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1 Section 153C – AO cannot assume jurisdiction u/s. 153C on the basis of loose paper, seized in the course of search on a person (other than the assessee), which loose paper neither makes any reference to the assessee company, nor of any transaction entered into by the assessee. Amendment made by the Finance Act, 2015 to section 153C is prospective and is applicable w.e.f. 1.6.2015.

1.      
  [2017] 85 taxmann.com 87 (Mumbai – Trib.)

DCIT vs. National Standard India Ltd.

ITA Nos. 4055 to 4060 (Mum.) of 2015

A.Ys.: 2005-06 to 2010-11,  Date of Order: 28th July, 2017

FACTS

The management of the assessee company
changed in May 2010 and consequently, the assessee company became a part of
Lodha Group of companies. At the time of search on Lodha Group of entities on
10.1.2011, premises of the assessee company at Wagle Estate, where the project
of Lodha Group viz. Lodha Excellencia was coming up, was covered u/s.
133A. 

In the course of the search, minutes of SCUD
meeting giving details of projects, customers, flats booked by them, area of
the flat, consideration and deviation from the listed price were seized. These
minutes had a remarks column which explained the deviation and indicated in
many cases payment in cash euphemistically referred to as “payment in other
mode”.

Further, in the course of search, Mr.
Abhinandan Lodha, key person of Lodha Group, in his statement recorded u/s.
132(4) of the Act, came up with a disclosure of Rs. 199.80 crore and offered
the same as additional income.  From the
entity wise details of unaccounted income, furnished by Mr. Lodha, it was found
that it included Rs. 110.25 lakh in respect of sale of parking space in the
hands of assessee company in AY 2011-12.

The Assessing Officer, based on these
minutes and the statement recorded u/s.132(4), assumed jurisdiction u/s.153C of
the Act and issued a notice requiring the assessee to furnish return of income.

Vide order dated 31.3.2013 passed u/s.153A
r.w.s. 153C/143(3) the Assessing Officer (AO) assessed the loss to be Rs.
6,40,575 as against the returned loss of Rs. 3,62,51,460.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who observed that the seized document on the basis of which the
AO assumed jurisdiction u/s. 153C of the Act indicated the modus operandi
of the Lodha Group of receiving money, but did not make any reference to any
project of the assessee. It also did not bear any reference to the transactions
entered into by the assessee. The CIT(A) held that the AO had wrongly assumed
jurisdiction u/s. 153C of the Act. Accordingly, he quashed the assessment
framed by the AO u/s. 153A r.w.s. 153C/143(3) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

HELD

A reference to the provisions of section
153C of the Act reveals beyond any doubt that upto 30th May, 2015,
the requirement, as per mandate of law, for the purpose of assumption of
jurisdiction u/s. 153C was that the AO of the person searched should be
satisfied that money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or
books of accounts or documents seized `belonged’ to a person other than the
person referred to in section 153A. Section 153C excludes from its scope and
gamut such seized documents which though were found to pertain or relatable to
such `other person’, but however not found to be `belonging’ to the latter.

The legislature realising the fact that the
usage of the aforesaid terms seriously jeopardised the assumption of
jurisdiction by the AO in a case where any `books of account’ or `documents’
which though pertained to or any information contained therein related to such
other person, but were not found to be `belonging’ to him, amended the
provisions of section 153C, by the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 1.6.2015
and dispensed with the terms `belongs’ or `belong to’ and instead included
within its sweep books of account or documents which pertain or pertains to or
any information contained therein, relates to such other person.

The Tribunal held that the aforesaid
amendment to section 153C is not retrospective in nature and is applicable only
w.e.f. 1.6.2015. This observation stands fortified by the judgment of the Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT vs. Arpit Land (P.) Ltd. [2017] 393 ITR 276
(Bom.)
. It held that the case of the assessee would be governed by the
pre-amended law as was applicable upto 30.6.2015.

It observed that a bare perusal of the
seized documents does neither make any reference of the assessee company, nor
of any transaction entered into by the assessee company, which could go to
justify the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO u/s. 153C.

The Tribunal held that in the absence of any
document belonging to the assessee having been seized during the course of
search proceedings in the case of Lodha Group, the assumption of jurisdiction
by the AO u/s. 153C by referring to the above referred seized documents is
highly misplaced.

It also observed that the statement of Shri
Abhinandan Lodha recorded u/s. 132(4) in the course of search and seizure
proceedings conducted in the case of Lodha group cannot be construed as a
`seized document’, therefore, the reliance placed by the AO on the same to
justify the validity of jurisdiction assumed u/s. 153C in the hands of the
assessee company, cannot be accepted.

The Tribunal held that the AO had clearly
traversed beyond the scope of his jurisdiction u/s. 153C and therein proceeded
with and framed assessment u/s. 153A r.w.s. 153C/143(3) in the hands of the
assessee company.

The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) and
dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.


Article 12 of India-US DTAA – secondment of employee to Indian subsidiary – employee rendering specialised and expert services in the field of technology of setting up of a business centre does qualify as FIS under India-US DTAA.

1.       TS-294-ITAT-2017(Bang)
Emulex Design &
Manufacturing
Corporation vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of
Order: 23rd June, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer, a US company
(FCo) had a subsidiary, ICo in India. FCo entered into an agreement with ICo as
per which, FCo seconded one of its employee to ICo for rendering specialised,
skill based expert service to ICo. The services were in the field for technology
of setting up of an independent business centre. In the relevant financial
year, ICo reimbursed expenses incurred by FCo viz. the salary of the seconded
employee without any mark-up.

While filing the return of
income in India, FCo contended that the amount received from ICo was purely in
the nature of reimbursement and hence not taxable in India. Moreover, the
nature of services rendered by the seconded employee was managerial in nature
and hence was excluded from the purview of ‘Fees for included service’ (FIS) as
defined under Article 12 of India-US DTAA.

However, AO argued that the payment was in the nature of FIS.
Aggrieved, FCo raised objection before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), who
also upheld the order of AO.

Aggrieved by the order of AO, FCo appealed before the
Tribunal.

Held

–   The secondment agreement between FCo and ICo
indicated that ICo intended to obtain the temporary services of FCo’s employee
who possessed specialised skills and capabilities. The seconded employee was
required to provide their expert service in the field of technology for setting
up of an independent design centre.

–   Thus, secondment was for the purpose of
rendering specialised and expertise services and not for providing general
managerial or administrative service.

–   Having regard to the business profile of ICo1,
the services rendered by the employee qualifies as technical services.

–   Though the payment by ICo is without any
mark-up, such receipt is still chargeable to tax as FIS under the India-US DTAA2.

OECD – Recent Developments – an update

In this
issue, we have covered major developments in the field of International
Taxation so far in the year 2017 and work being done at OECD in various other
related fields. It is in continuation of our endeavour to update the readers on
major developments at OECD at regular intervals. Various news items included
here are sourced from various OECD Newsletters as available on its website.

 In this write-up, we have
classified the developments into 4 major categories viz.:

1)  Transfer
Pricing 

2)  Tax Treaties

3)  BEPS
Action Plans

4)  Exchange
of Information

 

1) Transfer Pricing

 

(i)  OECD releases latest updates to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations

 

     The OECD released the 2017 edition of the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations on 10.07.2017.

 

    The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
provide guidance on the application of the “arm’s length principle”, which
represents the international consensus on the valuation, for income tax
purposes, of cross-border transactions between associated enterprises. In
today’s economy where multinational enterprises play an increasingly prominent
role, transfer pricing continues to be high on the agenda of tax administrations
and taxpayers alike. Governments need to ensure that the taxable profits of
MNEs are not artificially shifted out of their jurisdiction and that the tax
base reported by MNEs in their country reflects the economic activity
undertaken therein and taxpayers need clear guidance on the proper application
of the arm’s length principle.

    

   The
2017 edition of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines mainly reflects a consolidation
of the changes resulting from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Project. It incorporates the following revisions of the 2010 edition
into a single publication:

 

–   The substantial revisions introduced by the
2015 BEPS Reports on Actions 8-10 “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with
Value Creation” and Action 13 “Transfer Pricing Documentation and
Country-by-Country Reporting”. These amendments, which revised the guidance in
Chapters I, II, V, VI, VII and VIII, were approved by the OECD Council and
incorporated into the Transfer Pricing Guidelines in May 2016;

 

–   The revisions to Chapter IX to conform the
guidance on business restructurings to the revisions introduced by the 2015
BEPS Reports on Actions 8-10 and 13. These conforming changes were approved by
the OECD Council in April 2017;

 

–  The revised guidance on safe harbours in
Chapter IV. These changes were approved by the OECD Council in May 2013; and

 

–  Consistency changes that were needed in the
rest of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to produce this consolidated
version of the Guidelines. These consistency changes were approved by the
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 19 May 2017.

 

    In
addition, this edition of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines include the revised
Recommendation of the OECD Council on the Determination of Transfer Pricing
between Associated Enterprises. The revised Recommendation reflects the
relevance to tackle BEPS and the establishments of the Inclusive Framework on
BEPS. It also strengthens the impact and relevance of the Guidelines beyond the
OECD by inviting non-OECD members to adhere to the Recommendation. Finally, it
includes a delegation by the OECD Council to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of
the authority to approve by consensus future amendments to the Guidelines which
are essentially of a technical nature.

 

   To
read the full version online: www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm

 

(ii) Release of a discussion draft containing Additional Guidance on
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments

 

   The
Report on Action 7 of the BEPS Action Plan (Preventing the Artificial Avoidance
of Permanent Establishment Status) mandated the development of additional
guidance on how the rules of Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention would
apply to PEs resulting from the changes in the Report, in particular for PEs
outside the financial sector. The Report indicated that there is also a need to
take account of the results of the work on other parts of the BEPS Action Plan
dealing with transfer pricing, in particular the work related to intangibles,
risk and capital. Importantly, the Report explicitly stated that the changes to
Article 5 of the Model Tax Convention do not require substantive modifications
to the existing rules and guidance on the attribution of profits to permanent
establishments under Article 7 (see paragraph 19-20 of the Report).

 

   Under
this mandate, this new discussion draft has been developed which replaces the
discussion draft published for comments in July 2016. This new discussion draft
sets out high-level general principles outlined in paragraph 1-21 and 36-42 for
the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in the circumstances
addressed by the Report on BEPS Action 7. Importantly, countries agree that
these principles are relevant and applicable in attributing profits to
permanent establishments. This discussion draft also includes examples
illustrating the attribution of profits to permanent establishments arising
under Article 5(5) and from the anti-fragmentation rules in Article 5(4.1) of
the OECD Model Tax Convention.

 

(iii)   Discussion Draft on the Revised Guidance on Profit Splits

 

    Action
10 of the BEPS Action Plan invited clarification of the application of transfer
pricing methods, in particular the transactional profit split method, in the
context of global value chains.

 

    Under
this mandate, this revised discussion draft replaces the draft released for
public comment in July 2016. Building on the existing guidance in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as well as comments received on the July 2016
draft, this revised draft is intended to clarify the application of the
transactional profit split method, in particular, by identifying indicators for
its use as the most appropriate transfer pricing method, and providing
additional guidance on determining the profits to be split. The revised draft
also includes a number of examples illustrating these principles. 

 

   Public Consultation:  The OECD intends to hold a public
consultation on the additional guidance on the attribution of profits to
permanent establishments and on the revised guidance on the transactional
profit split method in November 2017 at the OECD Conference Centre in Paris,
France. Registration details for the public consultation will be published on
the OECD website in September. Speakers and other participants at the public
consultation will be selected from among those providing timely written
comments on the respective discussion drafts.

 

(iv) Toolkit to provide practical guidance to developing countries to
better protect their tax bases

 

    The
Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) – a joint initiative of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), United Nations (UN) and World Bank Group – has published a
toolkit to provide practical guidance to developing countries to better protect
their tax bases on  22/06/2017.

 

   The
toolkit responds to a request by the Development Working Group of the G20,
and addresses an area of tax called “transfer pricing,” which refers
to the prices corporations use when they make transactions between members of
the same group. How these prices are set has significant relevance for the
amount of tax an individual government can collect from a multinational
enterprise.


   The toolkit, “Addressing
Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for
Transfer Pricing
Analyses”
, specifically addresses the ways developing countries can
overcome a lack of data needed to implement transfer pricing rules. This data
is needed to determine whether the prices the enterprise uses accord with those
which would be expected between independent parties. The guidance will also
help countries set rules and practices that are more predictable for business.

 

    The toolkit is part of a series of reports
by the Platform to help developing countries design or administer strong tax
systems. Previous reports have covered tax incentives and external support for
building tax capacity in developing countries.

 

     The delivery of the toolkit coincides with
the third meeting of the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS), held in the Netherlands on 21-22 June 2017, and demonstrates
the commitment of the Platform partners to work together to tackle a wide range
of pressing tax issues.

 

    The
toolkit has been updated following comments on a consultation draft which was
made public in January 2017.

 

     For
more information on the PCT, visit: www.worldbank.org/en/programs/platform-for-tax-collaboration

 

(v)  OECD releases a discussion draft on the implementation guidance on
hard-to-value intangibles

 

     In
May 2017, OECD invited public comments on a discussion draft which provides
guidance on the implementation of the approach to pricing transfers of
hard-to-value intangibles described in Chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines.

 

    The
Final Report on Actions 8-10 of the BEPS Action Plan (“Aligning Transfer
Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation”) mandated the development of guidance on
the implementation of the approach to pricing hard-to-value intangibles
(“HTVI”) contained in section D.4 of Chapter VI of the Transfer
Pricing Guidelines.

 

     This
discussion draft, which does not yet represent a consensus position of the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs or its subsidiary bodies, presents the principles
that should underline the implementation of the approach to HTVI, provides
examples illustrating the application of this approach, and addresses the
interaction between the approach to HTVI and the mutual agreement procedure
under an applicable treaty.

 

2) Tax Treaties

 

(i)  The Platform for Collaboration on Tax invites comments on a draft
toolkit on the taxation of offshore indirect transfers of assets

 

     In
August, 2017, the Platform for Collaboration on Tax – a joint initiative of the
IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group – sought public feedback on a draft toolkit
designed to help developing countries tackle the complexities of taxing
offshore indirect transfers of assets, a practice by which some multinational
corporations try to minimise their tax liability.

 

    The tax treatment of ‘offshore indirect
transfers’ (OITs) — the sale of an entity located in one country that owns an
“immovable” asset located in another country, by a non-resident of
the country where the asset is located — has emerged as a significant concern
in many developing countries. It has become a relatively common practice for
some multinational corporations trying to minimise their tax burden, and is an
increasingly critical tax issue in a globalised world. But there is no unifying
principle on how to treat these transactions, and the issue was not addressed
in the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. This draft
toolkit, “The Taxation of Offshore Indirect Transfers – A
Toolkit,”
examines the principles that should guide the taxation of
these transactions in the countries where the underlying assets are located. It
emphasises extractive (and other) industries in developing countries, and
considers the current standards in the OECD and the U.N. model tax conventions,
and the new Multilateral Convention. The toolkit discusses economic
considerations that may guide policy in this area, the types of assets that
could appropriately attract tax when transferred indirectly offshore,
implementation challenges that countries face, and options which could be used to enforce such a tax.

 

     The toolkit responds to a request by the
Development Working Group of the G20, and is part of a series the Platform is
preparing to help developing countries design their tax policies, keeping in
mind that those countries may have limitations in their capacity to administer
their tax systems. Previous reports have included discussions of tax incentives,
and external support for building tax capacity in developing countries. This
series complements the work that the Platform and the organisations it brings
together are undertaking to increase the capacity of developing countries to
apply the OECD/G20 BEPS Project.

 

     The
Platform aims to release the final toolkit by the end of 2017.

 

Questions to consider

1.  Does
this draft toolkit effectively address the rationale(s) for taxing offshore
indirect transfers of assets?

2.  Does
it lay out a clear principle for taxing offshore indirect transfers of assets?

3.  Is
the definition of an offshore indirect transfer of assets satisfactory?

4.  Is
the discussion regarding source and residence taxation in this context balanced
and robustly argued?

5.  Is
the suggested possible expansion of the definition of immovable property for
the purposes of the taxation of offshore indirect transfers reasonable?

6.  Is
the concept of location-specific rents helpful in addressing these issues? If
so, how is it best formulated in practical terms?

7.  Are
there other implementation approaches that should be considered?

8.  Is
the draft toolkit’s preference for the ‘deemed disposal’ method appropriate?

9.  Are
the complexities in the taxation of these international transactions adequately
represented?

 

(ii) OECD releases the draft contents of the 2017 update to the OECD
Model Tax Convention

 

    In
July 2017, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs released the draft contents of
the 2017 update to the OECD Model Tax Convention prepared by the Committee’s
Working Party 1. The update has not yet been approved by the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs or by the OECD Council, although, as noted below, significant
parts of the 2017 update were previously approved as part of the BEPS Package.
It will be submitted for the approval of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and of
the OECD Council later in 2017. This draft therefore does not necessarily
reflect the final views of the OECD and its member countries.

 

     Comments
are requested at this time only with respect to certain parts of the 2017
update that have not previously been released for comments.

 

    As part of the 2017 update, a number of
changes and additions will also be made to the observations, reservations and
positions of OECD member countries and non-member economies. These changes and
additions are in the process of being formulated and will be included in the
final version of the 2017 update. 

 

(iii) OECD releases BEPS discussion drafts on attribution of profits to
permanent establishments and transactional profit splits

 

     In
June 2017, OECD invited Public comments on the following discussion drafts:

 

–     Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments
, which deals with work in relation to Action 7
(“Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment
Status”) of the BEPS Action Plan;

–  Revised Guidance on Profit Splits,
which deals with work in relation to Actions 8-10 (“Assure that transfer
pricing outcomes are in line with value creation”) of the BEPS Action
Plan.

 

3) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action
Plans

 

(i)   OECD releases further guidance on Country-by-Country reporting
(BEPS Action 13)

 

     On
06/09/2017, the OECD’s Inclusive Framework on BEPS has released two sets of
guidance to give greater certainty to tax administrations and MNE Groups alike
on the implementation and operation of Country-by-Country (CbC) Reporting (BEPS
Action 13).

 

     Existing guidance on the implementation of
CbC Reporting has been updated and now addresses the following issues: 1) the
definition of revenues; 2) the treatment of MNE groups with a short accounting
period; and 3) the treatment of the amount of income tax accrued and income tax
paid. The complete set of interpretative guidance related to CbC Reporting
issued so far is presented in the document released today.

 

     Guidance has also been released on the
appropriate use of the information contained in CbC Reports. This includes
guidance on the meaning of “appropriate use”, the consequences of
non-compliance with the appropriate use condition and approaches that may be
used by tax administrations to ensure the appropriate use of CbCR information.

 

(ii)  Neutralising the tax effects of branch mismatch arrangements

 

     On
27/07/2017,
the OECD released a report on Neutralising the Effects of
Branch Mismatch Arrangements
(BEPS Action 2).

 

     In October 2015, as part of the final BEPS
package, the OECD/G20 published a report on Neutralising the Effects of
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
(OECD, 2015). This report set out
recommendations for domestic rules that put an end to the use of hybrid
entities to generate multiple deductions for a single expense or deductions
without corresponding taxation of the same payment. While the 2015 Report
addresses mismatches that are a result of differences in the tax treatment or
characterisation of hybrid entities, it did not directly consider similar
issues that can arise through the use of branch structures. These branch
mismatches occur where two jurisdictions take a different view as to the
existence of, or the allocation of income or expenditure between, the branch
and head office of the same taxpayer. These differences can produce the same
kind of mismatches that are targeted by the 2015 Report thereby raising the
same issues in terms of competition, transparency, efficiency and fairness.
Accordingly, this new report sets out recommendations for changes to domestic
law that would bring the treatment of these branch mismatch structures into
line with outcomes described in the 2015 Report.

 

(iii) Major progress reported towards a fairer and more effective
international tax system

 

     The
latest Report from OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría to G20 Leaders  describes the continuing fight against tax
avoidance and tax evasion as one of the major success stories of the G20,
founded on enhanced international co-operation. 
The report updates progress in key areas of OECD-G20 tax work, including
movement towards automatic exchange of information between tax authorities and
implementation of key measures to address tax avoidance by multinationals.

 

     The report to G20 Leaders highlights
progress in each of the areas where OECD has been mandated to boost
international co-operation on tax issues. 
This includes ongoing movement towards greater transparency, principally
through the work of the OECD-hosted Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes, which now includes 142 members and is managing
worldwide implementation of the Common Reporting Standard and the first
automatic exchanges of financial account information (AEOI), to take place in
September 2017.

 

    Global Forum members have established close
to 2,000 bilateral exchange relationships for AEOI. “These efforts are already
paying off, with 500000 people having disclosed offshore assets and around EUR
85 billion in additional tax revenue identified as a result of voluntary
compliance mechanisms and offshore investigations.” Mr Gurría said.

 

   Implementation also continues on measures to
reduce tax avoidance by multinational enterprises under the G20/OECD BEPS
Project. 101 countries and jurisdictions are now working on an equal footing
to set standards and monitor implementation via the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework
on BEPS.
The OECD has established a peer review process to assess
implementation of the BEPS minimum standards and work continues on pending
issues including transfer pricing.

 

     At the same time, countries are considering
measures to enhance tax certainty based on the joint OECD-IMF report to G20
Finance Ministers, as well as progressing discussions on the complex issues
around taxation of the digital economy. An interim report on taxation of the
digital economy will be delivered by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS
in early 2018, followed by a final report in 2020.

 

4) Exchange of Information

 

     CFA
Approves New Manual on Information Exchange

 

     In 2006, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs
approved a Manual on Information Exchange. The Manual provides practical
assistance to officials dealing with exchange of information for tax purposes
and may also be useful in designing or revising national manuals.

 

   The Manual follows a modular approach. It
first discusses general and legal aspects of exchange of information and then
covers the following specific subject matters:

(1) Exchange of Information on Request,

(2) Spontaneous Information Exchange,

(3) Automatic (or Routine) Exchange of
Information,

(4) Industry-wide Exchange of Information,

(5) Simultaneous Tax Examinations,

(6) Tax Examinations Abroad,

(7) Country Profiles Regarding Information
Exchange, and

(8) Information Exchange Instruments and
Models.

(9) Module
on joint audits: the Forum on Tax Administration joint Audits Participants Guide

 

     Joint
Audits (JA) are an innovative form of cooperation between countries. Bilateral
or multilateral JA have great potential for transfer pricing audits etc.
A JA is defined as an arrangement whereby Participating Countries agree to
conduct a coordinated audit of one or more related taxable persons (both legal
entities and individuals) where the audit focus has a common or complementary
interest and/or transaction. This new module reproduces the FTA (Forum on Tax
Administration) joint Audits Participants Guide issued by the FTA at its 6th
meeting on 15-16 September 2010 in Istanbul where tax commissioners met to
co-ordinate actions to address international compliance and taxpayer service.
They agreed that major improvements in compliance can be obtained through in
particular a Report on Joint Audits to support coordinated action through joint
audits and this  practical Guide intended
to inform tax auditors and their strategy team http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/13/45988932.pdf.

 

     The modular approach allows countries to
tailor the design of their own manuals by incorporating only the modules that
are relevant to their specific exchange of information programmes.

 

     Note: The reader may visit
the OECD website and download various reports referred to in this article for
his further studies.

10 Unexplained Investment – Section 69 – A. Y. 2008-09 – Addition based on invoices, delivery notes and stock statement submitted before bank – AO not examined suppliers of stock – No corroborative evidence to support AO’s claim – Physical verification of stock tallying with books of account maintained by assessee – Verification made by bank not relevant evidence – Addition cannot be made on ground of undisclosed income

CIT vs. Shib Sankar Das; 396 ITR 39 (Cal)

The assessee was an individual, carrying on
business as wholesaler of grocery items under a trade name. The Department had
discovered four invoices and delivery notes upon carrying out a survey of the
business premises of the assessee. The Assessing Officer added the aggregate
value of the goods in accordance with the invoices as undisclosed business income
and percentage profits on such goods presumed to have been sold. Furthermore,
during scrutiny proceedings, it was noticed that the assessee had submitted a
stock statement on February 29, 2008 before the bank in the matter of obtaining
enhanced credit facilities. The stock statement stood verified and acted upon
by the bank. This stock statement showed value of stock far in excess of the
stock in the statement disclosed to the Department. The Assessing Officer added
the difference also as undisclosed business income. The Tribunal deleted the
additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   The Assessing Officer
ought to have examined the suppliers to find out the truth or otherwise of the
claim. The Tribunal directed 5% of the value of goods, under the delivery
chalan bearing acknowledgment of receipt, to be added to the gross profit and
the addition of the other three purchases deleted. There was no attempt to
adduce corroborative evidence to support the Assessing Officer’s rejection of
the claim of the assessee. This view taken by the Tribunal was a plausible
view.

 ii)  At
the time of survey, physical verification of the stock was made and it tallied
with the books of account maintained by the assessee. When the Department
itself could not detect a discrepancy in the stock, a verification made by a
person not concerned with the assessment could not be relevant evidence to
lawfully presume undisclosed income. The correctness of the verification made
by the bank was not determined. The Tribunal was right in deleting the
addition. No substantial question of law arose.”

PART B: RTI Act, 2005

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Real time updates for Right to Information cases via email, SMS

The Central Information Commission (CIC) has taken an e-leap and would function like an e-court with all its case files moving digitally and the applicant being alerted about case hearings through an SMS and email. So now one can get real time updates while filing a complaint or appeal under Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Starting mid of September 2016, CIC would move to a new software, which would make the hearings faster and more convenient. As soon as an RTI applicant files an appeal or a complaint, he would be given a registration number and would get an alert on email and mobile phone about his case. The case would then be electronically transferred immediately to the concerned information commissioner’s registry electronically.

All this would be done within hours. At present, the process takes a few days.

The new system would also alert the RTI applicant about the date of hearing. An automatic SMS and email would be generated. Apart from this, the applicant would get an email in advance listing out the records given by him to CIC and the government’s submissions in his case. A senior CIC official told ET, “At present, the appellant and the ministry sometimes appear in the case without knowing what the submissions are. So this would help both sides in preparing for the case.”

The Commission would be able to expedite the processing of applications with the new software. At present, it also has to deal with complaints of loss of case files and non registration of cases. The facility would not only benefit the appellants but also information commissioners.

When a commissioner would open a case file on his computer, he would get a ready background of the specific case and also details about the appellant. The official said, “We would know if he has more appeals pending. This could facilitate hearing of multiple appeals of the same person on a given day. It would directly impact pendency as more cases would be disposed in a day.” CIC has already scanned 1.5 lakh files and converted them into electronic files.

(Source : Economic Times, September 05, 2016)

[2015] 60 taxmann.com 203 (New Delhi CESTAT) – CCE, Chandigarh vs. A.S. Financial

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Marketing services provided to a Bank using their publicity material
cannot be regarded as service provided under brand name/trade name of
Bank – Benefit of small scale service provider’s exemption available.

Facts:
Assessee
in terms of agreement with ICICI Bank was providing service of
promotion and marketing. Threshold exemption was claimed for commission
received for said services. Department denied exemption on the ground
that assessee was acting as the franchisee of ICICI and was providing
services under their brand/trademark and hence was not eligible for
threshold exemption under notification no. 6/2005-ST.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that just promoting products of the Bank by using their
publicity materials or displaying banners showing “franchise of ICICI”
would not mean that assessee was providing business auxiliary services
to the Bank, under the brand of ICICI. Services provided by the assessee
are business auxiliary services and the services provided by the Bank
are banking and financial services and assessee is not the franchisee of
the Bank as it is not providing financial services by using business
model or the trade name of the Bank. It is not the case where assessee
was paying some amount to the Bank for using its brand name or trade
name. On the contrary, it is the Bank which is paying to the assessee
for providing the marketing services. Hence, benefit of threshold
exemption is available.

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2015 (39) STR 612 (Tri.-Bang.) Embitel Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Bangalore

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Refund of CENVAT credit for want of registration at the time of exports and availment of CENVAT credit cannot be rejected. Subsequent registration shall also be considered sufficient compliance for refund of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The Appellants claimed refund of accumulated CENVAT credit used for export of services. Refund claim was rejected on the premise that during the period of availment of CENVAT credit and making exports, the Appellants were not registered. It was contended that the issue is no longer res integra and it was squarely covered in case of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Bangalore 2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar.). The Department claimed that the said decision was not applicable to the facts of the case since the notification in the present case specifically requires export to be made from the registered premises. The Department placed reliance on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in case of CCE, New Delhi vs. Hari Chand Shri Gopal 2010 (260) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was held that conditions of notification should be strictly followed and there cannot be any differentiation between substantive conditions and procedural conditions.

Held:
Para 3 of the said notification was related to submission of application and the reference to registered premises was for the limited purpose of determining where the refund claim shall be filed. There is no bar or prohibition in the law for making exports from unregistered premises. Relying on the decision of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal observed that there is no condition of registration for availment of CENVAT credit in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. In fact, it is a settled law that an assessee is entitled to CENVAT credit even in cases of clandestine removal and during unregistered period. Once CENVAT credit is admissible and the same cannot be utilised and when the rule provides for refund, such refund cannot be rejected. In any case, subsequent registration, of the premises from where exports took place, is also enough. The decision in Hari Chand Shri Gopal (supra) was not applicable in the present case since there was no condition in the Notification which required the assessee to register the premises. Accordingly, refund claim was allowed. However, the matter was remanded to original authority for verification of the correctness of the amount claimed.

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BCAS Practice Management Survey 2015

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I. Prologue:
The Infotech & 4i Committee of the BCAS conducted a first of its kind practice management survey during June 2015 amongst its members to provide vital data points to the members to benchmark themselves with their peers and to make an objective assessment of their own practice and how they can scale up their practice. The survey results have been also compared with similar survey in the US where feasible, for further insight.

II. Data:
This being the first ever survey, the response from the members has been inadequate. At the same time, most response have been meaningful. Given below is the tabulated summary and analysis of the responses. We hope that this will induce many more firms to participate next time around. Rounding off and approximations have been used wherever data was incoherent to make it comparable.

III. Findings:

1) We stratified the responses into four categories: Firms having 1 proprietor-3 partners, 4-6 partners, 7-9 partners and 10 or more partners.

2) The tabulation of the responses for firms in INDIA is given below:

If we look at firms in USA for a comparison, here is a snapshot from a survey conducted by Rosenberg Associates:

3) The analysis of the responses is given below:

a) Respondents for firms with 7-9 partners were very few, and their data is skewed. Example: Average net revenue of such firms is Rs.1.51 crore, whereas the average of firms with 4-6 partners is Rs.2.46 crore. It is possible that the above data may not be a true representation of the real world firms having 7-9 partners.

b) Size:
i) Gross fee per partner is showing an upward trend; where larger the firm, larger is the gross fee per partner.

ii) Similarly, net profit per partner is showing an upward trend.

iii) Net revenues of the firms is showing a healthy upward trend, commensurate to the size of the firm.

c) % to Net revenues: Staff compensation is 32% of the net revenues, overheads (S, G & A) is 21% of the net revenues and partner net income is 45% of the net revenues of the surveyed firm. The staff compensation average in US is 42% which indicates that US firms pay more to their staff than Indian firms. It also conversely means that in India, partners take home ratio is more than their counterparts in USA, which may further indicate that US firms employ more qualified resources.

d) Net revenues of firms at Rs.62 lakh for a 1 proprietor-3 partner firm when compared to Rs.2 crore.

When one looks at US firms, the smallest of the firms have average revenues of Rs.8.8 crore, with the larger firms averaging Rs.45 crore and more. The per partner fees start at Rs.3.5 crore and go above Rs.7.8 crore on an average. Even the net profit per partner averages Rs.1.27 crore and goes to Rs.2.4 crore and beyond for larger firms.

Even discounting for purchasing power parity and professional market adjustments (developed market in US vs. emerging market in India) , Indian firms have a lot of catch up to do. They can bill so much more and partners take home significantly higher than what they currently do.

This strengthens the case for niche practices, for concentrated efforts of specialising in service areas, for commanding higher fees and developing higher per partner revenues. This reinforces the argument that CA firms in India need to come together, consolidate operations and become full service firms with partners focusing on specific service areas and sub-service areas.

IV. Epilogue:

The Infotech and 4i Committee hopes that this survey will be useful to our members, to plan for the future.

Please send your feedback and suggestions to gm@bcasonline.org mentioning “BCAS Practice Management Survey 2015” in the subject line.

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Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FAT CA) and Common Reporting Standards (CRS) – the next stage

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Background
In the first two of my articles that were
published in the BCA Journal (February 2015 and April 2015 issues), we
had looked at the broad approach under FATCA and some portions of the
(then) draft regulations which had been at that stage circulated by the
Government to a small group for comments. The purpose of this article is
to trace the developments since then and address specific matters.

Before
proceeding, I must state that the views expressed in the article are my
personal views. They are not intended to be in the nature of tax advice
to the reader. They cannot be used as a defence against penalties
either under FATCA or any other law. The intent is to make readers aware
of a possible view. In regard to specific situations, they should
obtain advice from US tax advisors.

In the field of FATCA, the
Government of India signed the Model 1 Inter-Governmental Agreement
(IGA) on 9th July, 2015. The Rules for reporting u/s. 285BA were
notified on 7th August, 2015 and the first reporting deadline in respect
of records for 2014 was set at 31st August, 2015. This deadline was
later extended to 10th September, 2015. The initial guidance was issued
on 31st August and it is expected that additional detailed guidance may
be available later in the year. Even before these developments took
place, India signed the Minutes of Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreement (MCAA) in Paris as part of India’s commitment to be an early
adopter of OECD’s Common Reporting Standards (CRS).

IGA and the Rules
The
IGA lays down certain broad principles of the inter- Governmental
cooperation. Under Article 10(1), the IGA enters into force on the day
when India notifies the US that it has completed its internal procedures
for entry into force of the IGA. As India notified the US accordingly,
the IGA has entered into force.

Rules 114F, 114G and 114H
governing the reporting and the new reporting form i.e. Form 61B have
been introduced in the Income-tax Rules 1962 with effect from August 7,
2015. The attempt here is to examine the IGA and the Rules together for
ease of comparison and understanding.

Reporting deadlines and information required
The Table below gives the FATCA and the CRS reporting deadlines and the information required to be reported.



Abbreviations:
TIN – Taxpayer Identification Number; DOB – Date of birth; POB – Place
of Birth; DOI – Date of Incorporation; POI – Place of Incorporation;
NPFI – Non-Participating Financial Institution

An NPFI is a
financial institution as defined in Article 1(r) of the IGA1 other than
an Indian financial institution (FI) or an FI of any other jurisdiction
with which the US has an IGA. Where an FI is treated as an NPFI in terms
of the IGA between that other jurisdiction and the US, such NPFI will
also be treated as an NPFI in India.

Who is to report
In
terms of Rule 114G(1), every reporting financial institution (FI) has
to do the relevant reporting. The term reporting FI is defined under
Rule 114F(7) to mean

– A financial institution which is resident
(the reference here is to tax residence status) in India but excluding a
branch outside India of an Indian FI
– A ny branch in India of an FI that is not (tax) resident in India

In both cases, a non-reporting FI (not to be confused with NPFI) will be excluded from the ambit of the term reporting FI.

An Indian bank’s branch in (say) London will not be treated as a reporting FI but a Singapore or a US bank’s branch in India will be treated as reporting FI under Rule 114F(7).

Rule
114F(3) defines a financial institution to mean a custodial
institution, a depository institution, an investment entity or a
specified insurance company. The Explanation to Rule 114F(3) explains
the meaning of the four terms used in the sub-rule.

Under Rule 114F(5), a ‘non-reporting financial institution’ means any FI that is, –

(a)
A Government entity, an international organisation or a central bank
except where the FI has depository, custodial, specified insurance as
part of its commercial activity;
(b) R etirement funds of the Government, international organisation, central bank at (a) above;
(c) A non-public fund of the armed forces, an employee state insurance fund, a gratuity fund or a provident fund;
(d)
A n entity which is Indian FI solely because of its direct equity or
debt interest in the (a) to (c) above; (e) A qualified credit card
issuer;
(f) A FI that renders investment advice, manages portfolios
for and acts on behalf or executes trades on behalf a customer for such
purposes in the name of the customer with a FI other than a
non-participating FI;
(g) A n exempt collective investment vehicle;
(h)
A trust set up under Indian law to the extent that the trustee is a
reporting FI and reports all information required to be reported in
respect of financial accounts under the trust;
(i) A n FI with a local client base;
(j) A local bank;
(k)
In case of any US reportable account, a controlled foreign corporation
or sponsored investment entity or sponsored closely held investment
vehicle.

Paras (I), (J) and (K) of the Explanation to Rule
114F(5) clarify that Employees State Insurance Fund set up under the ESI
Act 1948 or a gratuity fund set under the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972
or the provident fund set up under the PF Act 1925 or under the
Employees’ (PF and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1952 will be treated as
non-reporting FI.

Para (N) of the Explanation to Rule 114F(5)
defines an FI with a local client base as one that does not have a fixed
place of business outside India and which also does not solicit
customers or account holders outside India. It should not operate a
website that indicates its offer of services to US persons or to persons
resident outside India. The test of residency to be applied here is
that of tax residency. At least 98%, by value, of the financial accounts
maintained by the FI must be held by Indian tax residents. The local FI
must, however, set in place a system to do due diligence of financial
accounts in accordance with Rule 114H.

The term ‘local bank’ will
include a cooperative credit society, which is operated without profit
i.e. it does not operate with profit motive. In this case also offering
of account to US persons or to persons resident outside India, will be
treated as a bar to being characterised as a local bank. The assets of
the local bank should not exceed US$ 175 million (assume Rs. 1050
crores, although the USD-INR exchange rate may fluctuate) and the sum of
its assets and those of its related entities does not exceed US$ 500
million (assume Rs. 3,000 crores). Certain other conditions also apply.

What is a financial account
Rule
114F(1) defines a ‘financial account’ to mean an account (other than an
excluded account) maintained by an FI and includes (i) a depository
account; (ii) a custodial account (iii) in the case of an investment
entity, any equity or debt interest in the FI; (iv) any equity or debit
interest in an FI if such interest in the institution is set up to avoid
reporting in accordance with Rule 114G and for a US reportable account,
if the debt or equity interest is determined directly or indirectly
with reference to assets giving rise to US withholdable payments; and
(v) cash value insurance contract or an annuity contract (subject to
certain exceptions).

For this purpose, the Explanation to Rule 114F(1) clarifies that a ‘depository account’ includes any commercial, savings, time or thrift account or an account that is evidenced by certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness or other similar instrument maintained by a FI in the ordinary course of banking or similar business. It also includes an account maintained by an insurance company pursuant to a guaranteed investment contract. In ordinary parlance, a ‘depository account’ relates to a normal bank account plus certificates of deposit (CDs), recurring deposits, etc. A ‘custodial account’ means an account, other than an insurance contract or an annuity contract, or the benefit of another person that holds one or more financial assets. In normal parlance, this would largely refer to demat accounts. The National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL) statement showing all of their investments listed at one place will give the readership an idea of what a ‘custodial account’ entails. These definitions are at slight variance with the commonly understood meaning of these terms in India.

Para (c) of the Explanation clarifies that the term ‘equity interest’ in an FI means,

(a)    In the case of a partnership, share in the capital or share in the profits of the partnership; and
(b)    In the case of a trust, any interest held by
–    Any person treated as a settlor or beneficiary of all or any portion of the trust; and
–    Any other natural person exercising effective control over the trust.

