone of our profession and if it is to remain so something needs to be done quickly. One aspect is to simplify the accounting language which I have dealt with earlier. The second is to take a re-look at the form and content of the audit report and its universal application. I am sure that in the changing business environment many of the questions of CARO, 2003, are not relevant and even if they are, they should apply only to a selective class. Today, the criteria make their application virtually universal. It is also necessary for the attitude of the regulators to change. It is only if they start using the fruits of our toil better that we will regain the respect of our clients and the public at large. Finally, any effort has to be well rewarded. To the small businessman the cost of audit is a burden. This results in the quality being seriously compromised. The cost of audit increases because the auditor is required to ensure compliance with all the stringent accounting standards and his verification process is subject to comprehensive auditing standards. One possible solution is to revise the threshold limits after crossing which a tax audit is mandatory. The cost inflation index is a very apt indicator. If we rely on that to compute capital gains and pay tax, there is no reason why it should not be an acceptable benchmark for tax audit in its current form. Those below this revised threshold should be required to follow accounting norms which are easy to understand and the auditor should have a much simpler form of reporting. This will possibly meet the requirements of all stakeholders.

I believe that it is only a profession that is able to critically appraise itself survives, otherwise it is likely to be consigned to history. In my view the auditing profession is facing a crisis of credibility. The need of the hour is to take the challenge head on and neither turn a blind eye, nor brush it under the carpet.

Anil.J.Sathe
Joint Editor
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Coastal Regulation Zone

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Introduction
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 is a general Act which deals with the protection and improvement of the environment. It fixes responsibilities on persons carrying out industrial operations and also prescribes standards to control and prevent pollution arising from the same. Section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government may provide for restriction of areas in which operations shall not be carried out or would be subject to certain safeguards. In pursuance of these powers, the Ministry of Environment and Forests has issued the Coastal Regulation Zone (‘CRZ’) Notification to protect coastal lines and regulate activities in these areas. In a country like India and more so in a city like Mumbai, which has a very long coastal line, regulations dealing with protection of this very valuable natural resource have an important role to play.

The Ministry had originally notified the CRZ Guidelines in 1991 vide Notification No. S.O. 114(E), dated 19th February 1991. These were amended and updated from time to time. There have been about 25 amendments to this Notification between 1991 and 2009, some of which have been emanated from the Supreme Court orders. However, these have now been rescinded by the Coastal Regulation Notification 2011 issued on 6th January 2011. Keeping in mind the special needs of Mumbai, several concessions have been provided to CRZ areas within Mumbai. Let us examine some of the important provisions of the CRZ 2011.

Definition of CRZ
The following areas are declared as CRZ:

(i) the land area from High Tide Line (HTL) to 500 mts. on the landward side along the sea-front. The term HTL means the line on the land up to which the highest water line reaches during the spring tide and so demarcated. HTL will be demarcated within one year from the date of issue of the 2011 notification.

(ii) the land area between HTL to 100 mts. or width of the creek, whichever is less on the landward side along the tidal influenced water bodies (i.e., bays, rivers, creeks, etc. that are connected to the sea and are influenced by tides).

(iii) the land area falling between the hazard line and 500 mts. from HTL on the landward side, in case of seafront and between the hazard line and 100 mts. line in case of tidal influenced water body. ‘Hazard line’ means the line demarcated by the Ministry of Environment through a survey of India. This is a new development probably prompted by the recent tsunamis impacting coastal regions.

(iv) land area between HTL and Low Tide Line (LTL) known as the intertidal zone.

(v) the water and the bed area between the LTL to the territorial water limit or 12 nautical miles in case of sea. This is an important change to expand the CRZ to include territorial waters as a protected zone.

(vi) the water and the bed area between LTL at the bank to the LTL on the opposite side of the bank, of tidal influenced water bodies.

The significance of declaring an area as CRZ is that the Notification imposes various restrictions on the setting up and expansion of industries, operations or processes, etc., in such areas.

Classification of CRZs & Regulations
For the purpose of conserving and protecting the coastal areas and marine waters, the CRZ area is classified into various categories. Depending upon these categories, the development or construction activities therein are also regulated. These are explained below.

CRZ-I
Meaning

CRZ-I includes those areas that are ecologically sensitive and those which play a role in maintaining the integrity of the coast, such as mangroves, in case mangrove area is more than 1,000 sq mts., a buffer of 50 mts. along the mangroves shall also be provided, coral reefs, sand dunes, national parks, wildlife habitats, structures of archaeological importance, heritage sites, etc. It also includes the area between Low Tide Line and High Tide Line. Thus, CRZ-I are the very core areas which are the first point of protection of the coastal line.

Regulation of Construction
No new construction activities are permitted in CRZ-I. Certain exceptions are made for constructions/ industries of vital importance, such as Atomic Energy projects, construction of trans-harbour sea link, development of green field airport at Navi Mumbai, construction of dispensaries/ schools/ bridges/roads, etc., which are required for traditional inhabitants living there, etc.

CRZ-II

Meaning

The areas that have been developed up to or close to the shoreline. Developed area is defined as that area within the existing municipal limits/ urban areas which are substantially built-up and has been provided with drainage, approach roads and other infrastructural facilities, such as water supply and sewerage mains.

Regulation of Construction

Construction is permitted in CRZ-II subject to the following important restrictions:

(a) buildings are permitted only on the landward side of the existing/proposed road, or on the landward side (i.e., towards land) of existing authorised structures. These shall be subject to the existing local town and country planning regulations (such as the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai and other BMC Regulations for buildings), including the existing FSI norms. However, no permission for construction of buildings will be given on the landward side of any new roads which are constructed on the seaward side of an existing road.

(b) reconstruction of authorised building is permitted subject to the existing FSI norms and without any change in present usage.

(c) construction involving more than 20,000 sq mts., built-up area in CRZ-II shall be considered by the Ministry in accordance with its Notification dated 14th September 2006 and in case of projects less than 20,000 sq mts. built-up area shall be approved by the concerned State/Union territory planning authorities in accordance with the 2011 Notification.

CRZ-III

Meaning
These include those areas that are relatively undisturbed and those do not belong to either CRZ-I or II which include coastal zone in the rural areas (developed and undeveloped) and also areas within municipal limits or in other legally designated urban areas, which are not substantially built-up.

Regulation of Construction The Notification provides for several regulations for CRZ-III. Some important regulations for CRZ-III include the following:

(a) NDZ: An area of up to 200 mts. from HTL on the landward side in case of seafront and 100 mts. along tidal influenced water bodies is to be earmarked as ‘No Development Zone’ (NDZ). The significance of NDZ is as follows:

— No construction is permitted within NDZ.

— Repairs or reconstruction of existing authorised structure not exceeding existing FSI/ plinth area/density is allowed.

— Construction/reconstruction of dwelling units of traditional coastal communities, fishermen is permitted, subject to certain restrictions.

— Certain key activities are permitted, such as agriculture, atomic energy generating power by non-conventional energy sources, construction of dispensaries/schools/roads, etc. which are required for the local inhabitants, etc.

(b) Area between 200 mts. to 500 mts. from HTL
— The following activities are permissible:

— Hotels/beach resorts for tourists or visitors subject to certain conditions.

— Notified ports.

— Foreshore facilities for desalination plants and associated facilities.

— Facilities for generating power by nonconventional energy sources.

— Construction of public utilities.

— Reconstruction or alteration of existing authorised building.

CRZ-IV

Meaning
The water area from the Low Tide Line to 12 nautical miles on the sea-ward side and the water area of the tidal     influenced water body from     the mouth of the water body at the sea up to the influence     of     tide    which is measured as 5 parts per 1,000 during the driest season of the year.

Regulation of Construction

Activities     impugning    on     the    sea    and     tidal     influenced water bodies are regulated except for traditional fishing     and     related     activities     undertaken     by     local communities which are subject, however, to certain conditions.

Other areas
    
Meaning
These include those areas which require special consideration for the purpose of protecting the critical coastal     environment and difficulties faced by local communities, such as, the CRZ area falling within municipal limits of Greater Mumbai. This is a new feature     of     the     2011     Notifications     and     a    welcome     move.     For     the     first     time     the     unique     nature of Mumbai’s coastlines and real estate problems have been recognised and addressed.

Regulation of Construction
CRZ areas of Greater Mumbai are further regulated as follows:

(i)   CRZ-I areas
In CRZ-I areas of Mumbai the only activities which can    be    taken    up    are construction    of    roads,    approach    roads    and    missing     link     roads    which    are    approved     in the Developmental Control Regulations of Greater Mumbai. However, all mangrove areas should be notified     and  5 times the number of mangroves destroyed/cut during the construction process should be replanted.

(ii)   CRZ-II areas
In CRZ-II areas of Mumbai, the development can continue     to     be     undertaken     in     accordance    with     the norms laid down in the Town and Country Planning Regulations as they existed on the date of issue of the Notification dated the 19th February, 1991.

 (iii)  Slum Redevelopment
One of the highlights of the CRZ 2011 includes the relaxations granted for slum redevelopment schemes. The features include:

  •   To provide a safe and decent dwelling to the slum-dwellers, the State Government may implement slum redevelopment schemes.

  •      The stake of the State Government should not be less than 51% in such redevelopment schemes which are in partnership with private sector.

  •   The FSI for such schemes should be in accordance with the existing regulations. Thus, an FSI of up to 4 can be availed depending upon the facts. This is a welcome move.

  •   All legally regularised tenants must be provided houses in situ or as per norms laid down by the State Government. Projects would be undertaken only after public consultation in which views of the tenants of such building would be obtained.

  •   Such schemes would be audited by the Comptroller & Auditor General.

  •     All redevelopment schemes would be subject to the Right to Information Act, 2005 in order to improve transparency.

By a very recent Circular, the SRA proposes to do away with the height restrictions imposed in CRZ II areas on buildings provided they are a part of a 33(10) or a 33(14) Scheme.

(iv)    Redevelopment of dilapidated, cessed and unsafe buildings

The Notification also deals with redevelopment of old and dilapidated, cessed and unsafe buildings in the CRZ areas of Greater Mumbai. This again is a welcome move for several buildings along coastal lines, such as Marine Drive, Juhu, Chowpatty, etc. Such redevelopment can be done subject to the following conditions:

  •     They shall be allowed to be taken up even with private developers.

  •    The FSI shall be in accordance with prevailing norms.

  •     Suitable accommodation must be provided to the original tenants during the course of redevelopment.

  •     The Ministry may appoint Statutory Auditors empanelled with Comptroller & Auditor General to undertake performance and fiscal audit in respect of such redevelopment schemes.

  •     Projects would be undertaken only after public consultation in which views of the tenants of such building would be obtained.

  •     All redevelopment schemes would be subject to the Right to Information Act, 2005 in order to improve transparency.

(v)    All open spaces, parks, gardens, playgrounds indicated in development plans within CRZ-II shall be categorised as no development zone.

(vi)    Floor Space Index up to 15% shall be allowed only for construction of civic amenities, stadium and gymnasium meant for recreational or sports-related activities and residential or commercial use of such open spaces shall not be permissible.

Approvals

For all projects attracting the CRZ, 2011 Notification, an application for CRZ clearance must be made to the concerned State or the Union territory Coastal Zone Management Authority. It will make recommendations within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of complete application to the Ministry or the State Environmental Impact Assessment Authority. The Ministry or the Authority shall consider such projects for clearance based on the recommendations of the concerned CZMA within a period of 60 days. The clearance accorded to the projects under the CRZ Notification shall be valid for the period of 5 years from the date of issue of the clearance for commencement of construction and operation. A procedure for post-clearance monitoring is also provided.

Enforcement

To implement the provisions of the CRZ 2011 Notification, powers prescribed under the Act are available to the Ministry, the Coastal Zone Manage-ment Authorities and the State Government.

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, in case the auditee is a builder who has constructed a building in coastal zones, whether the conditions of the Notification have been duly complied and whether necessary approvals have been obtained. Non-compliance with this could have serious repercussions for the builder. This also has very important repercussions for flat/office buyers in such a building. The Bombay High Court in the case of Sudhir M. Khandwala, Writ Petition No. 1077 of 2007 refused to stay the demolition of/regularise an unauthorised construction. Hence, a buyer of a premises in a building constructed in violation of the CRZ Regulations could lose his property. Thus, the Auditor can provide a value-added service by alerting his client of the repercussions of buying such a property. In such cases, he may advice his client to obtain a legal opinion.

By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Precedent — Judicial discipline — Contradictory decisions by Co-ordinate Benches — Institutional integrity.

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[Gammon India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs Mumbai, 2011 (269) ELT 289 (SC)]

In a civil appeal against the order of CESTAT the Court observed the conflicting orders on identical issues by the Bench of Tribunal.

After deciding the issues on merits the Court showed their deep concern on the conduct of the two Benches of the Tribunal while deciding appeals in the cases of IVRCL Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. (2004) 166 ELT 447 and Techni Bharathi Ltd. (2006) 198 ELT 33. In spite of noticing the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the present case, the Tribunal still thought it fit to proceed to take a view totally contrary to the view taken in the earlier judgment, thereby creating a judicial uncertainty with regard to the declaration of law involved on an identical issue in respect of the same Notification. It needs to be emphasised that if a Bench of a Tribunal, in identical fact-situation, is permitted to come to a conclusion directly opposed to the conclusion reached by another Bench of the Tribunal on an earlier occasion, it will be destructive of the institutional integrity itself. What was important is the Tribunal as an institution and not the personality of the members constituting it. If a Bench of the Tribunal wishes to take a view different from the one taken by the earlier Bench, the propriety demands that it should place the matter before the President of the Tribunal so that the case is referred to a larger Bench, for which provision exists in the Act itself. In this behalf, the Court referred to the following observations by a three-Judge Bench of the Court in case of Sub-Inspector Rooplal and Anr. v. Lt. Governor and Ors., (2000) 1 SCC 644.

“At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another Co-ordinate Bench of the same Tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of the same Tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two Co-ordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents . . . . .”

The Court directed that all the Courts and various Tribunals in the country shall follow the above salutary observations in letter and spirit.

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Compensation — Minor driving motorcycle without licence — Liability to pay compensation shifts on owner — Motor Vehicles Act 1988, section 168.

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[ Jawahar Singh v. Bala Jain & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2436]

On 18th July, 2004, at about 1.20 p.m. the deceased, Mukesh Jain, was riding his two-wheeler scooter with his son, Shashank Jain, as pillion rider. According to the prosecution, when they had reached the SDM’s Office, Delhi, a motorcycle, being driven in a very rash and negligent manner, tried to overtake the scooter and in that process struck against the scooter with great force, as a result whereof the deceased and his son were thrown on to the road and the deceased succumbed to the fatal injuries sustained by him.

A claim was filed by the widow, two daughters and one son of the deceased before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.8,35,067 in favour of the claimants together with interest @7%. The insurer was held liable to satisfy the Award and to recover the amount from the owner of the motorcycle.

The Supreme Court observed that Jatin was a minor on the date of the accident and was riding the motorcycle in violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Rules framed thereunder.

It was Jatin, who came from behind on the motorcycle and hit the scooter of the deceased from behind. Thus the responsibility in causing the accident was found to be solely that of Jatin. However, since Jatin was a minor and it was the responsibility of the petitioner to ensure that his motorcycle was not misused and that too by a minor who had no licence to drive the same, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal quite rightly saddled the liability for payment of compensation on the petitioner and, accordingly, directed the insurance company to pay the awarded amount to the awardees and, thereafter, to recover the same from the petitioner.

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Liability of guarantor — After his death does not extinguish — Specific contract — Banker’s right of general lien — Contract Act, section 131.

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[ State Bank of India & Anr. v. Mrs. Jayanthi & Ors., AIR 2011 Mad. 179]

One late N.P.S. Mahendran was running two establishments under the name of M/s. Aarthi Bala Tea Plantations and M/s. Sanjay Bala Tea Plantations. The deceased availed loan from the appellant bank and deposited the title deeds by way of collateral security and also executed various documents in order to secure due payment of loan. After the death of the said N.P.S. Mahendran, the respondents petitioners (wife and sons) became liable to pay Rs.1,14,86,428.32, which was outstanding in several loan accounts. The 1st respondent, widow, liquidated the entire outstanding dues lying in the account. The bank, after acknowledging the same, issued ‘No Due’ certificate in her favour. The respondents, then, requested the appellant bank to return the title deeds relating to the properties, which were deposited with the bank by Late N.P.S. Mahendran. In spite of repeated requests, the documents were not returned. The respondents-petitioners approached the bank on many occasions requesting for return of documents, but the same were not returned.

The appellant bank contended that the bank was exercising a general lien on the title documents standing in the name of Late N.P.S. Mahendran, who stood as a guarantor for other facilities and liabilities outstanding against M/s. Somerset Tea Plantation. It was contended by the bank that such cash credit facilities were availed from another branch of the bank, by one M/s. Somerset Tea Plantation and the deceased, husband of the 1st respondent, stood as a guarantor for the said facilities. The said firm had committed default and more than Rs.2.03 crores was due from the said firm. Hence, the bank had initiated a proceeding against the firm and the guarantor and after the death of N.P.S. Mahendran, the present respondents have been impleaded as legal representatives.

The Court observed that the liability under the guarantee is not revoked or extinguished on the death of the guarantor. Section 131 of the Contract Act clearly provides that in case of death of guarantor, the date of guarantee/continuing of the guarantee executed in favour of the bank stands revoked in respect of future transactions. It is well settled that on the death of the guarantor, the liability exists and such liability can be fastened on the estate of the deceased being inherited by his legal heirs, and the creditor can recover the dues out of the estate of the deceased.

The borrower, (late) N.P.S. Mahendran, had admittedly deposited the title deeds of the property to secure a loan transaction availed in respect of two plantation companies. This fact had not being disputed by the appellant bank. Therefore, the contract/mortgage, had been created by the deceased borrower for a specific purpose and for a specific loan and the contract was self-contained and the terms and conditions were binding upon both the borrower as well as the bank. When such is the situation, the bank cannot contend that they could hold the documents for a balance due in a different loan account where the said N.P.S. Mahendran was not a borrower. Further, the language of section 171 of the Act is explicit to the fact that the bankers are entitled to retain as a security for a ‘general balance account’. Admittedly, it was not the case of the appellant bank that the amount, which was now said to be due on account of the borrowings of M/s. Somerset Tea Plantation, was a general balance account of the deceased borrower N.P.S. Mahendran.

Therefore, this agreement/mortgage has to be construed as a ‘contract to the contrary’ and therefore, held that the bank could not claim these documents by invoking the power of general lien u/s.171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The bank was directed to return of title deeds.

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Power of attorney — Revocation by registered deed — Registration Act section 17(1)(b).

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[Chandrama Singh & Ors v. Mirza Anis Ahmed, AIR 2011 Allahabad 114]

The issue before the High Court was:

Whether the registered power of attorney under the provisions of section 32 r.w.s. 33 and section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act could be revoked without registration or cancellation thereof.

The power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was relating to the agricultural land of the plaintiff and included the power to sell the land. When there is a transfer of all rights and liabilities over the land including the power to transfer, then it was required to be registered and was registered. The power of attorney contained a clause that it would not be disputed or that there shall be no dispute between the parties and it shall not be ignored. By its cancellation the rights created are sought to be extinguished. The rights created related to immovable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees. Hence u/s.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act a document that creates or extinguishes any right in such immovable property would require registration. In the event a document required to be registered u/s.17 is not registered the effects of non-registration are detailed u/s.49 of the Act. Such a document shall not affect any immovable property or confer any power or create any right or relationship. Therefore, the document whereby the registered power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was cancelled required registration u/s.17 of the Act and since it was admittedly not registered the effect of non-registration u/s.49 of the Act would affect it.

In the present case a notice dated 20-2-1973 canceling the power of attorney was duly served and received by the attorney prior to the execution of the sale-deed dated 26-12-1975 by him. Admittedly it was a communication sent by the plaintiff to the attorney.

The power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was revocable. It did not contain any clause that it would be irrevocable. It only said that the parties thereto will not dispute it or ignore it. Normally revocation is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person against whom it is made. The power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was not a mere proposal or just a promise. It was also not a simple agreement between the parties. An agreement between the parties would have to contain an element of consideration or act or omission to give it enforceability as a contract. The power of attorney created rights in immoveable property including that of alienation. Being revocable it could be revoked. But not just by a communication. Since it dealt with immoveable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees and created a right to transfer the property it was compulsorily registrable. And when it was registered it could be revoked only upon execution of a registered document of revocation. Hence due to non-registration of the communication/document of revocation it could not affect the sale deed dated 26-12-1975 executed by the attorney, nor could it affect the power of attorney dated 17-3-1967. The relationship of principal and agent established through a registered deed could be validly terminated by a registered deed in view of the Registration Act.

The conclusion would, therefore, be that when the document/notice of cancellation dated 20-2- 1973 was compulsorily registrable and it was not registered, then even upon its execution or service upon the attorney it would not in any manner affect the rights created under sale deed dated 26-12-1975. It did not extinguish the rights created or assigned on the attorney upon execution of a registered power of attorney.

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Dishonour of cheque — Cheque drawn in foreign country — Accused cannot be prosecuted in India — Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

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[ Pale Hourse Designs & Anr. v. Natarajan Rathnam, AIR 2011 (NOC) 274 (Mad.)]

The issue that arose for consideration before the High Court was as to whether a person who is not a citizen of India, who has issued a foreign country cheque on a drawee bank functioning in a foreign country could be prosecuted for an offence punishable u/s.138 of the Act.

The Court observed that a combined reading of sections 1, 11, 12 and 134 to 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, makes clear that a cheque made/drawn in a foreign country on a drawee bank functioning in the foreign country and made payable therein shall be a foreign instrument and the law of the country wherein the cheque was drawn or made payable shall be the law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties and dishonour of the cheque. As such the payee cannot select a country and present it through a bank therein for collection to confer jurisdiction on a Court functioning therein. If the payee is given such a right to proceed criminally against the drawer by selecting the jurisdiction, the same will encourage forum shopping making the payees to go to a country wherein the dishonour of the cheque is made a criminal offence and wherein the law is more favourable to the payee enabling him to collect the amount covered by the cheque by way of fine or compensation by resorting to criminal prosecution. A person who is not a citizen of India for an act committed in a foreign country wherein it is not a punishable offence, cannot be prosecuted in India. In this case, none of the petitioners is a citizen of India. The acts constituting the offence, namely, issuance of the cheque, the dishonour of the cheque, the failure to make payment of the cheque after receipt of the statutory notice were all committed by them not in India, but in the USA. Therefore, they cannot be prosecuted in India for the said act as an offence punishable u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The Court further observed that the place of issuance of notice shall not be the only criterion conferring jurisdiction on the Court. All the transactions were made in the USA. The cheques were drawn on a bank in the USA. The cheques were payable at Massachusetts branch, United States of America. That being so, the respondent, with a view to invoke the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in order to have a short-cut method of collecting the cheque amount, has chosen to present the cheques in a bank at Anna Nagar, Chennai, Tamil Nadu for collection, issue notice from Adyar, Chennai and prefer the complaint on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet. The said act on the part of the respondent not only amounts to forum shopping, but also is an example of abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, the Court in order to avoid miscarriage of justice, to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to render complete justice, in exercise of its inherent power u/s.482 Cr. P.C. quashed the criminal proceedings.

