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ACIT vs. GMS Motors Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Delhi `C’ Bench Before R. S. Syal (AM) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 3530/Del/2012 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 6th August, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Satpal Singh / Sanjeev Kapoor

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S/s. 3, 28 – In a case where premises are taken on rent, manpower was hired, registration under MVAT and CST was obtained and deposit was paid to company whose vehicles were to be sold and sales of some spare parts had been sold, it cannot be said that the business of sales-cum-service centre has not been set up merely because sale of cars has not taken place.

Facts:
The assessee was to commence a business of sale-cumservice centre. During the previous year it took the premises on rent, hired man power who were paid salaries by cheque, obtained registration required under Maharashtra VAT Act, 2002 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and also deposited certain amount with Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., whose vehicles were to be sold by the assessee. The assessee had also sold some spare parts.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed expenses aggregating to Rs. 56,80,117 incurred towards financial charges and staff administrative charges on the ground that the sale of cars had not taken place during the previous year and therefore the business was not set up and hence deduction of expenses was not permissible.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the term `previous year’ as defined in s. 3 has a relationship with setting up of the business and not with the commencement of the business. It noted that the Apex Court has in the case of CIT vs. Ramaraju Surgical Cotton Mills Ltd. (63 ITR 478)(SC) has held that the business is set up when it is ready to discharge the functions for which it is being set up and the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (356 ITR 354)(Del) has held that business commences on doing first activity like purchase of raw materials, etc.

Considering the ambit of the term `setting up of the business’ in the light of the above mentioned judicial pronouncements the Tribunal held that any income arising after the date of setting up of the business is chargeable to tax and, similarly, any expenditure incurred after the setting up of the business is deductible subject to other relevant provisions. The activities carried out by the assessee, amply demonstrate that the business was set up though sale of vehicles did not take place during the year. The Tribunal noted that it was not the case of the AO that the expenses were non-genuine or capital in nature. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Practical insights into accounting for certain revenue arrangements

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The revenue recognition principles as discussed under Ind AS provide elaborate guidance on various types of arrangements that may be applicable to select class of companies or to most companies in general. In this article, we focus on the guidance provided under appendix B (Customer Loyalty Programmes) and C (Transfer of Assets from Customers) to Ind AS 18 on Revenue, sharing our perspectives on the accounting for the said arrangements.

Customer loyalty programmes

Customer loyalty programmes, comprising loyalty points or ‘award credits’, are offered by a diverse range of businesses, such as supermarkets, retailers, airlines, telecommunication operators, credit card providers and hotels. Award credits may be linked to individual purchases or groups of purchases, or to continued custom over a specified period. The customer can redeem the award credits for free or discounted goods or services.

The structure of loyalty programmes offered by sellers varies, but in general they can be classified into one of the following schemes:

  • Award credits earned can be redeemed only for goods and services provided by the issuing entity.
  • Award credits earned can be redeemed for goods and services provided either by the issuing entity or by other entities that participate in the loyalty programme.

For a programme to be accounted as a customer loyalty programme, it needs to contain two essential features:

  • the entity (seller) grants award credits to a customer as part of a sales transaction; and
  • subject to meeting any other conditions, the customer can redeem the award credits for free or discounted goods or services in the future.

For instance, a customer receives a complimentary product with every fifth product bought from the entity (seller). As the customer purchases each of the first five products, they are earning the right to receive a free good in the future, i.e., each sales transaction earns the customer credits that go towards free goods in the future.

However, it may be noted that not all types of programmes that provide free or discounted goods are accounted as customer loyalty programmes. For instance, say a purchase of membership of a club entitles a member to purchase certain goods or services at a discounted price. In such case, the substance of such membership needs to be evaluated closely. It may seem that the purchase of membership may not be a separate transaction and the amount received by the club may be against purchase of those discounts themselves.

Accounting for customer loyalty programmes
Deferral of revenue
Under Ind AS, the award credits (i.e., air miles, credit card points, etc.) under customer loyalty programmes are not recognised as sales promotion or any other expense. Instead, they are recognised as a separate component within a multiple element revenue arrangement. As such, the revenue under the sales arrangement is allocated to one or more elements, including the award credit. At the inception of the arrangement, the revenue attributable to the award credit is deferred and is recognised as and when the award credits are redeemed by the customer. The revenue attributed to the award credits takes into account the expected levels of redemption.

Allocation of revenue to award credits
Ind AS requires that the consideration received or receivable from the customer is allocated between the current sales transaction and the award credits by reference to fair values. The Ind ASs do not prescribe a particular allocation method. However, the following two methods provided under IFRS may also be applied under Ind ASs:

  • relative fair values; or
  • fair value of the award credits (residual or fair value method).

Using relative fair values, the total consideration is allocated to the different components based on the ratio of the fair values of the components relative to each other. For instance, assume a transaction comprises two components, X and Y. If the fair value of component X is 100 and of component Y is 50, then two-thirds of the total consideration would be allocated to component X. If the total consideration is 120, then revenue of 80 would be allocated to component X and 40 to Y.

Using the residual method, the undelivered components are measured at fair value, and the remainder of the consideration is allocated to the delivered component. For example, assume a transaction consists of two components, X and Y; at the reporting date only component X has been delivered. If the fair value of component Y is 50 and the total consideration is 120, then revenue of 70 would be allocated to component X and 50 to Y.

In estimating fair value, the entity (seller) takes into account:

  • the amount of the discounts or incentives that would otherwise be offered to customers who have not earned award credits from an initial sale; and
  • the proportion of award credits expected not to be redeemed, i.e., expected forfeitures.

Other estimation techniques may be available. For example, if an entity (seller) pays a third party to supply the awards, then the fair value of the award credit could be estimated by reference to the amount that the entity pays plus a reasonable profit margin. However, judgment is required to select and apply the estimation technique that is most appropriate in the circumstances.

Accounting for revenue related to award credit The revenue attributable to the award credit (that was deferred at inception) shall be recognised as such in the income statement as and when the awards are redeemed.

Any subsequent change in the estimates of awards expected to be redeemed are trued up for differences between the number of awards expected to be redeemed and the actual number of awards redeemed; the amount of revenue deferred at the time of the original sale is not recalculated.

Steps involved in accounting for customer loyalty programmes
Having discussed the principles of revenue recognition relating to the customer loyalty programmes, the following are the broad steps involved in accounting for the same:
1. Understand the various customer loyalty programmes in effect.

2. Identify the deliverables in the different programmes. Along with the principal goods, the deliverables could be supply of own goods free of cost or at a discounted price in future, supply of promotional gifts based on the level of purchases made by the customer, gift coupons which can be redeemed as a discount on future purchases, award credits, etc.
3. Identify the fair value of the goods sold and the award credit. The fair value of the award credit to be determined based on expected level of redemption, after considering the market price of the award and the amount of the discounts or incentives that would otherwise be offered to customers who have not earned award credits from an initial sale.
4. The appropriate method of allocation of consideration to award credit needs to be chosen. There are mainly two methods to allocate values to the components of a multiple deliverable arrangement: — Relative fair value method — Fair value of the undelivered component.
5. Once the value of the deliverables has been assigned as above, the management then needs to recognise revenue for the delivered goods at its fair value allocated as above and defer revenue equivalent to the allocated fair value of the award credit.
6. Once the fair value allocation is determined as above, the consideration allocated to sale of goods is not subsequently re-assessed based on change in estimates of forfeiture rate. The change in estimates of forfeiture rate only affects the pattern of recognition of revenue relating to the award credits.
7.    For the undelivered item (i.e., the award credit) the revenue would have to be deferred till the date of actual redemption. On redemption, the revenue attributable to the award credits is recognised.

Let us understand the above principles with the help of an example:

Company X runs a loyalty scheme rewarding a customer’s spend at its stores. Under this scheme, customers are granted 10 loyalty points (or award credits) for every 100 spent in X’s store. Customers can redeem their points for a discount in the price of a new product in X’s stores. The loyalty points are valid for five years and 50 points entitle a customer to a discount of 50 on the retail price of the product in X’s store.

During 2011, X has sales of 500,000 and grants 50,000 loyalty points to its customers. Based on the expectation that only 40,000 loyalty points will be redeemed, management estimates the fair value of each loyalty point granted to be 0.80. During 2011, 15,000 points were redeemed in exchange for new products, and at the end of the reporting period management still expected a total of 40,000 points to be redeemed, i.e., a further 25,000 points will be redeemed.

X records the following entries in 2011 in relation to the loyalty points granted in 2011:

Particulars

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

 

Bank

Dr.

500,000

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

 

460,000

 

 

 

 

To Deferred Revenue

 

 

40,000

(50,000*0.8)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue recognised in relation to sale of goods and deferred
revenue for loyalty points)

At the end of the reporting period, the balance of the deferred revenue is 25,000 [(25,000/40,000) x 40,000]. Therefore, the difference in the deferred revenue balance is recognised as revenue for the year.

Particulars

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

 

Deferred revenue

Dr.

15,000

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

 

15,000

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue recognised in relation to 15,000 loyalty points
redeemed in 2011)

During 2012, 17,500 points are redeemed, and at the end of the year management expects a total of 42,500 points to be redeemed, i.e., an increase of 2,500 over the original estimate. The fair value of each award credit does not change, but the redemption rate is revised based on the new total expected redemptions. At the end of the year, the balance of deferred revenue for 10,000 loyalty points (i.e., 42,500 — 15,000 — 17,500) is 9,412 [(10,000/42,500) x 40,000]. X records the following entry in 2012 in relation to the loyalty points granted in 2011:

Particulars

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

 

Deferred revenue

Dr.

15,588

 

(25,000 – 9,412)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

 

15,588

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue
recognised in relation to loyalty points redeemed in 2012)


Alternatively, on a cumulative basis 30,588 has been released, which can be calculated as (32,500/ 42,500) x 40,000.

Transfer of assets from customers

Ind AS 18 provides guidance on transfers of property, plant and equipment (or cash to acquire it) for entities that receive such assets from their customers in return for a network connection and/or an ongoing supply of goods or services. As such, the principles contained hereunder do not apply to gratuitous transfers of assets i.e., transfer of assets without consideration. Further, the guidance also cannot be applied to transfers that are in the nature of government grants or those covered under the service concession arrangements.

Concept of control

When the Company receives an item of property, plant and equipment from the customer, it will have to assess if the transferred item meets the definition of the asset from the Company’s perspective. An asset is defined as “an asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity”.

It is important to note that in determining whether an asset exists, the right of ownership is not essential. Therefore, if the customer continues to control the transferred item, the asset definition would not be met despite a transfer of ownership. Hence, the Company must analyse if it has obtained the control of the transferred asset to recognise the same in its books.

Control would imply right to utilise the transferred asset the way Company deems fit. For example, the Company can exchange that asset for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners.

As part of the arrangement for transfer of asset from the customer, the arrangement may require that the Company must use the transferred item of property, plant and equipment to provide one or more service to the customer. However, if the Company has the ability to decide how the transferred item of property, plant and equipment is operated and maintained and when it is replaced, it can be concluded that the Company controls the transferred item of property, plant and equipment.

If based on the above principles, it is concluded that the company has obtained control over the asset transferred by the customer, the company shall recognise (debit) the transferred asset as its own asset (though it may not have the ownership). The corresponding impact of the transfer shall be recognised as either revenue or deferred revenue, depending upon the obligations assumed by the company in lieu of the transferred asset.

Timing of revenue recognition
In determining the timing of revenue recognition, the entity (recipient) considers:

  •    what performance obligations it has as a result of receiving the customer contribution;

  •     whether these performance obligations should be separated for revenue recognition purposes; and

  •     when revenue related to each separately identifiable performance obligation should be recognised.

Comprehensive guidance on how to determine the entity’s performance obligations is not provided under the appendix C. In practice it may be difficult to determine whether the entity only has to connect the customer to a network, or it has to provide ongoing access to a supply of goods and services, or both.

All relevant facts and circumstances should be evaluated when determining whether additional performance obligations arise from the transfer including:

  •     whether or not the customer providing the contribution is charged the same fee for the supply of goods or services as is charged to other customers that are not required to make such customer contributions;

  •     whether customers have the ability to change the supplier of goods or services at their discretion; and

  •    whether a successor customer needs to pay a connection fee when the customer that made the customer contribution discontinues the service, and if so, the amount of such connection fee relative to the fair value of the asset contributed.

In our view, in determining whether a rate charged to a customer includes a discount, the entity should compare rates for ongoing services charged to customers that make a contribution with the rates charged to customers that do not.

If it is determined that some or all of the revenue arising from the customer contribution relates to the ongoing supply of goods or services, then the revenue is recognised as those services are delivered. Typically, such revenue is recognised over the term specified in the agreement with the customer. If, however, no such term is specified, then the period of revenue recognition is limited to the useful life of the transferred asset.

Instead of property, plant and equipment, an entity may receive cash that must be used to construct or acquire an item of property, plant and equipment in order to connect the customer to a network and/or provide the customer with ongoing access to a supply of goods or services. The accounting for such cash contributions depends on whether the item of property, plant and equipment to be acquired or constructed is recognised as an asset of the entity on acquisition/completion.

  •     If the asset is not recognised by the entity, then the cash contribution is accounted for as proceeds for providing the asset to the customer under Ind AS 11 or Ind AS 18, as applicable.

  •     If the asset is recognised by the entity, then the asset is recognised and measured as it is constructed or acquired in accordance with Ind AS 16; the cash contribution is recognised as revenue following the guidance as stated above.

Steps involved in accounting for transfer of assets from customers
Having discussed the principles of revenue recognition relating to the transfer of assets from customers, the following are the broad steps involved in accounting for the same:
(1)    Analyse all the relevant agreements to identify arrangements covered within this guidance.

(2)    Assess whether the control over the transferred asset is obtain by the company. If the control is transferred to the company, the asset will be recognised in the Company’s balance sheet.

(3)    Determine the obligations assumed by Company in lieu of the transfer of control over the transferred asset.

(4)    If the above-mentioned obligations are in the nature of ongoing services, then revenue attributable to those obligations is deferred and recognised as the underlying services are rendered and obligations fulfilled.

(5)    To the extent the above-mentioned obligations are fulfilled at the inception of the contract, recognise appropriate revenue upfront.

(6)    Depreciate the acquired asset over its useful life.

Let us understand the above principles with the help of an example:

Company X has entered into an agreement with Company Y to outsource some of its manufacturing process. As part of the arrangement, Company X will transfer the ownership of its machinery to Company Y.

Based on a report submitted by independent valuer, the fair value of assets transferred is Rs. 90,000. Initially, Company Y must use the equipment to provide the service required by the outsourcing agreement. Company Y is responsible for maintaining the equipment and replacing it when it decides to do so. The useful life of the equipment is 3 years. The outsourcing agreement requires service to be provided for 3 years for a fixed price of Rs.10,000 per year which is lower than the price that Company Y would have charged if the equipment had not been transferred. In such case the fixed price would have been Rs.40,000 per annum.

Pursuant to a detailed analysis, Company Y determines that the control over the equipment is transferred in its favour. Hence, Company Y would have to initially recognise the asset at its fair value in accordance with Ind AS 16. Further, Company Y would also have to recognise the revenue over the period of the services performed i.e., over 3 years.

Company Y shall recognise the following journal entries to recognise the transactions under the arrangement:

Particulars

 

Yr
1

Yr
2

Yr
3

 

 

 

 

 

Asset

Dr.

90,000

15,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Deferred

 

90,000

 

15,000

Revenue (Being transfer of

 

 

 

assets from customer)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bank

Dr.

10,000

10,000

10,000

 

 

 

 

 

Deferred Revenue

Dr.

30,000

30,000

30,000

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

40,000

40,000

40,000

(Being revenue recognised

 

 

 

under the arrangement)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Depreciation

Dr.

30,000

30,000

30,000

 

 

 

 

 

To acc. depreciation

 

30,000

30,000

30,000

(Being assets transferred

 

 

 

from customer depreciated

 

 

 

over its useful life)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary
Overall, the implementation of the above guidance on customer loyalty programmes and transfer of assets from customers will require significant judgment in several respects while preparing the entity’s financial statements.

After education, a health surcharge ?

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You may soon have to pay more tax since the government is considering a proposal to levy a surcharge to fund its ambitious plan of providing free healthcare to every citizen in the country.

The Planning Commission’s expert panel that has recommended a levy on universal health coverage has turned down the proposal for a securities transaction tax, and has instead voted for a health surcharge on taxable income to fund the scheme.

The move, it said, would complement the government’s budgetary allocation and also ‘obviate the need for user charges on the rich’.

Cess Pool
(1) Govt. collects Rs.27,500 cr via education cess.
(2) Another Rs.17,700 cr collected by cess goes for construction and maintenance of high ways.
(3) Over Rs.15,000 cr collected as surcharge on corporation, income tax.
(4) Other cesses and surcharges levied by the Centre include those on tobacco, pan masala, salt, among others.
(5) All cesses and surcharges add up to Rs.79,000 cr or 8.5% of total revenues.
(6) They are used for various purposes — from funding calamity relief and contingencies to clean energy.
(7) Govt. had levied cess to fund Kargil war, meet spending needs post Gujarat quake. Both cesses have lapsed. (Source : The Times of India, dated 16-8-2011)

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Non-advocates can appear in consumer cases

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The Supreme Court has ruled that non-lawyers can represent, appear and argue cases filed under the Consumer Protection Act before consumer district forums and commissions.

The Supreme Court passed the directive while dismissing an eight year-old appeal filed by the Bar Council of India against a 2002 Bombay High Court judgment that permitted agents to represent consumers. The Supreme Court Bench of Justice Dalveer Bhandari, Justice R. Mukundakam Sharma and Justice Anil Dave on Monday, however, said special guidelines were needed and accordingly, it directed the National Consumer Commission to ‘frame rules within three months’ to regulate the eligibility, ethics and conduct of non-legal representatives. Agents can be friends or relatives but they cannot accept any remuneration and must display competence.

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UK inks deal to tax cash stashed in secret Swiss bank accounts

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The Swiss government has agreed to tax black money held by UK citizens in Swiss bank accounts, for the first time, while still hiding their identity.

The deal could seen between £ 3 billion and £ 6 billion a year being handed to HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) by Swiss authorities.

The agreement is a part of the HMRC’s latest efforts to track down and tax money hidden in offshore accounts. It follows a similar deal agreed earlier this month between Germany and the Swiss authorities.

The UK citizens’ accounts in Swiss banks will be taxed at between 19% and 34% on the principal sum hidden, depending on how long the account has been running.

The Swiss agreed to make an initial down payment of 500 million Swiss francs (£ 387m) toward the tax liabilities of UK citizens with Swiss accounts.

From 2013, the account holders will also face an annual levy of between 27% and 48% on the income from their accounts, based on whether it has arisen as capital gains, dividends or interest. The UK authorities will also have the right to request the banking details of 500 UK individuals a year for further investigation.

UK citizens will only be able to avoid the new tax measures in Switzerland if they come forward and make a full disclosure of their finances there to HMRC.

(Source: The Times of India, dated 26-8-2011)

(Comment: Will India be able to prevail upon Switzerland to sign a similar deal ? Do we have the necessary political will?)

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25 companies in United States paid more to chief executives than taxman

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At least 25 top United States companies paid more to their chief executives in 2010 than they did to the federal government in taxes, according to a study released.

The companies which include household names like eBay, Boeing, General Electric and Verizon —averaged $ 1.9 billion each in profits, according to the study by the Institute for Policy Studies.

But a variety of shelters, loopholes and tax reduction strategies allowed the companies to average more than $ 400 million each in tax benefits —which can be taken as a refund or used as write-off against earnings in future years.

The authors of the study, which examined the regulatory filings of the 100 companies with the best-paid chief executives, said that their findings suggested that current United States policy was rewarding tax avoidance rather than innovation.

“We have no evidence that CEO’s are fashioning, with their executive leadership, more effective and efficient enterprises,” the study concluded. “On the other hand, ample evidence suggests that CEO’s and their corporations are expending considerably more energy on avoiding taxes than perhaps ever before at a time when the federal government desperately needs more revenue to maintain basic services for the American people.”

The study comes at a time when business leaders have been lobbying for a cut in corporate taxes and Congress and the Obama administration are considering an overhaul of the tax code to reduce the federal budget deficit.

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Foreign banks complain of ‘Imperialist’ US Tax Rule

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A U.S. law meant to snuff out billions of dollars in offshore tax evasion has drawn the criticism of the world’s banks and business people, who dismiss it as imperialist and “the neutron bomb of the global financial system”.

The unusually broad regulation, known as FATCA, or the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, makes the world’s financial institutions something of an extension of the tax-collecting Internal Revenue Service — something no other country does for its tax regime.

Conceived as a way to enlist the world in a crackdown on wealthy Americans evading tax, it gives global financial institutions and investment entities a choice: either collect and turn over data on U.S. clients with accounts of at least $ 50,000, or withhold 30% of the interest, dividend and investment payments due those clients and send the money to the IRS.

Foreign institutions and entities that refuse, or fail, to do so face bills for the taxes due, a draconian penalty of 40% of the amount in question and heightened scrutiny by the IRS.

The legislation that created FATCA was introduced in 2009 by four congressmen during a crackdown on: UBS, the Swiss bank giant that sold tax evasion services. Signed into law by U.S. President Barack Obama in March 2010, FATCA goes into effect on January 1, 2014, for most types of transactions and a year later for other payments.

(Source: www.cnbc.com 19-8-2011)
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Cry for Justices

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Attend to the shortage of judges at all levels on a war-footing.

The impending shortage of judges in the Supreme Court might grab headlines. But it is only the most visible aspect of a problem that ails our entire judicial system, right from the lowest to the highest level: the acute shortage of judges. So, come October, when seven of the judges of the Apex Court are due to retire, the Supreme Court will find itself functioning with less than 75% of its sanctioned strength. The position in High Courts all over the country is no better. According to news reports, with the exception of Himachal Pradesh, there is not a single High Court in the country that is functioning at full strength.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 7-9-2011)
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Indian varsities missing in top 200 global list

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The world’s second-fastest growing economy does not have an educational institute in the top 200 global list this year. The Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay — the only Indian varsity that found itself in the Top 200 Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) World University Rankings in 2010 at the number 187 spot — dropped 38 places to 225. Similarly, IIT Delhi fell to number 218 from 202 in 2010 and IIT Madras dropped to 281 from last year’s 262.

The remaining Indian universities featuring in the rankings, including IIT Kanpur, IIT Kharagpur, IIT Roorkee, IIT Guwahati, University of Delhi, University of Calcutta, University of Pune and University of Mumbai, did not find a place in the Top 300 World University Rankings.

Globally, while Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Oxford bettered their last year’s rankings from five and six to three and five, respectively, Yale University dropped one place from third to fourth rank.

In the Asia list, Japan was the best-represented nation, with five of the top 10 and 57 of the top 200 universities, ahead of China (40) and South Korea (35), Taiwan (16), India (11), Thailand (9), Indonesia (8), Malaysia (7) and Hong Kong (7). Despite its troubled economy, Japan’s universities continued to perform better, with Tokyo and Kyoto each moving up one place to fourth and seventh, respectively. In Singapore, National University of Singapore retained its place in the top three.

(Source: Business Standard, dated 7-9-2011)

(Comment: This is an eloquent testimony of falling standards of higher education in India and therefore the quality of output too. Mumbai University does not find any place at all !)

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Amnesty to tax evaders worries Transparency International

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Amnesty to tax evaders worries Transparency International with the government considering a plan to offer an amnesty scheme for voluntary disclosure of undisclosed bank accounts and assets held abroad, corruption watchdog Transparency International (TI) has expressed concerns about the amnesty to tax evaders. “Implicit in the proposal is acceptance that business corporate houses and individual businessmen have maintained secret bank accounts in foreign countries both by evading taxes and concealing the source of money, which could involve criminal and terrorist activities,” said P. S. Bawa, chair of Transparency International India. The watchdog said the earlier amnesty schemes were premised on the ground that business houses and individuals would learn a lesson, declare income, and pay taxes in future. But, it added, that this has apparently not happened and the hopes of the government have been belied. TI also believed that the present move confirmed the inappropriateness of such schemes that pardoned not only illegal activities and concealment of sources of income, but also evasion of taxes, all of which are punishable under the common and taxation laws. The body said the scheme encouraged tax evaders to continue such practice in the future. “Condoning such opaque activities that are against all norms of transparency, projects the image of the India as a reluctant, soft, and pliable State,” said the press release. TI reiterated that this would be a violation of the basic tenets of the Constitution that provides for rule of law and not executive orders that appear to be arbitrary and in violation of the fundamental right of equality before law.

(Source : www.business-standard.com)
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IS IT FAIR FOR THE BUREAUCRATS TO INDULGE IN WASTEFUL FORMALITIES?

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Introduction
All of us understand the importance of rules and procedures. However, unfortunately the bureaucrats fail to appreciate the very purpose of such rules and procedures. This is not to say that the rules may be bypassed or not complied with. Here is an instance as to how the approach of a government’s office defeats the very purpose of a prescribed formality.

The unfair instance
Recently an application was made to the Director, Software Technology Park of India (STPI), Navi Mumbai under the Right to Information Act, 2005 for obtaining certain information about their status under the Industrial (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951. A similar kind of confirmation was already given by STPI in three other cases. The present application was made since it was insisted upon by the tax authorities. This in itself is another problem.

Court fee stamps worth Rs.10 were affixed to the application
After about 15 days, a letter was received from STPI, New Delhi that the payment of fees by way of court fee stamp was not acceptable. They insisted on payment by cash/DD/postal order.

It was then verified from their website that the fee could be paid only by DD or by postal order. There is no mention of cash. The following questions immediately arise:

(a) they could have easily pointed out such deficiency (if at all it is so) at the time of accepting the application itself.

(b) There is no consistency between what is  written in the letter and what appears on the website — in respect of cash payment.

(c) Nobody seems to have calculated the value of time, paperwork, etc. wasted in this whole exercise.

(d) The amusing thing is that the bank charges for the DD of Rs.10 were Rs.30. Further, even the STPI authorities sent the same from New Delhi by speed-post, which was again a waste of money.

Incidental
On the same subject, in the context of section of 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, there is an Instruction no. 2/2009 of CBDT, dated March 09, 2009 that an approval granted by Director of Industries (STPI) if ratified by the Board of Approval (BOA) is valid. While clarifying this point, STPI office confirmed that the approval granted by them need not be ratified by BOA.

However, in the letter from STPI there was a typographical error. Instead of the word ‘ratified’ it was typed as ‘rectified’. The concerned CIT (Appeals) insisted on a separate confirmation from STPI regarding this obvious typographical error.

The wasteful aspect of this exercise is selfevident.

Conclusion
(1) The authorities should be made aware of the purpose and spirit of the rules.
(2) They should be trained to do a cost benefit of analysis.
(3) They should be made aware that their adamant attitude in waste of national resources.
(4) There should be clarity and consistency at all levels.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12, dated 15- 9-2011 —Savings Bank account maintained by residents in India — Joint holder — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits resident in India to include their non-resident close relative(s) (relatives as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) as joint holder(s) in their resident bank accounts on ‘former or survivor’ basis. However, such nonresident Indian close relatives are not permitted to operate the said bank accounts during the life-time of the resident account holder.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11, dated 7-9- 2011 — External Commercial Borrowings — Simplification of Procedure.

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Presently, RBI approval is required for change of lender for existing External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

This Circular has delegated the powers for approving change of lender for existing ECB to AD Category-I banks in cases where the original lender is an international bank or a multilateral financial institution (such as IFC, ADB, CDC, etc.) or a regional financial institution or a Governmentowned development financial institution or an export credit agency or supplier of equipment and the new lender also belongs to any one of the above mentioned categories, subject to the following:

(i) The new lender is a recognised lender as per the extant ECB norms;

(ii) There is no change in the other terms and conditions of the ECB; and

(iii) The ECB is in compliance with the extant guidelines.

However, RBI approval will have to be obtained, as at present, where change in the recognised lender is due to change of foreign equity holder and foreign collaborator.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10, dated 7-9-2011 — Deferred Payment Protocols, dated April 30, 1981 and December 23, 1985 between Government of India and erstwhile USSR.

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The Rupee value of the special currency basket, with effect from August 23, 2011 is Rs.66.9682 as against the earlier value of Rs.64.7004.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 9, dated 29-8-2011 — Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses.

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Presently, under the Rupee Drawing Arrangements (RDA), inward remittances for permissible purposes are received in India through Exchange Houses situated in Gulf countries, Hong Kong and Singapore, with prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has extended this facility of RDA under the Speed Remittance procedures to Exchange Houses situated in Malaysia.

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Domain Names

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A domain name, to put it simply, is a host-name that identifies Internet Protocol (IP) resources such as a website.1 For example www.kodak.com is the domain name of the website belonging to the Kodak Corporation. If one were to type the above domain name into the browser of their computer they would be directed to the relevant web page belonging to the Kodak Corporation. The Internet, as is well known, is a global network of networks whereby several computers are interconnected to each other. A domain name, thus, enables one computer to reach a particular web page/website and access the desired content.

In the context of the development of e-commerce, the importance of a domain name and its protection to a modern-day businessman is immense. A domain name consists of a top-level domain name and a second-level domain name. The top-level domain name in the above example would be ‘.com’ whilst the second-level domain name would be ‘kodak’. A common practice these days is to have a second-level domain name which consists of the trade mark and/ or trade name of the business as is evident from the said example. Hence, the wrongful use by a third person of a domain name could be extremely harmful to the goodwill, reputation and business of the owner of the domain name. Thus, the primary question which arises is whether a domain name which may consist of a trade mark or trade name can be protected as a form of intellectual property.

However, before dealing with the law on the aspect of protecting domain names, it would be important to have a basic understanding from the technical standpoint as to how the Internet functions and what is the role of a domain name, etc. in order to effectively understand the role of a domain name in practice.

Working of the Internet
As is well known, the Internet is a network of networks. Hence, a fundamental requirement would be that there must exist a system of locating one another as in locating different computers.

The system as it currently exists is that at one end is the user accessing the Internet from, usually, a computer. At the other end is a server, on which is stored in electronic form, the website which the user wishes to access. The user gains access to the Internet at a gateway, either via an internet service provider (ISP) or via a smaller, usually internal, network called an Intranet. In the middle is a highly sophisticated network comprising router and other computers linked together. Each computer connected to the Internet has a unique numerical address known as the Internet Protocol address (for example, 1.256.123.123) so that electronic information is delivered to the right place. To make these identification numbers more user-friendly, they can be associated with identifiers consisting of alphanumeric characters. These identifiers are Internet domain names. Because they are made up from alphanumeric characters, it is possible for the sequence of characters to spell out words and hence trade marks or other signs used by businesses2.

When the Internet was in its infancy, the system of registering domain names was done through a department of the Government of United States of America. However in the 1990s the United States Government put together an interagency working group to formulate a policy on privatising the domain name system. The idea of a new private non-profit corporation to administer the domain name system evolved into the setting up of the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). ICANN was formed in 1998 and is a corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. The ICANN allows different registrars to register domain names for use on the internet. ICANN, however does not control the content on the domain.

Law in India
Now let us examine the legal position in India on the protection of a domain name as a form of intellectual property. The issue is no longer res integra and has been answered categorically by the Supreme Court in the case of Satyam Infoway Limited v. Sifynet Solutions Private Limited3. The respondent in the said appeal had raised the defence that a domain name is merely an address on the Internet. The registration of a domain name with ICANN could not confer any intellectual property right, since the same was a contract with a registration authority allowing communication to reach the owner’s computer via Internet links channelled through the registration authority’s server which was in a way akin to registration of a company name which is a unique identifier of a company but by itself confers no intellectual property rights. The Apex Court, however, negatived the said contention and held, inter alia, as under;

“The original role of a domain name was no doubt to provide an address for computers on the Internet. But the Internet has developed from a mere means of communication to a mode of carrying on commercial activity. With the increase of commercial activity on the Internet, a domain name is also used as a business identifier. Therefore, the domain name not only serves as an address for internet communication, but also identifies the specific Internet site. In the commercial field, each domain name owner provides information/services which are associated with such domain name. Thus a domain name may pertain to provision of services within the meaning of section 2(z). A domain name is easy to remember and use, and is chosen as an instrument of commercial enterprise not only because it facilitates the ability of consumers to navigate the Internet to find websites they are looking for, but also at the same time, serves to identify and distinguish the business itself, or its goods or services, and to specify its corresponding online Internet location. Consequently a domain name as an address must, of necessity, be peculiar and unique and where a domain name is used in connection with a business, the value of maintaining an exclusive identity becomes critical. “As more and more commercial enterprises trade or advertise their presence on the web, domain names have become more and more valuable and the potential for dispute is high. Whereas a large number of trademarks containing the same name can comfortably co-exist because they are associated with different products, belong to business in different jurisdictions, etc., the distinctive nature of the domain name providing global exclusivity is much sought after. The fact that many consumers searching for a particular site are likely, in the first place, to try and guess its domain name has further enhanced this value”. The answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph is therefore an affirmative.”

The Apex Court, further held that the use of the same or similar domain name may lead to a diversion of users. Diversion of users means that a person may be directed to another website instead of the website he desires to access. To illustrate consider a case where a user is searching for www.kodak. com, but inadvertently types www.kodake.com into the Internet browser or a search engine and is then directed to the webpage of some third party, this would mean that he has been diverted away from the webpage he sought access to. This would be a form of passing of wherein the user of the mark ‘kodake’ is using the goodwill of the mark ‘kodak’ to divert customers to his website. This could impact e-commerce and its features of instant accessibility to users and potential customers and particularly so in areas of overlap between the two domains. Ordinary consumers/ users seeking to locate the functions available under one domain name may be confused if they accidentally arrived at a different but similar website which offers no such services. Such users could well conclude that the first domain name owner had mis-represented its goods or services through its promotional activities and the first domain owner would thereby lose their custom. It is apparent therefore that a domain name may have all the characteristics of a trade mark and could be protected as such.

Thus, the Apex Court squarely holds that a domain name can be protected as a trade mark. Hence, the proprietor of a trade mark may prevent a wrongful use of a domain name which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to its trade mark by filing proceedings for infringement and/ or passing off.

One factor which must be noted though is that whilst a trade mark is territorial, inasmuch as it would normally be registered within each country separately and protected by the laws of that country, a domain name is registered and used in cyberworld bereft of national boundaries. Thus protection under the national legal system of a country may not always suffice.

To illustrate if Kodak Corporation filed a suit in India against an infringer for injunctive orders against the use of the domain name ‘kodak. com’, the order of the Indian Courts would only be effective within the territory of India and not beyond, even though the infringing website can be accessed from anywhere in the world. Hence, in order to provide a solution to overcome this hurdle, the ICANN adopted the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).

Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy

The UDRP is a dispute resolution mechanism set up by the ICANN based on the report of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). India is one of the 171 countries of the world, who are members of WIPO. WIPO was established as a vehicle for promoting the protection, dissemination and use of intellectual property throughout the world.

