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Retrospective cancellation of R.C. of the buyer vis-à-vis validity of C form

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Introduction    
When the sales are in the course of inter-state trade, one of the facilities available is  applicability of lower rate of tax, if the sales are effected to a registered dealer under the CST Act. However, such lower rate is available to the transaction, if the said sale is supported by C form as obtained by the seller from the buyer. One of the conditions of C form is that the buyer, issuing C form, should be registered dealer under the CST Act at the time of purchase.

There are instances where the registration of the buying dealer is cancelled with retrospective effect.  Under such circumstances, there is also cancellation of C form which is issued earlier. The effect is that the selling dealer may get affected because of such cancellation. Its sale will be considered as without valid C form, which will invite higher rate of tax.

Recent judgment
Hon. Delhi High Court had an occasion to deal with such situation in case of Jain Manufacturing (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs The Commissioner Value Added Tax & Anr (W.P.(C)1358 of 2016 dt.1.6.2016. The facts, as narrated in the judgment, are as under:

“3. The Petitioner made an inter-state sale of goods to Respondent No.2 (Purchasing Dealer) by way of two invoices both dated 10th March, 2015. The first invoice was for a sum of Rs.7,53,373/- and the second for a sum of Rs.2,49,715/-. In terms of Section 8(1) (b) of the CST Act with Respondent No. 2 being a dealer registered under the CST Act in New Delhi [apart from being registered under the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (DVAT Act)] as of that date, and having purchased the goods from the Petitioner by way of inter-state sale, tax at the concessional rate of 2% was chargeable in the invoices and was accordingly included in the invoices raised by the Petitioner. The said two invoices accordingly mentioned the CST amounts as 15,067 and 4,994 respectively. The total sums of the 2 invoices were Rs.7,68,441/- and Rs. 2,54,709/- respectively. The payments for these invoices were made by RTGS into the Petitioner’s bank account.

4. On 13th April 2015, Respondent No. 2 obtained C-Form from the DT&T in respect of the aforementioned two invoices. A copy of the said C-Form is enclosed with the petition as Annexure P-4. It shows that it was a system generated C-Form containing details of the purchasing dealer i.e. Respondent No.2 with its Registration Certificate Number and the amount up to which such registration is valid. The name and address of the purchasing dealer i.e. Respondent No. 2 has also been indicated. It also bears the TIN and name of the selling dealer i.e. the Petitioner. It contains the details of the two invoices dated 10th March, 2015 with the respective amounts.

5. The Petitioner later learnt that the above C-Form had been cancelled by the DT&T. In order to verify this, the Petitioner checked the website of the DT&T. The status of the C-Form issued to the Petitioner was shown as cancelled on 27th November, 2015. The Petitioner also obtained a copy of an order passed by the Assistant Value Added Tax Officer (AVATO) in Form DVAT-11 on 4th August, 2015 cancelling the registration of Respondent No.2. A copy of the said cancellation order has been enclosed as Annexure P-6 to the petition. It was noticed that the cancellation was made retrospective from 26th February, 2014.

6. It is in these circumstances, the present petition has been filed contending that there was no power under the CST Act or in the Rules there under, viz., the Central Sales Tax Act (Registration & Turnover) Rules, 1957 or the Central Sales Tax (Delhi) Rules to cancel a C-Form issued by the DT&T.”

In  the writ petition the petitioner made a submission that the C form had been cancelled because the registration of the buying dealer was cancelled retrospectively. It was argued that there is no power for retrospective cancellation of the Registration. It was further argued that as a selling dealer it is only required to ensure that on date of sale the buying dealer is holding valid registration certificate (RC) under CST Act.  The retrospective cancellation cannot affect the selling dealer. The judgments in case of Suresh Trading Company (109 STC 439)(SC) and in case of Santosh kumar and Company (54 STC 322)(Ors) were cited.

On behalf of State, it was argued that the selling dealer was indulging in proxy litigation as the buying dealer, in whose case RC is cancelled, has not come forward. It was argued that the selling dealer, who is from Kanpur has no locus to contest the matter. It was also submitted that the transaction of sale was under cloud and it  was suspected of being effected with collusion. It was further argued that there is no vested right in the purchasing dealer to insist issuance of C form in its favour. However, the State could not point out any provision under CST Act by which RC can be cancelled retrospectively.

After hearing both the sides Hon. High Court observed as under:

“16. The central issue in the present case is whether there exists a power in the Commissioner VAT, Delhi under the CST Act and the Rules there under to cancel a C-Form and further if such power exists then whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case such power was rightly exercised.

17. No provision in the CST Act has been brought to the notice of the Court which enables an authority issuing a C-Form to cancel the C-Form. Rule 5(4) of the Central Sales Tax (Delhi) Rules, 2005 enables the authority which has to issue a C-Form to “withhold” the C-Form. The contingencies under which a C Form may be withheld are set out in Rule 5(4). For instance, Rule 5 (4) (v) envisages that some adverse material has been found by the Commissioner “suggesting any concealment of sale or purchase or furnishing inaccurate particulars in the returns.” The Commissioner could, in terms of the proviso to Rule 5(4), instead of withholding the C-Form, issue to the applicant such forms in such numbers and subject to such conditions and restrictions, as he may consider necessary. However, there is no specific provision even under the aforementioned Rules which enables the Commissioner to cancel the C-Form that has already been issued.

18. There is merit in the contention that one of the primary requirements for issuance of a C-Form is that the dealer to whom the C-Form is issued has to have a valid CST registration on the date that the C Form is issued. If the purchasing dealer does not possess a valid CST registration on the date of the transaction of sale, then the selling dealer cannot insist on being issued a C-Form. In the present case, on the date of the transaction i.e. 10th March, 2015 the purchasing dealer viz., Respondent No. 2 did posses a valid CST registration. The name of the purchasing dealer as shown in the invoices, and the name and address of the registered purchasing dealer as reflected in the C-Forms issued by the DT&T matched. The cancellation of the CST registration of Respondent No. 2 took place subsequently on 4th August 2015. Therefore, there was no means for the Petitioner as the selling dealer to suspect as of the date of sale or soon thereafter that the payments made to it RTGS was not by Respondent No.2 but by some other entity with the same name. It is not possible, therefore, to straightaway infer any collusion between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 or for that matter the other entity of the same name spoken of by the DT&T.

19. In any event, from the point of view of the Petitioner, the requirement of section 8(1) of the CST stood fully satisfied. The purchasing dealer had a valid CST registration on the date of purchase of goods by the Respondent No. 2 from the Petitioner. The C-Form issued by the DT&T confirmed the registration of Respondent No.2 under the CST Act.”

The Hon. High Court has referred to various judgments in support of above holding. After above discussion Hon. High Court also discussed about the practical effect of the cancellation of C forms in following words:-  

“26. It was submitted by Mr Narayan that there would be a practical difficulty in the DT&T seeking to inform every selling dealer in the country of the cancellation of registration of a purchasing dealer registered under the CST Act in Delhi and that the remedy of the selling dealers in such instance would be to proceed against the purchasing dealers. In the considered view of the Court, if the selling dealer has after making a diligent enquiry confirmed that on the date of the sale the purchasing dealer held a valid CST registration, and is also issued a valid C Form then such selling dealer cannot later be told that the C Form is invalid since the CST registration of the purchasing dealer has been retrospectively cancelled. Where, a selling dealer fails to make diligent enquiries and proceeds to sell goods to a purchasing dealer who does not, on the date of such sale, hold a valid CST registration then such selling dealer cannot later be seen to protest against the cancellation of the C-Form. As observed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi v. Shri Krishna Engg. (supra) the selling dealer in such instance will have to pay for his “recklessness”.

27.To answer the problem highlighted by Mr Narayan, the best course of action would be for an authority to cancel the CST registration prospectively and immediately place that information on its website. In such event, there would be no difficulty in the selling dealer being able to verify the validity of the CST registration of the purchasing dealer. However, where the cancellation of the registration and, consequently of the C-Form is sought to be done retrospectively, it would adversely affect the rights of bonafide sellers in other states who proceeded on the basis of the existence of valid CST registration of the purchasing dealer on the date of the inter-state sale. That outcome is not contemplated by the CST Act and the Rules there under.”

Conclusion

It is one of the much awaited judgments to protect the interest of genuine dealers. Now-a-days, under fiscal laws, there is a tendency to put more and more burden on the dealers and the authorities only exercise power of recoveries and that too from dealers who are otherwise regular and available. No attempt is made to nab the defaulters and fraudsters. Under such circumstances, the above judgment is path breaking. It is the department who should keep watch on defaulters and take necessary action against them for recovery and should not put burden on the genuine dealers.

SEBI’s proposal to regulate Algo/Hi frequency trades

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Background
The Securities and Exchange Board of India has put up a discussion paper on 5th August 2016 for regulating algorithmic trading, hi-frequency trading, co-location and some related matters. It has described the background of the subject, highlighted the issues and has invited comments from the public, on certain measures for regulating such matters.

This has resulted in a vigorous debate in media, amongst stock brokers/investors and the public. There have been some views that SEBI should not regulate such matters at all since, amongst others, this creates hurdles in the development of technology . The suggested methods have also been critically analysed. On other hand, there have been other views that SEBI should indeed regulate such matters on ground such that some parties obtain  certain special and unfair advantages through such trading. There are also concerns that these are being abused in a manner that the public and perhaps even SEBI does not realize such abuse, considering the sheer complexity involved.

Algo trading has increased exponentially. Indeed, the volumes are so large that just two figures should highlight it. As per SEBI, 80% of all orders and 40% of all trades are now generated through computer algorithms.

However, algo/hi-frequency trading have a dark side too. There has been a history in the United States of it being abused by certain traders to make huge profits at the cost of investors. There has been a huge debate over this in India too when SEBI is said to be investigating the alleged role of National Stock Exchange in a similar context.

Algorithmic/hi-frequency trading (“Algo trading”) is also said to have resulted in market crises (notable amongst these is the so-called Flash Crash of 2010 in the USA).

On other hand, there are obvious advantages of Algo trading including that of higher liquidity, lower spreads, etc.

These types of trades are also not understood well by investors and the public generally. Hence, the recent SEBI consultation paper can be a good opportunity to consider the background of the subject and some related matters.

Some concepts
Algo trading is conceptually simple to understand though, in practice, the manner in which such trades are carried out can be quite complex. The SEBI paper has explained some basic terms that are worth a review. This will also help one understand the various measures suggested by SEBI for regulating them.

Algorithmic Trading
The paper describes it as – “Algorithmic trading (for brevity, Algo), in simple words, is a step-by-step instruction for trading actions taken by computers (automated systems). Typically, trading algorithms enable the traders to automate the process of taking trading decisions based on the preset rules / strategies.”.

To put it simply, in Algo trading, the process of placing trades is automated using computers. Software is developed incorporating detailed instructions when to buy/sell, etc. and it monitors market data and places trades accordingly. There is nil or minimal human intervention. There are several advantages. The first, obviously, is very high speed. The time taken by a human operator to press a few keys is in computing time astronomically higher than the time the algo trading software takes to place/execute the order. Secondly, in case of repetitive situations, where the decision making follows standard parameters, it does not make sense using human intermediaries. Further, this also enables traders to carry out large trades usually at microscopic margins.

Hi-frequency trading (HFT)
Hi-frequency trading is really a type of Algorithmic trading. Algo trading as explained earlier is software-based trading with nil or minimal human intervention. HFT involves carrying out of extremely fast trades in very small fraction of seconds often taking advantage of the edge in information over others. The paper explains HFT as:-

“High Frequency Trading (HFT) is a subset of algorithmic trading that comprises latency-sensitive trading strategies and deploys technology including high speed networks, colocation, etc. to connect and trade on the trading platform. The growth and success of the high frequency trading (latency sensitive version of algorithmic trading) is largely attributed to their ability to react to trading opportunities that may last only for a very small fraction of a second.”

Co-location
Co-location (“Colo”) is considered to be a contentious issue. It basically means providing stock market intermediaries/hi-frequency traders’ servers a physical location that is very near stock market servers. Often, the servers are in the same building that the servers of the exchange are located in. Physical nearness to the exchange servers that receive and process trade data is critical since nearer the physical location to such servers, the faster can a intermediary/hi-frequency trader can receive and send back data. And thus act and profit on it, particularly if one is a hi-frequency trader.

High order-to-trade ratio
This means that the ratio of orders placed over actual trades executed is very high. The rest of orders are cancelled. This again is a common feature of HFT.

Issues faced

SEBI has identified the following issues that arise out of Algo trading and related aspects:-

(i) Unfair access or denial of faster access to persons not having co-location facility. To take a simple example, a person from New Delhi is physically quite far from the stock exchange servers in Mumbai and thus suffers a time disadvantage (even if of fraction of seconds) as compared to a person in Mumbai.

(ii) There is more price volatility.

(iii) HFT imposes costs on other market users

(iv) Algo trading results in a technological arms race.

(v) In times of high volatility, SEBI would get limited opportunities to intervene etc.

Solutions suggested by SEBI
SEBI has placed for discussion certain solutions. These are explained below with their advantages/disadvantages  including experience in regard to these solutions in other countries.

(i) Minimum resting time for orders:- Under this method, each order is not allowed to be modified/cancelled till a minimum resting time elapses. This will ensure that the order will be available for some time for execution and thus fleeting orders would be reduced. It is interesting to note that the resting time proposed is 500 milliseconds (1 second = 1000 milliseconds). Thus, this would affect only those parties whose orders undergo change in fractions of seconds.

(ii) Frequent batch auctions:- Orders for a specified period of time of 100 milliseconds will be grouped together and matched, instead of the continuous order matching mechanism. Thus, the advantage of time that a person may have over others owing to co-location, better technological equipment, etc. would be neutralised to an extent.

(iii) Random speed bumps:- This involves delaying orders randomly by a few milliseconds. The result is that this neutralises to some extent the speed advantages.

(iv) Randomization of orders received during a specified period of say 1-2 seconds:- Thus, the orders received during this period would be shuffled randomly and their time sequence altered. All orders within a specified period would have an equal chance and once again the speed advantage is neutralised.

(v) Maximum order to trade ratio:- This will ensure lesser fleeting orders and also that orders are entered into the system with a greater opportunity of their being converted into trades.

(vi) Separate queues for co-location and non-co-location orders:- One order from each queue would be taken alternatingly. Once again, the objective of neutralising speed advantage may be achieved to an extent.

(vii) Providing tick-by-tick feeds to all market participants:- Tick-by-tick data feed, as SEBI describes, “provides details relating to orders (addition+ modification + cancellation) and trades on a real-time basis”. This data is provided by exchanges for a fee. SEBI has suggested that data of top 20/30/50 bids/asks, market depth, etc. be provided to all. This would create a level playing field to all participants irrespective of their technological or financial strength.

Consideration of solutions
The opposition to regulating Algo trading is on various grounds. The first, of course, is that SEBI would be putting hurdles to technological developments and this would not be a wise thing to do. Further, each of the methods suggested create their own inequities. There would also be software and other changes required to provide for such solutions. There would need to be regulatory check to ensure that these solutions are in place. Interfering with such trading would also result in higher ask-put price differences, lower liquidity, etc. Some of the solutions offered, as SEBI itself points out in the paper, have been rejected in some places where they were originally proposed or adopted.

Having said that, there are abuses that need to be considered. While SEBI has already mandated fair, transparent and equitable rules in granting nearness to exchange servers, there have been concerns about this in one way or the other. Further, the sheer complexity of algo trading may result in a group of insiders abusing it to their advantage by prior arrangement particularly if the exchange or its staff plays truant. Thus, the measures suggested may, even if indirectly, help control such abuses. Further, SEBI may also need to regulate such trading to prevent such abuses.

Abuse of hi-frequency trading

Serious abuses have been pointed out from HFT arising out nexus between HFT traders on one hand, and brokers/exchanges on the other. Through a complicated mechanism including giving preferential treatment to HFT traders, it has been found internationally (and allegedly in India too to an extent) that HFT traders hugely profited at the cost of investors. By monitoring quotes on multiple stock exchanges, they came to know in advance impending orders. Effectively, they thus bought (or sold) cheap and sold high (or low) to investors who were not only slower but were also duped by alleged unfair underlying understanding. This has been described in lucid detail in the bestselling book Flashboys by Michael Lewis.

In India too, there is a shadow of this. A whistle blower wrote to SEBI and Moneylife (a financial magazine) about alleged irregularities by National Stock Exchange. It appears that SEBI is looking into this matter.

Thus, abuse of HFT trading can be a serious issue. The HFT traders, as described in the book Flashboys, do not profit in large amounts per trade. Their skimming is small amounts. But on a cumulative basis, they would make large amount of profits. There is a cascading effect of this. Investors end up paying higher price. In turn, this raises the cost of capital for companies seeking to raise capital from the markets. Generally, this would harm the crediblity of markets too.

Conclusion
In the author’s view, SEBI is wrong in proposing measures to slow down the speed of trades/data exchange. This would be restraining developments in technology. Indeed, it is submitted, this is not the real issue at all. The real issue is alleged inequitable access to speedy information and alleged abuse of algo trading through irregular means. For this purpose, SEBI would have to understand and keep pace with the technical developments in algo trading and closely monitor such trading and provide for mechanism to monitor trades and uncover abuses. While the existing Regulations of SEBI relating to frauds and unfair trade practices are general and perhaps broad enough to cover such abuses, SEBI may consider providing for certain matters specifically, describe them in detail and provide for punishment.

Part D: Ethics, Governance & Accountability

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Judicial Transperancy

‘Open letter to Chief Justice Thakur: The latest call for judicial transparency must not be ignored’

Former Central Information Commissioner Shailesh Gandhi asks why the judiciary is loath to implement the Right to Information Act.

Dear Sir,
I am writing this letter in the spirit of seeking an improvement in the working of the judiciary, and not as an exercise in criticism. India has not been able to deliver the fruits of democracy as per the aspirations of its people. I would submit that the responsibility lies with all the four estates – legislature, executive, judiciary and the press – as well as the citizens. One of the attributes on which we have been weak, is in recognising the citizen’s right to information. Despite Parliament passing a Right To Information Act, which rates among the best five laws as far its provisions are concerned, our global rank in implementing it is a poor 66.

It is well recognised that the first clarion call for transparency was given by Justice Mathew who wrote:
“The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. Their right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can at any rate have no repercussion on public security”.
— (State of UP vs Raj Narain, 1975.)

The only restrictions on this fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) permitted by the Constitution are those specified in Article 19(2). The exemptions in the Right To Information Act cover all of these. Yet the performance of all three estates in implementation has not been very good. There was a hope that the judiciary with its pronouncements on Right to Information would be a role model and enforcer of this right. This hope has been belied. There are various instances that can be highlighted. Here are two:
1.    The rules for Right to Information framed by many courts are not in consonance with the Right to Information Act. In fact, the Bombay High Court did not even frame the rules for a year, and some courts have exemptions not in the law. Some high courts have kept Rs 500 as the application fee, while most other competent authorities charge Rs 10.
2.    The Supreme Court Public Information Officer challenged an order of the Central Information Commission in the High Court, and despite it being dismissed by a division bench it has been stayed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has not heard this matter since 2010.
3.    
As Aniket Aga wrote in The Wire:
“While the government often comes under fire for not effectively implementing the RTI Act, few have noticed that India’s highest court violates the Act routinely, and with an impunity that makes the government’s evasion of the RTI Act seem benign.”

This is also evident in the way the court refuses to share information about the process of appointments and the reasoning behind it. Charges and complaints against judges are not shared with citizens, nor are the results of investigations. Lack of transparency and accountability are justified on the grounds of maintaining the independence of the judiciary. The little man – the citizen – is considered immature by the powerful to monitor them. Ills that afflict the other pillars of democracy are likely to be present in the judiciary as well. The best safeguard and disinfectant is transparency, and the demand for accountability that follows.

Justice Chelameswar has very boldly raised the issue of lack of transparency in the judiciary, and the nation is grateful to him. Please do not try to “sort it out”. You must take this opportunity to bring accountability and better governance to the nation. There is an urgent need to ensure that all judicial vacancies are filled by a proper, transparent process so that the faith of people in our democracy is restored. It is impossible that the judges can by themselves spare adequate time to select the new judges with proper diligence. You must be aware that the increase in backlog of cases is around 1.5% each year, whereas the vacancies in the judiciary are over 20%. This is the cause for pendencies. A proper process with adequate resource must do this job.

Please recognise Justice Chelameswar’s contribution to our democracy, take this opportunity to bring transparency to the judiciary and accept that mistakes may be made in all fields. A democracy providing an equitable and fair nation will evolve, not by having infallible public servants, but by devising institutional mechanisms that will correct the foibles of men.

We have lost the balance of the checks and balances designed by our Constitution. I beseech you sir, for the sake of our nation let us restore it with your authority and wisdom.

Yours truly

Shailesh Gandhi

RTI Clinic in October 2016: 2nd, 3rd, 4th Saturday, i.e. 8th, 15th, and 22nd 11.00 to 13.00 at BCAS premises.

PART C: Information on & Around

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Maharashtra Information Commission: Quick turnaround

Maharashtra’s information commission has set a blistering pace to tackle pending backlog, with a top official clearing a staggering 6,000 cases last year Anyone else would have thrown up their hands in despair on seeing over seven lakh right to information (RTI) applications at Maharashtra’s exceedingly busy information commission, but not the panel’s chief Ratnakar Gaikwad who took up the challenge and ensured that the cases were expedited. Ratnakar Gaikwad, the 64-year-old former Maharashtra chief secretary and IAS officer of 1975 batch, inherited a backlog of 4,074 cases of three years when he was named state chief information commissioner (CIC) in 2012. Within a month of joining, the bureaucrat came up with an ingenious solution – templates that helped speed up work. Gaikwad prepared 120 templates that fit a majority of the cases. It broadly covered certain legal provisions, and similar types of cases in which the facts are the same but the information may be different

RTI appeals pendency up 96 per cent in Pune as SIC shuttles between the city and Nashik

Of the seven SIC benches in the state, the ones in Nashik, Aurangabad and Amravati have been lying vacant.

Over the last few months, pendency of second appeals with the Pune bench of the State Information Commissionerate has seen a whopping 96 per cent rise. With 8,294 second appeals pending before it as of July 2016, the Pune bench has the second highest pendency in the state, the first being Amravati SIC bench having 8,340 appeals pending before it.
The SIC benches are practically the last stage of appeals for information seekers under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005. Second appeals are filed after the information seeker has exhausted all efforts to obtain information with government offices. SICs have the power to fine/summon and order for information to be provided to the applicant.
At present, Maharashtra has seven SIC benches. State’s chief information commissioner Ratnakar Gaikwad is based in Mumbai.

Maharshtra government: Public Information Officers can’t answer RTIs seeking information on them

The onus of taking decisions about such applications has now been given to the public authorities or other public information officers (PIOs) and appellate authorities (AA).

In a move to address the long standing complaints of Right to Information (RTI) users, the state government has issued a circular which has now debarred public information officers (PIOs) and appellate authorities (AA) from hearing or taking decisions on RTI applications which seek personal information about them. The responsibility of taking decisions about such applications has now been given to the public authorities or other PIOs/AAs.
PIOS and AA are designated by the RTI Act to take decisions about the application requests from information seekers. In case of information related to PIO or AA, the decision is taken by those officials themselves. RTI activists had pointed out how this was in contravention to the set norms of jurisprudence. Judges are often known to refuse hearing of cases if they feel there would be a conflict of interest in them — “Not before me” — is the commonly used term in such cases.
The recent notification issued by the General Administrative Department (GAD) of the state government, other than barring the PIOS/AAs from hearing such applications, have issued several other directives. Such applications are to be duly registered and separate records should be kept of them. As mentioned above, the new notification has mandated that such applications would be heard by the public authority (this usually is the head of the establishment) or other PIOs/AAs.

(Source : News articles from Indian Express)

PART B: RTI Act, 2005

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Real time updates for Right to Information cases via email, SMS

The Central Information Commission (CIC) has taken an e-leap and would function like an e-court with all its case files moving digitally and the applicant being alerted about case hearings through an SMS and email. So now one can get real time updates while filing a complaint or appeal under Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Starting mid of September 2016, CIC would move to a new software, which would make the hearings faster and more convenient. As soon as an RTI applicant files an appeal or a complaint, he would be given a registration number and would get an alert on email and mobile phone about his case. The case would then be electronically transferred immediately to the concerned information commissioner’s registry electronically.

All this would be done within hours. At present, the process takes a few days.

The new system would also alert the RTI applicant about the date of hearing. An automatic SMS and email would be generated. Apart from this, the applicant would get an email in advance listing out the records given by him to CIC and the government’s submissions in his case. A senior CIC official told ET, “At present, the appellant and the ministry sometimes appear in the case without knowing what the submissions are. So this would help both sides in preparing for the case.”

The Commission would be able to expedite the processing of applications with the new software. At present, it also has to deal with complaints of loss of case files and non registration of cases. The facility would not only benefit the appellants but also information commissioners.

When a commissioner would open a case file on his computer, he would get a ready background of the specific case and also details about the appellant. The official said, “We would know if he has more appeals pending. This could facilitate hearing of multiple appeals of the same person on a given day. It would directly impact pendency as more cases would be disposed in a day.” CIC has already scanned 1.5 lakh files and converted them into electronic files.

(Source : Economic Times, September 05, 2016)

Representation In Respect Of Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme 2016

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1.Eligibility

1.1 Partial disputed amounts
Issue

Where part of the demand determined for a year is undisputed and remains unpaid, it is not clear as to whether the declarant is entitled to waiver of interest/ penalty on the total outstanding amount or can the penalty be levied on the undisputed amount?

In this regard useful inference can be made to Instruction u/s 96 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. The Question 8 of Clarification 1 of the Circular: Samadhan 2/98 dated 3-9-1998 under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 [KVSS] is reproduced:
   
    “Q 8. Where only certain items of addition are in dispute can the assessee take advantage of the Scheme for the entire demand of the year?
   
    Ans. Yes. The Scheme is applicable to the entire demand of an assessment year.”
   
Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued keeping in view the intention and the objectives to be achieved in this scheme.

1.2 Relevant cutoff date
Doubt have arisen as to whether a declaration can be filed in a case where assessment order was passed on 15th February 2016 and appeal filed on 1st March 2016 within the due date?

In respect of an appeal filed after 29th February 2016 but within the time limit specified u/s 249 of the Act, the non-eligibility of making declaration under the Scheme may lead to discrimination.

Suggestion

It is suggested that necessary clarifications in this regard be issued.

2.Refund of Interest and Penalty
Issues

2.1If the demand raised on assessment has been paid / adjusted and interest u/s 220 of the Act has also been charged/paid, whether the declarant will be entitled to refund of the interest u/s 220 since u/s 202(I)(a) of FA, interest is payable only upto the date of assessment?
Section 206 of the Scheme states that any amount paid in pursuance of a declaration made u/s 202 of the FA shall not be refundable under any circumstances. However, in the cases referred in 2.1 above, the interest / penalty etc paid is not in pursuance of a declaration u/s 202, and hence refund should be granted in such cases.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification and instructions in this regard should be issued, considering the objects and intent of the Scheme. 

3. Penalty appeal pending before CIT (A) and quantum appeal pending before ITAT

3.1 Where the appeal against levy of penalty is pending before the CIT(A) and the quantum appeal is pending before the ITAT or higher forum, whether the ITAT appeal has to be given up in order to avail of the benefit under the Scheme for the penalty?

There are no provisions in the scheme to suggest that.

Section 203(2) provides that when declaration is in respect of tax arrear, consequent to such declaration the appeal filed before CIT (A) would be deemed to be withdrawn. The said deeming fiction does not refer to appeal before any other level / any other appeal other than the appeal for which declaration is made under the Scheme.

3.2 Further, in the above referred cases whether the declarant is required to pay only taxes or interest u/s 220 of the Act? The relevant Clause 3 (b) and (c) of Form 1-Part A relating to penalty order prescribed under Rule 3(1) of the Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme Rules, 2016 [the Rules] seems to lack clarity in this regard.

3.3 In case of penalty which is not relatable to income such as penalties under sections 271A, 271B, 271BA, 271BB, 271D, 271E etc, whether the quantum appeal pending has any relevance?  Clause 3 of the Declaration Form 1-Part A regarding penalty appeal, requires details of tax and interest determined on total income and outstanding demand as on the date of declaration, to be given. As per clause 3(g), the amount payable u/s 202(1)(b) would include outstanding demand plus 25% of minimum penalty.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarifications in this regard should be issued.

4. Determination of outstanding demand in cases where rectifications are pending
For the purpose of determining the “tax arrear”, what would be the manner of determining the ‘demand outstanding’ where rectification application is pending for non-grant of credit for TDS / tax payments or other mistakes apparent from record?

Suggestion
The demand outstanding should be determined after granting credit for legitimate TDS/ tax payments and rectifying other mistakes apparent from record.

It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued.

5. Specified Tax
Specified Tax is defined u/s 201(1)(g) as tax determined in consequence of retrospective amendment and relating to a period prior to the date of assent of President for amendment which is under dispute in respect of which such tax is pending as on 29th February 2016.

5.1 If the dispute is pending before the ITAT or higher forums and part of the demand is not on account of retrospective amendment but in the nature of “tax arrear”, not eligible for declaration since it is not pending before CIT(A)). Can a declaration under the Scheme be made only in respect of specified tax by withdrawing the relevant grounds in appeal and continue the litigation for the balance demand relating to other issues?
Or can the assessee, if he so wishes, take benefit of the Scheme in respect Specified Tax as well as tax determined in respect of other issues in the appeal? In this regard useful inference can be made to Instruction u/s 96 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, Question 8 of Clarification 1 of the Circular: Samadhan 2/98 dated 3-9-1998 under KVSS, which is reproduced in point 1.2 above.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued.

5.2 The undertaking u/s 203 of FA, in Form 2 refers to waiver of rights in respect of Specified Tax. Is there any procedure to be followed for waiving rights and timelines for the same?

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary procedures and time lines in respect of the same should be laid down.

5.3 If the declaration under the Scheme is not accepted can the dispute be reinstated?

Suggestion
Section 203(5) of the FA lays down criteria where the declaration shall be presumed to be withdrawn and the pending proceedings against the declarant shall be deemed to be revived.

It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued.

5.4 The Form of declaration u/s 203 of FA, Form 1-Part B-Clauses 4 to 7 – apparently refers to `amount payable as per assessment order’ i.e. to entire demand and not relating to specified tax only.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard be issued.

6. Dilution of Assessee’s claim
Whether filing of the declaration under the Scheme, would result in diluting the claim of the assessee on similar issues in subsequent years assessment proceedings?
In this regard useful inference can be drawn from the following:

i. Instruction under section 96 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, Question 21 of Clarification 2 of the Circular Samadhan 3/98 dated 7-10-1998 under KVSS which is reproduced as under:

“Question 21: By filing declaration under Samadhan Scheme for one assessment year, does the taxpayer forego his right of appeal on the same issue in other assessment years?

Ans.:No. The order under the Samadhan Scheme does not decide any judicial issue. It only determines the sum payable under the Scheme with reference to tax arrears.”

ii. Clarification 5 vide Letter: Do [No. 3372 – CH (DT)/98, dated 22-12-1998] under KVSS which is reproduced as under:
“Your understanding that, if an assessee comes under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme for some years this fact will not amount to a decision of the Issue involved and therefore no prejudice will be caused to the declarant in respect of that issue for any other assessment year in any other proceeding which might be pending under the Income-tax Act, is correct. The Board has already clarified this point in a reference which had been received earlier.”

iii. Clarification 6 vide Letter: Dated 22-12-1998 under KVSS which is reproduced as under:

It has already been clarified in Question No. 21 and answer thereto issued by the Government with reference to Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 that the order passed by designated authority under the Scheme does not decide any judicial issue. It only determines the sum payable under the Scheme with reference to tax arrears. If the assessee goes for Samadhan Scheme for some years, the decision in other years not covered under Samadhan will not get prejudiced either against the assessee or against the revenue, even though the issues remain the same.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard be issued.

7. Waiver of interest and penalty in Form 3 – Certificate of Intimation

Section 204(1) of the Scheme provides that the designated authority shall, within a period of 60 days from the date of the declaration, determine the amount payable by the declarant in accordance with the provisions of this Scheme and grant a certificate in such form as may be prescribed, to the declarant setting forth therein the particulars of the tax arrear or the specified tax, as the case may be, and the sum payable after such determination.

Rule 4 of the Rules provide that the designated authority shall issue a certificate referred to in sub-section (1) of section 204 in Form 3.
On an analysis of Form 3, it is observed that the Certificate does not include a waiver of interest and penalty.

Suggestion
It is suggested that the Certificate should specifically include a waiver of interest and penalty.

8. To cover appeals pending at any Forum
The object of the Scheme is to reduce huge backlog of appeals and to enable the Government to recover its dues expeditiously. Further, a lot of time, cost and energy of the Revenue are being blocked as also wasted in pursuing a large number of pending appeals before various appellate forums.

The present Scheme covers only the appeals pending before the first Appellate Authority in case of tax arrears and only limited issues with respect to specified tax pending before any Appellate Forum. As can be seen, restricting the scope of the Scheme to the above referred pending appeals runs contrary to the objects and intent of formulating the Scheme.

Suggestion
In order to reduce pending litigation to a great extent as also to unlock the revenue blocked due to such pending appeals, the Scheme may be made applicable to tax arrears in all the appeals pending before any Appellate Forum.

9. Appeals set aside by higher appellate authority with a direction to CIT(A) to decide the appeal denovo
The present Scheme requires the pendency of appeal before the first appellate authority as on February 29, 2016. However, the Scheme does not cover a case where appeals are set aside by a higher appellate authority to CIT(A), in case of the following instances:

a. Where a higher Appellate Authority like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”), High Court, Supreme Court has set aside the order of the first Appellate Authority with directions to hear the entire appeal denovo;

b.Where the higher Appellate Authority has set aside some of the grounds of appeal to the file of the first Appellate Authority to decide the same denovo;

c.Where the first Appellate Authority decided the appeal based on the grounds of appeal filed originally without admitting additional grounds of appeal raised by the assessee in the course of the appellate proceedings and the ITAT has set aside the appeal to the file of the first Appellate Authority to hear the additional grounds of appeal and decide the same on merits;

d.Where the higher Appellate Authority has passed the order on or before February 29, 2016 whereby it has set aside the appeal to the file of the first Appellate Authority to decide the same denovo but the order with respect to same has not been received by the declarant assessee or the first appellate authority on or before February 29, 2016;

e.Where the higher Appellate Authority’s order has been received on or before February 29, 2016 by the assessee whereby the appeal is set aside to the file of first Appellate Authority to decide the same denovo, but, the first Appellate Authority was not intimated about such order by the assessee; and

f.As an extension to (e) above, the first Appellate Authority was intimated about the order of higher Authority for setting aside the same to his file to decide the appeal denovo, but the first Appellate Authority has not initiated any action. 

Suggestion
If all such appeals are pending before the first Appellate Authority on or before February 29, 2016 then, the same may be considered as fit appeals for the purposes of taking benefit of the Scheme.

10. Determination of tax and interest
The Scheme covers tax, interest and penalty as per assessment order and penalty order respectively. However, it does not cover following:

Where the First Appellate Authority has decided the appeal with respect to grounds of appeal filed by the assessee originally without admitting the additional ground of appeal raised by the assessee in the course of appellate proceedings and subsequent to such order, the assessing officer passes an order giving effect to the order of first Appellate Authority which results in reduction of tax, interest, vis-a-vis penalty. Now, on further appeal by the assessee, the ITAT directed the first Appellate authority to hear the additional grounds of appeal on merits. In this case, the reduced tax and interest based on order giving effect to the order of the first Appellate Authority needs to be considered instead of figures as per assessment order. Similarly, the penalty to that extent will get reduced, hence, penalty as per penalty order should not be considered in this kind of cases.

Suggestion:
The above situation requires attention and needs to be clarified.

11. When a person is barred from making declaration under the Scheme:
Clause (c) of section 208 of the Finance Act, 2016 provides that prosecution under a specified enactment must be instituted on or before filling of declaration by the declarant to bar such person from making declaration under the Scheme. However, clause (b) of section 208 does not stipulate as to when order of detention should be made i.e. such order should be before declaration under the Scheme or any time thereafter.

Suggestion
Clause (b) of section 208 should specify as to when the detention order should be made. It is suggested that it should be made before filling declaration under the Scheme.

Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016

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13th
September, 2016


Ms Rani Singh Nair

Chairperson

Central Board of Direct Taxes,

Ministry
of Finance

New
Delhi.

 

Dear
Madam

Sub:
Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme,
2016

We
write to you on behalf of members of our respective organisations and also on
behalf of the citizens of India at large.

We
wholeheartedly support the initiative of the Government of India for reducing
the huge backlog of litigation by providing a window to the litigants to settle
the matter by paying some amount of tax/penalty/interest and withdraw the
pending appeal(s).

In
principle, the Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016 is a step in the
right direction for achieving the stated objective. In order to make the Scheme
more successful and thereby reduce the backlog of pending appeals as well as
unblock the massive amounts of disputed tax demands in the country, in the
interest of the tax paying community and in the larger interest of the nation,
we would like to drawn your kind attention to certain issues that arise from
the Scheme. These issues have not been addressed in the clarifications issued
on 12th September.

We
earnestly request you to kindly issue clarifications on these issues at the
earliest. Upon receipt of the same, we shall give it extensive publicity
amongst our members as well as amongst the tax paying community.

Assuring
you and the Government of India our fullest support in the massive nation
building exercise that is in progress,

We
remain,

Yours
sincerely,

                                                                                   

Chetan
M. Shah                                                            Raju
C Shah  

President,
                                                                     President,

Bombay
Chartered Accountants’ Society
             Chartered Accountants’ Association – Ahmedabad

 

                                                                                   

Hitesh
Shah                                                                  Raghavendra
Puranik

President                                                                       President

Chamber
of Tax Consultants                                  Karnataka
State Chartered Accountants’ Association

Dhruv Seth

President,

Lucknow
Chartered Accountants’ Society

Search and seizure- Assessment- Ss. 132, 153A of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2005-06: No assessment pending at time of initiation of search proceedings- Finding by Tribunal that no incriminating evidence found during course of search- Finalised assessment or reassessment shall not abate

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CIT Vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa; 386 ITR 483 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 2005-06, the assesee’s return was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and no notice u/s. 143(2) was issued. Thereafter on January 5, 2007 a search was conducted in the case of the assessee but no incriminating material was found. However, proceedings u/s. 153A were initiated for the A. Y. 2005-06 and the Assessing Officer added an amount of Rs. 93.72 lakhs u/s. 68 and Rs. 43.67 u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. The assesee challenged the validity of the assessment made u/s. 153A, on the ground that no assessment in respect of the six assessment years was pending so as to have abated. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s submission and held that no incriminating material having been found during the course of search, the entire proceeding u/s. 153A were without jurisdiction and therefore, the addition made had to be deleted.   

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Once an assessment was not pending but had attained finality for a particular year, it could not be subject to proceedings u/s. 153A of the Act, if no incriminating materials were gathered in the course of the search or during the proceedings u/s. 153A, which were contrary to and were not disclosed during the regular assessment proceedings.”

Reassessment- Ss. 147, 148, 152 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2011-12- Effect of section 152- Reassessment not resulting in assessment of higher income

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Notice not valid- Motto Tiles P. Ltd.; 386 ITR 280 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee had filed return of income computing a loss of Rs. 77,51,810/- and a book profit of Rs. 35,96,518/- and the same was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessment was reopened by issuing notice u/s. 148 proposing to make an addition of Rs. 81,18,000/- to the normal income. The objections filed by the assessee were rejected.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the court to the provisions of section 152(2) of the Act, which provides that where an assessment is reopened u/s. 147, the assessee may, if he has not impugned any part of the original assessment order for that year either u/ss 246 to 248 or u/s. 264, claim that the proceedings u/s. 147 shall be dropped on his showing that he had been assessed on an amount or to a sum not lower than what he would be rightly liable for if the income alleged to have escaped assessment had been taken into account, or the assessment or computation had been properly made. It was submitted that in view of the above provision, the proceedings are required to be dropped because even if the income which is alleged to have escaped assessment is taken into account, the petitioner would not be assessed at a higher amount.

ii)    The controversy stands squarely concluded by the decision of this court in the case of India Gelatine and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. ACIT; 364 ITR 649 (Guj), wherein the court in a case where the assessee had declared a loss of Rs. 1.44 crores under the normal computation and the assessment was framed on book profits of Rs. 2.89 crores, had held that even if the expenditure of Rs. 116.86 lakhs is disallowed, there would no change in the resultant change in the petitioner’s tax liability since the petitioner had already paid much higher tax and had allowed the petition.

iii)    It appears that the Revenue had accepted the said decision and had not challenged the same before the higher forum. The learned counsel for the Respondent has urged that the decision requires reconsideration. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the fact that the Revenue had accepted the said decision, the court does not find any reason to refer the matter for consideration to a larger bench.

iv)    For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed.”

Penalty- Concealment of income- S. 271(1)(c) of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2005-06- Compensation paid for mining ores claimed as deduction in year of payment but allowed over five year period of mining- Assessee accepting order and revising subsequent returns- Levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) not warranted

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CIT Vs. Thakur Prasad Sao and Sons (P) Ltd.; 386 ITR 448 (Cal):

The assessee had paid Rs. 2.75 crores on account of compensation for mining ores for a period of five years which claimed as revenue expenditure in the A. Y. 2005-06. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the expenditure was allowable over a period of five years which was the period during which the mining was to be conducted. The assessee accepted that order and accordingly revised the subsequent returns. The Assessing Officer levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that it was not possible to hold that the assessee furnished inaccurate particulars or concealed its income and accordingly deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee did not accept the disallowance; that there was no disallowance as such. The imposition of penalty was not warranted.”

Export- Hotel business- Deduction u/ss. 80HHC and 80HHD of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2004-05- Computation- Deduction for export earnings not to be affected by computation of deduction for hotel business- Assessee entitled to deduction on both- Total turnover for computation of deduction of profits from export to be taken excluding foreign exchange receipts from hotel business

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CIT Vs. ITC Ltd.; 386 ITR 487 (Cal):

Assessee was engaged in the business of hotel and export of goods with receipts in foreign exchange. For the A. Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer allowed the deduction u/s. 80HHD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the income of the hotel business and in arriving at the income earned by the assessee from export business for computing the deduction u/s. 80HHC, he was of opinion that the turnover of the hotel business had to be taken into account, i.e., he included it in the total turnover, thus reducing the percentage of profit available for deduction. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee following its own earlier judgment wherein it had held that the turnover has to be restricted to such receipts which had an element of profit derived from the export of goods and that the total turnover had to be reduced by the amount of gross receipts from the hotel business in order to keep the parity between the numerator and the denominator.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    The assessee was entitled to deductions both u/s. 80HHC and s. 80HHD of the Act. The assessee had income from convertible foreign exchange which arose from its hotel business in India and income from its export business. It was not the legislative intent that the benefit u/s. 80HHC was to be regulated by the turnover of the hotel business to which section 80HHD was applicable.  

ii)    The reasons advanced by the Tribunal in its earlier judgments were proper.”

Business expenditure- S. 37 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2003-04- Fines and penalties- Penalty charges paid to Pollution Control Board for failure to install pollution control equipment at factory premises- Is expenditure incurred for compensating damage caused to environment- Payment according to “polluter pays” principle- Compensation for purpose of business

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Expenditure allowable- Shyam Sel Ltd. Vs. Dy. CIT; 386 ITR 492 (Cal):

For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee debited in the profit and loss account the penalty charges paid to the Pollution Control Board for non installation of pollution control equipment at the factory premises. The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure which was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The payment made by the assessee was for the purpose of compensating the damage to the environment and this compensation was recovered on the “polluter pays” principle adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which was judicially recognised.
ii)      It was not the case that the business pursued by the assessee was illegal. The compensation was paid because the assessee had failed to install the pollution control device within the time prescribed. Therefore, the penalty payment made by the assessee was not hit by Explanation 1 to section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The payment was undoubtedly for the purpose of business or was in consequence of business carried on by the assessee and was thus covered by section 37 of the Act. The question is answered in favour of the assessee.”

Assessment – Limitation – Draft Assessment Order – Income Tax Authorities ¬– Even though an order is made u/s. 125A(1) empowering the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (IAC) to perform the function of an Income Tax Officer, yet if he has not exercised the power or performed the function of Income-Tax Officer, the provisions requiring approval or sanction of the IAC would be applicable – Provisions of section 144B would not apply only if the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises powers or performs the function of Income-tax Officer – In absence of actual exercise of powers the period during which the draft assessment order was forwarded to the IAC till the receiving of the instructions from IAC u/s. 144B is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation.

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CIT v. Saurasthra Cement and Chem. Industries Ltd. and Saraya Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2016) 384 ITR 186 (SC)

In terms of section 153 of the Income-tax Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), time limit for completion of the assessment to be made under section 143 or 144 of the Act is at any time before the expiry of two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income is first assessable, where assessment year is commencing on or after April 1, 1969.  On this reckoning, the date by which assessment should have been carried out by the Assessing Officer in respect of the assessment year 1981-82 was March 31, 1984.  The assessment order was, however, passed on September 1, 1984.  The Revenue claimed that this assessment order was still within the prescribed period of limitation because of the reason that on March 13, 1984 draft assessment  order was passed pertaining to the aforesaid assessment year and forwarded to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Central Range-II, Ahmadabad  on March 13, 1984 (i.e., before March 31, 1984).  The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner issued instructions under section 144B of the Act on August 31, 1984 and based on that the Assessing Officer framed the assessment on September 1, 1984 under section 143(3) of the Act read with section 144B of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the position that was taken by the Revenue was that the period from March13, 1984 to August 31, 1984, when the matter was before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, had to be excluded while computing the period of limitation of two years and once the period is excluded the assessment order was passed within the period of limitation.
The contention of the responding-assessee, on the other hand, was that, by order dated August 29, 1983, the Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, Ahmedabad  passed under section 125A(1) of the Act had assigned all the powers and functions of the Income Tax Officer, Central Circle, Jamnagar to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.  This order was passed specifically in case of the respondent herein which became effective from September 1, 1983.  It was the submission that once, by virtue of the aforesaid order dated August 29, 1983, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is conferred concurrent jurisdiction, along with the Income-tax Office, empowering him to make assessment order in the case of the assessee, there was no question of  forwarding the draft assessment order by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and this unnecessary and superfluous exercise would not enure to the advantage of the Revenue giving it the benefit of the period from March 13, 1984 to August 31, 1984 while calculating the period of limitation of two years provided under section 153 of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal found force in the said submission of the assessee and allowed the appeal thereby setting aside the assessment order.  The Gujarat High Court,  upheld this view of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal of the Appellant.

The Supreme Court  also noted that in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.13766 of 2001 which was preferred by the assessee  M/s.  Saraya Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., in the same circumstances, on the same question, the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary view.  The High Court of Allahabad has found merit in the stand taken by the Revenue and excluded the period during which the draft assessment was forwarded to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner till the date of receiving the instructions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 144B of the Act.

The Supreme Court thus, faced with two conflicting views and had  to decide as to which High Court had correctly decided the issue of limitation.

The Supreme Court noted that section 144B of the Act deals with a situation where the Income-tax Officer intends to pass an assessment order which is in variation to the income or loss that is shown in the return of the assessee and the amount of such variation exceeds the amount that can be fixed by the Board under sub-section (6) thereof. In such a situation, the Income-tax Officer is under obligation to first forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment to the assessee who can file his objections within 7 days thereof and if the objections are received, the Income-tax Officer is to forward the draft order together with objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, after considering the draft order and the objections, is empowered to issue such direction as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Income-Tax Officer to complete the assessment.

The Supreme Court further noted from the reading of section 153, the period (not exceeding 180 days) commencing from the date on which the Income –tax Officer forwards the draft order under sub-section (1) of section 144B to the assessee and ending with the date on which the Income-tax Officer receives the directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (a) of section 144B, is to be excluded while computing the period of limitation.

Before the Supreme Court, thrust   of the counsel for the assessee was on sub-section (4) of section 125A with the submission that on the conferment of the concurrent jurisdiction, provisions of the Act requiring approval and the sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner were not applicable and, therefore, the provisions of section 144B ceased to apply and should not have been invoked by the Income-tax Officer in the instant case. It was also argued that the High Court in the impugned judgment had rightly discussed that with the passing of a specific order dated August 29, 1983 by the Commissioner of Income-tax directing that all the powers and functions assigned to the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle, Jamnagar were thereby available to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Central Range II, Ahmedabad, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner,  Central Range II, Ahmedabad was brought at par with the Income-tax Officer, in so far as it pertains to the assessment of the assessee herein and he did not remain an Officer higher in status than the Income-tax Officer in so far as assessment of the assessee was concerned and for this reason also no such reference to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was called for.

According to the Supreme Court, these arguments were without any force and the result which the respondent-assessee wants did not flow from the reading of section 125A of the Act. The Supreme Court held that a bare reading of sub-section (4) of section 125A of the Act provides that where –

(a) An order is made under sub-section (1), and

(b) The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises the powers or performs the functions of an Income-tax Officer in relation to any area, or persons or classes of persons, or incomes or classes of income, or cases or classes of cases –

(i) references in this Act or in any rule made there under to the Income-tax Officer shall be constructed as references to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, and

(ii) any provision of this Act requiring approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will not be applicable.

The Supreme Court held that, hence, the provision of the Act requiring the approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will not be applicable only in those cases where both the aforementioned conditions (a) and (b) are are satisfied.  It would mean that, even though an order is made under section 125A(1) empowering the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to perform the functions of an Income-tax Officer, yet if he has not exercised the power or performed the function of an Income-tax Officer, the provisions requiring approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will be applicable.  Sub-section (4) nowhere provides that, if some directions by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner are issued as provided under sub-section (2), the provisions requiring approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will not be applicable.

The Supreme Court, in the instant case, found that it was not the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who exercised the powers or performed the functions of the Income-tax Officer, even when such a power was conferred upon him, concurrently with the Incom-tax Officer.  The significant feature of section 125A of the Act is that even when the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is given the same powers and functions which are to be performed by the Income-tax Officer in relation to any area or classes or person or income or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, on the conferment of such powers, the Income Tax Officer does not stand denuded of those powers.  With conferment of such powers on the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner gives him “concurrent” jurisdiction which means that both, the Income-tax Officer as well as the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, are empowered to exercise those functions including passing assessment order.  It is still open to the Income-tax Officer to assume the jurisdiction and pass the order in case the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner does not exercise those powers in respect of the assessment year.  Provisions of section 144B would not apply only if the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises powers or performs the functions of Income-tax Officer.  What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers that are borne out from the bare reading of sub-section (4) of section 125B.

According to the Supreme Court, the position would become abundantly clear when one reads section 144B, particularly, sub-section (7) thereof.

Sub-section (7), in no uncertain terms, mentions that section 144B will not apply in that case where the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner “exercises the powers or performs the functions of an Income-tax Officer” in pursuance of an order made under section 125 or section 125A.

The Supreme Court observed that in the instant case, as already noted above, no such power was exercised or function of an Income-tax Officer was performed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court of Gujarat while dismissing the appeal of the Revenue failed to take into account the earlier judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woolllen Mills Ltd. [1995]  212 ITR 310 (Guj), which had taken the above  view. The Supreme Court agreed with the view taken in CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woolllen Mills Ltd. thereby allowed Civil Appeal No.2984 of 2008 and setting aside the impugned judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

For these reasons, the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.13766 of 2011 filed by the assessee against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court was dismissed affirming the view in the said case.

3.Commissioner of Income Tax-4 vs. M/s. J.M. Financial Securities Pvt. Ltd. [ Income tax Appeal no 235 of 2014 dt : 27/07/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

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[Affirmed M/s. J.M. Financial Securities
Pvt. Ltd. vs Asst CIT – 4(3)  . [ITA No.
4289/Mum/11  ;  Bench : J ; dated 19/04/2013 ; A Y: 2004- 2005,
Mum.  ITAT ]

 Expenses
– Liability Disputed   
Once
the assessee stopped contesting the claim of SEBI, the liability was crystallized
during the year: Sec 37

The
Assessing Officer disallowed assessee’s claim for expenditure aggregating to
Rs.1.86 crores. This expenditure was on account of payment to SEBI of Registration
Fees and interest paid thereon on account of late payment. The explanation of
the  assessee was that there was a dispute
between SEBI and assessee with regard to the fees payable for registration in
respect of its taking over the business of M/s. J.M. Financial & Investment
Consultancy Services Ltd. However, in the subject assessment year, the assessee
decided to accept the contention of the SEBI on the question of fees payable
for registration with SEBI along with interest as contended by the SEBI. This
was warranted in view of the communication dated 19th November, 2003 from SEBI
to National Stock Exchange returning its application for trading in Future and
Options. 

Being
aggrieved the assessee carried the issue in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
dismissed the assessee’s appeal. 

On further
appeal, the Tribunal held that the only reason for not accepting the claim of
the  assessee as given by the lower
Authorities was that the assessee was not able to produce supporting documents
to evidence that the payment in fact had been made to SEBI. The evidence of
payment provided was a copy of the cheque issued in favour of SEBI drawn on
HDFC Bank.

The Hon’ble
High  Court observed that  there was no dispute that the  assessee had taken over the business of one
M/s. J.M. Financial Investment Consultant Services Pvt. Ltd. and a final
registration had to be applied for with SEBI. The assessee had earlier
contested the claim of SEBI in respect of the fees payable. However, during the
previous year relevant to the subject assessment year, the  assessee decided to accept the claim of SEBI
and pay the fees.

Once the assessee
acceptedthe claim of SEBI, the liability had crystallized during the year and
had to be allowed as an expenditure. So far as payment during the year is
concerned, the examination thereof may strictly be not necessary in view of the
above findings as the assessee is following Mercantile System of Accounting.
Nevertheless, the view taken by the Tribunal is a factual finding. The evidence
was in the form of copy of a cheque in favour of SEBI drawn on HDFC Bank.
Accordingly, appeal of the dept was dismissed  as the question framed does not give rise to
any substantial question of law.

2.CIT -16 vs. Sadanand B. Sule. [ Income tax Appeal no 300 of 2014,: 02/08/2016 (Bombay High Court)]. [Affirmed DCIT 16(2) vs. Sadanand B. Sule,. [ITA No. 831/MUM/2009, ; Bench : E ; dated : 07/08/2013 ; A Y: 2005- 2006, Mum. ITAT ]

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Cost of Acquisition of Shares –Vendor not disclosing the
receipt in their return – Assessee cannot be held responsible – for default
made by the vendors –  Consideration for
the sale of shares by account payee cheques is also significant:

The Assessee
sold 7,49,000 equity shares and 29,97,867 6% redeemable preference shares of
Lavasa Corporation Pvt. Ltd in the year under consideration, to Hindustan
Construction Corporation Ltd.. The Assessee disclosed long term capital gains
on sale of 7,49,000 equity shares and 24,97,867 6% redeemable preference shares
of Lavasa Corporation Ltd and short term capital gains on sale of 5,00,000 6%
redeemable preference shares of Lavasa Corporation Ltd.

The Assessee
had obtained 12,48,750 equity shares and 26,64,000 6% redeemable preference
shares of Lavasa Corporation on the merger of Yashomala Leasing & Finance
(P) Ltd. with Lake City Corporation (former name Lavasa Corporation) on the
basis of scheme of amalgamation approved by the Bombay High Court dated 1st
Aug. 2002. The assessee further purchased 5,00,000 6% redeemable preference
shares in the year 2003.

 As far as the long term capital gains was
concerned the assessee had considered the investment in the shares of the
company, Yashomala Leasing & Finance (P) Ltd. as the cost of acquisition as
he had obtained the shares sold, on the merger of the Yashomala Finance & Leasing
(P) Ltd with Lake City Corporation Ltd. The assessee purchased 1665 shares of
Yashomala Leasing Finance Pvt. Ltd  on  April, 2001 from Mr. Arvind Bhale and Mrs.
Jyoti Bhale. Yashomala had directly allotted one share to the assessee.

The
Assessing Officer does not dispute that the 
assessee was owner of the 1665 shares in Lavasa Corporation Ltd. and had
sold the shares along with other shares in the company during the previous year
relevant to the subject assessment year. However, during the assessment
proceedings the Assessing Officer by order dated 31st December, 2007 held that
the assessee had failed to establish the purchase of 1665 shares in 2001. In
particular he noted that the consideration claimed to have been paid by the assessee
to the vendors of the 1665 shares viz. Mr. and Mrs. Bhale was not found
unreliable. This was for the reason that the vendors had not shown any receipt
on account of sale of 1665 shares in its returns of income for Assessment Year
2001-02. On the basis of the above, the Assessing Officer concluded that as
date of acquisition of the shares is not known, the entire receipt on sale of
the shares has to be treated as short term capital gain and not at the value
claimed by the assessee but at an value worked out by him. 

 The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal on
consideration of facts .. It held that the basis of the Assessing Officer not
accepting the cost and the date of purchase of 1665 equity shares from Mr. and
Mrs. Bhale was not correct in view of explanation offered by the assessee. In
the explanation, the assessee’s claim of having purchased the shares during the
assessment year 2002-03 and the cost of acquisition was taken at Rs.41.25 lakhs
for computation of capital gains on its sale. 

Being
aggrieved, the Revenue carried the issue in appeal before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). In particular, it noted that the
assessee could not be held responsible for the failure of the vendors of the
shares i.e. Mr. and Mrs. Bhale to show the receipts on sale of shares in its
return of income for paying tax on the same. It noted the fact that all
payments made for the purchase of shares from Mr. and Mrs. Bhale were made
through account payee cheques. Further there were confirmation letters filed by
the vendors Mr. and Mrs. Bhale which were not even considered by the Assessing
Officer. The ITAT order also found that the order of the CIT(A) accepting the
explanation of the assessee for the discrepancies in its return of income could
not be found fault with. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed a  appeal before High Court. The Hon. High court held that the
purchasers of shares cannot be held responsible for default made by the vendors
of shares in filing their return of income and not disclosing consideration
received by them for sale of their shares. It was further observed that the
Assessing Officer completely ignored the confirmation letter given by vendors
of 1665 shares. Further fact that the assessee had paid the consideration for
the sale of 1665 shares by account payee cheques is also significant
.. The
view taken by both authorities on the basis of evidence and explanation made
available before them was a possible and reasonable view. In the above view the
question raised does not give rise to any substantial question of law.
High
court upheld the Tribunal order and dismissed the  Revenue appeal.

Revision – Jurisdiction – Condition Precedent – Satisfaction that an order passed by the authority under the Act is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue – Once satisfaction is reached, jurisdiction to exercise the power would be available subject to observance of the principles of natural justice – Unlike the power of reopening an assessment u/s. 147 of the Act, the power of revision u/s. 263 is not contingent on the giving of a notice to show cause.

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CIT v. Amitabh Bachchan [2016] 384 ITR 200 (SC)

For the assessment year 2001-02 the
assessment order was passed on March 30, 2004. 
After the assessment as above was finalized, a show-cause notice dated
November 7, 2005 under section 263 of the Act was issed by the learned
Commissioner of Income Tax detailing as many as eleven (11) issues/grounds on
which the assessment order was proposed to be revised under section 263 of the
Act.  The respondent-assessee filed his
reply to the said show-case notice on consideration of which by order dated
March 20, 2006 the learned Commissioner of Income Tax set aside the order  of assessment dated March 30, 2004 and
directed a fresh assessment to be made. 
Aggrieved, the respondent-assessee challenged the said order before the
learned Tribunal which was allowed by the order dated August 28, 2007.