For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the beneficiary has the direct or the indirect right to receive under a mandatory distribution or a discretionary distribution from the trust.

An ‘insurance contract’ means a contract, other than an annuity contract, under which the issuer of the insurance contract agrees to pay an amount on the occurrence of a specified contingency involving mortality, morbidity, accident, liability or property. An insurance contract, therefore, includes both assurance contracts and insurance contracts. An ‘annuity contract’ means a contract under which the issuer of the contract agrees to make a periodic payment where such is either wholly or in part linked to the life expectancy of one or more individuals. A ‘cash value insurance contract’ means an insurance contract that has a cash value but does not include indemnity reinsurance contracts entered into between two insurance companies. In this context, the cash value of an insurance contract means

(a)    Surrender value or the termination value of the contract without deducting any surrender or termination charges and before deduction of any outstanding loan against the policy; or

(b)    The amount that the policy holder can borrow against the policy

whichever is less. The cash value will not include any amount payable on death of the life assured, refund of excess premiums, refund of premium (except in case of annuity contracts), payment on account of injury or sickness in the case of insurance (as opposed to life assurance) contracts Para (h) of the Explanation to Rule 114F(1) defines an ‘excluded account’ to mean

(i)    a retirement or pension account where

  •     the account is subject to regulation as a personal retirement account;

  •     the account is tax favoured i.e. the contribution is either tax deductible or is excluded from taxable income of the account holder or is taxed at a lower rate or the investment income from such account is deferred or is taxed at a lower rate;

  •    information reporting is required to the income-tax authorities with respect to such account;
  •    withdrawals are conditional upon reaching a specified retirement age, disability, death or penalties are applicable for withdrawals before such events;

  •    the contributions to the account are limited to either US$ 50,000 per annum or to US$ One million through lifetime.

(ii)    an account which satisfies the following requirements viz.

  •    the account is subject to regulations as a savings vehicle for purposes other than retirement or the account (other than a US reportable account) is subject to regulations as an investment vehicle for purposes other than for retirement and is regularly traded on an established securities market;

  •    the account is tax favoured i.e. the contribution is either tax deductible or is excluded from taxable income of the account holder or is taxed at a lower rate or the investment income from such account is deferred or is taxed at a lower rate;

  •     withdrawals are conditional upon specific criteria (educational or medical benefits) or penalties are applicable for withdrawals before such criteria are met;

  •     the contributions to the account are limited to either US$ 50,000 per annum or to US$ One million through lifetime.

(iii)    An account under the Senior Citizens Savings Scheme 2004;

(iv)    A life insurance contract that will end before the insured reaches the age of 90 years (subject to certain conditions to be satisfied);

(v)    An account held by the estate of a deceased, if the documentation for the account includes a copy of the will of the deceased or a copy of the deceased’s death certificate;

(vi)    An account established in connection with any of the following

  •    A court order or judgment;

  •   A sale, exchange or lease of real or personal property, if the account is for the extent of down payment, earnest money, deposit to secure the obligation under the transaction, etc.

 

  •    An FI’s obligation towards current or future taxes in respect of real property offered to secure any loan granted by the FI;

(vii)    In the case of an account other than a US reportable account, the account exists solely because a customer overpays on a credit card or other revolving credit facility and the overpayment is not immediately returned to the customer. Up to December 31, 2015, there is a cap of US$ 50,000 applicable for such overpayment.

How to report

Under Rule 114G(9), the reporting FI must file the relevant Form 61B with the office of the Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) electronically under a digital signature of the designated director. The reporting FI must register on the income-tax e-filing website through its own login giving certain information including a ‘designated director’ and a ‘principal officer’. Although not stated in the Rules, the latter will generally be the contact person for the Government of India for any queries and the former will be the escalation point. These two terms are used under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). Currently, the registration is possible without obtaining a General Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN).

The report in Form 61B is, however, required to be uploaded through the personal PAN login of the designated director on the e-filing website. This feature is likely to undergo a change for the next reporting cycle.

Next steps and developments to come

The FIs will need to set up systems to do extensive due diligence procedures for existing accounts in order to comply with Rule 114H and to develop systems to capture the reporting information. Under Rule 114G(11), the local regulators for the FIs viz. the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority will have to issue instructions or guidelines to the FIs under their respective supervision. To avoid conflicting instructions, such instructions must be synchronised. At the Government’s end, the e-filing website must allow for filing of Form 61B through the reporting FIs login under the digital signature of a person who is not necessarily a person authorised to sign the tax return of the reporting FI. We will connect again on due diligence and on these other developments.

The Extension Rigmarole – the profession needs to introspect

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When this issue reaches you, the 30th September deadline for furnishing returns of corporate tax payers as well as those whose accounts are required to be audited will have passed. Either the due date will have been extended, forcing my colleagues to continue working strenuously or they would have heaved a sigh of relief, having toiled day and night to discharge an obligation which is primarily cast on the taxpayer. I have been in this profession for more than three decades and I must say with the deepest anguish that the position has not changed materially. Our profession continues to shoulder the burden of those whom it serves, with those served hardly realising it. Over the years, the onus, responsibility and obligations have increased, while the reward, remuneration and respect has not.

It is a topic that has been dealt with in earlier editorials and yet seeing the palpable tension that my colleagues are bearing, I felt that it is appropriate that the issue is brought to the fore once again. It is really troubling to see our professional brothers hoping for the extension announcement. It is almost as if, a farmer with a parched throat is looking heavenward for those providential droplets of rain.

Ensuring that the accounts are audited, the particulars of tax audit are verified, and the income tax return is filed before the due date is the responsibility of the businessman auditee. The reason for seeking extension of the due date is that the ITR forms were notified late. However, if one looks at the various representations being made before the government authorities, these have been made by professionals in their individual capacity and institutions of professionals, including our very own ICAI. I do not see a trade or tax-payers association involved in this exercise. When these representations have not borne fruit, the judiciary is being looked at as the saviour. Even here, out of the eight writ petitions/public interest litigations filed before various High Courts, 5 have been filed by individuals and 3 have been filed by professional bodies. Trade associations/business bodies are conspicuous by their absence.

Over the years, our profession has not been able to distinguish between the role and responsibilities of the client, and we Chartered Accountants as auditors or tax consultants. It is true that audit report states that preparation of financial statements and compilation of particulars required for tax audit are the responsibility of the auditee; but this is more in letter than in spirit. In the recent past, the complexities of law, the compliance requirements, have increased manifold. The auditor plays a significant role in compiling the details and in finalising the accounts, particularly in case of non-corporate assessees. To ensure proper compliance, he has to remain involved, while as an auditor he has to remain independent. Wearing these two hats is making a diligent professional either lose his hair or turning them grey!

The attitude of the government is also difficult to fathom. Various forms and procedures are prescribed/notified by the government authorities, taking their own sweet time to do so. I am not for asking for extension of time, but in fairness it must be pointed out that if the CBDT takes more than a year after the Finance Bill for the relevant year is passed, to notify the relevant forms and update its software, it is unfair to expect the tax payer to comply with the regulations within a period of two months. The Delhi High Court, while rejecting the petition for extending the due date, has already advised the government to come out with the prescription on the first day of the assessment year. Assuming that the government authorities have their own compulsions and limitations, one really does not understand as to why the due date should be so sacrosanct and cast in stone. It was interesting to read the observations of the Hon’ble judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court who asked the respondents as to whether tax payers would run away from the tax net if the due date was extended. Having said that, it is really not appropriate that we expect the judiciary to intervene in what is essentially a policy matter.

It is time that our profession does some serious introspection. We must make our clients aware of the responsibilities, and the line between the responsibilities of the auditee and that of the auditor must be redrawn. As far as documentation is concerned, we must really put our house in order. If we have communicated with our clients defining our role and responsibility, we must keep appropriate evidence of such communications. This will help us to defend ourselves, should fingers be pointed at us. If for a variety of reasons we are not in a position to discharge the onus that is being cast on us, we must explain this both to the government authorities, as well as to our clients. We must point out to the government that considering the increased cost of compliance, there is a very good case for raising the threshold limit of tax audit. If one takes the cost inflation index as the basis, the limit for business should be around Rs.3 crore while for that of a profession should be Rs.80 lakh. If these realistic limits are introduced, possibly the clients will be able to afford the cost of compliance.

We must interact with our clients so that they are made aware of the complexities of the compliance requirements. This will enable either the clients themselves or their trade associations to make proper representations before the government to ensure that while the objective of the government in calling for information is met, the taxpayers are not unduly inconvenienced. In this regard, the tax payer must be at the forefront, while we should be acting as catalysts. To illustrate, in case of assessees whose total income exceeds Rs. 25 lakh, they are required to submit details of their assets. One of these particulars is in regard to life insurance policies. The instructions in the form state that the premium paid till date is to be treated as the cost. For long-term policies with variable premium, it is virtually impossible for an assessee to have this data on hand. Instead of the premium, the sum assured along with the annual premium could also serve the purpose of the Department.

I am aware that what I am suggesting cannot be achieved at one go. It is a continuous process. One only hopes that the process begins in right earnest. As we bid adieu to Ganesha, the God of learning, one hopes that wisdom dawns on all concerned and the prayers of my colleagues are answered.

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FESTIVAL OF FRIENDSHIP & FORGIVENESS

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Friendship with all

Like ‘friendship day’, the Jains observe “friendship with all” festival on Samvatsari, i.e. the final day of paryusan. This day is the finale of eight days of intensive spiritual activities such as fasting or self-restraint on eating, samayika puja, listening to spiritual discourses, pratikarmana (regretting the wrong doings), reading of religious books, etc. In general, parusyana is the unique eight-day Jaina festival of fasting when every Jain – young or old, man or woman – all and sundries would endeavour to live a simple, sacred and sin-free life. On the final day, it is essential to FORGIVE everybody, particularly those people with whom one had direct dealing, relation and connection and ask for their pardon. This practice of ‘forget and forgive’ should be done sincerely, honestly and from the bottom of the heart.

There is an old Chinese saying :

“the enemy is best defeated who is defeated with kindness.”

Maitri bhavana reaches one:

  • To make and/or retain friends, express regret as soon as possible regardless of whether you are right or wrong,
  • Visualise a person as your dear friend even though he considers you as his enemy,
  • Sincerely wish to heal the breach between him and you with powerful bhavana of friendliness.

The importance of the Bhavana of Friendliness: The most important sutra in Jain spiritual practice is:

“Khamemi savvajive, savvejiva khamam iu me

Mitti me savva bhuesu, veram majjha na kenai”

The above means:

“I forgive all souls and request them all to forgive me. All the souls are my friends; none is my enemy. I do not have a feeling of enmity towards anybody”.

Forgiveness:

“A sadhaka has to first increase the tranquility of the mind by forgiving, and begging forgiveness of, the entire world of beings.”

Constant reflection of this bhavana cleanses the heart of destructive negative thoughts such as revenge, retaliation, enmity, intolerance, etc. It makes one’s heart extremely light as he considers everybody around him as his friends. This bhavana softens the heart and nourishes the capacity of forgiveness and forbearance. This thought prepares one for higher sadhana towards one’s goal of eventual transcendental emancipation. The mantra of ‘forget and forgive’ creates goodwill and amity. It increases one’s power of tolerance and patience and makes a person gentle. It will also create an atmosphere that encourages the concepts of ‘unity of mankind’ and ‘peaceful co-existence’, ‘mutual co-operation’ and ‘interdependence’. It makes life thoroughly enjoyable.

We need to constantly remember:

  • Forgiveness means transcending our judgement and hatred
  • To stop blaming others for our shortcomings
  • Forgiveness is 100% and unconditional
  • To forgive ourselves
  • Absence of forgiveness tantamounts to being imprisoned and an unawakened life
  • Forgiveness is the ultimate test for a person who is willing and able to live an enlightened life.
  • To forgive, we must transcend our bodies and learn to be detached.

Jainism firmly believes that one’s own soul is responsible for everything that is happening in its life. It has to suffer or enjoy the fruits of its own past deeds. Once this philosophy is accepted, one will never sit in judgement and blame others and will desist from the thought of revenge or retaliation.

“The non-violent approach does not immediately change the heart of the oppressor. It first does something to the hearts and souls of those committed to it. It gives them a new self-respect, it gives strength and courage that they did not know they had. Finally, it reaches the opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality” [Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)].

Every hurt or sting is like being bitten by a snake. One rarely dies from a snake bite, but once bitten, it is impossible to be unbitten, and the damage is done by the venom that continues to flow through our system. The venom is: ‘bitterness and hatred’ that we hang on to, long after the snake bite – hurt. It is this venom that destroys our peace of mind. The simple act of forgiveness saves us from anger and hatred and grants us freedom. Forgiveness buys peace of mind.

I believe Forgiveness is joyful, easy and above all freeing. It relieves us of the burdens of resentment, forget past grievances and is another mode of practicing detachment which means: ‘let go’.

So let us purge our prejudices, feelings of resentment, revenge, enmity, retaliation, anger and above all malice towards others. In other words, practice forgiveness and make. ALL ARE MY FRIENDS; I HAVE NO ENEMIES – the anchor of our life.

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CWG Seam 2010 – Criminal Justice System in India – 03-09-2015.

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Five years after the scandal-ridden 19th Commonwealth Games were staged, a court in Delhi has convicted five people.

The convictions—for causing a loss of Rs.1.42 crore to the government—are the first related to alleged financial improprieties amounting to several hundred crores of rupees in the conduct of the 2010 Games.

What is disturbing is the long time it has taken for the first convictions in a scandal that shamed India.

This is not the end of the journey through the justice system for the convicts: an appeals process that can take many more years will ensure that the last word on the case won’t be heard anytime soon.

India cannot overturn its legal traditions and laws and resort to Chinese-style corruption trials. But this is a moment for our lawmakers and the judiciary to introspect—without greatly simplifying the procedural aspects of criminal law, the system will remain geared to the advantage of wrongdoers.

(Source: Quick Edit in Mint dated 03-09-2015.)

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Raghuram Rajan’s ideas should inform public discourse and policymaking

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In an interview to ET, RBI governor Raghuram Rajan made some points that should inform the public discourse, besides policy-making. One, India’s economic situation is relatively robust and not particularly vulnerable to turbulence sweeping across the world from its epicentre in China. Two, creating strong institutions and flexible markets is the best way to absorb shock; it would be silly to turn our back on the world. Three, macroeconomic stability, functional hedging mechanisms and their adoption by economic agents are the best guarantee of avoiding currency shocks. Four, sectoral remedies run the risk of shifting rather than solving a problem. Five, while fears in certain quarters about a secular stagnation across the world might be exaggerated, India should use their negative effect on commodity prices to consolidate its war on inflation and vanquish it.

While not totally ruling out an interest rate response to economic woes, Rajan’s preference is to kill inflation expectations rather than to prop up growth with negative rates of interest. He points to the quandary of those central bankers whose policy rates are already close to zero and cannot use rate cuts to boost growth to argue that the stimulus to growth has to come from other quarters. Introducing GST, labour reform and removing the obligation on mills to make 40% of the yarn they produce as hanks for use on handlooms are examples of such other boosts that he did not mention. And raising productivity is the surest response, as he argues, to the increased competition arising from imports made cheaper by a depreciating yuan. Rajan did not dwell on the added downward pressure on the rupee that would be exerted by an interestrate cut and the burden this would place on the economy.

What Rajan says is perfect economic sense. The trouble is to align this with political sense for those who have to worry about winning elections. This is possible when economic sense permeates the public discourse, so that political leaders find the courage to argue for it, even at the expense of short-term pain.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 28-08-2015.)

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Being human: Will technology mean the end of work? That could be a good or a bad thing

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“If the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves” – that was Aristotle, anticipating a pleasant future of self-operating lutes and looms. That is a vision we have always nurtured. But with each big leap in technological progress, we have also worried about the economic and social disruption it could set off, the efficiency of machines and the impending obsolescence of being human.

With the digital revolution and its promise of self-driving cars, robots, machine intelligence and an Internet of Things, there is legitimate reason to worry about a jobless future. A recent Oxford study that analysed over 700 occupations concluded that 47% of these jobs – including in transport, logistics, office administration – could be automated out of existence in the coming decade. The advocates of tech claim that new opportunities are constantly being created. But what if they are wrong?

Tech entrepreneur Vivek Wadhwa is among the pessimists. He believes we are looking at a future where millions are permanently unemployed. This could be a dystopian future, with a tiny tech elite operating the machinery of civilisation while everybody else is dirt poor. Or it could be an arcadian one if, let us say, the government guarantees an income to everyone and we are liberated from the compulsion of having to slave away at work. In such a world work would be like a philanthropic vocation – engaged in only by those who have a yen for it. They might have de-addiction centres for workaholics even as the rest of us cultivate our hobbies. Don’t hand over everything to the machines, though. Masters may not require slaves but we could all be slaves of machines – which Aristotle did not reckon into his pretty picture.

(Source: Editorial in The Times Of India dated 23-07-2015.)

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Miles to go – Doing Business in India report card a much-needed reality check

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The business leaders, who met Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week,
would have been well served had the report entitled “Assessment of State
Implementation of Business Reforms” been released ahead of the meeting.
This exercise, conducted by the Department for Industrial Promotion and
Policy in collaboration with multilateral agencies, revealed in stark
terms the distance India’s states have to travel to create
business-friendly environments. The Centre deserves credit for
conceiving an exercise that highlights the gravity of the problem. That
India is a tough place to do business is no secret; it ranks 142 out of
189 in the World Bank’s Doing Business report of 2015. The Prime
Minister wants to place India within the top 50, and he has leveraged
his chief ministerial experience to convey the message that the
solutions for achieving this do not lie on Raisina Hill alone – the
states have to pull their weight. In a system as argumentative as
India’s it is to his administration’s credit that it managed to get the
states to agree on an exhaustive 98-point action plan last December to
improve the regulatory framework for doing business nationwide. India’s
disparate federation must become a united stakeholder in economic
reform.

It is noteworthy that National Democratic Alliance-ruled
or -allied states topped the overall results. But more pertinent is
that in terms of implementation of the 98-point action plan, no state
made it above 75 per cent, to qualify as a leader, and only seven states
made it to the “aspiring leader” category with scores between 50 and 75
per cent. The worrying factor is the 16 states that were grouped under
“Jump Start Needed” (no surprise, they cover Jammu & Kashmir and the
north-east). Worse, of the eight parameters, the highest score in three
is below 75 per cent. And in enforcing contracts, one of the key
concerns of any investor, the highest score is 55 per cent. The granular
nature of the action plan, grouped under eight broad parameters,
reveals the serious and basic nature of these gaps – more so since they
allow for none of the old alibis regarding step-motherly treatment from
the Centre. For instance, it is striking that no state has a full list
of all the licences, no-objection certificates and registrations
required by a business to set up and operate. Indeed, even states with
high growth rates, such as Maharashtra, cannot claim to offer great
business environments – Gujarat, for instance, scores just 33.3 per cent
in enforcing contracts, on par with Chhattisgarh.

The report is
right to acknowledge it does not take user opinion into account. Much
of the data underlying the indices are shallow, in the sense that
several of them focus on indicators that are not sufficiently
representative of the real problems hampering business. There is no
replacement, thus, for a comprehensive survey of the actual impediments
to business, and not just those reported by state governments. Including
some information on human development indicators – education,
availability of good schools and hospitals and so on – would have also
served as practical information for investors. Overall, however, it
represents a sensible beginning on the implementation of reform and
cooperative federalism.

(Source: Editorial in the Business Standard dated 16-09-2015.)

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DIPP Press Note No. 10 (2015 Series) dated September 22, 2015

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Streamlining the Procedure for Grant of Industrial License

Presently,
the initial validity period of an Industrial License for the Defence
Sector is 7 years, which can be further extended to 10 years.

This
Press Note provides that the initial validity period of an Industrial
License for the Defence Sector will now be 15 years, which can be
further extended to 18 years. In case the License has expired the
Licensee can apply for a fresh License.

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DIPP Clarification dated September 15, 2015

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Clarification on FDI Policy on Facility Sharing Arrangements between Group Companies

This Press Note clarifies as under: –

Facility sharing agreement between group companies through leasing / sub-leasing arrangements for larger interest of business will not be treated as ‘real estate business’ within the provisions of the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2015, provided such arrangements are at arm’s length price in accordance with the provisions of Income Tax Act 1961, and annual lease rent earned by the lessor company does not exceed 5% of its total revenue.

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DIPP Press Note No. 9 (2015 Series) dated September 15, 2015

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Review of existing Foreign Direct Investment policy on Partly Paid Shares and Warrants

This Press Note makes the following two changes to the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2015 with immediate effect: –

1. Para 2.1.5 is amended to read as under: –

‘Capital’ means equity shares; fully, compulsorily & mandatorily convertible preference shares; compulsorily & mandatorily convertible debentures and warrants.

2. Insertion of new para after para 3.3.3 of Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2015: –

3.3.3 bis: Acquisition of Warrants and Partly Paid Shares – An Indian Company issues warrants and partly paid shares to persons resident outside India subject to terms and conditions as stipulated by the Reserve Bank of India, from time to time.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 13 dated September 10, 2015

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Trade Credit Policy – Rupee (INR ) Denominated trade credit

This circular permits Indian importers to enter into loan agreements with overseas lenders to avail trade credit in Rupees (INR) based on the guidelines mentioned below: –

i. Trade credit can be raised for import of all items (except gold) permissible under the extant Foreign Trade Policy.

ii. Trade credit period for import of non-capital goods can be up to one year from the date of shipment or up to the operating cycle, whichever is lower.

iii. Trade credit period for import of capital goods can be up to five years from the date of shipment.

iv. Banks cannot permit roll-over/extension beyond the permissible period.

v. Banks can permit trade credit up to US $ 20 million or its equivalent per import transaction.

vi. Banks can give guarantee, Letter of Undertaking or Letter of Comfort in respect of trade credit for a maximum period of three years from the date of the shipment.

vii. The all-in-cost of such Rupee (INR) denominated trade credit must be commensurate with prevailing market conditions.

viii. All other guidelines for trade credit will be applicable for such Rupee (INR) denominated trade credits.

Overseas lenders can hedge their exposure in Rupees through permitted derivative products in the on-shore market with a bank in India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12 dated September 10, 2015

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Guidelines for Grant of Authorisation for Additional Branches of FFMC/AD Cat. II

This circular has, with immediate effect, modified the guidelines for opening of additional branches by FFMC / AD Cat. II as under: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated September 10, 2015

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Exchange Earners’ Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account – Discontinuation of Statement pertaining to trade related loans and advances

Presently, banks are required to report transactions relating to loans / advances from EEFC account on a quarterly basis to the Regional Office of RBI.

This circular states that banks are, with immediate effect, not required to submit the quarterly statement of loans / advances from EEFC account to the Regional Office of RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 9 dated August 21, 2015

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Foreign Direct Investment – Reporting under FDI Scheme on the e-Biz platform

This circular states that from August 24, 2015 Form FCTRS (Foreign Currency Transfer of Shares) pertaining to transfer of shares, convertible debentures, partly paid shares and warrants from a person resident in India to a person resident outside India or vice versa can be filed online on the eBiz portal of the Government of India. This facility for online filing is an additional facility and the manual system of reporting will continue till further notice.

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Practical aspects of acceptance of deposits by Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies1 – Part-II

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In this Article, we will deal with testing a few transactions, as to whether they fall in the category of deposits, Compliance aspects of post-acceptance of deposits, penal provisions in case of violation of the provisions of Companies Act 2013 (”the Act”) and Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014 (“the Rules”)

1. In respect of the following transactions entered by the Company, whether the amount received can be termed as a Deposit?

a) Amount received from Foreign Company, Body Corporate, Foreign Citizen, and Foreign Collaborators in the course of business transactions;

Ans: Before one can take a shelter of any exemption available under Rule 2 (1) (c) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014, the purpose of the transaction needs to be understood. Although in terms of Rule 2 (1) (c) (ii) of the Rules any amount received from Foreign Company, Body Corporate, Foreign Citizen, and Foreign Collaborators inter-alia is exempt from definition of deposit and thus will fall outside the purview of section 73 -76 of the Act; the amount received as a loan from a Director who is a foreign citizen will not be exempt as a deposits if brought without prior approval of Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Thus loan received from Director who is a foreign citizen out of funds maintained in the account outside India or out of funds in NR(E) or FCNR Account maintained in India without RBI approval will be termed as deposit.

b) Amount received as subscription money for allotment of securities

Ans: A Company allotting securities will have to follow the procedure for allotment of securities as envisaged in section 62 (1) or section 42 read with applicable Rules. In case the Company fails to make allotment of securities within 60 days of receipt of money the amount received will be treated as deposit and the Company will have to refund the amount within 15 days of the permissible period of 60 days to the person who has paid such subscription money. It may not thus be possible in future to keep loan or deposit from an outsider as a deposit on the ground that the shares were intended to be allotted to him.

c) Amount received from Relative of Director

Ans: Amount received from a relative of Director will be exempt in terms of recently amended2 provisions of Rule 2 (1) (c) (viii) provided the relative gives a declaration that the amount given to Company is from his own sources and not borrowed from any other source. Thus the Company’s ability to gather financial resources from close sources has increased multifold, since the amount received from following person defined as relative (Section 2 (77) of Act3) will not be treated as deposit from now:

(i) M embers of a Hindu Undivided Family of a Director (HUF);
(ii) Spouse of Director;
(iii) Father including step father;
(iv) Mother including step mother;
(v) Son, including step son;
(vi) Son’s wife
(vii) Daughter
(viii) Daughter’s Husband;
(ix) Brother including step brother;
(x) Sister including step sister;

2. What is a “ Circular and Circular in form of Advertisement (CoFA )” in terms of deposit Rules

Rule 4 of Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014 provides for Circular and Circular in the form of Advertisement. A Private Company, Non-Eligible Company or Eligible Company4 intending to accept a deposit is required to issue a document disclosing various details as prescribed in Form DPT-1 of the Rules. The main difference is in the mode of placing this information in public domain before issue, which is as follows:

1) Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies issue circular since they can accept deposits only from Members and thus the circular issued, has a limited sphere of application.

2) Eligible Company who can accept deposits from outsiders (not necessarily its Members) will have to issue Circular in the form of an Advertisement in English language and vernacular language newspaper having wide circulation in the state where Company’s registered Office is situated;

Thus what is Circular in DPT-1 for a Private Company; Non-Eligible Company is a Circular in form of Advertisement in case of Eligible Company

3. Is it necessary to file the Circular/Circular in form of Advertisement with the Registrar and what is the validity thereof

The Circular/Circular in Form of Advertisement (CoFA) is required to be filed with the Registrar of Companies having jurisdiction over the Registered Office of the Company 30 days before the date of its issue to members or release in the newspaper as the case may be. Every Circular or CoFA shall remain valid till:

1) Six months from the date when Company’s financial year ends; or

2) Date of AGM when Accounts are adopted by the Members; or

3) Last date by which AGM should have been held in case the same is not held; Whichever is earlier

In every Financial Year, the Company shall issue a fresh Circular/or fresh CoFA for facilitating acceptance deposit.

4. What are the post acceptance compliances in respect of Deposits as prescribed by Deposit Rules 2014

Following are the post acceptance compliance in respect Private Companies/Non-Eligible Companies and Eligible Companies.

a) Rule 5 (1) (2) of the Rules requires that every Company including Private Company shall enter into a contract, 30 days before the date of issue of Circular or CoFA with a Deposit Insurance Service Provider for securing re-payment of deposits in case of default in re-payment by the Company. Sub- Rule (3) provides that cost of premium should be borne by the Company, and its burden should not be passed on to depositors; Sub-Rule (4) provides for penal interest payment liability on the part of Company in case of failure of Company to renew/ default in compliance with terms of contract for availing deposit insurance services and repayment of deposit in case of continuing non-compliance with terms of contract;

b) Rule 6 (1) of the Rules provides for creation of security in the form of charge on the tangible assets mentioned in Sch III of the Act for due repayment principal amount and interest thereon. At any given point of time, the value of assets charged shall not be less than the amount not covered by deposit insurance as mentioned in Rule 5; Further the amount of deposits shall not exceed the market value of assets charged as security, based on valuation made by the registered valuer. Effectively all deposits should be secured by way of either deposit insurance or by way of charge on the assets of the Company;

c) R ule 7, 8 and 9 provide for appointment of Trustee for Depositors, Duties of Trustees and Meeting of Depositors. If the Company is accepting only unsecured deposits, then appointment of Trustee is not mandatory

d) Rule 10, 11,12 14 provide for form of application for deposits; Power of depositor to nominate person in case of death of depositor; obligation of Company to provide deposit receipts and Maintenance of Register of Deposits;

e) Rule 13 provides for creation of Deposit Repayment Reserve Account and maintenance of Liquid Assets. According to this Rule, every Company shall on or before 30th April of every year, deposit an amount not less than 15% of the deposits maturing during the financial year and the financial year next following, in a separate Bank account opened with schedule bank. The amount so deposited shall always remain at least 15% of the total amount of deposits maturing during the financial year and the financial year next following

f) Rule 15-21 deals with following aspects:

(i) General provisions regarding pre-mature repayment – Rule 15
(ii) Compliance pertaining to filing of Return with Registrar of Companies – Rule 16
(iii)    Penal rate of interest payable to depositor in case of overdue deposits – Rule 17
(iv)    Power of Central Govt – Rule 18

(v)    Applicability of section 73-74 to eligible companies – Rule 19

5.    What are the Penal Provisions of the Companies Act 2013 and Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014?

The Companies (Amendment) Act 2015 vide section 76A has provided that, in case of violation of provisions of section 73-76 or Rules made thereunder or deposits accepted in violation of the said section or default made in repayment of the same, the Company shall be liable for the following:

(a)    Repayment of entire amount of deposit, including interest remaining unpaid to the depositors; and

(b)    Fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 crore but which may extend upto Rs. 10 crore

Every Officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25 lakh but which may extend to Rs. 2 crore, or with both.

In case of violation of the provisions of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014 the penalties are as follows:

(a)    Rule 5 (4) default in complying with terms & conditions of contract for maintaining deposit insurance cover or failure to correct the non-compliance in given time – all deposits covered under the Insurance Scheme including interest payable thereon becomes due for repayment;

(b)    Failure to make repayment of such deposits as stated in (a) above, the Company shall be liable for penal interest @ 15 % p.a. for the period of delay and penalty u/s. 76A shall be attracted;

(c)    Rule 17 provides for payment of interest @ 18% p.a. as penal interest in case of overdue deposits which are matured, claimed but unpaid;

(d)    Rule 21 of provides that in absence of provision of any specific penalty Company and every officer in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 5,000/- and where the contravention is continuing one with a further fine of Rs. 500/-for every day after the first during which the contravention continues.

Now alleged tax evasion even in derivatives – SEBI’s recent order

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Background
Yet another case of alleged tax evasion through manipulative trading in stock markets has come to light as per a recent SEBI Order (Ex-parte ad interim Order of SEBI dated 20th August, 2015). In earlier cases, as discussed a few times in this column, the alleged tax evasion was in respect of equity shares. Equity shares were acquired at lower prices, prices were thereafter allegedly increased to very high levels by price manipulation and the shares acquired were then sold to generate tax free long term capital gains. This time, however, the alleged tax evasion (or possibly other objects as discussed later) is through trading in stock options. Certain persons on one side consistently made huge losses and certain persons on the other side made huge profits through trades in stock options at prices that were artificially and significantly different from the “intrinsic price” of the options, as per SEBI. In this order, as in earlier cases, SEBI has, pending further investigation, passed an ex-parte interim order and banned certain parties from accessing or dealing in the capital markets.

Earlier cases of alleged tax evasion through equity shares
There have been several earlier SEBI orders that have held that there has been massive manipulation in the price and trading of certain scrips on stock exchanges with an objective to evade tax. While there have been different orders in respect of different companies, the modus operandi as recorded by SEBI in those orders has been largely similar. The companies, in respect of whose shares such tax evasion was alleged, were earlier usually suspended/ inactive. They did not have any significant revenues, assets, profits, etc.

The companies were generally closely held. Shares of these companies were then acquired by certain persons either directly from the company by way of preferential allotment or through off market transfers by the promoters of such companies. Thereafter, or at a later stage, the share capital in amount and numbers both was substantially increased by way of issue of bonus shares and splitting of face value of shares. The net result was that the cost of acquisition of shares over the expanded capital thus got diluted. The next step was to systematically manipulate the share price of such companies through trading on the stock market at increasingly higher prices. The trading was within a group through circular trading. Thus, the price rose very substantially at the end, often more than 50 times the original price. A period of twelve months passed which resulted in the equity shares acquired by way of preferential allotment or off market purchases to be long-term capital assets. Thereafter, over a period, these acquirers sold their shares. The sales were allegedly synchronised i.e., the sales and purchases were matched in terms of price and time. This was done to parties allegedly connected to the Promoters/company, etc. SEBI alleged that the company, its promoters, the persons who manipulated the share price and the persons who gave an exit to the acquirers at the later stage when the price of the shares were much higher, were all related/connected. SEBI held that this whole exercise was carried out with the objective of earning illegitimate long term capital gains that were tax free. The whole exercise was also in violation of several provisions of Securities Laws being fraudulent, manipulative, etc. In view of this, SEBI passed interim orders prohibiting various parties involved from accessing and dealing in capital markets.

Trading in stock options
In the present case, the alleged manipulation was in case of stock options. As readers are aware, stock options are not created or allotted by the company but are created and traded through the stock market. A facility is offered on stock exchanges for trading in stock options of companies with certain features such as lot size, expiry period, etc. They can be then traded. The strike price of the stock option would have close connection with the price of the shares. For example, there may be an option in respect of shares of company X. The buyer of such option would thus have right to buy a certain number of shares of that company at the strike price. This option he has to exercise on or before the expiry period. However, such stock options are settled by way of reversal before such expiry period. The buyer effectively pays or receives the difference in the price paid by him.

As stated, the strike price at which the options are traded bears a close relation to the price of the underlying share. Thus, for example, if the price of the underlying share is Rs.100, the strike price will have relation with this price with the buyer/seller’s judgment about the expected fluctuations in this price plus other factors such as carrying costs being then factored in. The strike price will usually move depending upon the movements in the price of the underlying shares. Thus, if the price of the underlying shares rises to Rs.120, the strike price of the options too will move in that direction. Other things being equal, it would be rare to find strike price widely diverging with the intrinsic price.

The modus operandi in the present case of manipulations of options
SEBI has described that the particular modus operandi in the present case was as follows.

There were certain parties who dealt in stock options at a price that was unjustifiably very different from the intrinsic price. Thus, for example, they sold options at a strike price that was much higher than the intrinsic price. The options were acquired by a certain group of persons on the other side. Curiously, these sellers reversed the transactions at a low price. The counter parties who were sellers were again the same parties who had originally purchased the options.

The result was that one group of parties made huge losses while another group made huge profits.

SEBI recorded several other findings. These parties were often the only parties who traded in these stock options. They traded with each other very often in close synchronisation. The movement in the price of the options was unreasonable for such short time and also in relation to the underlying price of the shares. The parties often had no other trades.

SEBI was of the view that the transactions were suspicious and with ulterior motives. SEBI believed that the motives could be tax evasion, creation of net worth or other similar motives. In any case, it said that there was clear manipulation of the prices and volumes in violation of several provisions of the Securities Laws. The matters required further investigation, but in the interim, to prevent further violations, SEBI banned the parties from accessing or dealing in the capital markets.

Some of the observations/conclusions of SEBI are worth reviewing.

“The repeated sell of illiquid stock options by the loss-making entities to a set of entities at a price far lower than the theoretical price/intrinsic value and subsequent reversal trades with the same set of entities within a short span of time with a significant difference in buy and sell value of stock options, in itself, exhibits abnormal market behavior and defies economic rationality, especially when there is absolutely no corresponding change in the underlying price of the scrip. On the other hand, trading behavior of profit-making entities exhibited through opening specific trading accounts and operating them exclusively to execute reversal trades in illiquid stock options with a set of entities clearly indicates their role in facilitating loss-making entities in executing their ulterior motive.


Considering the facts and circumstances discussed herein above, I, prima-facie, find that the loss-making entities were deliberately making repeated loss through their reversal trades in stock options which does not make any economic sense, and the profit-making entities were facilitating them by becoming their counterparties and were acting in concert with a common object of intended execution of these suspicious and non- genuine trades. The reasons for executing such trades by these entities could be showing artificial volume and trading interest in these instruments or tax evasion or portraying artificial increase in net worth of a private company/individual. Be as it may, it is amply clear to me that the rationale for such transactions is not genuine and legitimate as the behavior exhibited by these entities defies the logic and basic economic sense. No reasonable and rational investor will keep making repeated loss and still continue its trading endeavors. On the other hand, an entity/ scheme may not forever be able to make only profit and become equivalent to an assured profit maker/scheme. I am of the considered view that the scheme, plan, device and artifice employed in this case of executing reversal trades in illiquid stock options contracts at irrational, unrealistic and ? unreasonable prices, apart from being a possible case of tax evasion or portrayal of artificial net worth to certain entities, which could be seen by the concerned law enforcement agencies separately, is prima facie, also a fraud on the securities market in as much as it involves non-genuine/manipulative transactions in securities and misuse of the securities market. “

Considering that SEBI believed that the reason for such transactions may be with an objective of tax evasion, it also said it would refer the matter to Income-tax and other authorities. It observed:-

“As the purpose of the above mentioned transactions may be to generate fictitious profits / losses for the purpose of tax evasion / facilitating tax evasion, the matter may be referred to Income Tax Department for  investigation  and  necessary  action  at  their end. The matter may also be referred to Financial Intelligence Unit and Enforcement Directorate for necessary action at their end.” ?

Conclusion

SEBI is rightly coming down hard on such cases where it believes that there are rampant and there are manipulative and fraudulent acts. Such acts affect the markets in man ways. The artificial volumes may influence investors not only in the shares and options being manipulated but even in other shares/options. Unsuspecting investors may thus suffer losses. The credibility of the markets would also suffer and thus harm the interests of bonafide companies who end up having to suffer in many ways including getting a lower price for their shares. The image of the country too suffers. The culture of violating laws and even expecting to get away also gets entrenched. Clearly, strong action is necessary.

However, it is also seen that these orders are at a very preliminary stage. SEBI has stated that the full investigation is yet to be over. The allegations are serious. It would have to be backed up by foolproof investigation supported by impeccable logic and evidence. For upholding severe actions and punishment, law and courts require such clear and conclusive evidence. In any case, a message has certainly gone across that SEBI and stock exchanges are closely monitoring such cases. The investigative resources and powers SEBI has are helping it gather considerable information. Time will of course show whether and to what extent wrong doers are punished and how much impact it has on malpractices in capital markets.

[Sections 43CA, 50C and 56 of Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”)] – need for some amendments

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The menace of Black Money stashed abroad as well as in India is both an external and internal threat as this could be used to finance militancy. It is also unhealthy for the Indian economy as taxes are avoided – which increases the burden on the honest tax payer. Time and again, efforts have been made to unearth black money either by way of strict enforcement or by way of amnesty schemes or voluntary disclosure schemes.

It is an open secret that a major portion of `black money’ gets parked in the real estate sector. Towards this end, the various State Acts (Stamp Acts) and the Central Law –The Income-tax Act have tried to curb this malpractice e.g. the Income- tax Act contained provisions for obtaining tax clearance certificates before sale of immovable properties, thereby providing for a mechanism for preemptive purchase of undervalued properties by the Central Government. However, it is an admitted fact that these mechanisms failed and therefore have either been omitted by the Government or struck down by the Apex Court (e.g. Section 52 was read down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese vs. ITO (1981) 7 Taxman 13). Similarly, Chapter XXC of the Act also proved ineffective.

