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[2014] 148 ITD 619 (Delhi) Vineet Sharma vs. CIT (Central)-II, New Delhi. A.Y. 2005-06 and 2006-07 Order dated- 8th November 2013

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S. 264- CIT cannot pass order prejudicial to the assessee u/s. 264, CIT cannot pass order u/s. 263 prejudicial to the assessee, otherwise it would make the prohibition u/s. 264 that the CIT cannot pass the order prejudicial to the assessee nullity.

Facts:
A search u/s. 132 was conducted at the business/residential premises of the assessee and in response to notice u/s. 153A, the assessee filed the return of income disclosing certain taxable income.

The Assessing Officer, having completed his assessment passed a penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c) in respect of substantial part of additional income disclosed by the assessee in the return filed in response to notice u/s. 153A, but not on the entire additional income disclosed by the assessee.

The assessee filed a revision petition u/s. 264 before CIT for quashing the penalty order.

The CIT held the penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c) to be erroneous on the ground that the Assessing Officer had not levied the penalty in respect of the entire additional income offered in the return filed in response to notice u/s. 153A.

Hence, during the pendency of the revision petition u/s. 264 with CIT, the CIT passed an order u/s. 263 setting aside the penalty order and also treated the assessee’s petition u/s. 264 infructuous on the ground that the penalty order had already been set aside during the proceedings u/s. 263.

In the fresh penalty order passed in pursuance of order u/s. 263, the Assessing Officer levied the penalty on the entire additional income disclosed by the assessee in the return filed in response to notice u/s.153A.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:
It is evident that u/s. 264, the Commissioner can revise any order passed by any authority subordinate to him on his own motion or on the application made by the assessee and can pass the order as he thinks fit but cannot pass an order prejudicial to the assessee.

The CIT cannot pass an order prejudicial to the assessee u/s. 264, and hence it was held that once the assessee approaches CIT for getting relief u/s. 264, CIT cannot pass order u/s. 263 prejudicial to the assessee, otherwise it would make the prohibition u/s. 264 that the CIT cannot pass the order prejudicial to the assessee nullity.

Even on facts, it was held that the order u/s. 263 cannot be sustained because it is a settled position that penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not to be levied on every income. The penalty is to be levied only when the conditions prescribed u/s. 271(1)(c) are satisfied.

When one looks at the language of section 271(1)(c), even in regard to concealed income, the levy of penalty is not automatic because discretion has been given to the Assessing Officer to levy or not to levy the penalty which would be clear from the use of the words ‘may’ in section 271(1)(c).

Moreover, Assessing Officer has also been given discretion to levy the penalty at the rate ranging between 100 % to 300 % of the tax sought to be evaded.

Therefore, if the Assessing Officer levies the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on the part of the additional income, it cannot be said that the order of the Assessing Officer is erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue within the meaning of section 263.

In the instant case, the penalty had already been levied on the substantial portion of the additional income. Also in the penalty order, the Assessing Officer had discussed each and every fact as well as legal position in detail and, at the end, he had also mentioned the amount of concealment worked out by him and then calculated penalty thereon.

In such a case, merely because in the opinion of the Commissioner the penalty should have been levied on the entire returned/assessed income, it would not vest the Commissioner with the power of suo motu revision u/s. 263.

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Search and seizure: Block assessment: Block period: S/s. 132A and 158B(a): Period up to which “requisition was made”: Meaning of: Date on which the authorisation u/s. 132A was issued is to be taken and not the dated of execution of the authorisation: Warrant of authorisation u/s. 132A issued on 18-09-2001: Warrant executed and books of account and other documents received on 21-03-2003: The block period will be from 01-04-1995 to 18-09-2001 and not from 01- 04-1996 to 21/03/2003 as taken by the<

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Sanjay Gupta vs. CIT; 366 ITR 18 (Delhi):

The assessee derived income from purchase and sale of properties and from trading of transistor parts. He also worked as an informer for the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence. On 15-06-2001, the CBI conducted a search at the premises of the assessee and seized cash amounting to Rs. 1,12,50,000/-. The Director of Incometax (Investigation) issued a warrant of authorisation u/s. 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 18-09-2001. The Income Tax Authorities executed the warrant and received the books of account and other documents on 21-03- 2003. The Assessing Officer passed block assessment order u/s. 158BC for the block period from 01-04-1996 to 21-03-2003.

When the dispute reached the High Court in appeal the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) “Block period” has been defined to mean the period comprising previous years relevant to the six assessment years preceeding the previous year in which search u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is conducted or requisition u/s. 132A is made. It also includes the part of the previous year till the date when the search u/s. 132 is conducted or such requisition u/s. 132A is made.

ii) Making a requisition would not be the same as receiving the articles that are requisitioned. The expression “a requisition was made” cannot be equated to receiving the articles that were requisitioned. There was no reason to read the expression “requisition was made” not to mean the date on which the authorised officer made the requisition, but to mean the date when he received the records and assets pursuant thereto.

iii) The block period adopted by the Assessing Officer was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the assessment made by the Assessing Officer would also be required to be reviewed. Thus, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to assess the income for the block period 01-04-1995 to 18-09-2001.”

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Revision: S/s. 143 and 263: A. Y. 2006-07: ITO had jurisdiction at the time issuing notice u/s. 143(2): Assessment order u/s. 143(3) passed by ITO when jurisdiction was with Dy. Commissioner/ Assistant Commissioner as per Departmental Circular: Assessment order not invalid: Commissioner does not have power to revise such order u/s. 263:

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CIT vs. Kailash Chand Methi: 366 ITR 333 (Raj):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee had filed the return of income declaring income of Rs. 2,32,969/-. The ITO completed the assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Incometax Act, 1961 making an addition of Rs. 4,50,000/-. The Commissioner initiated proceedings u/s. 263 of the Act, but being satisfied with the submissions of the assessee dropped the proceedings. Subsequently, another Commissioner set aside the order of the ITO holding that the ITO had no jurisdiction to complete the assessment as the income of the subsequent A. Y. 2007-08 was over Rs. 5 lakh and the jurisdiction lay with the Dy. Commissioner/ Asst. Commissioner and not with the ITO . The Tribunal set aside the order of revision.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Commissioner does not have unfettered or unchequered discretion to revise the order u/s. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He can do so within the bounds of the law and has to satisfy the need of fairness in action. The Commissioner cannot invoke the powers to correct each and every mistake or error committed by the Assessing Officer. Every loss to the Revenue cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

ii) T he notice u/s. 143(2) was issued on 11-01-2007 by the ITO and at that particular time, the income for the subsequent A. Y. 2007-08 was not submitted, rather the financial year had not ended by then and the ITO assumed valid jurisdiction. The return for the A. Y. 2007-08 was submitted on 31-08-2007, and merely because the assessment order was passed after 31- 08-2007, the assessment order u/s. 143(3) passed by the ITO on 30-09-2008, could not be said to be without jurisdiction. The assessment order passed on 30-09- 2008 was within jurisdiction and validly passed.

iii) M oreover, one Commissioner had issued notice u/s. 263 for the same assessment year and he having been satisfied dropped the proceedings and it was only thereafter that another Commissioner came to the conclusion about the jurisdiction while the earlier Commissioner was also aware of this fact. The order of the Commissioner was at best a result of change of opinion and tantamount to abuse of powers granted to the Commissioner. The practice adopted by the Commissioner is de hors and it amounts to unnecessary harassment to the assessee for no fault of his. Therefore, the order of revision was not valid.

iv) We do not find any infirmity or perversity in the order of the Tribunal. The appeal, being devoid of any merits, is hereby dismissed.”

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Income: Unexplained investment: Section 69: A. Y. 2005-06: Search and seizure: Jewellery found during search: Instruction No. 1916 dated 11-05- 1994: Jewellery within prescribed limits: Addition of value of part of jewellery as undisclosed income: Not justified:

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CIT vs. Satya Narayan Patni; 366 ITR 325 (Raj):

There
was a search action in the case of the Appellant on 30-06-2004,
wherein, besides other items, gold jewellery weighing 2202.464 gms,
valued at Rs. 10,53,520/- was found. Looking to the status of the
assessee and the statement given during the course of search operation
by various family members and considering the fact that there were four
married ladies in the house including the wife of the assessee, no
jewellery was seized. However, jewellery to the extent of 1600 grams,
was treated as reasonable by the Assessing Officer which had been
received by them at the time of their marriage. The balance jewellery
weighing 602.464 gms, was treated as unexplained in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation from the assessee and the value thereof of Rs.
2,88,176/- was added to the income of the assessee as unexplained
investment u/s. 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the
Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
O n a perusal of Instruction No. 1916 dated 11/05/1994 issued by the
CBDT, it is clear that in the case of a wealth-tax assessee, whatever
gold, jewellery and ornaments have been found and declared in the
wealth-tax return, need not be seized. However, subclause (ii)
prescribes that in the case of a person not assessed to wealth-tax, gold
jewellery and ornaments to the extent of 500 gms. per married lady, 250
gms. per unmarried lady and 100 gms per male member of the family need
not be seized. Sub-clause (iii) also prescribes that the authorised
officer may, having regard to the status of the family, and the customs
and practices of the community to which the family belongs and other
circumstances of the case, decide to exclude larger quantity of
jewellery and ornaments from seizure.

ii) A dmittedly looking to
the status of the family and the jewellery found in the possession of
the four ladies, it was held to be reasonable and therefore, the
authorised officer, in the first instance, did not seize the jewellery
as being within the limit or limits prescribed by the Board and the
subsequent addition was not justifiable on the part of the Assessing
Officer and rightly deleted by both the two appellate authorities.

iii)
T he Tribunal has correctly analysed the circular of the Board and we
do not find any infirmity or perversity in the order of the Tribunal.
The appeal, being devoid of any merits, is hereby dismissed.”

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House property income: Annual letting value: Section 23(a): A. Y. 2005-06: For determining annual value of property municipal rateable value may not be binding on Assessing Officer only in cases where he is convinced that interest free security deposit and monthly compensation do not reflect prevailing rate: In such a case, Assessing Officer can himself resort to enquire about prevailing rate in locality: Where a premises is covered by Rent Control Act, Assessing Officer must undertake exercise<

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CIT vs. Tip Top Typography: [2014] 48 taxmann.com 191 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee had let out commercial premises. The assessee had received Rs. 3,60,000/- as rent and Rs. 5,25,00,000/- as interest free security deposits from the tenants. The Assessing Officer noticed that the rent received by the assessee was nominal and the circumstantial evidence indicated that the fair market value was higher. Therefore, he obtained instances of the rental amount prevailing in the market and particularly in the area and confirmed that the property was not covered by the Rent Control Act. On the basis of such comparable instance, the annual letting value u/s. 23(1)(a) was determined at Rs. 85,72,608/- as against Rs. 3,60,000/- shown by the assessee. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer and directed him to verify the rateable value fixed by the Municipal authorities and if the same is less than Rs. 3,60,000/-, then the actual rent received should be taxed. In appeal filed by the Revenue, the following questions of law were raised:

“i) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, Tribunal was right in holding that the fair rental value specified in section 23(1)(a) is the municipal value or actual rent received whichever is higher and not the annual letting value on the basis of comparable instances as adopted by the Assessing Officer, though the property under consideration was not covered by the Rent Control Act?

ii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, Tribunal was right in remitting the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer with direction to verify the rateable value fixed by the Municipal Authorities and if the same is less than the actual rent received, then the actual rent received should be taxed?”

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) T he rateable value, if correctly determined, under the municipal laws can be taken as Annual Letting Value u/s. 23(1)(a) of the Act. To that extent we agree with the contention of the learned Counsel of the assessee. However, we make it clear that rateable value is not binding on the assessing officer. If the assessing officer can show that rateable value under municipal laws does not represent the correct fair rent, then he may determine the same on the basis of material/ evidence placed on record.

ii) We are of the view that where Rent Control Legislation is applicable and as is now urged the trend in the real estate market so also in the commercial field is that considering the difficulties faced in either retrieving back immovable properties in metro cities and towns, so also the time spent in litigation, it is expedient to execute a leave and license agreements. These are usually for fixed periods and renewable. In such cases as well, the conceded position is that the Annual Letting Value will have to be determined on the same basis as noted above.

iii) I n the event and as urged before us, the security deposit collected and refundable interest free and the monthly compensation shows a total mismatch or does not reflect the prevailing rate or the attempt is to deflate or inflate the rent by such methods, then, as held by the Delhi High Court, the Assessing Officer is not prevented from carrying out the necessary investigation and enquiry. He must have cogent and satisfactory material in his possession and which will indicate that the parties have concealed the real position.

iv) H owever, we emphasise that before the Assessing Officer determines the rate by the above exercise or similar permissible process he is bound to disclose the material in his possession to the parties. He must not proceed to rely upon the material in his possession and disbelieve the parties. The satisfaction of the Assessing Officer that the bargain reveals an inflated or deflated rate based on fraud, emergency, relationship and other considerations makes it unreasonable must precede the undertaking of the above exercise. After the above ascertainment is done by the Officer he must, then, comply with the principles of fairness and justice and make the disclosure to the Assessee so as to obtain his view.

v) The following conclusions are drawn:-

a) AL V would be the sum at which the property may be reasonably let out by a willing lessor to a willing lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous circumstances.

b) An inflated or deflated rent based on extraneous consideration may take it out of the bounds of reasonableness.

c) A ctual rent received, in normal circumstances, would be a reliable evidence unless the rent is inflated/ deflated by reason of extraneous consideration.

d) Such ALV, however, cannot exceed the standard rent as per the Rent Control Legislation applicable to the property.

e) If standard rent has not been fixed by the Rent Controller, then it is the duty of the assessing officer to determine the standard rent as per the provisions of rent control enactment.

f) T he standard rent is the upper limit, if the fair rent is less than the standard rent, then it is the fair rent which shall be taken as ALV and not the standard rent.

vi) We do not see as to how we can uphold the submissions of Mr. Chhotaray that the notional rent on the security deposit can be taken into account and consideration for the determination. If the transaction itself does not reflect any of the afore-stated aspects, then, merely because a security deposit which is refundable and interest free has been obtained, the Assessing Officer should not presume that this sum or the interest derived therefrom at Bank rate is the income of the assessee till the determination or conclusion of the transaction.

vii) The Assessing Officer cannot brush aside the rent control legislation, in the event, it is applicable to the premises in question. Then, the Assessing Officer has to undertake the exercise contemplated by the rent control legislation for fixation of standard rent. The attempt by the Assessing Officer to override the rent control legislation and when it balances the rights between the parties has rightly been interfered with in the given case by the Appellate authority. The Assessing Officer either must undertake the exercise to fix the standard rent himself and in terms of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 if the same is applicable or leave the parties to have it determined by the Court or Tribunal under that Act. Until, then, he may not be justified in applying any other formula or method and determine the “fair rent” by abiding with the same. If he desires to undertake the determination himself, he will have to go by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Merely because the rent has not been fixed under that Act does not mean that any other determination and contrary thereto can be made by the Assessing Officer.

viii)We are of the opinion that wherever the Assessing Officer has not adhered to the above principles, and his finding and conclusion has been interfered with, by the higher Appellate Authorities, the revenue cannot bring the matter to this Court as no substantial question of law can be arising for determination and consideration of this Court. Then, the findings by the last fact finding Authority, namely the Tribunal and against the revenue shall have to be upheld as they are consistent with the facts and circumstances brought before it. If they are not vitiated by any perversity or error of law apparent on the face of the record, the appeals of the revenue cannot be entertained. They would have to be accordingly dismissed.”

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Boskalis International Dredging International CV vs. DDIT [2014] 47 taxmann.com 150 (Mumbai – Trib.) A.Y: 2002-03, Dated: 18-07-2014

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S. 92C, the Act; Rule 10A(d), the Rules – when the transactions are influenced by each other, particularly in determining price/ profit in the transactions, they are ‘closely linked transactions’; however, where taxpayer undertook transactions with different AEs, only transactions with each separate AE could not be clubbed.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a limited partnership established in Netherland to undertake international dredging contracts. It entered into a contract with Indian Oil Corporation for dredging and reclamation for a refinery project in India. For this purpose, it hired dredgers/vessels/equipment on lease from certain Associated Enterprises (“AEs”).

The taxpayer followed CUP method for benchmarking the international transactions of leasing of dredger/equipment using valuation certificates of an international firm that are normally used in the dredging industry for negotiating lease rentals. The said valuation certificates were accepted by TPO as suitable benchmark for computing the ALP. The taxpayer then clubbed all lease transactions with all AEs together and benchmarked the same on an aggregate basis by adopting average of all.

Referring to section 92C of the Act read with Rule 10A(d) of the rules, the taxpayer contended that all the transactions of lease of dredger and equipment being similar, were the same class of transactions. Further, dredgers and equipment were used for carrying out single project and they could not be used independently since their working was dependent on each other. The taxpayer also contended that the TPO should consider the average of all the payments (whether above the benchmark valuation certificates or below the benchmark valuation certificates) and since such average was lower than the benchmark, question of any adjustment will not arise.

The tax authority contended that the benchmark valuation certificates of the international firm constituted a scientific benchmark. Once a scientific benchmark is used as a basis, and as each vessel is a class by itself, no clubbing of transactions should be done.

The issue before Tribunal was whether for determining ALP, lease rentals paid to AEs should be considered by adopting ‘vessel-by-vessel’ approach or ‘class of transactions’ approach (i.e. clubbing) in respect of ‘closely linked transactions’.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.

If transactions are closely linked or continuous in nature, they can be considered as ‘closely linked transactions’ in terms of Rule 10A(d). When number of transactions are entered into between two parties, then portfolio approach (and not individual transaction approach) should be followed.

To examine whether the number of transactions are closely linked or continuous, it should be considered whether a transaction is, follow on of, and wholly or substantially dependent on, the earlier transaction. If the transactions are influenced by each other, particularly in determining the price/profit, they can be regarded ‘closely linked transactions’.

The taxpayer had taken dredger/equipment on hire from several AEs. The objective of transfer pricing provisions is to avoid base erosion and profit shifting from one tax jurisdiction to another tax jurisdiction. Therefore, for determining ALP, the clubbing of transactions can be only to the extent of the transactions with each AE. Transactions with different AEs cannot be clubbed as ‘closely linked transactions’ so as to influence the aggregate price or profit arising from the transactions because they cannot be termed as closely linked or continuous so as to influence the price in aggregate or the profit of the parties arising from these transactions.

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DCIT vs. Kothari Food and Fragrances (ITA No 92/LKW/2012) (Unreported) A.Ys: 2008-09, Dated: 05-09-2014

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Ss 40(a)(i), 195(1) – discount allowed by exporter to foreign buyer for pre-payment constitutes ‘credit’ in terms of section 195(1) and since tax was not withheld, the discount was disallowable u/s 40(a)(i).

Facts:
The taxpayer was an exporter of certain products. The products were exported to an overseas buyer on credit. The taxpayer offered discount to the buyer for making payment before the due date. The buyer was required to provide through its bank a guarantee or stand by letter of credit to the bank of the taxpayer for an amount equal to the provisional price and the interest. The contract did not mention pre-payment discount. However, in the invoice, the taxpayer allowed pre-payment discount and asked the buyer to pay the net amount after adjusting the advance payment from the invoice amount. Since the prepayment discount was adjusted in the invoice earlier from the contract price, effectively, the buyer paid the amount after deduction of pre-payment discount.

The AO held that credit of discount in the account of the foreign buyer of the taxpayer in its book of account was a ‘credit’, though not ‘payment’. Therefore, provisions of section 195(1) were attracted. Since the taxpayer had not withheld tax from such ‘credit’, the discount was disallowable in terms of section 40(a)(i) of the Act.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.

Whether payment of discount is made to the buyer or lesser amount is collected from the buyer (after adjusting the discount), the buyer receives the benefit. In Havells India Ltd. (ITA No 55/2012 and 57/2012), the Delhi High Court held that income in form of discount or interest is taxable in India and hence, ratio of decision of Supreme Court in GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. [2010] 327 ITR 456 (SC) was not applicable.

The pre-payment discount given by the taxpayer cannot be equated to quantity discount since quantity discount is reduction in sale price. The pre-payment discount was effectively in the nature of interest because it was in consideration of the taxpayer receiving advance payment and to compensate the buyer for making the payment in advance before the sale of goods. Mere nomenclature will not change its character.

Section 195 of the Act required the taxpayer to deduct tax from any sum paid to a non-resident which was chargeable under the Act.

The pre-payment discount allowed by the taxpayer was a ‘credit of income’ to the account of the buyer. As the taxpayer had not withheld the tax on the credit of such discount, the discount amount was disallowable u/s. 40(a) (i) of the Act.

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ITO vs. Antrax Technologies (P.) Ltd. [2014] 49 taxmann.com 275 (Bangalore – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2007-08 Dated: 10-07-2013

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Ss 9(1)(vi), 9(1)(vii) and 40(a)(i), the Act – payments for import of operations and service manuals relating to equipment being for purchase of copyrighted products, were neither FTS nor royalty and hence withholding of tax was not required.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian Company. The taxpayer was engaged in the business of import and sale of certain visual equipment, such as, projectors, projector lamps, etc. During the relevant previous year, the taxpayer imported manuals and software containing operating and servicing instructions for use of the equipment and separately made payments to the supplier for the same.

Before the AO, the taxpayer contented that manuals and software were copyrighted products and the payments was made for use and sale of copyrighted products and not for acquiring copyrights. Therefore, payments for the services manuals were neither in the nature of FTS nor in the nature of royalty which were subject to withholding of tax. However, the AO concluded that in light of the decisions of Karnataka High Court in Samsung Electronics Company Ltd (ITA No 2988 of 2005) and Sonata Information Technology Ltd (ITA No 3076 of 2005), payment for purchase of software were to be treated as royalty and were subject to withholding of tax. As the taxpayer had not withheld tax from the payments, the AO applied the provisions of section 40 (a)(i)1 of the Act and disallowed the payments.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows. Service manuals were books containing guidance and instructions for operation, use and after-sale service of equipment and thus were part of the equipment imported by the taxpayer.

While software requires user license, the manuals were copyrighted products that could be used by any person purchasing the equipment. There is a clear distinction between the copyrighted article and equipment which comes with a copyright or license to use the copyright.

In case of Samsung Electronics Company Ltd and Sonata Information Technology Ltd, Karnataka High Court dealt with import of software which required license to use copyright and hence, the Court held the payment was in the nature of royalty. However, the service manuals are not products but they merely provide guidance in using the product. Also, the equipment imported by the taxpayer is not protected by license or copyright and can be used by anyone who purchases them without any restriction on either its transfer or its usage. Therefore, the payment was not subject to withholding of tax.

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 43B r.w.s. 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va): A. Y. 2008-09: Employer’s and Employees’ contributions to Provident fund deposited before due date for filing return u/s. 139(1):

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Amount allowable as deduction: Essae Teraoka P. Ltd. vs. CIT; 366 ITR 408 (Kar):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee company had deposited the Employer’s and Employees’ contribution to the provident fund after the due date under the Provident Fund Scheme but before the due date for filing the return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer added the amounts to the income of the assessee u/s. 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 2(24)(x) of the Act and did not allow the deduction. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) F rom a bare perusal of clause (va) of section 36(1) of the Act, it is clear that if any sum received by the assessee employer from any of his employees towards the employees’ contribution to provident fund is deposited in the relevant fund within the time stipulated in the scheme then the assessee is straightway entitled to deduction as contemplated u/s. 36(1)(va) of the Act.

ii) Section 43B states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Income-tax Act, a deduction otherwise allowable in this Act in respect of any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any fund such as provident fund shall be allowed if it is paid on or before the due date as contemplated u/s. 139(1) of the Act. This provision has nothing to do with the consequences, provided for under the Employees’ Provident Funds Act for not depositing the “contribution” on or before the due date therein.

iii) T he word “contribution” used in clause (b) of section 43B of the Act means the contribution of the employer and the employee. That being so, if the contribution is deposited on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Act, the employer is entitled to deduction.

iv) I n the result, the appeal is allowed and the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellantassessee and against the Revenue.”

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ITAT: Duty of Tribunal to decide appeals: Section 254(1): A. Y. 1997-98 and 1998-99: Unnecessary remand by ITAT causes prejudice and amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction:

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Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. vs. ITAT (Bom): W. P. No. 3650 of 2014 dated 14-08-2014:

For the A. Y. 1997-98 as regards the assessee’s claim for deduction of service charges the Tribunal had remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. Allowing the writ petition filed by the assessee against the said order, the Bombay High Court (see 290 ITR 464) had held that as the CIT(A) had given specific grounds for the disallowance , the Tribunal ought to have decided the specific issues on merit and not simply remanded it. Thereafter, the Tribunal decided the issue on merits and allowed the assessee’s claim. For A. Y. 1998-99, though the CIT(A)’s order was passed on the same date as the order passed for A. Y. 1997-98 and the Tribunal was aware of the High Court order for A. Y. 1997-98, it still remanded the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. Miscellaneous application filed by the assessee was dismissed on the ground that the remand order was a conscious “decision” and not an apparent mistake.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal should not have refused to consider and decide the issue relating to service charges, more so, when an identical view taken by it earlier has not found favour of this Court. This Court repeatedly reminded the Tribunal of its duty as a last fact finding authority of dealing with all factual and legal issues. The Tribunal failed to take any note of the caution which has been administered by this Court and particularly of not remanding cases unnecessarily and without any proper direction.

ii) A blanket remand causes serious prejudice to parties. None benefits by non-adjudication or non-consideration of an issue of fact and law by an Appellate Authority and by wholesale remand of the case back to the original authority. This is a clear failure of duty which has to be preformed by the Appellate Authority in law. Once the Appellate Authority fails to perform such duty and is corrected on one occasion by this Court, and in relation to the same assessee, then, the least that was expected from the Tribunal was to follow the order and direction of this Court and abide by it even for this later assessment year.

iii) I f the same claim and which was dealt with by the Court earlier and for which the note of caution was issued, then, the Tribunal was bound in law to take due note of the same and follow the course for the later assessment years. We are of the view that the refusal of the Tribunal to follow the order of this Court and equally to correct its obvious and apparent mistake is vitiated as above. It is vitiated by a serious error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal has misdirected itself completely and in law in refusing to decide and consider the claim in relation to service charges.

iv) O rder of the Tribunal is set aside for reconsideration of the issue on service charges in accordance with law.”

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Housing projects: Deduction u/s. 80IB(10): A. Y. 2006-07: Limit on extent of commercial area of housing project inserted w.e.f. 01/04/2005 does not apply to projects approved before that date:

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CIT vs. M/s. Happy Home Enterprises (Bom); ITA No. 201 of 2012 dated 19-09-2014:

The following questions were raised in this appeal by the Revenue before the Bombay High Court.

“i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in allowing to the assessee company a deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, for A. Y. 2006- 07 amounting to Rs. 2,11,74,864/- wherein the commercial area built by the assessee exceeded the limit specified in clause (d) to section 80IB(10) of the I. T. Act, 1961?

ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in holding that the limits on commercial area provided in clause (d) to section 80IB(10) of the Act, would not be applicable even after 01-04-2005 as the projects were approved before that date even though no such exception is provided under the Income Tax Act?”

The High Court decided the questions in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i) Clause (d) of section 80IB(10) is a condition that relates to and/or is linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and the Legislature did not intend to give any retrospectivity to it.

ii) A t the time when the housing project is approved by the local authority, it decides, subject to its own rules and regulations, what quantum of commercial area is to be included in the said project. It is on this basis that building plans are approved by the local authority and construction is commenced and completed. It is very difficult, if not impossible to change the building plans and/or alter construction midway, in order to comply with clause (d) of section 80IB(10).

iii) It would be highly unfair to require an assessee to comply with section 80IB(10)(d) who has got his housing project approved by the local authority, before 31-03-2005 and has either completed the same before the said date or even shortly thereafter, merely because the assessee has offered its profits to tax in A. Y. 2005-06 or thereafter.

iv) It would require the assessee to virtually do a humanly impossible task. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature and it would run counter to the very object for which these provisions were introduced, namely to tackle the shortage of housing in the country and encourage investment therein by private players.

v) I t is therefore clear that clause (d) of section 80IB(10) cannot have any application to housing projects that are approved before 31-03-2005.”

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Assessment – Best judgment assessment – Assessee not very educated person, not properly represented – Supreme Court refused to interfere with assessment but directed that no interest be recovered and no penalty proceedings be initiated.

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Tripal Singh and Anr. vs. CIT & Anr. [2014] 365 ITR 511 (sc)

The dispute before the Supreme Court related to the assessment year 1998-99. The petitioner-assessee failed to appear before the assessing authority which compelled the assessing authority to complete the assessment u/s. 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said order is dated 29th December, 2005. The petitioner did not file any appeal, instead challenged the assessment order by filing a revision as provided for u/s. 264 of the Act before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Admn.), Muzaffarnagar. The memo of revision was dated 23rd May, 2006. The said revision was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax on 25th March, 2008, as no one attended the office on the fixed date. Thereafter, an application to recall the said order was filed which was dated 9th June, 2008. The said application was dismissed by the order dated 26th October, 2010, on the short ground that there was no provision under the Income-tax Act for recalling the order passed u/s. 264 thereof. Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed.

Before the High Court, Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that power to pass ex-parte order included the power to recall the same notwithstanding absence of any express provision in respect thereof. He further submitted that the Commissioner of Income-tax should have decided the revision on the merits even if the petitioner could not appear on the fixed date.

The High Court held that it was not necessary to examine the proposition as to whether the Commissioner of Incometax was right in rejecting the restoration application on the ground and on the facts of the present case that he does not possess power to recall the ex-parte order. According to the High Court, even assuming that the Commissioner had power to recall the ex-parte order on the merits, it did not find that the petitioner had been able to establish sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date fixed. The assessment order was also passed ex parte. It appeared that the petitioner was never serious to pursue his remedies under the Act and filed the revision application as a chance petition and did not prosecute it. The High Court did not find any merit in the petition.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the facts were very peculiar in this case because the appellants, who were not very educated persons, unfortunately could not be properly represented before the Assessing Officer and, therefore, the assessment was made ex-parte for the assessment year 1998-99. The Supreme Court noted that so far as the subsequent assessment years were concerned, some relief was given to the appellants-assessees by the High Court, but so far as the assessment year 1998-99 is concerned, the assessment was over and the assessment order has become final. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that it was not proper to interfere with the assessment order. However, it directed that no penalty proceedings would be initiated and no interest would be recovered from the appellants-assessees and that the amount of tax would be paid within 60 days and if the amount was not paid within 60 days, it would be open to the authorities to charge interest on the assessed tax.

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ACIT vs. Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Delhi `B’ Bench Before G. D. Agrawal (VP) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 5466/Del/2013 A.Y.: 2003-04. Decided on: 1st September, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Parwinder Kaur / Rohit Gar and Tejasvi Jain

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S. 32 – Point of Sales (POS) systems qualify for depreciation @ 60% being the rate applicable to computers.

Facts:

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed from the tax audit report that additions to Computers included a sum of Rs. 65,89,449 towards POS on which depreciation was claimed @ 60%. The AO held that POS could be regarded as computer accessories but not as computer. It is only computers and computer software which qualify for depreciation @ 60%. The rate of 60% cannot be extended to computer accessories and peripherals. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the POS systems are capable of performing the basic functions performed by a computer such as data processing, storage, etc and therefore are similar to computers. The AO allowed depreciation on POS @ 25% i.e. the rate applicable to normal plant and machinery.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Rajdhani Powers Ltd. (ITA No. 1266/2010) decided the issue in favor of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had on perusing the technical specifications of POS from the brochure filed held that the POS terminal is akin to computer in terms of basic features and can be categorized as `Computers’. It also noted that he had followed the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Rajdhani Powers Ltd. (supra) and therefore no interference was called for.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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M/S. Lawrence and Mayo ( India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. S.T.O. and M/S. Sokkia India (P) Ltd. vs. C.S.T.,West Bengal and Another, [2012] 51 VST 423 (WBTT)

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VAT – Classification of Goods-Surveying Instrument- Covered By Entry Relating to Plant –Taxable at 4%, Entry No. 54B, 83 (c), Part I, Schedule C, of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003

FACTS
The dealers filed petition before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal against the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax holding sale of surveying instrument covered by Schedule CA of the act and taxable at 12.5%.

HELD
Survey is an integral part in the entire process of construction. In fact, the execution of work is done on the basis of data furnished by the surveying instruments. As indicated in the brochures, the surveying instruments, in India, are not just used for taking measurement only. It performs multifarious functions; taking measurement is one of its functions. Judging this aspect, it cannot be called to be a ‘measurement tool’ simpliciter. In view of amplitude of the definition of “plant”, as held in several cases, the surveying instruments squarely come within the extended meaning of ‘plant’ and would be covered by Entry No. 54B, Part I, of Schedule C of the Act. Therefore, it is taxable at 4%. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the petition filed by the dealers and set aside the order of the Commissioner.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 25 dated 3rd September, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Indian Rupees

This circular permits eligible lenders of ECB to lend in Indian Rupees, subject to the following terms and conditions: –

a. The lender must mobilise Indian Rupees through swaps undertaken with a bank in India.

b. The ECB contract must comply with all other conditions applicable to the automatic and approval routes, as the case may be.

c. The all-in-cost of such ECB must be commensurate with prevailing market conditions.

