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Rainmaking – In The Monsoon Of Our Time


In traditional parlance, a rainmaker has been a
term used to allude to the Native American practice of dancing to encourage
deities to bring forth the rain necessary for crops. In summertime during a
drought, for instance, the rainmaker would dance and sing songs on the plains,
and this activity was believed by others in the tribe to magically cause clouds
to come and bring the life-giving rain.

 

In today’s environment, a rainmaker is someone
with a Midas touch who ‘magically’ brings new business and clients to a firm or
generates more revenue from existing customers and donors, and rain is a
metaphor for money.

 

Having a rainmaker on your team can be a huge
asset, as well as a liability. As assets, there is the obvious: rainmakers can
bring in unprecedented amounts of revenue into your practice, making money flow
through your firm like actual rain in a Mumbai monsoon. Typically, they are
confident individuals whose optimism is infectious, making sure your firm is
constantly high on positivity. Because they are very good at positioning you in
front of clients, rainmakers can raise the image of your firm, and make sure
that they close deals.

 

Unfortunately, rainmakers have a downside as well:
they are typical good at doing the job, not so much as explaining how they got
it done, which makes them poor mentors and teachers. They can be high
maintenance and arrogant, and find it difficult to work with people in
authority. The biggest disadvantage of rainmakers however, is that they are
well aware of their own importance to the firm, and can hold it hostage, making
outrageous demands and throwing huge tantrums. 

 

Rainmakers are outgoing, social and well-connected
individuals, always looking to make connections and open new avenues for fresh
business opportunities. While all of us may not be Harvey Specter (the
rainmaker on the popular Netflix show ‘Suits’), over 20 years in the profession
have taught me that we all need to ignite the rainmaker within us in order to
survive and stay relevant in today’s hyper-competitive market.

 

With the exponential growth of the Indian economy
in the past 20 years, there has been a corresponding increase in demand for
legal, accounting, trusteeship secretarial and administrative services. The
impact of this has been two-fold: on one hand, there has been a further
expansion of the Big 4 firms and their service offerings. Conversely, there has
been a break-away of the old guard and a mass migration of rainmaker
professionals who take with them, highly experienced leadership teams and go on
to set up boutique Indian firms (with a pan-India presence), and in some cases,
Indian tax advisory firms with global offices. This surge in entrepreneurship
has caused a huge disruption in the way in which larger, more established firms
attract new business and retain existing client relationships.

 

In the legal services market there has been
consolidation of some of the national legal firms with footprints across India.




Parallelly, the emergence of young entrepreneurial
firms, many of which are break-aways from old firms who start their independent
practices which offer a one-stop solution to their clients, has caused a
fragmentation in the market.

 

The traditional approach in business development
of professional services firms has had an unwritten rule: a strong aversion to any form of promotion, marketing or any other form of
solicitation of new clients or work.



In fact, the term ‘business’ was seldom used by
seasoned tax and legal professionals in the course of describing the nature of their work. Most professionals have held on to an image of being ‘service
providers’ who are sought after and approached by clients for their expertise
and advise.

 

The evolution of the legal and regulatory
landscape, along with increased transparency in procedures and initiatives by
the government resulting in “ease of doing business in India”, has impacted the
traditional sources of (bread and butter) work and revenue for
professionals.The professional services industry has also witnessed rapid
changes and development in the regulatory landscape with the introduction of a
new Companies Act and Good & Services Tax. New areas of practice such as
forensic accounting, competition law and trade law have developed, creating
additional opportunities for super-specialisation and novel service offerings
such as pre-emptive and strategic advice to clients. Artificial Intelligence
and technology have mechanised and caused the commoditisation of several
service offerings, forcing firms to cut fees and costs charged to clients.
There is innovate software available in the market that has automated the work
that was previously achieved by human effort. To further compound the
situation, the number of chartered accountants, lawyers and company secretaries
that have entered the profession over the past decade is also rising
exponentially, and all this while the pie of work has not grown proportionally.

 

The costs of doing business by professionals
(office rent and overheads, salaries, etc.) have also increased substantially.
The escalation in costs have well exceeded the growth of businesses and there
is a huge gap between the two. All these factors have resulted in a
hyper-competitive environment with price wars between firms and significant
undercutting of fees to capture market share and clients. There is no longer
any rationality between the fees that can be charged for a piece of work and the effort taken by the professional to perform the work.

 

Given the compounded effect of business disruption
by technology and automation, increase in competition and price wars amongst
professionals, it is imperative for professionals to adopt marketing strategies
to develop their practice, remain relevant and stay ahead of the curve.

 

This can be achieved in relatively simple ways and
with proper planning does not necessarily require significant time and effort.

 

Contribution of Articles: There is nothing as ego-boosting as a
by-line! The law and all legal matters have moved beyond the realm of purely
legal journals and sections dedicated to law and all things legal, and into the
regular broadsheets of almost all publications. Contributing articles and
opinion pieces to mainstream newspapers and magazines helps members of our
reticent community get into the public eye. The challenge is to make sure that
you avoid legalese and technical jargon, and write your pieces in a way that
appeal not just to your legal brethren but also to the public at large.

 

Quotes: A great way to make yourself visible is to
establish yourself as an ‘expert’ or ‘go-to’ person for journalists on legal
and tax issues and topics. All this would involve is the journalist calling or
emailing you for your comments on any issues that form the subject of your
article. It is a much simpler and more effective way of making yourself known,
with very little effort on your side. You would need to cultivate a few
journalists however, and make sure that you are available to them whenever they
need a quote.

 

Conducting Workshop for Clients: Clients look to you as experts who know
of the latest developments in the field. While the nitty-gritty of the legal
and tax world does not have to concern them, it is always useful to share basic
knowledge with your clients on these matters. When the Goods & Services Tax
was introduced across India in 2017, a number of professional services firms
organised workshops and seminars for their clients to explain the workings and
impact of this new tax regime to them. Most firms use these workshops as an
opportunity to network and touch base with clients, and hence they are invitee
events. A quicker, more cost-effective way to conduct such workshops is to host
webinars. All you need is a stable Internet connection, a webinar platform and
prior intimation to potential attendees.

 

Speaking at Conferences and Seminars: Speaking as opposed to attending
conferences and seminars, adds a lot more value to the brand equity of a
professional. This is one of the most effective, yet under-rated ways of
marketing oneself and ones’ services. Professionals who excel at this have got
their name on the speaker circuit and are often invited to prestigious events
as a keynote speaker or part of a panel, or even as moderator for a panel
discussion. Whichever role you get invited for, conferences and seminars are a
great way to get in the limelight and network with a large audience who could
translate into clients. The best way to organise this is to liase with event
organisers specialising in legal and tax conferences and seminars, and become
an indispensable part of their list of speakers.



Newsletter: Sending out a newsletter to clients is a great
way to be in regular touch with them. The newsletter needs to be attractively
presented, contain short snippets and articles and need not be more than 1-2
pages long. Alternatively, the newsletter could be a shorter update on recent
developments in the field or event alerts.

 

Change is the only constant in life, and as legal
and tax professionals, it is imperative that we let go of the old guard and
embrace new ways to networking and creating business for ourselves. ‘Those who
snooze, lose’, as the saying goes, so it is time we woke up, smell the coffee
and jumped on the marketing bandwagon so that we continue to stay relevant in
this dynamic and rapidly changing world. 
 

 

Economic War

1. Preface

This is a simple
and short article explaining ‘what is an economic war’. The term: “Trade War”
has become current term. Earlier popular term was “Currency War”. Economic War
is a broader term covering all these smaller wars.

    

Some common queries
may be: “Why this War?” “What may be the impact of a global economic war on
India/ on global economy?” “Can we protect India from the ill effects of a war
amongst other nations?” “How is it that President Trump imposed sanctions on
Turkey (In August 2018) and Indian Rupee went down?”

 

This article
presents:

 

(i)    Historical reasons leading to current
Trade War; and


(ii) A few probabilities as results of war. These are considered guesses.
I don’t know actually how future will unfold.

 

Global events like
Economic Wars are like “elephants”. Writers and observers are like “the
six blind men
”. Everyone looks at one or two aspects. Warring parties
involved also create deliberate confusions. I am presenting my views. There are
several other views simultaneously prevalent. Some philosophical thoughts on
Wars are given in notes at the end of the article.

 

1.2  Definition: An
Economic War
is fought mainly for economic benefits using economic instruments
as weapons. Its economic impact can be more devastating than a weapons war. And
yet, there may be no loss of life – at least directly due to war.

 

1.3  When the war is between a
giant like USA and a smaller country like Venezuela; the smaller nation may get
economically destroyed. When the war is between two giants like USA &
China, both may be damaged. If a full scale Economic World War erupts,
global economy can be seriously damaged. Whole world will be poorer.

Share markets should normally be the first victim. Yet, even now the market
indices have not fallen. This may be because: (i) the cartel of share market
giants may be convinced that all these “War Cries” are just Trump’s typical
style of negotiating. Once the declared opponents concede, there will be no
war. Or (ii) they may be offloading their stocks to the gullible retail
investors. Or (iii) the Cartel may have some other strategy.

 

1.4  Different economic
weapons
are:

 

i)     Currency exchange rate manipulation or
currency dumping (also called Currency War);

 

(ii)   Globalisation & imposition of a particular
currency at the cost of others (Dollarisation);

 

(iii)   Tariffs (Custom duties);

 

(iv) Import restrictions of the licensing type &
others;

 

(v)   Nationalisation of assets & businesses
belonging to enemy Government and citizens of enemy country. US government has
done this repeatedly.

 

(vi) Sanctions; rhetoric & threats; etc.

 

(vii) Finally when
nothing works, weapons wars have been unleashed in the last few decades. The threat
of real weapons war makes rhetoric work. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un knew
well that his fate will not be different from the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein
and Libya’s Gaddafi. Hence, Kim came to the negotiating table.

 

1.5  Almost all wars
are fought for economic reasons (Greed of exploiting other nations’
resources for own benefit) and/or for ego issues. Even in today’s modern
world, large nations may go to war largely for ego. Generally many issues are
mixed up as the cause for a war. Mahabharat war was fought largely for
economics & ego. Duryodhan was greedy & egotist. He would not fulfil
his promise. War became necessary. Hitler started 2nd world war for
redeeming the German pride & for economic reasons. USA has started current
trade war with China & several other countries mainly for economic reasons.

 

1.6  Many people are
greedy
. This applies to individuals, societies, corporates and countries.
They want economic benefits at the cost of others. Generally they will start
with exploitations. If the exploited person, group, market does not
understand, fine. If, even after understanding, the exploited group cannot
fight back, there is apparent peace – which in economics may be called “Equilibrium”.
When someone resists, the equilibrium is disturbed. Systems are established
to frustrate resistance. When systems do not work and exploited people/
countries fight back; there may be a weapons war. Generally the exploited lobby
is further destroyed. Rarely the exploited sections win & exploiters lose the
war. Historians
praise victors.

 

Two illustrations
of economic exploitation within a country are given below: paragraphs 1.7 &
1.9.

 

1.7  Illustration 1: In
India the “Upper Caste” developed an entire caste system of exploiting the
“Lower Castes
”. Religion & mythology have been used to confuse &
confound the poor people; and to establish & continue the exploitative
caste system. Similarly, religion & gender bias have been used by men to
exploit women. They (‘lower’ caste people & women) were deprived of even
education beyond their occupation by birth. It worked for thousands of years.
No amount of social reforms by several reformers including Gandhiji has
effectively removed Casteism from our society. (People living in big cities may
not have the idea of deep rooted caste prejudices in smaller towns &
villages.) Indian Constitution gave equal rights to women; and to every
individual irrespective of caste. Every Indian has a right to education. This
single step has maximum positive impact.



Indian Supreme
Court
has now given equal rights to LGBT community & declared
individual freedom as corner stone of our constitution. But even these have
still not completely removed caste based prejudices and exploitations from our
society.

 

This is an
explosive subject & can provoke heated discussions on several issues.

1.8  My purposes for giving illustrations here are
to
show that:

 

(a)   Economic exploitation is all pervasive in
human life. Greed is almost like gravity
– pulling every one down. Both
(Greed & Gravity) are not noticed in everyday life. Most people never
realise that they are: (i) exploiting others; and/or (ii) they are being
exploited. We Indians exploit others when we get opportunity. Exploitation is
not special to some people.

 

(b)   At the same time, there can be NO
generalisations.
Most social reformers have come from men and ‘upper
castes’.

 

(c)   Exploitations have reversed also. As held by
Honourable SC in India, some backward caste people have abused the provisions
of The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. In
life there are several cross-currents.

 

1.9  Illustration 2:  In USA, whole population is exploited
by business lobbies. Pharmaceutical Lobby and Insurance
lobby – to name two. For anyone in doubt, ask for costs of medicines and
medical services in USA; and compare with the costs in India. You will realise
how US residents are being exploited by Pharma lobby & Insurance lobby.

 

Banking Lobby

In the past, US
Government tightly regulated banks & financial institutions which
used public money. They were not allowed to indulge in speculation & in
derivatives with depositors’ money. The banking lobby got the regulations modified
and openly used public savings for dangerous speculation including derivatives.
Banks & Financial Institutions together brought about the Great American
Economic Crisis of the years 2007 & onwards.
Economists of the world
know that ‘greed of banks and financial institutions’ was the primary cause for
the crisis. Nothing happened to bankers or to banking laws. Whole focus as
“Cause for Crisis” was shifted to tax planning; and BEPS programme was started
by G20 & OECD.

 

In USA, the weapons
lobby
(Pentagon) is of course most powerful. Whole of USA is being
exploited for continuing wars and weapons productions. In fact, world has
financed American wars. This statement may look unbelievable. I have explained
it in some of my past articles. For a short statement, listen to CNBC interview
of Jack Ma – chairman of Alibaba at:

 

https://www.cnbc.com/video/2017/01/25/alibaba-chairman-jack-ma-on-meeting-donald-trump.html?__source=sharebar%7Cemail&par=sharebar

 

Current US initiated Trade War

 

2.    Current
Trade War – started in July, 2018:

 

2.1  We come to current US
initiated Trade War. The Trade War has already started. So we are not
discussing empty theories. It is also possible that by the time, BCAS Journal
is printed and you read this article; a lot of developments would have taken
place.

 

2.2  To understand the
reason why Trump has started this trade war, we may consider several matters.

 

2.3  Trump’s theories:  Trump claims that USA is the most liberal
country and rest of the world is taking undue advantage of USA. This is at the
cost of GDP, trade deficits and employment in USA. Since other countries are
not responding to his appeals; war is necessary. He also claims that USA is the
most powerful economy as well as army. So the war will be won by USA.

 

2.4  Trump has conveniently forgotten
past strategies
implemented by USA. Today, when those strategies have
resulted in unemployment in USA, Trump loves to blame China & others. (See
Jack Ma’s interview on link given under paragraph 1.9 above and also see
paragraphs 5 & 6 below.)

 

2.5  War mongering:   Every warrior – whether Individual or
Government – spreads several theories including incorrect theories that justify
the war. World has neither forgotten nor forgiven the campaign that US & UK
had spread when they decided to attack Iraq. They alleged after September 2001
(World Trade Centre attack by Al Qaeda) that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had
accumulated “Weapons Of Mass Destruction” (WMD) which could be used
against..(?). It was known that Iraq neither had WMD nor the capability to
strike USA. It was later that the world realised that real purpose of attack
was – to punish Saddam Hussein – who defied US order to ‘sell oil only in US$’.
Saddam sold oil in Euro and got killed. Iraq got economically destroyed for not
obeying USA.

 

This is a clear
illustration of the hypothesis (Please see paragraph 1.6 above.) that: “when
economic exploitation is resisted, the victim is destroyed by weapons war”
.
For eg., Saddam Hussein  resisted US
Dollarisation of Iraqi crude oil exports. And Iraq was attacked by US. And
the world remained a silent spectator
.

 

2.6  Even a strong army
may not open war on all fronts. But initially it seemed that Trump
opened up war on several fronts. He blamed almost all – (i) known adversaries
of USA as well as (ii) countries that considered themselves as strong allies of
USA. (Please see Note 1 below.) This second category includes Mexico, Canada,
UK & European Union (EU). After a lot of war rhetoric against EU; on 24th
July, 2018, EU president Jean Claude Juncker met Trump and a temporary truce
has been signed. (Please see note No. 5 below.)

   

India has been
warned by Trump. But India is an insignificant trade partner of USA and hence
is on the low burner. (Don’t feel bad. We, Indians are still insignificant in
world economy.) There is also another equation of – using India to fight China.
So how USA behaves with India – is yet to be seen.

 

2.7  Some History: After 2nd
world war
, USA turned benevolent to all war victim countries including the
countries attacked by USA – Germany and Japan. To protect Western Lobby from
Russian threat, NATO was formed. Under NATO and similar other
agreements, the US army is present in every West European country and many
others. 72 years after the end of World War II, and 26 years after
dismemberment of USSR, US army is still present in Europe and several other
countries. Hence even Germany observes restrain while protesting against US
policies. Others have to simply toe the line.

 

2.8  Truth under the surface:
In USA, the President is most conspicuous person. He is the spokesman
for the whole Government. But his real power and impact may be far less than
apparent. There is an Establishment of think tanks, bureaucrats & lobbies
that works. They continue to work irrespective of the President for the time
being.

 

Illustration: When, in 1981, Ronald Reagan became the President, many
observers wrote him off as an ineffective failure from film industry. In 1982,
preparations for an Economic War against USSR started. (For some
details, see Note 2 below.) Reagan retired in 1988. The Economic attack on USSR
was made in the year 1992. Credit for the great event – destruction of USSR –
is being given to Reagan. However, who actually fought the war? The Establishment
which remains behind curtains fought the real economic war.

 

 

US policies (Paragraphs 3 to 6 below):

 

3.    Super
Power No.1

 

3.1  It is US policy that US
should always remain Super Power No.1. All other countries should start from
No. 11 & onwards. If any country becomes so strong that it can challenge;
or does challenge US authority in some serious manner; it will be destroyed by
several alternatives available with USA. One of the alternatives is: Economic
War. Economic wars may take ten years preparations also.

 

3.2  I believe that an
action plan to hit China’s powers was already prepared long before Trump
decided to stand in election. Now that the Establishment has got a suitable
President, the war is started.

 

3.3  China has started
serious process to make Chinese Yuan a currency of international
trade.
It has asked Russia, India and several countries to start their
bilateral trade in bilateral currencies. This is a challenge to the
Dollarisation of global trade.

 

China has started
serious endeavour to reduce its holding of US treasury bonds. China is
developing international foreign exchange markets in Yuan. This is a direct
challenge to Dollarisation of the international trade & investment.

 

China is today 2nd
largest economy. Chinese military and mind-set are the only powers on
earth that can say “No” to USA. (Apart from President Putin of
Russia.)  The “One Belt One Road”
project by China is an audacious plan to increase Chinese influence globally.
Expanding Chinese bases in South China Sea; building a chain of ports in
countries like Srilanka, Pakistan, Djibouti etc., is a threat to American ego
for its largest military presence all over the world.

 

These are more than
enough causes for USA to set in motion a plan to destroy China. The plan may or
may not be similar to the plan for USSR. The Establishment waited for
suitable opportunity and struck when suitable president was in chair. Further
plans will unfold as the days go by.

 

4.  Dollarisation of Global Trade:

It is another
unwritten order that whole world should do its international trade in US $.
When this order is not obeyed, see what happens:

 

4.1 Iran & Venezuela are facing allegations of being
terrorist nations. Severe sanctions are imposed on them crippling common life.
Their offense: exporting crude oil in currencies other than US$.

 

4.2  South East Asian
countries – Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines – went
insolvent in the year 1997 because they started exporting their goods to Japan
in Japanese Yen instead of US $. President Suharto of Indonesia committed
another offense of disobeying US order of allowing independence to East Timor.
(Population 12,00,000.) Suharto lost his power and Indonesia lost East Timor.

 

4.3  Iraq was attacked
and destroyed because it was selling oil in Euro. European Union understands
fully well that this is an indirect attack on EURO. However, EU can’t do much
except being a silent spectator.

 

4.4  EU launched Euro on 1st
January, 1999. This was a challenge to Dollar  
monopoly of international currency. Hence EURO suffered a massive
economic attack. Its exchange rate dropped from “1 Euro = $ 1.2” to “1 Euro = $
0.8”.

 

These are just some
illustrations of how US enforces Dollarisation of global trade &
investments – by fighting economic wars on the world.

 

4.5  Having Dollarised
global financial settlements, now US has Weaponised Dollar. She is using
$ as a weapon. If any nation, any bank or financial institution disobeys US
dictates, its international payments will be crippled.  That entity’s international business will
almost be stopped.

 

5.    Using World for
outsourcing labour:

 

Outsourcing is done
for many decades. Computer software outsourcing through the internet made it
famous. However, outsourcing manufacturing functions is far older tradition.

 

5.1  There was a time
when the US Establishment adopted a policy. “Reserve US manufacturing for high
tech products and for weapons. Even for high tech items US MNCs need to own
only the technology. Manufacturing was shifted abroad and commoditised. All low
value manufacturing should be outsourced.” First outsourcing started with Japan.
Then major supplier of labour was China. The Establishment’s theory was
as under. Manufacturing within USA has high labour cost. China can provide
cheap labour. So let China manufacture goods. US want only sales and
distribution of cheap goods from abroad. This way, US consumers would get goods
at cheaper prices. And MNCs will make higher profits. Around 1980, China was
‘advised’ to devalue its currency. Chinese currency was devalued from Two
Yuan per $ to Four Yuan per $.
By the year 1993, Yuan depreciated to Eight
Yuan per Dollar.

 

5.2  A devaluation of Chinese
currency means:
(i) US gets same goods for much less dollars. (ii) Chinese
individual exporter –who counts his profits in Yuan, feels that he is still
making good profits. (iii) China as a whole suffers massive losses. In fact
devaluation meant poor Chinese people subsidising rich Americans.

 

American MNCs would
go to China and set up factories there. China would feel happy as “foreign
direct investment” was flowing into the country bringing precious dollars.
However, all low value products and environmentally harmful production was
being shifted to China.

 

5.3  This was an
elaborate plan. Explaining it in easier terms would mean several pages of
article. I would end this second US strategy in short here.

 

6.    Results of outsourcing were:

 

6.1  Americans were getting goods
at low prices. Inflation within USA was always under control.
American consumer was happy. American business made good profits in marketing
and distribution.

 

6.2  American labour
jobs were exported
abroad. This was planned by US establishment. It was not
an unknown development. In a super capitalist country, it is a declared policy
that “there is no job security in USA.” Business creates several entry barriers
for competition and secures its safety. But as far as labour is concerned, it
has to simply hope. Simultaneously, even education is fully commercialised in USA.
It is very costly. Middle class and poor cannot afford higher education. Hence
supply of blue collar labour kept on increasing and employment opportunities
kept on going down.

 

6.3  This outsourcing
policy has gone on for a few decades. Whole generations of middle class have
become poorer than their parents. Trump realised this gap in US economic
system. He used it for his political advantage. Now, to fulfil his election
promise to bring jobs back to USA, he has to start a Trade War. This is what
the Establishment wants.

 

This is the
reason why USA has started a Trade War.

See preface
paragraph 1(i).

      

Summary so far: There is a serious challenge to USA’s Super Power status and
monopoly of Dollar. USA has started a pre-emptive strike before the challenge becomes
serious.

 

Note: US economic policies require decades of study to understand. It is
difficult to explain in one article. I have tried to simplify and summarise.
Another way of understanding real life economics is personal discussions at
BCAS study circle for International Economics.

 

7.   Indian Government:

Very few Indians
give due importance to Economics Wars. Fewer still understand it. In these
chaotic and dangerous times we need a Government that fully understands the
risks to which whole world is now exposed; and implements plans to protect
Indian economy. In my humble submission our present Prime Minister understands
these matters far better than most other PMs. He has the will power and the
capability to protect Indian economy.

 

We may remember
that in 1992 & 1997 a cartel did attack primarily USSR and South East Asia.
Attacks on Indian economy were incidental. The 2007 American Economic Crisis
spread over almost entire globe. In all three instances, it was primarily GOI
and RBI which managed and protected Indian economy. Government bureaucracy
continues to be same – probably, now more competent and empowered. We should be
able to sail through.

 

Sadly, we do not
have any private sector think tanks that can help GOI.

 

8.   Indian share market:

For a long period
Indian share market has behaved as if it has no connection with Indian economy.
In a war, such myths get exposed and destroyed. If the war is prolonged, Indian
share market can be badly affected.

 

9.  Can we estimate how the Trade War will proceed
further?

What will be the
results for Global economy?

 

See preface
paragraph 1(ii).

 

The war can go any
which way. It is difficult to guess how it will go. And yet, there are people
with huge investments in global markets. Apart from investors in shares and
securities, there are large industrial investments that can be seriously
affected. They would want considered estimates of the consequences of the
current Trade War. Can anyone advise them? I cannot advise. But I am presenting
some extreme opposite probabilities.

 

Some probable
results:

9.1  Trump made all
kinds of noises, insults and threats against several countries. But he settled
without firing a single bullet – with North Korea and Mexico. There is a
compromise of sorts with EU. Canada may soon fall. It is possible that Trump
may win the “War on the World” simply by threats. Only China refuses to
succumb.

 

9.2  Past Economic Wars – Instruments used:

 

Some of the past
Economic Wars have shown that these wars are fought by US Government using
following instruments:

 

(i) media for
public mind manipulation; (ii) IMF, UN & World Bank; (iii) cartel of banks
& financial institutions (iv) American Think Tanks (v) fact that Dollar is
the global currency.

 

We may refer to all
these together as Economic War Group. Note that only USA has all these
war instruments.

 

Secrecy of their strategy is their strength. They will never tell “what” is
their target; and “how” and “when” they will try to achieve the target.

The issue of “When”
is answered as the Trade War with China has already started.

 

Let us assume that
Chinese Government is fully aware of this strategy of economic wars. To fight
this strategy, China needs similar group of international institutions under
its control; control over global media; global currency; and so on. It is well
known that no country other than USA has this strength. So, how can China win
the war? Make your own guess.

 

9.3  China’s possible alternative response:

 

In absence of a
comparable Economic War Group, what can China do? What can be the consequences?

      

Consider the war
background
before proceeding.

 

1.    USA is the largest debtor country.
Borrowing is now a compulsion. She needs to borrow every day $ 2 Bn. If the
world stops subscribing to US treasury bonds; US Government will stop
functioning.

 

2.    Several countries around the world are fed
up of US hegemony. But “Who will bell the cat?” Who will throw the first
salvo? Once a nation strikes against US Economic war; many nations may join.

 

3.    Trump is unpopular within and outside
USA. Long hand of law may catch up with Trump. Whether the next president will
be friendly with the “Establishment” or not; is an issue.

 

Possible
Response:
Let us say, China takes following steps
& US responds step by step or at one stroke. (Note: This is pure
hypothesis. And yet, it is possible.) China owns largest quantity of US
treasury bonds and currency as its foreign exchange reserve.

 

CHINA

China dumps US
treasury
bonds & currency worth one trillion Dollars in the market in
one day for cash settlement. Then China refuses to buy any further US treasury
bonds. China refuses to sell any goods to USA on credit or for $ payment. She
demands either gold or Yuan or commodities in payment for any export to USA.

 

USA

US Treasury bond
market can crash.

Or

US Government &
Economic War Group can try to buy entire stock on the same day. This may not be
practical because China would demand cash payment. This would not be a
“futures” transaction. This would be sale by China “in Cash” for immediate
payment.

 

EU, Canada &
Mexico may follow China and refuse to sell goods on credit to US customers.

 

US need to borrow
every day. If the funds are not available, Government machinery will stop. It
has now happened several times that US Govt. could not pay its expenses &
non-essential services had to be stopped. Then the Govt. increased borrowing
limits & paid its expenses out of borrowings. Fiscal Cliff has been
discussed several times. It is a serious reality for which no American
Government has any solution. Real financial position of USA is weaker than what
is made out.

 

Now, if the world
stops lending to USA, what can US do? She will have to finance expenses by
simply printing notes. If there is no outside taker of US notes, deficit
financing will cause immediate and significant inflation. A country that
has not seen more than 2% inflation, will be shocked by 10% inflation.

 

More important, a
lot of commodities that US public takes for granted, will simply not
be available.
US talks of shifting production from China to USA. Can it
start fresh factories in a short time? There can be huge uproar within USA
making US Government fall. So far, all wars have been fought beyond American
land. This war will be fought within USA. For the first time Americans
may suffer consequences of the war.

 

China’s response to
Economic War – by an attack on US $ – may work better if Japan, EU, Canada
& Mexico etc., join in the Economic World War. Normally US would succeed in
“divide & rule policy” & won’t allow all of them to join
together. However, the way Trump behaves, probability of a combined front
against USA has improved. Against a combined front USA is doomed. In absence of
a combined front, ‘who will win’ becomes uncertain. Only certainty will be –
world economy will be damaged.

 

9.4  How long the world will go
on fighting?

How can world
avoid all wars?

 

One solution
appears. If there were a World Government, all wars would be
unnecessary. We have a good experience also. In India, at some time, there were
more than seven hundred kingdoms. Huge amount of their resources were spent on
war & defence. Now India is one country. All Kingdoms have merged into one.
There is no war within India. Of course, there are differences and troubles.
But these can’t be compared with wars.

 

Another solution
may be: At the root of all wars, there are greed and ego. Consider –
hypothetically, a solution where greed and ego are replaced by love &
spirituality. There would simply be no wars of any kind. Not a single soul
would go without food, medical services, education & home. Then the form of
Government would be irrelevant.

 

May God Bless human
kind.

 

Notes:

 

Note 1.             Allies:  (See para No. 2.4) India, Pakistan, Britain or
any other country may consider itself to be a friend of USA. However, in
economics as in politics; no one is a permanent enemy and no one is a permanent
friend. Britain and European Union (EU) realised this fact when US cartel
attacked Euro on 1st January, 1999 – the day of Euro’s launch.
Trump’s accusations against EU have made this fact abundantly clear.

 

Note 2.             Outsourcing & Exchange Rates:
Japan:

 

In the year 1940,
Japanese Yen to US $ rate was 4 yen = $1. After 2nd
world war defeat of Japan huge inflation took place in Japan. US occupied Japan
& controlled its economy. It is then that US outsourcing to Japan started.
Yen was depreciated to 360 Yen = $1.

 

After a few
decades, Japan grew in manufacturing strength. Japanese cars started winning
the competition with American cars. This is when Japan was asked to revalue its
currency. Eventually, it appreciated to 140 yen to a dollar in the year 1990.
And Japan went into deep recession. 1990s was called the lost decade for Japan.
By now rate has gone up to 112 yens per dollar.

 

US Strategy is: when a country is pure commodity supplier, its currency must be
down. When it starts competing with US manufacturers, its currency must
appreciate.

 

My observations: Japan is excellent in manufacturing and poor in international
economics. It followed the dictates of US Establishment in exchange rate policy
and suffers. China is refusing to obey the orders by the Establishment. Hence
the Trade War.

 

Note 3. An Illustration of past
Economic War: 1992 economic war on USSR
.

 

In the year 1982
under president Reagan, US Establishment started preparations for economic war
against USSR. For the public & media consumption, “Star Wars” were started
to maintain US superiority in air war over USSR. Real strategy was – massive
expenditure in developing missiles and counter missiles made USSR insolvent, US
printed dollars & world grabbed dollars as $ was global currency. World
was financing US Star War
. No one was buying USSR Rouble & hence no one
financed USSR in her Star War. Result was – USSR insolvency.

 

Reagan retired in
1989. In the year 1992 USSR was economically destabilised because of sudden
change from communist regime to democratic regime installed by President
Mikhail Gorbachev. KGB arrested Gorbachev and nation was thrown in chaos. At
that time the G4 – US, UK, France and Germany together with their cartel of
banks and financial institutions struck. USSR got divided into fifteen
countries and economically went insolvent
. It got reduced from the position
of Super Power No. 2 to 11. USA won the Cold War without losing men or money.

 

Note 4. Strategies like outsourcing
may not be a Government of USA decision. Nor a one man decision. Initially,
businesses found it profitable to shift labour abroad. Then Government
supported it. Eventually it developed into a full national strategy.

 

Note 5. Trump’s negotiating
strategy
is now famous. “First threaten the opponent with dire
consequences. When the opponent is mentally broken, negotiate on your own
terms.” This is what he did with North Korea and Mexico. This is how he
negotiated a temporary truce with European Union.

 

This truce has
given USA tremendous benefit. Consider the news that China was making overtures
with EU to make a joint attack on USA. EU was scared but was considering
joining hands with China. Now Trump has ensured that EU will stay with US.
China is the lonely warrior.

 

Note 6.             More and more
nations are disillusioned about US hegemony. Finance Minister of Germany
– Mr. Heiko Maas came out with clear statement that – US is
using $ monopoly for suppressing other nations. Even the global Swift Payment
system based in Belgium is using US$ for settlements. EU must come out with its
own international settlement system independent of US $. Prime Minister Ms.
Merkel of Germany quickly contradicted. She said: US defence deal with Germany
is far more important. See the link –
https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-quashes-german-foreign-minister-heiko-maas-anti-american-dream/.

 

Soon French
President stated that US defence deal is no longer reliable. EU must not depend
exclusively on US for its defence.

 

Note 7. Ego:     It is said: “Eleven Sadhus can stay in one
hut. But two Samrats cannot stay in one Samrajya”.

 

Note 8.  Advait:

1.    Indian philosophy of Advait has taught me
that “We are all one”. “
?? ?? ?? ??” is a famous Indian slogan.

 

2.    Hence no one is my enemy. When “We are all
one”; the concept of enemy is void ab initio.

 

3.    We have to live in this practical Sansar
knowing the philosophy and yet being alert about people who, under the
influence of greed, are out to harm us. Protect ourselves. Protect the weak.
Hate none.

 

Note 9.  Geeta: 

Consider what Trump
representing US Government thinks: “I am the Super Power No. 1. I must get what
I demand. I can & will destroy all competition. Who can fight me?”

 

See here Geeta
chapter 16 shlok 14 as translated by Swami Chinmayanandji: (Without any
modification.)

 

“Businessmen in
the world, unknown to themselves, constantly chant this stanza in their heart
of hearts. “I destroyed one competitor in the market, and now I must destroy
the remaining competitors also.” …”In fact, what can those poor men do to stop
me from doing what I want?”… “Because there is none equal to me in any
respect…I am the Lord. I enjoy, I am the most successful man. I am strong in
influence, among political leaders, in my business connections, and in my bank
balance. I am strong and healthy….” This, in short, is the ego’s SONG OF
SUCCESS that is even hummed in the heart of a true materialist. Under the spell
of this Satanic lullaby, the higher instincts and the divine urges in man go
into a sleep of intoxication.

 

Most people keep
Geeta on one side while analysing commercial/ economic/ war matters. I
personally submit: Geeta is a way of life. Without incorporating principles of
Geeta in life, it (life) has no meaning at all. Consequences of a person’s
actions will be as projected in Geeta.

Nature has its own
way of dealing with any person (Individual, company or Government) who
continuously abuses others. Nature’s ways are unpredictable and beyond our
logic.

 

10. In my reading,
it is possible that the Trade wars started by USA – together will several other
factors; will bring about the downfall of USA. Then what? Some other greedy
people will exploit the world. Men have been fighting wars for thousands of
years. When will it stop?

 

Wars will stop when
people become free from forces of Maya – Greed and Ego. In other words, wars
will stop when people become spiritual.
 

 

 

Corporate Social Responsibility

1.     Introduction

1.1    I
initiate the subject of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) with a sutra
written by Chanakya

Dharma – religion (ethics or commitment
to duty as a human being) is the nucleus of happiness. The core of dharma is
wealth or Artha. The stability of the state is the precondition for Artha
(wealth) in the state. The primary duty of the rulers/government is to be in
command over senses and emotions (perennially until they are ruling)


Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
is an evolving concept and represents the collective culmination of fundamental
desire of every human being to be happy and to direct the efforts of all to
make it happen.


1.2    General Aspects

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
can be explained as the initiative of a company to assess and take
responsibility for the company’s effects on the environment and impact on
social welfare. The term, generally, applies to company’s efforts that go
beyond what may be required by regulators. Corporate social responsibility is a
form of corporate self-regulation integrated into a business model. CSR
functions as a built-in, self-regulating mechanism whereby a business monitors
and ensures its active compliance with the spirit of the law and its response
to societal needs.


1.3    The term
“corporate social responsibility” came into common use in the late
1960s and early 1970s after certain corporations formed the term stakeholder,
meaning those on whom an organisation’s activities have an impact. It was used
to describe corporate owners beyond shareholders.


1.4    A single
globally accepted definition of CSR does not exist. However, various
organisations have developed formal definitions of CSR, some of them are:


1.4.1   Corporate
Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave
ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of
life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and
society at large. – World Business Council for Sustainable Development.


1.4.2   Corporate
Social Responsibility is essentially a concept whereby companies decide
voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment. – European
Commission; Employment & Social Affairs.


1.5    Corporate
social responsibility offers manifold benefits both internally and externally
to the companies. Externally, it creates a positive image amongst the people
for its company and earns a special respect amongst its peers. Internally, it
cultivates a sense of loyalty and trust amongst the employees in the
organisational ethics. It can improve operational efficiency of the company and
can be accompanied by increase in quality and productivity.


1.6    The
essence of CSR comprises philanthropic, corporate, ethical, environmental and
legal as well as economic responsibility. In India, the evolution of CSR refers
to changes over time in cultural norms of corporations’ engagement and the way
businesses managed to develop positive impacts on communities, cultures,
societies, and environment in which those corporations operated.


1.7    In the
last decade, CSR has rapidly evolved in India with some companies focusing on
strategic CSR initiatives to contribute toward nation building. Gradually, the
companies in India started focusing on need-based initiatives aligned with the
national priorities such as public health, education, livelihoods, water
conservation and natural resource management.


2.     CSR
in India – Legal Position

2.1    The
government introduced mandatory CSR requirements in Companies Act 2013. The
2013 Act mandates companies to spend on social and environmental welfare,
making India perhaps one of the very few countries in the world to have such a
requirement embedded in a corporate law. The CSR provision became effective
from 1st April 2014. Significant amendments have been made to CSR
provisions through issuance of various notifications, clarifications (including
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)), Guidance Note on accounting for expenditure
on CSR (GN on CSR) by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.


2.2    As per
rule 2(c) of Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules 2014 CSR
means and includes but it is not limited to –


i. Projects or programs relating to
activities specified in Schedule VII to the Act; or


ii. Projects or programs relating to
activities undertaken by the board of directors of a company in pursuance of recommendations
of the CSR committee of the Board as per declared CSR Policy of the Company
subject to the condition that such policy will cover subjects enumerated in
Schedule VII of the Act.


2.3  Applicable to certain companies

Section 135 (1) provides that every
Company having –


i. Net worth of rupees five hundred
crore or more; or


ii. Turnover of rupees one thousand
crore or more; or


iii. Net profit of rupees five crore or
moreduring the immediately1 preceding financial year shall
constitute a Corporate Responsibility Committee of the Board.


As per rule 3 (1) of Companies
(Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules 2014 every company including its
holding or subsidiary and a foreign company defined under clause (42) of
section 2 of the Act, having its branch office or project office in India which
fulfils the criteria specified in section 135(1) shall comply with the
provisions of section 135 of the Act and The Rules.


2.3.1   “Net
Worth
” means the aggregate value of the paid-up share capital and all reserves
created out of the profits and securities premium account, after deducting the
aggregate value of the accumulated losses, deferred expenditure and
miscellaneous expenditure not written off, as per the audited balance sheet,
but does not include reserves created out of revaluation of assets, write-back
of depreciation and amalgamation.


2.3.2   “Turnover”
means the aggregate value of the realisation of amount made from the sale,
supply or distribution of goods or on account of services rendered, or both, by
the company during a financial year.


2.3.3 “Net Profit” means the net profit of a
company as per its financial statement calculated as per section 198 of the
Companies Act 2013, but shall not include the following: i. any profit arising
from any overseas branch or branches of the company whether operated as a
separate company or otherwise; and


ii. any dividend received from other
companies in India, which are covered under and complying with the provisions
of section 135 of the Act.


2.3.4   “average
net profits
” shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of
section 198 of the Companies Act 2013.


2.3.5   The net
worth, turnover or net profit of a foreign company shall be computed in
accordance with the balance sheet and profit and loss account of such company
prepared in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (I) of
section 381 and section 198 of the Act.


2.3.6      It has been provided that the net profits in
respect of a financial year for which the relevant financial statements were
prepared in accordance with he provisions of the Companies Act 1956, shall not
be required to recalculate the same in accordance with the provisions of
Companies Act 2013.


2.4  Constitution of the CSR Committee

2.4.1   Section
135 (1) provides that every Company covered by section 135(I) shall constitute
Corporate Social Responsibility committee with 3 or more directors, out of
which at least one director shall be independent director. In case where
company is not required to appoint an independent director under sub-section
(4) of section 149, it shall have in its CSR committee two or more directors.

A private company having only two
directors on its Board shall constitute its CSR Committee with two such
directors.

A foreign company shall constitute CSR
Committee comprising of atleast two persons of which one person should be
resident in India authorised to accept on behalf of the company service of
process any notices or other documents served on the company and another person
shall be nominated by the foreign company.

The composition of the Corporate Social
Responsibility Committee is required to be disclosed in the Board’s report
prepared under the Act.


2.4.2   The
2013 Act mandates that every company (including its holding or subsidiary, as
well as foreign companies having project office/branch in India) to undertake
CSR activities if they meet certain thresholds. One question which arises is
whether a holding or a subsidiary of a company (which fulfils the criteria for
CSR applicability under the 2013 Act) also has to comply with CSR provisions,
even if such holding or subsidiary itself does not fulfil those criteria. The
FAQs issued by the MCA clarify that a holding or a subsidiary of a company is
not required to comply with CSR provisions unless the holding or subsidiary
itself fulfils the CSR criteria.

2.4.3    
It has also been clarified in the rules that every company which ceases
to satisfy the criteria mentioned above for three consecutive financial years
shall not be required to- a. constitute a CSR Committee; and

b. comply with the provisions contained
in section 135, till such time it meets the criteria specified in sub section
(1) of section 135.


2.5    Functions of CSR Committee


Section 135 (3) provides that the CSR
committee shall –

a.  formulate and recommend to
the Board, a CSR Policy which shall indicate the activities to be undertaken by

the company as specified in Schedule VII; of Companies  Act 2013

b.  recommend
the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the CSR activities. 

c.   monitor
the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company from time to time.


The Board shall take into account the
recommendations made by the CSR Committee and approve the CSR Policy of the
company.


2.6    CSR Policy and Report

Section 135 (4) provides that the Board
after taking into account the recommendations of CSR Committee, approve the CSR
policy for the Company and disclose the content of such policy on the Company’s
website.


The Board’s report to shareholders
pertaining to a financial year shall include an annual report of CSR containing
particulars specified in the Annexure to Companies (CSR Policy) Rules 2014.


2.7    Contribution under CSR


2.7.1   Section
135 (5) provides that every company referred in s/s. (1) shall ensure that the
company spends in every financial year at least 2% of the average net profits
of the Company made during the three immediately preceding financial years, in
pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy.

If the Company fails to spend such
amount the Board shall in its report made under clause (o) of sub-section (3)
of section 134, specify the reasons for not spending the amount.

2.7.2   Contribution
of any amount directly or indirectly to any political party u/s.182 of the Act
shall not be considered as CSR activity.


3.     CSR
ACTIVITIES

3.1    As per
rule 4 of Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules 2014 CSR
activities includes activities undertaken by the Company as per its policy as
projects or programs either new or ongoing excluding activities undertaken in
pursuance of its normal course of business.


3.2   Activities which are included in CSR – As
per Schedule VII of Companies Act 2013


Activities relating to –


i. 
eradicating hunger, poverty and malnutrition, promoting health care
including preventive health care and sanitation (including contribution to the
Swachh Bharat Kosh set up by the Central Government for the promotion of
sanitation) and making available safe drinking water;


ii. 
promoting education, including special education and employment
enhancing vocation skills especially among children, women, elderly, and the
differently abled and livelihood enhancement projects;


iii.  
promoting gender equality, empowering women, setting up homes and
hostels for women and orphans; setting up old age homes, day care centres and
such other facilities for senior citizens and measures for reducing
inequalities faced by socially and economically backward groups;


iv. ensuring environmental
sustainability, ecological balance, protection of flora and fauna, animal
welfare, agro forestry, conservation of natural resources and maintaining
quality of soil, air and water; (including contribution to the clean Ganga Fund
set up by the Central Government for rejuvenation of river Ganga)


v.   
protection of national heritage, art and culture including restoration
of buildings and sites of historical importance and works of art; setting up
public libraries; promotion and development of traditional arts and
handicrafts;


vi.  
measures for the benefit of armed forces veterans, war widows and their
dependents;


vii.  
training to promote rural sports, nationally recognised sports, para
Olympic sports and Olympic sports;


viii. 
contribution to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund or any other
fund set up by the Central Government for socio-economic development and relief
and welfare of the Scheduled Caste, the Scheduled Tribes, other backward
classes, minorities and women;


ix. contributions or funds provided to
technology incubators located within academic institutions which are approved
by the Central Government;


x.  
rural development projects;


xi. 
slum area development.

3.3    The CSR
projects or programmes or activities undertaken in India only shall amount to
CSR Expenditure. Companies should give preference to the local area and areas
around it where it operates, for spending the amount earmarked for CSR
activities. The MCA has also clarified that CSR activities enumerated in the
Schedule VII of the 2013 Act are broad-based and are intended to cover a wide
range of activities. Thus, these prescribed activities should be interpreted
liberally to capture
their essence.


3.4    Rule 4 of
the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014, requires
that the CSR activities that shall be undertaken by the companies for the
purpose of section 135 of the Act shall exclude activities undertaken in
pursuance of its ‘normal course of business’. The Rules also specify that CSR
projects or programmes or activities that benefit only the employees of the
company and their families shall not be considered as CSR activities in
accordance with the requirements of the Act. Such programmes or projects or
activities, that are carried out as a pre-condition for setting up a business,
or as part of a contractual obligation undertaken by the company or in
accordance with any other Act, or as a part of the requirement in this regard
by the relevant authorities cannot be considered as a CSR activity within the
meaning of the Act.


3.5    Similarly,
the requirements under relevant regulations or otherwise prescribed by the
concerned regulators as a necessary part of running of the business, would be
considered to be the activities undertaken in the ‘normal course of business’
of the company and, therefore, would not be considered CSR activities.


4.     Implementing
CSR activities


4.1   A Company
can undertake CSR activities in one or more of the following ways:

i)     The Company itself can do these activities
ii)    A company established u/s. 8 of the
Act or a registered trust or a registered society, established by:-

a)    the
company, or

b)    the
company alongwith any other company, or

c)    the
Central Government or State Government or any entity established under an act
of Parliament or a State legislature, or

d)    Any
other person or persons, where such company or trust or society have an
established track record of three years in undertaking similar programs or
projects and the company has specified the projects or programs to be
undertaken, the modalities of utilisation of funds of such projects and
programs and the monitoring and reporting mechanism.


iii)    A
company can collaborate with other companies for undertaking projects or programs
or CSR activities in such a manner that the CSR Committees of respective
companies are in a position to report separately on such projects or programs
in accordance with these rules.


4.2    Companies
may build CSR capacities of their own personnel as well as those of their
implementation agencies through Institutions with established track records of
atleast three financial years but such expenditure including expenditure on
administrative overheads shall not exceed five per cent of total CSR
expenditure of the company in one financial year.


5.     CSR
– Accounting and related disclosures

5.1    The
Institute of Chartered Accountant of India has issued Guidance Note on
Accounting for expenditure on CSR activities which provides accounting
guideline for CSR expenditure.


5.2    The amount
of contribution made towards CSR would generally, be treated as an expense and
charged to the statement of profit and loss, unless it gives rise to an asset.
According to the Guidance Note on Accounting for CSR, an asset would be recognised
on the basis of an evaluation of control over the asset and accrual of future
economic benefits to the company.

5.3    Section
135 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013, requires that the Board of every eligible
company, “shall ensure that the company spends, in every financial year, at
least 2% of the average net profits of the company made during the three
immediately preceding financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social
Responsibility Policy”. A proviso to this Section states that “if the company
fails to spend such amount, the Board shall, in its report specify the reasons
for not spending the amount”.

Further, Rule 8(1) of the Companies
(Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014, prescribes that the Board
Report of a company under these Rules shall include an Annual Report on CSR,
containing particulars specified in the Annexure to the said Rules, which
provide a format in this regard. The above provisions of the Act clearly lay
down that the expenditure on CSR activities is to be disclosed only in the
Board’s Report in accordance with the Rules made thereunder.

In view of above, no provision for the
amount which is not spent, i.e., any shortfall in the amount that was expected
to be spent as per the provisions of the Act on CSR activities as compared to
the amount actually spent at the end of a reporting period, may be made in the
financial statements.

The proviso to section 135 (5) of the
Act, makes it clear that if the specified amount is not spent by the company
during the year, the Directors’ Report should disclose the reasons for not
spending the amount.

However, if a company has already
undertaken certain CSR activity for which a liability has been incurred by
entering into a contractual obligation, then in accordance with the generally
accepted principles of accounting, a provision for the amount representing the
extent to which the CSR activity was completed during the year, needs to be
recognised in the financial statements.

Where a company spends more than that
required under law, a question arises as to whether the excess amount ‘spent’
can be carried forward to be adjusted against amounts to be spent on CSR
activities in future period. Since ‘2% of average net profits of immediately
preceding three years’ is the minimum amount which is required to be spent u/s.
135 (5) of the Act, the excess amount cannot be carried forward for set off
against the CSR expenditure required to be spent in future.

Further, the Board of Directors of the
Company are free to decide whether any unspent amount from the minimum required
CSR expenditure is to be carried forward to the next year. However, the carried
forward amount should be over and above the next year’s CSR allocation
equivalent to atleast 2% of the average net profit of the Company of the
immediately preceding three years.

Additionally, a company should also
disclose related party transactions e.g. contribution to a trust controlled by
the company in relation to CSR expenditure.

5.4 In some cases, a company may supply goods
manufactured by it or render services as CSR activities. In such cases, the
expenditure incurred should be recognised when the control on the goods
manufactured by it is transferred or the allowable services are rendered by the
employees. The goods manufactured by the company should be valued in accordance
with the principles prescribed in Accounting Standard (AS) 2, Valuation of
Inventories. The services rendered should be measured at cost. Indirect taxes
(like excise duty, service tax, VAT or other applicable taxes) on the goods and
services so contributed will also form part of the CSR expenditure.

Where a company receives a grant from
others for carrying out CSR activities, the CSR expenditure should be measured
net of the grant.

5.5       Item 5 (A)(k) of the General Instructions for
Preparation of Statement of Profit and Loss under Schedule III to the Companies
Act, 2013, requires that in case of companies covered u/s. 135, the amount of
expenditure incurred on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Activities’ shall be
disclosed by way of a note to the statement of profit and loss. From the
perspective of better financial reporting and still be in line with the
requirements of Schedule III in this regard, it is generally recommended that
all expenditure on CSR activities, that qualify to be recognised as expense
should be recognised as a separate line item as ‘CSR expenditure’ in the
statement of profit and loss. Further, the relevant note should disclose the
break-up of various heads of expenses included in the line item ‘CSR
expenditure’.

5.6    In case a
contribution is made to a fund specified in Schedule VII to the Act, the same
would be treated as an expense for the year and charged to the statement of
profit and loss. In case the amount is spent through a registered trust or a
registered society or a company established u/s. 8 of the Act the same will be
treated as expense for the year by charging off to the statement of profit and
loss.

5.7    In cases,
where an expenditure of revenue nature is incurred on any of the activities
mentioned in Schedule VII to the Act by the company on its own, the same should
be charged as an expense to the statement of profit and loss. In case the
expenditure incurred by the company is of such nature which may give rise to an
‘asset’, a question may arise as to whether such an ‘asset’ should be
recognised by the company in its balance sheet. In this context, it would be
relevant to note the definition of the term ‘asset’ as per the Framework for
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements issued by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India. As per the Framework, an ‘asset’ is a “resource
controlled by an enterprise as a result of past events from which future
economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise”. Hence, in cases
where the control of the ‘asset’ is transferred by the company, e.g., a school
building is transferred to a Gram Panchayat for running and maintaining the
school, it should not be recognised as ‘asset’ in its books and such
expenditure would need to be charged to the statement of profit and loss as and
when incurred. In other cases, where the company retains the control of the
‘asset’ then it would need to be examined whether any future economic benefits
accrue to the company. Invariably future economic benefits from a ‘CSR asset’
would not flow to the company as any surplus from CSR cannot be included by the
company in business profits in view of Rule 6(2) of the Companies (Corporate
Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014.

Where a company receives a grant from
others for carrying out CSR activities, the CSR expenditure should be measured
net of the grant.

5.8    Recognition of income earned from CSR
projects/programmes or during the course of conduct of CSR activities

Rule 6 (2) of the Companies (Corporate
Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014, requires that “the surplus arising
out of the CSR projects or programs or activities shall not form part of the
business profit of a company”. Thus, in respect of a CSR project or programme
or activity, it needs to be determined whether any surplus is arising
therefrom. A question would arise as to whether such surplus should be
recognised in the statement of profit and loss of the company. It may be noted
that paragraph 5 of Accounting Standard (AS) 5, Net Profit or Loss for the
Period, Prior Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies, inter alia,
requires that all items of income which are recognised in a period should be
included in the determination of net profit or loss for the period unless an
Accounting Standard requires or permits otherwise. As to whether the surplus
from CSR activities can be considered as ‘income’, the Framework for
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements issued by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India, defines ‘income’ as “increase in economic
benefits during the accounting period in the form of inflows or enhancements of
assets or decreases of liabilities that result in increases in equity, other
than those relating to contributions from equity participants”. Since the
surplus arising from CSR activities is not arising from a transaction with the
owners, it would be considered as ‘income’ for accounting purposes. In view of
the aforesaid requirement any surplus arising out of CSR project or programme
or activities shall be recognised in the statement of profit and loss and since
this surplus cannot be a part of business profits of the company, the same
should immediately be recognised as liability for CSR expenditure in the balance
sheet and recognised as a charge to the statement of profit and loss.
Accordingly, such surplus would not form part of the minimum 2% of the average
net profits of the company made during the three immediately preceding
financial years in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy.

5.9    Presentation and disclosure  in financial statements

The General Instructions for
Preparation of Statement of Profit and Loss under Schedule III to the Companies
Act, 2013, requires that in case of companies covered u/s. 135, the amount of
expenditure incurred on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Activities’ shall be
disclosed by way of a note to the statement of profit and loss.

The notes to accounts relating to CSR
expenditure should also contain the following:

a. Gross amount required to be spent by
the Company during the year;

b. Amount Spent during the year;

c. Details of related party
transactions eg; contribution to a trust controlled by the Company in relation
to CSR expenditure as per AS -18 – Related Party Disclosures;

d. Where provision is made in case of
CSR activity for which a liability has been incurred by entering into a
contractual obligation the same should be presented as per requirements of
Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013. Further movements in the provisions
during the year should be shown separately.

6.     CSR
– Tax implications

6.1    Before
Companies Act, 2013 and Finance Act, 2014, the expenditure on CSR was not
mandatory and there was no direct provision under Income Tax Act dealing with
CSR expenditure. Therefore, all the voluntary expenditures incurred on CSR were
claimed either u/s. 35(2AA) or 35AC or u/s. 80G of the Income Tax Act and in
most of the cases the CSR expenditures were claimed to be allowed u/s. 37(1) of
the Income Tax Act, 1961. However, after Companies Act 2013, CSR expenditure
became mandatory and the tax treatment of CSR spends became contingent upon the
Income Tax Act, 1961 and amendments thereof.

The Finance Act, 2014 had brought a
very radical and far reaching amendment, as far as CSR expenditures are
concerned. The Finance Act had proposed that CSR expenditure shall not be
allowed as expenditure u/s. 37 of Income Tax Act, 1961. However, any CSR
expenditure which is allowed as deduction under other sections such as section
30, 32, 35, 35AC, 80G etc., should be possible.

6.2    Historically
it is well established by various judicial pronouncement that the CSR
expenditures were allowed u/s. 37 (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, only on the
background that these expenditures were considered to be for the purpose of
business or for advancement of the business of the assessee. However, now Rule
4 of CSR Rule specifically provides that CSR activities will not include any
activities undertaken in pursuance of normal course of business and therefore,
to constitute a valid CSR expenditure, the expenditure cannot be in relation to
or for advancement of business of the company. Under this background, the
amendment in the Finance Act, 2014 seems to be clarificatory in nature as
expenditure can be allowed to be deducted u/s. 37(1) only when it is incurred
for the purpose of business.

6.2.1   If the
company directly undertakes CSR expenditures there will be no tax deduction and
therefore, the company cannot claim the tax benefits when it spends the amount
directly.

6.2.2   If the
company undertakes CSR expenditures through 80G registered NGOs (including its
own foundation) then the company can claim some tax benefit as such
contribution provide 50% tax benefit.

 6.2.3  Further,
if a corporate undertakes CSR activities through Institutions registered u/s.
35CCA, 35AC, 35CCC, 35CCD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 or through funds like
Prime Minister Relief Fund, National Defence Fund having 100% tax benefit u/s.
80G then it will get 100% tax advantage.

6.2.4   Further, if
a corporate undertakes CSR activities through Institutions registered u/s. 35
for scientific research or social research then it may get 125% to 175% tax
advantage and will be most advantages for CSR, but the choice of activities will
be reduced and the money will go towards research and not towards direct field
level programmes.

6.2.5      Thus,
the present tax provisions of differential tax statement of CSR expenditure may
shift focus of the company to have a CSR policy on the basis of tax efficiency
also.

6.3    The present laws dealing with CSR, i.e.
Companies Act 2013 and Income Tax 1961, thus are going in 2 different
directors. The Companies Act requires a company to spend certain amount towards
C.S.R. and lays down elaborate mechanism in respect of the same. The Income Tax
Act very clearly states that the C.S.R. expenditure would not be allowed as
business expenditure. However, in case the company spends the amount of CSR
through a section 8 Company, Trust or Society, it can legitimately claim this
as a deduction under relevent provisions of the Income Tax Act. Thus, it
appears that there is a need to have a co-ordinated approach in these two laws,
in respect of CSR activities.

7.     CSR
– Implementation issues

7.1    Certain
issues have been surfaced during the implementation of the CSR rules and they
can be addressed by setting up appropriate mechanisms. First, if a company has
to spend relatively large sums on CSR year after year, because its profits are
huge, it will face the challenge of identifying appropriate projects on a
sustained basis. It is important to realise that companies need to pump in 2
per cent of their net profits every year. This can put a strain on the
company’s management to search, select, implement and monitor new projects
every year. The task is likely to cumulatively build up both in terms of scale
and scope over time. For large companies the issue of identifying appropriate
projects on a sustained basis is even more challenging. Spending of such large
amounts may require large companies to have dedicated centres that identify,
implement, and monitor large scale projects or a large number of smaller
projects. This entails additional costs for a company that need to be factored
in. The Rules foresee this to some extent and allows companies to carry out
their CSR activities through registered trusts set up by the companies or
outside trusts with good track records; but the activities of these trusts
would in turn become challenging and will possibly need monitoring.

7.2    Another
issue relates to the treatment of CSR kind of expenditure that companies may
already be incurring. Would reclassifying them as CSR expenses meet the
requirements of law? For example, can companies that are operating educational
institutions or running major hospital facilities for their employees beyond
what the law requires, claim the excess facilities as CSR expenditure u/s. 135?

Will this be allowed if such facilities
are also open to nonemployees as well? Some questions have already been raised
as to whether certain types of expenditure which companies have been incurring
will qualify as items towards meeting the specified CSR target. In response to
this, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs issued a circular dated June 18th,
2014 (MCA, 2014b) specifying that “the activities undertaken in pursuance of
the CSR policy must be relatable to Schedule VII of the Act and the activities
mentioned in the Schedule VII must be interpreted liberally capturing the
essence of the subjects enumerated therein.” As stated earlier, the circular
also lists certain specific types of expenditures that will count as CSR
expenditure for meeting the provisions of section 135 and those that will not.
More such explanations and clarifications are likely to be made over time.

7.3    Another
problem relates to coordination among companies in choosing their respective
CSR activities. This is a concern, particularly because the Rules recommend
that the companies give preference to local areas in their CSR spending. To
prevent duplication in particular types of CSR projects by companies within a
particular region, formal partnerships or consortiums can be set up to achieve
better coordination of CSR activities among companies within that region. In
instances where large investments are necessary, such as in hospitals and
schools, smaller companies may be better off by pooling their CSR resources
through such consortiums.

7.4    Many
companies give donation to Trust or Societies for the purpose of CSR and claim
it as CSR expenditure. In such cases, it is necessary for the company to obtain
a certificate from the Trust or Society that the requisite amount has been
actually spent for the purpose for which it was received by the Trust. The
Trust/ Society should produce some documentary evidence for the company to show
that the actual work is done and the amount is spent on such work.

7.5    The Trust
or Societies which receive money form companies towards CSR need to follow a
proper method of accounting whereby they should be able to show to the
companies that the money received is actually spent for the specified purpose.
The company may even ask for a certificate from the auditor of such
Trust/Society for this purpose and even ask for a copy of the financial
statement of the Trust/Society for its records.

7.6 Companies need support from Non-Profit
Organisations (NPO) in various area of CSR activities such as identification
implementation and perseverance in undertaking such activities. People need a
different mindset when they do social work. This is an area where people
working in social sector through NPO need to guide and support the people form
the corporate sector in respect of various skills required for doing such work.
The combination of perseverance of persons doing social work coupled with the
effective and efficient way of handling the matter can give better results from
CSR activities.

7.7    The
N.P.Os need to prepare proper project reports and present their ideas in an
organised manner before the corporates so that the Companies get the required
confidence before they commit their money and time for such projects. This is
one area which needs substantial improvement since a large number of N.P.Os do
not have the necessary expertise and skills to make proper presentation even
when they are actually doing good work at ground level.

7.8    There is a
need to carry out social audit of many of the CSR projects so as to identify
and measure the impact of such work on the various sections of the Society.
There is a need for more agencies who can do such work. Mere spending of money
is not sufficient for achieving the desired social results and this aspect
needs to be brought to the notice of the corporates in proper manner.

7.9    Registrar
of Companies has issued Notices to many companies to explain as to why the
companies have not spent the necessary amount towards CSR. There is no penalty
provided in the Companies Act 2013 for non-payment or less payment towards CSR.
However, the collection of such data and explanations form companies by
Registrar of Companies indicate that the Govt. might soon come out with some
more stringent provisions in this matter.

8.     Way
Forward

8.1    CSR is a
social movement wherein the companies are contributing their money and time in
fulfilling certain social objectives which help the members of the society. It
would be more useful if the top management of the companies put their heart and
soul into it and spend some more time for these activities. This would achieve
better effective and efficient use of economic resources for the betterment of
the Society. This would be also a good step in the right direction to ensure
sustainability of the business of the company.

8.2    Corporate
Social Responsibility should now move on to Individual Social Responsibility
whereby each individual feels the necessity of doing something for the society
Of course doing your own job with full integrity and honesty itself is a
positive contribution to the Society. However, if every individual decides to
spend atleast 5% of his/her time for some social work, it will make great
difference to the society. Everyone can choose the area of work as per his
choice, but such commitment of time will make all the difference to the area of
work selected. This will support many good initiatives taken by N.P.Os since
the social work actually needs involvement of many people in addition to the
monetary contribution. Such social work will also enhance the work experience
and reputation of people doing it and make them more happy.

The purpose of this article would be
achieved if more readers decide to do something for others and move on to
fulfil Individual Social Responsibility.

 

Transfer of intangible rights: Sale or service?

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In a recently reported
case of Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2016 (44)
STR 161 (Bom) whereunder two writ petitions, one filed by the captioned company
(referred to as the Monsanto) and the other filed by Subway Systems (India)
Pvt. Ltd. (Subway), Hon. Bombay High Court painstakingly examined whether each
of the transactions involved were liable for VAT or service tax.  Although the facts in both the petitions were
totally different, interestingly the petitions were tagged together on finding that
the issue involved was similar.  Facts in
both the cases are briefly summarized below:

Monsanto’s
case:

The petitioner, Monsanto
supplied to third parties certain type of hybrid cotton seed which was infused
with a proprietary technology that protects it against a known menace to cotton
corp.  From these hybrids, these parties
generate large quantities of sowable seeds which are in turn sold to cotton
farmers.  The end product seeds thus have
the benefit of menace protection technology. 
The parties to whom the technology is provided in the form of seeds, (known
as donor seeds) make commercial use of the technology.  In the backdrop of these facts, Monsanto has
claimed that this is a case of offer of technology through container seeds.  The party pays for technology and not
container.  They do not sell any goods to
the end user.  Therefore, there being no “transfer
of right to use”, they should be exigible to service tax.  Central to their claim was
non-exclusivity.  Monsanto licensed to various
third parties the said technology.  Those
developers in turn cannot sub-license the technology.  They use it to produce sowable seeds.  Therefore the recipients of technology obtain
right to use the technology but there is no transfer of that right.  The container seed is the only means by which
technology can be transferred.  Provision
of technology was followed by training for using donor seeds and developing
foundation seeds and training for undergoing regulatory tests before the
licensee could produce foundation seed. For this, a one-time fixed fee plus a
trait fee was received by Monsanto under the agreement with third parties.  Petitioner’s plea was that service tax and
VAT are mutually exclusive and well settled relying inter alia on BSNL 2006 (2) STR
161 (SC)
, Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd.
vs. CTO 2008 (9) STR 337
and Association
of Learning and Finance Companies vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR
417
.  The petitioner’s main
contention was that there did not involve “transfer
of right to use goods”
in the transaction of providing donor seeds.  This was pleaded mainly on the ground that
there is absence of ‘exclusivity’ and inability of the transferor to transfer
the same right to another in terms of twin
tests
comprised in the five attributes required to be satisfied as laid
down in the case of BSNL (supra).  In
this judgment to constitute a transaction as one of “transfer of right to use the goods”, 5 attributes are required to
be satisfied viz. there are goods available for delivery, there is consensus ad
idem as to the identity of the goods, the transferee must have a legal right to
use the goods and the twin tests of temporary ‘exclusion’ of the transferor to
have the said right i.e. during the period the transferee has such right and
incapacity of transferor to again transfer the same rights to others.  According to the petitioner, the said test
applies to tangible and intangible goods equally and therefore the law laid
down in Duke & Sons (1999) 1 Mah LJ
26,
Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom)
and Nutrine
Confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 40 VST 327 (AP)

did not represent correct position in law as certain facts were not made available
to the Court at the time these cases were decided. For instance, when Duke
& Sons’ case (supra) was decided, judgment of Supreme Court interpreting
Article 366 (29A)(d) was not available.  Further,
in Nutrine’s case (supra), BSNL’s test was not correctly applied and it was contrary
to BSNL.  Based on these submissions
among others, it was pleaded that their case is one of permissive use only and
not a sale or deemed sale. Since such transaction of permissive use is covered
under service tax law, it is one of service.

Subway’s
case:

In this case, the
transaction is a franchise agreement. Subway has claimed that franchise
agreement is a pure service.  Its
franchisees in Mumbai have obtained right to display Subway’s trademarks.  The franchisees enjoy no title to these trademarks.  This is therefore neither a sale nor a deemed
sale.  Subway’s business consists of possessing
non-exclusive sub-license from Subway International B.V., a Dutch LLC (which in
turn received in a second layer from an American company owning proprietary
rights) to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY branded
restaurants, serving sandwiches and salads under the service mark, SUBWAY in
India.  Under franchise agreements
entered into with third parties, specified services are listed to enable
franchisee to operate sandwich shops in Subway’s name.  The rights are limited and they are non-transferable
or non-assignable.  Further, Subway
reserves the right to compete with its franchisees.  Consideration from the franchisees is received
by way of one-time franchise fee and royalty payable weekly based on weekly turnover.  The petitioner paid service tax since 2003 on
these fees.  The State Government however
contended that since the franchisee has acquired right to use trademarks, there
is a transfer of right to use those trademarks and therefore claimed VAT on
this in 2014 and issued notice to this effect and subsequently several show
cause notices as well as exparte assessment order.  The petitioner pleaded that the franchise
agreement was not one for sale or transfer of right to use but merely
permitting the franchisee to display certain marks and use certain technologies
and methodology to prepare salads and sandwiches for sale and this was a
permissive use.  Subway could enter into
as many / as few agreements with other franchisees even simultaneously and
could compete with its franchisees.  The
license provided thus is limited.  Apart
from this factual aspect, it was also pleaded for Subway that in the light of
several decisions of the Supreme Court on various composite contracts, Article
366(29A) was amended in 1983 whereby only under six specific situations,
transactions could be considered deemed sale and the amendment allowed specific
composite contracts to be divisible and by separating element of ‘sale’ it
could be taxed.  Subway’s agreement could
not be split and sale was not distinctly discernible.  However, the revenue contended that
‘franchise’ and ‘trademarks’ are expressly covered under MVAT Act since 2005 as
‘goods’ and therefore liable for VAT. 
Both revenue and the petitioner relied on Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom). The
petitioner chiefly relied on Asian Oilfield
Services vs. State of Tripura (2015) SCC (online Tai 483
and BSNL (Supra) 
and Imagic Creative (supra).