State Governments have also joined hands in these efforts by amending their respective Stamp Acts to provide for levy of stamp duty on higher of the prescribed ‘ready reckoner value’ and apparent consideration. The Central Government also introduced section 50C in the Income -tax Act w.e.f. 1-4-2003, section 43CA w.e.f. 1-4-2014 and amended section 56(2)(vii) w.e.f. 1-4-2014. Though such provisions are a welcome step in indirectly curbing the flow of black money in real estate transactions, sometimes some unintended and unfair consequences follow. A few such instances are listed below:

The ‘ready reckoner value’ fixed by State Governments for an under construction property and a ready possession property is the same. When it is an open secret that in the real estate market there is an undesirable flow of black money, it is also equally true that the property rates vary according to the stages of construction. If a person is booking a flat today in the year 2015 in a big project, where possession is likely to be received in the year 2020 (though the builder might have intended it to be in the year 2018), the rates would be substantially different from the rates of a ready possession property. Further, in many cases, the builder offers the properties even at much lower rates in the pre-booking stage, to finance the construction. It is openly advertised in newspapers etc. for discounts in pre-booking stage. But the ‘ready reckoner value’ does not provide for any concession for such under construction properties.

In many cases, people have some existing rights in the properties and there is some pending litigation in the Courts. We are all aware of the speed of disposing of litigations in India. In a few such cases, parties agree for out-of-court settlement and decide a consideration substantially lower than the current market value, for obvious reasons.

In some cases, the Court itself decides the consideration to be paid by one litigant to the other, which is substantially lower than the market value.

Recently, I came across a few cases, where a builder has asked for extra consideration for the extra area (balcony) due to change in DC Regulations. Though such area was actually not an ‘extra area’, as the balcony was already there in the original plan but due to change in DC Regulations, it is now to be included in the carpet area. The actual consideration for such so called extra area when compared with the current ‘ready reckoner value’, is bound to be lower. There is a separate supplementary agreement executed and registered after the change in DC Regulations.

Therefore, even the saving clause of sub-section(3) of section 43CA or proviso to Section 56(2)(vii) may not help. (i.e. existence of an agreement of a prior date).

In all the above cases, there are genuine hardships to both the buyers and sellers because of the application of section 43CA and 56(2)(vii). It is accepted that there are safeguards in-built in these sections to refer the valuation to the departmental valuation officer, wherever assessee claims that the ‘ready reckoner value’ is higher than the market value, but the ‘effectiveness’ of such reference is known to all. From a common man’s perspective, when the agreement is executed, it gets reported through AIR to the Income Tax department and the case is taken up for scrutiny in almost all cases of difference between the actual consideration and the ‘ready reckoner value’. In genuine cases, at higher appellate levels, justice may be obtained with a time consuming and costly litigation. However, at the first assessment stage, getting a relief even in genuine cases is a herculean task.

Legislation with a sound objective is always welcome but is it fair to have a rigid, mechanical and rather oversimplified approach in its implementation?

Suggestion:
An appropriate discounting factor be introduced for valuation of incomplete construction based on the stage of construction. So also, exceptions be provided in situations like decisions of a court. Moreover, exceptions provided in Sections 43CA and 56(2) are missing in Section 50C. The provision should be amended to include the same.

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Female Intestate Succession – The Tide Turns (Sometimes)

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Introduction
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is one of the
few codified statutes under Hindu Law. It governs the position of a
Hindu male/female dying intestate, i.e., without making a valid Will.
The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person who
is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. The Act overrides all Hindu
customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such
property and the order of preference among them. Thus, if a Hindu dies
leaving behind property and does not make a valid Will, then the law
decides which of his/her heirs get what and in what ratio!

There
are separate rules for succession in the case of intestate Hindu males
and Hindu females. Through this Article, let us examine the usual
succession pattern of a female Hindu and certain special circumstances
when this usual pattern changes.

Usual Succession Pattern
Before analysing the special circumstances, one must understand the usual succession pattern of a Hindu female dying intestate.

All
property, whether movable or immovable and by whatever means acquired,
belonging to a female Hindu is held by her as a full owner. A female
Hindu has absolute power to deal with her property and she can dispose
off her property by way of a Will, gift, etc.

The property of an intestate Hindu female devolves on the following heirs in the order specified below:

(a) Firstly, upon her sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased children) and husband;
(b) Secondly, upon the heirs of her husband;
(c) Thirdly, upon her parents
(d) Fourthly, upon the heirs of her father
(e) Fifthly, upon the heirs of her mother

The
order of succession is in the order specified above. Thus, if she has
children and/or husband then they take the entire property
simultaneously and in preference to all other heirs.

Need for a Change?
What
is interesting to note is that in a case where she does not have any
children or husband or grandchildren of predeceased children, then her
property goes to her husband’s heirs and not to her heirs. Thus, if the
mother of her husband is alive, then her whole property would devolve on
her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law is also not alive, it would
devolve as per the rules laid down in case of a male Hindu dying
intestate i.e., if the father of her deceased husband is alive, her
father-in-law will inherit her property and if the father-in-law is also
not alive, then her property would devolve on the brother and sister of
the deceased husband.

This position has been a bone of
contention when it comes to women’s equal rights. The 207th Report dated
June 2008 of the Law Commission of India makes a case for amending the
Hindu Succession Act to provide that in cases where an intestate Hindu
widow dies issueless, then equal rights must be given to her parental
heirs along with her husband’s heirs to inherit her property. Thus, both
her parent’s heirs and her husband’s heirs must equally inherit her
estate.

The Order Changes – Property from Parents
The above succession pattern undergoes a drastic change in two cases. These are the notable exceptions to the general law.

In
a case where a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving behind any
children or grandchildren of predeceased children, then only in respect
of the property which she had inherited from her parents the succession
position is altered. The Act provides that such property which she had
inherited from her parents would go to her father’s heirs and shall
neither go to her husband nor her husband’s heirs. Thus, three
conditions must be satisfied for this provision to apply and these are
as follows:

a) A female Hindu must die intestate;
b) She must have inherited property from either of her parents; and
c) She must not have any son, daughter or grandchildren from a predeceased son or daughter.

If
all of the above are met, then the property inherited from her father
or mother would go to her father’s heirs. Interestingly, this is so even
if her husband is alive. However, if she leaves behind a child then the
normal succession pattern would apply and even property inherited from
her parents would go to her children and husband. It must be noted that
irrespective of whether the property is inherited by her from her father
or mother, it would go only to the heirs of her father and not to heirs
of her mother.

The exception is only qua property inherited by a
lady from her parents and cannot extend to property inherited from her
husband – Reshma G. Bhandari vs. Yeshubai H. Koli, 2008(2) Bom. C.R.
294. Similarly, the words “father” and “mother” do not in any way lead
to a conclusion to include property inherited from relatives from her
father’s side or her mother’s side”, as including such additional terms
would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Legislature – Balasaheb
Anandrao Ghatge vs. Jaimala Shahaji Raje, 1977 Mh. L.J.777.

Further,
the exception only deals with inherited property. Property received by
way of a gift from parents or by Will or any other mode would not be
covered by the exception and would continue to be governed by the normal
succession pattern.

The Madras High Court while interpreting
the essence of the above exception in Ayi Ammal vs. Subramania Asari,
1966 (1) M.L.J. 411, has held that the word “inherit” is a word of known
import and ordinarily cannot give any difficulty in understanding its
content. To inherit is to receive property as heir that is succession by
descent. It referred to a dictionary definition and held that it meant
to receive property as heir. Inherit meant, succession by descent. To
take by inheritance meant to take, or to have; to become possessed of;
to take as heir at law by descent or distribution; to descend. The words
inherit and heir in a technical sense, related to right of succession
to the real estate of a person dying intestate”. The word “inherited” in
the above exception had not been used in a loose way and would not
include within its purview receipt of property from the father or mother
during their lifetime.

Similarly, the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in Babballapati Kameswararao vs. Kavuri Vesudevarao 1972 AIR(A.P.) 189,
has held that the exception only covers the acquisition of the property
by succession and not by way of a gift or under a will. The word
inherit thus can in the context only mean to receive property as heir
succession by descent. The view of the Gujarat High Court in Jayantilal
Mansukhlal vs. Mehta Chhanalal Ambalal, 1968 (9) G.L.R. 129 is also
similar.

The only persons covered by the exception are the
father’s heirs. If there are no heirs of the father then the normal
succession pattern would resume.

A very interesting question which arises is that what if the father of the Hindu female is alive? In such an event, would the property go to him or to his heirs, i.e., would the heirs of the father get the property in exclusion of the father? A Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bhimadas vs. P. K. Kanthamma, ILR 1977 AP 418 held that the father was entitled to the estate during his lifetime. It is only if the father is no more that his heirs would be entitled to the estate of the female Hindu intestate. However, this decision of the Single Judge was overturned by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh in Pinkana Pasamma vs. Bhimadas, 1993(1) KLT

174.    According to the latter decision, the law was very clear and the father’s heirs would get the estate as if the father was no longer alive (even though he was actually alive)!
The law created a deeming fiction whereby the father was deemed to have died intestate immediately after the death of the female Hindu. A similar decision was taken by the Kerala High Court in Sindhu Ajayan vs. Damodaran Pillai, 2011(3) ILR (Ker) 12.

Property from Father-in-law

A second exception in the Act is in respect of property inherited by a female intestate from her husband or her father-in-law. If she dies without leaving behind any children or children of pre-deceased children then the property would devolve not as per the normal succession order but would devolve upon her husband’s heirs. Thus, three conditions must be satisfied for this provision to apply and these are as follows:

d)    A female Hindu must die intestate;

e)    She must have inherited property from either her father-in-law or her husband; and
f)    She must not have any son, daughter or grandchildren from a predeceased son or daughter.

At first blush, it appears that this is a case of redundant drafting. Would not property inherited by a lady from her deceased husband or from her father-in-law in a case where her husband has predeceased her always devolve upon her husband’s heirs since that is the normal succession order under the Act? Her parents would come into the picture only under the 3rd list. Her husband’s heirs take precedence since they are in the 2nd list in the normal order. Why then was this exception inserted? However, consider a case of a female who has inherited property from her late husband or her late father-in-law and then she remarries. If she dies intestate and issueless, her second husband would claim a right to all her property, including the property which she inherited from her first husband or first husband’s father. To prevent this from happening, this exception has been enacted.

What if she has no children from the first marriage but has children from the second marriage then would this exception fail and these children and her second husband would get all her property including what she inherited from her first husband or first husband’s father? Alternatively, would the exception continue to apply since she does not have any children from the first marriage? This is a matter on which there is no express clarity.

Consider a third scenario where she has children from her first marriage but has also remarried. In such a case, this exception would surely fail and these children and her second husband would get all her property including that which she inherited from her first husband or first husband’s father.

Similarly, as in the first exception, the property must have been inherited by her and not received by will or gift or any other mode.

Conclusion

The succession law in the case of females has always been vexed and biased. While there have been some improvements over the years, there are miles yet to be covered. Should not all property received by her from her parents, by way of gift, will, succession, etc., go back only to her parents in the absence of children/husband? Should not the recommendations of the Law Commission be enacted? One often feels that instead of carrying out only amendments such as having a women director on the board (which in several cases is only symbolic), the personal succession law relating to women needs an urgent overhaul! Let us hope that one day the tide would turn for the good (instead of only sometimes as is the case today).

(Advisory practice and Code of Ethics)

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Arjun (A) — Hey Shrikrishna, you were explaining to me what professional scepticism is and why it is needed.
Shrikrishna (S) —And I told you many stories of how an auditor came into deep trouble for acting in good faith.
A — I feel like giving up this signing business and do only advisory work. No kitkit of disciplinary cases.
S — Do you feel, there is no risk in advisory practice? There are many cases where CAs were held guilty for giving wrong advice.
A — Don’t tell me! But we do everything for the benefit of our client only!
S — Agreed. But when he is exposed, he passes on the blame to you only. Moreover, nowadays the Regulators like revenue authorities, MCA and so on have also become very active in this regard.
A — But how would they know that we have advised?
S — Why? Many times, you give written advice or opinion; you raise invoice with that description; clients also tell the authorities to save their own skin.
A — I give my advice only orally. But client very often takes it only to suit his convenience. S — But then, when there are penalty proceedings like concealment of income, the client tries to take shelter that he was wrongly advised.
A — Yes. They say they are lay persons and everything is looked after by their CA. And quite often, they escape the penalty.
S — That is because the Tribunal often gives weightage to such a plea of client’s ignorance; and consultant’s advice. But sometimes, they rap the CAs for wrong advice.
A — Really?
S — Yes, really, one client rang his CA for advice; when he received a negative order from CIT(Appeals). The CA told him about further appeal to the Tribunal. In fact, his matters for earlier years were already before the Tribunal.
A — Then what happened?
S — Client told him that he had no money to spend on repetitive litigation. He enquired whether there was any alternative.
A — This happens quite often.
S — Actually, that client was no more with this CA and had gone to some other CA for routine work. He asked this CA only due to his old relations. The CA told him that since, on the same point, the matter was already before the Tribunal, he could wait and watch. If ITAT ’s order was in his favour, he could go for rectification for subsequent year’s orders. The issue was that of principle and not factual.
A — But rectification may get time-barred.
S — Actually, the CA meant rectification by CIT(A) of his appellate order. But the client by mistake approached the Assessing Officer for rectification.
A — But the Department never acts on our applications for rectification! They remain pending for years together unless you follow up.
S — That precisely happened here. So at a much later date, the client’s new CA filed an appeal to ITAT . It was delayed by 8 years!!
A — Oh my God! So much delay? S — In the condonation proceedings, the client’s counsel, as usual, pleaded that the client received wrong advice from his CA.
A — But I am told, nowadays the Tribunal insists on a sworn affidavit from the consultant or CA that he gave such advice.
S — Right you are. Here, the Tribunal did the same thing. This CA in good faith gave an affidavit that he had given such advice in the given circumstances at that point of time. He said that the advice was misunderstood by the client.
A — The Tribunal passed strictures not only against that CA but against the whole profession for lack of knowledge and lack of due diligence.
S — Yes, I have heard this case. It created a sensation a few months ago.
A — Your Council took serious note of this and initiated proceedings against the CA for bringing disrepute to the profession.
S — Baap re! But who complained?
A — Neither the Tribunal nor the client. In fact the client said he had nothing against the CA since the client knew the reality. The Disciplinary Directorate acted suo moto – on its own – since the ITAT order would certainly tarnish the image of the profession.
S — So far hundreds of cases of condonation might have escaped on the ground that the consultant gave wrong advice. But none of them went in this direction. Bad luck of that CA! But I heard that the Tribunal rectified its own order and deleted some para of strictures. Is it true?
A — Yes. But that may not help the CA. Let us watch how the case progresses now.
S — A good eye-opener once again!

Note:
The provisions of the Code of Ethics are equally applicable to advisory work undertaken by us professionals. The above dialogue tries to explain the same. The C.A. can also be charged under the Consumer Protection law.

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Precedents – Obiter Dictum – Is something said by a judge and has no binding authority: Constitution of India – Article 141

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Laxmi Devi vs. State of Bihar AIR 2015 SC 2710

The Hon’ble Court observed that an obiter dictum, of course, is always something said by a judge. It is frequently easier to show that something said in a judgment is obiter and has no binding authority. Clearly, something said by a Judge about the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an obiter dictum.

The term ratio decidendi, which in Latin means “the reason for deciding”. According to Glanville Williams in ‘Learning the Law’, this maxim “is slightly ambiguous. It may mean either (1) rule that the judge who decided the case intended to lay down and apply to the facts, or (2) the rule that a later Court concedes him to have had the power to lay down.” In G. W. Patons’ Jurisprudence, ratio decidendi has been conceptualised in a novel manner, in that these words are “almost always used in contradistinction to obiter dictum. An obiter dictum, of course, is always something said by a Judge. It is frequently easier to show that something said in a judgment is obiter and has no binding authority. Clearly something said by a Judge about the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an obiter dictum.” ‘Precedents in English Law’ by Rupert Cross and JW Harris states -“First, it is necessary to determine all the facts of the case as seen by the Judge; secondly, it is necessary to discover which of those facts were treated as material by the Judge.” Black’s Law Dictionary, in somewhat similar vein to the foregoing, bisects this concept, firstly, as the principle or rule of law on which a Court’s decision is founded and secondly, the rule of law on which a latter Court thinks that a previous Court founded its decision; a general rule without which a case must have been decided otherwise.

In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on, the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it.

It is further trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom.

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Will – Execution – Mere non-registration of Will would not make it suspicious: Evidence Act Section 67 & 68.

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Dhameshwar vs. Gish Pati & Ors. AIR 2015 HP 77

The Appellant plaintiff had filed a suit against the Respondent-defendant, namely, Gish Pati and Proforma Respondents-defendants for declaration and for permanent prohibitory injunction as a consequential relief. According to the plaintiff, Smt. Drumati Devi had not executed the Will, dated 15.06.1985, Ex. DW2/A in favour of defendant, Sh. Gish Pati. Drumati Devi was 78 years of age in the year 1985 and the defendant No. 1 in collusion with the subordinate revenue staff and behind the back of the plaintiff and proforma defendants, got the mutation attested in his favour with regard to the share of late Smt. Drumati Devi. He came to know about this in the month of January, 1994. The Will is unregistered. Smt. Drumati Devi was an old, illiterate and simple lady. She had never expressed her will or desire to disentitle the plaintiff and other proforma defendants from her share in the suit property. The execution of the Will was result of undue influence, misrepresentation and coercion. The Will, dated 15.06.1985, was null and void. He also sought the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant No. 1.

The suit was contested by the defendant No. 1. According to him, Smt. Drumati Devi was fully capable and sensible lady. She in lieu of the services rendered by him, executed a Will in his favour. Thereafter, on the basis of the Will, dated 15.06.1985, the mutation was also attested. The revenue entries were in accordance with the law.

What emerges after analysis of the statements of the witnesses, is that the Will is dated 15.06.1985. It was scribed by Dile Ram. The contents of the Will were read over and explained to Drumati Devi. She had put her thumb impression on the same. Thereafter, the marginal witnesses, Himan and Het Ram signed the same. The defendant No. 1 used to look after his mother. The plaintiff was out of village. The last rites were performed by defendant No. 1. Drumati was in her senses at the time of execution of the Will.

The counsel for the plaintiff contended that the marginal witnesses have used different ink. The Court held that merely the fact that the marginal witnesses have used different ink, will not make the Will suspicious.

The non registration of the Will will not make it suspicious. The Will has been executed strictly as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Succession Act.

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The petitioner filed a divorce petition u/s. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court. In that application, the petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 2 – wife caused mental cruelty to him by different means.

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Kalia Hati & Ors vs. State of Odisha & Ors. AIR 2015 Orissa 138 (FB)

The Court was concerned with the following question – What is the meaning of the expression “in particular, and without prejudice to the generality” appearing in section 14(ii) of the Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1980 (the Act)?

Section 14(i) of the Act deals with functions of the Corporation. It provides that the functions of the Corporation shall be generally to promote and assist in the rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries, trade and commerce in the State. Section 14(ii) starts with “in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of Clause (i)”. Thereafter, it provides various particular purposes for which acquisition can be made.

In Shiv Kirpal Singh vs. Shri V. V. Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097, the Supreme Court relying on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of King Emperor vs. Sibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156 held that when the expression “without prejudice to the generality of the provisions” is used, anything contained in the provisions following the said expression is not intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision.

Thus, the Court concluded that sub-section (i) of section 14 of the Act is independent and is couched in broad terms. The same cannot be in any manner whittled down by the language of sub-section (ii) of section 14 of the Act.

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Evidence – Tape Recorded conversation between spouses – Admissible in evidence – violates right to privacy – But not admissible if recorded without knowledge of spouse – If admitted it would amount to violation of “right to privacy”.

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Vishal Kaushik vs. Family Court & Anr. AIR 2015 Raj 146

The petitioner filed a divorce petition u/s. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court. In that application, the petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 2 – wife caused mental cruelty to him by different means.

The petitioner moved two applications on that very day. First application was filed for placing on record original cassette with a DVD. Second application was moved with the prayer that the original cassette and DVD be sent for FSL examination to determine their genuineness. The Family Court dismissed the application without seeking reply from the respondent.

The Hon’ble Court referred to section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and observed that:

The exception to privileged communication between husband and wife carved out in section 122 of Evidence Act, which enables one spouse to compel another to disclose any communication made to him/her during marriage by him/her, may be available to such spouse in variety of situations, but if such communication is a tape recorded conversation, without the knowledge of the other spouse, it cannot be, admissible in evidence or otherwise received in evidence, as recording of such conversation had breached her `right to privacy’.

Husband cannot be, in the name of producing evidence, allowed to wash dirty linen openly in the court proceedings so as to malign the wife by producing clandestine recording of their conversation.

Thus, recorded conversation between the husband and the wife, even if true, cannot be admissible in evidence and the wife cannot be forced to undergo voice test and expert cannot be asked to compare CDs, which conversation had been denied by her.

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Admission / Concession – Advocate – Senior Counsel – cannot settle and compromise claim without specific authorisation from his client. Advocates Act, 1961, Section 35:

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Himalayan Co-op. Group Housing Society vs. Balwan Singh & Ors. AIR 2015 SC 2867

One
of the most basic principles of the lawyer client relationships is that
lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties,
lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents owe their
principals and, thus, have to respect the clients’ autonomy to make a
decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation.
Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional
responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather
than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The law is now
well settled that a lawyer must be specifically authorised to settle and
compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has
no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a
compromise/settlement. A lawyer by virtue of retention, has the
authority to choose the means for achieving the client’s legal goal,
while the client has the right to decide on what the goal will be.
Despite the specific legal stream of practice, seniority at the bar or
designation of an advocate as a senior advocate, the ethical duty and
the professional standards insofar as making concessions before the
court remain the same.

Generally, admissions of a fact made by a
counsel is binding upon their principals as long as they are
unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission,
the court should be wary to accept such admissions until and unless the
counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make such
admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or
admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. Lawyer
generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or
statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial
legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is
clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer
was employed. Neither the client nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s
statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions.
Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional
responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather
than substitute their judgement for that of the client.

Therefore,
the Bar Council of India (BCI) Rules make it necessary that despite the
specific legal stream of practice, seniority at the Bar or designation
of an advocate as a Senior Advocate, the ethical duty and the
professional standards insofar as making concessions before the Court
remain the same. It is expected of the lawyers to obtain necessary
instructions from the clients or the authorised agent before making any
concession/statement before the Court for and on behalf of the client.

While
the BCI Rules and the Act, does not draw any exception to the necessity
of an advocate obtaining instructions before making any concession on
behalf of the client before the Court, this Court in Periyar and
Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (1991) 4 SCC 195 has noticed
the sui generis status and the position of responsibility enjoyed by the
Advocate General in regards to the statements made by him before the
Courts. The said observation is as under:

“19…Any concession
made by the government pleader in the trial court cannot bind the
government as it is obviously, always, unsafe to rely on the wrong or
erroneous or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing for the
State unless it is in writing on instructions from the responsible
officer. Otherwise it would place undue and needless heavy burden on the
public exchequer. But the same yardstick cannot be applied when the
Advocate General has made a statement across the bar since the Advocate
General makes the statement with all responsibility.”

The
Hon’ble Court conclude by noticing a famous statement of Lord Brougham:
“an advocate, in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in the
world and that person is his client”

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 432 (Mumbai – Trib.) IMG Media Ltd vs. DDIT A.Y..: 2010-11, Order dated: 26th August, 2015

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Article 13(3) and 13(4) of India-UK DTAA, s. 9(1)(vi) and 9(1)(vii)
–payment made to a UK Company for capturing and delivering live audio
and visual coverage of cricket matches was: neither FTS since
broadcasters or BCCI had not acquired technical expertise which enabled
them to produce the live coverage feeds on their own; nor Royalty since
there was no transfer of all or any right.

Facts:
The
Taxpayer was a Company incorporated in the UK and a tax resident of UK
having a tax residency certificate for the relevant year. The Taxpayer
was engaged in the business of multimedia coverage of sports events
including cricket. BCCI engaged the Taxpayer for capturing and
delivering live audio and visual coverage of cricket matches. The
Taxpayer had contended that since the cumulative period of stay in India
of personnel of the Taxpayer exceeded the threshold limit of 90 days in
the ’12 month’ period, from March 22, 2008 to March 21, 2009, service
PE of the Taxpayer was constituted in India under Article 5(2)(k) of
India-UK DTAA. Accordingly, the payment made by BCCI to the Taxpayer
constituted business income, taxable on net basis

The Tax
Authority contended that the amount received by the Taxpayer was in the
nature of FTS and Royalty and assessed the entire amount on gross basis.

Held:
On FTS
Having regard to the following facts, the Tribunal held that payment received by the Taxpayer was not FTS.

  • The
    Taxpayer had delivered the final product (i.e., program content)
    produced by it by using its technical expertise which was altogether
    different from provision of technology itself.
  • In the former
    case, the recipient would get only the product which he can use
    according to his convenience, whereas in the latter case, the recipient
    would get the technology/knowhow which would enable him to produce other
    program content on his own and thus, know-how would be made available
    and would constitute FTS.
  • The Tax Authority had not established
    that the broadcasters (acting on behalf of the BCCI) or the BCCI itself
    had acquired the technical expertise from the Taxpayer which would
    enable them to produce the live coverage feeds on their own after the
    end of contract.
  • Since the essential condition of “make
    available” clause was not satisfied, the amount received by the Taxpayer
    for delivering live audio and visual coverage of cricket matches was
    not FTS in terms of Article 13(4) (c) of India-UK DTAA.

On Royalty
Having regard to the following facts, the Tribunal held that payment received by the Taxpayer was not Royalty.

In
order to constitute ‘royalty’, the payment should have been made “for
the use of, or the right to use any copyright etc”. In the instant case,
the payment made to the Taxpayer was for producing the program content
consisting of live coverage of cricket matches.

The job of the
Taxpayer ended upon the production of the program content. BCCI was the
owner of the program content produced by the Taxpayer. The broadcasting
was carried out by some other entity licensed by BCCI.

Thus,
there was no question of transfer of all or any right. Therefore, the
payment received by the Taxpayer could not be considered ‘royalty’
either under India-UK DTAA or u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

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TS-501-ITAT-2015- (Mum) Lionbridge Technologies Private Limited vs ITO A.Y.: 2007-08, Order dated: 5th August 2015

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Section 195 – on facts, amount reimbursed towards allocation, without any mark-up, of cost of off-the-shelf software purchased from vendors, being not chargeable to tax in India, payer was not obliged to deduct tax u/s. 195

Facts:
A company incorporated in USA (“USCo”) had entered into global agreement with certain software vendors for purchase of standard off-the-shelf software to be used by its group entities across the globe including India. USCo made payments to the vendors and allocated the cost of the software, without any mark-up, amongst various group entities based on the number of desktop in each group entity. The Taxpayer, an Indian company, also reimbursed the allocated cost to USCo.

According to the Taxpayer, since the software was purchased off-the-shelf, and was acquired for use, the payment did not result in ‘royalty’ or ‘income’ in the hands of the recipient. Further the payment was merely reimbursement of cost without any mark up.

However, according to the Tax Authority, the payment was in the nature of ‘royalty’.

Held:
USCo had made the allocation at cost without charging any mark-up. There was no dispute about the reimbursement amount paid to USCo being not chargeable to tax in India.

It was not a case where USCo had developed software which was given for use to the Taxpayer. The software was purchased from vendors and cost was allocated. It was a case of pure reimbursement of cost without any mark-up.

Thus, there was no dispute that the amount paid to USCo, being purely a reimbursement, was not chargeable to tax in India. Thus, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in G E India Centre Technology Ltd vs. CIT [339 ITR 587], it was held that there was no obligation on the Taxpayer to withhold tax u/s. 195

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TS-511-ITAT-2015 (Mum) Reuters Limited vs. DCIT A.Y.: 1997-98, Order dated: 28th August 2015

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Article 5(5) and 5(2)(k) of India-UK DTAA – income from distribution of
news and financial information products was not taxable in India in the
absence of dependent agent PE, and service PE under India-UK DTAA ?
Facts: The Taxpayer was a UK tax resident engaged in the business of
providing worldwide news and financial information products (“Reuter
Products”). The Taxpayer entered into three agreements with its Indian
Subsidiary (“ICo”) – License Agreement, Product Distribution Agreement
and Distributor Agreement (“DA”) – for independent distribution of
Reuter Products to Indian subscribers. In terms of DA, the Taxpayer
provided Reuter Products to ICo, which independently distributed it to
Indian subscribers.

While there was no dispute on the first two
agreements, in respect of DA, the Tax Authoroty held that the Taxpayer
had a PE in India in the form of ICo, as it was dedicated for the
business of the Taxpayer; and secondly, the Taxpayer had also deputed
its own employee as Bureau Chief during the relevant period, for
rendering services to ICo on its behalf. Accordingly, the entire
distribution fee was taxable on gross basis @20% u/s. 44D r.w. section
115A.

Held:

On Agency PE

Having regard to the following facts, the Tribunal held that ICo did not constitute agency PE of the Taxpayer.

  • Perusal
    of DA showed that ICo did not have any authority to negotiate or
    conclude contracts which would bind the Taxpayer nor to act as an agent
    of the Taxpayer qua distribution to Indian subscribers.
  • Perusal
    of contract between ICo and Indian subscribers showed that it was an
    independent principal-toprincipal arrangement and ICo had initiated
    litigation for recovery of debts from Indian subscribers.
  • Any news and material supplied by ICo to the Taxpayer was on principal-to-principal basis.
  • Income of ICo from subscription fee was far in excess of service fee.
  • Under DA, ICo had not earned any commission.
  • ICo
    was not subject to instructions or comprehensive control of the
    Taxpayer. It was bearing the business risk and was not acting only on
    behalf of the Taxpayer. Further, it was not “wholly or almost wholly”
    dependent on the Taxpayer in any manner since it was independently
    earning subscription fees, which were far in excess of service fees
    earned from the Taxpayer.

On Service PE
The
employee deputed by the Taxpayer was only acting as chief reporter and
text correspondent in India in the field of collection and dissemination
of news. There is no furnishing of services by the employee to ICo and
the employee had no role in providing Reuter Products to ICo, which
earned distribution fee. Thus Taxpayer did not trigger Service PE in
India.

Accordingly, distribution fee earned by the Taxpayer in India was not taxable in India.

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TS-390-ITAT-2015 (Del) Mitsui & Co. India Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Order dated: 20th August 2015

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Section 92C – Support services cannot be recharacterized as trading transaction and cost of sales to be excluded while computing Arm’s Length Price (“ALP”); No adjustment to be made where the difference between ALP and price charged is within ±5%.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company, was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese Company (“JCo”). JCo was a general trading company) in Japan playing an important role in linking buyers and sellers of wide range of products. The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of providing support services to various group entities of JCo. The Taxpayer was a facilitator for the transactions entered into by JCo and its group entities.

During the relevant financial year, the Taxpayer had entered into various transactions, which included provision of services, purchase of goods (including capital goods), reimbursement of expenses (payments and receipts) and receipt of interest. The Taxpayer used Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”) as the most appropriate method and used ‘Berry Ratio’ as the Profit Level Indicator (“PLI”) for benchmarking the transaction. It calculated the Berry Ratio by taking into account operating profit and operating expenditure. The Taxpayer contended that its average berry ratio was 1.34 as against 1.09 computed on the basis of the 20 comparables set out in the transfer pricing study and hence the transactions entered into were at arm’s length price.

The tax authority was of the view that data was to be used only for the relevant financial year and cost of sale should be included in the denominator of the PLI used and not the operating expenses.

As regards the support services, the tax authority held that it should be treated equivalent to trading and the income received therefrom should be considered as trading income and comparison should be made accordingly. However, the Taxpayer was of the view that Function, Asset and Risk (“FAR”) analysis of the service business is different from trading business. Hence, the Taxpayer approached DRP. DRP upheld the order of the tax authority. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the ITAT.

Held:

Relying on judgment of Delhi High Court in Li & Fung India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [361 ITR 85 (Delhi)], and in Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd vs. DCIT [ITA No. 5042/Del/11 dated 21.10.2014], it was held that it is impermissible to make notional addition in the cost base and then take into account the costs which are not borne by the Taxpayer. Thus, it was not correct on the part of the tax authority to include the cost of sales incurred by the Associate Enterprises (“AEs”) in respect of which the Taxpayer has rendered services and then to work out the profit for determination of the arm’s length prices1. Thus, Tax Authority was not right in including the cost of sales of AEs while determining ALP.

As per the provisions of section 92C, first the most appropriate method should be determined. Based on that, ALP should be determined by using various comparables. Further, when the difference between the ALP and the cost paid or charged is within the permissible range, no adjustment is required to be made.

Therefore as the margin was within the permissible range of 5%, the adjustment made to ALP was not sustainable and was to be deleted.

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Automatic Exchange of Information

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Every country in the world is concerned about its tax base. The Organization of Economic Development (OECD) has drawn comprehensive action plan to address the issue of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) which has been endorsed by G20 leaders and their finance ministers at their summit held in St. Petersburg in September 2013. Exchange of Information is the key to prevent erosion of the tax base.

The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted by the Government of the United States in 2010, to combat offshore tax evasion and for detecting tax noncompliance by US individuals and US owned entities having foreign financial accounts and offshore assets. On July 9, 2015, India signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) with the US to implement FATCA and improve tax compliance. This IGA obliges qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) in India to report about the financial accounts held by US persons in India to the Indian competent authority who in turn shall share the information with the US IRS. The agreement is reciprocal in nature i.e. US IRS is also obliged to provide India with information regarding accounts/assets held by Indian persons in the US.

On the other hand, OECD along with G-20 countries, on similar lines as FATCA, has developed a Standard for automatic exchange of Financial Account Information, Common Reporting Standard (CRS).

An attempt is made in this article to highlight the need, manner and impact of exchange of information under various types of agreements/frameworks.
1. Introduction

1.1 Article on Exchange of Information under a Tax Treaty

Exchange of Information between two jurisdictions can be made in several ways. Article 26 of the United Nations Model Convention (UNMC) and the OECD MC deal with provisions relating to the Exchange of Information (EOI). Almost all comprehensive tax treaties signed by India contain Article on Exchange of Information whereby Tax Authorities in India can obtain information about specific query from its counterpart in the other contracting State.

1.2 Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TI EA)

Countries (especially Tax Havens) with which India does not have a full-fledged tax treaty, an agreement to share information known as “Tax Information Exchange Agreement” (TIEA) has been entered into by India with 15 countries including Saint Kitts and Nevis, Bahamas, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Gibraltar, British Virgin Islands, Isle of Man, Cayman Islands, Jersey, Macau, Liberia, Argentina, Guernsey and Monaco, San Marino.

The nature and type of information that can be requested under the TIEA include identity and ownership information, accounting information and banking information among other things.

Under a TIEA, the Contracting States are not required to provide administrative assistance and exchange information in cases of “fishing expedition”, i.e. speculative requests that have no apparent nexus to the inquiry or investigation in the requesting State. Thus, the information about all Indians having bank accounts in a particular country cannot be requested as it would amount to a fishing expedition.

1.3 Limitations of EOI under a Treaty and TIEA

Exchange of Information, both under a Tax Treaty or a TIEA has a major limitation and i.e. these instruments cannot be used for fishing expedition. In other words, information in respect of a specific person or case/ matter can only be obtained under these agreements. Therefore, perhaps a need was felt by India for more comprehensive and a broad framework whereby information flows continuously on an automated basis and that too in respect of all overseas transactions by residents/tax payers in India to unearth illicit deals or black money stashed abroad. In the above background, automatic exchange of information under FAT CA and Multilateral Agreement under the framework of CRS by OECD would prove to be crucial sources of information to Indian Revenue Authorities.

Let us deal with both these frameworks in some more detail.

2.0 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

2.1 Manner of Reporting under FATCA

The FATCA guidelines specify two types of Inter Governmental Agreements (IGA) that countries are expected to enter into with the US – Model 1 and Model 2. Under the Model 1 IGA, all foreign financial institutions (FFI) in the participant country (for instance, an insurance company or a bank operating in India) would be obliged to report all FAT CA related information to its specified competent authority (which, in India is the Central Board of Direct Taxes), who would then report this information to the US authorities. Under the Model 2 IGA, all foreign financial institutions are required to report information directly to IRS.

In each of such models, the foreign financial institutions will need to get itself registered with the IRS. However, in case of Model 2 IGA, these financial institutions will also need to sign an FFI agreement with the IRS. Switzerland is one such country that has adopted Model 2 IGA. India has executed the Model 1 IGA. As a result, qualifying Indian institutions need not sign an FFI agreement, but will have to register on the FAT CA Registration Portal or file Form 8957 of the IRS and obtain a Global Intermediary Identification Number.

Basic framework of IGA signed by India

(For further information on FATCA, you may refer to an article by CA. Sunil Kothare published in March 2015 issue of BCAJ) 2.2 I nformation reporting and disclosure under the IGA by Qualifying Financial Institutions (QFIs) in India As per the IGA, all financial accounts with QFIs in India such as banks accounts, investment in mutual funds or hedge funds, insurance policies etc. come under the purview of reporting under FAT CA. However, there are certain accounts which are not required to be reported by the QFIs to the Indian Competent Authority and in turn to the US IRS under FAT CA. They are as follows: ? List of Accounts exempt from reporting under FATCA A. C ertain Savings Accounts i. N on-Retirement Savings Accounts established in India under the Senior Citizens Saving Scheme of 2004 to provide Indian senior citizens savings and deposit accounts. ii. Retirement and Pension Account maintained in India that satisfies the following conditions: – T he account is subject to regulation as a personal retirement account or is part of a registered or regulated retirement or pension plan for the provision of retirement or pension benefits (including disability or death benefits); or is subject to regulation as a savings vehicle for purposes other than for retirement as the case may be;
– The account is tax-favored (i.e. contributions to the account that would otherwise be subject to tax under the laws of India are deductible or excluded from the gross income of the account holder or taxed at a reduced rate, or taxation of investment income from the account is deferred or taxed at a reduced rate);
– Annual information reporting is required to the tax authorities in India with respect to the account;
– Withdrawals are permitted only on reaching a specified retirement age, disability, or death, or on specific criteria related to the purpose of the savings account or penalties apply to withdrawals made before such specified events; and
– Either Annual contributions are limited to $50,000 or less or there is a maximum lifetime contribution limit to the account of $1,000,000 or less.

iii. Non-Retirement Savings Account that is maintained in India (other than an insurance or Annuity Contract) and satisfies following conditions:

– The account is subject to regulation as a savings vehicle for purposes other than for retirement;
–    The account is tax-favored (i.e., contributions to the account that would otherwise be subject to tax under the laws of India are deductible or excluded from the gross income of the account holder or taxed at a reduced rate, or taxation of investment income from the account is deferred or taxed at a reduced rate);

–    Withdrawals are permitted on meeting specific criteria related to the purpose of the savings account (for example, the provision of educational or medical benefits), or penalties apply to withdrawals made before such criteria are met; and

–    Annual contributions are limited to $50,000 or less and subject to certain rules laid down.

B.    Term Life Insurance Contracts satisfying the following conditions:

–    Maintained in India with a coverage period that will end before the insured individual attains age 90;
–    On which periodic premiums are paid which do not decrease over time and are payable at least annually during the period the contract is in existence or until the insured attains age 90, whichever is shorter;
 

–    The contract has no contract value that any person can access (by withdrawal, loan, or otherwise) without terminating the contract and is not held by a transferee for value.