The recognised lender, for the purpose of executing swaps for ECB denominated in Indian Rupees, can set up a representative office in India and also hedging their rupee exposures.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated 2nd September, 2014

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Three divisions of Foreign Exchange Department shifted to FED CO Cell at New Delhi

This circular states that, with effect from 15th July, 2014, the following three divisions of Foreign Investment Division (FID): –

a. Liaison/Branch/Project Office (LO/BO/PO) Division,
b. N on Resident Foreign Account Division (NRFAD ), and
c. Immovable Property (IP) Division

have been shifted to New Delhi. The address for correspondence for the three divisions is FED, CO Cell, Foreign Exchange Department, Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Regional Office, 6, Parliament Street, New Delhi – 110 001, India.

This circular states that all applications, returns, etc. pertaining to the above three divisions (including extension or closure of LO/BO) must be sent to the FED CO Cell at New Delhi. Online reports for NRFAD can continue to be emailed at the same email address as earlier.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 22 dated 28th August, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 313/2014-RB dated 2nd July, 2014

Purchase and sale of securities other than shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company by a person resident outside India

Presently, eligible investors registered with SEBI, can purchase eligible government securities directly from the issuer of such securities or through registered stock broker on a recognised Stock Exchange in India within the limits prescribed by RBI and SEBI from time to time.

This circular has removed the restrictions on the persons from whom eligible investors can purchase eligible government securities. As a result, eligible investors can acquire eligible government securities in any manner as per the prevalent/approved market practice.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 21 dated 27th August, 2014

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Refinancing of ECB at lower all-in-cost – Simplification of procedure

Presently, refinancing of existing ECB by raising fresh ECB at lower all-in-cost is permitted under the Automatic Route if the outstanding maturity of the original loan is maintained. However, case where the Average Maturity Period (AMP) of the fresh ECB is more than the residual maturity of existing ECB need prior approval of RBI under the approval route.

This circular gives power to Banks to approve, under the Automatic Route, refinancing of existing ECB by raising fresh ECB at lower all-in-cost even if the Average Maturity Period (AMP) of the fresh ECB is more than the residual maturity of existing ECB, subject to the following conditions: –

i. Both the existing and fresh ECB must be in compliance with the applicable guidelines;
ii. A ll-in-cost of fresh ECB must be less than that of the all-in-cost of existing ECB;
iii. Consent of the existing lender must be obtained;
iv. Refinancing must to be undertaken before the maturity of the existing ECB;
v. Borrower must not be in the default/Caution List of RBI and must not be under the investigation of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE);
vi. O verseas branches/subsidiaries of Indian banks are not be permitted to extend ECB for refinancing an existing ECB; and
vii. All requirements in respect of reporting arrangements like filing of revised Form 83, etc. must be followed.

This facility is available even in those cases where existing ECB was raised under the approval route if the amount of new ECB raised is eligible to be raised under the automatic route.

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Is It Fair to ignore prepaid taxes for penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on escaped income?

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Synopsis
Penalty under section 271(1)(c)
has been a bone of contention between tax payers and Income-tax
Department. In this Article, the author has tried to bring out an
anomaly wherein a person who has not furnished a return of Income at all
may receive a more favorable treatment than someone who has actually
furnished a return but has failed to include a particular income
therein. He has explained this with a simple and lucid live example.

Introduction
Penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is for concealment of
particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.
The Income-tax Department treats the relevant income as ‘concealed’ or
‘escaping assessment’. For brevity, it will be referred to as ‘escaped
income’ in this article. Penalty is equivalent to 100% to 300% of the
‘tax sought to be avoided.’

Relevant provision
Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c) defines the expression ‘Amount of Tax Sought to be Avoided’ (ATSA) as follows:

“(a)
in any case where the amount of income in respect of which particulars
have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished has
the effect of reducing the loss declared in the return or converting
that loss into income, means the tax that would have been chargeable on
the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or
inaccurate particulars have been furnished had such income been the
total income;

(b) in any case to which Explanation 3 applies,
means the tax on the total income assessed [as reduced by the amount of
advance tax, tax deducted at source, tax collected at source and
self-assessment tax paid before the issue of notice u/s. 148];

(c)
in any other case, means the difference between the tax on the total
income assessed and the tax that would have been chargeable had such
total income been reduced by the amount of income in respect of which
particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been
furnished.”

Clause (a) deals with a situation of loss vis-à-vis escaped income.

Clause
(b) is relevant for this article – It refers to Explanation 3 which
deals with a situation where no return has been filed.

Explanation 3 —
“Where
any person fails, without reasonable cause, to furnish within the
period specified in sub-section. (1) of section 153 a return of his
income which he is required to furnish u/s. 139 in respect of any
assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1989, and
until the expiry of the period aforesaid, no notice has been issued to
him under Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148
and the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) is satisfied
that in respect of such assessment year such person has taxable income,
then such person shall, for the purposes of Clause (c) of this s/s., be
deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income in respect of
such assessment year, notwithstanding that such person furnishes a
return of his income at any time after the expiry of the period
aforesaid in pursuance of a notice u/s. 148.”

The unfairness
In
terms of Explanation 3 – where the assessee has not filed or furnished
the IT return and any escaped income is detected then the prepaid taxes
like TDS, advance tax, tax collected at source and self assessment tax
are to be deducted from the tax on the total income for the purposes of
calculating ATSA. This is logical and fair. However, Clause (b) does not
deal with a situation where the return was duly furnished but a
particular item remained to be included in the income. This is a more
common situation particularly if the income is in the nature of only
accrual and not actually received. Sometimes there could be TDS on the
said escaped income which also remains to be claimed. It is grossly
unjust and unfair not to consider this TDS while calculating ATSA on
escaped income.

It is a different story if such inadvertent
escapement is accepted by the income tax department as non concealment.
Otherwise, it leads to an anomaly that a person who has not furnished a
return at all receives more favourable treatment than the one who
actually furnishes the return but fails to include a particular item.

Needless
to state that the particulars in Form 26AS are not necessarily complete
and reliable. Otherwise, an assessee would get a hint that some income
has remained to be included.

Live Example
An
individual’s services were transferred from Company A to Company B
within the same group. Company A credited ESOPs to his demat account and
duly deducted tax on the perquisite value. Since, it was only a
notional income, it did not occur to the assessee to obtain salary
certificate from Company A, hence purely out of oversight and ignorance,
the income remained to be included. It was revealed in the course of
assessment from Form 26AS. Therefore, although full tax @ 30% was
deducted on the perquisite value – escaped income – the definition of
ATSA does not permit the deduction of this TDS for penalty u/s.
271(1)(c).

Suggestion

The scope of Clause (b) of
Explanation 4 should be enlarged so as to cover both the situations
namely non furnishing of return as well as non inclusion of particular
income in the return filed.

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Is levy of penalty mandatory and inevitable? – is the reliance on the decision of the supreme court correct?

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Synopsis
The Supreme court decision in the case of Shriram Mutual Fund observed that penalty is attracted the moment contravention is established and the intention of the parties involved becomes irrelevant. In this article, the author discusses the application of this ratio by SEBI in levying penalty and various arguments against this approach

Sebi relies on supreme court decision and holds levy of penalty to be mandatory

Almost each and every SEBI order levying penalty relies on a Supreme Court decision in Shriram’s case (SEBI vs. Shri Ram Mutual Fund (2006) 68 SCL 216). The interpretation of SEBI is that since there is a violation, then penalty has to follow. Not only is mens rea (guilty intent) irrelevant, it is stated, but the penalty has to mandatorily follow any violation. Further, mitigating factors are irrelevant. In short, it is put forth that according to the Supreme Court decision, in case of proceedings for levy of penalty, penalty is mandatory and the Adjudicating Officer has no discretion in the matter. Is this the ratio of the decision? Should a person who has not filed a document late, or made some errors in some filings, etc. resign himself to a penalty in all circumstances?

As stated, for this purpose, SEBI almost always cites a single sentence from the Shri Ram case as if by mindless rote. Here is one example from a recent SEBI Order (in matter of M/s. Vizwise Commerce Private Limited, Order No. JJ/AM/AO-117/2014, dated 28th August 2014).

“In the matter of SEBI vs. Shri Ram Mutual Fund (2006) 68 SCL 216 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that “In our considered opinion, penalty is attracted as soon as the contravention of the statutory obligation as contemplated by the Act and the regulation is established and hence the intention of the parties committing such violation becomes wholly irrelevant.” (emphasis supplied)

With such words, it would appear inevitable that even in cases of mere clerical violations, liability is strict and absolute and there is no escape to levy penalty. However, the matter does not end there. Next cited are the powers of SEBI to levy huge penalties. Most provisions allow levy of penalty of upto Rs. 25 crore or a Rs. 1 lakh per day. Citing the decision and such penal provisions, large penalties running into several lakhs are levied, which, if one compares with huge and absolute powers SEBI has, would sound almost lenient.

The mitigating factors, even if pleaded by the party, are usually brushed aside, as if the hands of SEBI are tied in view of the clear mandate of the Supreme Court.

The alleged defaulter, in the face of such words of the Supreme Court, is demoralised and believes that there is no point in filing an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). It also so happens that the SAT in recent times rarely reduces or reverses such penalty. Thus, it is common to see scores of orders passed every week with large amount of penalties.

Is penalty inevitable? What did THE Supreme Court really say?
However, is levy of penalty so inevitable? Has the Supreme Court made the issue so absolute? Or are the words of the Court cited out of context? It is submitted that Supreme Court has really held something different. Moreover, it has itself considered mitigating factors and has not wholly ruled out bonafide intention. The Court has also not relieved SEBI/Adjudicating Officer from exercising judicial discretion and stated that he may choose not to levy penalty in appropriate cases.

Let us review very briefly the reported facts of Shriram’s case. Shriram was a mutual fund. Provisions made by SEBI prohibited a mutual fund from dealing with stock brokers beyond 5% of its aggregate sales/purchases. It was an admitted fact that in 12 instances Shriram violated this limit. Penalty was levied. Shriram pleaded before the SAT (the appellant did not appear before the Supreme Court) that the violation was not intentional and there were certain genuine circumstances that required them to deal with such brokers beyond the maximum limits. The SAT set aside the order of penalty “on the purported ground that the penalty to be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion. The Tribunal has held that the penalty is warranted by the quantum which has to be decided by taking into consideration the factors stated in section 15J.”

Question of law
The Supreme Court phrased the “question of law” before it in the following words:-

“The important question of law which arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing the appeals of the respondent herein and that whether once it is conclusively established that the Mutual Fund has violated the terms of the Certificate of Registration and the Statutory Regulations, i.e., the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulation, 1996, the imposition of penalty becomes a sine qua non of the violation. In other words, the breach of a civil obligation which attracts penalty in the nature of fine under the provisions of the Act and the regulations would immediately attract the levy of penalty irrespective of the fact whether the contravention was made by the defaulter with any guilty intention or not.” (emphasis supplied).

Thus, as will seen later, the question before the Court was whether, once a violation is established, does penalty have to follow or would also have to be established that the defaulter had a guilty intention?

What The Supreme Court held

It is in this light that the Court reviewed the framework of the Act. It pointed out that broadly there were two sets of proceedings under the Act – one under which penalty is levied in civil proceedings and others which are criminal proceedings. For imposing penalty in civil proceedings, proof of a guilty intention is not required, while it is mandatory in case of criminal proceedings. Since in the present case, the proceedings were for levy of penalty under civil proceedings, there was no need to prove that Shriram had a guilty intention. It was sufficient to show that the violation was established.

Since this was done, penalty was leviable. However, is this the end of the matter? Is “intention” wholly irrelevant? Are other factors including mitigating factors wholly irrelevant? It is submitted this is not so and not only does the Act provide otherwise, but even the Supreme Court does not say so.

Factors to be considered for deciding quantum of penalty or waiving it

That penalty is not inevitable is apparent from the SEBI Act itself. Section 15J makes it clear that, in adjudication proceedings, the Officer shall have due regard to certain factors. The section reads as under (emphasis supplied):-

While adjudging quantum of penalty under section 15-I, the Adjudicating Officer shall have the due regard to the following factors, namely :-

(a) the amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage, wherever quantifiable, made as a result of the default;

(b) the amount of loss caused to an investor or group of investors as a result of the default;

(c) the repetitive nature of the default.”

Thus, the Act itself mandates the Adjudicating Officer to consider these three factors. This was recognised in Shriram’s case as well.

It is also submitted that in appropriate cases levy of zero penalty is also permissible. It is also submitted that other factors, apart from these three statutory factors, would also be relevant, depending on facts of each case. This is also evident from decision of Supreme Court.

For example, the Supreme Court noted that “there has been a clear violation of the statutory regulations and provisions repetitively, covering a period of 6 quarters”. In other words, the fact that the violations were repetitive over six quarters was highlighted.

The Supreme Court also reviewed the circumstances in the case to show that there were no extraordinary circumstances mitigating the violation. the Court observed, “the facts and circumstances of the present case in no way indicate the existence of special circumstances so as to waive the penalty imposed by the adjudicating officer”. Again, this shows two things. Had there been special facts/circumstances shown, then firstly, they would have to be considered. Secondly, appropriate circumstances would justify waiver of the penalty too. Indeed the Court went ahead and observed that the Officer had considered all the circumstances before levy of penalty which too was below the maximum amount.

Curiously, the Court even noted that the violation was wilful. the Court observed, “hence, we hold that the respondents have wilfully violated statutory provisions with impunity and, hence, the imposition of penalty was fully justified.” One wonders, if it was so clear that wilful intent is totally irrelevant, why was such a factor considered? if it can be clearly established in a particular case that there was no wilful violation, would penalty not be leviable? or at least penalty would be reduced? in other words, absence of mens rea is not wholly irrelevant, as SEBI orders suggest.

In light of this, it is submitted that the consistent stand of SEBI that violation has to result in penalty is an erroneous interpretation and its reliance on Shriram, far from being correct, is actually wrong and goes against what the Court held in that case. It is submitted that SEBI has to consider all mitigating factors before levy of penalty. If the appellant demonstrates that he did not have guilty intention, that too has to be judicially considered. Further, SEBI has full discretion to levy a nominal penalty or even waive penalty altogether. SEBI also has to consider the three factors that section 15J prescribes. The defaulter would also be right in questioning an order of penalty on grounds that there were mitigating circumstances or that such circumstances were not appreciated by SEBI. It is thus high time that the ghost of Shriram that haunts adjudication proceedings is exorcised, either by SEBI itself, or through a strong appeal before SAT/Supreme Court. And justice, sense of fair play and absence of arbitrariness be restored in adjudication proceedings.

It is worth drawing attention to a recent amendment to penalty provisions made by the Securities Laws Amendment Act, 2014, notified on 25th August, 2014. By the amendment, most provisions relating to penalties now provide  that  a  minimum  penalty  of  Rs.  1  lakh  would be leviable. It is submitted that despite such provision, the ratio of Shriram continues to be valid. SEBI has to consider all circumstances even for levy of minimum penalty. SEBI continues to have a power to waive penalty altogether.

Tenancy – Statutory Tenancy – Can be bequeathed by Will – Unless it is specifically barred by some provision – Powers of Appellate Court – Subsequent Events – Mould relief accordingly: Section 96 of CPC:

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Gaiv Dinshaw Irani & Ors. vs. Tehmtan Irani & Ors. AIR 2014 SC 2326

One Bomanji Irani, who was the predecessor of Appellants herein, acquired tenancy rights in respect of the premises. The premises comprised of residential Bungalow. Bomanji executed a Will dated 15th October, 1934 in favour of his children and wife Daulatbai, appointing Daulatbai as a residuary legatee of the Will. Bomanji Irani died on 27th September, 1946 leaving behind his wife Daulatbai; five sons, and three daughters. The Will was probated with consent of all the legal heirs and Daulatbai had rights over the suit premises and the tenancy rights which, as claimed, could be bequeathed as per law. Daulatbai executed a Will on 2nd January, 1949 in favour of her son Dinshaw who was the original Defendant No. 2. However, the said Will was not probated.

The then Bombay Municipal Corporation (‘BMC’) acquired ownership rights in respect of the suit premises and issued eviction notices to the heirs and legal representatives of Bomanji, comprising Daulatbai and five sons. In response to the eviction notices, the legal heirs and representatives of Bomanji objected to the same but they consented to the tenancy being transferred in the name of Dinshaw Irani (original Defendant No. 2).

Daulatbai addressed a letter to the BMC requesting for transfer of rent bills in the name of her son Dinshaw. The BMC passed an eviction order against the heirs and legal representatives of Bomanji. Against the said eviction order passed by the BMC, the heirs and legal representatives of Bomanji jointly filed a suit as joint tenants,. Daulatbai died during the pendency of this suit. On 11th July 1977, the said suit was decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs and the order passed by the BMC terminating the tenancy was set aside. By letter dated 18th September, 1981, BMC transferred the tenancies in favour of Dinshaw, subject to certain conditions. Respondent No. 1 (son and legal heir) and Respondent No. 5 (son of the legal heirs) objected to the transfer of tenancy in the name of Dinshaw Irani.

The Respondents (legal heirs of Homi and Ardeshir Irani) on coming to know about the transfer of tenancy of the suit premises, issued a notice and subsequently filed Long Cause Suit challenging transfer of tenancy before the City Civil Court at Bombay. The City Civil Court dismissed both the suits by two separate judgments.

On further Appeal, the Court observed that divesting of tenancy rights by means of a Will is a highly debated topic and is subject to the tenancy laws of the concerned State. In the present matter, the tenancies being the suit premises are owned by the local authority of Mumbai and are subject to the State Act being the Bombay Rents, Hotel And Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The said Act, since repealed, exempts the present tenancy from its purview as per section 4(1). The BMC Act is also silent on this aspect.

In the case of Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar and Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 683, four Judges of a five-Judge Constitution Bench held that the rule of heritability extends to statutory tenancy of commercial as well as residential premises in States where there is no explicit provision to the contrary and tenancy rights are to devolve according to the ordinary law of succession unless otherwise provided in the statute.

The Court observed held that, in general, tenancies are to be regulated by the governing legislation, which favour that tenancy be transferred only to family members of the deceased original tenant. However, in the light of the majority decision of the Constitution Bench in Gian Devi vs. Jeevan Kumar (supra), the position which emerges is that in absence of any specific provisions, general laws of succession to apply.

The BMC by means of a letter dated 19th September, 1961 treated all the heirs of Bomanji as joint tenants; and the heirs of Bomanji by means of letter dated 25th October, 1961 also claimed themselves to be joint tenants; Daulatbai in her letter dated 3rd February, 1962 also claimed joint tenancy along with her sons and sought transfer of the rent receipts only in the name of her son Dinshaw.

The High Court taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief in the appeal u/s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same has been challenged by the Appellants. In ordinary course of litigation, the rights of parties are crystallised on the date the suit is instituted and only the same set of facts must be considered. However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal u/s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not precluded from taking note of developments subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed by a party. The entire purpose of the suit the Courts taking note of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This rule is one of ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson vs. State of Alabama 294 US 600 followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs. Keshwar Lal Choudhury AIR 1941 FC 5. The abovementioned principle has been recognised in a catena of decisions.

The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognisance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief.

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Precedent – Manner of citing – Whenever any issue is decided by the Supreme Court or/and High Court, it is to be first referred to by the Authorities/ Tribunals and then decision should be rendered on the issue involved in the case:

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Commr. of Customs and Central Excise vs. Advani Oerlikon Ltd (2014) (306) ELT 66 (Chhattisgarh)

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the order passed by the Commissioner of appeals.

The short question that arises for consideration in the reference application before the Hon’ble Court is whether any referable legal question arises out of the order passed by the Tribunal for being answered by this Court in its reference jurisdiction.

The Hon’ble Court observed that though while deciding the issue, the Tribunal did not refer to any case law on the subject, yet the view taken by the Tribunal was in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. In fact, it would have been better if the Tribunal had taken note of the law on the subject laid down by the Supreme Court and then would have expressed its view.

The Court further observed that whenever, any issue is decided by the Supreme Court or/High Court then it has to be first referred to by the Authorities/Tribunals and then decision should be rendered on the issue involved in the case keeping in view the law laid down in decided cases.

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Coparcenary property – Right of daughter – No partition affected prior to enforcement of Amendment Act – Death of father (co-parcener) – Daughter will have right at par with son. Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6 (as amended in 2005)

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Jamanbhai Maganbhai Mavani & Another vs. Bhanuben Maganbhai Mavani & Others AIR 2014 Gujarat 185

The short facts of the case are that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were the original plaintiffs [‘Sisters’] who had filed the suit for partition of the coparcenary property of their father’s family contending inter alia that they were daughters of the deceased Maganbhai Mohanbhai Mavani and the defendants were the brothers, in possession of the family property and they were entitled to the share in the family property.

The appellant together with respondent No. 3 – the defendants resisted the suit contending inter alia that the Will was executed by the father during his lifetime in favour of the mother, original defendant No. 1 and it was contended that the partition had taken place and further, after marriage of the original plaintiffs, they were not entitled to get any share in the property.

The court observed that the Will was not proved. Apart from the said aspect, if the property was a coparacenary property, the right would accrue to the members of the coparcenary from the very beginning.

Once the partition was not proved or there was no partition, coparcenary property would continue to have same character and it cannot be said that since the right accrued on the date when the father had expired. Such right is saved by amendment made in provision of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. As such on the date of death of the father, if the property remained as coparcenary property and no division or partition is made prior to the amendment, the right cannot be extinguished of Hindu female in coparcenary property. There was no satisfactory evidence, produced before the trial Court nor before the High Court to show that the property was partitioned prior to the amendment. If the property was not partitioned prior to the amendment, merely, because the father, one of the coparceners of the property had expired, such right cannot be said to have extinguished nor could be it said that the right of partition had accrued only on the death of the father. If on the date of amendment, the property has continued as coparcenary property, Hindu female will have right at par with the son.

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Coparcenery property – Karta – When male member is available, female in such circumstances would not be eligible to become a karta of family–Section 6–Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

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Jagannath Rangnath Chavan vs. Suman Sahebrao Ghawte & Ors AIR 2014 (NOC) 491 (Bom)

One Mr. Nana had three children – one son by name Tukaram and two daughters Suman (Plaintiff No.1) and Shanti aka Vimal (Plaintiff No.2). The two daughters had filed a suit against the present appellant, who was defendant no.1 and another defendant, challenging the sale deed dated 28-03-1968 executed by their brother Tukaram in favour of the present appellant/defendant no.1 and, in the alternative, for partition and separate possession.

Nana had died on 19-07-1967. The plaintiff no.1, Suman was already married and had gone to reside with her husband at her matrimonial place; whereas plaintiff no.2 Shanti aka Vimal was a minor, who resided with Tukaram. Tukaram had the responsibility of marrying plaintiff no.2 Shanti aka Vimal, since there was no other male member in the family except him. Tukaram vide sale deed on 29- 12-1967 sold the suit land on 28-03-1968 to defendant no.1. As there was no other source of livelihood/income to Tukaram, he applied the sale proceeds for performing rituals, maintenance of the family and for performing marriage of Shanti aka Vimal (Plaintiff No.2). Tukaram died on 03-12-1971. After his death, both the sisters had filed the suit on 29-09-1973.

The appellant (defendant no.1) filed his written statement and contested the claim made by the plaintiffs, principally on the ground that Tukaram, after the death of Nana, became the Karta of the family, being the eldest son remaining in the family due to marriage of plaintiff no. 1 and for legal necessity, he was compelled to sell the suit land and the said transaction of sale was binding on the plaintiffs who could not have questioned the sale deed. On one of the issues, the trial Court held that Tukaram was the Karta of the family and the legal necessity was duly proved and, therefore, the sale deed was binding and could not be questioned.

The court observed that it will be revolutionary of all accepted principles of Hindu law to suppose that the seniormost female member of a joint Hindu family, even though she has adult sons who are entitled as coparceners to the absolute ownership of the property, could be the manager of the family. She would be the guardian of her minor sons till the eldest of them becomes a major, but she would not be manager of the joint family for she is not a coparcener.

Thus, the court held that a female, in normal circumstances and particularly as in the instant case when a male is available is not eligible to become a manager or Karta of the family, he being the son and, as such, it was only Tukaram the major son who was left Karta sui juris in the family. Hence, Tukaram was the only eligible and competent person of the family after the death of Nana to act as Karta/manager.

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Coparcenary property – Hindu Law – Partition – Wife cannot demand partition of joint family property – She would get a share only if partition is demanded by her husband or sons and property is actually partitioned.

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Jayamati Narendra Shah (deceased by L.Rs) and Others vs. Narendra Amritlal Shah. AIR 2014 Bombay 119.

The plaintiff was the son of the defendant (Father). The defendant’s wife, the plaintiff’s mother, expired on 10th June, 2013 leaving behind a registered will dated 2nd July 2011. The plaintiff sought administration of her estate. The plaintiff also sought disclosure of the remainder of the estate which the plaintiff had no knowledge of. The plaintiff was the sole beneficiary under the will of the deceased (Mother) which had been sought to be probated. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the properties bequeathed by the deceased (Mother) to him. In the suit, the plaintiff claimed partition of immovable properties that had been bequeathed to him and mandatory injunction directing the defendant to handover those properties to the plaintiff and the permanent injunctions against alienation.

The plaintiff claimed 1/2 undivided share which the deceased had in a flat. The defendant resides in that flat. The plaintiff had left that premises upon certain disputes between the parties prior to the death of the deceased.

The title of the deceased to give her a right to bequeath the property would have to be seen in the context of a HUF of her husband, the defendant herein. The husband was alive on the date of the Will as also on the date of her death. The deceased was not a widow.

In a HUF, only sons (vertically) and brothers (laterally) would constitute a coparcenary in a Joint Hindu Family. Their wives may be members of the joint Hindu family but are not coparceners. The proprietary rights are of a coparcener if the joint Hindu family owns any joint property. The wives of coparceners do not get any interest in joint property owned and held by coparceners who are co owners. The wives of the co-owners do not get any interest by virtue of their birth. It is only a Hindu widow who gets the interest of her husband in the coparcenary or joint family property upon the death of her husband. That interest enables her to claim maintenance and residence. Only a widow can demand partition of the interest which her deceased husband would have been entitled. Consequently a wife has no share, right, title or interest in the HUF in which her husband is a coparcener with his brothers, father or sons and after the amendment of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 with his sisters and daughters also. The wife, may be a member of a joint Hindu family. But by virtue of being a member in the joint Hindu family she cannot get any share, right, title or interest in the joint Hindu property which that family owns. A wife cannot demand partitition unlike a daughter. She would get a share only if partitition is demanded by her husband or sons and the property is actually partitioned. The claim by a wife during the life time of the husband in the share and interest which he has as a coparcener in his HUF is wholly premature and completely misconceived.

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Potato Salad and the Funny World of Finance

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If you were to do a Google search for “Potato Salad” what do you think will be the very first result?

A recipe…
An update on the nutritional value of potato salad…

A list of places that serve the ‘best’ potato salad…

You will be surprised that it is none of this. Instead, what you may find is a link to a Kickstarter fundraising project initiated by Zach Danger Brown, wanting to raise US $ 10 for his project, which he describes very simply as:

I’m making potato salad.

Basically, I’m just making potato salad. I haven’t decided what kind yet.

Zach put up this very simple project on the crowdfunding platform ‘Kickstarter’ to raise a modest US $ 10 …. And he has already got a commitment of over US $ 50,000 till date! What is even more interesting is the speed at which he has managed to raise the funds and the number of people who have chosen to contribute to the project – at the point when I am writing this article (1st August, 2014) there are 6,730 backers who have pledged a whopping US $ 54,030 against the goal of just US $ 10! Surely, Zach would not be short of US $ 10, and may be, he didn’t even want to make Potato salad… but a creative thought, the promised reward of “…you will get a ‘thank you’ posted on your website and I will say your name out loud while making the potato salad…” was enough to set the crowdfunding community amused enough to make a commitment to the project.

Well, when you ask for US $ 10 and get US $ 50000 instead, it is surely newsworthy. No wonder that the story made its way in to the Forbes e-magazine, with the title “What Potato Salad Teaches Us About Crowdfunding”. The article goes on to explain that, there are many projects that aim at alleviating poverty or making healthcare available to the needy, or making that breakthrough invention…. But every once in a while, it will happen that the project that manages to raise funds has nothing to do with charity, social relevance or technology; the project that catches the fancy of the invisible contributing community is the one that makes no lofty promises but just tickles their funny bone, or amuses them after a tiring day at work!

This brings us to crowdfunding, and what’s new in this funny world of finance.

Kickstarter is a crowd-funding platform with the stated objective of ‘bringing creative projects to life’. It allows individuals with creative ideas to conceptualise the idea, convert it to a project and seek funding for a specific amount through the website www.kickstarter.com.

The project is then hosted on the website for making commitments for contributing to the project. If the project is able to raise the requisite funding within the timeline defined by the project creator, the project goes ahead, the funds committed are collected and given to the project creator – all this for a small fee of 5% retained by Kickstarter. If the project fails to obtain full commitment for funding, it does not go ahead – it is all or none principle for fundraising.

Kickstarter has been successful is raising funds for many projects. The website claims that 6.7 million people have backed a kickstarter project till date, and many of them have backed multiple projects.

Kickstarter is just one of the many crowdfunding platforms – these platforms provide a unique option of raising funds for projects that may not be able to access the traditional banking channels or may not have the requisite commercially viable revenue model that is required under the traditional financing options. Each platform defines the elibility criteria, who can post a project and who can contribute – the rules may vary, but the underlying principle remains the same: using an internet-based platform for seeking funds from a wide and vibrant variety of internet users for ideas, projects, causes, whims and fancies. These platforms give a chance to the contributor to feel a sense of belonging to the underlying cause and feel connected with the community of contributors.

Crowdfunding has made it possible for people to fund projects in the arena of art, design, movie making, theatre, publishing, photography and more. This means of funding is equally popular for raising funds for socially relevant projects, charity, angle investing, developing technology or undertaking some extra-ordinary travel. So, if you have a great art project, an idea about an App that you are convinced will serve a useful purpose, a sculpture that you want to create, a book that you want to write, a movie that is running in your mind…..you know that there could be an eager set of contributors waiting to give you the funds to make that project happen.

I know that many of the readers would be wondering as to how the funds in the hands of the project owner would be taxed, if at all, or how will the Crowdfunding Platform accrue its income, or how do the platform creators prevent abuse and frauds…. As for me, I will stick to telling stories about people who made history in the world of finance by asking for $ 10 to make potato salad!

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New Theory of Relativity for Corporate India

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Synopsis
Compliance for Related Party Transactions has been given a new dimension by the Companies Act, 2013 and the Listing Agreement. The Governance model has been turned inside out. This article examines the requirements under these two key statutes and also highlights the other compliances which companies need to bear in mind for related party transactions. Recent relaxations under both these Laws have also been covered.

Introduction
One of the definitions of relativity is the quality or state of being relative. Albert Einstein has made relativity famous by his Theory of Relativity (E= mc2)which is now a fundamental principle of Physics.

However, Corporate India is now grappling with a new Theory of Relativity – the one propounded by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (via the Companies Act, 2013)and the SEBI (via the Listing Agreement), i.e., the Related Party conundrum!

A host of new regulations have revolutionised the concept of related party transactions. While the intention of these new regulations is very clear, i.e., safeguarding minority interest, some of the original provisions were rather harsh and may have lead to stifling the normal business operations. Accordingly, the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 were diluted to some extent. Recently (on 15th September, 2014), SEBI also amended the original provisions of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. Let us, through this Article, look at these new provisions under the Companies Act as well as the Listing Agreement.

New Theory
We may rephrase Einstein’s famous theory as follows for Corporate India’s related party transactions:

R = S.2(76) + S.188 + Cl. 49 + S.40A(2)(a) + AS 18

Where the Variables of this Equation are:

R = Related Party Transactions;

Section 2(76) and S.188 of the Companies Act, 2013, both of which are effective from 1st April, 2014 for all companies;

Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, which is effective from 1st October, 2014 for listed companies;

Section 40A(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and

AS 18 = Accounting Standard 18 issued by the ICAI

Let us look at these variables in detail.

Who is a Related Party?

The compliances for related party transactions (“RPTs”) are to be done under two laws – section 188 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Cl. 49 of the Listing Agreement. In effect, for listed companies, the higher (stricter) of the two laws would apply. The definition of a related party in relation to a listed company u/s. 2(76) of the Companies Act, 2013 and Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement is given in Table-1.

* U nder the Companies Act, a relative for an individual means his HUF, spouse, parents, children, siblings and spouses of children. Stepfather, step-mother, step-son, step-brother and step-sister are also relatives. However, a stepdaughter is not a relative. Further, unlike the earlier list u/s. 6 of the Companies Act, 1956, several relatives have been omitted from the definition, these include, grandparents, grand children, spouse of grand children, spouses of siblings.

Under the earlier provisions of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement (prior to the amendment carried out on 15th September, 2014), several other entities were considered to be a related party. However, all those entities have now been replaced with one single statement – Related Parties under an Accounting Standard. A person who is not a related party under the Companies Act but is covered under an Accounting Standard would now be so even under Clause 49. Thus, listed companies have to consider the definition under the Companies Act and also the definition under the applicable Accounting Standards.

What is a RPT?
Now that we have considered who is a related party, let us also understand what constitutes a Related Party Transaction (RPT) for a listed company. Clause 49 defines the same in a very wide manner to mean a transfer of resources, services or obligations between a company and a related party, regardless of whether a price is charged. Hence, even a free service would be a related party transaction. Further, a RPT includes a single transaction or a group of transactions in a contract.