Findings
of the Court:

The Court on a very
careful consideration in Monsanto’s case found that although ld. Counsel for
the petitioner commended that the transaction of transferring technology was
one of “permissive use”, in view of the Court, the said interpretation was not
supported by law.  The Court observed
that the seeds transferred were fully vested in the transferee.  On the issue of effective control, the Court
observed that effective control over the said seed and therefore that portion
of the technology embedded in the seeds was also transferred to the transferee.  The transferee could do whatever it wished
and Monsanto had no control left after the transfer.  Hence the transfer was to the exclusion of
Monsanto India and this satisfied the twin test laid down in BSNL.  The Court, in this context categorically observed
that BSNL’s judgment noted various factual aspects and the test was therefore
set out in those circumstances. Thus Hon. Supreme Court in that case did not
have occasion to consider its applicability to intangible property like
intellectual property.  The Court thus
also observed that Tata Sons (supra) was interpreted accordingly whereas Kerala
High Court in Malabar Gold (para 35), 2013 (32) STR
3 (Ker) took a contrary view.  It took
BSNL test to be applicable as a general proposition.  The Court expressed that they had serious
reservation about its universal applicability by stating, “we do not think this can ever be a correct reading of BSNL”.  Further that the Bombay High Court in Duke &
Sons (supra) held that test would not be applicable in the case of
trademarks.  According to the Court
therefore the law laid down in Duke & Sons is a good law.  The Court thus considered the instant case to
be the case of a transfer of the right to use goods while inter alia also
referring to various clauses in the agreement pointed out by the revenue in
support thereof.  For instance under a
specific clause 7.1, the sub-licensee could assign the agreement and its rights
and obligations under the agreement to its wholly-owned subsidiaries without
permission of Monsanto.  This according
to the Court would not happen if there was only permissive use as claimed by
the petitioner. Revenue’s reliance on the case of G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 43 VST 323
was viewed as well-founded by the Court while observing that in the instant
case, sub-licensing actually amounted to passage of effective control.  The Court also drew analogy in fair detail
with downloading of software by purchasing license.  The Court observed that when a license is
purchased, it is still a sale although what the user has purchased is a right
to use software.  Proprietary rights to
the software do not have to be transferred or sold.  On identical lines in the instant case
identified technology, the one which was infused in seeds were transferred to
use as the transferee wished.  The
intellectual property may continue to be owned by Monsanto.

Finding this case to be diametrically
opposed to model in the case of Subway, the Court observed that primarily
reliance on the case of Asian Oilfield and BSNL by the petitioner was correct
as Subway’s transaction could not be split into two distinct or severable
components.  If State was to be permitted
to tax the whole transaction, it would mean extending upon the power of the
Centre under the Union List.  The Court
noted that agreement between Subway and its franchisee is a bare permission to
use as there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the
franchisees and for all the reasons in law and fact that licensing of
technology in Monsanto is held to be transfer of right to use, the franchise
agreement in Subway’s case must be held permissible use only. 

The Court however noted
with caution to state that this did not mean that every franchise agreement
will necessarily be outside the purview of amended MVAT Act.  However, merely because of inclusion of
franchisees under MVAT Act would not automatically make all franchise
agreements liable to VAT.  There may be
class of agreements of franchise that would have all incidents of a ‘sale’ or a
“deemed sale” i.e. transfer of the right to use to attract VAT and not
otherwise.  However, limiting its view on
the agreement under the case of Subway, the Court opined that the facts of the
case does not constitute a sale exigible to VAT.  Equally it rejected a proposition that the
transaction which is nothing but a service could be converted as sale merely because
an entry is inserted in the State statute. 
Subway agreements are purely licensing agreements consisting of permissive
right to franchisees to use defined intangible rights, therefore not amenable
to VAT but a service liable for service tax.

Conclusion:

The above decision in
particular in the case of Subway relying on the decision of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom)
based on an altogether different aspect reached a
verdict that the franchise agreement involved is exigible to service tax than
one reached in the  case of Malabar Gold Pvt.
Ltd. (supra).  In Subway’s case above, it
is found that only “permissive use” is granted under the agreement and
therefore it cannot be interpreted as “transfer of right to use goods” whereas
Kerala High Court decided “franchise agreement” as one of service simply based
on interpreting the tests provided in BSNL’s case (supra) as having general
proposition even vis-à-vis intangible goods like intellectual property. It is
important to note that in this case, the Court has categorically made a point
in the context of Monsanto’s case that in the case of BSNL (supra), Hon.
Supreme Court did not have occasion to examine the aspects of transfer of
intangible goods such as intellectual property. Therefore the tests laid down
therein for determining a transaction of “transfer of right to use goods”
should not be followed as having universal application and especially in the
context of transactions involving transfer of use of intangible goods.  A thin line divides a transaction of service
from that of sale.  The controversy soon
is likely to be part of history with the onset of GST regime coming into force
in a short while.  Yet, one cannot ignore
the hardship faced in this regard by a large number of tax compliant entities
which have paid tax under one law and has  to face wrath of the other for want of
appropriate law and mechanism to resolve the manmade issue.

(Readers may read the
above with March, 2016 issue of BCAJ article on transfer of use of intangibles
under service tax feature).

[2016] 73 taxmann.com 91 (Kol – Trib.) Bombay Plaza (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT ITA Nos. 1641 & 1203 (Kol) of 2014 A.Ys.: 2006-07 and 2007-08, Dated: 02.09.2016

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S. 22 r.w.s.
27(iiib)  – The provisions of section 22
read with section 27(iiib) are not attracted in the case of an assessee who is
a licensee and not a lessee.  

FACTS: 

The assessee company, formed with the
main object of acquiring on license or by purchase, etc premises in India and
also to license or sub-license or lease or sub-lease such lands, or property or
premises, had entered into an agreement 
dated 16.4.1991 with East India Hotels Ltd. under which it got on leave
and license basis 9000 sq. feet in Hotel Oberoi Towers, Bombay for the purpose
of using it as a shopping centre.  The
tenure of the leave and license was for a period of 50 years at a fixed monthly
license fee agreed between the parties. 
After acquiring the said shopping space the assessee utilized it in
granting different portions of the shopping space to various parties who were
interested in setting up shops there with the condition that shopkeepers had to
subscribe to a specific number of shares of the assessee apart from payment of
monthly charges.  The assessee also
provided various services to the licensees like air-conditioning, telephone
services, maintenance, electricity, water, sanitary, security, etc.  The assessee was basically involved in the
business of providing the said shopping space on license along with various
services.  The consideration from this
activity was shown as business income. 
The assessee claimed license fee paid to East India Hotels as a
deduction.

While assessing the total income of the
assessee under section 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO), in view
of the provisions of section 22 r.w.s. 27(iiib) of the Act, charged the said
income under the head `Income from House Property’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD:

The Tribunal noted that the license was
not only for use of the shop area but also for the use of facilities like
air-conditioners, use of elevators, etc. 
It noted various clauses of the leave and license agreement with a view
to ascertain whether the subject matter of agreement was a lease or a
license.  It noted the definition of
`lease’ under Transfer of Property Act and the definition of `license’ under
the Indian Easements Act and keeping in mind these definitions it laid down the
distinction between the lease and the license. 
Applying the tests so laid down it came to the conclusion that the
parties intended it to be a license and the agreement did not create any
interest in the property owned by the licensor and that the licensee did not
have exclusive possession of the property. 
The assessee, as a licensee, had granted sub-license to various parties
and derived income therefrom.  It held
that once it is concluded that the assessee is only a licensee, then it can
safely be said that the provisions of section 22 read with section 27(iiib) of
the Act are not attracted.  Accordingly,
it held that the income in question cannot be assessed under the head `Income
from House Property’. 

The Tribunal also observed that keeping
in mind the objects of the assessee and the facts and circumstances of the
assessee’s case, it can be safely concluded that the assessee carried on a
systematic and regular activity in the nature of business and therefore the
income from granting the premises on sub-license was to be assessed under the
head `Income from Business’.  It observed
that the latest decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chennai Properties
and Investments Ltd. (373 ITR 673)(SC) was not available to the Tribunal when
it passed the order in case of another group company based on which decision of
the Tribunal the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. 

The Tribunal held that in view of the
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chennai Properties and Investments
Ltd. (supra) the question whether the assessee is a deemed owner under section
22 r.w.s. 27(iiib) of the Act, no longer assumes importance.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

Mohamed Taslim Shaikh v. Addl. CIT ITAT Mumbai `B’ Bench Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (JM) and Rajesh Kumar (AM) ITA No. 7259/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Dated: 04.08.2016. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Dr. K. Shivram, Ms. Nilam Jadav / Randhir Gupta

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S. 271D – Penalty under section 271D cannot be levied in a case where assessee was prevented by reasonable cause to accept money from his close relative like father for making payment for immovable property.

FACTS:  

The assessee filed his return of income declaring total income of Rs.1,87,750.  In the course of assessment proceedings it was noticed that the assessee’s father made a payment of Rs.10,69,000 on behalf of the assessee for purchase of property which amount was treated as a loan in the books of account of the assessee.  The Assessing Officer initiated proceedings for levy of penalty under section 269SS read with section 271D of the Act.  After considering the reply of the assessee, the AO levied a penalty of Rs. 10,69,000.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD: 
The Tribunal, upon going through the material on record, observed that a similar addition was deleted by ITAT, Ahmedabad `A’ Bench in the case of ITO v. Dattuprasad Manharlal Dave in ITA No. 1816/Ahd/2013, wherein on a similar issue, relief was granted to the assessee.  It also observed that similar view has been taken by Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Dimpal Yadav & Akhilesh Kumar Yadav (2015) 379 ITR 177 (All.)(HC) wherein the Hon’ble High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal interalia holding that loan transaction was genuine and there was reasonable cause for cash loan in similar situation.  The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the penalty levied under section 271D because assessee was prevented by reasonable cause to accept the money from his close relative like father for making payment for immovable property.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

[2016] 73 taxmann.com 36 (Mum – Trib.) Kamlesh M. Kanungo HUF v. DCIT- TDS ITA Nos.: 4045 & 4046 (Mum) of 2015 A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2012-13, Dated: 19.09.2016

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S. 221 r.w.s.
201  – For the purposes of Explanation
below section 221(1) which prescribes that an assessee shall not cease to be
liable to penalty under sub-section (1) of section 221 merely by reason of the
fact that before levy of such penalty, he has paid tax a distinction has to be
made between  a case where the TDS is
deposited suo motu before any proceedings are initiated by the AO and a case
where the deposit of the TDS is made after initiation of proceedings by the AO
but before levy of penalty.  

FACTS:

The assessee HUF deducted income-tax
amounting to Rs. 1,71,88,352 under section 194A of the Act but did not deposit
it by due date which was 31.5.2011 but deposited it only on 30.6.2011 along
with interest. 

The Assessing Officer (AO) levied
penalty of Rs. 5,10,000 which was equivalent to 3% of the defaulted amount of
TDS. 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO by noticing that non-deposit
of requisite TDS to the Government Treasury was an admitted position.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD: 

The Tribunal observed that the proviso
to section 221(1) clearly suggests that the levy of penalty under section
221(1) is not automatic and that the AO is empowered to use his discretion not
to levy penalty if the default is for good and sufficient reasons. It noted
that the bonafides of the assessee in complying with the requirements of
depositing the tax into the Government Treasury stood established in as much as
the tax had been deposited even before the corresponding interest amounts were
paid to the respective creditors and also before any proceedings were initiated
by the AO. 

The Tribunal held that the Explanation
below section 221(1) refers to a situation where the tax has been paid “before
the levy of such penalty”, whereas in the facts of the present case the
assessee had deposited the requisite TDS along with applicable interest into
the Government Treasury even before any proceedings under section 201(1) of the
Act were initiated by the AO. 
Considering the penal nature of section 221 it would be in the fitness
of things to make a distinction between a case where the TDS is deposited suo
motu before any proceedings are initiated by the AO and a case where the
deposit of TDS is made after initiation of proceedings by the AO but before
levy of penalty.  It held that the
Explanation will not militate against the assessee because of this
distinction.   The Tribunal held that
there existed ‘good and sufficient reasons’ to mitigate the default in
question, and thus, the proviso to section 221(1) of the Act clearly comes to
the rescue of the assessee.

The Tribunal deleted the penalty levied
under section 221(1) r.w.s. 201(1) of the Act by the AO.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 91 (Kol – Trib.) Union Bank of India v. ACIT ITA Nos. 7589 (Mum) of 2014 A.Y.: 2008-09, Dated: 11.08.2016

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S. 244A  – While granting refund in pursuance to the
appeal effect order, the amount of refund granted earlier should be adjusted
first against the interest component of the earlier refund and thereafter the
balance amount should be adjusted against the principal component of tax in the
refund order granted earlier.  

FACTS:

The Assessing Officer (AO) while
computing the amount of refund arising as a result of passing an order giving
effect to the order of CIT(A) granted interest of Rs. 64,53,58,824 as against
the amount of Rs. 65,73,42,440 claimed by the assessee.  The discrepancy, according to the assessee,
arose because the AO adjusted the refund granted to the assessee first against
principal amount of tax due instead of adjusting it first against the amount of
interest and thereafter against the principal amount of tax.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal
to the CIT(A) who distinguished the order of the Tribunal, in the assessee’s
own case, for earlier year on the ground that the said order of the Tribunal
has not considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Fluoro
Ltd. (358 ITR 291).

Aggrieved, the assesse preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD: 

The Tribunal noted that the issue under
consideration was decided by the Tribunal, for AY1998-99, 2001-02 &
2005-06, in favour of the assessee.  It
noted that the earlier orders of the Tribunal were based on decision of the
Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation wherein it was
inter alia held that in a situation where only part amount is refunded by the
Department, then payment of interest on the balance amount due from the
Department to the assessee, on a particular date, does not amount to payment of
interest on interest.  The Delhi High
Court, while arriving at this decision, had taken support from the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. HEG Ltd. (2010) 324 ITR 331 (SC). 

The Tribunal observed that the facts
before it were similar to the facts of the case before the Delhi High Court in
the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation (supra) since in the present
case also only part amount was refunded in the first phase by the department
and when the balance amount was paid by the department in the second phase, the
assessee was entitled for interest on the balance amount of refund due.  It held that, in view of the observations of
the Delhi High Court, it can be said that it is not a case of payment of
interest on interest.  It also noted that
the Delhi High Court has held that the department ought to follow the same
procedure and rules while collecting tax and while issuing refunds. 

The Tribunal held that since the statute
itself has already prescribed a particular method of adjustment in Explanation
to section 140A(1), then justice, fairness, equity and good conscience demands
that same method should be followed while making adjustment for refund of
taxes, especially when no contrary provision has been provided. 

Following the order of the Tribunal of earlier
years, the Tribunal directed the AO to re-compute the amount of interest under
section 244A by first adjusting the amount of refund already granted towards
interest component and balance left, if any, shall be adjusted towards the tax
component.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

ACIT v. K. S. Constructions ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (JM) and Rajesh Kumar (AM) ITA No. 7660/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2010-11. Dated: 12.08.2016. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Vijay Kumar Bora / Ms. Aarti Vissanji

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S. 28 – Addition for suppressed sale cannot be made on the ground that the flat was sold at a rate lower than the rate at which other flats in the building were sold specially when the sale was at a price above the stamp duty value.

FACTS:  

The assessee firm carried on business as builders and developers.  During the year under consideration it had declared income from business and income under the head other sources.  In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had offered profits in respect of 6 commercial units sold during the year.  Of the six units sold the sale deeds in respect of the 5 units were registered in the financial year 2009-10.

The relevant details in respect of units sold can be tabulated as under –

 

 

Unit

Rate /
sq. mt

Rupees

Date of
registration of sale agt

Date of

First

payment

303

33,333

3.3.2006

30.12.2005

301

34,871

18.12.2009

7.2.2006

101

2,94,485

18.12.2009

19.8.2009

302

78,327

4.10.2009

24.11.2009

4th
floor

2,38,576

18.11.2009

13.7.2009

5th
floor

2,38,576

18.11.2009

13.7.2009

The AO asked the assessee to explain the difference in rate charged for unit no. 302 as compared to that charged for unit no. 101.  The assessee explained that the unit no. 302 suffered from design disadvantages and therefore it could not get customers to purchase unit no. 302 whereas the unit no. 101 commanded a price higher than the other units because it had a locational advantage of entire floor suitable for car show room as compared to unit no. 302.

The AO considering the date of first payment as well as date by which total payment was received by the assessee in respect of unit no. 101 and 302 held that the two transactions are comparable. He observed that it is a prevalent practice in real estate dealings; underhand transactions of on money cannot be denied specially in view of the fact that the difference in rate was more than three times.  He applied the rate at which the first floor premises were sold for the purposes of determining the actual sale rate for unit no. 302.  He, accordingly, added Rs. 4,16,70,874 to the total income of the assessee as unaccounted income from sale of unit no. 302.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who granted relief to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD: 

The Tribunal observed that

(i)    apart from Unit No. 302, date of agreement of unit no. 301 and that of units on 4th & 5th floors also fell in the same financial year;
(i)    the sale price of unit no. 302 is higher than its stamp duty valuation;
(ii)    the AO had accepted the variation in rates for sale of unit nos. 301, 302 and 4th & 5th floor vis-à-vis the rates for sale of unit no. 101.
(iii)    the AO has not brought any evidence on record  to show as to how the explanation of the assessee that there are locational disadvantages in case of Unit no. 302 is not correct;
(iv)    the AO has not brought any evidence to establish that there has been on money transaction for sale of said Unit no. 302;
(v)    it is not the case of the AO that the transaction is between related parties.
In the light of the above factual position, it observed that the addition made by the AO was simply on the basis of difference in booking of unit no. 101. It noted that CIT(A) had relied on the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Neelkamal Realtors & Erectors India(P.) Ltd (2013) 38 taxman.com 195 (Mum-Trib) and held that AO had not controverted the explanation furnished by the assessee during the course of assessment proceedings to explain the reasons for charging lower price in respect of unit no. 302 sold vis-à-vis rate / price for unit no. 101.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition of Rs. 4,16,70,874.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

[2016] 73 taxmann.com 68 (Mum-Trib)(SMC) Smt. Manasi Mahendra Pitkar v. ACIT ITA No. 4223 & 4224/Mum/2015 A.Y.: 2011-12, Dated: 12.08.2016

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S. 68 – The
bank pass book or bank statement cannot be construed to be a book maintained by
the assessee for any previous year as understood for the purposes of section
68.

FACTS: 

These were two appeals preferred by
husband and wife.  In both the appeals,
the common dispute was that the cash deposits made in the joint bank account to
the extent of Rs. 27,36,500 were treated as unexplained cash credits within the
meaning of section 68 of the Act. Substantive addition was made in the case of
Mahindra Chintaman Pitkar, the husband, and protective addition was made in the
case of Manasi Mahendra Pitkar, wife. The Tribunal in its order dealt with the
appeal in the case of husband as the lead appeal.

The assessee, an individual was employed
with Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. The Assessing Officer (AO)
noticed that during the year under consideration cash aggregating to Rs.
29,53,500 was deposited in the joint bank account of the assessee and his wife
with Thane Janata Sahakari Bank. 

On being asked the assessee explained
that the amounts were received from his father, father-in-law, son and various
other relatives & friends and that these amounts were used by him for
treatment of his wife who was bedridden and was suffering from the disease of
multiple sclerosis which required costly medical treatment.  It was explained that expenditure of Rs. 30
lakh a year was required to be incurred for medical treatment of his wife and
since the assessee was a salaried employee with limited resources he had
received amounts from family members, relatives and friends for the medical
treatment of his wife.

The AO added the sum of Rs. 29,53,500 to
the total income of the assessee on a substantive basis and also made similar
addition on protective basis in the case of his wife.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to CIT(A) who gave relief to the extent of Rs. 2,70,000 with respect to
withdrawals found in the bank account of assessee’s father and confirmed the
addition of Rs 27,36,500 as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the
Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD:

In the course of hearing
before the Tribunal, affidavit of the assessee narrating the factual position
about the disease of his wife and the utilization of funds for the medial
treatment was filed and the documents in support of the facts narrated in the
affidavit were also filed. The Tribunal considered the ratio of the judgment of
Bombay High Court in the case of Bhaichand N. Gandhi (1983) 141 ITR 67
(Bom).  It noted that the assessee did
not maintain any books of account and section 68 of the Act had to fail because
as per the judgment of the Hon’ Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Bhaichand
N. Gandhi (supra), the bank pass book or bank statement cannot be construed to
be a book maintained by the assessee for any previous year as understood for
the purposes of section 68 of the Act. 
It held that on this account itself the addition deserves to be deleted.

The Tribunal also observed
that the circumstances in which the cash deposits were made and the purpose for
which such monies were utilized was emerging from record and no material was
found by the AO to disprove the same.  It
noted that the assessee could not produce any formal corroborative evidence of
having received respective amounts from friends, relatives, however, it
observed that section 68 is a rule of evidence, and, the AO is expected to
consider the explanation rendered in the context of the circumstances of each
case.

The Tribunal held that the
addition is unsustainable in view of the ratio of the Bombay High Court in the
case of Shri Bhaichand N. Gandhi (supra). 

The order of CIT(A) was set
aside and the AO was directed to delete the addition of Rs. 27,36,500 made
under section 68 of the Act.

Since the substantive
addition in the case of the husband was deleted, the Tribunal held that the
protective addition in the hands of the wife was also unsustainable.

The appeals filed by the
assessee were allowed.

Lintas India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT(TDS) ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Ram Lal Negi (JM) ITA No. 3504/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2010-11. Dated: 02.08.2016. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Prakash Jotwani / Morya Pratap

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S. 194J – Internet charges for use of internet connectivity are not covered by section 194J.

S. 194J – Payment for computer software development does not qualify for deduction under section 194J.

FACTS-I:  

The assessee, during the year, paid internet charges for use of internet connectivity and deducted tax thereon under section 194C of the Act.  The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the payment so made qualifies for deduction of tax under section 194J as “fees for technical services”.  He, accordingly, held the assessee to be an assessee-in-default under section 201(1) / 201(1A) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO and held that as per the amendment, the domestic payments are now covered under section 194J and therefore the ratio of the decision relied on by the assessee in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. (251 ITR 53)(Mad HC) is not applicable in the instant case.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

HELD:  

The Tribunal held that the issue under consideration is squarely covered by various decisions of High Court and Tribunal.  It noted that –
(i)    the Delhi High Court had an occasion to examine a similar issue in the case of CIT v. Estel Communications (P.) Ltd. (217 CTR 102)(Del) wherein the Court held that mere payment by assessee for an internet bandwidth to a US company did not mean that technical services were rendered by the US company to the assessee and, therefore, provisions of section 9(1)(vii) did not apply so as to warrant any deduction of tax from payment made by the assessee to the US company;
(ii)    the Madras High Court in Skycell Communications Ltd and another v. DCIT & Others (2011) 251 ITR has considered the provisions fo section 9(1)(vii);
(iii)    Chandigarh Bench of ITAT in the case of HFCL Infotel Ltd. v. ITO (99 TTJ 440)(Chand. ITAT) referred to the decision of Madras High Court in Skycell Communications Ltd.;
(iv)    Mumbai Bench of ITAT has in the case of Pacific Internet (India) Pvt. Ltd. v ITO 318 ITR 179 (Mum)(AT) has relied upon the observations rendered in Estel Communications Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Communications Ltd. (supra) and held that payment for use of internet is not covered by the provisions of section 194J;
(v)    Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Ushodaya Enterprises P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2012) 53 SOT 193 (Hyd.) has held that payment made towards internet charges are similar in nature to bandwidth charges and are similar to the use of telephone lines, payments made for circuit charges to VSNL, bandwidth charges do not come under TDS provision and therefore no deduction is required under section 194J.
Relying on the ratio of the above, the Tribunal held that the assessee cannot be held to be in default for non-deduction of tax on internet charges under section 194J of the Act.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

FACTS-II:

The AO held the assessee to be in default for not having deducted tax on payment of Rs. 14,96,240 towards purchase of computer software development. The AO was of the view that payment for purchase of software qualifies as a “technical service” and requires deduction of tax under section 194J of the Act.  He, accordingly, held the assessee to be an assessee-in-default under section 201(1) and levied interest under section 201(1A).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD – II:

Explanation 2 of section 9(1)(vii) defines the words “Fees for technical services” as any consideration (including any lumpsum consideration) for rendering any managerial, technical or consultancy services.  It noted that the perusal of the aforesaid definition clarifies that the term FTS would include service of the following three types : Managerial, Technical and Consultancy.  Therefore, in order to decide whether the service will fall within FTS or not, it is necessary to determine the scope of these three terms.  Considering the scope of these terms as defined by the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of TUV Bayren (India) Ltd. dated 6.7.2012 in ITA No. 4994/Mum/2002 it held that the computer software purchased would not fall within the definition of “Fees for technical services” and therefore the provisions of section 194J are not applicable.

The Tribunal held that tax is not required to be deducted at source in respect of payment made for purchase of computer software development.

This ground of appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

ITO v. Uma Developers ITAT Mumbai `F’ Bench Before Jason P. Boaz (AM) and Sandeep Gosain (JM) ITA Nos.: 7718/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2012-13. Dated: 10.08.2016. Counsel for revenue / assessee: A K Dhondial / Vijay Mehta

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Ss. 80AC, 80IB(10), 139(1), 139(4), 143(1) – In a case where the return of income is filed beyond the period stipulated under section 139(1) but within the period stipulated in section 139(4), it is beyond the scope of section 143(1) to disallow the assessee’s claim for deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act.

FACTS:  

For assessment year 2012-13, the assessee firm filed its return of income on 31.3.2013 claiming deduction of Rs. 3,53,17,770 under section 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”). The Assessing Officer (AO) while processing the return on 10.5.2013, in view of the provisions of section 80AC of the Act disallowed the claim of deduction under section 80IB(10) for the reason that the assessee had filed its return of income beyond the time limit specified under section 139(1) of the Act.

Aggrieved with the order dated 10.5.2013, the assessee preferred a rectification appeal under section 154 of the Act contending that the disallowance of assessee’s claim for deduction under section 80IB(10) was beyond the scope of provisions of section 143(1) of the Act.  ACIT(CPC) vide order dated 16.3.2013 passed under section 154 of the Act rejected the application of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who observed that the Bombay High Court and Benches of ITAT at Mumbai, Bangalore and Ahmedabad have even in cases where return of income was filed beyond due date specified under section 139(1) of the Act, either allowed the deduction under section 80IB(10) or have set aside the issue to the file of the authorities below for consideration of the eligibility of the claim with the direction that the claim for deduction should not be denied merely on the ground that the return of income was filed beyond the time specified under section 139(1) of the Act. He also observed that the provisions of section 80AC of the Act were subject matter of discussion and interpretation in various judgments.  He, accordingly, held that the disallowance made by the AO is beyond the scope of the provisions of section 143(1) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD:  

Considering the ratio of the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of Trustees of Tulsidas Gopalji Charitable & Chaleshwar Temple Trust (207 ITR 368)(Bom) and of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Yash Developers (ITA No. 809/Mum/2011) even in cases where the return of income is filed beyond the due date stipulated under section 139(1) of the Act, the deduction should not be disallowed under section 143(1) merely in view of the provisions of section 80AC of the Act.  It held that the action of the AO in disallowing the assessee’s claim for deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act, since the return of income was filed beyond the period stipulated under section 139(1) of the Act in view of the provisions of section 80AC is beyond the scope of section 143(1) of the Act since there is neither an arithmetical error nor an incorrect claim apparent from the record.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the disallowance made under section 143(1)(a) / 143(1) of the Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

[2016] 159 ITD 743 (Mumbai Trib.) ITO (TDS) (OSD) vs. Fino Fintech Foundation A.Y.: 2011-12 – Dated: 22.06.2016.

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Section
194J read with Section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961- An assessee is
required to deduct tax under section 194J if it acquires or uses technical
knowhow which is provided by a human element. Mere use of technology by
contractors who provide services to the assessee would not make those services
technical services and hence when assessee makes payments to such contractors,
tax is required to be deducted under section 194C and not under section 194J.

FACTS:

The assessee Company was
involved in providing banking services through its network of agents in
extremely rural areas by use of a device called “Point of Transaction Machine
(POT)”.

The transactions of the
beneficiary/customers were settled at the end of the day by connecting the POT
to the Bank Server and the transactions of the beneficiary got reflected in the
beneficiary’s bank account.

In the relevant
assessment year, the assessee company had deducted tax u/s 194C on the payments
made to contractor towards the major expenses incurred under the heads – enrollment
charges, AMC charges, POT usage charges and rent for POT machines.

The AO observed that the
assessee was providing services for opening bank accounts to different banking
institutions in rural areas and that for opening bank accounts it was taking
help of other service-providers who would mobilise technical manpower for
opening the bank accounts. The service providers would prepare bio-metric and
demographic particulars of the customers and put the same in bank network for
the assessee.

The AO held that the
services of capturing photos and finger-prints by web camera and scanner
required highly technical skill and specified software and that the procedure
could not be performed by non-technical person. Hence, for such services,
payments made by the assessee under the heads enrollment expenses and AMC
charges would attract tax deduction under section 194J of the Act. Hence the AO
held that the assessee was in default under section 201(1) for the shortfall of
tax deduction and under section 201A for interest on the shorfall.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO the assessee preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority
(FAA). The assessee argued that it had hired services of service provider as a
contractor and that mere use of technology and/or technical equipments by
service providers while doing the said composite work for assessee would not
make it as a technical service and hence the tax was rightly deducted u/s. 194C
of the Act.

The FAA held that
provisions of 194C were applicable as there was no acquisition / use of
technical know-how by the assessee.

On revenue’s appeal –

HELD:

In case of CIT v.
Delhi Transco Ltd. [2015] 380 ITR 398 the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has defined
the word technical services while dealing with the section 194 J of the Act, in
the following manner-

Section 194J of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides
for deduction of tax at source from fees for technical services. Technical
services consist of services of technical nature when special skills or
knowledge relating to technical field are required for their provision,
managerial services are rendered for performing management functions and
consultancy services relate to provision of advice by someone having special
qualification that allow him to do so. What constitutes technical services
cannot be understood in a rigid formulaic manner. It will vary from industry to
industry. There will have to be a specific line of enquiry for determining what
in a particular industry would constitute rendering of a technical service.

In the case under
consideration, the FAA has rightly held that the provisions of section 194J
would not be applicable based on the following observation –

The services provided to the assessee were manual in
nature and no specific skills were required to provide the said services. The
services rendered by the parties to the assessee were neither in the nature of
fee for professional services, nor in the nature of managerial, technical or
consultancy services. Mere use of technology would not make it technical
services. For provisions of section 194J to be applicable, it is necessary that
there must either be acquisition or use of technical knowhow which is provided
by a human element. There was no acquisition of technical expertise/knowhow by
the assessee and the service providers were contractors executing contracts for
projects undertaken and hence the provisions of section 194C were applicable.

In the case under
consideration there is a use of technology, but, it does not mean that it is
not a contract. There is no legal or factual infirmity in the order of the FAA
and the assessee has rightly deducted tax as per the provisions of section 194C
of the Act.

Note – Relying on
the decision in case of CIT v. Bharti Cellular Ltd. [2009] 319 ITR 139 it was
also held that, the expression “fees for technical services” in
section 194J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has the same meaning as given to the
expression in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. In the said explanation
the expression “fees for technical services” means any consideration
for rendering of any “managerial, technical or consultancy services”.
Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “technical” would
take colour from the words “managerial” and “consultancy”,
between which it is sandwiched. Since both the words “managerial” and
“consultancy” involve a human element, the word “technical”
would also have to be construed as involving a human element.

TDS- Technical services- S. 194J of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Ys. 2007-08 to 2010-11- Transmission of electricity- No technical services- Tax not deductible on payment for such transmission

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CIT Vs. Hubli Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.; 386 ITR 271 (Karn)

The assessee, an electricity supply company, was a state owned company engaged in the business of buying and selling electricity. Power was transmitted from the generation point to consumers through the transmission network of the Karnataka Power Transport Corporation Ltd. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had not deducted tax at source on charges paid to Karnataka Power Transport Corporation Ltd. for transportation of electricity. He therefore treated the assessee as an assessee in default and raised demand u/s. 201(1) and (1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Commissioner(Appeals) found that the assessee had successfully demonstrated that the taxes were already paid by the payee and accordingly cancelled the demand. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    There was neither an offer nor an acceptance of any “technical service”, inter se between the parties. Admittedly, the Karnataka Power Transport Corporation Ltd. was a State owned company and the only power transmitting agency. There was neither transfer of any technology nor any service attributable to a technical service offered by the Karnataka Power Transport Corporation Ltd and accepted by the assessee.

ii)    Therefore, section 194J was not applicable. Moreover, it was not in dispute that the payee the Karnataka Power Transport Corporation Ltd had offered the income to tax and paid it. In the circumstances, there was no loss of revenue.

iii)    In the result, the appeals fail and accordingly stand dismissed.”

TDS: Ss. 10(23C)(iv), 194A, 194H, 201(1),(1A) of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2012-13- Payment of interest to entities exempted from tax- No tax need be deducted at source

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CIT Vs. Canara Bank; 386 ITR 229 (P&H)

The assessee had paid interest without deduction of tax at source to Punjab Infrastructure Development Board whose income was exempt u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee should have deducted tax at source and since tax was not deducted the assessee was treated as an assessee in default and raised demand u/ss. 201(1) and (1A) of the Act. The Commissioner(Appeals) deleted the demand and the same was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    The Commissioner(Appeals) and the Tribunal, on appreciation of material on record had concurrently recorded that if an organization was exempted from payment of tax there was no need for deduction of tax at source by the assessee.

ii)    The Department was not able to demonstrate that the approach of the Commissioner(Appeals) and the Tribunal was erroneous or perverse or that the findings of fact recorded were based on misreading or misappreciation of evidence on record. No question of law arose.”

[2016] 159 ITD 255 (Pune Trib.) S.R.Thorat Milk Products (P.) Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT A.Ys.: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2007-08 to 2009-10, Date of Order: 20.05.2016

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Section
37(1) read with Section 36(1)(iii) –
The share application money
pending allotment per se cannot be characterized and equated with share capital
as the obligation to return the share application money is always implicit in
the event of non-allotment of shares and consequently if the assessee incurs
interest expense on the share application money pending allotment, the said
interest expense can be claimed as revenue expenditure by the assessee.

FACTS:

During the various years
under appeal, the assessee had claimed deduction of interest paid, at the rate
of 12% per annum, on share application money pending allotment, while computing
business income.

The AO was of the opinion
that conditions laid down under section 36(1)(iii) are not fulfilled because ingredients
of borrowing as a positive act of lending by one and expense thereof by the
other, coupled with an obligation of refund or repayment thereof are not
present when the interest is paid on receipts in the nature of share
application money. Further the AO held that expenditure on account of interest
paid on share application money is not revenue but capital expenditure in
nature and therefore is not allowable under section 37(1) of the Act. He
accordingly disallowed the interest claimed by the assessee.

The CIT-(A) concurred
with the view of the AO and disallowed the claim of the said interest expense by
stating that when the money had been received with the intention of allotment
of shares, it could not subsequently acquire the colour of borrowed funds even
though it might have been utilized for business purposes.

Aggrieved by the order of
the CIT-(A), the assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD:

Even though the share
application money has been pending allotment for a substantial period of time,
the revenue has not disputed the contention of the assessee that the share
application money was utilized for business purposes.

In our opinion, the share
application money per se cannot be characterized and equated with share
capital. The obligation to return the money is always implicit in the event of
non-allotment of shares in lieu of the share application money received.
Allotment of shares is subject to certain regulations and restrictions as provided
under the Companies Act and receipt by way of share application money is not
receipt held towards share capital before its conversion. Therefore, payment of
interest on share application money cannot be treated differently in the
Income-tax Act.

Relevant extract of the
observation made in case of ACIT v. Rohit Exhaust Systems (P.) Ltd. in IT Appeal
No.686 / 687 of 2011-

The
Hon’ble ITAT, Pune in the case of Western India Forging Ltd. ITA No.
419/PN/2002 dated 24-07-2007 (PCAS journal February, 2008 Page No. 49 to 52)
has held that following the principle of commercial expediency, interest paid on
share application money pending allotment utilized for business purpose is an allowable
expense.

On
perusal of the said case of Western India Forging Ltd (supra), it has also been
noticed that as per provisions of section 69(5) of the Companies Act, 1956 a
company has to pay interest @6% per annum and as per provisions of section
73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 the maximum interest rate prescribed is 15% on
return of share application money.

Accordingly, the claim of
interest expenditure on share application money pending allotment was allowed
as revenue expenditure.

Shipping Company- S. 172 of I. T. Act, 1961- DTAA between India and Singapore- Where freight receipts in question derived by assessee, a Singaporean shipping company, was taxable at Singapore on basis of accrual and not on basis of remittance, benefit of article 8 of DTAA between India and Singapore could not be denied to assessee on ground that fright receipts were remitted to London and not to Singapore

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M.T. Maersk Mikage & 4 Vs. DIT; [2016] 72 taxmann.com 359 (Guj):

The assessee, a Singapore shipping company, had through ships owned or chartered by it, undertaken voyages from various Indian ports and earned income from exporters and out of other such business. The assessee, through present petitioner, filed a return of income u/s. 172(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, declaring the gross profit calculations, but claiming Nil income by relying on Article 8 of DTAA between India and Singapore. The Assessing officer denied benefit under article 8 to the assessee on the ground that freight receipts were remitted to London and not to Singapore. In his opinion, as per Article 24 of DTAA, the funds have to be remitted where the residents of the country is claiming benefit of the agreement which conditions in the present case was not satisfied. Revision application u/s. 264 of the Act made by the petitioner was dismissed by the CIT.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i)    The certificate dated 09.01.2013 issued by the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore certified that the income in question derived by ST Shipping(assessee) would be considered as income accruing in or derived from the business carried on in Singapore and such income therefore, would be assessable in Singapore on accrual basis. In other words, the full income would be assessable to tax on the basis of accrual and not on the basis of remittance.

ii)    This clause1 of Article 24 does not provide that in every case of non-remittance of income to the contracting state, Article 8 would not apply irrespective of tax treatment such income is given.

iii)    When in the present case, we hold that the income in question was not taxable at Singapore on the basis of remittance but on the basis of accrual, the very basis for applying clause1of Article 24 would not survive.

iv)    In the result, petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 25.03.2014 passed by the Commissioner is set aside. Resultantly, order of assessment dated 26.12.2011 is also quashed. Petition disposed of accordingly.”

PART A: Decision of Supreme Court

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CBSE asked to provided answer sheets and scrupulously observe the directions of Supreme Court in C.A. No. 6454 of 2011

Even after the historic 2011 judgment of the Supreme Court, where procuring copies of answer sheets by students came under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) continued to defy it. In a reply to a RTI query, posed by Whistle for Public Interest (WHIP), comprising of a group of law students, the CBSE replied on 28 December 2015, that, it charges Rs700 per subject for providing copy of answer sheets. In addition, students were compulsorily required to go through the process of ‘Verification of Marks’ for which the CBSE has prescribed fee of Rs.300 per subject. This meant that a student had to pay Rs1,000 per subject, if she applied for a copy of the answer sheet.
This was in gross violation of the SC order of 2011, which held that “Answer-Sheet is an Information and therefore, examinees shall have the right to inspect their Answer-Sheets under RTI Act, 2005 and its Rules made there under which prescribes Rs10 as application fee for getting the information and Rs2 per page for the copies of such information.”
 
The Supreme Court directed the CBSE to “scrupulously observe” the directions made by the Court in 2011. The CBSE has been asked to provide evaluated answer-sheets to candidates under RTI Act in compliance with the Supreme Court’s Ruling in the matter of CBSE & Anr. Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors – Civil Appeal No. 6454/2011.

All the state run institutions falling under the meaning of Public Authority defined under section 2(h) of the RTI Act are also obliged to provide answer-sheets under this transparency law.

E-Waste Disposal

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Introduction
There’s a new smart phone in the market and we buy it. A new laptop is introduced and we grab it. Ever wondered what happens to the old models which we sell, scrap or simply trash (in cases where they are no longer working)? How do these electronic items ultimately get disposed off? E-Waste or electronic waste is one of the largest sources of waste being generated in today’s waste. With newer models and variants of all gadgets being launched every day, the useful life of a technological gadget has reduced drastically thereby significantly increasing the e-waste generated everyday. For instance, did you know that a study states that India is the 5th largest producer of e-waste internationally. According to the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, India generates over 17 lakh tonnes of e-waste very year with an annual growth rate of 5% every year. India has over a billion mobile phones  and over 25% end up in e-waste every year.  Recognising this, the Central Government has recently framed the E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2016.  

Act
The mother statute for all things connected with the environment is the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.  It is a Central Act for the protection and the improvement of the environment. It defines environment pollution  as the presence of any solid, liquid  or gaseous substance in the environment in such concentration as may be injurious to the environment.  Under s.3 of this Act, the Government has power to take all such measures as is necessary for protecting and improving the quality of the environment and for preventing environment pollution. This includes laying down Rules, procedures and safeguards for the handling of hazardous substances, i.e., any substance which by reason of its chemical properties is liable to cause harm to humans /  living  beings / environment, etc. Consequently, the  Central Government has notified the amended  E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2016(“the EWM Rules”) which shall come into force from the 1st October, 2016. The EWM Rules define e-waste to mean electrical and electronic equipment, in whole or in part discarded as waste by the consumer or bulk consumer as well as rejects from manufacturing, refurbishment and repair processes.

Coverage
The EWM Rules apply to various types of entities involved in the  manufacture, sale, transfer, purchase, collection, storage and processing of e-waste or specified electrical and electronic equipment, including their components, consumables, parts and spares which make the product operational. Some of these entities are as follows:

(a)Manufacturer – a manufacturer of electrical and electronic equipment
(b)Producer – any person who sells (in any manner) manufactured / assembled / imported electrical and electronic equipment
(c)Bulk Consumer – Bulk users of electrical and electronic equipment, e.g., Governments departments, Public Sector Undertakings, banks, educational institutions, MNCs, partnership firms and companies that are registered under the Factories Act, 1948 and the Companies Act, 2013 and health care facilities which have a turnover of more than Rs. 1 crore or employ more than 20 employees.  Althoughthis definition is not very happily worded, it appears that in order to be covered, firms and companies must satisfy the turnover or employee threshold. Registration under both Factories Act and Companies Act is not possible because in that case all firms would be excluded. Further, all IT companies which are the biggest generator of e-waste would be excluded, which cannot be the intention. This is an important definition since it casts certain reporting requirements on all bulk  consumers.
(d)Dealer – buyer or seller of specified electrical and electronic equipment. The definition is wide enough to include offline and online dealers.
(e)Recycler – any person engaged in recycling and reprocessing of e-waste as per guidelines  laid down by the Central Pollution Control Board.
(f)Consumer – one of the more important entities covered by the EWM Rules is a consumer which is defined to mean any person using any (and not just specified) electrical and electronic equipment but excludes bulk consumers. Hence, any individual or small office would also be covered if he/it is involved in manufacture, sale, transfer, processing or storage of specified electrical and electronic equipment. This is a very important step toward environment protection since it spreads the net very wide.  

However, the Rules do not apply to a micro enterprise as defined in the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. This is interesting since while a micro enterprise is exempted, an individual end user is not!

The specified electrical and electronic equipment enlisted in the EWM Rules are computers, laptops, mobile phones, refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, televisions, printers, lamps containing fluorescent and other mercury.  It even covers their components, consumables, parts and spares. Conspicuous by their absent from this list are several popular consumer electronic / electric equipment, such as,  music systems, heating systems, irons, DVD players, cameras, etc. Whether this omission is intentional or an oversight is something which time will tell?

Responsibilities of various entities
The Rules lay down responsibilities for different entities in relation to e-waste:

(a)Manufacturer – must collect e-waste generated during manufacturing of any electronic / electrical equipment and channelise it for recycling or disposal.  It must also maintain and file prescribed information returns. The Return includes information on category and quantity of e-waste generated / stored/ recycled/transported /refurbished /dismantled /treated and disposed.   The channelisation could be to authorised dismantlers or recyclers.
(b)Producers – must provide an Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for  equipment produced by them covering the channelisation of e-waste generated by their products. This could also be through dealers, collection centres, buyback arrangements, etc. EPR means a responsibility of any producer of electrical or electronic equipment, for channelisation of e-waste to ensure environmentally sound management of such waste. EPR may comprise of implementing take back system or setting up of collection centres or both and having agreed arrangements with authorised dismantler or recycler either individually or collectively through a Producer Responsibility Organisation. The Central Pollution Control Board will grant an EPR Authorisation for managing EPR with implementation plans and targets outlined therein.

Every producer must make an application to the Central Pollution Control Board for EPR Authorisation within a period of 90 days from 1st October, 2016.  Any producer who has been refused an EPR cannot sell any electronic or electric equipment.  This is a very important requirement for producers.

The producer must also create mass awareness of recycling. The Deposit Refund Scheme is another way of doing so in which the producer charges an additional deposit at the time of sale and returns the money back with interest when the product is returned for recycling. Various returns are to be filed by a producer also.
(c)Dealers – they can act as collection centres for producers’ products. They must ensure that e-waste generated is safely transported to recyclers or dismantlers. 
(d)Refurbishers / Dismantlers / Recyclers – Their facilities must be in accordance with guidelines laid down by the Central Pollution Control Board. They must maintain records and also obtain an authorisation from the State Pollution Control Board.
(e)Bulk Consumers –  bulkconsumers of specified electrical and electronic equipment shall ensurethat e-waste generated by them is channelised through collection centre or dealers of authorised producer or dismantler or recycler  and they shallmaintain specified records of e-waste generated by them. Further,  they must ensure  that such end-of-life electrical and electronic equipmentare not admixed with e-waste containing radioactive material as are covered under theprovisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
(f)Consumers – the responsibilities for consumers of specified electrical and electronic equipment are the same as those enlisted above for bulk consumers, except that they do not have to maintain any records.
(g)Storage Responsibility – Every manufacturer, producer, bulkconsumer, collection centre, dealer, refurbisher, dismantler and recycler may store thee-waste for a maximum of 182 days and shall maintain arecord of collection, sale, transfer and storage of e-wastes and make these recordsavailable for inspection. The State Pollution Control Board can extend this period to 365 days if the waste needs to be stored for recycling or reuse. Transportation of e-waste must be carried out after maintaining the prescribed documentation.

Penalties
No specific penalties are provided under the Rules but they do provide that the manufacturer, producer, importer, transporter, refurbisher, dismantler and recycler shall be liable for all damages caused to the environment or third party due to improper handling and management of the e-waste. They further provide that the manufacturer, producer, importer, transporter, refurbisher, dismantler and recycler shall be liable to pay financial penalties as levied for any violation of the provisions under these rules by the State Pollution Control Board with the prior approval of the Central Pollution Control Board.

The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 provides a general penalty for anyone who fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of the Act, or its rules. The penalty is, in respect of each failure or contravention, an imprisonment of up to 5 years and / or a fine of up to Rs. 1 lakh. In case the failure or contravention continues, then there would be an additional fine which may extend to Rs. 5,000 / day during which such failure or contravention continues after the conviction for the first such failure or contravention. If the failure or contravention continues beyond a period of 1 year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years.

Responsibilities of Companies
Companies would be either bulk consumers or consumers. Depending upon their classification they need to comply with the provisions of the Rules.  

Conclusion
This is one more Regulation which businesses need to comply with. However, this is a welcome legislation which would help reduce the environmental pollution. One only hopes that this does not turn out into another means of red tapism and corruption.

Importance of Unity

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Arjun (A)

Shrikrishna Bhagwan, in Bhagwad Geeta,
you had told me about re-birth.

 

Shrikrishna
(S)

Yes dear.  I had mentioned that so far, you and I, and
all these people have taken innumerable rebirths.

 

Arjun

And whatever good or bad we do, we get
the fruit in the same birth or in next birth.

 

Shrikrishna

Yes. 
That is true.  But what makes
you ask this question?

 

Arjun

My friend is very innocent person,
very God-fearing.  Now practising in a
rural area.

 

Shrikrishna

What about him?

 

Arjun

He had done the audit of some company
5-6 years ago.  He left that work since
the company shifted elsewhere.

 

Shrikrishna

Ok. Then?

 

Arjun

A few months ago, all of a sudden,
survey party from income tax came to his office.  They harassed him for 3 days – asking
questions about that old client.

 

Shrikrishna

Oh! Why?

 

Arjun

They said they found two different
balance sheets signed by him for the 
same year – the last year of his audit.

 

Shrikrishna

Surprising!  But you said he is very innocent!

 

Arjun

Yes. 
I have no doubt about his innocence. 
Gentleman to the core!

 

Shrikrishna

What did they find?

 

Arjun

Actually, in village places, most of
the professionals work from residence only. 
They keep some room for office. 
So they searched the records in his house also.

 

Shrikrishna

But what did they get?

 

Arjun

Absolutely nothing.  Not even the remotest evidence.

 

Shrikrishna

So what did they finally do?

 

Arjun

They were completely satisfied.  But they said they had instructions to
investigate thoroughly.  They regretted
inconvenience caused to him!

 

Shrikrishna

Good. 
But there must be something else in the story.

 

Arjun

Yes. 
He showed them that he signed the same and the only balance-sheet that
was submitted to ROC and IT!  And the
alleged balance sheet which they got somewhere else was only photocopy.

 

Shrikrishna

They have to produce original.  But what was their grievance – when correct
balance sheet was filed with ITR?

 

Arjun

That’s precisely why I mentioned about
re-birth.  He must have committed some
sin in last birth.

 

Shrikrishna

Why?

 

Arjun

Actually, for subsequent years, there
were multiple financial statements for every year.  Different for ROC, different for IT and
something else to the Bank!

 

Shrikrishna

It was then a blatant fraud!

 

Arjun

Yes; true.  So subsequent years’ auditor is also in
trouble.

 

Shrikrishna

But where is the client?  What does he say?

 

Arjun

That’s another story.  The main director of that company is now
absconding.  That prompted them to go
to the CA’s office! He is the real culprit.

 

Shrikrishna

They must have recorded the statements
of both of them.

 

Arjun

Yes, obviously.  My friend flatly denied the
allegation.  But the subsequent auditor
succumbed to the pressure of survey people. 
But then immediately retracted it.

 

Shrikrishna

You mean to say your friend suffered
unnecessarily.  There was no fault on
his part.

 

Arjun

Exactly.  In the hospital, we see many small innocent
children suffering from terminal diseases. 
What sin they have committed?

 

Shrikrishna

You are right.  Your friend did not perhaps do anything
wrong; but somebody did it and the poor fellow suffered because of someone
else’s wrong deeds!

 

Arjun

And the irony is that the client is
very resourceful and influential.  He
will settle it with IT.  But the IT
people have forwarded the information to our Institute and my friend will
have to face the music for a few years!

 

Shrikrishna

I have sympathy for your friend.  But I had also explained to you the role of
fate or destiny in Bhagwad Geeta. Even Lord Shree Ram had to undergo hardship
for no fault on his part!

 

Arjun

I am more worried because in our
profession, there is hardly any opportunity to do a straight thing!  Everything is manipulation.  So what will happen in our next birth.

 

Shrikrishna

Dear Paartha, don’t be so negative.

 

Arjun

What shall we do?  Neither the clients whom we serve are clean
nor the authorities before whom we represent the clients are straight!

 

Shrikrishna

The only solution is the unity amongst
you all.  If you act collectively with
positive thinking and good leadership, you can improve the things.  You are educated professionals.  You should provide leadership to the
society.

 

Arjun

But what exactly we can do
collectively?

 

Shrikrishna

You can be more assertive.  You can afford to say ‘No’ to wrong
things.  Today, you have a fear that if
you refuse to oblige a client, some other CA will do it.  He will compromise on the standards.

Arjun

That’s true.  We can even develop good culture and
discipline iin the finance sector.

Shrikrishna

And you can establish the image and
credibility of the profession, so that no once can point a finger at you.

Arjun

I see a point in what you are
saying.  Since we are not united, no
one heeds to our feelings and suggestions. 
I think, all of us should seriously think on these lines.

 

Shrikrishna

I had already said in puranas that in Kaliyug, the real strength
lies in unity.  Please act unitedly and
you can change the world.

 

Arjun

Yes, My Lord!

Om Shanti.

Note:

The above
dialogue emphasises on importance of collective strength and how it is lacking
in our profession. The only solution to remain clean in the profession is to
have a good unity.

Precedent – Judicial Discipline – Departmental authorities bound by the judicial pronouncements of the Statutory Tribunals even if the decision of the Tribunal was not carried further in appeal on account of low tax effect [Central Excise Act, 1944 S. 35 and 35E].

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Lubi Industries LLP vs. Union of India (2016) 337 E.L.T. 179 (Guj.)(HC)

The petitioner manufactures and supplies submersible pumps to Government agencies. The contracts envisage pre-delivery inspection charges by third party agency at the cost of the buyer . However, initially the payment would be made by the petitioner and would be claimed from the Government. The contest between the petitioner and the Department is with respect to the inclusion of these charges towards the assessable value of the goods. This precise question in identical circumstances in case of this very petitioner came to be decided by CESTAT by judgement dated 16/06/2014, ruled in favour of the assessee.

When such a question arose again, the AO issued a show cause notice as to why the pre-delivery inspection charges should not be included in the assessable value and resultantly unpaid dues of Rs.1.37 lacs not be recovered. The petitioner heavily relied on its case decided in the Tribunal. The AO however confirmed the additions and relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Tamil Nadu vs. Southern Structures Ltd. 2008 (229) E.L.T. 487.
The High Court held that, the Assistant Commissioner committed a serious error in ignoring the binding judgement of the superior Court that too in case of the same assessee. Even if the decision of the Tribunal in the present case was not carried further in appeal on account of low tax effect, it was not open for the adjudicating authority to ignore the ratio of such decision. An order that the adjucating authority may pass is appealable, even at the hands of the department. This is clearly provided in Section 35 read with section 35E of the Central Excise Act. Therefore, even if the adjucating authority passes an order in favour of the assessee on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal, it is always open to the Department to file appeal against such judgement of the adjucating authority.

Family Arrangement – Panchayat Resolution reduced in writing – Resulting in relinquishment of rights – could be taken as Family Arrangement – though not registered can be used as a piece of evidence for showing or explaining the conduct of the parties. [Registration Act, 1908, S. 49, 17; Evidence Act, 1872, S.91]

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Subraya M.N. v. Vittala M.N. & Others AIR 2016 Supreme Court 3236.

A suit for partition was filed. The defendants opposed the same on the ground that plaintiffs had relinquished their rights for consideration and this was recorded in Panchayat Resolution. The Trial Court as well as the High Court held that Panchayat Resolution cannot be construed as a Family Arrangement and was inadmissible in evidence as the same was not registered. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that, the Trial Court and the High Court were not right in brushing aside the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the defendant to prove that the plaintiffs had relinquished their right in the immovable property. There is no provision of Law requiring family settlements to be reduced to writing and registered though when reduced to writing the question of registration may arise. Binding family arrangements dealing with immovable property worth more than rupees hundred can be made orally and when so made, no question of registration arises. If, however, it is reduced to writing with the purpose that the terms should be evidenced by it, it requires registration and without registration it is inadmissible; but the said family arrangement can be used as corroborative piece of evidence for showing or explaining the conduct of the parties.

Accident claim – Can be filed by non-dependant legal representative of the deceased. [Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, S.166, 140]

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Dr. Gangaraju Sowmini v. Alavala Sudhakar Reddy & Another, 2016 AIR Hyderbad 162 (FB)

The reference was filed by the claimant (non-dependent of the deceased) seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the chairman, Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal. The said reference was opposed by the Insurance Company on the ground that amount of compensation would not be granted to a claimant who is not dependant on the deceased.  

It was held by the Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court that in view of the plain language under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which is a substantive provision for making application for compensation, it is clear that either the injured person or the legal representatives of the deceased are entitled to make an application for award of compensation. Dependency is a matter, which will have a bearing on the issue with regard to fixation of compensation and apportionment of compensation if there are more than one claimant, but at the same time, in view of the plain and unambiguous language used under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the term ‘legal representative’ does not mean only a dependant. It is fairly well settled that the legal representative is one who can represent the estate of the deceased.

In the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Montford Brothers of ST. Gabriel and Another v. United India Insurance & Another, (2014) 3 SCC 394, it was held that it is common in the Indian society, where, the members of the family who are not even dependant also can extend their support monetarily and otherwise to the victims of accidents to meet the immediate expenditure for hospitalisation etc., in such cases, unless the legal representatives are allowed to continue the proceedings initiated by the person who succumbs to injuries subsequently, such claims will be defeated and that will also defeat the very object and intent of the Act. Any such measure would be wholly unequitable and unjust. Plainly, that would never be the intent of any piece of legislation. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the language under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 r/w. Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, we are of the view that even the legal representatives who are non-dependants can also lay a claim for payment of compensation by making application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Appellate Tribunal – Registrar cannot refuse to accept the appeal though not maintainable – Order of Non-Maintainability to be passed by the Tribunal itself and not the registrar even if the petition was prima facie not maintainable. [Tripura Value Added Tax Act 2004, S.71]

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New Medical (Agartala) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-VI, Agartala & Ors. (2015) 82 VST 238 (Tripura) (HC).

The petitioner had filed 2 separate appeals before the Tripura Value Added Tax Tribunal, Agartala, Tripura, but these appeals were returned to the petitioner without passing an order by the Registrar of the Tripura Value Added Tax Tribunal on the ground that since the appeals filed before the Commissioner were dismissed in limine without issuing notice, no revision was maintainable before the Tribunal.

It was held that, the Registrar of the Tribunal may form a prima facie view and raise an objection that an appeal is maintainable or not and it will be for the assessee or the counsel to satisfy the Registrar that such revision is maintainable. Even if the Registrar holds against the assessee, the assessee will still have the right to claim it in the Tribunal which should decide that issue in accordance with Law.
Any Judicial or Quasi-Judicial action has to be based on reasons therefore whenever in future any such order has to be passed even by the Registrar or his subordinates, that order must be in writing and must be conveyed to the assessee so that the assessee knows why the appeal or revision is being returned by the Tribunal.

Can a trust be a beneficiary in another trust?

Sometime back a CA friend of mine
specializing in tax planning, who normally consults me on legal issues before
formulating any tax saving plan, casually asked me whether I had an occasion to
consider the question as to whether a trust can be named to be one of the
beneficiaries of another trust.


My friend being conscientious and
thorough does not recommend to any client of his any tax saving plan unless he
is fully satisfied with all applicable legal and other issues.  He had some reservation on this question and
added that a particular Big Four CA firm was 
using this idea in its tax saving recommendations.  As I needed research to answer the point, I
could not respond to the inquiry spontaneously. 
The result of the research undertaken by me was quite interesting.  The purpose of this article is to share with
the readers of your esteemed journal the result of my research on the issue.


Section 9 to the Indian Trusts Act,
1882 provides that every person capable of holding property may be a
beneficiary.  Therefore, the two basic
requirements of being a beneficiary is that (i) the beneficiary should be a
person and (ii) should also be capable of holding property.


The term “person” is not defined in the
Indian Trusts Act.  It is therefore,
necessary to look at the definition of the term under the General Clauses Act,
1897.  The said Act defines a large
number of words and expression and such definitions apply to all Central Acts
and Regulations thereunder. The said Act defines the term ‘a person’ to include
any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or
not.  Even the Indian Penal Code, 1860
which also defines the term “person” gives same definition of the term to
include any company or association or a body of persons whether incorporated or
not.  It may be noted that both these
definitions are inclusive definitions and not exclusive. 

Therefore, to answer the question it is
necessary to determine whether a trust can be considered a “person”.


In the case of Abraham Memorial
Educational Trust  vs. C. Suresh Babu
reported in [2012] 175 Comp Cas 361 (Mad) the Madras High Court had occasion to
consider the meaning of the term “person”. 
It was a criminal case arising under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 and the court was required to interpret the meaning of
the term ‘company’ used in the Act. 
Section 141 of the said Act defines the word to mean ‘any body corporate
and includes a firm or other association of individuals’.   In that case the Court has held that
applying the doctrine of “ejusdem generis” and going by the purpose and
context, while interpreting the definition clause, a Public Charitable Trust
falls within the definition of the term “company”.  This definition will also apply in the
interpretation of the term ‘person’ in Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act.


In that case, the Hon’ble Court, inter alia, referred to
a passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shiromani Gurdwara
Prabandhak Committee  vs. Som Nath Dass
(reported in (2000) 4 SCL 146 para 19) as under:

“19.     Thus,
it is well settled and confirmed by the authorities on jurisprudence and courts
of various countries that for a bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific
development evolution of a fictional personality to be a juristic person became
inevitable.  This may be any entity,
living, inanimate, objects or things.  It
may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may impel the
courts to recognise it.  This recognition
is for subserving the needs and faith of the society.  A juristic person, like any other natural
person is in law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with
in accordance with law.  In other words,
the entity acts like a natural person but only through a designated person,
whose acts are processed within the ambit of law.
”


After considering some other Supreme Court case law, the
Hon’ble Court held as follows:

“26.     From
the foregoing discussions, it is manifestly clear that the moment a Trust
(organisation) is formed with an obligation attached to the same, an artificial
person is born and because such artificial person is recognised by law,
conferring upon such artificial person right to own property, to enjoy certain
other rights and also to discharge certain obligations, it attains the status
of a “juristic person”.  Thus, a Trust,
whether private or public, is a juristic person who can sue / be sued or
prosecute / be prosecuted.
”



The Court further considered the point whether omission
of the word ‘trust’ within the meaning of term ‘company’ had any effect and
held that:

“64.     When
there is omission to expressly mention the expression ‘Trust’ within the
meaning of the term ‘company’, by applying the principle of casus omissus,
whether this Court could fill up the said gap by reading the expression ‘Trust’
into the interpretation clause of Section 141 of the Act.  In this regard, I may refer to the
Constitution Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab Land
Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh  Vs. 
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh reported in 1990 (3) SCC 682,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-

            However,
a judge facing such a problem of interpretation cannot simply fold his hands
and blame the draftsman.  Lord Denning in
his Discipline of Law says at p.12: “Whenever a statute comes up for
consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee
the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not
possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity.  The English language is not an instrument of
mathematical precision.  Our literature
would be much the poorer if it were. 
This is where the draftsman of Acts of Parliament have often been
unfairly criticised.  A judge, believing
himself to be lettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language
and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or
that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity.  It would certainly save the judges trouble if
Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity.  In the absence of it, when a defect appears a
judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.   He must set to work on the constructive task
of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the
language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions
which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and
then he must supplement the written word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the
intention of the legislature.
”



Based on this discussion the Court held that:

“65.     Applying
the above law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
as I have already concluded, considering the intention of the Legislature while
bringing in Chapter – XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the fact that
a Trust having two or more trustees will squarely fall within the ambit of
‘association of individuals’ which in turn will fall within the meaning of the
term ‘company’, I am of the view that a Trust having a single trustee should
also be brought within the definition of the term ‘company’.
” 


Thus, based on the decision, a trust
(public or private) held to be a person and the first requirement condition of
being a beneficiary as required under Section 9 of the Indian Trusts Act is
satisfied.

Even otherwise, the Supreme Court had
many occasions to consider the meaning of the term ‘person’ under a number of
Central and State laws and has given very wide and extended meaning to the term
‘person’.  Illustratively, in Agarwal
Trading Corporation  v. Collector of
Customs, the word ‘person’ is held to include a company or association or body
of individuals whether incorporated or not. 
(See (1972) 1 SCC 553).  Again in
M M Ipoh v. CIT (1968) ISCR 65, it is held to include a firm so also in CIT v.
S.C. Angidi Chettiar (AIR 1962 S.C. 970). 
Moreover, while interpreting the word ‘person’ in Section 154(1) of U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforming Act, 1950 the Supreme Court has held
that keeping in view the object of legislation and by applying the rule of
contextual interpretation it becomes clear that the same would include human
being and a body of individuals which have juridical or non-juridical status. (
See Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn.), (2010)4SCC728. )


Therefore, the first requirement of the
legal provision being satisfied, we have to consider the second condition.  As far as the second requirement is
concerned, it does not need any elaboration to say that a trust is capable of
holding property.


Therefore, both the requirements to be
a beneficiary under Section 9 of the Indian Trusts Act are satisfied and a
trust can be a beneficiary in another trust.


Our trust laws mostly follow the
principles of English trust laws. 
Interestingly, however, the English Law does not recognise this
principle.  The general rule under
English Law is that a trust must have a ‘cestui que trust’.  A (private) trust to be valid must be for the
benefit of individuals …. or must be in that class of trusts for the benefit of
the public which the courts recognise as charitable in the legal sense of the
term (see Lewin on Trusts, 2008 edition, page 102 para 4.38).  The term ‘cestui que trust’ is defined to
mean ‘a beneficiary under / of a trust; one entitled to the income and profits
of trust funds; a person in whose favour the trust is created’ (see P. Ramanathan
Aiyar’s Law Lexicon 4th Edition Volume 2  page 1079). 
Halsbury’s Laws of England also provides that a trust may be created in
favour of any person to whom a gift can legally be made and a trust may also be
created for charitable purposes but not in general for a non-charitable purpose
or object or a non-human beneficiary … in general equity will refuse to
recognise a trust other than a charitable trust unless it is for benefit of
ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries. 
Therefore, it is clear that under English Law a private trust has to be
for the benefit of individuals and that another trust cannot be named as a
beneficiary under a trust.


Accordingly, it is established that under Indian Law a
trust can be named as a beneficiary under another trust.

 

Acquisition date v Appointed date

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Acquisition
date v Appointed date

In India, merger and acquisition schemes that require a court/ tribunal
approval will have an appointed date, mentioned in the scheme, which is the
date from which the merger and acquisition is accounted.  The scheme becomes effective when the court
order is passed and the order is filed with the Registrar of Companies.  The appointed date is a very important date,
since from an income-tax legislation perspective, that is the date when the
amalgamation or acquisition accounting is done and the carry forward of any
business losses is allowed to the transferee.

The Indian GAAP accounting standards were also aligned to this
concept.  AS-14, Accounting for Amalgamations, itself did not expressly contain any
discussion around the difference between the appointed date and effective
date.  However, an EAC opinion required
the accounting of the combination from the appointed date mentioned in the
court scheme, once the court approval was received.  From an income-tax perspective, the company
would need to file revised returns to reflect the combination from the
appointed date.

With the introduction of Ind AS, the Indian GAAP position is no longer
valid for companies that apply Ind AS. 
As per paragraph 8 of Ind AS 103 Business
Combinations
, the acquirer shall identify the acquisition date, which is
the date on which it obtains control of the acquiree
.

An investor controls an investee when it is exposed, or has rights, to
variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability to
affect those returns through its power over the investee.
 An investor shall consider all facts and
circumstances when assessing whether it controls an investee and the date of
obtaining control.

The date on which the acquirer
obtains control of the acquiree is generally the date on which the acquirer
legally transfers the consideration, acquires the assets and assumes the liabilities
of the acquiree—the closing date
. However, the acquirer might obtain
control on a date that is either earlier or later than the closing date. For
example, the acquisition date precedes the closing date if a written agreement
provides that the acquirer obtains control of the acquiree on a date before the
closing date.  An acquirer shall consider
all pertinent facts and circumstances in identifying the acquisition date.

Determination of acquisition date
under Ind AS may not always be straight-forward, particularly in a transaction
that involves a court scheme.  Such court
schemes may involve common control transactions involving entities under common
control or acquisition that involves independent or non-related parties.  Careful analysis of the facts and
circumstances and judgement would be necessary to determine the date of
acquisition.

When an independent party is
acquired, determining the acquisition date is important because at that date
the assets and liabilities are fair valued and goodwill and minority interest
is determined.  From the acquisition date
the acquired entity results are included in the financial statements of the
acquirer.

Business combinations
involving entities or businesses under common control shall be accounted for
using the pooling of interests method. The pooling of interest method is carried
out as follows:

i.  The
assets and liabilities of the combining entities are reflected at their
carrying amounts.

 
ii.
No
adjustments are made to reflect fair values, or recognise any new assets or liabilities.
The only adjustments that are made are to harmonise accounting policies.
   

iii.
The
financial information in the financial statements in respect of prior periods
should be restated as if the business combination had occurred from the
beginning of the preceding period in the financial statements, irrespective of
the actual date of the combination.

When a business
combination is effected after the balance sheet but before the approval of the
financial statements for issue by either party to the business combination,
disclosure is made in accordance with Ind AS 10 Events after the Reporting
Period,
but the business combination is not incorporated in the financial
statements.

 From an Ind AS perspective,
the business combination date in a common control transaction determines two
things:

i.      The
year in which the combination is accounted. 
Therefore, assuming the combination date is financial year 17-18, the
accounting will be done in the financial year 17-18.  However, the financial information for the
financial year 16-17, will be restated as if the business combination had
occurred from the beginning of the financial year 16-17.

 
ii.      
If
the business combination date falls after the balance sheet but before the
approval of the financial statements for issue by either party to the business
combination, disclosure is made in accordance with Ind AS 10 Events after
the Reporting Period,
but the business combination is not incorporated in
the financial statements.

Agreements or court schemes may
provide a retrospective date of business combination.  Irrespective of such date, the date for
business combination under Ind AS 103 is the date on which the control is
actually obtained.  This may or may not
correspond to the date specified in the agreement or the appointed date in a
court scheme.

Some business
combinations cannot be finalized without a regulatory approval or a court
approval.  An investor controls an investee when it is exposed,
or has rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and
has the ability to affect those returns through its power over the
investee.  It is necessary to consider
the nature of regulatory approval in each case, to determine the date when
control is passed.

 To illustrate, consider a business
combination involving three telecom companies, under a court scheme.  Though the court may approve the scheme, it
does not become effective till the transaction is approved by the Department of
Telecom (DOT)/ TRAI and the Competition Commission and the final order is filed
with ROC.  In this scenario, the last of
the date of final approval from DOT/ TRAI and the Competition Commission may be
the acquisition date.  Consider another business
combination, involving entities under common control.  Essentially two 100% subsidiaries of the
parent are merging to form one company. 
The shareholder of the companies, which is the parent company, has
approved the merger in the annual general meetings.  There are no creditors and no minority
shareholders.  No approval is required of
the Competition Commission or any other regulator, and there are no
complexities in the transaction. 
Essentially in such circumstances, the court order may be deemed to be a
formality, and the date of shareholders resolution approving the combination
may be the date of business combination
. 