The UDRP is incorporated by reference into every agreement for registration of a domain name. The UDRP states that if a third party complainant asserts to the relevant Registrar of domain name that the impugned domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trade mark or that the alleged registrant of the domain name has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name or that the domain name is being used in bad faith, then the dispute will be submitted to a mandatory administrative proceeding.

Thus, under the UDRP a complaint may be filed by any party based on the criterion required by the policy for either cancellation or transfer of the domain name. The proceedings are heard and decided by the members of the administrative panel. It may be relevant to note that the said mandatory administrative proceeding does not bar recourse to Courts and that the policy provides that either the complainant or the registrant may approach a Court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution of the disputes before the administrative proceedings are commenced or after they are concluded. In fact, even an order of the administrative panel is not to be executed for a period of 10 days after it is passed to enable the registrant to approach a Court of competent jurisdiction. In such a case, the panel’s decision would normally stand stayed till the outcome in the lawsuit4.

Thus, any person aggrieved by the wrongful use of a domain name has in principle two routes available to him. The person aggrieved may initiate an action for infringement and passing off under the trade mark law in a Court of competent jurisdiction, if the other requirements are met and may also file a complaint under the UDRP for cancellation and/or transfer of the impugned domain name.

Cybersquatting

At this juncture, before concluding, I would like to draw attention to one of the most common problems faced with respect to wrongful use of domain names i.e., cybersquatting. Cybersquatting (also known as domain squatting), according to the United States federal law ‘Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act’, is registering, trafficking in, or using a domain name with bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trade mark belonging to someone else. The cybersquatter then offers to sell the domain to the person or company who owns a trade mark contained within the name at an inflated price5.

This is a very nefarious and prevalent practice. Cybersquatters register several trade-marks as domain names and then hoard them, so that the true owner cannot register a domain name in consonance with its trade mark. At this stage the cybersquatter would then offer to sell the domain name to the true owner of the trade mark thereby making a wrongful profit. A recent illustration of this in the Indian context would be the case of Mr. Arun Jaitley. Mr. Jaitley wanted to register a domain name with his name, but was informed that the domain name www. arunjaitley.com was already registered. The Delhi High Court after considering the several facts involved in that matter was pleased to direct transfer of the domain name and grant punitive damages6.

Another form of cybersquatting would be where the top-level domain name is changed to make several different domain names, such as www.arunjaitley.in or www.arunjaitley.org. In such cases also protection may be sought as in the earlier case.

The problem of cybersquatting is rampant and very serious, hence in addition to the protection already available under the law relating to trade marks and under the UDRP, it may be important to draft a specific legislation to meet with and provide an efficacious remedy against such cyber-squatters. The primary need for such a legislation is obvious inasmuch as the prevalent laws do not deal with such situations, but Courts have by broadly interpreting the prevalent statutes carved out remedies.

Considering the importance and prevalence of the Internet in our lives today, it stands to reason that a domain name is a very valuable property. Second-level domain names which normally tend to consist of the trade mark of a business are the key identifiers to enable a consumer to reach the address/ webpage he wishes to access. There may be cases where a consumer reaches a website only to find that the webpage does not belong to the host he is looking for however, the damage of diversion is already done. Hence, it is imperative that all trade mark owners even if they do not maintain a presence in cyberspace ensure that no wrongful use and/ or deceptive use of their trade mark is being used. Such vigilance is necessary to ensure protection of the trade mark and the goodwill and reputation therein as also to prevent unwary consumers from being deceived.

VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INSIDER TRADING — whether punishable by SEBI?

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Can a Director be punished for violating the Company’s Code of Conduct on insider trading? What is the implication if the law only requires that the Company frame a Code, but does not make violations of the Code punishable? The answer to this question is not just critical for all listed companies that have framed fairly stringent Code of Conduct for insider trading, but is also relevant as a fundamental question of law. It should make companies also pause before drafting any Code of Conduct — whether for insider trading or otherwise. This question arises for consideration on account of a recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) which has held that violation of the Code of Conduct is punishable with penalty. And, if extended to its logical end, this conclusion would imply that other penal consequences could also follow.

It is worth discussing the background and general context of this issue first. Generally, SEBI provides detailed Regulations for orderly development of capital markets, etc. It regulates and punishes evils such as price manipulation, fraudulent market practices, insider trading, etc. and also provides for other regulations for investor protection, etc. SEBI did attempt to delegate some self-regulatory powers to bodies such as intermediaries, associations and even the companies themselves. The objective seemed to ensure self-discipline so that the burden on SEBI is reduced and SEBI comes into the picture for serious violations or where the self-regulating body itself is negligent. To that effect, the idea was also to circulate model Codes of Conduct which the self-regulating body could follow. Such model also helps in creating a sense of voluntary self-discipline.

However, SEBI often does lay down such Code of Conduct as part of Regulations to be followed without option and in other cases, it requires that the Company frame a Code and gives a model draft. Thus, for example, in cases of stock-brokers, the Code of Conduct laid down for them is prescribed as part of the Regulations which they have to follow and in case of violations, penal consequences follow.

In the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 (‘the Regulations’), companies and other entities were required to draft a Code of Conduct (for which a model was given) and then they were left to enforce it in the manner they deemed fit. It is important to note that the basic act of insider trading was defined in great detail in the Regulations itself. Insider trading was made punishable with penalty, apart from other penal consequences. However, to ensure that even companies take preventive steps to ensure that insider trading does not actually happen, a ‘model code of conduct’ was provided and the Regulations stated that the companies “shall frame a code of internal procedures and conduct as near thereto the Model Code . . . . . without diluting it in any manner and ensure compliance of the same”. Further, the companies were also required to “adopt appropriate mechanisms and procedures to enforce the Code”. It was also clarified that “action taken by the (company) for violation of the code . . . . . . shall not preclude (SEBI) from initiating proceedings for violation of these Regulations”. The Code consists of procedures like ensuring control over sensitive information, procedures for purchase/sale of shares by the employees, etc., prohibition on sale/purchase in short gaps, etc.

The Code itself provides that for violation of the provisions of the Code, the person concerned “may be penalised and appropriate action may be taken by the company” and “shall also be subject to disciplinary action by the company” of various types which may include wage freeze, etc.

Clearly, if the Company does not frame such a Code of Conduct, it would have violated the Regulations which would result in appropriate penal and other action. However, the question then is if an employee or director violates the Code, and it is not a case of insider trading under the Regulations, can SEBI take action against such employee/director? That was the issue raised in the present case.

The facts of this case can be summarised as follows. The listed company had proposed to carry out certain restructuring transactions which were price-sensitive. The Board of the Company met and passed resolution for such transactions. The Company duly disseminated to the stock exchanges the fact that such decisions were taken. The Managing Director of the Company (‘the MD’), however, sold shares of the Company.

Insider trading is essentially an act where an insider deals in securities of a Company on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information. Now it is important to note that in the present case, there was no allegation that the MD engaged in insider trading. However, he sold the shares before expiry of 24 hours of the outcome of such Board Meeting being made public. Thus, he was alleged to have violated the Code of Conduct of the Company.

The MD resigned as a Managing Director of the Company and thereafter the Company did not take any action against him apparently satisfied with his voluntary act of resigning as the Managing Director.

However, SEBI initiated action against the MD alleging that he had violated the Code of Conduct. The MD’s contention that violation of the Code was not violation of the Regulations was not accepted and a penalty of Rs.1 crore was levied on him. The MD appealed to SAT which upheld the order of the Adjudicating Officer, but reduced the penalty to Rs.25 lakhs.

Some important extracts from the SAT order are given in the following paragraphs (emphasis provided).

“It needs to be noted that the charge against the appellant in the show-cause notice is of violating Regulation 12(1) read with clause 3.2-3 and 3.2-5 of the code of conduct specified under Part A of Schedule I of the Regulations. In the impugned order, the appellant has been held to be guilty of violating the provisions of the code of conduct only. There is no allegation of insider trading against the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant had sold shares within the period when trading window was closed and thus violated the code of conduct prescribed by the company in terms of the obligations imposed upon it under the Regulations. The case of the appellant is that such violation of the code of conduct does not amount to violation of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder and hence not punishable by the Board. It is for the company alone to take action against the appellant. The question that needs to be answered, therefore, is whether violation of the code of conduct formulated by the company in compliance with the requirements of Regulations amounts to violation of Regulations

. . . . . Paragraph 5 of the code of conduct provides for reporting requirements for transactions in securities by all directors/officers/ designated employees and the compliance officer of the company is required to maintain records of all such declarations in the appropriate form.

(The Code) also provides that any sale/purchase or acquisition of shares and securities by all directors/ officers/designated employees shall not be allowed during a period of one exclusive day and conclude one exclusive day after the specified corporate action including declaration of financial results and declaration of dividends.

9.    Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records and the provisions of the regulations referred to above, we are of the considered view that the only possible conclusion that can be arrived at is that the code of conduct prescribed by the company for prevention of insider trading as mandated by the Regulations for all practical purposes is to be treated as a part of the Regulations and any violation of the code of conduct can be dealt with by the Board as violation of the Regulations framed by it. It needs to be appreciated that each company may like to add certain activities regulation of which may be necessary for preservation of price-sensitive information. The Board, cannot foresee all such contingencies and, therefore, it has laid down model code of conduct prescribing bare minimum conduct expected from the directors/ designated employees of the companies. The framing of code of conduct as near to the model code of conduct specified in the Schedule to the Regulations is mandatory for each company. The use of the word ‘shall’ makes it abundantly clear that this is a bare minimum conduct expected from the employees of the company. Paragraph 6 of the model code of conduct also makes it clear that the action by the company shall not preclude the Board from taking any action in case of violation of the Regulations.

…..the different nomenclature given to the code of conduct as a model code of conduct is to provide sufficient leverage to the company to make additions to the bare minimum code as prescribed in the Schedule to the Regulations.

11.    The provisions of the Regulations have to be interpreted keeping in view the aims and objectives of the Act. The main object of the Act is to protect the interest of investors in securities and to promote the development of and to regulate the securities market. In case the interpretation given by learned senior counsel for the appellant is accepted, it may lead to a situation where a person is not punished by the company for violating the code of conduct based on the model code of conduct prescribed in the Regulations and the Board finds itself unable to take action because the code of conduct is framed by the company. In fact this is what has precisely happened in this case. The company vide its letter dated February 11, 2008 has informed the Board that the appellant resigned from the office of the Managing Director and it was not possible to persue any action against him and the company decided to close the matter…. The purpose of the insider trading regulations is to prohibit trading by which an insider gains advantages by virtue of his access to price-sensitive information. The evil of insider trading is well recognised. A construction should be adopted that advance rather than suppress this object. To adopt the construction as suggested by the learned senior counsel for the appellant would result in allowing insider trading within a period set by the Board or by the company during which no trading is permissible.

12. We are, therefore, of the considered view that violation of the code of conduct, as framed by the company in accordance with the mandates prescribed in the Regulations, is nothing but part of the Regulations and any violation thereof is punishable by the Board also as violation of the Regulations in addition to such action that may be taken by the company. Any other view taken in the facts and circumstances of the case will defeat the very purpose of the Regulations in question.”

It is submitted with respect that the decision of SAT is erroneous in law. It goes against the wording of the law as well as the nature of the Code of Conduct prescribed in the insider trading Regulations. The only requirement under the Regulations is that the Company should frame the Code of Conduct. If the Company does not frame the Code of Conduct, there is a violation by the Company. If the Company frames the Code of Conduct and if an employee violates it and the Company does not take action, then too the Company may be held liable. However, there is no requirement in the Regulations that employees should follow the Code and if they do not, there would be punishment. Neither is there such a requirement nor is any penal consequences provided. It is not clear how an act can be punished when there is no requirement in law to follow it and also no requirement in law providing for punishment.

If SEBI is deemed to have the power to punish violations of the Code of Conduct, then the provision that the Company ‘may’ take action for violation of the Code of Conduct and this not preclude power of SEBI to punish for violations of the Regulations may be redundant.

The concern of SAT that persons may get away with insider trading if such an interpretation is taken is totally misplaced. The Regulations clearly cover cases of insider trading. In this case, no allegation at all was made of an act of insider trading. The violation was of a procedure to prevent insider trading. If there was no insider trading at all, then there is no question of any punishment. A preventive provision is to ensure that insider trading does not take place. If a person does not follow the preventive step, then the Company may punish such person. If the person does not follow the preventive step and also commits insider trading, then the Company and SEBI both may punish such person. But merely for not carrying out the preventive step which is regulated by the Company and when there is no insider trading at all, SEBI has no role to play.

Insider trading is certainly a bane in the capital markets and needs sternest of action. However, it is submitted that this decision needs reconsideration. It creates a wrong precedent and uncertainty as to the manner in which laws would be framed and enforced.

(2011) 23 STR 265 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore v. Lakshmi Technology & Engineering Indus Ltd.

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Cenvat credit — Renting of immovable property services provided by manufacturer of excisable goods — Manufacturer used credit from a common pool of excise, customs and service tax —Rule permit taking of such credit under a common pool and permit use of such credit for different purposes and thus the utilisation held valid.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of satellite components and aircraft components, also provided service of renting of immovable property. They used the credit in Cenvat account for paying excise duty on the goods cleared by them and also for paying service tax on service rendered under the category of Renting of Immovable Property. SCN was issued alleging that capital goods, inputs and input services on which credit was taken had no nexus with the renting of property service and thus Cenvat credit could not be utilised by them and demanded service tax accordingly along with interest and penalty.

Held:
It was held that a manufacturer of excisable goods is entitled to use the credit from a common pool to which different categories of specified excise duties, customs duty and service tax are allowed to be taken of.

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(2011) 23 STR 263 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad v. Azzam Rubber Products Ltd.

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Refund — Double payment of service tax by recipient of GTA services — Tax incidence paid by present respondent — Disclaimer certificate produced from transporters — U/s.11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 not necessary that person paying tax has to claim refund — Revenue’s appeal rejected.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of footwear, availed the services of goods transports agency i.e., for transportation of inputs and final products. The respondents while depositing service tax mentioned the name of the transporter inadvertently on the challan instead of their own name. On realising their mistake, remitted the tax again vide TR6 challan. The respondents filed an application for refund of tax paid by them earlier and submitted a disclaimer certificate from the transporter stating they have no objection in the said amount being refunded to the respondent. The Department contended that the refund could be granted only to the transporter who made the actual payment as per TR-6 challan and not to the respondent.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that any person was authorised to claim the refund if the applicant is able to furnish documents to establish that duty of incidence has not been passed on. It was held that in the present case, the duty of incidence was paid by the respondents and hence the Revenue‘s appeal was rejected.

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(2011) 23 STR 254 (Tri.-Del.) — Desert Inn Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Madap-keeper service — Valuation — Parking charges collected from clients includible — Section 65(105)(m) of the Finance Act, 1994 — Suppression of facts — Extended period of limitation can be invoked — Penalty — Option of 25% of penalty within 30 days to be provided.

Facts:
The appellants were providing services of mandapkeeper and paid service tax for the said activity. They also had parking space for which they charged separately from by their clients who enjoyed the services of mandap. A service tax was demanded on the charges for the said parking charges along with interest and penalties.

The appellants contended that they issued separate invoices for the charges and the same was reflected in their balance sheet separately. Also, the major portion of the demand was time-barred. Relying on the judgment in the case of Merwara Estates v. CCE, Jaipur 2009 (16) STR 268 (Tri.-Delhi), the appellants submitted that the penalties are not to be imposed in cases involving interpretation. Further, extended period of limitation was not invocable as suppression could not be alleged on the basis of balance sheet. The appellants relied on the judgment in the case of Martin & Harris Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE, Gurgaon 2005 (185) ELT 421 (Tri.-Delhi). The respondents submitted that without the parking space the mandap could not have been enjoyed by the clients and the car parking charges were not being collected from the persons parking their cars.

Held:
Taking into consideration the definition of ‘Mandapkeeper services’ u/s.65(105)(m) of the Act and the nature of services provided by the appellants, it was held that the services of car parking was in relation to use of the mandap as the car parking was a necessary facility for the use of mandap. The fact of separate collection of car parking charges was not coming clearly in the balance sheet. Extended period of limitation was held invokable as the appellants suppressed the facts from the Department. As regards penalty, it was observed that the appellants were not granted the option of paying 25% of the penalty within 30 days of the order of adjudication as held in the case of K. P. Pouches (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 2008 (228) ELT 331. Also, penalty once imposed u/s.78, penalty u/s.76 is not maintainable. Accordingly, demand of service tax was confirmed along with interest. As regards penalty, an option to pay 25% of the penalty within 30 days of the communication of this order was granted to the appellants.

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(2011) 23 STR 221 (Tri.-Delhi) — Instrumentation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I.

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Work contracts — Liability before 1-6-2007 —
Even in indivisible contract — Lump sum turn key (LSTK) work contracts
or EPC projects — Services provided as part of such contracts liable to
service tax — No mention that service tax is leviable in respect of only
stand-alone activity u/s.65(105) or 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act) — Service tax attracted if service is taxable — Consulting
Engineering Service — Engineering drawings separately charged in
contract — Activity covered under Consulting Engineer services — Failure
to obtain registration — Returns not filed — Non-payment of service tax
since 1997 — Assessee guilty of suppression — Extended period of
limitation invokable and liable to penalty.

Facts:
The
appellants engaged in the manufacture of telecommunication equipment,
UPS Systems, and primary and secondary instruments, etc., chargeable to
Central Excise duty. In addition, the appellants also designed,
installed and commissioned the electronic control systems, provided
operational training to the customer’s employees and also undertook
repair and maintenance of these equipments as per the contract with
their customers. Pursuant to the introduction of ‘Consulting Engineers’,
‘Installation & Commissioning’ and ‘Repairs and maintenance’ as
taxable services under section 65 of the Act), the appellants took
service tax registration for ‘Repair & Maintenance’ on 1-8-2003 and
for ‘Installation & commissioning’ and ‘Repairs & Maintenance’
on 20-1-2004. A show-cause notice was issued against the appellants in
respect of the ‘Consulting Engineer’ services provided prior to 1-8-2003
for service tax amounting to Rs.40,71,946 along with interest and
penalty.

Key contention of the appellants:
The
appellants did not provide any Consulting Engineer’s services but
executed lump sum turnkey contracts for design, engineering,
manufacture, supply, erection, testing and commissioning of control
systems. The lower Appellate Authority overlooked the law laid by the
Tribunal in the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodra 2003
(155) ELT 457 and a plethora of other cases holding that “lump sum
turn-key contracts for design, engineering, manufacture, supply,
erection, testing and commissioning cannot be vivisected to levy service
tax on the service components”. The view taken by the Tribunal in the
case of CCE, Raipur v. BSBK Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (253) ELT 522 (Tribunal-LB)
that after 46th Constitution amendment, the service part of a turnkey
contract can be separated from the goods part for levy of service tax
did not apply in the present case as the legal fiction under Article
366(29A) cannot be applied to the laws other than sales tax. The
appellants relied on a plethora of cases such as BSNL v. Union of India,
2006 (3) SCC 1, Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v.
Electricity Inspector, (2007) 5 SCC 447, Geo Miller & Co. (P) Ltd.
v. State of M.P., 2004 (5) SCC 209, etc. Relying on the decision in the
case of Patnaik & Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1965 SC 1655, it was
submitted that drawing and designs prepared were to be treated as
service provided by the appellant to themselves and not a consulting
engineer’s service provided to clients. Separate amount indicated in the
contract for ‘drawing/designing or engineering’ was only for a
milestone payment to be released on preparation and approval of drawings
and could be treated as value attributable to the drawings and
designing. The contracts in the case were indivisible turn-key contracts
with single-point responsibility which could be treated as severable
contracts. Such contracts became taxable as ‘Work contract services’
w.e.f. 1-6-2007 under 65(105)(zzza) of the Act and any activity under
work contract was not taxable prior to that date. The longer period of
limitation for demand of allegedly non-paid service tax was not
available to the Department as they were aware of the activities of the
appellants since 1991.

Key contention of the respondent:
The
services rendered as ‘consulting engineer’ were clearly distinguishable
as the clauses of the contract showed the intention to provide the
services and to charge separately for the same. The Tribunal in the case
of Transformers & Electricals Kerala Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (1) STR 233
(CESTAT-DB) held that the engineering consultancy component of EPC
contracts was taxable. Further, the terms of the contract clearly
indicated that service tax was rightly demanded on the charges for
drawing, designs and other technical assistance. There was no provision
in the Act that taxable service mentioned in section 65(105) will not be
taxable if provided under a lump sum turn-key contract (LSTK) or as a
work contract. There was no documentary evidence produced to show that
charges for drawing, designs, engineering assistance, etc. in the
contracts and invoices were not the actual charges for these contracts. A
work contract is a service contract and if that service was taxable
w.e.f. 1-6-2007, the same would attract service tax prior to 1-6-2007,
even if it is provided as a lump sum work contract. In addition it was
contended that the decision of Daelim (supra) did not lay down any law
as SLP was summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Karnataka High
Court decision of Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. was not a
binding precedent as no reasons were provided in the said judgment for
holding works contract as not liable for service tax.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that the preparation of basic and detailed engineering
drawings, on the basis of which erection and installation work was done
and training of clients was technical assistance provided to the clients
and it had to be held as consulting engineer’s services. As regards the
issue of subjecting lump sum turn-key work contracts to service tax
payment and the levying of the same prior to 1-6-2007, the Tribunal
observed that a contract will attract service tax if the service is
taxable u/s.65(105) of the Act and the legal fiction of Article 366(29A)
was of no relevance in this case. Service tax shall be chargeable in
case of a work contract for a particular service which is taxable
u/s.65(105) of the Act, regardless of it being divisible or indivisible.
The meaning of work contract being a contract for work and labour i.e.,
a service contract prior to 1-6-2007 and hence service tax would be
levied on the same prior to 1-6-2007. The contract and the invoices
indicated that the clients were charged for drawings/designs,
engineering and technical training and hence the contracts contained
component of activity covered by ‘Consulting Engineer service’. Hence,
service tax was chargeable. The longer period of limitation of five
years for unpaid service tax was rightly invoked in the light of the
appel-lant’s failure to furnish any explanation for non-payment of
service tax and for not obtaining registration. Penalty imposed u/s.76,
77 and 78 were also rightly imposed as the facts were suppressed.

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(2011) 23 STR 345 (Kar.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Mangalore v. Dee Pee En Corporation.

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Quantum of penalty — Whether penalty could be levied at the rate of Rs.100 per day on failure to pay duty by the assessee for period prior to 10-9-2004.

Facts:
The issue for consideration was whether the appellant could levy penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day on failure to pay duty by the assessee for the period prior to 10-9-2004 or not. According to the assessee, the provisions of section 76 to levy penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day came only from 10-9-2004 and thus it could not be levied retrospectively. The Department relying on the judgment in the case of ETA Engineering Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai 2004 (174) ELT 19 (Tri.- LB) contended that even for the period prior to 10-9-2004, the Tribunal had confirmed the order of levying penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the judgment of ETA Engineering Ltd. was not applicable to this case as it did not consider effective date of the amended provision. It was held that penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day was leviable for the period 10-9-2004 onwards and not prior to the said date.

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The Second Freedom Struggle – Our Unfinished Agenda

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Mahatma Gandhi gave us freedom from the Britishers. Yet, we still have to be free from hunger, poverty, and above all, from corruption. We, the older generation, who witnessed to our freedom struggle were losing heart. We remembered with nostalgia and a deep sense of sadness those days when the whole country was united and fighting against the foreign rule. The air resounded with the slogans of ‘Quit India’ and ‘Do or Die’. I personally recollected having helped in making badges and posters at home. We believed that all is lost and the torch lit by Gandhiji and our other leaders is extinguished. There is no more light. Only darkness.

But things are not so bad. There is a silver lining to the dark clouds. Anna Hazare and his team have rekindled the flame. From what we believed were smoldering ashes, he has relit a flame and brought back hope.

In August, we saw history in the making. Anna Hazare demonstrated to us and the world, what can be achieved by satyagraha and non-violence and how the common people can make the Government wake up from its slumber, sit up and listen to the message that people are not prepared to tolerate corruption.

The fight today is against corruption. We have to get rid of this cancer which is eating away the very vitals of our social fabric, that is based on Dharma and sapping at the very roots of our real freedom.

The present generation is dimly aware of the great movement which brought us freedom. I am reminded of an incident narrated in the book ‘Exodus’. The Jews were fighting the Britishers to get their homeland. One aged freedom fighter, a grandfather was dying of bullet injuries, suffered while breaking out from the prison where he was held pending his execution. His young grandson, who had helped him in the escape, tells him “Grandfather, it is good to die for one’s country”. The grandfather replies, “Son, it is good to have a country to die for !” People today are not aware what it means to be citizens of a free country. The sacrifices of freedom fighters and lakhs of our people during the freedom struggle have been forgotten.

There are three great things about the entire movement by Anna Hazare, which have gladdened my heart. First is the spontaneous response of lakh’s of people to the cause. Such a response was beyond the wildest imagination of anyone. Second is the amalgam of people which responded. They were from every strata of society. Many of them were young and most of them were the common man. It was indeed a movement of masses and the younger generation. The third is that the entire movement was peaceful and without any violence, incidents of looting, stone throwing or burning of vehicle. There was nothing like ‘The Jasmine Revolution’ of Middle East. This has restored my faith in our people and the principles laid down by Mahatma Gandhi.

But the battle has just begun. We have to see that the torch lit by Anna remains burning. There is a saying in Gujarati, that “Gujaratis are courageous only in the beginning”. That applies to the rest of the country also. We have to disprove this and wash this black stain from our forehead. Of course Mahatma Gandhi proved this for us.

I came across this very apt shloka from Niti Shatakam of Bhartruhari.

“Base men do not undertake any work apprehending obstacles. Mediocres make a start, but cease working when they encounter hindrances. The men of excellence, however, after commencing a job do not give up despite recurrence of impediments.”

We all have to take part in this movement against corruption. We have to finish it before it finishes us. We can no longer be passive observers. We must support and participate in the anti-corruption movement in every possible way. Of course we must resolve not to be part of corruption. We must not indulge in ‘convenient corruption’ — corruption to get what we want through offering bribes. We must also resist coercive corruption and refuse demands for bribes.

I would end with my Namaskaar to Anna and his team, for starting the struggle, and leading from the front, and also to millions who gave tremendous sacrifices in our freedom struggle. Let us assure Anna that we all are with him in this struggle to eradicate this cancer called corruption. Let us then rise united for this cause, and see that the torch of real freedom remains ever burning.

I conclude by quoting the national poet and freedom fighter Zaverchand Meghani:

“We do not know what perils lie ahead of us on the path. We only know that the call has come from Mother India.”
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(2011) 23 STR 369 (Tri.-Bang.) — Ceolric Services v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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Non-consideration of revised return filed belatedly — Return revised after lapse of 11 months — Rule 7C states revised return cannot be ignored just because it is filed after period provided in Rule 7B.

Facts:
Service tax was demanded and penalty was levied. The applicant had filed a return under Rule 7 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and subsequently revised it. The lower authority had not taken into consideration the revised return as it was filed after a lapse of 11 months and as per the rules, the revised return was to be filed within 60 days.

Held:
It was held that revised return cannot be ignored simply on the ground that the same was filed after the period provided under Rule 7B by virtue of section 7C of the Service Tax Rules 1994. The appeal was allowed by way of remand.

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(2011) 23 STR 367 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Nemlaxmi Books (India) P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat.

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Refund of Cenvat credit accumulated on export of goods — More than one refund claim filed for same quarter — Violation of condition No. 2A of appendix of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) and not sustainable — Rejection of refund upheld.

Facts:
The appellants were exporting stationary items, namely, notebooks and exercise books which were exempted from duty. The appellants were availing Cenvat credit on the duty paid on inputs and accordingly filed among other applications, an application on quarterly basis for refund of the accumulated credit on account of export for an amount of Rs.69,024 for the quarter January 2007 to March 2007. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the lower original authority and inter alia held that the second application filed by the appellants seeking refund of Rs. 69,504 was hit by condition 2(a) of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) which allows for refund of Cenvat credit only in cases where claims for such refund are submitted not more than once for any quarter in a calendar year. The appellants contended that the Commissioner (Appeals) travelled beyond the scope of show-cause notice as the original authority had not rejected the refund claim on the ground of two applications being submitted for one simple quarter under the condition of 2A.

Held:
The Tribunal concurred with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the plea for admissibility of refund was too feeble and devoid of any merits.

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(2011) 23 STR 346 (Tri.-Del.) — State Bank of Indore v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore.

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Banking and other financial services — Exemption under Notification No. 29/2004-ST for tax on interest in relation to overdraft, cash credit, bill discounting or exchange — Allegation that condition of interest being separately shown in invoice not fulfilled.

Facts:
The appeal was filed the Bank challenging the adjudication order levying service tax and cess. The appellant had followed all RBI guidelines and the debit slips in all transactions clearly disclosed interest and other receipts. The Department contended that the conditions of Notification No. 29/2004-ST exempting interests on overdraft facility, cash credit facility or discounting of bills, bills of exchange or cheques in relation to banking services were not fulfilled as the interest amount was not shown separately in any invoice, a bill or a challan issued for the purpose.

Held:
Strict interpretation was unwarranted if it is established that the claimant squarely falls within the exemption zone. However, it was necessary to satisfy the authority through evidence. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of with a direction to the appellant to adduce evidence as required by the Notification.

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(2011) 23 STR 310 (Tri.-Del.) — Prakash Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur.

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Adjudication — Adjournment of hearing to be at insistence of parties — Not for difficulty faced by authority or circumstances beyond its control — Limit of three adjournments has to be understood from facts of case — Fourth adjournment may be granted if circumstances demand and no choice left — Section 33A(2) of Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act).

Adjudication — Denial of request of cross-examination of persons whose statements were relied in SCN — Denial on ground that the case was based on documentary evidence and not on statements of persons.

Held:
Adjudicating authority pre-judged the issue and acted with pre-conceived mind — Natural justice principles to be followed by quasi-judicial authorities depending on facts/circumstances of case.

Appeal — Right to appeal not taken away and cannot be denied on ground of delay.

Facts:
An SCN was issued to the appellants demanding duty on unaccounted produces pursuant to the search and seizure. Notices were also sent to transporters. The Commissioner addressed a letter dated 26th September, 2008 to one of the appellants whereby the appellants’ request for cross-examination of witnesses was rejected and final date of hearing was intimated to the appellants.

The two issues requiring consideration are relating to misconstruction of provisions of law comprised u/s.33-A of the Act and the arbitrary rejection of the request for cross-examination of the persons whose statements were recorded and relied upon documents for conclusion in the matter.

The appellants contended that the Commissioner misconstrued the provisions contained in section 33-A of the Act which provided for granting of adjournment of hearing to a party for not more than three times as this was only an outer limit for number of days for hearing and thereby pleaded denial of natural justice. Referring to the Supreme Court decision in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 513 it was contended that the letter dated 26th September, 2008 clearly disclosed that the Commissioner had pre-judged the issue and had a biased approach in relation to the right of the appellants to cross-examine the persons whose statements were recorded and to be relied upon for the findings. This amounted to violation of principle of natural justice. According to the Revenue, the allegation of the appellants of biased attitude was devoid of substance. Such allegations cannot be made at a later stage after the final order was delivered. The appellants were uncooperative from the commencement of the proceedings. Further, relying on the decision in the case of Debu Shah v. Collector of Customs, 1990 (48) ELT 302, inter alia it was contended that in quasi-judicial proceedings authorities were not bound by strict rules of evidence and procedure and further contended that the information received from various sources could be relied upon without making it available to the parties.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the fourth adjournment could be granted u/s.33A of the Act on the basis of valid and justifiable reasons. The decision of the Commissioner to decide about the claim of the appellants for cross-examination of the witnesses was premature on account of the fact that there was no defence placed on record for the appellants. Following the decision in the aforementioned Shivananda Pathak’s case, it was observed that the rejection of the request for cross-examination on part of the Commissioner clearly disclosed legal bias. Also, the rules of natural justice are applicable to quasi-judicial authorities depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case as observed in the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 150. The appellants were well within their rights to challenge the appeal as the appellants had the right to challenge the interlocutory order either immediately after the passing of order or to challenge the same along with the final order. Setting aside the impugned order, the appellants were permitted to file detailed reply to the SCN on or before 20th October, 2009 and the Commissioner was directed to dispose of the matter, in any case before 31st March, 2010. The appellants would not be entitled to seek adjournment more than three times in the matter. The matter was remanded with the consent of both the parties before the Commissioner at Indore to avoid further complications in the matter.

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(2011) 23 STR 299 (Tri.-Del.) — Sahni Video Movies v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-II.

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Video tape production services — Exemption to individual professional videographer — Benefit of exemption denied in first appeal as not claimed earlier — Appeal allowed.

Facts:
The appellants being an ‘Individual professional videographer’ was denied exemption of service tax as exemption was not claimed earlier. The Department argued that the appellant being an individual videographer operating from his home was not liable to pay any service tax. Notification No. 7/2001-ST, dated 9-7-2001 stated that service tax on taxable service provided to a client by an individual professional videographer in relation to video tape production was exempt.

Held:
Though the benefit of the Notification was claimed in the first appeal, the authority had rejected the claim on the ground that it was not claimed earlier. However, the Tribunal stated that exemption could be claimed at any stage if it was available to the litigants, and thus the exemption was allowed to the appellant.

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(2011) 23 STR 295 (Tri.-Delhi) — Norasia Containers Lines v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi.

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Special Economic Zones (SEZ) — Exemption —Containers provided to units in SEZ — Exemption denied as containers partly used inside and partly outside SEZ — Containers used by units for bringing inputs and carrying finished goods out of SEZ — Impugned service of supply of containers, exempt.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing containers to various units in SEZ. Service tax was demanded on the ground that containers have been used partly in and partly outside SEZ. According to the appellants, in terms of the SEZ Act, 005 and the Rules thereunder, payment of service tax was exempted if taxable services were provided to a unit in the SEZ and the appellants had exactly done that irrespective of the fact that the container had carried cargo out of the SEZ territory, exemption could not be denied to them. ST Notification No. 4/2004 which limits the exemption to service consumed within the SEZ uses the expression ‘for consumption of services’ within such SEZ, but at the same time, also uses the expression ‘taxable services provided to a unit of the SEZ.’

Held:
Section 26 of the SEZ Act and Rule 31 of the SEZ Rules, 2006 make it clear that there was no restriction regarding the consumption of the services and the exemption was extended to the services rendered to a unit in the SEZ for the purpose of authorised operation i.e., for bringing inputs for manufacture and carrying finished goods out of SEZ for export purpose, in the SEZ. Thus, the impugned services relating to supply of containers in SEZ units were exempted from service tax.