C.    Account maintained in India, and is held solely by an estate if the documentation for such account includes a copy of the deceased’s will or death certificate.

D.    Escrow Accounts maintained in India established in connection with any of the following:

–    A court order or judgment;

–    For a sale, exchange, or lease of real or personal property subject to fulfillment of certain conditions;
–    An obligation of a Financial Institution servicing a loan secured by real property to set aside a portion of a payment solely to facilitate the payment of taxes or insurance related to the real property at a later time;

–    An obligation of a Financial Institution solely to facilitate the payment of taxes at a later time.

E.    Partner Jurisdiction Accounts

It refers to an account maintained in India and which is excluded from the definition of Financial Account under an agreement between the United States and another Partner Jurisdiction1 to facilitate the implementation of FATCA. However, such account should be subject to the same requirements and oversight under the laws of such other Partner Jurisdiction as if such account were established in that Partner Jurisdiction and maintained by a Partner Jurisdiction Financial Institution in that Partner Jurisdiction.

2.3 Due Diligence thresholds in case of new and pre existing accounts

FATCA requires full compliance by QFIs in India for “new accounts” (i.e. accounts opened after 30th June, 2014) as well as “pre-existing accounts” (i.e. accounts existing as on 30th June, 2014). This involves review, identification and reporting of relevant financial accounts. However, certain exemption thresholds are laid down by virtue of which no review or reporting of such accounts is required.

Account
balance

FATCA
compliance

USD 50,000 or less as at the end

Out of scope for FATCA, only in

of the
calendar year date

case of
Cash Value Insurance

 

contract

PRE-EXISTING
ACCOUNTS

 

Account
balance

FATCA
compliance

(as
of 30th June, 2014)

 

 

USD 50,000 or less

Out of scope for FATCA

USD 250,000 or less

Out of scope for FATCA, only in

 

case of
Cash Value Insurance

 

contract or an Annuity Contract

> USD
50,000 (USD 250,000 for

–   Referred as ‘Lower value

a Cash
Value Insurance Contract

 

account’

or
Annuity Contract)
up to USD

–

Review of
electronically

1,000,000

 

searchable
data required by

 

 

the
reporting Indian financial

 

 

institution for US Indicia2

> USD 1,000,000

–

Review of electronically

 

 

searchable
data required by

 

 

the
reporting Indian financial

 

 

institution
for US Indicia,

 

–   If the electronic databases

 

 

do not
capture all of the

 

 

requisite
information, then

 

 

paper
record search

 

–   findings of the relationship

 

 

manager (if applicable).

2.4    Impact of the IGA signed by India

2.4.1 Impact on US Citizens and Green card Holders living in India

Starting calendar year 2011, FATCA has subjected all US persons to report on Form 8938 their Bank, investment and brokerage accounts as well as other specified financial assets including but not limited to cash value of life insurance contracts and accumulation in certain retirement plans. Reporting of global income on US income tax return, including income earned in India, has undoubtedly been an important legal obligation of all US persons living in India. This is in addition to the long-standing requirement for US persons in India to report their bank accounts on Form TD 90.22-1 i.e. “Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)”.

(For further information on FBAR, the reader may refer to Q.14 of our Article published in this column in April 2015 issue of BCAJ)

FATCA will have a direct impact on the US Citizens and green card holders who qualify to be US persons. Such persons may be holding accounts with QFIs in India which shall now be reported to the Indian Competent Authority and in turn to the US IRS. It may happen that they have not reported/ disclosed such accounts to the IRS and as a consequence of such reporting, they are exposed to heavy financial penalties and even criminal prosecution under the US tax laws. Such individuals may however opt to disclose the said accounts under the 2014 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) to avoid prosecution and limit their exposure to civil penalties.

2.4.2 Impact on Indian residents

With the Black Money Law now in force, the IGA signed by Government of India can further have adverse implications for the Indian resident taxpayers who are holding undisclosed assets in the US. The reciprocal nature of the IGA will oblige US to provide India with information regarding accounts/assets held by Indian persons in the US and which may happen to be undisclosed to the authorities in India.

Such information will provide more teeth not only to the Indian tax authorities but also to the RBI for detecting assets held by Indian residents/ taxpayers in the US.

2.4.3 Impact on Financial Institutions in India

The Inter-Governmental Agreement between India and US is based on Model-1 of FATCA guideline. Hence, the QFIs in India need not report directly to the IRS.

The IGA would result into following implications for FIs in India:

  •     QFIs in India need to upgrade and expand their existing ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) procedures to identify US persons and impose additional reporting requirements on them;

  •    Banks and other financial bodies may also need to get waivers from account holders to report information collected from them to the Indian competent authority;

  •   Section 285BA of the Income-tax Act 1961 has been amended so as to serve as a broad enabling provision for reporting by QFIs in India for the purposes of tax information regimes such as FATCA. However, due to confidentiality clauses under different laws in India, appropriate regulations may need to be introduced which will enable and empower qualifying Indian institutions to comply with FATCA requirements and to mandate the US account holders to provide the requisite information.

  •   Both FATCA and CRS require Indian financial institutions to make changes to their systems, processes and documentation to capture information for identification of account-holders and for reporting to the Indian government. This is an uphill task involving manpower training, system changes, changes to new client on-boarding, remediation of pre-existing account-holders, classification of entity accounts as per FATCA taxonomy, etc., which have an attached cost.

  •     Non-compliant FIs would be liable to a penal withholding tax of 30 per cent of their US sourced income.

3.0    Multilateral Automatic Exchange Of Financial Account Information

The Organization of Economic Development (OECD) along with G-20 countries, on similar lines as FATCA model 1 IGA, has developed a framework for multilateral automatic exchange of financial account information, known as Common Reporting Standard (CRS). CRS sets out a standard basis for automatic financial account information exchange between member countries.

As of 4th June 2015, 61 countries are signatories to the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) committed to reciprocal tax information exchange. India is an early adopter and agreed for the implementation of CRS by January 1, 2016. India signed the MCAA AEOI CRS on 3rd June 2015. Compliance with CRS becomes mandatory from 1st January 2016.

More than 50 countries of the world have committed to exchange tax information on an automatic basis with effect from 2017 which includes notable tax havens and many developed nations as well. Some of the notable jurisdictions include Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Bahamas, UAE, Andorra, Bahrain, Panama, Cook Islands, Mauritius, UK, France, Germany and host of other countries including India.

4.0    Summation

Automatic Exchange of Information between US and India would hopefully start flowing from 1st October 2015 under FATCA. Information from more than 50 countries including notable tax haven would start flowing to India from 1st January 2016. Under the scenario, Indian tax officials will be better equipped to tackle the menace of Black Money and illicit/unreported transactions. Unprecedented powers are given to the Tax Administration under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015. There is a fear amongst citizens about misuse of powers without corresponding accountability on the part of the tax officials. It is high time that Government bring about Tax Administration Reforms as per the recommendations by the Parthasarthi Shome Committee’s Report.

Notification

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N O . VAT . 1 5 1 5 / C . R . 7 4 / Ta x a t i o n – 1 . d a t e d 12.8.2015

Maharashtra Government has issued Notification under Entry no. 12A in Schedule A dated 12.8.2015 and notified drugs for cancer for the purpose of this Entry.

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M/S. OMIL- JSC – JV vs. Union of India, [2013] 61 VST 370 (Gauhati),

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Central Sales Tax Act-Writ Petition – Jurisdiction of Court – Issue of C Form Declaration by Purchasing Corporation To Petitioner – Jurisdiction of Court – Not Barred – Direction to Issue C Form to Petitioner, Art 226 of The Constitution of India.

FACTS
The petitioner filed writ petition under article 226 of The constitution of India praying for issue of an appropriate writ directing the respondent, North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (in short NEEPCO) to issue declaration form C under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 to the Petitioner who had executed works allotted by NEEPCO. The respondent had objected to issue C forms on the ground that there is no provision in the agreement for issue of C forms.

HELD
The issue is with regard to issue of declaration form ‘C’ by the respondent – NEEPCO to the Petitioner for availing concessional rate of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which is a statutory exaction and not the breach of any of the terms of the contract. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is not barred in taking up matters of taxation and liabilities under taxation statutes and cannot refuse to interfere on the ground that the question raised arises out of contractual agreement and is one of enforcement of contractual obligation and the same should be referred to arbitration. The Writ Court, under such circumstances, cannot deny a party of its right to have the issue decided by Writ Court. On perusal of rule 12 of the CST (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1956, it becomes clear that the purchaser of the goods shall issue C form to the seller and that obligation is a statutory exaction of the CST Act and other specific provisions made in this behalf in regard to obtaining of the declaration form C and issue of duplicate, etc. There is no scope of defeating the intention of the Legislature stated in its provision at the sweet will and pleasure of the purchaser of goods. There is also no scope for denying the benefit available to a selling dealer as introduced by the Legislature upon the refusal of the purchaser to issue C form and it is made clear by providing under sub rule (3) of rule 12 that in case the original form issued by the purchasing dealer is lost, the selling dealer can demand from the purchasing dealer to issue a duplicate form. This necessarily implies that there exist an obligation to issue C forms by the purchasing dealer. Merely because, the contract agreement does not stipulate issue of C forms, it cannot refuse to issue the form to the petitioner who is entitled to the benefit u/s. 8 (1) of the Act only upon production of such forms. Moreover, the High Court found that the respondent NEEPCO through its correspondence to the petitioner, even prior to awarding the contract work, requested to avail of concessional rates of taxes, gave assurance to the petitioner time and again to issue C forms and even communicated to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, West Bengal. It cannot be allowed to deny the same and reject the claim of the Petitioner on the pretext of absence of any provision in the contract agreement to issue C form. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the respondent NEEPCO to issue the required C forms to the Petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

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M/S. Prathista Industries Ltd. vs. CTO, [2003] 61 VST 158(AP).

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Central Sales Tax – Provisions for Advance Ruling – Contained in
Local VAT Law – Substantive Provisions – Not Applicable to Proceedings
Under Central Sales Tax Act, section-67 of The Andhra Pradesh Value
Added Tax Act, 2005 and section 9 (2) of The Central Sales Tax Act,
1956.

FACTS
The Petitioner Company, registered
under the VAT and CST Act and engaged in manufacturing of eco-friendlyfertilisers etc., had made an application u/s. 67(1) of the AP VAT Act,
for advance ruling with regard to classification of its 17 products. The
advance authority passed order on 16th November 2011 holding it covered
by entry 19 of Fourth Schedule against which appeal before the Tribunal
was filed. Meanwhile, assessing authority made assessment for the years
2005-2006 and 2006-07 under the VAT and CST Act which were set aside by
appellate authority. The assessing authority framed assessment for the
period 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 under the CST Act and levied tax at the
rate determined by Advance Ruling Authority despite appeal pending
before the Tribunal against the order of Advance Ruling Authority. The
Petitioner Company filed writ Petition before the Andhra Pradesh High
Court challenging the assessment order passed under the CST Act during
the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The
provision for “advance ruling” is a mechanism introduced by the
legislature to ensure uniformity in orders of assessment, appellate and
revisional order, with regard to the classification of goods under
various entries of the schedule to the Act or rate applicable to such
goods, etc thereby avoiding conflicting orders being passed by different
assessing/ appellate/ revisionary authorities. Such a mechanism can
only be introduced by way of substantive provisions in a statute and
cannot be implied. Sub-section (2) of section 9 of the CST Act only
makes applicable provisions of the State sales tax law relating to
assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of tax including
any interest or penalty. Provisions relating to “advance ruling” would
not fall into any of the above categories. An advance ruling may be an
“aid” to an assessment, reassessment, collection of payment of tax but
it is not in itself a mechanism for it which are normally done under the
provisions of Central Sales Tax by the competent authorities under the
VAT Act. The above activities, it cannot be denied, can be done by such
authorities without benefit of advance ruling also (subject to appeal,
revision, etc.) in the hierarchy of authorities provided under the VAT
Act. The assessing authority is entitled to initiate and complete the
assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act in respect of the petitioner
when its application for “advance ruling” was pending before the
authority for advance ruling and pendency of its appeal against the said
ruling before the Tribunal would also not impede or operate disentitle
the assessing authority in any way in initiating or completing
assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act as the provisions of section
67 of the VAT Act would not apply to assessment made under the CST Act.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
Petitioner Company.

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[2015-TIOL-1716-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Mahindra Ugine Steel Co. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad

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CENVAT credit of service tax paid on construction services used for
construction of hostel/quarters for employees being in relation to
manufacturing business is admissible.


Facts:

The
Appellant is a manufacturer having a factory in a small town with meagre
transport facilities and other infrastructure. The Adjudicating
authority denied credit of service tax paid on construction services
used for construction of hostels/ quarters made for employees alleging
suppression and invoking extended period of limitation.

Held:

The
Tribunal considering the definition of input service provided under
Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 held that construction of
hostels/quarters for employees being in relation to manufacturing
business is allowable as CENVAT credit. The Tribunal also noted that
since the show cause notice was issued after two and a half years of
taking the credit, the same was barred by limitation. Moreover, since
the credit availed was disclosed in the EA-3 returns, there was no
suppression and accordingly extended period was not invokable.

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[2015 – TIOL – 1628 – CESTAT- MUM ] M/s Tilaknagar Industries Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad

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Mere taking credit without utilising will not attract interest as well as penalty.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer wrongly availed CENVAT credit on certain input services during the year 2005- 06.On being pointed out by the Central Excise officers, entire credit availed was reversed without utilisation. Show Cause Notice was issued demanding interest and penalty relying on the Board’s Circular No. 897/17/2009- CX dated 03/09/2009 wherein it was clarified that in view of the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Ind-Swift Labs Ltd [2011-TIOL-21-SC-CX] interest is leviable in case of wrong taking of credit or utilisation.

Held
The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Strategic Engineering (P) Ltd. [2014-TIOL-466-HC-MAD-CX] wherein it was held that the amendment to Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 substituting “taken or utilised” by the term “taken and utilised” for the levy of interest being clarificatory in nature will apply retrospectively, allowed the appeal.

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 227 (Mumbai CESTAT) – Mineral Exploration Corporation Ltd vs. CCE, Nagpur

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Grants received from Government towards reimbursement of expenses
incurred for survey does not amount to ‘service’, if entire amount is
expended without charging any consideration and “survey report” thus
prepared is retained by assessee and not supplied to Government.

Facts:
The appellant, a 100% Government of India undertaking is engaged
in the activity of making preliminary exploration report, based on
survey and detailed exploration report of mineral deposit for which they
were paid grant-in-aid by the Government of India. The second activity
involved, providing detailed survey and exploration reports on
contractual basis to various clients. The appellant paid service tax on
the second activity. As regards the first activity, the reports were
kept by them and could be sold to private users later, on payment of
fees on which service tax was discharged. Department sought to levy
service tax on grant-in-aids received from the Government under
Scientific and Technical Consultancy Services.

Held:
The Tribunal held
that activities undertaken are primarily classifiable under the Survey
and Exploration of Mineral Service and not as Scientific & Technical
Consultancy services. It was further held that the activity undertaken
by the appellant on the basis of 100% grant received from the Government
and the grant is totally expended on the expenses involved in various
activities as reflected in the balance sheet. For any service, there has
to be a service provider, a service receiver and a consideration. Where
the records show that no consideration has been paid by the Government
to the appellant for undertaking the said work and what has been
received from the Government is only the reimbursement of the actual
expenses involved; the activity is not liable for service tax. The
Tribunal further held that it is also not a matter of dispute that the
reports prepared on the basis of Grant received were kept with them and
may be sold to clients or customers on payment of charges and service
tax is paid on such charges. Therefore, clearly there cannot be
duplication of service tax payment. Accordingly, it was held that no
service has been provided by the appellant to the Ministry of Mines.

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 455 (Mumbai CESTAT) – CCE, Nagpur vs. Jain Kalar Samaj

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Donation received by a Mandap Keeper from decorator/caterer for grant of monopoly rights to provide decoration/catering services not taxable as business auxiliary service.

Facts:
Assessee provided Mandap Keeper’s services by leasing out its hall/lawns for ceremonial functions. Decoration and catering for the hall/lawns was carried out by a contractor. Assessee received donation of decoration tender from caterer/decorator and granted monopoly rights in its premises to a contractor. According to the department, the donation was taxable as Business Auxiliary services provided by it to the decorator.

Held:
The Tribunal considered the definition of “commission agent” as provided under Business Auxiliary service u/s. 65(19) of the Finance Act,1994 and held that commission agent must act on behalf of another person for provision of service. The Tribunal observed that the first appellate authority did not explain as to how the said definition is applicable in the present case and that he did not establish that the appellant while acting as a commission agent was actually acting on behalf of the decorator for providing or receiving service. It was held that the appellant provided the services of Mandap Keeper independently to his clients and decorator provided decoration services to his clients. The two services were independent of each other. The appellant is not acting on behalf of the decorator to provide service to his clients, nor is he acting on behalf of his clients to provide services to the decorator. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the activity of the appellant is not that of commission agent falling under the definition of business auxiliary service.

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[2015] 153 ITD 664 (Mumbai – Trib.) DIT (Exemptions) vs. Critical Art and Media Practices A.Y.: 2012 – 13 Date of Order: 11th March 2015.

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Section 2(15), read with sections 12A and 11 – If activities of an assessee trust are charitable and property is held wholly and exclusively under trust for charitable and religious purposes, then such a trust cannot be denied registration merely because its activities are extended outside India. Also the income applied outside India is also eligible for exemption, subject to the provisions of section 11(1)(c), if the activities of the assessee trust tend to promote the international welfare in which India is interested and the approval has been granted by the Board for such application of income.

FACTS
The Ld. DIT(E) had rejected the application of the appellant trust observing that the trust deed of the appellant trust reveals that the appellant trust has charitable as well as non charitable objects such as hosting of artists-inresidence programmes for international artists and raising funds for organising trips, seminars and conferences within and outside the country etc.

The Ld. DIT(E) had further observed that objects of the applicant trust were not merely confined to the territories comprising in India but also extended to and encompassed the whole world and consequently concluded that any activities carried out by the applicant trust in pursuit of aforesaid objects would involve application of funds of the trust outside India which renders it ineligible for exemption. He had therefore held that the objects of the trust contravene the provisions of section 11 of the Act, wherein it has been specifically provided that the application of income of the trust has to be within India, and consequently held that the applicant trust would not be entitled to registration u/s. 12AA of the Act.

On appeal:

HELD THAT
A careful reading of the twin conditions mentioned in section 11(1) reveals that these conditions can be differentiated on the point that the requirement of the first condition is that the property should be held under trust for ‘charitable purposes’ and whether the property is held in India or outside India is not relevant. As per second condition, it is not restricted that the whole of the income should be applied to charitable purposes in India only. The second condition suggests that ‘the income to the extent to which it is applied in India’ for charitable purposes is not to be included in the total income. The interpretation that can be drawn from the above provision is that even if the income is applied for charitable purposes outside India, then, it cannot be said that the purpose or activity of the trust is not charitable. However, the exemption from inclusion in the total income will not be given to such an expenditure incurred by the trust. The exemption as per the second condition has been restricted to the extent up to which such income is applied for charitable activities in India. Hence, if a charitable trust applies some of its income for charitable activities outside India and some of its income for charitable activities in India then it will be entitled to exemption up to the extent such income is applied in India and not otherwise and subject to the other conditions laid down in other provisions of the Act.

A careful reading of the main provision reveals that for a purpose or activity to be charitable in nature, there is no condition that such an activity should be performed ‘in India’ only. Such a condition of activities to be performed in India only is missing in the wording of the section 2(15) defining charitable purposes. Hence, the charity as per the provisions of the Act is not confined or limited to the boundaries of India only. If the activities of a trust fall within the domain of above definition e.g. relief to the poor, education, medical relief or advancement of any other object of general public utility etc. as mentioned above, then it is to be treated as a charitable trust.

The definition of ‘charity’ in no manner can be restricted to the activities done in India only, the ‘charity’ remains the ‘charity’, whether it is done in India or whether elsewhere in any part of the world irrespective of the territorial boundaries. However, so far as the computation of income or the relief under the Income-tax Act is concerned, the Act has restricted the exemption from inclusion in total income to the extent such an income is applied in India. So in the given example, if an institution offers help and support not only in India but also outside India for charitable purposes, such an institution will get benefit of exemption from tax of the income to the extent it is applied in India and not in relation to the income which is applied outside India. But, the fact remains that such an institution will be called a charitable institution only and not a commercial institution.

If the activities of the trust fall in the definition of ‘charitable purposes’ as defined u/s. 2(15) and the property is held under the trust wholly and exclusively for charitable and religious purposes as provided u/s. 11, and the Commissioner is satisfied about the genuineness of such activities, the trust is to be granted registration. For the purpose of grant of registration, the application of income in India is not a pre-condition, if its activities otherwise fall in the definition of ‘charitable activities’. However, so far as the computation of the income is concerned, such an institution will get exemption of income to the extent it is applied in India and not in relation to the income, even if applied for charitable purposes, outside India.

Further, as per the provisions of clause (c) of section 11(1), if the activities upon which the income is applied outside India tend to promote international welfare in which India is interested, such an income is also exempt but subject to approval of the Board.

In the present case, the objects of the trust suggest that the trust has been formed to promote art and culture of India within India and globally which fall in the definition of ‘any other object of general public utility’ and, hence, included in the definition of ‘charitable purposes’. So far as the application of income outside India is concerned, the assessee has vehemently stressed that the projects, conferences and seminars had been carried out by the trust to promote Indian culture and art at international level, further that the activities such as to host artists-inresidence programmes for national as well as international artists for the benefit of society are the objects that promote international welfare in which India is interested. He has further stressed that the trust has received permission from the Home Ministry, Government of India, to carry out such activities outside India. Considering the overall discussion it is to be held that the activities of the trust would fall in the definition of ‘charitable purposes’. However, so far as the application of income outside India, as claimed to have been applied to promote international welfare in which India is interested is concerned, it is to be proved with necessary evidences and also subject to approval of the Board for entitlement of exemption from tax on such income. However, the registration cannot be refused on the ground that the income is applied for charitable purposes outside India. 

In result, the appeal of the assessee-trust is allowed.

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[2015] 152 ITD 828 (Mumbai – Trib.) Navi Mumbai SEZ (P.) Ltd. vs. Assistant CIT A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of Order: 22nd December 2014.

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Section 37(1) – Where assessee incurs certain expenditure for increase in share capital and if the entire incremental share capital is used to meet the need for more working funds, then the said expenditure is to be allowed as revenue expenditure.

FACTS
The assessee filed its return wherein expenditure incurred for increase on share capital was claimed as revenue expenditure.

The revenue authorities rejected assessee’s claim holding that expenditure in question was capital in nature

On appeal before Tribunal:

HELD THAT
It was noted from record that the entire incremental share capital has been absorbed in the inventories. There is not an iota of doubt that the increase in the share capital has been fully utilised only in the purchase of trading stock.

In the present day scenario, the authorised/paid up capital is not static and can also be reduced as per provisions of the Companies Act. In the light of the factual matrix of the balance sheet, plea raised by the assessee is allowed and the Assessing Officer is directed to treat the expenditure in question as revenue expenditure..

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

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TDS- Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10 – Second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) which states that TDS shall be deemed to be deducted and paid by a deductor if resident recipient has disclosed the amount in his return of income and paid tax thereon, is retrospective in nature

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CIT vs. Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd.; [2015] 61 taxmann.com 45 (Delhi):

The following question was raised before the Delhi High Court:

“Whether the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) (inserted by the Finance Act, 2012), which states that TDS shall be deemed to be deducted and paid by a deductor if resident recipient has disclosed the amount in his return of income and paid tax thereon, is retrospective in nature or not ?”

The High Court held as under:

“i) Section 40(a)(ia) was introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 to ensure that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation where income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. Hence, section 40(a)(ia) is not a penalty provision for tax withholding lapse but it is a provision introduced to compensate any loss to the revenue in cases where deductor hasn’t deducted TDS on amount paid to deductee and, in turn, deductee also hasn’t offered to tax income embedded in such amount.

ii) The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is separately provided u/s. 271C. and, therefore, section 40(a)(ia) isn’t attracted to the same. Hence, an assessee could not be penalized u/s. 40(a)(ia) when there was no loss to revenue.

iii) The Agra Tribunal in the case of Rajiv Kumar Agarwal vs. ACIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 555 (Agra – Trib.) had held that the second proviso to Section 40(a) (ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, even though the Finance Act, 2012 had not specifically stated that proviso is retrospective in nature.”

The High Court affirmed the ratio laid down by the Agra Tribunal and held that the said proviso is declaratory and curative in nature and has retrospective effect from 1st April 2005.

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TDS – Failure to deduct – Section 201(1), (1A), (3) – A. Y. 2008-09 – Notice and order deeming the assessee in default – Notice declared barred by limitation by court – Amendment extending period of limitation – AO has no power to issue notice afresh on the same basis

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Oracle India P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 376 ITR 411 (Del):

In respect of F. Y. 2007-08, the Dy. Commissioner had issued a notice u/s. 201 dated 17/02/2014 and thereafter passed an order pursuant to the notice. The assessee filed a writ petition and contended that under proviso to section 201(3) introduced w.e.f. 01/04/2010, an order can be passed at any time on or before 31/03/2011 and that the notice and the order were barred by limitation. The Court allowed the writ petition and held that the notice dated 17/02/2014 was barred in view of the provisions of section 201(3) as it then existed. Thereafter another notice was issued on 20/01/2015, to take advantage of the amended section 201(3) which was brought into effect from 01/10/2014 whereby the period of limitation had been extended to seven years.

The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s writ petition and held as under:

“The notice that was issued on 20/01/2015, was on the basis of the same information in respect of which the notice dated 17/02/2014 had been issued. Thus, those proceedings which had ended and attained finality with the passing of the order of the Court in the writ petition could not be sought to be revived. Even otherwise, in so far as the F. Y. 2007-08 is concerned, the period for completing the assessment u/s. 201(1)/201(1A) had expired on 31/03/2015. The impugned notice is set aside.”

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Refund – Adjustment against demand u/s. 245 – A. Ys. 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2008-09 – Grant of stay of demand – Section 245 cannot be invoked

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Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 279 CTR 71 (Bom):

By an intimation u/s. 245 dated 31/07/2013, the Assessing Officer sought to adjust the refund for the A. Y. 2006-07 against the demand for the A. Ys. 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2008-09. The assessee filed its objections pointing out that no demand is outstanding for A. Y. 2004-05 and stay of the demand has been granted u/s. 220(6) in appeal pending before he CIT(A) for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09. Ignoring the objections, the Assessing Officer adjusted the refund against the demand.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“Factually there was no due outstanding for the A. Y. 2004-05 and the demand for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 had been stayed pending disposal of the assessee’s appeal before the CIT(A). Section 245 cannot therefore be invoked.”

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Reassessment – Sanction u/s. 151 – A. Y. 2007-08 – In the absence of the requisite sanction u/s. 151 the notice u/s. 148 will be invalid

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Dhadda Export vs. ITO; 278 CTR 258 (Raj):

For the A. Y. 2007-08,
the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 without obtaining the
prior sanction u/s. 151 of the Act. The objection raised on this count
was countered by relying on section 292B of the Act.

The Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition challenging the notice and held as under:
“i)
The objection has been rejected by the ITO citing the reason that
required sanction of CIT was not taken due to oversight that assessment
of the assessee firm had already been completed u/s. 143(3). It was
stated that mistake was committed inadvertently and is curable by
recourse to section 292B.
ii) That plea is liable to be rejected
because when specific provision has been inserted in the proviso to
section 151(1), as a prerequisite condition for issuance of notice,
namely, sanction of the CIT or the Chief CIT, the Assessing Officer
cannot find escape route for not doing so by relying on section 292B.
Resort to section 292B cannot be made to validate an action, which has
been rendered illegal due to breach of mandatory condition of the
sanction on satisfaction of Chief CIT or CIT under proviso to
sub-section (1) of section 151.
iii) This is an inherent lacunae
affecting the very correctness of the notice u/s. 148 and is such which
is not curable by recourse to section 292B.”

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Penalty – Concealment of income – Section 271(1)(c) – A. Y. 2005-06 – Assessment u/s. 115JB – No change in book profits and assessed tax – Penalty u/s. 271(1) (c) could not be levied

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CIT vs. Citi Tiles Ltd.; 278 CTR 245 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee was assessed u/s. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. There was addition to the normal income but the book profits remained the same. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“CIT(A) having not permitted addition in book profits u/s. 115JB even after detection of concealment, there remained no tax sought to be avoided. Hence penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) could not be levied.”

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2015 (39) STR 676 (Tri.-Bang.) Abraham Pothen vs. CCE & ST, Cochin

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Service receiver may claim refund of wrong service tax paid by
service provider even when the same is not shown separately on the
invoice, provided the service provider has discharged service tax
considering receipts to be inclusive of the service tax.

Facts:
The
service provider paid service tax, treating the amount received as
inclusive of service tax and thereafter, filed a refund claim as the
services were not taxable. However, the claim was rejected on the ground
of unjust enrichment, as service tax was passed on to their customers.
Accordingly, service receiver i.e. the appellants filed a refund claim.
The refund claim was rejected on the ground that there was no evidence
of payment of service tax by them and the procedure provided under Rule
4A of Service Tax Rules, 1994 was not followed. During the appellate
proceedings, the appellants submitted the proof of payments of service
tax to service provider and claimed that since service itself was not
taxable, issue of invoice was not required under the service tax law.

Held:
The
evidences produced by appellant were sufficient to demonstrate payment
of service tax. Since service tax was not collected separately, the
payments had to be considered to be inclusive of service tax.
Non-observance of Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules, 1994 was irrelevant.
However, penalties may be levied on the service provider as against
rejection of the refund claim of the service receiver. Therefore, since
the appellants had borne the service tax brunt, the appeal was allowed.

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2015 (39) STR 684 (Tri.-Bang.) India Vision Satellite Communications Ltd. vs. CCE, C & ST, Cochin

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Service recipient need not examine the correctness of service tax paid by service provider for claiming CENVAT Credit.

Facts:
The Appellants availed services of installation and commissioning in respect of an equipment and as per the Agreement, equipment rental charges were payable as well. Service tax paid on rent was availed as CENVAT credit. However, the service provider was registered with service tax authorities only for installation and commissioning services. Without digging into the facts of the case, the department and Commissioner (Appeals) denied CENVAT credit on the grounds that equipment rent was not eligible input service and if it is considered to be installation and commissioning services, the amount cannot be paid every month for a one time activity.

Held:

It is a settled law that if service tax is paid by service provider and service receiver is eligible for CENVAT credit, responsibility to examine correctness of service tax paid by service provider is not cast upon the service receiver. Accordingly, relying on various decisions, the Tribunal allowed CENVAT Credit.

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2015 (39) STR 698 (Tri.-Del.) Ionnor Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Chandigarh-I

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Refund of CENVAT credit with respect to input services received during the period prior to export taking place shall be available even in subsequent period, specially for 100% exporter of services.

Facts:

The Appellants, being 100% exporter of services, claimed refund of CENVAT credit under Notification No. 5/2006-CE (NT) with respect to input services received prior to export taking place. Vide Para 4 of the Notification (supra), refund can be granted only if assessee cannot utilise CENVAT credit against the goods exported during the quarter to which the claim relates. Accordingly, it was interpreted that refund is allowed only on input services consumed during the quarter in which export took place. Since in the present case, input services were not consumed in the quarter of export, the refund claim was rejected.

Held:

CBEC Circular No. 120/1/2010-ST clarified that CENVAT credit refund of past period in subsequent quarters shall be allowed specifically for 100% exporter of services, irrespective of date of CENVAT credit taken, if otherwise in order. Relying on the above Circular and also having regard to the fact that eligibility of CENVAT credit was not disputed and that the appellants cannot utilise CENVAT credit, the refund claim was allowed.

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[2015-TIOL-1888-HC-MUM-ST] M/s S2 Infotech Pvt. Ltd vs. The Union of India & ORS

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Sitting on files for months together is not conducive to the interest of nation’s economy. The Chief Commissioners, Service Tax should file comprehensive affidavit indicating the number of files pending and the time required to dispose those cases.

Facts
The Commissioner passed an order after almost 22 months of the date of personal hearing. The Appellant relied upon various circulars issued by the CBEC on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar [2009 (233) ELT 13 (SC)] stating that there should not be any unreasonable delay in passing adjudication order.

Held:
The High Court held that delay in proceedings and passing of orders is contrary to public interest. The Court also stated that ordinarily it would have set aside this order on this ground alone and would have sent it back for reconsideration. However, considering the number of files and matters pending, the Court ordered the Commissioners to place on record complete data and figures of the pending cases with the time required to dispose of these cases.

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[2015-TIOL-1828-HC-MUM-ST] Tahnee Heights Co-op Housing Society Ltd vs. The Union of India & ORS

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When refund ordered is paid to the Appellant, withholding interest thereon considering that if interest is also paid, the appeal before the Supreme Court would be rendered infructuous is not the correct understanding of law.

Facts:
The Appellant is a cooperative housing society which paid service tax under protest on amounts contributed by the members. The Tribunal ruled in their favour stating that services to members of club/co-operative housing society is not a service by one to another and accordingly service tax paid was ordered to be refunded. The Respondent refunded the principal sum, but refused to pay interest thereon stating that the Tribunal order was not accepted by them and they were in the process of filing an appeal against the said order. It was also stated that the Appellant should wait till the matter is decided at the Supreme Court level.

Held:
The High Court observed that the interest was withheld on a possible realisation that if the same is awarded their proceedings before the Supreme Court would be rendered infructuous. This cannot be the legal position nor can the understanding of the parties be based on the same. Further it was also noted that if the Respondent did not intend to pay the interest amount, it could have obtained such interim orders from the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Respondent should obtain requisite orders from the Supreme Court within a period of two months of receipt of this order. In the absence of such orders, interest should be paid within four weeks of expiry of two months.

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 181 (Allahabad High Court) – Rotomac Global (P) Ltd vs. CCE, Kanpur

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For computing time limit for filing of appeal, the day on which the order is served on assessee must be excluded.

Facts:
The
Application for refund was rejected by the adjudicating authority and
the order in that regard was served on 26th June 2013. The appellant
filed an appeal on 26th August 2013. However, the appeal was rejected by
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal on the ground of delay
of two days.

Held:
The High Court observed that as
per section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 the appeal has to be
presented within two months from the date of receipt of the order.
Relying upon section 35-O of the Central Excise Act,1944, it was held
that for computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal,
the day on which the order was served has to be excluded. Further, the
High Court held that even otherwise, the delay of two days was not too
fatal and a liberal approach should have been adopted while handling the
matter and the matter therefore, was remanded to decide the appeal on
merits, thereby quashing the order of the first appellate authority and
the order of the Tribunal.

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 152 (Kerala HC) – Akbar Travels of India (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Thiruvananthapuram

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Once section 80 is held applicable; all penalties u/s. 76, 77 & 78 must be waived.

Facts:
The Tribunal took a view that the Appellant is entitled to benefit of section 80 of the Finance Act 1994. However in terms of final order, the penalty u/s. 78 was deleted and only penalty u/s. 76 was retained. Therefore, a rectification application was filed before the Tribunal that penalty u/s. 76 ought to have been deleted. The application was disposed off clarifying that only penalty u/s. 78 was meant to be deleted. Aggrieved by the same, appeal was filed before the High Court.

Held:
The High Court held that section 80 opens with nonobstante clause. Once the assessee proves that there was reasonable cause for the said failure, section 80 starts to operate insulating imposition of all the penalties stated therein viz. penalties u/s. 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. Allowing the appeal, High Court also held that having considered the said provisions of law and in terms of specific findings of the Tribunal in its order regarding applicability of section 80 the rectification application must succeed.

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2015 (39) STR 569 (Mad.) Bootleggers Island vs. CESTAT, Chennai

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Waiver of penalty u/s. 80 may not be available on the sole ground of financial hardship, for delayed payment of taxes. Penalty is imposable even in cases where tax is paid before issuance of show cause notice.

Facts:
Service tax was paid belatedly without interest. A show cause notice was issued for payment of service tax with interest and penalties. After various rounds of litigation, the Tribunal held that on the sole basis of financial hardship for delayed payment of service tax, the appellants cannot escape from penalties.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that the Tribunal had clearly held that it was not a case where the benefit of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 should be extended. In the absence of such a substantial plea and there being no bonafide justification for exemption, penalty was rightly imposed as mandated by the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, it was noted that the Madras High Court in the case of Dhandayuthapani Canteen vs. CESTAT 2015 (39) STR 386 (Mad.), had held that penalty is imposable even in cases where tax is paid before issuance of show cause notice. With respect to bar on imposition of penalty u/s. 76 when penalty was levied u/s. 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, liberty was granted to the appellants to agitate the issue before the Commissioner.

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[2015 (322) ELT 772 (S.C.) Greaves Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Aurangabad

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Extended period cannot be invoked for the period prior to the issue of clarificatory circular by CBEC

Facts
CBEC, vide its circular dated 30/10/1996 clarified the manner of valuation of captively consumed goods. Demand was raised on the Appellants for non-inclusion of certain costs in arriving at the value for captive consumption for the period 1993-94 to 1997 invoking extended period of limitation. It was argued that since there was no misdeclaration or misstatement, the extended period was not invokable.

Held:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on the decision of Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad vs. Asarwa Mills [2015 (319) ELT 216 (S.C.) held that the Appellant cannot be faulted with for adopting a valuation mechanism prior to the issuance of the clarificatory circular. Accordingly, extended period cannot be invoked. Moreover, the demand for the normal period was also set aside as the tax effect thereof was negligible.

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Disallowance of set off vis-à-vis natural justice

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Introduction
Availability of set off (input tax credit) is the backbone of the Value Added Tax (VAT ) system. A dealer is entitled to claim set off of the tax paid by him to his vendors on all such purchases which are categorised as inputs. The system works in a manner whereby there is no undue burden on the dealer. The amount of VAT payable by a dealer is the difference between the tax payable on sale price less the tax already paid on purchases (inputs). Thus, the tax paid on purchases gets set-off against the tax payable on sale. Denial of set off may cause many problems and the system of VAT will not be workable. A dealer, while selling goods, works out the sale price on the basis of the cost of goods sold. As the tax paid on purchases (inputs) are available as setoff, the same are normally not considered in the cost. But, if the set off is not allowed for any reason, the vendor will be at great risk. This will cause economic loss to vendor with added burden for interest and penalty.

Set off is subject to conditions and not absolute right
It is now well settled that availability of set off is subject to provisions under the Act. In other words, when to give set off, how to give set off and with what reductions etc. is as per the provisions made by the respective State Governments. The dealer cannot ask for the same as a right. The above position is well settled by number of judgments and under MVAT Act, the well known judgment is in case of Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries, Kolhapur vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (51 VST 1)(Bom). In this case, the Hon. High Court observed that set off is not a constitutional right but a statutory right, hence it can be subject to conditions as may be prescribed.

Vital condition under MVAT Act
There are various conditions for grant of set off in the MVAT Rules. However, one very important condition is in section 48(5), which provides that the set off will be allowable if the government has received money on the same goods in the government treasury. In other words, if the vendor has paid tax on the same goods, which are purchased by the buyer, then the buying dealer is entitled to get set off. If the vendor has defaulted, then set off can be denied to the buyer. Although this is such a condition which is beyond the control of the buyer, but still it is held valid in the judgment of Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries (supra).