In a transaction between two
independent parties, the date the control passes is the date when the
unconditional offer is accepted.  When
the agreement is subject to substantive preconditions, the date of acquisition
will be the date when the last of the substantive precondition is fulfilled.

The Madras High Court by way of its
order dated 6 June, 2016 in the case of Equitas
passed a very interesting order.  In
the said case, the holding company had applied to the RBI for in-principle
approval to establish a Small Finance Bank (SFB).  The RBI granted an in-principle approval
subject to the transfer of the two transferor companies into the transferee
company, prior to the commencement of the SFB business. 

The Regional Director (RD) raised a
concern that the scheme did not mention an appointed date, and that the
appointed date was tied to the effective date. 
Further, even the effective date was not mentioned and it was defined to
be the date immediately preceding the date of commencement of the SFB
business.  The court observed that under
section 394 of the Companies Act such a leeway was provided to the
Company.  Further, section 394 did not
fetter the court from delaying the date of actual amalgamation/merger.  This judgement would provide a leeway to the
Company to file scheme of mergers/amalgamation with an appointed date/effective
date conditional upon happening or non-happening of certain events.

The two examples below explain how
the requirements of Ind AS and the court scheme can be aligned.

Acquisition of an
Independent Party

 Company
A (Acquisitive) wants to acquire Company B (Willing).  Acquisitive and Willing are involved in
running some business.  The acquisition
requires several important formalities to be completed including the approval
of the court.  One of the pre-condition
of the acquisition is the completion of all formalities and the receipt of
court approval.  Acquisitive follows
the financial year.  Acquisitive and
Willing enter into a binding agreement (subject to the above pre-condition) on
1 April 2016.  The appointed date
mentioned in the court scheme is 1 April 2016.  The formalities and the final court approval
for Willing to be subsumed in Acquisitive are received on 1 September 2016.

 Under
Ind AS 103, the acquisition date is 1 September 2016.  This is the date when Acquisitive will do a
fair value accounting and determine goodwill and minority interest.  Acquisitive will fair value the assets and
liabilities of Willing at 1 September 2016. 
Legally, for normal income tax computation, Acquisitive will consider
the profits of Willing for the full financial year 16-17.  However, in Ind AS financial statements,
Acquisitive will not account for Willings profits from 1 April 2016 to 31
August 2016 as its own profits; rather the profits for that period would
increase the fair value of net assets of Willings and reduce the amount of goodwill
recognized by Acquisitive.

 In
order to comply with the requirements of Ind AS, Acquisitive may consider the
following two options:

  •  Acquisitive
    relies on the Madras High Court judgement in Equitas.  Consequently, the
    appointed date and the effective date could be set out in the court scheme,
    as the date when the court passes the final order approving the acquisition,
    1 September 2016. The appointed date cannot be 1 April, 2016, because it
    would not be in compliance with Ind AS.
  •  Appointed
    date for tax purposes and tax financial statements can be 1 April 2016.
    However, the scheme should clearly provide that for accounting purposes in
    Ind AS financial statements, date determined under Ind AS 103 will be used.  In this fact pattern, the said date would
    be 1 September, 2016.  Some legal
    luminaries have opined that it is possible to follow this path and that the
    courts have an unfettered power to do so.

The
author believes that in general, the first alternative should be preferred as
it ensures consistency between tax and accounting treatment. Also, there will
be no need to file revised tax return for past periods or maintain two set of
financial statements, one for tax purposes and another for Ind AS purposes.

It
may be noted that for MAT purposes, the financial statements are required to
be in compliance with accounting standards. 
Therefore, for MAT purposes the financial statements should be
prepared with 1 September 2016 as the date of acquisition.  In other words, the Ind AS compliant
financial statements will be the relevant financial statements for the
purposes of MAT.  From an income tax
computation perspective for the carry forward of losses or acquisition
accounting, the tax financial statements prepared with an appointed date 1
April, 2016 may be acceptable. 

For
normal income tax computation purposes, legal merger is from 1 April 2016.
Profits from 1 April 16 to 31 August 16 has to be offered to tax in hands of Acquisitive
even though it reflects as goodwill in Acquisitives’ Ind AS financial
statements. Specific provisions of the Income tax Act will govern tax
treatment of items like tax WDV of assets, allowance of certain expenses on
actual payment basis, disallowance for TDS default, etc. Transition of
business loss/unabsorbed depreciation will be of amounts as determined till
31 March 16. Normal income tax computation is generally not impacted by
accounting treatment in Ind AS financial statements.

However,
if the court scheme contains any unusual adjustments that are not consistent
with tax policies, those may not be acceptable.  For example, if the court scheme allows
derivative profits to be recognized by Acquisitive directly into reserves in
the tax financial statements, and the auditor has modified the audit report,
the derivative profits will be taxable under income-tax laws.

Business Combination
between Common Control Entities

 Company
A (Acquisitive) and Company B (Willing) are in the business of manufacturing
and selling cement.  Both Acquisitive
and Willing have a common parent.  The combination
of Acquisitive and Willing requires several important formalities to be
completed such as approval from the competition commission, clearance from
minority shareholders and creditors, other regulatory approvals, and the
final approval of the court. 
Acquisitive follows the financial year.  Acquisitive and Willing enter into a
binding agreement on 1 April 2016, subject to completion of all
formalities.  A resolution has been
passed by shareholders of both the companies, prior to that date, for
approving the transaction.  The
appointed date mentioned in the court scheme is 1 April 2016.  The formalities are completed and the final
court approval is received on 1 April 2017.

 Under Ind AS 103, the combination
date is 1 April, 2017.  This is the
date when Willing will merge into Acquisitive.  The combination is accounted by Acquisitive
in the financial year 2017-18, using the pooling of interest method.  However, the financial information of
Acquisitive for the financial year 16-17, will be restated as if the business
combination had occurred from the beginning of the financial year 16-17, ie
from 1 April 2016.

 If the formalities are
completed and the final court approval is received on 1 April 2018, the
combination is accounted by Acquisitive in the financial year 2018-19.
However, the financial information of Acquisitive for the financial year 17-18,
will be restated as if the business combination had occurred from the beginning
of the financial year 17-18, ie from 1 April 2017.

 In
order to comply with the requirements of Ind AS and ensure tax consistency as
discussed in previous example, Acquisitive would need to rely on the Madras
High Court judgement in Equitas.  Essentially the appointed date and the
effective date could be set out in the court scheme, as the date when the
court passes the final order approving the combination transaction.  The appointed date may not be 1 April,
2016, because it would not be in compliance with Ind AS
.

 However,
Acquisitive may consider an option whereby it prepares separate accounts for tax purposes with an appointed
date of 1 April, 2016.  For MAT
purposes, Ind AS compliant financial statements will be the relevant
financial statements.  These aspects
are discussed in the previous example.

 Conclusion

The ICAI should
provide appropriate clarification on the above subject.  However, in the meanwhile, the principles
established in this article may be used to ensure compliance with Ind AS and
also fulfill the requirements of section 394 of the Companies Act.

TS-479-AAR-2016 Mahindra-BT Investment Company (Mauritius) Limited, In re Dated: 08.08.2016

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Section 6(3) of the Act; Article 13 of India Mauritius DTAA – since Mauritius company had commercial purpose and the nature of decisions taken by the Board of Directors in Mauritius showed that the control and management was not situated wholly in India, it qualified as treaty resident of Mauritius – Consequently capital gain from transfer of shares of Indian company was exempt under Article 13 of the DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a Mauritius company, was held by another Mauritius company (Mau Holding Co) and a UK company (UK Co). The Taxpayer’s board of Directors (BoD) comprised five directors, of which three directors were resident in Mauritius, one was a resident of the UK and one was a resident of India. The Taxpayer’s control and management was exercised by its BoD whose meetings were conducted in and chaired from Mauritius. The Taxpayer acquired certain shares (approximately 8.12%) in I Co, an Indian listed company through the stock exchange. I Co was a joint venture between Taxpayer, other promoters (Indian company and a UK company).

Taxpayer entered into an option agreement (Agreement) with a US Company (US Co), I Co and other promoters, as per which US Co was granted options over the Taxpayer’s shares in ICo representing 8.12 % of the total share capital, if US Co provided a certain level of business to I Co, which was set as a milestone.
In the year under consideration, US Co achieved the specified milestone and exercised its option to purchase shares of I Co from the Taxpayer in March 2010.
The Taxpayer approached the AAR to adjudicate on the issue of whether capital gains arising to the Taxpayer on transfer of I Co’s shares were exempt from tax in India under the capital gains article of the DTAA.

Held:
•The purpose of the arrangement was to motivate US Co, to give a certain level of business to I Co, by giving US Co an opportunity to acquire shares of ICo. Such conditions are not unusual or abnormal in the business agreement. Thus, contention that the Taxpayer had no commercial purpose but to transfer shares to US Co, and the real transaction was between I Co and US Co, was rejected by AAR.

•For a company to be treated as being resident in India as per the then applicable S. 6(3) the control or management was required to be wholly situated in India.

•However, in the facts of the case, having regard to the facts of the case, control and management of the Taxpayer was situated wholly in Mauritius.

  •      The minutes of the BoD meetings reflected that decisions related to financial matters, such as budgets, dividend declaration, buy-back of shares, approval of the Agreement etc., were taken by the BoD in Mauritius.

  •      The SC’s rulings, in the cases of Nandlal Gandalal  and V.V.R.N.M. Subbayya Chettiar , support that the expression “control and management” means de facto control and management, and not merely the right or power to control and manage. The BoD also included representatives from UK Co. The board meetings and the nature of decisions taken clearly indicate that control and management of the affairs of the Taxpayer, particularly financial affairs, were situated only in Mauritius.

  •     No additional facts were submitted to substantiate that any important affairs of the Taxpayer, for the purpose of the Act, were being controlled or managed  from India.

•Thus Taxpayer was a resident of Mauritius, and, accordingly in terms of Article 13(4), the capital gains arising to the Taxpayer was not taxable in India.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 198 (Delhi – Trib.) New Delhi Television Ltd v ACIT A.Y. 2007-08, Dated: 17.08.2016

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S.- 92B of the Act – (i) Managerial services provided prior to incorporation of proposed overseas subsidiary cannot be classified as an international transaction under section 92B despite the fact that the overseas subsidiary made reimbursement for the same post-incorporation. (ii) Fact that in the transfer pricing study submitted, transaction was classified as an international transaction is not determinative.

Facts:   

The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of television broadcasting. To expand its business internationally, it proposed to establish a subsidiary in UK (UK Subsidiary). During the relevant assessment year, the Taxpayer performed certain management services in relation to its establishment of the UK subsidiary. Such services were undertaken prior to its incorporation in the capacity of a shareholder. Post incorporation of the UK subsidiary, the Taxpayer received reimbursement for the management services (including salary and other expenses incurred on its managerial personnel) from the UK subsidiary.
In the transfer pricing study submitted by the Taxpayer such reimbursed amount was classified as international transaction. AO made transfer pricing adjustments in respect of the reimbursed amount.
Taxpayer contended that the management services were provided prior to incorporation in order to conceptualise and give effect to an efficient group structure and hence such services cannot be considered as an international transaction.

Held:


•As per the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, shareholder activity means an activity which is performed by a Member of an MNE group (usually the parent company or a regional holding company) solely because of its ownership interest in one or more group members i.e. in its capacity as a shareholder.
•Since the UK subsidiary had not come into existence at the time of rendering of services, the expenditure incurred on such services could be classified as expenditure for shareholder activity. Moreover, the Taxpayer had incurred the expenditure solely because of its ownership interest.
•The pre-incorporation provision of managerial services is a different transaction from the post-incorporation provision of managerial services since expenditure incurred when an AE was not in existence, cannot be classified as an international transaction.
•Merely because the UK subsidiary reimbursed expenditure post-incorporation, it cannot be the ground for triggering transfer pricing provisions.
•This holds good, notwithstanding that the Taxpayer itself had classified it as an international transaction in transfer pricing study.

[2016] 73 taxmann.com 14 (Mumbai – Trib.) Praful Chandaria v ADIT A.Y.: 2002-03, Dated: 26.08.2016

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Article 13 of India-Singapore DTAA – (i) while a call option simplicitor is not a capital asset, a perpetual call option coupled with grant of enjoyment of shareholder rights under a Power of Attorney results in transfer of capital asset in form of valuable right, which is distinct from shares; (ii) Capital gain arising on transfer of such asset is not chargeable to tax in India by virtue of Article 13(6) of India-Singapore DTAA.

Facts:    
The Taxpayer, a non-resident Indian and a tax resident of Singapore, held majority of shares in ICo. The Taxpayer entered into an agreement, whereby the Taxpayer granted option to MauCo to buy the shares in ICo at a strike price of USD1 within a period of 150 years. Furthermore, the Taxpayer executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney (PoA) in favor of a bank, confirming that he would not revoke the same. Taxpayer also gave an undertaking that he would not transfer the shares in any other manner.

The Taxpayer received certain consideration for grant of call option under the agreement during the relevant year. The Taxpayer did not offer such income to tax in India. The AO contended that the Taxpayer had effectively alienated his shares in ICo by way of an irrevocable PoA. Accordingly, the AO held that the income from grant of call option resulted in income through or from a capital asset in India and hence sought to tax the same as income from other sources under the Act.
Upon appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO . Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the Taxpayer preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

•Rights arising pursuant to grant of call option may not be treated as a ‘capital asset’ because, without exercising the option, no actual asset is acquired by the option holder. However, in the present case, the period of option in the agreement was fixed for an incredibly large period of 150 years. Also, an irrevocable PoA, in respect of ICo shares, was executed in favor of a bank, confirming that the Taxpayer would not, at any time, revoke the same. This suggests that the call option was granted for perpetuity. Further the rights which were enjoyed by the Taxpayer as a shareholder were exercised by the PoA holders to participate in the affairs of the company.
•Such a bundle of substantive rights would generally not be given under normal call option agreements. Thus taxpayer has in effect alienated a substantive and valuable right as an owner of the shares without alienating the shares itself.
•Such valuable rights/interest in shares qualifies as a “capital asset” and transfer of such results in “capital gain” chargeable to tax in India under the Act. However, as per Article 13 of the India-Singapore DTAA applicable for the relevant year, such gains are taxable only in Singapore.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 360 (AAR – New Delhi) Banca Sella S.P.A., In re Dated: 17.08.2016

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Section 47(vi) of the Act; Articles 14 and 25 of India-Italy DTAA – (i) In absence of consideration flowing to the amalgamating company, no capital gains in India; (ii) S. 47(vi) of the Act, exempting capital gains in the hands of amalgamating company is also applicable on amalgamation of Italian companies by applying the nationality non-discrimination clause of the DTAA; (iii) Capital gains on transfer of Italian company shares is taxable only in Italy under the India- Italy DTAA

Facts:
The Applicant was a banking company incorporated in Italy (“BSS”) and a member of a banking group in Italy. BSS, held 15% shares in an Italian company, SSBS while the balance shares were held by other Group entities.

In 2010, one of the group entities transferred the information technology business to the Indian branch of SSBS, for a fair consideration and on a going concern basis. Subsequently, SSBS merged into BSS. Consequently, SSBS ceased to exist and the Indian branch of SSBS vested in BSS. BSS paid the consideration to other shareholders of SSBS by way of fresh issue of shares, while shares which BSS held in SSBS were extinguished.
The pictorial representation of facts is as follows:

The Applicant sought ruling from AAR on the following questions.

•Upon amalgamation, whether SSBS would be taxable in India, as there is transfer of a capital asset, being the branch in India.
•If the above is answered in the affirmative, whether Article 25(3) of the DTAA on Nationality Non Discrimination Clause (NNDC) can be invoked to claim the exemption on amalgamation under S. 47(vi) of the Act, which is available only if the amalgamated company is an Indian company.
•Whether BSS and other shareholders would be liable to capital gains on extinguishment of its shareholding in SSBS.
•Whether amalgamation attracts transfer pricing (TP) provisions of the Act.

Held:
•In the absence of any consideration flowing to the amalgamating company i.e., SSBS, the computation mechanism would fail and hence income from “transfer” cannot be taxed as capital gains. Reliance in this regard was placed on SC decision in CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty.

•Although, there is a transfer of shares by BSS, in absence of consideration, no capital gains accrued to BSS.
•Article 25(3) of the DTAA on NNDC provides  that there  should be no  discrimination  between  locals and  foreigners  in  the  matter  of taxation. The only exception to Article 25(3) is grant of personal allowances, reliefs, reductions etc. The word ”personal”  denotes that the allowances are those that are available to individuals only. Thus the exception is not applicable to companies.

S. 47(vi) of the Act provides exemption to a local amalgamating company, on transfer of assets on amalgamation. By virtue of NNDC of DTAA, similar exemption is available to SSBS. 

•Transfer of shares by other shareholders of SSBS results in capital gains. However, such capital gain is taxable only in Italy by virtue of Article 14(5) of India-Italy DTAA.

•TP provisions are not applicable in the absence of any charge of tax in India

Transfer Pricing Documentation – Country by Country Reporting – An Overview

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To
address the problems of Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting [BEPS] in the context of international taxation of
MNE Groups, the OECD had in response to the G20 countries adoption of a
15-point Action Plan, released its 15 final reports on the Action Plans in
October 2015.

One
of the most important report is Action 13 – Transfer Pricing Documentation and
Country-by-Country Reporting, which in the process of implementation requires
suitable legislative changes in the domestic law of various countries. In
addition, final report on Action 8-10
Aligning Transfer pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, is equally important in
this regard.

India
has been one of the active members of BEPS initiative and part of international
consensus and accordingly has acted very swiftly in this matter by inserting
section 286 and 271GB and making suitable amendments in section 92D, 271AA
& 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] by the Finance Act, 2016 which
are effective from 1-4-2017 i.e. AY 2017-18.

The
purpose of this article is to bring awareness amongst the tax payers and their
consultants about the changes which are taking place in this regard in the global
and domestic front.

The
reader would be well advised to study final report on ‘
Action 13 –
Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting’ and ‘Guidance on the
Implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting’
issued by OECD in August,
2016, for an in depth study of understanding of the subject.

Synopsis
1. Introduction
2. Objectives of transfer pricing documentation requirements
3. A three-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation
4. Country-by-Country Reporting Implementation Package
5. Recent Developments in India
6. Conclusion

1.       Introduction

1.1 International tax issues have never been as high on the political agenda as they are today. The integration of national economies and markets has increased substantially in recent years, putting a strain on the international tax rules, which were designed more than a century ago. Weaknesses in the current international taxation rules create opportunities for BEPS, requiring bold moves by policy makers to restore confidence in the system and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities take place and value is created.

Following the release of the report Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in February 2013, OECD and G20 countries adopted a 15-point Action Plan to address BEPS in September 2013. The Action Plan identified 15 actions along three key pillars:

a) introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affect cross-border activities,

b) reinforcing substance requirements in the existing international standards, and

c) improving transparency as well as certainty.

1.2 So far, prior to the release of reports on Action 8-10 Aligning Transfer pricing Outcomes with Value Creation and Action 13 – TP Documentation and Country-by-Country, the OECD TP Guidelines for MNEs and Tax Administrations issued in July 2010, has been a major source of guidance on the TP issues to the MNEs and Tax Administrations.

1.3 Significant changes are proposed in OECD TP Guidelines, 2010, by Action 8-10 Aligning Transfer pricing Outcomes with Value Creation and Action 13 – TP Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, the summarised details of which are as follows:

Chapter of OECD TP

Description

I

Deletion of Section D of Chapter I in entirety and
replacement by new para 1.33 to 1.173 respect of Guidance for Applying Arm’s
Length Principle

II

Additions to Chapter II of the TP Guidelines by addition
of new para 2.16A to 2.16E in respect of Commodity Transactions

Elaboration of Scope of revisions of the guidance on the
transactional profit split method

Additional Guidance in Chapter II of the TP Guidelines
resulting from the Revisions of Chapter VI by insertion of para 2.9A

V

Deletion of text of Chapter V of the TP Guidelines in entirety
and replacement by new para 1 to 62 and Annexes I to IV in respect of TP
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting

VI

Deletion of current provisions of Chapter VI in entirety
and replacement by new para 6.1 to 6.212 in respect of intangibles

Deletion of current provisions of Annex to Chapter VI in
entirety and replacement by new Examples 1 to 29 in para 1 to 111 in respect
of intangibles

VII

Deletion of current provisions of Chapter VII in entirety
and replacement by new para 7.1 to 7.65 in respect of Low value-adding
Intra-Group Services

VIII

Deletion of current provisions of Chapter VIII in entirety
and replacement by new para 8.1 to 8.53 in respect of Cost Contribution
Arrangements

Insertion of Annex to Chapter VIII – Examples 1 to 5, to
illustrate the guidance on cost contribution arrangements

 

It is expected that a new version of OECD TP Guidelines for MNEs and Tax Administrations would be issued by
OED before the end of the year 2016, incorporating the changes suggested in the
BEPS Reports on Action 8-10 Aligning Transfer pricing Outcomes with Value
Creation and Action 13 – TP Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting.

1.4  
Implementation
therefore becomes key at this stage. The BEPS package is designed to be implemented
via changes in domestic law and practices, and via treaty provisions, with negotiations
for a multilateral instrument are under way and expected to be finalised in 2016.
OECD and G20 countries have also agreed to continue to work together to ensure a
consistent and co-ordinated implementation of the BEPS recommendations. Globalisation
requires that global solutions and a global dialogue be established which go beyond
OECD and G20 countries. To further this objective, in 2016 OECD and G20 countries
are preparing an inclusive framework for monitoring, with all interested countries
participating on an equal footing.

A better understanding
of how the BEPS recommendations are implemented in practice could reduce misunderstandings
and disputes between governments. Greater focus on implementation and tax administration
should therefore be mutually beneficial to governments and business. Proposed improvements
to data and analysis will help support ongoing evaluation of the quantitative impact
of BEPS, as well as evaluating the impact of the countermeasures developed under
the BEPS Project.

BEPS Action 13 report
contains revised standards for TP documentation and a template for Country-by-Country
[CbC] Reporting of income, taxes paid and certain measures of economic activity.

1.5 Action
13 of the
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting requires the development of “rules
regarding TP documentation to enhance transparency for tax administration, taking
into consideration the compliance costs for business. The rules to be developed
will include a requirement that MNEs provide all relevant governments with needed
information on their global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes
paid among countries according to a common template”
. In
response to this requirement, a three-tiered standardised approach to TP
documentation has been developed.

First, the
guidance on TP documentation requires MNEs to provide tax administrations with high-level
information regarding their global business operations and TP policies in a “master file” that is to be available to
all relevant tax administrations.

Second, it
requires that detailed transactional TP documentation be provided in a “local file” specific to each country, identifying
material related party transactions, the amounts involved in those transactions,
and the company’s analysis of the transfer pricing determinations they have made
with regard to those transactions.

Third,
large MNEs are required to file a CbC Report
that will provide annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business
the amount of revenue, profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued.
It also requires MNEs to report their number of employees, stated capital, retained
earnings and tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNEs
to identify each entity within the group doing business in a particular tax jurisdiction
and to provide an indication of the business activities each entity engages in.

Taken together, these
three documents (master file, local file and CbC Report) will require taxpayers
to articulate consistent transfer pricing positions and will provide tax administrations
with useful information to assess TP risks, make determinations about where audit
resources can most effectively be deployed, and, in the event audits are called
for, provide information to commence and target audit enquiries.

1.6  This
information should make it easier for tax administrations to identify whether companies
have engaged in transfer pricing and other practices that have the effect of artificially
shifting substantial amounts of income into tax-advantaged environments. The countries
participating in the BEPS project agree that these new reporting provisions, and
the transparency they will encourage, will contribute to the objective of understanding,
controlling, and tackling BEPS
behaviours.

The specific content
of the various documents reflects an effort to balance tax administration information
needs, concerns about inappropriate use of the information, and the compliance costs
and burdens imposed on business. Some countries would strike that balance in a different
way by requiring reporting in the CbC Report of additional transactional data (beyond
that available in the master file and local file for transactions of entities operating
in their jurisdictions) regarding related party interest payments, royalty payments
and especially related party service fees. Countries expressing this view are primarily
those from emerging markets (Argentina, Brazil, People’s Republic of China, Colombia,
India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey) who state they need such information to
perform risk assessment and who find it challenging to obtain information on the
global operations of an MNE group headquartered elsewhere. Other countries expressed
support for the way in which the balance has been struck in BEPS Action 13
report. Taking all these views into account, it is mandated that countries participating
in the BEPS project will carefully review the implementation of these new standards
and will reassess no later than the end of 2020 whether modifications to the content
of these reports should be made to require reporting of additional or different
data.

1.7  
Consistent and effective implementation of the TP documentation standards
and in particular of the CbC Report is essential. Therefore, countries participating
in the OECD/G20 BEPS Project agreed on the core elements of the implementation of
TP documentation and CbC Reporting. This agreement calls for the master file and
the local file to be delivered by MNEs directly to local tax administrations. CbC
Reports should be filed in the jurisdiction of tax residence of the ultimate parent
entity and shared between jurisdictions through automatic exchange of information,
pursuant to government-to-government mechanisms such as the multilateral Convention
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, bilateral tax treaties or tax
information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In limited circumstances, secondary mechanisms,
including local filing can be used as a backup.

These new CbC Reporting
requirements are to be implemented for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January
2016 and apply, subject to the 2020 review, to MNEs with annual consolidated group
revenue equal to or exceeding EUR 750 million. It is acknowledged that some jurisdictions
may need time to follow their particular domestic legislative process in order to
make necessary adjustments to their local law.

1.8 In
order to facilitate the implementation of the new reporting standards, an implementation
package has been developed consisting of model legislation which could be used by
countries to require MNE groups to file the CbC Report and competent authority agreements
that are to be used to facilitate implementation of the exchange of those reports
among tax administrations. As a next step, it is intended that an XML Schema and
a related User Guide will be developed with a view to accommodating the electronic
exchange of CbC Reports.

It is recognised that
the need for more effective dispute resolution may increase as a result of the enhanced
risk assessment capability following the adoption and implementation of a CbC Reporting
requirement. This need has been addressed when designing government-to-government
mechanisms to be used to facilitate the automatic exchange of CbC Reports.

Jurisdictions endeavour
to introduce, as necessary, domestic legislation in a timely manner. They are also
encouraged to expand the coverage of their international agreements for exchange
of information. Mechanisms will be developed to monitor jurisdictions’ compliance
with their commitments and to monitor the effectiveness of the filing and dissemination
mechanisms. The outcomes of this monitoring will be taken into consideration in
the 2020 review.

2.       Objectives
of transfer pricing documentation requirements

2.1 Three objectives of TP documentation are:
1. to ensure that taxpayers give appropriate consideration to TP requirements in establishing prices and other conditions for transactions between associated enterprises and in reporting the income derived from such transactions in their tax returns;

2. to provide tax administrations with the information necessary to conduct an informed TP risk assessment; and

3. to provide tax administrations with useful information to employ in conducting an appropriately thorough audit of the TP practices of entities subject to tax in their jurisdiction, although it may be necessary to supplement the documentation with additional information as the audit progresses.

2.2 Each of these objectives should be considered in designing appropriate domestic TP documentation requirements. It is important that taxpayers be required to carefully evaluate, at or before the time of filing a tax return, their own compliance with the applicable TP rules. It is also important that tax administrations be able to access the information they need to conduct a TP risk assessment to make an informed decision about whether to perform an audit. In addition, it is important that tax administrations be able to access or demand, on a timely basis, all additional information necessary to conduct a comprehensive audit once the decision to conduct such an audit is made.

3.       A
three-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation

3.1   This approach to TP
documentation will provide tax administrations with relevant and reliable information
to perform an efficient and robust TP risk assessment analysis. It will also provide
a platform on which the information necessary for an audit can be developed and
provide taxpayers with a means and an incentive to meaningfully consider and describe
their compliance with the arm’s length principle in material transactions.

    
(i)           
Master file

The master file should
provide an overview of the MNE group business, including the nature of its global
business operations, its overall TP policies, and its global allocation of income
and economic activity in order to assist tax administrations in evaluating the presence
of significant TP risk. In general, the master file is intended to provide a high-level
overview in order to place the MNE group’s TP practices in their global economic,
legal, financial and tax context. It is not intended to require exhaustive listings
of minutiae (e.g. a listing of every patent owned by members of the MNE group) as
this would be both unnecessarily burdensome and inconsistent with the objectives
of the master file. In producing the master file, including lists of important agreements,
intangibles and transactions, taxpayers should use prudent business judgment in
determining the appropriate level of detail for the information supplied, keeping
in mind the objective of the master file to provide tax administrations a high-level
overview of the MNE’s global operations and policies. When the requirements of the
master file can be fully satisfied by specific cross-references to other existing
documents, such cross references, together with copies of the relevant documents,
should be deemed to satisfy the relevant requirement. For purposes of producing
the master file, information is considered important if its omission would affect
the reliability of the TP outcomes.

The information required
in the master file provides a “blueprint” of the MNE group and contains relevant
information that can be grouped in five categories:

            a)   The
MNE group’s organisational structure;

            b)  A
description of the MNE’s business or businesses;

            c)  The
MNE’s intangibles;

            d)  The
MNE’s intercompany financial activities; and

            e)  The
MNE’s financial and tax positions.

Taxpayers should present
the information in the master file for the MNE as a whole. However, organisation
of the information presented by line of business is permitted where well justified
by the facts, e.g. where the structure of the MNE group is such that some significant
business lines operate largely independently or are recently acquired. Where line
of business presentation is used, care should be taken to assure that centralised
group functions and transactions between business lines are properly described in
the master file. Even where line of business presentation is selected, the entire
master file consisting of all business lines should be available to each country
in order to assure that an appropriate overview of the MNE group’s global business
is provided.

  
(ii)           
Local file

In contrast to the master
file, which provides a high-level overview, the local file provides more detailed
information relating to specific intercompany transactions. The information required
in the local file supplements the master file and helps to meet the objective of
assuring that the taxpayer has complied with the arm’s length principle in its material
TP positions affecting a specific jurisdiction. The local file focuses on information
relevant to the TP analysis related to transactions taking place between a local
country affiliate and associated enterprises in different countries and which are
material in the context of the local country’s tax system. Such information would
include relevant financial information regarding those specific transactions, a
comparability analysis, and the selection and application of the most appropriate
TP method. Where a requirement of the local file can be fully satisfied by a specific
cross-reference to information contained in the master file, such a cross-reference
should suffice.

 (iii)           
Country-by-Country Report

The CbC Report requires
aggregate tax jurisdiction-wide information relating to the global allocation of
the income, the taxes paid, and certain indicators of the location of economic activity
among tax jurisdictions in which the MNE group operates. The report also requires
a listing of all the Constituent Entities for which financial information is reported,
including the tax jurisdiction of incorporation, where different from the tax jurisdiction
of residence, as well as the nature of the main business activities carried out
by that Constituent Entity.

3.2  
The
CbC Report will be helpful for high-level TP risk assessment purposes. It may also
be used by tax administrations in evaluating other BEPS related risks and where
appropriate for economic and statistical analysis. However, the information in the
CbC Report should not be used as a substitute for a detailed TP analysis of individual
transactions and prices based on a full functional analysis and a full comparability
analysis. The information in the Country-by- Country Report on its own does not
constitute conclusive evidence that transfer prices are or are not appropriate.
It should not be used by tax administrations
to propose TP adjustments based on a global formulary apportionment of income.

4.       Country-by-Country
Reporting Implementation Package

4.1   Countries participating in the
OECD/G20 BEPS Project have therefore developed an implementation package for
government-to-government exchange of CbC Reports.

More specifically:

Model legislation requiring the ultimate parent entity of an MNE group to file the CbC Report in its jurisdiction of residence has been developed. Jurisdictions will be able to adapt this model legislation to their own legal systems, where changes to current legislation are required. Key elements of secondary mechanisms have also been developed.

Implementing arrangements for the automatic exchange of the CbC Reports under international agreements have been developed, incorporating the suggested conditions. Such implementing arrangements include competent authority agreements (“CAAs”) based on existing international agreements (the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, bilateral tax treaties and TIEAs) and inspired by the existing models developed by the OECD working with G20 countries for the automatic exchange of financial account information.

4.2  
Participating
jurisdictions endeavour to introduce as necessary domestic legislation in a
timely manner. They are also encouraged to expand the coverage of their
international agreements for exchange of information. The implementation of the
package will be monitored on an ongoing basis. The outcomes of this monitoring
will be taken into consideration in the 2020 review.

5.       Recent Developments in India –
Amendments by the Finance Act, 2016

5.1   The Finance
Act, 2016 has inserted section 286 relating to furnishing of report in respect
of international group by every parent entity or the alternate reporting entity
resident in India, on or before the due date specified u/s 139(1) of the
income-tax act, 1961, in the Form and manner, yet to be prescribed. This
section is effective from 1-4-17 i.e. assessment year 2017-18 and subsequent
years.

Further, new section 271GB has
been inserted wef 1-4-17 i.e. assessment year 2017-18 and subsequent years
relating to penalty for failure to furnish report or for furnishing inaccurate
report u/s 286.

In addition, section 271AA of the
Act relating to penalty for failure to keep and maintain information and document
etc. has been amended to provide that
if any
person being constituent entity of an international group referred to in
section 286 fails to furnish the information and document in accordance with
provisions of section 92D, then, the prescribed authority may direct that such
person shall be liable to pay a penalty of Rs. 5,00,000/-.

5.2   Background as
explained in Explanatory memorandum explaining provisions of the Finance Bill,
2016, is as follows:

“BEPS action plan –
Country-By-Country Report and Master file

Sections
92 to 92F of the Act contain provisions relating to transfer pricing regime.
Under provision of section 92D, there is requirement for maintenance of
prescribed information and document relating to the international transaction
and specified domestic transaction.

The OECD report on Action 13 of
BEPS Action plan provides for revised standards for transfer pricing
documentation
and
a template for country-by-country reporting of income, earnings, taxes paid and
certain measure of economic activity. India
has been one of the active members of BEPS initiative and part of international
consensus.
It is recommended in the BEPS report that the countries should
adopt a standardised approach to transfer pricing documentation. A three-tiered
structure has been mandated consisting of:-

(i)     a master file containing
standardised information relevant for all multinational enterprises (MNE) group
members;

(ii)    a local file referring
specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer; and

(iii)   a country-by-country report
containing certain information relating to the global allocation of the MNE’s
income and taxes paid together with certain indicators of the location of
economic activity within the MNE group.

The
report mentions that taken together, these three documents (country-by-country
report, master file and local file) will require taxpayers to articulate
consistent transfer pricing positions and will provide tax administrations with
useful information to assess transfer pricing risks. It will facilitate tax administrations
to make determinations about where their resources can most effectively be
deployed, and, in the event audits are called for, provide information to
commence and target audit enquiries.

The
country-by-country report requires multinational enterprises (MNEs) to report
annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business; the amount of
revenue, profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued. It also
requires MNEs to report their total employment, capital, accumulated earnings
and tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNEs to
identify each entity within the group doing business in a particular tax
jurisdiction and to provide an indication of the business activities each
entity engages in. The Country-by-Country (CbC) report has to be submitted by
parent entity of an international group to the prescribed authority in its
country of residence. This report is to be based on consolidated financial
statement of the group.

The
master file is intended to provide an overview of the MNE groups business,
including the nature of its global business operations, its overall transfer
pricing policies, and its global allocation of income and economic activity in
order to assist tax administrations in evaluating the presence of significant
transfer pricing risk. In general, the master file is intended to provide a
high-level overview in order to place the MNE group’s transfer pricing
practices in their global economic, legal, financial and tax context. The
master file shall contain information which may not be restricted to
transaction undertaken by a particular entity situated in particular country.
In that aspect, information in master file would be more comprehensive than the
existing regular transfer pricing documentation. The master file shall be
furnished by each entity to the tax authority of the country in which it
operates.

In order to implement the
international consensus, it is proposed to provide a specific reporting regime
in respect of CbC reporting and also the master file. It is proposed to include
essential elements in the Act while remaining aspects can be detailed in rules.
The elements relating to CbC
reporting requirement and matters related to it proposed to be included through
amendment of the Act are:

          (i) the
reporting provision shall apply in respect of an international group havingconsolidated revenue above a threshold to be prescribed.

            (ii) the
parent entity of an international group, if it is resident in India shall berequired to furnish the report in respect of the group to the prescribed
authority on or before the due date of furnishing of return of income for the
Assessment Year relevant to the Financial Year (previous year) for which the
report is being furnished;

               (iii)  the
parent entity shall be an entity which is required to prepare consolidated
financial statement under the applicable laws or would have been required to
prepare such a statement, had equity share of any entity of the group been
listed on a recognized stock exchange in India;

              
(iv) 
every
constituent entity in India, of an international group having parent entity
that is not resident in India, shall provide information regarding the country
or territory of residence of the parent of the international group to which it
belongs. This information shall be furnished to the prescribed authority on or
before the prescribed date;

               
(v)
the
report shall be furnished in prescribed manner and in the prescribed form and
would contain aggregate information in respect of revenue, profit & loss
before Income-tax, amount of Income-tax paid and accrued, details of capital,
accumulated earnings, number of employees, tangible assets other than cash or
cash equivalent in respect of each country or territory along with details of
each constituent’s residential status, nature and detail of main business
activity and any other information as may be prescribed. This shall be based on the template provided in the OECD BEPS report on
Action Plan 13;

             
(vi) 
an
entity in India belonging to an international group shall be required to furnish
CbC report to the prescribed authority if the parent entity of the group is
resident;-

(a)   in a country with which India does
not have an arrangement for exchange of the CbC report; or

(b)   such country is not exchanging
information with India even though there is an agreement; and

(c)    this fact has been intimated to
the entity by the prescribed authority;

            
(vii) 
If
there are more than one entities of the same group in India, then the group can
nominate (under intimation in writing to the prescribed authority) the entity
that shall furnish the report on behalf of the group. This entity would then
furnish the report;

          
(viii)
If
an international group, having parent entity which is not resident in India,
had designated an alternate entity for filing its report with the tax jurisdiction
in which the alternate entity is resident, then the entities of such group
operating in India would not be obliged to furnish report if the report can be
obtained under the agreement of exchange of such reports by Indian tax
authorities;

             
(ix) 
The
prescribed authority may call for such document and information from the entity
furnishing the report for the purpose of verifying the accuracy as it may
specify in notice. The entity shall be required to make submission within
thirty days of receipt of notice or further period if extended by the
prescribed authority, but extension shall not be beyond 30 days;

               
(x) 
For non-furnishing of the report
by an entity which is obligated to furnish it, a graded penalty structure would
apply:-

(a)   if default is not more than a
month, penalty of Rs. 5000/- per day
applies;

(b)   if default is beyond one month, penalty of Rs. 15000/- per day for the
period exceeding one month applies;

(c)    for any default that continues
even after service of order levying penalty either under (a) or under (b), then
the penalty for any continuing default beyond
the date of service of order shall be @ Rs.
50,000/- per day;

             
(xi)
In case of timely non-submission
of information before prescribed authority
when called for, a penalty of Rs.
5,000/- per day
applies. Similar to the above, if default continues even
after service of penalty order, then penalty of Rs. 50,000/- per day applies for default beyond date of service of
penalty order;

             
(xii)
If
the entity has provided any inaccurate information in the report and,-

(a)   the entity knows of the inaccuracy
at the time of furnishing the report but does not inform the prescribed
authority; or

(b)   the entity discovers the
inaccuracy after the report is furnished and fails to inform the prescribed
authority and furnish correct report within a period of fifteen days of such
discovery; or

(c)    the entity furnishes inaccurate information or document in response to notice
of the prescribed authority, then penalty
of Rs. 500,000/- applies;

         (xiii)The
entity can offer reasonable cause defence for non-levy of penalties mentioned
above.

The proposed amendment in the Act
in respect of maintenance of master file and furnishing it are: –

(i)   
the
entities being constituent of an international group shall, in addition to the
information related to the international transactions, also maintain such
information and document as is prescribed in the rules. The rules shall
thereafter prescribe the information and document as mandated for master file
under OECD BEPS Action 13 report;

(ii)  
the
information and document shall also be furnished to the prescribed authority
within such period as may be prescribed and the manner of furnishing may also
be provided for in the rules;

(iii)  for non-furnishing of the
information and document to the prescribed authority, a penalty of Rs. 5 lakh
shall be leviable. However, reasonable cause defence against levy of penalty
shall be available to the entity.

As indicated above, the CbC
reporting requirement for a reporting year does not apply unless the
consolidated revenues of the preceding year of the group, based on consolidated
financial statement, exceeds a threshold to be prescribed
. The current international
consensus is for a threshold of € 750 million equivalent in local currency.
This threshold in Indian currency would be equivalent to Rs. 5395 crores (at
current rates). Therefore, CbC reporting for an international group having
Indian parent, for the previous year 2016-17, shall apply only if the
consolidated revenue of the international group in previous year 2015-16
exceeds Rs. 5395 crore (the equivalent would be determinable based on exchange
rate as on the last day of previous year 2015-16). …..”

5.3   Section
286 of the Act relating to furnishing of report in respect of international
group provides for furnishing of a report in respect of an international group,
if the parent entity of the group is resident in India.

Sub-section (1)
provides that constituent entity in India of an international group, not
having a parent entity resident in India shall notify the prescribed authority
regarding the parent entity of the group to which it belongs or an alternate
reporting entity which shall furnish the report on behalf of the group in the
prescribed manner.

Sub-section (2)
provides that the parent entity of an international group, which is
resident in India, shall furnish a report in respect of the international group
on or before due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139 for
furnishing of return of income of the relevant accounting year.

Sub-section (3)
provides for the details to be contained in the report to be furnished. It,
inter alia, provides that the report shall contain aggregate information
in respect of amount of revenues, profit and loss, taxes accrued and paid,
number of employees, details of constituent entities and the country or
territory in which such entities are resident or located.

Sub-section (4) provides
for furnishing report by entities resident in India and belonging to an
international group not headed by Indian resident entity.

Sub-section (5) provides
for circumstances under which the constituent entities referred to in
sub-section (4) shall not be required to furnish the report.

Sub-section (6) provides that the prescribed
authority may, by issuance of notice for the purpose of verifying the accuracy
of the report furnished by any entity, require submission of information and
document as specified in the notice.

Sub-section (7) provides
that the reporting requirement under this section shall not apply to an
accounting year, if the total consolidated group revenue for the accounting
year preceding it, does not exceed the prescribed threshold.

Sub-section (8) provides
for application of the section in accordance with such guidelines and subject
to such conditions as may be prescribed.

Sub-section (9) of the
proposed new section, inter alia, defines various terms for the purposes
of the new section.

5.4  
The new section at 5 places makes
reference to ‘as may be prescribed’ in respect of form, manner and date of
notification, form and manner of report to be submitted, other information to
be included in the report, threshold limit of
total consolidated group revenue
for application of section and other guidelines and conditions for application
of section. However, so far no rules have been prescribed in respect of section
286.

5.5   However, as
mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum,
CbC reporting for an international group having Indian parent, for the
previous year 2016-17, shall apply only if the consolidated revenue of the
international group in previous year 2015-16 exceeds Rs. 5,395 crore (the
equivalent would be determinable based on exchange rate as on the last day of
previous year 2015-16).

6.       Conclusion

6.1  
So
far 44 countries have signed the
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) on CbC
reporting including India.

In addition, on
16 August 2016 OECD has issued further Guidance on the Implementation of
Country-by-Country reporting. This guidance covers the following issues:

               (i)  Transitional
filing options for MNEs (“parent surrogate filing”).

             
(ii)
The
application of CbC reporting to investment funds.

              (iii)The
application of CbC reporting to partnerships.

             
(iv)
The
impact of currency fluctuations on the agreed EUR 750 million filing threshold.

6.2  
Countries have agreed that implementing CbC
reporting is a key priority in addressing BEPS risks, and the Action 13 Report
recommended that reporting take place with respect to fiscal periods commencing
from 1 January 2016. Swift progress is being made in order to meet this
timeline, including the introduction of domestic legal frameworks and the entry
into competent authority agreements for the international exchange of CbC reports.
MNE Groups are likewise making preparations for CbC reporting, and dialogue
between governments and business is a critical aspect of ensuring that CbC
reporting is implemented consistently across the globe. Consistent
implementation will not only ensure a level playing field, but also provide
certainty for taxpayers and improve the ability of tax administrations to use
CbC reports in their risk assessment work.

[We have extensively relied upon final
report on ‘
Action 13 – Transfer Pricing Documentation and
Country-by-Country Reporting’ and ‘Guidance on the Implementation of Country-by-Country
Reporting’
issued by OECD in August, 2016, and the Memorandum
Explaining the Finance Bill, 2016, in preparing the above article giving an
overview of the subject.]

***

M/S Kataria Automobiles Limited&Anr.V. State of Gujarat, Appeal No. 535 of 2010, dated 18th July, 2016, (Guj).

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Central Sales Tax- Exemptionfrom Payment of Tax -In Excess of 4%-Without C Form -UnderNotification Dated 12.09.1995- Issued U/S 8(5) of The Act– Even After Amendment to Section 8(5) from 11.05.2002- Is valid, S. 8(5)of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts:

The appellant is an authorized distributor of Maruti cars and is a registered under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act and the CST Act. The Gujarat Government had issued a notification dated 12.09.1995 under section 8(5) of the CST Act to exempt from payment of tax in excess of 4% in respect of all inter-state sales effected from the State of Gujarat which was later on rescinded from 31.03.2006.

Accordingly, the appellant had paid tax @ 4% on its inter-state sales affected without C forms. The revenue did not accept the claim in view of the amendment to section 8(5) of the CST Act from 11.05.2002. The Tribunal also dismissed the claim and the appellant filed appeal before the Gujarat High Court against the said decision of Tribunal.

Held:

For applying the rate of tax on inter-State sales, two conditions have been laid down in Section 8. Section 8(1) lays down the condition that if sales are supported by ‘C Forms’, then concessional rate is supposed to be applied and Section 8(2) lays down that if sales are not supported by ‘C Forms’, then higher rate is applicable.

The amendment dated 11.05.2002 has inserted the condition in Section 8(5) that the State Government can exercise the powers vested in them subject to conditions laid down in Section 8(4). Section 8(4) states that benefit of concessional rate as provided for u/s 8(1) is allowable subject to the submission of ‘C Forms’.

In other words, the conditions laid down in Section 8(4) are in relation to Section 8(1) meaning thereby that on fulfillment of conditions, laid down in Section 8(4), the sale would be accepted and treated as sale under Section 8(1) otherwise, it would be considered as sale covered and governed by Section 8(2). Thus, the amendment in anyway, does not affect Section 8(2) as it is in connection with Section 8(1). The State Government had issued several Notifications u/s 8(5) with respect to Section 8(1) until 11.05.2002, which is the date on which the amendment was brought in. By the said amendment, the Legislature intended to restrict the issuance of Notifications with respect to conditions laid down in Section 8(1) and 8(4). If the amendment is treated to be affecting Section 8(2) then the said section would become redundant, which is not the intention of the Legislature.The amendment dated11.05.2002 does not affect or restrict the powers of State Government to issue Notifications u/s 8(5) with respect to Section 8(2).
Therefore, the State Governments can issue Notifications u/s 8(5) reducing the rate of tax with respect to transactions falling u/s 8(2) even after this amendment. In any case, the amendment does not affect the Notifications issued prior to amendment. It is settled position of law that Notifications hold the field unless they are specifically rescinded and the Notification in question, has been rescinded w.e.f. 31.03.2006 and so, it holds the field till then.
Hence, the authorities are bound to follow the same.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal and held that the rate of CST would be 4% in respect of all inter-state sales affected without C forms under the said notification till it was rescinded.

Commissioner of Commercial Taxes V. M/S A.R. Thermosets (Pvt.) Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 2650 of 2016, dated 6th September, 2016, SC

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VAT- Classification of Goods – Bitumen Emulsion- Is Bitumen- Taxable at 4%, Entry 22 of Part A of Schedule II of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Facts:
Respondent company manufactures “bitumen emulsion”. It filed an application before the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Lucknow, U.P., under Section 59 of the VAT Act seeking a clarification about the rate of tax applicable to the sale of bitumen emulsion. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, vide order dated 23.1.1999, opined that bitumen emulsion is an unclassified commodity and, therefore, is excisable to tax at the rate of 12.5% as it would fall under the residuary Entry. The Company filed appeal before the Tribunal where it was dismissed. The High Court, in appeal filed by the company, allowed the appeal. The revenue filed appeal before the SC against the decision of High Court allowing appeal of the respondent company.

Held:

The principal controversy, involved is “whether “bitumen emulsion” is covered within Entry 22 of Schedule II of the VAT Act which only refers to “bitumen”.

The bitumen, in its original form, is solid but melts when heated, for it is used in molten stage. There is no difficulty to appreciate that bitumen emulsion comes into existence when bitumen is treated with emulsifiers and other chemicals to attain a liquid form. It has a huge advantage and added benefit because it is not to be heated and detained in its liquid form and has better stability and thus, saves time and cost components. That apart, it ensures its use at the stage of application. Needless to say it is comparatively less hazardous. Bitumen consists of four forms of variants namely solid bitumen, polymer bitumen, crumble rubber modified bitumen and bitumen emulsion. The stand of the Revenue is that the word “bitumen” must be conferred a narrow meaning for the reason that the legislature has not thought it appropriate to use the prefix or suffix like “all”, in all forms or of all kinds. To this the SC clarified that bitumen is a generic expression which would include different types of bitumen. Revenue, however, intends to apply it restrictively. The said submission has a fundamental fallacy. Entry 22 does not exclude or specify that it would not include bitumen of all types    and varieties. This is not the principle or precept applied to interpret the entries under the Schedule of the Act.
The nature and composition of the product or the goods and the particular entry in the classification table is important. Matching of the goods with the Entry or Entries in the Schedules is tested on the basis of identity of the goods in question with the Entry or the contesting entries and by applying the common parlance test, i.e., whether the goods as understood in commercial or business parlance are identical or similar to the description of the Entry. Where such similarity in popular sense of meaning exists, the generic entity would be construed as including the goods in question. Sometimes on certain circumstances the end use test, i.e., use of the goods and its comparison with the Entry is applied.
The Entry in question uses the word “bitumen” without any further stipulation or qualification. Therefore, it would include any product which shares the composition identity, and in common and commercial parlance is treated as bitumen and can be used as bitumen. Applying the three tests, namely, identity, common parlance and end use of the goods and the Entry in question, bitumen emulsion would be covered by the Entry bitumen. It is worthy to note that bitumen emulsion matches the Entry as it is only one of the varieties of bitumen. Bitumen emulsion is processed bitumen, but the process has not changed its composition, commercial identity or its use. Bitumen emulsion is regarded and performs the same function as bitumen. As a result of processing, neither the primary character nor the composition is lost. Emulsification only eases and provides proficiency to the use of application of bitumen. Hence, in popular and commercial sense, bitumen emulsion is nothing but bitumen, which is in liquid form and is user friendly.
It is perceivable that the legislature has used the word “bitumen” and treated it as a separate entity. It has not indicated that this was done with the intention and purpose to exclude some type or variety of bitumen. All bitumen products, which share and have common composition and commercial entity, and meet the popular parlance test, is, therefore, meant to be covered by the said Entry. In the instant case, even the end use test is satisfied. There is nothing in the Entry to suggest and show that the Entry is required to be given a restrictive and a narrow meaning.The two varieties and types carry the same composition, do not differ in character and have the same commercial identity i.e. bitumen. That apart, the use or end use test is also satisfied.
Accordingly, the SC dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue and up held the judgment of High Court holding bitumen emulsifier is bitumen within the meaning of the entry 22 of part A of Schedule II of the act and taxable at 4%.

M/S|Larsen & Toubro Limited V. Additional Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes &Anr., Civil Appeal No. 2956 of 2007, 2318 OF 2013 and 7241 of 2016, dated 5th September, 2016 (SC)

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Sales Tax- Works Contract- Total Turnover- Does Not Include Turnover of Sub Contract, S. 6B of The Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957.

Facts:
The petitioner company, registered under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act and engaged in works contract had executed works contract and part of it or whole of it was given to another contractor as sub-contract and claimed deduction from total turnover for the purpose of levy of tax under section 6B of the Act in respect of value of contracts executed by sub-contractors. The department did not accept the claim of the company. The High Court in two periods denied the claim but in another appeal allowed the claim. The company filed appeal before the SC against the High Court judgment disallowing the claim and department filed appeal before the SC against the judgment of High Court allowing the claim. The SC by common judgment decided all three appeals involving identical issue for deduction of sub-contract value for levy of tax.

Held:
What is significant is that total amount paid or payable to the dealer as a consideration for ‘transfer of property in goods’, which is involved in execution of the works contract, is to be treated as ‘total turnover’.The Rule, thus, specifically restricts the total turnover in respect of those goods alone, where the property has been transferred. Thus, transfer of property in goods, becomes necessary event and unless there is a transfer of property, the amount paid is not to be included in the total turnover. The amount paid to the sub-contractor is not for transfer of property in goods. Accordingly, the SC held that the value of thework entrusted to the sub-contractors or payments made to them shall not be taken into consideration while computing total turnover for the purposes of Section6-B of the Karnataka Act. As a consequence, the two appeals which were filed by the company were allowed and the appeal preferred by the Revenue was dismissed by the SC.

[2016-TIOL-26-ARA-ST] M/s Steps Therapeutics Ltd

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Clinical pharmacology and Clinical research undertaken of the formulations viz. tablets, capsules etc. on the volunteers is covered by Rule 4(a) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012.

Facts:
The Applicant is in the process of establishing, developing and carrying on research in basic and applied sciences in relation to all kinds of drugs, pharmaceuticals and formulations, health care and bio-technology. The services to be provided include Clinical Pharmacology which is a study carried out for generic drugs. The study is proposed to be undertaken using formulations in the form of tablets, capsules, syrups, inhalers etc. Further they would undertake clinical research which involves project management, monitoring, medical writing etc. In terms of a sample agreement, clinical trials are to be undertaken for the drugs of the customers situated outside India on volunteers in India. These volunteers are kept under observation and their blood samples are tested for identification of various parameters as required by the customer and a consideration is charged on a project to project basis. This is the main activity of providing research assistance services to its customers. The question before the authority is whether the services provided are covered by Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012.

Held:
The Authority noted that the issue to be decided is whether the services of clinical pharmacology and clinical research are covered by Rule 3 viz. location of service recipient or Rule 4 viz. the location where the services are actually performed of the Place of Provision of Services Rules 2012. The service is covered by Rule 4(a) if the service is provided in respect of goods which are required to be made physically available by the recipient of service to the provider of service. In the present case, the study is undertaken using formulations, tablets, inhalers etc. provided by customers outside India on eligible volunteers in India. Therefore it is clear that the goods are required to be made physically available by the customers located outside India to the applicant and therefore the service of clinical pharmacology is covered by Rule 4(a) of the Rules. It was argued that the Education Guide issued by the CBEC categorically mentions that the service of market research is not covered by the said Rule 4. The authority noted that the guide at para 1.2 categorically provides that it is neither a departmental circular nor a manual of instructions and does not command the required legal backing to be binding on either side and in any case the provisions of Rule 4 are clear and therefore the Education Guide cannot take precedence over it. Further if the service of clinical pharmacology is not provided and only the service of clinical research is provided, the said service being in the nature of monitoring, project management etc. the authority held then it will not be in relation to the formulations provided by the service receiver and nor will it require physical presence of any representative of the drug company and therefore such service will not fall in the ambit of Rule 4 and will be covered by Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012.
Note: Readers may note, that Rule 4 of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 requires the services to be provided in respect of goods. Examples provided in the Education Guide at para 5.4.1. include repairs, reconditioning, cargo handling etc. Accordingly the service is essentially any physical service carried out on another person’s goods. However in the present case the drugs are the object of research whereas the service involves various aspects of research viz. study of the blood samples, the minute observation of the physical changes in the volunteers consuming the drugs, its analysis and then drawing an inference on the basis of their skill/knowledge/expertise etc. on the basis of which a report is sent outside India which is directly consumed outside India.  There is no physical service or manipulation performed on the drugs of the service receiver and therefore its inclusion in the said Rule 4 appears questionable.

[2016-TIOL-20-ARA-ST] M/s Global Transportation Services P. Ltd.

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III   Authority of Advance Ruling (AAR)

Facts:
The Applicant a provider of logistic solutions provides a number of services which are mutually exclusively viz. transportation of goods by road, loading/unloading of goods, air/ocean freight etc. on various outbound and inbound shipments. They enter into a contract with the airline for transportation of consignment who issues an Airway Bill which governs the terms of contract between them on a principal-to-principal basis. The Applicant in turn in a majority of cases issues a House Airway Bill upon its customers. The earning for all the services rendered is the difference between the amount charged to the customer and paid to the airlines/shipping lines/transporters etc. They also enter into reciprocal freight business arrangements with freight forwarders in other jurisdictions. The questions raised before the authority were whether the freight margin recovered from their customer/freight partner in case of outbound shipments is not taxable in light of Rule 10 of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 and whether in case of inbound shipments the same is covered under section 66D(p)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994-Negative list which provides an exemption to transportation of goods by aircraft/vessel from a place outside India upto the customs station. Further questions of valuation and CENVAT availability were also raised in case the above transactions were held to be taxable.

Held: 
The Authority noted that the relationship between the airline/shipping line and applicant is separate and distinct from the relationship between the applicant and its customer. The contract with the customer is to provide the service of transportation of cargo. In case of any damage or destruction, the applicant has an independent right against the airline/shipping line and the customer also has a right to recover damages from the applicant independently.  Therefore they are acting on a principal-to-principal basis providing the main service and are thus excluded from the definition of intermediary provided in Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 . Accordingly the place of provision of the said service will not be location of the service provider. The place of provision of transportation of goods is the destination of goods as per Rule 10 of the said rules and therefore in case of an outbound shipment the destination is outside India and accordingly the freight margin is not liable for service tax. Similarly in case of inbound shipments the service is covered by the Negative List – section 66D(p)(ii) and therefore is not exigible to service tax. However with effect from 01/06/2016, the said section has been omitted and therefore the said service of transportation is made taxable. However the exemption to transportation of goods by aircraft continues under the mega exemption notification vide notification 9/2016-ST dated 01/03/2016.
[Note: Readers may note the decision of Greenwich Meridian Logistics (India) P. Ltd [2016-TIOL-869-CESTAT-MUM] on similar facts reported in the May 2016 issue of BCAJ dealing with the period prior to July 12. Reference can also be made to the decision of Phoenix International Freight Services P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-II [2016-TIOL-2353-CESTAT-MUM] wherein the Tribunal relying on the decision of Greenwich Meridian (supra) has dropped the demand prior to July 2012.]

2016] 71 taxmann.com 92 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Swastik Wires vs. CCE

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Rule 6(3)(b) of CENVAT Credit Rules is not applicable if there is no levy of duty on goods cleared on account of absence of manufacture. Hence, where assessee availed the entire CENVAT credit and paid 8% at the time of clearance of such goods, the procedure was held to be in contravention of the law. However, demand is reduced to the extent of amount of 8% already paid by way of utilizing CENVAT credit.     

Facts:
The appellant a manufacturer of wires falling under chapter 72 and 85 of the first Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act registered with the Central Excise and cleared final product on payment of duty after availing Cenvat Credit of duty paid on inputs. The appellant was also doing galvanization on H B wire procured from other manufacturers. Since the process did not amount to manufacture there was no duty incidence on such product. For the period under consideration, the appellants availed cenvat credit on the entire common inputs used in the manufacture of dutiable products as also the products which did not attract duty. Such non-dutiable products were being cleared by them on payment of 8% of the value of the same in terms of provisions of Rule 6(3)(b) of Cenvat Credit Rules. Revenue, denied the CENVAT credit on the ground that, in as much as the appellants final product i.e. galvanized wire and the other wires which emerges by the process of wire drawing are not process amounting to manufacture and hence not liable to excise duty, the provisions of Rule 6(3) (b) of Cenvat Credit Rules is not applicable to them. Appellant contended that, the fact that the said goods are specified in the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff, they are required to be held as excisable goods, and although emerging as a result of non-manufacturing activity, the provisions of Rule 6(3)(b) would fully apply.

Held:
Tribunal observed that, said goods are admittedly specified in the tariff and in terms of Rule 2(d) and hence they have to be held excisable goods. The same attract duty at the rate of 16% ad valoram and there is no exemption notification in respect of said goods. It was further observed that admittedly, the said product did not attract duty at all on account of being a non-manufactured product. It was observed that on one hand, the appellant is taking a stand that no duty is required to be paid on the galvanized wire inasmuch as there was no manufacturing activity involved and thus reason that he is not paying full rate of duty of 16% on the said goods at the time of clearance of the same and on the other he is claiming the applicability of Rule 6(3)(b) on the ground that said goods are dutiable but exempted. Referring to the definition of “exempted goods” under rule 2(d) of Central Excise Rules, Tribunal held that if no duty of excise is leviable on account of non-manufacture, the question of exemption of same does not arise. As such, goods cannot held to be exempted goods, thus making the applicability of Rule 6(3)(b) as nil. It further held that, Rule 3 of Central Credit Rules allows a manufacturer or producer of final product to avail the credit of duty paid on the inputs, which are to be used by them in the manufacture of final product. If there is no manufacturing activity involved, the said Rule debars the availment of credit at the ab initio stage itself. It was however held that the Appellant has already reversed 8% of the cenvat credit for the purpose of payment of 8% of duty and hence to that extent payable duty demand has to be neutralized against the same.

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 133 (Bangalore-CESTAT) Dell India (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax

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When excess payment is made due to charging service tax at higher rate, by way of credit note adjustment of such excess payment is allowed against liability of subsequent period as per Rule 6 of Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellant continued to pay service tax at old rate although there was reduction in service tax rate.  This resulted in excess payment of service tax. Later, appellant issued credit notes to customers and issued fresh invoices by applying correct rate of service tax. However, the Appellant revised their ST-3 returns for the said period by showing this adjustment by way of reduction in valuation, though strictly speaking, this was not reduction in value, but applicability of correct rate of tax. Revenue did not allow the suo motu adjustment of excess payment of service tax as it was contended that this was neither strictly covered under Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules 1994 (Rules) nor under Rule 6(1A) of the Rules. Therefore, issue involved was whether appellant could claim refund of excess payment by following procedure governing refund claim or whether they could claim the credit of excess payment by way of adjustment as per Rule 6 of the Rules.

Held:
Liberal interpretation and generous view of provisions of service tax rules was required to be adopted. Though the appellant’s case was not strictly covered by provisions of different sub-rules of Rule 6 of Service Tax Rules, 1994, admittedly appellant was entitled to benefit of adjustment of excess service tax paid by them. Reliance was placed upon decision in the case of General Manager (CMTS) v. CCE [Final Order No. ST/A/52446/2014-CU (DB), dated 8-5-2014], wherein it was held that when an assessee during certain months, for reasons other than interpretation of law, taxability, classification, valuation or applicability of exemption, has paid service tax in excess of his actual tax liability, the Government cannot retain the excess tax paid by the assessee by refusing its adjustment against his tax liability during other months and refusing adjustment of such excess tax payment during a month against tax liability during other months and appropriation and retention of the same would amount to collection of tax without the authority of law which is contrary for the provisions of Article 265 of the Constitution of India.  
[Note: Readers may note that in case of Schwing Stetter India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, LTU, Chennai [2016] 71 taxmann.com 228, Chennai Tribunal held that in terms of Rule 6(4A) of STR, 1994, assessee is entitled to adjust excess payment against any of the subsequent months/quarters and department is not permitted to retain such excess payment by stating a reason of mere procedural lapse.]

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 68 (Hyderabad CESTAT) Xilinx India Technology Services (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner

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Refund of CENVAT Credit –Tribunal allowed refund of CENVAT Credit in respect of various services received by the Appellant in the light of definition of ‘input service’ amended w.e.f. 01.04.2011 – Rent paid for ‘fit out’ was held as part of the renting of immovable property service applying principles of  bundled services contained in section 66F.

Facts:
The Appellant a 100% EOU and provider of information technology and software service filed refund application under Rule 5 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 r/w Notification No.5/2006 CE(NT) dated 14-03-2006 for the period October, 2011 to December, 2011 in respect of various input services. Department denied the refund claimed relying upon decision of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. CCE [2009] 22 STT 54 (SC) observing that appellant has failed to establish that the input service has direct nexus with output services provided by appellant. The Appellant submitted that all the services in respect of which refund claim is denied are very much essential for providing the output services. It was also submitted that the view taken in the said case was doubted and referred to larger Bench of Supreme court in Ramala Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. CCE [Civil Appeal No. 3976/2007, dated 19-2-2016] and further that the said decision dealt with interpretation of inputs and not input services, and therefore not applicable.    

Held:
Hon’ble Tribunal allowed refund claim in respect of each of the services by holding as under:


Air Travel Agent:  These services were used for booking air ticket for the employees to travel abroad to attend seminar and other meetings. Tribunal noted that, the invoices are accompanied by other documents (e-mail communications) which evidence that the employee has travelled to attend seminar.

Club or Association Services – Services is in respect of the membership fee paid to the Chamber of Commerce. Services were availed for augmenting business and it is the organization which acquires the membership in such associations. It is not for personal consumption or use of employee and therefore is not excluded.

Renting of ‘fit-out’ – The original Authority had partly allowed the credit on renting and disallowed credit on fit out. However considering the components of rent, maintenance and fit out as part of the same agreement for rent, it was considered naturally bundled and full credit was allowed.
Other than the above services, credit in respect of banking and financial services, support services for Xeroxing documents CA service, courier service, custom house agents service, IT Software and Telecommunication service, manpower recruitment service, management and business consultant, commercial coaching and training service also has been allowed fully considering them essential for providing output services.
[Note: Readers may note that decision is important in view of the fact that it takes a view on eligibility of various input services in the light of amended definition of input services w.e.f.01.04.2011.]

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 293 (Mumbai-CESTAT) Decos Software Development Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Pune-III

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“Net CENVAT credit” under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules means the CENVAT credit availed during the relevant period irrespective of the date of invoice or when services were received or used for the purpose of export. Further, when records maintained by assessee clearly shows the actual date of availment of CENVAT credit, denial thereof on sole basis of clerical error in ST-3 returns is not valid.

Facts:
While filing ST-3 return, appellant mistakenly showed CENVAT credit in respect of certain invoices against April-June 2012 period although such credits were actually availed during July 2012–September 2012. The credit pertained to invoices dated prior to July 2012. By the time appellant realized this mistake in ST-3 return, time limit for filing revised return for “April-September 2012” had elapsed. However, from CENVAT account details maintained by the appellant, it was amply clear that the CENVAT credit (mistakenly shown in ST-3) was actually availed by the appellant during “July 2012-September 2012”. Accordingly, while filing refund claim for period “July 2012-September 2012” in terms of Rule 5 of CCR, 2004, the CENVAT credit in respect of the said invoices issued prior to 01/07/2012 was also included in “Net Cenvat Credit”. In spite of appellant informing the authorities about the mistake in filing ST-3 returns, refund claim to the extent of above component of CENVAT credit, was rejected by the revenue on the ground that invoices pertained to period prior to 01/07/2012 and appellant declared the same in ST-3 return for period “April 2012-June 2012” and ST-3 return, being statutory return should be taken as correct position of availment of CENVAT credit and in absence of revised return, the original return cannot be ignored.

Held:
Referring to Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, the Tribunal held that while deciding the claim for July – September 2012, whatever CENVAT credit is ‘availed’ in the quarter July to September, 2012 shall be taken as Net CENVAT credit. If the CENVAT credit is availed in any period prior to 01/07/2012, the same cannot be taken into Net CENVAT credit for the quarter July to September, 2012. In other words, even if services which were received and ENVAT credit taken prior to 01/07/2012, were used for export of service for the quarter July to September 2012, the same cannot be included in the net credit for the quarter July to September 2012. While arriving at such conclusion, Tribunal placed reliance on decision of Gujarat High Court in case of Commissioner vs. Man Industries (I) Ltd. 2015 (321) ELT 442 wherein it was held that when inputs were received in different period and credit was availed in subsequent period, the relevant period would be the one in which credit was availed and not the period in which input/input services were received.
As regards the facts of the case, Tribunal held that, just because the appellant has filed ST-3 return and shown the CENVAT credit availed in the April to June 2012 quarter cannot be the sole basis to conclude that the CENVAT credit was availed in that quarter. Appellant made categorical statement in their submissions that the CENVAT credit shown in the quarter April to June, 2012 is due to clerical error and in support of this statement they also produced the CENVAT credit account maintained on the computer which shows that the CENVAT credit was availed in the quarter July 2012 to September, 2012. Tribunal therefore remanded the matter with a specific direction that appellant’s claim be verified on the basis of CENVAT credit account produced by them as well as any other corroborative evidences, if required and if it is found that the CENVAT credit was availed in July to September 2012, even though on the invoices pertaining to the period prior to 01/07/2012, the refund shall be admissible.

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 69 (Hyderabad CESTAT) GE India Exports (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Hyderabad-II

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Invoice issued to unregistered premises of service recipient is valid for claiming input tax credit as Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules does not require to issue invoice only at registered premises.   

Facts:
Appellant obtained a centralized registration and filed a refund claim of CENAVT credit which included certain input services for which service provider issued invoices to the unregistered premises under service tax. Refund claim in respect of such invoices was rejected by revenue. It was argued that in terms of Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules, 1994, invoice bearing service tax registration number of service provider and disclosing the name, address and details of service recipient is valid enough to claim input tax credit and there is no such requirement of stating registered address of service recipient on the invoice.

Held:
Hon’ble Tribunal noted that when the invoice gives detailed description of services performed, when service tax is correctly paid by the service provider and in absence of any express requirement in Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules, 1994 stating that premises of service recipient has to be registered, department’s act of denying CENVAT credit was invalid and accordingly, appeal was allowed.