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E-filing of statutory Forms with ROC.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued the following filing schedule to avoid the rush and system congestion in MCA 21 due to heavy filing in last 10 days of the months of October and November 2011. It is requested that filing of balance sheet and annual return may preferably be done in the following order:

During this period, ROC facilitation centres/help desks would give priority in e filing/answering queries of companies falling under the above alphabetical order.
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Filing of certain forms by Directors of defaulting Companies for Defaulting Companies/Dormant Companies/Active Companies.

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The Ministry had issued General Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1-6-2011 wherein it was informed that in order to ensure corporate governance and proper compliances of provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, no request, whether oral or in writing or through e-forms, for recording any event-based information/changes shall be accepted by the Registrar of Companies from such defaulting companies, unless they file their updated Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Accounts and Annual Return with the Registrar of Companies.

However, in the interest of stakeholders, certain event-based information/changes were being accepted by the Registrar from such defaulting companies. Now, on the requests received from various quarters of the corporates & professionals, certain forms will be accepted by the Registrar as per the General Circular No. 63/2011, dated 6th September 2011 for:

(a) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of such companies.

(b) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of Companies having the status of Dormant Companies.

(c) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of Companies having the status as active in progress companies.

This Circular shall be effective from 18th Sept., 2011.

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Applicability of Revised Schedule VI for Companies having IPO/FPO.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide Circular has clarified that the Notification No. S.O. 447(E), dated 28-2-2011 pertaining to the Revised Schedule VI, will apply to accounts for the year ending on 31st March 2012. The Ministry has now clarified that the Financial Statements made for the limited purpose of IPO/FPO during financial year 2011-12 may be made in the revised Schedule VI to avoid administrative difficulties and unrealistic comparison.
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Online incorporation of companies within 24 hours will not be implemented.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs by General
Circular No. 61/2011, dated 5-9-2011, after re-examination of Circular
No. 49/2011 for incorporation of a company, has decided, that since
currently companies are being incorporated within 24-48 hours, online
approval of incorporation forms i.e., STP mode of approval of e-forms 1,
18 and 32 on the basis of certification and declarations given by the
practising professional will not be implemented as yet.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20, dated 16-9-2011 — Meeting of medical expenses of NRIs close relatives by Resident Individuals.

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Presently, a resident can make payment in rupees for meeting expenses on account of boarding, lodging and services related thereto or travel to and from and within India of a person resident outside India who is on a visit to India.

This Circular has expanded the meaning of ‘services related thereto’ as stated in Regulation 2(i) of Notification No. FEMA 16/2000-RB, dated May 3, 2000 by including medical expenses therein. As a result, a resident individual can now pay for the medical expenses incurred in India by his NRI close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956).

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19, dated 16-9-2011 — Repayment of loans of nonresident close relatives by residents.

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Presently, a close relative, resident in India, can repay the housing loan availed by his Non-Resident Indian (NRI) relative.

This Circular permits a resident close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956), of the NRI to repay the loan availed by the NRI by crediting the borrower’s (NRI) loan account through the bank account of such relative.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18, dated 16-9-2011 — Loans in Rupees by resident individuals to NRI close relatives.

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This Circular permits a resident individual to give an interest-free loan with a minimum maturity period of one year under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) to Non-Resident Indian (NRI)/Person of Indian Origin (PIO) close relative (means relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) by way of crossed cheque/electronic transfer. The loan is subject to the following conditions:

(1) The loan amount must be within the overall limit under the LRS of US $ 200,000 per financial year. The lender has to ensure that the amount of loan is within the LRS limit.

(2) The loan can be utilised for meeting the borrower’s personal requirements or for his own business purposes in India.

(3) The loan must not be utilised, either singly or in association with other person(s), for any of the activities in which investment by persons resident outside India is prohibited, namely:

(a) The business of chit fund, or

(b) Nidhi Company, or

(c) Agricultural or plantation activities or in real estate business, or construction of farm houses, or

(d) Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs).

Explanation: For the purpose of item (c) above, real estate business shall not include development of townships, construction of residential/commercial premises, roads or bridges.

(4) The loan amount must be credited to the NRO account of the NRI/PIO.

(5) The loan amount must not be remitted outside India.

(6) Repayment of the loan must be made by way of inward remittances through normal banking channels or by debit to the Non-resident Ordinary (NRO)/Non-resident External (NRE)/ Foreign Currency Non-resident (FCNR) account of the borrower or out of the sale proceeds of the shares or securities or immovable property against which such loan was granted.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17, dated 16-9-2011 — Gift in Rupees by Resident Individuals to NRI close relatives.

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This Circular permits a resident individual to make a rupee gift to a NRI/PIO who is a close relative of the resident individual (close relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) by way of crossed cheque/electronic transfer. The amount should be credited to the Non-Resident (Ordinary) Rupee Account (NRO) account of the NRI/PIO.

The gift amount must be within the overall limit  of US $ 200,000 per financial year as permitted under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for a resident individual. The resident donor will have to ensure that the gift amount being remitted is under the LRS and all the remittances under the LRS during the financial year including the gift amount have not exceeded the limit prescribed under the LRS.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16, dated 15-9- 2011 — Credit of sale proceeds of Foreign Direct Investments in India to NRE/FCNR (B) accounts — Clarification.

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Presently, in terms of Schedule 3, 4 and 5 of the FEMA Notification No. 20/2000-RB, dated May 3, 2000, sale proceeds of Foreign Investments in India are eligible for credit to NRE/FCNR(B) accounts, where the purchase consideration was paid by the Non-resident Indians/Persons of Indian Origin out of inward remittance or funds held in their NRE/FCNR(B) accounts and subject to applicable taxes, if any.

This Circular has extended the said facility of credit of sale proceeds of Foreign Investments in India to NRE/FCNR(B) accounts, where the purchase consideration was paid by the Non-resident Indians/ Persons of Indian Origin out of inward remittance or funds held in their NRE/FCNR(B) accounts and subject to applicable taxes, if any, to NRI/PIO under Regulation 11 of the said Notification.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15, dated 15-9-2011 — Exchange Earners Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account and Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) account — Joint holder — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits resident in India to include their non-resident close relative(s) (relatives as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) as joint holder(s) in their EEFC/RFC bank accounts on ‘former or survivor’ basis. However, such nonresident Indian close relatives are not permitted to operate the said bank accounts during the life-time of the resident account holder.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14, dated 15-9-2011 — Foreign Investments in India — Transfer of security by way of gift — Liberalisation.

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Presently, a person resident in India can transfer, by way of gift, to a person resident outside India any security including shares/convertible debentures up to the value of US $ 25,000 during a calendar year after obtaining prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has increased the said limit from US $ 25,000 to US $ 50,000. As a result, a person resident in India can now transfer, by way of gift, to a person resident outside India any security including shares/convertible debentures up to the value of US $ 50,000 per financial year after obtaining prior approval of RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 13, dated 15- 9-2011 — NRIs PIOs holding NRE/FCNR(B) accounts jointly with Indian resident close relative — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits Non-Resident Indian (NRI), as defined in FEMA Notification No. 5, to open NRE/ FCNR(B) account with their resident close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) on ‘former or survivor’ basis. The resident close relative is permitted to operate the account as a Power of Attorney holder during the lifetime of the NRI/PIO account holder.
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Infosys Limited (quarter ended 30th June 2011)

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Income taxes

The provision for taxation includes tax liabilities in India on the Company’s global income as reduced by exempt incomes and any tax liabilities arising overseas on income sourced from those countries. Infosys’ operations are conducted through Software Technology Parks (‘STPs’) and Special Economic Zones (‘SEZs’). Income from STPs are tax exempt for the earlier of 10 years commencing from the fiscal year in which the unit commences software development, or 31st March, 2011. The tax holiday for all of our STP units has expired as of 31st March, 2011. Income from SEZs is fully tax exempt for the first five years, 50% exempt for the next five years and 50% exempt for another five years subject to fulfilling certain conditions. For Fiscal 2008 and 2009, the Company had calculated its tax liability under Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT). The MAT credit can be carried forward and set-off against the future tax payable. In fiscal 2010, the Company calculated its tax liability under normal provisions of the Income-tax Act and utilised the brought forward MAT Credit.


The Company is contesting the demands and the Management, including its tax advisors, believes that its position will likely be upheld in the appellate process. No tax expense has been accrued in the financial statements for the tax demand raised. The Management believes that the ultimate outcome of this proceeding will not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s financial position and results of operations.

As of the Balance Sheet date, the Company’s net foreign currency exposures that are not hedged by a derivative instrument or otherwise is Rs.1,024 crore (Rs.1,196 crore as at March 31, 2011).

The foreign exchange forward and option contracts mature between 1 to 12 months. The table below analyses the derivative financial instruments into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining period as of the balance sheet date :

The Company recognised a gain on derivative financial instruments of Rs.37 crore and a loss on derivative financial instruments of Rs.69 crore during the quarter ended June 30, 2011 and June 30, 2010, respectively, which is included in other income.

2.22 Quantitative details

The Company is primarily engaged in the development and maintenance of computer software. The production and sale of such software cannot be expressed in any generic unit. Hence, it is not possible to give the quantitative details of sales and certain information as required under paragraphs 5(viii)(c) of general instructions for preparation of the statement of profit and loss as per revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956.


2.25 Dividends remitted in foreign currencies
The Company remits the equivalent of the dividends payable to equity shareholders and holders of ADS. For ADS holders the dividend is remitted in Indian rupees to the depository bank, which is the registered shareholder on record for all owners of the Company’s ADSs. The depositary bank purchases the foreign currencies and remits dividends to the ADS holders.

The particulars of dividends remitted are as follows :

Not reproduced.

2.28 Segment reporting
The Company’s operation predominantly relates to providing end-to-end business solutions, thereby enabling clients to enhance business performance, delivered to customers globally operating in various industry segments. Effective this quarter, the company reorganised its business to increase its client focus. Consequent to the internal reorganisation there were changes effected in the reportable segments based on the ‘management approach’, as laid down in AS-17, Segment reporting. The Chief Executive Officer evaluates the company’s performance and allocates resources based on an analysis of various performance indicators by industry classes and geographic segmentation of customers. Accordingly, segment information has been presented both along industry classes and geographic segmentation of customers. Accordingly, segment information has been presented both along industry classes and geographic segmentation of customers, industry being the primary segment. The accounting principles used in the preparation of the financial statements are consistently applied to record revenue and expenditure in individual segments, and are as set out in the significant accounting policies.

Industry segments for the company are primarily financial services and insurance (FSI) comprising enterprises providing banking, finance and insurance services, manufacturing enterprises (MFG), enterprises in the energy, utilities and telecommunication services (ECS) and retail, logistics, consumer product group, life sciences and health care enterprises (RCL). Geographic segmentation is based on business sourced from that geographic region and delivered from both on-site and offshore. North America comprises the United States of America, Canada and Mexico, Europe includes continental Europe (both the east and the west), Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the Rest of the World comprising al both places except those mentioned above and India. Consequent to the above change in the composition of reportable segments, the prior year comparatives have been restated.

Revenue and identifiable operating expenses in relation to segments are categorised based on items that are individually identifiable to that segment. Allocated expenses of segments include expenses incurred for rendering services from the company’s offshore software development centers Certain expenses such as depreciation, which form a significant component of total expenses, are not specifically allocable to specific segments as the underlying assets are used interchangeably. Management believes that it is not practical to provide segment disclosures relating to those costs and expense, and accordingly theses expenses are separately disclosed as ‘unallocated’ and adjusted against the total income of the company.

Fixed assets used in the Company’s business or liabilities contracted have not been identified to any of the reportable segments, as the fixed assets and services are used interchangeably between segments. Accordingly, no disclosure relating to total segment assets and liabilities are made. Geographical information on revenue and industry revenue information is collated based on individual customer invoiced or in relation to which the revenue is otherwise recognised.

Industry segments
Not reproduced.

Geographic segments

Not reproduced.

2.29 Gratuity plan
The following table set out the status of the Gratuity Plan as required under AS-15 :
Not reproduced.

2.30 Provident fund
The Guidance on Implementing AS-15, Employee Benefits (revised 2005) issued by Accounting Standards Board (ASB) states that benefits involving employer established provident funds, which require interest shortfalls to be recompensed are to be considered as defined benefit plans. Pending the issuance of the final guidance note from the Actuarial Society of India, the Company’s actuary has expressed an inability to reliably measure provident fund liabilities. Accordingly the Company is unable to exhibit the related information.

The Company contributed Rs.51 crore towards provident fund during the quarter ended 30th June, 2011 (Rs.43 crore during the quarter ended 30th June, 2010).

2.31 Superannuation

The Company contributed Rs.15 crore to be superannuation trust during the quarter ended 30th June, 2011 (Rs.14 crore during the quarter ended 30th June, 2010).

2.32 Reconciliation of basic and diluted shares used in computing earnings per share

2.33 Restricted deposits

Deposits with financial institutions as at June 30, 2011 include Rs.351 crore (Rs.431 crore and Rs.344 crore as at 30th June, 2010 and 31st March, 2011, respectively) deposited with Life Insurance Corporation of India to settle employee-related obligations as and when they arise during the normal course of business. This amount is considered as restricted cash and is hence not considered ‘cash and cash equivalents’.

(2011) 23 STR 341 (A.P.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Visakhapatnam-II v. Sai Sahmita Storages (P) Ltd.

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Availment of Cenvat credit by storage and warehouse provider — Without using cement and TMT bar, the assessee could not provide storage and warehousing services — Assessee entitled to credit of Central Excise duty paid on these items — No penalty could be imposed without a finding on suppression and irregular claim of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The assessee provided storage and warehousing services. They used cement and TMT bars for construction of warehouses and took credit on Central Excise duty paid on cement and TMT bars which was disallowed, against which the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) who dismissed the appeal and allowed the Department’s claim of suppression regarding availment of Cenvat credit on ineligible goods.

Held:
CESTAT referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi III, 2009 (9) SCC 193 wherein it was held that “all goods used in or relation to the manufacturer of the final products qualify as inputs” and had rectified the decision of the Appellate Authority by allowing credit. The Court confirmed CESTAT’s stand on allowance of credit and consequently non-levy of penalty.

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2011) 23 STR 213 (Del.) — Pearey Lal Bhawan Association v. Satya Developers Pvt. Ltd.

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Renting of immovable property — Service tax being indirect in nature — Lessee was liable to pay the same in absence of any specific arrangement in lease deed on introduction of the levy on the said category.

Facts:
The plaintiffs had a lease arrangement with the defendants in 2006 for maintenance of common services and facilitates in respect of leased premises. The agreement stated the liability to pay municipal, local and other taxes was of plaintiffs. However, there was no specific mention as to who would bear service tax. The Finance Act, 1994 introduced service tax w.e.f. 2007. The plaintiffs contended that the said tax being in nature of indirect tax, had to be deposited by the service provider only after collecting the same from the receiver. They claimed that the tax was on the service and not on the service provider; and by virtue of section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, it is presumed by law that the tax is to be collected from the service receiver. According to the defendant, the plaintiffs was law bound to bear all or any taxes levied by MCA, DDA, L&DO and or Government, local authority, etc. The defendants also relied on the ruling of the High Court of Allahabad in Thermal Contractors Association v. Dir Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., 2006 (4) STR 18 which inter alia held that “The payer of service tax is entitled to realise the same from its consumer; however it always depends on the contract entered into between the parties”.

Held:
The issue was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. While observing the ruling of the Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practioners v. Union of India, 2007 (7) SCC 527, the Court held that service tax is consumption-specific as it does not constitute a charge on the business but on the client. Further, relying on All India Taxpayers Welfare Association v. Union of India & Others, 2006 (4) STR 14, the Court observed that as per section 12A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 r.w.s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1944, invoice and other documents should bear the amount of service tax. Section 12B of Central Excise Act, 1944 r.w.s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1944 contemplates that service is deemed to have been passed on to the service receiver. The agreement was silent on service tax levy as it was not anticipated at the time of making argument.

Therefore, even in absence of an express provision in law, but based on the overall scheme of the legislation, service tax could be collected from the recipient and accordingly, the plaintiffs were eligible to collect service tax from the defendant.

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(2011) 23 STR 212 (Ker.) — Commissioner of Central Excise & Custom, Kochi v. Oriental Steel Trunks Agrico Industries.

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Interest and penalty — Tax with interest paid before SCN — Tribunal having no jurisdiction to consider matter relating to interest while disposing penalty appeal — Appeal allowed partly.

Facts:
The Tribunal set aside penalty by taking into consideration the payment of service tax along with the interest by the respondent before the issuance of show cause notice (SCN). The Revenue contended that the Tribunal had no authority to discuss about the respondent’s claim for refund of excess interest paid, since the appeal was filed in relation to penalty. The respondent relied on the Circular published by the Department granting time for compliance with statutory provision in regard to payment of service tax.

Held:
The Court allowing the appeal partly, vacated the part of the Tribunal’s order declaring the respondent’s entitlement for refund of interest as interest was not connected with penalty, whereas penalty part was not interfered with.

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Sale to and from SEZ — Whether in Course of Export/Import

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Introduction

An interesting issue lingers on — Whether sale to a unit in Special Economic Zone (SEZ) by a Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) unit or by SEZ unit to DTA unit amounts to sale/purchase in the course of export/ import? The issue arises because SEZs have been given special status by Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 (SEZ Act, 2005).

Sale in course of Export/Import under Sales Tax Laws

As per Article 286 of Constitution of India, no tax can be levied on sale/purchase taking place in the course of export and import. Section 5(1) and 5(2) of CST Act, 1956 defines when a sale/purchase is said to take place in the course of export/import. The said definitions are reproduced below for ready reference:

“5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export

(1) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is affected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.

(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.”

The accepted meaning of the above section is that the goods should be going out of Indian territory or should be coming from outside Indian territory. Unless this fact is present, the argument of sale in the course of export/import is almost not tenable. In relation to SEZ, there is special enactment i.e., SEZ Act, 2005. In the said Act, SEZ is given a special status as foreign territory for various purposes. The transactions with SEZ unit by a DTA unit (either sale or purchase) are to be routed through import/ export formalities like, filing of bill of entry, etc. Therefore, a debate arises as to whether it can be said to be sale in the course of export/import for the purposes of the Sales Tax Acts.

Analysis of legal position
In light of the above definition of sale in course of export/import in section 5(1) and 5(2), reproduced above, it can very well be stated that there is no possibility to consider sale/purchase transactions with SEZ as in course of export/import. This view has now been approved by the Allahabad High Court. Reference can be made to judgment in the case of M/s. India Exports v. State of U.P. & Others, (Civil Misc. W.P. No. 1488 of 2009, decided on 11- 2-2011 (All.).

In this case the facts were that the petitioner was a unit in SEZ. It cleared its manufactured goods i.e., furniture for sale to a DTA unit. The petitioner claimed this sale to the DTA unit as its export or in other words sale in the course of import and not liable to sales tax. The Sales Tax authorities levied CST as applicable to normal sale and hence this writ petition before the High Court. Before the High Court section 53(1) of the SEZ Act was relied upon. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference:

“The Special Economic Zones Act, 2005

“53. Special Economic Zones to be ports, airports, inland container depots, land stations, etc., in certain cases. A Special Economic Zone shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be a territory outside the customs territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorised operations.

(2) A Special Economic Zone shall, with effect from such date as the Central Government may notify, be deemed to be a port, airport, inland container depot, land station and land customs stations, as the case may be, u/s.7 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962): Provided that for the purposes of this section, the Central Government may notify different dates for different Special Economic Zones.”

Important arguments
Some of the important arguments of the petitioner were as under:

(i) Sale from SEZ to DTA are sales in the course of import on which Central Sales Tax is not leviable under Article 286 and section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act and for which no exemption notification is required.

(ii) Rule 47(1) of the SEZ Rules requires the buyer of DTA to submit import licence and Rule 47(4) provides for valuation and assessment of goods cleared for DTA to be made in accordance with the Customs Act and Rules; Rule 48 (1) requires the buyer of DTA to file a bill of entry for home consumption applicable to goods imported into India and Rule 48(2) provides for valuation of goods for customs duty in accordance with the provisions of the Customs Act. The territory of SEZ under these Rules shall be deemed to be territory outside the territory of India and thus any goods removed from SEZ to DTA are deemed to be goods imported from outside the territory of India. Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act deems sale and purchase of goods in the course of import only if the sale and purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India. The customs frontiers of India u/s.2(ab) of the Central Sales Tax Act means crossing the limits of the area of a customs station in which imported goods or export goods are ordinarily kept before clearance. There is no liability for payment of Central Sales Tax in respect of the sale and purchase of the goods in the course of import into the territory of India.

(iii) The customs duty is levied only on the goods imported into India, from territory outside India. Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 read vide Entry 83 of List-1 of 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India, and, section 53(1) and section 53(2) of the SEZ Act, the authorised operations in SEZ are deemed to be imports to SEZ as custom station, which covers port, air port, etc. The importer from SEZ to DTA is required to have import licence and to file a bill of entry. The deeming fiction in SEZ Act and Rules read with the Customs Act and Central Sales Tax Act makes the special transaction as import, exempt from Central Sales Tax.

(iv) The SEZ are deemed to be territory outside customs territory of India and thus they cannot be treated as part and parcel of any particular State in India. In the transaction of sale from SEZ to DTA there is no movement of goods from one State to another, calling for imposition of Central Sales Tax.

(v) The deeming fiction has to be given full play and affect and regulations assuming all facts on which fiction can operate.

Observations of High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that the sale is taxable as any other sale within India. After referring to statement of objects and reasons for SEZ Act, 2005, the High Court observed as under:

20. We do not find any substance in the argument of Shri Bharatji Agrawal that the Central Sales Tax cannot be levied on the sales made by the petitioner from SEZ unit to a unit in DTA. The SEZ Unit under the SEZ Act, 2005 is deemed to be territory outside the territory of India u/s.51, 53(1) for a limited purpose; Ss.(2) provides that SEZ shall with effect from the date of Notification by the Central Government be deemed to be a port, airport, inland container port, land station and land customs station u/s.7 of the Customs Act.

21.    The SEZ Act, 2005 has taken into consideration and has provided for amendment of the various taxing statutes, or modified them, for fulfilling the object and purpose of the Act. Section 7 provides for exemption from tax, duties or cess on any goods or services exported out of or imported into or produce from DTA by unit in SEZ or a developer subject to terms and conditions as may be prescribed and be exempt from the payment of tax, duties or cess under all enactment specified in the First Schedule. Section 27 of the SEZ Act, 2005 applies to the Income-tax Act with certain modifications in relation to developers and entrepreneurs who carry out authorised operations in SEZ and modifications are specified in Second Schedule. Section 57 amends the enactment specified in the Third Schedule, which are amended by SEZ Act, 2005. The Central Sales Tax is not included in any of these Schedules.   

The High Court also observed that a deeming clause in one statute cannot apply to other unless so specified in the said statute or can be inferred. That being not the position in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court held that the claim of sale in course of export/import is not tenable and confirmed levy of tax.

Conclusion:

This clarifies the position that unless there is specific scheme under the relevant sales tax laws, for sales tax purposes, the trade with or trade by SEZ will remain at par with DTA units.

GAPS in GAAP — Accounting for an operating lease that containS contingent rentals

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Issue
How does a lessee and a lessor account for a rent-free period in an operating lease with rental amounts that are entirely contingent (e.g., a percentage of sales)?

Fact pattern
A lessee enters into a new lease agreement for retail property with a lessor. The lease agreement has a term of 5 years with no renewal or purchase option. No rents are due for the first year (the ‘rent-free’ period). For years 2 through 5, the rent is set at 18% of the lessee’s annual sales, with no minimum rent payable. The rental rate will not be revised during the lease term, i.e., there are no market resets or other adjustments during the lease term. (The lease agreement actually states that rent is set at 18% of annual sales, and the lessor has agreed to forego the first year’s rent as an incentive to the lessee to enter into the lease.)

Analysis
Paragraph 3 of AS-19 defines contingent rent as that portion of the lease payments that is not fixed in amount but is based on a factor other than just the passage of time (e.g., percentage of sales, amount of usage, price indices, market rates of interest, etc.).

Contingent rents are not included in the definition of minimum lease payments, and hence do not determine whether a lease is a finance lease or operating lease. In the case of an operating lease, with regards to the lessee, paragraph 25(c) requires disclosure of lease payments recognised in the statement of profit or loss for the period, with separate amounts for minimum lease payments and contingent rents. Similarly, with regards to the lessor, paragraph 46(c) requires disclosure of total contingent rents recognised as income in the statement of profit and loss for the period. In other words, in the case of an operating lease, the disclosure requirements both for the lessor and the lessee seem to suggest that the accounting of contingent rent should be in the period to which they relate to.

Further, AS-19 requires straightlining of operating lease income/expense. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

23. Lease payments under an operating lease should be recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss on a straightline basis over the lease term, unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit.

40. Lease income from operating leases should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss on a straight-line basis over the lease term, unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern in which benefit derived from the use of the leased asset is diminished.

View 1 — All payments under the lease are considered contingent rent

The lessee and lessor record the actual rent amounts as expenses and income when they are incurred. In the fact pattern above, the lessee does not record any rent expense in year 1. For years 2 through 5, the lessee recognises rent expense, calculated as 18% of its annual sales, as amounts are incurred (i.e., as sales occur). Consistent with the amounts of rent recorded by the lessee, the lessor does not record any rent income in year 1; for years 2 through 5, the lessor recognises rental income, calculated as 18% of the lessee’s annual sales, as earned.

Reasons for View 1
AS-19 is not explicit in the treatment of contingent elements of operating lease rentals, and whether straightlining would be required.

Paragraph 3 of AS-19 excludes contingent rents from the determination of minimum lease payments for ascertaining rental income in finance leases. Notwithstanding that AS-19 uses different terminology to describe the determination of rental income for finance leases (‘minimum lease payments’) and operating leases (‘lease income’), it is inappropriate to purport that contingent rents cannot be determined for ascertaining total finance lease revenue but that they could be determined for ascertaining total operating lease revenue. Accordingly, lease payments or receipts under operating leases exclude contingent amounts.

A similar issue was also discussed by IFRIC in the context of similar IFRS standard. In its May 2006 meeting, the IFRIC considered a request for clarification of the requirements of IAS 17 with respect to contingent rentals. In particular, the IFRIC was asked to consider whether an estimate of contingent rentals payable/receivable under an operating lease should be included in the total lease payments/lease income to be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term. The IFRIC noted that although the standard is unclear on this issue, a consistent application is being adopted; that is, current practice is to exclude contingent rentals from the amount to be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term. Accordingly, the IFRIC decided not to add the issue to its agenda.

In practice, contingent rent payments or receipts made in connection with operating leases are recognised in the period in which they are incurred. Since no rent is paid in year 1 of the lease, no expense/income is recorded in the first year. Importantly, no amount of rent is due or receivable based upon sales in year 1 and such rents only accrue upon the future sales after year 1 (i.e., sales in years 2 through 5). In years 2 through 5, the contingent amounts are recognised as expense/income when they are incurred.

View 2 — The rent-free period is taken into consideration to determine lease expense/income

The rent-free period is taken into consideration to determine the rent expense and income for each period. In the fact pattern above, the lessee amortises the rent-free benefit (determined either based on expected sales for year 1 or actual sales for year 1) over the term of the lease on a straight-line basis.

Assume that sales in the first year are approximately Rs.1,945,000. Using the contingent rental rate applicable for years 2 through 5, the incentive related to the rent-free period is calculated as Rs. 350,000 (Rs.1,945,000 x 18%). Since the term of the lease is 5 years, the annualised benefit for the lessee is Rs.70,000. The lessee accrues rent payable of Rs.280,000 (total incentive of Rs.350,000 less amortisation of year 1 benefit of Rs.70,000) in year 1 and recognises that amount as rent expense in year 1. The accrued amount is amortised as a reduction of rental expense (i.e., the amounts due based on the sales in each year) over the remaining years.

Similarly, the lessor recognises lease income and a receivable of Rs.280,000 in year 1 and amortises the accrued amount as a reduction of rental income (i.e., the amounts receivable based on the sales in each year) over the remaining years.

Reasons for View 2
Accounting for the rent-free period in the above manner is consistent with the requirement of paragraph 23 and 40 of AS-19. The rent-free period, is an integral part of the net consideration agreed for the property and it should be recognised on a systematic basis over the term of the lease, even though the rent receipts or payments in the lease are all contingent on performance.

Even though the IFRS Interpretations Committee concluded in its May 2006 meeting that current practice was to exclude contingent amounts from operating lease receipts or payments, it noted that IAS 17 is ‘unclear’ as to whether an estimate of contingent rent under an operating lease should be included in the total lease consideration to be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term.

Applying paragraphs 23 and 40 of AS -19, the view reflects the notion that if there was no rent-free period, the parties to the lease agreement would have revised the annual rent payable to be based on a lower percentage of a performance indicator (i.e., in the fact pattern above, less than 18% of sales). The recognition of the rent-free benefit or cost over the lease term results in a pattern of expense or income recognition that is similar to a lease that has no rent-free period.

Accordingly, the benefit of such an incentive should be quantified, and recognised over the lease term on a straight-line basis (unless another systematic basis is more appropriate).

Author’s view

The author favour’s View 1, because it is rather improbable that the intention of the standard was to require straightlining of lease rentals that were contingent in nature. Straightlining requires knowing in advance the rentals for all the years covered by the operating lease arrangement. In an arrangement that is fully contingent, and there are no fixed or minimum or guaranteed payments, straightlining may not be appropriate.

View 2 may be possible under Ind-AS and IFRS. For example, in IFRS for operating leases, paragraph 5 of SIC 15 Operating Leases — Incentives states that: “All incentives for the agreement of a new…. operating lease shall be recognised as an integral part of the net consideration for the use of the leased asset, irrespective of the incentive’s nature or form or the timing of payments.”

The incentives in the paragraph above include a rent-free period, as reflected in paragraph 1 of SIC 15: “In negotiating a new or renewed operating lease, a lessor may provide incentives for the lessee to enter into the agreement. Examples of such incentives are…..

Alternatively, initial periods of the lease term may be agreed to be rent-free or at a reduced rent.”

Under SIC 15, the lessee and the lessor recognise the aggregate benefits of incentives in the following manner: “The lessee shall recognise the aggregate benefit of incentives as a reduction of rental expense over the lease term, on a straight-line basis, unless another systematic basis is representative of the time pattern of the lessee’s benefit from the use of the leased asset.” (SIC 15.5).

“The lessor shall recognise the aggregate cost of incentives as a reduction of rental income over the lease term, on a straight-line basis, unless another systematic basis is representative of the time pattern over which the benefit of the leased asset is diminished.” (SIC 15.4).

It may be noted that Ind-AS also contains similar requirements.

ICAI may consider addressing this issue both under Indian GAAP and Ind-AS.

Anchor Health and Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd. (Unreported) ITA No. 7164/Mum./2008 (Mumbai ‘A’ Bench) Article 13 of India-UK DTAA; Section 40(a)(i) of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 26-8-2011 Shri Pramod Kumar (AM) Shri Vijay Pal Rao (JM) Counsel for the appellant : P. K. B. Menon Counsel for the respondent : P. J. Pardiwala

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(i) As accreditation fee was not ‘royalties’ under Article 12(3) of DTAA, in absence of PE in India, was not chargeable to tax in India.
(ii) Obligation to withhold tax u/s.195(1) arises only if the payment is chargeable to tax in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of tooth powder, tooth paste, tooth brush and other health care products.

BDHF is a UK-based registered charitable institution. Based on study made by an independent panel of internationally recognised dental experts, BDHF evaluates consumer oral health care products to ensure that manufacturers’ product claims are clinically proven and not exaggerated. As a result of accreditation granted by BDHF, the manufacturer is allowed to mention this fact while marketing the products. The taxpayer had paid certain amount as accreditation fee to BDHF. The AO noticed that the taxpayer had not withheld tax from the payment made to BDHF.

The taxpayer submitted that as the recipient of income was not liable to be taxed on this income in India, tax was not required to be withheld by the taxpayer. Further, the disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) can only be made when taxes are deductible but not deducted. The AO, however, held that u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act, tax must be withheld at the time of remittance and since the taxpayer had not submitted any certificate about non-taxability of the amount, he disallowed the entire payment u/s.40(a)(i).

In appeal, the CIT(A) held that: the fee could not be treated as ‘royalties’; BDHF did not have any PE in India; consequently, the payment made to BDHF could not be taxed in India; and in absence of any tax liability on the payment, the taxpayer had no obligation to withhold tax from the payment. Therefore, he deleted the disallowance u/s.40(a)(i).

Held:
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

(i) The expression ‘royalties’ is defined in Article 13(3) of India-UK DTAA and the payment was not covered within the definition. While it was in the nature of ‘business profits’, BDHF did not have PE in India. Hence, it was not taxable in India. Even if in normal business parlance, it could be termed ‘royalty’, it cannot be so classified if it does not fall within the definition in India-UK DTAA.
(ii) In terms of the Supreme Court’s decision in GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 327 ITR 456 (SC), tax deduction u/s.195(1) arises only if the payment is chargeable to tax. The AO has to establish that the nonresident was chargeable to tax. Since BDHF was not liable to tax on fee, the taxpayer had no obligation to withhold tax.

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Nippon Kaiji Kyokoi v. ITO (2011) 12 taxmann.com 477 (Mum.) Article 5, 7 and 12 of India-Japan DTAA; Section 44C of Income-tax Act A.Ys.: 1999-2000 to 2004-05 and 2007-08 Dated: 29-7-2011

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(i) On facts, income for provision of services through independent person was effectively connected to, and chargeable in hands of, PE.

(ii) If receipt is effectively connected with PE, Article 12(5) excludes it from Article 12(1) and 12(2) and hence, it is subject to Article 7.

Facts:
The taxpayer, a Japanese entity, was engaged in the business of providing inspection and certification services to marine industry for classification of ships. The taxpayer had set up branches in India at Mumbai and Chennai. The branches carried out a survey and issued reports. The branches constituted PE in terms of Article 5 of India-Japan DTAA.

Sometimes when employees of PE were not available for the survey, the taxpayer engaged an independent surveyor. The independent surveyor was directly appointed by the HO in Japan and the HO directly raised invoices on customers. The HO collected the invoice amount, paid 55% to the independent surveyor and retained 45%. Since under such circumstances the branch did not render substantial services or play active role, entire fee was retained at the HO and no portion of survey fee was recognised in profit and loss account of the branch.

The AO accepted the contention of the taxpayer that the survey carried out through independent surveyors could not be attributed to PE in India. Accordingly, he held that the amount received from such survey should be treated as FTS under Article 12 and taxable @20% on the gross amount in terms of Article 12(2).

In appeal, the CIT(A) observed that when PE could not undertake the survey, it directed the independent surveyor to carry out the survey and therefore, PE played a procedural role. Since FTS was effectively connected with PE in terms of Article 12(5), its income was to be dealt with under Article 7. Accordingly, the CIT(A) determined 10% of the fee as the income attributable to PE as business income and directed that no further expenditure other than allowance for HO expenditure u/s.44C should be allowed. Before the Tribunal, the issues were:

  • Whether FTS was effectively connected with the PE?
  • If part of the amount was taxable as business profits under Article 7, whether balance amount could be taxed as FTS under Article 12(2)?