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Refund: Interest on: Section 244A: Block period 1-4-1995 to 21-3-2002 — Assessee deposited cheque on 29-12-2003: Amount debited to assessee’s bank account on 30-12-2003: Assessee entitled to interest for December 2003.

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[CIT v. Asian Paints Ltd., 12 Taxman.com 484 (Bom.)]

The assessee deposited cheque for amount of tax demanded with authorised agent of the Central Government on 29-12-2003 and account of assessee was debited to that extent on 30-12-2003. On appeal, assessment was set aside and the assessee became entitled to refund of tax paid. The Assessing Officer refunded tax with interest u/s.244A from January, 2004 till grant of refund and declined to grant interest for month of December, 2003 on ground that tax paid by the assessee was credited to the Central Government account on 12-1-2004. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest for the month of December 2003.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) According to the Counsel for the Revenue, though the assessee had deposited the cheque towards the tax demand on 29-12-2003, the amount was actually credited to the Central Government account on 1-1-2004 and therefore, on grant of refund, the assessee was entitled to interest from January, 2004. In support of the above contention, counsel for the Revenue relied upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. CIT, (2006) 281 ITR 274 and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Sutlej Industries Ltd., (2010) 325 ITR 331/190 Taxman 136.

(ii) U/s.244A(1)(b) of the Act, interest on refund is payable from the date of payment of tax to the date on which refund is granted. In the present case, admittedly the cheque for the amount of tax demanded was deposited with the authorised agent of the Central Government on 29-12-2003 and the account of the assessee was debited to that extent on 30-12-2003. The question therefore, to be considered is, whether debiting the tax amount from the bank account of the assessee by the authorised agent of the Central Government account viz. the authorised bank constitutes payment of tax under section 244(A)(i)(b) of the Act?

(iii) Once the authorised agent of the Central Government collects the tax by debiting the bank account of the assessee, the payment of tax to the Central Government would be complete. The fact that there is delay on the part of the authorised agent to credit that amount to the account of the Central Government, it cannot be said that the payment of tax is not made by the assessee, till the amount of tax is credited to the account of the Central Government. For calculating interest u/s.244A(1)(b) of the Act the relevant date is the date of payment of tax and not the date on which the amount of tax collected is credited to the account of the Central Government by the agent of the Central Government.

(iv) Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the decision of the ITAT in holding that the assessee had paid the taxes on 30-12- 2003 cannot be faulted.

(v) Once it is found that the tax was paid on 30-12- 2003, then as per the Rule 119A(b), of the Incometax Rules, on the tax becoming refundable, the assessee had to be refunded tax with interest for the entire month of December, 2003. Thus, in the facts of the present case, no fault can be found with the decision of the ITAT in holding that the tax was paid on 30-12-2003 and therefore, the tax was liable to be refunded with interest for the entire month of December, 2003.

(vi) The decision of the Rajasthan High Court, as also the decision of the Delhi High Court relied upon by the counsel for the Revenue are distinguishable on the facts as in both the above cases, the Courts were not called upon to consider the scope of the expression ‘payment of tax’ contained u/s.244A(1)(b) of the Act. In fact, the Circular No. 261, dated 8-8-1979 issued by the Board to the effect that the date of presenting the cheque should be the date of payment supports the contention of the assessee.”

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Recovery of tax: Certificate proceedings: Section 222: Assessee’s leasehold property (DDA lessor) auctioned by TRO for recovery of tax: DDA demanded 50% unearned increase for mutation: Not a condition of auction notice: Amount payable by Department and not by the purchaser.

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[CIT v. Monoflex India (P.) Ltd., 12 Taxman.com 499 (Del.)]

The assessee’s leasehold property was put to auction by the TRO for realisation of income-tax dues. The DDA was the lessor. The purchasers called upon the DDA to mutate the property and called upon the TRO to get the sale certificate registered. The DDA demanded 50% unearned increase for mutation of the property in favour of the purchasers. Disputes arose as to the liability to pay unearned increase and whether the same was payable by the purchasers or by the Income-tax Department or by the original sub-lessee, i.e., the defaulter assessee. As the disputes could not be resolved, the purchasers filed writ petition which was allowed by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by issuing a direction that the Department would deposit unearned increase with the DDA.

On appeal by the Revenue the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held as under:

“(i) The deed of the sub-lease clearly stipulates that 50% unearned increase is payable on the transfer of the leasehold rights in the property and the decision of the lessor in respect of market value shall be final and binding. The second proviso gives pre-emptive right to the lessor to purchase the property after deducting 50% unearned increase. Unearned increase is also payable in case of involuntary sale or transfer, whether it is by or through an executing or insolvency Court.

(ii) The terms of the lease are binding upon the lessor and the lessee. Under section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a lessee is entitled to transfer leasehold right, which he enjoys, to a third party, subject to a contract to the contrary. However, the lessee continues to be liable for the terms and conditions of the lease.

(iii) Rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act permits and allow the TRO to recover the arrears of tax by attachment and sale of defaulter’s immovable property. Thus, what can be sold and attached is a defaulter’s immovable property, i.e., the interest of the defaulter in the immovable property and not interest of a third person in the immovable property. Obviously, DDA’s interest could not have been sold or transferred for recovery of the defaulter’s dues. The right of the defaulter in the immovable property could be sold and transferred.

(iv) What the Act permits and allows is that the TRO can sell the right, title and interest of the defaulter assessee and nothing more. If the said right, title and interest is hedged with the conditions or fetters, the sale will be made subject to the said conditions/fetters. The rights of the lessor do not get affected. Thus, unearned increase is payable. (v) The second question is who is liable to pay the unearned increase. The plea of the Department is that 50% unearned increase is payable by the original sub-lessee and not by the Department or the TRO.

(vi) The Single Judge has, in the impugned judgment, specifically referred to and has quoted the public notice by which sale was made. The terms and conditions of said notice did not stipulate that the bidder would have to pay 50% unearned increase or bear such burden. There was no such stipulation. The sub-lease deed or copy thereof was with the Department and it had finalised the terms of sale. In case 50% unearned increase was to be paid separately by the purchaser, it should have been so indicated and mentioned. This would have resulted in a lower bid amount. It is not the case of the Department that sale consideration paid by the purchasers was less than the market price.

(vii) The terms of auction did not stipulate that the original sub-lessee shall pay 50% unearned increase. The TRO had agreed and promised to issue sale certificate to the auction purchaser, whose bid was accepted. It is only on payment of 50% unearned increase that an effective transfer can be made by the said sale certificate. In these circumstances, it is for the Department to make payment of unearned increase. Of course, in case its dues are still payable, it is open to them to take appropriate proceedings against the defaulter assessee in accordance with law.”

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Economic Assessment – Raghuram Rajan: A case for India

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Such bipolar behaviour seems to apply to assessments of India’s economy as well, with foreign analysts joining Indians in swings between overexuberance and self-flagellation. A few years ago, India could do no wrong. Commentators talked of “Chindia”, elevating India’s performance to that of its northern neighbour. Today, India can do no right.

India does have serious problems. Every commentator today highlights India’s poor infrastructure, excessive regulation, small manufacturing sector, and a workforce that lacks adequate education and skills.

These are indeed deficiencies, and they must be addressed if India is to grow strongly and stably. But the same deficiencies existed when India was growing rapidly. To appreciate what needs to be done in the short run, we must understand what dampened the Indian success story.

In part, India’s slowdown paradoxically reflects the substantial fiscal and monetary stimulus that its policymakers injected into its economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The resulting growth spurt led to inflation, especially because the world did not slide into a second Great Depression, as was originally feared. So monetary policy has since remained tight, with high interest rates contributing to slowing investment and consumption.

Moreover, India’s institutions for allocating natural resources, granting clearances and acquiring land were overwhelmed during the period of strong growth. India’s investigative agencies, judiciary and press began examining allegations of largescale corruption. As bureaucratic decision-making became more risk-averse, many large projects ground to a halt.

Only now, as the government creates new institutions to accelerate decision-making and implement transparent processes, are these projects being cleared to proceed. Once restarted, it will take time for these projects to be completed, at which point output will increase significantly.

Finally, export growth slowed, not primarily because Indian goods suddenly became uncompetitive, but because growth in the country’s traditional export markets decelerated.

The consequences have been high internal and external deficits. The post-crisis fiscal stimulus packages sent the government budget deficit soaring from what had been a very responsible level in 2007-08. Similarly, as large mining projects stalled, India had to resort to higher imports of coal and scrap iron, while its exports of iron ore dwindled.

An increase in gold imports placed further pressure on the current-account balance.

For the most part, India’s current growth slowdown and its fiscal and current account deficits are not structural problems. They can all be fixed by means of modest reforms. This is not to say that ambitious reform is not good, or is not warranted to sustain growth for the next decade. But India does not need to become a manufacturing giant overnight to fix its current problems.

The immediate tasks are more mundane, but they are also more feasible: clearing projects, reducing poorly targeted subsidies and finding more ways to narrow the current account deficit and ease its financing.

Every small step helps, and the combination of small steps adds up to large strides. But, while the government certainly should have acted faster and earlier, the public mood is turning to depression amid a cacophony of criticism and self-doubt that has obscured the forward movement.

Indeed, despite its shortcomings, India’s GDP will probably grow by 5-5.5% this year—not great, but certainly not bad for what is likely to be a low point in economic performance. The monsoon has been good and will spur consumption, especially in rural areas. The banking sector has undoubtedly experienced an increase in bad loans; but this has often resulted from delays in investment projects that are otherwise viable. As these projects come onstream, they will generate the revenue needed to repay loans. In the meantime, India’s banks have enough capital to absorb losses.

Likewise, India’s public finances are stronger than they are in most emerging-market countries, let alone emerging-market countries in crisis. India’s external debt burden is even more favourable, at only 21.2% of GDP (much of it owed by the private sector), while short-term external debt is only 5.2% of GDP. India’s foreign-exchange reserves stand at $278 billion (about 15% of GDP), enough to finance the entire current account deficit for several years.

That said, India can do better—much better. The path to a more open, competitive, efficient, and humane economy will surely be bumpy in the years to come. But, in the short term, there is much low-hanging fruit to be plucked. Stripping out both the euphoria and the despair from what is said about India—and from what we Indians say about ourselves—will probably bring us closer to the truth.

(Source: Extracts from an article by Shri Raghuram Rajan, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, in Mint Newspaper dated 12-09- 2013, written before he took office.)
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PART A: SUPREME COURT Decisions

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In BCAJ of October 2012, I had reported the Order of the Supreme Court in the writ petition in the matter of Namit Sharma vs. Union of India decided on 13-09-2012.

The said order had annihilated RTI operations in India. It was criticised by a large number of RTI activists, many retired judges and also by the Government itself. In BCAJ of November 2012, I had reported that the Government has applied for its review. Mr. Shailesh Gandhi and Mrs. Aruna Roy had intervened in this review petition.

Now the said review petition has been heard and the judgment dated 03-09-2013 (of 55 pages) is delivered by two judges, Justice A. K. Sikri and A. K. Patnaik (who was also one of the two judges in the writ along with Justice S. P. Sampath Kumar).

The Supreme Court held as under:

32. Under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 this court can review its judgment or order on the ground of error apparent on the face of record and on an application for review can reverse or modify its decision on the ground of mistake of law or fact. As the judgment under review suffers from mistake of law, we allow the Review Petitions, recall the directions and declarations in the judgment under review and dispose of Writ Petition (C) No. 210 of 2012 with the following declarations and directions:

(i) We declare that sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act are not ultra vires the Constitution.

(ii) We declare that sections 12(6) and 15(6) of the Act do not debar a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union Territory, as the case may be, or a person holding any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession from being considered for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, but after such person is appointed as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, he has to discontinue as Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union Territory, or discontinue to hold any other office of profit or remain connected with any political party or carry on any business or pursue any profession during the period he functions as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner.

(iii) We direct that only persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in the fields mentioned in sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act be considered for appointment as Information Commissioner and Chief Information Commissioner.

(iv) We further direct that persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in all the fields mentioned in sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act, namely, law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance, be considered by the Committees u/s. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioners.

(v) We further direct that the Committees u/s. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act while making recommendations to the President or to the Governor as the case may be, for appointment of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners must mention against the name of each candidate recommended, the facts to indicate his eminence in public life, his knowledge in the particular field and his experience in the particular field and these facts must be accessible to the citizens as part of their right to information under the Act after the appointment is made.

(vi) We also direct that wherever Chief Information Commissioner is of the opinion that intricate questions of law will have to be decided in a matter coming up before the Information Commission, he will ensure that the matter is heard by an Information Commissioner who has wide knowledge and experience in the field of law.

[Review petition (C) No. 2309 and (c) No. 2675 of 2012 in Writ Petition (C) No. 210 of 2012: State of Rajasthan & Anr vs. Namit Sharma, decided on 03-09-2013]

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Regulators must promote not strangulate industry

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India has several “regulators”, trying to “regulate” several sectors of the economy. There is SEBI keeping a check on the stock markets, TRAI doing the same for the telecom and broadcasting sectors, IRDA for the insurance sector, PFRDA for pensions, DGCA for civil aviation and CERC for electricity.

By their very nomenclature regulators regulate, which many mock to mean strangulate industries. In many cases, regulators focus on keeping private players in check, thinking of them as rapacious booty hunters who need to be tamed, confirming the suspicion that the government never really accepted the private sector as a dynamo of growth. What India needs in the form of regulators are bodies that focus on promoting and developing industry. For if industries develop, there are more tax revenues for the government, more jobs for the people, and more social and economic goals.

This would in turn propel industrial growth and start a virtuous cycle of prosperity. Regulation cannot become shorthand for controlling power tariffs. Equally, the proposed coal regulator should overhaul the defunct and destructive policy of reserving coal production for the inefficient public sector and not become an excuse to “regulate” prices, production capacities, import quotas and the like.

The primary role of regulators must be to ensure that the country’s resources are exploited efficiently and transparently for the benefit of industry and thereby people. Transparency demands that resources are allocated using ascending or single-step auctions, or tenders, not via opaque “administered methods” or “First Come First Served” which lead to corruption and hence must be banned.

Pricing must be remunerative, for only a profitable company can continue investing and exploring. Keeping prices and margins low, and crippling industry doesn’t serve anyone’s purpose, least of all the government’s. Domestic production of gas will increase, lowering the need for imports and easing the balance of payments position.

Regulators must of course always protect consumers. For if consumers suffer, industry suffers. Indeed, the whole reason for setting up SEBI came from the securities fraud of the early 1990s.

A fine balance between protecting consumer and corporate interests is required. The regulator often has to shield industry from the government’s faulty policies, just like the Supreme Court has to shield people from laws that violate the Constitution. A development oriented regulator must have the authority to question government policy, forcing it to make amends as and when required.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Shri Anil Shinde in the Times of India dated 11.09.2013).
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43 dated 13th September, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services–Simplification and Revision of Declaration Form for Exports of Goods/ Software

Presently, every exporter of goods or software has to give declaration in one of the forms (GR/PP/SDF/ SOFTEX/Bulk SOFTEX) and submit the same to the specified authority for certification.

This circular prescribes a common form called “Export Declaration Form” (EDF) for declaring all types of export of goods from Non-EDI ports and a common “SOFTEX Form” to declare single as well as bulk software exports. The EDF will replace the existing GR/PP form used for declaration of export of goods and as to be used on and from 1st October, 2013. Further, all exporters will have to declare all the export transactions, including those less than $25000, in the applicable form. The procedure relating to the exports of goods through EDI ports will remain the same and SDF form will be applicable as hitherto. The EDF and SOFTEX form have been given in Annex I and Annex II respectively. RBI will extend facilities to exporters for online generation of SOFTEX Form No. (Single as well as Bulk) for use in offsite software exports, in addition to EDF Form No. (Present web-based process of generation of GR Form No. gets replaced) through its website www.rbi.org.in. The specimen of online form and the advice are given in Annex III. Exporters have to complete the EDF/SOFTEX Form using the number so allotted and submit them to the specified authority first for certification and then to AD for necessary action as hitherto.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42 dated 12th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.284/2013-RB dated 27th August, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.596 (E) dated 6th September, 2013

Foreign Investment in India–Guidelines for calculation of total foreign investment in Indian companies, transfer of ownership and control of Indian companies and downstream investment by Indian companies

This circular has amended condition at (d) regarding downstream investments by an Indian company which is not owned and/or controlled by resident entity/entities. The amended condition is given in the table below:

 c.f. Annex to A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 4th July, 2013

 Earlier Condition

 Revised Condition

 ParaE 6 (ii) (d)

 For the purpose of downstream investment, the Indian companies making the downstream investments would have to bring in requisite funds from abroad and not use funds borrowed in the domestic market. This: would, however, not preclude downstream operating companies from raising debt in the domestic market. Downstream investments through internal accruals are permissible by an Indian company engaged only in activity of investing in the capital of another Indian company/ ies, subject to the provisions above and as also elaborated below:

 For the purpose of downstream investment, the Indian companies making the d o w n s t r e a m investments would have to bring in requisite funds from abroad and not use funds borrowed in the domestic market. This would, however, not preclude d o w n s t r e a m operating companies from raising debt in the domestic market. Downstream investments through internal accruals are permissible by an Indian company, subject to the provisions of clause 6(i) and as also elaborated below:

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 41 dated 10th September, 2013

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Overseas Direct Investment–Amendment
This circular has modified condition of clause (b) relating to obtaining prior permission under the Approval Route from the RBI for providing corporate guarantee by an Indian Party on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step down operating subsidiaries. The original and revised provisions are in the table:

Table regarding Overseas Direct Investment

 Original Provision

 Revised Provision

 (b) Further, it has also been decided that issue of corporate guarantee on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step down operating subsidiaries will be considered under the Approval Route, provided the Indian Party directly or indirectly holds 51% or more stake in the overseas subsidiary for which such guarantee is intended to be issued.

 (b) Further, it has also been decided that issue of corporate guarantee on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step down operating subsidiaries will be considered under the Approval Route, provided the Indian Party indirectly holds 51% or more stake in the overseas subsidiary for which such guarantee is intended to be issued.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated 10th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.286/2013-RB dated 5th September, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.595 (E) dated 6th September, 2013 Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings by Authorised Dealer Banks– Enhancement of limit

This circular permits banks to borrow funds, subject to certain conditions, from their Head Office, overseas branches and correspondents and overdrafts in Nostro accounts up to a limit of 100% of their unimpaired Tier-I capital as at the close of the previous quarter or $10 million (or its equivalent), whichever is higher, as against the existing limit of 50% (excluding borrowings for financing of export credit in foreign currency and capital instruments).

Further, banks can up to 30th November, 2013, enter into a swap transaction with the RBI in respect of the borrowings raised as above at a concessional rate of 100 basis points below the market rate for all fresh borrowing with a minimum tenor of one year and a maximum tenor of three years, irrespective of whether such borrowings are in excess of 50% of their unimpaired Tier I capital or not. Although banks are free to borrow in any freely convertible currency, the swap is available only for conversion of US $ equivalent into INR and the US $ equivalent shall be computed at the relevant cross rate prevailing on the date of the swap.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated 6th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.258/2013-RB dated 15th February, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.480 (E) dated 12th July, 2013

Export and Import of Currency

Presently, a resident individual can take outside India or having gone out of India on a temporary visit, bring into India (other than to and from Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 7,500.

This circular has increased this limit from Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 10,000. As a result, any person resident in India:

i) Can take outside India (other than to Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 10,000 (rupees ten thousand only); and

ii) Who had gone out of India on a temporary visit, can bring into India at the time of his return from any place outside India (other than from Nepal and Bhutan), Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 10,000 (rupees ten thousand only).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 38 dated 6th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.279/2013-RB dated 10th July, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.591 (E) dated 4th September, 2013

Notification No.FEMA.280 /2013-RB dated 10th July, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.531 (E), dated 5th August, 2013.

Purchase of shares on the recognised stock exchanges in accordance with SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations

Presently, FIIs, QFIs and NRIs can acquire shares on recognised stock exchanges in terms of Schedule 3, 4, 5 and 8 of FEMA Notification No. 20. However, non-residents are not permitted to acquire shares on stock exchanges under FDI scheme under Schedule 1 of FEMA Notification No. 20.

This circular permits non-residents including NRIs to acquire shares of a listed Indian company on the stock exchange through a registered broker under FDI scheme if:

i. The non-resident investor has already acquired and continues to hold the control in accordance with SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations.

ii. The amount of consideration for transfer of shares to non-residents consequent to purchase on the stock exchange must be paid as below:

a. by way of inward remittance through normal banking channels, or

b. by way of debit to the NRE/FCNR account of the person concerned maintained with an authorised dealer/bank; c. by debit to non-interest bearing Escrow account (in Indian rupees) maintained in India;

d. the consideration amount may also be paid out of the dividend payable by the Indian investee company, in which the said nonresident holds control as (i) above, provided the right to receive dividend is established and the dividend amount has been credited to specially designated non-interest bearing rupee account for acquisition of shares on the floor of a stock exchange.

iii. The pricing for subsequent transfer of shares to the non-resident shareholder shall be in accordance with the pricing guidelines under FEMA.

iv. The original and resultant investments must be in line with the extant FDI policy and FEMA regulations.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 32 dated 4th September, 2013

Liberalised Remittance Scheme–Clarifications

The RBI has issued clarifications regards to the LRS (given hereafter):

In case of invocation of the guarantee, the bank is required to submit to the Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Foreign Exchange Department, Reserve Bank of India, Central Office, Mumbai 400 001, a report on the circumstances leading to the invocation of the guarantee.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 37 dated 5th September, 2013

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Notification No. FEMA.267/2013-RB dated 5th March, 2013 notified vide G.S.R. 573(E) dated 27th August, 2013
Issue of Bank Guarantee on behalf of person resident outside India for FDI transactions

Presently, non-resident acquirers, subject to certain conditions, can open Escrow account and Special account with a bank in India for acquisition/transfer of shares/convertible debentures of an Indian company through open offers/delisting/exit offers.

This circular permits a bank to issue bank guarantee, without prior approval of RBI, on behalf of a nonresident acquiring shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company through open offers/delisting/ exit offers, if:

a) The transaction is in compliance with the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) [SEBI (SAST)] Regulations.

b) The guarantee is covered by a counter guarantee of a bank of international repute.

c) The guarantee will be valid for a tenure coterminus with the offer period only, as required under the SEBI (SAST) Regulations.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 36 dated 4th September, 2013

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Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings

Presently, Indian residents are not allowed to cancel and rebook forward contracts, involving the rupee as one of the currencies, booked by them to hedge their current and capital account transactions. However, exporters are allowed to cancel and rebook forward contracts to the extent of 25% of the contracts booked by them in a financial year for hedging their contracted export exposures.

This circular has:
1. Increased the said limit of 25% to 50% for exporters. Hence, exporters can now cancel and rebook forward contracts up to 50% of the contracts booked by them in a financial year for hedging their contracted export exposures.

2. Importers are now permitted to cancel and rebook forward contracts entered into by them to the extent of 25% of the contracts booked in a financial year for hedging their contracted import exposures.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31 dated 4th September, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) from the foreign equity holder

Presently, ECB cannot be availed for general corporate purpose.