[Note: Readers may note that while deciding on similar issue, in case of [2016] 71 taxmann.com 251 Prasad Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax-II, Hon’ble Chennai Tribunal held that CENVAT credit cannot be denied merely on the ground that service provider has mentioned incorrect address of service recipient on the invoice.]

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 188 (New Delhi-CESTAT) – Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhopal vs. Diamond Cement

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Where assesse filed refund claim in the year 2002 within one month of the rejection of Revenue’s appeal to the Tribunal, in respect of amount debited to Cenvat account in 1996, refund claim not time-barred.

Facts:
Prior to adjudication proceedings, the assessee debited their CENVAT credit account on various dates, by following Revenue’s view. However, proceedings were initiated resulting in confirmation of demand by the Adjudicating Authority. The said order was set aside by Commissioner (Appeals). Revenue’s appeal against the order of Commissioner (Appeals) was rejected by the Tribunal and resultantly, the assessee was entitled to refund of amount debited from CENVAT account. A refund claim was filed within a period of one month of the rejection of Revenue’s appeal by the Tribunal. This refund claim was rejected on the ground of time-bar. Commissioner (Appeals) allowed assessee’s appeal relying upon CCE vs. BCL Forgings Ltd. 2005 (192) E.L.T. 922 (Tri. – Mumbai), Hutchisom Max Telecom Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai 2004 (165) E.L.T. 175 (Tri. – Del) and Shree Ram Food Industries vs. Union of India 2003 (152) E.L.T. 285 (Guj) wherein it was held that payments made pursuant to department’s threats are not voluntary payment and hence limitation under section 11B is not applicable in that case. Further, the appeal against an assessment order or demand order amounts to protest and a formal letter of protest is not necessary.

Held:
Tribunal held that apart from reiterating that debit entries were made by assessee without any threat or coercion, the revenue has only contended that the decisions relied upon by the Commissioner (Appeals) are not applicable, without giving any details as to how the said decisions involving the same legal issue, are not applicable to the facts of the case. Merely because department has filed appeal against Tribunal’s judgment in the case of  BCL Forgings Ltd. (supra), before Bombay High Court, Tribunal’s decision do not become inapplicable. It was noticed that Commissioner (Appeals) recorded observations and findings that the debit entry was countersigned by Superintendent (Preventive) and the show cause notice itself mentions that the debit was made on pursuance of the officers of the Central Excise. Accordingly, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

2016 (43) STR 634 (Tri. –Mum.) Rent Works India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai V

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Different departments of Government of India cannot take different stands on same transactions.

Facts:  
Appellants paid salary to a foreign national person being the director of the company. Service tax was demanded under reverse charge mechanism on such payments. Relevant agreement, minutes of board meetings, records available at the website of Ministry of Company Affairs as well as income tax decision were produced holding that the amount paid was nothing but salary to director. Revenue stated that these evidences were not produced before lower authorities and argued that though the person was director, invoices indicated that the payment was made towards consultancy charges.

Held:
The agreement was for providing services for monthly remuneration and additional amount at the discretion of board of directors. The director had signed the Balance Sheet of the period under consideration. Therefore, the amount paid was towards remuneration. If the amount is considered as salary by income tax department, one branch of Ministry of Finance, the other branch viz. service tax department cannot hold it to be consultancy charges. The same department of Government of India cannot take different stand on the amount paid to the very same person and treat it differently.

2016 (43) STR 601 (Tri. –Hyd.) Amara Raja Electronics Ltd. vs. CCE, Tirupathi

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If service tax is paid on sharing of common expenses which is not objected by department, CENVAT credit thereof cannot be denied to service receiver.

Facts:
Appellants received invoices from its group company relating to common expenses incurred at branch. CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that it was merely sharing of common expenses. Relying on various judicial pronouncements, it was contested that the requisites for running a branch office was provided by group company which had nexus with manufacture of final product. However, department contended that it was not a case of rendition of services and in order to distribute common credits, the Appellants ought to be “Input Service Distributor”.

Held:
Since department was collecting service tax from group companies which was never objected, allegation cannot be made against service receiver that no services were rendered. In absence of any evidence by revenue that services were not rendered, appeal was allowed.

[Note:- Readers may note the decision in the case of Commr. Of ST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 496 (Guj.), wherein the activity of deputation of employees to subsidiary company and recovery of cost thereon was held as not liable to service tax. Reference can also be made to a similar decision of the Delhi CESTAT in the case of ONGC vs. Comm. Of ST, Delhi 2016 (8) TMI 500 – CESTAT Delhi. In sum and substance, in cases of sharing of common expenses, in absence of service, service tax shall not be paid. However, if paid, CENVAT credit thereof shall not be denied.]

[2016-TIOL-2171-CESTAT-MUM] Tata Quality Management Services vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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Actual expenditure incurred for rendering services can be taxed only as per the provisions of Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax Valuation Rules but the said rules are struck down as ultra vires by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd.

Facts:
Appellant engaged services of foreign service providers and paid service tax under reverse charge mechanism on the amounts paid to them. Further, amount on their stay and other out of pocket expenses during their visit in India was also paid.  The department contended that these expenses are required to be included in the value of the service rendered by the foreign party as the same is incurred in relation thereto. It was argued that these amounts were paid to various service providers who have charged service tax on the bills raised by them and therefore adding these amounts for payment of service tax under reverse charge mechanism will result in double taxation. Further the decision of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr. – 2012-TIOL-966-HC-DEL-ST was relied upon.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that due service tax is discharged on the entire amount paid to the foreigners. The amount paid for stay and travel are incidental expenses paid directly to the vendors who have paid applicable service tax and cannot be considered as amounts paid or payable to the foreigners. Further it was held that the said amount can be taxed only as per Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 which is struck down as ultra vires by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case mentioned above and therefore is not liable for service tax under reverse charge mechanism and the appeal was allowed.

[2016-TIOL-2223-CESTAT-HYD] M/s. Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad-I

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II.   Tribunal
Catering services provided in terms of the requirement under the Factories Act, 1948 is allowable as CENVAT credit post April 2011.

Facts:
The Appellant manufacturer availed CENVAT credit on outdoor catering services post April 2011. The department contended that post the said date these services are excluded from the definition of input service and therefore the credit is inadmissible. It was argued that only services which are used primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee are excluded whereas in the present case the services are provided within the factory premises as per the statutory requirement imposed by the Factories Act, 1948 and further the unit is located away from the city and therefore non-provision of food will directly impact the production.
         
Held:
The Tribunal observed the term ‘primarily’ in the exclusion clause and noted that the word means most proximate or important. However in the present case the service is most importantly used to comply with the requirements under the factories act failing which they will not be able to engage in production/manufacture of final products. Accordingly it was held that services are used in relation to the business of manufacture and not for any personal use or consumption of the employee and therefore the credit is allowed.  

[Note: Readers may note a similar decision in the case of Gateway Terminals (I) P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad [2015-TIOL-1471-CESTAT-MUM] digest provided in August 2015 wherein the Tribunal noted that provision of canteen facilities being a statutory obligation is a part of the business need and accordingly credit was allowed.]

2016 (43) STR 542 (Kar.) Commr. of ST, Bangalore vs. Kyocera Wireless (India) Pvt. Ltd.

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I.High Court
Registration not a pre-requisite for claiming refund of CENVAT Credit

Facts:
The Respondent is an exporter of services and claimed refund of CENVAT credit. Department rejected the claim on two grounds; namely; absence of service tax registration and non-production of sufficient documents for input services and output services.

Held:
Relying upon the decision of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Bangalore [2012 (27) STR 34 (Kar.)], it was held that registration was not required to claim CENVAT credit and refund thereof. In absence of clear findings from original adjudicating authority as well as Tribunal, matter was remanded to adjudicating authority for verification of records within 3 months from the date when the order of the said decision is received.

Retrospective cancellation of R.C. of the buyer vis-à-vis validity of C form

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Introduction    
When the sales are in the course of inter-state trade, one of the facilities available is  applicability of lower rate of tax, if the sales are effected to a registered dealer under the CST Act. However, such lower rate is available to the transaction, if the said sale is supported by C form as obtained by the seller from the buyer. One of the conditions of C form is that the buyer, issuing C form, should be registered dealer under the CST Act at the time of purchase.

There are instances where the registration of the buying dealer is cancelled with retrospective effect.  Under such circumstances, there is also cancellation of C form which is issued earlier. The effect is that the selling dealer may get affected because of such cancellation. Its sale will be considered as without valid C form, which will invite higher rate of tax.

Recent judgment
Hon. Delhi High Court had an occasion to deal with such situation in case of Jain Manufacturing (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs The Commissioner Value Added Tax & Anr (W.P.(C)1358 of 2016 dt.1.6.2016. The facts, as narrated in the judgment, are as under:

“3. The Petitioner made an inter-state sale of goods to Respondent No.2 (Purchasing Dealer) by way of two invoices both dated 10th March, 2015. The first invoice was for a sum of Rs.7,53,373/- and the second for a sum of Rs.2,49,715/-. In terms of Section 8(1) (b) of the CST Act with Respondent No. 2 being a dealer registered under the CST Act in New Delhi [apart from being registered under the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (DVAT Act)] as of that date, and having purchased the goods from the Petitioner by way of inter-state sale, tax at the concessional rate of 2% was chargeable in the invoices and was accordingly included in the invoices raised by the Petitioner. The said two invoices accordingly mentioned the CST amounts as 15,067 and 4,994 respectively. The total sums of the 2 invoices were Rs.7,68,441/- and Rs. 2,54,709/- respectively. The payments for these invoices were made by RTGS into the Petitioner’s bank account.

4. On 13th April 2015, Respondent No. 2 obtained C-Form from the DT&T in respect of the aforementioned two invoices. A copy of the said C-Form is enclosed with the petition as Annexure P-4. It shows that it was a system generated C-Form containing details of the purchasing dealer i.e. Respondent No.2 with its Registration Certificate Number and the amount up to which such registration is valid. The name and address of the purchasing dealer i.e. Respondent No. 2 has also been indicated. It also bears the TIN and name of the selling dealer i.e. the Petitioner. It contains the details of the two invoices dated 10th March, 2015 with the respective amounts.

5. The Petitioner later learnt that the above C-Form had been cancelled by the DT&T. In order to verify this, the Petitioner checked the website of the DT&T. The status of the C-Form issued to the Petitioner was shown as cancelled on 27th November, 2015. The Petitioner also obtained a copy of an order passed by the Assistant Value Added Tax Officer (AVATO) in Form DVAT-11 on 4th August, 2015 cancelling the registration of Respondent No.2. A copy of the said cancellation order has been enclosed as Annexure P-6 to the petition. It was noticed that the cancellation was made retrospective from 26th February, 2014.

6. It is in these circumstances, the present petition has been filed contending that there was no power under the CST Act or in the Rules there under, viz., the Central Sales Tax Act (Registration & Turnover) Rules, 1957 or the Central Sales Tax (Delhi) Rules to cancel a C-Form issued by the DT&T.”

In  the writ petition the petitioner made a submission that the C form had been cancelled because the registration of the buying dealer was cancelled retrospectively. It was argued that there is no power for retrospective cancellation of the Registration. It was further argued that as a selling dealer it is only required to ensure that on date of sale the buying dealer is holding valid registration certificate (RC) under CST Act.  The retrospective cancellation cannot affect the selling dealer. The judgments in case of Suresh Trading Company (109 STC 439)(SC) and in case of Santosh kumar and Company (54 STC 322)(Ors) were cited.

On behalf of State, it was argued that the selling dealer was indulging in proxy litigation as the buying dealer, in whose case RC is cancelled, has not come forward. It was argued that the selling dealer, who is from Kanpur has no locus to contest the matter. It was also submitted that the transaction of sale was under cloud and it  was suspected of being effected with collusion. It was further argued that there is no vested right in the purchasing dealer to insist issuance of C form in its favour. However, the State could not point out any provision under CST Act by which RC can be cancelled retrospectively.

After hearing both the sides Hon. High Court observed as under:

“16. The central issue in the present case is whether there exists a power in the Commissioner VAT, Delhi under the CST Act and the Rules there under to cancel a C-Form and further if such power exists then whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case such power was rightly exercised.

17. No provision in the CST Act has been brought to the notice of the Court which enables an authority issuing a C-Form to cancel the C-Form. Rule 5(4) of the Central Sales Tax (Delhi) Rules, 2005 enables the authority which has to issue a C-Form to “withhold” the C-Form. The contingencies under which a C Form may be withheld are set out in Rule 5(4). For instance, Rule 5 (4) (v) envisages that some adverse material has been found by the Commissioner “suggesting any concealment of sale or purchase or furnishing inaccurate particulars in the returns.” The Commissioner could, in terms of the proviso to Rule 5(4), instead of withholding the C-Form, issue to the applicant such forms in such numbers and subject to such conditions and restrictions, as he may consider necessary. However, there is no specific provision even under the aforementioned Rules which enables the Commissioner to cancel the C-Form that has already been issued.

18. There is merit in the contention that one of the primary requirements for issuance of a C-Form is that the dealer to whom the C-Form is issued has to have a valid CST registration on the date that the C Form is issued. If the purchasing dealer does not possess a valid CST registration on the date of the transaction of sale, then the selling dealer cannot insist on being issued a C-Form. In the present case, on the date of the transaction i.e. 10th March, 2015 the purchasing dealer viz., Respondent No. 2 did posses a valid CST registration. The name of the purchasing dealer as shown in the invoices, and the name and address of the registered purchasing dealer as reflected in the C-Forms issued by the DT&T matched. The cancellation of the CST registration of Respondent No. 2 took place subsequently on 4th August 2015. Therefore, there was no means for the Petitioner as the selling dealer to suspect as of the date of sale or soon thereafter that the payments made to it RTGS was not by Respondent No.2 but by some other entity with the same name. It is not possible, therefore, to straightaway infer any collusion between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 or for that matter the other entity of the same name spoken of by the DT&T.

19. In any event, from the point of view of the Petitioner, the requirement of section 8(1) of the CST stood fully satisfied. The purchasing dealer had a valid CST registration on the date of purchase of goods by the Respondent No. 2 from the Petitioner. The C-Form issued by the DT&T confirmed the registration of Respondent No.2 under the CST Act.”

The Hon. High Court has referred to various judgments in support of above holding. After above discussion Hon. High Court also discussed about the practical effect of the cancellation of C forms in following words:-  

“26. It was submitted by Mr Narayan that there would be a practical difficulty in the DT&T seeking to inform every selling dealer in the country of the cancellation of registration of a purchasing dealer registered under the CST Act in Delhi and that the remedy of the selling dealers in such instance would be to proceed against the purchasing dealers. In the considered view of the Court, if the selling dealer has after making a diligent enquiry confirmed that on the date of the sale the purchasing dealer held a valid CST registration, and is also issued a valid C Form then such selling dealer cannot later be told that the C Form is invalid since the CST registration of the purchasing dealer has been retrospectively cancelled. Where, a selling dealer fails to make diligent enquiries and proceeds to sell goods to a purchasing dealer who does not, on the date of such sale, hold a valid CST registration then such selling dealer cannot later be seen to protest against the cancellation of the C-Form. As observed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi v. Shri Krishna Engg. (supra) the selling dealer in such instance will have to pay for his “recklessness”.

27.To answer the problem highlighted by Mr Narayan, the best course of action would be for an authority to cancel the CST registration prospectively and immediately place that information on its website. In such event, there would be no difficulty in the selling dealer being able to verify the validity of the CST registration of the purchasing dealer. However, where the cancellation of the registration and, consequently of the C-Form is sought to be done retrospectively, it would adversely affect the rights of bonafide sellers in other states who proceeded on the basis of the existence of valid CST registration of the purchasing dealer on the date of the inter-state sale. That outcome is not contemplated by the CST Act and the Rules there under.”

Conclusion

It is one of the much awaited judgments to protect the interest of genuine dealers. Now-a-days, under fiscal laws, there is a tendency to put more and more burden on the dealers and the authorities only exercise power of recoveries and that too from dealers who are otherwise regular and available. No attempt is made to nab the defaulters and fraudsters. Under such circumstances, the above judgment is path breaking. It is the department who should keep watch on defaulters and take necessary action against them for recovery and should not put burden on the genuine dealers.

SEBI’s proposal to regulate Algo/Hi frequency trades

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Background
The Securities and Exchange Board of India has put up a discussion paper on 5th August 2016 for regulating algorithmic trading, hi-frequency trading, co-location and some related matters. It has described the background of the subject, highlighted the issues and has invited comments from the public, on certain measures for regulating such matters.

This has resulted in a vigorous debate in media, amongst stock brokers/investors and the public. There have been some views that SEBI should not regulate such matters at all since, amongst others, this creates hurdles in the development of technology . The suggested methods have also been critically analysed. On other hand, there have been other views that SEBI should indeed regulate such matters on ground such that some parties obtain  certain special and unfair advantages through such trading. There are also concerns that these are being abused in a manner that the public and perhaps even SEBI does not realize such abuse, considering the sheer complexity involved.

Algo trading has increased exponentially. Indeed, the volumes are so large that just two figures should highlight it. As per SEBI, 80% of all orders and 40% of all trades are now generated through computer algorithms.

However, algo/hi-frequency trading have a dark side too. There has been a history in the United States of it being abused by certain traders to make huge profits at the cost of investors. There has been a huge debate over this in India too when SEBI is said to be investigating the alleged role of National Stock Exchange in a similar context.

Algorithmic/hi-frequency trading (“Algo trading”) is also said to have resulted in market crises (notable amongst these is the so-called Flash Crash of 2010 in the USA).

On other hand, there are obvious advantages of Algo trading including that of higher liquidity, lower spreads, etc.

These types of trades are also not understood well by investors and the public generally. Hence, the recent SEBI consultation paper can be a good opportunity to consider the background of the subject and some related matters.

Some concepts
Algo trading is conceptually simple to understand though, in practice, the manner in which such trades are carried out can be quite complex. The SEBI paper has explained some basic terms that are worth a review. This will also help one understand the various measures suggested by SEBI for regulating them.

Algorithmic Trading
The paper describes it as – “Algorithmic trading (for brevity, Algo), in simple words, is a step-by-step instruction for trading actions taken by computers (automated systems). Typically, trading algorithms enable the traders to automate the process of taking trading decisions based on the preset rules / strategies.”.

To put it simply, in Algo trading, the process of placing trades is automated using computers. Software is developed incorporating detailed instructions when to buy/sell, etc. and it monitors market data and places trades accordingly. There is nil or minimal human intervention. There are several advantages. The first, obviously, is very high speed. The time taken by a human operator to press a few keys is in computing time astronomically higher than the time the algo trading software takes to place/execute the order. Secondly, in case of repetitive situations, where the decision making follows standard parameters, it does not make sense using human intermediaries. Further, this also enables traders to carry out large trades usually at microscopic margins.

Hi-frequency trading (HFT)
Hi-frequency trading is really a type of Algorithmic trading. Algo trading as explained earlier is software-based trading with nil or minimal human intervention. HFT involves carrying out of extremely fast trades in very small fraction of seconds often taking advantage of the edge in information over others. The paper explains HFT as:-

“High Frequency Trading (HFT) is a subset of algorithmic trading that comprises latency-sensitive trading strategies and deploys technology including high speed networks, colocation, etc. to connect and trade on the trading platform. The growth and success of the high frequency trading (latency sensitive version of algorithmic trading) is largely attributed to their ability to react to trading opportunities that may last only for a very small fraction of a second.”

Co-location
Co-location (“Colo”) is considered to be a contentious issue. It basically means providing stock market intermediaries/hi-frequency traders’ servers a physical location that is very near stock market servers. Often, the servers are in the same building that the servers of the exchange are located in. Physical nearness to the exchange servers that receive and process trade data is critical since nearer the physical location to such servers, the faster can a intermediary/hi-frequency trader can receive and send back data. And thus act and profit on it, particularly if one is a hi-frequency trader.

High order-to-trade ratio
This means that the ratio of orders placed over actual trades executed is very high. The rest of orders are cancelled. This again is a common feature of HFT.

Issues faced

SEBI has identified the following issues that arise out of Algo trading and related aspects:-

(i) Unfair access or denial of faster access to persons not having co-location facility. To take a simple example, a person from New Delhi is physically quite far from the stock exchange servers in Mumbai and thus suffers a time disadvantage (even if of fraction of seconds) as compared to a person in Mumbai.

(ii) There is more price volatility.

(iii) HFT imposes costs on other market users

(iv) Algo trading results in a technological arms race.

(v) In times of high volatility, SEBI would get limited opportunities to intervene etc.

Solutions suggested by SEBI
SEBI has placed for discussion certain solutions. These are explained below with their advantages/disadvantages  including experience in regard to these solutions in other countries.

(i) Minimum resting time for orders:- Under this method, each order is not allowed to be modified/cancelled till a minimum resting time elapses. This will ensure that the order will be available for some time for execution and thus fleeting orders would be reduced. It is interesting to note that the resting time proposed is 500 milliseconds (1 second = 1000 milliseconds). Thus, this would affect only those parties whose orders undergo change in fractions of seconds.

(ii) Frequent batch auctions:- Orders for a specified period of time of 100 milliseconds will be grouped together and matched, instead of the continuous order matching mechanism. Thus, the advantage of time that a person may have over others owing to co-location, better technological equipment, etc. would be neutralised to an extent.

(iii) Random speed bumps:- This involves delaying orders randomly by a few milliseconds. The result is that this neutralises to some extent the speed advantages.

(iv) Randomization of orders received during a specified period of say 1-2 seconds:- Thus, the orders received during this period would be shuffled randomly and their time sequence altered. All orders within a specified period would have an equal chance and once again the speed advantage is neutralised.

(v) Maximum order to trade ratio:- This will ensure lesser fleeting orders and also that orders are entered into the system with a greater opportunity of their being converted into trades.

(vi) Separate queues for co-location and non-co-location orders:- One order from each queue would be taken alternatingly. Once again, the objective of neutralising speed advantage may be achieved to an extent.

(vii) Providing tick-by-tick feeds to all market participants:- Tick-by-tick data feed, as SEBI describes, “provides details relating to orders (addition+ modification + cancellation) and trades on a real-time basis”. This data is provided by exchanges for a fee. SEBI has suggested that data of top 20/30/50 bids/asks, market depth, etc. be provided to all. This would create a level playing field to all participants irrespective of their technological or financial strength.

Consideration of solutions
The opposition to regulating Algo trading is on various grounds. The first, of course, is that SEBI would be putting hurdles to technological developments and this would not be a wise thing to do. Further, each of the methods suggested create their own inequities. There would also be software and other changes required to provide for such solutions. There would need to be regulatory check to ensure that these solutions are in place. Interfering with such trading would also result in higher ask-put price differences, lower liquidity, etc. Some of the solutions offered, as SEBI itself points out in the paper, have been rejected in some places where they were originally proposed or adopted.

Having said that, there are abuses that need to be considered. While SEBI has already mandated fair, transparent and equitable rules in granting nearness to exchange servers, there have been concerns about this in one way or the other. Further, the sheer complexity of algo trading may result in a group of insiders abusing it to their advantage by prior arrangement particularly if the exchange or its staff plays truant. Thus, the measures suggested may, even if indirectly, help control such abuses. Further, SEBI may also need to regulate such trading to prevent such abuses.

Abuse of hi-frequency trading

Serious abuses have been pointed out from HFT arising out nexus between HFT traders on one hand, and brokers/exchanges on the other. Through a complicated mechanism including giving preferential treatment to HFT traders, it has been found internationally (and allegedly in India too to an extent) that HFT traders hugely profited at the cost of investors. By monitoring quotes on multiple stock exchanges, they came to know in advance impending orders. Effectively, they thus bought (or sold) cheap and sold high (or low) to investors who were not only slower but were also duped by alleged unfair underlying understanding. This has been described in lucid detail in the bestselling book Flashboys by Michael Lewis.

In India too, there is a shadow of this. A whistle blower wrote to SEBI and Moneylife (a financial magazine) about alleged irregularities by National Stock Exchange. It appears that SEBI is looking into this matter.

Thus, abuse of HFT trading can be a serious issue. The HFT traders, as described in the book Flashboys, do not profit in large amounts per trade. Their skimming is small amounts. But on a cumulative basis, they would make large amount of profits. There is a cascading effect of this. Investors end up paying higher price. In turn, this raises the cost of capital for companies seeking to raise capital from the markets. Generally, this would harm the crediblity of markets too.

Conclusion
In the author’s view, SEBI is wrong in proposing measures to slow down the speed of trades/data exchange. This would be restraining developments in technology. Indeed, it is submitted, this is not the real issue at all. The real issue is alleged inequitable access to speedy information and alleged abuse of algo trading through irregular means. For this purpose, SEBI would have to understand and keep pace with the technical developments in algo trading and closely monitor such trading and provide for mechanism to monitor trades and uncover abuses. While the existing Regulations of SEBI relating to frauds and unfair trade practices are general and perhaps broad enough to cover such abuses, SEBI may consider providing for certain matters specifically, describe them in detail and provide for punishment.

Part D: Ethics, Governance & Accountability

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Judicial Transperancy

‘Open letter to Chief Justice Thakur: The latest call for judicial transparency must not be ignored’

Former Central Information Commissioner Shailesh Gandhi asks why the judiciary is loath to implement the Right to Information Act.

Dear Sir,
I am writing this letter in the spirit of seeking an improvement in the working of the judiciary, and not as an exercise in criticism. India has not been able to deliver the fruits of democracy as per the aspirations of its people. I would submit that the responsibility lies with all the four estates – legislature, executive, judiciary and the press – as well as the citizens. One of the attributes on which we have been weak, is in recognising the citizen’s right to information. Despite Parliament passing a Right To Information Act, which rates among the best five laws as far its provisions are concerned, our global rank in implementing it is a poor 66.

It is well recognised that the first clarion call for transparency was given by Justice Mathew who wrote:
“The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. Their right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can at any rate have no repercussion on public security”.
— (State of UP vs Raj Narain, 1975.)

The only restrictions on this fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) permitted by the Constitution are those specified in Article 19(2). The exemptions in the Right To Information Act cover all of these. Yet the performance of all three estates in implementation has not been very good. There was a hope that the judiciary with its pronouncements on Right to Information would be a role model and enforcer of this right. This hope has been belied. There are various instances that can be highlighted. Here are two:
1.    The rules for Right to Information framed by many courts are not in consonance with the Right to Information Act. In fact, the Bombay High Court did not even frame the rules for a year, and some courts have exemptions not in the law. Some high courts have kept Rs 500 as the application fee, while most other competent authorities charge Rs 10.
2.    The Supreme Court Public Information Officer challenged an order of the Central Information Commission in the High Court, and despite it being dismissed by a division bench it has been stayed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has not heard this matter since 2010.
3.    
As Aniket Aga wrote in The Wire:
“While the government often comes under fire for not effectively implementing the RTI Act, few have noticed that India’s highest court violates the Act routinely, and with an impunity that makes the government’s evasion of the RTI Act seem benign.”

This is also evident in the way the court refuses to share information about the process of appointments and the reasoning behind it. Charges and complaints against judges are not shared with citizens, nor are the results of investigations. Lack of transparency and accountability are justified on the grounds of maintaining the independence of the judiciary. The little man – the citizen – is considered immature by the powerful to monitor them. Ills that afflict the other pillars of democracy are likely to be present in the judiciary as well. The best safeguard and disinfectant is transparency, and the demand for accountability that follows.

Justice Chelameswar has very boldly raised the issue of lack of transparency in the judiciary, and the nation is grateful to him. Please do not try to “sort it out”. You must take this opportunity to bring accountability and better governance to the nation. There is an urgent need to ensure that all judicial vacancies are filled by a proper, transparent process so that the faith of people in our democracy is restored. It is impossible that the judges can by themselves spare adequate time to select the new judges with proper diligence. You must be aware that the increase in backlog of cases is around 1.5% each year, whereas the vacancies in the judiciary are over 20%. This is the cause for pendencies. A proper process with adequate resource must do this job.

Please recognise Justice Chelameswar’s contribution to our democracy, take this opportunity to bring transparency to the judiciary and accept that mistakes may be made in all fields. A democracy providing an equitable and fair nation will evolve, not by having infallible public servants, but by devising institutional mechanisms that will correct the foibles of men.

We have lost the balance of the checks and balances designed by our Constitution. I beseech you sir, for the sake of our nation let us restore it with your authority and wisdom.

Yours truly

Shailesh Gandhi

RTI Clinic in October 2016: 2nd, 3rd, 4th Saturday, i.e. 8th, 15th, and 22nd 11.00 to 13.00 at BCAS premises.

PART C: Information on & Around

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Maharashtra Information Commission: Quick turnaround

Maharashtra’s information commission has set a blistering pace to tackle pending backlog, with a top official clearing a staggering 6,000 cases last year Anyone else would have thrown up their hands in despair on seeing over seven lakh right to information (RTI) applications at Maharashtra’s exceedingly busy information commission, but not the panel’s chief Ratnakar Gaikwad who took up the challenge and ensured that the cases were expedited. Ratnakar Gaikwad, the 64-year-old former Maharashtra chief secretary and IAS officer of 1975 batch, inherited a backlog of 4,074 cases of three years when he was named state chief information commissioner (CIC) in 2012. Within a month of joining, the bureaucrat came up with an ingenious solution – templates that helped speed up work. Gaikwad prepared 120 templates that fit a majority of the cases. It broadly covered certain legal provisions, and similar types of cases in which the facts are the same but the information may be different

RTI appeals pendency up 96 per cent in Pune as SIC shuttles between the city and Nashik

Of the seven SIC benches in the state, the ones in Nashik, Aurangabad and Amravati have been lying vacant.

Over the last few months, pendency of second appeals with the Pune bench of the State Information Commissionerate has seen a whopping 96 per cent rise. With 8,294 second appeals pending before it as of July 2016, the Pune bench has the second highest pendency in the state, the first being Amravati SIC bench having 8,340 appeals pending before it.
The SIC benches are practically the last stage of appeals for information seekers under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005. Second appeals are filed after the information seeker has exhausted all efforts to obtain information with government offices. SICs have the power to fine/summon and order for information to be provided to the applicant.
At present, Maharashtra has seven SIC benches. State’s chief information commissioner Ratnakar Gaikwad is based in Mumbai.

Maharshtra government: Public Information Officers can’t answer RTIs seeking information on them

The onus of taking decisions about such applications has now been given to the public authorities or other public information officers (PIOs) and appellate authorities (AA).

In a move to address the long standing complaints of Right to Information (RTI) users, the state government has issued a circular which has now debarred public information officers (PIOs) and appellate authorities (AA) from hearing or taking decisions on RTI applications which seek personal information about them. The responsibility of taking decisions about such applications has now been given to the public authorities or other PIOs/AAs.
PIOS and AA are designated by the RTI Act to take decisions about the application requests from information seekers. In case of information related to PIO or AA, the decision is taken by those officials themselves. RTI activists had pointed out how this was in contravention to the set norms of jurisprudence. Judges are often known to refuse hearing of cases if they feel there would be a conflict of interest in them — “Not before me” — is the commonly used term in such cases.
The recent notification issued by the General Administrative Department (GAD) of the state government, other than barring the PIOS/AAs from hearing such applications, have issued several other directives. Such applications are to be duly registered and separate records should be kept of them. As mentioned above, the new notification has mandated that such applications would be heard by the public authority (this usually is the head of the establishment) or other PIOs/AAs.

(Source : News articles from Indian Express)

PART B: RTI Act, 2005

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Real time updates for Right to Information cases via email, SMS

The Central Information Commission (CIC) has taken an e-leap and would function like an e-court with all its case files moving digitally and the applicant being alerted about case hearings through an SMS and email. So now one can get real time updates while filing a complaint or appeal under Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Starting mid of September 2016, CIC would move to a new software, which would make the hearings faster and more convenient. As soon as an RTI applicant files an appeal or a complaint, he would be given a registration number and would get an alert on email and mobile phone about his case. The case would then be electronically transferred immediately to the concerned information commissioner’s registry electronically.

All this would be done within hours. At present, the process takes a few days.

The new system would also alert the RTI applicant about the date of hearing. An automatic SMS and email would be generated. Apart from this, the applicant would get an email in advance listing out the records given by him to CIC and the government’s submissions in his case. A senior CIC official told ET, “At present, the appellant and the ministry sometimes appear in the case without knowing what the submissions are. So this would help both sides in preparing for the case.”

The Commission would be able to expedite the processing of applications with the new software. At present, it also has to deal with complaints of loss of case files and non registration of cases. The facility would not only benefit the appellants but also information commissioners.

When a commissioner would open a case file on his computer, he would get a ready background of the specific case and also details about the appellant. The official said, “We would know if he has more appeals pending. This could facilitate hearing of multiple appeals of the same person on a given day. It would directly impact pendency as more cases would be disposed in a day.” CIC has already scanned 1.5 lakh files and converted them into electronic files.

(Source : Economic Times, September 05, 2016)

Representation In Respect Of Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme 2016

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1.Eligibility

1.1 Partial disputed amounts
Issue

Where part of the demand determined for a year is undisputed and remains unpaid, it is not clear as to whether the declarant is entitled to waiver of interest/ penalty on the total outstanding amount or can the penalty be levied on the undisputed amount?

In this regard useful inference can be made to Instruction u/s 96 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. The Question 8 of Clarification 1 of the Circular: Samadhan 2/98 dated 3-9-1998 under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 [KVSS] is reproduced:
   
    “Q 8. Where only certain items of addition are in dispute can the assessee take advantage of the Scheme for the entire demand of the year?
   
    Ans. Yes. The Scheme is applicable to the entire demand of an assessment year.”
   
Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued keeping in view the intention and the objectives to be achieved in this scheme.

1.2 Relevant cutoff date
Doubt have arisen as to whether a declaration can be filed in a case where assessment order was passed on 15th February 2016 and appeal filed on 1st March 2016 within the due date?

In respect of an appeal filed after 29th February 2016 but within the time limit specified u/s 249 of the Act, the non-eligibility of making declaration under the Scheme may lead to discrimination.

Suggestion

It is suggested that necessary clarifications in this regard be issued.

2.Refund of Interest and Penalty
Issues

2.1If the demand raised on assessment has been paid / adjusted and interest u/s 220 of the Act has also been charged/paid, whether the declarant will be entitled to refund of the interest u/s 220 since u/s 202(I)(a) of FA, interest is payable only upto the date of assessment?
Section 206 of the Scheme states that any amount paid in pursuance of a declaration made u/s 202 of the FA shall not be refundable under any circumstances. However, in the cases referred in 2.1 above, the interest / penalty etc paid is not in pursuance of a declaration u/s 202, and hence refund should be granted in such cases.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification and instructions in this regard should be issued, considering the objects and intent of the Scheme. 

3. Penalty appeal pending before CIT (A) and quantum appeal pending before ITAT

3.1 Where the appeal against levy of penalty is pending before the CIT(A) and the quantum appeal is pending before the ITAT or higher forum, whether the ITAT appeal has to be given up in order to avail of the benefit under the Scheme for the penalty?

There are no provisions in the scheme to suggest that.

Section 203(2) provides that when declaration is in respect of tax arrear, consequent to such declaration the appeal filed before CIT (A) would be deemed to be withdrawn. The said deeming fiction does not refer to appeal before any other level / any other appeal other than the appeal for which declaration is made under the Scheme.

3.2 Further, in the above referred cases whether the declarant is required to pay only taxes or interest u/s 220 of the Act? The relevant Clause 3 (b) and (c) of Form 1-Part A relating to penalty order prescribed under Rule 3(1) of the Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme Rules, 2016 [the Rules] seems to lack clarity in this regard.

3.3 In case of penalty which is not relatable to income such as penalties under sections 271A, 271B, 271BA, 271BB, 271D, 271E etc, whether the quantum appeal pending has any relevance?  Clause 3 of the Declaration Form 1-Part A regarding penalty appeal, requires details of tax and interest determined on total income and outstanding demand as on the date of declaration, to be given. As per clause 3(g), the amount payable u/s 202(1)(b) would include outstanding demand plus 25% of minimum penalty.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarifications in this regard should be issued.

4. Determination of outstanding demand in cases where rectifications are pending
For the purpose of determining the “tax arrear”, what would be the manner of determining the ‘demand outstanding’ where rectification application is pending for non-grant of credit for TDS / tax payments or other mistakes apparent from record?

Suggestion
The demand outstanding should be determined after granting credit for legitimate TDS/ tax payments and rectifying other mistakes apparent from record.

It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued.

5. Specified Tax
Specified Tax is defined u/s 201(1)(g) as tax determined in consequence of retrospective amendment and relating to a period prior to the date of assent of President for amendment which is under dispute in respect of which such tax is pending as on 29th February 2016.

5.1 If the dispute is pending before the ITAT or higher forums and part of the demand is not on account of retrospective amendment but in the nature of “tax arrear”, not eligible for declaration since it is not pending before CIT(A)). Can a declaration under the Scheme be made only in respect of specified tax by withdrawing the relevant grounds in appeal and continue the litigation for the balance demand relating to other issues?
Or can the assessee, if he so wishes, take benefit of the Scheme in respect Specified Tax as well as tax determined in respect of other issues in the appeal? In this regard useful inference can be made to Instruction u/s 96 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, Question 8 of Clarification 1 of the Circular: Samadhan 2/98 dated 3-9-1998 under KVSS, which is reproduced in point 1.2 above.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued.

5.2 The undertaking u/s 203 of FA, in Form 2 refers to waiver of rights in respect of Specified Tax. Is there any procedure to be followed for waiving rights and timelines for the same?

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary procedures and time lines in respect of the same should be laid down.

5.3 If the declaration under the Scheme is not accepted can the dispute be reinstated?

Suggestion
Section 203(5) of the FA lays down criteria where the declaration shall be presumed to be withdrawn and the pending proceedings against the declarant shall be deemed to be revived.

It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard should be issued.

5.4 The Form of declaration u/s 203 of FA, Form 1-Part B-Clauses 4 to 7 – apparently refers to `amount payable as per assessment order’ i.e. to entire demand and not relating to specified tax only.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard be issued.

6. Dilution of Assessee’s claim
Whether filing of the declaration under the Scheme, would result in diluting the claim of the assessee on similar issues in subsequent years assessment proceedings?
In this regard useful inference can be drawn from the following:

i. Instruction under section 96 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, Question 21 of Clarification 2 of the Circular Samadhan 3/98 dated 7-10-1998 under KVSS which is reproduced as under:

“Question 21: By filing declaration under Samadhan Scheme for one assessment year, does the taxpayer forego his right of appeal on the same issue in other assessment years?

Ans.:No. The order under the Samadhan Scheme does not decide any judicial issue. It only determines the sum payable under the Scheme with reference to tax arrears.”

ii. Clarification 5 vide Letter: Do [No. 3372 – CH (DT)/98, dated 22-12-1998] under KVSS which is reproduced as under:
“Your understanding that, if an assessee comes under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme for some years this fact will not amount to a decision of the Issue involved and therefore no prejudice will be caused to the declarant in respect of that issue for any other assessment year in any other proceeding which might be pending under the Income-tax Act, is correct. The Board has already clarified this point in a reference which had been received earlier.”

iii. Clarification 6 vide Letter: Dated 22-12-1998 under KVSS which is reproduced as under:

It has already been clarified in Question No. 21 and answer thereto issued by the Government with reference to Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 that the order passed by designated authority under the Scheme does not decide any judicial issue. It only determines the sum payable under the Scheme with reference to tax arrears. If the assessee goes for Samadhan Scheme for some years, the decision in other years not covered under Samadhan will not get prejudiced either against the assessee or against the revenue, even though the issues remain the same.

Suggestion
It is suggested that necessary clarification in this regard be issued.

7. Waiver of interest and penalty in Form 3 – Certificate of Intimation

Section 204(1) of the Scheme provides that the designated authority shall, within a period of 60 days from the date of the declaration, determine the amount payable by the declarant in accordance with the provisions of this Scheme and grant a certificate in such form as may be prescribed, to the declarant setting forth therein the particulars of the tax arrear or the specified tax, as the case may be, and the sum payable after such determination.

Rule 4 of the Rules provide that the designated authority shall issue a certificate referred to in sub-section (1) of section 204 in Form 3.
On an analysis of Form 3, it is observed that the Certificate does not include a waiver of interest and penalty.

Suggestion
It is suggested that the Certificate should specifically include a waiver of interest and penalty.

8. To cover appeals pending at any Forum
The object of the Scheme is to reduce huge backlog of appeals and to enable the Government to recover its dues expeditiously. Further, a lot of time, cost and energy of the Revenue are being blocked as also wasted in pursuing a large number of pending appeals before various appellate forums.

The present Scheme covers only the appeals pending before the first Appellate Authority in case of tax arrears and only limited issues with respect to specified tax pending before any Appellate Forum. As can be seen, restricting the scope of the Scheme to the above referred pending appeals runs contrary to the objects and intent of formulating the Scheme.

Suggestion
In order to reduce pending litigation to a great extent as also to unlock the revenue blocked due to such pending appeals, the Scheme may be made applicable to tax arrears in all the appeals pending before any Appellate Forum.

9. Appeals set aside by higher appellate authority with a direction to CIT(A) to decide the appeal denovo
The present Scheme requires the pendency of appeal before the first appellate authority as on February 29, 2016. However, the Scheme does not cover a case where appeals are set aside by a higher appellate authority to CIT(A), in case of the following instances:

a. Where a higher Appellate Authority like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”), High Court, Supreme Court has set aside the order of the first Appellate Authority with directions to hear the entire appeal denovo;

b.Where the higher Appellate Authority has set aside some of the grounds of appeal to the file of the first Appellate Authority to decide the same denovo;

c.Where the first Appellate Authority decided the appeal based on the grounds of appeal filed originally without admitting additional grounds of appeal raised by the assessee in the course of the appellate proceedings and the ITAT has set aside the appeal to the file of the first Appellate Authority to hear the additional grounds of appeal and decide the same on merits;

d.Where the higher Appellate Authority has passed the order on or before February 29, 2016 whereby it has set aside the appeal to the file of the first Appellate Authority to decide the same denovo but the order with respect to same has not been received by the declarant assessee or the first appellate authority on or before February 29, 2016;

e.Where the higher Appellate Authority’s order has been received on or before February 29, 2016 by the assessee whereby the appeal is set aside to the file of first Appellate Authority to decide the same denovo, but, the first Appellate Authority was not intimated about such order by the assessee; and

f.As an extension to (e) above, the first Appellate Authority was intimated about the order of higher Authority for setting aside the same to his file to decide the appeal denovo, but the first Appellate Authority has not initiated any action. 

Suggestion
If all such appeals are pending before the first Appellate Authority on or before February 29, 2016 then, the same may be considered as fit appeals for the purposes of taking benefit of the Scheme.

10. Determination of tax and interest
The Scheme covers tax, interest and penalty as per assessment order and penalty order respectively. However, it does not cover following:

Where the First Appellate Authority has decided the appeal with respect to grounds of appeal filed by the assessee originally without admitting the additional ground of appeal raised by the assessee in the course of appellate proceedings and subsequent to such order, the assessing officer passes an order giving effect to the order of first Appellate Authority which results in reduction of tax, interest, vis-a-vis penalty. Now, on further appeal by the assessee, the ITAT directed the first Appellate authority to hear the additional grounds of appeal on merits. In this case, the reduced tax and interest based on order giving effect to the order of the first Appellate Authority needs to be considered instead of figures as per assessment order. Similarly, the penalty to that extent will get reduced, hence, penalty as per penalty order should not be considered in this kind of cases.

Suggestion:
The above situation requires attention and needs to be clarified.

11. When a person is barred from making declaration under the Scheme:
Clause (c) of section 208 of the Finance Act, 2016 provides that prosecution under a specified enactment must be instituted on or before filling of declaration by the declarant to bar such person from making declaration under the Scheme. However, clause (b) of section 208 does not stipulate as to when order of detention should be made i.e. such order should be before declaration under the Scheme or any time thereafter.

Suggestion
Clause (b) of section 208 should specify as to when the detention order should be made. It is suggested that it should be made before filling declaration under the Scheme.

Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016

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13th
September, 2016


Ms Rani Singh Nair

Chairperson

Central Board of Direct Taxes,

Ministry
of Finance

New
Delhi.

 

Dear
Madam

Sub:
Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme,
2016

We
write to you on behalf of members of our respective organisations and also on
behalf of the citizens of India at large.

We
wholeheartedly support the initiative of the Government of India for reducing
the huge backlog of litigation by providing a window to the litigants to settle
the matter by paying some amount of tax/penalty/interest and withdraw the
pending appeal(s).

In
principle, the Direct Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016 is a step in the
right direction for achieving the stated objective. In order to make the Scheme
more successful and thereby reduce the backlog of pending appeals as well as
unblock the massive amounts of disputed tax demands in the country, in the
interest of the tax paying community and in the larger interest of the nation,
we would like to drawn your kind attention to certain issues that arise from
the Scheme. These issues have not been addressed in the clarifications issued
on 12th September.

We
earnestly request you to kindly issue clarifications on these issues at the
earliest. Upon receipt of the same, we shall give it extensive publicity
amongst our members as well as amongst the tax paying community.

Assuring
you and the Government of India our fullest support in the massive nation
building exercise that is in progress,

We
remain,

Yours
sincerely,

                                                                                   

Chetan
M. Shah                                                            Raju
C Shah  

President,
                                                                     President,

Bombay
Chartered Accountants’ Society
             Chartered Accountants’ Association – Ahmedabad

 

                                                                                   

Hitesh
Shah                                                                  Raghavendra
Puranik

President                                                                       President

Chamber
of Tax Consultants                                  Karnataka
State Chartered Accountants’ Association

Dhruv Seth

President,

Lucknow
Chartered Accountants’ Society

Search and seizure- Assessment- Ss. 132, 153A of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2005-06: No assessment pending at time of initiation of search proceedings- Finding by Tribunal that no incriminating evidence found during course of search- Finalised assessment or reassessment shall not abate

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CIT Vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa; 386 ITR 483 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 2005-06, the assesee’s return was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and no notice u/s. 143(2) was issued. Thereafter on January 5, 2007 a search was conducted in the case of the assessee but no incriminating material was found. However, proceedings u/s. 153A were initiated for the A. Y. 2005-06 and the Assessing Officer added an amount of Rs. 93.72 lakhs u/s. 68 and Rs. 43.67 u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. The assesee challenged the validity of the assessment made u/s. 153A, on the ground that no assessment in respect of the six assessment years was pending so as to have abated. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s submission and held that no incriminating material having been found during the course of search, the entire proceeding u/s. 153A were without jurisdiction and therefore, the addition made had to be deleted.   

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Once an assessment was not pending but had attained finality for a particular year, it could not be subject to proceedings u/s. 153A of the Act, if no incriminating materials were gathered in the course of the search or during the proceedings u/s. 153A, which were contrary to and were not disclosed during the regular assessment proceedings.”

Reassessment- Ss. 147, 148, 152 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2011-12- Effect of section 152- Reassessment not resulting in assessment of higher income

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Notice not valid- Motto Tiles P. Ltd.; 386 ITR 280 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee had filed return of income computing a loss of Rs. 77,51,810/- and a book profit of Rs. 35,96,518/- and the same was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessment was reopened by issuing notice u/s. 148 proposing to make an addition of Rs. 81,18,000/- to the normal income. The objections filed by the assessee were rejected.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the court to the provisions of section 152(2) of the Act, which provides that where an assessment is reopened u/s. 147, the assessee may, if he has not impugned any part of the original assessment order for that year either u/ss 246 to 248 or u/s. 264, claim that the proceedings u/s. 147 shall be dropped on his showing that he had been assessed on an amount or to a sum not lower than what he would be rightly liable for if the income alleged to have escaped assessment had been taken into account, or the assessment or computation had been properly made. It was submitted that in view of the above provision, the proceedings are required to be dropped because even if the income which is alleged to have escaped assessment is taken into account, the petitioner would not be assessed at a higher amount.

ii)    The controversy stands squarely concluded by the decision of this court in the case of India Gelatine and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. ACIT; 364 ITR 649 (Guj), wherein the court in a case where the assessee had declared a loss of Rs. 1.44 crores under the normal computation and the assessment was framed on book profits of Rs. 2.89 crores, had held that even if the expenditure of Rs. 116.86 lakhs is disallowed, there would no change in the resultant change in the petitioner’s tax liability since the petitioner had already paid much higher tax and had allowed the petition.

iii)    It appears that the Revenue had accepted the said decision and had not challenged the same before the higher forum. The learned counsel for the Respondent has urged that the decision requires reconsideration. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the fact that the Revenue had accepted the said decision, the court does not find any reason to refer the matter for consideration to a larger bench.

iv)    For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed.”

Penalty- Concealment of income- S. 271(1)(c) of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2005-06- Compensation paid for mining ores claimed as deduction in year of payment but allowed over five year period of mining- Assessee accepting order and revising subsequent returns- Levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) not warranted

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CIT Vs. Thakur Prasad Sao and Sons (P) Ltd.; 386 ITR 448 (Cal):

The assessee had paid Rs. 2.75 crores on account of compensation for mining ores for a period of five years which claimed as revenue expenditure in the A. Y. 2005-06. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the expenditure was allowable over a period of five years which was the period during which the mining was to be conducted. The assessee accepted that order and accordingly revised the subsequent returns. The Assessing Officer levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that it was not possible to hold that the assessee furnished inaccurate particulars or concealed its income and accordingly deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee did not accept the disallowance; that there was no disallowance as such. The imposition of penalty was not warranted.”

Export- Hotel business- Deduction u/ss. 80HHC and 80HHD of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2004-05- Computation- Deduction for export earnings not to be affected by computation of deduction for hotel business- Assessee entitled to deduction on both- Total turnover for computation of deduction of profits from export to be taken excluding foreign exchange receipts from hotel business

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CIT Vs. ITC Ltd.; 386 ITR 487 (Cal):

Assessee was engaged in the business of hotel and export of goods with receipts in foreign exchange. For the A. Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer allowed the deduction u/s. 80HHD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the income of the hotel business and in arriving at the income earned by the assessee from export business for computing the deduction u/s. 80HHC, he was of opinion that the turnover of the hotel business had to be taken into account, i.e., he included it in the total turnover, thus reducing the percentage of profit available for deduction. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee following its own earlier judgment wherein it had held that the turnover has to be restricted to such receipts which had an element of profit derived from the export of goods and that the total turnover had to be reduced by the amount of gross receipts from the hotel business in order to keep the parity between the numerator and the denominator.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    The assessee was entitled to deductions both u/s. 80HHC and s. 80HHD of the Act. The assessee had income from convertible foreign exchange which arose from its hotel business in India and income from its export business. It was not the legislative intent that the benefit u/s. 80HHC was to be regulated by the turnover of the hotel business to which section 80HHD was applicable.  

ii)    The reasons advanced by the Tribunal in its earlier judgments were proper.”

Business expenditure- S. 37 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2003-04- Fines and penalties- Penalty charges paid to Pollution Control Board for failure to install pollution control equipment at factory premises- Is expenditure incurred for compensating damage caused to environment- Payment according to “polluter pays” principle- Compensation for purpose of business

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Expenditure allowable- Shyam Sel Ltd. Vs. Dy. CIT; 386 ITR 492 (Cal):

For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee debited in the profit and loss account the penalty charges paid to the Pollution Control Board for non installation of pollution control equipment at the factory premises. The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure which was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The payment made by the assessee was for the purpose of compensating the damage to the environment and this compensation was recovered on the “polluter pays” principle adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which was judicially recognised.
ii)      It was not the case that the business pursued by the assessee was illegal. The compensation was paid because the assessee had failed to install the pollution control device within the time prescribed. Therefore, the penalty payment made by the assessee was not hit by Explanation 1 to section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The payment was undoubtedly for the purpose of business or was in consequence of business carried on by the assessee and was thus covered by section 37 of the Act. The question is answered in favour of the assessee.”

Assessment – Limitation – Draft Assessment Order – Income Tax Authorities ¬– Even though an order is made u/s. 125A(1) empowering the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (IAC) to perform the function of an Income Tax Officer, yet if he has not exercised the power or performed the function of Income-Tax Officer, the provisions requiring approval or sanction of the IAC would be applicable – Provisions of section 144B would not apply only if the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises powers or performs the function of Income-tax Officer – In absence of actual exercise of powers the period during which the draft assessment order was forwarded to the IAC till the receiving of the instructions from IAC u/s. 144B is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation.

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CIT v. Saurasthra Cement and Chem. Industries Ltd. and Saraya Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2016) 384 ITR 186 (SC)

In terms of section 153 of the Income-tax Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), time limit for completion of the assessment to be made under section 143 or 144 of the Act is at any time before the expiry of two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income is first assessable, where assessment year is commencing on or after April 1, 1969.  On this reckoning, the date by which assessment should have been carried out by the Assessing Officer in respect of the assessment year 1981-82 was March 31, 1984.  The assessment order was, however, passed on September 1, 1984.  The Revenue claimed that this assessment order was still within the prescribed period of limitation because of the reason that on March 13, 1984 draft assessment  order was passed pertaining to the aforesaid assessment year and forwarded to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Central Range-II, Ahmadabad  on March 13, 1984 (i.e., before March 31, 1984).  The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner issued instructions under section 144B of the Act on August 31, 1984 and based on that the Assessing Officer framed the assessment on September 1, 1984 under section 143(3) of the Act read with section 144B of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the position that was taken by the Revenue was that the period from March13, 1984 to August 31, 1984, when the matter was before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, had to be excluded while computing the period of limitation of two years and once the period is excluded the assessment order was passed within the period of limitation.
The contention of the responding-assessee, on the other hand, was that, by order dated August 29, 1983, the Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, Ahmedabad  passed under section 125A(1) of the Act had assigned all the powers and functions of the Income Tax Officer, Central Circle, Jamnagar to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.  This order was passed specifically in case of the respondent herein which became effective from September 1, 1983.  It was the submission that once, by virtue of the aforesaid order dated August 29, 1983, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is conferred concurrent jurisdiction, along with the Income-tax Office, empowering him to make assessment order in the case of the assessee, there was no question of  forwarding the draft assessment order by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and this unnecessary and superfluous exercise would not enure to the advantage of the Revenue giving it the benefit of the period from March 13, 1984 to August 31, 1984 while calculating the period of limitation of two years provided under section 153 of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal found force in the said submission of the assessee and allowed the appeal thereby setting aside the assessment order.  The Gujarat High Court,  upheld this view of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal of the Appellant.

The Supreme Court  also noted that in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.13766 of 2001 which was preferred by the assessee  M/s.  Saraya Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., in the same circumstances, on the same question, the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary view.  The High Court of Allahabad has found merit in the stand taken by the Revenue and excluded the period during which the draft assessment was forwarded to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner till the date of receiving the instructions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 144B of the Act.

The Supreme Court thus, faced with two conflicting views and had  to decide as to which High Court had correctly decided the issue of limitation.

The Supreme Court noted that section 144B of the Act deals with a situation where the Income-tax Officer intends to pass an assessment order which is in variation to the income or loss that is shown in the return of the assessee and the amount of such variation exceeds the amount that can be fixed by the Board under sub-section (6) thereof. In such a situation, the Income-tax Officer is under obligation to first forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment to the assessee who can file his objections within 7 days thereof and if the objections are received, the Income-tax Officer is to forward the draft order together with objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, after considering the draft order and the objections, is empowered to issue such direction as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Income-Tax Officer to complete the assessment.

The Supreme Court further noted from the reading of section 153, the period (not exceeding 180 days) commencing from the date on which the Income –tax Officer forwards the draft order under sub-section (1) of section 144B to the assessee and ending with the date on which the Income-tax Officer receives the directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (a) of section 144B, is to be excluded while computing the period of limitation.

Before the Supreme Court, thrust   of the counsel for the assessee was on sub-section (4) of section 125A with the submission that on the conferment of the concurrent jurisdiction, provisions of the Act requiring approval and the sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner were not applicable and, therefore, the provisions of section 144B ceased to apply and should not have been invoked by the Income-tax Officer in the instant case. It was also argued that the High Court in the impugned judgment had rightly discussed that with the passing of a specific order dated August 29, 1983 by the Commissioner of Income-tax directing that all the powers and functions assigned to the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle, Jamnagar were thereby available to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Central Range II, Ahmedabad, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner,  Central Range II, Ahmedabad was brought at par with the Income-tax Officer, in so far as it pertains to the assessment of the assessee herein and he did not remain an Officer higher in status than the Income-tax Officer in so far as assessment of the assessee was concerned and for this reason also no such reference to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was called for.

According to the Supreme Court, these arguments were without any force and the result which the respondent-assessee wants did not flow from the reading of section 125A of the Act. The Supreme Court held that a bare reading of sub-section (4) of section 125A of the Act provides that where –

(a) An order is made under sub-section (1), and

(b) The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises the powers or performs the functions of an Income-tax Officer in relation to any area, or persons or classes of persons, or incomes or classes of income, or cases or classes of cases –

(i) references in this Act or in any rule made there under to the Income-tax Officer shall be constructed as references to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, and

(ii) any provision of this Act requiring approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will not be applicable.

The Supreme Court held that, hence, the provision of the Act requiring the approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will not be applicable only in those cases where both the aforementioned conditions (a) and (b) are are satisfied.  It would mean that, even though an order is made under section 125A(1) empowering the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to perform the functions of an Income-tax Officer, yet if he has not exercised the power or performed the function of an Income-tax Officer, the provisions requiring approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will be applicable.  Sub-section (4) nowhere provides that, if some directions by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner are issued as provided under sub-section (2), the provisions requiring approval or sanction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will not be applicable.

The Supreme Court, in the instant case, found that it was not the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who exercised the powers or performed the functions of the Income-tax Officer, even when such a power was conferred upon him, concurrently with the Incom-tax Officer.  The significant feature of section 125A of the Act is that even when the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is given the same powers and functions which are to be performed by the Income-tax Officer in relation to any area or classes or person or income or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, on the conferment of such powers, the Income Tax Officer does not stand denuded of those powers.  With conferment of such powers on the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner gives him “concurrent” jurisdiction which means that both, the Income-tax Officer as well as the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, are empowered to exercise those functions including passing assessment order.  It is still open to the Income-tax Officer to assume the jurisdiction and pass the order in case the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner does not exercise those powers in respect of the assessment year.  Provisions of section 144B would not apply only if the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises powers or performs the functions of Income-tax Officer.  What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers that are borne out from the bare reading of sub-section (4) of section 125B.

According to the Supreme Court, the position would become abundantly clear when one reads section 144B, particularly, sub-section (7) thereof.

Sub-section (7), in no uncertain terms, mentions that section 144B will not apply in that case where the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner “exercises the powers or performs the functions of an Income-tax Officer” in pursuance of an order made under section 125 or section 125A.

The Supreme Court observed that in the instant case, as already noted above, no such power was exercised or function of an Income-tax Officer was performed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court of Gujarat while dismissing the appeal of the Revenue failed to take into account the earlier judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woolllen Mills Ltd. [1995]  212 ITR 310 (Guj), which had taken the above  view. The Supreme Court agreed with the view taken in CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woolllen Mills Ltd. thereby allowed Civil Appeal No.2984 of 2008 and setting aside the impugned judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

For these reasons, the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.13766 of 2011 filed by the assessee against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court was dismissed affirming the view in the said case.

3.Commissioner of Income Tax-4 vs. M/s. J.M. Financial Securities Pvt. Ltd. [ Income tax Appeal no 235 of 2014 dt : 27/07/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

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[Affirmed M/s. J.M. Financial Securities
Pvt. Ltd. vs Asst CIT – 4(3)  . [ITA No.
4289/Mum/11  ;  Bench : J ; dated 19/04/2013 ; A Y: 2004- 2005,
Mum.  ITAT ]

 Expenses
– Liability Disputed   –
Once
the assessee stopped contesting the claim of SEBI, the liability was crystallized
during the year: Sec 37

The
Assessing Officer disallowed assessee’s claim for expenditure aggregating to
Rs.1.86 crores. This expenditure was on account of payment to SEBI of Registration
Fees and interest paid thereon on account of late payment. The explanation of
the  assessee was that there was a dispute
between SEBI and assessee with regard to the fees payable for registration in
respect of its taking over the business of M/s. J.M. Financial & Investment
Consultancy Services Ltd. However, in the subject assessment year, the assessee
decided to accept the contention of the SEBI on the question of fees payable
for registration with SEBI along with interest as contended by the SEBI. This
was warranted in view of the communication dated 19th November, 2003 from SEBI
to National Stock Exchange returning its application for trading in Future and
Options. 

Being
aggrieved the assessee carried the issue in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
dismissed the assessee’s appeal. 

On further
appeal, the Tribunal held that the only reason for not accepting the claim of
the  assessee as given by the lower
Authorities was that the assessee was not able to produce supporting documents
to evidence that the payment in fact had been made to SEBI. The evidence of
payment provided was a copy of the cheque issued in favour of SEBI drawn on
HDFC Bank.

The Hon’ble
High  Court observed that  there was no dispute that the  assessee had taken over the business of one
M/s. J.M. Financial Investment Consultant Services Pvt. Ltd. and a final
registration had to be applied for with SEBI. The assessee had earlier
contested the claim of SEBI in respect of the fees payable. However, during the
previous year relevant to the subject assessment year, the  assessee decided to accept the claim of SEBI
and pay the fees.

Once the assessee
acceptedthe claim of SEBI, the liability had crystallized during the year and
had to be allowed as an expenditure. So far as payment during the year is
concerned, the examination thereof may strictly be not necessary in view of the
above findings as the assessee is following Mercantile System of Accounting.
Nevertheless, the view taken by the Tribunal is a factual finding. The evidence
was in the form of copy of a cheque in favour of SEBI drawn on HDFC Bank.
Accordingly, appeal of the dept was dismissed  as the question framed does not give rise to
any substantial question of law.

2.CIT -16 vs. Sadanand B. Sule. [ Income tax Appeal no 300 of 2014,: 02/08/2016 (Bombay High Court)]. [Affirmed DCIT 16(2) vs. Sadanand B. Sule,. [ITA No. 831/MUM/2009, ; Bench : E ; dated : 07/08/2013 ; A Y: 2005- 2006, Mum. ITAT ]

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Cost of Acquisition of Shares –Vendor not disclosing the
receipt in their return – Assessee cannot be held responsible – for default
made by the vendors –  Consideration for
the sale of shares by account payee cheques is also significant:

The Assessee
sold 7,49,000 equity shares and 29,97,867 6% redeemable preference shares of
Lavasa Corporation Pvt. Ltd in the year under consideration, to Hindustan
Construction Corporation Ltd.. The Assessee disclosed long term capital gains
on sale of 7,49,000 equity shares and 24,97,867 6% redeemable preference shares
of Lavasa Corporation Ltd and short term capital gains on sale of 5,00,000 6%
redeemable preference shares of Lavasa Corporation Ltd.

The Assessee
had obtained 12,48,750 equity shares and 26,64,000 6% redeemable preference
shares of Lavasa Corporation on the merger of Yashomala Leasing & Finance
(P) Ltd. with Lake City Corporation (former name Lavasa Corporation) on the
basis of scheme of amalgamation approved by the Bombay High Court dated 1st
Aug. 2002. The assessee further purchased 5,00,000 6% redeemable preference
shares in the year 2003.

 As far as the long term capital gains was
concerned the assessee had considered the investment in the shares of the
company, Yashomala Leasing & Finance (P) Ltd. as the cost of acquisition as
he had obtained the shares sold, on the merger of the Yashomala Finance & Leasing
(P) Ltd with Lake City Corporation Ltd. The assessee purchased 1665 shares of
Yashomala Leasing Finance Pvt. Ltd  on  April, 2001 from Mr. Arvind Bhale and Mrs.
Jyoti Bhale. Yashomala had directly allotted one share to the assessee.

The
Assessing Officer does not dispute that the 
assessee was owner of the 1665 shares in Lavasa Corporation Ltd. and had
sold the shares along with other shares in the company during the previous year
relevant to the subject assessment year. However, during the assessment
proceedings the Assessing Officer by order dated 31st December, 2007 held that
the assessee had failed to establish the purchase of 1665 shares in 2001. In
particular he noted that the consideration claimed to have been paid by the assessee
to the vendors of the 1665 shares viz. Mr. and Mrs. Bhale was not found
unreliable. This was for the reason that the vendors had not shown any receipt
on account of sale of 1665 shares in its returns of income for Assessment Year
2001-02. On the basis of the above, the Assessing Officer concluded that as
date of acquisition of the shares is not known, the entire receipt on sale of
the shares has to be treated as short term capital gain and not at the value
claimed by the assessee but at an value worked out by him. 

 The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal on
consideration of facts .. It held that the basis of the Assessing Officer not
accepting the cost and the date of purchase of 1665 equity shares from Mr. and
Mrs. Bhale was not correct in view of explanation offered by the assessee. In
the explanation, the assessee’s claim of having purchased the shares during the
assessment year 2002-03 and the cost of acquisition was taken at Rs.41.25 lakhs
for computation of capital gains on its sale. 

Being
aggrieved, the Revenue carried the issue in appeal before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). In particular, it noted that the
assessee could not be held responsible for the failure of the vendors of the
shares i.e. Mr. and Mrs. Bhale to show the receipts on sale of shares in its
return of income for paying tax on the same. It noted the fact that all
payments made for the purchase of shares from Mr. and Mrs. Bhale were made
through account payee cheques. Further there were confirmation letters filed by
the vendors Mr. and Mrs. Bhale which were not even considered by the Assessing
Officer. The ITAT order also found that the order of the CIT(A) accepting the
explanation of the assessee for the discrepancies in its return of income could
not be found fault with. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed a  appeal before High Court. The Hon. High court held that the
purchasers of shares cannot be held responsible for default made by the vendors
of shares in filing their return of income and not disclosing consideration
received by them for sale of their shares. It was further observed that the
Assessing Officer completely ignored the confirmation letter given by vendors
of 1665 shares. Further fact that the assessee had paid the consideration for
the sale of 1665 shares by account payee cheques is also significant
.. The
view taken by both authorities on the basis of evidence and explanation made
available before them was a possible and reasonable view. In the above view the
question raised does not give rise to any substantial question of law.
High
court upheld the Tribunal order and dismissed the  Revenue appeal.

Revision – Jurisdiction – Condition Precedent – Satisfaction that an order passed by the authority under the Act is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue – Once satisfaction is reached, jurisdiction to exercise the power would be available subject to observance of the principles of natural justice – Unlike the power of reopening an assessment u/s. 147 of the Act, the power of revision u/s. 263 is not contingent on the giving of a notice to show cause.

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CIT v. Amitabh Bachchan [2016] 384 ITR 200 (SC)

For the assessment year 2001-02 the
assessment order was passed on March 30, 2004. 
After the assessment as above was finalized, a show-cause notice dated
November 7, 2005 under section 263 of the Act was issed by the learned
Commissioner of Income Tax detailing as many as eleven (11) issues/grounds on
which the assessment order was proposed to be revised under section 263 of the
Act.  The respondent-assessee filed his
reply to the said show-case notice on consideration of which by order dated
March 20, 2006 the learned Commissioner of Income Tax set aside the order  of assessment dated March 30, 2004 and
directed a fresh assessment to be made. 
Aggrieved, the respondent-assessee challenged the said order before the
learned Tribunal which was allowed by the order dated August 28, 2007.

Aggrieved
by the order dated August 28, 2007 of the learned Tribunal, the Revenue filed
an appeal under section 260A of the Act before the High Court  of Bombay. 
The aforesaid appeal, i.e. I.T.A. No.293 of 2008 was dismissed by the
High Court by the order dated August 7, 2008 holding that as the Commissioner
of Income Tax had gone beyond the scope of the show-cause notice dated
November7, 2005 and had dealt with the issues not covered/mentioned in the said
notice, the   revisional order dated March 20, 2006 was in
violation of the principles of natural justice. 
So far as the question as to whether the Assessing Officer had made
sufficient enquiries about the assessee’s claim of expenses made in the
re-revised return of income was concerned, which question was formulated as
question No.2 for the High Court’s consideration, the High Court took the view
that the said question raised pure questions of fact and, therefore, ought not
to be examined under section 260A of the Act. 
The appeal of the Revenue was consequently dismissed.  Aggrieved, appeal was filed before the Supreme
Court upon grant of leave under article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The
Supreme Court noted that the assessment in question was set aside by the  Commissioner of Income Tax by the order dated
March 20, 2006 on the principal ground that requisite and due enquires were not
made by the Assessing Officer prior to finalization of the assessment by order
dated March 30, 2004.  In this
connection, the   Commissioner of Income Tax on consideration of
the facts of the case and the record of the proceedings came to the conclusion
that in the course of the assessment proceedings despite several opportunities
the assessee did not submit the requisite books of account and documents and
deliberately dragged the matter leading to one adjournment after the  other. 
Eventually, the Assessing Officer, to avoid the bar of limitation, had
no option but to “hurriedly” finalise the assessment proceedings which on due
and proper scrutiny disclosed that the necessary enquires were not made.  On the said basis the Commissioner of Income
Tax came to the conclusion that the assessment order in question was erroneous
and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue warranting exercise of power
under section 263 of the Act.  Consequently,
the assessment for the year 2001-02 was set aside and a fresh assessment was
ordered.  In the order dated March 20,
2006 the  Commissioner of Income Tax
arrived at findings and conclusions in respect of issues which were not
specifically mentioned in the show-cause notice dated November 7, 2005.  In fact, on as many as seven/eight (07/08)
issues mentioned in the said show-cause notice the   Commissioner of Income Tax did not record any
finding   whereas conclusions adverse to the assessee
were recorded on issues not specifically mentioned in the said notice before
proceeding to hold that the assessment needs to be set aside.  However, three (03) of the issues, were  common to the show-cause notice as well as the
revisional order of the learned Commissioner of Income Tax.