Aggrieved
by the order dated August 28, 2007 of the learned Tribunal, the Revenue filed
an appeal under section 260A of the Act before the High Court  of Bombay. 
The aforesaid appeal, i.e. I.T.A. No.293 of 2008 was dismissed by the
High Court by the order dated August 7, 2008 holding that as the Commissioner
of Income Tax had gone beyond the scope of the show-cause notice dated
November7, 2005 and had dealt with the issues not covered/mentioned in the said
notice, the   revisional order dated March 20, 2006 was in
violation of the principles of natural justice. 
So far as the question as to whether the Assessing Officer had made
sufficient enquiries about the assessee’s claim of expenses made in the
re-revised return of income was concerned, which question was formulated as
question No.2 for the High Court’s consideration, the High Court took the view
that the said question raised pure questions of fact and, therefore, ought not
to be examined under section 260A of the Act. 
The appeal of the Revenue was consequently dismissed.  Aggrieved, appeal was filed before the Supreme
Court upon grant of leave under article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The
Supreme Court noted that the assessment in question was set aside by the  Commissioner of Income Tax by the order dated
March 20, 2006 on the principal ground that requisite and due enquires were not
made by the Assessing Officer prior to finalization of the assessment by order
dated March 30, 2004.  In this
connection, the   Commissioner of Income Tax on consideration of
the facts of the case and the record of the proceedings came to the conclusion
that in the course of the assessment proceedings despite several opportunities
the assessee did not submit the requisite books of account and documents and
deliberately dragged the matter leading to one adjournment after the  other. 
Eventually, the Assessing Officer, to avoid the bar of limitation, had
no option but to “hurriedly” finalise the assessment proceedings which on due
and proper scrutiny disclosed that the necessary enquires were not made.  On the said basis the Commissioner of Income
Tax came to the conclusion that the assessment order in question was erroneous
and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue warranting exercise of power
under section 263 of the Act.  Consequently,
the assessment for the year 2001-02 was set aside and a fresh assessment was
ordered.  In the order dated March 20,
2006 the  Commissioner of Income Tax
arrived at findings and conclusions in respect of issues which were not
specifically mentioned in the show-cause notice dated November 7, 2005.  In fact, on as many as seven/eight (07/08)
issues mentioned in the said show-cause notice the   Commissioner of Income Tax did not record any
finding   whereas conclusions adverse to the assessee
were recorded on issues not specifically mentioned in the said notice before
proceeding to hold that the assessment needs to be set aside.  However, three (03) of the issues, were  common to the show-cause notice as well as the
revisional order of the learned Commissioner of Income Tax.

On
appeal, the   Tribunal took the view that the   Commissioner of Income Tax exercising powers
under section 263 of the Act could not have gone beyond the issues mentioned in
the show-cause notice dated November 7, 2005. 
The Tribunal, therefore, thought it proper to take the view that in
respect of the issues not mentioned in the show-cause notice the findings as
recorded in the revisional order dated March 20, 2006 have to be understood to
be in breach of the principles of natural justice.  The Tribunal also specifically considered the
three (03) common issues mentioned above and on such consideration arrived at
the conclusion that the reasons disclosed by the   Commissioner of Income Tax in the order dated March
20, 2006 for holding the assessment to be liable for cancellation on that basis
were not tenable.  Accordingly, the
Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee and reversed the order  of the suo motu revision dated March 20,
2006.

The
Supreme Court, in an appeal filed by the Revenue, observed that under the Act
different shades of power have been conferred on different authorities to deal
with orders of assessment passed by the primary authority.  While section 147 confers power on the
assessing authority itself to proceed against income escaping assessment, section
154 of the Act empowers such authority to correct a mistake apparent on the
face of the record.  The power of appeal
and revision is contained in Chapter XX of the Act  which includes section 263 that concern suo
motu power of revision on the   Commissioner of Income Tax.  The different shades of power conferred on
different authorities under the Act has to be exercised within the areas
specifically delineated by the Act and the exercise of power under one
provision cannot trench upon the powers available under another provision of
the Act.

The
Supreme Court reverting to the specific provisions of section 263 of the Act held
that what has to be seen is that a satisfaction that an order passed by the
authority under the Act is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the
Revenue is the basic pre-condition for exercise of jurisdiction under section
263 of the Act.  Both are twin conditions
that have to be conjointly present.  Once
such satisfaction is reached, jurisdiction to exercise the power would be
available subject to observance of the principles of natural justice which is
implicit in the requirement cast by the section to give the assessee an
opportunity of being heard.  It is in the
context of the above position that this court has repeatedly held that unlike
the power of reopening an assessment under section 147 of the Act, the power of
revision under section 263 is not contingent on the giving of a notice to show
cause.  In fact, section 263 has been
understood not to require any specific show-cause notice to be served on the
assessee.  Rather, what is required under
the said provision is an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.  The two requirements are different; the first
would comprehend a prior notice detailing the specific grounds on which
revision of the assessment order is tentatively being proposed.  Such a notice is not required.  What is contemplated by section 263, is an
opportunity of hearing to be afforded to the assessee.  Failure to give such an opportunity would
render the revisional order legally fragile not on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.

It
may be that in a given case and in most cases it is so done a notice proposing
the revisional exercise is given to the assessee indicating therein broadly or
even specifically the grounds on which the exercise is felt necessary.  But there is nothing in the section  (section 263) to raise the said notice to the
status of a mandatory show-cause notice affecting the initiation of the
exercise in the absence thereof or to require the Commissioner of Income Tax to
confine himself to the terms of the notice and foreclosing consideration of any
other issue or question of fact.  This is
not the purport of section 263.  There
can be no dispute that while the Commissioner of Income Tax is free to exercise
his jurisdiction on consideration of all relevant facts, a full opportunity to
controvert the same and to explain the circumstances surrounding such facts,
as  may be considered relevant by the
assessee, must be afforded to him by the Commissioner of Income Tax prior to
the finalization of the decision.

The
Supreme Court held that in the present case, there was no dispute that in the
order dated March 20, 2006 passed by the   Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263
of the Act findings have been recorded on issues that are not specifically
mentioned in the show-cause notice dated November 7, 2005 though there are
three (03) issues mentioned in the show-cause notice dated 7, 2005 which had
specifically been dealt with in order dated March 20, 2006.  The Tribunal in its order dated August 28,
2007 put the aforesaid two features of the case into two different
compartments.  In so far as the first
question, i.e., findings contained in the order of the Commissioner of Income
Tax dated March 20, 2006 beyond the issues mentioned in the show-cause notice was
concerned, the Tribunal held that the revision order was bad in law and also
violative of principles of natural justice and thus not maintainable. 

According
to the Supreme Court, the above ground which had led the Tribunal to interfere
with the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax seemed to be contrary to the
settled position in law, as indicated above and the two decisions of the
Supreme Court in Gita Devi Aggarwal (76 ITR 496) and Electro House (82 ITR 824).  The   Tribunal in its order dated August 28, 2007
had not recorded any findings that in course of the suo motu revisional
proceedings, hearing of which was spread over many days and attended to by the
authorized representative of the assessee, opportunity of hearing was not
afforded to the assessee and that the assessee was denied an opportunity to
contest the facts on the basis of which the   Commissioner of Income Tax had come to his
conclusions as recorded in the order dated March 20, 2006.

The
Supreme Court observed that in the course of the revisional exercise relevant
facts, documents and books of account which were over looked in the assessment
proceedings were considered.  On such
re-scrutiny it was revealed that the original assessment order on several heads
was erroneous and had the potential of causing loss of revenue to the
State.  It is on the aforesaid basis that
the necessary satisfaction that the assessment order dated March 30, 2004 was
erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue was recorded by the
Commissioner of Income Tax.  At each
stage of the revisional proceedings, the authorized representative of the
assessee had appeared and had full opportunity to contest the basis on which
the revisional authority was proceeding/ had proceeded in the matter.  The Supreme Court held that if the revisional
authority had come to its conclusions in the matter on the basis of the record
of the assessment proceedings which was open for scrutiny by the assessee and
available to his authorized representative at all times, it was difficult to
see as to how the requirement of giving of reasonable opportunity of being
heard as contemplated by section 263 of the Act had been breached in the
present case.  The order of the   Tribunal in so far as the first issue i.e. the
revisional order going beyond the show-cause notice was concerned, therefore,  could not  accepted.

The
Supreme Court therefore considered the second limb of the case as dealt with by
the Tribunal, namely, that tenability of the order of the Commissioner of
Income Tax on the three (03) issues mentioned in the show-cause notice and also
dealt with in the revisional order dated March 20, 2006.  The aforesaid three (03) issues were:

         (i)  The
assessee maintaining 5 bank accounts and the Assessing Officer not examining
the 5th bank account, books of account and any other bank account
where receipts related to KBC were banked.

       (ii) Regarding
claim of deposit of Rs.5206 lakh in Bank the a/c No. 11155 under the head
“Receipt on behalf of Mrs. Jaya Bachchan, and  

        (iii)  Regarding
the claim of additional expenses in the re-revised return. 

On the
above issues, the   Tribunal had given detailed reasons for not
accepting the grounds cited in the revisional order for setting aside the
assessment under section 263 of the Act. 
According to the Supreme Court, the reasons cited by the   Tribunal in so far as the first two issues
were  concerned may not justify a serious
relook and hence not be gone into.  The Supreme
Court however was of the opinion the third question would, however, require
some detailed attention.  The said
question was with regard to the claim of additional expenses made by the
assessee in its re-revised return which was subsequently withdrawn. 


The Supreme Court held
that there could  be no doubt that so
long as the view taken by the Assessing officer is a possible view, the same
ought not to be interfered with by the Commissioner of Income Tax under section
263 of the Act merelyon the ground that there is another possible view of the
matter.  Permitting exercise of
revisional power in a situation where two views are possible would really
amount of conferring some kind of an appellate power in the revisional
authority.  This is a course of action
that must be desisted from.  However, according
to the Supreme Court the above was not the situation in the present case in
view of the reasons stated by the Commissioner of Income Tax on the basis of
which the said authority felt that the matter needed further investigation, a
view with which the Supreme Court wholly agreed.  Making a claim which would prima facie
disclose that the expenses in respect of which deduction had been claimed had
been incurred and thereafter abandoning/withdrawing the same gave rise to the
necessity of further enquiry in the interests of the Revenue.  The notice issued under section 69C of the
Act could not have been simply dropped on the ground that the claim had been
withdrawn.  The Supreme Court, therefore,
was of the opinion that the   Commissioner of Income Tax was perfectly
justified in coming to his conclusions in so far as the issue No. (iii) was
concerned and in passing the impugned order on that basis.  The Tribunal as well as the High Court, therefore,
ought not to have interfered with the said conclusion.


The Supreme Court concluded that the present was a fit case for
exercise of the suo motu revisional powers of the   Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263
of the Act.

1.Commissioner of Income tax- 3 vs. SICOM LTD. [ Income tax Appeal no 137 of 2014 dt : 08/08/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

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[Affirmed  SICOM LTD  vs.  Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax Range 3(3),. [ITA No. 3130/MUM/2011  ;  Bench : E ; dated 10/10/2012 ; A Y: 2003- 2004.  (Mum).  ITAT ]

Reopening – Within 4 years – Change of opinion –  reopening  not permissible :Sec 148                                                                          

The
assessee company is engaged in the business of finance, leasing, banking and
investment company (non-banking financial company). The return was filed
declaring total loss of Rs. 84,29,79,390/- for AY 2003-04 . The assessment was
completed for an income of Rs. 30,90,29,470/- 
u/s 143(3) of the Act.  

Subsequently, the A.O. reopened the assessment by
issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act on 28-3-2008 after recording the reasons relating to write off of inter corporate  deposit (ICD), investment etc.


The assessee vide letter dtd. 18-7-2008 stated that
there has been no failure on their part to disclose all the material facts in
its return of income. However, the
WA.O. observed that the assessee failed to furnish
necessary details in respect of nature of assets written off. Therefore, it was
a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose all the material facts in its
return of income.


According to the A.O., the write off of investment wasa
capital loss,  and the same couldnot be
allowed as a revenue expenditure. Similarly, ICD and other assets written off
constituted capital loss as these were the capital assets of the assessee,
therefore, they were also not allowable as revenue expenditure and accordingly
the A.O. added the same.


The assessee on the reopening of the assessment submitted
that the assessee in response to the query raised by the A.O. in respect of
write off done in the books of accounts of inter-corporate deposits, other
assets and investment has filed detailed reply dtd. 10-11-2005 supported by the
finding given by the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for the AY’s 1981-82,
1982-83  and 1983-84. It was  further submitted that the A.O. after
considering the same has passed the assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act. It
was  further submitted that reopening of
the assessment on the same sets of fact is 
not permissible as it amounts to change of opinion.


The ITAT observed that in the course of original
assessment proceeding the A.O. has considered and examined the particular
aspect, the said aspect cannot be made a ground to reopen and initiate
reassessment proceedings. The assessing authority cannot have a fresh look and reopen
an assessment on the ground of change of opinion. The A.O. had considered and
examined whether or not write off of the amount of inter-corporate deposits,
other assets and investments was of revenue nature. The A.O. accepted the stand
of the assessee and has made no addition in the original assessment
proceedings. The reassessment proceeding cannot, therefore, be initiated on the
ground that the said claim of the assessee cannot be allowed as permissible deduction
under the provisions of the Act.  In the
present case it is noticeable that the assessee had disclosed fully and truly
all the material facts relevant for the assessment. There is no indication and
it is not alleged that there was “tangible material” to come to the conclusion
that there is escapement of income from assessment.  The reassessment proceeding  were quashed.


Being aggrieved by the order of ITAT, the Revenue filed
 appeal before the Hon.  High Court. The High court  upheld the Tribunal order and dismissed
the  Revenue appeal holding that Revenue has not been able to point out any
fallacy in the reasoning of the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the
reopening notice is without jurisdiction

NEED FOR DEPOSITS UNDER CAPITAL GAIN ACCOUNTS SCHEME

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Issues for Consideration

       Section
54(2) and a set of other similar provisions, provide for the deposit of Capital
Gains or the net consideration in a bank account in accordance with the Capital
Gains Account Schemes, 1988, in a case where such amount is not appropriated or
utilized by the assessee towards the purchase or construction of the new asset
before the date of furnishing return of income u/s. 139 of the Income Tax Act.

The amount so
deposited under this Scheme, is required to be utilized for investment in the
specified new asset, within the specified period by withdrawal from the same account
in accordance with the Scheme. The amount in the bank account remaining
unutilized, shall be charged as the Capital Gains for the year in which the
period of reinvestment expires and the assessee shall be entitled to withdraw
the same unutilized balance.

Instances happen
whereunder, an assessee utilizes the amount of the Capital Gains or the net
consideration in reinvesting the same in the specified new asset, within the
permissible time of 2 or 3 years, after filing the return of income u/s. 139,
without first depositing such amount in the designated account and routing the
investment through such account.

Issues arise in such
cases about the eligibility of the assessee, for claim of exemption from the
liability to tax on Capital Gains. The courts, in considering the issue, have
delivered conflicting decisions. The Karnataka High Court had held, that the assessee
should be eligible for the relief once the amount in question was utilized
within the permissible time. However, the Bombay High Court recently held, that
it was essential for an assessee to first deposit the unutilized amount in the
designated account and any failure to do so would result in denial of the
relief, even where he had utilized the amount of gains or consideration in
purchase or construction of a new asset with the overall permissible time
frame.

K Ramachandra Rao’s case

The issue arose before the Karnataka High Court in the case of the CIT
v. K. Ramachandra Rao, 230 Taxman 334.
In that case, the assessee sold
certain converted lands for a consideration of Rs.2.87 crore. The assessee
constructed the residential premises on another plot of land owned by him,
for which certain payments towards construction were made within a period of one
year of the transfer of the said lands, some payments were made within one
year before the transfer of the said lands and balance payments were made after
the transfer and after the due date of filing return of income u/s 139(1)
directly, without depositing the same in the designated bank account under
the Capital Gains Scheme. The construction of the premises was completed
within a period of three years of the transfer. The assessee claimed
exemption u/s 54F from taxation in respect of the capital gains arising on
the transfer of the said lands. The AO denied the claim for exemption on the
ground that a part was invested before the transfer of the said lands in
construction, and that the balance was invested directly without depositing
the same in the designated bank account.  

 

On appeal, the Commissioner(Appeals) held that the payments made within
one year before the date of transfer and also the payments made after
transfer were eligible for exemption in spite of the fact that the proceeds
were not deposited in the designated bank account. The tribunal, on appeal by
the revenue, confirmed the findings of the Commissioner(Appeals).    

 

In appeal to the High Court, the Revenue, besides another question, raised
the following substantial question of law:

 

“When the assessee invests the entire sale consideration construction of
a residential house within three years from the date of transfer can he be
denied exemption under Section 54F on the ground that he did not deposit the
said amount in capital gains account scheme before the due date prescribed
under Section 139(1) of the IT Act?”

 

The decision,
as reported, does not record the conflicting stands presented by the parties to
the appeal nor does it record the observations of the court that led to the
decision of the  High Court rejecting the
appeal of the Revenue, which  held as
under;

“As is clear from
Sub-section (4) in the event of the assessee not investing the capital gains
either in purchasing the residential house or in constructing a residential house
within the period stipulated in Section 54F(1), if the assessee wants the
benefit of Section 54F, then he should deposit the said capital gains in an
account which is duly notified by the Central Government. In other words if he
want of (sic) claim exemption from payment of income tax by retaining the cash,
then the said amount is to be invested in the said account. If the intention is
not to retain cash but to invest in construction or any purchase of the
property and if such investment is made within the period stipulated therein,
then Section 54F(4) is not at all attracted and therefore the contention that
the assessee has not deposited the amount in the Bank account as stipulated and
therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit even though he has invested the
money in construction is also not correct.”

 

Humayun Suleman Merchant’s case

 

The issue again
came up recently before the Bombay High Court in the case of Humayun Suleman
Merchant v CCIT, ITA No 545 of 2002 dated 18th August 2016.

 

In this case,
the assessee sold a plot of land for a consideration of Rs. 85.33 lakh on 29th
April 1995. The due date of filing of his return of income was 31st
October 1996. He entered into an agreement to purchase a flat for a
consideration of Rs. 69.60 lakh on 16th July 1996. Under this
agreement, 2 instalments of Rs. 10 lakh each were paid on 17th July
1996 and 23rd October 1996 to the developer/builder. A further
payment of Rs. 15 lakh was made on 1st November 1996 under the
agreement to purchase the flat. The possession of the new flat was obtained on
27th January 1997. No amount was deposited in the capital gains
account scheme.

 

The assessee
filed his return of income on 4th November 1996, after the due date
of filing of his return of income. In the return, exemption under section 54F
was claimed in respect of the entire cost of the new flat of Rs. 69.60 lakh.

 

The assessing
officer allowed exemption from capital gains under section 54F in respect of
the amount of Rs. 35 lakh paid till the date of the filing of the return, and
did not consider the balance amount of Rs 34.60 lakh paid subsequently for the
flat, on account of the assessee’s failure to deposit the unutilised consideration
for purchase on the flat in the specified bank account in accordance with the
capital gains account scheme. The Commissioner(Appeals) upheld the order of the
assessing officer. The tribunal also dismissed the appeal of the assessee.

 

Before the Bombay
High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that:

1.      The issue was covered by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT v Hilla J B Wadia 261 ITR 376, read with CBDT circulars dated 15 October
1986 and 16 December 1993. Further, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in the case of Smt Shashi Varma v CIT 224 ITR 106 also applied. Besides,
the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of K Ramachandra Rao
(supra) covered the issue.

2.      Section 54F had been brought into the Act with the object of encouraging
the housing sector. Therefore, a liberal/beneficial interpretation/construction
should be given to section 54F(4). Reliance was placed upon the decision of the
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v Ravinder Kumar Arora 342 ITR 38.

3.      Section 54F(4) deliberately use the word “appropriation” while extending
the benefit, since it intended to expand the scope of the benefit. Since the
word “appropriation” meant setting apart, once an agreement to purchase the
flat was executed in July 1996, and the consideration was set aside, though not
paid, it should be considered to be appropriated towards the purchase of a
flat, and hence the benefit of section 54F was available.

4.      Alternatively, the requirements of section 54F(4) had been satisfied, as
the entire amount had been paid to the developer before the last date
prescribed to file the return of income [the date prescribed under section 139
(4)], as held by the Gauhati High Court in the case of CIT v Rajesh Kumar Jalan
286 ITR 274.

 

On behalf of
the revenue, it was argued that:

1.      on a plain reading of section 54F(4), the assessee had not utilised the
entire net consideration taxable under the head capital gains for purchase of
the flat, nor had he deposited the balance unutilised consideration in a
specified bank account as notified in terms of section 54F(4), and was
therefore not entitled to the benefit of exemption from capital gains under
section 54F to the extent the requirements of the section were not met.

2.      The decision of the Bombay High Court in Hilla J B Wadia (supra), as well
as the circulars cited on behalf of the assessee had no application to the
facts of the case, as these were not in the context of section 54F(4), which
was not existing in the statute books at that point of time.

3.      The word “appropriation” only covered cases where the flat had already been
purchased within one year before the date on which the capital gains arose on
the transfer of the asset. In the present case, there was no purchase of a flat
prior to the sale of the capital asset, but the purchase was post sale of the
capital asset, which required utilisation and deposit in the specified account
to the extent not utilised.

4.      The decision of the Gauhati High Court in Rajesh Kumar Jalan had no
application to this case, as the amounts had not been utilised or deposited in
the specified bank account before the assessee filed his return of income on 4th
November 1996.

 

The Bombay High
Court analysed the provisions of section 54F. It noted that, while implementing
section 54F, it was noticed that at times assessments were completed prior to
the expiry of the period of 2 or 3 years from the date of sale of the capital
asset, and the assessee had not utilised the amount within the prescribed
period. This led to assessment orders being rectified by appropriate orders, to
withdraw the excess exemption allowed under section 54F. It was for this reason
that section 54F(4) was introduced. Further, the provisions of section 54F(1)
were made subject to the provisions of section 54F(4). Therefore, where the
consideration received on sale of the capital asset was not appropriated (where
purchase was earlier than sale) or utilised (where purchase was after the
sale), then the gains were subject to the charge of capital gains tax, unless
the unutilised amounts were deposited in the specified bank account as notified
under the capital gains account scheme. The exemption was available to the
unutilised amounts only if the mandate of section 54F(4) was complied with. A
further safeguard was provided to the revenue, where the assessee had not
invested the amounts in purchase/construction of a house property within the
specified time under section 54F(1), by providing that in such cases, capital
gains would be charged on the unutilised amount as income of the previous year
in which the period of 3 years from the date of the transfer of the capital
asset expired.

 

Applying this
analysis of the provisions to the facts before it, the Bombay High Court noted
that the entire net consideration which was to be utilised in purchase of the
new flat and which had not been utilised, had not been deposited in the
specified bank account before the due date of filing of the return under
section 139(1). The High Court noted that except Rs. 35 lakh, the balance of
the net consideration to be utilised, had not been utilised before the date of
furnishing of the return, 4th November 1996. Therefore, according to
the High Court, the order of the tribunal was correct.

 

The Bombay High
Court noted that the ratio of the cases of Hilla J B Wadia (supra) and Smt.
Shashi Varma did not apply, as in those cases, at the relevant point of time,
there was no requirement of depositing any unutilised amount in a specified
bank account under the capital gains account scheme. Further, the Bombay High
Court noted that the 2 CBDT circulars relied upon on behalf of the assessee did
not do away with and/or relax the statutory mandate of depositing the
unutilised amount in the specified bank account as required by section 54F(4).

 

Referring to
the decision of the Karnataka High Court in K Ramachandra Rao (supra), the
Bombay High Court expressed its inability to accept the reasoning adopted by
the Karnataka High Court. According to the Bombay High Court, the mandate of
section 54F(4) was clear, that an amount which had not been utilised in
construction and/or purchase of property before filing the return of income
must necessarily be deposited in an account under the capital gains account
scheme, so as to claim exemption. According to the Bombay High Court, this
aspect had not been noticed by the Karnataka High Court, and the entire basis
of the decision of the Karnataka High Court was the intent of the parties.
According to the Bombay High Court, in interpreting a fiscal statute, one must
have regard to the strict letter of law, and intent can never override the
plain and unambiguous letter of the law. The Bombay High Court observed that
while it should not easily depart from a view taken by another High Court on
considerations of certainty and consistency in law, the view of other High
Courts were not binding upon it unlike a decision of the Supreme Court or of a
larger or coordinate bench of the same court. If, on an examination of the
decision of the other High Court, it was unable to accept the same, it was not
bound to follow/accept the interpretation of the other High Court, leading to a
particular conclusion.

 

In the case
before it, the Bombay High Court found that the decision of the Karnataka High
Court was rendered sub-silentio; i.e. no argument was made with regard to the
requirement of deposit in notified bank account under the capital gains account
scheme before the due date as required by section 54F(4). The Bombay High Court
relied on Salmond’s Jurisprudence for the proposition that a precedent
sub-silentio is not authoritative. The Bombay High Court therefore held that it
could not place any reliance upon the decision to conclude the issue on the
basis of that decision.

The
Bombay High Court further rejected the reliance on the decision of the Delhi
High Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar Arora (supra), where the court had
held that the provisions of section 54F should be liberally construed, on the
grounds that in that case, all the requirements of section 54F stood satisfied,
and the only issue was the addition of the name of his wife in the purchase, on
the ground that that case had no application to the facts before it.

According
to the Bombay High Court, no occasion to give a beneficial constructions to a
statute could arise when there was no ambiguity in the provision of law, which
was subject to interpretation. In the face of the clear words of the statute,
the intent of parties and/or beneficial construction was irrelevant. It relied
on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sales Tax Commissioner,
vs Modi Sugar Mills 12 STC 182, Mathuram Agarwal vs State of Madhya Pradesh 8
SCC 67 and CIT vs. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd 206 ITR 727 for this
proposition.

The
Bombay High Court also rejected the argument that since the funds had been
earmarked to be invested in construction of a house, the funds could be
regarded as appropriated for the purpose of purchase of new residential house,
and therefore the requirements of section 54F(4) were satisfied. According to
the Bombay High Court, the word “appropriated” had been used with reference to
the cases where property had already been purchased prior to the sale of the
capital asset, and the amount received on sale of the capital asset was
appropriated towards consideration which had been paid for purchase of the
property. According to it, the plain language of the section made a clear
distinction between cases of appropriation (purchase prior to sale of capital
asset) and utilisation (purchase/construction after the sale of capital assets).
Therefore, the word “appropriated” would have no application in cases of
purchase/construction of a house after the sale of capital asset, as was the
fact in the case before it.

Referring
to the argument on behalf of the assessee, that since the entire amount had
been paid before the last due date to file the return specified in section
139(4), the exemption was available, based on the decision of the Gauhati High
Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Jalan, the Bombay High Court noted that the
factual situation before it was different. In the case before the Gauhati High
Court, the amounts were utilised before the date of filing of the return of
income, whereas in the case before the Bombay High Court, only a part of the
amounts were utilised before the date of filing of the return of income.
Therefore, the Bombay High Court was of the view that the decision of the
Gauhati High Court in that case was not applicable to the case before it.

The
Bombay High Court therefore held that the assessee was entitled to an exemption
under section 54F only in respect of the amount of Rs. 35 lakh actually paid
before the date of filing of the return of income, and not in respect of the
entire amount of Rs. 69.60 lakh agreed to be paid for purchase of the new
house.

Observations

Section 54 (2) reads
as under:

The amount of the capital gain which is not
appropriated by the assessee towards the purchase of the new asset made within
one year before the date on which the transfer of the original asset took
place, or which is not utilised by him for the purchase or construction of the
new asset before the date of furnishing the return of income under 
section 139, shall be deposited by him before furnishing such return [such deposit
being made in any case not later than the due date applicable in the case of
the assessee for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of 
section 139] in an account in any such bank or institution as may be
specified in, and utilised in accordance with, any Scheme which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame in this behalf
and such return shall be accompanied by proof of such deposit; and, for the
purposes of sub-section (1), the amount, if any, already utilised by the
assessee for the purchase or construction of the new asset together with the
amount so deposited shall be deemed to be the cost of the new asset :

Provided that if the amount deposited under this
sub-section is not utilised wholly or partly for the purchase or construction
of the new asset within the period specified in sub-section (1), then,—

 (i)  The amount not so
utilized shall be charged under 
section 45 as the income of the previous year in which
the period of three years from the date of the transfer of the original asset
expires; and

(ii)  The assessee shall be
entitled to withdraw such amount in accordance with the Scheme aforesaid.

The said sub-section
was introduced in the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. The intention behind
the introduction is explained vide memorandum explaining the provisions, as
under:

The existing provisions under sec. 54, ….. the original assessments
need rectification whenever the taxpayer fails to acquire the corresponding new
asset. With a view to dispensing with such rectification of assessment, the
bill seeks to provide for new Scheme for deposit of amounts meant for
reinvestment in the new asset. Under the proposed amendment, … also
.”

Circular No. 495 dt.
22.9.1987 has explained the amendment vide para 26.2 & 26.3 to avoid the
need for rectification of the assessment order of the year of transfer on
account of the assessee’s failure to acquire corresponding new asset within the
permissible time.

On a combined reading,
it is gathered that sub-section 2 has been introduced to provide for the
deposit of that part of the gain which has remained unutilized upto the date of
filing of return. The provision simultaneously ensures that the amount so
deposited in the designated account shall be deemed to be the cost of the new
asset, so as to enable an assessee to claim relief for the assessment year
corresponding to the year of transfer of the original asset without any further
compliance needed. As it is seen, the provision is primarily introduced to
avoid any rectification of the original assessment that maybe required, to meet
the consequences of the failure of the assessee to acquire the new asset within
the overall time permitted by law. Apparently, the law of sec. 54 and other
similar sections permitted and continue to permit an assessee to reinvest the
gains or the consideration within the prescribed time. This relief has neither
been taken away by the amendment nor is it intended to be taken away. In that view
of the matter, the core requirement for a relief continues to be the reinvestment
of the gains or consideration within the overall framework of the law.

The only purpose of
the amendment, therefore is to provide for a procedural mechanism in the form
of introduction of the Scheme so as to avoid the consequential rectification in
limited cases of failure of an assessee to reinvest. It may therefore not be
appropriate, to altogether deny the benefit to an assessee in a case where he
has reinvested the gains or the consideration in new asset within the
permissible time, though without depositing the gain or the consideration under
the Scheme. This more so, as in the case before the Bombay High Court, the
entire payment has been made before the date of the assessment.

In reality, one
routinely comes across cases where the payment of consideration is deferred for
several reasons, leading to non-compliance of conditions for deposit under the Scheme.
However, the transferor, on receipt of the consideration after the filing of
return of income, acquires or is in a position to acquire the new asset within
the specified period. Many intended transactions are seen to be not implemented
simply for inability to realize the funds by the due date of filing the return
of income. A provision introduced to facilitate the smooth assessment cannot be
so construed as to defeat the provisions of law.

The Courts seem to be favoring
the view that the deposits made within the extended time of s.139(4) would be
in compliance with the provisions of law. The Courts also seem to be of the
view that the benefit of the sections should not be denied in cases where the
new asset is purchased or constructed within the time extended u/s.139(4), even
where the deposits are made under the Scheme. Under the circumstances, no
serious controversy should arise in cases where reinvestment is made within
such extended time, with or without routing the investment through the
designated account.

One may also consider
the possibility of always routing the reinvestment through the designated
account, irrespective of the delay in depositing the gains or consideration
under the Scheme. This may help the assessee in contending that he has complied
with the provisions of law, but for the delay in depositing under the Scheme,
which delay may be condoned.

There is no doubt that
the entire Scheme of exempting the Capital Gains from taxation on reinvestment is
for the benefit of the assessee and for directing the investments in the
desired channels. It is a settled position in law that such provisions being beneficial
provisions for the assessee, should be construed liberally, so as to facilitate
the deduction and not to deny it.

In view of the above
discussion, it appears that the view of the Karnataka High Court is a better
view, in as much as the court has taken a view that promotes the legislative
intent behind the main provisions of law. It is respectfully submitted that an
important factor that should have been appreciated in Humayun’s case was that
there had been no loss of revenue nor was there any delay in reinvestment, and
that the entire payment for the new house had been made by the time the
assessment was completed.

Welcome GST IGST and Place of Supply Rules

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1. Introduction

1.1. Goods and Service Tax (“GST”) is a landmark indirect tax reform knocking at our doors. The Constitution Amendment Bill has been assented recently paving the way for introduction of dual GST to replace a plethora of indirect taxes. In June 2016, the Government had released a set of model GST laws for public comments, thereby reinforcing its commitment to introduce GST at the earliest opportune time. The Finance Minister has indicated his willingness to implement this landmark reform with effect from 01.04.2017.

1.2. Under the proposed dual GST Model, both the Central and the State Governments would levy Central GST (“CGST”) and State GST (“SGST”) respectively on the same comprehensive base of all supplies.

1.3. Since the State Governments would also have jurisdiction to levy tax on supplies, the need for addressing issues related to interstate supplies arises. As an integral part of the design, GST is proposed to be a destination based consumption tax and therefore in case of interstate supplies, the tax on the interstate supply must accrue to the Destination State. This would also enable seamless flow of credit in case of interstate supplies for business purposes.

1.4. Extending the principle of destination based consumption tax, supplies imported into the country would attract GST whereas supplies exported from the country need to be zero rated (i.e. not liable for payment of GST with unfettered input credit).

1.5. To enable a smooth implementation of the above propositions and to avoid conflicts of differing interpretations, the powers to enact provisions relating to inter-state supplies rests with the Centre. Accordingly, interstate supplies, imports and exports are to be governed by an Integrated GST (“IGST”) Law. The IGST rate is proposed to be determined by considering the CGST and SGST Rates. Effectively, in IGST, there would be two components i.e. CGST and SGST, out of which, the portion of CGST will be held by the Central Government and the portion of SGST will be transferred to the destination State Government. Thus, for IGST, the Central Government will work as a clearing house for the States where consumption takes place. IGST will also enable smooth flow of credits between the origin and the destination States by permitting cross utilisation of credits.

1.6. The spirit of GST being a tax on consumption and not a tax on business is achieved through the process of granting seamless credits. Accordingly, for transactions between businesses, essentially the tax charged by the supplying business is automatically eligible for credit to the receiving business. This basically implies that GST remains a creditable tax and therefore not a cost for any business. Since it is not a cost for any business, it is also not a revenue proposition for any Government (either Central or any of the State Governments)

1.7. This ‘wash’ nature of the tax across businesses has been an important driving principle in the formulation of the concept of IGST, its’ settlement matrix to the consuming State and the formulation of the Place of Supply Rules.

1.8. Therefore, to the extent that the inter-state supply is for a creditable purpose at the recipient’s end, the IGST payment stays in the common pool with the Central Government. It is only when the inter-state supply is not for a creditable purpose at the recipient’s end, the settlement provisions and allocation of the tax to the Central Government and the consuming State Government takes place. Similarly, the general rule for the place of supply of services and many of the specific rules determine the place of supply to be the location of the address of the registered person.

2. Levy

2.1. Section 7(1) of the CGST/SGST Act prescribes the levy under the respective enactments as under:

There shall be levied a tax called the Central/State Goods and Services Tax (CGST/SGST) on all intra-State supplies of goods and/or services at the rate specified in the Schedule . . . to this Act and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.

2.2. Similarly, Section 4(1) of the IGST Act prescribes the levy as under:

There shall be levied a tax called the Integrated Goods and Services Tax on all supplies of goods and/or services made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce at the rate specified in the Schedule to this Act and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.

2.3. From the above provisions, it is very clear that the levy under either of the enactments is dependent on the classification of the supply as either an intra-State Supply or an Inter-State Supply.  The principles to determine whether a supply is an intra-state supply or an inter-state supply are provided under Sections 3 and 3A of the IGST Act.

2.4. Section 3 of the IGST Act states as under:

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 5, supply of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in different States.

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 6, supply of services in the course of inter-State trade or commerce means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in different States.

2.5. Similarly, Section 3A of the IGST Act states as under

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 5, intra-state supply of goods means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in the same State.

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 6, intra-state supply of services means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in the same State.

2.6. Based on the above provisions, it is evident that the anchor point for determining whether a supply is an intra-state supply or an interstate supply is dependent on the location of the supplier and the place of supply. If the location of supplier and the place of supply is in the same State, it is to be treated as intra-state Sale and therefore liable for a combination of CGST and SGST whereas if the location of supplier and the place of supply are in different States, then the supply has to be treated as inter-state supply and liable for IGST

2.7. It may be noted that though the CGST as well as the IGST Acts apply to the whole of India, the levies under both the laws are anchored on the aspect of the “State”. Therefore, there would be challenges in interpretation of the place of supplies in case of territories which are not a part of any State (though a part of India). For example, it may be difficult to consider supplies to the extended continental Shelf either as intra-state or inter-state. It may however be noted that the definition of States includes Union Territories with Legislature (For example, Delhi and Puducherry)

3. Place of Supply for Goods

3.1. Section 5 of the IGST Act defines the place of supply of goods. The said provisions are fundamentally different from the current provisions since they are based on the destination principle rather than the origin principle.

3.2. The following table summarizes the place of supply of goods as defined under the GST Act and under the IGST Act:

Situation

Place of Supply as
per Section 5 of IGST Act

Supply involving movement of goods

Location of termination of movement for
delivery

Supply by way of transfer of documents of title

Principal place of business of the buyer

Supply not  involving movement of goods

Location of goods

Goods assembled or installed at site

Place of installation or assembly

Goods supplied on board of conveyance

Location at which goods are taken on
board

 

 

3.3. Section 5(2) of the IGST Act prescribes the general rule for place of supply as under:

Where the supply involves movement of goods, whether by the supplier or the recipient or by any other person, the place of supply of goods shall be the location of the goods at the time at which the movement of goods terminates for delivery to the recipient.

3.4. The above prescription is based on ‘supply involving movement of goods’ and not ‘supply causing movement of goods’. Further, the anchor point is the location where the movement of goods terminates for delivery to the recipient and not a generic termination of movement of goods. This can present some challenges in taxation of supplies on Ex-Works principle

3.5. Under the current provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, if a transaction causes a movement of goods from one State to another, it is considered as an inter-state supply even if the said transaction per se does not involve the movement of goods. Therefore, Ex-Works Sales are treated as inter-state sales if the supplier is able to establish an inextricable nexus of the delivery at the factory gate, with a subsequent movement of the said goods by the buyer to another State. However, since the model GST law determines the place of supply on the basis of location at which the goods are delivered to the receiver, it is possible that the place of supply of such ex-works sales shall be considered as the factory gate itself.

3.6. Section 5(2A) of the IGST Act deals with the place of supply of goods in cases where three persons are involved in the supply. The rule states as under:

Where the goods are delivered by the supplier to a recipient or any other person, on the direction of a third person, whether acting as an agent or otherwise, before or during movement of goods, either by way of transfer of documents of title to the goods or otherwise, it shall be deemed that the said third person has received the goods and the place of supply of such goods shall be the principal place of business of such person.

3.7. The above provision will cover various situations. A very commonplace situation is that of direct delivery of goods to a third person under instructions of the buyer. This is commonly referred to as the “Bill To”/ “Ship To” Model. For example, if A in Mumbai places an order to B in Gujarat and tells him to directly deliver the goods to C in Karnataka, there would be two supplies involved, supply by B to A and another supply by A to C. The supply by B to A will be governed under Section 5(2A) and the place of supply will be Maharashtra (principal place of business of A). B in Gujarat will charge IGST to A in Maharashtra. Further, the second supply by A to C will be governed by Section 5(2) and the place of supply will be Karnataka (place where the goods are finally delivered). A in Maharashtra will charge IGST to C in Karnataka and claim the corresponding credit of the tax charged to him by B in Gujarat.

3.8. Section 5(2A) will also cover various other situations like sale in transit, sale in bonded warehouse, high seas sales, etc.

3.9. However, in situations where the supply does not involve movement of goods, whether by the supplier or the recipient, the place of supply shall be the location of such goods at the time of the delivery to the recipient. This is specifically provided under Section 5(3)

3.10. Section 5(4) provides that where the goods are assembled or installed at site, the place of supply shall be the place of such installation or assembly. Under the current tax regime, we have issues in determination of situs of sale in case of composite works contracts. The Originating States demand a tax based on the theory of inextricable link between the movement of goods from their State and the final accretion at the Site. The Destination States also demand a tax if there is some intermediary processing or fabrication prior to the final accretion at the Site. Further, in most of the cases, taxes are deducted in the Destination State. The proposed Section 5(4) brings to rest these controversies and associated cash flow issues and is therefore a welcome change.

3.11. Section 5(5) states that where the goods are supplied on board a conveyance, such as a vessel, an aircraft, a train or a motor vehicle, the place of supply shall be the location at which such goods are taken on board

3.12. The above provision applies only in cases where the supply is made on board a conveyance and not to cases where the supplier supplies to the owner/representative of the conveyance when the conveyance is not in motion.

3.13. Consider the example of a person (X) who sells food to an airline and delivers the same to the crew of the aircraft at the loading point, such that the airline thereafter sells to the passengers during the flight. The supply of food by X to the airline would not be governed by Section 5(5) but will be governed by Section 5(2). However, the subsequent sale by the airline to the passenger will be governed by Section 5(5).

4. Place of Supply for Services – Objectives and Relevance

4.1. As stated earlier, the concept of IGST serves multiple objectives. Since the services are essentially intangible in nature, the place of supply rules for services are drafted considering these objectives in mind.

4.2. Some extracts from the Education Guide at the time of introduction of the negative list based taxation of services are very relevant and hence are reproduced below

The essence of indirect taxation is that a service should be taxed in the jurisdiction of its consumption. In terms of this principle, exports are not charged to tax, as the consumption is elsewhere, and services are taxed on their importation into the taxable territory. However, this determination is not easy. Services could be provided by a person located at one location, actually performed at another while being delivered to a person located at a third location, and occasionally actually consumed at a third location or over a larger geographical territory, falling in more than one taxable jurisdiction.

As a result it is necessary to lay down rules determining the exact place of provision, while ensuring a certain level of harmonization with international practices in order to avoid both the double taxation as well as double non-taxation of services.

It is also a common practice to largely tax services provided by business to other business entities, based on the location of the customers and other services from business to consumers based on the location of the service provider. Since the determination in terms of above principle is not easy, or sometimes not practicable, nearest proxies are adopted to provide specificity in the interpretation as well as application of the law.

4.3. Further to the above objectives, the place of supply rules under IGST also need to deal with situations of supplies amongst two or more States, where also the guiding principle is ensuring a seamless flow of credits amongst businesses and transfer of tax to the correct State of Consumption.

5. Place of Supply for Services – General Principle

5.1. Section 6 defines the place of supply of services. The general rules in relation to services arereproduced below

Section 6(2) (IGST)

The place of supply of services, except the services specified in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), made to a registered person shall be the location of such person.

Section 6(3) (IGST)

The place of supply of services, except the services specified in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), made to any person other than a registered person shall be

   (i) the location of the recipient where the address on record exists, and

   (ii) the location of the supplier of services in other cases

5.2. The above provisions are tabulated below for ready reference:

Section

Test

Location

6(2) of the IGST Act

Supplied to a registered person

Location of service receiver

6(3) of the IGST Act

Supplied to any other person

1.      Location of service recipient where
address on record exists

2.      Location of service provider in other
cases

 

 

 

5.3. The above rulesare subject to various exceptions, which are explained later.

5.4. Section 6(2) deals with cases where the supply is between two businesses. In that case, the place of supply is defined to be the location of the service receiver. For example, if a consultant located in Maharashtra provides a consultancy service to a client who is registered in the State of Gujarat, the place of supply will be considered as Gujarat and the consultant will charge IGST to the client. Since the client is registered in Gujarat, he would be eligible to claim the credit of this IGST in the State of Gujarat and therefore, essentially, the tax is not a cost to either of the parties and is not a revenue for any of the Governments.

5.5. It may be noted that the rule does not require any further analysis on what is the end purpose of the consultancy or who is the beneficiary of the consultancy service. For example, the consultant could have provided an advice on whether the client should set up a base in Maharashtra and also advised on various laws which might be applicable to him if the client sets up the base in Maharashtra. In another situation, the service may be connected with due diligence review of a target company located in Maharashtra (to help the acquiring company located in Gujarat take a decision on acquisition or otherwise). These underlying activities may be performed in Maharashtra. The perceived benefits may accrue in the territory of Maharashtra. However, these factors will be irrelevant in the determination of the place of supply of service. The place of supply of service will be determined by the general rule which is the location of the service recipient.

5.6. Under the current service tax regime, there have been disputes on this aspect (in the context of cross border transactions) and Courts have time and again laid down a few principles. The first principle is that the recipient of service will have to be determined based on the contractual obligation and not based on the ultimate beneficiary. The second principle is that actual performance of an activity cannot determine the location of the recipient of service. Useful reference may be made to the cases of Paul Merchants Ltd. [2013 (29) S.T.R. 257 (Tribunal)], Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt. Ltd. 2014 (36) S.T.R. 766 (Tribunal), Vodafone India Limited [2015 (37) STR 286 (Tri – Mum)], British Airways [2014 (36) S.T.R. 598 (Tri. – Del.)], Jet Airways Ltd. [2014 (36) S.T.R. 290 (Tri. – Mumbai)], Infosys Ltd. [2015 (37) S.T.R. 862 (Tri. – Bang.)], Tech Mahindra Ltd. [2014 (36) S.T.R. 241 (Bom.)], etc.

5.7. In fact, the definition of recipient of service provided under Section 2(80) of the CGST/SGST Acts also strengthens the above line of thought. The said section defines the recipient of service as the person who is liable to pay the consideration.

5.8. Section 6(3) deals with situations where the service recipient is not a registered person. Here also, the primary emphasis is on the address on record in the books of the supplier. Therefore, in all cases where the supplier has the customer’s address on record, the place of supply is determined to be the location of the recipient. However, if the supplier does not have the address on record, the location of the supplier will determine the place of supply of service.

5.9. The multiple objectives of enacting the place of supply rules highlighted earlier are clearly satisfied when one reads the general rule of place of supply of services. The same is explained in the table below:

Sr.

Situation

Place of Supply

Impact

Underlying Objective

1.

Supply by Indian service provider to
registered person

Location of Recipient

IGST charged by the service provider would
be available as credit to the recipient

Seamless flow of Credit

2.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person with address on record

Location of Recipient

IGST

Transfer of Tax to the Consumption State

3.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person (address not available on record)

Location of Supplier

CGST+SGST

Brings certainty to taxation.

4.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
registered person in India

Location of Recipient

IGST payable as import of services

Brings level playing field between Indian
and foreign service providers

5.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
unregistered person in India (generally address is not available on record)

Location of Supplier

Not to be treated as import of services

Procedural and Administrative Convenience.
Difficult to capture and administer such cases

6.

Supply by Indian service provider to foreign
unregistered person where address is available on record (generally foreign
customers would be unregistered)

Location of Recipient

To be treated as Export of Services

To enable zero rating in such cases


6. Place of Supply for Services – Exceptions

6.1. As can be seen above, the general place of supply rule for services based on the destination principle achieves multiple objectives, which inter alia, include objectives to zero rate export of services, tax import of services, provide for seamless credit mechanism and transfer of tax to the appropriate consuming State. However, in certain cases, it was felt that the services are predominantly local in nature and therefore, the source rule will be more appropriate than the destination rule.  Accordingly, various exceptions are provided to the general place of supply rule.

6.2. The following table provides an exhaustive list of exceptions to the general rule:

Sub-section of Section 6

Examples

Place of Supply

4(a)

Services in relation to Immovable property

Location
of immovable property

4(b)

Services of hotels

Location
of immovable property

4(c)

Mandap-keeper services

Location
of immovable property

4(d)

Ancillary services related to the above

Location
of immovable property

Explanation to section 4

Services in relation to accommodation on boats and vessels

Place where the boat/ vessel is located or intended to be located, if
intended to be located in more than one state, on a proportionate reasonable
basis

5

Services in relation to restaurant, catering, personal grooming,
fitness, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery

Place
of performance of service

6

Services in relation to training and performance appraisal

1.      Provided to registered person- Location
of service recipient

2.      Provided to others- place of performance

7

Services in relation to admission to an event

Place of the event, if held in more than one state, proportionate
basis

8

Organization of events, ancillary services and sponsorship

1.      Provided to registered person- Location
of service recipient

2.      Provided to others- place of event

9(a)

Services in relation to transportation of goods (including mail or
courier) provided to a registered person

Location of service receiver

9(b)

Services in relation to transportation of goods (including mail or
courier) provided to any other person

Location of handing over of goods

10(a)

Services in relation to passenger transportation to a registered
person

Location of service receiver

10(b)

Services to others in relation to passenger transportation where
embarkation place is known

Place of embarkation

Proviso to 10(b)

Services to others in relation to passenger transportation where
embarkation place is not known

As per sub-section (2) and (3)

11

Services supplied  on board of a
conveyance

First scheduled point of departure

12(a)

Telecommunication services including data, broadcasting, cable and DTH
through fixed communication line, leased circuits, cable or dish antenna

Location of installation of fixed communication line, leased circuits,
cable or dish antenna

12(b)

Telecommunication services by way of a postpaid mobile connection

Location of service receiver on record

12(c)

Telecommunication services by way of a prepaid mobile connection

Location of receipt of pre-payment or where the voucher is sold. In
case of payment through internet banking, location of receiver on record

13

Banking, Financial and stock broking service where service is linked
to the account

Location of service receiver

Proviso to 13

Banking, Financial and stock broking service where service is not
linked to the account

Location of service provider

14(a)

Insurance service provided to a registered person

Location of service receiver

14(b)

Insurance service provided to any other person

Location of service provider

15

Advertisement service provided to Central Government, State
Government, Statutory body or local authority

Respective state in specified proportions

6.3. All the above exceptions can be broadly divided into two baskets:

· Exceptions where the Source Principle is in full play (Example, immoveable property related services) – “Pure Source Principle”

· Exceptions where the Source Principle is in play only for unregistered persons (example, passenger/goods transportation services), whereas the destination principle applies for registered persons – “Hybrid Principle”

6.4. The underlying themes and objectives of these two baskets are analysed in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

7. Place of Supply for Services –Pure Source Principle

7.1. The following are important examples of services which would get classified under this principle

· Services in relation to Immovable property

· Hotels , Mandap-keeper services

· Restaurant, catering, personal grooming, fitness, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery

· Services in relation to admission to an event

· Services supplied  on board of a conveyance

7.2. While there are specific tests for each of these examples, the underlying theme is to enforce Source State Taxation. This impacts the objectives which were laid down for the general place of supply rule. The same is explained through the example of immoveable property where the test is based on the location of immoveable property. Similar principles will apply for other examples listed above as well.

This is tabulated in the table appearing hereafter:

Sr.

Situation

Place of Supply

Impact

Underlying Objective

1.

Supply by Indian service provider to
registered person

Location of Immoveable Property

CGST/SGST 
charged by the service provider would not be available as credit to
the recipient unless he is located in the Same State

Credit will be available only within the
same State and will not flow to another State (therefore the credit is not
seamless, unless ISD Concept is used to distribute the credit)

2.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person

Location of Immoveable Property

CGST/SGST

No Transfer of Tax to the Destination State

3.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
person in India

Location of Immoveable Property

Not to be treated as import of service

Since such services cannot be substituted
between Indian service provider and foreign service provider, the risk of non
level playing field is low

4.

Supply by Indian service provider to
foreign person

Location of Immoveable Property

CGST/SGST

No benefit of export of services

7.3. At a practical level, businesses may see cascading effect of taxes when the executives travel to other States and stay in hotels. Unless the business is registered in the other State (either as a supplier or as an input service distributor), the credit will not be available, resulting in cascading effect of taxes. It may therefore be represented to the Government that Section 6(4) be suitably amended so as to reclassify the same from the source principle to the hybrid principle (explained later) and thereby permit seamless flow of credit.

8. Place of Supply for Services –Hybrid Principle

8.1.As stated earlier, this basket of exclusions covers cases where the source principle is in play only for unregistered persons (example, passenger/goods transportation services) whereas the destination principle applies for registered persons.

8.2.The following are important examples of services which would get classified under this principle

· Training and Performance Appraisal

· Organisation of events and ancilliary services including sponsorship

· Transportation of Goods including mail and courier

· Passenger Transportation Services

8.3. The objectives of these tests are two fold – to ensure seamless credit flow amongst registered persons and at the same time enforce the source principle vis-à-vis the Indian territory as a whole. Again, there are specific tests for each of these examples, but the underlying theme is explained through the example of goods transportation where the test is based on the place from where the goods are loaded (only in cases where the customer is not registered). Similar principles will apply for other examples listed above as well

Sr.

Situation

Place of Supply

Impact

Underlying Objective

1.

Supply by Indian service provider to registered
person

Location of Recipient

IGST charged by the service provider would
be available as credit to the recipient

Seamless flow of Credit

2.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person

Place of Loading of Goods

CGST/SGST

No Transfer of Tax to the Destination State

3.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
registered person in India

Location of Recipient

IGST payable as import of services

Brings level playing field between Indian
and foreign service providers

4.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
unregistered person in India

Place of Loading of Goods (generally
outside India)

Not to be treated as import of services

Procedural and Administrative Convenience.

5.

Supply by Indian service provider to
foreign unregistered person

Place of Loading of Goods (generally in
India)

CGST/SGST

No benefit of export of services


9. Conclusion

9.1. The concept of IGST and the place of supply rules in respect of inter-state transactions are totally new and unique to the Indian context. While the policy makers have tried their best to keep the rules as simple as possible and also achieve the multifarious objectives embedded therein, there could be many areas where the situation may not have been foreseen by the Government resulting in unintended hardship.

9.2. The determination of the location of the supplier or the recipient in case of entities which are located in multiple States is based on the test of ‘establishment most directly connected with the supply’. The determination of such establishment can be a challenge and may also be subjective to a large extent. However, since the said determination is similarly worded in many jurisdictions, the international jurisprudence in this regard may assist the tax payers and the consultants till the time the judiciary reiterates some fundamental propositions in this regard.  In the interim, it definitely appears that the prescribed model laws represent a good start on the topic.

The reporting season is drawing to a close !

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The audit season has come to a close and the tax season has got stretched in organically due to Income Declaration Scheme (IDS) into October. Hopefully, when you receive this journal you have enough time and mind space to go through all that which this Issue contains.

Income Declaration
Scheme (IDS)

IDS
window ended with declarations amounting to Rs. 65,250 crores (from 64,250
disclosures) which should result in tax revenues of Rs. 29,262 crores. We are
not sure whether this amount meets the estimated collection expectations or not.
I am using the word, expectation, unlike many who use the word ‘target’, which
I believe is inappropriate.  It is now a trend
that targets are set for tax collection and then officials are made to work
towards it. Such verbiage results in application of methods that are
inconsistent with the fundamental features of Indian taxation system. In the
same breath I hope that this is a definitive beginning of an endeavour to end
the menace of black money and all the evils related to it. Let’s hope that we
will soon have some data in a b road form as to the nature of persons who have
declared and whether they include the usual suspects who generate, hoard and
circulate cash. Till this ‘target’ is not dealt with, we can be sure that cash
economy is here to stay.

Internal Financial
Controls (IFC)

On the accounting side we had the
first time reporting on Internal Financial Controls by auditors on the design
and operative effectiveness of IFC over financial reporting. While the concept
did have its origins in the same realm from where the company law was drafted, butthe
‘one size fits all’ applicability was a dampener. IFC was made a part of every auditor’s
report, be it of a newly started enterprise, to relatively small marketing
subsidiary of a foreign parent  to listed
mega enterprises. . The ministry of corporate affairs did not bring out any
guidance, relief, or progressive application. Such progressive approach could
have allowed reporting to mature and given smaller enterprises some breathing
time.. The present reporting requirement seemed like asking for use of a water
hose to kill a mosquito .  A ray of
relief came when the ICAI brought out the second technical publication on IFC
and covered reporting situations in a more practical, rational and realistic
way. This publication did bring sense by negating the effect of the overarching
reporting requirement of the law. It also enunciated situations where auditors
comments could be more relevant and serve the purpose of the reporting. While
many of us, whether in Industry or profession know that while the concept is
useful, it needs to be made more specifically relevant so that’s the benefits
can be tangibly felt by the company to which it applies.  The Society on its part did bring out a  small booklet that was published well in time.

GST

GST journey has been like the
story of a Bollywood blockbuster. A large part of the story was drama and suspense
for a long time. The story has taken a strong turn since the passage of the constitutional
amendment. Now the story is shaping to become a action packed thriller till the
end of this fiscal. I guess till the bill is finally drafted, all inputs are
taken and procedure laid out, it will remain that way since the producers and directors of GST seem to desperately want to meet the timeline of 1st
April 2017 which will be a fitting time for an interval. From then onwards, most
of us would wish that the story turns out to be all romance and not turn into a
tragedy or a horror show.

I will not go into the details of
the current stage of evolution of GST. However, For every practitioner, even at
the cost of repetition, emphasis, or inspiration I have to say that GST is
certainly the biggest show in the professional calendar of FY1617 and many
years beyond, .From its sheer impact, opportune timing, wide relevance and of
course the thrill of being an early mover, the GST story is definitely not to
be missed. Irrespective of how the story shapes post interval, you should know
that you can choose not to just watch it, play a part in it. Whatever you
choose, whether enter the cast or watch from the balcony, I wish us all a
pleasant experience.

Ease of doing
business (EoDB) –

The focus on ease of doing
business still remains on the agenda of the government. It is indeed heartening
that EoDB is very much on the implementation radar of this government. This
project, if one may call it so, is an important step towards transforming India
in to a investment destination of choice. I do not see it only from foreign
investment perspective, but also as a means to incentivise local entrepreneurial
talents and pursuit. . . As much as we are aware of, our laws – their
structure, applicability, procedures and interpretation by lower rungs of administrators
remains an issue of concern for entrepreneurs since decades. It’s major fall
out could be serious constraint on job creation and poverty elevation, which
are both part of stated policy and a need of the hour. It cannot be forgotten
that by 2020 we will have 1.35 billion people, amongst them; more than 900
million will be in the working age. All the noise of Make in India to EoDB is
not just a political gimmick but a wakeup call or even an alarm or a siren
sounding loudly.

The centre alone cannot be responsible
for EoDB, but states have to chip in and work towards a common goal. In this
context a 98 point action plan was formulated by the centre and states
together. The points included, single window clearances setting, monitoring
time lines for registrations, self certification instead of inspections amongst
other things. These points had to be adopted at state level to bring India out
of the dungeon of the ridiculous and roar into the 50th rank by 2017. The timeline
does remain to be stiff and ambitious, and rightly so, considering the urgency..
The good news is that 25 states have completed 75% of the 98 points action plan
goals.  

Juxtapose a recent report by The National
Academies of Engineering, Sciences and Medicine, USA which reported that Indian
migrants to the US were the most entrepreneurial and contributed billions of
dollars to the economy. If we look at it from our national perspective, two
aspects stand out. The entrepreneurial capabilities of Indians and wonders that
right environment can do to actualise those capabilities. With deregulation and
further reduction in excessive and irrelevant reporting requirements which
place a burden on small and medium businesses, we can reach from the ridiculous
towards relevant.

Kashmir situation

As I write this I am spending
time with professor Meem Hai Zaffar, PhD from Srinagar. He is a thorough
Kashmiri – a pluralist, rooted in Local as well as national traditions of culture
and philosophy. He tells me that even today; the cultural traditions prevalent
in Kashmir have tremendous cultural unity with rest of India. This includes
inter religious connection rising way above borders of religions, in the words
of traditional songs to customs. The multi cultural ethos and expansive values
find expression in local songs, folklore, shrines, and so on. He tells me that
the deep cultural tradition of Kashmir, going back to Kashyap Rishi of the
yore, to Lal -Ded to Nund Rishi is alive. I wanted to share this conversation, as
we normally hear only political facet of things in media, whereas culture is
what binds people and nations.

Wishing you a happy Dussehra and a joyous Diwali!

Raman Jokhakar

Co-chairman

Journal Committee

VALUES OF LIFE

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“Values are our personal beliefs we would
like to live by”

Values of life make life of a human
being valuable. It is the values chosen and practiced by a person that make
life of a person valuable. Values are our personal beliefs we live by. One
would certainly like to know the `values
the pursuit of which improve the quality of life – add value to life. Krishna in Chapter 13 of Gita, in Shlokas 7 to
11, teaches Arjun the values which are essential, and enumerates 20 values. These twenty values are: (1) Amanitvam
(which may be loosely translated as humility;
(2) Unpretentiousness; (3) Non injury; (4) Forgiveness, (5) Uprightness, (6)
Service to the teachers, (7) Purity; (8) Steadiness; (9) Self control; (10)
Indifference to sense objects; (11) Absence of egoism; (12) Repeated perception
of the pain of birth, old age, death and diseases; (13) Non-attachment; (14)
Non-identification of self with relatives; (15) Evenness of mind in both
favourable and unfavourable times; (16) Unwavering devotion; (17) Constancy in
self-knowledge; (15) Giving up undesirable company; (19) Consistency in self
knowledge; and (20) Perception of the end of true knowledge.

Truly a long and a formidable list. The path of the Seeker is like
walking on Razor’s Edge. As Kathopanishad says:

Having rushed through Gita a number
of times I started believing that I have understood the above verses describing
`values’ till I came across a book
called “Moolyo” (Values – The Gate to
Self Realization) written by Swami Viditatmanandji. Reading this treatise was an eye opener. Shri Viditatmanandji
in simple language has explained the meaning of these 20 values. In this
article I propose to deal with just one of them; the very first quality of `Amanitvam.