This circular permits eligible borrowers to avail ECB from their foreign equity holders for general corporate purposes under the Approval Route subject to the following conditions:

(a) Minimum paid-up equity of 25% must be held directly by the lender.
(b) Minimum average maturity of ECB must be 7 years.
(c) Such ECB cannot be used for any purpose not permitted under the extant ECB guidelines (including on-lending to their group companies/ step-down subsidiaries in India).
(d) Repayment of the principal can commence only after completion of minimum average maturity of 7 years. No prepayment will be allowed before maturity.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30 dated 4th September, 2013

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Overseas Direct Investments–Rationalisation/ Clarifications

This circular clarifies that:

(a) All the financial commitments made on or before 14th August, 2013, in compliance with the earlier limit of 400% of the net worth of the Indian Party under the automatic route will continue to be allowed. As a result, such investments will not be subject to any unwinding or approval from the RBI.

(b) Limit of financial commitments for an Indian Party (presently 100% of its net worth) will not apply to the financial commitments funded out of EEFC account of the Indian Party or out of funds raised by way of ADR/GDR by the Indian Party, as hitherto.

(c) Limit of 400% of the net worth of the Indian Party will apply in case the financial commitments are funded by way of eligible ECB raised by the Indian Party as per the extant ECB guidelines.

Certain additional/consequential clarifications are also annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 29 dated 20th August, 2013

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Investments by Non-resident Indians (NRIs) under Portfolio Investment Scheme (PIS) Liberalisation of Policy

Presently:

(a) An NRI can invest under PIS on repatriation and/or non-repatriation basis in shares and convertible debentures of listed Indian companies on a recognised stock exchange in India through a registered stock broker.

(b) An NRI can purchase and sell shares/convertible debentures under the PIS through a branch designated by an Authorised Dealer for the purpose and duly approved by the Reserve Bank of India.

This circular has made the following changes:

(a) Unique Code Number will be allotted only to Link office of the AD Category-I bank

(b) Allotment of Unique Code Number to each branch designated by that AD Category- I bank administering the Scheme is being dispensed with. Accordingly, banks are free, subject to certain terms and conditions, to permit their branches to administer the Portfolio Investment Scheme for NRIs.

Salient features of PIS for investments by an NRI are annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28 dated 19th August, 2013

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Press Release–F. No.44/17/2004-BO.II Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services dated 21st December, 2012

Foreign Investments in Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARC)

Presently: –

(a) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) up to 49% in the equity capital of ARC is permitted subject to certain conditions.

(b) FIIs are not permitted to invest in the equity capital of ARC

(c) General permission is granted to an FII to invest in Security Receipts (SR) up to 49% of each tranche of scheme of SR. However, a single FII cannot invest more than 10% in each tranche of scheme of SR.

This circular has made the following changes:
(a) Ceiling for FDI in ARC has been increased from the present 49% to 74%. However, no sponsor can hold more than 50% of the shareholding in an ARC either by way of FDI or by routing through an FII. Foreign investment in ARC would need to comply with the FDI policy in terms of entry route conditionality and sectoral caps.

(b) The foreign investment limit of 74% in ARC would be a combined limit of FDI and FII.

(c) Prohibition on investment by FII in ARC is being removed. The total shareholding of an individual FII cannot exceed 10% of the total paid-up capital.

(d) The limit of FII investment in SR is being enhanced from 49% to 74% of the paid-up value of each tranche of scheme of SR issued by the ARC.

(e) Individual limit of 10% for investment of a single FII in each tranche of SR issued by ARC is being removed. However, such investment must be within the FII limit on corporate bonds and sectoral caps under the extant FDI regulations have to be complied with.

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SAT Now Holds Front Running to be an Offence – SEBI Follows with Similar Amendments

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Departing from its two earlier decisions, the
Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) has now held front running to be
an offence. It has held that it is a fraudulent and manipulative act in
violation of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of
Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market)
Regulations, 2003 (“PFUTP Regulations”). This is in the case of Vibha
Sharma vs. SEBI (Appeal No. 27 of 2013, dated 4th September 2013). It
thus upheld SEBI’s Order which had levied a penalty of Rs. 25 lakh on
profits made on account of such front running of Rs. 7,15,854. Two days
later, SEBI too amended the PFUTP Regulations to introduce a
clarificatory amendment that apparently to intends to include front
running amongst the list of prohibited acts. The concept of front
running and an earlier decision in the case of Dipak Patel vs. SEBI
(Appeal No. 216 of 2011, dated 9th November 2012) were discussed in this
column a few months ago. However, to refresh the memory of readers, the
concept of front running is briefly discussed below. Front running, in
context of stock market trading, is, in simple terms, using of
information of impending and usually large orders and putting one’s own
orders ahead of execution of those orders. The advantage is that, by
putting orders in front, such a person is able to buy at a lower price.
Then, he will profit by reversing such transactions when the large
orders are executed and his shares are sold to such person at a higher
price. Take an example. A client places a large order for purchase of
shares of Company X with its broker. The experienced broker realises
that such a large order will certainly result in increase in the market
price of the shares on that day. He thus buys shares on his own account
before executing the client’s order. This usually results in the
expected increase in the price. Thereafter, he executes the client’s
order and on the opposite side he offers for sale his own shares at the
higher price. The client thus has to pay a higher price, the difference
being the profit of such broker. This series of acts by the broker is an
example of front running. The situations can be multiplied. The
employee of the broker may carry out such act. The broker may share the
information with someone who may carry out such trades. Employees of
institutional investors may do front running. And so on.

SEBI
has laid down a large variety of acts, generally and specifically, that
are treated fraudulent or manipulative practices under the PFUTP
Regulations. However, curiously, there is a specific Regulation 4(2) (q)
which deals with, while not using that term, front running by
intermediaries. The Regulations prohibit intermediaries from engaging in
such acts.

The SAT had earlier held in Dipak Patel’s (Appeal
No. 216 of 2011, decision dated 9th November 2012) case held that this
Regulation applied specifically to intermediaries only and there are no
other provisions in the Regulations/Rules/Act that specifically prohibit
front running by non-intermediaries. Hence, persons who are not
intermediaries cannot be held guilty of such charges. In that case, an
employee of a foreign institutional investor had, as per the findings,
advance information of certain proposed trades of his employer. He
conveyed this information to his cousins in India. Using this
information, the cousins carried out such advance trades. Then these
trades were reversed when his employer came to acquire the shares in the
market. The advance trades were at a lower price and these shares were
sold to the employer at a higher price, and substantial profits were
made. However, the employee was not an intermediary. Thus, the SAT held
that he could not be held liable under the PFUTP Regulations. SAT,
accordingly, had observed:-

“In the absence of any specific
provision in the Act, rules or regulations prohibiting front running by a
person other than an intermediary, we are of the view that the
appellants cannot be held guilty of the charges levelled against them.
There is no denying the fact that when the appellants placed their
order, these were screen based and at the prevalent market price.
Admittedly Passport was the major counter party for trading in the
market and was placing huge orders and hence possibility of order of
traders placing orders for smaller quantities matching with orders of
Passport cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it cannot be said that they
have manipulated the market. The alleged fraud on the part of Dipak may
be a fraud against its employer for which the employer has taken
necessary action. In the absence of any specific provision in law, it
cannot be said that a fraud has been played on the market or market has
been manipulated by the appellants when all transactions were screen
based at the prevalent market price.”

Thus, what was emphasised
was that, if at all, it was a fraud by the employee on the employer. And
for such fraud, the employer may take due action. But there was no
fraud or manipulation by the employee on the markets. Hence, there was
no violation of the PFUTP Regulations.

SAT followed the above
decision in Sujit Karkera vs. SEBI (Appeal No. 167 of 2012 dated 17th
December 2012) and this decision was on the same lines.

These
decisions created some dissatisfaction and were well debated. Now,
however, SAT has given a decision holding a view contrary to its earlier
decisions. As will be seen later, SEBI too has amended the law with
retrospective effect.

The findings of SEBI in the present case
were also similar. To point out a few, the Appellant was the wife of the
equity dealer of Central Bank of India (“CBI”). In 14 out of 16 trading
days, the trades of the Applicant matched with that of CBI. It was
found that the Appellant used to buy ahead of CBI and then sell the
shares when CBI came to purchase the shares of that Company on the same
day. It was noted that the Appellant sold all of the shares purchased on
that day to CBI. The price of purchase and the price of sales were
noted and in particular, the manner in which a higher-than-last traded
price was put as offer price for sale to CBI by the Appellant was noted.

SAT considered both its earlier decisions. However, using the
following reasoning, it departed from them and held that front running
was a fraudulent market practice and violation of 3(a), (b), (c), (d)
and 4(1) of the PFUTP Regulations and thus punishable. It observed:-

“A
minute perusal of the judgment of Dipak Patel makes it evident that act
of front running is always considered injurious be it an intermediary
or any other person for that reasons. We would like to give a liberal
interpretation to the concept of front running and would hold that any
person, who is connected with the capital market, and indulges in front
running is guilty of a fraudulent market practice as such liable to be
punished as per law by the respondent. The definition of front running,
therefore, cannot be put in a straight-jacket formula.”

The SAT also observed:-

“Advance
information of definite trade by CBI at manipulated price of particular
scrip was available to Appellant no. 1 and on basis of this information
she traded in security market and secured undue profits, which was
disadvantageous to other investors, since they were not privy to this
privileged information and resulted in manipulation of securities in
market.”

It could not be specifically proved that the Appellant received information from her husband by way of recording of phone calls, etc. However, SAT took into account the curious fact of consistent matching of transactions, timing and of course the relation between the Appellant and the employee of CBI, her husband.

The findings in the orders of SEBI and SAT clearly suggest that that the Appellant with her husband profited at the cost of CBI. Nevertheless, certain thoughts come to mind.

Would this not be treated as a fraud on CBI, the employer, by the employee by sharing information with the Appellant, his wife? And therefore this should be actionable by CBI and not SEBI?

The Order says that there was a loss/disadvantage to other investors. This too is difficult to understand. The Appellant purchased the shares from other investors on the same day. Later during the day, she sold the same at a higher price to CBI. But if this had not happened and CBI had come directly in the market, would not the sellers got the same price as they got in original sale as the transactions would have taken place in the same manner? The counter-argument possible is that though this may be a fraud by the employee on the employer, the fraud was carried out on the stock market which is a public arena for investors generally and not in a private transaction.

Finally, the question of redundancy of Regulation 4(2) (q) remains. If such transactions are violation of the other general provisions of the PFUTP Regulations, then what is the relevance of Regulation 4(2)(q)? Would not such an interpretation by SAT/SEBI make such a Regulation redundant and thus such interpretation violative of accepted principles of interpretation of statutes? The counter-argument is of course that if such a universal rule was made, then the various prohibitions say, on stock brokers, may be interpreted as not applicable to persons who are not stock brokers.

Nevertheless, the decision of SAT now creates a precedent that front running is a violation of the PFUTP Regulations and thus punishable.

SEBI has also amended the PFUTP Regulations by inserting an Explanation to Regulation 4 by a Notification dated 6th September 2013. The Explanation reads:-

“Explanation—For the purposes of this sub-regulation, for the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the acts or omissions listed in this sub-regulation are not exhaustive and that an act or omission is prohibited if it falls within the purview of regulation 3, notwithstanding that it is not included in this sub-regulation or is described as being committed only by a certain category of persons in this sub-regulation.”

Thus, it seeks to clarify that (i) the prohibited acts/ omissions in Regulation 4(2) are not exhaustive and (ii) acts/omissions included in Regulation 3 are prohibited even if Regulation 4(2) does not specifically include them or prohibits them only if committed by certain category of persons. Effectively, this Explanation seems to provide that if front running can be held to be covered under Regulation 3, then it will be an offence. This is despite the fact that Regulation 4(2) covers only front running committed by intermediaries.

In view of the above, front running, whether by intermediaries or non-intermediaries, will be an offence under the PFUTP Regulations. This is unless the SAT decision is appealed before the Supreme Court which, taking also into account the clarificatory amendment to the Regulations, gives a different decision.

Central Sales Tax- Declared Goods-Iron and Steel- Stainless Steel Wire-Does Not Fall under Entry “Tool, Alloy and Special Steels”- section 14((iv) (ix) of the Central sales Tax Act, 1956.

1. M/S Bansal Wire Industries Ltd. and another v. State of U.P. and others, [2011] 42 VST 372 (SC).

Central
Sales Tax- Declared Goods-Iron and Steel-Stainless Steel Wire-Does Not
Fall under Entry “Tool, Alloy and Special Steels”- section 14((iv) (ix)
of the Central sales Tax Act, 1956.


Facts

The
appellant is engaged in manufacture and sale of Stainless Steel Wire,
and was assessed under the UP sales tax Act and CST Act for the period
1999-2000 in which the assessing authorities levied tax @ 4% on sales of
Stainless Steel Wire by treating it declared goods covered by entry(ix)
of clause (iv) of section 14 of the CST Act, relating to “ Tool, Alloy
and Special Steels of any one of the above categories”. Subsequently,
the revising authorities issued notice to reopen the assessment to levy
higher rate of tax on sales of such Stainless Steel wire being not
covered by the term iron and Steel as defined in section 14(iv) of the
CST Act. The appellant filed writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
against issue of the said notice. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition holding that “stainless steel wire” is not covered under the
item “tool, alloy and special steels” in entry (ix) and, therefore, does
not fall under “iron and steel” as defined under clause (iv)of section
14 of the Central Act and therefore the provision of section 15 of the
Central Act does not apply. The appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court against the said judgment of High Court.

Held

The
language used in entry no. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the
items which are mentioned there are “tool, alloy and special steels”. By
using the words “of any of the above categories” in entry no. (ix),
would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to
entry No. (xv). However, entry (xvi) of clause (iv) would be included
in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the
aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry “tool, alloy and
special steels” being not applicable to entry (xv). Therefore, it was
held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of
clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Succession–ProbateProceeding–Compromise between Parties: Succession Act, 1925.

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Kamla vs. Mangi Bai & Ors. IAR 2013 Rajasthan 144

The appeal u/s. 384 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 had been filed against the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Nimbahera dated 17-04-1998, whereby the application filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 u/s. 276 of the Act was allowed and a probate of will executed by deceased Bheru Lal dated 06-04-1992 was ordered to be granted to them. Brief facts of the case are that Smt. Mangi Bai and Smt. Suhagi Bai, both daughters of Shri Veni Ram filed application u/s. 276 of the Act seeking probate of registered will dated 06-04-1992 executed by their brother Bheru Lal, who died on 01-02-1993. It was stated in the application that they were real sisters of deceased Bheru Lal, who died issueless and had no wife and to take care of the fact that there is no dispute in the future, the said will was executed by the deceased Bheru Lal in their favour. It was further indicated that the appellant herein who was impleaded as defendant in the said application had got the land, which was bequeathed under the will to them, mutated in her favour by claiming herself to be the wife of deceased Bheru Lal and the said land was acquired for construction of Mansarovar Dam and award in this regard was passed, which was sought to be received by the appellant herein. Ultimately, it was prayed that probate of the said will be issued in their favour.

However, during the pendency of the said proceedings on 07-04-1998, a compromise dated 31-3- 1998 in the form of application under Order XXIII, Rule 3 CPC was filed by the appellant as well as respondents No. 1 and 2.

It was held that there is no bar in entering into compromise in probate proceedings. It is open for parties in contested probate proceedings to settle their disputes by way of compromise-Refusal to pass decree in terms of compromise entered into amongst parties to proceedings despite filing of application under O.23, R.3 was improper.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51 dated 20th September, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services–Project Exports

Presently, the time limit for submitting form DPX 1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 is 30 days of entering contract for grant of post-award approval.

This circular has done away with the requirement of submission of forms DPX1, PEX-1, TCS-1 and DPX-3, to the concerned regional office of the RBI (Foreign Exchange Department) by the Approving Authority (AA). However, these forms may continue to be submitted to ECGC and Exim Bank where their participatory interests by way of funded/non-funded facilities, insurance/risk cover, etc., are involved.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48 dated 18th September, 2013

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Notification No. FEMA 281/2013-RB dated 19th July, 2013 notified vide G.S.R. No. 627(E) dated 12th September, 2013

External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy–Liberalisation of definition of Infrastructure Sector

This circular has expanded the definition of infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors for the purpose of ECB. The expanded definition is as under:

(a) Energy which will include (i) electricity generation, (ii) electricity transmission, (iii) electricity distribution, (iv) oil pipelines, (v) oil/gas/liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facility (includes strategic storage of crude oil) and (vi) gas pipelines (includes city gas distribution network);

(b) Communication which will include (i) mobile telephony services/companies providing cellular services, (ii) fixed network telecommunication (includes optic fibre/cable networks which provide broadband/ Internet) and (iii) telecommunication towers;

(c) Transport which will include (i) railways (railway track, tunnels, viaducts, bridges and includes supporting terminal infrastructure such as loading/ unloading terminals, stations and buildings), (ii) roads and bridges, (iii) ports, (iv) inland waterways, (v) airport and (vi) urban public transport (except rolling stock in case of urban road transport);

(d) Water and sanitation which will include (i) water supply pipelines, (ii) solid waste management, (iii) water treatment plants, (iv) sewage projects (sewage collection, treatment and disposal system), (v) irrigation (dams, channels, embankments, etc.) and (vi) storm water drainage system;

(e) (i) mining, (ii) exploration and (iii) refining;

(f) Social and commercial infrastructure which will include (i) hospitals (capital stock and includes medical colleges and paramedical training institutes), (ii) Hotel sector which will include hotels with fixed capital investment of Rs. 200 crore and above, convention centres with fixed capital investment of Rs. 300 crore and above and three-star or higher category classified hotels located outside cities with population of more than 1 million (fixed capital investment is excluding of land value), (iii) common infrastructure for industrial parks, SEZ, tourism facilities, (iv) fertiliser (capital investment), (v) post-harvest storage infrastructure for agriculture and horticulture produce including cold storage, (vi) soil-testing laboratories and (vii) cold chain (includes cold room facility for farm level pre-cooling, for preservation or storage of agriculture and allied produce, marine products and meat.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 46 dated 17th September, 2013

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Overseas forex trading through electronic/internet trading portals

This circular reiterates the prohibition on undertaking online trading in foreign exchange through portals/websites by residents. Further, it warns of stern action, as prescribed under FEMA, against the residents undertaking these transactions as well as banks which continue to allow the residents to undertake these transactions and fail to report these violations to the RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 45 dated 16th September, 2013

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Memorandum of Instructions governing moneychanging activities–Location of Forex Counters in International Airports in India

This circular states that non-residents can carry Indian currency up to a maximum of Rs. 10,000 beyond Immigration/Customs desk to the Duty Free Area/Security Hold Area (SHA) in the departure hall in international airports in India for meeting miscellaneous expenditures. However, they must dispose of Indian currency before boarding the plane.

Further, in order to provide money-changing facility to non-residents to convert unspent Indian rupees with them, Foreign Exchange Counters can be opened in the Duty Free Area/SHA beyond the Immigration/Customs desk in the departure halls in international airports in India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 44 dated 13th September, 2013

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Notification No. FEMA. 285/2013-RB dated 30th August, 2013 vide G.S.R. No.597 (E)

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India–Review of FDI policy–definition for control and sector specific conditions

This circular contains the following information:

1. Revised definition of the term ‘control’—’Control’ shall include the right to appoint a majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements.

2. The State Governments of Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka have given consent to implement the FDI policy on Multi-Brand Retail Trading in Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka respectively. As a result the list of States stands modified with the addition of the names of the above two States.

3. The Central Government has issued the new Consolidated FDI Policy which has come into effect from 5th April, 2013. The RBI has accordingly revised and updated the FDI caps and routes for various sectors in order to bring the same in uniformity with the sectoral classification for FDI as notified under the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular.

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Succession—Death of Male Hindu—Before Coming into force Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

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Bhagirathibai Chandrabhan Nimbarte & Anr. Vs. Tanabai (deed) by LRs. & Ors. AIR 2013 BOM. 99.

A Hindu joint family consisting of Vithoba, his wife Radhabai, son Chandrabhan and daughter Tanabai, owned and possessed the ancestral property. Vithoba died intestate on 23-01-1934, leaving behind him his widow Radhabai, son Chandrabhan and daughter Tanabai.

A Regular Civil Suit filed by the respondent Tanabai, claiming a declaration that she is the owner of half portion of the suit property, being the daughter of one Vithoba Nimbarte, who was the owner. The Trial Court, by its judgment and order dated 31-12-2001, has partly decreed the said suit and the declaration is granted that the plaintiff is the owner of 1/3rd share in the suit property. Accordingly, a decree for partition of the suit property has been passed and an enquiry into mesne profit has been ordered.

The Appellate Court held that after the death of Vithoba, his widow Radhabai had a right of maintenance. Hence, after coming into force of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, she became the absolute owner of half share in the suit property of Vithoba. After the death of son Chandrabhan, his widow Bhagirathibai was entitled to get the property as limited owner as per the provisions of section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, as Chandrabhan had no Class I heir. According to the Appellate Court, Radhabai and Bhagirathibai were in possession of the suit property and by virtue of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, they became the owners of half portion each of the suit property. Upon the death of Radhabai, Tanabai and Wanmala shall become the owners of 1/4th share each in the suit property.

Hence, the first question is about the rights of widow Radhabai and daughter Tanabai in the ancestral property after the death of Vithoba. The son Chandrabhan died intestate in the year 1952, leaving behind him his mother Radhabai, sister Tanabai, widow Bhagirathibai and daughter Vanmala. Hence, the other question is about the rights of the heirs of Chandrabhan to succeed the ancestral property after his death. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force from 17-06-1956, and hence the last question is whether it confers any right to property upon the mother Radhabai and sister Tanabai in the ancestral property.

A Hindu joint family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. A daughter ceases to be a member of her father’s family on marriage and becomes a member of her husband’s family. A joint or undivided Hindu family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members. The existence of at least one male member is essentially for constituting a joint family with other members. A Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the Hindu joint family. The coparcenary not only consists of father and sons, but also grandsons, great-grandsons of the holder of the joint family property for the time being. It includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property.

The property inherited by a Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property, whereas the property inherited by him from other relations is his separate property. If a Hindu inherits the property from his father, it becomes ancestral in his hands as regards his son. In such a case, it is said that the son becomes a coparcener with the father as regards the property so inherited and the coparcenary consists of a father and a son. Even a wife, though she is entitled to maintenance out of her husband’s property and has, to that extent, an interest in his property, is not her husband’s coparcener, nor is a mother a coparcener with her son, neither a mother-in-law with her daughter-in-law. Undisputedly, in the present case, there was no partition between Vithoba and his son Chandrabhan, when Vithoba was alive. Vithoba died intestate on 23-01-1934.

Here, in the present case, after the death of Vithoba on 23-01-1934, his undivided interest in the coparcenary property devolved upon the sole coparcener Chandrabhan by survivorship. Hence, Chandrabhan became the absolute owner of the entire property, and neither Radhabai, the widow of Vithoba, and the mother of Chandrabhan, nor Tanabai, the daughter of Vithoba and the sister of Chandrabhan, acquired any right in the coparcenary property.

