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UNEXPLAINED DEPOSITS IN FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

A few years back, around 2011, the Government of France shared certain
information with the Government of India concerning deposits in several bank
accounts with HSBC Bank, Geneva, Switzerland held in the names of Indian
nationals, or where such nationals had a beneficial interest. The information
was received in the form of a document known as ‘Base Note’ wherein various
personal details of account holders such as name, date of birth, place of
birth, sex / gender, residential address, profession, nationality, date of
opening of bank account in HSBC Bank, Geneva and balances in certain years, etc.,
were mentioned.

 

A number of cases
have since then been reopened on the basis of the ‘Base Note’, leading to
reassessments involving substantial additions and sizable consequential
additions which are being contested in numerous appeals across the country
mainly on the following grounds:

(i)   the assessee is a resident of a foreign
country and his income is not taxable in India,

(ii)  the source of income of the assessee in India
has no connection with the bank deposits concerned,

(iii)  the bank account was not opened or operated by
the assessee,

(iv) the bank account was not in the name of the
assessee,

(v)  the bank account was in the name of a private
trust which was a discretionary trust and the assessee had not received any
payment or income from the trust,

(vi) the reopening was bad in law.

 

In addition to the
above defences, the assessees have also contended that the additions were made
on the basis of unauthentic material (the ‘Base Note’), that copies of the
material relied upon were not provided, or that adequate opportunity of hearing
was not provided, or that the principles of natural justice were violated on
various grounds, and also that the A.O. had failed in establishing his case for
addition and in linking the deposits to an Indian source.

 

More than 20 cases
have been adjudicated by the Tribunal or the courts on the issue of the
additions, some in favour of the Revenue, some against the Revenue and in
favour of the assessee, either on application of the provisions of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 or on the grounds of natural justice. Most of these
decisions have been rendered on the facts of the case. In a few cases, the
issue involved was about the possibility of taxing an income in India for a
year during which the assessee was a non-resident and was the beneficiary of a
discretionary trust under the Income-tax Act, 1961. In one of the cases, one of
the Mumbai benches of the Tribunal held that no addition could be made on
account of such deposits in the assessment year in the hands of the assessee who
was a non-resident and had not received any money on distribution from the
trust in that year. As against this, recently in another case, another Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal held that the addition was sustainable even when the
assessee in question was not a resident for the purposes of the Act and claimed
to be a beneficiary of a discretionary trust.

 

THE DEEPAK B. SHAH CASE

The issue came up
for consideration in the case of Deepak B. Shah 174 ITD 237 (Mum).
The assessees in this case had filed income-tax returns which were processed
u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the Government of India received information from the
French Government under DTAA that some Indian nationals and residents had
foreign bank accounts in HSBC Bank, Geneva, Switzerland which were not
disclosed to the Indian Tax Department. This information was received in the
form of a document known as ‘Base Note’ wherein various personal details of
account holders, such as name, date of birth, place of birth, sex / gender,
residential address, profession, nationality, date of opening of bank account
in HSBC Bank, Geneva and balances in certain years, etc., were mentioned. After
receiving the ‘Base Note’ as a part of the Swiss leaks, the Investigation Wing
of the Income Tax Department conducted a survey u/s 133A at the premises of one
Kanu B. Shah & Co. During the course of the survey proceedings, the ‘Base
Note’ was shown to the assessees Deepak B. Shah and Kunal N. Shah and it was
indicated that the Revenue was of the view that both the assessees had a
foreign bank account. The said foreign bank account was opened in 1997 by an
overseas discretionary trust known as ‘B’ Trust, set up by a Settlor, an NRI
since 1979 and a non-resident u/s 6. Both the assessees with Indian residency
were named as discretionary beneficiaries of the said trust.

 

The A.O. added peak
balance in the hands of both the assessees at Rs. 6,13,09,845 and Rs.
5,99,75,370 for assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08, respectively. The same
additions were also made in the case of Dipendu Bapalal Shah who created the
private discretionary trust known as Balsun Trust.

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) affirmed the addition to the tune of half of the peak balance in the
hands of both the assessees to avoid double taxation. The CIT(A) confirmed the
addition to the tune of Rs. 3,06,54,922 and Rs. 2,74,007 (sic) in
A.Ys. 2006-07 and 2007-08 u/s 69A of the Act in both the cases.

 

In the appellate
proceedings of Dipendu Bapalal Shah, the CIT(A) set aside the addition on the
basis that as an NRI none of his business monies earned outside India could be
brought to tax in India, unless they were shown to have arisen or accrued in
India. He also held that there was no linkage of the amounts to India and the
Revenue had not discharged its duty on this issue. The said order of the CIT(A)
in the case of Dy. CIT vs. Dipendu Bapalal Shah 171 ITD 602 (Mum.-Trib.)
was upheld by the Tribunal on the ground that the contents of the affidavit
dated 13th October, 2011 were not denied or proved to be not true by
the A.O. Further, it was held that the bank account with HSBC Bank, Geneva was
outside the purview of the IT Act as Dipendu Bapalal Shah was a non-resident
Indian.

 

In the second
appeal, the assessees reiterated the undisputed facts about the ‘Base Note’ of
2011, denied knowledge of any such bank account and highlighted that no
incriminating material was found during the course of the survey; the Settlor
had created and constituted an overseas discretionary trust known as ‘Balsun
Trust’ by making a contribution to the said trust from his own funds / sources
with Deepak and Kunal as discretionary beneficiaries of the said trust; during
the years under consideration, they did not receive any distribution of income
from the said trust as no such distribution was done by the trust during those
years; the Settlor was a foreign resident since 1979 and was a non-resident u/s
6 of the Act; the Settlor and both the assessees in their respective assessment
proceedings had filed their sworn-in affidavits; the affidavit of the Settlor was
sworn before the UAE authority, stating on oath that he had settled an offshore
discretionary trust with his initial contribution, none of the discretionary
beneficiaries had contributed any funds to the trust, and none of the
beneficiaries had received any distribution from the trust.

 

The sworn
affidavits of the assessees stated that they were not aware of the existence of
any of the accounts in HSBC Bank, Geneva, that they never carried out any
transactions in relation to the said account, nor received any benefit from the
said account, and that they had not signed any documents nor operated the said
bank account. A clarificatory letter from HSBC Bank, Geneva was also filed
stating that they had neither visited nor opened or operated the bank accounts
and that no payments had been received from them or made to them in relation to
the said account; the addition was made in three hands but the Commissioner
(Appeals) deleted the addition in the hands of the Settlor, which order of
deletion was also upheld by the coordinate bench of the Tribunal, holding that
the contents of the affidavit of the Settlor were not declined or held to be
not true by the A.O.

 

It was explained
further that the bank account of HSBC Bank, Geneva was out of the purview of
the IT Act, as the Settlor was a non-resident Indian since 1979; looking to the
decision of the coordinate bench holding that the money belonged to the
Settlor, who was a non-resident, and the income of the non-resident held abroad
was not assessable in India unless it was shown to have arisen or accrued in
India; since it was held by the Tribunal that the amount in the HSBC account in
Geneva was owned by the Settlor who was a non-resident, there was no
justification or reason to sustain the order of the Commissioner (Appeals); the
Revenue had completely failed to show any linkage of the foreign bank account
with Indian money; addition had been made u/s 69A and it was a sine qua non
for invoking section 69A that the assessee must be found to be the owner of
money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles. The money was held in the
name of the Settlor, who claimed to be the owner of the said deposits from his
own funds / sources, and the Revenue had failed to bring any cogent and
convincing materials on record which proved that the assessees were owners of
the money in the HSBC account.

 

It was further
contended that the Settlor was the owner of the HSBC Bank account, Geneva and
the assessees were discretionary beneficiaries which led to the positive
inference that they were not the owners of the said account and hence the
additions u/s 69A could not be sustained; the assessees had not made any
contribution to, nor done any transaction with, the said trust at all; the
income of the trust could not be added in the hands of the beneficiaries and
the trustees, as the representative assessees, were liable to be taxed on the
income of the trust; if the discretionary trust had made some distribution of
income during the year in favour of the discretionary beneficiaries, only then
was the distributed income taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries; but
nothing of the sort had happened nor had the assessees received any money as
distribution of income by the discretionary trust; so long as the money was not
distributed by the discretionary trust, the same could not be taxed in the
hands of the beneficiaries.

 

It was explained
that as per the provisions of sections 5 and 9 read with sections 160-166 of
the IT Act, qua a trust, the statute clearly prescribed a liability to
tax in the hands of the trustee, and stipulated that a discretionary
beneficiary having received no distribution would not be liable to tax. As
such, the provisions required to be read strictly and no tax liability could be
imputed to the assessees as discretionary beneficiaries when the statute
specifically provided otherwise.

 

The Revenue
contended that the affidavits filed were self-serving documents without any
corroborative or evidentiary value; in the affidavit of Dipendu Bapalal Shah,
there was no detail of his family members, and, therefore, the said document
was self-serving without any evidentiary value; the confirmation submitted by
HSBC Bank had confirmed the names of Deepak B. Shah and Kunal N. Shah (the
assessees); the names of the assessees had been mentioned in the information
received by the Government of India as a part of Swiss Leaks in relation to
HSBC Bank, Geneva by way of the ‘Base Note’; the assessee had refused to sign
any consent paper, which clearly showed that the said transactions were proved
beyond doubt that these two assessees had a connection with the said bank
account; the assessees did not co-operate at any stage of the proceedings; in
such clandestine operations and transactions, it was impossible to have direct
evidence or demonstrative proof of every move of the assessee and that the
income tax liability was to be assessed on the basis of parameters gathered
from the inquiries, and that the A.O. had no choice but to take recourse to the
material available on record.

 

The Tribunal, on
due consideration of the contentions of both the parties, vide
paragraphs 14, 15, 17 and 18 of the order held as under:

 

‘14. Further, the bank account of HSBC Bank, Geneva is out of the
purview of the IT Act, as Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah is a non-resident Indian
since 1979. In the case of the two appellants before us, the same amount was
added in AYs 2006-07 and 2007-08 which was reduced by Ld. CIT(A) to one half of
the total additions to avoid any double taxation affirming the additions to
that extent. Looking to the decision of the coordinate bench holding that the
money belonged to Mr. Dipendu B. Shah who is non-resident and the income of the
non-resident held abroad is not assessable in India unless it is shown to have
arisen or accrued in India. Since it is held by the ITAT that the amount in
HSBC Account in Geneva is owned by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah who is non-resident
we do not find any justification or reasons to sustain the order of Ld. CIT(A)
when the Revenue has completely failed to show any linkage with foreign bank
account with Indian money. We find that addition has been made by the A.O. u/s
69A of the Act to justify the addition on account of peak balance. We agree
with the contentions of the Ld. AR that it is
sine
qua non for invoking section 69A of the IT Act, the assessee must be found
to be the owner of money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles and
whereas in the present case the money is owned and held by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal
Shah a foreign resident in an account (with) HSBC, Geneva and also admitted
that he is the owner of the money in the HSBC Account Geneva.’

 

‘15. In the present case the money is held in the name of Mr. Dipendu
Bapalal Shah who vehemently claimed to be owner of the said deposits from his
own fund / sources and the Revenue has failed to bring any cogent and
convincing materials on record which proved that the two appellants are owners
of the money in HSBC Account.’

 

‘17. In the present case, undisputedly Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah is owner
of HSBC Bank account, Geneva and the appellants are discretionary beneficiaries
which leads to positive inference that the appellants are not the owners of the
said bank account and hence the additions under section 69A cannot be
sustained. In the present case before us, admittedly both the appellants,
namely Deepak B. Shah and Kunal N. Shah are discretionary beneficiaries of the
“Balsun Trust” created by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah and the two
appellants have not made any contribution nor done any transaction with the
said trust at all. In our opinion in the case of discretionary trust, the
income of the trust could not only be added in the hand of beneficiary but the
trustees are the representative assessees who are liable to be taxed for the
income of the trust. If the discretionary trust has made some distribution of
income during the year in favour of the discretionary beneficiaries only then
the distributed income is taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries but nothing
of the sort has happened nor two appellants have received any money as
distribution of income by the discretionary trust. So long as the money is not
distributed by the discretionary trust, the same cannot be taxed in the hands
of the beneficiaries. Similarly, in the present case before us, the deposits held
in HSBC, Geneva account cannot be taxed in the hand of beneficiaries /
appellants at all.’

 

‘18. So applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
abovesaid two decisions, we are of the considered view that the additions
cannot be made and sustained in the hands of the appellants as the Balsun Trust
is a discretionary trust created by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah and said trust has
neither made any distribution of income nor did the two beneficiaries /
appellants receive any money by way of distribution. While the Department has
failed to bring any conclusive evidence to establish nexus between these two
appellants and the bank account in HSBC, Geneva and more so when Mr. Dipendu
Bapalal Shah has owned the balance in the HSBC, Geneva bank account, we are not
in agreement with the conclusions of the CIT(A) in sustaining the additions
equal to fifty percent of the peak balance in the hands of both the appellants.
Considering the facts of the two appellants, in view of various decisions as
discussed hereinabove, we hold that the order of CIT(A) is wrong in assuming
that the said money may belong to these two appellants and such conclusion is
against the facts on record and based on surmises and presumptions.
Accordingly, we set aside the order of Ld. CIT(A) and direct the A.O. to delete
the additions made u/s 69A in respect of HSBC Bank account for assessment years
2006-07 and 2007-08 in the case of both the appellants before us.’

 

In the result, the
appeals of the assessees were allowed and the additions made in their hands
were deleted.

 

THE RENU T. THARANI CASE

Recently, the issue
arose in the case of Renu T. Tharani 107 taxmann.com 804 (Mum).
The assessee in the case was an elderly woman in her late eighties. On 29th
July, 2006 she had filed her income tax return for A.Y. 2006-07 disclosing a
returned income of Rs. 1,70,800 in Ward 9(1), Bangalore. Her case was
transferred to Mumbai under an order dated 20th December, 2013
passed u/s 127 of the Act. The return was not subjected to any scrutiny and the
assessment thus reached finality as such. The investigation wing of the Income
Tax Department received information that the assessee had a bank account with
HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva. Based on the information, this case was
reopened for fresh assessment on 30th October, 2014 by issuance of a
notice u/s 148.

 

She responded by
stating that she had neither been an account holder of HSBC nor a beneficial
owner of any assets deposited in the account with HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)
SA, Switzerland, during the last ten years. It was further stated that HSBC
Private Bank (Suisse) SA had also confirmed that GWU Investments Ltd. was the
holder of account number 1414771 and, according to their records, GWU
Investments Limited used to be an underlying company of Tharani Family Trust,
of which Mrs. Renu Tharani was a discretionary beneficiary, and that the
Tharani Family Trust was terminated and none of the assets deposited with them
were distributed to her. It was further stated that the ‘Base Note’ issued was
inaccurate, as she did not have any account with HSBC Bank Geneva bearing
number BUP_SIFIC_PER_ID_5090178411 or any other number.

 

It was explained
that the income of a discretionary trust could not be taxed in her hands as per
the decision in the case of Estate of HMM Vikramsinhji of Gondal, 45
taxmann.com 552(SC),
wherein it was held that in the hands of the
beneficiary of a discretionary trust income could only be taxed when the income
was actually received, but in her case she had not received any money in the
capacity of beneficiary. It was submitted that in the light of the abovesaid
facts, there was no reason why the A.O. should insist on asking the assessee to
provide the details of the account standing in the name of GWU Investments
Ltd., as she was in no position to provide the details for the reasons
mentioned to the A.O.

 

However, none of
the submissions impressed the A.O. He rejected the submissions made by the
assessee and proceeded to make an addition of Rs. 196,46,79,146, being an
amount equivalent to US $3,97,38,122 at the relevant point of time, by
observing as follows:

 

‘12. The
assessee has not provided the bank account statement in which she is the
discretionary beneficiary nor has explained the sources of deposits made in the
said account… not acceptable because of the following reasons:

(a)  It is surprising that she does not know about
the Settlor of the Trust as well as the sources of deposits made in the HSBC
account. No bank account statement has been provided nor the source of deposits
made in the account explained by the assessee even after specific queries were
raised on this.

(b)  It is also surprising that as a beneficiary
she did not receive any assets when the Tharani Family Trust was terminated and
if that be so, then where all the money went after termination of the Tharani
Family Trust is open to question and the same remains unexplained.

(c)  Even though the returned income were not
substantial, these facts show that she is having her interests in India.

Considering the
facts of this case, the decision of the Hon’ble ITAT, Mumbai in the case of
Mohan Manoj Dhupelia in ITA No. 3544/Mum/2011 etc. is
directly applicable to this case.

In absence of
anything contrary, the only logical conclusion that can be inferred is that the
amounts deposited are unaccounted deposits sourced from India and therefore
taxable in India. This presumption is as per the provisions of section 114 of
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Thus, as per the
provisions of section 114 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also, it needs to be
held at this stage that the information / details not furnished were
unfavourable to the assessee and that the source of the money deposited in the
HSBC account is undisclosed and sourced from India.’

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any success. The CIT(A)
confirmed the conclusions so arrived at by the A.O. He noted as under:

 

‘21. The focus
of the submission is shifting responsibility on Assessing Officer without
furnishing any supplementary and relevant details. Vital facts (at cost of
repetition) regarding the entities involved / persons are as under:

A.  Smt. Renu Tharani is the beneficiary of
Tharani Family Trust.

B.  Smt. Renu Tharani is the sole beneficiary.

C.  Tharani Family Trust is the sole beneficiary
of GWU Investments Ltd.

D.  Smt. Renu Tharani holds interest in GWU
Investments Ltd. through Tharani Family Trust.

E.  Income attributable directly or indirectly to
GWU Investments Ltd. or Tharani Family Trust pertains to Smt. Renu Tharani.

F.  GWU Investments Ltd. having address in Cayman
Islands has investment manager as Shri Haresh Tharani, son of the appellant.

The holding
pattern of entities concerned and the contents of the base note cement the
issue. The fact that the appellant is sole beneficiary implies that there is
never a case of distribution and all income concerning the asset only belongs
to her, i.e., will accrue or arise only to her from the moment beneficial
rights came to the appellant.’

 

Coming to the
quantum of additions, however, the CIT(A) upheld the stand of the assessee and
gave certain directions to the A.O.

 

On second appeal,
the assessee stated that she was admittedly a non-resident assessee, inasmuch
as the impugned assessment was framed on the assessee in her residential status
as ‘non-resident’, and it was thus not at all required of her to disclose her
foreign bank accounts, even if any. It was explained that unlike in the United
States, where global taxation of income of the assessee was on the basis of
citizenship, the basis of taxability of income outside India, in India, was on
the basis of the residential status of the assessee. The fundamental principles
of taxation of global income in India were explained in detail to highlight
that unless someone was resident in India, taxability of such a person was
confined to income accruing or arising in India, income deemed to accrue or
arise in India, income received in India and income deemed to have been
received in India. None of those categories covered the income, even if any, on
account of an unexplained credit outside India.

 

The assessee
pointed out that since 23rd March, 2004 she was regularly residing
in the United States of America, and that, post the financial year ended 31st
March, 2006 onwards, the assessee was a non-resident assessee. In this
backdrop, she was not required to disclose any bank account outside India or
report any income outside India unless it was covered by the specific deeming
fiction which was admittedly not the case for her. It was, therefore, contended
that any sums credited in the bank account in question could not be taxed in
her hands.

 

Attention was
invited to a coordinate bench decision in the case of Hemant Mansukhlal
Pandya 100 taxmann.com 280, 174 ITD 101 (Mum),
wherein it was inter
alia
held that where additions were made to the income of an assessee who
was a non-resident since 25 years, since no material was brought on record to
show that funds were diverted by the assessee from India to source deposits
found in a foreign bank account, the impugned additions were unjustified. It
was thus contended that she, too, being a non-resident, such an income in
foreign bank deposits, even if that were so, could not be taxed in the hands of
the assessee.

 

It was further
contended that when the account did not belong to the assessee, there was no
question of the assessee being in a position to furnish any evidence in respect
of the same; that she did not have information whatsoever about the source of
deposits in this account, and the assets held therein; that the account was
held with GWU Investments Limited with which the assessee had no relationship
whatsoever; she at best was a beneficiary of the discretionary trust, settled
by GWU Investments Limited, but then in such an eventuality the question of
taxability would arise only at the point of time when the assessee actually
received any money from the trust by relying on the judgment in the case of Estate
of HMM Vikramsinhji of Gondal (Supra),
in support of the proposition;
that the entire case of the A.O. was based on gross misconception of facts and
ignorance of the well-settled legal position.

 

It was reiterated
that the assessee did not have any account with the HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)
SA, and yet she was treated as the owner of the account. The account was of the
investments, but was treated as a bank account. The assessee was a
non-resident, taxable in India in respect of her income earned in India, and yet
the assessee was being taxed in respect of an account which undisputedly had no
connection with India. Denying the tax liability in respect of such an account
at all, it was submitted that if at all it had tax implications anywhere in the
world, the liability was in the jurisdiction of which the assessee was a
resident. The assessee was taxable only on disbursement of the benefits to the
beneficiary, but then the beneficiary was being taxed in respect of the corpus
of the trust. The impugned additions were, even on merits, wholly devoid of any
substance.

 

The Revenue in
response vehemently relied upon, and elaborately justified, the orders of the
authorities below by highlighting that it was a case in which a specific
information had come to the possession of the Government of India, through
official channels, and this information, amongst other things, categorically
indicated that the assessee was a beneficiary and beneficial owner of a
particular account which had peak assets worth US $3,97,38,122 and that the
genuineness of the account was not in doubt and had not even been challenged by
the assessee, which reality could not be wished away. It was contended that the
IT Department had discharged its burden of proof by bringing on record
authentic information received through government channels about the bank
relationships which were unaccounted in India and unaccounted abroad, and
whatever documents the assessee had given were self-serving documents and
hyper-technical explanations, which did not contradict the official information
received by the Government of India through official channels, and it did in
fact corroborate and evidence the existence of the account with the assessee as
beneficiary and, in any case, the documents submitted could not be considered
enough to discharge the burden of the assessee that the evidences produced by
the Department were not genuine or the inescapable conclusions flowing from the
same were not tenable in law.

 

It was highlighted
by the Revenue that all that the assessee said was that she had no idea as to
who did it, and passed on the blame to a Cayman Island-based company which was
operating the said account, but then the Cayman Island company could not be a
person unconnected with the assessee. It was inconceivable that a rank outsider
would be generous enough to put that kind of huge money at her disposal or for
her benefit but, as a beneficiary, she was expected to know the related facts
which she alone knew. The fact of the Swiss Bank accounts being operated
through conduit companies based in tax havens was common knowledge and, seen in
that light, if the assessee had an account for her benefit in a Swiss Bank,
whether she operated it directly or through a web of proxies, the natural
presumption was that the money was her money which she must account for.

 

It was also pointed
out that within months of her changing the residential status, the account was
opened and the credits were afforded. Where did this money come from?
Obviously, in such a short span of time that kind of huge wealth of several
millions of dollars could not be earned by her abroad, but then if she had
shown that kind of earning anywhere to any tax authorities, to that extent, the
balance in Swiss account could be treated as explained. The technicalities
sought to be raised were of no use and the judicial precedents, rendered in an
altogether different context, could not be used to defend the unaccounted
wealth stashed away in the assessee’s account with HSBC Private Bank, Geneva.

 

In a brief
rejoinder, the assessee submitted that the sweeping generalisations by the
Revenue had no relevance to the facts before the Tribunal. The hard reality was
that the account did not belong to the assessee and that there was no direct or
indirect evidence to support that inference. The assessee was only a
beneficiary of a trust but the taxability in her hands must, at best, be
confined to the monies actually received from the trust; that admittedly GWU
Investments Ltd. was owner of the account in which the assessee was neither a
director nor a shareholder; and that, in any case, nothing remained in the
account as the same stood closed now. It was then reiterated that the assessee
was a non-resident and she could not be taxed in respect of monies credited,
even if that be so, in her accounts outside India; that there was no evidence
whatsoever of the assessee having an account abroad, that whatever evidence had
been given to the assessee was successfully controverted by her, that she was a
non-resident and her taxability was confined to the incomes sourced in India,
and that, for the detailed reasons advanced by her, the impugned addition of
Rs. 196,46,79,146 in respect of her alleged and non-existent bank account in
HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva must be deleted.

 

The Tribunal deemed
it important to recall the backdrop in which the information about the
assessee’s account with the HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA was received by the
Government of India to also refresh memories, and certain undisputed facts,
about the ‘HSBC Private Bank Geneva scandal’ as it was often referred to. In
paragraph 23 of the judgment, it detailed the backdrop. In paragraph 24, it
also referred to one more BBC report, which could throw some light on the
backdrop of this case, and found the report worth a look at by reproducing
extensively from it. The Tribunal further noted that those actions of the HSBC
Private Bank (Suisse) SA had not gone unnoticed so far as law enforcement
agencies were concerned, and the bank had to face criminal investigations in
several parts of the globe, and had to pay millions of dollars in settlement
for its lapses. In paragraph 26, it explained that the above press reports were
referred to just to set the backdrop in which the case before them was set out,
and, as they explain the rationale of their decision, the relevance of the
backdrop would be appreciated.

 

The Tribunal took it upon itself to examine the trust structures
employed by HSBC Private Bank since a lot had been said about the assessee
being a discretionary beneficiary of a trust which was said to have the account
with HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva. The Tribunal found that it would be
of some use to understand the nature of trust services offered by HSBC Private
Bank, as stated on their website even on the date of the decision.

 

It noted that the
assessee had shifted to the USA just seven days before the beginning of the
relevant previous year, and it would be too unrealistic an assumption that
within those seven days plus the relevant financial year, the assessee could
have earned that huge an amount of around Rs. 200 crores which, at the rate at
which she did earn in India in the last year, would have taken her more than
11,500 years to earn. Even if one went by the basis, though the material on
record at the time of recording reasons did not at all indicate so, that the
assessee was a non-resident for the assessment year, which was, going by the
specific submissions of the assessee, admittedly the first year of her
‘non-resident’ status, it was wholly unrealistic to assume that the money at
her disposal in the Swiss Bank account reflected income earned outside India in
such a short period of one year.

 

The Tribunal took a
very critical note of the fact that the assessee had, in response to a specific
request from the A.O., declined to sign ‘consent waiver’ so as to enable the IT
Department to obtain all the necessary details from the HSBC Private Bank
(Suisse) SA, Geneva which aspect of the matter was clear from the extracts from
the assessee’s submissions dated 25th February, 2015 filed by the
A.O. as follows:

 

‘……..we would
like to submit that the letter from HSBC Private Bank dated 5th
January, 2015 categorically states that the assessee does not have any account
in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA in Switzerland, hence question of providing
you with CD of HSBC Bank account statement does not arise. Also, the question
of signing the consent waiver does not arise as the assessee does not have any
account in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA.’

 

The Tribunal
observed that the net effect of not signing the consent waiver form was that
the A.O. was deprived of the opportunity to seek relevant information from the
bank in respect of the assessee’s bank account; if she had nothing to hide,
there was no reason for not signing the consent waiver form; all that the
consent waiver form did was to waive any objection to the furnishing of
information relating to the assessee’s bank account, i.e. HSBC Private Bank
(Suisse) SA Geneva in her case. The Tribunal found it necessary to take note of
the above position so as to understand that the assessee had not come with
clean hands and, quite to the contrary, had made conscious efforts to scuttle
the Department’s endeavours to get at the truth.

 

Proceeding with the
consent letter aspect, the Tribunal further observed that clearly, therefore,
the consent waiver being furnished by the assessee did not put the assessee to
any disadvantage so far as getting at the actual truth was concerned. Of
course, when the monies so kept in such banks abroad were legal or the
allegations incorrect, the assessee could always, and in many a case assessees
did, co-operate with the investigations by giving the consent waivers. The case
before the Tribunal, however, was in the category of cases in which consent
waiver had been emphatically declined by the assessee, and thus a deeper probe
by the Department had been successfully scuttled.

 

On the aspect of
the consent, the Tribunal found it useful to refer to a judgment of the
jurisdictional Bombay High Court on materially similar facts, wherein the Court
had disapproved and deprecated the conduct of the assessee in not signing the
consent waiver form, in the judgment reported as Soignee R. Kothari’s
case
in 80 taxmann.com 240. The Tribunal noted that it
was also a case in which the assessee, originally a resident in India, had
migrated to the USA and in whose case the information by way of a ‘Base Note’
was received from the French Government under the DTAA mechanism (as in the
assessee’s case), about the existence of her bank account with the same bank,
i.e. HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva; it was a case in which the assessee
had declined to sign the consent waiver form outright, and taken a stand that
the question of signing the consent waiver form did not arise. Neither such a
conduct could be appreciated, nor anyone with such a conduct merited any
leniency, the Court had held in that case.

 

The Tribunal
observed that on the one hand the assessee had not co-operated with the IT
authorities in obtaining the relevant information from HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)
SA Geneva, or rather obstructed the flow of full, complete and correct
information from the said bank by not waiving her rights to protect privacy for
transactions with the bank, and, on the other hand, the assessee had complained
that the IT authorities had not been able to find relevant information.
Obviously, those two things could not go together.

 

The Tribunal found
that while the claim of the assessee was that she was a discretionary
beneficiary of the Tharani Family Trust, that fact did not find mention in the
‘Base Note’ which showed that the assessee was the beneficial owner or
beneficiary of GWU Investments Ltd.; that in the remand report filed by the
A.O., there was a reference to some unsigned draft copy of the trust deed
having been filed before him but neither the deed was authentic nor was it
placed before the Tribunal in the paper-book. The assessee had not submitted
the trust deed or any related papers but merely referred to a somewhat
tentative claim made in a letter between one Mahesh Tharani, apparently a
relative of the assessee, and the HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA, an
organisation with a globally established track record of hoodwinking tax
authorities worldwide. Nothing was clear, nor did the assessee throw any light
on the same. The letter did not deny, nor show any material to controvert, what
was stated in the ‘Base Note’ i.e. GWU Investments Ltd. and the assessee were
linked as beneficial owners. There was no dispute that the account was in the
nominal name of GSW Investments Ltd., but the question was who was the natural
person / beneficial owner thereof. As for the trust, there was no corroborative
evidence about the statement, but nothing turned thereon as well. The assessee
being the discretionary beneficiary owner of the trust, and beneficial owner of
the underlying company, was not mutually exclusive anyway; but the claim of the
assessee being a discretionary beneficiary of the trust was without even
minimal evidence.

 

As regards the
reference to the judgment in the case of the estate of HMM Vikramsinhji
of Gondal (Supra),
the Tribunal noted that it was important to
understand that it was a case in which a discretionary trust was settled by the
assessee and the limited question for adjudication was taxability of the income
of the trust, after the death of the Settlor and in the hands of the
beneficiary. The observations had no relevance in the context of the case of
the assessee; firstly, neither was there any trust deed before the Tribunal,
nor the question before it pertained to the taxability of the income of the
trust; secondly, beyond a mention in the ‘Base Note’ as a personnes légales
liées
(i.e. related legal persons), there was no evidence even about the
existence, leave aside the nature, of the trust; thirdly, the point of
taxability here was beneficial ownership of GWU Investments Ltd., a Cayman
Island-based company, by the assessee; finally, even if there was a dispute
about the alleged trust, the dispute was with respect to taxability of funds
found with the trust and the source thereof. Clearly, therefore, the issue
adjudicated upon in the said decision had no relevance in the present context.
The very reliance on the said decision presupposed that the assessee was
discretionary beneficiary simplicitor of a discretionary family trust,
and nothing more – an assumption which was far from established on the facts of
the case.

 

As regards the
question of income which could be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee,
being a non-resident, and certain errors in computation on account of duplicity
of entries, etc., the Tribunal had noted that the CIT(A) had given certain
directions which it had reproduced in paragraph 18 of the Order, and those
directions were neither challenged nor any infirmities were shown therein. Obviously,
therefore, there was no occasion, or even prayer, for interference in the same.

 

In the end, the
Tribunal while confirming the order of the A.O. read with the order of the
CIT(A), nonetheless recorded that their decision could not be an authority for
the proposition that wherever the name of the assessee figured in a ‘Base Note’
from HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva an addition would be justified in
each case. The mere fact of an account in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva
by itself could not mean that the monies in the account were unaccounted,
illegitimate or illegal. The conduct of the assessee, the actual facts of each
case, and the surrounding circumstances were to be examined on merits, and then
a call was to be taken about whether or not the explanation of the assessee
merited acceptance. There could not be a short-cut and a one-size-fits-all
approach to the exercise.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The provisions of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 extend to the whole of India vide section 1 of
the Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for the charge of income tax in respect
of the total income of the previous year of a person. The total income so
liable to tax includes, vide section 5 of the Act, the income of a
person who is a non-resident, derived from whatever source which is received or
is deemed to be received in India or has accrued or arisen or is deemed to
accrue or arise to him in India. A receipt by any person on behalf of the
assessee is also subject to tax in India. The scope of the total income subject
to tax in case of a resident is a little wider inasmuch as, besides the income
referred to above, he is also liable to tax in respect of the income that
accrues or arises to him outside India, too, unless the person happens to be
Not Ordinarily Resident in India.

 

Section 9 expands
the scope of the income that is deemed to have accrued or arisen in India even
where not actually accrued or arisen in India and the income listed therein, in
the circumstances listed in section 9, such income would be ordinarily taxable
in India even where belonging to a non-resident, subject of course to the
provisions of sections 90, 90A and 91 of the Act.

 

The sum and
substance of the provisions is that the global income of a resident is taxable
in India, irrespective of its place of accrual. In contrast, income in the case
of a non-resident or Not Ordinarily Resident person is taxed in India only
where such an income is received in India or has accrued or arisen in India or
where it is deemed to be so received or accrued or arisen.

 

In both the cases
under consideration the assessees were non-residents and applying the
principles of taxation explained above, the income could be taxed in their
hands only where such income for the respective assessment years under
consideration was received in India or had accrued or arisen in India or where
it was deemed to be so. In both cases, the deposits were made during the
relevant financial year in the bank account with HSBC Geneva, Switzerland held
in the name of the discretionary trust or its nominee during the period when
the assessees in question were non-residents for the purposes of the Act. In
both the cases, the provisions of section 5 were highlighted before the
authorities to explain that the deposits in question did not represent any
income of the assessee that was received in India or had accrued or arisen in
India or where it was deemed to be so. In both cases, the assessees were the
beneficiaries of discretionary trusts and had not received any money or income
on distribution by the trust and it was explained to the authorities that the
additions could not have been made in the hands of the beneficiaries of such
trusts. In both the cases, the authorities had sought the consent of the
assessees for facilitating the investigation with the Swiss bank and collecting
information and documents from the bank – and in both the cases the consent was
refused.

 

In the first case
of Deepak B. Shah, the Tribunal found that the assessee was a non-resident for
many years, and the A.O. had failed to establish any connection between the
deposits in the impugned bank account and his Indian income. No addition was
held to be sustainable by the Tribunal in the hands of the non-resident
assessee on account of such deposits which could not be considered to be
received in India or had accrued or arisen in India or was deemed to be so. In
this case, the bank account was in the name of a discretionary trust of which
the assessee was a beneficiary and the Settlor of the trust had admitted the
ownership of the funds in the bank account and these facts weighed heavily with
the Tribunal in deleting the additions. It held that a beneficiary of the
discretionary trust could be taxed only when there was a receipt by him during
the year, on distribution by the trust.

 

And in the second
case, of Renu T. Tharani, the assessee, aged 83 years, a resident of the USA
for a few years, was a sole beneficiary of a discretionary trust who operated
the HSBC Geneva bank account. The addition was made in the hands of the
beneficiary assessee on account of deposits in a foreign bank account held in
the name of a company, whose shares were held by a discretionary trust, the
Tharani Beneficiary Trust; in the course of reopening and reassessment, and on
appeal to the Tribunal, the addition was sustained in spite of the fact that
not much material was available for linking the deposits to the Indian income
of the assessee for the year under consideration, and the fact that the
assessee was a beneficiary of the discretionary trust from which she had not
received any income on distribution during that year.

 

In the latter
decision, the assessee had brought to the attention of the Tribunal the
decision in the case of Hemant Mansukhlal Pandya, 100 taxmann.com 280
(Mum)
but that did not help her case. The fact that the assessee had
refused to grant the consent, as required under the treaties and agreements,
for facilitating the inquiry and investigation by permitting the authorities to
obtain documents from the foreign bank, had substantially influenced the
adjudication by the Tribunal. That the bank account was closed and the trust
was dissolved with no trail was also a factor that was not very helpful. The
fact that the trust was in a tax haven, Cayman Islands, and was managed by
‘professional trustees’ did not help the case of the assessee. The Tribunal
gave due importance to the international reports on the clandestine movement of
funds to go to the root of the source. It was also not very happy with the
genuineness of the evidences produced or their authenticity and also with the
withholding of information by the assessee, as also with the limited
co-operation extended by her.

 

The fact that the
assessee in the latter case had ceased to be a resident only a few years in the
past and had left India just a year before the year of deposit, and that the
quantum of deposits was very huge, might have influenced the outcome in the
case, though in our opinion these factors were not determinative of the
outcome. It is true that the deposits were made during the year under
consideration, but it is equally true that during the year under consideration
the assessee was a non-resident and therefore the addition to the income could
have been sustained only if it was found to have been received in India or was
linked to Indian operations. The fact that the assessee was a beneficiary of a
discretionary trust and the bank account was not in her name but in the name of
the company that belonged to the trust, coupled with the fact that the assessee
had not received any money on distribution from the trust during the year, are
the factors which weighed in favour of not taxing the assessee, but although
considered, these did not inspire the Tribunal to delete the addition.

 

The decisions of
the Apex Court relating to the taxation of a discretionary trust were held by
the Tribunal to be delivered in the context of the facts of the cases before
the Court and not applicable to the facts and the issue before it. In case of a
discretionary trust, the beneficiaries could be taxed only on receipt from the
trust on distribution of income by the trust. Please see Estate of HMM
Vikramsinhji of Gondal 45 taxamnn.com 552 (SC);
and Smt. Kamalini
Khatau 209 ITR 101 (SC).

 

The Tribunal in the
first case of Deepak B. Shah approved the contention of the assessee that the
addition in his hands was not sustainable in a case where the bank account was
in the name of the discretionary trust and the assessee was only the
beneficiary. It also upheld that the addition could not have been sustained
when no income of the trust was distributed amongst the beneficiaries. Its
decision was also influenced by the fact that the Settlor of the trust had
admitted the ownership of the account and the addition made in the Settlor’s
hands was deleted vide an order of the ITAT, reported in 171 ITD
602 (Mum)
in the name of Dipendu B. Shah on the ground that the
Settlor was a non-resident during the year under consideration.

 

As against that, in
the latter case of Renu T. Tharani, all the three facts that influenced the
Tribunal in the Deepak B. Shah case were claimed to be present. But those facts
did not deter the Tribunal from sustaining the addition, perhaps for the lack
of evidence acceptable to it to satisfy itself and delete the addition on the
basis of the evidence available on record. Had proper evidence in support of
the existence of a discretionary trust or in support of the non-resident source
of the funds been available, it could have strengthened the case of the
assessee.

 

There was no
finding of the A.O. to the effect that there was, nor had the A.O. established,
any Indian connection to the deposits. If the deposits were considered to be
made out of her income while she was in India, then such income should have
been taxed in that year alone, and not in the year of deposit.

 

A receipt in the
hands of a non-resident in a foreign country is not taxable under the Indian
tax laws unless such a receipt is found to be connected to an Indian activity
giving rise to accrual or arising of income in India. Please see Finlay
Corporation Ltd. 86 ITD 626 (Delhi); Suresh Nanda 352 ITR 611 (Delhi);

and Smt. Sushila Ramaswamy 37 SOT 146; Saraswati Holding Corporation 111
TTJ Delhi 334;
and Vodafone International Holding B.V. 17
taxmann.com 202 (SC).

 

Besides various
unreported case laws, the issue of addition based on the said ‘Base Note’
concerning the deposits in HSBC Bank account Geneva, Switzerland arose in the
following reported cases:

1.  Mohan M. Dhupelia, 67 SOT 12 (URO) (Mum)

2.  Ambrish Manoj Dhupelia, 87 taxmann.com 195
(Mum)

3.  Hemant Mansukhlal Pandya, 100 Taxmann.com 280
(Mum)

4.  Shravan Gupta, 81 taxmann.com 123 (Delhi)

5.  Shyam Sunder Jindal, 164 ITD 470 (Delhi)

6.  Soignee R. Kothari, 80 taxmann.com 240 (Bom).

 

The first two cases
were decided by the Tribunal against the assessees, while the later cases were
decided in favour of the assessee mainly on account of the failure of the A.O.
to establish the nexus of the bank deposits to an Indian source of income or to
adhere to the rules of natural justice or to obtain authentic documents.

 

A deposit in the
foreign bank account of a trust wherein the assessee was a beneficiary of a
trust was held to be taxable in the hands of the assessee for A.Y. 2002-03 for
the inability of the assessee to render satisfactory explanation in the course
of reopening and reassessment which were also held to be valid. Please see Mohan
M. Dhupelia, 67 SOT 12 (URO) (Mum).
Also see Ambrish Manoj
Dhupelia, 87 taxmann.com 195 (Mum).

 

The assessee, a
non-resident since 25 years, was found to have a foreign bank account in HSBC
Bank Geneva in his name for which no explanation was provided by the assessee,
staying in Japan for A.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08. The addition made by the A.O.
was deleted on the ground that the A.O. had not brought on record any material
to show that the income had accrued or arisen in India and the money was
diverted by the assessee from India. As against that, the assessee had proved
that he was a non-resident for 25 years. Please see Hemant Mansukhlal
Pandya, 100 Taxmann.com 280 (Mum).

 

In the absence of a
nexus between the deposits found in a foreign bank account and the source of
income derived from India, the addition made for A.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08 on
account of deposits in HSBC Account Geneva on the basis of a ‘Base Note’ in the
hands of the assessee who was a non-resident since 1990, was deleted. The
assessee was a Belgian resident. Please see Dipendu Bapalal Shah 171 ITD
602 (Mum).

 

For A.Y. 2006-07,
the A.O. had made additions to the total income on account of deposits in a
foreign bank account with HSBC Geneva. The assessee claimed complete ignorance
of the fact of the bank account. The addition was deleted on the ground that it
was made on the basis of unsubstantiated documents which were not signed by any
bank official and were without any adequate and reliable information. Please
see Shravan Gupta, 81 taxmann.com 123 (Delhi).

 

The addition was
made by the A.O. to the assessee’s income in respect of undisclosed amount kept
in a foreign bank account HSBC, Geneva, Switzerland. However, the same was set
aside due to non-availability of authentic documents and requisite information
to be relied upon by the A.O. to make the addition. Please see Shyam
Sunder Jindal, 164 ITD 470 (Delhi).

 

ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE REQUIREMENTS REGULATIONS – AN OVERVIEW

1.0 
Introduction

‘Substance
over Form’ is an evergreen debate now tilting in favour of the former. Can a
legal form justify weak substance, or can a strong substance without a legal form be relevant or
practical? Does one score over the other? Are they interdependent or independent
of each other? How does one determine substance in a given transaction or
arrangement? Is it necessary to lift the corporate veil each time to examine
substance? Can a perfectly legal structure within the four corners of the law
be challenged and ignored for want of (or say, apparent lack of) substance? Is
every case of double non-taxation or lower taxation attributable to lack of
substance? There are a host of questions in this arena, some with answers, many
with grey areas and some without an answer. The easiest answer, perhaps, could
be that each case is fact-specific. However, in this uniqueness we need to have
certain rules and regulations and / or patterns to determine substance and give
tax certainty to businesses.

Recently, many jurisdictions introduced
Economic Substance Requirements Regulations (or ESR Regulations) for
enterprises carrying on business activities in / from that jurisdiction in any
form.

In this Article, we shall attempt to
understand what are the provisions of a typical ESR Regulations regime, their
significance and how does one comply with them.

 

2.0 
Genesis of substance requirements

Way back in 1998, OECD published a Report
on ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’ expressing
concern about the preferential regimes that lack in transparency and that are
being used by Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) for artificial profit shifting.
OECD created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) to review and monitor
compliances by preferential tax regimes with respect to transparency and other
aspects of tax structuring.

One of the twelve factors set out in the
1998 Report to determine whether a preferential regime is potentially harmful
or not was, ‘The regime encourages operations or arrangements that are purely
tax-driven and involve no substantial
activities’.

Fifteen Action Plans to prevent BEPS are
based on the following three main pillars:

(1) coherence of corporate tax at the
international level,

(2) realignment of taxation and substance,
and

(3) transparency, coupled with certainty
and predictability.

BEPS Action Plan 5 dealing with ‘Countering
Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and
Substance,’
intends to achieve the objectives of the second pillar of
realigning taxation with substance to ensure that taxable profits are not
artificially shifted away from countries where value is created.
 

FHTP identified many harmful preferential
tax regimes that were providing an ideal atmosphere for profit-shifting with no
or low effective tax rates, lack of transparency and no effective exchange of
information.

To counter such harmful regimes more
effectively, BEPS Action Plan 5 requires FHTP to revamp the work on harmful tax
practices, with priority and renewed focus on requiring substantial activity
for any preferential regime and on improving transparency, including compulsory
spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes1.

_____________________________________________________________

1 Paragraph 23 of the BEPS Action Plan 5


3.0 
FHTP’s approaches

FHTP has provided three approaches to
address the issue of substance in an Intellectual Property (IP) regime. They
are as follows:

(i)   Value Creation:
This approach requires taxpayers to undertake a set number of significant
development activities in the jurisdiction to claim tax benefits;

(ii)  Transfer Pricing:
This approach would require a taxpayer to undertake a set level of important
functions in the jurisdiction concerned to take advantage of lower tax regime.
These functions could include legal ownership of assets or bearing economic
risks of the assets, giving rise to the tax benefits.

(iii) Nexus Approach:
This approach has been agreed to by FHTP and endorsed by G20. It looks at
whether an IP regime makes its benefits conditional on the extent of R&D
activities of taxpayers in its jurisdiction. The Nexus Approach not only
enables the IP regime to provide benefits directly to the expenditures incurred
to create the IP, but also permits jurisdictions to provide benefits to the
income arising out of that IP, so long as there is a direct nexus between the
income receiving benefits and the expenditures contributing to that income.

In other words, when the Nexus Approach is
applied to an IP regime, substantial activity requirements establish a link
between expenditures, IP assets and IP income. The expenditure criterion acts
as a proxy for activities and IP assets are used to ensure that the income that
receives benefits does, in fact, arise from the expenditures incurred by the
qualifying taxpayer. The effect of this approach is therefore to link income and
activities.

Based on the above approach for the IP
regime, the Action Plan suggests applying this method to non-IP regimes as
well. Thus, a preferential regime should provide the substance requirement with
a clear link between income qualifying for benefits and core activities
necessary to earn the income.

What constitutes a Core Activity depends
upon the type of regime. However, the Action Plan has given certain indicative
Core Income Generating Activities (CIGA) for different types of preferential regimes,
such as Headquarters regimes, Distribution and service centre regimes,
Financing or leasing regimes, Fund management regimes, Banking and Insurance
regimes, Shipping regimes and Holding company regimes. (Paragraphs 74 to 87
of the BEPS Action Plan 5.)
 

Under each of these regimes the Plan
identifies how preferential regimes give benefits and related concerns arising
from these regimes. Two common concerns under each regime are: (i)
‘Ring-fencing’, whereby foreign income is ring-fenced from domestic income to
provide tax exemption to the foreign-sourced income, and (ii) ‘Artificial
definition of the tax base’, whereby a certain fixed percentage or amount of
income is taxed, irrespective of the actual income of the taxpayer.

In order to address the above concerns, the
Action Plan provides CIGA in respect of each of the regimes mentioned above. A
taxpayer is expected to undertake CIGA commensurate with the nature and level
of activities. The idea underlying this is to tax income where value is
created. And value creation is determined by looking at the CIGA and also the
expenditure incurred to earn relevant income.
 

Another major concern about preferential
regimes is lack of transparency. This concern is addressed through Automatic
Exchange of Information through Common Reporting Standard (CRS)2.
Besides this, when information is sought on request, the international standard
on information exchange covers the provision not only of exchange of
information, but also availability of information, including ownership,
banking, and account information. The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes monitors implementation of international
standards on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes and
reviews the effectiveness of their implementation in practice.

________________________________________________________________________________________________

2 The Common Reporting Standard (CRS), developed in response to the
G20 request and approved by the OECD Council on 15
th July, 2014 calls
on jurisdictions to obtain information from their financial institutions and
automatically exchange that information with other jurisdictions on an annual
basis. It sets out the financial account information to be exchanged, the financial
institutions required to report, the different types of accounts and taxpayers
covered, as well as common due diligence procedures to be followed by
financial institutions. [Source: OECD (2017), Standard for Automatic Exchange
of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters]

 

4.0  Economic Substance Requirements Regulations
(ESR Regulations)

ESR Regulations require economic substance
in a jurisdiction where an entity reports relevant income. The underlying
objective of ESR Regulations is to ensure that entities report profits in a
jurisdiction where economic activities that generate them are carried out and
where value is created.

In December, 2017, the European Union Code
of Conduct Group (EU COCG) assessed preferential tax regimes with nil or only
nominal tax to identify harmful practices and enforce substance requirements.
The EU COCG also published a list of ‘non-co-operative jurisdictions for tax
purposes’ which were engaged in harmful tax practices such as ring-fencing
(through offshore tax regimes), artificial definition of tax base and lacked
transparency. Many countries promised to revamp their tax systems to curb
harmful tax practices and introduce substance requirements to avoid being
blacklisted. The work of EU COCG has been strengthened by BEPS Action Plan 5,
with similar objectives and wider applicability.

BEPS Action Plan 5 is also a Minimum
Standard which requires all G20 Nations and countries in the inclusive group
(over 135 countries) who are signatories of the BEPS Project to mandatorily
implement the same.
 

To comply with the above, the following
countries enacted legislation to introduce the Economic Substance Regulations
for tax purposes with effect from 1st January, 2019 or an accounting
period commencing thereafter:

(i)    Bahamas

(ii)   Bermuda

(iii)  British Virgin Islands (BVI)

(iv)  Cayman Islands

(v)   Guernsey

(vi)  Jersey

(vii)  Isle of Man

(viii) Mauritius

(ix)  Seychelles

(x)   United Arab Emirates (UAE) (implemented with
amendments effective from 10th August, 2020).

In this Article we shall look closely at
the ESR Regulations as implemented in the UAE. However, it may be noted that
ESR Regulations as introduced by the above-mentioned countries are by and large
similar as they are based on the guidance and requirements issued by the EU as
well as by the OECD; the requirements of CIGA for different regimes are almost
identical.
 

Broadly, ESR Regulations in every
jurisdiction would require resident entities to prove economic substance with
respect to the following criteria:

 

4.1 
Management test

The entity should be directed and managed
from the jurisdiction concerned. This can be proved by having physical board
meetings at regular frequency, maintaining minutes and accounts in the tax
jurisdiction concerned, directors having domain expertise of the activities of
the company, handling day-to-day operations and banking transactions, etc.

4.2 
CIGA test

The entity will have to clearly demonstrate
that Core Income Generating Activities are undertaken in the relevant
jurisdiction and such activities are commensurate with the level of income
generated therefrom. What is CIGA will depend upon the nature of income or the
regime. CIGA can be outsourced to a corporate service provider in the
jurisdiction, subject to oversight by the entity (e.g., monitoring and
control). In such cases, the relevant resources of the service providers will
be taken into account when determining whether the CIGA test is satisfied.

 

4.3 
Adequacy test

The entity will have to prove that it has
adequate number of qualified employees and infrastructure to carry out CIGA. It
has to also demonstrate that adequate expenditure is incurred to generate the
relevant income in that jurisdiction. ‘Adequacy’ of expenditure, employees or
infrastructure would depend upon the nature of the CIGA.

 

4.4  Summary of tests for Economic Substance
Requirements

1. The management and direction of the entity
should be located in the offshore jurisdiction concerned;

2. Core Income Generating Activities with respect to
the relevant activity must be undertaken in the offshore jurisdiction
concerned;

3. The entity should have a physical presence in
the offshore jurisdiction;

4. The entity should have full-time employees with
suitable qualifications in the jurisdiction concerned; and

5. The entity should have incurred operating
expenditure in the offshore jurisdiction concerned in relation to the relevant
activity.

 

5.0 
ESR Regulations in UAE

On 30th April, 2019, the Cabinet
of Ministers of the UAE issued Cabinet Resolution No. 31 of 2019 concerning
Economic Substance Requirements Regulations (Resolution 31). On 10th
August, 2020 amendments were introduced to Resolution 31 by the Cabinet of
Ministers by way of Resolution No. 57 of 2020 (ESR Regulations), which repealed
and replaced Resolution 31.

The UAE ESR Regulations contain 22
articles, a list of which is given below.

 

Article
No.

Description

1.

Definitions

2.

Objective of the Resolution

3.

Relevant Activity and Core Income Generating Activity

4.

Regulatory Authorities

5.

National Assessing Authority

6.

Requirement to meet Economic Substance Test

7.

Assessment of whether Economic Substance Test is met

8.

Requirement to provide Information

9.

Provision of Information by the Regulatory Authority

10.

Provision of Information by the National Assessing Authority

11.

Exchange of Information by Competent Authority

12.

Co-operation by other Governmental Authorities

13.

Offences and Penalties for failure to provide a Notification

14.

Offences and Penalties for failure to submit an Economic
Substance Report and for failure to meet the Economic Substance Test

15.

Offences and Penalties for providing inaccurate information

16.

Period for imposition of Administrative Penalty

17.

Right of Appeal against Administrative penalty

18.

Date of Payment of Administrative Penalties

19.

Power to enter Business Premises and Examine Business
Documents

20.

Executive Regulations

21.

Revocation

22.

Entry into Force

 

Ministerial Decision No. 100 for the year
2020 dated 19th August, 2020 is intended to provide further guidance
and direction to entities carrying out one or more Relevant Activities. An
entity subject to ESR Regulations shall have regard to this Decision for the
purposes of ensuring compliance with ESR Regulations.

           

5.1 
Basis of ESR Regulations

The basis of ESR Regulations in UAE as
stated in its ‘Ministerial Decision No. 100 for the year 2020 on the Issuance
of Directives for the implementation of the provisions of the Cabinet Decision
No. 57 of 2020 concerning Economic Substance Requirements’ (hereafter referred
to as ‘Ministerial Directives’) is as follows:

‘The ESR Regulations are issued pursuant
to the global standard set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which requires entities
undertaking geographically mobile business activities to have substantial
activities in a jurisdiction. In addition to the work of the OECD, the European
Union Code of Conduct Group (“EU COCG”) also adopted a resolution on a code of
conduct for business taxation which aims to curb harmful tax practices. The
Cabinet of Ministers enacted the ESR Regulations taking into account the
relevant standards developed by the OECD and the EU COCG.’

 

5.2 
Applicability

Article 3 of the Ministerial Directives
deals with the Licensees required to meet the Economic Substance test and
provides that ESR Regulations are applicable to Licensees. The term ‘Licensee’
is defined in Article 1 of the ESR Regulations to mean any of the following two
entities:

 

‘i. a juridical person (incorporated inside
or outside the State, i.e., UAE); or

ii. an Unincorporated Partnership;

registered in the State, including a Free
Zone and a Financial Free Zone and carries on a Relevant Activity.’

A juridical person is defined to mean a
corporate legal entity with a separate legal personality from its owners.

An Unincorporated Partnership is defined
under ESR Regulations to include those forms of partnerships that may operate
in the UAE without having a separate legal personality and are thereby
identified separately under the ESR Regulations.
 

In other words, the regulations cover all
Licensees (natural and juridical person) having the commercial license,
certificate of incorporation, or any other form of permit necessarily taken
from the licensing authority to do business. Going by the spirit of the ESR
Regulations, it is interpreted that entities in Free Zone (including offshore
companies) would also be covered.

 

Branches

Branch of a foreign entity in the UAE

Since a licensee could be in the form of a
UAE branch of a foreign entity (juridical person incorporated outside UAE is
covered in the definition), Article 3 of the Ministerial Directives
specifically covers them for compliance of ESR Regulations.
 

Similarly, a branch of a foreign entity
registered in the UAE that carries out a Relevant Activity is required to
comply with the ESR Regulations, unless the Relevant Income of such branch is
subject to tax in a jurisdiction outside the UAE.

Branch of a UAE entity outside UAE

Where a UAE entity carries on a Relevant
Activity through a branch registered outside the UAE, the UAE entity is not
required to consolidate the activities and income of the branch for purposes of
ESR Regulations, provided that the Relevant Income of the branch is subject to
tax in the foreign jurisdiction where the branch is located. In this context, a
branch can include a permanent establishment, or any other form of taxable
presence for corporate income tax purposes which is not a separate legal
entity.

 

5.3 Licensees exempted from ESR Regulations

The following entities which are registered
in the UAE and carry out a Relevant Activity are exempt from ESR Regulations:

(a)  an Investment Fund,

(b)  an entity that is tax resident in a
jurisdiction other than the UAE,

(c)  an entity wholly owned by UAE residents and
which meets the following conditions:

      (i)    the
entity is not part of an MNE Group;

      (ii)   all
of the entity’s activities are only carried out in the UAE;

(d)  a Licensee that is a branch of a foreign
entity, the Relevant Income of which is subject to tax in a jurisdiction other
than the UAE.
 

 

(a) Investment Funds

The ESR Regulations define an Investment
Fund as ‘an entity whose principal business is the issuing of investment
interests to raise funds or pool investor funds with the aim of enabling a
holder of such an investment interest to benefit from the profits or gains from
the entity’s acquisition, holding, management or disposal of investments and
includes any entity through which an investment fund directly or indirectly
invests (but does not include an entity or entities in which the fund
invests).’

The above definition would include the
Investment Fund itself and any entity through which the Fund directly and indirectly
invests, but not the entity or entities in which the Fund ultimately invests.
It is clarified that the words ‘through which an investment fund directly or
indirectly invests’ refers to any UAE entity whose sole function is to
facilitate the investment made by the Investment Fund. The exemption for
Investment Funds is distinct from the Investment Fund Management Business as
regulated under ESR Regulations. The Investment Fund itself is not considered
an Investment Fund Management Business unless it is a self-managed fund (the
Investment Manager and the Investment Fund are part of the same entity).

 

(b) Tax resident in a jurisdiction other
than the State

An entity which is tax resident in a
jurisdiction outside the UAE need not comply with the ESR Regulations. However,
in order for such an entity to avail this exemption, the entity must be
subjected to corporate tax on all of its income from a Relevant Activity by
virtue of being a tax resident in a jurisdiction other than the UAE. It should
be noted that an entity that pays withholding tax in a foreign jurisdiction
will not be considered as tax resident in a foreign jurisdiction other than the
UAE solely on that basis.

 

(c) An entity wholly owned by UAE
residents

An entity that is ultimately wholly and
beneficially owned (directly or indirectly) by UAE residents is exempt from the
Economic Substance Test only where such entity is: (i) not part of an MNE
Group; (ii) all of its activities are exclusively carried out in the UAE; and
(iii) UAE resident owners of the entity reside in the UAE. The entity must
therefore not be engaged in any form of business outside the UAE. In this
context, ‘UAE residents’ means UAE citizens and individuals holding a valid UAE
residency permit, who reside in the UAE.
 

(d) A
UAE branch of a foreign entity the Relevant Income of which is subject to tax
in a jurisdiction other than the State

An entity is not required to meet the
Economic Substance Test if such entity is a branch of a foreign entity and its
Relevant Income is subject to corporate tax in the jurisdiction where such
foreign entity is a tax resident.
 

Evidence
to be submitted to claim exemption from ESR Regulations

A Licensee that claims to be exempt on the
basis of being a tax resident in a foreign jurisdiction is required to submit
one of the following documents along with its Notification in respect of each
relevant Financial Year:

(a)  Letter or certificate issued by the competent
authority of the foreign jurisdiction in which the entity claims to be a tax
resident stating that the entity is considered to be resident for corporate
income tax purposes in that jurisdiction; or

(b)  An assessment to corporate income tax on the
entity, a corporate income tax demand, evidence of payment of corporate income
tax, or any other document, issued by the competent authority of the foreign
jurisdiction in which the entity claims to be a tax resident.

It is further provided that where an entity
fails to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its status as an Exempted
Licensee, the entity will be regarded as a Licensee for the purposes of ESR
Regulations and shall be subject to the requirements of ESR Regulations as
applicable to a Licensee, including the requirement to meet the Economic
Substance Test.

5.4 First reportable Financial Year

It is provided that all Licensees and
Exempted Licensees are subject to ESR Regulations from the earlier of (i) their
financial year commencing on 1st January, 2019, or (ii) the date on
which they commence carrying out a Relevant Activity (for a Financial Year
commencing after 1st January, 2019).

5.5 What are the Relevant Activities?

Article 3(1) of ESR Regulations identifies
any of the following activities to be a Relevant Activity: (i) Banking
Business, (ii) Insurance Business, (iii) Investment Fund Management Business,
(iv) Shipping Business, (v) Lease-Finance Business, (vi) Distribution and
Service Centre Business, (vii) Headquarters Business, (viii) Intellectual
Property Business, and (ix) Holding Company Business.

Entities are expected to use a ‘substance
over form’ approach to determine whether or not they undertake a Relevant
Activity and as a result will be considered Licensees for the purposes of ESR
Regulations, irrespective of whether such Relevant Activity is included in the
trade licence or permit of the entity. A Licensee may have undertaken more than
one Relevant Activity during the same financial period. In such a case, the
Licensee would be required to demonstrate economic substance in respect of each
Relevant Activity.
 

Any form of passive income from a Relevant
Activity can also bring the entity within the scope of the ESR Regulations.

 

5.6 Relevant Income

The Economic Substance Test has to be
satisfied by a Licensee having regard to the level of Relevant Income derived
from any Relevant Activity. For the purposes of the ESR Regulations, ‘Relevant
Income’ means entity’s gross income from a Relevant Activity as recorded in its
books and records under applicable accounting standards, whether earned in the
UAE or outside, and irrespective of whether the entity has derived a profit or
loss from its activities.
 

For the purposes of ‘Relevant Income’,
gross income means total income from all sources, including revenue from sales
of inventory and properties, services, royalties, interest, premiums, dividends
and any other amounts, and without deducting any type of costs or expenditure.
It appears that even capital gains are to be included while computing gross
income.
 

In the context of income from sales or
services, gross income means gross revenues from sales or services without
deducting the cost of goods sold or the cost of services. It is further
clarified that gross income does not mean taxable or accounting income or
profit.

 

5.7
Liquidation or otherwise ceasing to carry on Relevant Activities

A Licensee and an Exempted Licensee shall
be subject to ESR Regulations as long as such an entity continues to exist.

 

5.8
The Economic Substance Test – How to substantiate economic substance in the
UAE?

In order for a Licensee to demonstrate that
it has adequate substance in the UAE in a given financial year, an entity must
meet the following tests:


(a) Core Income Generating Activities
(CIGA) Test

The Licensee
should conduct Core Income Generating Activities in the UAE. The CIGAs are
those activities that are of central importance to the Licensee for the
generation of the gross income earned from its Relevant Activity.

 

The CIGAs
depend upon the nature of the Relevant Activity. The list given in Article 3(2)
of the ESR Regulations is an indicative list and not exhaustive3. A
Licensee is not required to perform all of the CIGAs listed in the ESR
Regulations for a particular Relevant Activity. However, it must perform any of
the CIGAs that generate Relevant Income in the UAE. It is clarified that
activities that are not CIGAs can be undertaken outside the UAE.

 

(b) Directed and Managed Test

The ‘directed and managed’ test aims to
ensure that a Relevant Activity is directed and managed in the UAE and requires
that, inter alia, there are an adequate number of board meetings held
and attended in the UAE. A determination as to whether an adequate number of
board meetings are held and attended in the UAE will depend on the level of
Relevant Activity being carried out by a Licensee.

 

Consideration must also be given to more
onerous requirements in respect of board meetings prescribed under the applicable
law regulating the Licensee or as may be stipulated in the constitutional
documents of the Licensee.

 

The ‘directed and managed’ test further
requires that:

(i)   meetings are recorded in written minutes and
that such minutes are kept in the UAE;

(ii)  quorum for such meetings is met and those
attendees are physically present in the UAE; and

(iii) directors have the necessary knowledge and
expertise to discharge their duties and are not merely giving effect to
decisions being taken outside the UAE.

 

The minutes of the board meetings must
record all the strategic decisions taken in relation to Relevant Activities and
must be signed by the directors physically present. The quorum shall be
determined in accordance with the law applicable to the Licensee setting out
quorum requirements, or as may be set out in the constitutional documents of
the Licensee (or both).

 

It is clarified that for the purposes of
ESR Regulations the ‘directed and managed’ requirement does not prescribe that
board members (or equivalent) be resident in the UAE. Rather, the board members
(or equivalent) are required to be physically present in the UAE when taking
strategic decisions. In the event that the Licensee is managed by its
shareholders / owners / partners, an individual manager (e.g., general manager
or CEO), or more than one manager, the above requirements will apply to such
persons to the fullest extent possible.

 

(c) Expenditure Test


Having regard to the level of Relevant
Income earned from a Relevant Activity, the Licensee should ensure that it (i)
has an adequate number of qualified full-time (or equivalent) employees in
relation to the activity who are physically present in the UAE (whether or not
employed by the Licensee or by another entity and whether on temporary or long-term
contracts), (ii) incurs adequate operating expenditure by it in the UAE, and
(iii) has adequate physical assets (e.g. premises) in the UAE.

 

What is adequate or appropriate for each
Licensee will depend on the nature and level of Relevant Activity being carried
out by such Licensee. A Licensee will have to ensure that it maintains
sufficient records to demonstrate the adequacy and appropriateness of the
resources and assets utilised and expenditure incurred.

 

It is provided that the National Assessing
Authority shall review such records and other supporting documentation
submitted in assessing whether a Licensee has demonstrated the adequacy and
appropriateness of resources and assets utilised and expenditures incurred.

 

The requirement for adequate employees is
aimed at ensuring that there are a sufficient number of suitably qualified
employees carrying out the Relevant Activity. The requirement for adequate
physical assets is intended to ensure that a Licensee has procured appropriate
physical assets to carry out a Relevant Activity in the UAE. Physical assets
can include offices or other forms of business premises (such as warehouses or
facilities from which the Relevant Activity is being conducted) depending on
the nature of the Relevant Activity. Such premises may be owned or leased by
the Licensee, provided that the Licensee is able to produce the lease
agreement, etc., to prove the right to use the premises for the purposes of
carrying out the Relevant Activity.

 


__________________________________________________________________________________

3 The indicative list of CIGAs is based on the recommendations of the BEPS
Action Plan 5 (paragraphs 74 to 87).


5.9 Outsourcing

Article 6(2)
of the ESR Regulations provides that a Licensee may conduct all or part of its
CIGAs for a Relevant Activity through an Outsourcing Provider. For the purposes
of ESR Regulations, an Outsourcing Provider may include third parties or
related parties. The substance (e.g., employees and physical assets) of the
Outsourcing Provider in the UAE will be taken into account when determining the
substance of the Licensee for the purpose of the Economic Substance Test,
subject to certain conditions.

 

5.10 Notification Filings


Every Licensee and Exempted Licensee is
required to submit a Notification to their respective Regulatory Authorities
setting out the following for each relevant financial year:

i.   the nature of the Relevant Activity being
carried out;

ii.  whether it generates Relevant Income;

iii.  the date of the end of its financial year;

iv. any other information as may be requested by
the Regulatory Authority.

 

A Notification submitted by an Exempted
Licensee must be accompanied by sufficient evidence to substantiate the
Exempted Licensee’s status for each category in which it claims to be exempt.
Failure to provide sufficient evidence to this effect will result in the
Exempted Licensee not being able to avail itself of the exemption and having to
comply with the full requirements of the ESR Regulations, including meeting the
Economic Substance Test.

 

The time frames for compliance with the
requirement to submit a Notification are different from the time frames to
submit an Economic Substance Report as discussed in paragraph 5.11 below.

 

The Notification must be submitted within
six months from the end of the financial year of the Licensee or Exempted
Licensee. The Notification must be submitted electronically on the Ministry of
Finance Portal.

 

 

5.11 Submission of Economic
Substance Report

Every Licensee shall be required to meet
the applicable Economic Substance Test requirements and submit an Economic
Substance Report containing the requisite information and documentation
prescribed under the ESR Regulations within 12 months from the end of the
relevant financial year.

 

The Economic
Substance Report of the
Licensee will be assessed by the National Assessing Authority within a
period of six years from the end of the relevant financial year. The
National
Assessing Authority will issue its decision as to whether a Licensee has
met
the Economic Substance Test. This six-year limitation period shall not
apply if
the National Assessing Authority is not able to make a determination
during
this period due to gross negligence, fraud, or deliberate
misrepresentation by
the Licensee or any other person representing the Licensee.

 

5.12
Exchange of information with foreign authorities


The Competent Authority will spontaneously
exchange information with relevant Foreign Competent Authorities under the ESR
Regulations pursuant to an international agreement, treaty or similar
arrangement to which the UAE is a party in the following circumstances:

i)   where a Licensee fails to satisfy the
Economic Substance Test;

ii)  where a Licensee is a high-risk IP Licensee;

iii)  where an entity claims to be tax resident in a
jurisdiction outside the UAE; and

iv) where a branch of a foreign entity claims to be
subject to tax in a jurisdiction outside the UAE.

 

Every Licensee that is carrying out a
Relevant Activity must identify the jurisdiction in which the Parent Company,
Ultimate Parent Company and Ultimate Beneficial Owner claim to be tax resident.
An Exempted Licensee that is either (i) tax resident in a jurisdiction other
than the UAE; or (ii) a UAE branch of a foreign company of which all the income
of the UAE branch is subject to tax in a jurisdiction other than the UAE must,
in addition to identifying the foregoing, also identify the jurisdiction in
which such Exempted Licensee claims to be (a) a tax resident or (b) the
jurisdiction of the foreign company of the UAE branch (as may be relevant).

 

5.13 Penalties


Stringent penalties are prescribed for
non-compliance with ESR Regulations, which are as follows:

 

Article No.

Nature of offence

Penalty

Remarks

13

Failure to provide Notification

AED 20,000

 

14

Failure to submit Economic Substance Report and any other
information or documents in accordance with ESR Regulations or Failure to
meet the Economic Substance Test

AED 50,000

AED 4,00,000 for a repeat offence in the subsequent year

15

Providing inaccurate information

AED 50,000

 

 

5.14
Summary of the Relevant Activities, related CIGAs and the Regulatory Authority4


One may refer to the Text of ‘Schedule 1 –
Relevant Activities Guide’, of the Ministerial Directives referred to in
Paragraph 5.1 infra, for detailed explanations and examples.


Relevant Activity
pursuant to Article 3.1 of Cabinet Resolution No. (57) of 2020

Core Income
Generating Activities (non-exhaustive) Article 3.2 of Cabinet Resolution No.
(57) of 2020

Regulatory Authority
pursuant to Article 4 of Cabinet Resolution No. (57) of 2020

Banking Business

(a) Raising funds, managing risk
including credit, currency and interest risk.

(b) Taking hedging positions.

(c) Providing loans, credit or other
financial services to customers.

1. UAE Central Bank

2. The competent authority in the
Financial Free Zone for the Banking Businesses

Insurance Business

(a) Predicting and calculating risk.

(b) Insuring or re-insuring against risk
and providing Insurance Business services to clients.

(c) Underwriting insurance and
reinsurance.

1. Securities and Commodities Authority

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Insurance Business

Investment Fund Management Business

(a) 
Taking decisions on the holding and selling of investments.

(b) Calculating risk and reserves.

(c) Taking decisions on currency or
interest fluctuations and hedging positions.

(d) Preparing reports to investors or
any government authority with functions relating to the supervision or
regulation of such business.

1. Securities and Commodities Authority

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Investment Fund Management Business

Lease-Finance Business

(a) Agreeing funding terms.

(b) Identifying and acquiring assets to
be leased (in the case of leasing).

(c) Setting the terms and duration of
any financing or leasing.

(d) Monitoring and revising any
agreements.

(e) Managing any risks.

1. UAE Central Bank

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Lease-Finance Business

 

Headquarter Business

(a) Taking relevant management
decisions.

(b) Incurring operating expenditures on
behalf of group entities.

(c) Coordinating group activities.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Headquarter Business

Shipping Business

(a) Managing crew (including hiring,
paying and overseeing crew members).

(b) Overhauling and maintaining ships.

(c) 
Overseeing and tracking shipping.

(d) Determining what goods to order and
when to deliver them,

(e) Organising and overseeing voyages.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Shipping Business

Holding Company Business

Activities related to a Holding Company Business.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial
Free Zone for the Holding Company Business

Intellectual Property Business

Where the Intellectual Property Asset is
a

(a) Patent or similar Intellectual
Property Asset: Research and development.

(b) Marketing intangible or a similar
Intellectual Property Asset: Branding, marketing and distribution.

In exceptional cases, except where the
Licensee is a High-Risk IP Licensee, the Core Income Generating Activities
may include:

(i) taking strategic decisions and
managing (as well as bearing) the principal risks related to development and
subsequent exploitation of the intangible asset generating income.

(ii) taking the strategic decisions and
managing
(as well as bearing) the principal risks relating to acquisition by third
parties and subsequent exploitation and protection of the intangible asset.

(iii) carrying on the ancillary trading
activities through which the intangible assets are exploited leading to the
generation of income from third parties.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Intellectual Property Business

Distribution and Service Centre Business

(a) Transporting and
storing component parts, materials or goods ready for sale.

(b) Managing inventories.

(c) Taking orders.

(d) Providing consulting or other
administrative services.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Distribution and Service Centre Business

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

4 Source:https://www.mof.gov.ae/en/StrategicPartnerships/Document/Economic%20Substance%20Relevant%20Activities%20Summary.pdf

                      5.15  Flow-chart of the Applicability of ESR
Regulations5

 

 

 ________________________________________________________________________

5.Source: https://www.mof.gov.ae/en/StrategicPartnerships/Pages/ESR.aspx



6.0.
Relevance of ESR Regulations for Indian Entities


Many Indian companies have their
subsidiaries, branches, project offices or other forms of entities operating in
the UAE. Every such entity needs to strictly follow the ESR Regulations as
stringent penalties are prescribed. The provisions of the ESR Regulations are
stricter than Limitation of Benefits under a Tax Treaty. Therefore, each structure
would need a reassessment, review and restructuring if need be. As the
Regulations are applicable to each type of Licensee, including Free Trade
Zones, Proprietorships, etc., even individual investments need to be examined
and should comply with ESR Regulations.


7.0 Epilogue


There is a well-known saying, ‘Don’t judge
a book by its cover’. It means, a beautiful cover cannot determine the worth of
a book. It can enhance its visual appeal but not the underlying (inherent)
value. In a lighter vein, an old Bollywood song also gives us some guidance… Dil
ko dekho, chehera na dekho, chehere ne lakhon ko loota… Dil sachcha aur chehera
jhutha.

 

So, there is no doubt that one needs to
have a substance and purpose in whatever structure one enacts, whichever
jurisdiction one chooses or whatever business activities / transactions one
undertakes. One has to justify every action from the perspective of non-tax
evasion, while one can always take benefits and advantages of favourable tax
treaties / regimes with good business substance.

 

It is equally important for Indian
entrepreneurs to bear in mind the ESR Regulations in different jurisdictions,
their reporting requirements while structuring or undertaking any outbound
investments / activities. They may also need to revisit their existing
structures to fall in line with the stringent substance requirements of various
jurisdictions. It may be noted that genuine businesses need not worry, but they
will have to prove their bona fides.

 

Special deduction u/s 80-IA of ITA, 1961 – Telecommunications services – Computation of profits u/s 80-IA(1) – Change in shareholding of company – Effect of section 79 – Losses which have lapsed cannot be taken into account for purposes of section 80-IA

8. Vodafone Essar
Gujarat Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2020] 424 ITR 498
(Guj.) Date of order: 3rd
March, 2020
A.Ys.: 2005-06 and
2006-07

 

Special deduction u/s 80-IA of ITA, 1961 –
Telecommunications services – Computation of profits u/s 80-IA(1) – Change in
shareholding of company – Effect of section 79 – Losses which have lapsed
cannot be taken into account for purposes of section 80-IA

 

The assessee company, established in
1997-98, was in the business of providing cellular telecommunications services
in the State of Gujarat. During the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2001-02,
there was a change in the shareholding of the assessee, as a result of which the provisions of section 79 of the IT Act, 1961 were made applicable and the accumulated losses from the A.Ys. 1997-98 to 2001-02 lapsed. The assessee made a claim for
deduction u/s 80IA for the first time for the A.Y. 2005-06. In the return of income, the assessee had shown total income of Rs. 191,59,84,008 and claimed the entire
amount as deduction u/s 80IA(4)(ii) of the Act. According to the A.O., the
quantum of deduction available to the assessee u/s 80IA(4)(ii) was to be
computed in accordance with the provisions of section 80IA(5), without the
application of the provisions of section 79.

 

This was upheld by the Commissioner
(Appeals) and the Tribunal.

 

On an appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat
High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)  The application of section 80IA(5) to deny the
effect of provisions of section 79 cannot be sustained. When the loss of
earlier years has already lapsed, it cannot be notionally carried forward and
set off against the profits and gains of the assessee’s business for the year
under consideration in computing the quantum of deduction u/s 80IA(1). The
provisions of section 80IA(5) cannot be invoked to ignore the provisions of
section 79.

 

ii)
The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Tribunal in the
respective tax appeals are quashed and set aside. The substantial question is
answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.’

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961 – Validity – Officer recording reasons and issuing notice must be the jurisdictional A.O. – Reasons recorded by jurisdictional A.O. but notice issued by officer who did not have jurisdiction over assessee – Defect not curable u/s 292B – Notice and consequential proceedings and order invalid

7. Pankajbhai
Jaysukhlal Shah vs. ACIT
[2020] 425 ITR 70
(Guj.) Date of order: 9th
April, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961
– Validity – Officer recording reasons and issuing notice must be the
jurisdictional A.O. – Reasons recorded by jurisdictional A.O. but notice issued
by officer who did not have jurisdiction over assessee – Defect not curable u/s
292B – Notice and consequential proceedings and order invalid

 

For the A.Y.
2011-12 an order u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed against the
assessee. Thereafter, a notice dated 29th March, 2018 u/s 148 was issued
to reopen the assessment u/s 147 of the Act. In response to the notice, the assessee submitted that the original return filed by him be
treated as the return filed in response to the notice u/s 148 and requested the
A.O. to supply a copy of the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. The
assessee participated in the assessment proceedings and raised objections
against the initiation of proceedings u/s 147 on the ground that the assumption
of jurisdiction on the part of the A.O. by issuance of notice u/s 148 was
invalid, contending that the notice was issued by the Income-tax Officer, Ward
No. 2(2), whereas the reasons were recorded by the Deputy Commissioner of
Income-tax, Circle 2. The Department contended that issuance of the notice by
the Income-tax Officer was a procedural lapse which had happened on account of
the mandate of the E-assessment scheme and non-migration of the permanent
account number of the assessee in time and that such defect was covered under
the provisions of section 292B and therefore, the notice issued could not be
said to be invalid.

 

The assessee filed
a writ petition and challenged the validity of the notice. The Gujarat High
Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  While the reasons for reopening the assessment
had been recorded by the jurisdictional A.O., viz., the Deputy Commissioner,
Circle 2, the notice u/s 148(1) had been issued by the Income-tax Officer, Ward
2(2), who had no jurisdiction over the assessee and, hence, such a notice was
bad on the count of having been issued by an Officer who had no authority to
issue such notice.

 

ii)   It was the Officer recording the reasons who
had to issue the notice u/s 148(1), whereas the reasons had been recorded by
the jurisdictional A.O. and the notice had been issued by an Officer who did
not have jurisdiction over the assessee. The notice u/s 148 being a
jurisdictional notice, any inherent defect therein could not be cured u/s 292B.

iii)  It was not possible for the jurisdictional
A.O., viz., the Deputy Commissioner, to issue the notice u/s 148 on or before
31st March, 2018 as migration of the permanent account number was
not possible within that short period and therefore, the Income-tax Officer had
issued the notice instead of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. Thus there
was an admission on the part of the Department that the Deputy Commissioner,
Circle 2, who had jurisdiction over the assessee had not issued the notice u/s
148 but it was the Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2) who did not have any
jurisdiction over the assessee who had issued such notice.

 

iv)  No proceedings could have
been taken u/s 147 in pursuance of such invalid notice. The notice u/s 148(1)
and all the proceedings taken pursuant thereto could not be sustained.’

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961 – Validity – Notice issued in name of dead person – Objection to notice by legal heir and representative – Department intimated about death of assessee in reply to summons issued u/s 131(1A) – Legal heir not submitting to jurisdiction of A.O. in response to notice of reassessment u/s 148 – Provisions of section 292A not attracted – Notice and proceedings invalid

6. Durlabhai
Kanubhai Rajpara vs. ITO
[2020] 424 ITR 428
(Guj.) Date of order: 26th
March, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961
– Validity – Notice issued in name of dead person – Objection to notice by
legal heir and representative – Department intimated about death of assessee in
reply to summons issued u/s 131(1A) – Legal heir not submitting to jurisdiction
of A.O. in response to notice of reassessment u/s 148 – Provisions of section
292A not attracted – Notice and proceedings invalid

 

For the A.Y.
2011-12, the A.O. issued a notice in the name of the assessee who was the
father of the petitioner u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 28th
March, 2018 to reopen the assessment u/s 147. Even prior to that, the Deputy
Director (Investigation) had issued a witness summons u/s 131(1A) in the name
of the assessee, the father of the petitioner, to personally attend the office
and the notice was served upon the petitioner. The petitioner furnished the
death certificate of his late father before the authority and submitted that he
had expired on 12th June, 2015, therefore, the notice was required
to be withdrawn. Thereafter, the notice in question dated 28th
March, 2018 was issued in the name of the late assessee. The petitioner also
received a notice dated 16th July, 2018 issued u/s 142(1) on 17th
July, 2018. The petitioner filed a reply and submitted that his father had
expired on 12th June, 2015 and a copy of the death certificate was
also annexed. The petitioner also contended in his reply that the fact of the
death of his father was disclosed pursuant to the summons issued by the Deputy
Director (Investigation) u/s 131(1A), that the notice issued u/s 148 was
without any jurisdiction as it was issued against a dead person and prayed that
the proceedings be dropped. The Department rejected the objections.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

 

‘i)  The petitioner at the first point of time had
objected to the issuance of notice u/s 148 in the name of his deceased father
(assessee) and had not participated or filed any return pursuant to the notice.
Therefore, the legal representatives not having waived the requirement of
notice and not having submitted to the jurisdiction of the A.O. pursuant
thereto, the provisions of section 292A would not be attracted and hence the
notice had to be treated as invalid.

 

ii)  Even prior to the issuance of such notice, the
Department was aware about the death of the petitioner’s father (the assessee)
since in response to the summons issued u/s 131(1A) the petitioner had
intimated the Department about the death of the assessee. Therefore, the
Department could not say that it was not aware of the death of the petitioner’s
father (the assessee) and could have belatedly served the notice u/s 159 upon
the legal representatives of the deceased assessee.

 

iii)
The notice dated 28th March, 2018 issued in the name of the deceased
assessee by the A.O. u/s 148 as well as further proceedings thereto were to be
quashed and set aside.’

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961 – Validity – Amalgamation of companies – Notice issued against transferor-company – Amalgamating entity ceases to have its own existence and not amenable to reassessment proceedings – Notice and subsequent proceedings unsustainable

5. Gayatri Microns
Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2020] 424 ITR 288
(Guj.) Date of order: 24th
December, 2019
A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961
– Validity – Amalgamation of companies – Notice issued against
transferor-company – Amalgamating entity ceases to have its own existence and
not amenable to reassessment proceedings – Notice and subsequent proceedings
unsustainable

 

In the return for the A.Y. 2015-16, the
assessee company furnished information regarding amalgamation of three
companies GMCL, GISL and GFL with it. In the return, under the heading ‘holding
status’, further details were provided below the column ‘business
organisation’, that is, the status of those three companies which were
amalgamated with it.

 

For the A.Y. 2015-16, the A.O. called for
certain information, and the assessee submitted the details categorically
stating that by virtue of the order passed by the High Court dated 18th
June, 2015, the amalgamation had taken place amongst the three companies. The
Assistant Commissioner issued a notice dated 25th March, 2019 u/s
148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A.Y. 2012-13 to GISL.

 

The assessee filed a writ petition and
challenged the notice. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and
held as under:

 

‘i)  The notice issued u/s 148 had been issued to
GISL which had been amalgamated with the assessee by order dated 18th
June, 2015 passed by the court and thus, it had ceased to have its own
existence so as to render it amenable to reassessment proceedings under the
provisions of section 147.

 

ii)  The amalgamation had taken place much prior to
the issuance of the notice dated 25th March, 2019 for reopening the
assessment. Thereafter, the assessee had informed the Assistant Commissioner
about the amalgamation of all the three companies with it with sufficient
details, viz., (i) the passing of the order dated 18th June, 2015 by
the court ; (ii) the communication dated 9th September, 2017
addressed by the assessee to the Income-tax Officer, during the assessment proceedings
for the A.Y. 2015-16 containing the information of amalgamation; and (iii) the
details of amalgamation in the return for the A.Y. 2015-16. Moreover, the
Assistant Commissioner and the Department were duly informed by the assessee
about the amalgamation and despite this a statutory notice u/s 148 (was sent).

 

iii)
The notice for reopening of the assessment being without jurisdiction, was not
sustainable. The notice and all the proceedings taken pursuant thereto were to
be quashed and set aside.’”