There are many words in Sanskrit
which cannot be adequately translated in English. There is no exact equivalent.
Amanitvam” is one such word. The
English equivalent is ‘humility’ which does not really bring out the import of the word “Amanitvam”.

I like the word “Amanitvam”. It is a quaint little word with deep-rooted meaning. I liked it
even more when I read the meaning as
explained by Swami Viditatmanandji.  Amanitvam can be best understood by
understanding its opposite term “Manitvam”.
Manitvam is the (negative) quality of
having very high expectations for the recognition one’s qualities, achievements,
status, education etc. It is generated from the false pride about one’s own
self. We expect respect for our position
for example –
 “I am the boss”, “I am
rich”, “I am a scholar”.   “I am an
elder” ……. We get disturbed when expected respect
is
not accorded or extended.
Being free from such feelings is Amanitvam.

We have to realize that we are
complete. We do not require anything to become complete. We have to understand
that “I” am the soul, the Atma which is complete. We do not need outside
appreciation to be complete. As Ishavasya Upnishads says:

Amanitvam” means “neither
begging for respect, nor hankering for praise or appreciation”, and not being disturbed even when one does not get
a well deserved credit.

Let us learn : a bird sings whether anyone appreciates or not. A
flower spreads its fragrance without wanting any praise from anyone. Sun rises
and shines on everyone without seeking
namaskar
. Hence one has to go on doing one’s work like them, without
waiting to be asked or appreciated.

To stop begging for respect is the
first step towards adding value to life. Amanitvam truly is the most
important value. That is why Krishna places
it first in the list of values. The world may not recognize the
goodness of a person, but not to be perturbed by non-appreciation is the first
step in our progress as the seeker.

Ultimately Amanitvam reflects the basic philosophy of Gita, viz; one has a right to work but not to
the fruits thereof.  We have to do our
duty irrespective of whether it is appreciated or not.  I conclude
by quoting
from a song in an old
film “Yatrik”:

Narendra Modi’s essential vision of Indian institutions – Creating prosperity for India will involve changing the rules of the game

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In an annual lecture organized by NITI Aayog on 26 August, Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked: “There was a time when development was believed to depend on the quantity of capital and labour. Today, we know that it depends as much on the quality of institutions and ideas.” Modi’s comment seems to be inspired, partly, from Why Nations Fail (2012) by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. In their thought-provoking book, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that institutions, and they alone, determine the prosperity of a nation. Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of institutions. The first refers to rules of the game—formal laws and informal norms. The second is in the nature of organizations.

Douglas North makes a distinction: “If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players.” Geoffrey Hodgson clarifies that North’s treatment of organizations as players does not rule out their becoming institutions themselves, especially when intra-organizational conflicts are taken into account. Since Modi went on to talk about NITI Aayog, which he set up as an evidence-based think tank, he was most probably talking about the second kind of institution—the organization. But his repeated reference to “ideas”—and transformative ones at that—means he did not preclude the first kind. After all, the concept of limited liability was just an idea before New York made it a law in 1811 and moved towards becoming the financial centre of the world.

“Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills,” say Acemoglu and Robinson, need to be supported by “inclusive political institutions, that is, those that distribute political power widely in a pluralistic manner and are able to achieve some amount of political centralization…” If NITI Aayog is an example of a new organization set up by the Modi government, the monetary policy framework has brought in new rules for fighting inflation. The goods and services tax (GST) council can be an example of the inclusive political institution that Acemoglu and Robinson talk about. The GST council centralizes indirect tax collection while providing both the states and centre a voice in setting tax rates.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory is not without sceptics. Jared Diamond has criticized it for ignoring geography; Arvind Subramanian says it fails to explain the development trajectory of both India and China. With India too poor for its level of political institutions and China too behind in its institutions for its level of income, Subramanian says Acemoglu and Robinson fail to explain the development trajectory of “one-third of humanity”.

Francis Fukuyama blames it for not elaborating on what makes an inclusive institution as opposed to an “extractive” one. Crucially, Fukuyama does not find the theory original as he says there is “no real difference between the ‘extractive/inclusive’ distinction” in Acemoglu-Robinson “and the ‘limited/open’ access distinction” in Violence and Social Orders (2009) by North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast. The latter three have argued that limited access order—the default state of human societies—create political stability by limiting economic and political participation. Not many nations have been able to break out of this by creating open access order which maintains political stability along with open economic and political participation.

While agreeing that the institutions are important, the critics don’t think they alone can explain prosperity. But Modi’s focus on institutions is not misplaced either. The critics of Acemoglu and Robinson will be satisfied with his verbiage. India’s bridge to open access order will involve changing the rules of the game—creating competitive markets and liberal institutions, not just seeking higher cash flows under the same old rules.

But when speaking of organizations as institutions, Modi will also have to focus on institutional design. Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta argue that “limited effectiveness of its public institutions” is both “a critical factor explaining India’s modest record in governance and development” and a result of poor institutional design. Therefore, even if the monetary policy framework is a commendable development, it does not take away from the challenge of appointing the right people to man the monetary policy committee. Creating a culture of evidence-based thinking at NITI Aayog is also an institutional design problem. An institution in place tasked with evidence-based thinking is not enough

(Source: Editorial in Mint Newspaper dated 07.09.2016)

5 Sections 220(2) and 221(1) – Penalty – Default in payment of tax – Penalty should not exceed the amount of tax in arrears – Tax in arrears does not include interest payable u/s. 220(2)

CIT vs. Oryx Finance and Investment P.
Ltd.; 395 ITR 745 (Bom):

The return of income was processed u/s.
143(1) Act, 1961 and a demand was raised. The Assessing Officer also imposed
penalty of Rs. 1,19,30,677 u/s. 221(1) of the Act for default by the assessee
in the payment of demand. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that
the penalty should not exceed the amount of tax in arrears and that tax in
arrears does not include interest payable u/s. 220(2).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   On reading the provisions
of section 221 conjointly with the definition of “tax” as detailed u/s. 2(43)
of the Act, the irresistible conclusion that would be drawn was that the
phraseology “tax in arrears” as envisaged in section 221 of the Act would not
take within its realm the interest component.

 ii)   The Assessing Officer
could impose penalty for default in making the payment of tax, but it should
not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. Tax in arrears would not include the
interest payable u/s. 220(2) of the Act.”

4 Sections 9 – DTAA between India and U.K – Arbitration – r.w.s. 195, and article 5 of DTAA – Income – Deemed to accrue or arise in India (Capital gains) – Whether arbitration proceedings against retrospective tax imposed by Finance Act, 2012 brought by Vodafone Group, UK under the Indo-UK BIPA (Bilateral Investment and Promotion Agreement) are liable to be stayed when on same issue an arbitration proceeding brought by Vodafone International Holdings BV is pending? – Multiple foreign corporate entities of same group cannot bring multiple arbitration proceedings under multiple investment protection treaties against a host State in relation to same investment, same economic harm and same measures especially when reliefs sought are same

UOI vs. Vodafone Group PLC UK; [2017] 84
taxmann.com 224 (Delhi):

Hutchinson Telecommunications International
Limited (HTIL) earned capital gains on the sale of stakes to Vodafone
International Holdings B.V. (VIHBV) in an Indian company by the name of
Hutchinson Essar Limited (HEL) for a certain consideration. The acquisition of
stake in HEL by VIHBV was held liable for tax deduction at source u/s. 195 and
since VIHBV failed to honour its tax liability, a demand u/s. 201(1)(1A)/220(2)
for non-deduction of tax was raised on VIHBV. However, the Apex Court quashed
the said demand. Subsequently, a retrospective amendment to section 9(1) and
section 195 read with section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 re-fastened the
liability on VIHBV.

It was stated in the plaint that aggrieved
by the imposition of tax, VIHBV, the subsidiary of defendants invoked the
arbitration clause provided under the Bilateral Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement (BIPA) between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of
Netherlands for the promotion and protection of investments through a notice of
dispute and subsequent notice of arbitration. While the said arbitration
proceedings were pending, the defendants served a notice of dispute and notice
of arbitration upon the plaintiff for resolution of an alleged dispute under
the India-UK BIPA primarily in respect of the same income tax demand that VIHBV
had identified as protected investment under the India-Netherlands BIPA and
which was already under adjudication before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted
under BIPA. It was stated in the plaint that though the plaintiff had raised
preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal constituted
under the India-Netherlands BIPA yet the tribunal ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction and merits should be heard together.

On an application made by the Union of India
challenging the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Delhi High Court
held as under:

“i)   This Court is of the prima
facie
view that in the present case, there is duplication of the parties
and the issues. Prima facie, this Court is also of the view that India
constitutes the natural forum for the litigation of the defendants’ claim
against the plaintiff. In fact, the reliefs sought by the defendants under the
India-UK BIPA and by the VIHBV the subsidiary of defendants under the
India-Netherlands BIPA are virtually identical.

 ii)   This Court in Pankaj
Aluminium Industries (P.) Ltd. vs. Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd., 2011 IV AD
(Delhi) 212
after relying upon DHN Food Distributors Ltd. vs. London
Borough of Tower Hamlets
[1976] 3 ALL ER 462 at Page 467 has recognised the
doctrine of single economic entity. Consequently, the defendants as well as
their subsidiary VIHBV, prima facie, seem to be one single economic
entity.

 iii)   This Court is of the prima
facie
opinion that as the claimants in the two arbitral proceedings form
part of the same corporate group being run, governed and managed by the same
set of shareholders, they cannot file two independent arbitral proceedings as
that amounts to abuse of process of law. This Court is further of the prima
facie
view that there is a risk of parallel proceedings and inconsistent
decisions by two separate arbitral Tribunals in the present case. In the prima
facie opinion of this Court, it would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to
permit the defendants to prosecute the foreign arbitration.

 iv)  Consequently, defendant,
their servants, agents, attorneys, assigns are restrained from taking any
action in furtherance of the notice of dispute and the notice of arbitration
and from initiating arbitration proceedings under India-UK Bilateral Investment
Protection Agreement or continuing with it as regards the dispute mentioned by
the defendants.”

9 Section 69 – Unexplained Investment – A. Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95 Seizure of diaries and files – No cogent evidence to prove assessee booked vehicles in fictitious names or earned premium by sale – No addition for unexplained investment permissible on conjectures or surmises

CIT vs. Classic Motors Ltd.; 396 ITR 1
(Del):

The assessee was a car dealer. Pursuant to a
search action u/s. 132 of the Act, 1961 in the premises of the assessee certain
diaries and files were seized. Based on some abbreviations found in the seized
diaries, but, which did not state any particulars of amounts or addresses, the
Assessing Officer held that there were unexplained investments on account of
booking of vehicles in fictitious names for the A. Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95, and
also by selling those vehicles at a premium for the A. Y. 1993-94.

Accordingly, he made additions calculated at
25% of peak booking amounts as unexplained investments. The Tribunal held that
without any material or evidence, no additions could have been made and deleted
the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The Appellate Tribunal
did not err in appreciating the evidence before it and concluding that without
cogent and credible material that the bookings were made by the assessee for
itself, the additions ought not to have been made.

 ii)   The Assessing Officer’s
additions made on account of peak booking amounts, as unexplained investments
from undisclosed income, were based on conjectures and surmises. The questions
are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

8 Section 263 – Revision – A. Y. 2009-10 AO not specifically mentioning particular claim does not mean that AO passed assessment order without making enquiry in respect of allowability of claim – AO not expected to raise more queries if he was satisfied about admissibility of claim on basis of material and details supplied – Order not erroneous or prejudicial to Revenue – Order u/s. 263 is not valid

MOIL vs. CIT; 396 ITR 244 (Bom):

The assessee, a public sector undertaking
was involved in the business of extraction and sale of manganese ore, generation
of electricity and manufacturing and sale of EMV and ferro minerals. In the
course of the scrutiny assessment for the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer
issued notice u/s. 142(1) of the  Act,
1961, requiring details in respect of twenty items. According to item No. 9,
the Assessing Officer asked the assessee to give a detailed note of expenditure
for the corporate social responsibility along with the bifurcation of the
expenses under different heads. In pursuance of the notice, the assessee had given
the bifurcation of expenses under various heads towards the corporate social
responsibility claim. The Assessing Officer allowed certain claims without
making a specific reference to them in the assessment order and disallowed
certain claims after giving detailed reasons for the disallowance. The
Commissioner invoked the jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act after holding that
the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order without making any
enquiry regarding the alowability of expenses claimed by the assessee under the
head “corporate social responsibility” and hence, the order was erroneous and
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and remanded the matter to the
Assessing Officer to redo the assessment in respect of the claim of the
assessee pertaining to the corporate social responsibility. The Tribunal
confirmed this order.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High
Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   The Assessing Officer
applied his mind to the claims made by the assessee and wherever the claims
were disallowable they have been discussed in that assessment order and there
was no discussion or reference in respect of the claims that were allowed. It
could not be said that merely because the Assessing Officer had not
specifically mentioned about the claim in respect of corporate social
responsibility, the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order without
making any enquiry in respect of the allowability of the claim of corporate
social responsibility.

 ii)   The query pertaining to
corporate social responsibility was exhaustively answered and the assessee had
provided the data pertaining to the expenditure under each head of the claim in
respect of corporate social responsibility, in details. The Assessing Officer
was not expected to raise more queries, if he was satisfied about the
admissibility of the claim on the basis of the material and the details
supplied. The provisions of section 263 of the Act could not have been invoked
by the Commissioner.

 iii)   The orders of the
Commissioner of Income-tax and the ITAT are quashed and set aside.”

 

7 Section 263 – Revision – A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 Erroneous and prejudicial to revenue – AO not overlooking relevant facts, not failing to make enquiries – Order not erroneous – Revision not justified – Revision order covering issues not mentioned in show-cause notice – Not permissible. DTAA between India and Oman, arts, 11 and 25 – Credit for tax paid in other country – Dividend received from Omani company by PE of assessee in Oman – Clarification of Oman authorities that exemption granted to dividend under Omani tax laws was tax incentive – To be regarded as conclusive – Assessments in earlier years allowing tax credit – Assessee entitled to benefit of tax credit

Principal CIT vs. Krishak Bharati
Co-perative Ltd.; 395 ITR 572 (Del):

The assessee was a multi co-operative
society registered in India. In a joint venture with the Oman oil company, it
formed a company in Oman in which it held 25% of the share holding. The
assessee established a branch office in Oman to oversee its investments in the
joint venture company. The branch office was independently registered as a
company in Oman and claimed the status of PE of the assessee in Oman under
article 25 of the DTAA between India and Oman and filed returns of income under
the Oman tax laws. For the A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, the assessments were
completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, 1961, bringing to tax dividend received by
the assessee from the joint venture company but allowing tax credit in respect
of the dividend received from the joint venture company, although the dividend
was exempted under the Oman tax laws by an amendment w.e.f 2000. Thereafter,
the Principal Commissioner issued a notice u/s. 263 of the Act on the ground
that any income which was not taxed at all according to the tax laws, could not
be construed as an incentive and that the exemption granted was not an
incentive granted under the Omani tax laws. He held that no tax credit was due
to the assessee u/s. 90 and that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was
erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. He also held that the assessee had
credited more income than the dividend received by it, that the accretion and
addition to its opening capital in terms of the profit on account of its PE in
Oman, audited and submitted during the proceedings, were not disclosed in its
accounts in India. He directed the Assessing Officer to make the assessment
accordingly.

The Tribunal held that the order passed u/s.
263 was without jurisdiction and unsustainable and that tax credit had been
allowed to the assessee during several preceding assessment years and
therefore, when there was no change in the facts or the relevant provisions of
law, following the principle of consistency of approach, credit for deemed
dividend tax was allowable in respect of the assessment year in question. It
also held that, (a) the annual accounts of the PE were prepared in accordance
with the International Financial Reporting Standards and accordingly, its share
or profit or loss in the joint venture company at 25% had to be accounted as
income in the profit and loss account of the PE eventhough such income was only
to the extent of dividend declared and distributed, (b) the joint venture
company was required to transfer a specified amount out of the total
distributable profit to reserve under the Omani tax laws and only the remaining
profits were distributed to the shareholders, and (c) therefore, even under the
Omani laws, the PE offered for taxation only the dividend income actually
received and not the total share of the PE in the profits of the joint venture
company. The undistributed share of profits shown in the books of the PE could
not be said to partake the character of income under the provisions of the  Act, 1961, as only the real income was
chargeable to tax. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the
assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   The order u/s. 263 dealt
with issues which were not covered by the show-cause notice which was issued to
the assessee. This was not permissible.

 ii)   Neither did the Assessing
Officer overlook the relevant facts nor did he not make inquiries. The queries
were specifically with respect to dividend income and exemption and had also
considered the explanation of the Omani authorities on the subject. Therefore,
the Commissioner’s view that the assessment orders were erroneous and required
revision was unsustainable.

 iii)   The certification
rendered by the Sultanate of Oman in its letter to the effect that under the
company income tax law of Oman, dividend formed part of gross income chargeable
to tax and that the tax law of Oman provided income tax exemption to companies
undertaking to certain identified economic activities considered essential for the
country’s economic development with a view to encouraging investments in such
sectors, were to be regarded as conclusive. If the tax authorities had any
doubts, they could not have proceeded to elevate them into findings, but
addressed them to Omani authorities if not directly, then through the Indian
diplomatic channels. In not doing so, but proceeding to interpret the laws and
certificate of Oman authorities, the Department had fallen into error.

 iv)  The Appellate Tribunal
found that up to the tax year 2011 in the orders passed under the income tax
law of Oman, dividend had been included in the total income and thereafter
deduction had been granted and that it was established that the assessee was
entitled to get credit for the deemed dividend tax under the provisions of
section 90 of the Act, 1961, together with the clarifications issued by the
Sultanate of Oman and the assessment made under Omani laws.

 v)   The findings of fact did
not call for interference and the Appellate Tribunal did not err in holding
that the Principal Commissioner had erred in directing the Assessing Officer
u/s. 263 to withdraw the tax credit. Questions of law are answered in favour of
the assessee and the appeals are dismissed.”

6 Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – A. Y. 2008-09 – Notice for reassessment by authority other than authority normally assessing assessee – Not mere irregularity or curable defect – Defective issuance of notice and not service of notice- Notice not valid – To be quashed

Shirishbhai Hargovandas Sanjanwalla vs.
ACIT; 396 ITR 167(Guj):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee’s return
was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act, 1961 by the ACIT Circle 4(2) who is the
jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the assessee. Subsequently, ACIT Circle
5(2) issued a notice u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment. According to the
Department, as the assessee was described as an agriculturist in a sale deed,
having a particular residential address, his assessment was made by the ACIT
Circle 5(2). The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the reassessment
notice.

 The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 “i)   In administrative or
quasi judicial matters, where exercise of powers is well regulated and segregated
through rules and regulations or administrative instructions, no authority or
officer who is not vested with the jurisdiction of the particular nature can
exercise such powers which would be purely a case of lack of authority failing
which there would be total anarchy and any officer positioned at any place may
choose to exercise jurisdiction over any assessee.

 ii)   It was a defective
issuance of notice and not a service of notice as it was issued by an authority
who was not competent. The Department ignored the fact that the assessee had
been regularly assessed year after year and originally was within the
jurisdiction of Income-tax Circle 9 and after restructuring, the ACIT Circle
4(2). Therefore, the ACIT Circle 5(2) had no jurisdiction to assess and issue
the notice for reassessment. It was not a mere irregularity or a defect which
could have been cured, but a question of jurisdiction of the authority to
reopen the assessment. The notice was to be quashed.“

3 Section 32 – Depreciation – Jetty – A. Y. 2005 – 06 – Rate of depreciation – 100% depreciation on temporary building structure – Jetty is a temporary structure – Entitled to 100% depreciation

CIT vs. Anand Transport; 396 ITR 204
(Mad):

The assessee was in the business of loading
and unloading of bulk cargo, relating to exports and imports, transportation of
cargo, both within and outside the ports and by see and attending to all works,
incidental to the works connected with the main business. The assessee was
awarded a contract by the MMTC on May 6, 2004. A jetty or loading platform was
erected, albeit, temporarily to facilitate loading of iron-ore onto vessels, in
furtherance of the contract awarded by MMTC, in favour of the assessee. The
assessee claimed 100% depreciation on the jetty. The Assessing Officer came to
the conclusion that the jetty or platform was a plant, as it was an apparatus
or tool which only enabled the assessee to carry on its business. The Assessing
Officer’s observation was that the jetty consisted mainly of a belt conveyor
and electrical support, and that the civil work was negligible. The Assessing
Officer further held that the conveyor belt could be dismantled and reused. He
allowed 25% depreciation on the jetty. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   A bare perusal of the
meaning of the word “jetty” would show that, it is in the nature of a
construction which is used either as a landing stage, a small pier, bridge,
staircase or a construction, built into the water to protect the harbor. The
utility of the jetty is limited by its construction. It is used to obtain
either access to a vessel, or protect the harbour.

 ii)   The provisions of the
contract would show that the jetty or loading platform was constructed by the
assessee on build-operate-transfer basis for a period of three years from the
date of commencement of the vessel loading operation. Quite clearly, the jetty
or loading platform, in this case, was erected by the assessee in order to
effectuate its business under the contract entered into with MMTC, which was
tenure based, and therefore, could not have been treated as anything else but a
temporary erection. Upon completion of the contract the assessee was required
to dismantle it.

 iii)   The fact that the jetty had other contraptions attached to it, such as a
conveyor belt, to facilitate the process of loading could not convert such a
structure into a plant. Therefore, even if the functional test was employed the
main function of a jetty, in the facts of the instant case, is to provide a
passage or a platform to ferry articles onto the concerned vessels. This could
have been done manually. That it was done by using a conveyor belt would not
convert a jetty into a plant. The assessee was entitled to 100% depreciation on
the jetty.”

2 Section 41(1) – Business income – Deemed income A. Y. 2007-08 – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Benefit must be obtained in respect of liability – Assessee a co-operative bank – Stale demand drafts and pay orders for sums owed by assessee bank to customers – Bank not deriving benefit on account of liability and liability still subsisting – Section 41(1) not applicable

CIT vs. Raddi Sahakara Bank Niyamitha;
395 ITR 652 (Karn)

The assessee was a co-operative bank. For
the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer made an addition in the income of the
assessee on the ground of demand drafts and pay orders payable as on the last
date of the financial year, which were not so far encashed by the customers. He
treated the said amount as representing cessation of liability u/s. 41(1) of
the Income-tax Act, (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”)
1961, and added back the amount to the declared income of the assessee. The
Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   In order to invoke
section 41(1) of the Act, 1961, it must be first established that the assessee
had obtained some benefit in respect of a trading liability which was earlier
allowed as a deduction. It is not enough if the assessee derives some benefit
in respect of such liability, but it is essential that such benefit arises by
way of “remission” or “cessation” of liability.

 ii)   The addition could not be
made u/s. 41(1) of the Act, since the liability of the assessee bank to pay
back the amounts to the customers in respect of such stale demand drafts and
pay orders does not cease in law. The appeal is dismissed.”

1 Section 37(1) – Business expenditure -A. Ys. 1997-98 to 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2009-10 – Year in which deductible (Licence fee) – Assessee, sole proprietor of Oil Corporation, was granted licence by Northern Railway for use of a piece of Railway land against a licence fee – On 20/01/1999, Northern Railway revised licence fee taking revised base rate as on 01/01/1985 – Thereafter, for each of years from A. Y. 2002-03 till A. Y. 2008-09, Northern Railway issued letters demanding enhanced licence fees and damages – Assessee paid actual licence fee and claimed deduction on account of licence fee but had disputed enhanced liability – AO disallowed licence fee on ground that it was a contingent liability and not allowable as a deduction till liability for enhanced licence fee, which had been contested by assessee, actually crystallized

1 Business expenditure
– Section 37(1) – A. Ys. 1997-98 to 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2009-10 – Year in
which deductible (Licence fee) – Assessee, sole proprietor of Oil Corporation,
was granted licence by Northern Railway for use of a piece of Railway land
against a licence fee – On 20/01/1999, Northern Railway revised licence fee
taking revised base rate as on 01/01/1985 – Thereafter, for each of years from
A. Y. 2002-03 till A. Y. 2008-09, Northern Railway issued letters demanding
enhanced licence fees and damages – Assessee paid actual licence fee and
claimed deduction on account of licence fee but had disputed enhanced liability
– AO disallowed licence fee on ground that it was a contingent liability and
not allowable as a deduction till liability for enhanced licence fee, which had
been contested by assessee, actually crystallized – Since assessee was
following mercantile system of accounting, liability to pay enhanced licence
fee would arise in year in which demand was made or to which it related
irrespective of when enhanced fee was actually paid by assessee 

Jagdish Prasad Gupta vs. CIT; [2017] 85
taxmann.com 105 (Delhi):

The assessee the sole proprietor of Oil
Corporation was granted licence by the Northern Railway for use of a piece of
Railway land for constructing and maintaining a depot for storage of petroleum
products etc. By a letter dated 08/02/1980, the Northern Railway revised
the licence fee. On 23/03/1988, the Northern Railway further enhanced the
licence fee. The Northern railway further terminated the licence for use of the
land on the ground that the assessee had failed to deposit the licence fees.
The Northern Railway applied to the Estate Officer (EO) praying for eviction of
the assessee from the land in question. The said application was disposed of by
the EO holding that the enhancements were made by the Northern Railway too
frequently and without legal basis. Further on 20/01/1999, the Northern Railway
revised the licence fee taking the base rate as on 01/01/1985. Thereafter, for
each of the years from assessment year 2002-03 till assessment year 2008-09,
the Northern Railway issued letters demanding enhanced licence fees and
damages. The tax treatment of the claim of the assessee in its income-tax
returns of the enhanced licence fee was deduction. The said claim was allowed
by the Assessing Officer for A. Ys. 1987-88 to 1994-95. For A. Ys. 1996-97 to
1999-2000, the Assessing Officer allowed the licence fee actually paid by the
assessee, holding that it was a contingent liability and not allowable as a
deduction till the liability for the enhanced licence fee, which had been
contested by the assessee, actually crystalised. CIT(A) and the Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) The undisputed
fact is that the assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting. It
has to book the liability in the year in which it arises irrespective of
whether it in fact discharges the liability in that year. In that sense, the
liability to pay the enhanced licence fee would arise in the year in which
demand is made or to which it relate irrespective of when the enhanced fee is
actually paid by the assessee.

 ii)   In the present case,
the liability of the assessee to pay the enhanced licence fee has, far from
being excused, sought to be enforced by the Northern Railway by repeated demands
notwithstanding the EO’s order dated 28/03/1990. As noted earlier, the Northern
Railway has preferred claim for arrears of enhanced licence fees and damages to
the tune of over Rs. 45 crores against the assessee before the sole Arbitrator
appointed by it. The demand is therefore very much alive and is subject matter
of adjudication in arbitration proceedings.

 iii)  The order dated
29/03/1990 of the EO no doubt holds the termination notice dated 23/03/1988 and
the claim for enhanced licence fee to be bad in law. However, it does not hold
that there is no liability on the assessee to pay the enhanced licence fees as
and when that is determined in accordance with law. The EO has in fact observed
that the Northern Railway ‘should form a definite policy in revising the
licence fee for a considerable period on uniform basis by incorporating the law
of principles of natural justice to avoid unnecessary litigation thereby not
causing losses of revenue to the railway administration under these
circumstances and ensuring prompt and regular payment of licence fee by
licencees.’ Also the EO ends the order by stating. The applicant is free to
revise the licence fee in accordance with the provisions of law and as per
terms of agreement. The order of the EO read in the correct perspective,
requires the Northern Railway to follow the due process of law by giving a
hearing to those adversely affected by the upward enhancement of liability
before a decision is taken. The Revenue’s characterisation of the said order,
as negating the liability to pay the enhanced licence fee for all times to come
does not flow on the above reading of the said order. On the other hand, it is
more consistent with the plea of the assessee that while he is not denying the
liability to pay the licence fee he is only questioning the procedure involved
in its revision which, according to him, is not in accordance with law.
Consequently, it could not be said that the assessee has sought to mislead this
Court by contending that he is not questioning the liability to pay licence fee
but is only questioning the quantification or the quantum of the licence fee.

 iv)  While the revenue may be
right in pointing out that for assessment years 2002-03 to 2005-06, the
assessee claimed only Rs. 35,37,300 as deduction on the ground of enhanced
licence fee although it could have claimed the further enhancement which had
taken place by then, the fact remains that the enhanced liability claimed by
the Railways by its letter dated 20/01/1999 and later by the letter dated 29/07-1999
subsisted and was /being demanded. The explanation offered by the assessee for
this inconsistency in its claim is a plausible one. It does not deter from the
position that being an accrued liability, the enhanced licence fee can be
claimed by it as a deduction in the year in which such liability arose.

 v)   In the arbitration
proceedings, the claim of the Railways includes the claim for the enhanced
licence fee as well as the arrears. The arbitration proceedings could end
either in favour of the Railways or the assessee. If it goes in favour of the
assessee, it would then have no liability to pay such enhanced licence fee and
in the year in which such final decision is rendered, the corresponding
reversal of entries will have to take place in terms of section 41(3). All of
this, in no way, extinguishes the liability of the assessee to pay the licence
fee. The assessee would be justified in claiming the enhanced licence fee as
deduction in the year in which such enhancement has accrued even though the
assessee has not paid such enhanced licence fee in that year. This legal
proposition is well settled.

 vi) The Railways has already
filed its claim before the Arbitrator for the arrears of licence fees and
‘damages’. As rightly held by the Commissioner (Appeals), and concurred with by
the Tribunal, the mere characterisation by the Northern Railway of the amount
claimed by it from the assessee as ‘damages’ will not, in the context of the
present case, make it any less an accrued liability. It is an expenditure
incurred by the assessee corresponding to the income he derives from using the
land for the purposes of his business.

 vii) The Tribunal did not
make a grievous error, in the order passed by it, regarding the claim for
enhanced licence fee as a deduction being allowable not in assessment year
1995-96 but in assessment year 1996-97. The argument that the Tribunal may have
exceeded its jurisdiction done not hold since the revenue has, apart from not
challenging the said order, implemented it fully by the consequent appeal
effect order.

 viii) For all of the above
reasons, the first issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the
revenue by holding that the liability of the assessee to pay enhanced licence
fees for the assessment years in question was an accrued liability which arose
in the year in which demand was raised.”

Annual Value of a Vacant Property

Issue for Consideration

The annual value of any building or land
appurtenant thereto is chargeable to income tax in the hands of the owner,
under the head ‘Income from House Property’, as per section 22 of the
Income-tax Act. The amount received or receivable is deemed to be the annual
value, as per section 23(1)(c), in a case where the property is let and was
vacant during the whole or any part of the previous year and as a result
thereof, the amount received or receivable is less than the sum for which the
property is reasonably expected to be let from year to year.

The relevant part of section 23(1),
substituted with effect from 1.4.2002, reads as under:

23.
(1) For the purposes of section 22, the annual value of any property shall be
deemed to be—

 (a) the sum for which the
property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year; or

 (b) where the property or any
part of the property is let and the actual rent received or receivable by the
owner in respect thereof is in excess of the sum referred to in clause (a), the
amount so received or receivable; or

 (c) where the property or any
part of the property is let and was vacant during the whole or any part of the
previous year and owing to such vacancy the actual rent received or receivable
by the owner in respect thereof is less than the sum referred to in clause (a),
the amount so received or receivable :

Issues arise in interpretation and application
of clause (c) of section 23(1), particularly about the possibility of claiming
the benefit of section 23(1)(c) by limiting the deemed annual value determined
under clause (a), in cases where the property was not let out during the year
and had remained vacant throughout the year. An additional dimension is
provided to the issue in a case where attempts are made to let out the property
without success, or where the property was let out during the preceding
previous year, but had remained vacant during the previous year.

A controversy has arisen around the true
import of clause (c) on account of certain decisions, whereunder the Pune and
other benches of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal have taken a view that the
benefit of clause (c) shall be available even in cases where a property had
remained vacant throughout the year. Against that the Mumbai bench had recently
held that the property should have been let, at least for some part of the
year, for availing the benefit under the said clause.

Vikas Keshav Garud’s Case

The issue in
the recent past had arisen in the case of Vikas Keshav Garud vs. ITO, 71
taxmann.com 214
,
before the Pune Bench of the Tribunal for assessment year 2009-10.

In that case, the commercial premises
situated at Dande Towers, Pune, owned by the assessee, had remained vacant
throughout the financial year 2008-09. The assessee had not offered any deemed
income for the purposes of taxation for assessment year 2009-10. The A.O.
however assessed the notional income of the premises at Rs. 1,51,200 under the
head ‘Income From House Property’ by adopting annual letting value of Rs.
12,600 p.m., which was the monthly rent received by the assessee during the
financial year 2006-07 from a tenant.

The assessee challenged the assessment under
the head ‘Income from House Property’ before the CIT(A) in appeal, which was
dismissed by the CIT(A), by confirming the action of the A.O., relying on the
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Vivek Jain vs.
ACIT, 337 ITR 74 (AP).

The Tribunal, in a further appeal by the
assessee, noticed that the A.O. had denied the benefit of clause (c) on the
ground that the property was not let at all during the year under consideration
and had also held that the intention to let out the property had no bearing on
application of the provisions of clause (c) of section 23(1); that the assessee
had ardently contested the action of the A.O. by relying on the decisions,
before the CIT(A) in the cases of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, 110
ITD 158 (Mum)
and Shakuntala Devi vs. DDIT, ITA No. 1520/Ban/2010 dt.
20.12.2011;
that both the authorities had relied upon the decision in the
case of Vivek Jain (supra) for denying the benefit of clause (c) and
rejecting the claim of the assessee.

The Tribunal noted that the property was let
out in financial year 2006-07 to IDBI Home Finance Ltd. at a monthly rent of
Rs. 12,600 and that the assessee could not let out the property during the
year, which led to the property remaining vacant throughout the year, though it
was available for being let and the intention to let, though clear, could not
fructify into actual letting. The Tribunal, in allowing the claim of the
assessee, held that the underlying principle of the provision was to be viewed
with regard to the intention of the assessee in letting out of the property,
together with the efforts put in by assessee for such letting out; that the
actual rent received from the property would have to be considered as ‘zero’ in
case of an assessee who made appropriate efforts for letting the property, but
failed to let.

Importantly, the Tribunal held that the
language of section 23(1)(c) clearly included a situation, where a property was
vacant for the whole year; that a situation could not co-exist wherein the
property was let during the year, with it being simultaneously vacant for the ‘whole
year; that the words ‘let’ and ‘vacant’ were mutually exclusive;
that the interpretation placed by the authorities was inconsistent with the
phraseology of the provision.

The Tribunal gathered the legislative intent
of allowing the benefit of clause (c) in the given situation, by contrasting
the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act, whereunder the
legislature in its wisdom used the phraseology ‘house is actually let’.
The Tribunal observed that the legislature, wherever required, had insisted on
actual letting of the property in express terms. Applying the purposive
interpretation, the Tribunal held that the expression “property is let
had to be read in contrast to “property is self-occupied” to arrive at
the true import of clause (c).

Importantly, the Tribunal observed that the
decision of the high court in Vivek Jain’s case (supra) could not
be read by the revenue in a manner that if the property remained vacant
throughout the year, section 23(1)(c) did not apply at all. The Tribunal also
relied on the fact that the property was actually let out during the financial
year 2006-07. In the totality of the circumstances and having regard to the
provisions of the Act, the Tribunal held that the annual value for the property
had to be assessed at Nil. The appeal of the assessee on this ground was
accordingly allowed by the tribunal.

A similar view was taken by the Mumbai bench
of the Tribunal in the case of Informed Technologies India Ltd. vs. Dy CIT
162 ITD 153.

Sharan Hospitality (P.) Ltd.’s case

The issue again arose before the Mumbai
bench of the ITAT in the case of Sharan Hospitality (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT in
ITA No. 6717/Mum/2012 dt. 12.09.2016
for assessment year 2009-10.

The assessee company, in the facts of the
case during the previous year under consideration, had acquired two properties.
One of the properties was acquired on December 18, 2008 and possession was
received on the same date. The property was acquired with the intent of
letting, so as to earn rental income. The assessee had entered into
negotiations with a company, which was in the process of setting up a state of
the art laboratory, at the relevant time. The basic terms and conditions agreed
upon between the parties for taking the property on rent, w.e.f 1.4.2009
onwards, were recorded in a letter of Intent dated February 9, 2009. The
property was accordingly let with effect from 1.4.2009 at the agreed rent of
Rs.38.95 lakh per month vide Leave and License Agreement dated 06.08.2009. The
Assessing Officer computed the annual value of the said property for assessment
year 2009-10 at Rs.116.85 lakh, i.e., taking notional rent for three months,
being January to March, 2009, ignoring the fact that the property was vacant
during that period. The action of the AO was confirmed by the CIT(A).

In appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee,
while not disputing the quantum of the gross annual rental value, claimed that,
inasmuch as the property, though lettable, was ‘vacant’ during the entire
period of the year since its acquisition in December, 2008; that its annual
value ought to be restricted to the actual rent received or receivable, i.e.,
Nil; that the condition of the property being let was met by the intent to let
out the same; that when the legislature had required the house property to be
actually let, it had stated so, as in section 23(1)(a); that not accepting the
claim of assessee would lead to absurd results, as in a case where the property
was not let for a single day of the year, and was vacant for the whole year,
its AV would stand to be computed taking the lettable value for the entire
year, while if it was let even for a single day during the year, the same would
stand restricted to the actual rent received/receivable, i.e., for one day.

It was further argued that the property
could not be ‘let’ and be ‘vacant‘ for the whole year at the same
time in-as-much as the two conditions could not co-exist, as was pointed out by
the Tribunal in Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, 295 ITR (AT) 341
(Mum).
The words “where the property was let” were to be
construed to include property held with the intent of letting it. Reliance was
also placed on decisions in cases of, Kamal Mishra vs. ITO 19 SOT 251 (Del);
Smt. Poonam Sawhney vs. AO, 20 SOT 69 (Del.); ACIT vs. Dr. Prabha Sanghi, 139
ITD 504 (Del); DLF Office Developers vs. ACIT, 23 SOT 19 (Del); Indu Chandra
vs. DCIT in ITA No. 96/2011 (Luck.); Shakuntala Devi vs. Dy. DIT (in ITA No.
1524/Bang/2010 dated 20.12.2011); Aryabhata Properties Ltd. vs. ACIT (in ITA
No. 6928/Mum/2011 dated 31.7.2013);
and ACIT vs. Suryashankar Properties
Ltd. in ITA No. 5258/Mum/2013 dated 10.6.2015).

The Revenue, in reply, contended that the
notion of ‘proposed to be let’ or ‘held for letting‘, etc.,
could not be imported into the provision, which sought to bring to tax a
notional sum, being the income potential – termed annual value, of a house
property, subject of course to the provisions of the Act, the measure of which
was the fair rental value, defined as the rent at which the house property
might reasonably be let from year to year; that it had nothing to do with the
actual letting of the house property, or the actual receipt of rent, and was in
the nature of an artificial or statutory income; the law in the matter was
well-settled, by the decision in case of CIT vs. Dalhousie Properties Ltd.,
149 ITR 708 (SC); New Piece Goods Bazar Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, 18 ITR 516 (SC); CIT
vs. H. G. Gupta & Sons, 149 ITR 253 (Del);
and Sakarlal Balabhai vs.
ITO, 100 ITR 97 (Guj).
It was further contended that the annual value,
irrespective of whether the property was actually let or not, was thus to be
subjected to tax, unless covered u/s. 23(1)(b), as was reiterated in Sultan
Brothers (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT, 51 ITR 353 (SC)
and In Liquidator of
Mahamudabad Properties (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT, 124 ITR 31 (SC),
wherein it was
held that even where the property was found to be in a state of utter
disrepair, it would yet have some annual value. The decisions relied upon by
the assessee, viz. Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. (supra); Shankuntala
Devi (supra)
; and Indu Chandra (supra) were claimed to be
distinguishable on facts. Reliance was placed on the case of Vivek Jain vs.
ACIT 337 ITR 74 (AP),
wherein the Andhra Pradesh high court, had rejected
similar contentions as were made in the instant case.

The Tribunal noted that a deduction for
vacancy allowance up to assessment year 2001-02, was allowable under clause
(ix) of section 24(1) which clause was omitted w.e.f. assessment year 2002-03.
Instead, section 23(1), substituted w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03, contained clause (c)
that provided for appropriate reduction of annual value in cases where a let
property was vacant. The Tribunal simultaneously took note of various decisions
of the courts, wherein it was held that the vacancy allowance of the kind
provided u/s. 24(1)(ix) could not be claimed if the property was not let out at
all during the previous year concerned, and that a proportionate amount out of
the annual value was permissible to be deducted, only where the property was
let out for a part of the year.

The Tribunal further noted that the issue,
u/s. 24(1)(ix), was well settled in favour of the view that a vacancy allowance
was possible only where the property was let out for a part of the year and not
where the property remained vacant throughout the year. Importantly, the
Tribunal in paragraph 5.3 of its order observed, that the position of the law qua
vacancy remission, post amendment, remained the same. The law laid down by
the courts in interpreting section 24(1)(ix) materially remained the same u/s.
23(1)(c), and therefore, no adjustment was possible under clause (c) of section
23(1) for a property which was vacant throughout the year. It also referred to
Circular no. 14 of 2001 issued by the CBDT for explaining the provisions of the
Finance Act, 2001 and to the Notes to clauses and the Explanatory Memorandum
accompanying the said Finance Act.

The Tribunal, in paragraph 5.2, took a
detailed note of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh high court in the case of Vivek
Jain (supra)
and the reasons supplied by the court in arriving at the
conclusion that no adjustment was possible u/s. 23(1)(c) on account of vacancy
in a case where the property was not let out at all during the year of
assessment.

The Tribunal also took note of the decisions
in cases of Ramesh Chand vs. ITO 29 SOT 570 (Agra) and Indra S. Jain
vs. ITO, 52 SOT 270 (Mum.),
wherein a view similar to the one being
advocated by the revenue was taken. The plethora of cases cited by the assessee
in favour of its claim including the case of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs.
ACIT, 295 ITR (AT) 341 (Mum.),
could not persuade the Tribunal to allow a
relief under clause (c) of section 23(1). On the contrary, the Tribunal
expressed its anguish that the different benches in the past failed to take
notice of the decision in the case of Vivek Jain (supra) and also did
not notice the developed law on the subject while deciding the issue u/s.
24(1)(ix), now omitted. It also observed that the Tribunal, in any case, was
not competent to read down the provision of law in a manner desired by the
assessee.

The Tribunal further observed that vacancy
as a concept had a symbiotic relationship with the notion of letting out and both
of them were intrinsically linked. There could not be a vacancy without actual
letting and there was no scope for the application of the ‘principle of causus
omissus
’, inasmuch as the law on the subject was abundantly plain and
clear. A vacancy could not exist or be considered independent of and de hors
the letting. The assessee’s appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Observations 

The issue under consideration has become
extremely contentious in as much as some of the decisions, delivered by
different benches of the Tribunal, uphold the claim for relief u/s. 23(1)(c) on
account of vacancy, even after the sole decision of the high court on the
subject in the case of Vivek Jain (supra), a decision which was cited
specifically in Vikas Keshav Garud’s case (supra).

In Vivek Jain’s case (supra), the
assessee, a practicing advocate, had adopted an annual value of Rs. Nil in
respect of a property that was vacant during the year as the same was not let
out. The benefit of section 23(1)(c) claimed by him was rejected by the AO, the
CIT(A) and the ITAT. In the further appeal u/s. 260A, the Andhra Pradesh High
Court upheld the action of the assessing officer with the following findings
and observations;

  the
contention that, as clause (c) provided for an eventuality where a property
could be vacant during the whole of the relevant previous year, both
situations, i.e., “property is let” and “property is vacant for
the whole of the relevant previous year”, could not co-exist, did not
merit acceptance.

 –  a
property let out for two or more years could also be vacant for the whole of a
previous year bringing it within the ambit of clause (c) of section 23(1) of
the Act.

 –   clause
(c) encompassed only such cases where a property was let out for more than a
year in which event alone would the question of it being vacant during the
whole of the previous year arose.

–    the
contention that, if the owner had let out the property even for a day, it would
acquire the status of “let out property” for the purpose of clause
(c) for the entire life of the property even without any intention to let it
out in the relevant year was also not tenable.

    the circumstances in which the annual let out value of a house
property should be taken as nil was as specified in section 23(2) of the
Act.

    u/s.
23(l)(c), the period for which a let out property might remain vacant could not
exceed the period for which the property had been let out.

   if
the property had been let out for a part of the previous year, it can be vacant
only for the part of the previous year for which the property was let out and
not beyond.

   for that part of the previous year during which the property was not
let out, but was vacant, clause (c) would not apply and it was only clause (a)
which would be applicable, subject of course to sub-sections (2) and (3) of
section 23 of the Act.

    such
a construction did not lead to any hardship, inconvenience, injustice,
absurdity or anomaly and, therefore, the rule of ordinary and natural meaning
being followed could be departed from.

–    the
benefit u/s. 23(1)(c) could not be extended to a case where the property was
not let out at all.

–       there
was no merit in the submission that the words “property is let” were
used in clause (c) to take out those properties which were held by the
owner for self-occupation from the ambit of the said clause.

    section
23(2)(a) took out a self-occupied residential house, or a part thereof,
from the ambit of section 23(1) of the Act. Likewise, u/s. 23(2)(b),
where a house could actually not be occupied by the owner, on account of his
carrying on employment, business or profession at any other place requiring him
to reside at such other place in a building not belonging to him, the annual
value of the property was also required to be treated as nil, thereby taking it
out of the ambit of section 23(1) of the Act. Section 23(3)(a) makes it
clear that section 23(2) would not apply if the house, or a part thereof, was
actually let during the whole or any part of the previous year. Thus, only such
of the properties which were occupied by the owner for his residence, or which
were kept vacant on account of the circumstances mentioned in clause (b)
of section 23(2), fell outside the ambit of section 23(1) provided they were,
as stipulated in section 23(3)(a), not actually let during the whole or part of
the previous year.

    clause
(c) was not inserted to take out from its ambit properties held by the
owner for self-occupation inasmuch as section 23(2)(a) provided for such
an eventuality.

    it
was only to mitigate the hardship faced by an assessee, and as clause (b)
did not deal with the contingency where the property was let and, because of
vacancy, the actual rent received or receivable by the owner was less than the
sum referred to in clause (a), that clause (c) was inserted.

–      in
cases where the property had not been let out at all, during the previous year
under consideration, there was no question of any vacancy allowance being
provided thereto u/s. 23(l)(c) of the Act.

–       the
order of the Tribunal, denying the benefit of vacancy u/s. 23(1)(c), was
upheld.

The unfairness of the law is manifest in
cases where the property is ready for being let out and cannot be let out in
spite of the best of the efforts of the owner. This unfairness is further
aggravated in a case where the property was let out in the past but could not
be let out during the year. It is in such circumstances that the decision of the
Andhra Pradesh high court hits hard and perhaps requires reconsideration. It is
true that the court had comprehensively examined the provisions, on hand, of
section 23(1)(c). There, however, is an urgent need to appreciate the
following:

–     the
provisions of section 23(1)(c) are materially different than the erstwhile
provisions of section 24(1)(ix), and therefore the case law developed on the
subject of a provision, now omitted, i.e. based on past law, should not color
the outcome on a new provision of law. An independent appraisal of section
23(1)(c) on the basis of the language of the law is required.

–    the
express words of the phraseology ‘was vacant during the whole or any part of
the previous year’
in section 23(1)(c) requires to be given due weightage.
While the Andhra Pradesh High Court has sought to give meaning to the term ‘whole
in the provision by explaining that it dealt with a situation involving letting
out of the premises for longer period, it remains to be interpreted in the
context of real life situations involving shorter periods of letting out. There
is no reason to not apply the provision in cases of letting out for shorter
periods and, if done so, there is a good possibility of a relief in such cases.

–     again,
the use of the phraseology ‘actually let’ in section 23(3)(a), during the whole
or any part of the previous year, clearly indicates that the legislature
whenever intended has in express terms provided for actual letting out of the
premises during the year itself. This aspect, though examined by the court, in
our respectful opinion, requires to be reviewed in as much as the fact
continues to be that the term ‘actually let’ has been used in contradiction to
only ‘let’ in the same section 23(3).

–    it
is impossible to envisage a situation wherein a property is vacant for the
‘whole of the year’ and is still let out during the same year. The property is
either vacant or let out.

     We are of the considered view that the
provisions of section 23(1)(c), when read in the manner in which it has been
read by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, results in unjust deprivation of a
deserving benefit in cases where the property had remained vacant throughout
the year and was not put to any use. The legislative intent therefore requires
to be clarified, or the law requires to be amended to restore the equity and
fairness.

Section 80JJAA – A Liberalised Incentive

Introduction

Job creation is the objective of any welfare
state. In a developing country like India, with its typical demographic
profile, creating employment is a priority of the government. For this purpose,
the state often promotes labour intensive industry and business. Giving a tax
incentive to businesses which provide for jobs is a method adopted for this
purpose. If the object is to promote a certain category of expenditure a tax
incentive/deduction is normally related to the expenditure itself. Section
80JJAA, from the time it was brought on the statute book from assessment year
1999-2000, provided such a deduction with reference to “additional wages”
paid to new regular workmen.

The manner in which it was enacted,
restricted its availability to only a few assessees. Firstly, only those
carrying on the business of manufacture of goods in a factory were entitled to
the deduction. Secondly, the deduction was limited only to payments to workmen.
Thirdly, the deduction was available only with reference to new regular workmen
in excess of 50 workmen, and that too, only if there was an increase of 10% or
more in the number of workmen employed. All in all, the deduction did not
provide the requisite incentive.

Finance Act
2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, liberalised the deduction
substantially. While some further relaxation would make the provision even more
effective, in its current form as well, the deduction is welcome. Though the
amendment to this provision was enacted a year earlier, it does not seem to
have attracted the attention that it deserves. The object of this article is to
explain the provisions, and bring to the notice of the reader certain issues
that may arise.

 Scope of the deduction

The deduction granted u/s. 80JJAA (1)
specifies the following conditions:

(1) it applies to an assessee
to whom section 44AB applies

(2) the gross total income of
such an assessee should include any profits and gains derived from business.

If  these threshold conditions are satisfied, the
assessee is eligible for a deduction of 30% of “additional employee cost”
incurred in the course of such business for three assessment years commencing
from the year in which such employment is provided.

 Exclusions

The deduction will not be available if

(1) the business is formed by
splitting up or the reconstruction of an existing business (the proviso
excludes business which is formed as a result of re-establishment,
reconstruction or revival specified in section 33B)

(2) the business is acquired by
the assessee by way of a transfer from any other person or as a result of any
business reorganisation

(3) the assessee fails to
furnish along with the return of income the report of an accountant as defined
in the explanation to section 288, giving such particulars in the report as may
be prescribed ( Rule 19 AB and form 10DA).

 Definitions

The explanation defines the terms
“additional employee cost”, “additional employee” and “emoluments”.

 Additional employee cost

This means the total emoluments paid or
payable to additional employees employed during the previous year. In the first
year of a new business, the additional employee cost will be the aggregate
emoluments paid or payable to employees employed during the previous year. In
case of an existing business, if there is no increase in the number of
employees from the total number of employees employed on the last day of the
preceding year, the additional employee cost shall obviously be “nil”

Emoluments paid otherwise than by account
payee cheque, account payee bank draft or the use of electronic clearing system
through a bank account would not be eligible for deduction. This would ensure
that the payment to the employee is verifiable subsequently and, since cash
payments are not permissible, it would significantly reduce misuse.

 Additional employee

An additional employee is one who is
employed by the employer during the previous year and thereby increases the
total number of employees employed by the employer. The following employees are
excluded from this definition.

 (1)    Employees whose total
emoluments are more than Rs. 25,000 per month.

(2)    An employee whose entire
contribution is paid by the government under the employees pension scheme
notified in accordance with the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act 1952 (EPF Act). Under the EPF Act, this refers to employees with
a disability. The rationale and relevance of this exclusion is not understood
and is discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

(3)    An employee who is
employed for a period of less than 240 days during the previous year.

(4)    An employee who does not
participate in the recognised provident fund.

 Emoluments

The term emolument is defined as any sum
paid to the employee but excludes

 (1)    contribution by the
employer to a pension fund, provident fund or any other fund for the benefit of
employees

(2)    any lump sum payment
paid or payable to an employee at the time of termination of his service, or on
superannuation or voluntary retirement such as gratuity, severance pay, leave
encashment, voluntary retrenchment benefits, commutation of pension etc.

Deduction for earlier years

Sub-section 80JJAA (3), provides that the
provisions of this section as they stood prior to the amendment would govern
the deduction for the assessment year 2016-17, and earlier years.

Issues

The amended provisions are certainly far
more liberal than those in force for assessment year 2016-17, and earlier
years. However, certain issues still remain. These are

(1) The deduction is available only to an
assessee to whom section 44AB applies and whose gross total income includes any
profits and gains derived from business.
The question that arises is
whether an assessee carrying on a profession would be eligible for the
deduction.

The terms business and profession are defined distinctly in section 2. Further,
section 44AB itself prescribes different thresholds for business and
profession. The Act, where it seeks to include the term profession, does so
explicitly (e.g., section 28). Therefore, it appears that an assessee carrying
on a profession will not be eligible for the deduction.

(2) If an assessee acquires a business
either by way of transfer or business reorganisation
, such an assessee
would not be eligible for the deduction
. While denying the benefit to an
assessee who acquires business on transfer may have some logic, one does not
understand as to why the benefit should be denied in a case of business
reorganisation. An undertaking may be transferred in the course of an
amalgamation or demerger. The business in such a situation is continued in a
different entity post such amalgamation/demerger. The possible reason for this
exclusion may be that the benefit is not intended to be given on account of
employees added due to a business being received on amalgamation/demerger.

However, succession to a business which
falls neither in the term “transfer” or “business reorganisation”, should not
result in a denial of the deduction. To illustrate if a business is succeeded
by legal heirs on the demise of the proprietor, the legal heirs should be
entitled to the deduction, in regard to the remaining assessment year/s for
which the claim is available

(3) The term additional employee excludes a
person whose emoluments are more than 25,000 per month. It may so happen
that an employee joins employment at a lower salary, but during the period of
three years for which an assessee employer is entitled to the claim his
emoluments cross 25,000.
The issue would be whether emoluments paid to such
an employee, should be excluded in totality or if such exclusion is
partial/limited. The exclusion of the employee is one “whose total emoluments
are more than Rs. 25,000 per month”. Therefore, till the emoluments reach that
threshold, the employee would continue to be an additional employee. The
provision to be interpreted is a deduction granting relief. Consequently, the
emoluments paid till they reach the threshold should be eligible for the
deduction.

(4) An employee who is employed for a
period of less than 240 days is excluded from the definition of “additional
employee”.
An issue is whether leave taken by the employee is to be
included for counting the days of employment. If an employee is entitled to a
certain number of days leave for the days served, the days of paid leave should
certainly be included for the purposes of calculating the number of 240 days.
Even otherwise, just because an employee has gone on leave, it cannot be said
that his employment has ceased during that period.

(5) An employee who does not participate
in a recognised provident fund is excluded from the definition of additional
employee.
In a situation where the provident fund act does not apply to the
establishment, on account of the number of employees being less than the
threshold limit, this should not act as a disability. This is on account of the
established principle of law that an assessee cannot be asked to do the impossible.
Therefore, if the relevant statute does not apply to the assessee, he should
not be denied deduction.

(6) A very odd
provision seems to be the provision of Explanation (ii)(b). As has been
mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, under the Employees Provident funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952, the contribution to the employees pension
fund is to be borne by the government in the case of an employee having a
disability. Such an employee is excluded from the definition of an additional
employee and consequently the emoluments paid to him do not qualify for
deduction. This provision does not seem to have any rationale, except perhaps,
that the Government does not want to give an additional benefit in such cases,
over and above the PF contribution that it is already bearing. The government
always seeks to promote and ensure that persons with disability are employed
gainfully. Therefore those employers who employ differently abled persons ought
to get an incentive. An amendment to this provision is called for.

 (7) One more issue is in respect of
calculation of number of additional employees. This could be a potent point for
litigation and therefore working of it is a key element. Consider the following
example in respect of eligible employees:

        

 

Year 1

Year 2

Employees at the beginning of the year

50

52

Resigned during the year

3

5

Added during the year

5

2

Net Addition

2

(3)

Total at year end

52

49

 

Considering the
above example, following questions arise:

a)  In Year 1, should net
additional employees be considered for deduction or gross addition?

b)  Does one need to maintain a
list of eligible employee and if so, how? If the numbers resigning / retrenched
are more, will deduction be denied?

c)  In Year 2, if there is a
net deduction, should the assessee still make a claim for 2 the additions made?

While at first blush this appears to be a
controversial issue, the answer is contained in the definition of additional
employee in the Explanation to the section. According to clause (ii) of the
explanation the term “additional employee” means an employee who has been
employed during the previous year and whose employment has the effect of
increasing the total number of employees employed by the employer as on the last
day of the preceding year.
In the illustration given above, the employer
employs five new employees during the year, but three resign resulting in a net
addition of two employees.

The issue arises because while the
explanation requires a comparison to be made with the strength of the employees
as on the last day of the preceding year, it does not contain a stipulation as
to when this comparison is to be made. When there is no specific mention one
would have to go by a purposive interpretation of the section. The incentive is
for employment generation. This is how the explanatory memorandum
describing the amendment refers to it. In light of the same, it will be
appropriate to consider only the net addition of employees. As to the point of
time when the comparison is to be made, it should be the last day of the
previous year for which the deduction is to be claimed. In respect of which
employee the deduction is to be claimed will be left to the discretion of the
employer assessee. Therefore in year one, the deduction should be claimed in
respect of the net increment of two employees. As far as the second year is
concerned, it appears that the assessee would not be entitled to any deduction.

Conclusion

Considering the provision in totality, it is
certainly far more liberal than its predecessor. A large number of assessees
could become entitled to the benefit of this deduction. This will be the first
year of the claim, and therefore, my professional colleagues should apprise
their clients of this deduction.

Reporting in form 3CD For AY 2017-18 – New Elements

Tax Audit has become more onerous with each
passing year. Tax Audit u/s. 44AB is carried out by perhaps the largest number
of practitioners, even more than statutory audit of companies. This article
seeks to cover important new points relevant to Tax Audit for AY 2017-18.

There have been notable changes in clauses related to ICDS and Loans. This
article seeks to put those points in perspective and update the reader of
nuances and intricacies that require a professional’s attention either as a
preparer or as the tax auditor.

 1.      Clause 8

        The relevant clause
of section 44AB under which the audit has been conducted is required to be
mentioned here. This aspect becomes important considering the fact that certain
deductions and exemptions may depend on the appropriate selection, and possibly
trigger action from CPC. A new category inserted in the utility pertains to S.
44ADA which is applicable from AY 1718:

         Clause (d) For
claiming profits less than prescribed u/s. 44ADA

        Eligible assessee [as
per section 44AA (1)] can select this clause in the utility if assessee chooses
to show taxable profit from specified profession less than 50% of total
turnover not exceeding Rs. 50 lakh.

 2.      CLAUSE 13 – Method of accounting                – ICDS Aspects

        Sub-clauses (d),
(e) and (f) have been inserted this year
to cover the impact of the Income
Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS). The Tax Auditor is required to
identify whether any adjustment is required to be made to the profit or loss as
per books of accounts in order to comply with the ICDS and if so, quantify the
adjustment. Further, the various disclosures required by each ICDS are required
to be given in clause (f). The following paragraphs deal briefly with each ICDS
and identify probable areas which may warrant adjustment from the income in the
books to arrive at the taxable income and consequent reporting under these
clauses.

 3.      ICDS discussed

        The Income
Computation and Disclosure Standards are applicable for computation of income
chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or
profession” or “Income from other sources” and not for the
purpose of maintenance of books of account. The Preamble to every ICDS provides
that in case of any conflict between the provisions of the Income-tax Act,
1961(‘the Act’) and the relevant ICDS, the provisions of the Act shall prevail
to that extent.