Held:
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

(i) In case of FTS, the test to be applied is activity test or functional test. Surveys, whether through own staff or through independent surveyors, should not be treated differently. As per Article 7(1), profits directly or indirectly attributable to PE were to be taxable in India. The CIT(A) had estimated these to be 10% of gross receipts, which was not disputed by the tax authority. Hence, this amount was to be treated as attributable to PE.
(ii) If the receipt is effectively connected with PE, Article 12(5) excludes entire receipts from Article 12(1) and 12(2). Thus, DTAA does not contemplate taxing of balance (excluding 10%) receipt under Article 12(2).

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SIEM Offshore Inc., in re (2011) 12 taxmann.com 374 (AAR) Article 23, India-Norway DTAA; Section 44BB, Income-tax Act Dated : 25-7-2011

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(i) On facts, consideration for services provided by the applicant to ONGC was not FTS. Hence, was not excluded from section 44BB of Income-tax Act.

(ii) After shifting of managerial control to Norway, the applicant qualified for benefit under Article 23(4) of India-Norway DTAA.

(iii) In terms of section 44BB of Income-tax Act, Service Tax cannot be excluded for the purposes of determining presumptive income. 

Facts:
The applicant was a company incorporated in Cayman Islands. To qualify for listing on stock exchange in Norway, in January 2010, the applicant shifted its managerial control to Norway. Thus, it also became a tax resident of Norway and Norway issued tax residency certificate to the applicant. The applicant was of the view that pursuant to its becoming a tax resident of Norway, it qualified to access India-Norway DTAA.

The applicant was owner and operator of support vessel and was engaged in providing services for extraction of oil and gas. In 2009, the applicant formed a consortium with three other members and entered into a contract with ONGC for providing bundled services for a deep water rig for 4 years. In terms of the agreement, ONGC was to make direct payment to each consortium member for performance of the work undertaken by it. The scope of work of taxpayer pertained to sea logistics and included logistical support, rescue operations, safety and security surveillance, etc.

The applicant applied to the tax authority for ascertaining the rate of withholding tax on its income from ONGC. The tax authority treated the applicant’s income as FTS and passed order for withholding tax @10% of the gross amount.

The applicant sought ruling from AAR on applicability of section 44BB to the receipts from ONGC and availability of benefits under India-Norway DTAA. The applicant contended that:

The receipts of the applicant from ONGC were subject to taxation u/s.44BB and consequently, only 10% of the gross receipts were chargeable as income.

Pursuant to shifting of its managerial control to Norway and its becoming tax resident of Norway, it qualified for benefit under India- Norway DTAA.

Under the agreement as well as under the domestic law the obligation of Service Tax was on ONGC. The applicant merely received the Service Tax and paid it to the tax authority on behalf of ONGC. Hence, Service Tax was not the income of the applicant so as to get covered within 44BB.

The tax authority contended that the receipts of the applicant were FTS, which were specifically excluded from section 44BB by proviso to section 44BB(1) through amendment to the Income-tax Act.

Held:
The AAR held as follows.

(i) From review of the role and responsibility of the applicant in terms of the contract amongst the consortium members, the responsibilities of the applicant were not to provide technical services. Therefore, the receipts were not FTS. Hence they were covered by section 44BB and were subject to presumptive basis of taxation.

(ii) Since the tax authority has not disputed shifting of the managerial control of the applicant to Norway and the tax residency certificate issued by Norway to the applicant, India-Norway DTAA should be considered. Having regard to the specific provision in Article 23(4) of India-Norway DTAA, the notional income will be limited to 75% and the tax chargeable shall be limited to 50% of the tax otherwise imposed by India.

(iii) The liability to pay Service Tax is that of the applicant although under the agreement, ONGC had undertaken to reimburse it. Section 44BB does not provide for any deduction in respect of Service Tax. The object of introducing section 44BB was to avoid all complications in determining tax liability of the recipient. Hence, exclusion of Service Tax from income is neither warranted nor permissible in the scheme of section 44BB.

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Recent Global Developments in International Taxation part II

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In this Article, we have given brief information about the recent global developments in the sphere of international taxation which could be of relevance and use in day-to-day practice and which would keep the readers abreast with various happenings across the globe in the arena of international taxation. We intend to keep the readers informed about such developments from time to time in future.

(1) United Kingdom

(i) Finance (No. 1) Act, 2010 — New measures regarding DOTAS

On 19 October 2010, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) announced that it was anticipated that the package of five measures revising and extending disclosure of tax avoidance schemes (DOTAS), which were issued for consultation following the Pre-Budget Report 2010-11 and in respect of which legislation was included in Finance (No. 1) Act, 2010 will be implemented on 1st January 2011. Some of the descriptions of schemes (‘hallmarks’) requiring disclosure that were the subject of the consultation will, however, be implemented in 2011-12.

(ii) Tax avoidance clampdown — New measures announced

On 6th December 2010, the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury announced a number of anti-avoidance measures.

The following measures take immediate effect:

— legislation to prevent groups of companies using intra-group loans or derivatives to reduce the group’s tax bill (group mismatch schemes); and
— legislation aimed at schemes involving accounting derecognition, i.e., where a company does not fully recognise in its accounts certain amounts involving loans and derivatives.

Further details will be published in respect of the following measures:

— legislation to address the practice of disguised remuneration (basically arrangements involving trusts or other vehicles);
— legislation aimed at avoidance involving changes in the functional currency of an investment company. The legislation is expected to take effect for accounting periods beginning on or after 1st April 2011; and
— legislation targetting VAT avoidance involving ‘supply splitting’. The legislation is expected to come into force with effect from the date of Royal Assent to the Finance Bill, 2011.

(iii) Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes — Extension to certain inheritance tax transfers

On 6th December 2010, HMRC published a document in response to the consultation on bringing within the disclosure regime inheritance tax (IHT) on transfers of property into trust.

The Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes (DOTAS) regime came into force on 1st August 2004. It introduced an obligation to report to HMRC certain tax avoidance arrangements. Broadly, where an arrangement is notifiable, the promoter must, within a specified time, provide HMRC with details of the arrangement. In certain cases, the obligation to report is shifted from the promoter to the user of the scheme.

The scheme currently covers income tax, capital gains tax, corporation tax, national insurance contributions, VAT, and stamp duty land tax.

(iv) Statement of Practice on Advance Pricing Agreements updated

On 17th December 2010, HMRC issued an updated version of Statement of Practice on Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) SP3/99 so as to provide greater transparency regarding the processes in respect of APAs for businesses and advisors and also to cover the relevant legislative changes that have been enacted since 1999.

The updated version of SP3/99 is available on the HMRC website.

(v) GAAR — Study group established

On 14th January 2011, HM Treasury announced that it had been notified of the experts who will work on the study into a General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) and the areas that the experts will cover. This follows the announcement on 6th December 2010 that a study group would be established to explore the case for GAAR in the United Kingdom.

The topics that the study group will consider include:

— consideration of the existing experience with GAARs and other anti-avoidance principles in other jurisdictions;
— what a UK GAAR could usefully achieve; and
— what the basic approach of a GAAR should be.

The study will also consider whether or not a GAAR could deter and counter tax avoidance, whilst providing certainty, retaining a tax regime that is attractive to business, and minimising costs for businesses and HMRC.

The study group will complete its work by the 31st October 2011 and will report its conclusions to the UK Treasury.

(2) Italy

(i) Tax Authorities issue Ministerial Circular No. 51/E: new CFC regime clarified

On 6th October 2010, the Italian Tax Authorities (ITA) issued Ministerial Circular No. 51/E (the Circular) aimed at providing further clarifications in respect to the new CFC regime introduced on 1st July 2009 by Article 13 of the Anti-crisis Law Decree No. 78 converted into Law No. 102/2009.

(3) South Africa

(i) Transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules revised

The Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2010 has introduced new transfer pricing (TP) rules. Section 31 of the Income-tax Act of 1962 has been repealed and replaced. The main reason for introducing new TP rules is to further align the Income-tax Act with Article 9 of the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions. This is in view of the fact that: — the current wording focusses on separate transactions, as opposed to overall arrangements driven by an overarching profit objective;

— the current wording seems to emphasise the comparable uncontrolled price method over other TP methodologies;

— the emphasis, in the current legislation on ‘price’ as opposed to ‘profits’ does not neatly align with tax treaty wording, potentially creating difficulties in the mutual agreement procedures available under tax treaties; and

— the need to directly merge thin capitalisation rules into the TP rules, as opposed to having parallel rules as is currently the case.

The revised legislation comes into effect on 1st October 2011.

(ii) Regional headquarter company regime introduced

In order to make South Africa an ideal location for multinational enterprises wishing to invest in Africa, a regional headquarter (HQ) company regime has been introduced vide the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2010. The regime is intended to address some tax barriers to the setting up of regional holding companies in South Africa.

(4) Thailand

Additional tax incentives package for Regional Operating Headquarters

On 27th October 2010, Royal Decree No. 508 (RD 508) was issued that added another package of tax incentives for Regional Operating Headquarters (ROH). With the advent of RD 508, a company may opt to apply for the old or new package of tax incentives. A company that wishes to apply for the new package is required to notify the Thai Revenue Department within five years from the date specified by the Director-General (to be announced later). RD 508 is effective from 28th October 2010.

(5) Mauritius

Budget for 2011 — Details

The Budget for 2011 was presented to the Parliament by the Minister of Finance on 19th November 2010. Details of the Budget, which unless otherwise indicated will apply from 1st January 2011, are summarised below.

Direct taxation

(a)    Corporate taxation
— corporate entities operating in the real estate business will be taxed as a separate taxable person at the rate of 15% instead of being taxed at the level of their individual partners;
— corporate entities holding Category 1 Global Business Licence, previously limited to carry on business offshore, will be allowed to conduct business both inside and outside Mauritius. Accordingly, foreign source income derived by such entities will continue to benefit from foreign tax credits while their domestic income will be subject to tax at the standard rate; and
— the current preferential corporate tax regime applicable to companies established in Free Trade Zones has been extended for two additional years.

(b)    Personal taxation

— interest income will be exempt from in come tax;
— individuals with total income (inclusive of exempt income) exceeding MUR 2 million will be subject to a 10% solidarity tax on their exempt income; this will apply in addition to their personal tax liability;
— new statutory deductions for individuals are introduced and include:

  •     deduction for interest expense on loans for the first acquisition/construction of a residence; and

  •     deduction for educational expenses in respect of children undertaking undergraduate studies at the university; and

— a reintroduction of tax exemption on income generated from the first 60 tonnes of sugar for small sugar-cane farmers with less than 15 hectares of land and who rely solely on income from sugar farming.

(c)    Capital gains tax
— gains from the sale of immovable property will be taxed at the rate of 15% for corpo rate entities. A reduced rate of 10% will apply for individuals after an exemption of MUR 2 million.

(d)    Other direct tax measures

— costs undertaken in the context of sugar-related business reform, such as factory closure costs, will be tax deductible;
— the threshold for the exemption from land conversion tax for small and medium planters is raised from 1 to 2 hectares;
— the 5% surcharge on land transfer tax introduced in 2008 is removed; and
— a fixed fee of MUR 350,000 per hectare is levied on the transfer of land conversion rights between unrelated parties.

Other measures

(a)    Tax management
— the deadline for e-filing of tax returns is extended for 15 days; and
— small sugarcane farmers are not required to file an income tax return.

(b)    Company laww

The Trust Act is amended to allow unlimited duration for non-charitable purpose trusts.

(6)    Japan

Transfer pricing

In accordance with the amendments to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the proposed amendment in the transfer pricing regime include:

— priority of methods adopted in calculating arm’s-length price;
— arm’s-length price range; and
— secret comparables.

Tax haven rules (CFC)

Under the proposal, there are amendments to:

— the effective income tax rates;
— the exemption conditions (Regional Headquarters Company);
— the calculation of aggregated income; and
— the passive income aggregation rule.

Foreign tax credits

Under the proposal, there are amendments to:
— the scope of foreign taxes;
— creditable foreign taxes;
— the scope of foreign source income; and
— the creditable limit of foreign taxes.

New special incentives for Comprehensive Investment Zones/Asian Base in Japan

(a)    Special incentives for Comprehensive Investment Zones

— A 50% initial depreciation or a tax credit of 15% of the acquisition costs of assets will be available for company conducting business as stipulated in International Strategy Special District Plan. This rule will be applied to assets acquired from the day the new regime become effective until 31st March 2014; or
— reduction of 20% taxable income for each fiscal year ending prior to the day five years from the day on which the designation was obtained.

A company will not eligible for both incentives at the same time.

(b)    Special incentives for Asian base in Japan

Under the proposal, to encourage foreign companies to set up a R&D centre or regional headquarters in Japan, Japanese subsidiary of a foreign company designated by competent ministers will enjoy the following incentives:

—    reduction of 20% taxable income which relate to such designated business for each fiscal year ending prior to the day five years from the day on which designation is obtained; and

— defer tax for income from excising stock option of a foreign parent company granted to the directors and employees.

(7)    Singapore

Budget for 2011 — Details

The Budget for 2011 was presented to the Parliament by the Finance Minister on 18th February 2011. Main details of the Budget, which unless otherwise indicated will apply from the year of assessment (YA) 2012, are summarised below:

Direct taxation

(a)    Corporate taxation

— for the YA 2011, companies with a 20% corporate tax rebate capped at SGD 10,000. Small and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  will receive the higher of the 20% rebate or a cash grant  amounting  to  5%  of  the  company’s revenue, but capped at SGD 5,000. The cash grant  is  available  only  to  SMEs  that  made Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions in YA 2011;
— a foreign tax credit (FTC) pooling system will be introduced, under which FTC is computed on a pooled basis for each particular stream of foreign income (FI) remitted into Singapore. The amount of FTC to be granted will be based on the lower of the pooled foreign taxes paid on the FI and the pooled Singapore tax payable on such FI, subject to the resident taxpayer meeting certain conditions;
— businesses can claim pre-commencement revenue expenses incurred in the accounting year immediately preceding the accounting year in which they earn the first dollar of trade receipts;
— the tax deduction of 250% on contributions to Institutions of Public Charter (IPCs) will be extended for another five years for donations made during 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2015;
— eligible   companies   that   make   voluntary contributions to the Medisave accounts of their self-employed person (SEP) partners from 1st January 2011 can deduct up to SGD 1,500 per SEP per year. The SEPs would be exempt from tax on these contributions;
— with effect from 1st April 2011, banks and other approved or licensed financial institutions will be exempt from withholding tax on interest and other qualifying payments made to all non-resident persons (excluding permanent establishments in Singapore), if the payments are made for the purpose of their trade or business; and
— companies that set up special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to acquire shares for their equity-based remuneration schemes can deduct the cost of the shares, subject to conditions.

(b)    Personal taxation
— a one-off personal income tax rebate of 20% that is capped at SGD 2,000 will be granted to all residents for YA 2011;
— taxpayers will be exempted from tax on alimony and maintenance payments they receive under a court deed or deed of separation;
— spouse relief and handicapped spouse relief will no longer be granted to taxpayers for maintaining their former spouses; and

(c)    Tax incentives
— various enhancements were made to existing incentives, such as:

  •     Productivity and Innovation Credit (PIC);
  •    Global Trader Program (GTP);
  •     Finance Treasury Centre (FTC);
  •     Captive insurance; and
  •     Marine insurance.

(8)    OECD

(i)    OECD — Report on disclosure initiatives for tackling aggressive tax planning released

On 1st February 2011, the OECD published a report on tackling aggressive tax planning through improved transparency and disclosure, which was prepared by the Aggressive Tax Planning Steering Group of Working Party 10 of the Committee of Fiscal Affairs (CFA).

The report was adopted by the CFA on 3rd January 2011 and outlines the importance of timely, targeted information to counter aggressive tax planning and provides an overview of disclosure initiatives introduced in some OECD countries.


(ii)    OECD — Transfer pricing aspects of intangibles — Scoping document released

On 25th January 2011, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs released the scoping document regarding its new project on the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles.

The work will focus on the following aspects:

— The development of a framework for analysis of intangible-related transfer pricing issues.
— Definitional aspects.
— Specific categories of transactions involving intangibles, such as research and development activities, differentiation between intangible transfers and services, marketing intangibles, other intangibles and business attributes.
— How to identify and characterise an intangible transfer.
— Situations where an enterprise would at arm’s length have a right to share in the return from an intangible that it does not own.
— Valuation issues.

The work is expected to lead to an update of the existing guidance on intangibles which is found in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TPG). In addition, a review will be carried out of the existing guidance in Chapter VIII of the TPG on Cost Contribution Arrangements, although the extent of any further work that might be needed on that chapter remains to be decided.

(9)    Miscellaneous

(i)    Austria — Ministry of Finance publishes Transfer Pricing Guidelines

On 28th October 2010, the Austrian Ministry of Finance published the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010; the first domestic transfer pricing guidelines ever published by the Ministry of Finance. The Guidelines deal with selected transfer pricing issues such as the methodology to be used, group internal financing, business restructuring and documentation requirements, but also with issues that are usually not directly linked to transfer pricing, such as permanent establishments, the Authorised OECD Approach and abuse of law by interposing companies.


(ii)    Treaty  between  Denmark  and  Luxembourg — Danish Tax Tribunal rules Luxembourg intermediary beneficial owner of Danish interest; Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies

On 17th November 2010, the Danish Tax Tribunal (Landskatteretten) published a decision (SKM 2010.729 LSR) and held that a holding company resident in Luxembourg was the beneficial owner of interest distributed by a holding company resident in Denmark. Details of the decision are summarised below.

Facts
A number of private equity funds and other investors acquired a Danish holding company (DK HoldCo) through a holding company resident in Luxembourg (Lux HoldCo). DK HoldCo distributed dividends to its parent company, Lux HoldCo. On the day of distribution of the dividends, Lux HoldCo granted two loans (one convertible loan and the other an ordinary loan) to DK HoldCo equal in amount to the distributed dividends. At the end of the income year in which the loans were granted, the convertible loan including the accrued interest, was converted into shares of DK HoldCo. In the following income year the ordinary loan, including the accrued interest, was also converted into shares of DK HoldCo. The Danish tax authorities concluded that the interest payments on the loans were subject to withholding tax, and required that the DK HoldCo should pay a withholding tax on the interests distributed to the Lux HoldCo, for two reasons:

—  Lux HoldCo was not the beneficial owner of the interest since (i) it did not carry out an active business but the holding of shares in
DK HoldCo, and (ii) had no real power to act regarding the disposition of the interest.

—  the  Interest  and  Royalty  Directive  (the Directive) does not prevent Denmark from levying withholding tax on the interests as the Directive only applies if the beneficial owner of the interests is a company or a permanent establishment resident in a Member State.

Legal background
Under the Danish law, interest paid to a foreign-related entity (i.e., an entity owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, more than 50% of the share capital or voting power in the company paying the interest) is subject to a withholding tax. No withholding tax is, however, levied if the withholding tax is reduced or abolished by a tax treaty or by the Directive. Under the Denmark-Luxembourg treaty (the Treaty), interests paid to a resident in the other contracting state can only be taxed in that other state if that resident is the effective beneficial owner of the interest [Art. 11(1)].

Issue
The issue was whether the Luxembourg holding company was the beneficial owner of the interest received from a Danish company, and subsequently qualified for the Treaty protection and/or protection under the Directive.

Decision
The Tax Tribunal emphasised, by referring to their earlier case law (see TNS:2010-04-23:DK-1), that a conduit company could only be disregarded as the beneficial owner of interest if the interest was redistributed. As the interest was not redistributed but converted into shares of the DK HoldCo, Lux HoldCo could not be regarded as a conduit company in respect of the interest. Thus, Lux HoldCo was held to be the beneficial owner of the interest under the Treaty and the Directive. The Tax Tribunal ruled in favour of the taxpayer and thereby overruled the decision made by the tax authorities.

Acknowledgment
We have compiled the above information from the Tax News Service of the IBFD for the months of October, 2010 to March, 2011.

Business expenditure: Section 37(1) While on business tour, the whole-time director of assessee-company was kidnapped by a dacoit: Ransom money paid to dacoit for releasing the director is allowable business expenditure.

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[CIT v. Khemchand Motilal Jain, Tobacco Products (P) Ltd., 13 Taxman.com 27 (MP)]

The assessee-company was engaged in manufacturing and sale of bidis. ‘S’ was a whole-time director of the assessee-company and was looking after the purchase, sales and manufacturing of bidis. During his business tour to Sagar for purchase of tendu leaves, ‘S’ was kidnapped by a dacoit for ransom. The assessee lodged complaint with the police and awaited the action of the police, but the police was unsuccessful to recover ‘S’ from the clutches of dacoit. Ultimately after 20 days, the assessee paid certain amount by way of ransom for release of ‘S’ and got him released. The assessee claimed deduction of that amount as business expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee on the ground that the ransom money paid to the kidnappers was not an expenditure incidental to business. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Revenue contended that the amount of ransom could not have been claimed by way of expenditure as the Explanation to s.s(1) of section 37 prohibits such expenditure.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provides that kidnapping a person for ransom is an offence and any person doing so or compelling to pay is liable for the punishment as provided in the section, but nowhere it is provided that to save a life of the person if a ransom is paid, it will amount to an offence. There is no provision that payment of ransom is prohibited by any law. In the absence of it, the Explanation to s.s(1) of section 37 will not be applicable in the instant case.

(ii) In the instant case, ‘S’ was on business tour and was staying at a Government rest-house, from where he was kidnapped. As he was on business tour, to get him released, if the aforesaid amount was paid to the dacoits as ransom money and because of this, he was released, the assessee claimed it a business expenditure.

(iii) The entire tour of ‘S’ was for purchase of tendu leaves of quality and for this purpose, he was on business tour and during his business tour, he was kidnapped and for his release the aforesaid amount was paid.

(iv) In these circumstances, the reasoning of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowing the aforesaid expenditure as business expenditure is to be confirmed.”

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Appeals by Revenue: Small tax effect: CBDT circular dated 15-5-2008 providing that notional tax effect could be taken in loss cases is prospective: Applicable to appeals filed on or after 15-5-2008.

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[CIT v. Continental Construction Ltd., 336 ITR 394 (Del.)]

The CBDT Circular dated 15-5-2008, provided that the Circular is applicable to the appeals filed on or after 15-5-2008. The Circular also clarified the terms ‘tax effect’ to include the notional tax effect in loss cases. It is the case of the Department that the Circular is clarificatory and therefore, in loss cases the notional tax effect has to be considered even in respect of appeals filed prior to 15-5-2008.

The Delhi High Court held that the notional tax effect in loss cases does not apply to appeals filed prior to 15-5-2008.

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Representative assessee: Section 163: Liability of representative assessee is limited to connected income: No liability for assessment of unconnected income.

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[General Electric Co. v. DDIT (Del.), WP No. 9100 of 2007, dated 12-8-2011]

Genpact India is an Indian company. The whole of the share capital of Genpact India was held by a Mauritius company. The whole of the share capital of the Mauritius company was in turn held by General Electric Co., USA. The Assessing Officer found that the shares of Genpact India were transferred outside India. He held that the transaction of transfer of shares of Genpact India has resulted in capital gains to General Electric, USA. Therefore, he issued a notice u/s.163 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 proposing to treat Genpact India as an agent of General Electric and to assess the capital gain in its hands as a representative assessee. General Electric Co. filed writ petition challenging the notice.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“(i) The mere fact that a person is an agent or is to be treated as an agent u/s.163 and is assessable as ‘representative assessee’ does not automatically mean that he is liable to pay taxes on behalf of the non-resident.

(ii) U/s.161, a representative assessee is liable only ‘as regards the income in respect of which he is a representative assessee’. This means that there must be some connection or concern between the representative assessee and the income.

(iii) On facts, even assuming that Genpact India was the ‘agent’ and so ‘representative assessee’ of General Electric, there was no connection between Genpact India and the capital gains alleged to have arisen to General Electric. Genpact India is sought to be taxed as representative assessee when it had no role in the transfer of shares. Merely because these shares relate to Genpact India that would not make Genpact India as agent qua deemed capital gain purportedly earned by General Electric Co.

(iv) Consequently, the section 163 proceedings seeking to assess Genpact India for the capital gains of General Electric were without jurisdiction.”

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Clarification reg. service tax on fees charged for Issuance of Country of Origin Certificate (COOC) — Circular No. 145/14/ 2011-ST dated 19-8-2011.

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By this Circular it has been clarified that services provided by Chamber of Commerce and any other authorised agencies for issuance of COOC with reference to national character of export goods upon examination of the origin of their composition, service tax as applicable on fees charged by such organisation shall be categorised under ‘Technical Inspection and Certification Agency Service’. It has been further clarified that service tax paid on ‘Technical Inspection and Certification’ of export goods is eligible for refund under Notification 17/2009-ST, dated 7th July, 2009.
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E-filing of service tax returns made mandatory for all service providers — Notification No. 43/2011-Service Tax, dated 25-8-2011.

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With this Notification now all assessees who are registered under the service tax law will have to file all half-yearly service tax returns electronically from October 1, 2011.
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Administrative relief to unregistered dealers — Trade Circular No. 13T of 2011, dated 30-8-2011.

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As per earlier Circular No. 33T of 2007, dated 18th April, 2007, delay in obtaining certificate of 4 registration beyond 5 years shall not be entitled to get any administrative relief. Now subject to the terms and conditions specified in this Circular, a dealer can get administrative relief even if delay in getting certificate of registration exceeds 5 years.
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(2011) 39 VST 302 (Bom.) Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, Mumbai v. Cadila Healthcare Limited

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Rate of tax — Table margarine — Not hydrogenated vegetable oil or vegetable oil — Taxable at 12.5% under residual Entry E-1 — Schedule Entry C-100, 102 and E-1 of Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

Facts:
The Commissioner of Sales Tax filed appeal against the decision of the Tribunal, dated August 2, 2008, holding that Nutralite table margarine sold by the dealer is covered by Schedule C-Entry 102 of the MVAT Act and taxable at 4%. Entry 100 of Schedule C covers vanaspati (hydrogenated vegetable oil), whereas Entry 102 of Schedule C covers vegetable oil. It was argued before the Tribunal by the dealer that Nutralite table margarine is vanaspati and if it is not vanaspati, then it is vegetable oil covered by Schedule Entry C-102 taxable at 4%. The Tribunal held that Nutralite table margarine is vegetable oil taxable at 4% under Entry 102 of Schedule C of the MVAT Act. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and held against the dealer that Nutralite table margarine is not vanaspati and not a vegetable oil and taxable at 12.5%.

Held:
(i) Margarine is used for baking, cooking and Nutralite table margarine sold by the dealer is used for cooking and as a spread. Palm oil is subjected to process of emulsification and the resultant product that emerges is Nutralite table margarine. Admittedly, table margarine is considered to be a distinct marketable commodity under the Central Excise Act.

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(2011) 39 VST 257 (SC) Hyderabad Engineering Industries v. State of Andhra Pradesh

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Inter-State sale/stock transfer — Dispatch of goods to branch outside the State — Against the ‘Forecasts’ for delivery of goods to the buyer — Under sale agreement — Is inter-state sale — Liable to tax u/s.3(a) and 6A of the CST Act, 1956.

Facts:
The assessee claimed inter-State Stock transfers to its various depots situated outside the State as per ‘Forecasts’ to be delivered to M/s. Usha International Ltd. (UIL), under an agreement for sale entered with it. The sales tax authorities disallowed the claim of inter-State stock transfer and levied tax @10% under the CST Act. The Company filed appeal before SC against the judgment of the High Court confirming levy of CST on disputed inter-State stock transfers treated as inter-State sales by the assessing authorities.

Held:
(1) The consistent view of this Court appears to be that even if there is no specific stipulation or direction in the agreement, for an inter-State movement of goods, if such movement is an incident of that agreement or if the facts and circumstances of the case denote it, the conditions of section 3(a) would be satisfied.

(2) In the instant case, the movement of goods from the assessee’s factory to its various godowns situated in different parts of country was pursuant to ‘Sales agreements’ coupled with ‘Forecasts’ which are nothing but ‘indents’ or firm orders. It does not matter how much goods were delivered to the branch office, which just acted as a conduit pipe before it ultimately reached the purchasers’ hands. All that matters is that the movement of the goods is in pursuance of the contract of sale or as of necessary incident to the sell itself.

(3) After considering the facts of the case, finding of fact by the assessing authorities duly confirmed by the Tribunal, SC held that impugned delivery of goods by the dealer’s factory to its various depots situated outside the State for delivery of goods to UIL against ‘Forecasts’ and ultimate delivery of goods to UIL by its depots to UIL is an inter-State sale liable to tax under the CST Act in the State of AP.

Accordingly the appeal filed by the dealer was dismissed.

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(2011) 23 STR 276 (Tri.-Chennai) — UCAL Fuel System Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai.

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Cenvat Credit of Service Tax — Services in respect of preparation of documents for pre-shipment and post-shipment of export goods — Eligible claim of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The appellants, M/s. UCAL Fuel System Ltd. were availing services in respect of preparation of documents for pre-shipment and post-shipment of export goods and were claiming credit of services paid on the same. The appellants were denied Cenvat credit of service tax of Rs.1,28,914 as the service provider did not mention the nature of the taxable services in any of the documents, on the basis of which appellants claimed the credit. The appellants argued that the services rendered had direct nexus with the business of the manufacture of the assessee’s final product and hence were in the nature of business auxiliary service.

Held:
After observing bills and other documents of the appellants, the Tribunal held that services availed by the appellants were business auxiliary services in nature and they were entitled to avail Cenvat credit of service tax paid on such services as per Rule 2(1) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

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Sudhir Thackersey Charitable Trust v. DIT ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM) ITA No. 5031/Mum./2010 Decided on: 26-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: A. H. Dalal/ V. V. Shastri

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Section 12AA — Registration of Trust — Delay in application for registration — Refusal to grant registration on the ground that the trust was claiming exemption u/s.11 even though it was not registered — Whether the refusal was on the valid ground — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee trust came into existence vide trust deed dated 24th August, 2006. It had not applied for registration till 30-10-2009. However, all along the trust was carrying on its activities and duly filing its return of income with claims for exemption u/s.11. The DIT refused to grant registration for the reason that the assessee was claiming exemption u/s.11 even though it had not complied with the mandatory provisions of registration. According to him the assessee had concealed its income by claiming exemption which otherwise it was not entitled to.

Held:
According to the Tribunal the reason for refusal to grant registration as given by the DIT was not relevant to the consideration on which an application for registration of a trust or charitable institution is to be examined. Further, it also noted that the assessee had admitted an inadvertent lapse in nonfiling of registration application and also the fact that the trust had not accepted any donation, other than corpus donation at the time of formation of the trust. According to it, the lapse by the assessee cannot be visited with the consequence of its being declined registration later also, which approach was not supported either by any specific legal provisions or plain logic or rationale. The DIT was only required to examine if the objects of the trust were charitable and the activities were bona fide. Further noting that the assessee had placed enough relevant details and supportive evidences in support of the trust objects being charitable and the activities being bona fide, the Tribunal directed the DIT to grant registration.

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Krishna Land Developres Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and Asha Vijay Raghavan (JM) ITA No. 1057/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on : 12-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rakesh Joshi/ A. K. Nayak

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Sections 22, 28 — Rental income for letting out premises, which are duly notified as IT Park and can be used only for a specific purpose along with provision of complex service facilities and infrastructure for operation such business is chargeable to tax under the head ‘Income from Business’.

Facts:
The assessee had let out on leave and licence basis for a period of 33 months property purchased by it along with the infrastructure, equipment and facilities, which were prescribed both by the Ministry of Commerce as well as the CBDT. The I.T. Park was duly notified by the Ministry of Commerce and also by the CBDT. The assessee offered licence fees in respect of this activity, for taxation, under the head ‘Income from Business’. The Assessing Officer (AO) relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shambhu Investments P. Ltd. v. CIT, 263 ITR 143 (SC) held that the income is assessable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the property in question was not a simple building but an I.T. Park with all infrastructure facilities and services. It observed that the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, notifies certain buildings as I.T. Park only if various facilities and infrastructure, as specified by the Department, are provided. It noted that all the technical requirements, infrastructures, facilities and services were being provided for in the building and it was for this reason that not only the Ministry of Commerce & Industries but also the CBDT notified the same as an I.T. Park which entitles the assessee to earn certain incentives. It also observed that the intention of the assessee while purchasing the property is to participate in the I.T. Park and it cannot be said that the intention is only to invest in property. The Tribunal observed that:

“The assessee is offering complex services by way of providing operation place in a notified I.T. Park, with all services and amenities such as infrastructure facilities, waiting room, conference room, valet parking, reception, canteen, 24 hours’ securities, internal facilities, high-speed lift, power back-up, etc. Just because a sister concern incurred this expenditure and claims reimbursement from the assessee, it cannot be said that the facilities are not provided for by the assessee. Whoever maintains them, the fact remains that it is the assessee who ultimately bears such expenditure for the services and undertakes to provide such services. The facilities are made available by the assessee to the person occupying the premises.”

The Tribunal noted that the Gujarat High Court has in the case of Saptarshi Services Ltd. 265 ITR 379 (Guj.) held that the income earned from business centre is to be assessed under the head ‘Income from Business and Profession’ and SLP filed by the Revenue against this judgment was rejected by the Supreme Court [264 ITR 36 (St)]. It also noted that the Mumbai Bench of ITAT has in the case of ITO v. Shanaya Enterprises, (ITA No. 3648/Mum./2010, A.Y. 2006-07, order dated 30th June, 2011) held that when the property is used for specific purposes and in the nature of providing complex services, the income is taxable under the head ‘Income from Business’.

Applying the propositions laid down in the abovementioned decisions, the Tribunal held that since the property can be used only for a specific purpose i.e., I.T. operation and the assessee has provided complex service facilities and infrastructure for operating such business, the income in question be assessed under the head ‘Income from Business & Profession’. It set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) and allowed this ground of the assessee’s appeal.