On
appeal, the   Tribunal took the view that the   Commissioner of Income Tax exercising powers
under section 263 of the Act could not have gone beyond the issues mentioned in
the show-cause notice dated November 7, 2005. 
The Tribunal, therefore, thought it proper to take the view that in
respect of the issues not mentioned in the show-cause notice the findings as
recorded in the revisional order dated March 20, 2006 have to be understood to
be in breach of the principles of natural justice.  The Tribunal also specifically considered the
three (03) common issues mentioned above and on such consideration arrived at
the conclusion that the reasons disclosed by the   Commissioner of Income Tax in the order dated March
20, 2006 for holding the assessment to be liable for cancellation on that basis
were not tenable.  Accordingly, the
Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee and reversed the order  of the suo motu revision dated March 20,
2006.

The
Supreme Court, in an appeal filed by the Revenue, observed that under the Act
different shades of power have been conferred on different authorities to deal
with orders of assessment passed by the primary authority.  While section 147 confers power on the
assessing authority itself to proceed against income escaping assessment, section
154 of the Act empowers such authority to correct a mistake apparent on the
face of the record.  The power of appeal
and revision is contained in Chapter XX of the Act  which includes section 263 that concern suo
motu power of revision on the   Commissioner of Income Tax.  The different shades of power conferred on
different authorities under the Act has to be exercised within the areas
specifically delineated by the Act and the exercise of power under one
provision cannot trench upon the powers available under another provision of
the Act.

The
Supreme Court reverting to the specific provisions of section 263 of the Act held
that what has to be seen is that a satisfaction that an order passed by the
authority under the Act is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the
Revenue is the basic pre-condition for exercise of jurisdiction under section
263 of the Act.  Both are twin conditions
that have to be conjointly present.  Once
such satisfaction is reached, jurisdiction to exercise the power would be
available subject to observance of the principles of natural justice which is
implicit in the requirement cast by the section to give the assessee an
opportunity of being heard.  It is in the
context of the above position that this court has repeatedly held that unlike
the power of reopening an assessment under section 147 of the Act, the power of
revision under section 263 is not contingent on the giving of a notice to show
cause.  In fact, section 263 has been
understood not to require any specific show-cause notice to be served on the
assessee.  Rather, what is required under
the said provision is an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.  The two requirements are different; the first
would comprehend a prior notice detailing the specific grounds on which
revision of the assessment order is tentatively being proposed.  Such a notice is not required.  What is contemplated by section 263, is an
opportunity of hearing to be afforded to the assessee.  Failure to give such an opportunity would
render the revisional order legally fragile not on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.

It
may be that in a given case and in most cases it is so done a notice proposing
the revisional exercise is given to the assessee indicating therein broadly or
even specifically the grounds on which the exercise is felt necessary.  But there is nothing in the section  (section 263) to raise the said notice to the
status of a mandatory show-cause notice affecting the initiation of the
exercise in the absence thereof or to require the Commissioner of Income Tax to
confine himself to the terms of the notice and foreclosing consideration of any
other issue or question of fact.  This is
not the purport of section 263.  There
can be no dispute that while the Commissioner of Income Tax is free to exercise
his jurisdiction on consideration of all relevant facts, a full opportunity to
controvert the same and to explain the circumstances surrounding such facts,
as  may be considered relevant by the
assessee, must be afforded to him by the Commissioner of Income Tax prior to
the finalization of the decision.

The
Supreme Court held that in the present case, there was no dispute that in the
order dated March 20, 2006 passed by the   Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263
of the Act findings have been recorded on issues that are not specifically
mentioned in the show-cause notice dated November 7, 2005 though there are
three (03) issues mentioned in the show-cause notice dated 7, 2005 which had
specifically been dealt with in order dated March 20, 2006.  The Tribunal in its order dated August 28,
2007 put the aforesaid two features of the case into two different
compartments.  In so far as the first
question, i.e., findings contained in the order of the Commissioner of Income
Tax dated March 20, 2006 beyond the issues mentioned in the show-cause notice was
concerned, the Tribunal held that the revision order was bad in law and also
violative of principles of natural justice and thus not maintainable. 

According
to the Supreme Court, the above ground which had led the Tribunal to interfere
with the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax seemed to be contrary to the
settled position in law, as indicated above and the two decisions of the
Supreme Court in Gita Devi Aggarwal (76 ITR 496) and Electro House (82 ITR 824).  The   Tribunal in its order dated August 28, 2007
had not recorded any findings that in course of the suo motu revisional
proceedings, hearing of which was spread over many days and attended to by the
authorized representative of the assessee, opportunity of hearing was not
afforded to the assessee and that the assessee was denied an opportunity to
contest the facts on the basis of which the   Commissioner of Income Tax had come to his
conclusions as recorded in the order dated March 20, 2006.

The
Supreme Court observed that in the course of the revisional exercise relevant
facts, documents and books of account which were over looked in the assessment
proceedings were considered.  On such
re-scrutiny it was revealed that the original assessment order on several heads
was erroneous and had the potential of causing loss of revenue to the
State.  It is on the aforesaid basis that
the necessary satisfaction that the assessment order dated March 30, 2004 was
erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue was recorded by the
Commissioner of Income Tax.  At each
stage of the revisional proceedings, the authorized representative of the
assessee had appeared and had full opportunity to contest the basis on which
the revisional authority was proceeding/ had proceeded in the matter.  The Supreme Court held that if the revisional
authority had come to its conclusions in the matter on the basis of the record
of the assessment proceedings which was open for scrutiny by the assessee and
available to his authorized representative at all times, it was difficult to
see as to how the requirement of giving of reasonable opportunity of being
heard as contemplated by section 263 of the Act had been breached in the
present case.  The order of the   Tribunal in so far as the first issue i.e. the
revisional order going beyond the show-cause notice was concerned, therefore,  could not  accepted.

The
Supreme Court therefore considered the second limb of the case as dealt with by
the Tribunal, namely, that tenability of the order of the Commissioner of
Income Tax on the three (03) issues mentioned in the show-cause notice and also
dealt with in the revisional order dated March 20, 2006.  The aforesaid three (03) issues were:

         (i)  The
assessee maintaining 5 bank accounts and the Assessing Officer not examining
the 5th bank account, books of account and any other bank account
where receipts related to KBC were banked.

       (ii) Regarding
claim of deposit of Rs.5206 lakh in Bank the a/c No. 11155 under the head
“Receipt on behalf of Mrs. Jaya Bachchan, and  

        (iii)  Regarding
the claim of additional expenses in the re-revised return. 

On the
above issues, the   Tribunal had given detailed reasons for not
accepting the grounds cited in the revisional order for setting aside the
assessment under section 263 of the Act. 
According to the Supreme Court, the reasons cited by the   Tribunal in so far as the first two issues
were  concerned may not justify a serious
relook and hence not be gone into.  The Supreme
Court however was of the opinion the third question would, however, require
some detailed attention.  The said
question was with regard to the claim of additional expenses made by the
assessee in its re-revised return which was subsequently withdrawn. 


The Supreme Court held
that there could  be no doubt that so
long as the view taken by the Assessing officer is a possible view, the same
ought not to be interfered with by the Commissioner of Income Tax under section
263 of the Act merelyon the ground that there is another possible view of the
matter.  Permitting exercise of
revisional power in a situation where two views are possible would really
amount of conferring some kind of an appellate power in the revisional
authority.  This is a course of action
that must be desisted from.  However, according
to the Supreme Court the above was not the situation in the present case in
view of the reasons stated by the Commissioner of Income Tax on the basis of
which the said authority felt that the matter needed further investigation, a
view with which the Supreme Court wholly agreed.  Making a claim which would prima facie
disclose that the expenses in respect of which deduction had been claimed had
been incurred and thereafter abandoning/withdrawing the same gave rise to the
necessity of further enquiry in the interests of the Revenue.  The notice issued under section 69C of the
Act could not have been simply dropped on the ground that the claim had been
withdrawn.  The Supreme Court, therefore,
was of the opinion that the   Commissioner of Income Tax was perfectly
justified in coming to his conclusions in so far as the issue No. (iii) was
concerned and in passing the impugned order on that basis.  The Tribunal as well as the High Court, therefore,
ought not to have interfered with the said conclusion.


The Supreme Court concluded that the present was a fit case for
exercise of the suo motu revisional powers of the   Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263
of the Act.

1.Commissioner of Income tax- 3 vs. SICOM LTD. [ Income tax Appeal no 137 of 2014 dt : 08/08/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

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[Affirmed  SICOM LTD  vs.  Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax Range 3(3),. [ITA No. 3130/MUM/2011  ;  Bench : E ; dated 10/10/2012 ; A Y: 2003- 2004.  (Mum).  ITAT ]

Reopening – Within 4 years – Change of opinion –  reopening  not permissible :Sec 148                                                                          

The
assessee company is engaged in the business of finance, leasing, banking and
investment company (non-banking financial company). The return was filed
declaring total loss of Rs. 84,29,79,390/- for AY 2003-04 . The assessment was
completed for an income of Rs. 30,90,29,470/- 
u/s 143(3) of the Act.  

Subsequently, the A.O. reopened the assessment by
issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act on 28-3-2008 after recording the reasons relating to write off of inter corporate  deposit (ICD), investment etc.


The assessee vide letter dtd. 18-7-2008 stated that
there has been no failure on their part to disclose all the material facts in
its return of income. However, the
WA.O. observed that the assessee failed to furnish
necessary details in respect of nature of assets written off. Therefore, it was
a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose all the material facts in its
return of income.


According to the A.O., the write off of investment wasa
capital loss,  and the same couldnot be
allowed as a revenue expenditure. Similarly, ICD and other assets written off
constituted capital loss as these were the capital assets of the assessee,
therefore, they were also not allowable as revenue expenditure and accordingly
the A.O. added the same.


The assessee on the reopening of the assessment submitted
that the assessee in response to the query raised by the A.O. in respect of
write off done in the books of accounts of inter-corporate deposits, other
assets and investment has filed detailed reply dtd. 10-11-2005 supported by the
finding given by the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for the AY’s 1981-82,
1982-83  and 1983-84. It was  further submitted that the A.O. after
considering the same has passed the assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act. It
was  further submitted that reopening of
the assessment on the same sets of fact is 
not permissible as it amounts to change of opinion.


The ITAT observed that in the course of original
assessment proceeding the A.O. has considered and examined the particular
aspect, the said aspect cannot be made a ground to reopen and initiate
reassessment proceedings. The assessing authority cannot have a fresh look and reopen
an assessment on the ground of change of opinion. The A.O. had considered and
examined whether or not write off of the amount of inter-corporate deposits,
other assets and investments was of revenue nature. The A.O. accepted the stand
of the assessee and has made no addition in the original assessment
proceedings. The reassessment proceeding cannot, therefore, be initiated on the
ground that the said claim of the assessee cannot be allowed as permissible deduction
under the provisions of the Act.  In the
present case it is noticeable that the assessee had disclosed fully and truly
all the material facts relevant for the assessment. There is no indication and
it is not alleged that there was “tangible material” to come to the conclusion
that there is escapement of income from assessment.  The reassessment proceeding  were quashed.


Being aggrieved by the order of ITAT, the Revenue filed
 appeal before the Hon.  High Court. The High court  upheld the Tribunal order and dismissed
the  Revenue appeal holding that Revenue has not been able to point out any
fallacy in the reasoning of the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the
reopening notice is without jurisdiction

NEED FOR DEPOSITS UNDER CAPITAL GAIN ACCOUNTS SCHEME

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Issues for Consideration

       Section
54(2) and a set of other similar provisions, provide for the deposit of Capital
Gains or the net consideration in a bank account in accordance with the Capital
Gains Account Schemes, 1988, in a case where such amount is not appropriated or
utilized by the assessee towards the purchase or construction of the new asset
before the date of furnishing return of income u/s. 139 of the Income Tax Act.

The amount so
deposited under this Scheme, is required to be utilized for investment in the
specified new asset, within the specified period by withdrawal from the same account
in accordance with the Scheme. The amount in the bank account remaining
unutilized, shall be charged as the Capital Gains for the year in which the
period of reinvestment expires and the assessee shall be entitled to withdraw
the same unutilized balance.

Instances happen
whereunder, an assessee utilizes the amount of the Capital Gains or the net
consideration in reinvesting the same in the specified new asset, within the
permissible time of 2 or 3 years, after filing the return of income u/s. 139,
without first depositing such amount in the designated account and routing the
investment through such account.

Issues arise in such
cases about the eligibility of the assessee, for claim of exemption from the
liability to tax on Capital Gains. The courts, in considering the issue, have
delivered conflicting decisions. The Karnataka High Court had held, that the assessee
should be eligible for the relief once the amount in question was utilized
within the permissible time. However, the Bombay High Court recently held, that
it was essential for an assessee to first deposit the unutilized amount in the
designated account and any failure to do so would result in denial of the
relief, even where he had utilized the amount of gains or consideration in
purchase or construction of a new asset with the overall permissible time
frame.

K Ramachandra Rao’s case

The issue arose before the Karnataka High Court in the case of the CIT
v. K. Ramachandra Rao, 230 Taxman 334.
In that case, the assessee sold
certain converted lands for a consideration of Rs.2.87 crore. The assessee
constructed the residential premises on another plot of land owned by him,
for which certain payments towards construction were made within a period of one
year of the transfer of the said lands, some payments were made within one
year before the transfer of the said lands and balance payments were made after
the transfer and after the due date of filing return of income u/s 139(1)
directly, without depositing the same in the designated bank account under
the Capital Gains Scheme. The construction of the premises was completed
within a period of three years of the transfer. The assessee claimed
exemption u/s 54F from taxation in respect of the capital gains arising on
the transfer of the said lands. The AO denied the claim for exemption on the
ground that a part was invested before the transfer of the said lands in
construction, and that the balance was invested directly without depositing
the same in the designated bank account.  

 

On appeal, the Commissioner(Appeals) held that the payments made within
one year before the date of transfer and also the payments made after
transfer were eligible for exemption in spite of the fact that the proceeds
were not deposited in the designated bank account. The tribunal, on appeal by
the revenue, confirmed the findings of the Commissioner(Appeals).    

 

In appeal to the High Court, the Revenue, besides another question, raised
the following substantial question of law:

 

“When the assessee invests the entire sale consideration construction of
a residential house within three years from the date of transfer can he be
denied exemption under Section 54F on the ground that he did not deposit the
said amount in capital gains account scheme before the due date prescribed
under Section 139(1) of the IT Act?”

 

The decision,
as reported, does not record the conflicting stands presented by the parties to
the appeal nor does it record the observations of the court that led to the
decision of the  High Court rejecting the
appeal of the Revenue, which  held as
under;

“As is clear from
Sub-section (4) in the event of the assessee not investing the capital gains
either in purchasing the residential house or in constructing a residential house
within the period stipulated in Section 54F(1), if the assessee wants the
benefit of Section 54F, then he should deposit the said capital gains in an
account which is duly notified by the Central Government. In other words if he
want of (sic) claim exemption from payment of income tax by retaining the cash,
then the said amount is to be invested in the said account. If the intention is
not to retain cash but to invest in construction or any purchase of the
property and if such investment is made within the period stipulated therein,
then Section 54F(4) is not at all attracted and therefore the contention that
the assessee has not deposited the amount in the Bank account as stipulated and
therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit even though he has invested the
money in construction is also not correct.”

 

Humayun Suleman Merchant’s case

 

The issue again
came up recently before the Bombay High Court in the case of Humayun Suleman
Merchant v CCIT, ITA No 545 of 2002 dated 18th August 2016.

 

In this case,
the assessee sold a plot of land for a consideration of Rs. 85.33 lakh on 29th
April 1995. The due date of filing of his return of income was 31st
October 1996. He entered into an agreement to purchase a flat for a
consideration of Rs. 69.60 lakh on 16th July 1996. Under this
agreement, 2 instalments of Rs. 10 lakh each were paid on 17th July
1996 and 23rd October 1996 to the developer/builder. A further
payment of Rs. 15 lakh was made on 1st November 1996 under the
agreement to purchase the flat. The possession of the new flat was obtained on
27th January 1997. No amount was deposited in the capital gains
account scheme.

 

The assessee
filed his return of income on 4th November 1996, after the due date
of filing of his return of income. In the return, exemption under section 54F
was claimed in respect of the entire cost of the new flat of Rs. 69.60 lakh.

 

The assessing
officer allowed exemption from capital gains under section 54F in respect of
the amount of Rs. 35 lakh paid till the date of the filing of the return, and
did not consider the balance amount of Rs 34.60 lakh paid subsequently for the
flat, on account of the assessee’s failure to deposit the unutilised consideration
for purchase on the flat in the specified bank account in accordance with the
capital gains account scheme. The Commissioner(Appeals) upheld the order of the
assessing officer. The tribunal also dismissed the appeal of the assessee.

 

Before the Bombay
High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that:

1.      The issue was covered by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT v Hilla J B Wadia 261 ITR 376, read with CBDT circulars dated 15 October
1986 and 16 December 1993. Further, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in the case of Smt Shashi Varma v CIT 224 ITR 106 also applied. Besides,
the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of K Ramachandra Rao
(supra) covered the issue.

2.      Section 54F had been brought into the Act with the object of encouraging
the housing sector. Therefore, a liberal/beneficial interpretation/construction
should be given to section 54F(4). Reliance was placed upon the decision of the
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v Ravinder Kumar Arora 342 ITR 38.

3.      Section 54F(4) deliberately use the word “appropriation” while extending
the benefit, since it intended to expand the scope of the benefit. Since the
word “appropriation” meant setting apart, once an agreement to purchase the
flat was executed in July 1996, and the consideration was set aside, though not
paid, it should be considered to be appropriated towards the purchase of a
flat, and hence the benefit of section 54F was available.

4.      Alternatively, the requirements of section 54F(4) had been satisfied, as
the entire amount had been paid to the developer before the last date
prescribed to file the return of income [the date prescribed under section 139
(4)], as held by the Gauhati High Court in the case of CIT v Rajesh Kumar Jalan
286 ITR 274.

 

On behalf of
the revenue, it was argued that:

1.      on a plain reading of section 54F(4), the assessee had not utilised the
entire net consideration taxable under the head capital gains for purchase of
the flat, nor had he deposited the balance unutilised consideration in a
specified bank account as notified in terms of section 54F(4), and was
therefore not entitled to the benefit of exemption from capital gains under
section 54F to the extent the requirements of the section were not met.

2.      The decision of the Bombay High Court in Hilla J B Wadia (supra), as well
as the circulars cited on behalf of the assessee had no application to the
facts of the case, as these were not in the context of section 54F(4), which
was not existing in the statute books at that point of time.

3.      The word “appropriation” only covered cases where the flat had already been
purchased within one year before the date on which the capital gains arose on
the transfer of the asset. In the present case, there was no purchase of a flat
prior to the sale of the capital asset, but the purchase was post sale of the
capital asset, which required utilisation and deposit in the specified account
to the extent not utilised.

4.      The decision of the Gauhati High Court in Rajesh Kumar Jalan had no
application to this case, as the amounts had not been utilised or deposited in
the specified bank account before the assessee filed his return of income on 4th
November 1996.

 

The Bombay High
Court analysed the provisions of section 54F. It noted that, while implementing
section 54F, it was noticed that at times assessments were completed prior to
the expiry of the period of 2 or 3 years from the date of sale of the capital
asset, and the assessee had not utilised the amount within the prescribed
period. This led to assessment orders being rectified by appropriate orders, to
withdraw the excess exemption allowed under section 54F. It was for this reason
that section 54F(4) was introduced. Further, the provisions of section 54F(1)
were made subject to the provisions of section 54F(4). Therefore, where the
consideration received on sale of the capital asset was not appropriated (where
purchase was earlier than sale) or utilised (where purchase was after the
sale), then the gains were subject to the charge of capital gains tax, unless
the unutilised amounts were deposited in the specified bank account as notified
under the capital gains account scheme. The exemption was available to the
unutilised amounts only if the mandate of section 54F(4) was complied with. A
further safeguard was provided to the revenue, where the assessee had not
invested the amounts in purchase/construction of a house property within the
specified time under section 54F(1), by providing that in such cases, capital
gains would be charged on the unutilised amount as income of the previous year
in which the period of 3 years from the date of the transfer of the capital
asset expired.

 

Applying this
analysis of the provisions to the facts before it, the Bombay High Court noted
that the entire net consideration which was to be utilised in purchase of the
new flat and which had not been utilised, had not been deposited in the
specified bank account before the due date of filing of the return under
section 139(1). The High Court noted that except Rs. 35 lakh, the balance of
the net consideration to be utilised, had not been utilised before the date of
furnishing of the return, 4th November 1996. Therefore, according to
the High Court, the order of the tribunal was correct.

 

The Bombay High
Court noted that the ratio of the cases of Hilla J B Wadia (supra) and Smt.
Shashi Varma did not apply, as in those cases, at the relevant point of time,
there was no requirement of depositing any unutilised amount in a specified
bank account under the capital gains account scheme. Further, the Bombay High
Court noted that the 2 CBDT circulars relied upon on behalf of the assessee did
not do away with and/or relax the statutory mandate of depositing the
unutilised amount in the specified bank account as required by section 54F(4).

 

Referring to
the decision of the Karnataka High Court in K Ramachandra Rao (supra), the
Bombay High Court expressed its inability to accept the reasoning adopted by
the Karnataka High Court. According to the Bombay High Court, the mandate of
section 54F(4) was clear, that an amount which had not been utilised in
construction and/or purchase of property before filing the return of income
must necessarily be deposited in an account under the capital gains account
scheme, so as to claim exemption. According to the Bombay High Court, this
aspect had not been noticed by the Karnataka High Court, and the entire basis
of the decision of the Karnataka High Court was the intent of the parties.
According to the Bombay High Court, in interpreting a fiscal statute, one must
have regard to the strict letter of law, and intent can never override the
plain and unambiguous letter of the law. The Bombay High Court observed that
while it should not easily depart from a view taken by another High Court on
considerations of certainty and consistency in law, the view of other High
Courts were not binding upon it unlike a decision of the Supreme Court or of a
larger or coordinate bench of the same court. If, on an examination of the
decision of the other High Court, it was unable to accept the same, it was not
bound to follow/accept the interpretation of the other High Court, leading to a
particular conclusion.

 

In the case
before it, the Bombay High Court found that the decision of the Karnataka High
Court was rendered sub-silentio; i.e. no argument was made with regard to the
requirement of deposit in notified bank account under the capital gains account
scheme before the due date as required by section 54F(4). The Bombay High Court
relied on Salmond’s Jurisprudence for the proposition that a precedent
sub-silentio is not authoritative. The Bombay High Court therefore held that it
could not place any reliance upon the decision to conclude the issue on the
basis of that decision.

The
Bombay High Court further rejected the reliance on the decision of the Delhi
High Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar Arora (supra), where the court had
held that the provisions of section 54F should be liberally construed, on the
grounds that in that case, all the requirements of section 54F stood satisfied,
and the only issue was the addition of the name of his wife in the purchase, on
the ground that that case had no application to the facts before it.

According
to the Bombay High Court, no occasion to give a beneficial constructions to a
statute could arise when there was no ambiguity in the provision of law, which
was subject to interpretation. In the face of the clear words of the statute,
the intent of parties and/or beneficial construction was irrelevant. It relied
on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sales Tax Commissioner,
vs Modi Sugar Mills 12 STC 182, Mathuram Agarwal vs State of Madhya Pradesh 8
SCC 67 and CIT vs. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd 206 ITR 727 for this
proposition.

The
Bombay High Court also rejected the argument that since the funds had been
earmarked to be invested in construction of a house, the funds could be
regarded as appropriated for the purpose of purchase of new residential house,
and therefore the requirements of section 54F(4) were satisfied. According to
the Bombay High Court, the word “appropriated” had been used with reference to
the cases where property had already been purchased prior to the sale of the
capital asset, and the amount received on sale of the capital asset was
appropriated towards consideration which had been paid for purchase of the
property. According to it, the plain language of the section made a clear
distinction between cases of appropriation (purchase prior to sale of capital
asset) and utilisation (purchase/construction after the sale of capital assets).
Therefore, the word “appropriated” would have no application in cases of
purchase/construction of a house after the sale of capital asset, as was the
fact in the case before it.

Referring
to the argument on behalf of the assessee, that since the entire amount had
been paid before the last due date to file the return specified in section
139(4), the exemption was available, based on the decision of the Gauhati High
Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Jalan, the Bombay High Court noted that the
factual situation before it was different. In the case before the Gauhati High
Court, the amounts were utilised before the date of filing of the return of
income, whereas in the case before the Bombay High Court, only a part of the
amounts were utilised before the date of filing of the return of income.
Therefore, the Bombay High Court was of the view that the decision of the
Gauhati High Court in that case was not applicable to the case before it.

The
Bombay High Court therefore held that the assessee was entitled to an exemption
under section 54F only in respect of the amount of Rs. 35 lakh actually paid
before the date of filing of the return of income, and not in respect of the
entire amount of Rs. 69.60 lakh agreed to be paid for purchase of the new
house.

Observations

Section 54 (2) reads
as under:

The amount of the capital gain which is not
appropriated by the assessee towards the purchase of the new asset made within
one year before the date on which the transfer of the original asset took
place, or which is not utilised by him for the purchase or construction of the
new asset before the date of furnishing the return of income under 
section 139, shall be deposited by him before furnishing such return [such deposit
being made in any case not later than the due date applicable in the case of
the assessee for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of 
section 139] in an account in any such bank or institution as may be
specified in, and utilised in accordance with, any Scheme which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame in this behalf
and such return shall be accompanied by proof of such deposit; and, for the
purposes of sub-section (1), the amount, if any, already utilised by the
assessee for the purchase or construction of the new asset together with the
amount so deposited shall be deemed to be the cost of the new asset :

Provided that if the amount deposited under this
sub-section is not utilised wholly or partly for the purchase or construction
of the new asset within the period specified in sub-section (1), then,—

 (i)  The amount not so
utilized shall be charged under 
section 45 as the income of the previous year in which
the period of three years from the date of the transfer of the original asset
expires; and

(ii)  The assessee shall be
entitled to withdraw such amount in accordance with the Scheme aforesaid.

The said sub-section
was introduced in the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. The intention behind
the introduction is explained vide memorandum explaining the provisions, as
under:

“The existing provisions under sec. 54, ….. the original assessments
need rectification whenever the taxpayer fails to acquire the corresponding new
asset. With a view to dispensing with such rectification of assessment, the
bill seeks to provide for new Scheme for deposit of amounts meant for
reinvestment in the new asset. Under the proposed amendment, … also
.”

Circular No. 495 dt.
22.9.1987 has explained the amendment vide para 26.2 & 26.3 to avoid the
need for rectification of the assessment order of the year of transfer on
account of the assessee’s failure to acquire corresponding new asset within the
permissible time.

On a combined reading,
it is gathered that sub-section 2 has been introduced to provide for the
deposit of that part of the gain which has remained unutilized upto the date of
filing of return. The provision simultaneously ensures that the amount so
deposited in the designated account shall be deemed to be the cost of the new
asset, so as to enable an assessee to claim relief for the assessment year
corresponding to the year of transfer of the original asset without any further
compliance needed. As it is seen, the provision is primarily introduced to
avoid any rectification of the original assessment that maybe required, to meet
the consequences of the failure of the assessee to acquire the new asset within
the overall time permitted by law. Apparently, the law of sec. 54 and other
similar sections permitted and continue to permit an assessee to reinvest the
gains or the consideration within the prescribed time. This relief has neither
been taken away by the amendment nor is it intended to be taken away. In that view
of the matter, the core requirement for a relief continues to be the reinvestment
of the gains or consideration within the overall framework of the law.

The only purpose of
the amendment, therefore is to provide for a procedural mechanism in the form
of introduction of the Scheme so as to avoid the consequential rectification in
limited cases of failure of an assessee to reinvest. It may therefore not be
appropriate, to altogether deny the benefit to an assessee in a case where he
has reinvested the gains or the consideration in new asset within the
permissible time, though without depositing the gain or the consideration under
the Scheme. This more so, as in the case before the Bombay High Court, the
entire payment has been made before the date of the assessment.

In reality, one
routinely comes across cases where the payment of consideration is deferred for
several reasons, leading to non-compliance of conditions for deposit under the Scheme.
However, the transferor, on receipt of the consideration after the filing of
return of income, acquires or is in a position to acquire the new asset within
the specified period. Many intended transactions are seen to be not implemented
simply for inability to realize the funds by the due date of filing the return
of income. A provision introduced to facilitate the smooth assessment cannot be
so construed as to defeat the provisions of law.

The Courts seem to be favoring
the view that the deposits made within the extended time of s.139(4) would be
in compliance with the provisions of law. The Courts also seem to be of the
view that the benefit of the sections should not be denied in cases where the
new asset is purchased or constructed within the time extended u/s.139(4), even
where the deposits are made under the Scheme. Under the circumstances, no
serious controversy should arise in cases where reinvestment is made within
such extended time, with or without routing the investment through the
designated account.

One may also consider
the possibility of always routing the reinvestment through the designated
account, irrespective of the delay in depositing the gains or consideration
under the Scheme. This may help the assessee in contending that he has complied
with the provisions of law, but for the delay in depositing under the Scheme,
which delay may be condoned.

There is no doubt that
the entire Scheme of exempting the Capital Gains from taxation on reinvestment is
for the benefit of the assessee and for directing the investments in the
desired channels. It is a settled position in law that such provisions being beneficial
provisions for the assessee, should be construed liberally, so as to facilitate
the deduction and not to deny it.

In view of the above
discussion, it appears that the view of the Karnataka High Court is a better
view, in as much as the court has taken a view that promotes the legislative
intent behind the main provisions of law. It is respectfully submitted that an
important factor that should have been appreciated in Humayun’s case was that
there had been no loss of revenue nor was there any delay in reinvestment, and
that the entire payment for the new house had been made by the time the
assessment was completed.

Welcome GST IGST and Place of Supply Rules

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1. Introduction

1.1. Goods and Service Tax (“GST”) is a landmark indirect tax reform knocking at our doors. The Constitution Amendment Bill has been assented recently paving the way for introduction of dual GST to replace a plethora of indirect taxes. In June 2016, the Government had released a set of model GST laws for public comments, thereby reinforcing its commitment to introduce GST at the earliest opportune time. The Finance Minister has indicated his willingness to implement this landmark reform with effect from 01.04.2017.

1.2. Under the proposed dual GST Model, both the Central and the State Governments would levy Central GST (“CGST”) and State GST (“SGST”) respectively on the same comprehensive base of all supplies.

1.3. Since the State Governments would also have jurisdiction to levy tax on supplies, the need for addressing issues related to interstate supplies arises. As an integral part of the design, GST is proposed to be a destination based consumption tax and therefore in case of interstate supplies, the tax on the interstate supply must accrue to the Destination State. This would also enable seamless flow of credit in case of interstate supplies for business purposes.

1.4. Extending the principle of destination based consumption tax, supplies imported into the country would attract GST whereas supplies exported from the country need to be zero rated (i.e. not liable for payment of GST with unfettered input credit).

1.5. To enable a smooth implementation of the above propositions and to avoid conflicts of differing interpretations, the powers to enact provisions relating to inter-state supplies rests with the Centre. Accordingly, interstate supplies, imports and exports are to be governed by an Integrated GST (“IGST”) Law. The IGST rate is proposed to be determined by considering the CGST and SGST Rates. Effectively, in IGST, there would be two components i.e. CGST and SGST, out of which, the portion of CGST will be held by the Central Government and the portion of SGST will be transferred to the destination State Government. Thus, for IGST, the Central Government will work as a clearing house for the States where consumption takes place. IGST will also enable smooth flow of credits between the origin and the destination States by permitting cross utilisation of credits.

1.6. The spirit of GST being a tax on consumption and not a tax on business is achieved through the process of granting seamless credits. Accordingly, for transactions between businesses, essentially the tax charged by the supplying business is automatically eligible for credit to the receiving business. This basically implies that GST remains a creditable tax and therefore not a cost for any business. Since it is not a cost for any business, it is also not a revenue proposition for any Government (either Central or any of the State Governments)

1.7. This ‘wash’ nature of the tax across businesses has been an important driving principle in the formulation of the concept of IGST, its’ settlement matrix to the consuming State and the formulation of the Place of Supply Rules.

1.8. Therefore, to the extent that the inter-state supply is for a creditable purpose at the recipient’s end, the IGST payment stays in the common pool with the Central Government. It is only when the inter-state supply is not for a creditable purpose at the recipient’s end, the settlement provisions and allocation of the tax to the Central Government and the consuming State Government takes place. Similarly, the general rule for the place of supply of services and many of the specific rules determine the place of supply to be the location of the address of the registered person.

2. Levy

2.1. Section 7(1) of the CGST/SGST Act prescribes the levy under the respective enactments as under:

There shall be levied a tax called the Central/State Goods and Services Tax (CGST/SGST) on all intra-State supplies of goods and/or services at the rate specified in the Schedule . . . to this Act and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.

2.2. Similarly, Section 4(1) of the IGST Act prescribes the levy as under:

There shall be levied a tax called the Integrated Goods and Services Tax on all supplies of goods and/or services made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce at the rate specified in the Schedule to this Act and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.

2.3. From the above provisions, it is very clear that the levy under either of the enactments is dependent on the classification of the supply as either an intra-State Supply or an Inter-State Supply.  The principles to determine whether a supply is an intra-state supply or an inter-state supply are provided under Sections 3 and 3A of the IGST Act.

2.4. Section 3 of the IGST Act states as under:

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 5, supply of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in different States.

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 6, supply of services in the course of inter-State trade or commerce means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in different States.

2.5. Similarly, Section 3A of the IGST Act states as under

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 5, intra-state supply of goods means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in the same State.

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 6, intra-state supply of services means any supply where the location of the supplier and the place of supply are in the same State.

2.6. Based on the above provisions, it is evident that the anchor point for determining whether a supply is an intra-state supply or an interstate supply is dependent on the location of the supplier and the place of supply. If the location of supplier and the place of supply is in the same State, it is to be treated as intra-state Sale and therefore liable for a combination of CGST and SGST whereas if the location of supplier and the place of supply are in different States, then the supply has to be treated as inter-state supply and liable for IGST

2.7. It may be noted that though the CGST as well as the IGST Acts apply to the whole of India, the levies under both the laws are anchored on the aspect of the “State”. Therefore, there would be challenges in interpretation of the place of supplies in case of territories which are not a part of any State (though a part of India). For example, it may be difficult to consider supplies to the extended continental Shelf either as intra-state or inter-state. It may however be noted that the definition of States includes Union Territories with Legislature (For example, Delhi and Puducherry)

3. Place of Supply for Goods

3.1. Section 5 of the IGST Act defines the place of supply of goods. The said provisions are fundamentally different from the current provisions since they are based on the destination principle rather than the origin principle.

3.2. The following table summarizes the place of supply of goods as defined under the GST Act and under the IGST Act:

Situation

Place of Supply as
per Section 5 of IGST Act

Supply involving movement of goods

Location of termination of movement for
delivery

Supply by way of transfer of documents of title

Principal place of business of the buyer

Supply not  involving movement of goods

Location of goods

Goods assembled or installed at site

Place of installation or assembly

Goods supplied on board of conveyance

Location at which goods are taken on
board

 

 

3.3. Section 5(2) of the IGST Act prescribes the general rule for place of supply as under:

Where the supply involves movement of goods, whether by the supplier or the recipient or by any other person, the place of supply of goods shall be the location of the goods at the time at which the movement of goods terminates for delivery to the recipient.

3.4. The above prescription is based on ‘supply involving movement of goods’ and not ‘supply causing movement of goods’. Further, the anchor point is the location where the movement of goods terminates for delivery to the recipient and not a generic termination of movement of goods. This can present some challenges in taxation of supplies on Ex-Works principle

3.5. Under the current provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, if a transaction causes a movement of goods from one State to another, it is considered as an inter-state supply even if the said transaction per se does not involve the movement of goods. Therefore, Ex-Works Sales are treated as inter-state sales if the supplier is able to establish an inextricable nexus of the delivery at the factory gate, with a subsequent movement of the said goods by the buyer to another State. However, since the model GST law determines the place of supply on the basis of location at which the goods are delivered to the receiver, it is possible that the place of supply of such ex-works sales shall be considered as the factory gate itself.

3.6. Section 5(2A) of the IGST Act deals with the place of supply of goods in cases where three persons are involved in the supply. The rule states as under:

Where the goods are delivered by the supplier to a recipient or any other person, on the direction of a third person, whether acting as an agent or otherwise, before or during movement of goods, either by way of transfer of documents of title to the goods or otherwise, it shall be deemed that the said third person has received the goods and the place of supply of such goods shall be the principal place of business of such person.

3.7. The above provision will cover various situations. A very commonplace situation is that of direct delivery of goods to a third person under instructions of the buyer. This is commonly referred to as the “Bill To”/ “Ship To” Model. For example, if A in Mumbai places an order to B in Gujarat and tells him to directly deliver the goods to C in Karnataka, there would be two supplies involved, supply by B to A and another supply by A to C. The supply by B to A will be governed under Section 5(2A) and the place of supply will be Maharashtra (principal place of business of A). B in Gujarat will charge IGST to A in Maharashtra. Further, the second supply by A to C will be governed by Section 5(2) and the place of supply will be Karnataka (place where the goods are finally delivered). A in Maharashtra will charge IGST to C in Karnataka and claim the corresponding credit of the tax charged to him by B in Gujarat.

3.8. Section 5(2A) will also cover various other situations like sale in transit, sale in bonded warehouse, high seas sales, etc.

3.9. However, in situations where the supply does not involve movement of goods, whether by the supplier or the recipient, the place of supply shall be the location of such goods at the time of the delivery to the recipient. This is specifically provided under Section 5(3)

3.10. Section 5(4) provides that where the goods are assembled or installed at site, the place of supply shall be the place of such installation or assembly. Under the current tax regime, we have issues in determination of situs of sale in case of composite works contracts. The Originating States demand a tax based on the theory of inextricable link between the movement of goods from their State and the final accretion at the Site. The Destination States also demand a tax if there is some intermediary processing or fabrication prior to the final accretion at the Site. Further, in most of the cases, taxes are deducted in the Destination State. The proposed Section 5(4) brings to rest these controversies and associated cash flow issues and is therefore a welcome change.

3.11. Section 5(5) states that where the goods are supplied on board a conveyance, such as a vessel, an aircraft, a train or a motor vehicle, the place of supply shall be the location at which such goods are taken on board

3.12. The above provision applies only in cases where the supply is made on board a conveyance and not to cases where the supplier supplies to the owner/representative of the conveyance when the conveyance is not in motion.

3.13. Consider the example of a person (X) who sells food to an airline and delivers the same to the crew of the aircraft at the loading point, such that the airline thereafter sells to the passengers during the flight. The supply of food by X to the airline would not be governed by Section 5(5) but will be governed by Section 5(2). However, the subsequent sale by the airline to the passenger will be governed by Section 5(5).

4. Place of Supply for Services – Objectives and Relevance

4.1. As stated earlier, the concept of IGST serves multiple objectives. Since the services are essentially intangible in nature, the place of supply rules for services are drafted considering these objectives in mind.

4.2. Some extracts from the Education Guide at the time of introduction of the negative list based taxation of services are very relevant and hence are reproduced below

The essence of indirect taxation is that a service should be taxed in the jurisdiction of its consumption. In terms of this principle, exports are not charged to tax, as the consumption is elsewhere, and services are taxed on their importation into the taxable territory. However, this determination is not easy. Services could be provided by a person located at one location, actually performed at another while being delivered to a person located at a third location, and occasionally actually consumed at a third location or over a larger geographical territory, falling in more than one taxable jurisdiction.

As a result it is necessary to lay down rules determining the exact place of provision, while ensuring a certain level of harmonization with international practices in order to avoid both the double taxation as well as double non-taxation of services.

It is also a common practice to largely tax services provided by business to other business entities, based on the location of the customers and other services from business to consumers based on the location of the service provider. Since the determination in terms of above principle is not easy, or sometimes not practicable, nearest proxies are adopted to provide specificity in the interpretation as well as application of the law.

4.3. Further to the above objectives, the place of supply rules under IGST also need to deal with situations of supplies amongst two or more States, where also the guiding principle is ensuring a seamless flow of credits amongst businesses and transfer of tax to the correct State of Consumption.

5. Place of Supply for Services – General Principle

5.1. Section 6 defines the place of supply of services. The general rules in relation to services arereproduced below

Section 6(2) (IGST)

The place of supply of services, except the services specified in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), made to a registered person shall be the location of such person.

Section 6(3) (IGST)

The place of supply of services, except the services specified in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), made to any person other than a registered person shall be

   (i) the location of the recipient where the address on record exists, and

   (ii) the location of the supplier of services in other cases

5.2. The above provisions are tabulated below for ready reference:

Section

Test

Location

6(2) of the IGST Act

Supplied to a registered person

Location of service receiver

6(3) of the IGST Act

Supplied to any other person

1.      Location of service recipient where
address on record exists

2.      Location of service provider in other
cases

 

 

 

5.3. The above rulesare subject to various exceptions, which are explained later.

5.4. Section 6(2) deals with cases where the supply is between two businesses. In that case, the place of supply is defined to be the location of the service receiver. For example, if a consultant located in Maharashtra provides a consultancy service to a client who is registered in the State of Gujarat, the place of supply will be considered as Gujarat and the consultant will charge IGST to the client. Since the client is registered in Gujarat, he would be eligible to claim the credit of this IGST in the State of Gujarat and therefore, essentially, the tax is not a cost to either of the parties and is not a revenue for any of the Governments.

5.5. It may be noted that the rule does not require any further analysis on what is the end purpose of the consultancy or who is the beneficiary of the consultancy service. For example, the consultant could have provided an advice on whether the client should set up a base in Maharashtra and also advised on various laws which might be applicable to him if the client sets up the base in Maharashtra. In another situation, the service may be connected with due diligence review of a target company located in Maharashtra (to help the acquiring company located in Gujarat take a decision on acquisition or otherwise). These underlying activities may be performed in Maharashtra. The perceived benefits may accrue in the territory of Maharashtra. However, these factors will be irrelevant in the determination of the place of supply of service. The place of supply of service will be determined by the general rule which is the location of the service recipient.

5.6. Under the current service tax regime, there have been disputes on this aspect (in the context of cross border transactions) and Courts have time and again laid down a few principles. The first principle is that the recipient of service will have to be determined based on the contractual obligation and not based on the ultimate beneficiary. The second principle is that actual performance of an activity cannot determine the location of the recipient of service. Useful reference may be made to the cases of Paul Merchants Ltd. [2013 (29) S.T.R. 257 (Tribunal)], Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt. Ltd. 2014 (36) S.T.R. 766 (Tribunal), Vodafone India Limited [2015 (37) STR 286 (Tri – Mum)], British Airways [2014 (36) S.T.R. 598 (Tri. – Del.)], Jet Airways Ltd. [2014 (36) S.T.R. 290 (Tri. – Mumbai)], Infosys Ltd. [2015 (37) S.T.R. 862 (Tri. – Bang.)], Tech Mahindra Ltd. [2014 (36) S.T.R. 241 (Bom.)], etc.

5.7. In fact, the definition of recipient of service provided under Section 2(80) of the CGST/SGST Acts also strengthens the above line of thought. The said section defines the recipient of service as the person who is liable to pay the consideration.

5.8. Section 6(3) deals with situations where the service recipient is not a registered person. Here also, the primary emphasis is on the address on record in the books of the supplier. Therefore, in all cases where the supplier has the customer’s address on record, the place of supply is determined to be the location of the recipient. However, if the supplier does not have the address on record, the location of the supplier will determine the place of supply of service.

5.9. The multiple objectives of enacting the place of supply rules highlighted earlier are clearly satisfied when one reads the general rule of place of supply of services. The same is explained in the table below:

Sr.

Situation

Place of Supply

Impact

Underlying Objective

1.

Supply by Indian service provider to
registered person

Location of Recipient

IGST charged by the service provider would
be available as credit to the recipient

Seamless flow of Credit

2.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person with address on record

Location of Recipient

IGST

Transfer of Tax to the Consumption State

3.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person (address not available on record)

Location of Supplier

CGST+SGST

Brings certainty to taxation.

4.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
registered person in India

Location of Recipient

IGST payable as import of services

Brings level playing field between Indian
and foreign service providers

5.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
unregistered person in India (generally address is not available on record)

Location of Supplier

Not to be treated as import of services

Procedural and Administrative Convenience.
Difficult to capture and administer such cases

6.

Supply by Indian service provider to foreign
unregistered person where address is available on record (generally foreign
customers would be unregistered)

Location of Recipient

To be treated as Export of Services

To enable zero rating in such cases


6. Place of Supply for Services – Exceptions

6.1. As can be seen above, the general place of supply rule for services based on the destination principle achieves multiple objectives, which inter alia, include objectives to zero rate export of services, tax import of services, provide for seamless credit mechanism and transfer of tax to the appropriate consuming State. However, in certain cases, it was felt that the services are predominantly local in nature and therefore, the source rule will be more appropriate than the destination rule.  Accordingly, various exceptions are provided to the general place of supply rule.

6.2. The following table provides an exhaustive list of exceptions to the general rule:

Sub-section of Section 6

Examples

Place of Supply

4(a)

Services in relation to Immovable property

Location
of immovable property

4(b)

Services of hotels

Location
of immovable property

4(c)

Mandap-keeper services

Location
of immovable property

4(d)

Ancillary services related to the above

Location
of immovable property

Explanation to section 4

Services in relation to accommodation on boats and vessels

Place where the boat/ vessel is located or intended to be located, if
intended to be located in more than one state, on a proportionate reasonable
basis

5

Services in relation to restaurant, catering, personal grooming,
fitness, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery

Place
of performance of service

6

Services in relation to training and performance appraisal

1.      Provided to registered person- Location
of service recipient

2.      Provided to others- place of performance

7

Services in relation to admission to an event

Place of the event, if held in more than one state, proportionate
basis

8

Organization of events, ancillary services and sponsorship

1.      Provided to registered person- Location
of service recipient

2.      Provided to others- place of event

9(a)

Services in relation to transportation of goods (including mail or
courier) provided to a registered person

Location of service receiver

9(b)

Services in relation to transportation of goods (including mail or
courier) provided to any other person

Location of handing over of goods

10(a)

Services in relation to passenger transportation to a registered
person

Location of service receiver

10(b)

Services to others in relation to passenger transportation where
embarkation place is known

Place of embarkation

Proviso to 10(b)

Services to others in relation to passenger transportation where
embarkation place is not known

As per sub-section (2) and (3)

11

Services supplied  on board of a
conveyance

First scheduled point of departure

12(a)

Telecommunication services including data, broadcasting, cable and DTH
through fixed communication line, leased circuits, cable or dish antenna

Location of installation of fixed communication line, leased circuits,
cable or dish antenna

12(b)

Telecommunication services by way of a postpaid mobile connection

Location of service receiver on record

12(c)

Telecommunication services by way of a prepaid mobile connection

Location of receipt of pre-payment or where the voucher is sold. In
case of payment through internet banking, location of receiver on record

13

Banking, Financial and stock broking service where service is linked
to the account

Location of service receiver

Proviso to 13

Banking, Financial and stock broking service where service is not
linked to the account

Location of service provider

14(a)

Insurance service provided to a registered person

Location of service receiver

14(b)

Insurance service provided to any other person

Location of service provider

15

Advertisement service provided to Central Government, State
Government, Statutory body or local authority

Respective state in specified proportions

6.3. All the above exceptions can be broadly divided into two baskets:

· Exceptions where the Source Principle is in full play (Example, immoveable property related services) – “Pure Source Principle”

· Exceptions where the Source Principle is in play only for unregistered persons (example, passenger/goods transportation services), whereas the destination principle applies for registered persons – “Hybrid Principle”

6.4. The underlying themes and objectives of these two baskets are analysed in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

7. Place of Supply for Services –Pure Source Principle

7.1. The following are important examples of services which would get classified under this principle

· Services in relation to Immovable property

· Hotels , Mandap-keeper services

· Restaurant, catering, personal grooming, fitness, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery

· Services in relation to admission to an event

· Services supplied  on board of a conveyance

7.2. While there are specific tests for each of these examples, the underlying theme is to enforce Source State Taxation. This impacts the objectives which were laid down for the general place of supply rule. The same is explained through the example of immoveable property where the test is based on the location of immoveable property. Similar principles will apply for other examples listed above as well.

This is tabulated in the table appearing hereafter:

Sr.

Situation

Place of Supply

Impact

Underlying Objective

1.

Supply by Indian service provider to
registered person

Location of Immoveable Property

CGST/SGST 
charged by the service provider would not be available as credit to
the recipient unless he is located in the Same State

Credit will be available only within the
same State and will not flow to another State (therefore the credit is not
seamless, unless ISD Concept is used to distribute the credit)

2.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person

Location of Immoveable Property

CGST/SGST

No Transfer of Tax to the Destination State

3.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
person in India

Location of Immoveable Property

Not to be treated as import of service

Since such services cannot be substituted
between Indian service provider and foreign service provider, the risk of non
level playing field is low

4.

Supply by Indian service provider to
foreign person

Location of Immoveable Property

CGST/SGST

No benefit of export of services

7.3. At a practical level, businesses may see cascading effect of taxes when the executives travel to other States and stay in hotels. Unless the business is registered in the other State (either as a supplier or as an input service distributor), the credit will not be available, resulting in cascading effect of taxes. It may therefore be represented to the Government that Section 6(4) be suitably amended so as to reclassify the same from the source principle to the hybrid principle (explained later) and thereby permit seamless flow of credit.

8. Place of Supply for Services –Hybrid Principle

8.1.As stated earlier, this basket of exclusions covers cases where the source principle is in play only for unregistered persons (example, passenger/goods transportation services) whereas the destination principle applies for registered persons.

8.2.The following are important examples of services which would get classified under this principle

· Training and Performance Appraisal

· Organisation of events and ancilliary services including sponsorship

· Transportation of Goods including mail and courier

· Passenger Transportation Services

8.3. The objectives of these tests are two fold – to ensure seamless credit flow amongst registered persons and at the same time enforce the source principle vis-à-vis the Indian territory as a whole. Again, there are specific tests for each of these examples, but the underlying theme is explained through the example of goods transportation where the test is based on the place from where the goods are loaded (only in cases where the customer is not registered). Similar principles will apply for other examples listed above as well

Sr.

Situation

Place of Supply

Impact

Underlying Objective

1.

Supply by Indian service provider to registered
person

Location of Recipient

IGST charged by the service provider would
be available as credit to the recipient

Seamless flow of Credit

2.

Supply by Indian service provider to
unregistered person

Place of Loading of Goods

CGST/SGST

No Transfer of Tax to the Destination State

3.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
registered person in India

Location of Recipient

IGST payable as import of services

Brings level playing field between Indian
and foreign service providers

4.

Supply by a foreign service provider to
unregistered person in India

Place of Loading of Goods (generally
outside India)

Not to be treated as import of services

Procedural and Administrative Convenience.

5.

Supply by Indian service provider to
foreign unregistered person

Place of Loading of Goods (generally in
India)

CGST/SGST

No benefit of export of services


9. Conclusion

9.1. The concept of IGST and the place of supply rules in respect of inter-state transactions are totally new and unique to the Indian context. While the policy makers have tried their best to keep the rules as simple as possible and also achieve the multifarious objectives embedded therein, there could be many areas where the situation may not have been foreseen by the Government resulting in unintended hardship.

9.2. The determination of the location of the supplier or the recipient in case of entities which are located in multiple States is based on the test of ‘establishment most directly connected with the supply’. The determination of such establishment can be a challenge and may also be subjective to a large extent. However, since the said determination is similarly worded in many jurisdictions, the international jurisprudence in this regard may assist the tax payers and the consultants till the time the judiciary reiterates some fundamental propositions in this regard.  In the interim, it definitely appears that the prescribed model laws represent a good start on the topic.

The reporting season is drawing to a close !

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The audit season has come to a close and the tax season has got stretched in organically due to Income Declaration Scheme (IDS) into October. Hopefully, when you receive this journal you have enough time and mind space to go through all that which this Issue contains.

Income Declaration
Scheme (IDS)

IDS
window ended with declarations amounting to Rs. 65,250 crores (from 64,250
disclosures) which should result in tax revenues of Rs. 29,262 crores. We are
not sure whether this amount meets the estimated collection expectations or not.
I am using the word, expectation, unlike many who use the word ‘target’, which
I believe is inappropriate.  It is now a trend
that targets are set for tax collection and then officials are made to work
towards it. Such verbiage results in application of methods that are
inconsistent with the fundamental features of Indian taxation system. In the
same breath I hope that this is a definitive beginning of an endeavour to end
the menace of black money and all the evils related to it. Let’s hope that we
will soon have some data in a b road form as to the nature of persons who have
declared and whether they include the usual suspects who generate, hoard and
circulate cash. Till this ‘target’ is not dealt with, we can be sure that cash
economy is here to stay.

Internal Financial
Controls (IFC)

On the accounting side we had the
first time reporting on Internal Financial Controls by auditors on the design
and operative effectiveness of IFC over financial reporting. While the concept
did have its origins in the same realm from where the company law was drafted, butthe
‘one size fits all’ applicability was a dampener. IFC was made a part of every auditor’s
report, be it of a newly started enterprise, to relatively small marketing
subsidiary of a foreign parent  to listed
mega enterprises. . The ministry of corporate affairs did not bring out any
guidance, relief, or progressive application. Such progressive approach could
have allowed reporting to mature and given smaller enterprises some breathing
time.. The present reporting requirement seemed like asking for use of a water
hose to kill a mosquito .  A ray of
relief came when the ICAI brought out the second technical publication on IFC
and covered reporting situations in a more practical, rational and realistic
way. This publication did bring sense by negating the effect of the overarching
reporting requirement of the law. It also enunciated situations where auditors
comments could be more relevant and serve the purpose of the reporting. While
many of us, whether in Industry or profession know that while the concept is
useful, it needs to be made more specifically relevant so that’s the benefits
can be tangibly felt by the company to which it applies.  The Society on its part did bring out a  small booklet that was published well in time.

GST

GST journey has been like the
story of a Bollywood blockbuster. A large part of the story was drama and suspense
for a long time. The story has taken a strong turn since the passage of the constitutional
amendment. Now the story is shaping to become a action packed thriller till the
end of this fiscal. I guess till the bill is finally drafted, all inputs are
taken and procedure laid out, it will remain that way since the producers and directors of GST seem to desperately want to meet the timeline of 1st
April 2017 which will be a fitting time for an interval. From then onwards, most
of us would wish that the story turns out to be all romance and not turn into a
tragedy or a horror show.

I will not go into the details of
the current stage of evolution of GST. However, For every practitioner, even at
the cost of repetition, emphasis, or inspiration I have to say that GST is
certainly the biggest show in the professional calendar of FY1617 and many
years beyond, .From its sheer impact, opportune timing, wide relevance and of
course the thrill of being an early mover, the GST story is definitely not to
be missed. Irrespective of how the story shapes post interval, you should know
that you can choose not to just watch it, play a part in it. Whatever you
choose, whether enter the cast or watch from the balcony, I wish us all a
pleasant experience.

Ease of doing
business (EoDB) –

The focus on ease of doing
business still remains on the agenda of the government. It is indeed heartening
that EoDB is very much on the implementation radar of this government. This
project, if one may call it so, is an important step towards transforming India
in to a investment destination of choice. I do not see it only from foreign
investment perspective, but also as a means to incentivise local entrepreneurial
talents and pursuit. . . As much as we are aware of, our laws – their
structure, applicability, procedures and interpretation by lower rungs of administrators
remains an issue of concern for entrepreneurs since decades. It’s major fall
out could be serious constraint on job creation and poverty elevation, which
are both part of stated policy and a need of the hour. It cannot be forgotten
that by 2020 we will have 1.35 billion people, amongst them; more than 900
million will be in the working age. All the noise of Make in India to EoDB is
not just a political gimmick but a wakeup call or even an alarm or a siren
sounding loudly.

The centre alone cannot be responsible
for EoDB, but states have to chip in and work towards a common goal. In this
context a 98 point action plan was formulated by the centre and states
together. The points included, single window clearances setting, monitoring
time lines for registrations, self certification instead of inspections amongst
other things. These points had to be adopted at state level to bring India out
of the dungeon of the ridiculous and roar into the 50th rank by 2017. The timeline
does remain to be stiff and ambitious, and rightly so, considering the urgency..
The good news is that 25 states have completed 75% of the 98 points action plan
goals.  

Juxtapose a recent report by The National
Academies of Engineering, Sciences and Medicine, USA which reported that Indian
migrants to the US were the most entrepreneurial and contributed billions of
dollars to the economy. If we look at it from our national perspective, two
aspects stand out. The entrepreneurial capabilities of Indians and wonders that
right environment can do to actualise those capabilities. With deregulation and
further reduction in excessive and irrelevant reporting requirements which
place a burden on small and medium businesses, we can reach from the ridiculous
towards relevant.

Kashmir situation

As I write this I am spending
time with professor Meem Hai Zaffar, PhD from Srinagar. He is a thorough
Kashmiri – a pluralist, rooted in Local as well as national traditions of culture
and philosophy. He tells me that even today; the cultural traditions prevalent
in Kashmir have tremendous cultural unity with rest of India. This includes
inter religious connection rising way above borders of religions, in the words
of traditional songs to customs. The multi cultural ethos and expansive values
find expression in local songs, folklore, shrines, and so on. He tells me that
the deep cultural tradition of Kashmir, going back to Kashyap Rishi of the
yore, to Lal -Ded to Nund Rishi is alive. I wanted to share this conversation, as
we normally hear only political facet of things in media, whereas culture is
what binds people and nations.

Wishing you a happy Dussehra and a joyous Diwali!

Raman Jokhakar

Co-chairman

Journal Committee

VALUES OF LIFE

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“Values are our personal beliefs we would
like to live by”

Values of life make life of a human
being valuable. It is the values chosen and practiced by a person that make
life of a person valuable. Values are our personal beliefs we live by. One
would certainly like to know the `values’
the pursuit of which improve the quality of life – add value to life. Krishna in Chapter 13 of Gita, in Shlokas 7 to
11, teaches Arjun the values which are essential, and enumerates 20 values. These twenty values are: (1) Amanitvam
(which may be loosely translated as humility;
(2) Unpretentiousness; (3) Non injury; (4) Forgiveness, (5) Uprightness, (6)
Service to the teachers, (7) Purity; (8) Steadiness; (9) Self control; (10)
Indifference to sense objects; (11) Absence of egoism; (12) Repeated perception
of the pain of birth, old age, death and diseases; (13) Non-attachment; (14)
Non-identification of self with relatives; (15) Evenness of mind in both
favourable and unfavourable times; (16) Unwavering devotion; (17) Constancy in
self-knowledge; (15) Giving up undesirable company; (19) Consistency in self
knowledge; and (20) Perception of the end of true knowledge.

Truly a long and a formidable list. The path of the Seeker is like
walking on Razor’s Edge. As Kathopanishad says:

Having rushed through Gita a number
of times I started believing that I have understood the above verses describing
`values’ till I came across a book
called “Moolyo” (Values – The Gate to
Self Realization) written by Swami Viditatmanandji. Reading this treatise was an eye opener. Shri Viditatmanandji
in simple language has explained the meaning of these 20 values. In this
article I propose to deal with just one of them; the very first quality of `Amanitvam’.

There are many words in Sanskrit
which cannot be adequately translated in English. There is no exact equivalent.
“Amanitvam” is one such word. The
English equivalent is ‘humility’ which does not really bring out the import of the word “Amanitvam”.

I like the word “Amanitvam”. It is a quaint little word with deep-rooted meaning. I liked it
even more when I read the meaning as
explained by Swami Viditatmanandji.  Amanitvam can be best understood by
understanding its opposite term “Manitvam”.
Manitvam is the (negative) quality of
having very high expectations for the recognition one’s qualities, achievements,
status, education etc. It is generated from the false pride about one’s own
self. We expect respect for our position –
for example –
 “I am the boss”, “I am
rich”, “I am a scholar”.   “I am an
elder” ……. We get disturbed when expected respect
is
not accorded or extended.
Being free from such feelings is Amanitvam.

We have to realize that we are
complete. We do not require anything to become complete. We have to understand
that “I” am the soul, the Atma which is complete. We do not need outside
appreciation to be complete. As Ishavasya Upnishads says:

“Amanitvam” means “neither
begging for respect, nor hankering for praise or appreciation”, and not being disturbed even when one does not get
a well deserved credit.

Let us learn : a bird sings whether anyone appreciates or not. A
flower spreads its fragrance without wanting any praise from anyone. Sun rises
and shines on everyone without seeking
namaskar
. Hence one has to go on doing one’s work like them, without
waiting to be asked or appreciated.

To stop begging for respect is the
first step towards adding value to life. Amanitvam truly is the most
important value. That is why Krishna places
it first in the list of values’. The world may not recognize the
goodness of a person, but not to be perturbed by non-appreciation is the first
step in our progress as the seeker.

Ultimately Amanitvam reflects the basic philosophy of Gita, viz; one has a right to work but not to
the fruits thereof.  We have to do our
duty irrespective of whether it is appreciated or not.  I conclude
by quoting
from a song in an old
film “Yatrik”:

Narendra Modi’s essential vision of Indian institutions – Creating prosperity for India will involve changing the rules of the game

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In an annual lecture organized by NITI Aayog on 26 August, Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked: “There was a time when development was believed to depend on the quantity of capital and labour. Today, we know that it depends as much on the quality of institutions and ideas.” Modi’s comment seems to be inspired, partly, from Why Nations Fail (2012) by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. In their thought-provoking book, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that institutions, and they alone, determine the prosperity of a nation. Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of institutions. The first refers to rules of the game—formal laws and informal norms. The second is in the nature of organizations.

Douglas North makes a distinction: “If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players.” Geoffrey Hodgson clarifies that North’s treatment of organizations as players does not rule out their becoming institutions themselves, especially when intra-organizational conflicts are taken into account. Since Modi went on to talk about NITI Aayog, which he set up as an evidence-based think tank, he was most probably talking about the second kind of institution—the organization. But his repeated reference to “ideas”—and transformative ones at that—means he did not preclude the first kind. After all, the concept of limited liability was just an idea before New York made it a law in 1811 and moved towards becoming the financial centre of the world.

“Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills,” say Acemoglu and Robinson, need to be supported by “inclusive political institutions, that is, those that distribute political power widely in a pluralistic manner and are able to achieve some amount of political centralization…” If NITI Aayog is an example of a new organization set up by the Modi government, the monetary policy framework has brought in new rules for fighting inflation. The goods and services tax (GST) council can be an example of the inclusive political institution that Acemoglu and Robinson talk about. The GST council centralizes indirect tax collection while providing both the states and centre a voice in setting tax rates.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory is not without sceptics. Jared Diamond has criticized it for ignoring geography; Arvind Subramanian says it fails to explain the development trajectory of both India and China. With India too poor for its level of political institutions and China too behind in its institutions for its level of income, Subramanian says Acemoglu and Robinson fail to explain the development trajectory of “one-third of humanity”.

Francis Fukuyama blames it for not elaborating on what makes an inclusive institution as opposed to an “extractive” one. Crucially, Fukuyama does not find the theory original as he says there is “no real difference between the ‘extractive/inclusive’ distinction” in Acemoglu-Robinson “and the ‘limited/open’ access distinction” in Violence and Social Orders (2009) by North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast. The latter three have argued that limited access order—the default state of human societies—create political stability by limiting economic and political participation. Not many nations have been able to break out of this by creating open access order which maintains political stability along with open economic and political participation.

While agreeing that the institutions are important, the critics don’t think they alone can explain prosperity. But Modi’s focus on institutions is not misplaced either. The critics of Acemoglu and Robinson will be satisfied with his verbiage. India’s bridge to open access order will involve changing the rules of the game—creating competitive markets and liberal institutions, not just seeking higher cash flows under the same old rules.

But when speaking of organizations as institutions, Modi will also have to focus on institutional design. Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta argue that “limited effectiveness of its public institutions” is both “a critical factor explaining India’s modest record in governance and development” and a result of poor institutional design. Therefore, even if the monetary policy framework is a commendable development, it does not take away from the challenge of appointing the right people to man the monetary policy committee. Creating a culture of evidence-based thinking at NITI Aayog is also an institutional design problem. An institution in place tasked with evidence-based thinking is not enough

(Source: Editorial in Mint Newspaper dated 07.09.2016)

5 Sections 220(2) and 221(1) – Penalty – Default in payment of tax – Penalty should not exceed the amount of tax in arrears – Tax in arrears does not include interest payable u/s. 220(2)

CIT vs. Oryx Finance and Investment P.
Ltd.; 395 ITR 745 (Bom):

The return of income was processed u/s.
143(1) Act, 1961 and a demand was raised. The Assessing Officer also imposed
penalty of Rs. 1,19,30,677 u/s. 221(1) of the Act for default by the assessee
in the payment of demand. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that
the penalty should not exceed the amount of tax in arrears and that tax in
arrears does not include interest payable u/s. 220(2).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   On reading the provisions
of section 221 conjointly with the definition of “tax” as detailed u/s. 2(43)
of the Act, the irresistible conclusion that would be drawn was that the
phraseology “tax in arrears” as envisaged in section 221 of the Act would not
take within its realm the interest component.

 ii)   The Assessing Officer
could impose penalty for default in making the payment of tax, but it should
not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. Tax in arrears would not include the
interest payable u/s. 220(2) of the Act.”

4 Sections 9 – DTAA between India and U.K – Arbitration – r.w.s. 195, and article 5 of DTAA – Income – Deemed to accrue or arise in India (Capital gains) – Whether arbitration proceedings against retrospective tax imposed by Finance Act, 2012 brought by Vodafone Group, UK under the Indo-UK BIPA (Bilateral Investment and Promotion Agreement) are liable to be stayed when on same issue an arbitration proceeding brought by Vodafone International Holdings BV is pending? – Multiple foreign corporate entities of same group cannot bring multiple arbitration proceedings under multiple investment protection treaties against a host State in relation to same investment, same economic harm and same measures especially when reliefs sought are same

UOI vs. Vodafone Group PLC UK; [2017] 84
taxmann.com 224 (Delhi):

Hutchinson Telecommunications International
Limited (HTIL) earned capital gains on the sale of stakes to Vodafone
International Holdings B.V. (VIHBV) in an Indian company by the name of
Hutchinson Essar Limited (HEL) for a certain consideration. The acquisition of
stake in HEL by VIHBV was held liable for tax deduction at source u/s. 195 and
since VIHBV failed to honour its tax liability, a demand u/s. 201(1)(1A)/220(2)
for non-deduction of tax was raised on VIHBV. However, the Apex Court quashed
the said demand. Subsequently, a retrospective amendment to section 9(1) and
section 195 read with section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 re-fastened the
liability on VIHBV.

It was stated in the plaint that aggrieved
by the imposition of tax, VIHBV, the subsidiary of defendants invoked the
arbitration clause provided under the Bilateral Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement (BIPA) between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of
Netherlands for the promotion and protection of investments through a notice of
dispute and subsequent notice of arbitration. While the said arbitration
proceedings were pending, the defendants served a notice of dispute and notice
of arbitration upon the plaintiff for resolution of an alleged dispute under
the India-UK BIPA primarily in respect of the same income tax demand that VIHBV
had identified as protected investment under the India-Netherlands BIPA and
which was already under adjudication before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted
under BIPA. It was stated in the plaint that though the plaintiff had raised
preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal constituted
under the India-Netherlands BIPA yet the tribunal ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction and merits should be heard together.

On an application made by the Union of India
challenging the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Delhi High Court
held as under:

“i)   This Court is of the prima
facie
view that in the present case, there is duplication of the parties
and the issues. Prima facie, this Court is also of the view that India
constitutes the natural forum for the litigation of the defendants’ claim
against the plaintiff. In fact, the reliefs sought by the defendants under the
India-UK BIPA and by the VIHBV the subsidiary of defendants under the
India-Netherlands BIPA are virtually identical.

 ii)   This Court in Pankaj
Aluminium Industries (P.) Ltd. vs. Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd., 2011 IV AD
(Delhi) 212
after relying upon DHN Food Distributors Ltd. vs. London
Borough of Tower Hamlets
[1976] 3 ALL ER 462 at Page 467 has recognised the
doctrine of single economic entity. Consequently, the defendants as well as
their subsidiary VIHBV, prima facie, seem to be one single economic
entity.

 iii)   This Court is of the prima
facie
opinion that as the claimants in the two arbitral proceedings form
part of the same corporate group being run, governed and managed by the same
set of shareholders, they cannot file two independent arbitral proceedings as
that amounts to abuse of process of law. This Court is further of the prima
facie
view that there is a risk of parallel proceedings and inconsistent
decisions by two separate arbitral Tribunals in the present case. In the prima
facie opinion of this Court, it would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to
permit the defendants to prosecute the foreign arbitration.

 iv)  Consequently, defendant,
their servants, agents, attorneys, assigns are restrained from taking any
action in furtherance of the notice of dispute and the notice of arbitration
and from initiating arbitration proceedings under India-UK Bilateral Investment
Protection Agreement or continuing with it as regards the dispute mentioned by
the defendants.”

9 Section 69 – Unexplained Investment – A. Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95 Seizure of diaries and files – No cogent evidence to prove assessee booked vehicles in fictitious names or earned premium by sale – No addition for unexplained investment permissible on conjectures or surmises

CIT vs. Classic Motors Ltd.; 396 ITR 1
(Del):

The assessee was a car dealer. Pursuant to a
search action u/s. 132 of the Act, 1961 in the premises of the assessee certain
diaries and files were seized. Based on some abbreviations found in the seized
diaries, but, which did not state any particulars of amounts or addresses, the
Assessing Officer held that there were unexplained investments on account of
booking of vehicles in fictitious names for the A. Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95, and
also by selling those vehicles at a premium for the A. Y. 1993-94.