Income – Unexplained money – Section 69A of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for application of section 69A – There should be evidence that assessee was the owner of the money – Assessee acting as financial broker – Material on record showing amounts passing through his hands – No evidence that amounts belonged to him – Amounts not assessable in his hands u/s 69A

4. CIT vs.
Anoop Jain
[2020] 424 ITR 115
(Del.) Date of order: 22nd
August, 2019
A.Y.: 1992-93

 

Income – Unexplained money – Section 69A of
ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for application of section 69A – There should
be evidence that assessee was the owner of the money – Assessee acting as
financial broker – Material on record showing amounts passing through his hands
– No evidence that amounts belonged to him – Amounts not assessable in his
hands u/s 69A

 

The assessee
was a financial broker. During the course of assessment for the A.Y. 1992-93,
the A.O. found that the assessee had received 13 pay orders aggregating to Rs.
5,17,45,958 from Standard Chartered Bank, Bombay during the financial years in
question, and mostly between December, 1991 and February, 1992. All these pay
orders were utilised by him for purchasing units and shares from different banks
and mutual funds. The explanation offered by the assessee was that all the pay
orders were received from C, a Bombay broker, and the purchase of units and
shares was done by him on behalf of C and these were then sold back to C after
earning normal brokerage. The A.O. found that all 13 pay orders were actually
tainted pay orders relating to the securities scam of 1992 and that they had
been issued by the Standard Chartered Bank under extraordinary circumstances.
The Standard Chartered Bank had informed the Assistant Commissioner, Circle
7(3) that it had been a victim of a massive fraud perpetrated in 1992 by
certain brokers in collusion with some ex-employees of the Bank to siphon out
funds. It was also conveyed that the Standard Chartered Bank had filed a first
information report with the C.B.I. in which ‘JP’, an ex-employee, was named as
one of the accused and the 13 pay orders were part of a total of 15 pay orders
fraudulently issued by ‘JP’. The A.O. did not accept the explanation and added
an amount of Rs. 5,17,45,958 to the income of the assessee u/s 69A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) noted that
certain assets were found by the C.B.I. in the possession of C, who then
surrendered them to the Bureau. The Commissioner (Appeals) also held that there
was no evidence to show that the money in question was utilised by the
assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) accordingly deleted the addition. This was
upheld by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)  The very basis for making the additions was
the inference drawn by the A.O. that the assessee had received pay orders and
spent the monies for purchase of shares and units as a result of some “financial
quid pro quo”. There were certain facts that stood out which showed that
these amounts received by the assessee as pay orders did not belong to him. The
assessee was only a conduit through whom the amounts were floated.

 

ii)  One of the essential conditions in section 69A
of the Act is that the assessee should be the “owner of the money” and it
should not be recorded in his books of account. There was overwhelming evidence
to show the involvement of C acting on behalf of SP for SMI. The C.B.I. also did
not proceed against the assessee and that discounted the case of any collusion
between the assessee and C along with P.

 

iii)
The assessee was at the highest used as a conduit by the other parties and did
not himself substantially gain from these transactions. In that view of the
matter, the concurrent view of both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
that the addition of the sum to the income of the assessee was not warranted
was justified.’

 


Income – Business income or income from house property – Sections 22 and 28 of ITA, 1961 – Company formed with object of developing commercial complexes – Setting up of commercial complex and rendering of services to occupants – Income earned assessable as business income

3. Principal CIT vs. City Centre Mall Nashik Pvt. Ltd. [2020] 424 ITR 85
(Bom.) Date of order: 13th
January, 2020
A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Income – Business income or income from
house property – Sections 22 and 28 of ITA, 1961 – Company formed with object
of developing commercial complexes – Setting up of commercial complex and
rendering of services to occupants – Income earned assessable as business
income

 

The assessee was a private limited company
incorporated with the object of construction and running of commercial and
shopping malls. The assessee set up a commercial complex-cum-shopping mall and
the operations commenced during F.Y. 2009-10. The assessee let out various
shops in this commercial complex dealing with various products.

 

Apart from letting out the premises, the
assessee also provided various services to the occupants such as security
services, housekeeping, maintenance, lighting, repairs to air conditioners,
marketing and promotional activities, advertisement and such other activities.
The premises were let out on leave and licence basis, and the compensation was
based on revenue-sharing basis. For the A.Y. 2010-11, the assessee declared its
income under the head ‘Income from business’. The A.O., however, treated it as
income from house property.

 

The Tribunal held that the income was
assessable as business income.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) The object of
the assessee was clearly to acquire, develop, and let out the commercial
complex. The assessee provided even marketing and promotional activities. The
intention of the assessee was a material circumstance and the objects of
association, and the kind of services rendered, clearly pointed out that the
income was from business.

 

ii)
All the factors cumulatively taken demonstrated that the assessee had intended
to enter into a business of renting out commercial space to interested parties.
The findings rendered by the Tribunal on assessment of the factual position
before it that the income in question had to be treated as business income was
justified.’

Section 28(iv) – Waiver of loan

1. M/s Essar Shipping Limited vs. Commissioner of
Income-tax, City-III, Mumbai
[Income-tax Appeal (IT) No. 201 of 2002 Date of order: 5th March, 2020 [Order dated 16th August, 2001
passed by the ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai in Income-tax Appeal No. 144/Ban/91 for
the A.Y. 1984-85] (Bombay High Court)

 

Section 28(iv) – Waiver of loan

 

The appellant company earlier was known as
M/s Karnataka Shipping Corporation Limited and carrying on the business of
shipping. During the relevant previous year, because of certain developments it
was amalgamated with M/s Essar Bulk Carriers Limited, Madras, whereafter it
came to be known as M/s Essar Shipping Limited.

 

In the assessment proceedings for the A.Y.
1984-85 following amalgamation, it filed a revised return of income wherein an
amount of Rs. 2,52,00,000 was claimed as a deduction being the amount of loan
given by the Government of Karnataka which was subsequently waived. It was
claimed on behalf of the appellant that the Government of Karnataka had written
off the said loan advanced to the appellant as the said amount had become
irrecoverable. The A.O. did not accept the claim of the appellant and observed
that waiver of loan benefited the appellant in carrying on its business and in
terms of the provisions contained in section 28, the said benefit enjoyed by
the appellant should constitute income in its hand. Accordingly, the aforesaid
amount was added to the total income of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved
by this, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(Appeals)-III,
Bangalore. The first appellate authority considered the requirement of section
28(iv) of the Act and held that waiver of loan could not be treated as a
benefit or perquisite because it was clearly a cash item. The amount would be
includible u/s 28(iv) only if it was a non-cash item and that cash item cannot
be treated as a perquisite. It was further held that what can be assessed u/s
28 are only items of revenue nature and not items of capital nature. Therefore,
waiver of loan cannot partake the character of income to be includible for
assessment. Accordingly, the addition made by the A.O. was deleted.

 

On further appeal by Revenue, the Tribunal
took the view that writing off of the loan was inseparably connected with the
business of the assessee and therefore this benefit had arisen out of the
business of the assessee. The amount written off was nothing but an incentive
for its business. It was held that the benefit was received by the assessee in
the form of writing off of the liability to the extent of the loan. Therefore,
it could not be said that the assessee received cash benefit. The Tribunal
opined that the A.O. had correctly made the addition considering the waiver of
loan as revenue receipt of the assessee and, therefore, set aside the finding
of the first appellate authority, thereby restoring the order of the A.O.

 

The appellant contended that to be an income
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘profits and gains of business and
profession’, the value of any benefit or perquisite has to arise from business
or the exercise of a profession and it should not be in cash. He submitted that
this court in Mahindra & Mahindra vs. CIT, 261 ITR 501 has
held that the income which can be taxed u/s 28(iv) must not only be referable
to a benefit or perquisite, but it must be arising from business. Secondly,
section 28(iv) would not apply to benefits in cash or money. The Supreme Court
in CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., 404 ITR 1 had affirmed
the finding of the Bombay High Court and declared that for applicability of
section 28(iv) of the Act, the income should arise from the business or
profession and that the benefit which is received has to be in some other form
rather than in the shape of money.

 

On the other hand, the Department contended
that after a loan is waived or written off, it partakes the character of a
subsidy, more particularly an operational subsidy. Emphasis was laid on the
expression ‘operational subsidy’ to contend that the action of the Government
of Karnataka in writing off of the loan provided was an act of providing
operational subsidy to the assessee, thus extending a helping hand to the
assessee to salvage its losses thereby benefiting the assessee to the extent of
the waived loan and it is in this context that he placed reliance on the
decision of Sahney Steel & Press Works Limited (Supra) and
Protos Engineering Company Private Limited vs. CIT, 211 ITR 919.

 

The Court observed that section 28 deals with profits and gains of
business or profession. It says that the incomes mentioned therein shall be
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘profits and gains of business or
profession’. Clause (iv) refers to the value of any benefit or perquisite
whether or not convertible into money arising from business or the exercise of
a profession. The Court relied on the decision in the case of  Mahindra & Mahindra Limited (Supra)
wherein the Supreme Court was examining whether the amount due by Mahindra
& Mahindra to Kaiser Jeep Corporation which was later on waived off by the
lender constituted taxable income of Mahindra & Mahindra or not. The
Supreme Court held as under:

 

‘On a plain reading of section 28(iv) of
the Income-tax Act,
prima facie, it appears that
for the applicability of the said provision, the income which can be taxed
shall arise from the business or profession. Also, in order to invoke the
provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, the benefit which is
received has to be in some other form rather than in the shape of money.’

 

In the above case, according to the Supreme
Court, for applicability of section 28(iv) of the Act the income which can be taxed has to arise from the business or profession. That apart,
the benefit which is received has to be in some other form rather than in the
shape of money. Therefore, it was held that section 28(iv) was not satisfied
inasmuch as the prime condition of section 28(iv) that any benefit or
perquisite arising from the business or profession shall be in the form of
benefit or perquisite other than in the shape of money, was absent. Therefore,
it was held that the said amount could not be taxed u/s 28(iv) in any circumstances.

 

The Court observed that the facts and issue
in the present case are identical to those in Mahindra & Mahindra
(Supra)
. Here also, a loan of Rs. 2.52 cores was given by the Karnataka
Government to the assessee which was subsequently waived off. Therefore, this
amount would be construed to be cash receipt in the hands of the assessee and
cannot be taxed u/s 28(iv). In view of the Supreme Court decision in Mahindra
& Mahindra
, the earlier decision of this court in Protos
Engineer Comp.
would no longer hold good.

 

The Court further observed that in the
decision in Sahney Steel & Press Works Limited (Supra) the
issue pertained to subsidy received by the assessee from the Andhra Pradesh
Government. The question was whether or not such subsidy received was taxable
as revenue receipt. In the facts of that case, it was held that such subsidies
were of revenue nature and not of capital nature.

 

Insofar as the argument of the Department,
that upon waiver of loan the amount covered by such loan would partake the
character of operational subsidy, the Court is unable to accept such a
contention. Conceptually, ‘loan’ and ‘subsidy’ are two different concepts.

 

In Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd.
(Supra)
, the Supreme Court held that the subsidy provided by the Andhra Pradesh Government was basically an endeavour of the state to extend
a helping hand to newly-set up industries to enable them to be viable and
competitive.

 

Thus, the Court held that there is a
fundamental difference between ‘loan’ and ‘subsidy’ and the two cannot be
equated. While ‘loan’ is a borrowing of money required to the repaid with
interest, ‘subsidy’ being a grant, is not required to be repaid. Such grant is
given as part of a public policy by the state in furtherance of the public
interest. Therefore, even if a ‘loan’ is written off or waived, which may be
for various reasons, it cannot partake the character of a ‘subsidy’.

 

The substantial question of law therefore is
answered in favour of the assessee by holding that waiver of loan cannot be
brought to tax u/s 28(iv) of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

 

 

 

BCAJ:
Positive impact of COVID-19 on number of pages

 

Month

2019

2020

%  change

May

112

148

32%

June

124

132

6%

July

136

148

9%

August

116

124

7%

September

140

156

11%

Total

628

708

13%

 

 

Do not dwell in the past, do not
dream of the future, concentrate the
mind on the present moment

— 
Buddha

 

 

God doesn’t dwell in the wooden,
stony or earthen idols.
His abode is in our feelings, our thoughts

 — 
Chanakya

Charitable institution – Exemption – Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Denial of exemption – Activity for profit – Effect of proviso to section 2(15) – Concurrent finding of appellate authorities that the assessee was charitable institution – Event organised to raise money – Amount earned entitled to exemption

2. CIT (Exemption)
vs. United Way of Baroda
[2020] 423 ITR 596
(Guj.) Date of order: 25th
February, 2020
A.Y.: 2014-15

 

Charitable institution – Exemption –
Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Denial of exemption – Activity for profit
– Effect of proviso to section 2(15) – Concurrent finding of appellate
authorities that the assessee was charitable institution – Event organised to
raise money – Amount earned entitled to exemption

 

The assessee is a
charitable institution registered u/s 12A of the Act. For the A.Y. 2014-15, the assessee filed its return of income declaring total income as Nil after claiming exemption u/s
11. But the A.O. assessed the total income at Rs. 4,53,97,808. He had found
that the assessee had received a total sum of Rs. 5,48,04,054 which included
Rs. 4,37,61,637 as income from organising the event of garba during the
Navratri festival. According to the A.O., the assessee sold passes and gave
food stalls on rent, etc., which constitutes 79.85% of its total income. The
assessee, during the year, had declared gross receipts of Rs. 5,27,40,432 and
showed surplus of Rs. 26,27,243. The assessee thereby claimed Rs. 4,42,59,665
as income from charitable event. The A.O. held that the activities of the
assessee as per the amended provision of section 2(15) could not be said to be
advancement of any other object of general public utility and, therefore, the
assessee was not eligible to claim the benefit under sections 11 and 12,
respectively, more particularly in view of section 13(8) of the Act. The A.O.,
having regard to the gross receipts of Rs. 5,48,04,054, made the addition of
Rs. 58,90,500 on account of the interest on FSF fund and Rs. 1,67,90,118 on
account of anonymous donation.

 

The Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), allowed the appeal of the assessee, taking the view that
the activities of the assessee could be termed as charitable in nature and the
assessee would be eligible for the benefit under sections 11 and 12. The
Tribunal concurred with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and
dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i) Once the activity of the assessee falls within
the ambit of trade, commerce or business, it no longer remains a charitable
activity and the assessee is not entitled to claim any exemption under sections
11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The expression “trade”, “commerce” and
“business” as occurring in the first proviso to section 2(15) must be
read in the context of the intent and purport of section 2(15) and cannot be
interpreted to mean any activity which is carried on in an organised manner.
The purpose and the dominant object for which an institution carries on its
activities is material to determine whether or not it is business.

 

ii) The object of introducing the first proviso
is to exclude organisations which carry on regular business from the scope of
“charitable purpose”. An activity would be considered “business” if it is
undertaken with a profit motive, but in some cases, this may not be
determinative. Normally, the profit motive test should be satisfied, but in a
given case the activity may be regarded as a business even when the profit
motive cannot be established. In such cases, there should be evidence and
material to show that the activity has continued on sound and recognised
business principles and pursued with reasonable continuity. There should be
facts and other circumstances which justify and show that the activity
undertaken is in fact in the nature of business.

 

iii)  The main object of the
assessee could not be said to be organising the event of garba. The
assessee had been supporting 120 non-government organisations. The assessee was
into health and human services for the purpose of improving the quality of life
in society. All its objects were charitable. The activities like organising the
event of garba, including the sale of tickets and issue of passes, etc.,
cannot be termed as business. The two authorities had taken the view that
profit-making was not the driving force or the objective of the assessee. The
assessee was entitled to exemption under sections 11 and 12.’

 

 

 

Assessment: (i) Effect of electronic proceedings – Possibility of erroneous assessment if transactions and statement of account of assessee not properly understood – A.O. to call for assessee’s explanation in writing to conclude that cash deposits made by assessee post-demonetisation of currency was unusual; (ii) Unexplained money – Sections 69A and 115BBE of ITA, 1961 – Chit company – Tax on income included u/s 69A – Monthly subscriptions / dues – Cash deposits of collection made post-demonetisation of currency by Government – Cash deposits during period in question not in variance with same period during preceding year – Addition of amount as unexplained money – Provisions of section 115BBE cannot be invoked

1. Salem Sree Ramavilas Chit Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2020] 423 ITR 525
(Mad.) Date of order: 4th
February, 2020
A.Y.: 2017-18

 

Assessment: (i) Effect of electronic
proceedings – Possibility of erroneous assessment if transactions and statement
of account of assessee not properly understood – A.O. to call for assessee’s
explanation in writing to conclude that cash deposits made by assessee post-demonetisation
of currency was unusual;

(ii) Unexplained money – Sections 69A and
115BBE of ITA, 1961 – Chit company – Tax on income included u/s 69A – Monthly
subscriptions / dues – Cash deposits of collection made post-demonetisation of
currency by Government – Cash deposits during period in question not in
variance with same period during preceding year – Addition of amount as
unexplained money – Provisions of section 115BBE cannot be invoked

 

The assessee was in
the chit fund business. For the A.Y. 2017-18, the A.O. added the amounts
received and deposited by it during the period between 9th November,
2016 and 31st December, 2016, post-demonetisation of Rs. 500 and Rs.
1,000 notes by the Government on 8th November, 2016 to the income of
the assessee. The order stated that the assessee did not properly explain the
source and the purpose of cash along with party-wise break-up as required in
the notice issued u/s 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The assessee filed
a writ petition and challenged the assessment order. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i) The order making the assessee liable to tax at the maximum marginal
rate of tax by invoking section 115BBE was misplaced. The assessee had prima
facie
demonstrated that the assessment proceedings had resulted in
distorted conclusion on the facts that the amount collected by it during the
period was huge and remained unexplained and therefore the amount was liable to
be treated as unaccounted money in the hands of the assessee u/s 69A. The
closing cash on hand during the preceding months of the same year was not at
much variance with the closing cash on hand as on 31st October,
2016. The demonetisation of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 notes by the Government was
on 8th November, 2016 and the collection of the assessee between 1st
November, 2016 and 8th November, 2016 was not unusual compared to
its collection during the month of November, 2015. The cash deposits made by
the assessee in the year 2016 were not at variance with the cash deposits made
by it in the preceding year. Collection of monthly subscription / dues by the
assessee during the period in question was reasonable as compared to the same
period in the year 2015.

 

ii) Since the
assessment proceedings no longer involved human interaction and were based on
records alone, such assessment proceedings could lead to erroneous assessment
if officers were not able to understand the transactions and statement of
accounts of the assessee or the nature of the assessee. The assessee was to
explain its stand in writing so that the A.O. could arrive at an objective
conclusion on the facts based on the record.

 

iii) Under these
circumstances, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remitted back to
the respondent to pass a fresh order within a period of sixty days from the
date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall file additional
representation if any by treating the impugned order as the show cause notice
within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order. Since the Government of India has done away with the human interaction
during the assessment proceedings, it is expected that the petitioner will
clearly explain its stand in writing so that the respondent-A.O. can come to an
objective conclusion on facts based on the records alone. It is made clear that
the respondent will have to come to an independent conclusion on facts
uninfluenced by any of the observations contained herein.’

Article 12 of India-USA and India-Netherlands DTAAs – Testing and certification charges paid to US and Netherlands entities did not qualify as FTS since they did not satisfy ‘make available’ requirement Article 12 of India-China and India-Germany DTAAs – Testing and certification charges were FTS and taxable in India

2. [2020] 117
taxmann.com 983 (Delhi-Trib.)
Havells India Ltd.
vs. ACIT ITA Nos.:
6072/Del./2010; 6073/Del./2010; 466/Del./2011
A.Ys.: 2004-05 and
2007-08 Date of order: 25th
August, 2020

 

Article 12 of
India-USA and India-Netherlands DTAAs – Testing and certification charges paid
to US and Netherlands entities did not qualify as FTS since they did not
satisfy ‘make available’ requirement

 

Article 12 of
India-China and India-Germany DTAAs – Testing and certification charges were
FTS and taxable in India

 

FACTS


The assessee was
engaged in the manufacture of electrical goods. It made payments to various
foreign entities in the USA, the Netherlands, China and Germany for testing and
certification of its products. The foreign entities had specialised knowledge
and facilities for undertaking testing and certification, which was required
for the manufacturing activity of the assessee. These were country-specific
certifications that were mandatory for sale in the respective countries.

 

The A.O. held that
the payments for testing fees were taxable u/s 9(1)(vii). As regards the
applicability of the DTAAs, the A.O. held that the services met the requirement
of ‘made available’ under the India-Netherlands and India-USA DTAAs. The A.O.
further held that the testing fees were in any case taxable under the
India-China and India-Germany DTAAs wherein the ‘make available’ clause was not
present.

 

The CIT(A) upheld
the order of the A.O.

 

Being aggrieved,
the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD


Payments to
US and Netherlands entities

Relying upon its
order in the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2005-06 and A.Y. 2006-07 and
following orders for earlier years, the Tribunal held that the services
provided did not satisfy the ‘make available’ condition. Hence, the services
were not chargeable to tax in India.

 

Payment to
Chinese entity

(a) The assessee contended that in terms of Article
12 of the India-China DTAA, the meaning of FTS was restricted to only services
performed in India, based on ‘place of performance test’.

(b) Relying on the decision in Ashapura
Minichem Ltd.2
dealing with Article 12 of the India-China
DTAA, the Tribunal observed that: (i) FTS shall be deemed to accrue or arise in
the source country when the payer is resident of that country; (ii) it is the ‘provision
of services’
, and not necessarily the ‘performance of services’ in the
source country which triggers taxability. The Tribunal observed that the
expression ‘provision for services’ used in the India-China DTAA is much wider
in scope than the expression ‘provision for rendering of services’
used in other DTAAs. Hence, rendition of services in India is not necessary for
taxability of FTS in India. It is sufficient that services were utilised in
India. Accordingly, under India-China DTAA, FTS was taxable in India.

(c) Relying on the above decision, the Tribunal
upheld disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) for non-withholding of tax.

 

Payment to
German entity

In case of payments
made to the German entity, the Tribunal held that the services provided by it
were in the nature of technical services and hence were taxable under the
India-Germany DTAA.

 

Standard
services and machine-provided services

(i)  The assessee relied upon the Supreme Court
decision in Kotak Securities3 to contend that
technical services were standard services. However, the Tribunal held that
testing services were not standard services as they were for a specific
country, a specific product, and / or a specific manufactured lot of the
assessee, which was exported to that particular country and conformed to the
standards specified in that country.

(ii) The assessee also relied
on the decision of the Apex Court in Bharti Cellular Ltd.4
to contend that services were not FTS as they were provided by machines without
any human intervention. However, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Kotak
Securities (Supra)
, the Tribunal did not accept the contention of the
assessee. In the said decision, after taking note of the decision in Bharti
Cellular (Supra)
, the Court had observed that services could be
technical even in case of a fully-automated process which did not involve human
intervention.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________


2    (2010)
40 SOT 220 (Mum)

3    (2016)
383 ITR 1 (SC)

4    (2011)
330 ITR 239 (SC)

 

 

You can’t blame gravity for
falling in love

 — 
Albert Einstein

Article 5 of India-UK DTAA – Section 195 of the Act – Payment for production and delivery of film outside India is not taxable in India

1. [2020] 118
taxmann.com 314 (Mumbai-Trib.)
Next Gen Films (P)
Ltd. vs. ITO ITA Nos.: 3782,
3783/Mum./2016
A.Ys.: 2011-12 to
2012-13 Date of order: 11th
August, 2020

 

Article 5 of
India-UK DTAA – Section 195 of the Act – Payment for production and delivery of
film outside India is not taxable in India

 

FACTS


The assessee and another Indian Company (E1) were co-producers of a
feature film. They entered into a commission agreement with D, a UK-based
company which was to provide production services like pre-production,
production, post-production and delivery of the feature film. Key terms of the
agreement were as follows:

(a) Based on the story concept provided by the
assessee, development of storyboards and screenplay, selection of locations and
special and visual effects services. D was to consult and take consent of the
assessee over important aspects like the identity of all key cast members, budget,
production schedule, delivery materials, cash flow, screenplay, production
services companies to be engaged, etc., to ensure that the film was produced
and delivered in accordance with the material requirement.

(b) Ownership of the film was solely and
exclusively with the assessee.

(c) As a consideration for the
aforesaid services, D was paid 100% of the budget. This amount was to be
reduced by the amount of UK Tax Credit advance, any underspent amount, interest
accrued on monies held in the production account and any realisable value from
equipment / materials sale at the end of production of the film.

 

To execute the
Indian leg of the project, D entered into a production service agreement with
E2 (a subsidiary of the parent of E1). The services of E2 were subject to the
direction and control of D. The A.O. was of the view that D had a place of
management in India. He further held that the assessee, D and E2 were
associated enterprises in terms of Article 10. Accordingly, E2 had also created
a service PE of D in India. Since the assessee had not withheld tax on
remittance, the A.O. deemed it as ‘assessee in default’ and initiated
proceedings u/s 201/201(1A) of the Act.

 

In appeal, the
CIT(A) held against the assessee who, being aggrieved, appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


Associated
enterprise

+ The contract
between the assessee and D was on a principal-to-principal basis which required
D to produce the film in accordance with the specifications laid down by the
assessee.

+ D carried out its
activities in consultation with the assessee to ensure that the film was
produced as per specifications and in keeping with the storyline.

+ D acted
independently and was free to take decisions and also engage other service
providers.

+ D had borrowed
against expected UK tax credit1. Thus, it could not be said that D
was dependent upon the assessee for its financial requirement.

+ D also recorded
revenue received from the assessee and consequential loss in its books of
accounts.

 

Thus, it could not
be said that the assessee participated directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of D.

 

Permanent
Establishment

* The agreement
between D and E2 was that between a principal and an agent. E2 had provided
limited production services for a lump sum consideration of Rs. 3 crores.

* The gross
receipts of E2 were Rs. 133.55 crores (A.Y. 2011-12) and Rs. 76.27 crores (A.Y.
2012-13), respectively, as compared to the fees of Rs. 3 crores received from
D. Therefore, E2 was an agent of independent status. Consequently, D did not
create a PE in India.

 

Thus, D and E2 were
not associated enterprises in terms of Article 10 of the DTAA.


_________________________________________________________________________________________________

1    Decision
does not mention nature or conditions qualifying for tax credit in UK

 

Section 40(a)(ia) r/w section 195 – Payments to overseas group companies considered as reimbursement of expense incurred, not liable to deduction of tax at source

3. ACIT vs. APCO Worldwide (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi) Members: Sushma Chowla (V.P.) and Anil Chaturvedi (A.M.) ITA No. 5614/Del./2017 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 9th September, 2020 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Rakhi Vimal / Ajay Vohra and Gaurav
Jain

 

Section
40(a)(ia) r/w section 195 – Payments to overseas group companies considered as
reimbursement of expense incurred, not liable to deduction of tax at source

 

FACTS


The issue was
with respect to disallowance of expenses u/s 40(a)(ia). The assessee had made
payments to its overseas group companies towards recoupment of actual cost
incurred by them on behalf of the assessee for corporate administration,
finance support, information technology support, etc., without deduction of tax
u/s 195. According to the assessee, the payments made cannot be considered as
income of the recipients, as no profit element was involved. However, according
to the A.O., the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were attracted. He accordingly
disallowed the payment of Rs. 1.49 crores so made. On appeal, the CIT(A)
deleted the addition by holding that the assessee was not required to deduct
tax at source on the reimbursement of the expenses made to overseas entities.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
noted that the CIT(A) had found that the payments made were on cost-to-cost
basis. Further, the coordinate bench of the Tribunal while deciding an
identical issue in the assessee’s own case in A.Ys. 2010-11, 2011-12 and
2012-13, had held that the provisions of section 195 were not attracted on the
amounts paid by the assessee to its overseas group companies as it was mere
reimbursement. Accordingly, it was held that no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) was
required to be made.

 

Section 199(3) and Rule 37BA – Credit for TDS allowed in the year of deduction even when related revenue was booked in subsequent year(s)

2. HCL Comnet Limited vs. DCIT (Delhi) Members: O.P. Kant (A.M.) and Kuldip Singh (J.M.) ITA No. 1113/Del./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 4th September, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Ajay Vohra, Aditya Vohra and Arpit
Goyal / S.N. Meena

 

Section
199(3) and Rule 37BA – Credit for TDS allowed in the year of deduction even
when related revenue was booked in subsequent year(s)

 

FACTS


The assessee
was in the business of selling networking equipment and installation and
provision of after-sales services. In respect of after-sales services, the
customers would make payment which covered 
a period of three to four years. The assessee would recognise revenue
from such services on a year-to-year basis. However, the customer would deduct
TDS on the entire amount at the time of payment as per the provisions of the
Act. Relying on the decision of the Visakhapatnam bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Asstt. CIT vs. Peddu Srinivasa Rao (ITA No. 324/Vizag./2009, CO
No. 68/Vizag./2009, dated 3rd March, 2011),
the assessee
claimed that it was eligible to claim the entire TDS in the year of deduction
(even when the related revenue was booked in subsequent financial years).
Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Toyo Engineering India Limited vs. JCIT (5 SOT 616)
and of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of HCL Comnet Systems and Services
Ltd. vs. DCIT (ITA No. 3221/Del./2017 order dated 31st December,
2019).
However, the A.O. rejected the claim of the assessee.

 

HELD


The Tribunal,
following the order passed by the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case
of HCL
Comnet Systems and Services Ltd.,
held that the TDS credit is to be
granted irrespective of the fact that related revenue is booked in subsequent financial years. Accordingly, the assessee’s
claim for credit of the TDS in the year of deduction was allowed.

Section 80IC – Income arising from scrap sales is part of business income eligible for deduction u/s 80IC

1. Isolloyd Engineering Technologies Limited vs. DCIT (Delhi) Members: O.P. Kant (A.M.) and Kuldip Singh (J.M.) ITA No. 3936/Del./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 4th September, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: None / S.N. Meena and M. Barnwal

 

Section 80IC
– Income arising from scrap sales is part of business income eligible for
deduction u/s 80IC

 

FACTS


The assessee
had three manufacturing units. It was entitled to claim deduction u/s 80IC @30%
on the first two units and @100% on the third one. During the year under
appeal, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s 80IC included the sum of Rs.
52.67 lakhs qua the amount of scrap sales aggregating to Rs. 80.13
lakhs. According to the A.O., the same was not related to manufacturing
activity, hence it was disallowed. On appeal, the CIT(A) restricted the
addition to Rs.7.08 lakhs by allowing the deduction to the extent of Rs. 45.59
lakhs claimed u/s 80IC.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
noted that the scrap consisted of empty drums, off-cuts, trims, coils,
leftovers, packing material, ‘gatta’, scrap rolls, etc., which were generated
in the course of the business. According to it, it was settled principle of law
that scrap generated in the business is part and parcel of the income derived
from the business and as such forms part of the business profit, as held by the
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sadu Forgings Ltd. (336 ITR 444).
It further noted that the CIT(A) had duly obtained and analysed unit-wise
details of scrap sold in the year under appeal and found the claim of the
assessee prima facie plausible. However, without giving any reason, the
sum of Rs. 7.08 lakhs was disallowed. According to the Tribunal, the CIT(A) had
erred in disallowing the amount of Rs. 7.08 lakhs out of the total claim of Rs.
52.67 lakhs made u/s 80IC. Accordingly, it allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Section 244A – Interest is payable on refund arising out of payment of self-assessment tax even though refund is less than ten per cent of tax determined

4. [2020] 119 taxmann.com 40 (Del.)(Trib.) Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. vs. CIT ITA Nos. 2553, 2641 (Delhi) of 2013 &
others
A.Ys.: 1999-00 to 1994-95 Date of order: 31st August, 2020

 

Section 244A – Interest is payable on
refund arising out of payment of self-assessment tax even though refund is less
than ten per cent of tax determined

 

FACTS


The assessee
claimed refund of Rs. 201,37,93,163 comprising of advance tax, TDS and
self-assessment tax of Rs. 14,59,79,228 and Rs. 186,78,13,935, the tax paid on
different dates. The A.O. did not allow interest u/s 244A(1)(a) on the amount
of Rs. 14.59 crores as the refund was less than 10% of the tax determined u/s
254 r/w/s 143(3).

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order on the
ground that to give effect to the provisions of section 244A(3), the assessee
had to mandatorily cross the limitations imposed u/s 244A(1)(a).

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) treated the entire amount of Rs.
14.60 crores as prepaid taxes for the purpose of section 244A(1)(a). This, according to the Tribunal, was where the
CIT(A) considered / read the provisions wrong. The Tribunal held that the
prepaid taxes consist of TDS and advance tax. The provisions of self-assessment
tax are governed by section 140A which is not covered by the provisions of
section 244A(1)(a). Self-assessment tax which is payable on the basis of return
does not constitute part of advance tax. For the purpose of embargo of 10% of
tax determined in accordance with the provisions of section 244A(1)(a), it is
clear from the provisions of the section that self-assessment tax does not form
part of the embargo as self-assessment tax falls under clause (b) of section
244A(1). The proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 244A is
applicable and has to be considered for the computational purpose of interest
computable for the refund payable u/s 244A(1)(a).

 

As regards the
question whether or not interest is payable on self-assessment tax paid, the
Tribunal observed that it is trite law that whenever the assessee is entitled
to refund, there is a statutory liability on the Revenue to pay the interest on
such refund on general principles to pay interest on sums wrongfully retained.

 

Section 244A does
not deny payment of interest in case of refund of amount paid u/s 140A. On the
contrary, clause (b) being a residuary clause, necessarily includes payment
made u/s 140A. Since there is no proviso attached to sub-clause (b), the
embargo of 10% is not applicable for calculation of interest for the refund
arising out of payment of self-assessment tax.

 

The Tribunal held
that with regard to the self-assessment tax paid, the assessee is eligible for
interest on the total amount of refund in accordance with the provisions of
section 244A(1)(b). This ground of appeal was allowed.

 

Sections 250 and 271AAA – Ex parte dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), without considering the material on record on the ground that the written submissions were not signed by the assessee, is contrary to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 250

3. 118 taxmann.com 223 (Raj.)(Trib.) Keshavlal Devkaranbhai Patel vs. ACIT ITA No. 124 /Rajkot/2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 28th July, 2020

 

Sections 250 and 271AAA – Ex parte
dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), without considering the material on record on
the ground that the written submissions were not signed by the assessee, is
contrary to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 250

 

FACTS


Aggrieved by the
order levying penalty u/s 271AAA, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A). The assessee had filed his explanation before the A.O. and also before
the CIT(A). However, the submissions filed before the CIT(A) were not signed by
the assessee.

 

In view of this,
the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal by recording that the assessee was not
interested in pursuing the appeal.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal found
the order of the CIT(A) to be very cryptic and not having any discussion on the
material already available on record before him. The Tribunal observed that:

(i)   there is no valid and justifiable reason
given by the appellate authority in his order while dismissing the claim of the
assessee;

(ii)  the CIT(A) has recorded in his order that the
assessee has filed written submissions in the office on 29th August,
2017 but without signature, hence the same were not considered by the CIT(A);
and

(iii) the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution even when the written submission was on record which did not bear
the signature of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal held
that the CIT(A) ought to have adjourned the matter and passed a further
direction to file fresh written submissions, duly signed. It is a basic
principle that justice should not only be done, but it must also be seen to be
done. In the absence of that, the Tribunal held, the order impugned is not in
consonance with the spirit and object of sub-section (6) of section 250.

 

The Tribunal set
aside the issue to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate it
afresh after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and to pass a
speaking order thereon keeping in mind, inter alia, the mandate of the
provisions of section 250(6) in order to render true and effective justice.

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are not applicable to introduction of development rights as capital contribution in an AOP of which assessee is a member

2. 119 taxmann.com 186 (Mum.)(Trib.) Network Construction Company vs. ACIT ITA No. 2279/Mum./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 11th August, 2020

 

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are
not applicable to introduction of development rights as capital contribution in
an AOP of which assessee is a member

 

FACTS


The assessee firm
acquired development rights in respect of seven buildings of which the assessee
firm developed and sold four on its own and disclosed the profit earned as
business profit in its return of income. The development rights in respect of
the remaining three buildings were shown as investments in the balance sheet as
at 31st March, 2010.

 

As per the joint
venture agreement dated 1st July, 2010, the assessee contributed
development rights in respect of three buildings as ‘capital contribution’ in
an AOP for an agreed consideration of Rs. 5 crores. The assessee contended that
the capital gains were to be computed in accordance with the provisions of
section 45(3).

 

The A.O. treated
the introduction of the development rights as a transfer and computed capital
gains by applying the provisions of section 50C by adopting Rs. 10,10,47,000,
being stamp duty value of these rights, as the full value of consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
observed that section 45(3) is a charging provision having two limbs joined by
the conjunction ‘AND’. The first limb is a charging provision which levies
capital gains tax on gains arising from the contribution of a capital asset in the
AOP by a member, and the second limb is an essential deeming fiction for
determining the value of consideration without which the charging provision
would fail. The Tribunal also observed that the provisions of section 50C are
also a deeming fiction which deems only the value of consideration for the
purpose of calculating capital gains in the transfer of a capital asset from
one person to another. It held that the provisions of section 50C are not
applicable in the present case and that the provisions of section 45(3) will be
applied.

 

The Tribunal
reversed the orders of the A.O. and the CIT(A) and allowed this ground of
appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Section 44AD r/w sections 44AB and 144 – Assessing Officer can resort to estimation of income under the provisions of section 44AD only after rejecting the books of accounts of the assessee, by best judgment assessment u/s 144

1. [118 taxmann.com
347]
Saykul Islam vs.
ITO ITA No.
64/Ahd./2018
A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 31st
July, 2020

 

Section 44AD r/w sections
44AB and 144 – Assessing Officer can resort to estimation of income under the
provisions of section 44AD only after rejecting the books of accounts of the
assessee, by best judgment assessment u/s 144

 

FACTS


The assessee is an
individual trading in hardware goods. His business turnover was in excess of
Rs. 1 crore, but he had declared profit at 0.99% of the turnover in his tax
return. The information was provided by the assessee in his return of income
reflecting maintenance of books of accounts, but not audited as required under
the provisions of section 44AB. The A.O. was of the view that as per the
provisions of section 44AD, an assessee may claim lower profits and gains than
the profits and gains specified in sub-section (1) of section 44AD provided
that the assessee keeps and maintains such books of accounts and other
documents as required under sub-section (2) of section 44AA and gets his
accounts audited and furnishes a report of such audit as required u/s 44AB. The
assessee submitted that the net profit percentage was very low in his business
and requested the officer to take the net profit percentage @3% of the
turnover.

 

The A.O. rejected
this contention and estimated the net profit at 8% of the turnover. On appeal
to the CIT(A), he reduced the estimated profit on turnover from 8% to 5%.
Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee filed an appeal with the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


The assessee had
produced all books of accounts, bills, vouchers and other documents; however, without
pointing out any mistake or error in the books of accounts, the A.O. made an
addition at 8%. Moreover, the books of accounts were not rejected. The Tribunal
observed that the A.O. could resort to estimation of net profits only after
rejecting the books of accounts u/s 145(3) and thereafter making best judgment
assessment u/s 144. Instead, he estimated net profits only on the basis of
suspicion that the assessee might be inflating expenses and showing a lower net
profit ratio. On the factual position of the case, the Tribunal directed the
A.O. to estimate the income at 2.5% of the turnover.

 

The appeal of the
assessee was partly allowed.

NEW TCS PROVISIONS – AN ANALYSIS

 

The Finance Act,
2020 has inserted a new sub-section (1H) in section 206C of the Income-tax Act,
1961 with effect from 1st October, 2020 to provide for collection of
tax at source (Tax Collected at Source or TCS) on consideration received on
sale of certain goods. In this article an effort is being made to set out
various issues that are likely to arise out of these newly-inserted provisions.

 

AMENDMENT IN BRIEF

Every seller whose
turnover in the immediately preceding F.Y. exceeds Rs. 10 crores and who
receives an amount exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs in aggregate from a buyer in any
previous year on the sale of goods, is required to collect a sum of 0.1%
(0.075% for F.Y. 2020-21) on the sale consideration exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs from
the buyer of such goods.

 

The rate is to be
increased to 1% if neither PAN nor the Aadhaar number are provided.

 

Receipts from sale
of scrap, alcohol, motor vehicles, remittances under Liberalised Remittance
Scheme (LRS) and overseas tour programme packages are excluded from this
sub-section since they are covered by other clauses of section 206C.

 

The provisions of
TCS shall not be applicable in cases where the buyer is liable to make a tax
deduction at source from the amount payable to the seller, and such tax has
been deducted. Besides, goods exported out of India have also been excluded
from the applicability of TCS.

 

Further, the
following have been excluded from the meaning of the term ‘buyer’, thus making
these provisions inapplicable to them:

–    Central Government

–    State Government

–    Embassy

–    High Commission

–    Legation

–    Commission

–    Consulate

–    Trade Representation of a foreign state

–    Local Authority

–    Person importing goods into India

–    Other Notified Person

 

ISSUES

‘Goods’

The levy of TCS is
on the consideration received on the sale of goods. The Income-tax Act does not
define the term ‘goods’. But it can be interpreted widely since anything that
is marketable, i.e., capable of being sold in the market, can be classified as
goods. The other relevant legislation from which a definition can be drawn is
the Sale of Goods Act. As per section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, ‘goods’
are described as: ‘Every kind of movable property other than actionable claims
and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass and things
attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before
sale or under the contract of sale.’

 

Under this
definition, shares and securities are included within the definition of goods.
Let us analyse this position in the following scenarios:

 

Shares &
securities held as stock in trade by a dealer trading in them

Listed shares and securities:

In case of listed
shares and securities, the dealer who regularly trades in them is required to
pay Securities Transaction Tax (STT) for transactions carried out through the
recognised stock exchanges. The identity of the buyer is not known to the
seller and, therefore, whether the sale consideration exceeds Rs. 50 lakhs for
each buyer cannot be determined. The machinery for implementation of TCS
provisions would not work in these cases. In view of these practical
difficulties, the CBDT vide its Circular No. 17 of 2020 dated 29th
September, 2020 (the Circular) has provided that the provisions of sub-section
(1H) of section 206C will not be applicable to transactions for sale of shares
/ securities and commodities which are carried out through recognised stock /
commodities exchanges. Though welcome, the Circular gives only limited clarity
and a few more issues with regard to ‘goods’ covered under this section are
discussed below.

 

Unlisted shares & securities:

In such a
scenario, there would be no STT payable on the sale of these shares. Since the
consideration would be received directly from the buyer, the seller will be in
a position to collect tax at source. Therefore, unless there is a specific
exclusion, unlisted shares and securities sold by a dealer may be covered under
these provisions. However, shares of private limited companies are not tradable
on account of restrictions on their transfer and may therefore not be regarded
as stock-in-trade. Sales proceeds of such shares may not be regarded as turnover
if they are held as capital assets. If the seller of such shares is otherwise a
dealer in goods having a turnover of more than Rs. 10 crores in the preceding
year, the question of applicability of TCS may arise. The question is whether
TCS provisions are attracted by sale of goods only in the course of business or
even otherwise in the case of a businessman. This is discussed further below.
Shares held as capital assets are taken up next.

 

Shares &
securities held as investments / Capital assets by an investor

Listed shares and securities:

In the case of
listed shares and securities, they would remain outside the scope of TCS for
the same reasons as discussed above.

 

Unlisted shares and securities:

In a case where unlisted shares and securities held as investments are
sold, whether they would constitute ‘goods’ would determine the applicability
of the TCS provisions. These shares and securities would usually be capital
assets and their sale would give rise to resultant capital gains / loss. Though
the definition of ‘goods’ under the Sale of Goods Act includes stocks and
shares, the fact that they would be considered as ‘goods’ in the context of
these provisions seems unlikely, and therefore may be excluded.

 

In order to
extrapolate this thought further, let us analyse the criteria to be fulfilled
for the applicability of TCS provisions. This sub-section has two-fold
criteria:

(i) the turnover from business of the preceding
financial year should be in excess of Rs. 10 crores, and

(ii) the aggregate consideration received from sale
of goods during the previous year should be in excess of Rs. 50 lakhs.

 

The consideration
received from the sale of such shares will not be included in the ‘turnover’
from business while determining the threshold of Rs. 10 crores. It would be
inappropriate to include such consideration while ascertaining the threshold
for aggregate consideration for the applicability of the TCS provisions. One
cannot apply an independent sense to interpret the words ‘turnover’ and
‘consideration’ on sale of goods which has been used in the same sub-section
(this reasoning has been elaborated further).

 

OTHER ASSETS


Next, would TCS
provisions be applicable in the case of other assets (other than the ones in
which the seller deals) that are sold? To illustrate the same, let us look at a
scenario: Say, Mr. A sells certain automobile parts (which constitute his
stock-in-trade) to Mr. B (buyer) during the year, the aggregate consideration
being Rs. 60 lakhs and the other relevant conditions have been fulfilled.
Assume that he further sells some machinery / furniture to Mr. B for a
consideration of Rs. 25 lakhs.

 

Will Mr. A collect
tax at source on the consideration received for the sale of machinery /
furniture as well?

 

A prima facie
view that one may be inclined to adopt is that TCS would be required to be
collected on the consideration received from the sale of machinery or
furniture, since the section does not carve out any specific exclusion. That
may be a conservative view, but it would be unfair to not evaluate the contrary
view. Before we analyse the same, it is pertinent to note that Mr. A in the
illustration above trades in or deals in automobile parts. In what is probably
an isolated transaction, he has sold certain machinery / furniture to one of
his buyers, Mr. B.

 

Before taking up
the contrary view, the following are certain important observations:

1. As discussed above, the term ‘goods’ has not
been defined in the Act. It is therefore capable of being applied to a wide
range of things. ‘Goods’ may also cover every movable asset except money and
actionable claims. However, when a particular word has not been defined in the
statute, it is important to understand its usage in the context of the
provision.

 

2.  The provisions related to TCS are covered
under Chapter VII-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which deals with Collection
& Recovery of Tax. The heading for section 206C containing the group of
sub-sections u/s 206C reads as ‘Profits & Gains from the business of
trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc.’

 

3. While the term ‘goods’ may mean a wide range of
items, the heading to the section in which the particular sub-section appears
clearly hints at receipts in the nature of profits / gains from the business of
‘trading’… In view of this, one may infer that the receipts intended to be
covered in this section are such receipts as arise to the seller from the sale
of such items that he trades in as part of his business.

 

4. Further, as per the Literal Rule of
Interpretation of Statutes, where a statute uses a word which is of everyday
use, such a word should be interpreted in its popular sense, i.e., construed as
it is understood in common language. Therefore, to interpret goods as
understood in common language, would ordinarily mean stock in trade or goods
that a person trades in regularly in the course of his business activities.

 

5. Explanation to this sub-section defines
‘seller’ as…

‘seller’ means
a person whose total sales, gross receipts or turnover from the business
carried on by him exceed ten crore rupees during the financial year immediately
preceding the financial year in which the sale of goods is carried out, not
being a person as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify for this purpose, subject to such conditions as may be
specified therein.

 

The seller in the context of this sub-section is a person whose sales /
gross receipts or turnover from ‘business’ carried on by him exceeds Rs. 10
crores in the preceding financial year. In determining the threshold for one of
the two criteria for applicability of these provisions, the sales / turnover
from ‘business activities’ of such seller has to be taken into account. It
would be inappropriate to include receipts on sale of such items which would
otherwise not form a part of
turnover or sales in determining the threshold for consideration of goods sold.
To put it simply, in the illustration above, when Mr. A sells machinery /
furniture to Mr. B, such amount will not be included in his ‘turnover from
business’ as clearly stated by the meaning of seller given in the explanation.
To include it in the aggregate consideration for goods sold, and
collect tax on such amount, would therefore not be appropriate.

 

Thus, a possible
contrary view is that other assets sold by the seller to the buyer which do not
represent goods or items that the seller trades in as a part of his business
would not be covered by these provisions.

 

APPLICABILITY OF
PROVISIONS

This sub-section
is effective from 1st October, 2020 and is prospective in
application. It is triggered if the consideration received for sale of goods of
the value, or aggregate of such value, is in excess of Rs. 50 lakhs in any
previous year (other than goods exported out of India). Therefore, the
threshold criterion of consideration in excess of Rs. 50 lakhs has to be
considered for the entire previous year.

 

This has been
clarified by paragraph 4.4.2(iii) of the Circular, which states that since
the threshold of fifty lakh rupees is with respect to the previous year,
calculation of receipt of sale consideration for triggering TCS under
sub-section (1H) of Section 206C shall be computed from 1st April,
2020.
Let us take up a few probable scenarios here:

 

(I)   Mr. A sells goods to Mr. B for Rs. 65 lakhs –
for Rs. 20 lakhs, both sale and receipt of consideration were pre-October,
2020; for Rs. 45 lakhs, both sale and receipt of consideration were
post-October, 2020. Though TCS provisions will be applicable on the receipt of
sale consideration of Rs. 45 lakhs post-October, for determining the threshold
criterion, receipt of sale consideration of Rs. 20 lakhs will be considered.

 

(II)  Mr. A sells goods to Mr. B and receives an
aggregate consideration of Rs. 75 lakhs. The sale and receipt of the entire
consideration take place post-1st October, 2020. Here, without any
doubt, the TCS provisions will be applicable and Mr. A will be under an
obligation to collect tax on Rs. 25 lakhs (Rs. 75 lakhs minus Rs. 50 lakhs).
Before we analyse further, it is important to take note of paragraph 4.4.2(ii)
of the Circular which states as under: Since sub-section (1H) of section
206C of the Act applies on receipt of sale consideration, the provision of this
sub-section shall not apply on any sale consideration received before 1st
October, 2020. Consequently, it would apply on all sale consideration
(including advance received for sale) received on or after 1st
October, 2020 even if the sale was carried out before 1st October,
2020.

 

(III) Mr. A had sold certain goods to Mr. B in F.Y.
2019-20 for a consideration of Rs. 80 lakhs. Of this, Rs. 10 lakhs was received
in F.Y. 2019-20. Of the balance Rs. 70 lakhs, further Rs. 5 lakhs was received
in July, 2020 and Rs. 65 lakhs was received post-October, 2020.

 

In view of the
above paragraph of the Circular, the seller would be required to make TCS on
the receipt of Rs. 15 lakhs of consideration received in the month of October,
2020 (Rs. 65 lakhs minus Rs. 50 lakhs), even though the sales were effected in
F.Y. 2019-20.

 

The Circular
categorically states that TCS would be applicable on all sale considerations,
even if the sale was carried out before 1st October, 2020. This is
not sufficiently asserted in the provisions of section 206C (1H) which states –
Every person, being a seller, who receives any amount as consideration for
sale of any goods of the value or aggregate value exceeding fifty lakh rupees
in any previous year…

 

In my humble view,
as mentioned above, this section is prospective in its application and takes
effect from 1st October, 2020. Though the trigger for applicability
of TCS provisions is ‘receipt of sale consideration’, it should not be made
applicable to such receipts for sales effected prior to 1st October,
2020.

 

Considering the
language used in the Circular, it will imply that all outstanding amounts due
to the seller for sales effected prior to 1st October, 2020 will now
be included in the ambit of the TCS provisions. This may span over a period of
the past one or two financial years, and the seller will be required to collect
TCS on receipts of such amounts. It may pose practical difficulties as the
buyers may be reluctant to remit additional amounts as they would not reflect
in the original invoices raised.

 

These practical
issues notwithstanding and referring to the arguments above, it will be unjust
to include receipts of consideration for sales affected prior to 1st
October, 2020 within the ambit of TCS.

 

There seems to be
an intention to apply the TCS provisions in respect of all sale considerations,
including advances, received on or after 1st October, 2020. However,
it’s ‘lost in translation’ as it further states advances received on or after 1st
October, 2020 including those for sales carried out before 1st
October, 2020. The only aspect clear from this paragraph is that the provisions
of TCS shall not apply on any sale consideration received before 1st
October, 2020.

 

Again, it is
important to note that the section does not use the word ‘advance’ and refers
to receipt of amount as ‘consideration for sale of goods’, or sale
consideration as used in common parlance. Further, neither has the term
‘consideration’ nor ‘sale consideration’ been defined in the sub-section, in
view of which the term will have to be understood in the context of its use in
common parlance. Any amount received as advance cannot partake the character of
‘sale consideration’ unless the corresponding sale against such sum of money
received is effected.

 

Thus, by merely
using a particular term in the Circular, which does not find place in the
section, its meaning cannot be imported in the section. Therefore, in my humble
view, TCS provisions will not be applicable on advances.

 

(IV) Mr. A,
dealing in a particular category of goods, sells them to Mr. B who uses them
further for his manufacturing / processing activity and is not the ultimate
consumer of such goods. Whether TCS would be collected by Mr. A in respect of
such goods?

 

To correlate,
section 206C(1A) excludes applicability of TCS on such sale transactions
covered u/s 206C(1) where the buyer uses the goods for further manufacturing or
production activities. At present, there is no such exclusion u/s 206C(1H).

 

The Circular makes
reference to transactions for sale of motor car, covering receipts from all
kinds of transactions of sale of motor car, under the TCS provisions, either
under sub-section (1H) or sub-section (1F), both sub-sections being mutually
exhaustive.

 

GOODS & SERVICES
TAX IMPLICATION


Another important
aspect that requires consideration is whether TCS is required to be collected
on the consideration inclusive of GST, or otherwise. The term sale
consideration has not been defined in the sub-section. It will mean the price
paid for purchase of goods. The question to be considered is whether it can be
said that GST is a part of the consideration? There are contrary views on this
issue as well. Based on certain judicial precedents, a view which prevails is
that GST is includible in the consideration and therefore TCS should be made on
the amount of consideration inclusive of GST.

 

Paragraph 4.6 of
the Circular clarifies that no adjustment on account of sale return or discount
or indirect taxes including GST is required to be made for collection of tax
under sub-section (1H) of section 206C of the Act since the collection is made
with reference to the receipt of the amount of sale consideration.

 

Let us evaluate
each of the items covered under this paragraph:

i. Sales
return:

a.  Sales
returns post receipt of amount of sale consideration by the seller:
In this case, the receipt will not
be net of sale return and the seller would have collected TCS on the same, as
it has been received. Assuming the sales return takes place in the subsequent
month, by when the seller has paid the amount of tax collected to the credit of
the government, the buyer will claim credit of the same while furnishing his
income tax return.

b.  Sales returns before receipt of amount of sale
consideration by the seller:
In this case, under
the terms of contract, the buyer will pay the amount net of sales return, and
thus the amount of consideration received will be subjected to TCS.

 

ii.  Discounts: The
discounts will be factored in the invoice, and / or the amount of sale
consideration received by the seller from the buyer will be net of such
discounts. As TCS is to be made on the amount received, no adjustment would be
required.

 

iii. GST: The Circular
states that no adjustment is required to be made on account of GST. It brings
little clarity on this aspect. In my view, GST should not be included for the
purpose of TCS though a conservative and practical approach adopted may be that
TCS is to be made inclusive of GST.

 

In case the
component of TCS is charged in the invoice, whether GST would be applicable on
the TCS component?

 

GST applies on the
consideration for supply of goods or services, whereas TCS is a collection of
the income tax component.

 

The Central Board
of Indirect Taxes (CBIC) Corrigendum to Circular No. 76/50/2018-GST dated 31st
December, 2018 issued vide F. No. CBEC-20/16/04/2018-GST has clarified
that for the purpose of determining value of supply under GST, TCS will not be
includible since it is in the nature of an interim levy. Therefore, if the TCS
component is reflected in the invoice, there will be no GST applicable on the
TCS component.

 

RESULTANT PRACTICAL
ASPECTS


The tax collected
by the seller shall be paid to the account of the Government by the 7th
of the month subsequent to the month in which the consideration was received.

 

No separate TAN is
required for TCS under this sub-section. The seller has to furnish TCS return
in Form 27EQ on a quarterly basis. The CBDT has amended the IT Rules in line
with the above changes to the TCS provisions.

 

The existing Rules
require the assessee to file quarterly TCS returns in Form 27EQ. Under the
amended Rules, the assessee (seller) is required to report the amount on which
TCS is not collected from the buyer. An annexure for party-wise break-up of TCS
is also provided in the form.

 

Due dates of
filing of Form 27EQ are:

Quarter

Due
date (normally)

April – June

15th July

July – September

15th October

October – December

15th January

January – March

15th May

 

 

CONCLUSION

As we cope with the implications of this newly-inserted sub-section, it
will be interesting to have a sneak peek into the history of these provisions.
The TCS provisions were first inserted by the Finance Act, 1988. The rationale
behind introducing these provisions was the fact that there was difficulty in
assessing the income of persons undertaking contracts for sale of liquor, etc.
Over the years, there have been several other sub-sections added to section
206C on the pretext of widening the tax base or to track high-value
transactions, the latest amendment being this insertion of sub-section 1H. From
1988 to 2020, both tax administration and tax compliance have undergone a sea
change. Considering the ‘E-mode’ of operations, several tests and checks are in
place to ensure minimal evasion of taxes and non-reporting of transactions.

 

Against this
backdrop, one wonders about the necessity of such provisions which are most
likely to increase the hassles of businessmen.

 

‘Lord Atkin once
said that an impartial administration of the law is like oxygen in the air:
people know and care little about it till it is withdrawn.’’

                                                                                         – Fali S. Nariman, Before Memory
Fades:
                                                                                                                              An Autobiography

BCAJ SURVEY ON DIGITAL GEARING OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT FIRMS

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick
survey in September 2020 to gauge the Digital awareness and adoption of
technology by CA firms.

 

Attributes of the
respondents:

 

A>  Location and Presence

32.5% respondents
had presence in Non-Metros and about 67.5% in both Metros and Non-Metros.

 

B>  Nature
of Respondents

45.5% respondents
were proprietors, 33.5% were firms having up to 4 partners, 11% were firms
having 5-9 partners and 10% were firms having more than 10 partners.

 

Survey Questions and Responses

 

1.  In the
present scenario, considering where the world is heading (WFH, extreme
digitisation, digital filings, client needs) and the role you perform at work,
how do you describe your personal digital skills?

 

 

 

2.  In the
role which you perform, how much time are you required to use digital skills?

 

 

3.  In terms
of awareness of where things are moving for accountants and digital
products/services available for CAs, how do you rate your DIGITAL AWARENESS?

 


 

4.  As part of
the digital journey, which of the following digital tools do you use?

     (Percentage
of participants using the tools)

 

 

5.  Considering
the present scenario, how effectively are your personnel operating under WFH in
the last several months?

 

 

6.  Keeping
the future in mind, what is the status of formal assessment of the current
state of digital maturity of your firm/practice?

 

 

 

 

 

7.  In order to gear up for the change, what
is/are you hindrance/s?
(Percentage of participants selecting each issue)

 

 

8.  Going
ahead, how important do you consider the digital skills and digital quotient in
GROWTH or even SURVIVAL of your practice?

 

 

9.  How often
do you consider upgrading digital capabilities and practices through SOFTWARE
and HARDWARE upgrades?

 

10. Going
ahead, at what capacity do you feel that your personnel can work from home?

 


EXECUTIVE PRESENCE

Executive
Presence
– we admire it in others and want it for
ourselves! Also called Personal Presence, Leadership Presence or The
‘It’ Factor,
this intangible, difficult to define yet must-have trait
is found in business and political leaders across the world.

 

In today’s
competitive world, technical and intellectual skills are not enough to
guarantee success as a business leader. While in-depth industry knowledge is
the foundation of your career, your ability to deliver and articulate a
confident message which engages your audience, and is consistent with your
corporation’s value system, and at times even a calibrated response in
stressful times, is a leadership skill which inspires trust.

 

Your executive
presence
is on display when you

(a) Meet with prominent clients and important
prospects,

(b) Communicate with your team,

(c) Work with stakeholders to get a buy-in for your
ideas,

(d) Increase your internal and external visibility
at public fora and networking events,

(e) Present your company to shareholders, investors
and media.

 

Leaders know about
this influential dimension and believe that communication is made up of both
verbal and non-verbal components and know how to use both effectively. Your
body movements, posture, facial expressions, gestures, eye contact and attire
influence the audience and inspire trust. By integrating their verbal and
non-verbal communication, they deliver a powerful signal saying ‘I am
capable and confident’
. It’s necessary for creating a powerful impact when
interacting with clients, board members, teams and shareholders. As defined by
Sheryl Sandberg, COO of Facebook, ‘Leadership is about making others better
as a result of your presence and making sure that impact lasts in your
absence’.

 

VISUAL RESUME


As per a research
study, people wearing branded clothes were ‘perceived’ as being richer and of a
higher status than those wearing non-designer clothes. But then Warren Buffet
once said, ‘I buy expensive suits. They just look cheap on me’. While
many argue that clothes are mere ‘packaging’ and it’s what’s inside that
matters, gurus of the advertising industry will convince you that brands spend
billions of dollars every year to enhance their packaging before marketing it
to their target customers. Similarly, when you meet people for business, your
appearance can inspire confidence, putting people at ease, or it can elicit
hesitation and create confusion in their minds.

 

Body
language:
Has body language taken a backseat in
today’s information age? Not really. Think about it – we continue to judge a
book by its cover, appreciate restaurants with nicely laid-out tables, enjoy
opening beautifully-wrapped gifts. And we also believe in Hollywood movies that
show love at first sight and vote for politicians who look trustworthy. Look
around you and observe the popular world leaders, from J.F. Kennedy, Winston
Churchill, Ronald Reagan, Barack Obama to Justin Trudeau, Vladimir Putin,
Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, they all display strong body language and
have used it to create an imposing presence. Physicality counts for a lot in
the business world, too. Body language is an integral component of Executive
Presence.
Defined as a non-verbal form of communication, when used
effectively it can be your key to greater success as it

(i)   Conveys interest, helping you build rapport
with stakeholders,

(ii)  Helps develop positive business relationships,

(iii) Influences and motivates your team members,

(iv) improves
productivity, and

(v)  helps
you present your ideas with more confidence and with greater impact.

 

Personal
branding:
In today’s day and age, and a highly
digitised and virtually connected world, personal branding and image management
have become ever so important. Chances are that you are working on your
personal branding – without even realising it. Every Facebook post or tweet on
Twitter is an opportunity to let others know who you are. Unlike traditional
meetings or conversations, our digital footprints are here to stay for a very
long time. They not only create a lasting impression on internal and external
stakeholders, but also help ensure better networking for the individual, which
is an important factor for success in today’s world. The word branding conjures
up an image of logos, advertising and models, which till today forms a large
chunk of how companies spend on a brand. Think IPL – look at the millions spent
by team-owners and their battery of consultants to ensure they look different
from the other teams and their fans recall their brand. For the past decade,
each IPL team has ‘invested’ millions on its logos, cricketers, sponsorships,
parties and cheerleaders.

 

(A) The leader as a statesman: There’s something about Mr. Deepak Parekh that inspires confidence.
Maybe it’s his serious demeanour or his succinct manner of communicating, but
when he makes a suggestion people listen and act on it. This explains why he is
invited on the boards of the best companies and by the government’s most
important policy-making committees. How has he managed to create this aura of
calm energy around himself? In his long career as a banker and head of HDFC,
the country’s premier housing finance company, he has built an impeccable
reputation for his integrity and decisiveness. Following in his footsteps is
the younger Mr. Uday Kotak, CEO, Kotak Bank. If he makes a comment in the
press, it is respected, if he is on a committee to define corporate governance,
investors believe he will steer it along the right path. Mr. Parekh and Mr.
Kotak are the most mature kind of leaders we call ‘statesman’ and it is
gravitas on display.

 

As per research
done at Princeton University, people decide on your trustworthiness within
one-tenth of a second. Whether it’s at an office meeting or a large social
gathering, successful leaders have an uncanny ability to command the room. They
get noticed when they walk into a room, and as they work their way through the
room, they make a connection with everyone they meet. They look people in the
eye, give them their full attention, listen to their story and say things that
make the other person feel good about the interaction. Interestingly, they
linger in your thoughts even after they have left. Clearly, leaders are in
complete agreement with American poet and civil rights activist Maya Angelou
who had famously remarked, ‘People will forget what you said, people will
forget what you did, but people will never forget how you made them feel.’

 

(B) In a virtual
world:
Today, managers and their teams are finding
it challenging to transition from high-contact, face-to-face meetings to remote
interactions. Despite the circumstances which have led to this sudden shift, it
may prove to be the new ‘normal’ for the next few months, maybe even forever.
Today, it has become a forced reality. The organisations of the future may not
need a physical location as their employees collaborate from remote locations,
creating new opportunities for both people and companies.

 

Leaders are
expected to add value by inspiring and motivating remote teams; the traditional
role of the leader as a supervisor is no longer relevant. As team members are
capable of solving their own problems, they need a leader who is both a coach
and a mentor. Simply put, leaders of remote teams have to make things smoother
for their teams to achieve their targets and stay engaged with the
organisation.

 

TEN WAYS TO ENHANCE YOUR EXECUTIVE PRESENCE

1. Embrace structure: As a leader, create a structure which allows smoother flow of
information. Spend time both at the individual level and at the group level
getting to know your team members better.

 

2. Focus on
enhanced communication:
We have to make changes in
our communication style to less distant and more accessible to our colleagues.
Communicating using technology requires a slightly more enthusiastic greeting,
speaking a tad bit louder, using a few extra gestures and spending a little
more time setting the context.

 

3. Encourage
participation:
A common complaint by all leaders is
that team members appear distracted during face-to-face meetings. With remote
teams, this problem has increased several fold. To encourage participation,
assign and allocate agenda items to team members. Ask specific questions to
individuals, e.g., ‘what was the highlight of your last week’s project?’ ‘what
more did you learn about this problem after speaking with the client?’

 

4. Redefine
trust:
When you can see team members sitting across
the corridor, you automatically assume that they are working. On the other
hand, if you see them once a month or twice a quarter, you might start doubting
their productivity. Managers will have to learn to trust their remote teams by
focusing on the deliverables, a major shift from the old order which gave
credit to the number of hours spent at the desk.

 

In the virtual
world, leaders tend to connect for task-based agendas, relying on technology.
However, humans need face-to-face interactions to trust and share their ideas.
Push for video calls – both at the individual level and at the group level.
Video calls are ideal for client meetings and internal reviews as they allow
screen-sharing and increased participation. Be quick to catch cues from members
who could be feeling lonely, appearing less motivated or possibly facing mental
health issues. Being clued-in enhances the leader’s ability to sense conflicts
and discontent at an early stage.

 

5. Micromanaging
is passé:
Check in frequently, but resist
micro-managing. Maintain clarity of communication, track the deliverables and
let your teams take ownership for their work.

 

6. Maintain
transparency:
Create a culture of being
non-judgmental and learn to manage biases. In the virtual world, it’s easier to
create sub-groups and alienate others. As a leader, you have to be sensitive to
this and nip it in the bud.

 

7. Enhance your
listening skills:
As a leader, an integral part of
your job is listening to your teams and clients. With remote working, leaders
are expected to further sharpen their ability to listen, offering support and
encouragement. Listen effectively, focus on vocal intonations, summarise and
repeat, ensuring you have a good grip on the ‘real’ problem.

 

8. Create a
sense of togetherness:
Like a traditional business
meeting, start remote interactions, too, with small talk. Ask pointed questions
to individual members, e.g., ‘How was your weekend?’ ‘What is the news from
your city?’ or ‘Give us a visual trip of your work zone.’ Small talk creates a
bridge, works as an ice-breaker and helps build relationships. Scheduling a
‘Zoom coffee’ for one-on-one interactions or a ‘Happy Hour’ for team drinks is
an excellent way to bond.

 

9. Civility
remains non-negotiable:
Some members will be
comfortable using technology while others may be awkward as they view it as a
physical barrier, leading to aggressiveness, rudeness and off-hand comments. As
a leader, be firm about acceptable behaviour and set the boundaries.

 

10. Promote a
culture of sharing:
Email, phone call, video call
or social media – what is the right communication tool for this query? Matching
the technology to your communication query requires planning. Plan the levels
of escalation and communicate them to your team.

 

CONCLUSION


It’s important to
note that Executive Presence can be developed through a combination of
self-awareness and coaching. In other words, you can learn to be a
leader who can influence and inspire and energise those around you. Is it
possible to build Executive Presence? Yes, it’s something you need to
focus on and you can develop it. Like any other skill, once you build awareness
on your strengths and weaknesses, you can get coached on your shortcomings. As
billionaire Warren Buffet said, his number one tip for success is: ‘Invest
in yourself.’

 

(Ms Shital
Kakkar Mehra is an executive coach, speaker and writer. She is the author of
‘Business Etiquette, A Guide for Indian Professional’ and has recently released
‘Executive Presence: The P.O.I.S.E. Formula for Leadership’, in July, 2020)

 

 

Life is a song – sing it

Life is a game – play it

Life is a challenge – meet it

Life is a dream – realise it

Life is a sacrifice – offer it

Life is love – enjoy it

                                                                        — 
Sai Baba

PROVISIONING FOR EXPECTED CREDIT LOSSES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NBFCs POST-COVID-19

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 outbreak which surfaced in
China towards the end of 2019 was declared a global pandemic by the WHO in
March, 2020. It has affected economic and financial markets, and virtually all
industries are facing challenges associated with the economic conditions
resulting from efforts to address it. As the pandemic increases both in magnitude
and duration, entities are experiencing conditions often associated with a
general economic downturn. The continuation of these circumstances could result
in an even broader economic downturn that could have a prolonged negative
impact on an entity’s financial results. In response thereto, the RBI announced
a series of regulatory measures and relief packages dealing with rescheduling
of loans and credit facilities, providing moratorium, asset classification and
provisioning for the entire financial services sector which comprises of banks,
financial institutions and NBFCs.

 

Since the purpose of this article is to
highlight some of the key issues that emanate from the Covid pandemic to be
considered by financial institutions and NBFCs, in particular, in applying the
expected credit loss model (ECL) for provisioning in their Ind AS financial
statements, the discussion of the regulatory aspects will only be limited to
the extent it impacts the ECL. Whilst the focus of this article is for lenders,
much of it would apply to measurement of ECL in industries other than financial
services.

 

For the purpose of this article, it is
assumed that the readers have reasonable working knowledge of the various
technical requirements and guidance under Ind AS on ECL and related matters.

 

OVERVIEW OF THE ECL
MODEL AND ITS INTERPLAY WITH OTHER TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IN THE
COVID ENVIRONMENT

 

ECL model as per Ind AS 109

Ind AS 109 on
Financial Instruments sets out a framework for determining the amount of
ECL that should be recognised. It requires that lifetime ECLs be
recognised when there is a significant increase in credit risk (SICR) on a
financial instrument
. However, it does not set bright lines or a mechanical
approach to determining when lifetime losses are required to be recognised, nor
does it dictate the exact basis on which entities should determine
forward-looking scenarios to consider when estimating ECLs.

 

Ind AS 109 requires entities to measure
expected losses and consider forward-looking information by reflecting ‘an
unbiased and probability-weighted amount that is determined by evaluating a
range of possible outcomes’
and taking into account ‘reasonable
and supportable information that is available without undue cost or effort at
that date about past events, current conditions and forecasts of future
economic conditions’.
Whilst it always required entities to consider
multiple scenarios, entities may not have done so because it did not make a
material difference to the outcome in a benign / static economic environment.
However, such an approach may no longer be appropriate in the current Covid
scenario. Further, Ind AS 109 requires the application of judgement and
permits entities to adjust their approach to determining ECLs in different
circumstances. A number of assumptions and linkages underlying the way ECLs
have been implemented to date may no longer hold in the current Covid
environment and therefore entities will have to revisit the ECL approach /
methodology and should not continue to apply their existing ECL methodology
mechanically.

 

PRESENTATION AND
DISCLOSURES

In line with the requirements of Ind AS
107
on Financial Instruments – Disclosures and Ind AS 1 on Presentation
of Financial Statements
, entities would be required to provide more
additional information to enable users of financial statements to understand
the overall impact of Covid-19 on their financial position and performance.
This is particularly important for areas in which Ind AS requires that
significant judgement is applied, which might also include other areas of
financial reporting. Similarly, the auditors would also need to consider
whether reporting on Covid-related matters needs to be reported as a key audit
matter in terms of the Auditing Standards.

 

Finally, distinguishing between adjusting
and non-adjusting events requires significant judgement,
particularly in the current environment for those entities where the economic
severity of the pandemic became apparent very shortly after the end of their
reporting period. The Guidance issued by the ICAI in connection therewith
should be referred to.

 

Impact of regulatory measures

The government and the RBI have been
announcing various relief measures / packages to enable entities to tide over
the adverse impact of Covid on their operations and financial position.
However, it may be difficult to initially incorporate the specific effects of
Covid and government support measures on a reasonable and supportable basis. The
changes in economic conditions should be reflected in macro-economic scenarios
applied by entities and in their weightings. If the effects of Covid are
difficult to be reflected in models considering the timing of Covid and
implications on Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting (IFCoFR),
post-model overlays or adjustments duly considering the portfolio segmentation
having shared credit risk characteristics and staging criteria (Stages 1, 2 and
3) may need to be considered as a pragmatic approach.

 

Further, entities should carefully assess
the impact of the economic support and relief measures on recognised financial
instruments and their conditions. This includes the assessment of whether such
measures result in modification of the financial assets and whether
modifications lead to their de-recognition. If it is concluded that the
support measures provide temporary relief to borrowers affected by the Covid
outbreak and the net economic value of the loan is not significantly affected,
the modification would be unlikely to be considered as substantial.

 

Finally, measures taken in the context of
the Covid outbreak that permit, require or encourage suspension or delays in
payments, should not be regarded as automatically having a one-to-one impact on
the assessment of whether loans have suffered an SICR.
Therefore, a
moratorium under these circumstances should not in itself be considered as an
automatic trigger of SICR. Assessing whether there is an SICR is a holistic
assessment of a number of quantitative and qualitative indicators. Furthermore,
when relief (forbearance) measures are provided to borrowers by issuers, these
measures should be analysed taking into account all the facts and circumstances
in order to distinguish, for example, whether the credit risk on the financial
instrument has significantly increased or whether the borrower is only
experiencing a temporary liquidity constraint and there has not been a
significant increase in credit risk and consequential impact on the ECL to be considered.

 

These and some other specific considerations
arising out of Covid-19 on the assessment of ECL are examined later in this
article.

 

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS


The following are some of the specific
considerations which need to be kept in mind whilst determining the adequacy
and appropriateness of the ECL provisions in the post-Covid scenario.

 

Reassessing the business model

As per Ind AS 109, the classification and
measurement of financial assets is dependent on the contractual cash flows
of the asset and the business model within which the asset is held,
which
in turn determines the basis of valuation of the financial assets and
the provisioning thereof. An entity’s business model is determined at a
level that reflects how groups of financial assets are managed together
to achieve a particular business objective. Going forward, entities may need to
revisit their business model to determine whether it (the business model) has
changed due to the Covid implications, as the entity may decide to sell its
‘hold to collect’ portfolio as part of its revised strategy to manage liquidity
and credit risks.

 

Revisiting overall portfolio
segmentation

In accordance with Ind AS 109, financial
instruments
should be grouped on the basis of shared credit
risk characteristics.
Due to the disruptions in the business
operations, entities might witness an impact on the credit quality of their
portfolio across certain industries, geographies, customer segments, etc., that
may require them to revisit their portfolio segmentation and revise the ECL
assessment as appropriate. This may result in new portfolios being created or
assets moving to an existing portfolio that better reflects the similar credit
risk characteristics of that group of assets.

 

Further, forward-looking information might
need to be tailored for each portfolio. How much weight to give that
information depends on the specific credit risk drivers relevant to the
entities’ portfolios.

 

To illustrate, entities may lend across a
broad customer base resulting in concentration of risk exposure because of the
sectors and geographic areas in which customers are based or work. An entity’s
expectations over future unemployment in a particular sector may only be
relevant to borrowers who work in that sector.

 

At a broader level the portfolios can be
segregated between corporate and retail customer base which can be further
segregated based on the representative shared credit risk characteristics,

as considered relevant. Examples of shared credit risk characteristics may
include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a)   instrument type;

(b)   credit risk ratings;

(c)   collateral type;

(d)   date of initial recognition;

(e)   remaining term to maturity;

(f)    industry;

(g)   geographical location of the borrower; and

(h)   the value and liquidity of collateral
relative to the financial asset if it has an impact on the probability of a
default occurring (for example, loan-to-value ratios).

           

Assessment of SICR vis-à-vis
moratorium

When an entity grants an extension of terms
to a counter-party, the management should assess whether or not this indicates
that there has been a significant increase in credit risk. Measures taken in
the context of the Covid outbreak that permit, require or encourage suspension
or delays in payments should not be regarded as automatically having a
one-to-one impact on the assessment of whether loans have suffered an SICR.
Determining whether a change in the timing of contractual cash flows is an
SICR, or evidence of a credit-impaired financial asset, requires careful
consideration of the specific facts and circumstances.

 

Within the population of customers that
apply for a moratorium, separating those that are in financial difficulty
(borrowers with a solvency issue) from those that are not (borrowers with a
temporary liquidity issue), will be an operational challenge.
Consideration
will need to be given to the payment status and history of the borrower
on the date when he applies for a moratorium. Therefore, an assessment will be
needed as to whether the moratorium is providing a short-term liquidity benefit
or addressing a deterioration in the borrower’s ability to meet its obligation
when due which, if it is a significant increase in lifetime Probability of
Default (PD), is an SICR.

 

An illustrative list of factors which can be
considered in making the aforesaid evaluations is as under:

 

1.   ‘Days Past Due’ metrics could reflect
the impact of the payment moratorium where borrowers take advantage of a
payment holiday and so instalments due on or after 1st March, 2020 may
no longer be ‘past due’.

2.   Payment history: Has the customer made
regular payments over, say, the last year on the loan in question and its other
credit obligations?

3.   Collateral: Has the valuation of the
underlying collaterals been significantly depleted?

4.   Leverage: Has the customer seen a
recent increase in leverage or indebtedness?

5.   Repeat forbearance: Has the customer
been granted prior / subsequent (post-balance sheet) forbearance treatments?

6.   Changes to credit risk policy: Do the
previous qualitative indicators of SICR need a reconsideration?

7.   Breach of the covenants of a credit
contract is a possible indication of unlikeliness to pay under the definition
of default. However, a covenant breach does not automatically trigger a
default. Rather, it is important to assess covenant breaches on a case-by-case
basis and determine whether they indicate unwillingness to pay.

8.   Sector in which the customer is
employed or operates, including its representative income profiles.

9.   Reference may also be drawn from various credit
agency reports
which detail the sectors which have had a significant
impact, e.g., travel, aviation, tourism, etc.

10. In case of wholesale customers, factors
including current cash position, gearing status, future payments (including
loan repayments, expenses), future cash inflows and likely covenant breaches
can be evaluated.

 

Paragraph B5.5.17 of Ind AS 109 also provides a non-exhaustive list of information that may be
relevant and considered by entities in assessing and evaluating changes in
credit risk.

 

The entity should have a clearly defined
policy
based on its portfolio to detail its evaluation of SICR and
how it will be applied across various portfolios and it should be approved by
the Board. (Refer to discussion under Governance process for further
details).

 

Assessing management overlays

This is an important consideration in the
context of the current unprecedented situation. The speed and timing of the
economic impact of Covid would require entities to include Post-Model
Adjustments (PMAs)
to cater for the inadequacies of their ECL
models
that are not designed to cater for the extreme economic
circumstances and government support measures that currently exist and to
reflect risks and other uncertainties that are not included in the underlying
ECL measurement models. Some of the macro-economic factors which could
be considered for making the assessment include, but are not limited to, GDP
growth rates, bank credit growth, wholesale price index, consumer price index,
Index of Industrial Production, unemployment rate, crude oil price, exchange
rates
, etc., depending upon the nature of the portfolio. Considering the
timing, availability of information and uncertainties involved, a pragmatic
approach needs to be considered depending on the facts and circumstances in doing the overlay on Probability of Default (PD)
scenarios at the identified segmented portfolio levels.
This would result
in additional downside scenarios in their year-end results, which topped
up the amount of their ECL allowances to specifically address economic
uncertainty.

 

Such PMAs should be well-controlled,
authorised, documented and need to be disclosed in accordance with the
governance framework for ECL as laid down by the entity.
It is recommended
that entities disclose an explanation for each material post-model
adjustment or overlay made,
along with the reason for the adjustment,
how the amount is determined, the approach used for the estimation and the
amount of each material post-model adjustment.

 

Probability weightage of various
scenarios

Paragraph 5.5.17(a) of Ind AS 109 requires the estimate of ECL to reflect an unbiased and
probability-weighted amount that is determined by evaluating a range of
possible outcomes.
In practice, this may not need to be a complex analysis,
and relatively simple modelling may be sufficient without the need for a large
number of detailed simulations of scenarios.

 

However, currently there is little
visibility on how long the pandemic would last and the economic impact could
range from a mild downturn (where growth slows for a quarter or two, and the
economy bounces back immediately) to a severe slowdown (where growth slows for
more than a year followed by a tenuous recovery). Accordingly, ECL computation
needs to be done based on a range of possible scenarios, presenting a varying
degree of the economic and financial crisis and predict corresponding outcomes
such as:

 

(i)   an optimistic scenario, considering a
temporary impact of Covid-19 and a V-shaped recovery,

(ii)  a scenario, considering a severe and extended
impact of Covid-19 and a U-shaped recovery; and

(iii) a pessimistic scenario, with a prolonged severe
downturn, leading to a new low-level normal.

 

An unbiased estimate is one that is neither
overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic. For this purpose, entities will need
to develop an estimate based on the best available data about past events,
current conditions and forecasts of future economic conditions. Adjustments to
expected loss rates in provision matrices and overlays to formal models (where
used) will be needed. Updated facts and circumstances should continue to be
monitored for any new information relevant to assessing the conditions at the
reporting date. The probabilities assigned to these multiple economic scenarios
will often be a significant judgement warranting disclosure, which is a
critical component of ECL reporting, given the level of measurement uncertainty
resulting from Covid.

 

Forward-looking
information

The use of forward-looking information is a
key component of the ECL impairment approach. But this is not straight-forward
and involves judgement. No one can predict the future with certainty so the
incorporation of forward-looking information introduces considerable volatility
into entities’ results.

 

The economic forecasts that entities use to
estimate lifetime losses should not only be consistent with internal
managements’ forward-looking views, but also supportable with sound
quantitative data and methods. It is recommended that lenders consider official
economic forecasts issued by RBI and internal economists in assessing the
severity and duration of the macro-economic deterioration. Economic forecasts
generated by research agencies or professional forecasters could also be used.
However, over-reliance on these sources may become problematic as market prices
for debt and derivatives might reflect factors other than the borrower’s risk
of default (such as market liquidity) and the credit ratings could be a lagging
indicator of credit risk. But so long as the forecasts are defensible and
consistent with the institution’s own views, these could also be used where
relevant for the particular financial instrument or group of financial
instruments, and not at the entity level, to which the impairment requirements
are being applied. Different factors may be relevant to different financial instruments
and, accordingly, the relevance of particular items of information may vary
between financial instruments, depending on the specific drivers of credit
risk. Some examples in respect thereof are as under:

 

(A)  For corporate lending, forward-looking information
includes the future prospects of the industries in which the group’s
counter-parties operate, obtained from economic expert reports, financial
analysts, governmental bodies, relevant think-tanks and other similar
organisations, as well as consideration of various internal and external
sources of actual and forecast economic information.

(B)  For retail lending forward-looking information
includes the same economic forecasts as corporate lending with additional
forecasts of local economic indicators, particularly for regions with a
concentration of certain industries, as well as internally generated
information of customer payment behaviour.

 

As required by paragraph 35G (b) of Ind
AS 107
, financial statements should disclose how forward-looking information
has been incorporated into the determination of expected credit losses,
including the use of macro-economic information.
Further, paragraph
35G(c)
requires disclosure on changes in the estimation techniques or
significant assumptions made during the reporting period and the reasons for
those changes.

 

Events after the reporting period

Ind AS 10 on Events
after the Reporting Period
distinguishes between adjusting and non-adjusting
events, with adjusting events being those that provide further evidence of
conditions that existed at the end of the reporting period and therefore need
to be reflected in the measurement of balances in the reporting period. Non-adjusting
events are those that are indicative of
a condition that arose after the end of the reporting period.

 

Entities will need to update their forward-looking
information to reflect expectations at the reporting date. Entities will need
to distinguish between those events that arose after the end of the reporting
period that reflect new events, as opposed to those that were reasonably
expected at the reporting period end and so would have been reasonably assessed
as being included in the forward-looking assessment made at the end of the
reporting period. This assessment might include, for example, assessing the
status and extent of the Covid-19 pandemic in geographies relevant to the
entity’s credit risk exposures at the reporting period end and considering the
path and extent of the increase in infection rates in other areas that were affected
earlier.

 

An entity may consider it reasonable at the
reporting period end to forecast particular macro-economic inputs used in ECL
modelling. If those macro-economic inputs end up not occurring or changing
after the reporting date, this should not be used as evidence to adjust the
entity’s expectation at the period end. Doing so would represent inappropriate
use of hindsight and would not reflect the conditions that existed at the
reporting period end. Distinguishing between adjusting and non-adjusting events
requires significant judgement, particularly in the current environment for
those entities where the economic severity of the pandemic became apparent very
shortly after the end of their reporting period.

 

The severity of the economic impact of Covid
after the end of the reporting period will require consideration even if those
economic impacts are non-adjusting events. When non-adjusting events after the
reporting period are material, an entity is required to disclose the nature of
the event and an estimate of its financial effect, or a statement that such an
estimate cannot be made.

 

Governance process

An entity’s Board of Directors (or
equivalent) and senior management are responsible for ensuring that it has
appropriate credit risk practices, including an effective system of internal
control, to consistently determine adequate allowances in accordance with its
stated policies and procedures, the applicable accounting framework and
relevant supervisory guidance.

 

As per the RBI circular dated 13th
March, 2020
on Implementation of Indian Accounting Standards, for
Non-Banking Financial Companies and Asset Reconstruction Companies,
the
RBI expects the Board of Directors to approve sound methodologies for
computation of ECL that address policies, procedures and controls for assessing
and measuring credit risk on all lending exposures, commensurate with the size,
complexity and risk profile specific to the NBFC / ARC.
These matters
become more critical in the context of the Covid-19-induced environment.
It would not be out of place for entities to set up a separate sub-committee
of the Board to monitor the impact on various aspects of the business due to
Covid, which could also cover the above referred matters.