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Mahalaxmi Sheela Premises CHS Ltd. v. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and Vijay Pal Rao (JM) ITA Nos. 784, 785 & 786/Mum./2010 A.Ys.: 2000-01 to 2002-03 Decided on: 30-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Hiro Rai/ P. C. Maurya

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Sections 22, 28 and 58 — Income received on lease of a portion of terrace of the building and a wall of the building for the purpose of fixing of hoarding, neon sign, etc., is assessable under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

Facts:
The assessee leased out portion of terrace of the building and a wall of the building to one Mrs. Sudha Vora, for the purpose of fixing of hoarding, neon sign, etc. The Assessing Officer, while assessing the total income for A.Y. 2000-01, assessed the income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ on the ground that the amount received by the assessee was not for letting of a building or terrace or any land appurtenant thereto but on account of allowing Mrs. Sudha Vora to display the advertisement of neon sign, illuminated hoarding, of a size 60 ft x 20 ft on the terrace and also illuminated hoarding of size 20 ft x 50 ft on a vertical wall of a building facing Pedder Road. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) held that the terrace has not been let out but merely permission has been granted to use the terrace only to set up the hoarding and to display the hoarding. He also observed that the lessee could use only a portion of the terrace and the purpose of utilisation was not for stay, etc. He upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the following case laws:

(1) ITO v. Cuffe Parade Sainara Premises Co-op. Society Ltd., (ITA No. 7225/Mum./2005, order dated 28-4-2008)

(2) Dalamal House Commercial Complex Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No. 2286/ Mum./2008, order dated 29-5-2009)

(3) Sharda Chambers Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No. 1234/Mum./2008, order dated 1-9-2009)

(4) Matru Ashish CHS Ltd. v ITO, (ITA No. 316/ Mum./2010, order dated 27-8-2010)

(5) S. Sohan Singh v. ITO, (16 ITD 272) (Del.); and

(6) CIT v. Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op. Society Ltd., (ITA No. 3183 of 2010/Mum.).

The Tribunal noted that in the case of Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. ITO, Mumbai ‘B’ Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 5048/Mum./2004, A.Y. 2001-02 and ITA No. 1433/Mum./2007, for A.Y. 2002-03 and ITA No. 1434/Mum./2007, for A.Y. 2003- 04, order dated 4-11-2009, the facts were that the assessee had allowed a telecom company to erect the tower on their terrace in consideration of an amount of Rs.5,93,700 and claimed it as being chargeable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. The Tribunal following the decision in the case of Sharda Chamber Premises v. ITO, (supra) and ITO v. Cuffe Parade Sainara Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. held such income to be chargeable under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

The Tribunal further noted that the jurisdictional High Court in ITA No. 3183 of 2010 in para 3 of judgment dated 16th August, 2011 confirmed the findings of the Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op. Society Ltd.

In view of the aforesaid binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A), allowed the ground raised by the assessee and directed the AO to assess the income in question under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Part A: ORDERs of SIC & CIC

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RTI Act and RTI Rules: RTI Rules of Bombay High Court

In the September issue of BCAJ, I covered a decision of three-member Bench of Maharashtra State Information Commission. In this issue, I cover one more.

Under the RTI Act, there are two types of authorities to which the Act is applicable: Public Authority and Competent Authority. The latter is defined u/s.2(e) as under:

“Competent authority means —

(i) the Speaker in the case of the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State or a Union Territory having such Assembly and the Chairman in the case of the Council of States or Legislative Council of State;
(ii) the Chief Justice of India in the case of the Supreme Court;
(iii) the Chief Justice of the High Court in the case of the High Court;
(iv) the President or the Governor, as the case may be, in the case of other authorities established or constituted by or under the Constitution;
(v) the Administrator appointed under Article 239 of the Constitution;
This case deals pertains to the Bombay High Court, Mumbai. It is the decision of three-member Bench comprising the then State Chief IC (Shri Vilas Patil), SIC, Amravati (Shri M. L. Shah) and SIC, Aurangabad (Shri D. B. Deshpande).

Shri Anandnatraj submitted an RTI application to PIO, in the office of the Registrar, Bombay High Court (BHC) seeking the information in respect of writ petition Nos. 2650 of 95 and 2689 of 95. He asked for photocopies of all papers filed and orders issued in respect of the petition.

The PIO expressed his inability to furnish the information, stating that “the application was not complete in all respects as received as per the Bombay High Court Right to Information Rules, 2006. As per the said Rules, a Court Fee Stamp of Rs.12 is required on the application, however, Rs.10 Court Fee Stamp is affixed. Hence there is deficit of Court Fees of Rs.2. As per the said Rules, the applicant has to submit the application in prescribed format. Please see High Court website ‘bombayhighcourt.nic.in’ for the said Rules. Moreover, in view of the provision to Rule 9 and Rule 19 of the Bombay High Court Right to Information Rules, 2006 the information in respect of judicial proceeding or records cannot be supplied under Right to Information, but you may obtain the said Information as per the procedure prescribed in the Bombay High Court Rules and Orders”.

The applicant preferred an appeal to the First Appellate Authority (FAA). The grounds of appeal were: “the BHC RTI Rules, 2006 are not consistent and in agreement with the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. As provided in Rule 9 of the said Rules, that is, Rule 9 in para 1 obtaining information in respect of third party is permissible by submission of application in Form ‘A’ as per Rule 3, the same rule in para 2 forbids the information of 3rd party in respect of judicial proceedings and records. The said contradiction in clause 9 needs proper interpretation/classification by the Public Information Officer in his reply.”

FAA responded “it is clear that the reply sent by the Public Information Officer cannot be faulted with. The information sought is relating to record of judicial proceedings and copies of the same can be obtained by applying at the facilitation centre of the High Court.” The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

The applicant then furnished the second appeal to Maharashtra Information Commission. First the appeal was heard by a single member by one SIC, Shri Ramanand Tiwari. However he passed on order that “since the issues involved are very important, I suggest that the case should be heard by the full Bench of the Commission or least a Bench consisting of three Commissioners and directed to the Secretary of the Commission to obtain the orders of the CIC and do the needful.”

Accordingly a three-member Bench heard the matter on 14-3-2011. The appellant submitted his written statement and argued also as briefly noted hereinafter.

The respondent PIO also submitted written statement and argued that the PIO and FAA have acted according to BHC RTI Rules which are made by the Chief Justice of the HC, being the ‘Competent Authority’ u/s.28 of the RTI Act.

The main contention before the Commission was that “rules framed by the Competent Authority u/s.28 of the Act, can only be for giving effect to and for carrying out the provisions of the Right to Information Act and cannot be contrary to the provisions of the Right to Information Act. They would be ultra vires and illegal and consequently unenforceable in view of the provisions of section 22 of the Act”.

“The Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court cannot negate the provisions of the Right to Information Act, since neither section 8, nor section 24 gives exemption in respect of providing information related judicial proceeding and records.”

The Commission made the following decision:

“Hence, it is necessary to examine the rules of Interpretation of the statutes.

Once the Legislature has passed the Act, it is subject to judicial review in respect of the constitutionality and the implementation of the provisions of the said Act.

No doubt, the rules made in exercise of the powers delegated under the principal Act, for carrying out the purpose laid down in the principal Act, cannot travel beyond the scope of the Act, nor can they, themselves, enlarge the scope of statutory provisions. They cannot also militate against the provision under which they were made (AIR 1956 SC, AIR 1957 SC 532).

However, the Rules framed under the Act have the force of the Law. (AIR 1954 All 639).

Therefore, the function of the Court is to apply the law as it stands. It is not for the Court to re-write the law, even though the Court notices anomalies and omission and considers the provision as they stand unreasonable (AIR 1982 Ker. 126).

In view of such principles of interpretation of statutes, the Commission has to give the decision as per the rules framed by the Chief Justice High Court of Judicature of Bombay as a Competent Authority u/s.28 of the Act.

Therefore, the decision of the First Appellate Authority is upheld and there is no necessity to interfere with the order of the First Appellate Authority.

However, in view of the points raised by the appellant, the Commission, in view of provisions of section 25(5) of the RTI Act, recommends to the Public Authority, that is the High Court to examine judicially the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, whether they are in conformity with the provisions or spirit of the RTI Act, and if found not to be in conformity with the provisions or spirit of the Act, then take such steps to promote such conformity”.

[Shri S. Aanandnatraj, Mumbai v. FAA and PIO of High Court of Mumbai, decision dated 29-4-2011 under Appeal No. 5842/02]

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CONTROVERSY: WHETHER RENTING OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY A SERVICE?

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Issue for consideration:

Section 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act or the service tax law) contains provisions relating to taxable service of renting of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of, business or commerce. The service was introduced with effect from 1-6-2007 in the service tax law. The activity of renting an immovable property per se was not perceived as a transaction of service. When airport services were introduced, the Government vide its Circular No. 80/10/2004-ST, dated 17-9-2004 (para 5) also clarified to such effect:

“However, in case a part of airport/civil enclave premises is rented/leased out, the rental/lease charges would not be subjected to service tax, as the activity of letting out premises is not rendering a service.”

The introduction of the category gave rise to resistance to pay service tax chiefly by various retail outlets selling goods and occupying licensed/ leased premises and some other licensees/lessees, engaged in business activity as they do not have the potential to claim CENVAT credit of service tax on licence fees payable for the use of commercial premises. Consequently, writ petitions were filed in various High Courts across the country challenging the levy and constitutional validity thereof. The Delhi High Court first took a position in the case of Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2009 (14) STR 433 (Del.) and held a view that in terms of section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), renting out of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce would not constitute a taxable service and as a result, the Notification dated 22-5-2007 and Circular dated 4-1-2008 were held ultra vires the Act.

In service tax law, the term ‘service’ is not defined but every taxable service introduced in the tax net is separately defined. Therefore, the issue has been that while an immovable property is rented or licensed or leased, whether there is any value addition or whether there exists any element of service?

Background of Home Solutions’ writ petition:
In this writ, the petitioner challenged the legality, validity and vires of Notification No. 24/2007, dated 22-5-2007 and Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST, dated 4-1- 2008 issued by the Government.

It was further alleged that because of the incorrect interpretation of law by the said Notification and the Circular, service tax was sought to be levied on renting of immovable property as opposed to service tax on a service provided in relation to the renting of immovable property.

The petitioners also took an alternative plea that in case it is held that such a tax is envisaged, then the provisions of section 65(90a), section 65(105) (zzzz) and section 66 insofar as they relate to the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property would amount to a tax on land and would therefore fall outside the legislative competence of the Parliament as the subject was covered under Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India and would fall within the exclusive domain of the State Legislatures and therefore the same be declared unconstitutional.

It was, inter alia, submitted that the impugned Notification and the Circular which proceeded on the assumption that the renting of immovable property was itself a service, were contrary to and inconsistent with the charging provision and therefore ultra vires the Act. Since service tax is a value-added tax and can only be levied on the value addition, the words ‘in relation to’ in section 65(105)(zzzz) of the said Act are of great significance. The value addition of service in the present context could be an improvement or the betterment of the property provided by the owner to the lessee or licensee. It is that betterment alone which could qualify as a service. The act of renting of the immovable property by itself does not provide any value addition to any person and therefore cannot be treated as a service. To support this contention reference was made to the various entries falling within the scope of ‘taxable service’, which would reveal that it is only the value addition which is taxable.

The Court held that in terms of section 65(105) (zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994, renting out of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce would not constitute a taxable service and as a result, Notification dated 22-5-2007 and Circular dated 4-1-2008 were ultra vires the Act. The Court distinguished the observations made by the SC in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam’s case [2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)], on which the respondent had placed reliance to the effect that “making available a premises for a period of a few hours for the specific purpose of being utilised as a mandap whether with or without other services would itself be a service and cannot be classified as any other kind of legal concept”. The Court also referred to the observations made by the SC in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners [2007 (7) STR 625 (SC)] wherein the SC, inter alia, had observed that “service tax is a value added tax and that just as excise duty is a tax on value addition on goods, services tax is on value addition by rendition of services. A distinction was also sought to be made between property-based services and performance-based services. The property-based services cover service providers, such as architects, interior designers, real estate agents, construction services, mandap keepers, etc. Whereas the performance-based services are those provided by persons, such as stock-brokers, practising chartered accountants, practising cost accountants, security agencies, tour operators, event managers, travel agents, etc.” Applying the same to renting of immovable property service, the High Court observed “There is no dispute that any service connected with the renting of such immovable property would fall within the ambit of section 65(105)(zzzz) and would be exigible to service tax. The question is whether renting of such immovable property by itself constitutes a service and, thereby, a taxable service. Service tax is a value added tax. It is a tax on the value addition provided by some service providers. Insofar as renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce is concerned, any value addition could not be discerned. Consequently, the renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce by itself does not entail any value addition and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a service.” (emphasis supplied). The Delhi High Court however did not examine alternative plea of constitutional validity. The Government filed an SLP against the said ruling which is admitted, but no stay has been granted against the Delhi HC Ruling. The same is pending for disposal.

The amendment by the Finance Act, 2010:
To overcome the above ruling, the Finance Act, 2010 redefined ‘taxable service’ with retrospective effect from 1-6-2007 as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided –

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person, (*by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting) for use in the course of or, for furtherance of business or commerce.”

* Words substituted for (in relation to renting of immovable property).

As a result, a service provided by renting of immovable property or a service ‘in relation to’ such renting of immovable property, is brought within the tax net. TRU, Circular No. 334/1/2010 — TRU dated 26-2-2010 clarified the amendment as under:

Para 9.2:

“In order to clarify the legislative intent and also bring in certainty in tax liability the relevant definition of taxable service is being amended to clarify that the activity of renting of immovable property per se would also constitute a taxable service under the relevant clause. This amendment is being given retrospective effect from 1-6-2007.”

Thus, renting of immovable property by itself is considered to be a taxable service. In the Finance Act 2010, it has been declared:
“No act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable had this amendment not come into force.”

Recently, the Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court have delivered their judgments on this burning issue and have decided the scope of powers of the Parliament to enact the activity of renting of premises for the use of or for furtherance of business or commerce, as service. Earlier, during F.Y. 2010-11 the other High Courts viz. Orissa High Court, in Utkal Builders Limited v. UOI, [2011 (22) STR 257 (Ori)] and P&H High Court in Shubh Timb Steels Ltd. v. UOI, [2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H)] have also held to the effect that renting of property for commercial purpose was certainly a service and had a value for the service receiver. While the Bombay High Court has extended the interim order to remain in force till September 30, 2011 and some of the petitioners have decided to knock the door of the Supreme Court, hopes of getting a decision in favour of retailers in the special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court against UOI v. Home Solutions Retail India Ltd., [2009 (15) STR J23 (SC)] appears to have dimmed. Both the decisions are briefly analysed below:

Retailers Association of India & Other v. UOI’s case, 2011 (23) STR 561 (Bom.):

The petitioners had in their petition, inter alia, challenged the legislative competence of the Parliament in the context of Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India. The constitutional challenge to the legislative competence of the Parliament was premised on the submission that:

  •     The tax which has been imposed on a taxable service which is defined to mean renting of immovable property is a tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

  •    All four judgments of the Supreme Court, referred to later herein, did not deal with a situation where the legislation would fall within the purview of a specific entry in List II.

  •     Article 246 of the Constitution empowers the State Legislature to make laws “with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II”.

  •     In consequence, the power of the State Legislature is not only to make laws imposing taxes on lands and buildings, but to enact legislation with respect to taxes on lands and buildings;

  •     Entry 49 of List II must receive the broadest possible interpretation and amplitude.

  •     Especially when read in the context of Entry 97 of List I, the width and ambit of Entry 49 of List II cannot be curtailed with reference to the residuary power of the Parliament; and

  •     A tax whether levied on the basis of rent, annual value, or capital value would constitute a tax on lands having regard to the ambit of Entry 49 of List II. A tax based on leasing of a land and computed by rental value cannot be rested on Entry 97 of List I, because it is in substance, a tax on a transaction of letting of land and Entry 49 of List II would preclude a levy by the Parliament of a service tax on letting.

Relevant legal provisions:

Article 246 of the Constitution of India:

“246. Subject-matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.

(1)    Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union List).

(2)    Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), the Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Concurrent List).

(3)    Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).

(4)    The Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included (in a State) notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.”


Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India:

List I — Union List — Entry 97 — Residuary power:

97.    Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.

List II — State List — Entry 49:

49.    Taxes on lands and buildings.

In order to address the constitutional challenge in the above petitions, the Court briefly traced the evolution of judicial thought on the issue of imposition of service tax (paras 5 to 10) by referring to the following four Supreme Court decisions in which the controversy was analysed:

(i)    Tamil Nadu Kalayana Mandapam Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)

(ii)    Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI, 2005 (182) ELT 33 (SC)

(iii)    All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Associa-tion v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) and

(iv)    Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC).

The Court, based on the analysis of the legislative provisions contained in (i) Article 246 of the Constitution of India read with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II read with Entry 49, and (ii) residuary powers under Entry 97 of List I, noted that “If the subject on which the Parliament has enacted legislation is found, upon determining its true nature and character not to fall within the purview of a field reserved to the States, the Parliament would have legislative competence in any event under Entry 97 of List I read with Article 248. The essential question that falls for determination in the present case is whether the levy of a service tax on a taxable
service which the Parliament defined to be the renting of immovable property falls within the exclusive province of the State Legislatures under Entry 49 of List II.”

The Court referred to the following judgments of the Supreme Court where the scope and ambit of Entry 49 of List II has been interpreted:

  •    Ralla Ram — AIR 1949 FC 81:

In this case, the Federal Court held that merely because the Income- tax Act adopted annual value as the standard for determining income, it would not necessarily follow that if the same standard were to be employed as a measure for any other tax (in the given case — an annual tax on buildings and lands situated in the rating areas as stipulated in the Schedule at a particular rate), that tax also became a tax on income. The Court distinguished between the nature of tax and nature of machinery quantifying the tax and the Bombay High Court averred that Ralla Ram’s case is an authority for the proposition that it is the essential nature of the tax and not the nature of the machinery, which must be looked at in determining the validity of the impost.

  •    Sudhir Chandra v. Wealth Tax Officer

— AIR 1969 SC 59:

This case dealt with a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Wealth Tax Act of 1957 on the ground that it transgressed upon a field reserved to the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II. The Bombay High Court noted that while explaining the scope of Entry 49, the Supreme Court held:

“But the legislative authority of the Parliament is not determined by visualising the possibility of exceptional cases of taxes under two different heads operating similarly on taxpayers. Again Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule con-templates the levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as units. It is normally not concerned with the division of interest or ownership in the units of lands or buildings which are brought to tax. Tax on lands and buildings is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and bears a definite relation to it. Tax on the capital value of assets bears no definable relation to lands and buildings which may form a component of the total assets of the assessee.”
(emphasis supplied).

  •     Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Hazareth — AIR 1970 SC 999:

In this case, the constitutional validity of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 was considered. The Court ruled that however wide a taxing entry in the State List may be, it would still not authorise a tax which is not expressly mentioned. If the pith and substance of the law did not fall within the purview of Entry 49 of the State List, the Parliament, it was held, would undoubtedly possess that power under Article 248 and Entry 97 of the Union List. While holding that the Gift Tax Act, 1958 was not a tax on lands and buildings, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that Entry 49 postulates a tax resting upon the general ownership of lands and buildings and a tax which is imposed directly upon lands and buildings.

  •    D. G. Gose & Co. v. State of Kerala — 1980 2 SCC 410:

The Bombay High Court noted that in this case the above principle was reiterated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court holding that a tax on buildings is “a direct tax on the assessee’s buildings as such, and is not a personal tax without reference to any particular property”.

  •     India Cement Ltd. — AIR 1990 SC 85:

Referring to the observation by the Supreme Court in this case to the effect that “there is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land” and held that the tax levied under the Income-tax Act, 1961 on income “though computed in an artificial way from house property” was levied on the income and not house property and therefore, did not fall within the purview of Entry 49 of List II. The Bombay High Court also noted that a principle was enunciated (in a judgment of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India) that a tax on lands and buildings would not comprehend within its purview a tax on income arising from land or building.

The Bombay High Court observed that the above judgments of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the settled principle of law is that a tax on lands and buildings is a tax on the general ownership of lands and buildings. In order that a tax must fall under Entry 49 of List II, the tax must be one directly on lands and buildings. A tax which is levied on the income which is received from lands or buildings is not a tax on lands or buildings.

The petitioners’ submission was that a tax on land within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II can take into account the use to which the land is put. The service tax imposed by the Parliament on renting of immovable property takes account of the user of the land or building and, hence, the service tax on renting of immovable property is a tax which the State Legislatures could conceivably impose under Entry 49 of List II. In support of the contention, it was urged that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, (AIR 1965 SC 1561) is an authority for the proposition that in order to be a tax on land, the charge under the legislation must be on the land as a unit. In that case, a tax was imposed u/s.62 of the Assam Local Self Government Act, 1953. Section 62(1) stipulated that the local Board may order that no land shall be used as a market otherwise than under a licence to be granted by the Board. U/ss.(2) which was the charging provision, it was stipulated that on the issue of an order u/ss.(1), the Board may grant a licence for the use of any land as a market and impose an annual tax thereon. While upholding the validity of the tax, the Supreme Court noted that the tax was, in substance, a tax on the land but the charge only arises on land which was used for a market.

Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of W.B., [1995 Supp (1) SCC 707] which dealt with a challenge to the validity of a cess imposed under the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. The levy was challenged in Goodricke on the ground that it was not a tax on lands and buildings. The Supreme Court held that the subject -matter of the tax and the levy was land on the premise that the entire land covered in the tea estate was treated as a separate category of land as a unit for the purposes of the levy of tax. Merely because a tax on lands or buildings is imposed with reference to the income or yield of lands or buildings, it would not cease to be a tax on lands or buildings.


Residuary power of the Parliament to legislate:
Referring to observations made by the SC in the cases of:

  •     UoI v. H. S. Dhillon — AIR 1972 SC 106,
  •     Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax — AIR 1970 SC 169,
  •     Sat Pal & Co. — AIR 1979 SC 1550,
  •     International Tourist Corp. — 1981 2 SCC 318, and few of the above-referred judgments, the Bombay High Court noted that “while the Court must give a broad and liberal interpretation to Entry 49 of List II, the interpretation to be placed on that entry must nevertheless be meaningful. In each case, the Court must have regard to the true nature and character of the levy in determining as to whether in pith and substance, the tax is a tax on land and buildings. If the essential nature of the levy is the imposition of a tax on land and buildings, it would fall within Entry 49 of List II. If on the other hand, the essential nature and character of the levy is not a tax on land and buildings, then the exercise of interpretation would not bring within its purview a tax which is not one on land and buildings.”

To determine the character of the levy under challenge, analysis of section 66 (charging section), section 65(105)(zzzz), section 65(90a) and section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 was made and it was held that:

(a)    The charge of tax is not on lands or buildings.
(b)    The charge of tax is on a taxable service.
(c)    The measure of tax is the gross amount charged by the service provider.
(d)    The charge of tax is not on lands or buildings as a unit nor is the tax on lands or buildings.
(e)    To be a tax on lands and buildings under Entry 49 of List II, the tax must be directly a tax on lands and buildings. That is not the true character of an impost on taxable services.

On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited, [(2004) 10 SCC 201] in support of the submission that the law in the present case is a law which imposes a tax on land and buildings. It was urged that in paragraph 129 of the judgment the Supreme Court, inter alia, has laid down the following principles regarding:

“(6) ‘Land’, the term as occurring in Entry 49 of List II, has a wide, connotation. Land remains land though it may be subjected to different user. The nature of user of the land would not enable a piece of land being taken out of the meaning of land itself. Different uses to which the land is subjected or is capable of being subjected provide the basis for classifying land into different identifiable groups for the purpose of taxation. The nature of user of one piece of land would enable that piece of land being classified separately from another piece of land which is being subjected to another kind of user, though the two pieces of land are identically situated except for the difference in nature of user. The tax would remain a tax on land and would not become a tax on the nature of its user.

(7)    To be a tax on land, the levy must have some direct and definite relationship with the land. So long as the tax is a tax on land by bearing such relationship with the land, it is open for the Legislature for the purpose of levying tax to adopt any one of the well-known modes of determining the value of the land such as annual or capital value of the land or its productivity. The methodology adopted, having an indirect relationship with the land, would not alter the nature of the tax as being one on land.”

In this frame of reference, the Bombay High Court noted that though as per this decision the expression ‘land’ in Entry 49 of List II has a wide connotation, the judgment in Kesoram Industries (supra) does not mark a departure from the ambit and content of Entry 49 of List II which has been laid down in the previous decisions of the Court including the judgments of the Constitution Bench in Nawn’s case and in Hazareth’s case (supra) or for that matter the decision of the Bench of seven learned Judges in Dhillon’s case (supra) and held that service tax that has been legislated upon by the Parliament is not a tax on land. The true nature and character of the levy is not a tax on land or buildings. The charge of tax is a taxable service which the Parliament regards as being rendered. The renting of immovable property is an activity which in the legislative wisdom of the Parliament involves a conferment of service and it is in that legislative exercise that the Parliament has proceeded to impose a levy of service tax. The measure of tax u/s.67 is the gross amount charged by the service provider for the service which is provided or which is to be provided by him. In the case of renting of immovable property, the measure is the rental. The measure of the tax does by no means indicate that the tax is a tax imposed on land or buildings.

The Bombay High Court noted that the decision in Godfrey Philips [(2005) 2 SCC 515] is not a decision which elucidates the scope of Entry 49 of List II to the Seventh Schedule. Whereas, the ambit of Entry 49 has been explained in several judgments of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as well as in the judgment of the Bench consisting of seven Judges in Dhillon (supra).

The Bombay High Court reiterated that since properly construed a tax which has been imposed by the Parliament is not in essence and in its true character a tax on land and buildings, the tax cannot nonetheless be held as a tax within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II in spite of the true nature and character of the levy. The essential nature and character of the levy is one which is referable to the residuary power of the Parliament under Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97. The Parliament, it may be noted, introduced Entry 92C into List I by the Constitution (Eighty Eighth Amendment) Act, 2003 to specifically deal with taxes on services. That provision has still not been enforced. In the circumstances, the true nature and character of the levy of service tax in the present case is a levy under the residuary power which has been conferred upon the Parliament.

Whether renting of immovable property has an element of ‘service’?

The Court did not accept the submission of the petitioners that there is no service involved in letting out of the immovable property and, there-fore, it was not open to the Parliament to impose service tax on the supposition that taxable service is involved on the premise that “The submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Parliament when it legislates upon a matter is entitled to make an assessment of fact on the basis of which the legislation is designed and drafted. An underlying assessment of fact by the Parliament on the basis of which a law has been enacted cannot be amenable to judicial review absent a case of manifest arbitrariness. That apart, it is equally well settled that the Legislature in enacting a law is entitled to provide for a deeming fiction …….. The fact that the service which is provided may not, to the petitioners, accord with what is commonly regarded as a service would not militate against the validity of the legislation…….. In the affidavit in reply that has been filed in these proceedings it has been stated that renting of property is considered to add value to the activity of the person who has rented the property. When a person has a property at a particular location, he is able to charge a higher sum for the merchandise sold therefrom than he would be able to charge if he were to sell the same merchandise from a place which does not have the same locational advantage. Renting of a property, it has been submitted, adds value to the activities of a person renting the property.” The Court also referred to the judgment of the SC in the case of Navnitlal C. Jhaveri v. K. K. Sen, Assistant Comm. of I. Tax AIR 1965 SC 1375. [refer paras 28 to 31].

The Court finally decided “Therefore in our view, looked at from either standpoint, the legislative basis that has been adopted by the Parliament in subjecting taxable services involved in the renting of property to the charge of service tax cannot be questioned. The assumption by a legislative body that an element of service is involved in the renting of immovable property is certainly not an assumption which can be regarded by the Court as being so manifestly absurd or perverse as to lead to an inference that the Parliament had treated as a service, an item which in no rational sense could be regarded as involving service. But more significantly, even if the Court were to proceed on the basis, suggested by the petitioners that no element of service is involved, that would not make the legislation beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. So long as the legislation does not trench upon a field which has been reserved to the State Legislatures, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the law must be treated as valid and within the purview of the field set apart for the Parliament. There is, it must be emphasised, no violation set up of any provision in Part III of the Constitution, (save and except on the issue of retrospectivity which would be considered subsequently).”

Retrospectivity:

The Court did not accept the challenge to the legislation on the ground that it is retrospective is lacking in substance by referring to (i) the plenary power of the Parliament to enact legislation, (ii) the Delhi High Court’s judgment in the case of Home Solutions and further observing that: “The provision was given retrospective effect so as to cure the deficiency which was found upon interpretation by the Delhi High Court”, (iii) the affidavit in reply by the UOI, (iv) the SC’s judgment in the case of Bakhtawar Trust v. M. D. Narayan, 2003 5 SCC 298, and (v) to the judgments in the cases of Shubh Timb Steels Limited v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H) and Utkal Builders Limited v. Union of India, 2011 (22) STR 257 (Ori.) wherein the constitutional validity of the provision has been upheld.

Cinemax India Limited’s case
— 2010 TIOL 535 HC AHM-ST:

Petitioners in these petitions challenged the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property on the grounds that:

(i)    The amendment is unconstitutional being beyond legislative competence of the Parliament.
(ii)    The Delhi High Court having held that renting of immovable property is not a service in absence of any value addition, the Union of India can never change the nature of tax by changing the event of transaction.
(iii)    The amendment not being clarificatory cannot be retrospectively enforced.

The Union of India, on the other hand took the ground that renting of immovable property is taxable service if such renting is for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce.

The petitioners inter alia contended that renting of immovable property does not amount to service as it is a transaction whereby rights in or in relation to immovable property is transferred for a certain period for consideration based on market value of the property. It is not an activity involving performance, skill or knowledge on behalf of petitioners, it was also contented that end- use i.e., the use which the licensee/lessee puts the property to cannot be determinative of the nature of transaction or can create a taxable event. At the most, it can bring about valid classification for taxation. The act of the consumer is not value addition for considering an activity a ‘service’. The value addition must be done by the service provider and in this context reliance was placed on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners & Others v. UOI & Others, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) and Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC). Further, with reference to an example it was discussed that when a landlord/licensor has property capable of being used both for residence and/or for commercial purpose, it is an irrational proposal to contend that if it is licensed for commercial use, there is value addition and therefore taxable ‘event’ occurs and no taxable event occurs when provided for residential use. There is no difference per se in the activity.

Whereas, the Revenue inter alia contended that the Legislature defined immovable property for the purpose of taxing event and only when it is used for furtherance of business or commerce, it is taxed and thus it made a class different from what is defined under other enactment like Transfer of Property Act. There is always a value addition when an immovable property is provided for furtherance of business and commerce to the recipient of service. Relying on Tamil Nadu Kalyan Mandap Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC), it was contended that definition of taxable service includes renting in the course of furtherance of business. Like in the case of catering contracts, for the fact that tax on sale of goods is involved does not mean that service tax cannot be levied on the aspect of catering which is a service. The event of making available business premises is rendition of service though it may be an event of leasing or licensing under the Transfer of Property Act and/or Easement Act. Reliance was placed on the case of Shubh Timb Steels Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H). For the purpose of validation of the Act for retrospective amendment relying on Gujarat Ambuja Cement v. UOI, 2005 TIOL 53 SC-ST, it was contended that the amendment cured defect and which was within legislative competence. Relying on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners, 2007

(7)    STR 625 (SC), it was contended that service tax is on value addition by rendition of services. Relying on similar view expressed in Moti Laminates P. Ltd. v. CCE, 1995 (76) ELT 241 (SC) wherein it was held that there is no difference between production and manufacture of saleable goods and production of marketable/saleable services in the form of an activity undertaken by the service provider for consideration.

The Gujarat High Court observed that in normal course of renting of immovable property, service tax is not attracted in absence of any activity in-volving performance, skill, expertise or knowledge. Renting of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce is an activity which amounts to rendition of service in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce. Relying on the decisions of Association of Leasing and Financial Services v. UOI (supra), the Court observed that service tax is a tax on activity, whereas sales tax is a tax on sale of thing or goods. Taxable event under the service tax is each exercise/activity undertaken by the service provider and it is imposed every time service is rendered to customer/client, it is a value added tax. Citing Tamil Nadu Kalyan Mandapam (supra)’s case, it was held that service could not be struck down on the ground that it does not conform to a common understanding of the word, ‘service’ so long as it does not transgress any specific restriction contained in the constitution.

Thus, when a service recipient uses an immovable property in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce, it can safely be stated that the service provider has rendered service enabling the service recipient in value addition. Meaning thereby that such activity undertaken by service provider for value addition in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce i.e., to carry on the activity or business or commerce of the service recipient amounts to rendition of service and will fall within the meaning of the definition of ‘service tax’ and there was no case made out to declare section 65(105)(zzzz) as unconstitutional or ultra-vires any provision of the constitution.

Conclusion:

In summation, various petitions before both the Courts viz. the Bombay High Court and the Gujarat High Court, respectively, have been dismissed upholding the activity of renting/leasing/licensing of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of business as service. In addition thereto, the constitution validity is also upheld as service tax on the activity of renting is not considered a tax on land or buildings. Also the Courts have concluded to the effect that there exists value addition for the recipient or consumer of service when premises are provided for the use of business. The grounds of rejection of petitions by the P&H High Court in Shubh Timb (supra) and the Orissa High Court in Utkal Builders (supra) are not discussed hereinabove. While the Orissa High Court has not dealt with whether or not value addition exists in renting of immovable property or whether it is a necessary ingredient for a transaction to be held as ‘taxable service’, the P&H High Court has observed that even if there is no value addition, the impugned provision cannot be held void. Whereas, all the four High Courts have upheld legislative competence of the Parliament and retrospectivity with a focus on different aspects, it appears that litigation at the level of the Apex Court may mainly revolve around the aspect of value addition and whether or not the tax levied as service tax could be considered a tax on land and buildings.

Bhumiraj Homes Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. S. Syal (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM) ITA No. 2170/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on : 25-3-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Pradip Kapasi/ Naresh Kumar Balodia

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Section 80IB(10) — Deduction in case of housing project — (1) For computation of built-up area for commercial purpose whether proportionate area covered by staircase, passage, lift area and liftroom, etc. is also to be considered — Held, No. (2) While considering the size of the plot whether the unbuilt-up area should be bifurcated in proportion to commercial as well as residential area — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee, a builder developer had claimed a deduction of Rs.2.55 crore u/s.80IB(10) representing the profits of the housing project. In the original assessment deduction u/s.80IB(10) was disallowed to the extent it was relatable to profits of the commercial area. In the re-assessment proceeding u/s.147, the AO disallowed the remaining part of the deduction which was earlier allowed as in his opinion only the projects approved as ‘housing projects’ were eligible and not those approved as ‘residential as well as commercial projects’ by the local authority.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue contended that the commercial area exceeded 10% of the total built-up area computed on the following basis, hence, the order of the AO was to be upheld. It was submitted that:

  • Built-up area for commercial purpose should include proportionate area covered by staircase, passage, lift area and lift-room;
  • While considering the size of the plot, unbuiltup area should be bifurcated in proportion to commercial as well as residential area. Plot size so calculated was less than 1 acre. It also relied on the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal decision in the case of Bengal Abuja Housing Development Ltd. v. DCIT, (ITA No. 1595/Kol./2005, dated 24-3-2006).

Held:
The Tribunal did not agree with the Revenue’s contention that unbuilt-up area should be bifurcated in proportion to commercial as well as residential area. According to it, in any project there would always be some portion of the area which remains unbuilt and is required to be kept open as per the plans approved. According to the Tribunal the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal was not on the point advocated by the Revenue. As regards the contention to include proportionate area covered by staircase, passage, lift area and lift-room, the Tribunal noted that since all shops and commercial establishments were in the ground floor, such areas cannot be considered to compute built-up area for commercial purpose. Further, relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Brahma Associates (ITA No. 1194 of 2010), it allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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(2011) 128 ITD 459/ 9 taxmann.com 121 (Mum.) ACIT v. Safe Enterprises A.Y.: 2005-06.