 3.1     ICDS II – Inventories

 3.1.1  ICDS II requires the
value of inventories to include duties and taxes (the “inclusive method”) in
line with the provisions of section 145A of the Act. This is in contrast with
Accounting Standard (“AS”) – 2 on Valuation of Inventories which mandates the
“exclusive method”. Under the exclusive method, inventories are to be valued
net of any duties or taxes that are subsequently recoverable from the taxing
authorities. The ICAI Guidance Note on Tax Audit provides detailed
reconciliation of the adjustments required u/s. 145A of the Act between both
the methods and concludes that the effect on the profit or loss due to these
adjustments would be ‘nil’. Looking at the requirements of ICDS II in isolation
one may conclude that the inclusion of recoverable duties and taxes in the
value of inventories would result in increase of profit for the year. However,
taking the effect of all the adjustments required as per the provisions of
section 145A, there would be no resulting increase or decrease of profit.
Accordingly, the Tax Auditor may report ‘nil’ under this head with a suitable
note detailing the Section 145A adjustments and the stand taken by her.

 3.1.2  In respect of business
of service providers, AS 2 does not cover work in progress (WIP) arising in the
ordinary course of business. Therefore, if under Ind-AS, WIP of service
providers is recognised, that is to be ignored under the ICDS unless it falls
under ICDS III.

 3.2     ICDS III – Construction
contracts

 3.2.1  ICDS III requires
contract revenue to be recognised when there is a reasonable certainty of
ultimate collection while AS 7 and Indian Accounting Standard (“Ind- AS”) -11
mandate recognition when it is possible to reliably measure the outcome of the
contract. In cases where these two conditions are not simultaneously met, it
could result in an adjustment.

 3.2.2  ICDS III provides for
adopting the percentage of completion method (‘POCM’) for recognising contract
revenue and contract costs at the reporting date. AS 7 and Ind-AS 11 also
provide similarly. The manner of determining the stage of completion for
recognition of contract revenue / contract costs is similarly provided.

 3.2.3  Under ICDS III, as in AS
7 and Ind-AS 11, during the early stage of contract where the outcome of the
construction contract cannot be estimated reliably, contract revenue is
recognised only to the extent of costs incurred. However, early stage of a
contract shall not extend beyond 25% of the stage of completion as per ICDS
III. There is no such requirement under AS-7 or Ind-AS 11. The difference in
treatment will result in an adjustment.

 3.2.4  Retention monies are
part of contract revenue as defined in ICDS III. AS 7 is silent on their
treatment. If the retention monies are not recognised in books till they are
due, there will be an adjustment required to taxable income.

 3.2.5  Both AS 7 and Ind-AS 11
require recognition of expected losses, that is, when it is probable that total
contract costs will exceed total contract revenue, as an expense immediately.
There is no such provision under ICDS III and such expected loss would be
recognised like any other loss from the contract on the basis of Percentage of
Completion Method followed. This difference in treatment would require an
adjustment while computing the taxable income.

 3.2.6  CBDT has ‘clarified’
that there is no specific ICDS applicable to real estate developers, BOT
projects and leases.1 However, in the later part of the
clarification, CBDT has stated, “Therefore, relevant provisions of the Act
and ICDS shall apply to these transactions as may be applicable”
. It
appears that since there is no special treatment given for these businesses,
all the ICDS would be relevant. However, the draft ICDS on Real Estate
Transactions issued in May 2017, would be notified in due course. In case
of  Builder-Developer, applicability of
ICDS III and ICDS IV  is questionable,
considering that such Developer is constructing on his own account and not as a
contractor, and further, is not selling goods or rendering servicces. However,
ICDS IV may apply for other income of Real Estate Developers.

 3.2.7  ICDS IV applies to sale
of goods and rendering of services. In cases where, in substance, the
transactions are not in nature of construction contracts, with the developer
not passing on the risk and rewards of ownership, the developer is selling
immovable property which are not goods and he is not rendering any services as
he develops the property on his own account and subsequently sells or leases
them. Hence, arguably, ICDS IV should also not apply to him.

 3.3    ICDS
IV – Revenue Recognition

 3.3.1  Revenue is measured
under Ind AS 18 at fair value of consideration received or receivable. If there
is an element of deferred payment terms in the consideration, then the fair
value of consideration may be less than the nominal amount of cash receivable.
In such a case, the difference is to be recognised as interest revenue. ICDS IV
does not require such treatment and the resulting difference in the amount of
revenue will require an adjustment.

 3.3.2  In cases where the
transaction price is composite, for instance, where the selling price of a
product includes consideration for after-sales service, Ind AS 18 requires the
consideration for such after-sales service to be deferred and recognised as
revenue over the period during which the service is performed. There is no such
requirement in
ICDS IV.

 3.3.3  Services contracts-

         AS 9 gives the option
of completed service contract method for services contracts in certain
situations. In contrast, under ICDS IV, services contract revenue is to be
recognised as per the percentage of completion method (POCM) in accordance with
ICDS III. The resulting difference would require an adjustment. Further, ICDS
IV permits completed services contract method in cases of services contracts
with duration of not more than ninety days. Similar relaxation is not available
under AS 9 and could result in an adjustment.

 3.3.4  Interest, royalty and
dividends-

a.  Interest received on
compensation or enhanced compensation is taxable when received [section
145A(2)] and ICDS IV is not applicable.

b.  ICDS requires interest on
any refund of tax, duty or cess to be recognised when received. This treatment
may be at variance with that in the books when such interest is recorded
earlier on accrual..

c.  Under ICDS IV, interest is
to be recognised on time basis while royalty on the basis of contractual terms.
The condition of reasonable certainty of ultimate collection contained in AS 9
or Ind-AS 18 is absent. The difference in treatment could result in an
adjustment.

 3.4    ICDS
V – Tangible assets

 3.4.1  Under Ind-AS 16, the
components of costs of property, plant and equipment (PPE) include estimated
costs of dismantling and removing the item and restoring the site. Also
included in the costs are costs of major inspections. These costs are not
included under ICDS V and such expenditure cannot be considered as expenditure
directly attributable in making the asset ready for its intended use.

 3.4.2  Ind-AS 16 provides that
in case the payment for PPE is beyond the normal credit terms, the difference
between the cash price equivalent and the total payment is to be recognised as
interest over the period of credit unless such interest relates to a period
before such asset is ready for intended use and is capitalised in accordance
with Ind- AS 23. However, ICDS V is silent in this regard, and therefore, the
total payment would be treated as the cost.

 3.4.3  Under both AS 10 and
Ind-AS 16, cost of a fixed asset/PPE should be recognised as an asset only if
it is probable that future economic benefits associated with the item will flow
to the enterprise and such costs can be measured reliably. Under ICDSV, this
condition is absent. As a result, under ICDS V, the initial recognition of the
asset and subsequent addition to the cost would be made whether or not economic
benefits will flow to the enterprise.

 3.4.4  Though AS 10 recognises
that the cost of fixed asset may undergo changes subsequent to its acquisition
and construction due to exchange fluctuations, exchange losses or gains cannot
be capitalised after the asset is ready for its intended use. However, ICDS VI
provides for recognition of exchange difference as per section 43A of the Act.
Section 43A provides that, in case of an asset acquired from a country outside
India, the increase or reduction in liability while making payment towards the
cost of the asset or repayment of the moneys borrowed for acquiring the asset
due to change in the rate of exchange, shall be added to or deducted from the
actual cost of such asset. Section 43A has no application in case of asset
acquired from within India by availing a foreign currency loan. These
differences in treatment could result in an adjustment while computing the
taxable income.

 3.5    ICDS
VI – Effect of changes in Forex Rates

 3.5.1  ICDS VI requires
non-monetary items to be translated at the rate on the date of the transaction,
except in case of inventory which is carried at net realisable value
denominated in foreign currency, where it shall be reported at the closing
rate. This treatment is in accordance with AS 11 dealing with effects of
foreign exchange rates. However, ICDS [in para 5(ii)] provides that any
exchange difference arising on conversion of non-monetary items on the
reporting date shall not be recognised as income or expense of the year. There
is an apparent contradiction within ICDS VI itself in the treatment provided in
this respect.

 3.5.2  Foreign operations

        AS 11 and Ind-AS require that all assets and
liabilities of a non-integral foreign operation to be converted at closing rate
and resulting exchange differences to be taken to a Foreign Currency
Translation Reserve (FCTR). ICDS VI requires the transactions of a foreign
operation, integral or non-integral, to be treated as the transactions of the
assessee itself. Accordingly, the difference in treatment will give rise to
adjustment to the taxable income. Further, the transitional provisions require
any balance in FCTR as on 1st April, 2016 to be recognised in AY
2017-18 to the extent not recognized in the computation of income in the past
[FAQ 16 Circular No. 10/2017, dated 23rd March, 2017]. These
differences in treatment will result in adjustments while computing the taxable
income.

 3.5.3  Forward exchange
contracts

      AS 11 requires
mark-to-market (MTM) losses/gains to be recognised at the reporting date in
respect of trading or speculation contracts. In contrast, ICDS requires
premium/discount on such contracts to be recognised only on settlement.

 3.6    ICDS
VII – Government grants

 3.6.1  ICDS VII provides that
the recognition of government grants should not be postponed beyond the date of
receipt. In a case where the grant is received pending compliance of some
conditions and the accrual of the grant has not taken place, the grant would be
disclosed as a liability in the books of accounts. This difference in treatment
could result in an adjustment in the computation of income, though it can be
argued that where income has not accrued, ICDS VII should yield to section 5 of
the Act.

 3.6.2  As per AS 12, grants
that relate to non-depreciable assets are to be credited to a capital reserve.
Such an option is not available under ICDS VII and has to be recognised as
income. This will require an adjustment to the computation of total income.

 3.6.3  As per AS 12,
non-monetary assets given at concessional rates are to be accounted in the
books at their acquisition cost or if given free, such assets are to be
accounted at a nominal value. ICDS VII also requires similar treatment.
However, Ind-AS 20 requires such assets to be accounted at fair value,
warranting an adjustment in computation.

 3.7    ICDS
VIII – Securities

 3.7.1  Under ICDS VIII, where a
security is acquired in exchange for other security, the fair value of security
so acquired shall be its actual cost. This is in contrast to the treatment
under AS 13 wherein the acquisition cost should be the fair value of the
securities issued. This difference in treatment would result in different costs
of securities for accounting and tax purposes and will affect the resulting
gain or loss on their disposal.

 3.7.2  The treatment of
pre-acquisition interest is same in ICDS VIII and AS 13.

 3.7.3  ICDS VIII requires the
securities held as stock-in-trade to be valued at year-end at actual cost or
net realisable value, whichever is lower. However, the comparison of actual
cost and net realisable value is required to be done category-wise and not
item-wise
as is done under AS 13. The categories for the purpose of
comparison under ICDS VIII are shares, debt securities, convertible securities
and any other securities not covered above. Therefore, adjustments would need
to be made for the difference in valuation of closing stock.

 3.7.4  ICDS VIII requires
unlisted and thinly-traded securities held as stock in trade to be valued at
actual cost regardless of their realisable value. AS 13 does not deal with
unlisted and thinly-traded securities specifically.

 3.8    ICDS
IX – Borrowing Costs

 3.8.1  Borrowing costs defined-

         Section 36(1)(iii)
and Explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Act cover only interest to be
considered for capitalisation to the cost of the asset. ICDS IX extends
capitalisation requirement to other components of borrowing costs [vide para
2(1)(a)]. Borrowing costs are defined in ICDS IX on the same lines as under AS
16 and Ind-AS 23, except that the exchange differences arising from foreign
currency borrowings to the extent they are regarded as an adjustment to
interest costs are not dealt with by ICDS IX.

 3.8.2  In case of inventories,
as per AS 2, interest and other borrowing costs are usually considered as not
relating to bringing the inventories to their present location and condition
and as a result not included in the cost of inventories. On the other hand,
inventories which require a substantial period of time to bring them to a
saleable condition are qualifying assets and borrowing costs that are directly
attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of such assets are
to be capitalised as part of the cost of such asset as laid down in AS 16.
However, Proviso to section 36(1)(iii) read with Explanation 8 to section 43(1)
require that interest paid on amount borrowed for the acquisition of new assets
for the period before such assets are first put to use is to be capitalised and
not allowable as revenue expenditure. Arguably, inventories are not for
extension of business or profession and are not ‘put to use’ and the proviso
ought not apply to inventories. Contrarily, ICDS IX requires capitalisation of borrowing
costs related to inventories which take more than twelve months to bring them
to saleable condition. This will result in an adjustment.

 3.8.3  Under AS 16 and Ind-AS
23, qualifying assets requiring capitalisation of borrowing costs are assets
requiring substantial period of time to get ready for their intended use. There
is no such requirement under ICDS IX. Thus, any delay, however short, in
putting to use any asset, being tangible or intangible assets listed in the
definition would require capitalisation of borrowing costs directly related to
their acquisition. The treatment mandated by ICDS IX is in accordance with
provisions of section 36(1)(iii) and Explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Act.

 3.8.4  Further, there is no
provision in ICDS IX for suspension of capitalisation during extended periods
when active development in construction of a qualifying asset is interrupted as
is mandated by AS 16 and Ind-AS 23. This treatment is in accordance with the
provisions of section 36(1)(iii) and Explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Act.

 3.8.5  Capitalisation –
Borrowing costs directly attributable borrowings

        Where funds are
borrowed specifically for acquisition, construction or production of a
qualifying asset, ICDS IX provides that the amount of borrowing costs to be
capitalised on that asset shall be the actual borrowing costs incurred during
the period on the funds so borrowed. In cases where funds borrowed are not
utilised for the qualifying asset or where funds are borrowed for other
purposes but are utilised for acquisition, construction or production of
qualifying asset, ICDS IX would have no application. However, such a literal
reading of ICDS IX could lead to an anomalous interpretation and the
consequences may be unintended. Utilisation of the funds borrowed for the
purposes of acquisition, construction or production of qualifying asset alone
should qualify for capitalisation.

 3.8.6  Capitalisation –
Borrowing costs of general borrowings

        ICDX IX gives detailed
calculations to determine borrowing costs to be capitalised in case of use of
general borrowings to acquire qualifying assets. The calculations given do not
envisage situations where funds are utilised out of general borrowings on
different dates. Both AS 16 and Ind-AS 23 provide for weighted average cost of
borrowing to be capitalised. The difference in determining the borrowing costs
for general borrowings could result in adjustment in computation of income.

 3.8.7  Income from temporary
investments out of borrowed funds

        Both AS 16 and Ind-AS
23 provide that where borrowed amounts are temporarily invested pending their
expenditure on the qualifying asset, the borrowing costs to be capitalised
should be determined as the actual borrowing costs incurred on that borrowing
during the period less any income on the temporary investment of those
borrowings. ICDS IX is silent in this respect and could result in an
adjustment. The Supreme Court has held that such interest cannot be set off
against interest paid and has to be offered to tax under the head ‘Income from
other Sources’.2 On the other hand, it was held in another case that
where the investment is inextricably linked with the process of setting up of
the plant, such interest should be set-off against the interest paid and the
net interest is to be capitalised3. The Tax Auditor may form her
opinion on the basis of specific facts of the auditee and apply these rulings.

 3.9    ICDS
X – Provisions and contingencies

 3.9.1  As in AS 29 and Ind AS
37, ICDS X does not require recognition of a contingent asset. However, for
subsequent recognition of a contingent asset as an asset, ICDS X requires
‘reasonable certainty’ of inflow of economic benefits, as against the need for
‘virtual certainty’ of inflow of economic benefits under AS 29 and Ind AS 37.

This difference in treatment could result in an adjustment.

 3.9.2  In respect to
recognising reimbursements of expenditure to be provided for, both AS 29 and
Ind AS 37 require a ‘virtual certainty’ of the receipt of reimbursement. In
contrast, ICDS X requires only ‘reasonable certainty’ to recognise the
reimbursements.

 3.9.3  Under ICDS X, provisions
are to be reviewed at every year-end and if it is no longer reasonably certain
that an outflow of resources will be required to settle the obligation, the
provision should be reversed. AS 29 and Ind AS 37 both require reversal of the
provisions if it is no longer probable that there will be an outflow of
resources. This difference in the trigger for reversal of provisions could lead
to an adjustment in computing taxable income.

 3.9.4  Transitional
provisions in ICDS X require that at the end of the financial year 2016-17, a
review of all past events is needed to be carried out to see whether any
provision is to be recognised or derecognised, and whether any asset is to be
recognised or derecognised, in relation to such past events, as per the
provisions of ICDS X.

3.10   One will have to
carefully consider the transitional provisions given in each ICDS to ascertain
exact applicability of the respective ICDS for previous year ended 31st
March 2017 being the first transitional year.

 3.11   An important point that
demands mention here relates to keeping track of ICDS related changes in the
following years. Since ICDS effect is given directly in the computation of
income, and not in books of account, one will have to keep a track on a
memorandum basis. In the subsequent year/s, this effect will have to be
considered at the time of computation of income since the same might be getting
reflected in the books of account and double inclusion of income and its
elimination will be required. For example, an item of revenue was considered in
FY 2017-18. Due to ICDS revenue standard, it was already added to taxable
profits in FY 2016-17 (AY 2017-18). In such a scenario, this item needs to be
removed at the time of computing the income for AY 2018-19.

 3.12   A welcome measure
introduced by way of a proviso to section 36 (1)(vii) which has considered the
possible implications of an item being considered as income even though not in
the books and its subsequent irrecoverability not being written off in the
books of account. This provision was introduced by Finance Act 2015 w.e.f.
1.4.2016 and accordingly applies from AY 2017-18 onwards.

 3.13   Disclosure required by
clause 13(f) is a new challenge. The online utility already contains a field
for standard wise disclosures. However, in the utility, no tables are getting
accepted thus necessitating description. It is suggested that the practitioner may
compile a list of ICDS disclosures required each ICDS wise, and insert them in
these fields. Alternatively, an annexure may be prepared of all such
disclosures ICDS wise, and uploaded as an annexure to the tax audit report.

 4.      CLAUSE 18: Depreciation

         Recently, the CBDT
has made changes in the Income Tax Rules to restrict the rate of
depreciation maximum up to 40% for block of assets which are currently eligible
for depreciation at a higher rate (50%, 60%, 80%, 100%). This amendment is
applicable from current financial year itself (i.e. FY 2016-17) in case of new
manufacturing companies (incorporated on or after 1.3.2016) which will opt for
lower corporate tax rate of 25% u/s. 115BA of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

       For all other
assessees, the Notification states the effective date is 01.04.2017. However,
ITRs for A.Y. 2017-18 have not been modified and they still mention rates of
depreciation higher than 40%. Hence, it can be inferred that the above
amendment is applicable from next year (i.e. FY 2017-18) for assesses not
opting for section 115BA benefit.

 5.      CLAUSE 26 – Section 43B – Any tax, duty or other sum

        Section 43B has been
amended vide Finance Act (FA) 2016 to include any sum payable by the assessee
to the Indian Railways for the use of railway assets [Clause (g)]. For
instance, this clause will include amounts charged by Indian Railways to hire
out wagons. The disallowance under this clause does not include railway freight
payable as the same is towards service of transportation and not for use of
railway assets.

 6.      CLAUSE 31: ACCEPTANCE OR REPAYMENT OF LOAN OR DEPOSIT OR SPECIFIED
SUMS (SECTION 269SS/SECTION 269T)

         Substantial changes
have been made in clause 31 of Form 3CD dealing with above transactions.

         Earlier there were
three sub clauses in clause 31. In the amended form, there are five sub
clauses.
Sub-clause (a) deals with particulars of each loan or deposit
in an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269SS taken or accepted
during the previous year. Sub-clause (b) deals with particulars of each specified
sum
in an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269SS taken or
accepted during the previous year.

          In both the above
clauses, following details to be reported additionally:

            Whether the loan or deposit or specified sum
was taken or accepted by cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing
system through a bank account;

            in case the loan or deposit or specified sum
was taken or accepted by cheque or bank draft, whether the same was taken or
accepted by an account payee cheque or an account payee bank draft.

         In this regard,
reference may be made to amendment to sections 269SS and 269T by the Finance
Act 2015, whereby the scope of these sections was extended to transactions in
immovable property. Explanation to section 269SS defines the term specified sum
as money receivable as advance or otherwise in relation to transfer of an
immovable property, whether or not transfer has taken place. Explanation to
section 269T defines the term specified sum as money in the nature of advance
or otherwise in relation to transfer of an immovable property, whether or not
transfer has taken place. This definition does not distinguish between capital
asset or stock in trade. So the scope of this section is very wide. All
transactions in immovable property exceeding the threshold will have to be
reported in this clause.

        Sub-clause (c) deals
with particulars of each repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum in
an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T made during the
previous year. In addition to the existing details, the following details are
to be reported additionally:

     – whether the repayment
was made by cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a
bank account;

     – in case the repayment
was made by cheque or bank draft, whether the same was taken or accepted by an
account payee cheque or an account payee bank draft

          In addition to the
above changes, two new sub- clauses (d) and (e) are inserted:

       Sub-clause (d) deals
with particulars of repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum in
an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T received otherwise
than by a cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a
bank account during the previous year.
Sub-clause (e) deals with
particulars of repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum in an
amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T received by a cheque or
bank draft which is not an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft during the previous year.

           Following details are
required to be given in these clauses:

(i) name, address and
Permanent Account Number (if available with the assessee) of the payer;

(ii) amount of loan or deposit or any specified advance received
otherwise than by a cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system
through a bank account during the previous year / received by a cheque or bank
draft which is not an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft during
the previous year.

        The reporting
requirement in respect of section 269T was earlier applicable only in case of
the person making the repayment of loan or deposit or any specified advance.
Under the new clause 31, reporting is also to be done by the recipient. So the
person who receives any repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum
in an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T, will have to
scrutinize the mode of repayment and report whether any repayment is received
by him otherwise than by a cheque or bank draft or use of electronic
clearing system through a bank account during the previous year or received by
a cheque or bank draft which is not an account payee cheque or account payee
bank draft during the previous year.
This information will enable the
department to initiate penalty proceedings u/s. 271E against the person who has
made the repayment in contravention of section 269T.

 7.      Cash 
deposits  during
demonetisation period – Impact on     Clause 16 (a) & 16(d)

         Cash deposits in the
bank accounts due to demonetisation would be very common. This needs to be
dealt with diligently as it might have consequences on taxable income of the
assessee. Clause 16 of the tax audit report requires reporting of certain
amounts not credited to the Profit & Loss A/c. It has several sub-clauses
out of which the followings may be relevant:

(a) the items falling within
the scope of section 28

(d) any other item of income

        It might be possible
that cash has been deposited in personal bank account of the assessee (who has
a proprietary concern) and it does not form part of the books of account
related to his business which have been audited. In such case, the auditor
should not be concerned about its source and evidences in that regard as the
scope of audit is restricted only to the books of account related to the
business or profession of the assessee.

        However, when cash
has been deposited in the regular bank account of the business and has also
been recorded in the books of account which are subject to audit, the auditor
needs to consider the following aspects:

  Whether
it is out of the balance available in the cash book as on that particular date?

  Are
there any irregular / unusual receipts which are recorded in the cash book
which have increased the cash balance matching with deposit into bank account?

   What
is the source of such receipts and are there sufficient audit evidences
available to justify it?

        In case of companies,
the disclosure made in the financial statements pursuant to MCA Notification GSR
308(E) dated 31-3-2017 should also be taken into account while reviewing the
above aspects. One may need to ascertain, especially in case of non corporate
assessees, that the available cash balance shown as on 31st March
consist of permitted / non SBN currency to ensure accuracy and validity of cash
balance.

          The
reporting under the specific clause as mentioned above or reporting of
qualification at the appropriate place in Form No. 3CA/3CB may be considered
depending upon outcome of the inquiry made in this regard. Where sufficient and
reliable audit evidences are not available justify the source of cash deposits,
the auditor may qualify his report by incorporating suitable qualification in
Form No. 3CA/3CB.

Aadhaar and the Right to Privacy: An Overkill by Over linking?

Aadhaar seems
to be the flavour of the day for the Government. In the past few months, the
Government has gone on an overdrive to link all persons, transactions and other
digital initiatives through Aadhaar. Linking of PAN to Aadhaar was made
mandatory to be done before 31st August 2017 (now extended to 31st
December 2017). Providing Aadhaar for all bank accounts before 31st
December 2017 has been made mandatory under the Prevention of Money Laundering
(Maintenance of Records) Rules.Besides the requirement of obtaining Permanent
Account Number, Aadhaar number of the purchaser for all financial transactions
exceeding Rs. 50,000 has been introduced.Linking of all mobile SIM cards with
Aadhaar before 6th February 2018 has also been made mandatory. The
requirement of quoting of Aadhaar on registration of a death has also been
introduced from 1st October 2017. MCA has announced its intention to
make all MCA21 services linked to Aadhaar. The Government has also stated its
intention of linking all driving licences with Aadhaar shortly.

 While one
appreciates the need from a security perspective to link all these transactions
or accounts with the Aadhar number, a few questions do arise as to the manner
and haste with which this is being implemented. If one examines the provisions
of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits
and Services) Act, 2016, section 3(1) clearly provides that every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number
by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing
the process of enrolment. Therefore, obtaining an Aadhaar number is not
mandatory under the Aadhaar Act, but optional. This was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Binoy Viswam’s case (396 ITR 66), where the mandatory linking
of Aadhaar number with PAN was challenged.

Section 7 of
the Aadhaar Act provides that the Government, for the purpose of establishing
identity of an individual as a condition for receipt of a subsidy, benefit or
service, may require that such individual undergo authentication,or furnish
proof of possession of Aadhaar number, or in the case of an individual to whom
no Aadhaar number has been assigned, such individual makes an application for
enrolment. The proviso to this section states that if an Aadhaar number is not
assigned to an individual, the individual shall be offered alternate and viable
means of identification for delivery of the subsidy, benefit or service.

Therefore,
the very basis of the Aadhaar Act was that Aadhaar is optional, only for
purposes of subsidies, benefits or services, and that alternative and viable
means of identification should also be offered to persons who did not have
Aadhaar number.
Given
this, without amending the Aadhaar Act, is the Government justified in making
it mandatory under other laws?  Of course,
in Binoy Viswam’s case, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the
requirement u/s.139AA of the Income Tax Act to link every PAN with the Aadhaar
number, justifying it on the ground of the need to check corruption and black
money, to tackle the problems of terrorism and crime and to ensure that
subsidies reach the right person. This decision was rendered subject to the
issue pending before the Supreme Court on whether the right to privacy, which
may be violated by the requirement of furnishing Aadhaar, was a fundamental
right under the Constitution.

A nine-judge
bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy vs. Union
of India, has now held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under
the Constitution. It has further held that an invasion of life or personal
liberty must meet the three-fold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates
the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate state aim;
and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects
and the means adopted to achieve them. The Supreme Court further held:

 “We commend to the Union Government the need to
examine and put into place a robust regime for data protection. The creation of
such a regime requires a careful and sensitive balance between individual
interests and legitimate concerns of the State. The legitimate aims of the
State would include for instance protecting national security, preventing and
investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the spread of knowledge, and
preventing the dissipation of social welfare benefits. These are matters of
policy to be considered by the Union government while designing a carefully
structured regime for the protection of the data.”

While the legal
position of whether the requirements of mandatorily linking bank accounts, PAN
and mobile SIMs to Aadhaar violate this right to privacy would be taken up by the Supreme
Court in November 2017, other questions as to whether this is the right
approach by the Government do arise.

From a
situation where Indian residents are informed that Aadhaar is optional, to make
it compulsory under other laws may be legally correct, but is it morally
correct? Does this backdoor approach not amount to misleading the public? First
asking citizens to obtain Aadhaar which is meant to give benefits under social
schemes, then, steadily making Aadhaar mandatory for one thing after another!
Is it morally correct to burden citizens, especially those outside most social
benefit schemes to mandatorily quote Aadhaar in spite of them having obtained
PAN and other KYC registrations?

Again, in
law, Aadhaar was meant to ensure targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits and
services by the Government. What is the subsidy, benefit or service provided by
the Government when I file my tax returns, operate my bank account, use my
mobile phone or purchase jewellery exceeding Rs.50,000? Should not the
Government first amend the Aadhaar law, clarify the complete purpose of
Aadhaar, define benefits to every citizen and the State, put a security
apparatus in place for those who are keeping this identity information, and
then implement these requirements?

Viewed from the
perspective of observance of the right to privacy, versus the legitimate
concerns of the State, one can understand the need to link bank accounts with
Aadhaar ((e.g. to check money laundering). But what is the compelling need to
link mobile numbers or driving licences or death certificates with Aadhaar? One
can understand that this will help improve governance in these areas, or help
in tracing persons. But is this so necessary that it overshadows the right to
privacy? In almost all countries, obtaining a SIM card is an easy process, and
one does not need a domestic national identity proof / social security number
to obtain a SIM card. Is this therefore a case of overkill?

Through these
requirements, the Government is effectively making Aadhaar mandatory. Today, a
mobile phone is almost a necessity, a driving licence ensures that you can move
around even in the absence of efficient public transport, and it is not
possible to carry out some basic economic transactions without a bank account,
given the restrictions on cash payments. So a person is left with no choice but
to compromise his right to privacy in order to obtain an Aadhaar number due to
these requirements. What was meant to give benefits is now an impediment to
deny basic benefits citizens are entitled to and pay for!

There is also
the problem of the exceptional cases. Many senior citizens are unable to have
their fingerprints captured, due to their fingerprints being flattened and
faded by old age. They are unable to obtain Aadhaar, even if they have the
desire to do so. How do non-residents obtain SIM cards for use during their
visits to India without an Aadhaar number, for which they are not eligible?
Non-resident accounts obviously cannot comply with the requirement of linking
their bank accounts to Aadhaar. The Government in the past has come in for a
lot of flak for implementing schemes in haste without proper planning or
considering all the ramifications. The same fate should not befall this
initiative. Therefore, all these exceptions need to be thought through and
exemptions provided for, just as was done in the case of linking of PAN to
Aadhaar.

Given the large
number of hacking incidents involving hitherto thought safe databases (such as
Equifax) that one reads about, and given the different places at which the
Aadhaar numbers would be provided, the likelihood of leakage of Aadhaar data is
quite high. Should the Government not provide in the law for insurance or
compensation to persons affected by any such leak? After all, it is at the
behest of the Government that one is being forced to obtain and provide an
Aadhaar number.

Lastly, should
not a citizen, who just wants to comply with the law, and lead a quiet, decent
and private life without much Government interference, be allowed to do so? Can
we really see a situation of “less Government, more governance” graduate from
just being a slogan, to becoming a reality in our lifetimes?

Fear

‘We have nothing to fear but fear itself’.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Fear, it appears in the second nature of a
human-being. We live our lives in fear. Let us list a few ‘fears’

Fear of failure

Fear of parents – peers

Fear of Society

Fear of hell

Fear of death and above all

Fear of God

The
question is : why is it that fear dominates our lives. It is because we
are indoctrinated into ‘fear’ since our birth – it is sub-consciously instilled
in us. ‘Fear’ also stems from negative thinking. On the other hand, if properly
viewed fear can be a great motivator. Let us examine how : ‘fear of
failure’ can and should motivate us to work hard and succeed, ‘fear of parents
– peers’ – their criticism and castigation should motivate us to good action,
same should be the case with ‘fear of Society’ and ‘fear of hell’ should
motivate us to live a righteous life. As everyone likes to be immortalised and
is conscious that death is a certainty – ‘fear of death’ should motivate us to
achieve the impossible, namely, act with the purpose of serving selflessly.
This service society recognises as leaving ‘footprints on the sands of time’ –
for example – actions of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Abraham
Lincoln, Chanakya, Alexander, Edison, Einstein and many more. All of them would
have harboured some fears including fear of failure, but they converted ‘fear’
into a motivator and it is for all of us to see what they achieved. ‘Fear’
for them ceased to be ‘fear’
– result – they have left ?foot prints on
the sands of time’.

The
fear that amazes me is ‘fear of GOD’. Rumi says God’s message to mankind
is : ‘Love me, fear me not’. Yet it is an achievement of human mind to
have converted an object – nay – fountain of love into an element of fear. GOD
in all religions is gracious, yet we have, consciously and
unconsciously, been taught to live in fear of HIM. W. B. Yeats proclaims : ‘GOD
that frightens is no GOD’
. Hence, there should be no fear of GOD.

The
question is : What is the answer to ‘fear’. I would say challenge the fear –
face it. I also believe, fear can be conquered with knowledge. Emerson guides us
‘the wise man in the storm prays to God, not for safety from danger, but for
deliverance from fear’
. Robin Sharma recommends – ‘walk towards your
fear
’. In other words, altering our attitude and perceptions of fear we
can convert ‘fear’ into ‘love’. Instead of being afraid, let us start loving
all those we are afraid off – in essence start loving ‘fear’ itself. Fear like
love is a reaction – emotion which arises in the mind. So let us make an
effort to change our thinking to replace ‘fear’ with ‘love’. Every fear
including all the ‘fears’ herein can be converted into Love. However, the
apparent contradiction is conversion of ‘fear of hell’ into ‘Love for hell’.
I think this should be the easiest because once there is no fear of hell – hell
ceases to exist. It has been rightly said ‘love has no place for fear’.

I
conclude by quoting Dada Vaswani :

‘Love is what we are born with, fear is what
we learn here’

So let
us stop fearing ‘fear’ and start loving our ‘fears’.

Author’s
note: I ask myself, have I overcome my ‘fears’ – the honest answer is : most
yes and some no – but the journey continues.

Questions on GST

Issue 1: Should
the revenue be presented gross or net of GST under Ind AS?

 Paragraph 8 of Ind AS 18 Revenue states as below:

 “Revenue includes only the gross
inflows of economic benefits received and receivable by the entity on its own
account. Amounts collected on behalf of third parties such as sales taxes,
goods and services taxes and value added taxes are not economic benefits which
flow to the entity and do not result in increases in equity.”

An entity collects GST on behalf of the government and not on its own
account. Hence, it should be excluded from revenue, i.e., revenue should be net
of GST. This view is consistent with the guidance given in the Guidance note on
Ind AS Schedule III issued by ICAI and will apply irrespective of pricing
arrangement with customers, say, fixed prices inclusive or exclusive of GST. It
may be noted that GST net presentation does not impact the presentation of
excise collected from customers and paid to the government for periods till 30th
June 2017. Excise duty will be included in revenue and presented as an expense
in accordance with Ind AS principles.

Issue 2: How
should a company treat the GST paid on raw material/ finished goods inventory
purchased and available as GST input tax credit? Should it be included in
valuation of inventory at the quarter/ year-end?

Paragraph 11 of Ind AS 2 Inventories states as below for
refundable taxes:

“The costs of purchase of inventories
comprise the purchase price, import duties and other taxes (other than those
subsequently recoverable by the entity from the taxing authorities), and
transport, handling and other costs directly attributable to the acquisition of
finished goods, materials and services.”

Thus, only those taxes are included as costs of inventory which are not
subsequently recoverable by the company from taxation authorities. Since
GST paid on raw material/ finished goods inventory purchased is available for
set-off against the GST payable on sales or is refundable, it is in the nature
of taxes recoverable from taxation authorities. Accordingly, input tax paid
should not be included in the costs of purchase, to the extent
utilisable/refundable.

On similar lines, Ind AS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE)
requires that the cost of an item of PPE comprises – purchase price, including
import duties and non-refundable purchase taxes,
after deducting trade
discounts and rebates (emphasis added). Hence, similar accounting will
apply to the GST Input Credit available on purchase of items of PPE. To the
extent not utilisable/refundable, the same may be included in cost of goods
sold, inventory or PPE as the case may be.

Issue 3: How is
GST paid on inter-branch transfers accounted for? It is assumed that sales
depots have obtained requisite registration and other documents. Hence, they
will be able to obtain full credit for GST paid on supply of goods.

For reasons already mentioned (refer issue 2), the valuation of
inventory at the branches should not include GST. The GST paid on branch
transfer of inventory should be reflected under an appropriate account such as
“GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable Account.”

Issue 4: As on
30th June 2017, the factory is holding substantial stock of
inventory on which no excise duty is paid, since those were not cleared from
the factory. How should the company value such inventory and the input tax
credit (ITC) on the inputs for manufacturing the inventory?

1.  Since excise duty is not payable on such inventory (as per
notification of CBEC), no provision for excise duty is required. Consequently,
the inventory valuation will not include excise duty.

 2.  After 30th June, the Company will pay GST on supply.

 3. The ITC credit on procurement for manufacturing the inventory will
be recorded as GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable Account, provided the
Company has adequate documentation and is reasonably certain of receiving the
ITC.

Issue 5: As on
30th June 2017, the sales depot of the entity is holding substantial
stock of inventory on which excise duty was paid, since those goods were
cleared from the factory. How should the company value such inventory and the
excise duty paid? The Company is entitled to ITC subject to submission of
proper documents. The Company has sufficient documentation available.

Paragraph 11 of Ind AS 2 Inventories states as below for
refundable taxes:

“The costs of purchase of inventories
comprise the purchase price, import duties and other taxes (other than those
subsequently recoverable by the entity from the taxing authorities), and
transport, handling and other costs directly attributable to the acquisition of
finished goods, materials and services.”

Since the tax is a recoverable tax, inventory lying at the depot should
be valued at net of excise duty paid to the extent the company will be able to
receive ITC. The corresponding ITC should be reflected under the other
appropriate account such as “GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable Account.”

Issue 6: After
initial recognition, how should the “GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable
Account” be treated in the financial statements?

Balances in the GITC Receivable Account, pertaining to both inputs and
PPE, should be reviewed at the end of each reporting period. If it is found
that the balances or a portion thereof are not likely to be used in the normal
course of business or not refundable (even in inverted duty structure), then,
notwithstanding the right to carry forward such excess credit under GST Law,
the non-useable excess credit should be adjusted in the financial statements.
The irrecoverable input credit should generally be added to COGS or inventory
or PPE, as applicable.

In some cases, it may so happen that the company is not able to avail
input credit for reasons such as: it has not got proper registration, not
maintained proper documentation or not filed proper returns or the vendor has
not uploaded credit. In such cases, GST Input Credit disallowance is in the
nature of expense for the company. The same should be written off to P&L
immediately.

It may be noted that GITC is not a financial
instrument;
hence Ind
AS 109 Financial Instruments is not applicable. Though impairment rules
of Ind AS 109 do not apply, the impairment rules of Ind AS 36 Impairment
of Assets
will apply.
Therefore, GITC that may not be recovered or
recovered after significant time period should be impaired for
non-recoverability and time value of money under Ind AS 36.

Issue 7: How should
a company present the “GITC Receivable Account” in the balance sheet?

The GITC Receivable Account represents an amount receivable due to
statutory right and against contractual right. Hence, it is a non-financial
asset and should be presented as such in the balance sheet.

The amount should be classified as current and non-current asset
depending upon the classification criteria as laid down under paragraph 66 of
the Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements and Ind AS compliant
Schedule III, viz., the following criteria. Particularly, the criteria at (a)
and (c) will be more critical.

‘An entity shall classify an asset as current when:

(a) It expects to realise the asset, or intends to sell or consume it,
in its normal operating cycle,

(b) It holds the asset primarily for the purpose of trading,

(c) It expects to realise the asset within twelve months after the
reporting period, or

(d) The asset is cash or a cash equivalent (as defined in Ind AS 7 Statement
of Cash Flows
) unless the asset is restricted from being exchanged or used
to settle a liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period.

 An entity shall classify all other assets as non-current.’

Issue 8: Under
the GST regime, dealers may face losses on their inventory at 30th
June; for example, ITC benefit may not be available with respect to certain
local taxes or cess. To compensate dealers for the losses, the manufacturing
company has decided to provide cash compensation to dealers. How should the
company treat such compensation to dealers, particularly whether it should be
reduced from revenue or shown as an expense?

Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Ind AS 18 provide as below:

“9. Revenue shall be measured at the
fair value of the consideration received or receivable.

 10. The amount of revenue arising on a
transaction is usually determined by agreement between the entity and the buyer
or user of the asset. It is measured at the fair value of the consideration
received or receivable taking into account the amount of any trade discounts
and volume rebates allowed by the entity.”

 Paragraph 18 of Ind AS 18 states as below:

 “18. Revenue is recognised only when it
is probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will
flow to the entity. In some cases, this may not be probable until the
consideration is received or until an uncertainty is removed. For example, it
may be uncertain that a foreign governmental authority will grant permission to
remit the consideration from a sale in a foreign country. When the permission
is granted, the uncertainty is removed and revenue is recognised. However, when
an uncertainty arises about the collectability of an amount already included in
revenue, the uncollectible amount or the amount in respect of which recovery
has ceased to be probable is recognised as an expense, rather than as an
adjustment of the amount of revenue originally recognised.”

 Based on the above, the following two views seem possible under Ind AS
18:

 (a) The cash compensation paid to dealer is effectively a cash incentive
paid by the company. This reduces consideration received/ receivable for sale
of goods and fair value thereof. Consequently, it should be reduced from
revenue since Ind AS 18 requires revenue to be recognised at fair value. This
would also be the view under Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with
Customers,
which requires any cash compensation paid to customer or
customer’s customer to be reduced from revenue.

 (b) The circumstances for compensation arising from the extraordinary
situation did not prevail at inception, when the original sale agreement was
signed between parties. At the time of recognition, there was no uncertainty
regarding the revenue receivable. Nor the company had any explicit/ implicit
obligation to provide cash compensation. Rather, the company has decided to
provide cash compensation to the dealer in exceptional circumstances arising
purely after recognition of the original sale transaction. This expense was
incurred to maintain harmony and good relationship with dealers and is not
reflective of the fair value of the revenue. The compensation should be seen as
a distinct activity from the original revenue. Thus,  it can be presented as an expense rather than
reduction from revenue.

The author believes that from an Ind AS 18 perspective, both the views
are acceptable.

Issue 9:
Consider that a company has entered into contract for supply of goods for INR
10,000 plus GST @ 18%, i.e., total invoice amount of INR 11,800. The sale
agreement involves deferred payment at the end of the 18th month. It
is a ‘zero percent’ financing arrangement. The management has determined that
the present value of sale consideration including GST amount discounted at
market rate of interest is INR 9,900. How will the company reflect this
transaction in the financial statements?

Though the company will recover the amount from the customer at a later
date, it needs to pay the GST immediately to the government. Consequently, the
company will pass the following entry to recognise sale/ supply of goods:

Debit
Receivable from customer

(discounted
amount)                       INR 9,900

Credit Sale of goods                       INR 8,100

Credit GST payable                         INR 1,800

Going forward, interest on receivable from customer will be recognised
using market rate of interest, i.e., the rate used for original discounting.

Issue 10:
Consider that the company has entered into fixed price construction contract
which includes all taxes at the rates prevailing when the agreement was signed.
No variation is allowed due to change in indirect tax rates. Due to
applicability of GST, the taxes applicable on the company have increased. How
should the company reflect such impact in its financial statements?

GST   is pass   through on the company, i.e., the company
collects GST on behalf of the government. Hence, revenue should be net of GST
Payable to the government, irrespective of the 
fact  that the company has signed
an all-inclusive  contract with its
customers. Consequently, the increase in tax rate due to the GST
applicability which cannot be absorbed by customer will reduce overall
construction revenue/margins.
The company should reflect such reduction as
change in estimate while determining construction revenue/margins to be
recognised based on Ind AS 11 Construction Contracts principles. The
company will make Ind AS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting
Estimates and Errors
disclosures related to change in estimate. If due
to increase in the GST rate, the overall contract has become loss making, Ind
AS 11 would require an expected loss on the construction contract to be
recognised as an expense.

Issue 11: How
does the introduction of GST impact indirect tax incentive schemes such as
advance authorisation/ EPCG schemes and various export promotion schemes under
the foreign trade policy (FTP)? How should these schemes be accounted for under
Ind AS and GST regime?

At the time of writing this article, the status of indirect tax
incentive schemes under the GST regime is not very clear. It is expected that
the Government will introduce appropriate changes in the law/ foreign trade
policy to clarify these impact.

Based on non-authoritative FAQs issued by the Finance Ministry, the
following applies:

 As
the GST Law stands today, while the exporters will continue to get the benefit
of BCD (Basic Custom Duty) exemption, the Integrated GST (IGST) that has
replaced CVD (Countervailing duty) and SAD (Special Additional Duty) is not
exempt. This would mean the importer will have to pay IGST and claim refund or
utilise it against output liability, if any. Midterm review of the Foreign
Trade Policy is likely to align FTP with GST. Representation has been made to
allow IGST exemption in case of Advance Authorisation, EPCG and other such
benefits. IGST paid would be presented as GITC Receivable Account.

  The benefit of Merchandise Exports from India
Scheme (MEIS) and Service Exports from India Scheme (SEIS) for its utilisation
against procurement tax (earlier Central excise and Service tax) is no longer
available under GST. However, they may be utilised to pay basic custom duty or
additional duties of customs not covered under GST.

   Therefore, MEIS and SEIS scripts at 30th June, may be
usable. The entity will have to evaluate the extent to which it can be used.
Since the scripts are also transferable, the possibility of utilisation is
high. To the extent it cannot be used, or refund is not available, the same
will have to be written off.

  There
is no clarity in respect of State incentives or Package schemes and the
Area-based exemptions made available to industry, which had made investment in
the state. Fact remains that under GST, the exemption could be only by way of
refund or utilisation of tax credit after paying tax. For example, in a State,
the entity may be entitled to sales tax exemption for a certain number of
years. Under GST, the entity will have to pay GST, and claim refund of SGST
from the State Government. The entity will have to evaluate the extent to which
they will be able to receive refund; to the extent refund is not available,
impairment would be required.

This is an area where the companies should maintain a close watch.
Further clarity on this matter will emerge in the near future.

The author believes that accounting impact on such incentive schemes can
be analysed in detail only after clarity from the Government. In the interim,
the related principles in Ind AS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and
Disclosure of Government Assistance
will continue to apply to these
schemes.

If the government does not provide incentive schemes which were
previously available to the company, then this may indicate an impairment of
assets/ onerous contracts. Consequently, it is imperative that the companies
evaluate the impact of applying Ind AS 36 Impairment of Assets and Ind
AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets carefully.

Issue 12: At
the time of dispatch of goods, a company raises an invoice and incurs GST
liability. Does that automatically result in revenue recognition under Ind AS?

Under Ind AS 18, revenue from the sale of goods shall be recognised when
all the following conditions have been satisfied:

(a) the entity has
transferred to the buyer the significant risks and rewards of ownership of the
goods;

(b) the entity retains
neither the continuing managerial involvement to the degree usually associated
with ownership nor the effective control over the goods sold;

(c) the amount of revenue
can be measured reliably;

(d) it is probable that the
economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity; and

(e) the costs incurred or
to be incurred in respect of the transaction can be measured reliably.

It may so happen that an
invoice is raised and
GST liability is incurred, but because the above conditions are not fulfilled,
revenue cannot be recognised under
Ind AS.

GST – implementation – Practical difficulties – need for appropriate Guidance

September 1st 2017

To,

Shri Hasmukh Adhia, Revenue Secretary,

The Government of India,

Ministry of Finance,

(Department of Revenue, Central Board of
Excise & Customs)

New Delhi

 

Dear Sir,


GST Implementation –
Practical Difficulties – Need for appropriate Guidance

A.  Registration:

1. Section 22 of CGST Act
states “(1)Every supplier shall be liable to be registered under this Act in
the State or Union territory, other than special category States, from where he
makes a taxable supply of goods or services or both, if his aggregate turnover
in a financial year exceeds……”

     There is wide spread
confusion about the phrase “from where he makes a taxable supply of goods or
services”. Different interpretations are being given by Central authorities and
State authorities. It is requested that either the terminology may kindly be
defined in the Act itself or appropriate guidance may kindly be provided in
this regard so that the Taxable Persons can comply with the requirements
accordingly.

2.     Many dealers, who were already registered under the earlier laws,
have not been able to migrate due to various difficulties: one of them is
difference in PAN in the records of authorities and real PAN. They should be
permitted to migrate the registration with effect from 1st July 2017
by bringing in suitable amendments in the portal. The time limit for making
application for migration by such persons may be provided to be 30 days from
the introduction of this functionality on the portal.

3.  There are certain
sectors, which have come into the GST net for the first time (they were not
liable for VAT or Service Tax earlier). Many of them have already applied for
registration, but their applications are still pending for approval, all such
applications may kindly be cleared at the earliest. And those who have not yet
been able to apply due to any kind of confusion or due to non working or slow
working of website or for any other reason, may kindly be permitted to apply
for registration w.e.f. 1st July 2017. The time limit for making
application by such persons may be stipulated to be 30th September
2017.

4.     It may be noted that unless registration is granted to such
persons, they may not be able to issue Tax Invoice. Thus, will not be able to
pay tax and submit returns etc.

5.   Further, in many cases
where application has been made before 30th July for new
registration, certificates have been issued granting registration w.e.f. the
date of granting registration, instead of date of liability. The online filing utility
for GSTR-3B does not allow such dealers to submit return for the month of July.
It may be necessary to issue general instruction for all such cases that their
registration should be made effective from 1st July 2017 and that
the portal should accept invoices of the earlier date.

B. Submission of Returns and
Payment of Taxes:

     Present provisions under
the GST laws provide filing monthly returns by all tax payers whether small or
big. (Except those who have opted for composition scheme). And such returns
have to be filed in three parts on three different dates. Several restrictions
have been prescribed whereby if a person wishes to submit required information
earlier than the due date, he cannot do so. This is creating greatest unrest
among the small and medium enterprises. It may be imperative for the Government
to mitigate the hardship likely to be caused to all such taxable persons.

    It looks like that
suggestions made by various trade associations in this regard have been
ignored. If your good selves have a look at the provisions in GST laws
worldwide, you will appreciate that all such countries who have successfully
implemented GST have ensured much easier compliance by the tax payers. However,
our country has chosen such a rigid time frame and in such a manner, which is
practically impossible to comply with on regular basis. Kindly consider the
time and energy which will be required for such kind of compliance by SMEs
every month throughout the year.

     It is requested
therefore, Chapter IX of the CGST Act regarding submission of returns etc. may
kindly be revisited. (Suggestion made by various associations may kindly be
considered and/or the provisions may kindly be made on the lines of similar
provisions under the laws of various other countries who have successfully
implemented VAT such as EU VAT, Australian VAT or Singapore VAT, etc.)

     It is also observed that
many functionalities on the portal are still not operational. The trade and
industry will need at least 30 days to understand the nuances of the portal
since it is the first time of operation. Therefore, it is suggested that the
due dates of filing of various returns be decided at least 30 days after the
respective functionalities are opened on the portal.

   Further, the
offline/online utility should be provided in such a manner that GSTR-3 is
simultaneously generated from information contained in GSTR-1 and GSTR-2.

     Form GSTR-3B requires a
taxable person to report “supplies made to composition dealer”. As the
compliance of such a requirement looks almost impossible, the Form may kindly
be amended accordingly.

     The due date for payment
of tax may remain same i.e. within 20 days from the end of month.

C. Reverse Charge Mechanism:

   Another major area of
concern to all the tax payers (whether big or small) is provisions contained in
section 9(4) of the CGST Act (supplies received from un-registered persons),
coupled with section 31(3)(f) and the condition that the liability under
reverse charge has to be first paid in cash and the credit thereof (if
eligible) can be claimed thereafter.

     Section 9 “(4) The
central tax in respect of the supply of taxable goods or services or both, by a
supplier who is not registered, to a registered person shall be paid by such
person on reverse charge basis as the recipient and all the provisions of this
Act shall apply to such recipient as if he is the person liable for paying the
tax in relation to the supply of such goods or services or both.”

    Section 31(3) “(f)a
registered person who is liable to pay tax under sub-section(3) or sub-section
(4) of section 9 shall issue an invoice in respect of goods or services or both
received by him from the supplier who is not registered on the date of receipt
of goods or services or both;”

    Respected Sirs, there is
an urgent need to kindly have a look into the provision once again. How much
revenue does the Government expect from such a provision? It will be the most
cumbersome job for the tax payers calculating liability on account of all such
supplies received from ‘un-registered persons’, issuing an invoice for all such
supplies, calculation of tax for each item at respective rate, payment thereof
and thereafter again claiming credit of the same amount as ITC. It may the most
time-consuming exercise for all taxable persons throughout the country,
resulting into almost no additional revenue to the Government and undue burden
of cash outflow on the Tax Payer. It may also result into a tool of harassment
at assessment and audit proceedings. It is requested that such provisions must
be avoided.

    Till necessary amendment
is done in the Act, the applicability of section 9(4) may kindly be kept in
abeyance, or, permission may kindly be granted to discharge the liability
through the Electronic Credit Ledger to the extent credit is available in
respect of such supplies received from un-registered suppliers in the same tax
period.

D. Time of Supply:

     Section 12(2) of CGST
Act may need appropriate amendment to provide ease of compliance.

E. Place of Supply:

     Considering
the complexities involved in the provisions, it is requested that a Guidance
Note may kindly be issued for appropriate compliance by Taxable Persons. It may
be noted that there are different views expressed by the concerned authorities
and leading consultants in respect of various kinds of transactions of supply
of goods as well as in respect of supply of services.

F. Composition Schemes:

     World over composition
schemes are being encouraged for easier compliance by all those who are
generally supplying goods/services to consumers, but, the Composition Schemes
as provided under our laws contain too many conditions and restrictions whereby
all those who really want to opt for composition cannot do so. It is suggested
that:

1. The turnover limit of
Composition scheme for manufacturers and retailers may kindly be raised to
Rupees 150 lakhs (from present limit of Rs. 75/50 lakhs).

2. The Composition Scheme
for hotels (restaurants, eating houses and caterers) should be permitted to all
such establishments without any limit of turnover. It will provide a great
relief to all those people who are dependent on such eating houses for their
daily meals. As the rate of composition under this scheme is kept at 5%, which
is much higher than other composition schemes, the suggestion may kindly be
considered in the interest of people in general.

G.         HSN Codes and
Rates of Tax:

1.   Although the Government
has not made it clear to the people that why it is necessary to mention HSN
code in respect of each and every supply of goods and why HSN code-wise summary
of intra state and interstate supplies is required to be reported in GSTR-1 and
GSTR-2, in this connection, kindly have a look at the rates of tax prescribed
through various rate schedules, items falling under same HSN code (2 digits and
4 digits) may be liable to tax under 2 or 3 different rate schedules. The
registered tax payers are maintaining rate wise bifurcation of each outward
supply as well as inward supply. Further bifurcation thereof into HSN codes and
service accounting codes may result into a much complicated accounting and the
same may lead to various kinds of errors in reporting. It is requested that HSN
code-wise reporting may kindly be kept in abeyance for the time being (at least
during first two years of implementation).

 2. The Rate Schedules may have to be thoroughly reviewed. In the
present set up it is likely to raise a large number of classification disputes,
which must be avoided for having it to be a just and fair law.

H. FAQs and Replies through
Twitter:

    It should be made clear
to all those concerned that whether replies given through Twitter can be
considered as official reply of the Department and if someone has followed the
same whether he will be protected from levy of additional tax, fine and
penalties.   

Thanking you

Yours sincerely,

 

For
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,

                                                                                 

 

Narayan
Pasari                                                           Deepak
R. Shah              

President                                                                    Chairman
– Indirect Tax Committee

Intimation Issued Under Section 143(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961…

24th August 2017

To,

Mr. Sushil Chandra, Chairman

Central Board of Direct Taxes,

North Block,

New Delhi

 Dear Mr. Chandra

 

Sub: 1)
Intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’)
displays mismatch of income without detailed analysis or reconciliation of income tax
returns filed by assessees.

 

            2) Challenges and potential consequences in
relation to returns processed by CPC

 

On behalf of our members
and on behalf of thousands of affected tax payers of the country, we would like
to bring to your kind attention some serious issues which have been brought to
our notice by some of our members on the captioned subject.

 

1.  Issuance of intimation under section 143(1) of the Act without
detailed analysis

It is noted that while
issuing Intimations issued u/s. 143(1) for A.Y. 2016-17, in a large number of
cases, notices have been sent to tax payers pointing out alleged discrepancies
in the income shown in the return of income. These notices are based on a
reconciliation done by the CPC between Form 26AS, Form 16 (in case of salaried
tax payers) and the figures reflected in the ITR forms. In most cases, the
notices state that the difference between the figure as per the ITR and the
figure as per Form 16 / 26AS represents under reported income or over reported
deductions and therefore adjustments will be made in the Intimation to be
issued u/s. 143(1).

Some of the sample
adjustments that have been proposed to be made in several cases are given
below:


a.  Denial of Allowances, Deductions and extra additions made at the
issuance in Income Tax Return

 

a.1 Allowances
which are exempt under section 10(14)(ii) of the Act read with Rule 2BB of the
Income-tax Rules,1962 (‘the Rules’),claimed in the
Income-tax return has been disallowed since the same has not been considered in Form 16 issued to the
assesses say Transport Allowance

 

a.2 Chapter
VI- A deductions- mainly u/s. 80C, 80D and 80TTA have been denied on the ground
that the same are not reflected in the Form 16.

It is respectfully
submitted that these types of comparisons are completely unfair and unwarranted
u/s. 143(1). First of all, Form 16 cannot be made the basis for computing the
total income of an assessee. At best, the salary income can be verified with
the Form 16. An assessee has every right to claim deductions and/or exemptions
if he/she is entitled to do so under the Income-tax Act even if the same are
not reflected in the Form 16. It may be appreciated that issuance of Form 16 is
not in the control of a salaried person. It is done by the employer. If an
employer makes a mistake or if an employer provides incomplete information in
the Form 16, that cannot be taken as the basis for making upward adjustments in
an employee’s total income. In any case, deduction u/s. 80TTA can never form
part of Form 16 since it is a deduction in respect of interest on savings bank
account. This deduction will never appear in the Form 16 unless the employee
has provided details of his income from savings bank account to his employer.

Further, it is common
knowledge that many times, employees prefer to pay advance tax on their non
salary income instead of disclosing the said income to the employer and getting
a TDS done from that income by the employer. This stand is taken across the
country by thousands of employees. There could be various reasons for this. One
very strong reason for taking such a stand is to protect the privacy of one’s
other income from the employer. In such cases, the income as well as deductions
claimed under Chapter VI-A against such income will not appear in the Form 16.

It is respectfully
submitted that proposing adjustments to the income based on such a comparison
will only add to the problems faced by taxpayers. This is in stark contrast to
the Finance Minister’s repeated statements that the government would like to
make tax laws simple and easy to comply with, for taxpayers.

As regards the exemptions
like transport allowance, there are multiple situations where the Form 16
generated by an employer is not accurate in all respects. Often, employers show
only net taxable salary income in the e-TDS statements and Form 16 instead of
showing the gross separately and the exemptions separately. On the other hand,
an employee, while filing his own return, would show the correct amounts (i.e.
gross and exemptions). In such cases, the employee cannot be penalised because
of the lapse of the employer. At the end of it, the employer has every right to
disclose his true and correct income in the return.

 

b.  Amounts on which Tax is Collected at Source is being considered as
Other Income

In certain cases, the
seller of certain goods has to collect tax at source and pay it to the
government. This TCS appears in the Form 26AS of the tax collector. In several
cases, it has been brought to our notice that the gross amount (on which the
seller has collected the tax at source) is being added to the total income of
such person based on Part B of Form 26AS which displays the details of tax
collected at source (TCS) by the seller.

           

c.  Notice u/s. 139(9) of the Act

In a large number of cases,
tax payers have received notices u/s. 139(9) stating that the return filed is
defective. In such cases, the reason given for such a stand is that certain
amounts as shown in the ITR in the fields of income do not match with the
amounts shown in the ITR in the Balance Sheet / Profit & Loss Account
fields.

In this regard, certain
examples brought to our notice by some of our members are given below:

Case
one:  

When a taxpayer has Capital
Gains which is credited to the Profit & Loss Account, the same is reduced
from the figure of Net Profit in the computation and then offered for tax under
the head “Capital Gains”. The amount that is reduced from the Net Profit as per
Profit & Loss Account would be the book profit. On the other hand, the
amount of capital gains offered for tax in the return would be as computed
under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, in case of long term
capital gains, the gain offered to tax would be indexed gain which would
naturally be different from the figure of book profit.

In such genuine cases also,
the income tax return has been treated as defective return under section 139(9)
of the Act to the extent of mismatch between the schedules of Business Profit
with reference to CG schedule.

Case two:

The Income tax return has
been rejected on the basis of difference between schedules of Business Profit
and Income from Other Source as illustrated hereunder:

Actual facts of the case –
income earned by Mr. A

 

Sr.
No.

Particulars

Amount (Rs.)

Amount (Rs.)

1.

Net
Profit as per Profit & Loss Account (includes Interest income of parent)

 

       
35,000

 

 

 

 

2.