 

The following are some of the specific matters
which need to be documented and approved by the Board and / or the Audit
Committee of the Board (ACB):

 

(I)    The parameters and assumptions considered
as well as their sensitivity to the ECL output.

(II)   NBFCs / ARCs are advised to not make
changes in the parameters, assumptions and other aspects of their ECL model for
the purposes of profit smoothening.

(III)  The rationale and justification for any
change in the ECL model.

(IV)  Any adjustments to the model output (i.e.,
a management overlay)
which are necessitated due to Covid-19 should be approved
by the ACB
together with its rationale and basis.

(V)  ACB should also approve the
classification of accounts that are past due beyond 90 days but not treated as
impaired, together with the rationale for the same.

 

CONCLUSION

Covid-19 is likely to be the new normal and
will continue to pose several challenges which will require quick responses on
a real-time basis, which may make it difficult to incorporate the specific
effects of the regulatory support measures on a reasonable and supportable
basis. However, changes in economic conditions should be reflected in
macro-economic scenarios applied by entities and in their weightings. If the
effects of Covid-19 cannot be reflected in models, post-model overlays or adjustments
will need to be considered. Although the current circumstances are difficult
and create high levels of uncertainty, ECL estimates can still be made if
monitored under the appropriate supervision and governance framework laid down
by the entities, based on reasonable and supportable information supplemented
by adequate disclosures for transparency in the entity’s financial statements.

 

(The author
would like to acknowledge the contribution of CA Rukshad Daruvala and CA
Neville Daruwalla for their inputs in preparing this article.)

 

 

FRAUD ANALYTICS IN INTERNAL AUDIT

BACKGROUND

Even though some organisations are
disinclined to report fraud, it is still necessary to try to prevent and detect
it. There is, however, some confusion over who exactly is responsible for this
task, with many non-auditors having the misconception that it is the duty of
auditors, internal or external, to uncover fraud. From the external auditors’
perspective, their role is to say whether the financial statements fairly
represent the operations of the company. Internal auditors would argue that
revealing fraud is not their ultimate goal – they aim to test the effectiveness
of internal controls. In reality, it’s much more likely that errors rather than
frauds will be found during an audit.

 

Under the
Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 – CARO 2020 – the Statutory Auditor is
required to report on fraud and whistle-blower complaints as below:


(a) Has there
been any fraud by the company or any fraud done on the company? Has any such
fraud been noticed or reported at any time of the year? If yes, the nature and
amount involved have to be reported.

(b) Whether
the auditors of the company have filed a report in Form ADT-4 with the Central
Government as prescribed under the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014?

(c) In case of
receipt of whistle-blower complaints, whether the complaints have been
considered by the auditor.

 

While
uncovering fraud may not be an auditor’s main responsibility, there is
certainly a variety of tools, tests and processes that can be utilised to
detect it. And data analytics increases the chances of uncovering fraud.

 

WHAT IS FORENSIC
ACCOUNTING?

Forensic
accounting is a specialty practice area where accounting, auditing and
investigative skills are used to analyse information that is suitable for use
in a court of law.

 

Forensic
accountants are often engaged to quantify damages in instances related to fraud
and embezzlement, as well as on matters involving insurance, personal injury,
business disputes, business interruption, divorce and marital disputes,
construction, environmental damages, cyber-crime, products liability, business
valuation and more.

 

What is
fraud investigation?

Fraud investigation is the process of
resolving allegations of fraud from inception to disposition. Standard tasks
include obtaining evidence, reporting, testifying to findings and assisting in
fraud detection and prevention.

 

Developing an
investigation plan includes:


(i)    Review and gain a basic
understanding of key issues.

(ii)   Define the goals of the
investigation.

(iii)   Identify whom to keep
informed.

(iv)  Determine the terms of
reference and timeline for completion.

(v)   Address the need for law
enforcement assistance.

(vi)  Define team member roles and
assign tasks.

(vii)  Outline the course of
action.

(viii) Prepare the organisation
for the investigation.

 

What is
fraud analytics?

Fraud
analytics is an integral part of fraud investigation. Fraud analytics combines
analytic technology and techniques with human interaction to help detect
potential improper transactions, such as those based on fraud and / or bribery,
either before the transactions are completed or as they occur.

 

The process of
fraud analytics involves gathering and storing relevant data and mining it for
patterns, discrepancies and anomalies. The findings are then translated into
insights that can allow a company to manage potential threats before they occur
as well as develop a proactive fraud and bribery detection environment.

 

KEY REASONS FOR USING DATA ANALYTICS FOR FRAUD DETECTION

Forensic data
analysis tools help organisations to fully realise or realise to a credible
extent early fraud detection, increased business transparency and reduced costs
of their anti-fraud programme.

 

Some of the
key reasons for using forensic data analysis tools are:


(A)  Early fraud detection.

(B)  Ability to detect fraud that
could not be detected earlier.

(C)  Faster response in
investigations.

(D)  Increased business
transparency.

(E)  Getting the business to take
more responsibility for managing the company’s anti-fraud programme.

(F)  Reduced costs of the
anti-fraud programme.

 

Case
study on fraud analytics – ‘Procure to Pay’

‘Procure to
Pay’ is one of the major areas of success with fraud analytics. The main
objective is to check for the validity of items. This encompasses supplier
overpricing, invalid invoices, frauds of various types, accidental duplication
and simply picking up out-of-control expenses.

 

Some of the
illustrative fraud analytics tests for visualisation and / or red flag
detection are:


1.   Analyse purchases or payments
by value bands and identify unusual trends.

2.   Test for splitting,
particularly below threshold authority limits.

3.   Summarise by type of payment
– regular supplier, one-time supplier, etc.

4.   Analyse by period to
determine seasonal fluctuations.

5.   Analyse late shipments for
impact on jobs, projects, or sales orders due.

6.   Reconcile orders received
with the purchase orders to identify shipments not ordered.

7.   Report on purchasing
performance by location.

8.   Summarise item delivery and
quality and compare vendor performance.

9.   Compare accrued payables to
received items to reconcile to general ledger.

10. Check for continued purchases
despite high rate of returns, rejections, or credits.

11. Track scheduled receipt dates
versus actual receipt dates.

12. Identify price increases
higher than acceptable percentages.

13. Capture invoices without a
valid purchase order.

14. Find invoices for more than
one purchase order authorisation.

15. Isolate and extract pricing
and receipt quantity variations by vendor and purchase order.

16. Filter out multiple invoices
just under approval cut-off levels.

17. Detect invoice payments on
weekends or public holidays.

18. Find high value items being
bought from a single vendor.

19. Aging analysis of open orders
beyond a specified number of months.

20. Changes to orders in terms of
quantity and unit price after receipt of material.

21. Orders raised after receipt of
material and / or after receipt of supplier’s bills.

22. Sequential orders raised on
suspect vendors.

23. Backdating of orders.

24. Same material being bought
under different material codes.

25. Same material being bought
from the same vendor on different payment terms and / or delivery terms.

26. Payments to vendors initiated
and approved by the same user.

27. Same vendor having multiple
vendor codes of which one or more code/s have debit balances (on account of
advances) while other code/s are receiving bill-based payments without
adjusting the on-account advances.

28. Duplicate bill payments to a
vendor against the same invoice and order – exact match on invoice.

29. Duplicate bill payments to a
vendor against the same invoice and order – near match on invoice (fuzzy
pattern-based match).

30. Material bought at a higher
price from a vendor when there is an open order within the system for the same
material pending delivery at a lower price.

 

The examples
given in this article are based on use of IDEA Data Analysis Tool. However, a
reader can choose and use any Data Analytical Tool for conducting such fraud
analytics.

 

Case
Study 1 – Using Benford’s Law in IDEA Software to identify Vendor Payment
splitting and / or skimming

 

In this tool Benford’s Law has been
incorporated for easy detection of red flags. Any significant alteration to the
natural flow of numbers is identified in the form of a graph. The graph
containing many specialised views is designed to identify common forms of
fraud.

 

Benford’s Law
lets you compare your data under review for patterns predicted by Benford’s Law
of Digital Analysis. Spot irregularities by analysing digits in numerical data
sets to capture potential fraud (exploratory analytics). Apply the Benford’s
Law – Last 2 Digits Test, to detect skimming and circumvention of vendor
payments just below a threshold approval limit as seen in the ‘Highly
Suspicious’ red bars in the Benford’s screenshot below.

 

 

Case
Study 2 – Apply the Relative Size Factor (RSF) test to capture Vendor Payment
outliers

 

The purpose of
the Relative Size Factor (RSF) test is to identify anomalies where the largest
amount for subsets in a given key is outside the norm for those subsets. This
test compares the top two amounts for each subset and calculates the RSF for
each. The RSF test utilises the largest and the second largest amount to
calculate a ratio based on purchases that are grouped by vendors in order to
identify potential fraudulent activities in invoice payment data, as has often
been suggested in fraud examination literature.

 

 

Case Study 3 – Apply the Fuzzy Duplicate test to
capture duplicate pattern matches

 

The Fuzzy
Duplicate task identifies pattern-based matching (similar) records within
selected character field/s and then groups them based on their degree of
similarity. Identify multiple similar records within selected character fields
to detect data entry errors, multiple data conventions for recording
information and fraud. Generate a potential list of pattern matching duplicates
on the Inventory Description in an Inventory Master Dump.

 

Case
Study 4 – Apply Anti-Bribery and Corruption checks through Search on a General
Ledger narration field

 


A search
provides keyword searching capabilities to find text within fields in a database
without the need to write code / equations to execute the search criteria.
Anti-bribery and corruption checks can be applied through Search on a General
Ledger to look for the narration field containing key words like ‘gift’,
‘donation’, ‘suspense’ and other such text.

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

Incorporating
an anti-fraud programme for internal auditors (even for external / statutory
auditors) is extremely important, irrespective of the requirement of the law as
the top management and stakeholders are moving towards ‘zero tolerance’ of such
incidents. If a process / area has been reviewed / audited and later there are
incidents of fraud detected, then there is always a close scrutiny of the work
carried out by the internal auditor.

 

With the
advent of technology and the data explosion, it is necessary for the internal
auditor to employ data analytics tools and techniques, or ‘Fraud Analytics’,
for:

*
comprehensive coverage of process / area under review,

* storing
evidence using the analytics tool on the steps taken for each test, full
coverage of the period under review or even sample selection,

* devising and
completing various tests for detecting any anomaly or red flags,

* focusing on
transactions / areas which show patterns which deviate from the norms.

BENEFITS FOR SMPs UNDER MSME ACT & OTHER STATUTES

The
Chartered Accountants in public practice spread across India are generally
categorised as Small and Medium Practitioners (SMP). As per ICAI statistics,
almost 97% of the CA firms in India are sole proprietorships or partnership
firms with up to five partners. This category forms the backbone of the
profession in India catering to a vast number of entities.

 

The
ICAI’s Ethical Standards Board in a recent decision has clarified that ‘A CA
firm may register itself on Udyog Aadhar, a web portal of the Ministry of
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises’. Accordingly, the SMP CA firms can avail
the various benefits available to the MSME units by registering themselves
under ‘UDYAM’ (earlier Udyog Aadhar).

 

The
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act was notified in
2006 to address policy and practical issues affecting MSMEs as well as the
coverage and investment ceiling of the sector.

 

Many CAs
do not register as MSMEs due to lack of familiarity with the various benefits
and support made available by the government for the sector. The authors have
attempted to summarise in this article the key benefits available to SMPs.

 

CLASSIFICATION OF MICRO, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTERPRISES

 

The
revised classification of MSME’s applicable w.e.f. 1st July, 2020
for Manufacturing and Service Enterprises is as follows:

 

Micro

Small

Medium

Investment in Plant & Machinery (for manufacturing entities) or
Equipment (for service entities) not more than

Rs. 1
crore

Rs. 10
crores

Rs. 50
crores

 

AND

Annual turnover not more than

Rs. 5 crores

Rs. 50 crores

Rs. 250 crores

 

REGISTRATION OF MSME (UDYAM)

 

Registration
under the MSME Act, 2006 will be called  Udyam
Registration w.e.f. 1st July, 2020 and a dedicated web portal has
been made available for registration at the following web address:
https://udyamregistration.gov.in.

 

The
following are important features of the new registration process:

 

* The
MSME registration process is fully online, paperless and based on
self-declaration.

* No
documents or proofs are required to be uploaded for registering as an MSME.

* No fees
are payable for registration.

* Aadhaar
number is mandatory for obtaining Udyam Registration (Aadhaar of
proprietor / partner / karta / authorised signatory).

* PAN and
GSTIN are mandatory for Udyam Registration from 1st April, 2021.

* PAN and
GST-linked details on investment and turnover of enterprises will be taken
automatically from government data bases.

*
Registration of entities not having either PAN or GSTIN will be cancelled
w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.

* A
registration certificate will be issued which will have a dynamic QR Code from
which the details about the enterprise can be accessed.

* All
existing enterprises registered under EM–Part-II or Udyog Aadhar shall register
again
on the Udyam Registration portal on or after 1st July,
2020. All enterprises registered till 30th June, 2020 shall be
reclassified in accordance with this Notification.

* The
existing enterprises registered prior to 30th June, 2020 and not
having registered under Udyam shall continue to be valid only for the
period up to 31st March, 2021.

 

KEY BENEFITS FOR SMPs UNDER THE MSMED ACT AND OTHER STATUTES

 

1.
Protection against delayed payments to Micro & Small Enterprises (MSEs)

 

The MSMED
Act, 2006 gives protection to MSME-registered entities against delay in
payments from buyers.
Further, the MSME’s have right of interest on delayed payment through
conciliation and arbitration and settlement of disputes to be done in minimum
time.

 

  • If any micro or small
    enterprise that has MSME registration supplies any goods or services, then
    the buyer is required to make payment on or before the date agreed upon
    between the buyer and the micro or small enterprise.
  •  In case there is
    no payment date on the agreement, then the buyer is required to make
    payment within 15 days of acceptance of goods or services.
  • Further, in any case,
    a payment due to a micro or small enterprise cannot exceed 45 days from
    the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.
  • In case of failure by
    the buyer to make payment on time, the buyer is required to pay compound
    interest with monthly interest rests to the supplier on that amount from
    the agreed date of payment or 15 days of acceptance of goods or services.
  •  The penal
    interest
    chargeable for delayed payment to an MSME enterprise is three
    times the bank rate
    notified by the Reserve Bank of India. Such
    interest is also not a tax-deductible expense under the Income-tax Act.
  • Further, as mentioned
    in section 22 of the MSMED Act, 2006, where any buyer is required to get
    his annual accounts audited under any law for the time being in force,
    such buyer shall furnish additional information in his annual statement of
    accounts regarding the outstanding principal and interest payable to MSME
    enterprises.

 

MSME
units can access the MSME SAMADHAAN portal
(https://samadhaan.msme.gov.in/) for prompt settlement of any disputes relating
to delay in payment or interest.

 

2.  Credit Guarantee Scheme for Micro & Small
Enterprises (CGTMSE)

 

  • Credit guarantee for
    loans up to Rs. 2 crores, without collateral and third-party guarantee.
  • New and existing Micro
    and Small Enterprises engaged in manufacturing or service activity are
    eligible borrowers under this scheme.
  • Borrowers need to
    conduct a market analysis and prepare a business plan containing relevant
    information, such as business model, promoter profile, projected
    financials, etc. and submit the loan application which is sanctioned as
    per the bank’s policy. After the loan is sanctioned, the bank applies to
    the CGTMSE authority and obtains the guarantee cover.
  • Guarantee coverage
    ranges from 85% (Micro Enterprise up to Rs. 5 lakhs) to 75% (others).
  • 50% coverage is for
    retail activity.

Detailed
information and application
can be obtained from https://www.cgtmse.in/

 

3.
Interest Subvention Scheme for MSMEs – 2018

  • 2% interest subvention
    on fresh or incremental loans, maximum up to Rs. 1 crore, to MSMEs.
  • This interest relief
    will be calculated at two percentage points per annum (2% p.a.), on outstanding
    balance from time to time from the date of disbursal / drawl or the date
    of notification of this scheme, whichever is later, on the incremental or
    fresh amount of working capital sanctioned or incremental or new term loan
    disbursed by eligible institutions.
  • Incremental / fresh
    term loan or incremental / fresh working capital extended from 2nd
    November, 2018 by any scheduled commercial banks, NBFCs, RRBs, UCBs
    (scheduled and non-scheduled) and DCCBs would be covered under the scheme.
  • SIDBI shall act as a
    nodal agency for the purpose of channelling of interest subvention to the
    various lending institutions through their nodal office.
  • MSMEs already availing
    interest subvention under any of the schemes of the State / Central
    government are not eligible under the scheme.

 

Detailed
information about the scheme can be obtained from:
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/125ISCUR72A9B5ADE83345F9A47410967A83ED27.PDF

Detailed
information and application can be obtained from
https://sidbi.in/files/circulars/ISS-for-MSMEs,-2018—Circular-and FAQs.pdf

 

4.
Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme – Atmanirbhar Bharat Mission 2020

 

The
Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme, worth Rs. 3 lakh crores, was launched
as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Mission on 20th May, 2020. The
scheme provides credit relief to MSMEs facing hardships due to coronavirus
pandemic-triggered lockdowns.

 

In a
pragmatic mid-scheme assessment, the government on 1st August, 2020
has expanded the eligibility criteria for the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee
Scheme (ECLGS) beyond MSMEs to include ‘individuals who take loans for business
purpose’. With the eligibility expansion, Chartered Accountants, who
have taken loans for their professional needs, will be eligible for credit
under the special credit guarantee scheme which was earlier aimed to benefit
medium and small enterprises.

 

KEY FEATURES

 

  • All MSME borrower
    accounts with outstanding credit of up to Rs. 25 crores as on 29th
    February, 2020 which were less than or equal to 60 days past due as on
    that date, i.e., regular, SMA 0 and SMA 1 accounts, and with an annual
    turnover of up to Rs. 100 crores, would be eligible for Guaranteed
    Emergency Credit Line (GECL) funding under the scheme.
  • The amount of funding
    shall be either in the form of additional working capital term loans (in
    case of banks and FIs), or additional term loans (in case of NBFCs).
  • Funding would be up to
    20% of their entire outstanding credit up to Rs. 25 crores as on 29th
    February, 2020.
  • The entire funding
    shall be provided with a 100% credit guarantee.
  • Tenor of loan under
    the scheme shall be four years with moratorium period of one year on the
    principal amount.
  • No guarantee fee shall
    be charged.
  • Interest rates under
    the scheme shall be capped at 9.25% for banks and FIs, and at 14% for
    NBFCs.

 

5. Trade Receivables
Discounting System (TReDS)

 

  • TReDS is a digital
    platform for MSMEs to auction / discount their trade receivables at
    competitive rates through online bidding by financiers.
  • The system, which is
    accessible online through three exchanges, was launched to ensure that
    suppliers are credited their due receivables in a timely manner.
  • The system is
    initiated when a transaction is conducted between the supplier and buyer.
  • The receivable is
    logged into the system by the supplier.
  • Receivables are funded
    by financiers through a bidding process.
  • Only the supplier is
    able to view all the bids placed by different financiers. When the
    supplier selects the best bid, the amount is received within two to three
    business days from the financier.
  • On the regular due date,
    the due amount is debited from the buyer and transferred to the financier.
  • The objective is to
    address the critical needs of MSMEs:

(i)
Promptly finance trade receivables, and (ii) Financing trade receivables based
on buyers’ credit rating.

 

TReDS has
been licensed to three exchanges:

 

(1)
Receivables Exchange of India Ltd. (RXIL):
A joint venture between
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and National Stock Exchange
of India Limited (NSE).

https://www.rxil.in/AboutTreds/Treds

(2)       Invoicemart: Promoted by A TReDS Ltd.
(a joint venture between Axis Bank and mjunction services).

https://www.invoicemart.com

(3)       M1Xchange: Promoted by Mynd Solutions
Private Limited

M1xchange:
https://www.m1xchange.com/treds.php

 

Detailed
information available at:
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/TREDSG031214.pdf

 

6. Public
Procurement Policy from MSME

 

  • The Public Procurement
    Policy for Micro and Small Enterprises (MSME) Order, 2012 has mandated every
    Central Ministry / Department / PSU to procure minimum 25% of the annual
    value of goods or services and certain reserved items from Micro and Small
    Enterprises.
  • No fees for procuring
    tender document or furnishing earnest money; and, in certain cases, price
    adjustment also permissible for MSEs to the extent of 15% to match lowest
    bid in tender.
  • The MSME SAMBANDH is
    the Public Procurement Portal launched by the Central Government for the
    MSMEs to monitor the implementation of the public procurement from MSEs by
    Central Public Sector Enterprises (sambandh.msme.gov.in).

 

7.
Reimbursement of ISO Certification

 

  • All registered Micro
    and Small Industries can avail an exemption of all expenses incurred for
    obtaining ISO 9000, ISO 14001 and HACCP certifications.
  •  It includes 75%
    of the certification expenses up to a maximum of Rs. 75,000 to each unit
    as one-time reimbursement.
  • Scheme applicable only
    to those MSEs which have acquired Quality Management Systems (QMS) / ISO
    9001 and / or Environment Management Systems (EMS) / ISO14001 and / or
    Food Safety Systems (HACCP) Certification.

 

For more
information:

https://www.startupindia.gov.in/content/sih/en/government-schemes/reimbursement_iso_standards.html

 

  • 8. Service Exports
    from India Scheme (SEIS)

 

  • To facilitate growth
    in export of services so as to create a powerful and unique ‘Served from
    India Scheme’ brand, instantly recognised and respected the world over.
  • Under this scheme, all
    Indian Service Providers having free foreign exchange earning of at least
    US $15,000 in the preceding year can claim the Duty Credit Scrip.
  • For Individual Service
    Providers and sole proprietorships, such minimum net free foreign exchange
    earnings criterion would be US $10,000 in the preceding financial year.
  • This Duty Credit Scrip
    is equivalent to 3% – 7% of ‘NET’ free foreign exchange earned during the
    previous financial year.
  • The Duty Credit Scrips
    and goods imported against them shall be freely transferable.
  • The services of SMPs
    are covered under the category – Professional Services – Legal Services,
    Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services and Taxation Services.
  • Free foreign exchange
    earned through International Credit Cards and other instruments as
    permitted by RBI for rendering of service are also taken into account for
    computation of Duty Credit Scrip.
  • Import Export Code
    (IEC) is mandatory at the time of rendering service for claiming benefits.

 

For more
information:
https://dgft.gov.in/CP/

 

9.
Reduced IPR Filing Fee

  • The Department of
    Electronics and Information Technology (DeiTY) has launched a scheme
    entitled ‘Support for International Patent Protection in E&IT
    (SIP-EIT)’ to provide financial support to MSMEs and Technology Startup
    units for international patent filing.
  • The reimbursement
    limit has been set to the maximum of Rs. 15 lakhs per invention or 50% of
    the total charges incurred in filing and processing of a patent
    application, whichever is lesser.

 

For
details refer:
http://www.ict-ipr.in/sipeit/SIPEITForm

 

CONCLUSION

 

The
Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME) is one of the top priority sectors
for the present Government of India and it is providing all the support and
assistance needed for the development of the sector. The Small and Medium
Chartered Accountant Practitioners (SMPs) are the most popular source of advice
and support to MSMEs.

 

Among
other MSMEs, the SMPs are also in need of credit and technical support for
growth and development. The delayed recovery of outstanding dues from clients
leads to working capital issues and a major roadblock for the growth of small
CA firms. The lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic has further reduced the
inflow of client funds and resulted in a cash crunch. The various schemes as
discussed above will come as a great guidance to the practising Chartered
Accountancy firms in these difficult times.

 

 

 

TAXPAYER SERVICES: MESSAGE, MEANING AND MEANS – 2/2

This Editorial covers the remainder of what the previous
one couldn’t due to limitations of space. In September we had covered tax
overreach, accountability, creating grounds for taxpayers
and stoppage of target-setting.
Here are more points on detailing the Taxpayer’s Charter (TC) to honour the
honest taxpayer:

 

Scrutiny: The time between notice, commencement of actual
proceedings and closure must be three to five months. Today, assessment happens
in the last few months before time-barring. This is as unfair to an ITO who has
to read, study, understand and form an opinion, as it is to a taxpayer /
professional.

 

Time as the essence: Outer time limit at the CIT(A) level is
specified as one year and six months for fact-based appeals. Non-response by an
ITO / assessee to a CIT(A)’s call for information and response time trails
should be mentioned in orders and non-response by the A.O. cannot be a reason
for stretching dispute resolution. At the ITAT level, the time limit
should generally be fixed up to three years, and two years for matters of fact.
Remand of cases should be monitored, statistics of the number of matters
remanded and the average time taken should be reported in public domain.

 

Structure of orders: Orders should carry the dates of submissions and
hearings, brief nature and number of submissions and questions raised from both
sides. Additions / SCNs should state clearly, where possible, whether the
issues are predominantly about law or fact so that further dispute resolution
can be placed in the right bucket. Just as the assessee makes a statement at
the end of an ITR, the ITO should declare that the assessment order, demand,
etc. are in accordance with the Taxpayer’s Charter and the provisions of law.

 

Data: A.Y.-wise statistics, including drill-down up to
Commissionerate level, is made available in the public domain. This should
include the number of orders passed at each level, the number and value of
demands raised, how many appealed, appealed by assessee or Department [in case
of CIT(A) onwards], did the matter contain an issue of law or fact or
indeterminate, ageing of each appeal at each level, determination in favour of
Department or assessee, and amount demanded vs. amount determined at each level
of dispute resolution. Such data must be published regularly. A periodic
jurisdiction-wise transparent reporting will show us what is happening.

 

Reservation in tax system: It is outrageous that
agricultural income without any limit goes ‘tax-free’. As reported by the CAG,
in A.Y. 2017-18, Rs. 500 crores of agricultural income went tax-free without
adequate verification based in 1527 / 6778 cases. This is inequitable,
unreasonable and disrespectful to honest taxpayers. Section 10(1) is a conduit
for evasion, misuse and laundering (refer TARC Report in 2014).

 

Data obesity: Today ITR seeks so many details of the assessee
which the assessee has already given elsewhere. When companies have filed data
on the MCA, GST or customs portals, why ask for it, then send mismatch notices,
and trigger some action based on incomparable data points? Recent example of
ISIN in ITR (A.Y. 2021): Can an honest taxpayer not share his DP ID, CAS ID,
etc., and ITD can thereafter fetch data from the Stock Exchanges to match it? Let’s
have one nation, one Government!

 

Other issues include: Sharpening selection of cases (1% of
taxpayers make up 50% of demands), consider cost incurred by the taxpayer in cost
of collection vs. collected, accounting of revenue
collected (disputed
amounts collected should be treated as an advance), rewriting ITA in plain
English
and giving due attention to what the taxpayer gets after a lifetime
of paying taxes when 98% others don’t. While an Honest Taxpayer is not
defined, if his rights and services are enumerated, it will be a stronger,
meaningful and praiseworthy start.

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

BE THE CHANGE: REMEMBERING GANDHI

‘Be the
change you wish to see in the world,’
said Gandhiji as he invited us to become agents
of change. Today, as we face a severe environmental crisis, this teaching is
more relevant than ever. But what does it really mean to you and me?

 

Often people
ask me – what difference will it make if I make a small change in my life? Will
I be able to
save the Amazon forests that are burning down? Will I be able to save those
dolphins and whales that are dying on the shores with stomachs full of plastic?
What can I do?

 

The damage
that disposable plastic has had on our natural world and on other living beings
is unprecedented. The seas and oceans are now filled with microplastics that it
will be almost impossible to clean up. But who is using these products that end
up in the ocean?

 

Imagine if
one billion Indians took a pledge never to use a plastic carry bag in their
lives, to find creative alternatives to plastic water bottles and to never ask
for plastic spoons in a restaurant.

 

Gandhiji
reminds us that real change comes from an individual level and grows into
national and international change. He said, ‘What is true of the individual
will be tomorrow true of the whole nation if individuals will but refuse to
lose heart and hope.’

 

Making this
change is not as difficult as we make it out to be. When I was growing up, we did
not have
single-use disposables in our life. We carried our own cloth bags to the market
and we bought oils and milk in bottles. Drinking water was available at train
stations and restaurants for free. The idea of using plastic spoons and forks
emerged much later. So we have seen that it is possible to live a life without
disposable plastics.

 

You might
think – but this is so inconvenient! The one reason that people in the UK gave
for not carrying their own cloth bags was that they ‘forgot’. The cost we are
paying for this forgetfulness is so high that future generations will never
forgive us. Microplastics are entering the water we drink and the food we eat.
Cancers are being caused by these nano particles of plastic. Is this worth it?

 

As
individuals, if we find ways to reuse items in our own lives, we will be
saving money, saving our own health and our environment. As accountants and
auditors to businesses, if we can conduct waste audits, even as a complimentary
service, we enable huge savings by establishing systems of reuse.

 

Here are some
of the small things you can do at the corporate level:

1.  Can ball pens get refills
instead of being thrown out each time the ink gets over?

2.  Can plastic water bottles
be replaced by drinking water stations at each level?

3.  Can food be packaged in larger
steel containers instead of small individual plastic packets?

4.  Can conferences use ‘green’
kits – do nametags have to be in disposable plastics?

5.  Can cleaning supplies be
ordered in larger quantities and stored rather than in smaller plastic
containers?

6.  Can plastic packaging be
replaced by paper
and cloth packaging?

7.  Can waste be segregated
and wet waste composted at source?

8.  Can plastic wastes be recycled?

9.  Can the corporate campus be
declared a plastic-free zone
?

 

Such a waste
audit and its recommendations can be followed up with change of habit and new
norms.

 

Gandhiji
visited the UK wearing a khadi dhoti to make a point about
self-determination. How can we make a point and redesign our lifestyle and
working style as we celebrate the birth anniversary of Bapu?

 

You and I may
not be able to make grand and brave statements, but even the smallest change we
make in our choices can lead the world towards the change we wish to see. It is
because Gandhiji believed that one voice mattered, that the entire world
listened to them.

 

Be the change
you wish to see in the world.

Capital gains – Transfer – Sections 45(4) and 47 of ITA, 1961 – Conversion of firm to private limited company – Transaction not transfer giving rise to capital gains

4.      
Principal CIT vs. Ram Krishnan
Kulwant Rai Holdings P. Ltd.; [2019] 416 ITR 123 (Mad.)
Date of order: 16th July, 2019 A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Capital gains – Transfer – Sections 45(4)
and 47 of ITA, 1961 – Conversion of firm to private limited company –
Transaction not transfer giving rise to capital gains

 

The assessee was a
private limited company. Originally, the assessee was a partnership firm and it
was converted into a private limited company. The firm revalued its assets and
in the revaluation, the value of the assets was increased to Rs. 117,24,04,974,
but the book value of the assets on the date of revaluation was Rs. 52,16,526.
The AO held that the total value of the capital account of all the four
partners after being revalued stood at Rs. 117,32,87,069, that the shares were
allotted to the partners of the firm for a total amount of Rs. 10 lakhs and
that the balance of Rs. 117,22,87,070 was given as credit of loan to the
partners of the erstwhile firm in the same proportion as their share capital of
the firm, that this was a deviation stipulated u/s 47(xiii) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 for exemption from the capital gains and made an addition of Rs.
117,22,87,070 towards short-term capital gains and brought the amount to tax.

 

The Tribunal held
that the capital gains tax could not be levied in the hands of the
assessee-company, which succeeded to the assets and the liabilities of the firm
and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘(i)   The legal position having been well settled
that when vesting takes place, it vested in the company as it existed.
Therefore, unless and until the first condition of transfer by way of
distribution of assets is satisfied, section 45(4) of the Act would not be
attracted. In the facts and circumstances, there was no transfer by way of
distribution of assets.

 

(ii)   The Commissioner (Appeals) did not take into
consideration the legal issue involved, i.e., when a firm was succeeded by a
company with no change either in the number of members or in the value of
assets with no dissolution of the firm and no distribution of assets with
change in the legal status alone, whether there was a “transfer” as
contemplated u/s 2(47) and 45(4) of the Act. The Tribunal rightly decided the
issue.’

Business expenditure – Difference between setting up of business and starting commercial activities – Company formed to design, manufacture and sell commercial vehicles – Commencement of research and development and construction of factory – Business had been set up – Assessee entitled to deduction of operating expenses, financial expenses and depreciation

3.      
Daimler India Commercial
Vehicles P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT.; [2019] 416 ITR 343 (Mad.)
Date of order: 5th July, 2019 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Business expenditure – Difference between
setting up of business and starting commercial activities – Company formed to
design, manufacture and sell commercial vehicles – Commencement of research and
development and construction of factory – Business had been set up – Assessee
entitled to deduction of operating expenses, financial expenses and
depreciation

 

The assessee was a
company. In terms of its memorandum of association, it was incorporated for a
bundle of activities, viz., designing, manufacturing, distributing, selling,
after-sales engineering services and research and development of commercial
vehicles and related products and components for the domestic Indian and
overseas market. The AO disallowed the operating expenses, financial expenses
and depreciation. The reason given by him was that the commercial operation of
manufacture and sale of commercial vehicles had not commenced so far and,
therefore, the expenditure incurred by the assessee under the three heads could
not be allowed.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order on the ground that the business of the assessee had not been set up.

 

On appeal by the
assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

‘(i)   There is a clear distinction between a person
commencing a business and a person setting up a business. When a business is
established and ready to commence business, then it can be said of that
business that it is set up. The test is of common sense and what in the eye of
a business can be said to be the commencement of business. One business
activity may precede the other and what is required to be seen is whether one
of the essential activities for the carrying on of the business of the assessee
as a whole was or was not commenced. In the case of a composite business, a
variety of matters bearing on the unity of the business have to be
investigated, such as unity of control and management, conduct of the business
through the same agency, the interrelation of business, the employment of same
capital, the maintenance of common books of accounts, employment of same staff
to run the business, the nature of the different transactions, the possibility
of one being closed without affecting the texture of the other, etc.

 

(ii)   There was no dispute with regard to the date
on which the assessee had set up its business. The business of the assessee had
been set up in the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal erred in holding that
merely because the manufacturing and sale of the vehicle did not take place the
business of the assessee had not been set up. This was never an issue before
the AO and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to unsettle the finding of the date
on which the business of the assessee was set up. The order of the Tribunal had
necessarily to be set aside.

 

(iii)   The assessee had commenced and performed
activities relating to designing of commercial vehicles and related products
research and development, buying and selling of parts and in the process of construction
of factory building for manufacture of commercial vehicles. The unity of
control, management, etc., of the assessee in respect of each of its activity
had not been disputed by the Revenue. In such circumstances, the assessee on
showing that it had commenced several of its activities for which it was
incorporated would definitely qualify for deduction of the expenditure incurred
by it under the head operating expenses, financial expenses and depreciation.’

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 43B of ITA, 1961 – Deduction only on actual payment – Service tax – Liability to pay service tax into treasury arises only upon receipt of consideration by assessee – Service tax debited to profit and loss account – Cannot be disallowed

2.     Principal CIT vs. Tops Security
Ltd.; [2019] 415 ITR 212 (Bom.)
Date of order: 10th September,
2018
A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 43B
of ITA, 1961 – Deduction only on actual payment – Service tax – Liability to
pay service tax into treasury arises only upon receipt of consideration by
assessee – Service tax debited to profit and loss account – Cannot be
disallowed

 

The assessee
provided detection and security services to its clients. The AO found from the
balance sheet that the assessee had claimed the amount of unpaid service tax as
its liability. The AO held that according to section 43B of the Income-tax Act,
1961 the service tax could be allowed only when paid and that the amount was
not allowable as deduction. The assessee submitted that the gross receipts
included the service tax but whenever it was due and payable, namely, when the
amount for the services was realised, it would be remitted.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that the tax became payable only when it was collected from the
customer. The Tribunal found that though the service tax was included in the
bill raised on the customers, it was not actually collected from them and
confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘(i)   The Tribunal was justified in holding that
the service tax debited to the profit and loss account but not credited to the
Central Government by the assessee could not be disallowed u/s 43B.

 

(ii)   The liability to pay service tax into the
treasury arose only when the assessee had received the funds and not otherwise.
The consideration has to be actually received and thereupon the liability to
pay tax would arise. No question of law arose.’

Appeal to High Court – Territorial jurisdiction – Sections 116, 120, 124, 127, 260A and 269 of ITA, 1961 – Territorial jurisdiction of High Court is not governed by seat of the AO – Appeal would lie to High Court having jurisdiction over place where Tribunal which passed order is situated

1.      
Principal CIT vs. Sungard
Solutions (I) Pvt. Ltd.; [2019] 415 ITR 294 (Bom.)
Date of order: 26th February,
2019
A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Appeal to High Court – Territorial
jurisdiction – Sections 116, 120, 124, 127, 260A and 269 of ITA, 1961 –
Territorial jurisdiction of High Court is not governed by seat of the AO –
Appeal would lie to High Court having jurisdiction over place where Tribunal
which passed order is situated

 

In this case, the
Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal had passed an order on 30th July,
2015. On 8th September, 2015, an order was passed u/s 127 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 transferring the respondent-assessee’s case from an
Assessing Officer (AO) at Bangalore to an AO at Pune. On the basis of the place
of the new AO, the Revenue filed an appeal against the order of the Tribunal in
the Bombay High Court. The assessee’s advocate raised a preliminary objection
about the maintainability of the appeal before the Bombay High Court.

 

The Bombay High
Court accepted the assessee’s plea and held as under:

 

‘(i)   A bare reading of sections 116, 120, 124,
127, 260A and 269 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 establishes that Chapter XIII of
the Act would be applicable only to the income-tax authorities under the Act as
listed out in section 116 thereof. Thus, it follows that the provisions of
sections 120, 124 and 127 of the Act will also apply only to the authorities
listed in section 116 of the Act. The Tribunal and the High Court are not
listed in section 116 of the Act as income-tax authorities under the Act.

 

(ii)   The jurisdiction of the court which will hear
appeals from the orders passed by the Tribunal would be governed by the
provisions of Chapter XX of the Act which is a specific provision dealing with
appeals, amongst others to the High Court. In particular, sections 260A and 269
of the Act when read together would mean that the High Court referred to in
section 260A of the Act will be the High Court as defined in section 269, i.e.,
in relation to any State, the High Court of that State. Therefore, the seat of
the Tribunal (in which State) would decide jurisdiction of the High Court to
which the appeal would lie under the Act.

 

(iii)   The High Court to which the appeal would lie
is not governed by the seat of the Assessing Officer. The words “all
proceedings under this Act” in section 127 have to be harmoniously read with
the other provisions of the Act and have to be restricted only to the
proceedings under the Act before the authorities listed in section 116 of the
Act. Thus, a harmonious reading of the various provisions of law would require
that the appeal from the order of the Tribunal is to be filed to the Court
which exercises jurisdiction over the seat of the Tribunal.

 

(iv)  Accordingly, the Bombay High Court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain appeals u/s 260A of the Act in respect of orders
dated 30th July, 2015 passed by the Bangalore Bench of the
Tribunal.’

 

Commemorating the Mahatma

Gandhiji is the
most admired Indian of the last hundred years. In his lifetime and after his
death he inspired people across continents and cultures to act. Today he is
most noticeable on currency notes, in photos at schools and government offices,
in political speeches, in history books, political dressing, stamps, schemes,
slogans, museums and the like. He is vanishing or missing in places where his
ideals are needed the most – in behaviour and approach. Many of his ideas have
either vanished or have been totally adulterated. 


Gandhiji
propagated many ideas that are as relevant today as they were then in spite of
the change in external situation and their context. Swadeshi, Satyagraha,
ends do not justify the means, non violence as an epitome of all virtues, karo
ya maro
(do or die), civil resistance, Swaraj, cleanliness, social
service, Sarvodaya and more. Many of these values are the need of our
times more than ever before. Much of humanity has walked away from the trail he
blazed. Let us look at two of his ideals in today’s context: 

Truth: Satyagraha literally means insistence on truth.
This insistence arms the votary with matchless power1
. It means
that all worthwhile activities that can only be sustainable, and genuinely
profitable if they depend on the ability to answer a fundamental question – Is
this truthful
? Rather a first and last question! Today truth is perhaps the
first and the last casualty to justification, opinions, denials,
rationalisations, propaganda at all levels. Bapu carried an immaculate ability
for insistence on truth that carried no anger, no retaliation
and no submission
. As chartered accountants, we are in the job of what is
true (and fair). Do we ask this question with enough rigour – to ourselves and
to the government? Or do we just carry on and find ways to keep going?

Swadeshi: Swadeshi is that spirit in us which restricts
us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the
more remote2.
  In today’s
times it could stand for several things. For one – how can we operate in a
global environment keeping a deep connection with our roots? As a country we
lack a narrative – the US, China has it! We haven’t articulated Indian approach
or we are mostly in a ‘follow’ and ‘tow’ mode?

Swadeshi can be seen from the perspectives of globalisation
and interdependence. Swadeshi is a form of deep interdependence. If
there is no local interdependence, what is the meaning of global
interdependence? By serving the immediate neighbourhood, we don’t harm anyone –
serving the family, neighbourhood, culture, ethos, fraternity, society and the
entire rashtra.

Much of India
remains colonised – not politically, but psychologically. Take the English
language – which is considered a bridge language (to the exclusion of all other
Indian languages) and the lack of which is still looked down upon. People are
made to believe that English is the ‘be all and end all’ of development. Japan,
Germany, Russia and many non English speaking nations didn’t take that route.
We often look at many Indian words that are ‘non translatable’ through their
dim English description. Some of the courts and government trainings are still
‘English only’. Indian laws are written in a fuzzy ‘Queen’s English’, which is
legally done away with even in England, when only 9% people understand English.
This obnoxious writing of laws remains the chief instigator of litigation.
Indian languages are not even considered business languages in the ‘corporate’
world. In a Board room full of Indians well versed in a common language,
discussions are generally not in any Indian language.

Have you
noticed how India often sees itself through the eyes of the ‘non Indian’?
Indian traditions are analysed, written and taught through the eyes of those
who are not steeped in the deeper and wider Indian civilizational ethos. We are
yet to have an indigenous validation mechanism for our products and services to
receive confirmation of ‘good enough’ or ‘fit for consumption’. Many imported
ideas, often violent, have spread across the country in disguise.

‘Swadeshi’
could effectively serve as an insurance against psychological, commercial and
economic colonisation.

Finally, the legacy and relevance of the Mahatma in a given context is
what each one of us makes of it. In the end and always – It’s up to us! 

 

 

_____________________________________________

1 Young India, 27.2.1930

2   Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 336-44


Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

RECOVERING THE UNRECOVERABLE

Recovery
proceedings are initiated to realise the taxes dues. The proceedings are a
final step towards the realisation of any tax or amount which has been
confirmed as payable after following the due process of adjudication and has
remained unpaid beyond the statutory time limit. Government has set in place
three broad routes for collection of taxes – (a) self-assessment; (b)
adjudication; and (c) tax deduction at source / tax collection at source. Under
Article 265 of the Indian Constitution, not only should the levy of tax be
under authority of law, its collection should also be backed by a clear
authority of law. Recovery is the end stage of collection and any action beyond
statutory boundaries would be unconstitutional and rendered void. This article
aims at discussing the various circumstances under which recovery could be
initiated and their respective modes.

 

CIRCUMSTANCES
WARRANTING RECOVERY

Self-assessed
/ admitted taxes

The self-assessment
scheme requires taxpayers to compute the taxes and discharge the dues by
reporting in tax returns u/s 39 of the CGST / SGST Act. Self-assessed taxes are
considered as admitted taxes (though there is no estoppel in tax law)
and are recoverable without any adjudication u/s 73/74 (sec. 75[12]).
Self-assessed taxes are payable on or before the due date of filing the returns
and are to be discharged on FIFO basis (section 49[8]), i.e., any payment would
be first adjusted towards previous period tax liabilities and then towards
current period tax dues. The common portal maintains an indelible trail of tax
liabilities and its eventual adjustment.

 

Primary issues
arising here are: (a) GSTR3B does not appear to be a ‘return’ u/s 39 (refer
our previous article in BCAJ September, 2019)
and one may contend
that tax liabilities reported in 3B are not covered by the said section; (b)
GSTR-9 (annual return) may also involve admission of tax liabilities, but this
is a return u/s 44 and not u/s 39; (c) GSTR3B online module does not permit the
taxpayer to file its return without payment of the reported tax liabilities,
and hence reported tax cannot remain unpaid if returns are filed; and (d)
reporting of outward supplies in GSTR-1 statement u/s 37 does not constitute
filing of return u/s 39. In effect, though the taxes are ‘self-assessed’
(liability is determined by the taxpayer), such self-assessment is not through
the return specified u/s 39. Consequently, section 75(12) does not seem to
apply under the current return filing scheme. The Revenue may still want to
invoke recovery provisions on the ground that they are admitted taxes even
though the admission is not by way of a return u/s 39. A better alternative for
the Revenue would be to conduct full-fledged assessment proceedings and then
proceed for any recovery.

 

Taxes arising
from adjudication / assessments

Taxes assessed by
way of an order of adjudication u/s 73/74 are recoverable after three months
from the date of service of the order. Three months’ time enables the taxpayer
to prefer any appeal before the appellate forum on any aggrieved point of
assessment. Once an appeal is preferred, the tax demand continues unless it is
stayed by a higher forum (say, a High Court, etc.). Section 107(7) provides for
an automatic stay over recovery of demands on payment of 10% of the disputed
tax dues under first appeal (20% in case of second appeal u/s 112[8]). In cases
of multiple issues involved, taxes due on issues not disputed would be payable
on expiry of three months from service of order. The proper officer in such
cases is required to issue a demand notice in DRC-07 and proceed towards
recovery on its expiry. The proper officer can also seek special permission for
recovery in a shorter period in case he believes that the action of the
taxpayer (such as fleeing the country, disposal of assets, etc.) in the interim
may jeopardise the recovery.

 

Taxes
collected and unpaid

Taxpayers are
required to remit any amount collected as taxes forthwith to the government.
The taxpayer is not allowed to hold on to taxes which are collected,
irrespective of whether such amounts are duly collectible under law. This is
based on the fundamental tenet of indirect
taxation wherein taxpayers are made ‘agents’ of the government and such agents
are not permitted to engage in profiteering from taxes. A classic case would be
where taxable person collects taxes from the recipient prior to its time of
supply (such as advance, including taxes collected prior to sale of goods).
Such amounts are payable forthwith (implying on the immediate due date) and the
taxable person cannot claim that the time of supply of provisions is yet to be
triggered. The section provides for an issuance of a show cause notice and its
conclusion prior to proceeding on the recovery (one-year time limit). Where the
amount is held to be wrongly collected by the taxpayer, the section also
provides for a claim of refund by the person who has ‘borne’ the incidence of
taxes, failing which the same would be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund.

 

Recovery of legacy tax liabilities

Section 174(2) saves the rights, obligations or liabilities in respect
of anything done prior to the repeal of earlier laws. Under this provision, tax
demands pertaining to pre-GST periods can be enforced against the defaulter and
recovered under the respective laws. The erstwhile Central excise, VAT laws
contained similar provisions for recovery of tax dues. Simultaneously, section
142(8) of GST law also enables recovery of tax dues which are unrecovered under
the earlier tax laws.

 

While the recovery proceedings initiated prior to 30th June,
2017 are saved by the said provisions, a question arises whether Revenue should
initiate recovery (such as garnishee proceedings, etc.) after 30th
June, 2017 under the erstwhile law or u/s 142(8) of the GST law. One view would
be that section 174(2)(d) r/w/s 174(2)(e) permits any legal proceeding to be
instituted, continued or enforced in respect of tax dues of the earlier laws
despite their repeal w.e.f. 30th June, 2017. Such legal proceeding
(including recovery proceedings) can be instituted even after the repeal as
long as it pertains to tax dues pertaining to the period prior to the repeal.
The provisions of section 142(8) are in addition to the erstwhile recovery
provisions and the recovery officer can opt for either of these provisions.

 

The alternative view would be that section 174(2) in its entirety only
permits institution of proceedings qua the tax defaulter. A garnishee
proceeding, which is an independent proceeding, cannot be instituted after 30th
June, 2017 as there is no pre-existing liability on the defaulter’s debtor to
the government as on the said date. One of the arguments being canvassed in Sulabh
International Social Service Organization vs. UOI 2019 (4) TMI 523 (JH)

is that the term ‘instituted’ refers to proceedings already instituted before
30th June, 2017. It is on account of this deficiency in the repeals
/ saving provision that section 142(8) comes into operation for recovery
actions instituted after 30th June, 2017. Therefore, any recovery
proceeding should necessarily be initiated under the GST law. Rule 142A
provides for issuance of DRC-07A for creation and recovery of the legacy tax
liabilities on the GST portal.

 

Recovery of transitional credit

The transition scheme has been codified for enabling tax credits on
introduction of GST. Recovery of incorrect transition credit falls under two
variants: (a) recovery due to non-conformity with erstwhile provisions, say
Cenvat, availed on input services ineligible under Cenvat Rules. The recoveries
would be either covered under the repeals and savings provisions or u/s 142(8) (alternative
view discussed above)
; and (b) recovery due to non-conformity with GST
provisions, say ineligible cess carried forward or ineligible credits of stocks
u/s 140(3), etc. These recoveries arise due to violation of GST law and would
be recoverable through specific provisions under GST law rather than any
erstwhile law. However, GST law lacks a specific recovery provision for transitional
items such as these.

 

Overlooking the literal interpretation and giving a wide meaning to
‘input tax credit’1  u/s
73/74, transitional credit could at the most be recoverable under the said
sections, in which case it would form part of GST liabilities and hence covered
under the previous heading – Taxes arising from adjudication /
assessments.
The scope of section 73/74 in this context has been
discussed in an earlier article.

 

Recovery in case of clandestine removal /
non-accounted goods

Goods without appropriate documentation are considered as tax-evaded
goods and such goods are liable for seizure. Such evasive acts may be
identified as a result of inspection, search or interception. In case of
hazardous, perishable goods or any other relevant consideration, the proper
officer would dispose of the goods by following the process through DRC-16.
However, the said recovery is subject to the final outcome of the assessment
following the inspection, search or interception.

 

MODES OF RECOVERY

Recovery by
deduction / adjustments

The section
empowers the proper officer to adjust amounts held by the government (e.g.,
refunds) and due to the taxpayer against any dues to the government. Refund may
be either held by the proper officer himself or by any specified officer.
Amounts lying under the electronic cash ledger balance would also be subject to
such adjustments as being amounts held by the government. The proper officer
would issue DRC-09 intimating the specified officer to adjust the tax dues from
the amounts due to the taxable person. Rule 143 includes, amongst others,
officers of public sector undertakings / State-operated undertakings within its
coverage, implying that the proper officer can directly approach such creditors
for recovery.

 

Recovery by
detention and sale of goods

The proper officer
or any other specified officer/s is empowered to detain goods belonging to the
defaulter and under the control of the proper officer. The process of acquiring
control over goods has not been specified under the section. One would view
this section as being limited only to goods which are already under control of
the proper officer (say, confiscation of goods u/s 130 or seizure u/s 67). Rule
144 requires the officer to issue a notice in DRC-10 for public auction of
goods under its control and conclude the recovery through DRC-11 and DRC-12. An
issue would arise as to ascertainment of goods which are ‘belonging’ to the
taxpayer. The answer possibly lies in the underlying principle followed by all
the modes of recovery, i.e., recover amounts over which the taxpayer has
financial claim and not just possession / legal title.

 

Recovery by
garnishee

The proper officer
is empowered to issue a garnishee to a third-party debtor who holds sums to the
account of the taxpayer. A garnishee is an instruction to the third-party
debtor to pay the required sum forthwith or within the time specified, or pay
it on becoming due to the proper officer instead of the tax defaulter. The
proper officer would have to issue the notice in DRC-13 which would have
overriding claim against any other claims of the tax defaulter. The payment by
the third party to the government would constitute sufficient discharge of the
debt due to the tax defaulter (issued in DRC-14). Failure on the part of the
third party to comply with the notice would result in its treatment as a
defaulter under law and initiation of an independent recovery process on such
person. Recovery can also take place where any amounts are due under an
execution decree to the taxable person and the proper officer can request the
court to execute the decree in its favour for settlement of tax dues (DRC-15
and process of Civil Procedure Code, 1908).

 

Recovery by
distraint (seizure)

The proper officer
can also seize any movable / immovable property belonging to or under the
control of the taxable person and detain the same until the amount is paid.
Unlike detention, this provision extends to all property (such as fixed assets,
land, building, etc.) for recovery proceedings. If the said amount is not paid
within 30 days, the proper officer is empowered to sell the property for
realisation of the amounts due after deduction of the expenses of sale.

 

Recovery as
land revenue

Amounts due to the
government can be recovered as arrears of land revenue by applying to the
District Collector. The proper officer would issue a certificate to the
District Collector for recovery of the tax dues under the respective Revenue
Recovery Act under which all rents, incomes arising from the land would accrue to
the government account.

 

Government has
various options for recovery and though not explicit, the general practice has
been to recover amounts based on their ease of recovery without any specific
sequence. It is discretionary for the officer concerned that he may recover the
amount by attachment and if, in the opinion of the officer concerned, the goods
are of such nature that they are not saleable or would not fetch any price he
may not recover the amount by attachment and sale of such goods. The use of the
methods as provided is discretionary and even if the approach was slightly
indirect it need not be interfered with by the court (Prem Chandra Satish
Chandra vs. CCE (1980 6] E.L.T. 714 [All.]).

 

PROPER ADMINISTRATION AND OFFICER FOR
RECOVERY

Recovery
proceedings are to be conducted only by the ‘proper officer’ who may or may not
be the adjudicating officer. Section 2(91) of the CGST Act grants the Board the
power to assign the recovery functions to specified officers under its
administration. In view of the cross empowerment provisions, the challenge
would arise on the front of deciding the ‘proper officer’ for recovery
provisions. Does adjudication performed by the Centre permit the state tax
officer to proceed on recovery? The 16th Council meeting has provided exclusive
administrative powers to the state / Central administration based on the
allocation agreed between the governments. Moreover, section 6(2) provides that
where the proper officer has initiated a proceeding on a subject matter under
the CGST Act, the corresponding proper officer under the SGST Act is prohibited
from initiating any proceeding and vice versa. Recovery proceedings
would have to be initiated only by the proper officer from the administration
assigned for the taxpayer.

 

In the case of the
SGST Act, the Commissioner of the state would be empowered to perform the
assignment. Under the CGST law, the delegation is as follows:

 

Principal /
Commissioner

Reduce the 3-month
moratorium for recovery (proviso to s. 78)

Addl. / Joint
Commissioner

Permission for
transfer of property in case of pending tax dues

Asst. / Dy.
Commissioner

All other powers

Superintendent /
Inspector

Nil

 

 

State Commissioners
have also issued necessary instructions delegating their powers to Assistant
Commissioners for performing the recovery functions. Recently, the High Court
in Valerius Industries vs. UOI 2019 (9) TMI 618 (Guj.) held that
the State Commissioner being a delgatee himself, cannot further delegate the
recovery powers conferred by the State to its junior officers. The provision of
attachment of property on this ground was struck down by the court.

 

PROCEDURE FOR RECOVERY

The basic
requirement of recovery is that there should be a tax due either through self /
revenue assessment. Rule 142 prescribes the forms and the demand notice to be
issued along with the order of assessment directing the taxable person for
payment of tax dues. The notice is required to quantify the tax, interest and
penalty payable on account of assessment. This demand notice should be arrived
at after adjustments of amounts already paid to the government. Once the
pre-conditions for recovery are satisfied, the recipients to whom the
directions are being served would have to be issued a notice instructing them
to either exercise distraint or appropriate the amounts held with them to the
government. Revenue has in multiple cases attempted to recover taxes pending
adjudication or without any adjudication. This action has been clearly struck
down by courts from time to time and as recently as in Mono Steel India
Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (2019-TIOL-422-HC-AHM-GST)
where bank
attachment immediately on issuance of a show cause notice was set aside.

 

PECULIARITIES UNDER GST

Though there is
standardisation of the legal framework, the current GST structure (CGST / IGST
and 29 states and 7 UTs; pre- 6th August, 2019) is still fettered
with tax segmentation and multiple state administrations. This poses definite
challenges over acquisition of jurisdiction for proceeding with recovery.
Section 25 has fragmented a single unified legal entity, based on its presence
across the states, into ‘distinct persons’ for purposes of implementation of the
Act, implying that each state registration is ring-fenced from the rest of the
entity. While the Act has placed this fiction from a legal perspective, most
organisations are unified from an operational perspective. The challenges are
explained by way of examples:

 

Q1 – ‘A’ a multi-locational entity having registration in all states
would still operate on a single bank account, unified debtor / creditor
relationships and directors / workforce. The proper officer in Maharashtra
having jurisdiction over AMH would like to proceed with a garnishee
order to a bank or a debtor of ADEL.

A1 – Explanation to section 79 prescribes that person would include
‘distinct persons’. The officer is within his powers to issue garnishee notice
to any bank / debtor and recover the sums due from the distinct person. In the
context of recovery, one may have to view the entire entity as one person even
though there is a bifurcation for the purpose of levy and collection of taxes.
Of course, this is an issue that would be subject to judicial scrutiny.

 

Q2 – Extending this example further to a scenario where distinct bank
accounts / debtor lists are maintained based on registrations… does the
officer have jurisdiction to recover sums due from a debtor of another distinct
person of the entity?

A2 – The proper officer can issue a garnishee to any debtor it chooses
to and is not limited by the geographical limits of the state. The proper
officer can issue a garnishee to all bank accounts / creditors for the purpose
of recovery.

 

Q3 – ADEL, a distinct person, has been sanctioned a
CGST/SGST/IGST amount. Would the proper officer of AMH be entitled
to adjust demands with the refunds sanctioned to ADEL?

A3 – Specified officer has been defined to include any officer of the
Central / state government. The proper officer may direct the officer of ADEL
to appropriate the refunds to the outstanding demands in Maharashtra.

 

SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN RECOVERY

Section 80 – Recovery in instalments: A Commissioner is empowered to permit payments of tax dues in
instalments subject to the condition that any default therefrom  would make the entire balance outstanding
without any further recovery notice. The officer in such cases directly
proceeds for recovery of the balance amount after the act of default.

 

Section 81 – Transfer of property void in certain cases: This
section repudiates any transfer of property by sale, mortgage, exchange, etc.,
which is in the possession of a taxpayer if such transfer has been conducted
with an intention to defraud the government. The proper officer in such cases
is permitted to recover its tax dues from the property notwithstanding the fact
that the property has been transferred by the taxable person. The proviso to
the said section carves out an exception for cases where the transfer is made
for adequate consideration in good faith, or with the prior permission of the
proper officer.

 

Section 82 – Tax to be first charge on property: This section overrides all laws, except the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, to state that any amount payable as taxes under the GST
law would be a first charge over the property. In Central Bank of India
vs. State Of Kerala [2009] 21 VST 505 (SC),
the three-judge Bench held
that in case of specific provisions in the statute, the sovereign State would
have primacy over secured debt for realisation of sovereign dues and
distinguished the decision in Union of India vs. SICOM Limited [2009] 2
SCC 121
, delivered in the context of Central excise, held the converse
in the absence of a specific provision in the statute.

 

Section 83 – Provisional attachment of property: This section empowers the proper officer to obtain the permission
of the Commissioner seeking provisional attachment of property during the
pendency of any proceeding in order to protect the interest of the Revenue.
Such provisional attachment is valid for a period of one year from the date of
attachment.

 

Section 84 – Continuation and validation of recovery proceedings: Where the demand notice is subject to appeal, revision, etc., any
subsequent enhancement at a higher forum would need to be followed up with an
additional demand notice. The recovery proceedings in respect of the original
demand can be continued without a fresh notice from the stage at which such
proceedings stood immediately before the disposal of such proceedings. For
example, in case a garnishee order has been issued to a debtor and the same has
been stayed by a court, the proper officer need not issue a fresh garnishee
notice after the passing of the order and can proceed for recovery to the
extent the original demand is confirmed. In case of any enhancement, a fresh
demand notice recovery process would have to be initiated.

 

LIABILITY IN SPECIAL CASES

The GST law
prescribes cases where the recovery provisions can extend beyond the taxable
person. The cases have been tabulated below:

 

Scenario

Relationship: Taxable person & other
person

Type of liability of the said person

Transfer of business by sale, gift,
lease, license, etc.

Transferee – Transferor

Joint and several liability on tax dues
up to date of transfer

Principal agency transactions

Agent – Principal

Joint and several liability of principal
on goods sold by agent

Amalgamation / merger

Amalgamating and amalgamated company

Tax dues would be assessed separately in
respective companies’ hands from appointed date to effective date of order

Directorship

Private company – Director

Joint and several liability on directors
who are responsible for gross neglect, misfeasance, etc.

Partnership / HUF

Firm – Partners / HUF – Member

Joint and several liability on partners
up to date of retirement (subject to intimation of retirement) or partition

Guardian / Trustee, court of wards, etc.

Minor – guardian / Trustee, etc.

Recovery from the guardian, etc., in the
same manner as recoverable from minor

Death of individual

Deceased – Legal representative

Legal representative liable entirely,
except where the business is discontinued, in which case the liability is
limited to the estates of the deceased

Dissolution

Firm – Partner

Joint and several liability on partners
up to dissolution

Discontinuation of business

Firm / AOP / HUF – Partner / Member

Joint and several liability on partner /
member

 

One must note that
there is no outer time limit for recovery of tax dues once the adjudication has
been completed within the specified time frame. Generally, one should expect
that the Revenue would proceed on recovery at the earliest for recovering its
arrears.

 

Recovery is a necessary tool for the
government to realise its taxes. Yet, this tool should be used cautiously and
wisely for effecting its end purpose rather than mere display of authority over
the taxpayer. The erstwhile law as well as GST Law has already experienced
hasty use of these provisions and leading to the closure of the enterprise
itself. The heads of administration should issue circulars limiting the
instances where such provisions should be invoked, in a way ensuring efficient
recovery of taxes rather than killing the golden goose itself.  

RIGHT TO INFORMATION CONSTRICTED

Gandhiji had said: ‘Real Swaraj will come,
not by the acquisition of authority by a few, but by the acquisition of the
capacity by all to resist authority when it is abused. In other words, Swaraj
is to be attained by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to
regulate and control authority.’ (Young India, 29-1-1925, p. 41.)

 

This Swaraj eluded India all these years
despite a very well drafted Constitution and a reasonably fair system of
elections. The average Indian citizen owns the government but did not get the
respect due to him. His simple demand for information of how and why the
government which governed in his name took actions was denied to him despite it
being recognised as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. This was formally codified in the Right to Information Act, 2005
which is one of the progressive transparency laws in the world.

 

The biggest gain has been in empowering
individual citizens to translate the promise of ‘Democracy of the people, by
the people, for the people’ into a living reality. The law as framed by
Parliament has outstandingly codified this fundamental right of citizens. When
framing the law cognisance had been taken of various landmark decisions of the
Supreme Court on the subject. One of the objectives of this law mentioned in its
preamble is to contain corruption. It is a simple, easy to understand statute,
which common people can understand. However, there are some decisions of
information commissions and courts which are constricting this fundamental
right of citizens which is sanctioned neither by the Constitution nor by the
law. This article is an effort to highlight one such instance, the Girish
Ramchandra Deshpande
judgement, which is resulting in an effective
illegal amendment of the law without Parliamentary sanction. The denial of
information has been justified on the basis of section 8(1)(j) which allows
denial of information, when:

 

(j) information which relates to personal
information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity
or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public
Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is
satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
information:

 

Provided that the information, which cannot
be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any
person.

 

The RTI Act mandates that all citizens have
the right to information subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 7(1)
clearly states that information can only be refused for the reasons specified
in sections 8 and 9. Section 22 of the Act ensures that no prior laws or rules
can be used to deny information. I would also draw attention to the fact that
the reasonable restrictions which may be placed on the freedom of expression
under Article 19(1)(a) have been mentioned in Article 19(2) of the Constitution
as those affecting ‘the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.’

 

It is worth remembering two judgements of
the Supreme Court. A five-judge bench has ruled in P. Ramachandra Rao vs.
State of Karnataka case No. [appeal] (crl.) 535
: ‘Courts can declare
the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill
the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly
meant for the legislature’. In Rajiv Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs. Chaudhari Devilal
University, Sirsa and another (2008)
,
the Supreme Court, after
referring to its earlier decisions, has observed as follows: ‘The decision of a
Court is a precedent, if it lays down some principle of law supported by
reasons. Mere casual observations or directions without laying down any
principle of law and without giving reasons does not amount to a precedent.’

 

The Supreme Court’s judgement in the
Girish Ramchandra Deshpande1 case is being treated as the law
throughout the country and I will argue that this has the effect of amending
section 8(1)(j) without legitimacy
. This article
will seek to show that the impugned judgement does not lay down the law and is
being wrongly used to constrict the citizen’s fundamental right to information.

 

Girish Ramchandra Deshpande had sought
copies of memos, show cause notices and censure / punishment awarded to a
public servant. He had also demanded details of assets and gifts received by
him. Since the Central Information Commission gave an adverse ruling he finally
went to the Supreme Court. The main part of the judgement states:

 

‘12. The petitioner herein sought for
copies of all memos, show cause notices and censure / punishment awarded to the
third respondent from his employer and also details viz. movable and immovable properties
and also the details of his investments, lending and borrowing from banks and
other financial institutions. Further, he has also sought for the details of
gifts stated to have accepted by the third respondent, his family members and
friends and relatives at the marriage of his son. The information mostly sought
for finds a place in the income tax returns of the third respondent. The
question that has come up for consideration is whether the above-mentioned
information sought for qualifies to be “personal information” as defined in
clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act.

 

13. We are
in agreement with the CIC and the courts below that the details called for by
the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show
cause notices and orders of censure / punishment etc. are qualified to be
personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act.
The performance of an employee / officer in an organisation is primarily a
matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are
governed by the service rules which fall under the expression “personal
information”, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public
activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would
cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given
case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information
Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest
justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be
passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

__________________________________

1   Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27734 of
2012; Girish Ramchandra Deshpande Versus Cen. Information Commr. & Ors;
K.S. Radhakrishnan & Dipak Misra; 3rd October, 2012; (2013) 1
SCC 212

 

 

 

14. The details disclosed by a person in
his income tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from
disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a
larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State
Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the
larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.’

 

A careful reading of the RTI Act shows that
personal information held by a public authority may be denied under section
8(1)(j) under the following two circumstances:

(i) Where the information requested is
personal information and the nature of the information requested is such that
it has apparently no relationship to any public activity or interest; or

(ii) Where the
information requested is personal information and the disclosure of the said
information would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual.

 

If the information is personal
information, it must be seen whether the information came to the public
authority as a consequence of a public activity
.
Generally, most of the information in public records arises from a public
activity. Applying for a job or ration card are examples of public activity.
However, there may be some personal information which may be with public
authorities which is not a consequence of a public activity, e.g., medical
records or transactions with a public sector bank. Similarly, a public
authority may come into possession of some information during a raid or seizure
which may have no relationship to any public activity.

 

Even if the information has arisen by a
public activity it could still be exempt if disclosing it would be an
unwarranted invasion on the privacy of an individual. Privacy is to do with
matters within a home, a person’s body, sexual preferences, etc., as mentioned
in the Apex Court’s earlier decisions in Kharak Singh and R. Rajagopal
cases. This is in line with Article 19(2) which mentions placing restrictions
on Article 19(1)(a) in the interest of ‘decency or morality’. If, however, it
is felt that the information is not the result of any public activity or
disclosing it would be an unwarranted invasion on the privacy of an individual,
it must be subjected to the acid test of the proviso: Provided that the
information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature
shall not be denied to any person.

 

The proviso is meant as a test which must be
applied before denying information claiming exemption under section 8(1)(j).
Public servants have been used to answering questions raised in Parliament and
the Legislature. It is difficult for them to develop the attitude of answering
demands for information from citizens. Hence, before denying personal
information, the law has given an acid test: Would they deny this information
to the elected representatives? If they come to the subjective assessment that
they would provide the information to MPs and MLAs they will have to provide it
to citizens, since the MPs and MLAs derive legitimacy from the citizens.

 

Another perspective is that personal
information is to be denied to citizens based on the presumption that disclosure
would cause harm to some interest of an individual.

If, however, the information can be given to the legislature it means the
likely harm is not very serious, since what is given to the legislature will be
in public domain. It is worth remembering that the first draft of the bill
which had been presented to the Parliament in December, 2004 had the provision
as section 8(2) and stated: (2) Information which cannot be denied to
Parliament or Legislature of a State, as the case may be, shall not be denied
to any person.
In the final draft passed by Parliament in May, 2005, this
section was put as a proviso only for section 8(1)(j). Thus, it was a conscious
choice of Parliament to have this as a proviso only for section 8(1)(j). It is
necessary that when information is denied based on the provision of section
8(1)(j), the person denying the information must give his subjective assessment
that he would deny it to Parliament or State Legislature if sought.

 

It is worth noting that in the Privacy Bill,
2014 it was proposed that sensitive personal data should be defined as personal
data relating to:

 

‘(a) physical and mental health, including
medical history, (b) biometric, bodily or genetic information, (c) criminal
convictions, (d) password, (e) banking credit and financial data, (f) narco
analysis or polygraph test data, (g) sexual orientation. Provided that any
information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or to be
furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for time being
in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data for the purposes of
this Act’.

 

Only if a reasoned conclusion is reached
that the information has no relationship to any public activity or that
disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion on the privacy of an individual, a
subjective assessment has to be made whether it would be given to Parliament or
State Legislature. If it is felt that it would not be given, then an assessment
has to be made under section 8(2) whether there is a larger public interest in
disclosure than the harm to the protected interest. If no exemption applies,
there is no requirement of showing a larger public interest.

 

In the impugned judgement, an RTI request
for copies of all memos, show cause notices, orders of censure / punishment,
assets, income tax returns, details of gifts received, etc. of a public servant
was denied. The Court has ruled without giving any legal arguments merely by
saying that this is personal information as defined in clause (j) of section
8(1) of the RTI Act and hence exempted. It must be noted that the law does not
exempt all personal information. The only reason ascribed in this decision is
that the Court agrees with the Central Information Commission’s decision. Such
a decision does not form a precedent which must be followed. It cannot be
justified by Article 19(2) of the Constitution or by the complete provision of
section 8(1)(j). As per the RTI Act denial of information can only be on the
basis of the exemptions in the law. The Court has denied information by reading
section 8(1)(j) as exempting:

 

‘information which relates to personal
information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public
activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy
of the individual
unless the Central Public Information Officer or the
State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may
be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of
such information’.

Provided
that the information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State
Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”

 

There are no words in the judgement, or the
CIC decision which it has accepted, discussing whether the disclosure has any
relationship to a public activity, or if disclosure would be an unwarranted
invasion on the privacy. The words which have been struck above have not been
considered at all and information was denied merely on the basis that it was
personal information. Worse still, the proviso ‘Provided that the
information…..’ (underlined above) has not even been mentioned and while
quoting section 8(1)(j) the proviso has been missed. Effectively, only 40 of
the 87 words in this section were considered.

 

The Supreme Court judgement in the ADR
/ PUCL Civil Appeal 7178 of 2001 has laid down that
citizens have a right to know about the assets of those who want to be public
servants (stand for elections). It should be obvious that if citizens have a
right to know about the assets of those who want to become public servants,
their right to get information about those who are public servants
cannot be lesser. This would be tantamount to arguing that a prospective groom
must declare certain matters to his wife-to-be, but after marriage the same
information need not be disclosed!

 

The Girish Ramchandra Deshpande
judgement should not be treated as a precedent for the following reasons:

 

(i)    It is devoid of any detailed reasoning and
does not lay down a ratio;

(ii)    It does not analyse whether a public servant’s
work and assets is information which is a public activity or not. The judgement
when stating that certain matters are between the employee and the employer
misses the fact that the employer is the ‘people of India’;

(iii)   It has completely forgotten the proviso to
section 8(1)(j) which requires subjecting a proposed denial to this acid test;

(iv)   It has not considered the clear ratio of the Rajagopal
judgement or the ADR / PUCL judgement

(v)   This became the most commonly used exemption.
In R.K. Jain vs. Union of India JT 2013 (10) SC 430 this was
reiterated when denying information about the comments on the integrity of an
official by the Chairman of CESTAT. This referred to the Girish Deshpande
judgement enthusiastically and held it as a precedent. Subsequently, in Canara
Bank vs. C.S. Shyam
, civil appeal No. 22 of 2009 the
Supreme Court refused names and details of officials transferred holding this
as personal information and quoting the Girish Deshpande judgement.
Effectively, the law has been amended and most information which relates to a
natural person, and can be called personal, is being denied. This conceals
corruption, protects people who have submitted false bills or certificates. It
is also helpful to ensure that fictitious beneficiaries of various schemes
cannot be caught. The law’s objective of curbing corruption is being defeated;

(vi) Across the
country, information about MLA funds expenditure, officers’ leave, caste
certificates, file notings, educational degrees, beneficiaries of subsidies and
much more are being denied. Many PIOs are denying information which may have
the name of a person claiming it is personal information.

 

A major provision of the RTI Act has been
amended by a judicial pronouncement which appears to be flawed. It is also
violating Article 19(2) of the Constitution. A major tool of citizens to bring
the shenanigans, arbitrary and corrupt acts of public servants has been
affected adversely without a proper reasoning. Commissioners and the legal
profession must discuss this and it must be recognised that Girish
Ramchandra Deshpande
does not lay down the law on section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and is contrary to the ratio of the R. Rajagopal
and ADR judgements. However, the Girish Ramchandra
Deshpande
judgement has been treated as a precedent in two subsequent
Supreme Court judgements and is being used to deny most information which can
be related to a natural person. This has become the most commonly used
exemption.

 

PIOs and
Information Commissioners are using this widely to deny all information which
relates to any person and the Right To Information Act is being subverted and
illegally converted into Right to Denial of Information. Section 8(1)(j) is
being converted into an omnibus exemption which can be used to deny most
information.
This will
be a very unfortunate regression for citizens’ fundamental right and would
greatly curb their power to get accountability and curb corruption.

 

The nation must
discuss this illegal and unconstitutional curtailment of our fundamental right
and create a strong public opinion for its restoration.

GANDHIAN PRINCIPLES AND THE CA PROFESSION

The second of October, 2019 is the 150th
birth anniversary of the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi. By a
coincidence, it is also the birth anniversary of our beloved Ex-Prime Minister,
the Late Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. Both were known to be highly principled
persons. That is why we still remember them with reverence even after so many
years. I felt honoured when I was asked to write an article on Gandhian
principles vis-à-vis our CA profession for our BCA Journal.

 

It is true that
quite a few decisions or stands taken by Gandhiji on certain points proved
highly controversial. Some of his views became the subject matter of severe
criticism; so much so that it eventually resulted in his unfortunate
assassination. After all, every coin has two sides. However, the fact remains
that no one questioned his integrity and honest intentions for the good of our
country.

 

In this article, I will attempt to enumerate
a few of his principles with reference to the conduct of our CA profession. I
compliment the Editor for choosing this very important topic and thank him for
giving me the opportunity to express my views on it.

 

We are in kaliyug and violating,
circumventing or crushing good principles has become the rule of the day. In
fact, that is the very essence of kaliyug.

 

God was particularly kind to this country
that he gave us so many towering personalities during our fight for freedom –
Lokmanya Tilak, Veer Savarkar, Mahatma Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel, Subhash
Chandra Bose, Lala Lajpatrai, Bhagat Singh, Rabindranath Tagore, Swami
Vivekananda and hundreds of others in different walks of life. Hardly any other
country would be so blessed. Despite this, unfortunately, we remained poor and
weak in almost every respect. The reason is that the level of the society or a
country depends on the level of the common citizen. These personalities
received not only praise and respect but they were literally revered and
worshipped. However, they were not followed in letter and spirit in day-to-day life. Mahatma Gandhi remained only on the walls of government
offices and courts; and also on currency notes! He was never given a place in
our hearts. The politicians merely used his name for their selfish motives.
Thus, he was physically assassinated only once, but he is now being killed
every day. We CAs are an integral part of the society and I proceed to examine
whether CAs were also a party to this every-day assassination, or they were an
exception to the general rule. I have selected only a few of Gandhiji’s
principles.

 

TRUTH

The two great values cherished and professed
by Mahatmaji were Truth and Non-violence. Truth was supreme. Even his
autobiography is titled My Experiments with Truth. Truth was dearest to
his heart. Not that he never deviated from the truth, but he had the courage to
confess whenever and wherever he felt that he had deviated. This is his real
greatness.

 

After all, no one is infallible.

 

We CAs, unlike lawyers, are intimately
connected with Truth. Our core function in the profession is to attest the
financial position as ‘True and Fair’. I leave it to the conscience (and
introspection) of every reader of this article as to how many times we have
deviated from this principle. It is not only an ethical principle, but it is
our statutory obligation.

 

Here, I would pause a little to discuss
briefly our Code of Ethics. The motto of our Institute, as recommended by Maharshi
Aurobindo
is ‘ya Esha Supteshu Jagarti’. It was adopted from the Kathopanishad.
A CA should be the one who is expected to be awake when the world around is
asleep. Symbolically, Truth is ‘light’ (day) and Untruth is ‘darkness’ (night).
Thus, our very motto and vision as well mission is to pursue the Truth.

 

In my opinion, the edifice of our entire
Code of Ethics is the three messages given by the ancient Gurus to their
disciples (shishyas). These are enshrined in the Taittireeya
Upanishad
.

Satyam Vada – Speak the Truth

Dharmam Chara. Pursue the eternal principles of righteousness
(religion means one’s duty; and not the worship)

Swadhyayan ma pramadah!

Never commit any default in studies or in
updating of knowledge.

 

This is nothing but our CPE.

 

Against this, what is commonly observed is
that we not only overlook the untrue things but often become a party to the
creation of false things and certify them to be true. Forget the big scams
where CAs’ active role was exposed, many of the scams were masterminded by the
CAs; but even on day-to-day basis we consciously sideline this principle.

 

All of us are so familiar with this that the
point hardly needs any elaboration.

 

NON-VIOLENCE

The second principle dearest to his heart
was non-violence. By non-violence I do not mean merely physical non-violence.
We may not beat or assault any one, or kill any one. We may not torture any
one, or cause injury to any one at the physical level. But indirectly, we may
either overlook or connive at such behaviour, or run away from it. There may be
a few CAs who may be indirectly helping or supporting such acts. Thus, there
are many underworld people, or criminals, or even ‘politicians’ with criminal
inclinations, or traders, or manufacturers engaged in or aiding violence.

 

I know a CA, a practicing Jain, refused to
do the work of a slaughter house. I don’t mean to suggest that no CA should
render service to such a business so long as it is a socially accepted and
lawful business. It was only an indicative observation. At the same time, a CA
should use discretion in selecting a client and have the courage to say ‘No’ to
certain types of clients.

 

SELF-RESPECT

Gandhiji’s struggle against humiliating
treatment in South Africa is well known. In fact, that was his debut in public
life. That made him a leader.

 

Today, CAs receive humiliating treatment
from government, bureaucrats and even clients. They are taken for granted by
all these people. Politicians make even public statements against the whole
profession. But we have no courage to raise our voice against such humiliation.
We are not assertive. We cannot put our foot down on the nonsensical things. We
have made our signature very cheap. Many of the CAs do not themselves keep the
respect of their own signature, then why and how will others respect it?

 

One of the reputed agencies had expressly
notified in one of their documents, ‘Please avoid bringing Chartered
Accountants’ certificates as the same are often found unreliable!’  No one pulled them into the court of law
for this.

 

The manner in which we go begging to the
Finance Minister every year for extension of due date is indeed very
humiliating. Government should understand that this is a chronic or systemic
problem and not the fault or inefficiency of CAs. We are not capable of making
strong and assertive representations but we merely beg mildly. Lawyers for
flimsy grounds have the audacity (or courage?) to boycott the proceedings of
the court.

 

Even transporters are so organised that they
make the government bend in their favour. We, as a profession, never show this
kind of strength of unity and collective action. The reason may be that we are
not perceived to be indispensable.

 

CHARACTER

By character I do not mean merely moral
character in a physical sense. Character is the result of honesty and
integrity. Courage comes out of this character. It is well said: ‘If one salutes
oneself, one need not salute anyone; but if one pollutes oneself, one has to
salute everyone!’

 

We blame bureaucrats and police personnel
for corruption. Unfortunately, we feel that corruption means only bribery.
Actually, the worst form of corruption is corruption of thoughts – our evil
thoughts. If we observe, when we come across any law or regulation many of us
first think of loopholes. We always think of ways and means to bypass it.
Often, our profession is perceived as the one that ‘manages’ everything.

 

Even our mandatory CPE hours many CAs try to
‘manage’ by hook or by crook. This is nothing but corruption. We CAs are
financial ‘police’. Had we performed our duty consciously, the extent of
financial scandals or debacles could have been minimised. But audit as a
function was never taken in its true spirit or with enough stringency by many.
It was seen either as mere compliance or even as a ‘tool’ to get loans from
banks. Accepting fees without doing justice to the audit is also corruption.

 

Gandhiji did propagate defiance of ‘black
law’ or unjust law. But that was an open and transparent movement against the
Britishers in the interest of the country. It was not meant for achieving
anybody’s selfish, vested interests. Unfortunately, even our judicial system
also never understood and performed its role meaningfully. Both the principles
of judicial system, viz., ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ and ‘justice
hurried is justice buried’, are violated conspicuously every day. CAs and the
legal profession are sister professions and both the ‘sisters’ have often
worked hand-in-hand in dismantling or crushing the very foundation and purpose
of the respective professions. This is the tragedy and we have no courage to
speak against it. We take pride in playing with words and crippling the system
by any means without any scruples.

 

PATRIOTISM AND NATIONAL
SPIRIT

Winston Churchill, who is responsible for
deaths of several million Indians, had observed, ‘India is not a nation, but
only a population!’ The question is — Do we represent our national character?
CAs are supposed to provide intellectual leadership to the society. Gandhiji
had the courage to swim against the flow. We are not only swimming with the
flow, but often remain in the forefront. Examples are plenty if we study all
the scams that have occurred so far. The intellectual class often ridicules the
concepts like patriotism. We have to ask ourselves how do we display a national
spirit?

 

When there was burning and communal violence
in Noakhali, Gandhiji had the courage to go there alone and observe a fast for
peace.

 

LEADERSHIP

CAs are rarely perceived as thought leaders.
You hardly come across any CA who is influencing opinion in society or of the
common man. Have we ever attempted to influence or mould the thinking of our
clients? We always ‘follow’ the clients’ thoughts. A leader has to be
‘proactive’. Why are we always reactive?

 

Thus, if any new regulation is proposed in
bill form – be it by government or by our Institute – we seldom study it from
the point of view of creating public opinion for or against it. Do we bother or
even push enough to give our suggestions and express our apprehensions
effectively at the right forum and at the right time?

 

 

I firmly believe that our country has the
real inherent expertise in the accounting field. Unfortunately, non-Indians are
dominating the scene. Many of the so-called accounting standards may lack
logic, purpose or consistency. They may not be relevant in the Indian context.
We only keep criticising them but accept them with a ‘slave’s mindset’. The few
firms who have vested interests in thrusting these regulations on us attract
our talented members by offering hefty packages. In our fight for freedom, many
intellectuals consciously remained away from the attractive jobs offered by the
British government. Today, our intelligent CAs are tolerating the stressful if
not torturous treatment in these so-called ‘professional firms’ who are doing
nothing but ‘business’ in an unscrupulous and unfair manner.

 

Gandhiji in his newspaper ‘Harijan’
influenced and moulded public opinion into the desired channel for the benefit
of the society and the country. How many CAs are into journalism doing such a
job? On TV channels, when there are discussions or debates on social or national
issues, the presence of CAs among expert panellists is conspicuous by its
absence – meaning, CAs are never perceived as social leaders! Are we not
concerned with social and national issues?

 

SIMPLICITY

Simplicity should not be merely a ‘style’,
it should be a way of life. One can be essentially simple. Simplicity is
expressed in thinking, writing, expressing and all aspects of living. Is there
real simplicity in drafting of our regulations or pronouncements? Is there
enough clarity? Is there enough truth and forthrightness? Are we either
offensive or defensive? We find that all such texts are full of ambiguity. It
is our duty to compel the concerned persons to make it simple.

 

We often see very pompous and showy offices
of CAs. For a professional a reasonably decent office set-up is sufficient. But
in the craze of showmanship, many professionals compromise on principles. In
the process they also move away from nature in their day-to-day life. Many CAs
work as ‘brokers’ quite contrary to the principles of Gandhiji.

 

LOVE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Gandhiji staked
his entire life for the freedom of the country. He fought for independence. Are
CAs really independent in their profession? If our client pays the fees for his
own audit, can we really afford to be independent? It is an obvious conflict of
interest. In our Code of Ethics there are items of misconduct based on the
‘conflict of interest’. When there is no effective independence in attest
function, the foundation of the profession itself gets crippled. All
complicated regulatory measures are of no use.

 

SENSE OF JUSTICE

Gandhiji fought injustice. When he started
practising as a lawyer, he was particular in accepting only those cases where
he believed that the truth was on his client’s side. He used to verify it
first. If at a later date his client turned out to be false, he used to give up
the brief. Do we have the courage to do such a thing? The business assessees
for whom we fight tooth and nail with the tax department – are they really on
the right side of the law? What are we shielding by using the best of our
professional skills?

 

CONCLUSION

Readers may wonder why I am so critical or
sceptical about the situation. Actually, the entire society is behaving more or
less in the same manner – that is, against the principles cherished and taught
by Gandhiji and other towering personalities. In fact, I see that there is a
lot of hypocrisy all around. In our motto, the CA profession has been equated
with the ultimate Truth – the Brahman or the Atman. But in
reality? The less said the better. For that matter, all the professions have
failed and succumbed to the pressure of kaliyug.