New Concept of Hawala/R. C. Cancellation
In addition to disallowance of set off on the ground of non-payment by vendors, the sales tax authorities in Maharashtra have found one new way of disallowing set off. Under this new method, the setoff can be denied even without assessing the vendors. The Sales Tax Department of Maharashtra has published on its own website a list of ‘suspicious dealers’ (called hawala vendors) and also a list of dealers whose Registration certificates (R.C.) have been cancelled. The assessing authorities are indiscriminately disallowing set off on all the purchases from such listed vendors.

Principles of Natural justice not followed
Under the guise of hawala vendors and R.C. cancellation, the principles of natural justices are also kept aside by the learned assessing authorities. It is said that the names of hawala dealers or retrospective cancellation of R.C. of the vendors is based on certain materials collected from such vendors and on the basis of their statements under oath or their affidavits, etc. However, these materials used for considering the vendors as defaulters as well as hawala vendors is not delivered to the concerned buyers in whose case the set off is being disallowed. Further, no cross examination opportunity is granted. Therefore, amongst others, such disallowance is against the principles of natural justice and cannot be upheld in the eyes of law.

Right of cross examination is a crystallised right
There are a number of judgments laying down the principle that when the authorities use outside material, delivery of copies of the same and cross examination of the author of such material is required to be given to the concerned opposite party. Amongst others, reference can be made to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Tilagarathinam Match Works vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tirunelveli (295 ELT 195) (Mad.)

In this case, the Hon. High Court has held that such a cross examination opportunity is required to be given even without the same being asked for by the opposite party. Thus, this is a very settled principle of natural justice and flouting of the same will render the order invalid. However, in case of hawala and R.C. cancellation cases, the authorities in Maharashtra are having a view that what is declared on their website is the final word and no such opportunity is required to be given.

With due respect, it is submitted that this is a wrong notion.

Shree Bhairav Metal Corporation vs. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No. 2149 of 2015 dated 26.3.2015)(Guj. H.C.)

Now the position is also clear in respect of hawala and R.C. cancellation. In the above case before Hon. Gujarat High Court, the facts as considered by the Hon. High Court are narrated as under:

“It appears that while claiming the aforesaid ITC, the petitioner dealer showed purchases of Rs.48,12,825 alleged to have been purchased from one M/s Lucky Enterprises. The petitioner also produced the bills with respect to purchase of goods alleged to have been purchased from M/s Lucky Enterprises. Thus, the assessee dealer claimed Rs.1,92,513 out of total ITC claimed of Rs.6,49,561/- on the purchases alleged to have been made from M/s Lucky Enterprises. That the Assessing Officer passed assessment order dated 30.12.2010 allowing the ITC as claimed by the petitioner dealer including the purchases made by the petitioner alleged to have been purchased from M/s Lucky Enterprises.

It appears that the registration certificate of M/s Lucky Enterprises came to be cancelled ab initio from 22.2.2006 on the ground that M/s Lucky Enterprises is not a genuine dealer and had indulged into billing activities only and all the transactions made by M/s Lucky Enterprises were found to be bogus and non-genuine.”

Thus the set off was disallowed on the ground of hawala and R. C. cancellation. However, the copy of the R.C. cancellation was not delivered to the appellant. Noting the above facts, the Hon. High Court has remanded the matter back while observing as under:

“9.4 As observed earlier, the impugned order has been passed by the adjudicating authority denying the ITC claimed by the petitioner on the alleged purchases made by the petitioner from M/s Lucky Enterprises on the ground that the registration certificate of M/s Lucky Enterprises– seller has been cancelled ab initio on the ground that the seller had involved into the billing activities only and all the transactions by M/s Lucky Enterprises are held to be bogus. The petitioner has been denied the ITC on the ground of the aforesaid activities/alleged transactions between the petitioner and M/s Lucky Enterprises. However, as observed herein above, the petitioner was not served with the copy of the order in the case of M/s Lucky Enterprises. Now, the copy of the order passed in the case of M/s Lucky Enterprises is available with the petitioner. Therefore, after giving an opportunity to the petitioner with respect to observations made in the case of M/s Lucky Enterprises insofar as the alleged transactions between the petitioner and M/s Lucky Enterprises and after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to prove the genuineness of the transaction between them and M/s Lucky Enterprises in light of the observations made herein above, therefore, the matter is required to be remanded to the adjudicating authority to consider the claim of the petitioner for ITC on the alleged purchases made by the petitioner from M/s Lucky Enterprises.”

Thus, the Hon. High Court has reiterated the principles of natural justice and remanded the matter for allowing opportunity to buyer to substantiate its claim after delivery of copies of adverse order. The truth can be established only upon such exercise.

Conclusion

Under MVAT Act also, wherever the set off is disallowed on the basis of default of vendor including hawala allegation and R.C. cancellation, the above principle is required to be followed. Therefore, the assessments made today without following such principle cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law.

SUPREME COURT: NO SERVICE TAX ON WORKS CONTRACT PRIOR TO 01/06/2007

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Background
In the August 2015 issue of BCAJ under the Service
tax feature, both the minority view and the majority view in the
5-member Bench’s decision in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. vs. CST, Delhi 2015
(38) STR 266 (Tri.-LB) were synopsised over the controversy of whether a
works contract was divisible and the service portion involved therein
was liable for service tax prior to June 01, 2007, when service in a
works contract was notified vide introduction of sub-clause (zzzza) in
section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). The wait and anxiety
has been put to an end by the Hon. Supreme Court’s path breaking
judgment in a bunch of appeals led by CCE & C Kerala vs. Larsen and
Toubro Ltd. 2015-TIOL-187-SCST wherein the Apex Court has allowed
appeals of the assessees by categorically holding that prior to June 01,
2007, the Act did not lay down any charge or machinery to levy and
assess service tax on indivisible composite works contracts.

THE JUDGMENT OF The HON. SUPREME COURT:
In
various revenue appeals, the substance contended was that the 46th
amendment itself divided works contract by Article 366(29A)(6) and what
remained after removing goods element was labour and service and these
were subjected to service tax by various entries in the Finance Act,
1994. Secondly, the Finance Act, 1994 itself contains both charge of
service tax as well as machinery by which only labour and service
element in indivisible contracts is taxable and the statute need not do
what the constitution amendment has already done viz. splitting of
indivisible works contract into a separate contract of transfer of
property in goods involved in execution of works contract taxable by the
States and labour and service element on the other hand is taxable by
the Central Government. As such, defining works contract in 2007 for the
first time would make no difference as the elements of works contracts
were already taxable under the Finance Act, 1994 even prior to the
introduction of the said definition. Lastly, therefore relying on
section 23 of the Contract Act and McDowell & Company Ltd. 1985 (2)
SCC-230, all indivisible contracts were made with a view to avoid/ evade
tax and this being contrary to public policy, invoking principles laid
down in the said McDowell’s case, the socalled indivisible contracts
should be taxed under the Finance Act, 1994.

As against the
above, it was pleaded for various assessees that works contract is a
separate species known to the world of commerce and law and being so, an
indivisible works contract would have to be split into constituent
parts by necessary legislation to contain a charge to service tax
together with requisite machinery provisions. Secondly, there did not
exist such charge and machinery prior to 2007 and what was taxable was
only the pure service in which no goods element was involved and thirdly
in view of this, the Delhi High Court’s judgment in G. D. Builders’
case 2013 (32) STR 673 (Del) was wholly incorrect.

Analysis:
Considering
the above rival contentions, the Hon. Apex Court examined section 64,
relevant clauses in section 65(105), charging section 66 and section 67
of the Act, Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules,
2006 (Valuation Rules) dealing with valuation in depth and also went
into examining in detail second Gannon Dunkerley judgment (1993) 1 SCC
364, heavily relied by the assessee’s counsel and observed at para 15 of
the judgment, that unless splitting of an indivisible works contract is
done, taking into account the eight deductions elaborated in the said
judgment of Gannon Dunkerley (supra) (i.e. deductions for amount paid to
subcontractor for labour and services, planning, designing and
architect’s fees, hire charges for machineries and equipments,
consumables like water, electricity and fuel etc., other charges for
labour and services, cost of transportation to bring goods to the place
of work and cost of establishment and profit of the contractor relatable
to labour/services) the charge would transgress into forbidden
territory i.e. cost, expense and profit attributable to the transfer of
property in goods in such contract. This being the case, the Court
concurred with the case of the assessees that the charging section
itself must specify that service tax can only be on the works contracts
and the measure of tax can only be on the portion of the works contract
representing service element to be derived only by deducting value of
property in goods transferred in execution of the works contract from
the gross value of the works contract. The Court further noted that as
reflected in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. UOI 2006-TIOL-15-
SC-CT-LB, the scheme of taxation under the constitution is such that
powers of the Centre and State are mutually exclusive. Thus, it is
important to segregate the two elements completely and in case of
transgression, the levy would be constitutionally infirm and therefore
exclusivity has to be maintained and thus the Court relying again on
Gannon & Dunkerley (supra), Kone Elevators India P. Ltd. P. Ltd. vs.
State of T. N. 2014-TIOL-57-SC-CT-LB and Larsen & Toubro vs. State
of Karnataka 2013-TIOL- 46-SC-CT-LB endorsed recognition of works
contracts as a separate species of contract and interalia cited Larsen
& Toubro 2013-TIOL-46-SC-CT-LB in approval thereof as follows:

“…..
The term “works contract” in Article 366(29A)(b) is amply wide and
cannot be confined to a particular understanding of the term or to a
particular form. The term encompasses a wide range and many varieties of
contract. The term “works contract” in Article 366(29A)(b) takes within
its fold all genre of works contract and is not restricted to one
specie of contract to provide for labour and service alone”.

The
Court also analysed and accepted the assessee’s next important plea
that there did not exist charge to tax works contract in the Finance
Act, 1994 prior to 01/06/2007 is a correct view. To arrive at the view,
reliance was interalia placed on the following:

Mathuram Agrawal vs. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 667

“The
statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of
the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to
pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any
ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then
there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the
needful in the matter.”

Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST, 1985 Supp SCC 205 = 2002-TIOL-589-SC-CT

“The
components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The
first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which
prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear
indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged
to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and
the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for
computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and
definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in
point of law.”

CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460

“Thus
the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute
an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation
provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not
intended to fall within the charging section.”

The Court held that the five taxable services referred to the charging section 65(105) would refer only to service contracts simpliciter and not the composite works contracts which was clear from the very language defining taxable service as “any service provided”. To fortify and advance the above contention further, the Court observed that in contrast to the above, section 67 post amendment in 2006 for the first time prescribed that when the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable to be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner. It is also evident that Rule 2(A) of the Valuation Rules framed pursuant to the power has followed the second Gannon Dunkerley’s case (supra) while segregating the ‘service’ component from the component of ‘goods’. In consonance thereof, the Court also noted that not only the statute was amended and rules framed but a Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007 was also notified for payment of service tax at presumptive rate.

Lastly, the Court examined the Delhi High Court’s judgment in G. D. Builders (supra) holding that levy of service tax in section 65(105) sub-clauses (g), (zzd), (zzh), (zzq) and (zzzh) is good enough to tax indivisible works contract and commented as follows:

  •     Reference was made to various judgments which had no direct bearing on the point at issue and further the second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) was referred to in passing without noticing any of the key paras set out in this judgment.

Mahim Patram Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2007

(3)    SCC 668 was completely misread to arrive at the proposition that even when rules are not framed for computation of tax, tax would be leviable. This judgment concerned itself with works contract being taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act. In accordance with sections 9(2) and 13(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, powers are conferred on officers of various States to utilise the machinery provisions of the States sales tax statutes for levy and assessment of Central sales tax under the Central Act, so long as the said rules were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Central Act. Thus, the extracted passage from Mahim Patram’s case (supra) in G. D. Builders’ case (supra) referred to rules not being framed under the Central Act and not to the rules not being framed at all. The conclusion drawn based on such misreading was found wholly incorrect by the Court. The finding in G. D. Builders (supra) was thus contrary to the line of decisions discussed above among various others. In support thereof one such passage from para 17 of Jagannath Baksh Singh vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1563] was extracted from Heinz India (P) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (2012) 5 SCC 443 which read as:

“An imposition of tax which in the absence of a prescribed machinery and the prescribed procedure would partake of the character of a purely administrative affair can, in a proper sense, be challenged as contravening Article 19(1)(f).” (emphasis supplied).

  •     In addition to the above, the Court also took note of the fact that either machinery provisions were struck down or held inadequate and therefore assessment thereunder was rendered ineffective vide the Patna High Court’s decision (affirmed by Apex Court in State of Jharkhand vs. Voltas Ltd. 2007-TIOL-86-SC-ST, Madras High Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (1993) 88 STC 289 and Orissa High Court in Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Orissa, (2008) 012 VST 0031).

The Court concluded by holding that the Finance Act (prior to 01/06/2007) laid down no charge or machinery to levy and assess service tax on indivisible works contracts. Therefore, the revenue’s apprehension that several exemption notifications have been granted qua service tax levied by the Finance Act, 1994 was also answered emphatically that whichever judgment would be appealed against before the Supreme Apex Court, such notifications would have to be disregarded.

Conclusion:

While it is heartening to note that the controversy which began with the decision in Daelim’s case 2003(155) ELT 457 (T) at the end of over ten years has reached finality for better; nevertheless a large number of assessees who met with an adverse decision in this battle and who did not litigate for want of resources or any other reason would have certainly succumbed to the suffering of financial loss in one or the other way in different proportions for no fault of theirs but only on account of vague and unprecise legislation. The question therefore arises thus, is whether an honest assessee has any recourse under the constitution to question accountability of the law administering machinery which also encompasses drafting of laws? Many open issues of similar nature like dual taxation to the transactions of providing license to software or transfer of intellectual property etc. on a similar uncertainty have made tax payers and stakeholders suffer without having any recourse to even consider questionability. Is it the fruit that we are ‘enjoying’ in a democratic setup?

Smt. Shreelekha Damani vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `F’ Bench Before Vijay Pal Rao (JM) and N. K. Bhillaiya (AM) ITA No. 4061 /Mum/2012 A. Y. : 2007-08. Decided on: 19th August, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue : J. D. Mistry / Manjunath R. Swamy

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Sections 153A, 153D – If the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner is devoid of application of mind, mechanical and without considering the materials on record, such an approval renders the assessment order void.

Facts:
In the search carried out on Simplex group of companies and its associates, the office/residential premises of the company and its directors/connected persons were covered. On the basis of incriminating documents/books of account found during the course of search, assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act. As per endorsement on page 11 of the assessment order, the assessment order was passed with the prior approval of the Addl. CIT, Central Range-7, Mumbai.

Aggrieved by the additions made, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

Aggrieved, by the order passed by CIT(A), the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

In the Tribunal, the assessee preferred an application to raise additional ground viz., that the A.O. has not complied with the provisions of section 153D and hence the assessment u/s. 153A was bad in law.

Held:
The Legislative intent is clear inasmuch as prior to the insertion of section 153D, there was no provision for taking approval in cases of assessment and reassessment in cases where search has been conducted. Thus, the legislature wanted the assessments/reassessments of search and seizure cases should be made with the prior approval of superior authorities which also means that the superior authorities should apply their minds on the materials on the basis of which the officer is making the assessment and after due application of mind and on the basis of seized materials, the superior authorities have to approve the assessment order.

The Tribunal noted that the Addl. CIT had granted approval vide his letter dated 31.12.2010 where he mentioned that as per his letter dated 20.12.2010, the AOs were asked to submit the draft orders for approval u/s. 153D on or before 24.12.2010. He had also mentioned that since the draft order in the case of the assessee was submitted on 31.12.2010, there was not much time left for him to analyse the issues of draft order on merit. Therefore, he approved the draft order as it was submitted.

Having noted the language of the approval, it came to a conclusion that the language of the approval letter established that there has been no application of mind by the Addl. CIT. It held that the approval granted is devoid of any application of mind, is mechanical and without considering the materials on record. It held that in its opinion the power vested in the Joint Commissioner to grant or not to grant approval is coupled with a duty. The Addl CIT is required to apply his mind to the proposals put up to him for approval in the light of the material relied upon by the AO. The said power cannot be exercised casually and in a routine manner.

The Tribunal held the assessment order under consideration to be bad in law and annulled it.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2015-TIOL-1363-ITAT-HYD C. H. Govardhan Naidu Prodduturu vs. DCIT A. Ys.: 2007-08 to 2011-12. Date of Order: 5th August 2015

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Section 263, 271D – Failure of the AO to initiate proceedings u/s. 271D for violation of section 269SS could not be considered as an error calling for revision u/s. 263.

Facts:
Consequent to the search and seizure action u/s. 132 of the Act, at the residential premises of the assessee, notices were issued and assessments made by the Assessing Officer for assessment years 2007-08 to 2011- 12 u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act.

The CIT on examining the assessment record found that for A.Y. 2007-08 to 2011-12, the assessee had raised/repaid loans in cash, violating the provisions u/s. 269SS/269T which attract penalty leviable u/s. 271D/ 271E of the Act. Since the same, according to him, were not examined by the A.O. the assessments so completed required revision u/s. 263. He issued notices u/s. 263, to the assessee, to show cause why assessments made for all five years under consideration should not be revised.

The CIT, considering the submissions made by the assessee to be not acceptable, passed an order directing the A.O. to redo the same after making detailed inquiries and investigations on the issues pointed out by him in the notices issued u/s. 263.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The issue under consideration is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M. Dhara & Brothers vs. CIT-XVI (2015-TIOL-482-ITAT-KOL) wherein it was held by the Tribunal by following the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Linotype & Machinery Ltd. 192 ITR 337 (Kol)., that the failure of the A.O. to initiate proceedings u/s. 271D for violation of section 269SS could not be considered as an error calling for revision u/s. 263.

The Tribunal held that there were no errors in the orders passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act for all the five years under consideration which were prejudicial to the interest of the revenue calling for revision by the Learned CIT(A) u/s. 263. The Tribunal set aside the impugned common order passed by the CIT, u/s. 263, for all the five years under consideration and restored the orders passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A.

The appeals of the assessee were allowed.

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Presentation of Excise Duty under Ind AS

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Query
Paragraph 8 of IAS 18 “Revenue” states as follows:
“Revenue includes only the gross inflows of economic benefits received
and receivable by the entity on its own account. Amounts collected on
behalf of third parties such as sales taxes, goods and services taxes
and value added taxes are not economic benefits which flow to the entity
and do not result in increases in equity. Therefore, they are excluded
from revenue. Similarly, in an agency relationship, the gross inflows of
economic benefits include amounts collected on behalf of the principal
and which do not result in increases in equity for the entity. The
amounts collected on behalf of the principal are not revenue. Instead,
revenue is the amount of commission.”

Paragraph 47 of Ind AS 115
“Revenue from Contracts with Customers” states, “An entity shall
consider the terms of the contract and its customary business practices
to determine the transaction price. The transaction price is the amount
of consideration to which an entity expects to be entitled in exchange
for transferring promised goods or services to a customer, excluding
amounts collected on behalf of third parties (for example, some sales
taxes). The consideration promised in a contract with a customer may
include fixed amounts, variable amounts, or both.”

IAS 18 and
its replacement IFRS 15 (Ind AS 115) have established a principle that
is very broad and may not be conclusive in determining the presentation
of certain indirect taxes. For example, both the standards may result in
requiring sales tax to be presented as a tax collected from the
customer on behalf of the government; however, the presentation of
excise duty may not be abundantly clear.

The current Indian GAAP AS 9 ‘Revenue Recognition’ states as follows with respect to presentation of excise duty.

The
amount of revenue from sales transactions (turnover) should be
disclosed in the following manner on the face of the statement of profit
or loss:

Turnover (Gross) XX

Less: Excise Duty XX

Turnover (Net) XX

The
amount of excise duty to be deducted from the turnover should be the
total excise duty for the year except the excise duty related to the
difference between the closing stock and opening stock. The excise duty
related to the difference between the closing stock and opening stock
should be recognised separately in the statement of profit or loss, with
an explanatory note in the notes to accounts to explain the nature of
the two amounts of excise duty.

AS 9 is very prescriptive and
does not establish a clear principle for requiring a net presentation of
excise duty. Besides it contains a fatal flaw. On the one hand, it
requires a net presentation, which may mean that excise duty is
collected from the customer on behalf of the government. On the other
hand, it requires excise duty to be included in the cost of inventory,
which may mean that excise duty is paid by the manufacturer as part of
its cost of producing the inventory. Both these principles are
absolutely contradictory to each other. Therefore, AS 9 may not be very
helpful in determining the presentation of excise duty under Ind AS.

Arguments supporting a gross presentation of excise duty under Ind AS
Excise
duty is a duty on manufacture or production of excisable goods in
India. The law in India provides that a duty of excise on excisable
goods which are produced or manufactured in India shall be levied and collected at the time of removal of goods from factory premises or from approved place of storage. The taxable event is the manufacture or production of an excisable article and the duty is levied and collected at a later stage for administrative convenience. The levy of excise duty is not restricted only to excisable goods manufactured and intended for sale. It is also leviable on excisable goods manufactured or produced in a factory for internal consumption. Although the duty is usually paid only when the goods leave the warehouse, this is described as merely a practical expedient. The duty becomes payable once the goods are manufactured and is payable even if the goods are not sold (eg., are scrapped or utilised for own use). Further, scrapping of inventory post manufacture nullifies the whole transaction and any credit availed on inputs needs to be reversed. Thus the manufacturer is not acting as an agent for the tax authority.

The excise duty recovered should be included as part of revenues. The excise duty is a tax on manufacture and the risk of financial loss relating to non-recovery of this duty is with the manufacturer. This duty is similar to any other cost of production and is payable by the manufacturer irrespective of whether it ultimately recovers it from another party or even if it does not sell the goods ultimately. Therefore, the Company is not necessarily recovering these taxes on behalf of the government. In other words, the Company is not acting as an agent for the tax authority but is acting as principal for the whole amount.

Excise duty may be levied on different basis for different industries. These may be linked to the transaction value or Maximum Retail Price (MRP) or based on a specific valuation or a volume-based determination. In the case of sales tax or VAT , levy is on the basis of the sales price charged to customer. Therefore it appears that excise duty is more a cost of production rather than a levy on sales.

Arguments supporting a net presentation of excise duty under Ind AS

The excise duty should be reduced from revenues. From a manufacturer perspective, excise duty is a regulatory levy which is ultimately borne by the consumers. It does not add any value to the goods sold and hence, including it in revenue will not reflect the real revenue of the manufacturer.

IAS18.8 specifically states that amounts collected on behalf of third parties such as sales taxes, goods and services taxes and value added taxes are not economic benefits which flow to the entity and do not result in increases in equity. The excise duty collected from the customer (as evidenced in the excise invoice) is only a recovery of excise duty paid by the company and therefore does not result in an increase in equity. The excise duty is also similar to a value added tax and accordingly not to be included within revenues. In spirit, the excise duty mechanism is not substantially different from the way sales tax operates, and hence excise duty should be presented in the same manner as sales tax. In other words, revenue is presented net of excise duty.

Amount of excise duty forming part of the sale price of the goods is required to be indicated separately in all documents relating to assessment of duty, e.g., excise invoice used for clearance of excisable goods. It is, however, open to a manufacturer to recover excise duty separately or not to make a separate recovery but charge a consolidated sale price inclusive of excise duty. The incidence of excise duty is deemed to be passed on to the buyer, unless contrary is proved by the payer of excise duty. The buyer can subsequently claim a credit for the amount of excise duty paid (or deemed to be paid) as part of the purchase price. Further, the excise duty paid as a result of purchase of inputs for production/manufacture (as was included in the price of purchases), is available as a duty credit which is set off against the duty payable on production. As a result, effectively, there are no excise duty costs borne by the entities from purchase or production/sale of the goods and costs are borne by the ultimate consumers. In other words, the mechanism relating to excise duty is not materially different from sales tax, and hence the same principles should apply.

The excise duty rates are prescribed by the law and full amount paid is included in the invoice value to be recovered from customers. Further the obligation to make the payment arises only at the time of dispatch to customers. The duty is levied based on invoice value and is required to be separately stated on the invoice itself creating a constructive obligation to transfer the impact of any change in rates to the customers. The above analysis seems to indicate that while legally manufacturers/producers could have the primary obligation to pay the duty; the collection mechanism indicates that they are acting as collection agents.

In case a certain product is exempt from excise (not dutiable) at the time of manufacture, but subsequently is made dutiable on the date of removal for sale, such goods will continue to not be chargeable to excise – considering the status on date of manufacture. However, if a certain rate of duty is applicable at the time of manufacture (say 8%), but changes by the date of removal (say 12%), the rate prevailing at the time of removal (12%) will apply. This provides a mixed indicator of whether excise duty is a cost of manufacture or a duty on sales. Sales tax is usually calculated as a percentage of price charged to the customer. Therefore, if there is a change in the tax rate between manufacture and sale, the price charged to the customer (inclusive of tax) will need to be adjusted for the new tax rate.

In case of sales return, credit is allowed for the excise duty originally paid. Similarly excise duty is refunded if goods that left the factory are returned back to the factory. This operates similar to sales tax. For example, sales returns usually within a period of 6 months are considered for adjustment in sales tax liability.

-Assessment under US GAAP

In the absence of specific guidance under IAS 18/ other IFRS, reference has been made to other GAAP (US GAAP EITF Issue 99-19 Reporting Revenue Gross as a Principal versus Net as an Agent). Under the EITF 99- 19, the various indicators supporting the gross and net presentation are summarised below-

Whether an entity is acting as a principal or agent in collecting excise taxes on behalf of the authorities is a matter of judgment, and no one factor may support a
conclusion on its own, and the relative strength of each indicator may be considered

a. Whether the entity is exposed to financial risks in respect of the excise Duty.

i. General inventory risk

Gross presentation-Excise is levied once goods leave an entity’s warehouse (i.e. even where goods are used for internal consumption and irrespective whether they are sold or not). Thus, an entity would bear the risk of the excise duty where goods may not be sold.

Net presentation- Excise duty may be recovered in cases where goods are damaged, obsolete, or not sellable and thus in this case, the inventory risk for
excise duty would not lie with the entity.

ii. Credit risk
Gross presentation- An entity is required to pay excise on the goods, irrespective of whether they are sold or not. While the amounts can be recovered from the customers on sale, the credit risk will lie with the entity if receivables are not collected.

Net presentation- No matters to support.

b. Whether the entity has the discretion to determine the price of the goods charged to the customer (in respect of the excise duty)

Gross presentation- An entity is required to disclose the amount of excise duty forming part of the sale price of the goods is required to be indicated separately in all documents relating to assessment of duty, e.g., excise invoice used for clearance of excisable goods. It is, however, open to a manufacturer to recover excise duty

separately or not to make a separate recovery but charge a consolidated sale price inclusive of excise duty. Further, an entity would have the final authority in determining the final selling price of the product and may decide to recover a part or the whole excise duty from its customers.

Also, excise is determined as a percentage of the production cost rather than the sales cost.

Net presentation – If excise increases/decreases would mandate (by law) the price of the goods to increase/decrease, the discretion to determining price in respect of
excise may not lie with the entity.

-Guidance Note on Accounting Treatment for Excise Duty

The relevant extracts are given in the table below. Excise duty is a duty on manufacture or production of excisable goods in India. Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, deals with charge of Excise Duty. This Section provides that a duty of excise on excisable goods which are produced or manufactured in India shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed. This prescription is contained in the Central Excise Rules, 1944 which provide that excise duty shall be collected at the time of removal of goods from factory premises or from approved place of storage (Rule 49). Rate of duty and tariff valuation to be applied is the one in force on that date, i.e., the date of removal (Rule 9A) and not the date of manufacture. This difference in the point of time between taxable event, viz., manufacture and that of its collection has been examined and discussed in a number of judgements. For instance, the Supreme Court in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CCE [1989 (44) ELT 598] summed up the legal position as under:

“It is well settled by the scheme of the Act as clarified by several decisions that even though the taxable event is the manufacture or production of an excisable article, the duty can be levied and collected at a later stage for administrative convenience. The Scheme of the said Act read with the relevant rules framed under the Act particularly Rule 9A of the said rules, reveals that the taxable event is the fact of manufacture of production of an excisable article, the payment of duty is related to the date of removal of such article from the factory.”

Supreme Court in another case, viz., CCE vs. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. [1996 (83) ELT 3] held as under:

“We are of the opinion that Section 3 cannot be read as shifting the levy from the stage of manufacture or production of goods to the stage of removal. The levy is and remains upon the manufacture or production alone. Only the collection part of it is shifted to the stage of removal.”

The levy of excise duty is not restricted only to excisable goods manufactured and intended for sale. It is also leviable on excisable goods manufactured or produced in a factory for internal consumption. Such intermediate products may be used in manufacture of final products or for repairs within the factory or for use as capital goods within the factory. Excisable goods so used for captive consumption may be eligible for exemption under specific notifications issued from time to time. Finished excisable goods cleared from the place of removal may also be eligible for whole or partial duty exemption in terms of notifications issued from time to time. Such exemption, subject to specified limits, if any, may relate to a manufacturer, e.g., a small scale industrial unit. Exemption may be goods specific, e.g., handicrafts are currently wholly exempt from duty. The exemption may also be end-use specific, e.g., goods for use by defence services. Excisable goods can be removed for export out of India either whoIly without payment of duty or under bond or on payment of duty under claim for rebate of duty paid.

Excisable goods, after completion of their manufacturing process, are required to be kept in a storeroom or other identified place of storage in a factory till the time of their clearance. Each such storeroom or storage place is required to be declared to the Excise Authorities and approved by them. Such storeroom or storage place is generally referred to as a Bonded Storeroom. Dutiable goods are also allowed, subject to approval of Excise Authorities, to be removed without payment of duty, to a Bonded Warehouse outside factory. In such cases, excise duty is collected at the time of clearance of goods from such Bonded Warehouses.

Amount of excise duty forming part of the sale price of the goods is required to be indicated separately in all documents relating to assessment of duty, e.g., excise invoice used for clearance of excisable goods (section 12A). It is, however, open to a manufacturer to recover excise duty separately or not to make a separate recovery but charge a consolidated sale price inclusive of excise  duty. The incidence of excise duty is deemed to be passed on to the buyer, unless contrary is proved by the payer of excise duty (section 12B).

In considering the appropriate treatment of excise duty for the purpose of determination of cost for inventory valuation, it is necessary to consider whether excise duty should be considered differently from other expenses. Admittedly, excise duty is an indirect tax but it cannot, for that reason alone, be treated differently from other expenses. Excise duty arises as a consequence of manufacture of excisable goods irrespective of the manner of use/disposal of goods thereafter, e.g., sale, destruction and captive consumption. It does not cease to be a levy merely because the same may be remitted by appropriate authority in case of destruction or exempted in case goods are used for further manufacture of excisable goods in the factory. Tax (other than a tax on income or sale) payable by a manufacturer is as much a cost of manufacture as any other expenditure incurred by him and it does not cease to be an expenditure merely because it is an exaction or a levy or because it is  avoidable. In fact, in a wider context, any expenditure is an imposition which a manufacturer would like to minimise.

Excise duty contributes to the value of the product. A”duty paid” product has a higher value than a product on which duty remains to be paid and no sale or further utilisation of excisable goods can take place unless the duty is paid. It is, therefore, a necessary expense which must be incurred if the goods are to be put in the location and condition in which they can be sold or further used in the manufacturing process.

Excise duty cannot, therefore, be treated differently from other expenses for the purpose of determination of cost for inventory valuation. To do so would be contrary to the basic objective of carrying forward the cost related to inventories until these are sold or consumed. As stated above, liability to excise duty arises even on excisable goods manufactured and used in further manufacturing process. In such a case, excise duty paid (if the same is not exempted) on the intermediary product becomes a manufacturing expense. Excise duty paid on such intermediary products must, therefore, be included in the valuation of work-in-process or finished goods manufactured by the subsequent processing of such products.

Since the point of time at which duty is collected is not necessarily the point of time at which the liability to pay the duty arises, situations will often arise when duty remains to be collected on goods which have been manufactured. The most common of these situations arises when the goods are stored under bond, i.e., in a bonded Store Room, and the duty is paid when the goods are removed from such bonded Store Room.

Divergent views exist as to whether provision should be made in the accounts for the liability in respect of goods which are not cleared or which are lying in bond at the balance sheet date.

The arguments in favour of the creation of liability are briefly summarised under:

a) The liability for excise duty arises at the point of time at which the manufacture is completed and it is only its collection which is deferred; and

b) failure to provide for the liability will result in the balance sheet not showing a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the enterprise. The arguments against the creation of the liability, briefly summarised, are as under:

a) Though the liability for excise duty arises at the point of time at which the manufacture is completed, it gets quantified only when goods are cleared from the factory or the bonded warehouse;

b) the actual liability for excise duty may get modified by the time the goods are cleared from the factory or bonded warehouse;
c) where goods are damaged or destroyed before clearance, excise duty may be waived by the competent authority and therefore the duty may never be paid; and

d) failure to provide for the liability does not affect the profits or losses.

Since the liability for excise duty arises when the manufacture of the goods is completed, it is necessary to create a provision for liability of unpaid excise duty on stocks lying in the factory or bonded warehouse. It is true that the recovery of the duty is deferred till the goods are removed from the factory or the bonded warehouse and the exact quantification will, therefore, be at the time of removal and that estimate of duty made on balance sheet date may change on account of subsequent events, e.g., change in the rate of duty and exports under bond. But, this is true of many other items also, e.g., provision for gratuity and this cannot be an argument for not making a provision for existing liability on estimated basis.

The estimate of such liability can be made at the rates in force on the balance sheet date. For this purpose, other factors affecting liability should also be  onsidered, e.g., exemptions being availed by the enterprise, pattern of sales — export, domestic etc. Thus, if a small scale undertaking is availing the benefit of exemption allowed in a particular financial year and declares that it wishes to avail such exemption during next financial year also, excise duty liability should be calculated after taking into consideration the availability of exemption under the relevant notification. Similarly, if an enterprise is captively consuming all its production of a specific product and has been availing of exemption from payment of duty on that product, no provision for excise duty may be required in respect of non-duty paid stock of that product lying in factory or bonded warehouse.

– Summary of Recommendations
a) Excise duty should be considered as a manufacturing expense and like other manufacturing expenses be considered as an element of cost for inventory valuation.
b) Where excise duty is paid on excisable goods and such goods are subsequently utilised in the manufacturing process, the duty paid on such goods, if the same is not recoverable from taxing authorities, becomes a manufacturing cost and must be included in the valuation of workin- progress or finished goods arising from the subsequent processing of such goods.
c) Where the liability for excise duty has been incurred but its collection is deferred, provision for the unpaid liability should be made.
d) Excise duty cannot be treated as a period cost. The Guidance Note requires excise duty to be treated as a cost of production. If a principal vs. agent analysis is done, the Guidance Note position would effectively translate into treating the manufacturer as the principal rather than an agent who pays excise duty on behalf of the customer. However, the Guidance Note deals with accounting of excise duty. It does not deal with presentation of excise duty in the financial statements. Asstated earlier, AS 9 requires a net presentation of excise duty. The net presentation of excise duty is contradictory to the principle under AS 9 and the Guidance Note to treat excise duty as the manufacturer’s cost.

Conclusion
Overall, it appears that there is an argument both for a gross presentation and a net presentation. Therefore at this stage, either gross presentation or net presentation under Ind AS would be acceptable. It may be more appropriate for the ICAI to come out with a clear guidance so that there can be consistency in the presentation of excise duty.

2015-TIOL-1467-ITAT-MUM ACIT vs. Tops Security Ltd. A. Y.: 2008-09. Date of Order: 27th May 2015

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Section 43B – Amount of service tax, billed to the client but not
received, not having been paid to the Central Government, in view of the
provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 6 of Service Tax
Rules, 1994, cannot be disallowed u/s. 43B.

Facts:
The
Assessing Officer disallowed a sum of Rs.6,43,88,850 u/s. 43B of the
Act in view of the fact that the assessee had not paid this amount till
due date of filing its return of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it contended that the amount
under consideration though was included in the bills but was not
collected from the customers. Referring to Rule 6 of Service Tax Rules,
1994, it was argued that tax becomes payable only when it is collected
from the customers. The CIT(A) following the decision of the Madras
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of CIT vs. Real Image Media
Technologies [114 ITD 573(Mad)] allowed this ground of appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
TheTribunal
noted that in the assessee’s own case, for A.Y. 2005-06, this issue was
decided in favour of the assessee. It noted the following observations
in order dated 14.11.2014 –

“We further note that an
identical issue was considered and decided by this Tribunal in
assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2005-06, vide decision dated 30.6.2010, in
ITA No. 5393/ Mum/2008 in para 14 as under:-

14. After
considering the rival submissions and perusing the relevant material on
record it is seen that a sum of Rs.2,74,26,695 represents the amount
which was debited to the profit and loss account but not paid to the
Government as it was not collected. The remaining amount of Rs.45 lakh
and odd represents the amount which was collected by the assessee and in
turn paid to the Government in this year. The contention of the learned
Departmental Representative that the said sum of Rs. 3.19 crore which
was claimed as deduction should be disallowed u/s 43B as it was not paid
to the Government, does not merit acceptance in view of the direct
order of the Tribunal passed by the Chennai Bench in ACIT vs. Real Image
Media Technologies (P.) Ltd. [114 ITD 573 (Chennai)]. In this case it
has been held that service tax though billed but not received not having
been credited to the Central Government by virtue of Finance Act, 1994
read with Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, cannot be disallowed
u/s. 43B. No contrary judgment has been brought to our notice by the
learned Departmental Representative. Respectfully following the
precedent, we uphold the view taken by the learned CIT(A) on this issue.
This ground is not allowed.”

2.2 The issue before us, is
regarding disallowance of Service Tax which was not collected by the
assessee from the customers to the tune of Rs.5,12,22,734/-. Since an
identical issue was directed by this Tribunal in assessee’s own case
(supra), accordingly, following the earlier order of this Tribunal, we
do not find any error or illegality in the impugned order of CIT(A) qua
this issue. …..”

Following the above mentioned decision, for
the sake of consistency, the Tribunal decided this issue in favour of
the assessee and against the Revenue.

This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

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2015-TIOL-1376-ITAT-HYD ACIT vs. Manjeera Hotels & Resorts Ltd. A. Y.: 2008-09. Date of Order: 10th July 2015

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Section 32 – Transformers, HT lines & miscellaneous civil works form part of wind mill and are entitled to depreciation @ 80% under that category. These are not separate independent Plant & Machinery but are integral part of the windmills system and have no independent existence as Plant & Machinery. The civil works such as foundations cannot be treated as buildings so as to consider them as independent assets.

Facts:
The assessee company, engaged in hotel business, forayed into business of wind mills power generation. In its return of income filed the assessee had claimed depreciation on items like transformer, HT lines, electrical supplies and certain civil work @ 80%. The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed part of depreciation on these items. He allowed depreciation on items of plant and machinery (transformer, HT lines and electrical supplies) @ 15% and on civil works @ 10%.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A). The CIT(A) following the decision in the case of ACIT vs. Rakesh Gupta (Chd Trib)[ 60 SOT 81].