Section 188 on the other hand gives a specified list of contracts or arrangements with a related party which constitute a related party transaction. Hence, the scope of section 188 is much narrower and would only apply to the transactions specified therein. While what constitutes a contract is easy to understand, what constitutes an arrangement could be a moot point? Further, the Rules treat certain RPTs as prescribed RPTs for which a special resolution of the shareholders is required. Both these lists are given in Table-2.

Turnover. Using a consolidated turnover is a good move for Holding Companies which have little or no operations of their own.

What compliances are required?
The compliances required for RPTs under both the laws are illustrated below.

(A) If the RPT is in the Ordinary Course of Business and on an arms’ length pricing, the compliances are given in Table-3.

ALP = Arms’ Length Pricing basis, i.e., an RPT conducted as if it were between unrelated parties so that there is no conflict of interest. To demonstrate that the RPT is on an ALP, the Company may consider comparable uncontrolled prices or such other available illustrations which would demonstrate that the transaction has been carried out on an arms’ length price. The concept of ALP is relevant only qua the Companies Act since Cl. 49 makes no distinction between an RPT at ALP or otherwise.

* What is an ordinary course of business has not been defined and would have to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. The Memorandum of Association, Financial Statements, Board Minutes, history of past transactions, etc., could be some of the indicators of what is ordinary for a company. For instance, purchase of shares of the promoter’s private company would not be in the ordinary course of business even though it may be on an arms’ length pricing.

* The twin conditions or ALP and ordinary course of business need to be satisfied for a company to get out of the provisions of section 188(1) of the Act. Compliance with any one is not enough.

(B) If the RPT is not in the Ordinary Course of Business and/or not on an arms’ length pricing, the compliances are given in Table-4.


The  rules  earlier  prescribed  that  a  company  having  a paid-up capital of rs. 10 crore or more shall not enter into any RPT which is not on an ALP and not in the ordinary course of business without a special resolution. thus, for such companies the requirement of checking whether the RPT was a prescribed RPT was not relevant. However, by virtue of an amendment dated 14th august 2014, the MCA has removed this clause. Hence, as the law stands currently, the threshold requirement of Rs.10 crore of capital stands removed to determine whether an RPT requires a special resolution.

Thus,  the  standards  prescribed  under  Clause  49  are more stringent than those u/s. 188. While section188 provides a gateway in the form of ordinary course of business which is at an arms’ length price, there is no such gateway under Clause 49.

How is the Voting for RPTS to be carried out?

We have seen that shareholders’ approval is required either  under  the  Companies  act  or  under  the  listing agreement  or  both.  This  gives  rise  to  several  issues, some of which are enumerated below.

All for One and One for All?

Section188 provides that no member of the company shall vote on any special resolution, to approve any RPT which may be entered into by the company, if such member is a related party.

A question which arises is that in a transaction between two related parties would all other related parties also be disentitled from voting or would only the ones affected by the transaction be disentitled? for instance, would a director who is a shareholder be disentitled merely because he is a director even though he has no special interest in a transaction? Thus, does the Three Musketeers’ slogan apply – all related parties would be clubbed together even if they have no interest in the transaction?

The MCA issued a clarification in this respect that related party has to be construed with reference to/in the context of the contract or arrangement for which the special resolution  is  being  passed.  this  is  a  very  important clarification that was eagerly awaited. The impact of the same may be illustrated as follows:

Illustration 1
a holding company is entering into a transaction with its substantially owned subsidiary, which is now treated as a related party. the managing director and other directors of the holding company are also treated as related parties u/s. 2(76) of the act. however, if they are shareholders they can vote on this transaction since they are not related parties in the context of the contract being considered.

Illustration 2
A company proposes to enter into a contract with the MD’s wife. here, the md would have to abstain from voting as a shareholder since he is a related party in the context of the contract being considered. however, other directors of the holding company can vote on this transaction if they are shareholders.

To add more spice to the flavour, SEBI has come out with an interesting amendment. It states that for RPTs all entities falling under the definition of related parties shall abstain from voting, irrespective of whether the entity is a party to the   particular transaction or not. this sets at naught the exemption given by the mCa! a classic case of “What the Left Hand Giveth, the Right Hand Taketh  Away.”  thus,  under  the  illustration-1  explained above, the directors of the holding company would have to abstain from voting even though they are not related to the transaction in question. A very strange and harsh requirement.

Father-Son Transactions

In the case of an RPT with a wholly owned subsidiary, the MCA has clarified that special resolution passed by the holding company would suffice under the Act for entering into transactions between the wholly owned subsidiary and the holding company.

Taking a cue from the MCA, the SEBI has also issued a relaxation. neither prior approval of the audit Committee nor shareholders’ special resolution is required for a transaction between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary whose accounts are consolidated with such holding company and placed before the shareholders at the general meeting for approval. however, this exemption is only for a 100% subsidiary.

Past Life Benefit?
The MCA has also clarified that related party contracts entered into by companies, after making necessary compliances u/s. 297 of the Companies act, 1956, which contracts came into effect before the commencement of section 188 of the Act, will not require fresh approval u/s. 188 of the act till the expiry of the term of original contract. However, if a modification in such contract is made on or after 1st April 2014, then the requirements u/s. 188 will have to be complied with.

Blanket Exemption?
Further, section 188 does not apply to transactions arising out of compromises, amalgamations, arrangements, etc., dealt with under specific provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or Companies act, 2013. Clause 49 does not carry a similar exemption.

Before or After?
Should the consent of the Board be obtained prior to     or after entering into the RPT? For prescribed RPTs, shareholders’ resolution is required to be passed prior  to the transaction but in other cases, no such express provision is made. Further, the section 188 provides that in case of a contract or arrangement entered into by a director or any employee without approval of the Board/Company, such contract may be ratified by post-facto consent within 3 months.

The   provisions   of   Clause   49   are   applicable   to   all prospective RPTs entered into after 1st October 2014. All existing material related party contracts or arrangements as on the date of this circular which are likely to continue beyond 31st march, 2015 must be placed for approval of the shareholders in the first General Meeting subsequent to 1st october, 2014. However, a company may choose to get such contracts approved by the shareholders even before 1st october, 2014. In case of a listed company, the shareholders’ resolution would also require an e-voting facility.   The   amended   Clause   49   permits   the  audit Committee to grant an omnibus approval for RPTs subject to certain conditions.

Consequences     of Non-Compliance The Act provides that any RPT which is not in compliance with section 188 may be  voidable  at  the  option  of  the Board.  The  director  or the employee concerned who authorised such contract or arrangement with the related party will be liable to indemnify the company for any loss incurred by it. Further, the company can proceed against such  director or employee for recovery of any loss it sustains due to such RPT.

The   punishment   for   non-compliance   of   section   188 on a director/employee in case of a listed company is imprisonment for a term of up to 1 year and/or fine of Rs. 25,000 to rs. 5 lakh. in case of an unlisted company the punishment is a fine of Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 5 lakh. Further, a person who has been convicted of an offence u/s.   188 at any time during the last 5 years is not eligible for appointment as a director of a company. the  punishment  for  non-compliance  with  the  listing Agreement has been laid down under the Securities Contract (regulation) act, 1956 and can extend up to a term of a maximum of 10 years and/or a fine of up to a maximum of Rs. 25 crore.

Reporting and Accounting requirements
Disclosures about RPTs are to be given under 3 Regulations – Section 188, Clause 49 and AS 18:

Section 188
of the Companies Act

clause 49 of
the listing agreement

Accounting
Standard 18 on Related

Party disclosures

Every
RPT (other than one at ALP and in the ordinary course of business) must be
referred to in the Board of Directors’ Report along with justifications.

Details
of all materials RPTs shall be disclosed quarterly along with the compliance
report on corporate governance

Accounting
for transactions with those related parties as defined in AS 18 are to be
given in the Financial Statements.

The Explanatory Statement to the Notice
calling a General Meeting (if any)
for passing a Special Resolution must mention the prescribed particulars.

The
Related Party Policy should be disclosed on the company’s website and also in
its Annual Report. The url to the web page should also be provided in the
Annual Report.

The
manner and nature of accounting is also given under AS 18.

A
Register of Contracts or Arrangements in which Directors are interested must
be maintained in the prescribed form.

The  Standard  on  Auditing  (SA)  550  Revised-  related Parties lays down the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to related party relationships and transactions while auditing financial statements.

Specified Domestic Transactions
How can there be any major development in india without the income-tax act having its share of the pie? the last piece of this jigsaw puzzle is s. 40a(2)(a)of the income-tax act which has introduced the concept of Specified Domestic Transactions. Any payments made by an assessee to related parties as specified under the income-tax act which are excessive or unreasonable may be disallowed to the extent of such excess. Further, certain related party transactions need to comply with the prescribed documentation, reporting and audit requirements in a manner similar to international transactions under the Transfer Pricing Regime. A  recent  delhi  tribunal  decision  in  the  case  of  Jai Surgicals Ltd vs. ACIT, reported at 534(2014) 46-A, BCAJ has held that payments made to a related party without obtaining approval under the erstwhile section 297 of the Companies act, 1956 cannot be treated as an offence or being prohibited by law. hence, such payment would not be disallowed u/s. 37(1) of the income-tax act.

Conclusion
SEBI has clearly thrown down the gauntlet to listed companies to carry out related party transactions both in letter and in spirit of the law. A plethora of regulations would force companies to have a relook at such transactions and ensure better minority protection. However, while we welcome better governance, let us not lose sight of the difference  between  governance  and  regulation.  these regulations  should  not  end  up  leading  to  more  law, but no order!!

Comments on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements by Concessionaires

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28th August 2014

The Secretary,
Accounting Standards Board,
The Institute of Chartered Accounts of India,
Indraprastha Marg,
ICAI Bhawan, Post Box No. 7100,
New Delhi – 110002

Dear Sir,

Subject: Comments on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements by Concessionaires

We have pleasure in forwarding herewith Comments of Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting. The Exposure Draft was discussed in detail by our Accounting and Auditing Committee and on the basis of the same we are sending our comments. We hope that our comments will receive due consideration.

Thanking you.

Bombay Chartered Accountants ‘ Society

Nitin Shingala                                                                                         Harish N. Motiwalla
President                                                                                                Chairman
                                                                                                Accounting & Auditing Committee

Comments on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements by Concessionaires Para 14 Here it is stated as follows:

“The concessionaire should recognize and measure revenue in accordance with Accounting Standard (AS) 7, Construction Contracts, and Accounting Standard (AS) 9, Revenue Recognition, for the construction or upgrade and operating the services it performs, respectively. If the concessionaire performs more than one service under a single contract or arrangement, consideration received or receivable should be allocated by reference to the relative fair values of the services delivered.”

Comment
If the concessionaire performs service and books its income on the basis of its performance, the consideration received or receivable should also be allocated by reference to the relative fair values of the services performed and not delivered.

As such, there may be difference between the services performed and considered as delivered, which would be the billed revenue. However, there is a possibility where the concessionaire would consider certain services being already performed and accordingly would book the same as revenue though, the difference between the income recognized as performed and delivered would be treated as Unbilled Revenue.

In view of the adoption of new IFRS 15 – Revenue Recognition, which replaces IAS 11 – Construction Contracts as well as IAS 18 – Revenue Recognition, when a contract contains more than one distinct performance obligation, an entity allocates the transaction price to each distinct performance obligation on the basis of relative stand alone selling price.

Considering the above scenario, kindly provide guidance as to whether the concessionaire can allocate consideration by reference to the fair values of the services on the basis of the Input Method (on the basis of the cost incurred towards each distinct performance obligation to the overall cost of the contract).

Para 18
Here it is stated as follows:

“AS 10, Accounting for Fixed Assets, requires that ‘when a fixed asset is acquired in exchange for another asset, its cost is usually determined by reference to the fair market value of the consideration given. It may be appropriate to consider also the fair market value of the asset acquired if this is more clearly evident’. Thus, in accordance with AS 10, service concessions arrangement which is compensated by grant of a right to collect fees from users of the public service would require the acquired ‘intangible asset’ to be recorded at a value which represents the fair value of the construction services rendered.”

Comment
As per AS 26 – Intangible Assets, Para 23 states “An intangible asset should be measured initially at cost.” Hence if there is to be capitalization of cost incurred for receiving a right to charge users of the public service by the concessionaire, the same has to be on the basis of the identifiable component of cost incurred which can be categorized for the receipt of such rights. The reference is the Guidance should be through AS 26 which is the standard specifying treatment for intangibles.

The reference to AS 10, it is felt deals with situation of exchange of tangible asset with a tangible asset. In the case of concessionaire, the cost incurred may not be creation of any tangible asset, since the ownership will be with the operator. Hence the determination of fair value on the basis of treating the cost incurred for construction of a certain asset which does not belong to the concessionaire and treating the said cost towards exchange for another asset which is also not a tangible asset, seems to be faulty.

Para 23
Here it is stated as follows:

“………These contractual obligations to maintain or restore infrastructural facilities, except for any upgrade element (see paragraph 14), ……..”

Comment
Reference to “(see paragraph 14)” should be “(see paragraph 15)”.

Para 25 & 26

“Receivable

25 The amount due from or at the direction of the grantor is accounted for as a receivable

26 In case of an annuity, interest element should be segregated and should be recognized in the statement of profit and loss at the rate implicit in the annuity contract.”

Comment
Clarification in cases where the Concessionaires have already recognized financial asset in accordance with 2008 Guidance note in its financial statements.

The 2014 Guidance Note deals only with accounting of Receivable and not financial asset except in cases where the amounts are in nature of Annuity Para 26 of GN provides the segregation of interest.

However since there may be Concessionaires who may have early adopted the 2008 Guidance note (as early adoption was allowed), in cases where such entities have recognized Financial asset in accordance with Para 23 to 25, it will be required to derecognize the same under 2014 GN as no similar provisions have been made. Guidance Note should provide the manner in which such changes will be incorporated in financial statements.

Para 28

Here it is stated as follows:
“The,  depreciable amount of the intangible asset recognized according to paragraph 27 should be allocated on a systematic basis over the best estimate of its useful life.”
 
Comment
Intangible asset has to be amortized over its useful life and hence the word “depreciable amount” should be replaced with “amortizable amount”.

Para 28 & 29
Here    it    is    stated    as    follows:
“28  the depreciable amount of the intangible asset recognized according to paragraph 27 should be allocated on a systematic basis over the best estimate of its   useful life.

29  the amortisation method used should be in accordance    with    the    principles    laid    down    in    AS    26.”

Point 16 of Example 2 of Illustration
Here    it    is    stated    as    follows:
“16         In    accordance    with    AS    26,     the     intangible asset    is amortized over the period in which it is expected to be available for use by the concessionaire, i.e. years 3–10. for the purpose of this example, the depreciable amount of the intangible asset (rs.1, 084) is allocated using the straight-line method.  the annual amortization charge is therefore  rs.1, 084 divided by 8 years, i.e.  Rs.135   per year.”

Comment
Para    28/29    of    GN    prescribes    the    method    of    amortization    as    per    AS    26    (para    73).    Point    16    of    Example    2    provides     the    amortization on straight line method over the concession period.     However,     Schedule     II     of     Companies     Act     2013    specifically     provides     that     the     amortization     will     be     in    
accordance expected revenue for the year as compared to the total revenue during the concession period.  to this extent the Gn will have to be amended for the Concessionaires who are covered by the provisions of the Companies   act, 2013

Para 33
Here    it    is    stated    as    follows:
“in those service concession arrangements, where the concession fees or periodic premium payable to the grantor is of the nature of  revenue sharing arrangement, i.e., the concessionaire acts as the agent of the grantor as a collector of fees from the users of the public service, the amount of fees collected is adjusted for the concession fees or premium paid to the grantor.”

Comment
If the concessionaire is acting as an agent, guidance and clarity is sought as to whether the fees collected by the concessionaire should be accounted on gross basis or on Net basis.

Is an auditor expected to be omniscient?

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Auditors are experts in accounting and auditing matters, but are they expected to possess competencies in fields not usually related to their profession? Quite frequently, auditors are confronted with situations which require expertise that transcends well beyond the realm of accounting and auditing. Consider for instance the following scenarios:

• For an oil exploration company, if the results of exploration and drilling indicate the presence of oil and gas reserves which are considered to be commercially viable, the expenditure incurred on exploration and drilling is capitalised and amortised (depleted) on a ‘unit of production’ basis computed based on proved reserves in the oilfield. How would an auditor estimate the quantum of oil reserves in an oil field?

• In case of a coal mining company, it is necessary to remove overburden and other barren waste materials from the land pit to access ore from which minerals can economically be extracted. Costs incurred for removal of such waste materials during the initial development phase of the mine are generally capitalised. These costs are usually amortised using a proportion of the quantity of ore extracted during a period over the estimated ore reserves. How would one estimate the ore reserve in a mine?

• How would an auditor obtain assurance over the reported liabilities of a company that has made a provision for costs arising as a consequence of an environmental disaster for which the company is culpable?

• How would an auditor obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to support the ‘true and fair’ opinion on the financial statements of a company that owns expensive jewelry, works of art or antiques, either as trading or as investment assets.

The above scenarios present situations where it is imperative to involve an expert to provide necessary information for preparation of the financial statements.

Other areas where experts may be involved are actuarial valuation of liabilities associated with insurance contracts and employee benefit plans, valuation of intangible assets such as brands, patents and trademarks, site clean-up costs, interpretation of contracts, laws and regulations, analysis or valuation of complex derivatives or financial instruments etc.

Depending on the nature, significance and complexity of the matter that requires the involvement of an expert, an auditor may determine whether he has the expertise to evaluate the work of the expert engaged by the management (known as management’s expert), or whether he needs to engage an ‘auditor’s expert’ so as to decrease the risk that material misstatement will not be detected.

An ‘auditor’s expert’ is an individual or organisation possessing expertise in a field other than accounting or auditing, whose work in that field is used by the auditor to assist him in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence. An auditor’s expert may be either an auditor’s internal expert (from within his own firm) or an external expert. It is pertinent to note that an auditor’s expert is engaged by the auditor and not by the client (‘auditee’).

In the present article, we will focus on aspects that an auditor would need to consider where he himself chooses to evaluate the work of the expert rather than employing an ‘auditor’s expert’.

SA 500 Audit Evidence provides guiding principles for auditors where information to be used as evidence has been prepared using the work of a management’s expert.

Having regard to the significance of the expert’s work for audit purposes, the auditor would need to evaluate the competence, capabilities and objectivity of the expert when assessing the risk of material misstatements; obtain an understanding of the work performed by him and evaluate the appropriateness of the expert’s work as audit evidence for the relevant assertion.

Let us understand the application of SA 500 with certain practical real-life scenarios.

1. Actuarial valuation of retirement benefits

Use of actuaries in valuation of retirement benefits/longterm employee benefits is one of the most common practice followed by enterprises world over. While auditors are not expected to re-work the valuation performed by the actuary, an auditor is expected to be cognisant of key factors considered in the valuation and to perform corroborative audit procedures. An illustrative inventory of procedures that need to be performed are as under:

i. Testing the assumptions and methods used by the actuary with empirical data available in public domain as well as historical data of the enterprise. The procedures that could be followed while testing some of these assumptions are listed below –

a. Salary increments – could be tested based on past history of increments given by the enterprise and the general level of increment in the industry in which the enterprise operates.

b. Mortality – could be tested by reference to the mortality tables used by insurance companies

c. Attrition – could be tested based on past history/ experience of employees exiting the enterprise. The workforce could be categorised into various age profiles and a graded attrition rate be applied to each profile.

d. Discount rate – could be tested by reference to yields on government bonds with a maturity that corresponds to the remaining service life considered by the actuary.

e. Expected return on plan assets – could be tested by reviewing the profile of investments comprised in the plan.

f. An analytical review of the various components of the actuarial valuation such as current service costs, return on plan assets, actuarial gains/losses, past service costs etc. in relation to the previous year may also provide directional insights to the auditor.

ii. T esting whether the assumptions and methods are generally accepted by the actuarial profession and are appropriate for financial reporting purposes

iii. Testing whether the source data provided by the enterprise to the actuary was relevant, complete and accurate, for e.g., employee data provided by the enterprise relating to salary, date of joining, leave policy and accumulated leave balances (in case of valuation of compensated absences) etc.

iv. Whether the actuary is a member of any statutory professional body governing the actuarial profession and is subject to ethical/accreditation standards of that body.

v. T he auditor could also consider discussing with the actuary on any aspect relating to the actuarial valuation where clarifications are needed. The personal experience with previous work of the expert could also assist the auditor in evaluating the competence of the actuary.

vi. T he auditor should also be mindful of circumstances that would impair objectivity of the actuary, for e.g. , whether the actuary has any financial interest in the enterprise, whether he provides other services and has any business/personal relationships with the enterprise (other than the engagement for actuarial services).

vii. I t may however be noted that the auditor continues to be responsible for opining on the financial statements which incorporate the retirement benefits liability accounted using the valuation provided by the actuary.

2. Valuation of employee stock option plans

Generally, listed companies in india which issue employee stock options (ESOP) are required to obtain a valuation of the ESOP using an appropriate valuation model for the purpose of determining the fair value of the options for accounting/disclosure purposes. Such valuations are performed by a valuation expert using an appropriate model such as Black Scholes or Binomial models. Usually, in such cases, an auditor does not engage an ‘auditor’s expert’ for evaluating the work performed by the  management  expert.  though  the  valuation  may  be performed by the management expert, the auditor can validate the same by independently testing some of the assumptions/data used by the management expert in valuing the options such as –

i.    dividend yield – by reviewing the past dividend history to validate this assumption
ii.    Volatility – by reviewing the fluctuation in the share prices of the Company over the valuation period
iii.    testing the number of options granted,  exercised and lapsed during the qualifying period

Even in this case, the auditor continues to be responsible while opining on the financial statements which include the ESOP charge accounted based on the valuation provided by the management’s expert.

3.    Estimation of reserves in an oilfield

Enterprises engaged in such industries would  have  their own internal team of professional engineers and geologists or may seek the services of external experts to deduce the expected reserves in an oil field. Such a team of experts may evaluate data to determine whether oil can be economically produced from the well, whether infrastructure exists to enable the marketing of production to be obtained from the field, findings from prior years, their own knowledge of relevant formations and drilling, completion and production techniques applied by the Company etc.

Some of the significant points of focus for oil reserve valuation by an expert could be –

i.    The nature, scope and objectives of the expert’s report – whether the report is prepared solely for the exclusive use of the enterprise and forms the basis for the assessment of impairment of property, plant and equipment.

ii.    Whether the expert acknowledges the fact that the auditors use the report for the purposes of the year end audit?

iii.    Whether the evaluation of reserves is a routine part of the expert’s business?

iv.    Are these experts employed by other oil and gas development and exploration companies to perform such evaluations and thus have established procedures and guidelines that are followed as part of the reserve evaluation process?

v.    Whether the expert  compares  the  data  provided  by the management with public information before incorporating the data in to the model used for computing the reserve. Whether assumptions are reviewed and tested  by  management  to  ensure  the reliability and consistency of the output with expectations and actual results?

vi.    Whether the expert is required to comply with the ethical standards of any governing body and whether the report issued has under any statutory sanction?

vii.    Whether the expert has any direct or indirect interest in the enterprise which could impair his objectivity?

viii.    Based on the complexity involved, the auditors could consider incorporating a ‘matter of emphasis’ in the audit report clearly expressing his reliance on the technical evaluation done by the expert of the expected oil reserves which has formed basis of providing for amortization of the exploratory and drilling costs of the oil well.

4.    Valuation of Artworks

Where an enterprise is engaged in trading of artworks/ antiques, one would need the involvement of a valuation expert to test whether the net realisable value of such items exceeds the cost so as to comply with the requirements of AS 2 – Valuation of inventories.

The valuation of artworks is influenced by factors such as the identity of artist, the art style deployed (such as contemporary, modern etc.), the age of the artwork, the medium used i.e., whether  the  artwork  is  on  canvas or paper, at what price have the paintings of the artist concerned been sold in the recent past, recognition of the artist by art galleries/auctioneers, demand and supply of the artworks of the concerned artist etc. In addition to the generic audit procedures discussed in the preceding cases, the auditor would need to be aware of these nuances while verifying the valuation performed by the expert.

5.    Physical verification of stock pile of minerals

For enterprises that transact in/consume minerals such as natural gypsum (usually found in rock form) or coal, it may not be practical to conduct a physical verification of the entire stock by weighment, where the quantum of stock at the year-end is substantial. In such cases, the enterprise may engage a surveyor to certify the quantum of stock based on volumetric measurement.   The auditors in such cases should not merely rely on the report furnished by the surveyor but perform alternative procedures such as an overall reconciliation of quantity of materials purchased, expected material consumption (relative to finished goods produced) and derived closing inventory.

Concluding Remarks
Where enterprises involve experts to provide information necessary for preparation of the financial statements, auditors would need to decide whether they have the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate the  work performed by the experts and not merely rely on their reports. ultimately, the audit opinion is the sole responsibility of the auditor, and that this responsibility is not reduced by reliance on the work performed by   the expert.

Contingent Pricing of Fixed Assets and Intangible Assets

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In most cases, fixed assets and intangible assets are purchased at a certain price and the accounting is fairly straight forward. Purchase of an asset on credit gives rise to a financial liability when the asset is delivered. The buyer makes the payment to the seller and relinquishes the financial liability. However, more complex contracts are emerging, where the payments could be contingent upon one or more variables. This is generally referred to as contingent consideration.

Some payments are dependent on the purchasers future activity derived from the underlying asset. For example, a contract for the purchase of a licence may specify that payments are based on a specified percentage of sales derived from that licence. Some payments could depend upon the performance of the asset, for example whether the asset acquired complies with agreed-upon specifications at specific dates in future, such as standard production capacity or a standard performance. Other payments may be dependent on an index or a rate. For example, an operator in a service concession agreement agrees to pay an annual concession fee to the grantor, with the principal amount increasing at the end of each year based on the consumer price index.

The provisions relating to AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets, AS 6 Depreciation Accounting and AS 26 Intangible Assets are set out below.

AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets
9.1 The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price. Examples of directly attributable costs are:

i. site preparation;
ii. initial delivery and handling costs;
iii. installation cost, such as special foundations for plant; and
iv. professional fees, for example fees of architects and engineers.

The cost of a fixed asset may undergo changes subsequent to its acquisition or construction on account of exchange fluctuations, price adjustments, changes in duties or similar factors.

11.2 When a fixed asset is acquired in exchange for shares or other securities in the enterprise, it is usually recorded at its fair market value, or the fair market value of the securities issued, whichever is more clearly evident.

AS 26 Intangible Assets
25. The cost of an intangible asset comprises its purchase price, including any import duties and other taxes (other than those subsequently recoverable by the enterprise from the taxing authorities), and any directly attributable expenditure on making the asset ready for its intended use. Directly attributable expenditure includes, for example, professional fees for legal services. Any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the cost.

26. If an intangible asset is acquired in exchange for shares or other securities of the reporting enterprise, the asset is recorded at its fair value, or the fair value of the securities issued, whichever is more clearly evident.

AS 6 Depreciation Accounting
6. Historical cost of a depreciable asset represents its money outlay or its equivalent in connection with its acquisition, installation and commissioning as well as for additions to or improvement thereof. The historical cost of a depreciable asset may undergo subsequent changes arising as a result of increase or decrease in long-term liability on account of exchange fluctuations, price adjustments, changes in duties or similar factors.

16. Where the historical cost of an asset has undergone a change due to circumstances specified in para 6 above, the depreciation on the revised unamortised depreciable amount is provided prospectively over the residual useful life of the asset.

Author’s point of view
Neither AS-10 Accounting for Fixed Assets nor AS 26 Intangible Assets provides any clear guidance on how to account for such contingent pricing arrangement for acquisition of fixed assets and intangible assets. Theoretically many views are possible.

View 1.1
The fixed asset and the liability can be measured at cost on date of acquisition. The cost would be the amount paid on the date of acquisition. In the case of fixed assets, based on paragraph 9.1 of AS-10, any subsequent change in the liability or consideration is capitalised to the cost of fixed asset. This can be used by analogy for intangible assets as well. AS 6 is also clear that any such changes to the fixed asset cost are depreciated prospectively. This is not clear in the case of intangible assets; however the same analogy may be used.

View 1.2
A variation of View 1.1 is that any change to the cost of the asset is not included in cost of the asset, but the impact is taken to P&L. This view is supportable as paragraph 9.1 of AS-10 includes price adjustments, which is not the same as contingent consideration. In other words paragraph 9.1 does not clearly deal with accounting for contingent consideration and hence it is arguable that the changes to the liability are included in the P&L.

View 2
On the date the fixed asset or intangible asset is purchased, the control is transferred to the buyer and consequently a debit to fixed asset or intangible asset and a credit to liabilities would arise equal to the fair value of the contingent payment. Paragraph 11.2 of AS 10 and paragraph 26 of AS 26 support this view, though those paragraphs apply to consideration by way of shares or securities.

The core issue would then be whether the remeasurement of the liability on account of changes in the consideration should be recognised in the profit or loss or included as an adjustment to the cost of the asset. This is a major issue that is not clear even under International Financial Reporting Standards and is a matter of significant debate in the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC).

Paragraph 9.1 requires subsequent changes in cost to be included as cost of fixed assets. However those costs do not include contingent consideration adjustment. Therefore there are supportable arguments that subsequent changes in the remeasurement of liability may be recognised in the profit or loss.

Conclusion
In this article, we have simplified the issue of contingent payments and not taken into consideration the various complex arrangements that may be involved and their impact on accounting. Take for example, the contingent payments based on a quoted index. Under IFRS typically one would make an assessment of whether there is an embedded derivative, and whether that embedded derivative needs to be valued and accounted for separately or not. Indian GAAP does not contain any guidance on this matter. The ICAI should participate in the current discussions of IFRIC on this subject and arrive at an amicable conclusion as this would also be relevant for the purposes of interpretation of Ind-AS.

levitra

SECONDMENT/DEPUTATION OF EMPLOYEES SERVICE TAX IMPLICATIONS

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Introduction
Secondment/Deputation of
employees within group companies has been a very common feature in
almost all major business houses in India. The globalisation of the
Indian economy has resulted in substantially increased presence of
Multi-National Companies (MNC) in India and Indian companies in the
markets abroad. This gave rise to cross-border secondment/deputation of
employees within a group.

Several issues have arisen as regards
service tax implications on secondment/deputation of employees within a
group (either based in India or abroad) resulting in extensive
litigation. The same is being discussed hereafter.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
a) Provisions Prior to 1/7/12

“
“manpower recruitment or supply agency” means any person engaged in
providing any service, directly or indirectly, in any manner for
recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, to any
other person.”

Section 65(105)(k) of the Act

“taxable service means any service provided or to be provided –

to
any person, by a manpower recruitment or supply agency in relation to
the recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, in any
manner.

Explanation

For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that for the purposes of this sub-clauses,
recruitment or supply of manpower includes services in relation to
prerecruitment screening, verification of the credentials and
antecedents of the candidate and authenticity of documents submitted by
the candidate.”

b) Provisions with effect from 01/07/2012

Section 65B (44) of the Act

“
“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for
consideration, and include a declared service, but shall not include –

……..
(b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment.”

Rule 2(1) (g) of Service tax rules, 1994 (Rules)

“
“Supply of manpower” means supply of manpower, temporarily or
otherwise, to another person to work under his superintendence or
Control.”

Relevant Extracts from Draft CBEC Circular No. 354/127/2012 TRU dated 27-07-2012

A. Scope of Manpower Supply

2.
After the negative list coming into force, the erstwhile definition of
the manpower recruitment or supply agency is no more applicable. Thus,
the words manpower supply would have to be given their natural meaning.
The manpower supply is understood to mean when one person provides
another person with the use of one or more individuals who are
contractually employed or otherwise engaged by the first person. The
essence of the employment should be that the individuals should be
employed by the provider of the service and not by the recipient of the
service.

3. There could be certain contracts in which such
manpower is made available to execute another independent contract by
the service provider. For example, a person may agree to carry out
construction or a manufacture for another in which certain manpower may
be engaged. As long as such manpower is not placed operationally
under the superintendence or control of the recipient, it shall not be a
case of manpower supply, though it will continue to be judged
independently whether it comprises any other taxable service.

4. There
are also cases of secondment whereby certain staff belonging to an
organisation is placed at the disposal of a subsidiary company or any
other associate company. Such cases will be covered by the definition of
manpower supply as the contractual employment continues to be with the
parent company.

B. Joint Employment

5. T here
can also be cases where staff is employed by one or more employers who
normally share the cost of such employment. The services provided by
such employee will be covered by the exclusion provided in the
definition of service. However, if the staff has been engaged by one
employer and only made available to other for a consideration, it shall
not be a case of joint employment.

6. Another arrangement could
be where one entity pays the salary and other expenses of the staff on
behalf of other joint employers which are later recouped from the other
employers on an agreed basis on actuals. Such recoveries will not be
liable to service tax as it is merely a case of cost reimbursement.

Service tax implications
•
As regards the provisions applicable prior to 01-07-2012, most of the
litigation is centered around applicability under the taxable service
[section 65(68) /65(105)(k) of the Act] of “manpower recruitment or
supply agency service”. Under the said provisions the following
conditions had to be fulfilled so as to bring the subject activities
within the scope of taxable service viz.:

The service provider
should have been engaged in providing the service of recruitment or
supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise to any other person; and

the
individuals had to be contractually employed by the manpower supply
agencies and there was no employee – employer relationship between the
individual and the service recipient.

• Under the negative list
regime, introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, service tax is payable
on all activities for consideration carried out by one person or another
for consideration, except those excluded from the definition of
‘service’ or specified in the negative list of services and the
exemption notifications. The services provided by an employee to the
employer, if provided in the course of or in relation to employment,
have been specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’.