 

I have no particular grudge against the CA
profession as such. The observations made in this article would apply with
equal force more or less to all professions and occupations. In my humble
opinion, CAs have proved no exception to the general conditions of kaliyug.

 

However, CAs have the capability and
training to look through and see what is happening, the direction in which
things are headed and also future implications.

 

The only remedy is to remember the real
heroes this country had produced a few decades ago and follow their path
consciously and religiously. Even when the situation looks bleak, when we look
at Bapu’s life we see that he stood for what he believed to be true even
if it meant to stand alone. This reflection and marching towards finding what
is true should be our dandi march towards restoration of values
in each of our circles of influence.

 


GANDHI FOR US NOW

The author is former Vice-Chancellor of
Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad, a university founded by Gandhiji in 1920, and is
engaged in charitable works in rural areas.

 

Humanity in general has been optimistic and
so it should be. However, there have been times when all has not been well and
the business as usual approach can and has landed the humanity in deep crisis.
In the distant past, most crises have arisen due to natural calamities. In
recent times, however, many of the crises have been man-made. A seemingly major
crisis has hit the humanity today. It is the deepening environmental and
ecological crisis. The intense desire of human beings to control nature and
exponentially increase the materialistic living are said to have led to the
present crisis. In the context of our country the nature of the crisis is the
same. The impact is so hard that our socio-cultural values at society level and
ethical values at individual level have gradually been vanishing. In totality,
one can see the crisis arising due to the irresponsible and often irreversible
behaviour of most of us. In our cultural parlance there is serious disturbance
and discord between Vyakti (Individual), Samashti (Universe) and Prakruti
(Nature).

 

Gandhiji understood the problem and offered
a solution with potential to restore and perhaps build harmony among vyakti,
samashti and prakruti. In case of India, the immediate crisis is
related to character. Gandhiji’s life was his message and was about continuous
character-building, a process that was initiated from childhood. With his
departure his message was conveniently forgotten. The result is that people
with character and integrity are at a premium both in public and private lives.
Unethical means in business have become the norm rather than the exception. In
fact, the world over the business management schools are trying to introduce
ethics and spirituality courses in the curricula. Recently, a Bench headed by the
then Chief Justice of India gave a judgement with regard to the Vyapam case in
Madhya Pradesh where the students were admitted to medical college fraudulently
and had completed the course. Upon disqualification, they had filed a petition.
The judgement read, ‘If we desire to build (our) nation on the touchstone of
ethics and character, and if our determined goal is to build a nation where
only rule of law prevails, then we cannot accept the claim of appellants
(students) for suggested social gains (by allowing them to keep the degrees on
the condition of doing social service free of cost for some years)’. This is
just one illustration of many in the country.

 

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi transformed his
persona to a level that earned him the title of Mahatma. The process of
transformation began from a very early age. Mohan’s regard for service began
with service of his parents and later turned into service of humanity. Watching
a play of Harishchandra, he wrote, ‘To follow the truth and to go
through all the ordeals Harishchandra went through was the one ideal it
inspired in me”. Truth and honesty got engraved permanently on the young
Mohandas’s mind and changed his personality completely in the years to come. At
a young age he learned three aspects of improving the self: Sveekruti –
acknowledgement, Pashchatap – repentance, and Prayashchit –
willingness to accept punishment for wrong-doing. He also thought that it was
possible for others to do the same; he expected that every individual should,
indeed, do so. As a student in England he remained faithful to the oath he made
to his mother not to touch wine, woman and meat. His resolve to being truthful
and honest under the most trying circumstances helped him to acquire a strong
self-discipline.

 

By the age of twenty five years, young
Gandhi had accepted and had become a staunch practitioner of honesty, truth and
non-violence. Gandhi firmly internalised the value of firm resistance with
self-suffering in the situations of injustice and exploitation rather than inflicting
injury and violence to the perpetrator.
It was this Gandhi who went on to
lead the South Africa Satyagraha between 1896 and 1914 and after that
became the central figure in India’s fight for Independence. Gandhi fought for
his liberty and freedom and for the freedom of communities by using non-violent
protest – Satyagraha. Self-discipline is what is needed in order to be a
Satyagrahi for fighting for one’s own liberty and freedom, and for
serving the society and its causes. Once he practised being a truthful Satyagrahi,
he suggested others to try it.

 

He gave eleven vows or Mahavrats. 1. Satya – Truth, 2. Ahimsa or Love, 3. Brahmacharya
or Chastity / Control, 4. Aswada – Control of the Palate, 5. Asteya
– Non-Stealing, 6. Aparigraha – Non-Possession, 7. Abhaya –
Fearlessness, 8. Sprushya bhavana – Removal of Untouchability, 9. Shareera
Shrama
– Bread Labour, 10. Sarvadharma Samabhava – Tolerance:
Respect of all Religions, 11. Swadeshi – Use of Products Made in India.
This is practical idealism as we shall see. (All these eleven vows can be
adopted by a Gruhastha.) This is the key for character-building and we
should take the core values and start the work at all ages with special
emphasis on education of children in the country.

 

The second point is about the environmental
and ecological crisis. Gandhiji had anticipated today’s problem in 1909 in his
small treatise Hind Swaraj. His criticism of the modern civilization was
the following:

 

‘Let us first consider what state of
things is described by the word “civilization”. Its true test lies in the fact
that people living in it make bodily welfare the object of life… The people of
Europe today live in better-built houses than they did a hundred years ago.
This is considered an emblem of civilization and this is also a matter to
promote bodily happiness. Formerly, they wore skins and used spears as their
weapons. Now, they wear long trousers, and, for embellishing their bodies, they
wear a variety of clothing and, instead of spears, they carry with them
revolvers containing five or more chambers. If people of a certain country, who
have hitherto not been in the habit of wearing much clothing, boots, etc.,
adopt European clothing, they are supposed to have become civilized out of
savagery… Men will not need the use of their hands and feet. They will press a
button, and they will have their clothing by their side. They will press
another button, and they will have their newspaper. A third and a motor-car
will be in waiting for them. They will have a variety of delicately dished up
food. Everything will be done by machinery. Formerly, when people wanted to
fight with one another, they measured between them their bodily strength; now
it is possible to take away thousands of lives by one man working behind a gun
from a hill. This is civilization.’

 

Indeed, it all applies to the India of
today. The industrial revolution is all about material production to meet
material needs. Science led to technologies and technologies largely produced
material comfort. Information technology in the beginning showed some potential
to be an equalizer, but soon went into the same control lines – in the hands of
few powerful people with money and power. Protestant Ethics had justified the
‘this worldly affairs’, especially creating material wealth for family and
society to live comfortably as divine. And free market was the best agency
which would provide equal opportunity to all, thus simultaneously optimising
individual and social welfare. It was presumed that the civil society that
would result out of such protestant values would be virtuous. The virtue of
civil society, if left to its own devices, were said to include good character,
honesty, duty, self-sacrifice, honour, service, self-discipline, tolerance,
respect, justice, civility, fortitude, courage, integrity, diligence,
patriotism, consideration for others, thrift and reverence.

 

 

But as capitalism flourished the Protestant
values gave way. Gluttony, pride, selfishness and greed became prominent. These
are precisely the Christian sins. Communist society could do no better than the
Orwellian phrase ‘some are more equal than others’! The modern economic
progress has increased the tension among the nations. Human footprint is
dangerously self-destroying. Conflicts within and between the countries and
military violence and killings are said to have been more than the total loss
that occurred during the Second World War.

 

Like the West celebrates individual liberty,
Gandhiji too upholds individual liberty but with responsibility to self, fellow
humans and nature. The individual and societal efforts have to be mended and
mentored in a way where vyakti’s interface with samashti is
harmonious; every vyakti is an essential part of the processes in samashti.
However, vyakti’s mind-set in interacting with samashti and prakruti
has to be the following:

 

Ishavasyam
idam sarvam Yatkinchit Jagatyam Jagat;

Ten
tyaktena bhunjitha maa grudha kasya swid dhanam

 

Whatever there
is changeful in this ephemeral world, all that must be enveloped by the Lord.
By this renunciation (of the world), support yourself. Do not covet the wealth
of any one.

 

With
advancements in science and technology as well as human achievements, nature
has to be treated with respect and humanity must not cancel tomorrow. Although
individual freedom is the ultimate goal, humanity needs to go on the Gandhian
way of education for freedom. Gandhiji himself was a learner till the last day
of his life. His kind of education that would inform / influence the
preferences and choices of individuals was not only confined to Indians, but
also to world citizens. The resultant position would not be that of pursuing
limitless wants. It is imperative that the desire to acquire more and more
should decline. The era of equality of rights and opportunities can then be
established. If people adopt the eleven vows listed earlier, harmony and
‘equality of rights and opportunities’ are possible globally. With practise of
the vows, the relationship between humans and nature would alter, averting the
ecological crisis. When vyakti (individual) changes and becomes
responsible and focuses on development of inner self, peace will evolve in samashti
(universe) and harmony with prakruti (nature) will return. Gandhi
beckons.

 

A ‘RESIDENTIAL HOUSE’ FOR SECTIONS 54 AND 54F

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

An assessee, whether an individual or an
HUF, is exempted u/s 54 of the Income-tax Act from capital gains arising from
the transfer of a long-term capital asset, being a residential house, on the
purchase or construction of a residential house within the specified period.
Similar exemption is granted u/s 54F of the Act for capital gains arising from
the transfer of any long-term capital asset, not being a residential house, on
the purchase or construction of a residential house, within the specified
period and subject to other conditions as provided therein. One of the
essential conditions for availing the exemption under both these provisions is
that the house purchased or constructed should be a ‘residential house’.

 

Quite often, an issue arises as to whether
the exemption can be availed when the new property purchased or constructed,
though approved and referred to as a residential house, has been used for
non-residential or commercial purposes. Such issues arise in implementation of
sections 54 and 54F, including for compliance with conditions that apply
post-exemption. The issue may arise even where one is required to determine the
nature of premises under transfer, for ascertaining the application of sections
54 or 54F, which are believed to be mutually exclusive, that call for
compliance with
different conditions.

 

The Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal has held
for the purposes of section 54F that the new house constructed for residential
use, consisting of all the required amenities, accordingly would not lose its
character of a residential house even if it was used for some commercial
purposes. As against this, the Delhi bench of the Tribunal has held that the
existing residential house which was used by the assessee as his office would
not be taken into consideration while determining whether the assessee owned
more than one residential house as on the date of transfer of the original
asset while applying the provisions of section 54F.


THE N. REVATHI CASE

The issue
first came up for consideration of the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of N. Revathi vs. ITO 45 taxmann.com 30 (Hyderabad – Trib.).
In this case, the assessee claimed the exemption u/s 54F on transfer of a
long-term capital asset, not being a residential house, on utilisation of the
net consideration in constructing a residential building over the plot of land
owned by her jointly with her sister for assessment year 2007-08. The building
consisted of ten flats, five each belonging to the assessee and her sister.
Since the AO was of the view that the exemption could be claimed only for one
flat, he deputed the Inspector to make a spot inquiry for verifying the
assessee’s claim. Upon verification, it was also found that the said building
was used for running a school by the assessee and her friend and it had
classrooms, a big hall and a play area for children in the cellar of the
premises. The exemption u/s 54F was denied by the AO on the ground that the
building constructed was not a residential house. While passing an ex parte
order on account of non-appearance on the part of the assessee, the CIT (A)
concurred with the view of the AO by holding that the term ‘residential’
clearly implied usage as a ‘home’.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was argued on behalf
of the assessee that the Inspector, while submitting his report on 23rd
December, 2009, had categorically stated that the school had started
functioning six months earlier. Therefore, it implied that no school was
functioning in the said residential building during the relevant assessment
year.

 

The Tribunal held that only because the
building was used as a school could not change the nature and character of the
building from residential to commercial; even a residential building could be
used as a school or for any other commercial purpose; the relevant factor to
judge was whether the construction made was for residential purpose or for
commercial purpose; if the building had been constructed for residential use
with all amenities like kitchen, bathroom, etc., which were necessary for
residential accommodation, then even if it was used as a school or for any
other commercial purpose, it could not lose its character as a residential
building. However, it further held that if the construction was made in such a
way that it was not normally for residential use but for purely commercial use,
then it could not be considered to be a residential house; the primary fact
which was required to be examined was whether the building had been constructed
for residential use or not, a fact that could be verified from the approved
plan and architectural design of the building.

 

As the approved plan of the building
constructed by the assessee was not brought on record, the Tribunal remitted
the matter back to the file of the AO to conduct an inquiry to find out the
exact nature of construction, i.e., whether the said building was constructed
for residential use or for commercial use. The AO was directed to allow the
exemption if it was found that the building had been constructed for
residential use with all amenities which were necessary for a residential
accommodation. Insofar as the allowability of the exemption with respect to
more than one flat was concerned, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of
the assessee.

 

THE SANJEEV PURI CASE

The issue, thereafter, came up for
consideration of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sanjeev
Puri vs. DCIT 72 taxmann.com 147 (Delhi – Trib.).

 

In this case (assessment year 2010-11) the
assessee, who was a senior advocate, owned three different properties as
follows:

(i)   E-549A, which was used for residential
purposes;

(ii) E-575A, used
as office for conducting the legal profession; and

(iii)  Gurgaon flat which was still under
construction.

 

The assessee sold the rights in the
under-construction Gurgaon flat which resulted in long-term capital gains of
Rs. 1,48,23,645. Proceeds from the aforesaid sale were invested in purchase of
a new residential house for which the assessee claimed an exemption u/s 54F of
the Act. The exemption claimed u/s 54F was denied by the AO on the ground that
the assessee on the date of transfer of the rights held more than one
residential house, namely, E-549A and another at E-575A, holding that the
latter was also a residential property and, therefore, the assessee owned more
than one residential house at the time of transfer. He held that a residential
property could not be used as an office and that there was no distinction
between the ‘type’ of the property and its ‘actual use’. In other words, the
actual use of E-575A for commercial purposes did not make the premises
non-residential. The CIT (A) upheld the view of the AO and confirmed the
disallowance.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was argued by the
assessee that the house at E-575A was not used for residential purposes and was
put to use for the purposes of his profession being carried on by the assessee
from the said premises; holding the said property to be residential house
merely on the basis that the same was classified as residential property as per
municipal laws and in the registered sale deed executed at the time of purchase
of such property and disregarding the actual use thereof for professional
purposes, was not justified.

 

The Revenue argued before the Tribunal that
the manner of the construction would decide the nature of the house, as to
whether it was residential or commercial. The usage of the property was
immaterial if the property was shown as residential on the records of the
corporation. The capability of the premises for use as a residential house was
enough and it was not necessary to reside there. Therefore, it was claimed that
the exemption was rightly denied on the basis of the fact that the property was
classified as residential property as per municipal laws and in the registered
sale deed executed at the time of purchase of such property, disregarding the
actual use thereof for professional purposes.

 

The Tribunal
held that for availing deduction u/s 54F, the test to be applied would be that
of the actual use of the premises by the assessee during the relevant period.
In other words, it did not make a difference whether the property had been
shown as residential house on the records of the government authority but it
was actually used for non-residential purpose. The actual usage of the house by
the assessee would be considered while adjudicating upon the eligibility of exemption
u/s 54F. Accordingly, the AO was directed to allow the exemption u/s 54F as
claimed by the assessee for the reason that E-575A was used for commercial
purposes, i.e., non-residential purposes, and therefore the assessee could not
be held to have held more than one residential premises.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The primary issue under consideration is the
basis on which a particular house should be recognised as a residential house,
i.e., whether the premises by its plans and approval and its design should be a
residential house, or whether it should have been used as a residential house,
or whether both these conditions should have been satisfied. While the
Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal has considered the nature of the house, i.e.,
how it has been built and how it has been classified in the records of the
local authorities as the basis, the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal has considered
the actual usage of the premises as the basis for determination.

 

The provisions of sections 54 and 54F use
the term ‘residential house’, but without defining it. One possibility is to
apply a common parlance test to understand the meaning of such term, which has
not been defined expressly under the Act. It should be attributed a meaning
supplied to it by a common man, i.e., a meaning accorded to the term in the
popular sense. In that sense, a house is considered to be a residential house
when it has all the facilities which makes that house capable of residing in,
i.e., facilities for living, cooking and sanitary requirements, when its
location is in a residential area, when it has been recognised as a residential
house by the local authorities for the purpose of levying different types of
taxes. The house satisfying these conditions, not necessarily all of them, can
be regarded as a residential house irrespective of the purpose for which that
house has been put to use, unless it is found that it was always intended to be
used for non-residential purposes and it was shown to be a residential house
only for the purpose of availing the benefit of exemption.

 

A useful reference can be made to the
observations of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Purshottam
Dass 112 Taxman 122 (Delhi)
for understanding the meaning of the term
‘residential house’. In this case, the High Court was dealing with the issue of
eligibility of exemption granted under erstwhile provisions of section
23(1)(b)(ii), which was available only in respect of ‘residential unit’. The
relevant observations of the High Court in this regard are reproduced below:

 

Question whether a particular unit is
residential or not is to be determined by taking into account various factors,
like, the intention of the constructor at the time of construction, intended
user, actual user, potentiality for a different user and several other related
factual aspects. The provision only stresses on erection of a building
comprising of residence(s) during a particular period.

 

In a given case, the constructor may have
constructed a particular unit as the residential unit, but to avoid deterioration
on account of non-user, may have temporarily let out for office purposes. There
may be a case where for some period of a particular assessment year, the
building has been used for residential purposes and for the residual period for
office purposes. There may be another case when during the period of five years
referred to in the provision for three years building is used for residential
purposes and for balance period for office purposes. Can it be said in the
above three contingencies, the unit ceases to be a residential unit for some
periods? These factual aspects have great relevance while adjudicating the
question whether the exemption is to be allowed. We may state that user is one
of several relevant factors and not the conclusive or determinative one. The
intention of constructor at the time of erection is one of the relevant
factors, as stated above. If intention at the time of erection was use for
residential purposes, it is of great relevance and significance.

 

In view of these observations, the High
Court allowed the exemption as claimed u/s 23(1)(b)(ii), on the ground that the
construction of the house was made for residential purpose and in a residential
area though there was temporary non-use as residence and, consequently,
temporary use for office purposes. Thus, one of the important criteria which is
required to be considered is the intention of the assessee while purchasing or
constructing a house. If the intention was to use the house as a residential
house at that point in time, then the subsequent usage of that house for a
non-residential purpose for a temporary period should not disqualify that
assessee from claiming the exemption.

 

Reference can also be made to the definition
of a ‘residential unit’ as provided in section 80-IBA, though it has restricted
applicability only for that section. This definition is reproduced below:

 

‘residential unit’ means an independent
housing unit with separate facilities for living, cooking and sanitary
requirements, distinctly separated from other residential units within the
building, which is directly accessible from an outer door or through an
interior door in a shared hallway and not by walking through the living space
of another household.

 

In this definition also, importance has been
given to the structure of the unit, rather than the usage of the unit.

 

Further, a usage test may not help in
several cases, like in a case where the house has not been put to any use at
all, or a case where the house has been used for both residential as well as commercial
purposes, or a case where the house has been used for different purposes over
different periods. In such cases, it will be difficult to determine the nature
of the house for the purpose of allowing the exemption u/s 54 or 54F. However,
again, the intention may play an important role; commercial premises purchased
with the intention to use them for residential purposes may qualify to satisfy
the test of the provisions.

 

Importantly, the erstwhile provision of
section 54 as applicable prior to A.Y. 1983-84 was materially different from
its present provision. Under the erstwhile provision, the exemption was
available only when the house property was purchased or constructed by the
assessee for the purpose of his own residence or of the parents. This condition
was omitted by the Finance Act, 1982 with effect from A.Y. 1983-84. The
expression ‘the assessee has within a period of one year before or after
that date purchased, or has within a period of two years after that date
constructed, a house property for the purposes of his own residence’
was
substituted by the expression ‘the assessee has within a period of one year
before or after the date on which the transfer took place purchased or has
within a period of three years after that date constructed, a residential
house’.
Circular No. 346 dated 30th June, 1982 explained the
reason for this change as follows:

 

The conditions of self-occupation of the
property by the assessee or his parents before its transfer and the purchase or
construction of the new property to be used for the residence of the assessee
for the purposes of exemption of capital gains created hardships for assessees.
This was usually due to the fact of employment or business of the assessee at a
place different from the place where such property was situated.

 

Thus, the fact that the assessee cannot
always occupy the house for his own residential purpose has been recognised
while relaxing the condition for claiming the exemption. In such a case, the
exemption cannot be denied merely because the residential house has been let
out and the tenant has used it for non-residential purpose.

 

In the case of Dilip Kumar and Co.
(TS-421-SC-2018),
it has been held that the notification conferring an
exemption should be interpreted strictly and the assessee should not be given
the benefit of ambiguity. However, the Delhi High Court, in the case of Purshottam
Dass (Supra)
, has considered this aspect. In this case, the Revenue had
also argued that the exemption provisions or exception provisions have to be
construed strictly and it should be construed against the subject in case of
ambiguity. Reliance was placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
case of Novopan India Ltd. vs. CCE JT 1994 (6) SC 80; CCE vs. Parle
Exports (P) Ltd. 1989 (1) SCC 345;
and Union of India vs. Wood
Papers Ltd. 1990 (4) SCC 246.
With regard to this contention, the High
Court held that the language with which the case at hand was concerned was
clear and unambiguous and, therefore, there was no need for seeking the intention
and going into the question whether a strict or liberal interpretation was
called for.

 

The better view is that a house, which is
otherwise a residential house by its nature, cannot cease to be a residential
house merely on the ground that it has been used for non-residential purpose,
unless it is found that the intention of the assessee was never to put that
house for residential use. This principle should equally apply while
determining the number of houses owned by the assessee as on the date of transfer
of the original asset while applying the proviso to sub-section (1) of section
54F without any exception. Two diagonally opposite views may not be taken while
interpreting the same expression ‘residential house’ used at two different
places in the same section, unless warranted by the rule of beneficial
interpretation, where two views are possible.

 

It is
interesting to see that the assessee in both the cases, in either of the
situations, has been allowed the exemption by the Tribunal, perhaps indicating
that the benefit of the exemption should not be denied by laying undue emphasis
on the approval by the authorities and the use thereof. As long as the assessee
is seen to have complied with the other conditions, the benefit under the
beneficial provisions should be granted and not denied. Accepting this would
even be the best view.

 


THE FINANCE (No. 2) ACT, 2019

THE FINANCE ACT, 2019

Mr. Piyush Goyal, the eminent chartered accountant, in his capacity as
Finance Minister presented a very bold Interim Budget of the Narendra Modi
government on 1st February, 2019. He tried to give benefits to
farmers, the poor, the unorganised sector, salaried employees and the
middle-class families. The Interim Budget was unique as it gave relief to
certain deserving persons in respect of the income tax payable by them in the
financial year beginning from 1st April, 2019. No Finance Minister
in the past has given any concession in the direct tax provisions in an Interim
Budget. With this Interim Budget, the Finance Act, 2019 was passed in February,
2019 and received the assent of the President on 21st February,
2019.

 

BENEFITS TO SALARIED EMPLOYEES AND MIDDLE
CLASS FAMILIES

While delivering
the Interim Budget, the Finance Minister stated that as per convention the main
tax proposals would be presented in the regular budget. However, he pointed out
that small taxpayers, especially the middle class, salary earners, pensioners
and senior citizens, need certainty in their minds at the beginning of the year
about their taxes. He said that while the existing rates of income tax would
continue for the financial year 2019-20, the following amendments have been
made by the Finance Act, 2019 for giving benefits to salaried employees and
middle-class families; these benefits will be available in the computation of
income and in the taxes payable on income for the financial year commencing on
1st April, 2019.

 

Salary income: In the last Budget the provision for allowing
standard deduction of Rs. 40,000 was made in place of the earlier provision for
allowance for reimbursement of medical expenses and transport allowance. This
standard deduction is now increased to Rs. 50,000 w.e.f. 1st April,
2019. This will benefit all salaried employees and pensioners.

 

House
property income:
At present an individual is
entitled to claim exemption in respect of one self-occupied house property. But
from 1st April, 2019 he will be entitled to claim exemption in
respect of two residential houses. Therefore, if an individual owns two or more
houses, which are not let out, he can claim exemption in respect of two
residential houses of his choice. In respect of houses in excess of two which
are not let out, he will have to pay tax on the basis of notional income.

 

Properties
held as stock-in-trade:
In the case of
assessees holding house properties as stock-in-trade, i.e., builders,
developers and persons dealing in real estate, the Finance Act, 2017 had
provided that such assessees would have to pay tax on the basis of notional
income of the house property which is not let out after one year from the date
of completion of construction. By an amendment of section 23(5) of the Income
tax Act, it is now provided that no tax will be payable in respect of the house
properties which are not let out for the first two years after the date
of completion of the construction.

 

Interest on
housing loans:
Section 24 of the Income-tax Act
at present provides for deduction of interest (subject to a maximum of Rs. 2
lakhs) paid in respect of one house which is claimed to be self-occupied. This
provision is now amended to provide that this limit of Rs. 2 lakhs shall apply
in respect of two houses which are claimed to be for self-use and not
let out. Considering the present level of prices of real estate, when the
benefit of exemption to self-occupied houses is extended to two houses, the
above limit of Rs. 2 lakhs for deduction of housing loans for two such houses
should have been enhanced to
Rs. 5 lakhs.

 

Exemption of
capital gains:
Section 54 of the Act provides
for exemption in respect of long-term capital gains on sale of any residential
house by an individual or HUF. This exemption is available if the assessee
sells any residential house and reinvests the capital gain in the purchase of
another residential house within two years of sale, or constructs such residential
house within three years of the sale. This section is now amended, effective
from the financial year 2019-20, to provide that if the long-term capital gain
does not exceed Rs. 2 crores the individual or HUF can purchase or construct two
houses within the prescribed time limit to claim the exemption from tax. It is
also provided that if this benefit is claimed by the individual or HUF in any
assessment year, he cannot claim a similar benefit in any other year later on.
However, if the individual or HUF subsequently sells the residential house, the
benefit u/s 54 will be available if the capital gain is invested in the
purchase or construction of one residential house during the specified period.

 

Benefit for
affordable housing projects:
At present section
80IBA provides for exemption in respect of income of the assessee who is
developing and building affordable houses. This is available if such a housing
project is approved between 1st June, 2016 and 31st
March, 2019. To encourage this activity, it is now provided that the benefit of
this exemption u/s 80IBA can be claimed if such a housing project is approved
between 1st June, 2016 and 31st March, 2020.

 

Rebate in
computing income tax:
Section 87A of the
Income-tax Act provides that if the total income of a resident individual does
not exceed Rs. 3,50,000 he shall be entitled to a deduction from tax on his
total income of Rs. 2,500, or the actual tax payable on such income, whichever
is less. This section is now amended to provide that if the total income of an
individual does not exceed Rs. 5 lakhs, he shall be entitled to rebate of Rs.
12,500, or the actual tax payable on such income, whichever is less. This
amendment is effective from the financial year 2019-20. It may be noted that
the above benefit of tax rebate is available u/s 87A only to
individuals. An HUF or AOP will not get this benefit.

 

Tax deduction
at source:
Tax is deducted at source (TDS) at
10% if the interest receivable on bank / post office deposits exceeds Rs.
10,000 in a financial year. By an amendment of section 194A of the Act, the
threshold limit for TDS on such interest is increased from Rs. 10,000 to Rs.
40,000, effective from 1st April, 2019. This will benefit small
depositors and the non-working spouse who will not suffer TDS in respect of
interest from bank / post office deposits if such interest is less than Rs.
40,000.

 

Similarly, u/s
194-I, tax is required to be deducted from rent paid by the tenant to the
specified assessee at the rate of 10% if the total rent for a financial year is
more than Rs. 1,80,000. This threshold limit has been increased to Rs. 2,40,000 from 1st April, 2019. Thus, no tax will deductible if
the yearly rent is less than Rs. 2,40,000 from 1st April, 2019.

 

THE FINANCE (No. 2) ACT, 2019

After the recent
General Elections, Ms Nirmala Sitharaman took charge as the first lady Finance
Minister of the country and presented her Budget to Parliament on 5th
July, 2019. The Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2019 was presented with the Budget and
was passed in July, 2019. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 received the assent of
the President on 1st August, 2019. Some of the important provisions
of this Act are discussed in this article. After the above Act was passed, the
President promulgated ‘The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019’ on 20th
September, 2019 to further amend the Income-tax Act and the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019. Some of the important provisions of this Act and the Ordinance are
discussed in this article.

 

Rates of
taxes

The slab rates of
taxes for A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) for an individual, HUF, AOP, etc., are
the same as in A.Y. 2019-20. Similarly, the rates of taxes for firms,
co-operative societies and local authority for A.Y. 2020-21 are the same as in A.Y.
2019-20. However, in the case of a domestic company the rate of tax will be 25%
if the total turnover or gross receipts of the company in F.Y. 2017-18 was less
than Rs. 400 crores. In A.Y. 2019-20 the limit for total turnover or gross
receipts for this rate was Rs. 250 crores for F.Y. 2016-17. Thus, about 99% of
domestic companies will now pay tax at the rate of 25%. Other larger companies
will pay tax at the rate of 30%.

 

The existing rates of surcharge on income tax will continue to be levied
on companies, firms, co-operative societies and local authorities. However, the
rates of surcharge (S.C.) in cases of individuals, AOPs, HUFs, BOIs, trusts,
etc. (residents and non-residents) have been revised as under:

 

 

Total income

Existing rate of S.C.

Rate of S.C. for A.Y. 2020-21
(F.Y.2019-20)

1

Up to Rs. 50 lakhs

Nil

Nil

2

Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore

10%

10%

3

Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 2 crores

15%

15%

4

Rs. 2 crores to Rs. 5 crores

15%

25%

5

Rs. 5 crores and above

15%

37%

 

Thus, the
super-rich individuals, HUFs, AOPs, BOIs, Trusts, etc., will now pay more tax
if their income exceeds Rs. 2 crores. While proposing to levy this additional
surcharge on super-rich individuals and others, the Finance Minister stated in
para 127 of her Budget speech:

 

‘In view of
rising income levels, those in the highest income brackets need to contribute
more to the nation’s development. I, therefore, propose to enhance surcharge on
individuals having taxable income of Rs. 2 crores to Rs. 5 crores and Rs. 5
crores and above so that the effective tax rates for these two categories will
increase by around 3% and 7%, respectively.’

 

The impact of the above enhanced super surcharge was felt by many of the
Foreign Institutional Investors (FPI) who are assessed in the status of AOPs.
There was large-scale protest by them. In order to alleviate the tax burden in
such cases and for others who pay tax at special rates u/s 111A and 112A, the
Central government issued a press note on 24th August, 2019 announcing
that this additional super surcharge will not be payable in the following
cases… in order to give effect to this announcement, the ordinance dated 20th
September, 2019 has made the required amendments in the First Schedule to
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019:

 

(i)    Capital gains on transfer of equity shares
in a company, redemption of units of an equity-oriented M.F. and units of a
business trust as referred to in section 111A and 112A.;

(ii)    Capital gains tax payable on derivatives
(futures and options) in the case of Foreign Institutional Investors (FPI)
which are taxable at special rates u/s 115AD;

(iii)   In the case of foreign companies there is no
change in the rates of taxes and surcharge. In the cases to which sections
92CE(2A), 115O, 115QA, 115R, 115TA or 115TD apply, the rate of S.C. will
continue to be 12%.

(iv)   The rate of health and education cess at 4%
of total tax will continue as at present.

 

Corporate
taxation

The ordinance dated
20th September, 2019 has amended certain provisions of the Income-tax
Act effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20). It is clarified in the press
note dated 20th September, 2019 that these amendments are made in
order to promote growth and investment. These amendments are as under:

 

Section 115BA This section provides for tax on income of
certain domestic companies. The taxation at the rate of 25% is at the option of
the company – if specified tax incentives are not claimed. Now, section 115BAB
has been inserted from A.Y. 2020-21 giving similar tax concession to certain
manufacturing companies. Therefore, it is now provided that where the company
exercises the option u/s 115BAB, the option exercised u/s 115BA will be
withdrawn.

 

Section
115BAA
This is a new section inserted effective
from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20). It provides that the tax payable by a
domestic company, at its option, shall be 22% plus applicable surcharge and
cess if such company satisfies the following conditions:

(a)   The Company does not claim any deduction u/s
10AA, 32(1)(iia), 32AD, 33AB, 33ABA, 35(1)(ii), (iia),(iii), 35(2AA), 35(2AB),
35AD, 35CCC, 35CCD or any of the provisions of chapter VIA under the heading ‘C
– deductions in respect of certain incomes’ excluding section 80JJAA;

(b)   The company does not claim deduction for
set-off of any carried forward loss which is attributable to deductions under
the above sections;

(c)   The company will be able to claim
depreciation u/s 32, excluding 32(1)(iia), which is determined in the
prescribed manner;

(d)   The company has to exercise the option for
the lower rate of 22% in the prescribed manner before the due date for filing
return of income u/s 139(1) relevant to A.Y. 2020-21. The option once exercised
will be valid for subsequent years. Further, the company cannot withdraw the
option once exercised in any subsequent year.

 

It may be noted
that section 115JB is also amended, effective A.Y. 2020-21, to provide that
section 115JB will not apply to a company which exercised the option under the
new section 115BAA.

 

The companies which
are engaged in trading activities, letting out of properties, rendering
services and other similar activities may find this concession in rate of tax
attractive if they are not claiming deductions under the sections stated in (a)
above.

 

Section
115BAB
This is also a new section inserted from
A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20). It provides that the tax payable by a
manufacturing domestic company, at the option of such company, shall be at the
rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and cess if the company satisfies the
following conditions:

 

(i) The company
should be set up and registered on or after 1st October, 2019 and
should commence manufacturing on or before 31st March, 2023 and

– is not formed by
splitting up, or reconstruction, of a business already in existence. However,
this condition will not apply to reconstruction or revival of a company u/s
33B;

– it does not use
any machinery or plant previously used for any purpose.

However, this
condition will not apply to machinery or plant previously used outside India if
the conditions stated in Explanation – 1 in the section are satisfied. Further,
by Explanation 2, concession is given if the value of the old plant and
machinery used by the company does not exceed 20% of the total value of the
plant and machinery;

– The company
should not use any building previously used as a hotel or convention centre;

(ii)    The company should not be engaged in any
business other than the business of manufacture or production of any article or
thing. Further, the company has to ensure that the transactions of purchase,
sales, etc., are entered into at arm’s length prices;

(iii)   The total income of the company should be
computed without any deduction u/s 10AA, 32(1)(iia), 32AD, 33AB, 33ABA,
35(1)(2AA)(2AB)(iia)/(iii), 35AD, 35CCC, 35CCD, or under any provisions of
chapter VI A other than the provisions of section 80JJA;

(iv)   The option u/s 115BAB for concessional rate
is to be exercised in the first return to be submitted after 1st
April, 2020 before the due date u/s 139(1). This option once exercised cannot
be withdrawn.

 

It may be noted
that the provisions of section 115JB will not apply to a company which
exercises the option under this new section 115BAB. This new section will
encourage investment in new companies engaged in manufacture of goods and
articles in India.

 

TAX DEDUCTION AT SOURCE

The existing
provisions for TDS will continue. However, there are some modifications in
sections 194-A and 194-I made by the Finance Act, 2019 as discussed earlier.
Further, the following modifications and additions are made by the Finance (No.
2) Act, 2019:

 

Section 194
I-A
It provides for TDS at the rate of 1% when
payment of consideration is made at the time of purchase of immovable property.
The term ‘consideration for immovable property’ is not defined at present. This
section is now amended w.e.f. 1st September, 2019 to provide that
the consideration for immovable property will include charges in the nature of
club membership fees, car parking fees, electricity and water facility fees,
maintenance fees, advance fees or any other charges of similar nature, which
are incidental to the transfer of the immovable property. This deduction of 1%
tax will have to be made for payment made on or after 1st September, 2019.

 

Section 194M: A new section 194M has been inserted in the Income-tax Act with
effect from 1st September, 2019. At present, any individual or HUF,
not liable to tax audit, is not required to deduct tax from payments made to a
contractor, commission agent or a professional u/s 194C, 194H or 194J. It is
now provided in section 194M that if any individual or HUF makes payment for a
contract to a contractor, commission or brokerage or fees to a professional of
a sum exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs, in the aggregate in any financial year, tax at
the rate of 5% shall be deducted at source. This provision will apply even if
the payment is for personal work. The individual / HUF governed by section 194M
will not be required to obtain TAN for this purpose. The individual / HUF can
use his PAN for this purpose. This provision for TDS will come into force from
1st September, 2019 and will cover all payments made in F.Y.
2019-20.

 

Section 194N: A new section 194 N has been inserted w.e.f. 1st
September, 2019 which provides that a banking company, co-operative bank or a
post office shall deduct tax at source at 2% in respect of cash withdrawn by
any account holder from one or more accounts with the bank / post office in
excess of Rs. 1 crore in a financial year. This section does not apply to
withdrawal by any government, bank, co-operative bank, post office, banking correspondent,
white label ATM operators and such other persons as may be notified by the
Central government. This limit of Rs. 1 crore will apply to all accounts of a
person in any bank, co-operative bank or post office. Hence, if a person has
accounts in different branches of the same bank, total cash withdrawals in all
these accounts will be considered for this purpose. This TDS provision will
apply to all persons, i.e., individuals, HUFs, firms, companies, etc., engaged
in business or profession, as also to all persons maintaining bank accounts for
personal purposes. Thus, there will be no deduction of tax up to Rs. 1 crore.
This TDS provision applies on amounts drawn in excess of Rs. 1 crore in a
financial year. The provision is effective from 1st September, 2019.
Therefore, if a person has withdrawn cash of more Rs. 1 crore in the F.Y.
2019-20, tax of 2% will be deductible on or after 1st September,
2019. This provision has been made in order to discourage cash withdrawals and
promote digital economy.

 

It may be noted
that u/s 198 it is now provided that the tax deducted u/s 194N will not be
treated as income of the assessee. If the amount of this TDS is not treated as
income of the assessee, credit for this TDS amount will not be available to the
assessee u/s 199 read with Rule 37BA. If credit is not given, this will be an
additional tax burden on the assessee. It may be noted that by a press release
dated 30th August, 2019 the CBDT has clarified that if the total
cash withdrawal from one or more accounts with a bank / post office is more
than Rs. 1 crore up to 31st August, 2019, TDS will be deducted from
cash withdrawn on or after 1st September, 2019 only.

 

Section
194DA:
Section 194DA, providing for TDS in
respect of payment for life insurance policy has been amended w.e.f. 1st
September, 2019. At present the insurance company is required to deduct tax at
1% of the payment to a resident on maturity of life insurance policy if such
payment is not exempt u/s 10(10D). The present provision for TDS at 1% applies
to gross payment made by the insurance company although the assessee is
required to pay tax on the net amount after deduction of premium actually paid.
In order to mitigate the hardship, this section now provides that tax at the
rate of 5% shall be deducted at source w.e.f. 1st September, 2019,
from the net amount, i.e., actual amount paid by the insurance company on
maturity of policy after deduction of actual premium paid on the policy.

 

EXEMPTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

Section
10(4C):
A new section 10(4C) is inserted in the
Income-tax Act after the press release dated 17th September, 2018.
Under this announcement the Central government had given exemption from tax in
respect of interest paid to a non-resident or a foreign company by an Indian
company or a business trust on Rupee-denominated bonds. Under the new section
10(4C), such interest received by the non-resident or foreign company during
the period 17th September, 2018 to 31st March, 2019 will
be exempt from tax.

 

Section
10(12A):
At present, payment from the National
Pension System Trust to an assessee on closure of his account or on opting out
of the pension scheme u/s 80CCD to the extent of 40% of the total amount
payable to him is exempt u/s 10(12A). This limit for exemption is now increased
to 60% of the amount so payable to the assessee by amendment of section 10(12A)
effective from F.Y. 2019-20.

 

Section 80C: In order to enable Central government employees to have more
options of tax savings investments u/s 80C, this section has been amended to
provide that such employees can now contribute to a specified account of the
pension scheme referred to in section 80CCD – (a) for a fixed period of not
less than three years, and (b) the contribution is in accordance with the
scheme as may be notified. For this purpose, the specified account means an
additional account referred to in section 20(3) of the Pension Fund Regulatory
and Development Authority Act, 2013.

 

Section
80CCD:
Section 80CCD(2) has been amended. The
Central government has enhanced its contribution to the account of its
employees in the National Pension Scheme (NPS) from 10% to 14% by a
notification dated 31st January, 2019. To ensure that such employees
get full deduction of this contribution, the limit of 10% in section 80CCD(2)
has been increased from F.Y. 2019-20 to 14%. For other employees the old limits
of 10% will continue.

 

Section
80EEA:
This is a new section that provides that
an individual shall be allowed deduction of interest payable up to Rs. 1,50,000
on loan taken by him from any financial institution for the purpose of
acquiring any residential house property. This deduction is subject to the
following conditions:

 

(a)   The individual is not eligible for deduction
u/s 80EE;

(b)   The loan has been sanctioned during the F.Y.
1st April, 2019 to 31st March, 2020;

(c)   The Stamp Duty Value of the residential house
does not exceed Rs. 45 lakhs;

(d)   The assessee does not own any other
residential house as on the date of sanction of the loan.

 

Once deduction of
interest is allowed under this section, deduction of the same interest shall
not be allowed under any other provisions of the Act for the same or any other
assessment year. It may be noted that the assessee will have the option to
claim deduction for interest up to Rs. 2 lakhs u/s 24(b) if he does not desire
to avail of the
above deduction.

 

Section
80EEB:
This is also a new section inserted to
encourage purchase of electric vehicles (EV) and preserve the environment. This
section provides that an individual can claim deduction for interest up to Rs.
1,50,000 payable on loan taken by him from a financial institution for purchase
of an EV. For this purpose the loan should have been sanctioned between 1st
April, 2019 and 31st March, 2023. Once a deduction of interest is
allowed under this section, no deduction for this interest will be allowable
under any other section for the same or any other assessment year. The terms
‘Electric Vehicle’ and ‘Financial Institution’ are defined in the section. It
may be noted that this deduction is allowable to an individual only and not to
any other assessee. From the wording of this section it is evident that an
individual can claim this deduction for interest even if the electric vehicle
is purchased for his personal use.

Section 80 –
IBA:
This section deals with deduction from
profits and gains from housing projects. The Finance Act, 2019 has extended the
date for approval of the project by the competent authority from 31st
March, 2019 to 31st March, 2020. However, in respect of the projects
approved on or after 1st September, 2019, some of the conditions
about the size of the project have been modified by amendment of the section as
under:

(i)    The restriction of plot area for the project
of 1,000 sq. metres which applied to only four metropolitan cities will now
apply to the cities of Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi National Capital Region
(limited to Delhi, Noida, Greater Noida, Ghaziabad, Gurugram, Faridabad),
Hyderabad, Kolkata and the whole of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (specified
cities);

(ii)    The carpet area of a residential unit in the
housing project should not exceed…

– In specified
cities 60 sq. metres (as against 30 sq. metres at present);

– In other cities
90 sq. metres (as against 60 sq. metres at present).

(iii)   The Stamp Duty Valuation of a residential unit
in the housing project should not exceed Rs. 45 lakhs.

 

The above
amendments will benefit some affordable housing projects.

 

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

The provisions of
section 12AA deal with the procedure for granting registration and cancellation
of registration in the case of a public trust or institution claiming exemption
u/s 11. This section is now amended, effective from 1st September,
2019, to give the following additional powers to the Commissioner (CIT):

(i)    At the time of granting registration, the
CIT can call for necessary information or documents in order to satisfy himself
about the compliance of such requirements of any other law for the time being
in force by the trust or institution as are material for the purpose of
achieving its objects;

(ii)    Where a trust or institution has been
granted registration u/s 12A or 12AA, and subsequently it is noticed that the
trust or institution has violated the requirements of any other law which is
material for the purpose of achieving its objects and the order, direction or
decree, holding that such violation under the other law has become final, the
CIT can cancel the registration granted to the trust or institution.

 

It may be noted
this is a very wide power given to the CIT. To give an example, if a trust
governed by the Bombay Public Trust Act takes a loan from a trustee or a third
party, or sells its immovable property without obtaining the permission of the
Charity Commissioner as provided in the BPT Act, and the non-compliance or
delay in compliance with the provisions of the BPT Act is not condoned by the
Charity Commissioner and his order becomes final, the CIT can cancel the
registration u/s 12A/12AA. The consequence of such cancellation of registration
will be that the trust or the institution will be denied exemption u/s 11. In
addition, tax on accreted income u/s 115TD will be payable at the maximum
marginal rate.

 

It may be noted
that similar amendment is made in section 10(23C) effective from 1st
September, 2019. Therefore, all hospitals, universities, educational
institutions claiming exemption u/s 10(23C) will have to ensure that they
comply with any other law which is material for the purpose of achieving their
objects.

 

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES CENTRE

Section
47(viia b):
This section provides that any
transfer of a capital asset such as bonds, global depository receipts,
Rupee-denominated bonds of an Indian company or derivatives, made by a
non-resident through a recognised stock exchange located in the International
Financial Services Centre (IFSC) will not be treated as a transfer. In other
words no tax will be payable on
such transfer.

 

By amendment of
this section, the Central government is given power to notify similar other
securities in respect of which this exemption can be claimed. The consequential
amendment is made in section 10(4D).

 

Section 80LA: At present any unit located in an IFSC is eligible for deduction
u/s 80LA in respect of the specified business. Under the existing provision 100%
of the income of the unit from the specified business is exempt for the first
five consecutive assessment years and 50% of such income is exempt for the
subsequent five years. By amendment of this section, effective from A.Y.
2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20), it is now provided that 100% of such income will be
exempt for ten consecutive assessment years, at the option of the assessee, out
of fifteen years beginning with the assessment year in which permission or
registration is obtained under the applicable law.

 

Section 115A: This section provides for special rate of tax for a non-resident or
a foreign company having income from dividend, interest, royalty, fees for
technical services, etc. In computing total income in such cases, deduction
under chapter VIA is not allowed from the gross total income. To give benefit
of section 80LA to the eligible unit set up in the IFSC, this section is
amended to the effect that in the case of such an eligible unit, deduction u/s
80LA will be allowed against the income referred to in section 115A. This
amendment is effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20).

 

Section 115-O: Under this section dividend distribution tax
(DDT) is not applicable on dividend distributed out of current income by a unit
in the IFSC deriving income solely in convertible foreign exchange on or after
1st April, 2017. By amendment of this section, effective from 1st
September, 2019, it is now provided that DDT will not be payable even if the
dividend is distributed out of the income accumulated after 1st
April, 2017 by such a unit in the IFSC.

 

Section 115R: This section provides for levy of additional
income tax (income distribution tax) by a Mutual Fund (MF). This section is now
amended, effective from 1st September, 2019 to provide that the
above income distribution tax will not be payable if such distribution is out
of income derived from transactions made on a recognised stock exchange located
in any IFSC. For this exemption, the following conditions will have to be
satisfied:

(a)   The M.F. specified u/s 10(23D) should be
located in an IFSC;

(b)   The M.F. should derive its income solely in
convertible foreign exchange;

(c)   All units in the M.F. should be beneficially
held by non-residents.

 

Section
10(15):
This section provides for exemption of
interest income from specified sources. A new clause (ix) has been inserted,
effective from 1st September, 2019 to provide for exemption in
respect of interest received by a non-resident from a unit located in an IFSC
on monies borrowed by such unit on or after 1st September, 2019.

 

From the above
amendments it is evident that the government wants to encourage units to be set
up in IFSCs (e.g., Gifts City).

 

INCOME
FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

Section 32: At a press conference on 23rd August, 2019 the Finance
Minister announced that on vehicles purchased during the F.Y. 2019-20
depreciation will be allowed at the rate of 30% instead of 15%. For this
purpose the I.T. Rules will be amended. It is not clear from this announcement
whether this benefit will be given for only motor cars or all other vehicles
and whether it will apply to purchase of new vehicles or to purchase of second
hand vehicles also.

 

Section 43B: This section provides that deduction for certain expenditure will
be allowed in the year in which actual payment is made. This is irrespective of
the fact that liability for the expenditure is incurred in an earlier year.
This section is amended with effect from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide
that interest on any loan or borrowing taken from a deposit-taking NBFC or
systemically important non-deposit-taking NBFC will be allowable only in the
year in which the interest is actually paid. It is also provided that in
respect of F.Y. 2018-19 or any earlier year, if the deduction for such interest
is actually allowed on accrual basis, no deduction will be allowed for the same
amount in the year in which actual payment is made.

 

Section 43D: This section provides that in the case of a scheduled bank,
co-operative bank and other specified financial institutions interest on
specified bad and doubtful debts is not taxable on accrued basis but is taxable
in the year in which the same is credited to the profit and loss account. By
amendment of this section this benefit is now extended, effective from A.Y.
2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20), to deposit-taking NBFCs and systemically important non-
deposit-taking NBFCs.

 

CAPITAL GAINS

Section 50CA: At present the difference between the fair market value and actual
consideration is taxed in the hands of the assessee who transfers unquoted
shares, held as a capital asset, for inadequate consideration. The section 50CA
is now amended, effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that this
section will not apply to any consideration received or accruing as a result of
transfer of such shares by such class of persons and subject to such conditions
as may be prescribed. The intention behind this amendment is that if the prices
of the shares are fixed by certain authority (e.g., RBI) and the assessee has
no control over fixing the price, the assessee should not suffer.

 

Section 54GB:
This section grants exemption in respect of
long-term capital gain arising from transfer of residential property if the net
consideration is invested in shares of an eligible startup company. The said
startup company has to utilise the amount so invested for purchase of certain
specified assets, subject to certain conditions. By amendment of section 54GB,
effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) some of the above conditions have
been relaxed as under:

(a)   Lock-in period of holding the new asset
(computer or computer software) by the company is now reduced from five to
three years;

(b)   Benefit of section 54GB is now extended to
transfer of residential property from 31st March, 2019 to 31st
March, 2021;

(c)   The minimum shareholding and voting power
requirement in the startup company is now reduced from 50% to 25%.

 

The wording of the
amended section suggests that the above relaxations will also apply to
investments made by an assessee in a startup company prior to 31st March,
2019.

 

Section 111A: At present short-term capital gain on transfer of Units of Fund of
Funds is not eligible for concessional rate of 15% under this section. The
section is now amended, from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that
short-term capital gain on transfer of units of Fund of Funds will be taxable
at the concessional rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and cess.

 

INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES

Section
56(2)(viib):
Under this section, share premium
received from a resident by a closely-held company from issue of shares at a
consideration in excess of the fair market value is taxable in the hands of the
company as income from other sources. This is popularly referred to as ‘Angel
Tax’. At present this provision does not apply to investments by a venture
capital fund under the ‘Category I Alternative Investment Funds’. By amendment
of this provision, it is now provided, effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y.
2019-20) that this section will not apply to investments by Category II
Alternative Investment Funds.

 

This section
provides that the Central government can declare that the provisions of this
section shall not apply to investment by specified class or classes of persons.
By amendment of this provision it is now provided that if there is failure on
the part of the company to comply with the conditions specified in the above
notification, the company will be liable to pay the ‘Angel Tax’ as provided in
the section in the year in which there is such default. Further, the difference
between the fair market value of shares and the actual consideration received
on issue of shares will be considered as under-reported income and penalty u/s
270A will be levied on such amount.

It may be noted
that by a press release dated 22nd August, 2019 the CBDT has
clarified that the provisions of this section will not apply to startup
companies recognised by the DPIIT. CBDT has also issued a comprehensive
circular on 30th August, 2019 to clarify the assessment procedure for
such startup companies and also clarifying the circumstances when the
provisions for levy of ‘Angel Tax’ will not apply to such companies. This
indicates that the government is keen to encourage startups and may amend the
Income-tax Act to give effect to the assurances given by the Finance Minister
at the press conference on 23rd August, 2019 and at various meetings
with stakeholders.

 

Section
56(2)(x):
This section provides that any sum of
money, immovable property or specified movable assets received by an assessee
for inadequate consideration, the difference between the fair market value and
the actual consideration will be taxable in the hands of the assessee. There
are certain exceptions to this provision as listed in the fourth proviso to the
section. An amendment has been made in this proviso and item XI is added to
provide that receipt from such class of persons, and subject to such conditions
as may be prescribed, will not be taxable under this section.

 

It may be noted
that the provisions of this section are now made applicable to a non-resident.
This has been provided by amendment of section 9(1)(viii). Therefore, if a
non-resident receives any money, immovable property or specified movable
property outside India on or after 5th July, 2019 for inadequate
consideration, tax u/s 56(2)(x) will be payable by the non-resident.

 

INCOME OF A NON-RESIDENT

Section 9: Section 9 of the Act deals with income deemed to accrue or arise in
India. Under the Act, non-residents are taxable in India in respect of income
that accrues or arises (including income deemed to accrue or arise) or received
in India. At present, a gift of money or property (movable or immovable)
received by a resident is taxed in the hands of the donee, subject to certain
exceptions as provided in section 56(2)(x) of the Act. However, in the case of
a non-resident (including a foreign company) who is outside India a view is
taken that such gift is not taxable as it does not accrue or arise or is
received in India and is a capital receipt. To ensure that such gifts by a
resident to a non-resident are subject to tax u/s 56(2)(x) of the Act, section
9 has been amended w.e.f. 5th July, 2019. The amendment provides in
new clause (viii), added in section 9(1), that such income is taxable u/s
56(2)(x) under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. Thus, any sum of money
paid or transfer of any movable or immovable property situated in India on or
after 5th July, 2019 by a resident to a person outside India shall
now be taxable. In other words, section 56(2)(x) which provides for taxation of
a gift or a deemed gift where the value of the gift exceeds Rs. 50,000 will now
apply to such gift given by a resident to a non-resident. If there is a treaty
with any country, the relevant article of the applicable DTAA shall continue to
apply for such gifts as well.

 

Some of the cases
in which the above amendment will apply are considered below:

(a)   If Mr. ‘A’ (resident) who is not a relative
of Mr. ‘B’ (non-resident), as defined in section 56(2)(vii), remits more than
Rs. 50,000 as a gift to Mr. ‘B’ in a financial year, Mr. ‘B’ will be liable to
tax on this amount.;

(b)   In the above case, if Mr. ‘A’ has sold some
shares of an Indian company to Mr. ‘B’ at a price below its market value as
provided in section 56(2)(x), Mr. ‘B’ will have to pay tax on the difference
between the market value and the sale price, if such difference is more than
Rs. 50,000;

(c)   In the above case, if Mr. ‘A’ sells any
immovable property situated in India to Mr. ‘B’ at a price which is below the
Stamp Duty Valuation and the difference between the Stamp Duty Valuation and
the sale price is more than Rs. 50,000, the said difference will be deemed to
be the income of Mr. ‘B’;

(d)   It may be noted that the above amendment is
applicable to all transfers of property made on or after 5th July,
2019. Further, the amended provisions apply in all cases of transfers of
property situated in India by a resident (including an individual, HUF, AOP,
firm, company, etc.) to a non-resident person (including individual, firm, AOP,
company, etc.). In all such cases the resident will have to deduct tax at
source u/s 195 at applicable rates.

 

BUY-BACK OF SHARES

Section
115QA:
This section provides for levy of
additional income tax at the rate of 20% plus applicable surcharge and cess of
the distributed income on account of buy-back of shares by an unlisted domestic
company. As a result of this, the consequential income in the hands of the
shareholder is exempt u/s 10(34A). This provision does not apply to buy-back of
shares by a listed company. This section as well as section 10(34A) are now
amended. The amendment provides that even in the case of buy-back of shares by
a listed company on or after 5th July, 2019, the above additional
income tax will be payable by the company. So far as the shareholder is
concerned, exemption u/s 10(34A) will be allowed. It may be noted that the
ordinance dated 20th September, 2019 provides that this provision
will not apply to a listed company which has made a public announcement for
buy-back of shares before 5th July, 2019 in accordance with SEBI
regulations.

 

CARRY FORWARD OF LOSSES

Section 79: The existing section 79 which restricts carry-forward and set-off
of losses in the case of companies where there is change in shareholding of
more than 51%, has been substituted by a new section 79. This new section is
more or less on the same lines as the existing one. The only change made by the
new section is that this section will not apply from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y.
2019-20) to a company and its subsidiary and the subsidiary of such subsidiary
in the case where the National Company Law Tribunal (NELT), on an application
by the Central government, has suspended the Board of Directors of such a
company and has appointed new directors nominated by the Central government u/s
242 of the Companies Act, 2013 and a change in shareholding has taken place in
the previous year pursuant to a resolution plan approved by NCLT u/s 242 of the
Companies Act, 2013 after affording an opportunity of hearing to the Principal
C.I.T. concerned.

 

Section
115UB:
This section provides for pass-through
of income earned by Category I and II Alternate Investment Funds (AIF), except
for business income which is taxed at AIF level. Pass-through of income (other
than profit and gains from business) has been allowed to individual investors
so as to give them the benefit of lower rate of tax, if applicable.
Pass-through of losses is not permitted and these are retained at AIF level to
be carried forward and set off in accordance with chapter VI.

 

Sections
115UB(2)(i) and (ii) have been substituted and sub-section (2A) has been
inserted from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that the business loss of
the investment fund, if any, shall be allowed to be carried forward and it
shall be set off by it in accordance with the provisions of chapter VI and it
shall not be passed on to the unit holder. The loss other than business loss,
if any, shall be regarded as loss of the unit holders. It shall, however, be
ignored for the purposes of pass-through to its unit holders, if such loss has
arisen in respect of a unit which has not been held by the unit holder for a
period of at least 12 months.

 

The loss other than
business loss, if any, accumulated at the level of investment fund as on 31st
March, 2019 shall be deemed to be the loss of a unit holder who held the unit
on 31st March, 2019 and be allowed to be carried forward for the
remaining period calculated from the year in which the loss had occurred for
the first time, taking that year as the first year and shall be set off in
accordance with the provisions of chapter VI. The loss so deemed in the hands
of unit holders shall not be available to the investment fund.

 

FILING OF INCOME TAX RETURNS

Section 139: At present, section 139(1) provides that an individual, HUF, AOP,
BOI or Artificial Juridical Person has to file the return of income if their
total income exceeds the threshold limit without giving effect to exemptions /
deductions provided u/s 10(38), 10A, 10B, 10BA and chapter VIA. By amendment of
this section from the current financial year, in case of such assessees the
return of income will have to be filed if the total income exceeds the
threshold limit before claiming the benefit of sections 10(38), 10A, 10B, 10BA,
54, 54B, 54D, 54EC, 54F, 54G, 54GA, 54GB and chapter VIA.

 

Further, from the
A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) it will be necessary for an individual, HUF, AOP,
BOI, etc., to file the return of income although their income is below the
threshold limit in the following cases:

(i)    If the person has deposited an aggregate
amount exceeding Rs. 1 crore in one or more current accounts, with one or more
banks or co-operative banks during the year. It may be noted that this
requirement includes deposits in cash or by way of cheques, drafts, transfers
by electronic means, etc.;

(ii)    If the person has incurred expenditure
exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs on foreign travel for himself or any other person during
the year;

(iii)   If the person has incurred expenditure
exceeding Rs. 1 lakh on electricity consumption during the year; or

(iv)   If the person fulfils any
other conditions that may be prescribed.

 

Section 139A:
This section provides for allotment of PAN and
has been amended effective from 1st September, 2019 to provide as
under:

(a)   It is now provided that every person
intending to enter into any transaction, as may be prescribed, shall apply for
PAN;

(b)   Every person possessing Aadhaar number who is
required to furnish or quote his PAN which has not been allotted can furnish or
quote his Aadhaar number in lieu of PAN. He shall then be allotted a PAN in the
prescribed manner;

(c)   Every person who has been allotted PAN and
who has intimated his Aadhaar number u/s 139AA(2) can furnish or quote his
Aadhaar number in lieu of his PAN;

(d)   If a person is required to quote his PAN in
any document or transaction, as may be prescribed, he has to ensure that his
PAN or Aadhaar number is duly quoted in the document pertaining to such
transaction and authenticated in the prescribed manner;

(e)   It may be noted that in section 272, which
deals with levy of penalty for non-compliance of section 139A, consequential
amendment has been made effective from 1st September, 2019.

 

The above
amendments are made for ease of compliance and inter-changeability of PAN with
Aadhaar number effective from 1st September, 2019.

 

Section
139AA:
This section provides for linking of
Aadhaar number with PAN. The amendment in this section, effective from 1st
September, 2019, provides that if a person fails to intimate the Aadhaar
number, the PAN allotted to such person shall be made inoperative after the
date so notified in such manner as may be prescribed.

 

Section 140A: This section provides for payment of tax by way of self-assessment.
It has been amended effective from 1st April, 2007 to provide that
while calculating the amount of tax payable on self-assessment basis, any
relief of tax claimed u/s 89 can be deducted from the tax liability. Section 89
grants relief in tax payable when salary or allowances are paid to an employee
in advance. The consequential amendment is made in sections 143(1)(c), 234A,
234B and 234C. This amendment is only clarificatory.

 

Section 239: This section provides for a time limit for a person claiming refund
of tax. It has been amended with effect from 1st September, 2019.
Before the amendment, the provision was that, (a) the assessee claiming refund
of tax was required to file Form 30 prescribed by the I.T. Rules; and (b) such claim
for refund of tax could be made within one year from the last day of the
assessment year. Thus, claim for refund of tax could be made in respect of the
F.Y. ending 31st March, 2019 on or before 31st March,
2021. This time limit has now been reduced by one year and the requirement of
filing the prescribed Form No. 30 has been done away with by this amendment
from 1st September, 2019. Therefore, claim for refund of tax u/s 239
can be made by the assessee only within the time limit provided u/s 139. In other
words, claim for refund in respect of F.Y. 2018-19 will have to be made before
31st March, 2020.


MINIMUM ALTERNATE TAX (MAT)

At present, clause
(iih) of Explanation 1 below section 115JB(2) provides for book profits to be
reduced by the aggregate amount of unabsorbed depreciation and loss brought
forward in case of a company in respect of which an application for corporate
insolvency resolution process has been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority
u/s 7, 9 or 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

 

By amendment of
this section, this benefit is extended to a company and its subsidiary and the
subsidiary of such subsidiary, where the NCLT, on an application moved by the
Central government u/s 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 has suspended the Board
of Directors of such company and has appointed new directors who are nominated
by the Central government u/s 242 of the said Act. This amendment is effective
from the A.Y. 2020-2021 (F.Y. 2019-20).

 

The ordinance dated 20th September, 2019 has amended section
115JB(1) to provide that from A.Y. 2020-21, the rate of tax on book profits
will be reduced from 18.5% to 15%.

 

Section 115JB(5A)
is also amended to provide that this section will not apply to companies opting
to be taxed u/s 115BAA and 115BAB from A.Y. 2020-21.

 

TRANSFER PRICING PROVISIONS

Section 92CD: Section 92CD(3) provides that where the assessment or re-assessment
has already been completed and modified return of income has been filed by the
assessee pursuant to an Advance Pricing Agreement (APA), then the AO has to
pass the order of assessment, re-assessment or computation of total income.
This section is now amended, effective from 1st September, 2019, to
provide that the AO can pass such revised order only to the extent of modifying
the total income of the relevant assessment year in accordance with the APA.
The consequential amendment is also made in section 246A dealing with
appealable orders before CIT (Appeals).

 

Section
92CE(a):
Section 92CE(1) provides that the
assessee shall make secondary adjustment in a case where primary adjustment to
transfer price takes place as specified therein. Further, it is provided that
the said section shall not apply in cases fulfilling cumulative conditions, i.e.,
(a) where the amount of primary adjustment
made in any previous year does not exceed Rs. 1 crore; and (b) the primary
adjustment is made in respect of an assessment year commencing on or before 1st
April, 2016. Now this proviso is amended to make these two conditions
alternative. This amendment is effective from A.Y. 2018-19.

 

Section
92CE(1)(iii):
This section provides that
secondary adjustment shall be applicable where primary adjustment to transfer
price is determined by an advance pricing agreement. Now, section 92CE(1)(iii)
is amended to provide that the secondary adjustment will be applicable only
where the primary adjustment to transfer price is determined by an advance
pricing agreement entered into by the assessee u/s 92CC on or after 1st
April, 2017. Further, a new proviso after section 92CE(1) has been inserted
with effect from A.Y. 2018-19 to provide that no refund of the taxes already
paid till date under the pre-amended section shall be claimed and allowed.

 

Section
92CE(2):
This section
provides that the excess money available to the associated enterprise shall be
repatriated to India from such associated enterprise within the prescribed time
and, in case of non-repatriation, interest thereon is to be computed deeming
the excess money as advance to such associated enterprise. Now the said section
is amended to provide that the assessee shall be required to calculate interest
on the money that has not been repatriated. Further, an explanation has been
inserted to clarify that the excess money may be repatriated from any of the
associated enterprises of the assessee which is not resident in India in lieu
of the associated enterprise with which the excess money is available. This
amendment is effective from A.Y. 2018-19.

 

This section has
also been amended by insertion of new sub-sections (2A), (2B), (2C) and (2D) to
provide that where the excess money or part thereof has not been repatriated in
time, the assessee will have the option to pay additional income tax at the
rate of 18% on such excess money or part thereof. Such tax shall be in addition
to the computation of interest till the date of payment of this additional tax.
Further, if the assessee pays additional income tax, such assessee will not be
required to make secondary adjustment or compute interest from the date of
payment of such tax. Also, the deduction in respect of the amount on which
additional tax has been paid shall not be allowed under any other provision of
the Act and no credit of additional tax paid shall be allowed under any other
provision of the Act. This amendment is effective from 1st
September, 2019.

 

Section 286: This section provides for a specific reporting regime containing
revised standards for transfer pricing documentation and a template for
country-by-country reporting. Section 286(9)(a)(i) defines ‘accounting year’ to
mean a previous year in a case where the parent entity or alternate reporting
entity is resident in India. This definition is now amended effective from A.Y.
2017-18 and ‘accounting year’ in such a case will be the annual accounting
period with respect to which the parent entity of the international group
prepares its financial statements under any law of the country or territory of
which such parent entity is resident.

 

PENALTIES AND PROSECUTION

Section 270A:
This section provides for levy of penalty in a
case where a person has under-reported his income. The several cases of
under-reporting of income have been provided in section (2) of this section
which includes a case where no return of income has been furnished. In a case
where the person files his return of income for the first time in response to a
notice u/s 148, the mechanism for determining under-reporting of income and
quantum of penalty to be levied are not provided in this section. By amendment
of the section, effective from A.Y. 2017-18, it is now provided that where a
return of income has been filed for the first time in response to a notice u/s
148, if the income assessed is greater than the maximum amount which is not
chargeable to tax, then it will be considered that the assessee has
under-reported his income.

 

In such a case, the
amount of under-reported income shall be computed in the following manner:
(a)   In case of a company, firm or local
authority, the assessed income itself will be considered as under-reported
income;

(b)   In other cases, the excess of assessed income
over the maximum amount not chargeable to tax will be considered as
under-reported income.

 

Section
271DB:
This is a new section added with effect
from 1st November, 2019 which provides that if a person who is
required to provide facility for accepting payment through the prescribed
electronic modes of payment as referred to in new section 269SU, fails to
provide such facility, a penalty of Rs. 5,000 for each day of default will be
levied. This penalty can be levied only by the Joint Commissioner. No penalty
under this section will be levied if the person concerned proves that there
were good and sufficient reasons for such failure.

 

It may be noted
that new section 269SU has been added with effect from 1st November, 2019 to
provide that every person whose turnover or gross receipts in a business
exceeds Rs. 50 crores in the immediately preceding previous year shall provide
facility for accepting payment through prescribed electronic modes.

 

Section
271FAA:
This section provides for levy of a
penalty of Rs. 50,000 for default in compliance with clause (k) of section
285BA(1). Clause (K) referred to only reporting of prescribed particulars. By
amendment of this section, effective from 1st September, 2019, this
section has been made applicable to defaults in complying with reporting
requirements u/s 285BA(1)(a) to (k).

 

Section
276CC:
This section empowers prosecution in the
case of wilful default to furnish return of income within the prescribed time
limit. At present, in the case of a non-corporate assessee, prosecution cannot
be initiated if the tax payable on total income, as reduced by advance tax and
TDS, does not exceed Rs. 3,000. The amendment in this section from A.Y. 2020-21
(F.Y. 2019-20) provides that such prosecution cannot be initiated if the tax
payable on the total income assessed in a regular assessment, as reduced by
advance tax and self-assessment tax paid before the end of the assessment year
and TDS, does not exceed Rs. 10,000.

      

It appears that
raising of limit from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 10,000 is inadequate when the government
is trying to reduce litigation. This limit should have been raised to Rs. 25
lakhs.

      

It may further be
noted that by CBDT circular No. 24/2019 dated 9th September, 2019 it
has now been clarified that no prosecution u/s 276B to 276CC should ordinarily
be initiated if the amount of tax is less than Rs. 25 lakhs. In cases where the
amount of tax is less than Rs. 25 lakhs, the prosecution should be initiated
only with the prior approval of the Collegium of two CCIT / DGIT. This is a
welcome move and will result in reduction of litigation.

 

It may further be
noted that by another circular No. 25/2019 dated 9th September,
2019, the CBDT has granted further time up to 31st December, 2019
for making an application for compounding of offences under Direct Tax Laws as
a one-time measure. Normally, an application for compounding of offences can be
filed within 12 months as per the guidelines issued by CBDT. In some cases, the
assessees have not been able to make such an application. In order to reduce
litigation the CBDT, by the above circular, has granted time up to 31st December,
2019 as a one-time concession. Therefore, assessees who have not been able to
make such compounding applications till now will be able to make such
applications up to 31st December, 2019.

 

Section 201: At present section 201 provides for treating certain persons as
assessees in default for failure to deduct tax and also provides for charging
interest in such cases. From this, relaxation is provided in cases of failure
of such deduction in respect of payments, etc. made to a resident subject to
the condition that such resident payee (a) has furnished his return of income
u/s 139; (b) has taken into account such sum for computing income in such
return of income; and (c) has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in
such return of income. In such cases, it is provided that the person shall not
be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such non-deduction of tax.

 

The above benefit
is now extended, by amendment of sections 201 and 40(a)(i), for payments made
to non-residents effective from 1st September, 2019.

 

Section
201(3):
This section provides that an order deeming
a person to be an assessee in default for failure to deduct whole or part of
the tax from a payment made to a resident shall not be made after expiry of
seven years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or
credit is given.

 

Section 201(3) is
now amended, effective from 1st September, 2019, to provide that
such an order can be made up to:

(i)    expiry of seven years from the end of the
financial year in which payment is made or credit is given; or

(ii)    two years from the end of the financial year
in which the correction statement is delivered under proviso to section 200(3),
whichever is later.

 

OTHER AMENDMENTS

Section
2(19AA):
This section gives the definition of
‘demerger’. Section 2(19AA)(iii) provides that for such demerger, the property
and liabilities of the undertaking transferred by the demerged company to the
resulting company should be at book value. The applicable Indian Accounting
Standards (Ind AS) provides that in the case of demerger, the property and
liabilities of the demerged company should be transferred at a value different
from its book value.

 

This section has
been amended from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that in a case where
Ind AS is applicable, the property and liabilities of the demerged company can
be recorded by the resulting company at values different from the book value.

 

Rule 68B of
Second Schedule:
At present the Rule provides
that sale of immovable property attached towards recovery shall not be made
after expiry of three  years from the end
of the financial year in which the order in consequence of which any tax,
interest, fine, penalty or any other sum becomes final.

 

The following
amendments have been made affective from 1st September, 2019 to
protect the interest of Revenue, especially to include those cases where demand
has been crystallised on conclusion of the proceedings:

(a)   Sub-rule 1 is amended to increase the time
limit for sale of attached property from a period of three years to seven
years; and

(b)   A new proviso has been inserted in the said
sub-rule so as to give powers to CBDT to extend the above period of limitation
by a further period of three years after recording the reasons in writing.

 

Section 206A: The existing section 206A dealing with submission of statement, in
the prescribed form to the prescribed authority, about Tax Deducted at Source
from payment of any income to a resident has been replaced by a new section
effective from 1st September, 2019. The new section is more or less
on the same lines as the old one with a few major modifications as under:

 

(i)  In the case of a bank or a co-operative bank
the threshold limit for submission of this statement for interest payment to
the resident will now be Rs. 40,000 instead of Rs. 10,000;

(ii) Earlier, the Central
government was authorised to issue a notification to require any other person
to submit a statement for TDS from other payments. This power is now given to
CBDT which will frame Rules for this purpose;

(iii) The persons required to submit these statements
can make corrections in the statement in the prescribed form.

 

Section
285BA:
This section provides for furnishing of statement
of financial transactions or reportable accounts by the specified persons. This
section is amended effective from 1st September, 2019, as under:

(a) At present, CBDT has power to prescribe different values for
different specified transactions. This is subject to the minimum limit of Rs.
50,000. This limit is now removed;

(b) If there is any
defect in the statement, at present it can be rectified within the specified
time provided in section 285BA(4). If this defect is not rectified by the
person concerned, it is now provided that such person has furnished inaccurate
information in the statement. This will invite penalty of Rs. 50,000 u/s
271FAA.

 

Promotion of
digital economy:
At present various sections of
the Income-tax Act encourage payment / receipts through account payee cheques,
drafts, electronic clearing systems, etc. From the current year sections 13A,
35AD, 40A, 43(1), 43CA, 44AD, 50C, 56(2) (X), 80JJA, 269SS, 269ST, 269T, etc.,
are amended to provide that in addition to the existing modes of payment /
receipt, any other electronic mode, as may be prescribed, will also be
considered permissible.

 

AMENDMENTS IN OTHER LAWS

Along with the
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, some of the sections of the following Acts are also
amended:

(a) The Reserve Bank
of India Act, 1934; (b) The Insurance Act, 1938; (c) The Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956; (d) The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) Act, 1970 and 1980; (e) The General Insurance Business
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972; (f) The National Housing Bank Act, 1987; (g) The
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988; (h) The Securities and
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992; (i) The Central Road and Infrastructure Fund
Act, 2000; (j) The Finance Act, 2002, 2016, 2018 and The Finance (No. 2) Act,
2004; (k) The Unit Trust of India (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act,
2002; (m) The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; (n) The Payment and
Settlement System Act, 2007; and (o) The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income
and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015.

 

Finance Act,
2016:
The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 –
Sections 187 and 191 of the Finance Act, 2016, have been amended effective from
1st June, 2016 as under:

(i) At present,
under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 there is no provision for delayed
payment of the tax, surcharge and penalty payable in respect of undisclosed
income. Further, section 191 of the Finance Act, 2016 states that any tax,
surcharge and penalty paid shall not be refunded. A proviso is now inserted in
section 187 of the Finance Act, 2016 to provide that where the tax, surcharge
and penalty has not been paid within the due date for the same, the government
may notify a class of persons who may make payment of the same within the notified
date along with interest at the rate of 1% for every month or part thereof from
the due date of payment till the date of actual payment.

(ii) Further, a proviso has been inserted to section 191 to enable the
government to notify a class of persons to whom excess tax, surcharge and
penalty paid shall be refunded.

 

TO SUM UP

From the above
analysis it is evident that Mr. Piyush Goyal, the then Finance Minister,
provided some relief to all deserving sections of the society in the Finance
Act, 2019 which was passed with the Interim Budget in February, 2019. In that
Interim Budget he had placed the vision document of the government covering ten
areas, such as building physical as well as social infrastructure, creating
digital India, making India a pollution-free nation, expanding rural
industrialisation, making our rivers and water bodies our life-supporting
assets, developing our coastlines, developing our space programmes, making
India self-sufficient in food, making India a healthy society and transforming
India into a ‘Minimum Government-Maximum Governance’ nation. He had also stated
that this would be the India of 2030. Further, there would be a proactive and
responsible bureaucracy which will be viewed as friendly to the people. If this
can be achieved, we can create an India where poverty, malnutrition and
illiteracy would be things of the past. He further stated that it is the vision
of the present government that by the year 2030 India will be a modern,
technology-driven, high growth, equitable, transparent society and a ‘Ten
Trillion Dollar Economy’. Let us hope that our present government is able to
achieve its vision.

 

The present Finance
Minister, Ms Nirmala Sitharaman, in her Budget speech has repeated the above
ten points of the vision of the government for the next decade. She has further
stated in para 10 of her Budget speech that ‘Today, we are nearing the three
trillion dollar level. So when we aspire to reach the five trillion dollar
level, many wonder if it is possible. If we can appreciate our citizens’
“purusharth” or their “goals of human pursuit” filled with their inherent
desire to progress, led by the dedicated leadership present in this House, the
target is eminently achievable’.

 

In the Finance Act,
2019 which was passed in February, 2019, some benefit was given to small
taxpayers, especially the middle class, salary earners, pensioners and senior
citizens. In the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, several amendments have been made
in the Income-tax Act. The major amendment is in the field of surcharge on
income above Rs. 2 crores earned by all Individuals, HUFs, AOPs, Trusts, etc.
There was a lot of resistance from Foreign Institutional Investors. Considering
the issues raised by them, the Finance Minister has now announced that this super
surcharge will not be payable on capital
gains on sale of quoted shares by residents and non-residents. Further, as
promised by the government, the rate of tax for domestic companies is now
reduced to 25% where the turnover or gross receipts is less than Rs. 400
crores. This year’s Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 passed in July, 2019 is unique as
it has been amended by an Ordinance within two months – on 20th
September, 2019. It is explained that this has been done to resolve several
issues raised and opposing some of the tax proposals. Further, some of the
amendments have been made by the ordinance to encourage the corporate sector to
invest in new manufacturing activities and thus boost the economy.

 

Another important
amendment relates to TDS provisions. Now tax is required to be deducted at 5%
by an individual or HUF, who has paid more than Rs. 50 lakhs in a financial
year to a contractor, commission agent or a professional even for personal
work. Further, TDS at 2% will now be deducted by a bank if an assessee
withdraws more than Rs. 1 crore in cash in a financial year. Since this tax is
not to be deducted from any income chargeable to tax, the assessee will not get
credit for the TDS amount. This will amount to an additional tax burden on the
assessee.

 

There are several
provisions in the Act to give incentives to units situated in International
Financial Services Centres (IFSC). Incentives are also provided to attract new
units to be established in IFSCs. Similarly, incentives are also given to
startups. It is proposed that the ‘Angel Tax’ shall not be charged on startups
registered with the DPIIT. Incentives are also provided for those engaged in
construction of affordable houses.

 

Last year, section
143 of the Income-tax Act was amended authorising the government to notify a
new scheme for ‘e-assessment’ to impart greater efficiency, transparency and
accountability. Under this scheme it is proposed to eliminate the interface
between the assessing officer and the assessee, optimise utilisation of resources
and introduce a team-based assessment procedure. The Finance Minister has
stated in her Budget speech that it is proposed to launch this scheme of
‘e-assessment’ in a phased manner this year. To start with, such ‘e-assessment’
will be carried out in cases requiring verification of certain specified
transactions or discrepancies. Cases selected for scrutiny shall be allocated
to assessment units in a random manner and notices will be issued
electronically by a central cell, without disclosing the name, designation or
location of the AO. The central cell will be the single point of contact
between the taxpayer and the Department. It is stated that this new scheme of
assessment will represent a paradigm shift in the functioning of the Income tax
Department. It may be noted that the CBDT has issued a notification dated 12th
September, 2019 notifying a detailed scheme called the ‘E-Assessment Scheme,
2019’ which provides for the procedure for e-assessment u/s 143(3A). The Scheme
will come into force on a date to be notified hereafter. There is going to be
some confusion in the initial years when the new scheme is introduced. Let us
hope that this new scheme is successful.

 

With the amendments
made in several sections of the Income-tax Act by this year’s Budget, the
Income-tax Act has become more complex. The committee appointed by the
government has submitted its report to simplify the Income-tax Act. The
proposal is to replace the present six-decade-old Act by a new Direct Tax Code.
This report is not yet in the public domain. Let us hope that we get a new
simplified law during the tenure of the present government.

 

 

 

THE LATEST AMENDMENTS TO THE INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016

ONE STEP FORWARD
AND TWO STEPS BACKWARD?

 

INTRODUCTION

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has been
one of the present government’s landmark legislations and continues to be
pursued as a mechanism to improve India’s standing in the rankings for ‘ease of
doing business’. The government has been keenly following the judicial
developments and has also been very proactive in amending the law in an attempt
to iron out any difficulties.

Recently, by a Gazette Notification dated 16th
August, 2019 bearing No. S.O. 2953(E), the provisions of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Amendment Act) were brought into force.
This Amendment Act, in principle, is touted to be an outcome of the decision
passed on 4th July, 2019 by the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Standard Chartered Bank vs. Satish Kumar
Gupta, R.P. of Essar Steel Ltd.
1
and amends the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) on certain vital issues.

 

THE ESSAR STEEL CASE

The Essar Steel case related to the
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings of Essar Steel India Limited (ESIL) which
were initiated on the basis of an application filed by the State Bank of India
and Standard Chartered Bank under the provisions of section 7 of the IBC before
the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Ahmedabad. These proceedings were
amongst the first few insolvency proceedings initiated pursuant to the RBI
press release2  directing
banks to take action against 12 large companies that had defaulted on their
repayment obligations. The matter has had a chequered history and has been heavily
contested by various parties.

Initially, the litigation before the NCLT
was related to two resolution applicants, ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. (AMIPL)
and Numetal Limited (Numetal) submitting their respective resolution plans.

The Resolution Professional, however, found
both AMIPL and Numetal ineligible to be resolution applicants in view of the
amendments brought about by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act,
2017 and in particular the enactment of section 29A to the IBC which deals with
disqualification of applicants.

____________________________________

1   Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 242 of 2019

2   
https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=40743

 

While considering the challenge, the NCLT
remanded the matter back to the Committee of Creditors (COC) of ESIL, with
directions that the comments of the Resolution Professional on the eligibility
of the resolution applicants be placed before the COC and the COC should
consider the resolution plans submitted by the resolution applicants.


This decision of the NCLT was challenged
before the NCLAT. However, while the appeals were pending, the COC rejected the
proposals of both the resolution applicants, i.e., Numetal and AMIPL.
Eventually, when the appeals were finally heard by NCLAT, it found Numetal to
be an eligible resolution applicant as Numetal’s shareholder, Aurora
Enterprises Limited (which was a related party and hence violative of section
29A) had divested from Numetal. The NCLAT directed the COC to consider the
resolution plan of Numetal. However, insofar as the eligibility of AMIPL was
concerned, the NCLAT permitted its resolution plan to be considered by the COC
subject to it paying the outstanding dues and interest of KSS Petron Pvt. Ltd.
and Uttam Galva Steels Limited (both of which were alleged to be related
parties of AIMPL and hence affected by the provisions of section 29A). Both
Numetal and AMIPL approached the Supreme Court of India challenging the order
passed by the NCLAT.

 

The Supreme Court, vide its judgement of 4th
October, 20183 , while dealing with the challenges to section 29A of
the IBC, held that both the resolution applicants, AMIPL and Numetal, were in
breach of provisions of section 29A; however, exercising its powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, it agreed to once again permit the
resolution applicants to pay the debts of their respective related corporate
debtors and submit the resolution plans for consideration by the COC.
Subsequently, only AMIPL paid the debts of its related corporate debtors and
the resolution plan submitted by it was considered and ultimately approved by
the COC.

______________________________________

3   Civil Appeal Nos. 9402-9405 of 2018 in
ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and others

 

The second phase of litigation started
subsequent to approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority
where the plan submitted by AMIPL was approved with certain modifications. The
order passed by the Adjudicating Authority was challenged before the NCLAT4
by various stakeholders, including the promoter, secured creditors as well as
the operational creditors and the COC. The NCLAT dismissed the challenge to the
resolution plan but in the process laid down principles which are arguably
against well-settled banking principles and distribution of assets.

 

The NCLAT held that the COC is not empowered
to decide the manner in which the distribution of the resolution proceeds is
required to be made between one or other creditors as the same is within the
exclusive domain of the resolution applicant and, if found discriminatory by
the NCLT, the resolution plan could be rejected. It further laid down that the
COC is merely required to see the viability and feasibility of the resolution
plan apart from the other requirements and ineligibility of the resolution
applicant but not the distribution of the proceeds.

 

It also held that that under the IBC there
was no distinction between secured and unsecured financial creditors and the
IBC only had a homogenous class of financial creditors. Further, it also stated
that the provisions of section 53 of the IBC will not apply to distribution of
amounts amongst stakeholders as proposed by the resolution applicant in the
resolution plan. Finally, NCLAT observed that in cases where the NCLT is unable
to decide the claim on merit, the parties can raise the issue before the
appropriate forum in terms of section 60(6) of the IBC, whereas financial and
operational creditors whose claims have been decided by the Adjudicating
Authority or by NCLAT, such decision being final, is binding on such financial
and operational creditors. Their total claims will be considered to have been
satisfied.

 

In addition to the above, NCLAT also held
that the claims of financial creditors who were beneficiaries of a guarantee
will stand satisfied to the extent of the guarantee and the comparative amount
of the guarantee cannot be claimed from the principal borrower.

______________

4   Supra at 3

 

CONCERNS
ARISING SUBSEQUENT TO THE NCLAT DECISION IN STANDARD CHARTERED BANK VS. SATISH
KUMAR GUPTA, R.P. OF ESSAR STEEL LTD.5

By laying down that the COC was not required
to look into the distribution of the proceeds but merely the viability and
feasibility of the resolution plan, the NCLAT has ruled contrary to the report
of the Banking Law Reforms Committee of November, 2015 wherein primacy has been
given to the COC to evaluate the various possibilities and take a decision. In
the words of the Banking Law Reforms Committee, ‘the appropriate disposition
of a defaulting firm is a business decision, and only the creditors should make
it’.