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the issue under consideration is squarely covered, in favor of the assessee, by the following decisions of the co-ordinate bench – ACIT vs. Rakesh Gupta [60 SOT 81 (Chd) DCIT vs. Lanco Infratech Ltd. [2014-TIOL-133-ITAT-HYD]

Following the above decisions, the Tribunal held that the items which were treated by the AO as separate independent Plant & Machinery were integral part of the windmill system and have no independent existence as Plant & Machinery. The civil works such as foundations cannot be treated as buildings so as to consider them as independent assets. The Tribunal held that these items qualify for depreciation @ 80%.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Export oriented undertaking – Exemption u/s. 10B – A. Y. 2007-08 – Development Commissioner granting approval to assessee as 100% export oriented unit – Board of Approval ratifying this subsequently – Ratification relates back to date on which Development Commissioner granted approval – Assessee is entitled to exemption

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Principal CIT vs. ECI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.; 375 ITR 595 (Guj):

For
the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 10B as a 100%
export oriented unit. It had obtained approval from the Development
Commissioner. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that there was no ratification of the decision of the Development
Commissioner by the Board of Approval. The Commissioner(A) found that
the approval was subsequently ratified by the Board of Approval and
accordingly allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal confirmed the
decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
Circular No. 68 issued by the Export Promotion Council for EOUS and
SEZS dated May 14, 2009, made it clear that from 1990 onwards the Board
of Approval had delegated the power of approval of 100% export oriented
undertakings to the Development Commissioner and, therefore, the
Development Commissioner, while granting the approval of the 100% export
oriented unit, exercises delegated powers.
ii) In any case when at
the relevant time the Development Commissioner granted approval of the
100% export oriented unit in favour of the assessee, which came to be
subsequently ratified by the Board of Approval the ratification shall be
from the date on which the Development Commissioner granted the
approval. Hence, both the Commissioner (A) as well as the Tribunal have
rightly held that the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 10B as
claimed.”

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Export oriented undertaking – Exemption u/s. 10B – A. Y. 2007-08 – Part of manufacture outsourced but under control and supervision of assessee – Assessee entitled to exemption

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MKU (Armours) P. Ltd. vs. CIT; 376 ITR 514 (All):

The assessee is a 100% export oriented unit. For the A. Y. 2007-08 the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B on the ground that the assessee had got the manufacture outsourced. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that only a part of the manufacturing activity was got done by the assessee from outside agency and that too under the direct control and supervision of the staff of the assessee. After the job work, the product was returned to the assessee’s factory, where the final product was assembled, packed and dispatched to the overseas buyers. He allowed the claim of the assessee. However, the Tribunal restored the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“A new product had come out at the final stage. It was not a case of changing the label or the cover of the product. Only a part of the manufacturing activities was got done by the assessee from the outside agency and that too under the direct control and supervision of the managerial and technical staff available with the assessee. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 10B.”

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Educational Institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – A. Y. 2009-10 – One of the object clauses providing trust could run business – No finding recorded that predominant object of trust was to do business – Trust is entitled to exemption

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HARF Charitable Trust vs. CCIT.; 376 ITR 110 (P&H):

The
assessee trust was running educational institutions. The Chief
Commissioner rejected the assessee’s application for grant of approval
for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the
ground that the assessee trust had an intention to carry out business
activity which was not permissible for a charitable organisation. The
trustees were in place for the whole duration of their life and it gave
the organisation a look and character of a private body rather than a
charitable organisation and the objectives were not related the
promotion of education and the educational trust did not exist solely
for educational purposes.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the assessee’s writ petition and held as under:

“i) The school run by the assessee as such was affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education and had also been granted registration u/s. 12A w.e.f. 15/07/1997. Merely because one of the clauses of the trust deed provided that the trust would carry on other business as decided by the trustees that would not per se disentitle it from being considered for registration u/s. 10(23C)(vi).
ii) The reasoning that the trust had intention to carry out the business and the institution was not existing solely for educational purposes would amount to giving a very narrow meaning to the section and the predominant object test was to be applied. It was not that the Chief Commissioner came to the conclusion that the trust was doing some other business and the business was generating substantial amounts which would override the main objects of the trust which pertain mainly to the cause of education. In the absence of any such finding that the trust was doing business, the application could not have been rejected only on this ground that one of the clauses in the objects provided such right to the trust. The prescribed authority could have made it conditional by holding that if any such business was carried out, the registration granted was liable to be cancelled.
iii) Therefore, the order refusing to grant approval of exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) could not be justified solely on the ground that in view of a clause which provided that the trust could run a business, it would be debarred as such for registration on the ground that it was not existing solely for educational purposes. That merely a conferment of power to do business would not debar the right of consideration of the trust without any finding being recorded that the predominant object of the trust was to do business.
iv) Thus, the Chief Commissioner misdirected himself in rejecting the application on this ground without coming to any conclusion that the trust was carrying on any other activity under clause (i). It was also a matter of fact now that the trust had already also deleted the objectionable clause for the year 2010-11. The Chief Commissioner was directed to decide the assessee’s application afresh.”

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Disallowance u/s. 14A – A. Y. 2004-05 – Section 14A will not apply if no exempt income is received or receivable during the relevant previous year

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Cheminvest Ltd. vs. CIT; [2015] 61 taxmann.com 118 (Delhi)

In
the case of the assessee Cheminvest Ltd., the Special Bench of the ITAT
in [2009] 121 ITD 318 (DELHI)(SB) held that section 14A disallowance can
be made in year in which no exempt income has been earned or received
by assessee. It referred to the decision of Apex Court in case of CIT
vs. Rajendra Prasad Moody [1978] 115 ITR 519 to settle this controversy.

In the appeal by the assessee, the following question was raised before the Delhi High Court:

“Whether
disallowance under Section 14A can be made in a year in which no exempt
income has been earned or received by assessee?

The High Court held in favour of assessee as under:
“(i)
The Special Bench has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in
Rajendra (supra). In such case the Supreme Court held that Section
57(iii) does not say that expenditure shall be deductible only if any
income is made or earned. The decision of Supreme Court was rendered in
context of allowability of deduction u/s. 57(iii). Thus, such decision
could not be used in reverse to contend that even if no income has been
received, the expenditure incurred can be disallowed u/s. 14A.

(ii)
The expression ‘does not form part of total income’ in Section 14A
envisages that there should be an actual receipt of income, which is not
includible in the total income, for the purpose of disallowing any
expenditure in relation to said income.

(iii) In other words,
Section 14A will not apply if no exempt income is received or receivable
during the relevant previous year.”

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Business expenditure-Capital or revenue expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 1998-99 – Machine not put to use on ground that technology had become obsolete – Expenditure incurred for development of machines is revenue expenditure

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CIT vs. Britannia Industries Ltd.; 376 ITR 299 (Cal):

In the previous year relevant to A. Y. 1998-99, the assessee had developed four machines at a cost of Rs. 46,26,552/. However, after the machines were developed, the assessee found that the technology used had already become obsolete. Therefore, the machines were not put to use for manufacturing purposes. The assessee claimed the expenditure as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim. CIT(A) held that the expenditure is allowable u/s. 37. The Tribunal upheld the allowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The question whether the expenses incurred on account of development of machines was revenue expenditure or not basically is a question of fact and when the Tribunal had concurred with the views expressed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the view taken by them was a plausible view, no interference in the order of the Tribunal was warranted.”

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Total Income – Income of minor child of assessee from admission to the benefits of partnership cannot be taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s. 64(1) (iii) even when read with Explanation 2A where income earned by the trust cannot be utilised for the benefit of the minor during its minority.

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Kapoor Chand (Deceased) vs. ACIT (2015) 376 ITR 450 (SC)

The
brother-in-law of the appellant, namely Shri Ram Niwas Agarwal had
created two trusts for the benefit of two minor children of the
appellant, Kapoor Chand. One trust known as Priti Life Trust was for the
benefit of Kumari. Priti who was aged about 7 years and the other trust
was created by the name of Anuj Family Trust for the benefit of master
Anuj, minor son of the appellant, Kapoor Chand. One of the important
terms of both the trust deeds was that income so earned by the trusts
shall not be received by two minors during their minority and will be
spent for their benefits only once they attain the majority. Another
fundamental clause in both the trust deeds was that in case any of the
beneficiaries died before attaining majority, his/ her share would be
given to the other sibling. Both these trustees became partners in the
partnership firm. The said partnership firm earned profits in the year
1980-81 and share of the two trusts was given to them.

Since
these trusts were for the benefit of two minor children of the
appellant, invoking the provisions of section 64(1) (iii) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”), the Assessing Officer included the
said income in the income of the assessee and taxed it as such.

The appellant contested the assessment by filing an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal holding that since the minors had no right to receive the income of the trusts till the time they were minors, the provisions of section 64(1)(iii) read with Explanation 2A of the Act would not be attracted.

The Department challenged the aforesaid order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant approached the High Court of Uttaranchal by way of an appeal filed u/s. 260A of the Act which appeal was dismissed by the High Court.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid section that while computing the total income of any individual the income of a minor child of such individual from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm is to be included as the income of the said individual. Explanation 2A clarifies that if the minor child is a beneficiary under a trust, income arising to the trust from the membership of the trustee in a firm shall also be treated as income of the child and the provisions of sub-clause (iii) of section 64(1) shall get attracted even in that eventuality.

The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, it was clear from the facts narrated above, that two minor children of the appellant were the beneficiaries under the two trusts. The said trustees were the partners in the firm and had their shares in the income as partners in the said firm.

According to the Supreme Court, the entire controversy revolved around the question as to whether such income could be treated as income of a minor child. This controversy had arisen because of the reason that the income that had been earned by the trustees was not available to the two minor children till their attaining the age of majority.

The Supreme Court observed that this very question had come up before it in almost identical circumstances in the case of CIT vs. M. R. Doshi [1995] 211 ITR 1 (SC). The court, after taking note of some judgments of High Courts including the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Yogindraprasad N. Mafatlal vs. CIT [1977] 109 ITR 602 (Bom) interpreted the provisions of section 64(1)(v) of the Act in the following manner (page 4 of 211 ITR):

“Section 64(1)(v) requires, in the computation of the total income of an assessee, the inclusion of such income as arises to the assessee from assets transferred, otherwise than for adequate consideration, to the extent to which the income from such assets is for the immediate or deferred benefit of, inter alia his minor children. The specific provision of the law, therefore, is that the immediate or deferred benefit should be for the benefit of a minor child. Inasmuch as in this case the deferment of the benefit is beyond the period of minority of the assessee’s three sons, since the assets are to be received by them when they attain majority, the provisions of section 64(1)(v) have no application.”

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, as pointed out above, specific stipulation which is contained in both the trust deeds is that in case of demise of any of the minors the income would accrue to the other child. Therefore, the receipt of the said income was also contingent upon the aforesaid eventuality and the two minors had not received the benefit immediately for the assessment year in question, viz., as “minor” children. Explanation was of no help to the Department. The provision that is contained in Explanation 2A is only to take care of the income even when a trust is created. It does not go further and make any provision to the effect that even when the income earned by the trust cannot be utilised for the benefit of the minor during his minority the Explanation 2A shall be attracted. There is no such stipulation in the said Explanation. Moreover, the language of section 64(1)(iii) is clear and categorical which makes the income of minor child taxable at the hands of individual. Thus, in the first instance it has to be shown that the share of income is in the hands of minor child which requirement was not satisfied in the present case.

The Supreme Court however observed that the Department was not without remedy inasmuch as the income earned by the two minors would not go untaxed. On attaining majority when the aforesaid money in the form of income is received by the two individuals it would be open to the Department to tax the income at that time. Or else, the Department could take up their cases u/s. 166 of the Act, if permissible.

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Heads of Income – Where letting of property is the business of the assessee, the income is to be assessed under the head “Income from business”

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Chennai Properties and Investments Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC)

The appellant – assessee was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, with its main object, as stated in the memorandum of association, to acquire the properties in the city of Madras (now Chennai) and to let out those properties. The assessee had rented out such properties and the rental income received therefrom was shown as income from business in the return filed by the assessee. The Assessing Officer, however, refused to tax the same as business income. According to the Assessing Officer, since the income was received from letting out of the properties, it was in the nature of rental income. He, thus, held that it would be treated as income from house property and taxed the same accordingly under that head.

The assessee filed the appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the same holding it to be income from business and directed that it should be treated as such and taxed accordingly. Aggrieved by that order, the Department filed an appeal before the Incometax Appellate Tribunal which declined to interfere with the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and dismissed the appeal. The Department approached the High Court. This appeal of the Department was allowed by the High Court, holding that the income derived by letting out of the properties would not be income from business but could be assessed only income form house property. The High Court primarily rested its decision on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. vs. CIT [1961] 42 ITR 49 (SC) and in Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [1964] 51 ITR 353(SC).

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court noted that as per the memorandum of association of the appellantcompany the main object of the appellant company was to acquire and hold the properties known as “Chennai House” and “Firhaven Estate” both in Chennai and to let out those properties as well as make advances upon the security of lands and buildings or other properties or any interest therein. The entire income of the appellant company was through letting out of the aforesaid two properties namely, “Chennai House” and “Firhaven Estate”. There was no other income of the assessee except the income from letting out of these two properties.

According to the Supreme Court the judgment in Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [1962] 44 ITR 362 (SC) squarely applied to the facts of the present case. In that case the position in law was summed up in following words:

“Where there is a letting out of premises and collection of rents the assessment on property basis may be correct but not so, where the letting or sub-letting is part of a trading operation. The dividing line is difficult to find; but in the case of a company with its professed objects and the manner of its activities and the nature of its dealings with its property, it is possible to say on which side the operations fall and to what head the income is to be assigned.”

The Supreme Court held that in this case, letting of the properties was in fact the business of the assessee. The assessee, therefore had rightly disclosed the income under the head “Income from business”. It could not be treated as “Income from the house property”. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored that of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

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Substantial Question of Law – Appeal to High Court – High Court cannot decide the appeal without framing a question of law.

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P.A. Jose & Ors. vs. CWT (2015) 376 ITR 448 (SC)

The Revenue filed connected wealth-tax appeals against the order of the Tribunal holding that cash in hand in excess of Rs.50,000 in the hands of the assessee who were all individuals, did not form part of the asset u/s. 2(ea)(vi) of the Wealth-tax Act. The High Court allowed the appeal holding that cash in hand in excess of Rs.50,000 held by the individual assessees formed part of assets under section 2(ea)(vi). The individual assesses approached the Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the assessee’s contended that the High Court had committed an error by not framing substantial question of law as per the provisions of section 27A(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Supreme Court held that the appeal under the aforesaid section could be admitted only when a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and according to s/s. (4), of the question of law has to be formulated by the High Court.

The Supreme Court found that the such a question had not been framed and without framing question of law, the appeal had been decided by the High Court. The Supreme Court therefore remitted the matter to the High Court so that a substantial question of law could be framed, if any, and the appeal be heard again.

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Report of Accountant to be filed along with the return – Condition is directory and not mandatory – The report should however be filed before the order of assessment is made.

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CIT vs. G.M. Knitting Industries (P) Ltd. and CIT vs. AKS Alloys (P) Ltd. [2015] 376 ITR 456 (SC)

Additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) had been denied to the assessee on the ground that the assessee had failed to furnish form 3AA along with the return of income. The Tribunal allowed additional depreciation as claimed by the assessee. The High Court noted that the Form 3AA was submitted during the course of assessment proceedings and that it was not in dispute that the assessee was entitled to the additional depreciation. The High Court dismissed the appeal of the Revenue in the light of its judgment in CIT vs. Shivanand Electronics (1994) 209 ITR 63 (Bom). On further appeal by the Revenue, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal concurring with the view of the High Court and holding that even if Form 3AA was not filed along with the return of income but same was filed during the assessment proceedings and before the final order of the assessment was made, that would amount to sufficient compliance.

Note: The above were the facts in G.M. Knitting Industries (P) Ltd.

The facts in AKS Alloys (P) Ltd. were as under:

The Appellant was engaged in the business of manufacture of steel ingots. In respect of the assessment year 2005-06, assessment order dated December 26, 2007, was passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, in which, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee made u/s. 80-IB of the Act on the ground that for the purpose of claiming deduction, the assessee did not file necessary certificate in Form 10CCB along with the return of income.

The first Appellate authority allowed the appeal, thereby granting the claim of the assessee made u/s. 80-IB of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal, dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. On further appeal the Supreme Court held that the substantial question of law namely, whether the filing of audit report in Form 10CCB is mandatory, was well settled by a number of judicial precedents that before the assessment is completed, the declaration could be filed.

The Supreme Court disposed of both the matters by a common order.

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Admission Of Appeal and Section 271(1)(c)

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Issue for Consideration Section 271(1)(c) provides for the imposition of penalty by an AO in cases where he is satisfied that the person has concealed the particulars of his income or has furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The penalty leviable shall not be less than the amount of tax sought to be evaded but shall not exceed three times the amount of such tax.

Section 273B provides that no penalty shall be imposable where the person proves that there was a reasonable cause for his failure to disclose the particulars of his income or to furnish accurate particulars of such income. It is thus, essential for a person, for escaping the penalty to prove that he had not concealed the particulars of his income or has not furnished inaccurate particulars of his income or in any case he was prevented by a reasonable cause in concealing the income or furnishing the inaccurate particulars.

None of the relevant terms namely, concealment, inaccurate particulars or reasonable cause are defined under the Income-tax Act. Needless to say, that a person has therefore to rely on the several decisions delivered by the Courts for assigning true meaning to the said terms. Over a period, a judicial consensus has emerged where under a decision taken under a bona fide belief is considered to be not a case of concealment or a case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Likewise, selecting one of the possible views on a subject that is capable of 2 views is held to be providing the person with a reasonable cause for his failure to disclose or furnish accurate particulars of his income.

There seems to be an unanimity about the understanding that no penalty is leviable in a case where the issue concerning a claim of allowance/disallowance/ addition/ deduction/ exemption is debatable. Recently, the term ‘debatable’ has attracted the attention of the judiciary where under, the Courts are asked to determine whether an issue can be said to be debatable in a case where a High Court has admitted the appeal on merits of the claim by holding the issue to be one which involves a substantial question of law. While the Gujarat High Court has held that simply because an appeal has been admitted on merits of the claim of an assesse, it could not automatically be held that the issue was debatable and that no penalty was leviable. The Bombay High Court approving the 3rd member decision of the Ahmedabad bench of the Tribunal held that the issue became debatable once an appeal on merits of the claim was admitted on the ground that it formed a substantial question of law.

Dharamshi B. Shah’s case
The Gujarat high court had an occasion to consider the issue in the case of the CIT vs. Dharamshi B. Shah, 51 taxmann.com 274 (Gujarat). In the said case, an addition made by the AO on account of capital gains computed u/s. 45(3) was upheld by the tribunal and the assessee’s appeal against such an order was admitted by the High Court. The AO subsequently had passed an order levying penalty u/s. 271(1)(c), which was deleted by the Tribunal on the ground that no penalty was leviable once an appeal on the merits of the case was admitted by the court. In an appeal by the revenue department against such an order of the Tribunal, the court was asked to consider whether merely because the assessee’s appeal in respect of an addition on the basis of which penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was levied, had been admitted by High Court, it could be said that the issue was debatable so as to delete the penalty. One of the substantial questions of law raised before the court by the revenue was:

“Whether, in the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in not upholding the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act imposed by the Assessing Officer and upheld by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) holding that since the substantial question of law in respect of the addition on which the penalty has been levied, has been admitted by the hon’ble Gujarat High Court, the penalty would not survive without appreciating that the addition on which the penalty was levied was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal itself ? ”

The Revenue submitted that;

  • in the case before the court, the Tribunal had deleted the penalty imposed by the AO and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) solely on the ground that the appeal against the order passed by the Tribunal on the merits of the case, was admitted by the high court and, therefore, the issue was not free from debate and, consequently, the tribunal had set aside the penalty,
  • the issue involved in the appeal was squarely covered by the decision of the court in the case of CIT vs. Prakash S Vyas rendered in Tax Appeal No. 606 of 2010, now reported in 58 taxmann.com 334, wherein the aforesaid view was not accepted by the Division Bench of the court,
  • the impugned order passed by the tribunal was required to be quashed and set aside and the matter was required to be remanded to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and on its own merits.

The court noted the following observations of the tribunal while setting aside the order of the AO levying penalty:

 “… This is the settled position of law that the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is imposable in respect of any concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by the assessee. When for the addition made by the Assessing Officer which is confirmed by the Tribunal, a substantial question of law is admitted by the hon’ble Gujarat High Court, it has to be accepted that the issue is not free from debate, and, hence, in our considered opinion, under these facts, it cannot be said that the assessee has concealed his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income, and, therefore, penalty is not justified. We, therefore, delete the same.”

The court noted with approval its decision on an identical question in Tax Appeal No. 606 of 2010 now reported in 58 taxmann.com 334, wherein the court had observed as under and had quashed and set aside the order of the tribunal deleting the penalty and had remanded the matter to the Tribunal to consider the appeal afresh in accordance with law and on its own merits.

“10. Having, thus, heard learned counsel for the parties, we reiterate that the sole ground on which the Tribunal deleted the penalty was that with respect to the quantum additions, the assessee had approached the High Court and the High Court had admitted the appeal framing substantial questions of law for consideration. In view of the Tribunal, this would indicate that the issue was debatable and that, therefore, no penalty under section 271(1)(c) could be imposed.

11.    We are of the opinion that the Tribunal erred in deleting the penalty on this sole ground. Admission of a tax appeal by the High Court, in majority cases, is ex parte and without recording even prima facie reasons. Whether ex parte or after by-parte hearing, unless some other intention clearly emerges from the order itself, admission of a tax appeal by the High Court only indicates the court’s opinion that the issue presented before it required further consideration. It is an indication of the opinion of the High Court that there is a prima facie case made out and the questions are required to be decided after admission. Mere admission of an appeal by the High Court cannot without there being anything further, be an indication that the issue is a debatable one so as to delete the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act even if there are independent grounds and reasons to believe that the assessee’s case would fall under the mischief envisaged in said clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the Act. In other words, unless there is any indication in the order of admission passed by the High Court simply because the tax appeal is admitted, would give rise to the presumption that the issue is debatable and that, therefore, penalty should be deleted.

12.    This is not to suggest that no such intention can be gathered from the order of the court even if so expressed either explicitly or in implied terms. This is also not to suggest that in no case, admission of a tax appeal would be a relevant factor for the purpose of deciding validity of a penalty order. This is only to put the record straight in so far as the opinion that the Tribunal as expressed in the present impugned order, viz., that upon mere admission of a tax appeal on quantum additions, is an indication that the issue is debatable one and that, therefore, penalty should automatically be deleted without any further reasons or grounds emerging from the record.

13.    This is precisely what has been done by the Tribunal in the present case. The order of the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be sustained. The question framed is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The order of the Tribunal is reversed. Since apparently the assessee had raised other contentions also in support of the appeal before the Tribunal, the proceedings are remanded before the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law. The tax appeal is disposed of accordingly.”

The court approving the reasons stated in the said decision, quashed and set aside the order of the tribunal and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law on its own merits while holding that penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) could not be deleted on the sole ground that assessee’s appeal in respect of addition on basis of which penalty was levied had been admitted by the High Court.

Nayan Builders Case

The issue also arose before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nayan Builders, 368 ITR 722 wherein the court found that the appeal of the Revenue department could not be entertained as it did not raise any substantial question of law.

In the said case the addition of income of Rs. 1,04,76,050 and disallowance of expenses of Rs.10,79,221 on brokerage and Rs. 2,00,000 on legal fees made by the A.O. were sustained by the Tribunal and the appeal of the assessee u/s. 260A was admitted by the High Court on the ground that the said addition and the disallowances represented a substantial question of law.

The A.O., pending the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, had levied a penalty of Rs. 37,32,777 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act which was confirmed by the Commissioner(Appeals). On a further appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, challenging the levy of the penalty, the Tribunal held that, when the High Court admitted a substantial question of law on the merits of an addition/disallowance, it became apparent that the issue under consideration on the basis of which penalty was levied, was debatable. It held that the admission by the high court lent credence to the bona fides of the assessee in claiming deduction. It held that the mere fact of confirmation of an addition/disallowance would not per se lead to the imposition of penalty, once it turned out that the claim of the assessee could have been considered by a person properly instructed in law and was not completely debarred in law. Relying on the decisions in the cases of Rupam Mercantile Ltd. vs. DCIT, 91 ITD 237(Ahd.) (TM) and Smt. Ramilaben Ratilal Shah vs. ACIT, 60 TTJ 171(Ahd.), the Tribunal held that no penalty was exigible u/s. 271(1)(c), once the high court had held that the issue of addition/disallowance represented a substantial question of law.

On an appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court held that the imposition of the penalty was not justified. The court noted that the Tribunal as a proof that the penalty was debatable and involved an arguable issue, had referred to the order of the court passed in the assessee’s appeal in quantum proceedings and had also referred to the substantial questions of law which had been framed therein.

The court perused its order dated September 27, 2010, passed by it for admitting the Income Tax Appeal No. 2368 of 2009 on merits of the case, and held that there was no case made out for imposition of penalty and the same was rightly set aside. It held that where the high court admitted an appeal on the ground that it involved a substantial question of law, in respect of which penalty was levied, impugned order of penalty was to be quashed. It held that the appeal challenging the order of the Tribunal, passed for deleting the penalty levied, raised no substantial question of law and as a consequence dismissed it with no order as to costs.

Observations

An appeal u/s.260A lies to the High Court from an order of the Tribunal only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The issue under consideration in such an appeal should not only involve a question of law but should be one which involves a substantial question of law similar to the one required u/s.100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. A full bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purshottam, 251 ITR 84, held that to be a substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent…. that it was not free from difficulty or that it called for a discussion for an alternate view. It further held that the word “substantial” qualifying “question of law” meant having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable.

Recently, the Patna High Court in the case of DCIT vs. Sulabh International Social Service Organisation, 350 ITR 189, has held that a substantial question of law must be one which was debatable and not previously settled under the law of the land or a binding precedent.

A question can be a substantial question of law even when it affects the substantial rights of the party or is of general importance or where a finding based on no evidence is given or where a finding is given without appreciating the admissible evidence or where the order passed is perverse or unreasonable. A question can be held to be a substantial question of law on varied counts – it is largely so in the cases where issues are debatable or call for a discussion for alternate view and are not previously settled by law of the land and binding precedent.

In the context of the provisions of Income-tax Act, it is appropriate in most of the cases, to hold that the issue on hand is debatable, open, capable of having an alternate view once the same is held to be representing a substantial question of law by the Jurisdictional high court at the time of admission of appeal. Once it is so found, it is also appropriate to hold, unless otherwise established, that the assessee was under a bona fide belief for staking his claim and was under a reasonable cause for any failure, if any and in the presence of these factors no penalty u/s. 271(1)(c ) r.w.s.273B was leviable.

The Bombay High Court, in Nayan Builder’s case, following the above discussed logic had held that no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) was leviable once an appeal on merits of the case was admitted by the Court by holding that the issue on merits represented a substantial question of law. It does not appear that even the Gujarat High Court in Dharamshi B. Shah’s case has a different view other than when it held that dropping of the penalty should not be an automatic consequence of an admission of appeal on merits of the case. Even in that case, the Court set aside the order of the Tribunal with a direction to it to examine the issue afresh to find out whether there was a bona fide belief or a reasonable cause in the relevant case or not.

In our experience, a court records its satisfaction about the presence of a substantial question of law only where it is satisfied that the essential requisites forming such a question are placed on record. In the circumstances, the Gujarat High Court may be said to side with the view of the Bombay High Court, which view has been taken by the Court while approving the decisions of the Tribunal in the cases of Rupam Mercantile 91 ITD 273 (Ahd.), Ramilaben Ratilal Shah 60 TTJ 171 (Ahd).

The Consequences of Ultra Cheap Oil

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From $103 a barrel a year ago, the price of crude oil has crashed to $43, with no bottom in sight. What does this mean for geopolitics and its knock-on effects on India? Oil producing nations, such as Russia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Kuwait and Iraq — and even Saudi Arabia — are feeling the pinch. As oil revenues fall, these nations cut back on social security and government spending, leading to domestic unrest and lower demand for imports.

Two factors are responsible for the collapse of crude. First, production has outstripped demand by a wide margin. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) reckons that global oil inventories grew by 2.5 million barrels per day during June-July, more than the 0.4 million barrels per day in the same period last year. Demand grew at a sluggish 1.1 million barrels per day, year on year. Iran will hike output from 2016, adding to supply. A slowdown in China and India could further depress demand and lower prices. Two, Saudi Arabia, with the lowest well-head cost of oil production in the world, is locked in a battle for energy supremacy with the US. The latter now needs no energy imports, thanks to shale oil and tar sands from Canada. Riyadh refuses to cut production to boost oil prices because it wants to drive high-cost domestic US oil out of business.

Energy importers like India, Japan and China ought to be happy: lower crude helps balance deficits and could temper inflation. A steady slide in the value of the rupee against the dollar erodes some of the gains from falling oil prices. India can do two things: one, pass on some of the gains from the oil price crash to consumers. Two, sign up long-term contracts with suppliers based on current low prices and the even lower rates projected for the future.

(Source: Editorial in the The Economic Times dated 28-08-2015.)

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Falling prices an opportunity for quick reforms in oil and gas

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Plunging crude oil prices aren’t just a boon for
corporate India and the consumer. They are an invaluable opportunity for
the government to push for faster reform of pricing and distribution
distortions in the oil and gassectors. The Indian basket of crude oil is
trading below $43 a barrel, a seven-month low and less than half the
price of July last year. At the start of the current financial year, the
Union government had prepared its oil economy budget after assuming the
crude oil price to be at $70 a barrel. So far the average price has
been $55 a barrel – and, with global prices slated to slip to $40 a
barrel, the savings for the rest of the year would be substantial.
Moreover, by all accounts the convergence of global factors that has
kept prices benign is likely to continue.

The beneficial effects
of recent reforms to fuel pricing are already visible. In June 2010,
petrol prices were deregulated. This was followed by an exercise to
convert the cooking gas subsidy to a direct benefit transfer scheme that
went all-India in January this year. And in October 2014, the diesel
prices were deregulated. The impact on the petroleum subsidy has been
significant: the budgetary outlay has more than halved in 2014-15. For
the state-controlled oil marketing companies, the savings on
under-recoveries – the difference between production costs and retail
price – have been dramatic too. Underrecoveries dropped from Rs 1,39,869
crore in 2013-14 to Rs 72,314 crore in 2014-15. The government should
now focus on the need to eliminate the remaining subsidies on petroleum
products. To begin with, the subsidy on kerosene should be discontinued.
Retaining subsidy on kerosene distributed through ration shops is
dangerously illogical; having deregulated open-market kerosene prices in
February this year, the temptation for arbitrage is high. The subsidy
on cooking gas, mostly used by the better off, should also end.

Apart
from the monetary gains, the elimination of subsidies has corrected the
imbalance between diesel and petrol consumption in the transport
sector, as is evident in lower sales of gas-guzzling sports utility
vehicles; and reduced the incidence of kerosene adulteration of diesel.
These advantages strengthen the case for the government to take reforms
one step further to gas pricing and distribution. In a country that
imports a third of its gas requirements outside the administered pricing
system and urgently needs to reduce its excessive dependence on coal, a
transparent and fair gas pricing regime is essential. Without it,
big-ticket foreign investment will stay out, and a host of power and
fertiliser plants will stay stalled. Cleaning up gas pricing might well
have a positive domino effect on power and fertiliser subsidies, with
which successive governments have struggled to cope. For an economy that
urgently needs to address the twin challenges of accelerating
investment and climate change, it makes little sense to continue with an
administrative regime that is distortionary in its impact, especially
when global and local factors converge to present a unique opportunity
to reform.

(Source: Editorial in the Business Standard dated 26-08- 2015.)

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Lessons to learn from the Land Bill fiasco – The Bulldozing does not work in a democracy

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The government has decided to let its Ordinance, which diluted clauses
of the UPA regime’s 2013 land acquisition Act, to lapse. The opposition
claims it as a victory over the government. The alliance fighting the
BJP in the upcoming Bihar elections touts it as a victory for every poor
farmer. The truth is more nuanced: state governments have primary
jurisdiction over land laws. After the Singur and Nandigram incidents in
Bengal where the state tried to forcefully snatch land from farmers for
industry, many states have adopted innovative methods to minimise
opposition to acquire land for development and other projects. Rather
than a one-time acquisition, they seek to make land sellers stakeholders
in future development. The Centre must allow states this flexibility
without discrimination.

Most recently, Andhra Pradesh has
acquired significant parcels by offering farmers a portion of land they
have given up, to develop residential and commercial projects once the
area is developed. This will increase their incomes hugely, possibly for
decades. Earlier, Uttar Pradesh under Mayawati and Haryana under
Bhupinder Singh Hooda had developed models that combined upfront
payments, annuities and return of a portion of the land to land sellers,
making them stakeholders in development. However, there are exceptional
cases, like developing dams or irrigation projects, where social gains
outweigh the losses of those affected directly by projects. In these
cases, states must have the flexibility to ease the terms of the consent
clause, or make returns far more generous to the few who give up land
for the benefit of many.

There is a political message for the
BJP here: the Modi regime must learn to talk to all parties, including
allies and the opposition, before undertaking major policy decisions. In
our parliamentary and federal system, one size never fits all:
unilateralism is not an option. Next time, say, while trying to roll out
the GST, the government must first listen, build consensus and stop
trying to use its majority in the Lok Sabha to bulldoze opponents.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic times dated 01-09-2015.)

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Government in Business – Misplaced priorities

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The Narendra Modi-led National Democratic Alliance came to power following a campaign during which several commentators, and many of the wider public, seized on to its catchy slogan of “minimum government, maximum governance”. Senior leaders of his administration continue to insist the phrase is one of the principles underlying current economic policy. However, if that is the case, then the administration’s decisions reflect misplaced priorities and a flawed understanding of the role and scope of government – and indeed its strengths and weaknesses. Unless those priorities are rectified, and soon, the thrust of current policy is likely to spend itself in futility and failure.

Economic history and economic theory both reveal that governments, including and especially in developing societies, do certain things well and do other things badly. What they do not do well is running enterprises. Being insulated from the discipline of the market means that state-run corporations fail especially in consumer-facing enterprises. They are also notable failures in sectors where lower-level decision-making is crucial, and any interference in such decisions – or even the absence of a focus on returns, a lack that characterises public enterprises – can lead to the build-up of costly errors. Yet the government continues to run a vast business empire, and Mr Modi seems to have no intention of letting this empire go. Air India, for example, seems to be a target for “revival” rather than sale even though it is bleeding passengers and pilots – 30 Dreamliner-trained pilots just quit and the once-dominant state-owned airline is now third in the sector, with a 16 per cent market share. The loss-making company has to borrow at the sort of premium that indicates what the financial sector thinks of its chances. Such examples are legion. The Union cabinet recently approved “financial incentives” for two state-owned telecom companies that are never likely to make money in a cut-throat sector. And the new revival plan for public-sector banks, announced with much fanfare, stopped short of the crucial measures that would allow for genuine independence from interference.

Meanwhile, there are indeed areas where more effective and expansive state participation is necessary. While private schools are often inexpensive and effective, without improving public education there is no hope of creating a better-educated society and a workforce with skills. Yet the government, including through the implementation of the Right to Education Act, seems to want to avoid the hard task of fixing the poor quality of state education. And then there is health. Nowhere in the world has private provision of health care with public financing worked – and in India it is a recipe for disaster. The new National Health Policy suggests that public spending will go up from one per cent of gross domestic product to 2.5 per cent soon. But how that is spent is crucial. Many within the government argue that private insurance and provision should be the bedrock of health policy. This also seems to underlie the recent push for expanding insurance. Here, at least, there seems to be sympathy for “minimum government”. But these are completely the wrong sectors for it; more effective government participation is needed. Instead, the government is focused on staying in business where there is no credible case for the public sector. “Minimum government, maximum governance” will only become real when the administration shows signs of understanding where and how it works.

(Source: Editorial in the Business Standard dated 04-09- 2015.)

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Global – Rising profits

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Global corporate profits have soared since 1980.

A new study by
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) estimates that operating profits after
tax of the largest companies grew from $2 trillion to $7.2 trillion in
2013.

The reasons: corporate taxes were slashed across the
world, interest rates collapsed and labour costs stagnated after the
entry of millions of Chinese and Indian workers into the global economy.

MGI says large companies from emerging markets are driving
global revenue growth while profit rates are higher in developed
economies. The latter have more companies that create value from
intangibles like brands or technology while emerging markets still have
companies that make intensive use of their physical assets.

The
rise of emerging market corporate giants is one reason MGI expects
profits to fall as a proportion of the global economy in the coming
years.

(Source: Editorial in Quick Edit of Mint dated 10-09-2015.)

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End tax uncertainty – Govt must learn from the MAT controversy

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The Bharatiya Janata Party’s manifesto for the 2014 elections promised to end “tax terrorism”, and in his campaign speeches Narendra Modi likened the taxman’s role to the light touch of a honeybee harmlessly drawing nectar from a flower. More than a year later, however, the “flowers” are writhing in pain because of multiple taxationrelated stings, forcing the Modi government to spend an inordinate amount of time on damage control following a firestorm of protests from foreign investors. Consider the controversy over retrospective applicability of minimum alternate tax (MAT ) on foreign portfolio investors (FPIs). The Finance Bill 2015 amended the MAT provisions to exclude capital gains earned by FPIs from the ambit of MAT from April 1, 2015, but the tax department’s position has been that MAT applies to FPIs on all income (including capital gains) up to March 31, 2015 and to all income (other than capital gains) from April 1, 2015. Tax experts, however, say the noise over this absurd tax demand could have been easily avoided because as per the law, there cannot be provision for capital gains tax on FPIs which are resident in tax-treaty regimes where capital gains tax is not levied. Besides, MAT is supposed to apply to domestic companies which pay little or no tax because of the special incentives that the Income-Tax Act provides.

The controversy erupted when the tax department served notices on 68 foreign institutional investors (FII), demanding MAT dues. The notices were served after the Authority for Advance Rulings in 2012 had directed Mauritius-based investor Castleton to pay MAT on its book profits when the company transferred shares from a Mauritius entity to one in Singapore. What was surprising was that so much uncertainty over investments by FIIs was created even though the total value of the tax notices served eventually was just Rs 602 crore. The government got a committee headed by Law Commission Chairman A. P. Shah to look into this; but its report, submitted in July, was not made public because the Supreme Court was to hear a case that has a bearing on the matter filed by Castleton. As a result, uncertainty just increased. It is welcome that the government tried to make its intentions clear last week – especially as risk concerns return to global markets.

There is a lesson from all this. The government must douse such fires more swiftly. The tax department, meanwhile must be reined in. An overzealous pursuit of such cases is counterproductive to the larger cause of tax administration. It adds to the overall perception that India is arbitrary about taxes. The water has already been muddied by innumerable previous instances of conflict, notably those involving Vodafone and Cairn. In the MAT -FPI case, innumerable foreign investors had already got their prior tax returns audited by the tax department – without MAT ever being asserted. Investors have acquired and sold shares based upon share prices reflecting the understanding that the funds had no Indian tax exposure for portfolio securities sold after being held for the requisite long-term holding period. The harm to investor confidence – harm that is directly attributable to the sudden and unexpected MAT assertions – cannot be overstated.

(Source: Editorial in the Business Standard dated 24-08-2015)

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Nikesh Arora and Destructive Creation

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The dangers of too liberal startup funding

There is such a thing as too much of a good thing, asserts SoftBank president Nikesh Arora. Investors from around the world have ratcheted up valuations of Indian startups and this kills the discipline needed to run a sustainable business, says Arora. We agree. We would add that such open-fisted funding of startups has resulted in damaging brick-and-mortar businesses with which some of these web-based startups compete, often unfairly. Easy fortunes made on the basis of valuations that are yet to be validated by earnings create heroes and idols, attempting to imitate whom many aspiring entrepreneurs might shed their self-esteem and entrepreneurial energy, not because they fail to do business but because they do not see in the mirror the muscle-flexing, spandex-clad figure they adore and seek to become.