Other
Sources

 

 

 

Interest
Income

 

 

 

Parent

10,000

 

 

Minor’s
income (which would obviously not be credited to P&L Account of the
parent)

15,000

 

 

 

 

           
25,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  Thus, in the above example,
the gross income of the assessee would be as under:

 

Business
Income (35,000 less 10,000) =

Rs. 25,000

Income
from Other Sources (own + minor’s income)

Rs. 25,000

Total

Rs. 50,000

 

 

In the return of income
filed by Mr. A, the above data would be shown as under. As against this, the
last column shows the stand that the CPC is taking while processing the
returns:

 

Particulars

As
per Return

Stand
taken by CPC

Business
Profits

35,000

 

Less:
Interest Income – Parent

            
10,000

Mismatch
of Interest income offered under other sources as reduced from Business
Income.

Net
Business Income

            
25,000

 

 

 

 

Other
Sources

 

 

Interest
Income

 

 

Parent

10,000

 

Minor’s
income

15,000

 

Total
Income from Other Sources

         
25,000

Interest
income offered for tax is not matching with interest income reduced from
Schedule Business Profits

Gross
Income

50,000

 

Thus, in such cases, while
processing the return, non-existent defects are pointed out by the CPC and the
return is treated as defective. 

Case
three:

In Form ITR 1 – Income from
salary (net) has to be mentioned in Part B. On the other hand, the employer is
required to show gross salary, various exemptions (like HRA, LTA) and the net
taxable salary in the TDS return filed in Form 24. As a result, Form 26AS shows
gross salary based on the TDS return filed by the employer. 


In such cases, the income
tax return has been treated as defective return under section 139(9) of the Act
due to the mismatch of salary income shown in ITR 1 and Form 26AS. It may be appreciated
that in such cases, the tax payer cannot, even if he wants to, show the gross
salary and the deductions/exemptions separately in ITR 1.

In ITR 2, in salary
schedule, gross salary, exempt allowances and net salary can be shown and hence
139(9) notices are not received if ITR 2 is filed.

 

2. Challenges and potential
consequences in relation to returns processed by CPC

Quoting from the maiden
budget speech of the Hon’ble Finance Minister in 2014 “……I would like to convey
to this August House and also the investors community at large that we are
committed to provide a stable and predictable taxation regime that would be
investor friendly and spur growth….”.

However, receipt of notices
of defective returns as mentioned in preceding paragraphs not only negate the
stated objective of the government but also create huge challenges and hardship
on the affected assessees. In this process, the good work done by the
income-tax department of expeditious disbursement of refunds in several cases
goes unnoticed and the negativity created by such wrongful and inappropriate
adjustments / proposed adjustments to the income overshadows the minds of tax
payers.

We humbly request your goodself
to resolve the issues and issue necessary directions to the CPC so that before
issuing any notices to the assessees, proper care is taken and unnecessary
hardship is not caused to tax payers.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

 

For
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,

                                                                                 

 

Narayan R.
Pasari                                                       Ameet
N. Patel                

President                                                                      Chairman,
Taxation Committee

There is No Competition…(If you Decide to) Create Your Own Niche

Professional
service firms need to recognise that you don’t need to compete to grow; what
you need is to work towards creating your own niche.

 The niche firm

Those who think they can create a specialist professional service
firm…….……………………..will be the ones who in all probability will.

The niche professional service firm

Today
competitive advantage is defined as the leverage a business has over another.
In simple words, to show being better than the competitor/s. Businesses develop
attributes that differentiate their goods and services through price, quality
and such other features.

Does
one need to really compete in the professional services firm market? Shouldn’t
work be referred to oneself or one’s firm by someone who has been a satisfied
client. This is an age old truth of the professions; yet it is seldom
understood in its purest form.

At the
core of the profession lies knowledge and the abundance of it. And
professionals who excel are normally those who do that ‘one thing’ right. Over
and over and over again. In doing so, they learn so much and improvise
consistently. They reach such a level in their thought process that their final
output is hard to match, or even to come close to, by other professionals. It
is their calling. Their finesse and passion that creates what we call
“expertise”. Once expertise is developed, two things can happen. Professionals
can bask in their glory, develop complacency of what I would say ‘intellectual
arrogance’ and wane over a period of time. Or, for the select minority, they
would rise and rise and reach a level of sublimity that is seldom seen. The
latter is the one who creates new milestones, raises the bar, and develops new
frameworks, new models and new competencies that professionals would follow in
the years ahead.

Those
who succeed in their profession, have done so because they concentrated on
getting that one thing right. And they persevered till they succeeded. And then
moved on to continuously raising the bar, the depth of their advice, the
alternatives that one could explore and charted the unknown. It is they who the
world has recognised and rewarded. They have truly created, what we call, a
‘niche professional service firm’ out of years of demonstrated expertise,
research and perseverance.

Clients don’t need to be sought by a niche firm. Clients will find their
way to expertise, themselves.
They will
be referred to the expert. Just like if one needs a knee replacement surgeon,
one would normally ask “do you know who is the best in the business?” Patients
who need these surgeries dread even the thought of something going wrong and
they losing their mobility for life. “Is he good with post-operative care?”;
“How many surgeries has he conducted?”; “What is his success rate?”; “What
happens if something goes wrong – how will he and his team help me?”. These and
others are very natural questions that would come. The expert surgeon will give
a calm, composed and articulated, yet clear, response to each question and
more. The patient and their families return home reassured that they are in
safe hands. The surgery goes smoothly. The post-operative recuperation and
physio goes well. Spot on. The patient is back on his feet. Expertise proven.
What happens next – “He is the best surgeon around…he did so and so..he said so
and so..I highly recommend him..” Haven’t we all heard this at some point in
time about some or the other professional. Does this professional need to worry
about growth? His diary is full, weeks in advance. That is what being a niche
expert does to one’s credibility and reputation.

This
is the point that one needs to reach, if one has to really scale and grow in a
professional service firm. Create your niche. Create a perception..a visible
perception..that you are an expert. And the world is yours. Sounds simple…?
Well, may not be as easy as it sounds.

Let’s
look at how others have done this.

What
are the challenges? What does it take? Does everyone have a shot at becoming an
expert? The answer to all of these question lie in the choices that one makes.
The pattern of rigour and research. The perseverance.

The
road is always so full of challenges. It is always tough.

Can
one find their calling in this narrow space? To start with, a professional
needs to identify his calling. What does he or she excel at? What efforts is he
or she making currently and willing to make to reach the pinnacle?

Let’s look at a few examples

Most
senior tax professionals regularly converge in speaking sessions, conferences,
workshops, seminars, firm level discussion groups, study groups or peer groups
to dissect and analyse any new change or a new law or a path breaking judgment
that impacts the tax practice. It is hard work, at their age, coupled with a
quest for learning new concepts, unlearning old ones at times, and continuous
realignment to the demands of the profession that makes them excel at what they
do. The fire is burning even at the age of 65 or 75 – it is that X factor that
“I want to be the best tax professional around” that keeps them going. They
have made their money in life, they have achieved everything in the profession
that one could possibly achieve, they have earned their stars and kept them
flying high for north of 40-50 years. And done things repeatedly well. They
have become the luminaries of the profession. The key reason – know your niche
and excel at it.  

Sachin
Tendulkar, known world over as the Maestro of Cricket, practiced at 5.30 am
even during his last season – in his 24th year of international
cricket. Did the coach tell him to do that – No!! Did the captain ask him to
prove his fitness – No!! Then what was it? Well, it was the innate desire to
give his best – each time, every time. A quest for perfection and excellence.
Nothing less. Not even 0.5% diminution in performance would do for him. It is
this hunger and passion that led him to become what he is – the highest run
scorer in the history of cricket in both forms of the game (tests and one days)
and 100 centuries – a record that is unlikely to be broken for a long long
time. So what was it?

Do we,
as professionals, have it in us to strive for excellence – each time, every
time. Can we burn the morning hours to keep ourselves fit, take care of our
health – physical and mental, create an environment in the firm that attracts
the best people, retains them and rewards them for performance? Excel at client
delivery and client servicing. Follow the principles of practice management to
the core. And, have a strategy of focusing on a niche and building on that
niche. If we can answer a YES to all of these, consistently, we would have created
a niche professional service firm, that one can be proud of. Then, one does not
need to really compete in the true sense. One can focus on excellence, and
clients will come – referred from various sources. All you got to do is deliver
your best; and that will keep on increasing the referrals coming your way.

 That
brings us to the following questions commonly asked by practitioners:

 

  How does a small or medium sized CA firm
create a niche?

 

Where does one start?

 For a
SME CA firm, here are some ideas and examples that could be used as reference
points:

 

1.  First, SME firms should change their mindset
and believe in themselves and their abilities. Developing a niche may sound
daunting; but in reality, it is not. It needs determination and strong will;
such that the resolve to learn, apply and practice is with the highest level of
motivation. Imagine preparing for the CA final exams – that is the only goal –
and that is to develop expertise in a particular subject. And excel in the
same, continuously – month on month, year on year. Impossible – not at all,
just needs hard work and concentration.

 

2.  Focus. Look at some of our practitioners of
Service Tax who have transitioned into the GST regime like a fish takes to
warmer waters. They have adapted to the new law, spent hours and hours decoding
the developments and updates from the GST council, with new rules coming out
almost on a daily/weekly basis, the client requisitions for conducting GST
impact studies and assisting in the transition process, the technology
challenges and so on. One may argue that they already had a Service Tax
practice; and in that sense, were a niche player. But, even then, GST is a new
law, an amalgam of sales tax/VAT and service tax and central excise; and it
takes perseverance and patience to unlearn and relearn. The fact that they had
a practice helped them to focus on the new law, without worrying about other
service lines. And that’s where CAs will need to strive to transition to. Do not
worry about all service lines. Focus on one and give off your best.

 

3.  For SME firms, with two or more partners, the
easiest thing would be for service areas to be split between partners. Everyone
should not be doing everything. Taxation – Indirect Taxation and Direct
Taxation, Audits – Statutory and Internal, Corporate Advisory – Lead Advisory
and Transaction Advisory, are all knowledge driven practice areas. To expect
one professional to do justice to both Direct and Indirect Taxation is an
outright misalignment. You do not have many all-rounders in any profession;
that’s a small breed. A vast majority are generalists and SMEs would do well to
allow individual partners to pick up one service area and run with it. This
will also create a case for consolidating practices and growing one’s own firms
with merging with like-minded firms. When you have more bandwidth at the
partner level, each partner can pick up an area that he is most wanting to
excel in and then run with it. The partner can then excel at the particular
service area, develop his own team and create a niche for the firm.

 

4.  Consolidation of practices is the name of the
game. The large international and national firms have all grown because they
have partners leading specific practice areas. Clients see the expertise and it
is over and over again demonstrated due to the depth of the partner concerned.
How can a normal CA firm compete with such a value proposition? The only real
answer lies in focusing on that one practice area. Start with making a
determined effort in an area and grow with the expectation that what you are
creating is a niche that will pay rich dividends over time. Get all the books,
practice manuals, databases, expert articles, world literature available on the
subject; make a conscious effort to study and understand the concept, adapt it
to the law in India or whichever jurisdiction you need to apply it; and start
practicing in the right earnest.

 

     There is no one right way to implement these ideas; each firm
will have to adapt itself to the marketplace based on its own philosophy and
strengths. Be market centric, customer focused and consistently develop,
enhance, communicate your niche area of expertise in a demonstrable manner.

 

            In
conclusion, all of these examples drive to that one key principle: one really
does not need to compete with other professionals. Just execute on creating
your own niche. Remember the story of Akbar asking Birbal to shorten a line
without rubbing it out? Birbal simply draws a larger line!

Liberalised Remittance Scheme

1.  Background

     Liberalised
Remittance Scheme [LRS / the Scheme] was introduced vide AP (DIR Series)
Circular No. 64 dated 4th February, 2004 read with Notification No.
207(E) dated 23rd March, 2004.

     LRS was
introduced as a liberalisation measure to facilitate resident individuals to
remit funds abroad for permitted capital or current account transactions or
combination of both.

     Presently, FED
Master Direction No. 7/ 2015-16 dated January 1, 2016 (updated as on 12th
April, 2017) [LRS Master Direction] and FAQs on LRS dated 11th August,
2016 [LRS FAQs], explain the provisions of the LRS.

2.  LRS Limit

    Currently,
under LRS, Authorised Dealers [ADs] may freely allow remittances by resident
individuals up to USD 2,50,000 per Financial Year (April-March) for any
permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both.

    Consistent
with prevailing macro and micro economic conditions, the LRS limit has been
revised in stages. During the period from February 4, 2004 till date, the LRS
limit has been revised as under:

 

Date

Feb 4, 2004

Dec 20, 2006

May 8, 2007

Sep 26, 2007

Aug 14, 2013

Jun 3, 2014

May 26, 2015

LRS limit (USD)

25,000

50,000

1,00,000

2,00,000

75,000

1,25,000

2,50,000

Subsumes
remittances for current account transactions

Previously, there
were separate limits in respect of current account transactions. With effect
from 26th May 2015, LRS limit was increased to USD 2,50,000 per FY.
The increased limit now also includes/subsumes remittance limit for current
account transactions available to resident individuals under Para 1 of Schedule
III to Current Account Transactions Rules, as amended.

Clause 1(ix) of
the Schedule III to Current Account Transactions Rules, provides ‘Any other
Current Account Transaction’. However, Current Account Transactions Rules do
not clarify the type of transactions that are covered under this residual
clause and also whether there will be separate limits for those transactions or
that they too will be subsumed within LRS limit. Specific RBI approval will be
required for any transaction above the LRS limit.

Consolidation
and Clubbing

Members of a family
can consolidate their individual remittances under the Scheme if each of the
individual family member complies with all the terms and conditions. However,
in case of capital account transactions such as opening a bank
account/investment/purchase of property, etc. consolidation by family members
is not permitted if the remitting family member is not a co-owner/co-partner in
the overseas bank account/investment/property. Apparently, this is because a
resident cannot draw foreign currency to make gift to another resident in
foreign currency even if such gift is made by way of credit to the latter’s
overseas foreign currency account held under LRS.

3.  Availability of the LRS

   LRS is available to all resident
individuals including minors
. In case of remitter being a minor, the Form
A2 must be countersigned by the minor’s natural guardian.

   LRS not available to Corporates,
Partnership firms, HUF, Trusts, etc.

  Remittance by sole proprietor under LRS

    In case of a
sole proprietorship business, there is no legal distinction between the
individual / owner and the business. Hence, the owner of the business (in his
personal name and not in the name of the business) can make remittance up to
the
permissible limit under LRS. If the owner of the sole proprietorship business
intends to remit the money from the bank account of the sole proprietorship
business, then the eligibility of the proprietor only in his individual
capacity should be considered. Hence, if an individual in his own capacity
remits USD 250,000 in a financial year under LRS, he cannot remit another USD
250,000 in his capacity as owner of the sole proprietorship business.

4.    Permissible/Prohibited
transactions under LRS

 4.1  Permissible
Capital Account Transactions

       Para A.6 of
the LRS Master directions provides that the permissible capital account
transactions by an individual under LRS are:

opening of foreign currency account abroad
with a bank;

purchase of property abroad;

making investments abroad – acquisition and
holding shares of both listed and unlisted overseas company or debt
instruments; acquisition of qualification shares of an overseas company for
holding the post of Director; acquisition of shares of a foreign company towards
professional services rendered or in lieu of Director’s remuneration;
investment in units of Mutual Funds, Venture Capital Funds, unrated debt
securities, promissory notes;

–   setting up Wholly Owned Subsidiaries and Joint
Ventures1 (with effect from August 05, 2013) outside India for bona
fide business subject to the terms & conditions stipulated in Notification
No. FEMA. 263/ RB-2013 dated March 5, 2013;

  extending loans including loans in Indian
Rupees to Non-resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in Companies
Act, 1956.

 4.2  Permissible
Current Account Transactions

       As
mentioned earlier, limit of USD 2,50,000 per FY subsumes earlier separate
limits for remittances under Current Account Transactions Rules (viz. private
visit; gift/donation; going abroad on employment; emigration; maintenance of
close relatives abroad; business trip; medical treatment abroad; studies
abroad). Release of foreign exchange exceeding USD 2,50,000, requires prior
permission from the RBI.

 a. Private
Visits

       For private
visits abroad, other than to Nepal and Bhutan, any resident individual can
obtain foreign exchange up to an aggregate amount of USD 2,50,000, from an AD
or FFMC, in any one financial year, irrespective of the number of visits
undertaken during the year.

      Further,
all tour related expenses including cost of rail/road/water transportation;
cost of Euro Rail; passes/tickets, etc. outside India; and overseas
hotel/lodging expenses shall be subsumed under the LRS limit. The tour operator
can collect this amount either in Indian rupees or in foreign currency from the
resident traveller.

 b. Gift /
Donation

       Any
resident individual may remit up to USD 2,50,000 in one FY as gift to a person
residing outside India or as donation to an organization outside India.

 c. Going abroad
on employment

      A person
going abroad for employment can draw foreign exchange up to USD 2,50,000 per FY
from any AD in India.

 d. Emigration

      A person
emigrating from India can draw foreign exchange from AD Category I bank and AD
Category II up to the amount prescribed by the country of emigration or USD
250,000. Remittance of any amount of foreign exchange outside India in excess
of this limit may be allowed only towards meeting incidental expenses in the
country of immigration and not for earning points or credits to become eligible
for immigration by way of overseas investments in government bonds; land;
commercial enterprise; etc.

 e. Maintenance
of close relatives abroad

       A resident
individual can remit up-to USD 2,50,000 per FY towards maintenance of close
relatives [‘relative’ as defined in section 6 of the Indian Companies Act,
1956] abroad.

 f.  Business
Trip

        Visits by
individuals for attending an international conference, seminar, specialised
training, apprentice training, etc., are treated as business visits. For
business trips to foreign countries, resident individuals can avail of foreign
exchange up to USD 2,50,000 in a FY irrespective of the number of visits
undertaken during the year.

   If an employee
is deputed by the employer for any of the above and the expenses are borne by
the employer, such expenses shall be treated as residual current account
transactions outside LRS and may be permitted by the AD without any limit,
subject to verifying the bona fide of the transaction.

g. Medical
Treatment Abroad

ADs may
release foreign exchange up to an amount of USD 2,50,000 or its equivalent per
FY without insisting on any estimate from a hospital/doctor. For amount
exceeding the above limit, ADs may release foreign exchange under general
permission based on the estimate from the doctor in India or hospital/ doctor
abroad. A person who has fallen sick after proceeding abroad may also be
released foreign exchange by an AD (without seeking prior approval of the RBI)
for medical treatment outside India.

       In addition
to the above, an amount up to USD 250,000 per financial year is allowed to a
person for accompanying as attendant to a patient going abroad for medical
treatment/check-up.

 h. Facilities
available to students for pursuing their studies abroad.

       AD Category
I banks and AD Category II, may release foreign exchange up to USD 2,50,000 or
its equivalent to resident individuals for studies abroad without insisting on
any estimate from the foreign University. However, AD Category I bank and AD
Category II may allow remittances (without seeking prior approval of the RBI) exceeding
USD 2,50,000 based on the estimate received from the institution abroad

 i.  Purchasing
Objects of Art

       Remittances
under the Scheme can be used for purchasing objects of art subject to the
provisions of other applicable laws such as the extant Foreign Trade Policy of
the Government of India.

 5.    Outward remittance in the form of a DD

      The Scheme
can be used for outward remittance in the form of a DD either in the resident
individual’s own name or in the name of beneficiary with whom he intends putting
through the permissible transactions at the time of private visit abroad,
against self-declaration of the remitter in the format prescribed.

 6.    Open, maintain and hold Foreign Currency
Accounts

Individuals can
also open, maintain and hold foreign currency accounts with a bank outside
India for making remittances under the Scheme without prior approval of the
Reserve Bank. The foreign currency accounts may be used for putting through all
transactions connected with or arising from remittances eligible under this
Scheme.

 7.    Prohibitions under LRS

 7.1  Question
2 of the LRS FAQs provides that the remittance facility under the scheme is not
available for the following:

The Scheme is not available for remittances
for any purpose specifically prohibited under Schedule I or any item restricted
under Schedule II of Foreign Exchange Management (Current Account Transaction)
Rules, 2000, dated May 3, 2000, as amended from time to time.

Remittance from India for margins or margin
calls to overseas exchanges / overseas counterparty.

Remittances for purchase of FCCBs issued by
Indian companies in the overseas secondary market.

  Remittance for trading in foreign exchange
abroad.

  Capital account remittances, directly or
indirectly, to countries identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
as “non- cooperative countries and territories”, from time to time.

  Remittances
directly or indirectly to those individuals and entities identified as posing
significant risk of committing acts of terrorism as advised separately by the
Reserve Bank to the banks.

   In addition,
Banks should not extend any kind of credit facilities to resident individuals
to facilitate capital account remittances under the Scheme.

 7.2  Holding
Gold Abroad

        Under LRS a
person can remit for any purpose except those specifically prohibited.

       LRS Master
Direction provides a positive list of transactions permitted and FAQs of 2016
provides a negative list of transactions which are not permitted.

      Though not
specifically prohibited, it is understood that RBI is not in favour of using
remittances under LRS for holding gold abroad.

 7.3  Providing
Loans Abroad

      Due to
positive / negative list, though not specifically prohibited, it is understood
that RBI is not in favour of using remittances under LRS for giving loans
abroad.

 8.    Procedure for remittances under LRS

      The
individual should designate a branch of an AD through which all the remittances
under the Scheme will be made. The resident individual seeking to make the remittance
should furnish extant Form A2 for purchase of foreign exchange under LRS.

 9.    Overseas Direct Investment by Individuals
under LRS

      Regulation 20A of the Foreign Exchange Management
(Transfer or issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 [FEMA 120]
provides that a resident individual (single or in association with another
resident individual or with an ‘Indian Party’ as defined in this Notification) satisfying
the criteria as per Schedule V of this Notification
, may make overseas
direct investment
in the equity shares and compulsorily convertible
preference shares of a Joint Venture (JV) or Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS)
outside India.

      Para 5 of
the Schedule provides that at the time of investments, the permissible ceiling
shall be within the overall ceiling prescribed for the resident individual under Liberalised
Remittance Scheme
as prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time.

      Explanation:
The investment made out of the balances held in EEFC/RFC account shall also
be restricted to the limit prescribed under LRS.

       A resident
individual who has made overseas direct investment in the equity shares;
compulsorily convertible preference shares of a JV/WoS outside India or ESOPs,
within the LRS limit, will be required to comply with the terms and conditions
prescribed by the overseas investment guidelines in Schedule V of FEMA 120 vide
Notification No. FEMA 263/ RB-2013 dated March 5, 2013.

       No ratings
or guidelines have been prescribed under LRS of USD 2,50,000 on the quality of
the investment an individual can make. However, the individual investor is
expected to exercise due diligence while taking a decision regarding the investments
which he or she proposes to make

 10.  Rupee Loan by a resident individual to a
NRI/PIO who is a close relative

       A resident individual is permitted to make a rupee
loan to a NRI/PIO who is a close relative of the resident individual
(‘relative’ as defined in section 2(77) of the Companies Act, 2013) by way of
crossed cheque/ electronic transfer subject to the following conditions:

 a. The loan is free
of interest and the minimum maturity of the loan is one year.

 b. The loan, though
in rupees, should be within the overall LRS limit of USD 2,50,000, per
financial year, available to the resident individual. It is the responsibility
of the lender to ensure that the amount of loan is within the LRS limit of USD
2,50,000 during the financial year.

 c. The loan should
be utilised for meeting the borrower’s personal requirements or for his own
business purposes in India.

 d. The loan should
not be utilised, either singly or in association with other person, for any of
the activities in which investment by persons resident outside India is
prohibited, namely;

–  the business of chit fund, or

–   Nidhi Company, or

–  agricultural or plantation activities or in
real estate business, or construction of farmhouses, or

trading in Transferable Development Rights
(TDRs).

 Explanation:
For this purpose, real estate business shall not include development of
townships, construction of residential / commercial premises, roads or bridges.

 e. The loan amount
should be credited to the NRO a/c of the NRI / PIO. Credit of such loan amount
may be treated as an eligible credit to NRO a/c.

 f.  The loan amount
shall not be remitted outside India.

g. Repayment of
loan shall be made by way of inward remittances through normal banking channels
or by debit to the Non-resident Ordinary (NRO) / Non-resident External (NRE) /
Foreign Currency Non-resident (FCNR) account of the borrower or out of the sale
proceeds of the shares or securities or immovable property against which such
loan was granted.

11.     The purpose of this article is to highlight the
major changes in the LRS which were brought about by Notification No. FEMA.
263/RB-2013 dated March 5, 2013 in respect of investment outside India,
Notification No. G.S.R. 426(E) dated May 26, 2015 issued by Ministry of Finance
in respect of limits under LRS and Notification No. FEMA. 341/2015-RB dated May
26, 2015 in respect of subsuming of limits under Current Account Transactions
Rules in a holistic manner. This apart, there could be some contentious issues.
However, in the absence of any official clarification, it may not be proper to
consider these.

Shell-shocked – SEBI’s directions against ‘Shell’ Companies

Background

In August 2017, SEBI issued
directions to Stock Exchanges to severely restrict trading in the shares of
certain companies. SEBI had received a list of 331 companies from the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”). It appears that the reason for this restriction
is that these companies were shell companies (i.e., having no substantive
operations) and may have been used for money laundering post demonetisation in
November 2016. The directions caused severe distress to these companies and
their shareholders, and some of the companies appealed to the Securities
Appellate Tribunal and got relief. SEBI’s directions were remarkable, have
far-reaching impact and involve issues of law, and hence, it is worth
discussing and understanding these directions.

Overview of what happened

SEBI stated that it had
received a list of companies from MCA that were allegedly shell companies
(which apparently compiled the list after taking inputs from other authorities
such as SFIO). The list included listed companies.

In the ordinary course of
business, stock exchanges do place restrictions on trading of companies. Under
stock exchange regulations, depending on what is suspected (which may include
disproportionate rise in price/trading without underlying fundamentals),
restrictions in trading are placed. These restrictions progressively increase
by levels till the most restrictive level VI is reached. At this stage, trading
is allowed only once a month, with the price being the last traded price. Thus,
increase or decrease in price is not possible.

The
buyer is also required to pay 200% margin for five months as deposit with the
stock exchange. There are other restrictions also. Needless to say, while this
is marginally better than total delisting/suspension of listing, however, for
all practical purposes, trading in shares of such companies drops to virtually
zero. In the ordinary course, it is for the stock exchange to decide the level
of restrictions.

However, in the present
case, SEBI issued a directive to stock exchanges to place all these companies
at level VI. Exchanges are bound to obey such directions. Thus, trading was
effectively stopped and it could be done only in the restricted manner
mentioned earlier. The directions also imposed restrictions on `off market
transactions.’

Curiously, SEBI did not
clarify that the authorities that had forwarded the list had required SEBI to
place restrictions on all companies. It appears that MCA wanted SEBI to
investigate and thereafter take action. It also appears that not all the companies
were listed on stock exchanges! Hence, even SEBI had to ask the exchanges to
first check the list to find out which of the companies are listed and then
take action.

Factually, many of the
companies were large profitable companies with considerable operations and
active trading. Trading in their shares on exchanges suddenly ceased. These
companies had no choice but to urgently approach the Securities Appellate
Tribunal (“SAT”). Appealing to SAT could have been difficult, because of the
manner in which the directions were given. However, SAT gave prompt relief,
staying the orders in case of companies which appealed and ordered SEBI to
investigate and give opportunity to the said companies to present their case.

The
present status is that except for the handful of companies that appealed and
got a stay, trading in the remaining listed companies stands suspended.

Directions issued against the shell
companies

The
following extract from the directions dated 7th August 2017 of SEBI
to stock exchanges make clear what was ordered:-

“Trading in all such listed securities shall be placed in Stage VI
of the Graded Surveillance Measures (GSM) with immediate effect. If any listed
company out of the said list is already identified under any stage of GSM, it
shall also be moved to GSM stage VI directly. Under the Stage VI of GSM,
trading in these identified securities shall be permitted to trade once in a
month under trade to trade category. Further, any upward price movement in
these securities shall not be permitted beyond the last traded price and
Additional Surveillance Deposit of 200% of trade value shall be collected from
the Buyer which shall be retained with Exchanges for a period of five months.

 

Exchanges shall initiate a process of verifying the
credentials/fundamental of such companies. Exchanges shall appoint an
independent auditor to conduct audit of such listed companies and if necessary,
even conduct forensic audit of such companies to verify its credentials/
fundamentals.

 

On verification, if Exchanges do not find appropriate credentials/
fundamentals about existence of the company, Exchanges shall initiate the
proceedings for compulsory delisting against the company, and the said company
shall not be permitted to deal in any security on exchange platform and its
holding in any depository account shall be frozen till such delisting process
is completed.”

MCA had only suggested investi-gation by
SEBI, not orders

In its defense before SAT,
SEBI made a plea that it was required by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to
pass such directions. This contention was rejected by SAT. Even otherwise, it
was held that SEBI cannot blindly follow directions of MCA. SEBI, being an
entity bound by the SEBI Act, could not issue such directions without following
due process prescribed under the SEBI Act. SAT also noted that MCA had merely
required SEBI to investigate such companies, whether they were shell companies,
etc. and to take action, if required under law.

Issue of directions as a circular which
could be non-appealable

SEBI took an interesting
mode of taking action against such companies. In the ordinary course, it would
examine the facts of each company, notify and put the facts before them, make
specific allegations and ask them to explain their side before passing an
order. In extreme cases, SEBI can even pass interim ex parte order and
could grant the company a post-order hearing. But, even such orders would
require at least basic investigation and also be a speaking order.

Instead, SEBI directly
issued directions to stock exchanges requiring them to put the companies on the
highest restriction level. The result of this was that – the companies faced
restrictions just as they would have under a direct order on them. It seems,
SEBI did that to avoid an overturning of its order by claiming protection under
a recent decision of the Supreme Court (in NSDL vs. (2017) 5 SCC 517,
discussed in an earlier article in this column) that administrative orders
cannot be the subject matter of appeal. Thus, the only course of action against
such directions would have been a writ petition to the High court.

When the companies appealed
to SAT, SEBI contended that such directions being of administrative nature,
were not appealable as held by the Supreme Court.

However, SAT rejected this
contention. The following observations of SAT are relevant in this regard:-

 

“4. We see no merit in the preliminary objection raised by SEBI.
In the case of NSDL (Supra) the Apex Court after considering the scope of the
expression ‘administrative orders’ held that in that case the administrative
circular issued by SEBI was referable to Section 11(1) of SEBI Act and hence
falls outside the appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

 

6. Thus, the impugned communication is not a general direction
given by SEBI to the three stock exchanges in the interests of investors or
securities market as contemplated u/s. 11(1) of SEBI Act, but a specific
direction given in respect of only 331 listed companies which MCA suspected to
be shell companies. Moreover, specific direction given in the impugned
communication prejudicially affects the interests of only those companies
covered under the list of 331 companies identified by the MCA as ‘suspected to
be shell companies’. Therefore, in the facts of present case, the impugned
communication of SEBI which has serious civil consequences cannot be said to be
an administrative order. In other words, the impugned communication which
prejudicially impairs the rights and obligations of the appellants, its
promoters and directors would fall in the category of a quasi judicial order
and hence appealable before this Tribunal u/s. 15T of SEBI Act.

 

7. It is contended on behalf of SEBI that appeal u/s. 15T of SEBI
Act is maintainable only against an order passed by the Board or the
Adjudicating Officer of SEBI and therefore, the impugned communication issued
by the Chief General Manager of SEBI is not appealable u/s. 15T of SEBI Act. We
see no merit in the above contention, because, it is admitted by counsel for
SEBI during the course of arguments that the impugned action was approved by
the WTM of SEBI on 28.07.2017 and only thereafter on 07.08.2017, the Chief
General Manager has issued the impugned communication. Since the impugned
communication which is approved by the WTM of SEBI seeks to suspend the trading
in the securities of the appellants, on day to day basis the impugned
communication is in effect referable to a quasi judicial order passed u/s.
11(4) of SEBI Act and not an administrative order passed u/s. 11(1) of the SEBI
Act. Accordingly, we see no merit in the preliminary objection raised by SEBI.”

Whether matter was urgent?

SEBI often passes interim
orders before concluding investigation to ensure that status quo is
maintained. In the instant case, SAT rejected the view that there was an
urgency. SEBI received the letter from MCA dated 9th June 2017, but
issued directions after nearly two months.

Striking off of names of companies by
Registrar of Companies

A similar action against
allegedly shell companies was initiated earlier by the respective Registrar of
Companies of various states. However, due process of law was followed whereby a
notice was issued, giving reasons as to why their names were sought to be
struck off and an opportunity was given to the companies to respond.
Reportedly, such companies were more than 2.50 lakhs in number. However, SEBI,
did not issue any such notice.

What laws have such companies violated?

An interesting question
that arises is: What Securities Laws have such companies violated, even if it
was found that they were guilty of money laundering? Though SEBI does have wide
powers to issue orders, generally they are passed where Securities Laws are
violated, or to protect interests of investors, etc.

If there was any money
laundering, the company and its directors could face action under appropriate
law. However, that   may  not enable SEBI to pass orders under the
Securities Laws. In particular, if restrictive orders are passed, it is the
public shareholders of such companies who may get affected probably for no
fault of theirs as it happened in the instant case. Earlier, in cases where it was alleged that price manipulation
and other wrongs was carried out for helping parties to earn tax free long term
capital gains, there were several grounds to take action under Securities Laws.
However, in the present case, it is not evident on the face of it as to what
action SEBI could take.

Conclusion

This is an
example of arbitrary action by SEBI. The prices of the shares of the companies,
even of those who got a stay order, crashed. There was no formal investigation
as required by law and no hearing was granted before or after such directions.

While the companies who rushed to SAT got a stay, the SAT has not granted a
stay for operation of the directions on all companies. Even the route adopted
by SEBI of issuing directions to stock exchanges with a hope that it cannot be
appealed against was not justifiable. The silver lining in all this is how
SAT promptly distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court and thus created a
precedent for questioning SEBI’s orders.

 

The
concerns about abuse of corporate form for money laundering and other crimes
and even of listing remain. However, a well thought out strategy would be
needed to ensure that the action hits those entities who engage in such
activities – and them only.

Insolvency and Bankuptcy Code: Pill for all Ills – Part I

Introduction

The Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) has been hailed by many as the
messiah for resolving India’s sick company scene. It has been seen as the
saviour which would rescue India’s ailing companies and entities and provide a
speedy resolution for the creditors. Let us make an in-depth examination as
to whether the Code actually has the teeth to provide a simple one-window
clearance for creditors and the sick debtors or is it just another legislation
in India’s overcrowded regulatory scene!

Replaces Old Acts

The Code replaces
the archaic Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
Although this Act was repealed long ago, it has only now been given a formal
burial. The Code even amends the Companies Act, 2013 and has deleted all
provisions relating to winding-up of companies. Provisions relating to
winding-up (voluntary or compulsory) and sickness resolution for corporate
bodies are now enshrined in the Code itself. Even the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 (SARFAESI Act) has been made subject to the Code. Thus, bankers cannot
resort to the SARFAESI Act when an application under the Code has been
admitted. Thus, the Code even gives a major breather to borrowers.

Eventually,
provisions relating to bankruptcy / financial sickness of individuals, and
firms would also be governed by the Code. However, these sections have not yet
been notified.
As and when that happens, the
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
would be repealed. Thus, the Code would eventually become a one-shop law to
deal with financial sickness in all entities, corporate and non-corporate.
 

The Code is
divided into Five separate Parts, with the important ones being, Part II which
deals with Insolvency Resolution and Liquidation for Corporate Persons, Part
III
which deals with Insolvency Resolution and Liquidation for
Individuals and Firms
(this has not yet been made operational) and Part
IV
which deals with the Regulation of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of
India, Insolvency Professional Agencies, Insolvency Professionals,
etc.

The Code
constitutes an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI). The IBBI
would exercise regulatory oversight over insolvency professional agencies,
insolvency professionals, etc. and prescribe Regulations and Standards for
various purposes. The Scheme of the legislation is – the Code – the Rules
framed by the Central Government – the Regulations framed by the IBBI.

The Adjudicating
Authority under the Code is the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and an
Appeal lies against an NCLT Order to the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal (NCLAT). It may be noted that there is a barrage of
applications before the NCLT and the NCLAT has also been very active. 

Triggering the
Code for Corporate Debtors

The Code gets
triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default provided the
default is Rs. 1 lakh or more. Thus, a very low threshold has been kept for the
creditors to access the Code. Even corporate debtors from the SME sector could
get covered within the ambit of the Code. The meaning of several important
terms has been defined by the Code:

 a)  A corporate
debtor
is a corporate person (company, LLP, etc.,) which owes a debt
to any person. Here it is interesting to note that defined financial
service providers
are not covered by the purview of the Code. Thus,
insolvency and bankruptcy of NBFCs, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds,
etc., are not covered by this Code.
However, if these financial service
providers are creditors against any corporate debtor, then they can seek
recourse under the Code.

 b)  A debt
means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial
debt or an operational debt.
A financial debt is defined to mean a debt
along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for
the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for
provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues. The NCLAT
in the case of Neelkanth Township & Construction P. Ltd. vs. Urban
Infrastructure Trustees Ltd.,
CA(AT) (Insolvency) 44-2017
has
held that the law of limitation does not apply to the institution of an
insolvency process in respect of a financial debt in the nature of a debt with
interest. It further held that issue of debentures would fall within a
financial debt. Interestingly, the IBBI has come out with Regulations for other
creditors who are neither financial nor operational for submitting proof of
their claims. 

c)  A claim
which is one of the most important definitions is defined to mean a right to
payment or right to remedy for breach of contract under any law if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment. The right could be reduced to judgement,
fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.

 d)  It is also
relevant to note the meaning of the term default which is defined to
mean non-payment of debt when whole or any part has become due and payable and
is not repaid by the debtor.

Initiating
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution
process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of
default of a financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default
of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).
Depending upon the type of initiator, the process may be summarised as
explained in Table-1 below.

Table-1: Types of
Insolvency Resolution


 
Insolvency Resolution by Financial Creditor

Insolvency Resolution by Operational
Creditor

Insolvency Resolution by the
Corporate itself

One or more financial creditors can file an application before
the NCLT once a default (for a financial debt) occurs for initiating a
corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor. The
Gujarat High Court has, in the case of Essar Steel Ltd. vs. RBI, C/SCA/12434/2017,
held that banks can initiate insolvency proceedings even without waiting for
directions from the RBI under the Banking Regulation Act.

Any operational creditor can, once a default (for an operational
debt) occurs, deliver a demand notice on a corporate debtor.

Once a corporate debtor commits any default, it may on its own,
file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution
proceedings before the NCLT.

The NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not a default
has occurred and whether to admit the application.

The debtor must, either pay the sum demanded within 10 days of
receipt of the notice or point out any pending dispute in
respect of the notice and pending arbitration / suit which has been filed before
the receipt of such notice. The dispute could be qua
the
quality of goods / service or breach of any representations and warranties.
The NCLAT in Kirusa Software P. Ltd. vs. Mobilox Innovations P. Ltd,
CA(AT)(Insolvency) 6-2017
has held that dispute cannot be confined to
pending arbitration or a civil suit alone. It must include disputes pending
before every judicial authority including mediation, conciliation etc. as
long there are disputes as to existence of debt or default etc., it would
satisfy the conditions of a dispute. It could be in the form of a notice
prior to institution of a suit, notice under the Sale of Goods Act relating
to the quality of goods, etc.

The
NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not to admit the application.

The
resolution process commences from the date of admission of the application by
the NCLT.

If
the corporate debtor does neither of the above, then the operational creditor
may file an application before the NCLT. Only if the Operational Creditor
does not receive payment or notice of dispute can he file an application
before NCLT. The
NCLAT in Uttam Galva Steels
Ltd vs. DF Deutsche Forfait AG CA (AT) (Insolvency) 39-2017
has held
that right of an operational creditor to file an application accrues after
expiry of 10 days from the delivery of demand notice.

The
resolution process commences from the date of admission of the application by
the NCLT.

 

The
NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not to admit the application.

 

 

The
resolution process commences from the date of admission of the application by
the NCLT.

 

The NCLAT in JK
Jute Mills vs. Surendra Trading Co Ltd, CA(AT) 09-2017
has held that
the 14 days’ period available to the NCLT to admit or reject an application
must be counted from the date of receipt of the application by the NCLT and not
from the date of filing of the application. There would be a time gap between
the two, since the Registry will check whether the application filed is proper
in all respects. Further and importantly, it held that the 14 day period was
not a mandate of law since it was procedural in nature. Hence, in appropriate
cases, the NCLT could admit a petition even after this 14 days’ period. This is
a very crucial decision since it hits against the early resolution process for
which the Code is reputed. However, the NCLAT added that the time-bound
resolution within 180 + 90 days is mandatory since time is of the essence under
the Code.

The Calcutta High
Court in Sree Metaliks Ltd. vs. Union of India, WP 7144 / 2017
considered an interesting issue as to whether the NCLT must grant a hearing to
the corporate debtor before admitting any insolvency proceedings against it.
NCLT acting under the provisions of the Act, 2013 while disposing off any
proceedings before it. It held that NCLT was not to bound by the procedure laid
down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, it is to apply the
principles of natural justice in the proceedings before it. It can regulate its
own procedure, however, subject to the other provisions of the Companies Act of
2013 or the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 and any Rules made
thereunder. The Code of 2016 read with the Rules 2016 is silent on the
procedure to be adopted at the hearing of an application u/s. 7 presented
before the NCLT, that is to say, it is silent whether a party respondent has a
right of hearing before the adjudicating authority or not. The Court held that
based on principles of natural justice a corporate debtor must be given an
opportunity of being heard and rebutting the claim of default against him. A
similar view has also been held by the NCLAT in Innoventive Industries
Ltd, CA(AT) (Insolvency) 1&2-2017
.

Once an
application is admitted by the NCLT in either of the above three scenarios, the
corporate insolvency resolution process is set in motion and it must be
completed within a maximum period of 180 days subject to a further (maximum)
extension of up to 90 days. Thus, there is a specific time bound process within
which the corporate must be rehabilitated or else the NCLT would order its
liquidation / winding-up. This is one of the unique features of the Code.
Interestingly, once the Code has been triggered and a corporate insolvency
resolution process commences, there is no mechanism for its withdrawal and it
must be carried forward to its logical end, i.e., either the corporate is
rehabilitated or the resolution plea is rejected and liquidation proceedings
against the corporate commence. The Supreme Court has recently given a somewhat
distinguishing judgment in the case of Lokhandwala Kataria Construction
P. Ltd. vs. Nisus Finance and Investment Managers LLP, CA No. 9279/2017,

where it determined whether the NCLT has powers to admit a compromise between
the creditor and the corporate debtor once a resolution proceeding commences?
The NCLT held that it could not do so and the Supreme Court stated that this
was the correct position in law. However, its Order went on to state that since
all the parties were before it, by virtue of the powers conferred upon the
Supreme Court under Art. 142 of the Constitution, it was admitting the consent
terms. A similar view was again taken by it in Mothers Pride Dairy P.
Ltd. vs. Portrait Advertising and Marketing P. Ltd., CA No. 9286/2017
.
One
wonders whether for every consent terms would the parties have to approach the
Supreme Court for admission? Would this not be an unnecessary cost and time
burden on all parties concerned? Would it not be better to have a provision for
entertaining a consent applications by the NCLT itself? It is yet early days
for the Code and hopefully, these teething troubles would be resolved soon. It
may be noted that prior to admission, the Rules framed under the Code permit an
applicant to withdraw the applicant prior to its admission by the NCLT. This
view has also been held by NCLAT in its Order in the case of Ardor Global
P. Ltd. vs. Nirma Industries P. Ltd., CA (AT) (Insolvency) No. 135-2017.

The Gujarat High
Court in the case of Essar Steel Ltd. vs. RBI, C/SCA/12434/2017
has laid down the following guidelines to be followed by the NCLT while
considering any application under the Code:

 1.  It should not
act mechanically and that all provisions may not be treated mandatory but it
could be treated as a directive only based upon facts, circumstances and
evidence available before the NCLT;

 2. It should act without being guided by any advice or
directions in any form or nature by RBI or any other authority.

 3. The NCLT may proceed in accordance with Law and there
should not be undue pressure on it by the administration

 (… to be continued)

Sections 271BA, 273B of the Act – Non-filing of Form 3CEB on the basis that no AE relationship is created on combined reading of section 92A(2) and section 92A(1) is a reasonable cause – penalty not leviable u/s. 271BA

1.       TS-631-ITAT-2017(Mum)

Palm Grove beach vs. DCIT

A.Y.: 2011-12, Date of Order: 9th August, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company entered into a transaction with a
Non Resident (NR). Taxpayer contended that the definition of AE in terms of
section 92A(2) is to be read with section 92A(1) of the Act and consequently,
NR does not qualify as Associated Enterprise (AE) of the Taxpayer.
Consequently, Taxpayer did not file Form 3CEB as it had no other international
transaction.

AO rejected contentions of the Taxpayer and levied penalty
u/s. 271BA of the Act on ICo for failure to file Form 3CEB. Aggrieved, Taxpayer
appealed before CIT(A), who upheld the order of AO.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal

Held

   The Taxpayer did not file Form 3CEB in
respect of its transaction with the NR on the grounds that NR did not
constitute its AE u/s. 92A. Taxpayer was under a bonafide belief that the
provisions of section 92A(2) of the Act cannot be read in isolation but in
combination with section 92A(1) of the Act. Since the conditions specified in
both the sections were not satisfied in respect of Taxpayer’s transaction with
the NR, he took a view that NR does not qualify as its AE.

   The view that section 92A(2) of the Act
cannot be read independent section 92A(1) of the Act is one of the possible
interpretations of section 92A of the Act. Thus the Taxpayer was prevented by
sufficient cause from furnishing the TP audit report in Form 3CEB.

    Section
273B of the Act specifies that penalty u/s. 271BA of the Act will not be levied
in case there is a reasonable cause for failure to furnish Form 3CEB. Hence,
penalty u/s. 271BA of the Act is to be set aside.

Sections 92A, 92B of the Act – Transaction with foreign branch of Indian company is not an ‘international transaction’. Threshold of 90% purchase for determining associated enterprise (AE) relationship u/s. 92A(2)(h) is to be computed qua each supplier for AE determination.

1.       TS-689-ITAT-2017(Mum)

Elder Exim Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Ys: 2008-09 to 2010-11,

Date of Order: 16th August, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer is an Indian company engaged in the business of
manufacturing of spliced decorative veneer in flitch form. During the
assessment year (AY) under consideration, Taxpayer had entered into transaction
of purchase/import of raw-materials with two entities. One of the entities was
a foreign Company FCo and the other was the US branch of another Indian
company, ICo.

AO treated the transactions with the two entities as
‘international transactions’ within the meaning of section 92B of the Act. It
was contended by the AO that both FCo and ICo are Associated Enterprises (AEs)
for the following reasons: (1) 90% of purchases of Taxpayer were from FCo and
the US branch of ICo (2) Taxpayer and FCo had common shareholders/director who
influenced the prices at which the goods were purchased by the Taxpayer.

Taxpayer contended that (a) since there were no common
shareholders/directors of FCo and taxpayer, FCo was not an AE of the Taxpayer.
Thus the transaction with such entity would not qualify as an international
transaction; (b) Moreover, the transaction with US branch of ICo was a
transaction with an Indian entity and hence, did not qualify to be an
international transaction.

AO rejected the claims of the Taxpayer and made adjustment to
the purchase price paid by the Taxpayer by re-determining the arm’s length
price.

Aggrieved by the action of AO, Taxpayer appealed before
CIT(A) who affirmed the order of AO. Subsequently, Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal

Held

   International transaction is defined under
the Act as a transaction between two AEs, where either or both of them are
non-residents (NRs).

   The fact
that ICo is an Indian resident is not disputed. Since Taxpayer and ICo are
residents, the transaction between Taxpayer and ICo’s US branch cannot be
characterised as ‘international transaction’ under the Act.

   There was no evidence brought on record to
show that Taxpayer and FCo had common shareholders/directors. Further, the
director/shareholders of Taxpayer negotiated the prices of the purchases on
behalf of Taxpayer and not on behalf of FCo.

   Two enterprises are treated as AEs, u/s.
92A(2)(h), if 90% or more of purchases of one enterprise is from the other
enterprise. Thus, the Act requires computation of 90% threshold qua each
enterprise or party. It does not permit aggregation of purchases from different
parties for the purpose of testing the 90% threshold.

  Since purchase of raw materials
from FCo was about 38% of total purchases of taxpayer, FCo cannot be treated as
an AE of the Taxpayer u/s. 92A(2)(h). In absence of any AE relationship between
Taxpayer and FCo, transactions between them do not qualify as international
transaction.

Article 5 and 7 of India-Netherlands DTAA – Independent agent acting in its ordinary course of business and procuring ad time to be broadcasted on TV channels without an authority to legally bind the Taxpayer does not constitute DAPE of the taxpayer. Also, no further attribution to DAPE if agent is remunerated at ALP.

1.       TS-340-ITAT-2017(Mum)

International Global Networks BV vs. ADIT

A.Ys: 1998-99 to 2004-05,

Date of Order: 26th July, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer, a Netherlands company, was a wholly owned
subsidiary of FCo, a Hong Kong Company. FCo was ultimately held by another
company Foreign Company (FCo1). Taxpayer had an exclusive right for sale of
advertising time (ad time) in India on the channel owned by FCo Group. Taxpayer
engaged ICo, an Indian entity of the group, to procure business from Indian
advertisers in return for a commission of 15% of the gross advertisement
receipts from India.

AO held that the Taxpayer was merely a conduit and the
advertisement income belonged to FCo. The AO however assessed the whole of ad
time fees the income in the hands of the Taxpayer on protective basis.

Aggrieved by the order of AO, taxpayer appealed before CIT(A)
who concluded that the Taxpayer had a Permanent Establishment in India in the
form of ICo being its dependent agent.

Taxpayer argued that (a) ICo did not have power to conclude
contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer; (b) ICo carried on the activities for
Taxpayer in the ordinary course of ICo’s business;(c) ICo was engaged in
various business activities like undertaking agency activities,
producing/procuring and supplying program and acting as a licensee in India in
respect of other parties. Accordingly, ICo was economically independent of the
Taxpayer; (d) Consequently, ICo did not qualify as a dependent agent PE (DAPE)
of the Taxpayer in India; (e) In any case, since the remuneration paid to ICo
was at arm’s length, it did not warrant any further attribution, to Permanent
Establishment (PE).

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held

   The Tribunal noted that agreement between
Taxpayer and ICo, indicated as follows:

    ICo had to solicit the advertisement at the
rates fixed by the Taxpayer.

    ICo could not enter into agreement with any
client independently. Even after the agreement, Taxpayer was the final
authority to decide the fate of the advertisement.

    ICo was to receive fixed percentage of
invoiced amount as commission.

    ICo was free to carry out any other business
and as observed earlier did carry out other business.

    ICo had no right to bind the Taxpayer into
any legal obligation.

   The Tribunal ruled that ICo did not create a
DAPE for the Taxpayer in India for the following reasons:

    ICo was not economically dependent on the
Taxpayer, as it was engaged in various business activities like undertaking
agency activities, producing/procuring and supplying program and acting as a
licensee in India in respect of other parties.

    ICo was an independent agent acting in its
ordinary course of business and its activities were not wholly or exclusively
devoted to the Taxpayer.

    Activities of ICo are no different from
other agents of foreign telecasting companies operating in India.

   Also, commission of 15% paid to ICo was as
per the standard norms prevalent in the industry and it was also accepted to be
at  ALP by the tax authorities in the TP
assessment of the Taxpayer. Thus, the transaction between the parties were at
ALP. Even otherwise, since the payment was at ALP, there was no need of further
attribution in the hands of Taxpayer. Reliance was placed on Bombay HC ruling
in the case of Set Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. vs. DDIT(IT) [307 ITR
205]
and CIT vs. BBC Worldwide Ltd. [35 DTR 257]

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act – Payment for access to database containing publicly available information without any right to commercially exploit the information does not qualify as royalty.

1.      
TS-288-ITAT-2017(Del)

McKinsey Knowledge Centre India P. Ltd. vs. ITO

A.Y: 2008-09, Date of Order: 11th May, 2017

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act – Payment for access to database
containing publicly available information without any right to commercially
exploit the information does not qualify as royalty.

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the business of
rendering customised back-office operations and acting as a support center. For
the purpose of its business, Taxpayer was required to access the database owned
and maintained by FCo. The database contained general information on share
price, market commodity, currency exchange rates etc.

Taxpayer filed an application u/s. 195(2) of the Act for
obtaining a nil withholding certificate on amount payable to a Singapore Co
(FCo) for access to the database.

AO held that the transaction was in the nature of royalty and
thus, subject to withholding at the rate of 10% under India-Singapore DTAA.
Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A).

Taxpayer contended that the payment was made only for access
of the database which contained publicly available information. Taxpayer did
not obtain any license for use of the copyright in the literary work or to
commercially exploit the information and hence payment did not qualify as
royalty.

However, CIT(A) held that
access to database provided a right to the Taxpayer to use information relating
to technical, industrial and commercial knowledge, experience and skill and
hence qualified as royalty under the Act.

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held

   FCo provided Taxpayer a right to access a
database which consisted of general data relating to equity, share price,
market, exchange rates and commodity prices, which are available otherwise in
the public domain. The information was neither secret nor undivulged nor did it
pertain to FCo’s own experience.

   Though the information was the copyright of
FCo, Taxpayer had a limited right to access the database for its own use in
accordance with the agreement and not for the purpose of commercial
exploitation. Taxpayer obtained a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to use
the information.

   The transaction does not involve transfer of
all or any rights in respect of copyright in the literary work. Payment made by
the Taxpayer is for the use of “copyrighted material” and not for the “use
of the copyright”. Thus, the amount payable by ICo does not qualify as royalty
under the Act.

GST vis-a-vis Judgement under earlier Regime

Introduction

GST has been
introduced in our country from 1st July 2017. Although the overall
design of GST scheme is new, it is a mixture of both the taxes i.e. tax on
Goods as well as tax on Services. In the earlier regime, the taxation of goods
was separate and service tax was separate, hence litigation was accordingly
with the respective laws. However, certain judgements under earlier laws may
still have their relevance in GST regime. Looking into present notifications on
classification and rate/s of tax, it seems that classification of a transaction
and rate of tax thereon is going to be one major area of confusion and/or
conflict, wherein such judgements may provide us necessary guidance.

Case study 

Normally, there
can be five categories of transactions, to be dealt with to decide rate of tax.

(i)   Whether
transaction is supply of goods or supply of service?

(ii)  Whether
transaction is works contract?

(iii)  Whether
transaction relates to treatment / process of goods of others? 

(iv) Whether
transaction is mixed supply transaction?

(v)  Whether
transaction is composite transaction?

Once the nature
of transaction is decided to be one of above, the rate can be decided
accordingly.

If the
transaction is relating to supply of goods, the rate will be as applicable to
said goods. If it is service transaction, the rate will be as applicable to
service.

Works
Contracts, under GST, are related to immovable properties and such transactions
are categorised as ‘service transactions’. At the same time ‘Treatment and
Processing’ transactions are also categoried as ‘service transactions’.

Once a
transaction is categorised as service transaction, then it will not be
necessary to look into any goods involved in supply of services. The
transaction should be taxed as service, as one transaction.

Blasting
transaction   

In case of
blasting transaction, different chemicals and explosive materials are used for
blasting of land or rocks etc. It is seen that explosive materials are
taxable at 28% under GST, where as chemicals are taxable at 18%.

The first issue
in the above case will be to see the nature of blasting transaction. The nature
of blasting transaction has already been a subject matter of interpretation by
the Hon. Rajasthan High Court in case of Shekhawat Explosives vs. State
of Rajasthan and another (137 STC 326)(Raj)
.
The facts narrated by the
High Court in the above judgment are as under:

“5. In any case, both the sides requested
us that the matter may be examined on merits also. We therefore, heard learned
counsel on the merits of the case. Learned counsel Sh. Mehta has argued that
the job-work, which was undertaken by the present appellant was that of
blasting and in this job of blasting the explosives were used, which stood
exhausted in the process of blasting itself. Therefore, there is no effective
sale of any explosive by the appellant so as to make it leviable for charging
the sales tax under the provisions of the Act and therefore, the order as has
been passed by the assessing officer was bad from very inception.”

The Rajasthan
Sales Tax Department’s argument was that there is transfer of property in goods
in the above transaction and hence it is liable as works contract.

The Hon. High
Court examined the issue and came to conclusion as under:

“The charging
section is section 4 under chapter II, i.e., levy of tax and its rate and it
has been clearly provided under sub-section (1) of section 4 that the tax
payable by the dealer under this Act shall be at single point in the series of
sales by successive dealers, as may be prescribed and shall be levied at such
rates not exceeding fifty per cent on the taxable turnover, as may be notified
by the State Government in the Official Gazette. A conjoint reading of the
provisions of section 2(38) and section 4(1) makes it clear that in such
matters when a job of blasting is undertaken, the use of explosives in such job
can neither be termed as sale within the meaning of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act
nor it could be subjected to the levy of tax.

Learned counsel
Sh. Bhandari has argued before us, rather he was at pains to argue on the basis
of section 2(38), clause (ii) that it remains a case of sale because it
involved a transfer of property in goods and he submits that the explosives had
been purchased by the appellant on the basis of the form “C” supplied
by the department and on that basis he did avail certain concession. Even if
that be so, it will not give the status of sale to such process of extension.
Even if it is a case of transfer of property, though the property does not
stand transferred in any physical form, it stands exhausted in the process of
the execution of the works contract. Unless any transaction is given the status
of sale within the meaning of section 2(38), there is no question of charging
sales tax thereon. In case the appellant has made any misuse of the form
“C” and has wrongly availed any concession or has taken any undue
benefit or unlawful gain, which otherwise could not be available to him, it is
always open for the concerned authorities to take appropriate action against him
in accordance with law, but that does not mean that he could be made liable to
pay sales tax on such transaction (which does not amount to sale) on the basis
of which job of blasting was undertaken and completed and in the process
thereof the explosives were made use of.

6. We therefore, find that this appeal
must succeed on its own merits, the order dated November 24, 2001 passed by the
learned single Judge is set aside. This appeal as well as the writ petition are
allowed and the impugned assessment order dated September 29, 2001 (annexure 7)
is quashed and set aside.”

Conclusion     

It can be seen
that the transaction of blasting is considered as not sale of any kind of goods
and therefore it becomes transaction of rendering service. The nature of
transaction will remain the same even under GST regime. The outcome is that the
blasting transaction will be taxable under GST as service transaction. Even if
goods involving different rates are used for rendering the above service, still
there will not be any impact of the same for deciding the rate of tax. Service
is one transaction and the rate will be attracted as per rate applicable to
service. Since for blasting transaction, no separate classification is made for
rate of tax, it will fall in residuary category and liable to GST at 18%.

There are several such
other judgements, in the old regime, which will be useful for appropriate
guidance in the
GST regime.

GST – First Principles on the term ‘Business’

The objective of this article is to
understand the scope and relevance of the term ‘business’ under GST laws and
apply it in context of non-commercial institutions such as charitable trusts,
NGOs, educational institutions, employee welfare trusts, etc. and mutual
associations such as residential welfare associations, trade associations,
clubs, societies, etc. GST is generally understood as an amalgam of VAT and
Service Tax laws. While most of the VAT laws applied to dealers, which
somewhere built in the requirement of business, the service tax laws applied
comprehensively to all persons. In this context, it may be gainful to bear in
mind that the philosophy of the VAT laws is inherited in the GST law to some
extent.

At the outset, it can be argued that the
term supply by itself is a commercial term and is generally not used for
activities undertaken by non-commercial organisations. Though the term ‘supply’
is defined in a very broad manner, presence of a tinge commercial character in
the transaction seems to be essential element (unless specifically made
redundant). When examined in the presence of the terms ‘sale’, ‘transfer’,
‘service’, the term supply is narrow if seen from this perspective. It is
pertinent to note that the law makers have not used the term ‘activity’ (as was
used in the service tax law) but rather chose to use the term ‘supply’ which
indicates the intent of the Legislature to narrow down the scope of
chargeability on this count. Also, the statutory definition of term supply u/s.
7(1) is further qualified by the phrase ‘in the course of furtherance of
business’.