Further,
since the categorisation of taxable services has been done away with,
the condition of a person being engaged in the business of supply of
manpower is no more relevant. However, Rule 2(1)(g) of the Rules,
defines “supply of manpower” for the purpose of reverse change
provisions. .

Considering the specific exclusion from the
definition of service, the aspect of employer-employee relationship
assumes greater significance, insofar as the applicability of service
tax is concerned.

Employer – Employee relationship and Joint Employment
In
case of secondment/deputation of employees of an overseas based company
to an Indian company, the concept of joint employment becomes relevant,
provided the expatriate is also employed by the Indian company, in
terms of the relevant Indian laws are concerned. The issue which is
being deliberated is, whether the concept of joint employment can help
MNCs to arrange their affairs in a lawful manner so as to get the
benefit of exclusion from the definition of service. Hence, it is very
important to analyse and understand the concept of employment and
thereafter the concept of joint employment.

The Honorable
Supreme Court has from time to time expressed a view that the test of
supervision and control is a crucial point for determining the employer –
employee relationship. [Refer Shivanandan Sharma vs. Punjab National
Bank AIR 1955 SC 404]. However, it needs to be noted that the Honorable
Supreme Court has also held that since the nature of supervision and
control varies from business to business, it becomes difficult to
precisely define the degree of such supervision and control & lay
down a single formula or test for the same.

The Gujarat High Court in Satish Plastics vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner – 44 FLR 207 (Guj.) has summarised the tests for ascertaining master-servant relationship as under:

i) Was he doing the work for monetary payment?

ii)    Was the work done by him the work of the establishment or had a nexus with such work?

iii)    Was the payment made as wages, in the sense of being remuneration for the physical or mental effort in connection with such work?

iv)    Was the work such that it had to be done as directed by the establishment or under its supervision and control to the extent that supervision and control are possible having regard to the specialised nature of the work or the skill needed for its performance?

v)    Was the work of such a nature and character that ordinarily a master–  servant  relationship  could  exist and, but for the agreement styling it as a contract, common sense would suggest a master– servant bond?

vi)    Was the relation indicative of master–servant status in substance having regard to the economic realities irrespective of the nomenclature devised by the parties?

vii)    Was he required to do the work personally without the liberty to get it done through someone else?

The above can serve as a useful guide for ascertainment of employer–employee relationship.

In overseas jurisdictions, the test is that of the economic reality rather than various factors discussed above. however, no single or uniform test has been laid down by the Courts to determine the economic reality. Many factors such as the extent of the skill and initiative of an employee being an  integral  part  of  the  employees  business,  the permanency of their relationship, the nature and degree of employer’s control, etc., have been considered by the Courts in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case.

The absence of defined principles for the application of the test of economic reality has posed challenges before the Courts in determining the existence of employment relationship. Apart from the principle of economic reality, the Courts have also considered the principle of mutuality of obligation for determining the presence of a contract of service.

The  concept  of  joint  employment  has  been  recognized and given effect to in many overseas jurisdictions including US & UK in particular. However, the concept of joint employment and economic reality is comparatively new in india. further, the variety of tests propounded for establishing the employer- employee relationship has brought in more uncertainty. draft CBeC Circular referred above does briefly cover the concept. However, it does not provide any finality as to the Government’s perspective on the concept & service tax implications arising therefrom. the joint employment concern is necessarily an application of the principle of “substance over form”. But how far such relationships can actually sustain in employment laws is a difficult question for which there are no ready answers.

Analysis of some decisions:

•    Ruling in Volkswagen India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. CCE (2014) 34 STR 135 (Tri – Mumbai)

The brief facts of the case were that the appellant was a manufacturer of passenger vehicles and was registered under service tax for various taxable services like, management or business consultant’s service, consulting engineer’s service, etc.

Due to nature of the business, the appellant required people with specialised skill and experience and accordingly, the appellant employed many foreign nationals (called as global employees), who were previously employed with other group entity. there was an “inter Company employment agreement” between the appellant and its holding company namely Volkswagen AG, a company registered in Germany, which facilitatesd employment of personnel from other group companies. The  said  personnel  were  relieved  by  the  other  group company and were put at the disposal of the appellant and they function as whole time employees of the appellant– indian company and worked solely under the control, direction or supervision of the appellant in accordance with its policies, rules and guidelines generally applicable to the employees of the appellant company during the period  of  such  employment.  The  terms,  conditions  and place of employment of such global employee and their designation was in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed between indian company and the respective global employee. In particular, following agreement terms need to be noted:

•    The employment of such global employee shall be in his personal capacity only and not for and on behalf of the foreign company. the appellant also have a right to promote/discipline/suspend/take any action/terminate the services of such global employee at any point of time in accordance with its applicable policies without seeking any permission from the foreign company;

•    The other group company/foreign company will not have any obligation towards the appellant with regard to the performance of the global employee nor the foreign company shall enjoy any right, title to or interest in or be responsible for the work of global employee or assume any risk for the results produced from the work performed by the global employees while under employment with the appellant;

•    During the period of employment with the appellant, the holding company shall not in any way interfere with the working and/or the terms and conditions of such employee nor such employee shall be subject to any instruction or control of the foreign holding company;

•    The salary (including other entitlements) of such global employee shall be the liability of and decided and paid by the indian company i.e. the appellant based on its policies and guidelines and in case of default by the appellant, the foreign/global company will not be liable towards such global employee;

•    If the foreign/global company makes any payment to any third party (salary, etc.) in the home country of the global employee on behalf of the indian company, the foreign company will be entitled to be reimbursed by the indian company to the extent of such payment;

•    The foreign company will not be under any obligation to replace any of the global employees in the event the employment of any of the global employees is terminated by the global employee or the indian company, for any reason, nor the foreign company    is responsible for any loss or damage caused to the appellant or any action of such global employee;

•    The agreement does not create any service provider and client relationship between the foreign company and the appellant nor it would be construed that the foreign company is providing any type of  services with regard to employment of the global employees with the appellant;

•    Clearly provided that there is no direct or indirect consideration/charges (in cash or kind) payable by the indian company to the foreign company or vice-versa in this connection;

•    The remuneration clause provided is as follows:-
Your remuneration will be paid as follows:-
F Part of your net salary will be paid by the company into your valid account in Germany (through the disbursing agent, (VW aG) at the end of each calendar month).

F The  balance  part  of  your  net  salary  as  mutually agreed upon between you and company will be paid by the company into your valid account in india at the end of the calendar month.

Details of your remuneration will be communicated to you separately. your salary to be paid to Germany as above, would be paid subject to approvals as may be required under the indian exchange control regulations. the gross remuneration is subject to statutory withholding/indian income taxes as applicable.

The   company   shall   deduct   the   applicable   individual income-tax payable at source and make payment of the same.  The  company  shall  furnish  you  with  necessary certificates and any other documents evidencing the payment of this tax to the authorities as may be required by law.

…………..

•    The Visa clause of the agreement shows that such global employees are in the control and disposal and also command of the appellant and there is employer– employee relationship between them.

The revenue treated the aforementioned arrangement as “supply of manpower” by the foreign holding company to the appellant and issued show cause notice demanding service tax etc.

For  the  appellants,  it  was  submitted  that  there  was  no supply of labour or manpower, and/or recruitment service provided by the holding company of the appellant. as  per the requirement and request of the appellant, for skilled personnel, the holding company  facilitated  in  the identifying such foreign personnel, who were then employed by the appellant under separate agreement with each employee as aforementioned. Such global employees worked under the control and supervision of the appellant as its employees. Salary for such work done by the global employees was directly paid by the appellant and such income earned by the global employees was taxable as salary under the provisions of the income-tax act, 1961. Further, the appellant deducted income-tax at source from the salary of such global employee of the appellant as per the provisions of the income-tax act. the appellant had also issued necessary TDS certificate in capacity of employer.

Further,  a  part  of  the  salary  of  such  global  employees was remitted abroad in their home country, the same was done using the services of the holding company or other group companies as applicable and such amounts were reimbursed to the other company. It was further contended that apart from the part salary of the global employees (by way of reimbursement), the appellant had not paid any amount to their holding/foreign company. Merely because a part of the salary of such global employee was paid in their home country through the holding/foreign company, it could be said that the foreign/ holding company rendered supply of manpower or labour to  the  appellant. Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions in the case of ITC Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 387 (Tribunal) and Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 317 (Tribunal).

It was further contended that the holding/foreign company was not a “manpower recruitment or supply agency service” as required u/s. 65(105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, reliance was placed on C.B.E & C Circular No. 96/7/2007-S.T. dated 23-08-2007, wherein it has been clarified that in the case of supply of manpower, individuals are contractually employed by the manpower recruitment  or  supply  agency.  The  agency  agrees  for use of the services of an individual, employed by him, to another person, for a consideration. Employer–employee relationship in such case exists between the agency and the individual and not between the individual and the person who uses the services of the individual.

On  behalf  of  the  revenue,  it  was  contended  that  the indian entity should have paid full salary directly to the employee of the appellant company and not routed through the foreign/holding company. It is also the contention of the revenue that after a period of 3-4 years such global employees go back to the foreign/holding company and even during the intervening period, during the employment in the appellant company, the social security liability was discharged in their home country. Accordingly, it was submitted that the transaction is one of supply of labour/manpower by the foreign company to the appellant – indian company.

The tribunal held, “in view of the clauses of agreements noticed herein above and other facts, the global employees working under the  appellant  are  working  as their employees and having employee-employer relationship.  Further  there  is  no  supply  of  manpower service rendered to the appellant by the foreign / holding company. the method of disbursement of salary cannot determine the nature of transaction. Further, in view of the rulings relied upon by the appellant as aforementioned, we find that the facts are covered on all four corners and accordingly, the appeals are allowed and orders–in– original are set aside.”

•    Ruling in CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd (2014) 35 STR 496 (GUJ)

In this case, the issue in brief was whether the respondent is a manpower supply or recruitment agency.

The  brief  facts  were  that  respondent  had  a  composite textile mill and was engaged in manufacturing of fabrics and readymade garments. in order to reduce its cost, the respondent deputed some of its employees to its group company, who were also engaged in similar businesses. Reason for such deputation was also on certain occasions stipulated work arising for a limited period. The tribunal recorded that there was no allegation  of  finding  that the respondent had deputed employees to any other concerns outside its own subsidiary companies and also recorded that undisputedly the employees deputed do not work exclusively under the direction or supervision of the subsidiary company and upon completion of the work they were repatriated to the respondent company. On such basis, the tribunal held that the respondent could be said to be manpower supply recruitment agency and, therefore, not exigible to service tax.

The Revenue contended that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was very wide and would include range of activities of supply of manpower either temporarily or permanently and submitted that sizable manpower was required for the respondent from the group companies for deputation of the staff and also drew attention to the amendment of such definition to contend that after the amendment, the definition was widened.

The Court observed that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was wide and would cover within its sweep range of activities provided therein. However, in the present case, such definition would not cover the activity of the respondent as rightly held by the tribunal. to  court  observed,  “the  respondent  in  order  to  reduce his cost of manufacturing, deputed some of its staff to its subsidiaries or group companies for stipulated work or limited period. All throughout the control and supervision remained with the respondent. As pointed out by the respondent, company is not in the business of providing recruitment or supply of manpower. Actual cost incurred by the company in terms of salary, remuneration and perquisites is only reimbursed by the group companies.” There was no element of profit or finance benefit. The subsidiary companies could not be said to be their clients. deputation of the employees was only for and in the interest of the company. There was no relation of agency and client. it was pointed out that the employee deputed did not exclusively work under the direction of supervision or control of subsidiary company. All throughout he would be under the continuous control and direction of the company. The court further noted:
“We have to examine the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency in background of such undisputable facts. The definition though provides that manpower recruitment supply agency means any commercial concern engaged in providing any services directly or indirectly  in any manner for recruitment or supply of manpower temporarily or otherwise to a client, in the present case, the respondent cannot be said to be a commercial concern engaged in providing such specified services to a client. It is true that the definition is wide and would include  any such activity where it is carried out either directly or indirectly supplying recruitment or manpower temporarily or otherwise. However, fundamentally recruitment of the agency being a commercial concern engaged in providing any such service to client would have to be satisfied. In the present case, facts are to the contrary.”

In the result, the Court held that no question of law was involved.

Conclusion
•    For the period prior to 01-07-2012, as analyzed and held in judicial rulings, in order to be made liable to service tax, it would be essential to satisfy the test of existence of a manpower supply or recruitment agency as defined under the Act at the relevant time.

•    After introduction of negative list regime with effect from 01-07-2012, since the term ‘service’ has been very widely defined, it would be essential to satisfy  the test of employer – employee relationship so as    to be excluded from the definition of ‘service’. As discussed, the Courts have held that it is very difficult to lay down a single test or formula in this regard. hence, though guidance may be available from Court rulings, existence of employer–employee relationship would have to be determined considering the facts & circumstances of a given case.

•    It is  unfortunate  to  note  that  despite  the  fact  that a draft circular dated 27-07-2012 was issued by CBEC clarifying scope  of  Manpower  Supply  &  Joint Employment, CBEC has not issued a final Circular setting out Government’s perspective, in particular, as regards taxability of secondment/ deputation of employees. It is felt that issue of a CBeC Circular, would provide finality on the issue and avoid extensive litigation.

M/S. Shriya Enterprises vs. Commissioner Commercial Taxes, Uttarakhand, [2012] 51 VST (Uttara).

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VAT – Classification of Goods- Potato Chips – Covered by All Kinds of Processed Vegetables – Taxable at 4%, Entry 6, Sch II(B) of The Uttaranchal Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

FACTS
The dealer had purchased Potato chips from M/S. Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. by paying 4% VAT thereon and paid 4% vat on sales made by him. The assessing authorities levied tax @12.5% by treating ‘Potato Chips’ covered by residual entry attracting 12.5% tax. The appellate authority including Tribunal confirmed the assessment order levying 12.5% tax on sale of potato chips. The dealer filed revision petition against the impugned order of the Tribunal confirming the assessment order before the Uttarakhand High Court,

HELD
Entry 6 of Schedule II (B) of the Act, indicates that all processed and preserved vegetables would be covered by it and taxable at 4%. Unless the department can establish that the goods in question can by no conceivable process of reasoning be brought under any of the tariff items, resort can not be had to the residual category and if there is a conflict between entries, then the residuary category should not be taken into consideration. The High Court further held that it can not be disputed that potato is a vegetable after going thorough the process of slicing, frying and spicing the potato chips does not cease to be a vegetable. It is irrelevant as to whether it becomes a snack item or not. A processed vegetable can also be a snack item but then it does not take the snack item outside the entry of processed vegetables. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision petition filed by the dealer. The assessing authority was directed to levy tax on sale of Potato Chips at 4%

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2014 (35) STR 586 (Tri. – Mumbai) Commissioner of C. Ex., Aurangabad vs. Nagar Taluka SSK Ltd.

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If the assessee paid service tax belatedly after being informed by department, whether penalties may be waived on the grounds of lack of knowledge regarding service tax liability? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The respondents availed of Goods Transport Agency services on which service tax was to be discharged under reverse charge mechanism which was not known to them. On being pointed out, they demonstrated their inability to pay tax but assured to pay tax along with interest in future which was subsequently paid. The Adjudicating Authority, however, confirmed demand along with penalties under the Finance Act, 1994 on the grounds that intentionally payment was not made. Penalty levied was dropped by the Commissioner (Appeals) against which the department filed the appeal contending that tax was not paid on time and hence, mandatory penalty was imposable as per Hon’ble Apex Court’s decision. The assessee pleaded lack of knowledge and also requested for benefit of section 80. Respondent’s case was that they paid tax along with interest without availing input tax credit and therefore, requested to set aside penalty levied and allowing input tax credit.

Held:
Agreeing with the contentions of the respondents, benefit of section 80 was granted and penalties were waived.

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2014 (35) STR 564 (Tri. – Chennai) Shriram RPC Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Is penalty leviable when service tax along with interest is paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice? Held, No.

Facts:
On being pointed out by departmental auditor, service tax along with interest was paid. However, Show Cause Notice was issued imposing penalties. Since tax along with interest was paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice, the appellant claimed entitlement of benefit of 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 and also requested for benefits of section 80. Relying on the decision in case of CCE & STC, Bangalore vs. First Flight Couriers 2007 (8) S.T.R. 225 (Kar.), the revenue denied benefit of section 73(3) considering the case as one of suppression.

Held:
Section 73(3) of Finance Act, 1994 was issued with an intention to encourage immediate realisation of short payment and avoid unnecessary litigations. Karnataka High Court in case of ADECCO Flexione Work Force Solutions Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (kar.), had held that unless there is any active suppression, section 73(3) should be applicable considering First Flight Couriers (supra) on a different footing and not finding even bonafide error or doubt regarding legal provisions, the penalty was set aside.

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2014 (35) STR 529 (Tri. – Ahmd.) Patel Air Freight vs. Commr. Of C.Ex. & Service Tax, Vadodara

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In case of invoices paid after availing discounts, is CENVAT Credit available in full or proportionately? Held in view of facts, full credit would be available.

Facts:
The appellants had availed full CENVAT Credit on discounted invoices. The Revenue contended that CENVAT credit should be allowed proportionally. The appellants relied on Circular No. 877/15/2008-CX, dated 17th November, 2008 and Circular No. 122/3/2010- ST, dated 30th April, 2010 which clarified that CENVAT Credit will be available for such amount which has been paid as Excise Duty/Service tax whether at full value or proportionate value.

Held:
There was no evidence brought to prove that reduced service tax was paid. Also, CENVAT credit was availed of amount paid as service tax, full credit was held as available in view of the above refered circulars.

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2014 (35) STR 397 (Tri.-Del.) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Comm. of C.Ex., & ST, Allahabad

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Whether denial of CENVAT Credit on the ground that invoice did not contain service tax registration number of service provider is valid? Held, No

Facts:
CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that service tax registration number of service provider was not mentioned on the invoice. Adjudicating authority though observed the fact of deposit of tax by service provider in the ST-3 returns denied CENVAT Credit.

Held:
In view of production of ST-3 returns, the defect in the invoice had become a rectifiable defect and accordingly, Tribunal allowed CENVAT Credit.

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2014 (35) STR 459 (Del.) Indus Towers Ltd. vs. UOI

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Whether limited access granted can be considered as transfer of right to use, chargeable to VAT? Held, No

Facts:
The petitioners provide access to telecom towers, to telecom operators as well as provide passive infrastructure services and related operations and maintenance services on sharing basis. The active infrastructures are owned by the telecom operators. The sharing operator has a non-extensive right of site access availability on “use only basis” for installation, operation and maintenance of active infrastructure. Passive infrastructure provided was considered to be transfer of right to use goods by VAT department. It was contested that it is leviable to service tax under business support services and that the order for levying VAT was ultra vires Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India. The decision of Indus Towers Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 3 (Kar) delivered in its own case by Karnataka High Court wherein it was held that providing services in relation to site access cannot be considered to be transfer of right to use goods was relied on. However, the respondents contested that the question framed before the High Court was erroneous and therefore, the matter should be decided afresh.

Held:
No right, title, interest or any similar right was created in favour of telecom operator and it was the responsibility of the petitioners to ensure that the passive infrastructure was functioning efficiently. The limited access made available to telecom operators was inconsistent with the notion of “right to use” and it was only a permissive use for very limited purposes with very limited and strictly regulated access. The substance of the decision of the Karnataka High Court was thus followed.

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2014 (35) STR 433 (Chhattisgarh) Hotel East Park vs. Union of India

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Whether VAT is leviable on service portion, in sale of food and drinks, which is considered to be value of services under service, tax law? Held, No.

Facts:
The points for determination in the writ petition were whether any service tax could be charged on sale of an item or vice-versa and whether under Article 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution of India, service is subsumed in sale of food and drink. Further, whether section 66E(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 was violative of Article 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution of India?

Held:
Relying on the decision of T. N. Kalyan Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India & Others 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC), it was observed that section 66E(i) read with section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, only charges service tax on service portion and not on sales portion and was held intra vires the Constitution. Article 366(29A)(f) separates sale and service portion and the valuation should be done as per Rule 2C of the Service tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. Generally, service tax is charged on presumptive basis i.e. on 40% or 60% of the bill value. However, VAT is charged on total bill value. VAT shall not be charged over the amount determined as service portion and the which can be agitated before the State VAT authorities. VAT authorities were directed to issue necessary directions.

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2014 (35) STR 257 (Allahabad) Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCEx. & ST

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Whether Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued under 73(1)(a) of erstwhile provision for a reason of failure to disclose all material facts was valid when SCN was issued on the basis of details gathered from earlier two notices on same issue for the same period? Held, No

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in handling operations (cutting/bending iron & steel products and transportation) for TISCO from 1998 onwards and were under a belief that service tax was not applicable on the said activity. However, due to persuasion of the authority, they obtained service tax registration under C & F agent, filed returns and paid service tax on remuneration under protest. Further two notices were received for the period 1999 onwards which were duly complied with. Subsequently, a third Notice was issued u/s. 73(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 demanding service tax and penalties for the same period. Apart from submitting the details, validity of Show Cause Notice was challenged. The Commissioner confirmed the demand and penalties. On appeal, the Tribunal, also upheld tax and also the penalty.

Held:
For invoking section 73(1)(a) of the Act, there must exist material to form the belief as to failure to disclose true and full material facts. On perusal of Show Cause Notice, it was observed that material available on record was used to infer the escaped assessment. No case was made for non-disclosure of primary facts relating to transactions and hence invocation of section 73(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 was held illegal.

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 232 (Gujarat) – Cema Electric Lighting Products India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

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Whether assesse is entitled to the CENVAT Credit in respect of catering services received when consideration is recovered from the beneficiaries/assessee’s own employees? Held, No

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer availed CENVAT Credit of entire payment made to the canteen contractor even though the amount is recovered from its employees/ beneficiaries of canteen service. The demand was confirmed under Rule 14 of the CCR in respect of the amount recovered. Both Appellate authorities confirmed the demand.

Held:
The appellant is not entitled for CENVAT Credit if the amount is recovered from the beneficiaries/its own employees while running the canteen. Further, it was held that concurrent finding of facts by both the authorities below, that full details were not furnished and entire amount was recovered, justifies the invocation of extended period of limitation

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 79 (Allahabad) Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax vs. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd.

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Whether in the light of the principle of unjust enrichment recipient of service can claim refund u/s. 11B of Central Excise Act if ultimate burden of service tax liability has been borne by him? Held, Yes

Facts:
An assessee, a service recipient, received services of transport of natural gas from M/s. RGTIL falling under “Transport of Goods other than Water through Pipeline or other Conduit Services.” Transmission charges payable are fixed by a regulatory body. Invoices are raised on the basis of the provisional rates notified. Later, the tariff was approved with retrospective effect resulting into a downward revision. The adjudicating authority allowed refund claim of the assessee for the proportionate excess service tax remitted by RGTIL and borne by him. Appellate authority reversed this order in appeal filed by the Revenue on the ground that claim was filed by the service receiver and that the expression “any person” in section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 did not include the service receiver. The Tribunal allowed the refund. The Revenue raised two additional contentions before the High Court namely limitation for applying refund and principle of unjust enrichment.

Held:
The Additional issues raised were not accepted on the ground that they were not raised before and the observations of adjudicating authority allowing refund go in favour of assessee. The High Court relying on the decision of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India 1997 (89) ELT 247 held that the assessee is entitled to claim a refund of excess service tax paid.

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2014 48 taxmann.com 39 (Madras) Core Minerals vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Pre-deposit – Whether Rule 3 of Service Tax
(Determination of Valuation Rules) 2006 (“Valuation Rules”) is
attracted, when monetary consideration for service is specified in the
agreement and department has alleged suppression of value without
following procedure in Rule 4 of Valuation Rules? Held, No.

Facts:
The
appellant had entered into two agreements with the persons holding
mining licenses, one for providing mining services and the other for
purchasing the goods (i.e. extracted minerals) exclusively by the
appellant from the license holders. Department resorting to Rule 3(b) of
the valuation rules included certain expenses from the Profit and Loss
A/c such as “Over Burden Removal; Raising and Stacking Charges; Hire
Charges; Mining Expenses, Screening Charges; Sampling and Analysis;
Power and Fuel; Wages; Maintenance, etc.” in the value of taxable
services. Appellant contended before the Tribunal but did not succeed
and appealed before the High Court.

Held:
When there
are two agreements independent of one another, and a specific amount is
charged by the service provider under the agreement, that agreement has
to be tested on its own merits in terms of section 67(1)(i) of the
Finance Act, 1994 and invoking Rule 3(b) of the Valuation Rules, may not
be justified. Further, Rule 3(b) comes into play only when Rule 3(a) of
the Valuation Rules fails, and prima facie, there is no cogent reason
shown in the adjudication order as to how Rule 3 of the Valuation Rules
is applicable when there is a specific agreement. In this context,
Tribunal observed that, no provision under the Act or the Valuation
Rules, 2006 calls upon the assessee to prove the cost of services in any
manner and that the Revenue has also not followed the procedure
prescribed under Rule 4 of the Valuation Rules. It reduced the amount of
pre-deposit setting aside the order of the Tribunal

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 235 (Allahabad) Touraids (I) Travel Services vs. Commissioner of Central Excise.

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Whether the amendment in definition of “Tour Operator” u/s. 65(115) by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, enlarging its scope to include other supplementary services like ‘planning’, ‘scheduling’ etc. is only clarificatory and hence includible in value of taxable services provided prior to 10-09-2004 also? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The Assessee, a tour operator, entered into a contract with various Principal Tour Operators (‘PTO’), for providing transportation services by tourist vehicle and paid service tax only on transportation charges received by claiming an exemption up to 60% of the gross amount charged vide Notification No. 39/97-ST for providing package tour. No service tax was paid on the supplementary services provided of Air and Railway Ticket booking, food and lodging, guide services etc. contending that these were incurred on behalf of the PTOs for which reimbursement was made on actual basis and that the definition of “Tour operator” including such services was amended with effect from 10-09-2004. The Tribunal upheld the levy of service tax holding that treating entire tour contract as a package proves that he was fully aware that in a package tour, supplementary services are also included. Hence, this appeal was filed.

Held:
From a combined reading of definitions of “taxable service” in 65(105)(n) and “tour operator” u/s. 65(115), it is clear that the former definition is wide and includes all the services rendered relating to tour. While determining the scope of taxable service, it was held that, the phrase “in relation to” the tour means “in the aid of tour” also. Circular No. F.B.43/10/97-TRU, dated 22-08-1997 also clarifies that the value shall be the gross amount charged for services in relation to a tour and includes any supplementary services provided in relation thereto. The said clarification was reiterated by the Board in the years 2001 and 2007. The High Court therefore held that, the amendment in the definition is only clarificatory.

Further, since u/s. 67 the reimbursement does not fall within the purview of exclusion clauses, being a part of the gross amount, they are to be treated as value of taxable service.

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 227 (Delhi) Travelite (India) vs. Union of India

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Whether Rule 5A(2) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 is ultra-vires section 94 as the only type of audit contemplated under Finance Act is under section 72A i.e. special audit? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The appellant challenged the letter of Commissioner seeking records for scrutiny by audit party under Rule 5A (2) of the Service Tax Rules 1994 and the validity of the said Rule as well as the CBEC instruction No. F. No. 137/26/2007-CX.4 dated 01-01-2008. Department contended that the rule authorising audit was made pursuant to power conferred u/s. 94 of the Finance Act, 1994 and not u/s. 72A. It was contended that the Rule must conform to the statute under which it was framed and must be within the rule making power of the authority and that Instructions/Circulars cannot widen the scope of law.

Held:
The provisions related to scrutiny and audit of the assessee are provided only in section 72A of Finance Act, 1994 which envisages audit of assessee’s records under special circumstances, the High Court considered Rule 5A(2) as an attempt to include provision for such a general audit through back-door is ultra-vires the rule making power conferred u/s. 94(1) and hence, struck the same down. Consequently, any notice, circular, guideline etc. contrary to statutory laws issued under Rule 5A is also held unenforceable. For this proposition, the High Court relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh vs. Honourable Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council [2004] 8 SCC 747 elucidating concept of delegated legislation.

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Representation regarding removal of difficulties in ITR-6 faced by Foreign Companies

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To

19th September 2014
The Chairman,
Central Board of Direct Taxes,
North Block,
New Delhi – 110 001.

The Director General of Income Tax (Systems)
A R A Center, E-2, Ground Floor,
Jhandewalan Ext.,
New Delhi – 110 055.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (CPC)
Centralized Processing Centre,
Post bag No. 2, Electronic City Post,
Bangalore – 560 100.

Dear Sirs,

Subject: Representation regarding removal of difficulties in
ITR-6 faced by Foreign Companies

This
is in reference to Form ITR-6 applicable for Income-tax assessment year
2014-15 in case of corporate assessees notified vide Notification No.
28/2014 [F.NO.142/2/2014- TPL]/SO 1418(E), dated 30-5-2014. It has been
pointed out to us that the following difficulties are being faced by
Foreign Companies and request your urgent action to redress the same.

1. Bank Account and IFSC Code
1.1 In Form ITR-6, in Part B – TTI – Computation of Tax liability on Total Income – Refund, it is mandatory to enter Bank Account no., IFSC Code & Type of account, in all cases, without which xml file cannot be generated and the ITR-6 cannot be uploaded.

1.2
While in case of residents, one can appreciate the introduction of
mandatory requirement to give aforesaid information, in case of many
foreign companies it is creating various practical difficulties.

1.3
As you are aware that under the relevant provisions of the Foreign
Direct Investment [FDI] Scheme of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
[FEMA] and relevant regulations, a non-resident is required to bring in
funds in India through normal banking channels. There is no need or
requirement of any non-resident to have a bank account in India.
Dividends and other income on the FDI investment is directly paid in
foreign exchange to their bank accounts in the home countries. Even at
the time of disposal of the investments in the Indian companies, the
sale proceeds are directly repatriable to their bank accounts aboard.

1.4
Large number of foreign companies may not have regular operations in
India. Many of them may have hardly any operations in India. Such
foreign companies will not have bank account in India as commercially
and/or legally there is no need to have bank account in India. Such
foreign companies may also be required to furnish their Return of Income
in India u/s 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] and in view of
the abovementioned procedural requirement of mandatorily mentioning the
bank account no. and IFSC Code in ITR-6, they are not in a position to
fulfil their statutory obligation of furnishing Return of Income, for
want of bank account in India.

1.5 T he same issue was also
faced last year and upon representation a solution was provided whereby
the Foreign Companies who do not have a bank account in India were
permitted to put 9 times 9 in the bank account field and NNNN0NNNNNN in
the IFSC code.

1.6 In view of above, you are requested to continue to provide the same solution for AY 2014-15 and going forward as well.

2. Surcharge and education cess on income chargeable to tax at Special Rates under the DTAA

2.1
I n cases where foreign companies offer any income to tax in India at
the rates specified under the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreement [DTAA], the position is reasonably settled that the surcharge
and education cess is not applicable in such cases. In fact, many DTAAs
specifically include surcharge in Article 2, which generally deals with
Taxes Covered. For example, India’s DTAA with USA, UK, Japan and
Singapore etc.

Further, the education cess, being additional
surcharge also has the same impact. Even if by any chance, the revenue
wants to take any contrary stand in this respect, the assessee cannot be
prevented from adopting the above position.

2.2 U nfortunately,
for AY 2014-15 in the ITR-6 utility, in para 2(d) and 2(e) of Part B –
TTI relating to Tax Payable on Total Income, surcharge and education
cess is automatically calculated on such income and these fields are not
editable. This is rectly tantamount to automatic enforcement of the
view contrary to the one which the foreign company holds in these
matters. If such a procedure in ITR-6 is allowed to continue, then in
every such case, the Return of Income would show unpaid balance tax
payable to the extent of the automatic levy of the surcharge and the
education cess, which the assessee claims as not leviable.

Therefore,
this would involve unnecessary and avoidable implication of non-payment
of selfassessment tax which is factually not payable as per the claim
of the assessee. Such an incorrect position should not be created
through the above procedure of ITR-6.

2.3 In view of the above,
we request you to kindly take necessary immediate action to remedy the
situation so as to enable such foreign companies to furnish their
returns of income before the expiry of due date and to discharge their
statutory obligation.

2.4 I t is, therefore, strongly suggested
that where income is taxable under DTAA , surcharge/education cess
should not be automatically calculated in ITR 6. Alternatively, such
filed should be made editable in the ITR 6 utility.

Your early
action in redressing above difficulties shall be highly appreciated and
will immensely help the foreign companies to smoothly file their returns
in time.

Thanking you.

Bombay Chartered Accountants ‘ Society

Nitin P. Shingala                            Kishor B. Karia                                          Sanjeev Pandit
President                                       Chairman                                                   Co-Chairman
                                                     Taxation Committee

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Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Delhi `B’ Bench Before H. S. Sidhu (AM) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 3212/Del/2014 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 5th September, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Satpal Singh / Sanjeev Kapoor

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S/s. 79, 271(1)(c) – Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not leviable in a case where claim to carry forward capital loss was denied due to change in majority shareholding.

Facts:
For assessment year 2007-08 the Assessing Officer (AO) in an order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act assessed the returned income to be the total income. However, the claim of carry forward of loss of Rs. 23,09,722 was denied on the ground that there was a change in majority shareholding of the assessee and therefore by virtue of section 79 the said loss cannot be carried forward.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. The assessee after receiving the order of CIT(A) did not carry forward the capital loss of Rs. 23,90,722 in its return of income for AY 2012-13. The AO levied a penalty of Rs. 8,05,000 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the carry forward of long term capital loss of AY 2005-06 and 2006-07 had been duly accepted as correct as per returns filed and assessment orders passed by the AO in the relevant years. In the AY 2006-07, the AO specifically mentioned that carry forward of long term capital loss is allowed.