Accordingly, he made additions calculated at
25% of peak booking amounts as unexplained investments. The Tribunal held that
without any material or evidence, no additions could have been made and deleted
the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The Appellate Tribunal
did not err in appreciating the evidence before it and concluding that without
cogent and credible material that the bookings were made by the assessee for
itself, the additions ought not to have been made.

 ii)   The Assessing Officer’s
additions made on account of peak booking amounts, as unexplained investments
from undisclosed income, were based on conjectures and surmises. The questions
are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

8 Section 263 – Revision – A. Y. 2009-10 AO not specifically mentioning particular claim does not mean that AO passed assessment order without making enquiry in respect of allowability of claim – AO not expected to raise more queries if he was satisfied about admissibility of claim on basis of material and details supplied – Order not erroneous or prejudicial to Revenue – Order u/s. 263 is not valid

MOIL vs. CIT; 396 ITR 244 (Bom):

The assessee, a public sector undertaking
was involved in the business of extraction and sale of manganese ore, generation
of electricity and manufacturing and sale of EMV and ferro minerals. In the
course of the scrutiny assessment for the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer
issued notice u/s. 142(1) of the  Act,
1961, requiring details in respect of twenty items. According to item No. 9,
the Assessing Officer asked the assessee to give a detailed note of expenditure
for the corporate social responsibility along with the bifurcation of the
expenses under different heads. In pursuance of the notice, the assessee had given
the bifurcation of expenses under various heads towards the corporate social
responsibility claim. The Assessing Officer allowed certain claims without
making a specific reference to them in the assessment order and disallowed
certain claims after giving detailed reasons for the disallowance. The
Commissioner invoked the jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act after holding that
the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order without making any
enquiry regarding the alowability of expenses claimed by the assessee under the
head “corporate social responsibility” and hence, the order was erroneous and
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and remanded the matter to the
Assessing Officer to redo the assessment in respect of the claim of the
assessee pertaining to the corporate social responsibility. The Tribunal
confirmed this order.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High
Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   The Assessing Officer
applied his mind to the claims made by the assessee and wherever the claims
were disallowable they have been discussed in that assessment order and there
was no discussion or reference in respect of the claims that were allowed. It
could not be said that merely because the Assessing Officer had not
specifically mentioned about the claim in respect of corporate social
responsibility, the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order without
making any enquiry in respect of the allowability of the claim of corporate
social responsibility.

 ii)   The query pertaining to
corporate social responsibility was exhaustively answered and the assessee had
provided the data pertaining to the expenditure under each head of the claim in
respect of corporate social responsibility, in details. The Assessing Officer
was not expected to raise more queries, if he was satisfied about the
admissibility of the claim on the basis of the material and the details
supplied. The provisions of section 263 of the Act could not have been invoked
by the Commissioner.

 iii)   The orders of the
Commissioner of Income-tax and the ITAT are quashed and set aside.”

 

7 Section 263 – Revision – A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 Erroneous and prejudicial to revenue – AO not overlooking relevant facts, not failing to make enquiries – Order not erroneous – Revision not justified – Revision order covering issues not mentioned in show-cause notice – Not permissible. DTAA between India and Oman, arts, 11 and 25 – Credit for tax paid in other country – Dividend received from Omani company by PE of assessee in Oman – Clarification of Oman authorities that exemption granted to dividend under Omani tax laws was tax incentive – To be regarded as conclusive – Assessments in earlier years allowing tax credit – Assessee entitled to benefit of tax credit

Principal CIT vs. Krishak Bharati
Co-perative Ltd.; 395 ITR 572 (Del):

The assessee was a multi co-operative
society registered in India. In a joint venture with the Oman oil company, it
formed a company in Oman in which it held 25% of the share holding. The
assessee established a branch office in Oman to oversee its investments in the
joint venture company. The branch office was independently registered as a
company in Oman and claimed the status of PE of the assessee in Oman under
article 25 of the DTAA between India and Oman and filed returns of income under
the Oman tax laws. For the A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, the assessments were
completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, 1961, bringing to tax dividend received by
the assessee from the joint venture company but allowing tax credit in respect
of the dividend received from the joint venture company, although the dividend
was exempted under the Oman tax laws by an amendment w.e.f 2000. Thereafter,
the Principal Commissioner issued a notice u/s. 263 of the Act on the ground
that any income which was not taxed at all according to the tax laws, could not
be construed as an incentive and that the exemption granted was not an
incentive granted under the Omani tax laws. He held that no tax credit was due
to the assessee u/s. 90 and that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was
erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. He also held that the assessee had
credited more income than the dividend received by it, that the accretion and
addition to its opening capital in terms of the profit on account of its PE in
Oman, audited and submitted during the proceedings, were not disclosed in its
accounts in India. He directed the Assessing Officer to make the assessment
accordingly.

The Tribunal held that the order passed u/s.
263 was without jurisdiction and unsustainable and that tax credit had been
allowed to the assessee during several preceding assessment years and
therefore, when there was no change in the facts or the relevant provisions of
law, following the principle of consistency of approach, credit for deemed
dividend tax was allowable in respect of the assessment year in question. It
also held that, (a) the annual accounts of the PE were prepared in accordance
with the International Financial Reporting Standards and accordingly, its share
or profit or loss in the joint venture company at 25% had to be accounted as
income in the profit and loss account of the PE eventhough such income was only
to the extent of dividend declared and distributed, (b) the joint venture
company was required to transfer a specified amount out of the total
distributable profit to reserve under the Omani tax laws and only the remaining
profits were distributed to the shareholders, and (c) therefore, even under the
Omani laws, the PE offered for taxation only the dividend income actually
received and not the total share of the PE in the profits of the joint venture
company. The undistributed share of profits shown in the books of the PE could
not be said to partake the character of income under the provisions of the  Act, 1961, as only the real income was
chargeable to tax. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the
assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   The order u/s. 263 dealt
with issues which were not covered by the show-cause notice which was issued to
the assessee. This was not permissible.

 ii)   Neither did the Assessing
Officer overlook the relevant facts nor did he not make inquiries. The queries
were specifically with respect to dividend income and exemption and had also
considered the explanation of the Omani authorities on the subject. Therefore,
the Commissioner’s view that the assessment orders were erroneous and required
revision was unsustainable.

 iii)   The certification
rendered by the Sultanate of Oman in its letter to the effect that under the
company income tax law of Oman, dividend formed part of gross income chargeable
to tax and that the tax law of Oman provided income tax exemption to companies
undertaking to certain identified economic activities considered essential for the
country’s economic development with a view to encouraging investments in such
sectors, were to be regarded as conclusive. If the tax authorities had any
doubts, they could not have proceeded to elevate them into findings, but
addressed them to Omani authorities if not directly, then through the Indian
diplomatic channels. In not doing so, but proceeding to interpret the laws and
certificate of Oman authorities, the Department had fallen into error.

 iv)  The Appellate Tribunal
found that up to the tax year 2011 in the orders passed under the income tax
law of Oman, dividend had been included in the total income and thereafter
deduction had been granted and that it was established that the assessee was
entitled to get credit for the deemed dividend tax under the provisions of
section 90 of the Act, 1961, together with the clarifications issued by the
Sultanate of Oman and the assessment made under Omani laws.

 v)   The findings of fact did
not call for interference and the Appellate Tribunal did not err in holding
that the Principal Commissioner had erred in directing the Assessing Officer
u/s. 263 to withdraw the tax credit. Questions of law are answered in favour of
the assessee and the appeals are dismissed.”

6 Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – A. Y. 2008-09 – Notice for reassessment by authority other than authority normally assessing assessee – Not mere irregularity or curable defect – Defective issuance of notice and not service of notice- Notice not valid – To be quashed

Shirishbhai Hargovandas Sanjanwalla vs.
ACIT; 396 ITR 167(Guj):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee’s return
was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act, 1961 by the ACIT Circle 4(2) who is the
jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the assessee. Subsequently, ACIT Circle
5(2) issued a notice u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment. According to the
Department, as the assessee was described as an agriculturist in a sale deed,
having a particular residential address, his assessment was made by the ACIT
Circle 5(2). The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the reassessment
notice.

 The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 “i)   In administrative or
quasi judicial matters, where exercise of powers is well regulated and segregated
through rules and regulations or administrative instructions, no authority or
officer who is not vested with the jurisdiction of the particular nature can
exercise such powers which would be purely a case of lack of authority failing
which there would be total anarchy and any officer positioned at any place may
choose to exercise jurisdiction over any assessee.

 ii)   It was a defective
issuance of notice and not a service of notice as it was issued by an authority
who was not competent. The Department ignored the fact that the assessee had
been regularly assessed year after year and originally was within the
jurisdiction of Income-tax Circle 9 and after restructuring, the ACIT Circle
4(2). Therefore, the ACIT Circle 5(2) had no jurisdiction to assess and issue
the notice for reassessment. It was not a mere irregularity or a defect which
could have been cured, but a question of jurisdiction of the authority to
reopen the assessment. The notice was to be quashed.“

3 Section 32 – Depreciation – Jetty – A. Y. 2005 – 06 – Rate of depreciation – 100% depreciation on temporary building structure – Jetty is a temporary structure – Entitled to 100% depreciation

CIT vs. Anand Transport; 396 ITR 204
(Mad):

The assessee was in the business of loading
and unloading of bulk cargo, relating to exports and imports, transportation of
cargo, both within and outside the ports and by see and attending to all works,
incidental to the works connected with the main business. The assessee was
awarded a contract by the MMTC on May 6, 2004. A jetty or loading platform was
erected, albeit, temporarily to facilitate loading of iron-ore onto vessels, in
furtherance of the contract awarded by MMTC, in favour of the assessee. The
assessee claimed 100% depreciation on the jetty. The Assessing Officer came to
the conclusion that the jetty or platform was a plant, as it was an apparatus
or tool which only enabled the assessee to carry on its business. The Assessing
Officer’s observation was that the jetty consisted mainly of a belt conveyor
and electrical support, and that the civil work was negligible. The Assessing
Officer further held that the conveyor belt could be dismantled and reused. He
allowed 25% depreciation on the jetty. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   A bare perusal of the
meaning of the word “jetty” would show that, it is in the nature of a
construction which is used either as a landing stage, a small pier, bridge,
staircase or a construction, built into the water to protect the harbor. The
utility of the jetty is limited by its construction. It is used to obtain
either access to a vessel, or protect the harbour.

 ii)   The provisions of the
contract would show that the jetty or loading platform was constructed by the
assessee on build-operate-transfer basis for a period of three years from the
date of commencement of the vessel loading operation. Quite clearly, the jetty
or loading platform, in this case, was erected by the assessee in order to
effectuate its business under the contract entered into with MMTC, which was
tenure based, and therefore, could not have been treated as anything else but a
temporary erection. Upon completion of the contract the assessee was required
to dismantle it.

 iii)   The fact that the jetty had other contraptions attached to it, such as a
conveyor belt, to facilitate the process of loading could not convert such a
structure into a plant. Therefore, even if the functional test was employed the
main function of a jetty, in the facts of the instant case, is to provide a
passage or a platform to ferry articles onto the concerned vessels. This could
have been done manually. That it was done by using a conveyor belt would not
convert a jetty into a plant. The assessee was entitled to 100% depreciation on
the jetty.”

2 Section 41(1) – Business income – Deemed income A. Y. 2007-08 – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Benefit must be obtained in respect of liability – Assessee a co-operative bank – Stale demand drafts and pay orders for sums owed by assessee bank to customers – Bank not deriving benefit on account of liability and liability still subsisting – Section 41(1) not applicable

CIT vs. Raddi Sahakara Bank Niyamitha;
395 ITR 652 (Karn)

The assessee was a co-operative bank. For
the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer made an addition in the income of the
assessee on the ground of demand drafts and pay orders payable as on the last
date of the financial year, which were not so far encashed by the customers. He
treated the said amount as representing cessation of liability u/s. 41(1) of
the Income-tax Act, (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”)
1961, and added back the amount to the declared income of the assessee. The
Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i)   In order to invoke
section 41(1) of the Act, 1961, it must be first established that the assessee
had obtained some benefit in respect of a trading liability which was earlier
allowed as a deduction. It is not enough if the assessee derives some benefit
in respect of such liability, but it is essential that such benefit arises by
way of “remission” or “cessation” of liability.

 ii)   The addition could not be
made u/s. 41(1) of the Act, since the liability of the assessee bank to pay
back the amounts to the customers in respect of such stale demand drafts and
pay orders does not cease in law. The appeal is dismissed.”

1 Section 37(1) – Business expenditure -A. Ys. 1997-98 to 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2009-10 – Year in which deductible (Licence fee) – Assessee, sole proprietor of Oil Corporation, was granted licence by Northern Railway for use of a piece of Railway land against a licence fee – On 20/01/1999, Northern Railway revised licence fee taking revised base rate as on 01/01/1985 – Thereafter, for each of years from A. Y. 2002-03 till A. Y. 2008-09, Northern Railway issued letters demanding enhanced licence fees and damages – Assessee paid actual licence fee and claimed deduction on account of licence fee but had disputed enhanced liability – AO disallowed licence fee on ground that it was a contingent liability and not allowable as a deduction till liability for enhanced licence fee, which had been contested by assessee, actually crystallized

1 Business expenditure
– Section 37(1) – A. Ys. 1997-98 to 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2009-10 – Year in
which deductible (Licence fee) – Assessee, sole proprietor of Oil Corporation,
was granted licence by Northern Railway for use of a piece of Railway land
against a licence fee – On 20/01/1999, Northern Railway revised licence fee
taking revised base rate as on 01/01/1985 – Thereafter, for each of years from
A. Y. 2002-03 till A. Y. 2008-09, Northern Railway issued letters demanding
enhanced licence fees and damages – Assessee paid actual licence fee and
claimed deduction on account of licence fee but had disputed enhanced liability
– AO disallowed licence fee on ground that it was a contingent liability and
not allowable as a deduction till liability for enhanced licence fee, which had
been contested by assessee, actually crystallized – Since assessee was
following mercantile system of accounting, liability to pay enhanced licence
fee would arise in year in which demand was made or to which it related
irrespective of when enhanced fee was actually paid by assessee 

Jagdish Prasad Gupta vs. CIT; [2017] 85
taxmann.com 105 (Delhi):

The assessee the sole proprietor of Oil
Corporation was granted licence by the Northern Railway for use of a piece of
Railway land for constructing and maintaining a depot for storage of petroleum
products etc. By a letter dated 08/02/1980, the Northern Railway revised
the licence fee. On 23/03/1988, the Northern Railway further enhanced the
licence fee. The Northern railway further terminated the licence for use of the
land on the ground that the assessee had failed to deposit the licence fees.
The Northern Railway applied to the Estate Officer (EO) praying for eviction of
the assessee from the land in question. The said application was disposed of by
the EO holding that the enhancements were made by the Northern Railway too
frequently and without legal basis. Further on 20/01/1999, the Northern Railway
revised the licence fee taking the base rate as on 01/01/1985. Thereafter, for
each of the years from assessment year 2002-03 till assessment year 2008-09,
the Northern Railway issued letters demanding enhanced licence fees and
damages. The tax treatment of the claim of the assessee in its income-tax
returns of the enhanced licence fee was deduction. The said claim was allowed
by the Assessing Officer for A. Ys. 1987-88 to 1994-95. For A. Ys. 1996-97 to
1999-2000, the Assessing Officer allowed the licence fee actually paid by the
assessee, holding that it was a contingent liability and not allowable as a
deduction till the liability for the enhanced licence fee, which had been
contested by the assessee, actually crystalised. CIT(A) and the Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) The undisputed
fact is that the assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting. It
has to book the liability in the year in which it arises irrespective of
whether it in fact discharges the liability in that year. In that sense, the
liability to pay the enhanced licence fee would arise in the year in which
demand is made or to which it relate irrespective of when the enhanced fee is
actually paid by the assessee.

 ii)   In the present case,
the liability of the assessee to pay the enhanced licence fee has, far from
being excused, sought to be enforced by the Northern Railway by repeated demands
notwithstanding the EO’s order dated 28/03/1990. As noted earlier, the Northern
Railway has preferred claim for arrears of enhanced licence fees and damages to
the tune of over Rs. 45 crores against the assessee before the sole Arbitrator
appointed by it. The demand is therefore very much alive and is subject matter
of adjudication in arbitration proceedings.

 iii)  The order dated
29/03/1990 of the EO no doubt holds the termination notice dated 23/03/1988 and
the claim for enhanced licence fee to be bad in law. However, it does not hold
that there is no liability on the assessee to pay the enhanced licence fees as
and when that is determined in accordance with law. The EO has in fact observed
that the Northern Railway ‘should form a definite policy in revising the
licence fee for a considerable period on uniform basis by incorporating the law
of principles of natural justice to avoid unnecessary litigation thereby not
causing losses of revenue to the railway administration under these
circumstances and ensuring prompt and regular payment of licence fee by
licencees.’ Also the EO ends the order by stating. The applicant is free to
revise the licence fee in accordance with the provisions of law and as per
terms of agreement. The order of the EO read in the correct perspective,
requires the Northern Railway to follow the due process of law by giving a
hearing to those adversely affected by the upward enhancement of liability
before a decision is taken. The Revenue’s characterisation of the said order,
as negating the liability to pay the enhanced licence fee for all times to come
does not flow on the above reading of the said order. On the other hand, it is
more consistent with the plea of the assessee that while he is not denying the
liability to pay the licence fee he is only questioning the procedure involved
in its revision which, according to him, is not in accordance with law.
Consequently, it could not be said that the assessee has sought to mislead this
Court by contending that he is not questioning the liability to pay licence fee
but is only questioning the quantification or the quantum of the licence fee.

 iv)  While the revenue may be
right in pointing out that for assessment years 2002-03 to 2005-06, the
assessee claimed only Rs. 35,37,300 as deduction on the ground of enhanced
licence fee although it could have claimed the further enhancement which had
taken place by then, the fact remains that the enhanced liability claimed by
the Railways by its letter dated 20/01/1999 and later by the letter dated 29/07-1999
subsisted and was /being demanded. The explanation offered by the assessee for
this inconsistency in its claim is a plausible one. It does not deter from the
position that being an accrued liability, the enhanced licence fee can be
claimed by it as a deduction in the year in which such liability arose.

 v)   In the arbitration
proceedings, the claim of the Railways includes the claim for the enhanced
licence fee as well as the arrears. The arbitration proceedings could end
either in favour of the Railways or the assessee. If it goes in favour of the
assessee, it would then have no liability to pay such enhanced licence fee and
in the year in which such final decision is rendered, the corresponding
reversal of entries will have to take place in terms of section 41(3). All of
this, in no way, extinguishes the liability of the assessee to pay the licence
fee. The assessee would be justified in claiming the enhanced licence fee as
deduction in the year in which such enhancement has accrued even though the
assessee has not paid such enhanced licence fee in that year. This legal
proposition is well settled.

 vi) The Railways has already
filed its claim before the Arbitrator for the arrears of licence fees and
‘damages’. As rightly held by the Commissioner (Appeals), and concurred with by
the Tribunal, the mere characterisation by the Northern Railway of the amount
claimed by it from the assessee as ‘damages’ will not, in the context of the
present case, make it any less an accrued liability. It is an expenditure
incurred by the assessee corresponding to the income he derives from using the
land for the purposes of his business.

 vii) The Tribunal did not
make a grievous error, in the order passed by it, regarding the claim for
enhanced licence fee as a deduction being allowable not in assessment year
1995-96 but in assessment year 1996-97. The argument that the Tribunal may have
exceeded its jurisdiction done not hold since the revenue has, apart from not
challenging the said order, implemented it fully by the consequent appeal
effect order.

 viii) For all of the above
reasons, the first issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the
revenue by holding that the liability of the assessee to pay enhanced licence
fees for the assessment years in question was an accrued liability which arose
in the year in which demand was raised.”

Annual Value of a Vacant Property

Issue for Consideration

The annual value of any building or land
appurtenant thereto is chargeable to income tax in the hands of the owner,
under the head ‘Income from House Property’, as per section 22 of the
Income-tax Act. The amount received or receivable is deemed to be the annual
value, as per section 23(1)(c), in a case where the property is let and was
vacant during the whole or any part of the previous year and as a result
thereof, the amount received or receivable is less than the sum for which the
property is reasonably expected to be let from year to year.

The relevant part of section 23(1),
substituted with effect from 1.4.2002, reads as under:

23.
(1) For the purposes of section 22, the annual value of any property shall be
deemed to be—

 (a) the sum for which the
property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year; or

 (b) where the property or any
part of the property is let and the actual rent received or receivable by the
owner in respect thereof is in excess of the sum referred to in clause (a), the
amount so received or receivable; or

 (c) where the property or any
part of the property is let and was vacant during the whole or any part of the
previous year and owing to such vacancy the actual rent received or receivable
by the owner in respect thereof is less than the sum referred to in clause (a),
the amount so received or receivable :

Issues arise in interpretation and application
of clause (c) of section 23(1), particularly about the possibility of claiming
the benefit of section 23(1)(c) by limiting the deemed annual value determined
under clause (a), in cases where the property was not let out during the year
and had remained vacant throughout the year. An additional dimension is
provided to the issue in a case where attempts are made to let out the property
without success, or where the property was let out during the preceding
previous year, but had remained vacant during the previous year.

A controversy has arisen around the true
import of clause (c) on account of certain decisions, whereunder the Pune and
other benches of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal have taken a view that the
benefit of clause (c) shall be available even in cases where a property had
remained vacant throughout the year. Against that the Mumbai bench had recently
held that the property should have been let, at least for some part of the
year, for availing the benefit under the said clause.

Vikas Keshav Garud’s Case

The issue in
the recent past had arisen in the case of Vikas Keshav Garud vs. ITO, 71
taxmann.com 214
,
before the Pune Bench of the Tribunal for assessment year 2009-10.

In that case, the commercial premises
situated at Dande Towers, Pune, owned by the assessee, had remained vacant
throughout the financial year 2008-09. The assessee had not offered any deemed
income for the purposes of taxation for assessment year 2009-10. The A.O.
however assessed the notional income of the premises at Rs. 1,51,200 under the
head ‘Income From House Property’ by adopting annual letting value of Rs.
12,600 p.m., which was the monthly rent received by the assessee during the
financial year 2006-07 from a tenant.

The assessee challenged the assessment under
the head ‘Income from House Property’ before the CIT(A) in appeal, which was
dismissed by the CIT(A), by confirming the action of the A.O., relying on the
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Vivek Jain vs.
ACIT, 337 ITR 74 (AP).

The Tribunal, in a further appeal by the
assessee, noticed that the A.O. had denied the benefit of clause (c) on the
ground that the property was not let at all during the year under consideration
and had also held that the intention to let out the property had no bearing on
application of the provisions of clause (c) of section 23(1); that the assessee
had ardently contested the action of the A.O. by relying on the decisions,
before the CIT(A) in the cases of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, 110
ITD 158 (Mum)
and Shakuntala Devi vs. DDIT, ITA No. 1520/Ban/2010 dt.
20.12.2011;
that both the authorities had relied upon the decision in the
case of Vivek Jain (supra) for denying the benefit of clause (c) and
rejecting the claim of the assessee.

The Tribunal noted that the property was let
out in financial year 2006-07 to IDBI Home Finance Ltd. at a monthly rent of
Rs. 12,600 and that the assessee could not let out the property during the
year, which led to the property remaining vacant throughout the year, though it
was available for being let and the intention to let, though clear, could not
fructify into actual letting. The Tribunal, in allowing the claim of the
assessee, held that the underlying principle of the provision was to be viewed
with regard to the intention of the assessee in letting out of the property,
together with the efforts put in by assessee for such letting out; that the
actual rent received from the property would have to be considered as ‘zero’ in
case of an assessee who made appropriate efforts for letting the property, but
failed to let.

Importantly, the Tribunal held that the
language of section 23(1)(c) clearly included a situation, where a property was
vacant for the whole year; that a situation could not co-exist wherein the
property was let during the year, with it being simultaneously vacant for the ‘whole’
year; that the words ‘let’ and ‘vacant’ were mutually exclusive;
that the interpretation placed by the authorities was inconsistent with the
phraseology of the provision.

The Tribunal gathered the legislative intent
of allowing the benefit of clause (c) in the given situation, by contrasting
the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act, whereunder the
legislature in its wisdom used the phraseology ‘house is actually let’.
The Tribunal observed that the legislature, wherever required, had insisted on
actual letting of the property in express terms. Applying the purposive
interpretation, the Tribunal held that the expression “property is let”
had to be read in contrast to “property is self-occupied” to arrive at
the true import of clause (c).

Importantly, the Tribunal observed that the
decision of the high court in Vivek Jain’s case (supra) could not
be read by the revenue in a manner that if the property remained vacant
throughout the year, section 23(1)(c) did not apply at all. The Tribunal also
relied on the fact that the property was actually let out during the financial
year 2006-07. In the totality of the circumstances and having regard to the
provisions of the Act, the Tribunal held that the annual value for the property
had to be assessed at Nil. The appeal of the assessee on this ground was
accordingly allowed by the tribunal.

A similar view was taken by the Mumbai bench
of the Tribunal in the case of Informed Technologies India Ltd. vs. Dy CIT
162 ITD 153.

Sharan Hospitality (P.) Ltd.’s case

The issue again arose before the Mumbai
bench of the ITAT in the case of Sharan Hospitality (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT in
ITA No. 6717/Mum/2012 dt. 12.09.2016
for assessment year 2009-10.

The assessee company, in the facts of the
case during the previous year under consideration, had acquired two properties.
One of the properties was acquired on December 18, 2008 and possession was
received on the same date. The property was acquired with the intent of
letting, so as to earn rental income. The assessee had entered into
negotiations with a company, which was in the process of setting up a state of
the art laboratory, at the relevant time. The basic terms and conditions agreed
upon between the parties for taking the property on rent, w.e.f 1.4.2009
onwards, were recorded in a letter of Intent dated February 9, 2009. The
property was accordingly let with effect from 1.4.2009 at the agreed rent of
Rs.38.95 lakh per month vide Leave and License Agreement dated 06.08.2009. The
Assessing Officer computed the annual value of the said property for assessment
year 2009-10 at Rs.116.85 lakh, i.e., taking notional rent for three months,
being January to March, 2009, ignoring the fact that the property was vacant
during that period. The action of the AO was confirmed by the CIT(A).

In appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee,
while not disputing the quantum of the gross annual rental value, claimed that,
inasmuch as the property, though lettable, was ‘vacant’ during the entire
period of the year since its acquisition in December, 2008; that its annual
value ought to be restricted to the actual rent received or receivable, i.e.,
Nil; that the condition of the property being let was met by the intent to let
out the same; that when the legislature had required the house property to be
actually let, it had stated so, as in section 23(1)(a); that not accepting the
claim of assessee would lead to absurd results, as in a case where the property
was not let for a single day of the year, and was vacant for the whole year,
its AV would stand to be computed taking the lettable value for the entire
year, while if it was let even for a single day during the year, the same would
stand restricted to the actual rent received/receivable, i.e., for one day.

It was further argued that the property
could not be ‘let’ and be ‘vacant‘ for the whole year at the same
time in-as-much as the two conditions could not co-exist, as was pointed out by
the Tribunal in Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, 295 ITR (AT) 341
(Mum).
The words “where the property was let” were to be
construed to include property held with the intent of letting it. Reliance was
also placed on decisions in cases of, Kamal Mishra vs. ITO 19 SOT 251 (Del);
Smt. Poonam Sawhney vs. AO, 20 SOT 69 (Del.); ACIT vs. Dr. Prabha Sanghi, 139
ITD 504 (Del); DLF Office Developers vs. ACIT, 23 SOT 19 (Del); Indu Chandra
vs. DCIT in ITA No. 96/2011 (Luck.); Shakuntala Devi vs. Dy. DIT (in ITA No.
1524/Bang/2010 dated 20.12.2011); Aryabhata Properties Ltd. vs. ACIT (in ITA
No. 6928/Mum/2011 dated 31.7.2013);
and ACIT vs. Suryashankar Properties
Ltd. in ITA No. 5258/Mum/2013 dated 10.6.2015).

The Revenue, in reply, contended that the
notion of ‘proposed to be let’ or ‘held for letting‘, etc.,
could not be imported into the provision, which sought to bring to tax a
notional sum, being the income potential – termed annual value, of a house
property, subject of course to the provisions of the Act, the measure of which
was the fair rental value, defined as the rent at which the house property
might reasonably be let from year to year; that it had nothing to do with the
actual letting of the house property, or the actual receipt of rent, and was in
the nature of an artificial or statutory income; the law in the matter was
well-settled, by the decision in case of CIT vs. Dalhousie Properties Ltd.,
149 ITR 708 (SC); New Piece Goods Bazar Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, 18 ITR 516 (SC); CIT
vs. H. G. Gupta & Sons, 149 ITR 253 (Del);
and Sakarlal Balabhai vs.
ITO, 100 ITR 97 (Guj).
It was further contended that the annual value,
irrespective of whether the property was actually let or not, was thus to be
subjected to tax, unless covered u/s. 23(1)(b), as was reiterated in Sultan
Brothers (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT, 51 ITR 353 (SC)
and In Liquidator of
Mahamudabad Properties (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT, 124 ITR 31 (SC),
wherein it was
held that even where the property was found to be in a state of utter
disrepair, it would yet have some annual value. The decisions relied upon by
the assessee, viz. Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. (supra); Shankuntala
Devi (supra)
; and Indu Chandra (supra) were claimed to be
distinguishable on facts. Reliance was placed on the case of Vivek Jain vs.
ACIT 337 ITR 74 (AP),
wherein the Andhra Pradesh high court, had rejected
similar contentions as were made in the instant case.

The Tribunal noted that a deduction for
vacancy allowance up to assessment year 2001-02, was allowable under clause
(ix) of section 24(1) which clause was omitted w.e.f. assessment year 2002-03.
Instead, section 23(1), substituted w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03, contained clause (c)
that provided for appropriate reduction of annual value in cases where a let
property was vacant. The Tribunal simultaneously took note of various decisions
of the courts, wherein it was held that the vacancy allowance of the kind
provided u/s. 24(1)(ix) could not be claimed if the property was not let out at
all during the previous year concerned, and that a proportionate amount out of
the annual value was permissible to be deducted, only where the property was
let out for a part of the year.

The Tribunal further noted that the issue,
u/s. 24(1)(ix), was well settled in favour of the view that a vacancy allowance
was possible only where the property was let out for a part of the year and not
where the property remained vacant throughout the year. Importantly, the
Tribunal in paragraph 5.3 of its order observed, that the position of the law qua
vacancy remission, post amendment, remained the same. The law laid down by
the courts in interpreting section 24(1)(ix) materially remained the same u/s.
23(1)(c), and therefore, no adjustment was possible under clause (c) of section
23(1) for a property which was vacant throughout the year. It also referred to
Circular no. 14 of 2001 issued by the CBDT for explaining the provisions of the
Finance Act, 2001 and to the Notes to clauses and the Explanatory Memorandum
accompanying the said Finance Act.

The Tribunal, in paragraph 5.2, took a
detailed note of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh high court in the case of Vivek
Jain (supra)
and the reasons supplied by the court in arriving at the
conclusion that no adjustment was possible u/s. 23(1)(c) on account of vacancy
in a case where the property was not let out at all during the year of
assessment.

The Tribunal also took note of the decisions
in cases of Ramesh Chand vs. ITO 29 SOT 570 (Agra) and Indra S. Jain
vs. ITO, 52 SOT 270 (Mum.),
wherein a view similar to the one being
advocated by the revenue was taken. The plethora of cases cited by the assessee
in favour of its claim including the case of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs.
ACIT, 295 ITR (AT) 341 (Mum.),
could not persuade the Tribunal to allow a
relief under clause (c) of section 23(1). On the contrary, the Tribunal
expressed its anguish that the different benches in the past failed to take
notice of the decision in the case of Vivek Jain (supra) and also did
not notice the developed law on the subject while deciding the issue u/s.
24(1)(ix), now omitted. It also observed that the Tribunal, in any case, was
not competent to read down the provision of law in a manner desired by the
assessee.

The Tribunal further observed that vacancy
as a concept had a symbiotic relationship with the notion of letting out and both
of them were intrinsically linked. There could not be a vacancy without actual
letting and there was no scope for the application of the ‘principle of causus
omissus
’, inasmuch as the law on the subject was abundantly plain and
clear. A vacancy could not exist or be considered independent of and de hors
the letting. The assessee’s appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Observations 

The issue under consideration has become
extremely contentious in as much as some of the decisions, delivered by
different benches of the Tribunal, uphold the claim for relief u/s. 23(1)(c) on
account of vacancy, even after the sole decision of the high court on the
subject in the case of Vivek Jain (supra), a decision which was cited
specifically in Vikas Keshav Garud’s case (supra).

In Vivek Jain’s case (supra), the
assessee, a practicing advocate, had adopted an annual value of Rs. Nil in
respect of a property that was vacant during the year as the same was not let
out. The benefit of section 23(1)(c) claimed by him was rejected by the AO, the
CIT(A) and the ITAT. In the further appeal u/s. 260A, the Andhra Pradesh High
Court upheld the action of the assessing officer with the following findings
and observations;

–   the
contention that, as clause (c) provided for an eventuality where a property
could be vacant during the whole of the relevant previous year, both
situations, i.e., “property is let” and “property is vacant for
the whole of the relevant previous year”, could not co-exist, did not
merit acceptance.

 –  a
property let out for two or more years could also be vacant for the whole of a
previous year bringing it within the ambit of clause (c) of section 23(1) of
the Act.

 –   clause
(c) encompassed only such cases where a property was let out for more than a
year in which event alone would the question of it being vacant during the
whole of the previous year arose.

–    the
contention that, if the owner had let out the property even for a day, it would
acquire the status of “let out property” for the purpose of clause
(c) for the entire life of the property even without any intention to let it
out in the relevant year was also not tenable.

–    the circumstances in which the annual let out value of a house
property should be taken as nil was as specified in section 23(2) of the
Act.

–    u/s.
23(l)(c), the period for which a let out property might remain vacant could not
exceed the period for which the property had been let out.

–   if
the property had been let out for a part of the previous year, it can be vacant
only for the part of the previous year for which the property was let out and
not beyond.

–   for that part of the previous year during which the property was not
let out, but was vacant, clause (c) would not apply and it was only clause (a)
which would be applicable, subject of course to sub-sections (2) and (3) of
section 23 of the Act.

–    such
a construction did not lead to any hardship, inconvenience, injustice,
absurdity or anomaly and, therefore, the rule of ordinary and natural meaning
being followed could be departed from.

–    the
benefit u/s. 23(1)(c) could not be extended to a case where the property was
not let out at all.

–       there
was no merit in the submission that the words “property is let” were
used in clause (c) to take out those properties which were held by the
owner for self-occupation from the ambit of the said clause.

–    section
23(2)(a) took out a self-occupied residential house, or a part thereof,
from the ambit of section 23(1) of the Act. Likewise, u/s. 23(2)(b),
where a house could actually not be occupied by the owner, on account of his
carrying on employment, business or profession at any other place requiring him
to reside at such other place in a building not belonging to him, the annual
value of the property was also required to be treated as nil, thereby taking it
out of the ambit of section 23(1) of the Act. Section 23(3)(a) makes it
clear that section 23(2) would not apply if the house, or a part thereof, was
actually let during the whole or any part of the previous year. Thus, only such
of the properties which were occupied by the owner for his residence, or which
were kept vacant on account of the circumstances mentioned in clause (b)
of section 23(2), fell outside the ambit of section 23(1) provided they were,
as stipulated in section 23(3)(a), not actually let during the whole or part of
the previous year.

–    clause
(c) was not inserted to take out from its ambit properties held by the
owner for self-occupation inasmuch as section 23(2)(a) provided for such
an eventuality.

–    it
was only to mitigate the hardship faced by an assessee, and as clause (b)
did not deal with the contingency where the property was let and, because of
vacancy, the actual rent received or receivable by the owner was less than the
sum referred to in clause (a), that clause (c) was inserted.

–      in
cases where the property had not been let out at all, during the previous year
under consideration, there was no question of any vacancy allowance being
provided thereto u/s. 23(l)(c) of the Act.

–       the
order of the Tribunal, denying the benefit of vacancy u/s. 23(1)(c), was
upheld.

The unfairness of the law is manifest in
cases where the property is ready for being let out and cannot be let out in
spite of the best of the efforts of the owner. This unfairness is further
aggravated in a case where the property was let out in the past but could not
be let out during the year. It is in such circumstances that the decision of the
Andhra Pradesh high court hits hard and perhaps requires reconsideration. It is
true that the court had comprehensively examined the provisions, on hand, of
section 23(1)(c). There, however, is an urgent need to appreciate the
following:

–     the
provisions of section 23(1)(c) are materially different than the erstwhile
provisions of section 24(1)(ix), and therefore the case law developed on the
subject of a provision, now omitted, i.e. based on past law, should not color
the outcome on a new provision of law. An independent appraisal of section
23(1)(c) on the basis of the language of the law is required.

–    the
express words of the phraseology ‘was vacant during the whole or any part of
the previous year’
in section 23(1)(c) requires to be given due weightage.
While the Andhra Pradesh High Court has sought to give meaning to the term ‘whole’
in the provision by explaining that it dealt with a situation involving letting
out of the premises for longer period, it remains to be interpreted in the
context of real life situations involving shorter periods of letting out. There
is no reason to not apply the provision in cases of letting out for shorter
periods and, if done so, there is a good possibility of a relief in such cases.

–     again,
the use of the phraseology ‘actually let’ in section 23(3)(a), during the whole
or any part of the previous year, clearly indicates that the legislature
whenever intended has in express terms provided for actual letting out of the
premises during the year itself. This aspect, though examined by the court, in
our respectful opinion, requires to be reviewed in as much as the fact
continues to be that the term ‘actually let’ has been used in contradiction to
only ‘let’ in the same section 23(3).

–    it
is impossible to envisage a situation wherein a property is vacant for the
‘whole of the year’ and is still let out during the same year. The property is
either vacant or let out.

     We are of the considered view that the
provisions of section 23(1)(c), when read in the manner in which it has been
read by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, results in unjust deprivation of a
deserving benefit in cases where the property had remained vacant throughout
the year and was not put to any use. The legislative intent therefore requires
to be clarified, or the law requires to be amended to restore the equity and
fairness.

Section 80JJAA – A Liberalised Incentive

Introduction

Job creation is the objective of any welfare
state. In a developing country like India, with its typical demographic
profile, creating employment is a priority of the government. For this purpose,
the state often promotes labour intensive industry and business. Giving a tax
incentive to businesses which provide for jobs is a method adopted for this
purpose. If the object is to promote a certain category of expenditure a tax
incentive/deduction is normally related to the expenditure itself. Section
80JJAA, from the time it was brought on the statute book from assessment year
1999-2000, provided such a deduction with reference to “additional wages”
paid to new regular workmen.

The manner in which it was enacted,
restricted its availability to only a few assessees. Firstly, only those
carrying on the business of manufacture of goods in a factory were entitled to
the deduction. Secondly, the deduction was limited only to payments to workmen.
Thirdly, the deduction was available only with reference to new regular workmen
in excess of 50 workmen, and that too, only if there was an increase of 10% or
more in the number of workmen employed. All in all, the deduction did not
provide the requisite incentive.

Finance Act
2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, liberalised the deduction
substantially. While some further relaxation would make the provision even more
effective, in its current form as well, the deduction is welcome. Though the
amendment to this provision was enacted a year earlier, it does not seem to
have attracted the attention that it deserves. The object of this article is to
explain the provisions, and bring to the notice of the reader certain issues
that may arise.

 Scope of the deduction

The deduction granted u/s. 80JJAA (1)
specifies the following conditions:

(1) it applies to an assessee
to whom section 44AB applies

(2) the gross total income of
such an assessee should include any profits and gains derived from business.

If  these threshold conditions are satisfied, the
assessee is eligible for a deduction of 30% of “additional employee cost”
incurred in the course of such business for three assessment years commencing
from the year in which such employment is provided.

 Exclusions

The deduction will not be available if

(1) the business is formed by
splitting up or the reconstruction of an existing business (the proviso
excludes business which is formed as a result of re-establishment,
reconstruction or revival specified in section 33B)

(2) the business is acquired by
the assessee by way of a transfer from any other person or as a result of any
business reorganisation

(3) the assessee fails to
furnish along with the return of income the report of an accountant as defined
in the explanation to section 288, giving such particulars in the report as may
be prescribed ( Rule 19 AB and form 10DA).

 Definitions

The explanation defines the terms
“additional employee cost”, “additional employee” and “emoluments”.

 Additional employee cost

This means the total emoluments paid or
payable to additional employees employed during the previous year. In the first
year of a new business, the additional employee cost will be the aggregate
emoluments paid or payable to employees employed during the previous year. In
case of an existing business, if there is no increase in the number of
employees from the total number of employees employed on the last day of the
preceding year, the additional employee cost shall obviously be “nil”

Emoluments paid otherwise than by account
payee cheque, account payee bank draft or the use of electronic clearing system
through a bank account would not be eligible for deduction. This would ensure
that the payment to the employee is verifiable subsequently and, since cash
payments are not permissible, it would significantly reduce misuse.

 Additional employee

An additional employee is one who is
employed by the employer during the previous year and thereby increases the
total number of employees employed by the employer. The following employees are
excluded from this definition.

 (1)    Employees whose total
emoluments are more than Rs. 25,000 per month.

(2)    An employee whose entire
contribution is paid by the government under the employees pension scheme
notified in accordance with the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act 1952 (EPF Act). Under the EPF Act, this refers to employees with
a disability. The rationale and relevance of this exclusion is not understood
and is discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

(3)    An employee who is
employed for a period of less than 240 days during the previous year.

(4)    An employee who does not
participate in the recognised provident fund.

 Emoluments

The term emolument is defined as any sum
paid to the employee but excludes

 (1)    contribution by the
employer to a pension fund, provident fund or any other fund for the benefit of
employees

(2)    any lump sum payment
paid or payable to an employee at the time of termination of his service, or on
superannuation or voluntary retirement such as gratuity, severance pay, leave
encashment, voluntary retrenchment benefits, commutation of pension etc.

Deduction for earlier years

Sub-section 80JJAA (3), provides that the
provisions of this section as they stood prior to the amendment would govern
the deduction for the assessment year 2016-17, and earlier years.

Issues

The amended provisions are certainly far
more liberal than those in force for assessment year 2016-17, and earlier
years. However, certain issues still remain. These are

(1) The deduction is available only to an
assessee to whom section 44AB applies and whose gross total income includes any
profits and gains derived from business.
The question that arises is
whether an assessee carrying on a profession would be eligible for the
deduction.

The terms business and profession are defined distinctly in section 2. Further,
section 44AB itself prescribes different thresholds for business and
profession. The Act, where it seeks to include the term profession, does so
explicitly (e.g., section 28). Therefore, it appears that an assessee carrying
on a profession will not be eligible for the deduction.

(2) If an assessee acquires a business
either by way of transfer or business reorganisation
, such an assessee
would not be eligible for the deduction
. While denying the benefit to an
assessee who acquires business on transfer may have some logic, one does not
understand as to why the benefit should be denied in a case of business
reorganisation. An undertaking may be transferred in the course of an
amalgamation or demerger. The business in such a situation is continued in a
different entity post such amalgamation/demerger. The possible reason for this
exclusion may be that the benefit is not intended to be given on account of
employees added due to a business being received on amalgamation/demerger.

However, succession to a business which
falls neither in the term “transfer” or “business reorganisation”, should not
result in a denial of the deduction. To illustrate if a business is succeeded
by legal heirs on the demise of the proprietor, the legal heirs should be
entitled to the deduction, in regard to the remaining assessment year/s for
which the claim is available

(3) The term additional employee excludes a
person whose emoluments are more than 25,000 per month. It may so happen
that an employee joins employment at a lower salary, but during the period of
three years for which an assessee employer is entitled to the claim his
emoluments cross 25,000.
The issue would be whether emoluments paid to such
an employee, should be excluded in totality or if such exclusion is
partial/limited. The exclusion of the employee is one “whose total emoluments
are more than Rs. 25,000 per month”. Therefore, till the emoluments reach that
threshold, the employee would continue to be an additional employee. The
provision to be interpreted is a deduction granting relief. Consequently, the
emoluments paid till they reach the threshold should be eligible for the
deduction.

(4) An employee who is employed for a
period of less than 240 days is excluded from the definition of “additional
employee”.
An issue is whether leave taken by the employee is to be
included for counting the days of employment. If an employee is entitled to a
certain number of days leave for the days served, the days of paid leave should
certainly be included for the purposes of calculating the number of 240 days.
Even otherwise, just because an employee has gone on leave, it cannot be said
that his employment has ceased during that period.

(5) An employee who does not participate
in a recognised provident fund is excluded from the definition of additional
employee.
In a situation where the provident fund act does not apply to the
establishment, on account of the number of employees being less than the
threshold limit, this should not act as a disability. This is on account of the
established principle of law that an assessee cannot be asked to do the impossible.
Therefore, if the relevant statute does not apply to the assessee, he should
not be denied deduction.

(6) A very odd
provision seems to be the provision of Explanation (ii)(b). As has been
mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, under the Employees Provident funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952, the contribution to the employees pension
fund is to be borne by the government in the case of an employee having a
disability. Such an employee is excluded from the definition of an additional
employee and consequently the emoluments paid to him do not qualify for
deduction. This provision does not seem to have any rationale, except perhaps,
that the Government does not want to give an additional benefit in such cases,
over and above the PF contribution that it is already bearing. The government
always seeks to promote and ensure that persons with disability are employed
gainfully. Therefore those employers who employ differently abled persons ought
to get an incentive. An amendment to this provision is called for.

 (7) One more issue is in respect of
calculation of number of additional employees. This could be a potent point for
litigation and therefore working of it is a key element. Consider the following
example in respect of eligible employees:

        

 

Year 1

Year 2

Employees at the beginning of the year

50

52

Resigned during the year

3

5

Added during the year

5

2

Net Addition

2

(3)

Total at year end

52

49

 

Considering the
above example, following questions arise:

a)  In Year 1, should net
additional employees be considered for deduction or gross addition?

b)  Does one need to maintain a
list of eligible employee and if so, how? If the numbers resigning / retrenched
are more, will deduction be denied?

c)  In Year 2, if there is a
net deduction, should the assessee still make a claim for 2 the additions made?

While at first blush this appears to be a
controversial issue, the answer is contained in the definition of additional
employee in the Explanation to the section. According to clause (ii) of the
explanation the term “additional employee” means an employee who has been
employed during the previous year and whose employment has the effect of
increasing the total number of employees employed by the employer as on the last
day of the preceding year.
In the illustration given above, the employer
employs five new employees during the year, but three resign resulting in a net
addition of two employees.

The issue arises because while the
explanation requires a comparison to be made with the strength of the employees
as on the last day of the preceding year, it does not contain a stipulation as
to when this comparison is to be made. When there is no specific mention one
would have to go by a purposive interpretation of the section. The incentive is
for employment generation. This is how the explanatory memorandum
describing the amendment refers to it. In light of the same, it will be
appropriate to consider only the net addition of employees. As to the point of
time when the comparison is to be made, it should be the last day of the
previous year for which the deduction is to be claimed. In respect of which
employee the deduction is to be claimed will be left to the discretion of the
employer assessee. Therefore in year one, the deduction should be claimed in
respect of the net increment of two employees. As far as the second year is
concerned, it appears that the assessee would not be entitled to any deduction.

Conclusion

Considering the provision in totality, it is
certainly far more liberal than its predecessor. A large number of assessees
could become entitled to the benefit of this deduction. This will be the first
year of the claim, and therefore, my professional colleagues should apprise
their clients of this deduction.

Reporting in form 3CD For AY 2017-18 – New Elements

Tax Audit has become more onerous with each
passing year. Tax Audit u/s. 44AB is carried out by perhaps the largest number
of practitioners, even more than statutory audit of companies. This article
seeks to cover important new points relevant to Tax Audit for AY 2017-18.

There have been notable changes in clauses related to ICDS and Loans. This
article seeks to put those points in perspective and update the reader of
nuances and intricacies that require a professional’s attention either as a
preparer or as the tax auditor.

 1.      Clause 8

        The relevant clause
of section 44AB under which the audit has been conducted is required to be
mentioned here. This aspect becomes important considering the fact that certain
deductions and exemptions may depend on the appropriate selection, and possibly
trigger action from CPC. A new category inserted in the utility pertains to S.
44ADA which is applicable from AY 1718:

         Clause (d) For
claiming profits less than prescribed u/s. 44ADA

        Eligible assessee [as
per section 44AA (1)] can select this clause in the utility if assessee chooses
to show taxable profit from specified profession less than 50% of total
turnover not exceeding Rs. 50 lakh.

 2.      CLAUSE 13 – Method of accounting                – ICDS Aspects

        Sub-clauses (d),
(e) and (f) have been inserted this year
to cover the impact of the Income
Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS). The Tax Auditor is required to
identify whether any adjustment is required to be made to the profit or loss as
per books of accounts in order to comply with the ICDS and if so, quantify the
adjustment. Further, the various disclosures required by each ICDS are required
to be given in clause (f). The following paragraphs deal briefly with each ICDS
and identify probable areas which may warrant adjustment from the income in the
books to arrive at the taxable income and consequent reporting under these
clauses.

 3.      ICDS discussed

        The Income
Computation and Disclosure Standards are applicable for computation of income
chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or
profession” or “Income from other sources” and not for the
purpose of maintenance of books of account. The Preamble to every ICDS provides
that in case of any conflict between the provisions of the Income-tax Act,
1961(‘the Act’) and the relevant ICDS, the provisions of the Act shall prevail
to that extent.

 3.1     ICDS II – Inventories

 3.1.1  ICDS II requires the
value of inventories to include duties and taxes (the “inclusive method”) in
line with the provisions of section 145A of the Act. This is in contrast with
Accounting Standard (“AS”) – 2 on Valuation of Inventories which mandates the
“exclusive method”. Under the exclusive method, inventories are to be valued
net of any duties or taxes that are subsequently recoverable from the taxing
authorities. The ICAI Guidance Note on Tax Audit provides detailed
reconciliation of the adjustments required u/s. 145A of the Act between both
the methods and concludes that the effect on the profit or loss due to these
adjustments would be ‘nil’. Looking at the requirements of ICDS II in isolation
one may conclude that the inclusion of recoverable duties and taxes in the
value of inventories would result in increase of profit for the year. However,
taking the effect of all the adjustments required as per the provisions of
section 145A, there would be no resulting increase or decrease of profit.
Accordingly, the Tax Auditor may report ‘nil’ under this head with a suitable
note detailing the Section 145A adjustments and the stand taken by her.

 3.1.2  In respect of business
of service providers, AS 2 does not cover work in progress (WIP) arising in the
ordinary course of business. Therefore, if under Ind-AS, WIP of service
providers is recognised, that is to be ignored under the ICDS unless it falls
under ICDS III.

 3.2     ICDS III – Construction
contracts

 3.2.1  ICDS III requires
contract revenue to be recognised when there is a reasonable certainty of
ultimate collection while AS 7 and Indian Accounting Standard (“Ind- AS”) -11
mandate recognition when it is possible to reliably measure the outcome of the
contract. In cases where these two conditions are not simultaneously met, it
could result in an adjustment.

 3.2.2  ICDS III provides for
adopting the percentage of completion method (‘POCM’) for recognising contract
revenue and contract costs at the reporting date. AS 7 and Ind-AS 11 also
provide similarly. The manner of determining the stage of completion for
recognition of contract revenue / contract costs is similarly provided.

 3.2.3  Under ICDS III, as in AS
7 and Ind-AS 11, during the early stage of contract where the outcome of the
construction contract cannot be estimated reliably, contract revenue is
recognised only to the extent of costs incurred. However, early stage of a
contract shall not extend beyond 25% of the stage of completion as per ICDS
III. There is no such requirement under AS-7 or Ind-AS 11. The difference in
treatment will result in an adjustment.

 3.2.4  Retention monies are
part of contract revenue as defined in ICDS III. AS 7 is silent on their
treatment. If the retention monies are not recognised in books till they are
due, there will be an adjustment required to taxable income.

 3.2.5  Both AS 7 and Ind-AS 11
require recognition of expected losses, that is, when it is probable that total
contract costs will exceed total contract revenue, as an expense immediately.
There is no such provision under ICDS III and such expected loss would be
recognised like any other loss from the contract on the basis of Percentage of
Completion Method followed. This difference in treatment would require an
adjustment while computing the taxable income.

 3.2.6  CBDT has ‘clarified’
that there is no specific ICDS applicable to real estate developers, BOT
projects and leases.1 However, in the later part of the
clarification, CBDT has stated, “Therefore, relevant provisions of the Act
and ICDS shall apply to these transactions as may be applicable”
. It
appears that since there is no special treatment given for these businesses,
all the ICDS would be relevant. However, the draft ICDS on Real Estate
Transactions issued in May 2017, would be notified in due course. In case
of  Builder-Developer, applicability of
ICDS III and ICDS IV  is questionable,
considering that such Developer is constructing on his own account and not as a
contractor, and further, is not selling goods or rendering servicces. However,
ICDS IV may apply for other income of Real Estate Developers.

 3.2.7  ICDS IV applies to sale
of goods and rendering of services. In cases where, in substance, the
transactions are not in nature of construction contracts, with the developer
not passing on the risk and rewards of ownership, the developer is selling
immovable property which are not goods and he is not rendering any services as
he develops the property on his own account and subsequently sells or leases
them. Hence, arguably, ICDS IV should also not apply to him.

 3.3    ICDS
IV – Revenue Recognition

 3.3.1  Revenue is measured
under Ind AS 18 at fair value of consideration received or receivable. If there
is an element of deferred payment terms in the consideration, then the fair
value of consideration may be less than the nominal amount of cash receivable.
In such a case, the difference is to be recognised as interest revenue. ICDS IV
does not require such treatment and the resulting difference in the amount of
revenue will require an adjustment.

 3.3.2  In cases where the
transaction price is composite, for instance, where the selling price of a
product includes consideration for after-sales service, Ind AS 18 requires the
consideration for such after-sales service to be deferred and recognised as
revenue over the period during which the service is performed. There is no such
requirement in
ICDS IV.

 3.3.3  Services contracts-

         AS 9 gives the option
of completed service contract method for services contracts in certain
situations. In contrast, under ICDS IV, services contract revenue is to be
recognised as per the percentage of completion method (POCM) in accordance with
ICDS III. The resulting difference would require an adjustment. Further, ICDS
IV permits completed services contract method in cases of services contracts
with duration of not more than ninety days. Similar relaxation is not available
under AS 9 and could result in an adjustment.

 3.3.4  Interest, royalty and
dividends-

a.  Interest received on
compensation or enhanced compensation is taxable when received [section
145A(2)] and ICDS IV is not applicable.

b.  ICDS requires interest on
any refund of tax, duty or cess to be recognised when received. This treatment
may be at variance with that in the books when such interest is recorded
earlier on accrual..

c.  Under ICDS IV, interest is
to be recognised on time basis while royalty on the basis of contractual terms.
The condition of reasonable certainty of ultimate collection contained in AS 9
or Ind-AS 18 is absent. The difference in treatment could result in an
adjustment.

 3.4    ICDS
V – Tangible assets

 3.4.1  Under Ind-AS 16, the
components of costs of property, plant and equipment (PPE) include estimated
costs of dismantling and removing the item and restoring the site. Also
included in the costs are costs of major inspections. These costs are not
included under ICDS V and such expenditure cannot be considered as expenditure
directly attributable in making the asset ready for its intended use.

 3.4.2  Ind-AS 16 provides that
in case the payment for PPE is beyond the normal credit terms, the difference
between the cash price equivalent and the total payment is to be recognised as
interest over the period of credit unless such interest relates to a period
before such asset is ready for intended use and is capitalised in accordance
with Ind- AS 23. However, ICDS V is silent in this regard, and therefore, the
total payment would be treated as the cost.

 3.4.3  Under both AS 10 and
Ind-AS 16, cost of a fixed asset/PPE should be recognised as an asset only if
it is probable that future economic benefits associated with the item will flow
to the enterprise and such costs can be measured reliably. Under ICDSV, this
condition is absent. As a result, under ICDS V, the initial recognition of the
asset and subsequent addition to the cost would be made whether or not economic
benefits will flow to the enterprise.

 3.4.4  Though AS 10 recognises
that the cost of fixed asset may undergo changes subsequent to its acquisition
and construction due to exchange fluctuations, exchange losses or gains cannot
be capitalised after the asset is ready for its intended use. However, ICDS VI
provides for recognition of exchange difference as per section 43A of the Act.
Section 43A provides that, in case of an asset acquired from a country outside
India, the increase or reduction in liability while making payment towards the
cost of the asset or repayment of the moneys borrowed for acquiring the asset
due to change in the rate of exchange, shall be added to or deducted from the
actual cost of such asset. Section 43A has no application in case of asset
acquired from within India by availing a foreign currency loan. These
differences in treatment could result in an adjustment while computing the
taxable income.

 3.5    ICDS
VI – Effect of changes in Forex Rates

 3.5.1  ICDS VI requires
non-monetary items to be translated at the rate on the date of the transaction,
except in case of inventory which is carried at net realisable value
denominated in foreign currency, where it shall be reported at the closing
rate. This treatment is in accordance with AS 11 dealing with effects of
foreign exchange rates. However, ICDS [in para 5(ii)] provides that any
exchange difference arising on conversion of non-monetary items on the
reporting date shall not be recognised as income or expense of the year. There
is an apparent contradiction within ICDS VI itself in the treatment provided in
this respect.

 3.5.2  Foreign operations

        AS 11 and Ind-AS require that all assets and
liabilities of a non-integral foreign operation to be converted at closing rate
and resulting exchange differences to be taken to a Foreign Currency
Translation Reserve (FCTR). ICDS VI requires the transactions of a foreign
operation, integral or non-integral, to be treated as the transactions of the
assessee itself. Accordingly, the difference in treatment will give rise to
adjustment to the taxable income. Further, the transitional provisions require
any balance in FCTR as on 1st April, 2016 to be recognised in AY
2017-18 to the extent not recognized in the computation of income in the past
[FAQ 16 Circular No. 10/2017, dated 23rd March, 2017]. These
differences in treatment will result in adjustments while computing the taxable
income.

 3.5.3  Forward exchange
contracts

      AS 11 requires
mark-to-market (MTM) losses/gains to be recognised at the reporting date in
respect of trading or speculation contracts. In contrast, ICDS requires
premium/discount on such contracts to be recognised only on settlement.

 3.6    ICDS
VII – Government grants

 3.6.1  ICDS VII provides that
the recognition of government grants should not be postponed beyond the date of
receipt. In a case where the grant is received pending compliance of some
conditions and the accrual of the grant has not taken place, the grant would be
disclosed as a liability in the books of accounts. This difference in treatment
could result in an adjustment in the computation of income, though it can be
argued that where income has not accrued, ICDS VII should yield to section 5 of
the Act.

 3.6.2  As per AS 12, grants
that relate to non-depreciable assets are to be credited to a capital reserve.
Such an option is not available under ICDS VII and has to be recognised as
income. This will require an adjustment to the computation of total income.

 3.6.3  As per AS 12,
non-monetary assets given at concessional rates are to be accounted in the
books at their acquisition cost or if given free, such assets are to be
accounted at a nominal value. ICDS VII also requires similar treatment.
However, Ind-AS 20 requires such assets to be accounted at fair value,
warranting an adjustment in computation.

 3.7    ICDS
VIII – Securities

 3.7.1  Under ICDS VIII, where a
security is acquired in exchange for other security, the fair value of security
so acquired shall be its actual cost. This is in contrast to the treatment
under AS 13 wherein the acquisition cost should be the fair value of the
securities issued. This difference in treatment would result in different costs
of securities for accounting and tax purposes and will affect the resulting
gain or loss on their disposal.

 3.7.2  The treatment of
pre-acquisition interest is same in ICDS VIII and AS 13.

 3.7.3  ICDS VIII requires the
securities held as stock-in-trade to be valued at year-end at actual cost or
net realisable value, whichever is lower. However, the comparison of actual
cost and net realisable value is required to be done category-wise and not
item-wise
as is done under AS 13. The categories for the purpose of
comparison under ICDS VIII are shares, debt securities, convertible securities
and any other securities not covered above. Therefore, adjustments would need
to be made for the difference in valuation of closing stock.

 3.7.4  ICDS VIII requires
unlisted and thinly-traded securities held as stock in trade to be valued at
actual cost regardless of their realisable value. AS 13 does not deal with
unlisted and thinly-traded securities specifically.

 3.8    ICDS
IX – Borrowing Costs

 3.8.1  Borrowing costs defined-

         Section 36(1)(iii)
and Explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Act cover only interest to be
considered for capitalisation to the cost of the asset. ICDS IX extends
capitalisation requirement to other components of borrowing costs [vide para
2(1)(a)]. Borrowing costs are defined in ICDS IX on the same lines as under AS
16 and Ind-AS 23, except that the exchange differences arising from foreign
currency borrowings to the extent they are regarded as an adjustment to
interest costs are not dealt with by ICDS IX.

 3.8.2  In case of inventories,
as per AS 2, interest and other borrowing costs are usually considered as not
relating to bringing the inventories to their present location and condition
and as a result not included in the cost of inventories. On the other hand,
inventories which require a substantial period of time to bring them to a
saleable condition are qualifying assets and borrowing costs that are directly
attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of such assets are
to be capitalised as part of the cost of such asset as laid down in AS 16.
However, Proviso to section 36(1)(iii) read with Explanation 8 to section 43(1)
require that interest paid on amount borrowed for the acquisition of new assets
for the period before such assets are first put to use is to be capitalised and
not allowable as revenue expenditure. Arguably, inventories are not for
extension of business or profession and are not ‘put to use’ and the proviso
ought not apply to inventories. Contrarily, ICDS IX requires capitalisation of borrowing
costs related to inventories which take more than twelve months to bring them
to saleable condition. This will result in an adjustment.

 3.8.3  Under AS 16 and Ind-AS
23, qualifying assets requiring capitalisation of borrowing costs are assets
requiring substantial period of time to get ready for their intended use. There
is no such requirement under ICDS IX. Thus, any delay, however short, in
putting to use any asset, being tangible or intangible assets listed in the
definition would require capitalisation of borrowing costs directly related to
their acquisition. The treatment mandated by ICDS IX is in accordance with
provisions of section 36(1)(iii) and Explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Act.

 3.8.4  Further, there is no
provision in ICDS IX for suspension of capitalisation during extended periods
when active development in construction of a qualifying asset is interrupted as
is mandated by AS 16 and Ind-AS 23. This treatment is in accordance with the
provisions of section 36(1)(iii) and Explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Act.

 3.8.5  Capitalisation –
Borrowing costs directly attributable borrowings

        Where funds are
borrowed specifically for acquisition, construction or production of a
qualifying asset, ICDS IX provides that the amount of borrowing costs to be
capitalised on that asset shall be the actual borrowing costs incurred during
the period on the funds so borrowed. In cases where funds borrowed are not
utilised for the qualifying asset or where funds are borrowed for other
purposes but are utilised for acquisition, construction or production of
qualifying asset, ICDS IX would have no application. However, such a literal
reading of ICDS IX could lead to an anomalous interpretation and the
consequences may be unintended. Utilisation of the funds borrowed for the
purposes of acquisition, construction or production of qualifying asset alone
should qualify for capitalisation.

 3.8.6  Capitalisation –
Borrowing costs of general borrowings

        ICDX IX gives detailed
calculations to determine borrowing costs to be capitalised in case of use of
general borrowings to acquire qualifying assets. The calculations given do not
envisage situations where funds are utilised out of general borrowings on
different dates. Both AS 16 and Ind-AS 23 provide for weighted average cost of
borrowing to be capitalised. The difference in determining the borrowing costs
for general borrowings could result in adjustment in computation of income.

 3.8.7  Income from temporary
investments out of borrowed funds

        Both AS 16 and Ind-AS
23 provide that where borrowed amounts are temporarily invested pending their
expenditure on the qualifying asset, the borrowing costs to be capitalised
should be determined as the actual borrowing costs incurred on that borrowing
during the period less any income on the temporary investment of those
borrowings. ICDS IX is silent in this respect and could result in an
adjustment. The Supreme Court has held that such interest cannot be set off
against interest paid and has to be offered to tax under the head ‘Income from
other Sources’.2 On the other hand, it was held in another case that
where the investment is inextricably linked with the process of setting up of
the plant, such interest should be set-off against the interest paid and the
net interest is to be capitalised3. The Tax Auditor may form her
opinion on the basis of specific facts of the auditee and apply these rulings.

 3.9    ICDS
X – Provisions and contingencies

 3.9.1  As in AS 29 and Ind AS
37, ICDS X does not require recognition of a contingent asset. However, for
subsequent recognition of a contingent asset as an asset, ICDS X requires
‘reasonable certainty’ of inflow of economic benefits, as against the need for
‘virtual certainty’ of inflow of economic benefits under AS 29 and Ind AS 37.

This difference in treatment could result in an adjustment.

 3.9.2  In respect to
recognising reimbursements of expenditure to be provided for, both AS 29 and
Ind AS 37 require a ‘virtual certainty’ of the receipt of reimbursement. In
contrast, ICDS X requires only ‘reasonable certainty’ to recognise the
reimbursements.

 3.9.3  Under ICDS X, provisions
are to be reviewed at every year-end and if it is no longer reasonably certain
that an outflow of resources will be required to settle the obligation, the
provision should be reversed. AS 29 and Ind AS 37 both require reversal of the
provisions if it is no longer probable that there will be an outflow of
resources. This difference in the trigger for reversal of provisions could lead
to an adjustment in computing taxable income.

 3.9.4  Transitional
provisions in ICDS X require that at the end of the financial year 2016-17, a
review of all past events is needed to be carried out to see whether any
provision is to be recognised or derecognised, and whether any asset is to be
recognised or derecognised, in relation to such past events, as per the
provisions of ICDS X.

3.10   One will have to
carefully consider the transitional provisions given in each ICDS to ascertain
exact applicability of the respective ICDS for previous year ended 31st
March 2017 being the first transitional year.

 3.11   An important point that
demands mention here relates to keeping track of ICDS related changes in the
following years. Since ICDS effect is given directly in the computation of
income, and not in books of account, one will have to keep a track on a
memorandum basis. In the subsequent year/s, this effect will have to be
considered at the time of computation of income since the same might be getting
reflected in the books of account and double inclusion of income and its
elimination will be required. For example, an item of revenue was considered in
FY 2017-18. Due to ICDS revenue standard, it was already added to taxable
profits in FY 2016-17 (AY 2017-18). In such a scenario, this item needs to be
removed at the time of computing the income for AY 2018-19.

 3.12   A welcome measure
introduced by way of a proviso to section 36 (1)(vii) which has considered the
possible implications of an item being considered as income even though not in
the books and its subsequent irrecoverability not being written off in the
books of account. This provision was introduced by Finance Act 2015 w.e.f.
1.4.2016 and accordingly applies from AY 2017-18 onwards.

 3.13   Disclosure required by
clause 13(f) is a new challenge. The online utility already contains a field
for standard wise disclosures. However, in the utility, no tables are getting
accepted thus necessitating description. It is suggested that the practitioner may
compile a list of ICDS disclosures required each ICDS wise, and insert them in
these fields. Alternatively, an annexure may be prepared of all such
disclosures ICDS wise, and uploaded as an annexure to the tax audit report.

 4.      CLAUSE 18: Depreciation

         Recently, the CBDT
has made changes in the Income Tax Rules to restrict the rate of
depreciation maximum up to 40% for block of assets which are currently eligible
for depreciation at a higher rate (50%, 60%, 80%, 100%). This amendment is
applicable from current financial year itself (i.e. FY 2016-17) in case of new
manufacturing companies (incorporated on or after 1.3.2016) which will opt for
lower corporate tax rate of 25% u/s. 115BA of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

       For all other
assessees, the Notification states the effective date is 01.04.2017. However,
ITRs for A.Y. 2017-18 have not been modified and they still mention rates of
depreciation higher than 40%. Hence, it can be inferred that the above
amendment is applicable from next year (i.e. FY 2017-18) for assesses not
opting for section 115BA benefit.

 5.      CLAUSE 26 – Section 43B – Any tax, duty or other sum

        Section 43B has been
amended vide Finance Act (FA) 2016 to include any sum payable by the assessee
to the Indian Railways for the use of railway assets [Clause (g)]. For
instance, this clause will include amounts charged by Indian Railways to hire
out wagons. The disallowance under this clause does not include railway freight
payable as the same is towards service of transportation and not for use of
railway assets.

 6.      CLAUSE 31: ACCEPTANCE OR REPAYMENT OF LOAN OR DEPOSIT OR SPECIFIED
SUMS (SECTION 269SS/SECTION 269T)

         Substantial changes
have been made in clause 31 of Form 3CD dealing with above transactions.

         Earlier there were
three sub clauses in clause 31. In the amended form, there are five sub
clauses.
Sub-clause (a) deals with particulars of each loan or deposit
in an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269SS taken or accepted
during the previous year. Sub-clause (b) deals with particulars of each specified
sum
in an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269SS taken or
accepted during the previous year.

          In both the above
clauses, following details to be reported additionally:

          –  Whether the loan or deposit or specified sum
was taken or accepted by cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing
system through a bank account;

          –  in case the loan or deposit or specified sum
was taken or accepted by cheque or bank draft, whether the same was taken or
accepted by an account payee cheque or an account payee bank draft.

         In this regard,
reference may be made to amendment to sections 269SS and 269T by the Finance
Act 2015, whereby the scope of these sections was extended to transactions in
immovable property. Explanation to section 269SS defines the term specified sum
as money receivable as advance or otherwise in relation to transfer of an
immovable property, whether or not transfer has taken place. Explanation to
section 269T defines the term specified sum as money in the nature of advance
or otherwise in relation to transfer of an immovable property, whether or not
transfer has taken place. This definition does not distinguish between capital
asset or stock in trade. So the scope of this section is very wide. All
transactions in immovable property exceeding the threshold will have to be
reported in this clause.