In fact, the term business plays a
significant role in the entire definition of ‘supply’ under section 7 which can
be analysed as follows:

 (i) The first clause of supply requires that all forms of supply of
goods or services should be ‘in the course or furtherance of business’ .

(ii) The second clause dispenses with the requirement that the
import transaction should be in the course or furtherance of business; in
other words, non-business transactions
which are import of services would
also be termed as supply.

(iii) The third clause r/w Schedule I enlist transactions entered
into without consideration. This clause dispenses with the requirement of
consideration flowing between the taxable persons in such transactions. Even
though certain entries do not use the term business, there is an implicit
requirement of a business activity being present in view of the specific terms
such as ‘business asset’, ‘principal’, ‘agent’, etc.

This interpretation leads one to an
inference that except in case of import of service (as well as import of goods
in IGST transactions), transactions can be termed as a supply only if they
acquire the feature of being a business/ commercial transaction. Further
analogy can also be drawn from various other definitions / provisions under the
GST Law (such as outward supply, capital goods, inputs, composite supply, input
tax credit, place of business, etc). None of these terms attempt to
administer a non-business transaction. Given the scheme of the law, it would be
reasonable to interpret that only transactions in the nature of ‘business’
(except import of service and goods) would have GST implications.

This leads us to question as to whether any
boundaries can be drawn over the term ‘business’ under the GST law.

 Definition of ‘Business’

The term business has been defined in an
inclusive manner u/s. 2(17) of the CGST Act to include the following
activities:

 a)  Any trade, commerce,
manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar
activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit

b)  Any activity or transaction
in connection with or incidental or ancilliary to sub-clause (a)

 c)  Any activity or transaction
in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there is volume, frequency,
continuity or regularity of such transaction

 d)  Supply or acquisition of
goods including capital goods and services in connection with commencement or
closure of business;

 e)  provision by a club,
association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other
consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members;

 f)   admission, for a
consideration, of persons to any premises;

 g)  services supplied by a
person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him in the course
or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation;

 h)  services provided by a race
club by way of totalisator or a licence to book maker in such club ; and

 i)   any activity or
transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any
local authority in which they are engaged as public authorities;

 The primary part of the said definition can
be analysed as follows:

 (a) Main activity being in the
nature of ‘trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager
or any similar activity whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit’;

 (b) Incidental/ ancillary
activity to the above business activity;

 (c) Main activity constituting
business regardless of whether there is volume, frequency, continuity or
regularity; and

 (d) Any activity in connection
with commencement or closure of business.

A brief history of a similarly worded
definition under the VAT laws may assist us in understanding the scope of the
term. Historically, the term business was not included in the list of
definitions under the Central Sales Tax Act and other General Sales tax
legislation. It was in 1959 where the Madras General Sales Tax Act defined this
term to include trade, commerce, etc. within its ambit. The definition has
evolved over time and attempted to overcome certain infirmities identified by
judicial decisions. It would be very interesting to note that the Courts not
given an unlimited space to this term even-though the said term was defined in
an inclusive manner.

 Legal principles on the term ‘business’

The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 had defined
the said term as follows:

 “‘business’ includes,

(i)  And trade, commerce,
manufacture or an adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or
manufacture, whether or not such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or
concern is carried on with a motive to make gain or profit and whether or not
any gain or profit accrues from such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or
concern; and

(ii) Any transaction in
connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, such trade, commerce,
manufacture, adventure or concern”

The said definition is similar, in terms of
coverage, to clause (a) and (b) of section 2(17) of the GST Law. The respective
state enactments also had similar definitions with modifications in terms of
additional clauses widening the coverage of the term. The debate over the scope
of the term business dates back to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Abdul Bakhi And Bros [1964] 15 STC 644 (SC),
wherein the Court held that the expression “business” though extensively used
as a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used in the sense of
an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a
person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as
business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or
contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and not for sport or
pleasure.

In another decision (prior to the insertion
of expansive clauses of incidental/ ancillary activity), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd’s case ([1967] 19 STC 1 (SC)) was
examining whether discarded machinery, sale of waste, scrap or unserviceable
material and by-products fall within the scope of the term ‘business’. The
assessee contended that it was not engaged in buying and/or selling of such
material and the said material was not sold with an objective of profit. The Court observed that the term ‘business’ does
not hinge solely on the motive of earning profit though it predicates a motive
which pervades a whole series of transactions effected by the person
. The
Court observed that though the volume and frequency of the transaction was
high, the taxable person cannot be said to have the intention of carrying on
business of such items. Though the residuary price may impact the profit and
loss account by reducing the costs, that does not by itself establish an
intention to carry on business in that product.

 They are either
fixed assets of the Company or are goods which are incidental to the
acquisition or use of stores or commodities consumed in the factory.
Those goods are sold by the Company for a price which goes into
the profit and loss account of the business and may indirectly be said to
reduce the cost of production of the principal item, but on that account,
disposal of those goods cannot be said to become part of or an incident of the
main business of selling textiles.
In order
that receipts from sale of a commodity may be included in the taxable turnover,
it must be established that the assessee was carrying on business in that
particular commodity, and to prove that fact it must be established that the
assessee had an intention to carry on business in that commodity. A person who
sells goods which are unserviceable or unsuitable for his business does not on
that account become a dealer in those goods, unless he has an intention to carry
on the business of selling those goods.

In the same judgement, the Court also held
that sale of by-products (caustic liquor) was an incident of the manufacturing
activity of the Company and was includible in the definition of business under
the Bombay Sales Tax Act under the primary clause itself.

 ‘For reasons
which we have already set out in dealing with “kolsi”, we are of the
view that waste caustic liquor may be regarded as a by-product or a subsidiary
product in the course of manufacture and the sale thereof is incidental to the
business of the Company and the turnover in respect of both “kolsi”
and “waste caustic liquor” would be liable to sales tax.’

Subsequently, in the post amendment period,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co.
of India ltd. [1973] 31 STC 426 (SC)
settled some conflicting High Court
decisions and held that the amendment in 1964 has made the intention of
profit
as an unnecessary criteria not only to the primary clause,
but also to the secondary clause of the definition of business. In view of this
amendment, canteen sales, sales of advertisement materials and scrap sales were
held to be taxable under the post amendment period even if they were not
conducted with the object of making profit. Though the decision of Raipur
Manufacturing (supra)
was held to be not applicable as regard the intention
of profit, in the view of the author, the intention of carrying on trade,
commerce which was cited in the said decision is still relevant.

In a landmark decision of State of Tamil
Nadu and Another Versus Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras,
the Court
was examining the taxability of sale of uncleared or abandoned items by a Port
established under a statute performing statutory functions without any objective
of making profit. It was held that, if the main activity was not business then
any connected or incidental activity of sales would not amount to business
unless an independent intention to conduct business is these connected
activities is established. In this backdrop, the Court held that Port Trust was
not engaged in business and hence the activity of sale of uncleared or
abandoned items cannot be termed as a business activity. This ruling is very
important in the context of educational, social and charitable associations and
discussed in later paragraphs.

In another decision in Board of Revenue
vs. A. M. Ansari [1976] 38 STC 577 (SC),
auction of forest produce was held
not to be regarded as a business activity in the absence of a frequency of such
activity. The Supreme Court held that volume, frequency, continuity and
regularity of transactions in a class of transactions should ordinarily be
undertaken to be termed as a business activity.

Application of legal principles of the
definition of business under GST Law

The first clause of the definition is the
bedrock on which most of the clauses of definition rest upon. Except for the
inclusion of profession, vocation, adventure, wager, etc., the said
clause is more or less similar to the definition of the business in the central
sales tax and state sales tax statutes. The clause should be understood in a
commercial sense (as understood by the Supreme Court in Abdul Bakshi’s case
supra
) except for the requirement of a profit motive. The clause renders the
intention of making pecuniary benefits as an irrelevant factor in deciding
whether an activity is business. Each of the words in this clause could be
attributed a meaning as follows:

   ‘trade’
primarily refers to exchanging of goods for goods or goods for money with a
secondary meaning of being a repeated activity carried on with a profit motive
which is distinguished from agriculture, etc; but in the context of this Act
should also refer to provision of services and not merely goods

‘commerce’
refers to a larger volume of trade though there is not specific scale when a
trade is termed as commerce. 

   ‘manufacture’
has been used to cover manufacturing activities which do not fall within the
contours of the term ‘trade’.

  ‘profession’
would refer to an occupation requiring intellectual skill or any other manual
skill controlled by intellect.

   ‘vocation’
refers to calling or the way in which an individual passes his/her life; but in
the context of the previous terms should be understood to refer to activities
such as sports, art not undertaken as a professional but for recreation or
pleasure.

  ‘adventure’
would refer pecuniary risks, a venture, a speculation in which there is
considerable risk of loss as well as a chance of gain; and in the context of
the previous terms should be understood as having a feature of trade, commerce,
manufacture, etc. say conducting research activities connected or not with the
primary business.

   ‘wager’
would refer to betting activities where the possibility of success is highly
uncertain.

The second clause includes activities which
are incidental to the primary business activity. The said clause emphatically
requires that the primary activity should be in the nature of business for the
incidental activity also to be included in the definition. This is in line with
the principles laid down by the Madras Port Trust’s case where the primary
activity of the Trust was of non-business character. As rightly pointed out in
the decision, this conclusion should be reached only after ensuring that the
incidental activity should not be an independent activity to fall within the
first clause itself.

The third clause makes the frequency,
continuity or regularity of the primary activity as irrelevant in deciding
whether the activity is in the nature of business, in other words occasional
transactions. This clause overcomes the Supreme Court’s view in H.A.
Ansari’s case
which required that there should be some regularity in
dealings for the transaction to be a business and also overcomes a contention
of the assessee that they are not ‘carrying on’ (a degree of continuity) a
business activity.

The fourth clause specifically includes any
transaction in connection with commencement or closure of business. The purpose
of this clause is to remove any ambiguity over such transactions to be ‘in the
course’ of business. Such transactions though strictly not in the course of
business would also be included in the definition of business. Similarly,
transactions which relate to closure of business would be included though they
are strictly not ‘in the course or furtherance of business’.

It can be inferred that the legislature has
intended to cover transactions even having a remote connection with a business
activity and also made the stage of business irrelevant for the definition of
business. As a consequence, the legislature has widened the scope of items
which would be governed under the law. Further, a definition of wide import
would ensure all transactions are eligible for the benefit of input tax credit
since the eligibility of input tax credit (like taxability) revolves around the
transactions being in the ‘course or furtherance of business’. Having said
this, a question arises whether the definition has implicitly excluded
non-commercial activities which are undertaken by social, charitable or public
organisations from its scope. While the definition is qua the activity, in the
view of the author, the status of the organisation performing the activity
should also be kept in mind to understand the intention behind the activity. A
discussion based on the above thought process has been attempted below.

Charitable Trusts and Charitable Activities

The GST Law has conferred certain exemptions
on specified services by charitable organisations; one exemption is with
reference to services of an entity registered u/s. 12AA of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (IT Act) by way of charitable activities; the other is for services by way
of conducting religious ceremonies, renting of religious place meant for general
public and owned or management by an entity registered u/s.12AA or section
10(23C) of the IT Act, provided the rental charges for the room/ hall, etc.
are within the specified limits. The exemption entries are fairly narrow in its
scope and may result in taxation of other non-commercial activities.

The former exemption entry grants benefit on
two counts i.e. (a) the service should be provided by a 12AA registered entity
and (b) such activities are in the nature of charitable activities. One aspect
(i.e. the subject) has been borrowed from the IT Act while the other aspect
(i.e. the subject matter of taxation) has been provided under said notification
itself by way of an explanation.

The coverage of the first aspect of the
exemption entry is purely dependent upon the status of the registration u/s.
12AA of the IT Act. The Income-tax Act provides that exemption would be
available on specified incomes of charitable or religious trusts under the
provisions of section 11 and 12 provided such eligible trusts are registered
u/s. 12AA of the IT Act. The trust may or may not be enjoying complete
exemption from income tax (say in view insufficient recoupment of income for
charitable purposes, etc.). As long as the trust is holding a valid 12AA
registration certificate, it meets the requirement of the first part of the
exemption entry and the said entity would continue to be covered under the said
clause. Therefore, religious trusts, though not strictly carrying charitable
activities exclusively, would still be covered under this clause, since 12AA
registration is applicable even for religious trust.

The other aspect is with reference to the
scope of services which are eligible for such exemption. The trust which is
registered u/s. 12AA is eligible for exemption only for services ‘by way of’
charitable activities. Charitable need not always mean free or without
consideration; charitable would also refer to subsidised or at minimal costs
with an intent to grant a benefit to the recipient over and above what is charged
for that activity. This entry grants exemption from GST on recoveries from such
activities as long as the activities are for charitable purpose i.e. public
health and awareness in respect of specific diseases; advancement of religion,
spirituality or yoga, educational or skill development programmes for specified
persons and preservation of environment.

The said exemption entries are narrow in the
sense that not all social activities would fall within the term ‘charitable
activities’. The larger question that arises is whether an entity not
registered u/s. 12AA or engaged in activities which are not within fold of
‘charitable activities’ under the exemption notification be liable to GST at
all. Framing a legal proposition, would a non commercial entity engaging in
public service, irrespective of whether registered u/s. 12AA of the IT Act or
not, be liable to be taxed under GST. Two simple examples can be taken:

Example 1 – Old Age Homes under a
Charitable Trust (whether registered u/s. 12AA or not)

ABC trust is owning and operating old-age or
orphanage homes. The said Trust owns the land, buildings and the proceeds from
such trust are necessarily required to be applied for the primary object of the
Trust. The Trust has the following sources of receipts – (a) maintenance
charges for the persons admitted at the old age home; (b) renting of precincts
to third parties for their commercial activities; (c) sale of handmade goods by
old age persons; etc. Admittedly, the trust is not a commercial concern
though it is engaging in certain income generating activities. Clause (a) of
the definition requires that there should be an activity in nature of ‘trade,
commerce, etc’ with or without a pecuniary benefit. Though the intention of
profit has been made irrelevant, the intent to engage in business has not been
dispensed with (refer analysis above) in Burmah Shell case. Moreover in the Madras
Port Trust case (supra)
the Court held that mere sale of articles cannot by
itself be termed as business unless there is an intention to engage in such
activity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sai
Publication Fund [2002] 126 STC 288 (SC)
applying the Madras Port Trust
case has held a similar view. Hence, it can be argued that the Old age Trust
should not be subject to any GST on such transaction even though they are
income generating activities i.e. any sale or service cannot be equated to a
business activity, especially in the absence of an intention to engage in such
activity as an occupation.

Example 2 –
NGO engaged in Charitable activities organising a Marathon (whether registered
u/s. 12AA or not)

An NGO which is registered as a 12AA trust
and engaged in charitable activities relating to public health. The NGO
conducts a marathon for collection of funds and uses the same for charitable
activities1. The NGO collects participation fee for the marathon and
also receives other income from sponsors and advertisers. The said income is
then deployed for charitable activities. The activity may or may not be an
isolated/ non-recurring activity for the NGO. Applying the definition of supply
and business, the question that needs to be answered is whether the aforesaid
income can be said to be part of a trade/ commercial activity and subjected to
GST. Going by the rationale in the previous case study, a stand can be taken
that the NGO is not engaged in trade, commerce, etc. Though clause (c) taxes
transactions which are non-recurring, such transactions should first qualify as
a business transaction as per clause (a). The marathon activity by the NGO
cannot be termed as a trade, commerce activity and hence the NGO cannot be
termed to be in business. However, this is different from an organisation which
organises a marathon and as a practice chooses to donate a portion of proceeds
for a particular social cause. The differentiating factor is the intent behind
the activity which continues to be highly relevant in the scheme of the
definition of business, though the proceeds may meet the same end-use.

____________________________________________________________________________________________

 1   There
is a thin line of difference between services ‘for’ charity and service ‘by
way’ of charity.  The exemption entry
only covers the latter but not the former.

 Example 3 – Employee Welfare Trust

Companies establish welfare trusts wherein
the employees compulsorily contribute a nominal sum towards membership fees.
The trust is established with an objective of medical aid, scholarships to
employees or their dependants. The trust cannot be said to be engaged in a
trade, commerce or such activity and may not fall within the scope of the term
supply. Moreover, the membership fee is strictly not a consideration since the
amount is not paid for a direct inducement of a supply of service of goods
rather it merely establishes an eligibility at the employees to claim a benefit
provided by the trust.  It can therefore
be argued that the Trust is not liable for payment of GST.

In summary, the status of the entity, its
objective (incl. that enshrined in charter documents), pattern of dealings and
the importance of the transaction in the scheme of objects would all play a
role in deciding the intent behind the transaction. As repeatedly held by
Courts, the onus of proving taxability qua business transaction is on
the revenue contending the taxability. Similarly, there is a very good case to
argue that the welfare trusts, social trusts and institutions claiming income
tax exemptions u/s. 10(23C), whether charitable or not, can still be said to be
outside the ambit of GST unless they undertake activities which are
predominantly in the nature of trade, commerce, etc.

 Mutual Associations (Trade/Non-Trade), etc.

The fundamental requirement for a
transaction to be termed as ‘supply’ in section 7 of the GST law is the
existence of two or more transacting parties (with or without consideration).
The definition of business includes a provision of a facility/ benefit by a
club, association, society or such mutual benefit body as ‘business’. The
question arises is whether in view of this inclusion any activity by a mutual
concern (such as clubs, resident welfare associations, etc.) to its
members results in a levy of GST on the services of such concerns. In order to
answer this question, it may be essential to relook at the principles under income tax and erstwhile service tax regime.

 Mutuality Principles under Income Tax
Law

Mutual societies are formed by pooling
resources for the common benefit of all its members. The mutual societies could
be incorporated or otherwise and it would not alter the concept of mutuality.
Under income tax, an association of members forming a mutual group is not
taxable on the surplus resulted in the hands of the association on the doctrine
of mutuality. This is based on the concept that no one can profit from himself
or trade with himself. The profit or surplus merely indicates that the members
have over-charged themselves and they continue to have a right of disposal over
the surplus or even wind up such surplus.   

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner
of Income-Tax vs. Bankipur Club [1998] 109 STC 427 (SC
) laid down certain
requirements to claim the benefit of mutuality:

    Complete identity of the
contributors and the participators i.e. contributors to the common fund and the
participators in surplus should be an identical body

    Legal form of the
association is immaterial

    Mere fact that some of the
members take  advantage of the activities
while the others having the right to do so do not avail of this, does not
affect mutuality

    If money is realised from
members and non-members for the same consideration by giving alike facilities
to all, it evidences profit earning motive and commerciality and mutuality
cannot be said to exist (Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City vs. Royal
Western India Turf Club Ltd. AIR 1954 SC 85)
.

 The relevant extract of the judgement is :

“………if the
object of the assessee-company claiming to be a “mutual concern” or “club”, is
to carry on a particular business and money is realised both from the members
and from non-members, for the same consideration by giving the same or similar
facilities to all alike in respect of the one and the same business carried on
by it, the dealings as a whole disclose the same profit-earning motive and are
alike tainted with commerciality. In other words, the activity carried on by
the assessee in such cases, claiming to be a “mutual concern” or “members’
club” is a trade or an adventure in the nature of trade and the transactions
entered into with the members or non-members alike is a trade/business/transaction
and the resultant surplus is certainly profit income liable to tax……

In a more recent case of Bangalore Club
vs. CIT [2013] 350 ITR 509 (SC)
, the Court denied the benefit of mutuality
on the basis that surplus funds which were loaned to a member bank against
interest were at the disposal of such member who used it for commercial
operations. In other words, diversion of funds to third parties or even members
for exclusive use would adversely affect the concept of mutuality and taint the
society with a commercial nature, though to the extent the mutual operations
continue, such benefit would be available. 

Mutuality Principles under Service
Tax Law

The service tax law vide Finance Act, 2006
and subsequently in the negative list scheme had by insertion of an explanation
treated a club or association and its members as distinct persons. The
explanation was attempted to dissect the principle of mutuality and impose
service tax on the services of a club or association to its members. A dispute
arose with regard to the impact of the explanation on the club or association
services provided by such mutual associations. The High Court in Ranchi Club
Ltd vs. CCE, Ranchi (2012) 26 STR 401 (Jhar)
differentiated between a
‘members club’ and a ‘propreitory club’ for incorporated associations. In a
members club, every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member
with no third party transaction and there is no separate legal person in such
case. However, in a propreitory club, where certain shareholders are members or
certain members are shareholders; or members are not owner of the property of
the club, then the club and its members are distinct persons. The Court
followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Joint Commercial Tax Officer
vs. The Young Men’s Indian Association – 1970 (1) SCC 462,
which held that
in a member’s club, the club is merely acting as an agent for its members in
the matter of supply of various preparations and there could not be a ‘sale’ in
such arrangements.

In order to tax a mutual concern, it is
imperative that the legislature breaks through the concept of mutuality by
fictionally delinking the mutual society from its members. In the current GST
law, the provisions do not fictionally define the club or its members as
distinct persons or alter the status of mutuality, The inclusion in the
definition of business merely treats the activity as a business activity.
Neither does the current definition of ‘supply’ nor the charging section of GST
law treat the club and its members as distinct persons. In fact, the case of
seeking GST from clubs or mutual society is on a weaker footing in comparison
to the service tax law as there is no parallel to Explanation 3 of section
65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, in the current GST law. In fact, in few
specific instances, the deeming fiction to treat branches in two States or in
two countries as distinct persons or supplies between principal and agent as
deemed supplies has been introduced. In the absence of such deeming fiction, it
can be argued that the limited role which the said clause performs is include
the activity as a business activity for the club, association or mutual
society. The said analysis could be applied in the following case studies:

Example 1 – Resident Welfare associations
(RWAs)

RWAs are established for the mutual welfare
of the residents of a particular locality. RWAs collect maintenance fees, rent
out space for commercial establishments, hoardings, etc. The said
associations are formed by the residents with periodical contributions which
are utilised for the maintenance of common areas of the resident establishment.
In the process, it derives income from third parties from the common area but
for the sole purpose of reducing the maintenance costs to residents of the
establishment. Section 7 defining supply requires that there has to be a supply
to another for consideration for it to be termed a supply. The maintenance fee
collected by the RWAs from its members cannot be termed as a transaction
between two parties (in view of the concept of mutuality) and consequently be
outside the scope of taxability. The exemption entries for RWAs (Rs. 5,000/-
per month) may really not have any application to associations which are
conforming to the concept of mutuality.

Renting service by the RWAs to third parties
would not fall within the concept of mutuality. Yet, in such transactions, a
contention can be made that the renting services by RWAs are for the purpose of
reduction of costs of the RWAs and therefore not a business activity in the
sense of being a trade, commerce, etc. It may also be noted that section
2(17)(e) covers only services and facilities to members within the scope of
business and not services and facilities to non members.

Another example would be with respect to the
club facilities which are housed in the RWAs. If the in-house club is
maintained and operated by the third party and the association merely rents out
the place which houses the club, the principle of mutuality would not apply and
GST would be applicable on the services rendered by the third party club. But
where the club is being operated by the association itself, the ground of
mutuality can certainly be taken and GST may not apply in such circumstances.

Example 2 – Clubs or association services
(RWAs)

Clubs provide several facilities to its
members including recreation, restaurants, renting of space, etc.
Member’s clubs operate on the principle of mutuality, own properties on behalf
of the members and hold the funds/ contribution for the members. The club would
have to conforn to the conditions to establish mutuality based on the
principles in Bankipur’s case. While article 366(29A) contains a specific
clause to tax on ‘supply’ of goods by an unincorporated association or body of
persons to a member for consideration as a sale of goods by such association to
its members, the said clause cannot on its own trigger taxation in GST regime
on account of the following reasons:

   The
Calcutta Court in State of West Bengal and Ors vs. Calcutta Club Limited
[2008] 14 VST 499 (Cal)
held that though article 366(29A) has been amended,
the vital requirement of consideration continues to be present in the sales tax
law. In a members’ club, the charges paid for the services are merely
reimbursement of the costs incurred by the club and cannot be termed as
consideration between the club and the members2.

 

2   It may be noted that this matter has been
referred to a larger bench of the Supreme Court vide decision [2016] 96 VST 20
(SC) State Of West Bengal And Others vs. Calcutta Club Limited, but in the view
of the author, the decision of the Calcutta High Court states the correct
position of law.

  The
effect of the deeming fiction of Article 366(29A) has not been percolated in
the GST law in the definition of supply or taxable persons (and only in a
limited way in Schedule II of the Act). The requirement of two persons and a consideration
in mutual societies is still wanting in the current GST law.

  Article
366(29A) applies to ‘supply of goods’ and does not apply ‘supply of services’ –
also refer Entry 7 of Schedule II of the GST law. Therefore, a restaurant
services by a mutual society is deemed to be a supply of service & would
not be covered by the said entry.

   Section
25(4) and (5) of the GST law does not seem to cover the aspect of distinct
persons for a club and its members.

The author does see a certain challenge in
taking the stand over non-taxability in view of entry 3 of Schedule I which
deems a supply of goods by an agent to its principal as a GST transaction. This
is in view of the Court observations that clubs operate as an agent of the
members in performing its function. But it may also be noted that the
definition of ‘agent’ does not strictly cover the classes of persons like a
club, society, etc. and hence, may stand excluded.

The exercise of examining the business
aspect of a transaction is a double-edged sword since any attempt to exclude an
act from the term business would have potential consequences over the input tax
credit claim u/s. 17(1), on the ground of it being used either wholly/ partly
for a non-business activity.

This is on the basis that an input or input
service or capital goods on which credit is proposed to be claimed should
necessarily be used ‘in the course or furtherance of business’ for it to be
eligible for credit. But there would certa inly be fresh litigation on the
definition of business and last word is far from being stated.

2 Section 43(1) – Grant / subsidy received for research – Assessee in books of account reduced it from the cost of plant and machinery but depreciation claimed on the original cost – Tribunal upheld the assessee’s action of claiming depreciation on the cost of fixed assets without deducting the grant / subsidy amount.

1.      
Spectrum Coal & Power Ltd.
vs. ACIT (Mumbai)

Members: P. K. Bansal (V. P.) and Pawan
Singh (J. M.)

ITA Nos.: 1295 and 1296 / Mum / 2012.

A.Ys.: 2000-01 and 2001-02,           Date of Order: 3rd August,
2017

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Salil Kapoor
/ Ram Tiwari

FACTS

The assessee
had received a sum of Rs. 9.97 crore from US Aid through ICICI under the
Program for Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research in the years 1996-97 and
1997-98, which was credited to the capital reserve in the balance sheet of the
Company’s accounts. In the F.Y. 1999-2000, the assessee company had adjusted
this amount against the investment in plant and machinery. However, the cost of
plant & machinery was not reduced to this extent while calculating the
written down value (WDV) for the purpose of determining the depreciation as per
the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The Assessing Officer treated the grant
received by the assessee from US Aid through ICICI as cost met directly or
indirectly by any other person or authority as per the provisions of Section
43(1) and in computation of WDV of the plant and machinery for the purpose of
calculation of depreciation the amount of grant received was reduced from the
cost of plant and machinery. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the Assessing
Officer.

Before the
Tribunal, the assessee submitted that the grant was not given to meet the cost
of any specific asset but to create an institutional environment for the
technology innovation in the energy sector. Further, it was pointed out that
this grant was repayable by the assessee. The repayment had to be made @2% of
the gross annual sales. The Revenue on the other hand, supported the decision
of the lower authorities and argued that the true nature of the amount received
by the assessee was not loan, but it was a grant. The ICICI had merely turned
this assistance into a conditional grant while extending this amount to the
assessee, repayable amount being twice the amount of conditional grant given as
royalty linked to the sales. It was contended that the assessee had merely
returned a sum of Rs 20 lakh. Thereafter, neither the ICICI Ltd. has recovered
the amount from assessee company nor the assessee has provided for any royalty
payable to ICICI Ltd. in its books of account. The conduct of the assessee
shows that it has treated this amount given by ICICI Ltd. as aid / assistance /
grant / subsidy and not as a loan.

HELD

The Tribunal
went through the agreement entered into between the assessee and ICICI Ltd.
under which the assessee was given the said amount. Based thereon, it noted
that the assessee was required to repay the said grant subject to the condition
that the maximum repayment amount will not exceed 200% of the grant received
and till then the assessee was to pay 2% of the gross annual sales of the coal
beneficiated under the proposed commercial project.

According to
the Tribunal, the grant from this agreement was conditional. It was a financial
arrangement and cannot be regarded to be a subsidy / grant. The Tribunal also
observed that the grant was to create an institutional environment for
technological innovations in the energy sector. Therefore, even if the grant is
not treated as the financial arrangement and was treated as a subsidy, as
contended by the revenue, it was not for a specific plant & machinery.

The Tribunal
further relied on the decision of the Visakhapatnam Tribunal in the case of Sasisri
Extractions Limited vs. ACIT (122 ITD 428)
and noted that even after
insertion of Explanation 10 to section 43(1), the Tribunal has categorically
held that the basic principle underlying the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of CIT vs. P. J. Chemicals (210 ITR 830), still holds good.
Accordingly, it was held that financial grant received by the assessee could
not be reduced from the actual cost of fixed assets for computing the
depreciation under the Income-tax Act.

1 Section 11 – (i) Depreciation allowed on fixed assets cost of which was allowed as application of income; (ii) Assessee allowed the benefit of carry forward of deficit for future set-off.

1.      
DCIT vs. Gharda Foundation
(Mumbai)

Members: G. S. Pannu (A. M.) and Amarjit
Singh (J. M.)

ITA Nos.: 5962 & 5963/MUM/2016

A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2012-13,

Date of Order: 30th August, 2017

Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Saurabh
Deshpande / Hiro Rai

FACTS

The assessee
being a charitable organisation registered u/s. 12A was engaged in carrying on
activities of charitable nature. The dispute involved in the appeal was on two
issues – firstly, the Revenue was aggrieved by the decision of the CIT(A) in
directing the AO to allow the benefit of depreciation and secondly, the action
of the CIT(A) in allowing the assessee the benefit of carry forward of the
deficit of Rs. 3.5 crore for future set-off.

Before the
Tribunal, the revenue justified the AO’s action pleading that the decision of
the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel
Selection (264 ITR 110
), which was relied on by the assessee, had not been
accepted by the Department on merits and on a similar issue, SLP (Civil) no.
9891 of 2014 has been filed before the Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corporation. Further, it was contended that allowing of
depreciation would amount to a double deduction, which was impermissible having
regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. (199
ITR 43).

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the decision in the case of Escorts Ltd. being relied upon by the
Revenue had been considered by the Delhi High Court in the case of Indraprastha
Cancer Society, (112 DTR 345), wherein it opined that the allowance of
depreciation in similar situation would not amount to a double deduction.
Further, it was noted that the Delhi High Court in the case of Vishwa Jagriti
Mission, ITA No. 140/2012 dated 29.3.2012 also allowed a similar claim after
analysing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. It also
noticed that the Supreme Court had dismissed the SLP filed by the Department
against the said decision of the Delhi High Court vide SLP No. 19321 of 2013.
The Tribunal further noted that the Bombay High Court, subsequent to the
decision in the case of Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, had
considered a similar argument of the Revenue in the case of Mumbai Education
Trust, ITA No. 11/2014 dated 03.05.2016 and had allowed the claim of the
assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue on
this ground and allowed the depreciation as claimed by the assessee.

 

As regards the
issue relating to carry forward of the deficit of Rs.3.50 crore to be set-off
against the future income, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) relying
on the judgements of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mumbai Education
Trust.

3 Section 115BBE– Amendment made by the Finance Act, 2016 to section 115BBE(2), with effect from 01.04.2017, whereby set-off of loss against the income referred to in sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B, 69C or 69D is denied, is prospective and is effective from 01.04.2017.

1.      
[2017] 84 taxmann.com 138
(Jaipur- Trib.)

ACIT vs. Sanjay Bairathi Gems Ltd.

ITA No. : 157 (Jp.) of 2014

A.Y.: 2013-14, Date of Order: 8th
August, 2017

FACTS       

The assessee-company was engaged in carrying
on business of export, import and manufacture of precious and semi-precious
stones and jewellery. In the course of survey action at the business premises
of the assessee-company which action was converted into search, excess stock of
Rs. 231.41 lakh was surrendered.

 

The AO assessed the income on account of
excess stock u/s. 69B. However, he denied set-off of business loss against
excess stock by applying the provisions of section 115BBE and relied on the
decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Kim Pharma
(P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2013] 35 taxmann.com 456
and Liberty India vs. CIT
[2007] 293 ITR 520.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who relying on the ITAT, Jaipur Bench in the case of DCIT vs.
Ramnarayan Birla
[IT Appeal No. 482 (JP) of 2015, dated 30.9.2016] held
that the excess stock so found is part of regular business, the same is to be
taxed as business income. He further held that the amendment to the proviso of
section 115BBE wherein the word “or set off of any loss” is introduced by the
Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.4.2017, set-off of business loss during the year
against the excess stock found in the search operation is allowable. The CIT(A)
allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the
provisions of section 115BBE come under Chapter XII providing for determination
of rate of tax in certain special cases and accordingly, it relates to
quantification of amount of tax and not to the computation of total income and
therefore, the amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2016 would not affect
the computation of total income. It was, accordingly, contended that the
business loss in the instant case cannot be allowed to be set-off against the
amount brought to tax u/s. 69B in terms of undisclosed investment in stock of
stones, gold and jewellery.

 HELD

The Tribunal having noted the amendment
brought in section 115BBE(2) by the Finance Act, 2016, observed that if the
contentions made by CIT(DR) are accepted, the question that arises is would the
interpretation render sub-section (2) otiose and what was the necessity
for bringing in such amendment. It observed that the intention of the
legislature has been provided in the memorandum explaining the amendment.

The Tribunal held that given the fact that
the AO has invoked the provisions of section 115BBE in the instant case, the provisions
of sub-section (2) to section 115BBE are equally applicable. The amendment
brought in by the FA, 2016 whereby set-off of losses against income referred to
in section 69B has been denied is stated clearly to be effective from 1.4.2017
and will accordingly, apply AY 2017-18 onwards. Accordingly, for the year under
consideration, there is no restriction to set-off of business loss against
income brought to tax u/s. 69B of the Act.

The Tribunal observed that the matter could
be looked at from another perspective. The provisions relating to set-off of
losses are contained in Chapter VI relating to aggregating of income and
set-off of losses. Whenever legislature desires to restrict set-off of loss or
allowance of loss, in a particular manner, usually, the provisions are made in
Chapter VI such as non-allowance of business loss against salary income as
provided in section 71(2A), and treatment of short-term or long-term capital
losses. There is no specific provision which restricts set-off of business losses
against income brought to tax u/s. 69B. Interestingly, both section 69B and
section 71 fall under the same Chapter VI. In the absence of any provisions in
section 71 falling under Chapter VI which restrict set-off, in the instant
case, set-off of business losses against income brought to tax u/s. 69B cannot
be denied.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by
the revenue.

 


Section 37– Expenses on account of provident fund contribution of employees employed through the sub-contractor of the assessee-contractor are allowable if the same are incurred as per the conditions of contract entered into by the assessee-contractor and rendering of services by labourers of sub-contractors for the purposes of business of assessee was not doubted.

1.      
 [2017] 82 taxmann.com 292 (Pune- Trib.)

Ratilal
Bhagwandas Construction Co. (P.)
Ltd. vs. ITO

ITA No.:
1698 (Pune) of 2014

A.Y.:
2009-10, Date of Order: 31st May, 2017

FACTS

The assessee-company was engaged in the
business of industrial concern. It filed its return of income declaring a total
income of Rs. 4,82,49,120. In the course of assessment proceedings, the
Assessing Officer (AO) on perusing the `Office and Administration Expenses
Account’, noticed that assessee had debited Rs. 20,78,557 on account of
provident fund for employees of the contractors of the assessee company. He
noticed that this amount of Rs. 20,78,557 comprised of Rs. 9,73,953 being
employees’ contribution to PF and Rs. 11,04,624 being employers’ contribution.

The AO asked the assessee to justify this
claim of Rs. 20,78,557. The assessee submitted that under the agreement entered
into by the assessee with its various clients, the assessee is liable for
provident fund expenditure. It also submitted that many of the sub-contractors
do not have PF registration and hence, the assessee has paid their PF
contribution and therefore the same is claimed as an expenditure. The AO
considering the fact that in respect of assessee’s own employees, assessee has
contributed only employers’ contribution and had deducted the portion of
employees’ contribution from their wages / salaries, but in respect of
employees of the sub-contractors which were engaged by the assessee, no such deduction
was made from the wages / salaries of the concerned employees. The AO
disallowed Rs. 9,73,953 (being employees contribution to PF in respect of
employees of sub-contractor).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who apart from upholding the order of the AO also enhanced the
disallowance by directing the AO to disallow further Rs. 11,04,124 being
employer’s contribution pertaining to contractor’s employees.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 HELD

The Tribunal observed that under the terms
of the contract entered into by the assessee with its customers, it is the
responsibility of the assessee to comply with the requirements of the Employees
Provident Fund Act. Under the contract, it was the duty of the assessee to
cover all employees (including that of sub-contractor) under the Provident Fund
Act.

The Tribunal held that a perusal of sections
of Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and
Employees Provident Fund Scheme 1952 together with the clauses of the agreement
that the assessee had entered into with his clients show that the assessee is
responsible for the deduction of provident fund dues of the employees,
including those employed through sub-contractor and its deposit with the
appropriate authorities. It observed that in the present case, the rendering of
services by the labourers of the sub-contractors for the purpose of business of
the assessee has not been doubted by the revenue. It observed that statutorily,
the assessee could have recovered the Provident Fund dues from the
subcontractors, but when the assessee is not in a position to recover the
amounts paid as provident fund contribution for the respective contract
labourers, or considering the business exigencies when the assessee bears the
expense on account of Provident Fund contribution, then whether in such a
situation the expense can be disallowed? It held that the same cannot be
disallowed as an expenditure, more so when the rendering of services by the
subcontractors for the business of the assessee is not in doubt and in such a
situation, the expenditure can be allowed u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

Section 37(1) does not curtail or prevent an
assessee from incurring an expenditure which he feels and wants to incur for
the purpose of business. Expenditure incurred may be direct or may even
indirectly benefit the business in the form of increased turnover, better
profit, growth, etc. The AO cannot question the reasonableness by
putting himself in the arm-chair of the businessman and assume status or
character of the assessee and that it is for the assessee to decide whether the
expenses should be incurred in the course of his business or not. Courts have
also held that if the expenditure is incurred for the purposes of the business,
incidental benefit to some other person would not take the expenditure outside
the scope of section 37(1) of the Act.

It observed that it is a settled law that
the commercial expediency of a businessman’s decision to incur a particular
expenditure cannot be tested on the touchstone of strict legal liability to
incur such expenditure.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance of
employees contribution of PF (as made by the AO) and that of employers
contribution of PF (as enhanced by CIT(A)) was uncalled for. The appeal filed
by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

 

1 Section 153C – AO cannot assume jurisdiction u/s. 153C on the basis of loose paper, seized in the course of search on a person (other than the assessee), which loose paper neither makes any reference to the assessee company, nor of any transaction entered into by the assessee. Amendment made by the Finance Act, 2015 to section 153C is prospective and is applicable w.e.f. 1.6.2015.

1.      
  [2017] 85 taxmann.com 87 (Mumbai – Trib.)

DCIT vs. National Standard India Ltd.

ITA Nos. 4055 to 4060 (Mum.) of 2015

A.Ys.: 2005-06 to 2010-11,  Date of Order: 28th July, 2017

FACTS

The management of the assessee company
changed in May 2010 and consequently, the assessee company became a part of
Lodha Group of companies. At the time of search on Lodha Group of entities on
10.1.2011, premises of the assessee company at Wagle Estate, where the project
of Lodha Group viz. Lodha Excellencia was coming up, was covered u/s.
133A. 

In the course of the search, minutes of SCUD
meeting giving details of projects, customers, flats booked by them, area of
the flat, consideration and deviation from the listed price were seized. These
minutes had a remarks column which explained the deviation and indicated in
many cases payment in cash euphemistically referred to as “payment in other
mode”.

Further, in the course of search, Mr.
Abhinandan Lodha, key person of Lodha Group, in his statement recorded u/s.
132(4) of the Act, came up with a disclosure of Rs. 199.80 crore and offered
the same as additional income.  From the
entity wise details of unaccounted income, furnished by Mr. Lodha, it was found
that it included Rs. 110.25 lakh in respect of sale of parking space in the
hands of assessee company in AY 2011-12.

The Assessing Officer, based on these
minutes and the statement recorded u/s.132(4), assumed jurisdiction u/s.153C of
the Act and issued a notice requiring the assessee to furnish return of income.

Vide order dated 31.3.2013 passed u/s.153A
r.w.s. 153C/143(3) the Assessing Officer (AO) assessed the loss to be Rs.
6,40,575 as against the returned loss of Rs. 3,62,51,460.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who observed that the seized document on the basis of which the
AO assumed jurisdiction u/s. 153C of the Act indicated the modus operandi
of the Lodha Group of receiving money, but did not make any reference to any
project of the assessee. It also did not bear any reference to the transactions
entered into by the assessee. The CIT(A) held that the AO had wrongly assumed
jurisdiction u/s. 153C of the Act. Accordingly, he quashed the assessment
framed by the AO u/s. 153A r.w.s. 153C/143(3) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

HELD

A reference to the provisions of section
153C of the Act reveals beyond any doubt that upto 30th May, 2015,
the requirement, as per mandate of law, for the purpose of assumption of
jurisdiction u/s. 153C was that the AO of the person searched should be
satisfied that money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or
books of accounts or documents seized `belonged’ to a person other than the
person referred to in section 153A. Section 153C excludes from its scope and
gamut such seized documents which though were found to pertain or relatable to
such `other person’, but however not found to be `belonging’ to the latter.

The legislature realising the fact that the
usage of the aforesaid terms seriously jeopardised the assumption of
jurisdiction by the AO in a case where any `books of account’ or `documents’
which though pertained to or any information contained therein related to such
other person, but were not found to be `belonging’ to him, amended the
provisions of section 153C, by the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 1.6.2015
and dispensed with the terms `belongs’ or `belong to’ and instead included
within its sweep books of account or documents which pertain or pertains to or
any information contained therein, relates to such other person.

The Tribunal held that the aforesaid
amendment to section 153C is not retrospective in nature and is applicable only
w.e.f. 1.6.2015. This observation stands fortified by the judgment of the Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT vs. Arpit Land (P.) Ltd. [2017] 393 ITR 276
(Bom.)
. It held that the case of the assessee would be governed by the
pre-amended law as was applicable upto 30.6.2015.

It observed that a bare perusal of the
seized documents does neither make any reference of the assessee company, nor
of any transaction entered into by the assessee company, which could go to
justify the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO u/s. 153C.

The Tribunal held that in the absence of any
document belonging to the assessee having been seized during the course of
search proceedings in the case of Lodha Group, the assumption of jurisdiction
by the AO u/s. 153C by referring to the above referred seized documents is
highly misplaced.

It also observed that the statement of Shri
Abhinandan Lodha recorded u/s. 132(4) in the course of search and seizure
proceedings conducted in the case of Lodha group cannot be construed as a
`seized document’, therefore, the reliance placed by the AO on the same to
justify the validity of jurisdiction assumed u/s. 153C in the hands of the
assessee company, cannot be accepted.

The Tribunal held that the AO had clearly
traversed beyond the scope of his jurisdiction u/s. 153C and therein proceeded
with and framed assessment u/s. 153A r.w.s. 153C/143(3) in the hands of the
assessee company.

The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) and
dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.


Article 12 of India-US DTAA – secondment of employee to Indian subsidiary – employee rendering specialised and expert services in the field of technology of setting up of a business centre does qualify as FIS under India-US DTAA.

1.       TS-294-ITAT-2017(Bang)
Emulex Design &
Manufacturing
Corporation vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of
Order: 23rd June, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer, a US company
(FCo) had a subsidiary, ICo in India. FCo entered into an agreement with ICo as
per which, FCo seconded one of its employee to ICo for rendering specialised,
skill based expert service to ICo. The services were in the field for technology
of setting up of an independent business centre. In the relevant financial
year, ICo reimbursed expenses incurred by FCo viz. the salary of the seconded
employee without any mark-up.

While filing the return of
income in India, FCo contended that the amount received from ICo was purely in
the nature of reimbursement and hence not taxable in India. Moreover, the
nature of services rendered by the seconded employee was managerial in nature
and hence was excluded from the purview of ‘Fees for included service’ (FIS) as
defined under Article 12 of India-US DTAA.

However, AO argued that the payment was in the nature of FIS.
Aggrieved, FCo raised objection before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), who
also upheld the order of AO.

Aggrieved by the order of AO, FCo appealed before the
Tribunal.

Held

   The secondment agreement between FCo and ICo
indicated that ICo intended to obtain the temporary services of FCo’s employee
who possessed specialised skills and capabilities. The seconded employee was
required to provide their expert service in the field of technology for setting
up of an independent design centre.

   Thus, secondment was for the purpose of
rendering specialised and expertise services and not for providing general
managerial or administrative service.

   Having regard to the business profile of ICo1,
the services rendered by the employee qualifies as technical services.

   Though the payment by ICo is without any
mark-up, such receipt is still chargeable to tax as FIS under the India-US DTAA2.

OECD – Recent Developments – an update

In this
issue, we have covered major developments in the field of International
Taxation so far in the year 2017 and work being done at OECD in various other
related fields. It is in continuation of our endeavour to update the readers on
major developments at OECD at regular intervals. Various news items included
here are sourced from various OECD Newsletters as available on its website.

 In this write-up, we have
classified the developments into 4 major categories viz.:

1)  Transfer
Pricing 

2)  Tax Treaties

3)  BEPS
Action Plans

4)  Exchange
of Information

 

1) Transfer Pricing

 

(i)  OECD releases latest updates to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations

 

     The OECD released the 2017 edition of the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations on 10.07.2017.

 

    The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
provide guidance on the application of the “arm’s length principle”, which
represents the international consensus on the valuation, for income tax
purposes, of cross-border transactions between associated enterprises. In
today’s economy where multinational enterprises play an increasingly prominent
role, transfer pricing continues to be high on the agenda of tax administrations
and taxpayers alike. Governments need to ensure that the taxable profits of
MNEs are not artificially shifted out of their jurisdiction and that the tax
base reported by MNEs in their country reflects the economic activity
undertaken therein and taxpayers need clear guidance on the proper application
of the arm’s length principle.

    

   The
2017 edition of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines mainly reflects a consolidation
of the changes resulting from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Project. It incorporates the following revisions of the 2010 edition
into a single publication:

 

   The substantial revisions introduced by the
2015 BEPS Reports on Actions 8-10 “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with
Value Creation” and Action 13 “Transfer Pricing Documentation and
Country-by-Country Reporting”. These amendments, which revised the guidance in
Chapters I, II, V, VI, VII and VIII, were approved by the OECD Council and
incorporated into the Transfer Pricing Guidelines in May 2016;

 

   The revisions to Chapter IX to conform the
guidance on business restructurings to the revisions introduced by the 2015
BEPS Reports on Actions 8-10 and 13. These conforming changes were approved by
the OECD Council in April 2017;

 

  The revised guidance on safe harbours in
Chapter IV. These changes were approved by the OECD Council in May 2013; and

 

–  Consistency changes that were needed in the
rest of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to produce this consolidated
version of the Guidelines. These consistency changes were approved by the
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 19 May 2017.

 

    In
addition, this edition of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines include the revised
Recommendation of the OECD Council on the Determination of Transfer Pricing
between Associated Enterprises. The revised Recommendation reflects the
relevance to tackle BEPS and the establishments of the Inclusive Framework on
BEPS. It also strengthens the impact and relevance of the Guidelines beyond the
OECD by inviting non-OECD members to adhere to the Recommendation. Finally, it
includes a delegation by the OECD Council to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of
the authority to approve by consensus future amendments to the Guidelines which
are essentially of a technical nature.

 

   To
read the full version online: www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm

 

(ii) Release of a discussion draft containing Additional Guidance on
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments

 

   The
Report on Action 7 of the BEPS Action Plan (Preventing the Artificial Avoidance
of Permanent Establishment Status) mandated the development of additional
guidance on how the rules of Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention would
apply to PEs resulting from the changes in the Report, in particular for PEs
outside the financial sector. The Report indicated that there is also a need to
take account of the results of the work on other parts of the BEPS Action Plan
dealing with transfer pricing, in particular the work related to intangibles,
risk and capital. Importantly, the Report explicitly stated that the changes to
Article 5 of the Model Tax Convention do not require substantive modifications
to the existing rules and guidance on the attribution of profits to permanent
establishments under Article 7 (see paragraph 19-20 of the Report).

 

   Under
this mandate, this new discussion draft has been developed which replaces the
discussion draft published for comments in July 2016. This new discussion draft
sets out high-level general principles outlined in paragraph 1-21 and 36-42 for
the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in the circumstances
addressed by the Report on BEPS Action 7. Importantly, countries agree that
these principles are relevant and applicable in attributing profits to
permanent establishments. This discussion draft also includes examples
illustrating the attribution of profits to permanent establishments arising
under Article 5(5) and from the anti-fragmentation rules in Article 5(4.1) of
the OECD Model Tax Convention.

 

(iii)   Discussion Draft on the Revised Guidance on Profit Splits

 

    Action
10 of the BEPS Action Plan invited clarification of the application of transfer
pricing methods, in particular the transactional profit split method, in the
context of global value chains.

 

    Under
this mandate, this revised discussion draft replaces the draft released for
public comment in July 2016. Building on the existing guidance in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as well as comments received on the July 2016
draft, this revised draft is intended to clarify the application of the
transactional profit split method, in particular, by identifying indicators for
its use as the most appropriate transfer pricing method, and providing
additional guidance on determining the profits to be split. The revised draft
also includes a number of examples illustrating these principles. 

 

   Public Consultation:  The OECD intends to hold a public
consultation on the additional guidance on the attribution of profits to
permanent establishments and on the revised guidance on the transactional
profit split method in November 2017 at the OECD Conference Centre in Paris,
France. Registration details for the public consultation will be published on
the OECD website in September. Speakers and other participants at the public
consultation will be selected from among those providing timely written
comments on the respective discussion drafts.

 

(iv) Toolkit to provide practical guidance to developing countries to
better protect their tax bases

 

    The
Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) – a joint initiative of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), United Nations (UN) and World Bank Group – has published a
toolkit to provide practical guidance to developing countries to better protect
their tax bases on  22/06/2017.

 

   The
toolkit responds to a request by the Development Working Group of the G20,
and addresses an area of tax called “transfer pricing,” which refers
to the prices corporations use when they make transactions between members of
the same group. How these prices are set has significant relevance for the
amount of tax an individual government can collect from a multinational
enterprise.


   The toolkit, “Addressing
Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for
Transfer Pricing
Analyses”
, specifically addresses the ways developing countries can
overcome a lack of data needed to implement transfer pricing rules. This data
is needed to determine whether the prices the enterprise uses accord with those
which would be expected between independent parties. The guidance will also
help countries set rules and practices that are more predictable for business.

 

    The toolkit is part of a series of reports
by the Platform to help developing countries design or administer strong tax
systems. Previous reports have covered tax incentives and external support for
building tax capacity in developing countries.

 

     The delivery of the toolkit coincides with
the third meeting of the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS), held in the Netherlands on 21-22 June 2017, and demonstrates
the commitment of the Platform partners to work together to tackle a wide range
of pressing tax issues.

 

    The
toolkit has been updated following comments on a consultation draft which was
made public in January 2017.

 

     For
more information on the PCT, visit: www.worldbank.org/en/programs/platform-for-tax-collaboration

 

(v)  OECD releases a discussion draft on the implementation guidance on
hard-to-value intangibles

 

     In
May 2017, OECD invited public comments on a discussion draft which provides
guidance on the implementation of the approach to pricing transfers of
hard-to-value intangibles described in Chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines.

 

    The
Final Report on Actions 8-10 of the BEPS Action Plan (“Aligning Transfer
Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation”) mandated the development of guidance on
the implementation of the approach to pricing hard-to-value intangibles
(“HTVI”) contained in section D.4 of Chapter VI of the Transfer
Pricing Guidelines.

 

     This
discussion draft, which does not yet represent a consensus position of the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs or its subsidiary bodies, presents the principles
that should underline the implementation of the approach to HTVI, provides
examples illustrating the application of this approach, and addresses the
interaction between the approach to HTVI and the mutual agreement procedure
under an applicable treaty.

 

2) Tax Treaties

 

(i)  The Platform for Collaboration on Tax invites comments on a draft
toolkit on the taxation of offshore indirect transfers of assets

 

     In
August, 2017, the Platform for Collaboration on Tax – a joint initiative of the
IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group – sought public feedback on a draft toolkit
designed to help developing countries tackle the complexities of taxing
offshore indirect transfers of assets, a practice by which some multinational
corporations try to minimise their tax liability.

 

    The tax treatment of ‘offshore indirect
transfers’ (OITs) — the sale of an entity located in one country that owns an
“immovable” asset located in another country, by a non-resident of
the country where the asset is located — has emerged as a significant concern
in many developing countries. It has become a relatively common practice for
some multinational corporations trying to minimise their tax burden, and is an
increasingly critical tax issue in a globalised world. But there is no unifying
principle on how to treat these transactions, and the issue was not addressed
in the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. This draft
toolkit, “The Taxation of Offshore Indirect Transfers – A
Toolkit,”
examines the principles that should guide the taxation of
these transactions in the countries where the underlying assets are located. It
emphasises extractive (and other) industries in developing countries, and
considers the current standards in the OECD and the U.N. model tax conventions,
and the new Multilateral Convention. The toolkit discusses economic
considerations that may guide policy in this area, the types of assets that
could appropriately attract tax when transferred indirectly offshore,
implementation challenges that countries face, and options which could be used to enforce such a tax.

 

     The toolkit responds to a request by the
Development Working Group of the G20, and is part of a series the Platform is
preparing to help developing countries design their tax policies, keeping in
mind that those countries may have limitations in their capacity to administer
their tax systems. Previous reports have included discussions of tax incentives,
and external support for building tax capacity in developing countries. This
series complements the work that the Platform and the organisations it brings
together are undertaking to increase the capacity of developing countries to
apply the OECD/G20 BEPS Project.

 

     The
Platform aims to release the final toolkit by the end of 2017.

 

Questions to consider

1.  Does
this draft toolkit effectively address the rationale(s) for taxing offshore
indirect transfers of assets?

2.  Does
it lay out a clear principle for taxing offshore indirect transfers of assets?

3.  Is
the definition of an offshore indirect transfer of assets satisfactory?

4.  Is
the discussion regarding source and residence taxation in this context balanced
and robustly argued?

5.  Is
the suggested possible expansion of the definition of immovable property for
the purposes of the taxation of offshore indirect transfers reasonable?

6.  Is
the concept of location-specific rents helpful in addressing these issues? If
so, how is it best formulated in practical terms?

7.  Are
there other implementation approaches that should be considered?

8.  Is
the draft toolkit’s preference for the ‘deemed disposal’ method appropriate?

9.  Are
the complexities in the taxation of these international transactions adequately
represented?

 

(ii) OECD releases the draft contents of the 2017 update to the OECD
Model Tax Convention

 

    In
July 2017, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs released the draft contents of
the 2017 update to the OECD Model Tax Convention prepared by the Committee’s
Working Party 1. The update has not yet been approved by the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs or by the OECD Council, although, as noted below, significant
parts of the 2017 update were previously approved as part of the BEPS Package.
It will be submitted for the approval of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and of
the OECD Council later in 2017. This draft therefore does not necessarily
reflect the final views of the OECD and its member countries.

 

     Comments
are requested at this time only with respect to certain parts of the 2017
update that have not previously been released for comments.

 

    As part of the 2017 update, a number of
changes and additions will also be made to the observations, reservations and
positions of OECD member countries and non-member economies. These changes and
additions are in the process of being formulated and will be included in the
final version of the 2017 update. 

 

(iii) OECD releases BEPS discussion drafts on attribution of profits to
permanent establishments and transactional profit splits

 

     In
June 2017, OECD invited Public comments on the following discussion drafts:

 

–     Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments
, which deals with work in relation to Action 7
(“Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment
Status”) of the BEPS Action Plan;

  Revised Guidance on Profit Splits,
which deals with work in relation to Actions 8-10 (“Assure that transfer
pricing outcomes are in line with value creation”) of the BEPS Action
Plan.

 

3) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action
Plans

 

(i)   OECD releases further guidance on Country-by-Country reporting
(BEPS Action 13)

 

     On
06/09/2017, the OECD’s Inclusive Framework on BEPS has released two sets of
guidance to give greater certainty to tax administrations and MNE Groups alike
on the implementation and operation of Country-by-Country (CbC) Reporting (BEPS
Action 13).

 

     Existing guidance on the implementation of
CbC Reporting has been updated and now addresses the following issues: 1) the
definition of revenues; 2) the treatment of MNE groups with a short accounting
period; and 3) the treatment of the amount of income tax accrued and income tax
paid. The complete set of interpretative guidance related to CbC Reporting
issued so far is presented in the document released today.

 

     Guidance has also been released on the
appropriate use of the information contained in CbC Reports. This includes
guidance on the meaning of “appropriate use”, the consequences of
non-compliance with the appropriate use condition and approaches that may be
used by tax administrations to ensure the appropriate use of CbCR information.

 

(ii)  Neutralising the tax effects of branch mismatch arrangements

 

     On
27/07/2017,
the OECD released a report on Neutralising the Effects of
Branch Mismatch Arrangements
(BEPS Action 2).

 

     In October 2015, as part of the final BEPS
package, the OECD/G20 published a report on Neutralising the Effects of
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
(OECD, 2015). This report set out
recommendations for domestic rules that put an end to the use of hybrid
entities to generate multiple deductions for a single expense or deductions
without corresponding taxation of the same payment. While the 2015 Report
addresses mismatches that are a result of differences in the tax treatment or
characterisation of hybrid entities, it did not directly consider similar
issues that can arise through the use of branch structures. These branch
mismatches occur where two jurisdictions take a different view as to the
existence of, or the allocation of income or expenditure between, the branch
and head office of the same taxpayer. These differences can produce the same
kind of mismatches that are targeted by the 2015 Report thereby raising the
same issues in terms of competition, transparency, efficiency and fairness.
Accordingly, this new report sets out recommendations for changes to domestic
law that would bring the treatment of these branch mismatch structures into
line with outcomes described in the 2015 Report.

 

(iii) Major progress reported towards a fairer and more effective
international tax system

 

     The
latest Report from OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría to G20 Leaders  describes the continuing fight against tax
avoidance and tax evasion as one of the major success stories of the G20,
founded on enhanced international co-operation. 
The report updates progress in key areas of OECD-G20 tax work, including
movement towards automatic exchange of information between tax authorities and
implementation of key measures to address tax avoidance by multinationals.

 

     The report to G20 Leaders highlights
progress in each of the areas where OECD has been mandated to boost
international co-operation on tax issues. 
This includes ongoing movement towards greater transparency, principally
through the work of the OECD-hosted Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes, which now includes 142 members and is managing
worldwide implementation of the Common Reporting Standard and the first
automatic exchanges of financial account information (AEOI), to take place in
September 2017.

 

    Global Forum members have established close
to 2,000 bilateral exchange relationships for AEOI. “These efforts are already
paying off, with 500000 people having disclosed offshore assets and around EUR
85 billion in additional tax revenue identified as a result of voluntary
compliance mechanisms and offshore investigations.” Mr Gurría said.

 

   Implementation also continues on measures to
reduce tax avoidance by multinational enterprises under the G20/OECD BEPS
Project. 101 countries and jurisdictions are now working on an equal footing
to set standards and monitor implementation via the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework
on BEPS.
The OECD has established a peer review process to assess
implementation of the BEPS minimum standards and work continues on pending
issues including transfer pricing.

 

     At the same time, countries are considering
measures to enhance tax certainty based on the joint OECD-IMF report to G20
Finance Ministers, as well as progressing discussions on the complex issues
around taxation of the digital economy. An interim report on taxation of the
digital economy will be delivered by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS
in early 2018, followed by a final report in 2020.

 

4) Exchange of Information

 

     CFA
Approves New Manual on Information Exchange

 

     In 2006, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs
approved a Manual on Information Exchange. The Manual provides practical
assistance to officials dealing with exchange of information for tax purposes
and may also be useful in designing or revising national manuals.