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Section 143 r.w.s. 133A — Assessee can retract the admission made during survey in respect of concealed income with sufficient evidence and hence no addition of the said amount can be made.

Facts:
The assessee-firm was engaged in the business of civil contracts. During the course of survey, it was noticed that three invoices amounting to Rs. 76,33,179 were not entered into the books of accounts. The AO hence concluded that the labour receipts were suppressed. The partner of the firm agreed to the above findings and offered Rs.76 lakhs as additional income on that account.

However, in the immediate post-survey proceedings, the assessee was able to produce all the related documents before the assessing authority, thus retracting his earlier admission. The Assessing Officer made addition of the impugned amount despite retraction by the assessee. On appeal to the CIT(A) by the assessee the learned CIT(A) considered the matter in great detail and ultimately deleted the said additions. Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.

Held:

1. Survey is essentially an evidence gathering exercise. It is an established position of law that if a disclosure is made by the assessee either under mistaken belief of facts and law due to mental pressure from the survey party or under coercion, he can retract the statement and the admission so made.

2. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Pullan Gode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala that admission was an extremely important piece of evidence, but it cannot be said to be conclusive. It is open to the person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect.

3. Also it was held in CIT v. Ramdas Motor Transport and Jaikishin R. Agarwal v. ACIT that if the admission in the statement is not supported by any asset or document, the retraction may be genuine.

4. The assessee, in the post-survey proceedings as well as assessment proceedings had amply demonstrated through credible evidence the source of labour receipts.

Consequently, the ITAT upheld the order of the CIT(A).

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(2011) TIOL 530 ITAT-Kol. ITO v. Rajesh Kr. Garg A.Y.: 2006-2007.

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Sections 40(a)(ia), 194C — When tax was not deducted at source on the basis of Form 15I received by the assessee from the payee and the assessee failed to file Form 15J with the jurisdictional CIT, disallowance cannot be made merely on the basis that the Form 15J was not filed in time with the jurisdictional CIT.

Facts:
The assessee, engaged in business of transportation of goods through hired trucks, made payments aggregating to Rs.28.01 lakhs in respect of 42 vehicles and actual payment was exceeding Rs.50,000 per vehicle, without deduction of tax at source since it had received declarations from the payees in Form 15I. However, the assessee did not file Form 15J within the prescribed time to the jurisdictional CIT. The Assessing Officer disallowed the sum of Rs.28.01 lakhs u/s.40(a)(ia), though the declarations were produced before him in the course of assessment proceedings, on the ground that the authenticity of receiving Form 15I is not discharged due to non-filing of Form 15J with the jurisdictional CIT. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) stated that the Act does not say that Form 15I is to be treated as non-est due to non-filing of Form 15J by the assessee with the jurisdictional CIT. He held that Form 15I comes into effect before the actual payment or crediting to the account takes place, whereas the due date for furnishing the particulars in Form 15J is 30th June following the financial year. The appellant was to stop deduction of tax on payments as and when he received Form 15I from the sub-contractor. He also observed that the AO had not doubted the existence of Form 15I at the time of making the payment by the assessee. He deleted the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Before the Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that this issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of ITAT, Mumbai ‘F’ Bench in the case of Shri Vipin P. Mehta v. ITO, (ITA No. 3317/Mum./2010, A.Y. 2006-07, order dated 20th May, 2011) and also by the decision of Ahmedabad ‘A’ Bench in the case of Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad v. Dy. CIT, (OSD) (ITA No. 2228/Ahd./2009, A.Y. 2006-07, order dated 29-4-2011).

The Tribunal found that the assessee had obtained Form 15I and filed during the course of assessment proceedings but failed to file Form 15J with the jurisdictional CIT. The Tribunal found the issue to be covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Vipin P. Mehta (supra). Following the ratio laid down by the said decision, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and deleted the addition made by the AO.

The Tribunal decided this ground of appeal in favour of the assessee.

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(2011) TIOL 511 ITAT-Mum. Manali Investments v. ACIT A.Y.: 2005-06.

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Sections 2(29A), 2(29B), 2(42A), 2(42B), 48, 49, 50 and 74 — Brought forward long-term capital loss can be set-off against capital gain computed u/s.50 in respect of a long-term capital asset.

Facts:
The assessee, engaged in the business of finance and investments, sold meters and transformers, which were its depreciable assets, for a consideration of Rs.1,45,99,988. The gain arising on such sale was shown as long-term capital gain. The AO noticed that these meters and transformers were purchased in earlier years for a consideration of Rs.8,75,99,928 and on these 100% depreciation was claimed and allowed in the respective first year itself. The AO invoked the provisions of section 50 and regarded the gain to be short-term capital gain. The assessee, placing reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Ace Builders Pvt. Ltd., (281 ITR 210) (Bom.) contended that such profit on sale of meters and transformers, which were otherwise long-term capital assets, was required to be considered as long-term capital gain for the purposes of set-off against brought forward loss arising on transfer of long-term capital assets. The AO rejected this contention of the assessee and treated the amount of Rs.145.99 lakhs as short-term capital gain on sale of assets which resulted into not allowing set-off against brought forward loss from the long-term capital assets.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The effect of section 50 is that once depreciation has been allowed under this Act on a capital asset which forms part of a block of assets, then capital gain on the transfer of such assets shall not be computed in accordance with the provisions of sections 48 and 49, but the income so resulting shall be deemed to be the capital gains arising from the transfer of short-term capital assets in the manner provided in the latter section. Section 50 is a deeming provision and only by legal fiction income from the transfer of otherwise long-term capital assets (held for a period of more than 36 months) is treated as capital gains arising from the transfer of short-term capital assets. Such deeming provision has to be restricted only up to the point which has been covered within the provisions of section 50. The prescription of section 50 is to be extended only up to computation of capital gains. Once the amount of capital gain is determined in case of depreciable assets as per this section, ignoring the mandate of sections 48 and 49 which otherwise deal with the mode of computation of capital gains, the function of this provision shall come to an end and the capital gain so determined shall be dealt with as per the other provisions of the Act. If the assessee is otherwise eligible for any benefit under the Act which is attached to a longterm capital asset, the same shall remain intact. It cannot be denied simply for the reason that on the transfer of such a long-term capital asset, the short-term capital gain has been computed as per section 50.

There can be two stages, viz. firstly, the computation of capital gain on the transfer of otherwise longterm capital assets u/s.50 and secondly, when such capital gain has been so computed, the applicability of other provisions dealing with the short-term or long-term capital assets.

As has been held in the case of Ace Builders (supra), the view that by virtue of the operation of section 50, the capital gain so computed becomes that arising from the transfer of a short-term capital asset for all purposes is incorrect.

The effect of provision of section 74 is that the brought forward loss from long-term capital assets can be set off only against long-term capital gain within the period prescribed in s.s(2) of section 74.

In the instant case, capital gain has arisen from the transfer of an asset which was held for a period of more than three years and no long-term capital gain has entered into the computation of total income of the assessee on this transaction. This amount would also retain the character of long-term capital gain for all other provisions and consequently qualify for set-off against the brought forward loss from the long-term capital assets.

The appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.

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Insurance business: Section 44: A.Y. 2002-03: The amount set apart by insurance company towards solvency margin as per directions given by IRDA is to be excluded while computing actuarial valuation surplus: Pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund would continue to be governed by provisions of section 44, irrespective of fact that income from such fund is exempted.

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[CIT v. Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd., 201 Taxman 115 (Bom.); 12 Taxman.com 388 (Bom.)]

The assessee was engaged in the life insurance business. In its return of income for the A.Y. 2002-03, it computed actuarial valuation surplus by excluding the provision for reserve on account of solvency margin amounting to Rs.3,500 crores and loss in Jeevan Suraksha Fund. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee and passed the assessment order by adding the amount on account of the provision for solvency margin and loss from Jeevan Suraksha Fund, inter alia, on the ground that the provision for solvency margin was not an ascertained liability; and that income from Jeevan Suraksha Fund being exempt u/s.10(23AAB), the loss incurred from the said fund could not be adjusted against the taxable income. The Tribunal deleted the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) A plain reading of Rule 2 of the First Schedule to the Act, makes it clear that the annual average of the surplus from the insurance business has to be arrived at by adjusting the surplus or deficit disclosed by the actuarial valuation made in accordance with the Insurance Act, 1938.

(ii) In the instant case, the Chairman of IRDA had directed that the solvency calculations of the assessee did not conform to the requirements of the Regulations that have been stipulated by the Regulatory Authority. It was further directed that the deficiency in the solvency margin was to the extent of Rs.10,000 crores and the assessee was directed to set right the said deficiency over a period of three years by making a provision which would be kept apart in the policy-holders’ fund and no part of the said provision would be available for distribution either to the policy-holders or to the Government of India. Accordingly, the assessee had set apart Rs.3,500 crores towards solvency margin in the assessment year in question.

(iii) The Tribunal, after considering various decisions of the Apex Court as also, the High Court and section 64(VA) of the Insurance Act, 1938, held that the amounts set apart towards the solvency margin as per the directions given by the IRDA was ascertained liability which was required to be set apart as per the Regulations framed by IRDA and, hence, liable to be excluded while computing the actuarial valuation surplus.

(iv) In those circumstances, the decision of the Tribunal in holding that the funds set apart as solvency margin had to be excluded while determining the distributable profits of the assessee could not be faulted.

(v) So far as loss incurred by the assessee from Jeevan Suraksha Fund was concerned, the Jeevan Suraksha Fund is a pension fund approved by the Controller of Insurance appointed by the Central Government to perform the duties of the Controller of Insurance under the Insurance Act. The loss incurred in the Jeevan Suraksha Fund has been considered by the actuary as a business loss, as per the valuation report as on the last day of the financial year, allowable u/s.44 read with the First Schedule to the Act. The fact that the income from such fund has been exempted u/s.10(23AAB) w.e.f. 1-4-1997, does not mean that the pension fund ceases to be insurance business, so as to fall outside the purview of the insurance business covered u/s.44.

(vi) In other words, the pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund would continue to be governed by the provisions of section 44, irrespective of the fact that the income from such fund is exempted, or not. Therefore, while determining the surplus from the insurance business, the actuary was justified in taking into consideration the loss incurred under Jeevan Suraksha Fund.

(vii) The object of inserting section 10(23AAB) as per the Board Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998 was to enable the assessee to offer attractive terms to the contributors. Thus, the object of inserting section 10(23AAB) was not with a view to treat the pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund outside the purview of insurance business, but to promote insurance business by exempting the income from such fund.

(viii) Therefore, in the facts of the instant case, the decision of the Tribunal in holding that even after insertion of section 10(23AAB), the loss incurred from the pension fund like Jeevan Suraksha Fund had to be excluded while determining the actuarial valuation surplus from the insurance business u/s.44 could not be faulted.”

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(2011) 39 VST 213 (Bom.) Addl. Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bunge India P. Ltd.

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Rate of tax — Margarine — Hydrogenated oil — Vanaspati — Taxable at 4% — Schedule Entry C-100 of Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

Facts:
The Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, filed an appeal to the Bombay High Court, against the decision of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, dated July, 9 2010, holding that margarine sold under the brand name ‘Lotus Margarine’ is vanaspati within the meaning of Schedule Entry C-100 of the MVAT Act, 2002 and is taxable at 4%. The High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the Tribunal.

Held:
(i) As per the opinion of the expert, margarine is a food in plastic form or liquid emulsion containing not less than 80% fat oil, vanaspati and margarine, all are essentially mixed triglycerides of the fatty acid. Oil and vanaspati contained moisture only in trace quantities, whereas margarine being formulated product contained about 12 to 16% moisture and other additives. Margarine is formulated using hydrogenated vegetable oil.

(ii) The High Court took in to account the fact that the margarine produced by other manufacturers viz., Kamani or Godrej is taxable at 4%, so under the principle of parity margarine which is produced by the respondent is rightly made taxable at 4% by the Tribunal.

(iii) Further, during the period from 2006 to 2008 the margarine produced by the respondent was classified in Schedule C, Entry 100 as vanaspati and was taxable at 4% till the decision of the AO, so there is no need to change the view.

(iv) Accordingly, the High Court affirmed the view taken by the Tribunal holding that margarine is vanaspati to be classified under Schedule C, Entry 100 of the MVAT Act, 2002 and taxable at 4%.

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(2011) 39 VST 191 (WBTT) Shri Rameshkumar Mehta and Another v. Commercial Tax Officer

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Sales tax — Refund — Dealer entitled to refund as per returns filed where assessment is set aside as time-barred — Sections 30, 45(1) and 60 of West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994.

Facts:
The dealer applied for refund of excess payment as per returns filed and amount paid after assessment under compulsion, where assessment order was set aside by the Tribunal being barred by limitation. The Department rejected his application against which dealer filed an application before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal. Since there was difference in opinion between technical and judicial members, the matter was referred to the Full Bench for decision.

Held:

(1) Absence of an assessment order does not and cannot mean that the assessee’s tax liability under the Act remains uncertified or un-quantified. If the assessment is not made, then the assessee’s tax liability gets quantified as per the amount of tax payable on the basis of the return figures. If the assessment is made, tax liability is quantified as determined/ assessed amount.

(2) Setting aside of an assessment order on the ground that it was time-barred and failure to pass an assessment order have the same legal impact.

(3) Section 60 of the Act providing for grant of refund did not confine refund only to excess payments made after an assessment order.

(4) Accordingly, the dealer is entitled to get refund of tax paid in excess, if the tax payable under the Act, even if excess payment is made voluntarily, if there is no unjust enrichment thereby. Accordingly, the application was allowed with direction to grant refund of TDS as well as paid after the assessment.

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(2011) 23 STR 399 (Tri.-Chennai) — Perambalur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy.

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Demand raised under Cargo handling agency
services — Cenvat credit on GTA services denied for want of proper
documents — CBEC’s Circular F.No. B-11/1/2002-TRU, dated 1-8-2002 — Once
activity not leviable and service tax paid, credit eligible — Demand
set aside.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in the
activity of loading or unloading of cargo and were paying service tax
under the category of GTA services. The demand of service tax was raised
on the ground that the services rendered by the appellants were in fact
‘Cargo handling services’ and the Cenvat credit was inadmissible as the
same was taken without any prescribed documents. The appellants
submitted that in light of the CBEC’s Circular F.No. B-11/1/2002-TRU,
dated 1-8-2002, individuals undertaking the activity of loading or
unloading cargo would not be liable to service tax as ‘Cargo handling
agency’.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that once the
activity itself was held not to be leviable to service tax and the
service tax was paid at the insistence of the Department, the assessees
were entitled to claim Cenvat credit. Accordingly, the demand together
with interest and penalty was set aside.

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(2011) 23 STR 392 (Tri.-Del.) — Small Industries & Development Bank of India v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh.

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Banking and other financial services — Whether foreclosure of loan is towards rendering of service or is ending of service and whether the same can be treated as lending of service.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing banking and financial services. The dispute arose in relation to the amount of Rs.8,06,059 collected on account of premium on pre-payment of direct loans from their customers 1-9-2004 to 31-3-2006. The demand of Rs.82,215 was confirmed against the appellants treating the amount collected as service charges received for services rendered under the category of banking and financial services. The appellants inter alia submitted that the amount received towards re-scheduling of loan and foreclosure of loan is not towards rendering any services and is in fact a case of ending the services.

Held:
Reflecting on the definition of ‘Banking and financial services’ as provided in section 65(10) of the Finance Act, 1994 during the relevant period, the Tribunal observed that the authorities did not indicate as to which sub-clause of the definition of the activity foreclosure falls under. Foreclosure premium was kind of a compensation for possible loss of interest revenue on the loan amount returned by the customers. Setting aside the appeal, it was held that the activity of foreclosure could not be treated as ‘Banking and financial services’.

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(2011) 23 STR 385 (Tri.-Del.) — Rajasthan State Warehousing Corp. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Demand — Amount collected by assessee in relation to handling, transportation and supervision charges while providing storage and warehousing charges — Service tax paid when pointed out by Department.

Held: No intention to evade tax — Extended period not invocable — Demand, interest and penalty be consequently reduced — Penalty u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 set aside.

Facts:
The appellants were a public sector undertaking engaged in the business of warehousing fertilisers and other items and were registered with the service tax authorities for payment of service tax on ‘Storage and warehousing charges’. During the audit conducted by the service tax authorities, it was observed that the appellants were recovering supervising charges from their customers which was being paid to the handling and transportation contractors appointed by them. The appellant started paying service tax on handling and transportation charges as also supervision charges under the ‘Cargo handling services’. A show-cause notice was issued against the appellants demanding tax as ‘Cargo handling services’ rendered during the past and sevice tax demand of Rs. 79,43,447 was confirmed against the appellants along with interest and penalty. The appellants inter alia contended that there was no intention to evade service tax and failure to pay service tax was due to the non-understanding of the appellants regarding the term ‘Cargo handling agency’ services provided by them. Therefore, the demand for period beyond 12 months be dropped.

Held:
The Tribunal considering the status of the appellants as a public sector undertaking and their conduct after the matter was pointed out to them held that there was no intention to evade payment of tax. Demand, interest and penalty u/s.75 was to be paid in respect of normal period and the penalty u/s.78 was held as not maintainable.

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(2011) 23 STR 375 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Galaxy Data Processing Centre.

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Business Auxiliary service — Computerisation of energy billing for Rajasthan State Electricity Board — Assessee feeding data provided by clients in computer network system with the software created specially for the client — No service undertaken on behalf of client as having no contact with customers — Work using custom-made software classifiable as Information Technology service.

Facts:
The appellants were ordered by Rajasthan State Electricity Board (RSEB) for computerisation of energy billing and related MIS, relevant formats, performas and information, for which the appellant developed a software only for RSEB. SCN was issued alleging that the services rendered by them amounted to BAS and thus service tax was payable and penalties were leviable. On appeal by the party, the Commissioner concluded that service rendered were in the nature of information technology service which is not included under the category of business service. Relying on the decision in the case of Dataware Computers & Ors. v. CCE & CST (Appeals), Guntur 2008 (87) RLT 325 (CESTAT-Bang.), the appellants contended that they have merely undertaken computer-enabled service of data processing and generation of reports and bills which came under Information Technologies service and not under BAS.

Held:
It was observed that the assessee had not undertaken any service on behalf of their clients as they did not have contract with the customer of their clients and were not issuing bills directly to the customers of their clients. The work of data processing using custom-made software deserves to be considered as Information Technology services. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and penalty set aside.

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Deduction u/s.10A: A.Y. 2004-05: Export proceeds received beyond 6 months: RBI approval under FEMA: Sufficient compliance u/s.10A: Amount received late entitled to deduction.

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[CIT v. Morgan Stanley Advantage Services Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.), ITA No. 4027 of 2010, dated 30-8-2011]

The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A.Y. 2004-05, for availing benefit u/s.10A, the assessee was required to realise the export proceeds by 30-9-2004. The assessee received export proceeds of Rs.2.20 crores in December 2004. On 7-10-2004, the assessee had made an application to the RBI seeking extension of time for realisation of the export proceeds. Reminders were sent on 24-1-2007 and 30-3-2007. By its letter dated 25-4-2007, the RBI confirmed the realisation of the amount under the provisions of FEMA. There was no separate approval under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the said amount of Rs.2.20 crores u/s.10A of the Act. The Tribunal held that once the assessee has applied for extension and has completed all the formalities and in response the RBI has taken the remittance on record, then non-issuance of a formal letter of approval by the RBI cannot be held against the assessee for none of its fault. The Tribunal further held that in the facts of the present case, it must be held that the extension has been granted in substance and, therefore, the benefit of section 10A has to be allowed to the assessee on the ground that the extension is deemed to have been granted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In our opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal. In the present case, the note appended to the RBI’s letter dated 25-4-2007 no doubt records that the approval granted by the RBI is under FEMA and the said approval should not be construed as approval by any Authority or Government under any other laws/regulations. The question is, whether the extension of time for realisation of the export proceeds by the Competent Authority under FEMA can be said to be the approval granted by the Competent Authority u/s.10A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

(ii) ‘Competent Authority’ in section 10A means the RBI or such other Authority as is authorised under any law for the time being in force for regulating payments and dealings in foreign exchange. Admittedly, RBI is the Competent Authority under FEMA which regulates the payments and dealings in foreign exchange. Thus, what section 10A(3) of the Act provides is that the benefits u/s.10A(1) would be available if the export proceeds are realised within the time prescribed by the Competent Authority under FEMA. In the present case, the competent authority under FEMA, namely, the RBI, has granted approval in respect of the export proceeds realised by the assessee till December, 2004. Therefore, the approval granted by RBI under FEMA would meet the requirements of section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In other words, once the competent authority under FEMA which regulates the payments and dealings in foreign exchange has approved realisation of the export proceeds by the assessee till December 2004, then it meets the requirements of section 10A(3) and consequently the assessee would be entitled to the benefits u/s.10A(1) of the Act.

(iii) Moreover, in the present case, the RBI which is the Competent Authority under FEMA as also u/s.10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has neither declined nor rejected the application made by the assessee seeking extension of time u/s.10A of the Act. Therefore, the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in holding that the approval granted under FEMA constitutes a deemed approval granted by the RBI u/s.10A(3) of the Act cannot be faulted.”

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Business income/House property income: Rent from leave and licence of office premises: Assessable as business income.

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[The Scientific Instrument Co. Ltd. v. CIT (All.), ITA No. 1 of 2003, dated 12-8-2011]

The assessee company was carrying on business of import and sale of scientific instruments. It purchased premises at Nariman Point, Mumbai in 1982 and had its regional office there. In November 1987, the assessee gave the property on leave-and-licence basis to Citibank. The rental income so received was offered to tax by the assessee as ‘business profits’. The Assessing Officer assessed the income as ‘income from house property’. The Tribunal upheld the assessment.

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In Universal Plast Ltd. v. CIT, 237 ITR 454 (SC), tests were laid down as to when income from property is assessable as ‘business profit’ and as ‘income from house property’.

(ii) Applying these tests, the rental income has to be assessed as ‘business profits’ because

(a) All assets of the business were not rented out by the assessee and it continued the main business of dealing in scientific apparatus, etc.

(b) The property was being used for the regional office and was let out by way of exploitation of business assets for making profit.
(c) The assessee had not sold away the properties or abandoned its business activities. The transaction is a ‘commercial venture’ taken in order to exploit business assets and for receiving higher income from commercial assets.”

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Offences and prosecution — False verification in return — Since the signature on return was not disputed at the time of assessment and penalty proceedings, it amounted to admission and the accused could not have been acquitted for the reason that prosecution was not able to prove the signature of the accused.

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[ITO v. Mangat Ram Norata Ram Narwana & Anr., (2011) 336 ITR 624 (SC)]

M/s.
Mangat Ram Norata Ram is a partnership firm carrying on the business of
sale and purchase of machinery, iron pipes and spare parts. One Mr. Hem
Raj happened to be one of its partners. M/s. Mangat Ram Norata Ram
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the firm’) filed its income-tax return for
the A.Y. 1988-89 on July 14, 1988 through its counsel, which was signed
and verified by Hem Raj, its partner. The income-tax return showed the
income of the firm Rs.1,02,800. Return was accompanied by statement of
income, trading accounts, profit and loss account, partnership account
and balance sheet for the A.Y. 1988-89. The assessment was completed by
the then Income-tax Officer u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act for
Rs.1,47,370.

The books of account of the firm were taken into
possession by the Sales Tax Department, which were obtained by the
Income-tax Department and on its perusal, discrepancies relating to
entries of income, sale and purchase, bank account, etc., were noticed
and accordingly a notice u/s.148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was issued requiring the
respondents to furnish a revised return within 30 days. The respondents
did not comply with the notice and thereafter notice u/s.142(1) of the
Act was issued and the assessee-firm ultimately filed its incometax
return declaring its income of Rs.1,47,870. This return was said to be
duly signed and furnished by the accused Hem Raj, which was accompanied
by a revised statement of income, trading account and profit and loss
account. All these documents were also signed by the accused Hem Raj. On
consideration of the same, the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
made addition of Rs.1,28,000 with the trading account, Rs.1,10,000 in
the bank account and Rs.19,710 as additional income and assessed the
total income to Rs.3,68,200 and directed for initiating penalty
proceedings.

Ultimately, the minimum penalty of Rs.1,24,950 was
imposed u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act and further a sum of Rs.7,890 and
Rs.12,680 u/s.271(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent firm filed appeal
against the imposition of penalty which was dismissed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The respondents had paid the
penalty inflicted on the firm.

A complaint was also lodged for
prosecution of the respondents u/s.276C(1), 277 and 278 of the Act. The
Trial Court on appraisal of the evidence held both the respondents
guilty and awarded a fine of Rs.1,000 each u/s.276C(1), 277 and 278 of
the Act to the firm, whereas, Hem Raj was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine Rs.1,000 on each count and
in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months.

The
firm and Hem Raj aggrieved by their conviction and sentence preferred
appeal and the Appellate Court set aside the conviction and sentence on
the ground that sanction for prosecution was not valid. The Appellate
Court further held that the prosecution has not been able to prove the
signature of Hem Raj in the return filed, and hence, the conviction is
bad on that ground also. The Income-tax Officer aggrieved by the
acquittal of the accused preferred an appeal and the High Court by its
impugned judgment upheld the order of the acquittal and while doing so
observed that the sanction is valid but maintained the order of
acquittal on the ground that the prosecution has not been able to prove
that the return was signed/verified by Hem Raj.

On further
appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the prosecution had led evidence
to prove that the revised return was filed by the firm under the name
of the accused Hem Raj and on that basis assessment was made by the
assessing authority. There is further evidence to show that aggrieved by
the order of assessing authority, an appeal was preferred before the
Appellate Authority under the signature of the accused Hem Raj, which
was dismissed and the penalty was paid. At no point of time the accused
Hem Raj made any objection that the return did not bear his signature
and was not filed by him. It is trite that admission is the best
evidence against the maker and it can be inferred from the conduct of
the party. Admission implied by conduct is strong evidence against the
maker, but he is at liberty to prove that such admission was mistaken or
untrue. By proving conduct of the accused Hem Raj in not raising any
dispute at any point of time and paying the penalty, the prosecution has
proved his admission of filing and signing the return. Once the
prosecution has proved that, it was for the accused Hem Raj to
demonstrate that he did not sign the return. There is no statutory
requirement that signature on the return has to be made in the presence
of the income-tax authority. Nothing has been brought in evidence by the
accused Hem Raj that the signature did not belong to him on the return
and the penalty was paid mistakenly. The Supreme Court was of the view
that the Appellate Court had misdirected itself in not considering the
evidence in a right perspective and acquitting the accused, so also the
High Court which failed to correct the apparent error.

Accordingly,
the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and the impugned orders were set
aside and the judgment of conviction passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate was restored. However, the Supreme Court reduced the
substantive sentence from one year to six months on each count and they
were directed to run concurrently.

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BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING — IMPLICATIONS U/S.56(2)(viia)

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The Finance Bill, 2010 witnessed the introduction of a new provision in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (IT Act), being the insertion of clause (viia) to sub-section (2) of section 56 of the IT Act, with effect from 1st day of June 2010.

Until such time, only individuals and Hindu Undivided Families (HUF) were covered within the provisions of section 56(2). As explained in the Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2010, clause (viia) was inserted in section 56(2) to prevent the practice of transferring shares of an unlisted company without consideration or at a price lower than the Fair Market Value (FMV) and to bring it under the tax net.

The legislative intent behind introduction of this provision was to prevent laundering of unaccounted income under the pretext of gifts, especially after abolition of the Gift Tax Act. Hence, these provisions are in the nature of anti-abuse provisions.

These provisions apply only if the recipient of shares is a company and in which public are not substantially interested or a firm. The term ‘firm’ has now been inclusively defined u/s.2(23)(i) to include a Limited Liability Partnership as defined (LLP), under the LLP Act, 2008.

We reproduce below the relevant extract of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act:

“(viia) where a firm or a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, receives, in any previous year, from any person or persons, on or after the 1st day of June, 2010, any property, being shares of a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, —

(i) without consideration, the aggregate fair market value of which exceeds fifty thousand rupees, the whole of the aggregate fair market value of such property;

(ii) for a consideration which is less than the aggregate fair market value of the property by an amount exceeding fifty thousand rupees, the aggregate fair market value of such property as exceeds such consideration:

Provided that this clause shall not apply to any such property received by way of a transaction not regarded as transfer under clause (via) or clause (vic) or clause (vicb) or clause (vid) or clause (vii) of section 47.

Explanation — For the purposes of this clause, ‘fair market value’ of a property, being shares of a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation to clause (vii);”

The provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act are therefore, attracted upon fulfilling of the following conditions:

(a) Recipient is a firm or a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, as defined u/s.2(18) of the IT Act closely held company;
(b) Transferor can be any person;
(c) Recipient must ‘receive’ shares of a closely-held company; and
(d) Shares should be received without consideration or for inadequate consideration.

Therefore any receipt of shares of a closely-held company, without consideration or for inadequate consideration, is taxable in the hands of the recipient.

For the purposes of this section, consideration would be deemed to be inadequate, if the difference between the actual consideration and the FMV (to be determined as per prescribed Valuation Rules) of the property exceeds Rs.50,000.

As per Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, the FMV of unquoted shares is to be determined as under:

(a) Equity shares: Book value of the shares to be computed as follows:

(A – L) x (PV)
—————-
(PE)

Where,
A = Book value of the assets in balance sheet as reduced by any amount paid as advance tax under the Income-tax Act and any amount shown in the balance sheet including the debit balance of the profit and loss account or the profit and loss appropriation account which does not represent the value of any asset.

L = Book value of liabilities shown in the balance sheet but not including the following amounts —

(i) the paid-up capital in respect of equity shares;

(ii) the amount set apart for payment of dividends on preference shares and equity shares where such dividends have not been declared before the date of transfer at a general body meeting of the company;

(iii) reserves, by whatever name called, other than those set apart towards depreciation;

(iv) credit balance of the profit and loss account;

(v) any amount representing provision for taxation, other than amount paid as advance tax under the Income-tax Act, to the extent of the excess over the tax payable with reference to the book profits in accordance with the law applicable thereto;

(vi) any amount representing provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities;

(vii) any amount representing contingent liabilities other than arrears of dividends payable in respect of cumulative preference shares.

PE = Total amount of paid-up equity share capital as shown in balance sheet.

PV = the paid-up value of such equity shares.

Please note, here FMV does not imply the actual market value of the shares at which shares may be transacted between parties. It is the value of shares as determined based on book value of the assets and liabilities of the company.

(b) Other than equity shares: Price which the shares will fetch in the open market, to be determined by a valuation report of a Merchant Banker or a Chartered Accountant.

If, in case the company has issued Compulsory Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS), then unless it has been actually converted to equity shares, it would be regarded as ‘other shares’. Thus, on any transfer of CCPS before its conversion, one will have to consider its market value, as stated above, to ascertain the implications u/s.56(2)(viia).

The tax officer is given the power to refer the questions of FMV of equity shares and other shares, to a valuation officer. For this purpose, necessary changes have been made u/s.142A(1) of the IT Act, with effect from 1st July 2010.

In order to avoid hardships in genuine cases, certain exceptions have been provided in the said provision as listed below:
(a) Receipt of shares in an Indian company by amalgamating foreign company from the amalgamated foreign company, in a scheme of amalgamation;

(b) Receipt of shares in an Indian company by resulting foreign company from the demerged foreign company, in a scheme of demerger;

(c) Receipt of shares in case of business reorganisations of a co-operative bank;

(d) Receipt of shares in the resulting company by the shareholders of the demerged company, under a scheme of demerger; and

(e) Receipt of shares in the amalgamated company by the shareholders of the amalgamating company, under a scheme of amalgamation.

Thus, the receipt of shares of a closely-held company, for reasons, other than as mentioned above, would attract the provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act.

It is pertinent to note that corresponding amendments to section 49 by insertion of sub-section (4) have been incorporated, so as to provide that if provisions of section 56(2)(viia) are invoked, then the FMV of the shares so determined would be regarded as the ‘cost of acquisition’ in the hands of the recipient. This is to ensure that once the recipient is taxed on the differential value of the consideration, i.e., difference between FMV and the actual consideration, then such recipient is entitled to add such value towards its cost of acquisition of the shares.

The applicability of these provisions to certain transactions which are not specifically included in the list of exceptions will have to be judged by interpretation of the provisions as they read vis-à-vis the actual legislative intent. A strict interpretation may lead to absurd results while digging the legislative intent may lead to a liberal interpretation.

In this article, we have dealt with certain peculiar situations which may arise in corporate restructuring.

1.    Receipt of shares pursuant to fresh issue of shares at a price less than FMV or issue of bonus shares by the company

In case, where a closely-held company restructures its capital base, it may consider the option of further issue/rights issue to new/existing shareholders. Unlike listed companies which are subject to pricing guidelines on preferential allotment, closely-held companies are free to issue shares at a price as decided by its board of directors.

Thus, legally a closely-held company is entitled to issue shares at less than the book value of its existing shares, being the FMV for the purposes of section 56(2). Now, whether such an issue of shares at less than FMV can be covered within the ambit of section 56(2)(viia)? Also, would there be any taxability u/s.56(2)(viia) in case of bonus issue by a company which due to its very nature would always be received by the shareholders without any consideration?

The application of section 56(2)(viia) to allotment of bonus does not seem to be the legislative intent. This is supported by the Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2010 which indicates that section 56(2)(viia) ought to apply only in case of ‘transfer’ of shares. In case of allotment of shares, there is no ‘transfer’ of shares. Further, even the meaning of the words ‘receives any property’ contemplates that the property should be in existence before it can be received. Whereas, in case of issue of shares by a company, shares come into existence only at the time of allotment.

Additionally, in case of bonus issue, it is a case of capitalisation of reserves which in any case belong to the shareholders. Therefore, the shareholders do not receive shares without consideration, rather what they receive is in lieu of an existing right in the profits of the company. Hence, 56(2)(viia) ought not to apply to a bonus issue.

2.    Conversion of debentures into equity shares at a pre-agreed value

Similar to issue of equity shares, it is common for companies to issue debentures which are convertible into equity shares of the company at a later date. At the time of issue of such instrument, the subscriber would have paid the entire value of the debenture and would have agreed to the terms and conditions regarding the conversion ratio of debentures into equity shares.

A question that arises is at the time of actual conversion of debentures, if the FMV of the equity shares is higher than the price paid by the debenture holders to acquire the debentures, would section 56(2)(viia) apply?