As per the provision of section 3(1) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, when a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow shall, subject to the provision of s/s. (3), be entitled in respect of the property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son. In the present case, there was no partition between Vithoba and his son Chandrabhan prior to the death of Vithoba on 23-01-1934. Hence, though Vithoba died intestate, he did not leave any separate property. It was only a coparcenary property in the hands of the son Chandrabhan after the death of Vithoba. Hence, section 3 of the said Act will not be attracted so as to make Radhabai entitled to even a limited interest in the property in question.

The next question, which falls for consideration, is the effect of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, with effect from 17-06-1956.

In the present case, Chandrabhan died before coming into force of the said Act, and hence his mother Radhabai did not possess any vestige of title. The mere fact that Radhabai was in possession of the suit property along with Bhagirathibai, the widow of Chandrabhan, after 1952, was not sufficient to attract the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The section is not intended to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser, as has been held by the Apex Court in Eramma’s case, cited supra.

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Revision—Merger of order—Rejected only on ground of limitation and not on merits: Such an order does not merge.

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Kaizen Organics Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (2013) 293 ELT 326 (Raj.)

The petitioner is a manufacturer of menthol powder, menthol crystal, D.M.O. and menthol oil and engaged in exporting them without payment of duty under Rule 19 of the Rules. Between October 2005 to April 2006, it accordingly cleared six consignments for export under the letter of undertaking submitted to the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise. It also submitted the proof of export before the said authority for acceptance under the above provision of the Rules, where after the said authority accepted the same. It was thereafter that, by letter dated 26-10-2006, that the said authority withdrew the acceptance of the proof of export covering the consignments. Though meanwhile, as the petitioner claims, the consignments had been duly exported after being inspected by the customs authorities at the port concerned, in terms of the relevant instructions issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs. A show-cause notice dated 27-10-2006 followed, encompassing all the six consignments requiring the petitioner to show cause as to why the central excise duty of Rs. 69,73,481 would not be recovered from it u/s. 11A of the Act, together with interest contemplated under section 11AB thereof.

The petitioner’s/assessee’s appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), and the revision u/s. 35EE against the proposed consequential action for realisation of central excise duty with interest and penalty, having been rejected, filed a writ before the Court for relief. The petitioner incidentally had preferred appeal before the Central Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The Tribunal having rejected the appeal as not maintainable, as the subject-matter thereof was covered by the eventualities contemplated in clauses (b) & (c) enumerated under the proviso to Section 35B(1), it thereafter sought refuge u/s. 35EE of the Act and preferred a revision thereunder. As admittedly, the revision application was at the time of institution was not only barred by time in terms of s/s. (2) of section 35EE, but also beyond the period extendable by the revisional authority under the proviso thereto, interference was declined on the ground of bar of limitation. Contending that as the petitioner had been pursuing its relief bona fide before the wrong forum i.e. the Tribunal, the learned revisional authority ought to have adjudicated its application u/s. 35EE on merits, the petitioner has sought the remedial intervention of the Court.

The petitioner’s revision u/s. 35EE has been dismissed only on the ground of delay without any adjudication on merits, there is no merger thereof with the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and thus, it is entitled to lay its challenge to the impugned actions of the respondent authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, independently de hors such dismissal.

However, the above rejection of the petitioner’s revision application u/s. 35EE being only on the ground of limitation and not on merits, the arguments against merger thereof with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), Jaipur has substance.

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Appellate Tribunal–Judicial Discipline-Precedent- Tribunal bound to follow decision of Supreme Court in preference to decision of Tribunal which was not challenged: CESTAT:

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S and S Power Switch Gear Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Anr. (2013) 19 GSTR 349 (Mad.)

The assessee manufactured H.T. circuit breakers of various types and discharged payment of duty at 5%, in terms of Notification No.53/1993/CE, dated 28th February, 1993, classifying the goods under a particular Heading 8535. The Commissioner confirmed the demand of duty on the ground that the goods were classifiable under Heading 8537 and also imposed penalty. The assessee challenged the said order before CESTAT. By an order dated 31st May, 2002, the Tribunal held that the notification was applicable from date of publication and there was no deliberate suppression or misstatement of facts with an intent to evade payment of duty and consequently, the extended period of limitation under the proviso to section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not available and remanded the matter for redetermination of classification and to restrict the demand of duty to six months only. This order of the Tribunal was not challenged. The Commissioner thereafter passed a final order and held that the circuit breakers with control panels were classifiable under Heading 8537 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 in terms of the Board’s Circular No. 32/8/94-CX-4, dated 14th July, 1994, that the circular was applicable prospectively and confirmed the demand of duty for the period from 14th July, 1994 to 31st July, 1994. On appeal by the Department, the Appellate Tribunal held that the Department’s prayer for confirmation of entire duties invoking the extended period could not be accepted and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for quantification of duty for a period of six months on the reason that in the earlier order, the Tribunal had held that the demand be restricted to six months’ period only and that the order had not been appealed against. On appeal by the assessee, the High Court held, allowing the appeal, that the issue involved was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court and consequently, the order passed by the Tribunal without considering the decision of the Supreme Court was not correct. Merely because the assessee had not challenged the earlier order of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, it could not be taken as a precedent when already, on the very same issue, the Supreme Court decided in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal was bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in preference to the decision of the Tribunal, though such decision had become final in so far as the assessee was concerned.

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Appeal to Appellate Tribunal—Grounds urged in Memorandum of Appeal but not advanced during the course of submission or arguments— No error apparent on face of order of Tribunal : Central Excise Act, 1944 Section 35C(2):

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Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. vs. UOI 2013 (293) E.L.T. 667 (Bom.)

Against the final order of the CESTAT, the appellant had filed an appeal before the Supreme Court u/s. 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The appellant also filed an application for rectification before the Tribunal on the ground that certain grounds that were raised in the Memorandum of Appeal were not dealt with in the order of the Tribunal. While rejecting the application, the Tribunal noted that neither in the oral submissions nor in the written submissions that were tendered to it during the course of the proceedings, were any submissions advanced with reference to those grounds. Hence the appellant preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court.

The appellant submitted that the Tribunal was duty bound to consider and deal with every grounds urged in the Memorandum of Appeal even though these were not raised or advanced during the course of the submissions.

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court observed that the Tribunal is indeed duty bound to address those grounds which are placed in issue, during the course of the oral arguments. Where in a given case, in the considered exercise of a professional judgment of Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, the Counsel has not considered it appropriate to raise certain grounds during the course of the oral submissions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the Tribunal must nonetheless deal with all those grounds which are raised in the Memorandum of Appeal. The grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal may as contemporary experience shows, cover a broad canvas of the draftsman, who may seek to raise every possible ground of challenge. Which ground of challenge should actually be pressed before the Tribunal is a matter which lies in the exercise of the professional judgment of Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting party. No fault can be found with the Tribunal because it has not addressed a submission which was not advanced at the hearing of the appeal before the Tribunal. In the present case, even before this Court, it is an admitted position that what has been recorded by the Tribunal in the extract noted earlier, is the correct record. The Tribunal has noted at more than one place that the ground on which the application for rectification was moved, was not advanced either in the oral submissions or for that matter, in the written submissions. Therefore, the appeal against the rectification order was dismissed, holding that there was no error apparent on the face of the order of the Tribunal.

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Powers of the Tribunal to stay demand proceedings beyond 365 days

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Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides for the powers to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) to pass any orders including orders for stay of demands. The said power to grant stay was given explicit recognition on insertion of section 253(7) and a proviso to section 254(2A). The Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2001 and Circular No. 14 of 2001 dated 12th December 2001 [252 ITR 65(St.)] explaining the intention of insertion of aforesaid proviso to section 245(2A) vide the Finance Act, 2001 observed as under:

“….it has been observed that many assessees file appeals to the Tribunal only to obtain stay of demand and avoid payment of justified taxes. In order to discourage this practice, and ensure speedier collection of outstanding tax, the Act has amended Section 254…”

However, the language used by the legislature to introduce the proviso to section 254(2A) was subject to various interpretations by the judicial forums in the following decisions:

• Subhadra (B) vs. ITO (2005)(272 ITR 100)(Hyd.)(AT);
• Centre for Women’s Development Studies vs. DDIT (257 ITR 60)(Del)(AT);
• Anuradha Timber Estates vs. DCIT (282 ITR 59)(Hyd) (AT), etc

While the language of the proviso to section 254(2A) achieved its object, it created hardships for those assessees who had genuine reasons for stay of demand. They were subjected to unjustified and unreasonable recovery proceedings.

The said insertion of proviso to section 254(2A), however, did not limit the powers of the Tribunal to pass fresh orders of stay on expiry of 180 days. In order to address the said anomaly, the Legislature substituted the aforesaid proviso vide Finance Act, 2007 with the following three new provisos to section 254(2A):

• First Proviso—After considering the merits of application of stay arising in the appeal, the Tribunal shall pass orders of stay and dispose the appeal within a period of 180 days;

• Second Proviso—If the appeal is not disposed of within a period of 180 days, then the Tribunal may extend the period of stay or pass an order of stay for further period or periods as it thinks fit, provided the Tribunal is satisfied that delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, pursuant to the application so moved before the Tribunal by the assessee on expiry of aforesaid 180 days of stay; and

• Third Proviso—The period of stay originally allowed and/or extended as above shall not exceed 365 days and the Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the said original and/or extended period, which if not disposed would vacate stay of demand on expiry of the said period.

However, the Bombay High Court in the case of Narang Overseas (P) Ltd vs. ITAT and Ors (295 ITR 22), relying upon the decision of the apex court in the case of CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. (180 ELT 434) [judgment delivered while considering similar provisions on powers of Tribunal to stay demand under the Indirect Tax Laws] held that the third proviso to section 254(2A) so inserted vide the Finance Act, 2007 cannot be construed as limitation on the powers of the Tribunal to grant interim relief even if the delay in disposal of appeal is not attributable to acts of the assessee.

Pursuant to the aforesaid observations, the third proviso to section 254(2A) was again amended vide the Finance Act, 2008 to address the said interpretation, by specifically clarifying that the order of stay by the Tribunal shall stand vacated after 365 days from the date of initial stay, even if the delay in disposing the appeal is not attributable to the assessee.

The impugned proviso of section 254(2A) as amended vide the Finance Act, 2008 has since then been subject to different interpretations by judicial forums on the powers of Tribunal to stay demand beyond a period of 365 days from the date of initial stay. One finds that the issue of whether the Tribunal has powers to stay demand beyond 365 days can be divided into three parts:

1. Determination of powers of the Tribunal under the Act;
2. Constitutional validity of third proviso to section 254(2A) of the Act; and
3. Whether third proviso to section 254(2A) is mandatory or directory

1. Determination of powers of the Tribunal under the Act:

At the outset, reliance is placed on the decision of the apex court in the case of ITO vs. M.K.Mohammed Kunhi (71 ITR 815), wherein the court made the following specific observations w.r.t. powers of the Tribunal under the Act:

“….The right of appeal is a substantive right and questions of fact or law are at large and are open to review by the Tribunal. …The powers which have been conferred by section 254 on the Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective… It is well known that the Tribunal is not [a] Court but it exercises judicial powers. The Tribunal’s powers in dealing with appeals are of the widest amplitude and have in some cases been held similar to and identical with the powers of an appellate Court under the CPC…”

The above decision holds that while the Tribunal is not a Court, it has judicial independence and in certain cases even has powers similar and identical to an appellate Court as provided in the Civil Procedure Code. The question which then arises is can the legislature impose conditions and/or limit the said powers of the Tribunal to provide stay on demand proceedings?

On study of relevant decisions which are set out later, the following characteristics of the right of appeal emerge:

• The right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right and cannot be assumed unless expressly given by the statute;

• Right of appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice;

• The appeal is a creation of a statute and therefore subject to the conditions imposed by the statute;

However, the aforesaid plenary powers of the legislature to impose conditions in regard to the right to appeal are subject to certain limitations, which are as under:

• The conditions imposed and/or specified have to be in relation to the assessee as something which is required to be complied with by the assessee. But where the assessee has no control or say, then the said provisions cannot be sustained;

• An appeal is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interpretation to redress the error of the court below; anything which pares down this very right, carving the kernel out, it violates the provision creating the right;

• Appeal is a remedial right and if remedy is reduced to a husk of procedural excess, and

• The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) and an Act of the Court shall prejudice no man (actus curiae neminem gravabit).

The aforesaid relevant legal propositions were observed in the following decisions while opining on the powers of the legislature to impose subjective conditions of prepayment of deposit of disputed tax and/ or penalty and/or its waiver thereof for entertaining the appeals before the Tribunal under the respective statutory acts, which are as under:

• Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Jawahar D. Mehta vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay (AIR 1988 SC 2010);
• Seth Nand Lal & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 2097);
• Emerald International Ltd. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. (122 STC 382)(P&H)(FB);
• Anant Mills Co. Ltd vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (AIR 1975 SC 1234);
• Sita Ram and Others vs. State of UP (AIR 1979 SC 745);
• Raj Kumar Dey and Others vs. Tarpada Dey and Others (1987)(4 SCC 398);
•    PML Industries Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (2013)(30 STR 113) (P&H); etc.

So, while the legislature has plenary powers to impose conditions on the Tribunal in regard to the right of appeal, it is equally true that conditions so imposed cannot be so unreasonable or onerous that they violate the exercise of said right of appeal itself. On application of aforesaid principles to the issue under consideration:

•    Firstly, the assessee’s right for grant of stay is subjected to functioning of the Tribunal to pass final orders on appeal within the period of stay, over which the assessee has no control;

•    The assessee shall not have right for grant of stay beyond a prescribed period, if the Tribunal cannot pass final orders within period of stay, for no fault of the assessee;

•    The cause and effect relationship are prejudicial to the assessee; and

•    The assessee will not be granted stay of demand beyond the prescribed period, even though on merits he deserves and has a genuine case of stay.

Therefore, one may conclude that the conditions imposed by the legislature vide the provisos to section 254(2A) seriously affect right of appeal of the Tribunal which includes right to stay demand beyond the prescribed period.

2.    Constitutional validity of the third proviso to section 254(2A) of the Act

The constitutional validity of the third proviso to section 254(2A) of the Act was under challenge in the case of Jethmal Faujimal Soni vs. ITAT & Ors. (333 ITR 96)(Bom); however, it was not adjudicated upon on account of request by the department to instead give directions for expeditiously disposing the appeal, which was accepted by the court.

However, in the case of Narang Overseas (supra), the court, while considering the powers of the Tribunal to grant stay of demand, made the following relevant observations w.r.t. constitutional validity of the provisos to section 254(2A) of the Act, which is as under:

“…..The mischief if and at all was the long delay in disposing of proceedings where interim relief had been obtained by the assessee. The second proviso as it earlier stood could really have not stood the test of non-arbitrariness as it would result in an appeal being defeated even if the assessee was not at fault, as in the meantime the Revenue could proceed against the assets of the assessee. The proviso as introduced by the Finance Act, 2007 was to an extent to avoid the mischief of it being rendered unconstitutional. Once an appeal is provided, it cannot be regarded nugatory in cases where the assessee was not at fault.”

[Emphasis supplied]

So, the High Court in very clear terms held that any arbitrary conditions imposed to defeat the right of appeal for no fault of the assessee would regard it as unconstitutional.

Recently, CBEC issued Circular No. 967/01/2013 dated 1st January 2013, with similar conditions as present under consideration. The said Circular provides for initiating recovery proceedings against the assessee if no stay was provided by the relevant appellate authority within the prescribed period of filing an appeal. The said conditions in the Circular on being challenged before various courts, was decided in favour of the assessee by either reading down the said onerous conditions of the Circular; or setting aside the said provisions of the Circular with specific observations that no recovery proceedings shall be initiated in cases where there is no fault of the assessee; or providing interim stay of demand:

•    Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others (2013)(29 STR 449)(Bom.);

•    Manglam Cement Ltd. vs. Superintendent, Central Excise and Ors. (86 DTR 215)(Raj);

•    Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd. vs. UOI through Secretary and Others (86 DTR 176)(Guj.);

•    PML Industries Ltd. vs. CEC (supra); and

•    Ultratech Cement Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others (W.P. No. 736 of 2013) dated 9th January, 2013

In light of the above discussions, it is possible that the third proviso to section 254(2A) may fail to pass the test of constitutional validity and the courts may decide to read down the provisions to mean that the Tribunal has powers to order stay of demand even beyond 365 days from the date of initial stay, provided there is no fault of the assessee in the disposal of appeal.

3.    Whether the third proviso to section 254(2A) is mandatory or directory:

Alternatively, without going into the constitutional validity of the impugned provisos, one may urge that the said provision is directory in nature. It is a well-settled position that if a provision is mandatory then an act done in breach thereof will be invalid, but if it is directory then the act will be valid although the non-compliance may give rise to some other conse-quences. Even a complete non-compliance of a directory provisions has been held in many cases as not affecting the validity of act done in breach thereof.

On perusal of the relevant decisions on the subject, the following tests, (which are by no means exhaustive) have been applied by the courts to determine as to whether a provision is mandatory or directory:

•    Generally, the intent of the legislature is of paramount importance and not the language of the provision in which the intent is clothed;

•    The meaning and intention of the legislature are to be ascertained by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other;

•    The phraseology of the provisions is not by itself a determinative factor. The use of the word “shall” or “may” respectively, would ordinarily indicate imperative (mandatory) or directory character, but not always;

•    Whether non-compliance with the provision would render the entire proceedings invalid or not;

•    When consequences of nullification on failure to comply in a particular manner is provided by the statute itself, then such statutory requirement must be interpreted as mandatory;

•    If the object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the provision directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious inconvenience will be caused to innocent persons without furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory;
 

•    The provision enacted is generally regarded as mandatory, if the language of the provision is clothed in a negative form. Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative;

•    When the provisions of statute relate to performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would cause serious inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the courts to hold such provisions to be directory;

•    When a public authority is required to do a certain thing, within a specified period, the same is ordinarily directory; however, it is equally provided that when consequences for inaction on part of the statutory authority within the specified time is expressly provided, it must be held imperative; and

•    When mandatory and directory requirements are lumped together in a provision, then in such a case, if mandatory requirements are complied with, it will be proper to say that the enactment has been substantially complied with notwithstanding the non-compliance of directory requirements;

The relevant decisions which were considered in order to list down the aforesaid legal propositions are as under:

•    M/s. Delhi Airtech Services Pvt Ltd. and Anr vs. State of UP and Anr. (2011)(9 SCC 354);
•    May George vs. Special Tahsildar & Ors. (2010)(13 SCC 98);
•    Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd. (2003)(2 SCC 111);
•    Balwant Singh vs. Anand Kumar Sharma (2003)(3 SCC 433); etc.

On the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, if the provisions of section 254(2A) are to be determined as to whether they are a mandatory or directory provision, one may infer as under:

•    Legislative history suggests that the main intention of the provision was to discourage practice of those assessees who used to defer the payment of justified taxes for months or years under the garb of stay of demand till disposal of appeal by the Tribunal and to ensure speedier collection of said taxes;

•    A Tribunal being a public functionary takes a decision on the final appeal and interim application for stay of demand and it is not within the powers and control of the assessee. The provisions of section 245(2A) relate to performance of public duty. So, on failure of the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal within the period of stay would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to assessees who have no control over those entrusted with the duty;

•    The third proviso to section 254(2A) has caused serious inconvenience to the public (assesses), since the provisions provide for automatic vacation of stay of demand and thereby initiation of recovery proceedings, for even those who have genuine case and/or at no fault for delay in disposal of appeals; and

•    Section 254(2A) alongwith provisos thereof are not clothed in a negative form, barring use of negative words w.r.t. expiry of period for disposing of orders.

In light of the above, it may be urged that section 254(2A) read with provisos, are lumped together with both mandatory and directory conditions. The mandatory condition being the Tribunal has to decide on merits the assessee’s application for stay of demand, thereby reflecting substantial compliance with the provisions. The condition of disposing stay granted appeal within a prescribed period as being a directory condition.

Therefore, in view of the above, one can conclude that the Tribunal has powers to pass order for stay on merits even on expiry of prescribed period, provided the delay in disposal of appeal in not on account of the assessee.

For the sake of completeness, it would be necessary to mention that in the case of CIT vs. Ecom Gill Trading Pvt Ltd. (2012)(74 DTR 241)(Kar), the Court considering the provisions of section 254(2A), has held that the Tribunal has no powers to grant stay of demand for a period exceeding 365 days from the date of initial stay. The High Court has based its conclusions on the following important findings:

•    The Tribunal which is the creature of the statute should abide by the statutory provisions in letter and spirit and the introduction of third proviso to the Finance Act, 2008 makes it abundantly clear that the purpose is to ensure that order of stay of demand has no effect after the period of 365 days from the date of initial stay; and

•    None of the decisions of the Bombay High Court viz., Narang Overseas (supra), CIT vs. Ronuk Industries (333 ITR 99), have any significance or an impact on the amendment brought about by the third proviso to section 254(2A) vide the Finance Act, 2008.

These findings of the High Court to hold otherwise have either been addressed in detail in the aforesaid paragraphs and/or can be distinguished. In addition to the above, the following are the decisions of various other judicial forums, wherein it has been held that the Tribunal has powers to stay demand beyond 365 days from the date of initial stay under section 254(2A):

•    CIT vs. Ronuk Industries (supra);

•    Tata Communications Ltd vs. ACIT (130 ITD 19) (Mum)(SB);

•    Vodafone West Ltd. vs. ACIT (S.A. No. 86,87/ Ahd/2012 arising out of ITA No. 386 and 387/ Ahd/ 2011) dated 11th January 2013; and

•    Qualcomm Incorporated vs. ADIT (S.A. No. 177 to 183/Del/2012 arising from ITA No. 3696 to 3702/
Del/2012) dated 28th September 2012

The aforesaid decisions are not discussed in detail, as they have either followed the decisions discussed in detail above and/or no new observations are made therein.

Based on the aforesaid averments, one may argue that Tribunals have powers to stay demand proceedings even beyond 365 days; however, it shall be equally necessary to remind oneself of the observations of the apex court in the case of ITO vs. M.K.Mohammed Kunhi (supra), which read as under:

“A certain apprehension may legitimately arise in the minds of the authorities administering the Act that, if the Tribunal proceeds to stay recovery of taxes or penalties payable by or imposed on the assesses as a matter of course, the Revenue will be put to great loss because of the inordinate delay in the disposal of appeals by the Tribunal. It is needless to point that the power of stay by the Tribunal is not likely to be exercised in a routine way or as a matter of course in view of the special nature of taxation and revenue laws. It will only be when a strong prima facie case is made out that the Tribunal will consider whether to stay the recovery proceedings and on what conditions, and the stay will be granted in most deserving and appropriate cases where the Tribunal is satisfied that the entire purpose of the appeal will be frustrated or rendered nugatory by allowing the recovery proceedings to continue during the pendency of the appeal.”