 

   The Manual follows a modular approach. It
first discusses general and legal aspects of exchange of information and then
covers the following specific subject matters:

(1) Exchange of Information on Request,

(2) Spontaneous Information Exchange,

(3) Automatic (or Routine) Exchange of
Information,

(4) Industry-wide Exchange of Information,

(5) Simultaneous Tax Examinations,

(6) Tax Examinations Abroad,

(7) Country Profiles Regarding Information
Exchange, and

(8) Information Exchange Instruments and
Models.

(9) Module
on joint audits: the Forum on Tax Administration joint Audits Participants Guide

 

     Joint
Audits (JA) are an innovative form of cooperation between countries. Bilateral
or multilateral JA have great potential for transfer pricing audits etc.
A JA is defined as an arrangement whereby Participating Countries agree to
conduct a coordinated audit of one or more related taxable persons (both legal
entities and individuals) where the audit focus has a common or complementary
interest and/or transaction. This new module reproduces the FTA (Forum on Tax
Administration) joint Audits Participants Guide issued by the FTA at its 6th
meeting on 15-16 September 2010 in Istanbul where tax commissioners met to
co-ordinate actions to address international compliance and taxpayer service.
They agreed that major improvements in compliance can be obtained through in
particular a Report on Joint Audits to support coordinated action through joint
audits and this  practical Guide intended
to inform tax auditors and their strategy team http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/13/45988932.pdf.

 

     The modular approach allows countries to
tailor the design of their own manuals by incorporating only the modules that
are relevant to their specific exchange of information programmes.

 

     Note: The reader may visit
the OECD website and download various reports referred to in this article for
his further studies.

10 Unexplained Investment – Section 69 – A. Y. 2008-09 – Addition based on invoices, delivery notes and stock statement submitted before bank – AO not examined suppliers of stock – No corroborative evidence to support AO’s claim – Physical verification of stock tallying with books of account maintained by assessee – Verification made by bank not relevant evidence – Addition cannot be made on ground of undisclosed income

CIT vs. Shib Sankar Das; 396 ITR 39 (Cal)

The assessee was an individual, carrying on
business as wholesaler of grocery items under a trade name. The Department had
discovered four invoices and delivery notes upon carrying out a survey of the
business premises of the assessee. The Assessing Officer added the aggregate
value of the goods in accordance with the invoices as undisclosed business income
and percentage profits on such goods presumed to have been sold. Furthermore,
during scrutiny proceedings, it was noticed that the assessee had submitted a
stock statement on February 29, 2008 before the bank in the matter of obtaining
enhanced credit facilities. The stock statement stood verified and acted upon
by the bank. This stock statement showed value of stock far in excess of the
stock in the statement disclosed to the Department. The Assessing Officer added
the difference also as undisclosed business income. The Tribunal deleted the
additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   The Assessing Officer
ought to have examined the suppliers to find out the truth or otherwise of the
claim. The Tribunal directed 5% of the value of goods, under the delivery
chalan bearing acknowledgment of receipt, to be added to the gross profit and
the addition of the other three purchases deleted. There was no attempt to
adduce corroborative evidence to support the Assessing Officer’s rejection of
the claim of the assessee. This view taken by the Tribunal was a plausible
view.

 ii)  At
the time of survey, physical verification of the stock was made and it tallied
with the books of account maintained by the assessee. When the Department
itself could not detect a discrepancy in the stock, a verification made by a
person not concerned with the assessment could not be relevant evidence to
lawfully presume undisclosed income. The correctness of the verification made
by the bank was not determined. The Tribunal was right in deleting the
addition. No substantial question of law arose.”

PART B: RTI Act, 2005

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Real time updates for Right to Information cases via email, SMS

The Central Information Commission (CIC) has taken an e-leap and would function like an e-court with all its case files moving digitally and the applicant being alerted about case hearings through an SMS and email. So now one can get real time updates while filing a complaint or appeal under Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Starting mid of September 2016, CIC would move to a new software, which would make the hearings faster and more convenient. As soon as an RTI applicant files an appeal or a complaint, he would be given a registration number and would get an alert on email and mobile phone about his case. The case would then be electronically transferred immediately to the concerned information commissioner’s registry electronically.

All this would be done within hours. At present, the process takes a few days.

The new system would also alert the RTI applicant about the date of hearing. An automatic SMS and email would be generated. Apart from this, the applicant would get an email in advance listing out the records given by him to CIC and the government’s submissions in his case. A senior CIC official told ET, “At present, the appellant and the ministry sometimes appear in the case without knowing what the submissions are. So this would help both sides in preparing for the case.”

The Commission would be able to expedite the processing of applications with the new software. At present, it also has to deal with complaints of loss of case files and non registration of cases. The facility would not only benefit the appellants but also information commissioners.

When a commissioner would open a case file on his computer, he would get a ready background of the specific case and also details about the appellant. The official said, “We would know if he has more appeals pending. This could facilitate hearing of multiple appeals of the same person on a given day. It would directly impact pendency as more cases would be disposed in a day.” CIC has already scanned 1.5 lakh files and converted them into electronic files.

(Source : Economic Times, September 05, 2016)

[2015] 60 taxmann.com 203 (New Delhi CESTAT) – CCE, Chandigarh vs. A.S. Financial

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Marketing services provided to a Bank using their publicity material
cannot be regarded as service provided under brand name/trade name of
Bank – Benefit of small scale service provider’s exemption available.

Facts:
Assessee
in terms of agreement with ICICI Bank was providing service of
promotion and marketing. Threshold exemption was claimed for commission
received for said services. Department denied exemption on the ground
that assessee was acting as the franchisee of ICICI and was providing
services under their brand/trademark and hence was not eligible for
threshold exemption under notification no. 6/2005-ST.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that just promoting products of the Bank by using their
publicity materials or displaying banners showing “franchise of ICICI”
would not mean that assessee was providing business auxiliary services
to the Bank, under the brand of ICICI. Services provided by the assessee
are business auxiliary services and the services provided by the Bank
are banking and financial services and assessee is not the franchisee of
the Bank as it is not providing financial services by using business
model or the trade name of the Bank. It is not the case where assessee
was paying some amount to the Bank for using its brand name or trade
name. On the contrary, it is the Bank which is paying to the assessee
for providing the marketing services. Hence, benefit of threshold
exemption is available.

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2015 (39) STR 612 (Tri.-Bang.) Embitel Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Bangalore

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Refund of CENVAT credit for want of registration at the time of exports and availment of CENVAT credit cannot be rejected. Subsequent registration shall also be considered sufficient compliance for refund of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The Appellants claimed refund of accumulated CENVAT credit used for export of services. Refund claim was rejected on the premise that during the period of availment of CENVAT credit and making exports, the Appellants were not registered. It was contended that the issue is no longer res integra and it was squarely covered in case of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Bangalore 2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar.). The Department claimed that the said decision was not applicable to the facts of the case since the notification in the present case specifically requires export to be made from the registered premises. The Department placed reliance on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in case of CCE, New Delhi vs. Hari Chand Shri Gopal 2010 (260) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was held that conditions of notification should be strictly followed and there cannot be any differentiation between substantive conditions and procedural conditions.

Held:
Para 3 of the said notification was related to submission of application and the reference to registered premises was for the limited purpose of determining where the refund claim shall be filed. There is no bar or prohibition in the law for making exports from unregistered premises. Relying on the decision of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal observed that there is no condition of registration for availment of CENVAT credit in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. In fact, it is a settled law that an assessee is entitled to CENVAT credit even in cases of clandestine removal and during unregistered period. Once CENVAT credit is admissible and the same cannot be utilised and when the rule provides for refund, such refund cannot be rejected. In any case, subsequent registration, of the premises from where exports took place, is also enough. The decision in Hari Chand Shri Gopal (supra) was not applicable in the present case since there was no condition in the Notification which required the assessee to register the premises. Accordingly, refund claim was allowed. However, the matter was remanded to original authority for verification of the correctness of the amount claimed.

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BCAS Practice Management Survey 2015

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I. Prologue:
The Infotech & 4i Committee of the BCAS conducted a first of its kind practice management survey during June 2015 amongst its members to provide vital data points to the members to benchmark themselves with their peers and to make an objective assessment of their own practice and how they can scale up their practice. The survey results have been also compared with similar survey in the US where feasible, for further insight.

II. Data:
This being the first ever survey, the response from the members has been inadequate. At the same time, most response have been meaningful. Given below is the tabulated summary and analysis of the responses. We hope that this will induce many more firms to participate next time around. Rounding off and approximations have been used wherever data was incoherent to make it comparable.

III. Findings:

1) We stratified the responses into four categories: Firms having 1 proprietor-3 partners, 4-6 partners, 7-9 partners and 10 or more partners.

2) The tabulation of the responses for firms in INDIA is given below:

If we look at firms in USA for a comparison, here is a snapshot from a survey conducted by Rosenberg Associates:

3) The analysis of the responses is given below:

a) Respondents for firms with 7-9 partners were very few, and their data is skewed. Example: Average net revenue of such firms is Rs.1.51 crore, whereas the average of firms with 4-6 partners is Rs.2.46 crore. It is possible that the above data may not be a true representation of the real world firms having 7-9 partners.

b) Size:
i) Gross fee per partner is showing an upward trend; where larger the firm, larger is the gross fee per partner.

ii) Similarly, net profit per partner is showing an upward trend.

iii) Net revenues of the firms is showing a healthy upward trend, commensurate to the size of the firm.

c) % to Net revenues: Staff compensation is 32% of the net revenues, overheads (S, G & A) is 21% of the net revenues and partner net income is 45% of the net revenues of the surveyed firm. The staff compensation average in US is 42% which indicates that US firms pay more to their staff than Indian firms. It also conversely means that in India, partners take home ratio is more than their counterparts in USA, which may further indicate that US firms employ more qualified resources.

d) Net revenues of firms at Rs.62 lakh for a 1 proprietor-3 partner firm when compared to Rs.2 crore.

When one looks at US firms, the smallest of the firms have average revenues of Rs.8.8 crore, with the larger firms averaging Rs.45 crore and more. The per partner fees start at Rs.3.5 crore and go above Rs.7.8 crore on an average. Even the net profit per partner averages Rs.1.27 crore and goes to Rs.2.4 crore and beyond for larger firms.

Even discounting for purchasing power parity and professional market adjustments (developed market in US vs. emerging market in India) , Indian firms have a lot of catch up to do. They can bill so much more and partners take home significantly higher than what they currently do.

This strengthens the case for niche practices, for concentrated efforts of specialising in service areas, for commanding higher fees and developing higher per partner revenues. This reinforces the argument that CA firms in India need to come together, consolidate operations and become full service firms with partners focusing on specific service areas and sub-service areas.

IV. Epilogue:

The Infotech and 4i Committee hopes that this survey will be useful to our members, to plan for the future.

Please send your feedback and suggestions to gm@bcasonline.org mentioning “BCAS Practice Management Survey 2015” in the subject line.

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Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FAT CA) and Common Reporting Standards (CRS) – the next stage

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Background
In the first two of my articles that were
published in the BCA Journal (February 2015 and April 2015 issues), we
had looked at the broad approach under FATCA and some portions of the
(then) draft regulations which had been at that stage circulated by the
Government to a small group for comments. The purpose of this article is
to trace the developments since then and address specific matters.

Before
proceeding, I must state that the views expressed in the article are my
personal views. They are not intended to be in the nature of tax advice
to the reader. They cannot be used as a defence against penalties
either under FATCA or any other law. The intent is to make readers aware
of a possible view. In regard to specific situations, they should
obtain advice from US tax advisors.

In the field of FATCA, the
Government of India signed the Model 1 Inter-Governmental Agreement
(IGA) on 9th July, 2015. The Rules for reporting u/s. 285BA were
notified on 7th August, 2015 and the first reporting deadline in respect
of records for 2014 was set at 31st August, 2015. This deadline was
later extended to 10th September, 2015. The initial guidance was issued
on 31st August and it is expected that additional detailed guidance may
be available later in the year. Even before these developments took
place, India signed the Minutes of Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreement (MCAA) in Paris as part of India’s commitment to be an early
adopter of OECD’s Common Reporting Standards (CRS).

IGA and the Rules
The
IGA lays down certain broad principles of the inter- Governmental
cooperation. Under Article 10(1), the IGA enters into force on the day
when India notifies the US that it has completed its internal procedures
for entry into force of the IGA. As India notified the US accordingly,
the IGA has entered into force.

Rules 114F, 114G and 114H
governing the reporting and the new reporting form i.e. Form 61B have
been introduced in the Income-tax Rules 1962 with effect from August 7,
2015. The attempt here is to examine the IGA and the Rules together for
ease of comparison and understanding.

Reporting deadlines and information required
The Table below gives the FATCA and the CRS reporting deadlines and the information required to be reported.



Abbreviations:
TIN – Taxpayer Identification Number; DOB – Date of birth; POB – Place
of Birth; DOI – Date of Incorporation; POI – Place of Incorporation;
NPFI – Non-Participating Financial Institution

An NPFI is a
financial institution as defined in Article 1(r) of the IGA1 other than
an Indian financial institution (FI) or an FI of any other jurisdiction
with which the US has an IGA. Where an FI is treated as an NPFI in terms
of the IGA between that other jurisdiction and the US, such NPFI will
also be treated as an NPFI in India.

Who is to report
In
terms of Rule 114G(1), every reporting financial institution (FI) has
to do the relevant reporting. The term reporting FI is defined under
Rule 114F(7) to mean

– A financial institution which is resident
(the reference here is to tax residence status) in India but excluding a
branch outside India of an Indian FI
– A ny branch in India of an FI that is not (tax) resident in India

In both cases, a non-reporting FI (not to be confused with NPFI) will be excluded from the ambit of the term reporting FI.

An Indian bank’s branch in (say) London will not be treated as a reporting FI but a Singapore or a US bank’s branch in India will be treated as reporting FI under Rule 114F(7).

Rule
114F(3) defines a financial institution to mean a custodial
institution, a depository institution, an investment entity or a
specified insurance company. The Explanation to Rule 114F(3) explains
the meaning of the four terms used in the sub-rule.

Under Rule 114F(5), a ‘non-reporting financial institution’ means any FI that is, –

(a)
A Government entity, an international organisation or a central bank
except where the FI has depository, custodial, specified insurance as
part of its commercial activity;
(b) R etirement funds of the Government, international organisation, central bank at (a) above;
(c) A non-public fund of the armed forces, an employee state insurance fund, a gratuity fund or a provident fund;
(d)
A n entity which is Indian FI solely because of its direct equity or
debt interest in the (a) to (c) above; (e) A qualified credit card
issuer;
(f) A FI that renders investment advice, manages portfolios
for and acts on behalf or executes trades on behalf a customer for such
purposes in the name of the customer with a FI other than a
non-participating FI;
(g) A n exempt collective investment vehicle;
(h)
A trust set up under Indian law to the extent that the trustee is a
reporting FI and reports all information required to be reported in
respect of financial accounts under the trust;
(i) A n FI with a local client base;
(j) A local bank;
(k)
In case of any US reportable account, a controlled foreign corporation
or sponsored investment entity or sponsored closely held investment
vehicle.

Paras (I), (J) and (K) of the Explanation to Rule
114F(5) clarify that Employees State Insurance Fund set up under the ESI
Act 1948 or a gratuity fund set under the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972
or the provident fund set up under the PF Act 1925 or under the
Employees’ (PF and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1952 will be treated as
non-reporting FI.

Para (N) of the Explanation to Rule 114F(5)
defines an FI with a local client base as one that does not have a fixed
place of business outside India and which also does not solicit
customers or account holders outside India. It should not operate a
website that indicates its offer of services to US persons or to persons
resident outside India. The test of residency to be applied here is
that of tax residency. At least 98%, by value, of the financial accounts
maintained by the FI must be held by Indian tax residents. The local FI
must, however, set in place a system to do due diligence of financial
accounts in accordance with Rule 114H.

The term ‘local bank’ will
include a cooperative credit society, which is operated without profit
i.e. it does not operate with profit motive. In this case also offering
of account to US persons or to persons resident outside India, will be
treated as a bar to being characterised as a local bank. The assets of
the local bank should not exceed US$ 175 million (assume Rs. 1050
crores, although the USD-INR exchange rate may fluctuate) and the sum of
its assets and those of its related entities does not exceed US$ 500
million (assume Rs. 3,000 crores). Certain other conditions also apply.

What is a financial account
Rule
114F(1) defines a ‘financial account’ to mean an account (other than an
excluded account) maintained by an FI and includes (i) a depository
account; (ii) a custodial account (iii) in the case of an investment
entity, any equity or debt interest in the FI; (iv) any equity or debit
interest in an FI if such interest in the institution is set up to avoid
reporting in accordance with Rule 114G and for a US reportable account,
if the debt or equity interest is determined directly or indirectly
with reference to assets giving rise to US withholdable payments; and
(v) cash value insurance contract or an annuity contract (subject to
certain exceptions).

For this purpose, the Explanation to Rule 114F(1) clarifies that a ‘depository account’ includes any commercial, savings, time or thrift account or an account that is evidenced by certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness or other similar instrument maintained by a FI in the ordinary course of banking or similar business. It also includes an account maintained by an insurance company pursuant to a guaranteed investment contract. In ordinary parlance, a ‘depository account’ relates to a normal bank account plus certificates of deposit (CDs), recurring deposits, etc. A ‘custodial account’ means an account, other than an insurance contract or an annuity contract, or the benefit of another person that holds one or more financial assets. In normal parlance, this would largely refer to demat accounts. The National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL) statement showing all of their investments listed at one place will give the readership an idea of what a ‘custodial account’ entails. These definitions are at slight variance with the commonly understood meaning of these terms in India.

Para (c) of the Explanation clarifies that the term ‘equity interest’ in an FI means,

(a)    In the case of a partnership, share in the capital or share in the profits of the partnership; and
(b)    In the case of a trust, any interest held by
–    Any person treated as a settlor or beneficiary of all or any portion of the trust; and
–    Any other natural person exercising effective control over the trust.

For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the beneficiary has the direct or the indirect right to receive under a mandatory distribution or a discretionary distribution from the trust.

An ‘insurance contract’ means a contract, other than an annuity contract, under which the issuer of the insurance contract agrees to pay an amount on the occurrence of a specified contingency involving mortality, morbidity, accident, liability or property. An insurance contract, therefore, includes both assurance contracts and insurance contracts. An ‘annuity contract’ means a contract under which the issuer of the contract agrees to make a periodic payment where such is either wholly or in part linked to the life expectancy of one or more individuals. A ‘cash value insurance contract’ means an insurance contract that has a cash value but does not include indemnity reinsurance contracts entered into between two insurance companies. In this context, the cash value of an insurance contract means

(a)    Surrender value or the termination value of the contract without deducting any surrender or termination charges and before deduction of any outstanding loan against the policy; or

(b)    The amount that the policy holder can borrow against the policy

whichever is less. The cash value will not include any amount payable on death of the life assured, refund of excess premiums, refund of premium (except in case of annuity contracts), payment on account of injury or sickness in the case of insurance (as opposed to life assurance) contracts Para (h) of the Explanation to Rule 114F(1) defines an ‘excluded account’ to mean

(i)    a retirement or pension account where

  •     the account is subject to regulation as a personal retirement account;

  •     the account is tax favoured i.e. the contribution is either tax deductible or is excluded from taxable income of the account holder or is taxed at a lower rate or the investment income from such account is deferred or is taxed at a lower rate;

  •    information reporting is required to the income-tax authorities with respect to such account;
  •    withdrawals are conditional upon reaching a specified retirement age, disability, death or penalties are applicable for withdrawals before such events;

  •    the contributions to the account are limited to either US$ 50,000 per annum or to US$ One million through lifetime.

(ii)    an account which satisfies the following requirements viz.

  •    the account is subject to regulations as a savings vehicle for purposes other than retirement or the account (other than a US reportable account) is subject to regulations as an investment vehicle for purposes other than for retirement and is regularly traded on an established securities market;

  •    the account is tax favoured i.e. the contribution is either tax deductible or is excluded from taxable income of the account holder or is taxed at a lower rate or the investment income from such account is deferred or is taxed at a lower rate;

  •     withdrawals are conditional upon specific criteria (educational or medical benefits) or penalties are applicable for withdrawals before such criteria are met;

  •     the contributions to the account are limited to either US$ 50,000 per annum or to US$ One million through lifetime.

(iii)    An account under the Senior Citizens Savings Scheme 2004;

(iv)    A life insurance contract that will end before the insured reaches the age of 90 years (subject to certain conditions to be satisfied);

(v)    An account held by the estate of a deceased, if the documentation for the account includes a copy of the will of the deceased or a copy of the deceased’s death certificate;

(vi)    An account established in connection with any of the following

  •    A court order or judgment;

  •   A sale, exchange or lease of real or personal property, if the account is for the extent of down payment, earnest money, deposit to secure the obligation under the transaction, etc.

 

  •    An FI’s obligation towards current or future taxes in respect of real property offered to secure any loan granted by the FI;

(vii)    In the case of an account other than a US reportable account, the account exists solely because a customer overpays on a credit card or other revolving credit facility and the overpayment is not immediately returned to the customer. Up to December 31, 2015, there is a cap of US$ 50,000 applicable for such overpayment.

How to report

Under Rule 114G(9), the reporting FI must file the relevant Form 61B with the office of the Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) electronically under a digital signature of the designated director. The reporting FI must register on the income-tax e-filing website through its own login giving certain information including a ‘designated director’ and a ‘principal officer’. Although not stated in the Rules, the latter will generally be the contact person for the Government of India for any queries and the former will be the escalation point. These two terms are used under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). Currently, the registration is possible without obtaining a General Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN).

The report in Form 61B is, however, required to be uploaded through the personal PAN login of the designated director on the e-filing website. This feature is likely to undergo a change for the next reporting cycle.

Next steps and developments to come

The FIs will need to set up systems to do extensive due diligence procedures for existing accounts in order to comply with Rule 114H and to develop systems to capture the reporting information. Under Rule 114G(11), the local regulators for the FIs viz. the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority will have to issue instructions or guidelines to the FIs under their respective supervision. To avoid conflicting instructions, such instructions must be synchronised. At the Government’s end, the e-filing website must allow for filing of Form 61B through the reporting FIs login under the digital signature of a person who is not necessarily a person authorised to sign the tax return of the reporting FI. We will connect again on due diligence and on these other developments.

The Extension Rigmarole – the profession needs to introspect

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When this issue reaches you, the 30th September deadline for furnishing returns of corporate tax payers as well as those whose accounts are required to be audited will have passed. Either the due date will have been extended, forcing my colleagues to continue working strenuously or they would have heaved a sigh of relief, having toiled day and night to discharge an obligation which is primarily cast on the taxpayer. I have been in this profession for more than three decades and I must say with the deepest anguish that the position has not changed materially. Our profession continues to shoulder the burden of those whom it serves, with those served hardly realising it. Over the years, the onus, responsibility and obligations have increased, while the reward, remuneration and respect has not.

It is a topic that has been dealt with in earlier editorials and yet seeing the palpable tension that my colleagues are bearing, I felt that it is appropriate that the issue is brought to the fore once again. It is really troubling to see our professional brothers hoping for the extension announcement. It is almost as if, a farmer with a parched throat is looking heavenward for those providential droplets of rain.

Ensuring that the accounts are audited, the particulars of tax audit are verified, and the income tax return is filed before the due date is the responsibility of the businessman auditee. The reason for seeking extension of the due date is that the ITR forms were notified late. However, if one looks at the various representations being made before the government authorities, these have been made by professionals in their individual capacity and institutions of professionals, including our very own ICAI. I do not see a trade or tax-payers association involved in this exercise. When these representations have not borne fruit, the judiciary is being looked at as the saviour. Even here, out of the eight writ petitions/public interest litigations filed before various High Courts, 5 have been filed by individuals and 3 have been filed by professional bodies. Trade associations/business bodies are conspicuous by their absence.

Over the years, our profession has not been able to distinguish between the role and responsibilities of the client, and we Chartered Accountants as auditors or tax consultants. It is true that audit report states that preparation of financial statements and compilation of particulars required for tax audit are the responsibility of the auditee; but this is more in letter than in spirit. In the recent past, the complexities of law, the compliance requirements, have increased manifold. The auditor plays a significant role in compiling the details and in finalising the accounts, particularly in case of non-corporate assessees. To ensure proper compliance, he has to remain involved, while as an auditor he has to remain independent. Wearing these two hats is making a diligent professional either lose his hair or turning them grey!

The attitude of the government is also difficult to fathom. Various forms and procedures are prescribed/notified by the government authorities, taking their own sweet time to do so. I am not for asking for extension of time, but in fairness it must be pointed out that if the CBDT takes more than a year after the Finance Bill for the relevant year is passed, to notify the relevant forms and update its software, it is unfair to expect the tax payer to comply with the regulations within a period of two months. The Delhi High Court, while rejecting the petition for extending the due date, has already advised the government to come out with the prescription on the first day of the assessment year. Assuming that the government authorities have their own compulsions and limitations, one really does not understand as to why the due date should be so sacrosanct and cast in stone. It was interesting to read the observations of the Hon’ble judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court who asked the respondents as to whether tax payers would run away from the tax net if the due date was extended. Having said that, it is really not appropriate that we expect the judiciary to intervene in what is essentially a policy matter.

It is time that our profession does some serious introspection. We must make our clients aware of the responsibilities, and the line between the responsibilities of the auditee and that of the auditor must be redrawn. As far as documentation is concerned, we must really put our house in order. If we have communicated with our clients defining our role and responsibility, we must keep appropriate evidence of such communications. This will help us to defend ourselves, should fingers be pointed at us. If for a variety of reasons we are not in a position to discharge the onus that is being cast on us, we must explain this both to the government authorities, as well as to our clients. We must point out to the government that considering the increased cost of compliance, there is a very good case for raising the threshold limit of tax audit. If one takes the cost inflation index as the basis, the limit for business should be around Rs.3 crore while for that of a profession should be Rs.80 lakh. If these realistic limits are introduced, possibly the clients will be able to afford the cost of compliance.

We must interact with our clients so that they are made aware of the complexities of the compliance requirements. This will enable either the clients themselves or their trade associations to make proper representations before the government to ensure that while the objective of the government in calling for information is met, the taxpayers are not unduly inconvenienced. In this regard, the tax payer must be at the forefront, while we should be acting as catalysts. To illustrate, in case of assessees whose total income exceeds Rs. 25 lakh, they are required to submit details of their assets. One of these particulars is in regard to life insurance policies. The instructions in the form state that the premium paid till date is to be treated as the cost. For long-term policies with variable premium, it is virtually impossible for an assessee to have this data on hand. Instead of the premium, the sum assured along with the annual premium could also serve the purpose of the Department.

I am aware that what I am suggesting cannot be achieved at one go. It is a continuous process. One only hopes that the process begins in right earnest. As we bid adieu to Ganesha, the God of learning, one hopes that wisdom dawns on all concerned and the prayers of my colleagues are answered.

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FESTIVAL OF FRIENDSHIP & FORGIVENESS

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Friendship with all

Like ‘friendship day’, the Jains observe “friendship with all” festival on Samvatsari, i.e. the final day of paryusan. This day is the finale of eight days of intensive spiritual activities such as fasting or self-restraint on eating, samayika puja, listening to spiritual discourses, pratikarmana (regretting the wrong doings), reading of religious books, etc. In general, parusyana is the unique eight-day Jaina festival of fasting when every Jain – young or old, man or woman – all and sundries would endeavour to live a simple, sacred and sin-free life. On the final day, it is essential to FORGIVE everybody, particularly those people with whom one had direct dealing, relation and connection and ask for their pardon. This practice of ‘forget and forgive’ should be done sincerely, honestly and from the bottom of the heart.

There is an old Chinese saying :

“the enemy is best defeated who is defeated with kindness.”

Maitri bhavana reaches one:

  • To make and/or retain friends, express regret as soon as possible regardless of whether you are right or wrong,
  • Visualise a person as your dear friend even though he considers you as his enemy,
  • Sincerely wish to heal the breach between him and you with powerful bhavana of friendliness.

The importance of the Bhavana of Friendliness: The most important sutra in Jain spiritual practice is:

“Khamemi savvajive, savvejiva khamam iu me

Mitti me savva bhuesu, veram majjha na kenai”

The above means:

“I forgive all souls and request them all to forgive me. All the souls are my friends; none is my enemy. I do not have a feeling of enmity towards anybody”.

Forgiveness:

“A sadhaka has to first increase the tranquility of the mind by forgiving, and begging forgiveness of, the entire world of beings.”

Constant reflection of this bhavana cleanses the heart of destructive negative thoughts such as revenge, retaliation, enmity, intolerance, etc. It makes one’s heart extremely light as he considers everybody around him as his friends. This bhavana softens the heart and nourishes the capacity of forgiveness and forbearance. This thought prepares one for higher sadhana towards one’s goal of eventual transcendental emancipation. The mantra of ‘forget and forgive’ creates goodwill and amity. It increases one’s power of tolerance and patience and makes a person gentle. It will also create an atmosphere that encourages the concepts of ‘unity of mankind’ and ‘peaceful co-existence’, ‘mutual co-operation’ and ‘interdependence’. It makes life thoroughly enjoyable.

We need to constantly remember:

  • Forgiveness means transcending our judgement and hatred
  • To stop blaming others for our shortcomings
  • Forgiveness is 100% and unconditional
  • To forgive ourselves
  • Absence of forgiveness tantamounts to being imprisoned and an unawakened life
  • Forgiveness is the ultimate test for a person who is willing and able to live an enlightened life.
  • To forgive, we must transcend our bodies and learn to be detached.

Jainism firmly believes that one’s own soul is responsible for everything that is happening in its life. It has to suffer or enjoy the fruits of its own past deeds. Once this philosophy is accepted, one will never sit in judgement and blame others and will desist from the thought of revenge or retaliation.

“The non-violent approach does not immediately change the heart of the oppressor. It first does something to the hearts and souls of those committed to it. It gives them a new self-respect, it gives strength and courage that they did not know they had. Finally, it reaches the opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality” [Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)].

Every hurt or sting is like being bitten by a snake. One rarely dies from a snake bite, but once bitten, it is impossible to be unbitten, and the damage is done by the venom that continues to flow through our system. The venom is: ‘bitterness and hatred’ that we hang on to, long after the snake bite – hurt. It is this venom that destroys our peace of mind. The simple act of forgiveness saves us from anger and hatred and grants us freedom. Forgiveness buys peace of mind.

I believe Forgiveness is joyful, easy and above all freeing. It relieves us of the burdens of resentment, forget past grievances and is another mode of practicing detachment which means: ‘let go’.

So let us purge our prejudices, feelings of resentment, revenge, enmity, retaliation, anger and above all malice towards others. In other words, practice forgiveness and make. ALL ARE MY FRIENDS; I HAVE NO ENEMIES – the anchor of our life.

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CWG Seam 2010 – Criminal Justice System in India – 03-09-2015.

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Five years after the scandal-ridden 19th Commonwealth Games were staged, a court in Delhi has convicted five people.

The convictions—for causing a loss of Rs.1.42 crore to the government—are the first related to alleged financial improprieties amounting to several hundred crores of rupees in the conduct of the 2010 Games.

What is disturbing is the long time it has taken for the first convictions in a scandal that shamed India.

This is not the end of the journey through the justice system for the convicts: an appeals process that can take many more years will ensure that the last word on the case won’t be heard anytime soon.

India cannot overturn its legal traditions and laws and resort to Chinese-style corruption trials. But this is a moment for our lawmakers and the judiciary to introspect—without greatly simplifying the procedural aspects of criminal law, the system will remain geared to the advantage of wrongdoers.

(Source: Quick Edit in Mint dated 03-09-2015.)

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Raghuram Rajan’s ideas should inform public discourse and policymaking

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In an interview to ET, RBI governor Raghuram Rajan made some points that should inform the public discourse, besides policy-making. One, India’s economic situation is relatively robust and not particularly vulnerable to turbulence sweeping across the world from its epicentre in China. Two, creating strong institutions and flexible markets is the best way to absorb shock; it would be silly to turn our back on the world. Three, macroeconomic stability, functional hedging mechanisms and their adoption by economic agents are the best guarantee of avoiding currency shocks. Four, sectoral remedies run the risk of shifting rather than solving a problem. Five, while fears in certain quarters about a secular stagnation across the world might be exaggerated, India should use their negative effect on commodity prices to consolidate its war on inflation and vanquish it.

While not totally ruling out an interest rate response to economic woes, Rajan’s preference is to kill inflation expectations rather than to prop up growth with negative rates of interest. He points to the quandary of those central bankers whose policy rates are already close to zero and cannot use rate cuts to boost growth to argue that the stimulus to growth has to come from other quarters. Introducing GST, labour reform and removing the obligation on mills to make 40% of the yarn they produce as hanks for use on handlooms are examples of such other boosts that he did not mention. And raising productivity is the surest response, as he argues, to the increased competition arising from imports made cheaper by a depreciating yuan. Rajan did not dwell on the added downward pressure on the rupee that would be exerted by an interestrate cut and the burden this would place on the economy.

What Rajan says is perfect economic sense. The trouble is to align this with political sense for those who have to worry about winning elections. This is possible when economic sense permeates the public discourse, so that political leaders find the courage to argue for it, even at the expense of short-term pain.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 28-08-2015.)

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Being human: Will technology mean the end of work? That could be a good or a bad thing

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“If the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves” – that was Aristotle, anticipating a pleasant future of self-operating lutes and looms. That is a vision we have always nurtured. But with each big leap in technological progress, we have also worried about the economic and social disruption it could set off, the efficiency of machines and the impending obsolescence of being human.

With the digital revolution and its promise of self-driving cars, robots, machine intelligence and an Internet of Things, there is legitimate reason to worry about a jobless future. A recent Oxford study that analysed over 700 occupations concluded that 47% of these jobs – including in transport, logistics, office administration – could be automated out of existence in the coming decade. The advocates of tech claim that new opportunities are constantly being created. But what if they are wrong?

Tech entrepreneur Vivek Wadhwa is among the pessimists. He believes we are looking at a future where millions are permanently unemployed. This could be a dystopian future, with a tiny tech elite operating the machinery of civilisation while everybody else is dirt poor. Or it could be an arcadian one if, let us say, the government guarantees an income to everyone and we are liberated from the compulsion of having to slave away at work. In such a world work would be like a philanthropic vocation – engaged in only by those who have a yen for it. They might have de-addiction centres for workaholics even as the rest of us cultivate our hobbies. Don’t hand over everything to the machines, though. Masters may not require slaves but we could all be slaves of machines – which Aristotle did not reckon into his pretty picture.

(Source: Editorial in The Times Of India dated 23-07-2015.)

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Miles to go – Doing Business in India report card a much-needed reality check

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The business leaders, who met Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week,
would have been well served had the report entitled “Assessment of State
Implementation of Business Reforms” been released ahead of the meeting.
This exercise, conducted by the Department for Industrial Promotion and
Policy in collaboration with multilateral agencies, revealed in stark
terms the distance India’s states have to travel to create
business-friendly environments. The Centre deserves credit for
conceiving an exercise that highlights the gravity of the problem. That
India is a tough place to do business is no secret; it ranks 142 out of
189 in the World Bank’s Doing Business report of 2015. The Prime
Minister wants to place India within the top 50, and he has leveraged
his chief ministerial experience to convey the message that the
solutions for achieving this do not lie on Raisina Hill alone – the
states have to pull their weight. In a system as argumentative as
India’s it is to his administration’s credit that it managed to get the
states to agree on an exhaustive 98-point action plan last December to
improve the regulatory framework for doing business nationwide. India’s
disparate federation must become a united stakeholder in economic
reform.

It is noteworthy that National Democratic Alliance-ruled
or -allied states topped the overall results. But more pertinent is
that in terms of implementation of the 98-point action plan, no state
made it above 75 per cent, to qualify as a leader, and only seven states
made it to the “aspiring leader” category with scores between 50 and 75
per cent. The worrying factor is the 16 states that were grouped under
“Jump Start Needed” (no surprise, they cover Jammu & Kashmir and the
north-east). Worse, of the eight parameters, the highest score in three
is below 75 per cent. And in enforcing contracts, one of the key
concerns of any investor, the highest score is 55 per cent. The granular
nature of the action plan, grouped under eight broad parameters,
reveals the serious and basic nature of these gaps – more so since they
allow for none of the old alibis regarding step-motherly treatment from
the Centre. For instance, it is striking that no state has a full list
of all the licences, no-objection certificates and registrations
required by a business to set up and operate. Indeed, even states with
high growth rates, such as Maharashtra, cannot claim to offer great
business environments – Gujarat, for instance, scores just 33.3 per cent
in enforcing contracts, on par with Chhattisgarh.

The report is
right to acknowledge it does not take user opinion into account. Much
of the data underlying the indices are shallow, in the sense that
several of them focus on indicators that are not sufficiently
representative of the real problems hampering business. There is no
replacement, thus, for a comprehensive survey of the actual impediments
to business, and not just those reported by state governments. Including
some information on human development indicators – education,
availability of good schools and hospitals and so on – would have also
served as practical information for investors. Overall, however, it
represents a sensible beginning on the implementation of reform and
cooperative federalism.

(Source: Editorial in the Business Standard dated 16-09-2015.)

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DIPP Press Note No. 10 (2015 Series) dated September 22, 2015

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Streamlining the Procedure for Grant of Industrial License

Presently,
the initial validity period of an Industrial License for the Defence
Sector is 7 years, which can be further extended to 10 years.

This
Press Note provides that the initial validity period of an Industrial
License for the Defence Sector will now be 15 years, which can be
further extended to 18 years. In case the License has expired the
Licensee can apply for a fresh License.

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DIPP Clarification dated September 15, 2015

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Clarification on FDI Policy on Facility Sharing Arrangements between Group Companies

This Press Note clarifies as under: –

Facility sharing agreement between group companies through leasing / sub-leasing arrangements for larger interest of business will not be treated as ‘real estate business’ within the provisions of the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2015, provided such arrangements are at arm’s length price in accordance with the provisions of Income Tax Act 1961, and annual lease rent earned by the lessor company does not exceed 5% of its total revenue.

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DIPP Press Note No. 9 (2015 Series) dated September 15, 2015

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Review of existing Foreign Direct Investment policy on Partly Paid Shares and Warrants

This Press Note makes the following two changes to the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2015 with immediate effect: –

1. Para 2.1.5 is amended to read as under: –

‘Capital’ means equity shares; fully, compulsorily & mandatorily convertible preference shares; compulsorily & mandatorily convertible debentures and warrants.

2. Insertion of new para after para 3.3.3 of Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2015: –

3.3.3 bis: Acquisition of Warrants and Partly Paid Shares – An Indian Company issues warrants and partly paid shares to persons resident outside India subject to terms and conditions as stipulated by the Reserve Bank of India, from time to time.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 13 dated September 10, 2015

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Trade Credit Policy – Rupee (INR ) Denominated trade credit

This circular permits Indian importers to enter into loan agreements with overseas lenders to avail trade credit in Rupees (INR) based on the guidelines mentioned below: –

i. Trade credit can be raised for import of all items (except gold) permissible under the extant Foreign Trade Policy.

ii. Trade credit period for import of non-capital goods can be up to one year from the date of shipment or up to the operating cycle, whichever is lower.

iii. Trade credit period for import of capital goods can be up to five years from the date of shipment.

iv. Banks cannot permit roll-over/extension beyond the permissible period.

v. Banks can permit trade credit up to US $ 20 million or its equivalent per import transaction.

vi. Banks can give guarantee, Letter of Undertaking or Letter of Comfort in respect of trade credit for a maximum period of three years from the date of the shipment.

vii. The all-in-cost of such Rupee (INR) denominated trade credit must be commensurate with prevailing market conditions.

viii. All other guidelines for trade credit will be applicable for such Rupee (INR) denominated trade credits.

Overseas lenders can hedge their exposure in Rupees through permitted derivative products in the on-shore market with a bank in India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12 dated September 10, 2015

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Guidelines for Grant of Authorisation for Additional Branches of FFMC/AD Cat. II

This circular has, with immediate effect, modified the guidelines for opening of additional branches by FFMC / AD Cat. II as under: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated September 10, 2015

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Exchange Earners’ Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account – Discontinuation of Statement pertaining to trade related loans and advances

Presently, banks are required to report transactions relating to loans / advances from EEFC account on a quarterly basis to the Regional Office of RBI.

This circular states that banks are, with immediate effect, not required to submit the quarterly statement of loans / advances from EEFC account to the Regional Office of RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 9 dated August 21, 2015

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Foreign Direct Investment – Reporting under FDI Scheme on the e-Biz platform

This circular states that from August 24, 2015 Form FCTRS (Foreign Currency Transfer of Shares) pertaining to transfer of shares, convertible debentures, partly paid shares and warrants from a person resident in India to a person resident outside India or vice versa can be filed online on the eBiz portal of the Government of India. This facility for online filing is an additional facility and the manual system of reporting will continue till further notice.

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Practical aspects of acceptance of deposits by Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies1 – Part-II

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In this Article, we will deal with testing a few transactions, as to whether they fall in the category of deposits, Compliance aspects of post-acceptance of deposits, penal provisions in case of violation of the provisions of Companies Act 2013 (”the Act”) and Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014 (“the Rules”)

1. In respect of the following transactions entered by the Company, whether the amount received can be termed as a Deposit?

a) Amount received from Foreign Company, Body Corporate, Foreign Citizen, and Foreign Collaborators in the course of business transactions;

Ans: Before one can take a shelter of any exemption available under Rule 2 (1) (c) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014, the purpose of the transaction needs to be understood. Although in terms of Rule 2 (1) (c) (ii) of the Rules any amount received from Foreign Company, Body Corporate, Foreign Citizen, and Foreign Collaborators inter-alia is exempt from definition of deposit and thus will fall outside the purview of section 73 -76 of the Act; the amount received as a loan from a Director who is a foreign citizen will not be exempt as a deposits if brought without prior approval of Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Thus loan received from Director who is a foreign citizen out of funds maintained in the account outside India or out of funds in NR(E) or FCNR Account maintained in India without RBI approval will be termed as deposit.

b) Amount received as subscription money for allotment of securities

Ans: A Company allotting securities will have to follow the procedure for allotment of securities as envisaged in section 62 (1) or section 42 read with applicable Rules. In case the Company fails to make allotment of securities within 60 days of receipt of money the amount received will be treated as deposit and the Company will have to refund the amount within 15 days of the permissible period of 60 days to the person who has paid such subscription money. It may not thus be possible in future to keep loan or deposit from an outsider as a deposit on the ground that the shares were intended to be allotted to him.

c) Amount received from Relative of Director

Ans: Amount received from a relative of Director will be exempt in terms of recently amended2 provisions of Rule 2 (1) (c) (viii) provided the relative gives a declaration that the amount given to Company is from his own sources and not borrowed from any other source. Thus the Company’s ability to gather financial resources from close sources has increased multifold, since the amount received from following person defined as relative (Section 2 (77) of Act3) will not be treated as deposit from now:

(i) M embers of a Hindu Undivided Family of a Director (HUF);
(ii) Spouse of Director;
(iii) Father including step father;
(iv) Mother including step mother;
(v) Son, including step son;
(vi) Son’s wife
(vii) Daughter
(viii) Daughter’s Husband;
(ix) Brother including step brother;
(x) Sister including step sister;

2. What is a “ Circular and Circular in form of Advertisement (CoFA )” in terms of deposit Rules

Rule 4 of Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014 provides for Circular and Circular in the form of Advertisement. A Private Company, Non-Eligible Company or Eligible Company4 intending to accept a deposit is required to issue a document disclosing various details as prescribed in Form DPT-1 of the Rules. The main difference is in the mode of placing this information in public domain before issue, which is as follows:

1) Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies issue circular since they can accept deposits only from Members and thus the circular issued, has a limited sphere of application.

2) Eligible Company who can accept deposits from outsiders (not necessarily its Members) will have to issue Circular in the form of an Advertisement in English language and vernacular language newspaper having wide circulation in the state where Company’s registered Office is situated;

Thus what is Circular in DPT-1 for a Private Company; Non-Eligible Company is a Circular in form of Advertisement in case of Eligible Company

3. Is it necessary to file the Circular/Circular in form of Advertisement with the Registrar and what is the validity thereof

The Circular/Circular in Form of Advertisement (CoFA) is required to be filed with the Registrar of Companies having jurisdiction over the Registered Office of the Company 30 days before the date of its issue to members or release in the newspaper as the case may be. Every Circular or CoFA shall remain valid till:

1) Six months from the date when Company’s financial year ends; or

2) Date of AGM when Accounts are adopted by the Members; or

3) Last date by which AGM should have been held in case the same is not held; Whichever is earlier

In every Financial Year, the Company shall issue a fresh Circular/or fresh CoFA for facilitating acceptance deposit.

4. What are the post acceptance compliances in respect of Deposits as prescribed by Deposit Rules 2014

Following are the post acceptance compliance in respect Private Companies/Non-Eligible Companies and Eligible Companies.

a) Rule 5 (1) (2) of the Rules requires that every Company including Private Company shall enter into a contract, 30 days before the date of issue of Circular or CoFA with a Deposit Insurance Service Provider for securing re-payment of deposits in case of default in re-payment by the Company. Sub- Rule (3) provides that cost of premium should be borne by the Company, and its burden should not be passed on to depositors; Sub-Rule (4) provides for penal interest payment liability on the part of Company in case of failure of Company to renew/ default in compliance with terms of contract for availing deposit insurance services and repayment of deposit in case of continuing non-compliance with terms of contract;

b) Rule 6 (1) of the Rules provides for creation of security in the form of charge on the tangible assets mentioned in Sch III of the Act for due repayment principal amount and interest thereon. At any given point of time, the value of assets charged shall not be less than the amount not covered by deposit insurance as mentioned in Rule 5; Further the amount of deposits shall not exceed the market value of assets charged as security, based on valuation made by the registered valuer. Effectively all deposits should be secured by way of either deposit insurance or by way of charge on the assets of the Company;

c) R ule 7, 8 and 9 provide for appointment of Trustee for Depositors, Duties of Trustees and Meeting of Depositors. If the Company is accepting only unsecured deposits, then appointment of Trustee is not mandatory

d) Rule 10, 11,12 14 provide for form of application for deposits; Power of depositor to nominate person in case of death of depositor; obligation of Company to provide deposit receipts and Maintenance of Register of Deposits;

e) Rule 13 provides for creation of Deposit Repayment Reserve Account and maintenance of Liquid Assets. According to this Rule, every Company shall on or before 30th April of every year, deposit an amount not less than 15% of the deposits maturing during the financial year and the financial year next following, in a separate Bank account opened with schedule bank. The amount so deposited shall always remain at least 15% of the total amount of deposits maturing during the financial year and the financial year next following

f) Rule 15-21 deals with following aspects:

(i) General provisions regarding pre-mature repayment – Rule 15
(ii) Compliance pertaining to filing of Return with Registrar of Companies – Rule 16
(iii)    Penal rate of interest payable to depositor in case of overdue deposits – Rule 17
(iv)    Power of Central Govt – Rule 18

(v)    Applicability of section 73-74 to eligible companies – Rule 19

5.    What are the Penal Provisions of the Companies Act 2013 and Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014?

The Companies (Amendment) Act 2015 vide section 76A has provided that, in case of violation of provisions of section 73-76 or Rules made thereunder or deposits accepted in violation of the said section or default made in repayment of the same, the Company shall be liable for the following:

(a)    Repayment of entire amount of deposit, including interest remaining unpaid to the depositors; and

(b)    Fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 crore but which may extend upto Rs. 10 crore

Every Officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25 lakh but which may extend to Rs. 2 crore, or with both.

In case of violation of the provisions of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014 the penalties are as follows:

(a)    Rule 5 (4) default in complying with terms & conditions of contract for maintaining deposit insurance cover or failure to correct the non-compliance in given time – all deposits covered under the Insurance Scheme including interest payable thereon becomes due for repayment;

(b)    Failure to make repayment of such deposits as stated in (a) above, the Company shall be liable for penal interest @ 15 % p.a. for the period of delay and penalty u/s. 76A shall be attracted;

(c)    Rule 17 provides for payment of interest @ 18% p.a. as penal interest in case of overdue deposits which are matured, claimed but unpaid;

(d)    Rule 21 of provides that in absence of provision of any specific penalty Company and every officer in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 5,000/- and where the contravention is continuing one with a further fine of Rs. 500/-for every day after the first during which the contravention continues.

Now alleged tax evasion even in derivatives – SEBI’s recent order

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Background
Yet another case of alleged tax evasion through manipulative trading in stock markets has come to light as per a recent SEBI Order (Ex-parte ad interim Order of SEBI dated 20th August, 2015). In earlier cases, as discussed a few times in this column, the alleged tax evasion was in respect of equity shares. Equity shares were acquired at lower prices, prices were thereafter allegedly increased to very high levels by price manipulation and the shares acquired were then sold to generate tax free long term capital gains. This time, however, the alleged tax evasion (or possibly other objects as discussed later) is through trading in stock options. Certain persons on one side consistently made huge losses and certain persons on the other side made huge profits through trades in stock options at prices that were artificially and significantly different from the “intrinsic price” of the options, as per SEBI. In this order, as in earlier cases, SEBI has, pending further investigation, passed an ex-parte interim order and banned certain parties from accessing or dealing in the capital markets.

Earlier cases of alleged tax evasion through equity shares
There have been several earlier SEBI orders that have held that there has been massive manipulation in the price and trading of certain scrips on stock exchanges with an objective to evade tax. While there have been different orders in respect of different companies, the modus operandi as recorded by SEBI in those orders has been largely similar. The companies, in respect of whose shares such tax evasion was alleged, were earlier usually suspended/ inactive. They did not have any significant revenues, assets, profits, etc.

The companies were generally closely held. Shares of these companies were then acquired by certain persons either directly from the company by way of preferential allotment or through off market transfers by the promoters of such companies. Thereafter, or at a later stage, the share capital in amount and numbers both was substantially increased by way of issue of bonus shares and splitting of face value of shares. The net result was that the cost of acquisition of shares over the expanded capital thus got diluted. The next step was to systematically manipulate the share price of such companies through trading on the stock market at increasingly higher prices. The trading was within a group through circular trading. Thus, the price rose very substantially at the end, often more than 50 times the original price. A period of twelve months passed which resulted in the equity shares acquired by way of preferential allotment or off market purchases to be long-term capital assets. Thereafter, over a period, these acquirers sold their shares. The sales were allegedly synchronised i.e., the sales and purchases were matched in terms of price and time. This was done to parties allegedly connected to the Promoters/company, etc. SEBI alleged that the company, its promoters, the persons who manipulated the share price and the persons who gave an exit to the acquirers at the later stage when the price of the shares were much higher, were all related/connected. SEBI held that this whole exercise was carried out with the objective of earning illegitimate long term capital gains that were tax free. The whole exercise was also in violation of several provisions of Securities Laws being fraudulent, manipulative, etc. In view of this, SEBI passed interim orders prohibiting various parties involved from accessing and dealing in capital markets.

Trading in stock options
In the present case, the alleged manipulation was in case of stock options. As readers are aware, stock options are not created or allotted by the company but are created and traded through the stock market. A facility is offered on stock exchanges for trading in stock options of companies with certain features such as lot size, expiry period, etc. They can be then traded. The strike price of the stock option would have close connection with the price of the shares. For example, there may be an option in respect of shares of company X. The buyer of such option would thus have right to buy a certain number of shares of that company at the strike price. This option he has to exercise on or before the expiry period. However, such stock options are settled by way of reversal before such expiry period. The buyer effectively pays or receives the difference in the price paid by him.

As stated, the strike price at which the options are traded bears a close relation to the price of the underlying share. Thus, for example, if the price of the underlying share is Rs.100, the strike price will have relation with this price with the buyer/seller’s judgment about the expected fluctuations in this price plus other factors such as carrying costs being then factored in. The strike price will usually move depending upon the movements in the price of the underlying shares. Thus, if the price of the underlying shares rises to Rs.120, the strike price of the options too will move in that direction. Other things being equal, it would be rare to find strike price widely diverging with the intrinsic price.

The modus operandi in the present case of manipulations of options
SEBI has described that the particular modus operandi in the present case was as follows.

There were certain parties who dealt in stock options at a price that was unjustifiably very different from the intrinsic price. Thus, for example, they sold options at a strike price that was much higher than the intrinsic price. The options were acquired by a certain group of persons on the other side. Curiously, these sellers reversed the transactions at a low price. The counter parties who were sellers were again the same parties who had originally purchased the options.

The result was that one group of parties made huge losses while another group made huge profits.

SEBI recorded several other findings. These parties were often the only parties who traded in these stock options. They traded with each other very often in close synchronisation. The movement in the price of the options was unreasonable for such short time and also in relation to the underlying price of the shares. The parties often had no other trades.

SEBI was of the view that the transactions were suspicious and with ulterior motives. SEBI believed that the motives could be tax evasion, creation of net worth or other similar motives. In any case, it said that there was clear manipulation of the prices and volumes in violation of several provisions of the Securities Laws. The matters required further investigation, but in the interim, to prevent further violations, SEBI banned the parties from accessing or dealing in the capital markets.

Some of the observations/conclusions of SEBI are worth reviewing.

“The repeated sell of illiquid stock options by the loss-making entities to a set of entities at a price far lower than the theoretical price/intrinsic value and subsequent reversal trades with the same set of entities within a short span of time with a significant difference in buy and sell value of stock options, in itself, exhibits abnormal market behavior and defies economic rationality, especially when there is absolutely no corresponding change in the underlying price of the scrip. On the other hand, trading behavior of profit-making entities exhibited through opening specific trading accounts and operating them exclusively to execute reversal trades in illiquid stock options with a set of entities clearly indicates their role in facilitating loss-making entities in executing their ulterior motive.


Considering the facts and circumstances discussed herein above, I, prima-facie, find that the loss-making entities were deliberately making repeated loss through their reversal trades in stock options which does not make any economic sense, and the profit-making entities were facilitating them by becoming their counterparties and were acting in concert with a common object of intended execution of these suspicious and non- genuine trades. The reasons for executing such trades by these entities could be showing artificial volume and trading interest in these instruments or tax evasion or portraying artificial increase in net worth of a private company/individual. Be as it may, it is amply clear to me that the rationale for such transactions is not genuine and legitimate as the behavior exhibited by these entities defies the logic and basic economic sense. No reasonable and rational investor will keep making repeated loss and still continue its trading endeavors. On the other hand, an entity/ scheme may not forever be able to make only profit and become equivalent to an assured profit maker/scheme. I am of the considered view that the scheme, plan, device and artifice employed in this case of executing reversal trades in illiquid stock options contracts at irrational, unrealistic and ? unreasonable prices, apart from being a possible case of tax evasion or portrayal of artificial net worth to certain entities, which could be seen by the concerned law enforcement agencies separately, is prima facie, also a fraud on the securities market in as much as it involves non-genuine/manipulative transactions in securities and misuse of the securities market. “

Considering that SEBI believed that the reason for such transactions may be with an objective of tax evasion, it also said it would refer the matter to Income-tax and other authorities. It observed:-

“As the purpose of the above mentioned transactions may be to generate fictitious profits / losses for the purpose of tax evasion / facilitating tax evasion, the matter may be referred to Income Tax Department for  investigation  and  necessary  action  at  their end. The matter may also be referred to Financial Intelligence Unit and Enforcement Directorate for necessary action at their end.” ?

Conclusion

SEBI is rightly coming down hard on such cases where it believes that there are rampant and there are manipulative and fraudulent acts. Such acts affect the markets in man ways. The artificial volumes may influence investors not only in the shares and options being manipulated but even in other shares/options. Unsuspecting investors may thus suffer losses. The credibility of the markets would also suffer and thus harm the interests of bonafide companies who end up having to suffer in many ways including getting a lower price for their shares. The image of the country too suffers. The culture of violating laws and even expecting to get away also gets entrenched. Clearly, strong action is necessary.

However, it is also seen that these orders are at a very preliminary stage. SEBI has stated that the full investigation is yet to be over. The allegations are serious. It would have to be backed up by foolproof investigation supported by impeccable logic and evidence. For upholding severe actions and punishment, law and courts require such clear and conclusive evidence. In any case, a message has certainly gone across that SEBI and stock exchanges are closely monitoring such cases. The investigative resources and powers SEBI has are helping it gather considerable information. Time will of course show whether and to what extent wrong doers are punished and how much impact it has on malpractices in capital markets.

[Sections 43CA, 50C and 56 of Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”)] – need for some amendments

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The menace of Black Money stashed abroad as well as in India is both an external and internal threat as this could be used to finance militancy. It is also unhealthy for the Indian economy as taxes are avoided – which increases the burden on the honest tax payer. Time and again, efforts have been made to unearth black money either by way of strict enforcement or by way of amnesty schemes or voluntary disclosure schemes.

It is an open secret that a major portion of `black money’ gets parked in the real estate sector. Towards this end, the various State Acts (Stamp Acts) and the Central Law –The Income-tax Act have tried to curb this malpractice e.g. the Income- tax Act contained provisions for obtaining tax clearance certificates before sale of immovable properties, thereby providing for a mechanism for preemptive purchase of undervalued properties by the Central Government. However, it is an admitted fact that these mechanisms failed and therefore have either been omitted by the Government or struck down by the Apex Court (e.g. Section 52 was read down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese vs. ITO (1981) 7 Taxman 13). Similarly, Chapter XXC of the Act also proved ineffective.

State Governments have also joined hands in these efforts by amending their respective Stamp Acts to provide for levy of stamp duty on higher of the prescribed ‘ready reckoner value’ and apparent consideration. The Central Government also introduced section 50C in the Income -tax Act w.e.f. 1-4-2003, section 43CA w.e.f. 1-4-2014 and amended section 56(2)(vii) w.e.f. 1-4-2014. Though such provisions are a welcome step in indirectly curbing the flow of black money in real estate transactions, sometimes some unintended and unfair consequences follow. A few such instances are listed below:

The ‘ready reckoner value’ fixed by State Governments for an under construction property and a ready possession property is the same. When it is an open secret that in the real estate market there is an undesirable flow of black money, it is also equally true that the property rates vary according to the stages of construction. If a person is booking a flat today in the year 2015 in a big project, where possession is likely to be received in the year 2020 (though the builder might have intended it to be in the year 2018), the rates would be substantially different from the rates of a ready possession property. Further, in many cases, the builder offers the properties even at much lower rates in the pre-booking stage, to finance the construction. It is openly advertised in newspapers etc. for discounts in pre-booking stage. But the ‘ready reckoner value’ does not provide for any concession for such under construction properties.

In many cases, people have some existing rights in the properties and there is some pending litigation in the Courts. We are all aware of the speed of disposing of litigations in India. In a few such cases, parties agree for out-of-court settlement and decide a consideration substantially lower than the current market value, for obvious reasons.

In some cases, the Court itself decides the consideration to be paid by one litigant to the other, which is substantially lower than the market value.

Recently, I came across a few cases, where a builder has asked for extra consideration for the extra area (balcony) due to change in DC Regulations. Though such area was actually not an ‘extra area’, as the balcony was already there in the original plan but due to change in DC Regulations, it is now to be included in the carpet area. The actual consideration for such so called extra area when compared with the current ‘ready reckoner value’, is bound to be lower. There is a separate supplementary agreement executed and registered after the change in DC Regulations.

Therefore, even the saving clause of sub-section(3) of section 43CA or proviso to Section 56(2)(vii) may not help. (i.e. existence of an agreement of a prior date).

In all the above cases, there are genuine hardships to both the buyers and sellers because of the application of section 43CA and 56(2)(vii). It is accepted that there are safeguards in-built in these sections to refer the valuation to the departmental valuation officer, wherever assessee claims that the ‘ready reckoner value’ is higher than the market value, but the ‘effectiveness’ of such reference is known to all. From a common man’s perspective, when the agreement is executed, it gets reported through AIR to the Income Tax department and the case is taken up for scrutiny in almost all cases of difference between the actual consideration and the ‘ready reckoner value’. In genuine cases, at higher appellate levels, justice may be obtained with a time consuming and costly litigation. However, at the first assessment stage, getting a relief even in genuine cases is a herculean task.

Legislation with a sound objective is always welcome but is it fair to have a rigid, mechanical and rather oversimplified approach in its implementation?

Suggestion:
An appropriate discounting factor be introduced for valuation of incomplete construction based on the stage of construction. So also, exceptions be provided in situations like decisions of a court. Moreover, exceptions provided in Sections 43CA and 56(2) are missing in Section 50C. The provision should be amended to include the same.

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Female Intestate Succession – The Tide Turns (Sometimes)

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Introduction
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is one of the
few codified statutes under Hindu Law. It governs the position of a
Hindu male/female dying intestate, i.e., without making a valid Will.
The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person who
is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. The Act overrides all Hindu
customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such
property and the order of preference among them. Thus, if a Hindu dies
leaving behind property and does not make a valid Will, then the law
decides which of his/her heirs get what and in what ratio!