Similar to the issue of equity shares for cash, on conversion of debentures, the company would issue equity shares to debenture-holder in consideration of the value of the debentures being surrendered to the company. On allotment of shares by the company at the time of conversion of debenture, new shares are brought into existence at such point of time and hence section 56(2)(viia) ought not to apply on conversion of debentures into equity shares.

3.    Implications for non-resident recipients

Section    56(2)(viia) does    not make any distinction between resident and non-resident companies/ firms. Therefore, receipt of any shares of a closely held company by a non-resident without consideration or for an inadequate consideration would be taxable as ‘Income from other sources’ under the IT Act.

However, if the non-resident is a resident of a foreign country with which India has entered into a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), his taxability in India would depend on the relevant DTAA. Under the DTAA, the said income may be governed by the Article dealing with ‘Other Income’. It may be noted that the DTAAs entered by India with countries like Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Mauritius, etc., provide that ‘Other Income’ earned by a resident of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in the Contracting State where the taxpayer is resident, except if the tax-payer carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment (PE) or the person provides independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein. In other words, section 56(2)(viia) may not apply to a non-resident, if he does not have a PE or fixed base in India.

If the non-resident is a resident of a foreign country with which India has not entered into a DTAA, then the provision of section 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act would apply and income earned by such non-resident would be subject to tax in India.

4.    Sale of an undertaking comprising of shares on a slump-sale basis

When a closely-held company acquires an ‘undertaking’ by way of a ‘slump sale’ and the undertaking, inter alia, comprises of shares of a company in which public are not substantially interested, whether it can be said that provisions of section 56(2)(viia) get attracted.

In such a case, can it be said that the transfer is of certain assets and liabilities as a whole for a lump sum consideration and that it would not be possible to artificially allocate consideration towards the shares, which form part of the undertaking?

Even if one were to ignore the practical difficulty, section 56(2)(viia) should not apply to sale of an undertaking, because the words used in section 56(2)(viia) are ‘receives any property, being shares of a company …….’ which means that the property being transferred/received should be shares of a company. In case of sale of an undertaking, the property being transferred would be an ‘undertaking’ and not ‘shares’ per se. To attract section 56(2)(viia), the subject matter of receipt should be ‘property being shares’ and not property being an undertaking which may include shares of a company in which public are not substantially interested. Several Court decisions have recognised ‘undertaking’ as a distinct capital asset or a distinct property. If sale of an undertaking on a slump sale is viewed as a sale of individual assets like plant and machinery, shares, etc. and subjected to section 56(2)(viia), it would go to diluting the meaning of slump sale.

However, the above argument may be looked at differently by the Revenue authorities, in case of transfer of an undertaking where the undertaking comprises only of shares of a company, i.e., an Investment Division.

5.    Capital reduction/Buyback of shares

Amongst others, companies resort to capital reduction u/s.100-103 of the Companies Act as part of their corporate restructuring. One of the ways of doing capital reduction is by way of cancellation of shares either partially or fully (in case a class of shares is being cancelled). Depending on the purpose of capital reduction and the liquidity in the company, the board of directors may decide to pay the shareholders certain amount of consideration per share. In case of closely-held companies, the FMV as defined for the purpose of section 56(2)(viia) of the shares may or may not be relevant in deciding the consideration on cancellation of shares. Post introduction of section 56(2)(viia), the issue is whether this section will get attracted in the hands of a company if the consideration paid is less than the FMV of the shares cancelled.

On the same lines, can it be said that a buyback of shares by a closely-held company u/s.77A of the Companies Act, 1956 will attract the provisions of 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act?

The key issue here is whether the meaning of the words ‘receives’ as used in the provision can extend to buyback or capital reduction for mere cancellation purposes? As the word ‘receives’ is not defined under the IT Act, it gives room to varied interpretations.

While the ‘transfer’ of shares pursuant to capital reduction/buyback are taxable transfers in the hands of the transferor, the tax authorities may contend that these would constitute ‘receipt’ in the hands of the company cancelling or buying back the shares and therefore should be subjected to section 56(2)(viia) if the consideration paid to the shareholders is less than the FMV.

A relevant point, that the company does not receive its shares, but only cancels its share capital pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Companies Act. In fact, the Companies Act does not permit a company to hold its own shares. Even if one were to say that a company receives its own shares on buyback or cancellation of shares, it is for the limited purpose of cancellation of those shares and therefore the company does not actually ‘receive’ any property, in the nature of shares.

However, litigation on applicability of section 56(2)(viia) to buyback or reduction cannot be ruled out.

6.    Transfer of shares by a partner of a firm/LLP

When a partner of a firm/LLP transfers shares of a closely-held company by way of capital contribution to a firm/LLP, section 45(3) of the IT Act would apply. As per section 45(3), the amount recorded in the books of accounts is deemed to be the full value of the consideration for computing the capital gain in the hands the partner.

If, the value so recorded in the books of the firm/ LLP is less than the FMV as determined under the valuation rules, then it may be possible that the difference between the FMV and the price at which transfer is made by the partner, may be considered as income of the firm/LLP u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the IT Act.

While undertaking any business reorganisation, a closely-held company will have to evaluate the applicability and the possible implications u/s.56(2) (viia) of the IT Act. Since this is a recently introduced provision, various interpretations can emerge.  

Cross-border Secondments — Tax implications

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Just as the ambiguity over tax implications on secondment of expats to India appeared to be settling down, the Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’) has vide its ruling in the case of Verizon Data Services1, reopened the Pandora’s box by holding that salary reimbursement of seconded employees is taxable in India as Fees for Included Services (‘FIS’)/ Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’).

This article discusses key tax implications arising on Secondment of employees of Foreign Company to Indian Company, in light of the existing regulations and various judicial precedents.

Introduction
Increasing number of MNCs establishing business in India has led to a huge surge in the number of ‘Expatriates’ working in India. The term ‘expatriate’ has not been defined in the Act. However, as per various legal dictionaries2, expatriate means someone who is removed from/voluntarily leaves one’s own country to reside in or become a citizen of another country.

Typically, Foreign Companies (‘FCo’) depute their employees to India either in connection with some project or for rendering services to the Indian company (‘ICo’) or to safeguard their interest in India (stewardship functions). For this purpose FCo may enter into a contract to depute their employees to ICo for a predetermined time period. FCos also depute their employees to India as a part of a Foreign Collaboration Agreement (‘FCA’) under which they are obliged to provide complete support to ICo in carrying out business ventures.

‘Deputation’, in common parlance means appointment, assignment to an office, function. The dictionary meaning of the term ‘Second’ is to transfer temporarily to another unit or employment for a special task3. However, as a common practice, both these terms are used interchangeably.

Dual employment

To retain employment with FCo and safeguard the social security/retirement benefits in their home country, expats desire to continue to be on the payroll of FCo and receive salary in their home country. Accordingly, the foreign entity will be regarded as the ‘Legal Employer’. On the other hand, the expats function under the control and supervision of the ICo which eventually bears their salary costs by reimbursing the same to FCo. Thus, ICo can be regarded as the ‘Real’ or ‘Economic employer’.

The concept of ‘Dual Employment’ is also recognised in section 192(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’). The Section provides for withholding tax compliances in case of ‘Simultaneous employment’ or ‘Successive employment’ with an option to the employee to choose one of the employers who can consolidate the withholding tax obligations in respect of his salary.

With this background, let us understand the tax implications arising out of the said arrangements. Key tax implications on secondments

  • Expats — Salary received by expatriate employees could be subject to tax in India as such
  • Foreign Companies — FCo deputing expats could be subject to tax in India.

For the purposes of this article, we have only discussed the taxability of FCos in India.

Tax implications in the hands of FCo
Taxation of payments made to FCos in India, pursuant to secondment contracts has been a subject-matter of litigation since quite some time now. The Indian Revenue authorities have been contending that by sending their employees to India, the foreign entities are actually rendering services to the ICo or carrying out business in India. Accordingly, they hold that;

  • the payments made by Indian entities are in the nature of Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’); or
  • the foreign entities have a Permanent Establishment (‘PE’) in India by virtue of the employees’ presence in India.

Consequently, ICo is held liable to withhold taxes u/s.195 of the Act, before making payments to FCo.

On the other hand, FCos believe that merely by seconding their employees to work under the supervision and control of ICo, they are not rendering any services in India. The amount recharged to ICo is mere recovery of salary costs of secondee paid by FCo in the home country and no taxable income arises in India.

Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) and Article 12/13 dealing with FTS in many DTAAs specifically excludes ‘salaries’ from the scope of FTS. Thus, if it can be established that the secondee is the employee of ICo, then the salary cost recharged by FCo cannot be regarded as FTS.

As regards PE, by virtue of its employees’ presence in India, FCos are exposed to two types of PEs; (i) Service PE and (ii) Fixed Place PE. One of the most important factors to mitigate the PE risk in case of secondment arrangements is establishing the fact that the ICo is the real employer of the expats and FCo does not have any presence in India through them.

Thus, the moot question is whether the secondee, who renders services to ICo can be regarded as its employee, even though he continues to remain on the payroll of FCo.

Contract of service and contract for service

A contract, by virtue of which an employer-employee relationship is established, is regarded as a Contract of Service, whereas contracts which entail services to be rendered by one entity to another could be regarded as Contracts for Services. The importance of this distinction is also recognised by the OECD4 in their ‘Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital’ published in July 2010 (‘hereinafter referred to as the OECD commentary’).

In order to draw distinction between ‘contract of service’ and ‘contract for service’, one needs to understand what constitutes an employment relationship in case of such contracts. Thus, interpretation of the term ‘employer’ assumes paramount significance.

Employer
The term ‘employer’ is not defined in the OECD model convention or in the Indian domestic law. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in various decisions5 has laid down the following key tests to determine the existence of employment relationship.

  • Control and supervision over the method of doing work;
  • Payment of wages or other remunerations;
  • Power of selection of the employee;
  • Right of suspension or dismissal of the employee

Further, the OECD Commentary6 has also laid down the following key factors for determining an employer-employee relationship:

  • Authority to instruct the individual regarding the manner in which the work is to be performed
  • Control and responsibility for the place of work
  • Remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided
  • Provision of tools and materials to employee
  • Determination of the number and qualifications of the individual seconded
  • Right to select the individual to perform work and to terminate contractual agreements with the employee for that purpose
  • Right to impose disciplinary sanctions related to the work of that individual
  • Determination of holidays and work schedule.

The OECD commentary7 also provides that the financial arrangement between the two enterprises would also be one of the relevant factors in determining the nature of the relationship.

Renowned author, Professor Klaus Vogel in his treatise on Double Taxation Conventions has provided his views on the term ‘employer’ as follows

“An employer is someone to whom an employee is committed to supply his capacity to work and under whose directions the latter engages in his activities and whose instructions he is bound to obey.”8

As per Prof. Vogel’s hypothesis9, the determination of employer rests with the degree of personal and economic dependence of the employee towards the enterprises involved. Thus, if the employee works exclusively for the ICo and was released for the period in question by the FCo, he may be regarded as an employee of the ICo.

Thus, the aforesaid criteria can be applied in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the ICo and the Secondee.

Judicial precedents

Having discussed what constitutes an employer-employee relationship, let us now look at the stand adopted by Indian judicial authorities in case of such secondment contracts. The common issue before the judiciary is whether the reimbursement of salary cost by ICo to FCo could be regarded as income of the FCo (FTS or otherwise) and be subject to withholding tax u/s.195 of the Act?

Having regard to the terms of the secondment contracts and after applying the tests discussed above, the Indian judicial authorities, in various cases10  have held that reimbursement of salary costs of seconded employees cannot be regarded as income of the FCo. Consequently, there is no withholding tax requirement u/s.195 of the Act. Some of the key common observations in most of these decisions are discussed below:

  •   Expats are deputed to work under the control and supervision of the ICo. FCo is not responsible for the actions of the expats. Thus, FCo does not render any technical service to the ICo.

  •   Since payment by ICo is towards reimbursement of salary cost borne by FCo, no income can be said to accrue to FCo in India.
  •     Referring to Klaus Vogel’s commentary and the relevant facts, ICo could be regarded as an ‘economic employer’ of the secondees. Agreement constituted an independent contract of service.

  •     Since the deputed employees were not subject to the control and supervision of the FCo, there would be no Service PE.

However, in case of AT&S India Pvt. Ltd.11, it was held that compensation paid by ICo to FCo constituted FTS liable to withholding tax u/s.195 of the Act. While arriving at the said ruling, the AAR made the following key observations:

  •     FCo was the real employer of the secondees as it retains right over the employees and has power to remove/replace them

  •     Pursuant to foreign collaboration agreement, FCo had undertaken to render the services to ICo and hence, lent the services of its seconded employees on payment of compensation by ICo

  •     The recipient of the compensation was FCo and not the seconded employees. Further, the payment was not merely reimbursement of salary, it also included other costs

  •     Thus, compensation referred to in the secondment agreement was for rendering ‘services of technical or other personnel’ — hence taxable as FTS and liable to withholding of tax u/s.195.

Here the key fact noted by the AAR was that the secondment agreement was in connection with the foreign collaboration agreement, whereby FCO had undertaken to render services to ICo. Accordingly, payments made pursuant to the secondment agreement were held taxable in the nature of fees for services rendered by FCo.

Verizon ruling

This recent AAR ruling has reignited the somewhat settled position as regards secondment contracts.

Facts

The applicant, Verizon India (‘VI’) is engaged in providing software and allied services to its parent, Verizon US (‘VUS’). GTE Overseas Corporation (‘GTE’), another US-based affiliate is engaged in business activity similar to VI. VI entered into an agreement with GTE for secondment of its three employees to India. The structure of the arrangement is depicted below:

One of the secondees assumed the position of managing director of VI while the other two employees liaised between VI and VUS, and supervised its day-to-day operations.

The salient features of the agreement were:

  •     Employees would function exclusively under the control and supervision of VI;

  •     Employees would continue to remain on the payroll of GTE;

  •     GTE would be absolved from the responsibility/ liability of the work, actions performed and the quality of results produced by its employees;

  •     GTE had the authority to replace and terminate the employees;

  •     GTE would disburse the salary of the secondees and get the same reimbursed from VI without any mark-up;

  •     VI would be liable for the Indian withholding tax compliances and the payments to GTE would be made ‘Net of taxes’.

Key questions before the Authority

  •    Whether the amounts reimbursed to GTE would constitute income accruing to GTE and therefore the same is liable to deduction of tax in accordance with the provisions of section 195 of the Act?

  •     If yes, then whether the payment is taxable as Fees for Included Services (‘FIS’) under the Act read with the India-USA DTAA?

AAR Ruling12

The AAR held that the seconded employees are employees of GTE and not VI. The payments made for performing managerial services would be regarded as FIS under the India-USA DTAA. Also, managerial services are directly covered under FTS as defined under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Hence, the payment is taxable and VI would be liable to withhold tax u/s.195 of the Act. While arriving at the said conclusion, the AAR made the following key observations:

  •    Since the control and supervision of the company vests with the managing director, GTE has rendered managerial services to the applicant.

  •     The ‘net of tax’ payment clause in the agreement suggests that the services provided by GTE were liable to tax in India.

  •     Since the employees continue to be on the payroll of GTE, get their salaries from it and can be terminated only by GTE, GTE is the employer of the seconded employees.

  •     The nature of the two receipts, one in the hands of GTE and the other in the hands of employees by way of salaries spring from different sources and are of different character and represent different species of income.

  •     As per MOU of the DTAA it is clear that ‘make available’ clause would be applicable only to technical services. ‘Make available’ clause does not apply to managerial services, the payments for which are otherwise covered within the ambit of FIS under Article 12(4) of the DTAA.

  •     Since the amount reimbursed by the applicant is taxable as FIS, the question of PE is merely of an academic interest. Accordingly, the same was not delved into.

Analysis

  •     AAR has not appreciated that managing director is subject to the superintendence and control of Board of Directors and MOA/AOA of the company. The fact that a managing director can be regarded as an employee of the company has been discussed in several judicial precedents14. The AAR also failed to consider the Tribunal rulings in the cases of IDS Software and Karlstorz Endoscopy India, which dealt with similar facts.

  •     AAR failed to consider Circular No. 720 of the CBDT, dated 30th August 1995, which clarifies that each section relating to tax withholding under Chapter XVII of the Act deals with a particular kind of payment and excludes all other sections in that Chapter and that the payment of any sum shall be liable to deduction of tax only under one section. This Circular was duly relied upon in the case of HCL15. Withholding tax on reimbursements u/s.195 which have already suffered tax u/s.192 amounts to double taxation.

  •     While analysing whether the ICo is the real employer, the AAR ignored the key tests laid down by the Supreme Court, OECD guidelines and Klaus Vogel’s commentary on International Hiring Agreements.

  •    AAR has misinterpreted the FIS clause in the India-US treaty by holding that for services that are technical or consultancy in nature, the make-available clause would not apply. Various judicial precedents16 have held that services which are not technical in nature are not covered within the scope of FIS clause.

  •    The AAR ruling is also not in line with other decisions pronounced on similar issue by various authorities in the cases of HCL Infosystems, Cholamandalam MS General Insurance, IDS Software Solutions, etc.

Key takeaways

  •     Since the law is not yet settled and various judicial authorities have adopted different interpretations, drafting of the secondment agreement by clearly defining the nature of relationships between various parties assumes paramount significance.

  •    While drafting the agreement, the principles promulgated by the OECD and the tests laid down by the Apex Court which determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship should be kept in mind.

  •     The documentation and conduct of the seconded employees may also influence taxation of such transactions.

  •    A periodic review of the documentation and compliance process in line with the latest judicial precedents could help in mitigating risk.

Conclusion

The conflicting rulings by various authorities and the uncertainty on taxability of payments made pursuant to secondment contracts continue to create a dilemma in minds of Indian as well as multinational corporations deputing their employees in India. However, to put at rest the stir created by such rulings, concrete clarification from the Legislature17 or the final word from the Apex Court in the near future is the need of the hour. Till then it’s a wait-and-watch situation for all18.

1       Verizon Data Services India Private Limited v. CIT (AAR No. 865 of 2010)

2       a. Law Lexicon (2nd Edition, reprint 1999 on page 681) — ‘Renunciation of allegiance, one voluntary renunciation of citizenship in order to become a citizen of another country’

b.     Black’s law dictionary (Sixth Edition, page 576) — The voluntary act of abandoning renouncing one’s country and becoming the citizen or subject of another

c.     Webster — Residing in a foreign country

d.    Oxford — Remove onself from homeland

3       As noted by the AAR Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. (2009 TIOL 02 ARA-IT)

4       Para 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 15

5       Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal (25 ITR 449); Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal (40 ITR 17); Ram Prashad (86 ITR 122)
 
6. Para 8.14 of the Commentary on Article 15

7       Para 8.15 of the Commentary on Article 15

8       Page 899

9       Page 885

10     IDS Software Solutions v. ITO, 2009 TII 22 ITAT-Bang-Intl; Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. (‘CM’)(2009 TIOL 02 ARA-IT) (Advance Rulings); Tekmark Global Solutions LLC (‘TLLC’) (131 TTJ 173) (Mumbai-ITAT); ACIT v. Karlstorz Endoscopy India Pvt. Ltd. (‘KI’) (ITA No. 2929/ Del/2009)

11     AT&S India Pvt. Ltd. — 287 ITR 421 (‘AAR’) — Distinguished in case of Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd.

12     AAR ruling is binding only on the applicant and the Income-tax officer in respect of transaction in relation to which the ruling is sought. However, persuasive value may be drawn in other similar cases.

13     DIT v. Morgan Stanley and Co. Inc. 292 ITR 416 (SC)

14     K. R. Kothandaraman v. CIT (1966) 62 ITR 345 (Mad), Scottish Court of Sessions in Anderson v. James Sutherland(1941) S.C. 203, Ram Prashad v. CIT (1972) 86 ITR 122 (SC)

15     In HCL Infosystems Ltd. v. DCIT, (76 TTJ 505, later affirmed by Delhi High Court in 272 ITR 261), Delhi ITAT held that reimbursement of salary cost of personnel seconded by Indian company to foreign company was not subject to tax withholding u/s.195

16     Raymonds Ltd. 80 TTJ 120 (Mum.), Boston Consulting Group – 93 TTJ 293, McKinsey & Co. Inc (Philippines) & others 99 TTJ 857 (Mum.)

17     The Legislature has recognised the ambiguity and has endeavoured to provide some clarity on the subject by defining the term employer in the proposed Direct TaxesCode, 2010.

18     Verizon has filed an appeal before the High Court against the said ruling. The outcome is eagerly awaited.

(2011) 57 DTR (Visakha) (Trib.) 299 Swaraj Enterprises v. ITO A.Y.: 1999-2000.

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Section 40(b) — Partners may choose not to provide depreciation in books and in such case AO is not entitled to deduct the cumulative depreciation from capital balances for working out interest u/s.40(b).

Facts:
The assessee paid interest to its partners and claimed the same as deduction. There was no dispute that the partnership firm had complied with the conditions prescribed u/s.40(b) of the Act. The dispute was related to the determination of the capital account balances of the partners on which the interest is payable. The assessee claimed interest on the capital account balances of the partners as disclosed in its books of account. However, during the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the firm did not provide for depreciation on the fixed assets in its books. However for the purpose of computing the total income, it has claimed depreciation in accordance with section 32 of the Act. Thus it was noticed that the net profits for book purposes have been shown at a higher figure by not charging depreciation, which would consequently increase the capital balances of the partners. In that case, the assessee would claim deduction of more amount of interest on the capital balances so inflated by not providing depreciation on the fixed assets. The AO felt that it is compulsory for the assessee to provide for depreciation in the books also.

Hence the AO reworked the capital balances of the partners by reducing the cumulative amount of depreciation therefrom and accordingly allowed the interest computed on such reduced capital balances. The learned CIT(A), confirmed the order of the A.O. The learned CIT(A) relied upon the decision of the SMC Bench of Visakhapatnam in the case of Arthi Nursing Home v. ITO, (2008) 119 TTJ (Visaka) 415 in order to reject the appeals filed by the assessee before him.

Held:
In the case of Arthi Nursing Home (supra), the SMC Bench, inter alia, placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of British Paints Ltd. (1991) 188 ITR 44, wherein it was held that the AO has a right and also duty to consider whether the books disclose the true state of accounts and the correct income can be deduced therefrom. The computation of total income is not affected by the amount of depreciation provided for in the books of account and the position remains the same even if no depreciation is provided for in the books. Hence, in our view, the ratio laid down in the case of British Paints Ltd. (supra) shall not apply in respect of depreciation, as it will not affect the computation of total income under the Income-tax Act.

Under the Partnership Act, there is no statutory compulsion to provide for depreciation in the books of account or to follow the accounting standards prescribed by the ICAI, though it may be in the interest of the partnership firms to follow the said accounting standards.

In Explanation 5 to section 32, the words ‘whether or not the assessee has claimed the deduction in respect of depreciation’ would show that the assessee has an option not to claim depreciation while computing his total income, but the said option shall be ignored by the AO and he will deduct depreciation from the total income of the assessee. Thus, there is no statutory compulsion for the partnership concerns to provide for depreciation in the books of account under Explanation 5 to section 32.

The AO is authorised only to verify whether the payment of interest to any partner is authorised by and is in accordance with the terms of partnership deed and also it relates to the period falling after the date of partnership deed. Besides the above, the AO should restrict the rate of interest, if the rate authorised in the partnership deed is more than the rate specified in section 40(b)(v) of the Act. Thus, it could be seen that nowhere it is provided that the AO is entitled to disallow the payment of interest to partners by reworking the capital account balances of the partners.

levitra

Relevance of audit reports

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The auditors amongst us must be heaving a sigh of relief. The 30th September deadline has gone by. Many of us would have issued audit reports under the Companies Act, Income Tax Act and various other statutes. It is time to examine the utility and relevance of these reports which are the result of the toil we have all undergone.

These may seem to be harsh words but if we are honest to ourselves, we will be able to accept the truth. Preparation of financial statements is universally an object driven exercise, the reflection of the true state of affairs is rarely one of them. To most, it is ensuring the minimum tax burden, to some others it is keeping investors and lenders happy, and to the CEO it is the proof of his performance. It is left to the hapless auditor to examine whether the statements are true and fair.

It is in this context we must take a look at the audit reports that we issue. One often faces a question from young professionals as to whether it is “necessary” or “mandatory” to report a particular aspect. If we are to express an opinion on truth and fairness of the financial statement we need to disclose and report on every matter that has a material impact rather than making the letter of the statue a fortress to protect ourselves.

I do not believe that the blame lies only at our door, though we cannot escape our share of it. The tax audit report which is the bread and butter for many professionals in this country is an apt illustration. To the auditee the best report is one which causes it the least tax damage. He is not concerned with the content of the report. This is not only the attitude of small businessmen, but the largest of corporations including those in the public sector. The tax gatherer for whom these reports are issued pays scant attention to them. The authorities neither have the time nor the inclination to utilise these reports. Take the case of the report under the Companies Act. CARO 2003 has been with us for eight years now, but I wonder to what extent the regulators have used report under CARO. To both the entity and the regulator these reports appear to be a compliance formality.

The problem is compounded by the complexity of the accounting language. Accounting is supposed to be the language of business. However, the plethora of accounting and reporting standards and frequent changes in them has made this language incomprehensible. The AS, the Ind AS, IFRS can confuse the most competent professional and therefore one has sympathy for the plight of the entrepreneur. It is almost as if we had been asked to speak in Sanskrit, while the listener understands a Bambaiya Hindi. My suggestion to the authorities is to reserve Sanskrit for the gods of business and profession and permit commoners to converse in the language that they understand.

Auditing is the backbone of our profession and if it is to remain so something needs to be done quickly. One aspect is to simplify the accounting language which I have dealt with earlier. The second is to take a re-look at the form and content of the audit report and its universal application. I am sure that in the changing business environment many of the questions of CARO, 2003, are not relevant and even if they are, they should apply only to a selective class. Today, the criteria make their application virtually universal. It is also necessary for the attitude of the regulators to change. It is only if they start using the fruits of our toil better that we will regain the respect of our clients and the public at large. Finally, any effort has to be well rewarded. To the small businessman the cost of audit is a burden. This results in the quality being seriously compromised. The cost of audit increases because the auditor is required to ensure compliance with all the stringent accounting standards and his verification process is subject to comprehensive auditing standards. One possible solution is to revise the threshold limits after crossing which a tax audit is mandatory. The cost inflation index is a very apt indicator. If we rely on that to compute capital gains and pay tax, there is no reason why it should not be an acceptable benchmark for tax audit in its current form. Those below this revised threshold should be required to follow accounting norms which are easy to understand and the auditor should have a much simpler form of reporting. This will possibly meet the requirements of all stakeholders.

I believe that it is only a profession that is able to critically appraise itself survives, otherwise it is likely to be consigned to history. In my view the auditing profession is facing a crisis of credibility. The need of the hour is to take the challenge head on and neither turn a blind eye, nor brush it under the carpet.

Anil.J.Sathe
Joint Editor
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Coastal Regulation Zone

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Introduction
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 is a general Act which deals with the protection and improvement of the environment. It fixes responsibilities on persons carrying out industrial operations and also prescribes standards to control and prevent pollution arising from the same. Section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government may provide for restriction of areas in which operations shall not be carried out or would be subject to certain safeguards. In pursuance of these powers, the Ministry of Environment and Forests has issued the Coastal Regulation Zone (‘CRZ’) Notification to protect coastal lines and regulate activities in these areas. In a country like India and more so in a city like Mumbai, which has a very long coastal line, regulations dealing with protection of this very valuable natural resource have an important role to play.

The Ministry had originally notified the CRZ Guidelines in 1991 vide Notification No. S.O. 114(E), dated 19th February 1991. These were amended and updated from time to time. There have been about 25 amendments to this Notification between 1991 and 2009, some of which have been emanated from the Supreme Court orders. However, these have now been rescinded by the Coastal Regulation Notification 2011 issued on 6th January 2011. Keeping in mind the special needs of Mumbai, several concessions have been provided to CRZ areas within Mumbai. Let us examine some of the important provisions of the CRZ 2011.

Definition of CRZ
The following areas are declared as CRZ:

(i) the land area from High Tide Line (HTL) to 500 mts. on the landward side along the sea-front. The term HTL means the line on the land up to which the highest water line reaches during the spring tide and so demarcated. HTL will be demarcated within one year from the date of issue of the 2011 notification.

(ii) the land area between HTL to 100 mts. or width of the creek, whichever is less on the landward side along the tidal influenced water bodies (i.e., bays, rivers, creeks, etc. that are connected to the sea and are influenced by tides).

(iii) the land area falling between the hazard line and 500 mts. from HTL on the landward side, in case of seafront and between the hazard line and 100 mts. line in case of tidal influenced water body. ‘Hazard line’ means the line demarcated by the Ministry of Environment through a survey of India. This is a new development probably prompted by the recent tsunamis impacting coastal regions.

(iv) land area between HTL and Low Tide Line (LTL) known as the intertidal zone.

(v) the water and the bed area between the LTL to the territorial water limit or 12 nautical miles in case of sea. This is an important change to expand the CRZ to include territorial waters as a protected zone.

(vi) the water and the bed area between LTL at the bank to the LTL on the opposite side of the bank, of tidal influenced water bodies.

The significance of declaring an area as CRZ is that the Notification imposes various restrictions on the setting up and expansion of industries, operations or processes, etc., in such areas.

Classification of CRZs & Regulations
For the purpose of conserving and protecting the coastal areas and marine waters, the CRZ area is classified into various categories. Depending upon these categories, the development or construction activities therein are also regulated. These are explained below.

CRZ-I
Meaning

CRZ-I includes those areas that are ecologically sensitive and those which play a role in maintaining the integrity of the coast, such as mangroves, in case mangrove area is more than 1,000 sq mts., a buffer of 50 mts. along the mangroves shall also be provided, coral reefs, sand dunes, national parks, wildlife habitats, structures of archaeological importance, heritage sites, etc. It also includes the area between Low Tide Line and High Tide Line. Thus, CRZ-I are the very core areas which are the first point of protection of the coastal line.

Regulation of Construction
No new construction activities are permitted in CRZ-I. Certain exceptions are made for constructions/ industries of vital importance, such as Atomic Energy projects, construction of trans-harbour sea link, development of green field airport at Navi Mumbai, construction of dispensaries/ schools/ bridges/roads, etc., which are required for traditional inhabitants living there, etc.

CRZ-II

Meaning

The areas that have been developed up to or close to the shoreline. Developed area is defined as that area within the existing municipal limits/ urban areas which are substantially built-up and has been provided with drainage, approach roads and other infrastructural facilities, such as water supply and sewerage mains.

Regulation of Construction

Construction is permitted in CRZ-II subject to the following important restrictions:

(a) buildings are permitted only on the landward side of the existing/proposed road, or on the landward side (i.e., towards land) of existing authorised structures. These shall be subject to the existing local town and country planning regulations (such as the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai and other BMC Regulations for buildings), including the existing FSI norms. However, no permission for construction of buildings will be given on the landward side of any new roads which are constructed on the seaward side of an existing road.

(b) reconstruction of authorised building is permitted subject to the existing FSI norms and without any change in present usage.

(c) construction involving more than 20,000 sq mts., built-up area in CRZ-II shall be considered by the Ministry in accordance with its Notification dated 14th September 2006 and in case of projects less than 20,000 sq mts. built-up area shall be approved by the concerned State/Union territory planning authorities in accordance with the 2011 Notification.

CRZ-III

Meaning
These include those areas that are relatively undisturbed and those do not belong to either CRZ-I or II which include coastal zone in the rural areas (developed and undeveloped) and also areas within municipal limits or in other legally designated urban areas, which are not substantially built-up.

Regulation of Construction The Notification provides for several regulations for CRZ-III. Some important regulations for CRZ-III include the following:

(a) NDZ: An area of up to 200 mts. from HTL on the landward side in case of seafront and 100 mts. along tidal influenced water bodies is to be earmarked as ‘No Development Zone’ (NDZ). The significance of NDZ is as follows:

— No construction is permitted within NDZ.

— Repairs or reconstruction of existing authorised structure not exceeding existing FSI/ plinth area/density is allowed.

— Construction/reconstruction of dwelling units of traditional coastal communities, fishermen is permitted, subject to certain restrictions.

— Certain key activities are permitted, such as agriculture, atomic energy generating power by non-conventional energy sources, construction of dispensaries/schools/roads, etc. which are required for the local inhabitants, etc.

(b) Area between 200 mts. to 500 mts. from HTL
— The following activities are permissible:

— Hotels/beach resorts for tourists or visitors subject to certain conditions.

— Notified ports.

— Foreshore facilities for desalination plants and associated facilities.

— Facilities for generating power by nonconventional energy sources.

— Construction of public utilities.

— Reconstruction or alteration of existing authorised building.

CRZ-IV

Meaning
The water area from the Low Tide Line to 12 nautical miles on the sea-ward side and the water area of the tidal     influenced water body from     the mouth of the water body at the sea up to the influence     of     tide    which is measured as 5 parts per 1,000 during the driest season of the year.

Regulation of Construction

Activities     impugning    on     the    sea    and     tidal     influenced water bodies are regulated except for traditional fishing     and     related     activities     undertaken     by     local communities which are subject, however, to certain conditions.

Other areas
    
Meaning
These include those areas which require special consideration for the purpose of protecting the critical coastal     environment and difficulties faced by local communities, such as, the CRZ area falling within municipal limits of Greater Mumbai. This is a new feature     of     the     2011     Notifications     and     a    welcome     move.     For     the     first     time     the     unique     nature of Mumbai’s coastlines and real estate problems have been recognised and addressed.

Regulation of Construction
CRZ areas of Greater Mumbai are further regulated as follows:

(i)   CRZ-I areas
In CRZ-I areas of Mumbai the only activities which can    be    taken    up    are construction    of    roads,    approach    roads    and    missing     link     roads    which    are    approved     in the Developmental Control Regulations of Greater Mumbai. However, all mangrove areas should be notified     and  5 times the number of mangroves destroyed/cut during the construction process should be replanted.

(ii)   CRZ-II areas
In CRZ-II areas of Mumbai, the development can continue     to     be     undertaken     in     accordance    with     the norms laid down in the Town and Country Planning Regulations as they existed on the date of issue of the Notification dated the 19th February, 1991.

 (iii)  Slum Redevelopment
One of the highlights of the CRZ 2011 includes the relaxations granted for slum redevelopment schemes. The features include:

  •   To provide a safe and decent dwelling to the slum-dwellers, the State Government may implement slum redevelopment schemes.

  •      The stake of the State Government should not be less than 51% in such redevelopment schemes which are in partnership with private sector.

  •   The FSI for such schemes should be in accordance with the existing regulations. Thus, an FSI of up to 4 can be availed depending upon the facts. This is a welcome move.

  •   All legally regularised tenants must be provided houses in situ or as per norms laid down by the State Government. Projects would be undertaken only after public consultation in which views of the tenants of such building would be obtained.

  •   Such schemes would be audited by the Comptroller & Auditor General.