The Tribunal also noted that in the assessment order of AY 2007-08 there was no mention that the assessee had furnished any inaccurate particulars of income or had made any wrong claim of carry forward of long term capital loss. The disallowance of carry forward of long term capital loss was on technical ground and not on account of any concealment of any particulars of income. The Tribunal noted that section 271(1)(c) postulates imposition of penalty for furnishing of inaccurate particulars and concealment of income. It observed that the conduct of the assessee cannot be said to be contumacious so as to warrant levy of penalty. The Tribunal held that the levy of penalty was not justified. It set aside the orders of the authorities below and deleted the levy of penalty.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Branch transfer vis-à-vis dispatch against estimated demand

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Introduction
In the last issue of BCAJ, the issues arising in relation to branch transfer vis-à-vis estimated demand from the customer (also referred to as standing order) was discussed. The judgment of Hon. Tribunal in case of Ina Bearing India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (VAT APPEAL No.20 of 2010, dated 25/2/2014) was analyzed.

In continuation of that discussion we now analyse a judgment on similar issue by the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority (CSTAA). The said authority has analysed legal position in detail and has given observations which will be useful in deciding correct nature of branch transfer vis-à-vis interstate sale.

Judgment in case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (72 VST 1)(CSTAA-New Delhi).

The facts leading to the litigation as narrated by the CSTAA are as under:

“The appellant, a Central Government public sector undertaking, was engaged in the business of refining, distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum products. In pursuit of its obligation to maintain uninterrupted supply of petroleum products, storage points were set up across the country to cater to the needs of various markets/ consumers including general public. The appellant made supplies of aviation turbine fuel to the Air Force and the Army at various locations outside the State under contract for supply by first branch transferring aviation turbine fuel to its bulk petroleum installations, which were large storage facilities at Air Force stations and then making supplies to aircrafts on demand by designated officers. The assessing officer rejected the claim of stock transfer by the appellant. By an assessment order passed pursuant to an order of remand in appeal, the claim of stock transfer of aviation turbine fuel was allowed in respect of sale to private airlines at the receiving locations and rejected in respect of sale to the Air Force and the Army. An appeal against this assessment order was dismissed as not maintainable. An appeal before the Tribunal was dismissed by a majority of two Members, out of the three Members’ Bench. The minority view was that the levy of Central Sales Tax in respect of supplies to the Air Force at various locations outside State was bad in law but the majority held that the levy was correct. On appeal, to the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority, by the appellant contending that the supply order was only confined to quality and pricing of the product and there was no obligation upon the Air Force to purchase any particular quantity of the product from the appellant-corporation as the supply was only to be made on a requirement placed by designated officers and the payment was only to be made for such supply:”

Thus, there was dispatch of goods for meeting requirement of customer and there was over all contract about rate and quality etc. However, there was no obligation on the buyer to purchase particular quantity. The buyer used to purchase as per his requirement from time to time. Under such circumstances the learned CSTAA observed that contract is in the nature of standing order.

After reproducing section 3 of the CST Act, the learned CSTAA has observed as under;

“A perusal of the provisions, extracted above, shows that it raises a presumption of law and that is—a sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, if the sale or purchase . . . (a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another, or (b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another. For purposes of clause (b) of section 3, Explanation I says that where goods are delivered to a carrier or other bailee for transmission, the movement of the goods shall be deemed to commence at the time of such delivery and terminate at the time when delivery is taken from such carrier or bailee.

Explanation 2 deals with a situation where the movement of goods commences in one State and terminates in the same State but in the course of movement it passes through another State, and enjoins that it should not be treated as a movement of goods from one State to another State.

It would also be relevant to note section 6A of the Act. It provides that if any dealer claims that he is not liable to pay tax under the Act in respect of any goods, on the ground that the movement of such goods from one State to another was occasioned by reason of transfer of such goods by him to any other place of his business or to his agent or principal, and not by reason of sale, then the burden of proving that the movement of goods was so occasioned shall be on the dealer. It also provides the mode of discharge of that burden of proof. To discharge the burden the dealer has to furnish to the assessing authority, within the prescribed time, a declaration duly filled and signed by the principal officer of the other place of business, for his agent or principal, containing the prescribed particulars in the prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority, along with the evidence of dispatch of such goods. On production of such a declaration, if the assessing authority is satisfied, after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary, that the particulars contained in the declaration furnished by the dealer are true, he is authorized, either at the time of, or at any time before, the assessment of the tax payable by the dealer under the Act, to make an order to that effect and on his so doing, the movement of the goods, to which the declaration relates, shall be deemed for the purpose of the Act to have been occasioned otherwise than as a result of sale.”

After, observing as above learned CSTAA stated the General principles about branch transfer and interstate sale in following words;

“General principles for determining any transaction, as “inter-State” sale are as follows:

(1) That an inter-State sale takes place when there is movement of goods from one State to another.

(2) That such inter-State movement must be the result of a covenant, express or implied in the contract of sale or as an incident of the contract.

(3) That such a covenant need not be specified in the contract itself, and it would be enough if the movement was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract of sale.

(4) That there should be a conceivable link between a contract of sale and the movement of goods from one State to another.

Following factors are necessary to constitute a branchtransfer:

(i) The branch office looks to and estimates the bulk requirements of the area falling in its circle.
(ii) It requires the head office/terminal to supply to it such estimated bulk quantities.
(iii) The head office/terminal sends the quantity accordingly from time to time to meet out the said requirement of its branch office.
(iv)The appropriation of goods to customers takes places in the branch office only.
(v) The branch office has always a choice to supply/sell goods in the branch which means that it has the option of diversion of goods.
(vi)The movement of goods in case of “branch transfers” is from head office/terminal to the branch office and there is no appropriation of goods to a particular customer at the time of such movement from head office.”

Thus, certain principles are now available to distinguish between branch transfer and interstate sale. We hope that it will be useful for future guidance.

Conclusion

Thus,   though 
 the 
 issue   about   branch   transfer   and
interstate sale largely depends
upon facts of each case, the above guidelines will
certainly help in determining the
nature of transaction. the overall
legal position appears
is
that though dispatch may be in relation to demand from customer, if there is no obligation on the buyer
to purchase particular
quantity and the actual ascertainment of the goods to be sold
and delivered is done at the branch,
then there will be branch transfer
and not interstate sale.

 

The judgment of the Hon. Tribunal cited above is required
to be seen in the light of the above judgment of the   Hon. CSTAA.

ACIT vs. GMS Motors Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Delhi `C’ Bench Before R. S. Syal (AM) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 3530/Del/2012 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 6th August, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Satpal Singh / Sanjeev Kapoor

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S/s. 3, 28 – In a case where premises are taken on rent, manpower was hired, registration under MVAT and CST was obtained and deposit was paid to company whose vehicles were to be sold and sales of some spare parts had been sold, it cannot be said that the business of sales-cum-service centre has not been set up merely because sale of cars has not taken place.

Facts:
The assessee was to commence a business of sale-cumservice centre. During the previous year it took the premises on rent, hired man power who were paid salaries by cheque, obtained registration required under Maharashtra VAT Act, 2002 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and also deposited certain amount with Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., whose vehicles were to be sold by the assessee. The assessee had also sold some spare parts.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed expenses aggregating to Rs. 56,80,117 incurred towards financial charges and staff administrative charges on the ground that the sale of cars had not taken place during the previous year and therefore the business was not set up and hence deduction of expenses was not permissible.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the term `previous year’ as defined in s. 3 has a relationship with setting up of the business and not with the commencement of the business. It noted that the Apex Court has in the case of CIT vs. Ramaraju Surgical Cotton Mills Ltd. (63 ITR 478)(SC) has held that the business is set up when it is ready to discharge the functions for which it is being set up and the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (356 ITR 354)(Del) has held that business commences on doing first activity like purchase of raw materials, etc.

Considering the ambit of the term `setting up of the business’ in the light of the above mentioned judicial pronouncements the Tribunal held that any income arising after the date of setting up of the business is chargeable to tax and, similarly, any expenditure incurred after the setting up of the business is deductible subject to other relevant provisions. The activities carried out by the assessee, amply demonstrate that the business was set up though sale of vehicles did not take place during the year. The Tribunal noted that it was not the case of the AO that the expenses were non-genuine or capital in nature. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Practical insights into accounting for certain revenue arrangements

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The revenue recognition principles as discussed under Ind AS provide elaborate guidance on various types of arrangements that may be applicable to select class of companies or to most companies in general. In this article, we focus on the guidance provided under appendix B (Customer Loyalty Programmes) and C (Transfer of Assets from Customers) to Ind AS 18 on Revenue, sharing our perspectives on the accounting for the said arrangements.

Customer loyalty programmes

Customer loyalty programmes, comprising loyalty points or ‘award credits’, are offered by a diverse range of businesses, such as supermarkets, retailers, airlines, telecommunication operators, credit card providers and hotels. Award credits may be linked to individual purchases or groups of purchases, or to continued custom over a specified period. The customer can redeem the award credits for free or discounted goods or services.

The structure of loyalty programmes offered by sellers varies, but in general they can be classified into one of the following schemes:

  • Award credits earned can be redeemed only for goods and services provided by the issuing entity.
  • Award credits earned can be redeemed for goods and services provided either by the issuing entity or by other entities that participate in the loyalty programme.

For a programme to be accounted as a customer loyalty programme, it needs to contain two essential features:

  • the entity (seller) grants award credits to a customer as part of a sales transaction; and
  • subject to meeting any other conditions, the customer can redeem the award credits for free or discounted goods or services in the future.

For instance, a customer receives a complimentary product with every fifth product bought from the entity (seller). As the customer purchases each of the first five products, they are earning the right to receive a free good in the future, i.e., each sales transaction earns the customer credits that go towards free goods in the future.

However, it may be noted that not all types of programmes that provide free or discounted goods are accounted as customer loyalty programmes. For instance, say a purchase of membership of a club entitles a member to purchase certain goods or services at a discounted price. In such case, the substance of such membership needs to be evaluated closely. It may seem that the purchase of membership may not be a separate transaction and the amount received by the club may be against purchase of those discounts themselves.

Accounting for customer loyalty programmes
Deferral of revenue
Under Ind AS, the award credits (i.e., air miles, credit card points, etc.) under customer loyalty programmes are not recognised as sales promotion or any other expense. Instead, they are recognised as a separate component within a multiple element revenue arrangement. As such, the revenue under the sales arrangement is allocated to one or more elements, including the award credit. At the inception of the arrangement, the revenue attributable to the award credit is deferred and is recognised as and when the award credits are redeemed by the customer. The revenue attributed to the award credits takes into account the expected levels of redemption.

Allocation of revenue to award credits
Ind AS requires that the consideration received or receivable from the customer is allocated between the current sales transaction and the award credits by reference to fair values. The Ind ASs do not prescribe a particular allocation method. However, the following two methods provided under IFRS may also be applied under Ind ASs:

  • relative fair values; or
  • fair value of the award credits (residual or fair value method).

Using relative fair values, the total consideration is allocated to the different components based on the ratio of the fair values of the components relative to each other. For instance, assume a transaction comprises two components, X and Y. If the fair value of component X is 100 and of component Y is 50, then two-thirds of the total consideration would be allocated to component X. If the total consideration is 120, then revenue of 80 would be allocated to component X and 40 to Y.

Using the residual method, the undelivered components are measured at fair value, and the remainder of the consideration is allocated to the delivered component. For example, assume a transaction consists of two components, X and Y; at the reporting date only component X has been delivered. If the fair value of component Y is 50 and the total consideration is 120, then revenue of 70 would be allocated to component X and 50 to Y.

In estimating fair value, the entity (seller) takes into account:

  • the amount of the discounts or incentives that would otherwise be offered to customers who have not earned award credits from an initial sale; and
  • the proportion of award credits expected not to be redeemed, i.e., expected forfeitures.

Other estimation techniques may be available. For example, if an entity (seller) pays a third party to supply the awards, then the fair value of the award credit could be estimated by reference to the amount that the entity pays plus a reasonable profit margin. However, judgment is required to select and apply the estimation technique that is most appropriate in the circumstances.

Accounting for revenue related to award credit The revenue attributable to the award credit (that was deferred at inception) shall be recognised as such in the income statement as and when the awards are redeemed.

Any subsequent change in the estimates of awards expected to be redeemed are trued up for differences between the number of awards expected to be redeemed and the actual number of awards redeemed; the amount of revenue deferred at the time of the original sale is not recalculated.

Steps involved in accounting for customer loyalty programmes
Having discussed the principles of revenue recognition relating to the customer loyalty programmes, the following are the broad steps involved in accounting for the same:
1. Understand the various customer loyalty programmes in effect.

2. Identify the deliverables in the different programmes. Along with the principal goods, the deliverables could be supply of own goods free of cost or at a discounted price in future, supply of promotional gifts based on the level of purchases made by the customer, gift coupons which can be redeemed as a discount on future purchases, award credits, etc.
3. Identify the fair value of the goods sold and the award credit. The fair value of the award credit to be determined based on expected level of redemption, after considering the market price of the award and the amount of the discounts or incentives that would otherwise be offered to customers who have not earned award credits from an initial sale.
4. The appropriate method of allocation of consideration to award credit needs to be chosen. There are mainly two methods to allocate values to the components of a multiple deliverable arrangement: — Relative fair value method — Fair value of the undelivered component.
5. Once the value of the deliverables has been assigned as above, the management then needs to recognise revenue for the delivered goods at its fair value allocated as above and defer revenue equivalent to the allocated fair value of the award credit.
6. Once the fair value allocation is determined as above, the consideration allocated to sale of goods is not subsequently re-assessed based on change in estimates of forfeiture rate. The change in estimates of forfeiture rate only affects the pattern of recognition of revenue relating to the award credits.
7.    For the undelivered item (i.e., the award credit) the revenue would have to be deferred till the date of actual redemption. On redemption, the revenue attributable to the award credits is recognised.

Let us understand the above principles with the help of an example:

Company X runs a loyalty scheme rewarding a customer’s spend at its stores. Under this scheme, customers are granted 10 loyalty points (or award credits) for every 100 spent in X’s store. Customers can redeem their points for a discount in the price of a new product in X’s stores. The loyalty points are valid for five years and 50 points entitle a customer to a discount of 50 on the retail price of the product in X’s store.

During 2011, X has sales of 500,000 and grants 50,000 loyalty points to its customers. Based on the expectation that only 40,000 loyalty points will be redeemed, management estimates the fair value of each loyalty point granted to be 0.80. During 2011, 15,000 points were redeemed in exchange for new products, and at the end of the reporting period management still expected a total of 40,000 points to be redeemed, i.e., a further 25,000 points will be redeemed.

X records the following entries in 2011 in relation to the loyalty points granted in 2011:

Particulars

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

 

Bank

Dr.

500,000

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

 

460,000

 

 

 

 

To Deferred Revenue

 

 

40,000

(50,000*0.8)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue recognised in relation to sale of goods and deferred
revenue for loyalty points)

At the end of the reporting period, the balance of the deferred revenue is 25,000 [(25,000/40,000) x 40,000]. Therefore, the difference in the deferred revenue balance is recognised as revenue for the year.

Particulars

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

 

Deferred revenue

Dr.

15,000

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

 

15,000

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue recognised in relation to 15,000 loyalty points
redeemed in 2011)

During 2012, 17,500 points are redeemed, and at the end of the year management expects a total of 42,500 points to be redeemed, i.e., an increase of 2,500 over the original estimate. The fair value of each award credit does not change, but the redemption rate is revised based on the new total expected redemptions. At the end of the year, the balance of deferred revenue for 10,000 loyalty points (i.e., 42,500 — 15,000 — 17,500) is 9,412 [(10,000/42,500) x 40,000]. X records the following entry in 2012 in relation to the loyalty points granted in 2011:

Particulars

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

 

Deferred revenue

Dr.

15,588

 

(25,000 – 9,412)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

 

15,588

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue
recognised in relation to loyalty points redeemed in 2012)


Alternatively, on a cumulative basis 30,588 has been released, which can be calculated as (32,500/ 42,500) x 40,000.

Transfer of assets from customers

Ind AS 18 provides guidance on transfers of property, plant and equipment (or cash to acquire it) for entities that receive such assets from their customers in return for a network connection and/or an ongoing supply of goods or services. As such, the principles contained hereunder do not apply to gratuitous transfers of assets i.e., transfer of assets without consideration. Further, the guidance also cannot be applied to transfers that are in the nature of government grants or those covered under the service concession arrangements.

Concept of control

When the Company receives an item of property, plant and equipment from the customer, it will have to assess if the transferred item meets the definition of the asset from the Company’s perspective. An asset is defined as “an asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity”.

It is important to note that in determining whether an asset exists, the right of ownership is not essential. Therefore, if the customer continues to control the transferred item, the asset definition would not be met despite a transfer of ownership. Hence, the Company must analyse if it has obtained the control of the transferred asset to recognise the same in its books.

Control would imply right to utilise the transferred asset the way Company deems fit. For example, the Company can exchange that asset for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners.

As part of the arrangement for transfer of asset from the customer, the arrangement may require that the Company must use the transferred item of property, plant and equipment to provide one or more service to the customer. However, if the Company has the ability to decide how the transferred item of property, plant and equipment is operated and maintained and when it is replaced, it can be concluded that the Company controls the transferred item of property, plant and equipment.

If based on the above principles, it is concluded that the company has obtained control over the asset transferred by the customer, the company shall recognise (debit) the transferred asset as its own asset (though it may not have the ownership). The corresponding impact of the transfer shall be recognised as either revenue or deferred revenue, depending upon the obligations assumed by the company in lieu of the transferred asset.

Timing of revenue recognition
In determining the timing of revenue recognition, the entity (recipient) considers:

  •    what performance obligations it has as a result of receiving the customer contribution;

  •     whether these performance obligations should be separated for revenue recognition purposes; and

  •     when revenue related to each separately identifiable performance obligation should be recognised.

Comprehensive guidance on how to determine the entity’s performance obligations is not provided under the appendix C. In practice it may be difficult to determine whether the entity only has to connect the customer to a network, or it has to provide ongoing access to a supply of goods and services, or both.

All relevant facts and circumstances should be evaluated when determining whether additional performance obligations arise from the transfer including:

  •     whether or not the customer providing the contribution is charged the same fee for the supply of goods or services as is charged to other customers that are not required to make such customer contributions;

  •     whether customers have the ability to change the supplier of goods or services at their discretion; and

  •    whether a successor customer needs to pay a connection fee when the customer that made the customer contribution discontinues the service, and if so, the amount of such connection fee relative to the fair value of the asset contributed.

In our view, in determining whether a rate charged to a customer includes a discount, the entity should compare rates for ongoing services charged to customers that make a contribution with the rates charged to customers that do not.

If it is determined that some or all of the revenue arising from the customer contribution relates to the ongoing supply of goods or services, then the revenue is recognised as those services are delivered. Typically, such revenue is recognised over the term specified in the agreement with the customer. If, however, no such term is specified, then the period of revenue recognition is limited to the useful life of the transferred asset.

Instead of property, plant and equipment, an entity may receive cash that must be used to construct or acquire an item of property, plant and equipment in order to connect the customer to a network and/or provide the customer with ongoing access to a supply of goods or services. The accounting for such cash contributions depends on whether the item of property, plant and equipment to be acquired or constructed is recognised as an asset of the entity on acquisition/completion.

  •     If the asset is not recognised by the entity, then the cash contribution is accounted for as proceeds for providing the asset to the customer under Ind AS 11 or Ind AS 18, as applicable.

  •     If the asset is recognised by the entity, then the asset is recognised and measured as it is constructed or acquired in accordance with Ind AS 16; the cash contribution is recognised as revenue following the guidance as stated above.

Steps involved in accounting for transfer of assets from customers
Having discussed the principles of revenue recognition relating to the transfer of assets from customers, the following are the broad steps involved in accounting for the same:
(1)    Analyse all the relevant agreements to identify arrangements covered within this guidance.

(2)    Assess whether the control over the transferred asset is obtain by the company. If the control is transferred to the company, the asset will be recognised in the Company’s balance sheet.

(3)    Determine the obligations assumed by Company in lieu of the transfer of control over the transferred asset.

(4)    If the above-mentioned obligations are in the nature of ongoing services, then revenue attributable to those obligations is deferred and recognised as the underlying services are rendered and obligations fulfilled.

(5)    To the extent the above-mentioned obligations are fulfilled at the inception of the contract, recognise appropriate revenue upfront.

(6)    Depreciate the acquired asset over its useful life.

Let us understand the above principles with the help of an example:

Company X has entered into an agreement with Company Y to outsource some of its manufacturing process. As part of the arrangement, Company X will transfer the ownership of its machinery to Company Y.

Based on a report submitted by independent valuer, the fair value of assets transferred is Rs. 90,000. Initially, Company Y must use the equipment to provide the service required by the outsourcing agreement. Company Y is responsible for maintaining the equipment and replacing it when it decides to do so. The useful life of the equipment is 3 years. The outsourcing agreement requires service to be provided for 3 years for a fixed price of Rs.10,000 per year which is lower than the price that Company Y would have charged if the equipment had not been transferred. In such case the fixed price would have been Rs.40,000 per annum.

Pursuant to a detailed analysis, Company Y determines that the control over the equipment is transferred in its favour. Hence, Company Y would have to initially recognise the asset at its fair value in accordance with Ind AS 16. Further, Company Y would also have to recognise the revenue over the period of the services performed i.e., over 3 years.

Company Y shall recognise the following journal entries to recognise the transactions under the arrangement:

Particulars

 

Yr
1

Yr
2

Yr
3

 

 

 

 

 

Asset

Dr.

90,000

15,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Deferred

 

90,000

 

15,000

Revenue (Being transfer of

 

 

 

assets from customer)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bank

Dr.

10,000

10,000

10,000

 

 

 

 

 

Deferred Revenue

Dr.

30,000

30,000

30,000

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

40,000

40,000

40,000

(Being revenue recognised

 

 

 

under the arrangement)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Depreciation

Dr.

30,000

30,000

30,000

 

 

 

 

 

To acc. depreciation

 

30,000

30,000

30,000

(Being assets transferred

 

 

 

from customer depreciated

 

 

 

over its useful life)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary
Overall, the implementation of the above guidance on customer loyalty programmes and transfer of assets from customers will require significant judgment in several respects while preparing the entity’s financial statements.

After education, a health surcharge ?

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You may soon have to pay more tax since the government is considering a proposal to levy a surcharge to fund its ambitious plan of providing free healthcare to every citizen in the country.

The Planning Commission’s expert panel that has recommended a levy on universal health coverage has turned down the proposal for a securities transaction tax, and has instead voted for a health surcharge on taxable income to fund the scheme.

The move, it said, would complement the government’s budgetary allocation and also ‘obviate the need for user charges on the rich’.

Cess Pool
(1) Govt. collects Rs.27,500 cr via education cess.
(2) Another Rs.17,700 cr collected by cess goes for construction and maintenance of high ways.
(3) Over Rs.15,000 cr collected as surcharge on corporation, income tax.
(4) Other cesses and surcharges levied by the Centre include those on tobacco, pan masala, salt, among others.
(5) All cesses and surcharges add up to Rs.79,000 cr or 8.5% of total revenues.
(6) They are used for various purposes — from funding calamity relief and contingencies to clean energy.
(7) Govt. had levied cess to fund Kargil war, meet spending needs post Gujarat quake. Both cesses have lapsed. (Source : The Times of India, dated 16-8-2011)

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Non-advocates can appear in consumer cases

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The Supreme Court has ruled that non-lawyers can represent, appear and argue cases filed under the Consumer Protection Act before consumer district forums and commissions.

The Supreme Court passed the directive while dismissing an eight year-old appeal filed by the Bar Council of India against a 2002 Bombay High Court judgment that permitted agents to represent consumers. The Supreme Court Bench of Justice Dalveer Bhandari, Justice R. Mukundakam Sharma and Justice Anil Dave on Monday, however, said special guidelines were needed and accordingly, it directed the National Consumer Commission to ‘frame rules within three months’ to regulate the eligibility, ethics and conduct of non-legal representatives. Agents can be friends or relatives but they cannot accept any remuneration and must display competence.

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UK inks deal to tax cash stashed in secret Swiss bank accounts

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The Swiss government has agreed to tax black money held by UK citizens in Swiss bank accounts, for the first time, while still hiding their identity.

The deal could seen between £ 3 billion and £ 6 billion a year being handed to HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) by Swiss authorities.

The agreement is a part of the HMRC’s latest efforts to track down and tax money hidden in offshore accounts. It follows a similar deal agreed earlier this month between Germany and the Swiss authorities.

The UK citizens’ accounts in Swiss banks will be taxed at between 19% and 34% on the principal sum hidden, depending on how long the account has been running.

The Swiss agreed to make an initial down payment of 500 million Swiss francs (£ 387m) toward the tax liabilities of UK citizens with Swiss accounts.

From 2013, the account holders will also face an annual levy of between 27% and 48% on the income from their accounts, based on whether it has arisen as capital gains, dividends or interest. The UK authorities will also have the right to request the banking details of 500 UK individuals a year for further investigation.

UK citizens will only be able to avoid the new tax measures in Switzerland if they come forward and make a full disclosure of their finances there to HMRC.

(Source: The Times of India, dated 26-8-2011)

(Comment: Will India be able to prevail upon Switzerland to sign a similar deal ? Do we have the necessary political will?)

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25 companies in United States paid more to chief executives than taxman

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At least 25 top United States companies paid more to their chief executives in 2010 than they did to the federal government in taxes, according to a study released.

The companies which include household names like eBay, Boeing, General Electric and Verizon —averaged $ 1.9 billion each in profits, according to the study by the Institute for Policy Studies.

But a variety of shelters, loopholes and tax reduction strategies allowed the companies to average more than $ 400 million each in tax benefits —which can be taken as a refund or used as write-off against earnings in future years.

The authors of the study, which examined the regulatory filings of the 100 companies with the best-paid chief executives, said that their findings suggested that current United States policy was rewarding tax avoidance rather than innovation.

“We have no evidence that CEO’s are fashioning, with their executive leadership, more effective and efficient enterprises,” the study concluded. “On the other hand, ample evidence suggests that CEO’s and their corporations are expending considerably more energy on avoiding taxes than perhaps ever before at a time when the federal government desperately needs more revenue to maintain basic services for the American people.”

The study comes at a time when business leaders have been lobbying for a cut in corporate taxes and Congress and the Obama administration are considering an overhaul of the tax code to reduce the federal budget deficit.

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Foreign banks complain of ‘Imperialist’ US Tax Rule

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A U.S. law meant to snuff out billions of dollars in offshore tax evasion has drawn the criticism of the world’s banks and business people, who dismiss it as imperialist and “the neutron bomb of the global financial system”.

The unusually broad regulation, known as FATCA, or the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, makes the world’s financial institutions something of an extension of the tax-collecting Internal Revenue Service — something no other country does for its tax regime.

Conceived as a way to enlist the world in a crackdown on wealthy Americans evading tax, it gives global financial institutions and investment entities a choice: either collect and turn over data on U.S. clients with accounts of at least $ 50,000, or withhold 30% of the interest, dividend and investment payments due those clients and send the money to the IRS.

Foreign institutions and entities that refuse, or fail, to do so face bills for the taxes due, a draconian penalty of 40% of the amount in question and heightened scrutiny by the IRS.

The legislation that created FATCA was introduced in 2009 by four congressmen during a crackdown on: UBS, the Swiss bank giant that sold tax evasion services. Signed into law by U.S. President Barack Obama in March 2010, FATCA goes into effect on January 1, 2014, for most types of transactions and a year later for other payments.

(Source: www.cnbc.com 19-8-2011)
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Cry for Justices

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Attend to the shortage of judges at all levels on a war-footing.

The impending shortage of judges in the Supreme Court might grab headlines. But it is only the most visible aspect of a problem that ails our entire judicial system, right from the lowest to the highest level: the acute shortage of judges. So, come October, when seven of the judges of the Apex Court are due to retire, the Supreme Court will find itself functioning with less than 75% of its sanctioned strength. The position in High Courts all over the country is no better. According to news reports, with the exception of Himachal Pradesh, there is not a single High Court in the country that is functioning at full strength.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 7-9-2011)
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Indian varsities missing in top 200 global list

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The world’s second-fastest growing economy does not have an educational institute in the top 200 global list this year. The Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay — the only Indian varsity that found itself in the Top 200 Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) World University Rankings in 2010 at the number 187 spot — dropped 38 places to 225. Similarly, IIT Delhi fell to number 218 from 202 in 2010 and IIT Madras dropped to 281 from last year’s 262.

The remaining Indian universities featuring in the rankings, including IIT Kanpur, IIT Kharagpur, IIT Roorkee, IIT Guwahati, University of Delhi, University of Calcutta, University of Pune and University of Mumbai, did not find a place in the Top 300 World University Rankings.

Globally, while Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Oxford bettered their last year’s rankings from five and six to three and five, respectively, Yale University dropped one place from third to fourth rank.

In the Asia list, Japan was the best-represented nation, with five of the top 10 and 57 of the top 200 universities, ahead of China (40) and South Korea (35), Taiwan (16), India (11), Thailand (9), Indonesia (8), Malaysia (7) and Hong Kong (7). Despite its troubled economy, Japan’s universities continued to perform better, with Tokyo and Kyoto each moving up one place to fourth and seventh, respectively. In Singapore, National University of Singapore retained its place in the top three.

(Source: Business Standard, dated 7-9-2011)

(Comment: This is an eloquent testimony of falling standards of higher education in India and therefore the quality of output too. Mumbai University does not find any place at all !)

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Amnesty to tax evaders worries Transparency International

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Amnesty to tax evaders worries Transparency International with the government considering a plan to offer an amnesty scheme for voluntary disclosure of undisclosed bank accounts and assets held abroad, corruption watchdog Transparency International (TI) has expressed concerns about the amnesty to tax evaders. “Implicit in the proposal is acceptance that business corporate houses and individual businessmen have maintained secret bank accounts in foreign countries both by evading taxes and concealing the source of money, which could involve criminal and terrorist activities,” said P. S. Bawa, chair of Transparency International India. The watchdog said the earlier amnesty schemes were premised on the ground that business houses and individuals would learn a lesson, declare income, and pay taxes in future. But, it added, that this has apparently not happened and the hopes of the government have been belied. TI also believed that the present move confirmed the inappropriateness of such schemes that pardoned not only illegal activities and concealment of sources of income, but also evasion of taxes, all of which are punishable under the common and taxation laws. The body said the scheme encouraged tax evaders to continue such practice in the future. “Condoning such opaque activities that are against all norms of transparency, projects the image of the India as a reluctant, soft, and pliable State,” said the press release. TI reiterated that this would be a violation of the basic tenets of the Constitution that provides for rule of law and not executive orders that appear to be arbitrary and in violation of the fundamental right of equality before law.

(Source : www.business-standard.com)
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IS IT FAIR FOR THE BUREAUCRATS TO INDULGE IN WASTEFUL FORMALITIES?

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Introduction
All of us understand the importance of rules and procedures. However, unfortunately the bureaucrats fail to appreciate the very purpose of such rules and procedures. This is not to say that the rules may be bypassed or not complied with. Here is an instance as to how the approach of a government’s office defeats the very purpose of a prescribed formality.

The unfair instance
Recently an application was made to the Director, Software Technology Park of India (STPI), Navi Mumbai under the Right to Information Act, 2005 for obtaining certain information about their status under the Industrial (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951. A similar kind of confirmation was already given by STPI in three other cases. The present application was made since it was insisted upon by the tax authorities. This in itself is another problem.

Court fee stamps worth Rs.10 were affixed to the application
After about 15 days, a letter was received from STPI, New Delhi that the payment of fees by way of court fee stamp was not acceptable. They insisted on payment by cash/DD/postal order.

It was then verified from their website that the fee could be paid only by DD or by postal order. There is no mention of cash. The following questions immediately arise:

(a) they could have easily pointed out such deficiency (if at all it is so) at the time of accepting the application itself.

(b) There is no consistency between what is  written in the letter and what appears on the website — in respect of cash payment.

(c) Nobody seems to have calculated the value of time, paperwork, etc. wasted in this whole exercise.

(d) The amusing thing is that the bank charges for the DD of Rs.10 were Rs.30. Further, even the STPI authorities sent the same from New Delhi by speed-post, which was again a waste of money.

Incidental
On the same subject, in the context of section of 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, there is an Instruction no. 2/2009 of CBDT, dated March 09, 2009 that an approval granted by Director of Industries (STPI) if ratified by the Board of Approval (BOA) is valid. While clarifying this point, STPI office confirmed that the approval granted by them need not be ratified by BOA.

However, in the letter from STPI there was a typographical error. Instead of the word ‘ratified’ it was typed as ‘rectified’. The concerned CIT (Appeals) insisted on a separate confirmation from STPI regarding this obvious typographical error.

The wasteful aspect of this exercise is selfevident.