 

Fittingly, the Supreme Court in K.
Shashidhar vs. Indian Overseas Bank
6 held that the
commercial and business decisions of the financial creditors are not open to
any judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority or the appellate authority.
Largely, prior to the NCLAT decision in Essar Steel’s case, it was settled that
COC will be the imprimatur (meaning authoritative approval) that will
guide the resolution process. This, perhaps, also explains the purposive
distinction between financial and operational creditors and the consequential
waterfall mechanism under the IBC. However, by significantly taking away the
power to decide the distribution of the proceeds, the NCLAT had left the door
wide open for more companies seeing liquidation proceedings as opposed to
insolvency and resolution.

 

Another fundamental distinction made by the
NCLAT in Essar Steel’s case was where it has refused to recognise the
difference between secured and unsecured financial creditors and decided to
treat both at par. This has created grave difficulties for secured creditors
where insolvency proceedings are pending and which are yet to commence. As a
result, this would also cause the cost of borrowing to go up significantly. An
equally important point to note would be that on the kicking in of the
moratorium period, the rights of secured creditors would get immediately
impacted, and now, with this ruling, secured creditors would expect little in
the resolution process. It would, therefore, not be completely incorrect to
conclude that more secured creditors may prefer to opt for liquidation as opposed
to resolution, as under liquidation at least the sanctity of those secured
creditors that chose to realise the security would be maintained.
Interestingly, even u/s 31B of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, primacy has been given to provisions of the IBC while
recognising the supremacy of secured creditors.

__________________________________

5   Supra at 3

6 
Civil Appeal No. 10673 of 2018 decided on 5th February, 2019

 

Another can of worms had also been opened
when the NCLAT held that provisions of section 53 of IBC do not apply to the
distribution of amounts received under a resolution plan but only apply in the
event of actual liquidation. This not only does violence to the language of the
statute, but is also a far cry from the well-established principles of law.
Even otherwise, operationally, this would lead to most COCs voting in favour of
liquidation as opposed to resolution, given that liquidation would recognise their
rights to realise security. Effectively, ‘maximisation of value’ through
resolution would arguably have become ‘liquidation’ value.

 

Given the flutter created by the judgement
in Essar Steel’s case, the government took prompt steps by amending the IBC.
Just how quick the reaction was is borne out from the fact that the judgement
in Essar Steel was passed on 4th July, 2019 and the Amendment Act
was passed on 24th July, 2019 and after receiving the President’s
Assent on 5th August, 2019 it was brought into force with effect
from 16th August, 2019.

 

Significantly, the NCLAT decision in the
Essar Steel matter has been challenged by the COC forthwith before the Supreme
Court7 and the same is pending further adjudication. It is yet to be
seen exactly how the same will play out, given that the Amendment Act is now in
force.

 

KEY
AMENDMENTS UNDER THE AMENDMENT ACT

Some of the key amendments brought about by
the Amendment Act are discussed below:

 

Amendment to section 7(4) of IBC

The Amendment Act has amended section 7(4)
of the IBC to make it necessary for the Adjudicating Authority to record
reasons if, in the case of a financial creditor application, it has not
ascertained the existence of default and passed the order within a period of 14
days. This amendment effectively recognises
the principle set out in the NCLAT decision in JK Jute Mills Company
Limited vs. Surendra Trading Company
8
where the NCLAT, while considering
whether the timelines under the IBC were mandatory for rectifying the defects
in an insolvency application, held that the timeline of seven days was
mandatory but the timeline of 14 days to decide on admission of the application
was directory. The NCLAT stated that reasons may be recorded where the
insolvency application is not disposed of within the time specified under the
IBC. Whilst the NCLAT made it discretionary to record reasons, the Amendment
Act makes it mandatory to record reasons.

____________________________

7   Civil Appeal (Diary Nos.) 24417 of 2019

 

 

 

Amendment to section 12 of IBC

A significant change brought about by the
Amendment Act is the mandatory timeline introduced for the completion of the
corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) by inserting a proviso to
section 12(3) of the IBC. The Amendment Act states that the CIRP shall
mandatorily be completed within a period of 330 days from the insolvency
commencement date, i.e., the date of admission, and shall be inclusive of
extensions granted and the time taken in legal proceedings in relation to the
resolution process of the corporate debtor. Where CIRP is at present pending,
the Amendment Act has made it mandatory for the CIRP to be completed within a
period of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, i.e., 16th
August, 2019.

__________________________________________

8   Company Appeal (AT) No. 09 of 2017 decided on
1st May, 2017. The NCLAT decision was challenged in the Supreme
Court in Civil Appeal No. 8400 of 2017 where the Supreme Court held that the
time to remove the defects from an insolvency application was not mandatory but
directory, but sufficient cause is required to be shown for the delay in
removing the defects

 

 

From the
changes made in the Amendment Act, this amendment seems to be the most
noteworthy and will have an immediate impact on all CIRPs, pending as well as
those admitted to insolvency. The timeline of 330 days, at first blush, seems
salutary, but given the mandatory nature of the amendment, appears difficult to
achieve in practice.

 

First, the 330-day period is inclusive of
all time taken in litigation in relation to the resolution process, which seems
difficult to achieve given the pendency of cases as well as delays in the
judicial system. Moreover, judicial primacy has already been bestowed to
exclude the time during which applications and appeals are pending before the
Adjudicating Authority and the appellate authority, keeping firmly in mind the
established principle, Actus curiae neminemgravabit – the act of the Court
shall harm no man
and, to quote the Supreme Court9 , ‘This is
only to say that in the event of the NCLT, or the NCLAT, or this Court taking
time to decide an application beyond the period of 270days, the time taken in
legal proceedings to decide the matter cannot possibly be excluded, as
otherwise a good resolution plan may have to be shelved, resulting in corporate
death and the consequent displacement of employees and workers.’

 

The NCLAT in the case of Quinn
Logistics India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mack Soft Tech Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
10
has enumerated several other instances beyond the control of the parties, other
than pending litigation, which could also delay the CIRP. Instances are also
seen where the suspended board of directors and personnel of the corporate
debtor have not co-operated with the interim resolution professional leading to
delay in formal commencement of the insolvency resolution process. Second, this
amendment makes the extension period granted for the CIRP exclusive. This,
along with the mandatory language of the amendment, would suggest that in the
event the CIRP is not completed within the period of 330 days, there would be
no other option before the Adjudicating Authority but to remit the corporate
debtor to liquidation under the provisions of section 33 of the IBC.
Threateningly, this has been the outcome in the case of S.N. Plumbing
Limited
11 where the resolution plan was not
approved within the period of 270 days under the then prevailing provisions of
the IBC, and the NCLAT held that the COC ceased to have any authority after 270
days, resulting in the Adjudicating Authority being mandatorily required to
pass an order for liquidation. Needless to say, this would be against the
spirit of the IBC which has fostered the idea to maximise valuation and save the
debtor from corporate death. Additionally, a one-size-fits-all approach may not
work where a CIRP for companies as large as Essar Steel India Limited having a
resolution plan worth more than Rs. 40,000 crores is being deliberated upon.

________________________________________

9   Supra at 5 – This decision was prior to the
Amendment Act, where the time period allowed under the IB Code was 270 days
inclusive of extension of 90 days

10  Decision
dated 8th May, 2018 in Company Appeal (AT) Insolvency No. 185 of 2018

 

Amendment to section 30 of IBC

Another key change has been made by amending
the provisions of section 30 of the IBC. This change has primarily been brought
about in view of the NCLAT decision in Essar Steel’s case. Essar Steel’s case
stated that it would be impermissible for a resolution applicant to
discriminate between various classes of creditors, such as secured and
unsecured creditors. This led to a position where, even though certain
creditors had security, they would recover only such amounts as would an
unsecured creditor. This was widely criticised.

 

The amendment to section 30 now provides
that a resolution plan should at the very least provide for payments to
operational creditors, which shall be the higher of the amount that would be
paid to the operational creditor u/s 53 of the IBC on liquidation of the
corporate debtor, or the amount that would be paid to the operational creditor,
if the corporate debtor was wound up and the resolution proceeds were
distributed in accordance with the waterfall set out in section 53(1). The
amendment further provides that the resolution plan should provide for the
payment to financial creditors who do not vote in favour of the resolution plan
and that such payment shall not be less than the amount such creditor would
receive u/s 53 if the corporate debtor was being liquidated. As would be
apparent, this change has been brought about to emphasise that the distribution
of resolution proceeds shall only be in accordance with the statutory waterfall
provided u/s 53 of the IBC and to negate the anomaly created in view of the
NCLAT’s decision in the Essar Steel case. This, therefore, clarifies that
different classes of creditors may continue to be treated differently and the
interest of a secured creditor would take priority over that of an unsecured
one.

____________________________________________

11  NCLAT decision in Sanjay Kumar Ruia vs.
Catholic Syrian Bank Limited
decided on 3rd January, 2019

 

 

Under section 53, the priority of claims
would be for claims of insolvency resolution professional costs, workmen’s
dues, claims of secured creditor where such secured creditor has relinquished
his security and is standing in line with the other creditors, wages of
employees, financial debts of unsecured creditors, government dues, unsecured
debts of secured creditors after adjusting the security value that they have
realised on enforcing the security. This means that only after the above claims
have been satisfied, the claims of operational creditors are given their due.
This is also the reason why operational creditors are normally given a nil
value or only Re. 1 as the resolution applicants are uncertain whether any
value will remain subsequent to settling the prior claims.

 

Section 30 has also been amended with an explanation
to state that the distribution of the resolution proceeds in accordance with
section 30 shall be fair and equitable. This change, in the view of the
authors, has been brought about in order to cease and desist operational
creditors or unsecured financial creditors from claiming that the resolution
plan is unfair, inequitable and discriminatory.

 

As an example, if a corporate debtor has
overall creditors of say Rs. 1,000 crores (Rs. 500 crores secured and remaining
unsecured), is undergoing insolvency and has a liquidation value of about Rs.
300 crores, the code mandates that a resolution applicant pay the creditors a
minimum of Rs. 300 crores. Further, the distribution of the Rs. 300 crores must
be in a manner so that they pay each class of creditors more money than they
would have got if the corporate debtor is wound up and money received is
distributed as per the waterfall set out in section 53 of the Code. Based on
Essar Steel’s judgement, distribution of amounts received from a resolution
applicant (Rs. 300 crores) would have to be paid proportionately to all
creditors for it to be approved (irrespective of their place in the waterfall
set out in section 53). Interestingly, in a recent judgement12, the
NCLAT has considered the amended provisions of section 30 of the IBC and has
held that creditors falling under the same class cannot be treated differently,
even if they have a dissenting vote. The basis of the judgement seems to be
that even though provisions of section 30 have been amended, the provisions of
regulation 38 of the CIRP regulations have not been amended. Thus, the CIRP
regulations do not permit a successful resolution applicant to discriminate
between similarly situated ‘secured financial creditors’ on the ground of
dissenting vote.

__________________________________

12  Company Appeal (AT) Insolvency No. 745 of 2018
decided on 17th September, 2019 – Hero Fincorp Ltd. vs. Rave
Scans Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

 

 

Another explanation added to section 30
clarifies that on and from the commencement date of the Amendment Act, i.e., on
and from 16th August, 2019, the amended provisions of section 30
will also apply (a) where the resolution plan is pending approval or has not
been rejected by the Adjudicating Authority, (b) where an appeal has been preferred
either before the NCLAT or the Supreme Court, or (c) where a legal proceeding
has been initiated in any court against the decision of the Adjudicating
Authority in respect of the resolution plan.

 

Yet another amendment that has been brought
to section 30 in view of the NCLAT’s decision in Essar Steel’s case is that the
COC is required to consider not just the ‘feasibility and viability’ of the
resolution plan but also ‘the manner of distribution proposed, which may take
into account the order of priority amongst creditors as laid down in section
53(1) of the IBC including the priority and value of the security interest of a
secured creditor’. A bare reading of this change will make it abundantly clear
that this has been brought about only to address the Essar Steel case.

 

By virtue of these changes and the
applicability of the amendments to section 30 even to those resolution plans
where appeals are pending before the NCLAT and the Supreme Court, it is clear
that these amendments may change the eventual distribution of the resolution
proceeds in the Essar Steel case.

 

OTHER
AMENDMENTS UNDER THE AMENDMENT ACT

Amendment to section 5(26) of IBC

Section 5(26) of the IBC has been amended to
clarify that the resolution plan may include provisions for restructuring,
including by way of merger, amalgamation and demerger. By permitting
restructuring under a resolution plan, the IBC has provided for greater
flexibility in the potential revival of a corporate debtor which is in
furtherance of the objective of the IBC. By providing even for merger,
amalgamation and demerger as potential options in a resolution plan, the
Amendment Act has effectively borrowed the principle as laid out in the NCLAT
decision in S.C. Sekaran vs. Amit Gupta & Ors.13
wherein it directed the liquidator to take steps u/s 230 of the
Companies Act, 2013 and only if there is a failure of revival, should the
liquidator then proceed with the sale of the company’s assets wholly, and if
that is not possible, then to sell the company in part and in accordance with
law.

_______________________________

13  Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 495 &
496 of 2018 decided on 29th January, 2019

 

 

Amendment to section 25A(3) of IBC

The Amendment Act has substituted the
provisions of section 25A(3) with the addition of section 3A which provides
that the authorised representative under 21(6A), i.e., the authorised
representative for security and deposit holders (viz., debenture / bond holders
and fixed deposit holders) as well as real estate allottees shall vote at COC
meetings in accordance with a majority decision, i.e., 50.01% or more of the
financial creditors he represents. Additionally, the amendment also states that
where the decision is in respect of section 12A, i.e., withdrawal of the
insolvency application, the authorised representative shall vote in accordance
with section 25(3) only, i.e., in accordance with the instructions received
from each financial creditor, to the extent of such financial creditor’s voting
share.

 

This amendment will further enhance the
objective to complete the insolvency resolution process in 330 days where large
insolvencies involving home buyers and investors holding security receipts are
concerned.

 

Amendment to section 31(1) of IBC

Amendment to section 31(1) has crystallised
that once the resolution plan has been approved by the Adjudicating Authority,
the same shall be binding on all and sundry. The Amendment Act has specifically
included Central government, state government and local authority to whom
statutory dues are pending in the list of stakeholders on whom the resolution
plan shall be binding.

 

As much as this is a much-celebrated
amendment as it will lead to increased resolution applicant interest and
confidence to bid by staving regulatory litigation, it could also lead to
situations where companies being in significant statutory debt could avoid
prosecution by simply knocking on the doors of the NCLT.

 

Amendment to section 33(2) of IBC

Provisions for initiation of liquidation as
provided u/s 33 have been amended to statutorily recognise the supremacy of the
COC to decide on the insolvency process of the corporate debtor. The amendment
provides that the COC may take a decision to liquidate the corporate debtor at any
time after the constitution of the COC but before confirmation of the
resolution plan, including before preparation of the information memorandum.

 

As argued earlier, this again recognises
that, after all, it is the COC which is the best judge on taking commercial
decisions, including as to whether or not revival of the corporate debtor is
possible. If the COC views that resolution is unlikely or not possible, it can
now kick-start the process of liquidation immediately and save time. Even
before the principle of COC supremacy was recognised by the Supreme Court in K.
Shashidhar
14, the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai in
the case of Gupta Coal India Private Limited15
recognised the supremacy of the COC and permitted liquidation of the corporate
debtor where it rejected the resolution plan and decided to go for liquidation.
The National Company Law Tribunal held that it could not go against the
decision of the COC.

 

CONCLUSION

The Amendment Act, in part, is a step in the
right direction where it has recast the efficacy of the resolution process by
recognising the COC’s supremacy and commercial wisdom in deciding not only on
the feasibility and viability of the resolution plan but also the distribution
of the resolution proceeds. Another laurel of the Amendment Act is that it has
statutorily recognised the applicability of the waterfall mechanism u/s 53 of
the IBC regarding liquidation proceedings to even insolvency proceedings. However,
despite these advantages the amendment to section 12 where the 330-day deadline
has been introduced as a hard stop may be impractical and risks more companies
undergoing liquidation rather than resolution. The government must naturally
look to augment the number of NCLT benches and improve the infrastructure.
There is also a need for improved training being given to stakeholders like
resolution professionals and COC members who play a crucial role in the
process.

 

Much like amendments to various economic
legislations being tested on constitutional principles, even the provisions of
the Amendment Act are now subject to the constitutional challenge in the case
of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar
Gupta & Anr.
16. It now remains to be seen whether the
changes proposed would have the necessary effect on the corporate insolvency
resolution process and yield the desired results.

_________________________________

14
Supra at 8

15
Decisionin MA 524 in Company Petition No.
31 of 2017 rendered on 1st January, 2018

16 Order dated 7th August, 2019
passed in Civil Appeal (Diary Nos.) 24417 of 2019

 

 

 

ADDITIONAL GROUND IN APPEAL: WHEN PERMISSIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Under tax
laws, remedies are provided against orders passed by lower authorities.
Normally, the remedy is either rectification or appeal. While rectification has
a limited scope because it is restricted to correction of apparent mistakes,
appeal has a very wide scope and is a useful right with the assessee. An
aggrieved assessee can file an appeal to the designated higher authority
against unfavourable order/s. Normally, there is also a scheme for filing a
second appeal before the Tribunal or such higher authorities as may be
prescribed.

 

However,
it may be noted that the rights to appeal are subject to certain conditions.
Generally, there are appeal forms which are to be filled up and in the same the
grounds about the issues raised in appeal are required to be mentioned. It is
expected that the assessee will take proper care while raising the grounds of
appeal. Under fiscal laws, the grounds can be amended or new grounds can be
added in the course of an appeal. If the matter is in first appeal, then the modification
/ addition of the grounds is normally not objected to. However, if the appeal
is before the Tribunal and if any new ground is to be raised, then the issue is
not that simple. The power of the Tribunal to allow the additional ground is
discretionary and it may allow it subject to its satisfaction.

 

RECENT CASE LAW

Recently, the Hon. Bombay High Court had occasion to deal with such an
issue in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. the
Commissioner of Sales Tax (68 GSTR 58) (Bom.)
under the BST Act. The
factual position involved is narrated by the High Court in the following words:

 

…..

‘7.   When all the aforementioned four second
appeals were fixed for hearing, the applicant sought permission to raise an
additional ground relating to levy of sales tax on the surrender of Exim
Scrips. This additional ground was with reference to the second appeals that
were filed pertaining to the F.Y. 1995-96. The additional ground sought to be
raised was thus:

 

“That the
lower authorities have erred in levying sales tax on surrender of Exim Scrip
and therefore such levy be set aside in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble
Tribunal in the case of M/s Agra Engineering Works (Second Appeal No. 185
of 1997, dated 30/4/2002).
”

 

8.    It was submitted on behalf of the applicant
that since this is a pure question of law, it could be raised at any time in
the appeal proceedings and therefore the said additional ground be allowed to
be raised before the MSTT.

 

9.    This was however vehemently opposed by the Revenue.
It was pointed out that this ground was never taken up either in the first
appellate proceedings or even in the grounds before the MSTT.

 

According
to the Revenue, the adjudication on this ground involved verification of the
relevant documents and therefore the said ground could not be allowed at such a
late stage of the proceedings.

 

10. Hearing the parties on this preliminary issue,
the MSTT opined that the applicant had not given any details of the particular
transactions, the levy in respect of which was now disputed through the
additional ground. It recorded that the assessment order for the period 1995-96
was also silent as regards whether any such transactions had been assessed to
tax. It was also not clear as to whether the transaction, if any, in respect of
the Exim Scrips constituted any surrender or sale. Having regard to these
facts, the MSTT agreed with the Revenue that adjudication in the context of
this ground would involve verification of relevant evidence so as to ascertain
the true nature of the transactions and therefore there was no case made out to
allow this additional ground to be raised at such a late stage. The MSTT
therefore declined to entertain the additional ground. Question (I) reproduced
by us earlier arises from this additional ground.’

…..

 

The above
matter came before the High Court by way of Sales Tax Reference. Long-drawn
arguments were made before the Court from both the sides. So far as the
assessee was concerned, it was submitted that the Tribunal is the last fact-finding
authority, and therefore it should have allowed the additional ground. It was
further submitted that the appellate powers under the BST Act are wide enough
to allow additional ground and even if additional evidence was required, still,
it could have been allowed.

 

Per contra,
on behalf of Revenue it was submitted that the additional ground sought to be
raised was not purely a question of law but was a mixed question of fact and
law and accordingly it was submitted that the rejection is justified.

 

The High
Court thereafter referred to the discussion by the Tribunal on the above ground
and came to a conclusion as follows:

 

…..

‘19.       As
can be seen from the aforesaid paragraphs, the MSTT (third Bench) on a
consideration of all the relevant facts had taken a conscious decision not to
entertain the additional ground relating to levy of tax on the transactions of
Exim Scrips. Thereafter, the fourth Bench of the MSTT itself examined the files
for the relevant financial years. It perused the files submitted by the
applicant in the assessment proceedings which contain statements of sales /
purchase, declarations and other relevant documents like transport receipts,
sales bills, etc. On going through all these files, the fourth Bench of the
MSTT opined that they did not contain any documents to conclusively show that
the Exim Scrips were surrendered to the Government of India or the designated
bank. On the contrary, in the statements of sales, the said transactions of
Exim Scrips have been specifically shown to be “Exim Scrips sold.”

 

Even in
the assessment order, the transactions were categorically mentioned to be
“sale” of Exim Scrips. After examining all this material, the MSTT opined (in
the referral order) that it was beyond any doubt that the assessment records
did not contain any document to conclusively show that the impugned
transactions constituted surrender of Exim Scrips and which was the additional
ground that was sought to be raised by the applicant. In this view of the
matter, it was absolutely clear that the adjudication on the said point before
the MSTT would have certainly involved perusal, verification and appreciation
of additional evidence and that is why the MSTT declined to adjudicate the said
issue. This was for the simple reason that no material on this additional
ground was ever produced. Over and above this, the MSTT in paragraph 21
(reproduced above) also examined certain documents which the applicant had
claimed to have submitted in the assessment proceedings. On examining the documents
mentioned in paragraph 21, the MSTT found that, in fact, at least part of the
Exim Scrips were admittedly sold by the applicant to one M/s Agrawal Traders of
Bombay.

 

As far as
the contention of the applicant regarding surrender of Exim Scrips is concerned,
the MSTT opined that the documents submitted by the applicant in relation to
certain cheque receipt entries in support of the receipt of cheques from the
Joint DGFT, the MSTT was of the opinion that merely on the basis of these
documents, the claim of the applicant that the Exim Scrips were surrendered to
the Government could not have been legally allowable unless the other
supporting documents relating to the particular transactions were produced,
verified and appreciated. To put it in a nutshell, the MSTT was of the view
that the relevant documents available on record were not sufficient for
adjudication of the additional ground that was sought to be canvassed by the
applicant. It would have certainly required leading of additional evidence.

 

20. We find that the applicant never made any
application for leading any additional evidence to substantiate its claim that
the Exim Scrips were in fact surrendered to the Government and were not sold.
In fact, in the order of MSTT dated 8th December, 2006 it was
specifically contended by the applicant that since the additional ground is a
pure question of law it could be raised at any time in the appeal proceedings
and therefore the MSTT ought to have entertained the additional ground. Having
found that the additional ground was not a pure question of law but required
additional documents and evidence which needed to be verified, produced and
appreciated, we do not think that the MSTT was unjustified in not entertaining
the additional ground regarding surrender of Exim Scrips. If the applicant did
not bring any material before the MSTT to substantiate its claim that it had
surrendered the Exim Scrips to the Government and therefore was not exigible to
tax, the MSTT necessarily could not have entertained the aforesaid ground as
there was no material brought on record to render a finding thereon.

 

In these
circumstances and peculiar to the facts of this case, we find that the MSTT was
legally justified in not adjudicating on the point regarding levy of tax on Exim
Scrips. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in answering Question (I)
in the affirmative and against the applicant and in favour of the Revenue.’

…..

 

Thus, the rejection is justified by the High Court. From the above
observation it can be seen that if the additional ground is about a law point,
then allowability of the same is normal. However, if the issue involves factual
position, then it becomes discretionary and may require more persuasion.

 

CONCLUSION

Though the
above judgement is under the BST Act, the ratio will apply to other fiscal laws
also where the assessee wants to raise additional grounds before the appellate
authority. Amongst others, while trying to raise additional grounds it is
expected that the assessee will give all relevant material that is ready to
convince the appellate authority to allow the additional ground. Normally, care
should be taken to take the grounds with the appeal itself, but if at all a
situation arises for raising additional ground, then the assessee should take
more care to submit the relevant supporting ground along with the application.
The above judgement will be a useful guidance for future.
 

Non-resident shareholder liable to capital gains tax on transfer of Indian company shares pursuant to conversion of the Indian company into an LLP under the LLP Act – The value of partnership interest as represented by capital as well as reserves and surplus is the full value of consideration for computation of capital gains on transfer of shares — Value of partnership interest is not same as cost of investment in shares

4. Domino
Printing Science Plc.
AAR No.: 1290
of 2012
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order:
23rd August, 2019

 

Non-resident shareholder liable to capital gains tax on transfer of
Indian company shares pursuant to conversion of the Indian company into an LLP
under the LLP Act – The value of partnership interest as represented by capital
as well as reserves and surplus is the full value of consideration for
computation of capital gains on transfer of shares — Value of partnership
interest is not same as cost of investment in shares

 

FACTS

The applicant, a tax resident of the UK, was 100% shareholder of an
Indian company ICo. During the relevant year and in accordance with the LLP
Act, ICo was converted into an LLP. Consequently, the shareholding of the
applicant in ICo was transformed into a partnership interest in the LLP.

 

The Applicant filed an application before the Authority for Advance
Ruling (AAR) with respect to the aforesaid conversion and raised the following
questions:

(i) Whether conversion of equity shares held by the applicant in ICo
into partnership interest in the LLP, consequent to the conversion of the ICo
into an LLP, would be regarded as a ‘transfer’ under the Act?

(ii) Whether the computation provisions of the Act are capable of being
applied to such transfer?

(iii) Whether the transaction can give rise to any taxable capital gains
in the hands of the applicant when the value for the partnership interest in
the LLP was the same as the value of the applicant’s interest in ICo?

 

HELD

On whether conversion would be regarded as a ‘transfer’ of a capital
asset:

 

(a) The definition of transfer u/s 2(47) of the Act is inclusive and,
therefore, extends to events and transactions which may not otherwise be
‘transfer’ according to the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the term. The
Act also clarifies that transfer includes parting of any asset or any interest
therein;

(b) As per the LLP Act, conversion results in dissolution and vesting of
all the assets of the company into the LLP. On such vesting, the share capital
of the company along with the interest of shareholders in the shares of the
company gets extinguished. Alternatively, conversion involves exchange of
shares in the company with partnership interest;

(c) The argument that charge of capital gains triggers only when there
is a transfer between two existing parties at a time is not correct. This is
evident by the fact that even conversion of capital asset into stock-in-trade
is considered as transfer under the Act;

(d) The Supreme Court in the case of Grace Collis2  concluded that the extinguishment of a
right includes extinguishment of a right in a capital asset independent of and
otherwise than on account of transfer. This also supports that extinguishment
of rights in the shares on conversion results in transfer;

____________________________________________________________

2. ITAT seems to be of the view
that since the income qualifies as a business income u/s 28(va), the assessee
creates a business connection in India

 

(e) Existence of a specific provision under the Act which exempts the
transaction of conversion of company into LLP from capital gains tax also
indicates that such transaction results in transfer, such conversion will be
subject to capital gains tax under the Act.

 

On computation mechanism of capital gains arising on transfer as a
result of conversion:

 

(f) On conversion, shareholders
relinquish their shareholding in the company to acquire capital in the LLP in
the same proportion in which shares were held in the company. Thus, the value
of the partnership interest in the LLP is to be considered as the Full Value of
Consideration (FVC) received / accrued to each shareholder for computation of
capital gains;

(g) FVC can be computed on the
basis of the accounts of the LLP considering the reserves and surplus
transferred. If such FVC is not ascertainable, the deeming provision u/s 50D of
the Act can be adopted to deem the fair market value as the FVC.

(h)        The
assessee’s contention that the value of partnership interest was the same as
the cost of acquisition of the shares in the company, is incorrect for the
following reasons:

(I)  Cost of shares is the price at
which shares are acquired. Such cost of acquisition varies from one shareholder
to another shareholder;

(II)       The value of partnership
interest is inclusive of the share capital as well as the reserves and surplus
(i.e., shareholders fund) which is different from the cost of acquisition of
shares;

(III)      Thus,
the value of partnership interest as reduced by cost of acquisition of shares
is subject to capital
gains tax.

 

Article 11 of India-Cyprus DTAA – Interest earned by Cyprian company from investment in CCDs which were funded by parent company qualified for lower rate under Article 11 of India-Cyprus DTAA since, on facts, the Cyprian company had indicia (marks or signs) of beneficial owner of interest income

3. TS-523-ITAT-2019
(Mum.)
Golden Bella
Holdings Ltd. vs. DCIT
ITA No.:
6958/Mum/2017
A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order:
28th August, 2019

 

Article 11 of
India-Cyprus DTAA – Interest earned by Cyprian company from investment in CCDs
which were funded by parent company qualified for lower rate under Article 11
of India-Cyprus DTAA since, on facts, the Cyprian company had indicia
(marks or signs) of beneficial owner of interest income

 

FACTS

The assessee, a limited liability company resident in Cyprus, was an
investment holding company. During the year under consideration, the assessee
earned interest income from investment in CCDs of an Indian company (ICo),
which was offered to tax in India @ 10% in terms of Article 11 of the
India-Cyprus DTAA. The source of funds for investment in CCDs was equity
capital and interest-free funds from the Mauritian parent (MauCo) of the
assessee.

 

 

 

The AO held that the investment in CCDs was made by
the assessee out of a back-to-back loan taken from MauCo and hence the Assessee
did not qualify as the beneficial owner of the interest income. Hence, the
Assessee was not eligible to avail the lower tax rate under Article 11 of the
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the DRP which affirmed the order
of the AO and held that the assessee’s role was limited to merely routing the
funds from MauCo and acting as a conduit for passage of funds of MauCo, as an
agent / nominee of MauCo. Hence, the assessee was not the beneficial owner of
interest income.

 

The Assessee went in appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

(i) The assessee had invested in CCDs and received interest for its own
exclusive benefit and not for or on behalf of MauCo;

(ii) As per the OECD Commentary on the Model Convention 2017 on Article
11, beneficial owner is an entity having right to use and enjoy the interest
income unconstrained by contractual / legal obligation to pass it on;

(iii) The mere fact that the investment was funded
using certain interest-free loans and share capital infused by MauCo did not
affect the assessee’s status as the beneficial owner of the interest income,
since the entire interest income was the sole property of the assessee who had
absolute control over the funds received from MauCo;

(iv) Further, the assessee also wholly assumed and maintained the
foreign exchange risk and the counter-party risk on interest payments arising
on the CCDs. Thus, there was no back-to-back transaction lacking economic
substance;

(v) Besides, the AO had failed to prove that:

(a) The assessee did not have exclusive possession and control over the
interest income received;

(b) The assessee was required to seek the approval or obtain consent
from any entity to invest in ICo or to utilise the interest income received;

(c) The assessee was not free to utilise the interest income received at
its sole and absolute discretion, unconstrained by any contractual, legal or
economic arrangements with any other third party;

(vi) Thus, interest income from investment in CCDs qualified to be taxed
@ 10% under Article 11 of the DTAA .

 

 

 

Section 9(1)(i) read with section 28(va) of the Act, Article 5(2)(1) of the India-US DTAA – Consideration received for granting the right to render BPO services to group entities qualified as business income u/s 28(va) of the Act – Such income was not taxable in India under the Act as well as the DTAA in absence of any business activity and PE in India

2. TS-458-ITAT-2019
(Pune)
Cummins Inc.
vs. DDIT
ITA No.:
2506/Pune/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order:
7th August, 2019

 

Section 9(1)(i)
read with section 28(va) of the Act, Article 5(2)(1) of the India-US DTAA –
Consideration received for granting the right to render BPO services to group
entities qualified as business income u/s 28(va) of the Act – Such income was
not taxable in India under the Act as well
as the DTAA in absence of any business activity and PE in India

 

FACTS

The assessee, a resident of USA, was part of a multi-national group
called the ‘Cummins’ group  and rendered
certain BPO services to the group entities as well as to its internal
divisions. During the relevant year, the assessee entered into an agreement
(assignment agreement) with an Indian company (ICo) to transfer the right to
render these BPO services for a lump sum consideration.

 

Pursuant to the assignment agreement, ICo was entitled to render BPO
services to all the Cummins group entities including the assessee. The assessee
contended that the lump sum consideration received was in the nature of
business income and such income was not taxable in India in the absence of a PE
in India.

 

The AO contended that by virtue of the assignment agreement, the
assessee mandated ICo to secure orders and render BPO services to the Cummins
group entities on his behalf. Therefore, the AO was of the view that this
resulted in continuing business activity for the assessee and hence it
established a business connection in India. For the same reason, the AO held
that ICo triggered a dependent agency PE for the assessee in India under the India-US
DTAA and, hence, the lump sum consideration was chargeable to tax in India both
under the Act as well as Article 7 of the DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee approached the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP).

 

The DRP did not concur with the AO that an agency PE was constituted in
India. However, on the basis of the assignment agreement, the DRP held that the
employees of the assessee were actively involved in rendering BPO services,
which triggered Service PE in India of the assessee under the India-USA DTAA.
Further, the DRP held that the amount received by the assessee would amount to
an income arising from a ‘source of income’ in India and hence chargeable u/s
9(1)(i) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(i) Prior to the assignment agreement
between the assessee and ICo, the BPO services were rendered by one of the
units of the assessee to other Cummins entities as well as to other units of
the assessee. Pursuant to the assignment agreement, ICo was required to render
services to the assessee as well as other Cummins group entities;

(ii) The assessee obtaining BPO services from ICo could not be equated
to granting of a right to ICo to render BPO services. This was evident from the
fact that a portion of the lump sum consideration was returned to ICo in the
form of higher outgo in the form of payment for receipt of services;

 

(iii) The lump sum compensation received in respect of granting right to
render BPO services to other Cummins group entities would be governed by
section 28(va) of the Act, under which any sum received for not carrying out
any activity in relation to any business or profession should be treated as
business income. This indicated that the assessee had a business connection in
India1. However, in the absence of any business operations in India,
such income was not taxable in India;

(iv) DRP misinterpreted the assignment agreement to
conclude that employees of the assessee were involved in rendering BPO services
in India. In fact, no material was brought on record to demonstrate that the
employees of the assessee were involved in rendition of the BPO services;

 

(v) In the present case, there were no services which were rendered by
the assessee in India through its employees or other personnel. Hence, there
was no service PE of the assessee in India.

(vi) In the absence of a PE of the assessee in India under the DTAA, the
lump sum consideration was not taxable in India under the DTAA.

___________________________________

1. ITAT seems to be of the view
that since the income qualifies as a business income u/s 28(va), the assessee
creates a business connection in India

 

 

Section 90(1)(a)(i) read with Article 25(2) of India-US DTAA — Foreign tax credit is available only in respect of taxes paid on the double-taxed income – Foreign tax credit is allowable against the taxes paid under the Act, which would include surcharge and cess

1. TS-499-ITAT-2019
(Pune)
DCIT vs. iGate
Global Solutions Ltd.
IT(TP)A. No.:
10/Bang/2014
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order:
26th August, 2019

 

Section 90(1)(a)(i) read with Article 25(2) of India-US DTAA — Foreign
tax credit is available only in respect of taxes paid on the double-taxed
income – Foreign tax credit is allowable against the taxes paid under the Act,
which would include surcharge and cess

 

FACTS

The assessee, an Indian company, had branches outside India. The
assessee paid foreign taxes on income earned by its branches outside India.
During the year under consideration, the assessee was assessed to minimum
alternate tax (MAT) u/s 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). The total
income earned during the year, consisted of certain export income which was
eligible for exemption u/s 10A of the Act under normal computation of tax.
However, as the assessee was assessed to tax under MAT, such export income was
also subjected to MAT in India.

 

However, the assessee claimed credit of the entire
amount of taxes paid outside India against the taxes payable under MAT,
including by way of surcharge and cess. However, the AO allowed credit only to
the extent of the taxes paid on the double-taxed income and such credit was
limited only against the base taxes paid under the base MAT rate of 10%, i.e.,
excluding the surcharge and cess.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A) who upheld the view
of the AO. The assessee then appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(i) Section 90(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires India to grant
credit of taxes in respect of income which is doubly taxed. In other words,
credit is allowed on taxes paid outside India only if such income has been
included in the total income under the Act as well as under the laws of the
foreign country. Similar provisions are also contained in India’s DTAAs.
Accordingly, the assessee is entitled to credit only for the taxes which are
paid on the double-taxed income;

(ii) Though the assessee is eligible
for deduction u/s 10A of the Act in respect of some portion of its total
income, such deduction was only for normal tax purposes and not for MAT. Since
the entire income was subjected to tax under MAT, the assessee was entitled to
claim credit of taxes paid on such income against taxes payable under MAT;

(iii) The language of section 90 of the Act as well as foreign tax credit
article under the DTAA provides for relief in respect of double-taxed income.
This requires that income tax is to be charged only on the balance amount of
income. As a result, whatever is the amount of tax and surcharge on the
double-taxed income should be automatically excluded from the total tax
liability computed under the Act;

(iv) Perusal of section 90 of the Act and foreign tax credit Article 25
of the DTAA suggests that foreign tax credit should be allowed at the rate at
which the double-taxed income is subjected to tax under the Act (i.e.,
inclusive of surcharge and cess).

 

Section 54F – Expenditure incurred by the assessee on remodelling, painting of the flat so that the same could be made habitable according to the standard of living of the assessee, forms part of cost of purchase and is admissible u/s 54F

3. Nayana Kirit
Parikh vs. ACIT (Mumbai)
Members:
Sandeep Gosain (J.M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A.M.)
ITA No.:
2832/Mum/2013
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order:
25th June, 2019
Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Rajen Damani / R.A. Dhyani

 

Section 54F –
Expenditure incurred by the assessee on remodelling, painting of the flat so
that the same could be made habitable according to the standard of living of
the assessee, forms part of cost of purchase and is admissible u/s 54F

 

FACTS

In the course
of assessment proceedings, the AO observed that the assessee had shown
long-term capital gain of Rs. 1,25,10,645 after claiming deduction of Rs.
1,54,50,250 u/s 54F of the Act. The assessee was asked to substantiate its
claim for deduction u/s 54F. The assessee submitted that she had acquired a new
residential property for Rs. 2,25,00,000 vide agreement dated 18th
March, 2009 jointly with her husband and incurred incidental expenditure of Rs.
15,00,500 thereon. Thus, the aggregate cost worked out to Rs. 2,40,00,500 of
which the assessee’s share was one–half, i.e., Rs. 1,20,00,250. The assessee
had also incurred an expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000 on the same flat to make it
habitable as per her standard of living and claimed deduction thereof u/s 54F
of the Act.

 

According to
the assessee, this sum of Rs. 34,50,000 formed part of the cost of the house as
it was incurred on electrification of the house, civil work, design planning,
plumbing, flooring, etc. According to the AO, the said expenditure was not
incurred on construction / improvement of the flat but on furniture,
fabrication and painting, etc. The AO held that the expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000
falls under the category of expenditure by way of renovation to make the flat
more comfortable and therefore is not liable to be allowable as part of the
cost of the flat. The AO denied benefit of section 54F to the extent of this
sum of Rs. 34,50,000.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that u/s 54F only amount
relating to agreement value, stamp duty, registration charges and professional
charges related to the purchase of the new flat could be claimed. The cost of
improvement and renovation are subsequent to the purchase and therefore cannot
be allowed as deduction u/s 54F of the Act. He upheld
the order of the AO on the ground that the expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000 has
been incurred to make the house more lavish.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the assessee incurred expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000 for
remodelling the flat, its painting and so on so that the same could be made
habitable according to her standard of living. The Tribunal held that the said
cost forms part of the cost of purchase and is admissible expenditure u/s 54F
of the Act. It noted that the case of the assessee is supported by various
judicial pronouncements and in particular the case of G. Siva Rama
Krishna, Hyderabad vs. ITO (ITA No. 755/Hyd./2013) A.Y. 2007-08; Ruskom Home
Vakil vs. ITO (ITA No. 4450/M/2014);
and Mrs. Gulshabanoo R.
Mukhi vs. JCIT (2002) 83 ITR 649 (Mum.)
. The Hyderabad Bench in the
case of G. Siva Rama Krishna (Supra) has held that expenditure
incurred on remodelling the flat in the normal course after purchasing the
readymade flat is allowable u/s 54F of the Act. The Tribunal, following the decisions of the Co-ordinate Benches, set
aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow deduction of Rs.
34,50,000, being expenditure incurred by the assessee, also u/s 54F of the Act.

 

The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

 

Section 234A – Interest u/s 234A can be charged only till the time tax is unpaid

2. Gulick Network Distribution vs. ITO (Mumbai) Members: Pawan Singh (J.M.) and M. Balaganesh (A.M.) ITA No. 2210/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 21st June, 2019 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Gautam R. Mota / Satish Rajore

 

Section 234A –
Interest u/s 234A can be charged only till the time tax is unpaid

 

FACTS

The assessee, a
private limited company, engaged in the business of multi-level marketing, did
not file its return of income within the time prescribed u/s 139 or 139(5). The
assessee filed its return of income manually on 7th May, 2014
declaring total income of Rs. 16,49,960 under normal provisions and Rs.
1,39,326 u/s 115JB of the Act. The AO received information in Individual
Transaction Statement (ITS) that the assessee company was in receipt of credit
of Rs. 16,49,960 and that the assessee failed to disclose the said income for
the relevant assessment year.

 

The AO issued
and served notice u/s 148 dated 30th March, 2017 and selected the
case for scrutiny. In response to the notice u/s 148, the assessee filed return
on 23rd June, 2017. The assessment was completed on 13th
October, 2017 u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147 and no addition was made to the returned
income. The AO, while passing assessment order, raised a demand of Rs. 5,81,470
on account of interest u/s 234A and 234B.

 

The due date of
filing return of income for the assessment year under consideration, i.e., A.Y.
2010-11, was 15th October, 2010. From the calculation of interest
levied by the AO, the assessee noted that since the assessee paid tax on 24th
March, 2014 he was liable to pay interest for 42 months (from 15th
October, 2010 to 24th March, 2014) and not for the period of 81
months (from 15th October, 2010 to 30th June, 2017) as
charged by the AO.

 

On 22nd
December, 2017 the assessee applied for rectification u/s 154 seeking
rectification of the working of the interest. The AO partially rectified the
mistake vide order dated 9th January, 2018.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order passed by
the AO on an application u/s 154 of the Act.

 

Still
aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where he relied
upon the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ms
Priti Prithwala vs. ITO [(2003) 129 Taxman 79 (Mum.)].
It was also
submitted that in the subsequent assessment year, on similar facts, no such
interest was charged from the assessee.

 

HELD

At the outset,
the Tribunal observed that, in principle, it is in agreement with the
calculation of interest as furnished by the assessee. It observed that in the
subsequent year, on similar facts, no such interest was charged by the Revenue.
It noted that the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal had in the case of Priti
Prithwala (Supra)
held that the words ‘regular assessment’ are used in
the context of computation. It does not show that the order passed u/s 143(3) /
144 shall be substituted by section 147. Considering the finding of the
Co-ordinate Bench and the fact that the assessee submitted that the assessee
could not be made liable to pay interest for the period during which it was not
possible on their part to file the return of income, the Tribunal directed the
AO to re-compute the interest up to the date of filing of the return.

 

The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

Section 50C – In the course of assessment proceedings if the assessee objects to adoption of stamp duty value as deemed sale consideration, for whatever reason, it is the duty of the AO to make a reference to the DVO for determining the value of the property sold

1. Aavishkar
Film Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (Mumbai)
Members:
Saktijit Dey (J.M.) and G. Manjunatha (A.M.)
ITA No.
2256/Mum/2016
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order:
21st June, 2019
Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Deepak Tralshawala / Jothi Lakshmi Nayak

 

Section 50C –
In the course of assessment proceedings if the assessee objects to adoption of
stamp duty value as deemed sale consideration, for whatever reason, it is the
duty of the AO to make a reference to the DVO for determining the value of the
property sold

 

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under
consideration, the assessee sold a residential flat for Rs. 1,75,00,000. The AO
in the course of assessment proceedings called for stamp duty value of the flat
sold by the assessee from the office of the Registrar. The stamp duty value of
the flat was Rs. 2,51,45,500. The AO called upon the assessee to explain why
short-term capital gains should not be computed by adopting the stamp duty
valuation.

 

The assessee
vide his letters dated 7th March, 2014 and 25th March,
2014 objected to adoption of stamp duty valuation. The assessee had
specifically stated the reasons for which the sale consideration received by
the assessee is reasonable and said that since the property was encumbered it
could not have fetched the value as determined by the stamp valuation
authority.

 

The AO,
rejecting the arguments of the assessee, proceeded to compute the capital gains
by adopting the stamp duty value to be the full value of consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

The assessee
then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that on the
face of the objection raised by the assessee, the AO should have made a
reference to the DVO for determining the value of the property and the stamp
duty valuation could not be adopted as the deemed sale consideration
considering the fact that the property was encumbered.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the issue before it is whether as per section 50C(2) of the Act, it
is mandatory on the part of the AO to make a reference to the DVO to determine
the value of the property. The Tribunal held that since in the course of
assessment proceedings the assessee objected to adoption of stamp duty value as
the deemed sale consideration, for whatever reason, it was the duty of the AO
to make a reference to the DVO for determining the value of the property sold.

 

The Tribunal
found the contention of the Department, viz., that the reference to DVO was not
made because the assessee raised the objection before the AO purposely at the
fag end to see to it that the proceeding gets barred by limitation, to be
unacceptable. It observed that even the CIT(A) could have directed the AO to
get the valuation of the property done by the DVO and thereafter proceeded in
accordance with law.

 

The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decisions of the Madras High Court
in the case of S. Muthuraja vs. CIT [(2014) 369 ITR 483 (Mad.)]
and also observed that the Calcutta High Court in Sunil Kumar Agarwal vs.
CIT [(2015) 372 ITR 83 (Cal.)]
has gone a step further to observe that
valuation by DVO is contemplated u/s 50C to avoid miscarriage of justice. The
Calcutta High Court has held that when the legislature has taken care to
provide adequate machinery to give a fair treatment to the taxpayer, there is
no reason why the machinery provided by the legislature should not be used and
the benefit thereof should be refused. The Court observed that even in a case
where no request is made by the assessee to make a reference to the DVO, the AO
while discharging a quasi judicial function is duty-bound to act fairly
by giving the assessee an option to follow the course provided by law to have
the valuation made by the DVO.

 

The Tribunal held that the AO should have followed the mandate of
section 50C(2) of the Act by making a reference to the DVO to determine the
value of the property sold. The AO having not done so and the CIT(A) also
failing to rectify the error committed by the AO, the Tribunal restored the
issue to the AO with a direction to make a reference to the DVO to determine
the value of the property sold in terms of section 50C(2) of the Act and
thereafter proceed to compute capital gain in accordance with law.

 

The Tribunal
did not delve into the issue relating to actual value of the property on
account of certain prevailing conditions like encumbrance, etc., as these
issues are available to the assessee for agitating in the course of proceedings
before the DVO.

 

The Tribunal
set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the issue to the AO for
fresh adjudication in terms of its direction.

 

Section 13(1)(c) – Payments made to trustees in professional capacity cannot be considered as for the benefit of trustees

3. [2019] 71
ITR (Trib.) 687 (Pune)
Parkar Medical
Foundation vs. ACIT
ITA Nos.: 2724
& 2725 (Pune) of 2017
A.Ys.: 2004-05
& 2005-06
Date of order:
20th March, 2019

 

Section
13(1)(c) – Payments made to trustees in professional capacity cannot be considered
as for the benefit of trustees

 

FACTS

The assessee
was a hospital registered u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. At the time of
reassessment proceedings, the AO disallowed Rs. 6,52,748 being professional
charges paid to two of the trustees. He also disallowed Rs. 1,95,000 being
utilisation charges paid to those trustees. These disallowances were made on
the ground that the assessee had violated the provision of section 13(1)(c)
which provides that where any part of the income of a trust enures or any part
of such income or any property of the trust or the institution is, during the
previous year, used or applied, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of any
persons referred to in section 13(3), then such amounts are not to be allowed
as deduction.

 

But the
assessee argued that the trustees were doctors and payments were made to them
for rendering their professional services apart from looking after the
day-to-day activities and managing the hospital. Further, the assessee paid
utilisation fees to the trustees because certain equipments were owned by those
trustees but were utilised by the hospital.

 

These arguments
were rejected by the CIT(A) and now the question before the Hon’ble ITAT was
whether payments made to the trustees were directly or indirectly for the
benefit of those trustees.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble
ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee on the following basis:

 

It was an
undisputed fact that the trustees to whom professional fees were paid were
qualified doctors who, besides looking after the administration and running of
the hospital, were also providing their professional medical services to the
assessee and thus such payments cannot be held to be paid for the direct or
indirect benefit of those trustees.

 

Similarly,
regarding the disallowance of utilisation fees paid to those trustees, the ITAT
held that there was no finding of the AO that utilisation fees paid were
excessive or were being paid for any direct or indirect benefit of those
trustees and hence cannot be disallowed.

 

Section 56(2)(viia) – Value of tangible or intangible assets once substantiated would be replaced with the book value for the purposes of FMV regardless of the book entries in this regard

2. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 165 (Ahd. – Trib.) Unnati
Inorganics (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No.:
2474/Ahd./2017
A.Y.: 2014-15  Date of order:
11th September, 2019

 

Section 56(2)(viia)
– Value of tangible or intangible assets once substantiated would be replaced
with the book value for the purposes of FMV regardless of the book entries in
this regard

 

FACTS

The assessee, a
private limited company, filed its return of income for A.Y. 2013-14 declaring
Nil total income. In the course of assessment proceedings the AO noticed that
the assessee company has, during the previous year, issued 10,16,000 shares of
face value of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 23 per share. The AO made
inquiries regarding the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the shares allotted, having
regard to the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act, for the purposes of
ascertaining the correctness of the premium charged.

 

The assessee
submitted that the company holds certain land parcels in Vadodara and Dahej
whose FMV is substantially high on the date of allotment of shares and
consequently premium charged of Rs. 23 per share is quite commensurate with the
FMV of shares allotted as contemplated in Explanation to section 56(2)(viib) of
the Act. By producing a valuation report of the land, the assessee demonstrated
that the value of land adopted by the assessee for this purpose is only 45% of
the jantri price. However, the AO disputed the FMV of the fresh
allotment and proceeded to apply the prescribed method of valuation as
stipulated in Rule 11UA to determine the FMV of the shares; for this purpose he
adopted the book value of the assets and liabilities including land as on 31st
March, 2013 and determined the FMV of fresh allotment at Rs 12.84 per share in
place of Rs. 33 per share adopted by the assessee. The AO, accordingly, added a
sum of Rs. 2,04,82,560 to the total income, on issue of shares at a price in
excess of the FMV of the shares, u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the
assessee by observing that (i) no accounting entry has been passed in respect
of the difference between the FMV of the land at the relevant point of time and
its corresponding actual costs as reflected in the books of accounts; (ii) if
share premium was charged on the basis of jantri price, then it was less
than what was required to be charged, and therefore there is arbitrariness in
deciding the issue price; (iii) the assessee first acquired land at Vadodara
for setting up its plant and thereafter acquired another plot of land at Dahej
since it was not in a position to complete legal formalities qua the
first property acquired by it, and therefore there is an element of ad
hocism
in the actions of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that section 56(2)(viib) seeks to enable the
determination of FMV by two methods: (i) prescribed method as purportedly
embedded in Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules; and (ii) FMV based on the
intrinsic value of the assets both tangible and intangible on the date of issue
of shares. Thus, the FMV of all the assets (tangibles, intangibles, human
resources, right of management or control or other rights whatsoever in or in
relation to the Indian company), whether recorded in the books or not,
appearing in the books at their intrinsic value or not, is a sufficient warrant
to value the premium on issue of unquoted equity shares by a closely-held
company. Thus, the Explanation (a)(ii) itself implies that book entry for
recognition of intrinsic value is not necessary at all. Moreover, the higher of
the values determined as per the first and second limbs of Explanation shall be
adopted for the purposes of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

 

It also observed that the FMV of the land belonging to the assessee
company was sought to be substantiated by the valuation report. And that the
valuation report has not been controverted by the Revenue. No rebuttal of the
fact towards the value of land is on record. It observed that one of the
grounds taken by the Revenue for rejecting the basis of determination of FMV is
that no accounting entry has been passed in respect of difference between the
FMV of the immovable property at the relevant point of time and its actual cost
as reflected in the books of accounts.

 

The Tribunal
held that the value once substituted would be replaced with the book value for
the purposes of FMV regardless of the book entries in this regard. What is
relevant is whether at the time of allotment of shares the value of shares as
claimed existed or not. The valuation report is not evidence in itself but
merely an opinion of an independent having regard to totality of expert facts
and circumstances existing on the date of valuation. So long as the facts and
circumstances exist, the presence or otherwise of valuation report per se
has no effect. It observed that the AO has himself, in a subsequent year,
disputed the higher valuation of Rs. 46 and unequivocally adopted Rs. 33 as its
fair value. The assessee has also been able to demonstrate arm’s length
transaction and unison of two different groups bringing different capabilities and
expertise for furtherance of business. Also, the existing promoters, too,
subscribed at a rate similar to the rate at which shares were allotted to the
new group which, according to the Tribunal, further reinforces the inherent
strengths in the valuations of the company as represented by the value of
equity shares.

The Tribunal
set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition
made u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

SUPERIOR VOTING RIGHTS SHARES: A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR FUNDING

BACKGROUND

After a short
consultation process, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the Securities and
Exchange Board of India have, in quick succession, notified the new regime and regulatory
requirements relating to Superior Voting Rights equity shares (SRs).
Essentially, SRs are a special category of equity shares. They provide for
extra voting rights in comparison with ‘ordinary equity shares’.

 

Generally, all
equity shares are equal. They have the same right to dividends, the same rights
of voting and other features. To use the common Latin term, they are all pari
passu.

 

For private
companies, there was considerable flexibility to create several categories of
equity shares, each category having different rights. Typically, the
differences relate to voting and / or dividends. One category of equity shares,
for example, may have multiple voting rights as compared to others. This
enabled the holders to exercise far more control and say, compared to the
‘economic’ interest in the company.

 

Availability of
such flexibility helped companies and their founders / promoters to negotiate
with investors. Investors may be interested in economic returns while the
promoters / founders may be needed to be given assurance of control over the
running and management of the company.

 

However, while
this was well accepted in case of private companies, there was divergence of
views relating to listed companies and even unlisted public companies. On the
one hand, it was argued that such matters should be left for internal
negotiations and decisions of the company, its promoters and investors. If they
desire to have such a structure, the law should not meddle. This is, of course,
so long as there is adequate disclosure of the facts. On the other hand, there
was opposition to allowing any such instrument giving differential rights on
the ground that it would allow a small group of shareholders to control the
company even at the cost of shareholders holding otherwise majority of economic
value. It was argued that such instruments went against the principle of
corporate democracy and governance.

 

SEBI varied its
view over a period of time. It had allowed the issue of one category of such
instruments but there was an approval process that often took months. The
result was that there were barely 4-5 companies that issued such instruments.
Curiously, it was found that in most of the cases, such instruments traded at a
huge discount over the ‘ordinary equity shares’. There was far less trading,
too.

 

Recently,
however, the debate arose again particularly in case of startups that
extensively use technology (internet, digital, biotech, etc.). Such companies
need capital and flexibility and there has been a history of companies that
have seen very rapid growth. Such categories of companies need to be given a
freer hand and also their promoters given a share disproportionate to the
amount of money that they invest. SEBI had recently initiated a consultation
process wherein the current law and practice in India and abroad was
highlighted.

 

After debate
and consultation, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and SEBI have both
made changes in their respective regulations / rules to allow for certain types
of instruments. The features of these instruments are briefly discussed here.

 

What type of
instruments are allowed to be issued?

Equity shares
with extra voting rights than other ‘ordinary’ equity shares are allowed. These
rights are called superior rights and hence such instruments are referred to as
‘Superior Rights’ shares or SRs.

 

Which type of
companies are allowed to issue SRs?

All companies
are given such powers. The MCA has made generic rules applicable to all
companies. However, SEBI has made further regulations applicable to listed
companies.

 

WHAT
ARE SR
s?

SRs are a
special category of equity shares with superior voting rights as compared to
other equity shares. No other differential, whether of dividends, share in
property, etc., is permitted. Thus, for example, the SRs – or ordinary equity
shares – cannot be given extra or lesser dividends. It is just that when it
comes to the matter of voting at general meetings, SRs would have extra voting
rights.

 

Note that the
MCA rules applicable to all companies generally provide for a wider category of
instruments not merely restricted to SRs. However, the focus of this article is
on SRs since SEBI has recognised and permitted only this class of instruments.

 

Shares with
‘inferior’ rights not allowed

Only shares
with superior voting rights are allowed to be issued. Thus, a company can have
a share with multiple voting rights or one voting right. It cannot have a share
with voting rights less than one vote per share. At present, companies have
issued shares with less voting rights. Such shares cannot be issued any more by
listed companies.

 

Shares with
other differential rights

Equity shares
with lesser or more dividend rights are not permitted to be issued by listed companies.
No other differential is also possible. The only differential permitted is
issue of shares with superior voting rights.

 

Who can be
issued SRs?

Unlisted
companies can issue SRs to any person. However, if the company wants to list
its shares on exchanges, the promoters / founders to whom SRs are issued should
be acting in an executive position in the company. Further, such SRs holders
should not be part of a promoter group whose collective net worth is more than
Rs. 500 crores.

 

How much extra
voting rights can be given to SRs?

SRs can be
given two to ten times extra voting rights as compared to ordinary equity
shares. At the minimum, thus, one SR can have twice the vote of an ordinary
equity share; and at the maximum, ten times. The multiple has to be in whole
numbers and not fractions (e.g., one cannot issue SRs with two and a half times
voting rights of ordinary equity shares).

What are the
procedures and approvals required for issue of SRs?

There are
several conditions for the issue of SRs. The articles of association should
permit such an issue. The companies’ rules require that an ordinary resolution
has to be passed approving such issue and for this purpose, certain disclosures
need to be made. However, the SEBI regulations require a special resolution
with certain further disclosure requirements. Earlier, there was a requirement
of having a three-year profit track record, but this requirement is now
dropped. As far as unlisted companies are concerned, any company can issue SRs.

 

Classes of SRs

The SEBI
regulations permit only one class of SRs.

 

‘Coat-tail’
provisions

These refer to
those situations where the SRs will have the same voting rights as ordinary
equity shares. In other words, SRs as well as ordinary equity shares will have
one vote per share. These requirements are prescribed for listed companies by
SEBI. Thus, in respect of the specified situations, which relate to important
matters or where there can be major conflict of interest, etc., the extra
voting rights on SRs are not available.

 

Sunset
provisions

Sunset in this context means the period of time after which the SRs
become ordinary equity shares. In other words, the extra voting rights of SRs
are removed. Unlisted companies are not mandatorily required to have sunset
provisions. However, listed companies need to provide that the SRs shall be
converted into ordinary equity shares by the fifth anniversary of listing of
the shares in the public issue of such a company. Such period can be extended
by another five years if a resolution is passed by the shareholders other than
SRs holders. The holders of SRs can, however, convert their SRs to ordinary
equity shares earlier.

 

There are also
mandatory sunset events where on the occurrence of such events the SRs get
converted into ordinary equity shares. These include, e.g., when the SR holder
resigns from the executive position, dies, etc.

 

Who can hold
SRs? What if they transfer the SRs?

Only those
promoters who have an executive position in the company can hold SRs. If the
holder dies, the person to whom such shares devolve will not have any superior
rights in respect of such shares. Generally, sale of SRs will result in the
superior voting rights lapsing and such shares becoming like other ordinary
equity shares.

Lock-in period

Under the SEBI
regulations, the SRs held by the promoters shall be locked in during the period
they are SRs, or for the period of lock-in in accordance with the ordinary
provisions relating to lock-in for minimum promoters’ contribution, whichever
is later.

 

Maximum
percentage of voting rights

The SRs cannot
have voting rights above 74% of the total voting rights. Thus, the ordinary
equity shares need to have at least 26% voting rights. For listed companies,
the ordinary equity shares held by SRs holders are also counted for the
purposes of this limit of 74%.

 

Special
requirements relating to corporate governance for listed companies

A company
having SRs is required to ensure that at least half of its board consists of
independent directors. Its Audit Committee should consist only of independent
directors. And its Nomination and Remuneration Committee, its
Risk Management Committee and its Stakeholders Committee should comprise of at
least two-thirds independent directors.

 

CONCLUDING
REMARKS

The positive
aspect of the new set of provisions is that now, particularly in case of listed
companies, SRs can be issued without formal approval of regulatory authorities
like SEBI. Approval of shareholders is generally enough. The discretion and
also the delay for such approval is thus eliminated.

 

However, it can
be seen that a very narrow type of instruments is permitted to be issued and
that, too, having a limited validity period. The superior rights are not
applicable under several situations. Importantly, though the wording is not
sufficiently clear, it appears that listed companies cannot make a fresh issue
of SRs (except as rights / bonus). Shares with inferior voting rights cannot in
any case be issued.

 

Thus, the
regulators have taken a very conservative position as regards the issue of SRs.
There is of course a worldwide debate on whether such shares with differential
rights be allowed and under what circumstances. While many countries do allow
(and many do not), some countries let companies and their shareholders /
investors decide. There is thus a good argument to allow flexibility to
companies and their investors to decide on what type of instruments can be
issued instead of a blanket ban or very narrow permissibility.

 

One of the
principal objections is that investors do not understand such instruments and
hence may end up acquiring them to their loss. Alternatively, they may simply
not invest. One would have, though, thought that after so many years of debate
on such instruments, there would be knowledge for those who want to make some
effort. After all, even equity investing is for informed investors, more so
when the focus of regulations these days is on more and more disclosures and
transparency.

 

Be that as it
may be, there is now a narrow but fairly clear type of instrument that can be
issued. Time will tell how successful it is with companies, their promoters /
founders and, above all, investors.
 

 

POWER OF SILENCE

‘Maun’ in Sanskrit means silence. The
above is a Sanskrit proverb meaning everything can be achieved through silence.
It is a sign of control and tolerance. An underlying meaning of the proverb is
to exercise the wisdom to understand and comprehend when to speak and when to
be silent, given a particular situation.

 

When wisdom speaks, be silent. Do not
waste your candle when the sun is there – Anonymous

 

Mahatma Gandhi said silence has an effective
power to ignite the inner strength. According to him, the person who is on the
path of a continuous and effortful search for the truth follows the road-map of
silence. One of the basic and necessary foundations of Gandhiji’s principles of
Ahimsa could be silence.

 

Let silence be the art you practise

           

Many a time silence can speak volumes. A
well-known Hindi proverb Samajhnewale ko ishara kaafi hai has the
similar underlying interpretation – that a silent move can be more effective
than the spoken word. Silence has no limitations of communication. In the good
old days, movies used to be silent in the absence of technological advancement.
However, communication was complete and adequate.

 

The most important thing in communication
is what is not said – Peter Drucker

 

Silence is a form of meditation and
meditation without silence is almost impossible. Silence is more inner than
outer. It enables one to be calm and composed in the given situation. It has an
ability to increase one’s capacity to listen. It may not be a coincidence that
‘silent’ and ‘listen’ are spelt with the same letters! Silence can result in a
high level of concentration and high performance.

 

Work hard in silence; let your success
make the noise

In Hindu religion there is a concept of Maun
Vrat
, meaning ‘Vow of Silence’. In the sixth month of the Hindu calendar,
viz. Bhadrapad, 16 days are set aside for those who wish to follow Maun
Vrat.
Jain religion follows a particular day as Maun Ekadashi for
observing silence. It is a process of introspection and Maun Vrat could
have a scientific and medical justification too, so as to achieve conservation
of energy by remaining silent and its better utilisation. Exercising silence
enables one to hear the sounds of silence which are as healing as they are
enlightening.

 

If you want to make sense it has to come
from silence – Shri Shri Ravi Shankar

 

It is observed that in meetings and
discussions, the participants may speak when silence is expected and may remain
silent when speaking is necessary. It is said that smart people know what to
say, wise people know whether or not to say anything!

 

Be silent in two situations:

 

When you feel one can’t understand your
feelings from words, and

When one can understand without any words

 

In sports
activities such as tennis, silence is expected so that the players can
concentrate on the game. On the other hand, in cricket cheering the players and
creating a racket is usually expected! However, in a tense situation of winning
or losing, the spectators may observe silence on their own.

 

The quieter
you become, the more you can hear

 

In the context of the family scenario if the
members and life partners follow the proverb
to its logical conclusion, the family life can become so peaceful.
The elders’ symbolic silence in place of harsh words in dealing with the
children in the family can many a time work wonders. Moreover, a legacy of
control and tolerance can be passed on its own and naturally to the next
generation.

Silence is one of the hardest arguments
to refute

 

However, the virtue of silence may have to
be set aside under the situation that one’s silence is interpreted as weakness
or ignorance. In case of a situation of injustice, one may have to make noise
or deal with it in protest with appropriate words. In above situations one’s
silence could be misjudged.

 

Fools multiply when wise men are silent

The Bhagavad Gita says: Contentment
of the mind, amiable temperament, silence, religious meditation and good
thoughts reflect austerity of the mind.

 

Let us follow the virtues of silence and
ignite the strength within. Let us strive for the maturity, wisdom and grace to
appreciate that silence can be far more powerful than having the last word.

 

Namaskaar!

THE ANCESTRAL PROPERTY CONUNDRUM RELOADED

Introduction

Under the Hindu
Law, the term ‘ancestral property’, as generally understood, means any property
inherited from three generations above of male lineage, i.e., from the father, grandfather,
great-grandfather. In August, 2019, this Feature had analysed the confusion
surrounding the issue of ancestral property, more specifically, whether
ancestral property received by a person can be transferred away?

 

This Feature
had then noted that, as regards ancestral property, two views were prevalent.

View-1: Ancestral property cannot be alienated. According to this view, if the
person inheriting it has sons, grandsons or great-grandsons, then it
automatically becomes joint family property in his hands and his lineal
descendants automatically become coparceners along with him. A corollary of
property becoming ancestral property is that it cannot be willed away or
alienated in any other manner by the person who inherits it.

View-2: Ancestral property becomes self-acquired property in the hands of the
person inheriting it. Thus, he can deal with it by Will, gift, transfer, etc.,
in any manner he pleases.

 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Subsequent to
the publication of this Feature in August, 2019 the Supreme Court has once
again analysed the issue of ancestral property. What is interesting to note is
that on this burning issue two decisions of the Apex Court were delivered, both
of Co-ordinate Benches and both orders delivered on the same day (without reference
to one another)! These decisions appear divergent but ultimately due to the
facts, the conclusion reached is the same. Let us examine both these decisions.

 

Case-1:
Arshnoor Singh vs. Harpal Kaul, CA 5124/2019, order dated 1st July,
2019 (SC)

A person had
inherited property from his father who died in 1951 and which he, in turn, had
inherited from his father. This person tried to sell the property but his son
(the appellant before the Supreme Court) petitioned the Court against the same
on the grounds that the property was ancestral property and hence he could not
sell it on his own. Accordingly, the property was coparcenary / joint family
property in which the son had also acquired an interest by birth and hence his
father could not sell it as per his wish.

 

A two-member
Bench of the Supreme Court analysed various decisions, such as Yudhishter
vs. Ashok Kumar, 1987 AIR 558
on this subject (which were dealt with in
detail in the August, 2019 issue of the BCAJ under this Feature). It
held that after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, the concept of
ancestral property has undergone a change. Post-1956, if a person inherited a
self-acquired property from his paternal ancestors, the said property became
his self-acquired property and did not remain coparcenary property.

 

However, the
Apex Court held that if the succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e.,
prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the parties would
be governed by Mitakshara law. The property inherited by a male Hindu
from his paternal male ancestor would be coparcenary property in his hands
vis-à-vis his male descendants up to three degrees below him. The nature of
property remained as coparcenary property even after the commencement of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Incidentally, the comprehensive decision of the
Delhi High Court in the case of Surender Kumar vs. Dhani Ram, CS(OS) No.
1732/2012, dated 18th January, 2016
had taken the very same
view.

 

The Supreme
Court further analysed that in the case on hand, the first owner (i.e., the
great-grandfather of the appellant in that case) died intestate in 1951 and
hence the succession opened in 1951. This was a time when the Hindu Succession
Act was not in force. Hence, the nature of property inherited by the first
owner’s son was coparcenary property and thereafter, everyone claiming under
him inherited the same as ancestral property. The Court distinguished its
earlier ruling in the case of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh, Civil Appeal
2360/2016, dated 2nd March, 2016
since that dealt with a
case where the succession was opened in 1973 (after the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 came into force), whereas the present case dealt with a situation where
the succession was opened in 1951.

 

The Supreme
Court reiterated its earlier decision in the case of Valliammai Achi vs.
Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1967 SC 1153
that once a person obtains a share
in an ancestral property, then it is well settled that such share is ancestral
property for his male children. They become owners by virtue of their birth.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not allow the sale by the father to go
through since it affected his son’s rights in the property. Thus, the only
reason why the Supreme Court upheld the concept of ancestral property was
because the succession was opened prior to 1956.

 

Case-2: Doddamuniyappa vs. Muniswamy, CA No. 7141/2008, order dated 1st
July, 2019 (SC)

This decision of the Supreme Court also pertained to the very same
issue. The Supreme Court held that it was well settled and held by it in Smt.
Dipo vs. Wassan Singh 1983 (3) SCC 376
, that the property inherited
from a father by his sons became joint family property in the hands of the
sons. Based on this principle, the Supreme Court concluded that property
inherited by a person from his grandfather would remain ancestral property and
hence, his father could not sell the same. In this case, neither did the
Supreme Court refer to its earlier decisions in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh
(Supra) or Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar (Supra)
nor did it go into the
issue of whether the succession was opened prior to 1951. It held as a matter
of principle that all ancestral property inherited by a person would continue
to be ancestral property for his heirs.

 

It is humbly
submitted that in the light of the above decisions, this view would not be
tenable after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, based
on the facts of the present case, one can ascertain that the first owner died
sometime before 1950 and hence it can be concluded that the succession opened
prior to 1956. If that be the case, as held in Arshnoor Singh vs. Harpal
Kaul (Supra)
, the property continues to be ancestral in the hands of
the heirs. Hence, while the principle of the decision in Doddamuniyappa’s case
seems untenable, the conclusion is correct!

 

AUTHOR’S (FINAL) VIEW

A conjoined
reading of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the decisions of the Supreme
Court show that the customs and traditions of Hindu Law have been given a
decent burial by the codified Act of 1956. It is (once again) submitted that
the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Surender Kumar
(Supra)
is the most comprehensive exposition on the subject of
ancestral property. To reiterate, the important principles laid down by the
Delhi High Court are that:

 

(i)   Inheritance of ancestral
property after 1956 does not create an HUF property and inheritance of
ancestral property after 1956 therefore does not result in creation of an HUF
property;

(ii)  Ancestral property can only
become an HUF property if inheritance is before 1956, and such HUF property
therefore which came into existence before 1956 continues as such even after
1956;

(iii) If a person dies after
passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and there is no HUF existing at the
time of the death of such a person, inheritance of an immovable property of
such a person by his heirs is no doubt inheritance of an ‘ancestral’ property
but the inheritance is as a self-acquired property in the hands of the legal
heir;

(iv) After passing of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 if a person inherits a property from his paternal
ancestors, the said property is not an HUF property in his hands and the
property is to be taken as a self-acquired property of the person who inherits
the same.

 

CONCLUSION

In recent
times, some newspapers have also joined the confusion bandwagon and have
started printing articles suggesting that ancestral property continues as ancestral
in the hands of the person inheriting the same. All of these help add fuel to
an already raging controversy.

 

Considering these latest Supreme Court decisions,
it is evident that the government needs to urgently amend the Hindu Succession
Act en masse and specifically address the burning issue of ancestral
property. A piecemeal approach to amendment should be avoided and the entire
Act should be replaced with a new one. The Act is over 60 years old and should
be substituted by a modern, comprehensive legislation which can prevent
litigation. Precious money and time would be saved by doing so. Till that time,
we will continue witnessing sequels to this puzzle known as ancestral property!

 

ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT IN A SOURCE STATE

The determination of income of a
Multi-National Enterprise (MNE) having operations in various jurisdictions
faces many challenges. It is not easy to attribute profits to various
constituents of an MNE spread over multiple jurisdictions. OECD has so far adopted
a separate entity approach and recommended determination of profits on the
Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) based on a FAR (Functions, Assets and Risks)
analysis. However, of late ALP based on FAR has been challenged by many
developing nations (including India) on the ground that it is more skewed
towards residence-based taxation and does not take into account the place of
value creation, i.e., the market. In a traditional approach, profits are taxed
in a source country only if there is a Permanent Establishment (PE). It is
easier for MNEs to plan their affairs in a manner so as to avoid the presence
of a PE in a source country. Further, in a digitalised economy, it is extremely
difficult to attribute profits to various jurisdictions based on the traditional
approach. Therefore, many countries worldwide have moved away from ALP and
resorted to either the Formulary Apportionment Method (FAM) or a Presumptive
Basis of Taxation. This article compares and contrasts the different methods of
profit attribution and provides a contextual study to understand the proposed
amendments in Rule 10 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules) in respect of
attribution of profits to the operations of an MNE in India.

 

PRESENT
SYSTEM OF PROFIT ATTRIBUTION

Article 5 of a tax treaty lays down norms
for determination of a PE in the state of source. Article 7 of a tax treaty
stipulates principles of determination of profits attributable to a PE. The
existence of a PE in a source state gives a right to that state to tax profits
which are attributable to its operations. As we know, a treaty only provides
for distributive rules for taxing jurisdictions, leaving detailed computation
of profits to the respective domestic tax laws. For example, once it is
established that there is a PE in India, computation of profits attributable to
that PE will be subject to provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act).
However, Article 7 does provide certain restrictions or guidelines thereof for
computation of profits. A moot issue is to determine how much profits are
attributable to a PE in the source state.

 

Provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961

Section 9 of the Act deals with income
deemed to accrue or arise in India. It does provide certain source rules for
determination of such income. However, as far as business income is concerned,
section 9(1)(i) provides that all income accruing or arising whether directly
or indirectly through or from any business connection in India… shall be deemed
to accrue or arise in India. Clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i)
further provides that in the case of a business of which all the operations are
not carried on in India, the income of the business under this clause deemed to
accrue or arise in India, shall be only such part of income as is reasonably
attributable to the operations carried on in India.

 

The provision in tax treaties is similar, in
that it provides that if the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the
profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other state; but only to the extent
as are attributable to that PE. There is one exception, i.e., a tax treaty
which follows the UN Model Convention providing for the force of attraction
rule. According to this rule, when an enterprise has a PE in a source state,
then the entire revenue from the source state may get taxed in the hands of
that enterprise, whether or not it is attributable to that PE. Many Indian tax
treaties do have this Rule. However, the force of attraction is restricted to
the revenue derived from the same or similar activities as that of the PE.

 

Thus, determination of profits attributable
to a PE is crucial for its taxability in the source state. Ideally, the PE
should maintain books of accounts and financial statements in India (for that
matter, any source state) for determination of profit or loss from its business
operations, for it is so mandated in India. However, where such books of
accounts are not maintained (may be due to the head office’s view of
non-existence of PE or for any other reason) or where it is not possible to
ascertain the actual profits from such books of accounts, then the assessing
officer (AO) can invoke the provisions of Rule 10 which provide for
determination of profits as a percentage of the turnover, proportionate profits
or in any other manner as he may be deem appropriate. Thus, Rule 10 gives wide
discretionary powers to the AO in determination of profits attributable to a
PE.

 

Clauses (b) to (e) of Explanation 1 to
section 9(1)(i) of the Act provide various instances where income of a non-resident
from certain activities will not be deemed to accrue or arise in India.
However, Explanation 2 explicitly includes dependent agent within the scope of
business connection. Again, a question arises as to the role played by the
dependent agent and profits attributable to his activities in the dual
capacity: one, as an agent, and two, as a representative of the foreign
enterprise (as a PE).

 

Authorised OECD Approach (AOA)

At present, there are three versions of
Article 7 that feature in tax treaties worldwide, namely, (i) article 7 in the
OECD Model Convention (OECD MC) prior to 2010, (ii) article 7 in the revised
OECD Model Convention post-2010, and (iii) article 7 of the UN Model Convention
(UN MC). The distinguishing features of the above versions are given below.

 

Versions (i) and (iii) are similar in that
the pre-2010 OECD MC and the UN MC contain the provision of considering PE as a
separate and distinct enterprise. The PE, in this case, is considered as being
a separate and independent entity from its head office, such that it would
maximise its own profits. The PE, therefore, would be maintaining separate
books of accounts based on principles of accounting as applicable to a separate
and distinct entity. Klaus Vogel has referred to such a method as ‘separate
accounting’ or ‘direct method’. India supports this view and most of its tax
treaties are based on this principle.

 

However, in 2010, OECD changed its stance
and amended article 7 based on its report on the ‘Attribution of Profits to
Permanent Establishments’. In the said report and the new article 7 in its
model tax convention, OECD pronounced AOA as a preferred approach for
attribution of profits to a PE. AOA is also based on the ‘separate entity
approach’, though profits are to be determined based on Functions performed,
Assets employed and Risks assumed (FAR).

 

AOA provides
options for application of the new article 7 introduced in the OECD Model Tax
Convention in 2010 which requires that profits attributable to PE are in
accordance with the principles developed in the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines wherein the PE is first hypothesised as a functionally separate
entity from the rest of the enterprise of which it is a part, and then profits
are determined by applying the comparability analysis and FAR approach.

 

The AOA recommends a two-step approach for
determination of profits attributable to a PE:

 

Step 1: A
functional and factual analysis of the PE, aligned with FAR analysis, as
recommended in transfer pricing guidelines;

Step 2: A
comparability analysis to determine the appropriate arm’s length return (price)
for the PE’s transactions on the basis of FAR analysis.

 

AOA is based on ALP, which in turn is
determined based on FAR analysis under transfer pricing, which essentially considers
the supply side of the transaction and ignores the demand side, i.e., the
market or sales; and, therefore, India has rejected the same.

 

There is one
more issue in the revised article 7 of the OECD MC. Its pre-2010 version
recognised and acknowledged that apportionment of profits based on one of the
criteria, namely, receipts (or sales revenue), expenses and working capital,
was a reasonable way of apportioning profits to the PE. This was based on
paragraph 4 of the pre-2010 version of the OECD MC which gave an option to
attribute profits by way of an apportionment if it was customary to do so in
the state of PE. However, the revised OECD MC dropped this paragraph. The
impact of this change is that even where accounts are not available or
reliable, one needs to attribute profits to a PE based on FAR without
considering the market or sales. India’s position is very clear in that it
would also take the demand side or sales into consideration for attribution of
profits to a PE.

 

Shortcomings of ALP

Section 92F(ii) defines the ‘Arm’s Length
Price’ as a price which is applied or proposed to be applied to a transaction
between persons other than associated enterprises, in uncontrolled conditions.

Thus, a transaction between two or more AEs
needs to be compared with a similar transaction between two unrelated parties,
for the same or similar product or service, in the same or similar
circumstances. These two unrelated parties, whose transactions are compared
with that of AEs, must have similar functions, assets or risks as that of the
AEs. It is practically impossible to find such comparable companies or
transactions.

 

Section 92C prescribes six methods to
determine the ALP. Pricing depends upon many factors other than FAR. ALP fails
to take into account all aspects of a business. One cannot easily find
comparables for many businesses that are engaged in specialised services or
businesses, especially specialised product-lines involving complex intangibles.

 

Moreover, availability of data in the public
domain at the time of entering into the transaction for comparison purposes is
a big challenge. Public data is available only in cases of commodity trading
through exchanges. Maintenance of contemporaneous documentation and valuation
thereof are another big challenge.

 

Profit Split Method

The Profit Split Method (PSM) is applicable
when transactions are so interrelated that it might not be logical or practical
to evaluate the same individually. Independent entities in such scenarios may
agree to pool their total profits and distribute them to each of the
participating entities based on an agreed ratio. Thus, PSM uses a logical basis
and divides profits among participating entities to a transaction similar to
what independent entities would have apportioned for arriving at such an
arrangement.

 

The PSM method first identifies the outcome
of the transaction (i.e., the net profit of the transaction) of the group. The
profit then is to be divided among the entities of the group on an economically
rational basis such that profits would have been distributed in an arm’s length
arrangement. The total profit may be the profit from the transactions or a
residual profit that cannot readily be assigned to any of the entities of the
group, e.g., profits arising from unique intangibles. The contribution of each
entity is based upon a functional analysis of each entity. Reliable external
market data, if available, is always given preference.

 

The PSM method, although a method under the
arm’s length approach, is in reality based on the principles which are used for
the purpose of ‘Formulary Apportionment’.

 

The positive aspect of every PSM approach is
that it examines the controlled transactions under review in a prudent manner
as it is a two-sided method where every MNE concerned is evaluated. Thus, the
PSM method will be beneficial if the underlying contribution involves
intangibles owned by two or more MNEs, as no transfer pricing method other than
PSM would be applicable. PSM offers flexibility because it considers the
specific facts and circumstances of MNEs which cannot be found in comparable
independent enterprises. Moreover, a real actual profit is being split which
generally does not leave any of the MNEs concerned with an unreasonably high
profit since each MNE is appraised. It also removes the possibility of double
taxation as the total profit is split and distributed to the various
constituent entities across jurisdictions.

 

Challenges of PSM – lack of availability
of data and functions

There are two fundamental disadvantages with
the PSM. First, the application of PSM usually includes a weak and sometimes
doubtful connection of external market data with the controlled transactions
under consideration, resulting in a comparison with a certain amount of
subjectivity. Moreover, there is the lack of availability of data; both
taxpayers and tax administrations might find it hard to obtain reliable
information from MNEs in foreign countries. This inconvenience might materially
affect the reliability of the method since the profit should be an economical
assessment based on each and every function undertaken by the MNE, preferably
using external comparables which can support the valuation. (Source: Markham,
Michelle – Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets in the US, the OECD and Australia:
Are Profit Split Methodologies the Way Forward?
)

 

FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT METHOD (FA)

The Meaning of FA

As the name suggests, it is the
apportionment of the profits / losses of a corporation based on some
predetermined formula, over its different units or group of companies operating
under common control, across different jurisdictions based on significant
economic presence.

 

Formulary Apportionment, popularly known as
unitary taxation, allocates profit earned (or loss incurred) by an MNE wherein
its entity has a taxable presence. It is an alternative to the separate entity
approach under which a branch or PE within a jurisdiction is reckoned as a
separate entity, requiring prices for transactions with other parts of a
corporation or a group thereof, according to ALP.

 

As opposed to this, FA assigns the group’s
total global profit (or loss) to each jurisdiction based on certain variables
such as the proportion of assets, sales or payroll in that particular
jurisdiction. It is thus akin to PSM in a sense.

 

Under this method, all entities of the group
are viewed as a single entity (unitary combination) and therefore the method is
also known as unitary taxation worldwide. This method requires combined
reporting of the group’s results.

 

Advantages of FA

A unitary approach would replace the
following major elements which create fundamental problems for taxation of MNEs
under the ALP:

 

(i)   The need for analysing arm’s length price,
that is, an analysis of internal accounts and transactions for determining the
appropriate arm’s length price;

(ii)   The need to deal with complex anti-avoidance
rules, such as thin capitalisation, controlled foreign corporations, limitation
of benefits et al to prevent base erosion and profit shifting;

(iii) Quantification of contribution of intangibles
in income generation;

(iv) Freedom from
litigation arising from source and residence attribution rules;

(v) Lesser compliance burden on MNEs.

 

The above would enable simplification of the
international tax system, which shall benefit both taxpayers and tax
administrations.

 

At present, a majority of the transfer
pricing disputes undergoing several rounds of litigation are generally decided
in favour of the taxpayer. This is so in the U.S., India and other countries.
This is bound to happen in the absence of clear guidance on transfer pricing
issues. Matters pertaining to selection of appropriate comparable(s), usage of
the most appropriate method for benchmarking the transaction, management fees,
cost allocation arrangements, royalty pay-outs, etc., have been and continue to
be under litigation.

 

On the other hand, the unitary taxation
method, if not totally, would at least reduce and significantly contribute in
settling disputes. Further, in many cases in countries where significant
economic activities are carried out, there may not be any significant
difference in corporate tax rates. Hence, in the absence of wide differences in
corporate tax rates, there may be no significant compulsion or reason to
minimise a firm’s global tax liability by relocating production activities.

 

Limitations of FA

There are two primary questions that need to
be addressed for successful implementation of FA.

 

Q1) How and what shall be the basis for
the apportionment formula?

 

Generally, an overwhelming consensus on the
determination of weights for the factors would be decided by negotiations and
trade-offs. Historical data provides that the factors have been generally given
equal weight, that is, one-third each (sales, labour and assets employed).

 

Approach of the United States of America

The water’s edge approach of the States in
the US has tilted the balance towards sales. This approach apportions income to
production and sale equally, i.e., 50% of income is apportioned based on sales
and 50% on production (assets and labour quantify production).

 

[Water’s edge election basically says that
you (as a business or entity) agree to be taxed within the jurisdiction for the
sales that occur within that state, but only within the parameters laid down by
that state.]

 

Approach of the European Union

On the other hand, in 2012 the EU amended
the proposal drafted by the EU Commission, from equal weights to the three
factors, to 10% for sales, 45% for assets and 45% for labour.

 

Differences in preferences

Countries where wage rates are higher would
favour payroll rather than headcount in respect of the labour factor. This
would tend to benefit from the inclusion of the assets factor with an equal
weight. Therefore, such countries can concede that the labour factor be based
on the number of employees.