There
are separate rules for succession in the case of intestate Hindu males
and Hindu females. Through this Article, let us examine the usual
succession pattern of a female Hindu and certain special circumstances
when this usual pattern changes.

Usual Succession Pattern
Before analysing the special circumstances, one must understand the usual succession pattern of a Hindu female dying intestate.

All
property, whether movable or immovable and by whatever means acquired,
belonging to a female Hindu is held by her as a full owner. A female
Hindu has absolute power to deal with her property and she can dispose
off her property by way of a Will, gift, etc.

The property of an intestate Hindu female devolves on the following heirs in the order specified below:

(a) Firstly, upon her sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased children) and husband;
(b) Secondly, upon the heirs of her husband;
(c) Thirdly, upon her parents
(d) Fourthly, upon the heirs of her father
(e) Fifthly, upon the heirs of her mother

The
order of succession is in the order specified above. Thus, if she has
children and/or husband then they take the entire property
simultaneously and in preference to all other heirs.

Need for a Change?
What
is interesting to note is that in a case where she does not have any
children or husband or grandchildren of predeceased children, then her
property goes to her husband’s heirs and not to her heirs. Thus, if the
mother of her husband is alive, then her whole property would devolve on
her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law is also not alive, it would
devolve as per the rules laid down in case of a male Hindu dying
intestate i.e., if the father of her deceased husband is alive, her
father-in-law will inherit her property and if the father-in-law is also
not alive, then her property would devolve on the brother and sister of
the deceased husband.

This position has been a bone of
contention when it comes to women’s equal rights. The 207th Report dated
June 2008 of the Law Commission of India makes a case for amending the
Hindu Succession Act to provide that in cases where an intestate Hindu
widow dies issueless, then equal rights must be given to her parental
heirs along with her husband’s heirs to inherit her property. Thus, both
her parent’s heirs and her husband’s heirs must equally inherit her
estate.

The Order Changes – Property from Parents
The above succession pattern undergoes a drastic change in two cases. These are the notable exceptions to the general law.

In
a case where a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving behind any
children or grandchildren of predeceased children, then only in respect
of the property which she had inherited from her parents the succession
position is altered. The Act provides that such property which she had
inherited from her parents would go to her father’s heirs and shall
neither go to her husband nor her husband’s heirs. Thus, three
conditions must be satisfied for this provision to apply and these are
as follows:

a) A female Hindu must die intestate;
b) She must have inherited property from either of her parents; and
c) She must not have any son, daughter or grandchildren from a predeceased son or daughter.

If
all of the above are met, then the property inherited from her father
or mother would go to her father’s heirs. Interestingly, this is so even
if her husband is alive. However, if she leaves behind a child then the
normal succession pattern would apply and even property inherited from
her parents would go to her children and husband. It must be noted that
irrespective of whether the property is inherited by her from her father
or mother, it would go only to the heirs of her father and not to heirs
of her mother.

The exception is only qua property inherited by a
lady from her parents and cannot extend to property inherited from her
husband – Reshma G. Bhandari vs. Yeshubai H. Koli, 2008(2) Bom. C.R.
294. Similarly, the words “father” and “mother” do not in any way lead
to a conclusion to include property inherited from relatives from her
father’s side or her mother’s side”, as including such additional terms
would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Legislature – Balasaheb
Anandrao Ghatge vs. Jaimala Shahaji Raje, 1977 Mh. L.J.777.

Further,
the exception only deals with inherited property. Property received by
way of a gift from parents or by Will or any other mode would not be
covered by the exception and would continue to be governed by the normal
succession pattern.

The Madras High Court while interpreting
the essence of the above exception in Ayi Ammal vs. Subramania Asari,
1966 (1) M.L.J. 411, has held that the word “inherit” is a word of known
import and ordinarily cannot give any difficulty in understanding its
content. To inherit is to receive property as heir that is succession by
descent. It referred to a dictionary definition and held that it meant
to receive property as heir. Inherit meant, succession by descent. To
take by inheritance meant to take, or to have; to become possessed of;
to take as heir at law by descent or distribution; to descend. The words
inherit and heir in a technical sense, related to right of succession
to the real estate of a person dying intestate”. The word “inherited” in
the above exception had not been used in a loose way and would not
include within its purview receipt of property from the father or mother
during their lifetime.

Similarly, the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in Babballapati Kameswararao vs. Kavuri Vesudevarao 1972 AIR(A.P.) 189,
has held that the exception only covers the acquisition of the property
by succession and not by way of a gift or under a will. The word
inherit thus can in the context only mean to receive property as heir
succession by descent. The view of the Gujarat High Court in Jayantilal
Mansukhlal vs. Mehta Chhanalal Ambalal, 1968 (9) G.L.R. 129 is also
similar.

The only persons covered by the exception are the
father’s heirs. If there are no heirs of the father then the normal
succession pattern would resume.

A very interesting question which arises is that what if the father of the Hindu female is alive? In such an event, would the property go to him or to his heirs, i.e., would the heirs of the father get the property in exclusion of the father? A Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bhimadas vs. P. K. Kanthamma, ILR 1977 AP 418 held that the father was entitled to the estate during his lifetime. It is only if the father is no more that his heirs would be entitled to the estate of the female Hindu intestate. However, this decision of the Single Judge was overturned by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh in Pinkana Pasamma vs. Bhimadas, 1993(1) KLT

174.    According to the latter decision, the law was very clear and the father’s heirs would get the estate as if the father was no longer alive (even though he was actually alive)!
The law created a deeming fiction whereby the father was deemed to have died intestate immediately after the death of the female Hindu. A similar decision was taken by the Kerala High Court in Sindhu Ajayan vs. Damodaran Pillai, 2011(3) ILR (Ker) 12.

Property from Father-in-law

A second exception in the Act is in respect of property inherited by a female intestate from her husband or her father-in-law. If she dies without leaving behind any children or children of pre-deceased children then the property would devolve not as per the normal succession order but would devolve upon her husband’s heirs. Thus, three conditions must be satisfied for this provision to apply and these are as follows:

d)    A female Hindu must die intestate;

e)    She must have inherited property from either her father-in-law or her husband; and
f)    She must not have any son, daughter or grandchildren from a predeceased son or daughter.

At first blush, it appears that this is a case of redundant drafting. Would not property inherited by a lady from her deceased husband or from her father-in-law in a case where her husband has predeceased her always devolve upon her husband’s heirs since that is the normal succession order under the Act? Her parents would come into the picture only under the 3rd list. Her husband’s heirs take precedence since they are in the 2nd list in the normal order. Why then was this exception inserted? However, consider a case of a female who has inherited property from her late husband or her late father-in-law and then she remarries. If she dies intestate and issueless, her second husband would claim a right to all her property, including the property which she inherited from her first husband or first husband’s father. To prevent this from happening, this exception has been enacted.

What if she has no children from the first marriage but has children from the second marriage then would this exception fail and these children and her second husband would get all her property including what she inherited from her first husband or first husband’s father? Alternatively, would the exception continue to apply since she does not have any children from the first marriage? This is a matter on which there is no express clarity.

Consider a third scenario where she has children from her first marriage but has also remarried. In such a case, this exception would surely fail and these children and her second husband would get all her property including that which she inherited from her first husband or first husband’s father.

Similarly, as in the first exception, the property must have been inherited by her and not received by will or gift or any other mode.

Conclusion

The succession law in the case of females has always been vexed and biased. While there have been some improvements over the years, there are miles yet to be covered. Should not all property received by her from her parents, by way of gift, will, succession, etc., go back only to her parents in the absence of children/husband? Should not the recommendations of the Law Commission be enacted? One often feels that instead of carrying out only amendments such as having a women director on the board (which in several cases is only symbolic), the personal succession law relating to women needs an urgent overhaul! Let us hope that one day the tide would turn for the good (instead of only sometimes as is the case today).

(Advisory practice and Code of Ethics)

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Arjun (A) — Hey Shrikrishna, you were explaining to me what professional scepticism is and why it is needed.
Shrikrishna (S) —And I told you many stories of how an auditor came into deep trouble for acting in good faith.
A — I feel like giving up this signing business and do only advisory work. No kitkit of disciplinary cases.
S — Do you feel, there is no risk in advisory practice? There are many cases where CAs were held guilty for giving wrong advice.
A — Don’t tell me! But we do everything for the benefit of our client only!
S — Agreed. But when he is exposed, he passes on the blame to you only. Moreover, nowadays the Regulators like revenue authorities, MCA and so on have also become very active in this regard.
A — But how would they know that we have advised?
S — Why? Many times, you give written advice or opinion; you raise invoice with that description; clients also tell the authorities to save their own skin.
A — I give my advice only orally. But client very often takes it only to suit his convenience. S — But then, when there are penalty proceedings like concealment of income, the client tries to take shelter that he was wrongly advised.
A — Yes. They say they are lay persons and everything is looked after by their CA. And quite often, they escape the penalty.
S — That is because the Tribunal often gives weightage to such a plea of client’s ignorance; and consultant’s advice. But sometimes, they rap the CAs for wrong advice.
A — Really?
S — Yes, really, one client rang his CA for advice; when he received a negative order from CIT(Appeals). The CA told him about further appeal to the Tribunal. In fact, his matters for earlier years were already before the Tribunal.
A — Then what happened?
S — Client told him that he had no money to spend on repetitive litigation. He enquired whether there was any alternative.
A — This happens quite often.
S — Actually, that client was no more with this CA and had gone to some other CA for routine work. He asked this CA only due to his old relations. The CA told him that since, on the same point, the matter was already before the Tribunal, he could wait and watch. If ITAT ’s order was in his favour, he could go for rectification for subsequent year’s orders. The issue was that of principle and not factual.
A — But rectification may get time-barred.
S — Actually, the CA meant rectification by CIT(A) of his appellate order. But the client by mistake approached the Assessing Officer for rectification.
A — But the Department never acts on our applications for rectification! They remain pending for years together unless you follow up.
S — That precisely happened here. So at a much later date, the client’s new CA filed an appeal to ITAT . It was delayed by 8 years!!
A — Oh my God! So much delay? S — In the condonation proceedings, the client’s counsel, as usual, pleaded that the client received wrong advice from his CA.
A — But I am told, nowadays the Tribunal insists on a sworn affidavit from the consultant or CA that he gave such advice.
S — Right you are. Here, the Tribunal did the same thing. This CA in good faith gave an affidavit that he had given such advice in the given circumstances at that point of time. He said that the advice was misunderstood by the client.
A — The Tribunal passed strictures not only against that CA but against the whole profession for lack of knowledge and lack of due diligence.
S — Yes, I have heard this case. It created a sensation a few months ago.
A — Your Council took serious note of this and initiated proceedings against the CA for bringing disrepute to the profession.
S — Baap re! But who complained?
A — Neither the Tribunal nor the client. In fact the client said he had nothing against the CA since the client knew the reality. The Disciplinary Directorate acted suo moto – on its own – since the ITAT order would certainly tarnish the image of the profession.
S — So far hundreds of cases of condonation might have escaped on the ground that the consultant gave wrong advice. But none of them went in this direction. Bad luck of that CA! But I heard that the Tribunal rectified its own order and deleted some para of strictures. Is it true?
A — Yes. But that may not help the CA. Let us watch how the case progresses now.
S — A good eye-opener once again!

Note:
The provisions of the Code of Ethics are equally applicable to advisory work undertaken by us professionals. The above dialogue tries to explain the same. The C.A. can also be charged under the Consumer Protection law.

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Precedents – Obiter Dictum – Is something said by a judge and has no binding authority: Constitution of India – Article 141

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Laxmi Devi vs. State of Bihar AIR 2015 SC 2710

The Hon’ble Court observed that an obiter dictum, of course, is always something said by a judge. It is frequently easier to show that something said in a judgment is obiter and has no binding authority. Clearly, something said by a Judge about the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an obiter dictum.

The term ratio decidendi, which in Latin means “the reason for deciding”. According to Glanville Williams in ‘Learning the Law’, this maxim “is slightly ambiguous. It may mean either (1) rule that the judge who decided the case intended to lay down and apply to the facts, or (2) the rule that a later Court concedes him to have had the power to lay down.” In G. W. Patons’ Jurisprudence, ratio decidendi has been conceptualised in a novel manner, in that these words are “almost always used in contradistinction to obiter dictum. An obiter dictum, of course, is always something said by a Judge. It is frequently easier to show that something said in a judgment is obiter and has no binding authority. Clearly something said by a Judge about the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an obiter dictum.” ‘Precedents in English Law’ by Rupert Cross and JW Harris states -“First, it is necessary to determine all the facts of the case as seen by the Judge; secondly, it is necessary to discover which of those facts were treated as material by the Judge.” Black’s Law Dictionary, in somewhat similar vein to the foregoing, bisects this concept, firstly, as the principle or rule of law on which a Court’s decision is founded and secondly, the rule of law on which a latter Court thinks that a previous Court founded its decision; a general rule without which a case must have been decided otherwise.

In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on, the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it.

It is further trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom.

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Will – Execution – Mere non-registration of Will would not make it suspicious: Evidence Act Section 67 & 68.

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Dhameshwar vs. Gish Pati & Ors. AIR 2015 HP 77

The Appellant plaintiff had filed a suit against the Respondent-defendant, namely, Gish Pati and Proforma Respondents-defendants for declaration and for permanent prohibitory injunction as a consequential relief. According to the plaintiff, Smt. Drumati Devi had not executed the Will, dated 15.06.1985, Ex. DW2/A in favour of defendant, Sh. Gish Pati. Drumati Devi was 78 years of age in the year 1985 and the defendant No. 1 in collusion with the subordinate revenue staff and behind the back of the plaintiff and proforma defendants, got the mutation attested in his favour with regard to the share of late Smt. Drumati Devi. He came to know about this in the month of January, 1994. The Will is unregistered. Smt. Drumati Devi was an old, illiterate and simple lady. She had never expressed her will or desire to disentitle the plaintiff and other proforma defendants from her share in the suit property. The execution of the Will was result of undue influence, misrepresentation and coercion. The Will, dated 15.06.1985, was null and void. He also sought the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant No. 1.

The suit was contested by the defendant No. 1. According to him, Smt. Drumati Devi was fully capable and sensible lady. She in lieu of the services rendered by him, executed a Will in his favour. Thereafter, on the basis of the Will, dated 15.06.1985, the mutation was also attested. The revenue entries were in accordance with the law.

What emerges after analysis of the statements of the witnesses, is that the Will is dated 15.06.1985. It was scribed by Dile Ram. The contents of the Will were read over and explained to Drumati Devi. She had put her thumb impression on the same. Thereafter, the marginal witnesses, Himan and Het Ram signed the same. The defendant No. 1 used to look after his mother. The plaintiff was out of village. The last rites were performed by defendant No. 1. Drumati was in her senses at the time of execution of the Will.

The counsel for the plaintiff contended that the marginal witnesses have used different ink. The Court held that merely the fact that the marginal witnesses have used different ink, will not make the Will suspicious.

The non registration of the Will will not make it suspicious. The Will has been executed strictly as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Succession Act.

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The petitioner filed a divorce petition u/s. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court. In that application, the petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 2 – wife caused mental cruelty to him by different means.

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Kalia Hati & Ors vs. State of Odisha & Ors. AIR 2015 Orissa 138 (FB)

The Court was concerned with the following question – What is the meaning of the expression “in particular, and without prejudice to the generality” appearing in section 14(ii) of the Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1980 (the Act)?

Section 14(i) of the Act deals with functions of the Corporation. It provides that the functions of the Corporation shall be generally to promote and assist in the rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries, trade and commerce in the State. Section 14(ii) starts with “in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of Clause (i)”. Thereafter, it provides various particular purposes for which acquisition can be made.

In Shiv Kirpal Singh vs. Shri V. V. Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097, the Supreme Court relying on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of King Emperor vs. Sibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156 held that when the expression “without prejudice to the generality of the provisions” is used, anything contained in the provisions following the said expression is not intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision.

Thus, the Court concluded that sub-section (i) of section 14 of the Act is independent and is couched in broad terms. The same cannot be in any manner whittled down by the language of sub-section (ii) of section 14 of the Act.

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Evidence – Tape Recorded conversation between spouses – Admissible in evidence – violates right to privacy – But not admissible if recorded without knowledge of spouse – If admitted it would amount to violation of “right to privacy”.

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Vishal Kaushik vs. Family Court & Anr. AIR 2015 Raj 146

The petitioner filed a divorce petition u/s. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court. In that application, the petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 2 – wife caused mental cruelty to him by different means.

The petitioner moved two applications on that very day. First application was filed for placing on record original cassette with a DVD. Second application was moved with the prayer that the original cassette and DVD be sent for FSL examination to determine their genuineness. The Family Court dismissed the application without seeking reply from the respondent.

The Hon’ble Court referred to section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and observed that:

The exception to privileged communication between husband and wife carved out in section 122 of Evidence Act, which enables one spouse to compel another to disclose any communication made to him/her during marriage by him/her, may be available to such spouse in variety of situations, but if such communication is a tape recorded conversation, without the knowledge of the other spouse, it cannot be, admissible in evidence or otherwise received in evidence, as recording of such conversation had breached her `right to privacy’.

Husband cannot be, in the name of producing evidence, allowed to wash dirty linen openly in the court proceedings so as to malign the wife by producing clandestine recording of their conversation.

Thus, recorded conversation between the husband and the wife, even if true, cannot be admissible in evidence and the wife cannot be forced to undergo voice test and expert cannot be asked to compare CDs, which conversation had been denied by her.

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Admission / Concession – Advocate – Senior Counsel – cannot settle and compromise claim without specific authorisation from his client. Advocates Act, 1961, Section 35:

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Himalayan Co-op. Group Housing Society vs. Balwan Singh & Ors. AIR 2015 SC 2867

One
of the most basic principles of the lawyer client relationships is that
lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties,
lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents owe their
principals and, thus, have to respect the clients’ autonomy to make a
decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation.
Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional
responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather
than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The law is now
well settled that a lawyer must be specifically authorised to settle and
compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has
no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a
compromise/settlement. A lawyer by virtue of retention, has the
authority to choose the means for achieving the client’s legal goal,
while the client has the right to decide on what the goal will be.
Despite the specific legal stream of practice, seniority at the bar or
designation of an advocate as a senior advocate, the ethical duty and
the professional standards insofar as making concessions before the
court remain the same.

Generally, admissions of a fact made by a
counsel is binding upon their principals as long as they are
unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission,
the court should be wary to accept such admissions until and unless the
counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make such
admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or
admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. Lawyer
generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or
statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial
legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is
clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer
was employed. Neither the client nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s
statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions.
Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional
responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather
than substitute their judgement for that of the client.

Therefore,
the Bar Council of India (BCI) Rules make it necessary that despite the
specific legal stream of practice, seniority at the Bar or designation
of an advocate as a Senior Advocate, the ethical duty and the
professional standards insofar as making concessions before the Court
remain the same. It is expected of the lawyers to obtain necessary
instructions from the clients or the authorised agent before making any
concession/statement before the Court for and on behalf of the client.

While
the BCI Rules and the Act, does not draw any exception to the necessity
of an advocate obtaining instructions before making any concession on
behalf of the client before the Court, this Court in Periyar and
Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (1991) 4 SCC 195 has noticed
the sui generis status and the position of responsibility enjoyed by the
Advocate General in regards to the statements made by him before the
Courts. The said observation is as under:

“19…Any concession
made by the government pleader in the trial court cannot bind the
government as it is obviously, always, unsafe to rely on the wrong or
erroneous or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing for the
State unless it is in writing on instructions from the responsible
officer. Otherwise it would place undue and needless heavy burden on the
public exchequer. But the same yardstick cannot be applied when the
Advocate General has made a statement across the bar since the Advocate
General makes the statement with all responsibility.”

The
Hon’ble Court conclude by noticing a famous statement of Lord Brougham:
“an advocate, in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in the
world and that person is his client”

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 432 (Mumbai – Trib.) IMG Media Ltd vs. DDIT A.Y..: 2010-11, Order dated: 26th August, 2015

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Article 13(3) and 13(4) of India-UK DTAA, s. 9(1)(vi) and 9(1)(vii)
–payment made to a UK Company for capturing and delivering live audio
and visual coverage of cricket matches was: neither FTS since
broadcasters or BCCI had not acquired technical expertise which enabled
them to produce the live coverage feeds on their own; nor Royalty since
there was no transfer of all or any right.

Facts:
The
Taxpayer was a Company incorporated in the UK and a tax resident of UK
having a tax residency certificate for the relevant year. The Taxpayer
was engaged in the business of multimedia coverage of sports events
including cricket. BCCI engaged the Taxpayer for capturing and
delivering live audio and visual coverage of cricket matches. The
Taxpayer had contended that since the cumulative period of stay in India
of personnel of the Taxpayer exceeded the threshold limit of 90 days in
the ’12 month’ period, from March 22, 2008 to March 21, 2009, service
PE of the Taxpayer was constituted in India under Article 5(2)(k) of
India-UK DTAA. Accordingly, the payment made by BCCI to the Taxpayer
constituted business income, taxable on net basis

The Tax
Authority contended that the amount received by the Taxpayer was in the
nature of FTS and Royalty and assessed the entire amount on gross basis.

Held:
On FTS
Having regard to the following facts, the Tribunal held that payment received by the Taxpayer was not FTS.

  • The
    Taxpayer had delivered the final product (i.e., program content)
    produced by it by using its technical expertise which was altogether
    different from provision of technology itself.
  • In the former
    case, the recipient would get only the product which he can use
    according to his convenience, whereas in the latter case, the recipient
    would get the technology/knowhow which would enable him to produce other
    program content on his own and thus, know-how would be made available
    and would constitute FTS.
  • The Tax Authority had not established
    that the broadcasters (acting on behalf of the BCCI) or the BCCI itself
    had acquired the technical expertise from the Taxpayer which would
    enable them to produce the live coverage feeds on their own after the
    end of contract.
  • Since the essential condition of “make
    available” clause was not satisfied, the amount received by the Taxpayer
    for delivering live audio and visual coverage of cricket matches was
    not FTS in terms of Article 13(4) (c) of India-UK DTAA.

On Royalty
Having regard to the following facts, the Tribunal held that payment received by the Taxpayer was not Royalty.

In
order to constitute ‘royalty’, the payment should have been made “for
the use of, or the right to use any copyright etc”. In the instant case,
the payment made to the Taxpayer was for producing the program content
consisting of live coverage of cricket matches.

The job of the
Taxpayer ended upon the production of the program content. BCCI was the
owner of the program content produced by the Taxpayer. The broadcasting
was carried out by some other entity licensed by BCCI.

Thus,
there was no question of transfer of all or any right. Therefore, the
payment received by the Taxpayer could not be considered ‘royalty’
either under India-UK DTAA or u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

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TS-501-ITAT-2015- (Mum) Lionbridge Technologies Private Limited vs ITO A.Y.: 2007-08, Order dated: 5th August 2015

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Section 195 – on facts, amount reimbursed towards allocation, without any mark-up, of cost of off-the-shelf software purchased from vendors, being not chargeable to tax in India, payer was not obliged to deduct tax u/s. 195

Facts:
A company incorporated in USA (“USCo”) had entered into global agreement with certain software vendors for purchase of standard off-the-shelf software to be used by its group entities across the globe including India. USCo made payments to the vendors and allocated the cost of the software, without any mark-up, amongst various group entities based on the number of desktop in each group entity. The Taxpayer, an Indian company, also reimbursed the allocated cost to USCo.

According to the Taxpayer, since the software was purchased off-the-shelf, and was acquired for use, the payment did not result in ‘royalty’ or ‘income’ in the hands of the recipient. Further the payment was merely reimbursement of cost without any mark up.

However, according to the Tax Authority, the payment was in the nature of ‘royalty’.

Held:
USCo had made the allocation at cost without charging any mark-up. There was no dispute about the reimbursement amount paid to USCo being not chargeable to tax in India.

It was not a case where USCo had developed software which was given for use to the Taxpayer. The software was purchased from vendors and cost was allocated. It was a case of pure reimbursement of cost without any mark-up.

Thus, there was no dispute that the amount paid to USCo, being purely a reimbursement, was not chargeable to tax in India. Thus, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in G E India Centre Technology Ltd vs. CIT [339 ITR 587], it was held that there was no obligation on the Taxpayer to withhold tax u/s. 195

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TS-511-ITAT-2015 (Mum) Reuters Limited vs. DCIT A.Y.: 1997-98, Order dated: 28th August 2015

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Article 5(5) and 5(2)(k) of India-UK DTAA – income from distribution of
news and financial information products was not taxable in India in the
absence of dependent agent PE, and service PE under India-UK DTAA ?
Facts: The Taxpayer was a UK tax resident engaged in the business of
providing worldwide news and financial information products (“Reuter
Products”). The Taxpayer entered into three agreements with its Indian
Subsidiary (“ICo”) – License Agreement, Product Distribution Agreement
and Distributor Agreement (“DA”) – for independent distribution of
Reuter Products to Indian subscribers. In terms of DA, the Taxpayer
provided Reuter Products to ICo, which independently distributed it to
Indian subscribers.

While there was no dispute on the first two
agreements, in respect of DA, the Tax Authoroty held that the Taxpayer
had a PE in India in the form of ICo, as it was dedicated for the
business of the Taxpayer; and secondly, the Taxpayer had also deputed
its own employee as Bureau Chief during the relevant period, for
rendering services to ICo on its behalf. Accordingly, the entire
distribution fee was taxable on gross basis @20% u/s. 44D r.w. section
115A.

Held:

On Agency PE

Having regard to the following facts, the Tribunal held that ICo did not constitute agency PE of the Taxpayer.

  • Perusal
    of DA showed that ICo did not have any authority to negotiate or
    conclude contracts which would bind the Taxpayer nor to act as an agent
    of the Taxpayer qua distribution to Indian subscribers.
  • Perusal
    of contract between ICo and Indian subscribers showed that it was an
    independent principal-toprincipal arrangement and ICo had initiated
    litigation for recovery of debts from Indian subscribers.
  • Any news and material supplied by ICo to the Taxpayer was on principal-to-principal basis.
  • Income of ICo from subscription fee was far in excess of service fee.
  • Under DA, ICo had not earned any commission.
  • ICo
    was not subject to instructions or comprehensive control of the
    Taxpayer. It was bearing the business risk and was not acting only on
    behalf of the Taxpayer. Further, it was not “wholly or almost wholly”
    dependent on the Taxpayer in any manner since it was independently
    earning subscription fees, which were far in excess of service fees
    earned from the Taxpayer.

On Service PE
The
employee deputed by the Taxpayer was only acting as chief reporter and
text correspondent in India in the field of collection and dissemination
of news. There is no furnishing of services by the employee to ICo and
the employee had no role in providing Reuter Products to ICo, which
earned distribution fee. Thus Taxpayer did not trigger Service PE in
India.

Accordingly, distribution fee earned by the Taxpayer in India was not taxable in India.

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TS-390-ITAT-2015 (Del) Mitsui & Co. India Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Order dated: 20th August 2015

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Section 92C – Support services cannot be recharacterized as trading transaction and cost of sales to be excluded while computing Arm’s Length Price (“ALP”); No adjustment to be made where the difference between ALP and price charged is within ±5%.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company, was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese Company (“JCo”). JCo was a general trading company) in Japan playing an important role in linking buyers and sellers of wide range of products. The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of providing support services to various group entities of JCo. The Taxpayer was a facilitator for the transactions entered into by JCo and its group entities.

During the relevant financial year, the Taxpayer had entered into various transactions, which included provision of services, purchase of goods (including capital goods), reimbursement of expenses (payments and receipts) and receipt of interest. The Taxpayer used Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”) as the most appropriate method and used ‘Berry Ratio’ as the Profit Level Indicator (“PLI”) for benchmarking the transaction. It calculated the Berry Ratio by taking into account operating profit and operating expenditure. The Taxpayer contended that its average berry ratio was 1.34 as against 1.09 computed on the basis of the 20 comparables set out in the transfer pricing study and hence the transactions entered into were at arm’s length price.

The tax authority was of the view that data was to be used only for the relevant financial year and cost of sale should be included in the denominator of the PLI used and not the operating expenses.

As regards the support services, the tax authority held that it should be treated equivalent to trading and the income received therefrom should be considered as trading income and comparison should be made accordingly. However, the Taxpayer was of the view that Function, Asset and Risk (“FAR”) analysis of the service business is different from trading business. Hence, the Taxpayer approached DRP. DRP upheld the order of the tax authority. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the ITAT.

Held:

Relying on judgment of Delhi High Court in Li & Fung India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [361 ITR 85 (Delhi)], and in Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd vs. DCIT [ITA No. 5042/Del/11 dated 21.10.2014], it was held that it is impermissible to make notional addition in the cost base and then take into account the costs which are not borne by the Taxpayer. Thus, it was not correct on the part of the tax authority to include the cost of sales incurred by the Associate Enterprises (“AEs”) in respect of which the Taxpayer has rendered services and then to work out the profit for determination of the arm’s length prices1. Thus, Tax Authority was not right in including the cost of sales of AEs while determining ALP.

As per the provisions of section 92C, first the most appropriate method should be determined. Based on that, ALP should be determined by using various comparables. Further, when the difference between the ALP and the cost paid or charged is within the permissible range, no adjustment is required to be made.

Therefore as the margin was within the permissible range of 5%, the adjustment made to ALP was not sustainable and was to be deleted.

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Automatic Exchange of Information

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Every country in the world is concerned about its tax base. The Organization of Economic Development (OECD) has drawn comprehensive action plan to address the issue of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) which has been endorsed by G20 leaders and their finance ministers at their summit held in St. Petersburg in September 2013. Exchange of Information is the key to prevent erosion of the tax base.

The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted by the Government of the United States in 2010, to combat offshore tax evasion and for detecting tax noncompliance by US individuals and US owned entities having foreign financial accounts and offshore assets. On July 9, 2015, India signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) with the US to implement FATCA and improve tax compliance. This IGA obliges qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) in India to report about the financial accounts held by US persons in India to the Indian competent authority who in turn shall share the information with the US IRS. The agreement is reciprocal in nature i.e. US IRS is also obliged to provide India with information regarding accounts/assets held by Indian persons in the US.

On the other hand, OECD along with G-20 countries, on similar lines as FATCA, has developed a Standard for automatic exchange of Financial Account Information, Common Reporting Standard (CRS).

An attempt is made in this article to highlight the need, manner and impact of exchange of information under various types of agreements/frameworks.
1. Introduction

1.1 Article on Exchange of Information under a Tax Treaty

Exchange of Information between two jurisdictions can be made in several ways. Article 26 of the United Nations Model Convention (UNMC) and the OECD MC deal with provisions relating to the Exchange of Information (EOI). Almost all comprehensive tax treaties signed by India contain Article on Exchange of Information whereby Tax Authorities in India can obtain information about specific query from its counterpart in the other contracting State.

1.2 Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TI EA)

Countries (especially Tax Havens) with which India does not have a full-fledged tax treaty, an agreement to share information known as “Tax Information Exchange Agreement” (TIEA) has been entered into by India with 15 countries including Saint Kitts and Nevis, Bahamas, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Gibraltar, British Virgin Islands, Isle of Man, Cayman Islands, Jersey, Macau, Liberia, Argentina, Guernsey and Monaco, San Marino.

The nature and type of information that can be requested under the TIEA include identity and ownership information, accounting information and banking information among other things.

Under a TIEA, the Contracting States are not required to provide administrative assistance and exchange information in cases of “fishing expedition”, i.e. speculative requests that have no apparent nexus to the inquiry or investigation in the requesting State. Thus, the information about all Indians having bank accounts in a particular country cannot be requested as it would amount to a fishing expedition.

1.3 Limitations of EOI under a Treaty and TIEA

Exchange of Information, both under a Tax Treaty or a TIEA has a major limitation and i.e. these instruments cannot be used for fishing expedition. In other words, information in respect of a specific person or case/ matter can only be obtained under these agreements. Therefore, perhaps a need was felt by India for more comprehensive and a broad framework whereby information flows continuously on an automated basis and that too in respect of all overseas transactions by residents/tax payers in India to unearth illicit deals or black money stashed abroad. In the above background, automatic exchange of information under FAT CA and Multilateral Agreement under the framework of CRS by OECD would prove to be crucial sources of information to Indian Revenue Authorities.

Let us deal with both these frameworks in some more detail.

2.0 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

2.1 Manner of Reporting under FATCA

The FATCA guidelines specify two types of Inter Governmental Agreements (IGA) that countries are expected to enter into with the US – Model 1 and Model 2. Under the Model 1 IGA, all foreign financial institutions (FFI) in the participant country (for instance, an insurance company or a bank operating in India) would be obliged to report all FAT CA related information to its specified competent authority (which, in India is the Central Board of Direct Taxes), who would then report this information to the US authorities. Under the Model 2 IGA, all foreign financial institutions are required to report information directly to IRS.

In each of such models, the foreign financial institutions will need to get itself registered with the IRS. However, in case of Model 2 IGA, these financial institutions will also need to sign an FFI agreement with the IRS. Switzerland is one such country that has adopted Model 2 IGA. India has executed the Model 1 IGA. As a result, qualifying Indian institutions need not sign an FFI agreement, but will have to register on the FAT CA Registration Portal or file Form 8957 of the IRS and obtain a Global Intermediary Identification Number.

Basic framework of IGA signed by India

(For further information on FATCA, you may refer to an article by CA. Sunil Kothare published in March 2015 issue of BCAJ) 2.2 I nformation reporting and disclosure under the IGA by Qualifying Financial Institutions (QFIs) in India As per the IGA, all financial accounts with QFIs in India such as banks accounts, investment in mutual funds or hedge funds, insurance policies etc. come under the purview of reporting under FAT CA. However, there are certain accounts which are not required to be reported by the QFIs to the Indian Competent Authority and in turn to the US IRS under FAT CA. They are as follows: ? List of Accounts exempt from reporting under FATCA A. C ertain Savings Accounts i. N on-Retirement Savings Accounts established in India under the Senior Citizens Saving Scheme of 2004 to provide Indian senior citizens savings and deposit accounts. ii. Retirement and Pension Account maintained in India that satisfies the following conditions: – T he account is subject to regulation as a personal retirement account or is part of a registered or regulated retirement or pension plan for the provision of retirement or pension benefits (including disability or death benefits); or is subject to regulation as a savings vehicle for purposes other than for retirement as the case may be;
– The account is tax-favored (i.e. contributions to the account that would otherwise be subject to tax under the laws of India are deductible or excluded from the gross income of the account holder or taxed at a reduced rate, or taxation of investment income from the account is deferred or taxed at a reduced rate);
– Annual information reporting is required to the tax authorities in India with respect to the account;
– Withdrawals are permitted only on reaching a specified retirement age, disability, or death, or on specific criteria related to the purpose of the savings account or penalties apply to withdrawals made before such specified events; and
– Either Annual contributions are limited to $50,000 or less or there is a maximum lifetime contribution limit to the account of $1,000,000 or less.

iii. Non-Retirement Savings Account that is maintained in India (other than an insurance or Annuity Contract) and satisfies following conditions:

– The account is subject to regulation as a savings vehicle for purposes other than for retirement;
–    The account is tax-favored (i.e., contributions to the account that would otherwise be subject to tax under the laws of India are deductible or excluded from the gross income of the account holder or taxed at a reduced rate, or taxation of investment income from the account is deferred or taxed at a reduced rate);

–    Withdrawals are permitted on meeting specific criteria related to the purpose of the savings account (for example, the provision of educational or medical benefits), or penalties apply to withdrawals made before such criteria are met; and

–    Annual contributions are limited to $50,000 or less and subject to certain rules laid down.

B.    Term Life Insurance Contracts satisfying the following conditions:

–    Maintained in India with a coverage period that will end before the insured individual attains age 90;
–    On which periodic premiums are paid which do not decrease over time and are payable at least annually during the period the contract is in existence or until the insured attains age 90, whichever is shorter;
 

–    The contract has no contract value that any person can access (by withdrawal, loan, or otherwise) without terminating the contract and is not held by a transferee for value.

C.    Account maintained in India, and is held solely by an estate if the documentation for such account includes a copy of the deceased’s will or death certificate.

D.    Escrow Accounts maintained in India established in connection with any of the following:

–    A court order or judgment;

–    For a sale, exchange, or lease of real or personal property subject to fulfillment of certain conditions;
–    An obligation of a Financial Institution servicing a loan secured by real property to set aside a portion of a payment solely to facilitate the payment of taxes or insurance related to the real property at a later time;

–    An obligation of a Financial Institution solely to facilitate the payment of taxes at a later time.

E.    Partner Jurisdiction Accounts

It refers to an account maintained in India and which is excluded from the definition of Financial Account under an agreement between the United States and another Partner Jurisdiction1 to facilitate the implementation of FATCA. However, such account should be subject to the same requirements and oversight under the laws of such other Partner Jurisdiction as if such account were established in that Partner Jurisdiction and maintained by a Partner Jurisdiction Financial Institution in that Partner Jurisdiction.

2.3 Due Diligence thresholds in case of new and pre existing accounts

FATCA requires full compliance by QFIs in India for “new accounts” (i.e. accounts opened after 30th June, 2014) as well as “pre-existing accounts” (i.e. accounts existing as on 30th June, 2014). This involves review, identification and reporting of relevant financial accounts. However, certain exemption thresholds are laid down by virtue of which no review or reporting of such accounts is required.

Account
balance

FATCA
compliance

USD 50,000 or less as at the end

Out of scope for FATCA, only in

of the
calendar year date

case of
Cash Value Insurance

 

contract

PRE-EXISTING
ACCOUNTS

 

Account
balance

FATCA
compliance

(as
of 30th June, 2014)

 

 

USD 50,000 or less

Out of scope for FATCA

USD 250,000 or less

Out of scope for FATCA, only in

 

case of
Cash Value Insurance

 

contract or an Annuity Contract

> USD
50,000 (USD 250,000 for

   Referred as ‘Lower value

a Cash
Value Insurance Contract

 

account’

or
Annuity Contract)
up to USD

Review of
electronically

1,000,000

 

searchable
data required by

 

 

the
reporting Indian financial

 

 

institution for US Indicia2

> USD 1,000,000

Review of electronically

 

 

searchable
data required by

 

 

the
reporting Indian financial

 

 

institution
for US Indicia,

 

   If the electronic databases

 

 

do not
capture all of the

 

 

requisite
information, then

 

 

paper
record search

 

   findings of the relationship

 

 

manager (if applicable).

2.4    Impact of the IGA signed by India

2.4.1 Impact on US Citizens and Green card Holders living in India

Starting calendar year 2011, FATCA has subjected all US persons to report on Form 8938 their Bank, investment and brokerage accounts as well as other specified financial assets including but not limited to cash value of life insurance contracts and accumulation in certain retirement plans. Reporting of global income on US income tax return, including income earned in India, has undoubtedly been an important legal obligation of all US persons living in India. This is in addition to the long-standing requirement for US persons in India to report their bank accounts on Form TD 90.22-1 i.e. “Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)”.

(For further information on FBAR, the reader may refer to Q.14 of our Article published in this column in April 2015 issue of BCAJ)

FATCA will have a direct impact on the US Citizens and green card holders who qualify to be US persons. Such persons may be holding accounts with QFIs in India which shall now be reported to the Indian Competent Authority and in turn to the US IRS. It may happen that they have not reported/ disclosed such accounts to the IRS and as a consequence of such reporting, they are exposed to heavy financial penalties and even criminal prosecution under the US tax laws. Such individuals may however opt to disclose the said accounts under the 2014 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) to avoid prosecution and limit their exposure to civil penalties.

2.4.2 Impact on Indian residents

With the Black Money Law now in force, the IGA signed by Government of India can further have adverse implications for the Indian resident taxpayers who are holding undisclosed assets in the US. The reciprocal nature of the IGA will oblige US to provide India with information regarding accounts/assets held by Indian persons in the US and which may happen to be undisclosed to the authorities in India.

Such information will provide more teeth not only to the Indian tax authorities but also to the RBI for detecting assets held by Indian residents/ taxpayers in the US.

2.4.3 Impact on Financial Institutions in India

The Inter-Governmental Agreement between India and US is based on Model-1 of FATCA guideline. Hence, the QFIs in India need not report directly to the IRS.

The IGA would result into following implications for FIs in India:

  •     QFIs in India need to upgrade and expand their existing ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) procedures to identify US persons and impose additional reporting requirements on them;

  •    Banks and other financial bodies may also need to get waivers from account holders to report information collected from them to the Indian competent authority;

  •   Section 285BA of the Income-tax Act 1961 has been amended so as to serve as a broad enabling provision for reporting by QFIs in India for the purposes of tax information regimes such as FATCA. However, due to confidentiality clauses under different laws in India, appropriate regulations may need to be introduced which will enable and empower qualifying Indian institutions to comply with FATCA requirements and to mandate the US account holders to provide the requisite information.

  •   Both FATCA and CRS require Indian financial institutions to make changes to their systems, processes and documentation to capture information for identification of account-holders and for reporting to the Indian government. This is an uphill task involving manpower training, system changes, changes to new client on-boarding, remediation of pre-existing account-holders, classification of entity accounts as per FATCA taxonomy, etc., which have an attached cost.

  •     Non-compliant FIs would be liable to a penal withholding tax of 30 per cent of their US sourced income.

3.0    Multilateral Automatic Exchange Of Financial Account Information

The Organization of Economic Development (OECD) along with G-20 countries, on similar lines as FATCA model 1 IGA, has developed a framework for multilateral automatic exchange of financial account information, known as Common Reporting Standard (CRS). CRS sets out a standard basis for automatic financial account information exchange between member countries.

As of 4th June 2015, 61 countries are signatories to the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) committed to reciprocal tax information exchange. India is an early adopter and agreed for the implementation of CRS by January 1, 2016. India signed the MCAA AEOI CRS on 3rd June 2015. Compliance with CRS becomes mandatory from 1st January 2016.

More than 50 countries of the world have committed to exchange tax information on an automatic basis with effect from 2017 which includes notable tax havens and many developed nations as well. Some of the notable jurisdictions include Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Bahamas, UAE, Andorra, Bahrain, Panama, Cook Islands, Mauritius, UK, France, Germany and host of other countries including India.

4.0    Summation

Automatic Exchange of Information between US and India would hopefully start flowing from 1st October 2015 under FATCA. Information from more than 50 countries including notable tax haven would start flowing to India from 1st January 2016. Under the scenario, Indian tax officials will be better equipped to tackle the menace of Black Money and illicit/unreported transactions. Unprecedented powers are given to the Tax Administration under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015. There is a fear amongst citizens about misuse of powers without corresponding accountability on the part of the tax officials. It is high time that Government bring about Tax Administration Reforms as per the recommendations by the Parthasarthi Shome Committee’s Report.

Notification

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N O . VAT . 1 5 1 5 / C . R . 7 4 / Ta x a t i o n – 1 . d a t e d 12.8.2015

Maharashtra Government has issued Notification under Entry no. 12A in Schedule A dated 12.8.2015 and notified drugs for cancer for the purpose of this Entry.

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M/S. OMIL- JSC – JV vs. Union of India, [2013] 61 VST 370 (Gauhati),

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Central Sales Tax Act-Writ Petition – Jurisdiction of Court – Issue of C Form Declaration by Purchasing Corporation To Petitioner – Jurisdiction of Court – Not Barred – Direction to Issue C Form to Petitioner, Art 226 of The Constitution of India.

FACTS
The petitioner filed writ petition under article 226 of The constitution of India praying for issue of an appropriate writ directing the respondent, North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (in short NEEPCO) to issue declaration form C under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 to the Petitioner who had executed works allotted by NEEPCO. The respondent had objected to issue C forms on the ground that there is no provision in the agreement for issue of C forms.

HELD
The issue is with regard to issue of declaration form ‘C’ by the respondent – NEEPCO to the Petitioner for availing concessional rate of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which is a statutory exaction and not the breach of any of the terms of the contract. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is not barred in taking up matters of taxation and liabilities under taxation statutes and cannot refuse to interfere on the ground that the question raised arises out of contractual agreement and is one of enforcement of contractual obligation and the same should be referred to arbitration. The Writ Court, under such circumstances, cannot deny a party of its right to have the issue decided by Writ Court. On perusal of rule 12 of the CST (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1956, it becomes clear that the purchaser of the goods shall issue C form to the seller and that obligation is a statutory exaction of the CST Act and other specific provisions made in this behalf in regard to obtaining of the declaration form C and issue of duplicate, etc. There is no scope of defeating the intention of the Legislature stated in its provision at the sweet will and pleasure of the purchaser of goods. There is also no scope for denying the benefit available to a selling dealer as introduced by the Legislature upon the refusal of the purchaser to issue C form and it is made clear by providing under sub rule (3) of rule 12 that in case the original form issued by the purchasing dealer is lost, the selling dealer can demand from the purchasing dealer to issue a duplicate form. This necessarily implies that there exist an obligation to issue C forms by the purchasing dealer. Merely because, the contract agreement does not stipulate issue of C forms, it cannot refuse to issue the form to the petitioner who is entitled to the benefit u/s. 8 (1) of the Act only upon production of such forms. Moreover, the High Court found that the respondent NEEPCO through its correspondence to the petitioner, even prior to awarding the contract work, requested to avail of concessional rates of taxes, gave assurance to the petitioner time and again to issue C forms and even communicated to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, West Bengal. It cannot be allowed to deny the same and reject the claim of the Petitioner on the pretext of absence of any provision in the contract agreement to issue C form. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the respondent NEEPCO to issue the required C forms to the Petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

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M/S. Prathista Industries Ltd. vs. CTO, [2003] 61 VST 158(AP).

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Central Sales Tax – Provisions for Advance Ruling – Contained in
Local VAT Law – Substantive Provisions – Not Applicable to Proceedings
Under Central Sales Tax Act, section-67 of The Andhra Pradesh Value
Added Tax Act, 2005 and section 9 (2) of The Central Sales Tax Act,
1956.

FACTS
The Petitioner Company, registered
under the VAT and CST Act and engaged in manufacturing of eco-friendlyfertilisers etc., had made an application u/s. 67(1) of the AP VAT Act,
for advance ruling with regard to classification of its 17 products. The
advance authority passed order on 16th November 2011 holding it covered
by entry 19 of Fourth Schedule against which appeal before the Tribunal
was filed. Meanwhile, assessing authority made assessment for the years
2005-2006 and 2006-07 under the VAT and CST Act which were set aside by
appellate authority. The assessing authority framed assessment for the
period 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 under the CST Act and levied tax at the
rate determined by Advance Ruling Authority despite appeal pending
before the Tribunal against the order of Advance Ruling Authority. The
Petitioner Company filed writ Petition before the Andhra Pradesh High
Court challenging the assessment order passed under the CST Act during
the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The
provision for “advance ruling” is a mechanism introduced by the
legislature to ensure uniformity in orders of assessment, appellate and
revisional order, with regard to the classification of goods under
various entries of the schedule to the Act or rate applicable to such
goods, etc thereby avoiding conflicting orders being passed by different
assessing/ appellate/ revisionary authorities. Such a mechanism can
only be introduced by way of substantive provisions in a statute and
cannot be implied. Sub-section (2) of section 9 of the CST Act only
makes applicable provisions of the State sales tax law relating to
assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of tax including
any interest or penalty. Provisions relating to “advance ruling” would
not fall into any of the above categories. An advance ruling may be an
“aid” to an assessment, reassessment, collection of payment of tax but
it is not in itself a mechanism for it which are normally done under the
provisions of Central Sales Tax by the competent authorities under the
VAT Act. The above activities, it cannot be denied, can be done by such
authorities without benefit of advance ruling also (subject to appeal,
revision, etc.) in the hierarchy of authorities provided under the VAT
Act. The assessing authority is entitled to initiate and complete the
assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act in respect of the petitioner
when its application for “advance ruling” was pending before the
authority for advance ruling and pendency of its appeal against the said
ruling before the Tribunal would also not impede or operate disentitle
the assessing authority in any way in initiating or completing
assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act as the provisions of section
67 of the VAT Act would not apply to assessment made under the CST Act.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
Petitioner Company.

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[2015-TIOL-1716-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Mahindra Ugine Steel Co. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad

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CENVAT credit of service tax paid on construction services used for
construction of hostel/quarters for employees being in relation to
manufacturing business is admissible.


Facts:

The
Appellant is a manufacturer having a factory in a small town with meagre
transport facilities and other infrastructure. The Adjudicating
authority denied credit of service tax paid on construction services
used for construction of hostels/ quarters made for employees alleging
suppression and invoking extended period of limitation.

Held:

The
Tribunal considering the definition of input service provided under
Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 held that construction of
hostels/quarters for employees being in relation to manufacturing
business is allowable as CENVAT credit. The Tribunal also noted that
since the show cause notice was issued after two and a half years of
taking the credit, the same was barred by limitation. Moreover, since
the credit availed was disclosed in the EA-3 returns, there was no
suppression and accordingly extended period was not invokable.

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[2015 – TIOL – 1628 – CESTAT- MUM ] M/s Tilaknagar Industries Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad

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Mere taking credit without utilising will not attract interest as well as penalty.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer wrongly availed CENVAT credit on certain input services during the year 2005- 06.On being pointed out by the Central Excise officers, entire credit availed was reversed without utilisation. Show Cause Notice was issued demanding interest and penalty relying on the Board’s Circular No. 897/17/2009- CX dated 03/09/2009 wherein it was clarified that in view of the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Ind-Swift Labs Ltd [2011-TIOL-21-SC-CX] interest is leviable in case of wrong taking of credit or utilisation.

Held
The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Strategic Engineering (P) Ltd. [2014-TIOL-466-HC-MAD-CX] wherein it was held that the amendment to Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 substituting “taken or utilised” by the term “taken and utilised” for the levy of interest being clarificatory in nature will apply retrospectively, allowed the appeal.

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 227 (Mumbai CESTAT) – Mineral Exploration Corporation Ltd vs. CCE, Nagpur

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Grants received from Government towards reimbursement of expenses
incurred for survey does not amount to ‘service’, if entire amount is
expended without charging any consideration and “survey report” thus
prepared is retained by assessee and not supplied to Government.

Facts:
The appellant, a 100% Government of India undertaking is engaged
in the activity of making preliminary exploration report, based on
survey and detailed exploration report of mineral deposit for which they
were paid grant-in-aid by the Government of India. The second activity
involved, providing detailed survey and exploration reports on
contractual basis to various clients. The appellant paid service tax on
the second activity. As regards the first activity, the reports were
kept by them and could be sold to private users later, on payment of
fees on which service tax was discharged. Department sought to levy
service tax on grant-in-aids received from the Government under
Scientific and Technical Consultancy Services.

Held:
The Tribunal held
that activities undertaken are primarily classifiable under the Survey
and Exploration of Mineral Service and not as Scientific & Technical
Consultancy services. It was further held that the activity undertaken
by the appellant on the basis of 100% grant received from the Government
and the grant is totally expended on the expenses involved in various
activities as reflected in the balance sheet. For any service, there has
to be a service provider, a service receiver and a consideration. Where
the records show that no consideration has been paid by the Government
to the appellant for undertaking the said work and what has been
received from the Government is only the reimbursement of the actual
expenses involved; the activity is not liable for service tax. The
Tribunal further held that it is also not a matter of dispute that the
reports prepared on the basis of Grant received were kept with them and
may be sold to clients or customers on payment of charges and service
tax is paid on such charges. Therefore, clearly there cannot be
duplication of service tax payment. Accordingly, it was held that no
service has been provided by the appellant to the Ministry of Mines.

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[2015] 60 taxmann.com 455 (Mumbai CESTAT) – CCE, Nagpur vs. Jain Kalar Samaj

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Donation received by a Mandap Keeper from decorator/caterer for grant of monopoly rights to provide decoration/catering services not taxable as business auxiliary service.

Facts:
Assessee provided Mandap Keeper’s services by leasing out its hall/lawns for ceremonial functions. Decoration and catering for the hall/lawns was carried out by a contractor. Assessee received donation of decoration tender from caterer/decorator and granted monopoly rights in its premises to a contractor. According to the department, the donation was taxable as Business Auxiliary services provided by it to the decorator.

Held:
The Tribunal considered the definition of “commission agent” as provided under Business Auxiliary service u/s. 65(19) of the Finance Act,1994 and held that commission agent must act on behalf of another person for provision of service. The Tribunal observed that the first appellate authority did not explain as to how the said definition is applicable in the present case and that he did not establish that the appellant while acting as a commission agent was actually acting on behalf of the decorator for providing or receiving service. It was held that the appellant provided the services of Mandap Keeper independently to his clients and decorator provided decoration services to his clients. The two services were independent of each other. The appellant is not acting on behalf of the decorator to provide service to his clients, nor is he acting on behalf of his clients to provide services to the decorator. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the activity of the appellant is not that of commission agent falling under the definition of business auxiliary service.

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[2015] 153 ITD 664 (Mumbai – Trib.) DIT (Exemptions) vs. Critical Art and Media Practices A.Y.: 2012 – 13 Date of Order: 11th March 2015.

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Section 2(15), read with sections 12A and 11 – If activities of an assessee trust are charitable and property is held wholly and exclusively under trust for charitable and religious purposes, then such a trust cannot be denied registration merely because its activities are extended outside India. Also the income applied outside India is also eligible for exemption, subject to the provisions of section 11(1)(c), if the activities of the assessee trust tend to promote the international welfare in which India is interested and the approval has been granted by the Board for such application of income.

FACTS
The Ld. DIT(E) had rejected the application of the appellant trust observing that the trust deed of the appellant trust reveals that the appellant trust has charitable as well as non charitable objects such as hosting of artists-inresidence programmes for international artists and raising funds for organising trips, seminars and conferences within and outside the country etc.

The Ld. DIT(E) had further observed that objects of the applicant trust were not merely confined to the territories comprising in India but also extended to and encompassed the whole world and consequently concluded that any activities carried out by the applicant trust in pursuit of aforesaid objects would involve application of funds of the trust outside India which renders it ineligible for exemption. He had therefore held that the objects of the trust contravene the provisions of section 11 of the Act, wherein it has been specifically provided that the application of income of the trust has to be within India, and consequently held that the applicant trust would not be entitled to registration u/s. 12AA of the Act.

On appeal:

HELD THAT
A careful reading of the twin conditions mentioned in section 11(1) reveals that these conditions can be differentiated on the point that the requirement of the first condition is that the property should be held under trust for ‘charitable purposes’ and whether the property is held in India or outside India is not relevant. As per second condition, it is not restricted that the whole of the income should be applied to charitable purposes in India only. The second condition suggests that ‘the income to the extent to which it is applied in India’ for charitable purposes is not to be included in the total income. The interpretation that can be drawn from the above provision is that even if the income is applied for charitable purposes outside India, then, it cannot be said that the purpose or activity of the trust is not charitable. However, the exemption from inclusion in the total income will not be given to such an expenditure incurred by the trust. The exemption as per the second condition has been restricted to the extent up to which such income is applied for charitable activities in India. Hence, if a charitable trust applies some of its income for charitable activities outside India and some of its income for charitable activities in India then it will be entitled to exemption up to the extent such income is applied in India and not otherwise and subject to the other conditions laid down in other provisions of the Act.

A careful reading of the main provision reveals that for a purpose or activity to be charitable in nature, there is no condition that such an activity should be performed ‘in India’ only. Such a condition of activities to be performed in India only is missing in the wording of the section 2(15) defining charitable purposes. Hence, the charity as per the provisions of the Act is not confined or limited to the boundaries of India only. If the activities of a trust fall within the domain of above definition e.g. relief to the poor, education, medical relief or advancement of any other object of general public utility etc. as mentioned above, then it is to be treated as a charitable trust.

The definition of ‘charity’ in no manner can be restricted to the activities done in India only, the ‘charity’ remains the ‘charity’, whether it is done in India or whether elsewhere in any part of the world irrespective of the territorial boundaries. However, so far as the computation of income or the relief under the Income-tax Act is concerned, the Act has restricted the exemption from inclusion in total income to the extent such an income is applied in India. So in the given example, if an institution offers help and support not only in India but also outside India for charitable purposes, such an institution will get benefit of exemption from tax of the income to the extent it is applied in India and not in relation to the income which is applied outside India. But, the fact remains that such an institution will be called a charitable institution only and not a commercial institution.

If the activities of the trust fall in the definition of ‘charitable purposes’ as defined u/s. 2(15) and the property is held under the trust wholly and exclusively for charitable and religious purposes as provided u/s. 11, and the Commissioner is satisfied about the genuineness of such activities, the trust is to be granted registration. For the purpose of grant of registration, the application of income in India is not a pre-condition, if its activities otherwise fall in the definition of ‘charitable activities’. However, so far as the computation of the income is concerned, such an institution will get exemption of income to the extent it is applied in India and not in relation to the income, even if applied for charitable purposes, outside India.

Further, as per the provisions of clause (c) of section 11(1), if the activities upon which the income is applied outside India tend to promote international welfare in which India is interested, such an income is also exempt but subject to approval of the Board.

In the present case, the objects of the trust suggest that the trust has been formed to promote art and culture of India within India and globally which fall in the definition of ‘any other object of general public utility’ and, hence, included in the definition of ‘charitable purposes’. So far as the application of income outside India is concerned, the assessee has vehemently stressed that the projects, conferences and seminars had been carried out by the trust to promote Indian culture and art at international level, further that the activities such as to host artists-inresidence programmes for national as well as international artists for the benefit of society are the objects that promote international welfare in which India is interested. He has further stressed that the trust has received permission from the Home Ministry, Government of India, to carry out such activities outside India. Considering the overall discussion it is to be held that the activities of the trust would fall in the definition of ‘charitable purposes’. However, so far as the application of income outside India, as claimed to have been applied to promote international welfare in which India is interested is concerned, it is to be proved with necessary evidences and also subject to approval of the Board for entitlement of exemption from tax on such income. However, the registration cannot be refused on the ground that the income is applied for charitable purposes outside India. 

In result, the appeal of the assessee-trust is allowed.

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[2015] 152 ITD 828 (Mumbai – Trib.) Navi Mumbai SEZ (P.) Ltd. vs. Assistant CIT A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of Order: 22nd December 2014.

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Section 37(1) – Where assessee incurs certain expenditure for increase in share capital and if the entire incremental share capital is used to meet the need for more working funds, then the said expenditure is to be allowed as revenue expenditure.

FACTS
The assessee filed its return wherein expenditure incurred for increase on share capital was claimed as revenue expenditure.

The revenue authorities rejected assessee’s claim holding that expenditure in question was capital in nature

On appeal before Tribunal:

HELD THAT
It was noted from record that the entire incremental share capital has been absorbed in the inventories. There is not an iota of doubt that the increase in the share capital has been fully utilised only in the purchase of trading stock.

In the present day scenario, the authorised/paid up capital is not static and can also be reduced as per provisions of the Companies Act. In the light of the factual matrix of the balance sheet, plea raised by the assessee is allowed and the Assessing Officer is directed to treat the expenditure in question as revenue expenditure..

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

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TDS- Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10 – Second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) which states that TDS shall be deemed to be deducted and paid by a deductor if resident recipient has disclosed the amount in his return of income and paid tax thereon, is retrospective in nature

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CIT vs. Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd.; [2015] 61 taxmann.com 45 (Delhi):

The following question was raised before the Delhi High Court:

“Whether the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) (inserted by the Finance Act, 2012), which states that TDS shall be deemed to be deducted and paid by a deductor if resident recipient has disclosed the amount in his return of income and paid tax thereon, is retrospective in nature or not ?”

The High Court held as under:

“i) Section 40(a)(ia) was introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 to ensure that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation where income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. Hence, section 40(a)(ia) is not a penalty provision for tax withholding lapse but it is a provision introduced to compensate any loss to the revenue in cases where deductor hasn’t deducted TDS on amount paid to deductee and, in turn, deductee also hasn’t offered to tax income embedded in such amount.

ii) The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is separately provided u/s. 271C. and, therefore, section 40(a)(ia) isn’t attracted to the same. Hence, an assessee could not be penalized u/s. 40(a)(ia) when there was no loss to revenue.

iii) The Agra Tribunal in the case of Rajiv Kumar Agarwal vs. ACIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 555 (Agra – Trib.) had held that the second proviso to Section 40(a) (ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, even though the Finance Act, 2012 had not specifically stated that proviso is retrospective in nature.”

The High Court affirmed the ratio laid down by the Agra Tribunal and held that the said proviso is declaratory and curative in nature and has retrospective effect from 1st April 2005.

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