GAPS in GAAP Accounting for BOT contracts

Background

Governments are always
starved of funds. To mitigate this problem, they enter into contracts
with private parties; particularly in the area of public service for the
development, financing, operation and maintenance of infrastructural
facilities such as, roads, bridges, ports, etc. An arrangement typically
involves a private sector entity (an operator) constructing the
infra-structural facilities used to provide the public service and
operating and maintaining those infrastructural facilities for a
specified period of time. The operator is paid for its services over the
period of the arrangement through user fees or the grantor pays
annuity. Such an arrangement is often described as a
‘build-operate-transfer’ (BOT) or a ‘public-to-private service
concession arrangement’. A feature of these service arrangements is:

1.  
 The grantor (generally the Government or a public sector company)
controls or regulates what services the operator must provide with the
infrastructural facilities, to whom it must provide them, and at what
price; and
2.    The grantor controls through ownership, beneficial
entitlement or otherwise any significant residual interest in the
infrastructural facilities if remaining at the end of the term of the
arrangement.

Typically under current Indian GAAP, practice is
that the grantor records the cost of constructing the infra-structure as
fixed assets or in some cases as intangible assets. No profit is
recognised on the construction, since it is not appropriate to recognise
any profit on constructing fixed assets/intangible assets for own use.

However,
if one were to look more deeply into the current Indian GAAP, a more
appropriate accounting interpretation of the arrangement would be as
follows:

1.    The infrastructure facilities should not be
recog-nised as property, plant and equipment of the operator, because
the contractual service arrangement does not convey the right to control
the use of the public service infrastructure facilities to the
operator. The operator has access to operate the infrastructure
facilities to provide the public service on behalf of the grantor in
accordance with the terms specified in the contract.

2.    Under
the terms of contractual arrangements, the operator acts as a service
provider. The operator constructs infrastructure facilities used to
provide a public service and operates and maintains those infrastructure
facilities (operation services) for a specified period of time.

3.  
 The operator should recognise and measure revenue in accordance with
Accounting Standard (AS) 7, Construction Contracts and Accounting
Standard (AS) 9, Revenue Recognition for the construction and operating
the services it performs.

If the operator performs more than one
service under a single contract or arrangement, consideration received
or receivable should be allocated by reference to the relative fair
values of the services delivered, when the amounts are separately
identifiable.

4.    Paragraph 34 of AS 26 Intangible Assets
states that “An intangible asset may be acquired in exchange or part
exchange for another asset. In such a case, the cost of the asset
acquired is determined in accordance with the principles laid down in
this regard in AS 10, Accounting for Fixed Assets.” Paragraph 11.1 of AS
10 states that “When a fixed asset is acquired in exchange for another
asset, its cost is usually determined by reference to the fair market
value of the consideration given. It may also be appropriate to consider
the fair market value of the asset acquired, if this is more clearly
evident.”

5.    If the operator provides construction services,
the consideration received or receivable by the operator should be
recognised at its fair value. The consideration may be, rights to a
financial asset (annuities are received from the government), or an
intangible asset (toll charges are collected from public).

6.    The operator should recognise a financial asset when it receives annuities from the grantor.

7.  
 The operator should recognise an intangible asset to the extent that
it receives a right (a licence) to charge users of the public service.

Let’s consider a simple example of how the intangible asset model would work.

Example

The
terms of the arrangement requires an operator to construct a road
within two years and maintain and operate the road to a specified
standard for eight years (i.e. years 3–10). At the end of year 10, the
arrangement will end and the road ownership will continue with the
government. The operator estimates that the costs it will incur to
fulfill its obligations will be as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 — Estimate of Costs


Assume
the operator collects Rs. 200 per year in years 3–10 from users of the
road. The user rates are fixed by the government. Fair value of
construction services is forecast cost plus 5%.

The operator
recognises contract revenue and costs in accordance with AS 7,
Construction Contracts and AS 9, Revenue Recognition. In year 1, for
example, construction costs of Rs. 500, construction revenue of Rs. 525
(cost plus 5 per cent), and hence construc-tion profit of Rs. 25 is
recognised in the statement of profit and loss. The operator provides
construction services to the grantor in exchange for an intangible
asset, i.e. a right to collect tolls from road users in years 3–10. In
accordance with AS 26, Intangible As-sets, the operator recognises the
intangible asset at cost, i.e. the fair value of consideration
transferred to acquire the asset, which is the fair value of the
consideration received or receivable for the construc-tion services
delivered. In accordance with AS 26, the intangible asset is amortised
over the period in which it is expected to be available for use by the
operator, i.e. years 3–10. The depreciable amount of the intangible
asset (Rs. 1,050) is allocated using a straight-line method. The annual
amortisation charge is therefore Rs. 1,050 divided by eight years, i.e.
Rs. 131 per year. The road users pay for the public services at the same
time as they receive them, i.e. when they use the road. The operator
therefore recognises toll revenue when it collects the tolls. The
statement of P&L for years 1-10 will appear as shown in Table 2.

The
above example has been kept simple and numerous other complications
have not been considered such as capitalisation of borrowing costs,
resurfacing obligation, negative grants, revenue sharing arrangements,
etc.

To sum up, it could be said that the current Indian GAAP is
not explicit as to how BOT contracts should be accounted for. 
Therefore, there appears to be two methods in which BOT contracts can be
accounted.

Method 1

A classic and conventional
method has been to recognise the construction cost of the infrastructure
as fixed asset and depreciate it over a period of time. The
corresponding revenue on user fees is recognised when user fees are
collected.

Challenges in applying method 2

Scope

Since
the accounting model involved in method 2 is so different from the
traditional ”fixed asset” model, it is critical to determine whether an
arrangement falls within its scope. This is not always straightforward
due to the complexity of the contracts setting out the key terms of the
concession arrangements. One challenge that may arise, is in
deter-mining whether the government body controls any significant
residual interest in the infrastructure asset at the end of the
concession arrangement. Another challenge that may arise in some
circumstances, is to determine whether the government in substance
controls the user price.

Intangible asset, financial asset, or both

The
next step is to determine which of the two ac-counting models
(intangible asset or financial asset) to apply. This decision will have a
significant impact on the revenues recognised from the contract. For
example, it is not uncommon for a contract accounted for by applying the
intangible model to give rise to double the revenues, compared to a
contract with nearly identical cash flows that is accounted for using
the financial asset model. Fortunately, the selection of the model to
apply is not an option. Rather, the model flows from whether the
operator has the right to charge for services (intangible model) or the
right to receive cash flows from the grantor (financial asset). This may
require careful analysis, since a contract that initially appears to
fall within the intangible model may have an element of guaranteed cash
flows. For example, if in the early years of the contract, the
government body guarantees a minimum level of revenues from the
operation of a new expressway to encourage private investment, there may
be both a financial asset and an intangible asset. Accounting for these
“combined model” concessions can become very complex, since costs and
revenues must be divided between the two components of the contract.
Dividing the total consideration into the two components may involve the
use of significant management judgment and estimation.

Estimates and fair values

Accounting
for concession arrangements typically involves an extensive use of
estimates and valuations, which are expected to have a significant
impact on the company’s financial statements. For example, revenues and
costs need to be recognised for the construction of the infrastructure
asset in accordance with AS-7. Since the contract is unlikely to specify
separately the revenue from construction, it is typically necessary to
impute construction revenues by applying an appropriate margin to the
construction costs, and to assign the balance of revenue to operations,
maintenance, etc. Companies may need to use either internal or external
benchmarking for similar construction contracts, since an assessment of
profitability on a service concession arrangement is normally made on an
overall IRR basis and not separately for the construction and operation
phases of the project.

Accounting for negative grants

Certain
arrangements include the provision for negative grants, wherein the
operator is required to make the payment to the grantor during the
duration of the arrangement. The negative grant may be either in the
form of fixed payment (upfront or annual throughout the service
concession arrangement) or in the form of a percentage of revenue earned
during the arrangement. The upfront fixed payment should be treated as
an intangible asset. In the case of annual fixed payment, intangible
assets should be recognised at the present value of the annual amounts.
However, there are mixed practices under Indian GAAP in these matters.
Where the negative grant is in the form of share in the percentage of
revenue earned during concession arrangement, the company should assess
whether the revenue is to be shown on a net or gross basis.

Other factors

Numerous
other issues need to be considered such as capitalisation of borrowing
costs, provision for maintenance obligation, etc. and the efforts
involved in applying method 2 should not be undermined.

Issue

Parent
Ltd is a listed entity. Parent Ltd has set up a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) which is its 100% subsidiary, for the purposes of entering into
an arrangement with NHAI. SPV has entered into BOT contract with NHAI.
As per the Agreement, NHAI has granted an exclusive right to the SPV to
construct, operate and maintain the road for a period of thirty years.
The SPV has sub-contracted the construction for 60% of the road contract
to Parent. In 2012-13, Parent has executed the work of above road
project and the profit margin is approximately 5%. Parent recognises the
margin earned in its stand-alone financial statements. Whether Parent
should eliminate the profit on revenue received from SPV from
construction services provided to the SPV, in its consolidated financial
statements (CFS)?

Response

The response to the
above question will depend on the method the Parent is following with
respect to the accounting of service concession arrangements.

Method 1

If
method 1 as described above is used, Parent should eliminate the profit
on revenue received from SPV from construction services provided to the
SPV, in its

CFS. This is primarily for two reasons. Firstly,
paragraph 10.1 of AS-10 Accounting for Fixed Assets states as follows
“In arriving at the gross book value of self-constructed fixed
assets…………

Any internal profits are eliminated in arriving at such costs.” Secondly, paragraph 16 of AS-21 Consolidated Financial

Statements
states as follows “Intragroup balances and intragroup transactions and
resulting unrealised profits should be eliminated in full.”

Method 2

If
method 2 is applied, Parent should not eliminate the profit on revenue
received from SPV from construction services provided to the SPV, in its
consolidated financial statements; provided method 2 is applied in its
entirety. Under this method, the company applies the principles of the
Guidance Note/IFRIC 12. The group is not controlling the infrastructure,
which in substance has been sold to the grantor in lieu of a right to
use (intangible asset). As the group has sold the infrastructure, an
appropriate profit should be recognised. In other words, the arrangement
is seen as providing construction services to the government, rather
than a construction service provided by the Parent to the SPV.

The
application of accounting treatment above should not be seen as a means
of applying the Indian GAAP principles (method 2) to selectively
recognise the profits that Parent has made on its billing to the SPV.
Rather, it is a holistic application of Indian GAAP principles to the
entire service concession arrangement. Therefore, in addition to the
cost incurred by the SPV on billings by Parent, there may be other cost
incurred in executing the contract. The Indian GAAP principles
enumerated above should be applied to the total construction cost
including those charged by Parent to the SPV. This would mean that in
addition to not eliminating the profit made by the Parent on its billing
to the SPV, Parent would also have to recognise an additional profit
representing the margin on other cost. Further, all service concession
arrangements that fulfils certain specific criteria (and explained in
this article), will have to be accounted for in this manner. In
ad-dition, other matters may need careful consideration such as
provision for maintenance and resurfacing obligation, negative grant,
sharing of revenue with grantor, capitalisation of borrowing cost, etc.

Thus
under method 2, the entire arrangement is recorded based on Guidance
Note/IFRIC 12 principles. There are numerous challenges in applying
method 2 and it is not a straight forward exercise. This may have the
effect of recognising the profit made on the construction services
including the billings of the Parent to the SPV; however, it has too
many other repercussions and accounting consequences (discussed in this
paper) which would need careful consideration.

Method 2

An
alternative method under current Indian GAAP is to recognise the
construction of the infrastructure as a construction service rendered to
the grantor in exchange of an acquisition of a right to use (an
in-tangible asset) or an unconditional right to annuities (a financial
asset). Those principles of current Indian GAAP are more clearly
articulated in the Exposure Draft Guidance Note on Accounting for
Service Concession Arrangements. International Financial Reporting
Standards IFRIC 12 Service Concession Arrangements also has similar
requirements. The working model with respect to this method has been
explained in this article, using a simple example where the construction
service is exchanged for an intangible asset (right to use). There are
numerous challenges in applying method 2, which are described below.
When method 2 is used, it should be applied to all contracts in the
group that meet the requirements set out in the Guidance Note ED/ IFRIC
12.

Revised Forms 15CA and 15CB—Changes and Impact

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Background
The Finance Act, 2008 inserted s/s. (6) in section 195 requiring that every person, who was required to deduct tax from the payment made to a non-resident, not being a company, or to a foreign company, should furnish prescribed information to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). Rule 37BB was then inserted by the Income Tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules, 2009, to lay down the procedures for the same.

Forms 15CA and 15CB, which were introduced in this regard, created contentious issues for practitioners and the Income-tax Department. The procedure was that for making a payment to a non-resident or a foreign company, the person making the remittance was required to obtain the certificate of a Chartered Accountant in Form 15CB, submit Form 15CA online based on the same, and finally submit both these documents to his bankers to complete the transaction. On 5th August 2013, CBDT issued Notification No. 58/2013 amending Rule 37BB and these forms with effect from 1st October, 2013. However, soon thereafter, on 2nd September 2013, CBDT amended Rule 37BB and the forms further by way of Notification No. 67/2013, again with effect from 1st October, 2013.

This article intends to highlight the changes in the reporting requirements and the impact of the same.

Changes in reporting
Hitherto, Forms 15CA and 15CB were required to be furnished by the person making the remittance to a non-resident, not being a company, or a foreign company, for every payment—irrespective of the quantum or the taxability of such payment. Rule 37BB, as amended by the two notifications referred above, provides certain relaxations in the reporting requirements based on the quantum and nature of payment. The changes are summarised in the table below:


Note 1: The specified list (as per Notification 67) covers remittances on account of –

•    Indian investment abroad in equity/debt/branches and wholly owned subsidiaries/subsidiaries and associates/ real estate
•    Loans to non-residents
•    Operating expenses of Indian shipping /airline companies operating abroad
•    Booking of passages abroad—airlines companies
•    Business travel, travel under basic travel quota, travel for pilgrimage, medical treatment, education
•    Postal services
•    Construction of projects abroad by Indian companies
•    Freight insurance relating to import and export of goods
•    Maintenance of offices/Indian embassies abroad
•    By foreign embassies in India
•    By non-residents towards family maintenance and savings
•    Personal gifts and donations, donations to religious and charitable institutions abroad, grants and donations to other Governments and charitable institutions established by the Governments, donations by Indian Government to international institutions
•    Payment or refund of taxes
•    Refunds or rebates on exports
•    By residents on international bidding

Note 2: The following items appeared in the specified list as per Notification No. 58, but are missing in the superseding Notification No. 67:

•    Payment for life insurance premium
•    Other general insurance premium
•    Payments on account of stevedoring, demurrage, port-handling charges etc.
•    Freight on imports—airline companies
•    Booking of passages abroad—shipping companies
•    Freight on exports—shipping companies
•    Freight on imports—shipping companies
•    Payments for surplus freight or passenger fare by foreign shipping companies operating in India.
•    Imports by diplomatic missions
•    Payment towards imports—settlement of invoice
•    Advance payment against imports

Impact and Issues

It is clear that the revised procedures for making remittances to non-residents seek to reduce the burden of compliance in several cases—where payments fall under the specified list, which are not liable to tax in India or where the remittances are very small in quantum. Furthermore, in cases where the proposed reporting is as extensive as the existing requirements, these amendments seek to capture much more information, thereby casting more onerous duty on the remitter as well as the Chartered Accountant issuing the certificate in Form 15CB. The revised Form 15CB and Part B of the revised Form 15CA attempt to capture nearly the entire process of determination of taxability of a cross-border payment. In doing so, however, the amendments leave several existing issues unanswered and also manage to raise new concerns. Some of these concerns are outlined below:

Persisting Issues:

i)    Personal Payments:

Section 195 places a burden on any person making payments to non-residents for personal expenses such as online purchases, paid downloads, etc. It is impractical for the payer either to obtain a Tax Deduction Account Number (TAN) or to undertake the procedures under Rule 37BB in order to comply with these provisions. While carving out several transactions from the reporting net, payments of personal nature other than gifts or donations have been left out of the specified list.

ii) Payments to non-residents operating in India:

The obligation to deduct tax at source or to furnish details in Form 15CA are in respect of payments made to non-residents irrespective of whether such payments involve any outward remittance or not. As a consequence, one faces difficulties in making payments in Indian rupees to non-residents who are operating in India. For instance, a person banking with the Indian branch of a foreign bank ends up paying a foreign company every time his bank charges him for services provided. This in turn implies that he must comply with Section 195 read with Rule 37BB while making such “payments”.

iii) Credit Card Payments:

Rule 37BB, as it stood before the amendment, as also the revised Rule 37BB require the details in Form 15CA to be furnished prior to making the remittance. However, in the age of e-commerce, electronic payments through credit cards and net transfers have become the order of the day. In such cases, it becomes difficult for the payer as well as the remitting bank to ensure compliance with the prescribed procedures.

iv) ECS/Auto debits:

Similar to credit card payments, it is near impossible to single out the payments made by way of system generated Auto Debits and ECS. Clarity is required on the issue of how details are required to be furnished in such cases and whether monthly compliance would be required.

Added Concerns:

i)  Sums not chargeable to tax:

The language of the revised Rule 37BB clearly spells out that it would apply in respect of remittances made for sums which are chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act. This is a deviation from the language of Rule 37BB prior to Notification No. 58 and especially from the language used in Notification No. 58. This leads to an inference that the revised procedure is not applicable in cases where the payments are not liable to tax in India. However, the notification lists 28 specific types of payments for which no information is required to be furnished. This may lead to an interpretation that all payments not falling within that list but which are not chargeable to tax in India would call for furnishing some information, either limited or extensive.

ii) Small payments:

Small payments of upto Rs. 50,000 individually or aggregating to Rs. 2,50,000 in the financial year have limited reporting requirements in Part A of Form 15CA. Accordingly, if one were to make a lumpsum payment exceeding the individual limit of Rs. 50,000 to a non-resident or a foreign company without crossing the annual limit of Rs. 2,50,000, it would attract the reporting in Part B of the Form. This would result in unintended consequences, foiling the intent to reduce the compliance burden for small payments.

iii) Difference in opinion on taxability:

If the revised Rule 37BB is not to apply to payments, which are not liable to tax in India, the same would present practical difficulties in application of the revised procedure. There could be a difference of opinion between the remitter and the authorised dealer on the taxability of a particular remittance. In the absence of any consensus, the authorised dealer may end up insisting on Form 15CA from the remitter before making a payment, while in the view of the latter, the same is not required.

iv) Import payments:

While payments for imports are considered not taxable in India in a vast majority of cases, this issue in not dealt with in the revised Rule 37BB, which otherwise exempts several types of payments from reporting requirements. In fact, in the proposed Rule 37BB as per Notification No. 58, the specified list consisted of import payments, thereby casting lesser obligations on such remittances. Deletion of imports from the specified list now creates even further ambiguity.

v) Capital Gains:

Section 195(2) is very clear that in case where only a part of the payment made to the non-resident or foreign company is liable to tax, the payer must make an application to the Assessing Officer (AO) for determination of that portion of the remittance which is taxable. The Supreme Court in the case of GE India Technology Centre Private Limited has held that the payer cannot by himself determine the taxability of such amount. Typical instances where 195(2) would get triggered and hence, an application to the AO would be required, include business income taxable in India or capital gains.

However, the revised Form 15CB requires the sum of long term and short term capital gains to be reported along with the manner of determination of the capital gains. This would imply that a Chartered Accountant can certify quantum of tax to be deducted from capital gains. This runs counter to the current interpretation of 195(2). As a consequence, it appears that the revised Form 15CB casts the duty of computation of capital gains income on the Chartered Accountant and a remittance/payment can be made to the payee on the basis of his certificate without making an application to the AO.

vi) Instructions by the RBI:

Currently, Rule 37BB does not require the details to be furnished to the authorised dealer. In fact, the requirement to submit Form 15CA accompanied with Form 15CB prior to making remittance is a mandate given by the RBI to the authorised dealers. The revised Rule 37BB(3) puts the onus on the authorised dealers for gathering of the information as well as retaining it, since an income-tax authority is entitled to call upon the authorised dealers to furnish a signed printout. Since the obligation cast under the Income-tax Act supersedes the instructions of the RBI, the revised requirements would need to be notified by the RBI. In the absence of notification by the RBI, the authorised dealers would be confused as to whether the process prescribed by Rule 37BB, the RBI or both is to be followed.

vii)    Hasty implementation:

The amendments to the procedures are sought to be implemented at a very short notice. The original Notification was issued on 5th August, 2013 followed by the Notification No. 67 issued on 2nd September, 2013. Both these notifications seek to usher in the new requirements with effect from 1st October, 2013. Considering that this is a very short-time frame, the existing system may not be geared for the changes. Further, if the RBI does not issue corresponding directions by 1st October 2013, implementation of the amendments would go haywire.

viii)  AD to furnish details to income-tax authority:

Apart from specifically requiring the details to be furnished to the authorised dealers, the revised Rule 37BB also places a cumbersome burden on them to produce the documents submitted to them if required by any income-tax authority during the course of any proceedings under the Act. This would place the authorised dealers under the duty to maintain the documents for a very long period of time.

Conclusion

The recent amendments in Rule 37BB intend to reduce the compliance burden on the remitter and the authorised dealers and facilitate more information for the income-tax authorities. However, two hurried amendments, followed by super-rapid implementation without addressing the lacunae could end up negating the intended benefits of the amendments to all concerned.

India’s low ranking in higher education is a matter of serious concern

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The QS world ranking of universities has no place for any Indian institution among the top 200.

Unlike China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, South Africa and Brazil. (Source: The Economic Times dated 13-09-2012) 120 (2012) 44-B BCAJ (Comment: We do not promote meritocracy in India. Politics of reservation in all walks is a big hindrance to promotion of meritocracy.)

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Don’t delay GAAR : Do it properly – but do it now

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There is no question that the proposed General Anti- Avoidance Rules, or GAAR, need to be reviewed. To the extent that they give excessive discretion to the tax assessment authorities, they are clearly unsuitable for a country like India where the tax department has often been accused of harassing its taxpayers. Compliance with tax requirements is difficult enough currently; allowing more levers for potential harassment to income tax officers is a dangerous step. The government’s move to set up a committee headed by tax expert Parthasarathi Shome was, thus, welcome. The Shome committee’s draft report, which was released on Saturday, however, is worrying in its own way. The delay by three years for “administrative” reasons, in particular, is questionable.

Remember, GAAR was always proposed to be part of the new direct taxes code, which was supposed to be in force by now. What additional preparation time will three years gain? It merely kicks the responsibility for introducing GAAR and calming market participants over to the next government. It strains belief to assume that, by that time, distrust of the income tax authorities will have ended. GAAR needs to be redrafted to ensure that excessive discretion is minimised — but six months is long enough to do that. The new tax policy should be in place by the next Budget. To try any less hard would be to betray the core purpose of GAAR: to serve as part of a co-ordinated, international crackdown on the sources and destinations of unaccounted-for and tax-avoiding money. This was a compact between the countries of the G20 post the financial crisis, when government resources were crucial to staving off the worst that could happen; and it is clearly something that voters desire. The government should do it properly, and do it now.