Conclusion
(1) The authorities should be made aware of the purpose and spirit of the rules.
(2) They should be trained to do a cost benefit of analysis.
(3) They should be made aware that their adamant attitude in waste of national resources.
(4) There should be clarity and consistency at all levels.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12, dated 15- 9-2011 —Savings Bank account maintained by residents in India — Joint holder — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits resident in India to include their non-resident close relative(s) (relatives as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) as joint holder(s) in their resident bank accounts on ‘former or survivor’ basis. However, such nonresident Indian close relatives are not permitted to operate the said bank accounts during the life-time of the resident account holder.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11, dated 7-9- 2011 — External Commercial Borrowings — Simplification of Procedure.

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Presently, RBI approval is required for change of lender for existing External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

This Circular has delegated the powers for approving change of lender for existing ECB to AD Category-I banks in cases where the original lender is an international bank or a multilateral financial institution (such as IFC, ADB, CDC, etc.) or a regional financial institution or a Governmentowned development financial institution or an export credit agency or supplier of equipment and the new lender also belongs to any one of the above mentioned categories, subject to the following:

(i) The new lender is a recognised lender as per the extant ECB norms;

(ii) There is no change in the other terms and conditions of the ECB; and

(iii) The ECB is in compliance with the extant guidelines.

However, RBI approval will have to be obtained, as at present, where change in the recognised lender is due to change of foreign equity holder and foreign collaborator.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10, dated 7-9-2011 — Deferred Payment Protocols, dated April 30, 1981 and December 23, 1985 between Government of India and erstwhile USSR.

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The Rupee value of the special currency basket, with effect from August 23, 2011 is Rs.66.9682 as against the earlier value of Rs.64.7004.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 9, dated 29-8-2011 — Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses.

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Presently, under the Rupee Drawing Arrangements (RDA), inward remittances for permissible purposes are received in India through Exchange Houses situated in Gulf countries, Hong Kong and Singapore, with prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has extended this facility of RDA under the Speed Remittance procedures to Exchange Houses situated in Malaysia.

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Domain Names

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A domain name, to put it simply, is a host-name that identifies Internet Protocol (IP) resources such as a website.1 For example www.kodak.com is the domain name of the website belonging to the Kodak Corporation. If one were to type the above domain name into the browser of their computer they would be directed to the relevant web page belonging to the Kodak Corporation. The Internet, as is well known, is a global network of networks whereby several computers are interconnected to each other. A domain name, thus, enables one computer to reach a particular web page/website and access the desired content.

In the context of the development of e-commerce, the importance of a domain name and its protection to a modern-day businessman is immense. A domain name consists of a top-level domain name and a second-level domain name. The top-level domain name in the above example would be ‘.com’ whilst the second-level domain name would be ‘kodak’. A common practice these days is to have a second-level domain name which consists of the trade mark and/ or trade name of the business as is evident from the said example. Hence, the wrongful use by a third person of a domain name could be extremely harmful to the goodwill, reputation and business of the owner of the domain name. Thus, the primary question which arises is whether a domain name which may consist of a trade mark or trade name can be protected as a form of intellectual property.

However, before dealing with the law on the aspect of protecting domain names, it would be important to have a basic understanding from the technical standpoint as to how the Internet functions and what is the role of a domain name, etc. in order to effectively understand the role of a domain name in practice.

Working of the Internet
As is well known, the Internet is a network of networks. Hence, a fundamental requirement would be that there must exist a system of locating one another as in locating different computers.

The system as it currently exists is that at one end is the user accessing the Internet from, usually, a computer. At the other end is a server, on which is stored in electronic form, the website which the user wishes to access. The user gains access to the Internet at a gateway, either via an internet service provider (ISP) or via a smaller, usually internal, network called an Intranet. In the middle is a highly sophisticated network comprising router and other computers linked together. Each computer connected to the Internet has a unique numerical address known as the Internet Protocol address (for example, 1.256.123.123) so that electronic information is delivered to the right place. To make these identification numbers more user-friendly, they can be associated with identifiers consisting of alphanumeric characters. These identifiers are Internet domain names. Because they are made up from alphanumeric characters, it is possible for the sequence of characters to spell out words and hence trade marks or other signs used by businesses2.

When the Internet was in its infancy, the system of registering domain names was done through a department of the Government of United States of America. However in the 1990s the United States Government put together an interagency working group to formulate a policy on privatising the domain name system. The idea of a new private non-profit corporation to administer the domain name system evolved into the setting up of the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). ICANN was formed in 1998 and is a corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. The ICANN allows different registrars to register domain names for use on the internet. ICANN, however does not control the content on the domain.

Law in India
Now let us examine the legal position in India on the protection of a domain name as a form of intellectual property. The issue is no longer res integra and has been answered categorically by the Supreme Court in the case of Satyam Infoway Limited v. Sifynet Solutions Private Limited3. The respondent in the said appeal had raised the defence that a domain name is merely an address on the Internet. The registration of a domain name with ICANN could not confer any intellectual property right, since the same was a contract with a registration authority allowing communication to reach the owner’s computer via Internet links channelled through the registration authority’s server which was in a way akin to registration of a company name which is a unique identifier of a company but by itself confers no intellectual property rights. The Apex Court, however, negatived the said contention and held, inter alia, as under;

“The original role of a domain name was no doubt to provide an address for computers on the Internet. But the Internet has developed from a mere means of communication to a mode of carrying on commercial activity. With the increase of commercial activity on the Internet, a domain name is also used as a business identifier. Therefore, the domain name not only serves as an address for internet communication, but also identifies the specific Internet site. In the commercial field, each domain name owner provides information/services which are associated with such domain name. Thus a domain name may pertain to provision of services within the meaning of section 2(z). A domain name is easy to remember and use, and is chosen as an instrument of commercial enterprise not only because it facilitates the ability of consumers to navigate the Internet to find websites they are looking for, but also at the same time, serves to identify and distinguish the business itself, or its goods or services, and to specify its corresponding online Internet location. Consequently a domain name as an address must, of necessity, be peculiar and unique and where a domain name is used in connection with a business, the value of maintaining an exclusive identity becomes critical. “As more and more commercial enterprises trade or advertise their presence on the web, domain names have become more and more valuable and the potential for dispute is high. Whereas a large number of trademarks containing the same name can comfortably co-exist because they are associated with different products, belong to business in different jurisdictions, etc., the distinctive nature of the domain name providing global exclusivity is much sought after. The fact that many consumers searching for a particular site are likely, in the first place, to try and guess its domain name has further enhanced this value”. The answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph is therefore an affirmative.”

The Apex Court, further held that the use of the same or similar domain name may lead to a diversion of users. Diversion of users means that a person may be directed to another website instead of the website he desires to access. To illustrate consider a case where a user is searching for www.kodak. com, but inadvertently types www.kodake.com into the Internet browser or a search engine and is then directed to the webpage of some third party, this would mean that he has been diverted away from the webpage he sought access to. This would be a form of passing of wherein the user of the mark ‘kodake’ is using the goodwill of the mark ‘kodak’ to divert customers to his website. This could impact e-commerce and its features of instant accessibility to users and potential customers and particularly so in areas of overlap between the two domains. Ordinary consumers/ users seeking to locate the functions available under one domain name may be confused if they accidentally arrived at a different but similar website which offers no such services. Such users could well conclude that the first domain name owner had mis-represented its goods or services through its promotional activities and the first domain owner would thereby lose their custom. It is apparent therefore that a domain name may have all the characteristics of a trade mark and could be protected as such.

Thus, the Apex Court squarely holds that a domain name can be protected as a trade mark. Hence, the proprietor of a trade mark may prevent a wrongful use of a domain name which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to its trade mark by filing proceedings for infringement and/ or passing off.

One factor which must be noted though is that whilst a trade mark is territorial, inasmuch as it would normally be registered within each country separately and protected by the laws of that country, a domain name is registered and used in cyberworld bereft of national boundaries. Thus protection under the national legal system of a country may not always suffice.

To illustrate if Kodak Corporation filed a suit in India against an infringer for injunctive orders against the use of the domain name ‘kodak. com’, the order of the Indian Courts would only be effective within the territory of India and not beyond, even though the infringing website can be accessed from anywhere in the world. Hence, in order to provide a solution to overcome this hurdle, the ICANN adopted the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).

Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy

The UDRP is a dispute resolution mechanism set up by the ICANN based on the report of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). India is one of the 171 countries of the world, who are members of WIPO. WIPO was established as a vehicle for promoting the protection, dissemination and use of intellectual property throughout the world.

The UDRP is incorporated by reference into every agreement for registration of a domain name. The UDRP states that if a third party complainant asserts to the relevant Registrar of domain name that the impugned domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trade mark or that the alleged registrant of the domain name has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name or that the domain name is being used in bad faith, then the dispute will be submitted to a mandatory administrative proceeding.

Thus, under the UDRP a complaint may be filed by any party based on the criterion required by the policy for either cancellation or transfer of the domain name. The proceedings are heard and decided by the members of the administrative panel. It may be relevant to note that the said mandatory administrative proceeding does not bar recourse to Courts and that the policy provides that either the complainant or the registrant may approach a Court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution of the disputes before the administrative proceedings are commenced or after they are concluded. In fact, even an order of the administrative panel is not to be executed for a period of 10 days after it is passed to enable the registrant to approach a Court of competent jurisdiction. In such a case, the panel’s decision would normally stand stayed till the outcome in the lawsuit4.

Thus, any person aggrieved by the wrongful use of a domain name has in principle two routes available to him. The person aggrieved may initiate an action for infringement and passing off under the trade mark law in a Court of competent jurisdiction, if the other requirements are met and may also file a complaint under the UDRP for cancellation and/or transfer of the impugned domain name.

Cybersquatting

At this juncture, before concluding, I would like to draw attention to one of the most common problems faced with respect to wrongful use of domain names i.e., cybersquatting. Cybersquatting (also known as domain squatting), according to the United States federal law ‘Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act’, is registering, trafficking in, or using a domain name with bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trade mark belonging to someone else. The cybersquatter then offers to sell the domain to the person or company who owns a trade mark contained within the name at an inflated price5.

This is a very nefarious and prevalent practice. Cybersquatters register several trade-marks as domain names and then hoard them, so that the true owner cannot register a domain name in consonance with its trade mark. At this stage the cybersquatter would then offer to sell the domain name to the true owner of the trade mark thereby making a wrongful profit. A recent illustration of this in the Indian context would be the case of Mr. Arun Jaitley. Mr. Jaitley wanted to register a domain name with his name, but was informed that the domain name www. arunjaitley.com was already registered. The Delhi High Court after considering the several facts involved in that matter was pleased to direct transfer of the domain name and grant punitive damages6.

Another form of cybersquatting would be where the top-level domain name is changed to make several different domain names, such as www.arunjaitley.in or www.arunjaitley.org. In such cases also protection may be sought as in the earlier case.

The problem of cybersquatting is rampant and very serious, hence in addition to the protection already available under the law relating to trade marks and under the UDRP, it may be important to draft a specific legislation to meet with and provide an efficacious remedy against such cyber-squatters. The primary need for such a legislation is obvious inasmuch as the prevalent laws do not deal with such situations, but Courts have by broadly interpreting the prevalent statutes carved out remedies.

Considering the importance and prevalence of the Internet in our lives today, it stands to reason that a domain name is a very valuable property. Second-level domain names which normally tend to consist of the trade mark of a business are the key identifiers to enable a consumer to reach the address/ webpage he wishes to access. There may be cases where a consumer reaches a website only to find that the webpage does not belong to the host he is looking for however, the damage of diversion is already done. Hence, it is imperative that all trade mark owners even if they do not maintain a presence in cyberspace ensure that no wrongful use and/ or deceptive use of their trade mark is being used. Such vigilance is necessary to ensure protection of the trade mark and the goodwill and reputation therein as also to prevent unwary consumers from being deceived.

VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INSIDER TRADING — whether punishable by SEBI?

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Can a Director be punished for violating the Company’s Code of Conduct on insider trading? What is the implication if the law only requires that the Company frame a Code, but does not make violations of the Code punishable? The answer to this question is not just critical for all listed companies that have framed fairly stringent Code of Conduct for insider trading, but is also relevant as a fundamental question of law. It should make companies also pause before drafting any Code of Conduct — whether for insider trading or otherwise. This question arises for consideration on account of a recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) which has held that violation of the Code of Conduct is punishable with penalty. And, if extended to its logical end, this conclusion would imply that other penal consequences could also follow.

It is worth discussing the background and general context of this issue first. Generally, SEBI provides detailed Regulations for orderly development of capital markets, etc. It regulates and punishes evils such as price manipulation, fraudulent market practices, insider trading, etc. and also provides for other regulations for investor protection, etc. SEBI did attempt to delegate some self-regulatory powers to bodies such as intermediaries, associations and even the companies themselves. The objective seemed to ensure self-discipline so that the burden on SEBI is reduced and SEBI comes into the picture for serious violations or where the self-regulating body itself is negligent. To that effect, the idea was also to circulate model Codes of Conduct which the self-regulating body could follow. Such model also helps in creating a sense of voluntary self-discipline.

However, SEBI often does lay down such Code of Conduct as part of Regulations to be followed without option and in other cases, it requires that the Company frame a Code and gives a model draft. Thus, for example, in cases of stock-brokers, the Code of Conduct laid down for them is prescribed as part of the Regulations which they have to follow and in case of violations, penal consequences follow.

In the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 (‘the Regulations’), companies and other entities were required to draft a Code of Conduct (for which a model was given) and then they were left to enforce it in the manner they deemed fit. It is important to note that the basic act of insider trading was defined in great detail in the Regulations itself. Insider trading was made punishable with penalty, apart from other penal consequences. However, to ensure that even companies take preventive steps to ensure that insider trading does not actually happen, a ‘model code of conduct’ was provided and the Regulations stated that the companies “shall frame a code of internal procedures and conduct as near thereto the Model Code . . . . . without diluting it in any manner and ensure compliance of the same”. Further, the companies were also required to “adopt appropriate mechanisms and procedures to enforce the Code”. It was also clarified that “action taken by the (company) for violation of the code . . . . . . shall not preclude (SEBI) from initiating proceedings for violation of these Regulations”. The Code consists of procedures like ensuring control over sensitive information, procedures for purchase/sale of shares by the employees, etc., prohibition on sale/purchase in short gaps, etc.

The Code itself provides that for violation of the provisions of the Code, the person concerned “may be penalised and appropriate action may be taken by the company” and “shall also be subject to disciplinary action by the company” of various types which may include wage freeze, etc.

Clearly, if the Company does not frame such a Code of Conduct, it would have violated the Regulations which would result in appropriate penal and other action. However, the question then is if an employee or director violates the Code, and it is not a case of insider trading under the Regulations, can SEBI take action against such employee/director? That was the issue raised in the present case.

The facts of this case can be summarised as follows. The listed company had proposed to carry out certain restructuring transactions which were price-sensitive. The Board of the Company met and passed resolution for such transactions. The Company duly disseminated to the stock exchanges the fact that such decisions were taken. The Managing Director of the Company (‘the MD’), however, sold shares of the Company.

Insider trading is essentially an act where an insider deals in securities of a Company on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information. Now it is important to note that in the present case, there was no allegation that the MD engaged in insider trading. However, he sold the shares before expiry of 24 hours of the outcome of such Board Meeting being made public. Thus, he was alleged to have violated the Code of Conduct of the Company.

The MD resigned as a Managing Director of the Company and thereafter the Company did not take any action against him apparently satisfied with his voluntary act of resigning as the Managing Director.

However, SEBI initiated action against the MD alleging that he had violated the Code of Conduct. The MD’s contention that violation of the Code was not violation of the Regulations was not accepted and a penalty of Rs.1 crore was levied on him. The MD appealed to SAT which upheld the order of the Adjudicating Officer, but reduced the penalty to Rs.25 lakhs.

Some important extracts from the SAT order are given in the following paragraphs (emphasis provided).

“It needs to be noted that the charge against the appellant in the show-cause notice is of violating Regulation 12(1) read with clause 3.2-3 and 3.2-5 of the code of conduct specified under Part A of Schedule I of the Regulations. In the impugned order, the appellant has been held to be guilty of violating the provisions of the code of conduct only. There is no allegation of insider trading against the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant had sold shares within the period when trading window was closed and thus violated the code of conduct prescribed by the company in terms of the obligations imposed upon it under the Regulations. The case of the appellant is that such violation of the code of conduct does not amount to violation of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder and hence not punishable by the Board. It is for the company alone to take action against the appellant. The question that needs to be answered, therefore, is whether violation of the code of conduct formulated by the company in compliance with the requirements of Regulations amounts to violation of Regulations

. . . . . Paragraph 5 of the code of conduct provides for reporting requirements for transactions in securities by all directors/officers/ designated employees and the compliance officer of the company is required to maintain records of all such declarations in the appropriate form.

(The Code) also provides that any sale/purchase or acquisition of shares and securities by all directors/ officers/designated employees shall not be allowed during a period of one exclusive day and conclude one exclusive day after the specified corporate action including declaration of financial results and declaration of dividends.

9.    Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records and the provisions of the regulations referred to above, we are of the considered view that the only possible conclusion that can be arrived at is that the code of conduct prescribed by the company for prevention of insider trading as mandated by the Regulations for all practical purposes is to be treated as a part of the Regulations and any violation of the code of conduct can be dealt with by the Board as violation of the Regulations framed by it. It needs to be appreciated that each company may like to add certain activities regulation of which may be necessary for preservation of price-sensitive information. The Board, cannot foresee all such contingencies and, therefore, it has laid down model code of conduct prescribing bare minimum conduct expected from the directors/ designated employees of the companies. The framing of code of conduct as near to the model code of conduct specified in the Schedule to the Regulations is mandatory for each company. The use of the word ‘shall’ makes it abundantly clear that this is a bare minimum conduct expected from the employees of the company. Paragraph 6 of the model code of conduct also makes it clear that the action by the company shall not preclude the Board from taking any action in case of violation of the Regulations.

…..the different nomenclature given to the code of conduct as a model code of conduct is to provide sufficient leverage to the company to make additions to the bare minimum code as prescribed in the Schedule to the Regulations.

11.    The provisions of the Regulations have to be interpreted keeping in view the aims and objectives of the Act. The main object of the Act is to protect the interest of investors in securities and to promote the development of and to regulate the securities market. In case the interpretation given by learned senior counsel for the appellant is accepted, it may lead to a situation where a person is not punished by the company for violating the code of conduct based on the model code of conduct prescribed in the Regulations and the Board finds itself unable to take action because the code of conduct is framed by the company. In fact this is what has precisely happened in this case. The company vide its letter dated February 11, 2008 has informed the Board that the appellant resigned from the office of the Managing Director and it was not possible to persue any action against him and the company decided to close the matter…. The purpose of the insider trading regulations is to prohibit trading by which an insider gains advantages by virtue of his access to price-sensitive information. The evil of insider trading is well recognised. A construction should be adopted that advance rather than suppress this object. To adopt the construction as suggested by the learned senior counsel for the appellant would result in allowing insider trading within a period set by the Board or by the company during which no trading is permissible.

12. We are, therefore, of the considered view that violation of the code of conduct, as framed by the company in accordance with the mandates prescribed in the Regulations, is nothing but part of the Regulations and any violation thereof is punishable by the Board also as violation of the Regulations in addition to such action that may be taken by the company. Any other view taken in the facts and circumstances of the case will defeat the very purpose of the Regulations in question.”

It is submitted with respect that the decision of SAT is erroneous in law. It goes against the wording of the law as well as the nature of the Code of Conduct prescribed in the insider trading Regulations. The only requirement under the Regulations is that the Company should frame the Code of Conduct. If the Company does not frame the Code of Conduct, there is a violation by the Company. If the Company frames the Code of Conduct and if an employee violates it and the Company does not take action, then too the Company may be held liable. However, there is no requirement in the Regulations that employees should follow the Code and if they do not, there would be punishment. Neither is there such a requirement nor is any penal consequences provided. It is not clear how an act can be punished when there is no requirement in law to follow it and also no requirement in law providing for punishment.

If SEBI is deemed to have the power to punish violations of the Code of Conduct, then the provision that the Company ‘may’ take action for violation of the Code of Conduct and this not preclude power of SEBI to punish for violations of the Regulations may be redundant.

The concern of SAT that persons may get away with insider trading if such an interpretation is taken is totally misplaced. The Regulations clearly cover cases of insider trading. In this case, no allegation at all was made of an act of insider trading. The violation was of a procedure to prevent insider trading. If there was no insider trading at all, then there is no question of any punishment. A preventive provision is to ensure that insider trading does not take place. If a person does not follow the preventive step, then the Company may punish such person. If the person does not follow the preventive step and also commits insider trading, then the Company and SEBI both may punish such person. But merely for not carrying out the preventive step which is regulated by the Company and when there is no insider trading at all, SEBI has no role to play.

Insider trading is certainly a bane in the capital markets and needs sternest of action. However, it is submitted that this decision needs reconsideration. It creates a wrong precedent and uncertainty as to the manner in which laws would be framed and enforced.

(2011) 23 STR 265 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore v. Lakshmi Technology & Engineering Indus Ltd.

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Cenvat credit — Renting of immovable property services provided by manufacturer of excisable goods — Manufacturer used credit from a common pool of excise, customs and service tax —Rule permit taking of such credit under a common pool and permit use of such credit for different purposes and thus the utilisation held valid.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of satellite components and aircraft components, also provided service of renting of immovable property. They used the credit in Cenvat account for paying excise duty on the goods cleared by them and also for paying service tax on service rendered under the category of Renting of Immovable Property. SCN was issued alleging that capital goods, inputs and input services on which credit was taken had no nexus with the renting of property service and thus Cenvat credit could not be utilised by them and demanded service tax accordingly along with interest and penalty.

Held:
It was held that a manufacturer of excisable goods is entitled to use the credit from a common pool to which different categories of specified excise duties, customs duty and service tax are allowed to be taken of.

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(2011) 23 STR 263 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad v. Azzam Rubber Products Ltd.

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Refund — Double payment of service tax by recipient of GTA services — Tax incidence paid by present respondent — Disclaimer certificate produced from transporters — U/s.11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 not necessary that person paying tax has to claim refund — Revenue’s appeal rejected.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of footwear, availed the services of goods transports agency i.e., for transportation of inputs and final products. The respondents while depositing service tax mentioned the name of the transporter inadvertently on the challan instead of their own name. On realising their mistake, remitted the tax again vide TR6 challan. The respondents filed an application for refund of tax paid by them earlier and submitted a disclaimer certificate from the transporter stating they have no objection in the said amount being refunded to the respondent. The Department contended that the refund could be granted only to the transporter who made the actual payment as per TR-6 challan and not to the respondent.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that any person was authorised to claim the refund if the applicant is able to furnish documents to establish that duty of incidence has not been passed on. It was held that in the present case, the duty of incidence was paid by the respondents and hence the Revenue‘s appeal was rejected.

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(2011) 23 STR 254 (Tri.-Del.) — Desert Inn Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Madap-keeper service — Valuation — Parking charges collected from clients includible — Section 65(105)(m) of the Finance Act, 1994 — Suppression of facts — Extended period of limitation can be invoked — Penalty — Option of 25% of penalty within 30 days to be provided.

Facts:
The appellants were providing services of mandapkeeper and paid service tax for the said activity. They also had parking space for which they charged separately from by their clients who enjoyed the services of mandap. A service tax was demanded on the charges for the said parking charges along with interest and penalties.

The appellants contended that they issued separate invoices for the charges and the same was reflected in their balance sheet separately. Also, the major portion of the demand was time-barred. Relying on the judgment in the case of Merwara Estates v. CCE, Jaipur 2009 (16) STR 268 (Tri.-Delhi), the appellants submitted that the penalties are not to be imposed in cases involving interpretation. Further, extended period of limitation was not invocable as suppression could not be alleged on the basis of balance sheet. The appellants relied on the judgment in the case of Martin & Harris Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE, Gurgaon 2005 (185) ELT 421 (Tri.-Delhi). The respondents submitted that without the parking space the mandap could not have been enjoyed by the clients and the car parking charges were not being collected from the persons parking their cars.

Held:
Taking into consideration the definition of ‘Mandapkeeper services’ u/s.65(105)(m) of the Act and the nature of services provided by the appellants, it was held that the services of car parking was in relation to use of the mandap as the car parking was a necessary facility for the use of mandap. The fact of separate collection of car parking charges was not coming clearly in the balance sheet. Extended period of limitation was held invokable as the appellants suppressed the facts from the Department. As regards penalty, it was observed that the appellants were not granted the option of paying 25% of the penalty within 30 days of the order of adjudication as held in the case of K. P. Pouches (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 2008 (228) ELT 331. Also, penalty once imposed u/s.78, penalty u/s.76 is not maintainable. Accordingly, demand of service tax was confirmed along with interest. As regards penalty, an option to pay 25% of the penalty within 30 days of the communication of this order was granted to the appellants.

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(2011) 23 STR 221 (Tri.-Delhi) — Instrumentation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I.

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Work contracts — Liability before 1-6-2007 —
Even in indivisible contract — Lump sum turn key (LSTK) work contracts
or EPC projects — Services provided as part of such contracts liable to
service tax — No mention that service tax is leviable in respect of only
stand-alone activity u/s.65(105) or 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act) — Service tax attracted if service is taxable — Consulting
Engineering Service — Engineering drawings separately charged in
contract — Activity covered under Consulting Engineer services — Failure
to obtain registration — Returns not filed — Non-payment of service tax
since 1997 — Assessee guilty of suppression — Extended period of
limitation invokable and liable to penalty.

Facts:
The
appellants engaged in the manufacture of telecommunication equipment,
UPS Systems, and primary and secondary instruments, etc., chargeable to
Central Excise duty. In addition, the appellants also designed,
installed and commissioned the electronic control systems, provided
operational training to the customer’s employees and also undertook
repair and maintenance of these equipments as per the contract with
their customers. Pursuant to the introduction of ‘Consulting Engineers’,
‘Installation & Commissioning’ and ‘Repairs and maintenance’ as
taxable services under section 65 of the Act), the appellants took
service tax registration for ‘Repair & Maintenance’ on 1-8-2003 and
for ‘Installation & commissioning’ and ‘Repairs & Maintenance’
on 20-1-2004. A show-cause notice was issued against the appellants in
respect of the ‘Consulting Engineer’ services provided prior to 1-8-2003
for service tax amounting to Rs.40,71,946 along with interest and
penalty.

Key contention of the appellants:
The
appellants did not provide any Consulting Engineer’s services but
executed lump sum turnkey contracts for design, engineering,
manufacture, supply, erection, testing and commissioning of control
systems. The lower Appellate Authority overlooked the law laid by the
Tribunal in the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodra 2003
(155) ELT 457 and a plethora of other cases holding that “lump sum
turn-key contracts for design, engineering, manufacture, supply,
erection, testing and commissioning cannot be vivisected to levy service
tax on the service components”. The view taken by the Tribunal in the
case of CCE, Raipur v. BSBK Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (253) ELT 522 (Tribunal-LB)
that after 46th Constitution amendment, the service part of a turnkey
contract can be separated from the goods part for levy of service tax
did not apply in the present case as the legal fiction under Article
366(29A) cannot be applied to the laws other than sales tax. The
appellants relied on a plethora of cases such as BSNL v. Union of India,
2006 (3) SCC 1, Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v.
Electricity Inspector, (2007) 5 SCC 447, Geo Miller & Co. (P) Ltd.
v. State of M.P., 2004 (5) SCC 209, etc. Relying on the decision in the
case of Patnaik & Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1965 SC 1655, it was
submitted that drawing and designs prepared were to be treated as
service provided by the appellant to themselves and not a consulting
engineer’s service provided to clients. Separate amount indicated in the
contract for ‘drawing/designing or engineering’ was only for a
milestone payment to be released on preparation and approval of drawings
and could be treated as value attributable to the drawings and
designing. The contracts in the case were indivisible turn-key contracts
with single-point responsibility which could be treated as severable
contracts. Such contracts became taxable as ‘Work contract services’
w.e.f. 1-6-2007 under 65(105)(zzza) of the Act and any activity under
work contract was not taxable prior to that date. The longer period of
limitation for demand of allegedly non-paid service tax was not
available to the Department as they were aware of the activities of the
appellants since 1991.

Key contention of the respondent:
The
services rendered as ‘consulting engineer’ were clearly distinguishable
as the clauses of the contract showed the intention to provide the
services and to charge separately for the same. The Tribunal in the case
of Transformers & Electricals Kerala Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (1) STR 233
(CESTAT-DB) held that the engineering consultancy component of EPC
contracts was taxable. Further, the terms of the contract clearly
indicated that service tax was rightly demanded on the charges for
drawing, designs and other technical assistance. There was no provision
in the Act that taxable service mentioned in section 65(105) will not be
taxable if provided under a lump sum turn-key contract (LSTK) or as a
work contract. There was no documentary evidence produced to show that
charges for drawing, designs, engineering assistance, etc. in the
contracts and invoices were not the actual charges for these contracts. A
work contract is a service contract and if that service was taxable
w.e.f. 1-6-2007, the same would attract service tax prior to 1-6-2007,
even if it is provided as a lump sum work contract. In addition it was
contended that the decision of Daelim (supra) did not lay down any law
as SLP was summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Karnataka High
Court decision of Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. was not a
binding precedent as no reasons were provided in the said judgment for
holding works contract as not liable for service tax.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that the preparation of basic and detailed engineering
drawings, on the basis of which erection and installation work was done
and training of clients was technical assistance provided to the clients
and it had to be held as consulting engineer’s services. As regards the
issue of subjecting lump sum turn-key work contracts to service tax
payment and the levying of the same prior to 1-6-2007, the Tribunal
observed that a contract will attract service tax if the service is
taxable u/s.65(105) of the Act and the legal fiction of Article 366(29A)
was of no relevance in this case. Service tax shall be chargeable in
case of a work contract for a particular service which is taxable
u/s.65(105) of the Act, regardless of it being divisible or indivisible.
The meaning of work contract being a contract for work and labour i.e.,
a service contract prior to 1-6-2007 and hence service tax would be
levied on the same prior to 1-6-2007. The contract and the invoices
indicated that the clients were charged for drawings/designs,
engineering and technical training and hence the contracts contained
component of activity covered by ‘Consulting Engineer service’. Hence,
service tax was chargeable. The longer period of limitation of five
years for unpaid service tax was rightly invoked in the light of the
appel-lant’s failure to furnish any explanation for non-payment of
service tax and for not obtaining registration. Penalty imposed u/s.76,
77 and 78 were also rightly imposed as the facts were suppressed.

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(2011) 23 STR 345 (Kar.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Mangalore v. Dee Pee En Corporation.

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Quantum of penalty — Whether penalty could be levied at the rate of Rs.100 per day on failure to pay duty by the assessee for period prior to 10-9-2004.

Facts:
The issue for consideration was whether the appellant could levy penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day on failure to pay duty by the assessee for the period prior to 10-9-2004 or not. According to the assessee, the provisions of section 76 to levy penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day came only from 10-9-2004 and thus it could not be levied retrospectively. The Department relying on the judgment in the case of ETA Engineering Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai 2004 (174) ELT 19 (Tri.- LB) contended that even for the period prior to 10-9-2004, the Tribunal had confirmed the order of levying penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the judgment of ETA Engineering Ltd. was not applicable to this case as it did not consider effective date of the amended provision. It was held that penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day was leviable for the period 10-9-2004 onwards and not prior to the said date.

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The Second Freedom Struggle – Our Unfinished Agenda

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Mahatma Gandhi gave us freedom from the Britishers. Yet, we still have to be free from hunger, poverty, and above all, from corruption. We, the older generation, who witnessed to our freedom struggle were losing heart. We remembered with nostalgia and a deep sense of sadness those days when the whole country was united and fighting against the foreign rule. The air resounded with the slogans of ‘Quit India’ and ‘Do or Die’. I personally recollected having helped in making badges and posters at home. We believed that all is lost and the torch lit by Gandhiji and our other leaders is extinguished. There is no more light. Only darkness.

But things are not so bad. There is a silver lining to the dark clouds. Anna Hazare and his team have rekindled the flame. From what we believed were smoldering ashes, he has relit a flame and brought back hope.

In August, we saw history in the making. Anna Hazare demonstrated to us and the world, what can be achieved by satyagraha and non-violence and how the common people can make the Government wake up from its slumber, sit up and listen to the message that people are not prepared to tolerate corruption.

The fight today is against corruption. We have to get rid of this cancer which is eating away the very vitals of our social fabric, that is based on Dharma and sapping at the very roots of our real freedom.

The present generation is dimly aware of the great movement which brought us freedom. I am reminded of an incident narrated in the book ‘Exodus’. The Jews were fighting the Britishers to get their homeland. One aged freedom fighter, a grandfather was dying of bullet injuries, suffered while breaking out from the prison where he was held pending his execution. His young grandson, who had helped him in the escape, tells him “Grandfather, it is good to die for one’s country”. The grandfather replies, “Son, it is good to have a country to die for !” People today are not aware what it means to be citizens of a free country. The sacrifices of freedom fighters and lakhs of our people during the freedom struggle have been forgotten.

There are three great things about the entire movement by Anna Hazare, which have gladdened my heart. First is the spontaneous response of lakh’s of people to the cause. Such a response was beyond the wildest imagination of anyone. Second is the amalgam of people which responded. They were from every strata of society. Many of them were young and most of them were the common man. It was indeed a movement of masses and the younger generation. The third is that the entire movement was peaceful and without any violence, incidents of looting, stone throwing or burning of vehicle. There was nothing like ‘The Jasmine Revolution’ of Middle East. This has restored my faith in our people and the principles laid down by Mahatma Gandhi.

But the battle has just begun. We have to see that the torch lit by Anna remains burning. There is a saying in Gujarati, that “Gujaratis are courageous only in the beginning”. That applies to the rest of the country also. We have to disprove this and wash this black stain from our forehead. Of course Mahatma Gandhi proved this for us.