 

Conversely, although countries which have
attracted large-scale manufacturing activities would benefit in terms of tax
revenues on account of the labour factor, they should also be willing to accept
a significant weightage for other factors. If the same has not been accepted,
there may be MNEs who would relocate their investments because of formula
over-weight tilt towards the labour factor. Therefore, it is essential that a
fine balance between factors of production and sales is achieved. This is
because some part of the income can be said to be attributable to (a) assets
employed for production, (b) number of employees on the payroll, and (c) the
sales function, of course.

 

Therefore, one may propose a ratio of 1
(assets employed): 1 (number of employees): and 2 (sales function). This is
because it gives equal importance to all factors of production as well as the
sales function. Further, equal importance is also given to the internal two (2)
factors of production as well, namely, capital and entrepreneurship.

 

Q2) 
Would it be appropriate to apply a general formula for all industries?

 

Evidently not. This issue has been debated
since the unitary approach was first mooted in the 1930s. The cause for concern
is that some types of industries do have special characteristics in need of a
special formula.

 

Examples

Transportation industries such as shipping,
aviation, etc., pose an issue because the assets which they are dependent upon
are mobile. In order to address the special nuance of this business, these
could be taxed based on the value of traffic between two contact (entry / exit)
points.

 

In the case of other nuanced industries,
such as extractive industries, the modern approach of ‘resource rent taxation’
is a more effective mode of taxation. Therefore, the interaction between
resource rent taxation and general corporate taxation would require a special
consideration.

 

However, for the purpose of achieving
neutrality, a general apportionment formula applied to most types of businesses
would be appropriate for allocating a general tax on income or profits.

 

Presumptive Taxation (PT)

As stated above, determination or
computation of profits in the source state is not an easy task and therefore there
is always an uncertainty about attribution of income and allowability of
expenses. Moreover, compliance burden is also high. In order to address these
issues, many countries give the option of presumptive taxation to
non-residents. Under this, irrespective of actual profit or loss, a certain
percentage of the gross receipts from the state of source is deemed to be
income and taxed therein. Once a taxpayer is covered by the presumptive tax
scheme, he would be relieved from the rigours of compliances.

 

The Income-tax Act, 1961 contains provisions
for taxing income of non-residents on presumptive basis. Some illustrative
provisions are given below:

 

Section

Types of assessees

Particulars of income

Tax rate

44BB

Any non-resident

Profits and gains in connection with or supplying
P&M on hire used, or to be used, in the prospecting for, or extraction or
production of mineral oils and natural gas in case of NR

10% of the gross receipts is deemed to be profits
and gains.

(Surcharge, health & education cess would be
extra)

44DA

Any non-resident

Royalties / FTS arising through a PE or fixed
place of profession in India

Taxable on net basis.

Basic rate 40%.

(Surcharge, health & education cess would be
extra)

44AE

Any assessee

Business of plying, leasing or hiring of goods
carriages owned by the assessee (not owning more than 10 goods carriages at
any time during the previous year)

Deemed profits @ Rs. 7,500 per vehicle, for every
month (or part thereof) or actual profits, whichever is higher.

In case of a heavy goods vehicle, profits are
deemed to be Rs. 1,000 per ton of gross vehicle weight or unladen weight as
the case may be, per vehicle for every month (or part thereof) or actual
earnings, whichever is higher

115A

Any non-residents and foreign company

Taxation in respect of income by way of dividend,
interest, royalty and technical service fee to non-residents and foreign
companies

(i) Interest income received by non- residents
(not being a company) or a foreign company – 20% plus applicable surcharge
and cess

(ii) Infra debt funds as specified u/s 10(47) –
5% plus applicable surcharge and cess

(iii) Dividend received by a non-resident or a
foreign company – 20% plus applicable surcharge and cess

(iv) Royalty or fees for technical services
income received by non-resident or foreign company – 10% plus applicable
surcharge and cess

115VA to V-O

Any company that owns at least one qualifying
ship and the main object of the company is to carry on the business of
operating ships

Computation of profits and gains from the
business of operating qualifying ships

(i) Qualifying ship having net tonnage up to
1,000 – Rs. 70 for each 100 tons

(ii) Qualifying ship having net tonnage up to
1,000 but not more than 10,000 – Rs. 700 plus Rs. 53 for each 100 tons
exceeding 1,000 tons

(iii) Qualifying ship having net tonnage up to
10,000 but not more than 25,000 – Rs. 5,470 plus Rs. 42 for each 100 tons
exceeding 10,000 tons

(iv) Qualifying ship having ship tonnage
exceeding 25,000 – Rs. 11,770 plus Rs. 29 for each 100 tons exceeding 25,000
tons

172

Any non-resident

Shipping business of non-residents

For the purpose of the levy and recovery of tax
in the case of any ship, belonging to or chartered by a non-resident, which
carries passengers, livestock, mail or goods shipped at a port in India –
7.5% of the amount paid or payable on account of such carriage to the owner
or charterer

Equalisation levy

Any non-resident

Charge of equalisation levy

Equalisation levy shall be charged @ 6% of the amount
of consideration payable, for any specified service received or receivable
from a non-resident, by –

i. A person resident in India carrying on any
business or profession; or

ii. A non-resident having permanent establishment
in India

 

 

Distinction between PSM / FA / PT

The stark difference between the Profit
Split Method (PSM), the Formulary Apportionment Method (FA) and the Presumptive
Taxation Method (PT) is the manner of calculation of profits.

 

Profit Spilt Method: In this method, total profits earned by related entities in
different jurisdictions is determined and then the same are attributed to each
one of them on a separate entity approach (following the arm’s length
principle), based on FAR analysis. In this case, usually the market or demand
side is overlooked or given less importance. This method is criticised in that
it is more skewed towards the country of residence of the enterprise.

Formulary Apportionment Method: Here, the actual profits of the MNE at the global level are
distributed to the participating entities. However, the distribution is based
on a predetermined formula with or without weightage. This method does take
care of demand side arising from ‘sales’, which is usually one of the factors
of profit allocation in the FA. This method considers all entities across the
globe under a single MNE as a single unit and consequently it is known as
‘Unitary Method’ as well.

 

Presumptive Taxation: This method rests on an altogether different footing. It does not
take into account the actual profit or loss of the business undertaking.
Instead, it presupposes a certain element of profit in the source state and
levies taxes based on a notional estimation. Normally, presumptive taxation is
given as an option to the taxpayer to have a tax certainty and reduce
litigation. If the actual profits are lower or there are losses, then the
taxpayer may opt for regular computational provisions along with related
compliances. Safe-harbour provisions under the TP Regulations are akin to
presumptive taxation.

 

PROPOSED PROFIT ATTRIBUTION RULE (COMBINATION
OF FA AND PT)

The CBDT Committee has recommended amendment
of Rule 10 of the Income-tax Rules to provide for detailed profit attribution
rules. It rejected the AOA for profit distribution, which is based on ALP
taking into account FAR analysis. It may be noted that AOA does not take into
account the demand side of a transaction.

 

The committee
suggested distribution of profits based on three factors carrying equal
weightage, namely, (a) sales (b) manpower and (c) assets. It is claimed that
the combination of these three factors would take into consideration both the
demand and the supply side of a transaction.

 

The draft report on Profit Attribution
outlines the formula for calculating ‘profits attributable to operations in
India’, giving due weightage to sales revenue, wages paid to employees and
assets deployed.

 

(Please refer to the July, 2019 issue of
the BCAJ for a detailed discussion on the proposed Profit Attribution Rules.)

 

CONCLUSION

Attribution of profits is a complex
exercise, more so when such attribution is related to complex intangibles or a
PE. The Arm’s Length Principle looks good in theory, but impracticable in real
ground situations. Therefore, even after decades of its existence, there are
litigations galore. Further, FAR analysis takes into account only the supply
side, giving less or no weightage to the demand side. On the other hand,
presumptive taxation, which uses estimation, may result in double taxation as
the residence country may deny the credit of taxes paid on presumptive basis.
The plausible solution seems to be a distribution of profits based on a
predetermined formula, i.e., the Formulary Apportionment Method.

 

However, unless there is a universal
consensus this method also is not practicable. Moreover, availability of data
at a global level or the willingness of a Multi-National Enterprise to share
such data could be a challenge. Difference in accounting treatment, difference
in taxable year, fluctuating exchange rates, changes in domestic tax laws, tax
incentives in different jurisdictions, etc., are all issues for which there are
no answers. This only proves that we are living in an imperfect world and that
we need to accept the imperfect tax system as the hard reality of life in an
era of cross-border transactions and the continuing emergence of giant
multinationals that rule the roost, with law-makers lagging far behind.

 

 

DETERMINING INCREMENTAL BORROWING RATE UNDER Ind AS 116

BACKGROUND

Ind AS 116 requires a
lessee to discount the lease liability using the interest rate implicit in the
lease if that rate can be readily determined. If the interest rate implicit in
the lease cannot be readily determined, then the lessee should use its incremental
borrowing rate. The interest rate implicit in the lease is likely to be similar
to the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate (IBR) in many cases. This is because
both rates, as they have been defined in Ind AS 116, take into account the
credit standing of the lessee, the length of the lease, the nature and quality
of the collateral provided and the economic environment in which the
transaction occurs. However, the interest rate implicit in the lease is
generally also affected by a lessor’s estimate of the residual value of the
underlying asset at the end of the lease and may be affected by taxes and other
factors known only to the lessor, such as any initial direct costs of the
lessor. It is likely to be difficult for lessees to determine the interest rate
implicit in the lease for many leases, particularly those for which the
underlying asset has a significant residual value at the end of the lease.
Consequently, the standard requires use of the IBR in these situations.

 

The lessee’s IBR is the rate that the lessee
would have incurred on debt obtained over a similar term for the specific
purpose of acquiring the leased asset. The lessee’s IBR may be equivalent to a
secured borrowing rate if that rate is determinable, reasonable and consistent
with the financing that would have been used in the particular circumstances.
The lessee’s IBR should reflect the effect of any compensating balances or
other requirements present in the lease that would affect the lessee’s
borrowing cost for similar debt. The IBR should also reflect the effect of any
third party guarantees of minimum lease payments obtained by the lessee, to the
extent that similar guarantees of debt payments would have affected the
borrowing costs. However, the lessee’s IBR should not include any component
related to the lessee’s cost of capital (i.e., the IBR should not reflect the
effect of lessee’s use of a combination of debt and equity to finance the
acquisition of the leased asset).

 

If the lessee’s financial condition is such
that third parties generally would be unwilling to provide debt financing, the
IBR of the lessee might not be readily determinable. In these rare cases, the
lessee should use the interest rate for the lowest grade of debt currently
available in the market place as its IBR.

 

Three steps are critical in determining the
IBR, namely: (a) the reference rate, (b) the financing spread adjustment, and
(c) lease-specific adjustment. These aspects are discussed below.

 

REFERENCE RATE

This will generally be the relevant
government bonds or currency swap rates (e.g., LIBOR) reflecting a risk-free
rate. The borrowings should be matched with the currency of the cash outflows
on the lease so that foreign exchange risk is removed. For example, lease cash
flows denominated in USD or GBP (or any other currency) should be matched with
the appropriate risk-free rates, such as those determined from US Treasury
Bills or UK Gilts.

 

The repayment profile should be considered
when aligning the term of the lease with the term for the source of the reference
rate. Risk-free rates exist for different durations. Therefore, the chosen rate
should be matched with the lease term, as defined by Ind AS 116. The relevant
duration of government bonds to consider is not the total lease term but a
weighted average lease term. While a risk-free rate determined from government
bonds or interest rate yield curves assumes repayment of the capital at
maturity, for an operating lease the repayments are typically spread over the
lease period.

 

Example: Foreign currency leases

Ez Co, an Indian airline company with INR
functional currency, leases aircrafts; the lease payments are specified in USD
and the interest rate implicit in the lease is not readily determinable. For
making the lease payments, Ez has borrowed in USD and taken a forward contract
to hedge against INR / USD exchange fluctuation risks. The USD loan interest
rate is 4% per annum and the hedge cost is 2% per annum. The currency in which
the lease is determined forms part of the economic environment for which the borrowing
rate is assessed. It is the US dollar incremental borrowing rate that has to be
determined. In this case, the IBR is 4% (subject to any further adjustments
required by the Standard) and not 6%.

 

FINANCING SPREAD ADJUSTMENT

For determining the spread, lessees should
use credit spreads from debt with the appropriate term. If the same is not
available, it will have to be estimated. The data available to entities to
determine their financing spread adjustment will depend on the type of company
and their financing structures.

 

Nature of debt financing

Type of entity

Data points available

Multiple debt financing arrangements

Large listed entities

Multiple data points

A bank loan

Small companies

Single data point

No significant debt financing arrangements

Cash surplus company

None

 

For entities with zero debt and / or net
cash balances, consideration should be given to both historical as well as
future debt facilities. The historical position may not be representative of
the current position of the company. It is incorrect to assume that companies
in this situation will have a zero spread, as Ind AS 116 requires the discount
rate to reflect the rate of interest the lessee would have to pay to borrow.
Companies with few data points on their credit spread should seek indicative
pricing from several banks or look to comparable data points available, such as
similar sized companies in a similar industry.

 

Ind AS 116 is very clear that the IBR is
lessee-specific. Therefore, it is important to evaluate what rate the lessee
would achieve on his own even if theoretically all funding would ultimately be
achieved through a group debt structure. Depending on who is the issuer, and
whether there are written guarantees from the group for the lease payments in
place, it may mean that in some cases a group credit spread that is applicable
to all lessees in a group may be more relevant. In determining an IBR, the
overall level of indebtedness of the entity (i.e., leverage) and whether the
value of the lease results in a change to the leverage ratio such that it
warrants a higher IBR, should be considered.

 

LEASE SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENT

The key requirement of Ind AS 116 is that the
IBR is directly linked to the asset itself, rather than being a general IBR. To
an extent, the lease is a secured lending arrangement as the lessor can reclaim
the underlying property. The security of the underlying asset should
potentially reduce the credit spread charged by a lender. If there are no data
points with respect to secured borrowing rates the lessee may consider asking
banks or lenders, or use valuation specialists. While all leases will reflect a
secured borrowing position, in practice certain assets may be more valuable to
a lessor and easier to redeploy. For example, the costs of repossessing an
asset of low value (e.g., a Xerox machine) or low duration relative to its cash
flow would be high. Consequently, the security would be largely irrelevant. On
the other hand, in larger value assets with a longer duration (e.g., office
space), the benefit of having security is more valuable because the lessor will
not be at a significant loss in the event of default by the lessee.

 

PROPERTY YIELDS

In the basis for conclusions of IFRS 16,
property yields are specifically identified as a potential data point for
companies to consider: ‘The IASB noted that, depending on the nature of the
underlying asset and the terms and conditions of the lease, a lessee may be
able to refer to a rate that is readily observable as a starting point when
determining its incremental borrowing rate for a lease (for example, the rate
that a lessee has paid, or would pay, to borrow money to purchase the type of
asset being leased, or the property yield when determining the discount rate to
apply to property leases). Nonetheless, a lessee should adjust such observable
rates as is needed to determine its incremental borrowing rate as defined in
IFRS 16.’

 

The valuation typically is determined by a
multiplier being applied to the rental income to be received, with the
multiplier representing 1/Yield. Using property yield is more suitable to
valuing commercial property where all likely buyers in the market view the
asset as an investment, for example, valuing
commercial properties. Using property yield is less suitable for owner-occupied
property (e.g., residential properties). Property yields are determined by
assessing the yield profile from recent, comparable sales of similar assets
with similar characteristics. The ‘equivalent yield’ reflected by comparable
sales represents the weighted average of current and future rental income,
smoothing out the effect of rent-free periods or vacancy. In determining the
property yield, the risk to be considered includes location, quality of
property, specification, future rental and capital growth prospects, the
tenants’ credit profile and local supply / demand dynamics. For companies
wanting to use property yields to help them determine lease specific
adjustments, the following assumptions are relevant:

 

(i)   The currency of property
lease cash flows is aligned with the currency in which the property is valued;

(ii)   The duration of the property
yield data points available are aligned to the weighted average term of the
lease; and

(iii)  The property yields are
aligned to the characteristics of the property lease being assessed (quality,
sector and location of the property).

 

Practical questions and answers

Query

Ind AS 116 defines the lessee’s incremental
borrowing rate as ‘The rate of interest that a lessee would have to pay to
borrow over a similar term, and with a similar security, the funds necessary to
obtain an asset of a similar value to the right-of-use asset in a similar
economic environment.’ What does ‘similar term’ mean in the context of a lease
with a non-cancellable period followed by one or more optional periods? Does
similar term imply:

 

(a)  A debt for a period equal to the
non-cancellable term?

(b) A debt for a period equal to the maximum term
(including the periods covered by the options to renew)?

(c)  A debt for a period equal to the
non-cancellable term with extension options?

(d) A debt for a period equal to the lease term as
determined in accordance with Ind AS 116 (i.e., taking into account whether or
not it is reasonably certain to exercise the option/s to renew).

 

Response

The discount rate should be consistent with
the cash flows that are to be discounted and since those cash flows take into
account only the rentals over the lease term as determined according to Ind AS
116, (d) is the right answer.

Query

Ind AS 116
defines the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate as ‘The rate of interest that a
lessee would have to pay to borrow over a similar term, and with a similar
security, the funds necessary to obtain an asset of a similar value to the
right-of-use asset in a similar economic environment.’ What does ‘similar
security’ mean in the context of a lease that grants to the lessee the
right-of-use (ROU) for the underlying asset for a period of time? Sometimes,
there could be some guarantees by the parent company or another company in the
group. Can the parent company’s IBR be used?

 

Response

If parent
provides guarantee on the subsidiary’s debt the pricing of the lease would be
more influenced by the credit risk associated with the parent. The rate used by
the subsidiary should reflect the IBR of the parent, unless the subsidiary is
able to obtain financing on a stand-alone basis without the parent or other
related entities guaranteeing the debt. If that is not the case, the parent’s
IBR would be a more appropriate rate to estimate.

 

However,
allowing a subsidiary to look up at the parent’s borrowing rate without looking
at anything else, such as the currency exchange rates, may not be appropriate.
Even with a guarantee from the parent company, there are other factors that
could influence the pricing (and the implicit rate) offered by the lessor (such
as tax and other local regulations for example). The lessee should always look
at its own borrowing rate and take into account the impact of any guarantees
provided by the parent company to the lessor. This could be done by soliciting
quotes from local lenders for similar conditions and guarantees. Corporate
borrowing rates may be used as a starting point. However, appropriate
adjustments are usually necessary to take into account specific facts and
circumstances of the lease. The inter-company rate on loans from the parent to
the subsidiary generally should not be used as the lessee’s incremental
borrowing rate.

 

Query

Ind AS 116
defines the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate as ‘The rate of interest that a
lessee would have to pay to borrow over a similar term, and with a similar
security, the funds necessary to obtain an asset of a similar value to the
right-of-use asset in a similar economic environment.’ What does ‘similar
value’ mean?

 

Response

The
right-of-use (ROU) asset rather than the underlying asset shall be considered
as a security with similar value.
The value of the ROU
asset does not include payments that are not lease payments (e.g., variable
payments not based on an index or rate). Similarly, the lease payments relating
to optional periods that are not included in the lease term should also be
excluded.

 

Query

A company is able to estimate the IBR at
which it would borrow to buy a truck (10 years’ useful life) or property.
Whether the same IBR can be applied if the asset is not the truck but rather a
5-year right of use (ROU) or the asset is not property but an ROU of the
property, or say only two floors of a building are leased?

 

Response

Whilst there is a practical difficulty in
determining the IBR in the case of an ROU, it is necessary to do so and it will
not be the same as the IBR of the truck or the property.

 

A lessee should start with the rate it would
incur to purchase the underlying asset, but that rate would require adjustment
to reflect ‘an asset of similar value to the ROU asset’. Adjustments may be
both negative and positive depending on the type of asset and risks associated
with the residual value of the asset.
 

 

ACIT-2(3) vs. M/s Tata Sons Ltd.; date of order: 9th December, 2015; [ITA. No. 1719/Mum/2012, A.Y.: 2004-05; Mum. ITAT]

3.      
The Pr. CIT-2 vs. M/s Tata Sons
Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 639 of 2017]
Date of order: 19th August, 2019 (Bombay High Court)

 

ACIT-2(3) vs. M/s Tata Sons Ltd.; date of
order: 9th December, 2015; [ITA. No. 1719/Mum/2012, A.Y.: 2004-05;
Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 147 – Reassessment – The reopening
notice was issued before the reasons were recorded for reopening the assessment
– Reopening notice is bad in law [S. 148]

 

On 6th
March, 2009 the AO issued a notice u/s 148 of the Act seeking to re-open the
assessment. The assessee company contended that the reopening notice was issued
much before the reasons for doing so were recorded, thus the reopening notice
was without jurisdiction. However, the AO did not accept the assessee’s
contention and passed an order of assessment u/s 143(3) r/w/s 148 of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved with the order, the assessee
company carried the issue in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the
reopening notice had been issued without having recorded the reasons which might
have led the AO to form a reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax had
escaped assessment. The reasons were recorded on 19th March, 2009
while the impugned notice issued is dated 6th March, 2009. The
CIT(A) held that the entire proceeding of reopening is vitiated as notice u/s
148 of the Act is bad in law.

 

Aggrieved with this, the Revenue filed an
appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal specifically asked the Revenue to
produce the assessment record so as to substantiate its case that the impugned
notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued only after recording the reasons for
reopening the assessment. The Revenue produced the record of assessment for
A.Y. 2004-05 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal on facts found from the entries
made in the assessment record produced an entry as regards issue of notice u/s
148 dated 6th March, 2009.

 

However, no
entries prior to 6th March, 2009 were produced before the Tribunal
so as to establish that the reasons were recorded prior to the issue of notice
dated 6th March, 2009 u/s148 of the Act. Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that there was nothing in the records which would indicate that any
reasons were recorded prior to the issue of notice. Therefore, the order of the
CIT(A) was upheld.

 

Still aggrieved, this time with the order of
the Tribunal, the Revenue carried the issue in appeal to the High Court. The
High Court held that both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently come to
a finding of fact that no reasons were recorded by the AO prior to issuing the
reopening notice dated 6th March, 2009.

 

Further,
section 292B of the Act would have no application in the present facts as the
condition precedent for issuing of the reopening notice, namely, recording of
reasons, has not been satisfied by the AO. Thus, it is not a case of clerical
error but the substantial condition for a valid reopening notice, viz.,
recording of reasons to form a reasonable belief, is not satisfied. Accordingly
the appeal was dismissed.



Sandu Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT-10(2); date of order: 23rd March, 2016; [ITA. No. 2087/Mum/2012; A.Y.: 2009-10; Mum. ITAT] Section 194H – Tax deduction at source – Manufacture the goods as per the specification – Discount vis-a-vis commission – No principal-agent relationship, hence not liable to deduct tax at source – Consistent view accepted over years

2.      
Pr. CIT-14 vs. Sandu
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [ITA No. 953 of 2017]
Date of order: 27th August, 2019 (Bombay High Court)

 

Sandu Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Asst.
CIT-10(2); date of order: 23rd March, 2016; [ITA. No. 2087/Mum/2012;
A.Y.: 2009-10; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 194H – Tax deduction at source –
Manufacture the goods as per the specification – Discount vis-a-vis commission
– No principal-agent relationship, hence not liable to deduct tax at source –
Consistent view accepted over years

 

The assessee company is engaged in the
manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines. During the assessment proceedings the AO
noted that on the sales turnover of Rs.14.25 crores, the assessee had given
discount of Rs. 7.27 crores. The AO called upon the assessee to furnish details
of the discount given. In response, the respondent pointed out that it was
selling its Ayurvedic medicines to a company called Sandu Brothers Private
Limited (SBPL) at a discount of 51%. This, after taking into account the cost
of distribution, field staff salary, travelling expenses, incentives,
marketing, etc. However, the AO held that 10% was on account of discount and
the balance 41% was the commission involved in selling its product through
SBPL. He therefore held that tax had to be deducted on the commission of Rs.
5.84 crores u/s 194H of the Act. This not being done, the entire amount of Rs.
5.84 crores being the commission at 41% was disallowed in terms of section
40(a)(ia) of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an
appeal before the CIT(A). But the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal.

 

Being aggrieved by the order, the assessee
filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had
entered into an agreement with SBPL on 1st April, 1997 for the sale
of its products. As per clause 1 of the agreement, the assessee is to
manufacture and process certain Ayurvedic drugs and formulations by utilising
the secret formulation given by SBPL and pack them in bulk or in such other
packs as may be stipulated or specified by SBPL to enable them to market the
same by buying the said products on its account. Clause 11 of the agreement
stipulates that the sale of goods to SBPL is on principal-to-principal basis
and none of the parties to the agreement shall hold oneself as agent of the
other under any circumstances. It further stipulates that SBPL shall sell the
products on its own account only and not as an agent or on behalf of the
assessee.

 

Clause 10(a) of the agreement provides that
the assessee shall manufacture the goods as per the specifications of SBPL and
if the products are not in accordance with the standard, SBPL shall have the
right to reject the products. However, clause 10(b) provides that once SBPL
accepts certain products manufactured by the assessee, any loss suffered by
SBPL subsequently, due to handling, transportation of storage shall be borne by
SBPL itself. Thus, on overall consideration of the agreement between the
parties, it becomes clear that once certain goods are sold to SBPL after
certification by them, ownership of such goods is transferred from the assessee
and vests with SBPL. Thus, once the goods are certified by SBPL and sold to
them the contract of sale concludes as far as the assessee is concerned, as
goods cannot be returned back to the assessee. Therefore, examined in the
aforesaid perspective, it has to be concluded that it is a transaction of sale
between the assessee and SBPL on principal-to-principal basis and there is no
agency between them. Further, on a perusal of the invoices raised, it is clear
that the assessee has given a discount of 51% on the MRP of the goods sold.

 

These evidences clearly demonstrate that
there is no relationship of principal and agent between the assessee and SBPL.
The Departmental authorities have failed to demonstrate that SBPL was acting as
an agent on behalf of the assessee to satisfy the condition of section 194H. It
is also relevant to note, though, that the agreement with SBPL is subsisting
from the year 1997 and similar trade discount has been given to SBPL on sales
effected over the years; but the Department has not made any disallowance
either in the preceding assessment years or in the subsequent assessment years.
This fact is evident from the assessment orders passed for A.Ys. 2005-06 and
2006-07 u/s 143(3) of the Act. That being the case, when the Department is
following a consistent view by not treating the discount given in the nature of
commission over the years under identical facts and circumstances, a different
approach cannot be taken in the impugned A.Y.

 

Being aggrieved
by the order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed that the Tribunal has on facts come to the conclusion that the sale of
goods to Sandu Brothers Private Limited was on principal-to-principal basis and
not through an agent. Thus, no amount of the discount aggregating to Rs. 7.27
crores can be classified as commission. Therefore, section 194H of the Act
calling for deduction of tax of such a commission would have no application to
the present facts. The Revenue has not been able to show that the finding of
fact arrived at by it on the basis of the terms of the agreement is in any
manner perverse, or capable of a different interpretation. Therefore, the
department appeal was dismissed.

 

M/s Siemens Nixdorf Information Systemse GmbH vs. Dy. Dir. of Income Tax (Int’l Taxation) 2(1); [ITA No. 3833/M/2011; date of order: 31st March, 2016; A.Y.: 2002-03; Mum. ITAT] Section 2(14) – Capital asset – Advance given to subsidiary – Loss arising on sale of said asset was held to be treated as short-term capital loss [S. 2(47)]

1.      
The CIT (IT)-4 vs. M/s Siemens
Nixdorf Information Systemse GmbH [Income tax Appeal No. 1366 of 2017
Date of
order: 26th August, 2019
(Bombay
High Court)

 

M/s Siemens Nixdorf Information Systemse
GmbH vs. Dy. Dir. of Income Tax (Int’l Taxation) 2(1); [ITA No. 3833/M/2011;
date of order: 31st March, 2016; A.Y.: 2002-03; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 2(14)
– Capital asset – Advance given to subsidiary – Loss arising on sale of said
asset was held to be treated as short-term capital loss [S. 2(47)]

 

The assessee company has a subsidiary by the
name Siemens Nixdorf Information Systems Limited (SNISL) to which it had lent
an amount of Euros 90 lakhs under an agreement dated 21st September,
2000. When SNISL ran into serious financial troubles and was likely to be wound
up, the assessee company sold this debt of Euros 90 lakhs to one Siemens AG.
This was done on the basis of the valuation carried out by M/s Infrastructure
and Leasing Finance Ltd. The assessee company claimed the difference in the
amount which was invested / lent to SNISL and the consideration received when
sold / assigned to Siemens AG as a short-term capital loss.

 

However, the AO disallowed the short-term
capital loss, pointing out that the amount lent by the assessee company to its
subsidiary was not a capital asset u/s 2(14) of the Act and also that no
transfer in terms of section 2(47) of the Act took place on the assignment of a
loss.

 

Being aggrieved, the assessee company
carried the issue in appeal to the CIT(A). But even the CIT(A) did not accept
the contention that the amount of Euros 90 lakhs lent to SNISL was a capital
asset and upheld the order of the AO. However, it also held that although the
assignment of a loss was a transfer u/s 2(47) of the Act, but it is of no avail
as the loan being assigned / transferred is not a capital asset.

 

On further appeal, the Tribunal held that
section 2(14) defines the term ‘capital asset’ as ‘property of any kind held by
an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession’, except
those which are specifically excluded in the said section. It further records
the exclusion is only for stock-in-trade, consumables or raw materials held for
purposes of business. It thereafter examined the meaning of the word ‘property’
to conclude that it has a wide connotation to include interest of any kind. It
placed reliance upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CWT
vs. Vidur V. Patel [1995] 215 ITR 30
rendered in the context of the
Wealth Tax Act, 1957 which, while considering the definition of ‘asset’, had
occasion to construe the meaning of the word ‘property’. It held the word
‘property’ to include interest of every kind. On the aforesaid basis, the
Tribunal held that in the absence of loan being specifically excluded from the
definition of capital assets under the Act, the loan of Euros 90 lakhs would
stand covered by the meaning of the word ‘capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(14)
of the Act. It also held that the transfer of the loan, i.e., capital asset,
will be covered by section 2(47) of the Act. The Revenue had not filed any
appeal on this issue, thus holding that the assessee company would be entitled
to claim loss on capital account while assigning / transferring the loan given
to SNISL to one to Siemens AG.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of the ITAT,
the Revenue carried the issue in appeal to the High Court. The Court observed
that section 2(14) of the Act defined the word ‘capital asset’ very widely to
mean property of any kind. However, it specifically excludes certain properties
from the definition of ‘capital asset’. The Revenue has not been able to point
out any of the exclusion clauses being applicable to an advancement of a loan.
It is also relevant to note that it is not the case of the Revenue that the
amount of Euros 90 lakhs was a loan / advance income of its trading activity.
The meaning of the word ‘property’ as given in the context of the definition of
asset in the Wealth Tax Act is that ‘property’ includes every interest which a
person can enjoy. This was extended by the Tribunal to understand the meaning
of the word ‘property’ as found in the context of capital asset u/s 2(14) of
the Act. The High Court in the case of Vidur Patel (Supra) has
observed
as under:

 

‘…So far as the meaning of “property” is
concerned, it is well settled that it is a term of widest import and, subject
to any limitation which the context may require, it signifies every possible
interest which a person can hold or enjoy. As observed by the Supreme Court
in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments vs. Shri Lakshmirudra Tirtha Swami
of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) SCR 1005
, there is no reason why this word should
not be given a liberal or wide connotation and should not be extended to those
well-recognised types of interests which have the insignia or characteristic of
property right.’

 

The only objection of the Revenue to the
above decision being relied upon was that it was rendered under a different
Act. In this context, the Court relied on another decision in case of Bafna
Charitable Trust vs. CIT 230 ITR 846
. In this case, the Court observed
as under:

 

‘Capital asset has been defined in clause
(14) of section 2 to mean property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or
not connected with his business or profession, except those specifically
excluded. The exclusions are stock-in-trade, consumable stores or raw materials
held for the business or profession, personal effects, agricultural land and
certain bonds. It is clear from the above definition that for the purposes of
this clause property is a word of widest import and signifies every possible
interest which a person can hold or enjoy except those specifically excluded.’

The Bombay High Court noted that the Revenue
had not been able to point out why the above decision of this Court rendered in
the context of capital assets as defined in section 2(14) of the Act was
inapplicable to the present facts; nor, why the loan given to SNISL would not,
in the present facts, be covered by the meaning of ‘capital asset’ as given u/s
2(14) of the Act. In the above view, as the issue raised herein stands
concluded by the decision of this Court in Bafna Charitable Trust (Supra),
and also by the self-evident position as found in section 2(14) of the Act, the
Revenue appeal accordingly stands dismissed.

Refund of tax wrongly paid – Income-tax authorities – Scope of power u/s 119 of ITA, 1961 – Tax paid by mistake – Application for revision u/s 264 not maintainable – Income-tax authorities should act u/s 119

8.      
Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. vs.
Principal CIT; [2019] 416 ITR 166 (Mad.)
Date of order: 12th June, 2019 A.Y.: 2007-08

 

Refund of tax
wrongly paid – Income-tax authorities – Scope of power u/s 119 of ITA, 1961 –
Tax paid by mistake – Application for revision u/s 264 not maintainable –
Income-tax authorities should act u/s 119

The assessee is a
bank. For the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee paid fringe benefits tax in respect of
contribution to an approved pension fund. For the A.Y. 2006-07, the Tribunal
held that fringe benefits tax was not payable on such contribution. Therefore, for
the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee filed an application u/s 264 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 for refund of the tax wrongly paid. The application was rejected on
the ground of delay.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘(i) The Income-tax
Department represents the sovereign power of the State in matters of taxation.
Whether the Department had illegally collected the tax from the citizen or
whether the assessee mistakenly paid the tax to the Department, the consequence
is one and the same. If the assessee had mistakenly paid, it is a case of
illegal retention by the Department.

 

(ii) It is
well-settled principle of administrative law that if the authority otherwise
had the jurisdiction, mere non-quoting or misquoting of provision will not
vitiate the proceedings.

 

(iii)   Section 264 was clearly not applicable in
this case. But section 119 could have been invoked. The authority ought to have
posed only one question to himself, i.e., whether the assessee was liable to
pay the tax in question or not. If he was not liable to pay the tax in
question, the Department had no business to retain it even if it was wrongly
paid.

 

(iv)  In this view of the matter, the order impugned
in this writ petition is quashed and the respondent is directed to pass orders
afresh u/s 119 of the Act within a period of eight weeks from the date of
receipt of this order.’

Refund – Interest on refund – Section 244A of ITA, 1961 – Amount seized from assessee in search proceedings shown as advance tax in return – Return accepted and assessment made – Assessee entitled to interest u/s 244A on such amount

7.      
Agarwal Enterprises vs. Dy.
CIT; [2019] 415 ITR 225 (Bom.)
Date of order: 24th January, 2019 A.Y.: 2015-16

 

Refund – Interest on refund – Section 244A
of ITA, 1961 – Amount seized from assessee in search proceedings shown as
advance tax in return – Return accepted and assessment made – Assessee entitled
to interest u/s 244A on such amount

 

In the course of
the search proceedings u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 conducted in the
office premises of the assessee on 9th October, 2014 cash of Rs. 35
lakhs was seized. The assessee applied for release of the seized cash after
adjusting tax liability due on the amount but the same was not accepted by the
AO. The assessee filed its return of income for the A.Y. 2015-16, declaring
total income of Rs. 39.15 lakhs, which included the cash of Rs. 35 lakhs seized
during the course of the search. The assessee showed the seized cash of Rs. 35
lakhs as advance tax and claimed a refund of Rs. 27.50 lakhs. The AO passed an
assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act including the said cash of Rs. 35 lakhs
in the total income. However, the amount of Rs. 35 lakhs which was shown as
advance tax was not accepted and an independent demand of Rs. 9.18 lakhs was
raised on the assessee u/s 156 of the Act. The demand was paid by the assessee.
Subsequently, on application for refund of seized cash of Rs. 35 lakhs, the AO
refunded Rs. 31.5 lakhs after deducting the outstanding penalty demand of Rs.
3.5 lakhs. However, the AO refused to pay interest on the refunded amount.

 

The assessee filed
a writ petition and challenged the order. The Bombay High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

 

‘(i)   It was an undisputed position that Rs. 35
lakhs was seized when the officers of the Revenue searched the assessee’s
premises. It was also undisputed position that consequent to the seizure of Rs.
35 lakhs, the assessment was done not u/s 153A of the Act, but u/s 143(3) of
the Act in respect of the A.Y. 2015-16.

 

(ii) The assessee in its return of income filed on 22/09/2015 had shown
Rs. 35 lakhs being the seized cash, as advance tax. While passing the
assessment order, the Assessing Officer did not adjust the seized cash as
advance tax paid on behalf of the assessee. This non-adjustment by the
Assessing Officer of the amount being offered as advance tax by the assessee
was unjustified and without reasons. Under the circumstances, the character of
the seized cash underwent a change and became advance tax. This was more
particularly so as for the subject assessment year, it had been accepted as
income. Though the Revenue did not accept the declaration made by the assessee
in its return of advance tax, the fact was that the assessee claimed it to be
tax.

 

(iii) Therefore, on the date the demand notice u/s 156 of the Act was
issued, there was an excess amount with the Revenue which the assessee was
claiming to be tax. Therefore, in terms of the Explanation to section
244A(1)(b) the amount of Rs. 35 lakhs was excess tax (on change of its character
from seized amount to tax paid) and the assessee was entitled to interest on
Rs. 35 lakhs w.e.f. 16/12/2016 on the passing of the assessment order. The
Assessing Officer had to give interest at 6% per annum from 16/12/2016 up to
31/05/2017 on Rs. 35 lakhs (i.e. before the adjustment of penalty of Rs. 3.5
lakhs of Rs. 35 lakhs) and on Rs. 31.50 lakhs from 01/06/2017 to 07/03/2018
when the sum of Rs. 31.5 lakhs was paid to the assessee.’

Industrial undertaking – Deduction u/s 80-IB of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Profit must be derived from industrial undertaking – Assessee manufacturing pig iron – Profit from sale of slag, a by-product in manufacture of pig iron – Profit entitled to deduction u/s 80-IB

6.      
Sesa Industries Ltd. vs. CIT;
[2019] 415 ITR 257 (Bom.)
Date of order: 18th April, 2019 A.Y.: 2004-05

 

Industrial undertaking – Deduction u/s
80-IB of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Profit must be derived from
industrial undertaking – Assessee manufacturing pig iron – Profit from sale of
slag, a by-product in manufacture of pig iron – Profit entitled to deduction
u/s 80-IB

 

For the A.Y.
2004-05, the assessee claimed deduction u/s 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961
for one of its industrial undertakings which was engaged in the manufacture of
pig iron. The AO computed the deduction u/s 80-IB only on the profits arising
from the sale of pig iron, without considering the profits arising on sale of
‘slag’ which, according to the assessee, was a by-product in the manufacture of
pig iron.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that the Commissioner
(Appeals) had taken the correct view holding that profits from sale of slag
generated out of the manufacturing process were a part of the profits derived
from the industrial undertaking engaged in the manufacturing of pig iron, but
allowed the appeal of the Revenue.

 

The Bombay High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘(i)   The conclusion drawn by the Tribunal was
contrary to the finding rendered by it and perverse. The slag generated during
the process of manufacturing activity of pig iron was part of the manufacturing
process and was a by-product of pig iron and an integral part of the
manufacturing activity conducted by the assessee and thus the profits earned
from the sale of such by-product would have to be considered as part of the
profits derived from the business of the industrial undertaking.

 

(ii)   The slag generated during the manufacturing activity
satisfied the test of first degree source and, thus, the assessee was eligible
to seek deduction u/s 80-IB for the profits earned out of the sale of slag, in
addition to the deduction already availed of by the assessee on the profits
earned on sale of pig iron.’

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54EC of ITA, 1961 – Investment in notified bonds within time specified – Part of consideration for sale of shares placed in escrow account and released to assessee after end of litigation two years later – Amount taxable in year of receipt and invested in specified bonds in year of receipt – Investment within time specified and assessee entitled to exemption u/s 54EC

5.      
Principal CIT vs. Mahipinder
Singh Sandhu; [2019] 416 ITR 175 (P&H)
Date of order: 12th March 2019 A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54EC of ITA,
1961 – Investment in notified bonds within time specified – Part of
consideration for sale of shares placed in escrow account and released to
assessee after end of litigation two years later – Amount taxable in year of
receipt and invested in specified bonds in year of receipt – Investment within
time specified and assessee entitled to exemption u/s 54EC

 

On 28th
November, 2007, the assessee sold certain shares and received a part of sale
consideration during the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2010-11. The
assessee made investment in Rural Electrification Corporation bonds on 6th
August, 2010 and claimed exemption u/s 54EC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the
A.Y. 2010-11. The AO held that such income was to be taxed in the A.Y. 2008-09
and that since the assessee had made investment in REC bonds on 6th
August, 2010, i.e., after a period of six months from the date of transfer of
the shares, irrespective of when the whole or part of sale consideration was
actually received, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s 54EC of the
Act.

 

The Tribunal, inter
alia
, held that the amount of Rs. 18 lakhs was deposited in an escrow
account as a security in respect of future liabilities of the company /
transferor, that since there was no certainty of the time of release of the
amount or part of the amount to either of the parties as dispute between the
parties had occurred and the litigation was going on, it could not be said that
the assessee had a vested right to receive the amount in question and that it
was only at the end of the litigation that the rights and liabilities of the
transferor and the transferee were ascertained and thereupon the share of the
assessee was passed on to the assessee for which the assessee had offered
capital gains in the immediate assessment year 2010-11. The Tribunal held that
the assessee was entitled to the benefit of exemption u/s 54EC as the amount
was invested by him in REC bonds in the year of receipt which was also the year
of taxability of the capital gains.

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

‘There was no error in the findings recorded by the Tribunal which
warranted interference. No question of law arose.’

 

Section 43CA applies only when there is transfer of land or building or both – In a previous year, when an assessee engaged in the business of construction of a commercial project entered into agreements to sell flats / offices (which were under construction) and there was no transfer of any land or building or both in favour of buyers, provisions of section 43CA would not apply

1. [2019] 108
taxmann.com 195 (Mum. – Trib.) Shree Laxmi Estate (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO ITA No.:
798/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 5th July, 2019

 

Section 43CA
applies only when there is transfer of land or building or both – In a previous
year, when an assessee engaged in the business of construction of a commercial
project entered into agreements to sell flats / offices (which were under
construction) and there was no transfer of any land or building or both in
favour of buyers, provisions of section 43CA would not apply

 

FACTS

The assessee,
engaged in the construction of a commercial project following the project
completion method of accounting, entered into seven agreements to sell flats /
offices. In each of these cases there was a huge difference between the
consideration as per the agreement entered into by the assessee and the stamp
duty value of the units agreed to be sold. Further, there were a further seven
agreements entered into during the previous year in respect of which the
allotments were made prior to 31st March, 2013. In these seven cases
also there was a huge difference between the agreement value and stamp duty
value.

 

The AO asked
the assessee to explain the difference between the agreement value and the
stamp duty value. In response, the assessee submitted that the two values were
different because (i) the stamp valuation authorities have charged stamp duty
by considering the project to be situated in an area different from the area
where the project is situated; (ii) in respect of seven agreements which were
registered during the year but the allotments were made in the earlier year,
the stamp duty value was greater because the allotments were made in an earlier
year whereas the stamp duty was levied on the basis of value prevailing on the
date of registration; (iii) the sale value of properties is based on various
market conditions, location, etc., whereas the stamp duty valuation is based on
thumb rule without taking into account various market conditions, location,
etc.

 

For these
reasons, the assessee pleaded, the agreement value is the correct value and the
buyers were not willing to make any payment over and above the amount stated in
the agreement. The assessee pleaded that in the alternative the provisions be
made applicable in A.Y. 2015-16 when, following the project completion method,
the assessee has offered profits for taxation. The AO added a sum of Rs.
3,41,41,270 being the difference between stamp duty value and the agreement
value of all the 14 flats to the total income of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO. He
then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that during the year under consideration the assessee had not reported
any sales of units since it was following the project completion method. The
project under consideration was completed and profits offered for taxation in
A.Y. 2015-16 by considering agreement value as sale consideration. The Tribunal
observed that it is not in dispute that the assessee had not sold any land or
building or both in respect of any of the units during the year under appeal.
The assessee had only registered the agreement during the year under appeal
wherein it is clearly stated that the subject mentioned property was still
under construction and that the ultimate flat owners shall allow the assessee
to enter upon the subject premises to complete the construction of the flats as
per the said agreement which was subject matter of registration with the stamp
duty authorities. The Tribunal held that what was registered was the ‘property
under construction’ and not the ‘property’ per se. Therefore, the question
was whether in these facts the provisions of section 43CA could at all be
applied.

 

Observing that the provisions of section 43CA are applicable only when
there is transfer of land or building or both, the Tribunal stated that in the
present case neither of these had happened pursuant to the registration of the
agreement. In respect of the seven allotments made prior to 31st March,
2013, the Tribunal observed that the assessee and the prospective purchaser had
specifically agreed that till such time as the agreement to sell is executed
and registered, no right is created in favour of the purchaser and that
allotment is only a confirmation of booking subject to execution of the
agreement which is to be drafted at a later point of time. The said allotment
letter also specifies that the relevant office has been allotted to the buyer
with the rights reserved to the assessee to amend the building plan as it may
deem fit and that the buyer is bound to accept unconditionally and confirm that
any kind of increase or decrease in the area of the said office or shift in the
position of the said office, due to amendment in plan, etc., and in case of
variation of the area, the value of the office shall be proportionately
adjusted.

 

The Tribunal
held that, during the previous year under consideration, the construction of
the property was not completed and that the registration of the agreement
resulted in a transfer of rights in the office (which is under construction)
and not the property per se. It held that there was no transfer of any
land or building or both by the assessee in favour of the flat buyers pursuant
to registration of the agreement in the year under appeal. The Tribunal held
that the provisions of section 43CA cannot be made applicable during the year
under consideration. The Tribunal supported its conclusion by placing reliance
on the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Yasin Moosa Godil
[(2012) 20 taxmann.com 425 (Ahd. Trib.)]
and Mrs. Rekha Agarwal
vs. ITO [(2017) 79 taxmann.com 290 (Jp. – Trib.)].

 

The Tribunal
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

 

Timeless Words of Bapu

Government

Good government is no substitute for
self-government. Men often become what they believe themselves to be. If I
believe I cannot do something, it makes me incapable of doing it. But when I
believe I can, then I acquire the ability to do it even if I didn’t have it in
the beginning. Corruption and hypocrisy ought not to be inevitable products of
democracy, as they undoubtedly are today.

 

Finding yourself

The best way to find yourself is to lose
yourself in the service of others.

 

Action

It’s the action, not the fruit of the
action, that’s important. You have to do the right thing. It may not be in your
power, may not be in your time, that there’ll be any fruit. But that doesn’t
mean you stop doing the right thing. You may never know what results come from
your action. But if you do nothing, there will be no result.

 

Democracy

Democracy demands patient instruction on it
before legislation.

 

My notion of democracy is that under it the
weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest.

 

People in a democracy should be satisfied
with drawing the government’s attention to a mistake, if any.

 

In true democracy every man and woman is
taught to think for himself or herself.

 

Happiness

Happiness is when what you think, what you
say, and what you do are in harmony.

 

Change

You must be the change you wish to see in
the world.

 

Non-violence

Non-violence is the greatest force at the
disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction
devised by the ingenuity of man.

 

Whenever you are confronted with an
opponent, conquer him with love…Non-violence is a weapon of the strong…Strength
does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.

 

Schools

All our national schools ought to be
converted into factories of our national ammunition, namely, constructive work.

 

The Lawyer

I had learnt the true practice of law. I had
learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men’s hearts. I
realized the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder.

Renunciation

Again, let no one consider renunciation to
mean want of fruit for the renouncer. The Gita reading does not warrant such a
meaning. Renunciation means absence of hankering after fruit. As a matter of
fact, he who renounces reaps a thousandfold. The renunciation of the Gita is
the acid test of faith. He who is ever brooding over result often loses nerve
in the performance of his duty.

 

Swaraj

Swaraj of a
people means the sum total of the Swaraj (self-rule) of individuals.

It is Swaraj when we learn to rule
ourselves.

Conservation of national sanitation is Swaraj
work and it may not be postponed for a single day on any consideration
whatsoever.

The get rid of the infatuation for English
is one of the essentials of Swaraj.

 

Swadeshi

I must not serve a distant neighbour at the
expense of the nearest.

India must protect her primary industries
even as a mother protects her children against the whole world without being
hostile to it.

 

Success

A burning passion coupled with absolute
detachment is the key to all success.

First they ignore you, then they laugh at
you, then they fight you, then you win.

 

Triumph

Man’s triumph will consist in substituting
the struggle for existence by a struggle for mutual service.

 

State

The state is the sum total of the sacrifice,
on its behalf, of its members.

 

One of the last Notes left by Gandhiji in
1948

I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are
in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the following test.
Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man [woman] whom you may have
seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use
to him [her]. Will he [she] gain anything by it? Will it restore him [her] to a
control over his [her] own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to swaraj
[freedom] for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? Then you will find
your doubts and your self melt away.

 

Journalism & Role of Newspaper

The newspaperman has become a walking
plague. He spreads the contagion of lies and calumnies.

 

One of the objects of a newspaper is to
understand popular feeling and to give expression to it; another is to arouse
among the people certain desirable sentiments; and the third is fearlessly to
expose popular defects.

 

Justice

Justice should become cheap and expeditious.
Today it is the luxury of the rich and the joy of the gambler.

 

Truth

Truth and untruth often co-exist; good and
evil often are found together.

 

Devotion to Truth is the sole justification
for our existence.

 

When you want to find Truth as God, the only
inevitable means is love, that is non-violence.

 

Ahimsa and
Truth are so intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle and
separate them.

IlI -Advised SEBI Move to Separate Chairman-CEO’s Post in Companies

Background

A recent amendment to the SEBI LODR
Regulations 2015 requires that Chairperson of a listed company shall not
be an executive director or related to the Managing Director/CEO. This applies
to top 500 listed companies in terms of market capitalisation. Such companies
will have to ensure the change is made not later than 31st March
2020.

 

This change looks good on paper as in
principle, it is wrong to concentrate power in one person / family in large
quoted companies in India. However, I submit that this particular requirement
does not make sense in Indian context as many large companies are family
controlled. It will disrupt board structure of such companies and is actually
counter productive. It could also harm the company’s business and public image.

 

While the genesis of this can be traced back
to norms of corporate governance in the West, the immediate trigger for this
amendment is a recommendation of the Kotak Committee’s report on corporate
governance released in October 2017. The Companies Act, 2013, has certain
provisions governing this, but they are not as restrictive and absolute as
these new provisions under the SEBI Regulations. Let us thus review the
provisions under Companies Act, 2013, what the Kotak Committee has recommended
and finally what are the new provisions and their implications.

 

Provisions regarding split of post of
Chairman/CEO under the Companies Act, 2013

Section 203 of the Act, which applies to
certain specified companies, provides certain restrictions on appointing a
Chairperson who is also the MD/CEO. The proviso to this section, which contains
this provision, reads as under:

 

“Provided that an individual shall not be
appointed or reappointed as the chairperson of the company, in pursuance of the
articles of the company, as well as the managing director or Chief Executive
Officer of the company at the same time after the date of commencement of this
Act unless,—
?

 

(a) the articles of such a company
provide otherwise; or
?

 

(b) the company does not carry multiple
businesses:
?

 

Provided further that nothing contained
in the first proviso shall apply to such class of companies engaged in multiple
businesses and which has appointed one or more Chief Executive Officers for
each such business as may be notified by the Central Government.”

 

However, as can be seen, this restriction is
not absolute. A company, can, for example, provide a relaxation in its articles
permitting such a dual post.

 

Kotak Committee on corporate governance

The Kotak Committee has recommended several
changes in the provisions relating to corporate governance.

 

The Committee gives elaborate reasons why
the post of Chairman and CEO should be segregated. Referring to a global trend
on this, the report talks of the advantages of this in the following words:

 

“The separation of powers of the
chairperson (i.e. the leader of the board) and CEO/MD (i.e. the leader of the
management) is seen to provide a better and more balanced governance structure
by enabling better and more effective supervision of the management, by virtue
of:

 

a) 
providing a structural advantage for the board to act independently;

 

b) 
reducing excessive concentration of authority in a single individual;

 

c) 
clarifying the respective roles of the chairperson and the CEO/MD;

 

d) 
ensuring that board tasks are not neglected by a combined
chairperson-CEO/MD due to lack of time;


e) 
increasing the possibility that the chairperson and CEO/MD posts will be
assumed by individuals possessing the skills and experience appropriate for
those positions;

 

f) 
creating a board environment that is more egalitarian and conducive to
debate. “

 

The Report of the Cadbury Committee is also
quoted where it was stated, “…given the importance and the particular nature
of the chairmen’s role, it should in principle be separate from that of the
chief executive. If the two roles are combined in one person, it represents a
considerable concentration of power”
.

 

However, no comparative study has been made
in the Indian context. It is presumed that what is good for the West, is best
for the rest!

 

The Report, however, provides for a phased
out implementation of this recommendation.

 

Amendments to the SEBI LODR Regulations
2015

SEBI has, after due consideration, amended
the Regulations by inserting clause (1B) to Regulation 17. This new clause
reads as under:

 

“(1B) With effect from April 1, 2020, the
top 500 listed entities shall ensure that the Chairperson of the board of such
listed entity shall—

 

(a)   be a non-executive director;

 

(b)   not be related to the Managing Director or
the Chief Executive Officer as per the definition of the term
“relative” defined under the Companies Act, 2013:

 

Provided that this sub-regulation shall not be applicable to the listed
entities which do not have any identifiable promoters as per the
shareholding pattern filed with stock exchanges.

 

Explanation.—The top 500 entities shall
be determined on the basis of market capitalisation, as at the end of the
immediate previous financial year.”

 

As can be seen, the new provision goes
beyond the recommendation of the Kotak Committee and it is now an absolute
requirement that this post should be segregated, and the chairperson should not
be related to the Managing Director/CEO.

 

Implications of new provision

The Chairman should not be an executive director,
nor should he be related to the Managing Director or CEO. Effectively, this
means that the Chairperson and the MD/CEO will not be from the same family.
Thus, for example, it would not be possible, for the father to be the Chairman
and the son to be the Managing Director. This will have implications for Indian
companies which are basically family controlled and / or family managed.

 

Do these new provisions make sense for
India?

The significant feature of companies in the
West is that the shareholding is widely held and the CEO is a professional
manager. Persons in control including the Board members normally have
insignificant holding even if their holdings are taken together. A widely held
shareholding could make it difficult for shareholders to get together and
exercise close control over the management. Thus, it matters how the Board of
Directors is structured. In such a situation for the more the checks and
balances, the better it is, for corporate functioning. Having the same person
as chairperson and CEO does result in concentration of power considering that,
as chairperson – CEO controls operations and influences. The issue is: Does
this provision have any relevance in Indian conditions? The answer, it is
submitted, is in the negative as most of large listed companies in India are
controlled by `promoter family’. The family normally has significant holding
and hence full operational control. The public shareholders know it and even
prefer it. Usually, it is the head of the promoter group (typically, the family
patriarch) who is the chairperson and thus the face of the group. For example,
the Bajaj group has Mr. Rahul Bajaj as the chairperson and Reliance group has
Mr. Mukesh Ambani. However, in India, the chairperson is also the CEO. This
really helps in giving a realistic picture of who is / or are the persons in
control of the company. Again, if the company is a first generation promoter
company, the chairperson and managing director is often the Founder – thus
segregating the posts of chairperson and managing director does not make sense
in India. Further the restriction that the relative of the managing director
cannot be chairperson is not relevant in view of fact that the Promoter Group
exerts control over the company. Moreover the family members of the Promoter
Group usually make up a significant part of the Board. The financial
institutions at times prefer this as they seek personal guarantees of the
promoters.

 

Hence, the principle that there should not
be concentration of power in the promoter family goes against the culture,
tradition and reality in India of how companies are founded and have been
governed over generations, for example, Birlas, Goenkas and many others. What
is needed in India is ensuring checks and balances over unbridled control by
the promoter group.

 

Strangely, though, the new requirement does
not apply to companies who do not have identifiable promoters. I feel in
companies which have no identifiable promoter the management should stand split
between the chairperson and the CEO. Further the provision should be in
consonance with section 203 of the Companies Act. It would be relevant to have
a chairperson who is not a relative of the CEO or the executive directors who
are actively managing the company.

 

Does the
Chairman really have any substantial powers under law in India?

Thus the real question then is whether the
chairperson who is not a relative will have any real power in the corporate
setup in India. The answer, I submit, is in the negative. Further the Companies
Act, 2013, and the SEBI Regulations that govern 500 top companies do not give
any real power to the chairperson. Normally a chairperson cannot and does not
take any significant/substantive decision.

 

The chairperson has limited administrative
powers of, say, chairing and conducting meetings, signing minutes book, etc.
Address the shareholders’ meeting. Even in family companies if the chairperson
is a patriarch he is a guide and has a balancing influence. Even the casting
vote, whereby he can break a deadlock, is rarely used.

 

In contrast, in public perception, the
chairperson is the corporate brand ambassador of the company. It makes sense if
the chairperson is from the founder/and or lead promoter group who actually
run, control and manage the operations. Insisting that the chairperson should
neither be the CEO, nor related to him, will result in making a chairperson who
has no real say in the company.

 

This would not make any difference in
corporate governance. Hence, the Kotak Committee rightly stops at recommending
that the post of CEO and chairperson should be split.

 

Conclusion

It is surprising that the corporate circle
has not reacted. However, it will not be surprising that these provisions will be
complied merely in letter, (box ticking), without any substantive benefit.
  

Registration of Wills

Introduction

One of the
modes of succession is through a will, also known as testamentary
succession
. A will is a document which contains the last wishes of a
person as regards the manner and mode of disposition of his property. The
making of wills in India is governed by the provisions of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925
(“the Act”). While intestate succession is
different for different religions, the law governing the making of wills is the
same for people of all religions except Muslims. The Act does not apply to
wills made by Muslims as they are governed by their respective Shariat Laws.
Succession, whether through wills or otherwise, always has some interesting
issues, one such being whether a will should be registered and if yes, does it
have any special advantages?

 

Meaning

As the
term `will’ indicates, it signifies a wish, desire, choice, etc., of a person.
A person expresses his will as regards the disposition of his property. The Act
defines a will to mean “the legal declaration of the intention of the
testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect
after his death”. The General Clauses Act, 1897, defines the term will to
include “a codicil and every writing making a voluntary posthumous disposition
of property”. The Indian Penal Code defines a will to denote any testamentary
document.

 

One of the
important facets of a will is that the intention manifests only after the
testator’s (person making the will) death, i.e., it is a posthumous disposition
of his property. Till the testator is alive, the will has no force. He can
dispose of all his properties in a manner contrary to that stated in the will
and such action would be totally valid. E.g., A makes a will bequeathing all
his properties to his brother. However, during his lifetime itself, he
transfers all his properties to his son with the effect that at the time of his
death he is left with no assets. Such action of the testator cannot be
challenged by his brother on the ground that he was bound to follow the will
since the will would take effect only after the death of the testator. In this
case as the property bequeathed would not be in existence, the bequest would
fail.

 

Disputes

Making a
will does not mean a blanket insurance against succession disputes. A will may
be challenged on various counts. Some of the common grounds on which a will is
challenged include:

 

(a)   The will does not comply with
the rules laid down under the Indian Succession Act in respect of a valid will.

 

(b)   The will is not genuine,
i.e., it has been obtained by fraud, forgery, undue influence, coercion, under
duress, etc.

 

From time
immemorial, wills have been and will continue to be a source of family
disputes. This is true not just in India but also in the west, e.g., USA,
England, etc. It is often said that “where there is a will, there is a
legal dispute” or that “where there is a will, there is a disgruntled relative
”.
In order that these legal disputes are minimised and the claims by disgruntled
relatives set aside, it is necessary that the will is a valid will and one
which can stand scrutiny in a court of law. One such precaution which is often
suggested to reduce disputes is to register the will.

 

Registration of a will

The
testator of a will or the executor, after him, may register the will with the
Registrar of Sub-Assurances under the Registration Act, 1908. However, it is
not compulsory to register a will. Even if a will bequeaths immovable property,
registration is not compulsory. In fact, section 17(1) of the Registration Act
which prescribes those instruments which require compulsory registration,
expressly states that only non-testamentary instruments are required to be
mandatorily registered.

 

Procedure

The procedure
for registering a will is as follows:

 

(a)   The will is to be registered with the
appropriate Registrar of Sub-Assurances. 

 

(b)   In case a person other than the testator
presents a will for registration, then such other person must satisfy the Registrar
that the will was executed by the testator who has since expired, and that the
person registering the will is authorised to do so.

 

(c)   The other procedures which are applicable for
the registration of any document would equally apply to a will also. For
instance, after the amendment in the Registration Act inserted in 2001, every
document which is to be registered requires the person presenting the document
to affix his passport size photograph and also his finger-print. It may be
noted that as is the case with any will, no stamp duty is payable even if it is
registered. There is no difference on this count.

 

(d)   Persons who are exempted from personally
appearing before the Registrar, include:

 

(i)    A person who is unable to come without risk
or serious inconvenience due to bodily infirmity;

 

(ii)    A person in jail under civil or criminal
process;

 

(iii)   Persons who are entitled to exemption under
law from personal attendance in Court. 

     

In such
cases, the Registrar shall either himself go to the house of such person or the
jail where the person is confined and examine him or issue a commission for his
examination.

 

A testator may also deposit
his will for safekeeping with the Registrar by depositing it in a sealed
envelope which contains the name of the testator and a statement about the
nature of the document. Once the registrar receives the cover he would enter the
name of the testator in his register book along with the date of presentation
and the receipt. Thereafter, he is required to place the envelope in his
fireproof safe. Such a deposited will can be withdrawn by the testator or by
his duly authorised agent. On his death, an application can be made to the
registrar to open the cover and cause the contents of the will to be copied
into his register book.



Mulla
in his commentary on the Indian Registration Act, 10th
Edition, Butterworths
, states that the applicant need not be a claimant
or executor under the will and may be anyone who is prepared to pay the
requisite copying and other fees. Hence, the will would become a public
document open to inspection. This is one disadvantage of registering a will.

 

Another
option one may consider to registration is notarising the will since even this
could help prove that the will is not forged.

 

Benefits of registration

Registration
of a will by the testator prior to his demise raises a strong presumption in
favour of the genuineness of the will but the same cannot be said of a will
which is registered after his death, or without his knowledge– Guru Dutt
Singh vs. Durga Devi, AIR 1966 J&K 75.
  Registration of a will helps in establishing
the date of execution or signing beyond a doubt. Also, registration establishes
the genuineness of identity of the testator and the witnesses. However, the
Delhi High Court in Thakur Dass Virmani vs. Raj Minocha AIR 2000 Del 234
has held that where the will was registered and the signatures of the testator
were similar to her regular signatures, due execution of the will may be
presumed. 

 

In Rabindra
Nath Mukherjee vs. Panchanan Banerjee by LRs(1954) 4 SCC 459
it has
been held that in a case where a will is registered and the Sub-Registrar
certifies that the same had been read over to the executor who, on doing so,
admitted the contents, the fact that the witnesses to the documents are
interested lost significance. The documents at hand were registered and it was on
record that the Sub-Registrar had explained the contents to the testator.
Hence, the Supreme Court did not find this as suspicious on the facts of the
case.

 

What registration does not prove

A will
need not be compulsorily registered; the fact that a will is not registered is
not a circumstance against the genuineness – Basaut vs. Brij Raj, A.I.R.
1935 (PC) 132.

 

Merely
because a will has not been registered by the testator, an adverse inference
cannot be drawn that the will is not genuine – Ishwardeo Narain Singh vs.
Kamata Devi AIR 1954 SC
280. In this case, the Supreme Court held that
there was nothing in law which required the registration of a will and wills
are in a majority of cases were not registered at all. To draw any inference
against the genuineness of the will merely on the ground of its
non-registration appeared to be wholly unwarranted.

 

Again in Rani
Purnima Devi vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 195
,
the Apex Court held as follows while examining the genuineness of a registered
will:

 

“There is no doubt that if a will has been registered, that is a
circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove its
genuineness. But the mere fact
that a will is registered will not by
itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion
exists
, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close
examination. If the evidence as to registration on a close examination reveals
that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the
testator that the document of which he was admitting execution was a will
disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its execution and signed
it in token thereof, the registration will dispel the doubt as to the
genuineness of the will. But if the evidence as to registration shows that
it was done in a perfunctory manner
, that the officer registering the will
did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was
admitting the execution of a will or did not satisfy himself in some other way
(as, for example, by seeing the testator reading the will) that the testator
knew that it was a will the execution of which he was admitting, the fact that
the will was registered would not be of much value. It is not unknown that
registration may take place without the executant really knowing what he was
registering
. Law reports are full of cases in which registered wills have
not been acted upon (see’ for example, Vellasaway Sarvai v. L. Sivaraman
Servai, (1) Surendra Nath Lahiri v. Jnanendra Nath Lahiri ( 2 )and Girji Datt
Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh)(3). Therefore, the mere fact of registration
may not by itself be enough to dispel all suspicion that may attach to the
execution and attestation of a will; though the fact
that there has been
registration would be an important circumstance in favour of the will being
genuine
if the evidence as to registration establishes that the testator
admitted the execution of the will after knowing that it was a will the
execution of which he was admitting.”

 

Registration
of a will would go a step in proving whether or not the will is the last will
of the deceased since the date of the execution of the will would get
established beyond a doubt. 

 

A will,
which requires probate, is of no effect unless probated. The mere fact of its
registration makes no difference. Thus, a Court when called upon to probate a
will would look into the fact of its registration only as one of the several
circumstances when deciding whether to grant probate or not. 

 

The registration of will is not the proof of the testamentary capacity
of the testator, as the Sub-Registrar is not required to make an enquiry about
the capacity of the testator.

 

Can a registered will be superseded by an
unregistered will?

The
question whether a registered Will can be superseded by an unregistered will
had also been a matter of consideration before the court of law, wherein the
Delhi High Court has held that there is no law that a registered will cannot be
superseded by an unregistered will. A will does not operate in praesenti.
Its operation is contingent upon the death of the testator. Till alive, the
testator can always revoke the will because a will is an instrument of trust by
a living person addressed in rem to be operative after his death. A will, be it
registered or be it unregistered can be revoked by defacing the will,
destroying the will or otherwise superseding the same. – Sunil Anand vs.
Rajiv Anand, 2008(103) DRJ 165
.The following passage from the judgment
is relevant:

 

“….the
will Ex.PW-1 is a registered will. Secondly, there is no law that a
registered will
cannot be superseded by an unregistered will.
A will does not operate in praesenti. Its operation is contingent upon
the death of the executor. A will creates no right, title or interest when it
is executed. The right is created under a will on the death of the testator.
Till alive, the testator can always revoke the will because a will is an
instrument of trust by a living person addressed in rem to be operative after
his death. A will, be it registered or be it unregistered can be revoked
by
defacing the will, destroying the will or otherwise superseding
the same
.”

 

Again, in Amara
Venkata Subbaiah and Sons and ors. vs. Shaik Hussain Bi, 2008(5)ALD547
,
the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the law was well settled that even
an unregistered codicil in relation to a registered will, would have to be read
as amending the will. Thus, this also supports the view that a registered will
can be superseded by an unregistered will.

Conclusion

While
registration of a will may not be a panacea for the ills of probate disputes,
it certainly is a strong anti-biotic as compared to an unregistered will! It
helps dispel the element of doubt associated with a will.
 

 

Ind AS vs. ICDS Differences

The author Dolphy D’Souza has
provided a detail list of differences between Ind AS and ICDS.  ICDS are closer to Indian GAAP than Ind
AS.  The differences between ICDS and Ind
AS have further exacerbated due to introduction of new standards, such as, Ind
AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers. 
These differences will further increase over time. Consequently, an Ind
AS company will be required to track these differences to enable tax
computation.  If the differences are
numerous, it is best that the tracking is done in the system rather than
outside the system such as on excel spread-sheets.

 

Point of Difference

Ind AS

ICDS

Ind AS 1 vs. ICDS I

Changes in accounting policies –
accounting of the impact

Change in accounting policy allowed only
when required by an Ind AS or results in more reliable and relevant
information. Requires retrospective application of changes in accounting
policies.

Change in accounting policy allowed only
when there is reasonable cause. ICDS does not provide any guidance on how to
account for the impact. Impact of change generally debited or credited to
current P&L.

Correction of prior period errors

Requires correction to be made for the
retrospective period.

Correction is made for the relevant
period, and previously filed ITR’s are revised.

Change in Mark to markup losses / gain

MTM loss/gain on derivative is
recognised in P&L unless designated as hedge.

Losses shall not be recognised unless
recognition is in accordance with provision of other ICDS. Instances of
losses permitted under ICDS are;

 

 

??Inventory valuation loss

 

 

???Loss on construction contract on POCM basis

 

 

??MTM forex loss on monetary item (include forward and option
for hedging)

 

 

??Provision for liability on reasonable certainty basis

 

 

Losses which may not be allowed as
deduction are as given below;

 

 

??Foreseeable loss on construction contract

 

 

??MTM on derivative (for example, commodity contracts) other
than forward and option for hedging covered by ICDS VI

 

 

CBDT FAQ dt 23rd March, 2017
clarified that same principle will apply to MTM gain as well.

Ind AS 2 vs.
ICDS II

Change in cost formula

Considered as change in an accounting
policy

Cannot be changed without reasonable
cause.

Inclusion of statutory levies in value
of inventory

Inventory to be valued net of creditable
statutory levies (like GST)

Inventory to be valued inclusive of
creditable statutory levies (like GST). 
However, this is just a matter of semantics, and the net profit as per
ICDS and Ind AS on this account will not be different.

Ind AS 115
vs. ICDS III and ICDS IV

Scope

Ind AS 115 deals with revenue arising
from contract with customers

ICDS III (Construction Contracts) and
ICDS IV (Revenue) are similar to erstwhile Indian GAAP AS 7 and AS 9.

Revenue recognition principle

Revenue is recognised based on five step
model on transfer of control to customer

For goods, revenue is recognised on
transfer of risk and rewards. For services, revenue is recognised to the
extent of stage of completion of contract

Identification of performance obligation

Detail requirements apply for
identifying and recognising revenue on multiple-element contracts

Do not require or prohibit
identification of performance obligation.

Allocation of transaction price

Allocated to performance obligation
identified based on relative standalone selling price.

Not covered in ICDS

Variable consideration

Methodology for estimating and
recognising variable consideration is set out in detail in the standard.

Currently, entities may defer measurement
of variable consideration until uncertainty is removed. For e.g. claims in
construction contracts are recognised on final certainty.

Sales return

Revenue is recognised after deducting
estimated return. Sales returns result in variable consideration.

No guidance is provided in ICDS

Significant financing

Revenue is adjusted for significant
financing and presented separately as finance cost/income

Revenue is not adjusted for time value
of money

Non-cash consideration

Measured at fair value

No guidance provided

Onerous contract

Expected losses are recognised as an
expense immediately.

Losses incurred on a contract will be
allowed only in proportion to the stage of completion

Real estate revenue

If the entity has a right to receive
payment for work completed to date, POCM is applied. Else completed contract
method needs to be followed.

Exposure draft issued. Requires POCM.

Early stage contract

Revenue recognised to the extent of cost
if there is no reasonable certainty.

Reasonable certainty threshold of 25% is
specified.

 

Revenue is recognised to the extent of
costs incurred when up to 25% of the work is completed otherwise
proportionate method will apply.

Service contract

Revenue is recognised on transfer of
control.

POCM applied. Straight-line method, if
service contract involves indeterminate number of acts over specific period
of time.

 

Completed contract, if duration < 90
days

Retention money

Retention monies are a deduction from
the revenue bill, which is paid by the customer on satisfactory completion of
contract or warranty period. The retention monies are treated as normal
revenue.

Same as Ind AS. Retention is part of
overall contract revenue and is recognised subject to reasonable certainty of
its ultimate collection.

Ind AS 16 vs. ICDS V

Major spare parts

Recognised as Inventory if do not meet
Ind AS 16 criteria. As per Ind AS 16 property plant and equipment are items
that;

??Are held for use in production or supply of good, and


??
Are expected to be used during more than
one period.

Machinery spares which can be used only
in connection with a Tangible fixed asset and where use is irregular, have to
be capitalised.

 

E.g., Spares which can be used with
multiple machine will be considered as inventory under ICDS whereas these
will be capitalised and depreciated in Ind AS.

Major inspections

They are capitalised. Remaining amount
from previous inspection is derecognised.

No guidance.

Ind AS 21 vs. ICDS VI

Foreign currency

Functional currency is currency of
primary economic environment in which company operated. Foreign currency is
currency other than functional currency.

Reporting currency is INR except for
foreign operation. Foreign currency is currency other than reporting
currency.

Scope exception

Foreign exchange gain/loss regarded as
adjustment to interest cost is scoped out.

The adjustment is considered as
borrowing cost under
Ind AS.

No such scope exclusion.

Capitalisation of exchange differences
on long term foreign currency monetary item for acquisition of fixed assets

Exchange difference is debited/credited
to P&L

? On imported assets S43A allows capitalisation

 

??With respect to local assets all MTM exchange differences are
included in taxable income

Forward exchange contracts on balance
sheet items, such as forward contract for debtor or creditor

Derivatives are measured at fair value
through P&L, if hedge accounting is not applied.

Any premium or discount shall be amortised
as expense or income over the life of the contract. Exchange difference on
such a contract shall be recognised as expense/income in the period in which
the exchange rate changes.

Forward exchange contract to hedge
foreign exchange risk of firm commitment or highly probable forecast
transaction

Derivatives are measured at fair value
through P&L, if hedge accounting is not applied.

Section 43AA introduced by Finance Act
2018 requires exchange differences on forward exchange contracts to be
recognised as per ICDS. Premium, discount or exchange difference, shall be
recognised at the time of settlement as per ICDS VI.

Foreign exchange contract for trading or
speculative purposes

Derivatives are measured at fair value
through P&L

Section 43AA introduced by Finance Act
2018 requires exchange differences on forward exchange contracts to be
recognised as per ICDS. Premium, discount or exchange difference, shall be
recognised at the time of settlement as per ICDS VI.

Foreign currency translation reserve
(FCTR)

Accumulated in reserves. Recognised in
P&L on disposal, deemed disposal or closure of branch.

FCTR taxed similar to FX
assets/liabilities; ie, monetary items are restated at closing exchange rates
but non-monetary items are stated at historical rates. FCTR balance (excludes
impact on non-monetary items) as on 1 April, 2016 shall be recognised in the
previous year relevant to assessment year 2017-18 to the extent not
recognised in the income computation in the past.

Ind AS 20
vs. ICDS VII

Government Grant – recognition

Not recognised unless there is a
reasonable assurance that the entity shall comply with the conditions
attached to them and the grants will be received.

 

Mere receipt of grant is not criteria of
recognition.

Similar to Ind AS, except recognition is
not postponed beyond the date of actual receipt.

Ind AS 20
vs. ICDS VII

Export Incentive

When it is reasonably certain that all conditions
will be fulfilled and the collection is probable.

In the year in which reasonable
certainty of its realisation is achieved.

Grant in the nature of promoters
contribution

No such concept.

No such concept.

Sales tax deferral benefit

Grant benefit imputed based on time
value of money. Benefit capitalised, if related to acquisition of asset. Else
credited to P&L.

No benefit imputed

Ind AS 109 /
ICDS VIII

Securities (quoted) – held for trading

Mark to market gain/loss recognised in
the P&L

Lower or cost or NRV to be carried out
category-wise.

 

Securities held by banks and Public
Financial Institutions to be valued as per extant RBI Guidelines.

Ind AS 23
vs. ICDS IX

Qualifying asset

Assets which takes substantial period of
time to get ready for its intended use.

No condition w.r.t substantial period of
time except inventory ( 12 months).

Capitalisation of general borrowing cost

Weighted average cost of borrowing is
applied on funds that are borrowed generally and used for obtaining a
qualifying assets.

Allocation is based on average cost of
qualifying asset to average total assets.

Borrowings – Income on temporary
investments

Reduced from the borrowing costs
eligible for capitalisation

Not to be reduced from the borrowing
costs eligible for capitalisation.

Commencement of capitalisation

Capitalisation of borrowing cost
commences, when the construction activity commences.

In case of specific borrowings, from the
date on which funds were borrowed. In case of general borrowings, from the
date on which funds were utilised.

Suspension of capitalisation

Capitalisation of borrowing cost
suspended during extended period in which active development is interrupted.

No guidance.

Ind AS 37
vs. ICDS X

Recognition of contingent assets
/reimbursement

Virtual certainty is required for
recognition.

Reasonable certainty is required for
recognition. Test of ‘reasonable certainty’ is not in accordance with section
4/5 of Income-tax Act. Hypothetical income not creating enforceable right
can’t be taxed.

Discounting of long term provision

Required

Not allowed.  

 

 

Decoding The Consequences of POEM in India

The Finance Act, 2016 substituted section
6(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act), w.e.f. 1st April 2017.
The “Place of Effective Management” (POEM) was introduced as one of the tests
for determination of the residential status of a company. Various stakeholders
raised concerns that a foreign company which is treated as a “POEM resident” in
India may not be able to comply with the provisions of the Act applicable to a
resident as the determination of POEM transpires during the assessment
proceedings that are usually years after the relevant tax year for which the
foreign company is treated as “POEM resident” in India. To mitigate such
concerns, the Finance Act, 2016 introduced section 115JH which gave the Central
Government power to notify exceptions, modifications and adaptations.
Therefore, laws and regulations applicable to an Indian company for computing the
tax liability would apply to a foreign company, which is a “POEM resident” in
India subject to such exceptions, modifications and adaptations notified by the
Central Government. On 15th June 2017, the CBDT issued a draft
notification for implementing the provisions of the section 115JH of the Act.
The Central Government has now published the final notification u/s. 115JH of
the Act on 22nd June 2018, specifying the consequences in respect of
a foreign company treated as “POEM resident” in India for the first time. This
write-up dissects and decodes the transitory consequences for a foreign
company.

 

1. 
Backdrop:

Prior to the
introduction of Place of Effective Management (POEM), a company was considered
as a resident of India only if its control and management were “wholly
situated in India”. An absolute threshold meant that companies could avoid
being classified as a resident by merely holding one key board meeting outside
India.

 

Therefore, to
protect India’s tax base and to align provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(‘the Act’) with the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs) entered into
by India with other countries1, India introduced the concept of POEM2
vide amendment3 to section 6(3)(ii) of the Act:

 

“Section
6(3):
For the purpose of the Act, a company is said to be a resident
in India in any previous year, if—

 

(i)  it is an Indian company; or

 

(ii)  its place of effective management, in that
year, is in India.

 

Explanation.—For
the purposes of this clause “place of effective management” means a
place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the
conduct of business of an entity as a whole are, in substance made.”

 

However, the use of
POEM as a test for residency was made applicable from assessment year 2017-18 onwards4.

 

As noted in the
Explanation to section 6(3), POEM is defined as the place where the “key
management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of
business of an entity as a whole are, in substance made.”

Therefore, the
definition of POEM has four limbs:-

___________________________________________________________

1   However, as per the 2017 update to the
OECD Model Tax Convention, the OECD has moved away from “POEM” to a
case-by-case resolution using Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) for determining
conflicts of dual residency.

2   According to the Explanatory Notes to the
provisions of the Finance Act, 2015. Circular No.- 19 /2015 dated 27th
November 2015. F. No. 142/14/2015-TPL.

3.  Refer section 4 of Finance Act 2015.

4.    Refer section 4 of
Finance Act 2016.

 

i.    Key Managerial and Commercial decisions

ii.    Necessary for the Conduct of Business

iii.   Of an entity as a whole

iv.   In substance made.

 

Since the
introduction of POEM in India, the CBDT has issued three circulars providing guidelines
with respect to POEM. The three circulars can be broadly classified as follows:

 

Circular No.

Date of Circular

Description

6

24th January 2017

Guidelines on determination of POEM.

8

23rd February 2017

Clarification on the turnover threshold for
applicability of POEM.

25

23rd October 2017

Clarification on applicability of POEM
for regional headquarters and applicability of General Anti-Avoidance Rule
(GAAR) for abuse of this Circular.

 

 

The first circular
(i.e. Circular No. 6) issued by the CBDT introduced following:

 

i.   An objective test –To determine whether a
foreign company has active operations outside India (formally known as “active
business outside India” test)5

 

ii.  Subjective Guidelines – To provide important
factors that may be considered while determining POEM.

 

A company is
considered to have an “active business outside India” when (a) its passive
income (An aggregate of sale and purchase transactions between related parties,
dividend, interest, royalty and capital gains) is less than 50 per cent of its
total income, and (b) the number of employees in India, value of assets in
India and payroll expenses relating to Indian employees is less than 50 per
cent of the company’s total employees, assets and payroll expenses,
respectively. The determination of these factors is based on an average of the
data pertaining to the relevant financial year and two previous years.

______________________________________________________

5   The “active business outside India” test and
‘passive income’ clause are akin to provisions or objectives of a Controlled
Foreign Corporation (CFC) Rule. It is pertinent to note that no country in the
world has such conditions for determination of POEM that tries to achieve dual
purposes.

 

A company having an
active business outside India is presumed to be non-resident as long as
majority of its board meetings are held outside India.

 

For companies that
fail the active business outside India test, the determination of residence
would involve identification of (a) persons who are responsible for management
decisions, and (b) place where decisions are actually made.

 

If a foreign
company gets hit by the POEM provisions, it becomes a resident and all
provisions of a resident company would apply to it. However, various
stakeholders raised concerns that a foreign company which is treated as a “POEM
resident” in India may not be able to comply with the provisions of the Act
applicable to a resident as the determination of POEM transpires during the
assessment proceedings that are usually years after the relevant tax year for
which the foreign company is treated as “POEM resident” in India. To mitigate
such concerns, the Finance Act, 2016, amongst other things, introduced special
provisions in respect of a foreign company said to be “POEM resident”6  in India by way of insertion of a new Chapter
XII-BC consisting of section 115JH in the Act with effect from 1st
April 2017. Section 115JH of the Act, inter alia, provides that the
Central Government may notify exception, modification and adaptation subject to
which, provisions of the Act relating to computation of total income, treatment
of unabsorbed depreciation, set off or carry forward and set off of losses,
etc., shall apply.

 

On 15th
June 2017, the CBDT issued a draft Notification for implementing provisions of
the section 115JH of the Act. The draft Notification invited comments from
stakeholders and the public. The Central Government, vide Notification dated 22nd
June 2018, released the final Notification7 under section 115JH(1)
of the Act. The final guidelines take forward the concept laid down in the
draft guidelines. It further provides clarification on other areas which were
not mentioned in the draft guidelines such as deemed computation of Written
Down Value (WDV) when WDV is not available in tax records, allowing carry
forward of unabsorbed depreciation on a proportionate basis when the accounting
year followed by the foreign company is different, explicitly defining “foreign
jurisdiction” etc. The consequences of a foreign company attracting POEM
provisions for the first time have been summarised below.

___________________________________________________–

6   “POEM resident” is a term coined by the
authors for companies that become “resident” as per the Income Tax Act, 1961
due to the attraction of the “POEM” provisions.

7     Notification No. S.O. 3039(E) dated 22nd
June 2018. The Notification is applicable from 1st April 2017.

 

2.  Key
takeaways from the Final Notification

The key takeaways
of the Notification are summarised below and a hypothetical case study of Ace
Ltd., is used to elucidate the takeaways in a more comprehensive manner.

 

2.1 Determination of WDV, brought forward
losses and unabsorbed depreciation for the relevant year

 

When the
foreign company is assessed to tax in the foreign jurisdiction

a)  The WDV of the depreciable asset shall be
determined as per the company’s tax records in the foreign jurisdiction.

 

b)  When WDV of the depreciable asset is not
available in tax records, the WDV is to be calculated as per the provisions of
the laws of that foreign jurisdiction.

 

c)  The brought forward loss and unabsorbed
depreciation shall be determined (year wise) on the basis of the foreign tax
records of the company.

 

When the
foreign company is NOT assessed to tax in the foreign jurisdiction

a)  The WDV of the depreciable asset, the brought
forward loss and unabsorbed depreciation (year wise) is to be determined on the
basis of the books of account maintained in accordance with the laws of the
foreign jurisdiction.

 

Other
miscellaneous provisions

a)  The brought forward losses and unabsorbed
depreciation determined above shall be allowed to be set-off and carry forward
in accordance with the provision of the Act for the remaining period,
calculated from the year in which brought forward loss and unabsorbed
depreciation occurred for the first time.

 

b)  The brought forward losses and unabsorbed
depreciation will be allowed to set off only against such income that has
become chargeable to tax in India on account of the foreign company becoming a
“POEM resident” in India.

 

c)  If there is a revision or modification in the
amount of brought forward loss and unabsorbed depreciation in the foreign
jurisdiction, then such revisions will also be made in India for set-off and
carry forward.

 

Case Study:

Ace Ltd., a foreign
company, was incorporated on 1st April 2016. It follows the same
financial year as India i.e. 1st April-31st March. It
acquired a fixed asset worth Rs 10 crores on 1st April 2016 itself.
The company attracts POEM provisions in India for financial year 2017-18. The
facts of the company are summarised below:

 

Depreciation as per
tax law – 10%.

WDV as per tax law
– 9 crores

 

Depreciation as per
company law – 20%.

WDV as per company
law – 8 crores

 

Business Loss as
per tax law – Rs 1,00,000/-

Business Loss as
per company law – Rs 1,50,000/-

 

Q1) What would be
the WDV of Ace Ltd.’s fixed assets as on 1st April 2017?

 

Scenario 1: Ace
Ltd. is incorporated in Singapore and the Singapore tax laws provide 10 rate of
depreciation.