Of course, liberal startup funding has an upside. In a culture that bars society from taking on risk, save a few groups, forcing the majority to seek jobs rather than pur sue entrepreneurship, liberal funding prompts many more people to chase their dreams instead of chafing at their limiting roles in somebody else’s business. This is most welcome. But this cannot, by itself, offset the damage. Investors who give their investee companies the freedom to burn cash encourage organisational flab: Housing. com is preparing to sack 600. e-Commerce companies have created a huge delivery business, on the strength of orders prompted by steep discounts financed by liberal funders. Once the discounts dry up, as they have to, when investors in e-commerce start looking for returns, will the delivery business sustain with its present manpower? The longer the discounts continue, the greater the hurt to offline retailers who do not have investors who think in terms of `burn rates’ and valuation changes.

Joseph Schumpeter coined the term creative destruction, to describe capitalism’s inner dynamic that constantly revolutionises the production structure, destroying the old to create the new. Excess funding of startups probably deserves to be termed destructive creation.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 11-08- 2015.)

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Phase Out, Not Ban, Participatory Notes

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As transparency norms rise, the supply will ebb. The Supreme
Court-appointed Special Investigation Team on black money has flagged
participatory notes (P-Notes) issued by foreign institutional investors
as a possible conduit for illegal funds in the capital market.
Transparency as to the identity of those investing in the market is
necessary. However, abrupt changes would be disruptive. The ideal
strategy is to lower the transaction cost of registering as an investor
in India, so as to encourage most investors to come in directly rather
than as part of a larger institutional investor, phase out most P-Notes
in a stipulated timeframe, while allowing a small category of entities
like university endowments, about whose credentials the regulator has
total comfort, to continue to invest via P-Notes.

Sebi, has
thoroughly revamped the disclosure requirements and eligibility
conditions for participation in the offshore derivative instruments, and
the rules now are far more stringent than before 2007, when Sebi, under
M. Damodaran, had banned them.

P-Notes returned, in the wake of
the financial crisis and capital flight, but with greater mandated
transparency. P-Notes can only be issued to entities from countries that
have signed a multilateral agreement to combat money laundering and for
exchange of information with the International Organisation of
Securities Commissions. Besides, the funds routed via P-Notes have
dropped substantially in recent years and now account for only about 11%
of the secondary market. So, there is no case for any abrupt regime
change.

However, for the sake of transparency, P-Notes are
entirely avoidable, and do need to be phased out in a timebound manner.
The new global rules in the making on transparency, complete with a
system of unique legal entity identifiers that would make beneficial
ownership visible at the end of even complex holding company chains,
would remove the virtue investors seek in P-Notes: anonymity. The supply
of P-Notes would come down, in other words. A time-bound plan to
phase-out P-Notes would make eminent sense.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 29-07- 2015.)

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On Crony Capitalism

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In his 2012 book, Breakout Nations, Ruchir Sharma said that any country that produces too many billionaires, relative to its size, is in all likelihood off balance. “If the average billionaire of a country has amassed too much wealth, not just billions but tens of billions, the lack of balance can lead to stagnation,” said he. At that time, he had said that “many of India’s super rich still inspire national pride, not resentment, and they can travel the country with no fear for their safety”, but this “genial state of affairs could change quickly.”

That point may well have been reached. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan on Monday came down heavily on crony capitalism – the nexus between “corrupt businessmen” and “venal” and “corrupt politicians” – which, he said, is “killing transparency and competition” and is “harmful to free enterprise, opportunity and economic growth.” The issue of cronyism had played out in full during the recent general elections. “If the debate during the elections is any pointer, this is a very real concern of the public in India today,” Mr Rajan added. Some argue that the charges of cronyism hurled at Narendra Modi during the election campaign, especially his closeness to Mukesh Ambani and Gautam Adani, did not stick; otherwise, how would his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, have gained a majority in the Lok Sabha? In this narrative, the fear of cronyism is exaggerated.

One school of thought says that Japan and South Korea progressed rapidly because a handful of their companies were singled out for special treatment by the government, and they delivered the results. Most of them have become global conglomerates. That may be true but the Indian experience inspires no confidence. What did telecom companies do when the government gave them inexpensive spectrum? Some of them sold stakes to foreigners at a huge premium. It was only after the Comptroller and Auditor General quantified the loss – it could be up to Rs 1.76 lakh crore, it said – that the people got to know of the extent of the scam. Similarly, the special economic zones became an opportunity for land grabbing. And coal blocks were bagged to lay hands on an undervalued natural resource.
These instances shouldn’t surprise anybody because cronyism has been an integral part of Indian business. In the pre-liberalisation age, many business houses got industrial licences and just sat on them in order to create a scarcity that would keep prices high. Most worked behind the scenes to ensure that rivals were denied licences. “An important issue in the recent election was whether we had substituted crony socialism of the past with crony capitalism, where the rich and the influential are alleged to have received land, natural resources and spectrum in return for pay-offs to venal politicians,” RBI Governor Rajan said.

Cronyism acts as a significant entry barrier into regulated businesses. It is not easy to take on entrenched players who have decision makers in their pockets. If they can cause ministers to be shunted out, imagine the damage they can inflict on newcomers. That’s why most young entrepreneurs these days are happy to confine themselves to unregulated sectors such as information technology. One way to end cronyism in the allocation of natural resources is to move to transparent auctions, like it has happened in spectrum. So far, it seems to have worked well. There is no reason why it can’t be replicated in other sectors. The government needs to put in place safeguards that will ensure that there is no collusion between bidders.

So strong is popular resentment at cronyism and privatesector corruption that nobody has dared to name a businessman for the Bharat Ratna this year.

(Source: Extracts from an article by Mr. Bhupesh Bhandari in Business Standard dated 15-08-2014)

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NJAC: Govt. in a hurry has missed two important checks

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The Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014, passed by the Parliament has proposed the establishment of a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The NJAC will replace the collegium of judges, which is currently responsible for appointments to the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts.

The idea of such a constitutional commission is a sensible one, especially given the increasing dissatisfaction with the opaque functioning of the judicial collegium.

But the Parliament ought to have been careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Despite its many faults, the collegium has been widely credited with protecting judicial independence, its raison d’etre and a fundamental prerequisite of the rule of law. In the two decades since, while other deficiencies have plagued the collegium, unbridled executive interference has not been one of them. In its collective anxiety to replace the collegium, the Parliament has failed to incorporate the collegium’s key safeguard against an erosion of judicial independence, i.e., a predominant voice for the judiciary in appointments. Experience demonstrates that a failure to give the judiciary preponderance in judicial appointments, especially in India’s constitutional democracy where the judiciary is the only real check on the legislature and executive, is prejudicial to judicial independence. As Nani Palkhivala powerfully described it, executive dominance immediately prior to and during the Emergency left our Constitution, specifically the judiciary, ‘defaced and defiled.’ For the nation to be once bitten and not twice shy is to take a blinkered view of this history.

However, in incorporating judicial preponderance, the cabal-like functioning that the collegium has often been accused of must not be replicated. Two checks are necessary: first, the NJAC must have a seventh member who is a retired Supreme Court judge for Supreme Court appointments and transfers between High Courts. For appointments to a high court, this seventh member should be a retired judge of the concerned high court. The former must be appointed by the Prime Minister, leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India whereas the latter must analogously be appointed by the Chief Minister of the state, leader of the opposition in that state and the chief justice of the high court. This proposal will ensure that appointments to high courts are not entirely dictated by the Centre. It deserves the consideration of state governments to whom the constitutional amendment will now be sent for ratification. Secondly, a key modification is necessary to the appointment procedure. The exercise of a veto by any NJAC member must be accompanied by reasons, which must be publicly disclosed. Currently , this is not provided for. A failure to disclose reasons will allow pernicious prejudices that have often prevented fine judicial minds from being elevated to the Supreme Court to persist. Transparency, a key leitmotif of the reform of the appointments process, demands such disclosure. It is also imperative that the criteria for selecting judges, and other key regulations, are carefully formulated by the NJAC itself and not left to the executive.

Judges have been appointed to the Supreme Court who have not delivered any significant judgments during their high court tenures. This is not peculiar to collegium appointments but happened during the period of executive dominance too. For elevation of judges, the NJAC must ascertain the number of judgments delivered, undertake an assessment of their quality and the judges’ adherence to values of judicial life. For assessing lawyers and jurists, the extent and quality of their practice or academic work and probity of conduct must be gauged. The NJAC would do well to study the workings of Judicial Performance Evaluation programmes in several states in the US and establish well-defined criteria to assess potential adjudicative ability.

Without such criteria being incorporated and publicly known, the establishment of the NJAC is meaningless. Worse still, without judicial preponderance, its very existence has the ominous potential of setting the clock back on the nation’s long quest of rescuing the judiciary from the clutches of executive caprice. No matter how noble the professed intention of the government in proposing this amendment, and Parliament in passing it, the undue haste with which the bills were piloted through, the lack of meaning full public debate and the complete absence of genuine parliamentary scrutiny, suggest otherwise. They demonstrate a powerful government in an inexplicable hurry, and a lame-duck Parliament seemingly failing to grasp the magnitude of its actions, the effects of which will far outlive its members’ tenures. If the NJAC is to be a genuine third way for judicial appointments, let it be a way that is underpinned by respect for the judiciary, pervaded by transparency and alive to the lessons from India’s chequered history of judicial independence.

(Source: An article by Ms. Ruma Pal and Mr. Arghya Sengupta in Times of India dated 17-08-2014).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31 dated 17th September, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Indian Rupees

Presently, an Indian company can, under the Automatic Route, issue shares/convertible debentures to a person resident outside India against lump-sum technical knowhow fee, royalty, External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) (other than import dues deemed as ECB or Trade Credit) and import payables of capital goods by units in Special Economic Zones subject to conditions like entry route, sectoral cap, pricing guidelines, etc. and compliance with applicable tax laws.

This circular permits an Indian company to issue equity shares against any other funds payable by the investee company, remittance of which does not require prior permission of the Government of India or RBI under FEMA, 1999 or any rules/regulations framed or directions issued thereunder, if:

1. The equity shares are issued in accordance with the extant FDI guidelines on sectoral caps, pricing guidelines etc.;

2. A pplicable taxes have been deducted on the funds payable and the conversion to equity is net of applicable taxes.

However, issue of shares/convertible debentures that require Government approval in terms of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 of FEMA 20 or import dues deemed as ECB or trade credit or payable against import of second hand machinery will continue to be dealt in accordance with extant guidelines.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30 dated 15th September, 2014

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Data on Import of Gold Statement – Submission under XBRL

This
circular states that statement on import of Gold, both monthly and
half-yearly, now have to be filed in XBRL format from September, 2014.
However, the monthly and half-yearly statement for September has to be
filed both manually (format annexed to this circular) as well as in the
XBRL format. From October, 2014 only the XBRL statement needs to be
filed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28 dated 8th September, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings: Hedging Facilities for Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs)

Presently, FPI are permitted to hedge their currency risk on the market value of entire investment in equity and/or debt in India as on a particular date.

This circular permits FPI, holding securities under the Portfolio Investment Scheme (PIS) in terms of schedules 2, 2A, 5, and 8 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or issue of security by a person resident outside India) Regulations, 2000 (Notification No. FEMA 20 /2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000), to now hedge the coupon receipts arising out of their investments in debt securities in India falling due during the next 12 months. The hedge contracts cannot be rebooked on cancellation, but they can be rolled over on maturity if the relative coupon amount is still to be received.

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Press Note No. 8 (2014 Series) issued by DIPP dated 27th August, 2014

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Policy for Private Investment in Rail Infrastructure Sector through Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment

This Press Note, with immediate effect, permits FDI in the following sectors of the Railway Transport Sector: –

Construction, operation and maintenance of the following.

(i)Suburban corridor projects through PPP, (ii) Highspeed train projects, (iii) Dedicated freight lines, (iv) Rolling stock including train sets, and locomotives/ coaches manufacturing and maintenance facilities, (v) Railway Electrification, (vi) Signaling systems, (vii) Freight terminals, (viii) Passenger terminals, (ix) Infrastructure in industrial park pertaining to railway line/sidings including electrified railway lines and connectivities to main railway line and (x) Mass Rapid Transport Systems.

FDI beyond 49% of the equity of the investee company in sensitive areas from security point of view, will be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for consideration on a case to case basis. Paragraph 6.1 has been amended as under: – 6.1 Prohibited Sectors: FDI is prohibited in:

(a) Lottery Business, including Government/private
lottery, online lotteries etc.
(b) Gambling and Betting, including casinos etc.
(c) Chit funds
(d) Nidhi company
(e) Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs)
(f) Real Estate Business or Construction of Farm Houses
(g) M anufacturing of Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes
(h) A ctivities/sectors not open to private sector investment: e.g: (l) Atomic energy and (ll) Railway operations ( other than permitted activities mentioned in para 6.2)

Foreign technology collaboration in any form, including licensing of franchise, trademark, brand name, management contract, is also prohibited for Lottery Business and Gambling and Betting activities.

Paragraph 6.1.12.1(ii) & 6.1.12.1(iii) are amended as under: –

(ii) “Infrastructure” refers to facilitiesrequired for functioning of units located in the Industrial Park and includes roads ( including approach roads), railway line/sidings including electrified railway lines and connectivities to the main railway line, water supply and sewerage, common effluent treatment facility, telecom network, generation and distribution of power, air conditioning.

(iii) “Common Facilities” refer to the facilities available for all units loicated in the industrial park, and include facilities of power, roads (including approach roads), railway line/sidings including electrifies railway lines and connectivities to the main railway line, water supply and sewerage, common effluent treatment, common testing, telecom services, air conditioning, common facility building, industrial canteens, convention/conference halls, parking, travel desks, security service, first aid center, ambulance and other safety services, training facilities and such other facilities meant for common use of the units located in the Industrial Park.

A new Paragraph 6.2.16, as under, has been added: –

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Press Note No. 7 (2014 Series) issued by DIPP dated 26th August, 2014

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Review of the policy on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Defence sector – amendment to ‘Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2014

This Press Note has modified Paragraphs 4.1.3(v)(d) and 6.2.6 of ‘Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2014’ relating to Defence Sector, with immediate effect.

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Wealth Tax – Valuation of asset – If in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, if the value determined by the taxpayer on the basis of rules 3 to 7 is absurd or has no correlation to the fair market value or otherwise not practicable, in such a case, it is open to the Assessing Officer to invoke rule 8 of Schedule III and determine the value of the asset either under rule 20 or refer u/s. 16A, for determination of the valuation of the asset

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Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [2014] 365 ITR 515 (SC)

The dispute before the Supreme Court related to wealthtax return of the appellant-assessee for the assessment year 1993-94. The assessee filed its return of taxable wealth at Rs.1,31,76,000 against which the assessment was completed at net wealth of Rs. 3,90,93,800. The dispute was about the valuation of the property in question being a residential flat situated in Worli, Bombay, which was owned by the assessee and used as a guest house. The immovable property was acquired by the assessee before 1st April, 1974, and the assessee filed return on self-assessment as per rules 3 to 7 of Schedule III to the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (for short, “AO” ) was of the opinion that the value of the said flat as disclosed in the return (as Rs.1,55,139) did not appear to be in consonance with the market value for a similar size flat in Mumbai and referred the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer under Rule 20 of Schedule III who valued the flat at Rs. 2,60,73,000. The Assessing Officer also relied upon the agreement to sell of the said flat dated 15th September, 1995, entered by the assessee with its vendor. In the said agreement, the price of the flat was shown at Rs.10,26,000. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that due to wide variation between the alleged market value as determined by the Departmental Valuation Officer and the value as disclosed by the assessee, it was not practicable to value the property as per rules 3 to7 hence, rule 8(a) was attached.

The Assessing Office further observed that as the assessee had taken plea that it was paying rent at Rs. 500 per month prior to the purchase of the flat and incurred expenditure on the improvement of the said flat, it was difficult for the Assessing Officer to ascertain the price and, therefore, it would be impracticable to apply rule 3.

On appeal, preferred by the assessee, the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. The appellate order was confirmed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Thereafter, the assessee preferred a miscellaneous application u/s. 35 of the Act seeking rectification of mistakes of fact and law apparent from the Tribunal’s order. It was rejected by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Finally, the High Court also affirmed the view taken by the Revenue.

Further on appeal, the Supreme Court, after referring to various provisions held that a conjoint reading of the various provisions makes it clear that the Legislature has not laid down a rigid directive on the Assessing Officer that the valuation of an asset is mandatorily required to be made by applying rule 3; the Assessing Officer has the discretionary power to determine whether rule 3 or rule 8 is applicable in a particular case. If the Assessing Officer is of the opinion that it is not practicable to apply rule 3, the Assessing Officer can apply rule 8 and value of the asset can be determined in the manner laid down in rule 20 or section 16A.

The word ‘practicable’ is to be construed widely. In the present context if in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, if the value determined by the taxpayer on the basis of rules 3 to 7 is absurd or has no correlation to the fair market value or otherwise not practicable, in such a case, it is open to the Assessing Officer to invoke rule 8 of Schedule III and determine the value of the asset either under rule 20 or refer u/s. 16A, for determination of the valuation of the asset.

The Supreme Court held that the invocation of rule 8(a) cannot be based on ipse dixit of the Assessing Officer. The discretion vested in the Assessing Officer to discard the value determined as per rule 3 has to be judicially exercised. It must be reasonable, based on subjective satisfaction; the power must be shown to be objectively exercised and is open to judicial scrutiny.

The Supreme Court observed that in the present case, the Assessing Officer refused to accept self-assessment for the following reasons:

(i) T here was a wide variation between the market value and the valuation done by the assessee as per the municipal taxes.

(ii) T he property was used as a guest house.

(iii) T he value for levy of municipal tax was very low, as the total rateable value of the assessee was done by the municipal authorities at Rs.6,573 per annum.

(iv) T he assessee was a tenant of the property at Rs.500 per month. After purchase of the property a lot of expenditure was incurred from time to time on improvement of the property which was very difficult to ascertain.

(v) T he value of the building was grossly understated as the assessee himself entered into an agreement to sell the same in the year 1995 for a sum of Rs.10,26,000.

Considering the above factors, the Assessing Officer assessed the value of the property at Rs. 2,60,73,000 as valued by the Department Valuation Officer.

The Commissioner of Wealth-tax held that the reference made by the Assessing Officer to the Department Valuation Officer was justified. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal also justified the action of the Assessing Officer and on appeal, the same was affirmed by the High Court, vide the impugned judgment.

The Supreme Court after careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, was of the opinion that the Assessing Officer was justified in holding that it was not practicable to apply rule 3 in the instant case and rightly referred the matter to the Valuation Officer u/s. 16A for determination of the value of the asset. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, has rightly assessed the wealth-tax on the basis of such value determined by the Valuation Officer. The Supreme Court did not find any merit in this appeal and the same was accordingly, dismissed.

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Capital gains –Exemption – In peculiar facts of the case, namely that the sale deed could not be executed in pursuance of agreement to sell for the reason that the assessee had been prevented from dealing with the residential house by an order of a competent court, which could not have been violated, the relief u/s. 54 should not be denied.

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Sanjeev Lal & Anr. vs. CIT & Anr. [2014] 365 ITR 389 (SC)

A residential house, being house No.267 situated in Sector 9-C, Chandigarh, was a self acquired property of Shri Amrit Lal, who had executed a Will whereby life interest in the aforesaid house had been given to his wife and upon death of his wife, the house was to be given in favour of two sons of his pre-deceased son – Late Shri Moti Lal and his widow. Upon the death of Shri Amrit Lal, possession of house was given to his widow. His widow, Smt. Shakuntala Devi expired on 29th August, 1993. Upon the death of Smt. Shakuntala Devi, as per the Will, the ownership in respect of the house in question came to be vested in the assessee and another grandchild of the late Shri Amrit Lal.

The assessee had decided to sell the house and with that intention they had entered into an agreement to sell the house with Shri Sandeep Talwar on 27th December, 2002, for a consideration of Rs.1.32 crore. Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.15 lakh had been received by way of earnest money. As the assessee had decided to sell the house in question, he had also decided to purchase another residential house bearing house No.528 in Sector 8, Chandigarh, so that the sale proceeds, including capital gain, can be used for purchase of the aforesaid house No.528. The said house was purchased on 30th April, 2003, i.e., well within one year from the date on which the agreement to sell had been entered into by the assessee.

The validity of the Will had been questioned by Shri Ranjeet Lal, who was another son of the deceased testator, Shri Amrit Lal, by filing a civil suit, wherein the trial court, by an interim order had restrained the appellants from dealing with the house property. During the pendency of the suit, Shri Ranjeet Lal expired on 2nd December, 2000, leaving behind him no legal heirs. The suit filed by him had been dismissed in May, 2004, as there was no representative on his behalf in the suit.

Due to the interim relief granted in the above stated suit, the assessee could not execute the sale deed till the suit came to be dismissed and the validity of the Will was upheld. Thus, the assessee executed the sale deed in 2004 and the same was registered on 24th September, 2004.

Upon transfer of the house property, long-term capital gain had arisen, but as the assessee had purchase a new residential house and the amount of the capital gain had been used for purchase of the said new asset. Believing that the long-term capital gain was not chargeable to income-tax as per the provisions of section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the assessee did not disclose the said long-term capital gain in his return of income filed for the assessment year 2005-06.

In the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2005-06 under the Act, the Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee was not entitled to any benefit u/s. 54 of the Act for the reason that the transfer of the original asset, i.e., the residential house, had been effected on 24th September, 2004, whereas the assessee had purchased another residential house on 30th April, 2003, i.e., more than one year prior to the purchase of the new asset and, therefore, the assessee was made liable to pay income-tax on the capital gain u/s. 45 of the Act.

The appeal, as far as it pertained to the benefit u/s. 54 of the Act was concerned, had been dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and, therefore, the appellants had approached the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal also upheld the orders passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and, therefore, the appellants had approached the High Court by filing appeals u/s. 260A of the Act, which were dismissed. Thus, the assessee approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that upon plain reading of section 54 of the Act, it is very clear that so as to avail of the benefit u/s. 54 of the Act, one must purchase a residential house/new asset within one year prior or two years after the date on which transfer of the residential house in respect of which the long-term capital gain had arisen has taken place.

The Supreme Court noted that in the instant case, the following three dates were not in dispute. The residential house was transferred by the appellants and the sale deed had been registered on 24th September, 2004. The sale deed had been executed in pursuance of an agreement to sell which had been executed on 27th December, 2002, and out of the total consideration of Rs.1.32 crore, Rs.15 lakh had been received by the appellants by way of earnest money when the agreement to sell had been executed and a new residential house/new asset had been purchased by the appellants on 30th April, 2003. It was also not in dispute that there was litigation wherein the will of the late Shri Amrit Lal had been challenged by his son and the assessee had been restrained from dealing with the house in question by a judicial order and the said judicial order had been vacated only in the month of May, 2004, and, therefore, the sale deed could not be executed before the said order was vacated though the agreement to sell had been executed on 27th December, 2002.

The Supreme Court remarked that if one considers the date on which it was decided to sell the property, i.e., 27th December, 2002, as the date of transfer or sale, it cannot be disputed that the assessee would be entitled to the benefit under the provisions of section 54 of the Act, because longterm capital gain earned by the appellants had been used for purchase of a new asset/residential house on 30th April, 2003, i.e., well within one year from the date of transfer of the house which resulted into long-term capital gain.

According to the Supreme Court, the question therefore to be considered was whether the agreement to sell which had been executed on 27th December, 2002, can be considered as a date on which the property, i.e., the residential house had been transferred.

The Supreme Court held that in normal circumstances by executing an agreement to sell in respect of an immoveable property, a right in person is created in favour of the transferee/vendee. When such a right is created in favour of the vendee, the vendor is restrained from selling the said property to someone else because the vendee, in whose favour the right in personam is created, has a legitimate right to enforce specific performance of the agreement, if the vendor, for some reason is not executing the sale deed. Thus, by virtue of the question is whether the entire property can be said to have been sold at the time when an agreement to sell is entered into. In normal circumstances, the aforestated question has to be answered in the negative. However, looking at the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act, which defines the word “transfer” in relation to a capital asset, one can say that if a right in the property is extinguished by execution of an agreement to sell, the capital asset can be deemed to have been transferred.

Consequences of execution of the agreement to sell are also very clear and they are to the effect that the appellants could not have sold the property to someone else. in practical life, there are events when a person, even after executing an agreement to sell an immovable property in favour of one person, tries to sell the property to another. In our opinion, Such an act would not be in accordance with law because once an agreement to sell is executed  in favour of one person, the said person gets a right  to get the property transferred in his favour by filing  a suit  for specific performance and, therefore, without hesitation it could be said that some right, in respect of the said property, belonging to the assessee had been extinguished and some right had been created in favour of the vendee/ transferee, when the agreement to sell had been executed.

Thus,  a  right  in  respect  of  the  capital  asset,  viz.,  the property in question had been transferred by the assessee in favour of the vendee/transferee on 27th december, 2002. The sale deed could not be executed for the reason that the assessee had been prevented from dealing with the residential house by an order of a competent court, which they could not have violated.

In view of the aforesaid peculiar facts of the case and looking at the definition of the term “transfer” as defined u/s. 2(47) of the Act, the Supreme Court was of the view that the assessee was entitled to relief u/s. 54 of the act in respect of the long-term capital gain, which he had earned in pursuance of transfer of his residential property being house No. 267, Sector-9-C, situated in Chandigarh and used for purchase of a new asset/residential house.

Acceptance and Repayment of Loans & Deposits – Applicability Journal Entries

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Issue For Consideration

Section
269SS of the Income-tax Act provides that no person shall take or accept
any loan or deposit otherwise than by an account payee cheque or bank
draft or by use of ECS through a bank account if the amount or the
aggregate of amounts of loan or deposit is twenty thousand rupees or
more. Likewise, section 269T provides that any loan or deposit shall be
repaid by an account payee cheque or bank draft drawn in the name of the
person who has made the loan or deposit or by use of ECS through a bank
account, if the amount of loan or deposit together with interest is Rs.
20,000 or more.

A violation of the provisions of section 269SS
attracts the penalty u/s. 271D and of section 269T attracts the penalty
u/s. 271E of an amount that is equivalent to the amount of loan or
deposit taken or repaid. No penalty however, is leviable where the
person is found to be prevented by a reasonable cause for the failure to
comply with the provisions of section 269Ss or section 269T in terms of
section 273B of the Act.

These sections list certain exceptions
wherein the specified transactions shall not be regarded as in
violation of the provisions. None of the exceptions specifically exclude
the transactions that are settled by an accounting entry or adjustment
of accounts. This has led to a controversy in a case where a transaction
of a loan or a deposit is executed or settled by a journal entry not
involving any movement of cash or funds. The Bombay High Court has held
that repayment of a loan by settlement of account through a journal
entry violated the provisions of section 269T while the Delhi High Court
has held otherwise.

Triumph International Finance(I) Ltd .’s case
In
CIT vs. Triumph International Finance (I) Limited, 345 ITR 270(Bom),
the High Court was asked by the Revenue to consider the following
question;

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that transactions
effected through journal entries in the books of the assessee would not
amount to repayment of any loan or deposit otherwise than by account
payee cheque or account payee bank draft within the meaning of section
269T to attract levy of penalty u/s. 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The
assessee, a Public Limited Company, a member of the NSE and a Category I
Merchant Banker, registered with SEBI, which was engaged in the
business of shares, stock broking, investment and trading in shares and
securities had accepted a sum of Rs. 4,29,04,722/- as and by way of
loan/inter-corporate deposit from the Investment Trust of India before
1st April, 2002, which was repayable during the assessment year
2003-2004. On 3rd October, 2002, it had transferred 1,99,300 shares of
Rashal Agrotech Limited, held by it, to the Investment Trust of India
for an aggregate consideration of Rs.4,28,99,325/-. As a result, the
assessee, on one hand, was liable to repay the loan/ inter-corporate
deposit amounting to Rs. 4,29,04,722/- to the Investment Trust of India
and on the other hand, to receive Rs. 4,28,99,325/- from the Investment
Trust of India towards sale price of the shares of Rashal Agrotech
Limited sold to the Investment Trust of India.

Instead of
repaying the loan/inter-corporate deposit to the Investment Trust of
India and separately receiving the sale price of the shares from the
Investment Trust of India, both the parties agreed that the amounts
payable/ receivable be set-off in the respective books of account by
making journal entries and the balance be paid by account payee cheque.
Accordingly, after setting off of the mutual claims through journal
entries, the balance amount of Rs. 5,397/- due and payable by the
assessee to the Investment Trust of India was paid by a crossed cheque
dated 19th February, 2003 drawn on Citibank.

It had filed its
return of income declaring loss of Rs. 17,27,21,815/- for the assessment
year 2003-2004. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) determining
the loss at Rs. 9,84,92,500/-.

Relying on the comments in the Tax
Audit Report regarding repayment of loan/inter-corporate deposit,
otherwise than by an account payee cheque or draft, the AO issued a
show-cause notice u/s. 271E, calling upon the assessee to show cause as
to why action should not be taken against the assessee for violating the
provisions of section 269T of the Act.

The detailed reply
however, was ignored by the AO who by an order dated 21st March, 2006
passed under section 271E of the Act, on the basis of the report of the
Joint Parliamentary Committee of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on the Stock
Market Scam, imposed penalty amounting to Rs. 4,28,99,325/- on the
ground that the assessee had repaid the loan/inter-corporate deposit to
the extent of Rs. 4,28,99,325/- in contravention of the provisions of
section 269T of the Act.

On appeal filed by the assessee, the
Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the penalty levied by the AO. On
further appeal filed by the assessee, the Tribunal allowed the appeal by
following its decisions in some of the group cases, and held that the
payment through journal entries did not fall within the ambit of section
269SS or 269T of the Act and consequently no penalty could be levied
either u/s. 271D or 271E of the Act.

The Revenue, in its appeal
to the High Court, submitted that the assessee belonged to the Ketan
Parekh Group, which was involved in the securities scam. It submitted
that the Ketan Parekh Group was found to be indulging in large scale
manipulation of prices of select scrips through fraudulent use of bank
and other public funds and had flouted all the norms of risk management
by making transactions through a large number of entities so as to hide
the nexus between the sources of funds and their ultimate use with the
sole motive of evading tax. It was further submitted that since the
language of section 269T of the Act was clear and unambiguous, the
tribunal ought to have held that repayment of the loan/inter-corporate
deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque or demand draft was in
violation of the provisions of section 269T of the Act and, hence, the
penalty imposed u/s. 271E of the Act was justified.

The
assessee, on the other hand, submitted that section 269T of the Act was
enacted to curb the menace of giving false explanation of the
unaccounted money found during the course of search and seizure; that
the bonafide transaction of repayment of loan or deposit by way of
adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of
business would not come within the mischief of the provisions of section
269T of the Act; the legislative history as also the circulars issued
by the CBDT confirmed that the provisions were not meant to hit genuine
transactions and the legislative intent was to mitigate any unintended
hardships caused by the provisions to genuine transactions; that in the
present case, genuineness of the transactions entered into by the
assessee with the Investment Trust of India was not in doubt; that no
additions on account of the transactions had been made in the regular
assessment; section 269T postulated that if a loan or deposit was repaid
by an outflow of funds, the same had to be by an account payee cheque
or demand draft and that discharge of the debt in the nature of loan or
deposit in a manner otherwise than by an outflow of funds would not be
hit by the provisions of section 269T.

The assessee  further submitted that instead of repaying the amount by account payee cheque/demand  draft  and receiving back the amount by way of demand draft/cheque, the parties, as and by way of commercial prudence, had settled the account by netting off the accounts and paid the balance by account payee cheque. relying on a decision of the apex Court in the case of J.

B.    Boda and Company P. Limited, 223 ITR 271(SC), it was submitted that the two-way traffic of forwarding bank draft and receiving back more or less same amount by way of bank draft was unnecessary and, therefore, in the facts of the present case, no fault could be found with the repayment of loan through journal entries. it was also submitted that the plain reading of section 269t, that each and every loan or deposit had to be repaid only by an account payee cheque or draft if accepted, would lead to absurdity because, by such interpretation not only mala fide transactions, but even genuine transactions would be affected.

Relying on the judgments of the apex Court in the cases of Kum. A. B. Shanti, 255 ITR 258 (SC) and J. H. Gotla, 156 ITR 323, the assessee submitted that if a strict and literal construction of a statute led to an absurd result, a result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation as ascertained from the scheme of the legislation and, if
another construction was possible apart from the strict and literal construction, then, that construction should be preferred to strict literal construction.

Inviting the attention of the court to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the books on accountancy, the assessee submitted that set-off of the claim/counter- claim otherwise than by account-payee cheque or bank draft was legally permissible in commercial transactions as also in the accounting practice. therefore, it must be held that genuine transactions like the transaction in the present case involving repayment of loan through journal entries did not violate section 269t of the act.

In any event, it was contended that having regard to the commercial dealings between the parties it must be held that there was reasonable cause for repaying the loan through journal entries. in view of section 273B of the act, penalty was not imposable u/s. 271 e of the act. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed on the decisions of the high Courts in the cases of Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited, 262 ITR 260 (Del.), Shree Ambica Flour Mills Corporation) 6 DTR 169 (Guj.) and Motta Constructions P. Limited, 338 ITR 66 (Bom.).

On careful consideration of the rival submissions, the court observed that the basic question to be considered in  the  appeal  was  whether  repayment  of  loan  of  Rs. 4,28,99,325/- by making journal entries in the books of account maintained by the assessee was in contravention of section 269t of the act, and, if so, for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269T, the assessee was liable for penalty u/s. 271e of the act.

The court observed that the argument advanced by the counsel for the assessee that the bonafide transaction of repayment of loan/deposit by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business would not come within the mischief of section 269t could not be accepted, because, the section did  not make  any distinction between the bonafide and non-bonafide transactions and required the entities specified therein not to make repayment of any loan/deposit together with the interest, if any otherwise than by an account payee cheque/bank draft if the amount of loan/deposit, with interest if any, exceeded the limits prescribed therein. Similarly, the argument that only in cases where any loan or deposit was repaid by an outflow of funds, section 269t  provided  for  repayment  by  an  account  payee cheque/draft, could not be accepted because section 269t neither referred to the repayment of loan/deposit by outflow of funds nor referred to any of other permissible modes of repayment of loan/deposit, but merely provided for an embargo on repayment of loan/deposit except by the modes specified therein. Therefore, in the case before it, where loan/deposit had been repaid by debiting the account through journal entries, it must be held that the assessee had contravened the provisions of section 269t of the act.

The court found that the reliance on the decision of the apex court in the case of J. B. Boda & Company P. Limited (supra) was misplaced as the aforesaid decision had no relevance to the facts of the present case, because, section 80-o and section 269t operated in completely different fields. The object of section 80-O was to encourage Indian Companies to develop technical knowhow and make it available to foreign companies and foreign enterprises so as to augment the foreign exchange earnings, whereas, the object of section 269t was to counteract evasion of tax.  for  section  80-o,  receiving  income  in  convertible foreign exchange is the basic requirement, where as, for section 269t, compliance of the conditions set out therein is the basic requirement. Section 80-O does not prescribe any particular mode for receiving the convertible foreign exchange,   whereas,   section   269t   bars   repayment of loan or deposit by any mode other than the mode stipulated under that section and for contravention of section 269t penalty is imposable u/s. 271e of the act. In these circumstances, the decision of the apex Court rendered in the context of section 80-o cannot be applied while interpreting the provisions of section 269t of the act.

The  high  Court  further  noted  that  on  reading  section 269t, 271e and 273B together, it became clear that  u/s. 269T it was mandatory for the persons specified therein to repay loan/deposit only by account payee cheque/draft if the amount of loan/deposit together with interest, if any, exceeded the limits prescribed therein; non-compliance of the provisions of section 269t rendered the person liable for penalty u/s. 271e in the absence of the reasonable cause for failure to comply with the provisions of section 269t of the act.

The court refused to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the assessee that if section 269t was construed literally, it would lead to absurdity, because, repayment  of loan/deposit by account payee cheque/bank draft was the most common mode of repaying the loan/deposit and making such common method as mandatory did not lead to any absurdity. Having held so, the court however observed that, in some cases, genuine business constraints necessitated repayment of loan/deposit by a mode other than the mode  prescribed  u/s.  269t  and  to  cater  to  the  needs of such exigencies, the legislature had enacted section 273B which provided that no penalty u/s. 271e should be imposed for contravention of section 269t if reasonable cause for such contravention was shown. the court noted that in the present case, the cause shown by the assessee for repayment of the loan/deposit otherwise than by account-payee cheque/bank draft was reasonable, as it was on account of the fact that the assessee was liable to receive amount towards the sale price of the shares sold by the assessee to the person from whom loan/deposit was received by the assessee, in as much as it would have been an empty formality to repay the loan/deposit amount by account-payee cheque/draft and receive  back almost the same amount towards the sale price of the shares.

Neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan/deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business had been doubted in the regular assessment and there was nothing on record to suggest that the amounts  advanced  by  investment  trust  of  india  to  the assessee represented the unaccounted money of the investment trust of india or the assessee. The fact that the assessee company belonged to the Ketan Parekh Group which was involved in the securities scam could not be a ground for sustaining penalty and it was not in dispute that settling the claims by making journal entries in the respective books was also one of the recognised modes of repaying loan/deposit.

In  the  result,  the  court  held  that  the  tribunal  was  not justified in holding that repayment of loan/deposit through journal entries did not violate the provisions of section 269T of the Act. However, in the absence of any finding recorded in the assessment order or in the penalty order to the effect that the repayment of loan/deposit was not a bonafide transaction and was made with a view to evade tax, it was held that the cause shown by the assessee was a reasonable cause and, therefore, in view of section 273B of the act, no penalty u/s. 271e could be imposed for contravening the provisions of section 269t of the act.

Worldwide Township projects lTD.’s case
The issue   inter alia   recently arose for consideration of the delhi high Court in the case of CIT vs. Worldwide Townships Projects Ltd., 269 CTR 444, wherein the revenue challenged the order of the tribunal holding that the penalty order passed by the ao u/s. 271d of the act was unsustainable in law.

In this case, the assessee filed its return of income for the assessment year 2007-08 on 30-10-2007, which return was taken up for scrutiny. the ao found that during the year in question, the assessee had shown purchases of land  worth  rs.  14.22  crore,  which  had  remained  to  be paid at the end of the year. This was accordingly reflected as Sundry Creditors in the name of one PACL India Ltd., which had purchased lands on behalf of the assessee from several land owners on payments made by it through demand drafts to various land owners on behalf of the assessee.

The AO held  that the transactions amounted to extending of a loan to the assessee by PACL India Ltd and that the said transaction fell foul of the provisions of sections 269SS and 269T of the Act, since no funds had passed through the bank accounts of the assessee for acquisition of the lands. The ao levied a  penalty u/s.  271d holding the assesssee responsible for violation of the provisions of section 269SS for sums aggregating Rs.14,25,74,302/- that, in his view,  were transferred to the loan account    in the form of book entries, otherwise than through an account payee cheque or a account payee draft.

In the appeal by the assessee, the Cit (appeals), relying on the decision of the delhi high Court in the case of Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd,: 262 itr 260, disagreed with the findings of the AO and deleted the penalty in the given circumstances  of  the  case.  The  tribunal  held  that  the order passed by the ao was beyond the time permissible u/s. 275(1)(a) and was not tenable in law.