Some other aspects of the recommendations are equally questionable. For one, there is insufficient recognition that the incentivisation of “foreign” investment from Mauritius must end. The tax treaty that India currently has with Mauritius must be renegotiated, and the grandfathering of investment made under more lax rules must not also perpetuate the “evergreening” of tax-free pipelines even after laws change. Entities investing in India must be properly regulated, even if in low-tax environments like Singapore, and should meet more stringent know-your-customer requirements than has hitherto been expected of those from Mauritius. The “Mauritius route” is unsustainable, and must be closed. A clear timeline and method to do so must be laid out.

Finally, there is the question of tax on short-term capital gains from listed securities, which the panel suggests be ended. This – yet another attempt to boost listed securities as destinations for India’s savings – is problematic in isolation. However, the Shome committee suggests that securities transaction taxes receive a compensating hike, in order to ensure no loss of revenue to the government. That has some points in its favour: a securities transactions tax does have the advantage of ensuring that more people come into compliance with the law. It serves as an incentive against speculation. It is simple. These are all positive qualities. In the end, it must be remembered that India’s tax system is starkly regressive, and taxation is too easy to avoid. The concerns of equity must be borne in mind when designing taxation. GAAR is an essential tool towards equalizing the tax burden, and must not be watered down beyond recognition.

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Be Constructive – What are the BJP’s alternatives to the government policies it bashes?

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Ordinary people won’t be happy with the politics of obstructionism. Recently, the BJP stalled Parliament at taxpayers’ cost. Then it decided to take anti-UPA protests to the streets, along with reforms-bashers like the Left. The result was partially effective “Bharat bandh” coming at the aam aadmi’s cost. The biggest irony is that the BJP, thanks to which Parliament’s monsoon session was washed out, now wants a special session to discuss the UPA’s nod to retail FDI!

Certainly, the main opposition party should seek answers from the government on important issues, including corruption. However, the place for such interrogation is Parliament. The BJP is also within its rights to disagree with government initiatives, be it subsidy reduction or retail reform. But to come across as neither interested in debate nor offering alternatives to the policies it bashes, doesn’t bolster the party’s image. The BJP seems more concerned with destabilising the government than with resolving issues.

Why does the BJP limit its critique of the diesel price hike or retail reform to making noise? Surely, it should also prescribe how it thinks India should promote much-needed fiscal consolidation. Petrol prices rose several times under the tenure of the NDA, which endorsed price decontrol in 2002. Nor was the NDA hostile to retail reform, as pointed out by commerce minister Anand Sharma. Opposing multi-brand retail FDI today, the BJP must explain how else investors can be made to help boost the agri-value chain. Or how direct contact between farmers and buyers could be facilitated to raise farm incomes and lower prices for consumers.

When ruling at the Centre, the NDA brandished pro-growth policies to claim India was shining. Today, the BJP comes across as wilfully disowning a modern economic vision in tune with fastglobalising India. Tomorrow, if it comes back to power, can it afford to blink at reforms and let the economy go further down the tube? It’ll also serve the nation better by providing constructive opposition rather than fuelling political uncertainty.

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New Publications

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The following publications have been released : (Page 522)

a) Compendium of Guidance Notes on Accounting (As on 1-7-2012)

b) Technical Guide on Audit of NBFC (Revised Edition 2012) c) WIRC Reference Manual (2012-13)

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Direct entry to CA course

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has given its final approval to the Amendments to Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988 which have been notified on 1st August, 2012.

Amongst other provisions, the amendments also stipulate Direct Entry Scheme to CA Course. Henceforth, Commerce Graduates/Post Graduates with prescribed percentage of marks and other students who have passed the Intermediate level examination or its equivalent examination by whatever name called, conducted by the Institute of Cost Accountants of India or by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India, shall be exempted from passing the Common Proficiency Test (CPT) if they wish to join the C.A. course. The details of the Scheme have been hosted on the Institute’s website and also published on Pages 507-517 of C.A. Journal for September, 2012.

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(Auditor’s appointment under Company Law)

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Clause (9) Part I of first Schedule to CA Act, 1949. CA Arjuna (A) : Hey Bhagawan, last time you explained to me the importance of communicating with the previous auditor. Now what next? Bhagawan Shrikrishna (S):I told you many things. But have you understood?

A – Well, I was attentive. I did understand; but find it difficult to digest and implement.

S – That is always the situation. You are impatient to grab the audit work; and are reluctant to comply with your Institute’s rules.

A – Unfortunately, our mindset has become that way. We often think of short-cuts or bypassing the rules or complying only at the 11th hour.

S – 11th hour is also not bad. You do it at 13th hour with a backdate!

A – We always have some hypothetical fear of doing things in time. We can’t work without tension! Now tell me, if directors of a company give us an appointment letter, is it not sufficient?

S – You often behave as if you have never studied the Companies Act. You can never see anything beyond income tax! That is the whole trouble.

A – Tell me then what I need to do.

S – At least read clause (9) of the First Schedule. First see whether you are the first auditor of that company or there is a change?

A – Why? Is there a difference? I just go by the directors’ letter.

S – Oh! Very dangerous! There are many who don’t even take an appointment letter! You are little better!

A – I am talking of a private limited company. Who is going to verify? Everything is within the family.

S – Are you sure – never are there any disputes in the family? Then why did you fight with Kauravas?

A – They were our cousins! Here, they are husband-wife and their son.

S – In Kaliyuga, there are instances where husband and wife – both CAs – separated and lodged complaints against each other to the Institute!

A – Oh Lord! I must keep Draupadi and Subhadra in good mood. Otherwise, they will drag me into court!

S – Can’t rule out! So, don’t be in a slumber. Previously you were ‘innocent’; but now they will call you ‘stupid’!

A – Anyway. Then what should I see?

S – See Sections 224 and 225 of the Companies Act. If it is the first appointment, then directors can appoint the auditor. But this has to be done within 30 days from incorporation.

A – Oh! And if they don’t?

S – That was sub-section (5) of Sec 224. Otherwise, they will have to hold an extraordinary general meeting and appoint the first auditor.

A – Ah! That’s simple. These are paper meetings. I will ask my friend to write minutes. He is a company secretary.

S – Arey Arjuna, don’t take it so lightly. All formalities of EGM must be observed.

 A – Yeah! He will draft the notice and minutes. Everything is internal!

S – One should see the record of service of notice. Remember, directors and members can deny that they received the notice. They can challenge the validity of the meeting itself.

A – Why should they? It is being done in company’s interest only.

S – So you feel. When everything is smooth and amicable, they will agree. But when friction starts, they will conveniently forget it.

A – Unnecessary complications! Very disgusting

. S – Why are you so uncomfortable when the compliances are so simple? After all, it is a corporate entity. There is sanctity behind these provisions.

A – Then tomorrow, there could be disputes amongst partners also!

S – Yes. That is very common. It is inevitable. Partners are bound to dispute and separate one day or the other! For every birth, there is a death and partnership is no exception.

A – Then, do you mean we should take everything in writing?

S – If possible, you should obtain signatures of all partners on your copy of balance sheet. Do you ever read the partnership deed of a client? There is normally a clause there that accounts will be signed by all partners.

A – Ah! All those are standard clauses. I don’t even ask for the Deed. Same is the case of memorandum and articles of a company. What’s the use of all those stereotyped clauses?

S – Then be ready for trouble.

A – Now, I am in practice for 24 years! Nothing has happened so far.

S – You have not died in the last 50 years. Can you not die now?

 A – Come back to auditor’s appointment. What if there is a change of auditors?

S – You have to first ensure whether the previous auditor has resigned or was removed. He may have just given a letter expressing his unwillingness to be reappointed.

 A – Then what? Is it not sufficient?

S – It may be an item requiring special notice under section 190 of the Companies Act. You have to see all these things.

A – This is too much! If I spend time on this, when shall I audit the accounts. There are deadlines.

S – This happens because you don’t recognise any other deadline except your tax returns. Why don’t you understand that your appointment should be validly made? It is of prime importance. Why are you so casual about it?

A – Clients come to us only at the last moment.

S – So to accommodate them, you compromise everything! If they are careless, make them understand the things. If you accommodate them, they will take you for granted. As if everything is your own duty.

A – I think I should insist on a company secretary’s certificate regarding compliances.

S – That will be better. At least some safeguard!. Client must spend for it. But your basic duty still remains.

A – What duty? S – At least to see the prima facie compliance.

A – Tell me further. Board can fill up a casual vacancy. Is it not?

S – Yes. But every vacancy is not a casual vacancy. First see whether the Board has power to do so. I mean, whether the vacancy is really casual.

A – Why?

S – Don’t expect me to teach you the whole of the Company Law. Why don’t you read the publication on Code of Ethics of your Institute?

A – Where will I get it?

 S – That also you want me to tell? What kind of a CA you are! Go to WIRC. The latest edition is of January 2009 – reprinted in May 2009.

A – Okay! I will see that. There seems no escape!

S – And remember, these provisions of Companies Act and Code of Ethics are very well thought of. Don’t take them as a burden. They are designed to safeguard your own interest. Otherwise, someday, you yourself will crib about your unjust removal.

A – I agree; but our clients are like that! And other CAs also are not bothered about it.

S – Don’t let your client take your professional work for granted. Read all these carefully and update yourself regularly. They are meant for your betterment. Your conduct with the client will decide the dignity of your fraternity, not only now but also in future. If you conduct yourself very loosely before the client, I am sure your future generation will pay for it.

Om Shanti.
Note :
The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 9 of the First Schedule which reads as under:
Clause (9): accepts an appointment as auditor of a company without first ascertaining from it whether the requirements of Section 225 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in respect of such appointment have been duly complied with;
Further, readers may also refer pages 188 to 210 of ICAI’s publication on Code of Ethics, January 2009 edition (reprinted in May 2009)
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Refund of the unlinked incorrect NEFT Payments

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has introduced a refund process on 16th September, 2012 for the unlinked incorrect NEFT payments, to be done through a revised refund e-Form available on the MCA21 portal.

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Conditions imposed for Conversion of Ordinary Society into Producer Company, under part-IX A of the Companies Act, 1956.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide circular No .29/2012 dated 10th September 2012 issued the conditions to be imposed for conversion of ordinary Society into producer Company, Part-IX A of the Companies Act, 1956.

On receipt of an application for conversion of a Co-operative Society into a Producer Company, the ROC’s will seek a written consent from the local Co-operative Department of the concerned state, certifying that the Society desirous of being converted into a Producer Company, under part IX A of the Companies Act, 1956, has no dues payable to the State at the time of such conversion and the Cooperative Department has ‘no objection’ to its being converted into a Producer Company. Further, the ROC’s need to satisfy themselves fully that the applicant society has indeed extended its activities outside the State where it is registered a Co-operative Society under the local/State level Law governing Co-operative Societies which are not inter State Co-operative Societies.

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Filing of B alance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account by Companies in Non-XBR L for accounting year commencing on or after 01.04.2011

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has on 3rd September 2012 issued a General Circular No. 28/2012 extending the time for filing of E-form 23AC/ACA (non-XBRL) as per revised Schedule VI without the additional Fees upto 15.10.2012 or within 30 days from the date of the AGM whichever is later. Full Circular can be accessed at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_ Circular_28_2012.pdf

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Sales / Exchange / Works Contract

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Introduction

Various types of transactions take place in day to day commercial world. A peculiar issue which is being considered here is about the status of a transaction where the dealer received goods for repair from his customer. The dealer replaces the same with his own goods and receives charges for repair. The old one, received from customer, is retained with him for further replacement after repair. The issue is whether on receipt of money from customer towards repair, whether the dealer would be liable to tax under Sales Tax Laws or it can be considered as transaction of exchange of goods thereby not liable to sales tax, or whether it falls in the category of works contract?

Judgment of Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal

The above issue was dealt with by Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal in the case of Kirloskar Copeland Ltd. (S. A. No. 428 of 2009 dt.18.04.2011).

In this matter, the appellant, M/s. Kirloskar Copeland Ltd., is a manufacturer & seller of compressors used in air-conditioners. It accepted defective compressors beyond the warranty period with certain fixed repair charges from customer & replaced them at the option of customer with another repaired compressor off the shelf. The defective compressor was then sent for repairs. The said repaired compressor was then available for replacement in lieu of defective compressor of another customer. The cycle goes on. The repairs charges received were mentioned in books as ‘repair charges’. This was treated by assessing officer as ‘sale’ of old repaired compressors and levied tax on the same.

Before Tribunal, reliance was placed on following judgments. G. G. Goyal Chartered Accountant C. B. Thakar Advocate VAT

(1) Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (9 STC 353) (SC)

(2) Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan (20 STC 430) (SC)

(3) Hotel Sri Lakshmi Bhavan (33 STC 444)

(4) Vishnu Agencies (P) Ltd. (42 STC 31) (SC) & others.

Tribunal held that in a transaction of cross transfer of property in defective compressor received from customer and giving repaired compressor off the shelf, there is no consensual agreement of sale supported by price or money consideration. Holding this as not a ‘sale’ transaction, Tribunal set aside the tax.

Therefore, the situation that developed is that, such receipt of money is not liable to tax under Sales Tax Laws.

Madras High Court’s Judgment

 Recently, Madras High Court had an occasion to deal with a similar issue. Reference is to the judgment of Madras High Court in Sriram Refrigeration Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (53 VST 382)(Mad).

In this case also, the dealer received defective compressors, in its Tamil Nadu office, gave another repaired compressor and also charged repair charges. The defective compressor was then transferred to Hyderabad workshop to repair and keep it in rolling stock.

The Tamil Nadu Sales Tax authorities levied Sales Tax on the same considering the transaction as works contract.
Based on above facts, the arguments on behalf of assessee, can be noted as under:

“The learned counsel appearing for the petition/ assessee contended that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that it is a deemed sale. He further contended that the Tribunal is wrong in holding that the transfer of property by way of replacement of defective parts in the compressors while undertaking repair works took place within the State of Tamil Nadu and hence, the transactions are liable to tax. He further submitted that the authorities have failed to appreciate the fact that the petitioner/assessee received defective compressors from their dealers, who had earlier received the same from their respective customers to whom the said compressors were sold by them and later, these defective compressors were despatched to the factory at Hyderabad for repair and reconditioning; that the repaired compressors were taken into the petitioner’s/assessee’s floating stock in due course on receipt from Hyderabad. But soon after the receipt of defective compressors, the reconditioned compressor was given to the authorized dealer from their floating stock and flat rate was charged as repairing charges, therefore, the assessing officer ought to have appreciated that the transactions partake the character of an exchange not exigible to tax under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.”

 In addition, it was also argued that the transaction is not works contract as use of spares etc. is negligible and not amounting to works contract. In alternative, it was argued that it is a transaction from Andhra Pradesh and not in Tamil Nadu. Hon. High Court rejected contention and upheld the levy considering it as works contract. In its judgment, Hon. High court observed as under:

 “The petitioner/assessee is the manufacturer of compressors and the said compressor is an important component in the air-conditioner/ refrigerator. The petitioner/assessee supplied refrigerators to the customers. There is no factory with repairing facility within the State of Tamil Nadu. The defective compressors were brought to the petitioner for repairs. When the defective compressor is handed over, a rectified compressor is immediately supplied by the petitioner. The petitioner, in order to have quick servicing, replaced the defective compressor by a re-conditioned compressor of the same model. The defective compressor received was subsequently transferred to the factory in Andhra Pradesh for rectification of the defects. The appellant/dealer collected repair charges for the defective compressors. The whole transaction is completed within the State. Therefore, the authorities below have taken a view that the transaction is works contract and the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract and thereby imposed sales tax on such transfers. The authorities have also held that there is no separate particulars towards labour charges and value of the property transferred. The provision of section 3B of the Act was attracted and the lower authorities correctly allowed 30 per cent deduction towards labour charges and the remaining 70 per cent was taxable at the appropriate rate. From the transaction, it is clear that the supply of defective compressor has been returned as a rectified compressor and therefore, the authorities below held that it amounted to works contract.
After the 46th Amendment, the definition of “sale” was enlarged including the transfer of property of goods involved in the execution of the works contract and thereby, imposed sales tax on such transfer and therefore, the tax on transfer of property in goods “whether as goods or in some other form” involved in the execution of works contract falls within the ambit of article 366(2A) of the Constitution of India. In this case, the defective compressor is repaired and regarding the same, the assessee also produced certain invoice wherein it is categorically stated that the repair charges were charged.”

It is further observed as under:
“26. While looking deep into the nature of transaction, it is found that the customer is never aware of the repair work being carried out in other State. The customer is not placing orders with the factory at Hyderabad for repair and return of the repaired compressor from Hyderabad to him. On the other hand, the transaction is made across the counter of the appellant by the customer, by delivering the defective compressor and receiving the repaired compressor. The point to be noted is that the parts to be replaced in the defective compressor and labour charges are arrived at and collected and even before the same compressor could be got repaired and given a replacement by a repaired compressor is made from the godown-stock. The parts to be replaced and the ‘work to be carried out’ are clearly identified as soon as the defective compressor is handed over to the appellant by the customer and charges there for are collected and the transaction is completed within the State. Thus the standard parts with particular reference to the ‘type and make’ of the compressor are determined, and thus they are only standard goods or ascertained goods. In the case of ascertained goods in a transaction of ‘sale’, the transfer of property takes place when the contract of sale or purchase is made. Accordingly, to settled position of law, the principles that apply to ‘sale’ will apply to ‘deemed sale’ as well.”

“From a reading of the above finding, it is clear that the whole transaction forms part of an implied contract for repair of the defective compressor in the State. It is only a replacement with a reconditioned compressor of the same mode instead of a defective compressor. Therefore, the authorities below are correct in coming to the conclusion that there is no contract for sale of compressors. Therefore, the transaction has to be treated only as works contract. The reconditioned compressors are handed over and the defective compressors were received by the assessee after charging repair charges and the whole transaction is within the State. After considering the nature of the transaction, all the authorities have given a categorical finding that there is a works contract and the transfer of property acquired within the State in the said contract. Further, the authorities below are correct in holding that in the absence of separate particulars towards labour charges and the value of property transferred the provisions of section 3B of the Act were attracted and allowed 30 per cent deduction towards labour charges and only the remaining turnover was chargeable to tax at the appropriate rate. The concurrent findings given by the authorities below are based on valid materials and there is no error or illegality in the order of the Tribunal warranting interference.”

Conclusion

It appears that such replacement in repair transaction will be works contract transaction. However, it is a debatable issue. It is possible to argue that replacement by a repaired compressor is normal ‘sale’ itself as there is transfer of a pre-existing repaired compressor from the assessee to the customer at a specific charge. The receipt of the defective compressor only helps the customer to bring down the take away price for the repaired compressor. In any case, in this judgment, based on finding of lower authority that the transaction is a works contract, the High court has upheld the levy as a works contract.

In the light of the above judgment, the judgment of Tribunal cited above will be correct to the extent that it is not ‘sale’ simpliciter. However, the position that it will not be covered under the Sales Tax Laws at all, cannot be a correct position. Though not as normal sale, but by way of a works contract, it will be taxable under the Sales Tax Laws.

EXPORTED SERVICES

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Preliminary

Under the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (ESR) which were in force prior to 01/07/2012, it was provided in Rule 4 that, any service which is taxable under clause (105) of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), may be exported without payment of service tax. Further clarifications were issued in the context of proportionate credit rules under CENVAT Credit as to the treatment to be given to “exported services”.

W.e.f. 01/07/2012, ESR have ceased to exist, and Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules) have been introduced. Importantly, for the first time, the concept of “exported services” has been specifically introduced under Service Tax Rules, 1994 (ST Rules).

This feature discusses the concept of “exported service” and consequent implications in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CENVAT Rules) and Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules) in regard to “exported services” However, it needs to be expressly noted that, for determination as to whether a service constitutes “export” or not, provisions under ST Rules should be read with the provisions under POP Rules.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

ST Rules Rule 6A – (Export of Services)

“(1) The provision of any service provided or agreed to be provided shall be treated as export of service when –

a) The provider of service is located in the taxable territory,

b) The recipient of service is located outside India,

c) The service is not a service specified in section 66D of the Act,

 d) The place of provision of the service is outside India,

 e) The payment for such service has been received by the provider of service in convertible foreign exchange, and

f) The provider of service and recipient of service are not merely establishments of a distinct person in accordance with item (b) of Explanation 2 of clause (44) of Section 65B of the Act.

(2) Where any service is exported, the Central Government may, by notification, grant rebate of service tax or duty paid on input services or inputs, as the case may be used in providing such service and the rebate shall be allowed subject to such safeguards, conditions and limitations, as may be specified, by the Central Government, by notification.”

CENVAT Rules
Rule 2(e) “exempted service” means a –

 (1) Taxable service which is exempt from the whole of the service tax leviable thereon; or

 (2) Service, on which no service tax is leviable under section 66B of the Finance Act; or

(3) Taxable service whose part of value is exempted on the condition that no credit of inputs and input services, used for providing such taxable service, shall be taken; but shall not include a service which is exported in terms of rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994”.

Rule 5: Refund of CENVAT Credit

 “(1) A manufacturer who clears a final product or an intermediate product for export without payment of duty under bond or letter of undertaking, or a service provider who provides an output service which is exported without payment of service tax, shall be allowed refund of CENVAT Credit……… Explanation 1 – For the purpose of this rule – (1) “export service” means a service which is provided as per Rule 6A of the Service tax Rules, 1994.”

Rule 6 – Obligation of a manufacturer or producer of final products and a provider of output service “………..

(7) The provisions of sub-rules (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall not be applicable in case the taxable services are provided, without payment of service tax, to a unit in a Special Economic Zone or to a developer of a Special Economic Zone for their authorized operations or when a service is exported.

(8) For the purpose of this rule, a service provided or agreed to be provided shall not be an exempted service when –

(a) the service satisfies the conditions specified under rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and the payment for the service is to be received in convertible foreign currency; and

(b) Such payment has *not been received for a period of six months or such extended period as may be allowed from time-totime by the Reserve Bank of India, from the date of provision.” [*Note: The use of the word ‘not’ appears erroneous].

Exported Service – Whether “taxable service” or “exempted service”

Under Central Excise, it has been a settled position that, exported goods are in the nature of taxable goods and not exempted goods. However under service tax, there was no clarity and issues continued to be raised. In the context of CENVAT Credit, vide Circular No. 868/6/2008 – CX dt. 9/5/08 it was clarified, as under: ……………

6 Whether export of service without payment of service tax under Export of Service Rules shall be treated as exempted service for the purpose of rule 6(3)?

No, export of services without payment of service tax are not to be treated as exempted services. W.e.f. 01/07/2012, Rule 2(e) of CENVAT Rules which defines “exempted services”, clearly provides that, services exported in terms of Rule 6A of ST Rules, would not be “exempted services”.

However, it needs to be expressly noted that, this is for the purpose of CENVAT Rules only.

 Brief Analysis of Rule 6A of ST Rules – “export of service”

 Each of the specified conditions is discussed hereafter.

 a) Service provider should be located in the taxable territory. This is in line with the concept of export which presupposes that service is usually provided from taxable territory to non– taxable territory. In this regard, the following definitions under the Finance Act, 1994 as amended (FA12) need to be noted.