 

Scenario 2: Ace
Ltd. is a Singapore company; however, the Singapore’s tax laws don’t provide
any specific rates for depreciation.

 

Scenario 3: Ace
Ltd. is incorporated in UAE.

 

Q2) What loss Ace
Ltd. can set off in the previous year 2017-18 in India?

 

Scenario 1: Ace
Ltd. is incorporated in Singapore.

 

Scenario 2: Ace
Ltd. is incorporated in UAE.

 

Solutions:

Answer 1:

Scenario 1: Since
Ace Ltd. is assessed to tax in Singapore and the Singapore tax laws specify the
rate of depreciation for the fixed asset, the WDV of such asset as on 1st
April 2017 will be Rs 9 crores (computed as per Singapore’s tax law).

Scenario 2: Since
Ace Ltd. is assessed to tax in Singapore and the Singapore tax laws do not
specify the rate of depreciation for the fixed asset, the WDV of such asset as
on 1st April 2017 will be Rs 8 crores (computed as per
Singapore’s company law).

 

Scenario 3: Since
Ace Ltd. is not assessed to tax in UAE, the WDV of such asset as on 1st
April 2017 will be Rs. 8 crores (determined on the basis of the books of
account maintained in accordance with UAE’s company law).

 

Answer 2:

Scenario 1: Since
Ace Ltd. is assessed to tax in Singapore, the loss in accordance with
Singapore’s tax law will be considered.
Therefore, the brought forward loss
of Rs. 1,00,000/- will be allowed to be set off for eight consecutive years.

 

Scenario 2: Since
Ace Ltd. is not assessed to tax in UAE, the loss as determined in the books
of account maintained in accordance with the company law will be considered.
Therefore,
the brought forward loss of Rs. 1,50,000/- will be allowed to be set off for
eight consecutive years.

 

Note: The loss calculated in both scenarios was from the year in which
brought forward loss occurred for the first time (i.e. previous year 2016-17).
It is important to always calculate the remaining period of set off from the
year the loss first occurred and not from the year in which the foreign company
becomes “POEM resident” in India.

    

2.2   Preparation of Profit and Loss and Balance
Sheet

a)  The foreign company will have to prepare
financial statements8
for the period immediately following its accounting year to the period in which
the foreign company becomes “POEM resident” in India.

 

b)  The foreign company shall also be required to
prepare financial statements for succeeding periods of twelve months till the
year the foreign company remains resident in India on account of POEM.

 

In other words, the
foreign company needs to prepare its financial statements for India on a
financial year basis consistently till it remains a “POEM resident” in India.

c)  For carry forward of loss and unabsorbed
depreciation, the following provision will apply:

 

–   If the “split period” is
less than six months, then such loss and unabsorbed depreciation will be
included in the year in which the foreign company becomes “POEM resident” in
India. Additionally, the financial statements will be extended to include the
split period.

____________________________

8   Profit and Loss Account & Balance Sheet.

 

For example:
Assuming Ace Ltd. is following a calendar year, then with a “split period” of
three months it does not have to prepare a “split” financial statement of three
months and financial year 2017-18 financial statement of twelve months
INDIVIDUALLY. It can combine both the financial statements and prepare a
fifteen month statement from 1st January 2017 to 31st
March 2018.

 

Furthermore, the
loss of previous year 2016-17 (Rs 1,00,000/- or Rs 1,50,000/- as the case may
be) will be now considered as current year business loss for the previous year
2017-18 in India.

 

–    If the “split period” is
equal to or greater than six months, then the split period would be classified
as a separate accounting year and consequently, the financial statements for
such split period need to be prepared.

 

For example: If Ace
Ltd. was incorporated in Australia where the previous year is from 1st
July – 30th June, then the split period for Ace Ltd would be nine
months  (1st July 2016 to 31st
March 2017).

 

Therefore, in such
a case, Ace Ltd. would have to file two separate financial statements i.e. (a)
split financial statement of nine months, and (b) previous year 2017-18
financial statement of twelve months.

 

It is pertinent to
note that the loss of previous year 2016-17 (Rs 1,00,000/- or Rs 1,50,000/- as
the case may be) will be allowed as a carry forward of business loss for eight
years in the previous year 2017-18 in India.

 

d)  Further, the Notification provides that in
case when separate split period accounts are prepared, the loss and unabsorbed
depreciation as per tax records or books of account, as the case may be, shall
be allocated on a proportionate basis.

 

2.3 Applicability of TDS Provisions (Chapter
XVII-B)

a)  Prior to becoming “POEM resident” in India, if
the foreign company has complied with the relevant provisions of Chapter XVII-B
of the Act, then it is considered to be compliant with the provisions of the
said Chapter.

 

b)  If more than one provision of Chapter XVII-B
of the Act applies to such foreign company as a:

–   resident, and

–    foreign company

 

then the provisions
applicable to a foreign company shall apply.

 

c)  Any payment to a foreign company who is “POEM
resident” in India – section 195(2) will still be applicable.

 

For example: If Ace
Ltd., a foreign company who is “POEM resident” in India, entered into a
management consultancy contract with an Indian entity, Soham Pvt. Ltd., then,
Soham Pvt. Ltd. (the payer) can make an application to the AO to determine an
appropriate sum chargeable to tax and to determine the liability for
withholding tax.

 

Since section
195(2) explicitly mentions that the payee i.e. Ace Ltd must be a
“non-resident”, (in the instant case Ace Ltd., being a “resident” due to the
POEM in India), the Notification specifically clarifies that the beneficial
provisions of section 195(2) will be applicable to the foreign company which is
resident in India due to its POEM in India.

 

Interestingly, it
is pertinent to note that the provisions of section 195 specifically mention
applicability to a foreign company. Therefore, any person making payment to Ace
Ltd. would be covered by the provisions of section 195 notwithstanding the fact
that Ace Ltd. has become resident of India by virtue of its POEM in India.

 

 

2.4  
Rate of Tax

a)  The rate of tax in case of the foreign company
shall remain the same even though the residential status of the foreign company
changes from non-resident to resident on the basis of POEM.9  

 

Therefore, Ace Ltd.
would be taxed at 40 per cent plus surcharge and cess. POEM, being in the
nature of
anti-avoidance to prevent base erosion, the high tax rates acts as a deterrent.

 

_____________________________________________

9   This is a derivation of key takeaways
explained in paragraphs 2.7 and 2.8.

 

 

2.5  
Foreign Tax Credit

a)  A foreign company will be eligible to avail
the benefits of India’s DTAA after it becomes “POEM resident” in India.

 

b)  In a case where income on which foreign tax
has been paid or deducted, is offered to tax in more than one year, credit of
foreign tax shall be allowed across those years in the same proportion in which
the income is offered to tax or assessed to tax in India in respect of the
income to which it relates and shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 128 of the Rules.

 

2.6  
Limitation on setting off against India sourced Income

a)  The exceptions, modifications and adaptions
referred to in Para A of the Notification shall not apply to India sourced
income of a foreign company. Therefore, brought forward loss, unabsorbed
depreciation and foreign tax credit will not will available for India sourced
Income of a foreign company.

 

For example: Ace
Ltd, a Singapore entity, follows calendar year (1st January – 31st
December), and the income earned and tax paid by Ace Ltd. in Singapore and in
India is summarised below:

 

Singapore

Source

Financial Year 2017-18

(January-December)

Financial Year 2018-19

(January-December)

Amount
(Rs  in crores)

Tax (Rs 
in crores)

Amount
(Rs  in crores)

Tax (Rs 
in crores)

Business

1,200

240

2400

480

 

 

India

Source

Financial Year 2017-18 (April-March)

Amount (Rs in crores)

Tax (Rs in crores)

Business

10,000

3,000

 

 

How much foreign
tax credit can Ace Ltd. claim, assuming that Ace Ltd. gets hit by POEM
provisions in financial year 2017-18?

 

Solution:

Sine Ace Ltd. is
struck by POEM provisions in financial year 2017-18, it will be considered as a
resident in India and consequently, its global income will be taxed in India.

Furthermore, it
will be taxed at the rate applicable for foreign companies.

 

Computation of Income and tax paid for

financial year 2017-18 in India

Particulars

Amount (Rs in crores)

India sourced Income (A)

10,000

Singapore Income:

 

9 months Income of financial year
2017-18
(1 March 2017 to 31 December 2017) (B)

 

900

3 months income of financial year
2018-19

(1 January 2018 to 31 March 2018) (C)

 

600

Total Global Income (A+B+C) = (D)

11,500

Taxed at the Rate – 43.26 per cent  (E)

4974.9

Less: Proportionate Foreign Tax
Credit: 

 

9 months tax of financial year 2017-18

(1 March 2017 to 31 December 2017) (F)

 

(180)

3 months tax of financial year 2018-19

(1 January 2018 to 31 March 2018) (G)

 

(120)

Net Tax Liability (E-F-G) = (H)

4674.9

 

 

Note for determining Source wise
Foreign Tax Credit

 

 

2.7  
Transacting with a foreign company who is “POEM resident” in India

Any transaction of the foreign company with any other person or entity
under the Act shall not be altered only on the ground that the foreign company
has become Indian resident.

 

For Example: Ace Ltd. has an associated enterprise Beta Private Limited
in India. Will transfer pricing provisions apply to “international
transactions” between Ace Ltd. and Beta Ltd.?

 

As per section 92B,
an “international transaction” means a transaction between two or more
associated enterprises, either or both of whom are non-residents. Therefore, it
is important for one of the associated enterprises to be a non-resident.

 

In the instant
case, since Ace Ltd. has become a “resident” in India due to the applicability
of POEM provisions, ideally, transfer pricing provisions should not be
applicable. However, the language of the Notification creates confusion and
needs clarity.

 

2.8   
Conflict between Provisions

a)  Subject to the paragraph 2.7 above, a foreign
company shall continue to be treated as a foreign company even if it is said to
be “POEM resident” in India and all provisions of the Act shall apply
accordingly.

 

b)  It is pertinent to note that the provisions of
the Act which are specifically applicable to either a foreign company or a
resident assessee will apply to such companies. The provisions relating to
non-resident assessees will not apply to such companies. It has been further
clarified that any conflict between provisions of the Act applicable to it as a
foreign company and provisions of the Act applicable to it as a resident
assessee, the former shall prevail.

 

For example: Act
Ltd., a foreign company, who is “POEM resident” in India, is taxed on:

 

Particulars

Ace Ltd.

Reason

Scope of 
Tax

Global Income

Provisions specifically applicable to
resident shall apply to Ace. Ltd.

Rate of Tax10

40%

Conflict between Foreign company as
Resident (30%) and Foreign Company (40%) – provision applicable to foreign
company will apply.

 

 

3. 
Issues

The final
Notification has provided much-needed clarity regarding the consequences of
POEM for foreign companies who are “POEM resident” in India for the first time.
However, there remains ambiguity in the applicability of POEM for cases where
POEM is applied for the second or more time. Determination of POEM is an annual
exercise which needs to be conducted for every assessment year. Therefore, it
is always possible that the facts of the case may reveal that a foreign company
might attract POEM provisions in Year 1, not attract POEM provisions in Year 2
and again attract POEM provisions in Year 3. In such a case, there are no
guidelines about the consequences of POEM for foreign companies who are “POEM
resident” in India for multiple times.

 

Furthermore, there are some issues which have not been addressed by the
final Notification such as the applicability of advance tax, transfer pricing,
etc. For example, according to Para D of the Final Notification, transactions
of a foreign company with any other person or entity under the Act shall not be
altered only on the ground that such foreign company has become a “POEM
resident” in India. This Para implies that transfer pricing provisions will
continue to apply even if a foreign associated enterprise has become “POEM
resident” in India. Therefore, such a foreign company will have to comply with
transfer pricing provisions while transacting with its Indian associated enterprise.
This concept is irrational because transfer pricing provisions were introduced
in India to prevent shifting of profits from India to another tax jurisdiction.
Transfer pricing should not apply when both the entities are taxed in India, as
there is no opportunity for tax arbitrage.

 

4. 
Conclusion

Section 4 of the Act empowers the Central Government, to specify the
rate of tax. As per the Act, a company is differentiated either as a “domestic
company”11 or a “foreign company”12.  A higher rate of tax is provided for the
foreign company as its scope of tax is limited to Indian sourced income only. A
domestic company, however, is liable to tax on its worldwide (global) income
and therefore subject to a reduced tax rate. Thus, the principle seems to be
that as the scope of tax widens, the rate of tax reduces.13  However, in the case of a foreign company who
is “POEM resident” in India, not only is its scope of tax broader but also its
rate of tax.

Particulars

Domestic Company

Foreign

Company

Foreign Company

being “POEM resident”

Scope of 
Tax

Global Income

India sourced

Income

Global Income

Rate of Tax14

30%15

40%

40%

 

 

The consequences of
POEM of a foreign company in India are harsh and punitive. Since the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2015 provides that the POEM rule is
targeted towards shell companies which are incorporated outside but controlled
from India, POEM should be used as an anti-avoidance tool and be resorted only
in exceptional cases. It is hoped that this provision will be used in the
spirit of the Explanatory Memorandum.
 

________________________________________________________

10  Excluding surcharge and cess

11  Read section 2(22A).

12  Read section 2(23A).

13  This principle might be based on the principle
of equity.

14  Excluding surcharge and cess.

15   A domestic company is taxable at 30 per cent.
However, the tax rate is 25 per cent if turnover or gross receipt of the
company does not exceed Rs. 50 crore.

 

Set Off vis-a-vis Gross Receipts for Rule 53(6)(B) of The MVAT Rules

Introduction

The grant of set off is
prerogative of the legislature. In other words, set off is not right of the
dealers. The set off is to be given as per Scheme, Rules and conditions
attached therewith.

 

Under MVAT Act, there is
broad scheme of granting set off including almost on all goods like Capital
goods, trading goods and expenses are eligible for set off. However, there are
certain conditions where set off can be reduced or it can be denied.

 

There is Rule 53(6)(b)
which has attracted long litigation. The rule is reproduced below for ready
reference.

 

“53. Reduction in
set-off

 

The set-off available under
any rule shall be reduced and shall accordingly be disallowed in part or full
in the event of any of the contingencies specified below and to the extent specified.

 

(6) If out of the gross
receipts of a dealer in any year, receipts on account of sale are less than
fifty per cent. of the total receipts, –

 

(b) in so far as the dealer
is not hotel or restaurant, the dealer shall be entitled to claim set-off only
on those purchases effected in that year where the corresponding goods are sold
or resold within six months of the date of purchase or are consigned within the
said period, not by way of sale to another State, to oneself or one’s agent or
purchases of packing materials used for packing of such goods sold, resold or
consigned:

 

Provided that for the
purposes of clause (b), the dealer who is a manufacturer of goods not being a
dealer principally engaged in doing job work or labour work shall be entitled
to claim set-off on his purchases of plant and machinery which are treated as
capital assets and purchases of parts, components and accessories of the said
capital assets, and on purchases of consumables, stores and packing materials
in respect of a period of three years from the date of effect of the
certificate of registration.

 

Explanation.-For the
purposes of this sub-rule, the “receipts” means the receipts pertaining to all
activities including business activities carried out in the State but does not
include the amount representing the value of the goods consigned not by way of
sales to another State to oneself or one’s agent.”

 

It can be seen that if the
receipts from sale are less than 50% of gross receipts, than set off is restricted
to the purchases which are sold within six months. If such condition is
applicable, then the dealer has to give the data about purchase and sale of
corresponding goods and then claim set off.

 

The major issue arises
about interpretation of “gross receipts”. One of the issues is what is the
scope of gross receipts?

 

Case of Mutual Funds

In case of Mutual Funds,
they run various different schemes. Separate accounts are kept for each scheme.
If receipts of all the schemes are considered then the mutual funds attract
above rule. However, if the scheme relating to particular commodity like gold
is considered separately then the above rule may not apply.  

 

There was controversy about
the scope of gross receipt in relation to mutual fund i.e. whether to take
receipts from all the schemes to compute the gross receipts or to take only
receipts of each scheme. The matter has reached to Hon. Bombay High Court in
case of Axis Mutual Fund (WP No. 710 of 2018 dt.6.8.2018).

 

The brief facts narrated by
Hon. Bombay High Court are reproduced below.

           

“3.  By the Deed of Trust dated 27.06.2009 made by
and between Axis Bank Limited, a settlor, and Axis Mutual Fund Trustee Company
Limited, trustee, an irrevocable trust/trusts called Axis Mutual Fund was
created.

 

4.  Axis Mutual Fund Trustee Company Limited
(“Trustee Company”), incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act,
1956, was approved by Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) to act as
a Trustee of the various scheme(s) of the Axis Mutual Fund.

 

5. Axis Asset Management
Company Limited (“Axis AMC”), incorporated under the provisions of the
Companies Act, 1956, was approved by SEBI to act as the Asset Management
Company for the scheme(s) of the Axis Mutual Fund.

 

6.  By the Deed of Trust dated 27th
June, 2009, the settlor, inter-alia, declared and agreed that the Trustee
Company shall manage the mutual fund in accordance with the  applicable regulations. Further, as per para
6.1.1 of the Deed of Trust dated 27th June, 2009, the Trustee
Company is allowed to float one or more schemes for the issue of units to be
subscribed by the public.

 

7.  The responsibility for the daily operations
of the scheme(s) of Axis Mutual Fund has been delegated to the Axis AMC through
an investment Management Agreement dated 27th June, 2009 executed
between the Trustee Company and Axis AMC. As enumerated in Clause 3 of this
Agreement dated 27th June, 2009, the delegated responsibilities,
inter alia, include the maintenance of accounts and records, evaluation of investment
operations, carrying out credit assessments in relation to proposes
investments.

 

8.  It is the contention of the Petitioner that
by the Deed of Trust dated 27th June, 2009, multiple trust(s), i.e. scheme(s), were created as and when floated. The various clauses of the
Deed of Trust indicating independent existence of each scheme is provided in
the table below:-

 

Para

Text

4.3.1

Entrustment
of property

 

The
liabilities of a particular Scheme shall be met out of assets of the same
scheme and shall in no way attach to or become a liability of any other
scheme.

4.3.2

Entrustment
of property

 

The
Trustee Company shall ensure that proper and separate accounting records are
maintained for each scheme.

6.1.14

Functions
of Trustee Company

 

Distribute
dividend and income of the relevant Scheme, as and when the same may become
due and payable.”

 

 

The contention of the
dealer was that though there is one trust deed, there are actually multiple trusts
as per the schemes. It was submission that a trust is an obligation annexed to
the ownership of property. It was also submitted that as clearly evident from
Deed of Trust, such obligations are towards the beneficiaries of each scheme
and not towards the beneficiaries of all the schemes put together. Accordingly,
it was argued that the receipts of each scheme to be seen separately. If it so
seen then for Axis Gold ETF Scheme, the condition of 50% of sale of the gross
receipts gets fulfilled and Rule 53(6)(b) will not apply. The reliance was
placed on the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in case of Commissioner
of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh and Anr. vs. Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizam’s
Family Trust (1986) 4 SCC 352.
 

 

On behalf of revenue the
above submission was opposed on the ground that trust is registered as dealer
and hence it is one dealer and the rejection of set off applying Rule 53(6)(b)
is correct.

 

The Hon. High Court
discussed various aspects including the judgment cited in case of Nizam’s
Family Trust. However, under the scheme of the Rule 53(6)(b), the Hon. High
Court upheld the action of the revenue.

The observations of the
Hon. High Court are as under;

 

“46. Such is not the case
before us. There is a single Deed of Trust. There may be separate schemes, but
there was never any intent as is now sought to be culled out and to create
separate Trust. This is not a case where separate Trusts were created and
hence, the principle relied upon by Mr. Sridharan from several works on Law of
Trust and to the effect that receipts from Axis Mutual Fund ETF alone have to
be considered for there is formation of more than one trust by the Deed of
Trust and that is permissible, has no application. This has no application here
because the earlier principle and based on the case of Commissioner of Income
Tax, Bombay City 1, Bombay vs. Manilal Dhanji, Bombay 3 is inapplicable. This
is not a case where the settlor has created more trusts under a single Trust
Deed. This is a clear case where the Deed of Trust permits floating one or more
schemes. That is not equivalent to creation of separate Trusts. It is in these
circumstances that the assessing officer, the first appellate authority and the
Tribunal all rightly concluded that the set-off available under Rule 53 has to
be reduced. It shall be accordingly in part or full in the event of any of the
contingencies specified and to the extent specified in sub-rule (6) of Rule 53.
Pertinently, the set-off has not been disallowed in full. It is hold that in
the case clearly specified of gross receipts of a dealer in any year and if
from that, receipts on account of sale are less than 50% of the total receipts,
then, insofar as the dealer, who is not a hotel or restaurant, the set-off is
permissible only on those purchases effected in that year where the
corresponding goods are sold or resold within six months from the date of
purchase. There is no creation of separate Trusts, but separate schemes under a
single Trust Deed are floated.”

Thus, the application of
Rule 53(6)(b) was justified.

                       

Conclusion

The above judgment will be
guiding judgment to interpret the scope of Rule 53(6)(b). However, leaving
aside the legality, the effect is that there will be double taxation in as much
as the set off is denied though on the sale of same goods, tax is collected. It
is for the policy makers to reconsider the issue and to give necessary relief
considering the scheme and object of the VAT system.
 

 

 

Job-Work : Old Wine In Better Bottle? (Part-1)

Job Workers are generally understood as
persons who perform a part of a manufacturing process on goods belonging to another.
Traditionally, job workers performed outsourced manufacturing/ processing
activities by receiving goods belonging to their principal and returning the
same after due processing. The arrangements are usually made for certain
commercial reasons, such as:

 

1.   Work requires special skilled labour

 

2.   Work can performed only with specialised
machinery

 

3.   Infrequent requirement not requiring a
full-fledged set-up

 

4.   Job worker can perform same/ similar tasks at
lower operating costs

 

5.   Paucity of space for job work activity

 

The objective of this article is to discuss
the concept of job work from the perspective of its scope and the general
procedures involved in a job work arrangement.

 

Job Work – A specie of a Contract

Job work contracts are usually a combination
of a service contract coupled with bailment. The owner of the goods delivers or
transfers possession over his goods to another person with a condition of
returning the goods or disposing them under the directions of the owner. The
essentials of a contract of job work would be as follows:

 

1.   The objective of the contract is to perform a
process/ treatment over the goods

 

2.   For the purpose of its fulfilment, the owner
of goods (generally called the principal) delivers/ transfers the possession of
goods with a specific mandate to the transferee (called the job worker) under a
contract of bailment

 

3.   Ownership continues to rest with the
principal awarding the job work

 

4.   The job worker performs his process on the
goods received and on completion delivers the goods back to the principal or
any other place as designated by the principal

 

5.   Job worker would have to account for the
consumption of goods/ scrap and wastage

 

6.   Job worker would ensure that the goods are
not merged / mixed with own goods or any other principals’ goods

 

7.   Job worker is required to take reasonable
steps for the safety of the goods in capacity as a bailee of these goods

 

Job Work – Its relevance and history

The concept of Job work was originally
contained in the Excise law. Excise law was an activity driven law in the sense
that the manufacturing process in a factory formed the basis of imposition of
duty. The ownership over goods was not relevant for deciding the taxable person
(1988 (38) E.L.T. 535 (S.C.) Ujagar Prints, etc. vs. UOI). It laid
emphasis on the physical location, movement and identity over the goods and
considered the terms of contract between the parties as an inessential element.
Therefore, every removal of goods, whether in processed or unprocessed form,
whether under a contract of sale, bailment or otherwise, had excise
implications either as duty payment or Cenvat Credit reversal. In order to
overcome the procedural difficulties of an intermittent duty payment or credit
reversal, the Government extended certain benefits to job workers and reduced
multiplicity of tax implications and compliance under job work transactions.
The benefits can be put into two baskets:

 

i.    Notification 214/86-CE dated 25-03-1986
granted duty exemption in case a job worker was engaged in manufacturing
activity as long as the principal undertook to discharge the applicable duty on
the finished goods.  Notification
83/94-CE and 84/94-CE exempted job worker manufacturer and supplier
manufacturer under the SSI scheme from payment of duty.

 

ii.    Rule 4(5) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004
allowed the manufacturer/ service provider to retain the Cenvat Credit availed
on inputs/ capital goods where such goods were sent for the purpose of job work
and returned within the prescribed time limit.

 

The important point that needs to be
observed is that both these benefits operated under different domains. The
former granted a duty benefit which was otherwise applicable in case of a
manufacturing activity undertaken by a job worker and the latter granted the
benefit of retaining Cenvat Credit inspite of goods being physically removed
for a specific purpose. Yet, the common intent behind this was to relax the
complexities in view of physical movement of goods and ensuring that the goods
are duly accounted at the original location after the job work.

 

On the other hand, the Sales tax / VAT law
did not contain specific provisions in respect of job work. Infact, one may say
that this was not essential because the levy was a transaction based levy with
the sole emphasis on the ‘transfer of ownership’ over the goods. As long as the
principal retained its ownership over the goods, any manufacturing activity on
such goods did not lead to tax implications. Pure job work being a contract for
service and bailment did not fall within the ambit of VAT (except for some
stray works contract cases). The movement of goods (inter-state or intra-state)
for job work coupled with transport documents did not generally have any
sales/VAT tax implications. At most, the law prescribed certain documentation
for movement of goods in order to protect the interest of revenue and tap any
diversion of goods.

 

One may say that excise is a ‘boundary’
based law whereas sales tax is a ‘transaction’ based law. Therefore, concept of
job work had prominence under the excise law rather than the sales tax
law. 

 

Concept of Job work under GST

The GST law is considered a pseudo-sales tax
law with its peripheries made from the excise law. Two important facets of the
law are (a) it’s a contract based transaction law; and (b) it’s a multi-point
levy on both goods and services. Every form of value addition, whether on goods
or of service is taxed under the GST law at the transaction level and not at
the unit level. Job work itself being a value-added activity is a ‘taxable
service’ and did not require any special treatment.

 

Yet, the GST law has introduced the concept
of job work.  The only possible reason
attributable to such a move could be that job work arrangements would involve
significant to and fro movement of goods between the principal and the job
worker. Hence from a revenue perspective it was important to ensure that the
inventory of goods (esp. tax credited goods) are duly accounted for by the
principal after completion of job work. Reporting of outward and inward
movement of goods for job work enables the revenue to ascertain the end-use of
the goods.

 

Framework of Job work under GST

Job work provisions are contained u/s. 19
and 143 with certain transitional provisions u/s. 141. Job work has been
defined u/s. 2(68) to mean any treatment or process undertaken by a person on
goods belonging to another registered person and the term job worker should be
construed accordingly. Section 19 is titled ‘Taking input tax credit in respect
of inputs and capital goods sent for job work’ and placed under the Input tax
Credit chapter (Chapter V). Section 16, 143, 141 use terms such as ‘inputs’ and
‘capital goods’ rather than ‘goods’ in general implying that the job work
provisions should be understood to extend only to those goods which are
availing the benefit of ITC. This indicates that job work provision were
intended to operate in the lines of Rule 4(5) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and
not as an exemption from payment of tax.

 

An examination of the general provisions and
the waiver conditions in section 19 and 143 further substantiate this
conclusion. Section 19 provides a relaxation to one of the primary conditions
of availing input tax credit i.e. the receipt of goods u/s. 16(2)(b). The
section state the following:

 

–    Credit on Inputs / capital
goods is permitted even in cases where such goods are directly sent to the
job-workers premises for job work without first being brought to the premises
of the principal provided they are returned in the specified period;

 

–   the goods are returned to
the principal within a period of one year or three years; and

 

–   in case of any violation,
the inputs/ capital goods originally sent out would deemed to be supplied by
the principal to the job worker on the day they were originally removed

 

Section 143 under Chapter XXI –
Miscellaneous contains procedural provisions to be followed in job work
transactions which state the following:

 

–     The principal is permitted
to send inputs/ capital goods to a job worker without payment of tax provided
they are returned within the prescribed period of one/ three years

 

–    It is permitted to supply
these goods directly from the job workers premises without bringing the same
back to the principal’s place of business if the job worker is registered or
the job workers place of business is included in the certificate of
registration of the principal

 

–     The principal is
accountable for the goods sent on job work

 

–     Waste and scrap generated
during job work is permitted to be supplied by a job worker directly from his
place of business on payment of tax

 

–     An extended meaning to the
term input has been provided which states that intermediate goods would also be
termed inputs – implying that intermediate goods would be permitted to remove
without payment of tax to a job worker.

 

Section 19 and 143 contain similar
provisions i.e. permitting zero-tax movement of goods back and forth between
the principal and job worker. The content of both the sections overlap each
other except on three points (a) treatment of scrap/ wastage; (b) inclusion of
intermediate goods for job work activity and (c) permitting clearance of goods
from job worker premises. Yet, one noticeable difference between section 19 and
143 is that while section 19 talks about ‘retention of the input tax credit’
in the hands of the principal, section 143 grants the benefit of removal of
goods to a job worker ‘without payment of tax’.

 

Rate of Tax/
Classification under GST

Job work activity has been deemed as a
supply of services under Schedule II of the GST Act (Entry 3). Notification
11-2017- Central Tax (Rate) (as amended) has provided the rates of tax for job
work activities. The said activity has been classified under HSN 9988 &
9989. Explanatory note to HSN 9988 states that it covers services performed on
physical inputs owned by others and are generally characterised as outsourced
manufacturing units, etc. The value of the service is based on the service fee
and not the value of goods manufacturer. HSN 9989 provides for classification
of other manufacturing services and cases which involve intangible inputs and
not necessarily physical inputs. The service rate schedule prescribes the
following rates for job work activities:

 

HSN/SAC

Scope of activity

Rate of Tax

9988

Printing of news-papers, book, etc;
Textile processing activities; job work for jewellery; food processing
activities; tanning and leather processing activities

5%

 

Manufacturing of clay bricks, handicraft
goods, etc

5%

 

Manufacturing of umbrella and Printing
of paper products attracting 12% tax

12%

 

Other Manufacturing services

18%

9989

Printing of all paper products (under
Chapter 48 or 49) where only content is supplied by the publisher and the
paper belongs to the printer

12%

 

Other manufacturing services including
publishing, printing, reproduction material recovery activities

18%

 

 

Issues under the GST law

A) 
What is the scope of the term ‘job work’?

The fundamental question arising under job
work is the extent of value addition that is permissible under a job work
arrangement. Is there any outer limit on the value addition (say the entire/
substantial part of the manufacturing activity)? Can a job worker be the owner
of the principal raw material itself while performing job work? These questions
are to be viewed independently – the former question is on substantial value
addition on account of the ‘processes’ performed by the job work and the latter
question is on value addition on account of the ‘type of inputs’ used by
the job worker?

 

Addressing the first aspect, it may be
relevant to examine the issue based on a controversy raised by a recent advance
ruling. The Maharashtra Advance Ruling Authority in re: JSW Energy Limited
(GST-ARA-05/2017/B-04)
had the occasion to examine whether coal converted
into electrical energy on job work basis would fall within the definition of
job work. The Advance Ruling authority held that the job work was not on
coal rather the coal was consumed in the process of generation of
electricity resulting in a manufacturing activity and hence beyond the scope of
the term job work. The Advance Ruling authority suggested that job work and
manufacturing activity are mutually exclusive and the presence of the term
manufacture limits the scope of the term job work. On appeal, the appellate
advance ruling authority (MAH/AAAR/SS-RJ/01/2018-19) held that the
definition does not permit complete transformation of tangible inputs into intangible
inputs – only minor additions are permitted in a job work arrangement (relying
on Prestige Engineering case discussed below). The AAAR stated that
though processing of inputs resulting in manufacture is permitted under job
work arrangements, the section requires the principal to bring back the inputs
and in the absence of a one-to-one correlation between the inputs and the
processed output, the activity is not within the scope of job work.

 

We need to analyse the definition of job
work a little more intricately. The term job work is defined to mean a
treatment or process undertaken on goods belonging to another registered
person. The emphasis of the definition is on two things (a) ownership of
goods
and (b) treatment/ process being performed on those goods. The
term treatment and process are very generic terms without any limits. In this
context, the term treatment generally means giving some properties (either
chemical, physical or biological) to another item. The term process has been
very widely understood by the Supreme Court in the past. In CCE vs.
Rajasthan State Chemical Works 1991 (55) E.L.T. 444 (SC)
it was held that
the natural meaning of process would refer to any treatment of certain
materials in order to produce a good result, a species of activity performed on
the subject-matter in order to transform or reduce it to a certain
stage.  The definition of job work reads
as follows:

 

2(68) “job work” means any treatment or
process undertaken by a person on
goods belonging to another registered person and the expression “job worker”
shall be construed accordingly

 

In comparison, job work was defined in the
CE notification 214/86 as follows:

 

“Explanation I. – For the purposes of
this notification, the expression “job work” means processing or
working upon of raw materials or
semi-finished goods supplied to the job worker/ so as to complete a part or
whole of the process resulting in the manufacture or finishing of an article or
any operation which is essential for the aforesaid process”

 

The AAR held that the treatment or process
should be performed upon the goods
for it to be termed as job work. Grammatically speaking, the term ‘on’ is used
as preposition1 to establish a relationship between a pronoun and
the rest of a sentence. Preposition generally have an object for which it
establishes a relationship. The legislature have used to term ‘on’ in order to
make goods as the object of the entire
statement. The said preposition is establishing a relationship between the
person and the goods and does not establish a relationship between the
process and the goods
. It proves that the term process in the definition is
unqualified and should be understood in its natural and complete sense. Unlike
the central excise definition which requires working upon raw materials,
current definition in GST is limited to performing the treatment on goods.
Since the definition is completely silent on the result of the treatment or
process, the definition should be widely construed.

 

Now referring to section 19 and 143, we can
infer that both sections require the principal to bring back the inputs and
capital goods within a specific time frame. The AAAR & AAR have commented
that the meaning of job work should also be gathered from section 19 and 143.
Since the provision require the principal to bring back the inputs, the term
job work should be understood as only limited to cases where the identity of
the goods is retained and as such returned to the principal. The AAAR failed to
appreciate that section 143 also permits the principal to ‘supply or export’
such inputs with or without payment of tax from the job-workers premises. Any
interpretation should be made based on contemporaneous circumstances. If such
narrow interpretation is made, principal manufacturers would also be barred
from sending raw materials to job work and clearing the finished products after
the manufacturing activity to end customers. Where the provision itself permits
onward clearance of finished products subsequent to a manufacturing activity,
the requirement of retention of the original identity of goods is an apparent
conflict with the term manufacture. The entire provision would become
unworkable with this absurd interpretation of the AAAR.

_____________________________________________________________

1     The term preposition is a word governing, and
usually preceding, a noun or pronoun and expressing a relation to another word
or element in the clause. 

 

 

Moreover, when 143(5) itself speaks about
generation of scrap and wastage and use of intermediate goods ‘arising’ from
inputs, it is necessarily referring to a manufacturing activity. This conveys
the intention that job workers are permitted to carry out manufacturing
activity including the fact that the existence of the original input is not
visible in the final product.  The AAR
failed to understand that the section does not contemplate that the inputs or
capital goods should be brought back in its original condition – such an
interpretation would defeat the concept of job work itself. It should be
interpreted to mean that inputs should either be contained in final products
after job work in some form or the other or the inputs should cause the further
generation of the new product emerging from the job work process. The important
aspect is that the original input should identifiable (either by its cause,
content, character) with job work process and the final product. The Supreme
Court in Prestige Engineering (India) Ltd. vs. CCE Meerut Samples – 1994
(73) E.L.T. 497 (S.C.)
while explaining the scope of the definition of job
work under an exemption notification stated that job work should not be
narrowly understood as requiring the job worker to return the goods in the same
form, this would render the notification itself redundant (since the definition
specifically contemplated ‘a manufacturing process’) but it also cannot be so
widely interpreted to allow an arrangement where the process involves
substantial value addition. 

 

The AAAR commented that coal converted into
electrical energy has not been brought back. The condition of bringing back
should be understood from the original intent under Rule 4(5) of Cenvat Credit
Rules i.e. ensuring tax credited inputs do not escape the taxation net while
the goods leave the premises of the taxable person. As long as they have been
used for a value added activity for the taxable person, the condition should be
understood as satisfied and the benefit should be granted. The narrow
interpretation adopted in the AAR only stifles the intent of the law.

 

One may also observe that the original
ITC-04 tool on the GSTN portal (form for reporting outward and inward movement
of goods under job work activity) required that quantity code of the original
inputs match with the quantity code of the processed item after job work. This
was a challenge as in many cases manufacturers would receive the processed item
in a different form/ quantity. After representations the revised ITC-04
(amended vide Notification 39/2018 dt. 04-09-2018) has suggested that the
original challan date and number need not be given if one-to-one correspondence
between the original goods send for job work and the returned goods is not
possible. This adds credence to the above conclusion that establishing identity
or existence of the original product is clearly not a requirement of the law
and the term job work should not be narrowed down by the requirement of
bringing back the inputs. This leads to an inescapable conclusion that a job
worker can perform any value added activity on the goods.

 

B) Are the terms manufacture and job work
mutually exclusive?

The AAR concluded that manufacture is
excluded from the definition of job work in view of a separate definition. This
was part of the ruling modified by the AAAR on appeal by stating that job work
activity may or may not result in manufacture. The term manufacture refers to
processing of raw materials or inputs resulting in emergence of a new products
having a distinct name, character and use. On scanning the entire law, the term
manufacture has been used with limited reference: composition scheme, transitional
credit, deemed export.  The term
manufacture is used in completely independent context and does not even
remotely narrow down the scope of the term job work.

 

In other words, the job work is understood
from a contractual sense while manufacture was understood from the physical
properties of the product. In terms of a contract, if a bailor-baliee
relationship is established between the contracting parties with specific
directions for performing a treatment/ process, it would necessarily be a job
work activity. There could be cases which are job work but do not result in a
manufacturing process and there could also be cases were a manufacturing
activity is not a job work transaction in a contractual sense. It is in view of
this independent concepts that under excise, job worker declaration was
required only where the job worker performed a manufacturing activity. Where
the job worker performed limited testing activities, it was not essential for
the job worker to comply with the exemption conditions of Notification 214/86.

 

The CBEC in its flyer have stated as
follows:

 

“Job work sector constitutes a
significant industry in Indian economy. It includes outsourced activities that
may or may not culminate into manufacture. The term Job work itself explains the
meaning. It is processing of goods supplied by the principal. The concept of
job work already exists in Central Excise, wherein a principal manufacturer can
send inputs or semi-finished goods to a job worker for further processing. Many
facilities, procedural concessions have been given to the job workers as well
as the principal supplier who sends goods for job work. The whole idea is to
make the principal responsible for meeting compliances on behalf of the job
worker on the goods processes by him (job worker), considering the fact that
typically the job workers are small persons who are unable to comply with the
discrete provisions of the law.”

 

The flyer clearly states that job work
activity may or may not result in manufacture. The idea behind the concept of
job work is to facilitate the tax free movement of goods and making the
principal responsible for goods under job work. The explanatory notes to the
HSN/SAC chapter headings also provide explain job work as involving an
outsourced manufacturing activity. Further, the notification prescribing the
rates also specify both manufacturing and processing activities to be included
under the SAC for job work. All these clearly indicate that the concept of job
work overlaps with the concept of manufacture and both need not be considered
as mutually exclusive concepts.

 

C) Whether
job worker can introduce substantial raw materials in its job work process?

A parallel question is whether the
definition prohibits a job worker from introducing substantial/ critical raw
materials in relative comparison to that received from the principal
manufacturer. A plain reading of the section certainly does not bar this
activity. The definition is open ended and left these matters to the mutual
contractual terms between the principal and job worker. Prima-facie, is
appears that law does not prohibit the introduction of substantial / high value
inputs or critical inputs being used by the job worker during the entire
processing. As an example there is no restriction for a goldsmith to use its
own gold where the solitaire diamond is being supplied by the principal
manufacturer. 

 

However, the Supreme Court in Prestige
Engineering (supra)
does not permit an open-ended definition of the term
job work. It stated that the definition should not be widely understood to
permit the job worker from performing substantial value added activity. This
understanding of the law was made while interpreting an exemption notification.
As discussed, the concept of job work is being introduced as a facility for
retaining the Cenvat credit rather than as an exemption provision. The
interpretation should be such that the facility made available is effective
rather than a dead letter. The Madras High Court in 2015 (316) E.L.T. 209
(Mad.) CCE vs. Whirlpool of India ltd
held that the definition of Prestige
engineering case is limited to that notification and does not extended over the
Cenvat Credit Rules. Therefore, one can certainly take a stand that the excise
understanding of value added activity should not narrow down the scope of the
prevailing definition.

 

The CBEC Circular No. 38/12/2018, dated
26-3-2018 has clearly permitted the job worker to use his own goods apart from
the goods received from the principal and has not restricted the type/ nature
of goods to be used by the job worker:

 

“5. Scope/ambit of job work : Doubts have
been raised on the scope of job work and whether any inputs, other than the
goods provided by the principal, can be used by the job worker for providing
the services of job work. It may be noted that the definition of job work, as
contained in clause (68) of section 2 of the CGST Act, entails that the job
work is a treatment or process undertaken by a person on goods belonging to
another registered person. Thus, the job worker is expected to work on the
goods sent by the principal and whether the activity is covered within the
scope of job work or not would have to be determined on the basis of facts and
circumstances of each case. Further, it is clarified that the job worker, in addition
to the goods received from the principal, can use his own goods for providing
the services of job work.”

 

Moreover, from
an economics perspective, one would be neutral to the fact that critical inputs
being used by the job worker. Being a value added tax law with job work
services also being taxed under its ambit, it is really immaterial on who
introduces the raw material since commercial terms would automatically
determine the transaction value of the each leg of the supply (incl. job work)
and taxes would be appropriately recovered. From a revenue administration
perspective, the benefit of job work was to tide over the compliance of input
tax credit reversal and availment during the intermediary phase. Revenue would
monitor the job work movement primarily to ensure that the input tax credit
availed on such goods is used for the intended objects only. Where substantial
value / critical raw materials are purchased by the job worker itself, the risk
exposure of granting the benefit u/s. 19 is correspondingly reduced. The input
tax credit on the bullion purchased has been now been availed by the goldsmith
and section 19 operates only the domain of inputs sent by the principal to the
job worker and not on the self-purchased inputs.

 

Rationally, this credit of bullion does not
jeopardise the input tax credit claim on the diamond purchase and sent by the
principal. Hence revenue authorities should not question the quantum / nature
of inputs being used by the job worker as it not result in any additional revenue.

 

The above conceptual understanding of job
work can be tabulated with some practical examples:

 

Sl No

Type of Work

Ownership of Raw material

Job work Process

Whether Job work?

1

Forging
of metal blocks into specific castings

Metal
Blocks supplied by principal

Foundry
activities

Yes
even though there is a manufacturing activity

2

Supply
of Coal which is used in power plant for generation of electricity

Coal
owned by principal

Power
generation, conversion of coal into steam is also a process

Yes,
even though tangible inputs convert into intangible output

3

Supply
of Customised Printed Paper

Paper
and Ink owned by printer

Printing/
publishing activity

May
not be classifiable as job work but as supply of goods but HSN 9989 and
notification permits such activity as job work

4

Retreading
of Tyres

Old
tyres supplied by the Principal and the retreading material owned by job
worker

Retreading

Yes
– CBEC Circular No. 34/8/2018-GST, dated 1-3-2018 gives a view that where
supplier of retreated tyres own the old tyres, it is a supply of goods

5

Manufacturing
of bearings with own raw material but based on moulds, dies, etc received
from principal

Ownership
of raw material with job worker and ownership of dies with principal

Manufacturing
activity

Yes
to extent of moulds, dies, etc even though no process or treatment of moulds
since there exists a bailor-bailee relationship over the moulds/ dies, etc

6

Bus-Body
Building Activity

Chassis
owned by principal

Body
built on chassis

Yes
as per Circular No. 52/26/2018-GST, dated 9-8-2018

7

Bottling
plants receiving concentrate for processing

Concentrates
usually purchased by bottlers

Contract
manufacturer

No
May not be a job work if there is a principal-principal relationship

8

Brand
owners merely lending brand for manufacturing activity: Pharma/ FMCG industry

Intangibles
owned by brand owner but all raw materials owned by manufacturer

Licensed
manufacturing / loan licensee

May
not be a job work activity but stated in HSN9989 as any manufacturing
activity involving supply if intangible inputs

9

Printing
of Paper/ Photographs based on intangible material (such as designs) supplied
by Customer on tangible material

Intangible
materials owned by principal

Printing
activity

May
not be a job work but included in HSN9989 as outsourced manufacturing
activity

10

Extraction
of paraffin from crude material

Crude
material owned by principal

Extraction/
purification

Yes,
treatment includes extraction

11

Repairing
a transport passenger vehicle

Vehicle
owned by manufacturer

Repairing/
painting, etc

No
compliance of job work provisions required if not an ITC eligible item

 

In summary, the concept of job work has not
undergone a substantial change from its parent law. There is no reason to limit
its scope with reference to some terminologies as is being attempted by the
AAR. In fact, the concept of job work has widened in relative comparison to
from its excise origin. Its full effect should be given especially in a value
added system. The AAAR have deviated from the essence of job work and this
needs to be examined by a higher forum. The other procedural issues on job work
can be undertaken in a subsequent article. 
 

 

Charity and Donations

Ours is a charity minded society. ‘Giving’
is an important ‘sanskara’ in our culture. My parents used to give ‘dakshina’
to the priests or alms to the beggars through our hands, so that the habit is
inculcated in early childhood.

 

The rationale behind tax exemptions to
charitable trusts is interesting. The Kings used to rule over a large
territory.  During famines or other
natural calamities, it was the king’s duty to provide food grains to the
affected subjects.  The distances from
capital city were quite long. Therefore, local godowns were maintained at
various places spread across the kingdom. Local religious temple – trusts were
entrusted with the task of looking after the warehouses and arranging for
distribution in appropriate situations. 
Since the trusts were performing the king’s task, they were granted
exemption from paying taxes. The taxes used to be normally equivalent to one
sixth of the crop, as agriculture was the main source of income.

 

Unfortunately, in the present era of
degenerating values, such exemptions are being misused by both – the
institutions as well as the donors while claiming tax benefits. Therefore, it
is now experienced the world over that the Government’s or regulator’s approach
towards the charitable institutions or NGOs has not remained very healthy.

 

Nevertheless, charity still continues and
will continue for ever. Here are two anecdotes:-

 

There was a housing society. Once, the
children in the society formed their club or ‘mandal’. It was decided to
raise funds by collecting contributions from the residents. There were many
buildings and each building was allotted to one or two children. An innocent
but smart boy collected some contribution from a gentleman. The person was a
little witty. He asked the boy –”Now that I have become a member of your mandal,
what will I get?”.

 

The kid was fumbled. He never knew what for
the funds were being collected. He thought for a moment and said, “Uncle,
perhaps you can again give such contribution next year!”. The real secret and
purpose of doing a good thing lies in doing it repeatedly and selflessly.

 

In an organisation of dedicated social
workers, the mentor was giving “useful tips for collection of funds. “One
should be begging ‘shamelessly’ for a good charitable cause”.  By shamelessly he meant, ‘without any ego’.
He narrated a real story of Pandit Madanmohan Malaviya, the founder of Banaras
Hindu University. He was a scholar and freedom fighter and left his well-paid job
under the British rule. He was posthumously conferred with Bharat Ratna in the
year 2014. He travelled all over the country to raise funds. Once he thought,
why not ask the Nizam for a donation to this cause!

 

“Are you mad?”. His colleagues
asked him. He said, “what worst can happen? He will insult me and drive me
away. I don’t mind that”.

 

He went before the Nizam in open court and
requested for a contribution to the Banaras Hindu University. As expected,
Nizam got wild and threw his mojri on Panditji! Panditji coolly with a
smiling face picked up those mojris and went away. Then he stood in the
market yard on a raised platform and started ‘auctioning’ the Nizam’s mojris!.

 

The news went to Nizam. He was baffled by
this unforeseen development. He called Panditji and gave him some funds!

 

I believe, our BCAS Foundation is working
with the same motivation and zeal!

4 Article 12 & Article 14 of India-Germany DTAA – Article 14 applies to payments made for obtaining scientific services from a non-resident individual; Article 14 being more specific provision applicable to professional services rendered by individuals shall prevail over Article 12

TS-492-ITAT-2018

Poddar Pigments Limited vs. ACIT

A.Y: 2008-09; Date of Order: 23rd
August, 2018

 

Article 12 & Article 14 of
India-Germany DTAA – Article 14 applies to payments made for obtaining
scientific services from a non-resident individual; Article 14 being more
specific provision applicable to professional services rendered by individuals
shall prevail over Article 12

 

Facts

The Taxpayer, an
Indian company, was engaged in the business of manufacturing master batches and
engineering plastic compounds. During the year, the Taxpayer entered into a
technical services agreement with a German scientist (Mr. X). As per the
agreement, Mr X was required to invent different processes of polymers by
applying different chemistry to raw materials used by the Taxpayer.

 

The Taxpayer
contended that payments made to Mr X was in the nature of independent
scientific services and hence, it qualified as independent personnel services
(IPS) under Article 14 of India-Germany DTAA. Since Mr X did not have a fixed
base in India and his stay in India did not exceed 120 days, payments made to
Mr X were not taxable in India as per Article 14 of India –Germany DTAA.

 

The AO rejected the
Taxpayer’s contention and held that the payments were in the nature of ‘fees
for technical services’ under Article 12 of DTAA as well as ITA. Hence, they
were subject to withholding of tax. Since the Taxpayer made payments to Mr X
without withholding tax, AO disallowed such expense u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act.

The CIT (A) upheld
AO’s contention. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

Held

–     As per Article 14 of
India- Germany DTAA, income derived by an individual resident of Germany from
the performance of professional services or other independent activities is
chargeable to tax only in Germany, if the individual German resident does not
have any fixed base regularly available to him in India for performing his activities
and further, if he has not stayed in India for a period or period exceeding 120
days in the relevant previous year. Also, professional services for the
purposes of Article 14 includes ‘independent scientific services’.

 

–     ITAT noted the documentary
evidence submitted by the Taxpayer and held that the services rendered by Mr X
were in the nature of scientific services. Hence, they would qualify as
professional services under Article 14 of the DTAA.

 

–     ITAT also noted that such
services would also qualify as technical services under the FTS Article of the
DTAA which would trigger source taxation in India. The issue, therefore was,
which of the two Articles governed taxability of Mr. X.

 

–     In the facts of the case,
Article 14 is applicable and not Article 12 for the following reasons:

 

•     Article 14 deals with income from
professional services of an “individual” taxpayer whereas Article 12 deals with
all the taxpayers (including individuals)

 

•     Article 12 is broader in scope and general
in nature as compared to Article 14 of DTAA. Accordingly, Article 14 would
apply on the facts of the case.

 

•     It is a general rule of interpretation that
specific or special provisions prevail over and take precedence over the
general provisions.

 

–     Thus,
in absence of a fixed base of the Taxpayer in India, and since the Taxpayer was
not present in India for a period exceeding 120 days, income from such services
was not taxable in India by virtue of Article 14 of the DTAA.
 

 

 

 

3 Article 11(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA – clarification issued by CBDT; Circular No. 789; Tax Residency Certificate can be the basis for determining beneficial ownership of interest income

TS-460-ITAT-2018

HSBC Bank (Mauritius) Limited vs. DCIT

A.Y: 2011-12; Date of Order: 2nd
July, 2018

 

Article 11(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA –
clarification issued by CBDT; Circular No. 789; Tax Residency Certificate can
be the basis for determining beneficial ownership of interest income

 

Facts

The Taxpayer was a
limited liability company incorporated, registered and tax resident, in
Mauritius and was engaged in banking business. During the year under
consideration, the Taxpayer earned interest from investments in debt securities
in accordance with the SEBI Regulations. The Taxpayer claimed that its income
was exempt in India in terms of Article 11(3)(c) of the India-Mauritius DTAA.

 

The AO, in
conformity with the directions of DRP, denied the exemption on the ground that
the Taxpayer did not fulfil the following three conditions prescribed in
Article 11(3)(c) of the India-Mauritius DTAA.

 

(i)   the interest was not “derived” by the
Taxpayer;

(ii)   interest was not “beneficially owned” by the
Taxpayer; and

(iii)  the Taxpayer did not carry on bonafide
banking business.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Taxpayer
derived interest income and that it was carrying on bonafide banking
business. As regards the third condition pertaining to ‘beneficial ownership’,
the Tribunal remanded the matter to AO.

 

The Taxpayer
agitated the issue through miscellaneous application before the Tribunal.
Thereafter, the Tribunal recalled its order insofar as it pertained to
‘beneficial ownership’. To support its proposition of being beneficial owner of
interest, the Taxpayer primarily relied on the Tax Residency Certificate (TRC)
issued by the Mauritian Revenue authorities.

 

Held

–     Clarification issued by
CBDT on circular no. 789 dated 13.04.2000 states that wherever a Certificate of
Residency is issued by the Mauritian authority, such Certificate will
constitute sufficient evidence for accepting the status of residence as well as
the beneficial ownership for applying the provisions of the India-Mauritius
DTAA.

 

–    While the aforesaid CBDT
Circular was issued specifically in the context of income by way of dividend
and capital gain on sale of shares, same shall also be applicable in the
context of interest income under Article 11(3)(c) of the India-Mauritius Tax
Treaty. Reliance was placed on Bombay HC in case of Universal International
Music B.V (TS-56-HC-2013)
wherein HC had relied upon the aforesaid Circular
in the context of royalty income.

 

–    Basis the Circular, TRC
obtained by the Taxpayer from Mauritian tax authority was sufficient evidence
that the ‘beneficial ownership’ of the impugned interest income was of the
Taxpayer.

 

Benami Act – No Longer A Paper Tiger ! – Part II

(continued
from page 38 of september 2018 bcaj)

 

5.     HOW WILL THE ACT BRING OUT ILLICIT MONEY?

Illicit money is parked to a substantial extent in benami properties.
The benefits of such properties are now effectively nullified by the Government
in the following manner.

–     Firstly, the real owner is disabled
from claiming any right on benami property.

–    Secondly, the benamidar is prevented
from re-transferring the benami property to the real owner.

–     Thirdly, by including sale proceeds
of benami property in the definition of ‘benami property’, benamidar is
prevented from enjoying the sale proceeds of such property.

–     Finally, the benami property is
confiscated and the same vests in the Central Government. Thus, the illicit
money parked in benami properties is eventually sent to Government coffers.

 

Thus, the Act provides teeth to the law and thereby enables
Government to deal with the holders of the illicit money parked in benami
properties. This is visible in the new preventive and punitive provisions which
did not exist in the Act prior to its amendment in November 2016. The
three preventive provisions which act as effective deterrents are reviewed, as
follows.

 

5.1      The
Owner deprived of the right to recover the benami property

 

Position of law prior to 1988 in respect of the prohibition of the right
to recover benami property was explained by the Supreme Court[1]
in the following words.

“prior to the coming into operation of the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, benami transactions were a recognised
specie of legal transactions pertaining to immovable properties. It was a legal right of the plaintiff to contend in
those days that even though the transfer of the property had been effected in
the name of defendant benamidar for the plaintiff from whom the consideration
had moved, the plaintiff was the real owner and, therefore, the defendant was
bound to restore such property to the real owner.
If the benamidar took up
a defiant attitude, then the law provided a substantive right to the plaintiff
to come to the court for an appropriate declaration and relief of possession on
that ground. For the purpose of prohibiting such benami transactions, the
Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance,
1988, was promulgated by the President and it was followed by the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)

 

5.1.1     The Act reaffirms the Owner’s deprivation

 

The abovementioned position prevailing prior to 1988 pertaining to the
real owner’s rights in respect of Benami property, was altered by
promulgation of the Ordinance[2]  on 19 May 1988. The Ordinance eventually
resulted in the enactment of section 4 which disabled the real owner in two
ways.

 

Section 4(1)barred the enforcement of the real owner’s claim on the benami
property
. Thus, now, the real owner cannot bring any suit, claim or action
to enforce his right as the real owner on the plea that the ostensible owner is
merely a benamidar. Section 4(1), thus, disables the real owner from
enforcing his right against the benamidar.

 

Likewise, section 4(2) is the other disabling provision in respect of benami
property. When the benamidar brings a suit to enforce his right in the
property, section 4(2) disables the real owner from enforcing his right of
defence to claim that he is the real owner.

 

5.2     Confiscation
of Benami Property

 

Under the old section 5, there was no provision for confiscation of
benami property and its vesting in the Central Government. This infirmity is
now sought to be remedied by providing confiscation of the benami property and
its vesting in the Government. Upon such vesting, all rights and title in the
confiscated property vest in the Central Government absolutely free from all
encumbrances and that, too, without paying any compensation.

 

5.2.1 Confiscation
of sale proceeds

 

The Act defines “benami property” to mean any
property which is the subject-matter of a benami transaction. The term
also includes the proceeds from such property. The order of confiscation is in
respect of benami property which also includes the proceeds from sale of
such property. Hence, the sale proceeds of benami property are also
liable to confiscation.

 

5.3     Bar
on re-transfer of benami property

 

The Act provides that benamidar shall not re-transfer the Benami
property to the beneficial owner or his nominee.

 

5.3.1 Re-transfer–
null and void

 

The Act provides that any re-transfer of property by benamidar to
the real owner or his nominee in violation of the abovementioned prohibition is
null and void.

 

5.3.2     Prohibition
on re-transfer

–  not
applicable to IDS cases

 

Where the beneficial owner has made a declaration of benami property under
Income Declaration Scheme (“IDS”) pursuant to which benamidar
re-transfers the benami property, such re-transfer does not attract the
prohibition and voiding of the retransfer.

 

6.     ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT

The administration of the Act is done by various authorities and
officers.

6.1     Adjudicating
Authority

 

The Central Government is empowered to appoint Adjudicating Authorities
to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and the authority conferred by the Act.

Two notifications were issued by the Central Government on 25-10-2016
for appointment of Adjudicating Authorities.

 

6.1.1 Composition
of the Authority

 

The Adjudicating Authority comprises –

–    Chairperson

–    At least two other members

 

Thus, the minimum number of members of the Adjudicating Authority is
three.

 

6.1.2 Adjudicating
Authority to regulate its own procedure

 

The Act provides that the Adjudicating Authority is not
bound by the procedure specified in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

 

The Authority has powers to regulate its own procedure, subject to the
other provisions of the Act.

 

The Adjudicating Authority is, however, to be guided by the principles
of natural justice.

 

6.1.3   Central
Government to provide staff

 

The Act requires the Central Government to provide each
Adjudicating Authority with officers and employees.

 

6.1.4 Superintendence
over the staff

 

The officers and employees of the Adjudicating Authority are required to
discharge their functions under the general superintendence of the Adjudicating
Authority.

 

The word “superintendence” signifies exercise of some authority or
control over the person or thing subjected to oversight[3].

 

6.2     Authorities

 

The Act provides the following authorities.

–     The Initiating Officer (i.e. Assistant
Commissioner of Income-tax or a Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax);

–     The Approving Authority (Additional
Commissioner of Income-tax or Joint Commissioner of Income-tax);

–    The Administrator (Income-tax Officer); and

–     The Adjudicating Authority.

 

The roles of the abovementioned authorities are as follows.

 

6.2.1 Initiating
Officer

 

On the basis of the information in his possession, if the Initiating
Officer has reason to believe that any person holds a property as benamidar,
he initiates the process by issuing notice to the benamidar to show
cause within the time specified in the notice why such property should not be
treated as Benami property. A copy of the notice is served on the
beneficial owner.

 

Thereafter, with the previous approval of the Approving Authority, the
Initiating Officer provisionally attaches the property if, in his opinion, the
person in possession of the Benami property is likely to alienate such
property during the period specified in the notice. After making such inquiries
and calling for reports or evidence and taking into account all relevant
materials, the Initiating Officer takes the following actions within 90 days
from the date of issue of notice with the prior approval of the Approving
Authority.

 

(a)  Where the provisional
attachment was made:

(i)   pass order continuing
the provisional attachment of the property till the date of the order made by
the Adjudicating Authority; or

(ii)   revoke the
provisional attachment of the property;

(b)  Where provisional attachment
is not made:

(i)   pass order
provisionally attaching the property till the date of order made by the
Adjudicating Authority; or

(ii)   decide not to attach
the property specified in the notice.

 

Where the Initiating Officer passes the order continuing the provisional
attachment or passes the order provisionally attaching the property, he is
required to draw up a Statement of the Case within 15 days from such
attachment, and refer it to the Adjudicating Authority.

 

6.2.2   Approving
Authority

 

The Approving Authority may give or deny the prior approval to the
orders of the Initiating Officer which approve-

–     the provisional attachment of the property
held by benamidar.

–     the revocation of the provisional
attachment.

–     the order continuing the provisional
attachment

–    the decision not to attach the property
specified in the notice.

6.2.3   Adjudicating
Authority

 

On receiving the Statement of Case from the Initiating Officer, the
Adjudicating Authority takes the following actions.

–     adjudicates whether property is Benami
property,after hearing the affected persons, and pass an order.

–     Hears the affected persons after
passing the adjudicating order, and pass the confiscation order.

 

6.2.4     Administrator 

 

His role is to take possession of the confiscated Benami property
and manage the same.

 

6.2.5     Assistance
of other departments

 

In the enforcement of the Act, the authorities are assisted by
the following officers:

–     Income-tax authorities;

–     officers of the Customs and Central Excise
Departments;

–     officers of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985;

–     officers of the stock exchange recognised
under Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956;

–     officers of the Reserve Bank of India;

–    police officers;

–     officers of the Enforcement Directorate;

–    officers of the SEBI;

–     officers of any other body corporate
constituted or established under a Central or a State Act; and

–     such other officers of the Central
Government, State Government, local authorities or banking companies as the
Central Government may, by notification, specify, in this behalf.

 

6.3     Scope
of the powers of the Authorities

 

The powers of the abovementioned four authorities are not unfettered.

 

The authorities are required to exercise the powers and perform all or
any of the functions conferred on, or assigned to them under the Act or
the prescribed rules.

 

6.3.1   Authorities
to have powers of a Civil Court

 

The Authorities have the powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908
, while trying a suit in respect of the following
six matters:

–    discovery and inspection;

–     enforcing attendance of any person,
including any official of a banking company or a public financial institution
or any other intermediary or reporting entity, and examining him on oath;

–     compelling the production of books of
account and other documents;

–    issuing commissions;

–     receiving evidence on affidavits; and

–     any other prescribed matter.

 

7.     SCOPE OF PRACTICE FOR CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

Section 48 of the Act deals with “Right to representation”.
A person preferring an appeal to the Tribunal may choose to appear in person.
He is also free to take assistance of an authorised representative of his
choice to present his case before the Tribunal.

 

It is provided that any of the following persons may be authorised by
the appellant to appear on his behalf –

–     a relative or employee.

–     any officer of a scheduled bank with which
the appellant maintains an account or has other regular dealings.

–    any legal practitioner who is entitled to
practice in any civil court in India.

–     any person who has passed
theCBDT-recognised accountancy examination

–    any person who has acquired the
CBDT-prescribed educational qualifications.

 

8.     CASE STUDY: HOME LOAN – WHETHER BENAMI
TRANSACTION

In case of home loan, the following facts are observed:

–    The lender provides funds to the home-owner
and debits the account of the borrower.

–     The borrower (buyer) does not hold the
property “for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect,” of
the lender.

–     It is not intended that the lender will be
the real owner while the borrower will be mere name-lender.

–     Lender’s intention is only to get the
repayment of loan in scheduled instalments (including interest).

–     Lender will have charge on the property
till the loan is repaid with interest.

 

The moot issue is: whether the fact that the consideration for the
property is provided by the lender (who is a person other than the person in
whose name property is registered), will make the property the benami property?

 

The abovementioned facts show that the case of home loan will not fall
within the definition of ‘benami transaction’ under the Act.This
proposition is supported by the Supreme Court[4].

 

The legal position will not be any different where the loan is given for
purchase of a house under construction. For such loan, tripartite agreement is
entered into by the parties viz., lender, borrower, builder/developer/seller.

 

9.     PUNITIVE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

One may now review the rigorous punitive provisions of the Act
reflected in imprisonment and fine for certain offences [sections 3, 53 and
54
of the Act].The implications of these punitive provisions are
reviewed, as follows.

 

9.1     Section
3

 

Section 3(2) provides punishment for breaching the prohibition on benami
transactions. Punishment for entering into any benami transaction is
imprisonment uptothree years or with fine or both.

 

9.1.1     Punishment for transaction after 1st
November 2016

 

Section 3(3) provides different punishment for the benami
transaction entered into after 1st November, 2016.

 

Whosoever enters into any benami transaction on or after 1st
November 2016 is punishable u/s. 53, 54 and 55 which deal with the following
three aspects.

–    53: Penalty for benami
transaction

–    54: Penalty for false
information

–    55: Previous sanction

 

9.1.2     Overriding
nature of this punishment

 

Section 3(3) overrides section 3(2) [see the non-obstante expression in
section 3(3), viz., “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2),
….
]

Thus, in respect of the benami transactions entered into after 1st
November, 2016, the punishment mentioned in section 3(2) will not apply. The
punishment for such transactions will be determined in accordance with the
provisions of sections 53, 54 and 55.

 

9.1.3     Enquiry
by tax department into the source of

purchase of benami property – not barred

 

Punishment u/s. 3 does not prevent the tax department from enquiring
into the real ownership of property for tax purposes. Section 4 of the Act
merely nullifies the possibility of setting up of a claim of Benami in
any suit, claim or action between the real owner and the benamidar. A
proceeding for the purpose of tax assessment in which the question of benami
arises, however, does not partake of such claim, action, etc.

 

The tax department is concerned mainly with inquiring into the source of
investment in property for the purpose of assessment of income under the Income-tax
Act,
and ascertaining the person who made such investment: the assessee or
the benamidar.

 

Accordingly, prohibitions in sections 3 and 4 of the Benami Act
do not bar the enquiry by the tax officer into the source of investment in benami
property. The enquiry by the tax officer is to ascertain whether the investment
was made by the assesse. The benami character of the acquisition of the
property is merely secondary aspect in such inquiry. Any finding on such
secondary aspect is merely incidental[5].

 

9.2     Section
53

 

For convenience of reference, section 53 is extracted here.

 

53.  Penalty for benami
transaction

 

(1)  Where any person enters into a
benami transaction in order to defeat the
provisions of any law or to avoid payment of statutory dues or to avoid payment
to creditors,
the beneficial owner, benamidar and any other person who
abets or induces any person to enter into the benami transaction, shall be guilty of the offence of benami transaction.

(2)  Whoever is found guilty of the
offence of benami transaction referred to in sub-section (1) shall be
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine which may
extend to twenty-five per cent of the fair market value of the property.(Emphasis
supplied)

 

Section 53 (1) which is deemed to have come into force on 19th
May 1988, provides penal consequences where any person enters into a benami
transaction for any of the following three purposes.

–    to defeat the provisions of any law;

–     to avoid payment of statutory dues; 

–    to avoid payment to creditors


9.2.1   Persons guilty of the offence

According to section 53(1), three persons are guilty of the offence of
Benami transaction, viz,

–     the beneficial owner,

–     benamidar, and

–    any other person who abets or induces any
person to enter into Benami transaction.

 

9.2.2     Quantum
of punishment

 

Section 53(2) provides punishment for the offence of benami
transaction, viz, rigorous imprisonment for a term ranging from one year to
seven years.

 

The person guilty of the offence of benami transaction will also be
liable to fine which may extend to 25% of the fair market value of the
property. For this purpose, “fair market value” is the price that the
property would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date of the
transaction. Where the benami property is unquoted equity shares, their
market value will be determined in accordance with Rule 3(1) of the Prohibition
of Benami Transactions Rules, 2016
.

 

9.2.3     Difference
in the quantum of punishment:

Section 53(2) vs. Section 3(2):


Punishment for entering into benami transaction is by way of imprisonment for a
term that may extend to three years. Violation of section 3(1) may be
additionally punishable with fine. However, levying fine is optional.

When we look at the punishment provided in section 53(2) for benami transaction
entered into for any one or more of the three purposes mentioned in section
53(1), the following rigours of section 53(2) become apparent when compared
with the penalty u/s. 3(2).

–    Firstly, section 53(2) provides
punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a term of one to seven years. However,
in section 3(2), it is simple imprisonment that may extend upto three years.

–     Secondly, additional punishment
under section 53(2) by way of fine up to twenty-five percent of fair market
value of the property is mandatory and not optional. On the other hand, in
section 3(2), fine is optional.

9.2.4   Overriding
nature of section 53

 

According to section 3(3), in respect of Benami transactions
entered into on or after 1st November 2016, section 53 shall apply
not withstanding anything contained in section 3(2). Accordingly, Chapter VII
(Sections 53, 54 and 55) overrides only section 3(2) and not sections 3(1), 4,
5 and 6.

 

Thus, the rigorous imprisonment and fine specified in Chapter VII are
attracted only to the benami transactions entered into on or after 1
November, 2016 to defeat the provisions of any law or to avoid payment of
statutory dues or to avoid payment to creditors. However, the legal
consequences specified in sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 in respect of benami
transactions or benami properties will operate irrespective of the motive for
entering into the transaction.

 

9.2.5     Prosecution
of transferor – only in specified cases

 

A moot question that needs to be addressed is: can the transferor of a
benami property be prosecuted u/s. 53 of
the Act?

 

The transferor would be prosecuted only if he has abetted or induced any
person to enter into Benami transaction for any of the following three
purposes.

–     to defeat the provisions of any law

–    to avoid payment of statutory dues

–    to avoid payment to creditors.

 

This is indicated by the words in section 53(1) “beneficial owner,
benamidar and any other person who abets or induces any person to enter into
benami transaction, shall be guilty of the offence”.

 

In the context of the abovementioned three purposes, one may also note
the relevance of the following provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

 

Section

Subject

415

Cheating

421

Dishonest or
fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent distribution among
creditors

422

Dishonestly or
fraudulently preventing debt being available for creditors

423

Dishonest or
fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of
consideration

424

Dishonest or
fraudulent removal or concealment of property

 

 

9.2.6     Fraudulent
Transfers punishable

 

Now, fraudulent transfers are made specifically punishable u/s.
53 of the Act. Indeed, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 empowers
the Court to set aside transfers in fraud of creditors and transfers in fraud
of subsequent transferees[6].

 

9.3     Penalty
for furnishing false information

 

Any person who is required to furnish information under the Act knowingly
gives any false information to any authority or furnishes any false document in
any proceeding under the Act is punishable with rigorous imprisonment
for a term ranging from six months to five years and shall further be liable to
fine that may extend to ten percent of the fair market value of the property.

 

“Fair market value” is the price that the property would ordinarily
fetch when sold in open market on the date of the transaction. If Benami
property is unquoted equity shares, their fair market value will be determined
in accordance with rule 3 of Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions
Rules, 2016
.

 

9.4    Previous sanction for prosecution

 

Previous sanction of the Board is mandatory for instituting prosecution
against any person in respect of any offence u/s. 3, 53, or 54.

 

10.   CONCLUSION

In past, the debates in Parliament and the observations in the Law
Commission Reports always lamented that the then law was toothless. The
administration of the old Benami Law was found ineffective. There were no
deterrents to the persons indulging in benami transactions.

 

All shortcomings of the erstwhile benami legislation have been taken
care of in the Act that came into force on 1st November 2016.
The Government is determined to remove the evil of the benami transactions by
implementing provisions of the Act with all its deterrent and penal
remedies.


It is reported that so far, investigation has led to discovery of substantial
illicit money parked in benami properties valued at several hundred crores.
Show cause notices have been issued in a number of cases. Provisional attachments
have been made of benami properties totalling Rs 1,500 crores and the matters
are being pursued vigorously.  
 



[1] Rajagopal Reddy (R)
vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan (1995) 213 ITR 340 (SC)

[2] See: Section 2, The
Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance,
1988

[3] P RamanathAiyer’s
Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition (2001)

[4] Pawan Kumar Gupta
vs. RochiramNagdeo (1999) 4 SCC 243; AIR 1999 SC 1823

[5] CIT vs. K Mahion
(1995) 213 ITR 820 (Ker)

[6] See Law Commission
of India 57th Report: 7 August 1973, Paragraph 5.8

1 Article 5(2)(g) of India-Cyprus DTAA – auxiliary and preparatory activity undertaken prior to awarding of the contract cannot be reckoned for computing threshold for existence of PE.

TS-426-ITAT-2018

Bellsea Ltd vs.
ADIT

A.Y: 2008-09, Date
of Order: 6th July, 2018

 

Article 5(2)(g) of
India-Cyprus DTAA – auxiliary and preparatory activity undertaken prior to
awarding of the contract cannot be reckoned for computing threshold for
existence of PE.

 

Facts

The Taxpayer was a
company incorporated in Cyprus mainly engaged in the business of dredging and
pipeline related services for oil and gas installations. During the year under
consideration, Taxpayer was awarded a contract by another foreign entity (FCo)
for placement of rock in seabed for protection of gas pipelines and umbilical1 of subsea structures in oil and gas field developed in
India.

 

On the basis that
construction work had started on 4th January 2008 as per the
contractual terms, and was completed on 30th September 2008 (i.e the
date of issuance of completion certificate as per the contract), the taxpayer
contended that it did not have any PE in India. Accordingly, it did not meet
the 12-month threshold for creation of installation PE under Article 5(2)(g) of
India- Cyprus DTAA.

 

However, the AO
contended that 12-month threshold should be computed from September 2007, when
one of the employees of the Taxpayer visited India for the purpose of
collecting information, until November 2008 (as the formalities of final
completion certificate had extended upto November 2008, even though the date
mentioned in the completion certificate is 30th September 2008).
According to the AO, the presence was for a project which lasted for more than
12 months and triggered Installation PE.

_______________________________________________________-

1     A subsea umbilical is a bundle of cables and
conduits that transfer hydraulic, and electric power within the field (long
distances), or from topsides to subsea. They also carry chemicals for subsea injection,
and gas for artificial lift.

 

 

The Dispute
Resolution Panel (DRP), confirmed AO’s order and held that Taxpayer’s
activities triggered an installation PE in India. Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed
before the Tribunal.

 

Held

On date of
commencement of activities for computation of 12-month threshold

 

–     Article 5(2)(g) ostensibly
refers to activity-based PE. Hence, the duration of 12 months per se is
activity specific qua the site, construction, assembly or installation
project.

 

–     Auxiliary and Preparatory
work like pre-survey engineering, investigation of site, etc., for tendering
purpose without actually entering into the contract and without carrying out
any activity of economic substance or active work qua that project
cannot be construed as carrying out any activity of installation or
construction. Any kind of active work of preparatory or auxiliary nature could
be counted for determining the time period only if such work is undertaken
after the contract has been awarded/ assigned.

 

–     Further, no evidence was
placed on record to suggest that the Taxpayer had installed any project office
or developed a site for carrying out the preparatory work before entering into
the contract with FCo.

 

–    The performance of the
activities in connection with installation project or site, etc., commences
when the actual purpose of the business activity had started (which happened to
be 4th January, 2008 in the present case) and not before that as the
preparatory work if any, was for tendering purpose and to get the contract.

 

–    Reliance was placed on
decision of National Petroleum Construction Company (386 ITR 648) wherein,
the Delhi HC analysed similar provision appearing in Article 5(2)(h) of
Indo-UAE DTAA and held that any activity which may be related or incidental,
but was not carried out at the site in the source country would clearly not be
construed as a PE. Albeit, preparatory work at the site itself can be counted
for the purpose of determining duration of PE. However, in the present case,
there is no such allegation or material on record that any kind of preparatory
work had started at the installation sites prior to January 2008.

 

On date of
completion of activities for computation of 12 month threshold

 

–     The activity qua
the project comes to an end when the work gets completed and the responsibility
of the contractor with respect to that activity comes to end. The following
facts suggest that activity of the Taxpayer qua the project as per the
terms of contract had come to an end on or before 30th September,
2008;

 

•     Last sail out of barge/vessel was on 25th
September 2008 and Customs authorities also certified the demobilisation by
this date

 

•     All the payments relating to contract work
were received by the Taxpayer much before the closing of September, 2008

 

•     Even though final completion certificate
was issued in November 2008, the completion certificate itself mentioned the
date of completion as 30th September, 2008.

 

•     Also, there was nothing on record to
suggest that any activity post-completion was carried on or the project was not
completely abandoned before the completion of the period of 12 months.

 

–     Thus, 12-month threshold
period was not exceeded in the present case. Consequently, no PE can be said to
have been established under Article 5(2)(g).

2 Sections 2(47) and 54 – Condition regarding purchase of new property within one year of transfer of old property – Date of agreement to sale was considered as the date of transfer and not the date of conveyance deed.

Gautam Jhunjhunwala
vs. Income-tax Officer (Kolkata)

Members:  A. T. Varkey, (J. M.) and Dr A. L. Saini (A.
M.)

ITA No.:
1356/Kol/2017

A. Y: 
2012-13  Dated: 7th
September, 2018

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  P. R. Kothari / Rabin Choudhury

 


Sections 2(47) and 54 – Condition regarding
purchase of new property within one year of transfer of old property – Date of
agreement to sale  was considered as the
date of transfer and not the date of conveyance deed.

 

Facts

The assessee is an individual, who had sold
a flat vide deed of conveyance dated 26/27.12.2011. The sale deed was executed
in pursuance of an agreement to sale which was executed on 16.09.2011. The deed
of conveyance was registered while the agreement to sale was not
registered. 

 

The assessee had purchased a new residential
flat on 04.10.2010.  The AO took the date
of registration of the property sold as the date of transfer i.e. 26/27.12.2011
and since the new property was purchased on 04.10.2010, which, according to the
AO, was not within the period of one year from the date of transfer of the old
asset, he denied the benefit of section 54. 
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

 

Held

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Sanjeev
Lal vs. CIT (Civil Appeal No. 5899-5900 of 2014 dated 01.07.2014))
, the
Tribunal observed that by entering into an agreement to sale, some right which
the assessee had in respect of the capital asset in question had been
extinguished, because after execution of the agreement to sale, it would not be
open to the assessee to sell the property to others in accordance with the law.

 

The vendee gets a right to get the property
transferred in his favour by filing a suit under Specific Performance Act.
Thus, according to the Tribunal, a right in respect of the capital asset (old
residential property in question) had been transferred by the assessee in
favour of the vendee/transferee on 16.09.2011. 
And since purchase of the new property was on 04.10.2010, it was held
that the purchase of the property was well within one year from the date of
transfer as per section 2(47) of the Act.

 

As regards a question as to the
admissibility or otherwise of the agreement to sell as an evidence in a suit
for specific performance, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of S. Kaladevi vs. V. R. Somasundaram & others (Civil Appeal No.
3192 of 2010 dated 12.04.2010)
, the Tribunal noted that  the agreement to sell can be a basis for a
suit for specific performance in view of section 49 of the Registration
Act.  Thus, though the agreement to sell
was not registered, the vendee can seek decree of specific performance on the
basis of unregistered agreement to sell.

 

1 Section 206C – Assessee defaulted in collection of tax at source for which AO took action after seven years – When no limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action and passing the order, held that the same has to be done within a reasonable time which according to the Tribunal was four years.

Eid Mohammad Nizamuddin vs.
Income Tax Officer (Jaipur)

Members:
Vijay Pal Rao (J. M.) and
Vikram Singh Yadav (A. M.)

ITA NO.
248 and 316 /JP/2018

A. Y:
2009-10. Dated: 29th August, 2018

Counsel
for Assessee / revenue: Mahendra
Gargieya and Fazlur Rahman /  J.C.
Kulhari

 

Section 206C – Assessee defaulted in collection
of tax at source for which AO took action after seven years – When no
limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action and passing the
order, held that the same has to be done within a reasonable time which
according to the Tribunal was four years.

 

Facts

The assessee is a partnership firm, engaged
in the business of manufacturing and trading of Bidi. During the course of
survey proceedings, it was detected that for the F.Y. 2008-09 relevant to
assessment year 2009-10, the assessee firm was liable to collect tax at source
(TCS) @ 5% on sale of tendu leaves as per provisions of section 206C(1) but it
defaulted for non-collecting of TCS. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer
proceeded to pass order u/s. 206C(6)/206C(7) on 30/03/2016 whereby the assessee
was held as “assessee in default” within the meaning of section 206C(6) read
with section 206C(7) for non-collection of tax of Rs. 98.84 lakhs, including
interest. The assessee challenged the order passed by the Assessing Officer
before the CIT(A) and also raised objection against the validity of the said
order on the ground of limitation. The CIT(A) rejected the ground of limitation
however, granted part relief to the assessee to the extent of return of income
filed by the purchaser of tendu leaves, for which they issued Form No. 27BA.
Hence, the assessee as well as the revenue, being aggrieved by the order of the
CIT(A), filed the appeal and the cross appeal. One of the grounds of appeal by
the assessee was about the validity of the order passed by the Assessing
Officer.  According to it, the order
passed by the Assessing Officer was barred by limitation. The Tribunal decided
to take the said ground first as it was the root of the matter.

 

The assessee’s contention was that the order
passed by the Assessing Officer on 30/3/2016 was barred by limitation even
though the provisions contained u/s 206C did not prescribe any time limit for
initiation of proceedings or for passing order. However, according to the
revenue, when no limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action
and passing the order u/s. 206C, then there was no bar on the jurisdiction and
power of the Assessing Officer to pass the order.

 

Held

According to
the Tribunal, non-providing the limitation in the statute would not confer the
jurisdiction/powers to the Assessing Officer to pass order u/s. 206C at any
point of time. As otherwise, the Assessing Officer would get an unfettered
powers to take action at any point till an indefinite period which would defy
or defeat the very purpose and scheme of the statute. According to the
Tribunal, the analogy and reasoning given in the decisions of various High
Courts (listed below) in respect of the limitation for passing the order u/s.
201 was also applicable for considering the reasonable time period for passing
the order u/s. 206C. According to the Tribunal, the provisions of sections 201
and 206C have the same scheme and object, being the measures against the
avoidance of tax by the opposite parties with whom the assessee had the
transactions. Hence, applying the reasonable period of limitation as four years
within which the Assessing Officer should pass the order u/s. 206C(6)/206C(7),
the Tribunal held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer on 30/3/2016
was beyond the said reasonable period of limitation and consequently invalid,
being barred by limitation.

 

Cases relied on by the tribunal:

CIT vs. NHK Japan Broadcasting 305 ITR
137 (Delhi);

Vodafone Essar Mobile Services Ltd. vs.
Union of India & ors. (2016) 385 ITR 436 (Del);

Tata Teleservices vs. Union of India
& Anr. (2016) 385 ITR 497 (Guj);

CIT (TDS) vs. Anagram Wellington Assets
Management Co. Ltd. (2016) 389 ITR 654 (Guj);

CIT vs. U.B. Electronics Instruments Ltd.
(2015) 371 ITR 314 (AP);

CIT(TDS) & Anr. vs. Bharat Hotels
Limited (2016) 384 ITR 77 (Karn.)
.

6 Section 37(1) – In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the AO to substantiate that the payment of insurance premium of employees’ family members in terms of employment rules framed by the assessee company had no nexus with business of the assessee, it could hardly be said that the impugned expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, which is the real intent of section 37(1).

[2018] 96 taxmann.com 483
(Delhi)

Loesche
India (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No. :
295/Delhi/2016

A. Y:
2010-11    
Dated: 13th August, 2018


Section 37(1)
– In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the AO to substantiate
that the payment of insurance premium of employees’ family members in terms of
employment rules framed by the assessee company had no nexus with business of
the assessee, it could hardly be said that the impugned expenditure was not
incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, which is the real
intent of section 37(1).

           

FACTS

The assessee company engaged in business of
Design & Engineering, manufacturing and trading of vertical roller grinding
mill systems & components thereof for cement, steel, power plants and other
mineral based industries filed its return of income declaring total income of
Rs. 19,12,54,863.  In the course of
assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that amount of Rs.
15,48,654 has been claimed on account of medical insurance.  He called upon the assessee to furnish
details of relations of employees in respect of whom insurance premium has been
paid and also to show cause why it should not be disallowed on the ground that
it is gratuitious and not on commercial lines since obligation of the employee
has been met by the employer.  Upon
perusal of the list of relatives who had been insured, the AO noticed that
medical insurance premium has been paid to insure health of mother-in-law of
the Managing Director apart from his independent children and also towards
married sisters of other directors of the assessee company. He held that the
assessee had adopted an inequitable and unreasonable system by bearing the
medical insurance expenses of only the relatives of key managerial persons and
their distant family members.  Relying on
the decisions of Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Indian Express
Newspapers (Madurai) (P.) Ltd. [1999] 104 Taxman 578
and Calcutta High
Court in M D Jindal vs. CIT [1986] 28 Taxman 509 (Delhi), he held that
he was entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity in order to ascertain the
actual intention. He distinguished the case law of Bombay High Court in the
case of Mahindra & Mahindra on which reliance was placed by the
assessee since the instant benefit was not for achieving the purpose of
corporate social responsibility but in the instant case it was to benefit a few
selected employees.  Even otherwise,
since the employees had not offered what amounted to be perquisites in their
hands u/s. 17(2)(iv), he was of the view that these were not business expenses
qualifying for deduction u/s. 37(1).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the record
reveals that the assessee had paid the insurance premiums of the employees’
family members in terms of employment rules framed by the assessee-company
therefor.  Therefore, it can hardly be
said that the impugned expenditure were not incurred wholly and exclusively for
the purpose of business, which is the real intent of section 37(1).  The Tribunal further observed that the
authorities below have not brought any evidence on record to substantiate that
the payments so made by the assessee-company had no nexus with the business of
the assessee.  Even otherwise, it is not
necessary that all the payments/expenditure incurred by the assessee should
have a direct bearing on earning of income, but some payments are also made
under certain business expediency.  It
noted that the payments claimed to have been made for insurance premium of such
members who have attained the age of 21 years or more or who are the remote
relations of the assesse have already been offered by the assessee to tax
before the CIT(A).  It observed that the
authorities below appear to have rejected the claim of the assessee that these
payments were in the nature of perquisites to the employees as contemplated
u/s. 17(2)(iv), according to which any obligation which, but for such payment,
would have been payable by the assessee, shall be included in perquisites.
However, in view of proviso (iii) & (iv) appended to this section clearly
prohibit application of section 17(2) in certain eventualities contained in
these provisos. The Tribunal held that in view of the attending facts and
circumstances of the case and the provisions of law, noted above, there is no
justification in the findings reached by the authorities below for rejecting
the deduction of impugned expenditure claimed by the assessee. Therefore, there
is no justification to discard the impugned claim of the assessee u/s.
37(1). 