I came across this very apt shloka from Niti Shatakam of Bhartruhari.

“Base men do not undertake any work apprehending obstacles. Mediocres make a start, but cease working when they encounter hindrances. The men of excellence, however, after commencing a job do not give up despite recurrence of impediments.”

We all have to take part in this movement against corruption. We have to finish it before it finishes us. We can no longer be passive observers. We must support and participate in the anti-corruption movement in every possible way. Of course we must resolve not to be part of corruption. We must not indulge in ‘convenient corruption’ — corruption to get what we want through offering bribes. We must also resist coercive corruption and refuse demands for bribes.

I would end with my Namaskaar to Anna and his team, for starting the struggle, and leading from the front, and also to millions who gave tremendous sacrifices in our freedom struggle. Let us assure Anna that we all are with him in this struggle to eradicate this cancer called corruption. Let us then rise united for this cause, and see that the torch of real freedom remains ever burning.

I conclude by quoting the national poet and freedom fighter Zaverchand Meghani:

“We do not know what perils lie ahead of us on the path. We only know that the call has come from Mother India.”
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(2011) 23 STR 369 (Tri.-Bang.) — Ceolric Services v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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Non-consideration of revised return filed belatedly — Return revised after lapse of 11 months — Rule 7C states revised return cannot be ignored just because it is filed after period provided in Rule 7B.

Facts:
Service tax was demanded and penalty was levied. The applicant had filed a return under Rule 7 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and subsequently revised it. The lower authority had not taken into consideration the revised return as it was filed after a lapse of 11 months and as per the rules, the revised return was to be filed within 60 days.

Held:
It was held that revised return cannot be ignored simply on the ground that the same was filed after the period provided under Rule 7B by virtue of section 7C of the Service Tax Rules 1994. The appeal was allowed by way of remand.

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(2011) 23 STR 367 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Nemlaxmi Books (India) P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat.

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Refund of Cenvat credit accumulated on export of goods — More than one refund claim filed for same quarter — Violation of condition No. 2A of appendix of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) and not sustainable — Rejection of refund upheld.

Facts:
The appellants were exporting stationary items, namely, notebooks and exercise books which were exempted from duty. The appellants were availing Cenvat credit on the duty paid on inputs and accordingly filed among other applications, an application on quarterly basis for refund of the accumulated credit on account of export for an amount of Rs.69,024 for the quarter January 2007 to March 2007. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the lower original authority and inter alia held that the second application filed by the appellants seeking refund of Rs. 69,504 was hit by condition 2(a) of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) which allows for refund of Cenvat credit only in cases where claims for such refund are submitted not more than once for any quarter in a calendar year. The appellants contended that the Commissioner (Appeals) travelled beyond the scope of show-cause notice as the original authority had not rejected the refund claim on the ground of two applications being submitted for one simple quarter under the condition of 2A.

Held:
The Tribunal concurred with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the plea for admissibility of refund was too feeble and devoid of any merits.

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(2011) 23 STR 346 (Tri.-Del.) — State Bank of Indore v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore.

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Banking and other financial services — Exemption under Notification No. 29/2004-ST for tax on interest in relation to overdraft, cash credit, bill discounting or exchange — Allegation that condition of interest being separately shown in invoice not fulfilled.

Facts:
The appeal was filed the Bank challenging the adjudication order levying service tax and cess. The appellant had followed all RBI guidelines and the debit slips in all transactions clearly disclosed interest and other receipts. The Department contended that the conditions of Notification No. 29/2004-ST exempting interests on overdraft facility, cash credit facility or discounting of bills, bills of exchange or cheques in relation to banking services were not fulfilled as the interest amount was not shown separately in any invoice, a bill or a challan issued for the purpose.

Held:
Strict interpretation was unwarranted if it is established that the claimant squarely falls within the exemption zone. However, it was necessary to satisfy the authority through evidence. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of with a direction to the appellant to adduce evidence as required by the Notification.

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(2011) 23 STR 310 (Tri.-Del.) — Prakash Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur.

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Adjudication — Adjournment of hearing to be at insistence of parties — Not for difficulty faced by authority or circumstances beyond its control — Limit of three adjournments has to be understood from facts of case — Fourth adjournment may be granted if circumstances demand and no choice left — Section 33A(2) of Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act).

Adjudication — Denial of request of cross-examination of persons whose statements were relied in SCN — Denial on ground that the case was based on documentary evidence and not on statements of persons.

Held:
Adjudicating authority pre-judged the issue and acted with pre-conceived mind — Natural justice principles to be followed by quasi-judicial authorities depending on facts/circumstances of case.

Appeal — Right to appeal not taken away and cannot be denied on ground of delay.

Facts:
An SCN was issued to the appellants demanding duty on unaccounted produces pursuant to the search and seizure. Notices were also sent to transporters. The Commissioner addressed a letter dated 26th September, 2008 to one of the appellants whereby the appellants’ request for cross-examination of witnesses was rejected and final date of hearing was intimated to the appellants.

The two issues requiring consideration are relating to misconstruction of provisions of law comprised u/s.33-A of the Act and the arbitrary rejection of the request for cross-examination of the persons whose statements were recorded and relied upon documents for conclusion in the matter.

The appellants contended that the Commissioner misconstrued the provisions contained in section 33-A of the Act which provided for granting of adjournment of hearing to a party for not more than three times as this was only an outer limit for number of days for hearing and thereby pleaded denial of natural justice. Referring to the Supreme Court decision in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 513 it was contended that the letter dated 26th September, 2008 clearly disclosed that the Commissioner had pre-judged the issue and had a biased approach in relation to the right of the appellants to cross-examine the persons whose statements were recorded and to be relied upon for the findings. This amounted to violation of principle of natural justice. According to the Revenue, the allegation of the appellants of biased attitude was devoid of substance. Such allegations cannot be made at a later stage after the final order was delivered. The appellants were uncooperative from the commencement of the proceedings. Further, relying on the decision in the case of Debu Shah v. Collector of Customs, 1990 (48) ELT 302, inter alia it was contended that in quasi-judicial proceedings authorities were not bound by strict rules of evidence and procedure and further contended that the information received from various sources could be relied upon without making it available to the parties.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the fourth adjournment could be granted u/s.33A of the Act on the basis of valid and justifiable reasons. The decision of the Commissioner to decide about the claim of the appellants for cross-examination of the witnesses was premature on account of the fact that there was no defence placed on record for the appellants. Following the decision in the aforementioned Shivananda Pathak’s case, it was observed that the rejection of the request for cross-examination on part of the Commissioner clearly disclosed legal bias. Also, the rules of natural justice are applicable to quasi-judicial authorities depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case as observed in the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 150. The appellants were well within their rights to challenge the appeal as the appellants had the right to challenge the interlocutory order either immediately after the passing of order or to challenge the same along with the final order. Setting aside the impugned order, the appellants were permitted to file detailed reply to the SCN on or before 20th October, 2009 and the Commissioner was directed to dispose of the matter, in any case before 31st March, 2010. The appellants would not be entitled to seek adjournment more than three times in the matter. The matter was remanded with the consent of both the parties before the Commissioner at Indore to avoid further complications in the matter.

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(2011) 23 STR 299 (Tri.-Del.) — Sahni Video Movies v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-II.

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Video tape production services — Exemption to individual professional videographer — Benefit of exemption denied in first appeal as not claimed earlier — Appeal allowed.

Facts:
The appellants being an ‘Individual professional videographer’ was denied exemption of service tax as exemption was not claimed earlier. The Department argued that the appellant being an individual videographer operating from his home was not liable to pay any service tax. Notification No. 7/2001-ST, dated 9-7-2001 stated that service tax on taxable service provided to a client by an individual professional videographer in relation to video tape production was exempt.

Held:
Though the benefit of the Notification was claimed in the first appeal, the authority had rejected the claim on the ground that it was not claimed earlier. However, the Tribunal stated that exemption could be claimed at any stage if it was available to the litigants, and thus the exemption was allowed to the appellant.

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(2011) 23 STR 295 (Tri.-Delhi) — Norasia Containers Lines v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi.

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Special Economic Zones (SEZ) — Exemption —Containers provided to units in SEZ — Exemption denied as containers partly used inside and partly outside SEZ — Containers used by units for bringing inputs and carrying finished goods out of SEZ — Impugned service of supply of containers, exempt.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing containers to various units in SEZ. Service tax was demanded on the ground that containers have been used partly in and partly outside SEZ. According to the appellants, in terms of the SEZ Act, 005 and the Rules thereunder, payment of service tax was exempted if taxable services were provided to a unit in the SEZ and the appellants had exactly done that irrespective of the fact that the container had carried cargo out of the SEZ territory, exemption could not be denied to them. ST Notification No. 4/2004 which limits the exemption to service consumed within the SEZ uses the expression ‘for consumption of services’ within such SEZ, but at the same time, also uses the expression ‘taxable services provided to a unit of the SEZ.’

Held:
Section 26 of the SEZ Act and Rule 31 of the SEZ Rules, 2006 make it clear that there was no restriction regarding the consumption of the services and the exemption was extended to the services rendered to a unit in the SEZ for the purpose of authorised operation i.e., for bringing inputs for manufacture and carrying finished goods out of SEZ for export purpose, in the SEZ. Thus, the impugned services relating to supply of containers in SEZ units were exempted from service tax.

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E-filing of statutory Forms with ROC.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued the following filing schedule to avoid the rush and system congestion in MCA 21 due to heavy filing in last 10 days of the months of October and November 2011. It is requested that filing of balance sheet and annual return may preferably be done in the following order:

During this period, ROC facilitation centres/help desks would give priority in e filing/answering queries of companies falling under the above alphabetical order.
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Filing of certain forms by Directors of defaulting Companies for Defaulting Companies/Dormant Companies/Active Companies.

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The Ministry had issued General Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1-6-2011 wherein it was informed that in order to ensure corporate governance and proper compliances of provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, no request, whether oral or in writing or through e-forms, for recording any event-based information/changes shall be accepted by the Registrar of Companies from such defaulting companies, unless they file their updated Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Accounts and Annual Return with the Registrar of Companies.

However, in the interest of stakeholders, certain event-based information/changes were being accepted by the Registrar from such defaulting companies. Now, on the requests received from various quarters of the corporates & professionals, certain forms will be accepted by the Registrar as per the General Circular No. 63/2011, dated 6th September 2011 for:

(a) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of such companies.

(b) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of Companies having the status of Dormant Companies.

(c) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of Companies having the status as active in progress companies.

This Circular shall be effective from 18th Sept., 2011.

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Applicability of Revised Schedule VI for Companies having IPO/FPO.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide Circular has clarified that the Notification No. S.O. 447(E), dated 28-2-2011 pertaining to the Revised Schedule VI, will apply to accounts for the year ending on 31st March 2012. The Ministry has now clarified that the Financial Statements made for the limited purpose of IPO/FPO during financial year 2011-12 may be made in the revised Schedule VI to avoid administrative difficulties and unrealistic comparison.
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Online incorporation of companies within 24 hours will not be implemented.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs by General
Circular No. 61/2011, dated 5-9-2011, after re-examination of Circular
No. 49/2011 for incorporation of a company, has decided, that since
currently companies are being incorporated within 24-48 hours, online
approval of incorporation forms i.e., STP mode of approval of e-forms 1,
18 and 32 on the basis of certification and declarations given by the
practising professional will not be implemented as yet.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20, dated 16-9-2011 — Meeting of medical expenses of NRIs close relatives by Resident Individuals.

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Presently, a resident can make payment in rupees for meeting expenses on account of boarding, lodging and services related thereto or travel to and from and within India of a person resident outside India who is on a visit to India.

This Circular has expanded the meaning of ‘services related thereto’ as stated in Regulation 2(i) of Notification No. FEMA 16/2000-RB, dated May 3, 2000 by including medical expenses therein. As a result, a resident individual can now pay for the medical expenses incurred in India by his NRI close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956).

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19, dated 16-9-2011 — Repayment of loans of nonresident close relatives by residents.

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Presently, a close relative, resident in India, can repay the housing loan availed by his Non-Resident Indian (NRI) relative.

This Circular permits a resident close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956), of the NRI to repay the loan availed by the NRI by crediting the borrower’s (NRI) loan account through the bank account of such relative.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18, dated 16-9-2011 — Loans in Rupees by resident individuals to NRI close relatives.

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This Circular permits a resident individual to give an interest-free loan with a minimum maturity period of one year under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) to Non-Resident Indian (NRI)/Person of Indian Origin (PIO) close relative (means relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) by way of crossed cheque/electronic transfer. The loan is subject to the following conditions:

(1) The loan amount must be within the overall limit under the LRS of US $ 200,000 per financial year. The lender has to ensure that the amount of loan is within the LRS limit.

(2) The loan can be utilised for meeting the borrower’s personal requirements or for his own business purposes in India.

(3) The loan must not be utilised, either singly or in association with other person(s), for any of the activities in which investment by persons resident outside India is prohibited, namely:

(a) The business of chit fund, or

(b) Nidhi Company, or

(c) Agricultural or plantation activities or in real estate business, or construction of farm houses, or

(d) Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs).

Explanation: For the purpose of item (c) above, real estate business shall not include development of townships, construction of residential/commercial premises, roads or bridges.

(4) The loan amount must be credited to the NRO account of the NRI/PIO.

(5) The loan amount must not be remitted outside India.

(6) Repayment of the loan must be made by way of inward remittances through normal banking channels or by debit to the Non-resident Ordinary (NRO)/Non-resident External (NRE)/ Foreign Currency Non-resident (FCNR) account of the borrower or out of the sale proceeds of the shares or securities or immovable property against which such loan was granted.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17, dated 16-9-2011 — Gift in Rupees by Resident Individuals to NRI close relatives.

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This Circular permits a resident individual to make a rupee gift to a NRI/PIO who is a close relative of the resident individual (close relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) by way of crossed cheque/electronic transfer. The amount should be credited to the Non-Resident (Ordinary) Rupee Account (NRO) account of the NRI/PIO.

The gift amount must be within the overall limit  of US $ 200,000 per financial year as permitted under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for a resident individual. The resident donor will have to ensure that the gift amount being remitted is under the LRS and all the remittances under the LRS during the financial year including the gift amount have not exceeded the limit prescribed under the LRS.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16, dated 15-9- 2011 — Credit of sale proceeds of Foreign Direct Investments in India to NRE/FCNR (B) accounts — Clarification.

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Presently, in terms of Schedule 3, 4 and 5 of the FEMA Notification No. 20/2000-RB, dated May 3, 2000, sale proceeds of Foreign Investments in India are eligible for credit to NRE/FCNR(B) accounts, where the purchase consideration was paid by the Non-resident Indians/Persons of Indian Origin out of inward remittance or funds held in their NRE/FCNR(B) accounts and subject to applicable taxes, if any.

This Circular has extended the said facility of credit of sale proceeds of Foreign Investments in India to NRE/FCNR(B) accounts, where the purchase consideration was paid by the Non-resident Indians/ Persons of Indian Origin out of inward remittance or funds held in their NRE/FCNR(B) accounts and subject to applicable taxes, if any, to NRI/PIO under Regulation 11 of the said Notification.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15, dated 15-9-2011 — Exchange Earners Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account and Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) account — Joint holder — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits resident in India to include their non-resident close relative(s) (relatives as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) as joint holder(s) in their EEFC/RFC bank accounts on ‘former or survivor’ basis. However, such nonresident Indian close relatives are not permitted to operate the said bank accounts during the life-time of the resident account holder.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14, dated 15-9-2011 — Foreign Investments in India — Transfer of security by way of gift — Liberalisation.

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Presently, a person resident in India can transfer, by way of gift, to a person resident outside India any security including shares/convertible debentures up to the value of US $ 25,000 during a calendar year after obtaining prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has increased the said limit from US $ 25,000 to US $ 50,000. As a result, a person resident in India can now transfer, by way of gift, to a person resident outside India any security including shares/convertible debentures up to the value of US $ 50,000 per financial year after obtaining prior approval of RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 13, dated 15- 9-2011 — NRIs PIOs holding NRE/FCNR(B) accounts jointly with Indian resident close relative — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits Non-Resident Indian (NRI), as defined in FEMA Notification No. 5, to open NRE/ FCNR(B) account with their resident close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) on ‘former or survivor’ basis. The resident close relative is permitted to operate the account as a Power of Attorney holder during the lifetime of the NRI/PIO account holder.
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Infosys Limited (quarter ended 30th June 2011)

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Income taxes

The provision for taxation includes tax liabilities in India on the Company’s global income as reduced by exempt incomes and any tax liabilities arising overseas on income sourced from those countries. Infosys’ operations are conducted through Software Technology Parks (‘STPs’) and Special Economic Zones (‘SEZs’). Income from STPs are tax exempt for the earlier of 10 years commencing from the fiscal year in which the unit commences software development, or 31st March, 2011. The tax holiday for all of our STP units has expired as of 31st March, 2011. Income from SEZs is fully tax exempt for the first five years, 50% exempt for the next five years and 50% exempt for another five years subject to fulfilling certain conditions. For Fiscal 2008 and 2009, the Company had calculated its tax liability under Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT). The MAT credit can be carried forward and set-off against the future tax payable. In fiscal 2010, the Company calculated its tax liability under normal provisions of the Income-tax Act and utilised the brought forward MAT Credit.


The Company is contesting the demands and the Management, including its tax advisors, believes that its position will likely be upheld in the appellate process. No tax expense has been accrued in the financial statements for the tax demand raised. The Management believes that the ultimate outcome of this proceeding will not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s financial position and results of operations.

As of the Balance Sheet date, the Company’s net foreign currency exposures that are not hedged by a derivative instrument or otherwise is Rs.1,024 crore (Rs.1,196 crore as at March 31, 2011).

The foreign exchange forward and option contracts mature between 1 to 12 months. The table below analyses the derivative financial instruments into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining period as of the balance sheet date :

The Company recognised a gain on derivative financial instruments of Rs.37 crore and a loss on derivative financial instruments of Rs.69 crore during the quarter ended June 30, 2011 and June 30, 2010, respectively, which is included in other income.

2.22 Quantitative details

The Company is primarily engaged in the development and maintenance of computer software. The production and sale of such software cannot be expressed in any generic unit. Hence, it is not possible to give the quantitative details of sales and certain information as required under paragraphs 5(viii)(c) of general instructions for preparation of the statement of profit and loss as per revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956.


2.25 Dividends remitted in foreign currencies
The Company remits the equivalent of the dividends payable to equity shareholders and holders of ADS. For ADS holders the dividend is remitted in Indian rupees to the depository bank, which is the registered shareholder on record for all owners of the Company’s ADSs. The depositary bank purchases the foreign currencies and remits dividends to the ADS holders.

The particulars of dividends remitted are as follows :

Not reproduced.

2.28 Segment reporting
The Company’s operation predominantly relates to providing end-to-end business solutions, thereby enabling clients to enhance business performance, delivered to customers globally operating in various industry segments. Effective this quarter, the company reorganised its business to increase its client focus. Consequent to the internal reorganisation there were changes effected in the reportable segments based on the ‘management approach’, as laid down in AS-17, Segment reporting. The Chief Executive Officer evaluates the company’s performance and allocates resources based on an analysis of various performance indicators by industry classes and geographic segmentation of customers. Accordingly, segment information has been presented both along industry classes and geographic segmentation of customers. Accordingly, segment information has been presented both along industry classes and geographic segmentation of customers, industry being the primary segment. The accounting principles used in the preparation of the financial statements are consistently applied to record revenue and expenditure in individual segments, and are as set out in the significant accounting policies.

Industry segments for the company are primarily financial services and insurance (FSI) comprising enterprises providing banking, finance and insurance services, manufacturing enterprises (MFG), enterprises in the energy, utilities and telecommunication services (ECS) and retail, logistics, consumer product group, life sciences and health care enterprises (RCL). Geographic segmentation is based on business sourced from that geographic region and delivered from both on-site and offshore. North America comprises the United States of America, Canada and Mexico, Europe includes continental Europe (both the east and the west), Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the Rest of the World comprising al both places except those mentioned above and India. Consequent to the above change in the composition of reportable segments, the prior year comparatives have been restated.

Revenue and identifiable operating expenses in relation to segments are categorised based on items that are individually identifiable to that segment. Allocated expenses of segments include expenses incurred for rendering services from the company’s offshore software development centers Certain expenses such as depreciation, which form a significant component of total expenses, are not specifically allocable to specific segments as the underlying assets are used interchangeably. Management believes that it is not practical to provide segment disclosures relating to those costs and expense, and accordingly theses expenses are separately disclosed as ‘unallocated’ and adjusted against the total income of the company.

Fixed assets used in the Company’s business or liabilities contracted have not been identified to any of the reportable segments, as the fixed assets and services are used interchangeably between segments. Accordingly, no disclosure relating to total segment assets and liabilities are made. Geographical information on revenue and industry revenue information is collated based on individual customer invoiced or in relation to which the revenue is otherwise recognised.

Industry segments
Not reproduced.

Geographic segments

Not reproduced.

2.29 Gratuity plan
The following table set out the status of the Gratuity Plan as required under AS-15 :
Not reproduced.

2.30 Provident fund
The Guidance on Implementing AS-15, Employee Benefits (revised 2005) issued by Accounting Standards Board (ASB) states that benefits involving employer established provident funds, which require interest shortfalls to be recompensed are to be considered as defined benefit plans. Pending the issuance of the final guidance note from the Actuarial Society of India, the Company’s actuary has expressed an inability to reliably measure provident fund liabilities. Accordingly the Company is unable to exhibit the related information.

The Company contributed Rs.51 crore towards provident fund during the quarter ended 30th June, 2011 (Rs.43 crore during the quarter ended 30th June, 2010).

2.31 Superannuation

The Company contributed Rs.15 crore to be superannuation trust during the quarter ended 30th June, 2011 (Rs.14 crore during the quarter ended 30th June, 2010).

2.32 Reconciliation of basic and diluted shares used in computing earnings per share

2.33 Restricted deposits

Deposits with financial institutions as at June 30, 2011 include Rs.351 crore (Rs.431 crore and Rs.344 crore as at 30th June, 2010 and 31st March, 2011, respectively) deposited with Life Insurance Corporation of India to settle employee-related obligations as and when they arise during the normal course of business. This amount is considered as restricted cash and is hence not considered ‘cash and cash equivalents’.

(2011) 23 STR 341 (A.P.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Visakhapatnam-II v. Sai Sahmita Storages (P) Ltd.

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Availment of Cenvat credit by storage and warehouse provider — Without using cement and TMT bar, the assessee could not provide storage and warehousing services — Assessee entitled to credit of Central Excise duty paid on these items — No penalty could be imposed without a finding on suppression and irregular claim of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The assessee provided storage and warehousing services. They used cement and TMT bars for construction of warehouses and took credit on Central Excise duty paid on cement and TMT bars which was disallowed, against which the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) who dismissed the appeal and allowed the Department’s claim of suppression regarding availment of Cenvat credit on ineligible goods.

Held:
CESTAT referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi III, 2009 (9) SCC 193 wherein it was held that “all goods used in or relation to the manufacturer of the final products qualify as inputs” and had rectified the decision of the Appellate Authority by allowing credit. The Court confirmed CESTAT’s stand on allowance of credit and consequently non-levy of penalty.

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2011) 23 STR 213 (Del.) — Pearey Lal Bhawan Association v. Satya Developers Pvt. Ltd.

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Renting of immovable property — Service tax being indirect in nature — Lessee was liable to pay the same in absence of any specific arrangement in lease deed on introduction of the levy on the said category.

Facts:
The plaintiffs had a lease arrangement with the defendants in 2006 for maintenance of common services and facilitates in respect of leased premises. The agreement stated the liability to pay municipal, local and other taxes was of plaintiffs. However, there was no specific mention as to who would bear service tax. The Finance Act, 1994 introduced service tax w.e.f. 2007. The plaintiffs contended that the said tax being in nature of indirect tax, had to be deposited by the service provider only after collecting the same from the receiver. They claimed that the tax was on the service and not on the service provider; and by virtue of section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, it is presumed by law that the tax is to be collected from the service receiver. According to the defendant, the plaintiffs was law bound to bear all or any taxes levied by MCA, DDA, L&DO and or Government, local authority, etc. The defendants also relied on the ruling of the High Court of Allahabad in Thermal Contractors Association v. Dir Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., 2006 (4) STR 18 which inter alia held that “The payer of service tax is entitled to realise the same from its consumer; however it always depends on the contract entered into between the parties”.

Held:
The issue was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. While observing the ruling of the Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practioners v. Union of India, 2007 (7) SCC 527, the Court held that service tax is consumption-specific as it does not constitute a charge on the business but on the client. Further, relying on All India Taxpayers Welfare Association v. Union of India & Others, 2006 (4) STR 14, the Court observed that as per section 12A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 r.w.s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1944, invoice and other documents should bear the amount of service tax. Section 12B of Central Excise Act, 1944 r.w.s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1944 contemplates that service is deemed to have been passed on to the service receiver. The agreement was silent on service tax levy as it was not anticipated at the time of making argument.

Therefore, even in absence of an express provision in law, but based on the overall scheme of the legislation, service tax could be collected from the recipient and accordingly, the plaintiffs were eligible to collect service tax from the defendant.

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(2011) 23 STR 212 (Ker.) — Commissioner of Central Excise & Custom, Kochi v. Oriental Steel Trunks Agrico Industries.

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Interest and penalty — Tax with interest paid before SCN — Tribunal having no jurisdiction to consider matter relating to interest while disposing penalty appeal — Appeal allowed partly.

Facts:
The Tribunal set aside penalty by taking into consideration the payment of service tax along with the interest by the respondent before the issuance of show cause notice (SCN). The Revenue contended that the Tribunal had no authority to discuss about the respondent’s claim for refund of excess interest paid, since the appeal was filed in relation to penalty. The respondent relied on the Circular published by the Department granting time for compliance with statutory provision in regard to payment of service tax.

Held:
The Court allowing the appeal partly, vacated the part of the Tribunal’s order declaring the respondent’s entitlement for refund of interest as interest was not connected with penalty, whereas penalty part was not interfered with.

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Sale to and from SEZ — Whether in Course of Export/Import

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Introduction

An interesting issue lingers on — Whether sale to a unit in Special Economic Zone (SEZ) by a Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) unit or by SEZ unit to DTA unit amounts to sale/purchase in the course of export/ import? The issue arises because SEZs have been given special status by Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 (SEZ Act, 2005).

Sale in course of Export/Import under Sales Tax Laws

As per Article 286 of Constitution of India, no tax can be levied on sale/purchase taking place in the course of export and import. Section 5(1) and 5(2) of CST Act, 1956 defines when a sale/purchase is said to take place in the course of export/import. The said definitions are reproduced below for ready reference:

“5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export

(1) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is affected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.

(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.”

The accepted meaning of the above section is that the goods should be going out of Indian territory or should be coming from outside Indian territory. Unless this fact is present, the argument of sale in the course of export/import is almost not tenable. In relation to SEZ, there is special enactment i.e., SEZ Act, 2005. In the said Act, SEZ is given a special status as foreign territory for various purposes. The transactions with SEZ unit by a DTA unit (either sale or purchase) are to be routed through import/ export formalities like, filing of bill of entry, etc. Therefore, a debate arises as to whether it can be said to be sale in the course of export/import for the purposes of the Sales Tax Acts.

Analysis of legal position
In light of the above definition of sale in course of export/import in section 5(1) and 5(2), reproduced above, it can very well be stated that there is no possibility to consider sale/purchase transactions with SEZ as in course of export/import. This view has now been approved by the Allahabad High Court. Reference can be made to judgment in the case of M/s. India Exports v. State of U.P. & Others, (Civil Misc. W.P. No. 1488 of 2009, decided on 11- 2-2011 (All.).

In this case the facts were that the petitioner was a unit in SEZ. It cleared its manufactured goods i.e., furniture for sale to a DTA unit. The petitioner claimed this sale to the DTA unit as its export or in other words sale in the course of import and not liable to sales tax. The Sales Tax authorities levied CST as applicable to normal sale and hence this writ petition before the High Court. Before the High Court section 53(1) of the SEZ Act was relied upon. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference:

“The Special Economic Zones Act, 2005

“53. Special Economic Zones to be ports, airports, inland container depots, land stations, etc., in certain cases. A Special Economic Zone shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be a territory outside the customs territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorised operations.

(2) A Special Economic Zone shall, with effect from such date as the Central Government may notify, be deemed to be a port, airport, inland container depot, land station and land customs stations, as the case may be, u/s.7 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962): Provided that for the purposes of this section, the Central Government may notify different dates for different Special Economic Zones.”

Important arguments
Some of the important arguments of the petitioner were as under:

(i) Sale from SEZ to DTA are sales in the course of import on which Central Sales Tax is not leviable under Article 286 and section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act and for which no exemption notification is required.

(ii) Rule 47(1) of the SEZ Rules requires the buyer of DTA to submit import licence and Rule 47(4) provides for valuation and assessment of goods cleared for DTA to be made in accordance with the Customs Act and Rules; Rule 48 (1) requires the buyer of DTA to file a bill of entry for home consumption applicable to goods imported into India and Rule 48(2) provides for valuation of goods for customs duty in accordance with the provisions of the Customs Act. The territory of SEZ under these Rules shall be deemed to be territory outside the territory of India and thus any goods removed from SEZ to DTA are deemed to be goods imported from outside the territory of India. Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act deems sale and purchase of goods in the course of import only if the sale and purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India. The customs frontiers of India u/s.2(ab) of the Central Sales Tax Act means crossing the limits of the area of a customs station in which imported goods or export goods are ordinarily kept before clearance. There is no liability for payment of Central Sales Tax in respect of the sale and purchase of the goods in the course of import into the territory of India.

(iii) The customs duty is levied only on the goods imported into India, from territory outside India. Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 read vide Entry 83 of List-1 of 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India, and, section 53(1) and section 53(2) of the SEZ Act, the authorised operations in SEZ are deemed to be imports to SEZ as custom station, which covers port, air port, etc. The importer from SEZ to DTA is required to have import licence and to file a bill of entry. The deeming fiction in SEZ Act and Rules read with the Customs Act and Central Sales Tax Act makes the special transaction as import, exempt from Central Sales Tax.

(iv) The SEZ are deemed to be territory outside customs territory of India and thus they cannot be treated as part and parcel of any particular State in India. In the transaction of sale from SEZ to DTA there is no movement of goods from one State to another, calling for imposition of Central Sales Tax.

(v) The deeming fiction has to be given full play and affect and regulations assuming all facts on which fiction can operate.

Observations of High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that the sale is taxable as any other sale within India. After referring to statement of objects and reasons for SEZ Act, 2005, the High Court observed as under:

20. We do not find any substance in the argument of Shri Bharatji Agrawal that the Central Sales Tax cannot be levied on the sales made by the petitioner from SEZ unit to a unit in DTA. The SEZ Unit under the SEZ Act, 2005 is deemed to be territory outside the territory of India u/s.51, 53(1) for a limited purpose; Ss.(2) provides that SEZ shall with effect from the date of Notification by the Central Government be deemed to be a port, airport, inland container port, land station and land customs station u/s.7 of the Customs Act.

21.    The SEZ Act, 2005 has taken into consideration and has provided for amendment of the various taxing statutes, or modified them, for fulfilling the object and purpose of the Act. Section 7 provides for exemption from tax, duties or cess on any goods or services exported out of or imported into or produce from DTA by unit in SEZ or a developer subject to terms and conditions as may be prescribed and be exempt from the payment of tax, duties or cess under all enactment specified in the First Schedule. Section 27 of the SEZ Act, 2005 applies to the Income-tax Act with certain modifications in relation to developers and entrepreneurs who carry out authorised operations in SEZ and modifications are specified in Second Schedule. Section 57 amends the enactment specified in the Third Schedule, which are amended by SEZ Act, 2005. The Central Sales Tax is not included in any of these Schedules.   

The High Court also observed that a deeming clause in one statute cannot apply to other unless so specified in the said statute or can be inferred. That being not the position in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court held that the claim of sale in course of export/import is not tenable and confirmed levy of tax.

Conclusion:

This clarifies the position that unless there is specific scheme under the relevant sales tax laws, for sales tax purposes, the trade with or trade by SEZ will remain at par with DTA units.

GAPS in GAAP — Accounting for an operating lease that containS contingent rentals

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Issue
How does a lessee and a lessor account for a rent-free period in an operating lease with rental amounts that are entirely contingent (e.g., a percentage of sales)?

Fact pattern
A lessee enters into a new lease agreement for retail property with a lessor. The lease agreement has a term of 5 years with no renewal or purchase option. No rents are due for the first year (the ‘rent-free’ period). For years 2 through 5, the rent is set at 18% of the lessee’s annual sales, with no minimum rent payable. The rental rate will not be revised during the lease term, i.e., there are no market resets or other adjustments during the lease term. (The lease agreement actually states that rent is set at 18% of annual sales, and the lessor has agreed to forego the first year’s rent as an incentive to the lessee to enter into the lease.)

Analysis
Paragraph 3 of AS-19 defines contingent rent as that portion of the lease payments that is not fixed in amount but is based on a factor other than just the passage of time (e.g., percentage of sales, amount of usage, price indices, market rates of interest, etc.).