Section 64 of FA 12

“(1) This Chapter extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” ……… Section 65(27) of FA 12 “ ‘India’ means, –

 (i) the territory of the Union as referred to in clauses (2) and (3) of article 1 of the Constitution;

(ii) its territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone as defined in the Territorial Waters. Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976);

(iii) the seabed and the subsoil underlying the territorial waters;

(iv) the air space above its territory and territorial waters and (v) the installations, structures and vessels located in the continental shelf of India and the exclusive economic zone of India, for the purposes of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oil and natural gas and supply thereof;” Section 65 (52) of FA 12 “ “Taxable territory” means the territory to which the provisions of this Chapter apply.” Thus, simply stated, service provider should be located in India except in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.

b) Service recipient should be located outside India. Here also, it is to be understood that Jammu & Kashmir is otherwise a non-taxable territory. However, if recipient is located in Jammu & Kashmir, the condition of location outside India is not satisfied. This is also in line with the general concept of ‘export’.

 c) Service should not be a service specified in the Negative List of Services under section 66D of FA 12. This is very important inasmuch it spells out an important legislative intent that services which are specified in the Negative List are totally excluded from the service tax ambit. Hence, the question of the same being regarded as ‘export’, does not arise at all.

d)    The place of provision of service is outside India. This does raise many questions inasmuch as POP Rules contemplate that services could be provided by a service provider based in the taxable territory to a service recipient based in a non–taxable territory.

For instance, if the services are physically provided/performed outside India, the same would be completely out of the service tax ambit and hence, the question of the same being considered as ‘export’ would not arise at all. This anomaly also existed under ESR which was in force prior to 01/07/2012.

In this regard, attention is drawn to the following clarifications by the department in the context of some specific services:

CBEC Circular No. B-11/3/98-TRU dt. 7/10/98 – Market Research Agencies

Para 6.3

“An issue has been raised whether service tax is payable in respect of services rendered to foreign clients in India, and in respect of such services rendered abroad. It is clarified that service tax is payable on all taxable services rendered in India whether to an Indian or foreign client. However, services rendered abroad shall not attract service tax levy as service tax extends only to services provided within India.”

Dept Trade Notice No 1/2000 dt. 27/4/2000, Pune I – Tour Operator Services

Para 6.7

“Service tax on services rendered by tour opera-tors is only on services rendered in India in respect of a tour within Indian Territory. Services rendered by tour operators in respect of out-bound tourism i.e. for tours abroad, do not attract service tax. In case of a composite tour which combines tours within India and also outside India, service tax will be leviable only on services rendered for tours within India provided separate billing has been done by the tour operators for services provided in respect of tours within India.”

This remains an unresolved issue. Possibly the only logical reason appears to be treatment for determination of availability of CENVAT Credit.

e)    Realisation of consideration in convertible foreign exchange by a service provider. Compliance of this condition has assumed increased significance.

It needs to be expressly noted that, w.e.f. 01/07/2011, POT Rules have been introduced, whereby there is a liability to pay service tax on the service provider irrespective of realisation from the service recipient. Hence, in cases where consideration is not received (either fully or partly) by a service provider from the service recipient within the time limit permitted by RBI, the benefit of export would be denied subject to discussion in paras hereafter and service tax liability may be triggered from the date of completion of service in terms of POT Rules with applicable interest.

In cases where payments are not received by an exporter service provider within the time permitted by RBI, it would be advisable that appropriate procedure under RBI Regulations (like seeking an extension of time for unrealised proceeds) are complied with by service providers.

(f)    Service provider and service recipient should not be merely establishments of a distinct person in terms of Explanation 2(b) (should be read as 3) to section 65B(44) of the Act which defines ‘Service’. The said explanation reads as follows:

“(b) an establishment of a person in the taxable territory and any of his other establishment in a non-taxable territory shall be treated as establishments of distinct persons”.

At this point, it is required to note the relevant extracts from Department clarifications titled “Education Guide” dated 20/06/2012 issued in the context of Negative List based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01/07/2012 reproduced below:

Para 10.2.2

“Can there be an export between an establishment of a person in taxable territory and another establishment of same person in a non–taxable territory?

No. Even though such persons have been specified as distinct persons under the Explanation to clause (44)    of section 65B, the transaction between such establishments have not been recognized as exports under the above stated rule.”

Para 2.4.1

“What is the significance of the phrase “carried out by a person for another”?

The phrase “provided by one person to another” signifies that services provided by a person to self are outside the ambit of taxable service. Example of such service would include a service provided by one branch of a company to another or to its head office or vice versa.”

Para 2.4.2

“Are there any exceptions wherein services provided by a person to oneself are taxable?

Yes, two exceptions have been carved out to the general rule that only services provided by a person to another are taxable. These exceptions, contained in Explanation 2 (read as ‘3’) of clause (44) of section 65B, are :

  •     “An establishment of a person located in tax-able territory and another establishment of such person located in non-taxable territory are treated as establishments of distinct persons.” [Similar provision exists in section 66A(2). The said section is effective till 30/06/2012].

  •    “An unincorporated association or body of persons and members thereof are also treated as distinct persons.” [Also exists presently in part as explanation to section 65].

Implications of these classificatory remarks are that inter se provision of services between such per-sons, deemed to be separate persons, are likely to be taxed by the department. For example, services provided by a club to its members and services provided by the branch office of a multinational company to the headquarters of the multinational company located outside India would be treated as taxable provided other conditions relating to taxability of service are satisfied.

The term ‘establishment’ has not been defined under FA12/POP Rules/ST Rules. However, in this regard useful reference can be made to, “Education Guide” dated 20/06/2012 available on www. cbec.gov.in

In the line with the legislative intent, whereby services availed from an establishment based outside India by another establishment of the same legal entity in India are deemed to be taxed under reverse charge (as per Education Guide at least), it is being provided that in a reverse case scenario the benefit of export would be denied in such cases even if all the other conditions of Rule 6A of ST Rules are satisfied.

Despite the deeming fiction, which was introduced u/s 66A of the Act (in force upto 30/06/2012) and has been continued w.e.f. 01/07/2012 [section 65B(44) – Explanation 2], whether transactions between two establishments within one legal entity can be taxed at all under service tax, remains an unresolved legal issue which would have to be judicially tested.

Implications in case of delays in realisation of export proceeds

An important practical issue that would arise in such cases is, what would happen in cases where there is a delay in realisation of proceeds for “exported services” and application for extension has been made before RBI, and the case comes up for scrutiny/inquiry by the service tax authorities?

Similar issues did arise under income tax, wherein there was a procedure which prescribed for an application to be made to the Commissioner for seeking extension of time in cases of delays in realization of export proceeds. It was commonly found that applications were not disposed off/ nor proceeds realised till the time of completion of assessment. In many cases, assessing officers disallowed deduction claimed u/s 80HHC (subject to rectification) and raised demands which had to be appealed against.

It is felt that, similar situations may arise under service tax as well, whereby subject to discussions in paras hereafter, service tax authorities may raise protective demands with interest which would have to be contested by service providers. It would be advisable for the service providers to make appropriate disclosures in service tax returns.

Implications in cases where proceeds for exported services are not realised either fully or partially.

As stated earlier, non–realisation of proceeds for exported services, may trigger liability to service tax with interest from the point of completion of service in terms of POT Rules.

Further, it needs to be expressly also noted that, POT Rules do not have any provisions for abatements of service tax in case of bad debts (either fully or partially). Hence, this could cast an additional burden on the “exported services” provider, in addition to the loss on account of bad debt.

Implications under CENVAT Rules/ST Rules in cases of non–realisation of proceeds for exported services

a)    It has been a settled position in the context of duty drawback under the Customs law, that in case of non–realisation of export proceeds, drawback benefits received by an exporter are required to be paid back to the Government with appropriate interest.

b)    On the lines of duty draw back rules, it would appear that, refunds availed by an “exported services” provider under Rule 5 of CENVAT Rules/Notifications issued in terms of Rule 6A of ST Rules would have to be paid back to the Government with appropriate interest.

c)    On a combined reading of Rule 2(e) & Rule 6(8) of CENVAT Rules, it prima facie appears that, in cases where proceeds are not realised for “exported services”, the said services could be treated as “exempted services” with consequent implications.

This appears to be inconsistent considering the fact that, in cases where proceeds for exported services are not realised as prescribed in Rule 6A of ST Rules, export benefit would be denied and service tax liability may arise. Hence, if appropriate service tax liability has been discharged by an “exported services” provider, there should not be any adverse implications in terms of CENVAT Rules.

POP Rules v. ST Rules:

POP Rules were introduced w.e.f. 01/07/2012 in terms of the powers granted u/s 66C of FA 12 to determine the place where services are provided/ agreed to be provided or deemed to have been provided/agreed to be provided. This is essentially done to determine the taxability of cross border transactions. In addition to the said POP Rules, Rule 6A as discussed above in detail is introduced under ST Rules w.e.f. 01/07/2012, specifying conditions for determination of ‘export’ service. The said Rule 6A has not been made subject to POP Rules. Further, the clarification of the Government dated 20/06/2012 (para10.21 of Education Guide), clearly states that all the conditions under the said Rule 6A should be satisfied for a service to be treated as ‘exported’ service. On this backdrop, an important issue that arises for consideration is what would happen in cases where all the conditions specified in Rule 6A are not satisfied (for example, realisation in convertible foreign exchange) but the transaction is outside the taxable territory as per POP Rules.

According to one school of thought, such transaction would be regarded as non-taxable and therefore for the purpose of CENVAT Rules, the same would be treated as “exempted service” and hence the benefit of credits/refunds would be denied. The amendments in CENVAT Rules w.e.f. 01/07/2012 seem to support this line of thinking. According to an alternative school of thought, non-compliance of any of the conditions specified in Rule 6A of ST Rules could trigger service tax liability from the date of completion of service as per POP Rules with interest. This would result in apparent inconsistency vis-à-vis amendments in CENVAT Rules w.e.f. 01/07/2012.

To conclude, it appears that it is a contentious issue which needs to be speedily addressed/clarified to avoid litigation in this regard.

Channel Guide India Limited v. ACIT [ITA No.1221/Mum/2006] Article 12 of India-Thailand DTAA, section 9(1)(vi), 40(a)(i) of the IT Act 2004-05 29 August 2012 Present for the Appellant: Shri P.J. Pardiwalla Present for the Respondent: Shri Jitendra Yadav

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4. Channel Guide India Limited v. ACIT [ITA
No.1221/Mum/2006]
Article 12 of India-Thailand DTAA, section
9(1)(vi), 40(a)(i) of the IT Act
2004-05
29 August 2012
Present for the Appellant: Shri P.J. Pardiwalla
Present for the Respondent: Shri Jitendra Yadav
Consideration for the facility of satellite up-linking and telecasting programmes cannot be treated as an income chargeable to tax in India in the hands of non-residents u/s.9(1)(vi) or 9(1)(vii) of IT Act.

During the relevant year i.e., AY 2004-05, the amount paid was not taxable as per the legal position prevalent at the relevant time and hence, Taxpayer was not liable to withhold tax on the amount paid, irrespective of the retrospective amendment to bring to tax such payments. Accordingly, the provisions of section 40(a)(i) of IT Act, triggering disallowance for not withholding tax, cannot be invoked. Facts The Taxpayer, an Indian Company (ICO), entered into an agreement with a Thailand Company (FCO), for satellite up-linking and telecasting programmes. The amount paid to FCO was claimed by ICO as expenditure on account of broadcasting and telecasting. In addition, consultancy charges were also paid by ICO to FCO. Tax Department considered the payments made by the ICO to FCO as royalty/FTS under the DTAA/IT Act and disallowed the amount paid to FCO on the ground that tax withholding was not made by ICO.

Held:

On Characterisation of payments made to FCO As the ICO does not utilise the process or equipment involved in the operations, relying on Delhi HC decision in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunication Co. Ltd. (332 ITR 340), ITAT held that the charges paid can neither be treated as royalty nor be treated as FTS under the IT Act. The receipt is in the nature of business income which is not chargeable in the absence of PE.

There is no need to take recourse to other income Article of the DTAA which covers only the items of income not covered expressly by any other article in the DTAA. On deduction of taxes at source on account of retrospective amendment

On Tax Department’s contention that the payments were taxable due to the clarificatory retrospective amendments made by Finance Act 2012, the ITAT held that during the relevant year i.e., AY 2004-05, the amount paid was not taxable as per the legal position prevalent at the relevant time and hence, ICO was not liable to withhold tax on the amount paid irrespective of the retrospective clarificatory amendment carried out by Finance Act 2012 in section 9 of IT Act, which seeks to tax such payments.

Reliance was placed on SC’s decision in the case of Krishnaswamy S.PD (281 ITR 305) and Ahmedabad ITAT’s decision in the case of Sterling Abrasive Ltd (ITA No. 2243,2244 Ahd/2008) where emphasis was placed on the legal maxim ‘lex non cogit ad impossiblia’ meaning that the law cannot possibly compel a person to do something which is impossible to perform.

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In the facts of the case, payments made for transfer of allocated capacity in telecommunication submarine cable system does not constitute transfer of ownership right in the system. In the facts of the case, payment for transfer of capacity was consideration for right to use a process and/or right to use commercial or scientific equipment. Payment was therefore ‘royalty’ under the IT Act as well as the India-Saudi Arabia DTAA.

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    3. Dishnet Wireless Limited (AAR No. 863 of 2010)
    Article 13 of India- Saudi Arabia DTAA
    24 August 2012
    Present for the Applicant: Dr. Anita Sumanth
    Present  for  the  Department:  Mr.  G.  C. Srivastava & Others
    

In the facts of the case, payments made for transfer of allocated capacity in telecommunication submarine cable system does not constitute transfer of ownership right in the system.

In the facts of the case, payment for transfer of capacity was consideration for right to use a process and/or right to use commercial or scientific equipment. Payment was therefore ‘royalty’ under the IT Act as well as the India-Saudi Arabia DTAA.


Facts

The Applicant, a company incorporated in India, was engaged in the business of providing telecommunication services in India. A company registered in Saudi Arabia, (FCO), was engaged in operating telecommunication paths, facilities and network infrastructures in Saudi Arabia and other countries (except India). FCO was part of a consortium which entered into an agreement to plan and lay the Europe India Gateway cable (EIG Cable System), linking Indian subcontinent and the UK as part of telecommunication system. Each member of the consortium was entitled to a capacity allocation in the EIG Cable System, based on the proximity to the country to which the consortium member belonged. Further, the member was entitled to transfer its allocated capacity in the EIG Cable System to other telecommunication entities on a private basis, subject to a condition that the transferee should agree to the terms of the consortium arrangement. FCO entered into a Capacity Transfer Agreement (CTA) with the Applicant for transfer of 40% of its total allocated capacity in the EIG Cable System and received consideration of INR1,252 million from the Applicant. The total investment of FCO was agreed at INR3,129M in the project, out of which the Applicant contributed INR1,252M, as consideration for transfer of 40% capacity by FCO. The Applicant approached the AAR on the taxability of the consideration paid to FCO for capacity transfer.

AAR Ruing

The following features of CTA were considered by AAR to conclude that agreement was for grant of use of capacity and not for transfer of ownership rights in the system.

(1) A member of consortium held the allotted capacity on an ownership basis and was entitled to transfer the capacity to other telecommunication entities;

(2) Transfer of the capacity meant ‘making available to a non-member the right of use of capacity’, though primary responsibility to meet consortium obligations continued with the member;

(3) Right to use the agreed capacity is granted only for use by the transferee and it is not-transferable to any third party;

 (4) CTA did not result in transfer of the entire rights and obligations of FCO;

(5) No right of ownership, property in or title to the capacity, facilities or network infrastructure, equipment or software were conveyed to or vested in the Applicant;

(6) In the event of termination of the CTA, all rights of the capacity transferred were to revert to FCO unless mutually agreed otherwise.

In view of clarificatory amendment vide Finance Act 2012 and even otherwise, there is not much doubt that the amount paid was for right to use a process and/ or a right to use commercial or scientific equipment. Under the DTAA, consideration paid for use of or right to use a design or model plan, commercial or scientific equipment is royalty. Further, such royalty would be taxable in India as the payer is located in India. Payments made by the Applicant do not constitute reimbursements of FCO’s costs.

Such payments are not made by the Applicant to the consortium on behalf of FCO. The obligation towards consortium is and continues to be that of FCO. The payment, therefore, can neither be regarded as reimbursement nor cost recoupment.

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Fiscally transparent Swiss partnership firm is not eligible to claim benefits of India–Switzerland DTAA either at the partnership level or at the level of its partners.

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2. Schellenberg Wittmer (AAR No. 1029 of 2010)
Article 1, 4 and 14 of India-Switzerland DTAA,
section 9 of the IT Act
27 August 2012
Present for the Applicant: Mr. Nishith Desai & Others
Present for the Department: Mr. R.S. Rawal, & Others

Fiscally transparent Swiss partnership firm is not eligible to claim benefits of India–Switzerland DTAA either at the partnership level or at the level of its partners.


Facts

The Applicant, a Switzerland-based partnership firm (Swiss firm) was engaged in the practice of law and carried out its activities only in Switzerland. All the partners of the firm are tax residents of Switzerland. An Indian Company (ICO) appointed the Swiss firm to represent ICO in the adjudication proceedings in Switzerland.

The work in relation to the adjudication proceedings was performed by the Swiss firm primarily in Switzerland and Germany, except for a site visit and an adjudication hearing which happened over a period of six days in India. The Applicant approached the AAR to determine whether the fees received for legal services would be chargeable to tax in India under the provisions of the DTAA.

AAR Ruling

 The AAR denied benefit of the treaty to the firm as also to the partners and held that the income was sourced from India so as trigger tax in India.

It held :

(1) The partnership can be said to be domiciled in Switzerland or having its place of residence in Switzerland.

(2) However, for claiming treaty benefits, one needs to determine whether the firm is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the DTAA. If the body of individuals or any other entity is not a taxable entity in the contracting State, it will not be a ‘person’ under the DTAA.

(3) There is no definition of person in Swiss tax law corresponding to the IT Act, which confers the status of a ‘person’ on a partnership. Considering that partnership is not a taxable entity under the Swiss laws, it cannot claim the benefit of the DTAA.

(4) Benefit of DTAA cannot even be claimed by the partners as they are not the recipients of income. Partners merely have right to share profits of the partnership.

(5) Reliance placed on the OECD Commentary to support treaty eligibility is not accepted, since India is not a member of the OECD and India has also expressed its reservations on that part of commentary conclusion .

(1) The source of the income received by the Swiss firm, for rendering professional services to the Indian company, is in India. The fact that the major part of the services are rendered outside India in respect of a dispute arising in India cannot alter the source of income. Income would, therefore, be chargeable in India irrespective of whether it is FTS or not.

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Buy back of shares by an Indian Company from its Mauritius Parent is not a scheme designed for tax avoidance and Mauritius Parent is entitled to claim benefit of ‘no-taxation in India’ under the India- Mauritius DTAA. Under the IT Act, buy back is taxable and exemption u/s. 47 would be available only when either the holding company or the nominee holds the entire share capital and not otherwise. TP provisions under the IT Act would apply, even though the transaction may not be taxable in view o<

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    1. Armstrong  World  Industries  Mauritius
    Multiconsult Ltd (AAR No. 1044 of 2011)
    Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA, section
    47(iv) of the IT Act
    22 August 2012
    Present for the Applicant: Mr. B.L. Narasimhan & Others
    Present for the Department: Mr. R.S. Rawal & Others
    

Buy back of shares by an Indian Company from its Mauritius Parent is not a scheme designed for tax avoidance and Mauritius Parent is entitled to claim benefit of ‘no-taxation in India’ under the India-Mauritius DTAA.

Under the IT Act, buy back is taxable and exemption u/s. 47 would be available only when either the holding company or the nominee holds the entire share capital and not otherwise.

TP provisions under the IT Act would apply, even though the transaction may not be taxable in view of the DTAA.


Facts:

The applicant (MCO), a tax resident of Mauritius holding a valid Tax Residency Certificate (TRC), is a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) of a company incorporated in UK (UKCO). UKCO was, in turn, held by an US Company (USCO). Pursuant to the scheme of corporate reorganisation, one of the businesses of existing Indian company was demerged into another Indian company (ICO) which eventually came to be held by MCO.

ICO proposed to buyback certain number of shares from MCO in terms of the provisions of Indian Companies Act, 1956. Capital gains arising to MCO on buy-back was claimed to be tax exempt under DTAA. Tax Department resisted the claim by alleging that MCO was a shell company without any business purpose and buy-back was not a bonafide transaction.

AAR Ruling

Though MCO is incorporated in Mauritius and the investment was made through it for acquiring shares of ICO and such was the structure to take advantage of the beneficial provisions of the DTAA, this fact, by itself, is not sufficient to deny the benefits of the DTAA. This aspect had been laid down by the Supreme Court (SC) in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan [263 ITR 706].

The Tax Authority had not disclosed adequate material to justify a finding that MCO or its parent resorted in devising a scheme for tax avoidance. Once MCO is eligible to claim the benefits of the Mauritius DTAA, capital gains arising out of the proposed buyback of shares of ICO is not taxable in India irrespective of its taxability in Mauritius.

As the proposed buyback is an international transaction and out of which income arises, same is subject to the Transfer Pricing (TP) provisions under the IT Act, even if same is exempt under DTAA. Based on its earlier ruling in the case of RST [AAR No. 1067 of 2011], the AAR held that exemption u/s.. 47 of the Act would be available only when either the holding company or the nominee holds the entire share capital and not otherwise.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES

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1) Where the variation between the arm’s length price determined u/s. 92C and the price at which the international transaction has actually been undertaken does not exceed five per cent of the latter, the price at which the international transaction has actually been undertaken shall be deemed to be the arm’s length price for assessment year 2012-13.Notification No. 31/2012 dated 17th August,2012

2) Income-tax (Dispute R esolution Panel)(first amendment) R ules, 2012 – Notification No. 33/2012 dated 24th August,2012

CBDT will assign one CIT as a Reserve Member to each panel who would replace any Member of the Panel as and when the DGIT(Intl Tax) deems it necessary. He would function as a Member of the Panel in addition to his regular duties. Further, the notification states that the DGIT (Intl Tax) maytransfer the case of an eligible assessee from one Panel to the other after giving him due opportunity of being heard.