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

5 Section 23 – In case of a property construction whereof is not fully in accordance with the sanctioned plan and some alteration is required to bring it under proper plan, benefit of vacancy allowance u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act needs to be allowed in respect of the period taken for carrying out necessary alterations.

[2018] 96 taxmann.com 476
(Mumbai)

Saif Ali
Khan Pataudi vs. ACIT

ITA No.:
5811/Mum/2016

A. Y:
2012-13  
Dated: 21st August, 2018


Section 23 – In case of a property
construction whereof is not fully in accordance with the sanctioned plan and
some alteration is required to bring it under proper plan, benefit of vacancy
allowance u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act needs to be allowed in respect of the period
taken for carrying out necessary alterations.

           

Facts

The assessee owned a residential flat in a
society. The assessee considered the annual value of this flat to be Rs.
4,00,000. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the
assessee held that considering the size of the flat and its location, the
amount of rent estimated by the assessee to be its annual value was low. The AO
adopted 7% of the value of the investment in the flat to be its annual value.
Accordingly, he computed Rs. 81,08,802 to be the annual value of the flat under
consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) where the assessee argued that the building in which the house
was situated has been constructed unauthorisedly as per letter dated 9.2.2012
of Executive Engineer, Building Proposal (WS), `H’ Ward, Municipal Corporation
of Central Mumbai. It contended that the annual value shown by the assessee be
accepted and addition made by the AO deleted. He noted that as per the
valuation report filed by the assessee, the annual value of the property has
been estimated to be Rs. 11,86,723. The CIT(A) held that the alteration
required to be done to remove the unauthorised construction was minor.
Referring to the rent of another flat in the same building, the CIT(A) computed
the annual value to be Rs. 50,40,000.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that the
assessee was not able to let out the property and hence vacancy allowance be
granted. It was also submitted that there were some inherent defects in
construction of the property. The deficiency was pointed out by the authorities
and it was necessary to remove the deficiencies in order to bring the property
in accordance with the approved plan. Since defects were subsisting there was
reasonable cause why the flat would not be let out. It was also pointed out
that subsequently substantial expenditure was incurred by the assessee in order
to bifurcate the property into 3 flats in order to rent the same. In order to
avoid litigation the assessee was agreeable to offer Rs. 11,83,723 as annual
value, as computed by the assessee’s valuer.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has
partly rejected the assessee’s plea that the assessee was under an obligation
to remove certain unauthorised construction / defects done by the builder in
order to bring the construction under appropriate permission and sanction.  It observed that the CIT(A) has admitted that
certain defects were there but he has found the same to be minor.  No details whatsoever has been brought by the
CIT(A) in considering the defects to be dissected between major and minor.  Once when it is accepted that the construction
was not fully in accordance with the plan and some alteration was required to
bring it under proper plan, it has to be accepted that the flat was not in a
position to be let out dehors the removal of the defects.

 

The Tribunal held that there were certain
defects in the construction of the flat under the sanctioned plan, the removal
of which was necessary. Letting out a house which is not constructed as per an
approved plan cannot be forced upon an assessee.  Furthermore, subsequently the assessee has incurred
over Rs. 50 lakh for alteration of the flat which resulted in the bifurcation
of the flat into three parts. This oxygenates the assessee’s claim that the
premises required alteration in order to be properly let out.  It held that the plea made on behalf of the
assessee cannot be said to be spurious, vexatious, mere bluster or frivolous.
It held that the assessee deserves vacancy allowance u/s. 23(1)(c). 

 

Considering the ratio of the decision of the
Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2008] 110 ITD 158 (Mum.)
, the Tribunal held that the assessee should be
granted vacancy allowance.  However,
since the assessee had in its grounds of appeal agreed to offer Rs. 11,83,723
to be the annual value of the property, the proposal of the assessee was
accepted and the order of CIT(A) was held to be modified accordingly.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

4 Section 23(1)(a) – Provisions of section 23(1)(a) cannot be applied to a property constructed by the assessee, construction whereof was completed in the month of February and property remained unsold and vacant, as it is not possible to let out property just after its completion i.e. only after one month.

[2018] 97 taxmann.com 214 (Jaipur)

Raj
Landmark (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No.:
242/Jp/2018

A. Y:
2013-14
Dated: 24th August, 2018


Section 23(1)(a) – Provisions of section
23(1)(a) cannot be applied to a property constructed by the assessee,
construction whereof was completed in the month of February and property
remained unsold and vacant, as it is not possible to let out property just
after its completion i.e. only after one month.


FACTS

The assessee, a private limited company,
engaged in the business of real estate development constructed a commercial
complex, construction whereof was completed in February 2013 and which remained
unsold and vacant for one month during the previous year 2012-13. The Assessing
Officer (AO) computed the annual value of this property to be Rs. 9 lakh for
the month of March 2013. Since the construction of the property was completed
only in February 2013, the AO determined estimated rental income only for a
period of one month. 

 

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to
the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.


HELD

The Tribunal noted that the commercial
complex under consideration was held by the assessee as its stock-in-trade. It
noted that it was not the allegation of the AO that the assessee has
deliberately not let out the property in question under consideration. The
Tribunal, observed that without going into the controversy as to applicability
of section 23 in respect of a property held as stock-in-trade, it came to the
conclusion that it is not a case of keeping the property vacant from year after
year but the project was completed in Feb 2013. It observed that reasonably
expected rent envisaged by section 23(1)(a) itself signifies the possibility of
letting out of the property and also that there is a time lag between the
completion of construction of the property and letting out the property
thereafter. It is not practically possible to let out the property on the next
day of completion of construction or acquisition of the property. It held that
in a case when there is no possibility of any deliberate or unreasonable delay
in letting out the property then it is not expected to fetch a reasonable rent
just after completion of the project in question. Moreover, the present case
was not one of letting out a small space of the house but the entire project
was completed by assessee in the month of Feb 2013 and therefore the provisions
of section 23(1)(a) itself would not be workable in such a case for want of
immediate letting out the property just after its completion.

 

The Tribunal noted that the Legislature has
also recognised this aspect while inserting section 23(5) by Finance Act, 2017
w.e.f. 1.4.2018 allowing vacancy allowance of one year from the end of the
financial year in which certificate of completion of construction of the
property is obtained from the competent authority.

 

Though s/s. (5) is not applicable for
assessment year under consideration, however, it is not a case of allowing the
vacancy allowance in respect of the property held as stock-in-trade but it is
the fundamental issue of determination of notional annual letting value just
after completion of construction of the property held as stock-in-trade. The
Tribunal noted that without allowing a reasonable period or time gap from the
completion of construction of property held as stock-in-trade to let out the
same, the property cannot reasonably be expected to be let from year to year
and fetch fair market rent just after completion of construction.

 

The Tribunal held that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, section 23(1)(a) cannot be applied to the property
in question due to the peculiar reason that the completion certificate was
obtained only in Feb 2013 and it is not expected to let out the property just
after completion of the project and, therefore reasonable expected rent to be
fetched by the property in question is not possible immediately after the
completion without allowing a reasonable period, which is also recognised by
the Legislature.

 

The Tribunal deleted the addition made by
the AO on this account.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee were
allowed.



3 Section 271(1)(c) –Where satisfaction of AO while initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is with regard to alleged concealment of income by assessee, whereas imposition of penalty is for ‘concealment/furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’, levy of penalty is not sustainable

 
[2018] 195 TTJ (Asr)(TM) 1

HPCL Mittal Energy Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 
554 & 555/Asr/2014

A. Ys.: 
2008-09 & 2009-10  Dated: 20th
June, 2018


Section 271(1)(c) –Where satisfaction of AO
while initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is with regard to alleged
concealment of income by assessee, whereas imposition of penalty is for
‘concealment/furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’, levy of penalty is
not sustainable

 

FACTS

During the year under consideration, the AO
made disallowance of business loss; non-declaration of interest income from
deposits with banks and non-declaration of interest income on Fixed Deposit
Receipts (FDRs) as security given to the trial court. The additions were
confirmed by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal.

 

The penalty notice u/s. 274 was issued by
stating that the assessee ‘concealed the particulars of income’ with respect to
the above three disallowance/additions. However, the penalty order was passed
holding that ‘the assessee concealed the particulars of income/furnished
inaccurate particulars of such income’.

 

On appeal to CIT(A), the penalty order was
affirmed.

 

On further
appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee contended the penalty was not sustainable,
on the ground that the Assessing Officer levelled charge of ‘concealment of
income’ and also issued penalty notices on the same charge, but found the
assessee guilty in the penalty orders on a different and vague default of ‘concealment
of the particulars of income/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’.

 

The Judicial
Member concurred with the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee on
this preliminary legal ground and ordered deletion of penalty in his proposed common
order. On the other hand, Accountant Member passed order sustaining the penalty
on merits. On difference of opinion, matter was referred to the Third Member.

HELD

The Third Member held that the penalty
proceedings were separate from assessment proceedings, which got started with
the issue of notice u/s. 274 and concluded in the penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c).
Many a times, penalty initiated in the assessment order on one or more counts
by means of notice u/s. 274, was not eventually imposed by the AO on getting
satisfied with the explanation tendered by the assessee in the penalty
proceedings.

 

In any case,
confronting the assessee with the charge against him is sine qua non for
any valid penalty proceedings. It is only when the assessee was made aware of
such a charge against him that he could present his side.

 

It was evident that when the AO was
satisfied at the stage of initiation of penalty proceedings of a clear-cut
charge against the assessee in any of the three situations (say, concealment of
particulars of income), but imposed penalty by holding the assessee as guilty
of the other charge (say, furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income) or an
uncertain charge (concealment of particulars of income/furnishing of inaccurate
particulars of income), the penalty could not be sustained.

 

In the present
case, the Third Member held that the penalty was wrongly imposed and confirmed
and Judicial Member was justified in striking down all the penalty orders.

 

2 Section 11 & 13(1)(d) – It is only the income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5), that is liable to be taxed; violation of section 13(1)(d) does not result in the denial of exemption u/s. 11 to the total income of the assessee.

[2018] 194 TTJ (Del) 715

ITO vs. The Times Centre for Media and
Management Studies

ITA No.: 
1389/Del/2015

A. Y.: 
2010-11    Dated: 31st
May, 2018

Section 11 & 13(1)(d) – It is only the
income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of
section 11(5), that is liable to be taxed; violation of section 13(1)(d) does
not result in the denial of exemption u/s. 11 to the total income of the
assessee. 

 

FACTS

The assessee was a charitable institution in
terms of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and also registered u/s. 12AA(1)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the year under consideration the assessee
had received a donation of 50,000 shares worth Rs.2,00,000 from Angelo Rhodes
Ltd. (United Kingdom) way back in 1996 and had received dividend income of
Rs.2,36,000.



The AO proceeded to deny the exemption u/s. 11(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
for violation of provision of section 13(1)(d) r.w s. 11(5) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 pertaining to mode of investment.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) granted the assessee the
benefit of exemption on all income except the impugned amount of Rs.2,36,000.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it was well settled
that where investments or deposits had been made by a charitable trust which
were in violation of section 11(5), the benefit of exemption u/s. 11 would not
be denied on the entire income of the assessee and only the
investments/deposits made in violation of provisions of section 11(5) would
attract maximum marginal rate of tax.

 

The Tribunal followed the ratio of the
Hon’ble High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Fr. Mullers Charitable
Institutions (2014) 102 DTR (Kal) 386
wherein while dealing with an
identical issue it was held that a reading of section 13(1)(d) made it clear
that it was only the income from such investment or deposit which had been made
in violation of section 11(5) that was liable to be taxed and that the
violation u/s. 13(1)(d) did not tantamount to denial of exemption u/s. 11 on
the total income of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal relying upon the judgement of
the Hon’ble High Court, held that in the present case the maximum marginal rate
of tax would apply only to the dividend income from shares held in
contravention of section 13(1)(d) and not to the entire income.  

1 Section 56(2)(viia) – Provisions of section 56(2)(viia) are attracted only in case of “shares of any other company”

[2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 746

Vora Financial Services (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 532/Mum/2018

A. Y.: 2014-15     Dated: 29th June, 2018


Section 56(2)(viia) – Provisions of section
56(2)(viia) are attracted only in case of “shares of any other company” and
could not be its own shares as own shares cannot become property of the
recipient company; buy-back of own shares by a company cannot attract the
provisions of section 56(2)(viia) as the same does not satisfy the tests of
“becoming property” and “shares of any other company”

 

FACTS

During the year under consideration the
assessee made an offer to existing shareholders for buy-back of 25% of its
existing share capital at a price of Rs.26 per share. One of the directors of
the company offered 12,19,075 shares under the buy-back scheme for a
consideration of Rs.3,16,95,950 on 24.05.2013. The AO noticed that the book
value of shares as on 31.03.2013 was Rs.32.80 per share, whereas the
assessee-company had bought back the shares at Rs.26 per share.

 

The AO observed
that consideration of Rs. 3,16,95,950 had been reinvested in the company in the
form of loan. Hence, the AO took the view that the entire exercise was carried
out to reduce the liability of the company by purchasing shares below the fair
market value. Accordingly, the AO assessed the difference between the book
value of shares and purchase price of shares amounting to Rs.82,89,710 lakhs as
income of the assessee company u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the action of
the AO.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that a combined reading of
section 56(2)(viia) and the memorandum explaining the provision of it would
show that the section 56(2)(viia) would be attracted when “a firm or
company (not being a company in which public are substantially
interested)” receives a “property, being shares in a company (not
being a company in which public are substantially interested)”.

 

Therefore, the shares should become
“property” of recipient company and in that case, it should be shares
of any other company and could not be its own shares. Own shares could not
become the property of the recipient company.

 

Accordingly, section 56(2)(viia) would be
applicable only in cases where the receipt of shares became property in the
hands of recipient and the shares would become property of the recipient only
if they were “shares of any other company”.

 

In the instant case, the assessee had
purchased its own shares under buyback scheme and the same had been
extinguished by reducing the capital and hence the tests of “becoming
property” and also “shares of any other company” failed in this
case. Accordingly, the Tribunal took a view that the tax authorities were not
justified in invoking the section 56(2)(viia) for buyback of own shares.

In the result, the Tribunal set aside the
order passed by CIT(A) on this issue and directed the AO to delete the addition
made u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

4 Section 36(1)(vii): Bad debt- Write-off of bad debts were held to be allowable – and there is no obligation on the assessee to establish that debt had became bad.

1.     Hinduja Ventures Ltd vs.
DCIT [ Income tax Appeal no 270 of 2008, Dated: 2nd August, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[Hinduja
Ventures Ltd vs. DCIT; dated 24/08/2006; Mum. 
ITAT ]


After
the  close of accounting year, the
assessee had received money which it had written off as bad debts in its
accounts. Thus claim for deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Act was disallowed. It
is an agreed position between the parties that after the Amendment with effect
from 1.4.1981 to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, there is no requirement in law
that the Assessee must establish that the debt infact has become irrecoverable.

 

This as
requirement of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act to claim deduction on account of
bad debts is for the Assessee to write off the debt as irrecoverable in its
account. This is as held by the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. vs. CIT (2010)
323 ITR 397
. 

 

In this
case, it is undisputed position that the assessee had written off bad debts in
its account for the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year and
claimed deduction u/s. 36(1)(vii) of the Act. Thus, the fact that the amounts
written off as bad debts were recovered subsequent to the end of the accounting
year would not justify the Revenue to disallow the deduction on the ground that
the debt written off was not infact bad debt. In a similar circumstance, this
Court in CIT vs. Star Chemicals (Bombay) P. Ltd. [2009] 313 ITR 126 (Bom)
placed reliance upon Circular No.551 dated 23.1.1990 issued by the CBDT to
conclude that once the Assessee has written off debts as bad debts then the
requirement of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act are satisfied. There is no
requirement  to establish that the debt
was infact bad.

 

The tax on
the amount written off as bad debts in the previous year subject to relevant
Assessment Year has been offered to tax in the year the amounts were recovered
i.e. in the subsequent Assessment Year. The assessee  appeal was 
allowed.
 

 

3 Section 264 : Revision– fresh claim of the deduction can be entertained – delay in filing the Revision Application – for reasonable cause it should have been condoned – order rejecting the revision application was set aside.


1.    Dwarikesh Sugar Industries
Ltd vs. DCIT [ Writ Petition no 1206 of 2018, Dated: 12th July, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 


The
assessee is engaged in manufacture of sugar. It purchases sugarcane from
farmers through various Societies established by the State Government under the
U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Rules, 1954. The assessee
is required to pay commission to the above Societies from whom sugarcane is
procured. During the year, the assessee paid the Societies, the Commission
under the Sugarcane Act upto January, 2012. However, the assessee was under a
belief that the State Government would announce waiver of commission to be paid
to the Society under the Sugarcane Act for the months of February and March,
2012. In the above view, the assessee did not claim deduction on account of the
above accrued liability in its assessment for A.Y. 2012-13. However, the waiver
as expected from the State Government did not come. On the contrary, on 19th
June, 2012 the State Government called upon the assessee to pay the Commission
of Rs.4.25 crores payable to the sugarcane Societies for having acquired
sugarcane from them during February and March, 2012. In the aforesaid
circumstances, during the previous year relevant to A.Y 2013-14, the assessee
paid the commission of Rs.4.25 crores to the Societies under the Sugarcane
Act. 

 

The
assessee claimed a deduction of Rs.4.25 crores in its return for the previous
year relevant to the A.Y. 2013-14. However, the A.O, did not accept the
assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being commission paid to the
Societies under the Sugarcane Act. This on the ground that the payment relates
to the A.Y. 2012-13 and therefore could not be allowed as a deduction in the
A.Y. 2013-14. 

 

Consequent
to the above, the assessee filed an Appeal before the CIT(A). At the same time,
the assessee also filed a Revision Application u/s. 264 of the Act before Pr.
CIT alongwith an application for condonation of delay. The Pr. CIT rejected the
Assessee’s application for condonation of delay. This on the ground that the
assessee could have made this claim in a revised return for the A.Y 2012-13,
which infact it filed on 8th June, 2013. This without claiming this
deduction. Thus, the impugned order found, there is no cause for the delay and
rejected the condonation of delay application. Further, on merits also, Pr. CIT
rejected the claim. 

 

Consequent to the above,
the assessee filed an Writ Petition before the High Court. The Assessee relied
the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal vs.
CIT[2017] (78) taxmann.com 265
and the decision of the Kerala High Court in
Transformers & Electricals Kerala Ltd. Vs. DCIT[2016] 75 taxmann.com 298
wherein a view has been taken that the powers of revision u/s. 264 of
the Act are very wide and is not restricted to only consideration of claims
made before the A.O. Therefore, it is submitted that it would be appropriate
that, Pr. CIT passes a fresh order after hearing the parties and considering
the above decisions relied upon by the parties .

 

The
Revenue submits that restoring the Revision Application would be a futile
exercise as the Revision Application itself is not maintainable. It is pointed
out that the claim of deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being the payment made to the
Societies was not a claim made either in the original or revised return of
income before the A. O. Thus, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Goetze
(India) Ltd. vs. CIT, 2006 (284) ITR 323
, it is submitted that such a claim
could not be made before the CIT in Revision u/s. 264 of the Act.

 

The Hon.
Court find that the delay in filing the Revision Application u/s. 264 of the
Act is concerned, it is the assessee’s case that as payments of commission to
Societies under the Sugarcane Act was made in previous year relevant to A.Y
2013-14. This was consequent to the order dated 19th June, 2012 of
the State Government. Therefore, they took a view that, the deduction was
allowable in A.Y 2013-14. It was in the above context, that though the assessee
had filed a revised return of income, in the year 2013 for A.Y 2012-13, it did
not claim the deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being the amount paid to the
Societies. It was only after A.O, by his order dated 25th March,
2016 held that, this deduction of Rs.4.25 crores relates to A.Y 2012-13 and
therefore could not be allowed in the A.Y 2013-14 that the assessee was
compelled to file the Revision Petition so as to claim the deduction. This to
ensure that, in atleast one of the two assessment years it gets the benefit of
deduction.

 

It is to
be noted that the assessee filed its Revision Application on 22nd
April, 2016 i.e. within a month of the order of the A.O  relating to A.Y 2013-14. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the reason in filing the Revision Application is for reasonable
cause and should have been condoned by the Pr. CIT. In the above circumstances,
delay was condoned and revision application was restored to the Pr. CIT for
disposal of the application on merits. Petition was allowed.



2 Section 45 : Capital gains vis a vis Business income – sale of property held as investment – Rental income disclosed as business income – gains arising on sale of property held in investment to be treated as capital gains.

1.      
 Pr. CIT-31 vs. Shree Shreemal Builders [ Income tax Appeal no 205 of
2016, Dated: 31st July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[DCIT
vs. Shree Shreemal Builders; dated 14/11/2014, Mum.  ITAT ]

The
assessee sold a building which was acquired in 1978. It offered the gain made
on the sale of the building for tax under the head “capital gains”. However,
the A.O held that as the assessee was in business of development of real estate
and the fact that rental income received from building was offered to tax as
business income in the earlier years. The profit/gain on sale of the building
was in nature of business profit/gain. Therefore, chargeable to tax under the
head profit/gain of business or purchases and not under the head “capital
gains”.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT (A). The CIT(A) on the facts
found that the assessee had been showing the building as part of its assets in
the balance sheet and it has never been shown as stock in trade till date. The
CIT(A) further held that merely because a person is engaged in business of
development of real estate he is not barred by holding any property as and by
way of investment. It was further found that interest paid on borrowed funds
was being capitalised and not claimed as an expenditure in the regular course
of business to arrive at the taxable income. So far as classifying the rental
income under the head “business income” is concerned, it held that by itself it
alone would not change the character of an investment into stock in trade. In
these circumstances the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

 

Being aggrieved the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal find that the said building had been acquired in the year 1978 and
ever since that date the property has been shown as an asset/investment and not
as stock in trade. Further, it held that profit/gain on sale of the building is
classifiable under the head capital gains. Support was also drawn from the fact
that interest paid on the funds borrowed were not debited to the Profit and
Loss Account but were capitalised. So far as classifying the rental income from
the said building as business income is concerned, the ITAT helds that, by
itself, this would not change the character of the investment in the building
into a stock in trade. The appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

 

Being aggrieved the Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court find that the both CIT(A) and the
Tribunal on consideration of all facts has concluded that the building which
was acquired in 1978 and sold in previous year relevant to the subject
assessment year was an investment. This finding was on the basis that the
assessee had all along shown the building as its investment and not as its
stock in trade in its Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account. Further, the
interest paid on the amounts borrowed for acquisition of the building has been
capitalised since beginning and no amount of interest was claimed as an
expenditure in its profit and loss account. The first objection on behalf of
Revenue is that as the assessee is in the business of real estate development
all its income relating to real estate can only be taxed as business income.
This submission on behalf of the Revenue is contrary to the directions in the CBDT
circular No.4/2007 dated 15th June, 2007 wherein in paragraph 10
thereof it is stated that it is possible for a tax payer to have two portfolios
at the same time i.e. Investment portfolio (investment) and trading portfolio
(stock in trade).



Further
this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gopal Purohit (2010) 188 Taxman
140
has also held to the same effect. The second objection on behalf
of the Revenue is that as the assessee had classified its rental income from
the said building as business income that would by itself be evidence of it
being stock in trade. In any case in such matters the totality of the facts are
to be taken into account as done by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. Therefore the
profit/gain on sale of the investment is taxable under the head “capital
gains”. Accordingly, Revenue appeal dismissed. 

1 Section 68: Cash credits-Share application money-Permanent account numbers, bank details of share applicants and affidavits of share applicant company was furnished – share application money cannot be considered as unexplained cash credits.

1.        Pr. CIT-4 vs. Acquatic
Remedies Pvt. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 83 of 2016, Dated: 30th
July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

[DCIT
vs.  Acquatic Remedies Pvt. Ltd; dated
17/04/2015, Mum.  ITAT ]


A survey
was conducted on GP  by the Investigation
Wing of the Revenue. During the course of the survey, it was found that GP  was issuing bogus accommodation bills to
various concerns including the assessee and its sister companies. Consequently,
a search operation was conducted on the premises of the assessee and its sister
companies.

 

Thereafter,
assessment orders were passed u/s. 153(3) r.w.s 153A of the Act by the A.O for
A.Ys 2005-06 to 2009-10 making additions under the following heads :-

 

(a) on account
of introduction of share capital as unexplained cash credit u/s. 68 of the Act
;

 

(b) on
account of bogus purchases;

 

(c) on
account of commission paid at 2% for accommodation bills ; and

 

(d) on
account of cash discount at 5% on cash purchases.

 

The CIT(A)
for subject AYs confirmed the addition on account of unexplained cash credit
u/s. 68 of the Act relating to introduction of share capital. However, the
CIT(A) by common order partly allowed the Appeal to the extent of deleting
commission of 2% in respect of the share capital and on account of 5% discount
on purchases in respect of share capital.

 

Being
aggrieved, both the Revenue, as well as, the assessee filed appeals to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, allowed the Appeal of the assessee on issue of cash
credit and also in respect of commission and cash discount as held by the CIT
(A) while dismissing the Revenue’s Appeal.

 

The
Revenue  in appeal before High Court  challenges the order of the Tribunal that the
identity and creditworthiness of the shareholders is not established and the
genuineness of the transaction not being established, the Tribunal ought not to
have allowed the assessee’s appeals.

 

The Hon.
High Court finds that the persons who invested in the shares of the assessee
had PAN numbers allotted to them which was made available by the assessee to
the A.O. Besides, the shareholders had also filed Affidavits before the A.O
pointing out that they had invested in the shares of the assessee out of their
own bank accounts. Copies of acknowledgement of Return of Income of the
shareholders was also filed. The assessee also requested the A.O to summon the
shareholders. These evidences have not been shown to be incorrect. Therefore,
the objection with regard to identity of the shareholders not being established
does not survive. So far as, the creditworthiness of the investors is
concerned, these Appeals are of AYs prior to AY: 2013-14. It was only with
effect from 1st April, 2013 i.e. from the Assessment Year 2013-14
that a proviso was added to section 68 of the Act which required the person
investing in shares of any Company to satisfy, if required by the A.O, the
source of the funds which enabled the investments in shares.

 

So far as
the genuineness of the investment by the shareholders is concerned, Revenue
placed reliance upon the statement of Kamlesh Jain who was an employee, as well
as, the shareholder of the assessee and that during the course of the search,
certain blank transfer forms were found in the possession of the assessee.
Besides, it is submitted that the shares were supposed to be finally
transferred to the family members of the Directors of the assessee company at a
discounted price.

 

The
Tribunal records the fact that copies of the share application form, share
allotment Register and Bank Statements showing receipt of funds were on record.
Moreover, all the shareholders had filed Affidavits declaring the fact that
they are investing in the assessee company by issuing of cheques from their
Accounts. Infact, the statement very categorically states that, he did not
intend to purchase any shares of Aqua Formulations (P) Ltd., but no such
declaration is made in respect of the investment made by him in the assessee
Company. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence in support of the above
submission in the context of the assessee. It records, that the entire basis of
the Revenue’s case is based on surmise that the assessee was taking bogus
purchase bills and cash was introduced in the form of share capital without any
evidence in support.

 

Regarding  cash discount at 5% on cash purchases  and commission paid at 2% for obtaining
accommodation bills treating the same as unexplained expenditure. The court
held that there is no unexplained expenditure nor any bogus purchases.
Accordingly, the  Appeals were dismissed.






10 Section 69C – Unexplained expenditure (Work-in-progress)

CIT vs. B. G. Shirke Construction
Technology (P.) Ltd.; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 608 (Bom):
Date of the order: 8th August, 2018

A. Y. 2009-10


Search was conducted at
assessee-civil contractor’s premises on 18/12/2008 – Value of work-in-progress
as done by its site engineer on 30/11/2008 was done only on provisional basis –
Addition was sought to be made u/s. 69C on ground that figures indicated in
valuation report of site engineers were higher than work-in-progress recorded
in books – However, no verification was ever done by search party – Return
filed for relevant year showing closing work-in-progress as per books had been
accepted by Assessing Officer – There was no occasion to apply section 69C
since there was finding of fact that there was no excess work-in-progress than
that declared by respondent-assessee, and valuation done of work-in-progress as
on 31/11/2008 was only on provisional basis – Addition rightly deleted

The
respondent-assessee was a company engaged in the business of civil
construction. There was search and seizure operation conducted in the
respondent’s premises. During the course of search, valuation report of the
site engineers of the projects regarding Work in Progress (WIP) as on 30/11/2008
were found. It was noticed the figures indicated in the valuation report of the
site engineers were higher than the work-in-progress recorded in the books of
the respondent as on 30/11/2008. As per the provisional profit and loss
account, this difference was Rs. 9.30 crores. Thus, the respondent had agreed
to addition of Rs. 10 crores being made. However, at the end of subject
assessment year in its return of income the respondent had not offered the
additional income of Rs. 10 crores. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer
proceeded to add Rs. 10 Crores being the additional income on account of excess
work-in-progress, which was financed out of unexplained source of income.
Resultantly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 10 crores u/s. 69C of
the Act.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 10 crores holding that the
Assessing Officer did not controvert statement of the appellant that he had
correctly taken value of work-in-progress. Further, it held the Assessing
Officer had not brought on record any evidence to show that the appellant had
not recorded sales, purchase, other expenses properly in its books of account.
The Tribunal recorded the fact that the Assessing Officer had not disputed the
valuation of closing work-in-progress as on 31/03/2009. This figure had been
arrived on actual verification. There was also no disallowance of any
expenditure or suppression of income detected by the revenue. In the aforesaid
facts, the Tribunal held that in the absence of any material being brought on
record to show that the valuation done as on 31/03/2009 was incorrect, no
occasion to apply section 69C could arise. The Tribunal upheld the decision of
the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Both the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as
the Tribunal have rendered a finding that work-in-progress as indicated in its
return of income for the year ending 31/03/2009 correctly reflects the closing
work-in-progress determined on physical verification. On facts both the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal have rendered a finding that the
value of work-in-progress as done by its site engineers in November, 2008 was
only on provisional basis. No verification was ever done by the search party.
The return filed on 31/03/2009 showing its closing work-in-progress has been
accepted by the Assessing Officer. In the aforesaid facts, unless it is first
established by the revenue that there is unexplained expenditure, no occasion
to apply section 69C can arise.

 

ii)    The revenue has not challenged the
concurrent findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as of the Tribunal
that the work-in-progress as disclosed during the time of search was on
provisional basis and it was taken into consideration while determining the
work-in-progress as on 31/03/2009. The proposed question that the Tribunal held
that there is a difference in the book value and the physical value of the
work-in-progress is factually not correct. The revenue was not able to
substantiate the above presumption in the question as framed.

 

iii)    In view of the above, the question as
proposed does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

9 Section 43(5) – Speculative loss – Difference between speculation and hedging – Loss in hedging transaction – Deductible

ACIT vs. Surya International (P) Ltd.; 406
ITR 274 (All): Date of order: 6th September, 2017

A.
Y. 2009-10


The assessee was engaged in the business of production, refining and
sale of edible oil and its by-products. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee
claimed that the market related to purchase of raw materials, for improvement
and manufacture of refined oil was highly volatile and it had entered into
contracts for purchase of raw materials, mainly crude oil, which was the raw
material for refined oil on “high seas sale” basis and many times, looking to
the market trend, the assessee had to cancel such contracts for sale of raw
materials (crude oil). In the relevant year, it had resulted in a loss of Rs,
1,07,88,693/- which the assessee claimed as the business loss. The Assessing
Officer disallowed the claim holding it to be speculative loss.

 

The
Tribunal allowed the claim in respect of 32 transactions.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    Section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
provides that speculative transaction means a transaction in which a contract
for the purchase or sale of any commodity including stocks and shares, is
periodically and ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or
transfer of the commodity or scrips.

 

ii)    Clause (a), however, provides that a
transaction of this nature will not be deemed to be a speculative transaction
if the contract in respect of raw material or merchandise had been entered into
by a person in the course of his manufacturing or merchanting business to guard
against loss through future price fluctuations in respect of his contracts for
actual delivery of goods manufactured by him. Such contracts entered into by a
merchant or manufacturer to safeguard against loss through future price
fluctuation are in a commercial world known as hedging contracts. This clause
contemplates contracts entered into by two classes of persons namely (a) a
person who manufactures goods from raw materials, and (b) a merchant who
carries on merchanting business. Whereas in the case of a manufacturer it is
the contract entered into by him in respect of raw materials used in the course
of his manufacturing business to guard against loss through future price fluctuations
in respect of his contracts for actual delivery of goods manufactured by him,
that are taken out of the ambit of speculative transactions, the contracts
taken out of the scope of such transactions in the case of merchants are those
which he enters into in respect of his merchandise with a view to safeguard
loss through future price fluctuation in respect of contracts for actual
delivery of merchandise sold by him.

 

iii)    It is significant to note that section 43
nowhere provides that such hedging contracts must necessarily be purchasing
contracts. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether a particular
transaction by way of forward sale, which is mutually settled otherwise than by
actual delivery of the said goods has been entered into with a view to
safeguard against loss through price fluctuation in respect of the contract for
actual delivery of the goods manufactured.

 

iv)   The Tribunal was correct in allowing the
claim of the assessee in respect of 32 transactions.”

8 Sections 179(1), 220, 222, 281 and Schedule II, rr 2, 16 – Recovery of tax – Attachment and sale of property – Private alienation to be void in certain cases – Condition precedent for declaring transfer void – Issuance of notice to defaulter – Failure by Department to bring on record service of notice under Rule 2 –Charge registered by Sub-Registrar six and a half years after sale deed registered in favour of purchaser – Order declaring transfer null and void and notice for auction of property set aside

Rekhadevi
Omprakash Dhariwal vs. TRO; 406 ITR 368 (Guj): Date of order: 2nd
July, 2018

A.
Y. 1998-99


The
petitioner acquired the property in question under a sale deed dated 11/12/2008
for consideration through the power of attorney of the original owner VCT. The
transaction was carried out after due diligence like public advertisement and
title clear certificate. The property had been attached on 28/09/2006, towards
the outstanding tax dues of VCT, the original owner but the petitioner had no
knowledge of such attachment and came to know about the attachment subsequently
on 29/09/2011. Thereafter the petitioner made efforts to find out the details
with regard to such attachment, but ultimately, an order dated 26/05/2015 was
passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act
declaring the sale to the petitioner null and void. The petitioner communicated
with the Department on various occasions with a request to withdraw the order
declaring the sale null and void. On the basis of the order dated 26/05/2015,
which was affixed on the property along with information that the charge of the
Department had been registered on 08/12/2017, on 19/12/2017, a notice of
auction was issued to satisfy the outstanding demand of the original owner VCT.

 

The
petitioner filed writ petition challenging the said action by the Department.
The petitioner submitted that the order declaring the sale null and void after
a delay of six and half years and not within a reasonable period was arbitrary
and illegal and without jurisdiction and that therefore, the subsequent
communication for auction of the property was also illegal. Criminal
proceedings u/s. 276B of the Act were initiated against a company for
non-payment of tax deducted at source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who
was the non-executive chairman of the company treating him as the principal
officer of the company and an order was also passed.

 

The
Department contended that the property in question originally belonged to VCT,
that the order u/s. 144/147 for the A. Y. 1998-99 was passed on 23/03/2006,
that the demand was certified by the Assessing Officer on 22/08/2006 and the
tax recovery certificate was issued on 06/09/2006, and that on account of
default by the assessee VCT, the original owner of the immovable property, it
was attached by the Tax Recovery Officer on 28/09/2006 and copies were sent to
the Sub-Registrar. The notice of demand, the certificate, the order of
attachment of the property as well the panchnama by which the property was attached
were produced. The Sub-Registrar submitted that the order of attachment was
received on 26/06/2015 and subsequent thereto the charge was registered.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)    The petitioner being a bonafide purchaser
for consideration after due diligence could not be made to suffer on account of
the tax dues that ran in the name of the original owner. The sale deed was for
a consideration and the index copy was also issued in connection with the
transaction. The public notice for executing the sale deed was issued in
vernacular newspaper on 26/10/2007 and thereafter, a search was carried out.
The search report dated 01/10/2008 was also on record along with the title
clearance certificate of the advocate. It was evident from the documents that
the property in question was free from all encumbrances having clear title and
was available for transaction.

 

ii)    The documents produced along with the additional affidavit being
order u/s. 179(1), the certificate u/s. 222, the order of attachment and
panchnama drawn were all against the defaulting assesee VCT, and the petitioner
was not in the picture. The proviso to section 281 provided that such transfer
or charge might not be declared void if such a transfer or charge was made for
adequate consideration and without notice of pendency or completion of such
proceeding or without the notice of any tax liability or other sum payable by
the assessee.

According to the procedure for recovery of tax, Rule 16 of Schedule II to the
Act provides for issuance of notice for recovery of arrears by the Tax Recovery
Officer upon the defaulter requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified
in the certificate within fifteen days from the date of the service of the
notice and intimating that in default, steps would be taken to realise the
amount.

 

iii)    Rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act provides
for private alienation to be considered void in certain cases and requires
service of notice on the defaulter under Rule 2. In the affidavit as well as in
the additional affidavit the Department had not brought on record service of
notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II.

 

iv)   Moreover, it was evident from the affidavit
filed on behalf of the Sub-Registrar that for the first time the order of
attachment was given effect to by him only on 26/06/2015, when the charge was
registered which was six and a half years after the sale deed was registered in
favour of the petitioner.

 

v)    The order of the Tax Recovery Officer
declaring the transfer null and void and the subsequent communication for
auction of the property were to be set aside.”

2 Section 92B(2) of the Act – TP provisions cannot impute notional income. Existence of a prior agreement with AE of the Taxpayer is a pre-requisite for the transaction to qualify as a deemed international transaction

(2018) 96 taxmann.com 443 (Mum-Trib)
Shilpa Shetty vs. ACIT
A.Y: 2010-11; Dated: 21st August, 2018

Section 92B(2) of the Act – TP provisions
cannot impute notional income. Existence of a prior agreement with AE of the
Taxpayer is a pre-requisite for the transaction to qualify as a deemed
international transaction

 

Facts

The Taxpayer, an individual resident in India, was engaged in the
profession of acting in films and functioning as the brand ambassador for
various products.



During the year
under consideration, the Taxpayer was one of the parties to Share Purchase
Agreement (SPA) executed between FCo, a company incorporated in Bahamas, and
the shareholders of a Mauritius Company (MCo). FCo was owned by Mr A who was a
relative of the Taxpayer.

 

As per the SPA, the
shareholders of MCo agreed to transfer a portion of their shareholding in the
MCo to FCo.  Taxpayer was neither a buyer
nor a seller of shares of MCo under the SPA but the Taxpayer undertook to provide
brand ambassadorship services to an Indian company (ICo), which was the wholly
owned subsidiary of MCo. The brand ambassadorship services were to be provided
in relation to the promotion of an Indian premiere league (IPL) team owned by
ICo.  As per the SPA, such services were
to be provided by the Taxpayer without payment of any consideration by ICo.
However, ICo was not a party to SPA.

 

AO treated the
Taxpayer and MCo as Associated Enterprises (AEs) and held that the services
rendered by the Taxpayer to ICo by virtue of the SPA involving the shareholders
of MCo constituted an international transaction. The AO computed the ALP of the
brand ambassadorship services and imputed such ALP as additional income of the
Taxpayer.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer filed an appeal before the CIT(A) who held that Taxpayer’s
professional activities, constituted an ‘enterprise’ (distinct from Taxpayer
herself) u/s. 92F(iii). Further, since Mr. A controlled both FCo as well the
professional activities of Taxpayer (through the Taxpayer who was a relative),
there existed a AE relationship between the two enterprises u/s. 92A(2)(j).

 

CIT(A) also held
that the brand ambassadorship services were rendered by the Taxpayer to ICo on
the basis of a prior agreement (i.e the SPA) entered into by the AE of the
Taxpayer (i.e FCo). Hence, such services resulted in a deemed international
transaction u/s. 92B(2).

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer
appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

On existence
of control u/s. 92A(2)(j)

 

–     Section 92A(2)(j) deems
the two ‘enterprises’ as AEs if one of the enterprises is controlled by an
individual and the other ‘enterprise’ is also controlled by such individual or
his relatives.

 

–    Although Mr A controlled
FCo, nothing was brought on record to show that Mr A or any of his relatives
controlled the Taxpayer. Hence there is no AE relationship between the Taxpayer
and FCo u/s. 92A(2)(j)2 .

 

On deemed
international transaction

 

–    Section 92B(2) of the Act
cannot be applied to hold that transaction between Taxpayer and ICo was an
‘International transaction’ for the following reasons:

 

•     None of the parties to the SPA qualified as
AE of the Taxpayer.

 

•     As ICo was not a party to the SPA, there
was no ‘prior agreement’ between ICo and the AE of the Taxpayer.

 

On whether TP
can apply when there is no consideration

 

–     Chapter X pre-supposes
existence of ‘income’ and lays down machinery provisions to compute ALP of such
income, if it arises from an ‘international transaction’.

 

–     Section 92 is not an
independent charging section to bring in a new head of income or to charge tax
on income which is otherwise not chargeable under the Act.

 

–     Accordingly, since no
income had accrued to or received by the Taxpayer u/s. 5, notional income
cannot be brought to tax by applying section 92 of the Act.

________________________________________________________________

2       
The Tribunal did not rule on whether the CIT(A) was right in concluding
that the professional activity of the Taxpayer constituted a distinct
‘enterprise’
.

7 Section 263 – Revision – Validity – Merger of assessee-company with another entity – Assessee-company non-existant on date of issue of notice and order u/s. 263 – Notice and order void ab initio

Principal
CIT vs. Kaizen Products (P) Ltd.; 406 ITR 311 (Del): Date of order: 25th
July, 2017

A.
Y. 2009-10


There was
merger of the assessee with an entity V by an order of the Court dated
08/10/2010 and the merged entity was named A. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the
assessee filed the return of income on 19/09/2009. The Assessing Officer issued
a notice dated 09/04/2013 u/s. 148 of the Act and passed assessment order u/s.
147 on 23/07/2014 accepting the return filed by the assessee. The Principal
Commissioner issued a notice dated 23/03/2016 u/s. 263 and consequent thereto,
passed an order on 31/03/2016.

 

The
asessee contended before the Tribunal that the order u/s. 263 had been passed
against an entity which did not exist in the eye of law and therefore, the
proceedings were vitiated. The Department’s contention was that during the
proceedings u/s. 147, the assessee did not raise any objection on that ground
and therefore, it should not be permitted to raise the objection before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the notice and order were both in the name of
a non-existent entity and therefore, void ab initio.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“The
assessee had ceased to exist as a result of the order of the Court approving
its merger with another company and the issuance of the notice u/s. 263 and the
consequent order were in respect of a non-existent entity and void ab initio.”

6 Section 263 – Revision – Powers of Commissioner u/s. 263 – Commissioner (Appeal) passed order in appeal – Assessment order merges in appellate order – Commissioner has no jurisdiction to set aside such order – Order passed by AO and Commissioner (Appeals) after due consideration – Commissioner cannot set aside such order

Principal
CIT vs. H. Nagraj; 406 ITR 242 (Karn): Date of order: 29th May, 2018

A.
Y. 2008-09 and 2009-10

 

The
assessee firm was in the business of purchasing agricultural lands, converting
them for non-agricultural purposes and selling them. In the relevant years, the
assessee had claimed expenditure for developing lands. The assessee had
furnished names and addresses of parties to whom the amounts had been paid
along with permanent account numbers, bills and vouchers. Considering the
details furnished in support of the development expenses, the Assessing Officer
made addition of Rs. 2,38,16,700/- and Rs. 4,25,72,383/- for the A. Ys. 2008-09
and 2009-10 respectively. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the additions to
the extent of Rs. 12,50,000/- for A. Y. 2008-09 and allowed the appeal in
respect of the balance. As regards A. Y. 2009-10, an addition of Rs. 2 crores
was confirmed and balance of Rs. 1,92,72,383/- was deleted.

 

By
exercising his powers of revision u/s. 263 of the Act, the Commissioner
proceeded to hold that the properties purchased by the assessee and the
subsequent sale made in favour of B did not tally in respect of both the
assessment orders and therefore, directed reconsideration of the entire
material. The Commissioner further found that the development expenses
consisting of labour charges and work-in-progress had to be added for the A. Y.
2008-09. Similarly, in respect of payment towards commission, the Commissioner
found that the cheque payments and the tax deducted at source made for claiming
expenditure had to be verified. The Tribunal set aside the order of the
Commissioner. 

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    The revisional authority cannot, by acting
u/s. 263, interfere and upset the order passed by the Appellate Commissioner.

 

ii)    When the development expense as considered
by the Assessing Officer were the subject matter of appeal and the Commissioner
(Appeals) had found that for both the assessment years, the expenses incurred
had to be accepted disallowing the claim of Rs. 50 lakhs for the A. Y. 2008-09
and Rs. 2 crores for the A. Y. 2009-10, the question of the Commissioner
(Administration) exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 263 to once again
examine the very same issue so as to disallow the labour charges and
work-in-progress did not arise, as the order of assessment made by the
Assessing Officer merged with the order of the Appellate Commissioner.

 

iii)    When the Assessing Officer scrutinised the
returns for the A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10, he considered the purchase of lands
from villagers and thereafter sale of the same to B. He had dealt with the same
in the assessment order and had proceeded to arrive at a conclusion that for
the A. Y. 2008-09, there was unexplained income of Rs. 1,25,66,700/- and for
the A. Y. 2009-10, there was unexplained income in a sum of Rs. 1,92,72,383. He
had thus proceeded to treat these two items as undisclosed profit for the
respective years.

 

iv)   The order passed by the Assessing Officer
merged with that of the Appellate Commissioner for both the assessment years.
Therefore, there was no scope for the Commissioner to exercise jurisdiction
u/s. 263 to reexamine the purchase made by the assessee in respect of the lands
in question. Similar was the factual matrix involved in respect of commission
expenses claimed by the assessee for the two assessment years. The assessee had
submitted full details regarding payment of commission. After considering the
material, the Assessing Officer chose not to make any addition on the item
pertaining to commission.

 

v)    The Tribunal was right in holding that the
Commissioner was not justified in exercising the revisional powers u/s. 263 to
upset the order passed by the Assessing Officer which stood merged with the
order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).”

5 Sections 10AA and 144C – Draft assessment order – Section 144C – Power of AO – Additions not proposed in draft assessment order cannot be made by AO in final order – AO making disallowance of deduction u/s. 10AA in final order not proposed in draft order – Breach of provisions of section 144C – Not permissible

Pr. CIT vs. WOCO Motherson Advanced
Rubber Technologies Ltd.; 406 ITR 375 (Guj):
Date of order: 20th February, 2017

A. Y. 2011-12


The
assessee was a joint venture company of a company in Germany and another in
India. For the A. Y. 2011-12, in the draft assessment order issued by the
Assessing Officer u/s. 143(3) read with section 144C of the Act, the Assessing
Officer proposed only an arm’s length price adjustment of Rs. 1,48,43,000/- and
did not propose any disallowance in the draft assessment order. The draft
assessment order was carried before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) but the
assessee did not succeed. Thereafter, while passing the final assessment order
the Assessing Officer not only made addition of the arm’s length price
adjustment of Rs. 1,48,43,000/-, but also disallowed 50% of the deduction
allowed u/s. 10AA on the ground that it was claimed in excess by the assessee.

 

The
Tribunal held that the disallowance made u/s. 10AA was in breach of section
144C and set aside the disallowance.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Considering the entire scheme of section
144C, in conformity with the principals of natural justice, the assessee is
required to be given an opportunity to submit objections with respect to the
variations proposed in the income or loss returned. Therefore, while passing
the final assessment order, the Assessing Officer cannot go beyond what is
proposed in the draft assessment order.

 

ii)    When the Assessing Officer forwarded a draft
of the proposed assessment order to the assessee, he had not proposed to make a
disallowance of Rs. 7,64,15,421/- u/s. 10AA of the Act. The Tribunal was right
in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer in respect of the
claim made by the assessee u/s. 10AA on the ground that the disallowance was in
breach of section 144C in as much as it was not proposed by the Assessing
officer in the draft assessment order.”

4 Section 32 – Depreciation – Rate of depreciation – Computer – Printer part of computer – entitled to depreciation at 60%

CIT vs. Cactus Imaging India Pvt. Ltd.;
406 ITR 406 (Mad); Date of order: 16th April, 2018

A. Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05


For A. Ys.
2003-04 and 2004-05, the assessee had claimed depreciation at the rate of 60%
on its computers. The computers included printers. The Assessing Officer held
that the printers were not normal printers, but high value printers used for
printing banners and advertisement materials of large sizes and could not be
treated as a peripheral to a computer and the printer purchased by the assessee
could not perform any other function as performed by a normal computer.
Accordingly, the claim for depreciation at 60% was denied.

 

Before the
Commissioner (Appeals), a video demonstration was conducted and upon going
through the technical manual of the printers, he found that the printer could
not be used without the computer and concluded that it was a part of the
computer system. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.
These orders were affirmed by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Item III(5) of the old Appendix I to the
Income-tax Rules, 1962 stated “computers including computer software” and the
notes under the Appendix defined “computer software” in clause 7 to mean any
computer programme recorded in disc, tape, perforated media or other
information storage device. In the notes contained in the Appendix, the term
“computer” has not been defined.

 

ii)    A printer cannot be used without a computer
and should be treated as part of the computer and an accessory to the computer.

 

iii)    Since in respect of the very same machinery,
depreciation at the rate claimed had been permitted for the earlier years and
affirmed by the Division Bench, depreciation at the rate of 60% was allowable
on the printers.”

3 Section 32 – Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Condition precedent – Manufacture of article – Assessee need not be principally engaged in manufacture – Assessee entitled to additional depreciation on plant and machinery used in manufacture of ready mix concrete

Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd.
vs. UOI; 406 ITR 262 (Ker): Date of order:
19th December, 2017

A.
Y. 2006-07


For the A.
Y. 2006-07, the assessee procured three vehicles, specifically for the
transport of ready mix concrete for use in the construction site, from its own
manufacturing unit. The procurement of the vehicles was in the relevant year.
The assessee claimed additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) of the Act to the
extent of 20% of the actual cost of such vehicles which, according to the
assessee qualified as plant and machinery used in manufacture. The claim was allowed
by the Assessing Officer, but later disallowed in reassessment u/s. 147/148 of
the Act.

The
Tribunal held that there was no manufacture involved in the making of ready mix
concrete and upheld the disallowance.

 

On appeal
by the assessee, the Kerala High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    It cannot be held on a reading of section
32(1)(iia) of the Act, that the additional depreciation permissible to the
extent of 20% of the actual cost of plant and machinery, would be permissible
only in the case of an assessee engaged principally in the business of
manufacturing or production. This would be doing violence to the provision
since then it would amount to introducing the word “principally” to read “ an
assessee engaged in the business principally of manufacture and production of
any article or thing; then a claim u/s. 32(1)(iia) would be permissible to the
extent allowed as depreciation.

 

ii)    Considering the high degree of precision and
stringent quality control observed in the selection and processing of
ingredients as also the specific entry in the Central Excise Tariff First
Schedule, heading 3824 50 10 which deals with “Concrete ready to use known as
“Ready mix concrete”, though the ready mix concrete did not have a shelf-life,
the final mixture of stone, sand, cement and water in a semi-fluid state,
transported to the construction site to be poured into the structure and
allowed to set and harden into concrete was a thing or article manufactured.

 

iii)    The assessee, though engaged principally in
the business of construction, was entitled to additional depreciation u/s.
32(1)(iia) for the plant and machinery used in the manufacturing activity being
the production of ready mix concrete.”

2 Section 68 – Cash credit (Shares, allotment of) – Where assessee allotted shares to a company in settlement of pre-existing liability of assessee to said company, since no cash was involved in transaction of said allotment of shares, conversion of these liabilities into share capital and share premium could not be treated as unexplained cash credits u/s. 68

V. R. Global Energy (P) Ltd. vs. ITO;
[2018] 96 taxmann.com 647 (Mad): Date of order:
6th August, 2018 A. Y. 2012-13


The
assessee-company allotted 1,19,000 shares with face value of Rs. 10 at a
premium of Rs. 5400 to one VR and the allotment of shares by the assessee to VR
was in settlement of the pre-existing liability of the assessee to said VR. The
Assessing Officer added the share premium and the share capital for the fresh
allotment of shares and treated the same as unexplained cash credits u/s. 68 of
the Act, while holding that the method of valuation was not acceptable and that
the share premium of Rs. 5400 was unreasonable.

 

In appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the
Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal
by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    The cash credits towards share capital were
admittedly only by way of book adjustment and not actual receipts which could
not be substantiated as receipts towards share subscription money.

 

ii)    The appeal is, thus, allowed and the
judgment and order of the Tribunal is set aside, for the reasons discussed
above. Additions u/s. 68 are also set aside.”

1. Section 2(28A) and 40 (a)(i) – Business expenditure – TDS – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i)

Principal CIT vs. West Bengal Housing
Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 610 (Cal):
Date of order: 9th August, 2018

A. Y. 2005-06

Interest
(Compensation for belated allotment of plot) – As per agreement, under Housing
Scheme, for failure to make plots available to allottees within stipulated
time, assessee housing/infrastructure development corporation paid
damage/compensation on amount allottees paid at rate equivalent to SBI interest
rate of FDs – Payments so made would not make payment on interest as defined
u/s. 2(28A) since there was neither any borrowing of money nor was there
incurring of debt on part of assessee – Tax not deductible – No disallowance
u/s. 40(a)(i)

 

The
assessee, was engaged in development of land, housing and infrastructural
facilities. A sum of Rs. 9.71 crore was found debited in the profit and loss
account of the assessee. This sum was claimed as deduction in computing the
income of the assessee under the head ‘income from business‘. The nature
of this expenditure was explained by the assessee before the Assessing Officer
as ‘compensation for delay, delivery of plots‘. The explanation given
was that as per the offer of allotment of plot of land developed by the
assessee, the assessee was under an obligation to hand over physical possession
of the plot to the allottees on payment of the entire cost of the land. If
possession of handing over of the plot was delayed for more than six months
from the scheduled date of possession, the assessee had to pay interest on
installments already paid by the allottee during such extended period at the
prevailing fixed term deposit rates for similar period offered by the State
Bank of India. According to the assessee, the actual nature of payment was in
the nature of damages for delayed allotment of a plot and thus, the assessee
had no TDS obligation. The Assessing Officer viewed the payment to be in the
nature of payment of interest and held that by reason thereof, the assessee
should have deducted tax at source u/s. 194A of the Income tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”) at the
time of payment or credit. The Assessing Officer further held that since the
assessee failed to deduct tax at source on the amount, the claim of the
assessee for deduction of the said sum cannot be allowed by reason of section
40(a)(ia).

 

The
Tribunal held that the amount in question cannot be characterised as interest
within the meaning of section 194A and hence, there was no obligation on the
part of the assessee to deduct tax at source and allowed the assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    From the definition of interest as occurring
in section 2(28A), it appears that the term ‘interest’ has been made entirely
relatable to money borrowed or debt incurred and various gradations of rights
and obligations arising from either of the two. The parenthesis in the section
is in the nature of a qualification of the borrowing of money/incurring of debt
and what it includes.

 

ii)    In CIT vs. H.P. Housing Board [2012] 18
taxmann.com 129/205 Taxman 1/340 ITR 388 (HP)
the High Court held that the
money was paid on account of damages suffered by the allottee for delay in
completion of the flats.


iii)    Reference may be made to the Apex
Court in Central India Spg. & Wvg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal
Committee, Wardha AIR 1958 SC 341
. Besides agreeing with the reasons given
by the Himachal Pradesh High Court for holding that payment for delayed
allotment of flats cannot be brought u/s. 2(28A) the said decision is of a
co-ordinate Bench.

 

iv)   The payment made by the assessee to the
allottee was in terms of the agreement entered between them where the liability
of the assessee would arise only if it failed to make the plots available
within the stipulated time. Hence, the payment made under the relevant clause
was purely contractual and as rightly held by the Tribunal, in the nature of
compensation or damages for the loss caused to the allottee in the interregnum
for being unable to utilise or possess the flat: The Flavour of compensation
becomes evident from the words used in the particular clause. The expression
‘interest’ used in the relevant clause of the Housing Scheme may be seen merely
as a quantification of the liability of the assessee in terms of the percentage
of interest payable by the State Bank of India. Since there is neither any
borrowing of money nor incurring of debt on the part of the assessee, in the
present factual scenario, interest as defined u/s. 2(28A) can have no application
to such payments. Consequently, there was no obligation on the part of the
assessee to deduct tax at source and consequently no disallowance could have
been made u/s. 40(a)(ia).

 

v)    In view of the above, the decision of the
Tribunal is to be confirmed.”

One Nation One Reporting


Last few weeks of September are like last overs of a 20-20 match –
tension, exhilaration and victory. Many Chartered Accountants had serious
issues with the tax filing utilities. It seems that the “empty screen” virus
which attacked GSTN made its appearance on the “incometaxindiaefiling” portal
also. If not the departments, the portals are certainly in touch with each
other!

 

Throughout the month I received reminder messages to file my tax returns
on or before 30th September 2018 or face penalty of Rs. 5000. Yet,
when I signed into the portal to upload, like thousands of others – the site
went blank – into an empty screen – perhaps representing the empty words of the
government.

 

From a high level, the Social Contract between the State and
Taxpaying Citizens is breaking down. One-word summary of its cause: Disregard.

 

Like many professionals, I wonder:

 

a.    Has the Finance Ministry set
a new record of poor taxpayer services?

 

b.    Have they breached their
obligation to make adequate arrangements to enable taxpayers to
discharge their obligations with ease1 ?

 

c.    What is the accountability
of Netacracy and Babucracy
when compliance enabling mechanism does not
work?

 

d.    Does tinkering Forms and
Utility
(at random frequencies) corroborate the mission of the Department 2?

 

e.    What should be the consequences
of not adhering to the stated Mission and Vision3 of Income Tax
Department?

I don’t know which emoji will come to your mind after reading Citizen’s
Charter, but many seem to have lost
the script. 

 

________________________________________________________

1   Income Tax Department Mission, Point No 2: To
Make Compliance Easy

2  Income
Tax Department Mission, Point No 3: To be accountable and transparent

3   Income Tax Department Mission, Point No 4: To
deliver Quality Services 

 

 

Design of Forms & Duplication: Income tax forms are a testimony to
design malfunction – in functionality and aesthetics, dated content, obsession
for excessive information, random placement of clauses, tinkering, focus on the
trivial and low sense of proportion.

 

Case in point: ITR to Form 29B to Form 3CD. Asking 8-10 registration
numbers in Form 3CD in Digital India – can I not put it in the master? MAT Form
29B asks for business code, which is already in ITR? Reproduction of details
from financials – when they could be attached or uploaded or picked up from MCA
(and let me tell you that when I incorporated a company in September I got
sales calls from five bankers before receiving certificate of incorporation –
how did they get that information?)? Asking for bifurcation of GST registered
and GST unregistered dealers – have GST returns stopped? 50 plus clauses/sub
clauses in a Tax Audit Report? … The only reason could be that someone didn’t
hear about ease of doing business!

 

In addition, multiple government agencies ask for same data for their
consumption although they are paid by the same taxpayers to talk to each other
and work in tandem. Can PF Department website not throw up a certificate to the
tax office about timely filings? What we need is – ONE NATION ONE REPORTING.
The State needs to get its act together and consolidate what it wants from
taxpayers and offer a single window to file everything! Instead of obfuscating,
blokes in North Block need to dumb down and utterly simplify everything.

 

How about:

1.    Not seeing the nation as
‘largely tax non-compliant society4’ (effectively calling us tax
evaders) and treat them as partners in nation building!

_____________________________________________________________________________________

4  Finance
Minister Arun Jaitley in his Union Budget Speech, February 2017 – The same
minister who made political party funding opaque. 

 

2.    Not inflicting the taxpayers
with quagmire5  of compliances
and providing seamless ease of compliance (and this is not as easy as
sloganeering)!

 

3.    A Ban on flip-flop law
tweaking and emphasis on discipline and care for taxpayers – it better be
demonstrable!

 

4.    Ending multiplicity and
duplication of filings and have departments talk to each other! Taxpayers are
not government servants, it’s the other way round!

 

5.    Justifying purpose, need and
quantum of reporting and why it cannot be served from fetching data from places
where it is already available! This means government has to be smarter and work
harder.

 

6.    Not punishing people who
comply and support compliance with outright coercive and thankless
‘provisions’? Slash and burn large parts of the Act, that will be a good
act. 

 

7.    Inserting a new chapter in
every tax law on “Rights of Taxpayers”, “Government Obligation to Tax Payer
Services”
and “Penalties for not serving the tax payers”.

 

8.    Including the ‘public
servants’ under Consumer Protection Act or similar and report performance of
circles / wards on a quarterly basis – like we pay advance taxes – show us that
advance taxes are working to serve the
tax payer!

 

Most taxpayers risk a lot and some everything, to earn their livelihood
from which taxes are paid. Taxes should be like fees paid – governments owe one
to the people who do pay taxes. The Finance Ministry should be glad that people
are not studying the CAG Reports on the performance of the government/s’ in
spending their hard-earned taxes. Rather than using smoke and mirrors,
it is time to look in the mirror Mr Minister!

__________________________________________________________

5  The
word refers to a swamp, marsh, quicksand, complex, hazardous, muddled, mixed up
…


Raman Jokhakar

Editor



 

 

Scope of The Definition of The Term ‘Interest’ – Section 2(28a)

Issue for Consideration

The term ‘interest’ has been defined in section 2(28A) of the Income
tax Act as under:

 

“interest” means interest payable in
any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a
deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation) and includes any service
fee or other charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in
respect of any credit facility which has not been utilised.

 

The term has been exhaustively defined and in its scope it includes the
service fee or other charges in respect of the borrowings, debts and even
unutilized credit facilities. It not only includes interest, as understood
generally, which is payable on any kind of borrowing or debt, but also includes
payment on a deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation. This
extensive definition of ‘interest’ has been a subject matter of controversy,
more particularly from the point of view of the applicability of section 194A
to various types of payments for deduction of tax at source.

 

By applying the extensive definition, the Madras High Court considered
the payment of guaranteed return at a particular percentage to the investors,
under an investment scheme, to be an ‘interest’, though not captioned as
interest otherwise by the parties. On the other hand, the Calcutta High Court
took a view that the payment of an amount due to delay in delivering the plots,
though termed as interest in the letter of allotment, did not fall within the
ambit of the definition of ‘interest’. Though the facts of the cases before the
Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court were materially different, the
issue arising therefrom was similar i.e. when does a payment made in respect of
a particular ‘obligation’ constitute interest. 

  

Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd.’s case:

The issue regarding the interpretation of the definition of the term
‘interest’ first came up, before the Madras High Court, in the case of Viswapriya
Financial Services & Securities Ltd. vs. CIT 258 ITR 496.

 

In this case, the assessee had floated an innovative scheme of
investment which enabled individual investors to entrust their funds for
management to the assessee, with a guarantee from the assessee that it would so
manage the funds as to ensure a minimum return of 1.5 percent per month to the
investor. The salient features of the scheme operated by the assessee were as
follows:

 

–    The offer memorandum was issued inviting the
investors to contribute and to entrust their money to the assessee for what had
been referred to as fund management. The offer memorandum formed the contract
between the investors and the assessee for the management on the investors’
behalf of the funds provided by the investors under the memorandum for
deployment in any investment.

 

–    The investor, under that memorandum, was to
pay the amount to the assessee by cheques or drafts drawn in the name of
“Viswapriya Funds Management Account-Bank Guaranteed Investments”.
The investors’ money were not made part of the funds of the assessee-company’s
accounts but were kept in a separate account.

–   A firm of chartered accountants had
been appointed to function as fiduciary and custodian of the scheme and the
accounts of that fund were also separately audited.

 

–    The investments made in the course of the
management were fully secured and were backed by bank guarantees. However, the
money entrusted under the scheme was to be managed by the assessee, and the
investor was not required to be informed as to the specific investments made
from the fund and the particular investment in which the investor’s amount was
utilised.

 

–    The investors were assured a guaranteed
return of 1.5 percent per month of the amount invested.

 

–   The assessee was entitled to a management
fee of 6 percent per annum from all the funds invested on behalf of the
investors, but with a condition to forgo a part of that management fee if the
returns on the investment were insufficient to ensure the stipulated distribution
at the rate of 1.5 percent per month to the investors.

 

–    If the return from the investments was in
excess of the amount of management fee and the minimum guaranteed return for
the investor, the assessee would become entitled to a performance incentive of
10 percent of such excess.

 

–    The investor had been promised the return of
his investment at the end of the agreed period of three years.

 

–    The investment made by the investor was
transferable. It was possible to be assigned or pledged with prior intimation
to the assessee. In the event of the death of the investor, the amount was to
be transferred to his nominee, if any, and in the absence of nomination, to his
legal heirs.

 

In the backdrop of these facts, for the assessment years 1993-94 and
1994-95, the assessing officer had passed an order u/s. 201(1) holding that the
assessee was liable to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A on the payments made to
the investors. The Tribunal upheld the order of the assessing officer and held
that the money received by the assessee from the investors created an
‘obligation’ and that the return on that investment at the guaranteed minimum
payment of 1.5 percent per month was covered by the definition of ‘interest’ as
provided in section 2(28A).

 

Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that
the income received by the assessee from the investments made by it did not
attract the liability for deduction of tax at source. Therefore, when the
amounts were distributed among the investors, no tax was deducted at source, as
the returns of the investments made from the fund were received by the
fiduciary and the custodian. It was also submitted that the scheme did not
bring about a relationship of debtor and creditor or borrower and lender and,
therefore, the definition of ‘interest’ in section 2(28A) did not apply to the
facts of the scheme.

 

The High Court held that the definition of interest, after referring to
the interest payable in any manner in respect of any money borrowed or debt
incurred, included the  deposits, claims
and ‘other similar right or obligation’ and observed that the statutory
definition included amounts which might not otherwise be regarded as interest
for the purpose of the statute. Even amounts payable in transactions where
money had not been borrowed and debt had not been incurred were brought within
the scope of the definition, as in the case of a service fee paid in respect of
a credit facility which had not been utilised. Even in cases where there was no
relationship of debtor and creditor or borrower and lender, if payment was made
in any manner in respect of any money received as deposits or on money claims
or rights or obligations incurred in relation to money, such payment was, by
the statutory definition, regarded as interest.

 

The scheme operated by the assessee imposed an obligation on the
assessee to repay the investor at the end of the period of 36 months, and also
to ensure a monthly payment of 1.5 percent to the investor during that period.
This obligation to repay, in the opinion of the High Court, was an obligation
akin to a claim or a deposit, to which reference was made in the definition of
interest. The payment made by the assessee being a payment made in respect of
an obligation incurred under the terms of the offer memorandum, was regarded as
interest falling within the scope of section 2(28A). The fact that the assessee
did not choose to characterise such payment as interest was not considered as
relevant by the High Court.

 

West
Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.’s case

The issue of the interpretation of the definition of the term
‘interest’, in the contest of section 194A, again came up before the Calcutta
High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. West Bengal Housing Infrastructure
Development Corpn. Ltd. 96 taxmann.com 610.

 

The assessee was a
company engaged in the business of development of land, housing and
infrastructural facilities in New Town Projects, Kolkata. For assessment year
2005-06, it claimed a deduction of expenditure amounting to
` 9,71,17,977 which was in the nature of compensation for delay in
delivery of plots. As per the offer for allotment of plot of land developed by
the assessee, the assessee was under an obligation to hand over physical
possession of the plot to the allottees on payment of the entire cost of the
land and registration of sale deed.

 

If possession of
the plot was delayed for more than six months from the scheduled date of
possession, the assessee had to pay interest on installments already paid by
the allottee during such extended period, at the prevailing fixed term deposit
rates, for similar period offered by the State Bank of India. According to the
assessee, although the relevant clause of the allotment letter used the
expression “interest”, the actual nature of payment was in the nature
of damages for delayed allotment of a plot and not in the nature of interest.

 

Rejecting the explanation of the assessee, the assessing officer viewed
the payment to be in the nature of interest, and disallowed the expenditure
claimed by the assessee u/s. 40(a)(ia), on account of the failure of the
assessee to deduct tax at source u/s.194A. The CIT (A) confirmed the order of
the assessing officer. Upon further appeal, the Tribunal held that the amount
in question could not be characterised as interest within the meaning of
section 194A, and hence there was no obligation on the part of the assessee to
deduct tax at source. Accordingly, it deleted the disallowance made by the
assessing officer and confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

Before the High Court, on behalf of the revenue, it was argued that the
amount in question was covered by the definition of interest as provided in
section 2(28A). Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in
the case of Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd. (supra). Reliance
was also placed on the decision in the case of CIT vs. Dr. Sham Lal Narula
50 ITR 513 (Punj),
for the proposition that the amount paid in lieu of
delayed payment of compensation to which a person was entitled on the
acquisition of his land was in the nature of interest1.

 

On behalf of the
assessee, it was argued that the amount payable by the assessee on account of
delay in delivering the plots was not interest within the meaning of section
2(28A), since the contract, in the instant case, was for sale of land by the
assessee to the allottee; the assessee did not borrow any money or incur any
debt; and no money was due by the assessee to the allottee. There was no
debtor-creditor relationship between the parties. The ‘right’ must be to a sum
of money and the ‘obligation’ must also be in respect of a sum of money. The
right of an allottee to obtain possession of land and the obligation of the
assessee to deliver possession therefore did not fall within the purview of the
definition. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.P. Housing Board 340 ITR 388
wherein, on an almost identical set of facts, it was held that the amount paid
by the assessee (H.P. Housing Board, in that case) was not payment of interest,
but payment of damages to compensate the allottee for the delay in the
construction of his house and the harassment caused to him.

 

Additionally, the assessee also contended that taxing statutes must be
strictly construed and any doubt must be construed against the taxing
authorities and in favour of the taxpayer.

 

As far as the definition of ‘interest’ was concerned, the High Court
held that the term ‘interest’ had been made entirely relatable to money
borrowed or debt incurred, and various gradations of rights and obligations
arising from either of the two. The parenthesis in the section was in the
nature of a qualification of the borrowing of money/incurring of debt and what
it included.

 

On the facts of the case, the High Court held that the payment made by
the assessee to the allottee was in terms of the agreement entered between
them, where the liability of the assessee would arise only if it failed to make
the plots available within the stipulated time. Hence, the payment made under
the relevant clause of the letter of allotment was purely contractual and in
the nature of compensation or damages for the loss caused to the allottee in
the interregnum for being unable to utilise or possess the flat. It had the
flavour of compensation and the expression ‘interest’ used in the concerned
clause might be seen merely as a quantification of the liability of the
assessee in terms of the percentage of interest payable by the State Bank of
India. Since there was neither any borrowing of money nor incurring of debt on
the part of the assessee, it was held that the interest as defined u/s. 2(28A)
had no application to such payments.

 

__________________________________________________

1   Though the
revenue relied upon this decision and claimed that such amount paid in lieu of
delayed payment of compensation was regarded as interest, the High Court in
that case refrained itself from dealing with the question as to whether the
said amount was “interest” or “compensation”. The High Court in that case had
considered the essence of the transaction more than the nomenclature and dealt
with the issue as to whether the said amount was a “capital receipt” or
“revenue receipt”.

 

 

While holding so, the High Court preferred to rely upon the decision of
the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of H.P. Housing Board (supra) over
the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Viswapriya Financial
Services & Securities Ltd (supra).
 

 

Observations

From the features of the scheme operated in Viswapriya’s case as
presented before the High Court, it appears that the scheme was similar to the
portfolio management scheme. In the case of portfolio management scheme, the
fund manager invests the funds of the investors and the gains generated by it
accrue to the investors. The fund manager receives the management fees for
managing the portfolio.

 

In Viswapriya’s case, the assessee had guaranteed a minimum
return with the condition that its management fees would get reduced to the extent
it failed to provide the guaranteed return. Therefore, as per the facts as
presented before the High Court, the only consequence of inability to provide
the guaranteed return was forgoing of the management fee to the extent of
shortfall and nothing more. Had it been the obligation of the assessee to
compensate the shortfall out of its own capital, then perhaps the view taken by
the High Court would have been justified.

 

In a similar case of chit funds, where the funds belong to the
contributors, various High Courts have taken a view that the bid discount and
dividend to contributors does not amount to interest. The logic is that bid
amount which is distributed among all the subscribers/members is not in respect
of any money borrowed by the chit fund company or any debt incurred by it.

 

Reference may be made to the following decisions in this regard:

 

CIT vs. Sahib Chits (Delhi) Pvt Ltd 328 ITR 342
(Del)

CIT vs. Avenue Super Chits (P) Ltd 375 ITR 76
(Kar)

CIT vs. Panchajanya Chits (P) Ltd 232 Taxman 592
(Kar)

 

The similar logic should have applied equally in Viswapriya’s
case. It appears that these cases have not been cited before the Madras High
Court nor the distinction between the interest, a definite liability, and the
return of gain to the one on whose behalf it was earned has been appropriately
highlighted.

 

A careful analysis of the definition of ‘interest’ as provided in
section 2(28A) reveals that, in order that a particular payment is regarded as
‘interest’ the following conditions should be satisfied –

 

1.  The payment should be
interest, service fee or other charge.

 

2.  It should be in respect of any
money borrowed or debt incurred including a deposit, claim or other similar
right or obligation and credit facility which has not been utilised.

 

3.  It is payable in any manner.

 

Not all payments can be considered as ‘interest’, unless the payment
can be termed as the interest, service fee or other charge. The legislature in
its wisdom has used the words “interest” and not just “any amount”.
Therefore, an amount paid, which is not an interest in form and in substance,
cannot be brought into the definition of the term to deem it as interest. The
very fact that the definition, in its second limb, has specifically included
‘any service fee or other charge’ within its scope suggests that the ‘interest’
in its extended meaning includes service fee and other charge and nothing else.
If the first limb was capable of including any type of payment within its
scope, which is in respect of money borrowed or debt incurred, then the second
limb would become otiose. Such an interpretation is against the basic rule of
harmonious construction, whereby an interpretation which reduces one of the
provisions to a dead letter should be avoided. In short, unless the payment can
be classified as an ‘interest’ in its ordinary meaning of the term, it would
not be termed as ‘interest’ u/s. 2(28A) unless of course, the payment
represents the service fee or charge of the specified kind. 

 

In the case of Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd.,
the amount paid by the assessee under the investment scheme floated by it can
also not be characteriSed as interest as per its general meaning. Interest is
something which is paid from one’s own income or capital. In the kind of
investment scheme operated by the assessee, the money was received from the
investors and retained by it in its fiduciary capacity. The assessee did not
become the owner of that money. The accumulated money was invested by the assessee
on behalf of the investors and the return earned by investing such money had
been distributed back to the investors who were entitled to it.

 

The Madras High Court was also swayed by the fact that the assessee had
guaranteed a certain percentage of return on investment made by the investors.
However, there may be several such arrangements under which the minimum return
has been guaranteed. For instance, a builder may assure a guaranteed repurchase
price to the investors. A life insurance policy may also have a minimum sum
assured on maturity to the policyholder. The differential amount in such cases
cannot be considered as an ‘interest’ merely because there is an obligation to
pay the amount with a pre-determined rate of return.

 

In the context of the certificates of deposit and the commercial paper
which are issued at a discount, the CBDT vide its Circular No. 647 dated
22-3-1993 has clarified that the difference between the issue price and the
face value is to be treated as ‘discount allowed’ and not as ‘interest paid’
and, therefore, the provisions of section 194A are not applicable to it. Thus,
the payment, even though in respect of the borrowing, has not been treated as
interest, as it is understood to be the discount and not the interest.

 

Guidance can be obtained from the decision of the High Court of Punjab
in the case of CIT vs. Sham Lal Nerula 50 ITR 5132 for
understanding the general meaning of interest as quoted below:

 

“Interest” in general terms is the return or compensation
for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging to or owed
to another. In its narrow sense, “interest” is understood to mean the
amount which one has contracted to pay for use of borrowed money.
“Interest” in this sense may be placed broadly in three categories.
The first kind is interest fixed by the parties to the bargain or contract,
that is, “interest'” ex pacto or ex contractu. The second kind of
“interest” is conventional interest, determined by the accepted
usage, prevalent in a trade or a mercantile community. This is also called ex
mora. In the third category may be placed the legal interest allowed by law or
where the court is empowered by the statute to grant interest generally or at a
fixed rate, that is, ex lege.

_______________________________________________

2     This decision is pertaining to the assessment
years prior to 1-6-1976 the date from which the definition of the term
‘interest’ was inserted in the Act.

 

The High Court of Punjab relied upon the decision of the House of Lords
in Westminster Bank Ltd. vs. Riches [1947] A.C. 390 / 28 Tax Cas. 159.
It was a case where a decree was passed against the Westminster Bank for £
36,255 as representing a debt due to Riches. In the exercise of its statutory
powers, the court also awarded a further sum of £ 10,028 as representing
interest due on the debt from the date when the cause of action arose. The
issue before the House of Lords was whether the additional sum of £ 10,028 was
taxable, being in the nature of income. The appellant contended that the
additional sum of £ 10,028, though awarded under a power to add interest to the
amount of the debt, and though called interest in the judgment, was not really
interest attracting income tax, but was damages.

 

In this context, Lord Wright observed:

 

“The appellant’s contention is in any case
artificial and is, in my opinion, erroneous, because the essence of interest is
that it is a payment which becomes due because the creditor has not had his
money at the due date. It may be regarded either as representing the profit he
might have made if he had had the use of the money, or conversely the loss he
suffered because he had not that use. The general idea is that he is entitled to
compensation for the deprivation. From that point of view it would seem
immaterial whether the money was due to him under a contract express or
implied, or a statute, or whether the money was due for any other reason in
law. In either case the money was due to him and was not paid or, in other
words, was with-held from him by the debtor after the time when payment should
have been made, in breach of his legal rights, and interest was a compensation,
whether the compensation was liquidated under an agreement or statute, as for
instance under section 57 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, or was
unliquidated and claimable under the Act as in the present case. The essential
quality of the claim for compensation is the same, and the compensation is
properly described as interest.”

Though interest has been interpreted as including the damages or
compensation for deprivation in the aforesaid decision, it may not be true in
every case, in view of the subsequent insertion of the specific definition in
the Act. As per the definition, the interest should be one which is payable in
respect of –

–   any moneys borrowed

–   debt incurred

–    deposit

–    claim

–   other similar right or obligation

–   Credit facility, utilised or not.

 

Something which is not payable in respect of any of the above, cannot
be regarded as interest for the purpose of the Act, though can be regarded or
called as interest otherwise as per the principles laid down in the aforesaid
decisions.

 

The first item in the above list is borrowing of money, which is simple
to understand, and there cannot be any debate with regard to it. The second
item refers to the ‘debt incurred’ and the term ‘debt’, though not defined
further in this section, has been defined in section 94B as follows:

 

“debt” means any loan, financial instrument,
finance lease, financial derivative, or any arrangement that gives rise to
interest, discounts or other finance charges that are deductible in the
computation of income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of
business or profession”.

 

The term ‘deposit’ is defined in section 269T as follows:

 

“loan or deposit” means any loan or
deposit of money which is repayable after notice or repayable after a period
and, in the case of a person other than a company, includes loan or deposit of
any nature.

 

Though both the above definitions have limited applicability to the
relevant Sections, it will have a persuasive value in order to understand their
meaning in the context of the definition of the term ‘interest’.

 

It can be seen that the common feature of all of the above items is
that there should be an involvement of money. As far as the borrowing is
concerned, the reference to ‘any moneys’ makes it clear that it cannot include
borrowing of non-monetary assets, for instance, borrowing of securities under
Securities Lending and Borrowing Scheme. As far as incurring of debt is
concerned, it can be a monetary debt or even a non-monetary debt. However, in
the context of this definition and considering the other preceding and
succeeding terms, it should be read in the narrow sense by applying the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Bharti
Cellular Ltd. 330 ITR 239
. In this case, the words “technical
services” have been interpreted in the narrower sense by applying the rule
of Noscitur a sociis, because the words “technical services”
in section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 comes in between the words
“managerial and consultancy services”. Therefore, incurring of a debt
not having monetary involvement should not be considered for the purpose of
interpreting the definition of the term ‘interest’.

 

Apart from borrowing of money and incurring of debt, the definition
also includes “deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation” in
parenthesis. As involvement of money is regarded as essential criteria, the
right must be to a sum of money and the obligation must also be in respect of a
sum of money. The Madras High Court has interpreted the term ‘obligation’ as
including the obligation to repay the money received. However, the definition
refers to a ‘similar’ right or obligation. Therefore, any and every obligation
in respect of money does not get covered unless it is similar to the borrowing
of money or incurring of debt. For instance, preference share capital cannot be
considered as a ‘similar obligation’. 

 

Reference can also be made to CBDT’s Instruction O.P. No.
275/9/80-IT(B) dt. 25-1-1981 which dealt with the issue of applicability of
s/s. 94A to the hire purchase instalment paid by a hirer to the owner under a
hire purchase contract. The relevant portion of the circular is reproduced
below:

 

4. It has to be considered whether the payment of any instalment or
instalments under a hire purchase agreement can be said to be by way of
interest in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. In this context,
it has to be borne in mind that a hire purchase agreement is a composite
transaction made up of two elements bailment and sale. In such an agreement,
the hirer may not be bound to purchase the thing hired. It is a contract
whereby the owner delivers goods to another person upon terms on which the
hirer is to hire them at a fixed periodical rental. The hirer has also the
option purchasing the goods by paying the total amount of the agreed hire at
any time or of returning before the total amount is paid. What is involved in
the present reference is the real nature of the fixed periodical rental payable
under a hire purchase agreement.

 

5. It may be pointed out that part of the amount
of the hire purchase price is towards the hire and part towards the payment of
price. The agreed amount payable by the hirer in periodical instalments cannot
be characterised as interest payable in any manner within the meaning of
section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act. It is in the nature of a fixed periodical
rental under which the hire purchase takes place.

 

6. It is true that the definition of the hire
purchase price in section 2(d) of the Hire Purchase Act, 1972, also refers to
any sum payable by the hirer under the hire purchase agreement by way of
deposit or other initial payment or credit or amounts to be credited to him
under such agreement on account of any such deposit or payment. But such
deposit or payment is not in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred
within the meaning of section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act.

 

7. In view of the above, it would appear that the
provisions of section 194A will not be attracted in the case of payment of
periodical instalments under a hire purchase agreement
.

 

Thus, deposit not in the nature of
money borrowed or debt incurred has been considered to be not relevant for the
purpose of interpreting the definition of the term ‘interest’. It strengthens
the view that “deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation” in
parenthesis should also have the element of borrowing of money or incurring of
debt. Similarly, in the case of bill discounting and factoring, where the bill
or debt is assigned to the bank/financial entity, various High Courts have
taken the view that the discount or factoring charges in such cases does not
amount to interest, given that such transactions amount to assignment of the
bill or debt, and discounting or factoring charges paid were not in respect of
any debt incurred or money borrowed. Reference may be made to the following
cases:



CIT vs. MKJ Enterprises Ltd 228 Taxman 61
(Cal)(Mag)

Principal CIT vs. M Sons Gems N Jewellery (P.)
Ltd 69 taxmann.com 373 (Del)

CIT vs. Cargill Global Trading (P) Ltd 335 ITR 94
(Del) – affirmed by the Supreme Court in 21 taxmann.com 496

 

Attention is also invited to the decision of the Allahabad High Court
in the case of CIT vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 211 Taxman 369. The
High Court was dealing with the applicability of section 194A on delayed
payment of compensation for accident under the Motor Vehicle  Act.
The relevant observations of the Court are
reproduced here:

37. The necessary ingredients of such interest are
that it should be in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred. The award
under the Motor Vehicle Act is neither the money borrowed by the insurance
company nor the debt incurred upon the insurance company. As far as the word
“claim” is concerned, it should also be regarding a deposit or other
similar right or obligation. The definition of Section 2(28A) of the Income Tax
Act again repeats the words “monies borrowed or debt incurred” which
clearly shows the intention of the legislature is that if the assessee has
received any interest in respect of monies borrowed or debt incurred including
a deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation, or any service fee or
other charge in respect of monies borrowed or debt incurred has been received
then certainly it shall come within the definition of interest.

 

38. The word “claim” used in the
definition may relate to claims under contractual liability but certainly do
not cover the claims under the statutory liability. The claim under the Motor
Vehicle Act regarding compensation for death or injury is a statutory
liability.

 

In the case of West Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corpn.
Ltd. 96 taxmann.com 610
, the Calcutta High Court was dealing with
altogether different facts as compared to Viswapriya’s case. The High
Court rightly held that the rights and obligation referred in the definition
should be arising either from borrowing of money or incurring of debt.
Therefore, the interest payable on account of failure to deliver a particular
asset on the scheduled date as per the agreed terms does not fall within the
definition of the term ‘interest’ under the Act. Though such compensatory
payment could have been regarded as interest as per the principles laid down in
the case of CIT vs. Sham Lal Nerula and Westminster Bank Ltd. vs. Riches,
the statutory definition does not recognise it as interest in the absence of
any borrowing of money, incurring of (monetary) debt or other such similar
arrangements having monetary involvement in respect of which the payment has
been made. Perhaps for similar reasons, the interest payable under the Real
Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 on account of the failure of the
promoter as envisaged in Section 18 of that Act may also not be regarded as
interest for the purpose of the Act.

 

This
analysis is restricted to the interpretation of the term ‘interest’ mainly from
the point of view of applicability of section 194A.