  •     All redevelopment schemes would be subject to the Right to Information Act, 2005 in order to improve transparency.

By a very recent Circular, the SRA proposes to do away with the height restrictions imposed in CRZ II areas on buildings provided they are a part of a 33(10) or a 33(14) Scheme.

(iv)    Redevelopment of dilapidated, cessed and unsafe buildings

The Notification also deals with redevelopment of old and dilapidated, cessed and unsafe buildings in the CRZ areas of Greater Mumbai. This again is a welcome move for several buildings along coastal lines, such as Marine Drive, Juhu, Chowpatty, etc. Such redevelopment can be done subject to the following conditions:

  •     They shall be allowed to be taken up even with private developers.

  •    The FSI shall be in accordance with prevailing norms.

  •     Suitable accommodation must be provided to the original tenants during the course of redevelopment.

  •     The Ministry may appoint Statutory Auditors empanelled with Comptroller & Auditor General to undertake performance and fiscal audit in respect of such redevelopment schemes.

  •     Projects would be undertaken only after public consultation in which views of the tenants of such building would be obtained.

  •     All redevelopment schemes would be subject to the Right to Information Act, 2005 in order to improve transparency.

(v)    All open spaces, parks, gardens, playgrounds indicated in development plans within CRZ-II shall be categorised as no development zone.

(vi)    Floor Space Index up to 15% shall be allowed only for construction of civic amenities, stadium and gymnasium meant for recreational or sports-related activities and residential or commercial use of such open spaces shall not be permissible.

Approvals

For all projects attracting the CRZ, 2011 Notification, an application for CRZ clearance must be made to the concerned State or the Union territory Coastal Zone Management Authority. It will make recommendations within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of complete application to the Ministry or the State Environmental Impact Assessment Authority. The Ministry or the Authority shall consider such projects for clearance based on the recommendations of the concerned CZMA within a period of 60 days. The clearance accorded to the projects under the CRZ Notification shall be valid for the period of 5 years from the date of issue of the clearance for commencement of construction and operation. A procedure for post-clearance monitoring is also provided.

Enforcement

To implement the provisions of the CRZ 2011 Notification, powers prescribed under the Act are available to the Ministry, the Coastal Zone Manage-ment Authorities and the State Government.

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, in case the auditee is a builder who has constructed a building in coastal zones, whether the conditions of the Notification have been duly complied and whether necessary approvals have been obtained. Non-compliance with this could have serious repercussions for the builder. This also has very important repercussions for flat/office buyers in such a building. The Bombay High Court in the case of Sudhir M. Khandwala, Writ Petition No. 1077 of 2007 refused to stay the demolition of/regularise an unauthorised construction. Hence, a buyer of a premises in a building constructed in violation of the CRZ Regulations could lose his property. Thus, the Auditor can provide a value-added service by alerting his client of the repercussions of buying such a property. In such cases, he may advice his client to obtain a legal opinion.

By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Precedent — Judicial discipline — Contradictory decisions by Co-ordinate Benches — Institutional integrity.

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[Gammon India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs Mumbai, 2011 (269) ELT 289 (SC)]

In a civil appeal against the order of CESTAT the Court observed the conflicting orders on identical issues by the Bench of Tribunal.

After deciding the issues on merits the Court showed their deep concern on the conduct of the two Benches of the Tribunal while deciding appeals in the cases of IVRCL Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. (2004) 166 ELT 447 and Techni Bharathi Ltd. (2006) 198 ELT 33. In spite of noticing the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the present case, the Tribunal still thought it fit to proceed to take a view totally contrary to the view taken in the earlier judgment, thereby creating a judicial uncertainty with regard to the declaration of law involved on an identical issue in respect of the same Notification. It needs to be emphasised that if a Bench of a Tribunal, in identical fact-situation, is permitted to come to a conclusion directly opposed to the conclusion reached by another Bench of the Tribunal on an earlier occasion, it will be destructive of the institutional integrity itself. What was important is the Tribunal as an institution and not the personality of the members constituting it. If a Bench of the Tribunal wishes to take a view different from the one taken by the earlier Bench, the propriety demands that it should place the matter before the President of the Tribunal so that the case is referred to a larger Bench, for which provision exists in the Act itself. In this behalf, the Court referred to the following observations by a three-Judge Bench of the Court in case of Sub-Inspector Rooplal and Anr. v. Lt. Governor and Ors., (2000) 1 SCC 644.

“At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another Co-ordinate Bench of the same Tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of the same Tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two Co-ordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents . . . . .”

The Court directed that all the Courts and various Tribunals in the country shall follow the above salutary observations in letter and spirit.

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Compensation — Minor driving motorcycle without licence — Liability to pay compensation shifts on owner — Motor Vehicles Act 1988, section 168.

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[ Jawahar Singh v. Bala Jain & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2436]

On 18th July, 2004, at about 1.20 p.m. the deceased, Mukesh Jain, was riding his two-wheeler scooter with his son, Shashank Jain, as pillion rider. According to the prosecution, when they had reached the SDM’s Office, Delhi, a motorcycle, being driven in a very rash and negligent manner, tried to overtake the scooter and in that process struck against the scooter with great force, as a result whereof the deceased and his son were thrown on to the road and the deceased succumbed to the fatal injuries sustained by him.

A claim was filed by the widow, two daughters and one son of the deceased before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.8,35,067 in favour of the claimants together with interest @7%. The insurer was held liable to satisfy the Award and to recover the amount from the owner of the motorcycle.

The Supreme Court observed that Jatin was a minor on the date of the accident and was riding the motorcycle in violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Rules framed thereunder.

It was Jatin, who came from behind on the motorcycle and hit the scooter of the deceased from behind. Thus the responsibility in causing the accident was found to be solely that of Jatin. However, since Jatin was a minor and it was the responsibility of the petitioner to ensure that his motorcycle was not misused and that too by a minor who had no licence to drive the same, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal quite rightly saddled the liability for payment of compensation on the petitioner and, accordingly, directed the insurance company to pay the awarded amount to the awardees and, thereafter, to recover the same from the petitioner.

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Liability of guarantor — After his death does not extinguish — Specific contract — Banker’s right of general lien — Contract Act, section 131.

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[ State Bank of India & Anr. v. Mrs. Jayanthi & Ors., AIR 2011 Mad. 179]

One late N.P.S. Mahendran was running two establishments under the name of M/s. Aarthi Bala Tea Plantations and M/s. Sanjay Bala Tea Plantations. The deceased availed loan from the appellant bank and deposited the title deeds by way of collateral security and also executed various documents in order to secure due payment of loan. After the death of the said N.P.S. Mahendran, the respondents petitioners (wife and sons) became liable to pay Rs.1,14,86,428.32, which was outstanding in several loan accounts. The 1st respondent, widow, liquidated the entire outstanding dues lying in the account. The bank, after acknowledging the same, issued ‘No Due’ certificate in her favour. The respondents, then, requested the appellant bank to return the title deeds relating to the properties, which were deposited with the bank by Late N.P.S. Mahendran. In spite of repeated requests, the documents were not returned. The respondents-petitioners approached the bank on many occasions requesting for return of documents, but the same were not returned.

The appellant bank contended that the bank was exercising a general lien on the title documents standing in the name of Late N.P.S. Mahendran, who stood as a guarantor for other facilities and liabilities outstanding against M/s. Somerset Tea Plantation. It was contended by the bank that such cash credit facilities were availed from another branch of the bank, by one M/s. Somerset Tea Plantation and the deceased, husband of the 1st respondent, stood as a guarantor for the said facilities. The said firm had committed default and more than Rs.2.03 crores was due from the said firm. Hence, the bank had initiated a proceeding against the firm and the guarantor and after the death of N.P.S. Mahendran, the present respondents have been impleaded as legal representatives.

The Court observed that the liability under the guarantee is not revoked or extinguished on the death of the guarantor. Section 131 of the Contract Act clearly provides that in case of death of guarantor, the date of guarantee/continuing of the guarantee executed in favour of the bank stands revoked in respect of future transactions. It is well settled that on the death of the guarantor, the liability exists and such liability can be fastened on the estate of the deceased being inherited by his legal heirs, and the creditor can recover the dues out of the estate of the deceased.

The borrower, (late) N.P.S. Mahendran, had admittedly deposited the title deeds of the property to secure a loan transaction availed in respect of two plantation companies. This fact had not being disputed by the appellant bank. Therefore, the contract/mortgage, had been created by the deceased borrower for a specific purpose and for a specific loan and the contract was self-contained and the terms and conditions were binding upon both the borrower as well as the bank. When such is the situation, the bank cannot contend that they could hold the documents for a balance due in a different loan account where the said N.P.S. Mahendran was not a borrower. Further, the language of section 171 of the Act is explicit to the fact that the bankers are entitled to retain as a security for a ‘general balance account’. Admittedly, it was not the case of the appellant bank that the amount, which was now said to be due on account of the borrowings of M/s. Somerset Tea Plantation, was a general balance account of the deceased borrower N.P.S. Mahendran.

Therefore, this agreement/mortgage has to be construed as a ‘contract to the contrary’ and therefore, held that the bank could not claim these documents by invoking the power of general lien u/s.171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The bank was directed to return of title deeds.

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Power of attorney — Revocation by registered deed — Registration Act section 17(1)(b).

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[Chandrama Singh & Ors v. Mirza Anis Ahmed, AIR 2011 Allahabad 114]

The issue before the High Court was:

Whether the registered power of attorney under the provisions of section 32 r.w.s. 33 and section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act could be revoked without registration or cancellation thereof.

The power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was relating to the agricultural land of the plaintiff and included the power to sell the land. When there is a transfer of all rights and liabilities over the land including the power to transfer, then it was required to be registered and was registered. The power of attorney contained a clause that it would not be disputed or that there shall be no dispute between the parties and it shall not be ignored. By its cancellation the rights created are sought to be extinguished. The rights created related to immovable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees. Hence u/s.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act a document that creates or extinguishes any right in such immovable property would require registration. In the event a document required to be registered u/s.17 is not registered the effects of non-registration are detailed u/s.49 of the Act. Such a document shall not affect any immovable property or confer any power or create any right or relationship. Therefore, the document whereby the registered power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was cancelled required registration u/s.17 of the Act and since it was admittedly not registered the effect of non-registration u/s.49 of the Act would affect it.

In the present case a notice dated 20-2-1973 canceling the power of attorney was duly served and received by the attorney prior to the execution of the sale-deed dated 26-12-1975 by him. Admittedly it was a communication sent by the plaintiff to the attorney.

The power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was revocable. It did not contain any clause that it would be irrevocable. It only said that the parties thereto will not dispute it or ignore it. Normally revocation is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person against whom it is made. The power of attorney dated 17-3-1967 was not a mere proposal or just a promise. It was also not a simple agreement between the parties. An agreement between the parties would have to contain an element of consideration or act or omission to give it enforceability as a contract. The power of attorney created rights in immoveable property including that of alienation. Being revocable it could be revoked. But not just by a communication. Since it dealt with immoveable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees and created a right to transfer the property it was compulsorily registrable. And when it was registered it could be revoked only upon execution of a registered document of revocation. Hence due to non-registration of the communication/document of revocation it could not affect the sale deed dated 26-12-1975 executed by the attorney, nor could it affect the power of attorney dated 17-3-1967. The relationship of principal and agent established through a registered deed could be validly terminated by a registered deed in view of the Registration Act.

The conclusion would, therefore, be that when the document/notice of cancellation dated 20-2- 1973 was compulsorily registrable and it was not registered, then even upon its execution or service upon the attorney it would not in any manner affect the rights created under sale deed dated 26-12-1975. It did not extinguish the rights created or assigned on the attorney upon execution of a registered power of attorney.

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Dishonour of cheque — Cheque drawn in foreign country — Accused cannot be prosecuted in India — Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

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[ Pale Hourse Designs & Anr. v. Natarajan Rathnam, AIR 2011 (NOC) 274 (Mad.)]

The issue that arose for consideration before the High Court was as to whether a person who is not a citizen of India, who has issued a foreign country cheque on a drawee bank functioning in a foreign country could be prosecuted for an offence punishable u/s.138 of the Act.

The Court observed that a combined reading of sections 1, 11, 12 and 134 to 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, makes clear that a cheque made/drawn in a foreign country on a drawee bank functioning in the foreign country and made payable therein shall be a foreign instrument and the law of the country wherein the cheque was drawn or made payable shall be the law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties and dishonour of the cheque. As such the payee cannot select a country and present it through a bank therein for collection to confer jurisdiction on a Court functioning therein. If the payee is given such a right to proceed criminally against the drawer by selecting the jurisdiction, the same will encourage forum shopping making the payees to go to a country wherein the dishonour of the cheque is made a criminal offence and wherein the law is more favourable to the payee enabling him to collect the amount covered by the cheque by way of fine or compensation by resorting to criminal prosecution. A person who is not a citizen of India for an act committed in a foreign country wherein it is not a punishable offence, cannot be prosecuted in India. In this case, none of the petitioners is a citizen of India. The acts constituting the offence, namely, issuance of the cheque, the dishonour of the cheque, the failure to make payment of the cheque after receipt of the statutory notice were all committed by them not in India, but in the USA. Therefore, they cannot be prosecuted in India for the said act as an offence punishable u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The Court further observed that the place of issuance of notice shall not be the only criterion conferring jurisdiction on the Court. All the transactions were made in the USA. The cheques were drawn on a bank in the USA. The cheques were payable at Massachusetts branch, United States of America. That being so, the respondent, with a view to invoke the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in order to have a short-cut method of collecting the cheque amount, has chosen to present the cheques in a bank at Anna Nagar, Chennai, Tamil Nadu for collection, issue notice from Adyar, Chennai and prefer the complaint on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet. The said act on the part of the respondent not only amounts to forum shopping, but also is an example of abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, the Court in order to avoid miscarriage of justice, to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to render complete justice, in exercise of its inherent power u/s.482 Cr. P.C. quashed the criminal proceedings.

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Refund: Interest on: Section 244A: Block period 1-4-1995 to 21-3-2002 — Assessee deposited cheque on 29-12-2003: Amount debited to assessee’s bank account on 30-12-2003: Assessee entitled to interest for December 2003.

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[CIT v. Asian Paints Ltd., 12 Taxman.com 484 (Bom.)]

The assessee deposited cheque for amount of tax demanded with authorised agent of the Central Government on 29-12-2003 and account of assessee was debited to that extent on 30-12-2003. On appeal, assessment was set aside and the assessee became entitled to refund of tax paid. The Assessing Officer refunded tax with interest u/s.244A from January, 2004 till grant of refund and declined to grant interest for month of December, 2003 on ground that tax paid by the assessee was credited to the Central Government account on 12-1-2004. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest for the month of December 2003.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) According to the Counsel for the Revenue, though the assessee had deposited the cheque towards the tax demand on 29-12-2003, the amount was actually credited to the Central Government account on 1-1-2004 and therefore, on grant of refund, the assessee was entitled to interest from January, 2004. In support of the above contention, counsel for the Revenue relied upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. CIT, (2006) 281 ITR 274 and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Sutlej Industries Ltd., (2010) 325 ITR 331/190 Taxman 136.

(ii) U/s.244A(1)(b) of the Act, interest on refund is payable from the date of payment of tax to the date on which refund is granted. In the present case, admittedly the cheque for the amount of tax demanded was deposited with the authorised agent of the Central Government on 29-12-2003 and the account of the assessee was debited to that extent on 30-12-2003. The question therefore, to be considered is, whether debiting the tax amount from the bank account of the assessee by the authorised agent of the Central Government account viz. the authorised bank constitutes payment of tax under section 244(A)(i)(b) of the Act?

(iii) Once the authorised agent of the Central Government collects the tax by debiting the bank account of the assessee, the payment of tax to the Central Government would be complete. The fact that there is delay on the part of the authorised agent to credit that amount to the account of the Central Government, it cannot be said that the payment of tax is not made by the assessee, till the amount of tax is credited to the account of the Central Government. For calculating interest u/s.244A(1)(b) of the Act the relevant date is the date of payment of tax and not the date on which the amount of tax collected is credited to the account of the Central Government by the agent of the Central Government.

(iv) Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the decision of the ITAT in holding that the assessee had paid the taxes on 30-12- 2003 cannot be faulted.

(v) Once it is found that the tax was paid on 30-12- 2003, then as per the Rule 119A(b), of the Incometax Rules, on the tax becoming refundable, the assessee had to be refunded tax with interest for the entire month of December, 2003. Thus, in the facts of the present case, no fault can be found with the decision of the ITAT in holding that the tax was paid on 30-12-2003 and therefore, the tax was liable to be refunded with interest for the entire month of December, 2003.

(vi) The decision of the Rajasthan High Court, as also the decision of the Delhi High Court relied upon by the counsel for the Revenue are distinguishable on the facts as in both the above cases, the Courts were not called upon to consider the scope of the expression ‘payment of tax’ contained u/s.244A(1)(b) of the Act. In fact, the Circular No. 261, dated 8-8-1979 issued by the Board to the effect that the date of presenting the cheque should be the date of payment supports the contention of the assessee.”

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Recovery of tax: Certificate proceedings: Section 222: Assessee’s leasehold property (DDA lessor) auctioned by TRO for recovery of tax: DDA demanded 50% unearned increase for mutation: Not a condition of auction notice: Amount payable by Department and not by the purchaser.

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[CIT v. Monoflex India (P.) Ltd., 12 Taxman.com 499 (Del.)]

The assessee’s leasehold property was put to auction by the TRO for realisation of income-tax dues. The DDA was the lessor. The purchasers called upon the DDA to mutate the property and called upon the TRO to get the sale certificate registered. The DDA demanded 50% unearned increase for mutation of the property in favour of the purchasers. Disputes arose as to the liability to pay unearned increase and whether the same was payable by the purchasers or by the Income-tax Department or by the original sub-lessee, i.e., the defaulter assessee. As the disputes could not be resolved, the purchasers filed writ petition which was allowed by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by issuing a direction that the Department would deposit unearned increase with the DDA.

On appeal by the Revenue the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held as under:

“(i) The deed of the sub-lease clearly stipulates that 50% unearned increase is payable on the transfer of the leasehold rights in the property and the decision of the lessor in respect of market value shall be final and binding. The second proviso gives pre-emptive right to the lessor to purchase the property after deducting 50% unearned increase. Unearned increase is also payable in case of involuntary sale or transfer, whether it is by or through an executing or insolvency Court.

(ii) The terms of the lease are binding upon the lessor and the lessee. Under section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a lessee is entitled to transfer leasehold right, which he enjoys, to a third party, subject to a contract to the contrary. However, the lessee continues to be liable for the terms and conditions of the lease.

(iii) Rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act permits and allow the TRO to recover the arrears of tax by attachment and sale of defaulter’s immovable property. Thus, what can be sold and attached is a defaulter’s immovable property, i.e., the interest of the defaulter in the immovable property and not interest of a third person in the immovable property. Obviously, DDA’s interest could not have been sold or transferred for recovery of the defaulter’s dues. The right of the defaulter in the immovable property could be sold and transferred.

(iv) What the Act permits and allows is that the TRO can sell the right, title and interest of the defaulter assessee and nothing more. If the said right, title and interest is hedged with the conditions or fetters, the sale will be made subject to the said conditions/fetters. The rights of the lessor do not get affected. Thus, unearned increase is payable. (v) The second question is who is liable to pay the unearned increase. The plea of the Department is that 50% unearned increase is payable by the original sub-lessee and not by the Department or the TRO.

(vi) The Single Judge has, in the impugned judgment, specifically referred to and has quoted the public notice by which sale was made. The terms and conditions of said notice did not stipulate that the bidder would have to pay 50% unearned increase or bear such burden. There was no such stipulation. The sub-lease deed or copy thereof was with the Department and it had finalised the terms of sale. In case 50% unearned increase was to be paid separately by the purchaser, it should have been so indicated and mentioned. This would have resulted in a lower bid amount. It is not the case of the Department that sale consideration paid by the purchasers was less than the market price.

(vii) The terms of auction did not stipulate that the original sub-lessee shall pay 50% unearned increase. The TRO had agreed and promised to issue sale certificate to the auction purchaser, whose bid was accepted. It is only on payment of 50% unearned increase that an effective transfer can be made by the said sale certificate. In these circumstances, it is for the Department to make payment of unearned increase. Of course, in case its dues are still payable, it is open to them to take appropriate proceedings against the defaulter assessee in accordance with law.”

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Economic Assessment – Raghuram Rajan: A case for India

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Such bipolar behaviour seems to apply to assessments of India’s economy as well, with foreign analysts joining Indians in swings between overexuberance and self-flagellation. A few years ago, India could do no wrong. Commentators talked of “Chindia”, elevating India’s performance to that of its northern neighbour. Today, India can do no right.

India does have serious problems. Every commentator today highlights India’s poor infrastructure, excessive regulation, small manufacturing sector, and a workforce that lacks adequate education and skills.

These are indeed deficiencies, and they must be addressed if India is to grow strongly and stably. But the same deficiencies existed when India was growing rapidly. To appreciate what needs to be done in the short run, we must understand what dampened the Indian success story.

In part, India’s slowdown paradoxically reflects the substantial fiscal and monetary stimulus that its policymakers injected into its economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The resulting growth spurt led to inflation, especially because the world did not slide into a second Great Depression, as was originally feared. So monetary policy has since remained tight, with high interest rates contributing to slowing investment and consumption.

Moreover, India’s institutions for allocating natural resources, granting clearances and acquiring land were overwhelmed during the period of strong growth. India’s investigative agencies, judiciary and press began examining allegations of largescale corruption. As bureaucratic decision-making became more risk-averse, many large projects ground to a halt.

Only now, as the government creates new institutions to accelerate decision-making and implement transparent processes, are these projects being cleared to proceed. Once restarted, it will take time for these projects to be completed, at which point output will increase significantly.

Finally, export growth slowed, not primarily because Indian goods suddenly became uncompetitive, but because growth in the country’s traditional export markets decelerated.

The consequences have been high internal and external deficits. The post-crisis fiscal stimulus packages sent the government budget deficit soaring from what had been a very responsible level in 2007-08. Similarly, as large mining projects stalled, India had to resort to higher imports of coal and scrap iron, while its exports of iron ore dwindled.

An increase in gold imports placed further pressure on the current-account balance.

For the most part, India’s current growth slowdown and its fiscal and current account deficits are not structural problems. They can all be fixed by means of modest reforms. This is not to say that ambitious reform is not good, or is not warranted to sustain growth for the next decade. But India does not need to become a manufacturing giant overnight to fix its current problems.

The immediate tasks are more mundane, but they are also more feasible: clearing projects, reducing poorly targeted subsidies and finding more ways to narrow the current account deficit and ease its financing.

Every small step helps, and the combination of small steps adds up to large strides. But, while the government certainly should have acted faster and earlier, the public mood is turning to depression amid a cacophony of criticism and self-doubt that has obscured the forward movement.

Indeed, despite its shortcomings, India’s GDP will probably grow by 5-5.5% this year—not great, but certainly not bad for what is likely to be a low point in economic performance. The monsoon has been good and will spur consumption, especially in rural areas. The banking sector has undoubtedly experienced an increase in bad loans; but this has often resulted from delays in investment projects that are otherwise viable. As these projects come onstream, they will generate the revenue needed to repay loans. In the meantime, India’s banks have enough capital to absorb losses.

Likewise, India’s public finances are stronger than they are in most emerging-market countries, let alone emerging-market countries in crisis. India’s external debt burden is even more favourable, at only 21.2% of GDP (much of it owed by the private sector), while short-term external debt is only 5.2% of GDP. India’s foreign-exchange reserves stand at $278 billion (about 15% of GDP), enough to finance the entire current account deficit for several years.

That said, India can do better—much better. The path to a more open, competitive, efficient, and humane economy will surely be bumpy in the years to come. But, in the short term, there is much low-hanging fruit to be plucked. Stripping out both the euphoria and the despair from what is said about India—and from what we Indians say about ourselves—will probably bring us closer to the truth.

(Source: Extracts from an article by Shri Raghuram Rajan, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, in Mint Newspaper dated 12-09- 2013, written before he took office.)
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PART A: SUPREME COURT Decisions

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In BCAJ of October 2012, I had reported the Order of the Supreme Court in the writ petition in the matter of Namit Sharma vs. Union of India decided on 13-09-2012.

The said order had annihilated RTI operations in India. It was criticised by a large number of RTI activists, many retired judges and also by the Government itself. In BCAJ of November 2012, I had reported that the Government has applied for its review. Mr. Shailesh Gandhi and Mrs. Aruna Roy had intervened in this review petition.

Now the said review petition has been heard and the judgment dated 03-09-2013 (of 55 pages) is delivered by two judges, Justice A. K. Sikri and A. K. Patnaik (who was also one of the two judges in the writ along with Justice S. P. Sampath Kumar).

The Supreme Court held as under:

32. Under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 this court can review its judgment or order on the ground of error apparent on the face of record and on an application for review can reverse or modify its decision on the ground of mistake of law or fact. As the judgment under review suffers from mistake of law, we allow the Review Petitions, recall the directions and declarations in the judgment under review and dispose of Writ Petition (C) No. 210 of 2012 with the following declarations and directions:

(i) We declare that sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act are not ultra vires the Constitution.

(ii) We declare that sections 12(6) and 15(6) of the Act do not debar a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union Territory, as the case may be, or a person holding any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession from being considered for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, but after such person is appointed as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, he has to discontinue as Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union Territory, or discontinue to hold any other office of profit or remain connected with any political party or carry on any business or pursue any profession during the period he functions as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner.

(iii) We direct that only persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in the fields mentioned in sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act be considered for appointment as Information Commissioner and Chief Information Commissioner.

(iv) We further direct that persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in all the fields mentioned in sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act, namely, law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance, be considered by the Committees u/s. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioners.

(v) We further direct that the Committees u/s. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act while making recommendations to the President or to the Governor as the case may be, for appointment of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners must mention against the name of each candidate recommended, the facts to indicate his eminence in public life, his knowledge in the particular field and his experience in the particular field and these facts must be accessible to the citizens as part of their right to information under the Act after the appointment is made.

(vi) We also direct that wherever Chief Information Commissioner is of the opinion that intricate questions of law will have to be decided in a matter coming up before the Information Commission, he will ensure that the matter is heard by an Information Commissioner who has wide knowledge and experience in the field of law.

[Review petition (C) No. 2309 and (c) No. 2675 of 2012 in Writ Petition (C) No. 210 of 2012: State of Rajasthan & Anr vs. Namit Sharma, decided on 03-09-2013]

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Regulators must promote not strangulate industry

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India has several “regulators”, trying to “regulate” several sectors of the economy. There is SEBI keeping a check on the stock markets, TRAI doing the same for the telecom and broadcasting sectors, IRDA for the insurance sector, PFRDA for pensions, DGCA for civil aviation and CERC for electricity.

By their very nomenclature regulators regulate, which many mock to mean strangulate industries. In many cases, regulators focus on keeping private players in check, thinking of them as rapacious booty hunters who need to be tamed, confirming the suspicion that the government never really accepted the private sector as a dynamo of growth. What India needs in the form of regulators are bodies that focus on promoting and developing industry. For if industries develop, there are more tax revenues for the government, more jobs for the people, and more social and economic goals.

This would in turn propel industrial growth and start a virtuous cycle of prosperity. Regulation cannot become shorthand for controlling power tariffs. Equally, the proposed coal regulator should overhaul the defunct and destructive policy of reserving coal production for the inefficient public sector and not become an excuse to “regulate” prices, production capacities, import quotas and the like.

The primary role of regulators must be to ensure that the country’s resources are exploited efficiently and transparently for the benefit of industry and thereby people. Transparency demands that resources are allocated using ascending or single-step auctions, or tenders, not via opaque “administered methods” or “First Come First Served” which lead to corruption and hence must be banned.

Pricing must be remunerative, for only a profitable company can continue investing and exploring. Keeping prices and margins low, and crippling industry doesn’t serve anyone’s purpose, least of all the government’s. Domestic production of gas will increase, lowering the need for imports and easing the balance of payments position.

Regulators must of course always protect consumers. For if consumers suffer, industry suffers. Indeed, the whole reason for setting up SEBI came from the securities fraud of the early 1990s.

A fine balance between protecting consumer and corporate interests is required. The regulator often has to shield industry from the government’s faulty policies, just like the Supreme Court has to shield people from laws that violate the Constitution. A development oriented regulator must have the authority to question government policy, forcing it to make amends as and when required.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Shri Anil Shinde in the Times of India dated 11.09.2013).
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43 dated 13th September, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services–Simplification and Revision of Declaration Form for Exports of Goods/ Software

Presently, every exporter of goods or software has to give declaration in one of the forms (GR/PP/SDF/ SOFTEX/Bulk SOFTEX) and submit the same to the specified authority for certification.

This circular prescribes a common form called “Export Declaration Form” (EDF) for declaring all types of export of goods from Non-EDI ports and a common “SOFTEX Form” to declare single as well as bulk software exports. The EDF will replace the existing GR/PP form used for declaration of export of goods and as to be used on and from 1st October, 2013. Further, all exporters will have to declare all the export transactions, including those less than $25000, in the applicable form. The procedure relating to the exports of goods through EDI ports will remain the same and SDF form will be applicable as hitherto. The EDF and SOFTEX form have been given in Annex I and Annex II respectively. RBI will extend facilities to exporters for online generation of SOFTEX Form No. (Single as well as Bulk) for use in offsite software exports, in addition to EDF Form No. (Present web-based process of generation of GR Form No. gets replaced) through its website www.rbi.org.in. The specimen of online form and the advice are given in Annex III. Exporters have to complete the EDF/SOFTEX Form using the number so allotted and submit them to the specified authority first for certification and then to AD for necessary action as hitherto.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42 dated 12th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.284/2013-RB dated 27th August, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.596 (E) dated 6th September, 2013

Foreign Investment in India–Guidelines for calculation of total foreign investment in Indian companies, transfer of ownership and control of Indian companies and downstream investment by Indian companies

This circular has amended condition at (d) regarding downstream investments by an Indian company which is not owned and/or controlled by resident entity/entities. The amended condition is given in the table below:

 c.f. Annex to A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 4th July, 2013

 Earlier Condition

 Revised Condition

 ParaE 6 (ii) (d)

 For the purpose of downstream investment, the Indian companies making the downstream investments would have to bring in requisite funds from abroad and not use funds borrowed in the domestic market. This: would, however, not preclude downstream operating companies from raising debt in the domestic market. Downstream investments through internal accruals are permissible by an Indian company engaged only in activity of investing in the capital of another Indian company/ ies, subject to the provisions above and as also elaborated below:

 For the purpose of downstream investment, the Indian companies making the d o w n s t r e a m investments would have to bring in requisite funds from abroad and not use funds borrowed in the domestic market. This would, however, not preclude d o w n s t r e a m operating companies from raising debt in the domestic market. Downstream investments through internal accruals are permissible by an Indian company, subject to the provisions of clause 6(i) and as also elaborated below:

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 41 dated 10th September, 2013

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Overseas Direct Investment–Amendment
This circular has modified condition of clause (b) relating to obtaining prior permission under the Approval Route from the RBI for providing corporate guarantee by an Indian Party on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step down operating subsidiaries. The original and revised provisions are in the table:

Table regarding Overseas Direct Investment

 Original Provision

 Revised Provision

 (b) Further, it has also been decided that issue of corporate guarantee on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step down operating subsidiaries will be considered under the Approval Route, provided the Indian Party directly or indirectly holds 51% or more stake in the overseas subsidiary for which such guarantee is intended to be issued.

 (b) Further, it has also been decided that issue of corporate guarantee on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step down operating subsidiaries will be considered under the Approval Route, provided the Indian Party indirectly holds 51% or more stake in the overseas subsidiary for which such guarantee is intended to be issued.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated 10th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.286/2013-RB dated 5th September, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.595 (E) dated 6th September, 2013 Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings by Authorised Dealer Banks– Enhancement of limit

This circular permits banks to borrow funds, subject to certain conditions, from their Head Office, overseas branches and correspondents and overdrafts in Nostro accounts up to a limit of 100% of their unimpaired Tier-I capital as at the close of the previous quarter or $10 million (or its equivalent), whichever is higher, as against the existing limit of 50% (excluding borrowings for financing of export credit in foreign currency and capital instruments).

Further, banks can up to 30th November, 2013, enter into a swap transaction with the RBI in respect of the borrowings raised as above at a concessional rate of 100 basis points below the market rate for all fresh borrowing with a minimum tenor of one year and a maximum tenor of three years, irrespective of whether such borrowings are in excess of 50% of their unimpaired Tier I capital or not. Although banks are free to borrow in any freely convertible currency, the swap is available only for conversion of US $ equivalent into INR and the US $ equivalent shall be computed at the relevant cross rate prevailing on the date of the swap.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated 6th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.258/2013-RB dated 15th February, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.480 (E) dated 12th July, 2013

Export and Import of Currency

Presently, a resident individual can take outside India or having gone out of India on a temporary visit, bring into India (other than to and from Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 7,500.

This circular has increased this limit from Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 10,000. As a result, any person resident in India:

i) Can take outside India (other than to Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 10,000 (rupees ten thousand only); and

ii) Who had gone out of India on a temporary visit, can bring into India at the time of his return from any place outside India (other than from Nepal and Bhutan), Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 10,000 (rupees ten thousand only).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 38 dated 6th September, 2013

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Notification No.FEMA.279/2013-RB dated 10th July, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.591 (E) dated 4th September, 2013

Notification No.FEMA.280 /2013-RB dated 10th July, 2013 notified vide G.S.R.No.531 (E), dated 5th August, 2013.

Purchase of shares on the recognised stock exchanges in accordance with SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations

Presently, FIIs, QFIs and NRIs can acquire shares on recognised stock exchanges in terms of Schedule 3, 4, 5 and 8 of FEMA Notification No. 20. However, non-residents are not permitted to acquire shares on stock exchanges under FDI scheme under Schedule 1 of FEMA Notification No. 20.

This circular permits non-residents including NRIs to acquire shares of a listed Indian company on the stock exchange through a registered broker under FDI scheme if:

i. The non-resident investor has already acquired and continues to hold the control in accordance with SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations.

ii. The amount of consideration for transfer of shares to non-residents consequent to purchase on the stock exchange must be paid as below:

a. by way of inward remittance through normal banking channels, or

b. by way of debit to the NRE/FCNR account of the person concerned maintained with an authorised dealer/bank; c. by debit to non-interest bearing Escrow account (in Indian rupees) maintained in India;

d. the consideration amount may also be paid out of the dividend payable by the Indian investee company, in which the said nonresident holds control as (i) above, provided the right to receive dividend is established and the dividend amount has been credited to specially designated non-interest bearing rupee account for acquisition of shares on the floor of a stock exchange.

iii. The pricing for subsequent transfer of shares to the non-resident shareholder shall be in accordance with the pricing guidelines under FEMA.

iv. The original and resultant investments must be in line with the extant FDI policy and FEMA regulations.

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