On a further appeal to the high Court by the revenue, the delhi high Court was unable to appreciate as to how, in the given circumstances of the case, there was an offence u/s. 269SS of the Act. The High Court observed that a plain reading of the provision indicated that the import of the above provision was limited and it applied only to a transaction where a deposit or a loan was accepted by an assessee, otherwise than by an account payee cheque or an account payee draft. the ambit of the section was clearly restricted to transactions involving acceptance of money and was not intended to affect cases where a debt or a liability arose on account of book entries. the object of the section was to prevent transactions in currency, which fact was also clearly explicit from Clause (iii) of the explanation to section 269SS of the Act, which defined  a loan or deposit to mean “loan or deposit of money.”  The liability recorded in the books of account by way of journal entries, i.e., crediting the account of a party to whom monies were payable or debiting the account of a party from whom monies were receivable in the books  of account, was clearly outside the ambit of the provision of section 269SS of the Act, because passing such entries did not involve acceptance of any loan or deposit of money. in the present case, admittedly  no  money was transacted other  than  through  banking  channels in as much as PACL India Ltd. made certain payments through banking channels to land owners on behalf of the assessee, which were recorded by the assessee in its books by crediting the account of PACL India Ltd, and in view of that admitted position, no infringement of section 269SS of the Act was made out.

The  delhi  high  Court  noted   that  the  court,  in  the  case of Noida Toll  Bridge Co. Ltd. (supra), had considered     a similar case where a company had paid money to the Government of Delhi for acquisition of a land on behalf  of the assessee therein. It noted that, in the said case, the ao had levied a penalty for alleged violation of the provisions of section 269SS, which was confirmed by the Commissioner(appeals), but was deleted by the tribunal. In an appeal by the Revenue, the High Court held as under:-

“While holding that the provisions of section 269SS of the Act were not attracted, the Tribunal has noticed that: (i) in the instant case, the transaction was by an account payee cheque, (ii) no payment on account was made in cash either by the assessee or on its behalf, (iii) no loan was accepted by the assessee in cash, and (iv) the payment of Rs. 4.85 crore made by the assessee through IL & FS, which holds more than 30% of the paid-up capital of the assessee, by journal entry in the books of account of the assessee by crediting the account of IL & FS. Having regard to the aforenoted findings, which are essentially findings of fact, we are in complete agreement with the Tribunal that the provisions of section 269SS were not attracted on the facts of the case. Admittedly, neither the assessee nor IL & FS had made any payment in cash. The order of the Tribunal does not give rise to any question of law, much less a substantial question of law.”

The  high  Court  accordingly  held  that  there  was  no violation of the provisions of section 269SS on passing of the journal entries for accepting a liability that arose on account of the payment made by a person on behalf of the assessee.

Observations.
Chapter XXB containing sections 269SS to section 269TT were introduced by the Income-tax (Second Amendment) act, 1981 with effect from 11th july, 1981 with a view to counter the evasion of tax. the object of the provisions are explained by the CBDT in its Circular no. 345 dated 28-06-1982 stating that the proliferation of black money posed a serious threat to the national economy and to counter that major economic evil, Chapter XXB was introduced.

It is apparent that the provisions were introduced to control the transactions in cash  and  where  found  to  be without reasonable cause, to punish the persons executing such transactions. any interpretation placed on these provisions shall have to factor in the objective behind the insertion of these provisions, a fact which has been the guiding factor for the judiciary, in case after case, while deciding the issues that routinely arise in applying the  provisions.  this  aspect  has  been  appreciated  by the Bombay high Court when it stated that settling the claims by making journal entries in the respective books was also one of the recognised modes of repaying loan/ deposit and once such settlement is found to be genuine, the question of levy of penalty does not arise. With this finding, in our opinion, the court accepted the principle that the non cash transactions were outside the scope of the set of the provisions, collectively read.

A literal interpretation of these provisions, also, in our respectful opinion, does not lead to bringing an accounting entry within the ambit of these provisions. a loan or deposit has to be ‘taken’ or ‘accepted’ or ‘repaid’ for attracting the provisions. there has to a receipt or a payment;  has to be received or paid. taking, accepting or repaying is a sine qua non of these provisions, failing which the provisions shall not apply. It is essential that this fact is established by the revenue before applying these provisions. these terms, when understood in common parlance, cannot by any stretch of imagination include the act of passing an accounting entry. In ordinary course, one does not take a loan by passing an accounting entry and so it is, in the case of a repayment. An accounting entry can pave a way for settlement or settling a transaction and may consequently result in creation of a debt or extinguishing a debt but cannot be construed as an acceptance or repayment which, in the ordinary meaning of the terms, are acts that require transfer of funds, which, in the case under consideration, is cash. In the absence of any movement of cash, the provisions have no role to play. Any other interpretation would rope in all those transactions wherein a debt is converted into a loan or a deposit.

Any doubt remaining in the matter of interpretation of these provisions is further dispelled by Clause (iii) of the Explanation to both the provisions, section 269 SS and 269T which defines a ‘loan or deposit’ to mean loan or deposit of money. unless a transaction involves money changing hands, the provisions have no role to play. We respectfully submit that it is this aspect of the provisions that the court failed to appreciate; may be due to the fact, recorded in the order, that the assessee admitted that the provisions of s.269t were applicable to its case.

The attention of the Bombay high Court was drawn by the assessee, not with success, to impress that the provisions were not applicable to the cases involving accounting entries, by relying on the decisions in the cases of noida Toll Bridge Company Limited, 262 ITR 260 (Del), Shree Ambica Flour Mills Corporation, 6 DTR 169 (Guj) and Motta Constructions P. Limited, 338 ITR 66 (Bom).

In Motta Constructions P. Limited, 338 ITR 66 (Bom), the same high Court was asked to examine the applicability of section 269 SS to the case of the journal entry passed by the company for acknowledging the debt in favour of a director, who had incurred some expenditure on behalf of the company. the court, in the circumstances, held that the said provisions had no application to the case where a debt was created by a journal entry, in as much as no loan or deposit could be said to have been received by the assessee company.

In Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited, 262 itr 260 (Del.), the High Court held that the provisions of s. 269SS were not applicable to a case of the company crediting the account of one IL & FS on payments made by IL & FS on behalf of the company, where none of the parties had made payment in cash. in Shree Ambica Flour Mills Corporation(2008, ) 6 DTR 169 (Guj) it was held that the payments made by sister concerns for each other were not in violation of section 269SS or section 269T of the Act.

The allahabad  high  Court  also,  in  the  case  of  CIT  vs. Saurabh Enterprises 269 CTR 451, has taken a view that where no cash was involved, but merely adjusting book entries, there was no violation of sections 269SS or 269T. the  income-tax  appellate  tribunal     has,  through  its various decisions, taken a consistent stand that the provisions of section 269SS and section 269T do not apply to the case of a debt created or extinguished by accounting entries. Please see, Bombay Conductors & Electrical Ltd. 56 TTJ (Ahd) 580, Muthoot M. George, 47 TTJ (Coch) 434, Sunflower Builders (P.) Ltd. 61 ITD 227 (Pune). the decision of the ahmedabad tribunal was later on confirmed by the Gujarat High Court reported in 301 itr 328.

Significantly, it is required to be appreciated that even otherwise, an accounting entry may not be and cannot be said to have the effect of resulting in a loan or a deposit. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bombay Steam Navigation Co., 56 ITR 52, observed as under; “An agreement to pay the balance of consideration, due by the purchaser, does not in truth give rise to a loan.    A loan of money results in a debt but every debt does not involve a loan. Liability to pay a debt may arise from diverse sources . Every creditor who is entitled to receive a debt cannot be a lender.”

While it is true that the provisions do not expressly exclude journal entries from the application of section 269SS and section 269T, it is also true that the entries, by themselves, cannot be said to have resulted in receiving a loan or repaying a loan, and without doubt, not in money. the decision of the Bombay high Court, on this limited aspect, needs to be reviewed.

Comparable Uncontrolled Price (‘CUP’) Method – Introduction and Analysis

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1 Background

Transfer pricing
provisions in section 92 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’)
prescribe that the arm’s length price (‘ALP’) of international/specified
domestic transactions between associated enterprises (‘AEs’) needs to
be determined with regard to the ALP, by applying any of the following
methods:

– Price-based methods: CUP Method
– Profit-based
methods: Resale Price Method (‘RPM’), Cost Plus Method (‘CPM’), Profit
Split Method (‘PSM’) and Transactional Net Margin Method (‘TNMM’)
– Prescribed methods: Other Method

The
provisions of the Act prescribe the choice of the Most Appropriate
Method having regard to the nature of the transaction, availability of
relevant information, possibility of making reliable adjustments, etc,
and do not prescribe an hierarchy or preference for any method1.

In
this article, the authors have sought to explain the conceptual
framework of the CUP Method, considerations for its applicability and
practical issues concerning industry-wise application of the CUP Method.
Judicial precedents have been referenced as appropriate, for further
reading.

2. Conceptual framework
The CUP Method has
been defined in Rule 10B(1)(a) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The
various nuances surrounding the application of CUP Method ( on the basis
of the sub clauses in the rule ) have been analysed below:

(i)“The
price charged or paid for property transferred or services provided in a
comparable uncontrolled transaction, or a number of such transactions,
is identified;”

Analysis
The CUP Method compares the
price in a controlled transaction to the price in an uncontrolled
transaction in comparable circumstances. If there is any difference in
the two prices, underlying factors remaining constant, it may suggest
that the conduct of the related parties to the transaction is not at
arm’s length, i.e. the controlled price ought to be substituted by the
uncontrolled price.

The CUP can be Internal or External. An
internal CUP is the price that the assessee has charged/paid in a
comparable uncontrolled transaction with a third party. An external CUP
is the price of a comparable uncontrolled transaction between third
parties (i.e. no involvement of the assessee). Refer to section 4 for
discussion of the issue governing selection of Internal CUPs and
External CUPs.

A potential issue could arise as regards whether
the provisions prescribe the use of a comparable ‘hypothetical
transaction’, i.e. transaction for which a price/consideration ‘is to be
paid’ or ‘would have been paid’.

Please refer to sections 5 and 6 for detailed discussions.

“(ii)
such price is adjusted to account for differences, if any, between the
international/ specified domestic transaction and the comparable
uncontrolled transactions or between the enterprises entering into such
transactions, which could materially affect the price in the open
market”

Analysis
In an ideal scenario, none of the
differences between the transactions being compared or between the
enterprises undertaking these transactions should materially affect the
price in the open market. One needs to assess whether reasonably
accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of
such differences.

Accordingly, the application of the CUP Method
prescribes stringent comparability considerations which need to be
addressed before the determination of ALP, which makes the application
of the CUP Method extremely difficult.

Currently, there is no
prescribed guidance on the manner of computing adjustments. Accordingly,
one can take guidance from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (‘OECD’) Guidelines which specify different types of
comparability adjustments.

The characteristics of the
goods/services/property/ intangibles under consideration, including
their end use, have a bearing on the comparability under the CUP Method
and require suitable adjustment. To illustrate, the prices of imported
unprocessed food products would not be the same as imported processed
food products.

Differences in contractual terms, i.e. credit
terms, transport terms, sales or purchase volumes, warranties,
discounts, etc., also play an important role whilst undertaking
comparability adjustments under the CUP Method and adjustments can
typically be made for these quantitative differences. Further, the
comparable uncontrolled transactions should ideally pertain to the
same/closest date, time, volume, etc., as that of the controlled
transaction.

The prices of various products may also differ due
to the differences in the geographic markets, owing to the demand and
supply conditions, income levels and consumer preferences,
transportation costs, regulatory and tax aspects, etc. Indian judicial
precedents have recognised these differences.

A potential issue
may arise in cases where it is not possible to quantify the exact
adjustment to be made to the uncontrolled transaction where the
differences are on account of qualitative attributes, say, for example,
adjustment for difference in quality of Indian products visà- vis
Chinese products.

Further, there may arise differences in the
intensity of functions performed and risks assumed by the assessee,
vis-à-vis a comparable uncontrolled transaction, where it may not be
possible to effect/adjust such differences. In such cases, it is
advisable to maintain robust transfer pricing documentation to identify
and address such material differences and reject the CUP method. To
illustrate, the ownership of intangibles such as trademarks/brands,
etc., could impair the application of the CUP Method.

“(iii) the
adjusted price arrived at under sub-clause (ii) is taken to be an arm’s
length price in respect of the property transferred or services
provided in the international/ specified domestic transaction.”

Analysis
The
results derived from an appropriate application of the CUP Method
generally ought to be the most direct and reliable measure of an ALP for
the controlled transaction. The reliability of the results derived from
the CUP Method is affected by the completeness and accuracy of the data
used and the reliability of assumptions made to apply the method.

3. Application & pertinent issues
The
Indian transfer pricing authorities have indicated a strong preference
for applying the CUP Method given that CUP directly focuses on the
international transaction under review. Even though the degree of
comparability required for application of the CUP Method is high,
unadjusted or inexact CUPs have been routinely applied by the
authorities.

Appellate Tribunals have dealt with the issue of
the application of CUP Method in several transactions pertaining to
various industry sectors and have thrown some light on the guidelines
and reasonable steps that need to be undertaken to make appropriate and
reasonable adjustments to the CUPs in order to arrive at the ALP.
Further, the Tribunals have also adjudicated on the preference of
selection of Internal CUPs over External CUPs. These industry-wide
transactions and the issues concerning application of CUP method in
regard to various categories of payments have been elucidated below:

(i) Payment/Receipt of brokerage:

Under
the internal CUP approach, the brokerage charged by the assessee
(broker) to its AEs could be compared to the brokerage charged by the
assessee to a third party. However, it would be important to consider
the following factors since they have a direct bearing on the pricing of
the respective transactions:

a.    the contractual terms and conditions, i.e. underlying functions and control exercised by each transacting party (e.g. settlement terms, margin money stipulations etc.)
b.    Volume of transactions and resultant discounts, if any
c.    functions  performed  by  the  assessee  in  earning the brokerage from the related party as well as unrelated party.

The Mumbai Tribunal in  the  case  of  RBS  Equities  has upheld the use of the CUP method for brokerage transactions after providing for an adjustment for differences in marketing function, research functions and differences in volumes.

(ii)    Payment/receipt of guarantee fees:

Placing reliance on international guidance and several judicial precedents2 , arm’s length guarantee fees are a factor of the following:

a.    nature – whether the guarantee under consideration is a quasi-equity guarantee.
b.    Whether the benefit derived by the recipient is implicit/ explicit in nature
c.    Purpose of guarantee – A financial or unsecured guarantee would warrant a higher compensation as opposed to a performance or secured guarantee
d.    the  value  of  assets  at  risk/anticipated  loss  given default of the borrower and anticipated probability of default of the borrower
e.    the rate at which guarantees are extended by banks in the country of the lender/borrower
f.    Credit rating of the borrower

In view of the above, it could also be argued that guarantee rates obtained from independent bank websites are generic in nature and not specific to any particular transaction that has been carried out.  thus, not only are they negotiable, they also vary depending on the terms and conditions of the transactions, and the relationship between the banks and the customer. hence, they cannot be used directly to represent the guarantee fee charged on a particular tested transaction.  this principle is supported by indian judicial precedents as well.

(iii)    Financial services – Intercompany loans/ deposits:

Placing reliance on several judicial precedents3, it could be argued that in a case where foreign currency loans/ deposits are advanced by an indian assessee to its overseas subsidiary (say in the USA), the rate of interest on the intercompany loan could be determined with reference  to  CUPs,  i.e.  the  london  interbank  offered Rate plus basis points, appreciating that arm’s length interest rates are a factor of the following:

a.    the value of the assets at risk, or the anticipated loss given the default of the borrower;
b.    anticipated probability of default of the borrower;
c.    the level of interest rates, in terms of risk-free rates for given tenor and currency;
d.    the market price of risk, or credit spreads; and
e.    taxes;
f.    Whether the loan/deposits are quasi-equity in nature (i.e. convertible to equity upon maturity);
g.    Purpose of the loan – i.e. whether the loans were extended for further investment purposes.

(iv)    Pharmaceuticals, chemicals – Import of raw materials/Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (‘APIs’):

The  mumbai  Bench  of  the  indian  tax  tribunal,  in  the cases of Serdia4 Pharmaceuticals and Fulford India5, have provided useful insights on transfer pricing issues related to the pharmaceutical industry.

In the case of Serdia, the prices of off-patented APIs imported by the taxpayer from foreign aes were compared by the Revenue authorities with the prices of generic APIs purchased by competitors from third party suppliers, by using the CUP Method.

Before decoding the Serdia verdict, it would be essential to delve into the decision of the Canadian federal Court of Appeal (‘FCA’) rendered in the case of GlaxoSmithKline Inc (‘GSK’)6 , as it has been quoted and relied upon by the Tribunal in the case of Serdia.

GSK imported APIs from its AE for secondary manufacture and distribution of the drug named “Zantac”. GSK also had a license agreement with its AE, which provided GSK with the right to use the “Zantac” trademark. applying  the CUP Method, the Revenue compared GSK’s import prices of APIs from AEs with the prices of generic APIs purchased by competitors from third party suppliers, and an adjustment was proposed for the difference in prices. Eventually, the FCA ruled that GSK’s license agreement with its ae must be considered as a circumstance relevant to the determination of the ALP of the APIs imported by GSK from its AE, and thereafter restored the matter back to the lower authorities for fresh adjudication.

What logically follows from the conclusion is that the price of a generic product cannot simply be a CUP for another product, which is accompanied with a license or right to use intellectual property (‘IP’), which in the aforesaid case was a valuable trademark. holding this to be the pivotal principle, let us revert to the Serdia ruling, where there was no evidence furnished by the taxpayer relating to the licensing of any accompanying intangible based on which a higher price to AEs could be justified. Further, the Tribunal clearly distinguished the facts of Serdia’s case from those in the case of uCB india7 and stated that the CUP Method cannot blindly be rejected without giving due consideration to the facts of each and every case.

Fulford,  however,  put  forth  an  argument  before  the Mumbai Tribunal against the use of the CUP Method applied by the revenue, to benchmark the prices of import of off-patented APIs from AEs with prices of generic APIs. Fulford’s primary contention was that the said comparison was flawed, as it had been undertaken in complete disregard of the functions, assets, and risks (‘FAR’) profile or characterisation of the parties to the transaction and Fulford’s FAR was of routine distributor entitled to profits commensurate to its distribution function. Fulford argued that application of the CUP Method in such cases might result in the indian distributor earning exorbitant margins or profits, a significant portion of which it might not deserve, being related to the intangibles owned and the various risks, including product liability risks borne by the foreign principal. Another issue faced by taxpayers has been the application of the CUP Method using secret comparables. Section 133(6) of the Act empowers the Indian Revenue authorities to call for information from various public sources in order to determine the ALP of the transaction, i.e. comparing the import prices of  APIs  imported  by the pharmaceutical companies with the prices of APIs available from such sources. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that without furnishing requisite details such as the quantum of transactions, quality of the API purchased, shelf life of the products, it is extremely difficult to make reliable adjustments as contemplated under the CUP method. A number of pharmaceutical companies face the double-edged sword where reduced import prices (owing to transfer pricing disallowances) are generally not considered by the Customs authorities for the purposes of customs duty assessment.

(v)    Information technology and Software – Payment of service fee:

The charge-out rates in the case of some it companies are determined having regard to the qualification/designation of the employees, i.e. per month/per man hour rates.     In this regard, some judicial precedents8 issued by the Indian Tribunals favour the application of the CUP Method as opposed to the tnmm method, since the rates are not determined on the basis of software developed or volume of work. In the case of Velankani Software, the Tribunal upheld the use of the internal CUP Method where the technology, asset and marketing support was provided by the ae in the controlled transaction as opposed to the uncontrolled transaction, where the assessee used its own technology, assets and marketing infrastructure, since the assessee operated on a billing ‘on time and material’ basis, i.e. rates based on man months at different prices for different skill sets of employees for aes as well as non aes, subject to the detailed documentation furnished by the taxpayer.

(vi)    Purchase and sale of power:

It is a known fact that a number of taxpayers set up captive power production units in order to source power at economical rates and achieve synergies and long term economies of scale. for the purposes of determining the appropriate quantum of deduction under the provisions of Chapter Vi-a of the act read with section 92Ba of the act, it is essential that the transfer of power by such captive units to the operating manufacturing plants is undertaken at fair market value/ALP. In this regard, guidance is provided by recent judicial precedents9    of the tribunals, wherein it is prescribed that any of the following values could be used as a CUP to determine the FMV of the controlled transaction

a.    Price at which excess power, if any, is sold by the captive power unit to the State Electricity Board
b.    Price at which power is purchased by the operating companies from the State Electricity Board
c.    Grid rates according to the Tariff card of the State electricity Board

(vii)    Purchase and sale of diamonds:
In the diamond industry, there is a huge dissimilarity and variation of features which leads to differences in prices. the  pricing  of  the  diamonds  depends  upon  various parameters/factors like size of the diamond, carat weight, various types of shape, colour, clarity, grade, etc., which leads to differential pricing of the diamonds. Thus, in such a condition, it becomes very difficult to apply the CUP method in benchmarking the pricing of diamonds.

4.    Internal vs. External CUPs

The  indian  revenue  authorities  tend  to  accept  the  use of Internal CUPs as well as External CUPs to determine the ALP of the controlled transactions. However, the oeCd Guidelines as well as several judicial precedents10 promote the preference of the internal methods over the external methods since the assessee itself is the party  to the controlled as well as the uncontrolled transaction and the quality of such data is more reliable, accurate and complete as against external comparables, which is the most important consideration in determining the possible application of the CUP Method. In case of external CUP, data may be derived from public exchanges or publicly quoted data. The external CUP data could be considered reliable if it meets the following tests:

a.    the data is widely and routinely used in the ordinary course of business in the industry to negotiate prices for uncontrolled sales

b.    the data derived from external sources is used to set prices in the controlled transaction in the same way it is used by uncontrolled assessees in the industry

c.    the  amount  charged  in  the  controlled  transaction is adjusted to reflect the differences in product quality and quantity, contractual terms, market conditions, transportation costs, risks borne and other factors that affect the price that would be agreed to by uncontrolled assessees

5.    Can quotations be used as CUPS?

Given the above absence of realistic internal/external CUP data for benchmarking the controlled transaction, can it be said that quotations obtained from third parties could constitute valid CUPs?

In the case of KTC Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. (TS 20 ITAT 2014 (Viz) TP), Adani Wilmar Ltd. (TS 171 ITAT 2013 (Ahd) TP), Reliance Industries Ltd. (TS 368 ITAT 2012 (Mum)), Ballast Nedam Dredging (TS 25 ITAT 2013 (Mum) TP) and
A.    M. Todd Co. India P. Ltd. (TS 117 ITAT 2009 (Mum)), various benches of the Tribunals had accepted quotations and rates published in magazines and newspapers as CUPs, subject to necessary adjustments.

However, in the case of Redington India Ltd. (TS 123 ITAT 2013 (CHNY) – TP), the Chennai ITAT rejected the ‘list price’ published on the manufacturer’s website as    a CUP, observing that it is only an indicative price and the CUP can only be based on actual sales. Further, in Sinosteel India Pvt. Ltd. (TS 341 ITAT 2013 (DEL) TP), the Delhi ITAT held that ALP under the CUP Method is  to be determined  based on ‘the price charged or paid’  in a comparable uncontrolled ‘transaction’ and hence, a quotation which has not fructified into a transaction could not be accepted as a CUP.

6.    Introduction of the sixth method – Other Method

The  Central  Board  of  direct  taxes  has  inserted  a  new rule 10AB by notifying the “other method” apart from the five methods already prescribed:

“For the purposes of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 92C, the Other Method for determination of the arms’ length price in relation to an international transaction shall be any method which takes into account the price which has been charged or paid,  or would have been charged or paid, for the same   or similar uncontrolled transaction, with Methods of Computation of Arm’s Length Price or between non- associated enterprises, under similar circumstances, considering all the relevant facts.”

The Guidance Note on Transfer Pricing issued by the institute of Chartered accountants  of  india  (august 2013 – revised) explains that the introduction of the other method as the sixth method allows the use of ‘any method’ which takes into account (i) the price which has been charged or paid or (ii) would have been charged   or paid for the same or similar uncontrolled transactions, with or between non-AES, under similar circumstances, considering all the relevant facts.

The    various    data    which    may    possibly    be    used for comparability purposes under the ‘Other Method’ could be:

(a)    Third party quotations; (b) Valuation reports; (c) tender/Bid  documents;  (d)  documents  relating  to  the negotiations; (e) Standard rate cards; (f) Commercial & economic business models; etc.

It is relevant to note that the text of rule 10aB does not describe any methodology but only provides an enabling provision to use any method that has been used or may be used to arrive at the price of a transaction undertaken between non-AEs. Hence, it provides flexibility to determine the price in complex  transactions  where  third party comparable prices or transactions may not exist, i.e. a more lenient version of the CUP Method. The  wide  coverage  of  the  other  method  would  provide flexibility in establishing ALPs, particularly in cases where the application of the five specific methods is not possible due to reasons such as difficulties in obtaining comparable data due to uniqueness of transactions such as intangibles or business transfers, transfer of unlisted shares, sale of fixed assets, revenue allocation/splitting, guarantees provided and received, etc. however, it would be necessary to justify and document reasons for rejection of all other five methods while selecting the ‘Other Method’ as the most appropriate method. the OECD Guidelines also permit the use of any other method and state that the taxpayer retains the freedom to apply methods not described in the OECD Guidelines to establish prices, provided those prices satisfy the ALP.

The  general  underlying  principle  is  that  as  long  as the quotation can be substantiated by an actual uncontrolled transaction to be considered as a price being representative of the prevailing market price, it can be considered as a comparable under the CUP Method. For all other purposes, the quotation would be considered as a comparable under the other method.

7. Conclusion

The CUP Method is the most direct and reliable measure of an ALP for the controlled transaction, using a comparable uncontrolled transaction, subject to an adjustment for differences,  if  any.  the  reliability  of  the  results  derived from the CUP Method is affected by the completeness and accuracy of the data used and the reliability of assumptions made to apply the method.

Application of the CUP Method entails, among others, a close similarity of the following comparability parameters like quality of the product, nature of services, contractual terms and conditions, level of the market, geographic market in which the transaction takes place, date of the transaction, foreign currency risks and intangible property ownership which could materially affect the price charged in an uncontrolled transaction.

Generally, internal CUPs are preferred over external CUPs in view of availability of reliable and accurate comparable data. A quotation could be considered as a CUP, so long as it is substantiated by an actual transaction and is a clear reflection of the prevailing market price.

Time to introspect

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Decisions of various judicial forums are always discussed and debated. Many decisions, particularly those of the High Court and the Apex Court have far-reaching impact on the business, industry, the profession and the public in general. Judgements of the Tribunals also attract attention, but to a lesser degree, as they are fact-based and do not finally decide the issue. However, recently, a decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was widely publicised in the media, and was the topic of discussion among our colleagues, for it contained rather critical observations about the profession. There were responses to what appeared in the media by some leaders of our profession.

On reading of the decision, I felt that while the comments may not have been necessary to decide the appeal, they were not entirely unwarranted. While it is true that in regard to some of the observations contained in the said decision that there could be two views, their tone reflected concern and anguish rather than only criticism. It must also be appreciated that the order was authored by a member of our profession.

The appeal before the Tribunal was filed beyond the prescribed period by 2,984 days. The delay was on account of erroneous advice given by a Chartered Accountant, which was admitted by him on the affidavit. The Tribunal which expressed admiration for core expertise and knowledge of Chartered Accountants, felt that the commission of such an error by a Chartered Accountant was unlikely. It felt that the affidavit had been issued to accommodate the client. It therefore rejected the affidavit. However, as the Tribunal has stated that if the Chartered Accountant had actually tendered such grossly erroneous advice or the Chartered Accountant “accommodated” the assessee in both events there was cause for worry. I would share that concern.

Even more disturbing was the fact that the reporting in the media gave an impression that the Tribunal had virtually castigated the entire profession, while the contents of the order were significantly different. What was distressing was the perception in the public mind that the profession deserved the brickbats it purportedly received.

Rather than take up an aggressive or defensive posture, the profession should take a note of this decision and seriously introspect. In an earlier editorial, I had mentioned that as professionals we need to understand our role and the parameters within which we carry out our professional duties. Given the nature of our profession a close association with the client is inevitable. However, that relationship or association should not result in our shying away from our duties and responsibilities. As much as we may have sympathy for the travails that a businessman has to suffer on account of unjust laws, complicated regulations etc., we cannot let that colour the opinion that we have to express as auditors and the advice that we have to give as tax consultants.

Apart from the expertise and technical prowess for which the public relies on our profession, what distinguishes us, or at least what ought to, from others is the ethical standards which we are expected to follow. It is in this area that we have seen consistent deterioration over the last couple of decades. We see among professionals, a desire for quick success, quick money and for that purpose the willingness to make the necessary compromises. While this is the attitude of some in the profession, the businessman also wants to hoodwink the law and achieve his objective wherever he can. This results in the “accommodation” to which the Tribunal has made a reference. Whenever this aspect is raised in discussions, the refrain of many of my friends is that the deterioration in the the profession is a “reflection of deteriorating ethical and moral standards in society.” While this is true, it cannot be a defence for falling standards of conduct. If, as a profession, we wish to claim some different and distinct status, we cannot say that because society tolerated unethical conduct by others, such conduct by a Chartered Accountant is pardonable. It is because of our professional skills and standing that the society expects something different from us. If we are to retain the rapidly diminishing respect for our profession in the society, we must discharge our onerous obligation. The Tribunal in another paragraph points out that if the member had indeed committed such a gross error, the efficacy of the Continuing Professional Education programs (CPE) which are held by the ICAI, may have reduced. Attendance of these programmes is mandatory, for practising professionals. While a general statement about the falling standards of these programmes is certainly not appropriate, their content, the manner in which they are conducted, is certainly worth a revisit. With continuous development of laws, rules and regulations and changes in the business environment, updation is required in a vast number of areas. The primary role of the ICAI is that of a regulator of the profession, and the setter of accounting and auditing standards. The responsibility of ensuring the updation of knowledge of a large number of members in numerous areas, while maintaining a high standard of quality is an onerous responsibility. For the benefit of the profession at large, it can share this responsibility with other professional bodies.

As far as individual professionals are concerned, one has in the recent past experienced an attitude of seeking exemption from the mandatory attendance of CPE programmes or make an attempt only to comply with the regulations in letter and not in spirit. This is inexcusable. If we claim to be an elite profession then we must accept the principle that our knowledge and professional skills have to remain updated and our skills have to be honed to perfection.

Finally, it is true that the conduct of the Chartered Accountant which led to the observations by the honourable Tribunal may not be representative of the profession in general, it is certainly not a solitary instance. Let us take this opportunity to introspect. I only hope that this will not be like an introspection by any political party after a debacle, but one which will result in some positive action.

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OUR DREAMS ARE WITHIN OUR REACH

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When we look back at our lives, we find that so many of our wonderful dreams have remained dreams only. We have not been able to realise our dreams. In many cases we have not even tried to achieve them.

If God gives us a chance to live our lives again, what would our life be like? Would it be better than our first innings? Would we achieve more? Would we become better human beings? Most of us would agree that if we are given another chance, our second innings would be better than this one. We would be better human beings, achieve many more goals, and reach far greater heights. We would be able to fulfil many of our unfulfilled dreams. A question arises as to why is it so? Why is it that we failed to achieve our goals? Why is it that we even failed to try? This is because we fail to do many things out of fear of failure and fear of ridicule. We are just too scared to step out of our comfort zone. It is said that even eagles need a push. The baby eagle who is ready to fly, but afraid of it, is literally pushed out of its comfort zone of the nest by the mother. It is only when it is pushed out, the baby eagle realises the power of its own wings and soars to great heights in the wide open sky. We must also learn to step out from our comfort zone. It is only then we will realise these dreams. I love this quote by R.L. Stevenson, which is my favourite.

“Twenty year from now you will be more disappointed by the things you did not do than by the ones you did do. So,throw off the bowlines, sail away from the safe harbor. Catch the trade winds in your sail. Explore, Dream, Discover.”

How true are these words! One cannot succeed without trying. We may lose. But it is “better to have loved and lost” than to have never loved at all. As it is aptly said, “A ship is safe in the harbour but that is not what it is meant for!” Friends, we have to dream, lift our anchors, and sail the high seas ( nay, rough seas) to achieve our dreams. We may have to face gales and storms, high winds, and rains. There is no option but to sail and overcome all these to achieve our dreams.

There are some interesting things about sailing. I did not know until I tried my hands at sailing, that a good sailor can sail in any direction, no matter from where the wind is blowing. Even when he wants to go in a direction directly from where the wind is blowing, he can always zigzag his way to the desired destination! In the words of Edward Gibbon, “the winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigator.” We have to be ablest navigators in this sea of life and reach our destination, realise our dreams. We should firmly believe that “It is not over until win!”

And have we not watched with baited breath the yachts racing, tilted at an impossible angle. My God! It is so scary to be in that yacht at that time. But, here too, experienced sailors tell us that if you feel too scared, just let go off the ropes! The yacht will at once come to a balanced even keel and you will be safe. So it is with life. If we are too scared we have just to let go off everything and trust in God. He will take care of us. He will see that our ship does not tilt over and we are not dumped into the sea. God is always there to look after us!

We have to be adventurous, learn to take risks, and chances. After all, if nothing is ventured, nothing will be gained. As Andre Gide puts it, “Man cannot discover new oceans unless he has the courage to lose sight of the shore. We just cannot sit on the shore of a river, afraid to step into the waters, and expect to cross the river.”

So friends, we shall dream, dream of reaching great heights. We shall never be afraid of failure and we shall put in our best. It is only if we try our best, put our best foot forward that we will be able to achieve our goals, and fulfil our dreams. It is our duty to be what we are capable of being. The greatest waste in the world is the difference between what we are and what we become, and what we are really capable of becoming.

“It is not enough to have lived. Be determined to live for something”.

– William Arthur Ward

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2014-TIOL-630-ITAT-DEL Jcdecaux Advertising India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT A. Y. : 2007-08. Date of Order: 08-09-2014

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Ss. 3, 4 – The business of selling ad space on bus queue shelters is set up on entering into a contract with a municipal body. Once the business is set up revenue expenditure incurred becomes eligible for deduction.

Facts:
The assessee company was incorporated to carry on the business of advertising on bus shelters, public utilities, parking lots, bill boards, etc. The assessee was awarded its first contract by New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) in March 2006 for construction of 197 Bus Queue Shelters (BQS) on Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis. Under this contract, the assessee was required to undertake preliminary investigations, study, design, finance, construct, operate and maintain BQS’s at its own cost. In consideration, the assessee was allowed to commercially exploit the space allotted in these BQS’s by means of display of advertisement for a period of 15 years. During the said period of 15 years the title and other rights in BQSs were to vest in NDMC.

During the previous year the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 18,36,62,145 incurred in discharge of its obligations under NDMC contract. The assessee also claimed deduction of Rs. 3,17,91,180. The AO disallowed Rs. 18,36,62,145 on the ground that it is capital expenditure and sum of Rs. 3,17,91,180 was admitted by the AO to be revenue in nature but was not allowed since according to the AO the business would commence only when the BQSs would be ready to provide space for advertisement to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO by observing that the business was not set up and therefore the revenue expenditure is also not deductible.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it did not press its ground for allowability of capital expenditure.

Held
The Tribunal noted that during the previous year the assessee formally signed a contract with NDMC on 08-03- 2006. On 30-03-2006, the assessee entered into manufacturing agreement with a supplier for manufacture and installation of BQSs and also made advance payment. It also arranged for credit facility and obtained overdraft limit as well as term loan. A security deposit was also placed with NDMC under the contract.

The Tribunal noted that the case made out by the lower authorities was that the business would commence only when the BQSs are ready for providing the space to the assessee for advertisement, being the source of its income. This, according to the Tribunal, was fallacious understanding of the concept of setting up of business. It held that the business of a building contractor is set up on his having all the necessary tools and equipments ready to take up the construction activity. Only when he gets construction contract and takes the first step in the direction of doing the construction activity, he commences his business. It cannot be said that the business of the contractor has not been set up till the construction work, undertaken pursuant to the contractor, goes on.

The assessee’s business was set up when it was prepared for undertaking the activity of building BQSs on receipt of contract from NDMC. It cannot be related to the completion of construction of BQSs. As the setting up of the business was over in the previous year, at the maximum, on entering into manufacturing agreement for manufacture and on installation of BQSs on 30-03-2006 not only the business was set up but had also commenced. Section 3 read with section 4 refers to the starting of the previous year from the date of setting up of a new business.

The expenditure of Rs. 3.17 crore had been disallowed since it was held to be incurred before commencement of the business and hence was in the nature of pre-operative expenses. Upon setting up of the business, all revenue expenses become eligible for deduction. The Tribunal held that the sum of Rs. 3.17 crore was allowable as deduction.

This ground of appeal of the assessee was allowed.

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2014-TIOL-656-ITAT-MUM ACIT vs. Gagandeep Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. A. Y. : 2008-09. Date of Order: 23-04-2014

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Section 68 – Share premium is a capital receipt and
not income in ordinary sense. Even if it is held that excess premium is
charged, it does not become income as it is a capital receipt. In case
of share capital, if identity is proved, no addition can be made u/s.
68.

Facts:

During the previous year, the assessee
company issued equity shares of face value of Rs. 10 each at a premium
of Rs. 190 per share. The face value of shares issued was Rs. 81,25,000
and the amount received as share premium was Rs. 6,69,75,000. The book
value of the shares at the time of issue of fresh capital was Rs. 10.
The AO asked the assessee to furnish the supporting details of
subscribers and to justify the share premium charged.

The
assessee stated that the premium was charged based on future prospects
of the assessee company. From the submissions made, the AO noticed that
the applicants were all group companies operating from the same address
where the assessee was operating its business. The share application
forms were all signed by the same person. The persons from whom premium
were charged were newly established companies and their source of funds
was from share capital. The funds raised by the assessee company were
invested in shares of M/s .Omni Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., which was also
a group company. These shares were subscribed at a premium of Rs.
12,490 per share. The AO made an addition of Rs. 7,53,00,000 u/s. 68 of
the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A) who observed that the AO has not given any reason as to why the
investment with a premium is not genuine when the assessee has produced
all the details of investors in the form of share application form, bank
account details, copies of return of income and balance sheet. He
allowed this ground of appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The
Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed all the requisite
details/documents which are required to explain credits in the books of
accounts by the provisions of section 68 of the Act. It stated that the
assessee has successfully established the identity of the company which
has purchased the shares at a premium. The assessee has also filed bank
account details to explain the source of the shareholders and the
genuineness of the transaction was also established by filing copies of
share application forms and Form No.2 filed with the Registrar of
Companies.

No doubt a non-est company or a zero balance sheet
company asking for a premium of Rs. 190 per share defies all commercial
prudence but at the same time it cannot be ignored that it is a fact
that it is a prerogative of the Board of Directors of the company to
decide the premium amount and it is the wisdom of the share holders
whether they want to subscribe to such heavy premium. The Revenue
authorities cannot question the charging of such huge premium without
any bar from any legislated law of the land.

The Tribunal
observed that the amendment to section 56(2) by insertion of clause
(viib) is applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. In the year under
consideration, the transaction has to be considered in the light of
provisions of section 68 of the Act. It held that the assesse has
discharged the initial burden of proof. Even if it is held that excess
premium has been charged, it does not become income as it is a capital
receipt. The receipt is not in the revenue field. What is to be probed
by the AO is whether the identity of the assessee is proved or not. In
the case of share capital, if the identity is proved, no addition can be
made u/s. 68 of the Act. The tribunal dismissed this ground of appeal
filed by the revenue.

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