        Sub-clause (c) deals
with particulars of each repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum in
an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T made during the
previous year. In addition to the existing details, the following details are
to be reported additionally:

     – whether the repayment
was made by cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a
bank account;

     – in case the repayment
was made by cheque or bank draft, whether the same was taken or accepted by an
account payee cheque or an account payee bank draft

          In addition to the
above changes, two new sub- clauses (d) and (e) are inserted:

       Sub-clause (d) deals
with particulars of repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum in
an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T received otherwise
than by a cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a
bank account during the previous year.
Sub-clause (e) deals with
particulars of repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum in an
amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T received by a cheque or
bank draft which is not an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft during the previous year.

           Following details are
required to be given in these clauses:

(i) name, address and
Permanent Account Number (if available with the assessee) of the payer;

(ii) amount of loan or deposit or any specified advance received
otherwise than by a cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system
through a bank account during the previous year / received by a cheque or bank
draft which is not an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft during
the previous year.

        The reporting
requirement in respect of section 269T was earlier applicable only in case of
the person making the repayment of loan or deposit or any specified advance.
Under the new clause 31, reporting is also to be done by the recipient. So the
person who receives any repayment of loan or deposit or any specified sum
in an amount exceeding the limit specified in section 269T, will have to
scrutinize the mode of repayment and report whether any repayment is received
by him otherwise than by a cheque or bank draft or use of electronic
clearing system through a bank account during the previous year or received by
a cheque or bank draft which is not an account payee cheque or account payee
bank draft during the previous year.
This information will enable the
department to initiate penalty proceedings u/s. 271E against the person who has
made the repayment in contravention of section 269T.

 7.      Cash 
deposits  during
demonetisation period – Impact on     Clause 16 (a) & 16(d)

         Cash deposits in the
bank accounts due to demonetisation would be very common. This needs to be
dealt with diligently as it might have consequences on taxable income of the
assessee. Clause 16 of the tax audit report requires reporting of certain
amounts not credited to the Profit & Loss A/c. It has several sub-clauses
out of which the followings may be relevant:

(a) the items falling within
the scope of section 28

(d) any other item of income

        It might be possible
that cash has been deposited in personal bank account of the assessee (who has
a proprietary concern) and it does not form part of the books of account
related to his business which have been audited. In such case, the auditor
should not be concerned about its source and evidences in that regard as the
scope of audit is restricted only to the books of account related to the
business or profession of the assessee.

        However, when cash
has been deposited in the regular bank account of the business and has also
been recorded in the books of account which are subject to audit, the auditor
needs to consider the following aspects:

–  Whether
it is out of the balance available in the cash book as on that particular date?

–  Are
there any irregular / unusual receipts which are recorded in the cash book
which have increased the cash balance matching with deposit into bank account?

–   What
is the source of such receipts and are there sufficient audit evidences
available to justify it?

        In case of companies,
the disclosure made in the financial statements pursuant to MCA Notification GSR
308(E) dated 31-3-2017 should also be taken into account while reviewing the
above aspects. One may need to ascertain, especially in case of non corporate
assessees, that the available cash balance shown as on 31st March
consist of permitted / non SBN currency to ensure accuracy and validity of cash
balance.

          The
reporting under the specific clause as mentioned above or reporting of
qualification at the appropriate place in Form No. 3CA/3CB may be considered
depending upon outcome of the inquiry made in this regard. Where sufficient and
reliable audit evidences are not available justify the source of cash deposits,
the auditor may qualify his report by incorporating suitable qualification in
Form No. 3CA/3CB.

Aadhaar and the Right to Privacy: An Overkill by Over linking?

Aadhaar seems
to be the flavour of the day for the Government. In the past few months, the
Government has gone on an overdrive to link all persons, transactions and other
digital initiatives through Aadhaar. Linking of PAN to Aadhaar was made
mandatory to be done before 31st August 2017 (now extended to 31st
December 2017). Providing Aadhaar for all bank accounts before 31st
December 2017 has been made mandatory under the Prevention of Money Laundering
(Maintenance of Records) Rules.Besides the requirement of obtaining Permanent
Account Number, Aadhaar number of the purchaser for all financial transactions
exceeding Rs. 50,000 has been introduced.Linking of all mobile SIM cards with
Aadhaar before 6th February 2018 has also been made mandatory. The
requirement of quoting of Aadhaar on registration of a death has also been
introduced from 1st October 2017. MCA has announced its intention to
make all MCA21 services linked to Aadhaar. The Government has also stated its
intention of linking all driving licences with Aadhaar shortly.

 While one
appreciates the need from a security perspective to link all these transactions
or accounts with the Aadhar number, a few questions do arise as to the manner
and haste with which this is being implemented. If one examines the provisions
of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits
and Services) Act, 2016, section 3(1) clearly provides that every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number
by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing
the process of enrolment. Therefore, obtaining an Aadhaar number is not
mandatory under the Aadhaar Act, but optional. This was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Binoy Viswam’s case (396 ITR 66), where the mandatory linking
of Aadhaar number with PAN was challenged.

Section 7 of
the Aadhaar Act provides that the Government, for the purpose of establishing
identity of an individual as a condition for receipt of a subsidy, benefit or
service, may require that such individual undergo authentication,or furnish
proof of possession of Aadhaar number, or in the case of an individual to whom
no Aadhaar number has been assigned, such individual makes an application for
enrolment. The proviso to this section states that if an Aadhaar number is not
assigned to an individual, the individual shall be offered alternate and viable
means of identification for delivery of the subsidy, benefit or service.

Therefore,
the very basis of the Aadhaar Act was that Aadhaar is optional, only for
purposes of subsidies, benefits or services, and that alternative and viable
means of identification should also be offered to persons who did not have
Aadhaar number.
Given
this, without amending the Aadhaar Act, is the Government justified in making
it mandatory under other laws?  Of course,
in Binoy Viswam’s case, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the
requirement u/s.139AA of the Income Tax Act to link every PAN with the Aadhaar
number, justifying it on the ground of the need to check corruption and black
money, to tackle the problems of terrorism and crime and to ensure that
subsidies reach the right person. This decision was rendered subject to the
issue pending before the Supreme Court on whether the right to privacy, which
may be violated by the requirement of furnishing Aadhaar, was a fundamental
right under the Constitution.

A nine-judge
bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy vs. Union
of India, has now held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under
the Constitution. It has further held that an invasion of life or personal
liberty must meet the three-fold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates
the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate state aim;
and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects
and the means adopted to achieve them. The Supreme Court further held:

 “We commend to the Union Government the need to
examine and put into place a robust regime for data protection. The creation of
such a regime requires a careful and sensitive balance between individual
interests and legitimate concerns of the State. The legitimate aims of the
State would include for instance protecting national security, preventing and
investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the spread of knowledge, and
preventing the dissipation of social welfare benefits. These are matters of
policy to be considered by the Union government while designing a carefully
structured regime for the protection of the data.”

While the legal
position of whether the requirements of mandatorily linking bank accounts, PAN
and mobile SIMs to Aadhaar violate this right to privacy would be taken up by the Supreme
Court in November 2017, other questions as to whether this is the right
approach by the Government do arise.

From a
situation where Indian residents are informed that Aadhaar is optional, to make
it compulsory under other laws may be legally correct, but is it morally
correct? Does this backdoor approach not amount to misleading the public? First
asking citizens to obtain Aadhaar which is meant to give benefits under social
schemes, then, steadily making Aadhaar mandatory for one thing after another!
Is it morally correct to burden citizens, especially those outside most social
benefit schemes to mandatorily quote Aadhaar in spite of them having obtained
PAN and other KYC registrations?

Again, in
law, Aadhaar was meant to ensure targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits and
services by the Government. What is the subsidy, benefit or service provided by
the Government when I file my tax returns, operate my bank account, use my
mobile phone or purchase jewellery exceeding Rs.50,000? Should not the
Government first amend the Aadhaar law, clarify the complete purpose of
Aadhaar, define benefits to every citizen and the State, put a security
apparatus in place for those who are keeping this identity information, and
then implement these requirements?

Viewed from the
perspective of observance of the right to privacy, versus the legitimate
concerns of the State, one can understand the need to link bank accounts with
Aadhaar ((e.g. to check money laundering). But what is the compelling need to
link mobile numbers or driving licences or death certificates with Aadhaar? One
can understand that this will help improve governance in these areas, or help
in tracing persons. But is this so necessary that it overshadows the right to
privacy? In almost all countries, obtaining a SIM card is an easy process, and
one does not need a domestic national identity proof / social security number
to obtain a SIM card. Is this therefore a case of overkill?

Through these
requirements, the Government is effectively making Aadhaar mandatory. Today, a
mobile phone is almost a necessity, a driving licence ensures that you can move
around even in the absence of efficient public transport, and it is not
possible to carry out some basic economic transactions without a bank account,
given the restrictions on cash payments. So a person is left with no choice but
to compromise his right to privacy in order to obtain an Aadhaar number due to
these requirements. What was meant to give benefits is now an impediment to
deny basic benefits citizens are entitled to and pay for!

There is also
the problem of the exceptional cases. Many senior citizens are unable to have
their fingerprints captured, due to their fingerprints being flattened and
faded by old age. They are unable to obtain Aadhaar, even if they have the
desire to do so. How do non-residents obtain SIM cards for use during their
visits to India without an Aadhaar number, for which they are not eligible?
Non-resident accounts obviously cannot comply with the requirement of linking
their bank accounts to Aadhaar. The Government in the past has come in for a
lot of flak for implementing schemes in haste without proper planning or
considering all the ramifications. The same fate should not befall this
initiative. Therefore, all these exceptions need to be thought through and
exemptions provided for, just as was done in the case of linking of PAN to
Aadhaar.

Given the large
number of hacking incidents involving hitherto thought safe databases (such as
Equifax) that one reads about, and given the different places at which the
Aadhaar numbers would be provided, the likelihood of leakage of Aadhaar data is
quite high. Should the Government not provide in the law for insurance or
compensation to persons affected by any such leak? After all, it is at the
behest of the Government that one is being forced to obtain and provide an
Aadhaar number.

Lastly, should
not a citizen, who just wants to comply with the law, and lead a quiet, decent
and private life without much Government interference, be allowed to do so? Can
we really see a situation of “less Government, more governance” graduate from
just being a slogan, to becoming a reality in our lifetimes?

Fear

‘We have nothing to fear but fear itself’.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Fear, it appears in the second nature of a
human-being. We live our lives in fear. Let us list a few ‘fears’

Fear of failure

Fear of parents – peers

Fear of Society

Fear of hell

Fear of death and above all

Fear of God

The
question is : why is it that fear dominates our lives. It is because we
are indoctrinated into ‘fear’ since our birth – it is sub-consciously instilled
in us. ‘Fear’ also stems from negative thinking. On the other hand, if properly
viewed fear can be a great motivator. Let us examine how : ‘fear of
failure’ can and should motivate us to work hard and succeed, ‘fear of parents
– peers’ – their criticism and castigation should motivate us to good action,
same should be the case with ‘fear of Society’ and ‘fear of hell’ should
motivate us to live a righteous life. As everyone likes to be immortalised and
is conscious that death is a certainty – ‘fear of death’ should motivate us to
achieve the impossible, namely, act with the purpose of serving selflessly.
This service society recognises as leaving ‘footprints on the sands of time’ –
for example – actions of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Abraham
Lincoln, Chanakya, Alexander, Edison, Einstein and many more. All of them would
have harboured some fears including fear of failure, but they converted ‘fear’
into a motivator and it is for all of us to see what they achieved. ‘Fear’
for them ceased to be ‘fear’
– result – they have left ?foot prints on
the sands of time’.

The
fear that amazes me is ‘fear of GOD’. Rumi says God’s message to mankind
is : ‘Love me, fear me not’. Yet it is an achievement of human mind to
have converted an object – nay – fountain of love into an element of fear. GOD
in all religions is gracious, yet we have, consciously and
unconsciously, been taught to live in fear of HIM. W. B. Yeats proclaims : ‘GOD
that frightens is no GOD’
. Hence, there should be no fear of GOD.

The
question is : What is the answer to ‘fear’. I would say challenge the fear –
face it. I also believe, fear can be conquered with knowledge. Emerson guides us
‘the wise man in the storm prays to God, not for safety from danger, but for
deliverance from fear’
. Robin Sharma recommends – ‘walk towards your
fear
’. In other words, altering our attitude and perceptions of fear we
can convert ‘fear’ into ‘love’. Instead of being afraid, let us start loving
all those we are afraid off – in essence start loving ‘fear’ itself. Fear like
love is a reaction – emotion which arises in the mind. So let us make an
effort to change our thinking to replace ‘fear’ with ‘love’. Every fear
including all the ‘fears’ herein can be converted into Love. However, the
apparent contradiction is conversion of ‘fear of hell’ into ‘Love for hell’.
I think this should be the easiest because once there is no fear of hell – hell
ceases to exist. It has been rightly said ‘love has no place for fear’.

I
conclude by quoting Dada Vaswani :

‘Love is what we are born with, fear is what
we learn here’

So let
us stop fearing ‘fear’ and start loving our ‘fears’.

Author’s
note: I ask myself, have I overcome my ‘fears’ – the honest answer is : most
yes and some no – but the journey continues.

Questions on GST

Issue 1: Should
the revenue be presented gross or net of GST under Ind AS?

 Paragraph 8 of Ind AS 18 Revenue states as below:

 “Revenue includes only the gross
inflows of economic benefits received and receivable by the entity on its own
account. Amounts collected on behalf of third parties such as sales taxes,
goods and services taxes and value added taxes are not economic benefits which
flow to the entity and do not result in increases in equity.”

An entity collects GST on behalf of the government and not on its own
account. Hence, it should be excluded from revenue, i.e., revenue should be net
of GST. This view is consistent with the guidance given in the Guidance note on
Ind AS Schedule III issued by ICAI and will apply irrespective of pricing
arrangement with customers, say, fixed prices inclusive or exclusive of GST. It
may be noted that GST net presentation does not impact the presentation of
excise collected from customers and paid to the government for periods till 30th
June 2017. Excise duty will be included in revenue and presented as an expense
in accordance with Ind AS principles.

Issue 2: How
should a company treat the GST paid on raw material/ finished goods inventory
purchased and available as GST input tax credit? Should it be included in
valuation of inventory at the quarter/ year-end?

Paragraph 11 of Ind AS 2 Inventories states as below for
refundable taxes:

“The costs of purchase of inventories
comprise the purchase price, import duties and other taxes (other than those
subsequently recoverable by the entity from the taxing authorities), and
transport, handling and other costs directly attributable to the acquisition of
finished goods, materials and services.”

Thus, only those taxes are included as costs of inventory which are not
subsequently recoverable by the company from taxation authorities. Since
GST paid on raw material/ finished goods inventory purchased is available for
set-off against the GST payable on sales or is refundable, it is in the nature
of taxes recoverable from taxation authorities. Accordingly, input tax paid
should not be included in the costs of purchase, to the extent
utilisable/refundable.

On similar lines, Ind AS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE)
requires that the cost of an item of PPE comprises – purchase price, including
import duties and non-refundable purchase taxes,
after deducting trade
discounts and rebates (emphasis added). Hence, similar accounting will
apply to the GST Input Credit available on purchase of items of PPE. To the
extent not utilisable/refundable, the same may be included in cost of goods
sold, inventory or PPE as the case may be.

Issue 3: How is
GST paid on inter-branch transfers accounted for? It is assumed that sales
depots have obtained requisite registration and other documents. Hence, they
will be able to obtain full credit for GST paid on supply of goods.

For reasons already mentioned (refer issue 2), the valuation of
inventory at the branches should not include GST. The GST paid on branch
transfer of inventory should be reflected under an appropriate account such as
“GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable Account.”

Issue 4: As on
30th June 2017, the factory is holding substantial stock of
inventory on which no excise duty is paid, since those were not cleared from
the factory. How should the company value such inventory and the input tax
credit (ITC) on the inputs for manufacturing the inventory?

1.  Since excise duty is not payable on such inventory (as per
notification of CBEC), no provision for excise duty is required. Consequently,
the inventory valuation will not include excise duty.

 2.  After 30th June, the Company will pay GST on supply.

 3. The ITC credit on procurement for manufacturing the inventory will
be recorded as GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable Account, provided the
Company has adequate documentation and is reasonably certain of receiving the
ITC.

Issue 5: As on
30th June 2017, the sales depot of the entity is holding substantial
stock of inventory on which excise duty was paid, since those goods were
cleared from the factory. How should the company value such inventory and the
excise duty paid? The Company is entitled to ITC subject to submission of
proper documents. The Company has sufficient documentation available.

Paragraph 11 of Ind AS 2 Inventories states as below for
refundable taxes:

“The costs of purchase of inventories
comprise the purchase price, import duties and other taxes (other than those
subsequently recoverable by the entity from the taxing authorities), and
transport, handling and other costs directly attributable to the acquisition of
finished goods, materials and services.”

Since the tax is a recoverable tax, inventory lying at the depot should
be valued at net of excise duty paid to the extent the company will be able to
receive ITC. The corresponding ITC should be reflected under the other
appropriate account such as “GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable Account.”

Issue 6: After
initial recognition, how should the “GST Input Tax Credit (GITC) Receivable
Account” be treated in the financial statements?

Balances in the GITC Receivable Account, pertaining to both inputs and
PPE, should be reviewed at the end of each reporting period. If it is found
that the balances or a portion thereof are not likely to be used in the normal
course of business or not refundable (even in inverted duty structure), then,
notwithstanding the right to carry forward such excess credit under GST Law,
the non-useable excess credit should be adjusted in the financial statements.
The irrecoverable input credit should generally be added to COGS or inventory
or PPE, as applicable.

In some cases, it may so happen that the company is not able to avail
input credit for reasons such as: it has not got proper registration, not
maintained proper documentation or not filed proper returns or the vendor has
not uploaded credit. In such cases, GST Input Credit disallowance is in the
nature of expense for the company. The same should be written off to P&L
immediately.

It may be noted that GITC is not a financial
instrument;
hence Ind
AS 109 Financial Instruments is not applicable. Though impairment rules
of Ind AS 109 do not apply, the impairment rules of Ind AS 36 Impairment
of Assets
will apply.
Therefore, GITC that may not be recovered or
recovered after significant time period should be impaired for
non-recoverability and time value of money under Ind AS 36.

Issue 7: How should
a company present the “GITC Receivable Account” in the balance sheet?

The GITC Receivable Account represents an amount receivable due to
statutory right and against contractual right. Hence, it is a non-financial
asset and should be presented as such in the balance sheet.

The amount should be classified as current and non-current asset
depending upon the classification criteria as laid down under paragraph 66 of
the Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements and Ind AS compliant
Schedule III, viz., the following criteria. Particularly, the criteria at (a)
and (c) will be more critical.

‘An entity shall classify an asset as current when:

(a) It expects to realise the asset, or intends to sell or consume it,
in its normal operating cycle,

(b) It holds the asset primarily for the purpose of trading,

(c) It expects to realise the asset within twelve months after the
reporting period, or

(d) The asset is cash or a cash equivalent (as defined in Ind AS 7 Statement
of Cash Flows
) unless the asset is restricted from being exchanged or used
to settle a liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period.

 An entity shall classify all other assets as non-current.’

Issue 8: Under
the GST regime, dealers may face losses on their inventory at 30th
June; for example, ITC benefit may not be available with respect to certain
local taxes or cess. To compensate dealers for the losses, the manufacturing
company has decided to provide cash compensation to dealers. How should the
company treat such compensation to dealers, particularly whether it should be
reduced from revenue or shown as an expense?

Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Ind AS 18 provide as below:

“9. Revenue shall be measured at the
fair value of the consideration received or receivable.

 10. The amount of revenue arising on a
transaction is usually determined by agreement between the entity and the buyer
or user of the asset. It is measured at the fair value of the consideration
received or receivable taking into account the amount of any trade discounts
and volume rebates allowed by the entity.”

 Paragraph 18 of Ind AS 18 states as below:

 “18. Revenue is recognised only when it
is probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will
flow to the entity. In some cases, this may not be probable until the
consideration is received or until an uncertainty is removed. For example, it
may be uncertain that a foreign governmental authority will grant permission to
remit the consideration from a sale in a foreign country. When the permission
is granted, the uncertainty is removed and revenue is recognised. However, when
an uncertainty arises about the collectability of an amount already included in
revenue, the uncollectible amount or the amount in respect of which recovery
has ceased to be probable is recognised as an expense, rather than as an
adjustment of the amount of revenue originally recognised.”

 Based on the above, the following two views seem possible under Ind AS
18:

 (a) The cash compensation paid to dealer is effectively a cash incentive
paid by the company. This reduces consideration received/ receivable for sale
of goods and fair value thereof. Consequently, it should be reduced from
revenue since Ind AS 18 requires revenue to be recognised at fair value. This
would also be the view under Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with
Customers,
which requires any cash compensation paid to customer or
customer’s customer to be reduced from revenue.

 (b) The circumstances for compensation arising from the extraordinary
situation did not prevail at inception, when the original sale agreement was
signed between parties. At the time of recognition, there was no uncertainty
regarding the revenue receivable. Nor the company had any explicit/ implicit
obligation to provide cash compensation. Rather, the company has decided to
provide cash compensation to the dealer in exceptional circumstances arising
purely after recognition of the original sale transaction. This expense was
incurred to maintain harmony and good relationship with dealers and is not
reflective of the fair value of the revenue. The compensation should be seen as
a distinct activity from the original revenue. Thus,  it can be presented as an expense rather than
reduction from revenue.

The author believes that from an Ind AS 18 perspective, both the views
are acceptable.

Issue 9:
Consider that a company has entered into contract for supply of goods for INR
10,000 plus GST @ 18%, i.e., total invoice amount of INR 11,800. The sale
agreement involves deferred payment at the end of the 18th month. It
is a ‘zero percent’ financing arrangement. The management has determined that
the present value of sale consideration including GST amount discounted at
market rate of interest is INR 9,900. How will the company reflect this
transaction in the financial statements?

Though the company will recover the amount from the customer at a later
date, it needs to pay the GST immediately to the government. Consequently, the
company will pass the following entry to recognise sale/ supply of goods:

Debit
Receivable from customer

(discounted
amount)                       INR 9,900

Credit Sale of goods                       INR 8,100

Credit GST payable                         INR 1,800

Going forward, interest on receivable from customer will be recognised
using market rate of interest, i.e., the rate used for original discounting.

Issue 10:
Consider that the company has entered into fixed price construction contract
which includes all taxes at the rates prevailing when the agreement was signed.
No variation is allowed due to change in indirect tax rates. Due to
applicability of GST, the taxes applicable on the company have increased. How
should the company reflect such impact in its financial statements?

GST   is pass   through on the company, i.e., the company
collects GST on behalf of the government. Hence, revenue should be net of GST
Payable to the government, irrespective of the 
fact  that the company has signed
an all-inclusive  contract with its
customers. Consequently, the increase in tax rate due to the GST
applicability which cannot be absorbed by customer will reduce overall
construction revenue/margins.
The company should reflect such reduction as
change in estimate while determining construction revenue/margins to be
recognised based on Ind AS 11 Construction Contracts principles. The
company will make Ind AS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting
Estimates and Errors
disclosures related to change in estimate. If due
to increase in the GST rate, the overall contract has become loss making, Ind
AS 11 would require an expected loss on the construction contract to be
recognised as an expense.

Issue 11: How
does the introduction of GST impact indirect tax incentive schemes such as
advance authorisation/ EPCG schemes and various export promotion schemes under
the foreign trade policy (FTP)? How should these schemes be accounted for under
Ind AS and GST regime?

At the time of writing this article, the status of indirect tax
incentive schemes under the GST regime is not very clear. It is expected that
the Government will introduce appropriate changes in the law/ foreign trade
policy to clarify these impact.

Based on non-authoritative FAQs issued by the Finance Ministry, the
following applies:

– As
the GST Law stands today, while the exporters will continue to get the benefit
of BCD (Basic Custom Duty) exemption, the Integrated GST (IGST) that has
replaced CVD (Countervailing duty) and SAD (Special Additional Duty) is not
exempt. This would mean the importer will have to pay IGST and claim refund or
utilise it against output liability, if any. Midterm review of the Foreign
Trade Policy is likely to align FTP with GST. Representation has been made to
allow IGST exemption in case of Advance Authorisation, EPCG and other such
benefits. IGST paid would be presented as GITC Receivable Account.

–  The benefit of Merchandise Exports from India
Scheme (MEIS) and Service Exports from India Scheme (SEIS) for its utilisation
against procurement tax (earlier Central excise and Service tax) is no longer
available under GST. However, they may be utilised to pay basic custom duty or
additional duties of customs not covered under GST.

   Therefore, MEIS and SEIS scripts at 30th June, may be
usable. The entity will have to evaluate the extent to which it can be used.
Since the scripts are also transferable, the possibility of utilisation is
high. To the extent it cannot be used, or refund is not available, the same
will have to be written off.

–  There
is no clarity in respect of State incentives or Package schemes and the
Area-based exemptions made available to industry, which had made investment in
the state. Fact remains that under GST, the exemption could be only by way of
refund or utilisation of tax credit after paying tax. For example, in a State,
the entity may be entitled to sales tax exemption for a certain number of
years. Under GST, the entity will have to pay GST, and claim refund of SGST
from the State Government. The entity will have to evaluate the extent to which
they will be able to receive refund; to the extent refund is not available,
impairment would be required.

This is an area where the companies should maintain a close watch.
Further clarity on this matter will emerge in the near future.

The author believes that accounting impact on such incentive schemes can
be analysed in detail only after clarity from the Government. In the interim,
the related principles in Ind AS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and
Disclosure of Government Assistance
will continue to apply to these
schemes.

If the government does not provide incentive schemes which were
previously available to the company, then this may indicate an impairment of
assets/ onerous contracts. Consequently, it is imperative that the companies
evaluate the impact of applying Ind AS 36 Impairment of Assets and Ind
AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets carefully.

Issue 12: At
the time of dispatch of goods, a company raises an invoice and incurs GST
liability. Does that automatically result in revenue recognition under Ind AS?

Under Ind AS 18, revenue from the sale of goods shall be recognised when
all the following conditions have been satisfied:

(a) the entity has
transferred to the buyer the significant risks and rewards of ownership of the
goods;

(b) the entity retains
neither the continuing managerial involvement to the degree usually associated
with ownership nor the effective control over the goods sold;

(c) the amount of revenue
can be measured reliably;

(d) it is probable that the
economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity; and

(e) the costs incurred or
to be incurred in respect of the transaction can be measured reliably.

It may so happen that an
invoice is raised and
GST liability is incurred, but because the above conditions are not fulfilled,
revenue cannot be recognised under
Ind AS.

GST – implementation – Practical difficulties – need for appropriate Guidance

September 1st 2017

To,

Shri Hasmukh Adhia, Revenue Secretary,

The Government of India,

Ministry of Finance,

(Department of Revenue, Central Board of
Excise & Customs)

New Delhi

 

Dear Sir,


GST Implementation –
Practical Difficulties – Need for appropriate Guidance

A.  Registration:

1. Section 22 of CGST Act
states “(1)Every supplier shall be liable to be registered under this Act in
the State or Union territory, other than special category States, from where he
makes a taxable supply of goods or services or both, if his aggregate turnover
in a financial year exceeds……”

     There is wide spread
confusion about the phrase “from where he makes a taxable supply of goods or
services”. Different interpretations are being given by Central authorities and
State authorities. It is requested that either the terminology may kindly be
defined in the Act itself or appropriate guidance may kindly be provided in
this regard so that the Taxable Persons can comply with the requirements
accordingly.

2.     Many dealers, who were already registered under the earlier laws,
have not been able to migrate due to various difficulties: one of them is
difference in PAN in the records of authorities and real PAN. They should be
permitted to migrate the registration with effect from 1st July 2017
by bringing in suitable amendments in the portal. The time limit for making
application for migration by such persons may be provided to be 30 days from
the introduction of this functionality on the portal.

3.  There are certain
sectors, which have come into the GST net for the first time (they were not
liable for VAT or Service Tax earlier). Many of them have already applied for
registration, but their applications are still pending for approval, all such
applications may kindly be cleared at the earliest. And those who have not yet
been able to apply due to any kind of confusion or due to non working or slow
working of website or for any other reason, may kindly be permitted to apply
for registration w.e.f. 1st July 2017. The time limit for making
application by such persons may be stipulated to be 30th September
2017.

4.     It may be noted that unless registration is granted to such
persons, they may not be able to issue Tax Invoice. Thus, will not be able to
pay tax and submit returns etc.

5.   Further, in many cases
where application has been made before 30th July for new
registration, certificates have been issued granting registration w.e.f. the
date of granting registration, instead of date of liability. The online filing utility
for GSTR-3B does not allow such dealers to submit return for the month of July.
It may be necessary to issue general instruction for all such cases that their
registration should be made effective from 1st July 2017 and that
the portal should accept invoices of the earlier date.

B. Submission of Returns and
Payment of Taxes:

     Present provisions under
the GST laws provide filing monthly returns by all tax payers whether small or
big. (Except those who have opted for composition scheme). And such returns
have to be filed in three parts on three different dates. Several restrictions
have been prescribed whereby if a person wishes to submit required information
earlier than the due date, he cannot do so. This is creating greatest unrest
among the small and medium enterprises. It may be imperative for the Government
to mitigate the hardship likely to be caused to all such taxable persons.

    It looks like that
suggestions made by various trade associations in this regard have been
ignored. If your good selves have a look at the provisions in GST laws
worldwide, you will appreciate that all such countries who have successfully
implemented GST have ensured much easier compliance by the tax payers. However,
our country has chosen such a rigid time frame and in such a manner, which is
practically impossible to comply with on regular basis. Kindly consider the
time and energy which will be required for such kind of compliance by SMEs
every month throughout the year.

     It is requested
therefore, Chapter IX of the CGST Act regarding submission of returns etc. may
kindly be revisited. (Suggestion made by various associations may kindly be
considered and/or the provisions may kindly be made on the lines of similar
provisions under the laws of various other countries who have successfully
implemented VAT such as EU VAT, Australian VAT or Singapore VAT, etc.)

     It is also observed that
many functionalities on the portal are still not operational. The trade and
industry will need at least 30 days to understand the nuances of the portal
since it is the first time of operation. Therefore, it is suggested that the
due dates of filing of various returns be decided at least 30 days after the
respective functionalities are opened on the portal.

   Further, the
offline/online utility should be provided in such a manner that GSTR-3 is
simultaneously generated from information contained in GSTR-1 and GSTR-2.

     Form GSTR-3B requires a
taxable person to report “supplies made to composition dealer”. As the
compliance of such a requirement looks almost impossible, the Form may kindly
be amended accordingly.

     The due date for payment
of tax may remain same i.e. within 20 days from the end of month.

C. Reverse Charge Mechanism:

   Another major area of
concern to all the tax payers (whether big or small) is provisions contained in
section 9(4) of the CGST Act (supplies received from un-registered persons),
coupled with section 31(3)(f) and the condition that the liability under
reverse charge has to be first paid in cash and the credit thereof (if
eligible) can be claimed thereafter.

     Section 9 “(4) The
central tax in respect of the supply of taxable goods or services or both, by a
supplier who is not registered, to a registered person shall be paid by such
person on reverse charge basis as the recipient and all the provisions of this
Act shall apply to such recipient as if he is the person liable for paying the
tax in relation to the supply of such goods or services or both.”

    Section 31(3) “(f)a
registered person who is liable to pay tax under sub-section(3) or sub-section
(4) of section 9 shall issue an invoice in respect of goods or services or both
received by him from the supplier who is not registered on the date of receipt
of goods or services or both;”

    Respected Sirs, there is
an urgent need to kindly have a look into the provision once again. How much
revenue does the Government expect from such a provision? It will be the most
cumbersome job for the tax payers calculating liability on account of all such
supplies received from ‘un-registered persons’, issuing an invoice for all such
supplies, calculation of tax for each item at respective rate, payment thereof
and thereafter again claiming credit of the same amount as ITC. It may the most
time-consuming exercise for all taxable persons throughout the country,
resulting into almost no additional revenue to the Government and undue burden
of cash outflow on the Tax Payer. It may also result into a tool of harassment
at assessment and audit proceedings. It is requested that such provisions must
be avoided.

    Till necessary amendment
is done in the Act, the applicability of section 9(4) may kindly be kept in
abeyance, or, permission may kindly be granted to discharge the liability
through the Electronic Credit Ledger to the extent credit is available in
respect of such supplies received from un-registered suppliers in the same tax
period.

D. Time of Supply:

     Section 12(2) of CGST
Act may need appropriate amendment to provide ease of compliance.

E. Place of Supply:

     Considering
the complexities involved in the provisions, it is requested that a Guidance
Note may kindly be issued for appropriate compliance by Taxable Persons. It may
be noted that there are different views expressed by the concerned authorities
and leading consultants in respect of various kinds of transactions of supply
of goods as well as in respect of supply of services.

F. Composition Schemes:

     World over composition
schemes are being encouraged for easier compliance by all those who are
generally supplying goods/services to consumers, but, the Composition Schemes
as provided under our laws contain too many conditions and restrictions whereby
all those who really want to opt for composition cannot do so. It is suggested
that:

1. The turnover limit of
Composition scheme for manufacturers and retailers may kindly be raised to
Rupees 150 lakhs (from present limit of Rs. 75/50 lakhs).

2. The Composition Scheme
for hotels (restaurants, eating houses and caterers) should be permitted to all
such establishments without any limit of turnover. It will provide a great
relief to all those people who are dependent on such eating houses for their
daily meals. As the rate of composition under this scheme is kept at 5%, which
is much higher than other composition schemes, the suggestion may kindly be
considered in the interest of people in general.

G.         HSN Codes and
Rates of Tax:

1.   Although the Government
has not made it clear to the people that why it is necessary to mention HSN
code in respect of each and every supply of goods and why HSN code-wise summary
of intra state and interstate supplies is required to be reported in GSTR-1 and
GSTR-2, in this connection, kindly have a look at the rates of tax prescribed
through various rate schedules, items falling under same HSN code (2 digits and
4 digits) may be liable to tax under 2 or 3 different rate schedules. The
registered tax payers are maintaining rate wise bifurcation of each outward
supply as well as inward supply. Further bifurcation thereof into HSN codes and
service accounting codes may result into a much complicated accounting and the
same may lead to various kinds of errors in reporting. It is requested that HSN
code-wise reporting may kindly be kept in abeyance for the time being (at least
during first two years of implementation).

 2. The Rate Schedules may have to be thoroughly reviewed. In the
present set up it is likely to raise a large number of classification disputes,
which must be avoided for having it to be a just and fair law.

H. FAQs and Replies through
Twitter:

    It should be made clear
to all those concerned that whether replies given through Twitter can be
considered as official reply of the Department and if someone has followed the
same whether he will be protected from levy of additional tax, fine and
penalties.   

Thanking you

Yours sincerely,

 

For
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,

                                                                                 

 

Narayan
Pasari                                                           Deepak
R. Shah              

President                                                                    Chairman
– Indirect Tax Committee

Intimation Issued Under Section 143(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961…

24th August 2017

To,

Mr. Sushil Chandra, Chairman

Central Board of Direct Taxes,

North Block,

New Delhi

 Dear Mr. Chandra

 

Sub: 1)
Intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’)
displays mismatch of income without detailed analysis or reconciliation of income tax
returns filed by assessees.

 

            2) Challenges and potential consequences in
relation to returns processed by CPC

 

On behalf of our members
and on behalf of thousands of affected tax payers of the country, we would like
to bring to your kind attention some serious issues which have been brought to
our notice by some of our members on the captioned subject.

 

1.  Issuance of intimation under section 143(1) of the Act without
detailed analysis

It is noted that while
issuing Intimations issued u/s. 143(1) for A.Y. 2016-17, in a large number of
cases, notices have been sent to tax payers pointing out alleged discrepancies
in the income shown in the return of income. These notices are based on a
reconciliation done by the CPC between Form 26AS, Form 16 (in case of salaried
tax payers) and the figures reflected in the ITR forms. In most cases, the
notices state that the difference between the figure as per the ITR and the
figure as per Form 16 / 26AS represents under reported income or over reported
deductions and therefore adjustments will be made in the Intimation to be
issued u/s. 143(1).

Some of the sample
adjustments that have been proposed to be made in several cases are given
below:


a.  Denial of Allowances, Deductions and extra additions made at the
issuance in Income Tax Return

 

a.1 Allowances
which are exempt under section 10(14)(ii) of the Act read with Rule 2BB of the
Income-tax Rules,1962 (‘the Rules’),claimed in the
Income-tax return has been disallowed since the same has not been considered in Form 16 issued to the
assesses say Transport Allowance

 

a.2 Chapter
VI- A deductions- mainly u/s. 80C, 80D and 80TTA have been denied on the ground
that the same are not reflected in the Form 16.

It is respectfully
submitted that these types of comparisons are completely unfair and unwarranted
u/s. 143(1). First of all, Form 16 cannot be made the basis for computing the
total income of an assessee. At best, the salary income can be verified with
the Form 16. An assessee has every right to claim deductions and/or exemptions
if he/she is entitled to do so under the Income-tax Act even if the same are
not reflected in the Form 16. It may be appreciated that issuance of Form 16 is
not in the control of a salaried person. It is done by the employer. If an
employer makes a mistake or if an employer provides incomplete information in
the Form 16, that cannot be taken as the basis for making upward adjustments in
an employee’s total income. In any case, deduction u/s. 80TTA can never form
part of Form 16 since it is a deduction in respect of interest on savings bank
account. This deduction will never appear in the Form 16 unless the employee
has provided details of his income from savings bank account to his employer.

Further, it is common
knowledge that many times, employees prefer to pay advance tax on their non
salary income instead of disclosing the said income to the employer and getting
a TDS done from that income by the employer. This stand is taken across the
country by thousands of employees. There could be various reasons for this. One
very strong reason for taking such a stand is to protect the privacy of one’s
other income from the employer. In such cases, the income as well as deductions
claimed under Chapter VI-A against such income will not appear in the Form 16.

It is respectfully
submitted that proposing adjustments to the income based on such a comparison
will only add to the problems faced by taxpayers. This is in stark contrast to
the Finance Minister’s repeated statements that the government would like to
make tax laws simple and easy to comply with, for taxpayers.

As regards the exemptions
like transport allowance, there are multiple situations where the Form 16
generated by an employer is not accurate in all respects. Often, employers show
only net taxable salary income in the e-TDS statements and Form 16 instead of
showing the gross separately and the exemptions separately. On the other hand,
an employee, while filing his own return, would show the correct amounts (i.e.
gross and exemptions). In such cases, the employee cannot be penalised because
of the lapse of the employer. At the end of it, the employer has every right to
disclose his true and correct income in the return.

 

b.  Amounts on which Tax is Collected at Source is being considered as
Other Income

In certain cases, the
seller of certain goods has to collect tax at source and pay it to the
government. This TCS appears in the Form 26AS of the tax collector. In several
cases, it has been brought to our notice that the gross amount (on which the
seller has collected the tax at source) is being added to the total income of
such person based on Part B of Form 26AS which displays the details of tax
collected at source (TCS) by the seller.

           

c.  Notice u/s. 139(9) of the Act

In a large number of cases,
tax payers have received notices u/s. 139(9) stating that the return filed is
defective. In such cases, the reason given for such a stand is that certain
amounts as shown in the ITR in the fields of income do not match with the
amounts shown in the ITR in the Balance Sheet / Profit & Loss Account
fields.

In this regard, certain
examples brought to our notice by some of our members are given below:

Case
one:  

When a taxpayer has Capital
Gains which is credited to the Profit & Loss Account, the same is reduced
from the figure of Net Profit in the computation and then offered for tax under
the head “Capital Gains”. The amount that is reduced from the Net Profit as per
Profit & Loss Account would be the book profit. On the other hand, the
amount of capital gains offered for tax in the return would be as computed
under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, in case of long term
capital gains, the gain offered to tax would be indexed gain which would
naturally be different from the figure of book profit.

In such genuine cases also,
the income tax return has been treated as defective return under section 139(9)
of the Act to the extent of mismatch between the schedules of Business Profit
with reference to CG schedule.

Case two:

The Income tax return has
been rejected on the basis of difference between schedules of Business Profit
and Income from Other Source as illustrated hereunder:

Actual facts of the case –
income earned by Mr. A

 

Sr.
No.

Particulars

Amount (Rs.)

Amount (Rs.)

1.

Net
Profit as per Profit & Loss Account (includes Interest income of parent)

 

       
35,000

 

 

 

 

2.

Other
Sources

 

 

 

Interest
Income

 

 

 

Parent

10,000

 

 

Minor’s
income (which would obviously not be credited to P&L Account of the
parent)

15,000

 

 

 

 

           
25,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  Thus, in the above example,
the gross income of the assessee would be as under:

 

Business
Income (35,000 less 10,000) =

Rs. 25,000

Income
from Other Sources (own + minor’s income)

Rs. 25,000

Total

Rs. 50,000

 

 

In the return of income
filed by Mr. A, the above data would be shown as under. As against this, the
last column shows the stand that the CPC is taking while processing the
returns:

 

Particulars

As
per Return

Stand
taken by CPC

Business
Profits

35,000

 

Less:
Interest Income – Parent

            
10,000

Mismatch
of Interest income offered under other sources as reduced from Business
Income.

Net
Business Income

            
25,000

 

 

 

 

Other
Sources

 

 

Interest
Income

 

 

Parent

10,000

 

Minor’s
income

15,000

 

Total
Income from Other Sources

         
25,000

Interest
income offered for tax is not matching with interest income reduced from
Schedule Business Profits

Gross
Income

50,000

 

Thus, in such cases, while
processing the return, non-existent defects are pointed out by the CPC and the
return is treated as defective. 

Case
three:

In Form ITR 1 – Income from
salary (net) has to be mentioned in Part B. On the other hand, the employer is
required to show gross salary, various exemptions (like HRA, LTA) and the net
taxable salary in the TDS return filed in Form 24. As a result, Form 26AS shows
gross salary based on the TDS return filed by the employer. 


In such cases, the income
tax return has been treated as defective return under section 139(9) of the Act
due to the mismatch of salary income shown in ITR 1 and Form 26AS. It may be appreciated
that in such cases, the tax payer cannot, even if he wants to, show the gross
salary and the deductions/exemptions separately in ITR 1.

In ITR 2, in salary
schedule, gross salary, exempt allowances and net salary can be shown and hence
139(9) notices are not received if ITR 2 is filed.

 

2. Challenges and potential
consequences in relation to returns processed by CPC

Quoting from the maiden
budget speech of the Hon’ble Finance Minister in 2014 “……I would like to convey
to this August House and also the investors community at large that we are
committed to provide a stable and predictable taxation regime that would be
investor friendly and spur growth….”.

However, receipt of notices
of defective returns as mentioned in preceding paragraphs not only negate the
stated objective of the government but also create huge challenges and hardship
on the affected assessees. In this process, the good work done by the
income-tax department of expeditious disbursement of refunds in several cases
goes unnoticed and the negativity created by such wrongful and inappropriate
adjustments / proposed adjustments to the income overshadows the minds of tax
payers.

We humbly request your goodself
to resolve the issues and issue necessary directions to the CPC so that before
issuing any notices to the assessees, proper care is taken and unnecessary
hardship is not caused to tax payers.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

 

For
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,

                                                                                 

 

Narayan R.
Pasari                                                       Ameet
N. Patel                

President                                                                      Chairman,
Taxation Committee

There is No Competition…(If you Decide to) Create Your Own Niche

Professional
service firms need to recognise that you don’t need to compete to grow; what
you need is to work towards creating your own niche.

 The niche firm

Those who think they can create a specialist professional service
firm…….……………………..will be the ones who in all probability will.

The niche professional service firm

Today
competitive advantage is defined as the leverage a business has over another.
In simple words, to show being better than the competitor/s. Businesses develop
attributes that differentiate their goods and services through price, quality
and such other features.

Does
one need to really compete in the professional services firm market? Shouldn’t
work be referred to oneself or one’s firm by someone who has been a satisfied
client. This is an age old truth of the professions; yet it is seldom
understood in its purest form.

At the
core of the profession lies knowledge and the abundance of it. And
professionals who excel are normally those who do that ‘one thing’ right. Over
and over and over again. In doing so, they learn so much and improvise
consistently. They reach such a level in their thought process that their final
output is hard to match, or even to come close to, by other professionals. It
is their calling. Their finesse and passion that creates what we call
“expertise”. Once expertise is developed, two things can happen. Professionals
can bask in their glory, develop complacency of what I would say ‘intellectual
arrogance’ and wane over a period of time. Or, for the select minority, they
would rise and rise and reach a level of sublimity that is seldom seen. The
latter is the one who creates new milestones, raises the bar, and develops new
frameworks, new models and new competencies that professionals would follow in
the years ahead.

Those
who succeed in their profession, have done so because they concentrated on
getting that one thing right. And they persevered till they succeeded. And then
moved on to continuously raising the bar, the depth of their advice, the
alternatives that one could explore and charted the unknown. It is they who the
world has recognised and rewarded. They have truly created, what we call, a
‘niche professional service firm’ out of years of demonstrated expertise,
research and perseverance.

Clients don’t need to be sought by a niche firm. Clients will find their
way to expertise, themselves.
They will
be referred to the expert. Just like if one needs a knee replacement surgeon,
one would normally ask “do you know who is the best in the business?” Patients
who need these surgeries dread even the thought of something going wrong and
they losing their mobility for life. “Is he good with post-operative care?”;
“How many surgeries has he conducted?”; “What is his success rate?”; “What
happens if something goes wrong – how will he and his team help me?”. These and
others are very natural questions that would come. The expert surgeon will give
a calm, composed and articulated, yet clear, response to each question and
more. The patient and their families return home reassured that they are in
safe hands. The surgery goes smoothly. The post-operative recuperation and
physio goes well. Spot on. The patient is back on his feet. Expertise proven.
What happens next – “He is the best surgeon around…he did so and so..he said so
and so..I highly recommend him..” Haven’t we all heard this at some point in
time about some or the other professional. Does this professional need to worry
about growth? His diary is full, weeks in advance. That is what being a niche
expert does to one’s credibility and reputation.

This
is the point that one needs to reach, if one has to really scale and grow in a
professional service firm. Create your niche. Create a perception..a visible
perception..that you are an expert. And the world is yours. Sounds simple…?
Well, may not be as easy as it sounds.

Let’s
look at how others have done this.

What
are the challenges? What does it take? Does everyone have a shot at becoming an
expert? The answer to all of these question lie in the choices that one makes.
The pattern of rigour and research. The perseverance.

The
road is always so full of challenges. It is always tough.

Can
one find their calling in this narrow space? To start with, a professional
needs to identify his calling. What does he or she excel at? What efforts is he
or she making currently and willing to make to reach the pinnacle?

Let’s look at a few examples

Most
senior tax professionals regularly converge in speaking sessions, conferences,
workshops, seminars, firm level discussion groups, study groups or peer groups
to dissect and analyse any new change or a new law or a path breaking judgment
that impacts the tax practice. It is hard work, at their age, coupled with a
quest for learning new concepts, unlearning old ones at times, and continuous
realignment to the demands of the profession that makes them excel at what they
do. The fire is burning even at the age of 65 or 75 – it is that X factor that
“I want to be the best tax professional around” that keeps them going. They
have made their money in life, they have achieved everything in the profession
that one could possibly achieve, they have earned their stars and kept them
flying high for north of 40-50 years. And done things repeatedly well. They
have become the luminaries of the profession. The key reason – know your niche
and excel at it.  

Sachin
Tendulkar, known world over as the Maestro of Cricket, practiced at 5.30 am
even during his last season – in his 24th year of international
cricket. Did the coach tell him to do that – No!! Did the captain ask him to
prove his fitness – No!! Then what was it? Well, it was the innate desire to
give his best – each time, every time. A quest for perfection and excellence.
Nothing less. Not even 0.5% diminution in performance would do for him. It is
this hunger and passion that led him to become what he is – the highest run
scorer in the history of cricket in both forms of the game (tests and one days)
and 100 centuries – a record that is unlikely to be broken for a long long
time. So what was it?

Do we,
as professionals, have it in us to strive for excellence – each time, every
time. Can we burn the morning hours to keep ourselves fit, take care of our
health – physical and mental, create an environment in the firm that attracts
the best people, retains them and rewards them for performance? Excel at client
delivery and client servicing. Follow the principles of practice management to
the core. And, have a strategy of focusing on a niche and building on that
niche. If we can answer a YES to all of these, consistently, we would have created
a niche professional service firm, that one can be proud of. Then, one does not
need to really compete in the true sense. One can focus on excellence, and
clients will come – referred from various sources. All you got to do is deliver
your best; and that will keep on increasing the referrals coming your way.

 That
brings us to the following questions commonly asked by practitioners:

 

–  How does a small or medium sized CA firm
create a niche?

 

– Where does one start?

 For a
SME CA firm, here are some ideas and examples that could be used as reference
points:

 

1.  First, SME firms should change their mindset
and believe in themselves and their abilities. Developing a niche may sound
daunting; but in reality, it is not. It needs determination and strong will;
such that the resolve to learn, apply and practice is with the highest level of
motivation. Imagine preparing for the CA final exams – that is the only goal –
and that is to develop expertise in a particular subject. And excel in the
same, continuously – month on month, year on year. Impossible – not at all,
just needs hard work and concentration.

 

2.  Focus. Look at some of our practitioners of
Service Tax who have transitioned into the GST regime like a fish takes to
warmer waters. They have adapted to the new law, spent hours and hours decoding
the developments and updates from the GST council, with new rules coming out
almost on a daily/weekly basis, the client requisitions for conducting GST
impact studies and assisting in the transition process, the technology
challenges and so on. One may argue that they already had a Service Tax
practice; and in that sense, were a niche player. But, even then, GST is a new
law, an amalgam of sales tax/VAT and service tax and central excise; and it
takes perseverance and patience to unlearn and relearn. The fact that they had
a practice helped them to focus on the new law, without worrying about other
service lines. And that’s where CAs will need to strive to transition to. Do not
worry about all service lines. Focus on one and give off your best.

 

3.  For SME firms, with two or more partners, the
easiest thing would be for service areas to be split between partners. Everyone
should not be doing everything. Taxation – Indirect Taxation and Direct
Taxation, Audits – Statutory and Internal, Corporate Advisory – Lead Advisory
and Transaction Advisory, are all knowledge driven practice areas. To expect
one professional to do justice to both Direct and Indirect Taxation is an
outright misalignment. You do not have many all-rounders in any profession;
that’s a small breed. A vast majority are generalists and SMEs would do well to
allow individual partners to pick up one service area and run with it. This
will also create a case for consolidating practices and growing one’s own firms
with merging with like-minded firms. When you have more bandwidth at the
partner level, each partner can pick up an area that he is most wanting to
excel in and then run with it. The partner can then excel at the particular
service area, develop his own team and create a niche for the firm.

 

4.  Consolidation of practices is the name of the
game. The large international and national firms have all grown because they
have partners leading specific practice areas. Clients see the expertise and it
is over and over again demonstrated due to the depth of the partner concerned.
How can a normal CA firm compete with such a value proposition? The only real
answer lies in focusing on that one practice area. Start with making a
determined effort in an area and grow with the expectation that what you are
creating is a niche that will pay rich dividends over time. Get all the books,
practice manuals, databases, expert articles, world literature available on the
subject; make a conscious effort to study and understand the concept, adapt it
to the law in India or whichever jurisdiction you need to apply it; and start
practicing in the right earnest.

 

     There is no one right way to implement these ideas; each firm
will have to adapt itself to the marketplace based on its own philosophy and
strengths. Be market centric, customer focused and consistently develop,
enhance, communicate your niche area of expertise in a demonstrable manner.

 

            In
conclusion, all of these examples drive to that one key principle: one really
does not need to compete with other professionals. Just execute on creating
your own niche. Remember the story of Akbar asking Birbal to shorten a line
without rubbing it out? Birbal simply draws a larger line!

Liberalised Remittance Scheme

1.  Background

     Liberalised
Remittance Scheme [LRS / the Scheme] was introduced vide AP (DIR Series)
Circular No. 64 dated 4th February, 2004 read with Notification No.
207(E) dated 23rd March, 2004.

     LRS was
introduced as a liberalisation measure to facilitate resident individuals to
remit funds abroad for permitted capital or current account transactions or
combination of both.

     Presently, FED
Master Direction No. 7/ 2015-16 dated January 1, 2016 (updated as on 12th
April, 2017) [LRS Master Direction] and FAQs on LRS dated 11th August,
2016 [LRS FAQs], explain the provisions of the LRS.

2.  LRS Limit

    Currently,
under LRS, Authorised Dealers [ADs] may freely allow remittances by resident
individuals up to USD 2,50,000 per Financial Year (April-March) for any
permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both.

    Consistent
with prevailing macro and micro economic conditions, the LRS limit has been
revised in stages. During the period from February 4, 2004 till date, the LRS
limit has been revised as under:

 

Date

Feb 4, 2004

Dec 20, 2006

May 8, 2007

Sep 26, 2007

Aug 14, 2013

Jun 3, 2014

May 26, 2015

LRS limit (USD)

25,000

50,000

1,00,000

2,00,000

75,000

1,25,000

2,50,000

Subsumes
remittances for current account transactions

Previously, there
were separate limits in respect of current account transactions. With effect
from 26th May 2015, LRS limit was increased to USD 2,50,000 per FY.
The increased limit now also includes/subsumes remittance limit for current
account transactions available to resident individuals under Para 1 of Schedule
III to Current Account Transactions Rules, as amended.

Clause 1(ix) of
the Schedule III to Current Account Transactions Rules, provides ‘Any other
Current Account Transaction’. However, Current Account Transactions Rules do
not clarify the type of transactions that are covered under this residual
clause and also whether there will be separate limits for those transactions or
that they too will be subsumed within LRS limit. Specific RBI approval will be
required for any transaction above the LRS limit.

Consolidation
and Clubbing

Members of a family
can consolidate their individual remittances under the Scheme if each of the
individual family member complies with all the terms and conditions. However,
in case of capital account transactions such as opening a bank
account/investment/purchase of property, etc. consolidation by family members
is not permitted if the remitting family member is not a co-owner/co-partner in
the overseas bank account/investment/property. Apparently, this is because a
resident cannot draw foreign currency to make gift to another resident in
foreign currency even if such gift is made by way of credit to the latter’s
overseas foreign currency account held under LRS.

3.  Availability of the LRS

–   LRS is available to all resident
individuals including minors
. In case of remitter being a minor, the Form
A2 must be countersigned by the minor’s natural guardian.

–   LRS not available to Corporates,
Partnership firms, HUF, Trusts, etc.

–  Remittance by sole proprietor under LRS

    In case of a
sole proprietorship business, there is no legal distinction between the
individual / owner and the business. Hence, the owner of the business (in his
personal name and not in the name of the business) can make remittance up to
the
permissible limit under LRS. If the owner of the sole proprietorship business
intends to remit the money from the bank account of the sole proprietorship
business, then the eligibility of the proprietor only in his individual
capacity should be considered. Hence, if an individual in his own capacity
remits USD 250,000 in a financial year under LRS, he cannot remit another USD
250,000 in his capacity as owner of the sole proprietorship business.

4.    Permissible/Prohibited
transactions under LRS

 4.1  Permissible
Capital Account Transactions

       Para A.6 of
the LRS Master directions provides that the permissible capital account
transactions by an individual under LRS are:

– opening of foreign currency account abroad
with a bank;

– purchase of property abroad;

– making investments abroad – acquisition and
holding shares of both listed and unlisted overseas company or debt
instruments; acquisition of qualification shares of an overseas company for
holding the post of Director; acquisition of shares of a foreign company towards
professional services rendered or in lieu of Director’s remuneration;
investment in units of Mutual Funds, Venture Capital Funds, unrated debt
securities, promissory notes;

–   setting up Wholly Owned Subsidiaries and Joint
Ventures1 (with effect from August 05, 2013) outside India for bona
fide business subject to the terms & conditions stipulated in Notification
No. FEMA. 263/ RB-2013 dated March 5, 2013;

–  extending loans including loans in Indian
Rupees to Non-resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in Companies
Act, 1956.

 4.2  Permissible
Current Account Transactions

       As
mentioned earlier, limit of USD 2,50,000 per FY subsumes earlier separate
limits for remittances under Current Account Transactions Rules (viz. private
visit; gift/donation; going abroad on employment; emigration; maintenance of
close relatives abroad; business trip; medical treatment abroad; studies
abroad). Release of foreign exchange exceeding USD 2,50,000, requires prior
permission from the RBI.

 a. Private
Visits

       For private
visits abroad, other than to Nepal and Bhutan, any resident individual can
obtain foreign exchange up to an aggregate amount of USD 2,50,000, from an AD
or FFMC, in any one financial year, irrespective of the number of visits
undertaken during the year.

      Further,
all tour related expenses including cost of rail/road/water transportation;
cost of Euro Rail; passes/tickets, etc. outside India; and overseas
hotel/lodging expenses shall be subsumed under the LRS limit. The tour operator
can collect this amount either in Indian rupees or in foreign currency from the
resident traveller.

 b. Gift /
Donation

       Any
resident individual may remit up to USD 2,50,000 in one FY as gift to a person
residing outside India or as donation to an organization outside India.

 c. Going abroad
on employment

      A person
going abroad for employment can draw foreign exchange up to USD 2,50,000 per FY
from any AD in India.

 d. Emigration

      A person
emigrating from India can draw foreign exchange from AD Category I bank and AD
Category II up to the amount prescribed by the country of emigration or USD
250,000. Remittance of any amount of foreign exchange outside India in excess
of this limit may be allowed only towards meeting incidental expenses in the
country of immigration and not for earning points or credits to become eligible
for immigration by way of overseas investments in government bonds; land;
commercial enterprise; etc.

 e. Maintenance
of close relatives abroad

       A resident
individual can remit up-to USD 2,50,000 per FY towards maintenance of close
relatives [‘relative’ as defined in section 6 of the Indian Companies Act,
1956] abroad.

 f.  Business
Trip

        Visits by
individuals for attending an international conference, seminar, specialised
training, apprentice training, etc., are treated as business visits. For
business trips to foreign countries, resident individuals can avail of foreign
exchange up to USD 2,50,000 in a FY irrespective of the number of visits
undertaken during the year.

   If an employee
is deputed by the employer for any of the above and the expenses are borne by
the employer, such expenses shall be treated as residual current account
transactions outside LRS and may be permitted by the AD without any limit,
subject to verifying the bona fide of the transaction.

g. Medical
Treatment Abroad

ADs may
release foreign exchange up to an amount of USD 2,50,000 or its equivalent per
FY without insisting on any estimate from a hospital/doctor. For amount
exceeding the above limit, ADs may release foreign exchange under general
permission based on the estimate from the doctor in India or hospital/ doctor
abroad. A person who has fallen sick after proceeding abroad may also be
released foreign exchange by an AD (without seeking prior approval of the RBI)
for medical treatment outside India.

       In addition
to the above, an amount up to USD 250,000 per financial year is allowed to a
person for accompanying as attendant to a patient going abroad for medical
treatment/check-up.

 h. Facilities
available to students for pursuing their studies abroad.

       AD Category
I banks and AD Category II, may release foreign exchange up to USD 2,50,000 or
its equivalent to resident individuals for studies abroad without insisting on
any estimate from the foreign University. However, AD Category I bank and AD
Category II may allow remittances (without seeking prior approval of the RBI) exceeding
USD 2,50,000 based on the estimate received from the institution abroad

 i.  Purchasing
Objects of Art

       Remittances
under the Scheme can be used for purchasing objects of art subject to the
provisions of other applicable laws such as the extant Foreign Trade Policy of
the Government of India.

 5.    Outward remittance in the form of a DD

      The Scheme
can be used for outward remittance in the form of a DD either in the resident
individual’s own name or in the name of beneficiary with whom he intends putting
through the permissible transactions at the time of private visit abroad,
against self-declaration of the remitter in the format prescribed.

 6.    Open, maintain and hold Foreign Currency
Accounts

Individuals can
also open, maintain and hold foreign currency accounts with a bank outside
India for making remittances under the Scheme without prior approval of the
Reserve Bank. The foreign currency accounts may be used for putting through all
transactions connected with or arising from remittances eligible under this
Scheme.

 7.    Prohibitions under LRS

 7.1  Question
2 of the LRS FAQs provides that the remittance facility under the scheme is not
available for the following:

– The Scheme is not available for remittances
for any purpose specifically prohibited under Schedule I or any item restricted
under Schedule II of Foreign Exchange Management (Current Account Transaction)
Rules, 2000, dated May 3, 2000, as amended from time to time.

– Remittance from India for margins or margin
calls to overseas exchanges / overseas counterparty.

– Remittances for purchase of FCCBs issued by
Indian companies in the overseas secondary market.

–  Remittance for trading in foreign exchange
abroad.

–  Capital account remittances, directly or
indirectly, to countries identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
as “non- cooperative countries and territories”, from time to time.

–  Remittances
directly or indirectly to those individuals and entities identified as posing
significant risk of committing acts of terrorism as advised separately by the
Reserve Bank to the banks.

   In addition,
Banks should not extend any kind of credit facilities to resident individuals
to facilitate capital account remittances under the Scheme.

 7.2  Holding
Gold Abroad

        Under LRS a
person can remit for any purpose except those specifically prohibited.

       LRS Master
Direction provides a positive list of transactions permitted and FAQs of 2016
provides a negative list of transactions which are not permitted.

      Though not
specifically prohibited, it is understood that RBI is not in favour of using
remittances under LRS for holding gold abroad.

 7.3  Providing
Loans Abroad

      Due to
positive / negative list, though not specifically prohibited, it is understood
that RBI is not in favour of using remittances under LRS for giving loans
abroad.

 8.    Procedure for remittances under LRS

      The
individual should designate a branch of an AD through which all the remittances
under the Scheme will be made. The resident individual seeking to make the remittance
should furnish extant Form A2 for purchase of foreign exchange under LRS.

 9.    Overseas Direct Investment by Individuals
under LRS

      Regulation 20A of the Foreign Exchange Management
(Transfer or issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 [FEMA 120]
provides that a resident individual (single or in association with another
resident individual or with an ‘Indian Party’ as defined in this Notification) satisfying
the criteria as per Schedule V of this Notification
, may make overseas
direct investment
in the equity shares and compulsorily convertible
preference shares of a Joint Venture (JV) or Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS)
outside India.

      Para 5 of
the Schedule provides that at the time of investments, the permissible ceiling
shall be within the overall ceiling prescribed for the resident individual under Liberalised
Remittance Scheme
as prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time.

      Explanation:
The investment made out of the balances held in EEFC/RFC account shall also
be restricted to the limit prescribed under LRS.

       A resident
individual who has made overseas direct investment in the equity shares;
compulsorily convertible preference shares of a JV/WoS outside India or ESOPs,
within the LRS limit, will be required to comply with the terms and conditions
prescribed by the overseas investment guidelines in Schedule V of FEMA 120 vide
Notification No. FEMA 263/ RB-2013 dated March 5, 2013.

       No ratings
or guidelines have been prescribed under LRS of USD 2,50,000 on the quality of
the investment an individual can make. However, the individual investor is
expected to exercise due diligence while taking a decision regarding the investments
which he or she proposes to make

 10.  Rupee Loan by a resident individual to a
NRI/PIO who is a close relative

       A resident individual is permitted to make a rupee
loan to a NRI/PIO who is a close relative of the resident individual
(‘relative’ as defined in section 2(77) of the Companies Act, 2013) by way of
crossed cheque/ electronic transfer subject to the following conditions:

 a. The loan is free
of interest and the minimum maturity of the loan is one year.

 b. The loan, though
in rupees, should be within the overall LRS limit of USD 2,50,000, per
financial year, available to the resident individual. It is the responsibility
of the lender to ensure that the amount of loan is within the LRS limit of USD
2,50,000 during the financial year.

 c. The loan should
be utilised for meeting the borrower’s personal requirements or for his own
business purposes in India.

 d. The loan should
not be utilised, either singly or in association with other person, for any of
the activities in which investment by persons resident outside India is
prohibited, namely;

–  the business of chit fund, or

–   Nidhi Company, or

–  agricultural or plantation activities or in
real estate business, or construction of farmhouses, or

– trading in Transferable Development Rights
(TDRs).

 Explanation:
For this purpose, real estate business shall not include development of
townships, construction of residential / commercial premises, roads or bridges.

 e. The loan amount
should be credited to the NRO a/c of the NRI / PIO. Credit of such loan amount
may be treated as an eligible credit to NRO a/c.

 f.  The loan amount
shall not be remitted outside India.

g. Repayment of
loan shall be made by way of inward remittances through normal banking channels
or by debit to the Non-resident Ordinary (NRO) / Non-resident External (NRE) /
Foreign Currency Non-resident (FCNR) account of the borrower or out of the sale
proceeds of the shares or securities or immovable property against which such
loan was granted.

11.     The purpose of this article is to highlight the
major changes in the LRS which were brought about by Notification No. FEMA.
263/RB-2013 dated March 5, 2013 in respect of investment outside India,
Notification No. G.S.R. 426(E) dated May 26, 2015 issued by Ministry of Finance
in respect of limits under LRS and Notification No. FEMA. 341/2015-RB dated May
26, 2015 in respect of subsuming of limits under Current Account Transactions
Rules in a holistic manner. This apart, there could be some contentious issues.
However, in the absence of any official clarification, it may not be proper to
consider these.

Shell-shocked – SEBI’s directions against ‘Shell’ Companies

Background

In August 2017, SEBI issued
directions to Stock Exchanges to severely restrict trading in the shares of
certain companies. SEBI had received a list of 331 companies from the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”). It appears that the reason for this restriction
is that these companies were shell companies (i.e., having no substantive
operations) and may have been used for money laundering post demonetisation in
November 2016. The directions caused severe distress to these companies and
their shareholders, and some of the companies appealed to the Securities
Appellate Tribunal and got relief. SEBI’s directions were remarkable, have
far-reaching impact and involve issues of law, and hence, it is worth
discussing and understanding these directions.

Overview of what happened

SEBI stated that it had
received a list of companies from MCA that were allegedly shell companies
(which apparently compiled the list after taking inputs from other authorities
such as SFIO). The list included listed companies.

In the ordinary course of
business, stock exchanges do place restrictions on trading of companies. Under
stock exchange regulations, depending on what is suspected (which may include
disproportionate rise in price/trading without underlying fundamentals),
restrictions in trading are placed. These restrictions progressively increase
by levels till the most restrictive level VI is reached. At this stage, trading
is allowed only once a month, with the price being the last traded price. Thus,
increase or decrease in price is not possible.

The
buyer is also required to pay 200% margin for five months as deposit with the
stock exchange. There are other restrictions also. Needless to say, while this
is marginally better than total delisting/suspension of listing, however, for
all practical purposes, trading in shares of such companies drops to virtually
zero. In the ordinary course, it is for the stock exchange to decide the level
of restrictions.

However, in the present
case, SEBI issued a directive to stock exchanges to place all these companies
at level VI. Exchanges are bound to obey such directions. Thus, trading was
effectively stopped and it could be done only in the restricted manner
mentioned earlier. The directions also imposed restrictions on `off market
transactions.’

Curiously, SEBI did not
clarify that the authorities that had forwarded the list had required SEBI to
place restrictions on all companies. It appears that MCA wanted SEBI to
investigate and thereafter take action. It also appears that not all the companies
were listed on stock exchanges! Hence, even SEBI had to ask the exchanges to
first check the list to find out which of the companies are listed and then
take action.

Factually, many of the
companies were large profitable companies with considerable operations and
active trading. Trading in their shares on exchanges suddenly ceased. These
companies had no choice but to urgently approach the Securities Appellate
Tribunal (“SAT”). Appealing to SAT could have been difficult, because of the
manner in which the directions were given. However, SAT gave prompt relief,
staying the orders in case of companies which appealed and ordered SEBI to
investigate and give opportunity to the said companies to present their case.

The
present status is that except for the handful of companies that appealed and
got a stay, trading in the remaining listed companies stands suspended.

Directions issued against the shell
companies

The
following extract from the directions dated 7th August 2017 of SEBI
to stock exchanges make clear what was ordered:-

“Trading in all such listed securities shall be placed in Stage VI
of the Graded Surveillance Measures (GSM) with immediate effect. If any listed
company out of the said list is already identified under any stage of GSM, it
shall also be moved to GSM stage VI directly. Under the Stage VI of GSM,
trading in these identified securities shall be permitted to trade once in a
month under trade to trade category. Further, any upward price movement in
these securities shall not be permitted beyond the last traded price and
Additional Surveillance Deposit of 200% of trade value shall be collected from
the Buyer which shall be retained with Exchanges for a period of five months.

 

Exchanges shall initiate a process of verifying the
credentials/fundamental of such companies. Exchanges shall appoint an
independent auditor to conduct audit of such listed companies and if necessary,
even conduct forensic audit of such companies to verify its credentials/
fundamentals.

 

On verification, if Exchanges do not find appropriate credentials/
fundamentals about existence of the company, Exchanges shall initiate the
proceedings for compulsory delisting against the company, and the said company
shall not be permitted to deal in any security on exchange platform and its
holding in any depository account shall be frozen till such delisting process
is completed.”

MCA had only suggested investi-gation by
SEBI, not orders

In its defense before SAT,
SEBI made a plea that it was required by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to
pass such directions. This contention was rejected by SAT. Even otherwise, it
was held that SEBI cannot blindly follow directions of MCA. SEBI, being an
entity bound by the SEBI Act, could not issue such directions without following
due process prescribed under the SEBI Act. SAT also noted that MCA had merely
required SEBI to investigate such companies, whether they were shell companies,
etc. and to take action, if required under law.

Issue of directions as a circular which
could be non-appealable

SEBI took an interesting
mode of taking action against such companies. In the ordinary course, it would
examine the facts of each company, notify and put the facts before them, make
specific allegations and ask them to explain their side before passing an
order. In extreme cases, SEBI can even pass interim ex parte order and
could grant the company a post-order hearing. But, even such orders would
require at least basic investigation and also be a speaking order.