3) Report u/s. 115JC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for computing adjusted total income and alternate minimum tax for LLP –Rule 40BA and Form 29C introduced– Notification no. 34/2012 dated 28th August 2012

4) Multilateral convention on mutual administrative assistance on tax matters with OECD member countries signed on 26th January, 2012 notified – Notification 35/2012 dated 29th August,2012

5) Advance Pricing Agreement Scheme notified- Notification 36/2012 dated 30th August, 2012

Income-tax (10th Amendment) Rules, 2012 notifies following rules detailing the Advance Pricing Agreement Scheme:

  •  Rule 10F explains the meaning of the terms application, bilateral agreement, covered transactions, most appropriate transfer pricing method, etc
  •  Rule 10G any person who has entered into an international transaction or any person contemplating to do so, can take benefit of this scheme.
  •  Rule 10H contains provisions for the Pre-filing Consultation.Before filing an application – in Form 3CEC to DGIT(Intl tax), meeting will be held between the team involving IT authorities and experts nominated by DGIT(Intl tax) and the person filing the application.
  •  Rule 10I specifies the procedure for making an application for Advance Pricing Agreement in Form 3CED along with the requisite fee. Such an application should be made to the DGIT(Intl tax) in case of a unilateral agreement and to the Competent Authority in case of a bilateral or multilateral agreements. Time limits are also prescribed for filing such application.
  •  Rule 10J contains procedure for withdrawal of the application by the assessee before finalisation of the terms of agreement in Form 10 CEE. Fees paid alonwith the application would not be refunded on withdrawal.
  •  Rule 10K details procedure for preliminary processing of application wherein any deficiencies or defects would be identified and applicant would be given the opportunity to rectify the same within prescribed time limit. In case thesame is not done, The DGIT(Intl tax) or the Competent Authority, as the case may pass an order after giving due opportunity, not allowing the application to be processed further. Rule 10L lays down the procedure for framing the agreement.
  •  Rule 10M provides that the Agreement would not be binding on the Board or the applicant if any of the critical assumptions change. In such an event, a notice needs to be given and the Agreement can be modified by following the prescribed procedure. The revision or the cancellation of the agreement shall be in accordance with rules 10Q and 10R respectively.
  •  Rule 10N provides for revision of the application.
  •  Rule 10O provides for the Annual Compliance Report to be furnished by the applicant in Form 3CEF.
  •  Rule 10P details the Annual Compliance Audit of the Agreement by the jurisdictional TPO.  

Rules 10S prescribes the renewal of the said agreement and Rule 10T deals with Miscellaneous matters. Rule 44GA has been introduced, which prescribes the procedure to be followed to deal with requests for bilateral or multilateral agreements

6) Income-tax (11th Amendment) Rules, 2012. -Notification No. 37 dated 12th September 2012 Rule 31ACB and Form 26A introduced being the format of the certificate to be issued by an Accountant under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 201. Rule 37J and Form 27BA introduced being the format of the certificate to be issued by an Accountant under first proviso to sub-section (6A) of section 206C

7) Cost Inflation Index for the financial year 2012-13 is 852 – Notification No. 38/2012 dated 17 September 2012

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Section 263 r.w.s. 40(b) – Allowability of interest to partners – Interest amount calculated as per daily product method by the assessee – Whether CIT is justified in holding the view that the interest should be calculated on the average amount of opening and closing balances – Held, no.

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2. Muthoot Bankers vs. DCIT
In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
Cochin Bench: Cochin
Before N. R. S. Ganesan (J. M.) and B. R.
Baskaran (A. M.)
ITA No. 223/Coch/2010
Decided on 27.07.2012
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: R.
Sreenivasan / A. S. Bindhu

Section 263 r.w.s. 40(b) – Allowability of interest to partners – Interest amount calculated as per daily product method by the assessee – Whether CIT is justified in holding the view that the interest should be calculated on the average amount of opening and closing balances – Held, no.


Facts:

The CIT noticed that the assessee had paid interest of Rs. 2.05 crores to a partner on his current account, which was computed under daily product method. According to him, it should have been calculated on the average amount of opening and closing balances, based on which, the interest payable to partner worked out to Rs. 1.59 crore. Accordingly, he set aside the order of the AO by holding that the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The assessee appealed before the tribunal challenging the order of the CIT.

Held:

Referring to the Supreme court decision in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (243 ITR 83), the tribunal observed that the revision of order u/s. 263 is permissible only after showing that the order passed by the AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. It further noted that the assessee has followed the product method for the purpose of calculating interest payable to the partner, since the partner was having frequent transaction of both receipts and payments. According to it, the said product method is scientific and also followed by the banks and financial institutions. The method takes into account all transactions of payments and receipts carried out throughout the year. On the other hand, the method suggested by the CIT was unscientific which does not taken into account the transactions that have taken place during the year. Accordingly, it held that the CIT has failed to establish that the assessment order was erroneous. Therefore, it set aside the order of the CIT.

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Section 12A – Registration as charitable institution – Assessee formed for improving the quality and profitability of the members’ enterprises by providing suitable platform to its CEOs who only could become assessee’s members – Whether entitled to registration – Held, yes.

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1. XYZ vs. DIT (Exem)
In the Income Tax appellate Tribunal “C”  
Bench: Mumbai
Before N. V. Vasudevan (J. M.) and
rajendra (A. M.)
ITa No. 3503/Mum/2011
Decided on 13.06.2012
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: A. H. Dalal / V. V. Shastri

Section 12A – registration as charitable institution – assessee formed for improving the quality and profitability of the members’ enterprises by providing suitable platform to its CEOs who only could become assessee’s members – Whether entitled to registration – Held, yes.


Facts:

The assessee incorporated as a private limited company was granted license u/s. 25 of the Companies Act, 1956. Its main object as per its Memorandum of Association was as under: “To promote and provide networking facilities to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of both private and public companies for improving the quality and profitability of their enterprises by providing a platform for CEOs for exchange of ideas and promotion of entrepreneurship through shared experience in India and to apply its income or profits if any, solely for the promotion of its objects and for the promotion of commerce in India and abroad.” The assessee applied for registration u/s. 12A.

According to the DIT, the object for which the assessee was incorporated were clearly not for the benefit of general public as a whole, but was confined to specific members only, viz., CEOs of companies and was commercial in nature. Hence, the assessee cannot be termed as a charitable association falling within the definition of section 2(15). Further, from the details filed, he noted that most of the activities of the assessee were held outside India. Therefore, relying on the decision of the Bombay high court in the case of State Bank of India (169 ITR 298), he held that the trust would not be entitled to exemption.

Held:

From the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Surat Art Silks Cloth Manufacturers Association (121 ITR 1), the tribunal noted that the object which seeks to promote or protect the interest of a particular trade or industry is object of public utility. It further noted that the main object of the assessee, was to promote networking facilities to the CEOs for improving the quality and profitability of their enterprises, by providing a platform for CEOs for exchange of ideas and promotion of entrepreneurship through shared experience in India. According to it, advancement or promotion of trade, commerce and industry leading to economic prosperity ensures a benefit of the entire community. It further observed that, that prosperity would also be shared by those who engage in the trade, commerce and industry, but on that account, the purpose is not rendered any less an object of general public utility. As regards holding of conference abroad, it held that the said act would not make the activities of the assessee being carried out outside India. The benefit of such conference will ultimately go to assessee and its members. Thus, it held that the reasons assigned by the DIT for rejecting the assessee’s application for registration cannot be sustained.

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Sections 50C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 50C cannot be invoked on receipt of refund of booking advance paid earlier to a builder.

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3. (2012) 147 TTJ 94 (Ahd)
ITO V. Yasin Moosa Godil
ITA No.2519 (Ahd.) of 2009
A.Y.2006-07. Dated 13.04.2012

Sections 50C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 50C cannot be invoked on receipt of refund of booking advance paid earlier to a builder.

The assessee had booked a flat with a builder and paid advance of Rs.16.12 lakh for the same from time to time. Since the entire amount was not paid by the assessee, the builder had neither handed over the possession of the flat to the assessee nor had he executed any registered sale deed in favour of the assessee. During the relevant assessment year, the assessee requested the builder to cancel the booking and return the advance paid of Rs. 16.12 lakh. The builder, the new buyer and the assessee entered into a tripartite registered sale agreement for transfer of the said flat, wherein the appellant (addressed as the vendor in the sale agreement) was to transfer all his rights, title and interest in the said flat to the buyer, the builder (addressed as the confirming party in the sale agreement) was to give possession of the said flat to the buyer and was also to allot the said flat to the buyer, which was originally agreed to be allotted to the assessee and the new buyer (addressed as the purchaser in the sale agreement) was to acquire only the rights in the said flat from the appellant and the possession and the allotment thereof from the builder. Accordingly, during the year under consideration, the assessee received back from the buyer the booking amount paid by him to the builder.

The Assessing Officer held that the flat was registered for value of Rs.57.57 lakh as against Rs.16.12 lakh refund received by the assessee. He, therefore, treated the difference of Rs.41.45 lakh as unexplained income u/s.50C. The CIT(A) deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of Dy.CIT V. Tejinder Singh (2012) 147 TTJ 87 (Kol)/ (2012) 72 DTR (Kol) (Trib) 160 held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under:

Prior to the execution of the tripartite agreement, the assessee had neither paid full consideration of the flat nor had he acquired the possession of the flat from the builder.

 From the agreement, it was evident that it is the builder who is transferring the capital asset i.e. the flat to the new buyer by handing over the possession of the flat as also the legal ownership thereof to the new buyer and the appellant only received back the advance paid by him to the builder by relinquishing his booking right in respect of the said flat.

From the reading of section 50C, it is evident that it is a deeming provision and it covers only to land or building or both. Section 50C can come into play only in a situation where the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer by an appellant of a capital asset, being land or building or both, is less than the value adopted or assessed or assessable by any authority of State Government for the purpose of payment of stamp duty in respect of such transfer. It is a settled legal proposition that deeming provision can be applied only in respect of the situation specifically given and hence cannot go beyond the explicit mandate of the section.

Therefore, it is essential that for application of section 50C the transfer must be of a capital asset, being land or building or both. If the capital asset under transfer cannot be described as “land or building or both”, then section 50C will not apply.

From the facts of the case, it is seen that the assessee has transferred booking rights and received back the booking advance. Booking advance cannot be equated with the capital asset and therefore section 50C cannot be invoked.

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S/s 56(2)(v) – Gift of India Millennium Deposit Certificate (IMD) received by an assessee is not taxable u/s. 56(2)(v) since the same is not money.

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2. 2012-TIOL-528-ITAT-MUM
ACIT v Anuj Jitendra Mehta
ITA No. 6399/Mum/2010
Assessment Year: 2006-07.  
Date of Order: 05.09.2012

S/s 56(2)(v) – Gift of India Millennium Deposit Certificate (IMD) received by an assessee is not taxable u/s. 56(2)(v) since the same is not money.


Facts:

On 25.9.2005, the assessee received, from a nonresident Indian, a gift in the form of IMD of face value of INR94,000. On 5.10.2005, the assessee prematurely encashed these IMDs and received maturity amount of INR139,452 equivalent to Rs. 98,56,827. While assessing the total income of the assessee, the AO stated that the assessee utilised the unaccounted income of the group company to obtain a non-genuine gift. He also held that the IMDs were equivalent to sum of money and attracted provisions of section 56(2) (v). He added the amount received by the assessee u/s.. 56(2)(v) on the ground that the status of IMDs with the facility of premature encashment available was on par with the legal status of a bank fixed deposit. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the gift was a genuine gift and following the ratio of the decision of ITAT in the case of Shri Anuj Agarwal (130 TTJ 49)(Mum) held that the gift of IMDs is gift in kind and outside the purview of section 56(2)(v) of the Act. He deleted the addition made by the AO. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

 The Tribunal noted that the facts of the present case before it were identical to the facts before the Tribunal in the case of Haresh N. Mehta (ITA No. 6804/M/2010, AY 2006-07, order dated 31.1.2012). In the case of Haresh N. Mehta, the Tribunal relying on the decision of co-ordinate Bench in the case of ACIT v Anuj Agarwal, 130 TTJ 49(Mum) and also the decision of ITAT Vizag Bench in Sri Sarad Kumar Babulal Jain v ITO (ITA No. 29/Viz/2011) order dated 11.8.2011 dismissed the appeal of the department by confirming the order of CIT(A). Following the decision of the

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Elections are Coming

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Elections to the Central Council and the Regional Councils will be held
in the month of December 2012. Those aspiring to be council members will
have, by now, filed their nominations. The Code of Conduct has come
into force from 5th September 2012.

Council members play an
important role in deciding the destiny of the profession in general. It
is important that the profession gets a capable and an efficient council
consisting of members who can shoulder that responsibility.

The
Institute, established as a statutory body, is entrusted with the
responsibility of regulating the profession of accountancy in the
country. This includes training and education of students aspiring to be
chartered accountants. Alongwith regulating the profession, the
Institute wields a significant influence at various levels. Opinion of
the Institute matters and should matter, while framing various economic
and corporate laws and policies.

Our Institute, to a large extent, is an
autonomous body. If the autonomy of the Institute has to be preserved,
then it is important that the profession conducts itself well and the
Council, the body that represents the profession, performs its functions
in a manner, that respect for the views of the profession is enhanced
in the government as well as within the industry. Great burden lies on
the shoulders of the members of the Central Council.

As a member of the
profession, what do I expect from the Council members who represent the
profession? I believe we must convey our expectations to those aspiring
to be our leaders. First and foremost, any person who aspires to become a
Council member must have impeccable integrity. Just as citizens expect
politicians to be honest, so also the professionals expect their
representatives to be persons of integrity. Is it too much to ask?

I
expect my Council members to have the will and the capacity to serve the
interest of the profession alongwith the interest of the nation. I put
the two – the national interest and the professional interest – together
because by encouraging the complicated laws, one may apparently serve
the professional interest by creating work for the profession, but that
certainly would not augur well in the national interest.

Our Institute is of the professionals, so it is important that the council members have good domain knowledge and the capacity to think ahead, take a holistic view, form a considered opinion and convey it effectively. As an emerging economy with a large market, India evokes great interest amongst the developed countries. At this juncture, it is necessary that our Institute plays a greater role at international accounting bodies in formulating accounting and auditing pronouncements.

This requires research and that is possible if the Institute collaborates with those in the industry and academics. Last but not the least, the ethics. Ethical behaviour goes beyond the Code of Ethics under the Rules and Regulations. Can a Council member change his name (albeit following all the legal formalities) to include a phrase as a part of his name that indicates he represents CAs? To me, that is seeking publicity in an inappropriate manner. Members of the Council that regulates the profession must refrain from such gimmicks.

Members of the profession expect more transparency. Every year, there are elections for the post of the President and the Vice-President. When one attempts to get the information about who were the candidates and how they fared in that election, that information is just not available. Why not make this information public? There have been frequent changes in the criteria for joining the CA course. One is unaware of the thought process behind these frequent changes. There are many such issues where transparency will only inspire confidence of chartered accountants in the Council and its members. Elections are still more than two months away.

So, let us give a thought to these issues and also give some food for thought, to the candidates for the Central Council and the Regional Councils. If we don’t think and act, we don’t have the moral right to blame our representatives.

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S. 43(5)(d), Rules 6DDA and 6DDB, Notification dated 22.5.2009 recognizing MCX as a recognized stock exchange – Transactions in commodity derivatives carried out on MCX are not speculative transactions w.e.f. 1.4.2006 though MCX has been notified, vide notification dated 22.5.2009, as a recognised stock exchange prospectively.

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1. [2012] 25 taxmann.com 252 (Mum)
ACIT v Arnav Akshay Mehta
ITA No. 2742/Mum/2011
Assessment Year: 2007-08.  
Date of Order: 12.09.2012

Section 43(5)(d), Rules 6DDA and 6DDB, Notification dated 22.5.2009 recognising MCX as a recognised stock exchange – Transactions in commodity derivatives carried out on MCX are not speculative transactions w.e.f. 1.4.2006 though MCX has been notified, vide notification dated 22.5.2009, as a recognised stock exchange prospectively.


Facts:

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2007-08, the assessee suffered a loss of Rs. 77,63,237 in trading in commodity derivatives on MCX. The assessee regarded this loss as a non-speculative business loss which was set off against short term capital gains and income from other sources.

While assessing the total income of the assessee for AY 2007-08, the AO noticed that w.e.f. AY 2006- 07, section 43(5)(d) provides that transactions in derivatives will not be regarded as speculative transactions if they have been carried out on a notified stock exchange. He also noted that MCX has been notified as a recognised stock exchange vide notification dated 22.5.2009 prospectively. He, accordingly, held the loss in trading in commodity derivatives to be speculative and denied the set off of the same against short term capital gains and income from other sources as was claimed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the assessee’s appeal. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. C. N. Vaze, Shailesh Kamdar, Jagdish T. Punjabi, Bhadresh Doshi Chartered Accountants Tribunal news

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the AO has treated the loss under consideration to be speculation loss mainly on the ground that the Notification No. 46 of 2009 issued by CBDT on 22.5.2009, recognising MCX as a recognised stock exchange for the purpose of section 43(5) only from the said date has a prospective effect and therefore, derivative trading in commodity through MCX prior to the said date will amount to speculation business. The Tribunal also noted that The Finance Act, 2005 has w.e.f. 1.4.2006 inserted clause (d) in the proviso to section 43(5) as a result of which w.e.f. 1.4.2006 trading in derivative carried out through the recognised Stock Exchange is treated as non-speculative transaction. For this purpose, Rules 6DDA and 6DDB provide that notification of recognised stock exchange will be done by the Central Government (CBDT).

The Tribunal held that a combined reading of 43(5) (d) and rules 6DDA and 6DDB and Explanation (ii) to section 43(5) indicates that the rules prescribed are only procedural in nature and they prescribe the method as to how to apply for necessary recognition and consequent notification. When a rule or provision does not affect or empower any right or create an obligation but merely relates to procedural mechanism, then it is deemed to be retrospective and will apply to all the proceedings, pending or to be initiated, unless such an inference is likely to lead to an absurdity. It also held that just because the procedural mechanism has taken a long time to notify a stock exchange as recognised stock exchange, it will not lead to an inference that the same would be applicable from the date the stock exchange is notified to be a recognised stock exchange. It observed that the notification does not empower any right or create an obligation, but only recognises what is already provided in the statute. It held that the transactions carried out through MCX Stock Exchange after 1.4.2006 would be eligible for being treated as non-speculative within clause (d) of proviso to section 43(5).

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Delegation of powers to Regional Directors u/s 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act, 1956

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Vide Notification Dated 30th August 2012, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has directed that wherever fee on cases pending u/s. 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act, 1956 have already been paid by the companies/stakeholders at the time of filing of petition, consequent upon the transfer of applications/ petitions from Company Law Board to the concerned Regional Directors, which is on account of operation of law, the company/stakeholders need not pay fee for the same petitions. Further, all pending cases before CLB under these sections stand transferred to Regional Directors and objections, if any, received by CLB with respect to these petitions shall be forwarded to the concerned RDs by the Secretary, CLB in writing.

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15 A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31 dated 17th September, 2012

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Establishment of Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO)/Project Office (PO) in India by Foreign Entities – Clarification.

This circular clarifies that foreign Non-Government Organisations/Non-Profit Organisations/Foreign Government Bodies/Departments, by whatever name called can set-up/establish offices in India (liaison/ branch/project) only after obtaining prior approval of RBI under the Approval Route.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30 dated 12th September, 2012

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Comprehensive Guidelines on Over the Counter (OTC) Foreign Exchange Derivatives – Cost Reduction Structures

Presently, use of cost reduction structures, i.e., cross currency option cost reduction structures and foreign currency – INR option cost reduction structures, is permitted only to hedge exchange rate risk arising out of trade transactions and the External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

This circular permits the use of cost reduction structures, additionally, for hedging the exchange rate risk arising out of foreign currency loans availed of domestically against FCNR (B) deposits.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 29 dated 12th September, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party – Rationalisation

 This circular has amended the guidelines relating to submission of Annual Performance Report (APR) as under: –

An Indian party, which has set up/acquired a Joint Venture (JV) or Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) overseas, will have to submit to its designated Bank every year, an Annual Performance Report (APR) in Form ODI Part III in respect of each JV or WOS outside India and other reports or documents as may be specified by the Reserve Bank from time to time, on or before the 30th of June each year.

The APR so required to be submitted, has to be based on the latest audited annual accounts/unaudited accounts, as the case maybe, of the JV/WOS, unless specifically exempted by the Reserve Bank.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28 dated 11th September, 2012 Trade Credits for Import into India

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Presently, trade credits upto INRNaN million per import transaction with a maturity period of more than one year and less than three years (from the date of shipment) can be availed of for the import of capital goods. This circular permits companies in the infrastructure sector to avail trade credit upto five years (instead of upto three years) for import of capital goods subject to the following: –

(i) The trade credit must be initially contracted for a period not less than 15 months and must not be in the nature of short-term roll overs.

(ii) Banks cannot issue Letters of Credit/Guarantees / Letter of Undertaking (LOU)/Letter of Comfort (LPC) in favour of the overseas supplier/bank /financial institution for the period beyond three years. The all-in-cost ceiling of the trade credit, with maturity period upto five years will be 350 basis points over six months, LIBOR for the respective currency of credit or applicable benchmark. The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling/processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 27 dated 11th September, 2012 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Bridge Finance for infrastructure sector

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Presently, Indian companies in the infrastructure sector can, under the Approval Route, import capital goods by availing of short term credit (including buyers’/suppliers’ credit) in the nature of ‘bridge finance’, subject to the following conditions:-

(i) Bridge finance must be replaced with a long term ECB.

(ii) ECB must comply with all the extant norms.

 (iii) Prior approval of RBI will have to be obtained for replacing the bridge finance with long term ECB.

This circular permits replacement of bridge finance (including buyers’/suppliers’ credit) availed of for import of capital goods with ECB under the Automatic Route subject to the following: –

 i. Buyers’/suppliers’ credit is refinanced through an ECB before the end of the maximum permissible period of trade credit.

 ii. Import of capital goods must be verified from the Bill of Entry by the Bank.

 iii. Buyers’/suppliers’ credit availed of is compliant with the extant guidelines on trade credit. iv. The goods that are imported, comply with the DGFT policy on imports. v. The proposed ECB must be compliant with all extant ECB guidelines. vi. Banks in India cannot provide any form of guarantees for the ECB. However, the borrower will still have to obtain prior approval of RBI (under Approval Route) for availing of bridge finance.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 26 dated 11th September, 2012 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Repayment of Rupee loans and/or fresh Rupee capital expenditure – $ 10 billion scheme

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Presently, an Indian company in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector, which has consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years ,can avail, under Approval Route, ECB up to 50% of the average annual export earnings realised during the past three financial years (within the overall of ECB ceiling of INRNaN billion) for repayment of Rupee loan(s) availed of from the domestic banking system and/or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure, provided the companies are not in the default list/ caution list of the Reserve Bank of India. This circular has modified the above facility as under: –

(a) An Indian company in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector, which has consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years can avail ECB; i. upto 75% of the average foreign exchange earnings realised during the immediate past three financial years; or ii 50% of the highest foreign exchange earnings realised in any of the immediate past three financial years, whichever is higher.

(b) A Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), which have completed at least one year of existence from the date of incorporation and do not have sufficient track record/past performance for three financial years, can avail ECB upto 50% of the annual export earnings realised during the past financial year.

(c) The maximum ECB that can be availed of by an individual company or group, as a whole, under this scheme is INRNaN billion.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 25 dated 7th September, 2012 Overseas Investment by Indian Parties in Pakistan

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Presently, investment in Pakistan is not permitted. This circular permits Indian parties to invest in Pakistan under the Approval Route of ODI Scheme in terms Regulation 9 of Notification No. FEMA 120/ RB-2004 dated 7th July, 2004 [Foreign ExchangeManagement (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 21 dated 31st August, 2012 Foreign investment by Qualified Foreign Investors (QFIs) – Hedging facilities

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This circular permits Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) to hedge their currency risk for the following: –

 i) Entire investment in equity and/or debt in India as on a particular date through foreign currency – INR options.

ii) Initial Public Offers (IPO) related transient capital flows under the Application Supported by Blocked Amount (ASBA) mechanism through Foreign Currency – INR swaps.

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