Contingent rents are not included in the definition of minimum lease payments, and hence do not determine whether a lease is a finance lease or operating lease. In the case of an operating lease, with regards to the lessee, paragraph 25(c) requires disclosure of lease payments recognised in the statement of profit or loss for the period, with separate amounts for minimum lease payments and contingent rents. Similarly, with regards to the lessor, paragraph 46(c) requires disclosure of total contingent rents recognised as income in the statement of profit and loss for the period. In other words, in the case of an operating lease, the disclosure requirements both for the lessor and the lessee seem to suggest that the accounting of contingent rent should be in the period to which they relate to.

Further, AS-19 requires straightlining of operating lease income/expense. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

23. Lease payments under an operating lease should be recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss on a straightline basis over the lease term, unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit.

40. Lease income from operating leases should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss on a straight-line basis over the lease term, unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern in which benefit derived from the use of the leased asset is diminished.

View 1 — All payments under the lease are considered contingent rent

The lessee and lessor record the actual rent amounts as expenses and income when they are incurred. In the fact pattern above, the lessee does not record any rent expense in year 1. For years 2 through 5, the lessee recognises rent expense, calculated as 18% of its annual sales, as amounts are incurred (i.e., as sales occur). Consistent with the amounts of rent recorded by the lessee, the lessor does not record any rent income in year 1; for years 2 through 5, the lessor recognises rental income, calculated as 18% of the lessee’s annual sales, as earned.

Reasons for View 1
AS-19 is not explicit in the treatment of contingent elements of operating lease rentals, and whether straightlining would be required.

Paragraph 3 of AS-19 excludes contingent rents from the determination of minimum lease payments for ascertaining rental income in finance leases. Notwithstanding that AS-19 uses different terminology to describe the determination of rental income for finance leases (‘minimum lease payments’) and operating leases (‘lease income’), it is inappropriate to purport that contingent rents cannot be determined for ascertaining total finance lease revenue but that they could be determined for ascertaining total operating lease revenue. Accordingly, lease payments or receipts under operating leases exclude contingent amounts.

A similar issue was also discussed by IFRIC in the context of similar IFRS standard. In its May 2006 meeting, the IFRIC considered a request for clarification of the requirements of IAS 17 with respect to contingent rentals. In particular, the IFRIC was asked to consider whether an estimate of contingent rentals payable/receivable under an operating lease should be included in the total lease payments/lease income to be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term. The IFRIC noted that although the standard is unclear on this issue, a consistent application is being adopted; that is, current practice is to exclude contingent rentals from the amount to be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term. Accordingly, the IFRIC decided not to add the issue to its agenda.

In practice, contingent rent payments or receipts made in connection with operating leases are recognised in the period in which they are incurred. Since no rent is paid in year 1 of the lease, no expense/income is recorded in the first year. Importantly, no amount of rent is due or receivable based upon sales in year 1 and such rents only accrue upon the future sales after year 1 (i.e., sales in years 2 through 5). In years 2 through 5, the contingent amounts are recognised as expense/income when they are incurred.

View 2 — The rent-free period is taken into consideration to determine lease expense/income

The rent-free period is taken into consideration to determine the rent expense and income for each period. In the fact pattern above, the lessee amortises the rent-free benefit (determined either based on expected sales for year 1 or actual sales for year 1) over the term of the lease on a straight-line basis.

Assume that sales in the first year are approximately Rs.1,945,000. Using the contingent rental rate applicable for years 2 through 5, the incentive related to the rent-free period is calculated as Rs. 350,000 (Rs.1,945,000 x 18%). Since the term of the lease is 5 years, the annualised benefit for the lessee is Rs.70,000. The lessee accrues rent payable of Rs.280,000 (total incentive of Rs.350,000 less amortisation of year 1 benefit of Rs.70,000) in year 1 and recognises that amount as rent expense in year 1. The accrued amount is amortised as a reduction of rental expense (i.e., the amounts due based on the sales in each year) over the remaining years.

Similarly, the lessor recognises lease income and a receivable of Rs.280,000 in year 1 and amortises the accrued amount as a reduction of rental income (i.e., the amounts receivable based on the sales in each year) over the remaining years.

Reasons for View 2
Accounting for the rent-free period in the above manner is consistent with the requirement of paragraph 23 and 40 of AS-19. The rent-free period, is an integral part of the net consideration agreed for the property and it should be recognised on a systematic basis over the term of the lease, even though the rent receipts or payments in the lease are all contingent on performance.

Even though the IFRS Interpretations Committee concluded in its May 2006 meeting that current practice was to exclude contingent amounts from operating lease receipts or payments, it noted that IAS 17 is ‘unclear’ as to whether an estimate of contingent rent under an operating lease should be included in the total lease consideration to be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term.

Applying paragraphs 23 and 40 of AS -19, the view reflects the notion that if there was no rent-free period, the parties to the lease agreement would have revised the annual rent payable to be based on a lower percentage of a performance indicator (i.e., in the fact pattern above, less than 18% of sales). The recognition of the rent-free benefit or cost over the lease term results in a pattern of expense or income recognition that is similar to a lease that has no rent-free period.

Accordingly, the benefit of such an incentive should be quantified, and recognised over the lease term on a straight-line basis (unless another systematic basis is more appropriate).

Author’s view

The author favour’s View 1, because it is rather improbable that the intention of the standard was to require straightlining of lease rentals that were contingent in nature. Straightlining requires knowing in advance the rentals for all the years covered by the operating lease arrangement. In an arrangement that is fully contingent, and there are no fixed or minimum or guaranteed payments, straightlining may not be appropriate.

View 2 may be possible under Ind-AS and IFRS. For example, in IFRS for operating leases, paragraph 5 of SIC 15 Operating Leases — Incentives states that: “All incentives for the agreement of a new…. operating lease shall be recognised as an integral part of the net consideration for the use of the leased asset, irrespective of the incentive’s nature or form or the timing of payments.”

The incentives in the paragraph above include a rent-free period, as reflected in paragraph 1 of SIC 15: “In negotiating a new or renewed operating lease, a lessor may provide incentives for the lessee to enter into the agreement. Examples of such incentives are…..

Alternatively, initial periods of the lease term may be agreed to be rent-free or at a reduced rent.”

Under SIC 15, the lessee and the lessor recognise the aggregate benefits of incentives in the following manner: “The lessee shall recognise the aggregate benefit of incentives as a reduction of rental expense over the lease term, on a straight-line basis, unless another systematic basis is representative of the time pattern of the lessee’s benefit from the use of the leased asset.” (SIC 15.5).

“The lessor shall recognise the aggregate cost of incentives as a reduction of rental income over the lease term, on a straight-line basis, unless another systematic basis is representative of the time pattern over which the benefit of the leased asset is diminished.” (SIC 15.4).

It may be noted that Ind-AS also contains similar requirements.

ICAI may consider addressing this issue both under Indian GAAP and Ind-AS.

Anchor Health and Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd. (Unreported) ITA No. 7164/Mum./2008 (Mumbai ‘A’ Bench) Article 13 of India-UK DTAA; Section 40(a)(i) of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 26-8-2011 Shri Pramod Kumar (AM) Shri Vijay Pal Rao (JM) Counsel for the appellant : P. K. B. Menon Counsel for the respondent : P. J. Pardiwala

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(i) As accreditation fee was not ‘royalties’ under Article 12(3) of DTAA, in absence of PE in India, was not chargeable to tax in India.
(ii) Obligation to withhold tax u/s.195(1) arises only if the payment is chargeable to tax in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of tooth powder, tooth paste, tooth brush and other health care products.

BDHF is a UK-based registered charitable institution. Based on study made by an independent panel of internationally recognised dental experts, BDHF evaluates consumer oral health care products to ensure that manufacturers’ product claims are clinically proven and not exaggerated. As a result of accreditation granted by BDHF, the manufacturer is allowed to mention this fact while marketing the products. The taxpayer had paid certain amount as accreditation fee to BDHF. The AO noticed that the taxpayer had not withheld tax from the payment made to BDHF.

The taxpayer submitted that as the recipient of income was not liable to be taxed on this income in India, tax was not required to be withheld by the taxpayer. Further, the disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) can only be made when taxes are deductible but not deducted. The AO, however, held that u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act, tax must be withheld at the time of remittance and since the taxpayer had not submitted any certificate about non-taxability of the amount, he disallowed the entire payment u/s.40(a)(i).

In appeal, the CIT(A) held that: the fee could not be treated as ‘royalties’; BDHF did not have any PE in India; consequently, the payment made to BDHF could not be taxed in India; and in absence of any tax liability on the payment, the taxpayer had no obligation to withhold tax from the payment. Therefore, he deleted the disallowance u/s.40(a)(i).

Held:
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

(i) The expression ‘royalties’ is defined in Article 13(3) of India-UK DTAA and the payment was not covered within the definition. While it was in the nature of ‘business profits’, BDHF did not have PE in India. Hence, it was not taxable in India. Even if in normal business parlance, it could be termed ‘royalty’, it cannot be so classified if it does not fall within the definition in India-UK DTAA.
(ii) In terms of the Supreme Court’s decision in GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 327 ITR 456 (SC), tax deduction u/s.195(1) arises only if the payment is chargeable to tax. The AO has to establish that the nonresident was chargeable to tax. Since BDHF was not liable to tax on fee, the taxpayer had no obligation to withhold tax.

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Nippon Kaiji Kyokoi v. ITO (2011) 12 taxmann.com 477 (Mum.) Article 5, 7 and 12 of India-Japan DTAA; Section 44C of Income-tax Act A.Ys.: 1999-2000 to 2004-05 and 2007-08 Dated: 29-7-2011

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(i) On facts, income for provision of services through independent person was effectively connected to, and chargeable in hands of, PE.

(ii) If receipt is effectively connected with PE, Article 12(5) excludes it from Article 12(1) and 12(2) and hence, it is subject to Article 7.

Facts:
The taxpayer, a Japanese entity, was engaged in the business of providing inspection and certification services to marine industry for classification of ships. The taxpayer had set up branches in India at Mumbai and Chennai. The branches carried out a survey and issued reports. The branches constituted PE in terms of Article 5 of India-Japan DTAA.

Sometimes when employees of PE were not available for the survey, the taxpayer engaged an independent surveyor. The independent surveyor was directly appointed by the HO in Japan and the HO directly raised invoices on customers. The HO collected the invoice amount, paid 55% to the independent surveyor and retained 45%. Since under such circumstances the branch did not render substantial services or play active role, entire fee was retained at the HO and no portion of survey fee was recognised in profit and loss account of the branch.

The AO accepted the contention of the taxpayer that the survey carried out through independent surveyors could not be attributed to PE in India. Accordingly, he held that the amount received from such survey should be treated as FTS under Article 12 and taxable @20% on the gross amount in terms of Article 12(2).

In appeal, the CIT(A) observed that when PE could not undertake the survey, it directed the independent surveyor to carry out the survey and therefore, PE played a procedural role. Since FTS was effectively connected with PE in terms of Article 12(5), its income was to be dealt with under Article 7. Accordingly, the CIT(A) determined 10% of the fee as the income attributable to PE as business income and directed that no further expenditure other than allowance for HO expenditure u/s.44C should be allowed. Before the Tribunal, the issues were:

  • Whether FTS was effectively connected with the PE?
  • If part of the amount was taxable as business profits under Article 7, whether balance amount could be taxed as FTS under Article 12(2)?

Held:
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

(i) In case of FTS, the test to be applied is activity test or functional test. Surveys, whether through own staff or through independent surveyors, should not be treated differently. As per Article 7(1), profits directly or indirectly attributable to PE were to be taxable in India. The CIT(A) had estimated these to be 10% of gross receipts, which was not disputed by the tax authority. Hence, this amount was to be treated as attributable to PE.
(ii) If the receipt is effectively connected with PE, Article 12(5) excludes entire receipts from Article 12(1) and 12(2). Thus, DTAA does not contemplate taxing of balance (excluding 10%) receipt under Article 12(2).

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SIEM Offshore Inc., in re (2011) 12 taxmann.com 374 (AAR) Article 23, India-Norway DTAA; Section 44BB, Income-tax Act Dated : 25-7-2011

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(i) On facts, consideration for services provided by the applicant to ONGC was not FTS. Hence, was not excluded from section 44BB of Income-tax Act.

(ii) After shifting of managerial control to Norway, the applicant qualified for benefit under Article 23(4) of India-Norway DTAA.

(iii) In terms of section 44BB of Income-tax Act, Service Tax cannot be excluded for the purposes of determining presumptive income. 

Facts:
The applicant was a company incorporated in Cayman Islands. To qualify for listing on stock exchange in Norway, in January 2010, the applicant shifted its managerial control to Norway. Thus, it also became a tax resident of Norway and Norway issued tax residency certificate to the applicant. The applicant was of the view that pursuant to its becoming a tax resident of Norway, it qualified to access India-Norway DTAA.

The applicant was owner and operator of support vessel and was engaged in providing services for extraction of oil and gas. In 2009, the applicant formed a consortium with three other members and entered into a contract with ONGC for providing bundled services for a deep water rig for 4 years. In terms of the agreement, ONGC was to make direct payment to each consortium member for performance of the work undertaken by it. The scope of work of taxpayer pertained to sea logistics and included logistical support, rescue operations, safety and security surveillance, etc.

The applicant applied to the tax authority for ascertaining the rate of withholding tax on its income from ONGC. The tax authority treated the applicant’s income as FTS and passed order for withholding tax @10% of the gross amount.

The applicant sought ruling from AAR on applicability of section 44BB to the receipts from ONGC and availability of benefits under India-Norway DTAA. The applicant contended that:

The receipts of the applicant from ONGC were subject to taxation u/s.44BB and consequently, only 10% of the gross receipts were chargeable as income.

Pursuant to shifting of its managerial control to Norway and its becoming tax resident of Norway, it qualified for benefit under India- Norway DTAA.

Under the agreement as well as under the domestic law the obligation of Service Tax was on ONGC. The applicant merely received the Service Tax and paid it to the tax authority on behalf of ONGC. Hence, Service Tax was not the income of the applicant so as to get covered within 44BB.

The tax authority contended that the receipts of the applicant were FTS, which were specifically excluded from section 44BB by proviso to section 44BB(1) through amendment to the Income-tax Act.

Held:
The AAR held as follows.

(i) From review of the role and responsibility of the applicant in terms of the contract amongst the consortium members, the responsibilities of the applicant were not to provide technical services. Therefore, the receipts were not FTS. Hence they were covered by section 44BB and were subject to presumptive basis of taxation.

(ii) Since the tax authority has not disputed shifting of the managerial control of the applicant to Norway and the tax residency certificate issued by Norway to the applicant, India-Norway DTAA should be considered. Having regard to the specific provision in Article 23(4) of India-Norway DTAA, the notional income will be limited to 75% and the tax chargeable shall be limited to 50% of the tax otherwise imposed by India.

(iii) The liability to pay Service Tax is that of the applicant although under the agreement, ONGC had undertaken to reimburse it. Section 44BB does not provide for any deduction in respect of Service Tax. The object of introducing section 44BB was to avoid all complications in determining tax liability of the recipient. Hence, exclusion of Service Tax from income is neither warranted nor permissible in the scheme of section 44BB.

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Recent Global Developments in International Taxation part II

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In this Article, we have given brief information about the recent global developments in the sphere of international taxation which could be of relevance and use in day-to-day practice and which would keep the readers abreast with various happenings across the globe in the arena of international taxation. We intend to keep the readers informed about such developments from time to time in future.

(1) United Kingdom

(i) Finance (No. 1) Act, 2010 — New measures regarding DOTAS

On 19 October 2010, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) announced that it was anticipated that the package of five measures revising and extending disclosure of tax avoidance schemes (DOTAS), which were issued for consultation following the Pre-Budget Report 2010-11 and in respect of which legislation was included in Finance (No. 1) Act, 2010 will be implemented on 1st January 2011. Some of the descriptions of schemes (‘hallmarks’) requiring disclosure that were the subject of the consultation will, however, be implemented in 2011-12.

(ii) Tax avoidance clampdown — New measures announced

On 6th December 2010, the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury announced a number of anti-avoidance measures.

The following measures take immediate effect:

— legislation to prevent groups of companies using intra-group loans or derivatives to reduce the group’s tax bill (group mismatch schemes); and
— legislation aimed at schemes involving accounting derecognition, i.e., where a company does not fully recognise in its accounts certain amounts involving loans and derivatives.

Further details will be published in respect of the following measures:

— legislation to address the practice of disguised remuneration (basically arrangements involving trusts or other vehicles);
— legislation aimed at avoidance involving changes in the functional currency of an investment company. The legislation is expected to take effect for accounting periods beginning on or after 1st April 2011; and
— legislation targetting VAT avoidance involving ‘supply splitting’. The legislation is expected to come into force with effect from the date of Royal Assent to the Finance Bill, 2011.

(iii) Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes — Extension to certain inheritance tax transfers

On 6th December 2010, HMRC published a document in response to the consultation on bringing within the disclosure regime inheritance tax (IHT) on transfers of property into trust.

The Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes (DOTAS) regime came into force on 1st August 2004. It introduced an obligation to report to HMRC certain tax avoidance arrangements. Broadly, where an arrangement is notifiable, the promoter must, within a specified time, provide HMRC with details of the arrangement. In certain cases, the obligation to report is shifted from the promoter to the user of the scheme.

The scheme currently covers income tax, capital gains tax, corporation tax, national insurance contributions, VAT, and stamp duty land tax.

(iv) Statement of Practice on Advance Pricing Agreements updated

On 17th December 2010, HMRC issued an updated version of Statement of Practice on Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) SP3/99 so as to provide greater transparency regarding the processes in respect of APAs for businesses and advisors and also to cover the relevant legislative changes that have been enacted since 1999.

The updated version of SP3/99 is available on the HMRC website.

(v) GAAR — Study group established

On 14th January 2011, HM Treasury announced that it had been notified of the experts who will work on the study into a General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) and the areas that the experts will cover. This follows the announcement on 6th December 2010 that a study group would be established to explore the case for GAAR in the United Kingdom.

The topics that the study group will consider include:

— consideration of the existing experience with GAARs and other anti-avoidance principles in other jurisdictions;
— what a UK GAAR could usefully achieve; and
— what the basic approach of a GAAR should be.

The study will also consider whether or not a GAAR could deter and counter tax avoidance, whilst providing certainty, retaining a tax regime that is attractive to business, and minimising costs for businesses and HMRC.

The study group will complete its work by the 31st October 2011 and will report its conclusions to the UK Treasury.

(2) Italy

(i) Tax Authorities issue Ministerial Circular No. 51/E: new CFC regime clarified

On 6th October 2010, the Italian Tax Authorities (ITA) issued Ministerial Circular No. 51/E (the Circular) aimed at providing further clarifications in respect to the new CFC regime introduced on 1st July 2009 by Article 13 of the Anti-crisis Law Decree No. 78 converted into Law No. 102/2009.

(3) South Africa

(i) Transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules revised

The Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2010 has introduced new transfer pricing (TP) rules. Section 31 of the Income-tax Act of 1962 has been repealed and replaced. The main reason for introducing new TP rules is to further align the Income-tax Act with Article 9 of the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions. This is in view of the fact that: — the current wording focusses on separate transactions, as opposed to overall arrangements driven by an overarching profit objective;

— the current wording seems to emphasise the comparable uncontrolled price method over other TP methodologies;

— the emphasis, in the current legislation on ‘price’ as opposed to ‘profits’ does not neatly align with tax treaty wording, potentially creating difficulties in the mutual agreement procedures available under tax treaties; and

— the need to directly merge thin capitalisation rules into the TP rules, as opposed to having parallel rules as is currently the case.

The revised legislation comes into effect on 1st October 2011.

(ii) Regional headquarter company regime introduced

In order to make South Africa an ideal location for multinational enterprises wishing to invest in Africa, a regional headquarter (HQ) company regime has been introduced vide the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2010. The regime is intended to address some tax barriers to the setting up of regional holding companies in South Africa.

(4) Thailand

Additional tax incentives package for Regional Operating Headquarters

On 27th October 2010, Royal Decree No. 508 (RD 508) was issued that added another package of tax incentives for Regional Operating Headquarters (ROH). With the advent of RD 508, a company may opt to apply for the old or new package of tax incentives. A company that wishes to apply for the new package is required to notify the Thai Revenue Department within five years from the date specified by the Director-General (to be announced later). RD 508 is effective from 28th October 2010.

(5) Mauritius

Budget for 2011 — Details

The Budget for 2011 was presented to the Parliament by the Minister of Finance on 19th November 2010. Details of the Budget, which unless otherwise indicated will apply from 1st January 2011, are summarised below.

Direct taxation

(a)    Corporate taxation
— corporate entities operating in the real estate business will be taxed as a separate taxable person at the rate of 15% instead of being taxed at the level of their individual partners;
— corporate entities holding Category 1 Global Business Licence, previously limited to carry on business offshore, will be allowed to conduct business both inside and outside Mauritius. Accordingly, foreign source income derived by such entities will continue to benefit from foreign tax credits while their domestic income will be subject to tax at the standard rate; and
— the current preferential corporate tax regime applicable to companies established in Free Trade Zones has been extended for two additional years.

(b)    Personal taxation

— interest income will be exempt from in come tax;
— individuals with total income (inclusive of exempt income) exceeding MUR 2 million will be subject to a 10% solidarity tax on their exempt income; this will apply in addition to their personal tax liability;
— new statutory deductions for individuals are introduced and include:

  •     deduction for interest expense on loans for the first acquisition/construction of a residence; and

  •     deduction for educational expenses in respect of children undertaking undergraduate studies at the university; and

— a reintroduction of tax exemption on income generated from the first 60 tonnes of sugar for small sugar-cane farmers with less than 15 hectares of land and who rely solely on income from sugar farming.

(c)    Capital gains tax
— gains from the sale of immovable property will be taxed at the rate of 15% for corpo rate entities. A reduced rate of 10% will apply for individuals after an exemption of MUR 2 million.

(d)    Other direct tax measures

— costs undertaken in the context of sugar-related business reform, such as factory closure costs, will be tax deductible;
— the threshold for the exemption from land conversion tax for small and medium planters is raised from 1 to 2 hectares;
— the 5% surcharge on land transfer tax introduced in 2008 is removed; and
— a fixed fee of MUR 350,000 per hectare is levied on the transfer of land conversion rights between unrelated parties.

Other measures

(a)    Tax management
— the deadline for e-filing of tax returns is extended for 15 days; and
— small sugarcane farmers are not required to file an income tax return.

(b)    Company laww

The Trust Act is amended to allow unlimited duration for non-charitable purpose trusts.

(6)    Japan

Transfer pricing

In accordance with the amendments to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the proposed amendment in the transfer pricing regime include:

— priority of methods adopted in calculating arm’s-length price;
— arm’s-length price range; and
— secret comparables.

Tax haven rules (CFC)

Under the proposal, there are amendments to:

— the effective income tax rates;
— the exemption conditions (Regional Headquarters Company);
— the calculation of aggregated income; and
— the passive income aggregation rule.

Foreign tax credits

Under the proposal, there are amendments to:
— the scope of foreign taxes;
— creditable foreign taxes;
— the scope of foreign source income; and
— the creditable limit of foreign taxes.

New special incentives for Comprehensive Investment Zones/Asian Base in Japan

(a)    Special incentives for Comprehensive Investment Zones

— A 50% initial depreciation or a tax credit of 15% of the acquisition costs of assets will be available for company conducting business as stipulated in International Strategy Special District Plan. This rule will be applied to assets acquired from the day the new regime become effective until 31st March 2014; or
— reduction of 20% taxable income for each fiscal year ending prior to the day five years from the day on which the designation was obtained.

A company will not eligible for both incentives at the same time.

(b)    Special incentives for Asian base in Japan

Under the proposal, to encourage foreign companies to set up a R&D centre or regional headquarters in Japan, Japanese subsidiary of a foreign company designated by competent ministers will enjoy the following incentives:

—    reduction of 20% taxable income which relate to such designated business for each fiscal year ending prior to the day five years from the day on which designation is obtained; and

— defer tax for income from excising stock option of a foreign parent company granted to the directors and employees.

(7)    Singapore

Budget for 2011 — Details

The Budget for 2011 was presented to the Parliament by the Finance Minister on 18th February 2011. Main details of the Budget, which unless otherwise indicated will apply from the year of assessment (YA) 2012, are summarised below:

Direct taxation

(a)    Corporate taxation

— for the YA 2011, companies with a 20% corporate tax rebate capped at SGD 10,000. Small and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  will receive the higher of the 20% rebate or a cash grant  amounting  to  5%  of  the  company’s revenue, but capped at SGD 5,000. The cash grant  is  available  only  to  SMEs  that  made Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions in YA 2011;
— a foreign tax credit (FTC) pooling system will be introduced, under which FTC is computed on a pooled basis for each particular stream of foreign income (FI) remitted into Singapore. The amount of FTC to be granted will be based on the lower of the pooled foreign taxes paid on the FI and the pooled Singapore tax payable on such FI, subject to the resident taxpayer meeting certain conditions;
— businesses can claim pre-commencement revenue expenses incurred in the accounting year immediately preceding the accounting year in which they earn the first dollar of trade receipts;
— the tax deduction of 250% on contributions to Institutions of Public Charter (IPCs) will be extended for another five years for donations made during 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2015;
— eligible   companies   that   make   voluntary contributions to the Medisave accounts of their self-employed person (SEP) partners from 1st January 2011 can deduct up to SGD 1,500 per SEP per year. The SEPs would be exempt from tax on these contributions;
— with effect from 1st April 2011, banks and other approved or licensed financial institutions will be exempt from withholding tax on interest and other qualifying payments made to all non-resident persons (excluding permanent establishments in Singapore), if the payments are made for the purpose of their trade or business; and
— companies that set up special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to acquire shares for their equity-based remuneration schemes can deduct the cost of the shares, subject to conditions.

(b)    Personal taxation
— a one-off personal income tax rebate of 20% that is capped at SGD 2,000 will be granted to all residents for YA 2011;
— taxpayers will be exempted from tax on alimony and maintenance payments they receive under a court deed or deed of separation;
— spouse relief and handicapped spouse relief will no longer be granted to taxpayers for maintaining their former spouses; and

(c)    Tax incentives
— various enhancements were made to existing incentives, such as:

  •     Productivity and Innovation Credit (PIC);
  •    Global Trader Program (GTP);
  •     Finance Treasury Centre (FTC);
  •     Captive insurance; and
  •     Marine insurance.

(8)    OECD

(i)    OECD — Report on disclosure initiatives for tackling aggressive tax planning released

On 1st February 2011, the OECD published a report on tackling aggressive tax planning through improved transparency and disclosure, which was prepared by the Aggressive Tax Planning Steering Group of Working Party 10 of the Committee of Fiscal Affairs (CFA).

The report was adopted by the CFA on 3rd January 2011 and outlines the importance of timely, targeted information to counter aggressive tax planning and provides an overview of disclosure initiatives introduced in some OECD countries.


(ii)    OECD — Transfer pricing aspects of intangibles — Scoping document released

On 25th January 2011, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs released the scoping document regarding its new project on the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles.

The work will focus on the following aspects:

— The development of a framework for analysis of intangible-related transfer pricing issues.
— Definitional aspects.
— Specific categories of transactions involving intangibles, such as research and development activities, differentiation between intangible transfers and services, marketing intangibles, other intangibles and business attributes.
— How to identify and characterise an intangible transfer.
— Situations where an enterprise would at arm’s length have a right to share in the return from an intangible that it does not own.
— Valuation issues.

The work is expected to lead to an update of the existing guidance on intangibles which is found in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TPG). In addition, a review will be carried out of the existing guidance in Chapter VIII of the TPG on Cost Contribution Arrangements, although the extent of any further work that might be needed on that chapter remains to be decided.

(9)    Miscellaneous

(i)    Austria — Ministry of Finance publishes Transfer Pricing Guidelines

On 28th October 2010, the Austrian Ministry of Finance published the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010; the first domestic transfer pricing guidelines ever published by the Ministry of Finance. The Guidelines deal with selected transfer pricing issues such as the methodology to be used, group internal financing, business restructuring and documentation requirements, but also with issues that are usually not directly linked to transfer pricing, such as permanent establishments, the Authorised OECD Approach and abuse of law by interposing companies.


(ii)    Treaty  between  Denmark  and  Luxembourg — Danish Tax Tribunal rules Luxembourg intermediary beneficial owner of Danish interest; Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies

On 17th November 2010, the Danish Tax Tribunal (Landskatteretten) published a decision (SKM 2010.729 LSR) and held that a holding company resident in Luxembourg was the beneficial owner of interest distributed by a holding company resident in Denmark. Details of the decision are summarised below.

Facts
A number of private equity funds and other investors acquired a Danish holding company (DK HoldCo) through a holding company resident in Luxembourg (Lux HoldCo). DK HoldCo distributed dividends to its parent company, Lux HoldCo. On the day of distribution of the dividends, Lux HoldCo granted two loans (one convertible loan and the other an ordinary loan) to DK HoldCo equal in amount to the distributed dividends. At the end of the income year in which the loans were granted, the convertible loan including the accrued interest, was converted into shares of DK HoldCo. In the following income year the ordinary loan, including the accrued interest, was also converted into shares of DK HoldCo. The Danish tax authorities concluded that the interest payments on the loans were subject to withholding tax, and required that the DK HoldCo should pay a withholding tax on the interests distributed to the Lux HoldCo, for two reasons:

—  Lux HoldCo was not the beneficial owner of the interest since (i) it did not carry out an active business but the holding of shares in
DK HoldCo, and (ii) had no real power to act regarding the disposition of the interest.

—  the  Interest  and  Royalty  Directive  (the Directive) does not prevent Denmark from levying withholding tax on the interests as the Directive only applies if the beneficial owner of the interests is a company or a permanent establishment resident in a Member State.

Legal background
Under the Danish law, interest paid to a foreign-related entity (i.e., an entity owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, more than 50% of the share capital or voting power in the company paying the interest) is subject to a withholding tax. No withholding tax is, however, levied if the withholding tax is reduced or abolished by a tax treaty or by the Directive. Under the Denmark-Luxembourg treaty (the Treaty), interests paid to a resident in the other contracting state can only be taxed in that other state if that resident is the effective beneficial owner of the interest [Art. 11(1)].

Issue
The issue was whether the Luxembourg holding company was the beneficial owner of the interest received from a Danish company, and subsequently qualified for the Treaty protection and/or protection under the Directive.

Decision
The Tax Tribunal emphasised, by referring to their earlier case law (see TNS:2010-04-23:DK-1), that a conduit company could only be disregarded as the beneficial owner of interest if the interest was redistributed. As the interest was not redistributed but converted into shares of the DK HoldCo, Lux HoldCo could not be regarded as a conduit company in respect of the interest. Thus, Lux HoldCo was held to be the beneficial owner of the interest under the Treaty and the Directive. The Tax Tribunal ruled in favour of the taxpayer and thereby overruled the decision made by the tax authorities.

Acknowledgment
We have compiled the above information from the Tax News Service of the IBFD for the months of October, 2010 to March, 2011.

Business expenditure: Section 37(1) While on business tour, the whole-time director of assessee-company was kidnapped by a dacoit: Ransom money paid to dacoit for releasing the director is allowable business expenditure.

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[CIT v. Khemchand Motilal Jain, Tobacco Products (P) Ltd., 13 Taxman.com 27 (MP)]

The assessee-company was engaged in manufacturing and sale of bidis. ‘S’ was a whole-time director of the assessee-company and was looking after the purchase, sales and manufacturing of bidis. During his business tour to Sagar for purchase of tendu leaves, ‘S’ was kidnapped by a dacoit for ransom. The assessee lodged complaint with the police and awaited the action of the police, but the police was unsuccessful to recover ‘S’ from the clutches of dacoit. Ultimately after 20 days, the assessee paid certain amount by way of ransom for release of ‘S’ and got him released. The assessee claimed deduction of that amount as business expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee on the ground that the ransom money paid to the kidnappers was not an expenditure incidental to business. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Revenue contended that the amount of ransom could not have been claimed by way of expenditure as the Explanation to s.s(1) of section 37 prohibits such expenditure.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provides that kidnapping a person for ransom is an offence and any person doing so or compelling to pay is liable for the punishment as provided in the section, but nowhere it is provided that to save a life of the person if a ransom is paid, it will amount to an offence. There is no provision that payment of ransom is prohibited by any law. In the absence of it, the Explanation to s.s(1) of section 37 will not be applicable in the instant case.

(ii) In the instant case, ‘S’ was on business tour and was staying at a Government rest-house, from where he was kidnapped. As he was on business tour, to get him released, if the aforesaid amount was paid to the dacoits as ransom money and because of this, he was released, the assessee claimed it a business expenditure.

(iii) The entire tour of ‘S’ was for purchase of tendu leaves of quality and for this purpose, he was on business tour and during his business tour, he was kidnapped and for his release the aforesaid amount was paid.

(iv) In these circumstances, the reasoning of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowing the aforesaid expenditure as business expenditure is to be confirmed.”

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Appeals by Revenue: Small tax effect: CBDT circular dated 15-5-2008 providing that notional tax effect could be taken in loss cases is prospective: Applicable to appeals filed on or after 15-5-2008.

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[CIT v. Continental Construction Ltd., 336 ITR 394 (Del.)]

The CBDT Circular dated 15-5-2008, provided that the Circular is applicable to the appeals filed on or after 15-5-2008. The Circular also clarified the terms ‘tax effect’ to include the notional tax effect in loss cases. It is the case of the Department that the Circular is clarificatory and therefore, in loss cases the notional tax effect has to be considered even in respect of appeals filed prior to 15-5-2008.

The Delhi High Court held that the notional tax effect in loss cases does not apply to appeals filed prior to 15-5-2008.

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