Instead, SEBI directly
issued directions to stock exchanges requiring them to put the companies on the
highest restriction level. The result of this was that – the companies faced
restrictions just as they would have under a direct order on them. It seems,
SEBI did that to avoid an overturning of its order by claiming protection under
a recent decision of the Supreme Court (in NSDL vs. (2017) 5 SCC 517,
discussed in an earlier article in this column) that administrative orders
cannot be the subject matter of appeal. Thus, the only course of action against
such directions would have been a writ petition to the High court.

When the companies appealed
to SAT, SEBI contended that such directions being of administrative nature,
were not appealable as held by the Supreme Court.

However, SAT rejected this
contention. The following observations of SAT are relevant in this regard:-

 

“4. We see no merit in the preliminary objection raised by SEBI.
In the case of NSDL (Supra) the Apex Court after considering the scope of the
expression ‘administrative orders’ held that in that case the administrative
circular issued by SEBI was referable to Section 11(1) of SEBI Act and hence
falls outside the appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

…

 

6. Thus, the impugned communication is not a general direction
given by SEBI to the three stock exchanges in the interests of investors or
securities market as contemplated u/s. 11(1) of SEBI Act, but a specific
direction given in respect of only 331 listed companies which MCA suspected to
be shell companies. Moreover, specific direction given in the impugned
communication prejudicially affects the interests of only those companies
covered under the list of 331 companies identified by the MCA as ‘suspected to
be shell companies’. Therefore, in the facts of present case, the impugned
communication of SEBI which has serious civil consequences cannot be said to be
an administrative order. In other words, the impugned communication which
prejudicially impairs the rights and obligations of the appellants, its
promoters and directors would fall in the category of a quasi judicial order
and hence appealable before this Tribunal u/s. 15T of SEBI Act.

 

7. It is contended on behalf of SEBI that appeal u/s. 15T of SEBI
Act is maintainable only against an order passed by the Board or the
Adjudicating Officer of SEBI and therefore, the impugned communication issued
by the Chief General Manager of SEBI is not appealable u/s. 15T of SEBI Act. We
see no merit in the above contention, because, it is admitted by counsel for
SEBI during the course of arguments that the impugned action was approved by
the WTM of SEBI on 28.07.2017 and only thereafter on 07.08.2017, the Chief
General Manager has issued the impugned communication. Since the impugned
communication which is approved by the WTM of SEBI seeks to suspend the trading
in the securities of the appellants, on day to day basis the impugned
communication is in effect referable to a quasi judicial order passed u/s.
11(4) of SEBI Act and not an administrative order passed u/s. 11(1) of the SEBI
Act. Accordingly, we see no merit in the preliminary objection raised by SEBI.”

Whether matter was urgent?

SEBI often passes interim
orders before concluding investigation to ensure that status quo is
maintained. In the instant case, SAT rejected the view that there was an
urgency. SEBI received the letter from MCA dated 9th June 2017, but
issued directions after nearly two months.

Striking off of names of companies by
Registrar of Companies

A similar action against
allegedly shell companies was initiated earlier by the respective Registrar of
Companies of various states. However, due process of law was followed whereby a
notice was issued, giving reasons as to why their names were sought to be
struck off and an opportunity was given to the companies to respond.
Reportedly, such companies were more than 2.50 lakhs in number. However, SEBI,
did not issue any such notice.

What laws have such companies violated?

An interesting question
that arises is: What Securities Laws have such companies violated, even if it
was found that they were guilty of money laundering? Though SEBI does have wide
powers to issue orders, generally they are passed where Securities Laws are
violated, or to protect interests of investors, etc.

If there was any money
laundering, the company and its directors could face action under appropriate
law. However, that   may  not enable SEBI to pass orders under the
Securities Laws. In particular, if restrictive orders are passed, it is the
public shareholders of such companies who may get affected probably for no
fault of theirs as it happened in the instant case. Earlier, in cases where it was alleged that price manipulation
and other wrongs was carried out for helping parties to earn tax free long term
capital gains, there were several grounds to take action under Securities Laws.
However, in the present case, it is not evident on the face of it as to what
action SEBI could take.

Conclusion

This is an
example of arbitrary action by SEBI. The prices of the shares of the companies,
even of those who got a stay order, crashed. There was no formal investigation
as required by law and no hearing was granted before or after such directions.

While the companies who rushed to SAT got a stay, the SAT has not granted a
stay for operation of the directions on all companies. Even the route adopted
by SEBI of issuing directions to stock exchanges with a hope that it cannot be
appealed against was not justifiable. The silver lining in all this is how
SAT promptly distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court and thus created a
precedent for questioning SEBI’s orders.

 

The
concerns about abuse of corporate form for money laundering and other crimes
and even of listing remain. However, a well thought out strategy would be
needed to ensure that the action hits those entities who engage in such
activities – and them only.

Insolvency and Bankuptcy Code: Pill for all Ills – Part I

Introduction

The Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) has been hailed by many as the
messiah for resolving India’s sick company scene. It has been seen as the
saviour which would rescue India’s ailing companies and entities and provide a
speedy resolution for the creditors. Let us make an in-depth examination as
to whether the Code actually has the teeth to provide a simple one-window
clearance for creditors and the sick debtors or is it just another legislation
in India’s overcrowded regulatory scene!

Replaces Old Acts

The Code replaces
the archaic Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
Although this Act was repealed long ago, it has only now been given a formal
burial. The Code even amends the Companies Act, 2013 and has deleted all
provisions relating to winding-up of companies. Provisions relating to
winding-up (voluntary or compulsory) and sickness resolution for corporate
bodies are now enshrined in the Code itself. Even the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 (SARFAESI Act) has been made subject to the Code. Thus, bankers cannot
resort to the SARFAESI Act when an application under the Code has been
admitted. Thus, the Code even gives a major breather to borrowers.

Eventually,
provisions relating to bankruptcy / financial sickness of individuals, and
firms would also be governed by the Code. However, these sections have not yet
been notified.
As and when that happens, the
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
would be repealed. Thus, the Code would eventually become a one-shop law to
deal with financial sickness in all entities, corporate and non-corporate.
 

The Code is
divided into Five separate Parts, with the important ones being, Part II which
deals with Insolvency Resolution and Liquidation for Corporate Persons, Part
III
which deals with Insolvency Resolution and Liquidation for
Individuals and Firms
(this has not yet been made operational) and Part
IV
which deals with the Regulation of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of
India, Insolvency Professional Agencies, Insolvency Professionals,
etc.

The Code
constitutes an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI). The IBBI
would exercise regulatory oversight over insolvency professional agencies,
insolvency professionals, etc. and prescribe Regulations and Standards for
various purposes. The Scheme of the legislation is – the Code – the Rules
framed by the Central Government – the Regulations framed by the IBBI.

The Adjudicating
Authority under the Code is the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and an
Appeal lies against an NCLT Order to the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal (NCLAT). It may be noted that there is a barrage of
applications before the NCLT and the NCLAT has also been very active. 

Triggering the
Code for Corporate Debtors

The Code gets
triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default provided the
default is Rs. 1 lakh or more. Thus, a very low threshold has been kept for the
creditors to access the Code. Even corporate debtors from the SME sector could
get covered within the ambit of the Code. The meaning of several important
terms has been defined by the Code:

 a)  A corporate
debtor
is a corporate person (company, LLP, etc.,) which owes a debt
to any person. Here it is interesting to note that defined financial
service providers
are not covered by the purview of the Code. Thus,
insolvency and bankruptcy of NBFCs, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds,
etc., are not covered by this Code.
However, if these financial service
providers are creditors against any corporate debtor, then they can seek
recourse under the Code.

 b)  A debt
means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial
debt or an operational debt.
A financial debt is defined to mean a debt
along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for
the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for
provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues. The NCLAT
in the case of Neelkanth Township & Construction P. Ltd. vs. Urban
Infrastructure Trustees Ltd.,
CA(AT) (Insolvency) 44-2017
has
held that the law of limitation does not apply to the institution of an
insolvency process in respect of a financial debt in the nature of a debt with
interest. It further held that issue of debentures would fall within a
financial debt. Interestingly, the IBBI has come out with Regulations for other
creditors who are neither financial nor operational for submitting proof of
their claims. 

c)  A claim
which is one of the most important definitions is defined to mean a right to
payment or right to remedy for breach of contract under any law if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment. The right could be reduced to judgement,
fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.

 d)  It is also
relevant to note the meaning of the term default which is defined to
mean non-payment of debt when whole or any part has become due and payable and
is not repaid by the debtor.

Initiating
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution
process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of
default of a financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default
of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).
Depending upon the type of initiator, the process may be summarised as
explained in Table-1 below.

Table-1: Types of
Insolvency Resolution


 
Insolvency Resolution by Financial Creditor

Insolvency Resolution by Operational
Creditor

Insolvency Resolution by the
Corporate itself

One or more financial creditors can file an application before
the NCLT once a default (for a financial debt) occurs for initiating a
corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor. The
Gujarat High Court has, in the case of Essar Steel Ltd. vs. RBI, C/SCA/12434/2017,
held that banks can initiate insolvency proceedings even without waiting for
directions from the RBI under the Banking Regulation Act.

Any operational creditor can, once a default (for an operational
debt) occurs, deliver a demand notice on a corporate debtor.

Once a corporate debtor commits any default, it may on its own,
file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution
proceedings before the NCLT.

The NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not a default
has occurred and whether to admit the application.

The debtor must, either pay the sum demanded within 10 days of
receipt of the notice or point out any pending dispute in
respect of the notice and pending arbitration / suit which has been filed before
the receipt of such notice. The dispute could be qua
the
quality of goods / service or breach of any representations and warranties.
The NCLAT in Kirusa Software P. Ltd. vs. Mobilox Innovations P. Ltd,
CA(AT)(Insolvency) 6-2017
has held that dispute cannot be confined to
pending arbitration or a civil suit alone. It must include disputes pending
before every judicial authority including mediation, conciliation etc. as
long there are disputes as to existence of debt or default etc., it would
satisfy the conditions of a dispute. It could be in the form of a notice
prior to institution of a suit, notice under the Sale of Goods Act relating
to the quality of goods, etc.

The
NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not to admit the application.

The
resolution process commences from the date of admission of the application by
the NCLT.

If
the corporate debtor does neither of the above, then the operational creditor
may file an application before the NCLT. Only if the Operational Creditor
does not receive payment or notice of dispute can he file an application
before NCLT. The
NCLAT in Uttam Galva Steels
Ltd vs. DF Deutsche Forfait AG CA (AT) (Insolvency) 39-2017
has held
that right of an operational creditor to file an application accrues after
expiry of 10 days from the delivery of demand notice.

The
resolution process commences from the date of admission of the application by
the NCLT.

 

The
NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not to admit the application.

 

 

The
resolution process commences from the date of admission of the application by
the NCLT.

 

The NCLAT in JK
Jute Mills vs. Surendra Trading Co Ltd, CA(AT) 09-2017
has held that
the 14 days’ period available to the NCLT to admit or reject an application
must be counted from the date of receipt of the application by the NCLT and not
from the date of filing of the application. There would be a time gap between
the two, since the Registry will check whether the application filed is proper
in all respects. Further and importantly, it held that the 14 day period was
not a mandate of law since it was procedural in nature. Hence, in appropriate
cases, the NCLT could admit a petition even after this 14 days’ period. This is
a very crucial decision since it hits against the early resolution process for
which the Code is reputed. However, the NCLAT added that the time-bound
resolution within 180 + 90 days is mandatory since time is of the essence under
the Code.

The Calcutta High
Court in Sree Metaliks Ltd. vs. Union of India, WP 7144 / 2017
considered an interesting issue as to whether the NCLT must grant a hearing to
the corporate debtor before admitting any insolvency proceedings against it.
NCLT acting under the provisions of the Act, 2013 while disposing off any
proceedings before it. It held that NCLT was not to bound by the procedure laid
down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, it is to apply the
principles of natural justice in the proceedings before it. It can regulate its
own procedure, however, subject to the other provisions of the Companies Act of
2013 or the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 and any Rules made
thereunder. The Code of 2016 read with the Rules 2016 is silent on the
procedure to be adopted at the hearing of an application u/s. 7 presented
before the NCLT, that is to say, it is silent whether a party respondent has a
right of hearing before the adjudicating authority or not. The Court held that
based on principles of natural justice a corporate debtor must be given an
opportunity of being heard and rebutting the claim of default against him. A
similar view has also been held by the NCLAT in Innoventive Industries
Ltd, CA(AT) (Insolvency) 1&2-2017
.

Once an
application is admitted by the NCLT in either of the above three scenarios, the
corporate insolvency resolution process is set in motion and it must be
completed within a maximum period of 180 days subject to a further (maximum)
extension of up to 90 days. Thus, there is a specific time bound process within
which the corporate must be rehabilitated or else the NCLT would order its
liquidation / winding-up. This is one of the unique features of the Code.
Interestingly, once the Code has been triggered and a corporate insolvency
resolution process commences, there is no mechanism for its withdrawal and it
must be carried forward to its logical end, i.e., either the corporate is
rehabilitated or the resolution plea is rejected and liquidation proceedings
against the corporate commence. The Supreme Court has recently given a somewhat
distinguishing judgment in the case of Lokhandwala Kataria Construction
P. Ltd. vs. Nisus Finance and Investment Managers LLP, CA No. 9279/2017,

where it determined whether the NCLT has powers to admit a compromise between
the creditor and the corporate debtor once a resolution proceeding commences?
The NCLT held that it could not do so and the Supreme Court stated that this
was the correct position in law. However, its Order went on to state that since
all the parties were before it, by virtue of the powers conferred upon the
Supreme Court under Art. 142 of the Constitution, it was admitting the consent
terms. A similar view was again taken by it in Mothers Pride Dairy P.
Ltd. vs. Portrait Advertising and Marketing P. Ltd., CA No. 9286/2017
.
One
wonders whether for every consent terms would the parties have to approach the
Supreme Court for admission? Would this not be an unnecessary cost and time
burden on all parties concerned? Would it not be better to have a provision for
entertaining a consent applications by the NCLT itself? It is yet early days
for the Code and hopefully, these teething troubles would be resolved soon. It
may be noted that prior to admission, the Rules framed under the Code permit an
applicant to withdraw the applicant prior to its admission by the NCLT. This
view has also been held by NCLAT in its Order in the case of Ardor Global
P. Ltd. vs. Nirma Industries P. Ltd., CA (AT) (Insolvency) No. 135-2017.

The Gujarat High
Court in the case of Essar Steel Ltd. vs. RBI, C/SCA/12434/2017
has laid down the following guidelines to be followed by the NCLT while
considering any application under the Code:

 1.  It should not
act mechanically and that all provisions may not be treated mandatory but it
could be treated as a directive only based upon facts, circumstances and
evidence available before the NCLT;

 2. It should act without being guided by any advice or
directions in any form or nature by RBI or any other authority.

 3. The NCLT may proceed in accordance with Law and there
should not be undue pressure on it by the administration

 (… to be continued)

Sections 271BA, 273B of the Act – Non-filing of Form 3CEB on the basis that no AE relationship is created on combined reading of section 92A(2) and section 92A(1) is a reasonable cause – penalty not leviable u/s. 271BA

1.       TS-631-ITAT-2017(Mum)

Palm Grove beach vs. DCIT

A.Y.: 2011-12, Date of Order: 9th August, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company entered into a transaction with a
Non Resident (NR). Taxpayer contended that the definition of AE in terms of
section 92A(2) is to be read with section 92A(1) of the Act and consequently,
NR does not qualify as Associated Enterprise (AE) of the Taxpayer.
Consequently, Taxpayer did not file Form 3CEB as it had no other international
transaction.

AO rejected contentions of the Taxpayer and levied penalty
u/s. 271BA of the Act on ICo for failure to file Form 3CEB. Aggrieved, Taxpayer
appealed before CIT(A), who upheld the order of AO.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal

Held

–   The Taxpayer did not file Form 3CEB in
respect of its transaction with the NR on the grounds that NR did not
constitute its AE u/s. 92A. Taxpayer was under a bonafide belief that the
provisions of section 92A(2) of the Act cannot be read in isolation but in
combination with section 92A(1) of the Act. Since the conditions specified in
both the sections were not satisfied in respect of Taxpayer’s transaction with
the NR, he took a view that NR does not qualify as its AE.

–   The view that section 92A(2) of the Act
cannot be read independent section 92A(1) of the Act is one of the possible
interpretations of section 92A of the Act. Thus the Taxpayer was prevented by
sufficient cause from furnishing the TP audit report in Form 3CEB.

–    Section
273B of the Act specifies that penalty u/s. 271BA of the Act will not be levied
in case there is a reasonable cause for failure to furnish Form 3CEB. Hence,
penalty u/s. 271BA of the Act is to be set aside.

Sections 92A, 92B of the Act – Transaction with foreign branch of Indian company is not an ‘international transaction’. Threshold of 90% purchase for determining associated enterprise (AE) relationship u/s. 92A(2)(h) is to be computed qua each supplier for AE determination.

1.       TS-689-ITAT-2017(Mum)

Elder Exim Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Ys: 2008-09 to 2010-11,

Date of Order: 16th August, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer is an Indian company engaged in the business of
manufacturing of spliced decorative veneer in flitch form. During the
assessment year (AY) under consideration, Taxpayer had entered into transaction
of purchase/import of raw-materials with two entities. One of the entities was
a foreign Company FCo and the other was the US branch of another Indian
company, ICo.

AO treated the transactions with the two entities as
‘international transactions’ within the meaning of section 92B of the Act. It
was contended by the AO that both FCo and ICo are Associated Enterprises (AEs)
for the following reasons: (1) 90% of purchases of Taxpayer were from FCo and
the US branch of ICo (2) Taxpayer and FCo had common shareholders/director who
influenced the prices at which the goods were purchased by the Taxpayer.

Taxpayer contended that (a) since there were no common
shareholders/directors of FCo and taxpayer, FCo was not an AE of the Taxpayer.
Thus the transaction with such entity would not qualify as an international
transaction; (b) Moreover, the transaction with US branch of ICo was a
transaction with an Indian entity and hence, did not qualify to be an
international transaction.

AO rejected the claims of the Taxpayer and made adjustment to
the purchase price paid by the Taxpayer by re-determining the arm’s length
price.

Aggrieved by the action of AO, Taxpayer appealed before
CIT(A) who affirmed the order of AO. Subsequently, Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal

Held

–   International transaction is defined under
the Act as a transaction between two AEs, where either or both of them are
non-residents (NRs).

–   The fact
that ICo is an Indian resident is not disputed. Since Taxpayer and ICo are
residents, the transaction between Taxpayer and ICo’s US branch cannot be
characterised as ‘international transaction’ under the Act.

–   There was no evidence brought on record to
show that Taxpayer and FCo had common shareholders/directors. Further, the
director/shareholders of Taxpayer negotiated the prices of the purchases on
behalf of Taxpayer and not on behalf of FCo.

–   Two enterprises are treated as AEs, u/s.
92A(2)(h), if 90% or more of purchases of one enterprise is from the other
enterprise. Thus, the Act requires computation of 90% threshold qua each
enterprise or party. It does not permit aggregation of purchases from different
parties for the purpose of testing the 90% threshold.

–  Since purchase of raw materials
from FCo was about 38% of total purchases of taxpayer, FCo cannot be treated as
an AE of the Taxpayer u/s. 92A(2)(h). In absence of any AE relationship between
Taxpayer and FCo, transactions between them do not qualify as international
transaction.

Article 5 and 7 of India-Netherlands DTAA – Independent agent acting in its ordinary course of business and procuring ad time to be broadcasted on TV channels without an authority to legally bind the Taxpayer does not constitute DAPE of the taxpayer. Also, no further attribution to DAPE if agent is remunerated at ALP.

1.       TS-340-ITAT-2017(Mum)

International Global Networks BV vs. ADIT

A.Ys: 1998-99 to 2004-05,

Date of Order: 26th July, 2017

Facts

Taxpayer, a Netherlands company, was a wholly owned
subsidiary of FCo, a Hong Kong Company. FCo was ultimately held by another
company Foreign Company (FCo1). Taxpayer had an exclusive right for sale of
advertising time (ad time) in India on the channel owned by FCo Group. Taxpayer
engaged ICo, an Indian entity of the group, to procure business from Indian
advertisers in return for a commission of 15% of the gross advertisement
receipts from India.

AO held that the Taxpayer was merely a conduit and the
advertisement income belonged to FCo. The AO however assessed the whole of ad
time fees the income in the hands of the Taxpayer on protective basis.

Aggrieved by the order of AO, taxpayer appealed before CIT(A)
who concluded that the Taxpayer had a Permanent Establishment in India in the
form of ICo being its dependent agent.

Taxpayer argued that (a) ICo did not have power to conclude
contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer; (b) ICo carried on the activities for
Taxpayer in the ordinary course of ICo’s business;(c) ICo was engaged in
various business activities like undertaking agency activities,
producing/procuring and supplying program and acting as a licensee in India in
respect of other parties. Accordingly, ICo was economically independent of the
Taxpayer; (d) Consequently, ICo did not qualify as a dependent agent PE (DAPE)
of the Taxpayer in India; (e) In any case, since the remuneration paid to ICo
was at arm’s length, it did not warrant any further attribution, to Permanent
Establishment (PE).

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held

–   The Tribunal noted that agreement between
Taxpayer and ICo, indicated as follows:

•    ICo had to solicit the advertisement at the
rates fixed by the Taxpayer.

•    ICo could not enter into agreement with any
client independently. Even after the agreement, Taxpayer was the final
authority to decide the fate of the advertisement.

•    ICo was to receive fixed percentage of
invoiced amount as commission.

•    ICo was free to carry out any other business
and as observed earlier did carry out other business.

•    ICo had no right to bind the Taxpayer into
any legal obligation.

–   The Tribunal ruled that ICo did not create a
DAPE for the Taxpayer in India for the following reasons:

•    ICo was not economically dependent on the
Taxpayer, as it was engaged in various business activities like undertaking
agency activities, producing/procuring and supplying program and acting as a
licensee in India in respect of other parties.

•    ICo was an independent agent acting in its
ordinary course of business and its activities were not wholly or exclusively
devoted to the Taxpayer.

•    Activities of ICo are no different from
other agents of foreign telecasting companies operating in India.

–   Also, commission of 15% paid to ICo was as
per the standard norms prevalent in the industry and it was also accepted to be
at  ALP by the tax authorities in the TP
assessment of the Taxpayer. Thus, the transaction between the parties were at
ALP. Even otherwise, since the payment was at ALP, there was no need of further
attribution in the hands of Taxpayer. Reliance was placed on Bombay HC ruling
in the case of Set Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. vs. DDIT(IT) [307 ITR
205]
and CIT vs. BBC Worldwide Ltd. [35 DTR 257]

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act – Payment for access to database containing publicly available information without any right to commercially exploit the information does not qualify as royalty.

1.      
TS-288-ITAT-2017(Del)

McKinsey Knowledge Centre India P. Ltd. vs. ITO

A.Y: 2008-09, Date of Order: 11th May, 2017

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act – Payment for access to database
containing publicly available information without any right to commercially
exploit the information does not qualify as royalty.

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the business of
rendering customised back-office operations and acting as a support center. For
the purpose of its business, Taxpayer was required to access the database owned
and maintained by FCo. The database contained general information on share
price, market commodity, currency exchange rates etc.

Taxpayer filed an application u/s. 195(2) of the Act for
obtaining a nil withholding certificate on amount payable to a Singapore Co
(FCo) for access to the database.

AO held that the transaction was in the nature of royalty and
thus, subject to withholding at the rate of 10% under India-Singapore DTAA.
Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A).

Taxpayer contended that the payment was made only for access
of the database which contained publicly available information. Taxpayer did
not obtain any license for use of the copyright in the literary work or to
commercially exploit the information and hence payment did not qualify as
royalty.

However, CIT(A) held that
access to database provided a right to the Taxpayer to use information relating
to technical, industrial and commercial knowledge, experience and skill and
hence qualified as royalty under the Act.

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held

–   FCo provided Taxpayer a right to access a
database which consisted of general data relating to equity, share price,
market, exchange rates and commodity prices, which are available otherwise in
the public domain. The information was neither secret nor undivulged nor did it
pertain to FCo’s own experience.

–   Though the information was the copyright of
FCo, Taxpayer had a limited right to access the database for its own use in
accordance with the agreement and not for the purpose of commercial
exploitation. Taxpayer obtained a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to use
the information.

–   The transaction does not involve transfer of
all or any rights in respect of copyright in the literary work. Payment made by
the Taxpayer is for the use of “copyrighted material” and not for the “use
of the copyright”. Thus, the amount payable by ICo does not qualify as royalty
under the Act.

GST vis-a-vis Judgement under earlier Regime

Introduction

GST has been
introduced in our country from 1st July 2017. Although the overall
design of GST scheme is new, it is a mixture of both the taxes i.e. tax on
Goods as well as tax on Services. In the earlier regime, the taxation of goods
was separate and service tax was separate, hence litigation was accordingly
with the respective laws. However, certain judgements under earlier laws may
still have their relevance in GST regime. Looking into present notifications on
classification and rate/s of tax, it seems that classification of a transaction
and rate of tax thereon is going to be one major area of confusion and/or
conflict, wherein such judgements may provide us necessary guidance.

Case study 

Normally, there
can be five categories of transactions, to be dealt with to decide rate of tax.

(i)   Whether
transaction is supply of goods or supply of service?

(ii)  Whether
transaction is works contract?

(iii)  Whether
transaction relates to treatment / process of goods of others? 

(iv) Whether
transaction is mixed supply transaction?

(v)  Whether
transaction is composite transaction?

Once the nature
of transaction is decided to be one of above, the rate can be decided
accordingly.

If the
transaction is relating to supply of goods, the rate will be as applicable to
said goods. If it is service transaction, the rate will be as applicable to
service.

Works
Contracts, under GST, are related to immovable properties and such transactions
are categorised as ‘service transactions’. At the same time ‘Treatment and
Processing’ transactions are also categoried as ‘service transactions’.

Once a
transaction is categorised as service transaction, then it will not be
necessary to look into any goods involved in supply of services. The
transaction should be taxed as service, as one transaction.

Blasting
transaction   

In case of
blasting transaction, different chemicals and explosive materials are used for
blasting of land or rocks etc. It is seen that explosive materials are
taxable at 28% under GST, where as chemicals are taxable at 18%.

The first issue
in the above case will be to see the nature of blasting transaction. The nature
of blasting transaction has already been a subject matter of interpretation by
the Hon. Rajasthan High Court in case of Shekhawat Explosives vs. State
of Rajasthan and another (137 STC 326)(Raj)
.
The facts narrated by the
High Court in the above judgment are as under:

“5. In any case, both the sides requested
us that the matter may be examined on merits also. We therefore, heard learned
counsel on the merits of the case. Learned counsel Sh. Mehta has argued that
the job-work, which was undertaken by the present appellant was that of
blasting and in this job of blasting the explosives were used, which stood
exhausted in the process of blasting itself. Therefore, there is no effective
sale of any explosive by the appellant so as to make it leviable for charging
the sales tax under the provisions of the Act and therefore, the order as has
been passed by the assessing officer was bad from very inception.”

The Rajasthan
Sales Tax Department’s argument was that there is transfer of property in goods
in the above transaction and hence it is liable as works contract.

The Hon. High
Court examined the issue and came to conclusion as under:

“The charging
section is section 4 under chapter II, i.e., levy of tax and its rate and it
has been clearly provided under sub-section (1) of section 4 that the tax
payable by the dealer under this Act shall be at single point in the series of
sales by successive dealers, as may be prescribed and shall be levied at such
rates not exceeding fifty per cent on the taxable turnover, as may be notified
by the State Government in the Official Gazette. A conjoint reading of the
provisions of section 2(38) and section 4(1) makes it clear that in such
matters when a job of blasting is undertaken, the use of explosives in such job
can neither be termed as sale within the meaning of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act
nor it could be subjected to the levy of tax.

Learned counsel
Sh. Bhandari has argued before us, rather he was at pains to argue on the basis
of section 2(38), clause (ii) that it remains a case of sale because it
involved a transfer of property in goods and he submits that the explosives had
been purchased by the appellant on the basis of the form “C” supplied
by the department and on that basis he did avail certain concession. Even if
that be so, it will not give the status of sale to such process of extension.
Even if it is a case of transfer of property, though the property does not
stand transferred in any physical form, it stands exhausted in the process of
the execution of the works contract. Unless any transaction is given the status
of sale within the meaning of section 2(38), there is no question of charging
sales tax thereon. In case the appellant has made any misuse of the form
“C” and has wrongly availed any concession or has taken any undue
benefit or unlawful gain, which otherwise could not be available to him, it is
always open for the concerned authorities to take appropriate action against him
in accordance with law, but that does not mean that he could be made liable to
pay sales tax on such transaction (which does not amount to sale) on the basis
of which job of blasting was undertaken and completed and in the process
thereof the explosives were made use of.

6. We therefore, find that this appeal
must succeed on its own merits, the order dated November 24, 2001 passed by the
learned single Judge is set aside. This appeal as well as the writ petition are
allowed and the impugned assessment order dated September 29, 2001 (annexure 7)
is quashed and set aside.”

Conclusion     

It can be seen
that the transaction of blasting is considered as not sale of any kind of goods
and therefore it becomes transaction of rendering service. The nature of
transaction will remain the same even under GST regime. The outcome is that the
blasting transaction will be taxable under GST as service transaction. Even if
goods involving different rates are used for rendering the above service, still
there will not be any impact of the same for deciding the rate of tax. Service
is one transaction and the rate will be attracted as per rate applicable to
service. Since for blasting transaction, no separate classification is made for
rate of tax, it will fall in residuary category and liable to GST at 18%.

There are several such
other judgements, in the old regime, which will be useful for appropriate
guidance in the
GST regime.

GST – First Principles on the term ‘Business’

The objective of this article is to
understand the scope and relevance of the term ‘business’ under GST laws and
apply it in context of non-commercial institutions such as charitable trusts,
NGOs, educational institutions, employee welfare trusts, etc. and mutual
associations such as residential welfare associations, trade associations,
clubs, societies, etc. GST is generally understood as an amalgam of VAT and
Service Tax laws. While most of the VAT laws applied to dealers, which
somewhere built in the requirement of business, the service tax laws applied
comprehensively to all persons. In this context, it may be gainful to bear in
mind that the philosophy of the VAT laws is inherited in the GST law to some
extent.

At the outset, it can be argued that the
term supply by itself is a commercial term and is generally not used for
activities undertaken by non-commercial organisations. Though the term ‘supply’
is defined in a very broad manner, presence of a tinge commercial character in
the transaction seems to be essential element (unless specifically made
redundant). When examined in the presence of the terms ‘sale’, ‘transfer’,
‘service’, the term supply is narrow if seen from this perspective. It is
pertinent to note that the law makers have not used the term ‘activity’ (as was
used in the service tax law) but rather chose to use the term ‘supply’ which
indicates the intent of the Legislature to narrow down the scope of
chargeability on this count. Also, the statutory definition of term supply u/s.
7(1) is further qualified by the phrase ‘in the course of furtherance of
business’.

In fact, the term business plays a
significant role in the entire definition of ‘supply’ under section 7 which can
be analysed as follows:

 (i) The first clause of supply requires that all forms of supply of
goods or services should be ‘in the course or furtherance of business’ .

(ii) The second clause dispenses with the requirement that the
import transaction should be in the course or furtherance of business; in
other words, non-business transactions
which are import of services would
also be termed as supply.

(iii) The third clause r/w Schedule I enlist transactions entered
into without consideration. This clause dispenses with the requirement of
consideration flowing between the taxable persons in such transactions. Even
though certain entries do not use the term business, there is an implicit
requirement of a business activity being present in view of the specific terms
such as ‘business asset’, ‘principal’, ‘agent’, etc.

This interpretation leads one to an
inference that except in case of import of service (as well as import of goods
in IGST transactions), transactions can be termed as a supply only if they
acquire the feature of being a business/ commercial transaction. Further
analogy can also be drawn from various other definitions / provisions under the
GST Law (such as outward supply, capital goods, inputs, composite supply, input
tax credit, place of business, etc). None of these terms attempt to
administer a non-business transaction. Given the scheme of the law, it would be
reasonable to interpret that only transactions in the nature of ‘business’
(except import of service and goods) would have GST implications.

This leads us to question as to whether any
boundaries can be drawn over the term ‘business’ under the GST law.

 Definition of ‘Business’

The term business has been defined in an
inclusive manner u/s. 2(17) of the CGST Act to include the following
activities:

 a)  Any trade, commerce,
manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar
activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit

b)  Any activity or transaction
in connection with or incidental or ancilliary to sub-clause (a)

 c)  Any activity or transaction
in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there is volume, frequency,
continuity or regularity of such transaction

 d)  Supply or acquisition of
goods including capital goods and services in connection with commencement or
closure of business;

 e)  provision by a club,
association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other
consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members;

 f)   admission, for a
consideration, of persons to any premises;

 g)  services supplied by a
person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him in the course
or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation;

 h)  services provided by a race
club by way of totalisator or a licence to book maker in such club ; and

 i)   any activity or
transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any
local authority in which they are engaged as public authorities;

 The primary part of the said definition can
be analysed as follows:

 (a) Main activity being in the
nature of ‘trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager
or any similar activity whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit’;

 (b) Incidental/ ancillary
activity to the above business activity;

 (c) Main activity constituting
business regardless of whether there is volume, frequency, continuity or
regularity; and

 (d) Any activity in connection
with commencement or closure of business.

A brief history of a similarly worded
definition under the VAT laws may assist us in understanding the scope of the
term. Historically, the term business was not included in the list of
definitions under the Central Sales Tax Act and other General Sales tax
legislation. It was in 1959 where the Madras General Sales Tax Act defined this
term to include trade, commerce, etc. within its ambit. The definition has
evolved over time and attempted to overcome certain infirmities identified by
judicial decisions. It would be very interesting to note that the Courts not
given an unlimited space to this term even-though the said term was defined in
an inclusive manner.

 Legal principles on the term ‘business’

The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 had defined
the said term as follows:

 “‘business’ includes,

(i)  And trade, commerce,
manufacture or an adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or
manufacture, whether or not such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or
concern is carried on with a motive to make gain or profit and whether or not
any gain or profit accrues from such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or
concern; and

(ii) Any transaction in
connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, such trade, commerce,
manufacture, adventure or concern”

The said definition is similar, in terms of
coverage, to clause (a) and (b) of section 2(17) of the GST Law. The respective
state enactments also had similar definitions with modifications in terms of
additional clauses widening the coverage of the term. The debate over the scope
of the term business dates back to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Abdul Bakhi And Bros [1964] 15 STC 644 (SC),
wherein the Court held that the expression “business” though extensively used
as a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used in the sense of
an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a
person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as
business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or
contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and not for sport or
pleasure.

In another decision (prior to the insertion
of expansive clauses of incidental/ ancillary activity), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd’s case ([1967] 19 STC 1 (SC)) was
examining whether discarded machinery, sale of waste, scrap or unserviceable
material and by-products fall within the scope of the term ‘business’. The
assessee contended that it was not engaged in buying and/or selling of such
material and the said material was not sold with an objective of profit. The Court observed that the term ‘business’ does
not hinge solely on the motive of earning profit though it predicates a motive
which pervades a whole series of transactions effected by the person
. The
Court observed that though the volume and frequency of the transaction was
high, the taxable person cannot be said to have the intention of carrying on
business of such items. Though the residuary price may impact the profit and
loss account by reducing the costs, that does not by itself establish an
intention to carry on business in that product.

 They are either
fixed assets of the Company or are goods which are incidental to the
acquisition or use of stores or commodities consumed in the factory.
Those goods are sold by the Company for a price which goes into
the profit and loss account of the business and may indirectly be said to
reduce the cost of production of the principal item, but on that account,
disposal of those goods cannot be said to become part of or an incident of the
main business of selling textiles.
In order
that receipts from sale of a commodity may be included in the taxable turnover,
it must be established that the assessee was carrying on business in that
particular commodity, and to prove that fact it must be established that the
assessee had an intention to carry on business in that commodity. A person who
sells goods which are unserviceable or unsuitable for his business does not on
that account become a dealer in those goods, unless he has an intention to carry
on the business of selling those goods.

In the same judgement, the Court also held
that sale of by-products (caustic liquor) was an incident of the manufacturing
activity of the Company and was includible in the definition of business under
the Bombay Sales Tax Act under the primary clause itself.

 ‘For reasons
which we have already set out in dealing with “kolsi”, we are of the
view that waste caustic liquor may be regarded as a by-product or a subsidiary
product in the course of manufacture and the sale thereof is incidental to the
business of the Company and the turnover in respect of both “kolsi”
and “waste caustic liquor” would be liable to sales tax.’

Subsequently, in the post amendment period,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co.
of India ltd. [1973] 31 STC 426 (SC)
settled some conflicting High Court
decisions and held that the amendment in 1964 has made the intention of
profit
as an unnecessary criteria not only to the primary clause,
but also to the secondary clause of the definition of business. In view of this
amendment, canteen sales, sales of advertisement materials and scrap sales were
held to be taxable under the post amendment period even if they were not
conducted with the object of making profit. Though the decision of Raipur
Manufacturing (supra)
was held to be not applicable as regard the intention
of profit, in the view of the author, the intention of carrying on trade,
commerce which was cited in the said decision is still relevant.

In a landmark decision of State of Tamil
Nadu and Another Versus Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras,
the Court
was examining the taxability of sale of uncleared or abandoned items by a Port
established under a statute performing statutory functions without any objective
of making profit. It was held that, if the main activity was not business then
any connected or incidental activity of sales would not amount to business
unless an independent intention to conduct business is these connected
activities is established. In this backdrop, the Court held that Port Trust was
not engaged in business and hence the activity of sale of uncleared or
abandoned items cannot be termed as a business activity. This ruling is very
important in the context of educational, social and charitable associations and
discussed in later paragraphs.

In another decision in Board of Revenue
vs. A. M. Ansari [1976] 38 STC 577 (SC),
auction of forest produce was held
not to be regarded as a business activity in the absence of a frequency of such
activity. The Supreme Court held that volume, frequency, continuity and
regularity of transactions in a class of transactions should ordinarily be
undertaken to be termed as a business activity.

Application of legal principles of the
definition of business under GST Law

The first clause of the definition is the
bedrock on which most of the clauses of definition rest upon. Except for the
inclusion of profession, vocation, adventure, wager, etc., the said
clause is more or less similar to the definition of the business in the central
sales tax and state sales tax statutes. The clause should be understood in a
commercial sense (as understood by the Supreme Court in Abdul Bakshi’s case
supra
) except for the requirement of a profit motive. The clause renders the
intention of making pecuniary benefits as an irrelevant factor in deciding
whether an activity is business. Each of the words in this clause could be
attributed a meaning as follows:

–   ‘trade’
primarily refers to exchanging of goods for goods or goods for money with a
secondary meaning of being a repeated activity carried on with a profit motive
which is distinguished from agriculture, etc; but in the context of this Act
should also refer to provision of services and not merely goods

– ‘commerce’
refers to a larger volume of trade though there is not specific scale when a
trade is termed as commerce. 

–   ‘manufacture’
has been used to cover manufacturing activities which do not fall within the
contours of the term ‘trade’.

–  ‘profession’
would refer to an occupation requiring intellectual skill or any other manual
skill controlled by intellect.

–   ‘vocation’
refers to calling or the way in which an individual passes his/her life; but in
the context of the previous terms should be understood to refer to activities
such as sports, art not undertaken as a professional but for recreation or
pleasure.

–  ‘adventure’
would refer pecuniary risks, a venture, a speculation in which there is
considerable risk of loss as well as a chance of gain; and in the context of
the previous terms should be understood as having a feature of trade, commerce,
manufacture, etc. say conducting research activities connected or not with the
primary business.

–   ‘wager’
would refer to betting activities where the possibility of success is highly
uncertain.

The second clause includes activities which
are incidental to the primary business activity. The said clause emphatically
requires that the primary activity should be in the nature of business for the
incidental activity also to be included in the definition. This is in line with
the principles laid down by the Madras Port Trust’s case where the primary
activity of the Trust was of non-business character. As rightly pointed out in
the decision, this conclusion should be reached only after ensuring that the
incidental activity should not be an independent activity to fall within the
first clause itself.

The third clause makes the frequency,
continuity or regularity of the primary activity as irrelevant in deciding
whether the activity is in the nature of business, in other words occasional
transactions. This clause overcomes the Supreme Court’s view in H.A.
Ansari’s case
which required that there should be some regularity in
dealings for the transaction to be a business and also overcomes a contention
of the assessee that they are not ‘carrying on’ (a degree of continuity) a
business activity.

The fourth clause specifically includes any
transaction in connection with commencement or closure of business. The purpose
of this clause is to remove any ambiguity over such transactions to be ‘in the
course’ of business. Such transactions though strictly not in the course of
business would also be included in the definition of business. Similarly,
transactions which relate to closure of business would be included though they
are strictly not ‘in the course or furtherance of business’.

It can be inferred that the legislature has
intended to cover transactions even having a remote connection with a business
activity and also made the stage of business irrelevant for the definition of
business. As a consequence, the legislature has widened the scope of items
which would be governed under the law. Further, a definition of wide import
would ensure all transactions are eligible for the benefit of input tax credit
since the eligibility of input tax credit (like taxability) revolves around the
transactions being in the ‘course or furtherance of business’. Having said
this, a question arises whether the definition has implicitly excluded
non-commercial activities which are undertaken by social, charitable or public
organisations from its scope. While the definition is qua the activity, in the
view of the author, the status of the organisation performing the activity
should also be kept in mind to understand the intention behind the activity. A
discussion based on the above thought process has been attempted below.

Charitable Trusts and Charitable Activities

The GST Law has conferred certain exemptions
on specified services by charitable organisations; one exemption is with
reference to services of an entity registered u/s. 12AA of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (IT Act) by way of charitable activities; the other is for services by way
of conducting religious ceremonies, renting of religious place meant for general
public and owned or management by an entity registered u/s.12AA or section
10(23C) of the IT Act, provided the rental charges for the room/ hall, etc.
are within the specified limits. The exemption entries are fairly narrow in its
scope and may result in taxation of other non-commercial activities.

The former exemption entry grants benefit on
two counts i.e. (a) the service should be provided by a 12AA registered entity
and (b) such activities are in the nature of charitable activities. One aspect
(i.e. the subject) has been borrowed from the IT Act while the other aspect
(i.e. the subject matter of taxation) has been provided under said notification
itself by way of an explanation.

The coverage of the first aspect of the
exemption entry is purely dependent upon the status of the registration u/s.
12AA of the IT Act. The Income-tax Act provides that exemption would be
available on specified incomes of charitable or religious trusts under the
provisions of section 11 and 12 provided such eligible trusts are registered
u/s. 12AA of the IT Act. The trust may or may not be enjoying complete
exemption from income tax (say in view insufficient recoupment of income for
charitable purposes, etc.). As long as the trust is holding a valid 12AA
registration certificate, it meets the requirement of the first part of the
exemption entry and the said entity would continue to be covered under the said
clause. Therefore, religious trusts, though not strictly carrying charitable
activities exclusively, would still be covered under this clause, since 12AA
registration is applicable even for religious trust.

The other aspect is with reference to the
scope of services which are eligible for such exemption. The trust which is
registered u/s. 12AA is eligible for exemption only for services ‘by way of’
charitable activities. Charitable need not always mean free or without
consideration; charitable would also refer to subsidised or at minimal costs
with an intent to grant a benefit to the recipient over and above what is charged
for that activity. This entry grants exemption from GST on recoveries from such
activities as long as the activities are for charitable purpose i.e. public
health and awareness in respect of specific diseases; advancement of religion,
spirituality or yoga, educational or skill development programmes for specified
persons and preservation of environment.

The said exemption entries are narrow in the
sense that not all social activities would fall within the term ‘charitable
activities’. The larger question that arises is whether an entity not
registered u/s. 12AA or engaged in activities which are not within fold of
‘charitable activities’ under the exemption notification be liable to GST at
all. Framing a legal proposition, would a non commercial entity engaging in
public service, irrespective of whether registered u/s. 12AA of the IT Act or
not, be liable to be taxed under GST. Two simple examples can be taken:

Example 1 – Old Age Homes under a
Charitable Trust (whether registered u/s. 12AA or not)

ABC trust is owning and operating old-age or
orphanage homes. The said Trust owns the land, buildings and the proceeds from
such trust are necessarily required to be applied for the primary object of the
Trust. The Trust has the following sources of receipts – (a) maintenance
charges for the persons admitted at the old age home; (b) renting of precincts
to third parties for their commercial activities; (c) sale of handmade goods by
old age persons; etc. Admittedly, the trust is not a commercial concern
though it is engaging in certain income generating activities. Clause (a) of
the definition requires that there should be an activity in nature of ‘trade,
commerce, etc’ with or without a pecuniary benefit. Though the intention of
profit has been made irrelevant, the intent to engage in business has not been
dispensed with (refer analysis above) in Burmah Shell case. Moreover in the Madras
Port Trust case (supra)
the Court held that mere sale of articles cannot by
itself be termed as business unless there is an intention to engage in such
activity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sai
Publication Fund [2002] 126 STC 288 (SC)
applying the Madras Port Trust
case has held a similar view. Hence, it can be argued that the Old age Trust
should not be subject to any GST on such transaction even though they are
income generating activities i.e. any sale or service cannot be equated to a
business activity, especially in the absence of an intention to engage in such
activity as an occupation.

Example 2 –
NGO engaged in Charitable activities organising a Marathon (whether registered
u/s. 12AA or not)

An NGO which is registered as a 12AA trust
and engaged in charitable activities relating to public health. The NGO
conducts a marathon for collection of funds and uses the same for charitable
activities1. The NGO collects participation fee for the marathon and
also receives other income from sponsors and advertisers. The said income is
then deployed for charitable activities. The activity may or may not be an
isolated/ non-recurring activity for the NGO. Applying the definition of supply
and business, the question that needs to be answered is whether the aforesaid
income can be said to be part of a trade/ commercial activity and subjected to
GST. Going by the rationale in the previous case study, a stand can be taken
that the NGO is not engaged in trade, commerce, etc. Though clause (c) taxes
transactions which are non-recurring, such transactions should first qualify as
a business transaction as per clause (a). The marathon activity by the NGO
cannot be termed as a trade, commerce activity and hence the NGO cannot be
termed to be in business. However, this is different from an organisation which
organises a marathon and as a practice chooses to donate a portion of proceeds
for a particular social cause. The differentiating factor is the intent behind
the activity which continues to be highly relevant in the scheme of the
definition of business, though the proceeds may meet the same end-use.

____________________________________________________________________________________________

 1   There
is a thin line of difference between services ‘for’ charity and service ‘by
way’ of charity.  The exemption entry
only covers the latter but not the former.

 Example 3 – Employee Welfare Trust

Companies establish welfare trusts wherein
the employees compulsorily contribute a nominal sum towards membership fees.
The trust is established with an objective of medical aid, scholarships to
employees or their dependants. The trust cannot be said to be engaged in a
trade, commerce or such activity and may not fall within the scope of the term
supply. Moreover, the membership fee is strictly not a consideration since the
amount is not paid for a direct inducement of a supply of service of goods
rather it merely establishes an eligibility at the employees to claim a benefit
provided by the trust.  It can therefore
be argued that the Trust is not liable for payment of GST.

In summary, the status of the entity, its
objective (incl. that enshrined in charter documents), pattern of dealings and
the importance of the transaction in the scheme of objects would all play a
role in deciding the intent behind the transaction. As repeatedly held by
Courts, the onus of proving taxability qua business transaction is on
the revenue contending the taxability. Similarly, there is a very good case to
argue that the welfare trusts, social trusts and institutions claiming income
tax exemptions u/s. 10(23C), whether charitable or not, can still be said to be
outside the ambit of GST unless they undertake activities which are
predominantly in the nature of trade, commerce, etc.

 Mutual Associations (Trade/Non-Trade), etc.

The fundamental requirement for a
transaction to be termed as ‘supply’ in section 7 of the GST law is the
existence of two or more transacting parties (with or without consideration).
The definition of business includes a provision of a facility/ benefit by a
club, association, society or such mutual benefit body as ‘business’. The
question arises is whether in view of this inclusion any activity by a mutual
concern (such as clubs, resident welfare associations, etc.) to its
members results in a levy of GST on the services of such concerns. In order to
answer this question, it may be essential to relook at the principles under income tax and erstwhile service tax regime.

 Mutuality Principles under Income Tax
Law

Mutual societies are formed by pooling
resources for the common benefit of all its members. The mutual societies could
be incorporated or otherwise and it would not alter the concept of mutuality.
Under income tax, an association of members forming a mutual group is not
taxable on the surplus resulted in the hands of the association on the doctrine
of mutuality. This is based on the concept that no one can profit from himself
or trade with himself. The profit or surplus merely indicates that the members
have over-charged themselves and they continue to have a right of disposal over
the surplus or even wind up such surplus.   

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner
of Income-Tax vs. Bankipur Club [1998] 109 STC 427 (SC
) laid down certain
requirements to claim the benefit of mutuality:

–    Complete identity of the
contributors and the participators i.e. contributors to the common fund and the
participators in surplus should be an identical body

–    Legal form of the
association is immaterial

–    Mere fact that some of the
members take  advantage of the activities
while the others having the right to do so do not avail of this, does not
affect mutuality

–    If money is realised from
members and non-members for the same consideration by giving alike facilities
to all, it evidences profit earning motive and commerciality and mutuality
cannot be said to exist (Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City vs. Royal
Western India Turf Club Ltd. AIR 1954 SC 85)
.

 The relevant extract of the judgement is :

“………if the
object of the assessee-company claiming to be a “mutual concern” or “club”, is
to carry on a particular business and money is realised both from the members
and from non-members, for the same consideration by giving the same or similar
facilities to all alike in respect of the one and the same business carried on
by it, the dealings as a whole disclose the same profit-earning motive and are
alike tainted with commerciality. In other words, the activity carried on by
the assessee in such cases, claiming to be a “mutual concern” or “members’
club” is a trade or an adventure in the nature of trade and the transactions
entered into with the members or non-members alike is a trade/business/transaction
and the resultant surplus is certainly profit income liable to tax……
”

In a more recent case of Bangalore Club
vs. CIT [2013] 350 ITR 509 (SC)
, the Court denied the benefit of mutuality
on the basis that surplus funds which were loaned to a member bank against
interest were at the disposal of such member who used it for commercial
operations. In other words, diversion of funds to third parties or even members
for exclusive use would adversely affect the concept of mutuality and taint the
society with a commercial nature, though to the extent the mutual operations
continue, such benefit would be available. 

Mutuality Principles under Service
Tax Law

The service tax law vide Finance Act, 2006
and subsequently in the negative list scheme had by insertion of an explanation
treated a club or association and its members as distinct persons. The
explanation was attempted to dissect the principle of mutuality and impose
service tax on the services of a club or association to its members. A dispute
arose with regard to the impact of the explanation on the club or association
services provided by such mutual associations. The High Court in Ranchi Club
Ltd vs. CCE, Ranchi (2012) 26 STR 401 (Jhar)
differentiated between a
‘members club’ and a ‘propreitory club’ for incorporated associations. In a
members club, every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member
with no third party transaction and there is no separate legal person in such
case. However, in a propreitory club, where certain shareholders are members or
certain members are shareholders; or members are not owner of the property of
the club, then the club and its members are distinct persons. The Court
followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Joint Commercial Tax Officer
vs. The Young Men’s Indian Association – 1970 (1) SCC 462,
which held that
in a member’s club, the club is merely acting as an agent for its members in
the matter of supply of various preparations and there could not be a ‘sale’ in
such arrangements.

In order to tax a mutual concern, it is
imperative that the legislature breaks through the concept of mutuality by
fictionally delinking the mutual society from its members. In the current GST
law, the provisions do not fictionally define the club or its members as
distinct persons or alter the status of mutuality, The inclusion in the
definition of business merely treats the activity as a business activity.
Neither does the current definition of ‘supply’ nor the charging section of GST
law treat the club and its members as distinct persons. In fact, the case of
seeking GST from clubs or mutual society is on a weaker footing in comparison
to the service tax law as there is no parallel to Explanation 3 of section
65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, in the current GST law. In fact, in few
specific instances, the deeming fiction to treat branches in two States or in
two countries as distinct persons or supplies between principal and agent as
deemed supplies has been introduced. In the absence of such deeming fiction, it
can be argued that the limited role which the said clause performs is include
the activity as a business activity for the club, association or mutual
society. The said analysis could be applied in the following case studies:

Example 1 – Resident Welfare associations
(RWAs)

RWAs are established for the mutual welfare
of the residents of a particular locality. RWAs collect maintenance fees, rent
out space for commercial establishments, hoardings, etc. The said
associations are formed by the residents with periodical contributions which
are utilised for the maintenance of common areas of the resident establishment.
In the process, it derives income from third parties from the common area but
for the sole purpose of reducing the maintenance costs to residents of the
establishment. Section 7 defining supply requires that there has to be a supply
to another for consideration for it to be termed a supply. The maintenance fee
collected by the RWAs from its members cannot be termed as a transaction
between two parties (in view of the concept of mutuality) and consequently be
outside the scope of taxability. The exemption entries for RWAs (Rs. 5,000/-
per month) may really not have any application to associations which are
conforming to the concept of mutuality.

Renting service by the RWAs to third parties
would not fall within the concept of mutuality. Yet, in such transactions, a
contention can be made that the renting services by RWAs are for the purpose of
reduction of costs of the RWAs and therefore not a business activity in the
sense of being a trade, commerce, etc. It may also be noted that section
2(17)(e) covers only services and facilities to members within the scope of
business and not services and facilities to non members.

Another example would be with respect to the
club facilities which are housed in the RWAs. If the in-house club is
maintained and operated by the third party and the association merely rents out
the place which houses the club, the principle of mutuality would not apply and
GST would be applicable on the services rendered by the third party club. But
where the club is being operated by the association itself, the ground of
mutuality can certainly be taken and GST may not apply in such circumstances.

Example 2 – Clubs or association services
(RWAs)

Clubs provide several facilities to its
members including recreation, restaurants, renting of space, etc.
Member’s clubs operate on the principle of mutuality, own properties on behalf
of the members and hold the funds/ contribution for the members. The club would
have to conforn to the conditions to establish mutuality based on the
principles in Bankipur’s case. While article 366(29A) contains a specific
clause to tax on ‘supply’ of goods by an unincorporated association or body of
persons to a member for consideration as a sale of goods by such association to
its members, the said clause cannot on its own trigger taxation in GST regime
on account of the following reasons:

–   The
Calcutta Court in State of West Bengal and Ors vs. Calcutta Club Limited
[2008] 14 VST 499 (Cal)
held that though article 366(29A) has been amended,
the vital requirement of consideration continues to be present in the sales tax
law. In a members’ club, the charges paid for the services are merely
reimbursement of the costs incurred by the club and cannot be termed as
consideration between the club and the members2.

 

2   It may be noted that this matter has been
referred to a larger bench of the Supreme Court vide decision [2016] 96 VST 20
(SC) State Of West Bengal And Others vs. Calcutta Club Limited, but in the view
of the author, the decision of the Calcutta High Court states the correct
position of law.

–  The
effect of the deeming fiction of Article 366(29A) has not been percolated in
the GST law in the definition of supply or taxable persons (and only in a
limited way in Schedule II of the Act). The requirement of two persons and a consideration
in mutual societies is still wanting in the current GST law.

–  Article
366(29A) applies to ‘supply of goods’ and does not apply ‘supply of services’ –
also refer Entry 7 of Schedule II of the GST law. Therefore, a restaurant
services by a mutual society is deemed to be a supply of service & would
not be covered by the said entry.

–   Section
25(4) and (5) of the GST law does not seem to cover the aspect of distinct
persons for a club and its members.

The author does see a certain challenge in
taking the stand over non-taxability in view of entry 3 of Schedule I which
deems a supply of goods by an agent to its principal as a GST transaction. This
is in view of the Court observations that clubs operate as an agent of the
members in performing its function. But it may also be noted that the
definition of ‘agent’ does not strictly cover the classes of persons like a
club, society, etc. and hence, may stand excluded.

The exercise of examining the business
aspect of a transaction is a double-edged sword since any attempt to exclude an
act from the term business would have potential consequences over the input tax
credit claim u/s. 17(1), on the ground of it being used either wholly/ partly
for a non-business activity.

This is on the basis that an input or input
service or capital goods on which credit is proposed to be claimed should
necessarily be used ‘in the course or furtherance of business’ for it to be
eligible for credit. But there would certa inly be fresh litigation on the
definition of business and last word is far from being stated.

2 Section 43(1) – Grant / subsidy received for research – Assessee in books of account reduced it from the cost of plant and machinery but depreciation claimed on the original cost – Tribunal upheld the assessee’s action of claiming depreciation on the cost of fixed assets without deducting the grant / subsidy amount.

1.      
Spectrum Coal & Power Ltd.
vs. ACIT (Mumbai)

Members: P. K. Bansal (V. P.) and Pawan
Singh (J. M.)

ITA Nos.: 1295 and 1296 / Mum / 2012.

A.Ys.: 2000-01 and 2001-02,           Date of Order: 3rd August,
2017

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Salil Kapoor
/ Ram Tiwari

FACTS

The assessee
had received a sum of Rs. 9.97 crore from US Aid through ICICI under the
Program for Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research in the years 1996-97 and
1997-98, which was credited to the capital reserve in the balance sheet of the
Company’s accounts. In the F.Y. 1999-2000, the assessee company had adjusted
this amount against the investment in plant and machinery. However, the cost of
plant & machinery was not reduced to this extent while calculating the
written down value (WDV) for the purpose of determining the depreciation as per
the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The Assessing Officer treated the grant
received by the assessee from US Aid through ICICI as cost met directly or
indirectly by any other person or authority as per the provisions of Section
43(1) and in computation of WDV of the plant and machinery for the purpose of
calculation of depreciation the amount of grant received was reduced from the
cost of plant and machinery. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the Assessing
Officer.

Before the
Tribunal, the assessee submitted that the grant was not given to meet the cost
of any specific asset but to create an institutional environment for the
technology innovation in the energy sector. Further, it was pointed out that
this grant was repayable by the assessee. The repayment had to be made @2% of
the gross annual sales. The Revenue on the other hand, supported the decision
of the lower authorities and argued that the true nature of the amount received
by the assessee was not loan, but it was a grant. The ICICI had merely turned
this assistance into a conditional grant while extending this amount to the
assessee, repayable amount being twice the amount of conditional grant given as
royalty linked to the sales. It was contended that the assessee had merely
returned a sum of Rs 20 lakh. Thereafter, neither the ICICI Ltd. has recovered
the amount from assessee company nor the assessee has provided for any royalty
payable to ICICI Ltd. in its books of account. The conduct of the assessee
shows that it has treated this amount given by ICICI Ltd. as aid / assistance /
grant / subsidy and not as a loan.

HELD

The Tribunal
went through the agreement entered into between the assessee and ICICI Ltd.
under which the assessee was given the said amount. Based thereon, it noted
that the assessee was required to repay the said grant subject to the condition
that the maximum repayment amount will not exceed 200% of the grant received
and till then the assessee was to pay 2% of the gross annual sales of the coal
beneficiated under the proposed commercial project.

According to
the Tribunal, the grant from this agreement was conditional. It was a financial
arrangement and cannot be regarded to be a subsidy / grant. The Tribunal also
observed that the grant was to create an institutional environment for
technological innovations in the energy sector. Therefore, even if the grant is
not treated as the financial arrangement and was treated as a subsidy, as
contended by the revenue, it was not for a specific plant & machinery.

The Tribunal
further relied on the decision of the Visakhapatnam Tribunal in the case of Sasisri
Extractions Limited vs. ACIT (122 ITD 428)
and noted that even after
insertion of Explanation 10 to section 43(1), the Tribunal has categorically
held that the basic principle underlying the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of CIT vs. P. J. Chemicals (210 ITR 830), still holds good.
Accordingly, it was held that financial grant received by the assessee could
not be reduced from the actual cost of fixed assets for computing the
depreciation under the Income-tax Act.

1 Section 11 – (i) Depreciation allowed on fixed assets cost of which was allowed as application of income; (ii) Assessee allowed the benefit of carry forward of deficit for future set-off.

1.      
DCIT vs. Gharda Foundation
(Mumbai)

Members: G. S. Pannu (A. M.) and Amarjit
Singh (J. M.)

ITA Nos.: 5962 & 5963/MUM/2016

A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2012-13,

Date of Order: 30th August, 2017

Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Saurabh
Deshpande / Hiro Rai

FACTS

The assessee
being a charitable organisation registered u/s. 12A was engaged in carrying on
activities of charitable nature. The dispute involved in the appeal was on two
issues – firstly, the Revenue was aggrieved by the decision of the CIT(A) in
directing the AO to allow the benefit of depreciation and secondly, the action
of the CIT(A) in allowing the assessee the benefit of carry forward of the
deficit of Rs. 3.5 crore for future set-off.

Before the
Tribunal, the revenue justified the AO’s action pleading that the decision of
the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel
Selection (264 ITR 110
), which was relied on by the assessee, had not been
accepted by the Department on merits and on a similar issue, SLP (Civil) no.
9891 of 2014 has been filed before the Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corporation. Further, it was contended that allowing of
depreciation would amount to a double deduction, which was impermissible having
regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. (199
ITR 43).

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the decision in the case of Escorts Ltd. being relied upon by the
Revenue had been considered by the Delhi High Court in the case of Indraprastha
Cancer Society, (112 DTR 345), wherein it opined that the allowance of
depreciation in similar situation would not amount to a double deduction.
Further, it was noted that the Delhi High Court in the case of Vishwa Jagriti
Mission, ITA No. 140/2012 dated 29.3.2012 also allowed a similar claim after
analysing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. It also
noticed that the Supreme Court had dismissed the SLP filed by the Department
against the said decision of the Delhi High Court vide SLP No. 19321 of 2013.
The Tribunal further noted that the Bombay High Court, subsequent to the
decision in the case of Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, had
considered a similar argument of the Revenue in the case of Mumbai Education
Trust, ITA No. 11/2014 dated 03.05.2016 and had allowed the claim of the
assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue on
this ground and allowed the depreciation as claimed by the assessee.

 

As regards the
issue relating to carry forward of the deficit of Rs.3.50 crore to be set-off
against the future income, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) relying
on the judgements of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mumbai Education
Trust.

3 Section 115BBE– Amendment made by the Finance Act, 2016 to section 115BBE(2), with effect from 01.04.2017, whereby set-off of loss against the income referred to in sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B, 69C or 69D is denied, is prospective and is effective from 01.04.2017.

1.      
[2017] 84 taxmann.com 138
(Jaipur- Trib.)

ACIT vs. Sanjay Bairathi Gems Ltd.

ITA No. : 157 (Jp.) of 2014

A.Y.: 2013-14, Date of Order: 8th
August, 2017

FACTS       

The assessee-company was engaged in carrying
on business of export, import and manufacture of precious and semi-precious
stones and jewellery. In the course of survey action at the business premises
of the assessee-company which action was converted into search, excess stock of
Rs. 231.41 lakh was surrendered.

 

The AO assessed the income on account of
excess stock u/s. 69B. However, he denied set-off of business loss against
excess stock by applying the provisions of section 115BBE and relied on the
decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Kim Pharma
(P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2013] 35 taxmann.com 456
and Liberty India vs. CIT
[2007] 293 ITR 520.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who relying on the ITAT, Jaipur Bench in the case of DCIT vs.
Ramnarayan Birla
[IT Appeal No. 482 (JP) of 2015, dated 30.9.2016] held
that the excess stock so found is part of regular business, the same is to be
taxed as business income. He further held that the amendment to the proviso of
section 115BBE wherein the word “or set off of any loss” is introduced by the
Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.4.2017, set-off of business loss during the year
against the excess stock found in the search operation is allowable. The CIT(A)
allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the
provisions of section 115BBE come under Chapter XII providing for determination
of rate of tax in certain special cases and accordingly, it relates to
quantification of amount of tax and not to the computation of total income and
therefore, the amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2016 would not affect
the computation of total income. It was, accordingly, contended that the
business loss in the instant case cannot be allowed to be set-off against the
amount brought to tax u/s. 69B in terms of undisclosed investment in stock of
stones, gold and jewellery.

 HELD

The Tribunal having noted the amendment
brought in section 115BBE(2) by the Finance Act, 2016, observed that if the
contentions made by CIT(DR) are accepted, the question that arises is would the
interpretation render sub-section (2) otiose and what was the necessity
for bringing in such amendment. It observed that the intention of the
legislature has been provided in the memorandum explaining the amendment.

The Tribunal held that given the fact that
the AO has invoked the provisions of section 115BBE in the instant case, the provisions
of sub-section (2) to section 115BBE are equally applicable. The amendment
brought in by the FA, 2016 whereby set-off of losses against income referred to
in section 69B has been denied is stated clearly to be effective from 1.4.2017
and will accordingly, apply AY 2017-18 onwards. Accordingly, for the year under
consideration, there is no restriction to set-off of business loss against
income brought to tax u/s. 69B of the Act.

The Tribunal observed that the matter could
be looked at from another perspective. The provisions relating to set-off of
losses are contained in Chapter VI relating to aggregating of income and
set-off of losses. Whenever legislature desires to restrict set-off of loss or
allowance of loss, in a particular manner, usually, the provisions are made in
Chapter VI such as non-allowance of business loss against salary income as
provided in section 71(2A), and treatment of short-term or long-term capital
losses. There is no specific provision which restricts set-off of business losses
against income brought to tax u/s. 69B. Interestingly, both section 69B and
section 71 fall under the same Chapter VI. In the absence of any provisions in
section 71 falling under Chapter VI which restrict set-off, in the instant
case, set-off of business losses against income brought to tax u/s. 69B cannot
be denied.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by
the revenue.

 


Section 37– Expenses on account of provident fund contribution of employees employed through the sub-contractor of the assessee-contractor are allowable if the same are incurred as per the conditions of contract entered into by the assessee-contractor and rendering of services by labourers of sub-contractors for the purposes of business of assessee was not doubted.

1.      
 [2017] 82 taxmann.com 292 (Pune- Trib.)

Ratilal
Bhagwandas Construction Co. (P.)
Ltd. vs. ITO

ITA No.:
1698 (Pune) of 2014

A.Y.:
2009-10, Date of Order: 31st May, 2017

FACTS

The assessee-company was engaged in the
business of industrial concern. It filed its return of income declaring a total
income of Rs. 4,82,49,120. In the course of assessment proceedings, the
Assessing Officer (AO) on perusing the `Office and Administration Expenses
Account’, noticed that assessee had debited Rs. 20,78,557 on account of
provident fund for employees of the contractors of the assessee company. He
noticed that this amount of Rs. 20,78,557 comprised of Rs. 9,73,953 being
employees’ contribution to PF and Rs. 11,04,624 being employers’ contribution.

The AO asked the assessee to justify this
claim of Rs. 20,78,557. The assessee submitted that under the agreement entered
into by the assessee with its various clients, the assessee is liable for
provident fund expenditure. It also submitted that many of the sub-contractors
do not have PF registration and hence, the assessee has paid their PF
contribution and therefore the same is claimed as an expenditure. The AO
considering the fact that in respect of assessee’s own employees, assessee has
contributed only employers’ contribution and had deducted the portion of
employees’ contribution from their wages / salaries, but in respect of
employees of the sub-contractors which were engaged by the assessee, no such deduction
was made from the wages / salaries of the concerned employees. The AO
disallowed Rs. 9,73,953 (being employees contribution to PF in respect of
employees of sub-contractor).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who apart from upholding the order of the AO also enhanced the
disallowance by directing the AO to disallow further Rs. 11,04,124 being
employer’s contribution pertaining to contractor’s employees.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 HELD

The Tribunal observed that under the terms
of the contract entered into by the assessee with its customers, it is the
responsibility of the assessee to comply with the requirements of the Employees
Provident Fund Act. Under the contract, it was the duty of the assessee to
cover all employees (including that of sub-contractor) under the Provident Fund
Act.

The Tribunal held that a perusal of sections
of Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and
Employees Provident Fund Scheme 1952 together with the clauses of the agreement
that the assessee had entered into with his clients show that the assessee is
responsible for the deduction of provident fund dues of the employees,
including those employed through sub-contractor and its deposit with the
appropriate authorities. It observed that in the present case, the rendering of
services by the labourers of the sub-contractors for the purpose of business of
the assessee has not been doubted by the revenue. It observed that statutorily,
the assessee could have recovered the Provident Fund dues from the
subcontractors, but when the assessee is not in a position to recover the
amounts paid as provident fund contribution for the respective contract
labourers, or considering the business exigencies when the assessee bears the
expense on account of Provident Fund contribution, then whether in such a
situation the expense can be disallowed? It held that the same cannot be
disallowed as an expenditure, more so when the rendering of services by the
subcontractors for the business of the assessee is not in doubt and in such a
situation, the expenditure can be allowed u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

Section 37(1) does not curtail or prevent an
assessee from incurring an expenditure which he feels and wants to incur for
the purpose of business. Expenditure incurred may be direct or may even
indirectly benefit the business in the form of increased turnover, better
profit, growth, etc. The AO cannot question the reasonableness by
putting himself in the arm-chair of the businessman and assume status or
character of the assessee and that it is for the assessee to decide whether the
expenses should be incurred in the course of his business or not. Courts have
also held that if the expenditure is incurred for the purposes of the business,
incidental benefit to some other person would not take the expenditure outside
the scope of section 37(1) of the Act.

It observed that it is a settled law that
the commercial expediency of a businessman’s decision to incur a particular
expenditure cannot be tested on the touchstone of strict legal liability to
incur such expenditure.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance of
employees contribution of PF (as made by the AO) and that of employers
contribution of PF (as enhanced by CIT(A)) was uncalled for. The appeal filed
by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.